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Choices for U.S. Contributions to NATO: Stability Policing in the Age of Multi-Domain Operations

Introduction

The United States Army claims they are a “force out of position” and must transform for large-scale combat operations (LSCO). The current narrative of large-scale warfighting comes at the expense of lessons hard-won over decades of small wars and stability operations. The Army is “out of position” but not just because of LSCO. The focus on LSCO is an oversimplification of the complexity and ambiguity of the future operating environment. The Army is trading clarity of narrative at the expense of a force balanced for both LSCO and non-LSCO operations.

The Army’s Multi-Domain Operations concept is increasingly being subsumed by the LSCO perspective which almost exclusively focuses on the sharpest point of the spear, without enough attention to the supporting functions that allow these wars to be won. Additionally, the LSCO perspective assumes a worst-case scenario of war over more likely scenarios of continuous disruptions across a spectrum of conflict, which may include proxies, hybrid warfare, and gray-zone aggression. These ambiguous forms of non-LSCO conflict are most likely to be prevalent amongst the nuclear armed-great powers that current security documents highlight as the most dangerous to western liberal interests.

It should be remembered that in the last period of peer competition in a nuclear era, the Cold War, the superpowers never faced off directly. Instead, they consistently competed with deterrence-by-denial and only fought indirectly through state or non-state proxies. Often, stability in areas of operation were as much or more of a concern than enemy destruction. To find the proper “fighting stance” in a period of renewed great

power competition, Multi-Domain Operations must be seen through both existential LSCO events and increasing non-LSCO events. In both categories, stability is a critical, non-optional, shaping component to success. While military forces may want to focus on combat tasks, a lack of minimum stability will undermine the ability of these forces to project combat forces per MDO. The lack of funds for non-military agencies means that the Department of Defense, and the United States Army as lead-service, will almost assuredly be told to fill stability voids in competition, crisis, and conflict. To get ahead of this eventuality while there is still time to program and develop, the Army must consider how to conduct multinational stability operations with its allies and partners, including the employment of stability police.

By examining policy, strategic, operational, and tactical considerations, this paper examines four discrete options for stability policing, including a civilian standby police force, cross-training combat forces in stability policing, a Security Force Assistance Brigade-like stability police force, and a National Guard gendarmerie-type construct. Through the evaluation of seven weighted criteria, the National Guard “State Stability Forces” are recommended to replace several National Guard Brigade Combat Teams. In doing so, states gain a capability more aligned with their Title 32 missions. The U.S. Army gains a competition capability, a crisis-response shaper, and a conflict enabler. After a review of the background, analysis, and synthesis of relevant information, a new understanding is developed that can guide campaigns of learning amongst subject matter experts around the world.

Background

There are several nested concepts at the intersection between MDO and Stability Policing. A review of MDO highlights that LSCO is a subset, not the entirety of the concept. Underlying LSCO and non-LSCO operations are stability operations, including the use of Stability Police. Various multinational and national approaches to stability policing inform the analysis of U.S. contributions to international missions in an MDO environment.

Strategic Concepts. There are many policy and strategic documents that inform the MDO stability policing conversation. The *NATO 2022 Strategic Concept* lays out a vision “to live in a world where sovereignty, territorial integrity, human rights and international law are respected and where each country can choose its path, free from aggression, coercion or subversion” (NATO 2022, 2). It goes on to lay out three core tasks: deterrence and defense; crisis prevention and management; and cooperative security. These tasks are carried out in a strategic environment full of physical and human security threats. While Russia is the largest threat, the People’s Republic of China is also called out by name along with terrorism, African and Middle Eastern conflict, and malign activities by Syria, Iran, and North Korea. Arms control and nuclear proliferation are highlighted as major concerns. Throughout, the document highlights the impacts of *instability* such as sexual violence, food insecurity, human trafficking, and cultural damage. Risks in cyberspace, space, and climates are all concerns.

The Biden Administration’s National Defense Strategy (NDS) is currently classified but based on *The Interim National Security Strategic Guidance* from 2021 and public releases about the 2022 NDS, it is likely highly aligned with the *NATO 2022*

Strategic Concept. The four priorities of the 2022 NDS are: defending the homeland, paced to the growing multi-domain threat posed by the PRC; deterring strategic attacks against the United States, Allies, and partners; deterring aggression, while being prepared to prevail in conflict when necessary, prioritizing the PRC challenge in the Indo-Pacific, then the Russia challenge in Europe; building a resilient Joint Force and defense ecosystem (Department of Defense 2022). North Korea, Iran, violent extremist organizations, and climate change as additional threats. Like the NATO document, it lists three approaches to achieve defense priorities: integrated deterrence, campaigning, and actions that build enduring advantages.

These documents highlight the importance of the holistic impact of *multiple domains*. This idea is mentioned seven times in the 11-page NATO concept and is called out specifically in U.S. documents. Secondly, *none* of these sources specify that *large-scale combat operations* are the default way that threats could or should be engaged. Instead, these documents reference a wide range of activities that are used by threats at various scales. Third, the need for *stability* is mentioned as a strategic end, an operational method, and a tactical level means necessary for success. The interim security guidance discusses stability 13 times, and the NATO strategy mentions it 27 times. Consistent stability messaging reinforces the idea that the MDO concept should work across a spectrum of security needs and should include stability as an end, way, and mean. Exploring the literature in these specific areas reinforces these ideas.

Multi-Domain Operations. Multi-Domain Battle (MDB), an initial concept that preceded MDO, pointed out that while the U.S. engaged in counterinsurgency operations in Iraq and Afghanistan, adversaries developed many capabilities that

contested American and allied dominance in domains where the joint force once enjoyed supremacy. It states, “the warfighting problem based on the complexities of the modern battlefield, the rate of change in terms of information access and decision, and the role that non-traditional or proxy/hybrid actors play to shape operations, especially prior to armed conflict” (U.S. Army TRADOC 2016). The solution MDB proposed relied on integrating capability in all domains to create holistically more powerful solutions.

Albert Palazzo cogently captured many of the criticisms of MDB in a three part-series in *Strategy Bridge*. Among other points, Palazzo recommended cross-agency synergy and a focus on “concerted and focused efforts by all government agencies to achieve strategic objectives by seeking advantages over potential adversaries before the commencement of hostilities, or even before the commencement of operational planning” (Palazzo 2017). TRADOC acknowledged an overemphasis on combat during MDO edits. The TRADOC commander wrote that “it became clear that the use of the word “battle” was stifling conversation and growth of the concept” (Townsend 2018). He determined the concept should span the tactical, operational, and strategic considerations while balancing conflict and non-conflict responsibilities. In other words, MDO would require an alignment with national strategy, cover the spectrum of military operations, and create joint and multinational interoperability (Townsend 2018).

The new *U.S. Army in Multi-Domain Operations 2028* outlined the military problem that “[i]n a new era of great power competition, our nation's adversaries seek to achieve their strategic aims, short of conflict, by the use of layered stand-off in the political, military and economic realms to separate the U.S. from our partners” (U.S.

Army TRADOC 2018). Through the core tenants of calibrated force posture, multi-domain formations, and convergence, the Army could achieve its overarching solution:

The U.S. Army in Multi-Domain Operations 2028 concept proposes a series of solutions to solve the problem of layered standoff. The central idea in solving this problem is the rapid and continuous integration of all domains of warfare to deter and prevail as we compete short of armed conflict. If deterrence fails, Army formations, operating as part of the Joint Force, penetrate and dis-integrate enemy anti-access and area denial systems; exploit the resulting freedom of maneuver to defeat enemy systems, formations and objectives and to achieve our own strategic objectives; and consolidate gains to force a return-to-competition on terms more favorable to the U.S., our allies and partners. (U.S. Army TRADOC 2018)

The idea of competition, or operating below the threshold of armed conflict, is a powerful component of the concept. It calls for “active engagement to counter coercion, unconventional warfare, and information warfare directed against partners” (U.S. Army TRADOC 2018). Cognitive separation and conflict below the threshold of armed conflict are reminiscent of hybrid or “grey zone” threats that rely on proxies, criminal actors, and other non-uniformed personnel to blur peace and war. Inevitably, the counter for these means requires interaction with the civilian population, using tools the majority of the Army is not used to leveraging, including unique capabilities and authorities. The concept points out that “In the past, the U.S. military—due to cultural, statutory, and policy reasons—has often remained reactive in competition below armed conflict” (U.S. Army TRADOC 2018, 27). Traditional military options used in this period may actually fuel adversary narratives and accelerate escalation, rather than reduce it. The concept suggests that calibrated, multi-domain forces in the right locations, with effective capabilities and authorities for action are necessary in competition. (U.S. Army TRADOC 2018, v).

Many characteristics of competition require stability and the ability to interact with civil populations. Even in cases where conflict is inevitable, a variety of activities must be completed to “set the theater” including, sustainment, security, and integration. Allied or partner forces are required to safeguard ports, roads, rail, utility infrastructure, and the labor force. These activities remain critical through the *penetrate*, *dis-integrate*, and *exploit* phases of the solution, as forces can only project so far without reliable resupply and communications. As forces move forward, they are likely to encounter progressively higher levels of destruction and instability. Without a significant stabilizing capability, combat power is slowly pulled towards maintaining larger areas of “rear” control, against adversaries skilled in projecting their influence at longer distances.

