Energy as a Factor for Turkish - Russian Rapprochement

Saltuk Bugra Karahan

Old Dominion University, skara007@odu.edu

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.odu.edu/gpis_etds

Part of the International and Area Studies Commons, and the International Relations Commons

Recommended Citation

Karahan, Saltuk B.. "Energy as a Factor for Turkish - Russian Rapprochement" (2015). Doctor of Philosophy (PhD), Dissertation, International Studies, Old Dominion University, DOI: 10.25777/v56e-r481
https://digitalcommons.odu.edu/gpis_etds/5

This Dissertation is brought to you for free and open access by the Graduate Program in International Studies at ODU Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Graduate Program in International Studies Theses & Dissertations by an authorized administrator of ODU Digital Commons. For more information, please contact digitalcommons@odu.edu.
ENERGY AS A FACTOR FOR TURKISH-RUSSIAN
RAPPROCHEMENT

by

Saltuk Buğra Karahan
B.S., August 1995, Turkish Army Academy
M.S., September 2000, Naval Postgraduate School

A Dissertation Submitted to the Faculty of
Old Dominion University in Partial Fulfillment of the
Requirements for the Degree of

DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY
INTERNATIONAL STUDIES

OLD DOMINION UNIVERSITY
December 2015

Approved by:

Steve A. Yetiv (Director)

Austin Jersild (Member)

Frances Hassencahl (Member)
ABSTRACT

ENERGY AS A FACTOR FOR TURKISH-RUSSIAN RAPPROCHEMENT

Saltuk Buğra Karahan
Old Dominion University, 2015
Director: Steve A. Yetiv

This dissertation started with a simple question: What was the main source of Turkish-Russian rapprochement seen generally after the end of the Cold War, specifically within the last 15 years (2001-2015)? A review of the literature on the subject revealed three explanations for Turkish-Russian rapprochement: (1) Perception of the U.S. as a threat in the Black Sea and Caucasus region, (2) Deterioration of Turkey’s relations with the West, and (3) Turkey’s need for energy. Thus came the main question for this work: To what extent does Turkey’s need for energy play a role in Turkish-Russian rapprochement? Although each of the explanations are analyzed in detail as variables in this study, the focus is on energy, primarily from a Turkish foreign policy perspective.

Once the variables were explored with their respective influence in Turkish-Russian relations, they were further tested on the foreign policy choices of Turkey in two specific regions of interest for Turkey: the Middle East and the South Caucasus. In the case studies, with the consideration that each country’s specific conditions played a role in its relations with Turkey, energy was found to be a significant factor. The findings from the case studies further supported the role of energy beyond any other factor in the making of Turkish foreign policy, and thus also support the main argument that Turkey’s need for energy has served as the main factor for Turkish-Russian rapprochement.
This thesis is dedicated to my father Faruk Karahan.
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

Firstly, I would like to express my sincere gratitude to my advisor Dr. Steve A. Yetiv for the continuous support of my Ph.D. study and related research, for his patience, motivation, and immense knowledge. His guidance helped me in all the time of research and writing of this thesis. I could not have imagined having a better advisor and mentor for my Ph.D. study.

Besides my advisor, I would like to thank the rest of my thesis committee: Dr. Austin Jersild and Dr. Fran Hassencahl for their insightful comments and encouragement, but also for the valuable questions which motivated me to widen my research from various perspectives.

My sincere thanks also goes to Dr. Karp, Dr. Serfaty and Dr. Earnest whom I had the chance to meet in GPIS, and who enlightened and broadened my view and thought process on global affairs during my time in Old Dominion University.

I thank my fellow PhD students who helped me throughout this dissertation with various forms of help from the discussions in determining and refining my topic to the final editing phase. In particular, I am grateful to my fellow Turkish friends in GPIS for enlightening me the first glance of research, for supporting me in my time in Afghanistan and for the support in the finalization of this dissertation.

Last but not the least, I would like to thank my family (my parents, my wife, my daughter, my brother, my sister and their families) and all my friends for supporting me spiritually throughout writing this dissertation and my life in general.
TABLE OF CONTENTS

LIST OF TABLES ........................................................................................................................................... ix

LIST OF FIGURES ........................................................................................................................................... x

Chapter

I. INTRODUCTION ............................................................................................................................................. 1
   BACKGROUND OF RELATIONS .......................................................................................................................... 1
   TURKEY’S EVOLVING FOREIGN POLICY AFTER THE COLD WAR ......................................................... 3
   TURKISH–RUSSIAN RELATIONS IN THE POST COLD WAR SETTING ...................................................... 5
   HISTORY AND NATURE OF RAPPROCHEMENT BETWEEN RUSSIA AND TURKEY ............................... 6
   METHODOLOGY .............................................................................................................................................. 8
   THREE VARIABLES FOR RAPPROCHEMENT .............................................................................................. 12
   LITERATURE REVIEW: HOW THIS DISSERTATION WILL CONTRIBUTE ...................................................... 21

II. TURKISH–RUSSIAN RAPPROCHEMENT ..................................................................................................... 26
   HISTORICAL BACKGROUND OF TURKISH–RUSSIAN RELATIONS .......................................................... 26
   APPROACH TO DIRECTLY OR INDIRECTLY RELATED POLITICAL ISSUES .............................................. 27
   HIGH LEVEL BUREAUCRATIC DIALOGUE ................................................................................................. 34
   AREAS OF ECONOMIC COOPERATION: TURKISH–RUSSIAN RAPPROCHEMENT IN ECONOMICS .......... 37
   A GENERAL ASSESSMENT OF THE AREAS OF ECONOMIC COOPERATION ........................................... 43
   THE INDICATORS OF TURKISH–RUSSIAN RELATIONS IN TURKISH MEDIA ........................................ 48

III. LITERATURE REVIEW AND THREE VARIABLES FOR RAPPROCHEMENT ............................................. 49
   THREE EXPLANATIONS FOR RAPPROCHEMENT ....................................................................................... 49
   EXPLANATION 1: U.S. AS A THREAT IN THE REGION ................................................................................. 49
   EXPLANATION 2: TURKEY’S DETERIORATING RELATIONS WITH THE WEST (U.S. AND THE EU) .......... 54
   EXPLANATION 3: TURKEY’S NEED FOR ENERGY ...................................................................................... 59

IV. DETERIORATION OF TURKEY’S RELATIONS WITH THE WEST ................................................................. 63
   CONSTRUCTIVIST THEORY ............................................................................................................................ 64
V. COMMON PERCEPTION OF THE U.S. AS A THREAT IN THE CAUCASUS AND THE BLACK SEA REGION .......................................................... 85
   THE REALIST ARGUMENT .................................................................. 85
   STEPHEN WALT AND BALANCE OF THREAT ................................... 87
   A BRIEF HISTORY OF THE BALANCE OF POWER IN THE REGION .... 88
   INDICATORS OF POST COLD WAR THREAT PERCEPTION ............. 89
   COLOR REVOLUTIONS AND THE THREAT PERCEPTION IN THE CAUCASUS .................................................................................. 91
   THREAT PERCEPTION IN THE BLACK SEA AND RESPONSES TO THE U.S. INVOLVEMENT IN THE BLACK SEA REGION ................ 91
   RESPONSES TO THE INVASION OF IRAQ ...................................... 93
   OVERALL THREAT PERCEPTION AS AN EXPLANATION .................. 94

VI. TURKEY’S INCREASING NEED FOR ENERGY .................................. 96
   LIBERALISM AS A MAINSTREAM THEORY IN INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS .......................................................... 96
   TURKEY’S ENERGY OUTLOOK ....................................................... 98
   TURKEY’S PIPELINE POLITICS .................................................... 109
   TURKISH ECONOMY AND TURKEY’S NEED FOR ENERGY BETWEEN 2000 AND 2010 .......................................................... 110
   EXTERNAL FACTORS RELATING TO ENERGY ................................. 114
   RUSSIA’S ENERGY POLICY ......................................................... 115
   OVERALL ASSESSMENT OF ENERGY AS A FACTOR OF RAPPROCHEMENT .......................................................... 118

VII. TWO CASES: TURKISH FOREIGN POLICY IN THE MIDDLE EAST AND THE SOUTH CAUCASUS ...................................................... 120
   REVISITING THE THREE VARIABLES FOR THE CASE STUDIES ...... 122
   FIRST CASE: TURKISH FOREIGN POLICY IN THE MIDDLE EAST ..... 124
   SECOND CASE: TURKISH FOREIGN POLICY IN THE SOUTH CAUCASUS .................................................................................. 141

VIII. ANALYSIS AND CONCLUSION ...................................................... 161
   TURKEY’S ECONOMY BEFORE AND AFTER RAPPROCHEMENT ...... 162
TURKEY’S ENERGY CONSUMPTION BEFORE AND AFTER RAPPROCHEMENT ................................................................. 162
TURKEY’S RELATIONS WITH THE WEST BEFORE AND AFTER RAPPROCHEMENT ........................................................................ 162
AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY IN THE BLACK SEA AND THE CAUCASUS BEFORE AND AFTER RAPPROCHEMENT ......................... 163
AMERICAN IMAGE IN TURKEY BEFORE AND AFTER RAPPROCHEMENT ........................................................................... 163
EVOLUTION OF TURKISH FOREIGN POLICY IN THE MIDDLE EAST 165
EVOLUTION OF TURKISH FOREIGN POLICY IN THE SOUTH CAUCASUS .................................................................................... 166
CONCLUSION .................................................................................................................................................. 167
REFERENCES .................................................................................................................................................. 169
APPENDIX A .................................................................................................................................................. 178
VITA ................................................................................................................................................................. 191
LIST OF TABLES

Table                                                                 Page
1. Oil Reserves in Turkey ........................................................................... 18
2. Natural Gas Reserves in Turkey ................................................................. 19
3. Turkey's Bilateral Trade with Russia ......................................................... 38
4. Issues Related to Russia in Turkish Media ................................................. 48
5. Energy Imports in Turkey and Europe ....................................................... 111
6. Trade Volume Between Turkey and Iraq between 2003 and 2010 .............. 130
7. Turkey-Iran Trade Relations .................................................................... 134
8. Turkey-Syria Trade Relations ................................................................... 138
9. Turkey-Armenia Trade Relations ............................................................... 146
10. Turkey-Azerbaijan Trade Relations ......................................................... 149
11. Turkey-Georgia Trade Relations .............................................................. 153
# LIST OF FIGURES

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Figure</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. Turkey's Crude Oil Supply Mix</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Turkey's Natural Gas Supply Mix</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Turkish Export to Russia</td>
<td>39</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. Turkish Import from Russia</td>
<td>39</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. Share of Imports in Turkey in 2004</td>
<td>78</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6. Share of Imports in Turkey in 2013</td>
<td>78</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8. Industrial Production Index in Turkey</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9. Turkey's Oil Consumption and Production between 1999 and 2009</td>
<td>102</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10. Turkey's Natural Gas Production and Consumption from 2009 to 2009</td>
<td>103</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11. Natural Gas Production between 1999 and 2008 (million cubic meters)</td>
<td>104</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12. Syria, flows of petroleum and other liquids, 2003-2012</td>
<td>140</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13. View of the U.S. in Turkey</td>
<td>164</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14. View of Russia in Turkey</td>
<td>165</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION

After the Cold War, global relations transformed the world. This is certainly true of relations between two of the most important countries in the world: Turkey and Russia. They have experienced a major rapprochement, especially since the beginning of the new millennium, which has impacted regional and global politics. This warming of relations has been reflected in mutual high-level official visits, the expansion of cooperation in several areas, and an overall increase in the political dialogue.

This study explores the nature of rapprochement between Turkey and Russia from 2000 to 2014 and attempts to determine to what extent Turkey’s energy need serves as an explanation for this rapprochement. Three possible explanations are determined as the sources (variables) of rapprochement: (1) Deterioration of Turkey’s relations with the West, (2) Common perception of the U.S as a threat to the regional powers in Caucasia and the Black Sea, and (3) Turkey’s rising need for energy. Although the rapprochement process has been initiated by both sides (Russia and Turkey), the focus in this study is on Turkish foreign policy.

Background of Relations

It is useful to understand the background of Russian-Turkish relations in order to comprehend the central thrust of this dissertation. The end of the Cold War and the redefining of world politics significantly influenced specific parts of the world. Throughout the Cold War, the Soviet Union and Turkey shared borders and both
maintained global political influence. Russia, the heir to the Soviet Union, had to redefine its foreign policy and adapt to the new environment. Although Turkey was not one of the two main actors in the Cold War, it was a prominent ally for the other actor, the U.S., and survived the Cold War era as a frontline state for NATO. Naturally, the end of the war brought significant changes to the foreign policies of these two states. Russia, lacking the glorious days of the past, had to reorient its foreign policy after a collapse, and Turkey, not as much needed with respect to Russia (yet still seen as a strategic ally for other security problems and the problems in the Middle East) had to reconsider its political and economic assets and foreign policy options in this new era.

Turkey lost its unique position as an indispensable Western ally against Russian power. However, in addition to its connection to the Middle East, its proximity to important energy sources created new opportunities. Within this new setting, Turkey increased its relations with most of its formerly unfriendly neighbors, and initiated a number of agreements with regional powers. The most significant among these relations was rapprochement with Russia, which happened to be an unchanging rival and enemy even centuries before the start of the Cold War. The decade following the collapse of the Soviet Union was not particularly significant in terms of rapprochement. Following a decade-long hesitation and negligence period, the rapprochement process took hold with the new millennium. Since the end of 2000, Turkey and Russia have approached each other in several issue areas, and the foundation laid in the last decade seems to have a promising influence for the coming years.
Turkey’s Evolving Foreign Policy after the Cold War

Turkey had a stable foreign policy during the Cold War. The period offered fairly limited options for Turkey’s foreign policy choices. Instead of working on a delicate balance as in the early years of the Republic, Turkey had a rather simple choice: to align itself with the West against a possible Soviet aggression or dominance. Throughout the Cold War years, Turkey took critical steps by becoming a founding member of the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) (1948); a member of the Council of Europe (1949); a member of NATO (1952); and an associate member of European Economic Community (EEC) (1963), in order to integrate itself with the West. The end of the Cold War opened a new era for Turkish foreign policy, and within the last two decades we have seen signs of this change.

Turkey was seen as one of the “most immediately affected states” in this new environment.¹ It was expected that with its connection to the newly liberated Turkic peoples, the geopolitical force of Turkey would be much greater than in the past. Turkey was expected to become a role model in the region. Especially with its “economic enterprise and the aid that it could provide in the region,” such a role was seen appropriate for Turkey.² Thus, Turkey’s foreign policy, which was affected by the East-West conflict for decades, had new determinants and a new orientation.³

By the end of the 1990s, this change was even more significant and was referred

³ Yasemin Çelik, *Contemporary Turkish Foreign Policy* (Greenwood Publishing Group, 1999).
to as “new activism,” with a status between “daring and caution.” By the time these assessments were made, the policies were still in line with most Western (American and European) policies. It was still in many respects a limited, Western-oriented independence and activism. The Iraq War in 2003 changed the magnitude of this sphere of independence. The aftermath of the war, in which the U.S. encountered several objections from its European allies to its foreign policy choices in the region, served as an environment for the practice of a significantly more independent foreign policy.

In this new environment, Turkey’s more independent foreign policy activism was met with caution in the Western world. At the end of the first decade of the millennium, some commentators started questioning Turkey’s Western orientation. The new policies were seen as too ambitious and sometimes dangerous for Turkey. The practice of this rather daring foreign policy requires a strong economy and Turkey seems to be well aware of the importance of energy for such a strong economy. Taking these necessities into account, the new approach in Turkish foreign policy was more obvious in Turkey’s relations with Russia. The almost non-existent relations between Turkey and the Soviet Union were replaced by the tremendously increasing Turkish–Russian relations within a decade after the collapse of the Soviet Union and its replacement by Russia.

---

5 Malik Mufti, Daring and caution in Turkish strategic culture: republic at sea (Palgrave Macmillan, 2009).
Turkish–Russian Relations in the Post Cold War Setting

The Russian and Ottoman Empires have fought along their borders in Caucasus and Balkans for centuries. One of these two empires has taken its place in the pages of history by opening a new era for a young republic. Modern Turkey, with its post–imperial nation-state status, looked for a peaceful existence in the early stages of the republic. In the early years of the republic, a friendly neighbor in the northeast was Soviet Russia, soon to become the Soviet Union. In a sense, the Soviet Union was the continuation of the last existing empire, and survived almost until the end of the twentieth century. The friendly relations within the brief early period of the Turkish Republic were frozen throughout the Cold War years when Turkey was forced to take a side in the war, and found refuge in the West, especially after the aggressive demands of Stalin’s Soviet Union.

The end of the Cold War ushered in a new environment for both Turkey and Russia, in which the three key variables of this study gained much greater meaning. While it might be possible to consider the end of the Cold War as a variable, it makes more sense to examine the more specific variables that it helped shape. The end of the Cold War and the consequent opportunity for a more independent foreign policy definitely was the major variable that changed relationships. However, this study focuses on more specific variables in order to weigh their importance while acknowledging that none of these variables would be possible in a Cold War environment where Turkey’s

---

9 Mustafa Aydin, "The Determinants of Turkish Foreign Policy, and Turkey's European Vocation," The Review of International Affairs 3, no. 2 (2003). p. 318 Aydin notes that, “Ataturk’s foreign policy was clearly an extension of his domestic policies. He realized that a peaceful foreign policy was needed in order to achieve his far-reaching reforms inside Turkey.”
foreign policy was strictly tied to its allies, specifically the U.S. Thus, this study scrutinizes the specific variables within the broader environment that made these variables possible.

In the post Cold War setting, Russia abandoned its formerly ambitious and hostile policy in search of prestige as well as friendly powers in the region. Turkey, with its new, relatively independent foreign policy, saw this new setting as an opportunity for developing relations with its long-time rival. Although the first years after the collapse of the Soviet Union were spent in instability and caution, the transition period was replaced with mutual agreements beginning in 2000. In September 2000, then Turkish Prime Minister Ismail Cem and Russian Minister of Foreign Affairs Igor Ivanov came together in the U.N. General Assembly in New York. During the conversation, the two ministers discussed the relations between their respective countries and areas of bilateral cooperation were discussed in more detail.\(^{10}\) A visit by the chairman of the Russian government to Ankara took place a month later. Since then, the relations between the two states have developed in several issue areas from tourism, to trade, to energy. Furthermore, a convergence in foreign policies of the two states is also evident.

**History and Nature of Rapprochement Between Russia and Turkey**

The starting point for the process that created the deepening of political dialogue between the two states is seen in the Eurasia Action Plan of 2001 between then-foreign

\(^{10}\) Further information about this conversation can be found in the Russian Federation’s website of Ankara Embassy. (http://www.turkey.mid.ru/hron/34.html)
ministers Ismail Cem and Igor Ivanov. Within the same year, Cem and Ivanov met several times, an agreement on the establishment of Blackseafor Task Force was signed, and the construction of Russia-Turkey Blue Stream Gas Pipeline saw significant progress. Since then, the cooperation between Turkey and Russia was improved in a broad range of issues, including energy, trade, tourism, and defense. The year 2005 was seen as the most significant with respect to the rapprochement. In Kiniklioglu’s words, it was an “annus mirabilis” from a bilateral political perspective. As he notes, within that year,

President Putin and Prime Minister Erdoğan met four times, including a seven-hour private meeting on the Black Sea. Putin’s visit in December 2004 marked a monumental event in itself, as he was the first Russian head of state to visit Turkey in 32 years. The visit was crowned by the signing of a Joint Declaration on the “Deepening of Friendship and Multidimensional Partnership” between Turkey and the Russian Federation. The declaration refers to a wide range of common interests and specifically accentuates the increasing confidence and trust established between the sides in recent years; calls for the diversification of actors in the quest of deepening the relationship and notes that both countries are Eurasian powers which value security and stability.  

---

12 Ibid.
Methodology

This study attempts to evaluate the influence of three variables that are hypothesized to have triggered the rapprochement process. Namely, these variables are (1) Deterioration of Turkey’s relations with the West, (2) Common perception of the U.S. as a threat in the Caucasus and the Black Sea, and (3) Turkey’s increasing need for energy (the development in the Turkish economy and Turkish aspirations for an energy hub status).

This study will examine the rapprochement between Russia and Turkey in two cases identified below, the Middle East and the South Caucasus. To do so, this work will examine the following indicators of rapprochement: the number of high-level official visits between Russia and Turkey, the increase in the number of agreements made, and the increase in political dialogue (mutual discussion of the regional/international issues and an increase in bilateral relations) within the fourteen-year timeframe.

This study makes use of prominent Turkish newspapers (mostly Hurriyet, Milliyet and Sabah newspapers) in addition to the information obtained from the Turkish Foreign Ministry, the Turkish Ministry of Energy and Natural Resources, and Turkish Statistics Institution. The frequency and the content of the Russian-related news in the newspapers within the fourteen-year timeframe provide insight into the nature of rapprochement and the factors behind it. The information obtained from the government sources depicts the development of rapprochement and the explanatory power of Turkey’s energy need within the period. In addition to these sources, information obtained from the embassies of both countries is used for an overall understanding of the relations between Turkey and Russia.
a. Structured-Focused comparison method is used for the case studies. As explained by George and Bennett, this method is “structured” such that the researcher writes general questions that reflect the research objective and these questions are asked of each case under study to guide and standardize data collection, thereby making systematic comparison and accumulation of the findings of the cases possible. The method is “focused” in that it deals only with certain aspects of the historical cases examined.\textsuperscript{13} Thus, this study seeks answers to the questions about the influence of each variable in the cases to be examined. And the focus is on the influence of these variables on the rapprochement.

This research asks the following questions:

(1) Is there a significant change in Turkey’s need for energy within the last 10 years?

(2) Is there a significant change in Turkey’s political relations with the West?

(3) Is there a significant change in the perception of the U.S.? (Is it perceived as a threat in the region by Russia and Turkey?)

(4) What is the causality mechanism behind each change and the rapprochement?

(5) How did each variable affect Turkish foreign policy in the Middle East? Is there a similar connection between any of the variables and Turkish foreign policy in the Middle East? (Did the need for energy, changing threat

\textsuperscript{13} Alexander L George and Andrew Bennett, \textit{Case studies and theory development in the social sciences} (Mit Press, 2005).
perceptions, or a disappointment in the relations with the West affect Turkey’s foreign policy in the Middle East?)

(6) How did each variable affect Turkish foreign policy in the Caspian region? Likewise, did any of these (the need for energy, changing threat perceptions or a disappointment in the relations with the West) affect Turkey’s foreign policy in the Middle East?

This method allows us to concentrate on the most similar sample regions where we can test our focus area (rapprochement) by employing several variables (need for energy, deterioration of relations with the West and perception of the U.S. as a threat) instead of relying on a single historical case.

b. The two cases to evaluate these variables are the Middle East and the South Caucasus. These are the regions that both Turkey and Russia are interested in and consider to be within their influence area. Turkish foreign policy changes in these two regions will help us understand the explanatory power of the variables. Each case will be analyzed with the perspective of “how the relations in this case would develop with each variable and how it actually did” and this analysis will bring us back to the explanatory power of that specific variable in Turkish-Russian rapprochement.

c. The three explanations for rapprochement have been determined with the literature review on the subject. Although there was not a consensus on the main explanation for rapprochement, there was a concentration on these three variables of rapprochement. This study analyzes each of them as well as their respective theoretical backgrounds with their explanatory power. A number of
indicators will be used to understand their respective influences.

(1) The indicators for Turkey’s need for energy are: A change in Turkey’s GDP, a change in the amount of Turkey’s imported oil and natural gas, a change in the amount of oil and natural gas transported via Turkey, and a change in the global price of oil and of imported natural gas.

(2) The indicators for deterioration of Turkey’s political relations with the West are EU reports on the accession process of Turkey; political statements by high-level Turkish government officials; the number of president/prime minister visits from Turkey to European nations and to the U.S, and vice versa; and opinion polls about the EU and the U.S.

(3) The indicators for the Russo-Turkish perception of the U.S. as a threat in the region are Russian and Turkish government responses to the invasion of Iraq, responses to the color revolutions in the Caucasus and Central Asia, the responses to the U.S. attempts to get actively involved in the Black Sea, and political statements against the U.S.

d. This study is completed with onsite research in Turkey.

While each variable will be analyzed with its explanatory power, it would be unrealistic to argue that there is a single dimension behind rapprochement. For that reason, even if a variable seems to have a relatively weak explanation, its influence is also studied in depth. Although both sides of the coin (Russian and Turkish perspectives) are analyzed, the focus is on the change in Turkish foreign policy towards Russia.

Since studies of Turkish–Russian relations typically point to the rapprochement as having begun in the early 2000s, I focused on the period from 2000 to today. Thus, the
comparison between the years 2000 and 2014 will explain the increased level of rapprochement. Despite the consequences of the end of the Cold War, and Russia’s rise as a new state that started almost a decade earlier, the first 10 years were ones of hesitation for Russia’s foreign policy orientation. A comparison and analysis of the journeys of each of the foreign policies of the two countries will provide a better understanding of the nature of rapprochement between these two countries.

**Three Variables for Rapprochement**

*First Variable: Deterioration of Turkey’s Relations with the West*

One variable that might have triggered the rapprochement is the change in Turkey’s political relations with the West in this period. Although the deterioration was not reflected in economic relations, the political discourse of the governments and high-level officials revealed a suspicion against the U.S and the EU. The relations with the West were mostly affected by the EU accession process (with respect to EU) and the 2003 Iraq War (with respect to the U.S.).

Turkey has embraced EU membership as a major foreign policy goal. This goal has been in line with the century-long Westernization project of Turkey. Turkey found itself quite close to this goal when the EU agreed to open accession negotiations with Turkey at its summit in Brussels in December 2004. However, these early hopes were replaced by frustration. In 2005, the Constitutional Treaty was rejected by France and the Netherlands; this was a strong indicator of the public opinion against enlargement of the EU. Furthermore, others like Bulgaria and Romania were accepted soon after, in 2007,
giving the impression that even if there would be an enlargement it could hardly involve Turkey. The situation was expressed in a RAND report with the following statement,

The deterioration of relations with the United States and Europe has not only reinforced a growing sense of nationalism but also sparked a search for new options. Some parts of the AKP [Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi (Justice and Development Party)] have begun to look to the Middle East as a means of compensating for weakening relations with the West, while others have suggested that Turkey should look more to Russia. Some have also advocated a “Eurasian option,” which would exploit Turkey’s economic and cultural ties with the former Soviet republics of Central Asia.

Similarly, a CSIS report sees “enlargement fatigue and concerns about Turkey’s political and social direction” as the source of leadership and public reluctance for further negotiations.14 The overall European approach certainly created a frustration on the Turkish front as well. The accession of Cyprus to the EU in May 2004 also added to the complication of the relations. As noted by Açıkmeşe and Triantaphyllou, this change in the structure of the EU complicated EU–NATO relations as well.15 All these factors caused a rise in frustration towards the EU. Even the support for EU membership has declined in Turkey. In 2004, 73 percent of the Turkish population supported EU membership; in 2006, that portion dropped to 54 percent.16

This variable by no means suggests that Turkey’s associations with the West would be replaced by the Eastern actors like Russia and China. As, Turkey’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs declares in its website, Turkey still considers the West as the only focus

14 Final Report of the CSIS U.S.-Turkey Strategic Initiative, March 2009
in its political and economic goals and. Within this period, still, most of the trade was with Europe, and all governments in this period had embraced the EU membership as a major foreign policy goal. However, it depicts the need Turkey felt to reassess its relations with the West and to diversify its foreign policy. In some cases this resulted in better relations with the Middle East and in some cases it meant more trade with Russia, China and Iran.

Within this period, the EU was not the only entity with which relations deteriorated. Relations with a more permanent ally, the U.S., were also in decline. Following the terrorist acts in the U.S. on September 11, 2001, Turkey (like many other members of the international community) offered full support for America’s war on terror. However, as America’s war on terrorism extended to its immediate neighborhood with a questioned legitimacy, relations began to deteriorate with the U.S. as well. The first sign was the rejection of the authorization of the use of Turkish facilities for Operation Iraqi Freedom on March 1, 2003. Later, the arrest of Turkish Special Forces personnel in Iraq increased the feelings of disappointment. The political tension between the two countries was seen in public opinion as well. According to a poll in July 2005, some 50 percent of the respondents in Turkey held “absolute negative view” of the U.S. The long-lasting PKK terror in Turkey also played a role in the deterioration of relations. The perception of a U.S reluctance to act against PKK inside Iraq was seen as offensive by many Turks. It also implied a double standard in the “war on terror.”

18 "Turkish Public Opinion about the USA and Americans,” ARI Movement, sponsored by Koç Holding, July 5, 2005 (www.ari.org.tr)
Second Variable: Common Perception of the U.S. as a Threat in Caucasia and the Black Sea

Another variable that might have triggered the rapprochement is the common perception of the U.S. as a threat in the Black Sea and Caucasus region. For sometimes converging and sometimes diverging reasons, both Turkey and Russia distanced themselves from the U.S. involvement in the Black Sea and Caucasus region. The American activity in Black Sea and Caucasia were seen as dangerous by Russia and Turkey. In particular, after the Iraq War and the resulting chaos in Iraq, Turkey and Russia got more anxious about the developments in this region.

Russian attitudes were a product of their desire to maintain their dominant power in the region. This was reinforced with the post Cold War humiliation and a resulting fear of a U.S. and European penetration of the region. Hill and Taşpinar argue that with this concern about its regional and global position, Russia “pursued the creation of its own single economic space in Eurasia focused on major regional trading partners like Ukraine and Kazakhstan.” Already having lost several former satellites to organizations like the EU and NATO, Russia worried about losing its influence in the immediate neighborhood. Even the situation with territorial conflicts in the Caucasus region was preferable to Russia over a long-term settlement that could bring further uncertainties.

The U.S. policy for color revolutions brought regime change in Georgia in 2003, in Ukraine in December 2004, and in Kyrgyzstan in March 2005; all these were also

---

21 Hill and Taspinar, “Russia and Turkey in the Caucasus: Moving Together to Preserve the Status Quo”, ifri Research Programme Russia/NIS, January 2006
observed with concern by Russia and Turkey. Likewise, neither Russia nor Turkey was enthusiastic about the membership of Ukraine and Georgia to NATO. Russia did not want to lose its sphere of influence and Turkey preferred a slower pace.

