Document Type
Article
Publication Date
2021
DOI
10.1017/can.2022.18
Publication Title
Canadian Journal of Philosophy
Volume
51
Issue
8
Pages
588-601
Abstract
Recent research suggests that, regardless of the truth of libertarianism about free will, there appears to be a widespread belief among nonphilosopher laypersons that the choices of free agents are not causally necessitated by prior states of affairs. In this paper, I propose a new class of debunking explanation for this belief which I call ‘reasons-based accounts’ (RBAs). I start the paper by briefly recounting the failures of extant approaches to debunking explanations, and then use this as a jumping off point to articulate several alternatives, highlighting the strengths and weaknesses of each.
Original Publication Citation
Kissel, A. (2021). Thinking reasonably about indeterministic choice beliefs. Canadian Journal of Philosophy, 51(8), 588-601. https://doi.org/10.1017/can.2022.18
Repository Citation
Kissel, Andrew, "Thinking Reasonably About Indeterministic Choice Beliefs" (2021). Philosophy Faculty Publications. 94.
https://digitalcommons.odu.edu/philosophy_fac_pubs/94
Comments
© The Author(s), 2022. Published by Cambridge University Press on behalf of Canadian Journal of Philosophy.
This is an Open Access article, distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International (CC BY 4.0) Licence, which permits unrestricted re-use, distribution and reproduction, provided the original article is properly cited.