Fall 2016

Care, Control, or Criminalization? Discourses on Homelessness and Social Responses

Lindsey L. Upton
Old Dominion University

Follow this and additional works at: http://digitalcommons.odu.edu/sociology_criminaljustice_etds

Part of the Criminology Commons

Recommended Citation
Upton, Lindsey L., "Care, Control, or Criminalization? Discourses on Homelessness and Social Responses" (2016). Sociology & Criminal Justice Theses & Dissertations. 9.
http://digitalcommons.odu.edu/sociology_criminaljustice_etds/9
CARE, CONTROL, OR CRIMINALIZATION? DISCOURSES ON HOMELESSNESS AND SOCIAL RESPONSES

by

Lindsey L. Upton
B.S. May 2009, Iowa State University
M.S. May 2011, Eastern Kentucky University

A Dissertation Submitted to the Faculty of Old Dominion University in Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for the Degree of DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY CRIMINOLOGY AND CRIMINAL JUSTICE

OLD DOMINION UNIVERSITY
December 2016

Approved by:

Ruth A. Triplett (Director)
Randolph R. Myers (Member)
Travis W. Linnemann (Member)
There has been a resurgence of political and media interest in homelessness, particularly in major urban areas throughout the United States. This interest is credited to a number of cities that declared a State of Emergency (SOE) due to their homelessness crisis in 2015. The motivation to declare homelessness as an urgent priority of local politics assists cities in temporarily overcoming longstanding budget and bureaucratic barriers. Undoubtedly, the criminal justice system is part of social response following a declared SOE, and homelessness is not an exception. Little attention has explored the historical, social, and political processes of problematizing homelessness from a criminological perspective. Drawing on theoretical insight from David Garland, Jonathan Simon, and Loïc Wacquant, the politics of homelessness and crime found in New York City (NYC) is interrogated through discourses in the *New York Times* (*NYT*) from 1970-2012. This research examines how talk about homelessness responses creates, enacts, and enforces technologies of the criminal justice system. This study finds the politicization of homelessness over time produces and legitimates increased controls and management of marginalized groups, where state authorities are experts, and the boundaries of care and criminalization are blurred. This study has implications for the management of homelessness and policies that further socially exclude the homeless from overcoming such conditions.
This dissertation is dedicated to my mother, Jody, who emphasized creativity, critical thought, and the importance of education in order to create a life dedicated to the pursuit of social justice.
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

A great many people have contributed to the production of this dissertation. I owe my gratitude to colleagues, family, and friends who helped shape my graduate experience.

My deepest gratitude is to my advisor, Dr. Ruth Triplett. I have been incredibly fortunate to have an advisor who gave me the freedom to explore my ideas and provide guidance towards clarity and structure. Her patience and support helped me further develop as a scholar while appreciating the process. Drs. Randy Myers and Travis Linnemann have made an imprint on my professional development, well beyond work on the dissertation. Their advice is always insightful and thought provoking. My sincerest gratitude to my rockstar committee; to all, I am eternally grateful.

To my colleagues at ODU and EKU, many to whom I am fortunate to call friends and a second family, you are also key to the completion of this project. Your support, compassion, and acceptance came at times when I needed it most. Importantly, I am incredibly thankful to my partner, Travis, for the ways our paths continued to cross over the years, for the patience and support provided through some of my toughest moments, and for the many ways you have helped me grow personally and professionally.

Importantly, I thank my siblings, parents, and grandparents for the ways their voices have shaped my own. The continued personal sacrifice and inspiration by each member empowered me to operate beyond defined boundaries and without sacrificing self. I am eternally grateful to all of them, for they are my anchor through school and life.
# TABLE OF CONTENTS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Chapter</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>I. INTRODUCTION</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>II. LITERATURE REVIEW</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>THE SOCIAL CONSTRUCTION OF SOCIAL PROBLEMS</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNDERSTANDING HOMELESSNESS</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HOMELESSNESS IN CONTEXT OF CRIME AND POVERTY</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNDERSTANDING PUNITIVENESS AND INSECURITY</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GARLAND’S CULTURE OF CONTROL</td>
<td>17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SIMON’S GOVERNING THROUGH CRIME</td>
<td>19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WACQUANT’S PUNISHING THE POOR</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>THIS STUDY</td>
<td>22</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>III. METHOD AND DATA</td>
<td>23</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RESEARCH DESIGN</td>
<td>23</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DISCOURSE ANALYSIS</td>
<td>24</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FOUCAULDIAN DISCOURSE ANALYSIS</td>
<td>25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PARAMETERS OF THE STUDY</td>
<td>28</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DATA</td>
<td>30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CODING</td>
<td>32</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SUMMARY OF DESIGN, DATA, AND ANALYSIS</td>
<td>34</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IV. GENTRIFICATION AND DISPLACEMENT IN THE 1970s</td>
<td>36</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GENTRIFYING GREENWICH VILLAGE AND NOHO</td>
<td>39</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SOLUTIONS FOR HOUSING ISSUES</td>
<td>45</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DETERIORATING SPACES IN NYC</td>
<td>53</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DETERIORATING YOUTH</td>
<td>56</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CONSTRUCTIONS OF THE HOMELESS OTHER</td>
<td>61</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CONCLUSION</td>
<td>63</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>V. THE POLITICIZATION OF HOMELESSNESS DURING THE 1980s</td>
<td>65</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>END S.R.OS AND CLEAN UP SHELTERS</td>
<td>68</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FORMAL ACTION TO END S.R.OS IN NYC</td>
<td>72</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HOUSING ASSISTANCE AND THE HOMELESS OTHER</td>
<td>73</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SHELTERS OUTSIDE THE CITY LIMITS</td>
<td>75</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>REVIVING THE STREETS THROUGH JOBS AND JUSTICE</td>
<td>76</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BARRIERS FACED IN FINDING SOLUTIONS</td>
<td>78</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SECURITIZING SHELTERS</td>
<td>81</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>POLICING THE HOMELESS CRIMINAL OTHER</td>
<td>85</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CONCLUSION</td>
<td>89</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chapter</td>
<td>Page</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>---------</td>
<td>------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>VI. EXPANDING SOLUTIONS TO HOMELESSNESS AND CRIME IN THE 1990s</td>
<td>92</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>THE DINKINS ADMINISTRATION</td>
<td>95</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>THE DINKINS ADMINISTRATION’S RESPONSE</td>
<td>99</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MILITARIZING SHELTERS AND MOBILIZING CITIZEN POLICING</td>
<td>103</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>POLICING THE HOMELESS CRIMINAL OTHER</td>
<td>106</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OPERATING ON “GIULIANI TIME”</td>
<td>111</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RESISTING GIULIANI’S PRACTICES</td>
<td>114</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ASSIGNING RESPONSIBILITY IN HOMELESSNESS RESPONSE</td>
<td>117</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>COMMUNITY EFFORTS TO ORGANIZE RESPONSE</td>
<td>119</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IMAGE OF THE HOMELESS OTHER</td>
<td>122</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CONCLUDING A DINKINS AND GIULIANI ERA</td>
<td>127</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>VII. SECURITIZING STREETS AND SHELTERS IN THE 2000s</td>
<td>130</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>THE POLITICS OF HOUSING AND SHELTERS IN A BLOOMBERG ERA</td>
<td>132</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HOUSING HOMELESS FAMILIES AND VETERANS</td>
<td>137</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HOUSING SEX OFFENDERS</td>
<td>141</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>POLICING HOMELESSNESS</td>
<td>148</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MANAGEMENT OF THE HOMELESS OTHER</td>
<td>151</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CONCLUSION</td>
<td>153</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>VIII. DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION</td>
<td>155</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SUMMARY OF ANALYSIS</td>
<td>156</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SOCIOLOGY OF PUNISHMENT: SECURING STREETS AND SHELTERS</td>
<td>165</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CARE AND CRIMINALIZATION OF HOMELESSNESS</td>
<td>172</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CONCLUSION</td>
<td>173</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>REFERENCES</td>
<td>177</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>VITA</td>
<td>202</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION

Homelessness is a social problem long studied by scholars across multiple disciplines and contexts (Bahr 1973; Lindelius and Salum 1976; Stoner 1983; Lamb 1984; Brahams and Weller 1985; Quigly 1989). Recently, there has been a resurgence in scholarly interest about homelessness in the United States (Mitchell 2003; Lee, Tyler, and Wright 2010; Willse 2015), and in Western countries, such as Canada (Layton 2000; Lenon 2000; Cloke, Milbourne, and Widdowfield 2003; Gaetz 2010), England (Pleace, Fitzpatrick, Johnsen, Quilgars, and Sanderson 2008; Fitzpatrick and Jones 2005), Germany (Busch-Geertsema and Fitzpatrick 2008), and Australia (Minnery and Greenhalgh 2007). An extension of renewed interest is in scholarship on the politicization of social problems (Beck 2015) and social justice issues surrounding struggles over public space in the United States (Mitchell 2003; Harvey 2009; Fainstein 2010). By politicization, scholars refer to the social, economic, scientific, legal, and religious interest on the topic (Cohen 1996).

Didier Fassin and Mariella Pandolfi’s (2013) in *Contemporary States of Emergency* provide examples of politicization through SOEs. This collection of works examines political and historical conditions that make state intervention possible as social problems are framed as natural disasters in need of intervention. A relevant topic for this study includes recent state of emergency (SOE) regarding the homelessness crisis declared by several U.S. communities, including Seattle (WA), Los Angeles (CA), Oakland (CA), Eugene (OR), and the state of Hawaii. Despite the urgency framed using state of emergency, homelessness is not new, and certainly not to the urban areas that declared SOE.
In fact, annual reports provided by major agencies in charge of responding to homelessness provide statistical estimates regularly where inconsistency is an accepted fact of any statistical attempt. For example, the National Alliance to End Homelessness (NAEH) cited little to no change in homelessness statistics over time and frequently report overall declines of homelessness in cities across the United States in recent years. Though, a report by the Coalition for Homelessness (2016) included rhetoric that indicated a “catastrophe of homelessness” is occurring the U.S and that homelessness is rising for certain subpopulations of homeless. Additionally, the most recent data from the Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD) provided in the agency’s 2015 Annual Homeless Assessment Report to Congress (see Henry, Shivji, de Sousa, Cohen, Khadduri, and Culhane 2015) stated homelessness had increased, citing New York as the city with the greatest increase followed by California.

Inconsistencies surrounding the rise and fall of homelessness are theorized as a matter of political and social factors that have long socially constructed the problem and the numbers produced (Barak 1991; Chelimsky 1991).

A state of emergency regarding the homelessness crisis is declared in order to reduce bureaucratic barriers faced and to push the issue into the political forefront for immediate increased resources and services. For example, a recent report provided by the National Alliance to End Homelessness (2016) summarized the recent trend toward declaring a SOE. It revealed the declared SOE temporarily: shifted zoning barriers that prohibited shelters and short term housing assistance for the homeless; furthered statutes and regulations that facilitated public-private partnerships and promoted contracts; prioritized homelessness to the top of budgetary and emergency resource lists; and further highlighted the issues of affordable housing that has long been discussed (NAEH 2016).
Undoubtedly, a state of emergency creates urgency in action and legitimizes state powers to intervene in social problems. It enables intervention in the form of care and control, or as others have conceptualized it in global contexts - militaristic and humanitarian aid (Fassin and Pandolfi 2013). This is illustrated in a brief provided by the City of Seattle (2016) that described the move to provide “more administration authority and flexibility in contracting for services and allocating resources in response to the homelessness crisis” and specifically addressed recent critical issues faced by homeless children. In this brief, we are directed to the politics behind declaring a SOE situated in a context of reports of increased homelessness. For example, Seattle/King County Coalition for Homelessness (2016) reported a 21% increase in homelessness from 2014-2015. The report further stated, “this number is always assumed an undercount, because we do not count everywhere, and because many people take great care not to be visible.” In this particular county, homelessness counts were conducted on one night of the year from 2am-5am, primarily focused in shelters. Thus, cities respond to visible indicators of homelessness such as encampments and tent cities as indicative of rising homelessness.

Similarly, in San Francisco, Supervisor David Campos stated a SOE enabled city response to complaints of encampments and homelessness visibility, which have “appeared in [greater] size and visibility in the past year” (“Campos Calls For…” March 8, 2016). Seattle and San Francisco are just two examples of cities that declared SOEs and cited homelessness visibility as problematic, thus necessitating the declared SOE. Moreover, it is reported that some cities, such as New York City (NYC), similar increases were faced however they did not declare a SOE (Markee 2016).

In constructing a crisis, the problem is publicized and a new light is cast on old issues (Beitsch 2015). The reproduction of a crisis works to produce resources and results. Cities
openly stated the declaration extends state authority to control and intervene. Though advocates see potential benefits in temporarily increased fiscal budgets and temporary authority over local bureaucratic matters, the full extent of consequences faced is undetermined. Advocates expected the extended authority cities knowingly called for in this political move could result in increased coercion and control that negatively impacts the homeless (Wogan 2015).

A declared SOE is an escalated example of moral and political urgency used to further state intervention strategies in the form of increased social control by authority figures. Another related and pervasive example is the extension of quality of life measures in that policing resulted from declared wars on urban crime and disorder. From the Johnson Administration’s War on Poverty to the Reagan Administration’s War on Drugs, Hinton (2016) connects the rise of mass incarceration to a conceptually different welfare system that connects care and control. Notions of care, equality, and economic opportunity were connected to cleaning up the streets from urban crime, disorder, and poverty as early as the Johnson [1963-1969] and Reagan Administrations [1969-1974]. The act of clearing encampments in order to address urban disorder involves partnership between the criminal justice system and social services. NYC (Willse 2015) and Seattle (Beckett and Herbert 2009) are two U.S. cities that implemented new control strategies linked to a host of perpetuated inequalities and exclusionary consequences long faced by marginalized groups under the guise of care and progressive movement. Declared SOEs and quality of life policing are then conceptualized as separate and not readily connected, though when operationalized we see an overlap in how their goals are enacted. Each is connected to national politics that wage a war on drugs and crime.

Like other social problems, then, homelessness is “as much created as it is discovered” (Cronley 2010: 320). Joel Best (1990:11) argued politics provide an avenue for bringing forth
conditions the public consider social problems. Homelessness symbolizes the threat of insecurity and instability to society that is recently repackaged as an emerging crisis despite its ongoing existence and perhaps gradual, rather than sudden, growth. It becomes politically and socially productive to garner public attention, motivation for action, and resources. Encampments have long existed and been controlled by police, however, what is unique to the study of homelessness today is a declared state of emergency around the issue.

Relatively little criminological attention links care, control, and criminalization in studies of homelessness and crime. To my knowledge, none exists that examines homelessness as a subject and brings together care, control, and criminalization. More specifically, there has been little criminological scholarship focused on the processes and practices that stem from constructing homelessness as a crime and disorder problem. Beyond criminology, homelessness is more frequently a focal point concerning poverty and crime studies (Watson 2000; Klodawsky 2006; Parsell 2010; Whiteford 2010; Willse 2015) and a concern given the rise in criminalization of homelessness (Mitchell 1997; Wright 2009). However, a great deal of existing literature popular among criminology scholars fits in the analysis of homelessness as a historical and political subject. Specifically, David Garland’s (2001) *Culture of Control*, Jonathan Simon’s (2007) *Governing Through Crime*, and Loïc Wacquant’s (2009) *Punishing the Poor* provide theoretical insight to the study of homelessness and its responses of care and control today. In addition, other scholars explore crime and poverty in the contexts of an eroded economic and social welfare system, a lack of access to affordable housing, stable employment, health care, and the control of public space (also see, Friedrichs, Galster & Musterd 2003; Beckett and Herbert 2009).
This study adds to criminological literature on the sociology of punishment by examining the processes of problematizing homelessness, including policies and practices created, enacted, and targeted at responding to homelessness. Specifically, it argues a new logic of social control that has emerged that blurs the boundaries of care and criminalization, and conflates moral and political urgency to legitimize state intervention. Importantly, this study adds to the field of criminology where it is focused on homelessness at the intersection of crime and poverty. The current study has implications for sociology of punishment insights found in the work of David Garland, Jonathan Simon, and Loïc Wacquant.

I explore three ideas related to research on the shifting governing forces of care and crime control. First, I provide a genealogy for historical and political unraveling of homelessness. I interrogate the historical developments of homelessness and responses to it through examining images and language over time. Second, we see how the mediated construction of homelessness and its responses rest in notions of care, control, and criminalization as attention is paid to various homeless subjects, particularly in defining who are the homeless other and who is deserving of varied responses. In tracing a genealogy of homelessness through a media source, a third element emerges that explores the connection between the politics of poverty, homelessness, crime, and care found in the governing forces of State authority. This study adds to scholarship that spans the “varieties of punitiveness” (Sylvestre 2013) based on “distinctive cultural, historical, constitutional, and political conditions (Tonry 2007: 1) across time, place, and perspective.

This analysis is focused on New York City (NYC), New York, USA from 1970-2012. Recently, New York witnessed the greatest increase among states in the U.S. for rates of homelessness in 2015 (AHAR 2016). Additionally, during the 1990s, crime rates dropped
dramatically in the United States, where NYC had the most significant crime drop. The politics of zero tolerance practices and quality of life policing are situated in NYC (Mcardle and Erzen 2001; Kusmer 2003; Vitale 2008). NYC Mayor Rudy Giuliani’s (1994-2001) tough on crime strategies that arrested New Yorkers for minor crimes gained global attention when his NYC zero tolerance quality of life policing was applied to Mexico City and determined a failure (Shapiro 2007; Mountz and Curran 2009). Mountz and Curran (2009: 1033) argue Giuliani’s ideas gained popularity due to their “currency in public discourse” where they “produced a ‘cult of personality’ that masks the very real failures of neoliberalism in everyday life,” or as Bourdieu and Wacquant (1999) refer, the idea of the expert. In regard to homelessness and responses to it, the creation of multiple coalitions, organizations, and alliances centered on ending homelessness fall in line with the argument that the role of the expert has been created that furthers state power and extends control.

This research is situated in NYC from the 1970s forward. In order to provide a critical historical reflection on the politicization of the homeless subject I used a highly consumed source located in the city of study, the New York Times (NYT). Baumgartner and Jones (1991: 1045) argued the “prevailing image of the policy problem through the use of rhetoric, symbols and policy analysis” is often captured in the media. News discourse on social problems is impactful and consequential. The NYT is a powerful avenue for organizations, politicians, and others to capture mass attention on the issue, thus it is an important site for deconstructing the framing of public policy issues used to legitimize state intervention. Framing analysis is a valuable tool to understand how homelessness and crime are problematized. Using a constructivist approach to examine news discourse from the NYT, texts are conceptualized and operationalized to provide empirical evidence of historical constructions of homelessness and crime. Constructivism is
further used to provide a theoretical framework to understand “crisis-making” of longstanding social problems.

This dissertation starts with a literature review that covers the topics of governance and criminalization of poverty, specifically on the convergence of criminalization and poverty through homelessness. Method and data are outlined in the next chapter to detail the use of ethnographic content analysis (Altheide 1987). In the chapters to follow, a history of the present is laid out by decade in one of the most highlighted cities in punishment literature, NYC.
CHAPTER II
LITERATURE REVIEW

The current study interrogates the perception of homelessness and its response through discourse found in the media. This study draws from literature on crime and poverty studies specifically as it relates to social control of crime and deviance. It is located in scholarship that understands media as a force in the social construction process.

As this chapter will show, homelessness is a topic of study relevant to criminology. Studying homelessness furthers our understanding of issues of poverty and crime but to do so best it requires specific attention paid to historical and political underpinnings, and examination of the relationship between control of both crime and poverty. As of this time, a gap in criminological literature exists on homelessness as a subject to understand crime control. However, insights from scholars interested in control such as Garland (2001), Simon (2007), and Wacquant (2009), provide a framework for examining homelessness.

In this chapter, I examine two key areas of the literature. First, I begin with the assumption of homelessness as socially constructed. I introduce important literature that provides the foundations for analysis of social problems through news media accounts. Next, I provide key insights from sociology of punishment theorists that are applied to scholarly exploration of homelessness and its response. Specifically, I outline significant contributions of critical sociologists David Garland, Jonathan Simon, and Loïc Wacquant that guided theoretical foundations of this study.
THE SOCIAL CONSTRUCTION OF SOCIAL PROBLEMS

For the purpose of this work, homelessness is a social problem that is understood as socially constructed. A constructivist assumption allows scholars to engage with the processes that enable social problems to become public concerns (Best 2013). Scholars who work from a constructivist perspective argue that defining a social problem is highly susceptible to historical conditions and forces of moral economy (Spector and Kitsuse 1977; Best 2013). History is a mode of analysis that extends beyond understanding history as archival past that leads up to the contemporary. Rather, historical insights are used to reconsider the present through analysis of the past (Garland 2014). Moral economy is a concept that expresses the idea that communities share a set of normative attitudes about the social relations and social behaviors that surround the local economy (Thompson 1961). Further, Spector and Kitsuse (1977:75), two important scholars who work from a constructionist perspective, argue social problems are created when individuals or a group “make assertions of grievances and claims” about a condition with which the public is more readily and easily concerned. According to Best (1990:11), “conditions must be brought to [public attention] in order to become social problems.” Therefore, social conditions are subject to political, economic, historical, and cultural underpinnings. Media are a “central institution of modern life” where political and public agendas are traced (Garland 2001: 85). Thus, scholars argue media help generate public agendas on issues that are deemed important, problematic, and prioritized (Garland 2001).

Within this social constructionist perspective, the media then are understood as communications that offer understanding of the cultural place social issues occupy (Stevenson 2002). Berger and Luckmann (1967) argue a central important aspect of communication is the role of language. The development of knowledge and language are core to understanding the
dialectics of social organization and social problems (Carter 2013). Thus, media are one site to analyze the reproduction of perceptions of social problems across time and place. Under this perspective then the media provide important cultural artifacts – such as news reports- that provide insights into social constructions of historical and political processes over time. Criminologists realize the importance of media to understanding crime and now there is an area within criminology of crime and media studies. One area found in crime and media studies deconstructs discourse found in news media accounts on crime and justice subjects (Barak 1995; Hope and Sparks 2000). Scholars in this area argue that cultural assumptions and political interests shape discourses that frame urgency to control a social problem. Key to understanding the power of the media is that these assumptions and interests are reproduced through mediated images of the subjects connected to particular social problems (Garland 2001).

Importantly, mediated images reproduce cultural imaginaries of marginalized populations, such as the homeless, as socially problematic and in need of intervention. Since the 1970s, critical scholars have examined news representations of crime and justice situated in the politics of fear of crime (Altheide 2002; Best 2013). Their analyses provided evidence for understanding news as cultural products that reproduce insecurities of real crime experienced and notions of punishment, law, and order. Such scholars demonstrated how media shape and circulate emerging knowledge of social problems. In addition, each provided insight into the process of claims making about crime and justice issues. McMullan (2005: 18) argued, “truth claims are anchored in discourse and discursive formations that produce particular ways of organizing thinking, talking and doing in regard to selected topics.” By examining crime and justice discourse, these scholars provided insight into how “power is exercised” through the
representation of social issues in the media (McMullan 2005: 23) and frameworks used to garner public concern for social problems (Altheide 2015).

This study seeks to understand the social construction of a particular social problem – homelessness – as a public concern. It uses homelessness as an example of a social problem historically subjected to policies that promote control of marginalized groups. It is to existing literature on the social construction of homelessness that we now turn.

UNDERSTANDING HOMELESSNESS

Social constructionists argue that, like other social issues, homelessness is “as much created as it is discovered” (Cronley 2010: 320). A social problem such as homelessness violates communities’ shared set of normative attitudes and behaviors, and in turn, it impacts social relations. In this section, we explore how homelessness is constructed particularly in its connection to crime. We then see how these images, particularly those constructed in the media, are important for they in turn are used to develop policies.

Understanding homelessness in the media starts with a recognition that the homeless subject is frequently constructed as deviant, criminal, or diseased. In a number of ways, the homeless are often identified as a fringe group on the edges of society. For example, Blau (1992) argued the dominant image of the homeless as “lazy misfits” and drug addicts. Additionally, to these depictions of the homeless as lazy, misfits, drug addicts, etc. are individual level explanations for these social problems.

The construction of homelessness as a marginalized, fringe group that falls under similar stigmatizations and socially exclusionary processes of the criminal and deviant other is important to understanding the social construction of homelessness and responses to it. The image of the
criminal and deviant other are often those negatively constructed and found at the fringe of society (Ferrell and Sanders 1995). Such groups are often less powerful fringe groups that have been marginalized (Ferrell and Sanders 1995; Young 2007). Young (2007) described the process of constructing marginalized groups where social norms are reproduced and reiterated. Young (2007) specifically refers to the constructed distinctions or “false binaries” between the majority and the minority productive. They work to reproduce practices of social exclusion and hierarchal order in providing services. Such constructions are politically and culturally situated, and enable social exclusion through hierarchies of morality (Young 2007). Therefore, constructing the homeless as a marginalized other is subject to underlying political and social processes and works to create deserving and undeserving populations for resources and services provided.

Framing homelessness as a social problem in need of normalization, intervention, and correction then is connected to the ideas of who the homeless are and which category they fit in terms of those that deserve services and those that do not (Ravenhill 2016). Here, we see the construction of individual and structural factors assigned responsibility and blame, thus shaping our social definitions of response and treatment for their homelessness. Causes and the corresponding responsibility are intimately connected to the constructed image, and are then related to policy and practice.

Often, logics are operationalized as oppositions where responsibility and blame is placed on those who participated in criminal or deviant behavior that led to homelessness, versus those who are diseased or fall through the cracks of structural failure (Neal 1997). Neal (1997) argued binary oppositions produced ideas of responsibility and deservedness that translated into “less than adequate” policy and practice. Furthermore, scholars argue this serves as a “critical point of entry for academics and activists interested in challenging the presumptive normalization of
homeless policies that cleave apart homeless communities.” Notions of homelessness, its causes, and its responses are continually reproduced to maintain “boundaries between chronic/non-chronic, productive/unproductive, and ‘old’ (e.g. male, single)/’new’ (e.g. female, families, children, youth) homeless—and marginalize our cities’ most disenfranchised populations” (Del Casino and Jocoy 2008: 193). In summary, it is important to study how we construct homelessness as strictly a housing, health, or crime problem. Such constructions translate into policies that impact entire homeless populations, perpetuating stereotypes, stigmas, and divisions among worthy versus unworthy marginalized groups. Nonetheless, homelessness and its responses have been conflated to issues of crime, disorder, and disease that follow distinct narratives in deservedness of resources (Cronley 2010). When we turn to criminology, however we see a gap in the study of homelessness where care, control and criminalization are simultaneously conceptualized. Next, we turn to the way sociologists and criminologists look at homelessness and issues of crime and poverty.

HOMELESSNESS IN CONTEXT OF CRIME AND POVERTY

Since the 1970s, scholars have examined control of space in the United States and Great Britain. In particular, scholars have applied this to changing urban landscape that imposes increased control and criminalization of homelessness (Amster 2003). This attention has sparked some interest among criminologists in documenting the increasing ways we have criminalized behaviors particular to the homeless (Becket and Herbert 2009). In addition, when criminologists study homelessness in the United States they often do so alongside other social problems connected to broad discussions of crime, poverty, and punishment (Hagan and McCarthy 1998). Homelessness itself is less frequently analyzed as a point of focus by criminologists. Even less
criminological inquiry has incorporated historical analyses into understanding the relationship between homelessness and crime over time (see, Chambliss 1964).

In addition to these problems with the way criminology approaches or does not approach the study of homelessness, one particular area for which criminologists and sociologists that study crime and poverty issues are criticized is for too narrowly focusing on control strategies that do not incorporate forms of care in theoretical understanding. For example, DeVerteuil (2014) argued a “multiplicity of homeless geographies” exist that are better understood as “multifaceted and ambivalent rather than only punitive.” Simply stated, care, control, and criminalization exist in any single given community. Further, DeVerteuil (2014) argued research that examines criminalization of homelessness in a city has potential for broadened conceptualizations of “varied and complex” responses to homelessness beyond only punitiveness. In the topic of homelessness, such interests culminate to help us understand the socially constructed image, how each is reproduced over time, and the politics of control that simultaneously include care and criminalization of a single phenomenon. What we also need as we turn to study homelessness in this manner is a framework for understanding care, control and criminalization practices. In the following, we discuss understanding homelessness and its responses within existing literature that has mentioned homelessness in a cursory manner.

UNDERSTANDING PUNITIVENESS AND INSECURITY

The politicization of the social problems is often linked to what Garland (2001) called a new crime control field that drives the state of mass incarceration. Politicization refers to social, economic, scientific, legal, and religious interests on the topic (Cohen 1996). Since the 1990s, scholars have examined the politicization of crime and disorder in NYC in the context of a newly
emerged crime control field. Insecurities of crime and disorder, high crime rates, and perceptions of risk helped fuel politics that decreased welfarism and fueled crime control (Walsh 2015). During the 1980s and early 90s, police responded to rises in crime, violence, and drugs with zero tolerance and broken windows policing in NYC which resulted in marginalized populations facing police crackdowns for minor crimes as the War on Drugs became increasingly politicized. The War on Drugs deepened racialized tensions in urban ghettos (Wacquant 2001). Drug users were cast as poor, unproductive individuals that need to be socially excluded from urban space (Garland 2001; Young 2007; Beckett and Herbert 2009). Recently, homelessness has been connected by Willse (2015) to similar crime and disorder concerns that further neoliberal logics to clean up and end a populations’ dependency on the welfare system.

Three prominent scholars contributed to the study of social control and punitive neoliberal policies found in the United States: David Garland (2001), Jonathan Simon (2007), and Loïc Wacquant (2009). Specifically, they understand increased governing forces found in institutions of everyday life connected to perceptions of fear of crime and insecurity. Scholars focused on the relationships between fear of crime and the culture of control (Garland 2001) or governmentality (Simon 2007). Simon (2007) and Garland (2001) are among scholars influenced by Foucauldian notions of governance. Foucault (1991) inspired scholarship that argues governance occurs at multiple sites, and consists of multiple actors including private and public actors. The technologies of governance operate through fear and insecurity.

Wacquant (2009) argues to shift toward including conceptualizations of social insecurity, not just criminal insecurity, and one that pushes the state back into focus as it seeks to understand strategies of urban poverty management. Wacquant (2009) seeks to understand how racial domination and social inequality are habitual practices, and welfare retrenchment and penal
expansion serve the rise in a neoliberal state. Wacquant’s work is influenced by that of Pierre Bourdieu (1978) that assumes class is a result of “group-making” where struggles for dominant ideas of social division and categorization are situated here and dominate over all other categorizations. The overall argument is that class affords freedom for some at the cost of increased regulation and crackdown on the social and economic activities of the racialized caste and working poor (Wacquant 2009). Punishment and society scholars have provided extant literature on crime and poverty. Specifically, each embraced the power of politics and history in understanding contemporary social problems. These works provide insight into the complexities of homelessness and its responses.

GARLAND’S CULTURE OF CONTROL

In 2001, Garland argued a new collective experience of crime and insecurity is created through distinct “social, economic, and cultural arrangements of late modernity” that shifted in the USA and UK. He argued that a shift occurred following the 1970s toward authorities using a piecemeal response of prevention and punishment (i.e., preventative partnerships and punitive segregation), a culture of control, where punishment and containment are successful political strategies to address insecurities of crime and disorder.

Garland (2001) identified these new experiences of crime and insecurity as early as the 1970s, where he characterized decades to follow were driven by anxieties and fears of crime and disorder situated in urban realities of high crime. According to him, shifting attitudes are a product of decades where high crime rates induced real fears and insecurities about the criminal other. Garland (2001) argued the fear of crime is a pervasive part of daily life where modern life is constructed as dangerous; here media are a central institution that reproduces modern life.
Simply, media play a significant role in reproducing fears and anxieties of crime that exist long after changes in urban realities of crime are observed.

These rising crime rates and real fears and insecurities, he then argued, interact with neoliberalism and conservative policies. Neoliberalism is a form of rationality where carceral institutions are linked to free trade, privatization, deregulation, and welfare retrenchment (Garland 2001; Harvey 2005). Garland (2001) argued neoliberalism is paradoxically linked to mass incarceration expansion. Others connect it to the contemporary ideal of a strict and severe police state (Harcourt 2010). In addition, Garland (2001) argued that society has shifted towards conservative policies where support and policies rooted in welfarism are decreased, and support and policies for crime control increased. These shifts produced a social re-organization in late modernity and neoconservative politics that increasingly dominated social life since the 1970s (Garland 2001).

