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Exploring the Role of Organizational Motivations in Cross-Sector Watershed Collaboration

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**EXPLORING THE ROLE OF ORGANIZATIONAL MOTIVATIONS IN
CROSS-SECTOR WATERSHED COLLABORATION**

By

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ABSTRACT

EXPLORING THE ROLE OF ORGANIZATIONAL MOTIVATIONS IN CROSS-SECTOR WATERSHED COLLABORATION

Luisa M. Diaz-Kope
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Watersheds are complex, dynamic and nested ecological systems that span across multiple jurisdictions. The complexity of watershed pollution requires adaptive and responsive strategies that incorporate government intervention along with community stakeholder engagement. This study explores the motivational determinants that drive local cross-sector watershed collaboration. Cross-sector collaboration offers local watershed stakeholders a holistic approach to address community watershed issues. These collaborative partnerships involve the voluntary engagement of member organizations from different industry sectors directing resources and working together to address local watershed issues of mutual interest.

This research explores the social processes and the motivations that drive organizations in different industry sectors to engage in local watershed collaboration. Drawn from the motivational and interorganizational relationships literature, a conceptual framework is created to guide the investigation of the study. A single case study research design is utilized to answer the research questions. Data sources included: (1) interviews, (2) official government and organizational web sites and various media sources, and (3) field observations and memos. A total of twenty-nine organizations participated in the study. The composition of the organizations included 10 private sector organizations, 10 public sector organizations and 9 nonprofit sector organizations. Interviews were conducted with

representatives from each of the member organizations that collaborate with Lynnhaven River Now. All of the organizations in the study are located within the boundaries of the Lynnhaven River watershed.

The results of the study identify ten motivational determinants that drive local cross-sector watershed collaboration. These motivational determinants include: asymmetry, catalytic actors, corporate/social consciousness, efficiency, instability, legitimacy, necessity, organizational interests, reciprocity and stability. In addition, the results of the study identify variations in the level of prevalence in the motivations of organizations from the public, private and nonprofit sectors that collaborate with LRN. Finally, the results from the study identify three types of organizational motivation orientations in local cross-sector watershed collaboration: (1) transactional, (2) philanthropic and (3) symbiotic. Empirical evidence suggests that determinants in local cross-sector watershed collaboration are likely driven by the organizational motivational orientations of an organization.

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This dissertation is dedicated to my mother and father, with my deepest love and gratitude for instilling in me a love for learning and the confidence to always strive to reach my highest potential.

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CHAPTER 1:

INTRODUCTION

Our nation's watersheds are important because they supply drinking water, are critical to our food supply, vital to national, regional and local commerce and affect the quality of outdoor recreation (Woolley & McGinnis, 1999). John Wesley Powell, noted 19th century Western explorer and geographer eloquently defined a watershed as "That area of land, a bounded hydrologic system, within which all living things are inextricably linked by their common water course and where, as humans settled, simple logic demanded that they become part of a community" (as cited in U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, 2015, para. 2). Watersheds are nested hydrologic systems that vary in scale and size, ranging from a few acres within a neighborhood community to encompassing hundreds of acres that span across numerous states, as in the case of the Chesapeake Bay Watershed (U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, 2001). The transboundary nature of watersheds poses unique challenges in the governance, administration, and management of common-pool resources (Kenney, 1997).

Environmental policy scholars purport that environmental degradation is a "wicked-problem" (Ernst, 2003; Morris, Gibson, Leavitt, & Jones, 2014). Rittel and Webber (1973) characterize "wicked-problems" as intractable, highly complex and dynamic in nature, thus rendering traditional interventions insufficient for finding solutions that address these problems. In the case of federal water policies, early governmental interventions to address water quality problems primarily emphasized command and control regulatory mechanisms (Gerlak, 2005; Morris & Emison, 2012). While traditional centralized regulations led to

progress in the reduction of point source pollution in America's waterways, they were ineffective at addressing non-point source pollution. Water pollution is derived from two sources; point-source and non-point source (U.S. Department of Agriculture, 1999). Point source pollution emanates from identifiable sources such as manufacturing facilities and waste treatment plants. Through production processes, these sources discharge harmful chemicals into our waterways (U.S. Department of Agriculture, 1999). In contrast, non-point source pollution emanates from numerous unidentifiable sources (i.e., urban and agriculture runoff) that are dispersed across a wide geographic area or result from the culmination of numerous small sources.

Over the years, the increased severity and the pervasiveness of non-point source water pollution in the United States have created an environmental crisis that threatens the quality of water in our nation's watersheds. Furthermore, the growing impairment and degradation of America's waterways threatens the well-being of society at large and the strength of the U.S. economy (U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, 2001). The EPA estimates that nearly 40 percent of America's watersheds are too impaired for fishing or swimming (U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, 2009).

Healthy watersheds are the lifeblood of this nation's economy. The Environment Protection Agency (EPA) reports that "[e]ach year, nearly \$200 billion of food and fiber, \$60 billion of manufactured products, and over \$40 billion of tourism depend on clean and healthy watersheds" (U. S. Environmental Protection Agency, 2001, p. 5). The causes and sources of environmental degradation affecting the quality of U.S. watersheds are multidimensional. Watersheds are complex, dynamic and nested ecological systems that span across multiple

jurisdictions. Consequently, traditional command-and-control governmental interventions to solve non-point source pollution have largely proven ineffective (Ernst, 2003; Morris & Emison, 2012). The pervasiveness of non-point source pollution has brought into question the efficacy of traditional command-and-control regulatory mechanisms in solving non-point source pollution. In response, new modes of interventions have emerged to address non-point source pollution. Watershed management in the 21st century has shifted away from centralized hierarchical administrative regimes towards more inclusive collaborative management approaches.

Collaboration and Natural Resource Management

The emergence of watershed collaboration reflects a growing realization among government, environmentalists, citizens, and free-market proponents that preserving and protecting America's watersheds requires a holistic approach to watershed management. The empirical literature in watershed management reveal a spectrum of typologies based on unique characteristics regarding watershed partnerships (see Bidwell & Ryan, 2006; Diaz-Kope & Miller-Stevens, 2015; Margerum, 2008; Moore & Koontz, 2001). Moore and Koontz's (2001) research on 64 watershed partnerships in Oregon identified three distinctive types of groups based on their membership composition including citizen-based, agency-based and mixed partnerships. This research focuses on mixed partnerships, also referred to in the literature as "cross-sector collaboration" (Bryson, Crosby, & Stone, 2006).

Bryson et al. (2006) define cross-sector collaboration as "[t]he linking or sharing of information, resources, activities, and capabilities by organizations in two or more sectors to

achieve jointly an outcome that could not be achieved by organizations in one sector separately” (p. 44). Cross-sector watershed collaboration groups are comprised of a network of member organizations from the public, private and the nonprofit sector (Moore & Koontz, 2001). Cross-sector collaboration is widely used to address complex social issues in a number of policy realms including health care, emergency management, public safety and natural resource management (see Lejano, 2008; Mandell, 1988; Margerum, 2011; Morris, Morris, & Jones, 2007; Shaw, 2003). Collaborative enterprises operate under core tenets (see Gray, 1989; Margerum, 2011; Wondolleck & Yaffee, 2000). These tenets include the following:

- Participation in the group is voluntary.
- Partners share a common interest.
- There is a high level of interdependence among partners.
- Authority is defused and shared among a network of partners.
- Decision-making is participatory and consensus-based.
- Partners mutually agree to share resources in order to achieve a mutual goal.

The extant body of literature on natural resource management identifies numerous potential benefits for establishing collaborative institutional arrangements (see Innes, 1996; Kenney, 1997; Leavitt, McNamara, & Morris, 2010; Morris et al., 2014; Wondolleck & Yaffee, 2000). Kenney’s (1997) research on interagency watershed collaboration found that collaborative partnerships enhanced the agencies’ ability to adapt and respond to changing ecological conditions. Morris et al.’s (2014) case study on grassroots watershed collaboration identified social capital as an important outcome of community-based watershed collaboration. Morris and his colleagues found that citizen engagement in community

environmental groups increased social capital, which in turn enhanced environmental stewardship in their communities. Wondolleck and Yaffee's (2000) research found that a key to successful public resource and environmental management was the involvement of key stakeholders with different interests in the decision-making process. Wondolleck and Yaffee's examination of public resource and environmental management practices found that collaboration helped build trust and reduce conflict among competing groups.

Similarly, Innes' (1996) case study research on consensus building in environmental planning found that not only did collaboration increase trust between levels of government agencies (federal, state and local) and between state and nonstate actors but also led to better outcomes in environmental planning and management. While these studies highlight the potential benefits of collaboration in natural resource management, the studies also found that collaborative arrangements are challenging and complex (Agranoff & McGuire, 2001; Thomson & Perry, 2006). Unlike traditional institutions where lines of authority are delineated and decision-making emanates from the top-down, decision-making in collaborative networks is participatory. Thus, network activities are established through deliberation and reaching consensus among network partners (Gray, *Collaborating: Finding common ground for multiparty problems*, 1989). Consequently, strategic decisions such as agenda setting and comprehensive environmental planning in collaborative networks require a longer time horizon. Other major deterrents to collaboration cited in the literature include the time, money and effort to establish collaborative relationships (transaction costs) (Lubell, Schneider, Scholz, & Mete, 2002), organizational cultural differences (Shaw, 2003) and the size and diversity of the stakeholders (Leach & Pelkey, 2001). Shaw (2003) argues that the

formation and sustainability of cross-sector collaborative partnerships are particularly challenging due to differences in organizational ethos across sector boundaries.

Despite these challenges, cross-sector collaboration is increasingly being used to tackle complex societal problems such as environmental watershed issues (Koontz & Thomas, 2006). One possible explanation to this phenomenon is that solutions to messy problems likely require the marshaling of diverse resources and the strength of core competencies that are unique to certain sectors, thus creating high degrees of synergies. Bryson et al. (2006) assert that interorganizational relationships are subject to “competitive and institutional pressures” which create challenges for establishing collaborative partnerships. Further, Gortner, Nichols, and Ball (2007) note that values, norms and beliefs vary across institutional sectors. Consequently, motivational drivers are important to cross-sector collaboration because they can compel stakeholders with often conflicting and competing interests, to reach out and forge alliances across sector boundaries.

Collaboration researchers found that organizational motivations are important to collaborative partnerships because they create stakeholder buy-in, a critical component of collaboration (see Gray, 1989; Margerum, 2011; Morris, Gibson, Leavitt & Jones, 2013; Wondolleck & Yaffee, 2000). Other studies found that motivations are vital to the sustainability of collaborative enterprises (Bresnen & Marshall, 2000). The decision for public, private or nonprofit organizations to collaborate across sectoral boundaries is likely influenced by organizational motivations that drive collective action. While findings from these studies identify motivations as critical to collaboration, there remains a dearth of

empirical studies that have systematically examined the types and the nature of organizational motivations that influence cross-sector watershed collaboration.

Research Purpose and Research Questions

The purpose of this research is to explore the organizational motivational drivers and to identify the social processes that influence the formation of local cross-sector watershed collaboration. This research has two primary objectives: (1) identify empirically the motivational drivers and social processes that led to the formation of local cross-sector watershed collaboration, and (2) develop a theoretical model that explains the role of motivational drivers and the social processes that influence the formation of local cross-sector watershed collaboration. There are five research questions that guide this investigation:

- (1) What are the organizational motivations that drive local watershed cross-sector collaboration?
- (2) What are the organizational motivations that drive organizations in the private sector to participate in local cross-sector watershed collaboration?
- (3) What are the organizational motivations that drive organizations in the nonprofit sector to participate in local cross-sector watershed collaboration?
- (4) What are the organizational motivations that drive organizations in the public sector to participate in local cross-sector watershed collaboration?
- (5) Are there certain organizational motivations between industry sectors that are more prevalent in local cross-sector watershed collaboration?

Significance of this Research

The role of collaboration in the administrative state has emerged as a vital organizational strategy to address intractable social problems (Chisholm, 1996; Gray, 1989; Agranoff & McGuire, 2003). Policymakers and public managers are increasingly relying on multi-sector alliances to achieve policy objectives. This is particularly evident in watershed policy (Kenney, 1997; Margerum, 2011; Wondolleck & Yaffee, 2000). The importance of collaboration in watershed management is evident from the expansive body of research that has been devoted to studying watershed collaboration (Bidwell & Ryan, 2006; Diaz-Kope & Miller-Stevens, 2015; Diaz-Kope, Miller-Stevens, & Morris, 2015; Gerlak, 2008; Goldfarb, 1994; Margerum, 2011; Morris et al., 2014 among many others). The extant body of empirical research on watershed management suggests that collaboration has played an instrumental role in improving the quality of watersheds in local communities (Leach, 2006; Margerum, 2011; Morris et al., 2013; Weber, 2003).

Scholarly works in the realm of collaboration have advanced our knowledge of the antecedents that influence the formation of collaborative enterprises. Gray's (1989) seminal work identified environmental turbulence, economic and technological change, increased competition, fiscal pressures and conflict as primary antecedents that create the conditions for stakeholders to collaborate. Other scholarly endeavors have directed their focus on the interworkings of collaboration. For example, Thomson and Perry (2006) build on Wood and Gray's (1991) antecedent-process-outcome framework by delving into dissecting the "black box" of the collaboration process. Thomson and Perry's work identifies five dimensions of the collaboration process including governance, administration, organizational autonomy,

mutuality and norms of trust and reciprocity. Thomson and Perry's work underscores the importance of understanding the dynamics of collaboration and how those dynamics influence collaboration processes.

An important finding in the watershed literature is the understanding that there are different types of collaborative arrangements, each with distinctive characteristics (Bidwell & Ryan, 2006; Diaz-Kope & Miller-Stevens, 2015; Moore & Koontz, 2001; Margerum, 2008). Evidence from this stream of research indicates that watershed groups' characteristics influence the groups' governance structure (Diaz-Kope & Miller-Stevens, 2015), activities (Margerum, 2008; Leach, Pelkey, & Sabatier, 2002), outputs (Koontz & Thomas, 2006; Duram & Brown, 1999) and environmental outcomes (Kenney, 1997; Moore & Koontz, 2001; Morris et al., 2013). Although these scholarly contributions have augmented our understanding of important elements in collaboration and watershed management, there remains a gap in the research on what motivates organizations to collaborate in watershed groups. One of the central tenets to collaboration is that participation is voluntary, with the exception of public organizations that can be mandated to collaborate. Regardless of whether the formation of a collaboration is voluntary or mandated, the motivations that compel different stakeholders to collaboration, or not to collaborate for that matter, is a critical component of collaboration.

This research is important in that it seeks to rectify two major deficiencies in the collaboration and watershed management literature. First, these bodies of knowledge treat individual and organizational motivations that drive the formation of collaborative enterprises as the same. Second, these areas of scholarship fail to distinguish the differences in

motivational orientations between sectors. Yet, in Gray's (1989) seminal book *Collaboration: Finding Common Ground for Multiparty Problems*, the author pointedly argues "The incentives to collaboration vary from sector to sector, as do the forms that collaboration takes" (p. 53).

Despite the growing consensus among collaboration and watershed management scholars that incentives play a critical role in collaborative arrangements (see Genskow & Born, 2006; Morris et al., 2014; Logsdon, 1991; Weber, 2009; Wondolleck & Yaffee, 2000 among others), empirical studies have been remiss in fleshing out the different variables that influence the motivational orientations of organizations in different sectors that participate in collaboration. This research take a first cut at filling that gap. The following section provides an overview of the setting for the study.

Study Setting

Lynnhaven River NOW (LRN) provides the setting for this research. LRN was established in 2002 by a group of concerned local citizens interested in restoring and protecting the quality of water in the Lynnhaven River (Morris et al., 2013). The organization's goal is to identify and reduce nutrient pollution affecting the quality of the Lynnhaven River watershed. The river is located in the jurisdiction of the City of Virginia Beach. The City's population is estimated at 448,479 (U.S. Census Bureau, 2014). The river encompasses 64 square miles and includes over 150 miles of shoreline (Morris et al., 2013). The sources of nutrient pollution in the Lynnhaven watershed emanate from non-point source

pollution caused by residential activities including pet waste, lawn fertilization and pesticides and leaks from septic-tanks (Virginia Pilot, 2003).

Through various community outreach programs, LRN seeks to educate and engage citizens and its local partners on developing and implementing watershed practices that promote environmental stewardship and restore and protect the river's natural resources (McNamara, Leavitt, & Morris, Multiple-sector partnerships and the engagement of citizens in social marketing campaigns: The case of Lynnhaven River Now, 2010). The organization's partners include organizations from all three institutional sectors. However, the majority of their partner's are affiliated with public sector organizations which include the United States Army Corps of Engineers (USACE), the Chesapeake Bay Foundation (CBF), the City of Virginia Beach Department of Public Works and Public Utilities and Parks and Recreation, state agencies, Virginia Beach Public Schools, Elizabeth River Project, the Dollar Tree Corporation, The Virginia Conservation Network, and several nonprofit organizations (Morris et al., 2013). The organization has approximately 8,000 active members that support the LRN through volunteerism in restoration projects and charitable donations (Lynnhaven River NOW, 2013).

This organization was selected for two primary reasons. First, the organization was identified as the convener of the watershed collaboration and the point of communication for partners working within their network (Morris et al., 2013). Second, the stakeholder composition in LRN consists of public, private and nonprofit organizations. Therefore, LRN's stakeholder composition provides an ideal setting for answering the research questions. LRN is in the city of Virginia Beach, in the watershed boundary of the Lynnhaven

River. The Lynnhaven River is one of the many tributaries that drain into the Chesapeake Bay.

The Chesapeake Bay

The Chesapeake Bay is North America's largest estuary and is the third largest in the world (Chesapeake Bay Foundation, 2012). The Chesapeake Bay spans approximately 41 million acres and its watershed flows across parts of six states: Virginia, Maryland, Delaware, West Virginia, Pennsylvania, Washington, D.C., and New York (Chesapeake Bay Foundation, 2014). The Chesapeake Bay Watershed is comprised of 100,000 rivers and streams, and its shoreline spans across 11,684 miles (Chesapeake Bay Foundation, 2014). Approximately 17 million residents live within the boundaries of the Chesapeake Bay Watershed.

For decades, nutrient pollution has been the primary environmental problem affecting the Chesapeake Bay's water quality and ecosystem (Doyle & Miralles-Wilhelm, 2008). The primary sources of the Bay's nutrient pollution are derived from nitrogen and phosphorus overload. The major causes of nitrogen and phosphorus overload emanate from the discharge of sewage treatment plants and the use of commercial and residential chemical fertilizers. These pollutants are the byproducts of a wide range of human activity including commercial and residential development, farming and urban groundwater runoff. Over the years, economic development, urban growth and the steady increase in the region's population have severely impacted the rivers and tributaries that feed into the Chesapeake Bay.

The Chesapeake Bay plays a vital role in the economy of the region and plays a significant role in the quality of life of the residents of the Hampton Roads area (Morris et al., 2013). The Hampton Roads area encompasses eight metropolitan cities including Norfolk, Virginia Beach, Suffolk, Newport News, Chesapeake, Hampton, Portsmouth and Williamsburg with a population of approximately 1.7 million (U.S. Census Bureau, 2010).

What Can We Learn From Lynnhaven River NOW?

The unique institutional class stakeholder composition of Lynnhaven River NOW (LRN) provides an opportunity to systematically study the organizational motivations that drive local cross-sector watershed collaboration and to identify the social processes that influence the formation of these organizations. Further, findings from studying this focal organization can better inform policymakers on what types of organizational motivations are important in watershed policy designs. The success and sustainability of local watershed partnerships likely depend on their ability to forge alliances across sector boundaries. The efficacy and implementation of state and local watershed policies likely depend on local government agencies working together across sector boundaries with community stakeholders. Given the importance of healthy watersheds to the welfare of society at large, this focal organization can augment our understanding of the nature of organizational motivations and their role in local cross-sector watershed collaboration. Moreover, the findings from this research can better inform policymakers, public managers and watershed stakeholders on the nature and types of organizational motivations that are needed to foster and sustain multi-sector alliances in watershed management.

Organization of this Dissertation

In the chapters that follow, each of the aforementioned research questions are addressed in an effort to glean a greater understanding of the nature of organizational motivations and what types of motivations are critical to the formation of local cross-sector watershed collaboration. The first chapter has provided an overview of watersheds and their importance to society; the role of collaboration in natural resource management and outlined the rationale, relevance, and approach of the research and its contribution to the field of collaboration and watershed management. Chapter two explores several streams of literature including industrial organization motivational theories, interorganizational relationships theories, collaboration and watershed management. The chapter identifies and discusses the major themes and concepts in these intellectual realms that form the underpinnings of the conceptual framework. Further, the chapter presents the underlying assumptions that guide the exploration of the focal organization and the development of the framework. Chapter three provides the methodological approach used in the research. Chapter four presents the analysis and results of the study. Chapter five provides a summation of the findings that address each of the research questions. In addition, the chapter identifies and discusses emergent themes drawn from the results of the study. Finally, the chapter discusses the limitations of the study and directions for future research.

CHAPTER 2:

LITERATURE REVIEW

This research seeks to answer five fundamental questions pertaining to organizational motivations that drive local cross-sector watershed collaboration and the social processes that influence their formation. In an effort to achieve a greater understanding of the phenomenon of interest it is important to identify, define and understand the concepts relevant to the topic area, the relationship between these concepts (theoretical underpinnings), and the contextual environment in which local cross-sector watershed collaboration operates. To accomplish this undertaking it is essential to establish the levels of analysis and to define the boundaries of the literature review.

This study uses two levels of analysis to examine the phenomenon of interest. The unit of analysis under investigation is the organization. The unit of observation is the watershed policy subsystem. Evan (1965) maintains that in order to understand interorganizational relationships one must consider the broader context of the environmental sub-system. Evan asserts,

“[a]ll formal organizations are embedded in an environment of other organizations as well as a complex of norms, values, and collectivities of the society at large. Inherent in the relationship between any formal organization is the fact that it is to some degree dependent upon its environment; in other words, it is a sub-system of the more inclusive social system of society” (Evan, 1965, p. B-218).

The following section outlines the approach used for the literature review, the organization of the chapter and the method used to develop the conceptual framework for the research.

Literature Review and Conceptual Framework

The literature review approach follows Galvan's (2009) guideline in "Writing Literature Reviews: A Guide for Students of the Social and Behavioral Science." The literature review's parameter and scope were limited to specific topic areas related to the phenomenon of interest. The development of the conceptual framework for this research draws from several streams of literature. These realms of intellectual inquiry include bodies of knowledge in the field of organizational behavioral theory, interorganizational relations theory, social psychology, collaboration and natural resource management. The scope of the literature review focuses on relevant concepts in the topic area which include intraorganizational and interorganizational motivation theories, the characteristics of the nature of the good theory, the social dilemmas of governing common-pool-resources, community-based watershed collaboration and the emergence of multi-sector alliances in natural resource management.

These topics were identified through academic database search engines via Old Dominion University's Library. A variety of academic databases were used including EBSCOhost, ProQuest, and Social Science Citation Index – Web of Science. These databases were chosen because they provide the broadest selection of scholarly sources in the research topic area. A secondary search was conducted that reviewed sources contained in the bibliographies of textbooks and monographs, dissertations and scholarly peer-reviewed

journals in an effort to identify other relevant sources not referenced in the databases and to identify key sources through cross-checking the frequency of times references were cited by multiple authors.

The chapter is organized as follows: The chapter begins with a discussion on the nature of the good theory. From this line of inquiry, the discussion expands to major perspectives that examine the dilemmas of common-pool-resources and their influence on the motivations of collective action resource institutions. This is followed by a primer of the study of motivation. Next, the literature review turns to realms of inquiry on intraorganization behavioral motivation and discusses the relevant seminal perspectives in that field of study. Building on the intraorganizational motivation literature, the review turns to realms of inquiry on interorganizational relationships and discusses the theoretical perspectives and conditions that facilitate the formation of collaborative arrangements. This discussion is then followed by an examination of the watershed management literature and empirical studies that identify the organizational motivations that drive local cross-sector collaboration. Interwoven in the literature review, propositions are posed that are relevant to the study and can be applied to the watershed setting. These propositions will guide the development of the conceptual framework (Yin, 2009).

The conceptual framework draws from multiple streams of literature. From these intellectual realms, relevant themes and concepts are identified and collapsed into large domains. From these domains, a list of key organizational motivational constructs is provided and operationalized. An overview of the key underlying assumptions that guide the

exploration of the focal organization is presented. The chapter concludes with presenting the developed conceptual framework that guides the study.

The literature review begins with an examination of the nature of the good perspectives. As discussed in chapter one, the nature and characteristics of watersheds pose unique challenges as to their governance and the institutional approaches that are most appropriate for the implementing of water policies and environmental management (Kenney, 1997). Given the complex nature of watersheds, logic dictates that any attempt to understand the organizational motivations that drive local cross-sector watershed collaboration must first begin with a clear understanding of the theoretical underpinnings of public goods and the institutional drivers (e.g., markets, environments and incentives) that influence societal institutions (public, private, nonprofit) to produce/provide different types of public goods.

The Nature of the Good Perspectives

Savas (1987) attributes the development of different forms of social institutions (public, private and nonprofit) to shifts in societal attitudes toward the roles of government in the provision and production of public goods and services. A public good is a product or service that an individual can consume without reducing its availability and its exclusivity to others (Savas, 1987). There are four important properties that distinguish goods: (1) *excludable*, (2) *non-excludable*, (3) *rivalrous consumption* and (4) *non-rivalrous consumption* (Coase, 1937).

By and large, the majority of public goods are non-excludable and non-rivalrous. Some examples of public goods include national defense, public parks, and sewer systems. Public goods are non-excludable goods, meaning the cost of preventing a “non-payer” from benefiting from the good is difficult if not nearly impossible (Savas, 1987). Consider the classic example of national defense. The cost to provide a national defense system is funded through the collection of federal taxes. However, if an individual refuses to pay their federal taxes the government cannot exclude a non-payer from the benefit gained from national defense. Collective action theorists refer to this type of problem as the “free-rider” dilemma (Hardin, 1968; Olson, 1965; Ostrom, 1990).

Central to the issue of the free-rider dilemma is that the nature of collective goods creates economic motivations that pose unique challenges regarding what types of institutional arrangements should provide collective goods. For instance, national defense is a collective good because the good can be consumed collectively by multiple individuals. Furthermore, national defense is a public good that is non-excludable and non-rivalrous (Savas, 1987), thus, the provision of national defense is not conducive to free markets. These challenges will be discussed in more detail in the next section.

A fundamental premise of the nature of the good theory is that the characteristics of goods impose limitations on social institutions (i.e. government and businesses) in the provision and allocation of public goods and services (Savas, 1987). Consequently, the characteristics of goods impact the institutional strategies and arrangements that can be used to deliver specific products and services to society (Cowen, 1999; Stone, 1997). These institutional arrangements include privatizations, joint ventures, interorganizational

arrangements, non-governmental enterprises and collaboration just to name a few (see Salamon, 2002). There are three distinctive institutional sectors in which these arrangements operate including the public sector, the private sector and the nonprofit sector (Salamon, 2002).

Savas (1987) contends that the characteristics of goods have direct implications on determining the roles of government and the types of arrangements that should be used in providing goods and services. Building on Coase's (1937) theory of the nature of the good, Savas examines the characteristics of goods and services through the lens of two broad dimensions: (1) *exclusivity* and (2) *consumability*. As described above, exclusivity refers to the ability of denying or limiting an individual's access to a particular good or service. Consumability refers to the manner in which a product or service is consumed. Consumption of a good or product can take two forms: jointly and/or simultaneously and individually (Savas, 1987). These dimensions fall at opposite ends of a continuum; where the degree of excludability of a good range from easy to difficult and the degree of consumability ranges from individual to joint. Savas applies these dimensions and examines four types of characteristics of goods: (1) private goods, (2) common-pool goods, (3) toll goods, and (3) collective goods. Table 2.1 classifies the four types of goods using the dimensions of exclusivity and consumability.

Table 2.1: Four Types of Goods in Terms of Intrinsic Characteristics

CONSUMABILITY	EXCLUDABLE	NON-EXCLUDABLE
Individual Consumption	Private Goods (Bottle Water, Private Automobiles)	Common-Pool Goods (Water, Air, Grazing Lands)
Joint Consumption	Toll Goods (Trains, Public Utilities, Sewage Services)	Collective Goods (National Defense, Fire & Police Protection Services)

Adapted from Savas, E. 1987 (p. 62). *Privatization: The Key to Better Government*. Chatham, NJ: Chatham House.

Four Types of Characteristics of Goods

Private Goods

Private goods are goods that are individually consumed and their access can be easily denied. An important characteristic of private goods is that the ownership of these goods is subject to individual property rights that can be enforced through contracts (Savas, 1987); thereby making the production and allocation of these goods and services ideal for market structure arrangements. Private goods and services are supplied by organizations operating in the marketplace.

Toll Goods

Toll goods are supplied by public, private and nonprofit enterprises (Savas, 1987). Like private goods, toll goods are supplied through market structures and are subject to market forces such as competition, supply, and demand (Coase, 1937). Toll goods fall under the rubric of excludable and jointly consumable. Some examples of toll goods include higher education, electrical power, mass transit, and sewage services (Savas, 1987). Some toll goods tend to form natural monopolies such as cable television or utility companies. These

particular toll goods operate in highly regulated environments in order to control their ability to exploit their market position (Savas, 1987).

Common-pool Goods

Common-pool goods are non-excludable goods that are individually consumed; thus, like collective goods, susceptible to economic incentives that create “free-rider” behavior (Hardin, 1968; Ostrom, 1990; 2000). The properties of common-pool goods limit the institutional strategies and arrangements that can be used to control their consumption and supply. Similar to collective goods, free market structures can not control the supply of common-pool goods (Savas, 1987). For these types of goods, their supply and consumption require institutional arrangements and strategies that use voluntary collective action or coercion (Morris & Emison, Introduction, 2012).

A critical distinction between collective and common-pool goods is that the latter consists of resources supplied by mother nature, thus vulnerable to exploitation to the point of exhaustion (Carson, 2002). Some examples of common-pool goods are wildlife, grazing land, water and air. While the supply of common-pool goods are naturally renewable, human activities, industrialization along with market pressures to meet the demands of society at large have severely degraded the environment and ecosystems (Carson, 2002). Given the nature of common-pool goods and their importance to the welfare of society at large, society designates these goods as worthy goods.

Worthy Goods

Integral to the theory of the nature of the good is the concept of worthy goods. Worthy goods are goods that society considers so important that their consumption and supply should not be denied regardless of one's ability or willingness to pay (Savas, 1987). Consequently, the provision and allocation of worthy goods require government mechanisms (e.g., subsidy and sponsorship) to ensure their supply. By and large, goods that are not excludable, tend to be unfavorable to free markets (collective and common-pool goods); and hold the attributes (either in part or wholly) of worthy goods.

Savas maintains that the designation of non-worthy goods (for lack of a better term) to worthy goods evolves over time due to various factors including shifts in societal values, advancements in technologies, market conditions and market failures. Take, for example, health care insurance for the elderly. Prior to the enactment of Medicare in 1965, health care was treated exclusively as a private good (Blumenthal & Morone, 2009). However, increases in market prices for health care insurance and changes in societal values towards protecting the welfare of aging Americans changed health care insurance from a solely private (individual) good to a collective good .

Collective Goods

As discussed earlier, collective goods fall under the rubric of nonexcludable and jointly consumable goods. Because of these characteristics, collective goods are not conducive to free market enterprise structures. Unlike toll and private goods, collective goods are difficult to account for or measure. For instance, how many units of police protection should be purchased for a city? Savas (1987) argues that the nature of collective

goods “[p]ose a serious problem in the organization of society” (p. 53). The most challenging problem of collective goods is their propensity to create economic incentives for “free-rider” behavior (Hardin, 1968; Ostrom, 1990; 2000). Consequently, other institutional strategies outside of market mechanisms are necessary to mitigate free-rider incentives. Savas identifies two institutional strategies that are appropriate for the provision and allocation of these goods; voluntary associations and coercion. A local community volunteer fire department is an example of using a voluntary association to supply fire protection to a community. The implementation of a compulsory military draft to ensure the supply of soldiers for the armed forces is an example of a coercive strategy. Table 2.2 summarizes the aforementioned discussion between common-pool and collective good.

Table 2.2: Properties of Common-pool Goods and Collective Goods

Characteristic	Common-pool Good	Collective Good
Consumption	Individual and simultaneous by many	Joint and simultaneous by many
Payment of goods	Unrelated to consumption; paid for by collective assessment	Unrelated to consumption; paid for by collective assessment
Exclusion of those who will not pay	Difficult	Difficult
Measurement of quantity and quality of goods	Difficult	Difficult
Measurement of performance of goods producer	Difficult	Difficult
Individual choice to consume or not	Yes	No
Individual choice as to quantity and quality of goods consumed	Yes	No
Allocation Decision	Made by collective action and/or political process	Made by political process

Adapted from Savas, E. 1987 (p. 55). *Privatization: The Key to Better Government*. Chatham, NJ: Chatham House.

