Fall 2015

'Home was Congo': Refugees and Durable Displacement in the Borderlands of 1,000 Hills

Erika Frydenlund
Old Dominion University

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‘HOME WAS CONGO’: REFUGEES AND DURABLE DISPLACEMENT IN THE

BORDERLANDS OF 1,000 HILLS

by

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Old Dominion University in Partial Fulfillment of the
Requirements for the Degree of

DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY

INTERATIONAL STUDIES

OLD DOMINION UNIVERSITY
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Approved by:

Jennifer N. Fish (Director)
David C. Earnest (Member)
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ABSTRACT

‘HOME WAS CONGO’: REFUGEES AND DURABLE DISPLACEMENT IN THE BORDERLANDS OF 1,000 HILLS

Erika Frydenlund
Old Dominion University, 2015
Director: Dr. Jennifer N. Fish

As forced migrants linger at the borders of the world’s conflicts, refugees from the Democratic Republic of Congo in Rwanda remain in camps where they have waited for ‘durable solutions’ to their geographic and political existence for nearly two decades. Protracted displacement such as this results from processes at the local, state, regional, and international levels, with consequences reverberating each of these levels, including insecurity, expenditure of already limited resources, and strained interstate political relationships. As refugees’ stays extend to increasingly long periods of time, situations once assumed to be temporary take on a semblance of permanence. Forced displacement increasingly transitions to relatively durable living instances of conflict spillover, articulating the wider human impacts of such patterns of vital, and often understudied, outcomes of conflict and power struggles. Using a qualitative approach within a specific site of displacement in the Great Lakes Region of Africa, this study engages in dialog with notions of sovereignty, post-colonialism, social constructivism, burden-sharing, and social stratification to uncover the possible motivations for making refugee situations permanent.

Home to approximately 16,000 Congolese refugees, Kiziba Camp in western Rwanda serves as a microcosm through which one can observe these multi-layered humanitarian aid and refugee hosting processes. By analyzing semi-structured interview and ethnographic data collected from Kiziba Camp in 2011, 2013, and 2014, interviews with key Rwandan government representatives, and existing media sources and nongovernmental organization reports, this research links the pursuit and maintenance of state sovereignty, as well as aspects of social construction at the local-level, with processes that contribute to protracted displacement. Analyses of this original data reveal intentional and unintentional factors emanating from state foreign and domestic policies, NGO disaster and humanitarian assistance rhetoric, as well as refugees’ own conceptualization of citizenship, identity, and belonging that contribute to the durability refugee displacement. Through the personal narratives of community leaders of Kiziba Camp, this study begins to reveal a theory about state dependency on refugee hosting and the agency of
refugees to imagine and define themselves, and how these factors contribute to a form of displacement that becomes increasingly durable over time.
For my mentors, Jennifer and David, for all the inspiring and educating you do in this world. You are the reason these words ever found their way to paper and you exemplify what it means to be teachers and mentors.

*Kiziba youth:* First of all, home is always home. If someone can guarantee me my security, home is always home. I can prefer going home than anywhere in the world. But for now I can’t see any stability in my country. Then for my future or my hope, I would like to go abroad.

Jennifer: Where would you like to go? Where abroad?

*Kiziba youth:* America. The reason why I prefer America? I can see myself, it’s my first time [to see] a student traveling with her professor. It shows the value that you are giving to your people. So, in here, I’ve never seen any teacher walking with one student because there [are] hundreds of students. He can’t get even one moment to take care of one student. So, you are a good example.

Jennifer: Thank you. We are very lucky though. We have a very special relationship. Not every teacher travels with a student one on one.
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

My family provided me with immeasurable support during this very long dissertation journey. Thomas, my husband, worked through so many of the ideas encompassed in these pages that he deserves a special thanks for the role he played in getting this story out into the world. It was he who convinced me not to miss the opportunity to go to Rwanda when the opportunity arose. My parents, Emiko and Doug, have always brought love and support to everything I do, and made all of this possible from the beginning. José Padilla spent a more than generous amount of time preparing me through academic discussions and questions to hone in on my core ideas about durability and forced migration. Andy Collins invested in weekly motivation talks to keep me motivated to finish. Mike Robinson forced me to set aside time every day to put these words on paper. I am forever grateful for these colleagues who valued the completion of this project even though it sat well outside their own disciplines. In particular, I would like to thank Daniel O’Leary, who sat with me in a coffee shop when I wanted to give up, and wouldn’t leave until we had collectively figured out how to motivate me to keep my academic dreams alive. From that day sprung this project about Kiziba that I wasn’t brave enough to start on my own.

Serendipitous encounters brought so many people together for this project that I cannot name them all. None of this would be possible without the generosity of the people living in Kiziba camp and the many other Rwandese and Congolese who opened their hearts and lives to me, helped me to navigate bureaucratic systems, and inspired me to keep going. A chance meeting with Gaston, in particular, shaped this entire endeavor. I am very grateful to Minister Séraphine Mukantabana, who shared parts of her own refugee experience as well has her diplomatic opinions about refugees in Rwanda. The interview with her was one of the highlights of my time in Rwanda as all of the pieces started to fall together. I also would like to thank Ibrahim, Kenyatta, Juliennne and her very supportive family, Jules, and Angelique. I feel so lucky and privileged to call you all friends and to have had the opportunity to work with you through these years.
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<td>Democratic Republic of Congo</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GOE</td>
<td>Group of Experts</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>INGO</td>
<td>International Nongovernmental Organization</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>M23</td>
<td>March 23 Movement, Militia group in eastern DRC</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MIDIMAR</td>
<td>Ministry of Disaster Management and Refugee Affairs (Rwanda)</td>
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<tr>
<td>UN</td>
<td>United Nations</td>
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<tr>
<td>UNHCR</td>
<td>United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees</td>
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<td>WFP</td>
<td>World Food Programme</td>
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INTRODUCTION

We are asking you who have power, who can make something...If you can make this happen for us, in general—not only me, all the refugees around the world or the refugees here—to return back home because it's where we feel happy. Everyone needs to live where he feels it’s his home. But here, it's somewhere else—in a foreign country.
- 2014 Interview, Elder Village Leader, Kiziba Camp

Nearly 43 million people make up a global “population of concern” under the watchful eye of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR). This number includes refugees, internally displaced persons (IDPs), asylum-seekers, and stateless persons. As the most macro-level systems of international governance establish humanitarian relief efforts, a network of INGO support structures, and “durable solutions” to the refugee crisis, the long-term prospects for lasting solutions—that would restore “home” as a place to live without fear of death or persecution—are little more than a dream for the vast majority of the world’s displaced. In 2013, only 414,600 refugees returned to their countries of origins; just 98,400 refugees resettled in 21 countries to start new lives (UNHCR, 2015e). That amounts to just a little over one percent of UNHCR’s population of concern. What happens to the rest?

Protracted refugee situations refer to those in which populations of more than 25,000, originating from the same country of origin, live as refugees in another country for more than five years (Executive Committee of the High Commissioner’s Programme Standing Committee, 2004). Forced migrants usually leave their homes believing their separation from home will be short. Ongoing conflict, political instability, and questions of legal citizenship claims in the country of origin increasingly lengthen the time spent in exile. In the meantime, these forced migrants bear the weight of the label “refugee” and are most often relegated to particular geographically contained spaces and the protection of the international system. By some estimates, protracted refugees who linger under this system for more than five years account for nearly two-thirds of all cases in the world (US Department of State, 2011), with the average at around 20 years in protraction (Loescher & Milner, 2009). They represent a global phenomenon of refugee “warehousing” and “wasted lives” of human potential (Bauman, 2004; M. Smith, 2004). The enduring
nature of these protracted situations motivated this study to explore ideas about durability in displacement.¹

Long-staying refugee scenarios often result from “chronic regional insecurity” and political impasses (Loescher & Milner, 2009). Complicated by the complex relationship between refugee producing and receiving countries, intervention by humanitarian aid organizations and a number of political, cultural, and economic factors further entrenches populations in intractable situations (Lischer, 2006; Loescher & Milner, 2005b). Many reviews of protracted displacement focus on security implications, political responses, and humanitarian strategies. These analyses delve into the role of state and non-state actors (Betts, 2008; Jacobsen, 2000; Lischer, 2006; Loescher & Milner, 2009; Salehyan & Gleditsch, 2006), with some even considering the agency and experiences of refugees themselves (Milner, 2011; S. Turner, 2010). This study seeks to examine the interplay between different actors and levels of analysis through the close study of a refugee camp location in the Great Lakes Region of Africa. Kiziba Camp encapsulates core complexities of displacement within the wider political context and the vital role forced migrants play in larger conflicts of land, identity, ethnicity, and social-economic-political power struggles. In order to uncover relationships that may contribute to protracted displacement. I move beyond identifying actors and focus on the processes as experienced by refugees themselves, who are paradoxically relegated to a distinctly marginal status within the global system that structures their displacement, while being active agents of both change and the reproduction of a distinctly “outsider-within” status. By exploring the systems and processes of a protracted existence, I uncover evidence that these situations are more than lengthy; they are in fact becoming durable forms of displacement.

BACKGROUND

Kiziba Camp, on the western border of Rwanda, serves as a case study for exploring the relationship between state, non-state, and refugee motivations for potentially maintaining displacement. This camp is one of five in Rwanda and houses over 16,000 refugees, mostly from the Democratic

¹ Throughout this study, I use the term “protracted displacement” to refer to long-staying or long-term refugees. Protraction here refers specifically to length and duration, and most commonly implies that the refugee context is still temporary. In contrast, I use the term “durable displacement” to refer to the transition from temporary (the traditional understanding of refugee situations) to permanent. Durability, then, refers to the changes in process, mentality, and treatment of camp residents in protracted situations that implies “no return and no road forward” (Bauman, 2004, p. 77).
Republic of Congo (DRC) (UNHCR, 2014c). The majority of camp residents arrived over 18 years ago and faces an extremely low likelihood of a near-term solution. This camp reflects broader regional political relationships that ultimately prevent safe return to the residents’ home villages. Refugees in Kiziba originate from several of the DRC’s easternmost provinces, with deep historical ties to Rwanda and a shared cultural and colonial past (Makombo, 1997; Mamdani, 2001, 2002; Prunier, 2009). The tense political relationship between host and sending countries and the notion that the DRC is a weak or failed state (Kraxberger, 2012; Reyntjens, 2007) illustrate the political intractability of so many protracted scenarios around the world. Political and security conditions in eastern DRC threaten not only Kiziba refugees’ plans for return, but also the very rights of citizenship and civic participation if repatriation became an option (Adelman & Barkan, 2011; Hovil, 2011; Makombo, 1997). On the surface, the high level of coordination among humanitarian assistance international nongovernmental organizations (INGOs) and the Rwandan host government exemplifies the caretaking role of these refugees. Delving deeper into the daily experiences of elected camp leaders, however, reveals that these systems may in fact contribute to enduring protraction.

This research draws upon original data collected over the course of three field visits to Kiziba Camp to situate this distinct case within five interlocking theories that address the motivations of states and INGOs in relation to protracted displacement. It considers how refugees fit into a larger system of state sovereignty in order to exacerbate displacement duration. This study assumes that states are motivated to preserve sovereignty and physical territory in order to access resources, recognition, and power, even in an ever-globalizing and flattening world (Friedman, 2005). The meaning and relevance of “sovereignty,” particularly in relation to territory and citizenship, is central to the growth of International Relations (IR) as the field strives to comprehend the realities of the complex flows of people who accompany political, economic, and technological flows across national borders. Analyses of forced migration throw into focus the tangible effects of such shifting patterns of global restructuring, at once challenging and reinforcing the territorial grounding of state sovereignty. By stripping refugees, IDPs, and

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2 The official name of the camp is Kiziba Refugee Camp. Local residents and INGO workers refer to this site as Kiziba or Kiziba Camp. Throughout this study, I employ the term Kiziba Camp to refer to this location.
stateless persons of physical place, or home, as well as political space to perform as citizens, the act of forced migration emphasizes the contemporary relevance of territory, space, and belonging (Agamben, 1998; Betts, 2009a; Mbembe, 2000). Set in the bucolic oasis of Rwanda's "land of 1,000 hills," these overarching IR theories manifest in Kiziba refugees’ conceptualizations of ‘home’ and the larger meaning of place within the particular borderland conflict that lingers across the lake.

This study is a significant contribution to the field of forced migration in that it begins to connect the actors of the global refugee regime and implicate them in the maintenance of durable, rather than temporary, displacement. It fills a gap in the literature that fails to connect systems of displacement across levels of analysis at the local, state, regional, and international levels. Furthermore, by delving into the particular dimensions of Kiziba Camp as a microcosm of the larger refugee situation, I offer the most comprehensive analysis to date on this exemplar location and its surrounding socio-political dynamics. Knowledge of these connections may help all actors in the global refugee regime, including refugees themselves, better engage in the peacemaking, peace-building, and durable solution finding processes that can lead to resolution of at least some contemporary protracted political refugee situations. By understanding how each actor intentionally or unintentionally contributes to protracted displacement, refugees, states, and INGOs can more mindfully approach policy and individual livelihood decisions that potentially reduce the wasted human lives accumulating in refugee warehousing situations throughout the world. One participant in this study captured the tragedy of refugees’ contained existence, as he reflected on the prospects of his future,

The other problem of refugees is just they spend all their time sitting just doing nothing. As I told you we are here since 1996...We just wake up every morning and wait [until] the end of the day, and this is the activity...I don't think there will be any improvement...But the thing which makes me tell you that there is no hope is that if you see for example [the DRC] president, he never does anything to secure our region and to let us come back home...And it's like even the international community is doing nothing to change the situation to stop the war so we can go back home and work on our farm and live a normal life. Yeah, we feel abandoned because we never heard them [the political leadership of the DRC] or see any sign from them to see that we are human beings like others who need their rights. So it's like we're abandoned. (Village leader, personal communication, 5 June 2014)

This project confronts the larger human loss central to refugee displacement, idleness in protracted camp contexts like Kiziba, and the core dimensions of maintaining human life at its bare essence. Through
direct accounts of life at the borderlands of existence, the data center the notion of “wasted lives” as a core priority for IR theory on forced migration and point to processes that make these temporary situations more durable. Any consideration of peace, human rights, and development requires contemplation of the human potential locked away in durably displaced populations who wait for solutions from the international community.

**RESEARCH DESIGN**

In the Methodology chapter, I begin by describing the research context for this study. Conducting interviews in a refugee camp presents a particularly sensitive fieldwork location nuanced by political conditions in the DRC/Rwanda borderlands. To convey the challenges of researching in this particular camp, the methodology chapter describes in detail the camp layout and organizational structure. This explanation demonstrates the barriers to entry, difficulty in conducting truly private interviews, and ethical considerations of the study. While not specifically studying women’s issues within the camp, the research design follows feminist methodologies in data collection practices and motivation for applying study results to improve human rights, equality, and justice for the Congolese refugees in Rwanda.

The data comes mainly from interviews conducted over the course of three years in Kiziba Camp. More than just a survey, these interviews involved speaking with elected camp representatives at length about a variety of semi-structured topics. The interviewers encouraged the respondents to ask questions and actively participate in the interview process, shaping the dialog as they saw fit. The university’s Institutional Review Board (IRB) reviewed and approved all interview questions used in the study. Given access limitations to the camp imposed by the host government, additional data used to illustrate the case of durable displacement in Kiziba included published accounts and INGO reports. Photographs included as part of observational fieldwork within the camp also serve to reinforce analytic points about life within the camp.

I structured the qualitative analysis of these interview data around a phenomenological research methodology (Giorgi & Giorgi, 2008). This allowed me to emphasize Kiziba refugees’ lived experiences as a way to interpret my intended subject of inquiry, namely durable displacement (Bhattacharjee, 2012). Unlike quantitative analyses that tend towards aggregation, this research methodology allowed for a creative exploration of the interview data in order to inform an exercise in theory building about the
durability of displacement (Bhattacherjee, 2012; Lofland & Lofland, 1995). Here, grounded theory and content analysis allow one to more freely explore the data space and begin drawing connections between micro and macro-level processes that may contribute to protraction. This approach represents a mix of qualitative research methodologies in order make the fullest use of the limited available data from interviews and other INGO reports.

OVERVIEW

This study starts with one case study to begin theory building about the interdependent actions and policies of refugees, states, and INGOs participating in the global refugee regime. It begins with a chapter to explain the context of flight for this particular case study, as well as the challenges for lasting solutions to these refugees’ protracted displacement. By setting up the historical context, we begin to see how the complexities of the DRC/Rwanda border translate to a sense of intractability, which illustrates how these refugees’ situation exceeds the limits of the term ‘protraction’ and becomes a more permanent, durable displacement. Chapter 3 then frames this cultural and political history in the broader IR and sociological literature. Focusing on how and why protracted refugee cases take on aspects of durability, the literature review examines five themes that traverse global, regional, state, and local levels of analysis. At the macro-level, I argue that aspects of collective action and burden-sharing, as well as institutions and practices of sovereignty, perpetuate displacement. The context of the African Great Lakes Region also ties this case to ideas of post-colonialism and state-building in Africa. At the local level, I then turn to social stratification to illustrate social structures that make displacement more durable. Finally, the review turns to the theme of social construction as a vehicle for uncovering underlying processes that perpetuate refugee status. This theme bridges the analytic gap across all levels of analysis and leads into the data-driven core of this study. I choose to situate these very macro-level systems by focusing on Kiziba Camp in western Rwanda, home to thousands of Congolese refugees who arrived around 1996. This camp, as I argue in more detail later, serves as a microcosm of the regional conflict that continues to displace thousands of people in the Great Lakes Region of Africa.

Chapter 4 looks at durability enforcing processes from the macro-level down to the micro-level. Specifically, I investigate how states and international nongovernmental organizations (INGOs) reinforce displacement in ways that imply permanence. The study employs the voices of Kiziba Camp elected
leaders and youth to demonstrate that state and state-like INGOs interact with encamped refugees to reproduce durable forms of displacement. These interactions, I argue, revolve around state and INGO motivations to attain resources, recognition, and power in an international system. Theories around sovereignty, power, and social stratification serve as a framework for understanding the connection between seeking these three goals and exerting Foucaultian biopower and governance over the refugees in camps. Elected camp leaders and camp youth articulate the connection between state and INGO policy choices and the experience of protraction in Kiziba Camp. Chapter 4 looks at how states, INGOs, and refugees contribute to establishing borders within borders—socially and politically constructed lines that keep the alien/noncitizen/refugee/other separated from the Rwandan citizens. States and INGOs reinforce these boundaries through a number of policies and protocols including aspects of security, education, economics, values, and norms. These intentional or unintentional characterizations, I argue, contribute to durable displacement and protracted situations.

Chapter 5 then turns to processes that occur at the micro, local level to understand what forces might arise from individuals in camp contexts that contribute to a sense of permanent, durable displacement. The study explores abstract ideas of home and belonging as expressed by the refugee leaders. How do these imaginings of “home” further entrench refugees in durable displacement? Drawing upon the work of Malkki (1992, 1994), I analyze how refugees envision their relationship with the larger international community by examining their requests for change and durable solutions. In particular, this work looks at how refugees in camps directly engage the international community while drawing a distinct line between themselves and the local community. I move beyond Malkki’s work by tying these experiences to the broader system of displacement. Looking at the refugees’ “outsider within” (P. H. Collins, 1986) construction of social boundaries from their ethnolinguistically similar host communities illuminates the ways that refugees participate in protracting displacement. These two analytic chapters focus heavily on interview data and INGO reports from the field to convey the lived experiences of refugees in Kiziba Camp. Together, they point to the processes that lead to durability of displacement, situating lasting solutions beyond the reach of refugees and contributing to a sense of wasted lives.

In the chapters that follow, broad theoretical claims come out of a particular case study, that of Kiziba Camp. While Kiziba Camp exhibits characteristics that make it particularly useful for this study—
namely regional diversity within the DRC and extreme length of protracted state—it does only constitute one instance of a global phenomenon at one particular moment in time. This is a deliberate limitation. For this study, I choose to focus on the depth of understanding life in Kiziba Camp by spending time collecting narratives of elected camp leaders at the expense of analyzing a large breadth of life across all refugee camps. This in-depth study provides space for developing theories about systems of durable displacement that I anticipate applying to other camps or even urban scenarios in the future. The scope of the current study, therefore, concerns the population of Kiziba Camp between 2011 and 2014. As such, the resulting analysis cannot necessarily be applied to other camps within Rwanda, the Great Lakes Region, or Africa as a whole. I feel that this does not necessarily restrict the theoretical value of this research; rather, the Kiziba Camp case study serves as a starting point for future research efforts to apply the theory of systems of durable displacement more broadly to other contexts. It is also worth noting that the theoretic contribution of this dissertation focuses on political refugees. Climate change refugees face an entirely different set of challenges, particularly regarding international coordination and the potential to return home. The conclusions of this research likely will not extend to non-political refugees. Future research should explore the particular case of climate change or other refugees in more detail.
As you can see if you look at Congo, there is no peace; there is no security for us. And again, to live in the refugee camp is not something you can wish for someone you love. So my wish would be to live in the place where I feel safe. Where I will be living [a] normal life.
-2014 Interview, Village Leader, Kiziba Camp

The unrest in the Great Lakes Region encompasses a complex ethnic and political web of players and an intricate conflict that stems from historical power struggles, colonial relations, and access to resources. While the scope of the region’s conflicts expands far beyond this dissertation, the particular contribution of this work focuses upon the case of the Banyarwanda refugees—Kinyarwanda-speaking peoples forced from the eastern Kivu Provinces and southeastern Katanga Province in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) to neighboring countries in waves beginning in 1996. This ethnic group remains in protracted limbo in Rwandan refugee camps today, nearly 20 years later. The Banyarwanda refugees represent a particular intersection of local, state, and regional politics that manifest as conflict, statelessness, and protracted refugee situations. Understanding the historical and political context of this region sheds light on the political processes that led to protracted displacement and frames the analysis of refugees’ experience in Rwandan camps presented later in this study.

Land and citizenship are tightly bound in Rwanda and the DRC (Autesserre, 2008; Hovil, 2011; Jackson, 2006; Makombo, 1997; Mamdani, 2001, 2002). The Banyarwanda population instantiates a critical yet understudied land/citizenship dimension of the human crisis in the DRC. Largely the result of iterations of restrictive citizenship laws, prolonged conflict, political instability, lack of state intervention by the government in Kinshasa, spillover conflicts, and state intervention from neighboring countries (Prunier, 2009, pp. 46-58), the last two decades witnessed hundreds of thousands of people displaced from eastern DRC. In January 2014, UNHCR estimated that 499,541 people from the DRC took refuge in other African countries, with nearly three million internally displaced in the country (UNHCR, 2014b). By January 2015, an estimated 84,640 of those forced migrants were living in Rwanda (UNHCR, 2014c). While they do not garner much international attention, the Banyarwanda refugees of both Kivus (North
and South) and Katanga exist in a state of limbo where host countries and the sending country lack the authority or willingness to officially grant citizenship.

Push and pull factors at the state level between Rwanda and the DRC exacerbate the conflicts that continue to uproot populations along the geographical border of Lake Kivu. As one member of the Banyamulenge ethnic group, originating from the Mulenge region of South Kivu, observed, "For long, the Banyamulenge have borne the brunt of Rwanda's forays into Congo" (IRIN, 2007). On the surface, by applying the "genuine and effective link" clause of Article 15 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, Banyarwanda are entitled to Congolese citizenship for two key reasons. First, the longevity of family ties to DRC territory, where most have lived for many generations, serves as the primary qualification. Second, the premise that they no longer have any ties to another nation-state, specifically Rwanda, Uganda, or Burundi merits a strong case for DRC citizenship. Yet, the vital relationship between local and state power struggles and regional ethnic tensions complicate what should be a simple interpretation of international conventions. Not only are Banyarwanda populations forcibly excluded from protections, potential repatriation to the DRC constitutes serious concern for their very livelihoods and safety. Ultimately, bureaucratic ambiguity and the pressing threat of safety leaves these forcibly displaced persons waiting for regional power to shift in their favor and grant them a place to call home (Batchelor, 1998; Makombo, 1997, p. 60; Weissbrodt & Collins, 2006). In the meantime, the population exists in long-term refugee communities serving as permanent residences for nearly twenty years.

This chapter sets the stage for a larger discussion of protracted displacement as experienced by the Banyarwanda people themselves, throughout the process of forced migration from the DRC into camps in Rwanda. From complex domestic and regional histories arises a political system in which refugee crises become enduring processes that uphold state pursuits beyond the immediate crisis. In the spirit of Zygmunt Bauman (2004), I consider the “wasted lives” that result from human beings left in ongoing limbo as insight into larger socio-economic and political dynamics that stem from pursuit of resources, recognition, and power. Focusing on the DRC/Rwanda border as an instance of a political system that produces and reproduces forced displacement, this chapter outlines a brief history of conflict in the Great Lakes Region of Africa.
STATE CRISIS IN THE DRC

King Leopold II of Belgium first carved out the DRC as a territory that he designated as his own personal colony, the Congo Free State. The colonial power immediately made use of abundant natural resources such as rubber and ivory by enforcing a tax system on the local population to outsource labor. With severe punishment, including death, for failure to meet harvesting quotas, competition and tension grew between neighboring communities. Abuse of resources and indigenous populations during that time resulted in the Belgian state taking over authority from King Leopold II, after which it took on the name Belgian Congo. The colonizers created hierarchical systems of social power and control through which they managed the extraction of vast amounts of resources (T. Turner, 2007). In the years between colonization and independence in 1960, uprisings and revolts of various groups including peasants and workers moved the country towards liberation from the colonial system (Nzongola-Ntalaja, 2002). The election that marked independence, however, propelled the state into crisis as Western governments intervened to unseat the newly elected, “militantly nationalist” prime minister (Nzongola-Ntalaja, 2002, p. 94).

As Western powers struggled to manage their economic interests in eastern DRC’s natural resources, a five-year post-independence crisis evolved in which the country became ripe for a succession of leadership that shaped the decades that followed. During the crisis, a weak central government could not adequately respond to political struggles and fracturing alliances compounded by a collapsing economic system. In 1965, Mobutu Sese-Seko took the country in a coup d’état beginning what culminated in a thirty-two year reign (McCalpin, 2002). Mobutu’s initial years saw some economic improvement and received popular support; in the 1970s, however, poor financial and economic decisions pushed the country deeper into debt and institutionalized the rampant corruption that plagues the country even today. By the 1990s, the DRC (then Zaire) had made little progress in the realm of development, but had enormous debts caused by Mobutu’s kleptocratic regime, where government

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1 The territory now known as the Democratic Republic of Congo has changed names over the course of colonial occupation, independence, and other political shifts. For simplicity throughout this research, I choose to call it the DRC regardless of the time period referenced. I acknowledge that this is a simplification of the historical changes undergone by the DRC, but choose to use just one name to avoid confusion.
officials reaped personal benefits from international aid and investment to the point of state collapse (McCalpin, 2002; T. Turner, 2007).

Foreign aid and investment eventually came to an end and Mobutu had no choice but to make political sacrifices. Hyperinflation in the country influenced the President’s decision to decentralize the military, leading to competition for resources between the newly divided units. This system ultimately devolved into one of warlords controlling territories and forcing out ethnic minorities or outsiders (McCalpin, 2002). Just as the state was imploding into chaos, and Mobutu’s grip on power quickly fading, the Rwandan genocide of 1994 pushed over one million refugees and a state-in-exile across the border into eastern DRC. A later section describes the role of the Banyarwanda in the subsequent political turmoil of the DRC. For now, one of the most salient aspects of the DRC’s history that continues to impact the country today resides in the country’s reigning presidents. Since the time of Mobutu, the Kabilas—father then son—ruled the DRC in turn, yet little has improved in terms of strengthening the central government, managing or reducing the civil strife in outlying areas, or developing a plan to economically rebuild a country so abundant in natural resources. Laurent Kabila oversaw increased weakening of state institutions and rampant corruption (Reyntjens, 2001). During Desire Kabila’s reign, the DRC has seen little improvement in response to government transition initiatives and internationally supervised peace processes. This is largely due to his inability to establish a strong central government and gain control over territory, citizenry, and armed factions (Reyntjens, 2007).

BRIEF HISTORY OF RWANDA

In stark contrast to the political chaos of the DRC, neighboring Rwanda stands as an example of successful post-conflict development in the eyes of many Western states (Campioni & Noack, 2012, pp. 3-5; Crisafulli & Redmond, 2012; "Zakaria: Africa's biggest success story," 2009). Rwanda’s steady progress in terms of development indicators following the 1994 genocide places its geographic and socio-political circumstance in sharp contrast to the DRC. This relative stability, however, attracts the attention of fans as well as critics, with some suggesting that such external markers of peace hinge upon high levels of government control and an avoidance of discussions of ethnic divides (Reyntjens, 2011). Ironically, the tight political control that enabled its ascension to the title of “donor darling” also contributed to the institutionalization of racial tensions that led to the 1994 genocide and accusations of human rights
abuses that continue today (Human Rights Watch, 2014). African Studies expert Gérard Prunier (1995) describes the makings of genocide as stemming from the relationship between population density and Rwanda’s predisposition for tight governmental control. These factors mingled with early European explorers’ “almost obsessive preoccupation” with race in the nineteenth century resulting in explosive social outcomes (Prunier, 1995, p. 5). Interactions with Westerners fed into a mythology of a superior race and Tutsi origins from abroad, which Prunier (1995) discounts as devoid of evidence. Salient to the Banyarwanda, the seeds of ethnic obsession sown in Rwanda continue to fuel xenophobic rhetoric in eastern DRC where autochthonous leadership frames the Banyarwanda—and the Tutsi groups more specifically—as outsiders/invaders.

Recently nominated to the UN Security Council, Rwanda has moved to publicly represent itself as the epitome of development, having risen from the devastation of its 1994 genocide to a state of economic growth, technological capacity, and a regional hub for international military operations (Gettleman, 2013; Kagame, 2011; Republic of Rwanda, 2012; “Rwanda voted onto UN Security Council,” 2012). As the first President following the genocide, Paul Kagame has framed Rwanda as an exemplar African state free from political conflict and corruption. This overhaul of public perception is often realized by contrasting the small nation with its surrounding conflict-ridden neighbors, namely through distinction from the DRC. In repeated political discourse, Rwandan officials publicly encourage the DRC to search for a resolution to the ongoing violence (Besheer, 2013; News of Rwanda, 2013). The power to evoke such a moral stance against political chaos stems from Rwanda’s international reputation for effective development and the government’s public affairs campaign. The image of Rwanda as the “donor darling” of the West and a model of post-conflict reconciliation is set against the UN reports implicating Rwanda in regional destabilization through support of the brutal M23 rebel groups operating in the eastern Kivu provinces (Hege, 27 November 2012; Hege et al., 15 November 2012), which the government of Rwanda fervently denies (Kagame, 2012). Some scholars even warn of brewing instability within the country tied directly to the regime’s discourse on racial/ethnic difference (Hintjens, 2008; Pottier, 2002; Reyntjens, 2011; Waldorf, 2011).

This study is concerned with the spillover effect of this lingering conflict in the DRC as it exists with refugee populations. I posit that the flow of refugees, as well as their existence in “human
warehouse” camps captures a vital dimension of the political relationships at the borders of such contested historical and contemporary terrains. As the following section describes, a close investigation of the Banyarwanda population provides a nuanced and original analysis of the complexities, human costs, and political implications of the larger regional conflicts and paths to socio-political stability. In this sense, I place the data collected among Banyarwanda populations within Kiziba Camp as an instance of the macro structures within this contested region.

THE BANYARWANDA

The descendants of Rwandan immigrants in the DRC hold a particular symbolic place and terminology. Banyarwanda, translated as “people of Rwanda,” broadly refers to an ethno-linguistic diaspora, regardless of nationality, with ancestry linked to Rwandan immigrants who continue to speak some dialect of Kinyarwanda, the national language of Rwanda (Makombo, 1997; Mamdani, 2002). The history of citizenship and ethnic identity of the Banyarwanda in eastern DRC is an important component of understanding the regional conflict in the Great Lakes Region (Fofana, 2009; Makombo, 1997; Mamdani, 2001, 2002; Prunier, 2009, pp. 48-58). As Deng (2001) succinctly states, while there are multiple contributing factors to the ongoing violence, “…the dispute over the citizenship rights of the Banyarwanda…is both a contributing factor and a consequence of the crisis” (p. 184). This section provides a brief history of the Banyarwanda in the DRC in order to demonstrate the citizenship crisis that impedes any access to long-term, durable solutions for those displaced from the eastern Kivus and Katanga provinces.

A sub-group of the Banyarwanda is the Banyamulenge, a term that originally referred to people of the Mulenge region of South Kivu, but is now often used as a blanket term for people identified as Congolese Tutsi (Deng, 2001). As residents of a country where citizenship rights are tightly bound to ethnic affiliation, all Banyarwanda have experienced political and juridical exclusion to some degree; though Banyamulenge have faced a very particular impact because of their stateless status during the last few decades (Deng, 2001; Lindquist, 28 November 2012). This subgroup traces its origins to one of the earliest migrations into South Kivu and reportedly adopted the name Banyamulenge in order to emphasize this difference with the other Kinyarwanda speakers in eastern DRC (Jackson, 2006; Mamdani, 2002; Vlassenroot, 2008). Arriving in the late 19th century—possibly even as early as
seventeenth century (Prunier, 2009, p. 51)—before the colonial Congo Free State established in 1885, Banyamulenge have often avoided revocation of citizenship due to ancestral ties to the land before the colonial powers settled and thus before independence (T. Turner, 2007, pp. 78-79). The exact history of the South Kivu Banyamulenge is unknown; however, various pre-colonial migrations throughout the 19th century likely coalesced in the area around a common Tutsi identity that now represents the Banyamulenge community of South Kivu (T. Turner, 2007). Despite the Banyamulenge’s long-standing history in South Kivu, T. Turner (2007) attributes the ongoing conflict and citizenship crises in that region to “incoherent, self-serving Belgian policy” (p. 80). Though unique in its origin, the Banyamulenge share with the Congolese Kinyarwanda speakers a history of migration and subsequent discrimination. For that reason, further reference to Banyarwanda includes those who identify as Banyamulenge unless otherwise specified.

The Banyarwanda diaspora represents waves of migrations from Rwanda dating back before the Belgian colony. Jackson (2006) demonstrates through historical tracings of this “Rwandaphone” population that their struggle with citizenship and right to belong go back to the 1960s as political structures adapted to the country’s new independence. Using linguistic and historical evidence, he also shows that a separation exists within the Banyarwanda; at the local level, they are all outsiders, but at the regional “megaethnic” level, Tutsis are collectively considered the outsiders/invaders while Hutu are linked to other “indigenous” groups. He argues that this multilevel dichotomy of insider/outsider contributes to the triggers of regional conflict. The stereotypes Jackson (2006) describes that emanate from megaethnic identities is important for later discussions about how the refugees in this study conceptualize the conflict. He explains,

Nilotes [Tutsi and Hima, the allochthons] are supposed to be pastoralists; Bantu [Nanda, Nyanga, Hunde, and Hutu, the autochthons] are agriculturalists. This typecasting flies in the face of recent practice; until war destroyed the Kivus’ rich cattle industry, people from all groups raised animals if they could afford to. However, the stereotype remains. Economic resentment against the Kivus’ richest ranchers was easily converted to ethnic animus against all “Tutsi.” If pastoralism then became a code for “foreignness,” agriculture, by contrast, became closely associated with “autochthony.” (Jackson, 2006, p. 107)

As Jackson (2006) demonstrates through his ethnographic research in the DRC, these ethnic and megaethnic discourses continue to fuel conflict even today. He argues it is through these ambiguous
delineations of who belongs and who does not that makes the conflict in the DRC so deep-seated and intractable (Jackson, 2006). These multi-tiered divisions of insider/outsider contribute further to what Mamdani (2001) argues is a crisis of citizenship that keeps the DRC embroiled in domestic and regional conflict. Together, these two scholars point to the critical ways in which identity and belonging are formalized into mechanisms of state sovereignty, namely legal acknowledgement of citizenship within a given territory. When these relationships remain unresolved and disputed by all levels of membership within the citizenry, they contribute—among other features of state collapse such as resource exploitation—to enduring political unrest and insecurity. Citizenship crises, then, derive from sovereignty crises and instigate forced migration.

The experience of attaining citizenship only to have it withdrawn time and time again from the state (Deng, 2001; Makombo, 1997, p. 54), coupled with logistic financial and administrative barriers to actually attaining citizenship documentation, contribute to scholars categorizing Banyarwanda as stateless (International Observatory on Statelessness, 2013; Lindquist, 28 November 2012; Makombo, 1997, p. 57; Redclift, 2013, p. 3). Despite similar experiences with discriminatory national citizenship laws, the NGOs highlighting Banyamulenge statelessness generally reference only South Kivu province and fail to mention that those from North Kivu are often denied the same rights. Historical circumstances of power, economics, and governance have also led to different outcomes at times, granting citizenship rights to some in North Kivu while the South has suffered. The long-term result of these conflicts and circumstances is that most Banyarwanda do not have guaranteed access to citizenship in the DRC they call home.² Importantly, Rwanda does not consider these Banyarwanda as its own citizens (Deng, 2001, p. 201), leaving a massive human gulf that reflects so many unsettled macro political relationships within this contested region.

THE GREAT LAKES REGIONAL CONFLICT

The Great Lakes Region shares a history of migration, colonial domination, and subsequent independence, many of the same features that define the Africa’s legacy. The region saw multiple waves

² In this case, citizenship is based mainly on the presumed year of immigration for the various groups, with some groups immigrating much earlier and thus maintaining citizenship, specifically voting rights, through more iterations of nationality law than other Banyarwanda regional subgroups.
of ethnic violence leading up to the well-known genocide in Rwanda in 1994, the ripple effects of which carry on today. The mass migration of over one million refugees fleeing as a state-in-exile in the aftermath of the 1994 genocide marks a critical moment in most current studies of the DRC, where issues of citizenship, identity, and belonging define the political landscape at the micro and macro levels. In accordance with the ways most modern analyses of the ongoing conflict in the DRC begin, the following section divides the citizenship turmoil of the Banyarwanda into pre- and post-1994 events.

"Zaire 97 Kivus" by BanyanTree is licensed under Creative Commons Attribution-Share Alike 3.0

**PRE-1994**

In the early 1900s, during colonial rule, waves of Rwandan labor migrants entered the DRC and Uganda to work on plantations and mine the vast resources in the area. Rwanda’s dense population provided a pool of workers that the colonial powers used to their advantage, creating pockets of Kinyarwanda-speaking groups throughout the region (Jackson, 2006; Mamdani, 2001; Prunier, 2009;
These economic migrants, facilitated by the Belgians’ Mission d’Immigration des Banyarwanda (MIB), numbered around 85,000 in the late 1930s and populated mainly the Masisi and Walikale regions of North Kivu as well as Katanga province in the south. As populations grew, often far outnumbering indigenous ethnic groups in the Kivus, tensions grew among the Banyarwanda and local autochthones, who were local land-owning tribes (Prunier, 2009). Effectively endorsed by the Belgian colonial powers, Banyarwanda in the Kivus took advantage of civic laws to acquire land, which subverted the traditional lineage- and chief-based system of land administration in those areas. These actions created hostilities among indigenous groups and the foreigner-Banyarwanda (Prunier, 2009).

During the civil war in the DRC between 1960-5, indigenous groups often took advantage of the fighting and ensuing chaos to take out their aggressions on Banyarwanda, thus fueling the friction between ethnic groups. President Mobutu saw in this an opportunity to align with the local Banyarwanda militia with very little local power so that he could support his own political agenda. With population numbers that put Banyarwanda in the majority or near-majority in some provinces, providing them with political power, voting rights, and supporting their militias supplied Mobutu with the backing he needed to pursue his political objectives. In the post-civil war years, for their support of Mobutu’s rise to power, Banyarwanda rose through the government ranks to occupy positions of power. Mobutu manipulated the Banyarwanda’s ostracized local status to propel himself into power, only to cast them aside later when they no longer suited his needs (Prunier, 2009).

In neighboring Rwanda, the years leading up to independence saw race relations becoming increasingly tense between Hutu and Tutsi elite fighting to shape the national narrative of race during the Belgian administration (Kiwuwa, 2012; Prunier, 1995). Known as the “social revolution” of 1959, Hutu elite drawing power from Westernized education and gaining rankings within religious institutions staged the strategic replacement of hundreds of Tutsi who had occupied positions of power throughout the government (Mamdani, 2001). What started as a “peasant revolt,” with local government leaders being replaced by new Hutu representatives spiraled into a massive upheaval in which up to 150,000 Tutsis were displaced throughout the region. Different scholars and organizations provide a wide range of estimates for the number of Tutsi killed during the social revolution, ranging from 5,000 to 20,000 people (Mamdani, 2001). Prunier (2009) points to this event as the actual seed that started the violence in the
DRC today. While these years served as critical indicators of future outbreaks of ethnic violence, no one specific event marks the precipitating point that led to genocide. Rather, “The fact is that it was not the revolution, but attempted restoration and the repression that followed, that opened the gateway to a blood-soaked political future for Rwanda” (Mamdani, 2001, p. 130). Spillover into surrounding areas spread the ethnic tension across national borders to neighboring countries and contributed to a larger regional conflict. Thus, the DRC and Rwanda remain vitally connected through these historical circumstances and their enduring expression as refugee crises.

Exiles from Rwanda’s 1959-1961 social revolution gained momentum from the nearby countries to which they fled. Current Rwanda president, Paul Kagame, was among those to take refuge in Uganda; a move that profoundly shaped the trajectory of his career as a result of political movements taking place among the exiles (Kinzer, 2008). Pushing Tutsi elites out of power in Rwanda and into the DRC further upset the tense relationships between Banyarwanda and local autochthones. Rwandan Tutsi migrants joined the ranks of Banyarwanda outsiders in the DRC, thereby sparking an already politically and socially tense situation. Further migrations into eastern DRC also occurred in 1964 in response to political movements that sought to push ever more Tutsi from power in Rwanda (Prunier, 2009).

In the 1970s, a Hutu-led government in Rwanda—buttressed by the Belgians during the transition to independence—strictly enforced hierarchical ethnic representation in education, business, and civil service. According to this government-sanctioned racialized ideology, any portion of the Tutsi population exceeding the 9% limit would be evicted from their respective institution or even killed in some cases. These evictions resulted in another mass emigration of Tutsi refugees from the country between 1972-3 (Prunier, 1995). At the same time, such a systematic reinforcement of ethnic ‘quotas’ set the stage for ideologies that would later incite genocide. This period also set in motion a series of waves of refugees from Rwanda, many of whom fled to the DRC. At the same time, the foundation of governance based on ethnicity formulated a migration pattern that remains central to the political relationship between Rwanda and the DRC discussed later.

In 1972, DRC President Mobutu, presumably under pressure from his head of the Bureau of the President—and a Banyarwanda—Bisengimana Rwema, signed into effect the most generous of all DRC nationality laws (Mamdani, 2001). The “Decree Law No. 71-020 of 26 March 1971 “effectively granted
citizenship and voting rights to all, including those of tracing lineage to Rwanda or Burundi, as long as they were residents of the DRC before January 1, 1950” (Deng, 2001, p. 198; Makombo, 1997, pp. 54-56). Followed the next year by the General Property Law, which granted land ownership privileges to citizens on a massive scale, economically advantaged Banyarwanda used their newly acquired citizenship to buy land and circumvent traditional means of leasing land from indigenous local chiefs. This fueled suspicions of a Rwanda/Burundi takeover of eastern DRC and exacerbated tensions between the Banyarwanda and other ethnic groups (Mamdani, 2001; Prunier, 2009). Less than a decade later, the DRC government revoked these rights when, in 1981, an amendment to the 1971 law restricted citizenship to groups able to prove residence in the DRC prior to 1885, the year in which the nation became the Congo Free State (Makombo, 1997, pp. 55-56). This restriction remained in effect and left thousands stateless, despite various changes to the 1981 law, until the December 2005 approval of a new constitution for the DRC.

By the early 1990s, the earlier waves of violence and political shifts in Rwanda had exiled about 700,000 Rwandan refugees from the country, many of whom migrated to DRC (Prunier, 1995, p. 63). The swells in Banyarwanda populations across the border only served to fuel the tense political, social, and ethnic fires brewing in eastern DRC. Leading up to the 1994 genocide, some disenfranchised Banyarwanda from the Kivus began leaving to train and fight with the Rwanda Patriotic Front (RPF) (Mamdani, 2002). This continued throughout and even after the 1994 genocide, with strong representation from the Banyamulenge as a response to the political and social oppression experienced in South Kivu leading up to that time (Vlassenroot, 2008). With ongoing threats to citizenship rights in the DRC, Banyarwanda joined forces with cross-border RPF movements (Mamdani, 2001). This movement brought into question, even more than before, the political allegiance of the Banyarwanda to the DRC. Indigenous propaganda seized the opportunity to portray Banyarwanda as Rwandan, based on their apparent sympathy for the RPF cause, even though the majority never took part in any cross-border training or military efforts (Mamdani, 2001). When the 1994 genocide unfolded, this history and staging of particular allegiances, coupled with the ethnic divisions inscribed through years of colonial power relations, played central roles in the manifestation of violence and the most severe ethnic cleansing operation of the 20th century and the violence that continues today.
POST-1994

The volumes of work dedicated to the study of the 1994 genocide in Rwanda point to three main initiating factors: 1) divisive social control mechanisms developed during colonialism, 2) constrained resources and population growth, 3) and the political and social climate of the country at that time. Collectively these factors ignited one of the greatest human catastrophes of the 20th century, when nearly one million people were killed in a short span of around 100 days (for more detailed historical accounts see Prunier (1995, 2009), Mamdani (2001), Chretien (2003) Gourevitch (1998)). Rwanda's genocide marks a critical turning point—a culmination of a journey that began in the colonial era—in the modern history of the Great Lakes. On the one hand, the political turnaround of the country and its rise to 'donor darling' status has catapulted the Rwandan government into the public arena. Some even claim that the government exploits international guilt for the lack of assistance provided during the tragedy (French, 2014). Ironically, however, as Rwanda models the post-conflict transition to peace, remnants of the genocide wreak havoc in close geographic proximity. The political fallout from this moment fueled the war and ongoing chaos in the DRC that has claimed the lives of millions of Congolese in the provinces bordering Rwanda and produced tens of thousands of refugees (T. Turner, 2007).

In the wake of the 1994 genocide in Rwanda, over one million people poured over the border into the DRC as an armed state-in-exile (Lischer, 2006). This alarming flow held disastrous consequences in the Kivu provinces, where Banyarwanda who migrated to the region for other reasons constituted the brunt of political and social marginalization. The génocidaires’ state-in-exile manipulated the vast number of refugees to become a tool of international affairs, both for resource extraction and intimidation of the governments in Kigali and Kinshasa. In addition to the political problems, as NGOs struggled to meet the basic needs of so many refugees resulting in health catastrophes, including a devastating cholera outbreak, and extreme strain on local environmental resources. Adding to the crisis, massive crime spread as large portions of the Interahamwe—the extremist Hutu paramilitary organizations that carried out the genocide—relocated to densely populated camps (Lischer, 2006; Prunier, 2009; Stedman & Tanner, 2003).

This government in exile, its former military (ex-FAR, or former Forces armées rwandaises), and Interahamwe militia members, equipped with the majority of Rwanda’s arsenal, immediately began
strategizing to take back Rwanda from RPF. Violence between the ex-FAR and the new Rwandan government continued across the border. In the meantime, the ex-FAR and Interahamwe looked to the existing Kinyarwanda-speaking population in the Kivus and planned to carve out a territory without consent of the local autochthons but with the backing of President Mobutu of the DRC (Prunier, 2009). The eastern Kivus’ autochthon communities rebelled against these Rwandan-foreigners taking over land and power in the Kivus. The sudden influx of Banyarwanda also fueled national discourses on outsiders/foreigners and rumors of a Rwandan takeover of eastern DRC (T. Turner, 2007, p. 89). A body of the transitional parliament of the DRC sent a commission to review the state of affairs in the eastern provinces as a result of the recent refugee influx. “Stacked with anti-Banyarwanda extremists,” the commission determined that eviction of all Kinyarwanda-speakers was the only solution (Mamdani, 2001, p. 255). Kinyarwanda-speaking Tutsi were pushed out of North Kivu—representing mainly Masisi and Rutshuru territories—and into refugee camps in Rwanda. Taking advantage of the chaos, other ethnic groups, including the Bahunde were also forced out of the country as enemies of the armed Hutu groups in North Kivu (Mamdani, 2001). Resisting a similar fate in South Kivu, the Banyamulenge began allying with the RPF to acquire arms and defend land that the government tried to seize (International Crisis Group, August 13 1998; Mamdani, 2001). The effect of the arming and refugee-hosting complex crisis in the Kivus is best summarized by Mamdani (2001):

The second effect of armed refugee camps [in addition to the “dollarization of the economy”] was to accelerate the tendency to militarize ordinary life. From Kivu, the genocide in Rwanda loomed like a volcanic eruption…Subjected to a regime of terror by armed Interahamwe based in refugee camps, more and more Congolese Tutsi crossed the border into Rwanda. In response, the RPF trained and armed Congolese Tutsi. As the Interahamwe roamed the countryside, they began collaborating with the Congolese army. In response, more and more Native Authorities created their own militia. (p. 256)

In this self-reinforcing arms race, the Kivus became increasingly militarized and factionalized, creating the violent tapestry of warlordism and militia-based control along ethnic lines that exists today (Autesserre, 2008; IRIN, 2007; Okumu, Bonome, & Hovil, 2010). Throughout the ongoing conflict, the vulnerability of Banyarwanda’s citizenship status, and therefore land-ownership rights, have made them susceptible to manipulation by armed and/or political movements as well as forced displacement (Fofana, 2009). In 1996, Mobutu’s government informed the UN Security Council that Banyarwanda are not
considered a Zairian ethnic group, precluding them from citizenship and associated indigenous rights (Deng, 2001, p. 200).

That same year, soon-to-be President Laurent Kabila, backed by regional and foreign powers, initiated a rebellion by his AFDL (Alliance des forces pour la liberation du Congo-Zaïre) forces to overthrow Mobutu. Part of his initial aim was purportedly to ally with the Rwandan government to disband the massive refugee camps in the Kivus along the border (Reyntjens, 2007). Some DRC analysts claim that this partnership sprung from Rwanda’s desire to unite the Tutsi diaspora under one nationalist state. The alliance would give Rwanda the ability to defend and stake out claims for the Banyarwanda abroad, namely in the DRC (Fofana, 2009; Mamdani, 2001). The consequences of this arms race in eastern DRC, combined with Kabila’s rise to power in 1997, resulted in the Second Congo War and the catastrophic implosion of state control in that part of the country (Fofana, 2009; Mamdani, 2001).

Barely in power for over a year, Kabila’s regime saw a liberation war rise up against it out of the Kivus. Turning his back on former Ugandan and Rwanda allies, Kabila “sought to stimulate resentment against the Tutsi” and fueled militia armament through the expulsion of allied forces. Rwanda and Uganda continued involvement—some say to preserve economic interests in the Kivus—by backing militia groups opposed to Kabila’s alliances (Fofana, 2009). Diamonds, gold, and coltan—an important mineral in the international technology market—constituted a large part of the resource extraction by Rwanda and Uganda through from eastern DRC (Prunier, 2009, p. 244). As evidence of neighboring states’ economic draw to remain militarily involved in the eastern DRC, Samset (2002) observes in her economic analysis of resource extraction as a driver for conflict,

While gold and coltan have dominated, diamonds have certainly made their mark in this phase of systematized exploitation. Diamonds cannot be found in the soils of Uganda and Rwanda, and the authorities of both countries confirm that they have no production of this mineral. Yet over the last few years, both countries have exported diamonds worth millions of US dollars. From 1997 to 1998 Uganda exports were multiplied by 12, and remained on a high level over the two ensuing years. By October 2000, Rwanda’s export of diamonds had reached a level 90 times higher than during the entire year of 1998. (p. 471)

This resource extraction reportedly funded both continued foreign efforts in DRC and other regional political campaigns (Prunier, 2009; Samset, 2002). Minerals serve as a particularly valuable wartime commodity as a tradable good that is less volatile than currency in the region. According to some
scholars, these resources, as well as timber and coffee, have indirectly funded Rwandan and Ugandan military expansion in the Great Lakes Region (Samset, 2002). This contributes to ongoing instability in eastern DRC and subsequently the availability of long-term repatriation solutions for Banyarwanda refugees abroad.

The massive post-genocide refugee influx, and more importantly a combative state-in-exile, does not mark the start of violence in eastern DRC, but rather the tipping point that exacerbated tensions into the complicated conflict that it is today. Tutsi communities fled—and continue to flee—over the border to Rwanda as refugees of the Interahamwe/ex-FAR presence and subsequent violence. As early as 1995, Rwanda began receiving the Congolese refugees that still live there today. This displaced population represents 1959 Rwandan refugees to the DRC, as well as economic migrants from generations before. Hundreds of thousands of internally displaced persons also fled the violence in the Kivus, though never crossing international borders and encompassing a range of ethnic groups. Prunier (2009) observes:

_The situation was paradoxical because many of the expulsees had been thrown out of their own country, while many other “refugees” [from 1959] were citizens of their country of asylum. But the RPF government had no intention of letting these potentially useful refugees simply melt into Rwandese society… (p. 57)_

With this quote, Prunier (2009) touches on the notion that the Rwandan government was aware of the use of refugees as tools of international policy. The Interahamwe/ex-FAR pushed the refugees out for political reasons, and the RPF government kept them as refugees, rather than integrating as citizens, for equally political reasons.

**RWANDA/DRC RELATIONS**

The historical and political foundation discussed in this chapter demonstrates that the politics of the region and the experiences of Congolese Banyarwanda are tightly bound in a complex cross-border relationship between the DRC and Rwanda. Bending the limitations of sovereignty to influence the political outcomes of the DRC, Rwanda and other neighboring countries have historically intervened throughout the post-colonial years. In an interview in 2012, however, Rwanda President Paul Kagame summarized the violence in the Congo as fighting that is not “going on between Rwanda and DRC. It’s between one group that is Congolese and another group that is Congolese” (Kagame, 2012). The Rwandan government dismisses implications of its involvement in the violence that defines the eastern
Kivu region, and vehemently denies international accusations of backing guerilla movements in the Kivus to further its own agenda (Kagame, 2012). Herein lies a central conflict in the relationship between the DRC and Rwanda. Publicly, Rwanda supports initiatives to end the violence in the eastern provinces, presumably to prevent regional destabilization that would affect its own prosperity (Gettleman, 2013; News of Rwanda, 2013; Zetter, 2012). And yet, conflicting reports directly from Rwanda’s government representatives indicate that it harbors suspicions of sabotage and nefarious actions from its largely ungoverned neighbor (Beswick, 2014; D. Smith, 2013). What exactly would Rwanda’s motivation be for involvement in prolonging the conflict? This question points to longer-term objectives from Rwanda’s development as a sovereign nation with participation in the international political economy and the global development industry. I assert that these conditions are linked directly to its role as peace facilitator and refugee host.

The Government of Rwanda sees, as part of its defining post-conflict develop strategy, Rwanda Vision 2020, a central move from an aid-dependent state to a middle income, “knowledge-based society” (K. Collins, 2013). Specifically, “Vision 2020 aspires for Rwanda to become a modern, strong and united nation, proud of its fundamental values, politically stable and without discrimination among its citizens” (Government of Rwanda, 2000). With this guiding ideology, Rwanda puts forth a development scheme that suggests it is a ‘special’ country within the region, with admirable measures of economic growth, the appearance of peaceful relations, and technological advancement. Ultimately, I believe, this public discourse and possibly clandestine military interventions and resource extraction in eastern DRC are part of a larger strategy for reaffirming international sovereignty and climbing the development ladder. Beswick (2014) similarly argues that Rwanda vies for military power and independence motivated by a “mistrust of external actors, stemming from the international failure to end the genocide…[that]…shapes their pursuit of relative military strength in the region and willingness to use force to achieve policy goals” (p. 221). This explains, she claims, Rwanda’s involvement in the DRC despite its “stated preference for a stable Congo” as well as the leadership role it has taken in African security issues (Beswick, 2014, p. 222).

Speaking to Rwanda’s sovereignty-based motivations, Beswick (2014) observes, “By not acting as a passive or predictable puppet of key donors and security partners such as the US, Rwanda retains its credentials as an authentic and authoritative African voice in the international arena” (pp. 222-223). She
goes on to argue that Rwanda’s unique perspective on military intervention also explains its involvement in the DRC, specifically that it does not view sovereignty through a non-interventionist lens. Instead, Rwanda reinforces a public image as a competent international actor by selectively emphasizing the Responsibility to Protect discourses of recent UN policies. In the case of the DRC, this involves intervening to assist the Tutsi diaspora where UN interventions failed to get results (Beswick, 2014).

**THE M23**

As described earlier, a particular feature of the Congo war is the increasing number of rebel groups that splintered from former government troops, militias, or emerged from local areas’ needs for protection against encroaching combatants. While many rebel groups continue to cause instability in eastern DRC, the M23 is of particular international and domestic concern. At the local level, M23 has been accused of human rights abuses including rapes, mass executions, and child soldier recruitment (Human Rights Watch, 2012, 2013; IRIN, 2012). Internationally, the group’s activities have drawn attention to the possible involvement of neighboring countries in the destabilization of eastern Congo, namely Rwanda. Important for this study, reports from a group of experts on the DRC organized by the UN Security Council, as well as extensive reporting from Human Rights Watch, implicate Rwanda in backing the M23 and contributing to the destabilization of the eastern DRC (Hege, 27 November 2012; Hege et al., 15 November 2012; Human Rights Watch, 2012, 2013). Delving into the role of M23 and the purported backing by the Rwandan government reveals underlying dynamics of intentional regional instability that contribute to the duration of Congolese refugees’ stay in camps abroad. In particular, a hotly contested UN document exposes these underlying tension and calls into question Rwanda’s stance as a ‘donor darling.’