The call for stabilizing forces is critical in the *return to competition*. The concept points out that in an age of nuclear near-peer, the likelihood of total defeat is reduced. Therefore, unlike in the post-World War II period, the same adversaries will remain adjacent to the areas now occupied by allied forces.¹ The consolidation of military gains is aided as civil stability is increased. If military forces must maintain a deterrent stance, they are unlikely to afford any loss of forces to build a constabulary force. Whether for the consolidation of gains or the re-establishment of deterrent capability, some sort of stability force would aid military forces conducting MDO.

Stability is critical in all phases of the military solution presented in MDO. The amounts and locations of stability vary with time and the condition of the environment. Despite MDB’s and MDO’s wide remit across the spectrum of conflict, considerations of

¹ In post WWII Europe, while the Nazis were defeated, the resulting instability in Eastern Europe allowed for the rise of a new adversary in the form of the U.S.S.R. While the Cold War represents a clear picture of competition, it was with a different competitor, unlike in MDO, which imagines the ability of the same adversary to remain engaged, albeit in a strategically disadvantaged position.

large-scale combat operations are dominating the intellectual conversation. Therefore, understanding scale in operations is a critical building block.

Operational Scales. In MDB, the conversation around scale focused on the compression of the battlefield due to speed of attack, or its extension due to the range of weapons and information effects. Later, the terms “large-scale ground combat” and “large-scale combat operations” emerged from a separate effort from the MDD concept development. MDO would sparingly adopt the term to merge perspectives, by mentioning the term three times in the document (Figure 1). Additionally, there was a shift from conducting MDB operations at all echelons to fighting “in echelon”. From the Theater Army down to the brigade level, different unit types played specific roles. While this provided clarity for what role each echelon’s functions should be, it tied these units together in an “all or nothing” configuration best suited for large-scale operations.




Figure 1 – A Google Trends Analysis was conducted by the author between the terms Large-Scale Combat Operations, Multi-Domain Battle, and Multi-Domain Operations on July 31, 2022. As MDB transitioned to MDO, Large-scale Combat Operations became an increasingly prevalent topic (Google, 2022).

The weaving of MDO and LSCO appeared to be impacted by a few factors. From a top-down perspective, the 2017 National Security Strategy and 2018 National Defense Strategy reinforced the military's traditional wartime character, through "overmatch". For example, the 2017 National Security Strategy stated, "[t]o retain military overmatch the United States must restore our ability to produce innovative capabilities, restore the readiness of our forces for major war, and grow the size of the force so that it is capable of operating at sufficient scale and for ample duration to win across a range of scenarios" (The White House 2017, 28). Less often quoted is the paragraph before, which states "[t]he Joint Force demonstrates U.S. resolve and commitment and provides us with the ability to fight and win across any plausible conflict that threatens U.S. vital interests" (The White House 2017, 28). While large-scale combat may be the most existential form of conflict short of nuclear war, the implication of winning "across any plausible conflict" is that military forces must be prepared for other modalities as well, while also contributing to competition. Lower-tier conflicts are not just about scaling down; they often require wholly different capabilities – such as stability police.

From the bottom-up perspective, as the NSS and NDS were published, TRADOC's Combined Arms Center undertook the task of understanding the capability gaps in the current force, to what might be needed in large-scale, conventional combat. The "17 LSCO Gaps" that resulted helped set the direction of capability development and thinking inside the Army. In October of 2018, a special edition of *Military Review* published a seven-book series focused on the history and future of LSCO. This

publication marked a waypoint of the narrative that tied the historical culture and successes of the Army with a similar vision of the future.

In adopting this narrative, the Army could use its organizational culture for change, instead of fighting its inertia. Referring back to Figure 1, we see that the interest in MDO and LSCO remained approximately equal to each other, with neither overtaking the other. While this could indicate an ongoing debate, the literature seems to suggest a merging between the two perspectives. For example, the *Army Multi-Domain Transformation: Ready to Win in Competition and Conflict* focuses on competition as a method to support the deterrence of defeat of great powers, near-peers, and peers (McConville 2021). The document goes on to suggest a logical connection between large-scale adversaries and large-scale conventional war. LSCO preparation represents a focus on conventional existential threats. However, if successful, that existential fight with a great power never comes. Historically speaking, Korea, Vietnam, Afghanistan, Syria, Ukraine, and other locations demonstrated that nuclear powers are more likely to compete through non-nuclear proxies. On one hand, LSCO represents an existential, if unlikely threat. On the other, non-LSCO operations represent a likely but insidious threat since their risks are difficult to gauge. In both cases, stability operations are a critical requirement for success.

Stability in the Military Context. Armies were traditionally created to “break” things. The need to destroy or defeat the enemy is core to the identity of military organizations. The pursuit of victory is not only often existential to the nation, but also to the identity of military organizations. Drifting from this core can cause an organizational identity crisis. While the military may not be interested in stability, stability is interested

in them. To successfully incorporate stability into military thought, it is important to understand its strategic, operational, and tactical forms. Only then can stability be placed in the context of Multi-Domain Operations, in both its LSCO and non-LSCO circumstances.

Stability as a Policy and Strategic Goal. War and other military actions like stability operations are generally recognized as politics as other means (Clausewitz 1989). Stability is often referred to with an assumed positive value. Stability can mean adherence to norms, predictability, and rule of law, all of which set the stage for economic and political cooperation. However, in a review of stability in international relations, Antonini (1999) found the term an unsettled concept. Stability was generally used to explain an equilibrium or robustness to some other property, whose value may or may not be positive. For example, you may have a stable state of peace or conflict; a political order stable but immoral. Stability is necessary for some areas to allow for growth in other areas (Colvin 2014). For example, an environment stable in its lack of violence allows for resource allocation in other areas (Institute for Economics and Peace 2021).

From a foreign policy perspective, Hastedt (2011, 342) points out that stability operations “may focus on internal situations, but may also have a broader focus seeking to prevent interstate violence from breaking out or trying to prevent an international conflict from spilling over into neighboring states”. Therefore stability is as much about prevention as it is prevention or mitigation. In security studies, a RAND (1966) definition stated that “[i]nternational stability is defined as a condition of international relations in which interstate violence is substantially nonexistent and where there is little likelihood

of this condition's changing unexpectedly to any significant degree.” In fact, stability is a key tenant of the North Atlantic Treaty, whose preamble includes seeking “to promote stability and well-being in the North Atlantic area” (NATO 1949). Article 2 states that Allies will “contribute toward the further development of peaceful and friendly international relations by strengthening their free institutions, by bringing about a better understanding of the principles upon which these institutions are founded, and by promoting conditions of stability and well-being... [and] seek to eliminate conflict in their international economic policies and will encourage economic collaboration between any or all of them” (NATO 1949). This reinforces the concept that stability is a strategic goal that enables other forms of political and economic cooperation.

For many years, NATO’s operations were most closely tied to development through the stability of security. In Bosnia, Kosovo, its training mission in Iraq, and even in its expansion across Europe, the west sought to end conflict and emplace and conditions for political-economic cooperation. At the 2014 Wales Summit, NATO focused not just on traditional deterrence, but on “expanding the ability to project stability beyond the Euro–Atlantic space” (Mercier 2018). Deterrence, crisis management, and peacekeeping were all seen as forms of projecting stability (Díaz-Plaja 2018). For the United States part, neither the 2018 nor 2021-2022 strategic guidance documents deviated from an appreciation for international stability, quoting the term in nearly every diplomatic, informational, economic, and military section.

Stability, from a strategic security perspective, describes a lack of conflict that sets the conditions for political and economic growth. For the military practitioner, the pursuit of stability is often the termination criteria for military missions. Although

militaries may orient on the destruction of the enemy, the U.S. Army identifies a strategic role to shape operational environments that “bring together all the activities intended to promote regional stability and to set conditions for a favorable outcome in the event of a military confrontation” (Headquarters, Department of the Army 2019). In other words, stability is not just a goal; it can be a form of operations.

Stability as an Operational Consideration. “Operations” carry varied meanings. In NATO’s definition, operations are “a sequence of coordinated actions with a defined purpose”(NATO 2022). Army Doctrinal Publication 3-0 advises planners to use operational art to cognitively link tactical actions to strategic objectives in time space and purpose (Headquarters, Department of the Army 2019). In operational art, planners use defeat and stability mechanisms to bridge micro-level activities to macro-level goals. In the ADP 3-0 (2-5), “a stability mechanism is the primary method through which friendly forces affect civilians in order to attain conditions that support establishing a lasting, stable peace”. Some examples include:

- *Compel means to use, or threaten to use, lethal force to establish control and dominance, affect behavioral change, or enforce compliance with mandates, agreements, or civil authority.*
- *Control involves imposing civil order.*
- *Influence means to alter the opinions, attitudes, and ultimately the behavior of foreign friendly, neutral, adversary, and enemy audiences through messages, presence, and actions.*
- *Support establishes, reinforces, or sets the conditions necessary for the instruments of national power to function effectively.*

In other words, leveraging these mechanisms provides the ability to achieve the strategic goals of regional or international stability. They are components of the operational approach. Before Multi-Domain Operations, Unified Land Operations described the Army’s operating concept. In it, four operational elements – defense, offense, stability, and defense support of civil authorities could be emphasized in

different proportions over time to achieve desired operational outcomes. The elements are interlinked. For example, the use of stability not only helps civil populations; it also supports secure lines of communication, basing, and assembly for combat areas. For this reason, commanders must consider stability a key role in their combat success.

Beyond the mechanisms, *stability operations* also appears as a term in its own right, as “an operation conducted outside the United States in coordination with other instruments of national power to establish or maintain a secure environment and provide essential governmental services, emergency infrastructure reconstruction, and humanitarian relief” (Headquarters, Department of the Army 2019, 3–0).