There are several conclusions that can be drawn from this stream of literature with regard to organizational motivations in watershed cross-sector collaboration. First, watersheds are common-pool goods, thus by their very nature pose challenges as to the types of institutional arrangements and strategies that can be used to control the consumption of water and the quality of watersheds. Second, the nature of watersheds creates organizational economic incentives that are susceptible to free-rider behavior; thus rendering market structures inappropriate to control the supply and consumption of water. Third, public policy prescriptions that deal with worthy goods must incorporate collective action arrangements in conjunction with coercive strategies in order to mitigate free-rider behavior in organizations. Finally, natural water resources are designated by society as a worthy good; as such, organizational motivations that drive collective action through multi-sector arrangements are critical to the protection of watersheds.

The nature of the good perspective offers several relevant themes and concepts that are important to our understanding of how characteristics of goods influence social behavior and institutional responses to the provisions of public goods. These themes include the nature of common-pool goods, free-rider behavior, worthy goods, and the implications of types of goods on policy prescriptions to meet societal needs. Building on these themes, the following section examines the theoretical perspectives that focus on collective action and the dilemma of governing common-pool resources.

Voluntary Collective Action and Social Dilemmas Perspectives

Germane to the understanding of organizational motivations that drive local cross-sector watershed collaboration is the inherent dilemmas of governing common-pool resources (Ernst, 2003; Ostrom, 1990; 2000; Hardin, 1968). Collective action theorists argue that the properties of common-pool-resources (e.g., transboundary, lack of property rights and non-exclusivity) create social dilemmas as to how to control their consumption and deciding the roles of social institutions in governing the “commons” (Hardin, 1968; Ostrom, 1990). Ostrom (2000) defines common-pool-resources as “[n]atural or humanly created systems that generate a finite flow of benefits where it is costly to exclude beneficiaries and one person’s consumption subtracts from the amount of benefits available to others” (p. 148). The following discusses the major perspectives that explain the nature of collective action in voluntary associations and the implications of governing common-pool resources.

“The Logic of Collective Action” Perspective

Mancur Olson’s (1965) seminal work *The Logic of Collective Action: Public Goods and the Theory of Groups* challenged a central premise of group theory: that individuals with overlapping interests will voluntarily mobilize and act in concert if they expect group members to mutually benefit (Bentley, 1908; Dahl, 2005; Truman, 1981). Olson takes issue with this premise; arguing instead, “[u]nless the number of individuals in a group is quite small, or unless there is coercion or some other special device to make individuals act in their common interest, *rational, self-interested individuals will not act to achieve their common or group interests*” (p. 2). This sentiment is echoed by Sandell and Sterm (1998) who argue that

group theory takes for granted that the explanatory factor for the formation of voluntary collective action is common interests.

According to Olson (1965), individuals are self-interested maximizers; thus, voluntary collective action emerges when rational agents need to coordinate their activities with others in order to acquire a collective good that is valued. Further, Olson asserts that organizations/associations serve the interests of their members. For instance, corporations are expected to serve the interests of their stockholders, labor unions are expected to represent workers interests and negotiate for higher wages and safe working conditions and public organizations are expected to further the interests of citizens. Olson suggests that the larger the membership of a voluntary group, the greater the propensity for free-rider behavior.

Olson contends that selective incentives neutralize free-rider behavior by disincentivizing non-cooperation and rewarding cooperation. Selective incentives include social and material incentives. Social incentives are intrinsic and include prestige, respect, fellowship and the “[f]ear of group harassment” (Sandell & Stern, 1998). Social incentives are transmitted through face-to-face personal interactions and are useful for recruiting new members to groups. Olson’s theory of the utility of social incentives in the recruitment of participants in small social networks is supported by empirical research (see Axelrod, 1984; Axelrod & Dion, 1988; Sandell & Stern, 1998). Researchers found that social incentives are more effective as a recruitment strategy than shared ideology or economic incentives (see Freeman, 1973; McAdam, 1986; Ostrom, 2000). In the case of environmental groups, Ernst (2003) maintains that free-rider behavior is less acute in smaller environmental groups because cooperative behavior among group members is easily monitored.

On the other hand, social incentives are less effective in large groups where interpersonal exchanges occur less frequently. In the case of large voluntary groups, material incentives (e.g., funding or economic gain) and coercive strategies (i.e., fines or sanctions) are more effective at compelling actors to engage in cooperative behaviors to achieve collective objectives (Olson, 1965). Ernst (2003) echoes Olson's argument, noting that efforts to restore the Chesapeake Bay through the formation of large voluntary citizen-based watershed groups is problematic because "[i]t is hard for individuals to see the direct result of their individual contribution to the group, and likewise, it is difficult for a large group to notice whether a single potential member fails to contribute" (p. 41). Taking a slightly different approach to explain the role of free-rider incentives in collective action and voluntary cooperation is the work of Garrett Hardin.

"The Tragedy of the Commons" Perspective

Garrett Hardin's (1968) work "The Tragedy of the Commons," poignantly illustrates the social dilemma when accessibility to common-pool-resources is freely open to all. Hardin's parable of the herdsmen grazing their cattle on a common pasture, tells the story of how each herdsman seeks to maximize their profit by adding as many of their cows as possible to graze on an open pasture. Since the pasture is freely opened and there are no restrictions on the number of cows to graze, each herdsman will keep adding cows and using the pasture until it is completely overgrazed. This parable illustrates the opportunistic tendency of human behavior to advance their self-interests in the short-run, in spite of the negative consequences to them in the long run. Hardin uses this parable to underscore his

argument that overpopulation and open access resources if left unregulated, will inevitably lead to the exploitation and the destruction of the “commons”.

More than four decades after Hardin proposed his theory of “the tragedy of the commons,” a growing number of environmental policy scholars purport that the only remedy to preserve the environment is through centralized authority and the use of coercive force (see Ernst, 2010; Keohler, 2007; Lyon & Maxwell, 2007). In the context of the Chesapeake Bay Watershed, Ernst (2010) applies Hardin’s theory to the overharvesting of marine resources (e.g., fish and shellfish). Ernst argues “The unregulated market provides little incentive to protect marine resources from overharvesting” (Ernst, 2010, p. 29). Furthermore, Ernst asserts that the increased scarcity of marine resources creates higher incentives for overharvesting fish, given that scarcity and demand increase the price of fish. Consequently, left unfettered, commercial fisherman will continue depleting the nation’s supply of fish until marine species are extinct (Ernst, 2010). Closely linked to Hardin’s “The Tragedy of the Commons” theory is the free-rider concept.

The free-rider concept suggests that in certain settings external incentives (e.g., sanctions and regulations) are necessary to overcome voluntary collective action dilemmas (Ostrom, 2000). While empirical evidence supports the propensity of “free-rider” behavior in the provision of public goods (see Montgomery & Bean, 1999; Ostrom, 1990; Schlager, 1994), other researchers have identified key variables that influence successful voluntary collective action including social norms of cooperation, reciprocity, fairness and trustworthiness (see Fehr & Fischbacher, 2004; Ostrom, 2000; Ray & Williams, 1999; Sabatier, Leach, Lubell, & Pelkey, 2005; Traxler & Spichtig, 2011). Other perspectives have

applied natural selection frameworks to explain voluntary collective action in common-pool resources regimes.

Natural Selection Perspectives

Organizational theorists have applied natural selection models to understand the nature of the environment and its influence on organizational decisions and structures (Aldrich & Pfeffer, 1976; Campbell, 1981; Hannan & Freeman, 1977). Aldrich and Pfeffer (1976) assert that organizations continuously scan their environment and adopt innovative strategies in order to adapt to variations in their environment. Moreover, Aldrich and Pfeffer suggests that the survival of organizations requires organizations to parallel their organizational structure to match the variations in their environment. Akin to Darwin's (1859) evolutionary theory, natural selection models primarily emphasized the process of selection and the nature of the environment (Aldrich & Pfeffer, *Environments of organizations*, 1976).

Ostrom (2000), among others, proposes that evolutionary theory is useful for explaining how common-pool resource regimes overcome the social dilemmas of collective action. Ostrom argues that Olson's "rationalist" perspective of "the logic of collective action," fails to explain the existence of successful voluntary collective action associations. Ostrom (2000) challenges Olson's (1965) rather gloomy portrayal of human behavior asserting that "[t]he world contains different types of individuals, some more willing than others to initiate reciprocity to achieve the benefits of the collective action" (p. 138).

Ostrom's (2000) examination of empirical studies showed that "[c]ontextual factors affect the rate of contribution of public goods" (p. 148). Evidence from numerous watershed field research studies support Ostrom's findings. These studies identify contextual factors

(e.g., setting, size of group, predictability of resources, the diversity of the group, the involvement of a leader/entrepreneur) as either facilitating or hindering the emergence of self-organized voluntary watershed organizations (see Ernst, 2003; Kenney, 1997; Koontz & Thomas, 2006; Margerum, 2011; McNamara, 2014; Morris, Gibson, Leavitt, & Jones, 2013; Wondolleck & Yaffee, 2000).

Proposition 1. If contextual factors influence an individual's or a group's motivational orientation, then it follows that the organization's motivational orientation to join a multi-sector watershed collaborative is influenced by their institutional class sector.

Ostrom's (2000) examination of empirical research on common-pool-resource regimes identified a common set of design principles that were present in successful long-standing voluntary common-pool resource regimes. These principles are outlined below (refer to p.149-153):

- Resource users design their own rules.
- Rules are clear and set boundaries that stipulate partners' roles and responsibilities.
- Rules account for local conditions and restrict the amount, technology and time allowed to harvest the resource.
- Resource users select local monitors to oversee the compliance of harvesting resources.
- Graduated sanctions are imposed for members who fail to abide by the rules.

- In the case of large common-pool-resources regimes (e.g., basin-wide watersheds), the presence of a system of multi-layer nested governance enterprises that organize regimes activities.

Building on evolutionary and free-rider perspectives, a growing number of scholars in the field of organizational science, sociology and political science have incorporated values of social norms to develop frameworks on cooperation. Several of these frameworks use *indirect* evolutionary approaches to explain the role of social norms and cooperation (see Fehr & Fischbacher, 2004; Ostrom, 2000; Traxler & Spichtig, 2011). Coleman (1990) describes social norms as “rules of conduct” that are predicated on widely shared beliefs. Moreover, Coleman suggests that internal and external incentives influence “rules of conduct.” Fehr and Fischbacher’s (2004) research found that norms of reciprocity give rise to cooperative behavior among individuals in groups. The importance of reciprocal relationships in collaborative partnerships has been well documented in a number of empirical studies (see Gray, 1989; Leach & Sabatier, 2005; Wondolleck & Yaffee, 2000).

Several relevant themes are drawn from the aforementioned theoretical perspectives. First, social norms (e.g., fairness and trustworthiness) are important intrinsic incentives to the formation of self-organized common-pool-resource organizations. Second, the orientation of motivations (or the “why” individuals/groups chose to create strategic alliances) are influenced by contextual factors such as setting and group characteristics (e.g., size and diversity). Finally, external incentives (e.g., money and regulations) are instrumental in neutralizing free-rider behavior among large voluntary collective action common-pool-resource regimes.

Before delving into the intra and inter organizational motivation literature and discussing the major theoretical perspectives that seek to explain organizational motivations, it is important to understand the different dimensions of motivation. The following section provides a primer on the study of motivation. This discussion highlights the critical concepts that are used to develop the conceptual framework and provides the contexts from which to analyze the major organizational motivation approaches that are discussed in the sections that follow.

A Primer of the Study of Motivation

There are numerous definitions of motivation found in the literature. Atkinson (1964) maintains that “[t]he study of motivation has to do with the analysis of the various factors which entice and direct an individual’s action” (p.1). Others characterize motivation as a set of internal and external incentives that influence behavior and “[d]etermine its form, directions, intensity and duration” (Denhardt, Denhardt, & Aristigueta, 2013, p. 164). Lawler (1973) asserts that motivation is a forward looking perspective that is a “goal-oriented behavior.” Furthermore, Lawler maintains that motivation is the impetus for a purposeful act that is made by a voluntary choice. Pettinger (1996) suggests that motivation is “[l]imited by and directed by the situations and environments in which people find themselves” (p. 94). Denhardt, Denhardt, and Aristigueta (2013) maintain that motivation theories seek to explain the social processes in which objectives are pursued and achieved.

Ryan and Deci (2000) contend that motivation is not a dichotomous variable with only two observed measures: (1) amotivation or the “lack of intention to act,” and (2) motivation

(action). Rather, Ryan and Deci argue that motivation varies in level (how much) and orientation (the type of motivation). The orientation of motivation is concerned with the “why” of motivation (Deci & Ryan, 1987; Ryan & Deci, 2000). In other words, the underlying goals and perceptions that create the impetus of action (Ryan & Deci, 2000). Behavioral scholars have examined motivation through three dimensions which include intrinsic motivation, extrinsic motivations, and amotivation (Deci, 1971; 1975; Kruglanski, 1978; Vallerand & Bissonnett, 1992).

The Three Dimensions of Motivation

Intrinsic Motivation

Ryan and Deci (2000) define intrinsic motivation as “[t]he doing of an activity for its inherent satisfaction rather than for some separable consequence” (p.56). Moreover, Ryan and Deci contend that intrinsic motivation has an internal locus of control, in that, intrinsic motivation is driven by psychological needs rather than external stimuli (incentives). Further, intrinsic motivation is a behavior that is voluntarily performed without any external inducement (rewards or sanctions) (Deci & Ryan, 1985).

Extrinsic Motivation

Vallerand and Bissonnett (1992) maintain that extrinsic motivation pertains to behavior that is driven by an external stimuli (incentives) in order to achieve an outcome. In other words, extrinsic motivation influences one’s behavior to achieve an end. Deci & Ryan’s (1985) Self-Determination Theory identifies four different types of extrinsic motivations: (1) *external regulation*, (2) *introjected regulation*, (3) *identified regulation* and (4) *integrated*

regulation. Ryan and Connell (1989) contend that these extrinsic motivations rest along a continuum of relative autonomy.

External regulation occurs when behavior is induced through external contingencies (rewards or control) (Deci & Ryan, 1985; Vallerand & Bissonnett, 1992). Conversely, introjected regulation occurs when rewards and sanctions are self-imposed (Vallerand & Bissonnett, 1992). For example, a student may stay up all night studying for an exam because they believe it will result in a good grade (Ryan & Deci, 2000). With regard to identified regulation, the behavior is self-directed because the individual values the behavior. For instance, a student may voluntarily do extra homework because they believe it will improve their ability to understand the material better (Ryan & Deci, 2000). Integrated regulation is the most autonomous form of extrinsic motivation and most akin to intrinsic motivation (Vallerand & Bissonnett, 1992). Ryan and Deci (2000) argue that integrated regulation occurs “[t]hrough self-examination and bringing new regulations into congruence with one’s values and needs” (p. 62).

Amotivation

Nested with the concepts of intrinsic and extrinsic motivation, is the notion of amotivation. Deci and Ryan (1985) argue that understanding the concept of amotivation is critical to the study of motivation. Amotivation is the absence of any intrinsic or extrinsic motivation. Vallerand and Bissonnett (1992) note that individuals are amotivated when “[t]hey perceive a lack of contingency between their behavior and outcomes” (p. 602). This is manifested through feelings of incompetency and lack of control over a course of an event. In this sense, amotivation can be conceptualized as a feeling of helplessness.

The remaining sections that follow in this chapter build on Deci and Ryans' motivation dimensions (intrinsic, extrinsic, amotivation). These dimensions will provide the basic framework from which to view various theoretical approaches to organizational motivation. The next section discusses these motivation dimensions in the context of the intraorganizational motivation literature. Intraorganizational motivation perspectives conceptualized organizations as “closed” systems rather than “open” systems (Cook, 1977; Thompson, 1967). Intraorganizational theorists sought to understand organizational performance through motivation orientations (behavioral and cognitive) and the implications of incentive structures on individuals and groups within an organization (Cook, 1977; Latham, 2007).

Intraorganizational Motivation Perspectives

The emergence of motivation theory in the context of organizational settings can be traced to early industrial organizational psychology theorists (Latham, 2007). Thought leaders in this intellectual realm of enterprise include the works of Maslow (1943), Mayo (1933), Herzberg (1966), Vroom (1964) and Viteles (1932;1953). The thrust of first generation organizational motivation theories emerged during the second quarter of the 20th century. The 1930's ushered in a series of socioeconomic crises including the collapse of the stock market, the advent of World War II and massive unemployment (Latham, 2007). The Great Depression, coupled with the erosion of the human condition in society, increased concerns among social scientists over the degradation of “humanization” in the workplace

(Latham, 2007). Consequently, the needs and goals of individuals became increasingly important among industrial organizational psychologists (Latham, 2007).

Prior to the 1930's, organizational theorists were primarily preoccupied with classical perspectives that focused on the "ideal-type" of organizational structure, divisions of authority and formalization of rules (Evan, 1965; Fry & Raadschelders, 2008). Classical organizational theorists viewed organizations as machines that converted inputs to outputs (Morgan, 1997). First generation organizational perspectives were oriented toward addressing technical issues in organizations: efficiency, productivity and performance (see Fayol, 1949; Mayo, 1933; Taylor, 1911; Weber, 1947).

Organizational behavior and motivation studies gained prominence in the early 1930's as a result of a series of experiments conducted by Elton Mayo (Mayo, 1933). Mayo's (1933) research at the Western Electric Company's Hawthorne plant found that informal workplace relationships among individuals and groups influenced organizational activities. This finding showed that organizational activities are not only influenced by organizational design (classical perspective) but also by the nature of an individual's behavior (behavioral perspective) (Morgan, 1997).

First generation organizational behavioral perspectives view organizations as biological organisms, whereby "[i]ndividuals and groups operate most effectively only when their needs are satisfied" (Morgan, 1997, p. 39). First generation behavioral theorists sought to understand the implications of human behavior on organizations' activities. These perspectives viewed motivation through a behavioral lens and emphasized human needs. In the latter half of the 20th century, second generation organizational motivational research

emerged. This realm of motivational inquiry shifted away from behavioral perspectives towards cognitive perspectives (Denhardt, Denhardt, & Aristigueta, 2013; Latham, 2007).

Cognitive perspectives view motivation as a forward looking, goal-oriented process rather than a reflexive human response to needs (Mowday, 1993). Cognitive motivation approaches emphasize goal attainment, the influence of an individual's characteristics, and the effects of rewards on motivation (see Goodman, 1977; Locke, 1996; Porter & Lawler, 1968; Vroom, 1964). The following two sections examine the major approaches found in behavioral and cognitive motivation perspectives.

Behavioral Perspectives

Early organization behavioral motivation perspectives that focused on understanding human behavior through the lens of satisfying individual needs include the works of Maslow (1943), McGregor (1957), Herzberg (1966) and McClelland (1965). Maslow's hierarchy of needs theory posed that humans are motivated to satisfy five basic needs including physiological, security, social, ego and self-actualization (Maslow, 1943). Maslow's theory argues that as lower needs were satisfied, an individual will strive to achieve the next higher level of needs. Building on the work of Maslow, McGregor's (1957) Theory X and Theory Y challenged conventional management perspectives (Theory X) that endorsed tight management controls as a means to modify employees' behavior. McGregor argued that management's responsibility is to create strategies that focus on developing workers' "self-control" and "self-direction" (Theory Y).

Taking a slightly different approach to needs-based motivation is Herzberg's (1966) motivation-hygiene theory and McClelland's (1965) acquired-needs theory. Herzberg's

theory identified two different classifications of motivational factors that influence job satisfaction and dissatisfaction which include intrinsic and extrinsic (or hygiene) motivation. Herzberg argued that intrinsic factors (e.g., achievement, recognition and responsibility), what Maslow referred to as higher level needs, influenced job satisfaction. On the other hand, Herzberg argued that extrinsic factors or hygiene factors (e.g., wages, job tenure and status), what Maslow referred to as lower level needs, can influence job dissatisfaction.

McClelland (1965) challenged earlier need-based theoretical assumptions that individuals' needs were innate. According to McClelland (1965) important needs are learned and driven by one's individual characteristics; thus, needs differ between individuals and are influenced by one's culture and experiences. McClelland's research identified three dominant motivator archetypes that individuals fall under : “(1) the need for achievement, (2) the need for power, and (3) the need for affiliation” (Denhardt, Denhardt, & Aristigueta, 2013, p. 169). McClelland argued that an individual's motivation orientation depends on their dominant motivator. Other organizational theorists sought to understand motivation as a cognitive process (Vroom, 1964; Porter & Lawler, 1968; Locke, 1978).

Cognitive Perspectives

Expectancy theories propose that an individual will be motivated if they perceive that their efforts will result in a positive outcome. Therefore, expectancy theories suggest that before an individual is motivated to act, they assess whether the expected performance and reward is worth their effort (Denhardt, Denhardt, & Aristigueta, 2013). Vroom (1964) identifies three human motivational factors which include valence, expectancy and force. Valence refers to the strength of the individual's perception of the outcome. Expectancy

refers to an individual's perception of what will result from their efforts. Force is the combination of valence and expectancy that compels an individual to act. Vroom argues that the stronger the valence (value of the reward), the stronger the force (inducement) for an individual to act.

Porter and Lawler (1968) expand on Vroom's theory of work and motivation by adding two additional factors to Vroom's model: ability and role clarity. According to Porter and Lawler, an individual may be highly motivated to perform the task/job but may lack the ability or the understanding of how to direct their efforts in a manner that is appropriate for their organizational role. Expectancy theories provide several important implications to the study of motivation. First, cognition is an important factor in understanding an individual's motivations. Further, expectancy theory suggests that intrinsic and extrinsic motivation are limited in their ability to compel individuals to act. Other factors such as opportunities, skills and ability influence an individual's behavior.

A central assumption in organizational motivation theory is that organizational activities are purposeful and directed towards achieving a goal (Denhardt, Denhardt, & Aristigueta, 2013). Closely related to expectancy theories are goal-setting theories. Latham (2007) asserts that "[g]oals are the immediate precursor to action" (p. 176). Locke (1978) pointedly notes that "Goal setting is recognized, explicitly or implicitly, by virtually every major theory of work motivation" (p. 594).

A number of scholars found that goal setting in organizations motivate employees' behavior (see Bandura, 1986; Eden, 1988; Locke, 1996). Tubbs' (1986) meta-analysis study on goal-setting and performance found that the existence of specific goals that are challenging

led to increases in employees' performance. Eden (1988) found that goal-setting increases individual's expectations and enhances one's beliefs in their ability to meet an objective or perform a task, otherwise referred to as "self-efficacy." Bandura's (1986) examination of self-regulatory dynamics in collective enterprises found that "collective-efficacy" influences cooperative behavior in group structures. Other cognitive perspectives viewed motivation through the lens of social exchange (see Adam, 1965; Goodman, 1977; Mowday, 1993).

Embedded in social exchange theories is the concept of distributive justice (Adam, 1965). Social exchange theories (also referred to as equity theory) are predicated on two assumptions about human behavior. The first assumption presumes that individuals make decisions based on their evaluation of possible outcomes and rewards (Adam, 1965; Goodman, 1977). The second assumption presumes that individuals use social comparison processes to assess whether their exchange with others is equitable or inequitable (Goodman, 1977; Mowday, 1993). In this respect, social exchange perspectives view motivation as a transactional condition; whereby the magnitude of equity or inequity influences an individual's behavior. Adam's (1965) equity model poses that an individual's perceptions of what is just or unjust are learned through socialization and comparing one's experiences to others.

Proposition 2. Organizational belief systems play an important role in the social processes that motivate individuals or groups to coalesce.

Early behavioral and cognition organizational motivation studies advanced our understanding of intraorganizational motivations. These studies shed light on the important role that incentives play in organizational performance, productivity and the overall viability

of organizations. From this body of knowledge several overarching themes emerge that pertain to this research. First, these studies showed that motivations are critical to the survival of organizations. Second, these studies identified organizational motivations as purposeful and strategic in nature. Finally, cognitive motivation studies underscored the importance of collective efficacy in the social processes of group dynamics in organizations.

The next section examines the major theoretical perspectives that focus on interorganizational relationships and the motivations that drive these arrangements. Before delving into interorganizational motivation perspectives, it is important to understand some of the major distinctions between intra and inter organizational motivation perspectives. Intraorganizational behavioral and cognitive perspectives view organizations as a “closed” system (Cook, 1977; Thompson, 1967). Conversely, interorganization relationships perspectives view organizations as an “open” system (see Gray, 1985; 1989; Aldrich & Pfeffer, 1976; Cook, 1977; Emery & Trist, 1965; Evan, 1965).

Another point of departure between intraorganizational motivation perspectives and interorganizational relationships perspectives is the unit of analysis under investigation. Intraorganizational motivation studies primarily focused on the individual as the unit of analysis and the organization as the level of observation (see Goodman, 1977; Latham, 2007; Locke, 1996; Mayo, 1933; Vroom, 1964). On the other hand, interorganizational motivation studies focus on the organization as the unit of analysis and the interorganizational domain as the level of observation (see Gray, 1985; 1989; Trist, 1983). According to Trist (1983), “[i]nter-organizational domains are concerned with field-related organizational population. An organizational population becomes field-related when it engages with a set of problems, or

[a]societal problem area, which constitutes a domain of common concerns for its members” (p. 270).

Interorganizational Relationships Perspectives and Motivations to Collaboration

The genesis of the interorganizational relationships inquiry stemmed from the deficiencies of early organizational studies (predominantly single case studies), failing to explain the development of complex social structures in urban settings during turbulent environments (see Etzioni, 1960; Turk, 1970; Warren, 1967). Van de Ven (1976) describes interorganizational relationships as a social action system comprised of two or more member organizations that coordinate their activities and processes in order to achieve collective and self-interest objectives. Further, Van de Ven notes that organizations participating in a social action system act as one unit, separate from their respective member organizations. Moreover, Van de Ven characterizes social action systems as an “ ‘[o]rganizational form’ for interorganizational collaboration” (p. 26). Building on these early seminal works, a number of interorganizational relationships (IOR) theorists explored the variable of “interests” to explain organizational behavior and the formation of linkages between organizations (DiMaggio, 1988; Gray, 1989; Oliver, 1991).

Organizational Interests

Institutional perspectives conceptualize an organization as a collection of individuals operating as a whole (Selznick, 1948). Hannan and Freeman (1984) characterize organizations as “special corporate actors” structured to accomplish collective interests and

serve as repositories of resources. Moreover, Hannan and Freeman (1984, p. 152) contend that “[o]rganizations receive public legitimation and social support as agents for accomplishing specific and limited goals.”

Institutional-level approaches to understand interorganizational relationships viewed organizations as a rational action system seeking to coordinate their efforts to maximize their interests (Selznick, 1948; Simon, 1945). Selznick contends that cooperative systems between organizations are a manifestation of a set of self-defense responses. Selznick identifies a number of self-defense conditions that prompt the formation of cooperative systems between organizations including market pressures, changes in leadership and policy, and threats from authoritative forces.

Other IOR scholars sought to explain interorganizational linkages through the lens of organizational mortality (Baum & Oliver, 1991; Meyer & Scott, 1983). In these studies, organizational interests and the formation of linkages center on the survival of the organization. Baum and Oliver (1991) found that corporations form strategic alliances to reduce their mortality rate. Baum and Oliver’s study identified four characteristics of organizations that influence their mortality rate including size, strategy, age and profit orientation (i.e., public vs. private). These characteristics were found to create vulnerabilities to an organization’s survival.

In an effort to off-set threats of vulnerability organizations will establish institutional linkages. For example, Baum and Oliver’s study found that new organizations will seek to form linkages with more established organizations in order to enhance legitimacy and reliability. In the case of profit orientations, studies found that corporate actors are motivated

to form strategic alliances with charitable organizations in an effort to align their brand with social issue causes (Austin, 2000; Herlin, 2015; Santana, 2013).

Other IRO theorists view organizations as open systems operating in dynamic environments (see Aldrich & Pfeffer, 1976; Cook, 1977; Emery & Trist, 1965; Evan, 1965; Gray, 1985; Levine & White, 1961; Thompson, 1967; Van de Ven, 1976). Theoretical perspectives in this intellectual realm of inquiry are predicated on two primary assumptions. First, that open systems are adaptive and fluid, whereby organizations continuously engage in exchanges between organizations within their environment (Buckley, 1967; Cook, 1977; Levine & White, 1961). Second, the viability of open systems depend on the adaptability and fluidity between organizations in the environment (Emery & Trist, 1965). The environment is a central focus among interorganizational relationships perspectives (see Aldrich & Pfeffer, 1976; Cook, 1977; Emery & Trist, 1965; Thompson, 1967). A common thread interwoven among these perspectives is the assertion that organizations change their structure to adapt to variances in the environment.

Instability

By and large, the literature on interorganizational relationships explains the formation of interorganizational arrangements through contextual factors including the environment, budgetary constraints, resource scarcity, conflict, regulatory and market pressures just to name a few (see Aldrich, 1976; Cook, 1977; Gray, 1985, 1989; Levine & White, 1965; Oliver, 1990; Turk, 1970; Thompson, 1974; Yuchtman & Seashore, 1967). Emery and Trist's (1965) research found that turbulent environments create uncertainty and instability, which in turn leads to interdependencies between organizations. According to organizational theorists,

turbulent conditions create independencies among organizations operating within interorganizational domains. This in turn, creates conditions that motivate organizations to establish interorganizational arrangements (Aldrich, 1976; Emery & Trist, 1965; Gray, 1989; Trist, 1983).

Emery and Trist contend that the greater the level of interdependency within interorganizational domains, the more precarious bureaucratic institutions are at navigating through turbulent environments to solve complex social problems. Gray (1989) echoes this sentiment and asserts that unilateral organizational strategies are ill-equipped (regardless of the size of the organization) for managing turbulent environments. Further, Gray asserts that stakeholders may be motivated to collaborate in order to change their environment or respond to contextual changes in the environment. Logsdon (1991) and other resource dependency theorists (see Cook, 1977; Aldrich, 1976; Pfeffer & Salancik, 1978) attribute interdependency among organizations to the scarcity of critical resources. Resource dependency perspectives suggest that organizations are driven by self-interests (DiMaggio, 1988; Aldrich, 1976; Oliver, 1991).

Resource dependency perspectives are predicated on two primary assumptions: (1) interorganizational competition creates resource-scarce environments, and (2), the survival of organizations operating in competitive environments hinge on their ability to garner scarce resources (Aldrich, 1976; Yuchtman & Seashore, 1967). Closely linked to resource dependency perspectives is exchange theory perspectives.

Proposition 3. The greater the level of resource scarcity in a domain, the greater the motivation for organizations to participate in interorganizational collaboration.

Exchange theory postulates that individuals, groups and organizations will select from among a set of alternative options that from which they expect to receive the most profit or benefit (Ivery, 2008). Levine and White's (1961) seminal study examines interorganizational relationships through the lens of exchange theory. Their research of twenty-two community health and welfare agencies found that "conditions of scarcity" limits an organization's functional ability to achieve their objectives. Levine and White assert that "conditions of scarcity" create the need for organizations to enter into exchange systems. Levine and White (1961) define interorganizational exchange as the "[v]oluntary activity between two organizations which has consequences, actual or anticipated, for the realization of their respective goals and objectives " (p.588). The findings from their study identified three key determinants that motivate organizations to enter into voluntary interorganizational exchange systems: (1) the limitations of organizational functions, (2) the level of domain consensus, and (3) the ability of an organization to access resources outside their exchange system.

In another study, Oliver (1990) conducted a meta-analysis of interorganizational relationship studies spanning three decades. Oliver's research identified six critical determinants that motivate organizations to establish voluntary interorganizational "linkages" (e.g., joint ventures, trade associations and social services joint programs). These motivations include: *necessity*, *asymmetry*, *reciprocity*, *efficiency*, *stability*, and *legitimacy*. These interorganizational motivation variables were drawn from a wide array of interorganizational relationships studies across a variety of settings. These studies sought to explain why organizations form interorganizational relationships and under what conditions. Oliver asserts that these interorganizational motivations are generalizable to different settings and across

different sectors. The following discusses each of the aforementioned interorganizational motivations.