Integrated from a previous rebel movement, the M23 reportedly splintered from the Congolese national military (FARDC) in 2012 based on accusations that the government had not fulfilled the agreements of the 23 March 2009 peace accord, from which the rebel group derives its name. Demands in the agreement included specific military ranks and salaries, repatriation of refugees who had been in Rwanda for over a decade, governmental reforms, and reforms of local administrative practices—some of which continue to contribute to protracted displacement of refugees and IDPs and local-level violence (Arieff & Coen, 2013; Kavanagh & Ojambo, 2013).
Despite destabilization caused by other insurgent-like groups in North and South Kivu provinces, M23 gained international attention in November 2012 after it seized the strategic border town of Goma, situated between Rwanda and the DRC (Gouby & Callimachi, 2012). A 200-page report by the UN Security Council Committee’s appointed Group of Experts (GOE) on the DRC provided extensive evidence in the form of eye witness accounts, interviews, satellite footage, and email correspondence, among other data, that the Government of Rwanda violated the arms embargo to the DRC by aiding M23 rebels (Hege et al., 15 November 2012). Human Rights Watch (HRW) reports substantiate these claims with hundreds of interviews in Rwanda and the DRC that implicate Rwanda’s involvement in the continued conflict of eastern DRC, adding to it the charges of forced recruitment and recruitment of child soldiers (Human Rights Watch, 2012a). HRW reports,

Field research conducted by Human Rights Watch in the region in May 2012 revealed that Rwandan army officials have provided weapons, ammunition, and an estimated 200 to 300 recruits to support [Gen. Bosco] Ntaganda’s mutiny in Rutshuru territory, eastern Congo. The recruits include civilians forcibly recruited in Musanze and Rubavu districts in Rwanda, some of whom were children under 18. Witnesses said that some recruits were summarily executed on the orders of Ntaganda’s forces when they tried to escape (Human Rights Watch, 2012b).

Rwanda’s Minister of Foreign Affairs, Louise Mushikiwabo, fervently denies the accusations. Denouncing the Group of Experts’ report as “far-fetched but fact free assertions,” Mushikiwabo told reporters that Rwanda remains committed to finding a lasting solution for regional stabilization and peace.

The Government of Rwanda claims that the GOE is furthering biased political objectives by producing the incriminating report and assert that none of it is factual (“UN Experts in political campaign against Rwanda,” 2012). The Group of Experts’ lead investigator, Steve Hege, has come under targeted personal criticism by Rwanda’s government officials and the media (Hege, 2013). Mushikiwabo, in an interview with Metro-US, directly attributed the false claims of the report to political motivations of Hege (“UN Experts in political campaign against Rwanda,” 2012). Officially responding to the GOE interim report, Mushikiwabo released a 131-page document condemning the evidence collection methods of the investigation team and the public release of the interim report before representatives of the Government of Rwanda could properly respond. In the retort she states,
Beyond hearsay and anonymous witness testimonies, the physical evidence presented in the addendum is utterly unpersuasive…the allegations contained in the addendum rely almost exclusively on unreliable, anonymous or compromised sources. Many have obvious motivations to fabricate, manipulate or distort information about Rwanda—FARDC intelligence and other DRC officials feature prominently—while others, such as deserters and captured rebels, have been interrogated under circumstances that raise severe questions (Mushikiwabo, 27 July 2012, p. 3).

Mushikiwabo goes on to question what Rwanda would gain from assisting M23, particularly after the extensive efforts on the part of the Government of Rwanda to encourage peaceful solutions to the conflict in the DRC. She asks, “Why would Rwanda have invested so much over the last three years in consolidating its partnership with the DRC central government if it eventually aimed to undermine it? (Mushikiwabo, 27 July 2012, p. 3)” The open-ended question, however, does not account for the economic benefits gained from Rwanda’s forays into eastern DRC, which other scholars report as a source of wealth for funding regional political efforts (Samset, 2002).

The partnership efforts that Rwanda publicly cites were renewed during a foreign-mediated diplomatic meeting in October 2013 between the leadership of the DRC and Rwanda. In this meeting, the respective presidents met one-on-one and the attending senators discussed moving forward with economic relations and security coordination (AWEPA, 2013). In a similar vein, the Minister of MIDIMAR commented in an interview that she coordinates as best she can with her DRC counterpart to keep the Congolese refugees informed about the situation in their homes. The DRC’s Minister has visited at least one of the camps (not Kiziba) to talk about the security situation in the Kivus, reportedly to allow the refugees to make informed choices about returning home. The cross-border minister relationship is not easy, given the many security concerns in the DRC, but Rwanda’s minister seemed hopeful that they were making steps in the right direction (Personal communication, Minister Séraphine Mukantabana, 13 June 2014).

In defense of the methodology of the UN GOE report, however, in a later interview Hege denied claims that his team relied only on human intelligence or that they neglected to give the Government of Rwanda opportunities to provide input before the report was released. During an email-based interview, Hege reflects on the irony of Rwanda claiming to be working to assist the DRC in peaceful resolutions when it points to conspiracies emanating from its neighbor as the reason this report is so negative. In his interview, he states,
Regarding the official Rwandan rebuttal you mentioned; it is a document that we studied and which we responded to exhaustively in Annex 3 of our final report, but the major premise of their argument was that the Group was the victim of a huge conspiracy orchestrated by the Congolese government. Not only as experienced investigators would this have been impossible, but the Congolese government could not have been capable of fabricating hundreds of false witnesses, documents, radio communications, emails scattered across three provinces, particularly when, at the outset of the M23 rebellion, it was not even cooperating with us. If true, that would have been the sign of a very effective state, not the "black hole" in need of radical governance reform that Rwanda has consistently tried to portray the Congo as (Hege, 2013).

Hege and his team report that M23 recruitment, facilitated by the Rwandan armed forces, mainly comes from “demobilized Rwandan soldiers and civilians, in addition to Congolese refugees [in Rwanda and Uganda]” (Hege et al., 15 November 2012, p. 11). Mushikiwabo offers the following official rebuttal from the Government of Rwanda regarding refugee recruitment:

Refugee camps in Rwanda are administered by the UNHCR. Claims that refugee camps in Rwanda were used for M23 recruitment ignore the fact that it is UNHCR, and not Rwandan civilian or military officials, who monitor and approve access and egress to the camps in question. There is no reliable evidence provided, that such recruitment activities ever took place (Mushikiwabo, 27 July 2012, p. 13).

While logical in its approach, Hege points out that UNHCR administration does not disprove the ability of M23 collaborators to recruit from within refugee camps. Specifically, he states, “refugees and M23 collaborators confirmed that recruitment has taken place in Nkamira camp outside Gisenyi, regardless of UNHCR’s presence” (Hege et al., 15 November 2012, pp. 72, 138). Indeed, to support Hege’s claim, recruitment of refugees from within UNHCR and other NGO-run camps is a well-documented phenomenon, even by UNHCR staff (Caux, 2006; Jacobsen, 2000; Lischer, 2006, pp. 31-37, 113).

In fact, older reports from Rwanda indicate that Congolese political groups were permitted by Rwandan forces to forcibly recruit in refugee camps in the early 2000s (Immigration and Refugee Board of Canada, 10 May 2006). Additionally, the early 2000s saw Rwandan government officials forcibly repatriating Congolese refugees before international outcry encouraged them to stop (US Committee for Refugees and Immigrants, 2002). More recently, US Department of State reports indicate that human trafficking of refugee children from the Rwandan camps is a recognized occurrence in the country. The recruitment of refugees by M23, however, as reported in Human Rights Watch and UN GOE reports may not represent specific support by the Rwandan government; failure to stop the occurrence still facilitates this form of human trafficking (US Department of State, 2013). In this respect, contrary to the Minister of
Foreign Affairs’ statement, the accusations against Rwanda do not represent uncharacteristic behavior; there are, however, no recent reports of such events occurring.

Whether by design or not, what is clear is that a vibrant international debate flourishes—namely between the GOE representing the UN Security Council and the Government of Rwanda—about Rwanda’s alleged covert roles in instigating and maintaining instability over the border. As this chapter has thus far demonstrated, strained relations between the DRC, Rwanda, and the international community derive from a complicated historical relationship in which the fate of the Banyarwanda became entangled. The push and pull of refugees, combatants, arms, and political troubles across the Rwanda/DRC border contributes to the enduring citizenship crisis experienced by the Banyarwanda. One Banyamulenge community leader poignantly conveys the consequences of the struggles to belong and survive in eastern DRC when he said, "For long, the Banyamulenge have borne the brunt of Rwanda’s forays into Congo" (IRIN, 2007). These communities served as tools of foreign policy—willing and unwilling—the consequences of which are ambiguous citizenship status, uncertain futures, and protracted, durable displacement. Interviews with the Banyarwanda, including my own, indicate that the majority would identify as Congolese if given the choice and peace could be restored to the country, but the actual situation is much more complicated and precludes a direct solution that would simplify such citizenship claims (Hovil, 2011; IRIN, 2007).

ONGOING CITIZENSHIP TROUBLES

As the DRC struggles to regain control over the conflict, displacement, corruption, and resource extraction within its border, it continues to revise its constitution. The words written in it, however, remain vague and leave room for interpretation much like previous versions. While the UNHCR lauds the 2005 Constitution as a resolution to statelessness (UNHCR Africa Bureau, 2006), the previous constitution, known as the Constitution of the Transition 2002, contained a nearly identical statement in Chapter II: Sovereignty, Article 14. The document states, “All ethnic groups and nationalities of persons and territories constituting that which has become the Congo (currently the Democratic Republic of the Congo) at independence shall enjoy equal rights and protection in terms of the law as citizens” (Inter-Congolese Dialogue, 2002). In fact, little of the wording has changed, and much of it is left up to interpretation by the government of what constitutes an ethnic group, who had legitimate presence in the
country at independence, and whether that ethnic group had to be indigenous and land owning at that
time. A government cable originating in the US embassy in Kinshasa reveals this loophole:

Recent events in Bukavu highlight the explosive nature of the nationality question,
particularly for Tutsis in eastern Congo. Current Congolese law does not recognize the
citizenship claims of some longtime residents whose ancestors immigrated to the
country, including the Banyamulenge Tutsis from Rwanda, who comprise less than 1
percent of the population. The Ministry of Justice has drafted a law that would outline
procedures to acquire nationality under Article 14 of the Transitional Constitution, which
says that all persons of ethnic groups or nationalities present in the DRC since
independence have the same legal rights as citizens. The Banyamulenge, however, were
not considered an indigenous ethnic group at independence (US Embassy in Kinshasa,
21 Jun 2004).

By some interpretations of the law, however, Banyarwanda are automatically eligible for Congolese
citizenship provided they do not hold any other nationality.

Reports indicate that a referendum to the constitution now grants citizenship to any ethnic group
present in the country at the time of independence in 1960, which should confer rights to Banyarwanda
populations as long as they can provide proof of residency (IRIN, 2005). One Kivu region expert claims
that this restoration of citizenship is automatic and it is not necessary to initiate reinstatement of
Congolese nationality. While there are no official mechanisms in place to re-administer citizenship to
Banyarwanda, they should report to their local leaders or “find five people to attest to his or her nationality
if residing far from his or her place of origin. The same is true for all Congolese” (Immigration and
Refugee Board of Canada, 24 January 2006). These loopholes existed during the 2002 transitional
constitution and, since the wording has not varied much, it is likely that this wording is purposefully
ambiguous to appease those who wish to exclude Banyarwanda from DRC citizenship, and those at the
international level who lobby against statelessness. Without listing the specific ethnic groups that the
DRC government officially recognizes as being in the country at the time of independence, the law
excludes a vast number of Banyarwanda who cannot provide documentation or local testimony (after
nearly two decades in camps) to defend their citizenship claims. It also leaves room for the government to
later revoke citizenship rights by refuting claims that the Banyarwanda groups existed in the DRC before
independence.

According to phone interviews conducted by the Immigration and Refugee Board of Canada with
organizations involved in the 2005 referendum elections, Congolese of Rwandan ancestry successfully
registered for and voted with no discrimination problems (Immigration and Refugee Board of Canada, 24 January 2006). This required presentation of identification documents that may be difficult for marginalized populations to acquire. Additionally, the new nationality law, which allegedly automatically confers citizenship to all those living in the DRC prior to independence, does not indicate how those who have been in exile for nearly two decades will manage to provide proof of residency. Hovil (2011) confirms my own research experience among Congolese refugees in Rwanda when she explains the complicated way in which they view their identity, belonging, and future options. They feel clearly unwelcome to integrate into Rwandan society as full citizens, but also skeptical of the reception they might experience if they returned home to the DRC. As with the return to the Congo, the primary question is not about citizenship in terms of voting power, but in terms of access to farmland. The citizen-state-territory relationship in the Great Lakes Region is firmly rooted in territory. Rwanda’s meddling in the DRC is potentially motivated by pursuit of additional land (Jackson, 2006). Refugees’ doubts about returning to the DRC derive from questions about regaining lost lands (Hovil, 2011). Rwanda’s hesitation to allow refugees’ integration as citizens springs from consciousness of the inability to provide any additional land to outsiders (Personal communication, Minister Séraphine Mukantabana, 13 June 2014). These three aspects combine to place the conversation squarely in the territorial realm of sovereignty.

CONCLUSIONS

The spatial restrictions and isolation of this case study provide a particularly salient context for understanding durability and the limitations of ‘durable solutions’ to protracted displacement. Rwanda is one of the most densely populated countries in Africa, which complicates avenues for integrating the tens of thousands of long-staying refugees within its borders (Gillingham & Buckle, 2014). The government itself notes that “Rwanda is characterized by acute land shortage” and proposes in its Vision 2020 a “modern land law” that will administer tenure of land to its citizens (Government of Rwanda, 2000). The already resource-constrained state faced land tenure problems after the genocide when the legal status of many land parcels became uncertain or fell under the contested ownership of multiple parties (Gillingham & Buckle, 2014). One report states of the land tenure endeavor, “The overarching goal is to embark on a land reform process that secures the rights of all citizens including the poor and vulnerable, while at the same time supporting national economic development and promoting environmental
sustainability” (Akinyemi & Nkubito, 2013, p. 4). A 2013 survey report after the land tenure reform laws went into effect revealed 84% of households held a land title (Akinyemi & Nkubito, 2013). Since approximately 80% of Rwandans rely on agriculture for their livelihoods (US Agency for International Development (USAID), n.d.), access to land is an important part of economic and physical survival. The Banyarwanda refugees residing in Rwanda’s camps experienced instability in their communities of origin due to citizenship problems, mainly related to land tenure. Their return home, even if the government restored citizenship fully, hinges on their ability to successfully access the land rights so integrally tied to livelihood and survivability (Hovil, 2011). Congolese refugees in Rwanda face very little prospects for access to land, given Rwanda’s current land shortage, and uncertain claims to land upon return to the DRC. This situation highlights the spatial durability of the refugees’ existence in camps and ties their rights and identities, as well as their access to ‘durable solutions,’ directly to land rights. Land tenure and access rights, as a spatial component, place yet another layer on the intractability of certain protracted refugee cases, particularly in the Great Lakes Region of Africa. Furthermore, they remind us that place and space still matter in this ever-globalizing world. Without settling the question of land access, the citizenship dilemma cannot be properly addressed.

As far back as 1997, just after the massive influx of Rwandan refugees fleeing the aftermath of the genocide, scholars argued that this citizenship crisis in the DRC among the Banyarwanda comprised a “time bomb issue in the Great Lakes Region” (Makombo, 1997, p. 60). And so it remains today. As with the Banyarwanda in the Great Lakes Region, Africa is experiencing increasing political marginalization of certain groups. Mbembe observes:

[Reclassification of localities] is powerfully underpinned by the recent proliferation of ideologies promoting the values of autochthony. Everywhere, the distinction between autochthonous peoples and foreigners has been accentuated, the ethnoracial principle serving increasingly as the basis for citizenship and the condition of access to land, resources, and elective positions of responsibility. (2000, p. 267)

For the Banyarwanda, and those controlling access to land in the Kivus, the link between citizenship and belonging is tied directly to physical territory. Without access to land, there is no livelihood and no political representation. Complicating this matter, the Kivu expert cited above told the Immigration and Refugee Board of Canada that the problem is not about Banyarwanda regaining nationality, but the mistrust
between ethnic groups, particularly in the Kivu Region, that has welled up into escalating violence for the last two decades (Immigration and Refugee Board of Canada, 24 January 2006). A Banyamulenge community leader from Bukavu explained,

Our plight has been made worse because whenever we are attacked, some of us run to Rwanda for help, confirming the perception that we are foreigners. If there was peace in eastern Congo, Banyamulenge would want to identify with Congo; those who run to Rwanda do so because they think it is the only place which can guarantee their safety (IRIN, 2007).

Questionable loyalties contribute to the construction of a Rwandaphone “other” and further preclude Banyarwanda access to land, despite constitutional reforms.

Straddling the local and global, Banyarwanda in the DRC and abroad are caught in the middle of state-level quests for sovereignty and power as well as local level interpretations of those international motivations. These factors play out not only in the international arena as arms embargos, cross-border violence, and public media campaigns, but also at the local-level as the lived experiences of Banyarwanda warehoused in Rwanda attest. The tenuous nature of citizen-state-territory relationship is clearly demonstrated in the way Banyarwanda vacillate between political partner to refugee/IDP pawns, terrorized to terrorizer, citizen and other. Their situation is a symptom of a larger, system-wide dysfunction in which “citizen,” “sovereignty,” and “state” can no longer adequately represent the complexity of the modern world.

Examining the experiences and understanding of Banyarwanda refugees in Rwanda begins to construct a picture of the complex relationship between citizen and state, revealing more systemic sources of durability in refugees’ exile. The Banyarwanda population’s existence at the intersection of so many of these physically and politically contested spaces of citizenship, identity, and movement crystallize larger theoretical debates within the existing context of central Africa. In search of a durable solution for one instance of a human, political, economic, and social problem that is becoming increasingly widespread—that of protracted displacement—we uncover state and local level processes that indicate a permanence and durability of displacement derived from the relationship between citizenship and belonging with state and territory. In order to undo what has taken place throughout decades of civil conflict, cross-border infringement of DRC sovereignty, and centuries of migration, the
Kivus must confront the question of autochthony and land distribution. To the Congolese refugees of Rwanda—and Uganda, though their experiences differ in some ways—the durable solution requires confirmation of a territorial home. Citizenship, belonging, and identity derive from the land, and without it, refugees see very little hope for their future. In the absence of a physical “home,” and in an environment of larger quests for sovereignty in the international system, the Banyarwanda become lost in a durable form of displacement. For these reasons, this in-depth focus on the Banyarwanda within the Lake Kivu region places human beings at the apex of this struggle and provides an account of conflict, disorder, and relative levels of development through the eyes of this particular group, which may arguably be most directly impacted by this larger conflict.

The following chapters consider themes of sovereignty, burden-sharing, post-colonialism, social stratification, and social construction to illuminate the ways local, regional, and international processes contribute to enduring refugee situations, while placing this case study within a larger theoretical framework that transcends the specificities of the DRC/Rwanda borderlands. Building off of NGO and scholarly reports from similar contexts, the specific case of Congolese refugees in Kiziba Camp provides insight into how these processes play out at the local level and point to the complications of ending a system of durable displacement. The contextual history and discussion of the most contemporary debates on this region’s socio-economic and political landscapes, situated in conversation with the larger theoretical discussion to follow, set the stage for the in-depth analysis of the original data that emerged within this study among Banyarwanda refugees in the region.
LITERATURE REVIEW: PLACELESSNESS & STATE SOVEREIGNTY

Even if they don’t like us, even if they kill some of our relatives…we don’t have any other country. Our home is Congo.
-2014 Interview, Woman Quartier Leader, Kiziba Camp

Forced displacement—including the political displacement that arises from statelessness—tears at the fabric of local societies and the international community. This process creates a borderless state that contests the most basic concepts of citizenship, territorial boundaries, and the State as a unit of analysis in International Relations. At the individual level, deprivation of legal rights to place, nationality, or citizenship creates vulnerabilities to exploitation, infringement of human rights, and political voicelessness among other problems (Batchelor, 1998; Weissbrodt & Collins, 2006). Scholars position statelessness as a chronic political condition with concrete and interconnected impacts at the local, national, and transnational levels (Agamben, 1995; Bauman, 2004). Giorgio Agamben (1995) and Zygmunt Bauman (2004) assert that forced migration and statelessness—and subsequent mass containment—result in loss of citizenship, human rights, and belonging in the international system and comprise some of the most unfortunate consequences of modernity. From a macro structural perspective, statelessness and lack of territorial belonging “throws into crisis the original fiction of sovereignty” which can no longer adequately describe the lived experiences of an increasing proportion of people in this world (Agamben, 1995, p. 117).

As the numbers of refugees, Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs), and stateless persons swell with each coming year, their role in the modern international political system cannot be ignored. Increasingly scholars take notice that displaced persons play a critical part in local and regional conflict, contributing to political destabilization of sending, receiving, and surrounding countries (Adamson, 2006; Betts & Loescher, 2011; Jacobsen, 2000; Lischer, 2006; Loescher, 1992; Loescher & Milner, 2005a, 2005b; Milner, 2011; Salehyan & Gleditsch, 2006). At once confirming the state as a unit of analysis by defining the boundaries between citizens and noncitizens, refugees, IDPs, and stateless persons, by their very existence, contest the “original fiction of sovereignty” in which the state provides for the total wellbeing of the inhabitants within its borders (Agamben, 1995). To combat the forces of modernity that
reduce the reach of states and central governments, international actors derive some self-justification from refugees. For receiving states, refugee reception and assistance provides an opportunity to affirm relevance in the international area and garner resources and support; in other words, the state shows that it is capable of responsibly responding to this international migration pressure. In a similar but opposite way, forced migration and statelessness serve to dismantle the illusion of sovereignty in refugee-producing countries as well as those states unable or unwilling to host refugees. These situations can quickly turn into crises where mass forced migration becomes an instrument of disruptive regional violence.

This research focuses on the border between eastern Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) and Rwanda—specifically the Banyarwanda populations displaced by decades of regional conflict, political manipulation, and ever-changing citizenship laws. I explore how statelessness and forced migration among this particular population reflects and reproduces larger conflicts, territorial ambiguities, identity questions, and human rights concerns in ways that perpetuate displacement. I argue that international, national, and local actors have motivations for institutionalizing displacement as a strategic political tool. Parallels may be drawn for other cases of protracted displacement, but the intention of this research is to delve into the political and social contexts and nuances of force migration patterns between Rwanda and eastern DRC. The history and current struggles of Banyarwanda provide an instance of durable displacement to interrogate the state/citizen/territory relationship as both a cause and effect of conflict.

The complexity of the perceived and assigned identity of the borderland Banyarwanda in the transnational narrative of DRC/Rwanda political interactions reveals how forced and protracted displacement is a symptom of a larger, system-wide dysfunction. In this identity and citizenship turmoil, certain dichotomies—insider/outsider, citizen/refugee, indigenous/immigrant, perpetrator/victim—challenge notion of refugeehood as a temporary status. Shifting the focus of the conversation on protraction from ongoing temporary limbo to one of durability highlights a systemic level of displacement across levels of analysis at the macro, meso, and micro scales in international relations.

Protracted refugee situations are growing in scale, number, and duration. Existing theories have failed to explain this expansion of durable cases due to a critical assumption of refugeehood as a temporary condition, as well as an inability to look across levels of analysis for systemic causes of
extended time spent in exile. As the following sections show, macro-level theories explain problems with international collective action and equitable burden-sharing of humanitarian responsibilities; meso theories provide insight into state sovereignty motivations and post-colonial structures that lengthen refugees’ state of limbo; and micro-level theories at the camp and individual levels explain social construction of non-citizen refugee ‘others’ and disproportionate impacts on vulnerable subgroups as a means for understanding protracted cases. Very few studies look across levels to identify processes that interact and intensify one another resulting in intractable forced displacement. For this reason, while existing micro-, meso-, and macro-level theories help us understand the fact of durability in displacement, they cannot explain its growth, intensification, and geographic spread. Confronting these aspects of protraction and durability requires a multiscalar approach to see the interaction across levels of analysis that collectively contribute to unending camp-based refugee situations. The following sections examine protraction across levels to reveal a troubling phenomenon: a global system that reproduces ongoing protraction and placelessness.

After first establishing the terms used to describe forced migrants in this research, I substantiate the claim that protraction and placelessness have grown in scope and duration. The following sections then parse out the different levels of analysis in current related work in order to highlight the usefulness of examining refugeehood across all scales to better understand protraction as a durable form of displacement.

**INSTITUTIONAL AND SPATIAL DISPLACEMENT**

Spatial and institutional components of displacement emerge as two broad themes in the literature on forced migration. In a complex global system that involves conflict, social and political divides, and geographic displacement, these two aspects work on one another to produce durable forms of displacement. Camp-based refugees inhabit a spatially distinct location separated from the host community by artificial borders imposed by the host state governments and INGOs. Additionally, refugees are institutionally isolated through the ‘refugee’ label. This label serves as a means to access necessary resources for survival as well as a marker of difference from the host community (Zetter, 1991). In this way, spatial and institutional distinctions of camp-based refugeehood form a feedback loop that reinforces their outsider status. Spatial delineations and artificial borders contain refugees as separate populations,
and institutional labels and processes affirm their existence as non-citizen others. The following section
drills into this feedback loop to emphasize that place still matters to those who have lost their ‘place’—
institutionally and spatially—in the international system. Spatial displacement in particular comes to the
forefront of the conversation in later analytic chapters where Kiziba residents speak out about their ‘home’
and artificial town-like camp. In the following sections, as we stretch across levels of analysis, it is clear
that the line between spatial and institutional displacement is tangled in the multilayered nature of
refugeehood and placelessness. The discussion moves from explaining the encompassing term of
‘placelessness’ and ‘refugee’ in the global system to breaking out the existing literature into broad theses
that try to explain protraction of what was meant to be a temporary refugee camp solution to human
migration crises.

**THE SEMANTICS OF DISPLACEMENT**

Policymakers, academics, and humanitarian aid workers and organizations are often careful to
make the distinction between refugees, IDPs, and stateless persons, with some acknowledged
categorical overlap. Refugees, on the one hand, flee across national borders from human-induced and
environmental disasters. IDPs, however, remain within their country of origin yet flee to a different area to
escape violence and threats to their livelihood. The reason for flight for both refugees and IDPs may be
the same. In the DRC, for instance, refugees and IDPs fled the same internal civil disorder and
subsequent targeted violence, but ended up in different geographic places. These definitions are
understandably separated in practice to protect each type of forced migrant from the unique
circumstances posed in and outside the country of origin, where one or both groups may have continued
citizenship claims in that country. Statelessness, on the other hand, demarcates a legal status above and
beyond territorial location. Populations who remain in the country of origin, for example, may become
stateless after a regime or law change, among other reasons (Weissbrodt & Collins, 2006). The
statelessness of IDPs and refugees associated with internal conflict in the DRC, for example, is directly
related to colonialism, land rights, and ethnic identity rather than the dissolution of a nation-state or the
physical movement of peoples in modern times (Deng, 2001; Mamdani, 2001, 2002; Stearns, 2011).

Falling outside the traditional territorial state jurisdiction, the United Nations serves as the main
governing organization for refugees and stateless persons. According to the 1954 Convention relating to
the Status of Stateless Persons, the UN defines a “stateless person” to be one “…who is not considered as a national by any State under the operation of its law” (UNHCR, 2012a). This is based predominantly on a legal classification of state’s claim to jurisdiction over an individual’s wellbeing (Batchelor, 1998). While many different factors can lead to one becoming stateless, the UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) identifies “racial and ethnic discrimination” as the most common (UNHCR, 2013b). Regardless of its origin, statelessness can lead to prolonged political marginalization in situations where the state cannot or will not resolve citizenship determinations. The UNHCR notes, “Often, such groups have become so marginalized that even when legislation changes to grant access to citizenship, they encounter huge obstacles and bureaucratic red tape. Often the cost of actually obtaining citizenship is almost insurmountable” (UNHCR, 2013b). The complicated nature of statelessness—and the determination of this vulnerable status—derives at least partly from the gap between international and national conventions on citizenship and the associated complexities of the lives of those who exist within and between states (Batchelor, 1998; Redclift, 2013). Essentially, international conventions protecting the human right to citizenship somewhere—or the “right to rights” (Goris, Harrington, & Köhn, 2009; Massey, April 2010, p. 33), do not specifically address how that citizenship must be determined (Batchelor, 1998; Goris et al., 2009; UNHCR, 2012a).

In the case of the DRC, this citizenship ambiguity results in a massively complex political situation where those who have lived in the country for generations have been denied citizenship based on ethnic categories and legacy policies of colonial meddling in customary land ownership rights (Autesserre, 2008; Deng, 2001; Long, 2012; Mamdani, 2001, pp. 236-239; Prunier, 2009, pp. 48-51; Stearns, 2011, pp. 69-74). Such historic and contemporary power asymmetries have manifested as a form of de facto statelessness¹, where Banyarwanda populations are denied citizenship rights in the DRC, even though they have never lived anywhere else (Deng, 2001). These and other forms of statelessness result in a deprivation of physical and/or political space within the international system (Batchelor, 1998; Weissbrodt

¹ It is worth noting here that stateless persons, such as those classified as Banyarwanda in the Kivu Region of DRC have, at different periods of time, vacillated between citizen, de facto stateless, and de jure stateless categorizations as used by Batchelor (1998) and Weissbrodt and Collins (2006). This only highlights the complexities of nationality and belonging in certain contexts and emphasizes the notion that people’s lived experiences do not fit neatly into static categories.
This broad recognition of statelessness is important because, in the words of Francis M. Deng (2001), a former representative of the UN Secretary General on Internally Displaced Persons, “Thinking of marginalization as a form of statelessness, while not creating a legal status, draws attention to the gross inequities, discrimination, and lack of protection for many people that call for effective remedies” (p. 205). Without recognizing the multitudes of ways that people are excluded from the political system and granted access to effective citizenship somewhere, the existing global governance and related responses to resolving the refugee crisis remain only partial; meanwhile the severe marginalization suffered by so many continues.

**PROTRACTION**

Protracted refugee cases are among those that particularly challenge the resources and management of the UNHCR. While long-term refugee situations are not a new phenomenon, the length of stay has received increasing media and scholarly attention in recent decades. These refugee crises extend beyond the immediate humanitarian emergency, requiring forced migrants to live in temporary conditions for decades with no solution in sight. The UNHCR identifies protracted refugee situations using “crude measures” that account for populations over 25,000 in exile for five or more years (Executive Committee of the High Commissioner’s Programme Standing Committee, 2004).

By these measures, approximately 6.3 million, or 54% of all global refugees live in protracted situations (UNHCR, 2015e, p. 28). The same UNHCR standing committee that referenced the metrics for identifying protraction noted, “if it is true that camps save lives in the emergency phase, it is also true that, as the years go by, they progressively waste the same lives” due to lack of economic and social opportunities to improve their situations (Executive Committee of the High Commissioner’s Programme Standing Committee, 2004, p. 3). According to the UNHCR, “The vast majority [of protracted refugee cases] are found in the world’s poorest and most unstable regions, and are frequently the result of neglect by regional and international actors” (UNHCR, 2006, p. 104). The combination of political, social, and economic pressures on these poor and/or unstable host nations creates crises beyond the initial forced

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2 It is important to note here that not all policymakers and scholars agree with the use of the term *de facto* statelessness. See (Massey, April 2010, pp. 27-60) for a more thorough discussion of the counter-argument.
migration. These include competition for scarce resources, regional entanglement in the politics of sending and receiving countries, and threats to local and national security (Executive Committee of the High Commissioner's Programme Standing Committee, 2004; Loescher & Milner, 2005a, 2005b, 2009; UNHCR, 2006).

As backlash to these potential threats linked to protraction, host governments increasingly confine refugees to camps in order to maintain control over the situation. Not only is this in conflict with the 1951 Convention allowing refugees freedom of movement (UN General Assembly, 1951), it also sentences them to a cycle of wasted lives and perversely contributes to security problems such as militarization, human trafficking, and exploitation of children as soldiers (Loescher & Milner, 2005b, 2009). The pervasiveness of protracted refugee situations combined with the intractable political conditions that limit options for durable solutions motivates this study, particularly focused on the Great Lakes Region of Africa. No one has long-term solutions that suit every protracted situation, but perhaps by training focus on one particular population, we can reveal dynamics that contribute to the problem. In this way, this research may contribute to uncovering previously unrecognized interdependent causes of protraction that may one day lead to solutions.

INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY

NEGLECT IN HUMANITARIAN MAINTENANCE

Massive flows of forced migrants across international borders necessitate an international response. Given the tremendous resource and security pressures these movements place on receiving states, the response calls for cooperation on a global scale to meet the needs of refugees of both the immediate flight and long-term stay. International cooperation and the role of international institutions constitute a broad subject area of IR theory that exceeds the scope of the present study. For the purposes of the research at hand, this section concentrates on burden-sharing and the global refugee regime in order to illuminate how collective action problems to address refugee crises at the global level can explain some aspects of protracted situations. Zygmunt Bauman (2004) connects refugee protraction and burden-sharing in his discussion of "wasted lives" of modernity. He observes,

As the 'redundant' population stays inside and rubs shoulders with the 'useful' and 'legitimate' rest, the line separating a transient incapacitation from the peremptory and final consignment to waste tends to be blurred and no longer legible. Rather than
remaining as before a problem of a separate part of the population, assignment to ‘waste’ becomes everybody’s potential prospect – one of the two poles between which everybody’s present and future social standing oscillates. (Bauman, 2004, p. 71)

Explaining the complications of those “latecomers to modernity”—namely recently modernized states—as they attempt to find “local solution[s] to globally caused problem[s]—though with meagre chances of success” (p. 72) he continues,

Even if they are stationary for a time, they are on a journey that is never completed since its destination (arrival or return) remains forever unclear, while a place they could call ‘final’ remains forever inaccessible. They are never to be free from the gnawing sense of the transience, indefiniteness, and provisional nature of any settlement. (Bauman, 2004, p. 76)

In these passages, Bauman philosophizes on the inherent global processes of modernization that contribute to the increasing permanence of temporary displacement. He points, on a very macro level, to the hopelessness of achieving local solutions to problems that involve burden-sharing and therefore international cooperation. Justified by claims of security threats, refugee receiving states cope with the inequitable burden of hosting by most often confining the forced migrants in camps for extended periods of time. This section outlines these security concerns and discusses how the United Nations serves as the global institution for facilitating resource distribution to populations in need. The section ends with a discussion about how these factors contribute to protracted contexts, and suggests that burden-sharing alone is not enough to explain why protraction extends for so long.

**SECURITY**

Forced migration has been recognized since the post-Cold War era as both a cause and consequence of insecurity (Abuya, 2010; Adamson, 2006; Jacobsen, 2000; Lischer, 2006; Muggah, 2006; Salehyan, 2007; Salehyan & Gleditsch, 2006; Stedman & Tanner, 2003). As such, it requires a humanitarian response and often an armed intervention on behalf of refugees, to both contain and protect forced migrant populations (Loescher & Milner, 2005b, pp. 24-26). Particularly in the case of resource-scarce states, an influx of displaced persons creates pressure on already strained resources, leading to animosity from the host communities as well as severe government destabilization for those unable to accommodate the influx (Adamson, 2006). Additionally, the displaced can contribute to pre-existing ethnic tensions, for example by tipping the balance of a minority group to the majority (Jacobsen, 1996;
Loescher, 1992; Milner, 2011). Refugees have also been commonly associated with armed group movements, providing resources and/or serving as combatants (Abuya, 2010; Lischer, 2006; Muggah, 2006; Stedman & Tanner, 2003). In some cases, porous borders afford a gateway for political movement across international lines, inciting security issues for the sending and receiving states. As Adamson (2006) points out, these challenges are particularly acute in developing countries which host the largest number of refugees in the world. Truly understanding the insecurity that accompanies forced migration requires a more complete picture of the political context of both sending and receiving countries, as well as of the population of refugees themselves (Jacobsen, 2000; Lischer, 2006; Loescher & Milner, 2005b).

Containing placeless persons in camps is one way that the host government can preserve its domestic order and effectively control the population of refugees. As explained by Foucault (2007), the very layout of the camp is a mechanism of control—a "milieu" that serves as a conduit of state power throughout a population. From a human geography perspective, Hyndman (2000) argues that camp spaces specifically reflect the interest of authoritative powers—that of NGOs and host governments—thus privileging certain aspects of camp life over others. As Jacobsen (1996) notes, “Even when there are no potential ethnic problems, governments may prefer to house refugees in camps because doing so reduces their political saliency within the local community. Refugees in camps are more easily monitored, controlled, and registered, all of which also facilitate eventual repatriation” (p. 673). Loescher and Milner (2005b) concur with this analysis of refugee camps as political and economic containment units. They explain,

Due consideration of the indirect threat to security that long-staying refugees may pose to host states has been lacking in both the research on and policy towards refugee movements. In these cases, it is not the refugee that is a threat to the host state, but the context within which the refugees exist that results in the securitization of the asylum question for many states. Lacking policy alternatives, many host governments now present refugee populations as security threats to justify actions that would not otherwise be permissible, such as denying refugees freedom of movement, preventing new arrivals of refugees and, in exceptional circumstances, carrying out mass expulsions. (2005b, p. 34)

The geographic control of refugees within the camp space not only keeps the state and humanitarian agencies in control of the influx of people, but it can also act as a management strategy to limit violence
and prevent an upset in the balance of power among communities outside of the camp (Loescher & Milner, 2005b, p. 33).

When the host government is weak and does not effectively utilize the camp space as a milieu for power, problematic results can occur. Numerous scholars and policymakers have attributed the ongoing violence in the DRC after the 1994 genocide in Rwanda to the ways in which the international community handled the massive influx of refugees (Lischer, 2006; Loescher & Milner, 2005a; Stedman & Tanner, 2003). After the 1994 genocide in Rwanda, Hutu refugees who fled to the DRC intermingled in camps with militants, génocidaires, and exiled political leaders. International aid fed and supplied the population, despite the known fact that these civilians provided resources for those perpetuating local and regional instability (Adelman, 2003). As a state in exile, with governance structures relatively intact after fleeing Rwanda, this group of forced migrants was primed to become a security threat for the region (Lischer, 2006). Adelman (2003) takes this a step further, implicating the international community in “powerlessness and unwillingness to take any risks” that perpetuated the violence in the DRC, and ultimately led to a civil war in the late 1990s—which continues to rage on in the eastern provinces (Mamdani, 2001; Stearns, 2011). The political and economic dimensions of the refugee crisis render the international community’s humanitarian aid programs as only temporary and insufficient bandages for such complex security concerns (Adelman, 2003).

The effect of the refugee crisis that burgeoned into a civil war and continues to cause regional instability in Central Africa has had far-reaching consequences for African state policies. Namely, the increasingly common view that refugees contribute to insecurity positions refugees as vital actors in state and international relations (Muggah, 2006). According to Loescher and Milner,

These refugee populations are seen not as passive victims of persecution and conflict, but as active agents engaged in the politics not only of their country of origin but also in the host country and the wider region, and thus as a potential source of instability on a scale similar to that witnessed in Central Africa in the 1990s. (2005b, p. 9)

In fact, the burden of hosting placeless persons with no foreseeable resolution can be seen as destructive to national sovereignty, an opinion heavily influenced by the negative publicity of “refugee warriors” that affect local and regional insecurity (Loescher, 1992). Potential security concerns are compounded by a general global decline in humanitarian aid and development assistance as well as international
impositions on national economies in developing countries based on terms of structural adjustment programs. These conditions leave host governments less willing to receive refugees who may be placeless for an extended period of time, and some national policies have even become hostile to forced migrants (Loescher & Milner, 2005a, 2005b). In some cases, close ethnic and linguistic ties ease some of this tension and facilitate local integration, as may be the case with the Banyarwanda (Loescher, 1992). More often, however, strained resources and indefinite stays result in national policies influenced by xenophobic belief systems held by citizens and politicians.

**BURDEN-SHARING**

As donor fatigue and international support for refugees diminishes the resources available to support “durable solutions” including local integration strategies, Loescher and Milner (2005b) contend that host nations become “more likely to contain refugees in isolated camps until a solution may be found elsewhere” (p. 20). In this way, they implicate burden-sharing of refugees as a driver for the increasing number and duration of protracted refugee situations. Advocating for more research into the relationship between protracted cases and regional political and security conditions, (Loescher & Milner) assert,

…protracted refugee situations are caused by the combined effect of inaction or unsustained international action in both the country of origin and the country of asylum. These chronic and seemingly unresolvable problems occur because of ongoing political, ethnic, and religious conflict in the countries of refugee origin and become protracted as a consequence of restrictions, intolerance, and confinement to camps in host countries. (2005b, p. 21)

Continued political unrest in the country of origin, unstable political relationships between the sending and receiving countries, as well as declining interest and participation of other international actors contributes to the long-term, intractable placelessness as seen in the refugee camps of Rwanda. Milner (2000) identifies the concept of “security burden” to establish the link between failures of the international community to address security concerns in refugee-generating regions and protracted forced displacement. While other forms of burden-sharing, including humanitarian aid and resources, are well documented in the academic and policy arenas, he argues that without addressing state interests in security, the good will of hosting nations wears thin and contributes to placelessness and regional insecurity (Milner, 2000).
Developing this argument further, Betts (2010) contends that so much international cooperation is involved in the refugee regime that it instead resembles more of a “refugee regime complex,” a term that he coins to illustrate how many aspects of refugee protection and forced migration interests are divested in multiple aspects of international burden-sharing. Elsewhere, he argues that states’ notions of interdependence play an increasingly important role in the protection of refugees given the historic unfair distribution of burden on states in the global south compared with those in the north (Betts, 2009b). In concert, these researchers’ works highlight the complex web of international institutions and agreements that have arisen from an environment where large-scale human movement necessitates cooperation between international actors. Additionally, they demonstrate that state capacities for managing these “globally caused problems” exacerbate the protraction of crises, particularly in the areas of security and human warehousing, which produces isolated, aid-dependent, long-term refugee situations that require continued international cooperation to provide aid and security. As states struggle to balance their own interests in international relations, refugee situations become increasingly protracted, where protracted cases represent two-thirds of all global refugees (US Department of State, 2011).

Refugees’ main hosts are some of the most resource-constrained states in the world. Pakistan, the Islamic Republic of Iran, Lebanon, Jordan, and Turkey hosted the most refugees of any country in 2013, namely because the two top sending countries—Afghanistan and Syria—collectively produced over five million refugees. The top five recipients—Germany, USA, South Africa, France, and Sweden—of refugee resettlement globally, on the other hand, saw just 380,300 in their territories (UNHCR, 2015e). With the exception of South Africa and France, recipient states are generally far removed from the areas of crisis and thus have less pressing need to face the true humanitarian burden of caring for so many displaced. At the time of writing, thousands of refugees are arriving by boat to Europe, forcing the hand of the EU to come up with an equitable burden-sharing plan to assist those states bearing the brunt of the sudden influx. Even among EU member states, there is very little agreement on how to equitably share the humanitarian burden of absorbing the refugees (Boehler & Pecanha, 2015; Pop, 2015). The disproportionate costs—economic, political, and security—of refugee hosting most often fall on the receiving state. As the EU is currently experiencing, however, massive influxes of displaced persons constitute a strong justification for international institutions to distribute the costs of a global collective
good across all international actors. In this case, the collective good is containment and/or absorption of displaced persons and the institution is the United Nations (UN).

**GLOBAL CARE INSTITUTIONS**

Placeless persons exist in a dynamic socio-political terrain, generally without a state to advocate for their rights and hosted in some of the world’s most resource-constrained states. The United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) serves as the main global governing body for coordinating supplies, logistics, and funding for humanitarian assistance. As described in the mandate that created the organization, it falls under the UN General Assembly and the UN Economic and Social Council (UN General Assembly, 1950; UNHCR, 2015b). The UNHCR originally provided relief only to refugees, but given the ever-changing political landscape, it has adapted to provide services to IDPs, stateless persons, and those in IDP-like or refugee-like circumstances. It forms the central international institution of the global refugee regime complex and facilitates the collective care of millions of placeless persons. The most recent published numbers at the time of writing estimated 51.2 million people displaced worldwide; 11.7 million of the 16.7 million refugees fell under the purview of the UNHCR. Additionally, the organization provided protection and assistance for 23.9 million internally displaced and 10 million stateless persons (UNHCR, 2015e). To meet the needs of these populations, the agency maintains an international staff of over 8,600 in 126 countries and mobilized over 4.3 billion US dollars in 2012 (UNHCR, 2015b). State contributions constitute the primary funding source, but a steadily increasing share also comes from private sector donations (UNHCR, 2013a). Hundreds of INGOs support the UNHCR through voluntary efforts from fundraising to day-to-day management of various camp services, such as clinic staffing or economic livelihood initiatives. Partners to manage the care and safety of a growing number of global persons of concern include the World Food Programme and UNICEF, as well as many community and faith-based organizations (UNHCR, 2013c). Together, this refugee regime supports policy development at both the international and national level, interacting with states and state officials to meet the needs of a growing population of placeless persons (Betts, 2008).

Among the responsibilities of the UNHCR is the pursuit of long-term, durable solutions for refugees, IDPs, stateless persons, and those in danger of becoming placeless. This includes policy and advocacy work that some states see as impinging on their sovereign rights to manage their own affairs
(Barnett, 2001; Jacobsen, 1996; Kaiser, 2005; Loescher & Milner, 2005a). To accomplish protection and service provision of vulnerable populations, UNHCR representatives actively engage host government members to promote “inclusiveness, predictability, and transparency” (UNHCR, n.d.). This advocacy work includes providing funding to host institutions conducting refugee-related work. The UNHCR also strives to “work closely with governments to support safe and respectful asylum policies, to negotiate refugee camp locations and security, and to guarantee safety for refugees upon their return home” (UNHCR, 2015c). In addition to host nation partnership building, refugee affairs encompass the participation of UN member states that provide financial support and options for third-country resettlement. Participating countries contribute to global policy development related to refugees and advocate for increased resettlement quotas adopted by states (UNHCR, 2010). These critical quotas provide long-term solutions to a portion of the world’s refugees. In 2013, the UNHCR resettled 98,400 refugees in 21 countries, just a small fraction of the 51.2 million displaced (UNHCR, 2015e). With less than two percent of the UNHCR’s persons of concern finding lasting solutions each year, only a globally coordinated solution can reasonably address the current burgeoning population of placeless persons.

**ONGOING BURDENS**

As the EU is demonstrating as it deliberates on a way forward to address the refugee crisis in Greece and Italy, burden-sharing between the global North and South works on a certain economic level where donors pass along billions of US dollars to the UNHCR to facilitate the (distant) care of millions of placeless persons. This maintenance approach explains some aspects of protraction. As long as the refugee-generating crisis remains spatially removed enough, those states that can afford to contribute to the global refugee regime do so in order to keep the refugees contained elsewhere (Bauman, 2004). When faced with the actual human costs of displacement, states resist notions of burden-sharing in terms of resettlement or relocation. This aspect of distancing manifests clearly in the tiny fraction of placeless persons finding solutions each year (UNHCR, 2015e). Neglecting the refugees’ need for place, donor states relegate the confinement of human bodies to the periphery of the global system, namely developing states. Bauman (2004) explains this as a lack of resources and will to resolve the protracted refugee cases. Hosting states justify prolonged encampment through the potential security threats posed by refugees (Jacobsen, 1996; Loescher & Milner, 2005b). Even the coordinating international institution,
UNHCR, may find justification for its own existence and access to power and resources through the ongoing care work required to maintain protracted cases (Barnett, 2001). And, for both the host state and the UNHCR, containment to camps makes the maintenance, care, and monitoring of refugees easier than managing the needs of urban refugees (Hyndman, 2000; S. Turner, 2010). All of these issues point to larger, structural, global factors that contribute to the protraction of placelessness.

The confluence of security issues, burden-sharing, and international humanitarian institution roles each also contribute to the state of durable displacement experienced by long-staying refugees. States and international actors exercise leverage that grants legitimacy and autonomy to each in the international system. Extracting political leverage from the act of hosting refugees, receiving states stipulate a “price for patience” (Jacobsen, 1996, p. 663) that grants access to aid resources and international recognition of state sovereignty. Similarly, states maintain autonomy and power through allowing (and monitoring in many cases) humanitarian intervention within territorial boundaries. Aid agencies, however, with better logistic and financial resources, erode this autonomy by intervening in domestic policies and using this relative power as political leverage. This give and take system of power between international organizations and refugee hosting states arguably creates an aid dependency/international legitimacy nexus that perpetuates protraction of refugee situations.

Alone, however, these macro-level burden-sharing factors cannot speak to the variation across different refugee contexts. In 2013, around 50% of repatriated refugees had spontaneously returned to their countries of origin without the assistance of UNHCR or large-scale international collective programs (UNHCR, 2015e). This movement points to factors that exist at the state and individual level contributing to length of time spent as refugees. In the case of Rwanda and the Congolese refugees, the state and the UNHCR cooperative effectively to meet the basic needs of the displaced and engage the sending state in diplomatic talks, and yet the refugees remain in a protracted situation with third-country resettlement the main available option. Burden-sharing considerations do constitute a motivating factor—particularly in terms of economics and security—for keeping refugees contained in camps, but they do not fully encompass the extent of protracted cases. At the macro global systems level, states may also confront aspects of sovereignty that foster continued protracted displacement.
The term “sovereignty,” while contested, is a central concept in International Relations theory that frames some macro-level aspects of durability in displacement (C. Weber, 1995, pp. 1-2). Although popularized as a foundational concept within the social sciences, schools of thought vary on its interpretation and application. Indeed, “Attention to sovereignty tends to raise more questions about international relations than it answers” (Biersteker & Weber, 1996a, p. 2). Most generically, sovereignty is the idea that states have domestic control and authority within a given territory and membership in the larger international community (Graham & Newnham, 1998, pp. 504-505); which is to say, sovereignty implies internal authority within territorial bounds, as well as international recognition and immunity from external authority. Krasner (2006) takes the term a step further by defining four types of sovereignty in order to demonstrate the complexity of both the concept and its practice in the international political system. He conceptualizes these four varieties as domestic sovereignty, interdependence sovereignty, international legal sovereignty, and Westphalian sovereignty, the definitions of which he clarifies, “…are not logically coupled, nor have they covaried in practice” (Krasner, 2006, p. 660). By delineating sovereignty into four interrelated categories, Krasner (2006) articulates the various aspects of authority and power that states strive to maintain: the pursuit of resources, power, and recognition. In terms of forced migration, relevant aspects of sovereignty can more logically be categorized as dualisms, namely material/functional versus ideational/normative and domestic/internal versus international/external. Since, by definition, refugees cross international borders and physically reside in some host location, state maintenance of sovereignty naturally aligns along both international and domestic priorities and aspirations. Likewise, the physical presence of placeless bodies presents both material and ideational challenges and opportunities for state performance and maintenance of sovereignty. Using this framework for decomposing sovereign interests, I argue that states pursue and preserve sovereignty in ways that reproduce certain domestic and regional conditions leading to the protracted “durable” displacement of refugee populations.

Forced migration challenges the sovereignty of states that both host and produce refugees (Troeller, 2003). Placelessness ultimately “…unhinges the old trinity of state/nation/territory” (Agamben, 1995) by removing the linkages between citizen and state through political and spatial marginalization.
The state’s power to define insider/citizen in opposition to outsider/non-citizen is compromised by a placeless other whose existence "represent[s] anomalies..." to the "...unproblematic nexus between state, citizen, and territory" upon which the international system of states is based (Betts, 2009a, p. 44). Additionally, as Lischer (2006) posited, a number of factors related to displaced persons can lead to destabilizing domestic and regional security threats, further compromising the control and legitimacy of the state. Theorizing broadly on the impact of global migration on state security, Fiona Adamson (2006) observes,

Migration and human mobility influence three core areas of state power: economic, military, and diplomatic. Here, again, the intervening variable between migration and national security is policy: if states have the capacity to design and implement effective policies that "harness the power of migration," international migration flows can enhance, rather than detract from or compromise, state power. (p. 185)

The policy link clearly articulates the role of states in structuring response to migration. Her analysis makes the point that states make decisions that affect the relationship between themselves and migrants; they can choose to “regime stretch” (Betts, 2013) in order to capitalize on the resources and economic opportunities afforded by incoming migrants.

Arguing that border regulation serves as evidence that globalization has not eroded state sovereignty, Adamson (2006) examines external sovereignty in terms of border control using Krasner’s (2001) concept of interdependence sovereignty. While this migration flow may challenge the capacities of “weak and failing states” (Adamson, 2006, p. 176), it provides an opportunity for others to demonstrate effective border control mechanisms. In many cases, however, the existence of placeless persons demonstrates a breakdown of domestic authority and control as humanitarian interventions encroach upon state politics (Barnett, 2001). Likewise, aspects of state control over international borders become challenged by mass migrations from one territory to another (Jacobsen, 1996). The dysfunction of domestic authority and border control problems related to forced migration ultimately affect the state at both domestic and international levels, demonstrating the many facets of sovereignty that maintain importance for the pursuit of resources, power, and recognition. In fact, as Barnett (2001) argues, preservation of state sovereignty shaped the entirety of the international refugee regime, including the
original scope of the UNHCR and legal aspects of refugee protection laid out in the international conventions.

My interest here is not in whether globalization erodes sovereignty (Bauman, 2004) or if the state should be the level of analysis in international relations theory, as are often debated in IR scholarship. Instead, I assume that states matter because place and territory continue to have relevance in the world today, particularly for those who lack legitimized space and belonging in the international system (Benhabib, 2004; M. Weber, 1946). Specifically, states still notionally maintain control of cross-border movements of people and goods, as well as the power to confer or deny citizenship rights (Adamson, 2006). Territory, as a unit of analysis, is most readily defined in terms of a state, which Max M. Weber (1946) famously defined as “a human community that (successfully) claims the monopoly of the legitimate use of physical force within a given territory” (M. Weber, 1946). Sovereignty, whether degraded or not, matters to states because it grants access to international recognition and reasserts territorially based domestic authority, which ultimately leads to more resources and power (Krasner, 2006). Clinging to the notion of sovereignty for access to resources and power is one particular aspect of state survival in an international system (Bull, 2012); one which relates directly to potential motivations for state responses to protracted displacement and placelessness.

In the following sections, I review four aspects of sovereignty—material-functional, ideational/normative, domestic/internal, and international/external—to demonstrate how states sovereignty is challenged by forced displacement and how the push and pull factors at the regional, state, and local level contribute to the permanence of refugee situations. The macroscopic view of global politics at the state and international level sheds some light on the possible reasons for enduring forms of refugeehood through examination of humanitarian economics, humanitarian intervention, state security concerns, and regional security.

MATERIAL/FUNCTIONAL SOVEREIGNTY

One particularly salient aspect of state sovereignty manifests as economic opportunities and losses. On the one hand, economic losses constitute a serious motivator for containing refugees in camps in order to mitigate the effects of population increases and needs in urban areas. Encampment provides the additional benefit of keeping the refugees in one area to make humanitarian aid provision
easier. On the other hand, economic opportunities afforded over the long-term, as refugee stays become protracted, may offset the cost of hosting and in fact provide incentives for maintaining encamped populations. This section focuses on the economics of refugee hosting in order to reveal possible drivers for durability in encamped refugee situations.

Displaced populations have a complex effect on the economies of host nations. Jacobsen (2005) points to the economic impact on host communities resulting from the “fluidity” of camp populations. She explains that residents may leave the camp for a variety of reasons including seeking employment or returning home to assess the political/security climate. This shifts the population at various times during the displacement and settlement process, resulting in varying potential for economic opportunities and impacts on host communities (Jacobsen, 2005, pp. 7-8). In many ways, the influx of placeless persons causes an extreme burden on the system, where state money diverts from local projects to meet the demand for humanitarian aid and/or containment of the displaced. As these patterns emerge, local economies must also adjust to the influx of labor and services. Even among short-term refugee displacement, teasing out the economic conditions and beneficiaries of displacement is a very complex endeavor (Chambers, 1986). For example, increased resource scarcity in the host country diminishing a state’s public service provision can result in conflicts over resources between the host community and refugees (Adamson, 2006, pp. 179-180). Furthermore, containment in camps can often prevent full economic interaction with the surrounding communities, making refugees extremely dependent on humanitarian aid, while limiting market opportunities for both the refugees and the local host communities (Loescher & Milner, 2005b, p. 10).

Displaced populations can also greatly strain the local environment, causing degradation of the land where camps are built, and forest depletion for firewood (Chambers, 1986; UNHCR, 2009). Jacobsen (1997) notes, however, that often this immediate environmental strain is temporary and characteristic only of the initial flight. Over time, this may balance out (Jacobsen, 1997), which appears to be the case in Rwanda. Host countries often use containing the extent of the environmental stress produced by a sudden influx of refugees as a reason for keeping refugees confined to camp spaces, rather than spreading displaced populations more evenly throughout local communities (Jacobsen, 1997). Jacobsen’s (1997) research suggests that concentrated camp settlements can, in fact, be more harmful
to the surrounding environment and communities. In particular, settlements can put severe strains on agricultural lands, keeping them from laying fallow to restore soil fertility as well as accumulating waste and chemicals in the camp soil from pest control and sanitation (Jacobsen, 1997). While core to the wider consideration of the impact of refugees on the existing environmental systems, these ecological preservation concerns may also at times mask other motivations for containment that are likely more closely related to security concerns and the control of human movement. For these reasons, analysis of the cost of displacement must consider the intersecting impacts of economic, social, environmental, and political burdens on host populations.

While examining the negative consequences of displacement on hosting countries, the literature suggests simultaneous benefits. For example, refugees can boost the local and national economy. Though precise metrics for analyzing this relationship are still being developed, refugees contribute to the economy by providing labor, engaging in market activities, and participating in agricultural activities (Loescher & Milner, 2005b, pp. 10-11; World Bank, 2012). Increased aid and infrastructure built around displaced persons camps may also provide benefits to surrounding communities through access to services offered by aid agencies, jobs in camp support and administration, and economic demand for local goods (Loescher & Milner, 2005b, pp. 70-71; Zetter, 2012, pp. 50-51). Likewise, humanitarian agencies may boost local markets by purchasing goods for the displaced and themselves (Jacobsen, 1996, p. 667). An example of this is when surrounding populations make use of clinic services within refugee camps that might otherwise be too far away for easy access (Kiziba AHA Clinic Director, personal communication, 13 March 2011). Even this relationship, however, is complicated by the conditions of the host community when the refugees arrive. In the short-term, services and medical and educational institutions are often stretched too thin for resources to be of much use to host communities. In the long-term, if these resources become better funded or less in demand by the refugee population, host communities may receive access to services they might not otherwise have (Chambers, 1986).

