Honor, Courage, Commitment: Understanding Sexual Assault in the United States Navy

Caitlin Veronica Muldoon

Old Dominion University

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HONOR, COURAGE, COMMITMENT:
UNDERSTANDING SEXUAL ASSAULT IN THE
UNITED STATES NAVY

by

Caitlin Veronica Muldoon
B.A. May 2008, Salisbury University
M.A. May 2009, University of Toledo

A Dissertation Submitted to the Faculty of
Old Dominion University in Partial Fulfillment of the
Requirements for the Degree of
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Approved by:

Elizabeth Monk-Turner (Director)
Scott Maggard (Member)
Harry Kantrovich (Member)
Recently, sexual assault within the military community has been drawing the attention of the media, military leaders, politicians and every day citizens. Criminologists however have traditionally not addressed this crime, and have specifically not addressed sexual assault within the US Navy. This dissertation seeks to address the current gap in literature by examining the sociocultural workplace climate of the US military and its possible contribution to the occurrence of sexual assaults. Utilizing original data obtained by NCIS, regression models were ran to evaluate sexual assault victim and offender demographics. The surprising findings were then discussed within the context of possible policy implications.
This dissertation is dedicated to all who have served this nation, but in particular, those brave women who fought for their right to fight for this country; to those who went where they were told they didn’t belong and did things they were told they could never do. And to those victims of military sexual assault, may this work bring you some peace of mind in knowing that people are listening to your voices and care about the change that desperately needs to take place.
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

There are many individuals who have contributed substantially to the successful completion of this dissertation. First, to my committee, without whom, this never would have been possible. Dr. Monk-Turner, your willingness to take on an unconventional criminology dissertation topic was invaluable, as was your enthusiasm, extreme patience and understanding of my process. Thank you for seeing my vision from the very beginning and helping me work my way through it. Dr. Scott Maggard, thank you so much for your continued attention and help in understanding and navigating a somewhat tricky, and at times, frustrating dataset. Dr. Harry Kantrovich, your insight about the Naval community and connections within it were invaluable. Thank you for helping me shape this project, putting me in touch with those who could give me accurate information, and reassuring me that I was on the right path. To Dr. Garland White, who from the very beginning of my time at ODU, got me excited about “communities” and assured me that my ideas of applying criminological literature to the military community were not crazy, and that my outside the box ideas were fascinating and I should run with them. To Dan Poche, of the Naval Criminal Investigative Service, who put many many hours and weeks and months into the collection and assembly of the data used in this dissertation; you went above and beyond, and without you, this truly would not have been possible.

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keeps me on my toes and provides perspective and insight. To my uncle John who opened doors and got this project really rolling. Without you, this truly would not have been possible. To my friends who have supported me over the years, I appreciate you more than you know. Lastly, to my fiancé, Andrew, you came in late to this game, but have proven to be the backbone of this team. Thank you for always listening to me, preventing major meltdowns, cheering me on, calming my anxieties, supporting me, letting me work, and occasionally delivering a glass of wine to my desk when I needed it. Your timing, as always, was impeccable. This dissertation may have started without you, but it is being finished largely in part because of you.
NOMENCLATURE

DOD-Department of Defense
DoN- Department of the Navy
OIF-Operation Iraqi Freedom
OEF-Operation Enduring Freedom
SAPRO-Sexual Assault and Prevention Office
US-United States
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CHAPTER 1
FORWARD

It is the intention of the project to be read by both criminologists and military personnel alike. And while my criminologist colleagues may understand my motivations, those members of the military not familiar with academia may not. That being said, I would like my intentions to be absolutely clear. Over the years my interest in crime within the military community has arisen not out of spite or negativity, but out of a genuine patriotic sentiment towards those who serve this nation. It is my sincere belief that the American military is essential to the survival of our nation and that the strength of that military comes from being able to be as efficient as possible. Crime and deviancy within the military community is a problem and it is one that is drawing resources away from the members of the military who are upstanding and patriotic individuals.

In the last few years our government has allocated millions and millions of dollars to help solve many of the problems our military community is currently experiencing. Millions are being spent on understanding substance abuse, violent acts (shootings), gangs, fraud (both benefits and contracts), and sexual assault and general violence against women. At the same time, every year of late, our government has made the conscious decision to cut pay, benefits, supply budgets, leave time, and even 4th of July firework displays on bases, while at the same time demanding continued excellence, and at times even an impossible level of performance, from the greatest military force on earth.

I am not so naive as to interpret budgets so simply as to state that solving the crime/deviance problem within the military would place more money in the pockets of the hardworking military member, but I am willing to state that contributing to the understanding of
crime and deviance within the military improves the efficiency of that military and contributes to a return in focus to national security and away from scandals. If we as a nation can understand how these problems are happening within the military, perhaps we are then closer to more efficient solutions that can be put in place. Even if it only helps a small amount, social science has a very solid role in the military community and needs to be continued in order to help the military be as strong as it can be.

The crimes and deviant behavior discussed and analyzed within this dissertation are representative of a small percentage of the military community as a whole. This is not in any way an attempt to portray those that sacrifice more than their share to defend this country as criminals or deviants or as anything less than the upstanding Americans that they are.
CHAPTER 2
INTRODUCTION

While the US military is predominantly made up of good, upstanding, hard-working Americans who simply want to serve their country and their communities, and provide for their families, there exists a few bad apples. Often times, crime and the US military are two topics that are never put together. As civilians, we like to consider our military men and women the best of the best our nation has to offer; those who wear the white hats while being the defenders of freedom and democracy. But the military community, just like any community, experiences crime, deviance, and disorder. Not convinced? Turn on any major news network and give it a little bit of time; eventually a story will be presented concerning military fraud, gangs, violent crime, substance abuse, or crimes involving violence against women and children. All of these topics are of themselves fascinating, but the current needs of the military dictate that the issue of violence against women within its ranks be addressed and understood as soon as possible.

In early 2013, President Barak Obama, acting as commander in chief of all US Military branches hold a press conference in which he stated that he had ordered Defense Secretary Chuck Hagle to, “step up our game exponentially” to stop sexual assaults in the military (Steinhaur 2013). He made it very clear that the situation was unacceptable and that there would be accountability going forward for failures to adequately address the sex assault situation by the military leaders tasked with oversight. Why did the Commander and Chief of the United States Armed Forces have to make this decree via a very public press conference? Because the Armed Forces of the United States of America has a sexual assault problem; one that is so large that it is
now making a regular appearance on the nightly news, and is indirectly impacting the efficiency of the military as a whole.

Again, these facts are shocking because the members of the military are seen by civilian society as being held to a higher level of conduct, the “white hat” wearers. But this shouldn’t be shocking to criminologists, especially when we take into account Emile Durkheim’s (1938) perspective that crime is a natural occurrence within any society and Janowitz (1960) who says that historically, the military is a reflection of the civilian society it is drawn from and serves. What is shocking to this criminologist, is that the military community, which clearly has a crime problem, has received nearly no consideration from this field. If we as a field can’t get excited about this topic for purely academic reasons, then perhaps the financial bottom line will grab the attention of criminologists; after all, our research historically is directed to where the money is.

In the year, 2012, the United States government allocated over $700 billion of a total $3.729 trillion budget for its Department of Defense (DoD) budget. It is a bigger number than most Americans can even conceptualize. Many would even have to stop and think about how many “billions” go into one trillion. Of that $700 billion, $154.2 billion is requested for the subcategory “military personnel,” but this does not represent the actual amount being spent of the military community. For a more accurate picture, and one that is decidedly more shocking in its scale, examining the budget requests from the individual branches themselves might be better:

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<tr>
<td>NAVY</td>
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<td>$170.6 billion</td>
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Clearly, that $154.2 billion “military personnel” request does not demonstrate the total amount being spent on America’s military. It is in fact, much more. To put it in perspective for criminologists, in that same year, 2012, the United States allocated $28.2 billion to the
Department of Justice (U.S. Office of Management and Budget 2012). Since criminological research is largely driven by the allocation of grants for specific topics (i.e. drugs, gangs, juvenile delinquency, corrections, policing) a community such as the military community, commanding a budget this large, and clearly experiencing crime problems, should be grabbing the attention of criminologists everywhere.

The point of discussing the amount of money being spent on the military is not to stir up a discussion concerning the ever-present question of how the nation should be spending its money, or which cause is more worthy of a higher budget. An entire library’s shelves worth of writings could be created around that discussion, and is perhaps best left to the economists to sort out. The purpose of this discussion and bringing in the total military spending figures is to make the following argument: If the nation is willing to spend that much of tax payers’ money on the military, then the government needs to have a full and complete understanding of the community that it is spending that large amount of money on. This understanding does not simply include the ins-and-outs of waging and winning a war, but rather, for reasons to be discussed shortly, also includes, and would be grossly incomplete without, the sociological functioning of the group, deviant and criminal behaviors that do occur within it, and more pertinent to this discussion, violence against women in the form of sexual assault.

In case the aforementioned figures don’t generate interest and motivation on the part of the military to adequately address its sexual assault problem, and criminologists to get involved with the understanding of that problem, there is one last figure worth mentioning; according to Faley et al. (1999), the total cost of sexual assaults for the US Army in 1988, over 20 years ago, was $250,000,000. According to a Service Women’s Action Network’s Quick Facts report on sexual assault in the military from 2012, in the year 2011 alone the military spent $10,880
treated each individual victim of military sexual trauma. That individual level cost, when multiplied by the number of military victims (that is, ignoring costs associated with treating civilians victimized by military personnel) leads to a grand total of $872,000,000 spent for 2011 treating military victims of sex assault. It is also worth noting that in OIF/OEF, and in engagements in both Iraq and Afghanistan, multiple reports have surfaced of troops being ill-equipped with bottom dollar, sub-par weapons and equipment produced by the most inexpensive defense contractor company possible. If the military can’t get interested in this topic for purely altruistic reasons, perhaps they can see the logic in addressing it so that resources can be allocated to adequately outfitting those who are willing to risk their lives to defend this nation and her interests abroad. As demonstrated, the numbers speak for themselves.

Violence against women within the military community is becoming more and more of a concern of late. Over the last couple decades, the nightly news has been littered with stories of sexual assault and intimate partner violence; The Navy’s Tailhook scandal, the Air Force Academy’s sexual assaults, the Army’s Fort Leonard Wood and Aberdeen Proving Ground incidents and the Army wife murders at Fort Bragg, and more recently, the Naval Academy’s sexual assault scandal. These cases all have in common two things; female victims, and male perpetrators. The point of interest however is that while the victims are female, they are comprised of both military and civilian individuals. The male perpetrators however, are exclusively military.

Despite the millions of dollars being poured into developing programs and training designed to prevent these types of crimes, something about the military community is fostering an environment that is conducive to the continuation of violence against women. The argument will be made in this dissertation that it is a pervasive hegemonic masculine conscious,
manifested and fostered via the camaraderie and brotherhood that is the foundation of the social culture of the US military, which is directly linked to the instances of sexual assault that the military is currently experiencing.

This study addresses violence against women via sexual assault within the military context, specifically within the US Navy community located in the Hampton Roads of Virginia area. It will first describe the current military culture in a sort of sociocultural approach that will act as a loose theoretical framework for how these crimes are occurring and why. As will be demonstrated, under this masculine hegemonic conscious women fall into a lower social class regardless of their official roles as soldier, sailor, wife, or mother and men become socialized to accept sexual violence. Second, all available relevant sexual assault literature will be discussed in order to better understand the military sexual assault problem. The sociocultural understanding of the military community and the sexual assault literature will then be discussed loosely within the frame of Cohen and Felson’s (1979) routine activities theory. Hypotheses concerning victim and offender characteristics will be developed based on this understanding of both military culture and established literature. Data from Naval Criminal Investigative Service concerning rapes, sexual/indecent assaults, simple assaults and domestic assaults will be analyzed in conjunction with the Department of the Navy’s Sexual Assault and Prevention Office in order to understand how extensive the problem is, and what specific victim and offender demographics are connected to these crimes. Lastly, findings will be reported and discussed in conjunction with possible suggestions for policy change and strategies for addressing these crimes going forward.

It is the purpose of this project to contribute to the exploration of a somewhat misunderstood problem. To date, multiple agencies/sources have attempted to measure sexual assaults within the military only to have conflicting definitions of the crime as well as
measurements of it. Many of the official agencies responding to this crime are taking a triage approach and working simply with individual cases and crimes in more of an individual level, trial-and-error, “let’s just see what works” strategy. As of yet, an aggregate, sociocultural focused approach from a criminologist has yet to be seen. This project stands as an attempt to involve criminology in the military sexual assault discussion, and also to aid in the further exploration and understanding of it. Findings from this study could perhaps aid the military community in allocating its resources in a more efficient manner.
While most people can immediately call to mind an image to define the word, “military,” in the interest of science, it is necessary to have a working definition in order to have a meaningful and scientific discussion of sexual assaults within the military community going forward. Further, a full understanding of the target subject, the military, is necessary in order even begin to understand crime, and specifically, sexual assaults, within it as a community.

Siebold (2001:140) defines the military as,

a formally organized entity or set of entities responsive to the government leaders heading a nation state (or equivalent government) and whose functions concern the use of arms to defend that nation state or to further its policies in its relations with other nation states or large collective entities.

Siebold (2001) goes on to include in this list all the branches of the military including the Coast Guard, as well as Reservist and National Guard components, international coalitions, and NATO. As many of our armed forces are working jointly in some sort of international effort whilst deployed, it is safe to assume then that for the purpose of study, all US military worldwide fall under the definition of U.S. military.

Aside from a working definition, a full understanding of the United States Military also rests heavily on an understanding of structure and organization. For this, a working paradigm is essential. Dunivin (1994) says that the dominating paradigm in the US military is combat masculine-warrior (CMW) paradigm. The first part refers to the fact that the sole purpose of the military is to engage in, and win, any and all combat situation it is presented with. All structure, organization and cultural sentiments are centered on this one primary goal. The second part of
the paradigm is the masculine-warrior component. The military is, strictly speaking in a numbers sense, primarily dominated by men, and the act of waging war is often interpreted to be masculine. As such, the culture of this combat structured community is dominated by a masculine norms, values, and lifestyles.

Keeping with the first part of Dunivin’s (1994) paradigm for understanding the US military, the structure and organization of the US military makes complete sense. Individuals within the US military are given a rank (rate in the Navy). This rank allows for quick combat decisions to be made because without knowing anything about another individual, based simply on rank, the decisions of who will lead and who will follow have already been made. No time is wasted debating the merits of individuals; the higher rank makes the call, and the lower rank falls in line. This lead/follow hierarchy permeates all aspects of military life both officially (on the job) and socially (at home and with friends).

These ranks are essentially broken up into three broad categories; enlisted, non-commissioned officer, and officer. Both enlisted and non-commissioned officers are considered enlisted personnel and represented by “E” and a number dictating their rank within that category. Officers are designated “O” and a number in exactly the same fashion. These “E-#” and “O-#” designations are how the government sets regulations for its personnel; everything from pay-scales to privileges is done by these “E” and “O” rank indicators. In fact, these “E” and “O” rank indicators are simply referred to as pay scales.

According to Schading, Shading and Slayton (2007) Enlisted (E) personnel make up the majority of the military, are generally younger, may have some college credits or perhaps even two-year associates degrees, and are perhaps looking for advanced technical training of some sort. Shading et al. (2007) say specifically that E-1 to E-4 (E-3 in the Navy and Marines)
personnel are often times just leaving home for the first time and are simply looking for travel or an adventure, or a life starting option other than traditional four-year college/university options. The next group, E-5 to E-9 (E-4 in Navy and Marines) represent the non-commissioned officers (NCOs) and they are responsible for, “direct tactical leadership in combat units, technical skills, and direction in support commands” (Shading et al. 2007:6). NCOs are typically older than the E-1 to E-3/4 group because they have served longer. They are also more educated; all must have graduated from high school or have a GED equivalent, and most have two year degrees or other advanced training/certifications from the branch they serve in. Some have four-year college degrees, but it is rare and often times this is seen in the Special Warfare and Special Forces communities for reasons not relevant to this discussion.

Commissioned officers (O) are different than enlisted personnel for a few reasons. They carry more responsibility than any enlisted individual. With advancement up the officer ranks comes more and more responsibility. Their commission according to Schading et al. (2007) as an officer is given directly by the President of the United States and their rank and advancement is confirmed by the US Senate. All officers must have a four-year degree from an accredited college or university and may be commissioned in one of three ways; they went to one of the service academies, they were in their school’s ROTC program, or they attended officer candidate school after graduation.

In terms of demographics, the branches are relatively similar. The Army for instance is comprised of 561,437 total active personnel; 97,551 of which are officers (of those 15,760 are female and 26,895 identify as a racial minority) and 463,886 are enlisted (of which, 60,255 are female and 145,628 identify as a racial minority) (Department of Defense 2011). The Navy however is comprised of 320,141 total active personnel; 53,209 of which are officers (of those,
8,520 are female and 10,288 identify as a racial minority) and 266,932 are enlisted (of those 43,896 are female and 112,895 identify as a racial minority) (Department of Defense 2011).

More detailed demographics of the Navy are interesting and relevant to an understanding of crime within it, specifically, these demographics help to understand the environment in which violence against women is occurring. As mentioned, there are a total of 320,141 active duty Naval personnel. Roughly 9% (or 29,433) have a four-year college degree, 65% (207,566) are under the age of 30, 54% (171,331) are married, and 41% (132,714) have children. Of those Navy personnel with children, 52% of men were under the age of 25 when they had their first child, and 70% of women were under the age of 25 when they had their first child (Department of Defense 2011).

The Navy’s two largest base areas globally are San Diego, California and the Hampton Roads area of Virginia. As such, it could be reasonable to expect similar demographic displays in these two areas as we would see for the Navy at large due to the large concentration of Naval personnel in these areas. The Navy in the Hampton Roads area of Virginia is spread out over multiple bases stretching through parts of Norfolk and Virginia Beach; Naval Station Norfolk, Naval Shipyard Norfolk, Little Creek, Oceana Air Base, Dam Neck, and Naval Medical Center Portsmouth among others. For these bases and surrounding areas, it would be reasonable to expect to find a similar low percentage of individual with degrees, and disproportionately high numbers of individuals that are young, male, married, and have children (that they had when they were also relatively young) that is observed in the entire Navy.
Demographics

Bryant (1979) in his book *Khaki Collar Crime* presents both a typology of crime within the military as well as his list of seven facilitators, or conditions specific to the military community and allow for crime to happen within it. A few of these facilitators are relevant to the discussion on sexual assaults. He says that the first facilitator of crime in the military is the population demographics of the military itself. Compared to the rest of American society, the military is disproportionally comprised of younger, predominantly male, lower-educated individuals who are also at the lower end of the income spectrum (See also for example Graves and Graves and Moriarty 2000; Marshall and McShane 2000; Mercier 2000). According to the above numbers presented by the Department of Defense itself, Bryant and many military sociologist/criminologists are correct about the age, gender, and education demographics of the US military.