Specific to the United States, we understand the mass incarceration that characterizes our country through a rise in zero-tolerance policies and quality of life policing throughout recent decades. Garland argued that both address urban realities of high crime and disorder that characterized the 1980s and 1990s. Politicians articulated fear and risk that sparked a motivated public, and policy agendas shifted toward governing problems through state, corporate, and private entities. In this way, crime control has increasingly become a part of everyday politics and social life.

Garland (2001) illustrated his points when he discussed NYC as a location where this is witnessed. NYC faced higher crime rates, increased media coverage of crime, and the increased prominence of victims from the 1970s to present. According to Garland (2001), the combination of these factors created a context where the politicization of crime is enabled. Consequently, new
understandings of crime emerged that emphasized the normalization of crime and the
demonization of the criminal other. This perception, in conjunction with fear of crime he argued,
has driven public and political agendas that support deterrence policies. Moreover, Garland
(2001) argued that even crime prevention policies under the guise of social inclusion tend to play
out in socially exclusionary ways and reproduce consequential social controls of the state.

SIMON’S GOVERNING THROUGH CRIME

Jonathan Simon (2007) explores the notion that society has moved beyond governing
crime to governing through crime, influenced by the work of Foucault. According to Simon
(2007), governing through crime shows itself in three important ways, where crime is a strategic
issue found across multiple institutions; it is used as a category to legitimize intervention in areas
that were not previously conceived as criminal justice matters; and the technologies, discourses,
and metaphors of crime and justice become more common. Simon (2007) argues fear of crime
has transformed schools, families, and workplaces to place more emphasis on crime control. This
transformation has shifted to areas where disruption in schools, for example, is responded to with
zero tolerance practices such as write-ups, detentions, and expulsion. This is pervasive in the
lives of children in the school system, where Simon (2007) argues notions of crime vulnerability
play out daily as we view children as potential targets and potential victims. Though the reality
of victims and offenders is relatively small compared to the entire population of children, fears
and anxieties of potential crime are so pervasive they are applied to all. A culmination of these
three important developments resulted in new opportunities for the governance of every day life
through crime control technologies.
Much like Garland, Simon (2007) directed attention to the 1970s and 1980s for economic and political shifts connected to the development or rise in governing through crime rationalities. He argued that, an economic recession, the politicization of law and order situated in neoliberalism, and fear of crime were all important factors underlying a rise in the management of criminal behavior found in multiple institutions. “Three strikes” laws are an example of policies enacted through such public and political agenda that lead to mass incarceration in the US. In fact, Simon (2007) argued violent crime continues to be a point of public concern and a normalized subject that dominates contemporary politics. Simon (2007) argued, however, individual and social costs of mass incarceration are largely ignored in popular rhetoric and policy concerns.

WACQUANT’S PUNISHING THE POOR

A third and final key scholar in understanding the sociology of punishment is scholar Loïc Wacquant. Wacquant (2009) argued that the “ascent of the penal state” and its associated ills in the U.S. and other advanced societies is a response to rising social insecurity, rather than strictly criminal insecurity. Wacquant (2009) argued a dismantling of the welfare state and shift toward a political project referred to as “neoliberal governance” occurred during the 1970s. This shift is said to influence a punitive management of the poor, where the welfare system is increasingly like the criminal justice system as its processes parallel that of punishment and control. Specifically, he illustrates this in the rise to mass incarceration which he views as a manifestation of the shift toward management of society’s urban, poor, black men (Wacquant 2009).
Wacquant (2009) connects social welfare and prison as two state functions that are manifestations of neoliberal governance. Wacquant points to the expansion and glorification of the police, courts, and prisons as responses to social insecurity. Such insecurities were faced following the Civil Rights movement in the 1960s, shifting social relations around progressive justice, increased use of zero tolerance policing and mandatory minimums, rising inequality and stagnant wage labor, and racial tensions. High crime rates and struggles for social order and hierarchies characterized recent shifts toward punitiveness.

Importantly, Wacquant (2009) also argued social and penal policies are two variants of poverty policy that are best understood as “new punitive politics of marginality.” Wacquant and colleagues (2011: 209) further state:

The resurging prison has come to serve three missions that have little to do with crime control: to bend the fractions of the post-industrial working class to precarious wage-work; to warehouse their most disruptive or superfluous elements; and to patrol the boundaries of the deserving citizenry while reasserting the authority of the state in the restricted domain it now assigns itself.

Lastly, Wacquant (2009) argued simultaneous and converging logics of “workfare” and expansive “prisonfare” facilitated the rise of the neoliberal state. “Workfare” and “prisonfare” double the regulatory mechanisms and institutions in place to manage poverty. Each exacerbates inequalities, meanwhile conceptualizing them as separate systems that divide social insecurities. The result is that each seems different and separate from one another as well as the populations primarily impacted.

Others who study the shifts in punitive politics and the transformation of crime control also argued these shifts have reshaped criminological thought, public policy, and the cultural
meaning of crime and criminals. Hallsworth and Lea (2011) argued the “security state” enables a new type of authoritarianism. Society is largely concerned with the management of marginalized populations through mechanisms of social exclusion. A pervasive and consequential conclusion is drawn where the “security state is emerging” in three important ways that continually reinforce overarching crime controls: the “transition from welfare to workfare and risk management; new measures to combat terrorism and organized crime; and the blurring of warfare and crime control” (Hallsworth and Lea 2011: 142).

This important scholarship has the potential to expand our understanding of homelessness at a point where poverty and crime converge, and where control today manifests itself in forms of care and criminalization as responses that further cause disruption and have significant consequences.

THIS STUDY

To further criminological voice in studies on homelessness and crime, and situated in work that seeks to understand care, control, and criminalization as simultaneously acting forces, I provide a historical account of the construction of homelessness through highly consumed news media, the NYT. In order to address tendencies of criminology to provide ahistorical accounts of poverty and crime, this study offers a historical understanding of the present homelessness crisis through the work of Garland (2001), Simon (2007), and Wacquant (2009). Their work provides a framework for examining media constructions of homelessness and responses to it. Understanding these constructions will help us understand where we are today as some states and cities with the highest homelessness populations declare states of emergency, while others facing similar homelessness statistics and conditions do not.
CHAPTER III

METHOD AND DATA

This study traces the dominant cultural narratives shaping understandings of homelessness and crime in NYC from 1970-2012 as found in the NYT. Attention is directed to the framing of the social problem and responses to it. The research design allows for an inductively built qualitative examination of discursive practices found in a highly consumed news source. Three key points, with theoretical underpinnings traced to Michel Foucault, guide the discourse analysis. They include: genealogy of the subject, technologies of power, and constructing the homeless subject. The following chapter describes the research design, analytic techniques, and data used to trace narratives found. Each is described below.

RESEARCH DESIGN

In order to trace the historical and political processes found in dominant cultural narratives on homelessness and the response to it, critical theory is the paradigm chosen. A paradigm is defined as “the set of common beliefs and agreements shared between scientists about how problem should be understood and addressed” (Kuhn 1962:45). Critical theory as a paradigm allows knowledge to be explored inductively, in order to build themes and interpretation from grounded data (Creswell 2003). It allows the researcher to understand social reality in a subjective and suspicious, yet scientific way (Guba and Lincoln 1994). This approach allows the researcher to explain why and how, rather than how much (Rourke and Szabo 2002).

The critical paradigm is focused in historical realism. Guba and Lincoln (1994) define historical realism as reality shaped by social, political, culture, economic, ethnic, and gender values that are crystallized over time. A critical endeavor maintains focus on value and meaning.
directed at understanding power and politics. Critical theory then is concerned with power relations and patterns of dominance. Critical theory looks at the world through a political lens, in which certain groups exert power and influence over other groups. It seeks to understand cultural aspects of power through narratives found in media. One method to examine narratives in the media from this paradigm using qualitative methods is through discourse analysis (Fairclough 2001).

Discourse analysis allows for in depth interrogation of language and the function it performs. Thus, I examine discursive practices that provide insight into power relations, social order, and practices surrounding homelessness and crime. Punishment and society theorists (i.e., Garland, Simon, and Wacquant) that situate their work in similarly critical endeavors use discourse analysis. Specifically, Garland (2014) discussed the method of writing a “history of the present” using Michel Foucault’s discourse analysis (FDA). The following outlines discourse analysis, specifically Foucauldian discourse analysis (FDA), and the appropriate connection to this study. I then provide details of the data collection process, followed by coding and analytic techniques used.

DISCOURSE ANALYSIS

Discourse is described as written texts, conversations, interviews, and multi-modal texts such as language and visual image (Fairclough 2001). Discourses represent particular ways of understanding and talking about the world (White and Stoneman 2012). Fairclough (2001) argues discourses are constitutive features of social interactions that produce and position people within social practices. Titscher and Jenner (2000) argue that understanding discursive practices is important to interrogating normalized and unquestioned “talk” around a subject over time.
Discourse analysis (DA), then, analyzes language situated in broad social, economic, political and culture contexts (van Dijk 1993; Fairclough 2001; Garland 2014). Specifically, DA is concerned with the dialectical relationship between language, ideology, and power (Fairclough 2001). Henry and Milovanovic (1996) argue such an analysis enables the researcher to deconstruct and reconstruct meaning found in discourse, while maintaining sensitivity for dialectics of struggle. Various ways of doing DA exist. The particular DA method considers the intent of focus as either micro or macro (Fairclough 2001). This study seeks to examine social and institutional practices surrounding homelessness and crime. Thus, it falls under methods of DA that lean toward macro level analysis. DA is used to confront seemingly normalized, common sense, and logical understandings produced about a subject.

Discourse analysis provides a useful method to connect texts, contexts, and practices in criminology. Particularly, it sheds light on the power of rhetorical constructs on creating realities and the reproduction of politics. DA connects discourse practices (i.e., the language, signs, meaning making) with the broad social, cultural, political contexts in which the discourse circulates (Henry and Milovanovic 1996; Fairclough 2001). This study extends criminological literature on homelessness and crime using discourse analysis.

FOUCAULDIAN DISCOURSE ANALYSIS

One method of DA is Foucauldian discourse analysis (FDA). FDA is recommended when examining social and institutional practices; whereas other methods of DA focus more on naturally occurring conversations or talk at an individual level (Edwards and Potter 1992). Additionally, Garland (2014), whose work drives theoretical understanding for this study, uses FDA in his own work and has produced knowledge based on its methods. As Garland (2014)
writes, FDA is used in studies that examine exclusionary or dividing practices, processes of “making” subjects and social problems productive, the dialectics of power-knowledge, and studies that seek to understand discourse as “productive of subjects and productive of truth” (Garland 2014: 367).

Furthermore, Garland (2014) uses FDA as “a method of writing critical history: a way of using historical materials to bring about a ‘revaluing of values’ in the present day” in punishment and society studies. As found in his work, FDA is concerned with deconstructing language found exercising power and knowledge over governed subjects through disciplinary practices in institutions (Garland 2014). According to Garland (2014), influenced by Foucauldian work, history over time is important to understanding the present. Such scholars refer to this study of history as genealogy that embraces “the struggles, displacements, and processes” that reproduce practices over time and place (Garland 2014: 373). FDA is concerned with how the past is traced in power struggles identified and observed by scholars today (Garland 2014). To conduct this method, researchers first identify and problematize the practice. Then, a history of the present is traced to provoke or problematize normalized processes. Problematization refers to the method of highlighting the “power struggles that produced” processes and “the forces that gave birth to our present-day practices” (Garland 2014: 373).

According to Howe (2014), a genealogy is conducted using three dimensions of Foucauldian thought (called specificities) to interrogate discursive practices using FDA. They include: veridiction (or historical truth at work or genealogy of the subject), governmentality (or the technologies, mechanisms, and functions of power), and subjectivations (construction of the subject through relation to veridiction and governmentality).
Foucault’s use of genealogies helps us expand notions of governance beyond the state to include a “myriad practices of governance within civil society” and the dialectical relations between governing practices (Howe 2014). Howe (2014: 223) describes the important work genealogy does in the study of the dialectics as it relates to a socially constructed world. “Genealogy proceeds by critically delineating and then comparing constructions over different periods in history, thus eschewing global generalizations about human life in favor of specific historical delineations of, say, practices of selfhood or relations of power” (Howe 2014: 223). Furthermore, veridiction refers to the “historical truth game at work in a given discourse” or historical truth at work (Howe 2014: 223). Governmentality refers to authority, control, and the creation of more “consensual” regimes of governance. This includes both, “those who govern and those who are governed” (Howe 2014: 223). Subjectivations refers to the practices in which the subject is created and situated in life in relation to veridiction and governmentality (Howe 2014).

Through a genealogy of homelessness, we understand how the homeless other is constructed (subjectivation), who and what governs homelessness (governmentality) and what historical truths are at work in their given contexts (veridiction). Importantly, we are able to see how the three specificities are constructed individually, but interactively, revealing the historical and political processes I discussed as important to this study. In terms of this study, I refer to each simply as genealogy of the subject, technologies of power, and constructing the homeless subject.

The current study then is influenced by David Garland’s work (2014) in two ways: theoretically and methodologically. Theoretically, insights from the “discourse of fear” about crime and disorder are connected to broader shifts in crime controls are used to understand
homelessness and its responses in news media. Methodologically, FDA provokes a study of “the history of systems of thought” (Garland 2014: 369) around homelessness and its response. In combination, the strong theory and method connection seek to uncover the normalized and legitimized meanings reproduced, meanwhile exposing contradictions found, and making sense of homelessness and its responses in the present. Importantly, Garland’s (2014) theoretical and methodological use of FDA offers criminologists a method to study care and criminalization, forces that simultaneously exist in governing the homeless (see criticisms, Wolch and DeVeurtieul 2001).

The methods used in this research design have now been outlined. The following details the data used to conduct the method and analysis. The data comes from one media source, in order to narrow the area of study and address issues of overgeneralization critiqued in past writings of Garland, Simon, and Wacquant’s theoretical contributions (Huey 2014). Below, I discuss parameters used in order to scientifically situate the process of data collection within theory and method. Parameters included location, source, and time frame. The following describes reasoning for the parameters chosen.

PARAMETERS OF THE STUDY

First, the location chosen for the study is NYC, New York, USA. In the late 1970s to mid 1980s, the United States faced significant social change related to crime and its control. A prominent place often discussed is NYC, largely because it was discredited as a battleground of crime, violence, and disorder. Though cities across the United States began to see rises in crime and violence, NYC is among the major metropolitan areas thrust into the national media spotlight. However, within a short decade of seeing rising crime rates, politicians such as NYC
Mayor Rudolph Giuliani celebrated New York Police Department’s (NYPD) success in impacting high crime rates through strategies of broken windows and zero tolerance policing (White 2011). NYC was then referred to as the “city that became safe” through practiced crackdowns on crime and quality-of-life policing. Years later, in the investigation of the response to crime and disorder across America, scholars uncovered crime statistics manipulations, thus discrediting some of NYC’s celebrated strategies (Zimring 2012). Nonetheless, scholars focused on NYC to discuss the rise in high crime and the significant crime drop in the 1990s (Zimring 2012). In the process, NYC became known for discriminatory practices such as arrests of the homeless (Smith 1998). Given the subject of this dissertation - homelessness and crime - NYC is an important, valuable location to confront discourse and politics of crime and poverty.

Second, the source chosen is the NYT. The NYT is selected due to two reasons. First, it has an archival database available to conduct a historical analysis from the 1970s to recent. Second, it is highly consumed media across time and place, and it is situated in a notorious city (i.e., NYC) for crime and poverty studies. The NYT is highly consumed and given the proximity to NYC, it is a viable option to conduct such an analysis.

Lastly, I chose the time frame 1970-2012 for two reasons. First, literature on punishment and society, specifically Garland (2001), Simon (2007), and Wacquant (2009), marks a shift in punitive practices within neoliberalism in the 1970s. During the 1970s, the mark of a neoliberal turn in U.S. history is connected to decline in the welfare system and increases in crime control (Harvey 1989; Harvey 2007; Garland 2001) that are also linked shifts in the experiences of crime and disorder in cities. Loïc Wacquant (2009) argued the scale of penal expansion over the decades since 1970 has shifted toward an increasingly profit-driven and privatized context in American politics. Such shifts increased measures to manage, control, and administer justice
through incoherent, exclusionary policies characterized by neoliberalism (Wacquant 2009). Thus, the 1970s mark a crucial point in studies of crime and poverty that provide opportunities to trace the “evisceration” of the welfare state and growth of the criminal justice institution (Wacquant 2009). Second, 2012 is chosen as the end date as it is the latest date available in the archives found in ProQuest Historical Newspapers: New York Times. I did not find a theoretical argument as to why this would change other parameters or negatively impact the study; therefore, the data are through the last day of the year 2012.

DATA

The data for this study are news articles, chosen for a few reasons. First, significant studies show media are influential in constructing our understanding of the social problems (Altheide 2001). Second, punishment and society scholars Garland (2001) and Simon (2007) specifically argue media are influential and use the news as specific source where power of political and public agendas are reproduced across time and space.

Next, I chose to conduct discourse analysis on a news source that is highly consumed throughout time and provides historical archives in order to meet the parameters of the study. Therefore, I chose to use the NYT. The NYT is also available using Pro Quest Historical Newspapers at my educational institution without additional cost. This meets criteria for conducting a historically based study.

ProQuest Historical Newspapers is a database that allows the user to search articles over time using key terms. Additionally, I was able to specify returned articles that were published in a particular time frame. Provided this tool, I used the terms “homeless” and “crime” and selected parameters to return articles from the year 1970 to the latest date available on the database,
which is the year 2012. The number of articles in the sample from 1970-2012, using key terms “homeless” and “crime” was 4,495.

In the next steps, the large sample was narrowed down using ProQuest database to ensure articles were pertinent to this research. Three pre-defined categories allowed me to exclude articles that did not fit based on “document type,” “subject,” and “location.” First, I narrowed results based on pre-defined category “document type” provided by ProQuest Historical Newspapers: NYT. I excluded the following from the articles returned based on “document type”: table of contents, summaries, classified ads, real estate transactions, marriages, and obituaries. Second, I excluded the following from the articles returned based on “subject”: book reviews, theater, television, music, motion pictures, other productions, title indexes and summaries. Third, I excluded the following from the articles returned based on “location”: locations outside of the United States, locations outside of the State of New York. I included those filed under locations categorized in the State of New York in order read through the articles more intimately to determine if they are related to NYC’s homelessness and crime as I conduct the discourse analysis. NYC is a large metropolitan of the State of New York; therefore, an article that discussed homelessness and crime in surrounding cities may also discuss homelessness and crime in NYC or discuss statewide discussions relevant to NYC. Using the pre-defined categories provided by ProQuest Historical Newspapers: NYT, I narrowed the results using ProQuest to a sample that would next be examined by the researcher to double check parameters (N= 1,831).

Next, I organized articles in chronological order and downloaded all from the sample narrowed down using ProQuest Historical Newspapers: NYT. In this next phase, I read the sample to determine that three parameters are met. They include: location is relevant/situated in
NYC, New York, USA, result is a news article or editorial, and articles discussed homelessness and crime. Then I conducted a preliminary read for general themes and codes regarding the topic focused on in the articles. I continued the study intimately engaged with the data, where a codebook was created to note all qualified and unqualified articles. The final articles analyzed for this study represented homelessness and crime in NYC, New York, in the United States (N=1,264; by decade 1970-1979: N=30, 1980-1989: N=172, 1990-1999: N=490, 2000-2012: N=572). Percentages for each theme that emerged are presented within the respective decades at the beginning of each chapter in the analysis.

CODING

Discourse analysis requires a researcher to reflexively engage with the data continually throughout the process. The coding strategy requires the researcher to become intimately knowledgeable of the data. The data chosen for this study is purposive and theoretical, and the data collection, analysis, and interpretation process of the final articles (N=1,264) analyzed was continually reflexive and circular (Altheide 1987: 67).

The sample of news articles were analyzed for themes that emerged in an open coding strategy. In a preliminary read, I developed broad themes based upon discursive patterns that emerged on news coverage of homelessness and crime. Discourse analysis involves an open coding strategy where the researcher reads the data and assigns attributes to specific units of analysis, such as paragraphs, sentences, or individual words (Altheide 1987; Saldaña 2015). Plummer (1983) refers to this as a reflexive analysis of documents. I reflexively approached the data through analysis of textual and narrative descriptions. In the codebook, I maintained paragraphs, sentences, and individual words as comments of the data to refer to before
conducting a second and third review of the data (Altheide 1987:67). In the preliminary read, topics emerged in several major themes that related to FDA.

Specifically, three overarching narratives appeared around governance and policing, housing, and the homeless other. Governance and policing included actors that administer surveillance and safety in the city and provide management of various spaces that connected to Foucault’s *governmentality*. Similarly, the emergent narrative around housing appeared that included shelters and hotels, which connected to Foucault’s *governmentality*. In addition, the emergent narratives constructing the homeless other, typically as criminal, victim, or other, connected to Foucault’s notion of *subjectivations*. These points emerged in the preliminary read of the data.

The preliminary read conducted helped categorize data into narratives, or as Fairclough (2001) referred tropes or narratives. The narratives are used as a start for further investigating the data. Hatch (2002: 152) argued it is essential to first read the data in early stages in order to begin to “divide it into elements (i.e., disaggregate it from the whole) based on predetermined categories.” While narratives are shaped by existing literature and knowledge, reflexivity is maintained and continued engagement with the data is achieved through open coding throughout the continually interactive process. The second and third read provide ensure the researcher is thorough in the investigation.

Next, I conducted a second and third read of the data in order to deconstruct normalized narratives about homelessness and crime. This phase takes the researcher beyond general coding and word or phrase count, to examine hidden meaning found in discursive practices. This phase further builds Foucault’s *specificities* (i.e., *veridiction*, *governmentality*, and *subjectivations*) and was used in order to trace a genealogy of homelessness and its responses. The second and third
read of the data are different from the first read. In the first read of the data, noting key phrases and ideas is used to provide a map of how the content in the data are discussed. Hermann (2015:85) further argued the use of initial typologies as “essential” in cases where thousands of articles, or pages, are found. However, this process becomes a more “sophisticated system” in the second and third examinations of the data.

SUMMARY OF DESIGN, DATA, AND ANALYSIS

The analytic techniques of discourse analysis, specifically Foucauldian discourse analysis (FDA), lie in the pragmatic goals of Michel Foucault. David Garland (2014) expanded knowledge of FDA in the field of criminology in order to broaden theoretical understandings of society’s governance through crime control and an increasing penal state. Discourse analysis, specifically FDA, is useful for scholars that seek to trace a “history of the present” of social problems. Garland (1992; 2001; 2010) and Harcourt (2011) provided critical histories of crime and punishment that used elements of this method. What is often criticized is the focus on theory rather then strict methodology. In fact, Foucault is noted for the development of unconventional historical method, or even “anti-method” (Shriner 1982).

Nonetheless, this study traces some of the dominant cultural narratives shaping understandings of homelessness and crime from 1970-2012 (N=1,264) found in the NYT. It is appropriately situated in NYC, NY (USA) given the source and the literature on crime and disorder frequented in criminology. The research design allows for an inductively built qualitative examination that is guided by three key points in order to conduct a discourse analysis, specifically a Foucauldian discourse analysis: genealogy of the subject (veridiction), mechanisms or technologies of power (governmentality), and constructions of the homeless other
(subjectivation). The proceeding chapters (iv, v, vi, vii) provide the analysis and results of each decade. Though the chapters are divided based on decade, it is important to note the narrative continues and these are arbitrary boundaries set for organizing purpose. The first analysis chapter begins with analysis provided from the 1970s.
CHAPTER IV

GENTRIFICATION AND DISPLACEMENT IN THE 1970s

There are 30 *NYT* articles analyzed in this chapter. They include articles between 1970-1979 that fit the parameters outlined in the methods chapter. In short, the articles focused on homelessness and crime found in the United States, specifically those addressing the politics of NYC as it relates to state and federal movements. Approximately 73% of the sample from this decade constructed the homeless subject. This is found both within articles that describe homelessness through descriptors of homeless subjects in addition to articles focused on describing the homeless subject. Narratives around the homeless other varied as homeless subjects are constructed as criminals, victims, or witnesses of crime. In this decade, we see homelessness as an issue that coexists with crime and disorder. Attention to homeless youth in gangs illustrates the need for social response to social problems in order to prevent further deterioration. In the 1970s, we see the emergence of forms of governance found in the community as responses to the socially constructed homeless subject.

In addition, nearly 53% of the articles analyzed discussed Foucault’s notion of *governmentality* or technologies and mechanisms of power through the role of the police and policing surrounding homeless and crime in NYC. For example, one story shared police commentary on the youth gang problem as police apprehended two youth charged in the “slaying” of a Brooklyn man (Haff 1971). Nearly 47% discuss technologies of power found in housing, shelters, and neighborhood or residential concern with various homeless housing as experts and systems are tasked with their responses to homelessness. Additionally, narratives emerged around budgetary concerns (26%), as well as families and youth (26%).
As the analysis shows, the role of police and housing dominate the discussion. During the 1970s, NYC witnessed great social change. The narrative advocated for increased police protection in the City to address crime and disorder. In addition, police are the authority that provides information on crime relevant to NYC. Police are a significant actor then in shaping knowledge of NYC’s crime problem and in turn, response to the problem calls for more police protection. Narratives on housing and residential concern in neighborhoods included a number of actors from the community, including police. Residents’ voices dominated discussion of deteriorating neighborhoods, specifically business and homeowners that demanded social concerns of homelessness and crime be addressed by the city. The blurred image of the homeless and criminal is found throughout narratives which calls for removal of the homeless criminal other in order to address issues of crime and disorder. It also calls for removal of the deserving homeless other to housing programs. Both are desired to address the crime and disorder problem generally.

During the 1970s, the responsibility to address problems of crime and disorder fell to politicians for response. In addition to reports of residents and business owners demanding police response, politicians were pressured to provide more funding and laws that enabled police powers, such as zoning ordinance changes. The narrative in the 1970s included demanding more from the city and its various extensions through complaints and criticism for past shortcomings. This is illustrated through stories of city non-profits that are unable to provide for the needs of homelessness and poverty as actors engaged in the public debate of what to do about the homelessness and crime problem. Two themes emerge, one that discusses the eviction of those who commit criminal and deviant acts from housing supported by the housing authority, and
Another which shifts toward the role of private property developers to clean up housing offered to homeless. This narrative escalates in future decades.

A common discussion point throughout the 1970s is the deterioration of neighborhoods and city conditions where the urgency of the social problem is illustrated in stories of deterioration found in symbolically powerful public places. Specifically, stories share how crime and disorder are regularly found within the systems set up to manage such problems, including in the halls of court houses and in a broken system that does not provide for juveniles. Here, we see care control and criminalization converge most clearly and powerfully as the narrative advocates a cleaning up of crime and disorder in the streets and within the system to provide better justice for all. Ideas of rehabilitation and prevention, versus classical notions of swift and severe punishment, are represented in the way this is talked about.

Throughout these discussions, another dominant narrative emerges centered on the legitimization and necessity of state governance over urban space. The framing of issues of crime and disorder as neighborhood concerns that need immediate response is centered on the visibility of crime and stories of victimization witnessed in NYC. The homeless are a subject linked to stories of crime and violence. Additionally, homelessness is a visual symbol of crime and disorder in neighborhoods as residents and business owners call for increased measures to clean up the city. In this sense, constructing the homeless subject as one of crime and disorder is justified as an indicator of the pervasiveness of social problems in the neighborhood. The extent to which this is a concern is further legitimized through the symbolic nature of a courthouse becoming home to the homeless. The convergence of two powerful subjects, the homeless and the criminal other, in space – whether it is the neighborhood or the courthouse – frames an urgency for city’s to change NYC’s deteriorating conditions.
Finally, in this decade we will see an adjoining narrative that reiterates the need for increased social control of marginally excluded who live in slum areas of NYC by specifically placing responsibility of governments to provide urban renewal strategies. These strategies for redevelopment of neighborhoods are presented in an equal opportunity guise that allows the middle and upper class residents of the neighborhoods to overcome struggles with which they are faced. Throughout, the rhetoric of a need for urban renewal and gentrification, which better serves an “urban elite” whose voices are prioritized, overshadows the social harm caused by these processes.

The broader politics of gentrification and policing urban space unfold in two communities: Greenwich Village and its neighbor NoHo. Greenwich and NoHo are neighborhoods discussed as those caught in the shuffle of NYC urban renewal projects. Narratives on housing and policing are found in this discourse surrounding homelessness and crime in the neighborhoods.

GENTRIFYING GREENWICH VILLAGE AND NOHO

In the 1970s, Greenwich Village (the Village) and North of Houston (NoHo) are a battleground of the politics of homelessness and the attendant forces of gentrification. Greenwich and NoHo emerge as a location where voices of residents and business owners demand improvement in the conditions faced, how improvement is achieved through urban renewal supported by the city and police, and how acknowledging the pervasive and problematic realities of homelessness as poverty and crime concerns impacts safety and security of the community. The narrative of the homeless subject found works here to justify and necessitate state control over urban space by managing the population through strict housing and police controls over the
homeless criminal other. It expresses neighbors’ concerns, politicians’ concerns, the police, and explicit zoning of space to address issues of crime and disorder through the social problem of homelessness.

Attention is focused on Greenwich, as “angry shopkeepers and residents” are among voices of the neighborhoods shared in the NYT. Greenwich residents indicate a long struggle in the neighborhood as it is “being made a ‘dumping ground’ for undesirables by the city’s Department of Social Services” (Hudson 1970). Powerful civic leagues and community leaders argued (Hudson 1970: 27):

…muggers, rapists, thieves, and addicts plague the Village, making it unsafe to work or live in or to visit. The city had been referring homeless clients, including those just out of prison, to the Greenwich and other transient hotels for men.

Greenwich Village, described in one article as the “once Bohemian community”, faced significant changes following World War II and now its residents strive to rebuild its “liberal and historic” status. Residents share they are unfairly threatened by issues of crime and disorder brought about by homeless and other marginalized groups (Lichtenstein 1970). The “presence of 1,500 to 2,000 homeless single men on welfare, 90 percent of them black, many of them recently released convicts” that, according to police, are a “major cause of the area’s crime” further constructed the image of who is to blame for the deterioration of the neighborhood (Lichtenstein 1970: 1). Here, we see a powerful statement where residents provide the extent to which concerns of homelessness and crime in their neighborhood have risen and the authority of the police is used to further draw attention to the demands.

Additionally, we see Greenwich residents continually blurred the image of the homeless subject with the criminal and disorderly other in the neighborhood. For example, a differentiation
between “hippies” and the homeless other is indicated that constructs a difference between the harmless, free subject versus those who are unemployed and engage in deviant and criminal behavior, the latter as a nuisance. One article stated “hippies were appalled” at the shift in the neighborhood to include more residents that were “heroin addicts” diseased from “rampant” hepatitis and venereal disease, and the “thousands of other jobless and homeless young” who moved to the area “threatening” the peace of the neighborhood (Wooten 1971). Low income, welfare recipients, and transient populations are constructed then as threats to Greenwich in their quest to rebuild from less ideal times.

The voices of residents and business owners are well represented in the NYT during this decade. However, we begin to see a shift toward the voices of politicians and community leaders with recognized authority. One example is the Village Action Alliance, a Republican political committee, mostly comprised of business owners and residents that organized protests and advocated rights for Greenwich as a neighborhood. Its activities ranged from drawing attention to deteriorating physical conditions of streets and parks to removing various attractions of danger and crime. Ralph de Blasio commented, on behalf of the Village Action Alliance, that the community “cannot live under this situation” and the effects of “undesirables ‘has to stop’” (Hudson 1970). Here, we begin to see voices appear on behalf of entire political organizations that represent key productive populations found within the city. Leaders of political community organizations engage with city officials and state politicians as the discussion plays out in the NYT.

In another example, political leader, Edward Koch, at the time Democratic representative for the 17th District, reflected on conditions in Greenwich that supported concerns by de Blasio and the Village Action Alliance. Koch described the recent rise in homelessness and crime
problem as a “horde of locusts … descending on us” and linked the fear of crime and disorder in neighborhoods to changes in low and mixed income housing (Lichtenstein 1970). Representative Koch framed the current rise in homelessness as a negative consequence stemming from rent controlled housing in NYC (Lichtenstein 1970). One reporter shared the story of Greenwich as a process of slow deterioration resulting from the changing housing situations (Lichtenstein 1970):

The police, who were already anxious, have become even more unnerved, and now the fear flows freely, like the sweet smell of hemp becoming ash, seeping into the very bricks and mortar, lurking malevolently around the corner of every day… By the summer of 1970, it was estimated that as many as 5,000 hippies had taken up permanent residence in The [Village], and in addition to them were the hundreds of ‘street people,’ the passers through, on their way from nothing to nowhere.