As Zetter (2012) points out, these economic costs and benefits to the host country and communities are unequally distributed, with many of the positive impacts to the economy only apparent in the long-term while the negative effects are more easily visible in the short-term. In particular, the poorest segment of the host population may feel the economic burden the most as wages drop and commodity
prices rise due to increased population sizes and economic demands in the local area (Whitaker, 2002; Zetter, 2012, p. 52). This may lead to grievances by the local community against the refugees, who reap the benefits of aid intervention and enjoy privileges above the surrounding community in terms of better access to public services (Loescher & Milner, 2005b, p. 33). The influx of refugees adds layers to the host countries’ social stratification, a point that complicates further integration and may fuel animosity towards the newcomers’ access to infrastructure development. Chambers (1986) notes,

This longer-term gain is even more problematical if the host country faces fiscal crises for its recurrent budget, with the dismal possibility that more schools and clinics built for refugees and hosts will later mean that the same very scarce recurrent resources for textbooks, drugs and the like will have to be spread out more thinly, with the likelihood that the poorer will once again be losers. (p. 253)

Accordingly, host countries must contend with the likely length of refugees’ stay, and make complex and often contested decisions about the appropriate investment in resources to sustain the population.

Jacobsen (2005) observes that the fluidity of the settlement process for placeless persons further complicates the economic relationship between displacement and the host community. While host governments might recommend or even require refugees to live in contained spaces such as camps, they often come and go in a “broad strategy of survival.” At times, this strategy requires them to leave the camp in search of work or repatriation options, then later return to make use of camp schools, visit friends and family, or escape outside conditions of insecurity, among other reasons (Jacobsen, 2005, pp. 6-8). Likewise, surrounding populations benefit from camp communities by entering to trade, sell, or access resources such as healthcare within the camps (Kiziba AHA Clinic Director, personal communication, 13 March 2011; field observation notes, 6 June 2014). While local outsiders may pass freely through the camp borders for the benefit of trade and services, for the majority of refugees, income and economic livelihood relies almost entirely on the informal economy (Jacobsen, 2005, p. 11). This means of economic survival situates displaced populations even further beyond the reach of the state, while solidifying their exchange relations across camp borders with the local community. Paradoxically, the relationship between forced migrants and the informal economy could become a reinforcing system in which refugees and local communities benefit from increased trade, thereby economically entrenching and stabilizing the displacement through processes that integrate refugees into a larger system that leads
to protraction. These circumstances inscribe socio-economic relations between refugee and local populations in ways that could reach a point where the economic health of host communities relies extensively on one refugee populations’ participation, thereby entangling one another in a mutually beneficial monetary relationship of potential long-term dependency.

The existing World Bank research shows very little focus on the positive impacts of displaced populations on host communities, though negative impacts are often highlighted. Most contemporary reports speculate that a focus on the benefits of refugee displacement may reveal that properly managed humanitarian assistance could have “…important positive social and economic impacts on society as a whole,” suggesting a further need for micro and macro-economic assessments for conditions such as housing and economic livelihood (World Bank, 2012, pp. 11, 40). Jacobsen (1996) theorizes, “The economic capacity of the host country to absorb refugees is determined by such factors as land availability, the carrying capacity of the land, employment patterns, and infrastructure” (p. 667). Her use of the term “absorption” is important here because it captures both the “ability and willingness” aspects of refugee hosting—including both positive and negative associations. By taking on the care of displaced populations, states may both incur burden and confer opportunities, which poses complex considerations of governance and resource allocation.

Particularly in the case of developing countries, the possibility that refugees may increase economic livelihoods may merit serious incentives for states to sustain hosting and long-term camps. Historically, forced migrant populations under certain conditions have had active transnational trading relationships which foster regional economic growth. The viability of these types of markets, however, depends largely on the domestic policies of the host nation (Chambers, 1986, p. 255). Overall, the short and long-term effects of refugee hosting are complex and highly dependent on the conditions of the host nation, as Chambers (1986) outlines in his analysis of “which rural hosts gain and which lose” (p. 257). If the World Bank researchers’ inference is correct, though short-term economic losses to host nations may make displaced populations appear to be burdensome, long-term hosting may have economic payoffs that further entrench displacement, in other words incentivizing the permanence of forced migrant communities (World Bank, 2012). In this way, protracted displacement becomes economically durable, thereby leading to increasing interdependency between displaced populations, local communities, and
the national economy. Proper management of the economic policies that provide benefits to the host community and country demonstrate competence of national authority that reifies functional sovereignty. Mismanagement, restrictive fiscal policies, and scarce existing resources, however, may result in the host government losing domestic legitimacy for failing to meet not only obligations to the refugees, but responsibilities to its citizenry as well.

**IDEATIONAL/NORMATIVE SOVEREIGNTY**

State sovereignty encompasses normative assumptions that internal affairs and governance reside with the state and outside the direct influence of external actors (Krasner, 2006). Forced migration across international borders, however, presents challenges to the autonomy of states in the strictest sense. As international organizations respond to humanitarian crises, the host state becomes a site of international affairs that may interfere or conflict with its own vision for domestic order and processes. Humanitarian intervention, however, presents not only challenges to states’ autonomy, but also opportunities to reinforce host and sending states’ roles in the international community. This section examines humanitarian intervention as both a challenge and opportunity to fortify notions of ideational/normative sovereignty. In particular, the opportunities for bolstering sovereignty provide insight into how the pursuit and maintenance of state sovereignty contributes to the durability of protracted refugee situations.

International principles of the “responsibility to protect” (R2P) complicate interstate tensions by providing grounds to intervene in the political issues of another international actor (Evans & Sahnoun, 2002). Under this premise, sovereignty is a distinction earned by demonstrating competency in facilitating international norms; failure to adhere to these conventions provides a window of opportunity for other states or international organizations to intervene. This represents yet another layer of state and INGO relations regarding displacement and placelessness. R2P impinges on states’ ability to control their own governance structures, and can inhibit conflict resolution as we see in the Great Lakes Region of Africa (Krasner, 2006). Ideational/normative aspects of sovereignty are particularly important when understanding the role of humanitarian intervention within the receiving state. Lischer (2006) emphasizes that “the receiving state response is critical to preventing the spread of civil war among violence-prone refugee groups, whether classified as persecuted or a state in exile” (p. 28), where the final outcome
depends heavily on the host nation's capacity and willingness to prevent violence. Clearly international actors have great incentive to intervene when characteristics and responses of the receiving state account for much of the outcome of refugees and potential violence in the region.

Jacobsen (1996) stresses the complicated relationship that emerges between refugee receiving states and international organizations and actors. On the one hand, humanitarian organizations operate in refugee camps and crisis areas almost entirely off of the good will and understanding of the receiving state. According to her, cultural and religious aspects of the host state influence receptiveness of refugees (Jacobsen, 1996). In the case of Rwanda, one cannot help but wonder if there is a connection between the country’s receptiveness and its turbulent history. With the pronounced national sentiment of abandonment by the international community during the 1994 crisis (AFP, 2009; Warner, 2014), it is not unreasonable for the comparatively stable Rwandan government to extend asylum to a population facing a similar fate. The similarity is also accentuated by the shared linguistic, cultural, and historical connections with the Congolese refugees (Jacobsen, 1996, p. 668). While no direct evidence points to these links shaping public policy, it could explain the patience and orderliness with which Rwanda handles the Congolese refugee population. Betts (2013) refers to this dynamic as “regime-consistent stretching.” By this he means the “degree to which the scope of a regime at the national or local level takes on tasks that deviate from those prescribed at the global level” (Betts, 2013, p. 34); in this case, Rwanda takes on the role of protector and diplomat on behalf of a population with which it empathizes above and beyond the norms of refugee protection. It is “consistent” in that in conforms to the “underlying purpose of the regime” (Betts, 2013, p. 34), in this case a public ‘never again’ stance. Here we see that states’ receptiveness and refugee policies reflect state interests and political objectives. Humanitarian intervention, however, can interrupt ideational/normative sovereignty when international organizations force themselves into what should be autonomous state affairs, from the host state’s perspective.

Even relying on the goodwill or receptiveness of host nations, international organizations have used the “threat of bad international publicity” to pressure receiving state to alter state policies or for “political consideration in shaping their [policy] responses” (Jacobsen, 1996, p. 665). This kind of coercive pressure erodes the notion of sovereignty and international understandings of nonintervention (Krasner, 2006). Jacobsen (2000) qualifies the scope of international organizations’ powers in state affairs by noting
the disproportionate advantage they have during an immediate refugee crisis. Observing the financial and logistical advantage of organizations like UNHCR during a refugee influx, she observes “this institutional weakness gives the better-financed and more experienced UNHCR and other refugee organizations an advantage…and limits the host government’s ability to resist their pressure” (Jacobsen, 1996, p. 664).

These powers of the UNHCR during immediate forced migration point to factors that erode normative sovereignty, but also imply that this power shifts in favor of the state in the long term. As immediate financing and logistic coordination becomes less applicable, namely in cases of protracted refugee situations, the state may regain those aspects of sovereignty abdicated for the purposes of addressing an immediate emergency.

Brown (2013) disagrees with the conventional notion that humanitarian aid relationships undermine sovereignty. Pointing to receiving states’ ability to negotiate deals and aid relationships with humanitarian organizations, he argues that these interactions reinforce sovereignty rather than deconstruct it. This is evidenced by the ability of states to negotiate the terms of assistance. He does, however, concede that “African policy autonomy may indeed be severely compromised by the aid relationship” due to terms and conditions developed and enforced by international organizations (Brown, 2013, p. 273). Ultimately, Brown (2013) finds that while states sacrifice some degree of autonomy to humanitarian intervention, sovereignty forms the foundation of the relationship between aid organizations and receiving nations as they collectively determine the terms and conditions of their relationship.

Jacobsen (1996) supports these conclusions when she summarizes the complicated push and pull factors between receiving state and international organizations. She explains,

In sum, the need for assistance, the avoidance of negative publicity, and institutional weakness all move the host government toward interaction with the international refugee regime which, in turn, pressures the government towards more positive refugee policies and practices. However, as noted, this relationship is not a straightforward one; interaction is accompanied by countervailing tendencies such as host government leverage over international organizations and sensitivities about sovereignty which may offset the positive influence of the international refugee regime. (Jacobsen, 1996, p. 664)

Barnett (2001) further complicates this state/humanitarian organization relationship by following the development of the UNHCR and connecting the organization’s policies with the interests of donor international actors—in other words, wealthy donor states. This relationship, he finds, developed into one
in which “by the early 1990s UNHCR was quickly becoming more deeply enmeshed in the internal affairs of states” (Barnett, 2001, p. 259). In this way his research implies that UNHCR intervention may in fact represent the erosion of receiving states’ sovereignty in the interests of a wide variety of international actors, including wealthy donor nations of the global North.

Camp management in Rwanda echoes this complex relationship between the UNHCR and the Rwanda Ministry of Disaster Management and Refugee Affairs (MIDIMAR). While the camp bears the signage of UNHCR, it is an entity operated and controlled by the Rwandan government through MIDIMAR. UNHCR outsources many of the service provisions (e.g. health, education, sanitation, food and firewood, and economic livelihood projects) to smaller international organizations; MIDIMAR sets the terms of these organizations, from establishing the educational curriculum to align with national standards, to monitoring elections and security within the camp. UNHCR’s presence implies some degree of aid dependency, and therefore power in shaping certain refugee policies (such as changing policies on the right to work) (personal communication, Minister Mukantabana of MIDIMAR, 13 June 2014). Rwanda, however, exercises its autonomy and independence by determining the flavor and scope of the aid administered to Congolese refugees camps. The UNHCR balances intervention with some deference to state autonomy. Similarly, MIDIMAR sacrifices some degree of its sovereignty in the strictest sense in order to gain a healthy working relationship with this INGO. In this way, refugee hosting both challenges and provides opportunities for states expression of sovereignty. Effective hosting nations, such as Rwanda, reap the rewards of international recognition and balanced non-interventionist approaches on the part of international actors though the obligatory relationship with UNHCR and other INGOs. Properly managed, this give-and-take relationship between the host nation and the international community results disincentives to dismantle protracted crises, specifically by promoting access to resources and international recognition as a functional global actor.

INTERNAL SOVEREIGNTY

The previous two sections dealt specifically with material/functional and ideational/normative aspects of sovereignty that point to incentives that states may have to perpetuate displacement. Each of those cases could also be classified as components of internal and external sovereignty, as they address state gains and losses in terms of economic and political aspects of refugee hosting. The following
section looks at internal sovereignty through the lens of security to understand motivators that exist to perpetuate placelessness and contribute to durability of camp situations.

Forced migration has been recognized since the post-Cold War era as both a cause and consequence of insecurity (Abuya, 2010; Adamson, 2006; Jacobsen, 2000; Lischer, 2006; Muggah, 2006; Salehyan, 2007; Salehyan & Gleditsch, 2006; Stedman & Tanner, 2003). As such, it requires a humanitarian response and often armed intervention on behalf of refugees, either to contain or protect forced migrant populations (Loescher & Milner, 2005b, pp. 24-26). In terms of domestic sovereignty, placelessness has both direct and indirect concerns. Particularly in the case of resource-scarce states, an influx of displaced persons creates pressure on already strained resources, leading to animosity from the host communities as well as severe government destabilization for those unable to accommodate the influx (Adamson, 2006). Additionally, the displaced can contribute to pre-existing ethnic tensions, for example by tipping the balance of a minority group to the majority (Jacobsen, 1996; Loescher, 1992; Milner, 2011). Displaced populations have also been commonly associated with armed group movements, either by providing resources or serving as combatants (Abuya, 2010; Lischer, 2006; Muggah, 2006; Stedman & Tanner, 2003). In some cases, porous borders provide a gateway for political movement across international lines, which can challenge the internal sovereignty of each of the sending and receiving states. As Adamson (2006) points out, these challenges are particularly acute in developing countries which host the largest number of refugees in the world. Some scholars argue, however, that truly understanding the insecurity that accompanies forced migration requires a more complete picture of the political context of both sending and receiving countries, as well as the population of refugees themselves (Jacobsen, 2000; Lischer, 2006; Loescher & Milner, 2005b).

Containing placeless persons in camps is one way that the government can preserve its domestic order and demonstrate effectiveness in managing its own internal affairs. As Jacobsen (1996) notes, “Even when there are no potential ethnic problems, governments may prefer to house refugees in camps because doing so reduces their political saliency within the local community. Refugees in camps are more easily monitored, controlled, and registered, all of which also facilitate eventual repatriation” (p. 673). Loescher and Milner (2005b) concur with this analysis of refugee camps as political and economic containment units. They explain,
Due consideration of the indirect threat to security that long-staying refugees may pose to host states has been lacking in both the research on and policy towards refugee movements. In these cases, it is not the refugee that is a threat to the host state, but the context within which the refugees exist that results in the securitization of the asylum question for many states. Lacking policy alternatives, many host governments now present refugee populations as security threats to justify actions that would not otherwise be permissible, such as denying refugees freedom of movement, preventing new arrivals of refugees and, in exceptional circumstances, carrying out mass expulsions. (2005b, p. 34)

The geographic control of refugees within the camp space not only keeps the state and humanitarian agents in control of the influx of people, but it can also act as a management strategy to limit violence and prevent an upset in the balance of power among communities outside of the camp (Loescher & Milner, 2005b, p. 33). As explained by Foucault (2007), the very layout of the camp serves as a mechanism of control—a "milieu" that serves as a conduit of state power through a population on which the modern concept of sovereignty relies. From a human geography perspective, Hyndman (2000) argues that camp spaces specifically reflect the interest of authoritative powers, that of NGOs and host governments, thus privileging certain aspects of camp life over others, namely gendered women's work.

When the host state government is weak and does not effectively utilize the camp space as a milieu for power, problematic results can occur. Numerous scholars and policymakers have attributed the ongoing violence in the DRC after the 1994 genocide in Rwanda to the ways in which the international community handled the massive influx of refugees (Lischer, 2006; Loescher & Milner, 2005a; Stedman & Tanner, 2003). After the 1994 genocide in Rwanda, Hutu refugees who fled to the DRC were confined to camps where militants and exiled political leaders intermingled with the forced migrants. During their time in these camps, international aid fed and supplied the population, despite the known fact that these civilians provided resources for those perpetuating local and regional instability (Adelman, 2003). As a state in exile, with governance structures relatively intact after fleeing Rwanda, this group of forced migrants was primed to become a security threat for the region (Lischer, 2006). Adelman (2003) takes this a step further, implicating the international community in "powerlessness and unwillingness to take any risks" that perpetuated the violence in the DRC, and ultimately lead to a civil war in the late 1990s—which continues to rage on in the eastern provinces (Mamdani, 2001; Stearns, 2011). Again, the political and economic dimensions of the refugee crisis emerge, rendering the international community's
humanitarian aid programs as only temporary and insufficient bandages for such complex security concerns (Adelman, 2003).

The effect of the refugee crisis that burgeoned into a civil war and continues to cause regional instability in Central Africa has had far-reaching consequences for African state policies. Namely, the increasingly common view that refugees contribute to state and regional insecurity positions refugees as vital actors in state and international relations (Muggah, 2006). According to Loescher and Milner,

These refugee populations are seen not as passive victims of persecution and conflict, but as active agents engaged in the politics not only of their country of origin but also in the host country and the wider region, and thus as a potential source of instability on a scale similar to that witnessed in Central Africa in the 1990s. (2005b, p. 9)

In fact, the burden of hosting placeless persons with no foreseeable resolution can be seen as destructive to national sovereignty, an opinion heavily influenced by the negative publicity of “refugee warriors” that affect local and regional insecurity (Loescher, 1992). This burden of potential security concerns is compounded by a general global decline in humanitarian aid and development assistance as well as international impositions on national economies in developing countries based on terms of structural adjustment programs.

These conditions leave host governments less willing to receive refugees who may be placeless for an extended period of time; some national policies have even become increasingly hostile to forced migrants (Loescher & Milner, 2005a, 2005b). Often, this results in national policies influenced by xenophobic belief systems held by citizens and politicians. In some cases, however, integration is eased by close ethnic and linguistic ties, as may be the case with the Banyarwanda (Loescher, 1992). One advantage of their socio-linguistic ties with Rwandans may be the ease with which they remain in protracted limbo and interact with the host government. Despite this potential for relatively seamless local integration, the stated preference of most refugees in this study is to return “home” to the DRC even though they are considered “outsiders” in that country and used as scapegoats for many of its social and political problems (Loescher & Milner, 2005b, pp. 27-31). This particular case is striking because of the close proximity between the host country and the Congolese refugees’ home country, literally just across the lake from the camp and visible on a very clear day. The separation represents a very distinct case of refugee management within the context of close ethnic ties punctuated by the policies of separation
enacted across this highly politicized and symbolic border. As this section demonstrates, the heightened security concerns and subsequent restrictive refugee policies that arise justify encampment rather than exploration of alternative solutions, including local integration. Regardless of whether the security threats are real or merely perceived, containment in human warehouses perpetuates the length of human lives held in limbo, and as is further explored in subsequent chapters, contributes to durability of displacement through processes of economic, political, and social isolation.

EXTERNAL SOVEREIGNTY

The threat of security does not only affect internal sovereignty. In fact, it underlies much of the dialog on forced migration at the macro-level of analysis. The idea that refugees contribute to interstate, regional, and international insecurity is hardly contested. A number of studies address the idea that refugee flows contribute to the spread of conflict (DIPS, 2006; Jacobsen, 2000; Lischer, 2006; Loescher & Milner, 2005a, 2005b; Mhembu-Salter, 2006; Milner, 2011; Muggah, 2006, 2010; Murison, 2002; Salehyan, 2007; Salehyan & Gleditsch, 2006). Refugees may be directly or indirectly involved in this security threat (Loescher & Milner, 2005a; Milner, 2011; Salehyan & Gleditsch, 2006), but for many of the reasons already described here, forced migration increasingly takes on the connotation of insecurity in international discussions of cross-border human movement.

Lischer (2006) develops a more nuanced understanding of why certain types of refugee populations result in conflict while others do not. She points to gaps in the literature addressing militarization of refugees that fail to recognize the types of populations, actions of state and non-state actors, and types of violence that arise. By more carefully analyzing particular refugee flows and subsequent violence or lack thereof, she implicates both sending and receiving countries, international actors, and refugees in the potential for the spread of conflict. Only by separating out the types of violence and actions of all parties involved can we begin to understand the correlation between forced migration and the spread of conflict (Lischer, 2006). The resultant challenge that forced migration poses to managing conflict with neighboring sending and/or receiving states necessitates international engagement that reinforces notions of external sovereignty and interdependence with global actors more broadly.
As mentioned above, refugees feature both overtly and discretely as tools of foreign policy. Explaining this in more detail, Loescher (1992) claims that refugee flows are “purposefully created as a strategic policy tool” where “Mass expulsions can…be used to destabilize or embarrass neighboring states which are strategic or political adversaries” (pp. 29, 32). Protracted and recurring refugee situations constitute a major concern for regional and international security, resulting in a number of threats such as camp militarization, insurgency, and recruitment of child soldiers (Loescher & Milner, 2005a). Additional security threats arise from third-party intervention, where refugees become tools of proxy wars and subsequently instruments of regional instability, whether intended or not (Adelman, 2003; Loescher & Milner, 2005a, 2005b; Muggah, 2010; Stedman & Tanner, 2003). Refugees also pose significant hurdles in peace-building processes. This occurs both at the negotiation table when armed refugee groups have committed violence against sending and/or receiving state, but also when the fate of long-staying refugees are considered only as a hindsight, rather than part of the peace-building efforts (Milner, 2011). Without making concerted efforts to include refugees in peace-building initiatives, Milner (2011) argues that international actors may be neglecting a crucial component to lasting peace. Given the role of refugees in both creating and sustaining instability between host and sending states as well as the international community at large, it is easy to see forced migration as a cause and consequence of conflict. The complex relationship between refugees and violence entrenches certain populations in unending limbo as peace-building efforts fail and continued protraction breeds potential sources of renewed conflict. As the work of these scholars shows, viewing these relationships through the lens of external sovereignty and state interdependence sheds light on the ways in which temporary displacement can become increasingly permanent.

**DURABLE MACRO-LEVEL INCENTIVES**

In summary, rather than a concrete answer about whether forced migration in fact erodes sovereignty, the survey of literature presented above further complicates the role of the state in international relations. I start with the assumption that states still matter in IR because territory and citizenship remain linked in ways most highlighted by those denied a physical and political place in the international arena. The purpose was not to determine a definitive conclusion about state sovereignty, but instead to demonstrate that by unpacking the term into its parts and varieties, we uncover a complex web
of political processes interacting at international, national, and local levels. By viewing sovereignty as a macro-level concept, we see that states may have some economic and political incentives for maintaining populations in protracted displacement. The motivators for contributing to protracted displacement include state interests in material/functional resources and ideational/normative recognition locally, regionally, and internationally. As Krasner (2006) explains, states will violate the norms of sovereignty “in inventive ways” to satisfy their needs for autonomy and independence (p. 665), which includes negotiation and sacrifice of some forms of the power that accompanies statehood and international recognition. These systems work for and against each other creating, what I argue, is a state of durable displacement, where refugees move from temporariness into perpetual and permanent limbo.

In terms of internal sovereignty, refugees challenge the host nation to demonstrate its capacity to provide for its citizens by putting pressure on economic resources and posing threats to national security. Containment in refugee camps serves to preserve domestic order and provides the opportunity for states to demonstrate competency in caring for a non-citizen other. In fact, capitalizing on the label of a specific kind of migrant, the refugee, may confer state access to aid and resources that incentivize hosting. Through this relationship, the state may develop its own dependence, both economic and political on the hosted refugee population.

Externally, refugee populations also challenge and serve as a resource for defining the notion of sovereignty. While forced migration across borders intensify border control operations and relationships with neighboring states, including increased potential for interstate conflict, the burden-sharing aspect of refugee hosting presents a set of opportunities for states to reassert themselves in international power dynamics. Through a give and take relationship, international humanitarian organizations and states negotiate terms of aid, administrate funds and resources, and thereby manage power dynamics between the host state and the wider international community. As each actor attempts to manipulate the other to gain more resource access, recognition, and/or power, they create a dependency between them that incentivizes protracted displacement. Additionally, the push and pull factors that create forced migrations creates insider/outsider dynamics at an international level. The host nations enter into the international arena as functioning partners in the refugee regime, while the sending countries become othered as “failed states” or dysfunctional political entities. By not conforming to the norms of sovereignty, these
states experience challenges to access power, resources, and recognition in the larger international community. This status expels them from the benefits of external sovereignty, a position that may lead to instability and protracted displacement for the refugees it produced.

Again, these macro-level views of protraction—with the state as the central actor seeking to preserve sovereignty in a larger international system—provides some insight into possible state and system-level motivations for maintaining refugees in protracted encampment. In general, sovereignty reveals that host states gain some benefits for hosting in the long term, particularly political influence and economic growth. The benefits, however, do not necessarily speak to social and individual reasons that camps may stay in protracted limbo for increasingly long periods of time. As later chapters reveal, refugees themselves are not devoid of agency and, based on the UN Charter granting refugees freedom of movement, they can and do spontaneously repatriate or migrate without consideration for international policies or host-state benefits.

**INCOMPLETE MACRO-LEVEL EXPLANATIONS**

What does this mean for the long-term? As Loescher and Milner (2005b) observe, “It is essential to recognize that protracted refugee situations have political causes, and therefore require more than humanitarian solutions” (p. 18). The discussion on sovereignty and forced migration above illuminated some of these political causes that contribute to extended periods of refugeehood. Where Loescher and Milner (2005b) emphasize the need to better integrate regional political and security considerations into policy development for durable solutions, and Milner (2011) underlines the importance of including refugees in peace-building initiatives, I do not believe these considerations address the complexity of the entire system. These scholars see states’ failures to act or engage in the peace-building processes as sources of protraction. This leaves the international organizations, specifically UNHCR, to monitor and administer the entirety of refugees’ needs, thus eliminating long-term options for durable solutions. Through the discussion of varieties of sovereignty, however, it is clear that states do act, but it is in preservation of their own self-interests—defined as sovereignty here—and in reaction to the consequences of their interactions in the larger international state system. Loescher and Milner’s many years of research into security, refugees, and peace-building does demonstrate the principles that both sending and receiving states must contribute to a long-term solution. However, their extensive studies do
not account for the motivations of states within the larger IR arena, thereby providing an incomplete
framework for evaluating ways to engage actors contributing to durable solutions.

**STATE AND STATE-LIKE ACTORS**

**MESOSCOPIC LENS OF POSTCOLONIALISM**

Sovereignty and burden-sharing provide insights into macroscopic views of displacement and
possible incentives states and international actors have for maintaining protracted refugee cases.
Zooming in to the issue of long-staying refugees, a postcolonial lens also provides perspective,
particularly in the context of Africa. The relevance of state sovereignty, in relation to the Western-imposed
Westphalian state ideal, has long been contested in Africa, where a distinct history of colonial rule
imposed constructed nation-state divides often through larger ethnic, linguistic, and tribal communities
(Dowden, 2012; Grovogui, 2002; Gruffydd Jones, 2013; Hagmann & Péclard, 2010; Notshulwana, 2011;
Sidaway, 2003). Many scholars and popular media outlets claim that colonial powers arbitrarily drew
African borders; however, others have shown this to be an oversimplification of history (Green, 2012;
Mbembe, 2000; Touval, 1966). Mbembe (2000) asserts that although Africans did not participate in
determining colonial boundaries, “...this does not necessarily mean that they were arbitrary”; instead,
they reflect socio-cultural and economic factors surrounding European and African interactions long
before formal colonization and boundary delineation (Mbembe, 2000, pp. 264-265).

Though these borders were not arbitrary, they did most often serve the political and economic
interests of colonial powers rather than those of the people in border communities; for this reason,
borders serve as a starting point for many discussions on the failure of governance in postcolonial Africa.
Bezabeh (2011) avoids the temptation to attribute citizenship and sovereignty ambiguities in Africa,
especially in DRC, to problems of states “in the making” that suffer from legacy problems left behind by
colonialism. He instead connects “…the problems surrounding issues of citizenship to the logic of
sovereignty and state, rather than the peculiarity of the African state or the sense of rootedness”
(Bezabeh, 2011, p. 590). Likewise, Hagmann and Péclard (2010) find among the consensus of studies on
Africa that states are “historical processes” which are “deeply embedded in social forces” (p. 542). African
states build unique conceptualizations of sovereignty over time as necessary to facilitate their own
political processes. Regardless of its complex origins, the fact that the DRC has been enmeshed in civil
conflict for nearly two decades presents serious obstacles to sovereign state operations (Kraxberger, 2012; Reyntjens, 2007). These challenges manifest in the form of refugee flows across international borders into neighboring countries and contribute to the exceptionally long periods these former DRC residents and citizens spend in exile.

The roots of these pressures on internal sovereignty derive long before independence from colonial powers spread throughout the Great Lakes Region and arguably begin with the history of European influences in Rwanda and eastern DRC. These social forces bubbled into waves of violence—most recently the 1994 genocide in Rwanda—that underlie much of the modern migration story in the Great Lakes Region. Imaginatively contrived race relations constructed by early explorers shaped the subsequent ruling strategies colonial powers in the region. In these systems, colonial overseers granted social and political privileges along race/ethnic lines as it suited their needs. Pointing to this confluence of race and colonial powers’ inflation of social stratification in Rwanda, Prunier (1995) summarizes the impending violent future by explaining,

The result of this heavy bombardment with highly value-laden stereotypes for some sixty years ended by inflating the Tutsi cultural ego inordinately and crushing Hutu feelings until they coalesced into an aggressively resentful inferiority complex. If we combine these subjective feelings with the objective political and administrative decisions of the colonial authorities favouring one group over the other, we can begin to see how a very dangerous social bomb was almost absent-mindedly manufactured throughout the peaceful years of abazungu [white, European] domination. (p. 9)

Mamdani (2001) further explains that when the rights and privileges are granted based on constructed lines of race and ethnicity, these identities become political, not cultural or biological.

Belgium took over administration of Rwanda from Germany after WWI as a UN trust territory on the path to independence, which it gained in 1962 (Kiwuwa, 2012; Mamdani, 2001; Newbury, 1988). The Belgians extended and adapted their system for a “native policy” in which certain groups were privileged above others, socially stratifying the population by choosing local chiefs primarily from among the Tutsi (Kiwuwa, 2012; T. Turner, 2007). In the 1920s, the Belgians orchestrated land re-distribution whereby Rwandese became local overseers of the people on those lands. The Belgians grouped these land areas into a hierarchical structure that reported directly to the Belgian authorities. Generally Tutsi, these
intermediaries served the wishes of the Belgians and helped to administer control over the population (Newbury, 1988).

Colonial era policies institutionalized divisive social and legal mechanisms, a legacy that continues to shape conflict and politics in the region (Kiwuwa, 2012; Newbury, 1988; Steinmetz, 2007). Mamdani (2001) summarizes this multi-layered approach by observing, “Through its discourse on race and ethnicity, the colonial state tried to naturalize political differences, not only between the colonizer and the colonized, but also—and this is the important point here—between two kinds of colonized: those indigenous and those not” (2001, p. 27). Citizenship and belonging as prerequisites to access power and resources continue characterize the conflict in the Great Lakes Region. Mamdani (2001) describes a “bifurcated state: civic and ethnic” (p. 28) where parts of society were governed by established legal systems and others by customary law; this fact, compounded by “institutionally entrenched discriminations” (p. 29), left the bottom of the race hierarchy, the Hutu, as “the core victims of colonial rule” (p. 27). This conceptualization of socio-political identities in Rwanda is important for understanding how deep roots of belonging played a part in the conflict that continues to uproot so many from the Great Lakes Region even today.

Even though a turbulent colonial history lingers in political, economic, and social structures throughout the continent, scholars, policymakers, and public media revisit the term “failed state” often when reflecting on the political situation of many African nations. In 2013, the DRC ranked number two in the Failed States Index (Yonetani & Holladay, 2013) as a result of militia violence—such as that of the rebel group M23—rambling out of government control, human rights violations by militias and government forces throughout the east, and the growing number of forced migrants (Messner & Lawrence, 2013). Additionally, some scholars attribute Africa’s problems with sovereignty and state failure to structural inequalities embedded in global hierarchies which enabled colonialism and the subsequent turmoil of many African states. Grovogui (2002), for example, notes, “The regimes of sovereignty instituted by various modern hegemons have been united by an ethos of hierarchy and privilege, on the one hand, and corresponding mechanisms of subordination and discrimination, on the other” (p. 323). Speaking specifically about colonialism in Africa, he observes that the “colonial regime of sovereignty” came into direct conflict with “African processes and structures of legitimation” (Grovogui, 2002, p. 327). Though this
hints at a more systemic reason for state failure in many African countries, sovereignty matters in an increasingly interdependent, interconnected world and for that reason, relative governance competency measures may still hold some value. Though not all scholars find these rankings productive, the conditions measured and the overarching national context play important roles in identifying the capacity of those governments to meet the needs of citizens as well as the describing change relative to other states (Messner & Lawrence, 2013).

Scholars may not agree on the validity or relevance of ranking state propensity for failure, however, the portrayal of postcolonial African governments in academic arenas is "virtually pathological," where they are often categorized as failed, weak, quasi, or on the verge of collapse (Hagmann & Péclard, 2010, p. 540). Sidaway (2003) observes, “African states are frequently represented as failed or weak. They are compared with sovereignties of the West, measured, weighed and found wanting of the strength, power, and effectiveness of western statehood” (p. 160). Use of the term “failed” in reference to statehood and sovereignty implies a frame of reference defined entirely from the perspective of “successful” states, mainly hegemonic global (north) powers. The DRC, like Somalia, however, represents a relatively straightforward case of state failure, with some claiming that it is beyond failure and into the realm of “nonstate” for its lack of governance and rampant ongoing violence (Herbst & Mills, 2013), particularly in the eastern part of the country that is farthest from the capital in Kinshasa and that borders Rwanda.

The phenomenon of a “nonstate” in the Great Lakes Region of Africa exists relatively unchallenged; however, this does not reflect disinterest in state sovereignty. Herbst and Mills (2013) observe, “African leaders in Congo’s neighborhood who should be most concerned about the country’s catastrophe dislike any questioning of state sovereignty, given that many of them do not have full control of their own territories” (pp. 78-79). Grappling with their own political turmoil after enduring years of colonial rule, neighboring states resist dialog about state sovereignty to preserve public perceptions about their own efficacy as international actors. By doing so, they demonstrate a lack of political will to stamp out the sources of refugee flows and may participate in long-staying refugee situations. Contributing to this strategic silence in the political arena on the validity of DRC’s sovereignty are the economic incentives to leave the mineral wealth of the country largely ungoverned (Autesserre, 2008; Eichstaedt,
2011; Grovogui, 2002; Herbst & Mills, 2013; Mbembe, 2000; Sidaway, 2003; Vlassenroot & Raeymaekers, 2009). The DRC represents a particularly sobering challenge to the notion of a sovereign state. Many aspects of its domestic control and international relationships are dysfunctional at best, but in most cases non-existent. This case affords an analysis of how foreign aid and multilateral support from major powers including the U.S. fail to assure the functional operations of Kinshasa’s central government (Autesserre, 2008; Clark, 2004, pp. 57-65; Fidler, 2009; Herbst & Mills, 2013). Deng (2001) sees this as a manifestation of a wider problem, however, in which the underlying drivers for conflict in the region stem from “…the interconnectedness of the conflict emanating from ethnic marginalization” (p. 184). He identifies this as a “problem with boundary making” which extends beyond the physical delineation of local, regional, and state borders to include more abstract boundaries such as race, class, identity, nationality, and legal status (Deng, 2001, p. 184). In the case of the refugees in this study, ethnic marginalization constitutes a primary reason that return to the DRC is a very unlikely solution to their protracted displacement.

The abstract boundaries described by Deng (2001) are an important part of the story of forced migration from the DRC into Rwanda, and the wider sense that the DRC government has failed as evident in the massive number of displaced refugees. Among those factors that affect public perception of the DRC as a failed state, the vast quantity of forced migrants generated in the last 20 years is most relevant to this study. The turbulent overarching political, social, and economic context generated a migration crisis that spilled beyond the national borders and impacted the daily micro-politics of this conflict-laden region. These impacts emerge at the local refugee camp and border community levels. Loescher and Milner (2005b) identify “chronic and recurring refugee flows,” such as those between DRC and Rwanda, as “a crucial but largely unrecognized component of peace-building processes in failing states” (p. 7). These mass movements of people and lack of viable long-term solutions represent challenges to the embodiment of sovereignty within the international state system, as discussed above. In the larger context of migrant flows that reflect the state of crisis, the case of Banyarwanda refugees encapsulates the residual human costs of such unsettled relations, political turmoil, and socio-economic divides.
Xenophobic and restrictive refugee policies result in othering the non-citizen as a way to reinforce notions of nationalism and belonging. This leads the use of citizenship by states and political leaders as a tool of exclusion for economic and political gains, as seen in the DRC (Manby, 2009, p. 21). In many places, specifically in the Great Lakes region of Africa, this has resulted in autochthonous local political systems that exclude “immigrant” descendants of generations past from political and economic participation (Bezabeh, 2011; Geschiere, 2009; Mbembe, 2000). Scholars have established that citizenship crises are the root of many of Africa’s ongoing conflicts, including in the DRC, which resulted from the transition to postcolonial independent governments (Mamdani, 2001; Manby, 2009). Manby (2009) observes, “Africa’s post-colonial history shows how difficult it has been to create a functioning polity from scratch among peoples without a history of common political organization; but also how surprisingly persistent is the attachment to the [territorial] units created by the colonizers” (pp. 3-4). Many scholars, however, warn that attributing all of the conflict in the Great Lakes region to after effects of colonization results in an oversimplification of the underlying causes of the ongoing violence (Mamdani, 2002; Mbembe, 2000; Niemann, 2007). On top of the political chaos of the postcolonial years came feelings of xenophobia left as “…a legacy of resentment of incomers and their privileges that still reverberates today” (Manby, 2009, p. 7). From this, a retreat to autochthony resulted in local politics, especially in eastern DRC, revolving around socially constructed imaginings of insider/outsider based on dates in the historical colonial past, the priorities of which changed with the political tide (Bezabeh, 2011; Geschiere, 2009; Mbembe, 2000). For eastern DRC and the Banyarwanda, this resulted in citizenship rights and political participation privileges being granted and revoked based on who was in power at the time. Bezabeh (2011) emphasizes the importance of placeless persons in this process of nation-building by noting, “In fact, the excluded and depoliticized beings are vital to the politically included beings, as they are repeatedly used to legitimate those who are at the core of the state” (p. 606). Again, the state most readily defines the citizen by establishing what it is not, reinforcing the notion of insider/outsider for the purposes of state-building.

Postcolonialism and the historical context of the region—specifically along the border of Rwanda and the DRC—bring to light state-building processes and ethnic marginalization that exacerbate forced migration and duration spent in refugee camps. In the case of the Banyarwanda refugees in Rwanda,
however, this perspective cannot effectively explain why this group remains in protracted limbo for so long. With a shared ethno-linguistic history, residual effects of colonialism do not explain the ongoing isolation and discrimination faced by the Banyarwanda refugees experiencing decades of exile in camps. Rwanda’s initial hosting response may be at least partially motivated by empathy for the DRC’s political turmoil in the wake of independence. In this particular protracted case where local integration appears to be a viable alternative to encampment, Rwanda prefers to maintain a containment strategy and keep the Banyarwanda as outsiders.

**SOCIAL CONSTRUCTION OF STATE SOVEREIGNTY**

Scholars note that sovereignty is best understood as a spatially and temporally constructed concept, the meaning of which has changed throughout history (Grovgogui, 2002; Mbembe, 2000; Sidaway, 2003; C. Weber, 1995, pp. 1-5). Expanding on this, some scholars describe sovereignty and the modern state system as socially constructed; namely, it is “…the normative conception that links authority, territory, population (society, nation), and recognition in a unique way and in a particular place (the state)” (Biersteker & Weber, 1996b, p. 3). Ultimately, sovereignty is a claim that states make both to domestic and international audiences. Refugees contribute to this conversation as states produce and/or receive refugees and manage the care of these often long-staying populations. Unpacking the relationship between refugees and the social construction of sovereignty helps to reveal state-level motivations for maintaining refugees in protracted encampment.

Claims to sovereignty and establishment as a legitimate entity in the international system conveys benefits such as increased domestic support, access to resources such as aid and financing, and power at home and abroad. As such, it also ties closely in with burden-sharing and interdependence aspects of external sovereignty discussed above. Refugee stays most often prolonged by “political impasses both in the country of origin and the country of asylum” (Loescher & Milner, 2005b, p. 37). Beyond nations begrudgingly hosting refugees and deteriorating interstate relations, Jacobsen (1996) explains that states use forced migration as a bargaining chip in international relations. She observes,

In agreeing to give asylum to refugees in exchange for increased resettlement quotas or financial reimbursement, host governments manipulate the situation to their own advantage. By increasing the price of their patience with refugees and calling upon donors to finance refugee programs, governments like Pakistan and Ethiopia have benefited from the presence of refugees. (Jacobsen, 1996, p. 663)
These gains represent both economic and political aspects of international affairs, giving states the power to manipulate the good will of international actors in order to reap the benefits from refugee hosting. Jacobsen (1996) points to the complex political and economic considerations that receiving governments weigh when serving as a host nation for forcibly displaced persons. She draws attention to the fact that decisions to host go beyond anticipating access to resources; the decision making process includes considerations about relationships with the sending country, political costs of international assistance and intervention, and security concerns (p. 674). These benefits associated with “the price of patience” may prolong the forced displacement by inhibiting incentives to participate in the peace process. In the case of Rwanda, responsibly hosting Congolese refugees for so many years and demonstrating competence in cooperating with UNHCR to run the camps contributes the overall image of the country as a “donor darling.” Though not directly related to refugee hosting, the public recognition derived by the Rwandan government from successful programs in the country funded and supported by international actors likely contributed to the country’s acceptance into the UN Security Council in 2012 (Permanent Mission of Rwanda to the United Nations, 2013; Republic of Rwanda, 2012).

Just as states can use autonomy and power conferred through sovereignty to gain access to resources and power, these entitlements also become a vulnerability that other political bodies can strategically use against them. International state and non-state actors can strategically utilize the mutual recognition aspect of international legal sovereignty, for example, as grounds for military or humanitarian intervention (i.e., “responsibility to protect”) in another state without its consent (Autesserre, 2008; Ayoob, 2001; Chesterman, 2003; Evans & Sahnoun, 2002; Mbembe, 2000). In this way, placeless persons can become a tool with which state actors manipulate the definition of sovereignty in the international arena to justify cross-border intervention. Likewise, demonstrating effective or even exemplary hosting of displaced communities can serve as evidence for legitimacy in the international state system. Betts (2009a) describes the complex relationship between state sovereignty and humanitarian crises as “the gradual shift away from absolute and unconditional state sovereignty toward recognition of the need for states to earn sovereignty through their respect for human rights” (emphasis mine) (p. 44).

In the case of the massive flow of refugees from the DRC, the existence of—and even the act of hosting—refugees, IDPs, and stateless persons originating from that country could provide a way for
adversarial states to demonstrate the government in Kinshasa’s inability to provide security to its own population. With frequent reference to the DRC as a “failed state” in the international arena (Kraxberger, 2012; Reyntjens, 2007), a considerable political weakness in terms of state sovereignty exists along the Rwanda/Congo border. This provides justification for other international actors to manipulate the concepts of sovereignty for the purposes of stabilizing the region or to pursue humanitarian intervention, thereby masking any underlying political and economic motives (Hege et al., 15 November 2012; Longman, 2002). Additionally, Rwanda as a host country demonstrates, through proper and efficient management of refugees, its own legitimacy as a sovereign nation capable of effective domestic administration of camp security and provisions, management of refugee flows across borders, and supervision of humanitarian agencies within the country. For these efforts, among many other strong development indicators and progress, the “donor darling” Rwanda (Grimm, 2013; Reyntjens, 2011) was awarded a seat on the UN Security Council, to the dismay of a vocal segment of the international community (“Rwanda voted onto UN Security Council,” 2012). The Rwanda and DRC case study will be explored in more detail in a later section. For now, it serves as an example of the motivation that can exist to orchestrate conditions leading to protracted regional destabilization and situations of durable displacement.

INTERNATIONAL BORDERS

Illicit transborder movements and problems with the migration of active nonstate political entities increases the perception that states and sovereignty no longer matter, but this could not be farther from the truth (Adamson, 2006, p. 176). In fact, I would argue that it is the state’s reaction to these challenges that reinforces or delegitimizes its own sovereignty, rather than making the concept obsolete all together. Jacobsen (1996) describes how the entanglement between internal and external sovereignty can be used as a political tool:

Sending and receiving countries can manipulate refugee flows so as to embarrass or pressure each other. Sending countries create or condone refugee flows for a number of reasons: to destabilize the receiving country, to force recognition of the sending country, or to stop interference by the receiving country in a sending country’s affairs...In turn, host governments can adopt policies toward refugees that are intended to embarrass or pressure unfriendly sending countries or prevent embarrassment to friendly sending countries. The bestowal of refugee status upon asylum seekers implies that the sending government persecutes its people, and a host government may not wish to implicate an ally in this way. (p. 665)
Here, she provides a window into the social construction of sovereignty at the state-level where refugee flows represent strategic political tools. She goes on to point to the perception that forced migrants are an extension of a state’s foreign policy initiatives, concurring in this way with the work of other scholars which implicate states in the strategic use of refugees as foreign policy tools (Jacobsen, 1996; Loescher, 1992; Loescher & Milner, 2005b; Stedman & Tanner, 2003). This political manipulation of forced migration implies a broader reliance on refugees as tools in the arena of international affairs; this relationship benefits to a certain degree from refugee sending and receiving, and may contribute to the ever increasing length of time refugees spend in camps.

Illicit, or “extralegal” (Jacobsen, 1996) cross-border movements provide insight into the degree of external sovereignty exhibited by a state through acts of interdependence and cooperation. First and foremost, regulation of international borders and granting citizenship and political community rights reiterates the territorial nature of the state, even in a globalizing world (Adamson, 2006, p. 176). Refugee flows are a particular example of transnational cross-border movement, an event that inextricably links the state policies of both sending and receiving countries. The emergence of “refugee-warrior communities”—in which political and military groups migrate with refugees across international borders and continue operating as nonstate actors—is a serious threat to the political relationship between sending and receiving countries, as well as to the integrity of the host state’s internal sovereignty (Lischer,
2006; Loescher, 1992; Loescher & Milner, 2005b, p. 10; Salehyan & Gleditsch, 2006). Like Krasner
challenge the concept of sovereignty in international relations, but not to the extreme that states no longer
matter. Krasner (2001) claims that globalization, particularly in the form of financial, resource, and human
migration flows across transnational borders, is "changing the scope of state control." And yet, it is at
these borders that the states most visibly exercise their external sovereignty and interdependence
(Jacobsen, 1996). These sites serve as continuous moments of interstate construction of sovereignty.

On the one hand, globalization and increased transnational movements of people have led to an
“erosion of national citizenship” followed by a need for more “flexible categories” of citizenship (Krasner,
2001). This is witnessed both in the daily flows of Congolese and some Rwandans back and forth across
the DRC/Rwanda border to retrieve staple supplies and trade as well as the comings and goings of
refugees and locals from the refugee camps in Rwanda. Economic trade necessitates, in the case of
Rwanda and the DRC, a more flexible category of migrant that allows for daily traversal of international
borders. While it does not secure voting rights and traditional membership in the citizenry, it does confer
economic and livelihood rights that are arguably more relevant to the lives of these daily migrants.
On the other hand, while interstate coordination and management of international borders represents some challenge to domestic authority and autonomy, it also presents opportunities to reassert state competency in the international arena. Rather than erode the sovereignty of states, the daily transnational flows of migrants forces an interstate relationship. In the process of articulating the terms of the migrants' transborder movements, states find the opportunity to establish and reassert their external sovereignties by laying out policies and procedures for international border crossings.

Both by managing cross-border migrations, as well as receiving placeless persons, a host state has the opportunity to legitimize its territorial control as well as make a public statement about its competence as a sovereign state (Loescher, 1992). Sending states, on the other hand, clearly demonstrate a breakdown in internal sovereignty that ultimately leads to mass human migrations. These push and pull/sending and receiving factors create amongst the international community a sense of insider/outsider; in these scenarios one is received as a competent member of the international community for responsibly hosting placeless persons, while the outsider “other” is seen as a “failed state” or otherwise defunct political institution that cannot demonstrate its ability to conform to the international norms and expectations associated with sovereignty. This includes sending states as well as those states that receive refugees but cannot properly manage them.

Arguably, some amount of nation building happens in the public eye of the citizenry at border crossings. In these spaces, the citizenry witnesses the competency of two nation-states, thereby reinforcing notions of domestic sovereignty, while border-guarding processes recreate norms of international sovereignty by performing actions of restriction and access at the border. As an example of this, the contrast between upstanding international participant (at the state-level) and “failed state” is clearly discernable at the Rwanda/DRC border near Goma. On the DRC side of the border, militant guards walk around the road as people approach the border on foot. In disheveled uniforms, they wave guns and yell at no one and everyone. On the Rwanda side, just steps away, guards maintain posts, discretely questioning those crossing the border and inspecting passes. Their demeanor is calm and they patrol in predetermined zones under the watchful eye of a state-of-the-art pass office. Just days before our arrival during the second field visit in 2013, thousands of refugees poured over this border from the DRC into Rwanda, and yet the Rwanda side showed no signs of chaos. Though this was just one day at
one border checkpoint, at the surface level the organization and discipline of the armed guards, the state of the border control agents and infrastructure, and the bureaucracy apparent in the way people passed through each checkpoint exposed the contrast between the “donor darling” Rwanda and the “failed” DRC. Again at the border of Kiziba Camp, this interstate relationship—and relationship with the broader international community—plays out as formalized monitored camp access and government surveillance. Serving as an international border within Rwanda’s national borders, the gate to the refugee camp marks a specific point of external sovereignty at which the government of Rwanda demonstrates its competent role in the international refugee regime; here the government interacts with international organizations, such as UNHCR, that bring with them their own challenges to sovereignty.

CITIZENSHIP

As discussed above, placelessness poses both a challenge and an opportunity for legitimizing the citizen/state/territory relationship in international relations. As an expression of internal sovereignty, administering citizenship represents a “closely guarded attribute of state sovereignty and territoriality” that reinforces this complementary relationship (Edwards & Ferstman, 2010, p. 7). According to Shacknove (1985), the “normal, positive relation between the citizen and the state” (p. 278) revolves around the expectation that the state will provide for individual needs, including security, access to resources, and political rights, in exchange for the citizenry’s allegiance. He argues that the state of “refugeehood” revolves around a disruption of this “social compact” that is more than migration in or across territories, making it a supraterritorial phenomenon (Scholte, 2000) that stems from a dysfunctional political citizen/state relationship (Shacknove, 1985, pp. 278-281). Barnett (2001) notes that the historical origins of the label “refugee” as a legal category could only have come from “a world of sovereign states that had categories of peoples called ‘citizens’ and were intent on regulating population flows” (p. 251). This shows the connection between the citizenry and the social construction of state sovereignty. Without support or acquiescence of the domestic audience, the internal sovereignty of the state holds little meaning.

To exist at all, the state relies on the collective belief in the social compact on the part of the citizens it claims to serve—without this the state would cease to exist as we know it. Benedict Anderson (1991) highlighted the importance of a collective understanding by citizens and noncitizens alike when he proposed that a nation “…is an imagined political community—and imagined as both inherently limited
and sovereign” (p. 6). Extending Anderson’s argument, Biersteker and Weber (1996b) argue that state sovereignty is socially constructed, changing and adapting over time to coincide with the citizenry’s imaginary. Included in this social construction is a determination of who belongs and who does not, a contrast between insider/outsider that critically links migration and citizenship in state politics. As Bauman (2004) observes of refugees, “‘Being under protection’ does not mean ‘being wanted’ – and everything needed, and much more, is being done to prevent the refugees from confusing the two” (p. 79). Indeed the camp, as a constructed apolitical space separated from the host community and condemned to dependency on the host government and international community, represents a clear delineation between insider/outsider and citizen/noncitizen. The camp boundary, security and surveillance mechanisms, and reproduction of the Rwandan state within the refugee camps all reinforce the permanent temporariness lived by camp residents.

Betts (2009a) further posits on the relationship between states and citizens/noncitizens that “…how states categorize and respond to forced migration is part of the process through which state sovereignty is constituted through boundaries, practices of inclusion and exclusion, and the creation of an external “other” in opposition to the national political community” (p. 53). By othering the migrant/refugee outsider, the state and its citizenry can more clearly imagine the boundaries of the official political community (Edwards & Ferstman, 2010; Zetter, 2007). These xenophobic tendencies inform asylum policies as well as contribute to the national imaginary of citizenship and belonging (Loescher & Milner, 2005a). In this way, placeless persons serve as a reminder of what it means to belong somewhere, and their status reinforces the internal sovereignty of a state.

Assuming refugees and other placeless persons are “depoliticized beings” (Bezabeh, 2011, p. 606), however, downplays the very political role they play in legitimizing a state’s internal sovereignty by articulating, through lived experiences, the difference between a citizen who belongs and a non-citizen who does not. In fact, I would argue that placeless persons are hyper-politicized beings in that their existence both legitimizes the state, as described above, as well as challenges the very notion of a “state” as a unit of analysis in International Relations theory. Bezabeh (2011) himself notes that who is considered a citizen/insider is “historically contingent” and changes throughout times and contexts. Agamben (1995) interrogates this challenging relationship further by observing that placelessness
“…unhing[es] the old trinity of state/nation/territory” by removing the linkages between citizen and state through political and spatial marginalization. He goes on to state that “…If in the system of the nation-state the refugee represents such a disquieting element, it is above all because by breaking up the identity between man and citizen, between nativity and nationality, the refugee throws into crisis the original fiction of sovereignty” (Agamben, 1995). In this way, the refugee stands as a testament to the importance of belonging and citizenship in contrast to the alien and unwelcome “other,” while also challenging the very notion of sovereignty on which state power rests. In this complex state/non-citizen relationship, refugeehood performs a necessary function of state-building/maintenance by codifying the notion of citizenship; refugees contribute to this construction of citizen vs. non-citizen by clinging to imaginary communities back “home” in their countries of origin and thus permanently enshrouding their time in the host community in temporariness.

**POWER AND PERCEPTION**

In general, refugee flows not only demonstrate the sending state’s diminished capacity for control over borders, but they also strain local and international resources, international and domestic security, and political relationships with the host nation, making refugees “in fact intensely political” (Loescher, 1992, p. 5). Arguing that sending and receiving states use refugees as foreign policy tools, Loescher (1992) points to states’ desires for power as a primary motivator in the strategic use of forced migration. Specifically, related to the case of Rwanda and the DRC, Loescher (1992) illuminates how host nations use refugee reception as a public statement of place and belonging in the international arena. Additionally, the host nation can accept certain kinds of refugees, such as those fleeing regime types like communism, in order to take a stand against a sending country (Loescher, 1992, pp. 34-44).

This control over space and human bodies relates to what Foucault (2007) termed “biopower” in which “technologies of power” regulate and control humans and populations as the “object of political strategy.” Surveillance and regulation over the human need to migrate in order to secure sustenance resources constitutes a critical component of the sovereign control of international borders, though Foucault might not have agreed with the conflation of biopower and sovereignty. Building off of Foucault and Giorgio Agamben’s (1998) ideas of “bare life,” Achille Mbembe (2003) furthers the idea that sovereignty is control over life and death. Speaking specifically of death, he notes, “To exercise
sovereignty is to exercise control over mortality and to define life as the deployment and manifestation of power” (Mbembe, 2003, p. 12). In his earlier work, however, Mbembe (2000) emphasizes the importance of territorial sovereignty, relating the “deconstruction of existing territorial frameworks” with the “[destruction of] ‘superfluous’ populations” (p. 284). This speaks to Bauman’s (2004) conceptualization as refugees representing the human waste of modernity and globalization, where their superfluousness is irrelevant to the functioning of society. Together these scholars’ works point to a possible explanation for the lack of long-term solutions to protracted situations. By regulating international borders—including camp borders within the host nation—the state grants access to “life” through resources and virtual “death” through denial of resources and opportunities. Reduced to the barest of political life, refugees constitute a marginal population of often wasted human potential at the mercy of a state exercising its sovereignty and power.

Adamson’s (2006) observation that mass migrations result in the need for increased international cooperation speaks to the role of forced migration in performance of external sovereignty. At the same time, however, it poses challenges for internal sovereignty in which increased reliance on the policies and political circumstances of others contests state autonomy. Herein lies a linkage between the individual lives of migrants and refugees and the sovereign interests of the state. Individual motives and needs dictate movement, but the state retains the ability to confer citizenship and the theoretical ability to control borders. Individual-level behaviors collectively form an international force that pressures the state’s ability to manage both internal and external sovereignty. In particular, security across international borders plays a significant role in the social construction of state sovereignty. The social construction of state sovereignty represents one bridge between analytical units of analysis in the forced migration research that helps to more fully explain the processes that contributed to durability in displacement. These concepts help to support the data from the field described in chapters 5 and 6.

CAMP & SOCIAL GROUP FACTORS

Scaling down to a unit of analysis smaller than the state and state-like institutions, social groups and camp structure reveal factors that entrench displacement by pushing refugees to the margins of society. Social stratification denies certain groups of people access to the resources and institutions that would allow individual pursuit of lives outside of the camp context. Social construction of refugees as
outsiders/others/non-citizens further marginalizes them and institutionalizes the mentality of protraction that instills durability in their situation. The following sections elaborate on these concepts to present an overview of the research that delves into protraction as an experience at the camp and social group levels.