Necessity

Necessity refers to regulatory or legal authorities that mandate the establishment of interorganizational linkages (Galaskiewicz, 1985; Ivery, 2008; Kaiser, 2011; Mandell & Steelman, 2003). A considerable number of interorganizational relationships are mandated under government regulatory frameworks as a policy implementation tool (see Agranoff & McGuire, 1999; Isett, Mergel, LeRoux, P, & Rethemeyer, 2011; Ivery, 2008; Kaiser, 2011). Rodriquez, Langely, Beland, & Denis (2007) note that mandated interorganizational relationships are ubiquitous in the private sector. Mandated interorganizational “linkages” in the private sector are established by parent companies between their subsidiaries in order to capture economies of scale and scope (Goold, Campbell & Alexander, 1994; Gortner et al, 2007; Rodriquez et al, 2007).

Asymmetry

Asymmetry refers to organizations that establish interorganizational linkages in an effort to garner power and influence over competitors through the acquisition of critical resources (Oliver, 1990). For instance, a corporation may be motivated to establish a joint venture with a major financial institution in order to gain control over “sources of capital” , in an effort to increase its power over other competitors in their industry sector (Oliver, 1990). Assumptions that underlie asymmetry motives align with Emerson’s (1962) power-dependence relation theory, which poses that actors garner power over other actors from resource dependencies.

A rich body of interorganizational relationships scholarship substantiates the assumptions that underpin Emerson's power-dependence relation theory (see Aldrich, 1976; Galaskiewicz, 1985; Gray, 1989; Provan & Milward, 1995; Rogers & Whetten, 1982; Van de Ven, Emmett & Koenig, 1975; Wood & Gray, 1991). In the context of collaboration, Purdy (2012) asserts that power dynamics in collaboration is concerned with *power over*, *power to* and *power for*. Stakeholders in collaboratives exert *power over* choosing the issues that are salient to the stakeholders (Gray, 1989). Purdy notes that stakeholders in collaboratives exert the *power to* voluntarily participate. Finally, collaboration allows stakeholders the *power for* voicing their concerns.

Reciprocity

Aligned with the exchange theory perspectives (Cook, 1977; Jarillo, 1988; Willer, 1999) and the social network perspectives (Coleman, 1988; Putman, 2000), norms of reciprocity are identified in the interorganizational relationships literature as critical to cooperation and collaboration in social network structures (see Coleman, 1988; Gray, 1989; Leahy & Anderson, 2010; Logsdon, 1991; Putman, 2000; Thomson & Perry, 2006). Norms of reciprocity in social network structures are derived from a communal vision, common interests and the mutual expectation that concerted efforts will advance collective interests (Leahy & Anderson, 2010; Putman, 2000; Gray, 1989; Weber & Khademian, 2008).

Some interorganizational relationship scholarship conceptualizes reciprocity based on two dimensions. The first, is grounded on prisoner's dilemmas games studies that explain cooperative behavior in the short term based on contingencies (see Axelrod, 1984; Ostrom, 1990; 2000). For example, Ostrom's (2000) examination of prisoner's dilemmas

experimental studies show that individual's perception of reciprocity influence collective action. Collaboration researchers found that partners are willing to engage in collaboration if they perceive that others are will respond in kind (see Axelrod, 1984; Ostrom, 1990; 2000; Van de Ven, 1976). The second dimension is based on long-term goals and values of obligation (Powell, 1990; Van de Ven, 1976). This dimension is predicated on the notion that parties are willing to incur initial disproportional costs, if they believe that other parties will "[e]qualize the distribution of costs and benefits over time out of a sense of duty" (Thomson & Perry, 2006, p. 27).

Other perspectives on reciprocity use social capital and network approaches. The social capital literature discusses reciprocity as a transactional relationship between individuals, groups or institutions (Coleman, 1988; Putman, 2000). Social capital assumptions on reciprocity are predicated on the notion that the willingness of institutions/individuals to engage in X activity, is contingent on their belief that others will engage in Y activity (Coleman, Social capital in the creation of human capital, 1988). Network perspectives view reciprocity as the residual of trust that is cultivated through the constant interaction between institutions/individuals (Lin, 2001).

Proposition 4. Norms of reciprocity are important intrinsic incentives to the formation of interorganizational arrangements.

Efficiency

The notion that efficiency is a motivating factor for organizations to form interorganizational relationships is well supported by empirical studies testing transaction cost theory (Hennart, 1988; Williamson, 1975; 1996, Zajac & Olsen, 1993). The premise behind

Coase's (1937) transaction cost theory poses that firms are motivated to minimize costs in their production/provision of goods. Therefore, organizations weigh the costs and benefits of exchanging resources in the market. According to Coase's theory, an organization's decision to "make, buy or ally" is based in part on their ability to economize their internal transaction costs (Geyskens, Steenkamp, & Kumar, 2006). Further, transaction related theories explain why transaction costs hinder or facilitate cooperative organizational arrangements (Williamson, *The mechanisms of governance*, 1996). In the case of providing public goods, Shaw (2003) attributes cost savings (e.g., legal services and funding for projects) as a motivating factor for nonprofit organizations to collaborate with local government agencies.

Stability

Interorganizational relationships theorists purport that organizations seek predictable and stable environments (Gray, 1985; Galaskiewicz, 1985; Van de Ven, 1976). This assertion is supported by resource dependency assumptions that posit scarcity of resources create conditions of uncertainty and instability, which creates turbulence in the environment (see Aldrich, 1976; Pfeffer & Salancik, 1978; Thompson, 1967). Oliver argues that uncertainty in the environment motivates organizations to establish interorganizational arrangements in order to "[a]chieve stability, predictability and dependability in their relations with others" (p. 246).

Pfeffer and Salancik (1978) maintain that environmental stability is essential for organizational strategic planning because it allows managers the ability to forecast future plans. Gazley and Brudney (2007) contend that interorganizational collaboration helps mitigate "external uncertainties" (i.e., strategic and financial) which may impede public,

private or nonprofit organizations from accomplishing their objectives. Logsdon (1991) suggests that turbulent and uncertain environments motivate cross-sector collaboration because risk and accountability can be shared among the stakeholders. Further, Logsdon purports that the higher the level of risks, the greater the incentive for cross-sector collaboration.

Proposition 5. The greater the level of turbulence and complexities in the a domain, the greater the motivation for an organization to establish interorganizational relationships.

Legitimacy

Oliver found that organizations are motivated to establish interorganizational arrangements as a means to “[i]mprove their reputation, image, prestige, or congruence with prevailing norms in its institutional environment” (p. 246). This finding is supported by empirical interorganizational relationship studies that found that organizations compete with other organizations’ reputation in order to elevate their public image (DiMaggio & Powell, 1983; Galaskiewicz, 1985; Pfeffer & Salancik, 1978). Galaskiewicz (1985) notes that organizations promote their legitimacy through “[c]ultural symbols and/or legitimate power figures in their environments” (p. 296). Wiewel and Hunter’s (1985) comparative case study analysis of newly established neighborhood associations found that these organizations increased their legitimacy among stakeholders through invoking their affiliations with more established organizations.

Proposition 6. A prominent company/organization is more likely to engage in an interorganizational relationship when other prominent companies/organizations are affiliated with that interorganizational relationship arrangement.

Catalytic Actors

A number of interorganizational collaboration scholars identify *catalytic actors* (e.g., conveners, champions, sponsors and collaboration entrepreneurs) as having a critical role in motivating stakeholders to participate in interorganizational collaboration (see Bardach, 1998; Bryson, Crosby, & Stone, 2006; Cigler, 1999; Gray, 1985, 1989; Lober, 1997, McNamara, Leavitt, & Morris, 2010; McNamara, 2014, Morris et al., 2013; Takahashi & Smutny, 2002; Weber, 2009). The literature characterizes conveners as an individual/actors that have the ability to induce legitimate stakeholders to mobilize and coordinate their activities in order to address a particular problem (Cigler, 1999; Gray, 1989; McNamara et al., 2010).

Gary (1989) notes that a conveners' powers are derived from their level of legitimacy (e.g., reputation, formal authority, status) in the problem domain. According to Takahashi and Smutny (2002), collaborative entrepreneurs are advocates of collaboration to solve complex problems. Therefore, collaborative entrepreneurs seize the opportunity to "sell" their ideas of collective action to other relevant stakeholders when a "collaboration window" opens (Lober, 1997; McNamara, 2014; Takahashi & Smutny, 2002).

Proposition 7. Catalytic leaders play a critical role in motivating stakeholders to participate in collaboration.

Corporate/Social Consciousness

Other organizational scholars seek to explain organizational behavior and motivations through the lens of corporate consciousness (Campion & Palmer, 1996; Lavine & Moore, 1996; Organ, 1990; Rousseau & Parks, 1992). The notion of corporate consciousness is found

in a number of social science fields including cognitive psychology, social psychology, sociology and anthropology (Cox & Blake, 1991; Lavine & Moore, 1996; Organ, 1990; Schein, 1985). Campion and Palmer (1996) define corporate consciousness as “[a] set of consciously held, shared values that motivate and guide individuals to act in such a manner that the interests of the corporation are balanced against its obligation to be responsible for the effects of its actions upon society, the environment, and the host of interested stakeholders” (p. 398).

Campion and Palmer’s examination of the extant literature on organizational psychology and behavior identify five components and/or antecedents that fall under the rubric of corporate consciousness. They are: social responsibility, business ethics, culture, corporate values and multiple stakeholders. Arguably, corporate consciousness has a number of important implications in watershed collaboration. First, given the voluntary nature of watershed collaborative enterprises, an organization’s corporate consciousness can foster intrinsic incentives that promote engagement in watershed protection and restoration initiatives. Second, Organ (1990) contends organizational citizenship behavior is shaped by the organization’s awareness of how their activities impact society at large and their external environment. This suggests that corporate consciousness can not only incent organizations to join watershed collaboration but also can influence an organization’s environmental management practices.

A number of important themes can be drawn from the interorganizational relationships literature that are pertinent to this study. First, norms of reciprocity influence the social processes that motivate organizations to establish interorganizational arrangements. Second,

public image is important to organizations. Therefore, organizations will compete with other organizations to increase their legitimacy. Third, the viability of organizations depends on predictable and stable environments. Consequently, organizations will seek to create strategic alliances in order to stabilize their environment and advance shared interests. Fourth, leadership plays an instrumental role in motivating relevant stakeholders to participate in collaborative arrangements. Fifth, an organization's ethos plays an important role in the social processes that shape their organizational motivation orientations. Finally, in resource-scarce environments organizations are motivated to engage in interorganizational arrangements as a strategy to achieve their objectives and advance their organizational interests.

Thus far the literature review has examined motivational dimensions from two predominant organizational perspectives: intra and inter organizational motivations. Building on these perspectives, the literature review turns to the watershed collaboration management literature. The following section discusses the context of community-based watershed initiatives that seek to promote cross-sector collaboration and draws on empirical research that discusses the organizational motivations that drive stakeholders to participate in cross-sector watershed collaboration.

Watershed Management and Motivations to Cross-sector Collaboration

According to the EPA, the most pressing social problem that threatens the welfare of society today is the growing severity and pervasiveness of non-point source pollution (U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, 2001; 2013a). Since the passage of the 1987 Clean Water

Act, the federal government has appropriated \$4 billion to implement various nonpoint source projects through a number of statutory programs (U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, 2013b). Directly aligned with this study is the Community-Based Environmental Protection (CBEP) program.

The CBEP uses a holistic approach to water management and planning that promotes collaboration between state and nonstate actors to improve water quality in local communities. Collaborative watershed initiatives seek to build capacity through the sharing of resources and establishing partnerships with community actors to address local watershed issues (for examples of recent watershed collaboration initiatives see U.S. Environmental Protection Agency 2014; USDA Natural Resource Conservation Service, 2011; Tennessee Healthy Watershed Initiative, 2013). Collaboration researchers found that when stakeholders agree to share critical resources to solve a complex problem, their combined efforts create greater effects than can be achieved by any singular institutional endeavor (Bryson et al., 2006; Gray, 1985; Lubell, 2005).

The emergence of local cross-sector watershed partnerships across the United States is indicative of shifts in water policy management approaches and the growing realization among state and nonstate actors that solving intractable environmental issues requires the concerted effort of public, private and nonprofit organizations (Kenney, 1997; Koontz & Thomas, 2006; Morris et al., 2013; Wondolleck & Yaffee, 2000). Kenney, McAllister, Caile, & Peckham (2000) broadly define watershed partnerships as:

“A primarily self-directed and locally focused collection of parties, usually featuring both private and intergovernmental representatives, organized to jointly address water-related

issues at the watershed level or a similarly relevant physical scale, normally operating outside of traditional governmental processes or forums, and typically reliant on collaborative mechanisms of group interaction characterized by open debate, creativity in problem and solution definition, consensus decision-making, and voluntary action” (p. 2).

Gray (1989) notes that cross-sector collaboration involves the integration of decision-making processes, resources and activities between two or more organizations operating in different sectors in order to address a complex social problem. Gray points out that incentives to collaboration vary across sectors as well as the type of form the collaborative structure take (i.e., agency-based, citizen-based or cross-sector). Gray’s (1989) research identifies the following incentives to cross-sector collaboration: global interdependence, competitive pressures, market failures, the fluctuations of economic environments, the rapid advancements in technology, government budgetary limitations to address complex social issues, the blurring of boundaries between sectors, and costs associated with litigation to resolve disagreement between disputing parties.

Logsdon’s (1991) research identifies two essential factors that influence an organization’s motivation to participate in cross-sector collaboration: the level of interest that an organization has to solve the problem, and the degree of organizational interdependence that an organization perceives to have with other stakeholders in effectively solving the problem. Logsdon maintains that in resource-scarce environments, organizational decisions regarding the allocation of their resources to solve complex social problems are predicated on the organization’s interests. Further, Logsdon notes that even if organizations recognize their interdependence with other organizations to effectively address a social problem of mutual

concern, free-rider behavior (as argued by collective action theorists) create disincentives for collective action in the provisions of collective goods.

Proposition 8. In resource-scare environments, organizations will allocate their resources or participate in cross-sector watershed collaboration if their interests are enhanced by their efforts to collaborate.

A significant body of scholarship in natural resource management discusses (implicitly or explicitly) motivations as drivers to the formation of cross-sector collaboration (see Brennsen & Marshall, 2000; Brody, Cash, Dyke, & Thornton, 2004; Darnall, 2002; Diaz-Kope & Miller-Stevens, 2015; Diaz-Kope, Miller-Stevens, & Morris, 2015; Ernst, 2010; Fleishman, 2009; Khanna, Koss, Jones, & Ervin, 2007; McNamara et al, 2010; Yaffee & Wondolleck, 1997). Watershed collaboration studies identify citizen salience, a sense of place, shared values/beliefs, the presence of a convener and common/compatible interests as key motivators that drive participation in community-based watershed collaboration (Bryson et al., 2006; Heikkila & Gerlak, 2005; Irvin & Stansbury, 2004; Margerum, 2011; McNamara et al., 2010; Morris et al., 2013; Wondolleck & Yaffee, 2000; Weber, 2009).

A central theme cited in watershed management studies is that a sense of place and community is an important motivating factor to stakeholder participation in local watershed collaboration. An overwhelming number of local watershed management studies show that a sense of place promotes shared values and a sense of communal ownership over preserving and protecting the quality of life in communities (see Leahy & Anderson, 2010; Lubell, 2004, 2005; Margerum, 2011; McNamara et al., 2010; Morris et al., 2013; Weber, 2009; Yaffee & Wondolleck, 1997; Wondolleck & Yaffee, 2000).

Weber's (2009) study of the Blackfoot Watershed identifies a strong attachment to place as a key motivating factor that galvanized stakeholders with competing interests to find common ground and work together to find solutions that balanced environmental and economic interests. Weber notes that in the case of the Blackfoot Watershed, incentives played a role in overcoming adversarial conditions and transforming self-interests to collective interests. Likewise, Morris et al.'s (2013) case study of three community-based watershed collaboratives in Hampton Roads Virginia identified a commitment to place as a powerful motivator to grassroots watershed collaboration. The authors note: "A positive emphasis on place-Because It's My Backyard-can inspire people who otherwise might not get involved"(p. 218). These findings are supported by Gray's (1989) research that observed that activities that are perceived as having a local focus are more likely to generate feelings of community and shared values (Gray, 1989). Gray postulates that "Geographic proximity facilitates structuring. Local level initiatives can best capture the advantages associated with geography" (p. 931).

Proposition 9. Organizational strategies that include a local focus as part of their mission is more likely to engage in local cross-sector watershed collaboration.

Irvin and Stansbury (2004) found that citizen's salience to watershed policy issues influenced civic engagement in watershed partnerships. Cooper, Bryer and Meek (2006) found that the level of institutional salience on environmental issues was a motivating factor for organizations to form strategic alliances. Fleishman's (2009) research on motivations that drive participants to form nonprofit estuary partnerships identified thirteen motivation factors. These factors include: access to meaningful information, participating in an environmental

network, the ability to collaborate with other organizations that share common goals, gaining financial capital and technical expertise, the ability to voice their concerns, an initiative sponsored by a person in the organization, advance policy preferences, getting the organization noticed by funders, expressing views to government, attracting volunteers and members, and efforts by other partners.

Wondolleck and Yaffee's (2000) examination of various watershed partnerships found that a shared sense of crisis was a powerful motivator for stakeholder participation in watershed partnerships. Their research found that environmental threats (economic or ecosystem) directly impacting the welfare of the community at large "[m]otivates people to do something now if they think it's going to disappear" (p. 77). Further, their research found that organizations are motivated to join watershed partnerships in order to gain the control of an issue or out of fear that their interests will not be protected. Finally, Wondolleck and Yaffee's research identified a shared sense of uncertainty and the fear of the unknown as a motivation for stakeholders to participate in watershed partnerships.

Proposition 10. The greater the externalities (e.g. environmental uncertainty, resource scarcity, crisis) that affect an organization's interests, the greater the level of motivation for an organization to participate in watershed cross-sector collaboration.

Proposition 11. Organizations that are impacted (positively or negatively) by watershed regulatory frameworks are more likely to engage in watershed cross-sector collaboration.

Lubell et al.'s (2005) research on watershed partnerships identified substantive and instrumental motivating factors as drivers for stakeholder participation in watershed collaboration. Their case study of the Salado Creek-Leon Creek found that stakeholders' self

interests was the predominant motivating factor for stakeholder involvement. Interestingly, augmenting human and social capital was the least mentioned motivating factor for stakeholder participation in the Salado Creek-Leon Creek Study. In their examination of the Illinois River watershed, Lubell and his associates found that stakeholder participation was primarily motivated by their objective to gain the attention of policymakers in order to advance their policy preferences. Additionally, both case studies cited obtaining information about the watershed and policymakers' plans to address watershed issues as motivating factors for stakeholder participation in the watershed partnership.

Lubell, Schneider, and Mete's (2002) meta-analysis of 958 watershed partnerships identified problem severity, institutional opportunities and political incentives as motivating factors for the formation of watershed partnerships. As with other watershed studies (see Heikkila & Gerlak, 2005; Margerum, 2011; Wondolleck & Yaffee, 2000), Lubell et al.'s (2002) research found a positive correlation between problem severity and the increase of stakeholder participation in watershed partnerships. With regard to political incentives, Lubell and his colleagues found that stakeholders with economic interests (e.g., mining, timber and fishing industry) will engage in rent-seeking behavior such as participating in watershed partnerships in order to mitigate stricter regulatory frameworks.

Proposition 12. Organizations operating in industry sectors that are dependent on watershed resources to advance their economic interests, are more likely to participate in watershed cross-sector collaboration.

A number of watershed studies identify the involvement of referent organizations and leaders (e.g., convener and champions) as motivating factors in cross-sector watershed

collaboration (see Heikkila & Gerlak, 2005; Lubell, 2004; McNamara, 2014; Margerum, 2011; McNamara et al., 2010; Morris et al., 2013). Heikkila and Gerlak's (2005) and Lubell's (2004) studies found that policy entrepreneurs and leaders with environmental expertise can create stakeholder buy-in in watershed collaboration. Both studies show that the engagement of policy entrepreneurs and leadership enhance factors that mitigate transaction costs in collective action regimes.

McNamara's (2014) case study of 17 nonprofit environmental organizations seeking to improve the conditions of Louisiana's coastal wetlands identifies the involvement of collaboration entrepreneurs as instrumental in advancing the coalition's ideas onto the political agenda and thereby creating opportunities for collaboration with state and non-state actors. McNamara et al.'s (2010) case study of the Lynnhaven River NOW (LRN) attribute the organization's engagement with community actors in the public and private sphere as critical to getting key stakeholders to join the watershed collaboration. Further, the study suggests that organizational participation in local cross-sector watershed collaboration is enhanced when the convener(s) or referent organization has local ties to the community.

Proposition 13. Referent organizations with local ties to the community and perceived by the community as having legitimate authority to organize the watershed collaborative, are more likely to generate organizational "buy-in" to participate in the collaboration.

In the natural resource management literature, empirical studies found that the transboundary nature of environmental problems require the right mix of incentives in order to establish cross-sector collaboration. Brody et al.'s (2004) research on the motivations that drive collaboration between U.S. forest and timber industry actors and government agencies

found that a multi-prong incentive strategy using a carrots and sticks approach was effective. Darnall's (2003) study on drivers that influence stakeholder participation in voluntary environmental initiatives (VEI) identified internal (e.g., management practices) and external motivations (e.g., regulations and market pressures) as factors that drive participation in VEI.

Proposition 14. Incentive structures (intrinsic and/or extrinsic) needed for an organization to participate in cross-sector watershed collaboration will vary from sector to sector; and are influenced by a variety of factors including the setting, the nature and scope of the watershed issue, political/economic and social environment, leadership and regulatory frameworks that impact each organization.

Empirical studies in the watershed management literature show a number of overlapping themes and concepts that are discussed in the intra and inter organizational motivation literature. For example, cognitive approaches to motivation emphasize that incentives that drive organizational behavior are goal-oriented (Denhardt, Denhardt, & Aristigueta, 2013; Latham, 2007). Expectancy perspectives explain organizational motivation behavior as a process by which individuals/groups weigh the costs and benefits of their actions before determining a course of action (see Adam, 1965; Goodman, 1977; Porter & Lawler, 1968; Vroom, 1964). These intraorganizational perspectives support watershed management studies that show collaboration is strategic in nature and partners in watershed collaboratives perceive that the benefits to participate in the network outweigh the costs (see Hardy & Koontz, 2008; Kenney, 1997; Leach, Pelkey, & Sabatier, 2002; Margerum, 2011).

Exchange perspectives explain the motivations to interorganizational relationships through conditions of scarcity (Ivery, 2008; Levine & White, 1961). Oliver's (1990) meta-

analysis identified necessity, asymmetry, reciprocity, efficiency, stability and legitimacy as critical contingencies of interorganizational relationships. These findings are well supported in the watershed collaboration literature (see Flornes, Prokopy, & Allred, 2011; Hardy & Koontz, 2008; Kenney et al., 2000; Leach et al., 2002; Margerum, 2011; Morris et al., 2013; Wondolleck & Yaffee, 2000). A critical departure from the interorganizational relationships studies and by the watershed collaboration management studies is that the latter treats organizational motivations and individual motivations as one and the same.

Arguably, individual and organizational motivations are driven by different motivational orientations. The motivational orientations of an organization is strategic in nature and above all mission oriented. Moreover, the watershed collaboration literature does not distinguish motivation orientations between sectors. Yet, Gray's (1989) seminal book acknowledges that incentives to collaborate vary from sector to sector and influence the collaboration arrangement undertaken by the stakeholders. Based on these findings, the following section presents a framework for understanding the motivational orientations that drive public, private and nonprofit organizations to participate in local cross-sector watershed collaboration. Included in the next section are the primary assumptions that guide the conceptual framework, the methodology for the development of the framework, the conceptual elements in the framework and the developed framework.

Conceptual Framework

Assumptions

There are six primary assumptions that guide the development of the conceptual framework. These assumptions are drawn from the literature review. First, participation in a collaboration is voluntary (Gray, 1989; Kenney et. al, 2000; McNamara et al., 2010; Morris et al., 2013). Second, it is assumed that organizations are rational actors and their motivations to participate in collaborative arrangements are grounded in organizational strategies, objectives, and interests, rather than individual interests (Denhardt, Denhardt, & Aristigueta, 2013; Oliver, 1990; Olson, 1965; Wood & Gray, 1991). Third, organizational decisions to direct their resources to collaboration arrangements must be authorized by top-level organizational leaders (Gortner, Nichols, & Ball, 2007). Fourth, organizational motivations to participate in a collaboration arrangement is goal-oriented and mission driven (Lawler, 1973; Oliver, 1990). Fifth, organizational participation in a collaboration arrangement is influenced by each organization's motivational orientations (Gray, 1989; Oliver, 1990; Olson, 1965). Sixth, organizational motivation orientations to participate in collaborative arrangements varies across sectors (Brody et al., 2004; Gray, 1989; Shaw, 2003). The aforementioned assumptions provide the basis for the development of the conceptual framework. The final section of this chapter discusses the development of the conceptual framework. This section provides the rationale for the design of the conceptual framework, the constructs and their operational definitions, and the developed conceptual framework that will guide the study.

The Development of the Conceptual Framework

The conceptual framework for the study uses two dimensions of motivation: organizational intrinsic motivation and organizational extrinsic motivation. Organizational intrinsic motivation is conceptualized as an incentive that is derived from within the organization and is based on the organization's strategies, goals, and mission. Organizational extrinsic motivation is conceptualized as an incentive that is derived from external stimuli outside of the organization. Drawn from the literature review, relevant concepts and themes are aggregated and collapsed into ten constructs. These constructs include: necessity, asymmetry, reciprocity, efficiency, stability, instability, legitimacy, catalytic actors, organizational interests, and corporate/social consciousness. Table 2.3 provides the definitions for each of the conceptual constructs and classifies each in their corresponding organizational motivation dimension (intrinsic or extrinsic).

Table 2.3: Organizational Motivation, Definitions of Constructs, and Dimensions


Conceptual Constructs	Definitions of Conceptual Constructs	Intrinsic and/or Extrinsic Organizational Motivation
Necessity	The extent to which external policies, rules, and procedures are required for an organization to follow in order to meet its objectives and achieve its mission (Oliver, 1990). For example, regulatory statutes, government sanctions, mandates by government or parent company.	Extrinsic Organizational Motivation
Instability	The external environmental forces that create unpredictability and uncertainty within the organization's subsystem (Gray, 1989; Wood & Gray, 1991). For example, market dynamics, globalization and competition.	Extrinsic Organizational Motivation
Catalytic Actors	The internal and/or external actors that engage in facilitating stakeholder "buy-in" to participate in collaboration (Gray, 1989) Examples found in the literature include referent organizations, champions, sponsors, collaborative entrepreneurs (McNamara, 2014; Morris et al., 2013; Wood & Gray, 1991).	Intrinsic and Extrinsic Organizational Motivation

Asymmetry	The extent to which an organization exerts its power or influence over another organization in order to control resources to achieve their objective (Oliver, 1990; Purdy, 2012).	Extrinsic Organizational Motivation
Stability	The degree of predictability and certainty that is supported by the organization's collaborative arrangements with other organizations, agencies or firms (Oliver, 1990).	Intrinsic Organizational Motivation
Efficiency	The extent to which an organization can economize costs through the establishment of collaborative arrangements (Oliver, 1990).	Intrinsic Organizational Motivation
Legitimacy	The extent to which an organization seeks to enhance its reputation, image and prestige through the establishment of collaborative arrangements (Oliver, 1990; (Sabatier, 1998).	Intrinsic Organizational Motivation
Reciprocity	The extent to which an organization perceives that exchanges of resources with another organization will be reciprocated and that the exchange advances mutual interests (Gray, 1989; Oliver, 1990).	Intrinsic Organizational Motivation
Corporate/ Social Consciousness	The extent to which an organization's decisions are guided by a sense of duty or obligation to act responsibly in order to protect the welfare of the community (local or global) (Campion & Palmer, 1996).	Intrinsic Organizational Motivation
Organizational Interests	The extent to which an organization establishes the formation of collective alliances in their strategic plans (e.g., access to funding, increase donations and volunteer pool) as a strategy to advance the organization's interest (Olson, 1965; Logsdon, 1991; Van de Ven, 1976).	Intrinsic Organizational Motivation

The constructs listed above align with the interorganizational relationships literature and the watershed management literature. As discussed in the preceding section, evidence from the literature review developed for this study show that many concepts and themes found in the interorganizational relationships theory literature are consistent with the findings from watershed management empirical studies (see Flornes, Prokopy, & Allred, 2011; Hardy & Koontz, 2008; Kenney et al., 2000; Leach et al., 2002). This certainly is not surprising,

given that watershed management often relies on establishing collaborative interorganizational relationships with state and non-state actors (see Diaz-Kope, Miller-Stevens, & Morris, 2015; Kenney et al., 2000; Margerum, 2011; Wondolleck & Yaffee, 2000). Therefore, it follows that the organizational motivational constructs identified above are relevant in the context of cross-sector watershed collaboration. Figure 2.4 displays the completed conceptual framework for this study.

Figure 2.4: Organizational Motivations Framework for Cross-sector Watershed Collaboration



Fitting the Pieces Together

The organizational motivations framework for cross-sector watershed collaboration adapts a systems approach to explain the motivational orientations that drive organizations in different sectors to participate in cross-sector watershed collaboration (Easton, 1957). The preceding literature review provides the foundation for the proposed framework. As described in chapter one, cross-sector watershed collaboration consists of a self-organized group of member organizations from different sectors working in concert and sharing their resources to address a watershed problem of mutual interests (Imperial, 2005; Moore & Koontz, 2001).

Given that participation in cross-sector watershed collaboration is voluntary (with the exception of government agencies that can be mandated to collaborate with other sectors), the motivational orientations (the why) that drive stakeholders from different sectors to participate in these arrangements is likely influenced by different levels of incentives structures (Brody et al., 2004, Gray, 1989; Shaw, 2003). Evidence from the interorganizational relationships literature and empirical studies on watershed collaboration show that instability, reciprocity, and necessity are critical motivators to collaboration (see Logsdon, 1991; Lubell, 2005; Morris et al., 2013; Van de Ven, 1976; Wondolleck & Yaffee, 2000). Thereby suggesting that certain incentives are *primary* to watershed collaboration.

Shaw (2003) suggests that organizations seek to collaborate across sectors because of the advantages gained from the partnership. Endicott's (1993) research on public and private partnerships established for land conservation found that nonprofits were motivated to collaborate with local government agencies as a means to acquisition critical services and funding (e.g., access to property records, legal advice/service, grants) for land conservation

projects. Sabatier (1998) contends that public or private entities may be motivated to collaborate with nonprofits to improve their public image. This line of research suggests that certain incentives play a greater role in an organization's decisions to join collaborative enterprises, thus suggesting the presence of a *secondary* level of incentive structures that influence the motivational orientations across sectors.

The basic argument that underpins this framework is that motivational orientations and levels of incentive structures influence cross-sector watershed collaboration across institutional class sectors. Empirical studies in watershed collaboration show that some incentives are necessary to motivate stakeholders to collaborate (e.g., instability and reciprocity), thus suggesting that certain incentives are *primary incentive structures* to collaboration (Heikkila & Gerlak, 2005; Kenney, 1997; Leahy & Anderson, 2010; McNamara et al., 2010; Morris et al., 2013). These incentives likely overlap across sectors. Moreover, researchers suggest that the presence or absence of certain incentives will influence the type of institutional class stakeholders that join a watershed collaboration (Endicott, 1993; Brody et al., 2004; Shaw, 2003). Thereby suggesting that *secondary incentive structures* (e.g., corporate/social consciousness, asymmetry and legitimacy) influence the nature of institutional class stakeholders (public, private or nonprofit) that engage in watershed collaboration. Therefore, it is likely that primary incentive structures will *overlap* across sectors while secondary incentive structures will likely *differ* across sectors. The conceptual framework for the study seeks to flesh out the motivational orientations that drive cross-sector watershed collaboration and identify the incentive structures that influence the nature of institutional class stakeholders that participate in watershed collaboration.

Chapter three discusses the methodology for the study and describes the research design, the data collection and analysis techniques that guide the study. A summary list of all of the propositions developed from the literature review is included below.

Summary List of Propositional Statements

Proposition 1. If contextual factors influence an individual's or a group's motivational orientation, then it follows that the organization's motivational orientation to join a multi-sector watershed collaborative is influenced by their institutional class sector.

Proposition 2. Organizational belief systems play an important role in the social processes that motivate individuals or groups to coalesce.

Proposition 3. The greater the level of resource scarcity in the watershed domain, the greater the motivation for organizations to participate in watershed cross-sector collaboration.

Proposition 4. Norms of reciprocity are important intrinsic incentives to local watershed cross-sector collaboration.

Proposition 5. The greater the level of turbulence and complexities in a domain, the greater the motivation for an organization to establish interorganizational relationships.

Proposition 6. A prominent company/organization is more likely to engage in an interorganizational relationship when other prominent companies/organizations are affiliated with that interorganizational relationship arrangement.