Concerns were shared with city officials and political leaders who responded. For example, Mayor Lindsey’s (1966-1973) Administration responded to Greenwich residents with “extreme concern” and supported the notion that increased police patrols were the necessary to fix the city’s “acute problem[s].” Here, we see city officials and Greenwich residents agree that police response would end the issues of crime and disorder. Organizations like de Blasio’s Village Action Alliance specifically indicate control of the homeless criminal other is necessary for the neighborhood to “get [their] parks and community back.” Greenwich residents continued to demand, “better police protection” against a “tidal wave of crime” that occurred nationally. This is reflected in an article that covered Greenwich and linked it to national political agendas. Mayor John Lindsay commented (Hudson 1970), “The war on crime will continue to be the first priority of my administration.”
In the *NYT* articles, Greenwich was a prioritized space where the conflict over issues of poverty, crime, and gentrification garnered political attention and action.

Police presence was not the only solution suggested by politicians and residents however. Articles primarily covered demands of the Greenwich residents for “more police protection and [for the city to] stop housing single men on welfare in local transient hotels” (Hudson 1970:27). Longstanding efforts to provide housing for “homeless clients, including those just out of prison” under direction of the Social Services Department in Greenwich continued to be largely contested (Hudson 1970). Further and unsurprisingly, the demand for changes in zoning ordinances emerged as a topic. This is illustrated through targeted efforts to remove welfare hotels from neighborhoods such as North of Houston Street (NoHo). One strategy to clean up welfare housing (Metropolitan Briefs 1974):

Midtown Realty Owners Association opposed use of [a] hotel for homeless…former New Yorker hotel [to] be used to house the temporarily homeless. The association, in a letter to Mayor Beame [1974-1977] on Friday, said, the ‘influx of homeless families’ at the hotel, at Eighth Avenue and 34th Street would ‘disrupt the vital business services’ that are essential to the area.

In the articles, private development and business are prioritized and their voices emerged to discuss the unequal and slow pace of zoning changes across NYC. This is illustrated in one story where NoHo residents said they felt “slated” compared to neighboring communities, such as South of Houston Street (SoHo), that benefited from the zoning changes (Blumenthal 1972). NoHo faced a lack of zoning changes that left residents and business owners in NoHo “deserted neighborhood of locked warehouses” where they faced the impacts of welfare hotels and displaced populations. In being “left behind,” NoHo residents voiced they were left “targets of
muggers, burglars and other predators” that were displaced from their neighbors, such as SoHo and Greenwich (Blumenthal 1972).

Responsibility for unequal and slow paced changes across the city is placed on the City and residents expressed concerns that the community was left to protect itself. Residents shared they were forced to “come together and create a nightly presence in the area that serves to deter crime”(Blumenthal 1972). The problem had become so pervasive, one article indicated, that NoHo business owners were forced to “scrutinize” customers through “locked door[s] before they [were] admitted” into local businesses (Blumenthal 1972). The answer to this undesirable dynamic of threat and victimization of crime and disorder faced by NoHo’s residents and business owners rested in zoning ordinance changes. Residents and business owners did not have an interest in leaving, as they “always liked it here” however “there was the feeling at night of stepping over bodies” (Blumenthal 1972).

The narrative further prioritized businesses, shoppers, and consumers actively engaged in NoHo as NYC attempted to rebuild it. The problematic population needed to change and the residents or business owners did not entertain leaving. Therefore, removing the source of the problem through police and zoning was the solution to issues faced in NoHo, much like Greenwich. Essential to this narrative is the construction of the homeless other as a problematic population. Stories illustrate how homelessness and poverty are blurred with crime and disorder to define the population and justify removal from productive neighborhoods.

A counter narrative emerged less frequently that challenged the dominant imagery that constructed homelessness as a cause of crime and disorder in neighborhoods. Occasionally, police reported that their crime records did not agree with residents’ perceptions of crime and disorder faced. This is illustrated in stories that shed light on the contentious topic of single room
occupancy hotels in neighborhoods. Residents looked to single-room-occupancy hotels that “cater” to welfare recipients in the 1970s as “centers of crime.” This explanation reproduced support for gentrification and zoning changes in order to remove populations from certain places. For example, NoHo residents discussed hotels that now “receive[d] men discharged from city prisons and other homeless poor” that caused issues in NoHo. The pervasiveness of this is further framed as a social problem that impacted surrounding areas as “crime spreads to the surrounding streets, seriously downgrading neighborhoods and threatening to destroy them” (Shumach 1970). The counter narrative emerges when police officers, such as Captain Edward Roberts, reported that NoHo actually witnessed a decline in robberies and burglaries. These types of acknowledgement are less frequent and certainly overshadowed by resident perceptions that portrayed a dirty and dangerous NYC and worked in favor of gentrification and urban renewal strategies. One commentator equated recent conditions to that of major European cities, framing the problem as something that is only temporary and has potential to achieve that of iconic European cities if proper response occurs (Blumenthal 1972), “…New York in the nineteen-seventies is like Restoration London or Francois Villon’s Paris. It’s dirty and dangerous but people will talk of this era.”

SOLUTIONS FOR HOUSING ISSUES

The previous section illustrated how mediated images of crime and disorder framed urgency to find an immediate solution. During the 1970s, gentrification and urban renewal were powerful solutions to the crime and disorder problem situated in politics that prioritized private development for residents and business owners. Additionally, notions of private development as a solution to the city’s problems emerge in discussions to find solutions for deteriorating welfare
hotels. In this context, the city is framed as failing in the management of low incoming housing in NYC. NYC public officials are criticized and labeled as “careless, indifferent landlord” who is “worse than profiteering slumlords” (Weisman 1971). Such a criticism fueled the argument for private development, by both businesses and residents, as necessary in “cleaning up” areas that formerly housed low income; the known “meccas” for the homeless and supposedly criminal residents of NYC (Weisman 1971).

The narrative of privatized housing services emerged in the 1970s as a solution to issues of low-income housing and “slum communities” (Weisman 1971). This narrative is further legitimized as the city is framed as a failure in low incoming housing management. This is illustrated in stories that covered three topics throughout the decade including discussion about the role of the city and non-profits, stories of evictions imposed by housing authorities and opposed by community members, and the debated impact of S.R.Os in effectively addressing homelessness and poverty. We begin with efforts by the city and non-profits to clean up housing and address urban renewal demands.

In 1962, NYC placed responsibility of the city housing and development on the City Urban Renewal Management Corporation (CURMCO), a domestic not-for-profit corporation that included city partnerships. Specifically, CURMCO’s role was to provide housing to displaced and homeless following city’s recent condemnation of deteriorating buildings. In the 1970s, CURMCO was charged with providing 3,800 units for housing displaced families from neighborhoods where emergencies were declared and rapid condemnation of “severe and unwarranted hardships” faced in “slum” communities occurred (Weisman 1971). Moreover, CURMCO promoted ideas of reinvestment from the private sector through federally subsidized incentives. NYC received a majority of New York State’s federal funding for redevelopment
under support of the Committee on Slum Clearance. CURMCO was specifically charged with redevelopment in order to “eradicate rampant deterioration and to stimulate private investment.”

During the 1970s, CURMCO and the City Housing Authority faced jeopardized relations with property management as neighborhoods dealt with condemned public housing. CURMCO was criticized for being “guided by a desire to balance its books than by the need to provide even minimal services” (Weisman 1970) and for running the city into a $16.5 million deficit while “managing city owned properties on urban renewal sites” in NYC (Ashbury 1973).

Incompetence was met with race and class conflict as NYC faced rapidly shifting migration across the city’s boroughs during the 1970s. For example, among the criticisms of CURMCO is rhetoric that attributes its shortcomings to 150 of its men who “were specially chosen untrained blacks and Puerto Ricans from local communities affected by urban renewal” (Weisman 1970). Conflicts over race and class were at the forefront of New Yorkers concerns as they adjusted to pre-1970s migration of Puerto Ricans, Haitians, and African Americans. Areas of Manhattan became associated with poverty and crime, which certainly stigmatized and deepened race and class conflicts. The 1970s marked a shift where the city increasingly supported the growth of retail and privately managed services that would attract wealthier population as NYC sought to move toward the image of productivity and success.

Racialized comments concerning unskilled labor and low-income housing appeared and fueled stereotyped images of the homeless, criminal other. They further framed the need to improve conditions of the city through corporate, private developers from the wealthier, more successful areas of NYC that were predominantly white. Through narratives that discussed an unsuccessful CURMCO run by “unskilled” and “migrant” residents, the private sector was further framed as a more viable option to revive neighborhoods and address issues of safety and
security. A dominant narrative emerged that prioritized property value and protection of businesses over the rights of the city’s criminal and poor. This is illustrated in a story that shared outrage over recent burglary of private developers’ maintenance shops several times per week. One resident reflected on the negative impact these crimes have in rebuilding and driving away private developers, “We’ve lost control. There’s no security at all” (Weisman 1971).

Another side to the narrative seeks to further displacement found in condemned and deteriorated spaces across NYC. In 1973, the Broadway Central Hotel, which temporarily housed low income “transients and welfare recipients”, collapsed following a noted “back and forth” between the owners and the city. The city cited the hotel for structural instability; meanwhile the owner and property manager said they faced resistance from the city in any efforts to address the citations. Shumach (1973) and Montgomery (1973) covered the story of the collapsed building, as 5 out of 308 residents remained unaccounted for after debris was removed during the search. The collapse left many displaced and some were relocated to temporary housing elsewhere as politics surrounding the irresponsibility of the landowner’s and city played out and neutralized the harm caused to transient residents. One article stated (Montgomery 1973), “…For some of them, who were welfare clients, the shifting from hotel to hotel was a familiar part of their lives.”

The story of displacement following actions of NYC Housing Authority, the “nation’s largest landlord,” continued as the city faced budget cuts and rising rent costs (Schuman 1975). The NYC Housing Authority discussed rising rent, electric, heat, gas, and police force budget cuts that impacted their ability to provide public housing facilities. This economic and financial deficit was compounded by city efforts to crack down on crime and deviance found in public housing. The question of where to put families and who is responsible for providing their
housing, is raised and also included how to decide who received limited services of public housing. One strategy cited in the 1970s included eviction based on “undesirability.”

In 1973, the *NYT* reported the NYC Housing Authority for evicting three families for undesirability on grounds the children committed crimes. As reported, Cynthia Bryant and her four children were threatened with eviction and faced a long battle in court to fight to stay in the neighborhood after her youngest plead guilty to criminal trespassing. Following an arrest for burglary and possession of burglary tools, Bryant’s son was sentenced to Riker’s Island. The Housing Authority “battled” to evict the family in three separate hearings, and stated the eviction was “necessary” as the family was “a danger to the health and safety of your project neighbors and the surrounding community.” Reporters stated the “neighbors petitioned asking that the family be allowed to remain in the home” (Fraser 1973). Eventually, the New York State Supreme Court issued a temporary restraining order against the Housing Authority from evicting Bryant’s family. Cynthia Bryant’s comment from court papers stated (Fraser 1973), “…to punish an entire family by rendering it homeless because one member of that family has pleaded guilty to a criminal act is to operate on an irrational theory of guilty by association.”

During this time, a case like the Bryants caught media attention and called for revising the City’s approach to “problem families.” Though clearly receiving some sympathy, not all agreed. Many saw such families as severe social problems that “monopolize the time of building managers and personnel” and “tax the legal and administrative staff during the lengthy evictions process” (Schuman 1975). Some fellow residents blamed the “single mother with too many children and no control” for new problems faced in the low-income neighborhoods (Schuman 1975). Joseph Christian, chairman of the Housing Authority, reported (Schuman 1975),
“…Problem families constitute a small percentage of public housing tenants. They can really destroy a project.”

This story shares the complicated relationship between the resistance to the practiced evictions that is protested by some locals and that is placed on hold by the New York State Supreme Court. However, it provided a mediated image of powerful authorities blaming a small percentage of problem families on the deterioration of the city’s project areas.

Finally, stories discuss incompetence by city management in the handling of single room occupancy (S.R.O) hotels. A common goal shared across the decade included finding the individuals, particularly congregations of individuals, who caused problems in the neighborhoods, then using City strategies discussed above to evict and/or confine such problems. It is here that the movement to dismantle single-room-occupancy hotels in NYC is discussed. During the 1970s, NYC experienced significant cuts in the availability of low-income housing, primarily because of the processes surrounding building deterioration, gentrification and reduced federal funding for housing. During this time, many New Yorkers faced difficulty finding affordable housing and apartments of single room occupancy hotels were used as a primary source of housing for populations who faced hardship. The dramatic reduction of S.R.O units witnessed in the 1960s and 1970s had an impact faced in the rhetoric found here. Though, S.R.Os were used by many populations, including migrants and artists, for affordability and convenience purposes, an image is constructed that suggests individuals in S.R.Os caused the NYC crime problem. Thus, the city was further legitimated in finding ways to remove single room occupancy hotels from the city landscape.

The sentiments felt about NYC S.R.Os were not universal across time or place. For example, the NYT featured criticisms by the Philadelphia Department of Public Assistance that
stated the existence of S.R.Os, homelessness, and crime did not mean a “cause and effect” relationship existed. Furthermore, NYC is referred to as unique in the relationship between S.R.Os homelessness and crime because those who stayed in the S.R.Os are attributed to crime and disorder problems. However, this narrative found in NYC is not consistent with others across the United States as cities struggle with the image of S.R.Os as crime infested. For example, in Indianapolis and San Francisco police explained the phenomenon of more crime as a “condition of the hotel, its location and the minor unlawful activities common to cheap hotels,” not necessarily transient or homeless people that temporarily reside there. In the same story, NYC is criticized for how it used hotels as “foster homes” for “its 4,000 or so released mental patients each year” and the use of S.R.Os as “hotels for prisoners”, or those released from Riker’s Island and other city penal institutions. One Pittsburgh management personnel commented on his “operation” – the S.R.O he ran - with fondness: “We never cease to amaze the police with the serenity of our operation… [NYC S.R.Os] are dreadful” (Siegel 1972).

The juxtaposition of NYC’s S.R.Os compared to other major cities, particularly framed in a negative light, and served as fuel for neighborhood alliances to call for increased security measures. These security measures included calls for increased police presence and for NYC to take control of neighborhoods. Ralph de Blasio, at the time Chairman of the businessmen’s organization called Village Action Alliance, argued the crime “has to stop.” It is constructed that the increased number of holdups and harassments of citizens’ areas like Greenwich and NoHo created a barrier to the city cleaning up its image and addressing crime and disorder. Specifically, stories report that the transient populations that resided in S.R.Os were the problem and removing their presence, both the individuals and the hotels themselves, would make NYC “more livable and to encourage businesses to relocate there.”
The powerful imagery of chaos, mayhem, and a broken neighborhood was used to further ideas of gentrification, as well as displacement and eviction of undesirables. Locals expressed the concern that those who lived in provided housing needed to be “broken up”, dispersed, and further controlled by the police. One resident commented, “the history of dumping is mainly a chronicle of bureaucratic maneuvering and mistakes” (Koenig 1978). Here, the bureaucratic maneuvering and mistakes are considered issues with city housing officials and political leaders. Meanwhile, the need to increase local alternative responses to the social problem through the police and community is continually advocated. In doing so, it is argued that the local community knows how to handle this, therefore releasing city controls of services and disperse resources that specifically deal with the issues of poverty, crime, and homelessness found in places like the S.R.Os.

Concerns about the S.R.Os, as well as the stories of eviction and city and non-profits, played a significant role in the construction of private development as a viable option. Generally, public services and city organizations were cited for the failures to address the problem now and criticized for their efforts that led to the conditions faced in NYC. NYC Mayor Lindsay’s (1966-1973) administration discussed the necessity to cater to private developers in the city in order to continue construction of new housing units and the rebuilding of NYC. This shifted focus on the part of political leaders mirrored sentiments provided in residential demands to ensure private development as residents and businesses joined in neighborhoods. Mayor Lindsay stated the city needed to ensure “its future neighbors” (i.e., private developers) were welcomed and that those neighbors must “[play] a significant role in designing it” (Starr 1970).
DETERIORATING SPACES IN NYC

The image of deteriorated spaces in NYC and urgency to clean up the city was particularly illustrated in stories about the NYC Criminal Courts Building and the justice system generally. The powerful imagery of the Courthouse included homeless sleeping on benches with heroin needles spread about the floor. The symbolic power of the Courthouse connected images of deterioration, crime, and homelessness as a normalized occurrence was reflected on as unacceptable and fueled the argument that urgent and serious interventions were needed.

NYC Criminal Courts Building in Manhattan was referred to as a “sordid setting” (Chambers 1974), where a homeless man sat on a bench with his belongings. One officer commented in the article, “In the halls of justice there’s no respect – even for property” as multiple stories outline how homelessness, heroin addiction, and crime infested behaviors have taken over the Criminal Courts Building. Such powerful imagery continues to blur homelessness with crime, disorder, and expresses threats to the legitimacy of the justice system and NYC authority faced in the 1970s. An article in the NYT stated (Chambers 1974)

Enter the lobby at 100 Centre Street. Half dozen vagrants who have spent the night in the building wander up and back, up and back. A spaced-out addict dances by, bumping into people…At the information desk, prostitutes, pimps and well known pickpockets drink soda pop and grind cigarettes into the filthy floor. No information is dispensed at the information desk. It has not been staffed for years.

Anyone who walks the halls, reports one article, faced a “treacherous” path and scene, likened to that of a “zoo.” The conditions faced are not safe and are no longer secure.

One NYT reporter provided criminal justice practitioners’ descriptive details of the Courts “today” where drug paraphernalia and addicts lined the halls of the Courthouse. Police, lawyers,
judges, legal aides, among other authorities described the court’s atmosphere as “degrading”, “disturbing”, “a pigsty”, “a hangout for vagrants”, and “a depressing, sad place”. Supreme Court Justice David Ross commented (Chambers 1974), “…The building looks like a stable. But after awhile, if you work in a stable long enough, you don’t smell the horse manure…How do you have respect for the law when you start out with dirty courtrooms?”

The courthouse and its “disappearance of dignity and the atmosphere of degradation and hopelessness” are said to have increased in the late 1960s and into the 1970s. Importantly, it is framed that the current bad conditions are new. The designation of its deterioration as a new problem provides a sense of rapid deterioration by referring to “better times” when average people could regularly participate in viewing the Courts in action without fear.

The homeless are powerfully connected to issues of crime and disorder in these stories of the courthouse. The need for urgency in state intervention through City and private management groups benefits from the conflation of homelessness to a crime and disorder problem. A narrative emerged in these stories that social problems had existed and were so normalized in the halls of the courthouse that people stopped responding to them. This is framed as problematic and a serious indicator of dire circumstances. The article further commented (Chambers 1974):

Outside the fourth-floor complain and docket room, another courthouse habitué was happily snoring as he sat sprawled on a bench, his shoes and socks drying out from the snow on the bench besides him, and the remainder of his worldly possessions – jackets, shirts, hat and cane in a shopping bag near by. Police officers and lawyers passed by never noticing him. He returned the following night, too. His threadbare overcoat and torn trousers are filled with lice. He said he needed a bath. He tries hard not to get in anybody’s way, and several court officers and luncheonette employees look after him.
Larry, said… ‘If you’re quiet about it and don't raise hell, you can spend the night’…at 11pm, as he sat in a phone booth.

We see here the discussion of crime, disorder, and other violations of our social standards as every day experiences found in the Court Building. This image furthers the notion that NYC in fact has experienced a serious shift in deterioration. Whereas private development is the solution to housing, the response to deterioration in the criminal justice system is addressed through security measures. This narrative advocated increased security in trained officials to provide management of entrances and exits in places like NYC Criminal Courts Building. An officer found in the Criminal Courts Building commented (Chambers 1974):

There is simply not enough security. Once there was great dignity here… at any time of the day or night, derelicts, usually drunk, sleep in window alcoves along the court’s corridors. Remnants of food are everywhere – on floors, spilling over receptacles, sometimes in courtrooms.

The same article further connected homelessness to deterioration in the Court (Chambers 1974):

No court officers check identification, as in Federal court, and often it is difficult if not impossible to distinguish between a vagrant seeking shelter and a vagrant arriving for his court case. Nonetheless, after three days of observation, it became clear that the building is home for six or seven lonely and sick men and women, who usually spend the night sleeping in bathrooms and corridors on the second floor.

The image of the homeless and criminal others is blurred as rhetoric reports on the need to and attempts to clean up the image of NYC. Vagrancy, filth, and drugs are cited as symbols of disorder and crime that have made it into the halls of the Manhattan Criminal Courts Building. This image is symbolic of NYC’s deteriorating power over all elements of the City. Thus, the
need to garner social control, particularly through crime control strategies, is further legitimated and made necessary. The message is also that to change NYC, it rests in better management and control of all elements of the landscape – from housing to the streets to the halls of the Courthouse, particularly certain populations within each, and through social exclusion measures.

DETERIORATING YOUTH

The narrative around control provided by authorities and private developers through displacement and eviction of crime and disorder is furthered in discussions of homeless youth. During the 1970s, the construction of homeless as criminal and disorderly others enabled narratives that supported cleaning up the many deteriorating places in NYC. However, in the 1970s, the construction of homeless youth worked to further ideas of care and control that were necessary to improve conditions faced. Stories shared increased fear of crime and disorder, however this fear in turn enabled state and private entities to intervene in serious conditions through extensions of care and control. Crime and disorder are so problematic the narrative asserts that it has impacted youth, and better programs are needed to provide care and protection for youth in the justice system. The narrative further argues a society must provide systems of control specific to youth in order to prevent and intervene at early stages where youth commit minor offenses. These interventions are framed as prevention in order to avoid hardened, serious criminals illustrated in stories of homeless youth gangs who are considered abandoned by society and the system.

These narratives are found in stories of the 1970s, officials are cited for removing children from their homes and youth being “jailed for playing hookey, being wayward, running away from home, or being likely to fall into evil ways” (NYT 1973). The juvenile justice system
is criticized for administering tough on crime policies “almost exclusively with poor children” while it overlooked “the rise of the suburban drug problem few white middle-class or wealthy children were brought before the juvenile courts” (NYT 1973).

Despite such criticisms present in news articles, the crackdown on urban youth is further made necessary and legitimate. Narratives depicted a rise in homeless youth gangs. These images of youths in gangs on the streets sleeping in abandoned buildings further overshadowed acknowledgement of such practices that were disproportionately faced across race and class.

In addition though, the system, at the time, provided “little to no protection to children,” and it was still seen as necessary for providing protection and prevention to children who were otherwise neglected or abandoned (Forer 1971). Importantly, in reports on what the justice system needed to do, there is a distinction drawn between types of youth in need of court services and the types of services they need. Youth who ended up in the juvenile justice system or shelter systems are considered those who are “neglected, abused, runaway or disobedient children”, as well as children from child-support disputes (Kaufman 1979). Specialized courts to “deal” with these juveniles were framed as positive avenues that afforded youth better circumstances. These courts could use diversion programs in order for youth to stand a chance in “redeem”-ing their criminal and antisocial behaviors. Homeless youth in particular were noted would benefit from the specialized court systems the most, according to the narrative. These diversion programs would prevent future delinquency through court order placed youth in “villages, or group foster homes for homeless children” as alternatives to institutions that mirrored adult corrections facilities (NYT 1973).

In clearly identifying those youth for whom the specialized courts were intended, the city advocated use of courts for youth that more adequately address their circumstances and life
chances, diverting and deterring future delinquency through controlled and management authorities. In these stories, juvenile justice system is framed as a positive, necessary response to address minor offenses, such as situations of runaway youth and petty theft, in order to prevent serious offenses. Recognition is maintained however that there are two types of juveniles: low-level offenders who we are to feel sympathy for because they come from poor backgrounds, and youth gang members who commit serious offenses. This narrative argues that a specialized justice system is needed to address growing concerns of poor, criminal youth that will impose a stricter system early on, and provide more deterrence than the adult facilities would. One article stated (Kaufman 1979):

Removing youths accused of serious crimes from the family-court system…would result in stiffer penalties, and thus serve as a more powerful deterrent of juvenile crime. It is a fact of life that juveniles, no less than adults, are capable of killing and destruction, and must be punished for such deeds. Yet society is unwilling to abandon young delinquents to the often hopeless fate that awaits adult criminals.

The same article further commented (Kaufman 1979):

The New York reform society therefore recommended the establishment of specialized institutions for children. These homes would provide refuge not only for young criminals but also for those who had been dealt with by the vendue – the homeless, the neglected and the vagrant – and children beyond their parents’ control or whose parents were considered “unfit.”

Stories argue state intervention is needed in order to protect vulnerable homeless youth. One story discussed homeless children from a shelter in South Jamaica in NYC. The shelter population was mostly African American and provided a day at the pool in a recently
rejuvenated area, providing a break for those who have faced the “harsh realities of urban America” that surrounded them with crime and disorder (Johnson 1971). Another story stated that the city had treated children as “slaves,” mostly poor, nonwhite, and “defenseless” against a deteriorating city (Forer 1971). Children across race and class are reported as restricted of educational opportunities and face “urban slums” of crime and disorder. The system is cited to have caused and set apart these children; through the “hostility” of the law that caused “hostility, antisocial behavior and despair” in general (Forer 1971). Forer’s (1971) article further stated, “…The poor, nonwhite slum child is jailed not because he has committed a crime but because he is poor and lives in a slum… Children are the last slaves in America, nonpersons beyond the ambit of constitutional protection.”

One story illustrates youth in NYC that enter the shelter system due to deteriorating social supports that lead to crime and disorder. One young male age 17 faced homelessness soon after his family abandoned him. He entered the shelter system and soon found himself as a “drunk” and a “drop-out” (Potter 1977). He stayed at Mount Vernon Youth Shelter, which housed youth ages 16-18 as an alternative to incarceration. He cycled in and out of the shelters in order to stay out of jail. His time spent in the shelter was a familiar story for juvenile delinquents in the 1970s, for those who could not make bail while they awaited trial for non-violent crimes, crimes other than murder, rape, arson, or serious assaults (Potter 1977; Fink 1979).

The shelter the boy stayed at was Mount Vernon Youth Shelter (MVYS). MVYS opened in January 1977 and served as an alternative to jail for about 300 boys – many of them homeless. The shelter is discussed as a tool for deterring youth from time spent in jail and being “exposed to older, hardened criminals who might have physically or mentally abused them” (Fink 1979). MVYS “enabled many of these youths to resume their work or education. It has also found jobs
for the unemployed and has provided psychological and drug treatment where necessary” and one of the residents commented he was “getting it all together” through the program (Fink 1979).

As reported in the NYT in the late 1970s, the Mount Vernon Youth Shelter faced significant budget cuts projected for 1980s. However, support and concern for youth is criticized for having a narrow vision that is not connected to results. “The trouble is you can’t get the money when you have a plan that works” (Fink 1979). In 1977, NYC’s Youth Board provided $2.3 million in state grant to implement 90 new programs on existing projects to “combat juvenile delinquency”, further commenting (NYT 1977):

These new programs will balance our strict law-enforcement efforts with services which provide alternatives to idleness and delinquency. The programs will give young people in the city more opportunity to develop their skills and talents in a positive way…The new programs include bolstering services to runaway and homeless youths through the use of hotlines, expanded shelters and counseling; reopening some schools and centers closed during the fiscal crisis for after-school and evening programs and underutilized public schools on Housing Authority community centers.

The imagery of homeless, violent youth street gangs in NYC during the 1970s was pervasive, with messages that urged increased management of youth by authorities. Articles discussed the role needed by police to address the violent surge of youth gangs in the streets. Such individuals are “gangs [of] youth who violently attack women and children”, with nearly “9,500 members” who have recently “terrorized” South Bronx in their violent acts and pushing drugs. The narrative consisted of a broken system of homes and justice where violence and drugs permeated every aspect of life, to the point where it culminated into violent homeless youth gangs. Families were replaced by the congregation of youth in abandoned buildings, and a lack
of authority is cited as the cause of such disorder and decay. Further commenting (Tolchin 1973):

Most of them are Puerto Ricans, many are homeless and almost all are estranged from their families. Most gangs are headquartered in abandoned buildings, some of which were vacated after the gangs moved in and set fire to other apartments in search of lebensraum.

CONSTRUCTIONS OF THE HOMELESS OTHER

Homeless youth are one image of the homeless criminal other that is used to further legitimate notions that NYC is best served with increased control of homelessness in order to address the management “crisis” of crime and disorder faced. The focus on homeless youth in the 1970s connected with stories of random street violence against certain New Yorkers that constructed fear of the homeless violent criminal. The image of the homeless violent criminal works to justify the need for state intervention to provide youth with safety away from the crime and disorder on the streets. It also works to argue that the city needs to manage and control the homeless in order to prevent random violence from victimizing vulnerable populations.

In one case, Henry Bell, 63, stabbed and killed James Pacheo, 23, with a hunting knife. Bell was a “Georgia-born vagrant” whose “only home is the NYC subway system” (Thomas, Jr. 1979). The attack was against a group of young adults who had “severe speech and hearing impediments,” in which Bell argued that he “acted in self-defense after Mr. Pacheo and two friends had tried to rob him while he was asleep.” The 16 “handicapped young men boarded the train that Mr. Bell was on” and witnesses said Mr. Bell began making “derogatory remarks,” calling them “dummies” and shouting obscenities. Mr. Bell drew his knife and slashed out, cutting one of them; they attempted to hold the door shut “against the pursuing Mr. Bell, who
managed to push it open and slash Mr. Pacheo’s throat.” Mr. Bell’s defense states he was trying to hold the door shut against a group of the men who tried to take his things; the case is going to a grand jury. Bell’s attack is shared as “another” case of NYC residents being attacked on the streets and in the subway system.

In another case, two men approached a woman on the subway and raped her, while another case involved teens that pushed a woman into the subway tracks (Thomas, Jr. 1979). In each of these stories, unknown homeless criminals commit violent crimes against seemingly ordinary citizens, who are innocently going home or to work when the attack occurred. Such stories unsurprisingly mention the police as the primary responders.

Police are also cited as responders to cases of victimization and death experienced by the homeless. For example, a homeless female, Irmgard Meyer, also known as the “shopping-bag lady,” was murdered in 1979 as she sought shelter during the night in an entrance to the Grand Central Subway Station. Though there were “no strong leads,” the story was used to further the narrative that violent homeless persons attack on the streets and subways, and even attack their own. The innocence of Meyer is discussed as she “wandered the streets of midtown Manhattan homeless and alone” despite the fact she had “land in the Southwest and an account with Franklin Mint.” She is reported as having lived in NYC for 17 years and became homeless in 1977 (Daniels 1979). Ultimately, she is represented as a victim of the overarching problem NYC recently faced with increased crime, disorder, and homelessness.

The threat of the homeless, criminal other is furthered through stories of nonviolent acts such as stealing and “cheating” off the welfare system that further legitimizes the need to manage and control this problem. These stories also indicate the decline in welfare services and assistance programs because some are taking advantage of the programs. In one story, the
Orphanage, not a youth facility but a “village commune” located in East Village, was scrutinized for “getting its food free from wholesalers under the guise of being a Protestant home for the homeless” (Drosnin 1971). Under the idea that residents were homeless, the Orphanage was able to receive resources and services for little to no charge. In other instances, though, the residents at the Orphanage were framed as “thieves” and framed as lacking morals, as they “prefer to steal from the neighborhood A and P whatever items [residents could] hustle” (Drosnin 1971). This “lifestyle” of shoplifting was increasingly criticized as “acceptable” by youth who were reported as part of the “counterculture [that] considers private enterprise fair game, it approaches ripping off the government with almost a sense of mission” (Drosnin 1971). Here, we see stories reflect ideas that the homeless are criminal and seek to receive handouts.

CONCLUSION

During the 1970s, the stories reported in the *NYT* share how the force of gentrification shapes the control of space and people. It shapes the boundaries and territories that are continually fought over, and provides examples of the housing and criminal justice system’s role in the boundary making process. The homeless subject is blurred with images of crime and disorder, and is used to justify neighborhood and community politics. Fear and the desire to remove “undesirables” are used to garner local to federal level resources, with the ultimate argument that redevelopment and gentrification are the only attainable solutions to crime and disorder caused by social problems such as homelessness and crime.