**DISPROPORTIONATE IMPACTS**

Much of this discussion on refugees and placelessness amalgamates forced migrants and stateless persons into one homogeneous analytical unit. It is worth acknowledging here that not all persons experience placelessness in the same way. In particular, certain subpopulations require special humanitarian assistance mechanisms to protect their unique interests, including sexual and gender-based violence (SGBV); traumatic experiences of abduction, rape, or military recruitment; and necessary access to resources, representation, and justice (Birkeland et al., 2004). These subpopulations stratify along race, class, gender, and age lines, with women and children receiving a particular emphasis in the literature. This is particularly relevant in relation to protracted cases in Africa where children, adolescents, elderly, and women form the most represented demographic characteristics (Crisp, 2002). These human qualities cannot be lumped into one “vulnerable” category, however, as each aspect deserves its own close look; each provides some insight into the efficacy and completeness of humanitarian assistance. Studies of camp life often reveal the necessity of examining these characteristics more closely. For example, in a 2006 study of 13 refugee hosting countries, sexual and gender-based violence (SGBV) represented the most common crime or dispute affecting a large portion of the refugee population across many “vulnerable” categories; this appeared in the interview and survey data even though the researchers did not specifically ask about SGBV (da Costa, 2006). In response to research and field reports pointing to assistance inequities, the UNHCR clearly delineated “five commitments to refugee women” that include striving towards equal decision making representation; individual documentation to ensure access to resources; developing strategies to combat SGBV; management and decision making roles in aid distribution; and provision of sanitary supplies for independence and dignity (DIPS, 2006; Martin, 2004). These commitments form a starting point for equitable service provision, beginning with the effect of displacement on gender roles.
The upheaval resulting in forced displacement often results in changing gender roles (Hyndman, 2000; Martin, 2004; M. Smith, 2004; UNHCR, 2008). Often for the first time in their lives, women become heads of households due to death and/or family separation during flight. Compounding that complicated dynamic, frustration with camp life, low employment rates, and strained resources contribute to higher rates of SGBV, putting women and girls at increased risk (DIPS, 2006; Martin, 2004). The UNHCR (2008) asserts that protraction has particularly dividing effects for women and girls resulting from increased incidents of SGBV, alcohol abuse among residents, under- or misrepresentation in camp justice systems, and reliance on “survival sex” as a necessary means to provide economic support for family members. On the other hand, interacting with humanitarian agencies and host government norms can also create opportunities that “open up new spaces for women;” for instance by participating in economic livelihood initiatives that challenge traditional gender roles or serving as elected representatives in camp governance structures (Hyndman & de Alwis, 2008). Even among women and girls, therefore, experiences and inequities vary greatly.

The gender-differentiated experiences of placelessness continue beyond the camp. The gender divide crosses international boundaries as women and girls seek asylum and/or resettlement options abroad. As one scholar observes of the international refugee conventions that states use to determine asylum eligibility, “Women’s social and political reality is much more complicated and less linear than the parameters conveyed by the [1951] Convention” (Daenzer, 2008). These policy gaps, Daenzer (2008) argues, derive from the fact that much of the persecution suffered by refugee women falls within the “private sphere,” resulting in ambiguous wording within the foundational 1951 Convention. As such, the Convention cannot adequately protect the interest and lives of women. She notes, “Women asylum seekers were therefore victims of an enduring paradox: they faced persecution because they were women; they were unprotected by refugee laws because they were women” (Daenzer, 2008, p. 232). Some states have adopted individualized policies that accommodate for different experiences along gender lines (Sadoway, 2008), but even these isolated incidents do not yet address the barriers for women to gain access to resources or asylum based on their specific experience of persecution.

While the UNHCR has made great strides in addressing—or at the very least opening up conversation about—gender equity and mainstreaming during humanitarian assistance, the special needs
of physically and mentally disabled refugees remains a gap in the provision of services. Estimated to number around 6.7 million worldwide (Pearce, 2014), disabled refugees are “often literally and programmatically ‘invisible’ in…assistance programs” (Women's Refugee Commission, 2008). Likewise, elder refugees comprise an often neglected subpopulation that requires special attention. One refugee camp operational reference guide explains, “Few NGOs include older refugees among their target groups because of misconceptions that older people are difficult to train, are not open to new ideas and are unable to participate effectively in community and economic activities” (DIPS, 2006, p. 119). Elder refugees and those with physical and/or mental disabilities suffer from similar deprivations as identified in the vast women refugee policy research, namely limited opportunities for economic engagement, diminished resource access, and insufficient representation in camp decision making processes (DIPS, 2006; Pearce, 2014; Women's Refugee Commission, 2008). Despite this, few studies specifically address the needs of elderly and disabled refugees.

This study does not delve into these critical areas of humanitarian assistance, but it is important to acknowledge that social stratification along race, class, gender, and age lines, among other characteristics, shapes the individual forced migration experience, especially in protracted situations. Lack of access to resources across social stratifications may contribute to aid dependency and lengthen stay in camp contexts. Additionally, stigma from SGBV may result in being ostracized from the community and complicate a return home. While these factors may speak to the stories of a portion of refugees remaining in long-staying cases for lack of options back ‘home,’ forced migrants experience protraction across all social dimensions. Again, this aspect constitutes but one part of the story about why some refugee cases endure for decades.

**SOCIAL CONSTRUCTION OF A REFUGEE ‘OTHER’**

From another perspective, Zetter (1991, 2007) argues that what constitutes the concept “refugee” as a label of a particular kind of migrant is that which serves the interest of the state. He contends that increasing rates of global migrations create incentives to develop restrictive labeling mechanisms that enable access to aid and resources for a privileged set of migrants. Zetter (1991) describes the ways in which these refugee-labeled identities become transformed through programs designed to create autonomy within the population (e.g. livelihood programs and education); but, instead these initiatives
cause the refugees to become “marginalized into a segregated and permanently transient and dependent status” (p. 55). He expands his argument by theorizing that this is not a one-way process. By selectively using the refugee label, refugees themselves transform their refugee identity by accessing privileged resources, but also by embracing the apolitical nature of the label. Zetter (1991) describes the complex refugee/host nation relationship further:

These entangled political interests help to explain the contradictory responses of the refugees. The state incorporates, in part intentionally, yet it wants to disengage. The refugees acquiesce in the creation of dependency; but they wish also to disengage from the unwanted outcomes of the policy. Dependency and independence, integration and the wish for the repatriation occur, ambiguously, together. (p. 57)

In this he highlights the duality of the refugee/host nation relationship. They are at once dependent upon and desiring autonomy from the host nation. Likewise, the state both “incorporates” and “disengages” from the refugees. A cycle of dependency tied directly to the states’ sense of internal sovereignty lies in this back and forth relationship between control and autonomy with the state.

For the refugees, containment in the camps creates an aid dependency that further entrenches them in protracted displacement. The existence of refugees challenges the citizen/state/territory relationship that may add relevance to internal sovereignty by distinguishing the citizen-insider against the refugee-noncitizen outsider. Clinging to notions of a nostalgic “home” further distances the refugee-other from the citizen and socially constructs them as temporary visitors in their country of asylum. Their existence reinforces the notion of place and belonging for citizens, thereby strengthening the states’ internal sovereignty.

An imposed geographic displacement defines the social location of refugees and creates a sense of homogeneity among camp residents. These camp residents also reside within a larger national and regional context that “others” them by drawing distinct lines of ethnic and national origin. Patricia Hill Collins (1986) introduced the phenomenon of “outsider within” to describe how Black women sociologists in a traditionally white male dominated field can draw on their dual perspectives—the academic training from a “community that historically excluded them” and the observations derived from their own “family experiences”—in order to contribute a greater depth and perspective to the field of sociology (p. S29). She notes that some Black feminists already pursue this frame of reference, “embracing the creative
potential of their outsider within status and using it wisely” (P. H. Collins, 1986, p. S30). P. H. Collins (1986) closes her academic call to action with the powerful statement that an outsider within perspective provides a means to bring oneself “closer to…the freedom both to be different and part of the solidarity of humanity” (p. S30). This outsider within concept may be expanded to situate the particular status of refugees.

In the context of this study, the residents of Kiziba Refugee Camp grapple daily, and in often-contradictory ways, with their own identities and limits to agency that invoke their status as outsiders within. As I will show in subsequent chapters, refugees are cultured in the ways of the host government and the international community, as values, practices, and rules of order are transmitted through institutions at both global and national levels. This places the forced migrants in a kind of solidarity with humanity that is beyond what Collins (1986) originally described. Refugees occupy a space at the local level in their host countries. They also transcend these immediate spaces of refuge to play a role in regional and international politics involved with conflict, peace-building, and the care work of the global refugee regime complex. Refugees’ broad global presence unites them in solidarity with humanity beyond that which is defined by the relationship between citizen, territory, and state. Specifically, the refugees represent a rupture of social contracts between citizens and sovereign states as well as the larger international collective obligations to placeless persons (Agamben, 1995; Barnett, 2001; Shacknove, 1985). They are, in this way, a matter of international affairs and thus hold a kind of presence in the international conscience. Refugees also occupy a very local existence situated among rural host populations. In the case of Kiziba, the surrounding communities share ethnolinguistic and cultural similarities that allow the refugees to blend in while simultaneously embodying the outsider/other. As I show later, refugees benefit from their dual status as ethnolinguistic insiders, but also as wards of the state-like INGOs and thus simultaneously apolitical and supra-political outsiders. They find their “part of the solidarity of humanity” (P. H. Collins, 1986, p. S30) in the in-between spaces of noncitizen/other that connects them both locally and internationally. The social complexities of the ‘outsider within’ envelop the refugees’ articulated feelings on agency and identity and shed some light into the construction of a refugee/other identity that permits access to humanitarian resources.
Turner (2010) comes to a similar conclusion when he describes the Burundian refugee camps in Tanzania as "a kind of ‘excluded inside’" (p. 10). In his study, the Hutu refugees shaped and were shaped by politics in Burundi, their country of origin. This exiled community felt included in the politics of their homeland through their formulations of identity and citizenship, yet remained spatially and temporally excluded from the daily life in Burundi (S. Turner, 2010). In this sense, displacement in camps heightens a collective sense of identity as outsiders in the country of asylum, often as a result of romanticized notions of refugees’ countries of origin. In Rwanda, elder Kiziba Camp residents’ nostalgia for “home” and an abiding connection to the DRC presented strongly throughout my research. Nostalgia and connection with the country of origin creates an imagined community of the DRC diaspora, despite the realities of lost land, years of separation, and inaccessible citizenship rights in the actual country (Anderson, 1991). At the same time, the refugees live on the very periphery of the state—what Bauman (2004) described as “dumping grounds.” They are thus spatially and socially excluded. Turner (2010) observes during his fieldwork that “although part of the nation and its imaginations, [the refugee camp] was also a parenthesis in time and place, a waiting room where refugees were meant to kill time before returning to ‘normality’” (p. 10). The camp “waiting room” served as a space where the refugees constructed “a subversive recasting and reinterpretation of [the past] in fundamentally moral terms” (Malkki, 1995, p. 54), or what Malkki (1995) calls “mythico-history.” In this space of exclusions, from their perspective as outsiders within, the refugees reconstruct identities of themselves, home, and hope for the future that do not necessarily reflect the political realities of the region and can have entrenching consequences on the permanence of their displacement.

Zetter (1991) describes this process of identity recreation in long-term refugee cases, noting that labeling forced migrants as “refugees” leads to situations where humanitarian intervention “schemes become a vehicle for transforming an identity where refugees are marginalized into a segregated and permanently transient and dependent status” (p. 55). His ideas begin to unpack refugees’ relationships with aid providers in order to understand why the forced migrants would contribute to the durability of their own displacement. Emphasizing the contradictory nature of this refugee labeling process, Zetter (1991) shows how long-staying refugees manipulate their identities and circumstances in order to reap certain aid benefits of the “political currency” they hold through their displaced status. In this sense, Zetter (1991)
suggests that refugees use their own status as forced migrants as an expression of agency in their everyday lives. Using their political currency, refugees directly and indirectly promote the continuation of aid dependency, an act that requires clearly delineating between themselves as refugees and the host community members. Zetter (1991) sees this attachment to aid dependency as a conscious decision to "sustain an image of transitory status" and cling to the politicized existence as refugees in protracted contexts (Zetter, 1991, p. 60). In the case of Kiziba, and the Banyarwanda refugees more broadly, they may not consciously make decisions to perpetuate the system of durable displacement, but their narratives reveal collective construction of a non-citizen/other category of existence that does not easily fit into UNHCR’s model for durable solutions. The narratives presented later in this research bring to light a shared identity shaped by protracted displacement, notions of citizenship and belonging, and expressions of agency in a camp situation acted upon by various international influences that reproduce ‘refugee’ as a status. In other words, refugees form their identities around a shared experience of protraction and a common narrative that places Kiziba Camp residents in a subjugated relationship to the state and the international institutions that literally and symbolically feed their existence.

Social construction of the ‘refugee’ label cannot alone explain protraction—it is just one piece of a multilayered system that creates and recreates the conditions leading to enduring displacement. The lens of social construction, much like the social construction of sovereignty discussed earlier, provides insight into the forces that occur between levels of analysis. These forces reveal a system that rejects the notion of refugees as temporary and creates a durability in displacement. This perspective explains protraction in a new light, not as a long-staying temporary situation, but as a durable form of existence on the fringes of the traditional international arena. As we will see in the next chapters, viewing protraction as a durable context helps to explain the autonomous and sovereign-like qualities of long-staying refugee camps and the possible motivations states may have to perpetuate this existence.

CONCLUSIONS

Thus far, we have seen that the literature falls into three broad categories: macro-level explanations that focus on the international community as the point of analysis; meso-level understandings of how state and state-like actors benefit from protracted refugee cases; and micro-level dynamics that occur in camps and social groups. In each of these analytic buckets, refugeehood is
generally assumed to be a temporary condition, even in protracted cases. This assumption clearly arises from the observation that the very word ‘camp’ associated with refugees implies temporariness; refugee camps rarely morph into permanence by becoming ‘towns,’ though they take on many of the qualities of towns and cities. Alone, the macro-level perspective of permanent temporariness cannot explain all aspects of long-term displacement. It does reveal some of the intractability of resolving refugee cases, namely through problems with burden sharing and performance of state sovereignty. This broad perspective highlights the difficulties of care and impetus for neglect that contribute to ongoing placelessness, but cannot explain the finer details that separate one protracted situation from another.

Mesoscopic perspective sheds additional light on the nuances of displacement, namely adding historical context and social construction of sovereignty to the picture of protraction. Legacy policies of colonialism, particularly in the Great Lakes Region of Africa where this study focuses, illuminate state-level factors that contribute to forced migration and protraction. In particular, the DRC’s status as a ‘failed’ or ‘non’ state speaks to the mass migrations of refugees and IDPs and the difficulties in coordinating massive repatriation of those living in camps for nearly two decades. Again, while this angle provides insight into the roles of states and institutions in prolonging displacement, it cannot speak to the choices that individuals make to stay or leave a camp. Personal, human experiences encapsulate part of the displacement story as they navigate the daily experiences of protraction and encampment. Without understanding the camp environment, we cannot yet fully grasp the systemic extent of displacement.

Microscopic levels of analysis—at the camp and social group level—highlight social stratification and insider/outsider constructions that situate refugees at the margins of society and condemn them to enduring limbo. In the context of this study, this means refugees may also contribute to durable displacement through intentional or unintentional participation in states’ quest for sovereignty and through their lived experiences as outsiders within.

Looking across all levels of analysis, from the refugee regime complex in the global arena to the individual camp residents experiencing and participating in the social construction of a refugee ‘other,’ we begin to see that there is a system of displacement that produces and reproduces conditions leading to protraction. From this, I derive the idea of ‘durability’ in displacement. The system is complex in the sense that dismantling any one element described above will not lead to the end of protraction. Each level of
analysis and component of the system is entwined in such a way that incentives, motivations, and even consequences for their role in the larger refugee regime complex further entrenches cases in protraction. Ultimately, protracted situations take on a sovereign-like quality of their own where ‘camps’ move more towards entities like ‘towns’ or even ‘states.’ In the case of Kiziba, and other Congolese refugee camps within Rwanda, the host government spreads the wealth of aid brought by assistance to the refugees by allowing access to medical care, water wells, and trading opportunities in the camp market through unfettered camp access for locals; meanwhile, the camp residents are allowed to leave the camp to trade and gain resources, but suffer from extremely restricted access to employment, education, or other local integration opportunities. In this way, the government both confirms its ability to provide services to local Rwandan citizens while reinforcing the international camp borders within its own domestic territory; the camp then represents a dependent microcosm of international borders within state borders.

Like the existing borders between the DRC and Rwanda, Congolese traverse daily to retrieve the goods they require for existence—everything from water and food to pots and pans—but in a way that economically benefits the border communities (field observation and personal communication, Goma border crossings, 27 January 2014). Since border regulation is an important demonstration of sovereignty, this regulated economic exchange both reasserts the host nation’s sovereign identity while facilitating an economic relationship that entrenches both the host and refugee communities in interdependency. Similarly, shared access to camp services by local Rwandan community members creates an unseen dependency on the camp population. Evidence of this resides in Rwanda’s Kiziba Camp health center where access had to be granted to surrounding communities as well in order to keep the peace and ensure “fairness” (Kiziba AHA Clinic Director, personal communication, 13 March 2011). According to aid workers in Kiziba, this strategy appears to work; however research suggests that the minimal short-term gains may have disproportionately negative effects for the poorest segments of the local population, fomenting hostile feelings for these “hidden losers” in the economy of refugee hosting (Chambers, 1986; Jacobsen, 1996, p. 667). Through INGO services and state burden-sharing activities, refugees and surrounding communities entwine, yet preserve borders that reinforce the distinction between non-citizen other and citizen. These processes, as I explain in the subsequent chapters, expose how local level dynamics also contribute to the durable displacement of Congolese refugees in Rwanda.
The following chapters look closely at Kiziba camp, but this case serves as an instance of much larger systems. The research that follows is probative in that it seeks not to prove a hypothesis about protraction, but rather looks at one camp to better understand the spatial and institutional forced of displacement acting on it. Through this process and a grounded theory methodological approach, I begin developing a theory of durable displacement that contributes to the field of refugee studies. Durability as a concept helps dispel the myth of temporariness imposed on so many protracted refugee cases throughout the world. By defining the situation for what it is, and looking at the systemic causes and effects, we can examine the citizen/state/territory relationship and question the roots of protraction and its enduring status. The next chapters follow a research agenda of focusing mainly on the social construction of state sovereignty and the social construction of a refugee ‘other’ to look across levels of analysis and ground the study in fieldwork data collected in Kiziba refugee camp. The social construction theses presented above span across micro, meso, and macro levels of analysis and thus provide a foundation for the argument that only by looking across these levels can we understand the systemic nature of protraction and confront its durability. Following an in-depth discussion of the research methodology, the two analytic chapters focus on fieldwork data to expose entrenching factors at the state, international institution, and individual refugee levels. The research concludes with discussion about the practical lessons we learn from naming durable displacement and the ways we can move forward to dismantle a system that supports so many wasted lives.
I can see you are taking notes when we are answering your question and you’re recording. So what are you going to do with what you recorded, with what you wrote down in your small book, and the pictures?
-2014 Interview, Refugee Youth, Kiziba Camp

OVERALL APPROACH

This study builds upon data collected through qualitative methods over the course of three field visits beginning in 2011. The interpretive research paradigm used in this study sought to uncover the theoretical relationships between individual interpretations of citizenship and belonging within the social constructs of life in a refugee camp. This particular research paradigm rests on “the assumption that social reality is not singular or objective, but is rather shaped by human experiences and social contexts (ontology) and is therefore best studied within its socio-historic context by reconciling the subjective interpretations of its various participants (epistemology)” (Bhattacherjee, 2012, p. 102). For this reason, the study necessitated qualitative input in the form of personal narratives and verbally articulated understandings of “home” and “belonging” in a protracted forced migration context (Brinkmann & Kvale, 2005). Given ethical considerations and limited access to the refugee population described later in this chapter, the most effective way to supplement the interview data was through existing quantitative metrics provided by UNHCR, the Rwanda Ministry for Disaster Management and Refugee Affairs (MIDIMAR), NGOs operating within the camp, and reports from other researchers and visitors to Kiziba. Drawing on the voices of refugees and NGO workers, in combination with official reports and metrics on Rwanda’s refugee populations, constituted an approach that afforded the most complete picture of the protracted situation in Kiziba available to the researchers.

Two university-educated, white, female researchers conducted the interviews presented in this study. They managed a team approach to the guided conversations, where one researcher asked questions and engaged directly in the conversation while the other took notes. This process maximized the use of the two-day pass allotted by the Rwanda Ministry of Disaster and Refugee Affairs (MIDIMAR) for access to Kiziba Camp. A university Institutional Review Board (IRB) vetted the interview questions
(see Interview Questions) and research methods prior to fieldwork. The full collection of data used to
develop this study incorporates content analysis of NGO reports, related published field research, and
historical records combined with interviews conducted with NGO, government, and camp representatives
over the course of four years. Interview data draw from one-on-one meetings with elected leaders of
various levels within the camp, group conversations with the camp Elected Council and Security Council,
and informational overviews provided by representatives of nongovernmental organizations overseeing
management of the camp. Additionally, as official representatives of the governmental body that manages
refugee camps for Rwanda, the Minister of MIDIMAR and the Kiziba Camp Manager each provided one-
hour long one-on-one interviews.

These data provide insight into refugee migration within the Great Lakes region, as well as a
focused examination of one specific camp, which serves as an exemplar to the larger context. Common
to forced migration studies, the context of Kiziba is methodologically challenging, both because of its
remote nature and because of its access limitations (Jacobsen & Landau, 2003). Despite this, including
in-person interviews is a critical feature of this type of research effort because it gives context and voice
to populations impacted by larger trends in protracted refugee displacement (Bhattacherjee, 2012, pp.
103-111). As Brinkmann and Kvale (2005) note,

...an increasing number of researchers have recognized that when the object is concrete
human experience, then qualitative methods are the most adequate means of knowledge
production. Following a well-known principle of inquiry, which dictates that researchers let
the object of research determine the method, rather than the other way round, qualitative
methods become an objective way of investigating a qualitative human world. (p. 162)

Each subsequent visit to Kiziba informed the next phase of the research project as interviewees
illuminated different aspects of the protracted displacement experience or new concerns about their
position in the global refugee crisis. Our goal in conducting this iterative approach to the research
question and goals was to develop a study that can be used as an advocacy tool for the participants as
well as contribute to the global conversation on protracted displacement (Bhattacherjee, 2012, pp. 104-
105). Turton (1996) describes this advocacy approach to research by noting the importance of
challenging assumptions formed by the dominant “elite,” including politicians and academics. For him,
research on “extreme human suffering” is only justified when “alleviation of suffering [is] an explicit
objective of one’s research” (Turton, 1996, p. 96). Direct voices of participants constitute at once a motivation to produce such research as well as a context in which to understand the depth of the refugee experience.

The intent to include personal narratives, however, must not compromise the integrity of the study or challenge the objectiveness of the methodology (Brinkmann & Kvale, 2005; Jacobsen & Landau, 2003). As Brinkmann and Kvale (2005) point out, “Ethical as well as scientific objectivity is about letting the objects object to what we as researchers do to them and say about them” (p. 169). They warn that bad methodology in forced migration studies can lead to sensationalizing or exaggerating the status and claims of participants, thereby contributing to “myths about refugees propagated by host governments and xenophobes” (Jacobsen & Landau, 2003, p. 187). Throughout the research process, participants were welcome to contribute to the conversation and questions posed during interviews. Given the limited communication connectivity of residents within Kiziba, it is impossible to allow each participant to review the data throughout this analysis portion, but we made concerted efforts to contact those with Internet and telephone access for verification and clarity.

This study relies predominantly on data collected in and about Kiziba Camp, though Rwanda maintains several other camps of Congolese refugees, and similar camps exist in Burundi and Uganda. Kiziba represents a microcosm of the extensive populations of Congolese refugees living outside of the DRC. In particular, the Congolese refugees in Rwanda are part of an ethnolinguistic group of Kinyarwanda speakers, the fact of which has led to discrimination and revocation of citizenship within the DRC, a topic of focus for this study. Specifically, unlike many of the other camps in Rwanda, Kiziba represents a geographic mixture of Congolese refugees from North Kivu (88%), South Kivu (7%), the region around Katanga (3%), and the rest (2%) from other parts of the DRC (G. Karagire, Kiziba Camp Manager, personal communication, January 25, 2013). Knowledge derived from conversations with MIDIMAR’s Kiziba Camp Manager, NGO representatives, and Kiziba residents suggests that other camps in the country house more geographically homogenous populations, with the majority coming from Masisi in North Kivu, for example. The heterogeneity of Kiziba’s population, as well the longevity of its nearly 20-

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1 As of 2011, three residents of Kiziba Camp originated from outside the DRC: one each from Kenya, Eritrea, and Ethiopia (G. Karagire, Kiziba Camp Manager, personal communication, January 25, 2013).
year operation, makes it the prime candidate to study the particular dynamics of displacement within the region. Additionally, the safety and stability of life in Kiziba Camp, given its relative permanence in the region, made it an exemplar area to study the effects of protracted displacement on identity and perceived citizenship. Finally, Rwanda’s national anti-corruption policies and public commitment to government transparency allowed a level of access to the camp unattainable in other countries. As with all anthropologically-based studies, key informants played a significant role in the development of this project. This included those who provided introductions and assistance navigating the official applications for camp access passes; we would be unable to replicate this level of assistance in Uganda or Burundi where we had no initial contacts. Repeated visits over the study period and personal connections between the researchers and several residents of Kiziba afforded a level of trust that permitted access to interviewees in even remote parts of the camp.

A key informant assisted with the selection of interview participants during the course of fieldwork in 2014. We acknowledge that over-reliance on one key individual potentially creates ethical challenges, as participants are likely part of the same social network or subgroup of residents and information shared between them could compromise security within that network (Jacobsen & Landau, 2003, p. 196). Access limitations and issues of trust, however, required reliance on the key informant as a critical link between the researchers and the Kiziba community. While this carries with it some potential for bias and harm, we viewed the connection with the key informant also as a mode of protection for participants. The key informant sought out participants without the researchers around, relieving pressure potential interviewees might feel declining participation in our presence. Given the potential biases, the scope of this probative study situates Kiziba Camp as a microcosm of the larger refugee crisis (Bhattacherjee, 2012, p. 105). It stands as one case study that explores the micro-level effects of political marginalization and isolation over prolonged time spans and extrapolates to understand how this experience informs the broader political situation in the Great Lakes region of Africa and beyond. The interviews are not intended to represent all Kiziba residents, all refugees in Rwanda, all Kinyarwanda speakers, or all refugees of the DRC. They are a small snapshot of life inside the camp of native Kinyarwanda speakers that help to inform a research agenda that questions notions of citizenship and belonging in the political environment of this specific region of Africa, namely the DRC/Rwanda border. This chapter sets the context for
fieldwork in Rwanda, specifically Kiziba Camp. Following a discussion of theoretical research considerations, the specific limitations, and means of gaining access to study participants forms the core of the methodological conversation. Finally, I describe in detail the data collection process and lay out an outline of the process for analyzing the data collected during this study.

Figure 6: Refugee camps in Rwanda

(Geographic Information Systems and Mapping Unit- UNHCR Regional Support Hub in Nairobi, 2012, UNHCR Presence in Rwanda: As of July 2012; (UNHCR, 2015a))
CAMP DESCRIPTION

Kiziba Camp is one of five refugee camps housing a total of 70,612 refugees, most from the DRC, as of May 2014 (Fitzpatrick, 2014). The Rwandan government originally designed one of those camps, the Nkamira Transit Center, for Rwandan returnees, but it was soon flooded with Congolese refugees. A new camp, Mugombwa, began accepting residents of Nkamira Transit Center in February 2014 to ensure relocation to better accommodation than the large warehouse-like tents of the transit location (MIDIMAR, 2014b). In the global context, Kiziba is a unique displacement context. Given its longevity, certain aspects of the camp take on forms of permanence, which illustrate the complex nature of humanitarian aid in protracted situations. What follows is a thick description of the environment and services in Kiziba. This serves to contextualize the experience of a particularly long-term, stable displaced population under the care of international and nongovernmental organizations and run by a uniquely stable host government.

The population of Kiziba is 16,513 as of May 2014, the vast majority of whom are Kinyarwanda speakers from North Kivu province, South Kivu province, and Katanga. Most of Kiziba residents arrived, or are descendants of those who arrived, in 1996 following the onset of a civil war in the DRC. Others arrived in 1998 and 2006 following various armed movements that displaced more people from eastern DRC. Given its enduring nature, Kiziba is deeply entrenched in MIDIMAR and UNHCR standards for institutional organization and governance structure. The camp is divided into 10 quartiers, each containing around five villages. Residents elect representatives at the village, quartier, and camp levels to represent the interests of the camp residents. UNHCR camp management guidelines suggest 50% representation of women in elected positions as the optimal goal (Birkeland et al., 2004). The UNHCR understands, however, that women’s participation in leadership roles may be dictated or limited by certain cultural and political practices, and therefore sets these as guidelines rather than requirements (UNHCR, 2008).

Along the camp’s main walkway is an increasingly vibrant economic center, which features small cantinas, mobile phone charging stations, shops to purchase minutes for mobile phone access, and a small market that sells vegetables and everyday necessities. Representatives from each of the villages participate in an elected camp security coalition that oversees daily activities. Camp elected leadership
refers crimes beyond the scope of reprimand to the Rwandan Police for official processing. The structured and repetitive nature of life in the camp results in reportedly low crime rates and a general sense of safety. The established election structure also lends well to finding elected leaders with whom to speak about the operations and daily activities of the camp. For these reasons, Kiziba serves as both a particular site for an ethnographic study of this microcosm of society at a contested border, and a representation of the larger structural manifestations of protracted displacement in the Lake Kivu region of Central Africa.

Figure 7: Kiziba Camp Market in June 2014

Photo by Jennifer N. Fish
HOUSING

To understand the context in which this study took place, it is important to understand the environment. In some ways, the camp represents a reduction of human life to its very most basic form. The allotment of land for the refugee camp abuts agricultural plots owned by Rwandan citizens. The division between camp and Rwanda at first seems arbitrary, but is quite stark: where the cluster of houses ends, Rwanda begins again. Houses are very small and constructed of wooden scaffolding surrounded by dried mud. In the majority of homes observed in this study, the roofs were mostly composed of UNHCR tarps that had long since disintegrated in the equatorial sun. The faded tarps serve as a reminder of the waiting endured by residents of this camp; UNHCR tarps should be short-term relief from the elements, but instead have become long-term architectural components of permanent living structures. This feature of camp life is slowly giving way to tin roofs, starting mostly from the outermost reaches of the camp, in order to address the leaks during heavy rains. While this provides relief from the elements—rain and leaking roofs being the most prevalent complaint among residents according to the

Figure 8: House in Kiziba with scaffolding exposed
community leaders—it also symbolizes a shift toward permanence. A drive past Kigeme Refugee Camp in 2014 revealed that the majority of roofs there were tin and the walkways were more prominent, giving a sense of airiness in the thoroughfares not present in Kiziba. It also looked more like a small city than Kiziba, serving as a glimpse into the protracted nature of Congolese refugees’ camp lives in Rwanda. No longer “camps” in the traditional sense, these areas increasingly gain qualities that befit established villages or towns.

The paths between houses in Kiziba are just wide enough to walk through. At some spots, one must angle her shoulders to slide through. The ground in these alleyways is often uneven from years of erosion that has washed away the dirt into deep grooves between the houses. This is particularly problematic during heavy rains when rivers of water flow between the houses to slide down the mountainside. Most houses have some sort of door, generally made from wood or tin from the oilcans that come as part of the World Food Programme distribution system. Windows have no coverings, furthering the sense that there is no true privacy in the camp. Small spaces between the houses serve as a communal place to dry clothing and as garden areas for some families. Every conversation is within hearing distance of someone else, given the close proximity of the neighboring houses.

**AID DELIVERY**

As with most displacement settings, the World Food Programme (WFP) delivers aid on a relatively regular schedule. When available, the aid arrives monthly. Food distribution benefits all camp residents holding the appropriate paperwork and represents a global standard of the bare minimum nutrition required to keep an adult human alive for one month: 11 kg of maize, 900 grams of oil, 3 kg of beans, and 0.15 kg of salt. This ration also assumes that supplies come exactly every month, which is not always the case given international donor fatigue and funding shortages throughout the WFP. Additionally, UNHCR subcontracts the firewood delivery to the camp, which residents use for cooking while the supplies last. Once there, a group of refugees supervises the distribution of the wood, which is reportedly not enough to make it through the entire month before the next drop-off. It is not uncommon to see refugees carrying bundles of firewood up the mountainside from the town below to supplement the official rations.
SANITATION

Communal toilet and bathing facilities are centrally located throughout the camp. This requires that residents walk short distances to access sex-divided shared sanitation spaces. During the first visit in 2011, we arrived on a day when a man with a plastic pack on his back was spraying chemicals around all of the toilets presumably to enforce sanitation. Since that time, the camp upgraded many of the toilets to concrete buildings with cement floors. A cistern outside the stalls collects water to manually flush the toilet after use. This provides considerable improvement to both the sense of privacy and the level of sanitation at the toilet facilities. On the outskirts of the camp, however, this is clearly an internal commitment to sanitation. At the edges where the camp gives way to Rwandan farmland, open pipes of sewage spill from the mountain to the road below, traveling down into the fields. The refugees commented that this is “the end” of the toilets. Public infrastructure in Rwanda has not yet reached this particularly remote refugee camp. Water wells are also dispersed throughout the camp. Unlike many other camps in Africa, water rations in Kiziba are far above the bare minimum for survival (Sutter et al., 2012). In fact, in order to demonstrate good will to their Rwandan neighbors, refugees allow access to the locals’ cows for drinking and cooling off in the water supply. The relative luxury of updated sanitation facilities and ready access to water again reflect a permanence to life in Kiziba. The concrete, relatively modern facilities rival those available in much of the Rwandan housing in the surrounding areas. Rather than a temporary settlement, these sanitation features and the care with which refugees maintain them imply a certain investment in life there that exceeds a high enough standard that the refugees feel compelled to share with surrounding Rwandan neighbors.

HEALTHCARE

The clinic serves the basic medical needs of refugees, as well as those from surrounding communities who find it more convenient to travel into the camp than all the way to town. A primary feature of the facility is the malnutrition program that manages infants suffering from food deficiencies. Africa Humanitarian Action (AHA), a nongovernmental organization, runs Kiziba’s clinic as of the time of writing. Patients with medical ailments that are beyond the expertise of the clinic staff require a trip to the medical center Kibuye for further diagnosis. For extremely difficult cases, patients must go to Kigali for
medical treatment. The capital is the last stop. If doctors in Kigali cannot diagnose and treat the medical condition, the patient must return to Kiziba with no medical resolution.

In 2011, the head of the clinic staff had been working in Kiziba for ten years. She noted that most likely because the population had been there so long, no recent outbreaks or epidemics occurred, resulting in a relatively stable overall health level for the camp. According to the clinic head, malnutrition is rare and mostly results from mothers who lack the ability to produce breast milk themselves and thus require supplemental feeding. To help expectant mothers in general, the World Food Programme extends rations three months before and after birth to ensure a caloric intake sufficient enough to support healthy maternal and child development. The medical staff expressed concern that residents use these rations for trading instead of supplementary nutrition for expectant mothers. A shortage of economic opportunities for camp residents makes extra rations a valuable trade commodity.

Malaria and respiratory issues are the major concerns. Kiziba clinic resources cannot meet the needs of tuberculosis and diabetes, so these conditions present significant challenges to residents and staff. HIV/AIDS still has relatively low prevalence in the camp, with only 162 (0.01%) reported HIV+ cases in 2011, even compared with Rwanda’s national rates (2.9%) (UNICEF, 2012). Gender-based violence is a reportedly diminishing occurrence in the camp. It still exists, and a common form is for men to take a woman’s rations to purchase alcohol. Due to intervention measures, it is becoming less shameful to report gender-based violence. Neighborhood community volunteers with training in sensitive gender-based violence incidents respond to these situations. This may have contributed to the diminishing number of cases. Reported rape cases are relatively rare, with 101 cases in 2011, though unreported cases remain difficult to measure. One female counselor is on staff to help address these issues and meet the needs of victims. The clinic staff estimated that in 2011, women under the age of 18 accounted for 30% of all pregnancies. Given the resources in the clinic and the relative poverty of the surrounding communities, Rwandan citizens who need to use clinic services have free access to the camp’s medical center (AHA Clinic staff, persona communication, 14 March 2011). Again, the luxury of local healthcare, though it does not meet the complex needs of some residents with challenging illnesses, stands in contrast to the relative access of the surrounding Rwandan community to medical treatment. With a pharmacy and multiple programs to address the more common health needs of residents and neighbors,
the clinic does not invoke the trauma center style facility imagined of refugee camps. Instead, the relaxed nature of operations and concentration on training and education for community members exemplifies the stability of an isolated, relatively homogeneous population that has coexisted in the camp for nearly two decades.

**EDUCATION AND OPPORTUNITY**

In Kiziba the most prominent influences of the Rwandan government are in the security and education sectors. Kiziba Camp hosts a school system that provides education through the tenth grade (ninth and tenth grades were newly added in 2014), run mainly by the refugees themselves under the purview of the host-nation educational system. The schools in the camp follow the Rwanda national curriculum, which focuses on science and English but also includes courses on entrepreneurship and some religious studies. In 2008, the Government of Rwanda converted the national language of its educational curriculum to English as an effort to align with the East African economic community (McGreal, 2008). Since the school systems in refugee camps follow the curriculum of the host government, this shift greatly affected the mode of education in Kiziba. Those teachers not yet fluent in English have the opportunity to attend seminars each year given by the Rwandan government to improve their conversation skills. English and Kinyarwanda dominate the classroom environment, but French still persists in some situations where teachers remain predominantly francophone. The linguistic influence over one of the most prominent institutions within the camp emphasizes the insider/outsider complexities of refugee life. While they exist on the periphery of society, lacking work permits and full integration into Rwandan life, the structure of the camp education system represents host country priorities and values. The values of the educational system integrate them in some ways with the broader Rwandan society; however, the abrupt termination of their education in 10th grade with little opportunity to use or expand what they have learned accentuates the outsider status of a refugee. This complex notion of belonging revealed itself in the ways the curriculum advisor in 2014, a refugee, boasted that the high school is the highest scoring school in the region, and yet the refugees have no access to education beyond the 10th grade. The relative success of Kiziba schools in comparison to others regionally is inversely proportional to the opportunities available after their studies finish.
In 2011, the Jesuit Refugee Services managed the school system, though they eventually withdrew their support in the camp. The principal of the high school in 2011 reported that 1,200 students attended mandatory co-ed classes supervised by 40 teachers. Some teachers are given salaries by nongovernmental organizations, while many are advanced students from the school that came back to teach as volunteers. They are not required to have university teaching degrees. While the school does not have enough books to issue one per student, each gets one notebook per subject and four pens per year. Girls and boys are present in representative numbers in the school system. In 2011, the principal noted that 75 students had abandoned school during the previous year. His general feeling was that boys who fail a class would not return to finish their studies. Girls, on the other hand, generally leave school because they become pregnant, but will often return after giving birth. He felt this may stem from the fact that global and national gender equity movements have created ample opportunities for girls to get scholarships to continue their education outside the camp, but tough economic times have dried up donor resources and resulted in the end of many of the scholarships that would support boys. The school year has three semesters, with the long vacations taking place in November and December. The high school has a solar-powered computer lab with access to Internet. After graduating from the school system, however, refugees do not have access to the lab any more.

After graduating from school two paths exist for refugees. A select few will receive sponsorships or scholarships to continue their studies outside the camp. Some with advanced language or management skills may get full or part-time work with one of the NGOs operating in the camp. An even smaller minority might attempt to find informal work on neighboring farms or nearby cities; though, this is at their own peril as they do not have proper identification that allows legal employment in Rwanda. The majority will go on with regular life activities, which largely translates to idleness in the camp. There is a hall where refugees can watch some soccer tournaments and hold community events, which was donated by the Spanish soccer club, Futbol Club Barcelona (Pedersen, 2010). In addition, the camp contains soccer fields on which to hold matches. Several men in the camp started an English conversation club, and the American Refugee Committee (ARC) encourages groups that specialize in certain crafts in order to promote access to economic opportunities and skill development. Additional
projects to promote economic livelihood include small kitchen gardens, chicken keeping, and rabbit husbandry.

Education and opportunities connect vitally to a baseline level of human existence central to camp life. One of the most predominant observations in Kiziba Camp is that of the cumulative impact of idleness. Even with the introduction of key supportive NGO projects and a successful education program, in such a protracted situation, residents face expansive stretches of time in a repetitive environment, leaving little opportunity for enrichment or access to life outside of the camp. In many ways, one of the most striking observations by the researchers during each visit to the camp was the palpable loss of human potential. Some residents find purpose by working with service providers, but many find the monotony of daily life oppressive. The Security Council indicated that idleness, in their opinions, was a major contributor to the potential for mischief. Of the problems that plagued the security officers the most, teenage idleness leading to misbehavior and adult abuse of alcohol topped the list. The Council felt unanimously confident that these behaviors result from having nothing else to do, perhaps as a sign of rebellion or even depression. When I asked our key informant in 2011 what he would be doing if he was not showing us around, he replied, “Nothing. Just sitting and waiting” for nothing in particular. This facet of life reoccurs several times throughout the different forms of interviews. Boredom with the selection of food rations and boredom with the opportunities available to do something with one’s life consistently resurfaced in dialog as a type of torture that they endure as a consequence of decades of political limbo.

RESEARCH CONSIDERATIONS

FEMINIST METHODOLOGIES

This study speaks to the larger concerns of feminist methodologists through its focus on the acquisition of data and the intention to apply this research to larger concerns for human rights, equality, and justice. While the research presented in this study does not specifically address women’s issues or directly challenge notions of gender, it addresses larger concerns of citizenship, which necessarily involves parallel considerations of race, class, gender, language, and sexuality at a global level. Additionally, the methodological approach to the study embodies a feminist research agenda, guided by principles that classify it as such. In the conclusion of their work, Taylor & Rupp (1991) suggest that, “in the course of our work…we came to believe that there is not a distinctive feminist methodology but rather
a feminist perspective on the research process” (p. 127). This observation gives feminist research methodology the space to apply to more than just women’s issues, but marginalized communities more broadly when they are cast through the lens of a feminist perspective (Harnois, 2013, pp. 5-6). Specifically, it adapts the qualities that Maria Mies (1991) describes of feminist research when she said, “While dominant science views things as static, dualistically ahistorical, mechanical, and additive, feminist science, which has not lost sight of its political goal, strives for a new view of the whole societal constellation in which things appear as historical, contradictory, linked to each other, and capable of being changed” (p. 63). The research process in this study follows the assumption that protracted refugee circumstances are more than a scientific occurrence, but rather a dynamic system embedded in global politics and history. The analysis of this type of system requires the lens of a political activist who believes these situations can and should change. In this case, the feminist approach lends itself to analyzing systemic interactions between individuals and global collective actors, which “dominant science” cannot reveal. Using the work of Fonow and Cook (1991) as a framework, refugee research of this type is clearly feminist in nature. Among the qualities of feminist research that they describe is “reflexivity” in which researchers “…reflect upon, examine critically, and explore analytically the nature of the research process” (Fonow & Cook, 1991, p. 2). By becoming involved in the life narratives of Kiziba residents, linking them to our own understanding of regional dynamics, and critically assessing an iterative approach to research in this context, we maintain that even without a primary focus on gender, the methodology described here is indeed feminist.

Another aspect of feminist research that plays out in challenging environments such as Kiziba is that of acknowledging the role that the researchers’ own emotions play in the process of inquiry. In feminist research methodologies, this is not seen as a scientific weakness, but rather an opportunity for “a source of insight or a signal of rupture in social reality” (p. 9) that contributes to the production of knowledge (Fonow & Cook, 1991). The fact then that I was drawn to this research topic because of my interest in migration, as a member of a family of migrants, and compelled to study Kiziba based on conversations with a Red Cross acquaintance in Rwanda serves as an opportunity in feminist analysis to draw upon personal insight and emotions to deepen the study. In this particular setting, it would be impossible to claim that our own emotional states of being and insights did not play a role in the research
process. Asking refugees about traumatic life experiences and the journey from peace to conflict to safety and subsequent limbo draws one into the interviewees' lives. Without expressed empathy for the speaker, an interviewer cannot delve into the ways in which these individuals conceptualize their own experience. The goal of the research was not simply to gather statistics on the self-identification of nationality, citizenship, and belonging, but rather to engage the multi-faceted experiences of Kiziba residents who live in an existence of intense waiting. For that reason, the feminist methodology that embraces the fact that emotions play a part in all data gathering processes is fully realized in the way the Kiziba Camp study evolved. That is not to say that the research was entirely emotionally driven. Maria Mies captures the dual nature of balancing emotions and objectivity with what she called "partial identification," which researchers use to develop a "double consciousness...[to become] aware of the objective structures within which we live and work (1991, p. 79)." She suggests that a researcher must disengage from her consumerist identity and instead channel her "human beingness" so that she can adopt "...the necessary closeness to the others as well as the necessary distance from [herself]" (Mies, 1991, p. 80). In this way, we opened ourselves up to the open conversations about experiences of displacement while channeling one another to maintain focus on the broader topic at hand.

The three tenets of feminist research articulated by Fonow and Cook (1991) serve as guiding principles of this research methodology. Specifically, they call upon researchers to demonstrate flexibility, theoretical reflexivity, creativity, and therefore dynamic growth framed through a feminist perspective. These qualities manifest in refugee research, as demonstrated by the ways in which the research agenda adapted to the changing requirements of MIDIMAR, the internal governance structures of the camp, and the availability of interviewees to speak freely with us. In particular, aspects of reflexivity, calls to action, and social justice featured prominently in our experience with the refugees, where they took an active role in the research process and shaped the nature of the goals of this study beyond the scope of scholarship alone to the aspirations of using this research to serve as a political platform with which to assist in improving the lives of this population of protracted refugees.

**REFLEXIVITY AND SOCIAL RESEARCH**

A critical facet of feminist research methodology involves considering one's own social location in relation to the study and its participants. Social location describes the prism of socio-economic and
political factors that shape a person’s viewpoint. The combination of these factors imply that there cannot be a truly objective study, as the human investigators are subject to their own life circumstances and experiences that shape the ways they approach the project at hand. These factors account for “...cultural values and power relations that contribute to subordination or oppression of other groups,” including race, class, and gender (Wood, 2009). By acknowledging our social location as economically and politically privileged, white, educated, women researchers, we can begin to challenge the underlying power dynamics that potentially shape the data gathering and analysis process. In particular, we represented the global North, a geo-political region the refugees immediately associated with political agency and power. This aspect of our social location added a layer of complexity to the interview process as refugees regularly asked us to be ‘ambassadors’ for their stories. Ambassadorship carried weight in terms of the ability to affect political change by sharing the refugees’ stories to politicians and INGOs that can change the circumstances of Kiziba’s protracted exile. These notions of ambassadorship and our perceived relative power to carry their messages into the international community form a section of the data analysis chapters to follow.

Confrontation of the researcher’s social location and subsequent effects on the study and participants involves a reflexive analysis of the process of inquiry at its most fundamental level (Fonow & Cook, 1991, p. 2; Oakley, 1992). In what way does my culture and relative privileges shape the way I hear and see the stories of others? In what way does it shape the way other participants see me, and subsequently the study? How does knowledge of this affect my methodological approach? These are the important considerations for the researcher to both observe potential areas for bias and protect participants from unintentional exploitation or harm. Some, however, argue that overreliance on reflexivity to accomplish these goals may lead to a false sense of tempering negative influences on the study (Hesse-Biber, 2012, pp. 197-198; Naples, 2003, pp. 41-42).

Despite some criticisms about the extent to which reflexivity of research processes improves the study both ethically and methodologically, the concept provides opportunity for the population of interest to move from being the “researched” to active participants (Brinkmann & Kvale, 2005; Oakley, 1992). In feminist theory, this creates an environment for richer, deeper analysis of the complex dynamics that shape social situations. Part of the reflexive process is to allow participants to ask questions of the
researcher and directly engage in the process, though not all choose to take part in this way (DeShong, 2013). In the case of Kiziba Camp interviewees, one recurring theme arose from the opportunity to ask us questions, that of story stewardship. In different words, many of the participants asked how we would use their stories, images, and in what ways we could actually make changes to improve their life circumstances. The prevalence of this question was itself surprising, demonstrating not only how the refugees viewed our relative power but also how in tune they were with the larger political and NGO systems that affect their everyday lives. No one asked for any specific measures or made demands that we felt we could not meet. This is an important point as we constantly strive to avoid false promises or misleading participants in any way. Through these questions, the interviewees took an active role in shaping the project by helping us to formulate a way to incorporate a scholar-activist approach, where the researcher attempts to directly engage with the participants to attain mutually beneficial study outcomes.

On a very individual level, this manifested as an offer to share the images and portraits we collected with them. Pictures are relatively rare in the camp, but many have access to technology that allows them to download images. Additionally, we plan to print portraits to mail to the camp manager for distribution to our interviewees.

More broadly, and calling us to a higher level of commitment to this research, the refugees asked how we could use our power and privilege to affect change for them. This aspect of the ambassador request ties directly to the concept of “action orientation” in feminist research (Fonow & Cook, 1991, pp. 5-9). What could we do to help them change their circumstances? It is a very heavy question to reflect on, and challenged us as researchers to consider our larger activist roles in the topics we choose to study. For them, protracted refugee status is not a lens through which to view larger political dysfunction at the regional and global levels. Their questions about ambassadorship constantly reminded us that this is a lived experience—one that they seek solutions in order to transform both their daily lives and the larger structural circumstances of Kiziba. While our social capital and relative power waver in relation to context, within the refugee camp research environment it took on the symbolic significance of being an avenue to bring an end to protraction, or even the monotony of food availability. Throughout this project, we paid close attention to the various methods with which we can use our privilege as a tool to give voice to refugee stories in a way that might somehow ultimately contribute positively to their lives. As academics,
our most prominent method to affect change is through writing, research, and subsequent awareness. In the short term, this is what we could offer, and most respondents seemed comfortable with that answer. For the long term, we continue to contemplate the ways in which our scholarship possesses the potential to engage in larger political and social change. Through the seemingly simple act of engaging the refugees in the research project by creating space for questions, they ultimately shaped the project and our own capacities for thinking reflexively on the research process in a forced migration context. The refugees themselves encouraged us to grow and think beyond the boundaries of academe to the realm of activism.

ETHICS OF FORCED MIGRATION RESEARCH

A number of scholars have written specifically about the ethics of conducting research among refugee and IDP populations. These studies encompass an array of migration locations—combat zones, IDP camps, refugee camps, urban settlements, and settlement abroad—from a variety of disciplines, mainly bioethics and social work. Among their contemplations of the roles and responsibilities of researchers working with displaced persons, philosophical and practical themes emerge. This section focuses on these broad ethical themes beginning first with the philosophical and ending with the practical. I will address these in turn in the context of the Kiziba Camp study to evaluate the methodological planning before the study, the iterative process of adjusting methods to reflect changing understandings of ethical research in this context, and finally the assessment process after the study's completion.

PHILOSOPHICAL ETHICS

Qualitative feminist field research derives from a strong desire to immerse oneself in the narratives of others, allowing their stories to guide the interview content and direction to shape the outcome of the final project. Often, this research methodology receives criticism from more quantitative fields for being overly subjective, limited in scope, and at times emotional, thereby risking objectivity by engaging too personally with the “subject” of the study. Brinkmann and Kvale (2005) offer an alternative assessment of this approach. In their attempt to conceptualize a moral framework with which to conduct ethical field research, they caution that rules, as those posed by IRBs, are not enough to guarantee ethical compliance. They observe,
...describing the real does not leave us with a value-neutral world devoid of moral content and guidance. Rather, with the help of thick ethical description—using concepts that are at once descriptive and value-laden (e.g. "courageous," "brutal," "gentle")—we can re-enchant the world morally, and disclose the moral normativity that we inevitably have to deal with in our lives as humans and researchers. (Brinkmann & Kvale, 2005, p. 176)

Ethically, then, as researchers we must acknowledge that our academic goals cannot be divorced from the study participants’ humanness or our own. To embrace this is to readily admit the bias in our work so that others can make informed decisions about applying the scope of these studies to other situations. Among the philosophical moral challenges we must confront in forced migration fieldwork, concepts of power, vulnerability, and a commitment to “do no harm” are the most predominant.

**POWER**

In feminist methodologies, as described in the previous section, considerations of the researcher’s social location and relative power in the interviewer/interviewee relationship plays an important role in disclosing the potential, and acknowledged, sources of bias in much the same way Brinkmann and Kvale (2005) advocate for using language that discloses this connection. The same researchers note that ethical qualitative research represents certain power imbalances despite the leaning toward participant-guided studies, cautioning that qualitative methods do not necessarily translate to ethical, power-balanced studies. Brinkmann and Kvale (2005) argue that power dynamics emerge when the researcher controls the start and end of the conversation, uses the interview as an instrument to further her own research agenda, manipulates the conversation to guide it back to the research topic, and monopolizes the interpretation of the data collected. They warn that without acknowledging these power dynamics, one cannot conduct ethical, objective studies.

Lammers (2007) criticizes this researcher-centric analysis of power by noting that it is equally crucial to recognize a researcher’s lack of power in the relationship. She recounts her experiences working among urban refugees in Uganda and how her social location as a white, female researcher with relative wealth translated to very little ability to make a substantial difference at the level expected of an “expert.” She recalls, “It was not mere modesty that made me not want to be approached as the expert; I found it unbearable to be confronted with my own powerlessness in the face of so much hardship” (Lammers, 2007, p. 74). She goes on to criticize that often researchers considering the power dynamics in a study think only in terms of economic power. This is troubling because:
Refugees are especially affected by this discourse of powerlessness and it is often overlooked that power springs from many sources: power that comes with wealth or status, physical power, the power of personality, intellectual power, the power, or ability to have rewarding relationships with others, the powers of creativity. (Lammers, 2007, pp. 74-75)

In my experience, my own power has always manifested in my mind as the power to leave the camp at the end of the day. These moments of crossing the camp border elicited reflection on the larger relative power I hold in my ability to pursue my life goals without substantive restrictions, travel across a range of geographic locations with minimal surveillance, and even regulate the rhythm, tempo, and variety in my everyday activities. Regardless of personal intentions, these power differentials embed innate imbalances in the researcher/researched dynamic. The point Lammers raised, however, is an important one because, in the context of refugee camps, we rely almost entirely on key informants, gatekeepers, and the generosity of participants who share their stories. At those moments, it is they, not us, who have more power in the relationship. They control access and the flow of information; they control which voices and truths will be represented and which will not. Lammers’ contestation of the common use of “power” in methodological conversations calls us to reflect upon moments and situations of relative power—rather than a sense of overall power or dominance—and provides an ethical framework with which to view our data collection. Some researchers view this relative power in subtle ways, where interviewees’ stories later become researchers’ data, where refugees have little control over the outcome and researchers maintain a “monopoly of interpretation” (Brinkmann & Kvale, 2005, p. 165). Ethically, this manifests as forms of “stealing stories” that many researchers take for granted (Pittaway, Bartolomei, & Hugman, 2010). By taking precautions, such as maintaining ongoing communication with study participants and ensuring their access to interviews and portraits, we attempt to mitigate the relative power differential that situates us in control of their stories.

VULNERABILITY

Another major theme in the conversation on research ethics among displaced persons revolves around the definition and use of the word “vulnerability,” particularly when applying for IRB approvals. As Turton (1996) describes, “displacement” carries with it the assumption that humans naturally belong to a certain place and that losing this territorial association, “…is to lose some part of one’s very humanity” (p. 97). This assumption, carried over in refugee research, creates the sense that potential research
participants are necessarily vulnerable for having been stripped of a part of themselves. Some reasons for this potential vulnerability include: lack of political rights in host nations; limited oversight from authorities or governments during flight; and camp demographics that reflect the incident that precipitated their flight, meaning potential for mixed ethnic and political groupings within camps exist (Leaning, 2001). Extending this argument of refugee vulnerability, Lange, Rogers, and Dodds (2013), using the case of bioethics, warn that vulnerability is best described in terms of layers of attributes that incorporate spatiotemporal factors and “explain an individual’s susceptibility to harm or wrongs” (p. 336). This is an important point that distinguishes certain populations from others. They argue that to ethically address the vulnerability of research participants, “researchers must attend to the broader circumstances facing research participants and the entire constellation of their inherent, situational, and pathogenic vulnerabilities” (Lange et al., 2013, p. 336). The literature on ethics in refugee research informs us that we should treat the use of the word “vulnerable” with care. Certain societal and political changes do indeed lead to vulnerabilities in access to service, political oversight, and potential for violence, among others. The term, however, should not loosely define all displaced contexts, as the specific instances of vulnerability are unique to each situation.

In the case of Kiziba, the type of vulnerability is not the same as that of an IDP camp situated in a conflict zone, or that of a camp that has only been settled in the past few years. Kiziba, as a relatively homogenous camp of Kinyarwanda-speaking refugees from the DRC who fled in one of two waves in response to conflict nearly two decades ago, reflects human vulnerability that arises not only from conflict, but also from prolonged political limbo and extended periods of monotony in everyday life. These factors uniquely inform the ways in which we describe Kiziba residents as “vulnerable,” noting that most are not in immediate physical danger or devoid of food, medical care, or education. Kiziba residents, in this context, are vulnerable in that their existence hinges on the participation of the aid community—the rhythm of life revolves around the sometimes unpredictable aid truck deliveries. They are vulnerable because they are outsiders without full citizenship and participation rights in their host country, even if most have an amicable relationship with neighboring Rwandan citizens. And, among myriad other reasons, Kiziba residents are vulnerable in their relative lack of agency to change their situation; those who have tried to go home have often met violence or death in the DRC, and those who stay remain in
political limbo. Thus, the researchers’ interpretation of the Kiziba context represents a more nuanced approach to ethically defining “vulnerability,” leading us to use the descriptor in reference to a distinct case in terms of the nature of power relations, longevity of location, and proximity of imminent threats. 