Proposition 7. Catalytic leaders play a critical role in motivating stakeholders to collaborate in cross-sector watershed organizations.

Proposition 8. In resource-scarce environments, organizations will allocate their resources or participate in watershed cross-sector collaboration if their interests are enhanced by their efforts to collaborate.

Proposition 9. Organizational strategies that include a local focus as part of their mission are more likely to engage in local cross-sector watershed collaboration.

Proposition 10. The greater the externalities (e.g. environmental uncertainty, resource scarcity, crisis) that affect an organization's interests, the greater the level of motivation for an organization to participate in watershed cross-sector collaboration.

Proposition 11. Organizations that are impacted (positively or negatively) by watershed regulatory frameworks are more likely to engage in watershed cross-sector collaboration.

Proposition 12. Organizations operating in industry sectors that are dependent on watershed resources to advance their economic interests are more likely to participate in watershed cross-sector collaboration.

Proposition 13. Referent organizations with local ties to the community and are perceived by the community as having legitimate authority to organize the watershed collaborative, are more likely to generate stakeholder "buy-in" to participate in the collaboration.

Proposition 14. Incentive structures (intrinsic and/or extrinsic) needed for an organization to participate in cross-sector watershed collaboration will vary from sector to sector; and are influenced by a variety of factors including the setting, the nature and scope of the watershed issue, political/economic and social environment, leadership and regulatory frameworks that impact each organization.

CHAPTER THREE:

METHODOLOGY

The crux of this research is based on two simple and rather intuitive notions: (1) an individual's and an organization's motivational orientations to collaborate in watershed management enterprises differ in meaningful ways, and (2) the nature of an organization's institutional class sector (public, private or nonprofit) influences their motivational orientations, and in turn, the incentive structures that drive their willingness to participate in cross-sector watershed collaboration. These two notions underpin the exploration of the research.

Before delving into the methodology for this research, a brief review of what was presented thus far is provided. Chapter one presented an overview of watersheds and their importance to society, the role of collaboration in natural resources management, and outlined the relevancy of this research and discussed its contribution to the study of collaboration and watershed management. Chapter two unpacked the major theoretical perspectives that focused on the incentives that influence organizational behavior including the nature of the good perspectives, collective action, social dilemmas perspectives and intra and inter organizational motivation behavioral perspectives.

Throughout chapter two, major themes and concepts were identified, discussed and analyzed. From the analysis of the literature, relevant themes and concepts germane to the study were collapsed and classified into ten constructs. A list of conceptual definitions of the constructs was provided along with an illustration of the developed conceptual framework.

The chapter concluded with a discussion of the rationale for the research and provided a summary of the propositional statements developed from the literature review.

We begin this chapter with a brief review of the purpose of the research and a summary of the research questions that guided the study. This review is followed by a discussion of the qualitative research tradition that forms the framework for the research design. Included in the discussion are the details and the rationale for the data collection and the analysis techniques used for the study. The chapter concludes with a discussion of the strengths, limitations, and the consideration for the research.

Purpose and Conceptual Framework

Research Purpose

The purpose of this research was to examine the organizational motivation incentives and to identify the social processes that influence the formation of local cross-sector watershed collaboration. The research was guided by two objectives: (1) identify empirically the organizational motivation drivers, the incentive structures and the social processes that led to the formation of local cross-sector watershed collaboration, and (2) advance the study of collaboration by moving toward developing a theoretical model of organizational motivations to cross-sector collaboration that explains the incentive structures and the social processes that drive the formation of local cross-sector watershed collaboration. The following provides a summary list of the research questions addressed in this study.

Research Questions

There are five research questions that guide this investigation:

1. What are the organizational motivations that drive local cross-sector watershed collaboration?
2. What are the organizational motivations that drive private organizations to participate in local cross-sector watershed collaboration?
3. What are the organizational motivations that drive public organizations to participate in local cross-sector watershed collaboration?
4. What are the organizational motivations that drive nonprofit organizations to participate in local cross-sector watershed collaboration ?
5. Are there certain organizational motivations between industry sectors that are more prevalent in local cross-sector watershed collaboration?

The literature review discussed in the preceding chapter provided the foundation for the conceptual framework. The framework for this study used the interorganizational relationships theory and the watershed management literature to explore the organizational motivational incentives that drive organizations in different sectors to participate in watershed collaboration. Based on the extant literature on motivations, ten organizational motivation constructs were identified as important incentives that drive different sectoral stakeholders to form strategic collaborative alliances. These organizational motivation constructs included: necessity, asymmetry, reciprocity, efficiency, stability, instability, legitimacy, catalytic actors, corporate/social consciousness, and organizational interests. These variables form the basis for

the conceptual framework developed to guide the study (see Appendix A- Constructs, Definition, Interview Questions, and Data Collection Strategies).

The methodological framework for the study follows a case study research tradition. Hays and Wood (2011) purport that the selection of the research tradition is critical because it serves as the blueprint for the research design. Moreover, Hays and Wood note that each qualitative research tradition has a unique purpose in naturalistic inquiry with its own methodological characteristics including sample method and size, data sources, and analytic approaches. Therefore, careful consideration must be given as to what type of research tradition is the most appropriate for a particular study. The next section discusses in more detail and provides the rationale for using a case study design for the study.

Research Design

To explore the nature of organizational motivations and the social processes that drive cross-sector watershed collaboration, the study followed a case study research tradition that applied both deductive and inductive approaches to answer the research questions and test the propositions. The research design for this study holds the following assumptions: that human activities are unpredictable and complex; that an individual/actor reacts in response to difficult situations and problems that they are impacted by; “[t]hat individuals act on the basis of meanings in which they are embedded; that meaning is defined and altered through human interactions” (Brower & Jeong, 2008, p. 827); and that the events of social phenomena are continually emergent and evolving (Brower, Abolafia, & Carr, 2000; Strauss & Corbin, 1994).

The remaining sections of this chapter detail the procedures used to select the participants, the data selection, data sources and analysis techniques used for the study. The chapter concludes with a discussion of the strengths, limitations and considerations of using a case study research design for the study.

Case Study Design

The research design for the study used a single case study approach to explore the organizational motivations that drive organizations in the public, private and nonprofit sectors to participate in local watershed collaboration. Yin (2009) asserts that case studies are appropriate when the nature of the study is exploratory and the researcher seeks to gain an in-depth understanding of the phenomenon under investigation. Moreover, Stake (2005) emphasizes that a case study is appropriate when (1) the researcher wants to explore the phenomenon in its natural context, (2) when the phenomenon under investigation is bound by time, place and activities, and (3) when the researcher seeks to explore and describe complex processes, events, individuals/groups or social dynamics. Creswell (2003) suggests that case studies are particularly valuable when the researcher needs rich and thick data to explore a phenomenon that is relatively new and innovative in a field of study.

Unit of Analysis

For this study, the unit of analysis was the organization, not the individual. More specifically, the units under investigation were the organizational motivations (intrinsic and extrinsic) that drove partner organizations from the public, private and nonprofit sectors to

participate in Lynnhaven River NOW (LRN). In order to understand the social processes and the organizational motivation orientations that drove different institutional class organizations to participate in LRN, textual data was collected through in-depth interviews using a semi-structured interview approach. An interview protocol using semi-structured questions guided the interview (See Appendix B-Interview Protocol Questions). The interview questions were developed from the extant literature on organizational motivations, interorganizational relationships theory, and collaboration. A number of interorganizational relationships studies that examined motivational determinants in multi-sector alliances used the organization as the unit of analysis (see Austin, 2000; Babiak, 2007; Brody, Cash, Dyke, & Thornton, 2004; Santana, 2013). For instance, Babiak's (2007) study on motivational determinants to interorganizational relationships in Canadian amateur sports system (partnerships consisting of multi-sector alliances) interviewed informants from 14 partner organizations to identify what motivated partners organizations to join the alliance.

Data Sources

The primary data sources for the study were individual interviews using semi-structured interview questions to capture the thick descriptive data needed to explore the organizational motivations and the incentive structures that drive particular sectors to engage in local cross-sector watershed collaboration. Hays and Wood (2011) note that thick descriptive data is a hallmark of qualitative research design. To this end, Hays and Singh (2012) maintain that the aim of thick descriptive data is to capture enough detail in the data in order to provide the reader a "[c]omprehensive and focused picture of a behavior or

occurrence that includes relevant psychosocial, affective, and culture undertones” (p. 8). In addition, the study uses various secondary data sources including memo writing, contact summary sheets, organizational web sites, and media sources. Although the unit of analysis was organizations, the primary data source for the study was in-depth interviews with key organizational representatives from each of the organizations in the sample in order to collect the pertinent data necessary to explore the determinants that motivate organizations to join a local watershed collaboration.

The selection of the primary data sources for this case study design were consistent with other case studies that examine organizational motivations and environmental management regimes (see Brody et al, 2004; Brody & Cash, 2004; Darnall, 2002; 2003). Brody et al.’s (2004) study employed in-depth telephone interviews with organizational representatives from the forest industry to study the organizational motivations that drive the timber industry to participate in collaborative environmental management initiatives. Likewise, Darnall’s (2002) research on incentives that drive industry actors to participate in voluntary environmental initiatives (VEI) uses internal and external organizational drivers as the unit of analysis in her study. Both studies seek to explain why private sector resource-intensive industries engage in environmental management given that environmental management is not part of their core business.

Brody and Cash’s (2004) examination of the literature identifies 10 internal and external motivators that explain timber industry actors’ engagement in environmental management collaboration. Among these include: effective resource management, direct financial gain, enhance public relations, improve relationships with partners and stakeholders,

acquisition data and technical expertise, an alternative to litigation and a better option to command-and-control regulations. Brody and Cash's research supports the underlying assumptions of the conceptual framework for this study. Specifically, that primary and secondary incentive structures play a critical role in cross-sector environmental collaboration.

The interview questions were designed to collect thick description in order to glean information about each respondent's organizational motivational orientations and the incentive structures and social processes that influenced their organization to join LRN. Maxwell (2005) asserts that implementing data collection strategies that capture thick description builds rigor in the study. Geertz (1973) contends that thick description allows the researcher to move beyond simple description of raw data and reporting excerpts of transcripts in findings.

Morse (1999) suggests that thick description allows the researcher to delve deeper into aspects of the research context and process, thus augmenting the research contribution. Further, Morse purports that thick description allows the researcher to make connections between concepts identified in the literature and the data collected from participants, thus allowing the researchers to synthesize and interpret the meaning of the data on a deeper level. Denzin (1989) outlines the primary components of thick description: "(1) it gives context of an act; (2) it states the intentions and meanings that organize the action; (3) it traces the evolution and development of the act; [and] (4) it presents the action as the text that can then be interpreted" (p. 33). Thus, incorporating thick description as a data collection strategy provided two major benefits for this study. First, thick description enhanced trustworthiness

and allows the researcher to identify and explore subtle nuances that emerge in the data (Creswell, 2007; Yin, 2009).

In addition, the study used other data sources including organizational web sites, media sources, documents, memo writing and observations. Memo writing goes beyond simply summarizing details. Charmaz (2006) maintains that writing memos allows the investigator to explore, check and develop new ideas as they emerge throughout the research process; thus allowing for a deeper level of analysis, and in turn, the discovery of emergent theory.

The purpose of using secondary data in the study was to confirm and/or supplement themes and concepts identified from the interviews conducted with organizational representatives. In addition, Stake (2005) and Yin (2009) contend that incorporating secondary data sources in naturalist inquiry enhances conformability and authenticity into the study. Conformability refers to the degree that findings genuinely reflect the participants' perceptions in the study (Lincoln & Guba, 1985). Similarly, authenticity refers to efforts from the researcher to ensure that respondent's perspectives are accurately conveyed (Lincoln & Guba, 1985). Both conformability and authenticity address the internal validity (the trustworthiness) of a study with subtle differences between them. Conformability refers to the neutrality of the researcher and speaks to the methodological criteria used in the study; whereas authenticity speaks to presenting participant's perspectives in a truthful light and speaks to the theoretical criteria used in the study.

Selection of the Setting

Lynnhaven River NOW (LRN) provides the setting for the study. LRN is a 501(c)(3) corporation that was established in 2002 by a group of prominent local citizens interested in restoring and protecting the quality of the water in the Lynnhaven River (Lynnhaven River NOW, 2013). The river encompasses 64 square miles in southeast Virginia, and includes over 150 miles of shoreline (Morris et al., 2013). Yin (2009) maintains that careful consideration must be given when selecting the setting for a case study.

Purposeful sampling was used to select the setting for the study. This sampling strategy was appropriate for the selection of the setting because the focal organization needed to meet specific criteria (Patton, 1987). LRN was selected as the setting for the study because the organization was identified as the convener and the point of contact for the partner organizations that are working together in this watershed collaboration (McNamara et al., 2010; Morris et al., 2013). Further, the composition of LRN's stakeholders included organizations from the public, private and the nonprofit sector. Given the nature of LRN's stakeholder composition and the research questions the study seeks to answer, LRN provided an ideal setting to systematically explore the nature of organizational motivation orientations in local cross-sector watershed collaboration and the social processes that influence stakeholders to participate in these enterprises.

Procedures

Sampling Strategies

A sample frame was provided by the Chief Executive Director of LRN which included the names of 43 organizations and available contact information for their representatives. The organizations that participated in the study represented a range of organizations from the public, private and nonprofit sectors. All of the organizations included in the sample frame were identified by LRN's CEO as currently working in LRN's watershed collaboration network or previously worked in LRN's watershed collaboration network.

At the beginning of the study, purposive sampling was used in the selection of the organizations. Eligible organizations for the study were affiliated with public, private or nonprofit organizations that work with LRN. Patton (1987) argues that purposive sampling is appropriate when the researcher seeks to obtain information-rich data for an in-depth case study. As the research progressed, theoretical sampling was utilized to allow for the exploration of emerging patterns and themes during data collection (Charmaz, 2006; Hays & Singh, 2011). Charmaz (2014, p. 206) emphasizes that theoretical sampling is emergent and allows the researcher to "[e]laborate the meaning of your categories, discover variations within them, and define gaps among categories. Moreover, theoretical sampling mitigates researcher bias by letting the emergent themes and concepts in the data drive the investigation. In addition, snowball sampling was used in an effort to collect data from relevant organizations not included in the original sample frame provided by LRN (Lincoln & Guba, 1995). Sampling continued until redundancy of themes and patterns were reached and

no new information was expected to be gained from further data collection (Hays & Singh, 2011).

Data Sources

The primary data sources for the study were interviews with representatives from the organizations that partner with LRN or previously worked for member organizations that partner with LRN. Interviews were conducted with 29 representatives from each of the organizations. These representatives were identified as key informants. The composition of the key informants in the study included some of the following: City officials, high-level local government administrators, chief executive directors of nonprofit organizations and corporations, presidents of nonprofit community associations and small business firms, and the superintendent of a private golf course. The selection of key informants was based on their scope of authority within their respective organization and their partnership with LRN. Given their level of status and responsibility in their respective organizations, the researcher anticipated the participants in the study to possess a high level of insight on their respective organizations. Key informants used in the study represented 10 private sector organizations, 10 public sector organizations, and 9 nonprofit sector organizations. Hays and Singh (2012) note that key informants are instrumental in qualitative studies because they can provide researchers critical information about the phenomenon under investigation including unique aspects of the setting, process and/or the program being studied, the ability to identify eligible participants and potentially facilitate contact with eligible participants.

Sample Size

Recruitment of participants for the study took place from June to August 2015 (see Appendix C-IRB Human Subjects Approval). A total of sixty-six ($n=66$) key informants representing member organizations working with LRN were invited to join the study. This total included key informants identified through snowball sampling. At the beginning of the study, invitation letters explaining the purpose of the research were sent to key informants via electronic mail or their postal address (see Appendix D-Recruitment Telephone and Appendix E-Recruitment Email). In the case of key informants that did not respond to the initial recruitment letter, a second attempt was made to contact them. A total of thirty-three ($n=33$) key informants agreed to participate in the study.

Of those thirty-three key informants, three did not meet the criteria of eligibility to participate in the study. Two of the three key informants disclosed at the beginning of their interview that their organization partnered with other watershed collaboration groups, but did not currently or previously partner with LRN. The other key informant disclosed that she was a volunteer for the member organization that partners with LRN rather than an official representative of the member organization. Finally, one of the key informants that initially agreed to participate in the study withdrew from the study due to personal reasons. This left the final sample size of twenty-nine key informants ($n=29$) representing twenty-nine member organizations that partnered with LRN to participate in the research.

Data Collection

The primary data collection method used for the study was interviews. Interviews were conducted in person or via telephone. At the beginning of each interview, participants were

asked to either sign an informed consent form or in the case of telephone interviews, provide their verbal consent prior to the start of the interview (see Appendix F-Informed Consent Telephone Interviews and Appendix G-Informed Consent Document). A semi-structured interview protocol was used to collect the data. Along with the interview protocol, probing questions were asked in order to clarify and/or expand on the comments made by the interviewee. The duration of interviews ranged from approximately 30-60 minutes. Interviews were recorded using a digital audio tape recorder and were transcribed verbatim. After each interview, a summary contact sheet (See Appendix H-Summary Contact Sheet) was completed. Summary contact sheets were used to record reflective/descriptive field notes and record observations of the setting, and the participants' behavior. In addition, memos were written to note gaps in the data and capture emerging themes and concepts as the research process unfolded.

The University's Social Science Research Center was contracted to transcribe all of the interviews conducted for the study. After the completion of each interview, the investigator exported each of the audio files to a shared password secured Dropbox folder. After the audio file was transcribed, the transcript was retrieved and imported into NVivo qualitative analysis software version 10. The transcript was then coded in NVivo for later analysis.

Data Analysis

The investigator used a number of inductive and deductive verification techniques to identify the thematic constructs and explore patterns and emerging concepts found in the data (Hays & Singh, 2011). Content analysis was used to analysis the transcripts. Content analysis

consisted of coding the data in three stages: open, axial and selective coding (Strauss & Corbin, 1994). At each stage of the coding process the data was compared and refined. In the first stage of the data analysis process open coding was used to analyze the interview transcripts in order to identify large domains. Once the initial analysis was completed, a preliminary codebook was created. Next, axial coding was conducted in order to analyze the relationships between large domains. The investigator continued this process until saturation was reached. Once saturation was reached selective coding was conducted. During selective coding, axial codes were further refined and emerging patterns and sequences were identified. At the completion of this process a final codebook was created.

A sample of the transcripts and the final code book was given to an independent coder. The independent coder was a fourth year Ph.D. student with prior experience conducting qualitative research and was experienced with inter-rater coding procedures. In addition, the independent coder was familiar with LRN and the research topic. The investigator and the independent coder then compared the codes and discussed agreements/disagreements in codes. Once agreements/disagreements were finalized the percentage agreement was calculated. The inter-coder percentage agreement calculation was 87.95%.

In addition, secondary data sources were obtained from official government and organizational websites, public records, archival and media sources were used in the study. Examples of key archival sources reviewed included government and organizational strategic plans, organizational mission statements, newsletters and annual reports on the state of the Lynnhaven River watershed and news articles about LRN and their activities and partners. Data from these secondary sources were used to provide historical, social and organizational

context to the phenomenon under investigation (Charmaz, 2006; Yin, 2009). In addition, the secondary sources were used to corroborate information captured in the interviews with the participants.

Finally, comparison analysis was used to compare the prevalence of motivation determinants in watershed collaboration between the three subgroups of organizations (private, public and nonprofit organizations). In order to compare data between subgroups, each of the transcripts imported into NVivo was assigned one of three attributes: private, public and nonprofit. The ability to assign a specific industry sector to each of the data sources provided the means for the researcher to organize the data by each of the subgroups (Bazeley & Jackson, 2013). Once all of the transcriptions were coded with NVivo, coding queries were run to: 1) organize the data by attributes, 2) sort data by nodes (codes), and 3) analyze text in order to identify differences in patterns of responses as to what motivational determinants prompted organizations in each subgroup to collaborate with LRN.

Yin (2009) discusses comparisons analysis in the context of cross-case synthesis. According to Yin, cross-case synthesis is appropriate when there are two or more cases included in the case study. Yin underscores that a case refers to the unit of analysis under investigation. Ayres and Kavanaugh (2003) contend that comparison analysis is useful when the researcher wants to identify relevant commonalities and/or differences within cases and/or across cases. According to Sandelowski (1996), incorporating across cases analysis in qualitative studies allows the researcher to identify relevant variations in patterns and themes.

Trustworthiness

A number of trustworthiness strategies were used during the research process to enhance credibility, transferability, confirmability and authenticity. First, two types of triangulation strategies were incorporated in the study. Data were collected from multiple sources including transcripts, news articles, governmental and organizational web sites. In addition, an independent coder was used to code a sample of the transcripts. The results of the inter-coder percentage agreement were calculated and reported. Second, field notes and memos were used throughout the research process. Field notes chronicled observations on participants' behavior and their surroundings. Memos were used to record emerging ideas and identify potential patterns and concepts in the data. Third, rich and thick data were captured in the interviews. The results discussed in chapter four include descriptive and detailed narratives that illustrate the concepts and themes identified in the data. Finally, all documents relating to the research were compiled and organized to maintain an audit trail.

Strengths, Limitations, and Considerations

There were a number of benefits and strengths to using this study's research design to investigate the motivational determinants the drive local watershed cross-sector collaboration. Using an in-depth case study design provided the researcher a number of advantages. First, conducting a case study provided the researcher the opportunity to identify subtle nuances in the data that might not have been discovered using another method (Creswell, 2007; Yin, 2009). Second, using a case study allowed the researcher to investigate the phenomenon from a closure vantage point, thus, enhancing the researcher's ability to explore the complex social

processes and the organizational dynamics that drove organizations in the study to engage in local cross-sector watershed collaboration with LRN. Moreover, using a semi-structured interview protocol allowed the researcher to ask participants probing questions, thereby allowing participants the opportunity to discuss other motivations that were not included in the conceptual framework (Hays & Singh, 2011; Remler & Van Ryzin, 2011). Finally, two types of triangulation strategies were used in the study to enhance trustworthiness including using multiple data sources and an independent inter-coder.

The case study also posed limitations. A limitation of this study was the generalizability of the findings. As is typical of small-N case studies, the findings of the research are not generalizable to other local watershed cross-sector collaborations (Patton, 1987; Remler & Van Ryzin, 2011). Moreover, nonprobability sampling was another limitation in the study. The sample frame for the study was provided by the CEO of LRN, and other participants were obtained through snowball sampling. Therefore, the sample used in the study was not random. Consequently, the study was susceptible to selection bias (Lincoln & Guba, 1995). Likewise, due to time and resource constraints the researcher was limited to interviewing one key informant from each of the member organizations that participated in the study. Therefore, the perspectives and responses expressed by the key informants are based on the interpretations of one of the organization's executive representatives, thus, subject to issues of representation. In an effort to mitigate this limitation, secondary data sources such as public records, organizational websites and media sources were used to confirm data collected from informants interviewed (Northrop & Arsneault, 2008; Creswell, 2009).

CHAPTER FOUR:

RESULTS AND DISCUSSION

Introduction

This chapter presents the results of the study. The chapter is organized by the research questions. The research questions are specifically organized to build continuity in reporting the results. In this effort, the results pertaining to the motivational determinants of each specific industry sector are unpacked. These results are then aggregated and discussed from a holistic perspective. Finally, the comparison analysis of the results is presented and discussed.

The chapter unpacks the results addressing each of the research questions in the following order: The chapter begins with addressing research question two and discusses the results of the analysis that pertain to the private sector data sources. Next, the results of the nonprofit sector data sources are reported that address the third research question. Then the results of the public sector data sources relating to the fourth research question are presented. This is followed by a discussion of the results of the analysis that answer research questions one and five. Propositional statements are incorporated throughout the chapter and compared to the empirical evidence. The chapter concludes with some final thoughts on the research results.

Research Question 2: What are the organizational motivations that drive organizations in the private sector to participate in local watershed cross-sector collaboration?

With the exception of efficiency, all of the other organizational motivation constructs in the framework created incentives that prompted partners in the private sector to engage in local cross-sector watershed collaboration. This section discusses the results based on the data analysis of the private sector data sources. The results are organized by thematic constructs. In the discussion variables, patterns and relationships are identified that relate to key concepts. Direct quotes are interwoven throughout the discussion to illustrate the context that underlines key concepts.

Efficiency

The data analysis revealed that the construct of efficiency was not a motivating factor for local watershed cross-sector collaboration among the private sector participants in this setting. All of the private sector participants expressed the sentiment that reducing costs was not a factor in their decision to collaborate with LRN. Participants described any realized cost savings resulting from the partnership as a benefit or “by-product” but not an incentive to collaboration. For example, one of the restaurant owners interviewed explained that his restaurant participated in LRN’s “Save our Shells” (SOS) program which benefitted the restaurant. Restaurants that participate in the SOS program save their discarded shells and put them in special containers to be picked up by LRN’s staff. The discarded shells are later used to build oyster reef sanctuary in the Lynnhaven River (Lynnhaven River NOW, 2012; Retrieved from <http://www.lynnhavenrivenow.org/newsletters/2012/summer2012oyster.pdf>.)

According to this restaurant owner:

In this particular case, our participation is them [LRN] picking up the shells that would normally go into the dumpster, which would then normally go into the landfill. The only cost benefit could potentially be that we typically get charged by the yard when it

comes to trash; when it came to the decision that didn't come into play. (Private sector interviewee #8)

In the case of the private sector data sources, this finding contradicts transaction costs perspectives that identify efficiency as an incentive for establishing interorganizational linkages (Coase, 1937; Williamson, 1991). Normative arguments using transaction costs perspective to explain the formation of collaborative arrangements hold up when efficiencies realized are bilateral. This was not found to be the case between the private sector partners and LRN. The empirical evidence revealed that the collaborative relationship between the private sector participants and LRN were found to be philanthropic in nature. The results showed that resource exchanges between private sector participants and LRN were unidirectional, with private firms donating resources to LRN. Consequently, the partnership with LRN would not be part of a cost reductions strategy for corporate managers. Therefore, efficiency considerations would not create an incentive for these partners to engage in local watershed collaboration with LRN.

Instability

Most of the participants in this group did not cite instability motives as an incentive to collaborate with LRN. However, a few of the participants interviewed did frame instability motives in the context of environmental regulations. Environmental regulations refer to governmental regulations (federal, state or local) that impact the organization's operational activities including services performed, processes or employees activities. During the interviews, a few of the participants discussed the way in which environmental regulations impacted their organizational operations. *Environmental regulations* were identified as a key concept related to the construct of instability among private sector participants.

One participant attributed changes in environmental regulations as a motivating factor for partnering with LRN, citing Total Maximum Daily Load (TMDL) requirements in the Chesapeake Bay as impacting their organization's operational activities. It is important to note that this participant's organization operates in the environmental consulting arena. A few participants stated that their organization's operations were regulated by federal and/or state environmental regulations (disposal of chemicals or oil). These participants described the environmental regulations as not burdensome and did not impact their overall activities. The majority of the private sector participants did not attribute environmental regulations as a motivating driver to partner with LRN.

Reciprocity

Building relationships was identified as the key concept among a few of the private sector participants relating to the construct of reciprocity. The concept of *building relationships* refers to engaging in activities that seek to cultivate informal and/or formal relationships through social interactions. In the words of one business CEO:

It, again, allows us to build a rapport with various stakeholders that may be part of that organization and other folks. By that, I mean that if we are involved with an organization like this and we are building relationships with other people that could become part of this organization and maybe through our practice we could bring other people into this arena." (Private sector interview #2)

Private sector participants described reciprocity in the context of social networks and building relationships. These participants used a variety of phrases to describe their views on building relationships in the context of reciprocity including "a good business decision," "part of our business plan" and "opens up avenues."

Participants in this group acknowledged that building relationships were an important objective in their organizations. A commonly expressed view among private sector partners was the idea that their partnership with LRN provided opportunities to expand their network and forge new relationships. For example, private sector interviewee # 9 said: “To be involved with an organization certainly opens up avenues and other relationships. So I would say this is not our primary purpose but I would say it is peripheral. ” This sentiment was echoed by another private sector participant who stated: “I am involved in different groups like that; more as giving back to the community. I would say a by-product of that is what you just described [enhancing relationships with other organization through collaboration], building other relationships with folks.” The findings provide support for proposition 6. A prominent company/organization is more likely to engage in an interorganizational relationship when other prominent companies/organizations are affiliated with that interorganizational relationship arrangement.

Organizational interests

There were four key concepts identified in the data related to the construct of organizational interests: *alignments of interests*, *good for business*, *shared watershed*, and *potential opportunities*. The data analysis indicated a relational pattern between the concepts of alignment of interests, good for business and watershed impacts. *Alignment of interests* refers to interests that are perceived as held in common or complementary between two or more organizations. The concept of *shared watershed* refers to a watershed that is shared among a set of watershed stakeholders located within the same watershed boundaries. The concept of *potential opportunities* refers to the manifestation of states of conditions or

resources that have yet to be realized. The concept *good for business* is best described as states of conditions that are perceived as favorable for a business to grow and thrive. As captured by this statement:

...they want to keep cleaning the river and open up more and more, and we want the water to get cleaner and clearer also because it helps us out economically and it helps them out environmentally. We are a business that thrives on a good environment.
(Private sector interviewee #2)

Participants in the private sector expressed the sentiment that their interests aligned or complimented LRN's interests. As noted in chapter one, LRN's interests center on protecting and restoring the Lynnhaven River watershed through establishing collaborative partnerships with public, private and nonprofit organizations (Lynnhaven River Now, 2015). The local watershed was widely cited by participants in this group as important to the welfare of the community and businesses operating in the community. Private sector participants noted that the watershed directly impacted the viability and/or success of their business as described by these two participants:

From a business perspective, if the Lynnhaven River is thriving and if it is improving as it is, and citizens who want to optimize their use, access, enjoyment of the Lynnhaven River – they are more likely to engage in certain activities, whether it be dredging, bulk heading, doing living shoreline, things of that nature, to enhance their enjoyment and benefit. Okay, so if they do that conceivably they would be doing some sort of activity that potentially is a regulated activity; since we work in the regulatory arena that could potentially mean business. (Private sector interviewee #9)

Private sector interviewee #2 stated:

The benefits we get are cleaner water and a much better quality oyster to sell and the ability to do that. That is where the benefit comes from both LRN in particular and [Company's name] generally. It is just the fact that we wouldn't even be in business if they hadn't started cleaning up the watershed.

A number of private sector participants framed protecting and restoring the watershed as a worthy cause that was good for the community and for businesses. Participants underscored the implications that the condition of the watershed had on the community's desirability as a tourist destination and a place to live and work. They noted that the City's desirability was important for residents, visitors and employers. As conveyed by this corporation's Chairman of the Board: "...LRN is helping clean the Watershed if they are successful, it makes us a more desirable place to live and work and I think that ...we are trying to improve the community and I think this is a part of it" (Private sector interviewee #7).

Finally, participants described working with LRN opened the possibility of potential opportunities to enhance their business. Participants used a range of variables to describe potential opportunities resulting from their partnership with LRN including new clients, business referrals, create new offerings and advancing technologies. As illustrated by the above quotations, participants viewed the watershed as important to their business, either directly or indirectly.

Catalytic Actors

Across this group of participants, the results showed that the leadership of LRN and the organization's founders played a critical role in recruiting and engaging private sector member organizations to participate in local cross-sector watershed collaboration. The participants in this group expressed great admiration and respect for the founders and the chief executive director of LRN. There were three key concepts identified related to the construct catalytic actors: *family ties*, *professional relationships* and *founders of LRN*. A

recurring theme found in the data was the relationship between the concept founder and family ties or professional relationships.

The concept founder refers to an individual that is responsible for creating and establishing LRN. Several participants cited one or more of the founders as instrumental in their decision to have their organization partner with LRN. Other participants noted their partnership with LRN was cultivated from a long-standing professional relationship with one or more of the founders. Participants used various terms to describe their professional relationship including “client,” “landlord” and “employer.” In addition, some participants stated that they were either directly related to one of the founders or that there was a long-standing friendship between their families. The data revealed that all of the private sector partners described close personal relationships with the founders of LRN and close ties to the community. The extant collaboration literature identifies catalytic actors as a vital ingredient to cultivating stakeholder buy-in in the formation of self-organized arrangements (see Bryson, Crosby, & Stone, 2006; Cigler 1999; Gray 1989; Morris et al., 2013). This finding provides support for proposition 7. Catalytic leaders play a critical role in motivating stakeholders to collaborate in cross-sector watershed organization.

Legitimacy

Private sector participants underscored that enhancing their organization’s reputation and image played a role in their decision to join LRN. The analysis of the private sector data sources identified two key concepts relevant to the construct of legitimacy: *organizational reputation*, and *organizational image*. The data revealed a relationship between

organizational reputation and organizational image as a factor for engaging in local watershed cross-sector collaboration among the private sector organizations.