The imaginary created reproduces insecurities about crime and justice and social insecurity (Wacquant 2009) through conflating the problem of homelessness and crime. Particularly during the 1970s, homelessness and crime are identified as overlapping problem for
which various leaders such as the NYC Housing Authority and the Mayors’ administrations must find solutions. The common narrative works to clean up the streets through the gentrification of places, cleaning up interior and immediately exterior places to identified problem areas. Acknowledgement of the negative impacts of displacement is overshadowed by the priority to change physical scenery and create visibility of safety with the rest of the population in mind (i.e., those not marginally excluded as the deviant and criminal other). Thus, the drug addicted, deranged, delinquent, and dangerous vagrant other is subject to controls and efforts to move, and continue moving, “anywhere but here.”
CHAPTER V
THE POLITICIZATION OF HOMELESSNESS DURING THE 1980s

The previous chapter revealed discourse around the notion of a deteriorating NYC rife with crime and disorder. Stories during the 1970s illustrated how homelessness is conflated with issues of crime and disorder. Specifically, the stories worked to construct the legitimacy of intervention through policing and a redesigned juvenile justice system, as well as on urgency in the need for both. Underlying this argument is the dominant response that gentrification and urban renewal will provide NYC the clean up it needs in order to overcome recent social changes linked to homelessness, crime, and poverty.

Similar narratives continued into the 1980s as the number of articles on homelessness and crime grew (N=172). Articles from the 1980s reveal discourse on homelessness as a crime and poverty problem in three areas: the housing problem, policing homelessness as crime and poverty issues, and stories of the homeless subject. Parameters for this chapter included those identical to the general study (i.e., NYT, NYC, specific to the topic) between 1980-1989. Within the three general categories, six major themes emerged. Approximately 58% of the sample during this time frame directly mentioned a political leader, such as Mayor Ed Koch [1978-1989], making politicization of homelessness the dominant emergent theme. Approximately 34% discussed the issue of crime and crime control. The image of homelessness or constructing homelessness appeared in 30% of the articles analyzed in this decade. This is found both within articles that describe homelessness through descriptors of homeless subjects in addition to articles that are solely focused on describing the homeless subject through its conditions. Nearly 27% of the articles discussed housing, including narratives around single room occupancy hotels or shelters in NYC. Further, 23% of the articles discussed notions of care, including providing
services to help and assist those facing issues of homelessness and crime. Twenty-four percent discussed issues of the neighborhood as it relates to homelessness and crime. Additionally, narratives emerged around budgetary concerns (25%) and a decline is witnessed in articles that discussed families, youth, and women (12% combined) as it relates to discourse on homelessness and crime.

Notably, during the 1980s the imagery of homelessness is conflated to crime and disorder faced in neighborhoods in discourse all throughout the decade. Foucault’s notion of technologies and mechanisms of power through the role of the police and policing emerged as a dominant discussion point in the 1980s, much like it did previously in the 1970s. Therefore I noted how this is talked about, including voices of those in positions of authority or those provided power to construct homelessness and its response through mediated images. Notions of techniques or mechanisms of power also emerged through discussions of neighborhood residents concern with various homeless housing options advocating increased management and control of bodies across the city landscape.

An additional technology or mechanism of power emerges as the analysis shows signs of the politicization of homelessness and crime during the 1980s as the most significant theme in this decade. Mayor Ed Koch [1978-1989] is the most dominant voice in this category we see the construction of the mediated image of homelessness and crime as the Koch Administration provides rhetoric around knowledge of homelessness and its responses to the growing problem of crime and violence in NYC. Discussions of budgetary items are included in the narrative around politics, specifically the budget actions by the Koch Administration regarding housing and policing. Here, we see budgets discussed in terms of providing NYC financial resources for gentrification through public housing assistance and private partnerships, in addition to increased
police surveillance through increased monitoring tools and increased presence of policing bodies. The political climate is to move away from large warehousing of homeless bodies in single room occupancy hotels to a more displaced and dispersed shelter system. In this decade, however, the Koch Administration frames housing options such as single-room occupancy hotels as a viable option though if, and only if, they are cleaned up.

Similar to the 1970s, policing remains an important topic of discourse. In particular, policing is discussed in terms of reviving the streets and later in the decade, we find policing through a presence in the shelter system an emergent theme.

Families, youth, and women are discussed in terms of debating care provided through increased assistance through the single room occupancy hotels and shelters. Further, we see stories that illustrate those as worthy of assistance and those who are not. Throughout the decade, the image of the homeless emerges as two major constructs – the homeless other and the criminal other. For example, in cases where housing and assistance are discussed, we see the discussion shift to women, children, and youth. More often than not, though, the homeless are broadly categorized and conflated to issues of crime and disorder. The underlying image here is the homeless criminal man that the neighborhood needs relief from, both due to his crimes and due to his abuse of the system.

All of this is seen in stories revolving around three topics. First, the shift between S.R.Os to better managed shelters is discussed. Second, a political narrative exists to securitize shelters through criminal justice technologies for the safety of those within and around them. Finally, the criminal justice role in reviving the streets is discussed. The chapter begins with the first of these – ending S.R.Os and shifting toward providing an improved shelter system.
END S.R.O.S AND CLEAN UP SHELTERS

The narratives surrounding housing in the 1980s called for a shift away from single room occupancy hotels toward temporary shelters and the long-term goal of permanent housing. Here we see the narrative emerge that prioritizes the clean up of housing assistance, particularly for homeless families and children. Political figures debate the budgetary concerns of housing assistance program cuts and expanded budgets or policing budgets as they grapple with how to clean up available housing for deserving populations (i.e., homeless women and children) and how to police non-deserving populations (i.e., homeless criminals). Weaved throughout is the important constructed imagery of homelessness that produces a hierarchy within the population. The narrative indicates a limited amount of housing translates into determining who is worthy of the resources and who is not. This is further illustrated by providing stories of homeless criminals that cause crime and disorder, and those who need housing and shelter to avoid the social ills faced on the streets of NYC during the 1980s.

The analysis begins with articles which show a clear indication that the city recognized the range of present housing options was limited, problematic, and necessitated making distinctions about which type of housing was most appropriate, or least appropriate, for a given category of the homeless. Political discussion often includes voice of public authorities that debate the economic factors of housing assistance, and importantly the issues of crime and disorder that surrounding feasible responses to homelessness needs in NYC. For example, the Koch Administration’s [1978-1989] effort to address homelessness advocated homeless families and children deserved permanent housing and available temporary resources provided by the city, instead of seeking “shelter in large, overcrowded, crime-infested armories” and “awful, vermin-infested, rattletrap hotels” (Dunlap 1984). The narrative indicated it was important for
the administration to focus its efforts on providing housing for families and youth. Two means of doing so were identified. First, clean up of existing hotels, shelters, and buildings (Basler 1986) and secured moving them away from S.R.O hotels into shelter programs.

A theme emerged that voiced struggles faced by the Koch Administration to end large warehousing of homeless in S.R.O hotels meanwhile facing budget concerns and rising crime rates at already existing hotel locations in NYC. Budget options to provide housing for homeless were debated. For example, one experimental proposal included a $25 million plan to provide housing to 1,800 homeless people. The city proposed to task “nonprofit organizations to rehabilitate and manage city owned buildings – most those taken for tax delinquency” (Dunlap 1984). Here we see the Koch Administration devoting resources to cleaning up existing spaces, including condemned buildings, in order to accommodate large number of homeless. However, Mayor Koch commented, “I don't believe we can be a supplier of homes [to] every homeless individual in the City of New York or who comes to the City of New York” as he reflects on the responsibility of the city to address issues of homelessness and crime through housing assistance. Meanwhile he acknowledges the city is trying options out to see what works, a question Mayor Koch states could “only be answered after trying it out. If it works, God bless it” (Dunlap 1984). Here, the narrative is illustrated that the city cannot meet all demands; therefore cleaning up existing programs that face issues of low budgets and deteriorating space is a shot at a solution to this problem. During the 1980s, the NYT reported on several projects the city proposed and occasionally implemented.

One city goal for housing was to divide the homeless across multiple boroughs, rebuilding existing buildings, in order to provide for rising number of homeless families during the 1980s and to appeal to neighborhood organizations that resisted large congregations of
homeless housing. Rhetoric however did not match action, and communities voiced their concern that the city was moving masses of people into one neighborhood. In one instance reported, the H.R.A, under direction of the Koch Administration, announced a plan to move at least 200 more homeless families into an area that already had the highest concentration of homeless families living in S.R.Os in the city. At the same time, the Koch Administration provided rhetoric that the large congregations of the homeless are not ideal. The struggle for the city to meet the demand is voiced. The city justified the move as "critical" because they had “exhausted all other options” (Basler 1986). Here we see the city trying to move families and youth away from S.R.Os that they acknowledge are crime infested and problematic. Neighborhoods protested against the “warehousing” of homeless that created a “crime epidemic”. David Dinkins, then Borough President of Manhattan, voiced resistance by neighborhoods that opposed proposals of the city to move 800 homeless into his neighborhoods. Dinkins further commented (Basler 1986):

   The government cannot put all the homeless families in one community. It's not fair to the families who are living in these hotels with no place for their children to play, no place to buy groceries. And it's not fair to the people who live and work in the neighborhood.

Mayor Koch argued the city plan was to “rely less and less on the 56 welfare [S.R.O] hotels it has been using to house the homeless and more on its own shelters” (Basler 1986). Ultimately, the plan to reduce the use of S.R.Os is favored by the public and government officials, however due to rising family homelessness and housing budget shortages, the city had to rely on existing S.R.Os.

   In addition to the city and neighborhood organizations, small business owners and clergymen echoed the narrative to stop the use of S.R.Os. They were concerned it caused issues to their businesses and was unfair to families. In one article, Basler reported a coalition of varied
business interest groups argued to “stop placing homeless families in the hotels” due to double victimization that occurred in the neighborhood (Basler 1986b). Such victimization is stated as an issue of placing families in overcrowded conditions filled with crime at S.R.O hotels that caused a spillover effect and further “victimized” the community. Basler (1986) described this as “double victimization” where “… large families cramped into small hotel rooms - they were the first victims. But now the neighborhood has become the second” (Basler 1986b). Basler (1986c) described in another article the conditions faced by families, as they “often cannot sleep at night, so raucous are the hotels where the families live”. A final description comes from one of the few times a homeless voice is heard. Betty Chisolm, 31, reflected on her physical, mental, and emotional health faced while living in the S.R.Os (Nix 1985):

I smoke a pack-and-a-half a day. I never used to smoke more than four cigarettes. But I'm depressed a lot. Sometimes you've got to laugh to keep from crying. There's a lot of pressure in here. And it's just as bad on the kids. The city is doing a lot of injustice to the homeless.

The imagery of S.R.Os as “disgraceful places to put mothers and children” perpetuated methods aimed to “break up” large congregations of the homeless and poor. This imagery fit the narrative where multiple voices called for a move away from S.R.Os due to crime and disorder associated with the hotels. These voices articulate the stigma of S.R.Os as one of dangerous conditions, drugs, and disorder. This furthered the narrative that the city needed to get rid of them and provide alternative housing options this ultimately served the agenda of breaking up congregations of homeless, providing divided and specialized shelters across the city, and moved homeless out of large spaces to allow growth of businesses. The imagery of increased families experiencing homelessness further politicized this social problem and prioritized the need for
housing in accordance with a number of interest groups. By framing such practices as those that led to “double victimization,” of homeless families and the community, narratives furthered the agenda to prioritize housing, specifically for homeless families.

FORMAL ACTION TO END S.R. OS IN NYC

Examples from other cities in New York State were reported in the NYT during this decade. They argued further to examine alternatives to NYC’s reliance on S.R. Os During the late 1970s, the decline of the S.R. Os accelerated at a tremendous rate due to conversion and demolition. During the 1980s and despite rising need, one strategy that continued to lessen S.R. Os in NYC included changing zoning ordinances. Many of NYC’s S.R. Os were located in areas that faced gentrification and urban renewal. By the mid 1980s, we already saw significant changes in zoning prohibited land use under newly imposed guidelines of the city. During this time, NYC also established a “temporary moratorium” – or temporary halt - on all S.R.O conversions in order to pass legislation that made the conversion process more restrictive.

Illustrations of these practices used by the city that further restricted and ultimately forced the removal of S.R. Os from the city landscape abound across all of New York State. For example, the NYT discussed the removal of homeless people from the Lakeview Motel 6 (an S.R.O), and other temporary housing, in Cortlandt, through changes in city zoning ordinances. This policy change that prohibited length of stay in a room, hotel, or place that did not have a stove for an extended period, was criticized for changing the rules and not providing alternatives. It was mostly homeless who were impacted by the change and their voices are heard describing the negative impact of the zoning change without planned alternatives (Brown 1987). Residents of the hotel pled with the city’s zoning board to allow them to stay in the temporary housing
options provided. However, according to Brown (1987b), city officials continued to “interpret zoning ordinances” that enforced removal of homeless families from certain hotels, motels, and other temporary housing due to common rhetoric that conflated hotels and homelessness with city crime problems. Martha Frye, who was homeless for three years, expressed frustration as she speculated why the city was motivated to change its practices (Brown 1987):

   Everybody is afraid of us. We’re just as afraid of you. We aren't drug addicts. We don't want to live here permanently. We don't want to bring your property values down. We're just asking for a little bit of help.

   Here we see the effects of fear of crime and the criminal other influence formal control strategies that impact who is able to access certain space across the city. Zoning ordinances furthered the notion that increased control is needed to “crackdown” on S.R.Os and welfare recipients, as they are linked to the crime and disorder problem. The varied narratives that surrounded single room occupancy hotels assisted in a collective local, state, and federal efforts to dismantle this commonly practiced response to homelessness. Rhetoric on all sides (i.e., the city, residents, and service providers) reiterated the image that S.R.Os were crime magnets and that the city needed to move toward shorter term housing assistance programs in order to minimize the visibility of homelessness and crime.

HOUSING ASSISTANCE AND THE HOMELESS OTHER

   Constructing the urgency to provide immediate solutions that addressed rising homelessness and issues of crime and disorder referred to processes that identified the homeless subject. Framing the urgency of the S.R.O problem is further legitimated by imagery that constructs a need for different, and often separate, housing options for homeless families, youth,
and women. This is illustrated in stories that continue the narrative around the dangers of S.R. Os. This talk serves two functions: justify shelter for prioritized groups across social statuses (i.e., race, class, gender, and age) and further justify notions that a divided shelter system would serve the community and individual needs.

Here we see the narrative that solutions for care are needed, however the shift is to provide safe options for families and children away from S.R. Os and into a divided shelter system. Three examples illustrate this point. First, one story brought to attention the poor management of women and children who fled domestic violence situations. This is identified as a particularly vulnerable group that often needed options away from what S.R. Os provided, as they are crime infested and dangerous places. Second, another story reported women who faced domestic abuse were re-victimized in the current shelter system and that a new system would provide safe options for women. The focus here advocated the need for a shelter in Chinatown, where “battered Korean [women] who sought security” was reported to be re-victimized in existing options. Women were “beaten and robbed” while forced to find shelter in the current options provided by the Koch administration (NYT 1986).

A final story reported on a temporary shelter in Times Square that was forced to adapt to the overflow of homeless families facing eviction. Here, we clearly see current housing options were situated in areas of high crime and disorder (Dowd 1984). A Reverend from a homeless services provider referred to the hotel as one of the “rottenest places” in the City, stating it was a place “right out of hell” situated in a location where “every vice in the world is extant” (Dowd 1984). In all of these examples, safe housing options for women and families are needed while the overall need to find space for housing the homeless remained important. Mostly, rhetoric to provide housing is connected to the city’s solutions to end crime and disorder.
SHELTERS OUTSIDE THE CITY LIMITS

During this decade, a narrative emerged that discussed the practice of moving shelters outside the city limits. In the early 1980s, the city had already begun dismantling S.R.Os and moved forward in seeking shelter options. However, neighborhood resistance to S.R.Os also carried into resistance of shelters as stories of crime, violence, and drug use within shelters threatened neighborhoods. As Koch dedicated budgets to building new shelters, the city made efforts to move shelters and homeless outside of the city limits. Rhetoric remained focused on the importance in identifying different subpopulations of homeless, as this would play a role in where the homeless are better placed.

Conflicting sentiment existed over displacing homelessness around NYC and the surrounding area. Stories point to the fact the Koch Administration had moved the city’s “social problems” to places away from areas of urban renewal in order appeal to public concern. In one story, a narrative emerged that expressed concern with the cost of bussing homeless shelter residents to the city by day and back to one location, the Wards Island shelter, by night.

A particular interest group, the Manhattan Psychiatric Center and Children’s Psychiatric Center, reported on the negative consequences they faced due to the city’s “bussing-the-homeless” system. In a Letter to the Editor (NYT 1981), a member of the Psychiatric Center stated, “homeless men do indeed need shelter and appropriate programs for their particular problems” however the group “strongly object[s] to what is a poorly thought-out and potentially harmful ‘solution’ to an admittedly serious problem” that has turned Wards Island into a “dumping ground for the city's social problems.” The letter cited “increased drug traffick[ing] and numerous security violations” that were “directly [attributed] to the Men's Shelter population on the island” (NYT 1981). In the letter, a distinction is further made between the psychiatric
facilities and shelter; the psychiatric facility created a “safe haven for the mentally ill” whereas the increasing presence of the men’s shelter is equated to a future “Devil’s Island” (NYT 1981). The Psychiatric Facilities are cited as unable to “protect their vulnerable patients and provide them with the means for rehabilitation - not to have them confined within an armed camp” due to the growing presence of the men’s shelter on Wards Island (NYT 1981). Here, we see resistance from neighborhoods outside of immediate NYC. Thus, resistance is felt within and without city limits, as the homelessness, crime, and disorder issues continued to remain at the political forefront.

REVIVING THE STREETS THROUGH JOBS AND JUSTICE

At the same time, a similar narrative is applied to addressing homelessness and crime problems in the city more broadly, through jobs, justice, and housing options. The narrative advocated for increased criminal justice spending in order to address rising crime rates and pervasive drug problems through two major practices: providing jobs and policing behaviors of at risk populations. In 1984, Mayor Ed Koch (1978-1989) and Governor Mario Cuomo (1983-1994) introduced a plan to create a voluntary service program designed for low-income 18 year olds, as they were defined as an at risk population faced with temptations of crime and disorder. Koch referred to the morality building that “cleaning parks, helping the elderly and the homeless, and working with children victims of crime” would provide for youth that faced unemployment, poverty, and a life of crime (Goodwin 1984a). The program targeted “deprived youngsters” and included youth in shelters, particularly racial minority groups (Goodwin 1984a). Koch further argued he hoped this model would catch national attention, “How about working in NYC? With the elderly, the poor people, the people who need help. And you’ll get something out of it”
Koch reflected on unemployment and lack of housing as major contributors to both homelessness and crime.

The Koch Administration furthered the idea of “reviving the city” through jobs and justice (Goodwin 1984b) by providing “thousands” of housing units to get people off the street (Dunlap 1984). In the midst of this rhetoric, Mayor Koch criticized “Reagan's policies” (though specifics not stated), arguing the Koch administration “pulled the city out of the depths of fiscal crisis and given its residents new hope and opportunity” through “housing starts, minority employment and reduced crime” (Goodwin 1984b). In his address summary provided in the NYT, Mayor Koch was criticized by audience members and received mixed reviews on his “representation of the city” as his self-claimed accomplishments were not representative of the realities faced in NYC as reports argued that crime rates and drug abuse continued. City Council President Carol Bellamy stated, “His glasses are a little too rose colored. He has been captured by the fascination of percentages, not by people” (Goodwin 1984b).

Shortly after the address where Koch proclaimed his Administration’s successes, his Administration shifted its focus toward implementing quality of life patrols, targeting minor and robberies. Narratives continued to criticize Koch for his “inflated” sense of self that misrepresented the conditions in NYC. Specifically, one article illustrates the contradiction by discussing recent budgets that funded plainclothes officers to gather information on the streets given crime spikes during the 1980s under direction of the Koch Administration (Basler 1986). High crime rates were indeed witnessed as stories of the homeless violent other emerged.
BARRIERS FACED IN FINDING SOLUTIONS

As we have seen somewhat already, the Koch Administration faced barriers in finding solutions to issues of homelessness and crime in three ways. First, rising homelessness and crime rates impacted housing options that existed. For example, shelters were framed as abused by drug users and became central points for drug trafficking. Second, neighborhoods resisted several proposals made by the city to build new shelters to replace old S.R.O options. Third, these barriers are compounded with other forms of financial and social strain faced by the city. Further, stories of the homeless, criminal other exacerbate the barriers faced, as the image of homelessness is increasingly blurred with crime and disorder and further resisted as NYC sought to disassociate from this image. In the following, we see illustrations of the barriers faced by the Koch Administration to respond to homelessness.

Issues of rising crime and homelessness on the streets reached such a problematic turn in the 1980’s that shelters became described as places of drug use and crime. During the 1980s, crack had arrived in NYC and the public discussed solutions for the new crack era. Mediated images of crack and other drugs shaped city response strategies through housing and policing as a crack era caused a new crime wave. Barbanel (1988) reported, “crack use pervades” the shelters, creating “a mood of perpetual danger”. Crack is further connected to other crimes as it provided “motives for countless fights and petty robberies” in the shelter. Bathrooms in the shelters are said to have “transformed into part-time crack houses” and stories report homeless men in the shelter who spent their money from work to support their drug addictions. In one story, Leroy McCoy, 28, a shelter resident, reflected on the social problems faced in shelters due to crack (Barbanel 1988), “…Crack here is devastating. If you don’t know how to fight, you can’t make it here. We’ve got nothing but hardened criminals.”
The narrative emerged that drugs caused violence and crime. Further, the narrative continued that these problems had all escalated in the shelter system. In one story, Tyrone Prindle, 19, was shot and killed by a fellow unidentified homeless man in a city run shelter. The story details Prindle’s life as a homeless young adult who had been in the shelter system since youth. The threat of violence within shelters is further illustrated as the article shares the “unidentified man” had possession of a gun that he was able to carry “past guards and two metal detector systems” (Nix 1986). The case raised further concern among police and the neighborhood about the presence of the shelter within the community and the violence faced within the shelter by fellow shelter residents. Around the mid 1980s, rhetoric began to appear that encouraged the city to fund increased security and surveillance in the city, especially in the housing system, in order to respond to the reported “knifings, beatings and molestation at … city shelters.”

The Koch Administration sought to address the housing crisis by building shelters in abandoned prisons, jails, and schools (Barbanel 1988; Barbanel 1989; Roberts 1989). Amid the reports of crime in shelters, city council members, and community organizers adamantly blocked multiple requests, stating a comprehensive plan was needed for homeless New Yorkers (Finder 1984; Barbanel 1989) to avoid repeating plans that “carelessly destroy vital neighborhood[s]” of NYC (Basler 1986b). Nonetheless, the Koch Administration moved forward with budget plans to build 11 new shelters in NYC boroughs. Business owners and residents raised concerns that the proposals were not well planned and neglected to consider safety and success of neighborhoods and their businesses. In one story, the owner of Boston Fish Market stated, “all of us will be run out, because we'll be at the mercy of criminals and drug dealers” (Daley 1987).
Reports of the negative impacts of homelessness, shelters, and crime further illustrate conflicts in community that persisted over time. Basler (1986) published a series of articles that discussed neighborhood politics of the shelter system. He focused on hotels near midtown NYC where a high concentration of homeless existed and families were being placed in the middle of crime and disorder due to “poor” housing management. Basler (1986) reported that neighborhoods faced “hard and loud and dangerous” conditions as homeless families continued to be “crammed in tiny hotel rooms in a neighborhood without playgrounds.” Neighborhood residents shared that living conditions are so bad they “stunt[ed] the families and hurt the neighborhood” as the city tried to overcome issues of crime and disorder by moving housing shelters into new neighborhoods. Andrew Holbrooke, neighborhood resident and photographer, commented on recent city efforts, stating they “singlehandedly destroyed what was once a healthy, up and coming neighborhood.” Holbrooke also said, “we could have absorbed some families, but no area can take the huge numbers of homeless that the city has dumped here” (Basler 1986). Holbrooke’s wife commented on housing options from S.R.Os to shelters in NYC neighborhoods, stating they threatened every day life of its residents (Basler 1986). Basler (1986) wrote, “…Merchants would no longer venture down the blocks where the three hotels are situated because they fear being mugged or threatened by groups of teenagers. We have muggings, purse snatchings, graffiti, noise, broken glass.”

These stories illustrate the continued struggle to find solutions to homelessness, crime and disorder. Further, they articulate concerns about the lack of safe options and perceived fear of what housing such as shelters and S.R.Os bring to a community. The resistance from neighborhood residents is not simply because they do not want the homeless, rather homeless
housing instigates anxieties of crime and disorder. The public share experiences of crime and disorder that perpetuate broader anxieties and fear of crime that characterized the 1980s.

The H.R.A commented on neighborhood residents’ complicated sentiments and recognized that they created barriers to the options the city had. Wilbur Hicks of the H.R.A commented (Daley 1982), “We're caught between a rock and a hard place. Everybody says help the homeless; help them, help them, but somewhere else. That's become the national anthem. We have a large number of homeless people that nobody wants.”

The city continued to express it had exhausted other options in current crisis faced. Existing buildings and hotels were the only source currently available during economic times (Schanberg 1984; Basler 1986) where the Federal Government is criticized for being “unfair to the city” through budget cuts (Levine 1989). Stella Schindler, deputy commissioner of H.R.A, commented (Levine 1989):

We have great sympathy for the people in the neighborhood and for their problems. But we put the families where the hotels are, and that area had the hotels. We can't promise we won't put more families in that area. There are several other hotels there that may take our families and there may come a time when we will have to use them.

SECURITIZING SHELTERS

In addition, to shaping the community response to homelessness, rising crime and disorder caused concern for safety and security at shelters. A narrative emerged that strongly advocated for increased security and surveillance measures in shelters. Often, the increase in quality of life measures and zero tolerance policing are traced to the Giuliani Administration in the 1990s. Here, we see though that the Koch Administration foreshadows the 1990s focus on
crime and disorder through similar policing tactics. For example, during the mid-1980s, Mayor Koch increased budgets to provide 24-hour security for the protection of clients and to hire a police crime-prevention team to inspect NYC shelters (Nix 1986). Recommendations provided by the team included increased television monitoring, guard presence, and use of metal detectors on all incoming clients (Nix 1986). In a Letter to the Editor, H.R.A Commissioner George Gross (1986) detailed city actions to improve security at homeless shelters, in addition to 24-hour security provided by Koch’s proposals (Gross 1985):

First, to prevent homeless men and women from bringing weapons into the shelters, we have added metal detectors in every shelter. Second, we are planning to install television monitors in some shelters to bolster on-site observation of incidents. Third, we have asked an outside company and the Police Department to evaluate our security operations and to recommend improvements to us.

Gross (1985) stated physical safety provided through increased surveillance by foot patrol and security devices would help shelters “feel safe” for residents, staff, and neighbors (Basler 1986). Increased spending was provided to employ private security companies, such as Globe Security, ($4.9 million-a-year) and Professional Security ($3.5 million-a-year). During 1986, the City of New York increased their budgets to employ 560 private agency guards and 79 H.R.A security guards in shelters.

In addition to technologies used to secure shelters, Gross (1985) detailed a crackdown in criminal and deviant behavior in the shelter system by implementing an ejection policy. As commissioner of the H.R.A, he stated shelters reported and arrested clients for crimes witnessed. In order to address the threat of clients returned after their arrest, the shelter system then created and implemented an ejection policy that prohibits the return of clients arrested for criminal
behaviors for at least 7 days (Gross 1985). This includes ejection for arson, robberies, and drug use. H.R.A framed the ejection policy as necessary in order to control those who are in the shelter system. This policy received attention in the *NYT* as it is strongly opposed and fought in court by organizations such as Robert Hayes, attorney and founder of the not-for-profit Coalition for the Homeless (Daley 1987). Hayes has spent his career fighting the Koch administration and other city officials for violations of homeless rights, specifically starting his career in the “fight” against shelter policies that negatively impacted the homeless in NYC during the 1980s (Daley 1987). Gross (1985) commented on justification for the ejection policy in his Letter to the Editor, specifically responding to Hayes’ activities:

> This policy, which would enable us to reduce the tensions in the shelter system, is contested in court by the Coalition for the Homeless. Robert M. Hayes, counsel to the coalition, whom you quote saying the shelters are unsafe, is the attorney suing the city to prevent the use of this ejection policy, which would enable us to reduce the climate of fear in the shelters.

Unsurprisingly, the ejection policy is targeted at dividing the dangerous, criminal homeless others from those who are not. It is situated in politics that seek to find and remove the criminal other from shelters in order to make shelters safe as the war on drugs ascends upon NYC. The distinction between the “hardened criminals” becomes more crucial and is reproduced, as the late 1980s crack epidemic becomes a major problem in the shelter system (Barbanel 1988). The blurring of drug addiction and homelessness is reiterated through one article that discussed veterans who are “alcoholics and crack users” that have “shown little interest in changing their lives” (Barbanel 1988). Captain Ronald Foreman of the Salvation Army’s first shelter for homeless veterans in NYC commented (Barbanel 1988):
We found we were very naïve and liberal. We were led to believe that guys who were in the service and were homeless needed only a job and a place to live.

Social hierarchy is reproduced in a way that the criminal homeless other is a threat to all, including homeless families and women who are deemed more worthy of social services. The ejection policy is a response that further seeks to remove the dangerous, drug addicted homeless from society. Meanwhile, the distinction between homelessness and crime is continually blurred throughout the decade that justifies increased management of the homeless through increased controls, and surveillance. However, policies are enacted that impact all residents thus normalizing the criminal justice system’s presence in welfare housing and shelters, regardless of the population.

Part of this normalizing of criminal justice technologies found in shelters is found in security measures that advocated increased police presence in city housing. In one example, undercover police operations at the shelters and hotels were conducted as an extension of NYC clean up efforts. Such efforts are attributed to rumors that both the homeless and private security guards commit crimes dangerous, violent crimes in the shelters. In one article, undercover police arrested two men, charged with promoting prostitution of two boys, 14 and 15 years old, in a hotel that provided temporary housing. Many residents of the building reported “child prostitution” and using children as “bait to set up robberies” (Nix 1985):

If they really wanted to clean this place up, they would put some undercover cops in here and weed out the people. What they pay in rent on this place for one month they could pay rent somewhere else for six months.

Another article discussed the stabbing of homeless men by two private security guards, “who are not authorized to carry weapons” (Nix 1985b).
POLICING THE HOMELESS CRIMINAL OTHER

The threat of the homeless other is reproduced through stories on the coverage of crimes by homeless, and against other homeless. This ultimately perpetuated the sense of urgency for increased controls of street life. Stories of violent victimization by homeless, particularly those staying in encampments and in the streets, work to further more broad concerns of crime and disorder. This advocates the need to draw attention to the crime problem and provide preventative solutions to address crime and poverty.

First, in the case of Thomas Burke, Jr., 15, is discussed. He was stabbed to death in an area known as Old Highway, 100 feet from a shack belonging to homeless William F. Burke, 46. William Burke referred to as the “Man with a Mop Handle,” was not related to Thomas Burke, Jr. (Basler 1986; Purdum 1987). Basler (1986) reported, Burke, Jr. was “last seen roller skating along the old highway” by his friends when they said they were “menaced by a man wielding a mop handle.” However, “no one saw the actual crime” as police questioned the homeless men who stayed on old highway. People who work near the location said they “knew that a few homeless men lived there, but those men never bothered” anyone and the neighborhood community league had no record of complaints. Further, Suzanne Trazoff, the H.R.A said they did not know of the “existence of a shack or beds on the old highway.” According to Trazoff, Burke had been in and out of the shelter system. Suzanne Halpin, Health and Hospitals Corporation, who provides outreach for “street people” said the homeless who stayed on Old Highway do not fit the profile of fragile or potentially mentally ill. Nancy Alberto, a guard for a local business who lets homeless inside wire gates to collect bottles and cans, commented (Basler 1986):

They look raggedy, like hobos, but they were not bad, they did not cause problems.
Despite these reported comments, the death of “innocent” teenager Thomas Burke by a difficult-to-predict homeless man, William Burke, sparked discussion that reiterated the need for increased patrols on the streets of NYC and for police to get a handle on the crime problem. The Koch administration tasked police with making sure all public places frequented by residents was better policed.

Second, the Koch Administration focused police efforts in response to a wave of stories that report on victimization of New Yorkers in the subway system by homeless. Stories shared cases of random murders, death of homeless, and rampant drug use in the subway system. This further set the stage for increased policing tactics targeted at removing homeless from the streets and transportation systems. The Koch Administration had stopped earlier practices of removing homeless, however in light of recent violence and crime, old practices emerged as new discussions to respond to the social problem.