**DO NO HARM**

A prominent theme in the academic conversations about ethical research among forced migrants is the idea that research should “do no harm.” The often traumatic experience of flight, regardless of how long ago, is a sensitive topic for most refugees. Inviting participants to discuss their forced migration revisits these past traumas in ways that can be harmful, emotionally or physically, to participants (De Haene, Grietens, & Verschueren, 2010, p. 1672). To protect “vulnerable” populations, IRB approval necessitates a research procedure that includes acquiring informed consent from the participants. Pittaway, Bartolomei, and Hugman (2010) challenge this step of protection noting, “It cannot be assumed that research participants necessarily share a common understanding of the purpose of research, the role of the academic and the academy, notions of consent, forms of engagement (and recruitment), or communication and perceptions of risk” (p. 242). Only an iterative process of informed consent, in which the subject is reminded in different parts of the dialog how this data will be used, can ensure that the participant fully accepts the researcher’s goals (Hugman, Pittaway, & Bartolomei, 2011, pp. 1278, 1281). This is not to be condescending, but to ensure that academic norms transcend cultural and linguistic barriers. For the Kiziba study, we openly answered questions from participants about the use of the data and photographs taken of every participant. Well versed in NGO “speak,” the participants challenged us about how we would be “ambassadors of their stories” and what we could do to improve their situation. It is impossible to know if these conversations crossed linguistic and cultural lines in order to be interpreted in the same way by both researchers and participants, but interviewees seemed comfortable with the idea that their stories (without identities) would be shared with the international community in book-form which would shed light on the protracted displacement they have been experiencing for the last two decades. Hugman et al. (2011) caution, however, that this can create its own potential for harm where some community members are willing to risk danger in order to share their stories. This, they observe, is not necessarily a universally shared opinion among the other camp members, and accordingly does not demonstrate an understanding of the scope to which this data could be used or how it might affect them.
at later stages in their lives. The researchers recall a particular incident where a refugee resettled abroad and saw his shared images on promotional materials. Pittaway et al. (2010) of the same research team observed, “While for the most part they are proud to be featured, at times they are shocked to find that their story is public knowledge” (p. 233). These incidents carry a legacy and travel through refugee communities in ways that impact all researchers; participants’ assessment of the intentions and potential dispersion of information gathered through contact in camp situations can create mistrust or aversion to participation.

Finally, Hugman et al. (2011) argue that harm can also come unintentionally as part of the research process. When researchers leave the site, some think of the information collected in the field as “data” and the participants as “sources,” while the refugees, from their own studies, “regard themselves as continuing to be part of the research” (p. 1278). An important ethical consideration for researcher, then, is the concept of ownership over data. This informs the care over all copies of the data and privacy of information contained in those interviews, as well as the ways in which the data are used to improve the lives of those who donated their stories. Brinkmann and Kvale (2005) describe these as “macro-ethical considerations” (p. 167). In contrast to micro-ethics which ensure that individuals are treated ethically with respect and dignity, macro-ethics dictate the ways in which the “knowledge produced will circulate in the wider culture and affect humans and society” (Brinkmann & Kvale, 2005, p. 167). It is this consideration that ensures not only the privacy and safety of the individual, but the responsible use of the data derived from these personal interviews, which is not the property of one individual, but rather the combined endeavor of the researchers and participants.

**PRACTICAL ETHICS**

This last point transitions into practical guidelines to help the researcher practice good ethics during fieldwork. Brinkmann and Kvale (2005) argue that these are best learned as cases in fieldwork context, rather than as concrete rules to follow as each situation warrants its own ethical lens. They urge researchers to become “morally proficient” by evaluating the work of others, specifically observing the context of the interview in both space and time (Brinkmann & Kvale, 2005, pp. 177-178). In general, however, the researcher’s goals must balance between minimizing risk to the participants while gathering enough data to paint a picture of the field. This risks re-traumatizing participants or even exposing them to
research assistants or translators who create feelings of insecurity among those sharing narratives (Jacobsen & Landau, 2003, p. 193).

Pittaway et al. (2010) introduce a version of reciprocal research in which participants both inform the direction of the study and design of inquiry. While they acknowledge that there is no established framework for accomplishing this in every case, and that funding is short and IRB approvals complex, ultimately all researchers must allow participants into the research process in ways that contribute to a dynamic, iterative process of participation. Speaking directly to the nature of questions that the Kiziba study participants posed to us, Pittaway et al. (2010) recall of their research, "They challenged us to consider both our own ethical research practice and the value of the organizational ethical arrangements which informed our work. More importantly, they challenged us to examine if we actually applied the principles of human rights and community participation, which we so proudly espouse in theory, to our work on the ground" (p. 235). In Kiziba, questions about our plans for follow-through, policy involvement, and use of their stories came up in nearly every interview. The participants called us to a higher level of academia—one in which we at least try to use their narratives as a tool to help improve their lives.

The challenge of morally undertaking the care of so many sensitive stories for the “greater good” is a question of how to leave a research site. Given the realities of funding to access remote global locations and the relative lack of connection after leaving the camp, how do we walk away carrying pieces of participants’ experience with us? Jacobsen and Landau (2003) express this in terms of friendship after working closely with refugees (p. 192), while Pittaway et al. (2010) encourage researchers to “recogniz[e] them as subjects in the process and not simply as sources of data,” implying a commitment to revisit the community again (p. 231). The efforts of Pittaway et al. to establish a working research relationship with a women’s group in Thailand called into question the idea of data ownership after the project’s completion. Often this data becomes the “property” of the researcher or institution, rather than a shared commodity that results from collaborative work. To complicate this, they note that many representatives, particularly women, in camps are figureheads for male household members. This brings into question the validity of data collected. The authors ask, “How do researchers ever know that the version they have recorded is an accurate reflection of the refugee experience?” (Pittaway et al., 2010, p. 233) Ultimately, the ways in which one leaves a research site defines more than potential future interactions with the interviewees; it
establishes an ethical standard for the research profession that elevates inquiry into populations of interest from “researched” to “participants.” Only through these considerations does our work take on the potential for social change beyond academic publication, an aspiration that should exist in all research work (Turton, 1996).

To perform research ethically in the Kiziba case, we assured participants that photos would be used for educational purposes only—so that more people could know about the protracted status of residents in the camp—as opposed to media, promotional, or other activities. We promised that we would distribute the pictures to them later, and four participants have already received copies of their photos. It is impossible to make guarantees about returning for larger projects in the camps, since we cannot assure funding access. We strive to be moral in our use of the data as a probative case study into the specific protracted refugee experience of the members of Kiziba Camp, rather than all refugees globally or even those in the Great Lakes Region of Africa. By contextualizing our approach and limiting the scope of the study, we endeavor to avoid many pitfalls of unethical research that implies broader generalizations than afforded by the data. The remote nature and limited access of the Kiziba community prohibits the type of reciprocal research envisioned by Pittaway et al. (2010); however, as researchers, throughout this four-year project, we maintained contact with key informants, developed a short-term project to meet the needs of some participants, and plan to continue our relationship with MIDIMAR and the camp staff, NGOs, and residents.

**INSTITUTIONAL REVIEW BOARD APPROVAL**

The two researchers involved in the qualitative data collection portion of this study submitted a full application detailing the study objectives, methodology, and research questions to the university Institutional Review Board (IRB) though the College of Arts and Letters at Old Dominion University. This application specified the terms and scope of the personal interviews conducted in Kiziba Camp in Rwanda. Protocol as articulated in the IRB application ensures confidentiality of all information and narratives gathered in the camp. Pseudonyms replace participants’ real names to protect their identity, safety, and privacy. Prior to each interview, the researchers informed the participant of the study goals.

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2 These residents have access to social media and email resources, so we provided digital copies.
and intended outcome. Interviewees provided verbal consent to participate in the research. The researchers regularly engaged the participants to ask questions and reiterate the extent to which the narratives would serve the larger academic and policy-oriented community. Interviewees could end the interview and/or withdraw from the study at any point. Beyond official meetings with elected councils, NGO representatives, and MIDIMAR staff, the researchers made every effort to ensure one-on-one interviews to protect the privacy of the interviewee. It is important to understand, however, the context of refugee camp environments, particularly the proximity of residents to one another. As much as possible, given the close quarters of the camp, the researchers maintained privacy by utilizing key informants who kept others away from the meeting areas. The researchers recorded all interviews, with the recording device kept in full view of the participant, in order to maintain the integrity of their narratives and experiences without relying on notes or shorthand. As described above, in order to maximize the available time to speak directly with refugees during the two-day window allotted by MIDIMAR’s camp pass, the researchers approached interviews as a team where one engaged in dialog with the participant while the other took notes. This effectively allowed the two researchers to present the study questions fluidly, follow up to questions arising from the dialog, and address questions directed at the study and the researchers from the participants.

CAMP ACCESS AND LIMITATIONS

ACCESS

Conducting research in a refugee camp poses unique challenges to the data collection process. At the national level, the government of Rwanda is very sensitive to negative criticism and wary of outside researchers for at least two reasons. First, the government is trying to prevent outside researchers from collecting data in Rwanda and simply taking it out and publishing articles and research from it, but giving no credit to the data-producing institution. The Minister of Health for Rwanda articulated the vulnerability of public institutions to this problem given the large amounts of data the government records and maintains (Agnes Binagwaho, personal communication, 22 January 2013). Western researchers often publish reports independently without opportunity for input from Rwandan officials on the study methodology, data use, or results leading to negative publicity for government-sponsored programs. Abuse by external researchers claiming to seek collaborative work in the past is a serious consideration
for all government agencies evaluating proposals by foreign researchers. This type of behavior resulted in a general mistrust of researchers coming in to collect data for their own career advancements. A second, related reason the government is wary of outside researchers stems from the recent publication of negative reports on different aspects of Rwandan life and politics that reflect negatively on the country without an opportunity for review or rebuttal of the study results. These dynamics certainly represent larger power struggles between researchers and “researched,” especially in developing countries.

MIDIMAR in particular faces these same challenges compounded by the responsibility of protecting a large, politically and economically vulnerable population in its purview. Minimally, these conditions warrant thorough vetting of all researchers intending to study the Congolese refugee population. According to Rwanda’s government standards, formal applications with copies of official passports and letters of explanation precede a visit to the Ministry to receive an official letter of approval granting a two-day maximum entry pass to the refugee camp. This is the first layer of barriers to entry. With the official Ministry letter, complete with government stamp, after traveling to the remote mountaintop location of Kiziba, one must then gain access through the elected camp leadership. This study took place during three separate two-day trips spanning four years, but each entry required some scrutiny from the camp leadership above and beyond the official Ministry level. The next section describes the process of gaining entry through this second layer of scrutiny in more detail.

**BUILDING TRUST**

To gain access to the formal application process, I relied upon organizational support systems, strong existing research networks, and key informants from Rwanda who could navigate the internal processes and local politics of access. In 2011, a personal contact at the Rwanda Red Cross facilitated the process of attaining an official camp pass from MIDIMAR. As mentioned above, the sensitivity of allowing foreign researchers into this highly protected community necessitates scrutiny on the part of the government. An endorsement from the Rwanda Red Cross, an agency with which they work closely, made the camp pass request possible during that first research year. It is important to note, however, that even with the Red Cross backing, numerous phone calls, official letters, and application requests were still part of the admission process. MIDIMAR granted the pass based on the recommendation of the Rwanda Red Cross, but still thoroughly vetted us before allowing entry.
For the first visit to the camp, the official MIDIMAR letter was not enough to gain entry past the Kiziba gate guards. The guards, refugees themselves, also conducted an extensive check of our credentials. My professor, two fellow graduate students, driver, and I arrived in the main square of the camp only to find another barrier to entry. In a room off of the main square, the Council of Elders spoke with our driver at length in Kinyarwanda to gather details of our intentions and objectives while in the camp. The evidence our driver used to persuade the Council of Elders to allow us into the camp to conduct research hinged directly on the concept of trust and protecting the vulnerability of those in their care. Our driver recounted to them an incident that happened while we drove up the mountain from town to the camp. My professor had spotted a woman wearing an Obama handkerchief on her head with a picture of the President of the US printed on it. She wanted to take a picture, but asked our driver to ask the woman on our behalf if it would be okay. The woman declined, so we thanked her and drove away without a photo. Using this story as evidence, our driver convinced the Council that we would respect the privacy and wishes of those in the camp.

This moment of research spoke to me for two very personal reasons. First, I was acutely aware of the fact that we, a group of four white US women, relied entirely on our black native Congolese male driver to negotiate in a language we could not understand to a room full of men in order to gain access to the broader population. This irony of feminist research emphasized for me my own limitations as a white, female researcher with nonexistent linguistic abilities among a group of people for whom verbal communication with peers is so important. Had our driver not noticed that photographic consent moment; not known us as well as he did and been able to articulate our intentions; not been raised in the DRC himself; and not been seen as a male “elder” in his own right, I am not convinced that the Ministry pass would have been enough to get us into the camp that day. My own social location, age, and gender naturally inform the lens through which I viewed these moments, but also presented as a set of limitations in this very sensitive and restricted environment. The encounter with the elder group also hinted at a phenomenon of durability that presents more fully in Chapter 6. The council and elected officials disregarded official Red Cross and MIDIMAR paperwork giving us access to the camp; this act represents a sense of autonomy, perhaps even state-like, that the Council oversees the affairs of the camp and
ensures the welfare of its residents. This constitution of the camp governance system placed us squarely as outsiders, entitled access only as deemed acceptable by this elder male council.

The visit in 2013 unfolded much differently than the previous trip. The official letter took several trips to the Ministry, networking connections with the MIDIMAR Camp Manager, and navigating the Ministry channels to find the official pass administrator. This time, with the same driver but also accompanied by an upper-middle class, female Rwandan friend, we met very little resistance at the front gate, yet more resistance in the main square than the previous year. Upon our arrival, a man introduced himself to us as the Camp President, though later conversations with a MIDIMAR representative called this title into question. He was reluctant to allow us to enter the camp or speak directly with the residents there. To confirm our official MIDIMAR letter, he called the Kiziba Camp Manager. When he was unable to get through, the Camp President offered to personally answer any questions we had, but would not let us directly interact with the refugees. We were not interested in his singular narrative, so we convinced him to assemble groups of elected representatives with whom we could speak without leaving the main square of the camp. To get permission to speak with these two groups required extensive explanation of what we were planning to study, the kinds of questions we planned to ask, and what we planned to do with this information. Ultimately, two all-male groups of elected camp leaders met to speak with us at length.

The first group represented the elected leaders of various aspects of life in the camp, such as president (overall), education, sports and recreation, and health. The second group was comprised of security personnel from a selection of the camp’s villages and the overall elected security representative for the entire camp. The camp president facilitated these meetings over the course of two days and contained them to one room off of the main square and behind the high school. At the end of the second day, the elected head of education convinced the stand-in president to allow us to walk to the market, about one quarter of a mile from the square toward the center of the camp, with strict supervision. As we toured the short stretch of road, two members of the Security Council monitored us to ensure we did not interact with anyone inappropriately or take any pictures. As the day began to end, these two guards left us to do other things. The extent of our research freedom that year was limited to an hour and a half
unsupervised in the market and just before sundown. The rest of the data were collected from official
elected representatives in one single room reserved for camp administration.

The third visit, in June 2014, represented an entirely different process. At the Ministry, we
received our camp pass with very few hurdles as we had been through the process twice before.
Accompanied by a different driver who coincidentally was born and raised in a similar part of the DRC as
many of the refugees in the camp, we easily negotiated access to the front gate. At the main square, we
met the new elected camp president, a young man in his early twenties who spoke English. I recognized
him from the council of camp officials from the previous year, and with very few questions he entrusted us
to the supervision of our key informant for the rest of our time in Kiziba. No one said it to us explicitly, but I
believe access to the camp came easiest in 2014 both from our repeat visits over the years and our
vested interest in some of the camp residents and their projects. That year, I worked with the American
Refugee Committee to develop a two-day workshop on knitting and crochet, led by my mother, an expert
in those skills. The workshops were well-received and may have contributed to the sense that we, as
foreign researchers, are invested in the lives of Kiziba residents. Additionally, I think respecting people’s
rights and privacy during our previous visits and just showing interest enough to come back for a third
time gained us some credibility that simultaneously facilitated access. Regardless of its origin, the camp
president’s approval that year granted us unfettered access to the entire camp, allowing insight into the
farthest reaches of this seemingly permanent temporary city on a remote mountaintop near Kibuye.

The obstacles we faced each year to gaining entry to the camp, both at the national and local
levels, reflect underlying hierarchies of power and structural changes in Kiziba that occur throughout time.
Though much of the camp seems stagnant and permanent on the surface level, life and society changes
in response to conditions in Rwanda, the DRC, and the humanitarian organizations that provide services
and stability for the residents there. Furthermore, each year, access to this remote, highly monitored, and
shifting society hinged centrally upon our ability to draw from local informants and utilize a wide range of
existing contacts within Rwanda.

KEY INFORMANTS AND CAMP GEOGRAPHY

Kiziba is a densely packed community of small mud brick and wooden buildings whose borders
drape over the sides of a mountaintop, looking onto Lake Kivu. Accommodating over 16,000 people, the
majority of roads are footpaths that weave in between these buildings and merge onto a few main thoroughfares. It would be easy to get lost in the maze of alleyways, and given the close proximity of houses, it would be equally easy to unintentionally invade someone’s privacy while walking past an open door. These geographic, housing, and socio-economic realities placed sharp contours on our ability to show up as outsiders and talk to residents in efforts to gain personal information and interview data. “Fitting in” took on a number of layers within this lived context. Rather than setting out with specific research questions in a formal method, we learned to see daily life through the eyes of residents, walking through their world and experiencing dimensions far outside of our initial conceptualization of the central thematic topics.

The first visit in 2011 started with a brief orientation walk through camp down the main road that passes the camp market. We did not try to interview anyone or ask questions, we simply spent a few hours observing life in the camp around the main center of economic activity. During that walk, a man in his mid-twenties approached us with the intent of practicing the English skills that he had learned in a small conversation group. He offered to show us other parts of the camp and asked what most interested us. During that initial tour, we visited a nursery school on the outskirts of the camp, the high school in the very center of the camp, the clinic, and several family houses. Based on advice given to us by Dr. Susan Martin of Georgetown University shortly before this trip to Rwanda, we were most eager to see the outer edges of the camp. There, she claimed, is where one can really get a sense of what life is like in the camp and the residents’ needs. Without a local guide, I cannot imagine how we would have gained access to these far reaches of the rural camp.

From an ethnographic observational perspective, the most striking dimension of life in Kiziba is its orderliness, cleanliness, and general sense of security. The camp Security Council and other elected leaders all confirm that the rate of crime is very low. As one leader pointed out, “We have nothing, so there is nothing to fight over or steal” (village leader, personal communication, 5 June 2014). As an example of a well-run refugee camp in Central Africa, Kiziba Camp hosts a number of high profile NGO visitors each year in addition to the NGO staff working there, making residents relatively comfortable with foreigners walking around and asking questions. I never felt that we needed an escort for our safety or
security; rather, the escort served as a cultural ambassador who was familiar with the camp layout, offered insights into life there, and facilitated interviews that enabled informed consent.

The daily rhythm of camp life closely follows the schedule of school children. Students of all ages leave class en masse for lunch break and flood the camp walkways. After the break is over, they return to their respective classrooms, with different schooling levels located throughout the camp. The nursery school is on the outskirts of the camp. On our second day in Kiziba, our guide offered to walk us out to the outer camp boundaries as we had requested. The walk to the nursery school was down a narrow dirt path that clung to the edges of the mountain below the houses in the camp above. It wound slightly down toward a soccer field and a collection of small cement buildings where our volunteer guide convinced a teacher to allow us to join class. The education system in Kiziba is both a particular source of pride for its regional success in producing passing students as well as a source of discontent given the limited extent of its services. Residents regularly comment about the lack of resources to finish high school. Additionally, while at school students have access to Internet and are taught how to use computers. Upon leaving school at the terminus of 10th grade, however, residents can no longer use these Internet services. Instead, they must rely on mobile phones to connect with those beyond the camp, a problem with inherent economic constraints.

That man who became our guide for the next day and a half assumed the role of a critical key informant for this study and facilitated access in each of the subsequent visits. Between the first visit in 2011 and the second in 2013, we lost contact with our key informant due to lack of access to an Internet connection and ability to secure enough money beyond basic expenses to activate his mobile phone regularly. These economic restrictions dictate access for the majority of residents in Kiziba. Only through irregular employment or trading opportunities can one get money to charge and buy minutes for mobile phone use. Though we lost contact with him between 2011 and 2013, upon our arrival during the second visit, he happened to be walking past the main square as we parked our vehicle and we were once again reunited. As a central hub for daily social interactions, this meeting was serendipitous but also spoke to the rhythm of life in Kiziba, which is highly tuned to events in the main square. This chance meeting precipitated the subsequent two years of research, but also highlighted the vulnerability of our research methods on connectivity and social connections amidst considerable technological challenges in the
camp. Speaking to the challenge of maintaining contact with refugees over the course of the year, the following research visit required coordination both with the key informant over sporadic email and phone messages, as well as communicating to him through others in the camp when they had access to social media and email outlets. Continuity of research, in this case, relied on a complex network of both technological and human social networks to maintain relationships with those in the camp.

Though there was not much he could do to improve our access to residents that year, since he was not a member of any elected council, he managed what access he could in the market where we met with his mother. In 2014, that same guide and friend worked tirelessly for two full days tracking down volunteer village and quartier leaders willing to participate in our interview process. Truly without the intervention of this key informant, this study would not have materialized in such a fruitful way. Even a Kinyarwand-speaking outsider would have encountered difficulties locating so many willing elected leaders to participate individually in our study. Likewise, at the Ministry level, key informants with personal connections to the Kiziba Camp Manager and Minister of MIDIMAR led to the opportunity to hold hour-long interviews with each representative.

Another dimension of reliance on others to produce the interview data lies in the linguistic barriers. In 2011, there were relatively few fluent English speakers in the camp. Rwanda converted the official language of public school instruction from French to English in 2008 (McGreal, 2008). Even with some French knowledge, many of the older refugees there only speak Kinyarwanda. During the first visit, we relied mainly on our Francophone driver’s negotiations with camp representatives in Kinyarwanda, as discussed above, and on French/English translations from our volunteer guide. The interviews conducted with NGO and school representatives required no interpreter as their education levels afforded them English and French fluency. For the second visit, we relied mainly on translations provided by our Francophone Rwandan friend and volunteer translations in English offered by the elected head of Education for the camp, who was eager to practice his conversation skills. Knowing that these interpreters were not fluent English speakers or professional language experts, we later had the recordings of the conversations translated for official research purposes later. The immediate translation services offered in the camp provided enough context to allow further questioning and in-depth conversations. During the third visit in 2014, our driver served as both cultural and linguistic interpreter
among the interview participants recruited by the key informant mentioned above. My own Kinyarwanda skills are limited to hello, how are you, and thank you very much, which I used as often as I could. While this is always a first start to breaking down cultural barriers, realistically the entire study hinged on the translation and interpretation skills and services of native Kinyarwanda speakers. Some nuances of the conversations and responses were likely lost in translation. This is a particular challenge to conducting research in another language of which the consequences cannot ever be adequately measured or accounted.

DATA COLLECTION

INTERVIEW FORMAT

Interviews followed a semi-structured format, relying on certain key questions asked to everyone and designed to guide the flow of conversation. If the interviewee felt compelled to diverge from the question to expand on certain ideas or convey personal experiences, she or he was encouraged to do so. Despite some concerns from the interviewees about giving “wrong” answers, we ensured that each person had the space to share to the extent he or she felt comfortable. As a two-person team, the researchers took turns asking questions from the core list of questions, while both adding follow-on inquiries as they arose. This allowed for one researcher to finish taking notes while the other proceeded to the next question. A small recording device documented all interviews, but supplementary notes served as a critical component of the research program to account for background noise that occasionally made parts of the recording difficult to understand. As much as possible, we conducted these interviews individually in order to grant the speaker privacy regarding her or his answers and allow free-flowing conversation about a variety of potentially sensitive topics. Unlike the interviews with elected council members in 2013, and the meetings with NGO representatives in 2011, the 2014 interviews with community leaders did not occur in group settings. Each leader was given as much time to answer and ask questions individually as she wanted. Our university IRB recommended against the use of focus groups for this phase of the questions in order to protect the privacy and sensitivity of the conversation topics.

As mentioned above, one must understand privacy in a refugee camp in the context of the crowded, open-door environment of Kiziba. As much as possible, these interviews took place on benches
distanced from open doors and windows of the many neighboring houses, and key informants who
facilitated our research visit asked passersby to keep their distance. In particular, it proved challenging to
keep small children away, who regularly began to accumulate in the alleyways between the houses
surrounding our interview sites. Our key informants often chased them away and encouraged them to go
back to school, but they were nevertheless present in the background of our research. Most adults
maintained a respectful distance from the interview site. This may have been out of respect for the
elected officials we were interviewing. Despite the apparent distance, the close proximity of everything
inside the camp makes it difficult to guarantee that no one overheard the conversation. The second on-
site measure of protection we could provide for the interviewees due to lack of complete privacy was
simply to observe reluctance to answer a set of questions and move on to other topics of interest. If an
interviewee was not comfortable talking about a set of questions, we chose not to pursue that particular
set of prompts in order to respect her or his privacy not to answer questions in such an open
environment. A deeper description of the camp setting follows, and may better illustrate the challenges of
maintaining true privacy in this environment.

This study purposefully addresses the divergence of Hutu/Tutsi history only as necessary to
further the understanding of a particular group of forced migrants. While certain aspects of this
racial/ethnic distinction are a critical part of the story, much of it is not since this study takes as a
foundational assumption that the Banyarwanda refugees in Rwanda are from the DRC. Ethnic tensions,
discriminatory practices, and social exclusion hinge on the Rwanda/Congo divide above and beyond
Hutu/Tutsi distinctions. For this reason, and to respect national sensitivities about racial/ethnic
discussions in Rwanda, I did not ask any interviewees who participated in this study to identify as one
ethnic group or another. The question did not add value to the present study and, as the following section
shows, would add a layer of tension that unnecessarily complicates a shared condition of protracted
forced displacement.

We asked every interviewee questions about past, present, and future living conditions, as well
as about messages to give to the international community (see Interview Questions). About the past, we
asked where she was from and what it was like there, as well about relations with neighbors there before
the war and whether she still had family there. Additionally, we asked each interviewee where “home”
was to him and to tell us his “nationality.” This theme of belonging also arose in questions about where one would live if one could choose. Every person answered questions about the future, specifically about what life he sees for his children in the coming years. We also asked questions about leaving the camp and whether the interviewee knew anyone who left to live in either Rwanda or the DRC. For those few who knew someone, we asked them to share what they knew of the experiences of those who left the camp. As concluding questions, we asked each participant: 1) What would you like the international community to know about this situation here in Kiziba? 2) Would you like to ask/know anything of us?

As feminist researchers, we designed these final questions with reciprocity in mind. We had hoped that it would give the interviewee the freedom to ask some questions about us to satisfy some curiosity or to no longer feel like the object of a study. We intended the question as an invitation to participate directly in the study, rather than serve as a data source. Our interpreter informed us early on, however, that in Kinyarwanda this question translates as an opportunity to make a request or “wish” of the person asking. Wanting to avoid the perception of giving false promises, we attempted to rephrase the question, but many still saw it as an opportunity to voice concerns and ask for activist-type help rather than learn about us. The exception to this was some of the camp youth that we interviewed, who were also interested in cross cultural learning as well as using the opportunity to make larger “wishes” for the work we plan to do with this interview data. In fact, the consistent way in which Kiziba residents received this question informed a growth moment for the study and the researchers. Their interest in how we plan to use the data and how it would benefit them challenged us, as outsiders with little opportunity for regular communication with our participants, to envision ways to carry this work forward in both an academic and policy/activist way. The most productive use of this connection with the community leaders of Kiziba is not yet clear, but the participants generally felt that a book publication was a legitimate means to get their story out into the larger international arena. As researchers, we continue to contemplate the questions posed to us by the participants regarding the ways in which we would be “ambassadors of their stories” and how our research could help them in their daily lives.

**INTERVIEW PROCESS**

The data collection for this study began in 2011 with interviews conducted with the official approval of camp authorities to attain overview information, demographics, and general data on Kiziba
Camp. We arranged to meet the leadership of each of the NGOs operating within the camp, with the exception of the ARC whose representative was away that week. These meetings consisted of informational interviews with the lead medical staff at the clinic operated by Africa Humanitarian Action (AHA), the principal of the camp high school, who also served as a representative of the Rwandan education system, and the head of the education-based humanitarian assistance, who was then an employee of Jesuit Refugee Service USA. Each of these representatives provided facts and information about their respective sector of camp services and answered questions that contextualized life in Kiziba. Given their education levels and training, most of these representatives conversed in English, with the exception of the 2011 high school principal who was predominantly Francophone.

In 2013, through a contact at the Rwanda Red Cross, we secured a one-hour private interview with the Kiziba Camp Manager for MIDIMAR. In his official capacity, he explained the history of the camp, its demographic makeup, and the national policies related to Kiziba’s operations. As an official representative of the government, this representative used English comfortably throughout our interview in the nation’s capital, which afforded room for several follow-up themes within the conversation. At the camp, through the unofficial camp president, we participated in two meetings with elected officials of Kiziba. One group consisted of six all-male members of the Executive Council. These elected men represented various sectors of camp life including Education; Youth, Sports, and Culture; Health and Welfare; Security; and Borders. This sample of meeting participants constituted the entire Executive Council, to the best of our knowledge. The second group, led by the camp level Head of Security, consisted of an all-male assembly of security officials elected from village and quartier (neighborhood) levels. While there are 10 quartier and approximately five villages in each (two have six villages), eight security members participated in the dialog based on availability. Executive Council members and the unofficial camp president selected these participants, thus the group likely reflects some level of bias. Our native Kinyarwanda-speaking, educated, female, middle-class Rwandan friend from Kigali interpreted the interviews into French and English when necessary. The elected head of the Education sector in the camp supplemented the English interpretations. A fluent Kinyarwanda/English speaker later translated the recorded conversations to ensure word-for-word recording of the dialog.
The third return visit to Kiziba generated the most in-depth and expansive data set. The interviews conducted in 2014 adopted a different format than in previous visits. These interviews were conducted in a one-on-one setting, providing as much privacy as the environment allowed (see Interview Questions). Given the full population size of Kiziba totaling over 16,000 and the limited two-day access pass, a reasonable random sampling of residents was not possible. In order to develop a strategic plan to obtain an overview of feelings within the camp, I determined the most productive use of our time there was to concentrate on those who elected by their community members to represent their voices to higher echelons of power within the camp. Interviewees were selected based on their social position in their respective sub-communities. Two major groups were the focus of this interview process. First, using the connections of our key informant, we interviewed 11 elected leaders in the camp. Each was the elected village representative, responsible for approximately 70 households per village, who reports directly to the elected leader of the quartier. One interviewee was one of only two women quartier leaders out of the ten officials at this level in the camp. She oversees five village-level leaders and reports directly to the camp president. The United Nations standards for the camp require 30% of elected leadership to be filled by women (G. Karagire, Kiziba Camp Manager, personal communication, January 25, 2013). At Kiziba, women hold over 40% of these seats. So, we sought out both male and female village leaders to participate in the interviews. They represented a wide range of ages, from 22 to 68, and various communities of origin in the DRC. The vast majority of this group had very little grasp of French or English. We conducted interviews primarily in English, relying on word-for-word interpretation by a native Kinyarwanda speaker at the time of the interview recording.

The second group in 2014 consisted of youth in their late-teens and early twenties. We did not choose these youth based on leadership qualities, as there were not any relevant youth-led groups from which to sample during our time in Kiziba. These participants volunteered based on availability and interest, and thus may reflect some sampling bias. Yet their input served as a vital dimension in understanding the experiences of youth who were born in Kiziba and who had not ever left the camp environment since their birth or early arrival. Both women and men participated in this round of interviews and represented a variety of regions in the DRC and ages upon first arrival in Kiziba. Given the study topic of citizenship and belonging, this group served as a critical insight into perceptions of “home” given
that many had never been or could not remember their place of origin in the DRC. This demographic group provided additional perspective on life and opportunity for youth in the camp, as well as future plans given the limited opportunities afforded in protracted limbo. Adapting to their various education levels and completion of English language courses, we conducted some of these interviews in English, while others required the services of our native Kinyarwanda-speaking interpreter. Many of the interviewees understood our questions in English, but felt more comfortable answering in Kinyarwanda. A professional research assistant who worked with us throughout the interviews and observational moments interpreted all of the interviews word-for-word. Sharing a common geographic history as the interviewees, he also provided insight into the spatial relationship between participants’ areas of origin.

As mentioned briefly above, the interpreter used for the 2014 interviews was Rwandan, but born and raised in an area of the DRC familiar to the participants. His personal connection with some of their areas of origin played a vital role in participants feeling at ease during each interview session. At the start of an interview, our interpreter introduced each of us, explained the purposes of the study, the types of questions we planned to ask, and his role in the process. He formally gained their verbal consent through this process, but informally gained their trust by relating stories of his own childhood in the DRC and reflecting on places or people that they might know in common. Considering the importance of trust building and the complexities of conducting research in a refugee camp, this interpreter became a defining element in the overall success of this research. He served the greater purpose of ensuring for our participants that we meant no harm by our questions and intended to use the answers in a responsible way. Additionally, his engagement with our research provided cultural insight to help us understand why some of our questions did not cultural translate to participants. A later section discusses this further.

SECONDARY DATA

The residents of Kiziba Camp embody the notion of a highly protected research group. The sensitivity of their living conditions and life experiences, as well as the security aspects that brought them to the camp and continue to keep them there, make interview research somewhat ethically challenging. In an effort to protect the residents of the camp, the Rwandan government generally issues only two-day passes for groups no larger than three visitors. This ensures some level of privacy for the refugees and
helps to prevent their exploitation as a kind of captive audience. Due to these limitations, secondary data played a significant role in developing a set of data with which to analyze this particular protracted context. To supplement the life narratives gathered through personal interviews, we also interviewed MIDIMAR representatives. Additionally, UNHCR and other NGO reports on the status of Congolese refugees in Rwanda and residents of Kiziba more specifically added to the data available about life there. Where available, we utilized news articles and quotes from MIDIMAR officials from media sources. Reports conducted by other researchers in camps near Kiziba along the DRC border and a Global Youth Connect report from August 2012 also provided valuable context and references, given the limited access to documentation specifically about Kiziba and limited allowable hours inside the camp.

Though not providing data specifically related to citizenship and belonging, NGO representatives played a role in data provision for this research project. In Kiziba Camp, with its enduring presence in the area, the UNHCR has overall control over the distribution of aid resources. This is mainly an administrative role, with each aspect of aid outsourced to different NGOs in the camp. As mentioned above, Africa Humanitarian Action (AHA) maintains the camp clinic. The ARC oversees livelihood/economic opportunities projects as well as others within the camp. In 2011, the Jesuit Refugee Services maintained and administered the camp school system. This has since changed hands. These NGO representatives keep the camp functioning on a daily basis in coordination with MIDIMAR officials who manage the overall camp and provide national-level assistance as necessary to keep the refugees safe and healthy. The majority of NGO workers enters the camp in the morning and leaves at night, with the exception of those who are refugees that live in Kiziba. Interviews with representatives from AHA, Jesuit Refugee Services, and school staff shaped the study by providing context for the situation in which the refugees live.

Additionally, through a chance contact, the Minister of MIDIMAR, Séraphine Mukantabana, in the company of her chief public affairs officer, generously provided us a short-notice, hour-long meeting in her office in Kigali. As a former refugee, she balanced the discussion between official humanitarian policies and her own experiences. We did not record the interview on an audio device, but took extensive notes on the conversation. Her experience as a refugee, NGO worker, and later Minister provided perspective on the national policy considerations that provide both support for refugee welfare and
practical use of limited resources in a developing country. She provided insight into the challenges Rwanda faces in developing long-term solutions for the residents of Kiziba and other camps. In particular, she tries to work with her counterpart in the DRC, facilitating meetings in camps to discuss the security situation there and options for return. While the meetings are infrequent and difficult to arrange, she feels it is extremely important for the refugees to hear from their home government about the specific security situations in order to make informed choices about their future. Despite the Minister’s self-proclaimed weakness in English and the background noise of the street below, she answered extensive questions about national policies and camp conditions with no trouble. Her grasp of the conversation was extensive, having lived as a refugee and worked through the NGO ranks to become more deeply involved in macro-level policies. This perspective served as a valuable insight into intersections between macro- and micro-level decisions that contribute to protracted displacement in the Great Lakes region.

DATA ANALYSIS

Conversations with MIDIMAR representatives took place at the Ministry offices in the capital city, Kigali, in English and followed both guided questions posed by the researchers and freeform conversations initiated by Ministry representatives. The researchers recorded notes from these conversations by hand during each interview and later transferred them to digital format. By approaching the NGO facilities in person, the researchers organized interviews with NGO representatives working in Kiziba Camp. The conversations accompanied tours of the NGO facilities within Kiziba and took place in the presence of other staff members, service providers, and camp residents. In order to observe the sensitivity and privacy of clients in the NGO offices, the researchers did not record these interviews on an audio device, but documented them as handwritten notes. We partially guided these dialogs with our own questions and NGO representatives supplemented the conversations with the prescribed information about their respective duties and mission that make up the standard organizational rhetoric. During the 2014 data-gathering visit, we recorded and transcribed, word-for-word, all interviews, taking care to ensure the privacy of each conversation to the best of our ability within the camp. Though we used an interpreter during the interviews to facilitate conversations when English did not convey properly or the interviewee could not understand the question, a native Kinyarwanda and fluent French speaker transcribed all portions of the interview word-for-word into English.
I coded three years’ worth of field notes and interviews by theme using the software Dedoose® to develop a qualitative analysis of the collected data. Phenomenological research methodologies informed process of analyzing these data, “emphasiz[ing] the study of conscious experiences as a way of understanding the reality around us” (Bhattacherjee, 2012, p. 109). Most distinctively from other methodologies, this type of qualitative analysis requires iterative creativity on the part of the researcher, as well as a suspension of personal and academic biases and presuppositions (Bhattacherjee, 2012; Lofland & Lofland, 1995). Unlike quantitative analyses, where assumptions and theoretical frameworks are in the foreground, grounded theory and content analysis allow the researcher creative room to develop theories by working through varying types of qualitative data sources.

The first step in this process involves reading through the entire collection of field notes, interview data, and supplementary data to get a macro-level view of the context in which these narratives take place. Next, the researcher identifies points of interest or “units of significance” in the data which can be grouped into themes (Giorgi & Giorgi, 2008). For these units, the researcher must explore the question, “Of what is this an instance” (Rosenau, 1980, p. 33), to gauge the relative importance of the text as well as situate it in the larger collection of data (Lofland & Lofland, 1995, p. 186). As in Grounded Theory research, themes emerge from the data, rather than in positivist methods where hypotheses and existing theory determines the categories of data analysis (Charmaz, 2008; Lofland & Lofland, 1995).

Finally, given the larger macro-level, regional contexts of war and displacement and the micro-level, lived experiences of refugees in Kiziba, the researcher interprets the data to derive meaning and theoretical foundations for future work on protracted refugee situations (Giorgi & Giorgi, 2008). Based on the principles of Grounded Theory, this theoretical building process is distinguished by “sampling for theory construction to check and refine conceptual categories, not for representativeness of a given population” (Charmaz, 2008, p. 83). For this particular type of research agenda, emergent themes unintended by the researchers’ original questions constitute a major advancement in developing theoretical underpinnings to describe the context at hand. In the case of Kiziba residents, the participants’ direct interaction with the researchers’ questions, particularly about stewardship of stories, not only ethically guided the study but also moved the research focus toward agency, activism, and engagement with global politics among refugees. Analyses of these interactions with participants and emergent
themes constitutes a “sense making” approach to research where data enhances understanding of the experience of protracted displacement rather than testing hypotheses or existing theories (Bhattacherjee, 2012, p. 113).

As described in the data collection section, additional NGO and media reports supplement the available data to understand the life, conditions, and political situation of Kiziba Camp. I analyzed these texts using content analysis, where reports pertaining specifically to life in Kiziba, similar camps in Rwanda, or IDP camps in the DRC with similar demographics are broken down into analytic units. As in the interview data, I then organized these units into themes and collected them into larger constructs with which to develop theories about protracted displacement in the Great Lakes region of Africa (Bhattacherjee, 2012, pp. 115-116). Using the above techniques, this study incorporates a mixed set of qualitative analysis strategies in order to understand the experiences of Kiziba residents and frame them in the larger socio-political dynamics of the region. Those analyses will follow in subsequent chapters.

CONCLUSIONS

This chapter outlined the process of developing a study about protracted refugee experiences in the Great Lakes Region of Africa. Specifically, it described the context of Kiziba Camp in Rwanda and the process of collecting data in a sensitive context. This process involved proper consideration of the ethical challenges facing researchers of forced migration as well as the barriers to entry to access isolated, protected populations. Using a feminist methodological approach, two researchers conducted interviews with MIDIMAR officials, NGO representatives, Kiziba elected representatives, and a small group of youth over the course of three years. This data gathering process relied on the expertise of key informants and skilled interpreters, as well as networking access to service providers who helped us to navigate the gatekeepers of Kiziba Camp. With camp access limited to short visit passes, I supplemented interview data with media, NGO, and researcher reports on Kiziba and nearby camps in order to develop a more complete picture of protracted political limbo of Kinyarwanda speakers from the DRC. I analyzed the data using principles of phenomenological research methodology, specifically Grounded Theory and analysis of texts, to build a theoretical framework with which to understand the intersection between protracted refugee situations, citizenship, and concepts of “home” and “belonging.” The next chapters detail the
analytical findings derived from the interview data, observational fieldwork, and available NGO and media reports.
DURABILITY AND THE STATE

For me as a former refugee, I think that resettlement is of course a solution. But it can’t be a last, last solution. The last solution is to come home. Somebody has to be sure to have his own country.
-2014 Interview, MIDIMAR Minister Mukantabana

KIZIBA AS A MICROCOSM

The residents of Kiziba Camp represent a subset of the Banyarwanda population from the DRC forced from their respective regions beginning in 1996 (Mhembu-Salter, 2006). The first refugees to cross into Rwanda who now live in the camp arrived on 27 November 1996, with another wave arriving in 2006. Now, the camp is closed to new arrivals unless they fall under the family reunification plan of Rwanda and the UNHCR. From the total population of approximately 16,000 refugees, about 88% of residents come from North Kivu, 7% from South Kivu, 3% from Katanga, and 2% from other parts of the DRC (G. Karagire, Kiziba Camp Manager, personal communication, January 25, 2013). The differences in their geographic origins, given the varying historical experiences of citizenship, marginalization, and migration, did not reveal any regionally-specific trends in the data. This likely points to the homogenizing effect of camp life and collectively constructed identity discussed at length in this and the next chapters. Three residents from other parts of Africa (Kenya, Eritrea, and Ethiopia) also live in the camp (G. Karagire, Kiziba Camp Manager, personal communication, January 25, 2013). ¹ With the exception of those three, the vast majority of Kiziba residents are Kinyarwanda-speaking and from the same broad Banyarwanda ethnic background (Mhembu-Salter, 2006). This makes them particularly well suited to live in Rwanda, given their shared language, which allows for interaction between the refugees and their Rwandese neighbors.

¹ The Kiziba Camp manager at MIDIMAR revealed the nationalities of the three non-Congolese refugees in the camp. Camp residents confirmed their presence during our fieldwork. The houses for these three non-Congolese were situated directly along the main thoroughfare through the camp, so we had the opportunity to greet them. Since the project focus is on the Banyarwanda story, we did not pursue interviews with these individuals, yet their experiences within the camp would be interesting for a future study.
In this demographic way, Kiziba represents a microcosm of the population of Banyarwanda driven out of the Congo nearly two decades ago. Their shared experiences, despite vastly different geographic points of origin, contain a common history of exclusion faced by Banyarwanda in the DRC. Drawing from the narratives of this population as a starting point, this chapter explores the ways in which the host nation’s state structures are reproduced within the camp to form a sense of permanence in what should be a temporary situation. Throughout this chapter, meso-level (states) ‘voices’ are often portrayed through the voices of refugees, rather than state actors. The sampling of state voices here is limited to the Minister of MIDIMAR and the Kiziba Camp Manager; however, refugees serving in administrative roles within the camp walk a fine line between the state- and individual-level perspectives. In the process of recreating host-state governance structures within the camp, elected and volunteer camp position-holders report to state institutions and to refugee constituents. For that reason, many of their voices feature here as insight into the relationship between the state and the camp/individual level experiences within Kiziba. This presents some analytical challenges as refugee voices fill in for state-level perspectives, opening up a gap in the state representation within this study. Yet the applied realities of the field setting limit both the accessibility of state official data and the opportunity to gain perspectives beyond official government speak available to the public. Future studies might resolve this by gaining access to government reports, more refugee administrators at the state-level, and the government’s public statements about refugee hosting. Here, refugee voices illuminate the perspective of state and camp level interactions that best support a notion of durability. The portrayal of structure and governance by camp elected leadership and security volunteers highlights the entanglement of meso- and macro- structures and institutions that point to durable displacement. The lens of governance within the camp ensures that this study captures state-level actions and perceived motivations by the refugees that contribute to durable displacement. It does not provide a strictly state-level view of refugee hosting, and that analysis will be left to future studies.

Humanitarian protocols additionally give legitimacy to the recreation of the functioning state at the local level. INGOs contribute in their own ways to durable displacement through indoctrination into national and international values and norms, as well as the construction of economic livelihood initiatives. These meso-level voices appear in the study as proxy presence—through humanitarian agency workers and billboards, rather than through the organizational rhetoric offered through camp management guides.
Again, a dedicated analysis of camp management guides would provide fruitful data for future studies, but the focus in this chapter is to evaluate the intertwined messages and perception of INGOs and refugees to demonstrate structures of durability within the camp.

Given the extreme length of protraction, the experiences of refugees in Kiziba Camp shed light on how forced migration becomes entrenched as a form of durable displacement—an existence in which the refugees feel no disillusions about integrating into Rwanda, but also no sense that there is a place for them in this world or in the world outside the camp. The Kiziba Camp case study demonstrates how, in the process of treating the symptoms of temporary displacement, state and NGO interactions actually become processes of reinforced permanence. Refugee voices help to hone in on these interactions rather than analyze state and INGO policies expressed through camp management manuals or institutional rhetoric. This chapter details key mechanisms by which Kiziba Camp becomes a container of larger state and international relations through the four aspects of camp life: security, education, politics, and economic livelihood.

DISCIPLINE AND BIOPOWER

Foucault describes two aspects of state control over bodies, discipline and biopower that are useful for understanding the dynamic between protracted refugees and the state. This extends to the relationship between refugees and the state-like INGOs that provide services within the camp. As S. Turner (2010) contends, in refugee contexts INGOs such as UNHCR take on a state-like quality through their "everyday practices of governing the camp through norms" (p. 8). As with states, UNHCR requires funding, international legitimacy or recognition to operate within sovereign borders, and power in order to fulfill its mandate to protect placeless persons (i.e. Responsibility to Protect (R2P); these factors convey to similar priorities of states preserving internal and external sovereignty. Similar to states, international organizations manage the relationship with citizen-subjects (in this case, refugees) to administer services and maintain security. In refugee camps in particular, UNHCR and other service-providing NGOs take on state-like qualities in relation to the refugee population that, like the host state, produce systems of durable displacement.

Protraction is central to understanding the state’s role within refugee camps because in these extended periods of time and through repetitive interactions, the host government, INGOs, and refugee
populations themselves structure and reproduce power relationships. The iterative nature of the relationships and power dynamics between these actors inherently exists through the social organization and governance of refugee populations in sustained co-existence. Reproduction of this power dynamic over the course of decades is part of the cyclical entrenching effect that promotes durable forms of displacement. Power of the state over the population requires no explanation; but, as Foucault describes, control of the modern sovereignty relies on “…the form of a total and exhaustive obedience in [individuals within the population’s] conduct to whatever the imperatives of the state may be” (Foucault, 2007, p. 453).

In other words, the host government and INGO control over the camp relies on the refugees’ “obedience” to the sovereign processes of power and discipline. Hearing refugee voices portray aspects of governance throughout this study brings this aspect of ‘obedience’ to the forefront and therefore the state’s entanglement in the refugees’ lives and extended protraction. Security provision, educational objectives, political structuring and quotas, and the affording of economic opportunities shed light into how the host government and INGO attempt to exert these forces in the camp to achieve acquiescence with certain values and norms. In a certain sense, then, in this study state and INGO voices are often not heard directly, but felt through refugee representatives’ descriptions of state interactions. What I examine in this chapter manifests as meso-level instances of power experienced at the micro/individual level. For that reason, refugee voices provide valuable insight into the state/INGO/refugee relationship. S. Turner (2010) explains INGOs’ desire for strict compliance to norms and imposed social structures as the wish for the “self-governing citizen-subject” who, in a camp situation, is more akin to the subject of colonial domination. He sees the refugees as largely acted upon by UNHCR; however, as I argue in Chapter 6, refugees participate in the processes of protracted displacement in ways that exhibit both lack of agency in response to governance as well as some ability to own their situation and derive a sense of power from it.

S. Turner’s (2010) research among Burundian Hutu refugees in Tanzania in 1997/8 demonstrates how state-like INGOs, specifically UNHCR, strategically govern camp populations as non-citizen ‘others’ in the host country. The analysis extends to host states that benefit from the presence of refugees by reaffirming the citizenship aspect of internal sovereignty. In his study he describes how humanitarian
agencies often frame the residents as helpless victims, which distorts their own sense of agency and autonomy. He explains,

In the liminal space of the camp, refugees are considered by relief agencies and the general public as being outside the normal political life of citizen-subjects. The primary concern of the UNHCR is to control and contain this population while at the same time keeping it alive and healthy, waiting for the day when the refugees may return to ‘normality’ and become proper citizens once again... Refugees are, in other words, assumed to be without political subjectivity. (S. Turner, 2010, p. 2)

Through this angle he interrogates the notion that refugees are “innocent” or devoid of any agency by situating historical narratives of their violent past, as told by the refugees, into a larger geopolitical context. He further argues that refugees serve the interests of nation-states by demonstrating a “necessary other” that defines “what the national citizen is not” (S. Turner, 2010, p. 7). In fact, in Turner’s (2010, p. 7) view, humanitarian agencies create the notion of dependent, innocent, apolitical victims through “the trivial daily practices of ‘caring for’ refugees” in programs such as economic development initiatives, agriculture programs, elections, and even healthcare.

This study extends Turner’s analysis of refugees’ relative agency by placing them as not only agents, but also vital actors who occupy a supra-political space. While at first they appear to have little voice in the larger political, economic, and social structures that govern daily life, their very existence challenges national identities of insider/citizen versus outsider/noncitizen, making them subjects of state-level identity formation and policymaking. Additionally, their engagement with the global political terrain and existence as a UNHCR “population of concern” places them as collective actors in the international sphere, affecting international processes through interactions with INGOs and visiting officials.² Their voices in this chapter contextualize the relationship between the host state, INGOs, and refugees that further entrenches displacement and leads to durable structures of protracted refugee status.

BORDERS WITHIN BORDERS

Understanding refugee camps in terms of state sovereignty starts with the conceptualization of this contained space as a representation of an international border within the host territory. In fact, states

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² Among the political dignitaries and INGO stakeholders who have visited the camp, the refugees spoke of Joan Laporta, president of the FC Barcelona soccer club in Spain who contributed to the funding and establishment of the community hall equipped with a television to watch soccer (Pedersen, 2010).
create this coping mechanism to reinforce international boundaries without violating international norms of non-refoulement (Purkey, 2013, p. 701). In other words, the host nation cannot maintain its position within the international community by choosing to refuse entry to refugees or force them back over the border. In order to validate control over its international borders, however, host nations strive for a containment policy that isolates refugees in international borders within domestic borders. In fact, as Purkey (2013) explains, fiduciary refugee dependency, which Rwanda arguably follows, bolsters state sovereignty by allowing it to exercise a “duty to respect, protect, and fulfill the human rights of refugees” (p. 706). This practice stands in sharp contrast to the more traditionally accepted notion that humanitarian intervention on behalf of refugees erodes domestic sovereignty of the host state. Rather, by assuming more responsibility, Purkey (2013) demonstrates that “the state is actually strengthening its claim to sovereign power” (p. 706). Rwanda follows this model by publicly demonstrating its commitment to ensuring the safety and humane support of refugees. In a statement to the media, the Minister of MIDIMAR noted,

The establishment of this camp justifies the efforts of the Government of Rwanda into the protection of Congolese refugees. However, we recognize that this is not the everlasting solution. That is why Rwanda is actively involved in all peace deals at both international and regional levels aiming at bringing back peace to DRC, which can be the major factor for refugees to return home. (MIDIMAR, 2014b)

Clearly this altruistic-like hosting also serves a higher international purpose, with Rwanda stepping in to work diplomatically with its neighbor to establish a lasting peace.

The implied role it plays as a ‘donor darling’ and international mediator of peace speaks to the state’s pursuit of international recognition critical to its maintenance of sovereignty (Krasner, 2006). By hosting the DRC’s refugees and “bringing back peace to DRC,” Rwanda positions itself as an international peace-builder, justifying its role on the UN Security Council. This role also confers resource support for the burden-sharing of refugees produced by the DRC’s state failures. The Minister of MIDIMAR, Séraphine Mukantabana, spoke directly to this during our personal interview by conveying her efforts to collaborate with her counterpart in the DRC. Despite the difficulties she faced in doing so, this alignment held both strategic and symbolic value for efforts to promote peace and bilateral diplomacy. Minister Mukantabana also framed Rwanda’s refugee hosting in terms of the national government’s engagement in cross-border peace talks. She emphasized,
The most important commitment is to advocate for peace for the refugees...it’s always sad to be [away from] your family. It’s one thing to travel abroad [for leisure], but it’s worse when you have been forced to leave your homeland. The main assistance [needed] is to provide security and peace in the region. (Séraphine Mukantabana, personal communication, 13 June 2014).

Minister Mukantabana even said that her DRC counterpart had visited at least one refugee camp to convey the security situation to them and explain their options for the future, namely that they must stay in the camp until the political climate in the Kivus improves (Séraphine Mukantabana, personal communication, 13 June 2014).

Minister Mukantabana’s interaction with her DRC counterpart speaks to Rwanda’s public attempts to maintain relationships with neighboring countries and work towards regional peace. Specifically, the diplomatic rhetoric of the Minister reflects a national commitment to managing relationships with neighboring DRC and the international community as a whole—yet another affirmation of state sovereignty. Interestingly, the state also plays upon this particular woman leader’s identity as a former refugee to represent the country in these cross-border migration issues. Within the larger national system of governance, Rwanda’s refugee camps feature as an international entity inside the sovereign state. Warranting international attention, peace-building talks and initiatives, and visits from Congolese diplomats positions the refugees as both local and international participants, and makes the camps active sites to make powerful political statements. In this way, while these Congolese refugee camps represent some of the greatest challenges in coping with the region’s conflicts, they also provide political opportunities to bolster the identity of the host nation. At the same time, they challenge the ability of the international aid/relief system to meet the demands of a long-staying settlement with extensive service needs. UNHCR and other INGOs step up to fill this services gap and, in doing so, take on state-like qualities such as managing international ‘borders,’ facilitating interstate relationships, rallying international support and resources for its operations and policies, and negotiating policies with international actors to increase burden-sharing.

**MAPPING KIZIBA**

Let us turn to a virtual immersion walk through Kiziba Camp to identify particular practices, systems, and physical features that literally and symbolically reveal this larger international function of protracted refugee cases. As a starting point, the seemingly benign layout of Kiziba Camp actually...
functions as a conduit for expression and interaction between the sovereign power (state and state-like INGOs) and camp population. Discipline used to control human bodies inside a territorial state manifests as control over space. Specifically, Foucault notes, “…discipline structures a space and addresses the essential problem of a hierarchical and functional distribution of elements” (Foucault, 2007, p. 35). As in the towns Foucault describes, Kiziba’s central square serves as the seat of power in the spatial configuration of the camp. Here, government and NGO representatives communicate with the population though a bulletin board system and maintain a physical presence in this common ground to uphold their role as leaders. The square also houses the primary meeting points for elected leadership. The radiating structure of the camp’s roads and alleyways from this central meeting point illustrate Foucault’s idea of the “milieu” (Foucault, 2007, p. 36), where the layout of this “town” (Kiziba) facilitates social interactions including trade and communication, but also functions as a conduit of security and control.

This system places disproportionate impacts on particular populations and may be less secure in practice. In fact, Hyndman (2000) argues, refugee camp geography enables the work of government and INGOs but is “inconvenient and potentially dangerous for refugees” and “can exacerbate the workload of refugee women” (p. 100). In her analysis, the layout of the camp first and foremost serves the interest of the governing body. This is not to say that the camp layout represents some sinister form of control by the government or UNHCR; in fact, as Foucault describes, it is a very natural social organization. However, the milieu allows for “circulation” throughout the camp, equating to an environment where actions and environments become interdependent because they are all spatially linked; the residents become more than just individuals, they are a united “population” (Foucault, 2007, pp. 36-37). In this way we can begin to imagine the layout of Kiziba as a city-like space, one that may harbor its own sovereign-like qualities. As a collective, the population is easier to govern and control. Foucault goes on to summarize that the “territorial sovereign [is] an architect of the disciplined space, but also, and almost at the same time [historically], the regulator of a milieu” (Foucault, 2007, p. 51). By this, we can see Rwanda—or any host government—and the humanitarian agencies as “regulators” of life in the camp.
Kiziba Camp offers one differentiating point of governance between host state and INGOs that arises under Foucault’s framework. The Rwandan state features primarily in security and disciplinary structures within the camp, exemplifying governance and sovereign power. INGOs, however, fall more in line with Foucault’s concept of biopower. This type of power comes from subjecting refugees “to a strongly moralizing and ethical biopolitical project by humanitarian agencies” through the provision of a “caring biopower, concerned with the life and health of the refugee population” (S. Turner, 2010, p. 9). Though the state and INGOs exert power over the refugees in different ways, the motivations for these actions derive from the same pursuit of resources, recognition, and power so central to the ideas of state—or state-like, in the case of UNHCR—sovereignty. Viewing the spatial layout of Kiziba as Foucault’s “milieu,” I proceed by identifying sectors of life in the camp, namely security, education, and economy, to demonstrate how interactions between refugees, the state, and INGOs perpetuate the permanence of their displacement.