Organizational reputation can be described as the culmination of long-standing public perceptions and beliefs held by stakeholders and/or constituents based on the collective activities of an organization over time (Brown, Dacin, Pratt, & Whetten, 2006). An organization's reputation is shaped by "outsiders" (e.g., clients and competitors). It is important to note that the private sector organizations in the study were well-established companies, ranging from 8 to over 30 years in business.

Private sector participants repeatedly stated that an organization's reputation was an important consideration as to whether they wanted to work with the organization. Participants frequently expressed their admiration for the leadership of LRN and noted the founders' reputation for their charity work and for "getting things done." In addition, participants pointed out that LRN was highly regarded in the community due to their success in restoring the oyster population. Participants expressed the desire of wanting to be associated with LRN. For example, private sector interviewee # 8 said: "I think being a part of LRN, which has so much more of a presence now than it did in the beginning, just hopefully sends the message that we are involved." Another participant described the role of organizational reputation from a strategic perspective stating:

...in that part of our strategic plan it literally says to stay on the leading edge of regulatory issues and part of our reputation is to be the people to come to when you have a very complicated environmental issue that may involve a one acre site or [a] 10,000 acre site. It doesn't matter it can be a complex environmental issue on virtually anything, so yeah our involvement with LRN is partially to stay abreast of issues that nonprofits working in a complex watershed may encounter." (Private sector interviewee #5)

Organizational image refers to the strategic communication of an organization's message conveyed through various marketing cues including advertising, public presentations and sponsorship of community groups and events (Keller & Aaker, 1998). Organizations use various branding strategies to communicate messages in order to create a public identity (Brown, Dacin, Pratt, & Whetten, 2006). Participants emphasized that enhancing their public image was important and played a role in their decision to collaborate with LRN.

In addition, private sector partners described community engagement and their partnership with LRN as an opportunity to enhance their public image. For example, private sector interviewee #9 stated: "Well we are always trying to improve our image and I would say yeah, to some degree that is a factor. Enhance the positive." Another corporate manager echoed a similar view and explained:

You never know where the next phone call is going to come from, and my business relies on that..., one of my old bosses said if you don't have money coming through the door, you're out of business. So it definitely increases our prestige.

Participants in this group described various activities they participated in including sponsoring community sports teams, conducting tours of their businesses to schools and citizens, public presentations and attending charity events. Participants used a variety of phrases when describing how they perceived their partnership with LRN enhanced public image including "generate goodwill," "being a good neighbor," "showing we care," and "good corporate citizen."

Asymmetry

Asymmetry motives created incentives for private sector partners to engage in local watershed collaboration with LRN. According to Oliver (1990) asymmetry motives are

derived from the desire to gain power over other organizations or their resources. Asymmetry motives described by private sector participants related to strategic positioning in their market in order to gain a competitive advantage among rival organizations.

A number of variables relating to asymmetry motives were identified in the data including enhanced exposure, market positioning, synergetic strategies, knowledge spanning and being on the cutting edge of technology. Variables of asymmetry were grouped into two key concepts: *positioning* and *strategic associations*. The concept of *positioning* refers to the implementation of management strategies designed to influence the perceptions of stakeholders and/or constituents in relation to other organizations that offer similar products and/or services in order to gain a competitive advantage in their market (Brown et al, 2006). The concept of *strategic associations* refers to creating intended alliances in order to develop new technologies and/or advance existing knowledge. A common thread found in the data was the coupling of these two concepts.

Corporate managers and CEOs interviewed expressed the view that working with LRN and collaborating with other partners in the network expanded their organization's exposure to potential clients, new innovations, and technologies, and enhanced their relationships with existing clients. For instance, this business owner described how collaborating with LRN helped advance knowledge for the firm and possibly gain a competitive advantage over competitors in his market. He said:

Oh yeah, because again it puts us at the forefront of how to build oyster reefs, how do you site oyster reefs, you know this gets back to the reason [that] I'm in the business in the first place to begin with. I've got [my] masters in marine environmental science and I rarely use marine environmental science in environmental consulting in Virginia, rarely, very, very, rarely, so this was just a great opportunity to work on that.

A similar sentiment was also echoed by this firm's CEO:

By demonstrating to the public and to potential clients that we are on top of things, [and] that we are aware of efforts and initiatives to improve a system that may directly or indirectly affect their work and so I think that knowledge is powerful so the more we know and the more we stay abreast of what is happening out there the better we can serve not only the community but our clients.

Necessity

All of the participants in this group stated that their organization was not mandated to collaborate with LRN or any other organization for that matter. Private sector partners that described necessity considerations as a motivating factor for joining LRN operated in the environmental domain. Necessity motives for these private sector participants appeared to be driven by how the watershed impacted their organization's operational activities. Participants in the group framed watershed impacts on operational activities using two dimensions: direct or indirect.

Direct watershed impacts can be described as environmental watershed conditions that directly affect an organization's operations (e.g., sales of goods or services and expenses). Direct watershed impact variables such as the quality of products, the supply of products, the demand of services/products and permits and compliance of government environmental ordinances were described by participants when explaining how the watershed impacted their organization's operations. For example, one private sector interviewee remarked:

Only from the standpoint that we offer a variety of different sorts of oysters obviously in our organization and Lynnhaven River oysters were one of the things that people clamored for forever. I think by impacting the environment and the ability to grow those oysters again helped our business.

Indirect watershed impacts can be described as environmental watershed conditions that indirectly affect an organization's operations. Indirect watershed impact variables such as

market conditions (strong or weak), customers' perceptions, labor market conditions, government environmental permits and compliance of local/state environmental ordinances were described by participants when explaining how the condition of the water indirect affected their operational activities. For instance, one restaurant owners explained: "When the beach was closed last summer that had an effect on our entire tourism industry and I am part of the resort industry so that has a negative perception of our industry as a whole." Another business owner emphasized the importance of the watershed on the business community, stating: "The quality of life in their region impacts the business community."

An interrelated concept to watershed impacts identified in the data was the concept of operating activities impacting the watershed. Operating activities impacting the watershed can best be described as activities conducted by the organization (i.e., sales of good and/or production) that affect net profits. The majority of the participants acknowledged that their operating activity affected the watershed. Participants framed operating activities in two dimensions: positively or negatively impacting the watershed. Positive variables identified in the data included social marketing materials, growing oysters, best management practices and wetland mitigation; negative variables included run-off from construction debris and the use of chemicals (oil, grease, fertilizer and pesticides. Participants that described negative operating activities on the watershed explained that procedures were in place to mitigate environmental impacts. Table 4.1 provides illustrations of private sector participants describing both dimensions of operating activities impacting the watershed.

Table 4: Positive and Negative Dimensions: Activities Impacting the Watershed

- “...there are signs out by Lynnhaven Mall that we designed that say ‘You are now in the Lynnhaven Watershed’. The fact that people wouldn’t normally think, because they are out here at a shopping mall way far away from the Lynnhaven River, but it is all part of the same watershed so the oil drippings and the crap that falls into the parking lot that goes into the sewers – it’s the Lynnhaven River where it is all heading. So yeah, I would like to think that we make a big impact.” (Private sector interviewee #3)
- “...positively, I don’t see any negative because all we are doing is growing oysters. –We should do about 4 to 4.5 million oysters this year.” (Private sector interviewee #2)
- “Absolutely, so we do things like fertilize, and we apply pesticides, and we clean equipment, and we have 255 acres that drain into the Lynnhaven, so absolutely that’s a factor.” (Private sector interviewee #6)

Oliver (1990) argues that necessity motives are influenced by regulatory pressures and/or governmental mandates. Oliver purports that necessity motives are prompted by the fear of repercussion from legislative authorities against an organization failure to comply. In the case of private sector partners collaborating with LRN, necessity motives appeared to be primarily driven by the watershed impacts on the organization’s operating activities rather than regulatory pressures or governmental mandates. For the study, the concept of *watershed impacts on operating activities* refers to environmental watershed conditions that affect an organization’s operational activities (e.g., investments and sales/services).

Stability

Stability was identified as a motivational driver among some of the private sector participants. The results of the analysis identified variables relating to stability including symbiotic, communication channels, and information networks as a motivating factor for private sector partners to participate in watershed collaboration with LRN. Participants used a variety of phrases to describe variables of stability including “purchasing power,” “mutual support system,” “contact information,” “access to learn more” and “stay abreast of issues.” Variables of stability were grouped into two key concepts: *organizational symbiotic relationships* and *enhance information accessibility*.

The concept of *organizational symbiotic relationships* refers to the strategic cultivation of relationships by two or more organizations that identify their mutual dependency within their environment. Further, the data showed that participants identified establishing relationships with other organizations as a strategic imperative. As noted by this participant:

In our original business plan, (which goes back to 1998) back when the company was formed, it was part of our mission and vision to establish relationships with different kind of environmental organizations. So I would say that was in our original blueprint.

Another participant described their view of the mutual benefits gained by the partnership and stated:

Oh yeah, because they want to keep cleaning the river and open up more and more and we want the water to get cleaner and cleaner, [and] also because it helps us out economically and it helps them out environmentally. We are a business that thrives on a good environment.

This finding substantiates proposition 12. Organizations that operate in industry sectors dependent on watershed resources to advance their economic interests are more likely to participant in watershed cross-sector collaboration.

The concept of *enhanced information accessibility* refers to the development of information channels designed to acquire information in order to achieve organizational objectives. Accord to one business CEO:

Yes because they are the only group really working on water quality issues. That is really important to us because that is in our core practices – that we have clean water so it gives us access to learn more about things we can do to improve our programs or opportunities to help their mission and our mission with being environmentally good stewards.

The data revealed that stability considerations centered on staying in tune with current environmental issues affecting the watershed through partnering with LRN. Participants described the partnership with LRN as a way of bringing organizations together that support protecting and restoring the watershed. As noted above, participants acknowledged that the condition of the watershed impacted their organizational operations’ either indirectly or directly. The data suggests that private sector organizations impacted by the local watershed (directly or indirectly) create mutual dependency among organizations, and in turn, create conditions that motivate private sector actors to establish collaborative alliances as a strategy to create predictability in their environment. In the words this corporate executive:

We are very much – we are very supportive because they have been supportive and they recognized that this is one thing where environmentalists and the businesses really join together because both want to clean up the water and both are cleaning up the water and when you take our oysters out of the water you are removing what I was telling you earlier – the nitrogen from the water column totally. So you are really helping out the environment and the city.

Corporate/Social Consciousness

Three key concepts related to the construct of corporate and social consciousness were identified in the private sector data sources: *organizational identity*, *organizational culture* and *environmental stewardship*. These concepts were found to intertwine and shape participants' motivations to participate in local watershed collaboration. The concept of *organizational identity* refers to the internal perceptions and beliefs collectively held among members of an organization (Brown, Dacin, Pratt, & Whetten, 2006). According to Hatch and Schultz (1997), the identity of an organization is shaped by "insiders." Organizational identity variables identified in the data included *philanthropic orientation*, *civic-minded*, *environmentally conscious*, and *deep-rooted community ties*. As expressed by this business owner, "...we are landscape architects. It is ingrained in our training and education to improve the environment." Another corporate executive stated, "...I would say we are very philanthropic. We try to contribute to most everything. My grandfather founded the Department store in Norfolk in 1894 and we have always been a very philanthropic family. We give back to the community whenever we can..."

Interrelated to organizational identity is the concept of organizational culture. Organizational culture is the culmination of deeply held values and beliefs that are institutionalized over time (Hatch & Schultz, 1997). Participants frequently expressed the perceptions of shared values about the health of the watershed with LRN. As captured by this participant's remark: "It was a great fit and they were trying to do what we felt was very important and have always felt to be very important especially in Tidewater, water quality and how important it is. It's just ingrained in our office and what we do."

The concept of *environmental stewardship* refers to a sense of duty held by the leadership of an organization to protect the environment through practices that mitigate the organization's impact on the environment. Participants in this group cited the opportunity to improve environmental practices as an incentive for joining LRN. Participants described a number of environmental practices used by their organization including "buying sustainable, local, and organic products," "recycling" and "creating low input landscape." For example, this participant noted: "We initiated this idea, expanding our natural areas and low input, not that we're the first [golf] course to do it but we were one of the precursors to that." Another private sector participant said:

I am an environmentalist too, but I don't look like one because I am the one cutting down the trees. Again, if you can cut down trees in a whole bunch of different ways and if I can keep some trees and sustain some things, I think I am doing a good job helping the environment.

Other participants expressed a deep sense of a responsibility to protect the environment for future generations. As illustrated in this quote:

From a legacy perspective, I want the young adults and children to see that this is very important and that the fruits of their labor one day will lead to a better system that they can enjoy and that their children's children can enjoy. From a legacy perspective, I think that is very important. That is a motivation factor.

A growing number of contemporary organizational scholars link corporate social responsibility (CSR) (also referred to as corporate consciousness) to corporate social practices involving cross-sector partnerships (see Athanasopoulou & Selsky 2012; Santana, 2013; Van der Heijden, Driessen, & Cramer, 2010; Waddock, 2009). Santana's (2013) study on the motivations for firms' use of social practices identified four motivational calculations that drive CSR including commitment to do the right thing, because the company believes it is

beneficial because it is embedded in the company's culture and because one or more individuals in the organization have a strong attachment to a certain social cause. The following section summarizes the results reported in this sections.

Summary of Key Findings

The results of the private sector data sources identified organizational interests, corporate consciousness, legitimacy, catalytic actors, and asymmetry as important motivational determinants for private organizations to engage in local watershed collaboration with LRN. Ancillary motives identified in the data were reciprocity, necessity, stability, and instability. Efficiency considerations did not create incentives for participants in this group. A number of important characteristics were identified in the results. First, most of the private sector partners in the study characterized the nature of their partnership as philanthropic. Second, all of the participants described resource exchanges in the partnerships as flowing from their organization to LRN. Third, many of the private sector partners described long-standing relationships with the founders of LRN. Fourth, all of the organizations operated within the watershed. Finally, most of the corporate managers perceived the partnership as mutually beneficial for both organizations.

Research Question 3: What are the organizational motivations that drive organizations in the nonprofit sector to participate in local watershed cross-sector collaboration?

The results of the nonprofit data sources were used to address the research question. The analysis identified an array of variables relating to each of the constructs in the conceptual frameworks. The results showed that all of the constructs in the framework were identified as incentives that drove nonprofit organizations in the study to engage in local watershed cross-sector collaboration; albeit in varying levels of prevalence. This section discusses the results of the nonprofit data sources for each of the constructs in the conceptual framework.

Catalytic Actors

With regard to catalytic actors, *third party sources* were identified as the catalyst that motivated participants in the nonprofit sector to partner with LRN. For the study, *third party sources* refer to outside information resources including media sources, an individual/group or an organization not affiliated with LRN. Participants typically described learning about LRN through word of mouth. A range of third party sources were identified in the data including a neighbor, a member of their organization, another watershed organization and City representatives.

Some participants expressed an awareness of LRN's reputation in the community for their work in the Lynnhaven watershed through media sources and attributed that as to their rationale for initially reaching out to LRN. The majority of participants described initiating the contact with LRN for the purposes of gaining information and knowledge about protecting and restoring the watershed. As demonstrated by this participant:

Through a member; I shouldn't say most of us but several people in the organization knew about it [LRN] but one of the members recommended them as a program so then we all knew and a few years later we decided we needed a refresher course for all of the

staff and a member of our Garden Club was the one that made the connection.
(Nonprofit interviewee #2)

Other participants cited referrals from other environmental organizations as the source of their initial interests in working with LRN. In contrast to the participants in the private sector that described a direct contact by one or more founders, only one participant in this group identified being acquainted with one of the founders through other projects as a motivating factor. This suggests that third party sources served as the catalyst for initiating the contact between the organizations; and through these early contacts, participants recognized the mutual benefit of collaborating with LRN. The role of third parties is identified in the literature as an important ingredient in the collaboration process (Gray, 1989; Weber, 2009). Weber's (2009) work in the Blackfoot watershed attributed third party sources as conduits of information for stakeholders to access knowledge and expertise between watershed stakeholders.

Instability

Results from the analysis of the nonprofit sector data sources identified the *deterioration of the watershed* and *red tape* as key concepts related to the construct of instability. Red tape refers to the complexities of policies and procedures required by government agencies. Deterioration of the watershed refers to the growing severity of the condition of the watershed. Participants attributed the poor state of the watershed as an incentive to collaborate with LRN. As expressed by nonprofit sector interviewee #5: "I think just reading about the state of the bay and the number of bad grades we are all getting on that is what caused us to be very concerned..." A number of participants representing civic leagues and garden clubs pointed out that the condition of the watershed was a concern for

their members because their homes were located next to a waterway. As demonstrated by this quote:

...a great percentage of our members of the [Garden Club] live on the Lynnhaven River. Their houses are literally backing up to that waterway. So, that really helped to sell if you care about the cleanliness of that water, if you care about your children playing, fishing, swimming out there, [and] here's an organization that's working hard to improve that. (Nonprofit interviewee #3)

Another participant cited the challenges of dealing with red tape as an incentive to collaborate with LRN and other organizations facing similar issues. She expressed the sentiment that LRN's experience with regulatory agencies helped her better understand the permit process. As illustrated in this quote: "...I didn't know there were so many regulations, so many; each person has a letter for this or that...They [LRN] were part of my path to learning about all of this and going to the meetings..." (Nonprofit sector interviewee #10)

Efficiency

Nonprofit participants framed the construct of efficiency in terms of volunteer networks and access to grant funding. The results of the data sources identified volunteer networks and grants as a key concept related to efficiency among nonprofit participants in this study.

Volunteer network refers to a group of individuals that are affiliated with an organization and donate their time and/or money to support a cause. Participants expressed the sentiment that volunteers played an instrumental role in their organization's ability to achieve their goals.

For example, this participant stated:

Volunteers are labor so if you're doing a shoreline project, you're doing a restored shoreline or putting trees in the ground, or you're trying to generate people who will participate in the oyster garden program which is a very low cost program but you need the people to do it and to pony up, there's a little suggested donation for that program

which just helps cover our costs. Yeah, those human resources, that volunteer network is very important. (Nonprofit sector interviewee #7)

In a similar vein, another participant underscored that the implementation of new restoration programs for restoring a museum's shoreline and buffer areas required a strategy to increase volunteers. Consequently, the curator actively sought partnering with organizations like LRN, who had expertise in restoration projects, to help them create strategies to accomplish this task. Partnering with LRN helped their organization learn about expanding their volunteer pool through social marketing strategies targeted to specific groups such as area schools (universities and secondary schools). As illustrated by nonprofit sector interviewee #10: "I didn't know how to start bringing my volunteers here, how can I pass the word that hey, this is the project, this is going on, I wanted to do other things but I learned from them [LRN] and they did in a very economical way."

A few participants perceived efficiencies through the lens of grant opportunities. One participant described learning about grant opportunity through attending venues with LRN and exchanging information with member organizations within the network. However, participants characterized grant opportunities as a by-product of the partnership, rather than a motivating factor.

Legitimacy

The analysis identified a number of variables in the data related to legitimacy including well-respected, admired, well-known, and recognized. Participants frequently described LRN as highly regarded and admired in the community. As demonstrated by these participants' remarks: "...LRN is a local organization was very-home-spun...and it is respected, admired by the community and organizations and people always want to be aligned

with people that are respected and admired” (Nonprofit sector interviewee #7). A few participants in this group indicated that enhancing their image did play a role in their decision to collaborate with LRN. As demonstrated by this participant:

I don’t know that we would definitely talk about that but there’s maybe a little component of that. This is a very well-known organization in Virginia Beach, well respected. They have managed since 2002 when they were founded, managed to clean up the River to the point that we ate oysters in 2007 out of the river. (Nonprofit sector interviewee #3)

Other participants expressed the sentiment that enhancing their image was a benefit of the partnership but noted it was not part of their decision to join. Another participant pointed out that reputation was a “two way street.” As demonstrated by these quotes, participants viewed their partnership with LRN as beneficial to their organization’s identity. Furthermore, the data suggests that LRN’s standing in the community was an important factor in their decision to engage in local watershed collaboration. In line with the private sector data sources, *organizational reputation* and *organizational identity* were the key concepts identified in the nonprofit sector data sources.

Asymmetry

Similar to the public sector partners interviewed, most participants in this group indicated that strategic “positioning” to enhance their presence in their industry sector was not an incentive to collaborate with LRN. Overall, participants conveyed a sense of camaraderie and mutual support for their fellow environmental nonprofit counterparts operating in their industry sector. According to the nonprofit sector interviewee #9, “We are a collaborative organization; you have to play in the sandbox with everybody else.” Another nonprofit partner echoed this sentiment and stated: “...collaboration and partnership is built into the

way [name of organization] operates and a lot of environmental nonprofits work” (Nonprofit interviewee #7). Participants did acknowledge that industry sector presence was important to the organization in terms of achieving organizational objectives; and affirmed affiliations play a role in industry presence.

One interesting finding relating to asymmetry motives was the variable nonprofit board. One participant from a nonprofit foundation noted that members of an organization’s board of directors are a motivating factor for partnering. Further, this participant added that the potential to be a board member was also a motivating factor for their organization to engage in collaboration. When this participant was probed to explain why the potential to serve on a nonprofit’s board was an incentive, he stated: “...because I am trying to figure out how to grow the foundation.” The participant explained that board members can influence the direction of the organization. The results showed that the potential to serve on the nonprofit board was an incentive relating to asymmetric motives. This finding is supported in other studies. For instance, Miller-Stevens, Ward and Neil’s (2014, p. 169) research on motives for serving on nonprofit boards cited “[e]xpansion of networks and sphere of influence” as a motive for representatives of organizations to serve on nonprofit boards.

Organizational Interests

The majority of participants in this group described variables of organizational interests as a factor to collaborate with LRN. Participants commonly noted an alignment of interests between their organization and LRN. Specifically, participants cited protecting the watershed as a primary interest shared with LRN. A range of variables were identified in the data related to organizational interests including access to grants and other resources,

expanding information channels, volunteer pools, and working smarter to clean the watershed.

Success was also cited as an incentive to collaborate with LRN. As reflected in the following two quotes:

Because of the work of an organization like LRN and our partnership with them, we are able to look and demonstrate a success story, here is proof, evidence that we can restore a waterbody into a vibrant system that's contributing to the economy, to the local economy, the state's economy, and local culture, recreation, and everything. So without success stories like this and there throughout the watershed, but in particular the Lynnhaven River is a success story that people talk about throughout the watershed. (Nonprofit interviewee #7)

Exactly, so I think that got everybody to say, hey this is really working. We can do this, this is something simple, something that everybody can do and it does make a difference. I think people get frustrated with the environment if they feel that their efforts are not really being successful but I think the good thing about LRN is they give you really concrete things you can do to help, it is working." (Nonprofit interviewee #5)

Other participants described improving and/or developing environmental practices as an incentive related organizational interest. As expressed by nonprofit interviewee #10:

When we got together, we went to a wellness class, the importance of using native plants and then on to the research for the oysters and how the oysters clean the river and then we shared knowledge about wellness restoration.

As demonstrated in the quotes above participants perceived a mutual benefit from collaborating with LRN. The ability to garner resources (i.e., volunteers, information, knowledge, and grant) that enhanced their ability to meet objectives in order to achieve their organization's goals was an incentive to collaborate with LRN. The results of the data analysis identified the following concepts related to organizational interests' motives: *building relationships, sharing resources (i.e., knowledge and information) and public education on environmental stewardship.*

Reciprocity

Many of the participants described a range of variables relating to reciprocity when discussing their motives to collaborate with LRN. These variables included promoting each other, cross-pollination, exchanging information, fostering environmental stewardship; mitigate duplication of efforts and leveraging resources. For example, nonprofit interviewee #3 said: “Well we certainly share the conservation component of our missions and so we really are leveraging what we can learn from them and help to spread that.” A few participants cited the strategy of cross-pollination when discussing reciprocity. As conveyed by nonprofit interview #10: “We all go to these collaborative meetings that are trying to cross pollinate; which is so needed, so that...you are not duplicating efforts and sharing information and things so we are all doing that.” Another nonprofit sector participant remarked: “I suppose that when you help other groups you know...teaching, teaches yourself too, right. When you teach the other person is learning but also you learn a lot from the experience as well...”

By and large, nonprofit participants expressed a deep connection to the community and caring about the environment and protecting the watershed. Some participants noted that their organization had formal policies that articulated practices directed toward community involvement. Furthermore, several nonprofit sector participants noted that their organization’s mission was geared towards protecting and restoring the environment through public education. Participants suggested that their desire to seek mutual exchanges of resources benefitted both organizations’ ability to achieve their goals, which was tied to improving the watershed. In a similar vein, Morris et al.’s (2013) research on local watershed collaboration

identified BIMBY (Because It's in My Back Yard) as a motivation for citizens to engage in grassroots collaboration.

Necessity

The motivations related to necessity were framed using two broad dimensions: the impact of the watershed on the organization's operations and the organization's operations on the watershed. Participants acknowledged the dynamic relationship between the impact on the watershed and their organization and vice versa. Participants described watershed impacts on their organization's operations in two contexts: bad or good. For example, this nonprofit participant said:

...we have a lot of land, we had to do these different restorations and so we have impacts in a bad and good way, bad way because we lost a lot of land and a good way because we had this partnership with many communities and people had to get to know us and what we do here.

Another nonprofit sector participant noted: "Everything we do impacts the watershed and vice versa." One participant cited operational activities directed toward the watershed as a motivator to collaborate. As reflexed by nonprofit interviewee #7: "We are on Pungo Ridge and we are pretty high up and I am sure what the direct impact is on us, but our impact on the watershed is a motivator." Another participant cited grant requirements as a necessity motive to collaboration. The participant noted that "In our experience funders do like to see collaboration, they like to [see] the money is spent in a way, taking more of the community into account, the better the money will be spent" (Nonprofit interviewee #7). Finally, all of the participants stated that they were not mandated to collaborate with LRN. Overall, the data revealed that necessity considerations among the nonprofit participants were not a primary incentive to collaborate with LRN.

Stability

Stability motives are prompted by uncertainty in the environment which leads to conditions of resource scarcity and lack of information (Oliver, 1990). Stability motives were also identified in the nonprofit sector data sources. Similar to asymmetry, instability, efficiency and necessity motives, stability considerations were found to play a minor role among nonprofit sector partners' decisions to collaborate with LRN. As suggested by Oliver, stability motives in this group were driven by the desire to garner knowledge and information in order to address complex watershed issues.

In this group, participants viewed building relationships through partnering with LRN as essential for watershed protection and conservation. Variables identified in the data relating to stability motives included increase knowledge about environmental stewardship (e.g., plant buffers, rain barrel gardens, oyster gardens), enhancing information accessibility (e.g., attending various workshops at LRN's facilities) and developing synergies through building relationships with other environmental groups. In addition, participants described stability as an outcome of collaborating with LRN rather than the incentive. One nonprofit participant explained: "I am sure at least I would think it improves everyone because lessons learned; successes and failures, all of that." Participants described stability practices such as actively scanning their environment for potential partners as a component of their management practices. As conveyed by this nonprofit participant:

...if there is a local watershed group putting all their energy into the local watershed, we are looking for the greater Chesapeake Bay watershed, we're strategically looking at area where we can create synergies by enhancing [our] relationship with other organizations. (Nonprofit interviewee #7)

Another nonprofit participant stated:

Yes, when we launched into these wetland restorations, we were willing to partner with everyone that had some knowledge of going through this same sense, we can learn about departments and how to proceed with everything and other people can help us, so [that] we can help them. (Nonprofit interview #10)

Corporate/Social Consciousness

As one might expect in the nonprofit sector, social consciousness was identified as a primary motivating factor for nonprofit partners to participate in watershed collaboration with LRN. Participants in the nonprofit sector described a range of variables when discussing social consciousness motives for watershed collaboration including organizational culture, conservation values, mission, environmental stewardship orientations, fundraising for community projects and educating the public. As illustrated by this quote:

We fundraise every year and before we did the park project with first landing state park, we sat down at a meeting and said, what are we going to do going forward with our fundraising and our community outreach and with our funds and basically everybody said let's spend our money, we shouldn't be sitting on a bank account, let's find appropriate projects and spend it. We don't want to be on our hands and knees, we don't want to be digging, we want projects that basically don't take too long, although this fundraising took several years for the park but it wasn't physically burdensome. (Nonprofit interviewee #3)

Participants frequently commented that their organization's values and culture "fit" with LRN's. Some participants noted that their organization had formal policies toward community engagement. As conveyed by nonprofit sector interviewee #7 "...my job for example, is community involvement, they hire people like me to directly work with the community, it's a pillar of the work that we do." A variety of organizational environmental initiatives were cited by participants including litter collections along the waterways, encouraging their members to participate in LRN's Pearl Home Program, restoring shorelines and planting trees. A key finding identified in the nonprofit data sources was the relationship between mission and social consciousness motives. Unlike the private sector organizations,

most of the nonprofit organizations in the study described environmental protection/restoration as a component of their mission. This suggests that nonprofit's social consciousness motives are mission oriented. The following provides a summary of the results and the key findings discussed in this section.

Summary of Key Findings

Motivational determinants that were identified among the nonprofit sector participants as important factors in their decision to engage in collaboration with LRN were organizational interests, reciprocity, and social consciousness. To a lesser extent, legitimacy, catalytic actors, necessity, stability, instability, efficiency, and asymmetry were identified as less significant motives. Four overarching characteristics were identified in the nonprofit data sources. First, participants in this group frequently characterized the nature of the relationship as symbiotic. Second, the majority of the participants described mission overlap between their organization and LRN. Third, resource exchanges between the nonprofit partners and LRN were based on sharing information and knowledge. Finally, the vast majority of the participants described taking the initiative to reach out to LRN to establish the partnership.

Research Question 4: What are the organizational motivations that drive organizations in the public sector to participate in local watershed cross-sector collaboration?

The analysis identified an array of variables relating to the constructs in the conceptual framework. All of the constructs in the framework were identified as motivational incentives

that encouraged member organizations in the public sector to participate in local watershed cross-sector collaboration. This section discusses the results of the public sector data sources for each of the constructs in the conceptual framework. In keeping with the other sections in the chapter, the results are organized by the thematic constructs; and relational patterns of variables are identified and grouped into key concepts. In the discussion of the results, quotes are provided to illustrate key concepts and patterns identified in the data sources.

Catalytic Actors

The results indicate that the founders of LRN acted as conveners with City leaders in order to garner support to clean the Lynnhaven River. The importance of leadership roles in collaboration is widely cited in the literature (see Bryson, Crosby, & Stone 2006; Cigler, 1999; Heikkila & Gerlak, 2005). Public sector participants cited the *City's leadership* and the *founders* of LRN as the impetus for creating stakeholder buy-in for the City and their respective departments to collaborate with LRN. Participants cited the Mayor, city council members and the City Manager as having an instrumental role in promoting partnerships between the City's various departments and LRN. As demonstrated by this city administrator's remarks:

I believe that it was supported by the highest level of our municipal government. I really believe that our City manager and city council members all encouraged us to work with LRN because they knew how important the Lynnhaven River is to the vitality of Virginia Beach. The economic vitality, environmental quality-it is just tied to our whole lifestyle here. (Public interviewee #5)

Further, participants frequently described the catalyst for the partnerships as a confluence of events that was reaching a critical mass over the concerns about the condition of the Lynnhaven River. A number of administrators and directors recalled that prior to the

establishment of LRN, city leaders were in discussions to launch a major initiative that sought to eliminate all of the private septic sewer systems draining into the River (see McLaughlin, 2004; Virginia Department of Environmental Quality, 2006). They explained that the initiative required a large capital investment to fund the project. Participants emphasized that the success of the initiative hinged on getting citizens to support the initiative, which meant citizens spending thousands of dollars to hook up their homes to the City's sewage system.

During the same timeframe, the founders of LRN were trying to garner support for their fledgling organization. Administrators and directors described the founders as influential citizens with deep ties to the community. Participants noted that City leaders recognized that community outreach programs were essential to cultivate citizen buy-in for the proposed initiatives. The partnership with LRN allowed the City to contract out the development and implementation of public awareness programs. In return, LRN received funds and other support from the City.

In the case of the private sector organizations, the findings indicate that both the City's leadership and the founders of LRN acted as collaboration sponsors for the formation of the partnership. Bryson and his colleagues define collaboration sponsors as "...individuals who have considerable prestige, authority, and access to resources they can use on behalf of the collaboration, even if they are not closely involved in the day-to-day collaborative work" (Bryson et al; 2006, p. 47). The founders of LRN were highly respected and successful private citizens in the community with political connections. Their standing in the community and their reputation for their philanthropic endeavors helped solidify support from high-level city officials. In addition, city leadership also acted as sponsors in the partnership. Their authority

and level of influence was effective in garnering support from the City's department directors and administrators to engage in the partnership.