Similarly, following the chaos in Iraq after the 2003 Iraq War, the Black Sea turned into another region of paranoia. The U.S. involvement in the Black Sea was seen as a possible intervention to Russian and Turkish seas, and was met with caution. Due to this perception, the United States’ request for an observer status in the Black Sea Economic Cooperation (BSEC) was not accepted by Russia, and Turkey did not make any effort toward its acceptance.

Russian fear concentrating on the threat to its current interests in the Black Sea and Caucasus region and Turkish fear concentrating on a possible instability within the region (possibly created by the U.S. democratization agenda) caused emergence of a strong will on both sides to preserve the current status quo in the Caucasus and the Black Sea.

*Third Variable: Turkey’s Increasing Need for Energy (Developing Turkish Economy and Turkish Aspirations for an Energy Hub Status)*

The development in the Turkish economy has increased the need for energy. Furthermore, Turkey has aspirations to become a regional energy hub by using the merits of its geographic location. So, Turkey needs Russian oil and natural gas not just for its own use, but also as a means of gaining status through its trade.

Energy has always played a role in foreign policy. The weight of energy in

---

foreign policy has changed according to the states and regions. While Russia has been criticized for using energy as a weapon in its relations, the U.S. was criticized for not integrating energy and foreign policy. Kalicki and Goldwyn summarize the issue in Energy and Security: Introduction: The Need to Integrate Energy and Foreign Policy.

Foreign energy producers—particularly those in the Arabian Gulf and increasingly Russia—have been able to integrate their energy development policies more effectively with their own economic and foreign policy interests. Saudi Arabia has long traded oil for U.S. military protection and for bearance on its domestic policies. China has used the power of its enormous market to trade oil for arms and to access supply where U.S. sanctions have banned U.S. companies from operating.23

As a developing economy, Turkish economy is in need of energy and almost totally dependent on outside energy sources in terms of oil and gas. Turkey lacks the strategic stocks for oil and gas (Tables 1 and 2 show the oil and natural gas resources in Turkey) and—in terms of natural gas—is mostly dependent on two sources, which have proved unreliable in earlier events: Russia and Iran. Despite the lack of its own energy sources, Turkey has the advantage of its geographical location (Graphs 1 and 2 show the crude oil and natural gas supply mix for Turkey). Turkey is located in close proximity to 72 percent of the world’s proven gas and 73 percent of oil reserves, in particular those in the Middle East and the South Caucasus.24

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Company</th>
<th>Oil in Reservoir</th>
<th>Productive Oil</th>
<th>Cumulative Production</th>
<th>Remaining Productive Oil</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Barrels</td>
<td>M.Tons</td>
<td>Barrels</td>
<td>M.Tons</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N.V. Turkso Perenco</td>
<td>1,345,640,319</td>
<td>183,864,387</td>
<td>356,491,160</td>
<td>48,585,519</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Petroleum E.M.I. &amp; Deochester</td>
<td>539,000,000</td>
<td>73,087,198</td>
<td>94,000,000</td>
<td>12,748,190</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Madison Oil Turkey Inc. &amp; TPAO</td>
<td>49,611,000</td>
<td>6,967,004</td>
<td>16,300,000</td>
<td>2,509,940</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N.V. Turkso Perenco &amp; TPAO</td>
<td>57,604,000</td>
<td>7,911,591</td>
<td>18,206,892</td>
<td>2,401,352</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ersan &amp; Aladdin &amp; Trans Med.</td>
<td>39,000,000</td>
<td>6,156,710</td>
<td>5,850,000</td>
<td>923,505</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ersan &amp; Aladdin M.E.</td>
<td>18,200,000</td>
<td>2,419,747</td>
<td>3,200,000</td>
<td>425,450</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Aladdi &amp; Madison (Turkey) Inc.</td>
<td>24,200,000</td>
<td>3,601,190</td>
<td>6,087,880</td>
<td>900,085</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Aladdin &amp; Trans Med.</td>
<td>2,600,719</td>
<td>362,267</td>
<td>530,719</td>
<td>73,933</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>적이 &amp; TPAU</td>
<td>111,948</td>
<td>13,148</td>
<td>11/948</td>
<td>13,148</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other</td>
<td>57,402</td>
<td>7,851</td>
<td>57,402</td>
<td>7,851</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>6,561,674,985</td>
<td>961,736,042</td>
<td>1,156,164,917</td>
<td>185,352,222</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: World Energy Council25
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Company</th>
<th>Gas in Reservoir⁴</th>
<th>Producible Gas</th>
<th>Cumulative Production</th>
<th>Remaining Producible Gas</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>TPAO</td>
<td>12 193 402 178</td>
<td>6 076 062 178</td>
<td>6 470 410 922</td>
<td>2 208 243 256</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N.V. Türkso Perenco</td>
<td>4 654 328 807</td>
<td>3 258 023 101</td>
<td>141 739 829</td>
<td>3 116 283 272</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Amity Oil Int &amp; TPAO</td>
<td>1 198 000 000</td>
<td>895 200 000</td>
<td>544 717 620</td>
<td>380 482 360</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Thrace Basin</td>
<td>49 741 653</td>
<td>49 741 653</td>
<td>49 741 653</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Thrace Basin &amp; Pinnacle</td>
<td>142 000 000</td>
<td>85 300 000</td>
<td>14 366 990</td>
<td>70 933 010</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Thrace Basin Nat.Gas</td>
<td>1 207 000 000</td>
<td>784 660 000</td>
<td>530 328 824</td>
<td>246 221 176</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Toreador &amp; TPAO</td>
<td>1 253 800 000</td>
<td>1 003 000 000</td>
<td>7 760 313 038</td>
<td>6 995 163 094</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Total: 20 698 330 038      14 755 476 932      7 760 313 038      6 995 163 094

Source: World Energy Council²⁶
Turkey’s new independent foreign policy requires a delicate balance, and energy
is a significant component of this balance. There are three pillars of energy relations between Turkey and energy exporting countries. The first pillar is the consumer–producer relationship between Turkey and these countries. The second is Turkey’s role as a transit country for the energy from these countries to other consumers. And, the third pillar is the global market’s pressure on the nature of energy relations. Each of these pillars has a specific effect on the level of cooperation between Turkey and energy exporting countries.

Furthermore, in addition to its role as an energy consumer, Turkey has the geographic location advantage of being close to 70 percent of the world’s oil and gas resources. As a result, an energy hub status is embraced by Turkey and the desire is to become a bridge between the major producers in the Caspian Sea basin and the Middle East regions and the major consumers in Europe.

**Literature Review: How This Dissertation Will Contribute**

There is not a rich literature specifically on the rapprochement between Russia and Turkey. However, there has been a wider spectrum of work on the changes in the foreign policies of the two countries since the Cold War. The literature about the recent rapprochement between Turkey and Russia looks into the same picture with different perspectives. The general imperatives for the rapprochement are accepted by most scholars, but the weight they attribute to each of these explanations differs. Hill and Taşpınar listed a number of factors for rapprochement including economic ties in energy

---

27 http://www.eia.gov/countries/cab.cfm?fips=tu

28 http://www.eia.gov/countries/cab.cfm?fips=tu
and other areas of trade as well as “removing several bones of contention” in the security area between the two states.\textsuperscript{29}

The results of the 2003 Iraq war and the relations between Europe and these two states led the rapprochement to be described as “the axis of the excluded” by the same scholars.\textsuperscript{30} While pragmatism and a sense of being excluded is mentioned by some, a change toward an ambitious foreign policy for the two states has also been seen as a factor of rapprochement. Laurelle concentrated on Eurasianism and its acceptance by certain circles in Turkey. She emphasizes the growth of nationalist and anti-Western movements in both Russian and Turkish political circles.\textsuperscript{31} According to her, Eurasianism is “a very relevant example of a prolonged ‘post-imperial trauma’ that both Turkey and Russia have due to their historically geographical and cultural dilemma vis-à-vis the West.”\textsuperscript{32} Kiniklioglu, on the other hand, emphasizes that the modest start of the relations in trade has evolved with the energy dimension and spread to several areas, while the external factors brought the political and strategic dimension.\textsuperscript{33} He adds that this is still a defensive rapprochement in nature.\textsuperscript{34} Rzayev sees the similarity in geopolitical situations as a source of rapprochement. Russia’s disappointment in being excluded from the European security architecture and the perception of threat from EU and NATO

\textsuperscript{29} Hill and Taspinar, “Russia and Turkey in the Caucasus: Moving together to preserve the Status Quo?”, IRFI, 2006
\textsuperscript{30} Taspinar and Hill, “Turkey and Russia, Axis of the Excluded”, Survival Vol.48 No. 1, Spring 2006
\textsuperscript{33} Kiniklioglu, Suat (2006) The Anatomy of Turkish-Russian Relations, March (Ankara: German Marshall Fund of the United States)
\textsuperscript{34} Kiniklioglu, Suat (2006) The Anatomy of Turkish-Russian Relations, March (Ankara: German Marshall Fund of the United States)
enlargement coincided with Turkey’s disappointment in EU accession talks and
deterioration of ties with the United States especially after the invasion of Iraq in 2003.  

While the literature on Turkish-Russian rapprochement is limited, a number of
authors have written about the change in the foreign policies. Among these, Belopolsky has examined the Russian alignment with China, Iran, and Iraq and used four different theories for the explanation of these alignments. Her explanations included Alliance Theory/Balance of Power, social constructivism, economic neo-liberalism, and governmental politics.

Brenda Shaffer has written about the pipeline politics of Turkey, and indicated her concern about the lack of a strategic plan and little integration of energy issues into Turkey’s overall foreign and security policies. Her interest in energy security brought the energy perspective into the scene.

Turkey’s new position after the Cold War, and the importance of energy relations between Russia and Turkey, have been popular subjects for the think tanks. However, the issue has not been as vigorously discussed in the academic arena. Two of the studies by CSIS and RAND analyzed the post Cold War change in Turkish foreign policy. Similarly, a conference, held by the Brookings Institution, analyzed the relationship

---

35 Rzayev, The Sources of Russia’s Rapprochement with Turkey, Postgraduate Studies in International Politics (Europe, Conflict Resolution and Peacebuilding), Universite Libre de Bruxelles in Azerbaijan in the World ADA Biweekly Newsletter, Vol. 2, No. 23, December 1, 2009
36 Belopolsky, Russia and the Challengers, : Russian Alignment with China, Iran and Iraq in the Unipolar Era, St Antony’s, 2009
38 Final Report of the CSIS U.S.-Turkey Strategic Initiative, March 2009
39 Larrabee and Lesser, Turkish Foreign Policy in an age of Uncertainty, RAND, 2003
between Turkey, Russia and Regional Energy Strategies emphasized the importance of energy in relations and was discussed by academics in an audience of business people as well as diplomats.

Energy security has gained increasing academic attraction within the last decade. However, the main focus was on the great power politics and its relationship with energy. This study looks into the issue from a middle-power perspective. Especially in the uni-polar and multi-polar environments following the Cold War, energy’s integration with foreign policy was not analyzed in depth. This study will contribute to our understanding of the effects of energy on foreign policy of the middle powers and the flexibility it provides in a multi-polar security environment.

There is little in literature about the post Cold War rapprochement between Russia and Turkey. Certainly, this dissertation will not be the only work on the rapprochement between Turkey and Russia. However, with its more comprehensive nature, it brings an in-depth analytical approach for determining which explanation is the best and why it is so. The contribution of this work will be on comparing the explanations and analyzing:

- The weight/importance of Turkey’s energy need in the post Cold War security environment.
- Changing contours of Turkish foreign policy towards Russia after the Cold War.
- Explanatory power of energy need in middle-power relations in the post Cold War setting.
- Turkish foreign policy in the two other regions of direct Turkish interest: the Middle East and the South Caucasus.
- Turkish-Russian rapprochement in a wider timeframe than specific policy
changes at certain moments.

Several scholars who have written about this rapprochement have emphasized different importance levels for these main explanations. However, their respective influences have not been studied with an analytical approach by looking into how they were influential in other cases of foreign policy. This study looks into two regions of interest for Turkey and attempts to evaluate the variables of rapprochement by testing them in these two regions. Thus, the cases to be used as a test are the foreign policy choices of Turkey in the Middle East and the South Caucasus. Turkey has direct relationships in these two regions and this study seeks to determine whether these explanations are valid in the changing contours of foreign policies in these two regions. Each variable/source of rapprochement is examined with its relative influence in the foreign policies in these two regions, and a conclusion about the main variable for Turkish–Russian rapprochement is derived from the result of these evaluations.
CHAPTER II
TURKISH - RUSSIAN RAPPROCHEMENT

Historical Background of Turkish-Russian Relations

The neighborhood and early official encounter of the Turkish and Russian states goes back to 1475 when Ottomans conquered the Genoese fortress of Caffa and became neighbors to the Muscovite Princes.¹ Since then, the more than 500 years of history has moments of cooperation as well as of severe confrontation. While some consider this history as developing on the basis of “mutual distrust fed by fear,”² some are inclined to consider the total 50 years of war as a negligible part of the Turko-Russian relations.

In fact, since 1568, there have been 13 wars between the two, not to mention the long Cold War. There was geographical, cultural, and economic rivalry between the two states throughout centuries. This rivalry and its resulting confrontation have been supported by negative perceptions that passed from generations to generations.³ However, there were brief periods of rapprochement interspersed throughout the confrontation. Imanov lists three periods of rapprochement before the collapse of the Soviet Union: First rapprochement between 1798 – 1805, second rapprochement between 1833 – 1838 and the third rapprochement between 1920 – 1935.⁴ The third period of

---

¹ Giray Saynur Bozkurt, ed. Türkiye - Rusya İlişkileri: Tarihi Rekabetten Çok Boyutlu İşbirliğine, 1 ed., Türkiye'nin Değişen Dış Politikası (İstanbul: Nobel Yayın, 2010).
³ Duygu Bazoğlu Sezer, "Turkish–Russian relations: The challenges of reconciling geopolitical competition with economic partnership," Turkish Studies 1, no. 1 (2000).
⁴ Vügar Imanov, ed. Türk - Rus İlişkilerinde Yakınlaştırma Dönemleri, 1 ed., Türkiye'nin Değişen Dış Politikası (İstanbul: Nobel Yayın, 2010), 726. Imanov argues that the common characteristics of these rapprochement periods are the facts that they came as an alliance against a military
rapprochement emerged following the collapse of the Soviet Union. After the first decade of hesitation following the collapse, the relationships already established in terms of shuttle trade and cultural/tourist visits were made more concrete by the officials of both countries.\(^5\) This chapter aims to analyze the nature of this last rapprochement between the two states under five main subtitles: approach to directly or indirectly related political issues, bureaucratic level dialogue represented in working groups or high-level official visits, areas of economic cooperation, military dialogue, and cultural dialogue.

**Approach to Directly or Indirectly Related Political Issues**

There have been a significant number of political issues in which both states were directly involved. Some were more fragile for one and less for the other like Chechnya for Russia and Cyprus for Turkey. The Iraq War was also important for its related international political dispute. Within the common neighborhood of the two states, the relations with Georgia and Armenia attracted significant attention as well.

**Chechnya**

A concurrence–if not a convergence–was experienced in the approach to the Chechnya problem. In the early uncertainty period of the post-Cold War era, both Turkey and Russia accused each other of supporting separatist movements within their states.\(^6\)


\(^6\) R. Olson, "The Kurdish Question and Chechnya: Turkish and Russian Foreign Policies since the Gulf War", *Middle East Policy* 4, no. 3 (1996): 106.
Several Caucasian diasporas living in Turkey had an important lobbying effect on the Turkish foreign policy relating to Chechnya. However, Turkey came to realize that the ethnic conflicts in the Caucasus could have ramifications within Turkey and create instability in the broader region. So, despite the lobbying pressure of several Caucasian diasporas within Turkey, a growing apprehension was observed in Turkish foreign policy towards Chechnya. Although, in 2001, a hostage crisis caused some tension in relations between the two states, Turkey made some positive steps toward good will to help Russia in this problem. The expulsion of B.Z. Arslangereyev (a person claimed to be a Chechen terrorist by Russia) from Turkey, the banning of the entry of leaders of terrorist formations operating in Chechnya, and the talks between the CHODs of the two states on this issue were all signs of this new attitude.

*Cyprus*

As the change in the Turkish attitude toward Russia’s Chechnya problem, Russia’s approach to the Cyprus problem also moved into a friendlier zone within the last decade. Cyprus has been one of the most important problems of Turkish foreign policy.

---

In 1960, a partnership state between Turkish and Greek Cypriots was established in accordance with the international agreements signed by the Turkish, Greek and British governments, and the Turkish and Greek Cypriots. Following the disagreements and problems between the two partners in the island and an annexation attempt of the island to Greece, Turkey intervened and moved its troops to the island in 1974. Consequently, Turkish Cypriots set up their own republic, while continuing the search for reconciliation.¹¹

Since then, there has been a continuous stalemate in the island, and due to its cultural roots with Greek Cypriots and economic relations with the southern part of Cyprus, Russia is seen as favoring the Greek side of the conflict. Turkey experienced a Cyprus Missile Crisis when the Greek Cypriot Administration made a deal with Russia to buy some S-300 surface to air missiles in early 1997 and when there were talks on buying more T-80 Russian tanks.¹² Although Russia was not seen as one of the sides of the crisis this event had a deteriorating effect on relations. Likewise, intensification of Turkey’s relations with Israel caused worries in Russia with regard to its overall Middle East policies.¹³ Thus, due to some economic, political and cultural reasons, Russian policies were mostly in favor of the Greek side in the Cyprus conflict.

However, Russian approaches to the Cyprus issue have become more neutral in the last ten years, or, in some cases, have changed to favor the Turkish side. This has been recorded as the first divergence from the Cyprus policy in 31 years.¹⁴ As a

---

¹¹ TC Dışişleri Bakanlığı (Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs), "Cyprus Issue (Summary)," http://www.mfa.gov.tr/cyprus-issue_summary_en.mfa.
¹³ Sezer, "Turkish-Russian relations: The challenges of reconciling geopolitical competition with economic partnership," 61.
¹⁴ Ş. Kantarcı, Kibris laboratuvarı (Aktüel, 2005).
consequence of this change, in addition to the several consultations held between Turkey and Russia before the 2005 referenda on the island, Russia later made statements to lift isolation on Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus (TRNC) and emphasized unfair isolation as well.\(^\text{15}\)

**Iraq War**

Another case where a similarity was observed in the foreign policy choices of the two states was their approach to the 2003 Iraq War. Both Turkey and Russia had supported the U.S. War on Terrorism, and the war in Afghanistan after 9/11. However, their support wavered when it came to the WMD arguments and invasion of Iraq in 2003. Kremlin cooperated in the war in Afghanistan in terms of neglecting its earlier objections to the U.S. presence in the region, arming the Northern alliance and even sharing intelligence.\(^\text{16}\) However, this stance did not last long, and after a covert period in which France and Germany mainly objected to the invasion of Iraq, Russia sharply voiced its objection as well.\(^\text{17}\) Furthermore, there was sharp criticism from Putin, who called the invasion “a direct violation of international law, and a major political blunder” and added that "Russia was seeking to stop military action as soon as possible."\(^\text{18}\) Several objectives were sought in Russian policy before, during, and after the Iraq War. These included the


\(^{17}\) R.O. Freedman, "Russian Policy Towards the Middle East Under Putin: The Impact of 9/11 and The War in Iraq," *Alternatives: Turkish Journal of International Relations* 2, no. 2 (2003).

assertion of Russia as an important global actor, the protection of positive U.S.–Russian relations after 9/11, and, most importantly, the protection of economic interests.¹⁹ Although this might seem natural for a longtime U.S. rival, interestingly, Turkish foreign response to the Iraq war was another surprise for the U.S. government. Turkey, a long time ally, also had supported the war in Afghanistan. As a secular country with a substantial Muslim population, Turkey was seen as a role model for many, and quickly assumed a high-profile role in the war in Afghanistan.²⁰ When the International Security Assistance Force was established in Afghanistan, the second commander of the Force was a Turkish General.²¹ However, like Russia, Turkey’s approach to the Iraq War was not sympathetic. To America’s surprise, Turkish parliament rejected the motion presented by the AKP government to make Turkish territory available for a northern front. Some referred to this as the power of the parliament since the decision was made despite the cabinet.²² Some attributed the rejection to the “realpolitik security considerations to counter-balance Iran and the U.S.” as well as political motivations of the ruling Justice and Development party.²³ And, some explained the situation with “the impact of identity politics and historical narratives on perceptions of interests.”²⁴ Whatever the underlying cause, Turkey and Russia were once more finding themselves on the same ground in

¹⁹ G. Golan, "Russia and the Iraq War: was Putin's policy a failure?," Communist and Post-Communist Studies 37, no. 4 (2004).
²⁰ Washington Report on Middle East Affairs; May2002, Vol. 21 Issue 4, p54
²³ T. Oguzlu, "Turkey and Europeanization of Foreign Policy?," Political Science Quarterly 125, no. 4 (2010): 658.
another international issue.

_Caucasus_

Although there was not a direct convergence of approaches in the Caucasus politics of the two states, the relative lack of turbulence in the region in terms of conflicting interests was another sign of the rapprochement. Historically, in Caucasus there was a clash of Turkish and Russian interests. In the South Caucasus, there was a particularly unfriendly border. Among the three states of the region, Armenia was mostly in the same bloc with Iran and Russia, while Georgia and Azerbaijan were on the Western-oriented Turkish side. The conflict between Armenia and Azerbaijan was the long-lasting problem of the region. Furthermore, in 2008, Russia’s war with Georgia became another source of tension.

However, despite the vast differences between Russia and Turkey, the relationship between the two states was not drastically affected by the tensions in the region. Caucasus became an area of contact and cooperation for Turkey, Russia and the U.S. following years of rivalry.²⁵ There were even signs of new Turkish activism in the region that seemed to have jeopardized the U.S. interest in the South Caucasus. Turkey’s efforts to mend fences with Armenia and the regional initiative of Caucasus Platform for Cooperation and Stability that Turkey started were indicators of changing policies in the region.²⁶ The Turkish efforts for normalizing relations with Armenia even caused

troubles with Azerbaijan. From a political, legal, and social perspective it would be hard to consider the Caucasus as an integrated region. From a political perspective, the North Caucasus is part of the Russian Federation; the southern part of Caucasus is formed of northern provinces of Iran and Turkey and Azerbaijan; and Armenia and Georgia have been independent republics since the end of the Cold War. Among these states, Armenia has always had significant support from Russia, while Azerbaijan and Georgia were oriented to the West. Naturally, with the effect of a long Soviet period, these two states were fragile to domestic conflicts and their minorities have enjoyed the support and protection of Russia.

Within the last 10 years, a change in the Turkish diplomacy was deeply felt in its relations with Armenia. President Gül’s visit to Yerevan for a soccer game, for example, showed that the earlier slow diplomacy in the region was improving. However, this attempt did not last long, due primarily to domestic reasons and sensitivity of relations with Azerbaijan. From an interest-focused perspective, within this period, Russia’s policy—considered to be based more on realpolitik—had the tendency towards “subtle balancing” and successfully caused the deterioration of Turkey’s relations with Azerbaijan and the West. This resulted in the leaning of Azerbaijan and Armenia more to Russia.

30 I. Torbakov, "Russia and Turkish-Armenian Normalization: Competing Interests in the South Caucasus," *Insight Turkey* 12, no. 2.
High Level Bureaucratic Dialogue

Parallel to the change in approaches to political issues, there has been a significant increase in the size and number of bureaucratic-level dialogue between the two states. This dialogue has been represented in cooperative work of the officials as well as the mutual visits from foreign ministers, prime ministers, and presidents of the two countries.

In September 2000, the year Russia’s Exports Capabilities-2000 was held in Istanbul, the two ministers of Foreign Affairs met in the 55th session of the UN General Assembly and discussed a broad range of issues from the situation in the Persian Gulf to the Palestinian–Israeli dialogue, the situation in Afghanistan, and the state of affairs in Cyprus.

In the next meeting of the two ministers, the bilateral issues were discussed in more detail, and at the close of the meeting, the ministers signed a Plan of Action to Develop Cooperation Between the Russian Federation and the Republic of Turkey. With this document a new mechanism of consultation was created—the High Level Joint Working Group, made up of the representatives of the ministers of foreign affairs. For the first time in a Russian–Turkish document, the fields of dialogue and cooperation were set forth extensively. The consultations between the two countries covered many aspects of the international agenda, and the Russian Minister of Foreign Affairs, Igor Ivanov, expressed the similarities of the views at a press conference following the signing of the

---

32 Transcript of Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation Igor Ivanov’s Remarks at Press Conference Following the Signing of a Russian – Turkish document. (New York, November 16, 2001)
He stated that, “The two countries agreed to cooperate actively in the Eurasian area, including with a view to assisting the political resolution of conflict situations, reinforcement of stability and the certain conditions for sustainable development in the region.”

Within this context, the high level joint working group (HLJWG) meetings were held in 2003, 2004, and 2005. In 2003, a Turkish delegate met with Russian Minister of Foreign Affairs Ivanov and Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs, Alexander Saltanov, in Moscow. In this meeting, issues about mutual cooperation and issues concerning the Middle East, specifically Iraq, were considered. The Eurasian interests of both states and the struggle against international terrorism were the other two issues on the agenda of this first meeting.

Consequently, another significant joint working group was held in Ankara in 2004. In this fifth meeting, which took place December 5-6, 2004, the representatives of the foreign ministries of the two countries exchanged views on topical questions of Russian-Turkish relations as well as on a number of major international problems affecting the interests of Russia and Turkey. These included the situation in the South Caucasus, Central Asia, Iran and Afghanistan, and issues of cooperation in the Black Sea region and of Middle East and Cyprus settlement. In the course of this HLJWG meeting, prospects for the further development of Russian-Turkish relations in the political, economic and other fields were examined. The sides also discussed some pressing regional and international problems, among them Middle East settlement and the

33 ibid.
34 Embassy of the Russian Federation in Turkey, "Russian-Turkish High-Level Joint Working Group Meets in Regular Session "  http://www.turkey.mid.ru/text_t76.html.
situation in Iraq, conditions in the Black Sea region, the South Caucasus and Central Asia, and Cyprus settlement.35

There were also visits from the foreign ministers of both countries within this period. Some of the meetings took place as visits and some happened as lengthy meetings in an international setting. As part of this dialogue, Russian Minister of Foreign Affairs Sergei Lavrov visited Turkey in 2006. During this visit, several Turkish newspapers, including Sabah, Milliyet, and Hürriyet, published interviews with Lavrov. In 2007, more consultation was held between the foreign ministers. Another visit from Lavrov took place in 2008, which was followed by a visit from Turkish Foreign Minister Ahmet Davutoğlu’s to Russia in 2009.

Finally, at a higher level, sometimes even in a personalized way, dialogue could be observed at the president or prime minister level visits made by both countries. In July 2005, Turkish Prime Minister Erdoğan and Russian president Putin met in Sochi, Russia. In the Fall of the same year, Putin was in Samsun, Turkey for the opening ceremony of Blue Stream Gas Pipeline. In June 2006, Putin and Turkish President Ahmet Necdet Sezer met in Moscow.36 The dialogue in 2006 continued as new presidents took office. Russian president Medvedev and Turkish president Abdullah Gül met in Astana, Kazakhstan in 2008. Another significant event indicative of this high-level dialogue was the teleconference held among Putin, Erdoğan and Berlusconi in 2009.

All the indicators of high-level bureaucratic dialogue were signs of

---

rapprochement between Russia and Turkey. The bureaucratic approaches were very often accompanied by substantial economic relations, which were sometimes reinforced by these official visits. The next section of this chapter will focus on the economic aspect of Turkish–Russian rapprochement.

**Areas of Economic Cooperation: Turkish–Russian Rapprochement in Economics**

Very often, Turkish—Russian rapprochement was reflected in the economic relations between the two countries. The economic relations were observed in a number of differing areas. In this section, I will touch upon four main areas of economic cooperation: trade, energy, construction, and tourism. In each of these areas, a significant increase in the relations between the two countries was observed.

**Trade**

Trade was the first significant form of relationship between Turkey and post Cold War Russia. The earliest form of trade between the two countries was the shuttle trade that started right after the collapse of the Soviet Union. Over time, registered trade replaced this form of trade. Once the shuttle trade came under control, it was easier to check and the amount of trade between the two countries has shown a significant increase in recent years. From the second half of the 1980s and throughout the 1990s, the trade was also reinforced due to the complementary character of the Turkish and Russian

*Shuttle trade is a term used for a Russian economic practice in which traders shuttle backwards and forwards across the country buying goods from cheap sources, major port cities, or outside Russia, and selling them in the Russian interior.*
Turkish exports to the Russian Federation were mostly composed of manufactured goods such as textiles, chemicals, food, and vehicles. On the other hand, Russian exports were mostly raw materials such as oil, natural gas, and metals. This difference in the nature of exported goods caused high elasticity of the Turkish exports and has been disadvantageous for Turkey.

The trade imbalance between the two has shown fluctuation throughout the years especially in times of economic crises. The 1.5-billion-dollar volume of trade between Turkey and the Russian Federation in 1993 increased to 4.2 billion dollars in 1997. Within this period, the trade revenues of Turkey and the Russian Federation were relatively equal. After the 1998 economic crisis in the Russian Federation, the amount of Turkish exports to the Russian Federation declined sharply—34.4 percent in 1998 and 56.3 percent in 1999.