During the 1980s, the Koch Administration ordered the police to make sweeps of the subway system. Police collaborated with social service providers to “steer [the homeless] to social service workers waiting above ground with offers of food and shelter” in sweeps conducted after midnight. This practice was used to “entice” the homeless to seek shelters rather than subways and the streets (Haberman 1982). Police were tasked with being the point in contact in subways, that much like shelters in the 1980s were described as dangerous and crime ridden. They offered a point in contact between homeless and social services, hospitals, and outreach workers (Haberman 1982).

In one focused sweep, police “ejected” nearly 205 homeless, 185 men and 20 women, from the subway system for outstanding warrants among other arrest-able offenses. According to rhetoric, subways were made safer in context of the idea that homeless were “a problem” and
needed to be removed by police to address safety and security issues. This legitimated similar sweeps to be conducted in shelters, where warrants were served. Fear of the homeless criminal other, perpetuated from stories of random acts of violence by homeless, assisted in legitimizing state authority that further displaced the homeless.

Third, NYC Police commented on “commuters being attacked and menaced by homeless.” He argued that the city needed to end its practice that allowed, “homeless seeking refuge” to sleep in places like Grand Central Terminal (Daley 1985). This temporary practice of providing refuge from the streets in shelters was overshadowed by police stories of violent victimization by homeless on subways. In addition, railroad officials said the “crime rate in the terminal had risen sharply” in the month this practice was allowed (Daley 1985). Metro-North police patrolling Grand Central reported, “a commuter was severely beaten with a broomstick wielded by a homeless man” and another case where “a commuter was robbed by homeless men” (McFadden 1985). Eventually, police were provided orders from Mayor Koch, who stated, “I thought it was an outrageous situation that people should be placed in a dangerous situation” as he critiqued the practice and policy that temporarily allowed and “encouraged” homeless to use the terminal (Daley 1985). Koch further promised that the city would send vans to the terminal to remove people from it and transfer them to shelters at least three times per week (Daley 1985).

The original policy practiced by Grand Central Terminal was meant to provide “refuge” during the night, however police officials were tasked with removing homeless during the day and night from Grand Central Terminal. Police presented the homeless with the ultimatum of jail, shelter, or hospitals as the Koch Administration instructed police to “prevent ‘loitering’ during the day by people who appeared to be vagrants” (Purnick 1985). For example, Metro-
North was instructed by Mayor Koch to “resume closing the station at 1:30 A.M” due to recent
“news accounts of increased crime and other problems associated with those who used the
terminal as their home” (Purnick 1985). The Coalition for the Homeless stated the police were
“acting within their legal rights” in removing “anyone who appears to be homeless [and having
them] escorted out of the station” (Purnick 1985).

In 1986, a spokesperson for the Port Authority stated 84 arrests were made for loitering in
bus terminals in New York and New Jersey, which is “punishable by up to 15 days in jail”, and
in some cases led to finding drugs, (see case of Alfred Clark by Johnson 1987). Police frequented
the terminals “in hopes of coaxing them into city shelters and programs” and ticketing or
arresting in cases where the efforts were not successful (Cummings 1987). Articles documented
the controversy over recent arrests and removal of homeless made in Grand Central Terminal
when cases landed in the NYC court system. In 1987, the courts ruled that NYC police cannot
“arrest people for loitering in public areas” of Grand Central terminal (Johnson 1987). Mayor
Koch’s announced police would continue management practices to prevent those from “sleeping
in the city’s bus and train depots” (Johnson 1987).

The homeless also faced victimizations across NYC streets and subways. This furthered
narratives that supported the political agenda to push the homeless into the shelter system. In one
report, six homeless individuals are reported to have frozen to death during poor weather
conditions in a single week; “the deaths, more than one every two days, have been attributed to a
winter chill that has pushed temperatures as low as 5 degrees in NYC”. Interviewed officials
claimed the city had provided enough space for those who froze to death. According to Suzanne
Trazoff, spokesperson for the H.R.A, shelters were “not near … capacity,” as they were
“Organized and Ready” (Uhlig 1988). Trazoff further commented (Uhlig 1988), “…We have
more than enough beds. We were organized and ready for this winter, so there's no reason for anybody to be on the streets.”

The homeless stranger in the community further constructs fear of the homeless criminal other in stories of random violence by criminals. Stories highlight dangers faced in New York as rising crime rates gain political and public attention during the 1980s. Here we see policing and an emergent theme that discusses police control in order to address the new era of crime. The early 1980s discuss pressures to the Koch Administration to increase policing measures, particularly quality of life measures in subways and against the homeless (NYT 1982). The convergence of policing crime and disorder is increasingly blurred with policing the homeless other as the decades move forward and quality of life becomes dominant in NYC politics.

CONCLUSION

During the 1980s, the social problem of homelessness is increasingly blurred with fears and anxieties about crime and disorder in NYC. Unsurprisingly, political voice on the subject is a common part of the narratives that seek to shape knowledge of homelessness and its responses. Mayor Ed Koch is faced with finding solutions to housing problems as neighborhoods resist S.R.Os and shelters; the same neighborhoods acknowledge the homelessness causes crime and disorder problems. Koch explores a number of options, including: continued use of S.R.Os, providing shelters both within and outside city limits, dedicating funds to reconstruct existing structures in order to provide housing for small, selecting groups of homeless across NYC appropriate or deserving of shelters, and increasing police measures available to the community in both the streets and in the housing system. It is here the observation is made that the problem of homelessness has increasingly been politicized. Though homelessness itself has long existed,
reference to political figures, particularly the Mayor and his Administration, is particularly
dominant in the 1980s. At the intersection of homelessness and crime, we see sentiments of
providing housing and shelter options that work to further administration of safety and security
technologies adapted from the criminal justice system. Examples included increased
management of populations using the welfare system, including housing options, through use of
police bodies and police technologies.

Another indicator of the political value of homelessness and crime witnessed during the
1980s is the sheer number of articles returned for this decade and the previous decade. Perhaps
what we see in the 1980s foreshadows the turn toward repressive policies, such as zero tolerance,
and quality of life policies, often associated with Mayor Giuliani’s Administration. Key political
leaders in NYC, such as Mayor Ed Koch, tended to maintain focus on finding solutions to
housing crisis faced, particularly for homeless families and youth. The community engaged in
discussions on options of where to house homeless families and youth amidst rapidly changing
urban space in NYC. The rising role of police is advocated in shelters and are not far beyond
what is often discussed as increased policing practices found in the 1990s.

By the 1980s, gentrification and urban renewal were favored in NYC as free market
expansion – specifically, the relations between businesses, consumers, and residents – continued
to move toward economic growth and prosperity. The rise in the economic priority is also
witnessed in the increase of discussions on budget and politics. Politicians included budget
discussions in context of extending gentrification practiced in NYC. High crime rates and the
need for crime control further legitimimized efforts to displace signs of crime and disorder.
Associating homelessness with issues of crime and disorder was used to legitimate pushing the
problem to the fringe of NYC limits and socially excluding problematic homeless from services such as housing during times of significant welfare retrenchment.

Much like the narrowing of policies in crime control, that allowed little room for political difference, the politics of homelessness demanded increased rigidity, toughness, and exclusion in the housing system and in management strategies. Homelessness as a crime and disorder issue in the 1980s worked to further contain and manage populations within the city. Furthermore, it worked to define and reinforce social boundaries found in the city as the image of NYC shifted through processes of gentrification and urban renewal. Strategies are legitimized through technologies of crime control found in the housing system.
CHAPTER VI
EXPANDING SOLUTIONS TO HOMELESSNESS AND CRIME IN THE 1990s

The 1970s and 1980s revealed narratives on homelessness around rising crime rates and a deteriorating NYC. As these social problems continued over the decades, the political discussions continued around defining the image of homelessness and debating the available responses in order to address the problems. Stories of neighborhood revitalization extended rhetoric around the control of space and people using crime control technologies. Some of these narratives continued into the 1990s. Fear of crime and disorder is particularly present in the narrative around homelessness and housing through the end of the 1980s and into the 1990s. Specifically, we see a continued focus on options for making S.R.Os and shelters safe in context of neighborhood revitalization and high violent crime rates. Here, as well, we continue to see a continued politicization of homelessness and crime as management and safety goals remain at the forefront of American politics.

Narratives that began during the Koch Administration continued into the 1990s with the Dinkins and Giuliani Administrations. Giuliani, however, appeared “tough” on the crime and disorder problem. His policies were debated, but he expressed little concern with appeasing the public or organizations impacted by his Administration. It is unsurprising then that the number of articles analyzed for this decade (N=490) more than doubled from the previous decade (N=172). Significant stories of the homeless subject worked to further politicize homelessness as it advocated increased policing across urban space. Mayors David Dinkins [1990-1993] and Rudy Giuliani 1994-2001] play a key role in politicizing homelessness and crime in the 1990s.

Parameters for this chapter included those identical to the general study (i.e., in the NYT, in NYC, specific to the topic) from 1990 to 1999. Whereas the 1980s witnessed political mention as
the dominant emergent theme, policing and crime control are the most dominant emergent topic found in the 1990s (42-43%). Approximately, 41% discussed the image of homelessness. Politicians in appear in 31% of the sample during this decade. Nearly 30% discussed neighborhoods, and 17% discussed housing such as shelters and single room occupancy hotels.

This is weaved throughout the decade within articles that describe homelessness in relation to broader goals that discuss housing and policing urban space. The construction of homelessness is found in stand-alone articles where homeless are involved in criminal offending and/or victimization. The imagery of homelessness is conflated to crime and disorder faced in neighborhoods in discourse.

The role of the police and policing emerged as a dominant theme, much like it did in the 1970s and 1980s. Therefore I noted how this is talked about, including voices of those in power through state and non-governmental agencies that are charged with response and management of the city’s social problems. Notions of technologies and mechanisms of power emerged through discussions focused in the neighborhood that advocated increased management and crime control in order to better police spaces occupied by homeless within the community. Ultimately, this prioritized neighborhood revitalization and safety, and we see social exclusionary practices advocated.

In discussions around neighborhood revitalization and safety, we also see emergent narratives that focused on political administrations’ responses to homeless through the shelter systems (i.e., welfare hotels and temporary shelters), the construction of fear of the criminal and homeless other, and increased rhetoric to securitize shelters and the streets in response to this fear. Throughout the decade, stories of crimes committed by and against the homeless work to
legitimize increased controls of the criminal other that are broadly politically supported and to normalize efforts by the city that seek stricter surveillance of criminal and deviant populations.

Several narratives developed throughout the decade. First, the dominant narrative concerned with issues of crime, disorder, violence, drugs, and disease remained at the forefront of public and political debate. Narratives reproduced stereotypes and practices of homeless management that further perpetuated notions of individualism and control of homeless subjects.

Second, political discussions around housing and shelters, policing of the streets and shelters, and homelessness management discuss the necessity and urgency given recent social problems faced. Though often cited for zero tolerance policing, broken windows, and anti crime campaigns that targeted the removal and arrest of the homeless (Neil 1998; White 2011), Giuliani continued narratives that existed in previous administrations for the need to get tough on NYC’s serious crime and drug problems. As we see, Koch and Dinkins both provided rhetoric that advocated a crackdown on crime and poverty. Such narratives work to politicize homelessness and crime.

Third, a narrative of increased surveillance and security emerged in unique ways. Stories of surveillance and security share an overarching militarized theme around NYC streets and shelters during the 1990s. The community expressed “compassion fatigue” as conditions continued and responses to the social problems faced are criticized. The assigned responsibility on the homeless and other crime groups combined with a decline in welfare services and an increase in crime and disorder provided a powerful context to further agendas on surveillance and safety.

Fourth, what is increasingly present in the rhetoric is the Not-in-my-back-yard (NIMBY) phenomenon that opposed affordable and transitional housing in neighborhoods. Urban
development scholar, Shively (2007) described NIMBY responses as those to remove characteristics of deviant and criminal populations brought into a neighborhood by development. In scholarship, NIMBY arises out of concerns with facilities such as drug treatment, mental health, criminal justice, affording housing, and homeless shelters (Shively 2007). The NIMBY narrative arises as neighborhoods look to preserve self-interest, business interest, and further rid NYC of the crime and disorder image that existed in previous decades.

Mayor Dinkins and Mayor Giuliani are at the political forefront of commentary regarding crime and violence issues across the narratives found. Ultimately, homelessness is blurred with issues of crime and disorder faced by NYC during this decade. The chapter starts then with political rhetoric surrounding the issues of homelessness and crime, particularly highlighting the narratives surrounding response to the problems by both Dinkins and Giuliani Administrations as the public looked to the city for solutions to the social problem.

THE DINKINS ADMINISTRATION

During the 1990s, three key topics emerged connected to the Dinkins Administration [1990-1993]. Much like the city’s predecessors of the 1980s, the Dinkins Administration discussed homelessness, crime, and poverty and gave similar responses. NYC had experienced significantly high crime rates and continually increased budgets to provide more policing through NYPD and private entities. Tensions emerged as budget cuts were announced for social services. As we will see, the increase in crime, an overall budget deficit, and tensions over where to provide funding, set the stage for Dinkins’ response to homelessness that included disproportionate controls of the streets and shelters.
In the 1980s, we see the poor conditions of NYC and a tense community provided the Dinkins Administration with significant obstacles and to its responses to homelessness. Sam Roberts, reporter for the _NYT_, described NYC’s conditions heading into the 1990s as wrought with the “city’s politically sensitive problems” and questioned NYC’s “ascent” based upon Mr. Dinkins’ “inclination” to make change. The problem is described in one article (Roberts 1990b):

The number of drug-related arrests in NYC soared from 18,489 in 1979 to 89,451 in 1988. The budget for housing homeless people multiplied from $8 million to more than $225 million. There were no AIDS cases diagnosed in the city in 1979; in 1989 there were 5,203. The proportion of children living in poverty climbed from a little more than 3 in 10 to closer to 4 in 10. Manufacturing jobs declined from 509,000 to 356,000; financial, insurance and real-estate employment jumped from 436,000 to 534,000. The percentage of foreign-born New Yorkers increased from about 24 percent to an estimated 30 percent.”

He continues to discuss the crime problem unique to the 1990s faced by the new Dinkins’ Administration.

Statistics tell just part of the story. The proliferation of crack, the cocaine derivative, and consequently of crime, arrested the revival of whole neighborhoods and dragged down others. It further overwhelmed a hospital already burdened by the AIDS epidemic. For a while, New York was building more jails cells than apartments.

At the same time, reporters discussed the goal of the administration to make NYC “fiscally solvent”, and Mayor Dinkins began the 1990s facing the necessity of “draconian budget cuts”. Narratives emerged that acknowledged the city’s need to address issues of crime and poverty, and this narrative was filled with political debate over whether Mayor Dinkins and the city of
New York could financially afford to address the social ills witnessed in the early 1990s. For example, the Mayor's rhetoric indicated goals to better serve the health and mental needs of homeless people. Residents questioned how Dinkins would do this during faced budget constraints (Purdum 1991a). One noticeable narrative advocated increased crime budgets for safety and security, meanwhile rhetoric supported overall decline in welfare budgets.

Eventually, the budget cut needs of the Dinkins Administration were made. The cuts came in the areas of welfare and social services (Barbanel 1990). In particular, social services found themselves competing for funding allocations offered to all public services during the Dinkins administration (Mitchell 1992):

After years of recession and fiscal trauma, after more than two years of watching the Mayor [Dinkins] seem to dispense only things like homeless shelters, city residents appeared to be caught off guard last week by Mr. Dinkins's cornucopia of library openings, day-care centers, health clinics and development projects.

The war on drugs and crime fueled the political movement to defund welfare services directly and changed the nature of funding for homeless and other services across the city. Increased services provided to homeless, for example, were provided through budgets directed at crime control and increased policing. This is illustrated in stories where shelters were provided increased security budgets, and support for drug and alcohol treatment. This is situated under notions that aimed to tighten controls within the shelter and control behaviors dangerous to the community both inside and outside of the shelter (Purdum 1991a). An unnamed community resident commented on the importance of one security measure included in the budget for screening for “drugs, alcohol, prior hospitalization or criminal activity.” He stated that if the city failed to implement stricter controls it would “[threaten] the stability and security of long-
established neighborhoods.” However, others cited such policies as “unforgiving” (Levitas 1990). James Wright, sociologist at Tulane University, discussed what the 1990s would look like given the conditions Dinkins faced (Levine 1990), where he stated, “…The drug problem is getting worse all the time. And I think in all honesty that we’re losing ground. The 1990’s will be worse than the 1980’s.”

Clearly, here we see the war on drugs, and the attention toward the crime problem strengthen the connection between homelessness, crime, and poverty. We see it also during the early 1990s when narratives emerged that criticized Mayor Dinkins and Mayor Koch for the “failed” attempts by the city to find solutions to homelessness in NYC. Politicians across the city weighed in on how recent Mayors had failed to allocate funding to places that provided improvement and success. Some reports included criticism by city officials and agencies for the “beefing up the police” over social services (Purdum 1991a; 1991b). One article on the budget priorities, reported a group of men surrounded “an oil drum that served both as a fireplace and a grill for sandwiches” as they shared one man’s story who was a “computer technician until his crack addiction cost him the job” (Gonzalez 1990). Articles shared stories of drugs and crime, in stories on the increased need for housing and social service resources. Images of families and children of waiting affordable housing options were cited. However, reports continued to link homelessness and crime. Peter F. Vallone, City Council Speaker, said (McKinley 1993), “…Why haven't these problems been corrected? Crime, education, homelessness, social services: New Yorkers pay their taxes so that City Hall will deal with these problems. They're not getting their money's worth.”

The City then continued to cite lack of finances and budget cuts on social services (Fritsch 1992). Housing and drug addiction services were cited as a serious problem faced, with
little to no resources available. The needs and demands outweighed resources available during Dinkins’ Administration (Levitas 1990). In fact, the fiscal problems of the city were used to justify the transformation of the administrations’ stated ideas of responses to homelessness. This is illustrated in story on Nancy Wackstein, director of the new Office on Homelessness, who was reported as having to find herself “trying to salvage homeless policies” she had once condemned before elections (Hedges 1990). Chris Hedges, *NYT* reporter, (1990) stated her position did not support shelters and hotels as appropriate solutions for families and children. Given the recent shift in politics faced by NYC social services, Wackstein was forced to back track and put the “liberal wave” political agenda that focused on permanent housing options “on ice” (Hedges 1990):

> In the 1980's we all thought about what we would do when we had power. Now we have it and there is nothing to play with. The social justice agenda will have to wait another decade…My beliefs have not changed. I still do not believe that hotels or congregate shelters are good for families and children, but I have a better understanding as to why the prior administration had been forced to use these facilities.

**THE DINKINS ADMINISTRATION’S RESPONSE**

Despite budget cuts to social services, the Dinkins’ Administration was pressured for solutions. Pressure often came in the form of comparisons to the Koch Administration’s efforts that remained at the political forefront in the *NYT*. Heavily scrutinized is the “vivid symbol of social policy disaster” that practiced housing “desperately poor mothers and children consigned to squalor” in NYC hotels during the 1980s (*NYT* 1990). Dinkins’ Administration was pressured by state and national politics to remove the “welfare hotel stain” of the Koch Administration.
The State of New York and Washington DC for example are cited for political pressures on NYC to abandon the practice of housing homeless families in “crime-infested” S.R. Os. NYT reporters referred to the problem as one of “crisis management” that led to disbursed federal emergency housing funds. The crisis labeled welfare hotels as a “form of abuse of poor children” and “warrens of crime, drugs and prostitution” (NYT 1990).

Shelters were viewed as a more desirable option, compared to S.R. Os, and the Dinkins Administration adopted a plan for “five-year overhaul of the shelter system that placed new, smaller shelters in many middle-class communities” in order to replace the old welfare hotel system (Morgan 1991c). Three narratives appear in NYT reports on the plan for shelters. First, it is here the narrative emerges that criticizes a history of emergency and temporary shelters that ended up with long term residents. Politicians and residents, among other actors, frame the use of shelters as appropriate only in cases of emergencies, such as for temporarily displaced children, women, and families. Narratives that advocated increased budgets and public attention toward providing more options noted the goals for a temporary nature of such services. Those homeless for drug addiction, alcohol abuse, and other crimes received less sympathy and were blamed for NYC’s crime problem.

A second narrative found in these stories residents and business owners pressured the City to remove large congregations of homeless from their neighborhoods, such as those found in ‘shantytowns’. Michael Kharfen, Director of the Mayor’s Community Assistance Unit, described the response, “…While the city has no official policy to move the homeless out of public spaces, the city would move to close such shantytowns when conditions become intolerable for the neighborhoods around them.”
These narratives legitimated the need for shelters during hard economic times as an option however; to be appropriately place out of sight.

A final narrative in the reports on the shelters called for a clean up of the shelter system in order to provide the accommodations for the emergencies the system was geared towards. Frequent crime and violence were experienced in the shelter system, as it was experienced on the streets, and NYC was tasked with the clean up of both. The narrative to clean up the shelters is discussed for homeless women, children, families, and the mentally ill. This is illustrated in one story about Fort Washington Armory in upper Manhattan that discussed the unfortunate circumstances that forced “paranoid schizophrenics [to] lie nervously next to ex-convicts they rightfully fear” (Dugger 1992). Dugger (1992) further commented that the city acknowledged the dire circumstances faced by homeless, especially mentally ill, who were left threatened by criminals and deviants each night. Dugger (1992) stated, “…Noises arise in the darkness: the moans of men having sex with men, the cries of the helpless being robbed, the hacking coughs of the sick, the pounding of feet running through a maze of 700 cots packed into one vast room.”

Though shelters are recognized as safer than streets, the common narrative is that neither streets nor shelters are safe. This narrative is further supported by comments that compare the streets of NYC with shelters (Gonzalez 1990). One shelter resident commented (Gonzalez 1990), “I feel safer here than when I was sleeping on the trains… You've got to know somebody or know how to fight or else you get robbed or beaten.”

Here we see both articles acknowledge threats to safety and security faced by the homeless in two spaces: the shelters and streets. The emerging narrative argues the city needs to address both problem areas in context of an increasingly pervasive crime problem that exists in multiple spaces. Later in the same article, a grim image of NYC shelter system is shared that
works to further justify the pervasiveness of crime and disorder in spaces where the homeless are forced to occupy (Gonzalez 1990):

…[the] sharp smell of ammonia thinly disguised the pungent odor of urine at the Atlantic Avenue men's shelter, where the city can house as many as 990 men barracks style on the armory's drill floor. Many of the residents are young men whose dazed glances betray the emptiness of a vanishing high. Older men wear makeshift paper-bag hats and shoes.

During the Dinkins Administration, we see narratives at work that advocate rebuilding aspects of the shelter system through increased security presence, and drug and alcohol screening. This is also illustrated in the story about “the Fort” where homeless mentally ill faced threatening nights. The shelter security guards are aware of the problem. However, they lack the resources and staff to enforce any crime control. Dugger (1992) stated, “…unarmed security guards are forced to look the other way” in the face of criminals who threaten other homeless in the shelter.

The narrative emerges that a lack in police security and surveillance is problematic in shelters and in the streets. This is illustrated, as neighborhoods share success stories where bolstering police patrols through other homeless is an option while they wait on the city to provide solutions. The role of neighborhood assistance is constructed in an important series of stories on homeless vets who overcome substance abuse issues and rise to assist police and communities in addressing crime and disorder on the streets and in shelters. Such stories work in ways to reproduce ideas that police cannot solve the drug and crime problem alone, and that the idea of a community to fight the criminal and deviant other is most successful through the militarization of policing. In the next section, the rhetoric surrounding a particular group known
as VCOPS foreshadows political and public attention toward framing militarized policing strategies as necessary.

MILITARIZING SHELTERS AND MOBILIZING CITIZEN POLICING

During the 1990s, veteran homelessness appeared as a prioritized concern in articles of homelessness and crime. Furthermore, reports suggest this sub-population would benefit from increased control that would come from structured daily operations found within shelters. As this narrative emerged, enhanced military rhetoric also emerged as talk around homeless veterans provided justification for increasing securitization and controls that would benefit other homeless. Homeless veterans are presented as offering a struggling shelter system a new source of military expertise and social control. The need for militarization had already appeared as early the Koch Administration in the 1980s, particularly in discussion about shelters budgeting for increased physical security. During the 1990s, the creation of VCOPS, comprised of homeless veterans, worked to normalize safety and security. After all, surveillance and structure benefited homeless military men before they returned home and ended up homeless. Success stories are shared of homeless veterans rehabilitated through this structure. Reports portray them as so successful they were privileged enough to become a part of VCOPS and assist police in the fight against crime. These homeless veterans and their successes were among the symbolic revitalization efforts that played an important role in addressing the damage of crime on communities and individuals. The narrative emerged that if structure and productivity benefited these men, it could work for others and was a solution to NYC’s crime and drug problems.

The stories that illustrate this begin with those that offer the construction of homeless veterans as deserving of care and compassion. This is expressed however in the structure of a
militarized shelter legitimizes the coercion, and crackdown of authority figures that characterized crime controls in the 1990s. These illustrated that homeless veterans were redeemable, and able to assist in the fight against the homeless criminal other. One article discussed the value of “staff sergeants” and “barracks rules” implemented to clean up the shelter system (NYT 1991). It is described as beneficial for all, though the militarized shelter system was largely directed to benefit homeless men, as they “compete with women and children for beds in local shelters that are often crime-ridden” (NYT 1991). The structure provided extensive rules, regular showers, strict waking hours, and an attitude of respect that was similar to the military experience. It was argued that the drug addiction and mental illness that impacted homeless veterans could be addressed through this more controlled and structured environments. Ken Smith, co-founder NYC Veteran shelter and former Vietnam veteran, shared (NYT 1991), “What we offer these guys is the kind of structure people who have been in the military are familiar with… That's what these guys need and aren't getting anywhere else.”

As militarized shelters emerged and provided homeless veterans with success and recovery, so did the idea that homeless vets, because of their military expertise, could be a source themselves of control. This is illustrated most clearly in stories on a new “patrol” on the streets known as the Veterans Civilian Observation Patrol (VCOPs). Social services supported the group, comprised of homeless veterans, as a method to “reclaim the streets and subways that many New Yorkers think have become a war zone” (Gonzalez 1990). VCOPs purpose was to provide homeless veterans with two things they were assumed to need, purpose and structure, while at the same time utilizing their skills in bolster police efforts to clean up neighborhoods in NYC.
VCOP was built on the idea of homeless vets having skills useful to fighting crime. It was reported that it utilized the “same instincts honed in distant jungles” to fight the crime and drug problem in NYC streets (Gonzalez 1990). The power of this imagery is shown in a report on war veteran Otis Caldwell, founder of VCOPs, who reflected on the organization’s value to the crime fight. Caldwell was a recovering alcoholic who had abandoned his job, ended up in a detoxification center, and then found himself in a homeless shelter. The homeless veterans program offered him a new life and purpose. He argued specifically that military experience equipped VCOPs to deal with the crime and drug problems of NYC during the 1990s (Gonzalez 1990), “Compared to Vietnam, the subways are a picnic. The difference is at least in Vietnam we had backup.” Caldwell further said police welcomed the idea of VCOPs assist in dealing with “troublemakers” where disordered behavior such as “drinking and urinating” and criminal behavior such as “robbery and drug-related crimes” were a problem (Gonzalez 1990).

The image of homeless vets recovering from the strains of war to protect the community is a powerful one. This is found as well in the powerful stories of the death of Edward Byrne and the revitalization and use of his home which offer symbols of devastation occurring in neighborhoods as well as hope for revitalization. These images are offered in a series of stories on Byrne. In these stories, Officer Byrne was described as a casualty of riff between drug dealers (Fried 1990). Officer Byrne “guarded” the home of a witness who testified about drug dealing in the surrounding neighborhood when he was shot by gang members. After Byrne’s death, the owner fled under the Government Witness Protection Program and the house remained abandoned. It was referred to as a symbol of the “crack-ravaged area of poor and working-class families” and “of the murderous world of drug dealers” (Fried 1990). Eventually the city bought the house in order to transform it into a home base for anti-drug operations by police. This plan
was not followed so the city began work with the community group, Star of the Sea, to turn the house into a youth center. However, once that fell through the city proposed building a shelter in its place in order to symbolize “hope and help for its troubled community” (Fried 1990). The house Officer Byrne guarded was formally approved for affordable, mixed-use housing and development, and would be “staffed and secured” by three homeless veterans who lived at other veteran’s shelters in NYC, under auspices of Veterans Service Corps (Fried 1990). Reporters further stated, “Give us your tired, your hungry, your huddled masses. We welcome them,” said Winnie McCarthy, Roman Catholic lay missionary of Start of the Sea, to the NYT. “We are trying to give the house back to a community that's already suffered because of the drugs” (Fried 1990).

POLICING THE HOMELESS CRIMINAL OTHER

While stories of homeless veterans promoted a narrative of care and compassion in order to help the homeless, a very different narrative existed that discussed other less prioritized homeless in NYC. For example, VCOPS and police partnered to improve the image of the streets through control of minor offenses. Criminalization of street behaviors impacted homeless specifically through panhandling and begging.

The crackdown on panhandling and begging was the subject of an important article that illustrates that not all homeless were seen as worthy of our care. One article focused on one example of the crackdown, NYC’s Transit Authority which “banned panhandling in the subway system” and imposing a $50 fine for violations (Wilkerson 1991). Wilkerson (1991) noted “compassion fatigue” marked the 1990s turning empathy into “intolerance” that enabled public support for “harsher restrictions on homeless people to reduce their visibility or force them to go
out on their own” (Wilkerson 1991). The public, he reported, expressed frustration, as business groups and the public became intolerant of the social problem, and pushed politicians to effectively “regulate the homeless” and crime problems so the city could once again prosper (Wilkerson 1991). He argued further that the old ways of welfare and sympathy that existed “before crises like AIDS and crack” now “competed for the nation's compassion” as the public faced issues of drugs, crime, and “two recessions [that] made life tougher for everybody” (Wilkerson 1991).

Here too though distinctions are made. Citizens reflected on those who asked for money in a “respectful” way versus those who “badger folk and [make] them feel you're going to do something to them if they do not give up some money.” The city needs to “regulate the homeless” with the police is strongly connected to the idea of “career panhandlers” that have “capitalized on sympathy” and aggressive panhandlers whose actions led to any “reasonable person to fear bodily harm” (Wilkerson 1991). The combination of compassion fatigue with the image of career and aggressive panhandlers led to the conclusion that social and welfare services alone would not resolve the problem (Wilkerson 1991), “In the early, naive days of the homeless crisis, people pinned their hopes on the legions of soup kitchens and armories-turned-shelters to reduce the number of people sleeping in doorways and soliciting money on street corners. But the numbers only grew.”

Along with dealing with panhandlers and begging, police were tasked with dealing with indicators associated with the visibility of homelessness in public spaces such as encampments and public transport. This is illustrated powerfully in reports of events from 1991. In 1991, Mayor Dinkins ordered forced eviction of “shantytowns” after complaints of “fights, loud music, unsanitary conditions” such as homeless who “urinated and defecated on the streets” were made
(Morgan 1991c). During the event, officers wore riot gear and staged a raid in East Manhattan at dawn. They evicted an estimated 200 people from “shanty-towns” who had previously been evicted from nearby Tompkins Square Park. Powerful images of the event are found in articles during the early 1990s (Morgan 1991c):

Bulldozers crushing and overrunning the makeshift quarters -- knots of shacks and tents that had become notorious for their squalor and a symbol of the city’s inability to deal with its growing homeless population. About 200 police officers escorted men and women from their shacks and tents and told them to wait along side streets for several hours until the lots were cleared of people. As the makeshift quarters came tumbling down, rats scampered from several of them.

The Dinkins Administration used police response to enforce the removal of “makeshift quarters” through unofficial policies targeted at congregations of homeless (Morgan 1991c) and motivated by agendas to remove signs of disorder and crime. This illustrates how pacification and gentrification go hand in hand.

Forced evictions were among the multiple policing strategies used by the Dinkins Administration to crackdown on criminal and deviant behaviors in the city. Another strategy involved securing public space through crackdowns on minor offenses. A series of stories focused on police arrests in the bus terminal where police referred to the current homelessness situation as “out of control” (Morgan 1991c). The police response sought to relieve “discomfort and lack of security among … commuters because of the presence of the homeless” (Morgan 1991c). The Administration further stated, “We want our customers to perceive the bus terminal as a clean, safe place to come to…” (Morgan 1991c). The Dinkins Administration acknowledges
an “unofficial policy” that did not allow “more than three or four homeless … gathered in one place” and instructed police to disperse and displace (Morgan 1991c).