SECURITY

In his conceptualization of the evolution of state power, Foucault classifies discipline as a way to control human bodies spatially, temporally, and behaviorally. Biopower, however, concerns “…a number
of phenomena that seem...quite significant, namely, the set of mechanisms through which the basic
biological features of the human species became the object of a political strategy, of a general strategy of
power...” (Foucault, 2007, p. 16). Like Foucault, I do not see these power relations as necessarily
negative or positive, but simply the outcome of a history between the sovereign state and the bodies
within its territorial jurisdiction. This is an important point because I do not intend to imply that the host
governments necessarily invoke state control mechanisms with nefarious goals. In fact, I view some
degree of the reconstruction of state structures within a refugee camp to be a logical outcome of the
protracted relationship. Based on the criteria set forth by Jacobsen (1996), Rwanda meets nearly all of
the benchmarks for responding positively to the refugee crisis from the DRC. Some of these criteria
include establishing a host government institution to support refugees (e.g. MIDIMAR), granting
permission for refugee-related INGOs to assist in-country, and cooperation with those agencies.

However, in Lischer’s (2006) rubric where she defines qualities that make certain refugee populations
more likely to militarize, the Congolese refugees of Rwanda fall in the “somewhat likely” category (p. 19).
According to her analysis, this type of population has some likelihood of becoming politicized during long-
term exile and thus could pose a potential security threat to the host state and the region. This puts the
government and INGOs in a precarious position. They must balance the restrictive nature of camp life
with the frustration experienced by long-term refugees that can lead to local and regional security crises
as refugees militarize. Threat of potential security disruptions may serve as a powerful motivator for the
entrenching aspects of Kiziba life explored in this chapter. States and INGOs create systems of
displacement in order to prevent militarization or other harm to the population. In doing so, they contribute
to the protraction of the displacement that potentially leads to violence and conflict.

Given this assessment and the strict character of the Rwandan state, it is not surprising that
security and surveillance feature prominently in the structure of Kiziba Camp. As I described in the
literature review, to maintain the legitimacy and efficacy of its internal sovereignty, the state must assure
citizens of its ability to control populations within its territory (Krasner, 2006). By demonstrating obedience
to these systems, refugees both find space for personal agency (Holzer, 2013; Zetter, 1991) and
perpetuate dependency on the host nation and supporting NGOs (Purkey, 2013; Sutter et al., 2012, p. 61;
Zetter, 1991). From the state and INGO perspective, as S. Turner (2010) argues, “it is the trivial daily
practices of ‘caring for’ refugees that create the refugee as bare life” (p. 7). He is speaking of the relationship between NGOs and encamped refugees, but the same applies for the host state. Through the micro-moments and repeated interaction of caring for the refugees by providing security and the necessities for life, the power-institution creates a dependency that defines the refugee as a political other. In this way, the interactions among refugees, the state, and other governing agencies (INGOs) become cyclic, dependent, and further entrench protraction.

Careful control of its refugee camps affirms internal and external sovereignties for the host nation. Smoothly operating camps, such as Kiziba, serve to exhibit Rwanda’s competence at managing internal affairs and security. Likewise, refugee hosting instantiates the Rwandan state’s involvement in the larger regional and global political arenas, demonstrating its ability to manage cross-border relations and participate in international diplomatic processes. The border surveillance and maintenance aspects of refugee hosting speak to larger conversations about securitization of refugees globally. In the context of globalization, especially after 9/11, refugees are increasingly viewed as having the potential to militarize or bring insecurity to the host country and even host region (Hammerstad, 2011; Loescher & Milner, 2005a, 2005b; Muggah, 2006; Salehyan & Gleditsch, 2006). Though, as Lischer (2006) demonstrates, the propensity for violence of refugees is highly dependent on more contextual factors such as the cause of flight, the state of the sending and host countries, regional political dynamics, and the presence or establishment of a state in exile. Even Rwanda’s MIDMAR Minister admits that these protracted situations can lead to security issues. She explained in her interview that the idea of resettlement “alleviates the problem of fighting to go home,” but that not being able to go home elicits ideas of fighting. She continued, “Being near the border with nothing to do, here is a possibility of thinking about ‘fighting to go home’” (Séraphine Mukantabana, personal communication, 13 June 2014). Given that possibility, and the turbulent inter-state history between Rwanda and the DRC, one might wonder why Rwanda would go to such lengths to accommodate large, protracted refugee populations in the ordered manner that it has so far.

Alexander Betts (2013) provides a theoretical explanation for why some regimes “stretch” to accommodate refugees when others do not, a phenomenon he proposes occurs when it benefits the host government elites. He defines “regime stretching” as “the degree to which the scope of a regime at the
national or local level takes on tasks that deviate from those prescribed at the global level" (Betts, 2013, p. 30). In the case of Rwanda, at the surface level the responsible hosting of refugees appears to be the government’s way of engaging international norms of refugee hosting. This has not always been the case; in fact, the protracted drain on resources and security compounded by premature announcement by the UN that the Congo War was over led to at least one major incident of refoulement by the Rwandan government (UNHCR, 2002a, 2002b). This was in clear violation of one of the main tenants, nonrefoulement, of the 1951 Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees (UN General Assembly, 1951; UNHCR, 2012b). Those types of situations, however, appear to be isolated incidents in Rwanda’s past. Understanding Rwanda’s approach to refugee hosting likely encompasses a broader national rhetoric that serves the interests of the country’s governing bodies and elite citizens, namely solidarity with an ethnolinguistically related population facing violence reminiscent of the genocide.

Overtly, Rwanda may be performing “regime-consistent” stretching (Betts, 2013, p. 30) in that protection of the Congolese refugees contributes to its “never again” stance toward the 1994 genocide (Bromley, 2009; Clover, 2014; Hintjens, 2008). Particularly following the Gatumba massacre in a Congolese refugee camp in Burundi in 2004, but also during various spurts of violence in Bukavu, the “genocide” label comes up again and again in reference to the Banyarwanda, mainly the Tutsi exiles from the DRC (Human Rights Watch, 2004). Structured, orderly care of the Congolese refugees in Rwanda aligns with the domestic intent to unite the country against future ethnic violence as well as cement its regional commitment to a larger linguistic diaspora that continues to face persecution. Hosting refugees facing persecution like that experienced in Rwanda during the genocide may also be an instance of nation-building, where refugees serve as a visual reminder of the consequences of disobedience to Rwanda’s strict norms on ethnic identification and discrimination. One scholar notes, “ensuring that refugees are offered adequate protection and rights may …be seen as an important expression of state sovereignty as opposed to an erosion of state authority” (Purkey, 2013, p. 695). To be clear though, while they are part of the collective Banyarwanda diaspora, a distinct demarcation between the status of Congolese refugee and Rwandan citizen remains firmly intact and defining for Kiziba residents, with significant barriers to transition from the former to the latter. As Loescher and Milner (2005b) contend, without alternative policy options, containment of refugees is the most effective way for many host states
to maintain political and security-based control over the displaced population. Performance of stringent security protocols at the border of the camp serves as a daily reminder of the reach of the state, the hospitality of the host, and the political placement of the camp residents as outsiders, all of which reinforce the notion of sovereignty at home and abroad.

The Rwandan state manifests itself in a number of ways within Kiziba Camp. Returning to the camp virtual tour, while no fences encircle the boundaries of the camp, the refugees manage official entry by way of the main vehicle road. When approaching Kiziba Camp from Kibuje on the shores of Lake Kivu, the main road splits at the mountaintop. To the right, a singular dirt vehicle road leads into Kiziba Camp, forming the first territorial barrier to entry. The Rwandan government and international NGOs officially define the camp’s territory, but the remoteness and almost tragically picturesque location of Kiziba’s mountaintop location reinforce the functional security operations of separation and containment. The length, remoteness, and marginal quality of the road itself, for example, assures that only those with an intention to visit the camp would travel along the eroded infrastructure leading up to the entrance gate. Upon arriving at the official border, another border space emerges through physical structures, security systems, and even the land’s distinct terrain.

Despite Kiziba’s distance from Kigali, the guards record entry and exit from the camp daily, including non-resident visitors who stay for a few days. Refugees can pass freely through the gate as long as they carry their refugee identification cards with them (border guard, personal communication, January 26, 2013). Regularly visiting INGO and government workers are generally exempt from scrutiny, but every unknown person attempting to pass through the gate must present the official paperwork from MIDIMAR granting access to the camp (see Webb (2011) for an account of approaching Kiziba without proper paperwork). The MIDIMAR camp manager establishes the entry protocol and the border control security volunteers then perform this monitoring and security action of the state (border guard, personal communication, January 26, 2013), enacting borders as state representatives. Surveillance and documentation of visitors to Kiziba performed by the refugee security volunteers speaks to Rwanda’s tendency towards orderliness and firm governance, a feature that it recreates in the camps through security protocols.
In Kiziba, once the registration book is full, the guards submit the logbook to MIDIMAR in exchange for a new one. In this way, the daily tasks of the guards replicate two particular aspects of the Rwandan state: record keeping and surveillance. Hyndman (2000, p. 124) explains that cataloging and mapping refugee camp populations mirror aspects of colonialism in which metrics represent instruments of state control over the colonized. The camp’s border guards, as well as hierarchical elected system of representatives, neatly catalog all entry to and from the camp, thus enabling and enacting these mechanisms of control all while reinforcing the notion of barriers and borders. The camp borders symbolize and demarcate the Congolese foreigner non-citizens against the Rwandan citizens who may enter to trade or make use of camp services and water. Administered and performed by the refugees at the local level, the Rwandan state exercises its authority and governance while managing the migration and political effects of cross-border relations with the DRC that manifest within its own territory in the form of long-staying refugees. The rigidity of these protocols and their seamless integration with the rhythm of camp life creates its own sense of permanence. Passage of security-based time occurs as the record book fills and is replaced by a new book, though no one knows what happens to the names and phone numbers contained within. Security volunteers serve as representatives of the state as they regulate the population and monitor the borders according to the host nation’s norms and specifications. At the micro-level, as the security volunteers perform this regularity, they participate as self-governing citizen-subjects of Rwanda; meanwhile, they embody the non-citizen ‘other’ that reaffirms Rwanda’s domestic sovereignty by serving as a living example of who a citizen is not (S. Turner, 2010). Security performance illustrates the blur between the meso- and micro- perspectives. Refugee voices bring life to the policies and procedures enforced by the Rwandan host state, but also carry meaning at the microscopic/individual level of analysis. The nightly security plan instantiates nearly seamless integration of state and camp governance structures and points to durable structures that help maintain refugees in protracted situations.

The omnipresence of the Rwandan state through police and military activities, in combination with the responsiveness to requests for help as reported by the Kiziba security volunteers (Personal communication, 26 January 2013), represents a level of state involvement not usually seen in other host nations (Holzer, 2013). Holzer (2013) asserts that the UNHCR often takes over certain responsibilities to
enforce the law within the camp setting. She explains the consequences of this, “Being a ward of international law is inextricably tied to alienation from the host law. Camp inhabitants experienced host law, primarily though their interactions with the police and security forces, courts and prisons, and the chieftaincy” (Holzer, 2013, p. 858). Generally then, in the case of her own research and another conducted in Ghana, she observes that civil disputes and criminality were “privitized, administered by refugee organizations or nongovernmental organizations rather than state officials” where the “security burden [is pushed] onto the backs of already vulnerable camp inhabitants” (Holzer, 2013, p. 858). In Kiziba, regular daily disputes are the purview of elected leadership within the camp. Unlike the experiences in some other camps, however, the government of Rwanda takes an active role in policing the boundaries of the camp. In the event of crimes beyond the scope of the elected camp governance mechanisms, the Security Council transfers the cases to the Rwandan Police and justice system. Gender-based violence and sexual assault occur within the camp, creating a disproportionate risk to women and girls. A nongovernmental organization, AVSI (Association des Volontaires pour les Services Internationals), attends to cases of sexual assault during the day. When incidents occur during the night (since all INGOs leave the camp at sundown and return in the morning), the refugees report them directly to the police and send the victim away for care at the hospital in town as soon as possible, rather than waiting for the aid workers to return the next day. The attacker is reportedly always remanded to the Police, so the refugees did not know the punitive outcome since that is “police matters” (Kiziba Security Council, personal communication, January 27, 2013). The respect for Rwandan police and justice institutions again places the refugees as participating citizen-subjects; the way the matter disappears into the Rwandan system, however, emphasizes their outsider status. From the state perspective, then, the refugee comply with the host nation norms of security and surveillance and, through the volunteer security patrols, facilitate governance and control of the population.

Foucault (2007) said, “Police is the direct governmentality of the sovereign qua sovereignty” (p. 441). In this case, the participation of Rwandan security forces serves to demonstrate and reiterate state sovereignty over this contained population of non-citizens. Host-state justice institutions take over when Kiziba councils cannot address the level of offense. Rather than distancing themselves from the refugees and refusing responsibility (Holzer, 2013), the Rwandan government takes a proactive stance while
enabling some agency of control within the camp borders. As articulated by the Minister of MIDIMAR, this measure reflects the commitment by Rwanda to provide security for the refugees for as long as they are on Rwandan soil (Séraphine Mukantabana, personal communication, June 13, 2014). The following sections take these ideas of host government state structure and views their manifestation in the lives of refugees—in particular security volunteers—in Kiziba camp. Together, these sections help to illustrate the messy blur between Rwandan institutional and governmental norms and the refugees’ maintenance of their own security structures. In the in-between, we begin to see that the state, INGOs, and camp residents are intertwined in a way that reinforces durability in displacement through the maintenance of security protocols and practices.

MICRO EXPRESSIONS OF STATE SECURITY STRUCTURES

Though often not physically present, the reach and values of the host state convey through the daily local actions of Kiziba’s volunteer security force. Just before the main road of the camp, a small building houses the guards who manage the main gate. Here, refugee security volunteers inspect all official paperwork granting entry; in a logbook, they record the names, phone numbers, and license plates of everyone entering the camp. For all its formality, however, as researchers we were struck by the responsibility bestowed upon the guard gatekeepers, who were also residents themselves. At just 16 years old, one gate guard confirmed, “Yes, it is me who makes decisions about people who enter here in the camp” (border guard, personal communication, January 26, 2013). The sense of pride conveyed by the border guards illustrates how refugees embrace micro-moments of agency within their encamped lives while enacting the will of the state. The young gate guard represents the first level of containment within the camp, an arm of the Rwandan government’s attempt to maintain order and preserve domestic sovereignty in the context of these recreated international boundaries within its territory.

My impression of Kiziba Camp is that of a secure, well-run institution where children feel safe to play far from the watchful eyes of their parents. When asked what made Kiziba particularly safe, MIDIMAR expressed that Kiziba is not any safer than any of the other border camps. “All the camps are

3 By some accounts, however, the Rwandan government has knowingly allowed recruitment of refugees, even children, from Kiziba and Gihembe camps to join armed rebellions in the DRC (Child Soldiers International, 2008; Hege et al., 15 November 2012; Mhembu-Salter, 2006).
safe. All have the same governance structures” (G. Karagire, Kiziba Camp Manager, personal communication, January 25, 2013); however, NGO workers with experience in the other camps did not feel the same way (Jesuit Refugee Service education director, personal communication, 14 March, 2011). Given that the refugees do not have experience in the other camps and MIDIMAR’s official stance was that all the camps were the same, the measure of difference and reason for those potential differences was not possible to ascertain. One thing that was very clear during the interviews is that security volunteers take their responsibility seriously. Though it is a volunteer position, these camp leaders repeatedly emphasized the importance of personal security for themselves, their families, and their neighbors. Executive Council members echoed the sentiments of the security volunteers. One stated, “…to have peace in our heart is the most important. Even though you cannot satisfy all your needs, you feel safe and in security” (Executive Council, personal communication, January 25, 2013). This pride in the level of security within the camp and the role the volunteers play speaks to the agency they feel in protecting themselves. In a protracted situation where so much is beyond the residents’ control, camp security stood out as one particular instance in which refugees felt pride in their ability to exert control over some aspects of their daily life conditions—illustrating a resilient enactment of agency in the face of such sharp structural determinants of their overall situation.

At night, the border takes on a different aspect of state re-creation. Refugee camp activities after dark remain an under studied research area (Vogler, 2006). Like many other camps, aid workers leave at the end of the day—as we were often encouraged to do by the residents as the sun began to set over Kiziba—and the regulation and administration of the camp fall entirely to the refugees themselves. In these undocumented hours, the refugees take back their agency for control over governance and daily activities. Refugees defer to the organizational structures established by the UNHCR and host state and become an instance of internal sovereignty and ‘citizen obedience’ played out at the camp level. Volunteer patrols organized by the villages within the camp monitor security throughout the night. The refugee security force consists of 62 elected members representing each of the neighborhoods in the camp, as well as a higher level Security Council that oversees the volunteers. They do not have guaranteed access to phones or radio communication. If something happens during the nightly patrols, they call out to one another and whoever is nearby will come running to help.
In Kiziba, the security volunteers, with a lack of reliable communication mechanisms, utilize the spatial arrangement of the main walkways of the camp to ensure other security officers are nearby to call out to if one should need assistance. This instance serves as a specific example of utilizing the camp layout as a Foucaultian milieu. It also shows the camp residents adopting control mechanisms of the state to manage the population in the absence of INGO and state representatives. Orderliness of nighttime operations in Kiziba shows the durable reach of the state in this protracted context. Despite no access to actual citizenship and incorporation into the Rwandan state, Kiziba residents embrace state structures enough to re-enact them at night without state supervision. This is a true performance of the obedient self-governing citizen at the camp/individual level, indicating that state structures are so pervasive as to have become the norm even without supervision.

The refugee camp administration disseminates security through the trodden arteries of the camp, radiating from the central square. This replicates the disciplinary mechanism of the Rwandan government’s focus on security even when the presence of state representatives dissipates for the night. It also represents a lens into the milieu’s inability to meet the needs of all residents, particularly those that reside in the remotest parts of the camp away from the main thoroughfares (Hyndman, 2000). Around 7:30 pm, the security volunteers from each neighborhood begin to assemble for the night’s duties (Security Council, personal communication, January 27, 2013). MIDIMAR claims that the police have provided training on security management to the refugees in Kiziba Camp (G. Karagire, Kiziba Camp Manager, personal communication, January 25, 2013); but, this conflicts with the information provided by the Kiziba Security Council that claims they do not receive support or training for their security initiatives (Kiziba Security Council, personal communication, January 27, 2013). Regardless of the source of security training, the volunteers clearly enforce a functioning security plan that involves close integration with Rwandan security forces.

Though it is unclear who instituted them originally, curfews are a prominent feature of nightlife in Kiziba and represent yet another layer of the disciplinary arm of the host state and UNHCR. We know from conversations with the refugee-elected head of camp security that security volunteers enforce curfews, first at 9:00 pm as a general call to move homeward and then again at 11:00 pm when everyone should be inside until 4:00 am when the curfew ends (Executive Council members, personal
communication, 25 January 2013). These guidelines, they assured us, are to facilitate control over security in the camp by getting everyone home at a reasonable hour. After 11:00 pm, unless there are ongoing activities such as televised soccer games in the community hall, the security volunteers patrol to ensure everyone has returned home and to address any delinquency (Security volunteer, personal communication, 26 January 2013). From sundown, Rwandese soldiers come to protect the camp borders (border guard, personal communication, January 26, 2013). Security members that we interviewed were reluctant to reveal whether this was to keep outsiders out or insiders in, but a member of the Executive Council reported that “there is always Rwandan security around our camp” (Kiziba Executive Council, personal communication, January 25, 2013). The Executive Council’s report of regular border guards from the Rwandan government provides a window into the ever-present host-state security norms.

According to the members of the Security Council, Rwandese soldiers arrive every night but never enter the camp unless the refugees need them to assist with an incident (personal communication, January 26, 2013). In this way, the curfews serve as one of Foucault’s sovereign state disciplinary mechanisms, where residents are forced to return home and exist in predetermined spaces of control. The security volunteers enact this disciplinary protocol. The Rwandese soldiers, then, serve as both a support and containment mechanism: they provide logistical support to enforce Foucaultian control and disciplinary mechanisms, while standing by to ensure separation from the general population.

During interviews with the Executive Council in 2013, elected leaders regularly expressed gratitude to the Rwandan government with statements like, “We are thankful to the country of Rwanda” and “What we appreciate is that this country of Rwanda gives us a place to stay and we thank you because this country ensures the security of all refugees we have here in the camp” (Executive council member, personal communication, 26 January 2013). This politically-driven sentiment conveyed a sense of gratefulness to the host nation, but also a plea to the international community to end the protraction. Kiziba elected leadership and security volunteers perform willingly as arms of the state to ensure the functioning—and perhaps even the sovereign-like qualities—of their community. Expressions of gratitude when Rwandan surveillance was not overtly present during the interviews speak to their performance as obedient citizen-subjects and their deep integration with state systems of governance and control.
Members of the Executive Council followed these platitudes with a pause before continuing to describe the ailments of life in the camp. This conversational pause offered insight beyond the mere gratitude that nuanced the sentences with a sense of “thank you, but…” From this and the subsequent conversations about the need for “durable solutions,” I concluded that the government does provide a strong foundation for security and order within the camp, so much so that the camp residents felt reluctant to ask for change that might secure a future beyond the camp. In some ways, this monitored autonomy within the operations of the camp serves to further entrench Kiziba residents in displacement. Their ongoing rehearsal as obedient citizen-subjects enculturates them into a particular classification of human existence. Though performing as such, they are not Rwandan citizens; but, as time passes and they become practiced at Rwandan or even INGO citizenry, they also become increasingly removed from their former place in the DRC. Kiziba refugees then find themselves in a structured form of limbo where they have some forms of constrained agency and the camp becomes a form of sovereign entity disembodied from any particular state. This contradictory relationship between the camp and the host state conveyed through the words of the Executive Council and Security Council hint at systemic forms of displacement. In fact, through the act of caring for the refugees and managing their state of displacement, the refugees entrench themselves in systems of host nation governance and citizenry that further distance them from the culture and norms of their communities of origin.

Again, this is not necessarily to portray a nefarious scheme by NGOs or the government to control or subjugate the population. The relationship goes both ways, with refugees participating in securitization, containment, and resource distribution as faux-citizen-subjects. The voices of the refugees show these entrenching aspects of meso-/state-level institutions recreated within the camp. Throughout our discussions with the Security Council in 2013, security volunteers repeatedly referred to the pride with which they performed these duties, even though they received no pay, because they felt they were protecting their family and their community. They reinforced the idea of the camp as outsiders kept separate from the surrounding Rwandan nationals. One security member said, “to become a security here, people have faith and confidence towards me but also it is a voluntary job so I do it by my own to protect people in the camp from enemies who can try to disturb our security” (personal communication, 27 January 2013). This narrative account provides the most overt framing of Rwandese as potential
“enemies” of the camp residents, speaking less to neighborly tensions and more to the clear delineation between “us” and “them.” Insider/outsider framing as an entrenching factor in durable displacement features more prominently in the analysis of refugee voices in the next chapter. For now, it is important to note that the residents perform as obedient citizen-subjects and yet reject and are denied full access to citizenship in Rwanda. This enactment of security juxtaposed with outsiderness contributes to the durability of their situation.

**MICRO EXPRESSIONS OF SECURITY AND THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY**

Like Holzer’s (2013) study, refugees in Kiziba did not express a felt sense of insecurity within the camp. The Security Council members came across as forgiving and even dismissive of the petty crimes committed within the camp as they attributed them to larger issues of idleness, boredom, and the hopelessness of protracted displacement. The camp president in 2013 noted,

> Another problem about security is about people who have nothing to do; they’re always here in the village missing what to do. In that case they start doing bad things and create bad behaviors, like those young people who finish their senior three secondary. After school they have nothing to do...So that’s a big problem, people don’t have activities or occupations (Personal communication, January 25, 2013).

Most incidents revolve around public drunkenness or activities that the Security Council attributes to teenagers having nothing to do to occupy their time. Idle youth causing problems with drugs, violence, and early pregnancy constituted the main security concern within the camp. In fact, the elected leaders and security volunteers seemed to have a very good working relationship with the Rwandese security forces. The refugees had confidence in their own security team’s ability to monitor the interior of the camp and felt the general state of security in Kiziba was very good. Claims of discontent about life in the camp focused more broadly on the international community rather than the relationship with the host government. In various interviews with Kiziba elected representatives, youth, and even casual conversations with residents, they repeatedly expressed frustration with the larger overall protracted situation that defined the camp living conditions and relegated such a large community to a prolonged contained existence. In expressing their concerns, refugee participants comfortably used the words “durable solutions”—INGO-speak for the theoretical long-term solutions of repatriation, local integration, and resettlement, in order of international preference. Shifting focus away from the host state/camp
relationship, participants in our interviews seemed to accept the governance structures of Rwanda superimposed onto camp life but question the work that international actors were doing to end their exile from the DRC.

Kiziba residents we spoke with engaged a wider international audience by framing camp security issues as being the result of limited schooling and the inability to return home. Solutions for these grievances speak directly to the role of INGOs and the broader international community, rather than qualms with the host nation. They asked for the international community to stabilize the DRC or else provide resettlement options because “living as refugees, it’s like living without living” (Village leader, personal communication, 5 June 2014). The asked us, as researchers, to be ambassadors for them to the international community. Their requests focused on more variety in food aid, more extensive healthcare, more access to education, and a long-term solution so they would not have to remain in the camp—all aspects of life under the management of INGOs. One village leader simply stated, “We’ve been in this camp for eighteen years now. We are really tired of this camp. If we could leave this camp one day, we’ll be happy” (personal communication, 6 June 2014). Along this theme, when asked about his hopes for the residents of Kiziba, a quartier (neighborhood) leader said, “To leave this life, this is the message. To leave. To go somewhere else, if they [the international community] can. Maybe we can have security. We can have a good life in terms of health” (quartier leader, personal communication, 6 June 2014). This plea to the international community is not just about resettlement, but also political stability in the DRC. Youth and village leaders alike asked for “peace in our country so that we can go back home” (youth representative, personal communication 6 June 2014). These are calls for solutions at the international level, demonstrating refugees’ place as supra-political actors. The refugees therefore occupy a space at the very local, camp level, but are also involved in the international dialog of long-term solutions, peace-building, and conflict. Overall they felt abandoned by international peacemaking processes and humanitarian assistance policies, robbed of the autonomy to make choices about their own futures, even as they simultaneously served as actors to uphold the international and national levels of camp structure, organization, and daily operations.
SECURITY AS AN INSTITUTION BETWEEN THE CAMP AND THE STATE

The Security Council members' repeated expressions of gratitude to the state of Rwanda, commitment to voluntarily monitoring the camp for security issues, and pride in the relative safety of Kiziba Camp all communicate a broader identity of a community within the larger Rwandan state (personal communication, 26 January 2013). They behave in accordance and in harmony with the Rwandan state and their Rwandese neighbors, embracing the identity of good, obedient, self-governing citizens. At the same time, however, residents repeatedly reinforced the idea that they do not belong in Rwanda. The security and surveillance of the Rwandan state at once envelops them in the compliant and participatory nature of citizenship while reinforcing, through careful isolation, the outsider status of these Banyarwanda communities within its borders. They share a commitment to orderliness and security, in addition to other cultural and linguistic similarities; but carefully managed police and military presence draws a clear line designating the insiders and outsiders in this context. While the refugees have essentially assimilated within the Rwandan state and become increasingly self-sustaining in the security sector, they remain outsiders. As residents become practiced in Rwandan security protocols, they integrate in some ways into Rwandan society, which nurtures a sense of permanence in the country and community. On the other hand, the clear demarcations between Rwandan citizen and refugee non-citizen contribute to the frustration that Lischer (2006) identifies as a seed of conflict, which could destabilize the region and also prolong their displaced status.

These opposing forces—of assimilation juxtaposed with clear delineation between insider/outsider and citizen/non-citizen—situate the Banyarwanda as a different category of human existence in a world of territorial sovereign states. Performing as a Rwandan citizen, yet excluded from the legal path to full integration and citizenship makes it clear they do not belong in the country where they have lived for decades. Conformation to this faux-citizen life, particularly for youth who have never been to the DRC or do not remember it, further excludes them from the enculturation into Congolese citizenship discussed in the next section. As a noncitizen of the world, they are entitled to no place in a system of territorial sovereign states. By adopting the norms and culture of the host government and INGOs over increasingly long periods of protracted displacement, they entrench themselves in a classification of refugee global noncitizen and therefore distance themselves from the realities of at least
the first two durable solutions: repatriation or local integration. The next section discusses enculturation as citizen-subjects through both formal and informal camp education.

EDUCATION

Considerations of refugees’ long-term human potential and the possibility to exercise agency within severe structural barriers place education as a central consideration of understanding refugees as a noncitizen other. Not only supporting the notion of the host state’s internal sovereignty by defining who a citizen is not, refugees participate in citizen-building mechanisms supervised by the host state and INGOs that indoctrinate them as members of a community while emphasizing their outsider, non-citizen status. The opposing actions of citizen formation and rejection comprise one aspect of the system of durability that underlies the relationship between states, INGOs, and refugees. Again, this section blurs the line between state and refugee voices to show the ways in which state institutions affect the lives of refugees. Through these mixed voices, we see an entangled narrative of citizenship and adherence to state and INGO value systems that create durability through their contradictory messages and applications.

At the intersection of Foucault’s disciplinary and biopower mechanisms of the state, education features as a central topic of conversation among residents of Kiziba. All refugee camps in Rwanda follow the national educational system, arguably an instrument of the country’s internal sovereignty to indoctrinate citizens to national norms and values. The standard trajectory for Rwandan citizens is six years of primary, three years of lower secondary, and three years of advanced secondary school before graduating and becoming eligible for study at university. Students take exams at the end of the junior secondary level (US ninth-grade equivalent) to determine eligibility for advanced secondary school (Embassy of the United States - Rwanda, 2014). The camp can provide only nine years of education based on available UNHCR funding in the country (UNHCR, 2014a). Students may apply for documentation that allows pursuit of advanced secondary school outside of the camp, but without scholarships to support tuition, room, and board, the majority of students cannot pursue this opportunity (Moscoe, Rogers, Kyarislima, & Umunyana, 2012). By some reports, the lack of available funds to pay for completion of school has resulted in problems with prostitution to make enough money for the necessary fees (Moscoe et al., 2012). As a result, within this microcosm camp situation, education features
prominently as a core institution that embodies the limited opportunity structures of Kiziba, while impacting so many other social conditions of the larger community.

As an interesting twist on gender equity in education, global economic recession has reportedly led to a decline in the number of scholarship/sponsorship opportunities for refugee students. Those resources that remain are generally available to girls specifically, leading to some resentment toward female students (Moscoe et al., 2012). One elder leader, reflecting on these inequities for male education opportunities, proclaimed himself “l’ambassadeur des garçons,” or ambassador of the men (Kiziba Elder Councilman, personal communication, 14 March 2011). His expression encapsulates a sentiment in the camp that men need an ambassador to ensure equal access to opportunities as women. In 2011, the school principal explained to us that because of these scholarships, girls will often return to school in the event that they become pregnant and must drop out. Boys, however, will often not return if they fail a class or encounter life obstacles because they lose all hope of potentially leaving the camp to study (personal communication, 6 June 2014). We live in a world where women still fight for gender equality in many aspects of life, but this phenomenon in the camp illustrates how international and host state norms and values are imposed onto the refugee camp in what might otherwise seem untraditional—or even unfair—way to the refugees themselves.

During the last visit in 2014, a new school building was under construction to accommodate the addition of one grade level to the school curriculum. This will not allow refugees to finish secondary school in the camp, but does offer the opportunity to study longer, in which many residents expressed interest (Kiziba high school curriculum director, personal communication, 6 June 2014). In this section, I discuss the complexity of the education system within Kiziba Camp. This manifests as both the formal Rwandese education as well as the extended INGO education that exists though informational billboards. By analyzing each in turn, I find instances of the host state and service-providing INGOs deriving opportunities for resources, recognition, and power critical to the preservation of sovereignty and point to underlying systems that make displacement durable.

**CITIZEN CREATION**

This section examines the camp education structure established, maintained, and monitored by the host state in order to understand state-imposed structures that affect refugees’ lives and perceptions
of permanence. To begin, I look at the idea of education as a state-run institution for creating citizens. Then, I turn to individual refugees’ perspectives to reveal the institutional power of state structures within the camp. These voices help to support the discussion of citizenship by illustrating the role of education in refugees’ lives through their own accounts. Revealing the power of educational norms and values, refugees’ testimonies about education frame the discussion of citizenship and international influences in the particular context of Kiziba’s residents.

**EDUCATION AND THE STATE**

The MIDIMAR Minister emphasized in our interview that it is important for refugees to access education and develop skills that will help them when they arrive home. This will eventually help them be competitive in the job market when they return home to the DRC (Séraphine Mukantabana, personal communication, 13 June 2014). In this way, education can be understood through the lens of external sovereignty in that, by educating the youth of its troublesome neighbor, Rwanda can potentially shape the economy and politics of a future, reintegrated DRC. By supporting a strong education system, with the help of UNHCR and other INGOs, Rwanda potentially creates international advocates upon the refugees’ return to the DRC; however, since the education system abruptly ends, leaving the refugees “stuck” without a high school diploma, they remain entirely dependent on the aid system and unable to seek out meaningful futures on their own. This separation from the fully participatory citizen experience maintains the refugees at an outsider-like distance and contributes to denying them the agency to end their own protracted displacement. If Milner (2011) is correct, failure to promote the participation of educated refugees to the international conversation about the fate of the DRC will impede progress to a lasting peace in the region. In its current state, camp education keeps refugees engaged in the politics and citizenship formation processes of the host nation while entrenching their displacement by not providing the means for involvement in peacemaking/building.

The educational system is a potential beacon of hope for future life plans in the refugees’ eyes as well as a frustrating limitation as a result of being a non-citizen. Given its basis in the national education system, the camp education provision can also be seen in the intersections of Foucault’s disciplinary and biopower concepts. As an element of biopower, the government indoctrinates, in some ways, refugees’ minds into the national consciousness. They perform citizenship without external force or coercion by
learning the Rwandan order of things at an early age. In effect, as Behdad (2005) argues about American culture, education is a tool to create citizens. He explains that education teaches people how to be citizens and how to “internalize rational state policies effectively and efficiently [perform] their civil and political duties without feeling the exorbitant power of the state” (Behdad, 2005, p. 70). The education system is therefore also a disciplinary tool of the state that ensures conformation to government expectations by educating on the rules and values of society; essentially it is then a mechanism for creating and enforcing internal sovereignty. Through the values instilled during mandatory public education, students become knowledgeable about and amenable to state institutions without forceful coercion, as imagined by Foucault’s ideas on biopower. In The Making of Citizens, Hughes (1902) speaks of global (economic North) school systems as a varied but predictable producer of citizens by saying:

The fact is, the school is a political institution maintained by the State for the cultivation and propagation of national ideals...Every school is a machine deliberately contrived for the manufacture of citizens. The die of the machine varies. (p. 4)

He goes on to say that schools are a selfish attempt of political control by indoctrinating citizens, which is “much cheaper than prisons” (Hughes, 1902, p. 5), further emphasizing the role that education plays in Foucaultian biopower. It represents state coercion without the use of force, instead using bodies—or minds in this instance—as a mechanism of control and indoctrination into the role of a national citizen.

It is not state control or power here that ensures durable displacement; rather, it is the false indoctrination into Rwandan society through the national education system that contributes to a sense of permanence. This is of course a complex realization. By operating in a responsible capacity as a host nation and supervising the educational system to the best of its ability, the government implicates itself in a system of containment. I do not believe this is intentional or driven by ulterior motives, but instead the result of necessary repeated interactions over long periods of displacement between the hosts and hosted.

REMINISCING ON OPPORTUNITIES PAST

In the repetitive cycle of life events that define the rhythm of the camp (e.g. resource distribution, curfews, and basic health care), education stands foremost as a symbol of hope for the future. A 24-year-old Kiziba resident told us, “So, the only thing which can give me hope for the future is to finish my
studies. For now, I can’t really tell what I can do because it’s like I’m stuck in life. I can’t finish my studies” (personal communication, 6 June 2014). Education represented the most common unprompted topic of conversation in all of the individual interviews and focus groups that we held over the course of three research visits to Kiziba; in particular, they reflected on the finality of the education track and frustration of being “stuck” due to limited opportunities to finish school. The administrative director in 2014 informed me that Kiziba schoolchildren perform among the top of regional schools in their area. These results created both a source of pride and frustration given the lack of options to finish secondary school and pursue university studies (personal communication, 6 June 2014). As one village leader explained, “My wish for my children is for them if I have means is to give them good life, good education” (personal communication, 5 June 2014). Her statement draws a direct relationship between education and happiness, or a “good life” which echoes the sentiment of nearly every resident with whom we spoke.

Among the youth we interviewed, the correlation between hope and education was stark, with one resident explaining, “My future? As long as I’m living in the camp, I don’t have any future. Because I don’t have an opportunity to finish my secondary school” (personal communication, 6 June 2014). A fifteen-year-old girl in the camp expressed this hope by telling us, “If I got a chance to finish my study, maybe it can be a good opportunity to find a nice job” (personal communication, 6 June 2014). Frustration over an unfinished education was more than about youth idleness in the camp setting, it was also about nostalgia for a past in which education was available to the Banyarwanda in the DRC. Education was a marker of progress and the normal cycle of life, as an elected village leader in the camp from North Kivu explained:

In the past when we are living in our country, we are sending our children to school with the hope that they finish studies and one day become a teacher or a doctor or a driver, but here the only chance you have to send your children is to get to the third level in secondary school and that level doesn’t really give any hope for the children. (personal communication, 6 June 2014)

Nostalgia for a past in which the full spectrum of education presented possibilities of secure futures speaks broadly to the interviews conducted with older residents in the camp. Hope for their children revolved almost entirely around a sense of loss that comes with an incomplete education.
One youth leader explained that the refugees’ education is a critical component of future peace-building, noting that the Congo will need them and their education to rebuild when they return (personal communication, 5 June 2014). Another youth leader philosophized on the detriment endured by camp youth with no advanced educational opportunities:

Their minds becomes somehow...stolen. It’s like lighting a candle. A light? Then it’s getting kind of dim, because their mind becomes somehow nothing to think about. Their thoughts become gone. Because if you live in the same life like this you haven’t an open mind to think about many things. You’re still being like some kinds broken. Like something which are closed—stuck. You have a closed mind. You can’t think about many thing, strongest thing. Your experience is what you show others. You can’t have biggest experience to think [and use] your mind...You haven’t many plans. It’s very hard for us. (personal communication, 5 June 2014)

His analogy of a mind without access to education as being like the light of a candle that grows dimmer provides an apt visualization of the distress many interviewees expressed about their hopes for the future without a complete education. It illustrates a psychological entrenching of refugee status “because if you live in the same life like this you haven’t an open mind to think about many things.” Subsequent generations of protracted cases, best illustrated through the narratives of these youth, have increasingly weak ties to ‘home’ and no delusions about their outsider status in the host state.

This youth’s narrative sheds light on the way the “refugee” idea is socially constructed in the camp when he says “you can’t have biggest experience to think [and use] your mind.” He was getting at the limitations of life and experience in the camp, and how this affects his peers’ perceptions of what they are able to accomplish in their futures. He felt frustration at their inability to see beyond the camp and imagine a different life—a non-refugee life. The word “stuck” in reference to life came up regularly in conversation with the youth. Some explained that only those with family connections in Rwanda outside of the camp had the opportunity to finish secondary school and potentially go on to college; but without education outlets, they saw little hope for their futures (camp youth representatives, personal communication, 6 June 2014). This idea of being “stuck” extends beyond the camp, however, into spatial and political dimensions. It speaks to some acknowledgement that their situation is enduring and somehow made durable by the lack of educational opportunities and ability to engage in regional peace-building, instead forgotten on this distant mountaintop overlooking their former home.
As evidenced by some of the less optimistic refugee youth with whom we spoke, the link between education and hope for the future reinforces the insider/outsider dynamic between refugees and the host country. More pessimistic voices generally represented the youth who had travelled outside of the camp in search of work at some point. A young man in the camp expressed frustration about opportunity by pointing out the barriers to work even with a high school diploma:

“It’s still a big issue because as you see, I’m a refugee, and I’m limited by the Rwandan law. It’s still a big problem. It’s still a big issue. Because even if I finish my studies and have a good level of education, if I don’t have my relative who can go and try to go not in the official way to get me documents [to work], it’s still a problem. It’s still a problem. So I’m not seeing any hope. (personal communication, 6 June 2014)

His testament speaks to a reality that even with the opportunity to finish school, job prospects outside the camp are slim. Refugees can get documentation to work legally within the country, but most residents we spoke with felt this was only available to those with personal connections in Rwanda who could navigate the system. This affected youth in a particularly salient way since they had experienced their entire education within the camp. More than the elder participants, they articulated an acute frustration with the fact that they could not pursue future opportunities because of incomplete education, lack of documentation to work legally, and no real hope of integration locally. Frustration with limitations on access to jobs, opportunities, and further education arises from the contrast between the indoctrination processes refugee youth engage in through the host state-administered education system and the realities of their non-citizen status. Contradictions such as these contribute to the feeling of being ‘stuck’ that encapsulates the durability of their situation. At the end of school, they indeed find themselves with “no return and no road forward” (Bauman, 2004, p. 77), an everyday testament to the durable nature of their displacement.

Ultimately, the top performing Kiziba students are met with an almost certain end to their prospective futures. Participation in the national economy is reserved for citizens and exceptional others. For the vast majority of those refugees trained to be good, assimilated, citizens for nine years in the Rwandan educational system, “graduating” from the camp school forces one to confront the false nature of that sense of belonging. They are able to perform as citizens in the country, thus promoting harmonious relationships with Rwandan neighbors and the host government institutions. However, the
reality of a very unlikely productive economic future in the labor market reinforces the non-citizen nature of their status in the country. In this way, the refugees’ contained experience reinforces internal sovereignty by serving as a living definition of what a citizen is not. As refugees in Rwanda, the Banyarwanda’s story may also function as a reminder for Rwandese citizens about the consequences of a government in shambles—harking back to the country’s own history of governmental catastrophes. From this perspective, conflict refugees may be a warning or reminder of what happens when citizens do not conform to government rules and regulations—when they ‘disobey.’ The refugees, through their very existence, help to socially construct the internal sovereignty of the state as non-citizen others and representatives of sovereignty gone wrong somewhere else. Indoctrination into the national consciousness reinforces permanence, in essence making the youth who have never seen or do not remember the DRC more Rwandan than Congolese; keeping their economic prospects at bay, on the other hand, draws a line between insider/citizen and outsider/refugee/non-citizen. This cycle of citizen creation and exclusion ultimately produces a protracted displacement in which refugees are dependent on a system for which they cannot be a part.

VALUES AND NORMS

Beyond the formal Rwandan education system, opportunities for indoctrination to international norms through the use of informational billboards persist throughout Kiziba Camp. S. Turner (2010) frames the value-creation strategy of INGOs as state-like, noting, “Although the UNHCR is not a state, it can act like a modern liberal state in its everyday practices of governing the camp through norms as it attempts to foster life in the camp” (p. 8). Seen throughout the country and Africa more generally, billboards convey norms by providing instruction for matters of health, safety, and agriculture; in a sense, these are a form of continued public education and indoctrination into the values of the host government and the INGOs that oversee the refugee camps. They also represent a means of Foucaultian biopower, whereby the state-like INGOs govern the refugee population with messaging that facilitates non-forceful coercion through acquiescence to international norms and values. Billboards displaying INGO messages also visually reinforce the presence of these organizations as overseers and providers within the camp. The messages of these billboards, each sponsored by UNHCR and African Humanitarian Action (AHA), align directly with the UN Millennium Development Goals, which represent the highest priority areas for
social development according to the United Nations (i.e. international norms and values). Specifically, the three billboards presented here encompass UN Millennium Development Goal one to “eradicate extreme poverty and hunger”; goals four and five to “reduce child mortality” and “improve maternal health”; and goal six to “combat HIV/AIDS, malaria and other diseases” (United Nations, 2015). Like the assimilation of Kiziba residents as faux-citizens of Rwanda through the formal Rwandan education system, these billboards integrate the refugees into a larger global community by indoctrinating them to the goals, values, and rhetoric of INGO-speak. This plays out in other ways when, for example, refugees asked about hope for their futures respond using words like “durable solution” which represents part of the UNHCR’s public affairs image of long-term solutions.

Using a visual example of the assimilatory power of ongoing billboard education, one can interpret the value systems conveyed to Kiziba residents. In Figure 10, the UNHCR and AHA message reads, “For the fight against malnutrition, be proactive to develop a home garden for everyone.” Seen in development initiatives led by the Rwanda Red Cross (field observation notes, 17 March 2011), the kitchen garden is a critical tool for addressing malnutrition throughout the country. The Rwandan
government included its refugee camps in the recent “1,000-Days in the Thousands Hills” campaign to integrate refugees and local communities in the fight against malnutrition (MIDIMAR, 2014a). However, the message is contrary to the realities of camp life. WFP & UNHCR (2014) note that access to land outside the camp is scarce in Rwanda, leaving little room for gardening. The existing kitchen gardens in Rwanda’s refugee camps are mainly initiatives for “particularly vulnerable groups” such as widows and HIV positive refugees (WFP & UNHCR, 2014).

Across all refugee camps in Rwanda, WFP & UNHCR (2014) estimate only 3% of the refugees’ food supply comes from their own agriculture efforts. There are approximately 315 kitchen gardens and 151 family rabbit husbandry units in Kiziba Camp for the 16,461 residents (MIDIMAR, 2014a). Refugees instead sell portions of their food rations to diversify their diets or provide money to cover other basic needs. Since food rations provide the 2,104 kilocalories required for basic adult human life (WFP & UNHCR, 2014), selling portions leads to reduced available staple calories. Kiziba measures in at the lowest Global Acute Malnutrition (GAM) rate (1.6%) among the refugee camps in Rwanda, so by comparison to the other camps, it is faring well. The WFP & UNHCR (2014) reports that malnutrition is connected to rates of infectious disease and therefore access to clean water. Kiziba alone provides both the recommended rate of clean water as well as prioritized systems for providing food rations to vulnerable subgroups, which may explain its comparatively low malnutrition rate (WFP & UNHCR, 2014). Even with these advantages over the other camps, WFP & UNHCR (2014) estimate that 43% of Kiziba’s population has “inadequate food consumption” (p. 7). Refugees’ ability to supplement inadequate diets is severely limited in Kiziba due to market inaccessibility. Prices in the market in Kiziba and the closest town market are high compared to national averages. In a 2014 assessment, cassava prices in the Kiziba market were double that in a nearby local market, which is a two-hour journey by foot (WFP & UNHCR, 2014, p. 12). Price differences may have something to do with the remoteness and relatively low agricultural production in the region. These prices, and the lack of economic opportunity discussed more at length in the next section, condemn Kiziba residents to nearly complete dependency on humanitarian aid for survival.

Despite interest expressed by the residents in expanding their diets and improving malnutrition as the billboard encourages, the reality is that access to market purchases or space for gardening is
extremely limited. The billboard conveys contradictory messaging by urging residents to conform to INGO-inspired kitchen gardens that are effective for resident/citizen Rwandan populations; however, the realities of lack of food diversity and food security constitute a major point of contention between the refugees and their international caretakers. These billboards, then, illustrate the ironies of INGO-speak within the camp. “Good” citizen-subjects would abide by the advice distributed by the governing and service providing state-like entities; however, camp conditions leave the refugees confined to limited food diversity and sustained dependence on aid distributions.

The monthly food delivery by World Food Programme symbolizes the residents’ dependency on this process and their inability to regain control over their health and bodies. Empty warehouses and household rationing between deliveries weigh heavily on the minds of Kiziba residents. Speaking as a representative of her constituents and conditions within the camp, one young woman leader informed us,

Most of the families here they are forcing their children to go to be, to sleep, [early] because children are hungry and there is no food...Another issue is that there is porridge that’s given to children, but at a certain age—at two years old—they cut the porridge to them. It’s right at the time when children want to play and want to use much energy. (village leader, personal communication, 5 June 2014)

Honing in on the implications of the INGO policies on the everyday lives of residents, she speaks specifically to the physical and emotional drain of a life dependent on the food decisions and delivery schedule of an institution outside of her control. This woman leader’s perspective provides context for the microcosm on which the INGOs impose their often-unrealistic billboard education. Her focus on the children and their energy also highlights the problems of long-term food security passed on to the next generation. Identifying as pastoralists—mostly cattle herders, but also agricultural produce—interviews with the residents of Kiziba conveyed a deep nostalgia for the role food played in their former lives.

Attention on the consequences of food insecurity for children also draws into focus the lost knowledge of generations of farmers and herders. This is a particularly entrenching aspect of the refugees’ unwilling dependency on food aid. Not only does it affect their health, but they also cannot teach the next generations about the subsistence practices they have cultivated over generations in the DRC. Dependency reigns over their futures as children born into a world of porridge and WFP-supplied corn, beans, and oil do not have the opportunities to learn the skills of their elders. The tragic and
frustrating message of the agricultural sign is an everyday reminder of knowledge lost, skillsets gone to waste, and a food supply chain well out of their control. Durability of displacement in this context derives from stunted development of children, constant and repeated reminders that food security is beyond control, and the broken processes for accumulated agricultural knowledge transfer to the next generations. While durability here is measured at the micro-camp level, these are manifestations of systems imposed by the state. They are explicit conditions of life that derive from state and INGO imposed norms and values that contribute to moving protraction from meaning “long-staying” to durable and permanent.

Similarly conveying value systems of the international community and INGOs supporting the camp, Figure 11 shows a billboard that roughly translates, “Mothers be aware that breastfeeding your child is enough [nutrition] during the first six months of your new baby’s life.” The maternal and child health education conveyed in the billboard is important; it reflects the maternal and child health areas of the UN Millennium Development Goals (United Nations, 2015). Contrary to the expectations of the INGOs, however, 43% of the population does not have adequate access to food; even if they agree with
the terms of the billboard, mothers must heavily rely on clinic malnutrition services to support the first two years of their children’s lives (personal communication, AHA Kiziba Clinic Staff, 14 March 2011). Again, the billboards serve as a constant visual reference to the international norms and expectations, indoctrinating the refugees into languages of INGOs; but perhaps more importantly, the billboards serve as a reminder of the loss of agency over personal choices, nutrition for healthy bodies, and general wellbeing experienced by the refugees. The INGOs’ billboard messaging demonstrates an inadvertent expression of power. This is what Foucault named biopower, where bodies and lives become the instruments of control rather than direct governmental interventions.

Figure 12 shows a message that says, “Work hand in hand with people living with HIV/AIDS. Don’t discriminate against them; rather work together for our development.” Refugees told WFP & UNHCR (2014) that prior to coming to Rwanda, they had not dealt with HIV/AIDS. The billboards and special INGO initiatives have brought this conversation to the forefront. The known HIV/AIDS rate across all camps is approximately 0.7% (WFP & UNHCR, 2014, p. 32). The WFP & UNHCR (2014) linked lack of economic opportunities across all of the camps to increased rates of Sexual and Gender-Based Violence (SGBV), unwanted pregnancies, and HIV/AIDS or other sexually transmitted infections. Women and girls must occasionally engage in sexual transactions to meet the economic needs of their families; additionally, parents send children to stay with other families when space or resources run out, putting those children at risk for sexual and/or economic exploitation (WFP & UNHCR, 2014). The spread of HIV/AIDS, STIs, and SGBV is not directly the result or consequence of INGO intervention. Rather, the billboard reflects the conditions of dependency that deepen as the refugees remain confined to this space. Engaging in the rhetoric of an international fight against HIV/AIDS will benefit the refugees in whatever long-term solution results from this protracted situation. The billboard itself still symbolizes the intertwining relationship between the refugees and the aid-supplying INGOs. It serves as a visual reminder about the lack of control of everyday resources and services, thereby allowing INGOs to exert biopower over the subject-refugee population.
In one account of a resident of Kiziba who was given the opportunity to speak with the Rwanda Minister of Health, he asked about the limited food options. Minister Dr. Agnes Binagwaho explained that the Ministry of Health cannot help these situations “because the refugee camps are an extraterritorial issue” embedded in global politics (Dushime, 2015). Refugee health as an “extraterritorial issue” places the conversation squarely in the international arena; it hyper-politicizes the refugees by catapulting them into the international conversation on food security, placelessness, and caregiving. These become the problems of INGOs such as UNHCR and its host institution partners, such as MIDIMAR and Rwanda Red Cross. This pushes local, individual level (private-sphere) experiences of refugees into the public, international sphere of politics, economics, and advocacy. All of these billboard-advertised health issues are linked to containment and deprived agency to make personal choices about nutrition and bodily care. They directly link the refugees’ experiences in a dependency relationship with the international community. An entire global refugee regime complex revolves around solving problems, including health issues, which requires access to power, resources, and recognition reinforce the internal and external sovereignty of both host states and the state-like UNHCR. The contrast between the value-laden billboards and the realities of camp life highlight the intractability of the refugees’ status, thereby
contributing in constructing forced migration as a durable institution. As they maintain the camps in a contained and governed way, INGOs and host states reap benefits of donor resources, recognition as relevant international actors, and power to manipulate diplomatic relations based on continued hospitality to long-staying refugees.

Kiziba residents that we interviewed expressed frustration with the limited agency they feel about the disconnect between international and host-state expectations and the realities of camp life. Though these voices represent micro-level factors of durability, they illustrate the manifestation of state and institutional policies at the camp level. These sentiments also emerged in the WFP & UNHCR (2014) report, which indicates that the feelings are shared across all Banyarwanda camps in Rwanda. One village leader pointedly summarized, "If someone gets sick here, even if it’s not a big issue, it is like he is condemned to die. Because even the food we are eating doesn’t make our body protect our system" (personal communication, village leader, 6 June 2014). This comment about the lack of refugees’ abilities to make their own choices about food and the consequences on their bodies speaks directly to Foucault’s ideas about biopower where control over biological features and bodies become a strategy of power (2007, p. 16). At the same time that camp residents depend upon aid deliveries for their livelihood and bodily wellbeing, they also confer upon international organizations a legitimacy necessary for their own survival. By controlling the bodies—health, wellbeing, and livelihood—of refugees, the UNHCR validates itself as a necessary international governmental body. The metrics of “populations of concern” over which the UNHCR “governs” substantiates international pleas for additional funding from participating nations and private donors. Hyndman (2000) ties UNHCR to Foucault’s ideas about “governmentality” by observing that the “UNHCR meticulously orders the field through exercises of counting, calculating, and coding refugees” (p. 123). Though she is speaking here of the UNHCR’s desire to quantify all aspects of refugee life as a management technique of governance, even subjugation or colonialism, it extends to the value of these numbers in terms of burden-sharing and external sovereignty. Quantitative metrics constitute organizational validity and proof of need of international funding. To gain funding, the refugee regime complex draws upon states’ desires to manage interdependent relationships that form the basis of external sovereignty.
While the UNHCR is concerned about aid-dependency, it has also built an international economy dependent upon aid-dependency. A network of contractors, staff, warehouses, suppliers, and logistics professionals as well as subcontracted NGOs and global programs support the massive humanitarian operations that UNHCR oversees. It is, by its very nature, a manifestation of international cooperation and states’ quest to manage external sovereignty, or states’ attempt to govern the processes that connect them to other states. In 2013, the UNHCR budget reached US$5.3 billion, up from just US$1.8 billion in 2008; that’s a 194% increase in funding to support a 31% increase in the population of concern. The funding supports a diverse and changing environment of displacement, adapting to complex and wide-scale emergency response needs. Nonetheless, it illustrates the economic validity of the UNHCR in the eyes of international public and private donors. This is not a criticism. I take the Foucaultian approach to power that it does not necessarily represent something negative. Rather, I suggest here that the educational billboards indoctrinate the camp residents into value systems relevant to the larger humanitarian aid regime. The billboards provide windows into the INGO priorities—international and host government priorities—that convey power over bodies and personal agency. These priorities also translate to the international arena as solicitations for funding and increased international cooperation. Despite the fact that these educational messages are mostly irrelevant to the vast majority of camp residents, the metrics gathered from these initiatives provide evidence to the international community about the relevance and necessity of INGO work. It binds the UNHCR and subcontracting INGOs in relationships, both economic and policy driven, with the host country as well as the broader international community. These relationships rely on the aid-dependency of refugees and ultimately derive some benefit from their protracted length of stay in terms of ongoing interactions with international actors and global public awareness of their humanitarian efforts. In this way, INGOs become (perhaps inadvertently) complicit in the protraction of refugee situations.

POLITICS

In the official political sphere of the camp, MIDIMAR encourages and facilitates elections for village, quartier, and camp leadership roles. In particular, Rwandan government representatives visit the camp before each election cycle to identify and encourage women to run for leadership positions. With 48.8% representation of women in the Rwandan Parliament in the first post-genocide election, gender
equality in the political sphere of the country is a model for the rest of the world. By enforcing quotas where certain seats in parliament are reserved for women and voted on only by women, Rwanda encourages women's political participation as a central feature of its post-genocide construction of a new nation (Powley, 2005). This value system carries over into the camps as well, with MIDIMAR-led workshops that encourage women to identify and train potential elected leaders.

Relaying the transference of gender equity values from the state to the camp-based refugee, one woman quartier leader explained,

MIDIMAR always teaches women [in the camp] to have the confidence to be leaders. The problem is that many of us, as women, we are shy; we are not interested. But MIDIMAR always comes to us and gives us a course to become, to give ourselves self-confidence to become leaders. We don't really have [a women's committee]. I can't say a meeting of women, but when it is election time, MIDIMAR calls the women and tries to push them to see if there are some confident women who can go up for election. So then, [during those workshops] we meet with the leaders to see who is confident. Most of the time they call a [woman] chief of village or chief of quartier to come teach them how to be leaders. They give them like a training of leaders—how to become a leader. (Quartier leader, personal communication, 6 June 2014)

As indicated in the testimony above, while Congolese women may be reluctant to pursue elected positions, the values of the host government pervade. During our first visit to the camp, male representatives explained women’s quotas for participation in elected leadership to be a UNHCR mandate of 50% (refugee NGO volunteer overseeing wood distribution, personal communication, 15 March 2011). Later we found out from the camp manager that it is actually MIDIMAR conveying the values of the Rwandan state that encourages at least 30% political participation of women (G. Karagire, Kiziba Camp Manager, personal communication, January 25, 2013). This miscommunication reveals the general acceptance of INGO and state norms and values by the refugees without much consideration for the origin of the policies. It is not that the refugees are uninterested, but that they have been participating in this system for so long, these imposed norms and values have become their reality. Even through this annual expression of democratic processes, the refugees experience political structures that reinforce the durability of their time in the camp and their status as exiles from the DRC.

