Explaining Foreign Policy: U.S. Decision-Making in the Gulf Wars
Steve A. Yetiv has developed an interdisciplinary, integrated approach to studying foreign policy decisions, which he applies here to understand better how and why the United States went to war in the Persian Gulf in 1991 and 2003. Yetiv’s innovative method employs the rational actor, cognitive, domestic politics, groupthink, and bureaucratic politics models to explain the foreign policy behavior of governments. Drawing on the widest set of primary sources to date―including a trove of recently declassified documents―and on interviews with key actors, he applies these models to illuminate the decision-making process in the two Gulf Wars and to develop theoretical notions about foreign policy. What Yetiv discovers, in addition to empirical evidence about the Persian Gulf and Iraq wars, is that no one approach provides the best explanation, but when all five are used, a fuller and more complete understanding emerges. [From Amazon.com]
Johns Hopkins University Press
Persian Gulf War (1991), Iraq War (2003), Foreign policy, Groupthink, United States
American Politics | International Relations | Military History | Political History | Political Theory
Yetiv, Steve A., "Explaining Foreign Policy: U.S. Decision-Making in the Gulf Wars" (2011). Political Science & Geography Faculty Books. 14.