Another instance of police securing public space through crackdown on minor offenses exists in the NYC Transit System. One reporter shared the story of a problematic “homeless menace” near Transit Station in Brooklyn. Later, a story about suspect Ricky Dansby, 36, appeared when police responded to a complaint that led one officer to shoot and kill homeless Mr. Dansby. The article described the incident where Dansby “attacked” an officer who attempted to carry out daily duty to control menaces and disruptive behavior. A witness shared with NYT (James 1992), “The cop was standing over the guy's body, laid on his back. The cop was very, very shaken up. He said: ‘This has never happened to me. I've never fired my gun. I've got to sit down. I'm too nervous’.”

Along with enforcing evictions and securing public spaces, police provided the homeless with information about shelters and services though not often effectively (Morgan 1991c). Morgan (1991a) commented, “Most of the people evicted refused to go to the city's homeless shelters. Many simply packed their belongings in boxes and shopping carts and wandered off in the rain.

As early as the Dinkins Administration, it was recognized that police action to displace and disperse the visibility of crime and disorder negatively impacted homeless services providers. This narrative is illustrated in one story that discussed the impact of police crackdowns on prostitution and drugs. Service providers shared negative impacts this had particularly on young female prostitutes with drug problems seeking help and shelter (Nieves 1993). Social service providers further share that young women are faced with limited options, including jail or violence by their “pimps.” This response is situated in context of measures to
clear the visibility of homelessness, crime, and disorder in an “anywhere but here” method that forced homeless into jails, shelters, or in the case of young prostitutes, into the harmful and violent conditions they likely ran away from in the first place.

Issues of mental health, drug addiction, and lack of employment and social support called for partnership between police and social services, however, despite stories that shared the harms of police interaction. The police practices enable displacement from shelters and jail in order to improve quality of life for “everyone.” For example, Nieves (1993) commented on the potential for police partnership with social services to protect young runaway youth from prostitution, drugs, and pimps by strategies that did not include locking them up. The narrative emerged that police and social services partnerships could shift toward more sensitive interventions that sought to address problems of mental health and drug addiction by taking people to shelters (Morgan 1991c), “Meanwhile, we have homeless people with complex problems, including depression, alcohol and drug dependence, lack of family networks and lack of employment. The quality of life for everyone is going to get worse.”

Cases like Dansby’s reinforced the fear of the homeless, criminal other that NYC faced during the 1990s. Particularly, stories legitimated arguments that supported Dinkins’ crackdown on homeless and crime. Though rhetoric existed, that acknowledges the homeless as victims and offenders, both images reinforced practices and policies of increased control in order to effectively address crime and disorder overall. The mid 1990s, to which we now turn, is characterized by “Giuliani Time” for zero tolerance policing and arresting homeless (Smith 1998).
OPERATING ON “GIULIANI TIME”

The politicization of homelessness continued during the Giuliani Administration (1994-2001) as increased criminalization against the homeless and other measures to clean up NYC at times incited “political furor” (Bumiller 1999a). Politicization of homelessness occurred in two ways. First, Giuliani further cut financial support for S.R.Os however he did not completely dismantle them. Giuliani was forced to acknowledge that they provided management and containment that could not be replaced overnight and that their removal would not help the crime and disorder problems faced in the streets. Second, efforts to clean up the streets and shelters systems of NYC escalated to a “tough love” approach in arresting homeless in public spaces who resisted police coercion to go to shelters (Bumiller 1999a). Giuliani legitimated his policy calling the practice an “outreach policy” for shelters and service providers (Bumiller 1999b).

We start with the S.R.Os in his early administration. Giuliani supported a new vision of S.R.Os that contradicted previous rhetoric to completely dismantle the S.R.O system. The City and Giuliani’s Administration moved toward removing the presence of “decrepit commercial hotels” from the City that would be replaced by supported S.R.Os. Supported S.R.Os introduced management groups that provided health care and substance abuse services on site six days per week. During the mid 1990s, for example, NYT reported on how the state and federal government planned to provide employment and health services, including medication and management of the population who stayed in renovated Euclid Hall (Purnick 1995).

The political movement argued S.R.Os could exist if better managed and supported by city services, meanwhile providing housing demands that continued to exist. For example, Julie Sandorf, President of the Corporation for Supportive Housing, felt “united” with Mayor Giuliani,
as the Mayor supported recent efforts to renovate a welfare hotel that provided emergency housing with daily on site social services daily (Purnick 1995):

It is costing the city money ($11.5 million) and seems to be costing the Republican Mayor whatever support he had on the traditionally Democratic Upper West Side. But with the same stubbornness that makes him a perverse political figure, eager to take on everyone from the City Council to his own Police Commissioner, Mr. Giuliani is supporting the transformation of Euclid Hall into housing for the homeless and others in need with services on the premises.

Under this plan for S.R.Os, issues of crime and disorder would be addressed by private and non-profit management services at each location.

Neighborhoods and communities opposed the efforts, further reporting that Giuliani’s administration was not addressing the “middle class concerns” he had earlier promised to address. Communities remained “traumatized by a proliferation of ill-conceived shelters and programs that attracted crime and drugs” in previous years (Purnick 1995). However, Deputy Mayor Fran Reiter argued in support of the new plan to renovate old S.R.Os and turn them into supported S.R.Os where better management existed. Mr. Reiter argued (Purnick 1995), “I understand, neighborhoods are so disgusted they can't see the good from the bad. But some of the opposition is totally irrational, based on fear about the commercial S.R.Os, which are cesspools.”

The need for supported S.R.Os for housing went hand in hand with aggressive tactics to get the homeless off the streets and to lean up the shelters. Police were instrumental in Giuliani’s management policies. Stories illustrate an emphasis on police management practices. One uses arrest power and unexpectedly connects them to social services. First, is homeless arrest policies.
By the late 1990s, the Department of Homeless Services reported Giuliani’s Administration fully implemented arrest policies for sleeping on sidewalks and presence in public spaces (Herszenhorn 1999b). Police were tasked with homeless removal policies removed people from the street and “forced people in city shelters to work in exchange for their beds.” Giuliani’s practice offered a coercive ultimatum that forced the homeless into jails or shelters (Herszenhorn 1999b), out of public view. Anyone who attempted to sleep in the streets or parks would be subject to arrest (Herszenhorn 1999b).

There was a second way police were instrumental in Giuliani’s plan for homeless. Under Giuliani, the city implemented undercover task forces to seek and apprehend criminal, homeless others. Police forces comprised of “plain cloth[ed] officers and their supervisors to work the streets from vans” used to “persuade” the homeless to move to shelters (Dugger 1994). One article commented on police methods as an “altruistic initiative to help the homeless” pointed out that (Dugger 1994), “…Until now, the city has primarily relied on nonprofit social service agencies and city caseworkers, psychiatrists and psychologists to work with the street homeless, who are often reluctant to seek refuge in shelters because they regard them as dangerous.”

City officials stated the “prime motivation” to increasingly use police as a contact for homeless was to move people from the street to shelters because “it’s not safe on the streets” (Dugger 1994). Meanwhile advocates argued “police historically have hustled the homeless from sidewalk to park bench to subway tunnel” and that this is an extension of “the muscle of the Police Department to get the homeless out of public spaces” (Dugger 1994). Captain Jay Kopstein is reported as saying however, “the sidewalk is not a mattress” (Dugger 1994).

Another way to remove the image of homelessness and their image off the streets emerged in context of the budgetary cuts by advocating services provided outside of the city’s
services. Non-profit organizations emerged with a greater presence in stories during the 1990s as police explored the assistance of outreach and service workers. One example included partnership between police and Homeward Bound. Homeward Bound is an organization that assisted homeless immigrants. Police and city social services referred homeless immigrants to Homeward Bound, who in turn provided immigrants financial support to return home instead of sending them into NYC shelters system (Kirby 1999). The assistance provided was framed as a useful, necessary tool during city budget cuts in the late 1990s. More police presence was increasingly used to provide a point in contact between the homeless and the rest of society, including outreach workers. Such a connection assisted in making the city safer (McKinley 1990), according to local politics represented in the NYT.

RESISTING GIULIANI’S PRACTICES

Some New Yorkers resisted Giuliani’s seemingly caring and compassionate argument that favored partnership between police and social services, recognizing the partnerships that placed homeless families and youth under strict management and control of shelters and other organizations as problematic. Thus, a narrative emerged that continued to criticize the city’s authority and ability to respond to the homelessness problem. Media provided a space for the political debate about the controversial nature of Giuliani and his city management tactics. This is particularly illustrated in a story where homeless families in the shelter system were threatened by the Giuliani administration to work and meet all requirements or the city would intervene with child foster care services (Bernstein 1999). Child services would be called if the parent was not actively working, passing drug and alcohol screenings, and meeting curfews of the shelter system (Bernstein 1999).
Under scrutiny for practicing unethical treatment of the homeless, Giuliani’s Administration insisted those who were arrested committed crimes and were indeed criminals causing disruption (Herszenhorn 1999a). Mayor Giuliani defended aggressive efforts to remove the homeless from the streets, where he argued not all went to jail and that the effort led to “more than 500 people have been taken to shelters.” The Department of Homeless Services disputed Giuliani’s claims (Herszenhorn 1999b) and further argued the shelters were no longer filled each night (Bumiller 1999). Mary Brosnaban, the Executive Director of the Coalition for the Homeless (Herszenhorn 1999b) stated, “The numbers in the shelters have actually gone down. There is absolutely no evidence whatsoever that police are actually escorting homeless people to the shelters.”

During the 1990s, the NYT reported on lawsuits that were filed to challenge the recent increase in police sweeps. In one important story, police stated that the sweeps were non-threatening, non-discriminatory, and were legally justified. Lawsuits argued arrests are illegally made and Giuliani’s Administration has violated several First Amendment rights of New Yorkers (Sachs 1998). The continued disagreement over “management” techniques by Giuliani’s Administration are described as falling into “two broad categories” (Sachs 1998):

One concerns the Mayor’s attitude – vindictive, in the view of his critics – to dissent. The other focuses on the inevitable tension between a government trying to manage public spaces and people seeking to parade, protest, preach and pitch their wares on public property.

The story continued focusing on the harm these practices caused some groups and the difference from past practices. For example, it is reported that the crackdown on minor offenses, including occupation of public space, is justified in efforts of the Administration to control
public space, however this is taken too far when imposed on certain subpopulations experiencing homelessness. Further the story reports that though Mayors Ed Koch and David Dinkins faced the court for First Amendment violations in their eras, Mayor Giuliani has faced the court system more due to his overtly “aggressive and engaged” management techniques that impacted all homeless (Sachs 1998). In a different story, Giuliani’s Administration justified the management techniques as necessary to address threats to commuters and economic growth. Giuliani’s attitude is referred to as a largely problematic contributor to why New Yorkers responded differently to him compared to his similar predecessors (Herbert 1999).

By the late 1990s, Giuliani was hardly reported as a favorite by NYC residents. He was referred to as aggressive, controversial, and accepted by the public as “Rudy being Rudy” (Herbert 1999). He was termed a “cold and remote and unforgiving” personality in City Hall, where he surrounded City Hall with police stationed in barricades. Giuliani was also coined a political leader who was “brilliant” in his fight against crime, yet politically motivated in most aspects of his responses to areas such as homelessness. His arrest homeless policies were labeled “heartless and vindictive public-policy moves” motivated by the need for authority. One article described Giuliani’s policies (Herbert 1999):

This kind of [political] move, carefully and cruelly crafted by the Mayor, no longer astonishes anyone. When Mr. Giuliani acts reprehensibly, it is widely seen as no big deal, just ‘Rudy being Rudy.’ Only a nitwit or an out-of-towner could think that concern for the troubled individuals helped by the psychiatric center would stop this Mayor from shoving a homeless shelter in the face of the offending Councilman.

The Giuliani Administration is critiqued for “trying to gain political advantage at the expense of the homeless” by using quality of life policies and police practices to manage the
social problem through the legal system (Bernstein 1999). Politicians also commented on the politically motivated, aggressive image of Giuliani in his homelessness response. For example, in one article former Mayor Ed Koch commented that Mayor Giuliani’s goal is to “dehumanize and demonize” people across the board (Herbert 1999). Giuliani, however, reflected upon his personality, policies, and practices to the NYT in a sentiment that reveals he is less concerned with what people think of him as his main goals was to address concerns in the city. Giuliani stated there was significant “improvements” for the conditions faced in NYC and justified his actions as those of “compassion” and “help” (Bumiller 1999). Giuliani commented on his image to NYT reporters (Cooper 1998) where he stated, “I think I'm taking NYC into the next century in much better shape than I found it. If people like my personality, thank you. If you don't, I really don't care.”

Multiple narratives existed around whether or not Giuliani’s practices were humane. Community protestors questioned the policies by the Giuliani administration, with one Reverend Bob Cassels who accused “Mr. Giuliani of endorsing violence by the police against blacks and the mentally ill by raising the cases of Amadou Diallo in Harlem and Gidone Busch in Brooklyn” (Herszenhorn 1999b). Through these responses, an overarching narrative exists that criticizes the city for its overall responsibility in handling the homelessness and crime problems. Giuliani is celebrated in some regard, though rhetoric continued to criticize the city overall for the conditions of crime and disorder faced in shelters and on the streets.

ASSIGNING RESPONSIBILITY IN HOMELESSNESS RESPONSE

During the 1990s, reporters discussed the roles of Dinkins and Giuliani in responding to NYC’s homelessness and crime “crisis”. The crisis was identified as a “management crisis” that
impacted all of NYC during the 1990s. In context of declining resources, increased crime and violence, and the public sentiment that homelessness caused social problems, the management crisis called for increased measures of social exclusion. In the narrative that criticized the city for failing to responsibly find solutions to the social problem, the rhetoric turned to partnerships beyond city level figures to find solutions and radically overhaul the shelter system. The first was increased involvement with the state between Governor Mario Cuomo’s Administration and NYC Homeless Commission led by Andrew Cuomo [1990-1993]. The second sought community organizations and private companies to respond with services needed for the crime and disorder problems in the shelter system and on the streets. One article discussed the positive impact of privatized shelters in NYC as their staff is “trained specifically in areas of mental health, substance abuse and unemployment, while the city essentially relies on all-purpose case workers” (Holloway 1997).

First, Governor M. Cuomo and NYC Homeless Commissioner Andrew Cuomo, under the Dinkins Administration, worked to recommend a “sweeping overhaul of NYC's troubled shelter system, including rent subsidies to help the homeless pay for housing” (Dugger 1992). In providing rent vouchers, the city and state would significantly alter how government housing is provided to the homeless, while also moving away from single room occupancy hotels and an overcrowded shelter system. The commission, headed by Andrew Cuomo, offered more services, including partnership with drug treatment, mental illness treatment, and job training programs. Homeless found in the shelter system could enroll in the service treatment programs in order to qualify for permanent options made available by government. The NYT reported this as a partnership between states and local governments to “strengthen enforcement of eligibility requirements for getting shelter” and ensuring shelters are only temporary (Dugger 1992).
Additionally, Governor Cuomo directed state funding to NYC in order to build new shelters with such treatment services at new building sites.

A counter narrative existed that contested Governor Cuomo’s plans to build new shelter and temporary housing sites in neighborhoods. Reporters shared the neighborhood “fiercely contested” the building of the units near various “designated site[s].” Neighborhoods imposed a restraining order on developments until political leaders that considered the neighborhoods they would be built in provided “alternative designs, sizes and locations.” This restraining order was supported by the potential violation of state education law as the neighborhood proclaimed building the units would violate building “housing on land designated for educational purposes” (Feron 1990). Further, Cuomo’s proposal was criticized on grounds that the developers were “guilty of discrimination” by housing only mothers and young children in the units built. The dominant narrative appears to place responsibility on the City for not responding to homelessness in a caring or compassionate light. However, neighborhoods opposed shelters and hotels in their communities due to unsafe conditions continually faced. One reporter interviewed a homeless woman who shared, “shelters, where people sleep on cots in cavernous rooms, were dangerous and offered little privacy” (Morgan 1991). The politicization of homelessness in the 1990s marked a contentious topic that offered criticism of the government and demand to address the homelessness and crime problem. Community organizations decided to act and seek out non-profit and private organizations to assist in control of the streets in their neighborhoods.

COMMUNITY EFFORTS TO ORGANIZE RESPONSE

Community organizations also responded to social problems while governments debated proposals for solutions. This is particularly illustrated in the reports on the organized community
civic league, Before Another Shelter Tears Us Apart (BASTA). BASTA is one civic league that openly advocated for affordable housing in order to minimize the impact of the shelter system on neighborhood crime and disorder. The group organized during the 1980s to “oppose further proliferation of shelters in the neighborhood” and to provide options that sought to break up congregations of homeless in hotels (Roberts 1990a, 1990b). BASTA described communities with shelters as places where, “hundreds of people [used] the neighborhood as a campus, and this drew all the other undesirables” into the Lower East Side of Manhattan. The undesirables are constructed as those who comprised the “41 percent of all drug arrests” that occurred in this section of Manhattan as those arrested “were individuals who gave their address as the Third Street Shelter” (Roberts 1990a). Rhetoric indicated the city did not provide safety and security, therefore the organization mobilized to provide this from within the neighborhood.

As reported, BASTA was involved in addressing the crime and disorder problem in the neighborhood in two noted ways. First, BASTA began to videotape the streetscape of NYC, where one could see “a vista of enemy campfires at night” and “hundreds of crack pipes” lit in NYC streets at this particular site. Second, BASTA actively engaged the community to better services provided. This is illustrated in stories where BASTA advocated the nonprofit social service organization operated by Manhattan Bowery Corporation. Manhattan Bowery Corporation provided alcoholics and drug addicts with residential treatment programs, and community organizations like BASTA sought hope and success through incorporating Manhattan Bowery Corporation in the shelter’s programming. BASTA “condemn[ed] warehousing of homeless people and advocate[d] affordable housing,” further stating “this is still a pretty liberal neighborhood. We did not call for closing the Third Street shelter, but converting
it with programs that actually did something and run by someone other than the city” (Roberts 1990a). Roberts (1990a) reported:

…failures of the city's welfare bureaucracy in its own lower Manhattan backyard -- including lingering concerns about rats being drawn to the Third Street kitchen operated by the Human Resources Administration -- justified fears in other neighborhoods where similar projects were being proposed.

The narrative existed then that the city had failed in its response to social problems during the 1990s. The local movement by BASTA to monitor their own streets and by organizations such as the Manhattan Bowery Corporation is respected in an emergent narrative.

In another story, we learn more about Manhattan Bowery Corporation. Manhattan Bowery Corporation was considered successful for their “set up [of] rigorous substance abuse recovery program[s]” in NYC shelter system. As politicians moved forward with partnerships to provide more of these solutions, the NYT reports that the community commend Manhattan Bowery for the structure the city failed to achieve. Homeless addicts found success in use of the Manhattan Bowery Corporation programs as they “progress” from detoxification to “education or vocational training, placement in permanent housing, perhaps a job in a nonprofit business - demolition, street cleaning, private security” (Anderson 1991). Emphasis on jobs came out in stories about Manhattan Bowery Corporation. Specifically, it is one organization that existed in part of a movement to provide homeless with jobs through use of the shelter system. One article reported practices of private companies and hotels to recruit transient populations from shelters and the streets. Companies included the Concord and Catskills who employed temporary and transient workers to provide low-skilled jobs for minimum wage, ultimately workers who were
seeking an “escape” from poverty through drug use and temporary work (Wolff 1991; Hernandez 1994).

IMAGE OF THE HOMELESS OTHER

As in the other decades, an image of the homeless is constructed found within articles that discuss other topics. During the 1990s, we see the homeless subject constructed in connected to narratives within the context of housing and crime. Stories of homeless subjects are used to further define certain homeless groups and define who is deserving of resources. Narratives also emerge that indicate services are needed for drug addicted and mentally ill homeless. Additionally, we see narratives emerge that advocate alternative options for families, children, and women who are victim to the homeless criminal other. However stories of the homeless other which are not connect to topics focused on in other articles further illustrate the need for safety and security in shelters in order to address the homelessness and crime problems. First, we begin with constructing the homeless mentally ill other. Second, we move to the homeless as victim and offender.

First, one image that emerges is concerned with mental illness and housing availability. These stories illustrated once again that homelessness is blurred with other issues such as mental illness and addiction. Following deinstitutionalization of mental health facilities, mental illness became a concern in the city and is cited by the NYT for issues of crime and disorder during the 1980s and into the 1990s. Increased resources and raised awareness is brought to political forefront for this segment of the population as the homeless mentally ill other needed prioritized services and management in order to address the crime and disorder caused by deinstitutionalization (NYT 1992). Importantly, these stories work to construct a homeless other
who is incapable of caring for oneself and who needs state intervention. The homeless mentally ill other is framed as responsible for crime and disorder on the streets, therefore prioritizing this as a social concern that needs state intervention worked to further forms of management through services.

During the 1990s, the reports discussed mental illness as a reason why New York faced issues of crime and disorder. However, others challenged the connection choosing the focus on housing (Dulhane 1990):

…the loss of single room occupancy housing, or S.R.Os, has had a serious effect on the numbers of people living on the streets and in shelters. Mental health research on the homeless confirms that this housing shortage is more critical than ‘deinstitutionalization’ and other mental health problems among the homeless.

Dulhane (1990) argued that the mentally ill are only a portion of the overall population who experienced homelessness. The “real impact of lost S.R.Os on homelessness is that when a new segment of people became residentially unstable in the 1980's, they did not have this stock of cheap rooms to fall back on” (Dulhane 1990). Housing and mental illness are factors heavily considered, however a more holistic vision is needed in order to address NYC’s homelessness problem (Dulhane 1990):

What might have been hidden in the old problem of skid row homelessness became a new problem of emergency shelter homelessness. That most of the homeless are young adults, not mentally ill and have never lived in S.R.O housing suggests wider causes of the homeless problem and more ambitious solutions than increasing the number of S.R.O units.
A second narrative found is related to homelessness beyond the city itself. The narratives first recognize that most people do not see homelessness as a problem beyond the city (Henson 1990):

…most folks picture the homeless the television news loves to show us: those ragged, dirty bag ladies and bums who are passed out from exhaustion on benches in Grand Central Terminal or in the tunnels of the NYC subways. Most folks think of the homeless as a ‘big city’ population because of these portrayals.

In this story, homelessness is framed as a problem that extends beyond Manhattan to impact surrounding boroughs. Awareness is raised about the problem of homelessness in surrounding boroughs. Below we see this described (Henson 1990):

The homeless are not white or black, or yellow or red - they are gray, gray, gray. Sick and tired of being sick and tired, they all have a gray, homeless pallor… Like a gray plague, the homeless population in America is growing and growing, moving out of the cities and into all the towns, villages and hamlets.

The image of homelessness as a crime and disorder problem included a range of those who are young, families, and women. Despite the range of conditions and subpopulations portrayed in the NYT, one article described a shelter outside the city limits as it provided for NYC’s displaced homeless. The story described the homeless there as a “gray plague” of people that sought “relief from the crime, drugs and hopelessness spawned in the city's tenements” (Henson 1990).

A significant location just outside the city limits emerged over the decades in Westchester. Westchester is a particular location that often provided for the needs of many NYC’s homeless. One youth shelter in Westchester received positive attention for being
considered a “safer” shelter where homeless from the inner city could find refuge. It was reported that such “unfortunates” included those across race, class, age, mental health, and other various characteristics and life circumstances. Groups identified included: “homeless teens having babies”; “23 percent were found to abuse drugs and 17 percent had an alcohol addiction” though “all [were] not junkies”; those who “[carried] the AIDS virus” (Roberts 1990b), and “some of the homeless [were] old with no one to care about them.” The older homeless were identified as “old timers” and were identified as those who had been “drinking and homeless for years, dressed in layers of filthy rags no matter what the temperature outside”, often on the verge of death “if they stopped drinking at this late date” (Henson 1990). Physical health issues such as chronic liver disease, dermatitis, arthritis, etc. are reported ailments faced by NYC homeless. The fragility and health are emphasized as such homeless are identified as “victims of circumstance” (Henson 1990):

Some of the elderly homeless lived and worked prosperous and productive lives, but are no longer able to care for themselves and have no family or friends willing to take on the responsibility. Many are true victims of circumstance - like the 70-year-old woman who had always worked and led a dignified life, only to lose everything she held dear in this world to a tragic fire. The day she arrived at the shelter she had lost her heart medication in the fire and, because the shelter was low on linens, she slept on a dirty, bare mattress.

Despite the differences that comprised the homeless population, all homeless shared one commonality in mediated images: “all have the gray pallor. All are … bewildered.” Reporters shared stories of veterans and youth who stated they were “messed up”, “lonely”, “need[ed] someone to love” them. Meanwhile they expressed the “terrified” experiences of the shelter system, specifically how they are “terrified of the other people in the shelter” (Henson 1990):
Some of our homeless are those being released from prisons. Some are revolving-door criminals, whose periods of homelessness led to incarceration and who are released back into homelessness. Others of our newly homeless are being released from prison after years of incarceration for violent crimes. They are hardened, bitter and have trouble adjusting. They are not being sent into a world of freedom, but into the incarceration of homelessness.

Finally, we see in stories a clear distinction emerge between the homeless “victim of circumstance” and the homeless criminal other. For example, in the case of Paris Drake, 31, a “panhandler” arrested in a recent “brick attack” that killed a young woman in Midtown Manhattan (Forero and Blair 1999). According to reports, “New Yorkers assumed assailant would turn out to be someone who had been heeding inner demons for years, bouncing among city shelters, jails, mental wards and the streets” (Bernstein 1999). Another article further discussed police actions (Forero and Blair 1999):

The highly publicized attack immediately led to speculation by the police that a person who was homeless and possibly mentally ill was responsible, and three days later, Mayor Rudolph VCOPS. Giuliani's administration announced that the homeless had no right to sleep on city streets and would face arrest for refusing shelter. The police have arrested more than 100 homeless people since the measure was announced.

Officials from the Mayor’s office and the Coalition for the Homeless disagreed on Mr. Drake’s identity. Although Drake is a “longtime petty criminal and crack user” he had “no known history of psychiatric treatment” and no history was found in the homeless shelter system (Bernstein 1999). Mary Brosnahan, director of the Coalition for the Homeless, was “offended that anyone would depict Mr. Drake as representative of homeless people” (Bernstein 1999).
The man didn't have an address. He was living at the Port Authority bus depot and panhandling. He fits every description of homelessness. The fact is... he was homeless. He’s a thug’, she said, pointing out that three weeks before the woman, Nicole Barrett, was hit with a brick, Mr. Drake was arrested and accused of mugging a homeless person. Homeless people are far more likely to be preyed upon than to prey upon others.

CONCLUDING A DINKINS AND GIULIANI ERA

Defining homelessness is politically charged in New York these days. A word used 20 years ago to evoke compassion for the poor is increasingly accepted as shorthand for a grab bag of undesirables, the deranged, disheveled, or destitute. Yet the same word applies to the largely unseen women and children who make up almost two-thirds of homeless shelter residents in NYC (Bernstein 1999). As the 1990s end, we see a constructed image of homelessness that recognizes diverse groups make up the homeless and each have different needs. Yet, the overarching narrative seeks to manage and control homelessness in ways that assist NYC in ending their crime and disorder problems. One does not need to go far to see rhetoric that indicated safety and security including tightened management strategies of the homeless are tightly bound to notions of care and concern. This is illustrated in the ways we talk about different subpopulations of homeless.

Several themes appeared in context of homelessness and crime found in the NYT during the 1990s that furthered boundaries of the prioritized homeless subject and shaped responses. The presence of public officials and authoritative figures is noted. Specifically, the political climate called for shifts from welfare hotels to other forms of housing and shelters. Mayors David Dinkins and Rudy Giuliani are among political leaders and authorities discussed in the
homelessness crisis faced during this decade. Scholars often link Giuliani’s tough on crime policies with controlling the visibility of homelessness on the streets. While this is certainly true, Mayor Dinkins’ Administration is discussed in the *NYT* for practicing increased controls in the streets and shelter systems that disproportionately impacted the homeless. In fact, at the beginning of Giuliani’s term, the *NYT* indicated partnerships and unity advocated between the Administration and social services. However, by the end of the 1990s, conflict over whether Giuliani had responded to the crime and disorder problem without violating the rights of homeless citizens is heavily debated. The power of police expanded controls against the unknown criminal homeless other was demanded.

In this decade, reporters discussed NYC and public officials struggle to address homelessness, crime, and disorder. In discussions of homelessness and crime, politicians and the public increased attention paid to the police role in responding to homelessness. While some articles advocated the police role in serving as both service members and social service providers, others critiqued and even protested the use of policing in responding to homelessness. Such ideas simultaneously exist, however the imagery of homelessness, as a population that requires structure – yet not too much structure, control and punishment – yet not too much control and punishment - is reproduced throughout this decade. The need for police power and governance in housing and on the streets is found in early years of this decade, as Dinkins battled the need to make dangerous shelters and streets safer. Meanwhile, the image of a dangerous shelter and subway system perpetuated ideas surrounding increased criminal justice response, particularly of police. The discussion of homelessness and crime becomes less about housing and more about defining the police role around responding to homelessness.
The politics toward minimizing visibility of homelessness on the streets are situated in the politics of crime and disorder. In a number of cases, the seemingly “random” victimization of homeless, and more so the “random” victimization of citizens by the homeless, are used to justify and legitimate the “muscle” of policing found in quality of life practices by city officials, particularly the Mayor’s administration. Protest and opposition occur, however rhetoric also indicated a sense of management and control of homelessness through the policing, and charging police with connecting homeless to housing and shelters. The image of the homeless other, as victim of crime and disorder or offenders, works to expand rhetoric toward increased control of populations across urban landscape.
CHAPTER VII
SECURITIZING STREETS AND SHELTERS IN THE 2000s

Following the peak in crime rates during the early 1990s, NYC continued to experience declining crime rates into the 2000s. Other social problems however did not decline. Overall, NYC experienced instability in terms of employment and a steady loss in affordable and supportive housing under Mayor Bloomberg’s [2002-2013] administration. Though crime rates were declining, Mayor Bloomberg’s term is marked by continued criticism of indicators of poverty and homelessness as numbers reached the highest NYC had witnessed in several decades.

The decade with the most articles analyzed was 2000-2012 (N=572). Significant stories of the homeless subject as deviant and criminal other worked to further politicize homelessness as city practices increased surveillance and safety across NYC streets and shelters. Mayors David Dinkins [1990-1993] and Rudy Giuliani [1994-2001] played a key role in politicizing homelessness and crime in the 1990s, which continued as Mayor Michael Bloomberg’s [2002-2013] administration continued welfare retrenchment and criminal justice expansion. Parameters for this chapter included those identical to the general study (i.e., in the NYT, in NYC, specific to the topic) from 2000-2012. Whereas the 1990s witnessed dominant emergent themes centered on expansion of policing and crime control practices (42-43%), discussions that constructed the image of homelessness (55%) dominated the narratives for the 2000s. Next, housing (41%) and neighborhoods (35%) were emergent narratives during this decade. Approximately, 28% of the articles discussed the expansion of crime controls and policing across streets and shelters. Politicians appear in 19% of the sample during this decade.
Construction of homelessness appears as the dominant theme throughout the articles analyzed (55%). This is found both within articles that describe homelessness through descriptors of homeless subjects in addition to articles that are solely focused on describing the homeless subject through its conditions. During the 2000s, we see continued focus on defining different homeless subjects. Particularly, we see articles focused on homeless sex offenders following coverage of a few criminal cases where the offender has sex offense history and a homelessness or shelter history.

Situated in relation to broader goals that discuss housing and policing urban space in order to provide safety and security, we see the fear of the criminal other, particularly in the shelter system, work to further measures of increased controls and tightened security. These are identified as narratives that further politics of governing through crime technologies and mechanisms of power. The imagery of homelessness is conflated to crime and disorder faced in neighborhoods in discourse that further promotes ways to control and manages the population. Technologies and mechanisms of power emerged through discussions focused in the neighborhood that advocated increased management and crime control in order to better police spaces occupied by homeless within the shelter and housing system. Ultimately, we see tightening of security, an increase in oversight and screening, and social exclusion practices advocated to further differentiate those who deserve care and compassion, and those who do not.

In the sample from the *NYT* during the 2000s we continued to witness the politicization of homelessness management as the community dissatisfaction with the City’s response to homelessness continues. The conflicted and complicated sentiments between homelessness and crime that were constructed in previous decades continue to influence NYC urban policy during Mayor Michael Bloomberg’s Administration (2002-2013). Housing the homeless, with attention
paid to specific subpopulations, and policing visibility of crime and disorder through control implemented in housing and social services, persisted as themes.