The connection between crime and lower-incomes within the military is relevant. According to the Department of Defense (2011) enlisted personnel in the pay grades of E-1 to E-4 were set to earn $18,000 and $26,000 for the 2012 fiscal year. While the military may provide a steady paycheck, Mercer (2000:5) says, “37 percent, of the lowest pay grades of E-1 to E-4 are composed of soldiers 30-years old and younger who are married.” The DoD (2011) also states that military spouses under the age of 30 make up 29.2% of all military spouses. Further adding to the financial burden placed on military members within this range of pay grades are two key facts; one, 39% of military spouses are classified as “not in labor force [i.e. not looking]” (The DoD reports that this number jumps to 45% when a spousal self-report measure is used.) and two, 44.2% of service members within the E-1 to E-4 range have dependents (children) under the age of 18.
The connection that these demographic categories have to crime has been long documented by criminologists. It is widely accepted that younger individuals commit more crimes (see for example Hirschi and Gottfredson 1983; Farrington 1986; Rowe and Tittle 1977; Hindelang 1981) and therefore, having disproportionately high level of younger individuals in a group would facilitate crime. The connection between crime and age within a military setting has long been cited as a facilitator of crime (see for example Caliber Associates 1996; Graves and Moriarty 2000; Marshall and McShane 2000; Mercer 2000). The relationship between gender and crime has also long been documented by criminologists with the understanding being that males commit more crimes than females, or as Lauritson et al. (2009:362) called it, “one of the few undisputed ‘facts’ of criminology.” Naturally then, the relationship between gender and crime within a military setting has also been pointed to as a facilitator. (see for example Caliber Associates 1996; Graves and Moriarty 2000; Marshall and McShane 2000; Mercer 2000). This gender-crime connection is relevant to a discussion of the issue of sexual assault within the military community as well and will be further expanded on within this chapter and the proceeding chapters.

Criminologists have addressed the education and crime connection and generally agree that higher education is tied to lower crime rates. While education level and crime within a military setting isn’t as well developed as the age/crime and gender/crime relationships, it has still received some attention and, along with gender and age is cited widely cited as a facilitator of crime within the military. Steveson (1990) in a study concerning the officer-enlisted distinction and organizational reactions to deviance over time found that the drastically increased amount of troops with degrees during Vietnam was directly tied to the amount of bad paper discharges (BPD…aka dishonorable discharge). This further proves that the role of the
education/crime connection within the military is of particular importance because of the social structure implications that education carries with it within the military that are not the same as civilian society.

Motivation for Joining

Understanding the motivations of the participants within a group may lay the foundation for understanding motivations to commit crimes or engage in deviant behavior. And while criminologists have traditionally ignored crime within the military, sociologists have been attempting to understand the military and deviant behavior within it for the last fifty plus years. Ignoring the sociological “mapping” of the military that has occurred previously in any of criminology’s future attempts at understanding crime and deviance within the military would be an irresponsible ignoring of the science that has already been developed. In order for criminology to move forward into the uncharted territory that is crimes within the military, we must first acknowledge the established sociological understandings of the military to date.

As a means of understanding the behaviors of an individual within a group, motivations for joining the group is a logical starting place. Criminologists have used motive for joining as a starting place for understanding gangs and prisons. A number of sociologists have attempted to establish a basic theoretical understanding of why individuals decide to participate in the military, and have arrived at a basic joining-motive question, is the military occupational or institutional? (see for example Janowitz 1971, 1977; Moskos, 1973, 1977, 1986, 1988; Moskos and Wood, 1988; Shields, 1993, Sorensen, 1994.) Generally speaking, an institutional military would be one in which the participants are drawn together because of a unifying ethos of patriotism and/or service to one’s nation. An occupational military by contrast would be one
where the participants are driven by an economic or career incentive/goal. A dominating
sentiment in this regard going forward from WWII is that, “military service is changing from a
calling or vocation, legitimized by institutional values, to an occupation, legitimized by the labor
market” (Moskos 1977; Segal & Segal 1983:161).

Both of these classifications could be the basis for understanding the individual’s mindset
when deciding to engage in criminal/deviant behavior. An individual who views the military as
an occupational community is strongly motivated by money or career prestige. Under this model,
such problem behaviors, or what Bryant (1979) would classify as Intra-occupational crimes
against property, such as misuse of funds or government property could be expected. Individuals
in a position of managing budgets, ordering materials, or those who find themselves being loaned
cars or jets because of their rank/job could fraudulently take advantage of their position. They
could also be susceptible to bribing or payoffs. By contrast, under an institutional model,
individuals are motivated by a unifying patriotic sentiment or call to service of one’s nation.
Potential dalliances into criminal or deviant behavior by the individual who sees the military in
this sense could include hazing, cover-ups (of failures or damaging information), or failure to
speak up in situations that would demand it for fear of damaging reputation of the military or its
ability to act effectively; essentially, all crimes/deviant behavior examples that are enacted in
attempts to maintain cultural/group standards/safety/security.

Organizational Structure

Organizational structure is a second sociological approach to understanding the behaviors
of the individuals within a group. One such approach relevant to a criminological study on the
military involve the Durkheim (1949) concept of rationalization of the societies. Segal and Segal
(1983) argue that Durkheim’s idea on goals evolving from collective-based to individual-based as the society goes from simple (pre-industrial) to complex (post-industrial) is applicable to military sociology in that the effectiveness of military groups is increased when the goals are more collective and less individualistic, as is the case with smaller military units. As we go away from these small military groups, into the much larger, much more formal “big” military, the goals switch from that of the group to that of the individual. Criminologists could expand on this as a means of understanding motivations and possibly theorizing crimes in this setting. Crimes within the more formal military would be more of the individual-goal type and would include abuses of power/position (i.e. sexual harassment, bribery, insider trading, etc.) and misuses of government property. We would expect to see more group-goal type crimes within small groups similar to what we would see with street and/or juvenile gangs (i.e. hazing, individual level violence between members on the unit, substance abuse related to performance stressors, etc.) As with the institutional model mentioned above, crimes/deviance directed towards maintaining the norms of the group (hazing, failure to report crimes, etc.) would happen at the smaller group/unit level.

Military Socialization

An individual might be able to trace a history of military service back for generations, and that individual might possess all the patriotic sentiment possible, but members of the US military are not born, they are made. It starts with a decision to join, but the process of “making” a soldier/Sailor/Marine is one of socialization, that is, the process by which an individual makes the transition from civilian to military. Bryant (1979:55) states that, “the socialization process must be extraordinarily intense, totally comprehensive, and effectively convert the civilian into a
noncivilian in terms of values, beliefs, and perspectives, as well as behavior.” Vest (2013:603) in a study of Army National Guardsmen highlighted these differences saying that, “civilian society values atomization, pursuit of comfort, freedom of choice, equality, and readiness for discussion and compromise, military culture emphasizes the contradictory values of unity, endurance, obedience, hierarchy, and readiness for violence.” Because life within the service is so different than civilian life, there exists, a necessity to unify all incoming members of the military under a common sentiment. This sentiment is the result of many individual acts of socialization including basic training and hazing.

It is the most basic function of basic training to instill in future service members the necessary skills to survive, and be successful in, combat situations. This training process has a latent effect however, the bonding of future military personnel through a shared unpleasant experience. The effect of this unpleasant training experience and the bond to the group that it facilitates is addressed by Lyon (1969:223) who interprets the process in the following way; “In order to justify to himself the severe initiation of recruit training, the Marine recruit has to assign high value to the group joined (or devalue the harshness of training.)” As today’s military force is entirely volunteer, the harshness of the training process is justified in the mind of the individual by the high value/prestige he places on membership within the group. There is a willingness to override any opposition thinking within one’s own mind, and accept the negative and counterintuitive situation before them, in order to become part of the group they have placed value upon.

The unpleasantness of basic training is not arbitrary bullying, it is completely deliberate and serves a purpose. Military sociologists have long pointed to it as the quickest and more efficient way to bond together members of the military at both, what Siebold (2007) calls the
primary (peer and leader bonding) level and secondary (organizational and institutional) level. In fact, military sociologists agree on the necessity of this experience as being personally degrading and acting as a sort of shock treatment or a personal crisis in order to solidify the bonds of the group (see for example Brotz and Wilson 1946; Bryant 1979; Janis 1945; Stouffer 1949; Zurcher 1967). The bonds that are forged in basic training are reinforced within combat units as the soldier/Sailor/Marine continues throughout their military career. According to Siebold (2007:287) however, the simplified primary and secondary level bonding is actually a more complex model of military group cohesion consisting of four parts; peer bonding (horizontal), leader (vertical), organizational, and institutional. While the peer to peer bond and the peer to leader bond may be a bit self-explanatory, he explains that the individual service person also has a bond to their next higher organization, what he appropriately calls organizational bonding (i.e. squadron and air wing) and to their individual branch, institutional bonding, (i.e. Navy, Army, etc.).

All of these various bonds that have been described operate simultaneously throughout the service member’s career and the group cohesion model is itself useful for understanding how crime/deviancy occur within the military. Many of the socialization processes that the military sociologists have identified have a hazing feel to them as criminologists would interpret it. Hazing and the role that it plays in the military is vital to the bonds mentioned above, but also acts as a starting point for understanding how crime/deviance is allowed to occur and go unanswered within the military. Dornbush (1955) and Park and Burgess (1921:735) address the role of hazing at military academies by referring to the socialization process (or as he calls it, assimilation) by saying that, “assimilation is a process in which persons and groups acquire the sentiment, memories, and attitudes of other persons/groups and by sharing their experience and
history, are incorporated with them in common cultural life.” This could not be truer of the military. Essentially, the shared unpleasant history/experiences of the group leads to a future commitment to the shared culture and history of the group which leads to a dedication on the part of the group to a replication of those unpleasant experiences for a new people trying to join the group.

This mapping of the group cohesion and an understanding of the bonds and the role that socialization/assimilation and hazing play in forging them, allows for the military criminologist to begin to understand how crimes/deviancy can be allowed to occur. Specifically, it paints the picture of how violence against women is allowed to occur within this community. Women trying to join the military may not be a new concept, and women being married to, and subsequently abused by, their service member husbands is definitely not a new concept, something about how these bonds within the military community are playing out is leading to an acceptance of sexual assault and spousal abuse. Simply put, the need to preserve tradition and group cohesion is being placed first on the list of behavior dictates and leads to an acceptance of these crimes on the part of the individual even when “big” military, the civilian world, and the individual’s own conscience is condemning them loudly.

_Military Workplace Culture_

The military workplace culture takes over after the various socialization processes are complete and provides the daily maintenance that is necessary to solidify the values and traditions that were instilled. Military workplace culture is ever present and is a daily reminder of why the individual does what they do, how they should go about doing it, and that they are not alone, but rather part of a devoted _brotherhood_. According to Bryant (1979:49) workplace
culture is another of the seven facilitators of crime and, develops as a way of the individual coping with problems associated with working the job on a daily basis and, “it provides reasons and rationalizations for certain types of work-related behaviors as well as clarifying, obscuring, or modifying their perspective of social control and sanctions.”

Much of this workplace culture centers on the profession of arms paradigm. The profession of arms in the United States is unique to any other profession in this country in that it, according to Huntington (1957), encompasses the following components not found in this specific combination in any other job; service to the state, deep loyalty, and expertise in the application and management of violence. The profession also carries with it a deep set feeling of independence from the civilian society it is sworn to serve;

Military professionals, Huntington observed, tended to view war as inherent in human nature and, therefore, favored the maintenance of a strong, diverse, and ready military force. Justifying war as an instrument of politics, they often perceived international law and organizations of little help to global peace and, given their specialized professional expertise, only hesitantly accepted civilian control over the armed forces. (Franke 2001:95; Huntington 1957)

Furthermore, those individuals who chose a career within the profession of arms possess different value systems than their civilian counterparts. In a study of value comparison between cadets in the US Military Academy at West Point and their civilian counterparts at Syracuse University, Franke (2001:113-4) found that the cadets, “tended to be more conservative, patriotic and warrioristic. . .and indicate that the next generation of military officers still adheres to traditional military values. . .By their freshman year, cadets already differed significantly in their levels of conservatism, patriotism, warriorism and individualism.”
Military Workplace Cultural Model

The military culture has essentially split into two main parts that appear to be addressed only as one by most military sociologists; formal military workplace culture, FMWC (the culture that big military advocates), and informal social military workplace culture, IMWC (the culture that the individual members of the military advocate/participate in). Each of these two factions of military workplace culture split likewise into two parts; manifest cultural image and latent cultural image. The manifest cultural aspect of the FMWC would be the part that advocates a view that the military should be reflective of the society it serves and representative of its population. Dorn (1990:115) and Dunivin (1994:538) sum up this sentiment stating that, “there appears to be a consensus in the United States that the armed forces should be a reflection of the society,” essentially it should, “mirror society’s social demographic makeup (regional, economic, racial, ethnic and gender diversity) as well as its core values (e.g. equality and civil rights). . excluding whole groups of ‘others’ (e.g women) from combat diminishes the pool of talent available for our nation’s defense.” This manifest culture of the FMWC is enforced via the passage of equality legislation within the military, the construction of equal representation recruitment ads, and the publicly projected stance of intolerance of all things counter to this equality sentiment (i.e. the Obama press conference on sexual assaults last year). The latent culture of the FMWC however is still very much alive and well, via the dominant combat warrior paradigm, and it effectively counters the manifest culture. This is achieved, according to Dunivin (1994:537) by individual branch slogans (i.e. the Marine’s “Every Man a Rifleman” slogan), inscriptions on buildings at the service academies (i.e. the Airforce Academy “Bring Me Men”), or even more disturbingly, the rampant hushed sexual assault cover-ups by individual commanding officers as depicted in the documentary The Invisible War.
The informal military workplace culture, IMWC, refers to the individual level culture. It is more present in the lives of the individual service personnel and has a larger impact on daily behavior than the FMWC. It too is split into manifest and latent cultures. The manifest IMWC refers to the more public everyday workplace cultural conditions that while not entirely public in the sense that the civilian world would know of them, are public in the sense that anyone within the military might be aware of them and could participate without restriction. Examples would include but are definitely not limited to displaying unit/squadron patches/colors/emblems/coins, unit BBQs/Picnics/deployment parties, charity/cause centered outings and specific unit/group facebook pages or other social media pages for the members of the group to post on. These all serve as outwardly unifying symbols of one’s belonging to the group and a reinforcement of the values of that group. All members of the group are invited to participate without hesitation or exclusion. It would be the equivalent of a civilian deciding to host a back yard BBQ for everyone at the office, or inviting the whole office to participate in a bowling league complete with matching T-Shirts; all are equally invited and benefit on both a group and individual level.
The latent cultural elements of the IMWC however, just as was seen with the latent cultural elements of the FMWC, take on a more negative theme. The latent cultural elements of the FMWC take on destructive, exclusive, closed-door, secretive feel but are still given full credibility and acceptance by the individual service members. These would include but again are definitely not limited to, gossip websites and deliberate scandals within the group, cliques, wives clubs, negative hazing and military group/job social media pages promoting inequality, anti-women sentiments and celebrating combat violence and enemy death. The ideas and sentiments expressed in these type of latent cultural elements may be unifying in nature, in that they contain ideas and sentiments that any member of the community can immediately recognize and identify with, there is an exclusive, bullying and potentially harassing theme to them. Civilians, and even former military not currently following military social media may not recognize the “humor” in the following two examples of latent cultural elements of the IMWC, but anyone affiliated with the military most likely will.
Figure 1.2-Airforce

Figure 1.3-Rack and Tap
Established Tradition and Masculine Hegemonic Conscience

Much of the unifying culture in the United States Military community revolves around the traditional masculine role. It is a somewhat logical situation; in the 230 plus years that the US military has been in existence, women were only allowed into its service academies in the early 1970’s and combat situations in the 1990’s. The ability to perform one’s job as a soldier/Sailor/Marine has always been linked to one’s masculinity and weeding out that mentality has proven difficult over time. Scarce (1997:47) states that, in the military, “men’s gender roles become more rigid and narrow, heavily scrutinized for any behavior that might seem the slightest bit feminine, and therefore, considered weak and unfit for military service.”

Taking into account then the fact that everything in the military from uniforms, to social engagements (i.e. balls), to combat accommodations, to daily language and terms is inherently male, the stalled attempts to integrate femininity should not be entirely shocking.

America in general, and American military specifically, has a long tradition of hegemonic masculinity. The term itself stems from Antonio Gramci’s ideas on how different class groups relate to each other, establish a hierarchy of power, and maintain one’s position within the group that dominates. Hegemonic masculinity then, according to, Barrett (1996:130) “refers to a particular idealized image of masculinity in relation to which images of femininity and other masculinities are marginalized and subordinated.” Currently in the Western world, hegemonic masculinity encompasses characteristics such as independence, risk-taking, aggression, heterosexuality, and rational decision making (Connell 1995). Men who possess these traits are regarded as strong or proper men, men who do not possess these traits but aspire to acquire them are seen as normal, men who neither possess, nor aspire to possess, these traits are regarded as
feminine; which for a man in Western culture, particularly in a Western world military culture, would be in insult.

These hegemonic masculine ideals dominate all aspects of life in America from work to home, advertising and entertainment, sports and especially, national defense. According to Arkin and Dobrofsky (1978:167), “the military has socialized millions of men according to some traditional blueprint... as such, the dominant adult male role [in America] could largely be the product of the military,” and vice versa due to the previously discussed military-as-a-reflection-of-the-society-it-serves connection. “Militaries around the world have defined the soldier as an embodiment of traditional male sex role behaviors. From recruiting posters that seek ‘a few good men’ to popular media images of John Wayne fearlessly leading the troops in a WWII battle, Tom Cruise as a ‘top gun’ pilot,” Will Smith as a Marine fighter pilot who saves the world from alien invasion in Independence Day, to Mark Wahlberg as Lone Survivor Marcus Luttrell, the cultural overlap between soldier/warrior and masculine American is overwhelming (Barrett 1996:129).

This role of masculinity within the military is so strong that it is often times the basis for controlling behaviors. When the Marine Corps decided to address spousal abuse, Lt. Gen. Jack W. Klimp, the Marine Corps' deputy commandant for manpower and reserve affairs had the following to say,

‘You're a Marine 24 hours a day. You're not just a Marine in the field. You're expected to conduct yourself like a Marine all the time.' Domestic violence is not Marine-like. It's not soldier-like. It's not Sailor-like. It's not airman-like. We need to ensure that every Marine, soldier, Sailor and airman in the Department of Defense understands that this is not part of being in the United States military. (Kozaryn 2000)
The implication here is that there is a gentlemanly element to the warrior paradigm, and that anything concerning violent or warrioristic behaviors towards innocents/civilians, which spouses and children would fall under, is un-gentlemanly, and in essence, not fit for duty in the military. The element of shaming is being used here to control the behaviors of the individual via the bonds they have with their peers, and the community’s unwavering commitment to all things manly.

This sentiment is reinforced every time a commander addresses a room of personnel he commands, “attention gentlemen!” “look alive gents!” and the tie between manliness and American gentlemanliness and military service is subconsciously reinforced. The expectation is that not only does the individual need to be manly in order to be effective in the military workplace, but they also need to possess elements of the traditional American concept of the sophisticated and chivalrous gentleman. This concept is inherently anti-female. Instead of condemning undesirable behavior (say rape for example) as simply inexcusable because no decent human being would engage in it, the approach is to label it unmanly and therefore unacceptable because it lowers the level of one’s manliness/readiness for war, not one’s humanity. Conversely, in the instances within the military where sexual assault occurs, it could be possible that the masculine cultural image has morphed into one that is accepting of violence against women.

Flawed as this approach may be, tying a military member’s manliness and ability to perform their duties to their behavior is an effective means of control. Why then, is it not working? A significant portion of this answer rests in the myth of the scorned gentleman soldier; the chivalrous warrior wronged by the woman he has entrusted with his heart, his children and his possessions while he is away defending freedom. Scholars have not really addressed this
myth and role that it plays within the military community with regard to fostering anti-female sentiment and contributing to an environment that could potentially allow for violence against women, but spend any bit of time within the military community, and it becomes very clear very quickly that this is a very dominant theme. It appears that at any point in time, any unit/group has at least one *brother* who is nursing a broken heart while another is navigating an ugly divorce. Stories of infidelity and frivolous spending of deployment pay by the spouse who is left back in the US run rampant, and any new military member will recall that one of the first pieces of advice they are given by colleagues who have been in longer is first, do not get married and second, never allow your spouse to sign a power of attorney.