Table 3: Turkey's Bilateral Trade with Russia

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Years</th>
<th>Export</th>
<th>Import</th>
<th>Balance</th>
<th>Volume</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2007</td>
<td>4,7</td>
<td>23,5</td>
<td>-18,7</td>
<td>28,2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2008</td>
<td>6,4</td>
<td>31,3</td>
<td>-24,8</td>
<td>37,7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2009</td>
<td>3,2</td>
<td>19,7</td>
<td>-16,5</td>
<td>22,9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2010</td>
<td>4,6</td>
<td>21,5</td>
<td>-16,9</td>
<td>26,1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Turkish Statistical Institute (TurkStat)

---

38 Cihangir Gürkan Şen, "Türkiye - Rusya Federasyonu Ekonomik ve Ticari İlişkiler."
Figure 3: Turkish Export to Russia

Source: Compiled by the Author from the Turkish Statistical Institute

Figure 4: Turkish Import from Russia

Source: Compiled by the Author from the Turkish Statistical Institute
At first, due to the unregistered shuttle trade, it was not easy to quantify the level of trade between Turkey and Russia. However, once the shuttle trade came under control, it was easier to determine the trade level and the amount of trade between the two countries has shown a significant increase in recent years. Although there were periods when the crises in the two countries affected their relations, mostly there has been an increase in the level of trade between the two.

The increase in trade was very often supported by the governmental-level approaches to using diplomacy for economic goals. Turkish and Russian leaders used to travel with a group of businessmen. For example, in 2004, Turkish Foreign Minister Abdullah Gul was accompanied by 150 businessmen during his visit to Moscow. In that specific visit, four protocols were signed on different issues.

Although both countries had strong economic relations with one another, there has always been a trade imbalance between the two. This was mainly due to the nature of goods exported by Turkey and Russia. The raw materials that Russia exported had a low level of flexibility, while the manufactured goods exported by Turkey had a high level of flexibility.

*Energy*

Energy and construction have been the two main areas of investment for Turkey and Russia. While the Turkish construction firms started operating in Russia right after the collapse of the Soviet Union, most of the Turkish energy in terms of oil and natural gas was provided by Russia.

This section will briefly touch upon another area of economic cooperation—
energy. Russia, with its vast resources of oil and natural gas, was a perfect supplier for the rising Turkish economy, which was hungry for energy. In 1990, Turkey’s oil consumption was 22,700 million tons and the demand for the natural gas was 3,148 million m$^3$. The demand for oil increased up to 30,669 million tons and the demand for the natural gas also increased.

Between 2010 and 2020, a 32.8 percent increase in Turkish oil consumption is expected with demand rising steadily from an estimated 640,000b/d to 850,000b/d by the end of the 10-year forecast period. Refining capacity between 2010 and 2020 is set to increase by 164.8 percent, reaching 1.62mn b/d by 2020. Gas consumption is expected to climb from an estimated 34bcm to 62bcm, depending largely on imports. LNG imports are expected to virtually double from an estimated 6.5bcm to 12.0bcm during the forecast period.\(^{39}\)

The Russian sale of natural gas to Turkey has gone through three stages: the period between 1984 and 1992, the period between 1992 and 1997, and the period from 1997 to the present. In the first period, the relationship was both an economic and a political one. In the second period, the issue of energy became a commercial one with less focus on political and strategic concerns. In the third period, economic relations began to have a political face again.\(^{40}\) Overall, there were increasing economic relations between Russia and Turkey surrounding the energy issue as Turkey began relying even more heavily on Russia.


\(^{40}\) Natalya Ulçenkko, ed. Rusya ve Türkiye'nin Stratejik Güvenliğinin Sağlanmasında Enerji Hammaddeleri İhracat ve İthalatının Rolü (İstanbul: Bilgi Üniversitesi Yayınları, 2003).
Construction

Turkey has recently made a big impact in the construction sector across the world, and Russia has been one of the main countries in which Turkish construction companies are employed. According to a statement made by the Izmir Chamber of Commerce, “in the last 30 years, the construction sector has undertaken nearly 6,000 projects worth around $200 billion in 89 countries and only in 2010, this figure was more than 500 projects worth of $20 billion in 48 countries, Turkmenistan, Libya, Iraq and Russia being the leading countries.”^41

The employment of construction companies in Russia started with the Russian state, but continued with local administrators, energy companies and banks. However, there were discontinuities in this sector due to the economic crisis in Russia and the consequent insufficient funding for the construction projects.^42

In his analysis of the Turkish–Russian multidimensional partnership Aras notes that the Turkish construction sector’s market share in Russia has continuously increased. Turkey’s construction sector is active in Moscow and has continually increased its market share in Russia since 2005. Turkish contractors finished 59 construction projects worth $3.6 billion in Russia in 2007. Further, Turkey’s construction sector was involved in business worth $20 billion in 2008. In addition, there are thousands of Turkish workers in the construction field in Russia. The number of Turkish workers sent to Russia through

---

^42 Şen, "Türkiye - Rusya Federasyonu Ekonomik ve Ticari İlişkiler."
A fourth dimension of the economic relations between Turkey and Russia is the tourism sector, which has prompted an increasing cultural dialogue as well. There has been an growing interest by Russian tourists in Turkish resort towns. As the numbers of entrance to Turkey from Istanbul and Antalya indicate, tourism has been the second biggest reason (the first is trade) for Russian visits to Turkey.

**A General Assessment of the Areas of Economic Cooperation**

With the above-mentioned economic background, there happened to be an increasing economic cooperation between Russia and Turkey. This cooperative area was mentioned in Russian Federation Ivanov’s meeting with Turkish business circles in 2001. In his speech Ivanov expressed that in addition to the increase in economic relations, Turkey and Russia could improve their relations of partnership with cooperation in third countries’ markets. While tourism, trade, and construction have served as significant areas of economic cooperation, energy happened to be the prime area of economic cooperation between the two countries.

**Cultural Dialogue: The Cultural Dimension of Turkish–Russian Rapprochement**

---

To a lesser extent, the improvement in political and economic relations were seen in the cultural area as well. Tourism, being the most important medium for cultural dialogue between the two states, has played the most important role. The two peoples of both states came to understand each other better through more interactions (tourism or trade oriented).

With Russia’s rapprochement with religion as well, it applied for an observer status in the Organization of Islamic Countries (OIC) and this was also granted with efforts by the Turkish Secretary General of the organization, Ekmeleddin İhsanoğlu. İhsanoğlu’s open dialogue approach was further reinforced by Putin’s invitation and İhsanoğlu’s four-day visit to Russia. Although İhsanoğlu represented the OIC rather than the Turkish Government, his attempts for Russian involvement in the OIC were likely encouraged by the developing cultural dialogue between Russia and Turkey.

Interrmarriages have also increased among Turkish and Russian citizens. Interestingly, these two formerly alienated nations found out how common their understandings were. Intermarriage was later even advocated by Turkish Minister of Foreign Affairs Davutoğlu. 44

Both nations were, in a sense, divided between East and West. Both were neither completely Western nor Eastern. This is why the famous Turkish novelist Alatlı argued that Russia should be observed carefully to understand what is happening to Turkey. This was more valid for the approach of intelligentsia in both countries. 45 It can also be argued that the similarities in the modernization process of both countries have played a role in

the cultural affinity between both.

Another significant indicator of rapprochement in the cultural arena has been in the area of education. Although Turkology has been taught in Russian universities for decades, Russian language and culture have not been afforded significance in Turkey. Within the mentioned period, several courses have started in Turkey, and Russian language was added to the curriculum of several universities. However, a comparison between the two countries still shows that Turkey is the one that lags in terms of cultural education.46

Several cultural centers were established in both countries for the betterment of relations in this period. Among these is the Turk Rus Center, established in 2010.47 In 2003, in the Joint Declaration of the Third Meeting of the Republic of Turkey-Russian Federation Joint Strategic Planning Group, the ministers from both countries stressed that, “increasing humanitarian and cultural contacts would significantly help developing bilateral relations in all fields, agreed on the importance of completing all necessary procedures by all relevant institutions so as for the cultural centers to be established between the two countries to commence their activities as early as possible.”48

Interracial marriages between Turkish and Russian citizens also served as a reinforcing factor for the cultural bonds between the two countries. It is estimated that there are tens of thousands of intermarriages between Russians and Turks. In the large resort town of

Antalya, Russians made up the highest percentage of intermarriages made in 2012 (590 of 1,414). Likewise, Russian citizens led the way in the purchase of real estate in Turkey.49

*Military Dialogue: (Security Dimension of Turkish–Russian Rapprochement)*

The security dimension of the Turkish–Russian rapprochement was the least significant one, yet, still, there has been an unexpected increase in military relations between the two states.

A decade after the end of the Cold War, the first signs of cooperation were seen on security issues. The establishment of the Blacksea Naval Cooperation Taskforce (Blackseafor) was such a step. Within the scope of the Blackseafor agreement, six states bordering the Black Sea created a regional multinational formation of navies with flexible functions intended for use in emergency situations in the Black Sea, exclusively for peaceful purposes. The new task force was also considered to be a school of naval skill for participating navies.

In January 2002, during Chief of General Staff of the RF AF Anatoly Kvashnin’s visit to Turkey, the Turkish and Russian sides signed a Framework Agreement on Cooperation in the Military Sphere, as well as the Russian-Turkish Treaty on Cooperation in Training Military Contingents. As an additional step for consolidating cooperation and stability in the Blacksea region, a document on Confidence and Security Building Measures in the Black Sea Area was signed in Kiev on April 25, 2002. The

document formed an integral mechanism of naval interaction in the region.

Within the same year, Turkish Chief of the General Staff Hüseyin Kıvrıkoğlu visited Moscow and met with Russian Defense Minister Sergei Ivanov. Kıvrıkoğlu and Ivanov discussed the status and prospects of bilateral military and military-technical cooperation.

In December 2004, during president Putin’s first official visit to Turkey, the sides moved toward a wider contractual base of bilateral military-technical cooperation—the two countries signed documents on the protection of intellectual property related to military technology and classified information.

Meanwhile, NATO’s relations were also developing with Russia. Following a decade of US/NATO negligence and humiliation of Russia, there were attempts to strengthen relations with Russia. The NATO/Russia council came as part of such an attempt.

After the 2003 Iraq War, the security-related cooperation developed between Russia and Turkey due to similar approaches to security problems, specifically in the Middle East region. Following the use of force in Iraq in 2003, Russia advocated a heavy UN hand on the international security issues and emphasized the importance of international law. Both Russia and Turkey envisioned a new multipolar world after the decade-long unipolarity in world politics.

The visits of top officials from both sides went far in promoting cooperation in the military sphere. In June 2007, Commander of the Turkish Air Force Faruk Cömert visited Russia; in November 2008, RF Defense Minister Anatoly Serdyukov visited Turkey; in 2009, Director of the Federal Border Guard Service of Russia, Commander of the border
guards of the CIS countries (First Deputy of FSB RF Director) Vladimir Pronichev; and in July 2010 Russian Navy Commander-in-Chief Admiral Vladimir Vysotsky paid official visits to Turkey increasing the military dialogue between the two countries.

The Indicators of Turkish–Russian Relations in Turkish Media

The increase in Turkish–Russian relations is also clearly indicated in the mention of Russia in mainstream Turkish newspapers, and in the Russian Embassy’s list of events concerning Turkish-Russian relations. Two prominent Turkish newspapers have increasingly written issues related to Russia, detailed in table four below. The list of the events showing Turkish–Russian relations is expressed in Appendix A.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>YEAR</th>
<th>Number of News Stories in Milliyet</th>
<th>Number of News Stories in Hurriyet</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2001</td>
<td>241</td>
<td>1822</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2002</td>
<td>402</td>
<td>1896</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2003</td>
<td>367</td>
<td>2015</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2004</td>
<td>543</td>
<td>2336</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2005</td>
<td>627</td>
<td>2477</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2006</td>
<td>842</td>
<td>3489</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2007</td>
<td>822</td>
<td>3672</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2008</td>
<td>3441</td>
<td>4737</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2009</td>
<td>2952</td>
<td>4534</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2010</td>
<td>2689</td>
<td>4875</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Compiled by the Author from Newspapers' Websites
CHAPTER III
LITERATURE REVIEW AND THREE VARIABLES FOR RAPPROCHEMENT

Three Explanations for Rapprochement

As expressed in chapter two, in several areas a rapprochement was observed between Turkey and Russia. Although there has been a consensus among many scholars on the genuinity of the change in Turkish–Russian relations, the explanations for the rapprochement or the weight they attribute to each explanation has differed among scholars. This chapter will focus on the explanations of the rapprochement and will recapitulate these explanations under three main titles. Thus, the review will focus on the Turkish–Russian relations literature and will simply reiterate different opinions from scholars on the nature and background of the rapprochement between the two states. The theoretical aspect of each explanation will be analyzed in chapters four through six.

Explanation 1: U.S. as a threat in the region
Explanation 2: Turkey’s deteriorating relations with the West (U.S. and the EU)
Explanation 3: Turkey’s need for energy

Explanation 1: U.S. as a Threat in the Region

It is argued that the rapprochement was a direct consequence of changing threat perceptions in the region. A decade after the end of the Cold War, there came the wave of newly democratizing states that triggered so-called color revolutions in the region. While this has been observed as a natural change in world politics, it has also been regarded as an emerging U.S. dominance in the world. Once the Soviet threat eroded, neither Turkey
nor the new Russia wanted a new and uninvited player, specifically in the Black Sea and Caucasus areas.

Duygu Bazoglu Sezer, a prominent Turkish scholar, expressed this as “the deep, perhaps systemic, instabilities that have engulfed the neighboring regions that these two states abut” and, according to her, “Russia, still the pre-eminent power in Eurasia, strongly resists a greater regional role for external actors primarily because of the conviction that the former Soviet space in Eurasia is Russia's backyard.”¹ Probably due to the same reason, the skepticism in Russian against Turkey persisted as well.

Advocates of this view argued that Russia, being aware that it could no longer exist in the region as a superpower, opted for developing links among the non-Western powers, thus replacing the U.S. hegemony with a multipolar world order. This was reflected in Putin’s 2007 Munich speech in which he sounded like the representative of the non-Western world. This was also seen as coming from the only world leader who could openly challenge the U.S. global power.²

There have been a number of factors promoting the threat perception, namely the effects of so-called color revolutions, willingness to protect the status quo for the status of the Black Sea, and the emerging ideology of Eurasianism in certain decision-making circles within both countries.

² Dimitri Trenin, "Russia Reborn," Foreign Affairs 88, no. 6 (2009).
Following the decade of unrivaled U.S. hegemony, there were revolutions in former CIS countries, and this environment raised suspicions about a possible U.S. intervention in the region. Kiniklioğlu and Morkva argue that, “The revolutions in Georgia and Ukraine added to the sense of Turkish ‘encirclement’ as Romania and Bulgaria were admitted to NATO in 2004.”

In their view, the traditionally realist Turkish foreign policy was not buying into the “democracy promotion rhetoric.”

Following the Iraq War, Turkey’s caution against U.S. policies increased due to the Turkish losses, and any attempt for further democratization in the region was considered another tool for increasing the U.S. influence in the region.

With this perception on the Turkish side, Russia was naturally dismayed by the U.S. influence seen in the revolutions. This Russian belief was shared by Turkey. Mosler, Richter, and Kuhn explain, “Despite a shared interest in combating terrorism, Russia remains opposed to expanding U.S. influence in the region and views Turkey as the most favorable and valuable partner to promote its national interests.”

While the Turkish attitude was seen as a “low profile attitude,” attempt at avoiding the struggles between Russia and the West, the consequent role Turkey played in the transformations of Georgia and Ukraine showed that Turkish policy making also opposed a possible U.S. intervention in the region. This was still a fragile balance since

---

3 Kiniklioğlu and Morkva, "An anatomy of Turkish–Russian Relations."
4 Ibid.
5 Ibid.
Turkey did not want to openly endanger its relations with the U.S. and the EU.

**Status of the Black Sea**

Another common view shared by Turkey and Russia was the status of the Black Sea. The perception of the U.S. as a threat was more obvious when it came to the status of the Black Sea. Several attempts by the U.S. to move into the Black Sea were blocked by Turkey and Russia. Kiniklioglu and Morkva argue that, “Turkey uses every opportunity in NATO to block further NATO/U.S. penetration into the Black Sea.”

The current status of the Black Sea is preserved with the Montreux agreement. Interestingly, Montreux was a disputed subject between Turkey and the Soviet Union for decades. However, the U.S. attempts for more involvement in the Black Sea brought these two states to the same line. The status of the Black Sea and the Turkish Straits has been one of the most important subjects of disagreement between Russia and Turkey. When the U.S. defined the Black Sea Basin as an area of security gap, and attempted to discuss the need for a U.S. military existence in the region, despite the support from Bulgaria, Romania and Georgia, Turkey and Russia participated on the same front to oppose this approach.

Both Turkey and Russia openly express their resolve on the subject. Both states argue that the issues related to the Black Sea should be solved by the littoral states and that third parties should not be involved. Due to this approach, Ankara and Moscow

---

8 Kiniklioğlu and Morkva, "An anatomy of Turkish–Russian Relations."
opposed the U.S. attempt to extend the mission area for Operation Active Endeavour, which operated in the Mediterranean to the Black Sea. Turkey finds it unnecessary to include the Black Sea for a NATO counter-terrorism operation, and instead argues that the operation should be conducted within the scope of the Blackseafor and Operation Black Sea Harmony.\textsuperscript{10}

\textit{The Emerging Ideology of Eurasianism}

Another factor promoting the threat perception was the rising ideology of Eurasianism in both countries.\textsuperscript{11} Eurasianism is defined as the ideology that, “among other things, promotes historical and cultural affinity between Russia and Turkey.”\textsuperscript{12}

The ideology of Eurasianism was revived after the collapse of the Soviet Union due to some intellectual efforts and perceptual changes in the Turkish and Russian societies. Laruelle defines Eurasianism as, “a Russian ideology born in the 1920s and 1930s and reformulated after the fall of the USSR, which proclaims that Russia’s mission is in Asia.” According to Laruelle, Eurasianism “contends that Russian identity, as it were, straddles both Europe and Asia, and can only be realized by rejecting the European model and strengthening ties with Asia.” Within this perspective, partisans of this ideology are thought to act as informal think tanks and try to influence the Russian foreign policy.\textsuperscript{13}

\textsuperscript{10} Ibid. \\
\textsuperscript{11} Igor Torbakov, "Eurasianism: Identity Debates and Russian-Turkish Rapprochement," (2006). \\
\textsuperscript{12} Ibid. \\
Interestingly, the close connection between Alexander Dugin, a prominent figure of this ideology and some Turkish political circles famous for formerly pro-Soviet and currently anti-American attitudes is a significant indicator of the anti-Americanism integral to this ideology. Eurasianism even brought together the formerly opposing intellectuals and politicians with nationalist and socialist political views.

Sener Akturk recently defined Eurasianism as a fourth style in Turkish politics. Referring to the three choice options put forward by Yusuf Akcura, a famous intellectual and one of the founders of Turkish nationalism as, “Islamism, Turkism and Ottomanism” and Samuel Huntington’s “Islamism, Turkism and Westernism,” Akturk emphasizes the rise of a fourth style adopted by several intellectuals as Eurasianism.14

In this new setting, some political circles in both countries shared their views of the American influence in the regions as a threat to the national identities. The fact that these views resonated in public opinion eventually also shaped the foreign policy choices of both countries.

**Explanation 2: Turkey’s Deteriorating Relations with the West (U.S. and the EU)**

Another explanation apart from the threat perception has been the circumstances that pushed Turkey away from the West. The deterioration of the relations occurred in several ways. First, Turkish aspirations to become an EU member state were followed by disappointments within the mentioned decade, and, second, the fact that Turkey’s new foreign policy orientation formalized as “zero problem with neighbors” caused notable

---

policy changes from the previous almost unconditional Western orientation. Third, the anti-Americanism fueled by the Bush presidency after 9/11 affected the overall public opinion in Turkey and this had some consequences in Turkish foreign policy choices.

An indicator of this change was observed when Turkey did not allow the use of its land for the invasion of Iraq in March 2003. This type of foreign policy choice was in line with the new “deepening cooperation with Moscow,” as put by Aaron Stein.15

There were other components behind the deterioration of relations with the West. The post 9/11 environment, which fueled anti-Americanism in the world, and the increasing influence of public opinion on foreign policy specifically for Turkey had consequences in Turkish foreign policy. Thus, the “declining favorable Turkish public opinion toward the United States,” mostly due to the U.S. foreign policy choices after 2000, also had an effect on the deterioration of the relations.16

Due to the deterioration of these relations, Stein argued that, “in the near to medium term it seems likely that Turkey is intent on pursuing a balanced foreign policy that maximizes its political self-interest, even in spite of its traditional Western allies.”17 Furthermore, according to him, “Moscow was intent on limiting Western attempts to circumvent Russian oil and gas pipelines, in order to maintain its geo-political influence in Europe. At that point, according to Stein, ‘conditions for the deepening of relations between Russia and Turkey seemed mature enough and this coincided with the Turkish political standpoint, in which deepening cooperation with Moscow fit nicely with

---

17 Stein, "Pipeline politics: Turkey’s Russian rapprochement ".
Turkey’s ‘zero problems’ foreign policy, while serving a number of Turkey’s immediate foreign policy goals.”

Likewise, Bal argued that more individualized, Ankara-centered, foreign policy was pursued by Turkey. Turkey, despite being a NATO member state, started to say “No” and to make more specific decisions. The two examples of this are the vote against the U.S. on March 1, 2003 regarding the Iraq war, and the prevention of the U.S. Navy involvement in the Black Sea following the Russia Georgia war in 2008.

Bal’s argument for change in the Turkish foreign policy includes seven characteristics of the new Turkish foreign policy: (1) Newer interpretation of Atatürk’s “Peace at home, peace in the world” principle, (2) interpretation of the Westernization in terms of Western principles rather than geography, (3) a new perception of Russia, (4) a new perception of Greece, (5) new self-perception in terms of society, history and strategy, (6) more unique decision making (being able to say “No” to offers from the West) and (7) a change parallel to the overall developments in democratization and pluralism within Turkey.

According to Kuhn, Mosler, and Richter, there were “two decisive turns in Turkish foreign policy that heralded change in the relations to Russia.” These two turns were the denial of the use of Turkish territory to the U.S. forces in the invasion of Iraq in 2003 and the change in Turkish domestic politics represented with AKP (Justice and

---

18 Ibid.
20 Ibid.; ibid.; Sascha Kuhn, "Energy Cooperation in the Caucasus: Continuity and Change in Russian-Turkish Relations".
21 Sascha Kuhn, "Energy Cooperation in the Caucasus: Continuity and Change in Russian-Turkish Relations".
Development Party). The first caused the deterioration of the relations with a permanent ally, the U.S., while the second turn caused faltering in the relations with the EU. However, it should be noted that The Justice and Development Party was quite eager in developing the relations with the EU when it first came to power. It campaigned hard to reestablish the negotiations with the EU within the first couple of years of its tenure, and shifted its orientation mostly due to the stalling negotiations and the resulting disappointment. Thus, the dominance of Western orientation in Turkish foreign policy in the 1990s was replaced by a diversification of the relations and a focus toward the East, and more specifically toward the Caucasus, in the 2000s.\footnote{ibid.}

Kiniklioglu also addresses these two issues and points out the sense of Turkish encirclement with the revolutions in Georgia and Ukraine, and sees the rapprochement as a response from Turkey to the Russian attempts for collaboration.

Political dialogue on the Black Sea/Caucasus region intensified when it became clear that the U.S. is pushing for a larger role for NATO in the region. The revolutions in Georgia and Ukraine added to the sense of Turkish ‘encirclement’ as Romania and Bulgaria were admitted to NATO in 2004. Troubled by the growing uncertainty vis-à-vis its European aspirations Turkey responded to insistent Russian overtures to collaborate in the region. Turkish opposition to extra-regional penetration of the region is mostly explained by two factors: First, that there is no need for NATO to enter the region as existing regional structures are adequate and in concert with NATO operations; second, that any regional initiative must include Russia.\footnote{Kiniklioglu and Morkva, "An anatomy of Turkish–Russian Relations."}

Ozbay argues that the refusal of the use of Turkish territory in 2003 has caused Russia to reconsider Turkey as a trustworthy, strong, and independent decision-making
country that can assert its political will in line with its own interests rather than as a classical U.S. ally. In his opinion, for Russia, a Turkey which can act independent from the Atlantic world was a state with which relations can be developed and which can be taken into account. He sees the several high-level mutual visits following March 2003 as an indicator of this changing relationship.

Sadik argues that the combination of several factors (domestic and international) has led to a significant influence of public opinion in Turkish foreign policy choices and notes the rise of anti-Americanism in Turkish public opinion between 2000 and 2006. His analysis also considers the anti-Americanism in the first years of the millennium as a given in Turkish–American relations.

As expressed by Stephen Larrabee, another important factor for the deteriorations of the relations with the U.S. was the diffidence of Washington in Turkey’s fight against terrorism. He argues that this

“(Washington’s diffidence in Turkey’s fight against terrorism) has contributed to an alarming rise in anti-American sentiment throughout Turkey. (A poll conducted by the Pew Charitable Trusts in June 2006 showed that only 12 percent of Turks viewed the United States positively.) Many Turks consider Washington's position to be tacit support for the PKK and evidence of a double standard: as they see it, the United States has invaded two countries—Afghanistan and Iraq—to eliminate terrorist safe havens but now refuses to help Turkey do the same.

This sentiment was further supported with the American invasion of Iraq and

---

consequent conflicting issues between Turkey and the U.S. in the northern territory of Iraq. In fact, many have noted that nothing has affected Turkish-American relations as much as the American presence in Iraq.\textsuperscript{27} Menon and Wimbush argue that anti-Americanism has started to influence Turkish political thinking regardless of the political orientation of the policy makers in Turkey. They note that,

“the possibility that Turkey, whether Kemalist or Islamist, could reassess its long-standing alliance with the United States is quite real. Indeed, some of Turkey’s foreign-policy choices—which are being discussed forthrightly in influential Turkish circles—involves reducing its reliance on the United States, or even turning away from Washington, and deepening ties with America’s competitors. Accompanying Turkish discussions about a new strategic orientation has been the growth of a deep anti-Western, and specifically anti-American, mood, one that now shapes the thinking of Turks, regardless of political persuasion, and that has sunk deep roots among the Kemalists, America’s traditional interlocutors.”\textsuperscript{28}

**Explanation 3: Turkey’s Need for Energy**

Another important variable that can explain Turkish–Russian rapprochement is Turkey’s need for energy and the Russian capacity and willingness to meet this need. While this argument is sometimes seen as a part of the bilateral trade between the two countries, it is actually about energy security.

A significant increase in the trade volume between Turkey and Russia has been observed since 2000. As noted by Stein,

“Much of the growth in trade volume is due to Turkey’s growing energy imports from Russia. Turkey finds itself at the center of the

\textsuperscript{28} Ibid., 130.
energy-rich Middle East and Eurasia region and has made it a priority to establish itself as Europe’s oil and gas hub. Russia, which is keen on controlling natural gas supply routes to Europe, sees Turkey as a vital strategic choke point and is intent on making a number of diplomatic inroads to ensure that its energy and economic interests are protected.”

When this strong dependence on Russian energy is considered, it is expected that Turkey would try to diversify its supplies and find alternative sources; this did not turn out to be the case. Mostly due to the insecurity of other sources like Iran, Turkey’s relations with Russia in terms of energy has only increased over time.\(^\text{30}\) As expressed by Eichenmüller, “a recently secured agreement regarding the construction of a nuclear power plant by Russia points into another direction.”\(^\text{31}\) Eichenmüller adds that, “Russia’s rejection of alternative energy supply routes through the Caucasus and Turkey’s wariness of increased gas imports from Iran due to respect for its relations with its American and European partners might have also been pivotal factors behind this decision.”\(^\text{32}\)

For some commentators, Turkish dependence on energy has denied Turkey leverage in its relations with Russia. Kuhn, Mosler, and Richter argue that,

“Initiated by the Turkish side, BLACKSEAFOR, BSEC and CSCP illustrate a somewhat unbalanced engagement in regional cooperation, as Turkey immediately stands to gain from cooperative arrangements while Russia has to a certain extent long been interested in preserving the status quo, that is, relative regional hegemony. Russia has more power to opt out than Turkey, as it holds more energy resources, and is less dependent on Turkey due to a larger set of trading partners. This might account for Moscow’s

\(^{29}\) Stein, "Pipeline politics: Turkey’s Russian rapprochement ."


\(^{31}\) Ibid.

\(^{32}\) Ibid.
rejection of the 2000 proposal, and helps understand why Turkey initiated CSCP without US or EU involvement.”

Parallel to the approach above, Mozur simplifies the common perception in Turkish–Russian energy relations as Turkey’s high level of dependence on Russian energy. He adds that this dependence is expected to increase over time. The growing dependence is seen as a result of two trends that complement each other: the high percentage of natural gas as a source in meeting Turkey’s primary energy supply and Russia’s share in Turkey’s total natural gas consumption. This is also supported with the increasing amount of natural gas consumption in Turkey and the almost insignificant percentage of indigenous production.

Kuhn, Mosler, and Richter’s analysis of the shift “from Russian hegemony in the region to increased balance of power between Russia and Turkey” explains the change with liberal institutionalism. Since such a shift was expected to increase the security dilemma, it led to more cooperation between the two countries, making them believe that liberal institutionalism has more explanatory power in the changing nature of Turkish–Russian relations. They argue that,

“Through intergovernmental negotiations and bargaining both actors managed to maximise their utility in the energy sector. The outcome of negotiations was and is dependent on relative bargaining power, which is much more balanced now than it was in the 1990s and early 2000s. Both countries saw a need in altering the status quo,

33 Sascha Kuhn, "Energy Cooperation in the Caucasus: Continuity and Change in Russian-Turkish Relations".
35 Sascha Kuhn, "Energy Cooperation in the Caucasus: Continuity and Change in Russian-Turkish Relations".
as ‘asymmetrical interdependence’ has significantly decreased, as an increase in relative bargaining power has reduced Turkey’s dependence on Russia.”

They add to these the internal pressures existing in both countries from the private business circles and different interest groups.  

Kuhn, Mosler, and Richter thus see “Pipeline Politics” as a very relevant factor for power distribution in the region. Their analysis, however, does not simply see this factor as Turkey’s need for energy. Instead, while Russia has the supply, Turkey’s involvement came from being a relevant transit point for Caspian resources and providing Russia alternate routes bypassing Ukraine.

Kınıklioğlu also sees energy as the “most significant aspect of the Turkish-Russian relationship.” According to him, in addition to being an important consumer country for Russian energy, Turkey can potentially provide new access areas for Russia in terms of energy. Turkey can facilitate the access to the energy markets in Greece, Spain, Italy, and North Africa. In addition to this, Turkey’s enthusiasm to present itself as a transit country and as an energy hub motivates the Russian officials “to make liberal use of language that would confirm Ankara’s ambitions.”