The document goes on to state:

These operations support governance by a host nation, an interim government, or a military government. Stability involves coercive and constructive action. Stability helps in building relationships among unified action partners and promoting U.S. security interests. It can help establish political, legal, social, and economic institutions in an area while supporting transition of responsibility to a legitimate authority. Commanders are legally required to perform minimum-essential stability operations tasks when controlling populated areas of operations. These include security, food, water, shelter, and medical treatment.

As with stability mechanisms, Stability Operations connect the military to civil considerations, and in doing so it opens the commander’s legal authority and responsibility over a range of social considerations. Here we find the need to build, rather than break. Stability also shifts the measure of success away from control of terrain or reduction of enemy strength to conditions often more difficult to achieve.

Stability as Tactical Tasks. Two of the best military references for how to conduct Stability Operations are ADP 3-07 and Field Manual (FM) 3-07, which lay out the details of executing stability operations tasks, and sequencing them from initial response - to transformation - to fostering sustainability through a continuum of failed,

failing, and recovering society. FM 3-07 goes further by arranging military stability tasks with Department of State post-conflict reconstruction essential tasks. These manuals provide the cognitive connection to transition military control to civilians. The manuals describe six stability tasks: establish civil security, establish civil control, restore essential services, support governance, support economic and infrastructure development, and conduct security cooperation. Tasks are aligned to Whole-of-Government sectors of Security, Justice and Reconciliation, Humanitarian Assistance and Social Well-Being, Governance/Participation, Economic Stabilization and Infrastructure. This delineation is important because it shows how military forces interact with civil society, but also makes a distinction about what the military should or should not do in the realm of stability.

Stability in international relations is a policy and strategy goal because the reduction of violence between states provides the predictability necessary for political-economic trust and risk-taking between nations, which leads to mutual benefit. Stability operations are the civil-military objectives that must be built upon to achieve that strategic goal. They also provide the conditions necessary for successful military operations, whether for offense, defense, or stability itself. Stability tasks are the activities that must be sequenced to achieve those operational objectives. Ultimately, the success of stability operations is the transition to civil control. Among other capabilities, Stability Policing is a means to obtain civil order.

Stability Policing. Where other forms of Security Assistance rely on training forces to defend against external threats, stability police are primarily focused on

positively impacting internal security. There are many examples of stability police models from the United Nations to individual nations, which are explored below.

The United Nations Model. United Nations Police (UNPOL) first deployed to the Congo in 1960. Since that time, UNPOL missions increased in size, complexity, scope, and formality. As defined in 2018, “the mission of UN Police is to enhance international peace and security by supporting Member-States in conflict, post-conflict and other crisis situations. Its goal is to realize effective, efficient, representative, responsive and accountable police services that serve and protect the population” (United Nations Police 2022). About 11,000 police are serving from 90 contributing countries in 14 UN missions. Officers serve in *formed police units* or as *individual police officers* as members of specialized teams, contracted seconded police, and civilian experts (United Nations Police 2022). These police use operational, capacity-building, and development tasks to improve civil conditions in their areas of responsibility. Areas of focus include public, safety, investigation, special operations, community policing, police services, enabling services, policy formulation, accountability, governance, and stakeholder engagement (United Nations 2017).

Despite a long legacy of operations, United Nations’ efforts towards stability have not been without criticism. One of the most well-regarded examinations is the “Report of the Panel on United Nations Peacekeeping” led by the UN diplomat Lakhdar Brahimi. This report determined that for successful peacekeeping, UN police should have the skills to reform and restructure the police they are partnered with, in addition to advising and monitoring. The report also highlighted that ad hoc deployments of police from various countries, caused difficulties because contributing nations only maintained a

limited capacity of ready police. Police were often unfamiliar with multinational operations and took time to integrate, delaying responsiveness. The review recommended that a standing capacity be established across nations, with specialized training, and short-notice availability. These police should nest in a larger civil justice team that includes technical experts (such as investigators and forensics) and experts on human, judicial, penal, and other rights. The report called for separation of military and police command authorities and requested that mandates for population protection be clear and appropriately resourced (Brahimi 2000).

The “Brahimi Report” fundamentally shifted stability policing to today’s structure. Creating formed police units and specialized teams improved the UNPOL system. Yet, the employment of police relies on contributing nations voluntarily delivering contribution in time. Limited-scale police groups who often hesitate to use force create additional gaps in stability operations. UN police can still be too late to arrive and underpowered to deal with large-scale producers of instability. This leads to both a “deployment gap” and “enforcement gap” that must be mitigated (Congressional Research Service 2004).

National Models. Nearly all nations maintain some sort of national police force for internal stability tasks. Generally, these forces are tapped into as contributions to United Nations missions. The *Carabinieri* in Italy, *Gendarmerie* in France, and *Guardia Civili* in Spain are examples of paramilitary–like police forces. While exercising police powers, forces are armed and trained to deal with larger-scale threats. These forces are experienced in national-level authorities, investigations, and operations to a much greater degree than their municipal brethren. Their employment is often concerned with

the social well-being of the state, which is particularly in line with stability. These forces are often used in UN, NATO, EU, and independent stability operations.

The *Carabinieri* are a separate branch of Italy's military forces, with full-time national police authority. They are equipped with small arms, ground vehicles, aircraft, and watercraft to carry out their missions. *Carabinieri* personnel assist in disaster response, military police, security of diplomatic missions, mobilization support, judicial police, public order, security policing, national civil protection, and international stability operations. Notably, since 1998 the *Carabinieri* maintain a successful *Multinational Specialized Unit* that has served in Bosnia and Herzegovina, Albania, Iraq, and Kosovo. Because of their intellectual and experiential background, Italy hosts both the Center of Excellence for Stability Police Units (CoESPU 2022) and the NATO Stability Policing Centre Of Excellence. Italy's tradition of gendarmerie forces, combined with a willingness to employ them in multilateral international operations, and the establishment of training programs for other gendarmerie combine to make them a leader in this space.

Another leader and perhaps the oldest paramilitary police force is the French Gendarmerie (Gendarmerie Nationale 2022). Originating as a 14th-century constabulary, this force would later control the national public order mission, including crowd and riot control. Although under the authority of the Minister of the Interior, it maintains responsibilities to the Minister of Defence as well. Like the *Carabinieri* it "is a military force in charge of law enforcement, which has a full jurisdiction over civilian population while carrying out judicial police, public safety, public order and intelligence missions, by implementing its interoperable policing and military skills both on the

national territory and abroad” (NATO 2022). It maintains air, maritime, land, and special force capabilities. French *Gendarmerie* served in many of the same locations as *Carabinieri* plus locations across Africa.

Other *Gendarmerie*-type forces include Netherland’s Koninklijke Marechaussee, Poland’s Zandarmeria Wojskowa, Portuguese Guarda Nacional Republicana, Romania’s Jandarmeria Română, Spain’s Guardia Civil, Lithuania’s Viesojo Saugumo Tarnyba and Turkey’s Jandarma Genel Komutanligi all participate with France and Italy in the European Gendarmerie Force in the EU. They served missions in Afghanistan, BiH, Kosovo, Central African Republic, Haiti, Libya, Mali, Tunisia, and Ukraine (EUROGENDFOR 2022). Many of these same nations also participate in the NATO Stability Policing Center or Excellence.

In North America, only Mexico maintains an active *gendarmerie*, beginning in 2014 (Corcoran 2017). Canada does maintain the Royal Canadian Mounted Police, which is a purely civil national police force (Government of Canada 2019). Through the RCMP’s International Policing Program and agreements with Global Affairs Canada and Public Safety Canada, contributions are made to multilateral and UN police missions (Government of Canada 2018). The United States has federal-level police departments, but they are generally arrayed to specialized functions, such as U.S. Park Police, U.S. Marshall’s, or any of the various departmental police or investigative services. However, none of these services has the excess capacity to support large-scale deployments to support stability operations or policing.

Gendarmerie-type forces significantly reduce the deployment and enforcement gaps if scaled appropriately. *Gendarmerie* maintains both military and civil training,

authorities, and operations that answer the challenges of grey-zone aggression.

Although they vary by nation, most nations can provide forces capable of supporting, mentoring, training, and even temporarily replacing host-nation police capability. The exception amongst allies appears to be the United States.

Analysis

Using the background of the literature review, it is possible to evaluate stability situations in Multi-Domain Operations requiring policing, both at the LSCO and non-LSCO scales. From there, proposals for possible stability force contributions can be evaluated by various criteria to determine a priority for future study.

Stability in MDO–LSCO. NATO’s Allied Command Transformation is developing the alliance’s vision for MDO. Currently, the working definition is “the orchestration of military activities, across all domains and environments, synchronized with non-military activities, to enable the Alliance to deliver converging effects at the speed of relevance” (NATO Allied Command for Transformation 2022). Since the definition is yet to develop into a full concept, the next best place for insight is the United States Army’s *Multi-Domain Operations: The Army in 2028*.