The myth of the cold hearted military spouse who does a soldier wrong has become so strong that it actually has a term within the community, *dependapotamus*. Various military social media/blog spots have addressed this myth and this term and a few have even defined it. Probably the most offensive example of a definition comes from a March 2014 posting on www.oafnation.com which stated the following,

*Dependapotamus: (noun) A shallow, heartless land mammal; preys upon enlisted military males; its natural habitat: the bars and nightclubs near military bases; its diet: government benefits, vodka and Doritos; its preferred transportation is a convertible adorned with military support stickers; its predominant predatory tactic is pre-emptive pregnancy and possessing your 1stSgt’s digits on speed dial.*

Roughly translated, we can ascertain that a dependapotamus is a woman who has intentionally gotten involved with a military member for the purposes of gaining access to his pay/benefits/military housing so that she might not have to work or support herself. Further, the myth holds that she accomplishes this by either purposely getting pregnant and forcing a marriage (spousal benefits) or by threatening to file a complaint with the military member’s supervisor. This myth of the dependapotamus is not unique to this one social site. The definition
may vary slightly, from site to site, but the interpretation is the same (see for example; www.oafnation.com, 2014; www.urbandictionary.com, 2008; terminallance.com, 2010; nexgenmilspouse.com, 2013; laughterpiss.blogspot.com, 2012.)

Figure 1.4-Dependapotamus
While military sociologists and criminologists have not really addressed the gender myth-military sexual assault connection, many other scholars have developed the gender myth sub-discipline and their findings may be helpful for an understanding of how this plays out in the military community. Howard (1984:270) in her study on gender stereotypes and reactions to victims found that, “when women are victimized in a manner consistent with crime stereotypes,
or ‘normal’ crimes, they may be especially likely to incur blame and to be derogated in accord with gender stereotypes.” This finding is important and relevant to this discussion because it can be expanded to fit the military community’s problem with sexual assaults in that it acknowledges that the community’s beliefs towards both the crime and the victim are relevant in understanding whether or not the community will tolerate the crime. If there is a dominating way of thinking within a community that sees women as desperate, opportunistic, and disloyal individuals consistent with the dependapotamus myth, then sexual violence towards women shouldn’t be entirely surprising. In fact, later in this dissertation, regression models will be conducted in order to test the strength of the relationship between sexual assault victimization and gender with the assumption being that females will be more likely to be victims of sexual assault than males.
With all these well-established masculine themes and traditions within the military, it should come as no surprise that integrating women into the armed forces has been met with difficulties, to say the least. A huge part of the myth of the gentleman soldier is based on the concept that soldiering was exclusively a male enterprise; women simply did not belong. Initial arguments against integrating women into the services revolved around this extremely vague and underdeveloped argument. Put more specifically, “male bonding is the cornerstone of small unit cohesion, and that the presence of women undermines this bonding, thus decreasing cohesion, and ultimately, readiness” (Savage and Gabriel, 1976:349). The exclusion of women in the armed forces is not simply an American concept, it is global:

In some countries, women are excluded or have limited involvement, as in Germany, Italy and Spain. In others all or almost all military positions, (including
those with direct, offensive combat functions) are open to them, as in Canada, the Netherlands, Norway and more recently, the United States and the United Kingdom. Notable examples among non-NATO nations are Israel, which conscripts women but excludes them from combat operations, and Australia, which has recently opened fighter pilot positions and submarines to women. (Dandeker and Segal 1996:29-30)

Dandecker and Segal (1996; Segal 1995) suggest that the role that women play in the military is determined primarily by the following; various military variables (such as war/peace time, the combat to support ratio, and promotion policies), characteristics of the social structure (demographic patterns, women’s role in the labor force, economic conditions), and cultural conditions/social construction of gender roles within the society. This *women don’t belong* sentiment is echoed by Iskra (2007) who says that even in the national emergency situation that was World War II, women were allowed to work only the jobs that were considered socially acceptable; office clerks, typists, telephone operators, and nurses.

It appears however that this old school argument is on the outs for the most part. In her content analysis examining current sentiment of the Navy, Marine Corps and Coast Guard in regards to women at sea, Iskra (2007) encountered results that were counter to this old school mentality. While both pro and anti-female integration sentiments were expressed, the anti-group was in the minority. The anti-integration group’s argument revolved around those old stereotypes; “women are caregivers not warriors,” and “women make babies, not war.” The pro-integration folks however cited themes of American patriotism and equality as the basis of their arguments. These themes of patriotism and equality appear to also be the official sentiment of the Navy in regards to the role of women in their ranks as well. Scott Benning, program analyst at the Department of the Navy’s Sexual Assault Prevention and Response Office (DoN SAPRO) at the Pentagon stated that the issue of women in all areas of service is not a question of belonging; it is the question of having the best possible person for the job filling the role in order to achieve
the goal; discrimination on the basis of gender weakens the effort. Simply put, the overriding argument for the longest time against allowing women to serve appears to have been backed foremost by the social construction of gender roles. By the time women were allowed into combat situations, it was not the society catching up with the military, but rather, the military catching up with the conditions of American society.

Figure 1.7-Equality

If the integration of women into the armed forces is no longer an issue, and is accepted by the majority of service personnel, then how is it that the sexual assault problem is continuing on? There appears to be a collision of three community elements; the minority who believe women do not belong, the dominant hypermasculine culture, and the opportunity to act on these beliefs. The collision of these three parts will be discussed further in chapter 3, but the hyper masculine culture is a sociological concept that requires attention here. Military sociologists have suggested
that hypermasculinity appears to be directly related to the sexual assaults that the military community is currently experiencing due to either connections between hypermasculinity and acceptance of rape (both in military and civilian situations), military communities and their fostering of hypermasculinity, or some combination of both (see for example, Begany and Milburn, 2002; Gruber, 1997; Ilies et al., 2003; Malamuth, 1988; Malamuth and Brown, 1994; Mosher and Anderson, 1986, Quackenbush, 1989; Vogt et al., 2007).

“Hypermasculinity is an extreme form of masculinity based on beliefs of polarized gender roles, the endorsement of stereotypical gender roles, a high value placed on control, power and competition, toleration of pain and mandatory heterosexuality” (Turchik and Wilson 2010:271; Hunter 2007) This hypermasculinity is the direct result of the implementation of an instutionalized aggression approach on the part of the US military. The military’s sole purpose is to win any and all combat situations it finds itself involved in. In achieving this goal, there is a certain mindset that the individual has to take on in order to perform at the level necessary to achieve the goal. This mindset is introduced to the individual, and fostered throughout the individual’s career by the institutional nature of the military. And as Koeszegi et al. (2014:230; Kovitz 2003) see it, “institutionalized aggression cannot be understood without a gendered approach, as images of masculinity and femininity are central for their social organization and the inherence of aggression: Violence and warfare have been constructed as essentially male, whereas femininity is equaled with weakness and peace.”

How does this hegemonic hypermasculinity play out with regard to women filling the ranks? In an extensive survey study conducted by RAND researchers examining the effect that integrating women into the military has on overall readiness, cohesion, and morale Harrell and Miller (1997) found that the military personnel surveyed did not feel that gender had an effect at
all on overall readiness, cohesion (unless the group was already experiencing conflict or cohesion issues), or overall moral levels. The researchers found that some things did negatively affect the relationship between gender and readiness, cohesion and moral levels including age/rank of the respondent, whether they were newly integrated units, whether there was preexisting upset within the units, and satisfaction levels with one’s job, but the researcher’s felt that gender could not be conclusively linked to the problem.

Koeszegi et al. (2014) also attempted to answer the above question by testing six different hypotheses concerning the role of aggression in support units and combat units and the experiences of this aggression by gender, as well as gender difference with regard to traditional military roles and the role of women within the military. They had many interesting findings, but most relevant to this discussion would be that while the majority of members of support units feel that women are effective as members of the military, the majority of members of combat units disagree and feel that their presence is detrimental to group performance. Further, aggression experienced by women in these units was higher and was interpreted by the authors to be the result of the need of male members of the unit to weed out the women, to solidify bonds between the male members of the unit, and to continue the hegemonic hypermasculine culture.

If aggression and bullying is the method used to ostracize women in combat units, it is not a stretch to see how bullying and aggression gets extended to sexual violence, or at the least, contributes to an environment that accepts it as a means of solidifying the brotherhood necessary to be successful in combat situations. “This sociocultural approach places rape on a continuum of sexually assaultive behaviors without defining rape as a deviant act committed by atypical individuals” (Berkowitz 1992:176; Margolin et al. 1989). It appears that sexual violence is almost acting as a way of forcing women out of the group. In a 2014 OAFnation.com post
entitled, “Women in the Infantry: A Common Sense Analysis,” an anonymous member of the military or contracting community going by the alias “Nocer” lays out his arguments for keeping women out of combat units citing physical inferiority, destruction of the warrior mentality/brotherhood, and the threat of sexual activity, both consensual and non-consensual, within the unit. Specifically, “Nocer” says the following in regards to the effect on the brotherhood and unit efficiency,

So what happens to these men who are living at the basest levels of human existence and instinct, when you insert a woman into the fold? . . . Is it realistic to expect them to live and die by their animal instincts, but completely turn off the most powerful instinct that human beings possess? When all the men in a unit are sex deprived they can turn that aggression and frustration towards more productive things like killing. . . . Now what happens if one or two men in a platoon are in a sexual relationship with the women in the platoon? Jealousy? Anger? Envy? Spite? What does that do to the fabric of that platoon? What does it do to the brotherhood? Infantrymen are about as alpha as men get. They love to kill and they love women. When as a whole, a group of men like this is saying that they want to spend years at a time with no women, they’re saying it for a reason. (www.OAFnation.com, 2014)

While many of the comments on this social media page attacked the author’s arguments, or took issue with specific parts of it, one anonymous commenter going by the alias “Casey” had the following to say, “…if you put a dude and a girl on post together, he's not watching his sector, he's thinking about getting some pussy. In addition, throwing even a half decent piece of ass in the middle of a downrange platoon comprised of type A personalities is tantamount to throwing a t-bone steak in the middle of a group of pit bulls.” The implication here with both of these examples is that if a woman dares to step into a hypermasculine military environment, sex is going to happen, consensual or not, that it should be expected, and that the only way to avoid it is to stay out. In essence, sexual violence, aggression, and bullying are all being used as a means of keeping an all-boys club female free.
In August of this year (2014) Brian Adam Jones, a Marine veteran and current editor in chief of Task and Purpose, an online journalism forum for veterans, wrote a column on the connection between social media outlets and anti-women sentiments in the Marine Corps. The article, titled “The Sexist Facebook Movement the Marine Corps Can’t Stop,” was quickly shared by many members of the military community on Facebook and received enough attention that Facebook forcibly shut down the pages mentioned in the article. All of the pages are operated anonymously by members of the military, and some of them were back up the very next day via the creation of a new page under the same name. Figure 1.8 shows an example of the types of content posted to these Facebook pages.

The most interesting and disturbing part is that while the individuals creating and maintain the page are anonymous, the thousands of individuals commenting on the content that is being posted are doing so under their own real names with their real pictures. As Jones (2014) puts it, “that these men, these US Marines, openly engage in this behavior, openly harass and denigrate women and minorities—under their real names, their real pictures, with no fear of repercussions—reflects a perceived tolerance of their actions.” When asked to comment on this social media movement amongst the military community, Jones (2014) stated that neither the Marine Corps nor the DoD was willing to address the issue or comment further. This unwillingness or inability to address the anti-women sentiments expressed by members of the military community on various social media outlets is part of the larger problem. The DoD and the various offices and departments it assigns the task of combating sexual assaults within its ranks, cannot honestly expect to be effective, when it refuses to acknowledge the sociocultural sentiments that are active within their workplace culture.
Conclusion

This chapter has sought to lay a foundation of understanding the problem of sexual assaults within the United States Navy. Understanding the community characteristics and cultural phenomenon that occur within this community is essential for understanding any type of statistical analysis conducted later on in this study. Everything from rank and organizational structure, to the combat masculine warrior paradigm, to the hypermasculine workplace culture and its history is relevant in putting in context the results later on.

Several community elements discussed in this chapter have a crossover with traditional criminology and could possibly lead to the overall number of sexual assaults in the Navy behaving as expected. As mentioned previously in this chapter, these elements include age, education, gender, and income. Military demographics point towards a community that is comprised of majority young males without degrees, and while having a steady income, when the amount that is married with children is taken into account, is relatively low. These are all factors that criminologists have established are tied to general crime within society, and therefore, are relevant to a discussion of sexual assaults within the military community. Specifically, with regard to a discussion of military sexual assault, the testing of these demographics and their relationship to sexual assault is essential. In fact, later in this dissertation, regression models will be conducted in order to test the strength of the relationship between sexual assault victimization and gender with the assumption being that females will be more likely to be victims of sexual assault than males.

Some military community elements that are possibly contributing to sexual assaults are unique to this community however and required an expanded discussion here in order to be in line with a criminological understanding of the problem. As mentioned, these elements include
the CMW paradigm, the hypermasculine workplace culture, and the structural organization of the military. The CMW paradigm refers to the constant combat mentality of members of the military as it is their sole purpose to win any and all combat situations the US military is involved with. That is, they consider themselves to be warriors 24 hours a day, 7 days a week and this warrior mentality permeates all elements of daily life. Along with this however, is the concept that the profession of arms is considered to be inherently male and that all things female are simply not fit for the war making job. This manifests itself in the form of a hypermasculine culture that is obsessed with fostering alpha-male type-A personalities and eradicating any and all female elements (actual females, and feminine themes) from the combat workplace.

These two elements, the CMW paradigm and hypermasculinity contribute to establishing women as second class citizens within the military workplace and thus their status as victims becomes more acceptable. Lastly, the rank and organizational structure of the military contributes to the fostering of sexual assaults within the community as it would just about any crime occurring within the community; leaders give orders, they are followed, no questions asked. A very strict leadership structure, while effective on the battlefield in defeating the enemy, is also effective in allowing negative behaviors to go on unchecked or challenged. When leadership isn’t questioned, bad behaviors can be swept under the rug or hidden behind an iron wall of don’t ask don’t tell.
CHAPTER 4

A REVIEW OF RELEVANT SEXUAL ASSAULT LITERATURE

Sexual Assaults: What We Know So Far

Sexual assault literature is vast and well developed. It has been addressed by many different academic fields and encompasses many different categories included, but by no means limited to, victimology, understanding offender motivations, societal contributions to the crime, and crime within special communities (i.e. total institutions). While it was the goal of chapter 1 to establish an understanding of the uniqueness of the military community and its culture, chapter 2 seeks to incorporate previously established sexual assault literature in both the civilian and military contexts into the discussion in order to arrive at an understanding that is consistent with previously established findings and a theoretical framework that is appropriate.

Victims of Sexual Assault

As mentioned throughout this dissertation, for the purposes of this discussion, the sexual assaults being analyzed are heterosexual in nature. And while it is understood that female on male sexual assaults, and both male and female homosexual sexual assaults do occur, the far majority are male on female and as such, will be discussed in that context. The large majority of heterosexual sexual assault victims in both the civilian and military world are women. Understanding as much as possible about risk factors contributing to victimization of women in sexual assaults is a vital piece of the overall puzzle in terms of attempting to prevent these crimes. The literature on victims of sexual assault is varied with regard to context and appears to have a very strong showing of college/university sexual assault, sexual assault within
retirement/elderly facilities and prisons, and sexual assault of children. Military sexual assault literature appears to be predominantly clinical in nature and written for nurses, social workers, and counselors.

Currently established literature points to a list of possible risk factors for military sexual assault. Sadler et al. (2003) found that women who were raped while active duty military were more likely to joined the military at a younger age, more likely to be enlisted, and less likely to have earned a college degree than their colleagues who were not sexually assaulted while active duty. Likewise, Skinner et al. (2000) found that women in the military who reported being sexual assaulted were generally younger that those who reported not being sexually assaulted. Coyle et al. (1996) also found that enlisted women reported being sexually assaulted more often than officers. These studies have particular relevance to this discussion as the present study tests connections between age and rank (which partially accounts for presence of a college degree) with sexual assault in the Navy.

There appear to be many similarities with regard to victims of civilian sexual assault and military sexual assault that revolve around two key similarities. Established literature points to both civilian and military victims of sexual assault being tied to alcohol use and partying (See for example Schwartz et al. 2001; Mouilso et al. 2012; Untied et al. 2013; Ullman et al. 2010) and prior sexual abuses (See for example Boney-McCoy, and Finkelhor 1995; Gidycz et al. 1993; Follette et al. 1996; Sadler et al. 2003; Sadler et al. 2004). While these similar risk factors will not be tested in this study, they are still relevant in that they add context for which to understand the results of this this study, and also provide a suggestion for future research.

There are also similarities when it comes to reporting, or not reporting the crimes as it appears that the concerns and fears of both civilian and military victims of sexual assault are
nearly identical. Civilian victims of sexual assault who do not report crimes do so, according to Sable et al. (2006) out of shame/fear/embarrassment, concerns about confidentiality, fear of not being believed, and fear of their perpetrator retaliating. Like their civilian sexual assault victim counterparts, victims of military sexual assault who do not report the crime do so out of fear of ridicule, gossip, being labeled a troublemaker, or concern that no action will be taken (Burgess et al., 2013; DoD 2011.)

Some differences between civilian and military victims of sexual assault exist and are worth discussing in order to more fully explore the issue. First, and probably most alarming, as Burgess et al. (2013) describe it, military sexual trauma (MST) occurs predominantly in the workplace whereas civilian rape occurs more often in social settings; MST victims are often times forced to live and work with their perpetrators and their success and failure of their careers, and even their own safety, is often times tied to their assaulter. Often times, according to Burgess et al. (2013) victims must seek the approval of their perpetrator (or his friends/associates) in order to be referred/allowed to seek medical treatment. Further, victims of MST are often time forced to choose between taking official action to stop the abuse, which will often times result in extreme damage to their career, or keeping quiet and accepting to potential for a repeat of abuse, but keeping their career on track (Burgess et al., 2013; Street and Stafford 2004). It is also worth noting that in cases of military sexual trauma, sexual harassment was strongly tied to a later sexual assault occurrence (Murdoch et al., 2006).

In a discussion of any crime, it is easy to get lost in the social science aspect of it, the situational details, the cultural elements contributing to it, and forget that there are actual victims. These victims of military sexual trauma experience a variety of negative life-altering consequences including, but not limited to, unwanted pregnancy, STDs, and non-combat related
PTSD (Burgess et al. 2013) future substance abuse problems (Hankin et al. 1999), and future psychiatric disorders (Saris and Lind 2008; Seedat and Stein, 2000). Understanding what victims of military sexual assault have in common with each other and with their civilian counterparts is an essential first step in understanding the whole problem. A key part to this understanding a testing of the relationship between some of the demographic characteristics discussed here and sexual assault victimization. In fact, later in this dissertation, regression models will be conducted in order to test the strength of the relationship between sexual assault victimization and gender with the assumption being that females will be more likely to be victims of sexual assault than males.