Elected community resident representation is an INGO-encouraged institution in the design of refugee camps, with one handbook stating that “for every chairman and/or male camp leader being elected, it should be ensured that there is a female counterpart with equal responsibilities/powers”
UNHCR guidelines suggest that “at least 50% [of members of the Grievance Committee and Council of Elders] should be women, with representation from all the major tribes” (DIPS, 2006). The exact structure of leadership required of each camp, however, is adapted to the context of the refugee group and quotas set by the UNHCR are not enforceable. Kiziba exceeds the MIDIMAR quota with approximately 42% of elected positions held by women (G. Karagire, Kiziba Camp Manager, personal communication, January 25, 2013). This intervention by MIDIMAR to encourage even “shy” women to become leaders is a direct reflection of Rwandan values.

While this aspect of camp life does not necessarily entrench refugees in continued displacement—rather it may ultimately help with political activism upon return to their country of origin—it does speak to the ways in which the host government reinforces its own identity as a sovereign state within the “international” borders of the camp. Though not mandated to become so actively involved in the political life of camp residents, MIDIMAR takes a serious interest in the ways women view themselves as potential elected leaders. This transmission of value system from host nation to highly functioning camp election process stands as a testament to the government’s competence as a refugee host and sovereign state. The camp remains an enclave of non-citizens, but it has a structured system of Foucaultian accountability that radiates from the center area where the leadership convenes and out through the representatives to all reaches of the containment area. It is an orderly replication of community-based leadership so common in rural parts of Rwanda. Like the education process, it engages refugees in citizenship processes that reaffirm their faux-citizen status and indoctrinate them into host nation norms and values; and yet, without the possibility of local integration, camp elections remain the domain of the refugee non-citizens.

ECONOMY

Much of the documentation about Kiziba in this section comes from the WFP & UNHCR (2014) report that summarizes the situation of each refugee camp in Rwanda. Refugee voices from the camp then help to contextualize the durability of economic conditions inscribed on life in Kiziba. One of the most resonant aspects of the report is the level of detail included about the health and economic lives of refugees in Rwanda. By this report alone, the refugees are engaged as a tool in internal and external sovereignty justification on the part of states and state-like INGOs. The report brings voices of Congolese
refugees, through focus group summaries, into the international arena to address questions about adequate funding and resource provision. Implied in its findings are assessments of host government and INGO competencies in caring for this vulnerable population. Simply by existing, the refugees play a part in international policy and funding decisions that link donors, such as the top UNHCR donors—the US and Japan—with migration issues located in remote areas of the DRC/Rwanda border. The report itself, then, serves as an instance of entrenching displacement factors. It demonstrates the need for additional funding to support the international refugee complex. The report also documents the host country’s successes and failures, serving as a testament to its ability to perform as a competent domestic entity and international actor. States and INGOs therefore document refugees’ experiences in ways that confer additional resources in the form of donations, recognition through an assessment of the refugees’ quality of life, and power though international public acknowledgement of the care work provided.

Food security and food diversity constitute serious grievances among the refugees, but the food aid is also the main source of economic income for most families. In Kiziba Camp specifically, an estimated 70% of family income comes from selling portions of monthly food aid (WFP & UNHCR, 2014). Aid dependency is perversely connected with economic agency among residents. It is also a source of vulnerability, exposing refugees to indebtedness, violence, and exploitation as undocumented workers outside the camp. The WFP & UNHCR (2014) report:

When there is not enough food or money to buy food the refugees employ a number of different strategies to cope with the situation. The most common negative coping strategies mentioned were: girls engaging in transactional sex to cover their basic needs; taking loans to cover domestic needs instead of investments; theft/robbery; underfeeding; and high-risk casual labour. All of these strategies potentially result in serious consequences.

Over the years, refugees in Rwanda have not had the opportunity to significantly expand their livelihoods and sources of income. The most common source of income is to sell part of the food ration. The money from selling food aid is used to buy additional, preferred types of food and to cover other basic needs. (pp. 3-4)

The refugees in our interviews across all years regularly commented that often, for the poorest camp residents, the food aid does not stretch for the whole month so some families struggle near the end. Speaking of her constituents and more broadly of camp conditions, one village leader in our interviews confirmed the WFP & UNHCR report findings,
So for the people who don’t have means to go out and buy rice, and meats, it’s hard for them. So this is the food they get from UNHCR\(^4\) [pointing to USAID bags of maize and beans]. Imagine to eat that kind of food, morning as a breakfast, as supper, as dinner, from Monday to Sunday. And sometimes the food we get from UNHCR, it doesn’t even cover enough, so we have to struggle to cover the remaining days. (village leader, personal communication, 5 June 2014)

Many participants in our field research expressed concerns along the themes of food monotony, daily monotony, food insecurity, leaving children to go hungry, and frustration with the inability to change the situation. Denying agency to engage in the larger process, particularly through economic self-sufficiency opportunities, is one way in which INGOs participate in the protraction of refugees. As the Minister of MIDIMAR and the refugee youth explained, without skills training and a sense of personal empowerment, the refugees will have little to fall back on in the event durable solutions become available (Séraphine Mukantabana, personal communication, 13 June 2014; camp youth representative, 6 June 2014). By understanding the economic context of the camp, this section provides insight into how employment opportunities and livelihood initiatives entrench refugees in protracted displacement through containment policies that benefit the host government and livelihood initiatives that benefit INGOs. In the following sections, refugee elected leaders provide generalizations about camp life that help to situate economic opportunities and policies within the context of life in Kiziba. Though not directly a voice of the state, their testimonies speak to the interplay between state-level and camp-level forces that embed durability in the refugees’ protracted status.

**IDLENESS AND WORK**

Economic opportunities are nearly as limited as food diversity in the camp. While residents and outside Rwandan community members can come and go from the camp, refugees experience strict restrictions on employment options. The MIDIMAR minister politically reiterated that regional peace was the only long-term solution, but she also noted “right now, we must facilitate them living here” through provision of skills and vocational training that will allow them to be competitive in the job market upon their return “home” (to the DRC) (Séraphine Mukantabana, personal communication, 13 June 2014). To this, however, she added, “In reality, we can’t consider to transform them into Rwandan citizens” because “we

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\(^4\) She says “UNHCR” here as a blanket statement for the aid provider in the camp, but food rations come from World Food Programme.
have not enough soil” and “we must be realistic” (Séraphine Mukantabana, personal communication, 13 June 2014). She did mention a forthcoming law that would provide a path to naturalization for refugees if they applied and met the criteria, though she did not elaborate on those criteria or estimate how many refugees it might affect.

The camp Executive Committee and Security Committee each turned repeatedly to the persistence of idleness in the camp as the root of all problems—namely alcohol abuse, staying out past curfew, and violence against other residents (personal communication, 26 and 27 January 2013). One village leader conveyed the frustration with idleness and lack of agency by summarizing the economic opportunities available to camp residents,

Life is really hard because you know we don’t have jobs. We can’t have a firm way to work. We don’t have enough food. You know, it’s really hard. We wake up in the morning and then, the whole day [we spend] without doing anything. We don’t have a job. We don’t have any purpose, working like men. (personal communication, village leader, 5 June 2014)

While this is an individual assessment, his role as village leader allows him to represent the general economic conditions of the camp, a sentiment that many other interviewees confirmed. The MIDIMAR Minister emphasized the importance of preventing young men from being idle as well as introducing vocational training to refugees so they would be competitive in the job market upon return to the DRC (Séraphine Mukantabana, personal communication, 13 June 2014). As a former refugee herself, this is a substantial point to make about the future of the Congolese refugees in Rwanda. This speaks to the fact that they belong back in the DRC and local integration is not under consideration by the Rwandan government. Minister Mukantabana emphasized several times during our interview that there is no room in Rwanda to give the refugees land to farm; local integration would sentence them to a life of poverty since they could not farm—an important aspect of life in a still primarily agricultural nation.
Some trade happens, mostly with refugees trading portions of their rations in the town below and neighboring Rwandans coming in to sell goods at the Kiziba market. In 2011, shortly after a distribution of World Food Programme (WFP) aid in the camp, we witnessed refugees loading bags of corn and beans onto the public bus to sell in town. A member of the Kiziba Executive Council explained that spare maize is often sold for 100 or 200 Rwandan Francs to get phone credit to use mobile phones for communication (Executive Council, personal communication, 14 March 2011). Although the individual food aid allotment meets the baseline caloric requirements to sustain a human life for one month, the refugees pool resources in order to access other necessary goods not included in the monthly rations—communication carrying obvious weight in this case to warrant corn rations. Some refugees find jobs with NGOs operating within the camp, though as one resident pharmacy employee of African Humanitarian Action...
explained, “We are so many here, we cannot find at the same time a job” (AHA employee, personal communication, 5 June 2014). At some point, there was a micro-lending women’s cooperative in the camp, but this failed when members were unable to make “enough contribution to make the business going on” (quartier leader, personal communication, 6 June 2014). Those who are not lucky enough to secure the handful of NGO jobs available to the refugees must turn to the informal economy outside the camp borders. The humanitarian agency employee and quartier leader, while both refugees in Kiziba themselves, portray instances of state-level policies manifesting in the lives of refugees. Restrictive economic—and ultimately local integration—policies keep the refugees from pursuing worthwhile and safe employment opportunities outside the camp. These policies condemn the refugees to idleness and nearly complete dependency on food rations as a means to meet their everyday needs. This cycle of dependency entrenches the refugees in durable forms of displacement as they languish without many opportunities to develop skills that could help them if they were ever released from limbo. It also provides a constant need for the refugee regime complex that allows conference of international recognition that the INGOs are necessary and require donor resources. In this way, restrictive economic policies heavily influence the durable nature of protracted situations.

Residents were reluctant to relay stories of those who had pursued work outside the camp. Without papers, they risk exploitation by those in the outside world who know they have no legal rights to work. One refugee youth explained, based on his experience seeking work outside the camp, “No, [the Rwandan government] has no papers for them [the refugees]. The salaries they get paid [outside the camp], because we have no ID is not a good life” (refugee youth, personal communication, 5 June 2014). Without citizenship, or at the bare minimum official work papers, refugees are relatively powerless to engage formally in the local economy. Some residents have little choice than to pursue illicit work without other sources of income. As one youth representative explained,

My friends, Rwandese, they knew that I am a refugee. It’s a hard situation…and they say you are not a man. You have no intellect to [them] there. You can’t feel safe there. Before I had some causal works outside the camp. But because I had no identity [papers] it was really amazing situation to work outside the camp without having the identity. You don’t work safely. The salary, they pay you as they want (youth representative, personal communication, 5 June 2014).
He left the camp to wait tables in a restaurant in order to get money to buy his nephew food. The child had a serious illness and could not digest the corn and beans supplied by WFP. Unable to access alternative means to get a job or find resources, he felt he needed to make money to buy more nutritious food. Ultimately, treatment and employment conditions outside the camp were so unpredictable and cruel that he returned to Kiziba. He speculated of others that leave the camp for work saying, “They don’t want to tell you about everything, but I think it’s the same...thing which happened to me” (youth representative, personal communication, 5 June 2014). A similar situation happened with one of the younger youth representatives that we interviewed. Several months after the initial interview, he contacted me to say that he was leaving the camp to pursue a job promised to him through an acquaintance. Just a few days after leaving, however, he returned and informed me that, “there’s someone who lie [to] me [about] that job I was going to” (personal communication, 4 November 2014).

The refugee youth’s intuition these stories are far more common than what surfaced in the interviews is likely correct; the MIDIMAR camp manager informed us that “There are not as many working-age men in the camp; many leave to find jobs” (G. Karagire, Kiziba Camp Manager, personal communication, January 25, 2013). The ability to attain proper work papers was generally attributed to those who had connections to get a full education and those who had “a rich family abroad [that] can try to find them papers...that’s the problem of why many of us, we are suffering, because we don’t have the connections” (youth representative, personal communication, 6 June 2014). Here, youth voices contribute to the dialog on economic opportunity as well as exclusion from society. They illuminate the state structures within which they must operate for survival. Without “connections” there are no opportunities. Unless one can work the system, there is no way to get official (or unofficial) documentation to pursue outside work, and thus no opportunities or hope for the future. This is an important aspect of camp life that again reinforces the insider/outsider nature of this border within a border. As the state exerts control over who can and cannot participate in the economy—an arguably critical component of the refugees’ expression of agency and even humanity—the line between citizen and noncitizen is firmly reinforced at the borders of the camp. This level of control and reiteration of the line between insider/outsider transcends the relationship between the host state and the refugees; it also applies to the relationship
between the international community and the refugees through policies and practices of service-providing INGOs.

Figure 14: World Vision Rabbit Husbandry Program

Photo by: Jennifer N. Fish

**LIVELIHOOD INITIATIVES AND VOCATIONAL TRAINING**

Providing vocational training generally falls to the realm of INGOs. The priority, length, and quality of training speak to INGO values rather than the reality of the camps. Through participation in these economic programs, refugees engage in INGOs’ own quests for resources, recognition, and power. As with state actors, these three powerful motivators serve as entrenching factors of displacement. By examining the programs available to refugees in Kiziba, we see that they more accurately serve the broader interests of INGOs and international values, while providing opportunities that are misaligned with the realities of the camp. These priorities reveal ways in which INGOs participate in protracting displacement.
Several INGOs, including the American Refugee Committee (ARC) and World Vision, facilitate livelihood initiatives intended to provide economic support for certain groups of refugees. These activities promote skills and often provide resources to support small business enterprises, though they generally focus only on the most vulnerable camp subpopulations, such as widows and HIV positive residents. According to a World Vision Rwanda (2013) annual report, 300 people from Kiziba, Gihembe, and Kigeme refugee camps participated in skills training for “tailoring, cooking, hairdressing, mechanics, knitting, welding, and carpentry” (p. 15). Across those three camps, 92 families also received a pair of rabbits to begin rabbit husbandry projects and start kitchen gardens. Error! Reference source not found. shows one such rabbit hutch. The rabbits can be sold for meat, while their manure provides fertilizer for the gardens (World Vision Rwanda, 2013). The limited access to such opportunities again speaks to the difficulty of attaining economic sufficiency—or even partial sufficiency—within the camp. As shown in Figure 15, other economic opportunities inside the camp include tailoring, power charging stations, and mobile phone minutes (“airtime”) shops. In a camp of over 16,000, however, the availability of economic opportunity leaves the vast majority of residents without any supplemental income and results in refugees needing to sell parts of food rations to provide other necessities. The knitting room, shown in Figure 15, provides one specific instance of how INGO initiatives that garner international support, funding from donors, and legitimacy for the organization itself, contrast with the realities of the camp. The individual-level experience conveyed support a concrete example of INGO policies and values playing out at the camp level.

During the third year of my fieldwork in Kiziba, my mother led a two-day knitting and crochet workshop for two groups of women identified by the ARC. From her professional expertise, she observed that the knitting center, established by an INGO and stocked by a faith-based organization, did not have the necessary lighting or equipment to be of any use to the refugees. Many of the donated knitting machines were broken, and the knitting groups had not learned how to repair or properly use the machines. There were no raw materials with which to make any tradable or sellable goods. No plan existed to propel this studio forward into an economic resource for the women in the knitting group. By plan here I mean that we observed no raw materials, no transport mechanisms to take the goods to the market, and no patterns or project ideas tailored to the local economic markets that would make any
business venture viable. Any items produced by the group would have a difficult time elevating the economic circumstances of any of the members because of these limitations. Here, "livelihood" initiative is donor-speak for applied projects that legitimate the INGOs’ efforts for their spatially distant contributors from the global North. In many instances, such projects build upon notions of helping poor/underprivileged women of the global South. Yet this “help” very often frames refugee women as among the most vulnerable, while simultaneously reinforcing their Third World Woman status (Mohanty, 1984) and reproducing the notion of the West as the prescribing agent of development for the world’s poor. In the case of Kiziba Camp’s former applied development initiatives, inactivity is evident in the broken knitting machines, empty supply stations, and abandoned work spaces that fail to provide any material change in economic opportunities or daily livelihoods. Rather than upholding a development vision as a charity (often mercy) project with the potential to change refugee women’s lives, these inactive initiatives more accurately represent hopelessness and donor disinvestment. These realities are distinctly evident by the visual imagery that both stands out in colorful billboard signage among the clay backwash of all of Kiziba Camp’s habitat infrastructures, as well as symbolizes the sharp contradictions of such projects’ closed operations and the international community’s abandonment.

This illustrates an instance of INGO priorities and values mapped onto refugee lives. Good will through donations did not translate to actual economic livelihoods. Like the microloan women’s group that once existed in the camp but ran out of momentum (village leader, personal communication, 6 June 2014), the knitting supplies were dropped in the camp to check an INGO funding box somewhere that ‘something’ had been done to boost economic livelihood. In reality, those knitting groups could eke very little out of those broken machines. The lack of thought-investment in this livelihood initiative instantiates a larger cycle of durable displacement. Though perhaps not intentional, the INGO benefits by legitimating itself to funders through programs such as the knitting room. In reality, however, it does nothing to uplift the economic standing of the participating women. The room sits filled with mostly broken machines and no supplies. No new influx of knitting skills training supports entrepreneurship or helps residents learn to repair and care for the machines. No one taught marketing or business techniques in conjunction with the knitting machines to ensure the participating refugees could transfer these donations (of time and
Figure 15: Economic Opportunities in Kiziba Camp

(Top to bottom) Tailoring/Knitting Studio, Mobile Phone Recharging Kiosk, and Mobile Phone Minutes

Shop in Kiziba Camp

Photo by: Jennifer N. Fish
machines) into economic opportunities. This phenomenon within Kiziba Camp is transferrable to the
playground and the scantily stocked handicraft store that generally remain locked. INGO initiatives
generate funding and international support for the institutions, thereby feeding the sense of legitimacy;
and yet very little translates into value-added initiatives in the remote protracted camp context.

CONCLUSIONS

In this chapter, I drew upon field notes from Kiziba Camp and INGO reports to illustrate the ways
in which host states and NGOs derive access to legitimate their internal and external sovereignty from
refugee hosting and service-provision. Refugee voices from the camp contextualized imposed state and
INGO value structures on the everyday lives of camp residents. These relationships came through in the
areas of camp security, education, politics, and economics. Foucault’s ideas of discipline and biopower,
as well as his conceptualization of a milieu though which these notions of power spread, helped to situate
Kiziba as a microcosm of the larger interaction between states, INGOs, and refugees. I see refugee
camps, specifically Kiziba, as representing a border within a border; that is to say, the camp represents
the relationship between Rwanda and the DRC, between citizen/non-citizen other and insider/outsider.
The protraction of the situation in Kiziba is important because it is through repetitive interactions that the
relationships between host state, INGOs, and refugees become even more entrenched in protraction.
Refugees in protracted cases become durably displaced as INGOs and host states find iterative value in
encamped populations through opportunities for legitimacy and resources tied to their own pursuits of
sovereignty. This chapter explored in particular the motivations for states and NGOs to protract
displacement, namely in the pursuit of resources, recognition, and power to preserve sovereignty. It also
touched on the role that refugees play in the factors that convert temporary camp situations into durable
displacement.

In the realm of security, refugees perform the will of the host nation by enforcing security
protocols at the camp border. Documentation and access restriction represent the character of the
Rwandan state and reinforce the complex idea of refugees as faux-citizens, compliant in the ways of
Rwandan security; but these systems also reiterate the outsider status of the refugees, thereby bolstering
internal sovereignty by defining the boundaries of citizenship and participation in the state. Unlike other
global camp scenarios, the Rwandan government actively engages in security within the camp, thus
conveying its own values and norms to the population. At night, however, the refugees adopt some agency through the administration of volunteer security patrols that ensure the safety of residents and instantiate the way that the camp takes on its own sovereign-like qualities. These groups work in collaboration with the Rwandese police and soldiers who patrol the camp perimeter every night; this relationship along the camp border again serves to reinforce the complex inclusive and exclusive relationship between refugees and the host state. From this relationship, the state derives relevance domestically for the ability to maintain security within its borders; it also gains international recognition for proper management of the population and the international border relationship the camp represents. Refugees were proud of their autonomy in daily camp security activities and found a sense of identity from the responsibilities allotted to them by the host government and INGOs. Their pride and sense of autonomy points to their roles as “obedient citizen-subjects” despite their exclusion from true citizenship. Implied in this relationship is a durability to displacement in the constructed identities of refugees, the topic of the next chapter.

Looking at the education of camp residents, we saw that the state administers a formal national curriculum that indoctrinates refugees into a false sense of citizenship. Education may represent an investment in the preservation of external sovereignty. By providing the full education and citizenship training of the eastern DRC’s youth, Rwanda can potentially shape the future of eastern DRC’s economy and politics. This speaks to the rumors of Rwanda’s interest in expanding into eastern DRC and is perhaps a motivator for the comprehensive response the country has provided the Congolese refugees. By not engaging refugees in the full spectrum of educational opportunities, however, the host state and INGOs are stunting the potential for cross-border and regional conflict resolution and peacemaking. The Banyarwanda refugees play a critical role in the conflict in eastern DRC; without fully training them in the process of peace-building and engaging them in the process, it is unlikely that any long-term resolution will allow them to return home. In this way, the limitations of the education system further entrench the refugees in a state of durable displacement.

Aspects of Kiziba residents’ economic life also speak to cementing factors of durability in displacement. These predominantly stem from refugees’ inability to access more reliable economic opportunities. Additionally, livelihood initiatives provided by the INGOs reflect international norms and
values rather than the realities of the camp. Faced with these inconsistencies, the refugees have very little agency to control their own food security and access to employment or trade relationships. By engaging in these programs, refugees become acclimated to the values and norms of the humanitarian and international community. INGOs encourage them to engage in internationally determined values that contradict their living environments, thereby reinforcing the notion of outsider/other. They also become practiced at the economic livelihood development projects that reflect INGO and international priorities without necessarily considering long-term viability of those avenues. While these serve a certain purpose within the camp, they result in a cycle where INGO funding focuses on (and grows from) developing norms and programs, and refugees become involved in purposefully apolitical activities that prevent them from actively engaging the larger peacemaking discussion (Milner, 2011).

Collectively, these aspects of life in Kiziba speak to both intentional and unintentional processes performed by the host state and INGOs that further protract displacement. As S. Turner (2010) contends, repeated micro-moments of interaction between refugees, host nation, and INGOs in the form of daily caretaking acts in fact contribute to the sense of permanence that pervades life in Kiziba. Additionally, the continued lack of agency among refugees to change the fate of their lives related to food, health, and occupation contribute to an overwhelming sense of frustration combined with protraction that Lischer (2006) warns can lead to refugee militarization. If this were to occur, it would cause local and regional insecurity and likely prolong the protracted state of displacement. The cumulative result of these many interactions reveal a system of dependency on the part of refugees, states, and INGOs that creates a state of durable displacement.
DURABILITY IN AGENCY AND IDENTITY

I don’t have a hope of returning to Congo, even if they are one day [at] peace. It’s like, I’m fed up [with] Congo, the country who killed my husband, the country who killed my relatives, my brother, and sisters. To be honest with you, I can’t go back to Congo. I would never in my life.
-2014 Interview, Village leader, Kiziba Camp

INSIDER NOWHERE

As a microcosm of the broader politics, history, and demography of the Great Lakes Region, Kiziba Camp refugees' interactions at the local level also contribute to protracted displacement. Refugee scholars often focus on the local reproductions of identity, citizenship, and agency (Bezabeh, 2011; Malkki, 1992; Redclift, 2011; S. Turner, 2010); but, my intent here is to expand this type of ethnographic analysis to demonstrate the ways in which refugees contribute to a system that leads to a durable form of displacement. Why would refugees themselves protract displacement? This question brings up complicated considerations and difficult dimensions of the relationship between transnational structures and individual agency. I do not claim their contribution to the system of displacement is intentional—though in militarizing camp cases, protraction may be an obvious outcome. Rather, by exploring the themes that emerge from the interview data with Kiziba elected leadership, youth representatives, and MIDIMAR officials, I intend to show how refugees engage in identity construction that further entrenches them in the “liminal drift” of placelessness (Bauman, 2004, p. 76).

Zygmunt Bauman (2004) philosophized on the hopelessness of the refugee situation, implying that protraction is the natural outcome of global processes. He laments,

Refugees are human waste, with no useful function to play in the land of their arrival and temporary stay and no intention or realistic prospect of being assimilated and incorporated into the new social body; from their present place, the dumping site, there is no return and no road forward. (Bauman, 2004, p. 77)

The frustration and hopelessness in Bauman’s words deeply convey in the interviews with Kiziba’s refugees. One resident stated simply, “In this refugee camp, there is no hope for me” (refugee youth, personal communication, 6 June 2014). Overall, the participants in our study felt acted upon by
humanitarian and host government agencies with little power to evoke lasting change. The interview excerpts to follow certainly speak to this sense of wasted human life—of a yearning for any kind of change. More subtly, however, the interviews expose the contradictory ways the refugees confront limits to their agency within the camp, as well as their relationship to the host government and international community. A close analysis of these narratives reveals the processes by which Kiziba Camp residents formulate their identities in terms of citizenship, “home,” and hope for the future, as they navigate agency within the larger structural determinants of their lives on the border of such contested terrains. The ongoing regional conflict and citizenship crisis adds a layer of complexity that draws parallels with the Rwanda/DRC border and larger conversations on refugee identity (Koko, 2013; Mamdani, 2002; Nzongola-Ntalaja, 2007). These structural factors contribute to the nearly unanimous sense among camp residents that there is indeed “no return and no road forward” (Bauman, 2004, p. 77). In this context of conflict, contested identities, and liminal drift, I draw upon interviews with Kiziba residents to show how their own imaginings contribute to the cycle of displacement.

AGENCY

A focus on agency within Kiziba Camp facilitates an investigation of how refugees situate themselves in reference to the host state, sending state, and state-like INGOs. I use the sociological idea of ‘agency’ to analyze interview data and reveal these underlying relationships. Here, I adopt the feminist poststructuralist understanding of ‘agency’ to reflect the authority one has to determine and shape the discourses that define one’s identity (Davies, 1991). More widely adopted versions of agency link its definition to the specific power or capacity of individuals to perform an action (Giddens, 1984). The idea of power as agency relies heavily on one’s subjectivity and access to that power. Subsequent theorists have adapted these definitions in response to more nuanced understanding of social processes by adding the idea that agency is “a temporally embedded process of social engagement” and should include “a capacity to imagine alternative possibilities” rather than relying only on past experiences (Emirbayer & Mische, 1998, p. 963). From a feminist poststructuralist approach, “fragmentation, contradiction, and discontinuity, rather than continuity of identity are the focus” (Davies, 1991, p. 43). As contradiction often emerges in the narratives of this study’s participants, this approach to agency provides a lens to view the complex ways refugees exercise and understand agency. In this light, “Agency is never freedom from
discursive constitution of self but the capacity to recognize that constitution and to resist, subvert, and change the discourses themselves through which one is being constituted” (Davies, 1991, p. 51). It is not power per se, but the “capacity to recognize” and challenge the identity and experience-shaping forces around them that constitutes agency.

The close relationship between agency and identity construction, explained in the feminist poststructuralist understanding of agency, forms a central theoretical underpinning of this chapter. In particular, noting the difference between Humanist and Feminist Poststructuralist conceptualizations of ‘agency,’ Davies (1991) explains that in the latter, human stories are not just “versions of events that occur in the real world,” but instead “are the means by which events are interpreted, made tellable, or even livable.” She continues, “All stories are understood as fictions, such fictions providing the substance of lived reality” (Davies, 1991, p. 43). Here, storytelling constructs identity, an iterative phenomenon of building “mythico-histories” that shape collective identities (Malkki, 1995). In the case of Kiziba residents, agency and identity formation go hand-in-hand as the refugees reflect on home, hope, and their place in the larger international refugee regime and political system in often contradictory and fragmented ways. Together, this agency to “resist, subvert, and change the discourses” (Davies, 1991, p. 51) that shape their encamped experiences emerge as a collective understanding that they occupy a particular ‘outsider within’ socio-political space. The refugees share resources with Rwandan host communities and therefore inhabit a very local, albeit spatially distinct, space. At the same time, they demonstrate an understanding that their governance structures and personal narratives carry weight in the international realm, placing them in a supra-political space inaccessible by non-refugee locals. The refugees shape the discourse of their protracted situation by framing themselves in the non-citizen, international actor category. This chapter describes this expression of agency and identity formation as a factor contributing to the durability of their displacement.

REFUGEES AS INTERNATIONAL ACTORS

While the ideas of agency and identity formation are conceptually abstract, the role of these forces in defining refugees’ interactions with states and INGOs constitutes a major part of the cycle of durable displacement. Zetter (1991) asserts that without recognizing the importance of these two major considerations—agency and identity formation—it is impossible to truly address the crisis of increasingly
long protracted situations, or even displacement more broadly. During the interview process, Kiziba refugees clearly identified relationships with states/INGOs at both a local and international level. In particular, they demonstrated mastery of diplomatic and INGO-speak by regularly calling upon the terms “ambassador,” “durable solutions,” and “guarantee.” The previous chapter explored these relationships through structural aspects of camp life. This chapter expands that discussion by examining how refugees manipulate discourses of humanitarian relief and forced displacement and form identities in camp contexts in ways that add durability to their situation.

Through some of these expressions of agency and identity, refugees rebel against Bauman’s (2004) claim that their lives are wasted or that they have “no useful function” (p. 77). S. Turner (2010) describes the motivations that lead refugees in camps to participate in identity formation and seek ways to enact agency,

What the refugees found the most threatening about the camp was the fact that life no longer was in their own hands and they were at the mercy of powerful external forces in the shape of relief agencies, local Tanzanians and Rwanda refugees. They sensed that their previous knowledge was no longer of much use for navigating everyday life in the camp. (p. 82)

He goes on to describe how the refugees of that camp actively engaged the identities and agency limitations established by the INGOs. They did not passively accept the apolitical identities imposed on them by UNHCR. The refugees in his study, much like those in Kiziba, found ways to gain control over the discourses that defined certain aspects of their own lives and identities by adopting an understand of themselves as actors in the larger international refugee regime. Seeing us, researchers from the global North, as having power to change their circumstances, a woman quartier leader proposed, “Maybe a hope can be, if you are a good ambassador for us, to tell the international community [we want] to leave this camp because we are tired of it” (quartier leader, personal communication, 6 June 2014). An elder man requested, “We are asking you who have power…not only for me, but all the refugees around the world or the refugees here, to return [us] back home because it’s where we feel happy” (village leader,

1 Quartier, or neighborhood, leaders supervise several villages and thus represent the mid-level tier of governance within the camp. Above the quartier leaders are the Executive Council and Elected Camp President who communicate directly with MIDIMAR and INGO representatives.
personal communication, 5 June 2014). These leaders were expressing more than frustration with their situation; they were calling upon us as Northern representatives in the larger international system to make changes that would secure their return home or resettlement abroad. They made no requests to the host state that granted us access to the camp, but rather placed their concerns in the context of the larger enduring regional conflict and the political processes that keep them contained in camps.

In her analysis of refugees’ interactions with the law, Holzer (2013) points to this larger engagement beyond the local to the international. She observes of camp-based refugee women protesting UNHCR migration policies, “The protesters anchored their claims to rights in a special relationship to the international community rather than host obligations. The placards that protesters carried offered a particularly clear window into this global (not local) approach” (Holzer, 2013, p. 863). Holzer (2013) notes that the long-staying Liberian refugees her study “develop an understanding of themselves as a distinctive group of rights holders with a special relationship to the international community—as refugees rather than simply Liberians or migrants” (p. 865) This distinction, as I demonstrate in this chapter, conveys in multiple realms of refugee life beyond the law. Malkki (1992) captures this best when she explains,

> Far from being a “spoiled identity,” refugee status was valued and protected as a sign of the ultimate temporariness of exile and of the refusal to become naturalized, to put down roots in a place to which one did not belong. Insisting on one’s liminality and displacement as a refugee was also to have a legitimate claim to the attention of “international opinion” and to international assistance. (p. 35)

‘Legitimate claim to… attention’ is encapsulated by Zetter’s (1991) idea of ‘political currency.’ Though he talks about this in reference to the gains for states hosting refugees, it transfers conceptually to refugees themselves. As they maneuver through a system of durable displacement, they exercise agency in order to access resources, recognition, and power in parallel ways to those of states and state-like INGOs in the previous chapter. In this sense, I contend that through their very role as international actors, refugees express a distinct form of agency.

In the Rwandan refugee context, Kiziba residents expressed a definite sense of conscious image-shaping as ethnolinguistically and socially compatible with host population at the local level and yet distinctly outsider non-citizens. Playing to the sense of outsider within, the refugees independently
expressed gratitude to the Rwandan host state. The Executive Council voiced appreciation to Rwanda several times during our focus group meeting (personal communication, 25 January 2013). Specifically, one member of the council took a moment to say to no one in particular, “We are thankful to the country of Rwanda” (personal communication, 25 January 2013). Another later elaborated, “What we appreciate is that this country of Rwanda gives us where to stay and we say thank you because this country ensures the security of all refugees we have here in the camp” (personal communication, 25 January 2013). They also reported good relations with their local Rwandan neighbors, even sharing clinic services and access to water wells. One elder village leader commented, “Yeah, we are living in good relationships. Sometimes, or most of the time, they even bring their crops—their sweet potatoes—and we buy them” (village leader, personal communication, 5 June 2014). Though others had slightly more nuanced “good” relations. One refugee youth hinted at the idea that as an outsider he must be on his best behavior outside the camp, and that is why he had no problems. He recounted,

After I reached there at school [outside the camp], I decide…I live in good relationship with Rwandese. I didn’t have any problems. Yes, because after reaching outside, because I’m a Congolese and a refugee, I can’t do the mistake while I’m not Rwandese. I have a good behavior there outside with the other student of Rwandese. (Kiziba youth, personal communication, 5 June 2014)

Linguistic and cultural ties with the surrounding communities—markers of the residents’ insider status—reportedly lent themselves to very few problems between refugees and local Rwandese. The WFP & UNHCR (2014) focus groups confirm this feeling of maintaining good relationships with Rwandan neighbors across all Congolese camps in the country.

For the long-tem, however, the refugees conveyed a deep sense of ‘thank you, but no thank you.’ In other words, they were diplomatically grateful to the host community and country for support, but would much prefer to go home. A woman quartier leader expressed best this when she said,

If I can’t be asked to go back to Congo [for security reasons], if I can’t ask to stay in Rwanda—because even if I’m in a refugee camp, it’s in Rwanda, I’ll be happy to go somewhere in peace, which is not Rwanda because I’m in Rwanda already. (quartier leader, personal communication, 6 June 2014)

This idea of going somewhere else “which is not Rwanda because I’m in Rwanda already” came up in several interviews. It speaks directly to the Congolese refugees’ framing themselves as distinctly separate
from Rwandans, despite their similarities; in other words acknowledging their outsider within status. Her narrative captures the essence of how Kiziba residents expressed a form of agency by taking control of the discourses surrounding their situation; this relatively powerful elected leader reiterates her subjectivity as a refugee deserving of international solutions, namely resettlement.

The MIDIMAR Minister, Séraphine Mukantabana, a former refugee herself, also made this distinction. During a personal interview, as she commented on the potential for local integration, she made it clear that “that is a one-by-one solution” and not a solution for the entire population. Her stance acknowledges the potential for refugees to occupy an ‘insider’ space, but with the caveat that these opportunities are available for exceptional ‘others’ rather than all refugees. As one of the most densely populated countries in Africa, the Minister articulated clearly that local integration is simply not viable in Rwanda because of the lack of available land to support the refugees. As she shared her process of considering the “best interest of the population” she posed the question, “What will be gained by being transformed into Rwandan citizens?” This, she argued, is only a short-term solution. The Minister offered that “the main assistance [MIDIMAR can offer] is to provide security and peace in the region...The most important commitment is to advocate for peace for refugees” (Séraphine Mukantabana, personal communication, 13 June 2014). Ultimately, while Rwanda commits to hosting refugees and advocating regionally for peace, the Congolese refugees are outsiders there, with no real claims to a life beyond the refugee label.

The quartier leader’s statement above makes it clear that she also has no intention of staying in the host country. In this way, she reinforces the durability of Kiziba refugees’ displacement. Her statement eliminates the possibility of the first two of UNHCR’s rank-ordered ‘durable solutions,’ specifically repatriation and local integration. The realities of the third option, resettlement abroad, for the millions of refugees experiencing protracted displacement like those in Kiziba, leave her and her fellow refugees in a state of continued ‘liminal drift’ with no sense of a long-term solution. Impossibility of a future solution emerged as a theme in the refugees’ interviews, but some shared a more concrete way of expressing the unending displacement they experienced. An elder village leader reasoned,

I’m a Congolese refugee because...we are here temporarily. We still have hope that we’ll go back home. This is a story of a whole history of refugees in Africa or [a] developing country. When you are born as a refugee, you are condemned to die as a refugee. It’s
not like in your country. I can come to America as a refugee and maybe in two or five years I can get citizenship. In Africa, no. Even if temporary can be a hundred years, it’s still temporary. (village leader, personal communication, 5 June 2014)

Unlike the quartier leader, this elder village leader is unwilling to give up hope of one day returning to his ancestral soil. He later confided that his deepest wish is to be buried on his land in the DRC when he dies. And yet, he seemed to grasp the durability of his situation. In his heart, even for “a hundred years” he will always be an outsider/foreigner in this host location. This stands as yet another testament to the way that the refugees accept, in some ways, their circumstances as perpetually placeless persons. It also shows how their identity construction as forever Congolese, and therefore outsider/other in the land of asylum, shapes a narrative of durable temporariness. In this way, he exhibits a kind of agency to resist local integration though it does not manifest directly as power to change his actions or circumstances.

Moving forward from this acceptance, refugees use their position to participate in some forms of broader international dialog. Holzer (2013) observed that refugees pass over local engagement to project their voices into the international arena. Kiziba Camp, for instance, regularly hosts INGO representative, political, and celebrity guests, giving the residents an opportunity to more fully connect with international actors. As one member of the Executive Council explained,

> When we see American visitors or other visitors, we ask them if possible they can be our ‘spokesman’ to tell to other people around the world that we are Congolese and also our country of DRC accepts that we are Congolese. If you say that, then everyone knows the truth; it could help us so we could go back to our country. (Executive Council, personal communication, 25 January 2014)

Likewise, members of the Executive Council and other interviewees suggested that we, as researchers, “go ask your government” for more resettlement options, including increased resettlement quotas or political intervention in the DRC to restore peace. The refugees directly engaged us, as white researchers representing an educational institution from the global North, as part of the peace-building process. Their perception of our power to evoke change regularly drew out requests during the interview process to be “good ambassadors” of their stories, which they understood to carry weight in the international political arena. The refugees thanked Rwanda for its hospitality, but did not ask for intervention or to serve as a spokesperson (even though it does both of these things); instead, they focused on the visitors to convey their messages to a larger international audience.
As discussed in the Methodology chapter, the refugees also enacted agency by calling our data collection team to a higher purpose in our research process. They pointedly questioned,

As you came to talk to us as leaders, what is the guarantee you are giving to us that you are going to be a good ambassador? What is the guarantee? How will we know that you transferred our message we are giving you? (Quartier leader, personal communication, 6 June 2014)

The last question about how they will know that we pass along their "message" is important for understanding how Kiziba refugees perceive their reality as durable displacement. I have interviewed Rwandese in other contexts as well as participated in focus groups of Banyarwanda forcibly relocated from Tanzania into eastern Rwanda. The term "ambassador" and the idea of a "guarantee" never came up in the other interviews. These words surfaced in nearly every interview conducted in Kiziba over each of the three years. The immediate association between our research teams’ presence and residents’ requests that we serve as a conduit of their message shows the embeddedness of international processes in the psychological, intellectual, and socio-political reference bases of refugees there. Well versed in INGO-speak, the refugees frequently use the words “ambassador,” “guarantee,” and “durable solutions” in English even when speaking French or Kinyarwanda. One refugee youth, using INGO-speak, told us, “I would like to go where I can find a durable solution” (refugee youth, personal communication, 5 June 2014). His use of the ‘durable solution’ buzzword places his plight outside the realm of Rwanda alone and into the global conversation on lasting solutions for increasingly long-staying refugee situations. In this way, refugees position themselves as international actors. Rather than engaging the host community, they understood a sense of their larger situation in the international context and encouraged us, as visiting outsiders, to carry their stories into the international realm in search of “durable solutions.” The specific vocabulary carries with it a power to engage in international dialog about access, privilege, and the weight of their stories as forced migrants. Furthermore, refugees’ knowledge of INGO and humanitarian/development machinery language articulated a form of agency, as they identified themselves within this larger system while using the language of the “master’s tools” in their hopes that the larger context of protraction would eventually be dismantled (Lorde, 1983).

Residents of Kiziba Camp repeatedly demonstrated a familiarity with muzunga (foreigners from the global North) outsiders through their easy interactions with us and by articulating awareness of the
wider global system that connotes our placement as Westerners. This idea of our ability to offer a “guarantee” and provide longer-term “ambassadorship” came up in most of the leadership interviews. One participant plainly asked,

What can you do? We are happy that you came to see us, to visit us, to hear our stories, to share our stories. What can you do to change this life for us? Because we are always complaining that we live hard life, that we live in [a] bad situation…If you could be our good ambassador to the international community to come and move us from this situation, we’ll be thankful for you and we’ll ask blessing from God for you. (village leader, personal communication, 6 June 2014)

By requesting a reciprocal value for their time and interview, refugees immediately placed themselves within a system of international processes, most reliably through INGOs. Furthermore, they exhibited agency in their expression of a core knowledge that their story carried some weight, and that we would be better positioned in our reporting of this global crisis by including their actual stories. They were not disillusioned about their request, however. One young woman explained,

What I can tell the American people or the international community is that we don’t live a really good life. We are living a hard life. Of course I know even people who are outside who are not living in the camp also it doesn’t mean that they live the best life; but at least it is different to life here in the camp. (refugee youth representative, personal communication, 6 June 2014)

Her message to the “international community” shows that she certainly understands that leaving the camp does not guarantee anyone a “good life,” but her request is one of agency to change daily processes. The refugees balance a complicated expression of agency where they know they have some voice in the international arena, but very little control over the ability to affect change in their daily circumstances.

This constrained agency stance came across in one particularly poignant statement by a woman village leader who expressed frustration with her children’s future opportunities. She stated, “Just tell [the international community] that we are dying. We are not living. We are just there. If they can do something, they can help us and change our life” (village leader, personal communication, 6 June 2014). Her summary of the exasperation felt among camp residents demonstrates a connection with the broader international community and frustration with the daily monotony and unending displacement that characterizes life in Kiziba. It also speaks to her understanding that the problems of unending displacement are international, not local, and thus places her in the larger conversation of global forced
migration. These expressions of defining the discourses that convey her experience to the international political community demonstrate a kind of agency, constrained by local and global circumstances and yet powerful among international actors. The following sections build on this idea by describing in turn the refugees' narratives along the themes of home, identity, and hope for the future.

SPACE AND PLACE

Given the refugees' relationship with the international community beyond that of the local host community, how does this shape and define identity, citizenship, and even state sovereignty in a way that perpetuates a durable form of displacement? Speaking philosophically to the ways humans as a species assign social meaning to spaces to make them our own, Sundstrom (2003) observes,

There is the force from below, the uptake of the label by those who are labeled. People forced to live in distinct places come to recognize, and even love, those places. As was the case with pre-war Jewish ghettos, the African American reaction to segregation has been one of struggle and resistance, but also appreciation and investment in their communities...While all involved want an end to social ills and distributive injustice, they do not want an end to their neighborhoods and communities. (Sundstrom, 2003, p. 86)

His words ring true for the refugee context as well. While refugees repeatedly sought a solution that would dismantle Kiziba, they simultaneously recognized their own sense of community in the proximity they share with so many others who experienced parallel circumstances and identify in similar borderland forms. They were unwilling to give up their home in Kiziba unless they could return to the DRC or resettle abroad. Kiziba held a special symbolism of security and stability that neither the host country nor the DRC in its current state could replace. Sundstrom (2003) goes on to discuss how place, “in a looping effect,” comes to “inhabit” the human identity (Sundstrom, 2003, p. 91). This theory broadly describes the cognitive processes that contribute to refugees’ sense of identity, hope, and home. The Kiziba residents demonstrated this in their own narratives, for instance when a village leader explained, “I am a Congolese, but here I’m a refugee. But, I’m Congolese” (village leader, personal communication, 5 June 2014). This this case, the contradictory answer of being Congolese but a refugee speaks to the influence of place and encampment on identity in Kiziba. Over decades of isolation in the camp, which identity presides, Congolese, refugee, or both? According to Sundstrom’s (2003) theory, refugees’ forced presence creates the camp environment in which they socially construct their world. As with the refugee youth, “home” and the camp become one in the same. The refugees’ imaginings—the social construction
of who they are and where they belong—in turn shapes the space by externally reinforcing them as 
foreigner/non-citizen/outsider/other. Sundstrom’s (2003) insistence that we see the process as cyclical, 
rather than one-way, illuminates a potential mechanism by which refugees inadvertently entrench their 
displacement into a more durable form.

The previous section placed refugees’ agency in the realm of the international community. This 
section follows the narratives of refugees to illustrate that while Kiziba residents find their protracted 
placelessness frustrating, they hold a deep sense of pride in their abilities to maintain a functional and 
orderly community, another instance of constrained agency. They have shaped this space into a 
community of their own—a separate extra-political space inside the territorial boundaries and internal 
sovereignty of the host state. This section explores the themes of home, identity, and hope to illustrate 
more abstractly the phenomenon Zetter (1991) described when he observed refugees choosing to retain 
the label ‘refugee’ as a conscious strategy. Refugee labeling and collective imaginings of identity, home, 
and hope further situate Kiziba’s residents outside of the context of citizenship in a traditional sovereign 
state, namely DRC or Rwanda, and therefore contribute to a sense that there are no realistic long-term 
solutions for their situation. These imaginings therefore contribute to the permanence and durability of 
their forced displacement.

HOME

The Banyarwanda have lived in camps in Rwanda for nearly two decades. Children in the camp 
now have not known any other life. Those in their early twenties barely remember the DRC. For those 
youth whose families were killed in flight, they do not even know what village they came from, nor have 
they heard stories about ‘home’ in the Congo from their parents or grandparents (youth representatives, 
personal communication, 6 June 2014). For those who are older and remember home, or have 
envisioned it through their families’ stories, the path back to the DRC is elusive and uncertain. Bauman 
(2004) again describes the inter turmoil of being “cast in a condition of ‘liminal drift’”:

Even if they are stationary for a time, they are on a journey that is never completed since 
its destination (arrival or return) remains forever unclear, while a place they could call 
‘final’ remains forever inaccessible. They are never to be free from the gnawing sense of 
the transience, indefiniteness, and provisional nature of any settlement. (p. 76)
This study argues, however, that “transience, indefiniteness, and provisional nature” becomes in itself more concrete and permanent. As refugees remain in exile, their individually and collectively constructed images of ‘home’ deviate from the realities of those places they once called ‘home.’

By exploring how Kiziba refugees refer to ‘home’ and belonging, we begin to see that this divergence places them somewhere in the periphery of belonging. In some conversations, the refugees clearly identified as non-Rwandan citizens, even in the future. One participant stated flatly, “Home is still Congo” but then continued,

I never plan to go back to Congo. I can’t even plan because even if I am telling you that some of my relatives are there, it doesn’t mean that they [are on] our property. They keep moving up and down, up and down because there is still a war. They currently can’t leave the country, but they are still displaced in the country. (village leader, personal communication, 6 June 2014)

Some even placed themselves in the ‘refugee’ only category—of neither the Congo nor Rwanda. The theme of ‘home’ further materializes this third category of refugee non-citizen other. As the protracted state of their displacement endures, the refugees become not only displaced in their citizenship and identity, but also spatiotemporally marginalized. They are separated from Rwanda by the borders of the camp, and separated from the Congo by physical distance; but they are also separated from ‘home’ by the decades that have changed the landscape, altered community structures, and likely removed most claims to property.

Malkki (1992) and S. Turner (2010) each see this particular aspect of protracted displacement as an opportunity to better understand the social construction of ‘home.’ Speaking on this importance of refugees as an instance of global processes, Malkki (1992) postulates that “trying to understand the circumstances of particular groups of refugees illuminates the complexity of the ways in which people construct, remember, and lay claim to particular places as ‘homelands’ or ‘nations’” (p. 25). The works of Malkki (1992) and S. Turner (2010) engage in a conversation about the role of memory among refugees in long-staying circumstances. They each demonstrate how Burundian refugees in Tanzania collectively reconstructed a nostalgic imagining of ‘home.’
The Kiziba refugees, with nearly two decades in the camp, articulate conflicting ideas of ‘home’ that center on a central theme of belonging nowhere. Two village leader interviews held independently and hours apart indicate this contradiction:

For me, I can say that home is here. I can’t say home is Congo when I’m not there. So for now, home is here [in the camp]. (young woman village leader, personal communication, 5 June 2014)

Of course, my home is there. Here?! No. No way. Home is there [in the Congo], not here. Here is just a hard life. (elder man village leader, personal communication, 5 June 2014)

The young woman village leader in the first quote identified in a “refugee” citizenship category, only noting that she’s Congolese after additional questions. Her understanding of why she had to leave the DRC was that the “other tribes, they were not happy with us who are speaking Kinyarwanda so they forced us to leave the country.” With no family remaining in the DRC, no foreseeable resolution to the security crisis in the eastern provinces, and an understanding that resettlement abroad is very rare, she expressed a very limited capacity to envision life beyond the camp. She places the Banyarwanda as outsiders, even in their villages of origin, by acknowledging that this cultural differentiation—that of being Kinyarwanda speakers—is what provoked the attacks and forced displacement in the first place. This points to her understanding that the solution is not as simple as returning home. Since Kinyarwanda continues to be the dominant language in the camp, in this statement she hints at an understanding that the instability in eastern Congo runs deeper than just violence and war. The larger conflict contains an ethnolinguistic component that frames her as an outsider in her ‘home.’ Combined with the knowledge that the refugees are also outsiders in Rwanda, this awareness likely influences her conceptualization of the camp as home “for now” and contributes to the collective understanding that home is nowhere for these refugees.

The elder village leader who felt that “home is there [in the Congo], not here [in Rwanda]” held extensive memories of his life in the DRC (elder man village leader, personal communication, 5 June 2014). Unlike most of the residents we interviewed, he had a son who maintained the family property in the DRC with his wife and children. The land is just that; it has no structures and no cows, but it is still home to him. Despite this existing connection, however, he did not feel he would ever return in his lifetime. He recalled a group who left Kiziba to return home to his village because they were tired of camp life. They were again chased out and forced to return and live in a different camp. Stories such as these
shaped some of the perceptions of older interviewees. Not only did those who left the camp to return to the DRC generally fail, they often ended up back in camps but not in Kiziba. From the elder village leader’s veteran vantage point in life, this seemed to confirm for him that he would live out his days in Kiziba Camp. He later explained to us,

I think that I can’t leave this camp. I can’t really leave this camp. First of all, life here is hard. So, if you ask me to go to other-outside of this camp, still in Rwanda but outside this camp—it will not change anything. Because if I compare my country where I came from to this country, it’s totally different...Because there’s [word] like the war ended, even now there are some who went back [to my village in the Congo], but the problem is that there is no guarantee for security. Anything can happen at any time. When you are living a hard life [in the camp], you say, well maybe there is peace now. Let me see if I can survive [back home] for just a short time, but others they are staying here because they don’t feel they have a guarantee...of security. (village leader, personal communication, 5 June 2014)

Notice the contradiction throughout his dialog. When specifically asked about ‘home,’ he felt the only answer was the Congo. But through his narrative, he revealed his understanding of the reality that this home no longer exists for him—it is just a memory. It is, even with his son’s continued physical claim over the land, an imaginary home. Those who have tried to return home failed and were then robbed of their life in Kiziba when they were assigned to another camp. As one of the few who still retained some presence in his village of origin, he seemed most acutely aware of the fact that his recollection of home was vastly different from the realities of a return to that place. He also conveyed a sense of durability in that risking an attempt to return home, even having maintained claims to land, could mean losing both the DRC and the safety and stability of Kiziba. When he reluctantly concedes that he “can’t really leave this camp,” he also alludes to the durability of all the residents’ displacement in this containment zone due to the inaccessibility of both return to the DRC and resettlement elsewhere.

One thing the refugees and the MIDIMAR Minister made clear was that Rwanda was not home. As a former refugee, the Minister spoke from her experiences, “The best solution is to have your own home in your home, even if it is a bad one because it is home. I think most refugees, even if [the country of origin] is a bad one, you feel at home” (Séraphine Mukantabana, personal communication, 15 June 2014). A refugee youth corroborated this stance,

First of all, home is always home. If someone can guarantee me my security, home is always home. I can prefer going home [to the DRC] more than anywhere in the world. But
for now, I can’t see any stability in my country. Then for my future or my home, I would like to go abroad. (refugee youth, personal communication, 6 June 2014)

This idea that “home is always home” came up in several interviews with refugee youth, leaders, and even the Minister. Yet, like the elder’s narrative above, the ‘home’ they spoke of represented more of an imaginary nostalgic home, or an allegiance to the memory of home, more than the concrete return to a physical place.

This imaginary, nostalgic ‘home’ served as a conceptual demarcation between the host country in which they reside “for now” and the longing for a place to belong. Kibreab (1999) sees this as a reflection of the refugees’ perceptions that the host communities do not welcome them. He notes of refugees globally,

They make every effort not only to maintain and develop their national collective identities and transmit them to their offspring, but also eliminate the factors that prompted their displacement in the first place so that they can return to their country in safety and dignity. Instead of working to develop roots in the new place, their aim becomes return to the country of origin from where they were forcibly uprooted. (Kibreab, 1999, p. 389)

While his main point is that territory still matters in a globalizing world, he makes clear the generality of the Kiziba refugees’ experiences. Regardless of the demographic and historic commonalities between the Banyarwanda refugees and their host population, xenophobic sentiments prevent them from seeing the host country as a potential long-term home. Thus, refugees face a split consciousness that mirrors the entrapment of their physical existence. They are not fully part of either community, and often their imagined home exists far from the geographic terrain that contains their daily existence in Kiziba Camp. As a result, while residents demonstrate agency in particularly complex ways in connection to the international governance structures that shape their daily lives, this defining disconnect from home constrains the refugees’ abilities to fully exercise agency or reconcile their placelessness in the region.

Exclusion from integration in Rwanda as a possible durable solution came across most clearly when one village leader said, “Here in Rwanda we are just here because we don’t have a choice. It’s like we are forced. We don’t have a choice…Home was Congo. But for now, I don’t have a home” (village leader, personal communication, 6 June 2014). His statement poignantly illuminates the durability of Kiziba refugees’ displacement. For him, this is a forced existence. It is not just a forced displacement from the Congo, but also an eviction from the citizen/state/territory relationship that defines modern statehood.
In this sense, he acknowledges that Kiziba Camp residents in fact have no home. They are placeless in a world where local politics rests within a state-centric and citizen-centered framework, giving the refugees no room for a full expression of agency. Refugees submit to the enduring nature of their durable displacement in three distinct ways: 1) Identifying home as a nostalgic imagining to which they likely cannot return; 2) positioning themselves first as a third category beyond Rwanda or DRC citizen; and 3) articulating hope for the future as concretely different from their existence within the camp. The next section discusses this vital second dimension by exploring how refugees’ social construction of identity and belonging contributes to the durability of their displacement. To frame this abstract idea more concretely in the lives of Kiziba residents, the next section focuses on the particular articulation of responsibility as an identity construction mechanism within the camp setting.

IDENTITY

The concept of identity among refugees transcends the personal, community, state, and global levels. Encampment, however, complicates refugees’ own sense of identity. Zetter (1991) refers to this as a “crisis-based identity” that is derived from “institutionalized perceptions” (p. 60). But Bauman (2004) takes his idea a step further by dramatically describing the identity crisis faced by refugees:

On the way to the camps, their future inmates are stripped of every single element of their identities except one: that of stateless, placeless, functionless refugees. Inside the fences of the camp, they are pulped into a faceless mass, having been denied access to the elementary amenities from which identities are drawn and the usual yarns of which identities are woven. (pp. 76-77)

His vivid picture fosters a feeling of hopelessness and identity lost. The last phrase, however, about “the usual yarns of which identities are woven” hints at the construction of alternative, unusual, identities in a refugee camp. Malkki’s (1992) analysis of identity picks up here when she observes of the increasingly “chronically mobile and routinely displaced” global population of migrants that,

...identity is always mobile and processual, partly self-construction, partly categorization by others, partly a condition, a status, a label, a weapon, a shield, a fund of memories, etcetera. It is a creolized aggregate composed through bricolage. (p. 37)

Bauman essentially claims that refugee identities are wiped clean by the processes of forced migration. Malkki’s (1992) theory allows us to see beyond the initial stripping of identity by showing that camp identities are formed and re-formed through internal and external forces that shape the collective “fund of
memories.” The refugees’ active shaping of these memories, stories, and imaginings are an expression of their constrained agency within the camp setting. From the combination of these two theorists we can see how refugees may construct complex senses of self and belonging that are at times in conflict with one another and may even contribute to a sense of permanence in the identity of displacement.

Complex identities formed within the liminal drift of Kiziba demonstrate a clear consensus among the refugees and host communities that the residents do not belong in Rwanda. The MIDIMAR Minister made this point very clear in our interview by stating, “In reality, we can’t consider to transform them into Rwandan citizens…This implies being able to provide them with all the capacity to be a good citizen…We have not enough soil. We must be realistic” (Séraphine Mukantabana, personal communication, 13 June 2014). Even despite Rwanda’s Vision 2020 plans that would carry it forward as a technology-driven, rather than agriculturally-based, economy, the Minister articulated a cultural ideal that to be a “good citizen” one must have “enough soil.” Since available terrain is not something Rwanda can offer so many Congolese, government leaders do not see local integration as a durable solution. Kibreab (1999) provides theoretical insight into the long-term prospects of local integration for the Banyarwanda refugees. He explains, “Cosmopolitan identity cannot be wished into existence in societies where identities are determined and rights are apportioned on the basis of territorially anchored identities” (Kibreab, 1999, p. 399). Here we see the predicament of these forced migrants in terms of the regional context, one which is based on autochthony and ties to the land. With no available land to distribute in Rwanda, the Minister asserts that refugees’ local integration is not a durable solution as it would sentence them to poverty and struggles. With no rights to their lands in the Congo, based on systems of local autochthony and administration of citizenship, they also have no territorial ties to their country of origin (Jackson, 2006). As a result, Kiziba Camp holds a very symbolic geographic and political space as one of the most enduring consequences of the larger conflicts that remain embedded in the soils of the Great Lakes region.