A dominant narrative emerges in the chapter that is focused on housing sex offenders and providing security through surveillance in existing shelter systems. Our gaze is drawn to the homeless sex offender other. Political and public attention discussed neighborhood concerns for protection against homeless sex offenders. Publicly framing this as a safety and security issue furthered political actions, including budgets, that provided increased surveillance measures in NYC shelters. Rhetoric continued to focus on issues of crime and violence in NYC neighborhoods, where homeless were subject to increased surveillance and control. Particular attention in the NYT is also paid to rhetoric surrounding continued protection for homeless children, families, and veterans from crime and disorder through separate services. We begin with understanding the housing and shelter crisis faced by Mayor Bloomberg’s administration, as it is the most dominant theme (40%) next to constructing the image of homelessness (55%).

THE POLITICS OF HOUSING AND SHELTERS IN A BLOOMBERG ERA

During the early 2000s, Mayor Michael Bloomberg (2002-2013) shifted focus to issues of safety and security provided in housing and shelters for the homeless, while extending Giuliani’s “tough on crime” approach in NYC streets (Bernstein 2002). In particular, as will be seen, following the September 11th attacks in 2001, Mayor Bloomberg implemented new strategies for increasing safety and security in NYC. Rhetoric advocated increased surveillance across NYC generally. However, here we see how this rhetoric is applied to the important homelessness concern of housing and sheltering marginalized population. Mayor Bloomberg’s administration practices of security through surveillance included police evaluation of data.
collection and monitoring found in the housing and shelter system. At the same time, fears of the foreign, terrorist other spread throughout the United States. Unsurprisingly, this impacted discourse surrounding homelessness and crime, as articles emerged that discussed the need for NYC to tighten controls and surveillance in shelters, on the streets, and in social service programs, all of which furthered “get tough” approach to crime.

In terms of safety and security in the shelters, articles early in the decade show that police, city officials, and the Department of Homeless Services (DHS) advocated securitizing shelters. Securitizing shelters is important in order to provide safety and security in three ways: expanding data collection strategies similar to crime and justice techniques used by NYPD, providing increased security personnel, and tightening the screening processes in all areas of housing and shelter system. First, the use of police and data collection is argued as necessary to make the shelters “safer” (Fries 2002). DHS and police were instructed to collect crime data and evaluate security in 7 DHS operated shelters out of the 44 shelters for single adults in NYC. For example, one story reported that Mayor Bloomberg assigned Police Commissioner Raymond W. Kelly to “assess the state of safety in city-run shelters, seeking both to evaluate security within shelters” and to “address the longtime perception among some homeless who believe that the streets are safer places to sleep” (Fries 2002). In turn, Police Commissioner Kelly ordered borough commanders to “survey shelters throughout the city, talk with program directors and, from those interviews, decide what role the department should have in addressing safety questions at shelters” (Fries 2002). In addition, Mayor Bloomberg and NYPD Commissioner Kelly increased statistics tracking practices in order to “examine crime in homeless shelters as part of the Compstat tracking system” (Fries 2002).
NYC Department of Homeless Services faced pressure to track crime statistics in the shelters and to collect client level data on who is coming and going from the shelter system. This pressure is illustrated in reports that discussed a lack of safety and rampant crime in the shelters. For example, a popular men’s shelter in Manhattan, which served 19,915 men in 2001, reported “10 felonies: four assaults -- all against uniformed Department of Homeless Services peace officers -- five drug offenses and one robbery. Misdemeanors, including lesser assaults and drug-related incidents, averaged two or three each month” (Bernstein 2002). This is discussed in context of how these numbers did not reflect the daily crime problems in the shelter system due to poor crime tracking options available to shelter staff.

The introduction of police crime mapping is connected to the Giuliani administration (Lipton 2000) and continued into Bloomberg’s administration. A crime mapping system traditionally used to monitor serious crimes like robbery, rape and murder, is introduced into the shelter system in order to track crimes across NYC shelters. NYPD were tasked with tracking complaints about minor disturbances such as loud music to graffiti, public drinking, prostitution, panhandling and homelessness using the mapping system across the city. Giuliani and Bloomberg expanded this to include monitoring crime in the shelter system in order to enable police to “move quickly and aggressively…counter any trends” that need police attention (Lipton 2000). The focus here is that the crime and disorder problem is a primary concern across the entire city, and we see it illustrated in stories that share the impact of expanded criminal justice technologies to monitor, control, and provide surveillance of marginalized populations.

Robert Mascali, acting first deputy of homeless services, furthered the narrative advocated to control crime in shelters (Fries 2002) by stating, “We made security a priority and
we made this investment. Of course, anything can be improved upon, and any additional security would be welcomed.”

In addition to data collection and monitoring, articles discussed increased budgets to provide more security devices, increased number of public police officers, increased lighting, and intensive screening processes in order to address safety concerns in shelters (Fries 2002). Other narratives emerged that discussed how to provide more security and safety changes to physical structures of the shelters and increased professionals or safety personnel on shelter sites is the solution.

However, the overarching discourse advocates needs for increased security and professionalization, the ways to achieve this were not always agreed upon. For example, a theme emerged around the role of personnel in shelter for the purpose of security. By this time shelters already had unarmed security guards and some supported the practice to hire more security guards. However, the effectiveness of unarmed security guards was not the solution to the problem (Fries 2002). Fries (2002) wrote, “…an armed police officer would be more effective than private security in controlling large shelters.” Stories of violence and drugs worked to encourage support for the use of armed and trained, professional police. This was reinforced by homeless shelter resident, Peter Engler, 23, who shared with NYT reporter Jacob Fries (2002), who stated, “You can bring drugs in here, you can bring weapons in here, anything you want. No one does anything. The N.Y.P.D., that's what I'd like to see in here.” This is further illustrated in another article that discussed frequent calls by security guards and shelter staff for police to respond to crimes reported at the shelter (Kilgannon 2002).

Another narrative counter to this emerged that discussed the potential conflict faced in an already “tense” shelter system if armed police were regularly present. This is illustrated in a story
which garnered attention about a 70 year old man arrested from his shelter bed at midnight and held in a cell until could see a judge the following day. His arrest was the result of a night raid. While rhetoric expressed concern that “abuse” had taken place in recent police night raids of the shelter system existed, the night raids were justified as necessary. The police were serving outstanding warrants for recent criminal acts linked to other more violent crimes.

Despite hesitations over having police in the shelters, the dominant narrative tended to reproduce fear of the homeless other shared in the community and within the homeless population. Ultimately, the need for safety and security that comes from using police in the shelter system overshadowed the potential negative interactions that could occur. This is illustrated by one homeless shelter resident, Dawn Witter, 45, who shared with Fries (2002), “You got to have friends, you got to be careful. You don't know where these people are coming from. Sometimes people come in from prison and they walk around bullying people. You have to watch your back.”

Not just NYPD securitized the shelters though. During the late 1990s and early 2000s, NYC began to significantly increase the number of professional police security into the shelter system, particularly those employed and trained directly under the Department of Homeless Services (DHS) and partnership with NYPD training facilities. By 2002, the number of DHS Police quadrupled. Their numbers continued to grow throughout the 2000s. Though officers had been present at various shelters in the past across NYC, then the number of trained and employed professional security officers significantly increased during the early 2000s. Partnerships were used to better provide expansion of criminal justice personnel between welfare services, such as housing and the shelter system, with police training programs. This is illustrated by the training partnership provided between Department of Homeless Services and John Jay College of
Criminal Justice (JJCCJ) in Manhattan. Here, we see the mission of the DHS Police clearly stated in part of the narrative to expand police services in order to provide security, safety, and surveillance (JJCCJ 2016), “DHS Police are charged with protecting the most vulnerable people in our society, the homeless. They are tasked with providing security services for all NYC shelters and other facilities under the Department of Homeless Services.”

Alongside security devices and security staff such as NYPD and DHS Police, housing and shelter practices included increased screening and tightened eligibility requirements applied to families, children, and veterans (Secret 2011). Like other practices, screening and eligibility connects to Bloomberg’s desire to remain tough on crime. For example, in 2007, a program called Advantage was started in order to “help people in shelters afford their own apartments, provided they work or take part in job training” (Secret 2011). Rent subsidies were provided to those who passed screening in the shelter system and targeted issues surrounding those who stayed in the shelter system too long. Bloomberg did not “tolerate” homeless people in the streets and did not tolerate “dangerous shelters or lack of beds for people to sleep in” (Bernstein 2002). Bloomberg continued efforts to control the shelter system including screening through technologies of the criminal justice system throughout the decade.

HOUSING HOMELESS FAMILIES AND VETERANS

As Bloomberg continued efforts to control crime and disorder in the shelters, he also implemented practices that were less overt in their crime control agendas, and included rhetoric that advocated providing safety and security for veterans, families, and youth. Here, we see certain sub groups of the homeless population were often distanced from the image of the homeless criminal other and received priority in housing and social services provided by the city
and state; so long as they met requirements in being orderly and non-problematic to shelter staff and the neighborhood. This priority, however, often included increased control through tightened restrictions and supervision. Rules were enforced strictly and resulted in evictions from shelter and housing programs if not followed.

This is illustrated in stories around the non-profit organization, Westhab. Westhab opened for homeless families, youth, and veterans during the 2000s (Brenner 2007). In terms of veterans, the need for veteran homeless services in Westchester and NYC was considered a priority as veterans returned home from Iraq and Afghanistan (Brenner 2007). Robert Sanborn, Westhab Vice President for Real Estate, commented (Brenner, 2007), “The need for housing for homeless veterans has always been there, but until recently, homeless families and singles demanded most of our attention.”

As veteran homelessness became a priority, services focused on required screening of veterans in the shelter system and providing intense treatment program services for mental health and alcohol and substance abuse. A court case involving Brooklyn Manor received attention as it sheltered veterans with disabilities and mental illnesses without, it was reported, providing proper screening and services to follow (Kaufman, 2004).

Lawyers and others who monitor the city's homeless population and the state's system of adult homes say that many of the men were transferred to Brooklyn Manor without being properly evaluated by either the shelter or the home and often without giving their full consent. They worry that the placements reflect shortfalls in the city's ability, at a time of near-record numbers of homeless, to ensure that those in the shelters are being sent to the most appropriate settings as they seek permanent housing.
Here, we see continued rhetoric that questions the city’s ability to address homelessness and crime issues. Responsibility and accountability are challenged as the community pushes for solutions to the problem for certain groups, particularly veterans, families, and children that need care and compassion from public services, so long as they comply with the rules and regulations put in place to counter crime and disorder.

Care and control work to provide governance of homelessness and crime through less overt connections to other policing strategies. Within prioritized and “vulnerable” populations, the care and compassion only goes so far and certainly does not exist without mechanisms of control that expand overall goals of homelessness management. The overarching theme that further connects care with control and criminalization faced in the shelter system is the narrative that criticizes the city for its ability to carry out any of these functions.

This is particularly illustrated when attention is drawn to an overcrowded NYC Emergency Assistance Unit. As reported, children and families slept on the floors of this temporary shelter unit. The floors were overcrowded and described as symbolic of Mayor Bloomberg’s homelessness crisis. Carmen Garcia, 37, an unemployed mother of four shared (Steinhauer 2002) said, “I never saw anything like it in my life: babies lying on the floor, even newborns. We filled out the papers. They told us to wait and we waited.”

In order to address concerns with lack of temporary shelter availability, Mayor Bloomberg and the Department of Homeless Services opened a temporary shelter in an old jail in the Bronx. This further articulates the desperate times faced by NYC homeless service providers, from children sleeping on the floors of the Emergency Assistance Unit to being forced to sleep in former jails. The public resented the idea of “children sleeping on prison cots, just beyond a wall of razor wire and among strangers” and it certainly “underscores how few good solutions there
are to the city’s homeless problem” (Steinhauer 2002). Department of Homeless Services commissioner Linda Gibbs faced court for failing to provide beds for the city’s homeless following reporting on the Emergency Assistance Unit’s conditions. Meanwhile Bloomberg used the conditions he and DHS faced as a platform for increased focus on housing for families, stating “housing cures homelessness for families” (Secret 2011).

Despite Mayor Bloomberg’s rhetoric and a newly announced five-year plan to reduce homelessness, the number of families who faced homelessness reached the highest it had been since 1982 (Kaufman 2007). Steven Banks, attorney in chief of the Legal Aid Society, attributed this crisis to mismanagement of the Bloomberg Administration, and administrations prior, that focused on shelters. Banks stated (Kaufman 2007):

Homelessness is a horrible symbol of a failure of a whole broad range of government policies. Unfortunately, just announcing a series of programs that treat the most visible manifestation of the problem without getting to the root still leaves the children and adults we represent in desperate circumstances.

Another example illustrated the lack of faith the community and homeless advocates had in the Bloomberg administration to respond to homelessness. In July 2006, NYC Department of Homeless Services was forced to use the much resisted hotel system in order to provide shelter and accommodations to rising number of homeless families. This occurred at Westway Motel. In the past, Westway housed a variety of transient populations that the community did not have issues with in their given time. Including “tens of thousands of refugees from around the world”, “deaf Mexican immigrants laboring in slave like conditions”, families who were displaced from collapsed buildings in other areas of NYC and those displaced by Hurricane Katrina.
By 2006, though, the community was resisting the placement of homeless there. President of the local civic associated called the hotel a “festering sore” (Brady 2007). DHS and others providing services critiqued the claims by residents, stating the crime wave began long before the homeless were housed in the hotel starting (Brady 2007). Perhaps what changed the community sentiment was the lack of faith in the ability of the city to manage homelessness, particularly under the assumption that NYC homeless caused a “crime wave.”

HOUSING SEX OFFENDERS

During the 2000s, we see rhetoric expressing compassion and care, however we also see this work to socially exclude the homeless criminal other from the homeless other deserving of social services and compassion strategies. This divide became more apparent as increased discussion on security and safety from sex offenders characterized the 2000s. It is at this time that sex offenders appeared as a new “problem” population among the homeless. This is illustrated in three stories around housing and providing surveillance of sex offenders. Here, we see housing sex offenders become a politicized concern during elections of various government officials. The narrative is further politicized by the murder of a woman by a formerly homeless man with a sex offense history. The murder also garnered attention because it was ruled a hate crime, motivated by racial tensions.

The general political discussion emphasized the necessity of 24-hour surveillance at shelters that house sex offenders and a location away from neighborhoods in order to ensure safety and security. Stories illustrating this narrative take place in three neighborhoods that are debated as potential shelter locations for NYC’s homeless sex offender population. The narrative
discusses housing the homeless in Suffolk, in Manhattan, and outside NYC city limits in Westchester.

First, during the 2000s, officials announced the relocation of an 850-bed men’s shelter from Manhattan to Brooklyn. Bellevue psychiatric hospital had served as an intake for homeless, returning offenders, and those released from mental health institutions since the 1980s. At the time, the city announced to move in order to replace the building with an upscale hotel and business properties. It was also sited for housing a majority of NYC’s registered sex offenders (Chan 2008). The neighborhood was relieved to move shelter away from Manhattan and the efforts to build a positive image of NYC.

A second story about sex offenders who are homeless is found in New York's Suffolk County, near Long Island. Here, state officials housed “sex offenders in trailers” that were “moved regularly around the county, parked for several weeks at a time on public land away from residential areas” as they enforced “stiff curfews” (Kilgannon 2007). This practice is referred to as the “trailer method.” City officials commented on the motivation for housing the homeless using the “trailer method.” Greg Blass, chief deputy commissioner of the Department of Human Services stated “the county avoids having to burden any single neighborhood with a permanent shelter for them.” The trailers move one to three times every one to two weeks to an “undisclosed spot” away from “schools, churches, day care centers or nursing homes” and avoid the “large clusters of sex offenders amassed in certain neighborhoods” (Kilgannon 2007). Greg Blass also stated the motivation to conduct the trailer method was to “make trailer living Spartan enough to motivate the offenders to seek permanent housing” and he further stated “we don't want to become a haven…It’s intended to be temporary” (Kilgannon 2007).
Officials saw this method as justified and legitimate in order to consider neighborhood safety and to avoid risk of people using the shelter for long term instead of temporary care. There were reports of some criticism. This practice was criticized as a “stopgap solution that only makes reintegration impossible” according to a psychiatry professor at Columbia University (Kilgannon 2007). Nonetheless, the trailer method was practiced in NYC amidst fear of the homeless sex offender other.

A third and final story involved Westchester County where politicians, such as Andrew Spano and opposing candidate Robert Astorino, debated policies and practices to address public concern over housing homeless sex offenders. At the time, Westchester County Executive Andrew Spano (1998-2010) announced plans to move a men’s homeless shelter from Camp La Guardia to a more residential area, near a jail, psychiatric facilities and a children’s hospital. Camp La Guardia had long provided NYC’s homeless population with shelter. Shortly after Spano’s announcement, he called it an “embarrassment” after opposing candidate Robert Astorino pointed out the number of homeless sex offenders at the location (Foderaro and O’Connor 2005). Robert Astorino claimed that if elected he would oppose moving the shelter due to the “threat and danger” of level 3 sex offenders that stayed at the 58-bed men’s homeless shelter (NYT 2005). Astorino noted level 3 offenders fall under “law enforcement classification for the likeliest repeat offenders” (NYT 2005). Residents protested, as the State proposed plans to house “child molesters” in a family neighborhood once it shutdown Camp La Guardia (NYT 2005). Westchester residents claimed the city wanted to “chase the homeless” from one place to another and they protested their home as another “dumping ground” for the city (West, 2005). Spano argued the proposal meant to bring people closer to services and to integrate more into the
community, however the question of what to do with the homeless sex offender in the NYC shelter system overshadowed moving the men’s shelter that had existed since 1934.

This story continues when Tim O’Leary, lead organizer of the group “No Way,” protested the shelter being shut down and relocated. His organization was supported by the Astorino campaign, among other republican affiliations. Sue Swanson, Republican, and former county legislator, wrote in an email (NYT 2005), “They put consolidation and budgetary considerations above the safety of Westchester residents… The county should keep the airport shelter open, where there's no threat of any Level 3 sex offenders in our neighborhoods and near children's facilities.”

Spano claimed the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) requested the shelter to move, however the FAA shared with reporters they did not request this (O’Connor 2005). Spano soon dedicated increased funding to the surveillance of convicted sex offenders at the Westchester Airport Shelter (O’Connor 2005). Spano’s “damage control” policy would track “all sex offenders who are sentenced to probation with global positioning technology”. This surveillance was “used in at least two dozen states and can alert officers within minutes to an offender's proximity to a school or playground” (Foderaro 2005). Political debate between Spano and Astorino politicized homelessness.

Connected to Westchester, increased surveillance of sex offenders was also pressured by the June 2005 death of Concetta Russo Camero, 56. The suspect, Philip Grant, a 43-year-old homeless man with a sex crime history, attacked the woman, Concetta Russo-Carriero, a 56-year-old receptionist at a White Plains law firm in a parking garage. Though no sexual violation was reported, Grant’s 1980 conviction as a Level 3 sex offender, referred to as “the most dangerous” type of sex offender, was reported. Grant was convicted of a first-degree rape in the
Bronx (Foderaro 2005). Timothy O’Leary, founder of a local organization against the new planned shelter called “No Way,” commented on the murder (Foderaro and O’Connor 2005), “This is the nightmare scenario that we’ve feared all along. Our assertion has been that placing the most dangerous people in the county system in this new location at Grasslands is irresponsible and senseless.”

On parole after serving his 24 years for the crime, Grant was released to the Westchester County Airport Shelter (Foderaro 2005) where he was then asked to leave for “having difficulty conforming” to the rules of the shelter and program (Foderaro and O’Connor 2005). White Plains and other residents close to the proximity of the Westchester County Airport criticized the city and state for bringing the problems of petty crime and violent crimes to the area. Jeanine F. Pirro, Westchester district attorney commented (Foderaro 2005), “Every day these predators are bused and delivered to the most populated areas of our community…where they are free to victimize innocent human beings.”

Philip Grant’s case reinforced the notion that sex offenders were dangerous population that needed 24-hour surveillance in order to protect the public from random sex crimes committed by strangers, as this became a political point in debate by Spano and Astorino. District Attorney Jeanine Pirro and Andrew Spano agreed, “state legislature should pass a civil commitment law, under which violent sex offenders, after their prison terms, face indefinite confinement in a psychiatric institution” (Foderaro 2005). Westchester County responded to the death of Russo-Carriero with increased spending to monitor “all high-level sex offenders who use the county's homeless shelters” and implemented practices that “closely followed” sex offenders “at all times by people monitoring them” (O’Connor, 2005). Robert P. Astorino, opposing Republican candidate against Andrew Spano, stated (O’Connor, 2005):
Unfortunately, this has taken way too long. They were just dumping these people off into the city with no supervision and just allowing them to run free, hoping that they would be good people. That's what caused Mrs. Russo-Carriero's murder.

Spano increased surveillance and tightened shelter requirements of the six sex offenders located in Westchester Airport Shelter. However, Westchester remained a point of political debate given recent crimes near Westchester and the political focus on Camp La Guardia over time. In the murder case, the victim’s family filed a $15 million lawsuit against Westchester County and the city of White Plains for negligence (O’Connor 2005). County officials faced pressure to increase surveillance at all shelters. The former barracks style shelter soon received a “state-of-the-art surveillance and alarm system” (O’Connor 2005):

Nearly 40 video cameras have been installed throughout the building so that its residents are kept under close watch at all times. Security stations with panic buttons are on every floor, and police cars have been assigned to circle the compound day and night. The tight security, county officials say, is largely for this reason: Among the roughly 110 people scheduled to move into the shelter when it opens this month, at least 13 are convicted sex offenders. Eight of the 13 are high-level offenders, considered the most dangerous, and in November, their status prompted County Executive Andrew J. Spano to require them to be watched at all times by trained monitors…”

In addition, police and patrol cars were “equipped with the names and photographs of the various sex offenders staying [at Westchester Airport Shelter]” in order to ensure optimal surveillance and safety (O’Connor 2005). Tim O’Leary, founding organizer of “No Way,” commented (O’Connor 2005):
The county says that this shelter will be safe, that it won't have any impact on our neighborhoods…That's an unrealistic view. The reality is that the shelter residents are free to leave the facility and can choose to go wherever they wish, including into our communities.

Spano advanced plans to move forward and eventually shut down the Westchester homeless shelter in 2006 (Gordon 2006).

Westchester’s Camp La Guardia shelter was eventually closed after the county sued the city, followed by a much-celebrated closure of the shelter (Gordon 2006). For many years, the community and county officials “blamed [Camp La Guardia] shelter residents for petty crime” (Kaufman 2006) and “drug and mental problems and criminal pasts” that often characterized residents (Fried 2001). Immediate residents who long resisted the shelter celebrated the closure, and city officials argue the move as positive due to the costly nature of transporting NYC’s homeless from the shelter located 70 miles outside of the downtown NYC. One article explained the longtime practice by the city (Kaufman 2006):

In 1999, the county sued the city, saying it was dumping minor criminals and drug addicts at the shelter and polluting the quality of local life. The city expects to save millions more by not having to run a shelter outside its borders. The city said it had cost $19 million a year to run Camp La Guardia, which included more than $7 million a year for transportation to and from the shelter and for security measures required by the lawsuit settlement.

Camp La Guardia’s shutdown was considered a “triumph of Mayor Michael R. Bloomberg’s five-year plan to reduce the number of homeless in the city by two-thirds by 2009” according to his administration. However, it was not due to crime and disorder or the fact
citizens’ voices were heard in resistance efforts. The administration framed the closure because of hard work by the Bloomberg administration to address homelessness. Deputy Mayor Linda I. Gibbs of Health and Human Services [2005-2013] commented (Kaufman 2006):

   The closing of Camp La Guardia is a milestone that tells us our plans are working.

Despite much resistance, the NYC boroughs are cited as the recipient shelters that will accept those from Camp La Guardia once it is shut down. One resident shared, “nobody wants these facilities in their backyard, but we recognize they have to go somewhere” (Kaufman 2006).

POLICING HOMELESSNESS

   Securitizing the city as a solution to social problems emerged as a theme in the 2000s just as in earlier decades. This is revealed in two ways, securitizing shelters and securitizing the streets. We see the discussion on securitizing the shelters range from changing the structure and occupation in shelters to tightening surveillance in terms of who is in the system and where various subpopulations are housed across the city. This practice in the shelters is connected to efforts to securitize the streets through change institutional practices, such as that found in policing and the physical changes in streets such as increased surveillance technologies. Police play a particular role in responding to homelessness during the Bloomberg Administration, as they have in previous decades.

   City officials and police justified the need to change the landscape of NYC in order to enhance police crackdowns on minor offenses. New fencing, benches, and cleared encampments assisted police efforts to enforce laws against congregation of homeless and other disorderly populations. Surveillance is provided in order to change police technology presence in the streets. Partnership between Department of Homeless Services and NYPD to conduct police
sweeps in homeless shelters and city encampments was supported in order to extend the crackdown on “quality of life” crimes that included sleeping, eating, and sitting in public space. Mayor Bloomberg is quoted in the Mayor’s Management Report praising the city for the crime and disorder it moved away from (McIntire 2004):

New Yorkers have much to be proud of when it comes to city services. The safest city in America continues to get safer. Our streets are the cleanest they have been in 30 years. We have made progress in educating our children; fewer families entered homeless shelters for the first time in four years; traffic fatalities decreased; potholes are being repaired quicker; and civilian fire fatalities remained at historic low levels.

Police considered the “increase in quality-of-life summonses” to efforts like “Operation Silent Night” and “Operation Clean Sweep” which targeted noise disturbance, “prostitution, disorderly youths, and other chronic problems” such as homelessness (McIntire 2004). Other police practices extended the 1990's “tough on crime movement” (Tavernise 2005). Continued from politics by the Giuliani Administration, city officials and police coordinated midnight raids and arrests for outstanding warrants in shelters as part of Mayor Bloomberg’s crackdown on crime and disorder. Another response used by police included crackdowns on “unlicensed street peddling and fare-beating,” particularly associated with the homeless, as “arrests for minor crimes…lead to people the police are already looking for and deter more serious crimes” and proof lies in the “vastly improved statistics on serious crime” (Tavernise 2005). Police also conducted undercover operations on public transportation systems, where they acted as “a citizen chatting to a boyfriend or girlfriend” or a delivery person “holding a pizza box” in order to catch fare-beaters (Tavernise 2005). Well into the 2000s, the “tough on crime” approach is framed as a method that works.
Opinions of residents, advocates, and others in the city conflicted over the role the police should play in increased measures to manage homelessness and the crime problem in NYC. New Yorkers complained, “police officers had abused their authority through improper searches and unwarranted threats of arrest” (McIntire 2004). Sympathies were particularly provided to the treatment of non-violent homeless such as those experiencing addiction and mental illness (Archibold 2006). Lawyers argued the city created an issue when it implemented increased police task forces to arrest homeless for farebeating and other minor violations. Police spokesperson Paul Brown stated, however “it was not unusual for the police to focus on fare-beaters to keep them from committing other crimes, and that the police often found people with warrants out for their arrest. The men are not immune from the law just because they are homeless” (Tavernise 2005).

Though some consider police as potentially exacerbating problems faced, the counter narrative legitimizes police presence on the streets in order to respond to random acts of violence. A story of a homeless man with a history of mental illness that killed a homeless woman by “punching her in the throat and later threw her body from a Brooklyn rooftop” particularly illustrates this. Police reported that Clifton Goring, 19, and victim, Terana Street, 33, argued over a place to sleep on the roof. Goring punched Street, this ultimately led to her death. Then her body was thrown over the rooftop by Goring (Ramirez 2001). Here, we see stories that advocate a police presence is needed in order to intervene with homeless who face addiction and mental illness issues, and pose threats against other less violent homeless.
MANAGEMENT OF THE HOMELESS OTHER

During the 2000’s, advocacy for increased control and surveillance practices reproduced the legitimacy of NYC crackdowns on minor offenses in order to prevent serious offenses. Articles focused on increased control and surveillance of certain homeless populations, particularly through care and compassion of veterans, women, and children, and through controls by the justice system directly aimed at homeless sex offenders. As in the earlier decades, there are also stories that strikingly reproduce an image of homelessness and crime. We see four stories that illustrate the value in framing a history of homelessness as a way to reproduce fears of the homeless justifying increased controls and surveillance of the entire homeless population.

First, the dangerous wanderer is illustrated in the reports of nameless individuals in the shelter system that appears after a serious crime, often a sexual assault or murder, is committed. One example, is the case of Johnny Gamba, a man brought to the NYC shelter system who remained among “dozens of human enigmas [that] have lingered in the city’s homeless shelter system for years, lost or deluded people who lack the identification required for benefits to pay for better care or housing” (Bernstein 2002). Another example, reported on an unarmed woman, who had a past life in Connecticut, but stayed in NYC shelter system where she died. Stories of unidentified homeless reiterated the need for NYC shelter system to increase it’s surveillance and to better track those who enter/leave it.

Second, this is further illustrated by stories that shared a murder, sex offenses, and history in homeless shelters with accompanying rhetoric that surveillance was necessary. Four in particular share the common elements to reproduce fear of the homeless criminal other. First, headlines reported that police arrested a panhandler serial killer with a drug problem. Vincent Johnson, 31, known as the Brooklyn Strangler, killed 6 women in NYC. All victims had drug
and prostitution related charges and were found dead, with little to no signs of struggle. The unpredictability of the homeless killer was reported as the murders he committed happened everywhere from rooftops to a mattress in a vacant lot to a private room of the victim. Past record included subway fare beating and minor drug charges (Rashbaum 2000). Second, another homeless man, Ishmael Holmes, 22, was arrested in the sexual assault of 8 women in NYC in 2000. His history of criminal offenses and drug use were referenced, as reporters stated he stayed in a homeless shelter and had repeatedly stalked women.

Third, another came about in a story where police arrested Julius Graham, 43, after he “stabbed and slashed” five people in “an outburst of violence all the more terrifying for its randomness” (Santora and Goodman 2012). Here, we see a violent homeless person randomly attack someone on the street. It reproduces fear of the homeless criminal other. Fourth, in another report, a mother of six, Diatra Hester-Bey (35), was sentenced to 10 years in prison for suffocating her baby, where she then left the homeless shelter they had been staying at with her “dead baby in a stroller” and threw the body in a dumpster (Hartocollis 2006). The murder occurred in 2000 and Hester-Bey collected $35 a month in welfare benefits in the child’s name while concealing the death of her child for nearly 4 years from social workers. Hester-Bey was charged with welfare fraud, grand larceny, and filing a false welfare application in the first trial, found deadlocked on negligent homicide in the first trial, and convicted of negligent homicide in the second trial (Hartocollis 2006):

Justice McLaughlin sentenced her to up to four years on the homicide charge, the maximum possible. The judge in the first trial, Justice Robert M. Stolz, also sentenced her yesterday to up to six years on the fraud charges, a year less than the maximum. She could serve up to 10 years on the combined sentences.
Here, we see crime and disorder of a homeless mother who is able to harm her children and discard the body with little to no remorse in the case. This fuels the idea that morality is low when it comes to the homeless subject, therefore we need to control and manage such populations in order to protect from potential victims. Other articles appeared throughout the decade that framed the homeless criminal as a dangerous other, which in turn furthered the narrative that increased policing is needed and surveillance and safety are important issues faced by NYC residents. Each of the cases describes a dangerous, homeless other found in NYC shelter system or in unpredictable places across the city landscape.

CONCLUSION

The fear of crime and disorder continued through the 2000s as the mediated image of homelessness expanded to include different subpopulations with various needs. The criminal homeless other dominated as a major source of fear and discussion during Bloomberg’s administration. A mediated political debate emerges as the city seeks solutions to homelessness, crime, and disorder in streets and in shelters. This is particularly discussed in terms of securitization through use of professionals and surveillance technology as solutions to homelessness and crime problems. The professional included trained police provided in shelters and a data driven collection method to further manage who is in the shelter, understanding their histories and potential for risk in the shelter.

Of particular interest concerning surveillance of high risk homeless criminals, we see rising concern for housing homeless sex offenders further reiterating justifications for surveillance of the homeless other. Our attention is drawn to the homeless sex offender through
political debates and public policies where campaign discussions about where to house the homeless are politically charged and situated in neighborhood politics.

The notion to socially exclude, displace, and monitor is reproduced as well by stories of homeless criminals wandering the streets of NYC. Criminal histories, including sex offenses, are blurred with homelessness and mental health histories, in cases where the homeless, criminal other commits a violent crime and media coverage follows with political commentary on the prevention provided through surveillance. Certainly, it is important to acknowledge the notion of increased surveillance measures found in NYC shelters following insecurities faced following 9/11 played a role. However, NYC had long voiced an interest in tightened restrictions and management techniques of the homeless. This management through tightened control applies to homeless children, families, and veterans that are prioritized in social services, as such populations face screening processes and treatment program requirements to continue services through the city.