The concept is threat-based, highlighting the risks that Russia, China, North Korea, and Iran pose through their ability to project instability at the strategic level. Projection combines military, informational, psychological, economic, political, and other means including hybrid warfare and “gray-zone aggression”. On one hand hybrid warfare “is a conflict involving persistent use of military force and non-armed aggression and can occur between both countries and substate entities that are at war with each other and those that are not” (Braw 2022). On the other hand, “gray-zone aggression is

the use of hostile acts outside the realm of armed conflict to weaken a rival, country, entity, or alliance” (Braw 2022). The goal of both is the breakdown in trust not just of home governments, but of the values and social systems of the nations at which they are aimed. Civilians are very much a cognitive and physical target, whether through coercion, propaganda, bribery, and infiltration of academia, business, and social groups. The projection of instability in the adversaries’ near-abroad is known as “stand-off” in MDO.

The nations employing stand-off also have either large-scale conventional, nuclear forces, or both. If allies do not field LSCO capabilities, it creates a vacuum of power that adversaries can take advantage of through a *fait accompli* (Boston et al. 2018). The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (AUSA 2016), the Chief of Staff of the Army (McConville 2021; Rempfer 2019), and the MDO concept itself, all require the Army to “prevail in large-scale ground combat operations” (U.S. Army TRADOC 2018, 24). Through the previous discussion of MDO’s solutions, the necessity for stability is revealed.

Stability in Competition. Here we ask how stability operations contribute to the Joint Force, so it can “compete to enable the defeat of an adversary’s operations to destabilize the region, deter the escalation of violence, and, should violence escalate, enable a rapid transition to armed conflict” (U.S. Army TRADOC 2018)? The joint force is likely to encounter threats below the threshold of armed conflict, typical of “gray-zone aggression”. Some of these issues include territorial violations, corrupted non-governmental organizations, exploitation of ethnic/cultural identities, directed media, lawfare, agitation/civil unrest, cyber operations, religious groups, energy conflict, malign

political actors, bribery, corruption, and other civil affairs (Braw 2022). The MDO concept outlines critical stability counteractions such as enabling the defeat of information and unconventional warfare, conducting intelligence and counter-reconnaissance, and demonstrating deterrence.

Stability in Conflict (Hybrid Warfare-LSCO). If competition escalates to conflict, forces retain previous competition threats plus new risks of physical defeat or destruction. Grey-zone aggression can morph into hybrid warfare, employing “conventional capabilities, irregular tactics and formations, terrorist acts...coercion, and criminal disorder” (Hoffman 2007). These acts threaten the ability of allies to project power.

If forces can deploy and assemble without interruption, they can then project combat power toward destabilizing enemy strengths. When forces are preoccupied with stability tasks, however necessary, they are reducing their combat power. This is likely why many commanders are hesitant to take on these responsibilities in the first place. As forces move through the battlefield, they are more likely to confront not increasing levels of devastation. The likelihood of encountering operationally disruptive instability rises with every meter of territory gained. Even if mostly secured from enemy forces, the potential for civil insecurity rises. In an operational environment whose tenants rest upon the ambiguity of threat, this risk is important to account for. Will forces continue to move forward to exploit enemy weaknesses, or need to operationally pause to consolidate the gains they have achieved? This choice plays out on whether the military trains combat forces to conduct stability operations or designates a specialty capability

to the task. With either decision, a failure to adequately address stability makes insurgencies more possible, as seen in Iraq and Afghanistan.

Stability in Return to Competition. At this stage, stability transitions from a mainly tactical-operational consideration, to an operational-strategic imperative. Instead of stability supporting the fight, the fight must support stability. However, at least in the earliest stages of the return to competition, alliance forces are likely to remain in contact with the adversarial influence greater than in the initial competition phase (U.S. Army TRADOC 2016). Military combat forces, especially unconventional warfare assets, remain engaged with potential external risks. Combat forces must deter a return to armed conflict while strengthening host-nation defense capabilities. This is achieved through a mix of conventional combat forces, special operations forces, and security force assistance units.

However, the destruction from previous combat operations will also create large-scale humanitarian crises. Whether by circumstance, adversaries, or internal malign actors, the lack of basic needs such as water, food, heat, electricity, and housing creates divisions in the population, exasperating vulnerabilities to violence, black/grey markets, and propaganda. Internal instability will be both a natural occurrence and one accelerated by adversaries to reduce the legitimacy of allied action. Therefore, the return of internal stability is both value and interest-based. The retention of combat forces for external security, defense development, and eventual withdrawal is crucial. Security policing allows for the retention of combat forces while providing a qualified interface with civil-society, without losing stability.

Stability in LSCO Case Studies. Case studies are a valuable method for studying security issues. However, the scope of this paper does not permit the depth necessary for meaningful case studies. Instead, this section highlights the type of operations that might be helpful when thinking about stability and stability policing in Large –Scale Combat Operations. The post-Cold War period is full of examples of Stability Operations, including Stability Police. Yet, neither Bosnia, Kosovo, Mali, Haiti, nor any number of other stability operations was preceded by a large-scale war. In the latest edition of FM 3-0: Multi-Domain Operations, set for publication in October of 2022, the definition of large-scale will likely be set at the maneuver of one or more corps. In this case, only the Gulf War and Iraq war would be considered a large-scale combat operation. Unfortunately, it is also one where post-war stability and reconstruction were not carried out in the consolidation of gains.

A better source of cases may be to look at the last cases of large-scale combat involving multiple corps, such as the Korean War and World War II. These cases could provide insights into how military, and police cooperated to provide the stability necessary for the success of civil populations in South Korea, Japan, Italy, and Germany in the post-war periods. Their scale and duration would provide a stark contrast to the commitment of forces and resources in more contemporary examples.

Stability in LSCO Summary. Stability plays critical and varied roles in LSCO operations. In competition, internal stability creates legitimacy that helps counter gray-zone aggression, while also providing the security necessary for basing, lines of communication, training, and staging of forces in the case that deterrence fails. Stability operations help set the theater, by building internal civil capability and resilience,

allowing other forms of security assistance to focus on capacity building against external threats. Stability police can contribute to intelligence gathering, the continuity of command and control, and enabling civil-military interoperability.

In conflict, internal stability must retain public order to help project combat power forward. Ports must function, refugees cannot clog roads, and utilities must function. During war, nerves will be on edge and tension will rise, and these tendencies must be dealt with a minimum of violence. As forces advance into former and current battlefields, instability is likely to reign. The retention of combat forces for battle is critical to maintaining the tempo of operations and extended lines of communication.

As combat forces consolidate gains in the return to competition, the relative peace will uncover deep civil issues. Even if basic needs are managed well, competition for political control may spill into violence if not managed well. Different populations may seek vengeance on real or imagined collaborators, attempting mob justice instead of the rule of law. Ethnic or cultural divisions can emerge in these conditions and cause a diversion from other operational imperatives. However, these situations occur as a consequence of LSCO and also non-LSCO conditions.

Stability in MDO-Non-LSCO. At the end of the Cold War, a new term entered the military lexicon – Military Operations Other Than War. As the west dealt with the instability associated with the breakup of the U.S.S.R., new military responsibilities developed. Some examples include prevention of conflict, peace operations, security sector reform, disarmament/demobilization/reintegration, foreign humanitarian assistance, foreign internal defense, and counterinsurgency. The definitions of these

operations were often blurry or overlapping because of their underlying social, rather than purely military, sources.

Resources were available for these new tasks because direct war amongst nuclear states is non-existent in the post-World War II era. Although the U.S.S.R and the west faced off during the Cold War, their conventional forces never moved against each other, in part due to the fear of nuclear annihilation. Instead, from Korea - to Vietnam - to Afghanistan, what did happen was a series of proxy wars. Although the west achieved few clear “victories” in these conflicts, the liberal western order remained not just intact, but thrived. When the United States became a superpower, it had no adversaries with the resources to mount even an effective proxy war.

Instead, adversaries incorporated new ways and means in the form of gray-zone aggression. As Braw suggests, the “primary reason gray-zone aggression is an attractive option for countries seeking to increase their power at Western expense is that the West’s traditional deterrence policy—based on conventional military strength and ultimately backed by nuclear weapons—has been successful in deterring traditional military aggression” (Braw 2021).

The west cannot abandon either nuclear or conventional deterrence. The resulting power vacuum would allow an adversary to assume the space unimpeded. However, conflicts such as Russia’s war on Ukraine are unlikely a sign that “big wars are back” amongst great powers. If anything, Ukraine is another example of a proxy war on the high end of hybrid warfare, since the west and Russia are not directly engaged with each other militarily. While LSCO is an existential concern, it is not the most likely

one. Instead, liberal democratic allies are likely to experience continued proxy and other attacks below the threshold of direct armed conflict.

In the world outlined by MDO, gray-zone and hybrid warfare occur at an increasingly frenetic pace, in a series of geographically disparate locations. Spurred by technological growth and interconnectedness, adversaries will seek asymmetric advantages in economic, political, and informational spheres. They will target the bureaucratic and cultural fault lines to create organizational and societal division and paralysis. Targets of the enemy are often non-military, increasingly challenging the military instrument as an appropriate response tool. The ability to move amongst the civil population as a trusted agent is critical. But this takes more than stability police “working their beat”. Technology will only continue to proliferate, adding a host of physical, cyber, and cognitive threats. Stability forces, including police, will battle for trust in communities flooded with inaccuracies and propaganda. Hacking exposes personal information of allied personnel, creating the possibility for hyper-focused psychological impact, more typical of a marketing campaign than a psychological operation. Stability police are as likely to be under surveillance by unmanned systems and cameras as they are to be conducting their surveillance. As trans-national crime organizations take advantage of this situation, there is a real chance that threats could extend back to officers’ homes. Contributing police departments may be less willing to contribute forces if adversarial reputational attacks are levied against their organizations, personnel, and families. Non-LSCO stability operations are likely to be complex, confusing, and increasingly personal.