---

37 Sascha Kuhn, "Energy Cooperation in the Caucasus: Continuity and Change in Russian-Turkish Relations".
38 Kınıklioğlu and Morkva, "An anatomy of Turkish–Russian Relations."
CHAPTER IV
DETERIORATION OF TURKEY’S RELATIONS WITH THE WEST

An important element in the rapprochement between Russia and Turkey is the deterioration of the relations between Turkey and the West. There have been two dimensions of the relations with the West for Turkey: first is the 60-year alliance with the U.S. since Turkey joined NATO, and the second is Turkey’s relations with the European Union, specifically its aspirations to be a full member of the EU.

This explanation depends on a constructivist approach, where the development of the relations is bound with the social aspect of international relations, rather than the material aspect. To the adherents of constructivism, the social and political world is very much related to the human consciousness and therefore the study of international relations should take ideas and beliefs into consideration since they shape the choices of the political actors in the scene.¹ In the case of Turkish–Russian rapprochement, it can be argued that the relations with the West throughout the first decade of the 21st century developed the non–Western aspect of the identity of Turkey and consequently led to the foreign policy choices that reflect this change in forms of more cooperation and rapprochement with non-Western powers.

When analyzing the change in Turkish foreign policy some scholars have chosen to explain it with values rather than power. Mufti argues that, “the dynamics of Turkish security policy during the past two decades cannot be explained adequately by external systemic pressures.” According to him, “Neorealism theory itself, after all, does not assert

¹ George Sørensen and Robert Jackson, Introduction to International Relations, Theories and Approaches (New York: Oxford University Press, 2007).
that systemic factors determine state behavior; they merely impose incentives and disincentives for various courses of action— incentives and disincentives that are in practice often overridden by other factors at the individual or domestic political levels.”

At this point, it is essential to look into the constructivist arguments first and then to analyze at what points there was a change in Turkish identity perception, how Turkey’s relations with the West deteriorated, how Turkish public opinion has changed against the United States and the EU, and how similar factors worked on the Russian side as well.

**Constructivist Theory**

As mentioned above, constructivism’s focus is on the ideas and norms rather than material (military or economic) power in international relations. Alexander Wendt, the prominent scholar of social constructivism, emphasizing the common commitment of realists and liberalists to rationalism, argues that, “rationalism offers a fundamentally behavioral conception of both process and institutions: They change behavior but not identities and interests.” On the other hand, some liberalists adhere to the conception of process in which “identities and interests are endogenous to interaction, rather than a rationalist-behavioral one in which they are exogenous.” Thus, Wendt’s constructivism attempts to build the bridge between these two understandings by looking into the so-called causal mechanism between self-help and anarchy.

---

2 Mufti, *Daring and caution in Turkish strategic culture: republic at sea.*
4 Ibid.
Wendt argues that, “self-help and power politics do not follow either logically or causally from anarchy and that if today we find ourselves in a self-help world, this is due to process, not structure.”\(^5\) He goes on to say, “anarchy is what states make of it.” Guzzini and Leander argue that Wendt has stayed within the parameters of the discipline in terms of defining identity, and that he refers to the states as the main actors as well. Thus, according to them, “Wendt undermines two key theoretical positions in IR which are the methodological and ontological individualism and materialism.” He is noted as having based his theory on idealism and holism.\(^6\) In other words, Wendt’s approach is defined as an attempt to bind loose ends in IR by accumulating knowledge to reach the essence of international relations.\(^7\)

While the focus of realism is on the anarchy and distribution of power as the main drivers of international relations, the constructivist argument emphasizes the importance of inter-subjective ideas as an important factor in shaping world politics. Ideas determine the behavior of the actors by redefining the identities and interests of the actors.\(^8\) The constructivist argument has also been used by other scholars like Finnemore, Sikkink, Ruggie, Katzenstein and Hopf.

Parallel to this approach, Finnemore and Sikkink have analyzed norm dynamics and political change. Their work, surveying the scholarship on norms and ideas, makes three arguments. First, they defend the validity of the ideational turn of the 1990s,

---
\(^5\) Ibid.
\(^7\) Ibid.
regarding it more than a simple turn to the traditional understandings. Second, they provide propositions about three aspects of norms (their origins, their implementation mechanisms, and the conditions for their influence). And, third, they refute the tendency to consider norms as an opposition to rationality. According to their approach of “strategic social construction,” rationality is still a part of determining political choice, identity or the social context. They argue that, “Actors strategize rationally to reconfigure preferences, identities, or social context. Rationality cannot be separated from any politically significant episode of normative influence or normative change, just as the normative context conditions any episode of rational choice.”

Similarly, in defense of institutionalism (or, as an attack on Mearsheimer’s realism), John Gerard Ruggie notes that the ideas play an important role in the construction of the post World War II security environment.

All of these studies were attempts at understanding a post Cold War world, in which most IR traditions lacked an explanation. Katzenstein, who offers a sociological perspective, is another advocate of the importance of norms, identities, and culture in the definition of national security. His approach, which depends on the insufficiency of other IR theories, depicts the dilemma of the post Cold War world’s security environment. He states,

“The Soviet Union has ceased to exist, and its successor states, organized in the Commonwealth of Independent States, are in the process of creating a new regional international system while at the

---

10 Ibid.
same time attempting to affect transitions from authoritarian socialism to democratic capitalism. The international positions of the United States and Japan have changed greatly as international competitiveness and financial power shifted away from the United States in the 1980s and away from Japan in the 1990s. China is undergoing a fundamental transformation in its economic structure and in its links to the international system. And the European Union (EU) appears to have been perhaps an overambitious attempt to accelerate the pace of European integration in the face of German unification. In South Africa, the Middle East, Central America, and Western Europe, long-standing violent conflicts that only a few years ago appeared to be simply unsolvable are now finding negotiated settlements. And in Europe, Central Asia, the Islamic world, and Africa, new conflicts are breaking out.”

Touching upon the skepticism of mainstream scholars (mostly from a realist or neoliberal institutionalist tradition) about constructivism, Ted Hopf mentions three main reasons for the misperception: 1) Mainstream scholars tended to see constructivism as postmodern and anti-positivist, 2) Constructivism itself was not very clear about its being placed within the framework of mainstream social science, and 3) The failure of constructivism to offer an alternative research program.

Hopf clarifies constructivism claims by summarizing the differences between “conventional” and “critical” constructivism, and suggesting a research agenda. He further argues that critical constructivism is more related to the critical social theory. He offers a research program of conventional constructivism that brings “alternative understandings of a number of the central themes in international relations theory, including: the meaning of anarchy and balance of power, the relationship between state identity and interest, an elaboration of power, and the prospects for change in world

---

13 Ibid.
politics,” including, “a constructivist reconceptualization of balance of threat theory, the
security dilemma, neoliberal cooperation theory, and the democratic peace.” According
to Hopf,

> “Although conventional and critical constructivism share a number of positions—mutual constitution of actors and structures, anarchy as a social construct, power as both material and discursive, and state identities and interests as variables—conventional constructivism does not accept critical theory’s ideas about its own role in producing change and maintains a fundamentally different understanding of power”.

Likewise, Wendt’s emphasis is on the differences in how people define the
concept of structure in international relations. When neorealists understand anarchy and
distribution of material capabilities, Wendt argues, assumptions should be made about the
distribution of interests. In addition, he argues that interests are constituted by ideas, and
thus social system, according to Wendt, is structured by distributions of knowledge. To
clarify cultural structures, Wendt points out “a typology based on three distinctions: (1)
between two levels on which they are organized, micro and macro, manifested as
common and collective knowledge respectively; (2) between their causal and constitutive
effects; and (3) between their effects on behavior and on identities and interests.”

Wendt’s real contribution to constructivism, and the issue more related to the
subject of this chapter, is his classification of three cultures of anarchy. In Social Theory
of International Politics, he summarizes this approach:

---

15 Ibid.
16 Ibid.
17 Alexander Wendt, Social theory of international politics (Cambridge University Press, 1999), 189.
18 Ibid., 190.
I proposed that anarchy can have at least three distinct cultures, Hobbesian, Lockean, and Kantian, which are based on different role relationships, enemy, rival, and friend. These structures and roles are instantiated in states' representations of Self and Other (role identities) and ensuing practices, but it is at the macro-level, relatively autonomous from what states think and do, that they acquire logics and tendencies that persist through time. Cultures are self-fulfilling prophecies that persist through time. Cultures are self-fulfilling prophecies that tend to reproduce themselves. Thus, even though defining the structure of the international system as a distribution of ideas calls our attention to the possibility that those ideas, and with them the "logic of anarchy," might change, it is no implication of this model that structural change is easy or even possible in given historical circumstances.\(^{19}\)

The overall constructivist approach, with its emphasis on the importance of norms, cultures and identities, and with its differing approach to the structure of the international system, offers an explanation for the significant policy change between Russia and Turkey. This explanation mostly assumes that the redefinition of Turkish and Russian identities (both ambiguous and undecided between East and West) has become a determinant factor in the change of political culture between these two states and the consequent change in their roles. In other words, it can be argued that the relationship between Russia and Turkey has existed in a Hobbesian culture for a long time. However, in the post Cold War environment, this Hobbesian culture has moved into Lockean, and, even in some cases, a Kantian one. Naturally, at least on the Turkish side, this change happened with two significant developments: more tensioned relations with the U.S., especially after the rejection of the use of Turkish soil in the invasion of Iraq, and the disappointment in Turkey’s EU accession process. These two occurrences prompted an identity reevaluation in Turkey, leading to a move from a Hobbesian culture to a Lockean

\(^{19}\) Ibid., 309.
or Kantian one. The next section evaluates these two cases and their effects on Turkish foreign policy.

**Relations with the U.S.**

Throughout the 2003 Iraq War and in the aftermath U.S.–Turkish relations were the worst they had been since the end of the second world war. Beginning with the denial of the use of Turkish soil for the northern front in the invasion of Iraq, there have been resentments on both sides, several of which even caused conflicts in this period.

By the late 1990s, there was mistrust in Turkey regarding the American moves in the region regarding the Iraq war. In 1998, while Turkey was dealing with its own Kurdish separatist terror problem, Washington had brought together two rival Iraqi Kurdish groups and kept Turkey out of the negotiation process. Although the governments were realistic enough to let the U.S. use Incirlik AFB for the missions related to the no-fly zone in northern Iraq and the continuous air strikes against the high-valued targets in Iraq, concerns were expressed by the then foreign minister Ismail Cem.

In 2003, a dozen Turkish Special Forces personnel were arrested by U.S. troops in the outskirts of Kirkuk, adding to the mutual feeling of aversion. The arrest, and the

---

attitude of the U.S. soldiers during, caused great public uproar in Turkey. As Barkey argued, although there was a consensus between Turkey and the U.S. on the containment of Iraq by the United States in the 1990s, some unpredictable events during Operation Iraqi Freedom caused resentment in Turkish decision makers and in the public as well.24

Rubin has described the issue as “comedy of errors.” According to him, although the March 1 vote and the July 4 arrest of Turkish Special Forces personnel had powerful consequences, they cannot solely explain the U.S.-Turkish tension. He sees the tension as a result of “misguided U.S. diplomacy in the run-up to the war and an American failure to properly address PKK terrorism, as well as counterproductive Turkish strategies regarding Iraqi Turkmen and Kurds.”25

Looking into the history of Turkish foreign policy and Turkish-American relations, Isyar notes the reactionary aspect of Turkish foreign policy and argues that “anti-American initiatives and reactions in Turkish foreign policy essentially exhibit spasmodic and conjuncture characteristics.”26

When George W. Bush made the “Axis of Evil” speech and referred to Iraq, Iran, and North Korea as the axis of evil, the reaction raised by General Tuncer Kilinc, secretary general of the National Security Council was to offer new options for Turkey that might fit its national interests better. And, this option included a new cooperation with Russia and Iran.27

---
Makovsky notes that the tensions between the two countries caused significant change in the circles of the U.S. House of Representatives as well.28 Isyar supports this argument with the increasing number of dissident senators in the U.S. and gives the example of the Republican Senator Bruce Jackson’s accusation of the AKP government for growing hostility against America in Turkey.29

Another important tension area between the U.S. and Turkey was the approach to Kurds and Turkmens in Iraq. Almost all Turkish governments had an interest in the Turkmen community, which has formed business and professional elite among the Iraqi population.30 Turkey has always argued that it was mistreated regarding the forced demographic change in the Turkmens-populated cities of Kirkuk and Telafer in northern Iraq. And, Turkey was offended by the U.S. choice to deal only with northern Iraq, the fact that it took a position favoring the Turkmen population.

On the other hand, Turkey has accused the U.S. for favoring the Kurdish population in Kirkuk and has been disappointed in the U.S. reluctance to deal with PKK terrorism in northern Iraq, causing a further deterioration in relations. Banu Eligur sees the Kurdish issue as the main source of tensions in Turkish-American relations. According to her,

“Changes in United States policy on the issue of PKK terrorism, and the rift between the U.S. and Turkey over measures to be taken against the presence of the PKK in northern Iraq, deeply divided the former close allies. Turkish policy-makers, along with the Turkish military and the Turkish public, increasingly regard the U.S. as

29 Ibid.
30 Rubin, "A comedy of errors: American-Turkish Diplomacy and the Iraq War."
having selectively targeted certain terrorists while turning a blind eye to the rise of PKK terrorism in Turkey.”

**EU Accession Process**

The United States was not the only Western ally with whom relations deteriorated. Although the third millennium started with great expectations about the accession of Turkey to the EU, several occurrences caused disappointment and frustration on the Turkish side.

Turkish foreign policy has always had a strong European orientation. Since the establishment of the Turkish Republic in 1923, westernization was one of the most influential determinants of Turkish foreign policy. However, Turkey’s European journey has always been full of disappointments, and the late 1990s to 2000s saw a particular increase in this disappointment. As noted by Kramer, “disappointment of short-sighted expectations of the benefits of the customs union with the EU and even more so the decision of the European Council in Luxembourg in December 1997 not to include Turkey in the list of candidate countries for EU membership have led to widespread political disappointment in Turkey.” Furthermore, this attitude was reinforced with the policy of Turkish government to freeze political relations with Europe in 1998.

A brief timeline of Turkey’s EU accession process is described below as displayed on the EU’s web site:

**09-01-1959** Turkey applies for associate membership in the European Economic

---

31 Eligür, "Turkish-American relations since the 2003 Iraqi war: a troubled partnership."
33 Ibid.
Community (EEC).

**09-01-1963** Association agreement ("Ankara Agreement") is signed, aiming at bringing Turkey into a customs union with the EEC and, ultimately, membership.

**04-01-1987** Turkey applies for full EEC membership.

**01-01-1995** Turkey-EU Association Council finalises agreement creating a customs union.

**12-01-1997** Luxembourg Council summit declares Turkey eligible to become EU member.

**03-01-2001** Council adopts Accession Partnership for Turkey.

**05-01-2003** Council adopts revised Accession Partnership for Turkey.

**12-01-2004** Council defines conditions for opening accession negotiations.

**10-01-2005** Council adopts negotiating framework, and negotiations are formally opened.

**10-01-2005** "Screening process" begins to determine to what degree Turkey meets the membership criteria and what remains to be done.

**06-01-2006** Negotiations are opened and closed on Chapter 25 (science and research).

**12-01-2006** Because Turkey refused to apply to Cyprus the Additional Protocol to the Ankara Agreement, Council decides that eight chapters will not be opened.

**02-01-2008** Council adopts revised Accession Partnership for Turkey.

**06-30-2010** Negotiations are opened on Chapter 12 (food safety, veterinary and phytosanitary policy).
Positive Agenda intended to bring fresh dynamics into the EU-Turkey relations was launched. (EU Enlargement Interactive Timeline).\textsuperscript{34}

Clearly, the process was extensive and, at certain periods, Turkey was not sure if the EU was ready to accept Turkey as a full member. This led to the loss of momentum, and in some cases, direction, in Turkey’s relations with the European Union. Although the EU and Europe in general had been the top priority for Turkish business circles, military leadership, and the dominant traditional political elites of Turkey, foreign policy was shaped with the less European-oriented nationalist circles, which had been in search of venues other than Europe.\textsuperscript{35}

Significant information was provided by European politicians supporting Turkish suspicions about the EU membership process. Although many former Eastern bloc countries were considered for membership, Turkey was left out. In 1997, following a meeting held in Brussels, leading European Christian Democrats described the European integration as a civilization project and thus considered Turkey out of this project as a Muslim country.\textsuperscript{36}

On the other hand, some commentators in Turkey put the blame on the governing Justice and Development party, arguing that the anti-European roots of the political team emerged at certain points despite the great strides they achieved due to the “opportunism and pragmatism that lies at the center of the political identity of the (mentioned) political

\textsuperscript{35} Krämer, A changing Turkey: the challenge to Europe and the United States: P.183.
\textsuperscript{36} Lionel Barber, "EU Group Rebuffs Turkish Entry Push," Financial Times, March 5, 1997, p. 2.
Several incidents fueled Turkish frustration with the EU. These included the granting of visas to citizens of Balkan countries before they became EU members, the accession of Greek Cyprus to the EU, and the EU’s stance on the terror problem in Turkey. As described by Buzan, the old game between Turkey and Europe involved promises for full membership, strong expectations, and unfulfilled or slowly implemented commitments on both sides. In the 2000s, more of the slow implementation could be blamed on the European side and from a constructivist perspective the frustration with the European Union process caused Turkey to reconsider its identity as well as its foreign policy choices.

The discontent with the EU process was not only about the unexpected negligence from the European Union, but was also shaped by the EU’s disillusionment with itself. This was described by Meral and Paris in the following statement:

“The slowdown and disillusionment with the EU has convinced more and more Turks that the project may not work out in the end, leading Turkey to diversify its investments beyond the EU in case Turkey’s bid for EU membership completely collapses. This possibility runs parallel with new concerns over the European economy, its internal political turmoil, and lack of a unified, coherent, and effective foreign policy. Turks rightfully wonder whether, after years of struggling to become a member, all that effort will turn out to be a bad investment in a weak EU organization without much to offer to Turkey.”

Although economic relations increased, the share of imports from Europe decreased during this period. Below, Figures 5 and 6 depict the change in the share of imports in Turkey.
Figure 5: Share of Imports in Turkey in 2004

Source: Compiled by the Author from the Turkish Statistical Institution

Figure 6: Share of Imports in Turkey in 2013

Source: Compiled by the Author from the Turkish Statistical Institution
From a Hobbesian to a Kantian World

Based on the constructivist approach, it can be argued that the anarchic environment or culture that defined relations between Turkey and Russia has undergone some change due to the circumstances that affected Turkish identity perception.

Turkey, frustrated by its deteriorating relations with the West, positioned itself in a different neighborhood. With regard to Russia, one of the main alternatives for building relationships, this has caused the move from a Hobbesian world to a Lockean, and even to a Kantian world.

This world was first created with a new Turkish identity perception due to frustration with its centuries-old journey to the West, reinforced by the public opinion that somehow affected the foreign policy choices at several points. A similar process occurred on the Russian side throughout the post Cold War period.

Having reviewed the relations with the U.S and the EU, we will evaluate the link between public opinion and Turkish foreign policy. Also included is a brief evaluation of the Russian dimension of the process, which will elucidate the constructivist argument on Turkish–Russian rapprochement.

Public Opinion and Turkish Foreign Policy

One other dimension of the change in Turkish foreign policy is the link between public opinion and foreign policy. According to Sadik, the changing structure of international relations and the transformation of communication technologies prompted
the link between public opinion and foreign policy making. Looking into the issue in 2006, Ian O. Lesser states that, “Public opinion now counts in Turkish foreign policymaking, and as polling results suggest, this opinion has turned distinctly anti-American in recent years.”

With regard to Turkish–American relations, Sadik reviews “how American foreign policy can influence Turkish public opinion toward the United States [and] what American policies may contribute to the rise or fall of anti-Americanism in Turkey.” His analysis measures the effects of U.S. military and economic assistance, U.S. FDI, and bilateral trade between the United States and Turkey on Turkish public opinion against the United States.

**The Russian Dimension**

On the other hand, it is also argued that the Russian side of the coin took a similar path. This argument is based on the rise of Eurasianism in Russian politics. Eurasianism is defined as “a Russian ideology born in the 1920s and 1930s and reformulated after the fall of the USSR, which proclaims that Russia’s mission is in Asia.” According to Laruelle, “It contends that Russian identity, as it were, straddles both Europe and Asia, and can only be realized by rejecting the European model and strengthening ties with Asia. Partisans of neo-Eurasianism seek to influence Russian political power and think of

---

41 Ian O. Lesser, "Turkey, the United States and the Delusion of Geopolitics.," *Survival* 3, no. 48 (2006).
43 Laruelle, "Russo-Turkish Rapprochement through the Idea of Eurasia: Alexander Dugin’s Networks in Turkey," p. 3.
themselves as a sort of informal think tank." Laruelle argues that with the network of Alexander Dugin, this approach found counterparts in Turkey, and these circles aided in the rapprochement process between Russia and Turkey.

Looking into the orientalist perspective of Eurasianism, Laruelle describes the interaction between ideology, philosophy of history, and orientalism: “Eurasianism knew how to create an original interaction between geographist ideology, philosophy of history, and orientalism. It developed a positive but general discourse about Orient: Russia would be closer to Asia than to Europe, Orthodoxy would be an oriental religion, Islam, Buddhism and Hinduism were appreciated for their mysticism, ‘fundamentalism,’ and ‘organicism.’”

Ironically, Eurasianism was also considered a reaction to Pan-Turkism. As a people whose ideology was constructed for the integration and territorial safety of Russia, the Eurasians felt themselves threatened by Pan-Turkic movements in the early 1900s. Thus, as in Turkey, an understanding of “false nationalism” and “true nationalism” were adopted. According to this understanding, Russian nationalism and Pan-Slavism were versions of “false nationalism,” and a nationalism taking the national culture as its basis was the “true nationalism.” A century after the emergence of Eurasianism, this time, especially in Turkish intellectual circles, the voices that reacted against the nationalist thoughts in the Cold War came together in their separate “true nationalist” approaches and this time the West, being foreign to the national culture, was the target of this new

---

44 Ibid.
version of nationalism.\textsuperscript{46}

This explanation naturally dictates that domestic politics influence the making of foreign policy. In the Russian case, the effects of domestic politics are very often cited, especially in the post Cold War environment. Even Kissinger, in his analysis of “the estrangement” in U.S.–Russian relations, acknowledges that, “a major challenge is the degree to which Russia’s internal evolution should affect U.S.–Russia relations.”\textsuperscript{47} In the Turkish and Russian cases, domestic politics seems to play a significant role in the development of foreign policies.

A number of factors have been put forth as the sources of Russian foreign policy. While some analysts see Russian foreign-policy choices as the reflection of the personal interests of a handful of oligarchs, some others consider the “hostility to the U.S.” as a central motive of Russian foreign policy. According to the second group of analysts, no matter the source of Russian foreign policy, its main axis is its nature as an opposition to the U.S. interests. The latter also argue that Russia uses both political and economic tools in order to influence the neighboring states that emerged after the collapse of the Soviet Union.\textsuperscript{48}

It should be noted that there are also scholars who attribute the constructivist explanations of Russian foreign policy to temporary circumstances. In this respect, Christian Thorun looks into both realist and constructivist analyses, and contends that mostly realist analysis of Russian foreign policy was more explanatory. However,


\textsuperscript{48} Keith Crane Olga Oliker, Lowell H. Schwartz, Catherine Yusupov, "Russian Foreign Policy, Sources and Implications," (RAND Corporation, 2009), P.4-5.
according to him, due to the weakness of Russia immediately after the Cold War, the first period was mostly occupied with cooperative foreign policy, and the transition in foreign policy choices was not as smooth as some analysts would assume.49

**Overall Assessment of the Deterioration of Relations with the West**

From the establishment of modern Turkey in 1923 on, Turkish foreign policy has had a western orientation. While different forms of westernization projects have been criticized by opposing political circles in Turkey, there has been a common understanding that Turkey deserves a place in the developed Western world. After the second world war, and throughout the Cold War, also affected by the memories of Russian enmity in its recent history, Turkey did not hesitate to embrace this orientation.

However, following the collapse of the Soviet Union, as in many parts of the world, Turkey’s political identity was reassessed from a cultural perspective. Due to the 2003 Iraq War and the EU accession process, this new assessment caused Turkey to reconsider its positioning in the world arena. With a constructivist perspective, it can be argued that the new Turkish identity caused a rapprochement between Turkey and Russia. While this argument has some basis in terms of a changing identity, Turkey did not seem willing to reorient its foreign policy in such a short period.

On the Kurdish issue, American indifference, which caused frustration, was benign when compared to the Russian support. Russia did not recognize the PKK as a terrorist organization because it did not commit any terrorist act on Russian soil, even

---

though the U.S. has kept it on the terrorist organizations list for quite a while. Thus, PKK had several meetings and organizations in Russia.

Although public announcements of encouragement were made by some officials for more cooperation with Russia and China, the reflection of these announcements in the economic and military areas were limited and were not to the level of Western satisfaction. Furthermore, the government rhetoric on the issues seems to be directed at Turkish public opinion rather than the criticized states.
CHAPTER V
COMMON PERCEPTION OF THE U.S. AS A THREAT IN THE CAUCASUS AND THE BLACK SEA REGION

Another strong explanation for the rapprochement between Russia and Turkey has been the new perceptions of threat in the region. According to this explanation, after the Cold War, the hegemonic American power started to dominate different geographies in the world. Two such areas were the areas from which the former Soviet Union states emerged (Caucasia and Central Asia) and the Black Sea. In particular, Caucasia and the Black Sea regions have been the historical rivalry arena for Turkey and Russia, and these two states, faced with a new global power in this region, decided to come together against this common threat.

This argument has its roots in the realist strand of international relations theories, and is mostly based on balance of power, or, more specifically, balance of threat approach. Below, a look into the realist approach will be delineated and the theoretical foundation of the “Threat Perception” explanation in the Turkish–Russian rapprochement will be discussed.

The Realist Argument

Realism has its own strands and all the separate approaches within realism have some differing perspectives. Realism has always looked at the world from a material power perspective and has developed its argument mostly around material (military and economic) power. All realist explanations have a conflictual character, and they all
emphasize national security.

The classical realism, mostly represented in the writings of Thucydides, Thomas Hobbes and Machiavelli, took insecurity and conflict as the basis for human condition.\(^1\) They all had a pessimistic view of the world due to their belief of the nature of mankind and international politics. Furthermore, they viewed power as the most significant basis of their argument and noted that power relations between states has been the focus point of any objective analysis of international relations.\(^2\) This focus on power has resulted in power rivalries and realists have always tried to explain the relations between states in terms of power and national interests.

In its neoclassic version, realism focuses on these relations from a systemic perspective, mostly represented in the writings of Kenneth Waltz. Seeing the issue as a systemic one rather than considering the actors, Waltz has always argued that eventually there would be rivalry and balancing within the anarchic system.

Waltz sees competition and rivalry as the main ingredients of the anarchic system and, according to him, the changes after the Cold War were only changes within the system, not of the system. Thus, according to him, there would be either competition or an alliance against a third power in the international system.\(^3\)

Waltz further argues that an attempt for a great power to gain hegemony in its own region or in some other part of the world will eventually cause the other powers to come together as a balancing coalition against this great power.\(^4\) He argues that, “The

---

\(^1\) Jackson, *Introduction to International Relations, Theories and Approaches*: 67.
excessive accumulation of power by one state or coalition of states elicits the opposition of others. Therefore, states can seldom afford to make maximizing power their goal. International politics is too serious a business for that."\textsuperscript{5}

The realist perspective has explanatory power in the rapprochement of Turkey and Russia in all its strands. A theoretical explanation can be found in the writings of Stephen Walt and his Balance of Threat theory, which serves as an alternative to the Balance of Power theory.

**Stephen Walt and Balance of Threat**

One explanation of the rapprochement between Turkey and Russia is Walt’s Balance of Threat theory. In his approach, Walt diverged from Waltz and argued that rather than balance of power, balance of threat is the main concept defining the structure of international relations.

Walt’s identification of the four criteria that he sees as the sources of threat perception are the strength of a state, its offensive capability, its offensive intentions, and its geographical proximity.\textsuperscript{6} Until the end of the Cold War, at least for Turkey, only two of the above were valid sources of a U.S. threat to the region. Still, the circumstances that put Turkey and the U.S. in the same camp made these two issues irrelevant when there was an open threat from the Soviet Union. As things changed, in addition to the first two criteria, the latter two also became a source of concern for Turkey after the Cold War.

Starting with the war in Iraq, the U.S. gained much more visibility in the region and, at least in terms of perception, gained a geographical proximity. Furthermore, more involvement in the Black Sea region, and the perceived support of the turmoil in the neighborhood with so-called color revolutions raised suspicions about intentions as well.

A Brief History of the Balance of Power in the Region

Caucasia and the Black Sea region have always been areas of rivalry between Russia and Turkey (and, in some cases, Iran). Considering the conflict in Caucasus and the Black Sea region, in addition to the multiethnic structure of the region, the strategic importance of the region has also been a reason for the attention of the regional and international actors.  

Hunter notes that, “Historically, sectarian and religious characteristics have affected the orientation of Caucasian peoples toward outside forces and powers. Thus the region’s Christians have traditionally gravitated towards Russia and see it as a natural ally and protector against their Muslim neighbors. The Muslims, meanwhile, have gravitated toward either Iran or Turkey.”

Hunter also notes that, “Having lost its influence in the Baltics and in the former Warsaw pact regions, while facing China to the East, Russia is concerned that the loss of its influence in the Black Sea region would once more turn it into a semi-landlocked country.”

The disintegration of the Soviet Union created a power vacuum throughout

---

7 Shireen Hunter, "Conflict in the Caucasus and Black Sea Region: Causes and Prospects for Resolution," in Hellenic Foundation for European and Foreign Policy (Halki International Seminar (7 - 14 September 1996)).
8 Ibid.
9 Ibid.
The following period was filled with the revived rivalries of regional and international actors in the region. Considering the multi ethnic structure of the relatively low-density population of the Caucasus, the major powers in the region like Iran, Russia, and Turkey all had some sort of influence on the relatively weak populations in the area. Thus, even if no other reason existed, there would always be a power rivalry amongst these countries.