During the 2000s, Mayor Bloomberg is faced with a “historic homelessness crisis” and NYC is criticized for failed policies that took away federal and local housing assistance programs. Much like his predecessors, Mayor Bloomberg is faced with crime and disorder, though crime rates continued to decline over the decade analyzed. Rising homelessness during the 2000s compared to those faced by previous administrations in this analysis is linked to Mayor Bloomberg’s harsh cuts in the Federal housing programs and tightened controls for screening and acceptance into the limited resources made available. This left record highs in terms of homeless families and children forced into NYC shelter system or in the streets where the fear of crime and disorder is discussed.
CHAPTER VIII
DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION

The beginning of this study observed a recent pattern where a number of cities declared a state of emergency (SOE) in response to their homelessness crisis. Many question arise about why some declared a state of emergency, such as those on the West coast, while others did not declare one despite having a large number of homeless (i.e., NYC and New York). The political motivation to declare homelessness as an urgent priority of local politics assists in temporarily overcoming longstanding budget and bureaucratic barriers. It increases the power of local authorities to address a social problem. Undoubtedly, governance of homelessness occurs in both the welfare and criminal justice system, where a declared SOE motivated by the visibility in homeless encampments, will experience an increase in controls. New York Times (NYT) articles from 1970-2012 are used to problematize current responses to homelessness in order to interrogate our understanding of homelessness through history. It helps us understand the vast array of responses ranging from care to criminalization, situated in efforts to manage a particular population.

Through a focused study on homelessness and crime, this research extends criminological literature on the social control of crime and poverty. Specifically, it draws on theoretical insights from David Garland (2001), Jonathan Simon (2007), and Loïc Wacquant (2009). What emerges through mediated images of homelessness is a transformation of social practices where care and criminalization are blurred and exist simultaneously in spaces used to contain marginalized populations in NYC. Through media analysis, insight is provided into public and political processes that shape the governance of marginalized populations over time, such as welfare housing and shelters.
The study begins in 1970s, as major shifts in neoliberal policies, welfarism, and crime control occurs. The focus in this decade is on gentrification and urban renewal. Particularly the forces that construct boundary making in the city landscape across marginalized populations (i.e., race, class, etc.). In the 1970s, businesses and residents report on ways homelessness and crime impede the revitalization of NYC. During the 1970s, we see constructions of homelessness used to further forces of gentrification and urban renewal. The unpredictability of random violence in NYC is constructed as part of every day life, thus furthering urgency to change the crime and disorder conditions faced by NYC. This is illustrated in stories of troubled homeless youth, a rise in youth gangs who are said to come from such poor conditions, and the visible presence of homelessness and drug use found within the Manhattan Criminal Courts Building. Moreover, this is connected to narratives on the decay and deterioration of buildings that culminated into moral decay and the deterioration of people.

During the 1970s, discourse suggests gentrification is a force that shapes control of people and places across class. Those outside productive social classes are pushed out of spaces across the city through rhetoric advocating efforts to clean neighborhood and streets. Gentrification shapes boundaries and territories that are continually debated, and provides examples of housing policies that parallel practices of the criminal justice system. Such policies assist in boundary making process that increasingly aims to remove undesirable, particularly lower class other. For example, Greenwich (i.e., the Village) faced being a dumping ground for homeless despite efforts to revitalize the neighborhood and its businesses. The “plague” of the homeless and criminal is conflated to a singular undesirable “other” that harms the neighborhood’s image and businesses.
In order to rehabilitate the city, discourse focused on youth and the recent youth gang problem. Alternative pathways are advocated in order to intervene on youth headed towards serious criminality and gang involvement. One way is to provide juvenile justice services that provide improved management of the population through employment and community services to better build morale. Meanwhile, shelter for youth is not prioritized in discussions that reveal budget cuts surrounding such services for homeless youth. In this decade, a narrative emerges that seeks to differentiate youth from adults in order to prevent serious criminals through increased early intervention and social controls on youth. Meanwhile it is acknowledged that the state needs to provide services and support for youth, as parents fail to do so thus resulting in issues of crime and disorder.

During the 1970s, homelessness and crime are identified as issues faced by formal city offices such as the NYC Housing Authority and the Criminal Courts Building. For example, the Housing Authority is noted for eviction policies if adults, and youth in families, commit criminal acts found in their supported housing programs. This foreshadows city management of criminal and disorderly people. The justice system and community are not entirely in agreement with the consequential practices found in the housing system. For example, the community expressed concerns with consequences of eviction policies by taking the NYC Housing Authority to Court over the eviction of families due to juvenile delinquency. A counter narrative emerges that acknowledges eviction of the marginalized other disproportionately impacts the criminal and poor and is justified through the powerful forces of gentrification to clean up the image of the city. As we see in future decades, identifying the homeless subject becomes increasingly important in mediated images and works to further ideas of who is worthy of management services versus jail. Situated in forces to clean up NYC’s buildings and people, the drug
addicted, deranged, delinquent, and dangerous other works to determine who is displaced and where the displacement occurs. Further, it builds the narrative “anywhere but here” throughout time and place in NYC.

Relatively little emerges in the 1970s that includes political powers of the city and political agendas of various mayoral administrations. In fact, in future decades, we see a greater theme emerge where Mayors Koch [1978-1989], Dinkins [1990-1993], Giuliani [1994-2001], and Bloomberg [2002-2013] are engaged in media discourse on defining homelessness and crime problems, particularly in finding solutions to it. The late 1970s included Mayor Ed Koch’s administration, where an increase in political authority and voice on the subject is found in the NYT. Themes throughout all mayoral administrations focused on housing, policing, and the image of homeless. This is witnessed as politicians express authority and expertise in areas such as policing the housing system and the streets of NYC. Rhetoric that advocated crime control and quality of life measures in shelters and the housing system during Mayor Koch’s administration in the data analyzed, and continued with a significant shift toward policing the streets is witnessed during the Dinkins and Giuliani administrations. Later, Mayor Bloomberg focused funds on making shelters safe and cracking down on crime and disorder found within the housing system, similarly to Mayor Koch’s 1980s practices. However, Mayor Bloomberg’s policies align with the socially exclusionary practices of the 2000s that seek to define and socially exclude certain worthy versus unworthy homeless populations.

During the 1980s, fear and anxieties about crime and disorder build as politicians engage in the discussions to find solutions to homelessness. Mayor Ed Koch provides political authority on the subject as the NYT documents the ways his administration talks about homelessness and solutions to it. Here, we see a continued struggle for the city to find successful solutions.
Powerful insights are provided where community organizations and local businesses resist the city’s efforts to find solutions through housing and shelters. Business owners and residents often criticize solutions that keep the homeless other within their community and neighborhood, while also criticizing the city’s failures to provide care and compassion for specific homeless populations, such as youth.

Here, a hierarchy reveals itself. Powerful political leaders, such as Mayor Koch, publicly engage in solutions to understand and address homelessness. We see neighborhoods and businesses resist S.R.Os and shelters as solutions to homelessness due the crime and disorder each bring as “bad business.” The question becomes where to move the homeless? As neighborhoods resist, the question is transformed into where to best displace homelessness and crime problems in an “anywhere but here” narrative. Koch explores a number of solutions in major NYC boroughs, including rebuilding existing S.R.Os to include more safety and security measures, moving temporary shelters outside city limits, restructuring housing options for families and children to provide for the orderly homeless, and importantly, administering all solutions with traces of crime control technologies that address anxieties and fears building throughout the 1980s. Here, we see foreshadowing of an increasing policing state, where police presence in the streets and in the housing system is commonplace in debates to finding the solutions.

Homelessness is increasingly politicized during the 1980s and continues through 2012. Though homelessness itself has always existed, the Koch administration foreshadows voices of those engaged in finding solutions to homelessness and the crime problem. Garland (2001) argued a shift in the politicization of crime control occurred in the 1980s and 1990s. Such a shift in crime control “transformed the structure of relationships that connects the political process
and the institutions of criminal justice” (Garland 2001:13). In the provision of housing and shelter during the 1980s, we see the administration of safety and security technologies become commonplace. Political engagement in the management of populations using the welfare system, including housing such as S.R.Os and shelters, and expansion of the use of police bodies and police technologies is normalized and legitimized. This process reproduces the notion that homelessness is a crime problem that needs crime-oriented responses.

During the Dinkins (1990-1993) to Giuliani administrations (1994-2001), NYC faced rising violent crime rates compounded by drug problems. Fear of crime and disorder certainly escalate in the NYT as solutions to such social problems are explored. Solutions target removing the criminal other and the threat of crime from the city and shelter landscapes where crime and disorder work to further construct boundaries and hierarchies. The dominant narrative was fear of crime and disorder that advocated increased control of people in the city, including zero tolerance policies in order to finally achieve the urban social order New Yorkers longed for in previous decades. Reproduction of power relations between state officials and local advocates continued as rhetoric in the NYT called for increased policing and criminal justice measures. The public demanded safety and security in at risk communities, in collaboration with political agendas that transformed our understanding of homelessness as part of a crime problem. This is also illustrated in the sheer increase in articles on homelessness and crime returned for each decade.

Repressive policies, zero tolerance, and quality of life policies were often associated with Mayor Giuliani’s Administration. In fact, Mayor Ed Koch’s practices and policies shared rhetoric to clean up shelters, single room occupancy hotels, and streets by cracking down on behaviors using police force. During the late 1980s, Mayor Koch ordered the “involuntary
commitment” through police force of those who pose an immediate threat and danger to self or others. This resulted in lawsuits headed by the New York Civil Liberties Union. The narrative overshadowed resistance to forced practices such as involuntary commitment to hospitals and jails. Specific to homeless, Koch, Dinkins, and Giuliani sought to remove homeless from the streets due to crime and disorder problems. Koch’s strategies focused on cleaning up S.R.Os that gradually shifted to focus on the streets during the Giuliani administration. Giuliani’s rhetoric included threats to arrest homeless on the streets that refused shelter were considered markedly less forgiving, less compassionate, and overtly tough on crime in the streets.

Situated in the context of the free market expansion witnessed during the 1970s and 80s, we see the prioritization of private groups such as businesses, alongside consumers and residents, which engage in economically productive lives. The rise in economic priority found in the articles analyzed witnessed a major theme that discussed mayoral budgets as it related housing assistance programs. Additionally, the mayor’s administration was increasingly discussed in terms of how they failed to regulate rents amidst gentrification and urban renewal, however this was not the dominant narrative. More frequently, budgets were discussed in terms of declined housing assistance budgets and increased crime control budgets for securitizing and policing amidst the high crime rates of the 1980s and 1990s. This narrative is normalized, as discussions on budgets indicate welfare cuts and criminal justice expansion continued into the 2000s, despite declining crime rates that began in the 1990s.

The problematic and consequential results of such social exclusionary practices are overshadowed by a need to follow the practice for crime and disorder solutions. This produced little to no room for alternative options. The politics of homelessness demanded increased rigidity, toughness, and exclusion in the housing management strategies for those that are
socially deemed low risk enough to remain within city limits (i.e., families, children, and women). Homelessness as a crime and disorder issue works to further manage populations within the city as it defines and reinforces social boundaries. Technologies of crime control found in the housing system are a prime example of the coercive forces used.

As we progress through the 1990s, we see an increased need to define the homeless subject in order to determine our solutions. This is theorized as due to the increased need to define subjects across homelessness that we should fear and those who are able to be managed under controls found within the housing, shelters, and addiction treatment programs. Particularly, this decade finds the overwhelming narrative to end crime and disorder under practices by the Dinkins and Giuliani administrations.

In this decade, reporters discussed NYC and public officials struggle to address homelessness, crime, and disorder. In discussions of homelessness and crime, politicians and the public increased attention paid to the police role in responding to homelessness. While some articles advocated the police role in serving as both service members and social service providers, others critiqued and even protested the use of policing in responding to homelessness. Such ideas simultaneously exist, however the imagery of homelessness, as a population that requires structure and management is reproduced throughout this decade. The need for police power and governance in housing and on the streets is found as early as the administrations of Ed Koch and David Dinkins. However, Rudy Giuliani certainly receives attention for swift and severe measures. The image of a dangerous shelter and subway system perpetuated ideas surrounding increased criminal justice response, particularly of police. The discussion of homelessness and crime becomes less about housing and more about defining the police role
around responding to homelessness. Housing is still discussed at times; however, more
connections are drawn between the police and housing.

The politics toward minimizing visibility of homelessness on the streets are situated in
the politics of crime and disorder. In a number of cases, the seemingly “random” victimization of
homeless, and more so the “random” victimization of citizens by the homeless, are used to
justify and legitimate the “muscle” of policing found in quality of life practices by city officials,
particularly the Mayor’s administration. Protest and opposition occur, however rhetoric also
indicated a sense of management and control of homelessness through the policing, and charging
police with connecting homeless to housing and shelters. The image of the homeless other, as
victim of crime and disorder or offenders, works to expand rhetoric toward increased control of
populations across urban landscape.

The fear of crime and disorder continued through the 2000s. Stories dominated the
mediated political debate to control certain images of homelessness and crime. What is unique to
the 2000s is how securitization and safety are achieved. Specifically, we see the rise of
professionals, trained and armed police, and surveillance technology as solutions to
homelessness and crime problems. The discussion here works to find solutions in providing the
best surveillance technology and monitoring of at-risk homeless groups, such as homeless sex
offenders in social service programs. A specific location this occurs is in making shelters safe
through professionally trained and armed police. Professionally trained officers and specific staff
dedicated to policing the shelter system is considered necessary and justified in rhetoric to
manage homeless sex offenders.

Surveillance of high-risk homeless sex offenders is a particular concern that emerges in
various ways during the 2000s. Here, we see rising concern for housing homeless sex offenders
in neighborhoods with shelters. The city defends their solutions in context of having few options available. Therefore, surveillance of homeless through the shelter system becomes the solution where all homeless are impacted. Thus, budgets continue to increase for securitizing shelters. Our attention is drawn to the homeless sex offender through political debates and public policies where campaign discussions about where to house the homeless are politically charged and situated in neighborhood politics. The notion to socially exclude, displace, and monitor is reproduced by stories of homeless criminals wandering the streets of NYC. Criminal histories, including sex offenses, are blurred with homelessness and mental health histories, in cases where the homeless, criminal other commits a violent crime and media coverage follows with political commentary on the prevention provided through surveillance.

However, NYC had long voiced an interest in tightened restrictions and management techniques of the homeless. This management through tightened control applies to homeless children, families, and veterans that are prioritized in social services, as such populations face screening processes and treatment program requirements to continue services through the city.

During the 2000s, Mayor Bloomberg is faced with an “historic homelessness crisis” and NYC is criticized for failed policies that took away federal and local housing assistance programs. Much like his predecessors, Mayor Bloomberg is faced with crime and disorder, though crime rates continued to decline over the decades analyzed. Uniquely, rising homelessness is during the 2000s, as compared to those faced by previous administrations in this analysis, is linked to Mayor Bloomberg’s harsh cuts in the Federal housing programs and tightened controls for screening and acceptance into the limited resources made available. This left record highs in terms of homeless families and children forced into NYC shelter system or in the streets where the fear of crime and disorder is discussed.
Our cultural and political understanding of homelessness as an issue of crime and disorder has expanded across decades. Specific notions of crime control are used in discourse surrounding homelessness and crime. Garland (2001: 23) argues, “crime control is reconfigured complex of interlocking structures and strategies that are themselves composed of old and new elements, the old revised and reoriented by a new operation context.” This is illustrated in stories across the decades that continually advocate safety and security measures in shelter and housing system to protect the community from ill impacts of those in the shelters. As early as Mayor Koch, we see rhetoric focused on the need for safety, security, and increased budgets to do so, while housing programs and other services faced significant budget cuts. This rhetoric is common throughout the decades as the need to control crime and disorder is legitimized, resulting in budget allocations toward crime control. What is different is that rhetoric takes a new shape and form in the city as it shifts from at risk crime places (i.e., from the shelters to the streets and back to the shelters). In addition, it takes new shape as we define a new at risk homeless, criminal other: the sex offender. This redirects our attention to securing the shelter system, to controlling who receives the limited temporary services provided, and who can be managed by the housing system. The criminal justice system is appointed to handle the rest.

SOCIOLOGY OF PUNISHMENT: SECURING STREETS AND SHELTERS

The 1970s marked a dramatic shift in late modern punishment, particularly in understanding the rise in mass incarceration and a shift toward punitiveness (Garland 2001; Simon 2009; Wacquant 2009). By the 1980s, rapid growth in the criminal justice system foreshadowed increased police expenditures during 1990s and 2000s that contributed to mass incarceration faced in the United States. The following discusses the work of Garland, Simon,
and Wacquant which explores the contextual factors that gave rise to the consequential expansion of punishment we see today.

First, Garland (2001) argues the fear of crime is pervasive in daily activities and increasingly impacts our social interactions. U.S. zero-tolerance policies receive global attention, where media have played a significant role in framing this. Crime control is a part of everyday politics and social life in need of management. Zero tolerance policies often discussed in terms of the streets are also found in shelters and the housing system. During the 1970s, crimes committed by youth resulted in entire families being evicted from housing assistance programs. As the decades progressed, rhetoric seemingly resists NY Housing Authority’s tightened restrictions that negatively impact families; however, the restrictions take new shape in the form of drug and alcohol screenings found in shelters and housing programs. Zero tolerance is practiced throughout the decades and individuals are forced to get help or get out. Garland specifically discusses how the war on drugs recreates a new focus for old practices. This is illustrated in restrictions and eviction policies found in the housing system during the 1970s. However this shifts as the narrative is legitimized shelters or housing to avoid jail, and then threatens with eviction and exclusion through tightened regulations constructed around crime and drugs.

Garland (2001) argues social controls have become increasingly privatized. This is particularly found in the form of corporate and private entities that are tasked with more effectively and efficiently running former city shelters. For example, during the 1980s Manhattan Bowery Corporation is tasked with running formerly run city social service programs. Private organizations are considered to have better trained, focused experts that are able to manage the
crime and drug problems faced in NYC shelters. Manhattan Bowery Corporation is one example of this discussed in the articles.

Additionally, Garland’s notion of responsibilizing individuals and the community to address homelessness and crime problems helps us understand the governance of homeless populations in New York. The city is, again, criticized for not finding solutions. However, community organizations and the homeless are tasked with self-policing and self-protecting in ways that displace responsibility formerly placed on the state. Police are tasked with managing those who cannot be policed by the community and private organizations increasingly found in shelter and housing systems. Partnerships exist centered on the task of controlling criminal and disorderly other found in the city as budgets decline to provide welfare services.

According to Garland (2001), the politicization of crime is enabled through several factors. NYC faced increased crime rates through the early 1990s, and then witnessed a significant decline. However, this research shows how increased media coverage of homelessness and crime over the years would suggest the problem is getting worse or that the problems are more interconnected than once before. What we can critically draw from this is the power the media holds to construct this fear and shape public policy. The politicization of homelessness and crime are consequential as new understandings of homelessness and crime emerge that work to normalize their relationship and further demonize the homeless criminal other. Fear of the homeless criminal other results in consequential measures of social exclusion that relegate marginalized groups to the fringes of society.

We see this illustrated in a powerful set of stories that emerge in the 2000s centered on the fear of the homeless sex offender other. This is best illustrated in the election of Astorino and Spano where plans to house homeless are at the political forefront. Astorino publicly criticizes
Spano for shutting down a shelter on grounds that Spano did consider where the high-risk sex offenders would go once the shelter shut down. Though the numbers were small (less than 10% of the shelter population), this piece of information becomes political ammunition against Spano by Astorino during their political campaign, in which Spano quickly provides an apology and solutions to shut down the shelter and house sex offenders through surveillance at a new location in another community. Shortly after this political debate between the two, Concetta Russo Camero was killed by Philip Grant, which is discussed in the 2000s.

Garland (2001) traces the rise in crime in the streets rhetoric found in the U.S. This is particularly illustrated in aggressive policing styles during the Giuliani “quality of life” sweeps discussed that are targeted at criminals and drug users broadly, but that include homeless. This extends to the shelter and increasingly so over the decades as tightened controls and surveillance in shelters are advocated as solutions to crime and disorder problems. This relates to Garland’s (2001) argument that the criminal other is shifting and changing, as the public is engaged in the process to differentiate a “sub-citizenry undeserving of fundamental liberties.” As the decades continue, it is increasingly common to differentiate between homeless children, families, and veterans, versus less prioritized groups. However, the homeless criminal other is the most undeserving, where crackdowns and aggressive police tactics are justified. The attachment and stigma of homelessness and a criminal record enables more broad shifts towards punishment and away from welfare support and rehabilitative services.

Next, Jonathan Simon’s (2009) Governing Through Crime discussed the transformation from governing crime to governing through crime. According to Simon, governing through crime occurs where a strategic issue exists across multiple institutions that are used as a category to legitimize intervention in areas that were not previously conceived as criminal justice matters.
Specifically, we see how technologies, discourses, and metaphors of crime and justice become more common. This analysis on mediated images of homelessness and crime reveal how homelessness is governed through matters of crime and disorder.

The analysis reveals how homelessness is increasingly discussed as an issue of crime and disorder over time. Simon (2009) argues fear of crime has transformed schools, families, and workplaces to place more emphasis on crime control. In a similar sense, we can see how shelters and other temporary housing offered to the homeless become mechanisms of control and containment of potentially risky populations. This transformation has shifted to areas where disruption is responded to with zero tolerance practices such as write-ups, detentions, and expulsion in schools and the workplace. We also see this with eviction policies and tightened screening tools used over time, particularly during Mayor Bloomberg’s administration. Violations, such as failed screenings and breaking curfew, can result in exclusion from shelter services for 30 or more days. Simon (2009) argues this is pervasive in the lives of children in schools. The application of crime control to children vulnerable as offenders and victims justify and legitimate increased controls of children in articles analyzed.

As a result of constructed imagery where children in schools are either potential targets or potential offenders, justification and legitimization for technologies of crime control exist on two grounds – as potential targets and potential serious offenders. Similarly, the homeless subject is viewed as an offender or victim. In the process of constructing homelessness in such binaries, we see many impacted by a set of polices and practices geared at a few persons. Though the reality of victims and offenders is relatively small compared to the entire population of children, fears and anxieties of potential crime are so pervasive they are applied to all. A culmination of such
three important developments resulted in new opportunities for the governance of every day life through crime control technologies.

Lastly, Wacquant (2009) links the expansion and glorification of criminal justice institutions as a response to social insecurity rather than criminal insecurity. Wacquant (2009) offers a class based understanding of homelessness and crime that Garland and Simon do not necessarily offer. Wacquant (2009) connects social insecurity, such as wage labor issues and the disruption of ethno-racial hierarchy, to social controls produced in the city. In this study’s historical analysis, we see housing insecurity continually reproduced across decades where criminal insecurity works alongside other insecurities. Management of those who fall outside the norms of work and productivity occurs without necessarily addressing limited wage options available to homeless. Wacquant (2009) would argue this is how we explain the phenomenon of penal expansion across time, despite contradictions found in declining crime rates.

Wacquant (2009) argues the need to reconnect social and penal policies and treat them as variations in order to understand the contemporary politics of marginality. Here, by extending beyond the “typical” criminal subjects, we see subjects that are governed through crime and criminality under notions they are groups that may be at risk for such behaviors because of their social status and marginalized position. The constructed image of homelessness and our responses to it reveal crime control strategies, yet these strategies are conceptualized as places of care and compassion or part of the welfare system. For example, housing and shelters that provide privatized treatment to populations that ultimately extend state intervention. Additionally, penal and social policy forces us to confront what Wacquant (2009) refers to as the downsizing of public aid and a shift toward temporary, subpar work as conditions of support. Here, we see social services offered to mother’s in the 1990s under the condition that they must
'work’ in order to continue receiving support. We see youth required to participate in volunteer community services within their neighborhoods during the 1980s in order to receive shelter services from Koch administration. Wacquant (2009) would argue this is a form of “double regulation of poverty in the age of deepening economic inequality and diffusing social insecurity.”

Wacquant (2009) further argues the resurging prison state is not about crime or crime control; rather, imprisonment becomes a way to contain and patrol the boundaries between productivity versus unproductivity, deserving and undeserving, etc. Over time, we see rhetoric that discusses limited city resources and continued welfare budget cuts. This increases the need to define who is/is not deserving of services and housing available; the rest, who are less deserving, are left under management of police. Throughout the decades, police are cited for using the “shelter or jail” method to clean the streets. Ultimately, this impacts what sociology of punishment theorists are concerned with in terms of mass incarceration. In particular, Wacquant (2001) connects the management of urban poor through control continuums results in growth of the carceral system:

Resulting symbiosis between ghetto and prison not only perpetuates the socioeconomic marginality and symbolic taint of the black subproletariat, feeding the runaway growth of the carceral system. It also plays a pivotal role in the remaking of ’race', the redefinition of the citizenry via the production of a racialized public culture of vilification of criminals, and the construction of a post-Keynesian state that replaces the social-welfare treatment of poverty by its penal management.

This is important to consider regarding homelessness and the practices of management at the intersection of poverty and crime. Coercive practices that focus on “shelters or jail” make it
difficult for homeless and at risk homeless to operate outside the options provided by the state, that are presented in terms of care and criminalization. Simply stated, if one does not accept the forms of care provided through shelters and housing system, the likelihood of ending up in jail is increased. While care itself has compassionate intention, here we see it in coercive form that deemphasizes agency of the homeless and forces such populations into a shelter system. Meanwhile we acknowledge the crime and disorder found in the housing and shelter systems over time. However, these are the options in order to manage the image of homelessness and other images of crime and disorder from the streets.

CARE AND CRIMINALIZATION OF HOMELESSNESS

Though rhetoric did not appear until the later decades analyzed, a recent phenomenon that gained attention is the “criminalization of homelessness.” Particularly scholars examine how urban areas practice this method as a first response to homelessness often using police to fine and jail homeless people. Scholars beyond the field of criminology criticize limited studies on homelessness (Wolch and Dear 1993; Huey 2015), where conceptualizations are narrowly focused on criminalization processes, such as for sleeping, sitting, using the restroom, bathing, eating, and much more. In this study, we see police, communities, advocates, and businesses share very different agendas in terms of practicing criminalization measures.

As city and state powers move towards criminalization practices, this is paralleled by an increase in formal organizations charged with providing care, compassion, and resources to address homelessness. Many cities have Office to End Homelessness, in addition to various coalitions to end homelessness. Ultimately, these two forces come together with a similar interest to end homelessness due to its impact on the community. How do we see the partnerships of
these forces play out? Often, police and service providers work together in their efforts. Given the recent declared SOE in Seattle, Los Angeles, San Francisco, and Hawaii, what is the role of the police and crime control technologies? Particularly in the context of rising concerns about encampment visibility and knowledge of a history where police and service partnerships are used to advocate displacement, providing the ultimatum to move along, go to a shelter, or go to jail.

Often, we conceptualize care and criminalization separately. However, responses of care and compassion simultaneously exist in the same space alongside criminalization. Partnered with agents of crime control, the overarching result in efforts to care and provide compassion is highly coercive and control is practiced by the city, non-profits, and various organizations tasked with provide social services. Ultimately, both care and criminalization act in similar notions to end the visibility of homelessness. Though conceptually different, we see similarities in strategies toward care and criminalization. This has a great impact in the normalized talk around services to end homelessness. For example, police are nearly always present in the implementation of services that seek to help the homeless. As we see homelessness conflated to a crime and disorder problem, police and justice system presence in the administration of social services is normalized. This has problematic implications from talk to practice in how we socially respond to homelessness, where care and compassion are shifted and transformed by overarching anxieties to crime and disorder. In providing shelter to the homeless, for example, police presence is necessary to control the potential for crime and disorder found in shelters.

CONCLUSION

This study adds insight into discourse constructing the image of homelessness that is increasingly conflated with issues of crime and disorder. Further, this study provides insight into
responses to the homeless subject where crime control policies and practices are normalized in similar spaces previously conceptualized as spaces of care and compassion. It brings homelessness to the forefront of crime and poverty studies, making homelessness and responses to it a subject of social control studies. Homelessness is conflated with a crime and disorder problem. As such, it constructs a powerful political force that is governed through crime and shapes boundaries across the city. Newly found “crises” or social problems are reproduced in order to legitimate further management through securitization. Particularly, this study shows how governing through crime is found in the housing and shelter system. In shelters, surveillance is constant and normalized in the name of care and compassion, and criminalization and crime control strategies exist double fold to manage populations that cannot remain within the shelters due to rules and regulations imposed. The imaginary created reproduces insecurities about crime and justice and social insecurity, where Wacquant’s (2009) *Punishing the Poor* brings together forces of gentrification and urban renewal found in populations characterized by work and housing instability. Historically, homelessness is understood as a class issue where class analysis is important. Thus, Wacquant (2009) provides insight into the management of poverty (i.e, race and class) found in the subject of homelessness. Particularly as analysis of solutions and consequences to it are provided. Here we see the conflating of homelessness to a crime issue that provides political power to draw our gaze to this social problem and justify management in two ways: through care and criminalization, where both appear increasingly similar.

As decades progress, we see connections between housing and the criminal justice system that illustrate how the fear of crime has transformed welfare, housing and social services as a state project. Police presence is found in the streets and in shelters in order to respond to the homeless, criminal other that poses a risk to society. It justifies and legitimates the need for
partnerships between groups that are charged with the well being of homeless; however, in turn, this provides the police power in interacting with homeless and furthering displacement to another place in the city or to shelters or to jail.

Additionally, we see subjects that were defined as deserving of care and compassion offered through homeless services and housing. We see subjects such as children, women, and veterans who are discussed in terms of how to protect them from pervasive crime and disorder problems. However, in turn, this care and control takes the form of control that has its own set of rules and regulations and can result in exclusion from services. We also see how certain groups are used to police one another in an effort to address crime.

This study most clearly points to the processes of politicization of homelessness found in the media over time to produce and legitimate the need for increased controls and management. The beginning of this dissertation introduced the current crisis of homelessness management faced by major cities across the United States and the recent rend to declare homelessness as a State of Emergency (SOE). The rationale behind NYC policies is often connected to political value in recreating the “homelessness crisis” in order to overcome bureaucratic barriers and increase funding for emergency shelters. However, where we see this play out is in response to those concerned with the visibility of encampments. What we learn from NYC is the creation of a homelessness crisis has been done throughout time. It is created to minimize the visibility of homelessness, and dismantling signs of homelessness as crime and disorder problems certainly work within these motivations. It does not, however, address longstanding structural issues. In fact, it creates policies and practices that further city powers to displace populations. Concerns are expressed that this could happen as cities continue to declare states of emergency concerning homelessness. The policies that result are control motivated and provide temporary power to a
city and ignores the injustices brought on by gentrification and social exclusion. Although it is still too soon to necessarily see what happens with the declared SOEs, it is worth being aware as a social science researcher interested in policy and rhetoric that the underlying the rhetoric of care and compassion behind SOEs is political. The consequences often result in increased controls of populations, ultimately impacting the lived realities of homelessness.

Policy should first recognize the increased use of criminal justice technologies to control the urban environment that exist beyond strictly criminal justice institutions such as police, courts, and corrections. In addition, acknowledgment of the broad social, political, and historical processes surrounding homelessness shed light on the structural injustices reproduced through control strategies that utilize criminal justice technologies. Policies that impact homelessness should need to respond to homelessness as a structural failure, rather than an individualized crime and disorder problem. Discourse surrounding homelessness and crime in NYC increasingly focused on policies that provided security and safety through the removal of homeless subjects from the streets, to increased surveillance of subjects in the shelter system, and eventual social exclusion of homeless subjects from society through incarceration and complete abandonment. Policies in place, even when frames as care and compassion, utilize criminal justice technologies to increasingly force homeless subjects under social service management and impose restrictions that further alienate homeless subjects.
REFERENCES


181


(http://murray.seattle.gov/)


Howe genealogy veridiction governmentality 2014


196


VITA

Lindsey L. Upton
Old Dominion University
Department of Sociology & Criminal Justice
Norfolk, VA 23529

EDUCATION

Ph.D. Criminology and Criminal Justice, Old Dominion University, Expected August 2016.
Dissertation: Care, Control, or Criminalization? Discourses on Homelessness and Social Response
Chair: Ruth A. Triplett, Ph.D.

M.S. Criminal Justice and Police Studies, Eastern Kentucky University, May 2011.
Thesis: Zapped: An Exploratory Study of Taser Use
Chair: Thomas Barker, Ph.D.

B.S. Criminal Justice and Psychology, Iowa State University, May 2009.

PUBLICATIONS


SELECTED PAPERS AND PRESENTATIONS