Preventative measures aimed only at the perpetrators potentially excludes valuable information regarding the victims. Understanding the full impact that military sexual assault has on its victims serves as the motivation necessary to continue the exploration of this problem. Moving forward with this specific discussion, exploring the victim characteristics within the US Navy here in the Hampton Roads region of Virginia and comparing them to the understood victim characteristics of DoN-SAPRO, will provide a further understanding of the problem upon which continued successful preventative can be enacted.

Perpetrators of Sexual Assault

Relevant to this discussion, and as mentioned above, perpetrators of sexual assault are most often male. Berkowitz (1992) does a thorough job of covering the literature available on understanding sexual assaults and acquaintance rape and says that perpetrators of this crime who are of a college age have a lot in common. Specifically, that many American men are socialized, or become the product of a society that is accepting/tolerant, and perhaps even encouraging of,
rape and sexual assault. The socialization of men to avoid all things “sissy” and feminine and to be aggressive and unemotional in all aspects of daily life leads to a set of attitudes that can contribute to sexual assault as well. These attitudes take the form of rape myths and their acceptance by the community can allow for sexual assaults to happen. According to (Burt 1991) some of the most popular rape myths include beliefs that the victim wanted/deserved the assault that happened, that no harm was done, or that the crime itself didn’t actually happen. In a more recent analysis of rape myths, Grubb and Turner (2012) found differences between males and females with regard to acceptance of rape myths. Higher levels of rape myth acceptance were found in groups of men rather than women, and men also placed blame for the assault on women more often. They also found that women who violate traditional gender roles are attributed more blame than those women who do not; and women who consume alcohol prior to their attack are attributed higher levels of blame than those who are not intoxicated.

These findings regarding perpetrators’ attitudes towards rape myth acceptance are interesting with regard to furthering the understanding of military sex assaults. As will be mentioned shortly, the military has a long standing history/tradition of alcohol use. Accepted alcohol abuse within the military community, combined with the fact that, as discussed in chapter 1, the military is predominantly comprised of males who have been socialized to be extremely masculine, could lead to sex assaults occurring. Further, Grub and Turner’s (2012) finding concerning the acceptance of victim blaming with regard to women who do not conform to traditional gender roles (i.e. a female soldier/sailor) could offer another explanation of the sociocultural causes of sexual assault in place. Essentially, women’s role within the military could be seen as non-feminine and therefore deserving of sexual assault under this line of thinking.
The issue of specific personality characteristics of sexual assault perpetrators has also been addressed previously. What is interested, is that, as Berkowitz (1992) points out, most of the studies do not indicate some sort of psychiatric ailment or some other psychological disturbance; more poignantly, “normal” men that do not display these psychological issues are just as likely as those who do to commit a sexual assault/acquaintance rape. This finding rings true in this discussion on military sexual assault because of society’s conceptualization of the military as the “white hat” wearers of society. Much of the initial outrage, and even unwillingness to accept that these crimes were happening within the community (even so far as to blame the women or express suspicion of their stories) rests in the idea that our military is not comprised of “those kinds of people.” Now we understand that sexual assaults and “those types of people” are not connected after all, and moving forward, this line of logic needs to be done away with in ongoing exploration of these crimes within the military community.

Researchers have however, identified a reliable set of personality characteristics that are present in sexual assault offenders. Generally speaking, sexual assault offenders will have in common all, some, most, or any of the following; early/very young first time sexual experiences, multiple sexual experiences at a very young age, overall hostility towards women, general irresponsibility, lack of social conscience, values legitimizing aggression towards women, and a need for dominance over sexual partners (Berkowitz 1992; Koss and Dinero 1989; Malamuth 1986; and Rapaport and Burkhardt 1994) More recent research appears to support these findings somewhat. Abbey and Jacques-Tiura (2011) took into account the previously established research when they examined the tactics that perpetrators of sexual assault utilize finding that, few perpetrators actually resorted to physical force, but rather, relied on verbal coercion and the victim’s impairment. Since a good amount of sexual assault cases within the military report
intimidation, coercion, and alcohol as having played a role in the sexual assault, these findings appear to be consistent and applicable to the military case.

*Total Institutions and Sexual Assault*

As long as complex societies have existed, there has also existed total institutions within them. And of late, sexual assaults within total institutions has become a focus for social scientists (See for example Beck et al., 2013; Crossmaker, 1991; Teaster and Roberto, 2004.) Understanding sexual assaults within total institutions could be helpful in understanding sexual assaults within the military community as the military is generally considered to be a total institution. Total institutions are ones that are estranged from the larger society by either physical barriers or social and cultural standards. Goffman (1957) outlined five different types of total institutions containing different types of individuals; those who are unable to care for themselves but are harmless (nursing home), those that are a harm to themselves and society unintentionally (psychiatric institution), those who are purposefully harmful to society (prisons), those pursuing a specialized task/service to society (military bases), those seeking solace or a retreat from society (religious compounds). Goffman (1957) further states that total institutions are characterized by the fact that all the individuals within eat, sleep, and play together. They do these activities in the company of large groups of other similarly situated individuals, and that the activities that they all participate in are heavily regulated and part of a larger overall plan for the institution. There could be no better example of a total institution than a military base, or even, the military community has a whole.

The discussion of the military as a total institution is important because in terms of understanding sexual assaults within it, examining the literature concerning sexual assaults
within other total institutions may be a logical starting place. The two total institutions that are closest in characteristics with a military community for the purpose of comparison would be college campuses and surprisingly, prisons. Both of these institutions have large populations that matriculate in the same area that are close in age to a military community, and both are supervised/regulated by a much smaller group within the institution (faculty/staff and correctional officers respectively).

The comparison between college campuses and military populations is not a new one (See for example, Bachman et al. 1987; Franke 1998; Franke 2001; Hammill et al. 1995; Holsti 1997; Kleykamp 2006; Morris 1983; Segal and Segal 2004, and countless others). Both college campuses and military communities are similar in age groups and are just leaving home for the first time. They both are also large populations that have been given a task (earn a degree, defend the nation respectively) and are supervised by a smaller group within the institution (professors/staff, and military officers respectively). They are both at times under stress and at times subject to strict rules, regulations and schedules. These commonalities and others make them logical comparison groups.

Fortunately for the researcher interested in studying sexual assaults in the military, much has been done with sexual assaults on college campuses. Examining the literature on sexual assaults on college campuses will perhaps shed light on sexual assaults within the military community. Two major themes dominate college campus sexual assault literature; the role of alcohol, and male perpetrators/male group peer pressure. Not surprisingly, because of the commonalities between college campuses and military communities in terms of age and life stage (See chapter 1), both of these themes are also very present in the current understanding of military sexual assault.
The role that alcohol use plays in sexual assault on college campuses has been thoroughly examined. Several studies have attempted to measure the prevalence of alcohol related sexual assaults on college campuses (See for example, Frintner and Rubinson, 1993; Harrington and Leitenberg, 1994; Gross and Billingham, 1998). Expanding on the measurements of the problem, Perkins (2002:94) identifies four common themes in the literature explaining increased risk of sexual assault with alcohol use on college campuses; (1) increased consensual activity prior to the forced activity due to lowered inhibitions, (2) the cultural stereotype of women who drink as more promiscuous or “easy”, (3) the diminished ability to consent or object to the activity, and (4) the diminished ability to physically resist or fight off an attack. These four themes would easily be applicable to the military community, and would dictate future research ideas, as the military community has a well-documented and studied connection to alcohol use (See for example, Ames et al., 2007; Bachman et al., 1999; Bray and Hourani, 2007; Pack, 1995).

Moving forward from this study, alcohol and its connection to military sex assaults should be examined more thoroughly.

The role that male perpetrators/male group peer pressure plays in sexual assault on college campuses has also been thoroughly examined. A more thorough examination of the role of masculinity and male peer groups in sexual assaults in the military is explored in chapter 1, but it is worth noting the consistency in both of the total institutions; military and college/university communities. In a study on college fraternities and their connection to sexual assault, Martin and Hummer (1989) found that [similar to] military communities, fraternities possess a concern with a narrow, stereotypical conception of masculinity and heterosexuality; a preoccupation with loyalty, protection of the group, and secrecy; the use of alcohol as a weapon against women's sexual reluctance; the pervasiveness of violence and physical force; and an
obsession with competition, superiority, and dominance. It is these values according to Martin and Hummer (1989) that are directly responsible for the continued sexual victimization of women who find themselves encountering fraternity type men.

Combining these, the alcohol use and male perpetrator/male peer pressure connections to sexual assault, to the military has really only been barely touched on of late. Applying findings about sexual assault on civilian college campuses to military academies appears to be the most logical starting place. In a comparison of the service academies to civilian colleges and universities, Brubaker (2009) states that sexual harassment or “rape testing” is often a precursor to a sexual assault and found that in the service academies, nearly half of women said they had experienced some form of sexual harassment, with the Air Force Academy being slightly more than half. Interestingly, this number was very similar to what women at civilian colleges and universities reported. Brubaker (2009) also found that while 90 percent of civilian university students reported that their assaulter was known to them, the service academy surveys did not ask this question, but did ask victims if their offender was a fellow cadet/midshipman to which 83 – 97% in 2005 and 82 – 86% in 2006 responded affirmatively (Brubaker 2006; Cook et al, 2005; Lipari et al, 2006).

One difference discovered between the two, civilian and military colleges, was that the rate of reporting the sexual assault was found to be higher at the service academies than at the civilian schools (Brubaker 2006; Cook et al, 2005; Lipari et al, 2006). This could perhaps point towards more faith in the military institution to handle the issue, or also a difference in the beliefs/personality characteristics in the women at the service academies than the civilian universities. The information above is valuable in that it further solidifies the connection between these two total institutions; college campuses and the military. Findings on sexual assault in this
one institution, universities, then could be applicable to another, the military, and in terms of exploring the somewhat unexplored topic of military sexual assaults, this is valuable.

The other total institution worth examining as a comparison to the military community would be prisons. This may be a shocking and surprising comparison (and perhaps even a bit offensive), but it is logical. Both prisons and military bases/naval ships are instruments of the state; one aimed at detaining criminals, the other aimed at allocating the resources necessary for national defense. Both prisons and military bases are home to large populations, the majority of which are male and relatively younger. These large prison populations, just like military bases, are governed by a smaller group of individuals (military officers and correctional officers). Just like military bases, prisons maintain a very clear physical barrier separating themselves from the rest of the community, making it extremely difficult for individuals to pass through that heavily armed barrier. And while inmates find themselves in a prison because they have wronged society, and military personnel find themselves on a military base or naval ship because of their noble desire to serve their country, for both populations, the message is very clear, you are not free to leave and your time is not your own.

Most relevant to this discussion on the understanding of sexual assaults however, is two points; first, that both of these total institutions operate daily on the basis of a social hierarchy, and second, that both of these total institutions conduct their business with nearly no direct observation from the outside world. Prisons have a very clear split between inmates and guards, and then a very informal hierarchy amongst the inmates. The military, as discussed in chapter 1, has a very clear, very formal divide between officers and enlisted, and a formal hierarchy amongst the two groups. However, the military does also have a social hierarchy amongst its smaller groups comprised of personnel of similar ranks. Nils et al. (2009) examined bullying in a
Navy community (Norwegian) and found that where leadership was interpreted to be unfair, bullying was more prevalent. This demonstrates the ability of the members of the military unit to enforce their own social hierarchy in order to establish their own view of order where their leadership simply will not. This bullying trend behaves much as would be expected in a prison according to (South and Wood 2006:494; Ireland 2000), “social hierarchy seems to be inherent in the prison system and prisons appear to be encouraging such a social system as bullies are given high status by both prisoners and staff.”

The following quote from Gresham Sykes’ *The Society of the Captives* could easily allow for the word prisons to be substituted with military bases, and inmates for soldiers/sailors, and still make perfect accurate sense,

> The massive body of regulations which is erected as a blueprint for behavior within the prison and to which the inmate must respond; this social order represents a means, a method of achieving certain goals or accomplishing certain tasks; and, as we have pointed out before, the nature of this social order becomes clear only when we understand the ends it is supposed to serve. (Sykes 1958:13)

As discussed in detail in chapter 1, the military has a very strict hierarchy and its purpose is to allow for success in combat situations. The prison likewise has a social hierarchy and its purpose is to control daily order within the prison so that there is not constant chaos requiring the constant involvement of the guards/correctional officers. At any given time in both prison and military communities, someone further up the food chain is turning a blind eye on a behavior that is technically against the rules, so long as it serves to keep the larger population settled. Bryant (1979:57) would refer to this as his 6th facilitator of general military crime, the “official toleration of military deviancy.”

…considering the mission of the military and the tasks expected of its members, a major problem is maintaining morale, neutralizing frustration and anxiety among the troops, and motivating personnel to channel aggressive goals properly. To accomplish this also requires some relaxation of the strict and pervasive norms
that govern military life. The troops have to “let off steam” as a disciplinary safety valve… (Bryant 1979:58)

Much the same way a prison guard may ignore the fact that cigarettes are being smuggled into the prison in the interest of keeping the inmates happy and therefore more manageable, a military officer may ignore a late return after a soldier’s Christmas leave time in order to keep moral high within the group. There is constant evaluation on the part of the guardians entrusted with managing both military communities and prison populations with regard to the rules and regulations; a type of balance between meeting the needs of the institution and allowing for basic human freedom. It is in this very necessary and deserved freedom however that problems can arise.

The freedom of the prisoner, whether it is granted in the name of humanity, economic efficiency, or reformation, and limited though it may be, creates a situation in which crimes among inmates are possible. Theft, murder, fraud, sodomy—all exist as possible acts of deviance within the prison and the custodians have the duty of preventing them from being converted into realities. (Sykes 1958:17)

As with the prison, when the social hierarchy of the military community fails to control behaviors and protect the individual members of its community, it becomes the duty of the officers to reestablish order. With the current sexual assault problem that the military faces, the officers appear to be at a loss and part of that is the lack of fully understanding the problem. As it stands right now however, the social system of the military community’s response to the sexual assaults has taken on a situation similar to the post prison riot situation,

The social system of the prison finally reaches a point where the inmates have established their own unofficial version of control. The custodians, in effect, have withdrawn to the walls to concentrate on their most obvious task, prevention of escapes. The outward guise of the custodians’ dominance within the walls is preserved, to be sure, for inmates are still counted, some infractions of the rules are still punished, and prisoners continue to be marched back and forth from their cells (Sykes 1958:127).
The same post crisis situation is seen in the military community, and has been seen during every non-immediate combat time since WWI. In times where there is no imminent combat situation present the military reverts back to the social hierarchy dominating the community and dictating acceptable behaviors within it. As was discussed in chapter one, this applies most especially, for the purpose of this discussion, to the use of sexual assault and rape as a means of protecting the combat brotherhood and weeding out women from combat situations. Essentially, the informal social hierarchy of the military community at times comes to believe that anything feminine does not have a place in the military, and as such, enforces the informal social hierarchy and weeds them out.

Sadly, just as the prison guards ignore the fact that the prisoners are running the show, the higher ranking officers ignore the problem of sexual assaults, preferring instead to focus on the task at hand, defending the nation, and assigning the task of “dealing with” sexual assaults to a lower ranking officer who likewise passes it off. Offenders, or worse, victims, are shuffled from one unit to the next so as to sweep any past sexual assault under the rug and not actually deal with it, all while at the same time, continuing to maintain an outward appearance of a cohesive functioning military community. Were it not for the few brave women who took their stories public, their injustices would have stayed hidden, locked behind the walls of a very secure total institution.

Theoretical Approaches to Understanding Sexual Assault in the Military Community

In Berkowitz’s (1992) literature review on sexual assaults and acquaintance rape on college campuses discussed above, he lays out a philosophical understanding that may have great relevancy to understanding the military sexual assault problem in that it sets a precedent for a
focus on victim and offender characteristics as the basis of that understanding. Berkowitz (1992:176) states that,

This model of sexual assault considers the relative influence of perpetrator characteristics, situational variables associated with sexual assault, the degree to which the perpetrator misperceives the sexual intent of his partner, and victim characteristics associated with women’s increased risk of victimization.

This model incorporates an understanding of the cultural/situational setting of the assaults, with an understanding of victim and offender characteristics in order to arrive at a full picture of the problem.

Figure 2.1 - Berkowitz Sexual Assault Model

As demonstrated in the literature, a major theme that appears in both military and civilian sexual assaults is the absence of a capable guardian/supervision. Immediately, this theme calls to attention, in the mind of the criminologist research, routine activities theory, RAT. Within criminology, the debate over whether or not RAT is a theory or perspective rages on. It is not the purpose of this project to contribute to this debate as it is not the purpose of this project to test RAT and its connection to sexual assaults. It is however, the prerogative of this project to use
RAT as the logical and common sense framework through which a discussion of sexual assaults within the military can rest. Perhaps future research could test RAT’s connection to military sexual assaults, but for right now, it will simply be used as the naturally occurring context through which a conversation about military sexual assaults can occur.

Routine activities theory suggests that crime activities are a function of the frequency of attractive victims, motivated offenders and weak or absent guardians coming together in the same location, and as such, is a better framework for this topic (Cohen & Felson, 1979; Sherman, et al., 1989). Felson and Cohen (1980) expanded on their routine activities theory by suggesting that crime is not necessarily just the result of a predatory or malicious attitude, but rather, a motivated offender taking advantage of the routine activities of their suitable targets. Felson and Cohen (1980) expand further on this idea saying that certain routine activities present a variety of criminogenic situations.

Routine Activities Theory is the natural and common sense framework for this project because of the dictates of previous literature. Many of the previous studies concerning perpetrators of sexual assault and the characteristics thereof, contribute to one overriding theme, who commits this crime and why. Furthermore, there is an extensive basis for utilizing RAT in conjunction with a feminist perspective as the theoretical perspective for a sexual assault study (Mustaine, and Tewksbury 2002; Schwartz and Pitts 1995; Schwartz et al. 2001)

When RAT is applied to the military sexual assault situation, one can see how the three elements, motivated offender, absent capable guardian, and suitable target could be easily be intermingled. Essentially, the sociocultural concepts discussed in chapter one (hypermascunility, traditional male workplace conscious) contribute to the motivation for the “motivated offender” element. The sociocultural elements described in chapter one contribute to a general anti-female
sentiment amongst some men within the community. This sentiment leads to a motivation to commit sexual assault in line with the bullying and continued protection of the warrior brotherhood concepts that are also discussed in length in chapter one. Absence of a capable guardian is seen in certain situations within military life; for example, certain situations in boot camps and combat where supervision is low. To counteract this supervision issue, the military has implemented a “battle buddy” system, and female soldiers/sailors are encouraged to take a same sex partner to the showers and off-hour social engagements with them. Increasing the presence of persons, both male and female, can reduce the risk to the assault occurring. The suitability of the target concept could be interpreted to include physical nature of women and the social encouragement of women to be “people pleasers” that will keep quiet in the aftermath of a sexual assault. Likewise, women being the minority, and also interpreted as the threat to the warrior brotherhood, become the obvious suitable target.

Rosen et al. (2003) discussed the results of the integration of women into combat units. If the integration of women into the armed forces is no longer an issue, and is accepted by the majority of service personnel, then how is it that the sexual assault problem is continuing on? There appears to be a collision of the minority who believe women do not belong due to the the dominant hypermasculine culture, and the opportunity to act on these beliefs. This collision happens slowly and over time and is spurred on by the sociocultural elements that were discussed in chapter one. Specifically, the informal cultural values that are expressed publicly via social media and other outlets; the derogatory jokes and cartoons, the continued perpetuation of the dependapotomus myth are all negative and perhaps even disliked sociocultural characteristics that contribute to an anti-female sentiment. Acceptance of the culture’s disliked characteristics is
the end result, and more specifically, an understanding of how sexual assaults could occur/a blaming of the victim becomes ingrained in the overall consciousness of the community.