The bipolar nature of the Cold War just suppressed regional powers. However, once the Cold War was over, a struggle between the regional powers for supremacy began again. In this new environment, Turkey’s isolationist foreign policy was replaced with activism, especially in the regions that were added to its foreign policy (Middle East, Caucasus and the Balkans).11

**Indicators of Post Cold War Threat Perception**

The post Cold War threat perception had different phases. The first decade after the collapse of the Soviet Union was a decade of hesitation. In this period, Russia was too weak to pursue an ambitious political agenda, and was perhaps mismanaged.

Regarding this first phase of post Cold War politics, Thorun argues that due to its limited foreign policy choices, Russia chose to cooperate with the determined Western powers rather than to choose confrontation. Taking the realist approach as his point of departure, Thorun argues that, “a major contention of realist scholars in the field of Russian foreign policy analysis is that during the first decade after the end of the Cold

---

11 Mustafa Aydin, *Turkish foreign policy: framework and analysis* (Stratejk Araştırmalara Merkezi - SAM (Center for Strategic Research), 2004).
War, Russia’s foreign policy options were significantly constrained due to the country’s weak power position vis-à-vis the Western states.”

He further suggests that, “in cases where Russia’s leadership faced a stark choice between cooperation and confrontation with the West, it chose cooperation.” According to him, in these cases, external limitations were very dangerous, as there was a consensus among the Western states about the determination to follow their interests. Thorun still takes ideational and domestic factors into account, however, and argues that, “the presence of external constraints was the single most important factor determining Russian foreign policy outputs.”

Over time, the hesitation was replaced with an awakening in Russia and the subsequent rivalry in the region. In particular, the fact that Turkey was depicted as a model in Central Asia by the Western powers caused an unrest in the Russian political circles and the military elite. The ambitious rhetoric about the “Turkish Model” was seen as evidence of Turkish intentions to fill the gap of influence in the region. In this period, the concept of “near abroad” also became an important element of Russian foreign policy thinking and Russia started to seek more influence in the region again.

Turkey, embracing a more passive role, especially after the death of President Ozal in 1993, and his replacement, the very conformist Demirel, almost fully pulled back and abandoned Russia’s “near abroad” until it realized that another actor, the United States, was more occupied with the region.

---

Color Revolutions and the Threat Perception in the Caucasus

In the first phase of the post Cold War environment, a number of conflict areas existed between Turkey and Russia. The new environment pushed Turkey into a rather daring and forward-leaning foreign policy. Despite the signing of the Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation by Demirel in 1992, the Turkish side reconsidered the situation after some Russian advances. Ankara’s desire to counter Russia without provoking it ended in some covert interventions in the Caucasus.15

As noted by Cooley,

“Although most Western commentators and policymakers understood the electorally induced regime changes in Georgia, Ukraine, and Kyrgyzstan as victories for democratic forces, in Eurasia these same events were largely viewed as U.S.-sponsored efforts to topple regimes and replace them with pro-Western clients. Accordingly, soon after the Orange and Tulip Revolutions, a variety of Eurasian regimes, with strong backing from Moscow, adopted a series of measures to counter the activities of external democracy actors so as to avoid a replay of the sequence of events which led to the overthrow of these governments.”16

Threat Perception in the Black Sea and Responses to the U.S. Involvement in the Black Sea Region

The Black Sea has always been an area of confrontation, and this was more true during the Cold War when it was one of the prominent theaters of global confrontation.

15 Mufti, Daring and caution in Turkish strategic culture: republic at sea: 110.
Despite all the hope, the end of the Cold War did not bring any cooperation at all. In addition to its vital status as Russia’s gate to the warm seas and Turkey’s control over the straits, other factors were also added by its status, providing an energy gate to Europe, its proximity to new geopolitical crisis areas, and the suspected external involvement.¹⁷

After 9/11, there were numerous U.S. attempts to become involved in the Black Sea. One such attempt was the request for expansion of NATO’s “Operation Active Endeavour,” which was developed in 2001 after the 9/11 attacks. This mission included monitoring and boarding of thousands of suspicious commercial ships. Several member state navies were involved in the mission, including Britain, Germany, Greece, Italy, the Netherlands, Spain, Turkey, and the United States. In 2006, when the U.S. requested the expansion of the operation into the Black Sea, Turkey opposed this attempt alongside with Russia.

Ariel Cohen has observed this shaky nature of Turkey-U.S. relations on this issue.

“The U.S. presence currently has the support of Bulgaria and Romania, but U.S. relations with Russia, Turkey, and Ukraine are on shaky ground. Neither Turkey nor Russia supported U.S. operations in Iraq, and relations with both countries have taken a downturn ever since then. Ukraine has adopted a more pro-Russian stance since Prime Minister Viktor Yanukovich took office. Georgia is under severe economic and political pressure from Russia and preoccupied with internal conflicts and is thus ill-equipped to act as a strong U.S. ally. This tangled web of interests and alliances and the recent rapprochement of Russia and Turkey, which has anti-American implications, may hamper U.S. activities in the area.”¹⁸

Although Turkey had supported some U.S.-backed initiatives in the Black Sea region in the 1990s, and as the hesitation period was over, and the U.S. involvement attempts had raised suspicions in the region, Turkey was also on the side of the countries that wanted to keep the U.S. away from the Black Sea region.

Responses to the Invasion of Iraq

Another area of threat was the invasion of Iraq in 2003. Following the terrorist attacks on 9/11, the hegemonic approach of the Bush administration caused a general unrest among most of the allies of the U.S. While France and Russia were openly opposed to the invasion, Turkey chose to denial the use of its soil. Meanwhile, there were tensions between Turkey and the U.S. due to the arrest of some Turkish special operations personnel in Iraq.

Russia, alongside France, was almost leading the opposition against the invasion of Iraq in 2003. Despite considering the economic relations with the U.S. at the time and avoiding an alliance with Europe to counter the U.S., hours after the invasion of Iraq, Putin was among the first leaders to condemn the act.\(^\text{19}\) The economic interests of Russia in Iraq was another determinant of the Russian position against the invasion.\(^\text{20}\) The unilateral decision of the U.S. in this period deepened the threat perception in the Middle East after the color revolutions in post Soviet neighborhood.

It can be argued that the Russian opposition in the invasion of Iraq was not as


strong as would be expected. However, it should be kept in mind that Russia, recovering from the humiliation of the 1990s, was just finding its status in all these oppositions. This became a basis for Russia’s multi-polar diplomacy. Larson and Shevchenko note that,

“From 1996 to 1999, Primakov pursued ‘multipolar’ diplomacy aimed at restoring Russia’s importance through diplomatic counter-alliances—a strategy of social competition. Primakov promised that Russian foreign policy would reflect his country’s ‘status as a great power’ and that Russia would seek an ‘equal, mutually beneficial partnership’ with the West. But Russia was too weak and financially dependent on the West to challenge U.S. actions, particularly given that the Clinton administration was prepared to act unilaterally.”

Seeing the “2008 Russo-Georgian war as much a turning point as a clear indicator of deeper trends of transformation of the security environment of the Black Sea region,” The European Parliament Report groups the “the threats and risks in the region” into three kinds: “(1) those related to competition among the great powers in the region, (2) the potential flashpoints which could at any time trigger a major crisis, and (3) the transnational threats and risks that are of concern to all Black Sea countries.” In this categorization, the U.S. attempts have been interpreted by Russia and Turkey as a threat for all Black Sea countries.

**Overall Threat Perception as an Explanation**

Threat perceptions could be seen in both Turkey and Russia in the period between 2000 and 2010. However, this perception was based more on caution than direct

confrontation. Turkey, despite its mild relations with the U.S., did not change its overall policy, and most of the steps in the foreign policy seemed aimed at soothing negative public opinion against the U.S.

There were objections to the invasion of Iraq throughout the western world. The resolve of the U.S. in the invasion and Turkish government’s pragmatic approach in the voting resulted in an unexpected tension in relations. Still, it would be difficult to make a direct connection with this common anti-American approach and the Turkish–Russian rapprochement. The color revolutions were more influential to the threat perception. Within this case, Turkey still followed a multilateral policy, if not a double-crossing one. While assisting the U.S., especially with its relations with Georgia and Azerbaijan, Turkey used the occasion as a tool to develop relations with Russia.
CHAPTER VI

TURKEY’S INCREASING NEED FOR ENERGY

A third explanation for Turkish Russian rapprochement is Turkey’s need for energy and the richness of Russian sources to fulfill this need. This argument is mostly based on a liberal perspective that considers the connection between trade and peace. According to this explanation, in the democratic environment of the post Cold War world, the mutual dependence (heavier on the Turkish side) on each other brought these two states closer together.

Liberalism as a Mainstream Theory in International Relations

The third explanation for Turkish-Russian rapprochement has its roots in the liberal theory of IR. Contrary to realism, liberalism has an optimistic view of the world and, thus, it is a more convenient explanation of rapprochement. The basic assumptions of liberal theory are based on the belief that human progress and human reason will eventually lead to cooperation and modernization and the development of the modern state in international relations. Although labeled as utopianism in a pejorative way, liberalism still forms the main contradicting and alternative theory to realism in the study of IR. Generally, liberalism is described as a reliance on “claims about the impact of interdependence, the benefits of free trade, collective security and the existence of a real harmony of interests between states.” As in realism, liberalism also has several different,

1 Jackson, Introduction to International Relations, Theories and Approaches: 100.
sometimes contradictory, strands. After a brief history of liberalism, this chapter will analyze how the complex interdependence of liberalism may form an explanation for Turkish-Russian rapprochement.

Very often, John Locke’s “natural law” theory is referred to in the history of liberalism. Seeing “political freedom and equality of mankind as divinely ordained,” Locke had an optimistic view of human progress with modern civil society and a capitalistic state. Such a society and such a state will rise as long as the individual freedoms are guaranteed. The modernization process and the technological developments of modernity have led to the reinforcement of these expectations. As technological improvements caused increasing efficiency in the production of goods, the belief in human reason and human progress also increased. As expressed by another prominent figure of liberalism, Jeremy Bentham, “the greatest happiness of the greatest number” seemed possible. Bentham based his arguments on utilitarianism, in which the concepts of good and bad should be put into measurable terms.

The optimistic views of the late 16th and 17th centuries were politically represented by and defended in Kant’s approach of triangulating peace. In Kant’s view, the triangle of democracy, trade and cooperation would end in perpetual peace. With this optimistic view of international relations, Kant argued that, “we have an absolute duty to treat human beings as autonomous moral agents. Moral imperatives are categorical rather than instrumental—we act morally because we ought to and not because it brings us benefits.” Moving on from this argument, as states became democratic—or republics, in

---

Kant’s term—and traded with each other, war would be less possible. This again means that human reason is expected to prevail, contrary to the Hobbesian view that “fear” will prevail. In Turkish–Russian relations, reason meant gaining from having more trade with each other, and from the Turkish perspective, it meant “benefiting from the rich sources of Russian energy with rapprochement steps.”

There are several strands of liberalism, as is the case for realism. In this study, I will focus more on interdependence liberalism, which became more common recently, especially with the writings of Joseph Nye and Robert Keohane.

**Turkey’s Energy Outlook**

As would be expected, Turkey’s energy outlook is closely related to the growth in the Turkish economy. The dynamic Turkish economy has shown a significant growth in recent years, becoming 17th in the world in terms of GDP. The rise in Turkey’s GDP is shown in Figure 7.
Likewise, the growing Turkish population is also ranked 17th in the world.\(^5\) Turkey, with a population of 71 million and a growth rate of 13 percent, has become an emerging economic power.\(^6\)

The urbanization and the industrialization in Turkey naturally has caused a significant increase in the demand for energy. Figure 8 shows the rise in the industrial production index in Turkey.

---


The demand for energy in Turkey is expected to nearly double between 2010 and 2020. With a six to eight percent per year growth rate, the primary energy consumption of Turkey is expected to be 222 million tons of equivalent oil (toe) in 2020, up from 126 toe in 2010.7

Most of this demand (70 percent) is met through imports. And, the primary energy demand of Turkey is mostly being met by hydrocarbon resources that Turkey lacks in a hydrocarbon rich geography. Sixty-five percent of the total energy consumption in Turkey is formed by oil and natural gas. Turkey has little reserves of these two hydrocarbon resources. Furthermore, the alternative lignite coal that Turkey produces is low quality, causes a great deal of pollution, and comes with a high level of

---

humanitarian risks in its production process.\textsuperscript{8}

Turkey’s proven oil reserve has been estimated at 284 million barrels and oil production per year is around 46 thousand barrels.\textsuperscript{9} With a consumption of 675 thousand barrels per year, the gap between consumption and production is significant. Furthermore, while there is an increase in the consumption of oil, the production rates are not increasing, perhaps even decreasing since 1990.\textsuperscript{10} Thus, five-sixth of Turkey’s oil demand is imported from abroad. Figure 9 shows the oil consumption and production in Turkey from 1999 to 2009.

As long as the oil fields in Turkey stay the same, it is expected that by 2030, oil reserves there will be depleted. The oil suppliers for Turkey are Iran, Russia, Saudi Arabia, Iraq, Kazakhstan, Azerbaijan, Syria, Italy, England, and Libya.

With such poor prospects for oil sources, an alternative energy source, natural gas, has been considered. Thus, Turkey would diversify its energy import with the help of newly emerging fields in Russia, Central Asia, and the Middle East. For the natural gas, geographical proximity is more important. As in the case for oil, Turkey’s own production of natural gas is not promising. With its environmental benefits, Turkey has gone through a process of transforming its power generation in the direction of natural gas.

---

gas fired in plants instead of coal and oil fired plants.\textsuperscript{13}

**Figure 10: Turkey's Natural Gas Production and Consumption from 2009 to 2009**

As in the case for oil, Turkey’s natural gas production is very limited and Turkey needs the support of resource import in this area. Since 1976, Turkey has produced its own natural gas. However, since then the demand for natural gas has continued to grow. Turkey started to import natural gas in LNG1987 from the Soviet Union. Today, Turkey primarily imports from Russia, Azerbaijan, Iran, Algeria, and Nigeria. Imports from Russia, Azerbaijan, and Iran are provided via pipelines and imports from Algeria and Nigeria are provided as liquefied natural gas (LNG).\textsuperscript{14}


Figure 11: Turkey’s Natural Gas Production (million cubic meters)

According to the World Trade Organization’s Trade Policy Review,\textsuperscript{15} Turkey’s primary energy consumption was around 80.5 million tons of oil equivalent (toe) in 2009. There were some declines of consumption, especially in 2007 and 2008, mostly due to the decline in economic activities. However, the energy market in Turkey expanded by four percent annually (on average) between 2000 and 2010. The great majority of the energy supply in Turkey is formed by fossil fuels (coal, oil and natural gas).

The young population in Turkey and the speed of urbanization are other factors affecting this demand in energy. Furthermore, Turkey’s per capita energy consumption’s being still below average of industrialized countries is considered a factor in making this energy demand among the fastest medium- to long-term growth in energy demand among members of the International Energy Agency.\textsuperscript{16} With this growth, Turkey’s energy

\textsuperscript{15}Trade Policy Review Body, World Trade Organization, 17 January 2012
\textsuperscript{16}IEA (2009).
demand is expected to be around 222 million toe in 2020.

The demand for energy is naturally expected to bring increasing investments in the infrastructure of the energy sector. Since the Turkish economy has recently focused on privatizing several areas, the investments in the energy sector are also expected to be led by the private sector. Parallel to the developments and the increasing need for energy, several steps have been taken by the Turkish Government to get the private sector more involved. As expressed in the 2012 WTO report, the Turkish government needs to provide a more transparent, predictable, liberalized, and competitive framework for privately owned operators in the energy market.\(^\text{17}\)

Actually, several reforms were accomplished in Turkey in the first decade of the first millennium. Turkey passed new legislation to reform the energy sector. Some of these reforms include the Electricity Market Law (2001), the Natural Gas Market Law (2001), the Petroleum Market Law (2003), the Liquefied Petroleum Gas (LPG) Market Law (2005), the Law on the Utilization of Renewable Energy Sources for the Purpose of Generating Electrical Energy (2005), the Energy Efficiency Law (2007), the Law on Geothermal Resources and Natural Mineral Waters (2007), and the Law on Construction and Operation of Nuclear Power Plants and Energy Sale (2007).\(^\text{18}\)

In 2001, Enerji Piyasasi Duzenleme Kurumu (The Energy Market Regulatory Authority, or EMRA) was established in Turkey. The aim of the EMRA was to regulate and supervise the energy market and the operators in the market.

Although there have been developments in some other aspects of the energy

\(^{17}\) Trade Policy Review Body, World Trade Organization, 17 January 2012

\(^{18}\) Ibid.
market, when it comes to petroleum and petroleum products, the expectations of privatization did not proceed as expected. The market in petroleum and petroleum products is still dominated by either government or former government large companies. Mainly, these are the Turkish State Petroleum Company (TPAO), the Turkish Petroleum Refinery Corporation (TÜPRAŞ), and the Petroleum Pipeline Corporation (BOTAŞ).

Although Turkey has its own resources of oil and natural gas they are very limited. The domestic production in Turkey meets only eight percent of demand. The geographical proximity of Turkey to the proven oil rich areas of the world like Central Asia, Caspian Basin, and the Middle East is a significant advantage for the supply of oil and natural gas. Its position as a bridge between the states in these regions and the import-dependent states (especially the European Union) provides a strategic location for the diversification of energy sources.

The Turkish economy is as an energy consuming one. Turkey’s value of $0.11 toe/1000$ GDP’s 12 percent less than the International Energy Agency’s expectation of 0.14 for the European region.\(^\text{19}\) The primary energy supply of 120 million toe natural gas is at the top of the list with 30.9 percent, and oil is second, with 25.3 percent. According to the primary energy demand projections, the share of oil is expected to remain around 26 percent by 2023. However, although the supply of natural gas is expected to increase, its share in the overall supply is expected to decrease to 23 percent. Currently, Turkey’s primary energy consumption 26.3 percent in residences, 26 percent in industry, 25.7 percent in the conversion sector, and 16.8 percent is used in the transportation sector.

\(^\text{19}\) Türkiye Petrolleri Anonim Ortaklığı, "2013 Yılı Ham Petrol ve Doğal Gaz Sektör Raporu (2013 Sector Report for Oil and Natural Gas)," (2013).
Only 27.5 percent of the energy demand is met with domestic production, and, thus, Turkey’s foreign energy dependency is at 72.5 percent. This ratio started to increase in the early 1990s, and has been around 70 percent since 2000.\textsuperscript{20}

Licenses for exploration and production of oil are granted by Turkish government, and the state is the owner of the oil resources in Turkey. The Turkish Petroleum Corporation (Türkiye Petrolleri Anonim Ortaklığı, or TPAO), as a state-owned corporation, is in charge of almost 75 percent of domestic production of oil in Turkey. The remainder of the production is performed by smaller, independent upstream companies. Imported crude oil (17.3 million tons in 2010) is predominantly sourced from Iran, the Russian Federation, Saudi Arabia, and Iraq.\textsuperscript{21}

When it comes to refining, TÜPRAŞ, which was privatized in stages in 2005 and 2006, controls nearly all the refining capacity in Turkey. While TUPRAS has enjoyed a monopoly in this area for some time, the EMRA has issued licenses to two enterprises to build new refining capacity and has provided licenses to 52 domestic and foreign companies. The amount of imported petroleum products by the wholesale enterprises reached 8.5 million tons in 2010. By the end of 2010, the EMRA had licensed nearly 24,000 operators to engage in importation, refining, transportation, storage, wholesale, or retail trade in petroleum products and LPG. Furthermore, the pricing of petroleum products was liberalized on January 1, 2005.\textsuperscript{22}

Since energy security is the main objective of Turkey’s energy policy, the

\begin{flushleft}
\textsuperscript{20} Ibid.  \\
\textsuperscript{22} World Trade Organization ibid.
\end{flushleft}
capacity of stockholding is limited in Turkey. Turkey has made several agreements with
the major suppliers of energy in its vicinity. These agreements have supported Turkey’s
role as an energy transit country. Currently, the two major international pipelines that
cross Turkey are the Iraq-Turkey pipeline with a throughput capacity of 1.4 million
barrels/day, and the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan crude oil pipeline, which may transport 1.2
million barrels/day. With the new orientations of Turkish foreign policy, other pipeline
projects are under consideration.

Turkey’s outlook in terms of natural gas is not very different. The consumption of
natural gas has significantly increased since it was first introduced as a source of energy
According to the World Trade Organization, “Of the 37.4 billion cubic metres consumed
in 2010, around half was used in gas-fired power plants; industrial and other commercial
users took 32 percent, while households consumed the remaining 17 percent (district
heating, cooking, etc.).”

As in the case for oil, Turkey's domestic production of natural gas is quite
negligible and it is provided by long-term (20 to 25-year) contracts. Turkey has made
several sales and purchase agreements. In these agreements six supplying countries were
the Russian Federation, Turkmenistan, Iran, Azerbaijan, Algeria, and Nigeria. The
natural gas from the Russian Federation, Iran, and Azerbaijan arrives via pipelines, and
gas from Algeria and Nigeria is shipped in the form of LNG. For export purposes, Turkey
has a connection with Greece. There are also planned pipeline projects that can help
Turkey find sources of imports and strengthen its role as a transit country or as an energy

\[23\] Ibid.
hub. The Nabucco Pipeline Project was such a project, linking consumers in Central and Eastern Europe with gas from the Caspian Sea in order to create a fourth supply corridor to Europe. In its attempts to secure its energy supply and fulfill the aspirations to become an energy hub in the region, Turkey supported several pipeline projects with different stakeholders.

**Turkey’s Pipeline Politics**

Pipelines played an important role in Turkey’s energy security. Currently, there are six operational natural gas and oil pipelines running through Turkey. Two of these pipelines are from Russia, transporting natural gas from Russia via Balkans and the Black Sea (also known as the Blue Stream). The third pipeline is the Baku-Tbilisi-Erzurum natural gas pipeline carrying natural gas from the Shah Deniz area of Azerbaijan to Turkey via Georgia. Parallel to this pipeline is the Baku–Tbilisi–Ceyhan pipeline, which carries oil from Azerbaijan to Turkey. There is also the 1601-mile long Tabriz-Ankara pipeline, which carries Iran’s natural gas to Turkey. And, finally, there is the oldest, the 600-mile long Kirkuk-Ceyhan pipeline, which carries Iraq oil.

Turkey has considered several options in the realization of pipelines in its region. While some of these were not welcomed by Russia, others were. The Nabucco project was a pipeline project that aimed to transfer Caspian sources to Europe by avoiding Russia. This project was supposed to decrease Europe’s dependence on Russian gas. However, an alternative to this has been the Turkish Stream project, which created an alternative route to Europe.

On December 1, 2014, the memorandum of understanding on the construction of
this pipeline was signed by Russian company Gazprom and the Turkish company Botas during Putin’s visit to Ankara. Within a month the feasibility study was discussed by Alexey Miller, Chairman of the Gazprom Management Committee and Taner Yildiz, Minister of Energy and Natural Resources.

Earlier, Turkey and Russia also considered the transfer of Russian gas to the Middle East with the Blue Stream II project. This project also aimed to transfer Russian gas to India through an Israeli port in its second phase. While the pipeline politics between Russia and Turkey helped Moscow limit Western attempts to circumvent its energy dominance in Europe, for Turkey it did fit the zero problems policy that it tried to pursue. Turkey’s approach included both developing new pipeline projects with Russia and working as the facilitator of alternative routes like Nabucco that will make Russia less energy dominant and thus less aggressive.

**Turkish Economy and Turkey’s Need for Energy between 2000 and 2010**

The Turkish economy saw a significant rise from 2000 to 2010. In this period Turkey’s GDP per capita rose from $561 billion to $1,116 billion and Turkish industry developed more than any other decade in Turkish history.

Turkey’s energy usage and import also rose in this period. Table 5 shows the degree to which the energy import changed in European countries and Turkey. While the energy import level in the EU rose 11 percent from 2002 to 2010, it increased 45 percent

---

25 Stein, "Pipeline politics: Turkey’s Russian rapprochement ".
26 Laciner, "Turkey's Pipeline Politics.
in Turkey in the same period. The rise in the economy and the related rise in energy consumption as well as energy imports forced Turkey to consider the need for energy in its foreign policy choices.

Table 5: Energy Imports in Turkey and Europe

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(1 000 tonnes of primary energy)</td>
<td>(tonnes of oil equivalent per inhabitant)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Turkey</td>
<td>857,510 830,083 1,068,335 1,912,773 5,025,260 744,855 784,317</td>
<td>1.77 1.92 2.04 2.83 2.68</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Eurostat</td>
<td>814,555 847,705 887,370 945,856 984,317</td>
<td>2.67 2.54 2.07 2.69 2.49</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Belgium</td>
<td>58,993 58,993 58,993 58,993 58,993</td>
<td>4.05 6.17 5.35 5.13 4.93</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bulgaria</td>
<td>8,954 12,275 8,954 11,527 7,230</td>
<td>1.13 1.19 1.24 1.35 1.96</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Czech Republic</td>
<td>11,329 11,770 12,870 12,528 11,461</td>
<td>1.11 1.15 1.26 1.22 1.99</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Denmark</td>
<td>8,755 9,075 7,959 4,634 3,841</td>
<td>1.83 1.88 1.47 0.85 0.86</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Germany</td>
<td>289,610 210,527 213,692 209,312 222,591</td>
<td>2.26 2.65 2.53 2.55 2.48</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Estonia</td>
<td>1,528 1,528 1,528 1,476 817</td>
<td>1.11 2.22 1.19 1.19 0.61</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ireland</td>
<td>13,693 13,910 14,140 14,332 13,600</td>
<td>3.51 3.45 3.38 3.26 2.91</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Greece</td>
<td>25,524 24,725 24,832 25,952 31,805</td>
<td>2.13 2.54 2.24 2.23 1.93</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Spain</td>
<td>168,618 115,998 143,672 129,492 108,076</td>
<td>2.04 2.21 2.94 2.79 2.39</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>France</td>
<td>137,367 141,532 141,932 138,523 133,834</td>
<td>2.24 2.29 2.29 2.13 2.27</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Italy</td>
<td>153,985 152,916 144,770 157,142 149,535</td>
<td>2.16 2.76 2.80 2.64 2.43</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cyprus</td>
<td>4,996 4,996 4,996 4,996 4,996</td>
<td>1.57 2.93 2.89 3.06 3.02</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Latvia</td>
<td>4,123 3,247 3,189 2,779 1,993</td>
<td>1.06 1.47 1.92 2.22 2.09</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lithuania</td>
<td>3,520 4,411 5,470 5,497 5,737</td>
<td>1.06 1.29 1.61 1.63 1.72</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Luxembourg</td>
<td>3,947 4,590 4,469 4,526 4,510</td>
<td>0.89 10.09 9.91 9.36 8.88</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hungary</td>
<td>14,615 15,782 17,231 16,865 15,135</td>
<td>1.45 1.52 1.71 1.69 1.51</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Malta</td>
<td>5,245 4,291 4,637 4,324 2,338</td>
<td>3.32 4.73 4.10 4.57 5.18</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Netherlands</td>
<td>31,230 28,925 36,538 34,121 30,894</td>
<td>1.95 1.84 2.24 2.08 1.86</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Austria</td>
<td>2,031 2,092 2,437 2,039 2,130</td>
<td>2.01 2.05 2.03 2.04 2.02</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Poland</td>
<td>28,150 15,440 19,869 30,903 32,114</td>
<td>2.52 2.53 2.53 2.50 2.26</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Portugal</td>
<td>21,815 25,215 21,826 21,975 21,755</td>
<td>3.39 2.65 2.67 2.63 2.65</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Romania</td>
<td>9,438 11,946 19,988 11,288 7,788</td>
<td>3.43 3.58 3.35 3.52 3.39</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Slovenia (1)</td>
<td>3,402 3,762 3,831 4,372 3,840</td>
<td>1.73 1.86 1.91 2.11 1.75</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Slovakia</td>
<td>12,737 12,505 20,963 11,987 11,314</td>
<td>2.29 2.39 2.00 2.00 2.09</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Finland</td>
<td>18,680 20,952 20,873 19,914 17,900</td>
<td>3.83 4.01 3.97 3.76 3.34</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sweden</td>
<td>19,685 20,413 19,632 19,768 19,467</td>
<td>2.23 2.27 2.19 2.15 2.08</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>United Kingdom</td>
<td>28,922 36,052 36,052 36,052 36,052</td>
<td>0.68 0.65 0.65 0.65 0.65</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Iceland</td>
<td>58,585 58,585 58,585 58,585 58,585</td>
<td>3.35 3.35 3.35 3.35 3.35</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Norway</td>
<td>268,545 230,758 188,743 138,258 175,327</td>
<td>48.10 44.50 43.45 39.84 38.13</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Switzerland</td>
<td>15,656 16,169 16,116 15,429 15,945</td>
<td>2.57 2.55 2.55 2.55 2.55</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Croatia</td>
<td>3,937 3,937 3,937 3,937 3,937</td>
<td>1.16 1.16 1.16 1.16 1.16</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FYR of Macedonia</td>
<td>1,371 1,371 1,371 1,371 1,371</td>
<td>1.15 1.15 1.15 1.15 1.15</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Turkey 2</td>
<td>51,457 55,244 69,267 72,675 74,315</td>
<td>0.75 0.83 0.95 1.03 1.02</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: EUROSTAT

In the Soviet period, Turkey’s main energy supplier was the Middle East.

However, after the end of the Cold War, Turkey became more dependent on Russian

energy beginning in the Yeltsin period. This dependency increased during in the Putin period.

*Official Statements Indicating Turkey’s Need for Energy*

Although the governmental sources did not very often want to voice the deficiency in energy supply, especially when the energy-related projects were shared with the public, Turkish political leaders brought this need into public discourse.