Closing the door to the second best durable solution (local integration) in the organizational rhetoric of UNHCR and the global refugee regime complex adds to the enduring sense of the Banyarwanda’s displacement. The majority of residents insisted that despite everything, they still consider the DRC as their home. A woman quartier leader explained, “Even if they don’t like us, even if they kill
some of our relatives, we don’t have any other country. Our home is Congo” (quartier leader, personal communication, 6 June 2014). Hovil (2011) found a similar distinction that frames the refugees as outsiders in their temporary camps. In her study of potential repatriation of the Banyarwanda to North Kivu, she found that most of her interviewees preferred to return home to the DRC if the security problems resolved. This idea of a secure Congo also came up in our interviews, with an Executive Council member saying, “Now it’s been long time that we are refugees. We are here since 1996, so it is 17 years that we are refugees and we wish that we could go back in our country if there is peace” (personal communication, 25 January 2013). Some of Hovil’s (2011) interviewees indicated that a possible alternative solution would be to allow dual nationality between Rwanda and DRC. While this particular solution did not emerge in my interview data, it does speak to the broader sense that the refugees were unwilling to give up completely on the DRC.

Older Kiziba residents carried distinct memories that clearly centered their sense of self in relation to the DRC. When asked about who he was and where he considers home, an elder village leader’s explanation really stuck with me throughout the study. During the data collection process, his narrative formed a defining moment in my own understanding of the complexities of this group’s particular experience. He simply stated, “When they put us in their books here, they say that we are Congolese refugees” (village leader, personal communication, 5 June 2014). He was among the first village leaders we interviewed and by far the most resigned to the fact that he would never belong anywhere. He felt he was “too old” to make a fresh start anywhere—Rwanda, the DRC, or abroad—and his candid portrayal of his identity as an institutional formality set forth by UNHCR really spoke to the way Kiziba refugees are byproducts of a regional conflict with very little prospect of resolution. The elder village leader’s acceptance of this fate embodied Bauman’s (2004) theories of “wasted lives.” By subscribing to the UNHCR’s definition of his place in this world, the elder village leader affirms the complicated situation in which these refugees find themselves. His existence as a Congolese Banyarwanda is both a byproduct and cause of the ongoing regional instability. The idea that he is defined simply by an entry in the logbooks of the overseers of the global refugee regime complex yields much agency in defining the discourses of the refugees’ protracted case. He defines himself in the durability of this ‘temporary’ situation—not as a Congolese citizen entitled to a future back in the homeland, and not as a
Banyarwanda at home in the ethnolinguistically related host state of Rwanda. He is of the growing global non-citizen "refugee" category, a notion that adds a sense of permanence, and hopelessness for a ‘durable solution,’ to the situation in Kiziba. This non-citizen/other acceptance emerged as a broader theme during interviews with the camp youth. As the next section describes, most of the youth had never experienced or could not remember the DRC. This shaped their identity construction and understanding of agency in different ways than that of the adults with whom we spoke.

**KIZIBA YOUTH**

The refugee youth we interviewed had left the DRC very young or had been born in Rwanda. Some with living older family members had heard stories of their former villages and life before the conflict. Others were born in transit (one in the transit camp outside Goma) or had lost family members who could convey those stories. Their lives were more definitively shaped by the constraints of the camp, and this in turn affected their identity construction. A hopeful youth told us, “we are the future of [the] Congolese. Maybe [we] would like to go ahead with our study, then anytime we shall return to our Congo country, our own country” (refugee youth, personal communication, 5 June 2014). Another refugee youth explained to me, “Home is Congo. Here I’m just like a visitor. I’m a Congolese because my parents were Congolese” (refugee youth, personal communication, 6 June 2014). His default to accept the identity of his parents as Congolese points to the more salient understanding among youth that they were outsiders in Rwanda. In this case, their own identities were constructed through an understanding of who they are not, namely Rwandan citizens. Though they had no memory or first-hand knowledge of the DRC, many identified with the homeland of their parents. His word choice also emphasizes the outsiderness of this population. Communities such as Kiziba that have resided in Rwanda for nearly two decades described as “visitors” encapsulates a distinctly prolonged form of the insider/outsider, citizen/non-citizen relationship between the refugees and the host communities, where identities are formed based upon entire generations’ existence within the camp context.

Not all youth readily accepted the idea of returning to the Congo. One youth who had been told by his parents about the DRC he left when he was just four years old told us, “The only place I don’t wish to go is to go back to Congo or to stay in Rwanda” (refugee youth, personal communication, 6 June 2014). They are all enculturated into the national citizenship of Rwanda through the camp educational
system, as described in the previous chapter. The youngest resident we interviewed, at just 15 years old, had the most idyllic hope of assimilation, informing us, “My wish can be to go live in Kigali if I can, because it’s a nice place” (refugee youth, personal communication, 6 June 2014). That she expressed this without ever having been to Kigali speaks to a younger generation’s mental assimilation with the host state. Unlike the adult camp residents, their interest in the DRC centered more on curiosity than a particular loyalty or nostalgia for a past “good” life. One refugee youth participant exemplified this internal contradiction when he explained,

For me, how I heard the information—how they killed our families—and now still. No, Congo, they don’t accept us as Congolese. Me, I have no plans for returning there...Even if I never lived in the Congo, I’m curious to know where my parents were from, to see our property, to see what the landscape looked like in my village where I come from. (refugee youth, personal communication, June 2014)

The youth we interviewed most often revealed this contradiction. They felt a similar draw of curiosity to see the land to which they feel they belong, and yet carried a sense that a future in the DRC is not a reality. Generations into this protracted displacement, many youth did not carry a strong connection to the Congo and thus embodied the permanence of a temporary camp life. The youth’s interest in his family’s property draws upon a cultural emphasis on the land and territorial nature of citizenship and belonging. Malkki (1992) explains these connections more fully in her work where she weaves earth-based terminology with human conceptualizations of identity and belonging, including people’s use of the word “roots” to describe where they came from and “land” as a synonym of country. The breech in this refugees’ connection between the land of origin they identify with and the realities of returning there provides insight into how identity formation further entrenches their displacement as durable. While they have no emotional attachments to home, they have an understanding that their identity and entitlement to future opportunities rests in the “property” and “landscape” of a territorial home in the DRC. They were also acutely aware that neither the DRC nor Rwanda held long-term opportunities for them, and instead envisioned themselves as needing more global solutions to end the durability of their situation.

While the adult refugees most often conceptualized their identities as Congolese citizen, youth participants often uniquely placed themselves in a separate category, that of “Congolese refugee.” This identity is one that does not see the DRC or Rwanda as a viable future option. One refugee youth
explained, “Yeah, my identity, I’m Congolese; but now I’m just a refugee. Because I don’t have any right to be Congolese or Rwandese” (refugee youth, personal communication, 6 June 2014). Ideas such as these presented more readily in the refugee youth. This was presumably because many had never actually been to the DRC or left very young. As youth who may have ventured out of the camp for education or to pursue employment, they also carried a more concrete understanding that they were outsiders in Rwanda. Another youth told us, “Because I’m a refugee. I’m here. I’m a Congolese refugee. My home is the camp” (refugee youth, personal communication, 5 June 2014). His story had particular salience because he had worked outside the camp and been exploited by employers. He opened up about these experiences and told us that while others are reluctant to share how Rwandese exclude them from life outside the camp, he believes it is a very common occurrence. From this participant’s perspective, the border between the camp and Rwandan society, even though permeable, marked a very concrete barrier and identity boundary. Again, this speaks to the refugees’ perceptions that they are outsiders within. They can blend in with neighbors only on a cursory level, but their foreignness and perceived outsider status would prevent full integration in Rwanda. This borderland reality leads to an internalized sense of entrapment that parallels the geographic and structural barriers to Kiziba residents’ abilities to reach beyond the containment of camp life.

While Kiziba interviewees expressed their ideas about identity and belonging in different forms—from being only Congolese to an institutional ‘refugee’ outsider—overall, participants conveyed feelings of hopelessness for the future. They shared a sense that “my life is only in this camp” (refugee youth, personal communication, 6 June 2014). In some ways, they embraced the outsider/non-citizen/other identity as a survival mechanism to access the resources of camp life until their preferred solution—return to the Congo they remember—presents itself. Consciously separating themselves from the ethnolinguistically similar host community adds to the durability of this particular context of displacement. It eliminates the potential for local integration, the second-best durable solution according to UNHCR. MIDIMAR representatives’ and Congolese refugees’ consensus that local integration sentences them to an even harder life than they already experience in the camp reinforces the permanent temporariness of their situation and perpetuates the belief that the only long-term solutions are to successfully return home or resettle abroad. The following section examines the identity of elected camp leaders in relation to
responsibility to show how sovereign-like governance mechanisms enforced by camp residents contributes to the durability of their encampment.

**RESPONSIBILITY**

The previous chapter discussed how Rwanda recreates its own political expectations inside the camp by administering elections and coaching women to run for representative positions within the camp. Through these elected posts, refugees create a collective sense of autonomy from the host state and INGOs. They do not refuse interaction with these entities, but rather negotiate the internal order of the camp on their own terms and manage the relationship with host government police and justice institutions and INGO representatives. In a sense, they embrace the spatial isolation of the camp to establish a sovereign-like state of autonomy in the form of internal governance. One elder village leader explained the role of elected representatives in the camp,

> So, being a leader, first of all you need to be wise, and you need to be open to everyone. You need to be like an Ombudsman. You need to share with [the families in your village], and you need to make sure that between the people you are leading there is no jealousy because of those cheap things—food or whatever. You just need to be wise and prevent any conflict without any need of going to the local government or authorities. (village leader, personal communication, 5 June 2014)

Given Rwanda’s active involvement in responding to major crimes within the camp, the village leaders’ attempts to prevent issues from needing local government or authorities’ intervention speaks more to the camp’s sense of autonomy than to an aversion to host government institutions. This village leader’s statement echoes the pride of the camp Security Committee that the community in Kiziba can take care of its own security problems with very little intervention from outside forces, specifically the host government and INGOs (Security Council, personal communication, January 27, 2013). These ideas of autonomy, internal governance, and managing its own daily security needs frames Kiziba as a sovereign-like entity and reaffirms the idea presented in the previous chapter that its borders actually represent international borders within the host state. The elected leaders’ roles as governance providers within the camp illustrate a particular identity and understanding of agency within a subset of the population. Their identity is shaped by the pride they feel in demonstrating agency to shape the camp environment. Autonomy as a spatially distinct community further entrenches the idea that Kiziba’s residents are not
citizens of the DRC or Rwandan states, but rather a separate non-citizen refugee category of human existence.

The governance system relies very heavily on elected leadership serving as advisors and ambassadors. Leadership roles carry with them a commitment to the community and a strong sense of working on behalf of the good of the entire camp. A woman village leader described her role,

"Being a leader is to be wise, to be an advisor to the people you’re leading. And of course as we always face many issues of life, on our level we don’t have a solution; we just transfer their issues to the next level. Then, if there is a good answer to bring back, we bring back a good answer to them. So that’s how we live and survive. (village leader, personal communication, 6 June 2014)"

This idea of leadership hierarchy as a way to communicate individual issues to the authority—host state or INGO—in order to “survive” illuminates the weight of these roles in the community. In a world where one has very little control over employment opportunities, food diversity and security, and healthcare, Kiziba refugees enact a sense of agency by conveying the local-level concerns of residents to the state and INGOs though established mechanisms of leadership. In many ways, they both work within the existing structural dependence on outside forces and express very distinct individual and group models of agency. For example, conversion of the camp’s roofs from canvas to tin affirms the leadership’s ability to affect change (however slowly) in the residents’ everyday lives. At the same time, individuals’ ability to articulate these demands relies upon their individual leadership skills and role model status within the camp.

Observations in the camp over the three years of fieldwork speak to the high priority residents place on ensuring and sustaining a clean living environment, with the monitoring responsibilities falling elected leadership. Expectations for individual accountability to maintain this standard demonstrate another level of agency in operation. While some garbage is visible near the walkways of the camp, the majority of streets, side streets, and alleyways are free from debris. Residents upheld this environmental standard as a reflection of UNHCR standards. Leaders are expected to interface with UNHCR to ensure maintenance of the houses within the camp. A woman village leader explained,

"To be a leader is to be a good ambassador; to look at the house[s of] the people you are leading...we always have issues [with] the roof [leaking]. We are the ones who give reports to the next step. And we teach them how they need to live; to be clean, to make
sure that their neighborhoods are clean; to avoid any diseases. (village leader, personal communication, 5 June 2014)

This responsibility for the maintenance of daily life appeared as both a core value system within Kiziba and a reflection of the larger structure of governance in operation. While residents live in individual mud houses, with typically two small rooms, their extreme close proximity and shared public toilets, wash stations, water access, and walkways impose a heightened expectation for collective accountability, which requires oversight and layers of hierarchy. The leadership structure in the camp works as a chain of command, with each village leader reporting to the quartier leader who in turn communicates with the camp president to report to the INGOs. At each of these levels, care for house roofs constituted a major concern of the leadership. During the final field visit, the leaders explained that the camp was slowly being converted from canvas roofs to tin. They felt accomplished that they could serve the needs of their constituents and neighbors; however, the tin roofs spreading throughout the camp are also visually symbolic of the permanence of this “temporary” camp space. This structural housing development therefore captured the complexities of leaders’ associations to the likelihood that Kiziba may remain their lifetime residence.

Autonomy as a functioning camp community extends to the camp leadership’s management of housing and disease. As an expression of agency, leaders took on responsibility for the physical wellbeing of their fellow residents—a task they identified as a literal lifesaving duty. A male village leader summarized his responsibilities,

I, as a leader, make sure that we are...even if we don't live a good life...are at least liv[ing] in a clean area to prevent any disease; because, as I told you, our bodies they are weak because of the type of food we are eating all the time. We have to make sure that we are living in a clean area to prevent any disease which can kill a lot of people in a short time. (village leader, personal communication, 6 June 2014).

His qualification that “even if we don’t live a good life,” the residents can strive to keep the environment clean and disease-free, speaks to some expression of agency over the condition of their lives, and an abiding human leaning toward sustaining livelihood at the most fundamental grassroots level. While they cannot control the food that would make their bodies stronger, they can manage other aspects of daily existence to make the camp life more tolerable and seem more secure and stable for residents. In this
way, they alter the discourses of their temporary encampment to reflect more permanent, reliable, state-like systems.

During the first year of fieldwork, a man wearing a plastic container on his back walked around spraying the public latrines and washroom run-off channels that form as rain drains through the camp down the mountain. He sprayed disinfectant around until even the latrines emitted no smell. In the third year of camp fieldwork, attendants worked around new latrines along the outer camp perimeter to ensure the areas stayed clean. They gathered water from a nearby cistern to manually "flush" the toilets. This resident-management of the fundamental aspects of human existence illustrates the refugees' adoption and adaption of INGO-inspired maintenance processes that support a claim and direct influence over the daily cycles of life. By regulating and participating in these habitual exercises, the refugees exercise agency in the traditional sense of power over actions; but they also engage a sense of agency that shapes the discourse of autonomy versus dependency. By demonstrating and practicing autonomy, the refugees challenge the limits of their aid dependency in ways that replicate states’ maintenance of internal and external sovereignty. Thus, the extensive labor involved in flushing the public toilets represents a larger collective investment in self-managed sustainability, even though they are dependent upon larger structures for basic needs. In the case of Kiziba, leaders also self-identified with these practices as part of a larger incentive to maintain health standards and cleanliness within the resources distributed by larger state and global institutions to sustain daily life. The INGO operating the camp clinic confirmed the MIDIMAR camp manager’s claim that Kiziba experiences very few disease outbreaks due to its high level of sanitation. Conscientious actions by residents to clean the communal areas reinforce the pride with which the interviewed leaders and council members explained how well Kiziba is managed, and thus portrayed a collective identity as a cohesive community unit. This one instance of Kiziba functioning as autonomous and state-like, despite its dependency on food and medical aid, captures the ongoing dialectic relationship between structural resource distribution and community agency and identity.

Pride in serving in elected positions—as a conduit of Kiziba residents’ wider voices that could reach the state and INGO levels and impact the daily circumstances of camp life—conveyed strongly in many of the leaders’ interviews. Participants repeatedly assured us that they lead “not by power but by
wisdom,” a technique that maintains the orderliness of the camp. In this role, another woman village leader explained, “To be a leader here in this neighborhood is to be the messenger of the people you are leading. We do that freely; we don’t have any salary. We just do it because we like it and we like to help the people we are leading” (village leader, personal communication, 5 June 2014). Beyond the standard representation of governance that would report within a national structure, Kiziba Camp leaders identified their role as in direct relationship to the international system of governance, thereby increasing their own sense of responsibility. These voluntary roles for the good of the community also serve as a reminder of the permanence of their situation. The orderliness, obedience to the leadership hierarchy, and the effectiveness of the camp governance structure to affect some change frames the camp as a kind of city. This autonomous entity, through its routinized system of participatory citizenship on the part of refugees, gives the impression that it could continue on in this state of displacement indefinitely so long as the aid deliveries arrive. Durability here comes from the ease with which refugees embrace local governance and the relationship with INGOs and host state institutions. As we explore the residents’ hopes for their future and the futures of their children, in the next section, the narratives rearticulate the social construction of identity and belonging as well as the durability of their displacement.

HOPE

The concept of hope became a focus of these interviews because it provides an avenue to explore the relationship between this enduring structural circumstance of protraction and individuals’ core agency and ability to grasp a future existence outside of Kiziba Camp. We often ended interviews by asking participants to share their hopes and visions for their future. In many instances, participants expressed no hope for the future. One village leader explained,

If you look at how hard life is here in the camp, I personally can’t see any hope for my children. If you say, okay go to Congo, there is not any hope for my children because there is no security. So for now, to be honest, I don’t see any hope. I just live daily. (village leader, personal communication, 5 June 2014)

When she says she “just live[s] daily,” this elected leader reinforces the permanence of their temporary situation. She felt that there is no future for her or her children in Congo, and no future in Rwanda. Rather than frustration bubbling to the surface and inciting possibilities of militarization, her statement speaks to a level of acceptance of this liminal space as her permanent reality. The peace-building process is out of
Kiziba refugees’ control and, instead of rallying for a revolution (Lischer, 2006), they resign to the durability of this forced displacement. As Milner (2011) asserts, refugees must participate in peace-building efforts in order to assure lasting solutions to the conflict and forced migration that perpetuate regional instability and eliminate possibilities to repatriate. As Kiziba residents submit to the enduring nature of their displacement, they assume a collective position outside of the conversation on peace-building. Noncitizens with no claim to territory have no investment in land-based conflict such as that in eastern DRC. In this liminal camp space, they exist outside of the political (conflict and peace) dialog in the Great Lakes Region. Collectively, the Banyarwanda are involved in the political turmoil of the DRC and Great Lakes Region. As the context chapter showed, they are part of the broader affected ethnolinguistic group. Autochthonous local leaders in the Kivu provinces continue to question the Banyarwanda’s eligibility for land rights and citizenship, adding fuel to a fiery past of colonialism, migration, and conflict over resources. In this sense, they belong in the regional peace-building dialog. But within the camp, their framing as apolitical INGO wards silences their voices in regional dialog and peace-building, thus limiting the potential for lasting repatriation solutions (Milner, 2000, 2011).

The participants of this study did not locate themselves as part of the solution, and thus saw virtually no hope for the future. One leader asked,

So here is my question. I personally came from Katanga. My father died in Katanga. My mother passed away here. Here we are in a refugee camp. What do you think about my hope for the future? Where do you think I would live if today they say 'we are closing this camp'? Because I don’t have any relatives in Congo. Here [in Rwanda] I don’t have any relatives. So if for example today you are asking about my hope for my future, if they say they are closing this camp, where do I have to move according to you? (village leader, personal communication, 5 June 2014)

Posing questions to us, as foreigner outsiders with a perceived level of relative power, emphasized the impossibility of Kiziba refugees’ situations and the core attachment to outsiders who represent the West and/or international humanitarian aid programs as the only avenue of hope. As we responded to the above participant’s core query, she went on to say, "UNHCR is the one who is giving us hope of living and surviving," further placing her own future into the hands of refugee assistance institutions (village leader, personal communication, 5 June 2014). These narratives of refugees’ perceptions of hope
continually reflected the relinquishment of agency in relation to the longer-term possibilities to alter the
daily circumstances of their lives and find another means of existence outside of Kiziba.

Others framed this sentiment of hopelessness in a more positive way by articulating their own
fantasized notions of an alternative existence. They dreamed of an unknown imagined location abroad—not in the DRC or Rwanda—where security is a guaranteed part of life. One leader speculated, “I can live anywhere around the world where I live in peace; where I have security. And, you know, when you have security all the time, you have hope of living” (village leader, personal communication, 6 June 2014). Others included all potential countries, stressing the importance of security, such as this village leader:

What I only need is a place around the world where I can have hope that [my children] can have a good life. It doesn’t matter if it’s in Rwanda, Uganda, Congo, or abroad. What I need is a good life, a good standard of life for my kids. (village leader, personal communication, 5 June 2014)

This “good standard of life” for most of the participants referred to both physical security and food security. Namely, participants identified common foundations of sustenance as core dimensions of these aspirations’ standards: the pursuit of alternative food choices, further education, employment opportunities and the ability to live free of fear from perpetrators of violence. This identification of the particular dimensions of a perceived “good life” illustrates another form of agency expressed by participants. In their imagined other existence, they articulated core dimensions of daily life that would allow for greater choices, opportunities, and material resources, all prioritizing the focus on an overarching climate of security and peace.

This idea of living in an idealized foreign land is perpetuated by the myths propagated by those who have resettled abroad, as well as the interconnectedness of globalization, which allows refugees to have immediate contact through phone, email, and social media avenues with former Kiziba Camp residents who gained asylum. Before leaving for resettlement abroad, refugees most often hold idealized views of the country to which they are traveling (Fanjoy, Ingraham, Khoury, & Osman, 2005). Those participants we interviewed in Kiziba who knew someone who had resettled abroad invariably smiled and conveyed a firm belief that life was much better in that new country. Such imagined, albeit inaccurate, perceptions situate hope for the future outside the immediate reach of refugee agency. In a contradictory
way, the thoughts of life in a distant and “better” land inspired hope, and yet the realities of quota restrictions on resettlement options added weight to the permanence of life in Kiziba.

My own experiences working with a U.S.-based local resettlement agency provide insight into the realities of refugees’ financial, emotional, and mental struggles, as they adjust to life in their new country of residence. Shedding light on the obligations and reasons for perpetuating myths of a good life, by studying remittances from resettled refugees, Akuei (2004) found that financial promises to those left behind often became so burdensome that refugees faced severe financial and psychological challenges in the new country. These obligations complicated their attempts to establish independence while remaining tied to financial obligations of their wider community within the camps. In her study, resettled refugees struggled to convey to relatives back home the financial hardships associated with acclimating to life in the new country because “in local thought, it is perceived as distasteful and undignified to complain about one’s problems” (Akuei, 2004, p. 6). In a casual conversation I shared with a young male refugee in Kiziba, he expressed his wish to go abroad somewhere like the U.S. Despite knowing people who had resettled abroad from the camp, he was very surprised to learn that even water costs money in the U.S.

These informal conversations shared with youth in more casual settings throughout the camp provide insight into the way hardships in the new country often do not convey to those left behind. The myth of a ‘great life’ stems from relocated refugees’ desires to save face and hide the real struggles of adjustment, as well as to help those left behind maintain hope for their future. Expressions of envy and joy by participants in this study indicated that this myth does in fact help to nurture a sense of hope for a potential new life abroad. Yet this hope is somewhat tainted by the intense and extremely lengthy process of attaining approvals for resettlement, which are offered to only a very small fraction of the population. In the meantime, Kiziba Camp residents’ sense of hope hinges upon the extremely unlikely chance that the outside international system of refugee management will deem them worthy of relocation. With less than
3 percent likelihood of relocation from Kiziba\(^2\), such embedded hope fractures refugees' agency and reproduces the sense of dependency on Western-operated donors and international systems.

Though Kiziba residents dream of a nostalgic home in the DRC or a highly glamorized life resettled abroad, an overall sense that their existence would be lived out in the camp repeatedly emerged as their dominant reality. As Bauman (2004) philosophized, their lives are indeed wasted by sitting in that camp, excluded from a permanent home with “no return and no road forward” (p. 77). Conversations with several youth reflected a prevailing expression of no sense of hope for the future. This predominant narrative script demonstrated how the process of protraction moves from forced displacement in the first generation to durable displacement in subsequent generations. One youth explained to us,

Teenagers haven’t hope of studying, haven’t hope of their future…You can [find a wife here], but if you think to begin having children, you can’t be leading to that kind of mind. Because we would have children without giving them schools and their future can’t be good. We don’t need our children to face the kind of life that we face. (refugee youth, personal communication, 5 June 2014)

This participant felt deeply troubled by the cycle of life in the camp without hope for a better future. As they continue to exist in a state of idleness, their lives are ‘wasted’ in a human potential sense. They currently have limits on economic participation, the ability to pursue educational opportunities to the fullest, and participation in local and regional peace-building processes that hold the potential to shape their lives. These factors contribute to the lack of hope conveyed by the vast majority of participants. By conceding to this idea of the future and essentially relinquishing agency for future change to the UNHCR, Kiziba refugees contribute to the sense of permanence that makes their situation durable. These constraints on hope, agency, and identity more clearly resonated in the refugees’ discussion of health and food. The following section discusses the theme of hope in relation to food and health, one of the most common unprompted themes that emerged in the interview data.

\(^2\) The global resettlement rate among refugees and asylum seekers is around 0.763\% (12.9 million refugees and asylum seekers globally in 2013 with 98,400 actually admitted for resettlement) (UNHCR, 2015e); UNHCR Rwanda has high goals for 2015, anticipating 2,000 selected for resettlement out of the 74,151 refugees in the country (UNHCR, 2015d). This lofty goal for UNHCR Rwanda indicates that the refugees will be “selected” for resettlement, though actual placement abroad can take several years (Kiziba Camp residents, personal communication, 5-6 June 2014).
HEALTHCARE, FOOD SECURITY, AND BODIES

In a contradictory way, the refugees’ framing of food security, bodies, and healthcare reinforced the permanent temporariness of the camp situation. While residents espoused a sense of the normalcy of life as they spoke about orderliness and local governance, in the realm of healthcare and food security, participants in this study framed their experiences on the periphery of society with very little agency to create meaningful change in their lives. At this core level of physical wellbeing, residents expressed much more dire associations and compromised senses of hope. A woman village leader told us, “But once you’re a refugee in the camp, no one cares for your healthcare. Yeah, so it’s like you’re condemned to die because you don’t have access to healthcare” (village leader, personal communication, 6 June 2014). As mentioned earlier, the camp clinic meets basic healthcare needs; in fact, the clinic is such an important asset, UNHCR and the Rwandan government opened the clinic up to surrounding locals to improve access to rural populations and prevent jealousy between communities. In that light, this leader is not speaking to the absolute lack of healthcare available to the refugees. Rather, she is addressing a broader sentiment that came up in several interviews about lack of agency to pursue healthcare options, particularly those that would sustain life and maximize livelihoods. This also ties in to camp food security since the limited rations cannot help their “body system[s] to protect ourselves” (village leader, personal communication, 6 June 2014). In these ways, residents felt no agency to change their daily circumstances and dependency on humanitarian aid. These sentiments complicate the notion of autonomy and managerial pride expressed by the leaders by reinforcing an identity dependent on external systems and suffering from marginal allocations from international donors.

As the Executive Council explained, the camp clinic does not always have enough medicine to address the needs of the refugees (personal communication, 25 January 2013). A study across all camps in Rwanda similarly found that refugees complained of service delays, medicine shortages, and access to more options than basic care and procedures (WFP & UNHCR, 2014). If a refugee presents symptoms beyond the expertise or capabilities of the camp clinic staff, he or she would then be transferred to Kibuye “after a long period of sickness.” This member of the camp leadership went on to explain, “When they arrive there, sometimes they find that they don’t have [the] medicine they need, so they make another transfer” (Executive Council, personal communication, 25 January 2013). Kigali is the last stop for
medical resolutions. If no solution can be found at the local hospital in Kigali, the refugee is returned to the camp. These cases include illnesses for which the doctors could find no cause as well as those for which the clinic staff cannot provide adequate care in the camp (e.g. diabetes and cancer). This lends itself to the feeling that refugees are “condemned to die,” but also reflects the realities of life in a developing country where everyone’s access to full healthcare options is limited.

As residents of Kiziba situated their health status within a larger context, they exercised agency in ways that expand beyond the access of Rwandan citizens in the surrounding rural Kibuye district. Although Rwanda has made great strides in improving healthcare indicators throughout the country, respiratory infections, HIV/AIDS, diarrheal diseases, and malaria are among the top ten causes of death in the host country (WHO, 2015). This corresponds with the most common diseases found among camp-based refugees in Rwanda, namely respiratory tract infections, watery diarrhea, and intestinal worms (WFP & UNHCR, 2014). Likewise, the western regions of Rwanda near the border with the DRC suffer the highest rates of food insecurity in the country, at around 37% compared with 24% nationally (WFP, 2013). According to WFP & UNHCR (2014), Kiziba households suffer from approximately 30% food insecurity, putting them in line with the context of both the region and the host state. Camp households that survive entirely off of the 2,103 kilocalories per day of food aid in the form of maize, beans, oil, and salt share a similar diet to those food insecure households in Rwanda (WFP & UNHCR, 2014). These host community households, in fact, fare worse as they consume mostly starches with little access to beans, vegetables, or oils and no fruits, milk, or meat.

The similarity of food security and health access between Kiziba residents and the surrounding Rwandan communities implies a more abstract construction of identity at play in the refugees’ interviews. By expressing concerns about food security and asking us, as researchers, to convey this message to the international community, the refugees exercise a kind of agency. They do this because they have a voice in the international community through the mouthpiece of INGOs such as UNHCR. As representatives (in their eyes) of the power and resources of the global North, they felt comfortable sharing these health and food security concerns very openly in conversation. This openness in dialog provided a window into Kiziba residents’ understanding of how donors and international governments affect their daily existence in the camp. They did not ask for direct handouts or any supplies directly from us. In fact, they often
accepted that as academics our contributions would be through writing and sharing their stories. Their understanding of the international refugee regime complex, and the role of donor governments and international institutions, conveyed in their acceptance that our role was to serve as ‘ambassadors’ for their stories, a greater calling beyond a specific, finite donation.

Unlike the surrounding host communities that have no guaranteed access to an international voice, the refugees implored us, “Just to tell [the international community] that we are here in the camp; we don’t live a good life. We are struggling to survive…because we don’t eat well. The food is not good [for us]” (refugee youth, personal communication, 6 June 2014). Reminiscent of the refugees in Zetter’s (1991) study, Kiziba residents strategically exercise their collective voice—one that carries weight in the international community through INGOs. Though it has taken a long time, these complaints did not fall on deaf ears and in fact stimulated change. In May 2014, the World Food Programme conducted a market assessment in response to a successful pilot project conducted in Gihembe refugee camp, another Congolese camp in Rwanda (WFP, 2014). This project would give vouchers to refugees instead of food distributions; the vouchers would allow refugees to access markets and better control their own diets, with obvious benefits to the local economy. Exploration of this project by the INGO that supplies food aid to the camps in Rwanda suggests that indeed the refugees do have a level of agency in terms of shaping international issues, such as food aid provision, that is beyond the reach of local communities. In these ways, refugees capitalize on their own displacement and political placelessness as an act of agency, thereby maximizing the reach of their power within the very system that enforces their prolonged containment.

An option for food vouchers, while greatly improving the diets of some refugees, also provides means for agency by more fully integrating refugees economically with the surrounding host communities. Economic integration likely results in positive benefits for refugees and host communities alike (Jacobsen, 2005; Zetter, 2012), but it also confers an economic durability to their state of displacement. The food voucher pilot program and plans for expansion illustrate that refugees do have avenues to affect change

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3 It is not likely that this will be a near term solution for Kiziba Camp as the report found limited access to markets could prove challenging for residents there. The report suggests establishing a new market closer to the camp to ensure success of the program.
in local and international processes, specifically through formal and informal economic markets and policy changes for aid distribution. Zetter (1991) points to this ‘political currency’ in his study as a reason refugees, even after local integration, preserve the label ‘refugee.’ By invoking the deep political meaning of placelessness in the ‘refugee label’ in this context, protracted populations exercise agency over aid distribution mechanisms and survive in durable displacement. Making the best of the complex and very difficult situation of liminal drift, many refugees embrace their outsider status to attain access to opportunities not afforded in surrounding host communities. Access to these resources, as seen in the clinic use, situates the refugees as outside the host state and in close proximity to the international arena in the eyes of the local community as well. Therefore, the foundational aspects of human survival—food and medical care—become central dimensions of refugees’ status and agency within a much larger national and international political machine where, at times, relatively small perks are bartered within a system that reinforces dependency and marginalization.

CONCLUSIONS

In this chapter, I illustrated how refugees form an identity in a third space outside of the traditional understanding of a citizen as someone who has rights to life in a territorially-based country. As outsiders in a state-centric world, they relied on a nostalgic remembrance of the Congo as home but carried a sense that they would likely live out their lives in the camp. This institutionalized acceptance of their situation itself perpetuates their displacement, putting them outside the realm of participation in peace-building processes or contributing ideas for a workable durable solution. In this way, the refugees function as part of the system that makes this kind of long-term displacement durable.

In the meantime, a measure of the cumulative impact of lost human potential is beyond the reach of even large-scale quantitative assessments of refugee displacement. Yet, this larger consideration provides an overarching and critical framework for any analysis of the human crisis contained in refugee protraction and ‘wasted lives,’ as we see throughout this study of Kiziba. Bauman (2004), writing on the global processes that produced and maintain forced migration, saw no end to the human waste accumulating in refugee camps. He notes,

The act of assigning to waste puts an end to differences, individualities, idiosyncrasies. Waste has no need of fine distinctions and subtle nuances, unless it is earmarked for recycling; but the refugees’ prospects of being recycled into legitimated and
acknowledged members of human society are, to say the least, dim and infinitely remote. All measures have been taken to assure the permanence of exclusion. (Bauman, 2004, p. 78)

As I illustrated in this chapter, through the narratives from Kiziba, refugees become absorbed in these “measures…to assure permanence of exclusion” and contribute to the system of displacement by identifying as non-citizen, outsider others. At the same time, this population exercises agency by constructing and participating in a governance structure that gives them voice in the international community and situates them as a sovereign-like entity within the host country. Conflicting identities, visions of 'home,' and hope for the future all point to a similar theme that places Kiziba refugees in a very distinct marginal location—they don't see themselves as strictly Congolese or future Rwandese. And while their dreams attach to the limited potential for relocation, camp residents reluctantly accept the likelihood that they will forever exist in an enduring cycle of displacement. This sentiment, combined with the lack of opportunities to participate in peace-building initiatives in the DRC, illuminates refugees’ roles in perpetuating a system of displacement that becomes increasingly durable over time.

Yet, liminal drift is not exactly the end of this story. Life does go on. One young woman village leader explained,

> Even if we are in a refugee camp, you know we are human beings. Life has to go the way it must go. So it means that for young people, boy or girl, you know sometimes they fall in love with each other. And one night of course, because they don’t have means, they can’t organize weddings. But one day they just decide to...in the evening, they just decide to take each other's hands and leave and start a new life [in another part of the camp]. (village leader, personal communication, 5 June 2014)

This narrative shows that their lives cannot remain indefinitely paused while waiting for a lasting solution. Life moves forward, future generations come into the camp knowing no other life, and the past life in the DRC becomes increasingly distant. The refugees articulated the repetitive life cycle in the camp, with one woman asking, “Can you imagine getting pregnant in this camp, then you have a baby in the camp, then the children start school in the camp. We are tired of living this life” (young village leader, personal communication, 5 June 2014). Factors of everyday life and human existence, when applied to the camp context, reflect a distinct life force and perhaps human survival spirit that exists simultaneously within the larger context of durable displacement. Spatially and sociologically isolated, the Kiziba population has become like its own country, complete with governance, collective identity, and sovereign-like borders.
While it may not be conscious or motivated by a particular set of long-term desires, durability emerges from the everyday activities of life. Within the contained space and limited opportunities afforded by the camp context, Kiziba refugees transform these daily activities into feelings of permanence and intractable solutions. Even as they internalize the larger limitations of their particular circumstance, in day-to-day life, residents also construct their own sense of community, shape the systems of governance within the camp, maximize access to basic needs such as sanitation and medical care, and clearly capitalize on their opportunities to exercise agency as vital players within the international systems that shape their existence. From this distinct dialectic relationship Kiziba refugees expressed, I posit their overall existence as one of constrained agency in a state of durable displacement.
CONCLUSIONS

You, as an American who came a long way from America to here, who had this heart of listening to us, what kind of guarantee are you giving to us that you’ll be a good ambassador and the message you’ll give to the international community will change the life of the refugees here in this camp.
-2014 Interview, Refugee youth, Kiziba Camp

Banyarwanda in eastern DRC have experienced decades of vacillation between inclusion and exclusion at both the local and national levels. In a land where people’s identities are still so connected to the land and local land-based politics, citizenship is more than a link between the sovereign state and its people. Land in the eastern DRC, and the region more broadly, signifies a right to belong, to participate, and to thrive in this world. Without it, one is lost, placeless, and often without the ability to imagine a future. Separated from their land, and homeland, for nearly two decades, the Congolese residents of Kiziba Camp in Rwanda represent the byproduct of ongoing conflict in the DRC resulting from post-colonialism, political instability, and the revocation of citizenship and rights at the local and national levels. In this sense, the Banyarwanda’s spatial isolation on a mountaintop overlooking their former home embodies the larger political climate of the regional and even the international system that fails to make any interventions that substantively address the war in the Congo. Kiziba, in particular, with its split demographic representation across the war-affected areas of South Kivu, North Kivu, and Katanga provinces serves as a window into the dynamics of displacement in the region.

Using qualitative analysis of interview data collected in Kiziba Camp over the course of three years, this study examined narratives of elected members of refugee councils, elected community leaders, and youth residents to begin to build theories about forced displacement in the Great Lakes Region of Africa. Using a grounded theory approach, I extracted themes that emerged in conversations with residents to better understand their experience in this protracted context. Chapter 3 positioned this study in terms of existing literature by asking why anyone would want to protract displacement. The answers to this question fall into five broad themes at varying levels of analysis. At the macro-level, state sovereignty and international burden-sharing for refugee assistance provide insight into why state and
state-like INGOs would contribute in ways that prolong instead of end displacement. At the regional level, remnants of a post-colonial past reveal state-building motivations for extending the length of time refugees spend in exile. Finally, the literature review looks at how micro-level, local processes such as social stratification and social construction contribute to extended periods of displacement. These systems together, I contend, move protracted refugee cases into a form of durable displacement. Rather than maintaining the temporary nature of these settlements, then, camps become state-like and permanent through the passage of time. This process then makes long-term prospects for ‘durable solutions’ even more unlikely.

The study then looked at the structure and narratives of the refugee camp to better understand these durability-increasing forces. Chapter 5 looks at institutions of camp life, namely security, education, politics, and economy to underscore the way host nations and INGO recreated their structures and values at the local level in ways that enforce a sense of permanence, and even autonomy, in this spatially marginalized community. These forces may not be intentional. The host government of Rwanda regulated education in the camp, for instance, and though it sees no prospects for local integration of the refugees, it indoctrinates them into the citizenship structures of the host country through formalized learning. As subsequent generations are born into the camp knowing nothing other than the information provided by the Rwandan education system, they exist as faux-citizens, uneducated in the ways of their country of origin and excluded from participation in their land of exile. Though unintentional, processes such as these reinforce the borders of the camp as international borders within Rwanda. Erected imaginary borderlands separate the refugees as outsider/foreigner/non-citizen others in contrast to the national citizens with full rights and belonging. Motivation to maintain displacement is rooted in the resources, recognition, and power that states and state-like INGOs derive from operating in the refugee regime complex.

Chapter 6 takes that idea of outsider/non-citizen/other and looks at refugees’ expressions of home, identity, and hope to understand the local forces that prolong and even add durability to their displacement. These themes reveal complex ways in which refugees feel they have the power to express agency and change their circumstances as well as when they relinquish agency to meet their needs for resources and support. Aid organizations bring all of the goods and services necessary for survival, yet
also serve as channels to voice concerns to the international refugee regime complex. It is through these complicated expressions of agency that refugees formulate their relationship with the state and state-like INGOs. Repetitive and iterative interactions with INGOs and other representatives of the international community are a conduit for refugees’ expression of agency. By demonstrating adeptness at navigating these waters through requests and vocabulary, Kiziba’s residents frame themselves as global citizens. They are living in a local context, but are also separated spatially and manage a form of autonomy that gives the camp a state-like quality. These factors contribute to a sense of durability of their situation that most clearly surfaces in their expressions of identity, home, and hope. I proposed that the refugees, after years contained in this camp, see themselves as a different classification of being outside of the citizen/state/territory relationship. Ironically occupying a physical space, these placeless persons identify with a nostalgic past in the Congo that likely no longer exists, or as a global citizen in some idealized resettlement setting. Rather than a citizen of any country, the refugees’ imaginings reveal a solidarity with broader humanity, situating themselves more in the international arena than in the local or regional political context. In this global setting, the refugees see the potential for agency to make requests and instigate change in their daily circumstances. In other ways, however, Kiziba residents are rooted firmly in the local host community. Sharing ethnolinguistic and cultural similarities, their interactions with local communities reinforce the refugees’ outsider status and lack of agency to improve their lives. It is through these processes and exhibited mechanisms of constrained agency, then, that the very micro-level camp life instances illustrate local, state, regional, and international forces that reinforce the permanence of this particular displacement case. The self-reinforcing and iterative nature of these daily processes add durability to this protracted case and move it from a temporary flight from conflict to a permanent, semi-autonomous, state-like entity.

A THEORY OF DURABLE DISPLACEMENT

By looking across state/INGO level and individual/camp levels of analysis, we can see that the interactions between global, state, and local-level actors entrench refugees in a more lasting and permanent form of displacement than is often encompassed in the temporariness of the word “refugee.” From the grounded theory approach of this study, I contend that encampment of refugees creates social, economic, political, and security conditions that together form mutually reinforcing spatial and institutional
systems of durable displacement, further distancing the realities of lasting solutions. Further research in different camp contexts would help to substantiate such claims as generalizable to the African Great Lakes Region more broadly, or even global cases of protracted refugee situations.

In the case of Kiziba, the refugees situate themselves—particularly over longer stretches of time and through generations—as a kind of citizen outside the traditional understanding of that word. They belong to neither the Congo, nor Rwanda, nor can they all access some idealized resettlement in a third country of asylum. At the state-level, the host nation derives resources, recognition, and power as an international actor through hosting refugees. These aspects support their claims of internal and external sovereignty as they manage their citizens and engage in the larger international arena. Host nations negotiate power relationship with the UNHCR, receive an influx of aid resources into the economy, and reap political capital at the international level for the role they play in diplomacy regarding refugees and hosting. These aspects confer legitimacy to claims of external sovereignty, while practices of exclusion toward the noncitizen, refugee ‘other’ reinforce internal sovereignty for the host state’s citizens. Additionally, the UNHCR and INGOs operating within the refugee regime complex are legitimated by the continued caretaking role of refugees, as the swelling UNHCR budget attests. Even humanitarian aid mechanisms, then, lead to durability of displacement in the hearts, minds, and daily operations of the refugees, thereby diminishing the likelihood of finding lasting solutions. Together, these complex and interacting forces create a system where durability is the outcome, and lasting solutions for refugees in long-staying situations become increasingly less feasible.

EXTENSION INTO THE FIELD

Simply identifying the forces of durability in a system of displacement is not enough to initiate change in the protracted cases of refugee exile. The Kiziba residents in this study asked that I carry their message out into the world and be a good ambassador so they can leave that place. One village leader asked,

As you’re coming from America, why don’t you go…okay, is there any space for us, where we can live instead of living in this camp? Or if you don’t know, then go ask…your government if there is a space where you can put us? (village leader, personal communication, 6 June 2014)
Knowing that this is not a reality and that resettlement is dictated by quotas and international negotiations beyond my reach, what is it that I can do? How can the time spent with these refugees become something more systemically powerful? We repeatedly grappled with these questions as we recorded narratives in the camp over the course of three years. I am inspired by the work of Pittaway et al. (2010) who gave back to the communities in which they conducted research by teaching advocacy and policy skills to give refugees the tools they needed to shape their own futures. Limited access to this camp population and the sensitive political situation in the host country and region make this option relatively impractical for Kiziba. Despite this, I still remained deeply committed to use this research in the way that I promised.

So, outside of the theoretical contribution, how does this work fit into the larger policy world that dictates the global refugee regime complex? I think the answer to this is two-fold. First, by understanding state and INGO policies and practices that contribute to displacement, we can begin to explore more fully the ways of regulating and ameliorating the impacts, particularly on those who experience long-term displacement. Knowing that there are forces that lead to a durability of displacement, states and INGOs can work towards alternative solutions. Rejecting the assumptions of temporariness that embody the word ‘refugee’ alone helps us move toward more active policy implications for assuring refugee lives are not wasted in protraction. Until all refugees have a future beyond the camp with the ability to make their own choices about their lives, this research must continue.

Part of the ethical burden of research is finding ways to ensure that the results of a study do not contribute in a negative way to the lives of those who shared their stories with me. While the use of the contents of this study of Kiziba Camp can never be fully fortified against the possibility of negative use, I propose some policy applications here to emphasize the good that I believe can come from identifying durability of displacement here. It is vital to look at the scholarship from an applied policy, as well as scholarly, perspective. The reason I pursued this work is connected directly to my interest in influencing some form of change and ultimately improving the livelihoods of people who exist in durably displaced situations. Of course, all of these applications would hinge upon INGO, host nation, and international community responsibility and willingness to make lasting and context-sensitive changes to management systems for protracted cases. The point of these policy ideas is to confront the durability of displacement
and attempt to find ways to avoid wasting lives. It may not be possible to prevent protraction, but there may be ways to avoid durability. In some cases, by embracing the durability of displacement, alternative aid strategies could enhance the quality of life or potential for success should durable solutions arise.

In the area of education, perhaps the national education system could be melded with educational priorities of the country of origin in order to prevent fully indoctrinated host state faux-citizens such as those in Kiziba. As this study showed, support systems built for refugees that assume a temporary stay can have complex consequences as generations are born into the camp context. Studying through online degree programs (e.g. Khan Academy or online university programs) through more efficient and available Internet services could allow refugees to expand skillsets that they could utilize in any of the three UNHCR proposed durable solutions. If we were to accept the durable nature of certain kinds of displacement, perhaps refugees could be trained to undertake the majority of humanitarian services provided by outside employees. Rather than university programs alone, refugees should have opportunities for trainings that would allow them to take over the medical support roles, fulfill the psychological counseling void, or even assume camp administration leadership so that humanitarian aid finds its way directly—rather than indirectly or not at all—into the camp economy to allow more self-sufficiency. Additionally, following the model of Pittaway et al. (2010) and the suggestion of Milner (2011), refugees could be prepared to participate in peacemaking, peace-building, and post-conflict rebuilding through diplomacy and lobbying education and training. As Milner (2011) suggests, without including massively displaced populations in the peace and conflict-resolution processes, displacement often becomes a chronic condition. All parties must be involved in the resolution of forced migration and the factors that led to the flight, and to do this, refugees must be trained to effectively use their voices in the diplomatic and international political arena.

In the realm of economics, the aforementioned options would likely help to redirect money into the local refugee economy, with benefits to the surrounding communities (World Bank, 2012). Livelihood initiatives could focus on culturally-tuned and regionally-tailored projects that prepare refugees to engage in either the local economy, the economy of their communities of origin, or even in a potential third country of asylum. Generalizable skillsets might include learning to build living roofs, establish vertical gardens that allow all residents to participate, or even exploring agricultural initiatives such as beekeeping.
that occupy a small spatial area. These kinds of initiatives could have more wide-spread accessibility and appeal for all residents—rather than just a select few vulnerable groups—and allow practice and maintenance of skills that can be passed on to younger generations such as land cultivation. Embracing the notion of durability in this context would allow the refugees to adopt strategies that both boost economic and/or health conditions in the interim and support skills that could be carried with them anywhere in the future.

Second, by understanding the durability that builds at the local level—in the identity and imaginings of the refugees—we can anticipate problems that arise with disrupting the state-like camp situation that has been home for such long periods of time. This work rests in the realm of psychologists and peace and reconciliation experts, but identifying the durability of these contexts serves as a useful starting point for truly understanding the potential consequences of ‘durable solutions.’ While the UNHCR’s goals for durable solutions provides an overarching framework, understanding the durability of certain protracted cases may shed light on the realistic success of certain options, including repatriation or resettlement. I hope that this work can contribute to political, social, and psychological strategies than can inspire new alternatives to existing long-term solutions and ease the transition of durably displaced refugees into those future options. Ultimately, by understanding durability as a concept of certain types of forced migration, and knowing where to draw the line between permanence and temporariness, we can begin to reimagine what a refugee camp stay looks like. Through the process of formulating new ways to exist in exile, we can gradually dismantle the notion of durability and convert the refugee experience into one without so much wasted human potential.

**FUTURE WORK**

This research identified processes at the macro, meso, and micro levels that contribute to a system of displacement where once temporary situations become increasingly permanent and durable. As the previous section discussed, three areas of further research include capturing the most likely avenues for advancing the questions raised in this study. First, an investigation of alternative hosting mechanisms for institutions in the camps, such as security, education, and healthcare, would reduce durability and reinforce the temporary nature of camp settings. Second, research into the psychological effects of removing refugees’ from durable displacement into mainstream society is necessary to ensure
the success of these populations in the future. It is not a matter of dropping them into a new context and expecting everyone to thrive. How do refugees from protracted situations that began to take on durable qualities adjust to resettlement or repatriation? If they repatriate, how do they reconcile with the host country after years of separation? Who will facilitate such a dramatic psychological transition? Third, having identified durability in displacement and the cyclic effects of these factors, an important next step is to develop research on how we dismantle the durability, protraction, and displacement. This would help move towards a future where exiled human beings can be released from their encampment and allowed to lead lives where their agency is not confined to the imprisonment of physical warehousing that defines the lives of refugees today. Until this level of the world’s conflict and power displacement spillovers are integrated into the international community’s approach to forced migration, humanitarian aid will remain an isolated response to the collective human tragedies of refugees. Kiziba Refugee Camp, and many others like it, has existed for nearly twenty years, hosting the same population while new generations are born into it. Under no context within the bounds of a human life can 20 years be deemed ‘temporary.’ At what point do we, as scholars and members of the global community, reject the assumptions of temporary refugeehood? By recognizing durability in displacement, we can begin to improve the livelihoods of those stuck in limbo in meaningful ways and reduce the human potential wasted in camps all over the world.
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TIMELINE OF BANYARWANDA CITIZENSHIP

The following table outlines the major legislative actions that revoked or bestowed citizenship on the Banyarwanda population of eastern DRC. In some cases, these actions provided citizenship to some Banyarwanda while revoking it from others. The most recent changes reportedly give citizenship to all Banyarwanda who can demonstrate presence in the country prior to the 1960 independence, but the ambiguous wording reflects earlier legislation that provided loopholes for exclusion.

Table 1: Summary of Citizenship Legislation for Congolese Banyarwanda

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year/Legislation</th>
<th>Citizen?</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1920 – Congolese roundtable convenes in Brussels</td>
<td>Ambiguous</td>
<td>The talk was focused on Independence and it was agreed that Banyarwanda who had lived in Congo for at least 10 years could vote like all Congolese (Deng, 2001, p. 197)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1959 – Legislative decree for Banyarwandas’ right to run for office</td>
<td>Ambiguous</td>
<td>Continuation of the 1920 talk (Deng, 2001, p. 197)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1960 – “Electoral Law 13”</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Reaffirms residency of ten years or more = right to vote. Many did so in the first municipal elections and many Banyarwanda were elected to office. (Deng, 2001, p. 197)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1960 – “The Fundamental Law of 1960”</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Newly independent Republic of Congo determines citizenship is only applicable to those tribal groups documented to exist within DRC prior to the definition of its national borders on 1 August 1885. Makombo notes (in the notes section), “…the former Zairian Government reaffirmed that Banyamulenge were not either a tribe of Zairians or Rwandan origin or Kinyarwanda-speaking Zairians” (p. 55)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Year/Legislation</td>
<td>Citizen?</td>
<td>Description</td>
</tr>
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<td>-----------------------------------------------------</td>
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<td>---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1964 – Luluabourg Constitution, Article 6</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>This is in slight conflict with Makombo’s account above, but Deng claims that the 1920 resolution was in force until 1964. He quotes article 6 of the new constitutions (p. 197): “Congolese citizenship is recognized [for] every person, one of whose parents was or had been a member of one of the tribes established within the territory of the Republic of the Congo in its borders as defined on 18 October 1908.” – this was written 30 June 1960, which may be why it’s confusing. Deng asserts that this should’ve included Rwandan groups as well. The Banyarwanda were allowed to vote in subsequent elections, but couldn’t run for office.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
| 1971—“The Decree Law No. 71-020 of 26 March 1971, Signed January 1972 by Pres. Mobutu | Yes      | Citizenship to all natives of Rwanda and Burundi arriving in DRC (Zaire) before 1950. Mobutu was allegedly under pressure from Tutsi leader Bisengimana Rwema. This law gave Banyarwanda political rights (voting and entering elections)
Note: Deng quotes his translation of another text as “[A]ll persons of Rwanda-Burundi origins established in the Congo by June 30, 1960, are Zairian from this date” – which makes sense because that’s the date the constitution was drafted. (p. 198) Makombo was citing the text actually written into the nationality act written in 1972 that gives the cutoff date as January 1, 1950.                                                                 |
<p>| 1981—Amendment to 1971 law                          | Some     | Limited citizenship again to those groups existing prior to 1885, but allowed for naturalization on an individual basis. Banyarwanda effectively lose the right to citizenship. The possibility for naturalization caused confusion because no administrative instruments were emplaced to enforce it. No previous Banyarwanda national identity cards were revoked (pp. 55-56)                                                                 |
| 1991-                                               | Ambiguous| “When, despite the 1981 Law, the Zairian National Conferences, established in 1991, decided that the transitional Government of Zaire should respect Banyarwanda’s acquired rights to protect them from statelessness, the Hunde and Nyanga indigenous ethnic groups protested.” (P. 56). Deng (p. 200) cites an Amnesty International report that says the results of the conferences upheld the 1981 law. |
| 1995—Resolution of 28 April 1995                    | No       | Aimed to examine the conflict in eastern DRC in order to exclude Banyarwanda from citizenship. Treated the Banyamulenge as “recent refugees” (p. 56)                                                                                                                                                                                                  |</p>
<table>
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<tr>
<th>Year/Legislation</th>
<th>Citizen?</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>September 1996</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Governor of S. Kivu threatens to intern and exterminate all Banyarwanda who refuse to leave. The Banyarwanda join in rebellion backed by Rwanda and Uganda and ultimately overthrow Mobutu and put Laurent Kabila in power—the DRC is born.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1996 – letter to the UN Security Council dated 23 Oct</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Deng states, &quot;...the Zairean government wrote that it did not consider that the Banyarwanda in general and the Banyamulenge in particular belonged to a Zairean ethnic group. They were therefore not entitled to Zairean citizenship unless they were to acquire such nationality through naturalization procedures. (p. 200)&quot;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1994</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>President Kabila annulled the Interim Constitution of 9 April 1994. As of 1997, the 1981 citizenship law is in effect, where Banyarwanda have no citizenship rights.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>December 2005 referendum</td>
<td>Yes/Ambiguous</td>
<td>All ethnic groups present in DRC at the time of independence in 1960 are DRC citizens, as well as descendants. According to UNHCR: “The Constitution thus confirms that Banyarwanda populations who were established in Congo prior to 1960 are citizens of the DRC” (UNHCR Africa Bureau, 2006). Utilizes same wording of earlier constitutions that preclude Banyarwanda citizenship.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
INTERVIEW QUESTIONS

1. Questions about the past
   1.1. Where are you from?
   1.2. What was life like there?
   1.3. What did you do for a living?
   1.4. How were your relations with your neighbors and community members?
   1.5. Do you still have family back there?

2. Questions about the present
   2.1. How are your relations with your neighbors and community members here?
   2.2. How do people outside the camp interact with you?
   2.3. What would you say is your national identity?

3. Questions about the future

4. Where would you like to live, if you could?
   4.1. If the fighting in the community where you came from ended, what would you do?
   4.2. What do you think life would be like if you could go back?
   4.3. If the fighting does not end, what will you do?
   4.4. How do you see your life in the next 10 years? 20 years?
   4.5. How do you see the life of your children in the future?

5. Questions about rumors of others leaving the camp:
   5.1. Do you know anyone who has left the camp?
   5.2. Where did they go?
   5.3. Where are they now? How are they now?
   5.4. Did their experience influence your ideas about leaving the camp?

6. Concluding:
   6.1. What are your hopes for the future of this camp?
   6.2. What would you like the international community to know about this situation here?
   6.3. What else is important for us to know about the situation for you here?
PHOTO/VISUALS PERMISSION

Frydenlund, Erika F.

From: Fish, Jennifer N.
Sent: Monday, August 03, 2015 2:49 PM
To: Frydenlund, Erika F.
Subject: permission to use photos

Dear Erika,

I grant you permission to include all of the photos you have selected for your dissertation. They will find their most relevant home in your publication.

With gratitude for your investment in this extraordinary work,

Dr. Fish

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Education

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<tr>
<th>Degree</th>
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<tr>
<td>Ph.D., International Studies</td>
<td>Old Dominion University</td>
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<tr>
<td>Graduate Certificate, Women’s</td>
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<td>May 2012</td>
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<tr>
<td>Graduate Certificate, Modeling &amp; Simulation</td>
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<tr>
<td>M.S., Statistics</td>
<td>Virginia Polytechnic Institute and State University</td>
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<tr>
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<td>May 2002</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Selected Experience

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Selected Publications