Asymmetry

By and large, asymmetry motives were not a motivating factor in local cross-sector watershed collaboration among most of the public sector organizations that participated in the study. The majority of the participants in this group were administrators, managers or directors of various city departments with large operating budgets and numerous employees (e.g., public works and public utilities). However, it is worth noting that one public sector participant did describe asymmetry motives when discussing her rationale for establishing a partnership between her department and LRN. This participant perceived that partnering with LRN had the potential to enhance her department's visibility as a resource for residents/businesses in the community. She explained:

I think LRN has a great reputation within the community and when you say it people know exactly what it is. Virginia Cooperative Extension is a bit broader. So when I say that people don't necessarily think immediately "Oh, watershed protection that is what they do!" So I think that association has definitely helped to bring out "Oh, you deal with Virginia Cooperative Extension. Oh, they do that. Oh, I didn't know that." So I think that has been helpful. Public sector interviewee #9

Notably, this participant's department operated with a small budget and limited staff compared to the other governmental departments/agencies that were included in the study. In the case of this participant, elevating her department's visibility through establishing a partnership with a well-recognized organization in the community suggests the use of a "positioning" strategy to enhance the organization's ability to service more clients.

The concept of *strategic service positioning* was identified as an asymmetry motive in the public sector data source. Strategic service positioning refers to the implementation of organizational strategies that seek to elevate a service organization's presence in their service domain. One possible explanation for this finding is that asymmetry motives in local watershed collaboration may be influenced by service domain dynamics such as the size of the department's budget and/or the number of overlapping organizations operating in the service domain. Oliver's (1990, p. 248) research found that public agencies may seek to establish linkages with high profile NGO's with the expectation of increasing the "...agency's power and influence, relative to other agencies operating in the same domain."

Efficiency

Several efficiency motive variables were cited by public sector participants. These motives include managing legacy costs, leveraging assets, controlling labor costs, contracting out services, costs avoidance, and expanding volunteer pools. A number of the administrators and directors of various City departments framed efficiency motives using two perspectives: *political and fiscal pressures*. From a political standpoint, participants underscored that the City's elective officials needed to find solutions to improve the conditions of the watershed without shifting the costs to taxpayers. As captured by this city administrator's statement:

...it's a business decision, to do that, think about what the city would pay to hire public works and the public utilities department and all those programs, you would be going crazy, the city is driven by city council, and the taxpayers and they're not going to hire more people, they can't get away with it so by reaching out and creating partnerships, you get this very extremely beneficial program. (Public sector interviewee #3)

From a fiscal perspective, participants explained that the implementation of nonpoint source pollution policies required manpower, skills, and resources that LRN could provide

more economically. For example, one participant noted that access to LRN's volunteer pool would eliminate legacy costs associated with retirement and hospitalization because the City would not incur those liabilities if they partnered with LRN. According to this public administrator:

I see working with them [LRN] as economical because you are basically contracting out a service. If you had to have permanent manpower on staff they would cost us more than what we give LRN. Nowadays a qualified person is going to cost you \$50,000 a year, and by the time you throw benefits all on top of it you are probably up to \$75,000 a year. (Public sector interviewee #1)

Another participant pointed out that the partnership allowed each organization to "...do what they do best." As an example he explained, public works could direct their resources to improve the City's water quality through their storm water management; and LRN could focus their efforts on public awareness through developing and implementing outreach programs, like LRN's "Scoop the Poop" social marketing campaign that focused on educating the public on practices that eliminate pet waste in the watershed.

A common theme expressed by participants was the concept of leveraging assets through maximizing each organization's core competencies. In the same vein, other studies found that public agencies prefer to direct their time and resources to core functions and outsource peripheral services (see Amagoh, 2009; Lain & Liang, 2004). Further, Oliver (1990) asserts that efficiency motives that drive interorganizational relationships are prompted by the desire to improve the organization's "internal input/output ratio." Such advantages are clear according to Oliver (1990, p. 251); the organization is able to "...increase internal efficiency and to reduce costs."

Stability

A few department administrators discussed stability motives when describing their rationale for collaborating with LRN. The results of the analysis identified *building trust among constituencies* as a key concept underlying participant's narratives when describing stability motives. The concept of building trust among constituencies refers to organizational strategies that seek to cultivate trust among individuals and/or groups that are represented by government officials.

City administrators expressed the sentiment that garnering taxpayers support for initiatives to cleaning up the Lynnhaven River was critical. These initiatives required the City to commit millions of dollars in large capital investments as well as enact new ordinances that impacted residents, developers, and businesses. The implementation of watershed initiatives had long time horizons that impacted groups of constituents (e.g., businesses and residents) in different ways. City leaders recognized that partnering with LRN provided a politically neutral actor that could create a balance between the economic and environmental interests of constituencies. As demonstrated by this city administrator's remarks:

It helps out a lot because they get calls, LRN will get a call about something, some issue there that a citizen has had and they'll call us or they'll call the DEQ or call the core of engineers, whoever it is and a lot of folks will trust them before they'll trust us even though we are working towards the same goal, but we get to the same goal, which is cleaner water.

A number of IOR theorists' link stability motives to the formation of interorganizational arrangements (Gray, 1985; Pfeffer & Salancik, 1978; Logsdon, 1991). Oliver (1990) research found that organizations will form linkages in an effort to create stability in their environment. Logsdon (1991) contends that turbulence and uncertainty in the environment create incentives

for organizations to establish alliances because risk and accountability is shared. Closely related to stability motives are instability motives.

Instability

Economic pressures, watershed conditions, environmental regulation, and conflict were key concepts identified as external factors that prompted instability motives among the public sector participants. Many participants described the on-going pervasiveness of nonpoint source pollution in the Lynnhaven watershed as one of the primary incentives for their decision to collaborate with LRN. According to one agency's department head:

The water was polluted and getting worse. Organizations like the Chesapeake Bay Foundation would tell people that we don't really have a way to enforce it but you need to stop...the EPA, gradually started coming down more in the form of TMDLs, and we had to come up with a plan to do that. So sure, like I said, I don't think the city could have done this without them [LRN] but I think they probably would have [there is] too much investment here.

Public administrators and department heads cited a myriad of external forces as the impetus that created the incentives to establish a partnership. These external forces included the collapse of the shell fishing industry, the growing population in the area, the looming threat of mandatory Total Maximum Daily Load (TMDL) requirements, beach closures and pressure from citizens and other constituent groups. In addition, underlying economic pressures were also identified as instability motives that drove public organizations to collaborate with LRN. For example, one of the participants explained that some of the City's most valuable residential properties were located around the River. The condition of the watershed directly affected property values, and in turn, the tax revenues collected into the City's General Fund.

Another city administrator discussed instability in the context of conflict. Prior to the partnership, he described a contentious environment between the City and various constituents stemming from water quality issues and the enactment of new City ordinances. He recalled:

...you probably won't find anybody on the city council to admit this but because they think it's so great that it's working so well right now. There was a time when it wasn't working very well. You know people were mad, people were mad about the bad water quality, people were mad about all of the regulations, developers were extremely upset. The guys trying to build a parking lot were furious at this stuff... (Public sector interviewee #7)

Instability motives are the manifestation of turbulence and uncertainty in the environment create interdependence between organizations that create the conditions to form strategic alliances (Aldrich & Pfeffer, 1976; Emery & Trist, 1965; Gray, 1985). A number of collaboration studies in natural resource management identified conflict among watershed stakeholders as an incentive for establishing local watershed collaborative arrangements (McKinney & Field, 2008; Lubell, 2005; Weber, 2009).

Necessity

Instability and necessity motives were found to be interrelated constructs among the public sector participants. City administrators and directors frequently conjoined the state of the watershed and the regulatory environment when describing necessity motives. Participants described two key concepts when discussing necessity motives: *administrative directive* and *environmental regulations*. An administrative directive refers to a formalized plan created by an organization's governance body outlining specific tasks and procedures in order to accomplish strategic objectives. While department administrators and directors noted that participation with LRN was voluntary, several cited administrative directives that promoted

public engagement and working with community groups (see City of Virginia Beach, 2016b). As described by one of the agency's directors: "...we have a city-wide administrative directive that discusses public involvement, but we don't have anything to my knowledge that prescribes how we interact with LRN." A general consensus among participants was the notion that achieving administrative directives towards cleaning the watershed required cultivating a coalition of the willing between citizens, businesses and city departments; LRN's pedigree and ties to the community could facilitate that endeavor.

Participant's discussions regarding environmental regulations centered on describing how the watershed impacted the organization's operations. A variety of operational activities were cited including dredging, installing bulkheads, construction, storm water management, monitoring bacteria levels in the watershed, grounds keeping practices including disposal of grass clippings and applications of fertilizers and pesticides in public areas. Participants identified a range of state and federal government oversight agencies that monitored their activities including the Virginia Department of Agriculture and Consumer Service (VDACS), the Department of Environmental Quality (DEQ), the Virginia Marine Resource Commission (VMRC), the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers (USACE) and the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (USEPA). One of the directors explained that City leaders viewed the partnership with LRN as a way to improve communications between regulatory organizations. He explained:

Virginia Beach has the largest shoreline, the largest watershed. Virginia Beach gets the most interactivity with other regulators. So [from] the VMRC, who regulates everything from the shoreline to the piers (local kind of stuff); to the DEQ, the VIMS and the [Army] Corps of Engineers, all of these activities on any major issue, (water quality, moisture rehab, dredging, bulkhead installation), they now come, they all sit at the same table. So they are able to actually move through environmental issues and solutions

much more quickly than they ever did. [This is] because LRN knows about the dredging issue, which public works wants to improve navigation; and everything else there is going to affect wetlands. So they will invite VIMS and DEQ to talk about sagacious planning activity and non-title wetlands importance and they'll give a position paper and they will remind the dredging faction that there's an issue here but they're all in the same room, they have to talk about it, the Core of Engineers who also has a very growing awareness of water quality and funding half a million dollars of water quality initiatives from LRN which are mostly oyster related but in terms of driving and awareness and forcing regulatory organizations to work together... (Public sector interviewee #7)

Finally, the data analysis showed that public sector partners in the study operated in a highly regulatory environment (see The Commonwealth of Virginia: Department of Conservation and Recreation and Department of Environmental Quality, 2003). As demonstrated in the quotation above, various state and federal agencies were routinely involved in operational activities with various city departments. Moreover, the data showed that for most of the public sector participants their organization's outputs and outcomes were directly impacted by the watershed. Arguably, this regulatory environment created necessity motives for public sector partners to collaborate with LRN. The findings provide support for proposition 11. Organizations that are impacted (positively or negatively) by watershed regulatory frameworks are more likely to engage in watershed cross-sector collaboration.

Legitimacy

Overall legitimacy motives were not identified as incentives that drive public sector participants to engage in watershed collaboration with LRN. Most participants expressed the sentiment that their motivations were guided by improving the conditions of the watershed rather than enhancing their organization's reputation or image. In the words of one participant:

It was more a matter of having a positive impact in the environment, in the community, not recognition or anything like that other than maybe we are a resource. We are here.

You need to know about us. You need to use us, but not from a publicity or that sort of level, no. (Public sector interviewee #6)

Interestingly, the data does suggest that City administrator, directors, and department heads recognized that their partnership with LRN enhanced the City's image and reputation. For instance, a few participants reflected on the City's image in the 70's-80's and recalled an era when the City was focused on pro-growth strategies that resulted in the over development around the watershed. One City administrator conveyed having conversations with environmental agencies during that timeframe and noted the agency's concerns over the environmental impacts in the region. He stated:

Many of the environmental agencies that I talked to back in those first few years had a very negative view of the beach in terms of not really putting too much value on environmental issues so I think that has totally flipped around. We are kind of the fair-haired children when it comes to environmental activism and getting some results and putting a priority on that; actually spending some money...I mentioned the \$300 million dollars on sanitary sewers as an example. (Public sector interviewee #3)

In a similar vein, when participants were asked if they received any publicity as a result of their partnership with LRN, they responded positively. A number of participants cited that their department was consistently recognized in LRN's newsletters. Other participants cited receiving "kudos" and "accolades" from various local media sources for their work with LRN over the years. One participant noted the City getting an award from the White House for their construction of fourteen acres of oyster sanctuary reefs in the Lynnhaven River (see *The Virginian Pilot*, 2010). Administrators and department heads conveyed a sense of pride and satisfaction with their organization's role in collaborating with LRN and improving the condition of the watershed. In the case of public sector actors, the findings suggest that legitimacy motives may create a positive reinforcement mechanism that incents public sector actors to continue their engagement with local watershed collaboration.

Reciprocity

Nearly all of the participants in this group described variables relating to reciprocity. Reciprocity motives cited by city administrators and directors included leveraging assets, maximizing resources, mutual benefits, expanding volunteer pools, creating “win-win” scenarios, access to state and federal grants and outsource public awareness services.

Resource capacity building strategies was identified as the central concept that underpinned the reciprocity motives in the public sector data sources. Resource capacity building strategies refer to the development and implementation of strategies that seek to leverage existing assets and/or garner resources in order to achieve organizational goals.

From the City’s leadership perspective, the partnership created a strategy to address the watershed issues on multiple fronts including capital investments, public works, engineering and community outreach. A few participants emphasized that the pollution issues (i.e., nonpoint source) plaguing the watershed were complex and required building resource capacity through establishing community partners and getting citizens on board with being part of the solution. This meant building social capital through outreach programs. In describing the role that resource capacity strategies played in motivating public actors to engage in local watershed collaboration, one City administrator reported:

We were really playing catch up on storm watershed management and so the real key, we thought, to get to the next level was to engage the citizens and get them to change their whole mindset about lawn fertilization practices and cleaning up after their pets and just getting them involved in terms of growing oysters and all that. That was the resource really that LRN brought to the table was the ability to really reach out to the community and get them involved in a very positive way, perhaps much more effectively than the City could have done. So it was a real grassroots effort. (Public interviewee #2)

Participants frequently coupled the concept of social capital with reciprocity motives. City administrators and directors routinely conveyed a concern for the lack of trust between government and citizens. Participants explained that City leaders recognized that building community trust was an essential component to improving the quality of the water in the River. As conveyed by one public agency department head:

It became very clear that the private sector can't do it all and the public sector can't do it all, but these collaborations can get a lot done and it was a great way for residents and the government to work toward a solution, because most of them had this attitude that government is bad, they don't listen to us, they only tax us, stuff like that, it seemed to me that we created a lot of good relationships with people. (Public sector interviewee #10)

Corporate/Social Consciousness

Many public sector participants described variables relating to social consciousness motives when discussing the reasons that their organization chose to collaborate with LRN. Social consciousness variables were classified under three central concepts: *environmental stewardship initiatives*, *organizational culture*, and *organizational identity*. Participants in this group framed organizational identity and culture in the context of community. Some examples of organizational identity and culture variables cited by participants include community involvement, strong community spirit, valuing citizen's input, community values, norms and beliefs and improving the quality of life for citizens. In the words of one city administrator: "We very much value citizen engagement and involvement and that is the expectation that we will operate a certain way via the community on this and other interactions that we have with the citizens." A common thread found in the data was the nexus between public service and social consciousness. Participants expressed a deep commitment to servicing the community and their desire to improve the quality of life for citizens. The City's commitment to

environmental stewardship was articulated in a number government reports, public records and web sites reviewed (see City of Virginia Beach Green Ribbon Committee, 2007; City of Virginia Beach, 2016a; Virginia Beach Beautification Commission, 2016).

Participants framed environmental stewardship initiative variables in the context of strategic management plans, environmental practices and serving on community environmental committees. These variables included developing TMDLs implementation plans, the development and implementation of community sustainability strategic plans, developing community outreach and public education programs. A number of these initiatives were identified in the City's Sustainability Plan on the City's website (see City of Virginia Beach, 2013). Participants frequently noted serving on various environmental committees with LRN including the Green Ribbon Committee, the Buffer Committee, the Landscaping Practices Committee and the City's beautification committee. Some participants described the City's strategic plans and highlighted that the plans articulated community engagement and promoted stakeholder input in City programs. As articulated by one city leader:

We [the City] have guidelines that we provide regarding community engagement and it talks a lot about our values. We really want to involve all of the stakeholders in whatever project we are involved in. Whether it is designing a park in a neighborhood, a new building, a new roadway or working on storm water quality...we really want to partner and engage the citizens and make sure all of the stakeholders that are impacted [are involved]. There is a whole administrative directive that talks about how that should happen.

Finally, participants acknowledged that helping their organization improve their environmental practices was another consideration that prompted their decision to partner with LRN.

Organizational Interests

All of the public sector participants cited organizational interests' motives as drivers that created incentives to engage in local watershed collaboration. An array of variables relating to organizational interests were identified including achieving strategic imperatives, the efficacy of capital improvement programs, environmental regulatory mandates, branding the City's image, improve economic vitality, access to state and federal grant funding, mitigating red tape and achieving economic, social and environment sustainability objectives.

Several city leaders and agency administrators conveyed the sentiment that the partnership with LRN was perceived as a strategy to enhance their ability to achieve long-term goals for the City. City administrators consistently stressed that the partnership with LRN was viewed by the City's leadership as a vital component in their efforts to build community support for policy driven initiatives that sought to improve the water quality in the River. The results show that participants in this group framed organizational interest's motives using three perspectives: *economic interests*, *environmental interests*, and *regulatory interests*.

Some participants described economic interests in terms of how the conditions of the watershed impacted tax revenue sources for the City including property taxes and the tax revenues generated from the boating, fishing, and tourism industries. The results showed a relationship between the concepts of economic and environmental interests. Participants commonly linked these concepts together when discussing organizational interests. As illustrated by these comments from two public agency administrators:

So, and I mean there's the boating industry, how many boats and how much money goes into marinas and boats at the end of the year and I mean it's a huge economic interest. Makes sense for the city to protect it not only for the environment values but to produce a good economic development business model. (Public sector interviewee # 7)

Another administrator stated:

I think that, if anything, people realized there is only so much out there and that as a community if we develop it out, what are we are going to be left with? In terms of these public resources and our highest valued real estate is waterfront property. So, if you don't maintain water quality, you don't maintain your shorelines, you don't maintain that ecological productivity, it's going to directly translate into lower tax base and things like that. (Public sector interviewee #4)

From a regulatory perspective, a number of participants cited various environmental regulations that impacted their organizational operations and activities. For example, one participant from the Department of Public Works described how his crews go out and test water quality for "...a host of parameters including detergents, petroleum, sewage, PH, chlorine..." He explained that the findings are reported to the commonwealth and the Department of Environmental Quality. Another participant from the Department of Parks and Recreation explained that many of the department's operational activities were regulated by the Chesapeake Bay Resource Protection Area such as the application of fertilizers and pesticides.

A number of administrators and directors explained that the City is mandated to clean the watershed under the federal and state statutes. As expressed by this agency's director:

The City is mandated to clean up its watershed in accordance with federal and state laws. The city must clean up its watershed; and so that has been through an awareness on the part of the City's elected officials and administrator to reach out to environmental groups to create partnerships, jointly organize, [and] fund programs to accomplish a common goal.

Many participants acknowledged that city council and the City's leadership identified improving the water quality in the River and focusing on the environment as a strategic imperative. As demonstrated by this public administrator's comments:

...if you read the city's strategic plans, you see the potential for the environment is a major element. If you read the city's sustainability plan, you can see that the sustainability of the environment is what the whole thing is about. If you read the city's strategic growth area plan, which this is more of our urban forum centers in the middle of Virginia Beach, you see that they're inundated in protecting the environment in an urban model how to do it and you know how to create a pond or fountain for run off and how to get an interfuse in the Lynnhaven without adversely affecting it, zero run off. (Public sector interviewee #7)

A few of the participants discussed the City's TMDL implementation plans and noted that the commonwealth required the plans to include involving citizen's groups like LRN (see The Commonwealth of Virginia: Department of Conservation and Recreation and Department of Environmental Quality, 2003). Finally, there was a general consensus expressed by participants that government interventions to clean the watershed could not do it alone; it required the concerted efforts from the business community, local environmental groups, and citizens. A brief summary of the key findings discussed in this sections are highlighted below.

Summary of Key Findings

Important motivational determinants to local watershed collaboration identified in the public sector data sources included organizational interests, reciprocity, corporate/social consciousness, catalytic actors, necessity, and instability. To a lesser extent, legitimacy, stability, and asymmetry motives were cited by a few participants as motivations to collaborate with LRN. A number of characteristics were identified across the public sector

data sources. The vast majority of public sector participants characterized the nature of their relationship with LRN as transactional. Participants in this group routinely described resource exchanges as formalized arrangements through contracts and MOUs. Nearly all of the public sector participants in the study acknowledged that the City was mandated to clean the Lynnhaven River watershed. The data revealed a mutual dependency to achieve organizational objectives between the public sector agencies and LRN. Lastly, the results indicate that the reputation of the founders of LRN and their direct involvement in reaching out to the City's leadership created the impetus to motivate the City and their public agencies to establish strategic alliances with LRN.

The next section discusses the results as they relate to answering the first research question. To address this research question the data were analyzed across all of the data sources included in the study. The interpretation of the results are framed and discussed from a holistic perspective.

Research Question 1: What are the organizational motivations that drive local watershed cross-sector collaboration?

Consistent with the proposed model, all of the thematic constructs included in the organizational motivation framework for cross-sector watershed collaboration were identified as thematic concepts to local cross-sector watershed collaboration in this setting. The thematic constructs include asymmetry, catalytic actors, corporate and social consciousness, efficiency, instability, legitimacy, necessity, organizational interests, reciprocity, and stability. Table 4.3 displays the empirical evidence discussed in this section. The table summarizes the number of

participants that discussed/described each the organizational motivation constructs as an incentive to collaborate with LRN. The results are listed in descending order of frequency.

Table 4.3: Summary of Organizational Motivation Data Source Frequency

Organizational Motivations	Number of Participants
Organizational Interests	29
Corporate/Social Consciousness	22
Legitimacy	21
Catalytic Actors	21
Reciprocity	20
Necessity	18
Stability	13
Instability	9
Asymmetry	9
Efficiency	6

As Table 4.3 displays, the extent to which each of the organizational motivations prompted member organizations to engage in local watershed collaboration varied in the data. The following section examines organizational motivations across the sectors. The section outlines the major themes found in the data that correspond to each of the organizational motivation constructs.

Organizational Interests

Empirical evidence indicates that organizational interests played an important role in motivating participants' organizations to partner with LRN. There were four primary categories relating to organizational interests' identified in the data analysis: economic,

environmental, regulatory, and community interests. As one might expect in local watershed collaboration, environmental interests were cited as motives across the three groups.

Environmental interests centered on the conditions of the watershed and its impact on the organization and the community at large. Notably, all of the organizations in the study operated in the same watershed.

Economic interests were cited as a motivating factor among public and private sector participants. For public sector participants, economic interests were connected to fiscal considerations concerning long-term capital investments, tax revenues and improving the economic vitality of the community. In the case of private sector participants, economic interests focused on creating new avenues (e.g. technologies, service/product offerings) to grow the company. Regulatory and community interests were cited by public and nonprofit sector participants respectively. Regulatory interests centered on public agencies improving watershed conditions in order to achieve better compliance with federal and state watershed regulations. Finally, community interests related to how the watershed impacted the quality of life for the community at large. These findings are consistent with institutional-level perspectives (see Levine & White, 1961; Logsdon, 1991; Selznick, 1948; Simon, 1945). Selznick (1948) and Simon (1945) contend that organizations will create cooperative systems as a self-defense response to environmental conditions. In a similar vein, Baum and Oliver (1991) and Meyer and Scott (1983) found that organizations will form institutional linkages in order to overcome threats of vulnerability. Van de Ven (1976) and Logsdon (1991) found that organizations will coordinate their activities and processes in order to advance their mutual interests.

Corporate/Social Consciousness

Another motivational construct that appeared to play an important role in prompting member organizations to collaborate with LRN was corporate/social consciousness. The data revealed four key concepts relating to this motivational construct: environmental stewardship, organizational culture, organization identity, and mission oriented. Three out of the four concepts were identified across the groups including environmental stewardship, organizational culture, and identity. As one might expect in watershed collaboration, the data showed that environmental stewardship was an incentive for organizations to partner with LRN. Environmental stewardship refers to a sense of duty held by the leadership of an organization to protect the environment through practices that mitigate the organization's impact on the watershed/environment. A number of watershed and environmental studies identify environmental stewardship as a determinant in collaboration (see Leach & Pelkey, 2001; Meyer & Konsiky, 2007; Wondolleck & Yaffee, 2000; Weber, 2009). Meyer and Konsiky's (2007) study on the adoption of local environmental institutions (LEIs) for wetland protection in Massachusetts identified pressing environmental issues among community stakeholders as an incentive to engage and establish LEIs.

Legitimacy

Across the three groups, the results indicated that legitimacy considerations prompted both private and nonprofit sector organizations to collaborate with LRN. Organizational reputation and image were identified as key concepts relating to legitimacy motives in both of these sectors. A number of private and nonprofit participants expressed the sentiment that their partnership with LRN enhanced their image. These findings are supported in other collaboration and interorganizational relationship studies (see Gray, 1989; Sabatier, 1998;

Wondolleck & Yaffee, 2000). For example, Sabatier's (1998) study identifies enhancing public image as a motivational determinant for a private organization to collaborate with a nonprofit organization. Likewise, Wondolleck and Yaffee's (2000) study on natural resource management identified the concept of reputation as an incentive for watershed stakeholders to collaborate. A general consensus expressed among all of the participants in the study was their respect for LRN, its leadership and their admiration for their accomplishments in increasing the oyster population and improving the watershed quality in the Lynnhaven River.

A number of participants in both the public and private sector expressed the view that their partnership with LRN had a positive effect on their organization's reputation. By and large, the results of the public sector data sources indicated that legitimacy considerations were not a motivating factor for their decision to collaborate with LRN. Several participants in the public sector acknowledged that their partnership with LRN had a positive influence on their organization's image. Public sector participants appeared to perceive any enhancement of their image due to their partnership as a by-product of the relationship.

Catalytic Actors

Catalytic actors were found to play an instrumental role in motivating the participants from the private and public sectors. The vast majority of participants in the private and public sector described either a formal or informal relationship with one or more of the founders. Participants characterized their relationships with catalytic actors as either professional or personal. Moreover, several of the public and private sector participants described long-standing relationships with one or more of the founders of LRN. A number of public and private sector participants described the founders of LRN as prominent private citizens that had a reputation for their philanthropic work in the community. In addition to the founders of

LRN, the results indicated that the City's leadership (e.g., city council, mayor, and city manager) acted as sponsors to get public organizations engaged in collaborating with LRN. The important role of catalytic actors in collaboration is widely identified in other watershed collaboration studies (see Heikkila & Gerlak, 2005; McNamara, 2014; Morris et al., 2013).

In the case of nonprofit organizations, catalytic actors were identified as third party sources rather than representatives of LRN. All but one of the nonprofit participants described learning about LRN through third party sources. In comparison to their private and public counterparts, most of the nonprofit participants interviewed described taking the initiative to reach out to LRN after they learned about the organization.

Reciprocity

Reciprocity motives were also cited across all three of the groups. A number of key concepts were identified in this construct including resource capacity building strategies, building relationships, leveraging and sharing resources. The results identified reciprocity motives as driven by the resources exchanged between the partners. The data analysis indicated two categories of resource exchanges: bilateral or unilateral. These results lend credence to resource dependency and exchange perspectives (see Coleman, 1988; Cook, 1977, Lin, 2001). Further, a number of collaboration scholars assert that organizations are more likely to engage in collaborative arrangements when individual partners perceive a sense of mutuality (Gray, 1989; Thomson & Perry, 2006; Ostrom, 1990).

The results revealed that reciprocity motives were influenced by the dependency of the resources exchanged in the partnership. For instance, resource exchanges were bilateral among private sector organizations; flowing from the business firm to LRN. Among the majority of the private sector participants, reciprocity motives were identified as playing a

minor role in motivating corporate managers to engage in local watershed collaboration. Conversely, resource changes were found to be unilateral between public sector organizations and LRN. For these participants, reciprocity motives provided incentives to collaborate with LRN. Likewise, for many of the nonprofit sector organizations, resource exchanges flowed from both directions. Similar to the public sector, reciprocity motives were identified as prompting nonprofit participants to collaborate with LRN. These findings were congruent with other interorganizational relationships studies that examine motivational determinants in multi-sector strategic alliances (see Babiak, 2007; Brody et al., 2004; Oliver, 1991).

Stability and Instability

Stability and instability motives were found to be manifested by uncertainty and turbulence in the environment. Across the three groups, stability motives to collaborate with LRN were classified under the following three categories: building trust among constituents, creating information channels and building relationships with other organizations. In all three groups, participants described the partnership with LRN as a strategy to expand their network and cultivate relationships with other organizations, new clients, and partners. The results revealed a number of stability practices commonly cited by several of the participants in the study including scanning the environment for potential partners and clients, creating conduits for information exchanges, and creating synergies. The empirical evidence suggests that the impacts of the watershed created mutual dependency among organizations in the public, private and nonprofit sector. Consequently, this created incentives to forge strategic alliances between LRN and their member organizations. Stability motives appeared to emanate from within the organizations as a management strategy to gain predictability and control their environment. A number of IOR scholars identify stability motives as a strategic response for

organizations to manage turbulence in the environment (see Aldrich & Pfeffer, 1976; Pfeffer & Salancik, 1978; Logsdon, 1991).

On the other hand, the results revealed that instability motives were triggered by external forces in the environment. The deterioration of the Lynnhaven River was commonly cited across the three groups as an instability motive for partnering with LRN. Environmental regulations were identified as instability motives that prompted organizations from most of the public sector organizations and a few of the private sector organizations that operated in the environmental arena. In addition, several public administrators and department directors cited economic pressures (e.g., the collapse of the shell industry) and growing conflicts among constituents as externalities that created incentives to engage in local watershed collaboration with LRN. These findings provide support for proposition 5; the greater the level of turbulence and complexities in a domain, the greater the motivation for an organization to establish interorganizational relationships.

Asymmetry

Similar to the results found with instability motives, asymmetry motives were cited by nine of the participants in the study. Of those participants, asymmetry motives were more frequently cited as a motivating factor among private sector participants than with the public or nonprofit participants. Four key concepts relating to asymmetry motives were identified in the data: strategic service positioning, positioning, strategic associations and the potential to serve on LRN's board of directors. As discussed in the aforementioned sections, asymmetry motives identified in the data were substantiated in the literature (see Brown et al., 2006; Miller-Stevens et al., 2014; Oliver, 1990).

Strategic service positioning is best described as the implementation of organizational strategies that seek to elevate a service organization's presence in their service domain. This concept was described by one of the public sector participants. The concept of positioning refers to strategies undertaken by private firms to enhance their presence in their market. Strategic associations are alliances established with other organizations in order to incorporate new technologies and/or advance existing knowledge. These two concepts were identified in a number of interviewees with private sector partners. Finally, the potential to be appointed to serve on LRN's board of directors was described by one of the nonprofit participants.

Efficiency

The empirical evidence indicated that efficiency motivations were the least frequently cited incentive among participants in the study. In fact, the data showed that none of the private sector participants cited efficiency considerations as a motivating factor for collaborating with LRN. To the contrary, a number of private sector participants acknowledge that there were costs incurred from the partnership with LRN. These costs included "working pro bono," donating money, and the use of facilities and equipment.

In contrast, efficiency motives were identified by participants from the public and nonprofit sectors as motivations to partner with LRN. Efficiency motives described among the public sector participants were grouped under two concepts: political and fiscal pressure. For the study, political pressures refer to the activities emanating from constituents in order to influence change to watershed policies. Fiscal pressures refer to the efficacy of public funding allocated to address watershed issues in the Lynnhaven River.

Efficiency motives described by nonprofit sector participants focused on increasing volunteer networks and access to grant funding. Volunteer network refers to a group of

individuals that are affiliated with an organization and donate their time and/or money to support a cause. Finally, access to grant funding refers to enhancing the organization's ability to secure grants because of their affiliation with another organization.

Necessity

Several key concepts were identified relating to necessity motives including environmental regulatory pressures, governmental mandates, and administrative directives. Across the three groups, necessity motives appeared to be prompted by watershed impacts on organizational operational activities. The results revealed that necessity considerations played a greater role in motivating public sector participants to engage in local watershed collaboration than participants in the private and nonprofit sector. Although, all of the participants stated that they were not mandated to collaborate with LRN, the governmental agencies that participated in the study were mandated by federal and state governmental authorities to clean the watershed (see U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, 2001; U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, 2009; Commonwealth of Virginia, 2010). A number of public administrators and directors of public agencies interviewed acknowledged that cleaning the Lynnhaven River watershed required a concerted effort from businesses, citizens, and NGOs. The ability to access governmental grants was also identified as a necessity incentive among the public and nonprofit sector organizations.