Stability in Non-LSCO Case Studies. For non-LSCO operations, there is more utility in contemporary cases. Afghanistan, Bosnia, Kosovo, Somalia, and Haiti are all useful. Technological growth and the impacts of globalization may also mean examining non-military examples where violence is used. Campaigns against organized crime, transnational criminal organizations, and counter-narcotics bring to light not only technical and tactical considerations but also operational examples of second and third-order unintentional consequences which might lead to different disruptions in complex social systems.

Stability in Non-LSCO Conclusion. Strategically speaking, a single non-LSCO event is unlikely to be an existential threat to a developed nation or alliance. However, continuous instability is like “death by a thousand cuts”. To avoid this death by disruption, a long-term approach and design must consider that efforts will never be “finished”, but are continuously challenged. This requires resilient and balanced force designs as the hierarchy of conflict types expands. Data shows intrastate and internationalized intrastate conflicts significantly outnumber interstate conflicts in the last 70 years (Robinson et al. 2018; Figure 2).




Figure 2 - Comparison of conflict types since WWII shows a minimal and decreasing number of interstate conflicts over time (Robinson et al. 2018).

The end of the Cold War was not “the end of history” hoped for by liberal political thinkers (Fukuyama 1989). However, it may have marked a transition point that authoritative systems are not well-equipped to compete by threat of large-scale force, at least against nuclear competitors. By seeking out ways of malign activity below LSCO military force, competitors can extend their resources to longer campaigns. Democratic allies have the advantage of flexibility but need to understand that they are in a long game to adapt their structures appropriately. An overcorrection to an all-LSCO force creates a vulnerability to the most-likely ways and means. Therefore, understanding the dynamics that might contribute to misalignment is important.

The Issues U.S. Contributions to Multinational Stability. Strategic and operational documents are clear on the need for multinational approaches. Single nations are particularly fragile to either LSCO or multiple aggregated non-LSCO events.

The U.S. must be prepared to provide stability for forces to multinational efforts, as well as integrate other nations' contributions. However, there are some factors particular to U.S. military contributions that could slow integration.

First, most, if not all military organizations, are built on a foundation of destroying and defeating the enemy. The United States Army's stated mission is:

To deploy, fight and win our nation's wars by providing ready, prompt and sustained land dominance by Army forces across the full spectrum of conflict as part of the joint force. The Army mission is vital to the Nation because we are the service capable of defeating enemy ground forces and indefinitely seizing and controlling those things an adversary prizes most – its land, its resources and its population. (Department of the Army 2022)

While acknowledging the full spectrum of conflict, the message is clear that armies break the enemy. Other political outcomes may come from this action, such as rebuilding a nation, but the military is a unique state tool deliberately built for destruction. While some military members may see the value of stability, it is a bit of antithesis to the military culture writ large. Understandably, military culture drives to optimize its primary role.

Given unlimited resources, perhaps the cultural inertia toward large-scale conventional warfighting would be easier to balance with other tasks. However, resource constraints are a serious consideration. Although the United States spends more than any other nation in the world, there are significant competing requirements for the federal budget, including the military services. Each service or program develop compelling narratives to explain why their approach is critical for the success of the nation. The most successful narratives are those which show immediate benefit, while also tying contemporary efforts to the traditional

role of the service. Because the narratives must be crystal clear when speaking to external audiences, they may lose portions of nuance over time to their internal audiences. This helps to explain why the more inclusive MDO concept is continually paired with the easy-to-identify LSCO narrative. Unfortunately, in this pairing, the criticality of stability operations may be drowned out of the conversation.

There is also a concern with military forces being involved in stability policing. A 2009 RAND study looked at whether the United States should field its own stability policing capability. The authors highlighted that military forces lacked the “training, experience, and mindset for policing” (Kelly et al. 2009). Military forces were found to use force as a first, rather than last option and had little contact in operations with civil populations in their training or experience. While Security Force Assistance units might be used to train some police forces to build capacity (Berriman et al. 2021), there are concerns that police might also take on the characteristics of a military force, if overexposed to military techniques (Billow 2020).

With the release of the 2018 National Defense Strategy, the lead for stabilization was shifted to the Department of State, U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) as agency of execution, and the Department of Defense in support (Bureau of Conflict and Stabilization Operations 2018). However, critics have pointed out that this approach may simply not be feasible or acceptable (Goodson 2018). First, while the DoD may or may not want the role of stability lead, they are simply the only department or agency funded to carry out stability

at scale. While there are millions of personnel in the Department of Defense, USAID numbers around 10,000 employees. Especially in a LSCO environment, it is difficult to see the Department of State having the capacity for such a mission. The last major success with post-war stabilization is World War II, where U.S. Army Constabulary forces were used for nearly eight years until German authorities resumed duties for policing. Throughout Austria and Germany, over 38,000 of these forces were employed (Center for Military History 2000). This “capacity gap” between what the State Department has the means to employ and what is necessary, means that U.S. military forces will likely be required to perform various stability functions amid and the immediate period after a conflict.

Additionally, under current agreements, such as the Geneva Convention and Hague regulations on military occupation, the military owns responsibilities for territorial stabilization where it gains control (Robinson et al. 2018). Further, with both gray-zone aggression and hybrid warfare, state and non-state actors will continue to play whatever organizational lines the U.S. puts in place to their advantage (Goodson 2018). For all the confusion of Afghanistan and Iraq, future conflicts will likely be even more ambiguous. Threats will not only take advantage of ambiguity, they will leverage technology to change approaches with increasing speed. Stability operations and policing will need to scale in size and apply varying levels of force. Maintaining a purely civilian force with this capacity and capability with no additional domestic responsibilities would come at a high cost. Therefore, options for stability forces, if not stability police will almost always include a military element. Understanding the options and criteria for a civilian,

military, or hybrid force is important in determining how the United States can best partner with allies in international stability operations.

Stability Policing in MDO: Evaluation Criteria for U.S. Contributions. With the review of MDO and Stability Operations, both in LSCO and non-LSCO, several characteristics should be addressed in the fielding of stability police capability. Budgetary considerations, responsiveness, scalability, the ability to transition to civilian control, retention of combat forces, and simplicity are considered in this order as evaluation criteria.

Because funding is a known constraint that drives the shape of capability decisions, it is placed first in the list of considerations. The lower the cost is considered better than higher. Secondly, the deployment of stability police capability must be responsive, due to the speed of situational changes projected in multi-domain operations. The longer it takes a stability force to mobilize and integrate, the greater the chance that instability will set in or that combat forces will be needed for stability tasks. Third, forces must be scalable to the geographic span of operations needed. A unit may have the best capabilities in the world, but if it is unable to conduct stability across the hundreds or thousands of miles in large-scale combat operations, then it is unlikely to be effective. Fourth, options are preferred that best integrate and transition to local civilian control. Militarization of civil authorities is to be avoided whenever possible. Fifth, the force must be capable of operating in foreign environments with multinational allies or partners. Sixth, the force must ultimately reduce the need for combat forces to engage in stability operations. Finally, simplicity is valued for its ability explain and

employ easily. With these criteria in mind, it is possible to examine multiple avenues for stability policing.

Options for U.S. Stability Policing Integration in Multinational MDO. For this analysis, four discrete choices for U.S. stability policing are reviewed and compared with each other. This list is neither exhaustive nor entirely novel. Portions of these options have been explored in other capacities, sometimes under similar circumstances. However, this is likely the first analysis and comparison of stability policing options from a MDO perspective. The four options for examination are a civilian-only capacity outside the military, using combat forces trained in policing skills as a secondary skill, developing a U.S. “federated” gendarmerie using the National Guards of the states, or the development of Stability Policing Transition Units similar to Security Force Assistance Brigades.

Standby Civilian-Only Capability. While gendarmerie forces are available resources for many countries, the United States has had neither a standing constabulary force nor a national police force of significant size for land service. The United States Coast Guard does act as a maritime national police force. However, its authorities, traditions, and capacity would not be suitable for an overseas, land-based, stability mission. In 2009, a RAND study recommended the creation of a civilian-reserve force under the supervision of the U.S. Marshall’s service. The report found that for a 6,000-person force, the cost would be approximately \$637 million in 2007 dollars. A force this size could provide stability for a country like the Ivory Coast, similar in size to Germany or New Mexico. This would be a significant capability if available on short notice. While significant discussions on developing such options took place at the height

of the Iraq and Afghanistan wars in the 2007-2010 period, the capability never fully materialized. The lack of a national policing culture for these forces likely contributed to this issue.

Training Existing Combat Forces. As previously mentioned, by treaty the United States military maintains responsibility for the stability of areas it takes control of during a time of war. However, immediate stability in the wake of conflict versus long-term stability requires different levels of focus and commitment. While Military Police are trained in many techniques such as detention, investigation, traffic control, and crowd control, their numbers are in small supply. Infantry and armor personnel are well-versed in the use of weapons, but not necessarily in restrained force. Training soldiers for stability tasks is possible, but will likely lose out to combat readiness and modernization priorities.

Civil Affairs, Special Forces, Engineers, Medical, and Judge Advocate General personnel all have a role in stability operations, but not in policing tasks. The Reserve component of the U.S. Army does employ a “38G” Civil Affairs area of concentration which includes specialties in laws, regulations, and policies; judiciary and legal systems, corrections, emergency management, and law and border enforcement (U.S. Army Talent Management 2016). However, the numbers of these type personnel are unlikely to ever reach the capacity needed for a policing force, and their availability is slightly delayed by not being on active duty.