Put simply, for some reason, a very small percentage of the very large US Navy community is motivated to commit sexual assaults, and there are threads of commonality with regard to this motivation amongst the offenders. Understanding the motivation then becomes essential to addressing the overall sexual assault problem, and understanding the motivation starts with exploring the characteristics of the offender.

A suitable target is the second required element of RAT. In this instance, and as will be demonstrated statistically in the next section, the far majority of sexual assaults within the military community involve female victims. Here again, there exists threads of commonality amongst the victims that constitute them suitable targets. Exploring these characteristics allows for a better understanding of the suitability concept and therefore contributes to potential preventative action.

Lastly, the absence of a capable guardian is very strong theme that is present in much of the sexual assault literature. Much the same way that college campuses have recommended buddy systems for social engagements, the military has as well. Recommending a buddy system, essentially placing a guardian in the situation or increasing supervision, directly addresses the concept that where there is a capable guardian, there is less crime, or in this case, sexual assault. The Navy may refer to the concept as one thing, and criminologists another, but the common sense approach is the same; increase the people in the situation, provide supervision, and decrease the chances of a sexual assault occurring.
Conclusion

This chapter has discussed all relevant sexual assault literature currently available. Military sexual assault has been discussed in conjunction with established literature on victim characteristics, offender characteristics and within the context of total institutions. This comparison was done so for the purposes of understanding the overall military sexual assault problem, and to provide a context for understanding the relevancy of the current study. Routine activities theory is the theoretical perspective guiding this work and its exploration of victim and offender characteristics with regard to military sexual assaults.
CHAPTER 5

THE CRIMINOLOGY-MILITARY RELATIONSHIP AND THE CURRENT STUDY: UNDERSTANDING SEXUAL ASSAULTS WITHIN THE US NAVY

Part 1: The Criminology/Academia-Military Relationship

“We have called academia. We’ve called the lawyers, the psychologists, the social workers. Academia has not been able to provide us with a model with documented efficacy in preventing sexual assaults. This is not a research project for us…” Dr. Paul Garst, Deputy Director of the Navy Sexual Assault Prevention and Response Office, had that to say via a phone interview in response to a question about the Navy’s attempts to address sexual assault within their community.

The relationship between the military and academia has been rocky over the last 50 plus years to say the least. Trust on both sides is lacking, the goals of both sides are at times vastly different, both sides are subject to bureaucratic oversight, and yet both sides benefit greatly at times from the complicated relationship. The military, like any town or community experiencing a problem, has looked to subject matter experts to try to help understand and address the problem. Understanding that relationship is relevant in understanding the literature that currently exists concerning sexual assaults within the military, and is also relevant in exploring the future of this topic.

The Unwillingness of US Military to Work with Criminologists/Academia

One major reason that the military does not want to cooperate with criminologists is because of the Military’s existing tumultuous relationship with the media. Think of the US
Military as essentially married to the media as Boyland (2011:2) suggests, “the honeymoon is long since over and both of us have seen the best and worst of each other. The partners cannot divorce or even think of asking for a permanent separation. They are forever linked and stay together for the sake of the children.” The “children” in this metaphor are the American tax paying citizens who want to know what our armed forces are up to, as well as the everyday average military folk abroad who believe that there is, “only one thing worse than losing a war, and that is fighting a war that people at home have forgotten or have no interest in” (Hsia 2011)

This metaphoric marriage has been going on for a very long time, and it has been filled with tension since the beginning. Boyland (2011:2) captures this sentiment adequately,

It appears we have appointed our worst generals to command our forces, and our most gifted and brilliant to edit newspapers! In fact, I discovered by reading newspapers that these editor-geniuses plainly saw all my strategic defects from the start, yet failed to inform me until it was too late. Accordingly, I’m readily willing to yield my command to these obviously superior intellects and I’ll, in turn, do my best for the cause by writing editorials—after the fact. (General Robert E. Lee: 1863)

This sarcastic sound bite from Robert E. Lee points to a strained relationship due to blaming and criticizing on both sides. This trend has continued long since the Civil War. The media will disagree with military strategy or battlefield decisions and will go air the marriage’s dirty laundry in a public forum. Likewise, when the media has stepped out of place and acted in such a way that is damaging to troops or their families, the military has made a point of drawing public attention to it.

Hsia (2011) writing for the New York Times observed two instances, for example, where the media acted in such a way that was harmful to military families or the military itself: the first being when many members of Hsia’s unit were killed in action and the embedded reporter published the names before families could be notified by the DoD, and the second came when an
embedded reporter, observing a firefight, decided to publish the names of troops the reporter felt were “holding back” in the fight. Both of these examples do not require an explanation. They were not the first, nor the only time these types of things have happened in this “marriage.”

Carrying on with this metaphor then, the military, like most government organizations, doesn’t trust a working relationship with another independent institution that it doesn’t have wrapped up safely in contracts and legalese. Like a jaded jilted lover, they have been burned in the past, and they are cautious in entering into relationships in the future. Essentially, if the US military can’t control the flow of information, they would rather error on the side of not releasing it in the first place for the sake of not having to deal with any negatives that could occur.

This is not to say that the military and academia have not been involved in the past. It’s actually quite the opposite. It has however, been a much more hushed secret affair. This relationship started during WWI when the military realized they were not going to win the war without gaining an upper hand. Martino-Taylor (2008:38) building upon C. Wright Mill’s (1956) works on the Military-Industrial-Academic Complex, “posit[s] that American universities play a greater role; many are cogs in the same complicit war machine.” She goes on to state that the US military contracted chemistry departments, physics departments, biology departments, psychology departments and schools of medicine at countless universities nationwide, including Ivy League schools, prestigious technical schools and state schools, to use their knowledge of science to create weapons that would win the war. Huge amounts of money were poured into these schools for the purposes of this research, and later, extensive testing on both animal and human subjects.

This information becoming public, as it clearly is, represents one of the dark marks on the history of the military. Being associated with testing weapons on human subjects (American
citizen human subjects) is an embarrassment they will not soon outrun. And even though the US military is still deeply involved with American universities for the purposes of research, this relationship has changed. The government started creating its own think tanks and filling them with researchers of university caliber. After all, a think tank separate from universities that exist solely to do a specific type of research that is contracted by the US military and is tied up in all sorts of legal contract tape, tends to stay more private, and out of the media. Instead of the only option for the military being going to a university that does the type of research they need, they can lure qualified professors with incentives of large salaries and grants to do the work they need away from the prying and public eyes of a university. Essentially, with better control of how the research is done, the military can keep their spouse, the media, out of it.

This changing military-academic relationship explains much of why the military is hesitant to get involved with criminologists at an academic level. Their problematic past aside, the military typically only involves itself with research it needs; if the military feels they do not have a problem to solve, then there is zero need for research addressing said non-problem. Until the last few years, crime was not on the military’s radar, and some would argue, it still isn’t. This strained relationship is particularly problematic with regard to the military sex assault issue, or as Steiger et al. (2010; Groves 2013: 748) put it, “it is an extremely sensitive topic, especially within the military arena and, therefore, does not lend itself to openness with reporting or willingness to discuss interventions.”

Getting crime, and specifically sexual assaults, on the military’s radar will require a few things; first, unfortunately, instances of crime within these communities will have to continue to increase in appearance in the media. Sexual assaults in the military have taken the spotlight in the last year, and as recently as September of 2013, mass shootings have unfortunately made an
appearance. Media that is local to towns that host major military installations have always ran pieces on fraud and misappropriation of funds, but it hasn’t really received the occupational-crime attention it deserves. Second, public outcry over the continued increase in appearance of military crime stories in the media will lead to pressure being placed on the military to solve the problem. Lastly, the military will have to come to the conclusion that the problem is criminal/deviant in nature and thus requires the expertise of criminologists to address. Because these three things have yet to happen (although it appears close at hand) the military isn’t exactly beating down the door of criminologists to hand over data and request answers to their problems.

*Disinterest on the Part of Criminologists in Crime within the US Military*

The military isn’t the only one to blame in this gap in criminology literature. Criminologists themselves haven’t necessarily been beating down the military’s door requesting data and asking to research their communities. Criminologists have long held an interest in studying special communities. The increased emphasis on a “war on terror” and the subsequent surge of troops sent to the Middle East and other parts of the world has renewed the focus that society and politicians place on the military. Many communities that had previously remained geographically or socially isolated from military bases and military communities have found themselves, in the past decade or so, interacting with them now on a regular basis via the increased privatization and outsourcing of services provided to military members and their families, resulting in the placement of civilian contractors within the military community (Bowen et al. 2001; Knox and Price 1999).

The military bases themselves, and the communities that reside within and around the bases operate, differently than non-military communities and are worthy of examination because,
just like non-military communities, military communities are experiencing rates of crime and deviant behavior. Understanding what makes these communities different, and what community factors could potentially be contributing to these rates of crime and deviant behavior is a worthwhile endeavor as it expands the currently established criminological literature. Specifically, as mentioned in the previous chapter, understanding the sociological and cultural elements of these communities is essential for understanding the current sexual assault problem.

As mentioned above, previously studied special communities present criminologists with a challenge in that these communities are not like “normal” communities because they present a special set of circumstances that are not present in mainstream society. Prisons are characterized by a loss of freedom and forced detention. Boarding schools and retirement homes have been studied as isolated communities. Impoverished communities are characterized by the stress that comes with the members of the community and their inability to afford items essential to everyday life and also a lack of mobility. Much like these two examples of special communities, military communities exhibit characteristics of isolation, some infringements upon freedoms, and stress. These characteristics, while similar to other special communities, are better described as completely different than those of previously studied special communities.

Military communities, regardless of the branch of service experience three common characteristics that, while not unique to just military communities, manifest themselves in a completely unique way and result in unique circumstances. Isolation (both physical and mental), moderate losses of freedoms, and stress (resulting from both personal and professional situations associated with life in the military), contribute to the uniqueness of the military community, and possibly, the crimes and deviant behavior that occur within.
Isolation is not typically a term associated with the military. With over 688,000 active duty personnel in the United States today (U.S. Department of Defense 2010), surely isolation is not a factor in these communities. The opposite is true however. Isolation acts at both the individual and the group level in both a physical and mental capacity. The individual could feel isolated because, leaving a family environment situated within mainstream society in order to join a military community leaves the individual feeling mentally isolated from their non-military family and friends as they may have to move far away and “leave” time in order to visit may be hard to come by. Members of a military community could collectively feel isolated from the rest of society because of their shared experiences that the rest of society, “just don’t understand.”

Physically, the individual is isolated from mainstream society in that they may live on base, or in a foreign country, or on a ship as part of their military service. Collectively, military communities are physically isolated because of their secure bases and ships which are not accessible by the rest of mainstream society and therefore present a physical separation.

The loss of freedoms associated with military service are not often considered when examining a military community. Members of the military forfeit many freedoms that regular citizens exercise every day. The loss of these freedoms is another characteristics that contributes to the uniqueness of the military community. Upon entering the military, the individual is no longer free to say whatever they wish. Insubordination is not tolerated, leaking classified information is met with criminal penalties, and publicly speaking out against policies is met with a lack of career advancement or forced discharge. Members of the military are also no longer in control of their own time like regular citizens. Whereas a private citizen can simply choose to leave any given day and travel or visit wherever and whomever they wish, members of the military are not allowed to leave without approval. A private citizen may have to show up to
work by a certain time or risk losing their job, but a member of the military must show up on
time every time and be exactly where they are supposed to be or risk physical detention or
criminal charges. This lack of control over one’s time or physical place is not a characteristic
unique to military communities in that prison and school communities also exhibit this
characteristic, however the application of controlled timing and placement of individuals is
unique within the military community.

Lastly, stress plays a major role within military communities and perhaps is the
characteristic that separates a military community from other special communities most
completely. The military community is not made up of just members of the military, but also
their spouses and children. Stress is exhibited by not only the individual service personnel, but
also their families. Children exhibit stress concerning having to relocate again or having a parent
be deployed again (Mmari et al. 2010). Spouses exhibit stress concerning their children’s
reaction to the moves and the deployed parent (Mmari et al. 2012) as well as the stress associated
with a loved one being in harm’s way and having to parent alone while they are away (Graves
and Moriarty 2000). The military members themselves face stress in many different capacities;
there is the stress associated with being deployed, the stress that personal/family problems
causes, and stress associated with continued testing and requirements related to work
performance which many times dictates career advancement or stagnation. While many special
communities that have previously been studied might exhibit stressful conditions, the stresses
associated with military communities are unique.

Even with the above established literature, the topic of crimes within the military, and
sexual assaults within the military specifically, still represents a major gap in criminological
literature. There appears to have been a slight interest around the time that the Vietnam War
was occurring, but any interest quickly dropped off and the field has yet to see a resurgence. This interest tends to have taken on an occupational or state crime approach as many reports of drug running by US military personnel as well as crimes on Vietnamese citizens were making their way out of the region and into the minds of American citizens back home. Sociologists have long had a strong military research base, and it appears that it is only growing, so the question then becomes, why have the criminologists not taken what the sociologists have done and run with it.

Most of the studies that have been conducted by social scientists over time can be broken down into the following categories; (1) military organization, leadership effectiveness and sociology of the military, (2) risky, self-destructive, and substance abuse behaviors by military personnel, (3) gender and sexuality studies, and (4) spouse, children and community studies. Absent from that list are crime and military community studies. This is not to say that the crime and military communities link has never been explored, it definitely has been (Bouffard 2003; Bryant 1979; Hakeem 1946; Mercier and Mercier 2000). The problem however is that these studies were conducted at least, if not more than, thirty years ago, (or using data from that time period), in a military that was very different than the one this nation has today, situated in a global community that is very different today than it was then, fighting wars that are very different. The research that was conducted then is relevant as it is all that we as social scientists have, but it is outdated and desperately needs to be replaced.

Crime in these previous studies is often covered under the broader concept of deviant behavior. It is treated as such because of two main reasons; first, the majority of studies that were conducted were done so in a sociological framework which treats all of these behaviors that go against the norms the same, and two, because military communities designate many behaviors as “crimes” under the UCMJ that civilian society does not. These status offenses need to be
studied in some common language and deviant behavior provides that. Topics such as non-felony spousal abuse, alcohol use (and now marijuana use in states/towns where it is legal), extra-marital affairs, sexual relationships between personnel of different ranks, sexual relations between personnel of any rank while deployed, other risky/self-destructive behaviors, non-participation in community, and insubordination are behaviors that would not carry with them a criminal penalties in civilian communities, but if the individual displaying these behaviors is a military personnel, then they become criminal offenses. This distinction is necessary because in terms of reviewing previous studies of crime and military communities, the only materials that are available are often times sociological studies of these types of deviant behavior that would not normally fit the bill for a review of criminological literature.

The closest that previous studies of military and crime gets to a more traditional criminological review of literature is where the military is tied to either the larger society as a whole or the life of an individual. This is demonstrated by a few studies. Hoch (1974) acknowledged the role that large military bases and university campuses, both of which having large populations of young males, would play in skewing any studies on crime in these areas and as such, left them out of his study. Hoch (1974) suggested that the large populations of disciplined citizens present in large military bases would decrease crime rates in the area due to the increased law enforcement capabilities that come along with a military base. Rephann (1999:378) found, that while service economic sectors such as amusement and entertainment increased crime rates, service sectors such as large military bases actually, “has a large depressing effect on crime” in the area.

Continuing on with an examination of military bases and crime, and including a component that is of recent concern, Paloyo, Vance and Vorell (2010) explore the closure of
military bases and their connection to rising crime in areas that host them. Paloyo et al. (2010:21-3) state that, “the personnel who populate the bases are largely comprised of young men—the demographic segment most prone to criminal activity—it is conceivable that the closures would reduce crime rates. . .” however, “we find no evidence for an association of crime with military bases. This conclusion holds over different estimation methods and different scales of analysis.” Taken all together, it can be concluded that while military bases may drastically increase the demographic most associated with crime (young males), that they also somehow decrease crime in the area, and if and when it becomes necessary for these bases to close, the communities that hosted them should expect no change, particularly a rise, in crime rates. Rephann (1999) sheds light on the how by suggesting that it is the presence of increased law enforcement at both prisons and military bases that has a positive effect on the efficacy of local law enforcement which carries a deterrent effect on crime in these communities.

Media Attention to Military Sex Scandals and Public Outcry

The relationship between the US military and academia, and specifically criminologists, becomes relevant because of the current climate; many new media organizations are spreading the word on a controversial crime story, the US military has a sexual assault problem. In a perfect scenario, the military would not be experiencing sexual assaults, and they most definitely would not be experiencing the public backlash that has arisen in response to them. Over the past 30 years, sporadic military sex scandals have made their way into the public eye via the news media and of late, have become a major topic within the military itself. This attention has forced the military to attempt to understand why these assaults are happening and attempt to formulate an effective strategy for combating them. The following are the more notorious incidents that
have grabbed the attention of both the military and the public, and made sexual assaults a major focus.

Burgess et al. (2013) state that the first attempt by the military to address sexual assault came in the wake of the infamous Tailhook incident. Of the more than 4,000 current and retired Naval aviators who attended the 35th annual Tailhook convention in Las Vegas, Nevada, 83 women and 7 men reported being sexually assaulted. This incident led to the resignation of the Secretary of the Navy, and the careers of 14 high ranking officers and 200 naval aviators being effected. The official Pentagon report on the incident found that this was not an isolated incident but rather, just the tip of the iceberg so to speak. From there, the media got ahold of the 1996 Army Aberdeen Proving Grounds sex assault scandal and the 2003 Air Force Academy sex assault scandal. More recent military sexual assault scandals include, but are by no means limited to; the West Point rugby team sexual assault scandal, the West Point shower picture/video recording scandal, the Naval Academy football team sexual assault scandal, the Ft. Hood SAPR team leader being accused of running a prostitution ring and forcing subordinates into prostitution, and lastly, the head of the DoAF-SAPR being arrested on sexual battery charges.

While it is again a small percentage of the military community engaging in these crimes, the media’s attention is constant and has driven it to the forefront of concerns on the part of everyday citizens and social science researchers. While these crimes may not be happening every day, the media’s coverage would give the average viewer the sense that these crimes are rampant and pervasive. As with any crime, media attention leads to viewer outrage, which leads to government interest, which leads to a government call to action, which leads to academics becoming interested. This is very true of the current situation and how sociologists and
criminologists are becoming aware and interested in the military sex assault situation. There simply is a lot of outrage, and a huge need for understanding.

The US Military’s Lack of a Public, Reliable, Complete Crime Database

Mercer and Mercer (2000:9) in their anthology of work concerning all the military branches and domestic violence and family abuse observed that, “Because the military is a closed system, conducting research has never been easy. Obtaining data can be problematic for social scientists. ..” This could not be a truer statement concerning the experience that social scientists interested in the military face in attempting to understand these communities. That being said however, some social scientists have been able to conduct studies on military communities under various circumstances. Think tanks such as RAND, the Center for Naval Analyses, the Naval Personnel Research and Development Center, and the Army Research Institute for the Behavioral and Social Sciences have conducted studies and released their findings publicly and to the military concerning various specific topics that the military gives them permission to research (See for example Caliber and Associate 1996). Occasionally, academic researchers are able to gain access to very specific data sources through either FOIA requests of non-classified data, or through permission of various branches to collect original data on very specific topics (See for example Raiha and Soma 2000.)