In this regard, Taner Yildiz, Turkey’s minister of Energy and Natural Resources, mentioned how the Turkish economy had grown and that they had put in the effort to meet Turkey’s need for energy. He said that, “Within the last 10 years, electrical power duplicated in terms of facilities and consumption. We have a similar goal for the coming decade,” in his speech to the nuclear energy students to be sent to Moscow for education.  

In a different occasion, during the 20th International Energy and Environment Fair and Conference (April 2014), Yildiz reminded attendees that while the energy need in the whole world is increasing, Turkey’s need increases in parallel to the rise in the economic development and wealth level in Turkey. He thus emphasized the importance of a multidimensional energy politics for supply and demand security. Furthermore, Yildiz argued that multilateral energy agreements will strengthen the bonds between Turkey and the energy-rich states in the Caucasus and in Central Asia. According to him, this would also have positive effects for Europe and other geographies.  

---

31 20th International Energy and Environment Fair and Conference (April 2014)
Likewise, Mevlut Cavusoglu, minister of Foreign Affairs, noted that Turkey needs to diversify its energy sources. After detailing the use of natural gas, hydroelectric dams, and the use of coal, he further reminded attendees of the need for nuclear energy. He added that Turkey needs to continue investing in renewable energy as well. Having listed the need for several types of energy, the foreign minister summarized that in order for Turkey to grow, it has to consider its need for energy.\footnote{32}{http://www.trthaber.com/haber/gundem/turkiyenin-nukleer-santrallere-ihtiyaci-var-182236.html}

Prime Minister Davutoglu, on the other hand, said that the weakness in energy was due to some investments not made in time. He commented that Turkey is spending $55 billion for energy import. While Turkey used to produce electricity with its own coal, it started using natural gas that it bought from Russia and Azerbaijan and had to buy from instable suppliers like Iran and Iraq. Davutoglu also emphasized the rise in Turkey’s economy and the consequent need for energy.\footnote{33}{http://tr.sputniknews.com/turkish.ru/vr/2014_10_27/Turkiyenin-nukleer-enerjisi/}

Davutoglu also reminded attendees that the natural gas consumption of Turkey rose within the last decade, and that there is a need to balance production and consumption in these areas. He added that Turkey, being a consumer country as well as a transit country for the energy suppliers, needs to aspire to be an energy hub instead of a transit state.\footnote{34}{http://www.trthaber.com/haber/gundem/milli-nukleer-santral-talimati-verdim-148550.html}

Turkey’s new president, Erdoğan, is also concerned about the rise in Turkey’s need for energy. In his recent speech in Slovakia, Erdoğan stated that this need is a justification for upcoming investments in nuclear energy. Erdoğan also stated the need to
diversify the sources of energy.\textsuperscript{35} As Turkey’s need to invest more on energy increased, public officials became more likely to share this information with the public.

**External Factors Relating to Energy**

While the growth in the Turkish economy has made Russia an indispensable partner, there were also external factors. The importance of energy as a political tool increased between 2000 and 2010. As expressed by Debra Johnson, the rise in the oil prices after 1999 and “the aftermath of August 1998” have been positive factors for Russia’s oil industry.\textsuperscript{36} Russia’s Gazprom, which is the fourth largest energy company after Exxon Mobil, Royal Dutch, Shell, and BP, has helped keeping the Russian economy stable with its exports of natural gas. Gazprom in this period earned almost a quarter of the budget revenues.\textsuperscript{37} In addition to the positive effect of high oil prices on the Russian economy, the rise in prices also made previously unattractive oil fields profitable.\textsuperscript{38} Johnson also notes that, “despite the fact that in 2002, energy accounted for 55 percent of Russia’s export revenues, almost 20 percent of GDP and approximately 40 percent of tax revenues, Russia’s energy sector is encountering severe problems.” According to Johnson Debra, the main reason behind this has been the continuing legacy of the former economic system and an incomplete and ineffective transition to the new.

\textsuperscript{35} Turkey’s Foreign Relations Council. [http://www.deik.org.tr/6060/Cumhurbaşkani_Sayın_Recep_Tayyip_Erdoğan_in_Slovenya_Slovakya_Romanya_resmi_ziyareti_kapsaminda_İş_Forumları_30_31_Mart_01_Nisan_2015_Ljubljana_a_Brüksel_Bükreş.html](http://www.deik.org.tr/6060/Cumhurbaşkani_Sayın_Recep_Tayyip_Erdoğan_in_Slovenya_Slovakya_Romanya_resmi_ziyareti_kapsaminda_İş_Forumları_30_31_Mart_01_Nisan_2015_Ljubljana_a_Brüksel_Bükreş.html)


\textsuperscript{37} Kamalov, İlyas; “Gazprom’un Avrupa’yı Fethi – Gazprom’s Conquest of Europe”, Stratejik Analiz, Ocak 2007,p.91.

\textsuperscript{38} Johnson, "EU–Russian energy links: a marriage of convenience?."
In his analysis of Turkey’s energy outlook, Tokuş, evaluates the energy issue in terms of Turkish–Russian relations and notes

“Turkey as an important growing energy market and Russia as the nearly unlimited energy provider as a neighbor for Turkey scope of that relationship has had many aspects accompanied with increasing political relationship. Through the signed natural gas agreements and projects like Blue Stream the amount of oil traded has created huge volume that has been signed in 2005 in Samsun. However, on the other hand, the existence of the Caspian oil as an alternative that would decrease dependency to Russian oil has made Putin and the Russian administration anxious about the issue.”

In his view,

“Although Turkey has an important need for Russian gas, due to the alternatives came to the agenda such as Baku – Tbilisi – Ceyhan and related projects on the Caspian gas, Russia and Turkey’s bargains behind the doors have not been so friendly as economic interdependence theory suggests. In case of such a situation, Turkey’s cost would be further limitations in supply of natural gas, and Russia’s cost would be loss of the huge income generated from Turkey and losing a secure transit partner for exporting energy not only to Turkey but also to the West.  

Russia’s Energy Policy

Energy has always played an important role in Russia’s foreign policy, and in the 1990s it played a significant part in relations with the West. With Putin’s coming to power, energy, in terms of oil and natural gas, became a central focus. This development stems from some changes in the Russian energy sector. Mankoff explains that Russia emerged “as the world’s largest producer of natural gas, with output totaling 607.4 billion

---

39 Halil İbrahim Tokuş, "Turkey as an Emerging Energy Hub" (Naval Postgraduate School, 2010).
cubic meters (bcm) in 2007, and as the number two oil producer after Saudi Arabia, with 9.98 million barrels per day (bbl/d) of output.40

Since the Putin government preferred a development model that was state directed, the effects of oil became more prominent in the Russian economy. As stated by Grace, “After the 1998 ruble devaluation and the flourishing of world oil prices, when Russia’s oil industry recovered, nearly single-handedly it dragged the nation out of depression.”41 Naturally, the consequent economic strength brought Russia more independence in the political arena.42

In Russia’s relations with the West, the situation regarding energy is mostly mutual dependence. Russia, being the main energy provider for Europe (this is more valid for natural gas, and the demand for natural gas is expected to increase since it is cleaner and has been used for electricity production) needs the revenues of energy export to maintain its economic growth and to be able to support the state budget. On the other hand, Russia has a vulnerability due to the infrastructure of existing pipelines, which creates limitations on the countries to which it can export.43

Russia’s leverage in the energy sector has served as a significant key to its great power status. Since it was not able to use the military nuclear power in any occasion and the permanent seat in the UN Security Council did not prevent the U.S. from unilateral actions when it was really needed, the option of energy export as a foreign policy tool has

42 Ibid.
become an important leverage. Thus, Russia, lacking its status as a military superpower, had the chance to become an energy superpower. With this intention, as noted by Smith,

“an institute for the fuel and energy complex was set up at Moscow's prestigious foreign policy body, MGIMO, in 2000, so highlighting the increased importance that the energy factor was now playing in Russian foreign policy thinking. The Institute (MITEK) was set up in order to provide Russian oil companies with the necessary specialists in the fields of international law, world economy, finances and management, so that these companies can effectively defend their interests in forums such as OPEC, the International Energy Agency IEA, and the International Association of oil and gas producers.”

Russia’s use of energy as a foreign policy tool in the 21st century has become more significant in its relations with Europe, particularly Ukraine. Even the agreement signed in 2014 gave Russia more leverage. According to the agreement, even if Russia raised the price of gas arbitrarily, or cut off the supply in winter (which has already happened twice), there is no sanction for Russia.

For the buyers of energy, diversification of energy sources has always been an important issue. Having multiple avenues of exporting energy reduces the risk of cutting off the energy distribution when a technical or political crisis among producers, consumers, or the market occurs. The more producers of energy there are, the more stable

---

45 Mark A Smith, Russia's Energy Diplomacy (Conflict Studies Research Centre, Royal Military Academy Sandhurst, 2002). 1.
the energy market is.\textsuperscript{47} Turkey, being in an unreliable environment, and having Iraq, Iran, and Russia as the main exporters of energy in oil and natural gas, had to consider this option in its energy policy.

However, the circumstances have forced Turkey to use Russia as the main energy provider, especially in terms of natural gas. On the other hand, Iran, a large provider of energy, was even less reliable when it came to energy. The natural gas flow from Iran has been interrupted several times without any warning. Furthermore, Turkish authorities did not receive a warm welcome when they attempted to discuss the issue with Iran.\textsuperscript{48}

Another important issue is the respective weight and effect of oil and natural gas in the consideration of energy dependency. While energy dependency has very often been considered in terms of oil and natural gas, the latter has a heavier hand in shaping foreign policy. As Stone notes, natural gas dependency “has a more pronounced direct correlation with foreign policy affinity than oil ... empirical analysis supports the assertion that gas is a more politically-charged commodity than oil. This stems from the fact that gas tends to be traded regionally, while oil is traded on a global market”. Although, very often, gas dependency comes with cultural and military ties, this was not the case in the Turkish-Russian relationship.

**Overall Assessment of Energy as a Factor of Rapprochement**

Energy has been a significant factor in rapprochement in Turkish–Russian

\textsuperscript{47} Aslıhan P. TURAN, Hazar Havzasında Enerji Diplomasisi

relations. In this mutually beneficial relationship, while Turkey needed energy for its developing growth, Russia used its energy both for its economic growth (as a source of income) and as a political leverage.

Although Russia was a more reliable provider to Turkey, especially when compared to Iran, its energy policies in Ukraine and Europe indicated that a similar threat was possible for Turkey. Contrary to Russia’s relations with other countries, which happen to be within the near abroad sphere of Russia, the relations with Turkey were not supported with cultural or military bonds. Thus, energy seems to have shaped the Turkish–Russian relationship in a manner not pertinent to, and in some cases despite, the nature of other forms of relations between the two countries.
CHAPTER VII
TWO CASES: TURKISH FOREIGN POLICY IN THE MIDDLE EAST AND THE SOUTH CAUCASUS

The previous chapters have explained how Turkey and Russia went through a rapprochement process after 2000. Once the significance and validity of rapprochement were explained, the three chapters dealt with each explanation of rapprochement, or each variable. All three main explanations for rapprochement were analyzed in depth with their respective influence on the Turkish-Russian rapprochement.

Since this dissertation aims to discover Turkish–Russian rapprochement from a predominantly Turkish foreign policy perspective, it is necessary to test the contours of Turkish foreign policy’s journey in other areas of interest for Turkey. In order to analyze Turkish foreign policy in two other regions of activism for Turkey, this chapter will focus on Turkish foreign policy in the Middle East and the South Caucasus. This chapter mainly aims to detail the evolution of Turkish foreign policy in these two regions, to try to understand the factors that shaped Turkish foreign policy in these regions, and to draw conclusions on the effects of each variable that worked in Turkish-Russian rapprochement.

Thus, in addition to the conclusions drawn from the analysis of Turkish–Russian rapprochement in the previous chapters, we will be able to test each variable as a factor shaping foreign policy choices of Turkey. It is difficult to argue that all these factors played the exact role they played in Turkish–Russian rapprochement in these two other regions of Turkish foreign policy activism. However, they all played a role at different
levels in different circumstances, and the role they played as foreign-policy factors in these two regions indicate a strong explanation for their role in Turkish–Russian rapprochement.

This chapter finds that energy was the prominent factor that shaped foreign-policy making in these regions, as it has been the most powerful explanation for Turkish–Russian rapprochement.

In this setting the three variables had their differing influence on the foreign-policy choices of Turkey in the region. The first variable, deterioration of Turkey’s relations with the West, did not have a significant impact on Turkey’s choices in the region. Since, with its population and economy, Turkey has been the dominant side in its relations with each of the countries in the region, it did not approach any of these countries for a balancing policy. Furthermore, none of the countries in the region had an anti-American status.

For the threat perception argument, only Georgia could be a location where the threat perception could be observed. Since neither Armenian nor Azerbaijani governments were affected by the color revolutions, there was not an occasion to perceive such a threat. In Georgia’s case, the post-Color revolution government only developed stronger relations with Turkey, which Turkey also appreciated due to more influence in the region, extension of the “zero problems” policy, and its reinforcement for Turkey’s stronger role in the region.

Energy appears to be a strong explanation for Turkish foreign policy in this region as well. This is seen in Turkey’s relations with the only energy-rich state in the region, Azerbaijan. It is not possible to explain Turkey’s strong relations with Azerbaijan with
energy since these two countries already had strong historical and cultural bonds as expressed in the “one nation two states” motto. However, Azerbaijan’s use of energy as leverage in Turkish–Armenian relations is the indicator in this case. The centuries-old Turkish–Azerbaijani brotherhood was threatened when Turkey unilaterally opted to develop its relations with Armenia, disregarding the Azerbaijan–Armenia relations. Neither cultural nor historical bonds were sufficient to conserve Turkish-Azeri brotherhood in such an environment. On the other hand, Azerbaijani energy was a strong reminder for Turkey to consider its Armenian policy. Thus, more than developing its existing strong relationship with Azerbaijan, energy has played as an important factor in curbing Turkey’s relations with Armenia despite Azerbaijan.

The analysis of Turkish foreign policy in the South Caucasus strongly indicates that, more than any other variable, energy has served as a dominant factor in shaping and balancing Turkish foreign policy in this region. While energy has served as the proactive force behind Turkey’s relations in the Middle East, it served as the reactive force in checking and balancing Turkish foreign policy in the region.

Revisiting the Three Variables for the Case Studies

This study has mainly argued that there have been three prominent factors in Russian–Turkish rapprochement. The underlying factors brought us to the three explanations: (1) Deterioration of Turkey’s relations with the West, (2) Common perception of the U.S. as a threat, and (3) Turkey’s increasing need for energy. In the analysis of Turkish–Russian relations, all three explanations appeared to be strong influential factors for rapprochement.
The period of research for this dissertation is 2000 to 2014. Within this period, despite some promising moments of hope, Turkey’s relations with the West did not develop as some people expected in Turkey. The EU accession process halted several times and U.S. unilateral actions in Iraq caused Turkey to be humiliated in its close neighborhood. The opinion polls in Turkey revealed a significant decrease in Turkish public opinion of the EU accession. Likewise, American popularity in Turkey significantly decreased in the period. All these developments provided strong reasons for Turkey’s reconsideration of its Eastern identity and its goal of a more powerful status in its Eastern neighborhood. In this new orientation, new natural partners would be China, Russia, and Iran. With its geographical proximity and more Western nature, Russia seemed to fit as the first choice for partnership and cooperation.

The second explanation focused on “threat perception” rather than the discovery of a new (or long-lost) identity. Thus, in this explanation, more than frustrations and humiliations, a concrete threat perception played an important role. The rationale behind this explanation was been the unilateral American activism in the neighborhood within this period. Despite objections even from the European allies of the U.S., the U.S. waged a war in Iraq, giving the impression that it was exacerbating-if not igniting-the political movements in several countries and causing the encirclement of the other independent states in the region. For Russian–Turkish relations, this was more significant in the Black Sea region and the color revolutions. Thus, the second explanation argues that what brought Russia and Turkey together during this period is this new perception of threat. These two countries saw the U.S. as a threat to their independence and opted for more cooperation against the American threat in the region.
Finally, the thrust of this dissertation is on the third explanation, which focuses on Turkey’s increasing need for energy. This explanation tacitly depicts a pragmatist and economically oriented nature in Turkish foreign policy in this period. According to this explanation, neither Turkey’s Eastern identity nor a U.S. threat perception were as influential as the more pragmatic factor of energy for Turkish–Russian rapprochement. This explanation is reinforced by the tangible increase in the volume of the Turkish economy, the reliance of Turkey on Russia for oil and natural gas, and the increasing importance of energy in Turkey’s development. Thus, the third explanation sees Turkey’s need for energy as the most influential source of rapprochement between the developing, energy-striving Turkey and energy-rich Russia.

First Case: Turkish Foreign Policy in the Middle East

Since the establishment of the new Turkish Republic in 1923, Turkey has always avoided any encounter with the Middle East. After the end of the Cold War, when the importance of the Middle East in terms of security increased, Turkish political elite became interested in the Middle East. This new activism has been represented mostly in relations with Iran, Syria, and Israel. Turkey and Iran had ideological confrontations in the 1990s, and there were tensions with Syria due to the terrorist safe havens in this country. Despite early cooperation with Israel in the 1990s, tensions occurred with this

2 Asiye Öztürk, The domestic context of Turkey's changing foreign policy towards the Middle East and the Caspian Region (Dt. Inst. für Entwicklungs- politik, 2009).
country as well.³

Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs expresses that “Turkey’s vision for the region is a permanent peace, stability, and security, along with a sustainable economic development. In this respect, security and stability is seen as the *sin qua non* for economic development. For this reason, Turkey’s efforts are focused on the solution of problems with mutual dialogue, creation of economic interdependence between regional states, and the strengthening of social and cultural relationships.”⁴

As in relations with Russia, the first period following the collapse of the Soviet Union was dominated by a hesitant Turkish foreign policy. While new relations were developed, they were not grounded in a strongly constructed foreign-policy orientation. Turkey, seeking an activism in the new areas of operation, took daring steps according to the wave of current affairs in this period.

Turkish foreign policy in the Middle East went through unexpected stages in the first decade of the third millennium. Although the opposite has been true since 2010, there had been a celebratory environment in Turkish academic circles for the success of Turkish foreign policy in the Middle East. Turkish foreign policy has been described as having evolved from distance to intervention in the region.⁵

In the early years of this period, as the head of the terrorist organization PKK was captured, a new rhetoric developed. Until then, there was an indifferent—if not hostile—

---
³ Meliha Benli Altunisik, "The Turkish model and democratization in the Middle East," *Arab Studies Quarterly* 27, no. 1/2 (2005).
⁴ TC Dışişleri Bakanlığı (Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs), "Orta Doğu ve Kuzey Afrika Ülkeleri İle İlişkiler (Relations with Middle Eastern and North African States)," http://www.mfa.gov.tr/turkiye_nin-ortadogu-ile-iliskileri.tr.mfa.
⁵ Mesut Özcan, "From distance to engagement: Turkish policy towards the Middle East, Iraq and Iraqi Kurds," *Insight Turkey* 13, no. 2 (2011).
language in Turkish foreign-policy circles when the Middle East was the issue. All the states to be considered in this section (Iran, Iraq, and Syria) were considered to have a negative influence on Turkish domestic politics. Iran, with its ideological approach, and Iraq and Syria with their open or covert support of terrorism in Turkey, were considered to be enemies in bad times, and irrelevant in good times.

Even before AKP’s rise to power, Adana Protocol established a confidence-building environment between Turkey and Syria. Furthermore, Turkey became more willing to take initiatives in this period. Such moves, as represented by Turkey’s diplomatic contact with Hamas after the elections, have also been interpreted as a diversion in Turkish Foreign policy. The Turkish elite’s approach was rooted in the view of the region’s pre-modern image and the several risks or threats seen in relations within the region.

Like Iraq, Turkey’s relations with Iran also developed during this period. While, throughout the 1990s, Iran was considered a hostile state covertly trying to export its Islamic regime, this perspective changed in the period between 2000 and 2010. Energy, again, was considered an important motive behind Turkey’s developing relations with Iran. Contrary to the expectations in the West that Turkey’s increasing relations with Iran would influence Iran, it happened to be the other way around, and Turkey developed close ties with Iran.

Larrabee, in his explanation of the change in Turkish foreign policy, described the

---

8 Larrabee, "Turkey RedisCOVERS the Middle East," 107.
new stance as “a response to structural changes in its security environment since the end of the Cold War” and commented that this might even be an opportunity for the West.\textsuperscript{10} However, as it turned out, Turkey’s own pragmatic approach was more influential, and rather than seeing Iran’s nuclear program as a threat, Turkey happened to be a defender for Iran’s right to pursue it.\textsuperscript{11}

Within the overall assessment of Turkey’s foreign policy in the Middle East, it can be seen that, while the relations with energy-rich states and regions improved despite some conflicts, the relations with energy-poor states like Syria quickly deteriorated because of security concerns.

\textit{Relations with Iraq}

Being deeply affected by the 2003 Iraq War, Turkey’s relations with Iraq also had a fluctuating journey. The invasion of Iraq, Turkey’s stance against any Kurdish autonomous government in the north of Iraq, and the cover supports from the authorities in Northern Iraq to the PKK played important roles in blocking Turkey’s attempts to develop cooperation with Iraq.

In the beginning, there was a dilemma in Turkish–Iraq relations. While, for security reasons, Turkey was strongly against any autonomous structure in the northern part of Iraq, its need for energy required development of relations with the government in the north of Iraq. The traditional foreign policy approach in Turkey towards Iraq was

\begin{footnotesize}
\begin{itemize}
  \item \textsuperscript{10} Larrabee, “Turkey Rediscovers the Middle East,” 103.
  \item \textsuperscript{11} In this context Turkey and Brasil brokered a compromise with Iran that happened to undermine the efforts in the UN to impose new sanctions on Iran (http://www.nytimes.com/2010/05/17/world/middleeast/17iran.html?_r=0).
\end{itemize}
\end{footnotesize}
shaped by the Kurdish problem and the geopolitical rivalry with Iran. These two factors required support for the central authority in Iraq. However, as the distrust grew with Maliki’s central government in Iraq, traditional Turkish foreign policy towards Iraq was gradually replaced by an energy-oriented one.

Beginning in 2008, significant developments occurred in Turkey–Iraq relations. First, Iraqi president Celal Talabani visited Turkey in March 2008. Within a year, Turkish president Abdullah Gul made a visit to Iraq. In this environment, the investments of Turkish businessmen in Iraq, especially in the areas of infrastructure and energy, developed even further. The importance of energy in the development of relations was quite significant.

Turkey’s Minister of Energy and Natural Resources Taner Yıldız indicated that, “Turkey’s energy import from Northern Iraq has reached 37 million barrels with 450,000 barrels per day. And our goal is to make this 550,000 barrels per day” Another development that shaped relations with Northern Iraq was Turkey’s three-stage plan to end PKK terrorism. However, the details of this plan are still not clear in many official circles, let alone among the Turkish public.

Several areas of cooperation came about after the visit made by then prime minister to Iraq, Erdoğan. During Erdoğan’s visit on July 10, 2008, the Turkey-Iraq High Level Strategic Cooperation Agreement was signed, and the first meetings took place on

---

12 Emre Iseri and Oguz Dilek, "The Nexus Of Turkey’s Energy And Foreign Policy With Iraqi Kurdish Oil: The Iranian Connection," ORTADOĞU ANALİZ (Middle Eastern Analysis) 5, no. 50 (2013).
September 17 and 18, 2009 in Istanbul, and on October 15, 2009 in Baghdad.¹⁵

The issue discussed in the meetings were security, the development of mutual economic relations between the two states, opening of two new border gates, management and sharing of water sources, cooperation in the operation, and international marketing of energy sources (oil and natural gas). The development of cooperation in areas such as health, education, and culture between the two nations was also mentioned. In this respect, it is argued that following the withdrawal of U.S. forces from Iraq, Turkey’s relations with Iraq moved from uncertainty to a high level of cooperation.¹⁶

This case was reinforced by mutual visits, starting with President Gul’s visit in 2008, and continuing with the visits of Iraq President Celal Talabani, Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdoğan and Iraq Prime Minister Nuri El Maliki. Ayhan’s argument was also supported by his view of the four principles of Davutoglu’s approach to the regional states and specifically to Iraq: Common security area, high-level political dialogue, economic interdependence, and living together in a common cultural ground.¹⁷

When it comes to the economic relations, a significant rise was also seen in the trade volume between Turkey and Iraq. Table 6 below shows the trade volume between Turkey and Iraq.

¹⁶ Veysel Ayhan, "Turkiye - Irak İlişkileri: Bolge Ulkelerinin Irak Politikasi Baglaminda Bir Analiz (Turkey-Iraq Relations: An Analysis in the Framework of Regional Countries’ Iraq Policy)," Ortadogu Analiz (Middle Eastern Analysis) 1, no. 9 (2009).
¹⁷ Ibid.
### Table 6: Trade Volume Between Turkey and Iraq between 2003 and 2010

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Years</th>
<th>Export (million $)</th>
<th>Import (million $)</th>
<th>Trade Volume (million $)</th>
<th>Balance (million $)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2003</td>
<td>829</td>
<td>112</td>
<td>941</td>
<td>716</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2004</td>
<td>1.820</td>
<td>467</td>
<td>2.288</td>
<td>1.353</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2005</td>
<td>2.750</td>
<td>458</td>
<td>3.208</td>
<td>2.291</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2006</td>
<td>2.589</td>
<td>375</td>
<td>2.965</td>
<td>2.213</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2007</td>
<td>2.811</td>
<td>645</td>
<td>3.456</td>
<td>2.167</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2008</td>
<td>3.912</td>
<td>1.320</td>
<td>5.233</td>
<td>2.591</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2009</td>
<td>5.126</td>
<td>952</td>
<td>6.078</td>
<td>4.174</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2010</td>
<td>6.042</td>
<td>1.354</td>
<td>7.396</td>
<td>4.688</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs

However, Turkey–Iraq relations naturally experienced some elements of friction as well. Ayhan lists these problem areas as sovereignty, water problems, and Kirkuk. One significant problem was the sovereignty issue for Iraq, particularly following the operations made by Turkey within Iraqi borders to chase PKK terrorists. Another problem was the sharing of water sources, mainly stemming from different perspectives on the usage of water sources. While Iraq sees Turkey acting unilaterally on the Tigris and Euphrates waters, which are seen as international waters, the Turkish side sees the problem as waters crossing borders. Last, but not least, Kirkuk has always posed a

---


19 Veysel Ayhan, ed. Türkiye - Irak İlişkileri: ABD Sonrası İşbirliği ve Sorun Alanları (Turkey - Iraq Relations: Cooperation and Problem Areas after USA), Türkiye'nin Değişen Dış Politikası (Turkey's Changing Foreign Policy) (Ankara: 2010), 396-97.

problem in Turkey–Iraq relations. Due to the Turkmen population living in this oil-rich region, Turkey has always observed the rights of the Turkish population in Kirkuk. Turkey’s stance, however, has always been met with suspicion by Arab and Kurdish populations in Iraq.  

As is the case for other relations in the region, Turkey’s relations with Iraq can hardly be separated from Iran’s relations with Iraq. Some Iranian scholars argue that Iran’s foreign policy towards Iraq is based on two pillars: establishing security and creating economic-cultural opportunities. This approach has resulted in an understanding of the relations as balance of interests after the invasion of Iraq.

*Relations with Iran*

While Turkey’s relations with Iraq followed a fluctuating pattern during and after the U.S. invasion, relations with Iran were also affected by the status of Iran in the West. A general description of Turkey’s relations with Iran starts with the unchanged border for several centuries. By some Iranian scholars, this relationship has been described as “essentially peaceful, without ever being warm.” Turkey has two consulate generals (Tebriz and Urumiye) in addition to the embassy in Tehran, while Iran has Istanbul, Erzurum, and Trabzon consulate generals in addition to the embassy in Ankara. 

---

21 Ayhan, *Türkiye - Irak İlişkileri: ABD Sonrası İşbirliği ve Sorun Alanları (Turkey - Iraq Relations: Cooperation and Problem Areas after USA).*

22 Kayhan Barzegar, "Iran’s Foreign Policy towards Iraq and Syria," *Turkish Policy Quarterly* 76(1979).


Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs states that the relations with Iran are developed on the basis of non-intervention in internal affairs, mutual respect, and good neighborhood.\(^{25}\)

Until the 18\(^{th}\) century, Turkish-Iranian relations were depicted by a struggle between the Shiism of Safavid dynasty and the Sunni orthodoxy of the Ottoman Empire.\(^{26}\) As agreements were reached between the two countries in the 1700s, relations became more stable and accommodating.\(^{27}\) Throughout the 20\(^{th}\) century, both states went through modernization processes and, with threat perceptions from great powers, did not confront with each other. Nun and Kibaroglu describe this as an effort by the regimes in both states to “consolidate their domestic power and to strengthen their regimes, at the same time trying to pursue an independent foreign policy.”\(^{28}\)

This non-amicable, but without confrontation, relationship tended to change following the 1979 regime change in Iran. Since then, Turkey has been suspicious of Iranian policies regarding a regime change in Turkey. In the early 1990s, Iran was accused of trying to export its regime to the neighborhood and some assassinations in Turkey were thought to be a consequence of these attempts. Secularist journalist Ugur Mumcu’ s assassination in front of his house was linked to an Iranian-based organization Kudus Ordusu (Jerusalem Army) by the prosecutor in the case.\(^{29}\) Other cases like Merve

\(^{25}\) TC Dışişleri Bakanlığı (Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs), "Iran Türkiye Siyasi İlişkileri (Iran - Turkey Political Relations)," http://www.mfa.gov.tr/turkiye-iran_siyasi-iliskileri.tr.mfa.


\(^{27}\) Mustafa Kibaroglu, ed. *Iran, Turkey's Neighborhood* (Ankara: Foreign Policy Instute, 2008).

\(^{28}\) Ibid.

Kavakci Affair\(^{30}\) and the Sincan Affair, where Iran’s ambassador’s speech caused anger in the more secular Turks, caused Iran to be seen as the actor behind the unrest in Turkey.

In addition to the mutual blaming in the 1990s, collapse of the Soviet Union also opened an area of rivalry between Iran and Turkey. Newly independent states in the former Soviet region had two choices: embrace a secular form of government like Turkey or adopt a more religious approach. For the most part, the second model came from Iran. Barkey sees Turkey’s attitude in this region as a more aggressive one compared to Iran.\(^{31}\)

However, it should be noted that Turkey had more linguistic and cultural bonds with the newly independent states.

