Document Type

Article

Publication Date

2026

DOI

10.1007/s44282-026-00419-1

Publication Title

Discover Global Society

Volume

4

Issue

1

Pages

228 (27 pp.)

Abstract

The main mechanism through which strategic stability can be preserved amongst nuclear armed states has traditionally been viewed as nuclear deterrence. Deterrence works on the premise that catastrophic consequences will cause rational restraint due to the fear of nuclear conflict. The proliferation of hybrid warfare (the coordinated use of conventional, cyber, informational, economic, and proxy instruments below the threshold of open war) has changed the strategic environment within which deterrence now operates. This research paper assesses whether nuclear deterrence is still effective in preventing escalation in an era marked by continuous grey zone competition amongst major powers. The paper also argues that while nuclear deterrence remains capable of preventing existential interstate wars, it is less than satisfactory as a standalone deterrent against hybrid coercion. Through qualitative analysis of strategic doctrines, nuclear posture reviews, defense white papers and official statements of the United States, Russia and China; this study demonstrates that hybrid warfare exploits the “shadow” of nuclear deterrence. The study’s findings indicate a paradox: nuclear weapons impose caution at the strategic level while allowing an intensification of competition below the threshold of major war. The study views all major powers symmetrically and recognizes that hybrid warfare is being employed by both western and non-western actors. Additionally, the study examines how the failure of arms control regimes has increased uncertainty regarding deterrence dynamics. Finally, the paper proposes an integrated model of cross-domain deterrence that incorporates nuclear credibility, political legitimacy, alliance cohesion and societal resilience.

Rights

© 2026 The Authors.

This article is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives 4.0 International (CC BY-NC-ND 4.0) License, which permits any non-commercial use, sharing, distribution and reproduction in any medium or format, as long as you give appropriate credit to the original author(s) and the source, provide a link to the Creative Commons license, and indicate if you modified the licensed material. You do not have permission under this license to share adapted material derived from this article or parts of it. The images or other third party material in this article are included in the article’s Creative Commons license, unless indicated otherwise in a credit line to the material. If material is not included in the article’s Creative Commons license and your intended use is not permitted by statutory regulation or exceeds the permitted use, you will need to obtain permission directly from the copyright holder.

Data Availability

Article states: "No datasets were generated or analysed during the current study."

ORCID

0009-0006-9633-0945 (Edmond)

Original Publication Citation

Edmond, C. (2026). Nuclear deterrence in the age of hybrid warfare. Discover Global Society, 4(1), Article 228. https://doi.org/10.1007/s44282-026-00419-1

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