However, the capacity of military forces is much larger than any single civilian government source. A 2018 RAND study determined that if tasks were prioritized, the DoD had significant capacity to achieve stability tasks (Robinson et al. 2018). However,

the capacity discussion looked at total numbers of different categories of personnel, without the context of the environment the stability operations might take place in, except to say there is a capability trade-off involved. In the study, stability is looked at from either a large-scale or small-scale endeavor. While this is an acceptable framework, it does not discuss the scale of stability operations in competition with combat forces, as would occur in a LSCO. However, the study does determine “it is highly unlikely that the current active-duty Army of 476,000 could spare the forces necessary for a stabilization force of 250,000, as originally estimated to be needed in Iraq in 2003” (Robinson et al. 2018, 68). An even longer, larger, and more intense LSCO creates the conditions for larger and longer instability. There will always be tension to retain forces for combat versus reserving forces for stability itself.

The National Guard as Gendarme. Earlier it was pointed out that beyond the Coast Guard, there is no real gendarmerie capability for the United States to fulfill stability policing for overseas deployments. However, each state’s National Guard demonstrates the ability to support public order for their respective state government. They often receive specialty training required for police operations. Generally, we think of National Guard policing either in the case of traditional military police units or in the execution of support to internal state stability. Trained tasks include disaster relief, humanitarian support, recovery operations, search and rescue, crowd control, detention, and security – all of which align with stability policing needs. Training is flexible because “states are free to employ their National Guard forces under state control for state purposes and at state expense as provided in the state’s constitution and statutes” (National Guard Bureau 2010). When acting in their Title 32 state role, the limitations of

the *Posse Comitatus Act* are not applicable, meaning that National Guard forces gain training and experience dealing with civil populations, including “rules for the use of force, rather than rules of engagement” (National Guard Bureau 2010). National Guard Regulations point out, “readily accessible, routinely exercised with local first responders, and experienced in supporting neighboring communities, the National Guard is particularly well suited for domestic law enforcement support missions” (National Guard Bureau 2010, 12).

National Guard forces are sometimes organized differently due to resource and mission differences. For example, many National Guard aviation units are Stability and Support Battalions, whose non-deployable LUH-72 Lakota helicopters can be used for reconnaissance, personnel movement, supply, casualty evacuation, search and rescue (Headquarters, Department of the Army 2022). With no offensive capability, these units become experts at tasks like those executed by gendarmerie aviation units. In other words, it is not unheard of to organize for specific state stability tasks.

Despite the usefulness of tailored organizations, the Congressional Budget Office reports that as of 2021, there were 26 National Guard Brigade Combat Teams (BCT) – 19 light infantry, 2, Stryker (light armored wheel vehicle), and 5 armored tank variations. Approximately 3,500-4,700 personnel are in each National Guard BCT (Congressional Budget Office 2016). This equals approximately 40,000 personnel in BCTs, with approximately 13,000 in direct combat-code specialties. While infantry personnel are extremely flexible in their employment for state duties, an additional drive for this distribution is the need for a combat reserve for the Active Duty component. After the Cold War, the Army Reserves shifted to a mainly combat service support role, leaving

the National Guard as the primary combat reserve force. There have been calls to change this balance to reflect a more homeland defense and security focus for state forces (Spencer and Wortzel 2002).

There is a possible reorganization that could meet MDO-LSCO and non-LSCO needs while providing states with more suitable options for internal stability and deployable stability policing. By taking a fraction of National Guard BCTs and training them as state-gendarmerie, forces would be better trained to complete homeland security missions. Reduction in BCTs is a sensitive issue, but LSCO readiness would likely be improved by State Stability Forces (SSF) because these units could fulfill needed purposes in federal competition conflict and the return to competition.

SSFs could be particularly useful in competition when aligned with existing State Partnership Programs (SPP), which pair state forces with foreign counterparts. Section 342 of Title 10 of the United States Code authorizes the National Guard “to support the Security Cooperation objectives of the United States, between members of the National Guard of a State or territory and any of the following: a) the military forces of a foreign country, b) the security forces of a foreign country, c) governmental organizations of a foreign country whose primary functions include disaster response or emergency response” (National Guard Bureau 2022). Already national police forces in Panama and Costa Rica, which have no military forces, work with National Guard partner units in the SPP (Boehm 2014). National Guard and Foreign Partners have previously deployed jointly to third countries, such as the Pennsylvania-Lithuanian Police Operational Mentor and Liaison Team to Afghanistan in 2010. The partnerships are inherently international and multinational, over an enduring timescale. State partnerships are inherently multi-

domain, as they generally incorporate assets from the different guard services, as well as specialty cyber assets (Boehm 2014). Recently introduced legislation may create a Space National Guard, which could increase SPP multi-domain capability even further (Feinstein 2022).

Stability Policing Transition Units (SPTU). State Partnership Programs are only one type of security assistance. Additionally, the idea of separating specialized security assistance capabilities from combat units is also not a new concept. The most recent iteration of this idea is the Security Force Assistance Brigades (SFABs). Where a BCT is approximately 4,500 personnel, an SFAB's composition is around 800 commissioned, warrant, and non-commissioned officers. These units are specifically built for "train, advise, and assist" missions using specially selected personnel. The goal is to build host-nation security force capacity so that they are capable of defending against external threats.

SFAB units are already in high demand, even as many are still being created. Because of their reduced personnel SFABs deploy quickly, create a smaller physical footprint, at a lower logistical cost. Since the SFABs do not bring combat capability, they are inherently less escalatory than the deployment of a brigade combat team, which makes them ideal for competition activities. In conflict, a SFAB team can act as a liaison between host-nation forces with local expertise and U.S. forces who have access to exquisite MDO capabilities. Further, in cases of LSCO, the skeleton of experienced leadership in an SFAB can be overlaid with the muscle of combat soldiers, creating a BCT. Expandability provides the SFAB with a tremendous range of employment if given resources and time for adjustment.

However, the SFAB's primary mission is to train host-nation military forces to defend against external threats. To meet the specific needs of stability policing and internal order, the makeup of personnel specializations would need for those tasks. Designing a Stability Policing Transition Unit capability is one option to bring together the right skills. Like an SFAB, the force would consist of experienced active-duty Military Police midgrade officers. They would be joined by civil affairs, engineers, cyber, and judge advocate general members. The unit would be multi-component, capable of leveraging Reserve 38Gs in associated positions. During competition, rotating SPP units could be integrated for enhanced unity of capacity-building. The SPTU should integrate follow-on civilian police forces until civil control is restored. The SPTU could maintain a forward deployed presence for integration, continuity, and capacity building. Additionally, this capability could expand to perform policing operations when host-nation police are overwhelmed. With the inclusion of the SPTU, these four options provide a wide array for evaluation.

Results and Discussion

Findings. From highest to lowest, the recommendations are the National Guard Gendarme, Stability Policing Transition Units, Use of Combat Forces with Secondary Training, and a Standby Civilian Capability (Table 1). A discussion of scoring for each option helps justify these findings.

Table 1 - Using the literature review and professional judgment, each of the policing options is ranked per weighted evaluation criteria. The criteria are given from highest importance to lowest with the total weighted score in the final column.

	Budget Considerations	Responsive	Scalable	Transition to Civilian Control	Multinational Interoperable	Retention of Combat Forces	Simplicity	
Multiplier	7	6	5	4	3	2	1	Total
Standby Civilian-Only Capability	1 (7)	1 (6)	2 (10)	4 (16)	1 (3)	4 (4)	4	50
Use of Combat Military Forces with Secondary Training	4 (28)	2 (12)	1 (5)	1 (4)	2 (6)	1 (2)	3	60
National Guard Gendarme	3 (21)	3 (18)	4 (20)	2 (8)	3 (9)	3 (6)	1	84
Stability Policing Transition Units	2 (14)	4 (24)	3 (15)	3 (12)	4 (12)	2 (4)	2	82

Standby Civilian-Only Capability (50). This capability came in last due to low scores in budgetary considerations, responsiveness, scalability, and multinational capability. This option did score highly in simplicity for the combatant commander and for the retention of combat forces in-theater. On issue with this choice is the return on investment of a standby force is only visible if the force is used, which may have contributed to the failure to fund the Civilian Reserve Corps. Civilian positions in Iraq and Afghanistan were notoriously difficult to recruit (Hagel et al. 2005). These factors hurt scoring for responsiveness and scalability. Further, a reserve civilian force drafted mostly from municipal governments could be difficult to acclimatize to multinational/international operations, especially considering even the most diverse

metropolitan areas average ~30% of their force with any second language skills (Associated Press 2010). While this option is appealing in theory, it is difficult to achieve.

Training Existing Combat Forces (60). Using combat forces is another option that appears appealing on the first examination. Combat forces conducted post-invasion stability and counterinsurgency operations for years in different forms. From Police Training Teams to Provincial Reconstruction Teams, combat forces attempted to bring stability to these countries. Especially in the early days of the wars, units would create ad hoc training plans on how to conduct security with civil populations. Post-WWII occupation, Vietnam, Bosnia, and Kosovo foreshadowed the need to train for stability. But in a world of limited resources, stability training was simply not a priority before the war. After adapting the total Army for stability and counterinsurgency operations, the pendulum is swinging fully toward LSCO.