The US military has occasionally over the last 50 plus years established behavior specific databases to help them keep records and understand a specific problem (the Army Family Advocacy Central Registry for example which houses data on all family crimes including domestic violence and child maltreatment.) Another problem is that even within the military community itself, behaviors are defined differently which results in conflicting and inaccurate
statistics. For example, the US Navy’s SAPRO conceptualizes sexual assault/harassment differently than does the DoD; the SAPRO takes more of the social work/psychological approach and defines an instance of sexual assault any time an individual feels victimized in a sexual way (and as such approaches the problem from more of a victim advocacy view), the DoD by contrast accepts a more legal focused conceptualization with specific elements of the encounter required in order for it to fit a more strict definition (and thus approaches it from a legal/justice focused standpoint) (Garst 2014). This difference in definitions of crimes is problematic to all researchers and is something Suris and Lind (2008) acknowledge as a problem/limitation in their study as well. This lack of uniformity between the two offices results in different statistics of the same concept, sexual assaults, and is problematic for any social scientist attempting to do any type of scientific analysis.

These problematic groupings of data are separate by branch, by problem, and by governing group which makes any type of access to them extremely difficult. Case in point, Naval Criminal Investigative Services, NCIS, keeps all records on all felony investigations that fall within their jurisdiction. These records however, are not in a database, they are stored in individual case files. If one was interested in studying homicides within Hampton Roads for example, a Freedom of Information Act, FOIA, request would have to be filed. That request would then be assigned to an NCIS personnel, who would be tasked with pulling every individual homicide case and compiling the individual cases into one mini-homicide database for the years requested and containing only the variables requested. That newly created mini-homicide database then has to go from NCIS back to the FOIA office to approval to be released to the researcher who requested it. A researcher interested in studying homicides outside of the military community however, would simply pull up the UCR on the FBI’s website, and instantly
be able to pull homicide data by year and location, and any other independent variables they need. This lack of centralized military crime database presents two problems: One, why would any research outside the military community bother with FOIA requests to study crime when they can study civilian crime much more easily, and two, how would a researcher within the military community tasked with studying a crime topic go about doing it when there is no database for them to pull up?

There appears to have been a solution suggested, DIBRS, the DoD version of NIBRS. In fact, according to publicly released DoD documents (Specifically DoD Directive 7730.47, 1996), DIBRS does exist and all branches and the DoD are feeding their crime data into it, following the exact same format that civilian law enforcement agencies do. DIBRS falls under the jurisdiction of Defense Manpower Data Center, DDMC. The question here is, if DIBRS exists, and all DoD agencies are feeding their crime data into it, and it is anonymous and compiled in the same format as NIBRS, why is it that it is not readily and publicly accessible? Giving all researchers access to DIBRS in the same way that NIBRS is accessible, could perhaps encourage the type of free range research that is currently going on with other non-military crime topics and would perhaps produce a more bountiful crop of research from which the military and DoD could draw possible solutions from. Simply put, sexual assaults in the military will not be properly addressed by press conferences, closed door discussions, and in-house experiments based on conflicting and methodologically unsound data. One uniform, accessible database is the first step towards an understanding and effective approach to addressing the problem.
Part 2: The Current Study

It is the purpose of this project to further contribute to the exploration of the problem of sexual assaults within the military community; specifically, within the Navy. It is the goal of the paper to provide this further understanding by comparing original NCIS data to previously established SAPRO data published in their annual reports, to assess the strength of the relationship between sexual assaults and victim/offender characteristics, and to discuss the interpretation of the data within the context of previously established literature on sexual assaults. The value of this project comes in its original contribution to the field of criminology, as well as the fact that it is a study on sexual assaults within the military community conducted by a completely unbiased, non-military-affiliated source.

These goals will be accomplished by first, running distributions and frequencies for the data obtained by NCIS; victim and perpetrator demographics need to be assessed. These characteristics will then be compared to DoN-SAPRO’s victim and perpetrator demographics to address the question of consistency in data recording amongst different sources currently examining this problem that was raised by Suris and Lind (2008). The DoN-SAPRO takes more victim-advocacy oriented, and DoD/NCIS is more of a justice model approach, so understandings the inconsistencies that result is essential. Lastly, simple regression analysis models will be ran to assess the strength of the relationships between the dependent variable, sexual assaults, and independent variables comprised of the various offender and victim characteristics that were discussed in part one.

While literature currently does exist on this topic, as shown by the previous chapter, a major focus right now is still concentrated on exploring the full extent of the problem. As demonstrated, no concrete, reliable tallies exist; depending on the source, a different number
presents itself. Groves 2013 addresses this inconsistency at length saying that there are a number of resources available to sexual assault victims including crisis hotlines, law enforcement, emergency medical services, networks of social services, and nonprofit organizations offering services including safe housing, crisis counseling, referrals for psychological and medical care, programs for building empowerment and self-efficacy, and assistance in navigating the legal and justice systems. These nonprofit organizations, the individual branch SAPROs, and the individual criminal investigative organizations (NCIS for example) all operationalize sexual assault differently leading to vast inconsistencies in categorizing and tallying these crimes.

A Discussion of the Data, Methods

The original data for this project comes from the Naval Criminal Investigative Services, and is the result of a FOIA request placed in early 2013 and fulfilled in late 2013. NCIS has jurisdiction in any felony cases involving Navy and Marine personnel and keeps files for all of the individual cases they process. These cases are not anonymous, and are not housed in a database; they sit in individual case files and are recalled by name or case number when needed. When crime data was requested of them, NCIS had to pull all cases individually and enter them into an anonymous database file. This file for this project contains sexual assault cases for the years 2002, 2007, and 2012. For both offender and victim, the file contains information on age, race, rank, and gender. Referring back to chapter one’s discussion on military life and the workplace, it is logical to conclude that the independent variable rank, also gives insight into the education level and income level of the individual due to the previous discussion of education rank, and the DoD’s annual publication of income by rank.
Data from NCIS was selected as a way of measuring sexual assaults in the Navy for a few reasons. First, as mentioned by the previous research, many different sources have attempted to figure out exactly what the size of the problem is, with different outcomes. NCIS while responsible for the Navy, and answering to the Secretary of the Navy, is comprised of civilian personnel and this offers an element of impartiality not seen with studies done directly by the SAPRO and DoD/DoN offices. Second, data in NCIS had not been previously compiled for this type of study. It was not gathered with any particular research question in mind on the part of the NCIS intelligence specialist who compiled the cases into one data file, so it is also free of bias. Third, because NCIS is not normally the basis for reports released to the media concerning this issue, there is no potential bias connected with “spin.” Lastly, NCIS uses a legal code from the UCMJ for recording felony actions, so there is no interpretive error with regard as to what constitutes an assault; if there is enough to investigate on a formal charge, then it is recorded, just like with civilian crime statistics.

As mentioned above, DoN SAPRO is the office most directly responsible for addressing sexual assaults within the Navy and has published a publicly accessible annual report since 2004, the first year they started doing so. Unlike NCIS however, they have different goals and mandates, and generally take a more victim-advocacy approach. According to Dr. Paul Garst, Deputy Director of DoN-SAPRO at the Pentagon, there are three ways that his office triangulates sexual assault within the Navy. The first is in the unrestricted reported cases. All reported cases of sexual assault come to the Sexual Assault Response Coordinator and are classified as either restricted or unrestricted. Unrestricted reported cases of sexual assault are those which the victim has given permission for names to be used and an official case to be filed with NCIS. With these cases, a simple tally can be recorded. Dr. Garst says that roughly 25% of cases remain restricted.
however so simply going with unrestricted cases fails to paint the whole picture. Because restricted cases are anonymous and sealed however, demographic details can’t be obtained or analyzed.

The second way DoN-SAPRO measures sexual assaults is via confidential surveys conducted by his office’s website. Navy personnel are emailed and encouraged to log on to a website where they can sign in with their username and a common password and answer questions about their experience with sexual assaults. These results, while confidential, are not anonymous and as Dr. Garst described, possess a potential for bias. The last way, and Dr. Garst described as the most difficult, is to conduct qualititative group interviews. Teams from SAPRO visit bases and conduct group discussions with various categories of personnel in order to look for group concerns and feeling about the progress being made. In general, Dr. Garst said that the results from these group interviews point to feelings of it being easier to report sexual assault Navy-wide, and that while many feel the problem has not gotten any better, no one has said that it is getting worse (Paul Garst, 2014).

Utilizing data from NCIS and the annual reports from DoN-SAPRO discussed above, the analysis for this project will be conducted in three parts. Part one will consist of running frequencies for all of the assault data from NCIS for the years 2002, 2007, and 2012. The goal here will be to simply understand what the data has to say in terms of conceptualizing sexual assault and the victim and offender characteristics. This sounds elementary, but the value of this project again rests in the exploration of the problem. This should return valuable information on the victim and offender demographics within the group of unrestricted sexual assault cases from the Hampton Roads area for these three years.
Part two of the analysis is a comparison of the offender and victim characteristics explored in part one, to the DoN-SAPRO annual reports for the years 2007, and 2012 containing information on victim and offender characteristics. There can be no comparison for 2002, because DoN-SAPRO was not yet in existence and thus there is no annual report for that year (Banning 2014). This comparison, even with 2002 missing, should still help to address the issue of different agencies using different methods to measure the same sexual assault problem. If these two different sources, this project and DoN-SAPRO are found to be comparable in their findings, then it would be reasonable to assume that an accurate measurement of the problem has been established.

Part three consists of binary logistical regression analysis models from the years 2002, 2007, and 2012 assessing the strength of the relationship between the dependent variable, sexual assaults, and the independent victim/offender characteristics variables. Essentially, this project hopes to shed light on which offender and victim characteristics are linked to sexual assault when compared to other types of assaults. These results should be helpful in further establishing the uniqueness of sexual assault within the military community, and also for identifying possible focus points for preventative measures.

Based on all the previous literature discussed thus far, the following hypothesis about victim characteristics could be constructed. In part one of the analysis concerning the frequencies of the data from NCIS, a few things could reasonably be expected. First, (citation on crime rates) that sexual assault (comprised of both indecent assault and rape for years 2002 and 2007, and indecent assault, rape, and adult sexual assault for the year 2012) will be occur more often than the other types of assault (simple assault and domestic assault). It will also be expected that the victims of sexual assault will be females more often, and at an overwhelmingly disproportionate
amount, than males. Continuing on with victim characteristics, it is expected that, as the
literature in chapter 2 suggests, the victims will be disproportionately younger, and enlisted
(which will lead to similar conclusions of non-degree holding, and lower income levels than their
female officer counterparts). For the offenders, it is expected that the offenders will be grossly
disproportionately male, younger, and also enlisted. The interesting outcome from part one will
come with seeing exactly where the distribution is with regard to age and rank; younger may not
necessarily mean youngest and the majority of victims and offenders could be in a middle
younger age grouping. Likewise with the rank scale, enlisted may not mean lowest enlisted. The
majority of offenders and victims could possibly fall within a lower, but not necessarily lowest,
enlisted grouping. It is expected that for both victims and offenders, no discernable or significant
pattern will be observed with regard to race and sexual assaults.

Part two of the analysis is a comparison of the findings in part one utilizing the data from
NCIS, to the DoN-SAPRO annual sex assault reports from the years 2007 and 2012. For both the
data from NCIS and the DoN-SAPRO annual sexual assault reports for the years 2007 and 2012,
there are statistics to compare for the following categories; total assaults, victim gender, age, and
rank, and offender gender, age, and rank. DoN-SAPRO does not provide race information in
their annual reports. It is expected that there will be differences between the NCIS and DoN-
SAPRO’s sexual assault statistics due to this phenomenon being observed in the previously
discussed literature concerning different sources of military crime information. To what degree
these differences will remain to be seen, but it is reasonable to expect that DoN-SAPRO may
have higher numbers with regards to total sexual assaults as they have a less justice-focused
legally defined standard of recording. If NCIS can only open a case and record it as a sexual
assault provided there is enough evidence to meet the legal standard of a felony sexual assault,
then it is only logical that with that stricter interpretation will come less total assaults recorded. It is expected however, that victim and offender age, gender, and rank demographics will behave very similarly, nearly the same, in both the NCIS data and the DoN-SAPRO reports.

Part three of the analysis consists of a binary logistical regression model where the victim and offender characteristics of age, race, gender and rank will be regressed on the different types of assault. While the independent variables reflecting victim and offender age, race, rank and gender are self-explanatory, the dependent variable, sexual assaults, requires some clarification. For each of the three years of data provided by NCIS, all felony offenses were included. These offenses included every type of offense possible, but more to the point, every type of assault imaginable. For example, included amongst the data sets were assault, aggravated assault, indecent assault, domestic assault, sexual assault and adult sexual assault. The dependent variable, sexual assaults, was constructed by combining all offenses that fit the category of sexual assault (i.e. indecent assault, sexual assault, rape, adult sexual assault.) A dummy variable was then constructed for sexual assaults versus all others. It is this sexual assault dummy variable that will be used in the regression model with the aforementioned independent variables.

The purpose here is to determine which of the independent variable characteristics is significantly tied to the sexual assaults and which are not. Several hypotheses can be constructed in regard to this regression model. First, it is expected that the younger an individual is, the more likely they will be a victim of sexual assault when compared to other forms of assault. Likewise for rank. Gender has been discussed at length throughout this project and it is expected that being female will be significantly linked to one being a victim of sexual assault when compared to other assaults. In terms of offenders, it is expected that the younger the individual, and the lower their rank, the stronger the link to possibly committing a sexual assault will be when compared to
other types of assault. Again, no link between race and sexual assault one one’s status as either a victim or offender is expected.

Conclusion

Chapter 1 presented an in depth overview of the military, its structure, and sociocultural characteristics relevant to a discussion of sexual assault. Chapter 2 presented a review of all relevant sexual assault literature concerning victims, offenders, and total institutions and integrated these readings with the military understanding presented in chapter 1. Chapter 3 has sought to provide an overview of the relationship between the military, the media and academia that has contributed to the inconsistency and difficulty in obtaining data with regard to military crime and specifically, military sexual assault. It has also been the purpose of this chapter to describe the data and its collection for this project. NCIS and DoN-SAPRO have both been discussed in length as the foundation for the analysis and findings that will occur in chapter 4.
CHAPTER 6
ANALYSIS AND FINDINGS

Part 1: Crosstab Analysis of NCIS Data

As was discussed in chapter three, several trends in the crosstabs of the NCIS data was expected. To review, the NCIS data is comprised of cases of sexual assault that were reported to NCIS, and it was expected that: First, that sexual assault (comprised of both indecent assault and rape for years 2002 and 2007, and indecent assault, rape, and adult sexual assault for the year 2012) will occur more often than the other types of assault (simple assault and domestic assault). It will also be expected that the victims of sexual assault will be females more often, and at an overwhelmingly disproportionate amount, than males. Continuing on with victim characteristics, it is expected that, as the literature in chapter two suggests, the victims will be disproportionately younger, and enlisted. For the offenders, it is expected that the offenders will be grossly disproportionately male, younger, and also enlisted.

The interesting outcome from part one will come with seeing exactly where the distribution is with regard to age and rank amongst these sexual assault cases; younger may not necessarily mean youngest and the majority of victims and offenders could be in a middle younger age grouping. Likewise with the rank scale, enlisted victims and offenders may not mean lowest enlisted. The majority of offenders and victims could possibly fall within a lower, but not necessarily lowest, enlisted grouping. It is expected that for both victims and offenders, no discernable or significant pattern will be observed with regard to race and sexual assaults.

The crosstabs revealed findings that were, for the most part, expected. With regard to the expectation that sexual assault would be the most common type of sexual assault across all three
time periods; this was found to not be the case in two of the three time periods. For 2002, of the total 160 assaults, 76 were sex assaults and for 2007, 98 of the total 441 assaults were sexual assaults. The exception was 2012 when it was reported that 160 of the total 268 assaults were sexual assaults. The testing of the relationships between suspect and victim characteristics and sexual assault returned a veritable mixed bag of results. For the purpose of this discussion, they will be addressed by characteristic, gender, age, race and then rank, with suspects first and then victims.

For 2002, 2007, and 2012, the crosstabs testing the relationship between suspect gender and sexual assault returned significantly strong relationships with Chi-Square Asymp. Sig. values of .074, .008, and .000 respectively. These values are well below the standard .05 and it can therefore be assumed that the relationship between suspect gender and sexual assault across all three time periods is strong. As is seen in tables 4.1, males were 88% more likely to be the perpetrator of sexual assault in 2002, 91% more likely in 2007, and 79% more likely in 2012. A testing of the relationship between victim gender and sexual assault for the years 2002, 2007 and 2012 was found to be less strong than that of the relationship between suspect gender and sexual assault, with Fisher’s Exact Test Exact Sig. values of .000, .195 (not significant and therefore omitted), and .000, respectively. As is seen in table 4.4, females were 87% more likely to be the victim of sexual assault in 2002 and 85% more likely in 2012.

Table 4.1-Offender Crosstab

| Offender Characteristics: |

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1 Fisher’s Exact Test was used because Chi-Square was not appropriate as it assumes a frequency of at least 5 in
Chi-Square value <.05  
*Fischer's Exact Test <.05  

For 2002, 2007, and 2012, the crosstabs testing the relationship between suspect age and sexual assault returned somewhat disappointing results with Chi-Square Asymp. Sig. values of .060, .245 and .597 respectively. These values are all above the standard .05, so a relationship between suspect age and sexual assault cannot be assumed. A testing of the relationship between victim age and sexual assault for the years 2002, 2007 and 2012 however, was found to be extremely strong with a Chi-Square Asymp. Sig. value of .000 for all three time periods. As is seen in table 4.2, nineteen was the most common victim age for 2002, and age 24 was the most common age for both 2007 and 2012. It is worth noting that age 24 was the second most common age for 2002.

Testing the relationship between suspect race and sexual assault for the years 2002, 2007, and 2012, returned a mix of strong and weak relationships with Chi-Square Asymp. Sig. values of .594, .000 and .011 respectively. The value for 2002 is above the standard .05 so it could be said that for 2002, no relationship between suspect race and sexual assault exists. As is seen in table 4.1, for 2007 and 2012 white suspects were the most common accounting for over 51% of the total. A testing of the relationship between victim race and sexual assault for the years 2002, 2007 and 2012 was found to be more in line with the expected result of no significant relationship with Chi-Square Asymp. Sig. values of .152, .167, and .749 respectively.

Table 4.2-Victim Crosstab
Victim Characteristics:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Female*</th>
<th>Age</th>
<th>Race (W)</th>
<th>Rank*</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2002:</td>
<td>87%</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>E2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2007:</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>E2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2012:</td>
<td>85%</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>E2</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Chi-Square value <.05  
*Fischer’s Exact Test <.05

Lastly, for 2002, 2007, and 2012, the crosstabs testing the relationship between suspect rank and sexual assault returned significantly strong relationships with Chi-Square Asymp. Sig. values of .005, .000, and .009 respectively. These values are well below the standard .05 and it can therefore be assumed that the relationship between suspect rank and sexual assault across all three time periods is strong. As is seen in table 4.1, the most common suspect rank for 2002 and 2007 was E4. E3 was the most common for 2012 (with E4 being second most common.) A testing of the relationship between victim rank and sexual assault for the years 2002, 2007 and 2012 was found to be extremely strong with a Chi-Square Asymp. Sig. value of .000 for all three time periods. As is seen in table 4.2, the most common victim rank for all three time periods was E2.