Summary of Findings

All of the constructs in the conceptual framework were identified as motivational determinants for organizations in this study to engage in local cross-sector watershed collaboration. As summarized in table 4.3, the frequency that participants cited motivational

determinants varied across the cases. The construct of organizational interests was the most frequently cited motivational determinant across the cases. Three-thirds of all of the participants cited variables relating to corporate/social consciousness, legitimacy, catalytic actors, reciprocity, and necessity as motives to partner with LRN. Stability motives were cited by two-thirds of the participants, and one-third of the participants cited instability, asymmetry, and efficiency.

Several overarching characteristics were identified in the data across the groups. First, participants in the group shared the belief that the condition of the watershed was important to the vitality of the community. Second, the results revealed that the partnerships with LRN were strategic alliances. Third, many of the participants expressed the view that the condition of the Lynnhaven River watershed impacted their organization's operational activities. Finally, the vast majority of the participants perceived that the partnership with LRN was mutually beneficial.

Research question 5: Are there certain organizational motivations between industry sectors that are more prevalent in local cross-sector watershed collaboration?

To address this research question a comparison analysis was conducted across the three groups of participants (i.e., public, private and nonprofit). The results from the data sources showed differences in the level of prevalence of organizational motivations between partners from different industry sectors. This section discusses the results of the cross comparison analysis. The discussion in this section focuses on examining striking differences in levels of prevalence (i.e., highly prevalent vs. low prevalence) of organizational motivations between the industry sectors. Table 4.2 summarizes the levels of prevalence

(highly, moderately and low) found in the organizational motivations between the industry sectors.

As displayed in table 4.2, varying levels of prevalence between industry sectors were detected in eight out of the ten organizational motivation constructs included in the framework. Organizational motivations relating to organizational interests' and stability were found to have the same level of prevalence between the sectors. In sum, the results provide evidence to support proposition 14. The data analysis showed that incentive structures (intrinsic and/or extrinsic) did vary from sector to sector. The empirical evidence is congruent with other recent IOR studies that examined motivations in cross-sector collaboration (see Austin, 2000; Babiak, 2007; Brennsen & Marshall, 2000). The results indicate that organizational motivation orientations were influenced by various factors including economic, environmental, regulatory and social factors that impact each organization.

Levels of prevalence were classified as highly prevalent, moderately prevalent, and having a low prevalence. Organizational motivation constructs classified as highly prevalent were discussed and/or described as an incentive to engage in local watershed collaboration with the focal organization by 7 or more participants in each of the cases. Likewise, moderately prevalent levels were used to indicate that 6-4 participants identified incentives relating to the motivational construct. Finally, low prevalence indicated that 3 or fewer participants described the construct as an incentive to collaborate with LRN. Table 4.4 summarizes the levels of prevalence of organizational motivations between industry sectors.

Table 4.4: Levels of Prevalence of Organizational Motivation between Sectors

Motivations	Public Sector	Private Sector	Nonprofit Sector
Organizational Interests	Highly Prevalent	Highly Prevalent	Highly Prevalent
Legitimacy	Low Prevalence	Highly Prevalent	Moderately Prevalent
Reciprocity	Highly Prevalent	Low Prevalence	Highly Prevalent
Catalytic Actors	Highly Prevalent	Highly Prevalent	Moderately Prevalent
Necessity	Highly Prevalent	Moderately Prevalent	Low Prevalence
Corporate/ Social Consciousness	Moderately Prevalent	Highly Prevalent	Moderately Prevalent
Stability	Low Prevalence	Low Prevalence	Low Prevalence
Instability	Highly Prevalent	Low Prevalence	Low Prevalence
Efficiency	Low Prevalence	Not Prevalent	Low Prevalence
Asymmetry	Low Prevalence	Moderate Prevalent	Low Prevalence

As reported in table 4.4, four organizational motives were identified as highly prevalent among the private sector participants including organizational interests, legitimacy, catalytic actors, and corporate/social consciousness; whereas, reciprocity, stability, and instability were found to have a low prevalence in this group. In the case of the public sector participants, organizational interests, reciprocity, catalytic actors, and necessity were found to be highly prevalent; whereas asymmetry, efficiency, stability, and legitimacy were identified to have a low prevalence. Finally, reciprocity and organizational interests were found to be highly prevalent among the nonprofit sector partners, while necessity, stability, instability, efficiency and asymmetry were found to have a low level of prevalence. There were striking differences in levels of prevalence between industry sectors found in four out of the ten organizational constructs. They are legitimacy, reciprocity, necessity, and instability. The following unpacks the results from each of the four aforementioned organizational constructs in more detail.

Legitimacy

Legitimacy motives played a greater role in the involvement of private and nonprofit partners in local watershed collaboration than in the public sector. Legitimacy motives were found to be highly and moderately prevalent in the private and nonprofit sector, respectively. In contrast, legitimacy motives among public sector partners had a low level of prevalence. The data revealed striking differences in the level of prevalence between private sector partners compared to the public sector partners. With the exception of one public sector interviewee, public sector participants emphasized that enhancing their organization's image and/or reputation was not a consideration for collaborating with LRN.

In the study, legitimacy motives were most prominently discussed among participants representing private corporations. Private sector partners pointed out that they wanted their organization to be recognized by the community as a good corporate citizen. In a similar vein, nonprofit sector partners expressed the desire to be viewed as good stewards of the environment. A growing number of interorganizational scholars link legitimacy motives to the rise of corporate social responsibility (CSR) and the increase of collaboration between private firms and NGO's (see Herlin, 2015; Kourula & Halme, 2008; Seitanidi & Ryan, 2007). According to Seitanidi and Ryan (2007), CSR strategies provide a means for private sector actors to shape their public image through their affiliation with social causes and their philanthropic activities.

Several private sector partners noted that the reputation of the focal organization and their board members was an important factor in their consideration to partnering with the focal organization. Private sector participants cited LRN's connections to influential actors,

their good standing in the community, and the reputation of the leadership and the founders as a valuable affiliation. As expressed by one private sector partner:

They're [LRN] run very well; people that sit on their board are some of the community leaders. I wanted to mention that's the third part of this, the other part is that by assisting LRN, I get the benefit of having face time with their board so that's definitely a benefit. Just like you're saying, these leaders in the community have been there a long time, some of them I know, a lot of them I don't know. So if I'm asked can I come in and help brief them? First of all, I'm more than happy to do it. Secondly, there's an advantage provided to me as a consequence of being able to go into that room and talk to them for an hour. There's definitely, getting to your question, is there a benefit? There's definitely a benefit.

Brown et. al (2006) identify "intended associations" as an important consideration for corporate managers. According to Brown and his colleagues, intended associations are positioning strategies that seek to enhance the organization's image/prestige among outside stakeholders. This finding supports proposition 8, suggesting that a prominent company is more likely to engage in local watershed collaboration when other prominent actors are affiliated with the focal organization.

Reciprocity

In contrast to asymmetry motives, where power and control of resources create the incentives (Oliver, 1990); reciprocity motives are driven by the desire to garner resources through cooperation in order to advance collective interests (Gray, 1989). Reciprocity motives played a greater role in local watershed collaboration among public and nonprofit sector partners than their private sector counterparts. Resource-based considerations were found to be highly prevalent among both the public and nonprofit sector partners. In comparison, the motive of reciprocity had a low prevalence among the private sector partners.

The results showed that resource exchanges between the private sector partners and

LRN were unidirectional, with resources going to LRN. For example, private sector participants described donating money, sponsorship, pro bono professional services (e.g., marketing, printing and consulting); office space and equipment (e.g., boats). As conveyed by this firm's CEO, "Well we donate money to LRN and we also donate oysters for their annual oyster roast. We have been doing that since the beginning." Another business CEO stated: "We help them in all phases of marketing and communication [and] form collateral material to strategies to television commercials." Private sector partners emphasized that their firms were very supportive of LRN's goals and were happy to do their part to ensure the continued success of the focal organization. In contrast, the flow of resource exchanges between public and nonprofit partners and LRN were found to be bidirectional in nature.

Reciprocity motives were found to be highly prevalent between public and nonprofits partners, however, their perspectives differed. Participants in each of these sectors described reciprocity from two different perspectives. Public sector participants described the collaboration from an exchange theory perspective (Cook, 1977; Willer, 1999). Specifically, administrators and department heads explained that the partnership was created as a strategy to garner critical services including the development and implementation of public education and outreach programs. In the words of one City administrator:

We provide funds to them for services that they render to us in terms of, for example, public education and the importance of proper storm water management and just generally environmental water quality issues in the Lynnhaven. That is one way. We provide a lot of staff support in terms of working with them on research at various levels. Projects – we proposed for example, an industrial facility that would actually grow oysters and have worked with them on that. We have coordinated on our capital improvements program in terms of building projects that will advance the water quality issues in the Lynnhaven. So we have had a lot of close collaboration on that. So I think that is it. It has been direct dollars for services they provide and it has been a lot of staff support and CIP support in terms of things that benefit them.

On the other hand, nonprofit sector partners described reciprocity motives from a social network perspective (Coleman, 1988). Nonprofit participants characterized reciprocity motives as supporting common interests, creating synergies, developing cross-pollination, sharing information and knowledge and fostering relationships to achieve better environmental stewardship. In this setting, the data suggests that reciprocity motives are influenced by resource exchange dependencies. In the case of the public and nonprofit partners, resources exchange dependencies appeared to be significant, particularly among public sector partners. Therefore, one would expect reciprocity motives to be highly prevalent among public and nonprofit partners. On the other hand, given that private sector partners were not dependent on LRN's resources to meet strategic goals, prevalence levels for reciprocity motives would likely be low. These results substantiate proposition 4. Norms of reciprocity are important intrinsic incentives to local cross-sector watershed collaboration.

Norms of reciprocity (e.g. cooperation and exchanging resources) were routinely described by participants in the interviews. Huxham and Vangen (2004) link reciprocity motives to the concept of collaborative advantage. According to Huxham and Vangen, organizations will pursue interorganizational alliances as a strategy to develop synergies in order to achieve mutual goals. In contrast to legitimacy motives, necessity considerations were found to be a strong motivating driver for local watershed collaboration with LRN among public sector partners compared to the other two industry sectors.

Necessity

Organizational motivations related to necessity were found to be highly prevalent among public sector partners compared to the nonprofit and private sector partners. In the

case of nonprofit partners, necessity motives were found to have a low prevalence among nonprofit partners. Environmental regulatory pressures and federal and state mandates to clean the Lynnhaven River appear to have prompted the City's leadership to engage in local watershed collaboration with LRN. Based on interviews with City public administrators and directors it appears that a confluence of events including the collapse of the shell fishing industry in the area, the growing deterioration of the water quality in the River and increasing conflicts among constituents motivated the City and its departments to partner with LRN. As noted by this public administrator:

I think it was more of a necessity, something had to get done, conditions had to improve, as I explained to you, citizens were unhappy, whether they were developers or environmentalists, they were unhappy by the response from the city alone to do these things and I think that's part of the decision why the city decided to reach out for these partnerships. (Public sector interviewee #7)

Oliver (1990, p. 243) asserts that organizations will establish "...linkages or exchanges with other organizations in order to meet necessary legal or regulatory requirements." A number of IOR studies identified government pressures as a motivating factor for the formation of voluntary linkages across industry sectors (see Babiak, 2007; Buchko, 1994; Oliver, 1997). Based on these findings, it seems likely that the level of prevalence was higher among public sector partners than the other two sectors, given that the City was mandated to clean the watershed. Consequently, in order to achieve desirable outcomes, necessity considerations would have prompted public sector partners to engage in watershed collaboration with LRN. Another predominant motivational construct discussed among public sector partners was instability motives.

Instability

As reported in table 4.2, the data revealed a striking difference in the level of prevalence between motivations relating to instability in public sector partners and their counterparts in the private and nonprofit sectors. In the case of public sector partners, instability motives played a major role in prompting participants to join LRN. Instability motives appeared to stem from turbulence in the environment. These motives were driven by external pressures from multiple fronts including social, economic, environmental, and regulatory pressures. Participants frequently cited the economic impacts resulting from the collapse of the shell fishing industry, the potential for stricter environmental regulatory frameworks, the deterioration of the quality of the watershed and increasing conflict with constituents. As portrayed by this public administrator:

Crisis might be too strong a word, but I think there was in the '80's through the early to mid-'90's even, and then kind of started steamrolling then, a sense that we were losing ground in the Lynnhaven. A lot of areas were condemned for shell fishing. Water quality was not the greatest, we were losing a lot of wetlands; we were having a lot of erosion problems. We went through massive growth in [the City]. I guess from the late '70's to the early '90's we were the fastest growing city in the country and we were literally building and attracting I think they said at one point, we were having forty or fifty thousand residents a year move [into the City]. So along with that, just massive changes on an environmental scale...at that time, there weren't as many environmental laws and controls in place either...So, I think that, if anything, people realized there is only so much out there and that as a community if we develop it out what are we going to be left with in terms of these public resources and our highest valued real estate is waterfront property. So, if you don't maintain water quality, you don't maintain your shorelines, you don't maintain that ecological productivity, it's going to directly translate into [a] lower tax base and things like that. (Public sector interviewee #4)

A common thread identified from interviewing public administrators and directors was that partnering with LRN was viewed as a strategy that could potentially create some stability through contracting out specialized services/programs needed to enhance the success of new

watershed initiatives. The quotation above demonstrates the multi-dimensional issues facing the City and the turbulence in the environment.

In contrast to public sector partners, instability motives in the other two sectors played a relatively minor role among these participants. Instability considerations voiced by nonprofit and private sector participants centered on issues relating to the watershed and its impact on their organization and/or its members. Of particular concern for these participants were environmental regulations and/or new changes in city ordinances implemented to mitigate watershed impacts from commercial and residential construction. This suggests that the complexities of new and changing environmental regulations at the local and state level created instability motives for a few private and nonprofit partners.

A number of IOR theorists attribute environmental uncertainty as the impetus for collaboration (Gray, 1989; Logsdon, 1991; Wood & Gray, 1991). Instability motives are rooted in resource dependence perspectives and exchange theory perspectives (Aldrich, 1976; Cook, 1977; Logsdon, 1991). Exchange theory posits that organizations/groups will select among a set of alternative options that they expect to receive the most profit or benefit (Ivery, 2008). This result supports proposition 10: The greater the externalities that affect an organization's interests, the greater the level of motivation for an organization to participant in local watershed cross-sector collaboration.

In this setting, public sector organizations appeared to be more affected by greater levels of turbulence and complexities in their domain, than the private and nonprofit sector partners in the study. Hence, it follows that instability considerations would have a greater influence on motivating public sector administrators, managers and directors to engage in

local watershed collaboration with LRN.

Summary of Key Findings

The results of the comparison analysis identified varying levels of prevalence of motivation determinants between organizations in different sectors. The data indicated varying levels of prevalence in eight out of the ten motivational constructs including legitimacy, reciprocity, catalytic actors, necessity, corporate/social consciousness, instability, asymmetry, and efficiency. Of the eight motivational constructs, striking levels of difference in prevalence were identified in legitimacy, reciprocity, necessity and instability motives.

The data analysis revealed that necessity and instability motives were highly prevalent among public sector participants. In contrast, necessity and instability motives were identified as having a low prevalence among private and nonprofit sector participants. The results identified reciprocity as highly prevalent in both the public and nonprofit sectors but having a low prevalence in the private sector. Legitimacy motives were identified as highly prevalent among the private sector organizations. Conversely, the results identified legitimacy motives as having a low prevalence among the public sector organizations. The remaining section of this chapter closes with some thoughts on the results of the research.

Final Thoughts

The preceding discussion illuminates some intriguing findings with respect to the role of motivations in local cross-sector watershed collaboration. The results of the research add

credence to Gray's assertion that motivations to collaborate vary from sector to sector (Gray, 1989). As theorized, certain motivations emerged in the data as more or less significant in watershed collaboration between industry sectors. Likewise, other motivations were identified as homogeneous among industry sectors. The results indicate that organizational interests, corporate/social consciousness, and stability motivational determinants were identified as homogeneous motivational determinants across the three sectors. Motivational determinants relating to organizational interests and corporate/social consciousness were identified as important motivations across the three sectors. On the other hand, stability motives were identified as less significant across the three groups.

Notably, efficiency motives were not identified as a motivational determinant in local watershed collaboration among the private sector partners interviewed for the study. Likewise, reciprocity, instability and necessity motives were identified as less significant motivational determinants among private sector partners. As discussed in this chapter, private sector participants characterized the nature of their strategic alliance with LRN as philanthropic. Given that the nature of philanthropic relationships, efficiency motives would be incompatible as an incentive to engage an organization in local watershed collaboration. Furthermore, the results indicated that private sector participants in the study were not dependent on LRN's resources to achieve their respective mission. Consequently, it seems unlikely that reciprocity, necessity and instability motives would create sufficient incentives for private firms to join local watershed collaboration. Motivational determinants that were identified as more significant among the private sector participants were legitimacy, catalytic actors, and asymmetry.

Important motivational determinants to local watershed collaboration identified in the public sector partners included reciprocity, catalytic actors, necessity, instability, and efficiency. To a large extent, resources scarcity and dependence likely created this combination of incentives to prompt public administrators and directors to partner with LRN. The data revealed that the vast majority of the public sector participants characterized the nature of their strategic alliance with LRN as transactional. Therefore, the role of resources and the mutual dependency between the City and LRN was fundamental to the formation of various strategic alliances created between the City's public agencies and LRN. These findings are in line with both resource dependency and exchange theory perspectives (Aldrich & Pfeffer, 1976; Levine & White, 1961; Yuchtman & Seashore, 1967).

In the case of nonprofit sector organizations, reciprocity, and legitimacy motives were identified as more significant motivational determinants to local watershed collaboration than catalytic actors, necessity, stability, instability, efficiency and asymmetry. Similar to the public sector organizations, resource scarcity and dependency were identified as critical factors that created incentives among the nonprofit partners to establish a partnership with LRN. Unlike the private sector organizations, the results indicate that the majority of the nonprofit sector organizations were more reliant on LRN's resources to achieve their mission than vice versa.

The empirical evidence from the study identified partnerships between organizations and LRN as strategic alliances. The results of the study indicate that organizational motivation orientations in local watershed collaboration are influenced by a number of factors including contextual conditions, the nature of the strategic alliance (e.g., transactional vs. philanthropic),

interdependency, resource scarcity, facilitating knowledge, gaining efficiencies, community ties and the legitimacy of the referent organization. In sum, the results of the research do support the literature on collaboration, interorganizational relationships and watershed management (Brody et al., 2004; Gray, 1989; Logsdon, 1991; Morris et al., 2013; Weber, 2009).

CHAPTER 5:

CONCLUSION

The complexity and pervasiveness of nonpoint source watershed pollution require adaptive and responsive strategies that incorporate regulatory frameworks (Ernst, 2010; Keohler, 2007) along with community stakeholder engagement (Kenney, 1997; Morris et al., 2013). As discussed in chapter two, watersheds are common-pool resources and thereby susceptible to exploitation (Hardin, 1968; Savas, 1987). The inherent nature of watersheds pose unique challenges with regard to managing and protecting these natural resources for society at large and preserving them for future generations.

Cross-sector collaboration offers local watershed stakeholders a holistic approach to address community watershed issues. These collaborative partnerships involve the voluntary engagement of member organizations from different industry sectors directing resources and working together to address local watershed issues of mutual interest (Kenney, 1997; Koontz & Johnson, 2004; Morris et al., 2013). The environmental conditions of watersheds have important implications for the welfare of society. At the local level, the condition of the watershed impacts the quality of life for residents, the prosperity and economic vitality of communities and their future sustainability.

Given the inherent social dilemmas of governing common-pool resources (Hardin, 1968 Ostrom, 2000; Savas, 1987) and the need to incorporate collaborative strategies to protect the condition of watersheds (Margerum, 2008; Wondolleck & Yaffee, 2000), understanding the motivations that drive organizations from different sectors to voluntarily engage in local watershed collaboration has important implications for the efficacy of

watershed protection and restoration endeavors. The remaining sections of this chapter discuss the following: First, a brief summary of the study is provided. This summary is followed by a synopsis of the findings that address each of the research questions. Then, the results of the study are synthesized and emergent themes are discussed. Next, the limitations of the study are re-examined. Following this re-examination, the implications of the research are discussed. Finally, the chapter concludes with presenting some promising avenues for future research.

Summary of Study

The purpose of this exploratory research was to expand our knowledge of local watershed management through cross-sector collaboration. This research focused on exploring the social processes and the motives that drove organizations in different sectors to engage in local watershed collaboration with LRN. Drawn from the literature, a conceptual framework was developed to guide the exploration of the phenomenon under investigation. A single case study research design was utilized to answer the research questions. The research questions sought to explore the motivational incentives that drove public, private and nonprofit organizations to collaborate with a local watershed organization. Furthermore, the researcher sought to discern whether certain motivations were more prevalent between organizations in different sectors. The study employed a case study qualitative research tradition to investigate motivational determinants in local watershed cross-sector collaboration. Interviews were the primary data source used for this case study.

Participants in the study consisted of key informants that represented member organizations collaborating with LRN. The key informants were comprised of an array of executive-level organizational leaders from 10 private sector organizations, 10 public sector organizations, and 9 nonprofit sector organizations. All of the member organizations in the study were local organizations operating within the boundaries of the Lynnhaven River watershed. The following section provides a synopsis of the results that addressed each of the research questions and highlights some key findings.

Summary of Results Addressing the Research Questions

The first research question focused on identifying the organizational motivations that drove member organizations that partnered with LRN to engage in local cross-sector watershed collaboration. The empirical evidence indicated that all of the thematic constructs included in the conceptual framework were identified as motivational determinants for local cross-sector watershed collaboration. These constructs included: asymmetry, catalytic actors, corporate/social consciousness, efficiency, instability, legitimacy, necessity, organizational interests, reciprocity, and stability. As reported in table 4.1 in chapter four of this dissertation, organizational interests were identified as the most commonly cited incentive among participants across the three sectors. Within this construct, four key concepts relating to organizational level interests were identified across the groups: economic, environmental, community and regulatory interests.

All of the participants in the study appeared to share common core values and beliefs that watershed protection and conservation were important to the community. Moreover, the

results revealed that motivations to collaborate with LRN were strategic in nature. Likewise, a vast majority of the participants perceived that the partnership helped advance their organization's mission and objectives in some fashion. Finally, the results revealed three different types of organizational motivation orientations among the organizations that participated in the study: transactional, philanthropic and symbiotic.

The second research question focused on identifying the organizational motivation determinants that influence member organizations from the private sector to participate in local watershed collaboration. The results indicated that asymmetry, catalytic actors, corporate consciousness, instability, legitimacy, necessity, organizational interests, reciprocity, and stability were cited by corporate managers and CEOs as motivational incentives to engage in local watershed collaboration with LRN. The findings revealed that efficiency considerations were not a motivating driver for influencing decision makers in this setting to engage in watershed collaboration.

The data revealed that corporate consciousness, organizational interests, legitimacy, catalytic actors, and asymmetry played a greater role in motivating decision makers to engage in local watershed collaboration. In contrast, the data revealed that incentives relating to necessity, reciprocity, stability and instability played a lesser role in influencing decision makers to engage in local watershed collaboration. Corporate managers routinely characterized the nature of their partnership with LRN as philanthropic. The findings suggest that when the nature of the strategic alliance is philanthropic, motives relating to resource exchanges and cost reductions are less likely to create incentives for corporate partners to engage in watershed collaboration.

The third research question sought to identify the organizational motivations that drive public organizations to collaborate with local watershed groups like LRN. The results of the public sector data sources indicated that asymmetry, catalytic actors, social consciousness, efficiency, instability, stability, legitimacy, necessity, organizational interests, and reciprocity were motivational determinants for public administrators and directors to engage in local watershed collaboration in this setting. Among these participants, organizational interests, reciprocity, necessity, efficiency, and instability were described by decision makers as important motivational determinants in their decision to engage in local watershed collaboration. In comparison, legitimacy, stability, and asymmetry motives were found to play a minor role in local watershed collaboration between public sector organizations and LRN.

A key finding from the analysis of the public sector data sources was that nearly all of the participants in this group characterized the nature of their relationship with LRN as transactional; whereby resource exchanges were typically described in the context of fee for service. Moreover, the results revealed that organizational interactions between the City's public agencies and LRN were more integrated than either the private sector or the nonprofit sector. Public administrators and directors frequently described LRN's involvement serving on various environmental committees with the City. The results suggest that in watershed collaboration, strategic alliances based on transactional relationships are more likely to be driven by efficiency and reciprocity motivational determinants.

The fourth research question focused on identifying the motivational determinants that drive nonprofit organizations to join local watershed groups. Similar to the public sector data sources, asymmetry, catalytic actors, social consciousness, efficiency, instability, stability,

legitimacy, necessity, organizational interests and reciprocity were found to be motivational determinants for nonprofit organizations to engage in local watershed collaboration. The majority of participants in this group described organizational interests, social consciousness, legitimacy, and reciprocity as important motivational determinants in their decision to engage in local watershed collaboration. By and large, the results indicated that asymmetry, efficiency, necessity, catalytic actors, stability and instability motivational determinants played a minor role in influencing decision makers in this group to collaborate with LRN.

Many of the participants in this group characterized their relationship with LRN as symbiotic. Participants frequently conveyed the sentiment that their mission either complimented or aligned with LRN's. A key finding from the data indicated that motivations among these participants were largely driven by mission overlap. In addition, the data revealed that resource exchanges between nonprofit sector participants and LRN largely centered on sharing information and knowledge that benefited each organization (e.g. grants and mitigating red tape). Another key finding revealed from the analysis of the nonprofit data sources was the role of catalytic actors. In comparison to their private and public sector counterparts, the majority of the nonprofit sector participants described learning about LRN through third party sources. Overall, the data indicated that catalytic actors did not play an instrumental role in motivating the majority of the nonprofit sector participants that were interviewed.

The fifth research question focused on identifying whether certain organizational motivations between industry sectors were more prevalent in local watershed collaboration. The empirical evidence identified variations in the level of prevalence in the motivations of

organizations from different sectors partnering with LRN. As summarized in table 4.1 in chapter four, levels of prevalence were categorized as high, medium and low. Striking differences in level of prevalence were found in four motivational constructs including legitimacy, reciprocity, necessity and instability.

Legitimacy motives were found to be highly prevalent among private sector organizations. In comparison, legitimacy motives were found to have a low prevalence among the public sector organizations. Reciprocity motives were found to be highly prevalent in both the public and nonprofit sector organizations; whereas reciprocity motives were identified as having a low prevalence in private sector organizations. The results identified necessity motives as highly prevalent in the public sector but having a low prevalence in the nonprofit sector organizations. Likewise, instability motives were identified in the data as being highly prevalent in the public sector. Conversely, instability motives were identified in the data as having a low prevalence among private and nonprofit counterparts in the study. The results reinforce Gray's assertion that incentives to collaboration vary from sector to sector. Furthermore, the results suggest that the nature of the strategic alliance (transactional, symbiotic or philanthropic) will likely influence the types of incentive structures (primary and secondary) that drive organizations to engage in local watershed collaboration. The next section synthesizes the analysis of the results and discusses the emergent themes found in the data.

Synthesizing the Results to Emergent Themes

The empirical evidence from the study supported all of the thematic constructs included in the organizational motivations framework for local cross-sector watershed collaboration. A synthesis of the results revealed five emergent themes relating to organizational motivations and the social processes that drove organizations from different sectors to engage in local cross-sector watershed collaboration in this setting: *connection to community; catalytic actors, the reputation of the focal organization, strategic alliances and organizational motivation orientations (the why)*. These themes form the theoretical underpinnings that build our understanding of the role of organizational motivations and the social processes that influence the formation of local cross-sector watershed collaboration arrangements. Collectively, the emergent themes suggest that organizational motivations in local cross-sector watershed collaboration are best understood as the manifestations of a dynamic social and environmental ecosystem between the watershed and its impact on the organizations that operate within its boundaries.

Connection to Community

All of the member organizations that were included in the study were located in the Lynnhaven River watershed. Participants frequently described the condition of the watershed as an important part of the vitality of the community and their organization. A common sentiment expressed across all of the participants in the study was their connection to the community. Many of the participants had long-standing ties to the community both personal and professional. The results showed that the condition of the watershed impacted (directly or indirectly) each of the organizations' interests. These organizational interests included

compliance with regulatory statutes, return on long-term capital investments, harvesting oysters, operating in a thriving community that attracts customers and creates a good labor market. In sum, the data showed that the condition of the watershed was salient to each of the organizations and to some degree tied to their success. Cooper et al.'s (2006) research found that institutional salience on environmental issues was a motivating factor for organizations to form strategic alliances. The theme "connection to community" is consistent with the extant literature on collaboration and watershed management (Gray, 1989; Kenney, 1997; Koontz & Johnson, 2004; Morris et al., 2013; Weber, 2009; Wondolleck & Yaffee, 2000).

Catalytic Actors

Consistent with social theory perspectives (Coleman, 1990; Putman, 2000), strong interpersonal connections with community leaders, family ties and professional relationships were identified as an impetus to engage key decision makers in their respective organizations to partner with LRN. The results revealed that the founders of LRN, the CEO of LRN and other influential community leaders reached out to key organizational decision makers in an effort to mobilize resources from critical community stakeholders. To a large extent, catalytic actors were found to play a greater role in motivating private and public sector organizations to collaborate with LRN. The data showed that catalytic actors in this setting were instrumental in identifying and mobilizing key stakeholders in the community to commit critical resources to LRN.

The collaboration literature characterizes catalytic actors as an individual/actor that has the ability to induce legitimate stakeholders to mobilize and coordinate their activities to address a particular problem (Gray, 1989; McNamara et al., 2010). A number of collaboration

scholars identified the importance of conveners in establishing stakeholder buy-in in collaborative enterprises (see Bardach, 1998; Cigler, 1999; McNamara, 2014). Austin (2000, p. 82) emphasizes that "...institutional partnerships are created, nurtured, and extended by people." Austin's research found that "social purpose partnerships" are motivated by emotional connections that individuals make with the social mission and the organizations involved in the partnership. The analysis of the results showed that long-standing interpersonal relationships between catalytic actors and key stakeholders established the necessary social capital to motivate organizational leaders to partner with LRN. This findings affirms proposition 7. Catalytic leaders play a critical role in motivating stakeholders to collaborate in cross-sector watershed collaboration.

The Focal Organization's Reputation

In line with organizational-level perspectives, the analysis of the results identified the focal organization's reputation as an emergent theme in the data. The organizational literature identifies three dimensions of organizational reputation: external stakeholders' collective perceptions about an organization (Barnett et al., 2006); perceptions about organizational efficacy (i.e., successes and failures) (Love & Kraatz, 2009), and the collective assessment of the organization's past performance and/or their future prospects (Fombrun, 1996). The data revealed that participants perceived LRN as having the legitimate authority to organize the watershed collaboration. The results indicate that LRN's reputation influenced perceptions about their legitimate authority to mobilize other organizations to join their efforts to clean the watershed. This empirical evidence provides support for proposition 13. Referent organizations with local ties to the community and are perceived by the community as having

legitimate authority to organize the watershed collaborative, are more likely to generate stakeholder “buy-in” to participate in collaboration.

LRN’s legitimacy was based on a number of factors that were identified in the data including the leadership of the organization (Board members and the CEO), their success in increasing the oyster population in the Lynnhaven River, their involvement at City council meetings and various city environmental committees (i.e. Green Ribbon Committee). A number of participants in both the private and public sector described LRN as a neutral actor that could work across political lines. Moreover, the data showed that participants perceived LRN as being able to balance economic interests (private sector and public sector) with environmental interests (nonprofit and public sector). Several of the nonprofit sector participants underscored that LRN was known for their willingness to share their experiences and knowledge with other environmental groups. In addition, participants frequently affiliated LRN as a “model of success” citing social marketing campaigns (e.g., Scoop the Poop) and public education outreach programs.

Organizational Motivation Orientations

With regard to organizational motivation orientations, the data showed distinctions among motivation orientations across the organizations that participated in the study. For this study, motivation orientations refer to the reasons why a particular organization chose to partner with LRN. A key finding in the study is that certain motivational incentives were more prominent in one sector than the other. For instance, public administrators and department managers described reciprocity motives as having an important influence on their decision to join with LRN. In comparison, the majority of public sector participants stated that

legitimacy motives did not play a role in their decision to partner with LRN. On the other hand, legitimacy motives were frequently cited by private sector participants as a primary incentive; whereas, reciprocity motives were found to play a minor role in influencing the motives of corporate managers. As discussed in detail in chapter four, reciprocity motives were described by public sector participants as primarily transactional; whereby the City contracted out public education outreach services to LRN, thus suggesting that motivational orientations are influenced by the industry sector and the type of the collaborative strategic alliance (transactional vs. philanthropic) formed between the focal organization and their partners.