This approach seems to have changed in the 2000s. As economic relations between Iran and Turkey increased, Turkish public opinion became to more favorable toward Iran.

German Marshall Fund’s findings, in this respect, indicate that the view against Iran was quite insignificant in Turkey. According to German Marshall Fund’s research, the vote against sanctions on Iran was not a surprise since “the plurality of Turks were not concerned (only 48 percent were concerned) about Iran acquiring nuclear weapons.” This contrast was even more significant when compared to the 86 percent in the U.S. and 79 percent in the EU.\(^{32}\) The report depicts the view in Turkey on Iran’s nuclear program as following:

\(^{30}\) Merve Kavakci was a female member of the parliament who insisted on wearing Islamic headdress when it was banned in the governmental places. Eventually she was barred from parliament and when her dual citizenship was discovered she was stripped of her Turkish citizenship.


The intensity of concern is substantial, as 49 percent of EU respondents and 69 percent of Americans were very concerned about Iran having nuclear weapons. In Turkey, roughly one-in-three (36 percent) were not at all concerned and only 18 percent were very concerned. When presented with multiple options for dealing with Iran’s nuclear program, one in four Turks were willing to accept that Iran could acquire nuclear weapons while only six percent of EU respondents and four percent in the United States were willing to do so. Considering Turkey has extensive economic ties with Iran, including tourism, it is not so surprising that support for economic sanctions on Iran was fairly low in Turkey (24 percent) compared to American (40 percent) support. Most Turks did not support meddling with Iran’s internal politics, as only six percent said that providing support to opponents of the current government in Iran would be the best option to prevent Iran from acquiring nuclear weapons. This option was fairly popular in the United States (25 percent).³³

As mentioned above, the trade between the two countries certainly has played an important role in this perception. Following the Iran-Iraq war, Turkey and Iran’s trade partnerships increased. Table 7 below indicates the trade volume between the two countries from 2001 to 2014.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>YEARS</th>
<th>IMPORTS</th>
<th>EXPORTS</th>
<th>TRADE VOLUME</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2001</td>
<td>839,800</td>
<td>360,536</td>
<td>1,200,336</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2002</td>
<td>920,972</td>
<td>333,962</td>
<td>1,254,934</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2003</td>
<td>1,860,683</td>
<td>533,786</td>
<td>2,394,469</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2004</td>
<td>1,962,059</td>
<td>813,031</td>
<td>2,775,090</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2005</td>
<td>3,469,706</td>
<td>912,940</td>
<td>4,382,646</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2006</td>
<td>5,626,610</td>
<td>1,066,902</td>
<td>6,693,512</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2007</td>
<td>6,615,394</td>
<td>1,441,190</td>
<td>8,056,584</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2008</td>
<td>8,199,689</td>
<td>2,029,760</td>
<td>10,229,449</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2009</td>
<td>3,405,986</td>
<td>2,024,546</td>
<td>5,430,532</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

³³ Ibid.
Table 7 Continued

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>YEARS</th>
<th>IMPORTS</th>
<th>EXPORTS</th>
<th>TRADE VOLUME</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2010</td>
<td>7,645,008</td>
<td>3,044,177</td>
<td>10,689,185</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2011</td>
<td>12,461,532</td>
<td>3,589,635</td>
<td>16,051,167</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2012</td>
<td>11,964,779</td>
<td>9,921,602</td>
<td>21,886,381</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2013</td>
<td>10,383,217</td>
<td>4,192,511</td>
<td>14,575,728</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2014</td>
<td>9,126,133</td>
<td>3,412,065</td>
<td>12,538,198</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Turkish Ministry of Customs and Trade

The change in Turkish public opinion favoring Iran has also been explained with the rise of political Islam in Turkish society along with the rise in the opinion that Turkey should act in closer cooperation with the Middle Eastern countries. The report by the German Marshall Fund on transatlantic trends shows this change. A 2010 finding of the report claims that more than half of the Turkish population think that Turkey should act alone or act with the Middle Eastern countries. Those who think that Turkey should act with the countries of the Middle East has rose from 10 to 20 percent from 2009 to 2010, while the percentage of those who think Turkey should act alone dropped from 43 to 34 percent in the same period.

Energy has naturally played an important role in Turkish-Iranian relations. Thirty-five percent of Turkey’s crude oil and 18 percent of natural gas comes from Iran. Thus, Iran is the primary supplier of oil for Turkey and the second supplier of natural gas, after Russia. The rise in relations with Iran also coincides with the growing energy demand in

36 Trends, "Key Findings."
Turkey.

**Relations with Syria**

The third Middle Eastern state in Turkey’s neighborhood for the analysis of the development of relations is Syria. Turkey’s relations with Syria have also followed a fluctuating pattern. Unlike Iran, during the Cold War years, Syria was in the Eastern Bloc camp and had very little relations with Turkey. However, in the Iran-Iraq war, Syria supported Iran. Syria also became a member of the American-led coalition during the Gulf War. Syria’s success in its pragmatist foreign policy was seen as a significant success of an irredentist fragile state, which came up as an artificial entity in the neighborhood of stronger states.

Despite the problematic environment after the collapse of the Soviet Union, Syria was able to survive the transition period in the 1990s. Assad’s foreign policy steered Syria away from a fate similar to that of other states like Romania and Yugoslavia. In this period, Turkey mostly saw Syria as an enemy, which protected and abated the head of the terrorist organization PKK.

Another long-lasting conflict between Turkey and Syria was the Hatay province, which had joined Turkey with a plebiscite in 1939 (Syria claimed the territory). As in the case for Iraq, the use of water has also been a problem area between the two states. Turkey had built new dams in the region and the decrease that this caused in the flow of

---

Euphrates created tensions in Turkey–Syria relations.\footnote{Ibid.}

Turkey began a growing alliance with Israel in the 1990s and this left Syria more fragile during this period. This tension is considered to be a response to the growing tension between the two states, which turned into a confrontation in 1998. Assad’s backing down in the confrontation caused the PKK leader to leave Syria and afterwards, a development started in Turkey’s relations with Syria.

Despite the betterment of relations after 1998, they could not be considered a partnership. Ankara and Damascus were both against the invasion of Iraq in 2003. However, Syria did not provide logistic support to the U.S., and did not limit the activities of former Baathist insurgents in its territory.\footnote{Veysel Ayhan, "Türkiye-Suriye İlişkilerinde Yeni Bir Dönem: Yüksek Düzeyli Stratejik İşbirliği Konseyi (A new period in Turkey-Syria Relations: High Level Strategic Cooperation Council)," \textit{Ortadoğu Analiz}, Kasim 9(2009).}

During this period, developments in the region offered several foreign policy choices for both parties. As the invasion of Iraq brought the risk of disintegration of the country, Turkey and Syria were faced with a similar threat. Thus, the threat perception about a new state in Iraq caused a rapprochement for both countries. However, this was not sufficient to create a strategic partnership.\footnote{Ibid.}

Syria, which did not support the invasion of Iraq, met with an international pressure to withdraw from Lebanon in 2003 and 2004. The UN resolution in 2004 stated that the Security Council declared support for a free and fair presidential election in Lebanon and called for withdrawal of foreign forces in Lebanon.\footnote{UN Resolution, "Resolution 1559 (http://www.un.org/press/en/2004/sc8181.doc.htm)." At this time, Turkey offered strong support to Syria despite the policies of the European Union and the United
States to the contrary. First, then Prime Minister Erdoğan visited Damascus in December 2004 to meet his counterpart Naci Otri. During this visit Erdoğan delivered the good news that more water from the Tigris river would flow to Syria, a common dam on the Asi river was discussed, and a deal on Arab gas was made.⁴⁴ A year later, in April 2005, Turkish president Ahmet Necdet Sezer visited Syria.⁴⁵ This visit came at a time when tensions with the U.S. had escalated following the murder of former Lebanese prime minister Hariri and the supposed Syrian influence in Lebanon.⁴⁶

This optimism was in line with the “zero problem with neighbors” policy of foreign minister Davutoglu for a while. Turkey and Syria enjoyed good neighborly relations with several official visits and an increasing volume of trade. Table 8 below indicates the trade between the two countries.

**Table 8: Turkey-Syria Trade Relations**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>YEAR</th>
<th>EXPORT</th>
<th>IMPORT</th>
<th>TRADE VOLUME</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1996</td>
<td>307,778</td>
<td>311,459</td>
<td>619,237</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1997</td>
<td>268,753</td>
<td>456,282</td>
<td>725,035</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1998</td>
<td>309,044</td>
<td>308,002</td>
<td>617,046</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1999</td>
<td>232,210</td>
<td>307,001</td>
<td>539,211</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2000</td>
<td>184,267</td>
<td>545,240</td>
<td>729,507</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2001</td>
<td>281,141</td>
<td>463,476</td>
<td>744,617</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2002</td>
<td>266,772</td>
<td>314,770</td>
<td>581,542</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2003</td>
<td>410,755</td>
<td>261,193</td>
<td>671,948</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2004</td>
<td>394,783</td>
<td>247,551</td>
<td>642,334</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2005</td>
<td>551,627</td>
<td>142,585</td>
<td>694,212</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

---

⁴⁵ Veli Güney, "Sezer Suriye'de kahramanlar gibi (Sezer is like heroes in Syria)," *Milliyet* 2005.
Table 8 Continued

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>YEAR</th>
<th>EXPORT</th>
<th>IMPORT</th>
<th>TRADE VOLUME</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2006</td>
<td>609,417</td>
<td>187,250</td>
<td>796,667</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2007</td>
<td>797,766</td>
<td>259,282</td>
<td>1,057,048</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2008</td>
<td>1,115,013</td>
<td>323,697</td>
<td>1,438,710</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2009</td>
<td>1,421,637</td>
<td>221,454</td>
<td>1,643,091</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2010</td>
<td>1,844,605</td>
<td>452,493</td>
<td>2,297,098</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2011</td>
<td>1,609,861</td>
<td>336,646</td>
<td>1,946,507</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2012</td>
<td>497,960</td>
<td>67,448</td>
<td>565,408</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2013</td>
<td>1,024,473</td>
<td>84,909</td>
<td>1,109,382</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2014</td>
<td>1,636,998</td>
<td>103,587</td>
<td>1,740,585</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Turkish Ministry of Customs and Trade

The Arab Spring deeply affected Turkey’s relations with Syria. As Ankara could not convince Assad to develop more democratic reforms in Syria, Turkey became one of the states favoring a regime change in Syria. This caused deeper deterioration of the relations.

Unlike its relations with Iran and Iraq, Turkey does not have an energy-related relationship with Syria. There was simply not enough time to develop this kind of relationship with Syria. Although Syria had been the eastern Mediterranean’s leading oil and natural gas producer once, the war caused a sharp decline in its oil production. Figure 12 below shows the oil consumption and production in Syria.

---

It can be argued that the betterment of relations with Syria after 2004 was also based on a pragmatist approach on both sides. Thus, neither a realist rivalry nor a constructivist “identity conflict” (There were deep worldview differences between Syria’s minority-controlled secular government and Turkey’s rather conservative government.) prevented the two sides from developing relations. However, the external factors of the Arab Spring resulted in a deep crack in relations.
Second Case: Turkish Foreign Policy in the South Caucasus

Another important case is Turkish foreign policy in the South Caucasus. Turkey had hot and cold relations with Armenia, Azerbaijan, and Georgia. The policy choices with these states also provide explanations for the motives of Turkish foreign policy in the period from 2000 to 2010. Although the relations with these states, especially Armenia and Azerbaijan, have deep historical routes, it can be argued that the foreign-policy choices made with these states reveals the motives behind the making of Turkish foreign policy.

Following the collapse of the Soviet Union, Ankara’s stance was to develop much closer relations with the former Soviet states. This stance was supported by Turkey’s Western allies mostly due to the fear of spreading Iranian fundamentalism in the region. In the first decade after the end of the Cold War, Turkey was presented as a model in the region. With wind of the Western support, Turkey wanted to create a Turkish sphere of influence in the region. This way, its importance as a frontline state during the Cold War would be sustained with the modern Western model image for the newly independent states.49

In Turkey’s relations with Armenia, there have been three main problem areas: The Armenian claims on the events of 1915, the invasion of Nagorno-Karabakh by Armenia, and the opening of border gates between Turkey and Armenia. Right after the Cold War, Turkey and Armenia developed good relations. In 1991, Turkey invited Armenia to be a founding member of the Black Sea Economic Cooperation Organization.

49 Krämer, A changing Turkey: the challenge to Europe and the United States: 97.
However, the invasion of Azerbaijan’s Nagorno-Karabakh in 1993 caused the end of this positive relationship.

Despite some steps like the opening of a church in Turkey’s Lake Van and the invitation of the Armenia’s Minister of Culture to the opening ceremony, and the start of flights from Armenia’s capital Erivan to Turkey’s resort town Antalya in 2007, or the so-called “cheese” and “football” diplomacies in 2008, the fragile nature of the relations did not allow for enduring rapprochement. The Azerbaijan-Armenia conflict has always dominated Turkish-Armenian relations, and the liberal explanation was not enough to restore relations. However, even the mentioned attempts for betterment of the relations is a significant clue to Turkey’s intent for more cooperation.

On the other hand, the deterioration of relations with Armenia can also be linked to Turkey’s need for Azerbaijani energy rather than the historical and cultural ties with this country. Turkey simply could not afford the deterioration of its relations with oil-rich Azerbaijan.

When it comes to Georgia, the relations were very much affected with the orientation of the Georgian government. Until the ousting of Gamsakhurdia, Turkey had an uneasy stance against Georgia, which was echoed by the pro-Abkhaz lobby in Turkey. The pro-Abkhaz lobby in Turkey caused Turkey to see Georgia as anti-Turkish, mostly due to its attitude towards Meskhetians.

However, as a principle, Ankara was always against self-determination and supported the territorial integrity of the states in its region. This was a natural consequence of Turkey’s problem within its own borders and its fight against PKK
separatist terrorism. However, the distance toward Georgia did not last long. When Georgia became more pro-Western, the importance of mutual dependence was appreciated by both countries. When it came to the export of Azerbaijani oil, Georgia and Turkey became even closer. Additionally, Georgia is involved in the Baku–Ceyhan and Baku–Erzurum oil and gas pipeline projects.

*Turkey’s Relations with Armenia*

Turkey’s relationship with Armenia happened to be one of the most problematic issues in the region. The historical problems related to the events of 1915, some claims of Armenia on the Eastern towns of Turkey, and the invasion of Nagorno Karabakh after the collapse of the Soviet Union made the relationship between these countries quite complicated.

Turkey was one of the first states to recognize Armenia’s independence on December 16, 1991. Turkey also provided humanitarian assistance and actively supported the integration of Armenia with some regional and Euro-Atlantic organizations. Likewise, Turkey invited Armenia to the Black Sea Economic Cooperation as a founding member although Armenia does not have a coast on the Black Sea.

However, these positive relations halted after Armenia invaded the Kelbeker Rayon of Azerbaijan on April 3, 1993. Following the invasion, Turkey tried to continue

---

51 Ibid.
52 Emre İşeri, *Türkiye'nin Yeni Dış Politika Etkinliğinin Kafkasya'daki Sınırları: Ermenistan Boyutu (The Limits of Turkey's New Foreign Policy Activism in Caucasus: Armenia Dimension), Türkiye'nin Değişen Dış Politikası (Turkey's Changing Foreign Policy)* (Ankara 2010).
with a peaceful attitude and requested that Armenia stop the invasion and withdraw its forces. Concurrently, in order to support Azerbaijan, Turkey gradually limited its relations with Armenia. Not having received a positive response from Armenia, Turkey decided to unilaterally close its expansive border with Armenia (Alican land border gate and Akyaka Railway Border Gate).

Another cause of the cessation of Turkey’s relations with Armenia was the issue related to some statements in Armenia’s “Independence Declaration” and “Constitution of Armenia.” The Declaration of Independence of Armenia contains the statement, “The Republic of Armenia stands in support of the task achieving international recognition of the 1915 Genocide in Ottoman Turkey and Western Armenia.” In this period Turkey’s government was accused of passivism and silence against this Armenian attitude by then president Turgut Ozal and all opposition parties in the Turkish parliament.

Thus, mostly due to Armenia’s relations with Azerbaijan and the manipulation of public opinion by several political sides in Turkey, Turkish–Armenian relations did not develop a great deal. However, with the belief that it would help the establishment of a regional cooperation environment and reinforce the stability in the region, Turkey unilaterally took further steps to first normalize and then develop its relations with Armenia. Within this framework, Turkey facilitated transportation to Armenia, provided flights to the Armenian capital Yerevan, and supported relations between non-governmental organizations.

---

54 The declaration of independence of Armenia can be found at the official web site of the Armenian government (http://gov.am/en/independence/)
55 Barış Özdal, Türkiye - Ermenistan İlişkileri ve Güney Kafkasya (Turkey - Armenia Relations and South Caucasus), Türkiye'nin Değişen Dış Politikası (Turkey's Changing Foreign Policy) (Ankara2010).
From 2007 on, Turkey’s efforts to develop good neighborly relations with Armenia have accelerated. This was in line with foreign policy advisor (later to be named minister of foreign affairs and prime minister) Ahmet Davutoğlu’s “zero problem with neighbors” policy. In March 2007, the Akdamar Church in Lake Van was restored by the Turkish government and several Armenian bureaucrats were invited to the opening ceremony. Within the same year, flights from Yerevan to Turkey’s resort town Antalya were also started.

In early 2008, so-called “cheese” diplomacy, and in the summer of 2008, “soccer” diplomacy took place. The first was project “Caucasian Cheese,” which cheese producers from Turkey, Azerbaijan, Georgia, and Armenia started in a fair in the Turkeyish town of Kars. When Turkey and Armenia happened to be in the same group for eliminations in the 2010 World Cup, Armenia’s president Serzh Sargsyan, who was elected in February 2008, invited Turkey’s president Abdullah Gul to Yerevan for the soccer match between Armenia and Turkey. This effort, however, did not materialize and ultranationalists on both sides worked to sabotage the normalization process.

The U.S. and the EU also affected Turkey’s relations with Armenia. Russia’s invasion of Georgia in 2008 deeply affected the conjecture in the Caucasus. Within this conjecture, Armenia and Turkey happened to take a similar stance. However, relations with Armenia could never be separated from relations between Turkey and Azerbaijan.

As events developed, Turkey had to make a choice between preserving its

---

57 Semih Idiz, "Ermenistan’la futbol diplomasisi kızışıyor (Soccer Diplomacy with Armenia is getting fierce)," *Milliyet*, 31 August 2009.
relations with its oil and natural gas rich brother nation Azerbaijan and developing better relations with Armenia with the support of the EU and the U.S.

In this period, Turkey barely had a trade relationship with Armenia. Table 9 below indicates the trade between Turkey and Armenia.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>YEAR</th>
<th>EXPORT</th>
<th>IMPORT</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2005</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>392</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2006</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>41</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2007</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>57</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2008</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>1489</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2009</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1052</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2010</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>2626</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2011</td>
<td>218</td>
<td>133</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2012</td>
<td>241</td>
<td>222</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2013</td>
<td>83</td>
<td>399</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2014</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>1349</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Turkish Ministry of Customs and Trade

In Armenia’s case, Turkey did not have any motive to develop better relations with Armenia apart from a desire to stabilize relations in its neighborhood and to regulate relations with the West. Yet, there were some attempts by Turkey to develop relations with Armenia.

Although there was almost no motive to develop relations there were motives to carefully control these relations. This will be analyzed in more detail in the section

dealing with Turkish–Azerbaijan relations. So far, it can be argued that Turkey’s energy relations with Azerbaijan happened to be more powerful and the centuries-old brotherhood between the two countries (expressed as “one nation, two states” in several official and non-official meetings).

Turkey’s Relations with Azerbaijan

Turkey’s relationship with Azerbaijan is probably stronger than that with any other friendly nation. This relationship is defined as one between the two states of a single nation. Among other Turkic languages, Azerbaijani is the closest to the Turkish spoken in Turkey.

Turkey was the first state to recognize Azerbaijan as it declared its independence on August 30, 1991. On January 24, 1992 the Friendship, Cooperation and Good Neighborhood Agreement was signed between Turkey and Azerbaijan following the Trade and Economic Cooperation agreement, which was signed on January 2, 1992. Within the same year, on November 2, 1992, an agreement regarding credit was signed between the two countries and the next year, on March 6, 1993 the Black Sea Economic Cooperation, Education, Culture, Science and Communication Agreement was signed.60

Currently, Turkey has its embassy in Baku and two consulate generals in Nahcivan and Gence, while Azerbaijan has consulate generals in Istanbul and Kars in addition to the embassy in Ankara.61 As indicated above, Turkey’s relations with

61 TC Dışişleri Bakanlığı (Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs), "Türkiye Azerbaycan Siyasi İlişkileri (Turkey - Azerbaijan Political Relations)," http://www.mfa.gov.tr/turkiye-azərbaycan-siyasi-iliskileri.tr.mfa.
Azerbaijan had very rarely included problems. Despite differences of opinion, almost all Turkish governments had friendly relations with Azerbaijan.

On August 16-17, 2010 Turkey’s president visited Azerbaijan and signed the “Strategic Partnership and Mutual Assistance” agreement. In September of the same year, at the summit of Heads of Turkish Speaking Countries, the declaration about the establishment of the High Level Strategic Cooperation Council was signed between Turkish Prime Minister Erdoğan and Azerbaijani President Ilham Aliyev. These two documents laid the legal foundation for the deepening of relations between the two countries.62 The first meeting of the High Level Strategic Cooperation Council was held in Izmir on October 25, 2011 and the second was held in Gebele on September 11, 2012.

Several agreements were signed in these two meetings.

The two states also actively promote cooperation in their regions. In this perspective, there have been Tripartite Meetings of ministers of foreign affairs. The Turkey-Azerbaijan-Iran tripartite meeting was held on March 7, 2012 in Naheivan, and the Turkey-Azerbaijan-Georgia tripartite meeting was held on June 8, 2012 in Trabzon.

The economic relations between Azerbaijan and Turkey were also developing day by day. By 2011, Turkey’s export to Azerbaijan was $2,65,166,000, while its import was $1,388,504,000.63 It is estimated that the total value of investment by the Turkish companies (their number exceeds 800) is above $3 billion. When the energy-related investments are also included this amount reaches more than $6 billion.64 Table 10 below

---

63 Affairs), "Türkiye Azerbaycan Siyasi İlişkileri (Turkey - Azerbaijan Political Relations)."
64 Ibid.
indicates the trade volume between Turkey and Azerbaijan.

Table 10: Turkey-Azerbaijan Trade Relations

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>YEAR</th>
<th>EXPORT</th>
<th>IMPORT</th>
<th>TRADE VOLUME</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2001</td>
<td>225,214</td>
<td>78,075</td>
<td>303,289</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2002</td>
<td>231,431</td>
<td>64,625</td>
<td>296,056</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2003</td>
<td>315,488</td>
<td>122,607</td>
<td>438,095</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2004</td>
<td>403,942</td>
<td>135,537</td>
<td>539,479</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2005</td>
<td>528,076</td>
<td>208,325</td>
<td>736,401</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2006</td>
<td>695,287</td>
<td>296,581</td>
<td>991,868</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2007</td>
<td>1,047,668</td>
<td>185,500</td>
<td>1,233,168</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2008</td>
<td>1,667,469</td>
<td>362,835</td>
<td>2,030,304</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2009</td>
<td>1,400,446</td>
<td>140,599</td>
<td>1,541,045</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2010</td>
<td>1,550,479</td>
<td>252,525</td>
<td>1,803,004</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2011</td>
<td>2,063,996</td>
<td>262,263</td>
<td>2,326,259</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2012</td>
<td>2,584,671</td>
<td>339,936</td>
<td>2,924,607</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2013</td>
<td>2,960,371</td>
<td>333,748</td>
<td>3,294,119</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2014</td>
<td>2,572,180</td>
<td>264,856</td>
<td>2,837,036</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Turkish Ministry of Customs and Trade

Following the collapse of the Soviet Union, the three consecutive governments of Azerbaijan had their own respective approaches to foreign policy. The first government of Muttalibov had a rather Russian-oriented foreign policy. His successor, Elchibey, preferred a policy promoting integration with Turkey and the West. After these two periods of transition, for quite a while, the dominant factor in Aliyevs’ Azerbaijan was a


balancing foreign policy. The crafty politician Haydar Aliyev designed a foreign policy that balanced the East, West, and Russia in a complicated manner. In this balancing period, Turkey’s relations with Azerbaijan had its ups and downs as well.

Yılmaz describes the permanent characteristics of the foreign policies of the three governments of Azerbaijan as follows: (1) The independence of the nation (2) Territorial integrity of the country (3) The solution of the Karabakh problem (4) Integration with the international institutions (5) Transition to the market economy.

Despite the constants in foreign policy, the means for reaching these goals differed widely between the three governments. In terms of security, an important factor that affected relations was the polarized political environment in the region, particularly in the South Caucasus. In this context, while Armenia was supported by Russia and Iran, Turkey was developing constructive relations with Georgia and Azerbaijan.67 Thus, having its foundation in the common culture and history, Turkey’s relations with Azerbaijan were also affected by the security concerns in the region.

However, Turkey’s policy of “zero problem with neighbors” made the relationship complicated when it appeared as a rapprochement with Armenia, whose invasion of a quarter of the Azerbaijani soil shaped the first three foreign-policy goals. In this context, Turkey could not afford to mend its relations with Armenia despite the strong objection from Azerbaijan. Turkey’s attempts at rapprochement with Armenia had come in the form of several meetings and a consequent protocol to be signed in Zurich for normalization of the relations. This rapprochement was strongly opposed in

Azerbaijan and despite Turkey’s assurances that the border gates would not be opened unless the Karabakh problem is solved, Azerbaijan preferred to impose some sanctions on Turkey.

In order to impose sanctions, Azerbaijan first used its energy weapon and regulated the gas prices. In 2008, Azerbaijan requested that the price of gas be raised. The minister of energy Taner Yildiz did not reveal the price due to the secrecy agreement, but did indicate that it would be more reasonable than the Russian gas.68 This was followed by economic sanctions on Turkish goods, pressure on the Turkish companies operating in Azerbaijan, and finally even the removal of flags, including those in the martyr cemeteries.69

The Baku–Tiblisi–Ceyhan (BTC) Pipeline is described as the main vein of the Turkish–Azeri partnership. With this energy project, Azerbaijan was able to get an export route for Caspian oil to the European markets. Its other options, Russia and Iran, had already proved unreliable, as the existing Baku-Novorossiysk route to the Russian port on the Black sea was economically inefficient and the Irani option carried with it American objections. The intergovernmental agreement in support of the pipeline was signed on November 18, 1999 during a meeting of the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) in Istanbul, Turkey. U.S. President Bill Clinton also participated in the agreement.70

Likewise, the Baku-Tbilisi-Erzurum pipeline was another project that reinforced

---

69 Yılmaz, "Türkiye-Azərbaycan əlişkərliyində Son Dönəm."
70 Hurriyet, "6 Milyar Dolarlık Imza (6 Billion Dollar Signature)," Hurriyet, 19 November 1999.
Turkish-Azeri relations. With this project, natural gas is transported from Azerbaijan to Turkey. The BTE pipeline agreement was signed in 2001. The aim of the project was to transport the gas produced in the Shah Deniz field of the Caspian Sea to Turkey via Georgia. The 690 km.-long pipeline was built between 2005 and 2007 and has been operational since then. The agreement was in force for 15 years and Turkey is to receive 6.6 billion cubic meters of natural gas per year although the pipeline is designed for the capacity of 16 billion cubic meters.

Another important project in Turkey’s energy relations with Azerbaijan is the Trans Anatolia Natural Gas Pipeline (TANAP) project. The two agreements for TANAP were signed in late October 2011 by Turkish Prime Minister Erdoğan and Azeri President Ilham Aliyev during the HLSC meeting. With the first agreement, Turkey is to buy the Shah Deniz II gas from Azerbaijan in 2017 and with the second agreement Azerbaijan is to transport Shah Deniz II gas to Turkey between 2017 and 2042. These agreements were especially important in contributing to the energy hub aspirations of Turkey. Turkey is expected to obtain re-export rights in the transport deal.

A careful look into Turkey’s relations with Azerbaijan shows that within the realm of Turkey’s pragmatist approach and Azerbaijan’s balancing policy there were some problematic issues despite the overall friendly nature of the relations. As Azerbaijan’s friendliness was taken for granted and Turkey initiated relations with Armenia regardless of Azerbaijan’s concerns, Baku’s first response was with its energy apparatus. This also affected Turkey’s relations with Georgia and caused a Turkish-Azeri-Georgian cooperation in the South Caucasus.
Turkey’s Relations with Georgia

As the Soviet Union collapsed, Turkey was one of the first countries to recognize Georgia’s independence on December 16, 1991. Within a few months, on May 21, 1992, a protocol on the Establishment of Diplomatic Relations between the two countries was signed. Soon, both countries opened embassies, and currently Georgia has two general consulates in Trabzon and Istanbul, while Turkey has a general consulate in Batumi.

Likewise, from education to economy, from culture to energy, several areas of cooperation exist between the two countries. The bilateral trade volume is around $1.4 billion and Turkey is the biggest trade partner for Georgia. Table 11 below shows trade relations between Turkey and Georgia.