Organizational cultural inertia makes this option less responsive and difficult to scale. The natural tension between committing forces to build and employ combat capacity will almost always win ahead of stability tasks. Stability only becomes a priority when it becomes a serious issue. Until then, there is a very real concern that diverting combat troops to stability tasks could lead to the early culmination of operations. Another disadvantage is that combat forces used for stability policing are less optimal for transition to civilian governance. Ultimately, the transition to civil control is the final test of success for stability forces. Only due to the size and depth of combat forces, high levels of control, and integrated support services does this option score higher than the standby civilian force.

Stability Policing Transition Units (82). SPTU's narrowly missed becoming the top recommendation. The organization's hybrid approach allowed for a high level of responsiveness and scalability, with the ability to phase more capability into theater over time. Active duty forces can be placed in-theater, either as assigned or rotating forces. Aligning National Guard SPP efforts could also increase responsiveness while setting conditions for multinational operations. Transition to civil authorities would be accomplished by integrating traditional civil affairs and reserve civil affairs, whose civilian occupations are well aligned. The SPTU's ability to supply and support civilian police augmenters would also accelerate transition from military to civil control.

There are drawbacks though. Mixing multiple Army components, let alone civilian augmenters, likely requires special, if not altogether new authorities. The command and control of this organization would be complex and ambiguous, requiring special selection. While the structure would allow for the attachment of additional forces, the likelihood is those expanded forces would be rerouted from combat units in a LSCO situation. For these reasons, the SPTU is not the best fit.

The National Guard as Gendarme (84). The top option only scores highest in the scalability category. The sheer number of National Guard forces, whose alignment with state missions could actually improve, improves the potential to scale. Arguably, this program could have been rated higher for transition to civilian control. However the SPTU came out ahead because of the range of options it could employ, including the inclusion of civil affairs and other specialties, providing a more holistic approach.

The strength of this option is that it is the best compromise approach in many categories. Although there is some upfront cost in converting these units, once

equipped, they are less expensive than BCT counterparts. Although not specifically addressed, this reorganization might also enable the Army's current modernization efforts, as armor capabilities could be transferred to active duty and Stryker moved to State Stability Forces.

As a National Guard unit, these forces would likely be less quickly available than the SPTUs, which have a sizable active-duty component. However, with SPP alignment and rotating Title 10 exercise schedules, this limitation could be mitigated. SPPs also provide a unique platform for multinational training, integration, and trust. With constant exposure to civil authorities and its unique dual state / federal authorities, a gendarmerie would be well-positioned to deal with overseas internal stability building and transition. Perhaps most critically, this option is not a challenge to the active-duty force. Instead the SSF enhances the ability to project combat forces for LSCO. After LSCO culminates, it provides a ready constabulary for the return to competition.

Recommendations

This paper considered the role of stability policing in multi-domain operations from a strategic and operational planners' perspective. With four options envisioned and ranked systematically, the next action would be to give the findings over to capability and concept developers from the United States and NATO. From a subject matter expert perspective, the NATO Stability Policing Center of Excellence along with the Concepts Division of NATO ACT would provide an excellent resource of gendarme and military police experience versed in multinational operations.

From a U.S. perspective, a joint project between the U.S. Army Peacekeeping and Stability Operations Institute and the U.S. Army Futures and Concept Center would

be useful. While considering how to best address MDO, multiple branches should provide feedback on the buildup, execution, and recovery from LSCO. Ideas on competition and the return-to-competition are undeveloped compared to the conflict components of MDO solutions. National Guard and Reserve components, which are sometimes underrepresented in such forums should have a prevalent role in these discussions.

Conclusion

Stability is a critical component of Multi-Domain Operations, whether for large-scale combat, small wars, or other non-combat operations. The organizational culture of the U.S. Army will always be biased toward the existential threats of conventional land wars. The dominant narrative of LSCO casts a shadow over critical capabilities that are critical to MDO, such as stability operations. The language of both Multi-Domain Battle and Operations paints clear pictures of the role of stability operations. In escaping the period of the Global War on Terror, the military may be swinging too far in the opposite direction, neglecting the threats of more likely non-LSCO operations.

If non-LSCO are the most likely action, then the development of stability forces are critical. Stability policing is an asset particularly key in transitioning from military to civilian control. Assuming other federal agencies can provide the depth in stability policing in LSCO or non-LSCO events neglects the realities of resource allocation. Without accounting for the capability, the Army creates the gap that will result in ad hoc efforts and possibly the extension of campaigns over time. Instead, options such as creating a National Guard gendarme, or the stability versions of Security Forces Assistance Brigades should be evaluated as first choices to augment allies' and

partners' capabilities. Creating partnerships with state Adjutants General and political leaders first would be critical in this effort, to convince them of the win-win that these elements could provide.

NATO is in the unique position of establishing its version of MDO while also raising the profile of its stability policing organizations. Synergy between these ideas is possible if we acknowledge the geopolitical realities that near-peer competitors are unlikely to fight us directly. Instead, they will seek asymmetric advantages to win without fighting. Stability policing is a resilient tool to succeed in MDO. It can reinforce partners in competition. Policing contributes to the security of key infrastructure and area security in conflict, releasing combat forces to maintain offensive operations. In a post-conflict world, stability police are essential to creating order and passing it back to civilian authorities. Without addressing stability and stability policing, our alliance, like the U.S. Army, may continue to find itself out of position.

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the-us-army-in-mdo-2028-final.pdf](https://api.army.mil/e2/c/downloads/2021/02/26/b45372c1/20181206-tp525-3-1-the-us-army-in-mdo-2028-final.pdf).

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<https://theglobalobservatory.org/2020/07/what-we-can-learn-from-united-nations-about-reforming-police/>.

This short article by Billow highlights the how the United Nations shifted viewing policing as a security function and instead started viewing it as a component of the rule of law and human rights. While Billow's target subject is how domestic policing can be reformed, he introduces important aspects of UN Policing, such as a definition of policing, Strategic Guidance for International Policing, and code of conduct. He also highlights the militarization of policing, which is important in the context of stability policing. A good introduction to both the UN and structures of policing thought.

Boehm, William B. 2014. *The National Guard State Partnership*. National Guard Bureau.

In this monograph from the National Guard, the history of a uniquely post-Cold War effort, the State Partnership Program is explored. From its roots in Eastern Europe starting in 1992, the program expanded to become an important part or relationship, capacity, and trust building for security assistance. The monograph demonstrates the strategic gains possible in competition, due to the wide SPP presence around the world and the access to foreign forces it provides. This is an important primer for any stability policing proposal involving the National Guard.

Brahimi, Lakhdar. 2000. "Report of the Panel on United Nations Peace Operations." A/55/305–S/2000/809. Comprehensive Review of the Whole Question of Peacekeeping Operations in All Their Aspects. New York: United Nations General Assembly Security Council.
https://peacekeeping.un.org/sites/default/files/a_55_305_e_brahimi_report.pdf.

Also known as simply the "Brahimi Report," this well-regarded examination of United Nations Peacekeeping Operations set the tone for many reforms, including in UN Policing. Although many of the recommendations of the report have not been implemented in the UN, they still provide value for anyone attempting to create a multinational policing capability. Some of the most prevalent recommendations are the need for short-notice access to forces, rapid deployment, and clear mandates. The report did lead to the creation of a standardized and professional standing-force made up of formed police units and expert teams.

Braw, Elisabeth. 2022. *The Defender's Dilemma: Identifying and Deterring Gray-Zone Aggression*. American Enterprise Institute.

Gray-zone aggression and hybrid warfare are particularly hot topic in military circles. The advantage of Elisabeth Braw's contribution is that it "places" gray-zone aggression in a way that is operationally useful. By differentiating gray-zone aggression as something that happens outside of war, she is able to separate it from hybrid warfare. This treatment should help in the study of *competition* which security experts still struggle with. Braw provides several suggested approaches to countering gray-zone aggression, through both civil government and populations themselves. These sources of action are critical to integrate with stability policing.

Bureau of Conflict and Stabilization Operations. 2018. "Stabilization Assistance Review: A Framework for Maximizing the Effectiveness of U.S. Government Efforts To Stabilize Conflict-Affected Areas." *United States Department of State* (blog). 2018. <https://www.state.gov/reports/stabilization-assistance-review-a-framework-for-maximizing-the-effectiveness-of-u-s-government-efforts-to-stabilize-conflict-affected-areas-2018/> .

The 2018 Stabilization Assistance Review nested with National Security and National Defense Strategies that were very realist in many respects. Although not as strongly worded as other documents, the SAR was meant to transition stability missions into civilian hands, freeing military forces to focus on more traditional military tasks. While the Department of State provides lead, Department of Defense would provide Defense Support to Stabilization. Should be read alongside DoD Directive 3000.05 "Stabilization" to uncover the nuances of the SAR.

Center for Military History. 2000. "The U.S. Constabulary in Post-War Germany (1946-52) | U.S. Army Center of Military History." *The U.S. Constabulary in Post-War Germany (1946-52)*. April 2000. <https://history.army.mil/html/forcestruc/constab-ip.html>.

This website from the U.S. Army Center of Military History is a light introduction to U.S. Constabulary operations in Europe after World War II. It provides the unit designations and timeline for force that served in 1946-1952, bringing security to disordered areas. This is a good resource for starting more in-depth historical studies of former military-lead, stability policing operations.

Clausewitz, Carl von. 1989. *On War*. Translated by Michael Howard and Peter Paret. Princeton Paperbacks. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.