The empirical evidence from the study supports the two arguments advanced in chapter two: First, motivational orientations and levels (primary vs. secondary) of incentive structures vary across industry sectors; and second, that primary and secondary incentive structures play a role in local cross-sector watershed collaboration. Moreover, the data suggests that in local cross-sector watershed collaboration, organizations operating in the same sector share motivational orientations. Furthermore, there is empirical evidence that indicates the presence of a hierarchy of incentive structures that influence an organization's willingness to participate in local watershed collaboration.

The findings lend credence to Brody and his colleagues' assertions that collaborative ecosystem management requires the "right mix" of incentives to engage stakeholders from different sectors to participate in cross-sector collaboration. Likewise, the results empirically support Gray's (1989) assertion that incentives vary from sector to sector. The concepts that emerge from the study are consistent with the thematic constructs contained in the

organizational motivations framework for cross-sector watershed collaboration. Accordingly, the results fit the collaboration and interorganizational relationships literature. This finding provides support for proposition 1; if contextual factors influence an individual's or group's orientation of motivation, then it follows that the organization's orientation of motivation to join multi-sector watershed collaboration is influenced by their industry class sector.

Strategic Alliance

The analysis of the results also showed that participants described their partnership as a strategic alliance. While participants in the study were found to share common values and beliefs about protecting the environment and the local watershed, motivations to collaborate were guided by organizational interests. As discussed above, the condition of the watershed had important implications to each of the organizations that participated in the study. The majority of the participants conveyed the sentiment that the partnership with LRN helped their organization meet strategic objectives including enhancing their market and service position, access to grants, increasing institutional knowledge, developing new offerings to clients, access to board members and contracting out services, just to name a few.

A number of interorganizational relationships (IOR) studies found that interdependency between organizations is increasing due to resource scarcity and uncertainty in the environment (Emery & Trist, 1965; Logsdon, 1991; Wood & Gray, 1991). Austin's (2000) study on strategic collaboration found that political, social and economic constraints incent organizations in different sectors to collaborate in order to achieve organizational objectives. In his study, Austin found that nonprofit and private sector organizations form strategic collaborations in an effort to create "joint value creation." Specifically, Austin found

that organizations seek to build institutional value through combining core competencies and resources with other organizations. This strategy (joint value creation) was routinely described as a motivating factor by public administrators and department directors interviewed in this research.

In a similar vein, the results showed that motivations to collaboration with LRN were goal-oriented. Participants across all three sectors described various types of goal-oriented strategies when discussing their motives to collaborate with LRN including reducing legacy costs through access to LRN's volunteer pool, opening avenues for potential opportunities, and increasing their organization's reach through serving on LRN's Board of Directors. Further, the results indicated that participants cited complimentary and/or alignment of goals as an incentive to partner with LRN. As one might expect, alignment of goals was frequently cited by garden club and civic league participants. Participants representing these types of organizations commonly described how the condition of the watershed directly impacted their neighborhoods, their member's property values and their quality of life in general.

Consistent with collaboration perspectives, this study found that an organization's motivation to participate in watershed collaboration is influenced by the level of interest that an organization has to solve the problem and the degree of organizational interdependency that an organization perceives to have with other stakeholders to effectively solve the problem (Brensen & Marshall, 2000; Gray, 1989; Logsdon, 1991). In this study, overlapping goals and complimentary missions were repeatedly cited as a primary motivating factor by both public and nonprofit sector participants.

The results showed that resource exchanges between partners in the form of payment of services (i.e., public education) or professional services (i.e., marketing campaign and environmental consulting) were authorized by top-level leaders in the organization. Corporate managers interviewed described that services rendered were through formalized agreements (i.e., MOUs and contracts). It is worth noting that these participants typically described discussing resource exchange agreements with LRN with other executive decision makers in their organization, thus suggesting that motivations were based on the collective interests of the organization rather than purely individual interests.

This finding lends credence to Athanasopoulou and Selsky's (2015) study on corporate social responsibility (CSR). In their study, Athanasopoulou and Selsky identify three levels of interest that influence CSR motivations: individual, organizational and the external social context of the issue. The authors advance the notion of embeddedness of interests as a perspective to understand why organizations engage in social issue causes. The analysis of the results suggest that organizational motivation theories on local watershed cross-sector collaboration need to incorporate a multi-dimensional perspective that includes both individual and organizational interests, and the social context in which they operate. The emergent themes discussed above provide a first step toward building an explanatory theoretical model that augments our understanding of the social processes and the role that organizational motivations played in influencing organizations from different sectors to engage in local watershed collaboration with LRN. The following section highlights the limitations of the study's results.

Limitations of the Study

A number of limitations relating to conducting a case study were addressed in chapter three of this dissertation. A case study was deemed appropriate to address each of the research questions (Yin, 2009). As detailed in chapter three, the nature of the study is exploratory. The research questions focused on identifying the motivations that drove organizations in different sectors to engage in local watershed collaboration with LRN. The purpose of the study was to advance our knowledge of motivational determinants in local cross-sector watershed collaboration. The empirical evidence from this research moves the study of collaboration one step closer toward developing a theoretical model that explain the social processes and the role that organizational motivation orientations play in the formation of local watershed cross-sector collaboration.

Local cross-sector watershed collaboration is a dynamic and complex social phenomenon involving the relationships between organizations and the individuals that manage their activities. In order to gain an in-depth understanding of the social processes and the motivations that drove member organizations to collaborate with LRN, a single case study design was selected to investigate this phenomenon. While the results of the study have important implications to local watershed collaboration there are limitations to the study's findings. These limitations are addressed in this section.

First, the results of the study should not be viewed as a representation of all local cross-sector watershed partnerships. In order to gain an in-depth understanding of the social processes and the motivations that drove organizations in different sectors to engage in local watershed collaboration with LRN, purposeful sampling was used to select the setting and the

participants for the study. The sample of participants that were selected for the study were specifically chosen because of their leadership position in their respective organizations and their institutional knowledge and direct experience involving the decisions that drove their organization to partner with LRN. Further, as discussed in chapter three, time and resource constraints limited the number of informants interviewed for each of the organizations that participated in the study. Consequently, perspectives and responses capture in the primary data sources were subject to issues of representation. In order to mitigate this limitation, secondary data sources were used to support data collected from informants.

As discussed in chapter four, the data revealed that motivations to partner with LRN were influenced by the industry sector of the organization (public, private or nonprofit), its mission and specific organizational strategies and goals. Therefore, the motivations identified in this study are specific to the organizations and the setting in which they operate. Consequently, it is likely that changing the setting and the compositional mix of the organizations may affect the incentive structures that drive local watershed collaboration in other watershed groups. However, the goal of this study was to provide a better understanding of the social processes and the motivations that drove public, private and nonprofit organizations to collaborate in this particular setting. Therefore, the results of the study are replicable to this specific setting.

The second limitation in the study was the constructs used in the conceptual framework. It is entirely plausible that constructs not included in the conceptual framework could have created incentives that drove participants in the study to partner with LRN. In an effort to mitigate this limitation, at the end of each interview, participants were given the

opportunity to identify and discuss other motivations not included in the conceptual framework that played a role in their decision to partner with LRN.

Another potential limitation addressed in the study was confirmability and authenticity of the results. As discussed in chapter three, both confirmability and authenticity address potential threats of trustworthiness in naturalist inquiry (Lincoln & Guba, 1995; Yin, 2009). In order to enhance confirmability and authenticity, triangulation of data sources (interviews, memos, and field/code notes) along with using an independent coder was incorporated in the design of the study. Triangulation mitigated issues of internal validity by utilizing multiple data sources to answer the research questions and identify emergent themes in the data. The remaining two sections in this chapter discuss the implication of the research and directions for future research.

Implications of the Research

This research provides both a practical and theoretical contribution to the field of public administration. From a theoretical perspective, the research builds on the extant literature on collaboration and watershed management by focusing on organizational motivations in watershed collaboration, a concept that has been largely overlooked in these bodies of knowledge. Previous scholarly works on collaboration have advanced our understanding of the conditions, antecedents and processes that encompass collaborative enterprises (see Cigler, 1999; Gray, 1989; Thomson & Perry, 2006). Although collaboration scholarship identifies motivations as important to the formation of self-organized arrangements, empirical studies on local watershed collaboration have not focused attention on fleshing out the

motivational determinants that influence organizations from different sectors to participate in these arrangements. This study takes a first cut at moving towards a theoretical model that explains the organizational-level motivations that are likely to encourage local cross-sector watershed collaboration.

Moreover, this study advances scholarship on collaboration and watershed management by making two contributions. First, the research investigates motivational determinants in multi-sector watershed collaboration from an organizational-level perspective. The extant literature on collaboration does not distinguish between individual and organizational motivation determinants. The empirical evidence from this research revealed that decisions to collaborate with LRN emanated from executive-level managers. The findings indicated that motivations to collaborate with LRN were strategic in nature, based on achieving organizational goals. Therefore, the role of motivations in organizational settings is distinctive from one's personal motivations. By taking an organizational-level perspective, this research fills an important gap in the collaboration and watershed literature.

Secondly, by exploring the motivational determinants that drove organizations from different sectors to engage in local watershed collaboration, the research revealed the importance of organizational dynamics in the formation of collaborative partnerships. An important dynamic that was identified in the study was the implications of the nature of the relationship in local watershed collaboration. The results indicate that the nature of the relationship (transactional vs. philanthropic) is likely to influence the incentives that prompt an organization to participate in local watershed collaboration. As stated above, an assumption that underpins this research is that individuals working for organizations are

motivated to a large extent by organizational interests, rather than purely individual interests. Empirical evidence from this study suggests embedded interests play a role in local watershed collaboration.

From a practical perspective, this research offers a useful framework that can inform policymakers, public managers and watershed groups on the types of motivational determinants that lead to local watershed collaboration. The framework developed for this study can be used as a heuristic tool to help practitioners with the implementation of watershed management plans. Moreover, the results of the research can provide organizations like LRN, a better set of tools to leverage the power of collaboration. For example, a local watershed group seeking to partner with a private firm should understand that the watershed group's reputation and that of their leadership is an important legitimacy motivational determinant. On the other hand, reciprocity and efficiency considerations will be more important incentives to engage public sector partners from government agencies to join a local watershed group. Given that the efficacy of watershed management plans will likely depend on forging strategic alliances across sector boundaries, understanding what motivates organizations to forge these alliances is important to the success and the sustainability of local watershed partnerships. This section closes with some final thoughts as to some promising areas of future research.

Directions for Future Research

The results of the study provide a foundation for future research relating to collaboration, watershed management, and organizational motivations. Future research could

incorporate a multi-case study design in order to test the theoretical model across different local watershed groups in a range of watershed settings. The findings from an expanded study could solidify the theoretical model proposed in this study and create a middle-range theory of organizational motivations in local cross-sector watershed collaboration. Should the findings be representative of organizational motivations in local cross-sector watershed collaboration, future research could then expand the application of the framework to test whether it is generalizable to explain organizational motivation orientations in other environmental collaboration partnerships.

Another promising area of future research could explore how the nature of the good influences the dynamics of collaborative enterprises. In other words, studies could examine how the characteristics of goods (e.g. common-pool goods vs. collective goods) impact the type of collaborative enterprise. Likewise, future studies could explore how the characteristics of goods influence the motivational orientations of organizations to engage in collaboration. Consistent with motivational orientations, future research could delve more closely into whether hierarchies of incentive structures play any role in the formation of multi-sector strategic alliances. In addition, future research could explore the role of organizational motivations and its effect on the life-cycle of collaboration arrangements. As argued earlier in chapter one, the sustainability of collaborative alliances likely depends on keeping stakeholders engaged and motivated to collaborate.

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Appendix A-Constructs, Definitions, Interview Questions, and Data Collection Strategies

Table 3.1 Constructs Definitions, Interview Questions, and Data Collection Strategies

Constructs & Definition	Interview Questions	Data Collection Strategies
1. Necessity -The extent to which internal and external policies, rules and procedures are required for an organization to follow in order to meet its objectives and achieve its mission (Oliver, Determinants of interorganizational relationships: Intergration and future directions, 1990).	1. Is your organization mandated (by government or a parent company) to participate in local environmental groups? 2. Does the local watershed impact your organization's operations? If, so, please describe how the local watershed impacts your organizational operations? 3. Do your organization's operational activities impact the local watershed? If so, please describe what types of organizational activities impact the local watershed? 4. Are any of these activities regulated by local, state, or federal government agencies such as the Environmental Protection Agency and Virginia Department of Environmental Quality (DEQ)?	Semi-structured interview and document review. Probing questions will be used to understand the nature of the relationship. Is it voluntary or mandated? And the role of the watershed on the organization. Organizational web sites will be reviewed to see whether the organization's operations impact the watershed (negative or positive). Government web sites will be reviewed to see if organizational activities are regulated by EPA or DEQ.
2. Stability –The degree of predictability and certainty that is supported by the organization's collaborative arrangements with other organizations, agencies or firms	5. Was part of your decision to join LRN based on enhancing your organization's ability to achieve better relationships with other organizations in the	Semi-structure interviews. Probing questions will be used to explore how the organization's partnership with LRN helps the organizations ability to stabilize their environment (i.e., gain access to information, technical

(Oliver, 1990).	community? If so, please provide some examples.	expertise).
	6. Was part of your decision to join LRN based on strategic management planning? For example, your ability to facilitate other partnerships that could provide access to resources (knowledge, political, technical, human, social capital) that your organization did not possess. If so, please provide some examples of how this partnership has helped your organization with their strategic plans (e.g. future forecasting)?	
3. Instability - The degree of external environmental forces that create unpredictability and uncertainty within the organization's subsystem (Gray, 1989, Wood & Gray, 1991).	7. Were there any external environmental factors (crisis, regulatory changes) that may have aided in your organization's decision to participate in LRN?	Semi-structure interviews and document review. Probing questions will be used to understand the nature of the environmental factors that influenced the organization's decisions to join LRN. Review public documents and governmental web sites to identify the external factors that may be impacting the organization's subsystem.
4. Legitimacy - The extent to which an organization seek to enhances its reputation, image and prestige through the establishment of collaborative arrangements (Oliver, Determinants of interorganizational	8. Has your organization received any publicity (media, newspapers, TV) as a result of your participation in LRN? If so, what type of publicity? 9. What type of	Semi-structure interviews and document reviews. Probing questions will be used to understand if the organization perceives that their involvement with LRN enhances their public image. Check organization's web site to see if they publicize events and activities with

relationships: Intergration and future directions, 1990).	community recognition did you receive for your participation in LRN?	LRN on their web site. Check public records (newspapers and other media sources) to see if organization has received any publicity for their involvement with LRN. How was the organization portrayed in the media?
	10. Was part of your decision to join LRN based on enhancing the organization's reputation, image, and prestige? If so, please provide some examples?	
5. Catalytic Actors- The internal and/or external actors that engage in facilitating stakeholder "buy-in" to participate in collaboration (Gray, 1989; McNamara, 2014; Morris et. al., 2013).	11. How did your organization first learn about LRN? a. Who facilitated the relationship between your organization and LRN? [External Referent organization/Collaborative Entrepreneur] b. If LRN initiated the contact, who was it and how did they get the leadership interested in joining the partnership? [Internal Champion/sponsors] c. If it was someone from inside your organization or outside of LRN, who was that individual and how did they get the leadership interested in joining LRN?	Semi-structure Interview. Probing questions will be used to understand the role of the catalytic actor(s) and their influence on the organization's willingness to joint LRN.
6. Corporate/Social Consciousness- The extent to which an organization's decisions are guided by a sense of duty or obligation to act responsible in order to	12. How does this partnership with LRN fit into the organization's values, culture and ethos? 13. Does your	Semi-structure Interview and document review. Check organizational web site to identify language that speaks to the organization's mission to serve the broader community through

<p>protect the welfare of the community (local or global) (Campion & Palmer, 1996).</p>	<p>organization have environmental stewardship? If so, can you please describe some of these initiatives?</p>	<p>activities that directly seeks to foster relationships with the community and improve the quality of life for community residence.</p>
<p>7. Organizational Interests-The implementation of any strategic plans (i.e., access to funding, increase donations and volunteer pool) that are intended to advance the organization's interests (Olson, 1965; Van de Ven, 1976).</p>	<p>14. Was part of your decision to join LRN based on enhancing your organization's ability to achieve its overall mission/objectives (e.g. increase the organization's resource capacity through sharing resources, circumvent bureaucratic red tape, increase volunteer pool or membership in organization, provide access to government funding)? If so, please explain how.</p>	<p>Semi-structured interviews and document review. Probing questions will be used to understand how the organization perceives collaboration to enhance their ability to meet organizational objectives. Organizational web sites will be reviewed to identify partnership activities, events and venues that have enhanced the organization's interests.</p>
<p>8. Reciprocity-The extent to which an organization perceives that exchanges of resources with another organization will be reciprocated and that the exchange advances mutual interests (Gray, 1989; Oliver, 1990).</p>	<p>15. Does your organization have formal/informal policies that articulate organizational practices directed toward local community involvement? If so, are these initiatives part of your organizations strategic management plans?</p>	<p>Semi-structured interviews and document review. Probing questions will be used to understand what types of organizational resource exchanges and if these changes are formal or informal (i.e., MOU's). Review public documents and organizational web sites to identify organizational practices (formal or informal) that speak to community involvement and building trust with community partners.</p>
<p>9. Efficiency-The extent to which an organization can economize costs through the establishment of collaborative arrangements (Oliver,</p>	<p>16. Was part of your decision to join LRN based on your organization's ability to economize costs to address watershed problems such as funding projects and</p>	<p>Semi-structure interviews. Probing questions will be used to access whether strategies to economize costs through collaboration is part of the organization's strategic planning (formal process).</p>

Determinants of interorganizational relationships: Intergration and future directions, 1990).	reducing legal services?	
10. Asymmetry -The extent to which an organization exerts its power or influence over another organization in order to control resources to achieve their objective (Oliver, 1990; Purdy, 2012).	17. Was part of your decision to join LRN based on your organization's ability to enhance its presence in its industry sector? For example, acquire additional resources such as grants from the government, increase capital, increase membership/donations, or increase your organization's ability to shape watershed policies.	Semi-structure interview. Probing questions will be used to explore in what way does the organization's involvement with LRN helps the organization to have power to or for controlling resources to enhance their competitive edge in their industry. For example, a nonprofit's ability to gain governmental grants.

Appendix B-Interview Protocol Questions

Interview Protocol:

The purpose of this study is to explore the organizational motivations and to identify the social processes that influence organizations from different institutional class sectors (public, private and nonprofit) to participate in cross-sector watershed collaboration.

(General Questions)

- 1-What is your position? How long have you worked in that capacity for this organization?
- 2-How long has your organization partnered with Lynnhaven River NOW (LRN)?
- 3-What types of resources/activities does your organization contribute to LRN?

(Catalytic Actors)

- 4-How did your organization first learn about LRN?
 - a. Who facilitated the relationship between your organization and LRN?
[External Referent organization/Collaborative Entrepreneur]
 - b. If LRN initiated the contact, who was it and how did they get the leadership interested in joining the partnership?
[Internal Champion/sponsors]
 - c. If it was someone from inside your organization or outside of LRN, who was that individual and how did they get the leadership interested in joining LRN?

(Organizational Interests)

5-Was part of your decision to join LRN based on enhancing your organization's ability to achieve its overall mission/objectives (e.g. increase the organization's resource capacity through sharing resources, circumvent bureaucratic red tape, increase volunteer pool or membership in organization, provide access to government funding)? If so, please explain how.

6-Was part of your decision to join LRN based on helping your organization develop/improve its environmental practices? (For example, improved or develop best management practices for watershed protection).

(Necessity)

7-Is your organization mandated (by government or a parent company) to participate in local environmental groups?

8-Does the local watershed impact your organization's operations? If, so, please describe how the local watershed impacts your organizational operations?

9-Do your organization's operational activities impact the local watershed?

- a. If so, please describe what types of organizational activities impact the local watershed?
- b. Are any of these activities regulated by local, state, or federal government agencies such as the Environmental Protection Agency and Virginia Department of Environmental Quality (DEQ)?

(Stability)

10-Was part of your decision to join LRN based on enhancing your organization's ability to achieve better relationships with other organizations in the community? If so, please provide some examples.

- a. Was part of your decision to join LRN based on strategic management planning? For example, your ability to facilitate other partnerships that could provide access to resources (knowledge, political, technical, human, social capital) that your organization did not possess. If so, please provide some examples of how this partnership has helped your organization with their strategic plans (e.g. future forecasting)?

(Instability)

11-Were there any external environmental factors (crisis, regulatory changes) that may have aided in your organization's decision to participate in LRN?

(Efficiency)

12-Was part of your decision to join LRN based on your organization's ability to economize costs to address watershed problems such as funding projects and reducing legal services?

(Reciprocity)

13. Does your organization have formal policies that articulate organizational practices directed toward local community involvement? If so, are these initiatives part of your organizations strategic management plans?

(Corporate/Social Consciousness)

14. How does this partnership with LRN fit into the organization's values, culture and ethos?

15. Does your organization have environmental stewardship initiatives?

- a. If so, can you please describe some of these initiatives?

(Legitimacy)

16-Has your organization received any publicity (media, newspapers, TV) as a result of your participation in LRN?

a. If so, what type of publicity?

b. What type of community recognition did you receive for your participation in LRN?

17-Was part of your decision to join LRN based on enhancing the organization's reputation, image, and prestige? If so, please provide some examples?

(Asymmetry)

18-Was part of your decision to join LRN based on your organization's ability to enhance its presence in its industry sector? For example, acquire additional resources such as grants from the government, increase capital, increase membership/donations, or increase your organization's ability to shape watershed policies.

(Closing Questions/Snowball Sampling)

19-Are there other motivating factors that I have not mentioned that are important for your organization to participate in local cross-sector watershed collaboration like LRN?

20-Is there anything you would like to add that I did not ask you that would be beneficial to this study?

21-Who would you recommend that we contact to further our understanding of motivation incentives that facilitate local cross-sector watershed collaboration?

Appendix C-IRB Human Subjects Approval



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Norfolk, Virginia 23508

Mailing Address
Office of Research
1 Old Dominion University
Norfolk, Virginia 23529
Phone(757) 683-3480
Fax(757) 683-5902

DATE: April 26, 2015

TO: John Morris, PhD

FROM: Old Dominion University Business Human Subjects Review Committee

PROJECT TITLE: [742233-1] Organizational Motivations that Drive Cross-sector Watershed Collaboration

REFERENCE #:

SUBMISSION TYPE: New Project

ACTION: DETERMINATION OF EXEMPT STATUS

DECISION DATE: June 1, 2015

REVIEW CATEGORY: Exemption category # [5.2]

Thank you for your submission of New Project materials for this project. The Old Dominion University Business Human Subjects Review Committee has determined this project is EXEMPT FROM IRB REVIEW according to federal regulations.

We will retain a copy of this correspondence within our records.

If you have any questions, please contact Kenneth Yung at (757) 683-4048 or kyung@odu.edu. Please include your project title and reference number in all correspondence with this committee.

This letter has been electronically signed in accordance with all applicable regulations, and a copy is retained within Old Dominion University Business Human Subjects Review Committee's records.

Appendix D-Recruitment Email

Date

Dear

My name is Luisa Diaz-Kope and I am a PhD candidate at Old Dominion University in the Department of Urban Studies and Public Administration. I am conducting my dissertation research on organizational motivations that drive cross-sector collaboration. More specifically, I am interested in examining the organizational motivations that drive watershed stakeholders operating in different sectors to establish collaborative arrangements with local watershed groups.

You are receiving this email because your organization is affiliated with a local watershed group. I am seeking participants for an in-person interview who are willing to answer questions about their organizational motivations that drive their participation in local watershed groups.

The interview will be approximately 60 minutes. The interview is completely voluntary, and can be stopped at any time. If you are interested in participating in the interview, or if you have questions regarding the study, please reply to this email or to one of the Principal Investigators listed below. Or, if you know of someone else in your organization that might be interested in participating in this interview, please forward this email.

Thank you for your time.

Sincerely,

Responsible Principal Investigator: John C. Morris, Ph.D., jcmorris@odu.edu
Co-Principal Investigator: Luisa Diaz-Kope, Ph.D. candidate, ldiaz002@odu.edu
Department of Urban Studies and Public Administration
Strome College of Business
Old Dominion University
2084 Constant Hall
Norfolk, VA 23529
757-683-3961

Appendix E-Recruitment Telephone

Hello:

My name is Luisa Diaz-Kope, and I am a Ph.D. candidate at Old Dominion University in the Department of Urban Studies and Public Administration. I am conducting my dissertation research on organizational motivations that drive cross-sector collaboration. More specifically, I am interested in examining the organizational motivations that drive watershed stakeholders operating in different sectors to establish collaborative arrangements with local watershed groups.

I am contacting you because your organization is affiliated with a local watershed group. I am seeking participants for a telephone interview who are willing to answer questions about their organizational motivations' that drive their participation in local watershed groups.

The telephone interview will be approximately 60 minutes. The interview is completely voluntary, and can be stopped at any time. If you are interested in participating in the interview, I would be happy to schedule a day and time that is convenient for you to be interviewed. If you have any questions about the study, I would be happy to answer them now.

Thank you for your time.

Below is a list of the Principal Investigators with contact information:

Responsible Principal Investigator: John C. Morris, Ph.D., jcmorris@odu.edu
Co-Principal Investigator: Luisa Diaz-Kope, Ph.D. candidate, ldiaz@odu.edu
Department of Urban Studies and Public Administration
Strome College of Business
Old Dominion University
2084 Constant Hall
Norfolk, VA 23529
757-683-3961

Appendix F-Informed Consent Telephone Interviews

To be read over the phone at the beginning of the interview to obtain verbal consent:

You are being asked to participate in this study because you work, or are associated with, a local watershed group. This research is being conducted by a doctoral student at Old Dominion University, and contact information of the Principal Investigators will be provided at the end of the introduction. The purpose of this study is to examine the organizational motivations that drive local cross-sector watershed collaboration. In these efforts, I am asking if you would be willing to participate in an interview asking you questions about the organization where you work and the organizational motivations that drive your organization to establish collaborative arrangements with local watershed groups.

This research is non-experimental in nature. Your interview will be recorded in a digital audio recorder, and the recording will be transcribed for analysis. Your participation is entirely voluntary, and your name and job title will be kept confidential. By agreeing to participate in this interview, you are consenting to the terms of this research study. You will suffer no penalty if you choose not to participate, and you can end the interview at any time.

If you have any questions about the study, I am happy to answer them now. Also, feel free to contact us in the future regarding this study. Below is a list of the Principal Investigators with contact information:

John C. Morris, Ph.D., jcmorris@odu.edu

Luisa Diaz-Kope, Doctoral Student, ldiaz002@odu.edu

Department of Urban Studies and Public Administration
Strome College of Business
Old Dominion University
2084 Constant Hall
Norfolk, VA 23529
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Appendix G-Informed Consent Document

PROJECT TITLE: Exploring the role of organizational motivations in cross-sector watershed collaboration.

INTRODUCTION

The purpose of this form is to give you information that may affect your decision to participate in the interview. By signing page 2 of this form, you agree to participate in the research study described below, and you agree to the conversation being recorded by a digital audio recording device.

RESEARCHERS

John C. Morris, PhD, Professor, Urban Studies and Public Administration
Luisa M. Diaz-Kope, MPA, Doctoral Student, Co-Project Investigator, Urban Studies and Public Administration

Old Dominion University
Norfolk, VA 23529
757-683-3802
jcmorris@odu.edu, ldiaz002@odu.edu

DESCRIPTION OF RESEARCH STUDY

This study builds on existing collaboration literature in the area of watershed management by exploring the incentives that drive local cross-sector watershed collaboration arrangements. The study introduces a theoretical model to help explain the incentive structures that facilitate the formation of collaborative alliances across sector boundaries. More specifically, the study examines the three focal organizations in Hampton Roads, VA and the incentives that motivate stakeholders operating in different sectors to establish collaborative arrangements with local watershed groups.

This research is non-experimental in nature. Your interview will be recorded in a digital audio format, and the recording will be transcribed for analysis. If you agree to participate, you can expect to engage in a conversation that will last approximately 60-90 minutes.

RISKS AND BENEFITS

RISKS: You may experience some discomfort being audio recorded. And, as with any research, there is some possibility that you may be subject to risks that have not yet been identified. If for any reason you are uncomfortable with the research, you are free to stop the interview at any time.

BENEFITS: There is no direct benefit to you for participating in this study. The main benefit of this study is to expand our understanding of organizational motivations that drive cross-sector watershed collaboration. This understating will better inform policymakers, public managers and watershed stakeholders on the nature and types of organizational motivations that are needed to foster and sustain multi-sector alliances.

COSTS AND PAYMENTS

The researchers are unable to give you any payment for participating in the interview. Your

participation is completely voluntary.

CONFIDENTIALITY

Information shared in the interview may be presented at academic conferences, in academic papers, or in other reports. However, no names or organizational information will be shared. This information will be kept completely confidential. Only the research team will have access to your name and organizational information.

WITHDRAWAL PRIVILEGE

It is OK for you to say NO to participate in the interview. Even if you say YES now, you are free to say NO later, and walk away or withdraw from the interview at any time. Your decision will not affect your relationship with Old Dominion University.

VOLUNTARY CONSENT

By signing this form, you are saying several things. You are saying that you have read this form or have had it read to you, that you are satisfied that you understand this form, the research study, your role in the interview, and the risks and benefits. The researchers should have answered any questions you may have had about the research. If you have any questions later on, then the researchers should be able to answer them. If at any time you feel pressured to participate, or if you have any questions about your rights or this form, then you should call the Office of Research, at 757- 683-3686 or George Maihafer, ODU Institutional Review Board chairperson, at 757-683-4520.

And importantly, by signing below, you are telling the researcher YES, that you agree to participate in this study and the interview. You are also agreeing to have the conversation recorded by a digital audio recording devise. The researcher should give you a copy of this form for your records.

INVESTIGATOR'S STATEMENT I certify that I have explained to this subject the nature and purpose of this research, including benefits, risks, costs, and any experimental procedures. I have described the rights and protections afforded to human subjects and have done nothing to pressure, coerce, or falsely entice this subject into participating. I am aware of my obligations under state and federal laws, and promise compliance. I have answered the subject's questions and have encouraged him/her to ask additional questions at any time during the course of this study. I have witnessed the above signature(s) on this consent form.

Subject's Printed Name & Signature Date

Investigator's Printed Name & Signature Date

Appendix H-Summary Contact Sheet

Interviewee:

Contact Date:

Interviewer:

Interview Date:

1. What were the main issues or themes that stuck out for you in this contact?
2. Anything else that stuck out as salient, interesting, or important in this contact?
3. What discrepancies, if any, did you note in the interviewee's responses?
4. How does this compare to the data collection?
5. Are there any implications of this interview that may inform future data collection for the study?

VITA

NAME OF AUTHOR: Luisa M. Diaz-Kope

PLACE OF BIRTH: Havana, Cuba

DEGREES AWARDED:

Doctor of Philosophy of Public Policy and Administration, 2016,
Old Dominion University
Master of Public Administration, 2011, Old Dominion University
Bachelors of Business Administration, 2008, Old Dominion University

AWARDS AND HONORS:

Pi Alpha Alpha, National Honors Society for Public Affairs and Administration, National Association of Schools of Public Affairs and Administration, 2010
Beta Gamma Sigma, International Honors Society for the Association to Advance Collegiate Schools of Business, 2008
Cum Laude, Old Dominion University, 2008

PUBLISHED REFERRED JOURNAL ARTICLES AND BOOK CHAPTERS

Diaz-Kope, L; Miller-Stevens, K; Morris, J.C. (2015). Collaboration processes and institutional structures: Reexamining the black box. *International Journal of Public Administration*, DOI: 10.1080/01900692.2014.949755.

Diaz-Kope, L; Miller-Stevens, K. (2015). Rethinking a typology of watershed partnerships: A governance perspective. *Public Works Management & Policy*, 20(1), 29-48.

Diaz-Kope, L., Lombard, J.R., Miller-Stevens, K. (2013). A shift in federal policy regulating the automobile industry: Policy brokers and the ACF. *Politics and Policy*, 41(4), 563-587

Miller-Stevens, K; Henley, T; Diaz-Kope, L. (2015). A new model of collaboration federalism from a governance perspective. In J.C. Morris & Miller-Stevens (Eds.) *Advancing collaboration theory: Models, typologies, and evidence*. London, UK: Routledge Publishing.