A few summarized points can be made with regard to the tested relationships between suspect and victim gender, age, race and rank across the three time periods within the US Navy population in the Hampton Roads area of Virginia. Gender and rank for both suspects and victims demonstrated the strongest relationships across the three time periods. Males were consistently more likely to be suspects, and females consistently more likely to be victims. Suspects were also likely to hold the rank of E4 and victims were likely to hold the rank of E2 consistently across the three time periods. The relationship between suspect age and sexual
assault was found to be not significant across all three time periods, whereas the relationship between victim age and sex assault was found to be strongly significant across all three time periods, with 24 being the most common in two of the three time periods (and second most common in one time period.) The relationship between suspect race and sex assault was significant in two of the three time periods, with white suspects being most common in both time periods. The relationship between victim race and sex assault was found to not be significant in any of the three time periods.

Understanding the strength of the relationships between suspect and victim characteristics and sexual assault can be useful in guiding future research in this topic. These understandings can also help shape future policy with regard to the allocation of resources and targeted education measures. It is suggested that future policy geared towards addressing sexual assault within the United States Navy be directed towards the most common suspects (males holding the rank of E4 or lower) and most common victims (females, aged 24 and younger who hold the rank of E2 and lower.)

**Part 2: Comparison to DoN SAPRO Reports**

Part two of the analysis for this project involves comparing the results from part one, to the established published reports from the DoN SAPRO office for the years 2007 and 2012. As stated in chapter three, it was expected that there would be differences between the NCIS and DoN-SAPRO’s sexual assault statistics due to this phenomenon being observed in the previously discussed literature concerning different sources of military crime information. The comparison of these two sources of data on sexual assaults is necessary for one overriding reason. Allowing one institution to do any and all reporting of statistics on a given type of crime is dangerous from

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2 The DoD did not start compiling sexual assault reports until 2003 so there is no report available for 2002.
the perspective of social sciences’ demands of integrity and objectivity as it does not allow for criticism, critique and review by its peers. A comparison between the two addresses this need for review and exposes any potential problems in the recording and reporting processes.

Unfortunately, not only is there no report for 2002, but the report posted to DoN SAPRO website containing the 2007 report is incomplete. Unlike in 2002 where a report on sexual assault simply does not exist, for 2007, the report published on the DoN SAPRO website is not specific to Navy sexual assault, but rather is a report on sexual assault throughout the entire US Military. In fact it is worth noting that all sexual assault reports published on the DoN SAPRO website are for the entire military and not specifically for the Navy. While the report for 2007 lists enclosures for the individual branches, they have not been included in the report itself published online. The report for 2007, addressing sexual assault in the entire United States Military is 33 pages long (U.S. Department of Defense 2008). By contrast, the report published on the DoN SAPRO website for 2012 also addressing sexual assault for the entire United States Military is 729 pages and does actually include the individual branch enclosures (U.S. Department of Defense 2013). This increase in reporting of nearly 96% might be indicative of the sudden interest military sexual assault commanded in 2012. Unfortunately, the only Navy specific reportable information that was contained in the 2007 report consisted of a brief synopsis of the Navy’s Sexual Assault Victim Intervention (SAVI) program, and an overall count of subjects and victims in both unrestricted and restricted cases. In terms of making a comparison to the NCIS data, the information contained within the 2007 report is not particularly helpful, as the demographic data it contains pertains only to all sexual assaults military-wide.

The 2012 DoN SAPRO report does include some data that is able to be compared to the NCIS data, however, it gets extremely confusing. According the report (2012), the Navy
enclosure states on what is equal to page 474 of the 729 page document (it is not labeled with an actual page number,) that there were a total of 527 unrestricted reports of sexual assault in 2012, 332 of the cases were completed that same year. This is important to keep in mind as the NCIS data is reflective of opened cases, but does not specify if they were closed. The 527 unrestricted reports of sexual assault is more comparable to the NCIS data for the purpose of this discussion, however the demographics provided by the DoN SAPRO report only apply to closed cases.

Immediately, the initial comparison between just these total numbers returns an interesting result. If the reports from the DoN SAPRO office are correct, then when compared to the NCIS data, it appears that the two sources are reporting somewhat consistently. For 2012, according to the NCIS data, 160 total sexual assaults were reported, whereas the DoN’s SAPRO report, which represents the entire global presence of the U.S. Navy, showed a total of 527 unrestricted reports of sex assaults. The interesting part here is that, as previously described in chapter one, the Hampton Roads area naval presence, which includes multiple Navy bases including main station Norfolk, is the largest U.S. Naval presence in the world. If the data is correct, 160 Hampton Roads area sexual assaults of the total 527 sexual assaults would represent roughly 30% of the total sex assaults reported in the entire Navy.

It is entirely possible that the largest U.S. Naval base on Earth could be responsible for 30% of all U.S. Navy sexual assaults. Consider it this way, according to the official website of the United States Navy (2015), there are 326,046 total active duty U.S. Navy service members, of which, according to the Hampton Roads Chamber of Commerce (2014), 83,000 are assigned to one of the 10 or so Naval bases in the Hampton Roads area. This number represents 25.4% of the total Navy. When taken all together, the numbers from both sources are suggesting that 25% of the total global US Navy population is responsible for 30% of sexual assaults annually.
Where the comparisons between DoN SAPRO reports and NCIS data become a bit more differentiated is in the victim and offender demographics themselves. Part one of this chapter addresses the strength of the relationship between the individual demographic variables and sexual assault within the Hampton Roads area of Virginia’s U.S. Navy population. This comparison will focus those aforementioned demographics recorded by NCIS and the demographics recorded by the 2012 DoN SAPRO report in order to decipher any possible similar patterns.

With regard to victim characteristics, there were similarities and differences (mainly differences) between the 2012 DoN SAPRO reports and the NCIS data. In 2012, DoN SAPRO reported 332 completed sexual assault investigations. They reported that those 332 investigations contained 356 victims. Of those victims, 76% were white, and 89% were female. For the same year, the NCIS data showed that of the 160 sexual assault cases that were investigated, 82 (or 51.2%) of the victims were white and 148 (or 92.5%) of the victims were female. Further, the 2012 DoN SAPRO report said that of the 356 victims, the majority, or one third, held the rank of E3. The NCIS data showed that the most common ranks that victims held in 2012 was E2 (38 of the 160 total cases, or 23.8%) with E3 being the second most common (35 of the 160 total cases, or 21.9%). Lastly, the 2012 DoN SAPRO report showed that of the 356 victims, 65% were between the ages of 19 and 24. The NCIS data showed that the most common age of victims was 24 (25 of the 160 total cases, or 15.6%) with age 23 being the second most common (23 of the 160 total cases, or 14.4%) and 19 (21 of the total 160 cases, or 13.1%) being the third most common.

Interestingly, as was mentioned above, the Navy population in the Hampton Roads of Virginia is the largest Navy presence on Earth and as such, should be a good sample of the Navy
as a whole, so it is somewhat strange to have differences that are so large between the
demographics recorded by NCIS Norfolk, and DoN SAPRO. The female demographic is within
a few percentage points difference, but a 20 percentage point gap in big Navy’s numbers in
various categories and Hampton Roads Virginia Navy’s numbers illustrates the need for further
testing and examination of how these records are compiled.

With regard to offender characteristics, there were mostly differences between the 2012
DoN SAPRO reports and the NCIS data. The 2012 DoN SAPRO report shows that of the 332
completed sexual assault investigations, there were 354 subjects. These subjects were male in
93% of the cases. The 2012 NCIS data from Norfolk reported that only 81.2% of perpetrators
were male. Strangely, unlike for victims, no race information about suspects is given by the DoN
SAPRO report (and no reason for this omission is offered) so a comparison cannot be made here.
The DoN SAPRO report goes on the say that the majority of suspects (54%) held the rank of E3-
E6. The NCIS data by comparison showed the most common rank that perpetrators held in 2012
was E3 (26 of the 160 total cases, or 16.2%) with E4 being the second most common (25 of the
160 total cases, or 15.6%) and E5 being third most common (21 of the total 160 cases, or
13.1%). Lastly, with regard to the age of suspect, the 2012 DoN SAPRO report stated that 36%
of suspects fell between the ages of 19-24. The NCIS data showed that the most common age of
perpetrators was 25 (22 of the 160 total cases, or 13.8%) with age 22 and 21 being the second
most common again (20 of the 160 total cases, or 12.5% and, 14 of the total 160 cases, or 8.8%
respectively.)

Again here, differences are observed between the DoN SAPRO report and the NCIS data
for 2012. The two most troubling comparisons however rest in the rank and age demographic
categories. It is not at all surprising that the majority of perpetrators (54%) would fall between
the ranks of E3-E6 when 66.9% of all sailors fall within that category (U.S. Department of Defense 2012). The same line of logic could be applied to age, as 66% of all active duty personnel are under the age of 30 (U.S. Department of Defense 2012). Making the assumption that an entire grouping of a demographic block is behaving consistently without examining the individual increments is problematic. For example, if a result indicates that 54% of offenders fall between E3 and E6 could possibly lead to the conclusion that offending is greater the lower or higher the rank. The same erroneous assumption could be made about age, specifically that offending increases as age decreases/increases. As is shown by the individual increments displayed within the NCIS data however, these assumptions would be inaccurate. Breaking up the grouping by individual rank and age might be helpful in discerning actual patterns of victimization and offending.

The comparison of the demographics is helpful because, regardless of the possible inconsistent recording practices, the demographics are behaving similarly in both sources. This is important for two main reasons moving forward. First, these results contribute to what criminologists, other social scientists, legislators and policy makers understand about sexual assault within the military community. By understanding the demographic patterns, effective policies addressing victim and offender characteristics can be designed. Secondly, more accurate and appropriate studies can be designed so as to better understand military sexual assault moving forward.

**Part 3: Regression Analysis of Offender and Victim Demographic Characteristics**

The third part of this chapter compares suspect and victim characteristics of sexual assault and attempts to construct a predictive model concerning the likelihood that an individual
will be a suspect or victim of sexual assault. The models all consisted of a dependent dummy variable that divided all assaults in the Hampton Roads Virginia are into either “sex assault” (=1) or “other assault” (=0.) The independent variables for all three models consisted of age, race, gender and rank. With the exception of age, all of the variables were dummy variables; race for both suspect and victim was coded as white =1, non-white =0, suspect gender was coded male =1, non-male=0, victim gender was coded female =1, non-female =0, and for both suspects and victims rank was coded as officer =1, non-officer=0. Three models were ran to correspond with the three time periods that have been discussed so far (2002, 2007 and 2012.) The discussion of these three models will continue to follow in chronological order. It is generally expected that age and gender will be the strongest predictors, race will have no impact, and rank will be difficult to interpret due to the disproportionally low presence of officers in both suspect and victim categories.

Binary logistic regression was preformed to assess the impact of various demographic characteristics on the likelihood that an individual would be the suspect or victim of a sexual assault within the United States Navy for the year 2002. As was discussed in part one of this chapter, there was a total assaults N=160, of which, sex assault recorded an N of 76. The model contained six independent variables (df=6), suspect age, victim age, suspect race, victim race, suspect gender and victim gender. The model was statistically significant with a Chi-Square score of 53.436, p<.001, indicating that the model was able to distinguish between sexual assaults and other assaults. As a whole, the model explained between 28.8% and 38.5% of the variance in sexual assault occurrence, and correctly classified 72.6% of the cases.
**Table 4.3-2002 Regression Model**

2002-Offender and Victim Characteristics

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variable</th>
<th>B</th>
<th>Exp(B)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Suspect Age</td>
<td>.040</td>
<td>1.041</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Victim Age</td>
<td>-.309</td>
<td>.734**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Suspect White</td>
<td>-1.883</td>
<td>.152**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Victim White</td>
<td>2.189</td>
<td>8.928**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Suspect Male</td>
<td>-.259</td>
<td>.772</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Victim Female</td>
<td>2.189</td>
<td>8.927**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
<td>4.204</td>
<td>66.982</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**P<.05

As shown in the Table 4.3, four of the variables were found to be significant predictors of sexual assault when compared to other assaults. The strongest predictors for sexual assault for 2002 was victim age, and victim gender. For a one year increase in victim age, the likelihood of a sexual assault occurring decreases by (OR=.734.) Females are 8.927 times more likely to be the victim of sexual assault. Also significant was the race of the victims. White individuals are .014 times more likely to be the victim of sexual assault. Lastly, the race of the suspect was also significant, revealing that white individuals were .031 times more likely to be the suspect of a sexual assault.
Table 4.4-2007 Regression Model

2007-Offender and Victim Characteristics

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>B</th>
<th>Exp(B)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Suspect Age</td>
<td>.352</td>
<td>1.422**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Victim Age</td>
<td>-.681</td>
<td>.506**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Suspect White</td>
<td>-1.520</td>
<td>.219</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Victim White</td>
<td>2.085</td>
<td>8.041**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Suspect Officer</td>
<td>-.510</td>
<td>.601</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Suspect Male</td>
<td>.580</td>
<td>1.786</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Victim Female</td>
<td>-.609</td>
<td>.544</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
<td>5.429</td>
<td>227.899</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**P<.05

Binary logistic regression was preformed to assess the impact of various demographic characteristics on the likelihood that an individual would be the suspect or victim of a sexual assault within the United States Navy for the year 2007. As was discussed in part one of this chapter, there was a total assaults N=441, of which, sex assault recorded an N of 98. The model contained seven independent variables (df=7), suspect age, victim age, suspect race, victim race, suspect gender, victim gender and suspect rank. The model was statistically significant with a Chi-Square score of 86.932, p<.001, indicating that the model was able to distinguish between sexual assaults and other assaults. As a whole, the model explained between 21.9% and 34.2% of the variance in sexual assault occurrence, and correctly classified 86.4% of the cases.

As shown in the Table 4.4, again, four of the variables were found to be significant predictors of sexual assault when compared to other assaults. The strongest predictors for sexual assault for 2007 was again, age. For a one year increase in victim age, the likelihood of a sexual assault occurring decreases by (OR=.506.) However, for a one year increase in suspect age, the likelihood of a sexual assault occurring increases by (OR=1.422.) Also significant was the
variable race. White individuals are 8.041 times more likely to be the victim of sexual assault, and white individuals were also .219 times more likely to be the suspect of a sexual assault.

Table 4.5-2012 Regression Model

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>2012-Offender and Victim Characteristics</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>B</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-----------------------------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Suspect Age</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Victim Age</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Suspect White</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Victim White</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Suspect Officer</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Victim Officer</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Suspect Male</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Victim Female</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**p<.05

Binary logistic regression was also performed to assess the impact of various demographic characteristics on the likelihood that an individual would be the suspect or victim of a sexual assault within the United States Navy for the year 2012. As was discussed in part one of this chapter, there was a total assaults N=268, of which, sex assault recorded an N of 160. The model contained eight independent variables (df=8), suspect age, victim age, suspect race, victim race, suspect gender, victim gender, suspect rank and victim rank. The model was statistically significant with a Chi-Square score of 52.082, p<.001, indicating that the model was able to distinguish between sexual assaults and other assaults. As a whole, the model explained between 32.6% and 59.4% of the variance in sexual assault occurrence, and correctly classified 92.4% of the cases. As shown in the Table 4.5, unfortunately, only one of the variables was found to be a significant predictor of sexual assault when compared to other assaults. The strongest predictor
of sexual assault for 2012 was victim gender. Females are 47.932 times more likely to be the victim of sexual assault in 2012.

While not all the independent variables were found to be significant predictors of sexual assault when compared to other assaults within the US Navy, there were a few major takeaways. First, age was found to be a significant predictor in both 2002 and 2007. Consistently between the two time periods, victim age was found to be a strong predictor, demonstrating that younger sailors have a higher likelihood of being the victim of sexual assault. In a surprising turn, race was found to also be a significant predictor. In both 2002 and 2007, white individuals were more likely to be the victim and suspect of sexual assault. Lastly, victim gender was also found to be significant in 2002 and 2012, with females being much more likely to be the victim of sexual assault. The potential implications of these findings will be discussed in greater detail in chapter 5.
CHAPTER 7
POLICY IMPLICATIONS AND DISCUSSION

This dissertation is an examination of the sexual assault issue within the United States Navy. Chapter one discussed the structure and organization of the military as well as military sociological and criminological literature that contributes to an understanding of crime within the military. Chapter two took it a step further and addressed the crime of sexual assault specifically and in the context of the military community and similarly situated communities. Chapter three explained the data that would be used and analysis that would occur. The results from chapter four were interesting and relevant to a discussion of policy implications and future research moving forward in the future with this topic.

While most criminological dissertations focus of a specific contribution to the field utilizing a sophisticated statistical analysis, this dissertation is different in the sense that while the quantitative analysis is valuable, the contribution to the field’s understanding of military sexual assault via the collection of relevant literature and construction of ideas about it is just as valuable. As such, implications of this dissertation can generally be broken in to two categories; implications from the examination and analysis of both the NCIS and DoD data, and implications from the collected literature relevant to sexual assault in the Navy specifically and the US Military as a whole.

Implications Stemming from the Analysis

With regard to the implications stemming from the findings from the data, the most important and overwhelming message is clear; the collection, classification and housing of
military crime data, and military sexual assault data specifically, must be improved. While no crime database is perfect, a logical starting point would be to model a military crime database after the civilian Uniform Crime Report (UCR) and put to work the 50+ years of research that has been done on the UCR and housing of civilian crime data to construct and maintain a military crime database. Simply put, any agency tasked with investigating a crime involving military personnel needs to submit information about that investigation to the central military crime database. Utilizing the same recording practices and information gathering techniques that civilian police departments utilize would make implementing this process in the military relatively easy. A few adjustments accounting for military specific details could be made to the reporting forms. It is recommended that either the Defense Data Manpower Center or a newly DoD sanction and created crime specialty data management office be tasked with housing and managing this database. This office and its criminologist employees should be tasked with writing any and all reports concerning crime within the military, and not the DoD SAPRO employees.

The importance of reliable data in addressing crime cannot be understated, and recently, a growing number of politicians are also calling for a reliable and accurate measurement. United States Senator Kristen Gillibrand (D-NY) appears to be leading the charge. In May of this year (2015) many news organizations got a hold of a report she released where she accused the DoD of not providing her with complete and accurate information about military sexual assault at many bases throughout the nation. She went on further to state that of the 107 cases she examined, less than a quarter went to trial, and of those, 11 obtained convictions (Office of U.S. Senator Kristen Gillibrand 2015).
While modeling a military crime database after a civilian crime database is the suggestion, civilian oversight in military legal/criminal matters is not. Legal matters within the military community need to be handled by the JAG corps and independent objective commands. They are really the only ones in a position to both objectively investigate and prosecute sexual assaults. This satisfies the need to remove the case proceedings from direct command and also the requests to utilize an outside party to investigate and prosecute.

The second most important take away from the analysis of the NCIS and DoD data rests in the possible inconsistencies with regard to the recording of the total sexual assault cases themselves. As was discussed in Chapter 3, there was some disagreement within the DoD SAPRO with regard to the legal definition or the clinical (counseling) definition of sexual assault. There needs to be a military-wide accepted definition of what constitutes a sexual assault and what does not. Having different definitions by branch and by recording agency make for a situation where inaccurate and inconsistent data is collected, making any type of meaningful analysis nearly impossible. Currently, the DoD has a reasonable definition of sexual assault,

> Intentional sexual contact characterized by use of force, threats, intimidation, or abuse of authority or when the victim does not or cannot consent. The term includes a broad category of sexual offenses consisting of the following specific Uniform Code of Military Justice (UCMJ) offenses: rape, sexual assault, aggravated sexual contact, abusive sexual contact, nonconsensual sodomy (forced oral or anal sex), or attempts to commit these acts.