Clausewitz' "On War" is one of the most well-known and deeply-studied texts on warfare since the Napoleonic era. In this paper, the source was cited for its placement of war as a subordinate form of politics. However, his distinctions between absolute versus real war, limited aims, and popular uprising are a caution of the over-attention to large scale battle, and also inform stability policing. A general reading may help researchers without a military background understand the characteristics of military culture, which can lead to the militarization of police, if armies are used for too long in a training capacity.

Congressional Budget Office. 2016. "The U.S. Military's Force Structure: A Primer," July, 27.

The CBO creates independent analysis to support the Congressional budget process. Reports such as these are excellent resources for understanding military force structure and capability through clear civilian language. This report in particular explains different types of military units, their use, size, composition and several other factors. These public documents help researchers with no military experience, or those who want to learn more about a component of the military they are unfamiliar with. When making capability decisions in a "zero growth" budgetary mindset, this report can help provide the data to help make trade-off decisions.

Congressional Research Service. 2004. "Policing in Peacekeeping and Related Stability Operations: Problems and Proposed Solutions." RL32321. <https://www.everycrsreport.com/reports/RL32321.html>.

While this CRS source is dated, it provides a good overview of the former United States Civilian Policing Program and attempts to create a 2,000 officer "on-call" reserve through Presidential Policy Directive – 71. Unlike other countries, this report points out that the United States recruited through contracted police individually, instead of created formed police units. This undermined cohesion, and quality was an issue as local police departments would often limit participation of their best officers. It also highlights legislative approaches which appear to have either not been pursued or failed, as there is no evidence of a similar efforts in the Department of State today.

Headquarters, Department of the Army. 2019. *ADP 3-0 Operations*.
https://armypubs.army.mil/epubs/DR_pubs/DR_a/ARN18010-ADP_3-0-000-WEB-2.pdf.

Although military doctrine can be difficult for the uninitiated, the Army took concrete steps to address this with Army Doctrinal Publication, which are generally easier to read than Field Manuals and other sources. To understand how the Army visualizes their activities, the ADP 3-0 is essential. The manual begins with an overarching logic diagram, then proceeding chapters explain in more detail about each portion of the visualization. This manual explains Unified Land Operations and the relationship of offense, defense, and stability.

Kelly, Terrence, Seth G. Jones, James E. Barnett, Keith Crane, Robert C. Davis, and Carl Jensen. 2009. "Does the United States Need a New Police Force for Stability Operations?" RAND Corporation.
https://www.rand.org/pubs/research_briefs/RB9432.html.

This 2009 RAND study attempts to solve the question of whether the United States should create a stability police force, and what structure it would take. It compares active-duty and reserve options for the military and a civilian full time or hybrid force. By reviewing this document, researchers can better understand some important considerations when designing and evaluating the force. The study also highlights the unique roles of *gendarme*. Although this study was conducted during the need for stability police at the height of Iraq and Afghanistan, its structures and considerations on topics such as militarization are still useful.

McConville, James. 2021. "Army Multi-Domain Transformation Ready to Win in Competition and Conflict." March 16, 2021.
https://armypubs.army.mil/epubs/DR_pubs/DR_a/ARN32547-SD_01_CSA_PAPER-01-000-WEB-1.pdf.

As Multi-Domain Operations and Large-Scale Combat operations competed for narrative space, it became necessary to reconcile the perspectives to communicate to government official, military members, and the general public. There was also competing narratives amongst DoD, other service, and Army concepts and doctrine. A series of white paper from the Chief of Staff of the Army's office tried to reconcile these dynamic and disparate pieces into an overarching logic. This paper takes the lens of competition to explain how its signature programs fit into the language of its own and other joint concepts. It is an interesting viewpoint of the integration that must occur from the independent force development required under Title 10 and parallel joint development.

National Guard Bureau. 2010. "Emergency Employment of Army and Other Resources National Guard Domestic Law Enforcement Support and Mission Assurance Operations." National Guard Bureau.
<https://www.ngbpmc.ng.mil/Portals/27/Publications/ngr/ngr%20500-5.pdf?ver=2018-09-07-082540-767>.

This regulation is an excellent source for understanding the unique roles at the state level for supporting law enforcement. Through the guidance provided, it is clear that the National Guard have a much different remit in their ability to interact with civil populations. The importance of this exceptional authority is that if embraced, it could lead to a very professional gendarme-like capability. In other words, instead of a military force providing policing type tasks, a portion of these forces could be trained for policing with military techniques and equipment. This regulation also points out the dual-authority responsibilities of designated commanders. This wearing of "two hats" is particularly useful for overseas multinational/U.S. authorities.

NATO. 2022. "NATO 2022 - Strategic Concept." June 2022.
<https://www.nato.int/strategic-concept/index.html>.

Every five years the North Atlantic Treaty Organization reexamines its strategic concept. The 2022 concept is notable because it specific highlights Russia as a threat, not a partner. China is recognized as coercive challenge. This strategic concept does a good job of putting threats to security, war or otherwise, in the context of a stable and prosperous Europe and surrounding areas. The prevalence of stability in this concept should help deliver a NATO Multi-Domain concept that is more inclusive to a variety of conflicts, not just the largest ones.

NATO Allied Command for Transformation. 2022. "Multi-Domain Operations: Enabling NATO to Out-Pace and Out-Think Its Adversaries : NATO's ACT." July 29, 2022.
<https://www.act.nato.int/articles/multi-domain-operations-out-pacing-and-out-thinking-nato-adversaries>.

Although NATO plans on a concept designed around Multi-Domain Operations, one is yet to be published. However, this short article is useful for establishing NATO's plans to incorporate MDO. Further it points to a definition of MDO that as *"the orchestration of military activities, across all domains and environments, synchronized with non-military activities, to enable the Alliance to deliver converging effects at the speed of relevance"*. This inclusive definition of MDO foreshadows a concept capable of incorporating a variety of security challenges and approaches at multiple scales, rather than one focused on large-scale operations. Advocates for stability planning need to advocate with NATO ACT to ensure they are recognized as a key "non-military" activity.

Robinson, Linda, Sean Mann, Jeffrey Martini, and Stephanie Pezard. 2018. "Finding the Right Balance: Department of Defense Roles in Stabilization." RAND Corporation. https://www.rand.org/pubs/research_reports/RR2441.html.

This RAND study aligns roughly with the 2018 National Defense Strategy and Department of State Stabilization Assistance Review. Like those documents, it centers military capabilities on security first, follow by support to civilian authorities. Through its five stability functions, it provides a framework for analysis. While it recommends other federal agencies for many tasks, it suggests the Department of Defense to be the lead for indigenous police capacity-building. However, its recommendations for achievement of these ends are not appropriate for support to large scale operations. Only considers combat forces or Military Police for the temporary replacement of host-nation police.

The White House. 2017. "National Security Strategy of the United States of America." December 2017. <https://trumpwhitehouse.archives.gov/wp-content/uploads/2017/12/NSS-Final-12-18-2017-0905-2.pdf>.

Although not without controversy, the 2017 National Security Strategy set a self-proclaimed realist set of priorities for the United States. While this document is being superseded by the Biden Administration's strategic documents, this document helps layout why military planners shifted so far away from stability operations in recent years. Recommend reading this source alongside other 2017-2018 strategies and reviews.

Townsend, Stephen. 2018. "Accelerating Multi-Domain Operations: Evolution of an Idea." Wwww.Army.Mil. July 25, 2018. https://www.army.mil/article/208974/accelerating_multi_domain_operations_evolution_of_an_idea.

In the transition from Multi-Domain Battle and Multi-Domain Operations, late-comers will be challenged to understand the logic for changes made between these two iterations. This short article written through the Commanding General of the Army's Training and Doctrine Command attempts to communicate those changes. The article focuses on operations other than conflict which is a major justification toward a stability policing capability.

United Nations. 2017. "United Nations Police in Peacekeeping Operations and Special Political Missions." <https://police.un.org/sites/default/files/sgf-policy-police-2014.pdf>.

This UN policy captures many of the reforms recommended by the Brahimi report, which were integrated over time. By speaking to the mission, composition, principles, code of conduct, functions and other key components of UN Policing, it develops a model for professionalization of police forces. It also discusses the role of Formed Police Units and Specialized Police Teams that were called for in the Brahimi report. This policy also aggregates a number of related references that would be useful to researchers in this area.

U.S. Army TRADOC. 2016. "Multi Domain Battle." 2016. https://www.tradoc.army.mil/wp-content/uploads/2020/10/MDB_Evolutionfor21st.pdf.

To fully understand the United States approach to Multi-Domain Operations, it is important to review its predecessor, Multi-Domain Battle. While all concepts are an amalgamation of ideas, MDB represents a "purer" version than the MDO that had to answer MDB's critics. Because this version did not "echelon" forces, it was much more flexible in scale. It was much more focused on explaining the conditions that must be met, rather than proscribing particular arrangements of forces conducting certain activities in a particular order. By understanding the roots of Multi-Domain Operations, it is easy to understand where logic leaps were made in later additions.

U.S. Army TRADOC. 2018. "The U.S. Army in Multi-Domain Operations 2028." 2018. <https://api.army.mil/e2/c/downloads/2021/02/26/b45372c1/20181206-tp525-3-1-the-us-army-in-mdo-2028-final.pdf>.

Multi-Domain Operations is the leader in joint and multinational concepts at this time. No other branch or nation has created as clear a vision as this document lays out. As NATO develops its own MDO concept, it will likely lean heavily on this document. Without any competing vision to contend with, researchers are best off to understand the language in this foundational document, until Field Manual 3-0: Multi-Domain Operations is published in October, 2022.