It is essential that going forward, if this is the definition, then all branches must adhere to this definition with regard to recording practices. While it is a noble idea that unwanted and harassing speech must not be tolerated, treating speech or other non-physical acts as sexual assaults and recording them as such is problematic and would need to be avoided.

Lastly, with regard to the data itself, even when accounting for the inconsistencies and differences between the NCIS and DoD sources, it appears that some victim and offender
demographics hold true. These demographics have a strong literature foundation (see chapters 1, 2 and 3,) so the results that were found in the analysis portion of this project were not surprising. These demographic trends need to be the foundation of future policies constructed to address the problem of sexual assault. Victim policies and education needs to be structured in such a way that understands that females between the ages of 19 and 24, holding the rank of E2-E4 are most often the victims of sexual assault, and that offenders holding the rank of E4 are most often the perpetrators.

Figure 5.1-Bathroom Flyer
Furthermore, the current sentiment of only addressing victim behavior and not perpetrator behavior is unacceptable. Table 5.1 is a picture of a flyer posted to a women’s bathroom at Wright-Patterson AFB. While the overall idea of educating women about what they could possibly do to avoid being a suitable target of sexual assault, and informing them of the helpful resources available to them should they become a victim of sexual assault is a good thing, it raises the question of what is or is not posted in the men’s restroom next door, and also, reinforces the cultural myth that victims are somehow responsible for their victimization. It is suggested that balance is grossly missing from the sexual assault education movement within the military. Posting warnings only in the restroom of the gender that is most likely to be victimized while ignoring the gender that is most likely to perpetrate is absurd. A reasonable suggestion for illustrating this point on a flyer that is most likely missing from the men’s restroom would be the following:

ATTENTION: Sexual assault is a crime and is not tolerated in the United States Military. If accused, your career could potentially be in jeopardy. If convicted you will serve jail time. The following are all helpful tips for avoiding being a perpetrator of sexual assault: Pay attention to your surroundings and take note of predatory behavior within your party. Do not allow members of your party to be unwillingly secluded. Socialize with people who share your same values. Do not serve anyone more alcohol when they are already intoxicated. Do not drug anyone. Do not physically harm anyone in order to have sex with them. Do not force an individual to have sex via the use of intimidation or a gang of people. Should you see any of these behaviors, report them appropriately. Failure to do so makes you an accessory and you will serve jail time. Preventing sexual assault is everyone’s duty.

Lastly, the results from the regression models themselves are valuable in terms of a better understanding of the demographics of sexual assault victims and offenders and possible policy implications. While no one variable was consistently significant over the three time periods, a few were significant in at least two of the time periods and are worthy of discussion. In 2002 and 2007 age was a significant predictor of victimization, with younger women being more likely to
be victimized. For 2007, suspect age was a significant predictor suggesting that the older a male gets, the more likely he is to offend. The take away from the age variables is that traditional military sexual assault education, which has been geared at both genders under the age of 30 perhaps needs to be redirected and altered for the suspect’s age. While it appears that education geared to victims is hitting an appropriate audience, it could be suggested that new education needs to be developed and tailored specifically towards the 25-40 crowd. This education could perhaps include addressing the “old school” mentality towards women in the military, as well as what used to be, but no longer is acceptable workplace behavior.

Gender was another significant predictor, however it was only significant for victims. Females have overwhelmingly higher odds of being the victim of sexual assault than their male counterparts. While this may seem obvious to some of those tasked with developing curriculum for military sexual assault education programs, simply informing women of their higher risk of victimization is not sufficient. It is suggested that those tasked with constructing these programs delve into the available literature concerning gender construction, workplace gender power dynamics, violence against women and sexual harassment and incorporate these readings into the curriculum. Informing military personnel that women are more likely to be victims of sexual assault is helpful, but providing context and explaining why it is the case and what elements of society have contributed to this situation allows for an individual to start questioning their environment and beliefs and then allows them to entertain the notion of change.

The most surprising result, by far, from the regression models was that race was a significant predictor of both victim and offender status for two of the three models. Generally speaking, in criminology, race is never a significant predictor. This very surprising result indicates that both those individual who identify as white are more likely to be both victims and
offenders of sexual assault in the US Navy. While gender equality has always been a problem in the US military, racial equality issues have been greatly improving since around the time of the Vietnam War. In today’s military, many of the systemic racial inequalities experienced in the civilian world are lessened. It is possible however that the regression model results are the result of a couple possibilities, first, simple numbers game where minorities still make up the minority of the military population, and two, reporting trends.

It is possible that there could be racial reporting trends that are rooted in cultural and civilian experiences that have accompanied individual military personnel into the military. Some literature has suggested that African American women have historically been perceived as sexually promiscuous and therefore sexual crimes against them are less offensive (Collins 1985; Neville and Pugh 1997). If this concept was playing out in the US military, then it would be expected that black women would have a higher chance of being victimized and the results don’t indicate that. It could be assumed then that the reporting practice trends might be responsible. Neville and Pugh 1997 suggest that, culturally specific attitudes towards the police might explain African American women’s’ unwillingness to report sexual assaults, specifically that a general distrust of the police and that a belief that the police would not take the claims seriously is to blame. Translated from civilian to military implications, it is suggested that sexual assault education within the US military include a very clear reporting procedure and a continued assurance that claims will be received, investigated fully, and victims will not need to fear retaliatory action.
Implications Stemming from Other DoD Report-Based Information

Two interesting points of information contained within the DoD’s report on sexual assault from 2012 are relevant to this discussion on policy and future research implications: First is the data concerning how NCIS was notified by of the unrestricted cases of sexual assault, and second, the amount of cases that were unable to be substantiated. The issue of how NCIS is notified of cases is best illustrated with the graph provided by the DoD’s 2012 report on sexual assault (see table 5.2.)

Figure 5.2-NCIS Notification

As the table 5.2 shows, 40% of the cases are being reported to NCIS by individual commands, and only 21% from the victims themselves. Chapters 1 and 2 illustrated all the potential reasons why having a victim of sexual assault in the military go through their command
in order to receive help or to pursue charges. Ideally, moving forward, this number needs to decrease. This could be achieved in two ways: First, an independent investigative resource needs to be in place. This could be achieved by continuing to rely on NCIS, but also by allocating more responsibility to investigate these crimes to the JAG corps. They are really the only ones in a position to both objectively investigate and prosecute sexual assaults. This would also satisfy the need to remove the case proceedings from direct command and also the requests to utilize an outside party to investigate and prosecute. Second, more education needs to be enacted geared towards letting military personnel know that their first option in reporting a sexual assault is not their command.

Another problem revealed by the reports is the issue of reported cases of sexual assault and the amount of those cases that can actually be substantiated (found to be legitimate cases of sexual assault and not processed out in some other way). In the entire military-wide DoD report on sexual assault from 2012, there were a total of 1320 sexual assault victims involved in cases that were investigated. Of those, only 817 were substantiated. The suspects for the same year show a similar result; of the 1406 alleged suspects, cases against only 749 were able to be substantiated. This finding leads to two very relevant questions, what happened with the nearly half of all the cases that couldn’t be substantiated? And also, what can be done to address this gap?

One unfortunate aspect to the question of the unsubstantiated cases is the issue of false claims of sexual assault. A surprising suggestion to help address this number might be to decriminalize consensual sexual acts between members of the military. On its face, anti-fraternization rules make a lot of sense; they help prevent emotional issues in the workplace and also help prevent favoritism. But these rules fail to take into account two major indisputable
unmalleable fact; first, consensual sex is a normal function of any adult population regardless of any conditions of that adult population including isolation, occupation, religion, stress, etc. . . and second, the criminalization of consensual sex inherently requires more than one person. This inherent joint-culpability creates a possible power situation for one of the involved parties. When two or more individuals are found to have engaged in a sexual encounter, their career is immediately in jeopardy. As such, facing severe damage to one’s career as well as the loss of years’ worth of effort, the self-preserving move (particularly if the individual is female and a fraternization conviction would become public knowledge to any and all colleagues, carrying with it all of the usual gendered sexual stigmatization) might be to claim that the encounter was non-consensual.

The acknowledgement that some of the sexual assault claims as not legitimate is not a comfortable line of thinking for any policy maker to really go down, but just as we must give every victim the care, dignity and respect that they deserve, we must also acknowledge that the current system is absolutely conducive to creating a power situation in which victimization can be falsely claimed to protect against punitive sanctions. According to the reports, a nearly 50% gap in reported sexual assaults and those that could be substantiated demands that, if false claims are being made, the question of why must be examined and address. If the goal of anti-fraternization rules (as well as adultery rules) is to prevent emotional tangles, distraction and favoritism in the workplace, then simply identify and severely punish those behaviors should they arise. Treating our military personnel as adults who are capable of making decisions as well as simplifying the rules in this regard could possibly decrease the amount of potential false claims that exist. With the decrease of false claims comes the increase in attention and credibility afforded to legitimate claims of sexual assault. As consensual sex within the military community
is decriminalized, the attention paid to individual sexual assault investigations, the resources
allocated for said investigations, and the consequences rendered to one who is found to have
committed a sexual assault all must increase.

Lastly, the issue of actual sexual assaults and reported sexual assaults needs to be
addressed and clarified in both official reports and media reports. Often times, media reports rely
on official reports, but many times, the confusion is so great that the full picture becomes very
distorted. In 2013, all of the major news organizations ran with the story that for 2012, there
were 26,000 reports of sexual assault military wide. Many of them cited a “pentagon study.” At
the same time, the DoD released their sexual assault report for 2012 and as discussed previously,
stated that a total 3,374 occurred. This is obviously a huge discrepancy. The 26,000 number
comes from an anonymous self-report survey conducted by the Defense Manpower Data Center
the concerned workplace environment. The DoD’s report is comprised of all sexual assault cases
actually reported and investigated. The DMDC’s workplace environment study is relevant
because much like self-report surveys used by criminologists, this is really the only way to
uncover the “dark figure of crime” associated with this particular offense within the military. In
terms of a number of “actual” sexual assaults that take place, it would be reasonable to assume
that the number falls somewhere in between the two numbers. Without clearer definitions of
what exactly constitutes sexual assault, and better reporting practices, the actual number may
never be uncovered.

Implications Stemming From the Literature

A series of themes appear in the literature relevant to military sexual assault; historical
military workplace culture, combat hypermasculinity. Addressing these themes are central to
making adjustments to the cultural elements within the military workplace that are perhaps contributing to sexual assaults. As was discussed in chapter 1, the military has a historical conscious of being men only. This cultural element needs to be done away with, essentially, the military needs to cast off the idea of cultural nostalgia, “the good old days” when women weren’t allowed. Those days were a mistake, and the cultural remnants of those days are embarrassing to our military. Sentiments expressed towards those days need to not be tolerated. Brownson (2015:771) also suggests promoting understanding, adaptation and acceptance the terms equivalent and equal in the workplace, Not simply a matter of semantics, utilization of the word “equivalent” as opposed to “equal” is critical in this discussion and in understanding the distinction between the physicality, skills, and behaviors both males and females bring to their Marine Corps experience. Although females may not be physically equal to their male peers in terms of strength and endurance, they certainly possess the potential to exhibit equivalency with the males.

To further combat hypermasculinity, Morris (1996) suggests integrating more and more women into military roles, particularly combat roles. Suggests replacing a culture of hypermasculinity with one of “ungendered professionalism” as the bond that holds these units together. Again, a noble idea, but as was demonstrated in chapter 1, the inherent culture of much of the combat groups, particularly the special warfare and special forces communities, revolves around hypermasculinity and forcing these groups to integrate is a recipe for disaster. Barrett’s (1996) findings on hypermasculinity differences by job within the Navy point towards a job specific approach in combating sexual assaults within the military but specifically within the Navy and essentially suggest fully integrated non-combat roles and fully segregated combat roles.

This idea is not unprecedented. It his however uncomfortable and extremely un-politically correct. In a nation where the Supreme Court has declared separate is very much not
equal with regard to Constitutional, it becomes difficult to even entertain the idea that separate might be a good idea in the armed forces. There are those in the special warfare community who believe that women are just as capable as men but believe that mixing the two would be disastrous, even catastrophic. The main argument against integration is simply the physical differences between men and women. Entertain the above quote above by Brownson (2015) in conjunction with the following example. A 6’2”, 220 pound Navy SEAL, fully kitted up with nearly 100 additional pounds of gear who finds himself injured in a combat situation could not possibly be dragged to safety by a female Navy SEAL (as women have been cleared to attend BUDS as this dissertation goes to print) standing roughly 5’8,” weighing 145lbs with nearly 100 lbs of additional gear on herself. Even if she is the strongest woman on earth, she can’t drag 300 pounds to safety. A smaller male SEAL would have difficulty doing it. The other major argument against integration of combat groups is what was illustrated in chapter 1, and that is, that a woman amongst these men would not be treated as an equal, but rather as a piece of meat.

So what is the solution here? Unfortunately, one of America’s most embarrassing mistakes might hold the key to addressing separate combat roles; the treatment of African Americans during WWII, specifically the case of the Tuskegee Airmen. Women who want to serve their nation in combat roles, and specifically within the special forces and special warfare communities, need to do so separately. It is an indisputable fact that the treatment of African American service members during WWII was unacceptable and embarrassing. The reasons they were segregated were arbitrary, not thought out, and downright illogical. But the one small beacon of light in the entire sham was that when pushed down and segregated, the Tuskegee Airmen, a squadron of all black pilots, not only preformed, but exceeded the performance of their white colleagues and eventually accepted these pilots as their equals. The same needs to be
done with women entering the special warfare and special forces communities. Let these women stand on their own and prove themselves as equals and they will be accepted as equals, or the equivalent, of their male colleagues. This equality will carry with it, an intolerance of sexual assault within these communities, effectively stopping a sexual assault issue before there really is one.

Highlight the differences where they do exist and capitalize on them. The impact of integrating women into the military is not a myth or untested idea; it has been tested repeatedly with consistent results demonstrating a definite effect. As previously stated, Savage and Gabriel (1976) mentioned the tie between integrating women and decreased unit cohesion and, “recent evidence suggests that under certain circumstances, the increased presence of women in U.S. Army companies is indeed associated with decreased cohesion, but no specific reasons for this have been established” (Rosen et al. 1999, Rosen et al. 2003:325-6). Further, from a measurable standpoint, the hypermasculinity and group cohesion are definitely effected by integrating women.

Group hypermasculinity was significantly positively associated at the group level with both vertical and horizontal cohesion in male-only units. However, the relationship between these variables in mixed gender units was negative. Thus, the presence of women in military units does not simple decrease the levels of group hypermasculinity, but changes the relationship of group hypermasculinity to cohesion. With women present in the unit, hypermasculinity is no longer related to positive outcomes, and may even be related to negative outcomes. (Rosen et al. 2003:344)

Lastly, in combating sexual assault from the military workplace cultural standpoint, certain myths about sexual assault need to be identified as myths and eradicated. Castro et al. (2015) do a good job of listing off these damaging myths. Included amongst them are the following:
Only women are assaulted. People who commit sexual assaults are of certain backgrounds. People who offend are evil and appear different than others. Sexual assault is less of a problem these days. If she was raped, why is she talking to him the next day? She would have resisted if she didn’t want to have sex. He couldn’t help himself. She shouldn’t have been drinking. She had sex with him before.

All of these myths are problematic to the overall efforts to combat sexual assault because they make assumptions about the blameworthiness of the victim in the crime that was committed against them. As was seen above with the image of the flyer posted in the women’s restroom on an Air Force base, victim blaming is so perverse in the military culture that it even dictates the attempts made to prevent sexual assault. Going forward, SAPRO education needs to be less centered around victim behavior and more centered around conveying the clear message to potential offenders that sexual assault is 100% not tolerated in the United States Military.

**Limitations**

As with any study, a few limitations do exist. The issue of the data itself is problematic. As was discussed in chapter 3, the data from NCIS was obtained via FOIA request and because of the nature of the data, this non-NCIS personnel researcher was not allowed to have access to the cases from which the data files were constructed. While it is assumed that Mr. Poche worked with the highest level of diligence and thoroughness, human error is entirely possible. Flaws with the data file construction are possible and at this point relatively unknown. It has also come to the attention of this researcher that after the data from NCIS was handed over for examination, a new electronic system was put in place to manage NCIS’ cases. If Mr. Poche were to compile a data file today, it would possibly be easier and more efficient. While the data itself didn’t change in that time period, the means of assembling it did, and in this way, there is potential for change.
Also, the data that was obtained from NCIS only contained the independent variables age, race, rank and gender. That was greatly limiting in this current study which focuses strongly on the impact of workplace culture and structure in understanding military sexual assault. A future strategy that examines cultural elements and community sentiments would be extremely helpful.

Lastly, the research was greatly hindered by the DoD’s SAPRO reports themselves. The reports are written in such a way that is greatly confusing to anyone attempting to understand the data within. Items are labeled unclearly in places. Tables are structured in very confusing ways. Attempting to do any type of outer-agency comparison or analysis is extremely difficult. While the researcher is fairly certain that the comparative analysis contained within the dissertation is correct based on how the reports were labeled, there does exist the possibility of error concerning the information contained within the reports themselves that the researcher has no way of verifying or examining for accuracy.
CHAPTER 8

CONCLUSION

The problem of sexual assault in the military is unacceptable. The prolonged inadequacy and inefficiency in addressing the problem and the subsequent cover-ups is embarrassing on a global scale. It must stop.

As this goes to print, several cases continue to appear in the media of sexual assaults within the military community, and subsequent intimation and cover-ups. (List lots of them all and brief details.) While there is much discussion amongst the leadership and legislative and executive branches, there is a gross failure to act in any significant way.

Implementation of these changes will be extremely difficult. But it is entirely possible. It may be time to acknowledge the culture of military leadership and how this contributes to an unwillingness to address and act in an effective way. Enacting any type of action moving forward forces an admittance of failure and as a result, a head will roll somewhere for it. While dealing with this problem, we need to consider harsh punishments for those who knowingly covered up these crimes and allowed for them to occur, but also forgiveness and understanding for those who were following established policies in good faith.

Crime is a normal function of any given society. Sexual assault, unfortunately, is going to occur in any given society. The idea of eradication is, while noble in its notion, naive and out of touch. Many societies have tried many different approaches, both peaceful and extremely punitive, to deter any number of crimes and have failed miserably. The first and immediate step that must be taken is an acceptance of the idea that these horrific crimes are going to happen. Make no mistake, this is not an acceptance of the crimes themselves! This is an acceptance of the notion
that the crime will occur, and with this acknowledgement and acceptance comes vigilance. The military must be vigilant and on guard against these crimes at all times, with no exception so that the idea that sexual assault is just a “hazard of the job” can be tossed away once and for all.
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VITA

Caitlin Veronica Muldoon
Department of Sociology and Criminal Justice
Norfolk, VA 23529

Education
(Expected) December, 2015 PhD Criminology, Old Dominion University, Norfolk, VA
May, 2009 M.A. Criminal Justice, University of Toledo, Toledo, OH.
May, 2008 B.A. Political Science, Salisbury University, Salisbury, MD.

Teaching Experience
• CRJS 427: Violence Against Women, Old Dominion University
• CRJS 396: Military Communities and Crime, Old Dominion University
• CRJS 262: Law and the Criminal Justice System, Old Dominion University
• CRJS 215: Introduction to Criminology, Old Dominion University

Professional Presentations
• Muldoon, Caitlin. 2015. “Examining the Connection Between Social Media and Sexual Assault within the Military Community.” American Society of Criminology, Washington DC.
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Academy of Criminal Justice Sciences