Table 11: Turkey-Georgia Trade Relations

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>YEAR</th>
<th>EXPORT</th>
<th>IMPORT</th>
<th>TRADE VOLUME</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2001</td>
<td>144,049</td>
<td>127,231</td>
<td>271,280</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2002</td>
<td>103,221</td>
<td>137,873</td>
<td>241,094</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2003</td>
<td>155,070</td>
<td>268,562</td>
<td>423,632</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2004</td>
<td>199,699</td>
<td>300,284</td>
<td>499,983</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2005</td>
<td>271,828</td>
<td>289,834</td>
<td>561,662</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2006</td>
<td>407,962</td>
<td>344,813</td>
<td>752,775</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2007</td>
<td>646,082</td>
<td>289,568</td>
<td>935,650</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2008</td>
<td>997,844</td>
<td>525,041</td>
<td>1,522,885</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2009</td>
<td>762,977</td>
<td>285,486</td>
<td>1,048,463</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2010</td>
<td>769,271</td>
<td>290,725</td>
<td>1,059,996</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2011</td>
<td>1,092,321</td>
<td>314,352</td>
<td>1,406,673</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2012</td>
<td>1,253,309</td>
<td>180,351</td>
<td>1,433,660</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

72 Ibid.
Table 11 Continued

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>YEAR</th>
<th>EXPORT</th>
<th>IMPORT</th>
<th>TRADE VOLUME</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2013</td>
<td>1,245,917</td>
<td>201,738</td>
<td>1,447,655</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2014</td>
<td>1,302,301</td>
<td>208,860</td>
<td>1,511,161</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Turkish Ministry of Customs and Trade

After making some regulations on the visa requirements between the two countries, Turkey and Georgia signed a protocol that allows the citizens of both countries to travel with national identifications. Thus, Batumi airport is jointly operated by Turkey and Georgia. Turkish citizens traveling to the nearby town of Batumi use this airport in their trips from the western towns of Turkey.

The friendly environment between Turkey and Russia is very much reinforced with the energy relations between the two countries. The Baku–Tbilisi–Ceyhan crude-oil pipeline and the Baku–Tbilisi–Erzurum natural-gas pipeline have served as the leverage for the strategic areas of cooperation between the two countries.

The two countries have also developed their cooperation in military areas. Turkey has contributed to the modernization of the Georgian Army. Turkey always had to be cautious in order to balance its relations with Georgia and Russia. While Turkey tried to develop closer relations with Georgia, in cases of Russian aggression Turkey could not provide full support for Georgia.

74 Hurriyet, "Bir Ulke ile daha vize kalkti (Visa requirement is abolished with another country)," http://www.hurriyet.com.tr/ekonomi/19349833.asp.
Azerbaijan has always been an inseparable part of Turkey’s relations with Georgia. As a recent conference indicated, “economic relations form the main pillar of the trilateral cooperation. This stems from Turkey’s demand for energy, Azerbaijan’s ability to supply this need, and Georgia’s geographical location, which enables the transit of Azerbaijan’s natural resources to Turkish as well as European markets.”\(^7\)

Thus, an overall assessment of Turkey’s relations in the South Caucasus region shows that all three variables shaped Turkish foreign policy in this region. Turkey’s identity has provided a lasting and close relationship with Azerbaijan and, to some extent, with Georgia. However, a threat perception for Russia was not enough to reinforce Turkey’s relations with Georgia. Turkey’s foreign policy attempts with Armenia were affected by the ongoing conflict between Azerbaijan and Armenia. As Turkey tried to develop closer relationships with Armenia, Azerbaijan’s objection, with energy as its impetus, was effective at halting a rapprochement. As in the case for the Middle East, the analysis suggests that Turkey’s relations in this region were also shaped by the need for energy.

*Turkish Foreign Policy in the Middle East and The Three Variables*

The first case for this study is Turkish foreign policy in the Middle East. Turkey’s relations with its Middle Eastern neighbors Iran, Iraq, and Syria were analyzed, revealing indicators for the influence of each variable on Turkish foreign policy in this region.

The foreign policy in the period of analysis was mostly shaped by the “strategic depth” notion of once advisor, then foreign minister, and lastly, prime minister Ahmet Davutoglu. As a consequence, stronger relations were developed with the Middle Eastern states, which were seen in the strategic-depth area of Turkey. However, a comparison of the countries provides more evidence of the effects of the three variables.

It is difficult to argue that Turkish foreign policy in this region was affected by the first variable, deterioration of Turkey’s relations with the West. On the contrary, the developments in the region (e.g. Turkish–American confrontation in the American invasion of Iraq, Turkey’s support for Iran’s nuclear energy quest, etc.) played a role in the deterioration of relations. Turkey’s “zero problem with neighbors” policy in this period created areas of cooperation with its Middle Eastern neighbors, but these good neighborly relations did not last due to unexpected developments in the region (e.g. Maliki government in Iraq, Assad’s response to the uprisings in Syria, and Iran’s responses to the deployment of NATO Patriot batteries in Turkey).

Unlike relations with Russia, relations with the Middle Eastern states had a Turkish dominance, thus rather than a post-frustration rapprochement, rapprochements with these countries were based on deliberate Turkish foreign policy planning, which seems not to have succeeded. Iran, however, may be considered an exception in this equation. Rapprochement with Iran seems to have been influenced by such a frustration, considering the declarations from the secular circles in Turkey for the consideration of alliance with this state alongside China and Russia.

Although the explanation of “deterioration of relations with the West” seeks cooperation with other strong countries, it does not fully explain Turkish foreign policy in
the Middle East, except for the case of Iran. Still, because relations with Iran did not develop in these times of frustration but, rather, after 2010, when Turkey independently developed these relations, this variable still does not explain Turkish foreign policy in the Middle East.

The second variable was based on the threat perception in the region. While in Turkish–Russian relations, this threat perception was felt in the Black Sea and the Caucasus regions, a similar threat perception could be observed in the Middle East where the U.S. had been involved for decades and preferred to act unilaterally, particularly since the invasion of Iraq in 2003. Furthermore, for the analyzed Middle Eastern countries (Iran, Iraq, and Syria) the issue was more than just perception. Syria and Iran did not have friendly relations with the U.S. for decades. Iraq has been invaded and even the post-U.S. invasion governments had problems with the U.S. Thus, looking into Turkey’s relations with the states of the region it could be argued that “threat perception” has also been a significant factor in Turkey’s relations in the region. However, as seen in the deployment of Patriots in Turkey and the effects of the Arab Spring in Syria, Turkey’s threat perception regarding the mentioned Middle Eastern states was stronger than the perception of the U.S. as a threat in this region. Even though American presence in the region was not welcome, Turkey’s stance against this was not as strong as the one in the Black Sea and Caucasus region.

The third variable was based on the liberal argument that claims that Turkey’s need for energy has been a prominent factor in Turkey’s relations with the countries in the region. As seen in the comparison of relations with the energy-rich Iran and Syria, while Turkey strongly opposed the regime in Syria, it was more accommodating to
Tehran. Despite the occasional aggressive rhetoric from the Iranian government, the trade relations between Turkey and Iran did not decrease in this period. Furthermore, although Turkey has always considered the existence of a Kurdish State in the north of Iraq as a red line in its foreign policy, energy trade with the local government in the north of Iraq has even deteriorated Turkey’s relations with Iraq’s central government.

*Turkish Foreign Policy in the South Caucasus and The Three Variables*

Looking into Turkey’s foreign policy in the South Caucasus, one sees that there have been attempts in line with the “zero problem with neighbors” policy in this region as well. However, the external circumstances have continuously shaped the foreign policy choices in this region.

The region has been an area of rivalry between the West (mainly the U.S.) and Russia, which considers the region its near abroad after the collapse of the Soviet Union. Thus, Turkey’s foreign policy choices have been vastly affected by this rivalry. This region has not been as disastrous as the Middle East, however, it was mostly occupied with frozen conflicts. Armenia’s decade-long invasion of Azerbaijan, Georgia’s problems with its ethnically diverse population, and historically bitter memories in the region made relations within the region even more complicated. In this environment, each country in the region was also affected by the mentioned Great Power rivalry. Armenia was backed by Russia in its invasion of Azerbaijan, but, due to the Armenian lobby in the U.S., it also had a chance to influence American foreign policy. Georgia and Azerbaijan had relations with both Russia and the U.S. until the 2008 invasion of Georgia by Russia.

In this setting, the three variables had differing influences on the foreign policy
choices of Turkey in the region. The first variable, deterioration of Turkey’s relations with the West, did not have a great influence on Turkey’s choices in the region. Since with its population and economy Turkey has been the dominant side in its relations with each of the countries in the region, Turkey did not approach any of these countries for a balancing policy. Furthermore, none of the countries in the region had an anti-American status.

Only Georgia could be a location where the threat perception could be observed. Since neither Armenian nor Azerbaijani governments were affected by the color revolutions there was not an occasion to perceive such a threat. In Georgia’s case, the post-color revolution government only developed stronger relations with Turkey, which led to more influence in the region, extension of the “zero problems” policy, and its reinforcement of Turkey’s stronger role in the region.

Energy appears to be a strong explanation for Turkish foreign policy in this region as well. This is seen in Turkey’s relations with the only energy-rich state in the region, Azerbaijan. It is not possible to explain Turkey’s strong relations with Azerbaijan with regard to energy since these two countries already had strong historical and cultural bonds as expressed in the “one nation two states” motto. However, Azerbaijan’s use of energy as leverage in Turkish–Armenian relations is the indicator in this case. The centuries-old Turkish–Azerbaijani brotherhood was threatened when Turkey unilaterally opted to develop its relations with Armenia disregarding Azerbaijan–Armenia relations. Neither cultural nor historical bonds were sufficient to conserve Turkish-Azeri brotherhood in such an environment. On the other hand, Azerbaijani energy was a strong impetus for Turkey to consider its Armenian policy. Thus, more than developing its
already strong relationship with Azerbaijan, energy played an important factor in curbing Turkey’s relations with Armenia despite Azerbaijan.

The analysis of Turkish foreign policy in the South Caucasus strongly indicates that, more than any other variable, energy has served as a dominant factor in shaping and balancing Turkish foreign policy in this region. While energy has served as the proactive force behind Turkey’s relations in the Middle East, it served as the reactive force in checking and balancing Turkish foreign policy in the region.
CHAPTER VIII
ANALYSIS AND CONCLUSION

This dissertation started with an attempt to answer one main question: What was the drive behind the unexpected rapprochement between Russia and Turkey after the Cold War. Although this question needed to be answered from two perspectives (Russian and Turkish perspectives) the main focus in this dissertation has been the Turkish perspective. As with many such questions, there were several answers. A thorough examination of all the answers showed that they could not be categorized into three groups, each of which represented a certain offshoot of the three mainstream international relations theories-realism, liberalism and constructivism.

With further scrutiny, the focus of this work has settled on the liberal perspective that is founded on the energy relation between Russia and Turkey or, more specifically, Turkey’s need for energy. Thus, the main question of this dissertation manifested itself as: To what extent did energy play a role in Turkish–Russian rapprochement within the first decade of the third millennium.

The end of the Cold War was the main force behind the rapprochement. However, this kind of rapprochement did not take place between every rival. Furthermore, Turkish–Russian rivalry, if not enmity, was not limited to the Cold War. For centuries, these two nations experienced several conflicts and bitterly fought against one another.

Although several scholars had accepted the existence of such a rapprochement, this work looked into more concrete instances to explain it. The rapprochement has been observed in several areas from military relations to tourism.
The trend in the economic development of Turkey indicates a strong motive for Turkey’s need for energy. And this need is predominantly met by Russian sources of energy. Turkey’s foreign policy choices in two other areas of significant foreign policy activism were analyzed as case studies in this dissertation. These two cases further supported the argument that energy has been a dominant factor in Turkey’s foreign policy choices and served as the main factor for Turkish-Russian rapprochement.

**Turkey’s Economy Before and After Rapprochement**

Turkey’s gross domestic product was around $200 billion in 2000 and increased to almost $800 billion a decade later. In 2000, Turkey imported predominantly from Europe, at around 60 percent); This decreased to 50 percent within the same decade. The rise in Turkey’s economy is very significant in the period of analysis.

**Turkey’s Energy Consumption Before and After Rapprochement**

Turkey’s petroleum consumption also rose during this period, from 614,000 barrels in 2001 to 728,000 barrels in 2013. The rise was more significant in terms of natural gas, which Turkey primarily imported from Russia (56 percent). The natural gas consumption in Turkey went up from 600 billion cubic feet per year to 1.6 trillion cubic feet per year.

**Turkey’s Relations with the West Before and After Rapprochement**

Another significant change was in Turkey’s relations with the West during the
mentioned period. For the Westerners (people who see Turkey’s future in its status as a Western/European country) in Turkey, this has been a vicious circle. As Turkey separated itself from the West, it got closer to Russia, and as its relations with Russia improved, its distance from the West increased. While in the early 2000s Turkey’s several attempts were applauded by the Western media, after a decade of multilateral relations, Turkey is now widely criticized by the Western media and there is a widening gap between Turkey and the West in the eyes of several Western observers.

**American Foreign Policy in the Black Sea and the Caucasus Before and After Rapprochement**

American foreign policy in the Black Sea and the Caucasus region also significantly increased during this period. The regime changes in the region were mostly interpreted as a U.S. policy. The color revolutions caused regime changes for Georgia in 2003, for Ukraine in December 2004 and for Kyrgyzstan in March 2005. Within the same period the U.S. attempted to gain membership for the Ukraine and Georgia in NATO. All these U.S. policies were met with caution by both Turkey and Russia.

**American Image in Turkey Before and After Rapprochement**

While there have been several different opinion polls about the American image in Turkey, Pew Research indicates that the favorable view of the U.S. in 2002 saw a decline the following decade. While 30 percent of the Turks had a favorable view of the U.S. in 2002, this dropped to 10 percent in 2011 (see Figure 13). On the other hand, the view of Russia showed a steady increase and became almost equal to that of the U.S., a
long-time ally with Turkey see (see Figure 14). Similarly, a survey conducted by EDAM (Center for Economics and Foreign Policy Studies) in 2013 shows that a military intervention by the U.S. and Israel in order to prevent Iran from getting nuclear weapons comes second after the foundation of an independent Kurdish state in the southern part of Turkey in the order of biggest threats for Turkish public opinion.¹

**Figure 13: View of the U.S. in Turkey**

![Bar chart showing percent of Turks having a favorable view of the U.S. from 2002 to 2014.](source)

Source: Pew Research Center²

---

¹ [http://www.edam.org.tr/Media/Files/85/EdamAnket20131_3ENG.pdf](http://www.edam.org.tr/Media/Files/85/EdamAnket20131_3ENG.pdf)

Evolution of Turkish Foreign Policy in the Middle East

Within the mentioned period Turkey’s foreign policy in the Middle East showed strong indicators that energy was a predominant factor in its foreign-policy making. For the analysis of Turkish foreign policy in the Middle East, Turkey’s relations with its three neighbors (Iran, Iraq, and Syria) were analyzed. All three states experienced turbulent times between 2000 and 2014. Iran, which has been confronting the West since the 1979 Revolution, continued to pursue its nuclear program in this period. Iraq went through a devastating war and suffered threats of separation. Syria, which seemed the most stable country for a while, collapsed after the Arab uprisings.

Under all these circumstances, the making of Turkish foreign policy seems to have been greatly affected by the need for energy. The hostile nature of Turkish–Iranian relations in the 1990s (mostly shadowed by Iran’s regime export policies) was replaced

Source 1: Pew Research Center

http://www.pewglobal.org/database/indicator/27/country/224/
with more amiable relations. Turkey became a defender of Iran’s pursuit of a nuclear program. Despite its red lines on the existence of an autonomous state in the north of Iraq, Turkey’s need for energy prompted cooperation with this region as well. On the other hand, Syria, which did not provide such opportunities in terms of energy, could not sustain strong relations with Turkey.

**Evolution of Turkish Foreign Policy in the South Caucasus**

The three countries of the South Caucasus maintained different imperatives for their relations with Turkey. While Azerbaijan, with its brother nation status, was on one end, Armenia with its historical problems with Turkey, was on the other end. Georgia’s relations with Turkey, on the other hand, were mostly shaped by the orientation of the government in Georgia.

In Turkey’s relations with the South Caucasian states, energy did not become a determining factor. However, at certain moments, Turkish foreign policy choices were also affected by Turkey’s need for energy. Armenia, which was kept out of the equation, did not develop any relationship with Turkey despite the pressures from the West and Russia’s support of improvement in the relations.

Georgia’s good relations with Turkey were mostly reinforced by its participation in the energy projects between Turkey and Azerbaijan. When it comes to Azerbaijan, although several factors required a strong friendship between Turkey and Azerbaijan, and this relation was supported with energy deals, at certain moments, Turkey’s rapprochement with Armenia was also controlled by energy in Azerbaijan. Turkey’s attempts for reconciliation of its relations with Armenia were checked by Azerbaijan and
Turkey’s need for Azeri energy appears to have influenced Turkey’s relations with Armenia as well.

Conclusion

This study has reviewed the unexpected Turkish–Russian rapprochement from 2000 to 2014 and has explored the motives for this rapprochement, which would reveal the theoretical explanation for Turkey’s relations with Russia. While each of the main factors (variables) appeared to have influenced Turkish-Russian rapprochement, the case studies on Turkish foreign-policy choices in other areas of interest for Turkey significantly support that Turkey’s need for energy is the main factor for shaping Turkish foreign policy in this period.

Both Turkey’s relations in the Middle East and South Caucasus were in some degree affected by the motives that shaped Turkish–Russian rapprochement. These motives (deterioration of Turkey’s relations with the West, perception of the U.S. as a threat in the region, and Turkey’s need for energy) have worked on different levels in affecting the relations with specific countries in the region.

Although every country has its own unique conditions and its relations with Turkey are bound to several factors, once the motives of Turkish-Russian rapprochement are tested in these relations, it appears that Turkey’s need for energy has served plays a significant role. Thus, this study argues that there is strong evidence that Turkey’s need for energy has served as the most significant factor in Turkish–Russian rapprochement. This is but one layer in what requires a multi-layered effort to understand the motives of Turkish foreign policy. Future work might analyze why energy has become such a strong
factor, whether it is related to domestic politics, and, if so, how. The need exists for further understanding of the contours of Turkish foreign policy in a complicated, mostly hostile and volatile environment in a time of great turbulence.
REFERENCES


———. "Iran Türkiye Siyasi İlişkiler (Iran - Turkey Political Relations)." http://www.mfa.gov.tr/turkiye-iran_siyasi-iliskileri.tr.mfa.


———. "Iran’s Foreign Policy Towards Iraq and Syria." *Turkish Policy Quarterly* 76 (1979): 77.


Cornell, Svante E. "What Drives Turkish Foreign Policy?". Middle East Quarterly (2012).


Çelik, Yasemin. Contemporary Turkish Foreign Policy. Greenwood Publishing Group, 1999.


Oguzlu, T. "Turkey and Europeanization of Foreign Policy?". Political Science Quarterly 125, no. 4 (2010): 657-83.


Olson, R. "The Kurdish Question and Chechnya: Turkish and Russian Foreign Policies since the Gulf War." Middle East Policy 4, no. 3 (1996): 106.


Özcan, Mesut. "From Distance to Engagement: Turkish Policy Towards the Middle East, Iraq and Iraqi Kurds." Insight Turkey 13, no. 2 (2011): 71-92.


Öztürk, Asiye. The Domestic Context of Turkey's Changing Foreign Policy Towards the Middle East and the Caspian Region. Dt. Inst. für Entwicklungspolitik, 2009.


Torbakov, I. "Russia and Turkish-Armenian Normalization: Competing Interests in the South Caucasus." Insight Turkey 12, no. 2 (2006).
"Russian-Turkish High-Level Joint Working Group Meets in Regular Session." [http://www.turkey.mid.ru/text_t76.html](http://www.turkey.mid.ru/text_t76.html).


APPENDIX A (THE CHRONOLOGY OF TURKISH RUSSIAN RELATIONS

(2000 - 2014))

[As mentioned by the Ankara Embassy of Russia]

09.20.2000 Russian Minister of Foreign Affairs Igor Ivanov Confers with Turkish Foreign Minister Ismail Cem

10.05.2000 Russia's Export Capabilities-2000 Exhibition held in Istanbul, Turkey

11.19.2001 Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation Igor Ivanov meets with Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Turkey Ismail Cem

10.18.2001 Chairman of the Government of the Russian Federation Mikhail Kasyanov made a working tour of the Krasnodar Krai (province) to have a look at the progress in constructing the Blue Stream gas pipeline.

06.07.2001 Russian Minister of Foreign Affairs Igor Ivanov's meeting with Media Representatives on Arrival in Ankara

06.08.2001 Speech by Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation Igor Ivanov at Meeting with Representatives of Turkey's Business Circles, Istanbul,

04.02.2001 Agreement on the Establishment of the Black Sea Naval Cooperation Task Force (Blackseafor) was signed in Istanbul.

04.25.2001 Pro-Chechen gunmen hold 120 people, including 54 Americans, before surrendering after 12 hours of negotiations in Turkey.

04.28.2001 Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation Igor Ivanov meets with Minister of Foreign Affairs of Turkey Ismail Cem

10.01.2001 Russia's President Vladimir Putin and President of the Republic of Turkey Ahmet Necdet Sezer Talk on the Phone
04.03.2002 Russian Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs Sergey Razov Meets with Nabi Sensoy, Turkish Ambassador in Moscow

04.09.2002 Russian Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs Alexander Saltanov Meets Turkish Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs Ali Tuigan

05.28.2002 Russian President Vladimir Putin Sends a Congratulatory Message to President of the Republic of Turkey Ahmet Necdet Sezer on Occasion of 10th Anniversary of the Signing of the Treaty on the Foundations of Relations Between the Russian Federation and the Republic of Turkey

06.05.2002 Meeting of the Russian Defense Minister Sergei Ivanov with Chief of the General Staff of the Armed Forces of Turkey H. Kıvrıkoğlu

06.08.2001 Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation Igor Ivanov’s Remarks at Joint Press Conference on Results of Talks with Turkish Minister of Foreign Affairs Ismail Cem, Ankara

06.25.2002 Russian-Turkish Consultations Concerning a Cyprus Settlement

07.03.2002 Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation Sergei Razov Meets with Kurtulus Taskent, the New Turkish Ambassador to Moscow

09.12.2002 Russian Minister of Foreign Affairs Igor Ivanov Meets with Turkish Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of Foreign Affairs Sukru Sina Gurel

09.11.2002 Russian Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs Yevgeny Gusarov Meets with Turkish Ambassador to Moscow Kurtulus Taskent

09.20.2002 Russian Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs Andrei Denisov Meets with Turkish Ambassador to Moscow Kurtulus Taskent

09.20.2002 Russian Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs Alexander Saltanov
Meets with Turkish Ambassador to Moscow Kurtulus Taskent

10.14.2002 Russian First Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs Vyacheslav Trubnikov Meets with Turkish Ambassador to Moscow Kurtulus Taskent

10.29.2002 Statement by Alexander Lebedev, the Russian Ambassador to Turkey, Regarding the Terrorist Act in Moscow, October 29, 2002

11.04.2002 Alexander Yakovenko, the Official Spokesman of Russia's Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Answers a Question from Russian Media About Turkey's Reaction to the Terrorist Act in Moscow

11.11.2002 Alexander Yakovenko, the Official Spokesman of Russia's Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Answers a Question from Russian Media Concerning the Expulsion from Turkey of Chechen Terrorist B. Z. Arslangereyev

11.21.2002 Decision by Turkish Authorities to Ban Entry into Country of Leaders of Terrorist Formations Operating in Chechnya

12.02.2002 Russian Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs Sergei Razov Meets with Turkish Ambassador to Moscow Kurtulus Taskent

12.25.2002 Russian President Vladimir Putin meets Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, Leader of Turkey's Justice and Development Party, the Kremlin, Moscow, December 24, 2002

12.23.2002 Press Conference Organized by the "Representation of the Freedom and Democracy Congress of Kurdistan in Russia and the CIS"

03.25.2003 Russian President Vladimir Putin Speaks to Turkish Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdoğan by Telephone

05.05.2003 Russia’s statement in Connection with to Earthquake in Turkey
05.12.2003 Russian-Turkish Cyprus Settlement Consultations

06.04.2003 Russian Minister of Foreign Affairs Igor Ivanov Meets with Turkish Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of Foreign Affairs Abdullah Gul

07.01.2003 Gazprom CEO Yuri Kamarov’s statements regarding the Blue Stream project

07.19.03 "The Chechen Republic is an integral part of the Russian Federation". (Article by P.Stegniy, the Ambassador of the Russian Federation to Turkey was published in *Turkish Daily News*, 19.07.03)

09.16.2003 Russian Turkish high level common working group meeting.

09.17.2003 Russian Federation Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs A.V. Saltanov meets A. Tuygan, Turkish Deputy Counselor of Foreign Affairs.

10.17.2003 Russian President V.V. Putin meets Turkish President Ahmet Necdet Sezer in his working trip to Malaysia.

11.12.2003 Russian Federation Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs S. Razov has an interviewed with Moscow Representative of Turkish news agency Anatolia Agency.

11.13.2003 Russian Federation Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs S. Razov ‘s article in Turkish Daily news newspaper: “Russia optimistic on Turkish gas deal”

11.15.2003 Terrorist bombings in Istanbul and the statement made by the Russian spokesman of Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

11.18.2003 Russian Federation Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs S. Razov ‘s meeting with Turkish Industry and Businessmen Association (TUSIAD) members.

11.20.2003 Completion of the talks between GAZPROM and BOTAS on the transfer of Russian natural gas to Turkey.
11.20.2003 Russian President V.V. Putin talks to Turkish Prime Minister R.T. Erdoğan on the phone.

12.10.2003 Russian Federation Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs S.S. Razov takes a working trip to Turkey.


12.25.2003 Russian-Turkish counseling.

01.17.2004 1853-56 Memorial ceremony for the soldiers who lost their lives in the Crimean War (1853-56) and the Russian-Ukrainian events in Turkey.

02.26.2004 Turkish Minister of Foreign Affairs A. Gül visits Russia.

02.26.2004 Russian President V.V. Putin talks to Turkish Prime Minister R.T. Erdoğan on the phone.


03.03.2004 Russian Ambassador to Turkey P. Stegniy addresses the participants of the Black Sea Forum on the business cooperation development

03.10.2004 Russian–Turkish conference on “Cooperation in the Eurasia”

03.30.2004 Alexander Yakovenko, the Spokesman of Russia's Ministry of Foreign Affairs makes a statement regarding Cyprus Negotiations

04.21.2004 Russian Federation Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs Y. V. Fedotov meets with Turkish Ambassador to Russia K. Taşkent.

04.21.2004 Statement by Gennady Gatilov, Acting Permanent Representative of the Russian Federation to the UN, Security Council Meeting on Cyprus

04.28.2004 Russian Federation Minister of Foreign Affairs Lavrov talks to Turkish Deputy Prime Minister A. Gül on the phone.

04.30.2004 Russian Federation president V.V. Putin talks to Turkish Prime Minister T.T. Erdoğan on the phone.

05.11.2004 Russian Federation Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs Y.V. Fedotov meets Turkish Ambassador K. Taskent.

05.14.2004 Russian President Putin writes a letter emphasizing the importance of cooperation between the two countries to Turkish Prime Minister R.T. Erdoğan.

05.17.2004 Russian Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs S.S.S Razov visits Turkey Rusya.

06.16.2004 Russian Minister of Foreign Affairs S.V. Lavrov meets Turkish Minister of Foreign Affairs A. Gül.

06.16.2004 Interview of Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation Sergey Lavrov, Granted to the Anatolian News Agency

06.16.2004 Speech by Russian Minister of Foreign Affairs Sergey Lavrov at the 31st Session of Foreign Ministers of the Organization of the Islamic Conference

06.17.2004 Russian Minister of Foreign Affairs Sergey Lavrov Meets with Mehmet Ali Talat, General Chairman of the Republican People's Party of the Turkish Cypriot Community

06.28.2004 Foreign Ministers of the NATO-Russia Council met in Istanbul. Taking stock of two years of accomplishments in the NRC framework, they reiterated
their adherence to the goals, principles and commitments contained in the Founding Act, the Rome Declaration and past NRC decisions, and their determination to stand together against shared threats.

11.23.2004 Russian Minister of Foreign Affairs Sergey Lavrov Meets with Turkish Minister of Foreign Affairs Abdullah Gul

12.23.2004 Russian-Turkish High-Level Joint Working Group Meets in Regular Session

12.31.2004 Vladimir Putin held a telephone conversation with Prime Minister of Turkey Recep Tayyip Erdoğan

01.10.2005 The Prime Minister of the Republic of Turkey Mr. R.T. Erdoğan's visit to Moscow.

02.06.2005 Russian Minister of Foreign Affairs Sergey Lavrov Meets with Turkish First Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs Ali Tuygan


05.24.2005 Russian Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs S.S. Razov’s Consultations with Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs A. Tuygan of Turkey

06.02.2005 Russian Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs Yuri Fedotov’s Consultations with Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs Eder Arat of Turkey

06.16.2005 Russian President Putin talks to Turkish Prime Minister R.T. Erdoğan on the phone.

07.17-18.2005 The Meeting of the Russian President V.V. Putin with Prime
Minister of the Republic of Turkey Recep Tayyip Erdoğan in Sochi, Russia

10.04.2005 Vladimir Putin held a telephone conversation with Turkish Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdoğan

10.19.2005 President Vladimir Putin held a telephone conversation with Prime Minister of Turkey Recep Tayyip Erdoğan

11.17.2005 The working visit of the President of the Russian Federation V.V.Putin to Samsun, Turkey

11.17.2005 Opening Ceremony of the Blue Stream Gas Pipeline, Samsun, Turkey

12.19.2005 Regular Meeting of the Russian-Turkish High-Level Joint Working Group (HLJWG) in Ankara

01.23.2006 President Vladimir Putin had a telephone conversation with Prime Minister of Turkey Recep Tayyip Erdoğan

05.06.2006 Russian Minister Of Foreign Affairs Sergey Lavrov speaks to Turkish Deputy Prime Minister And Minister Of Foreign Affairs Abdullah Gül by telephone

05.31.06 - 1.06.06 Official Visit of Russian Minister of Foreign Affairs Sergey Lavrov to the Republic of Turkey

06.29.2006 President of Turkey Ahmet Necdet Sezer visits Russia. The two Presidents discussed the outlook for settlement in Iraq and the Middle East, the situation with the Iranian nuclear programme, the situation in the Trans-Caucasus and the issue of Cyprus.

05.13.2008 Russian Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs Sergey Kislyak visits Turkey for political and military discussions.

06.05.2008 Russian President Vladimir Putin had a telephone conversation with
Prime Minister of Turkey Recep Tayyip Erdoğan

06.17.2008 Chief of Russian Navy Admiral V.S. Visotskiy visits Turkey.

07.03.2008 Russian Minister of Foreign Affairs Sergey Lavrov visits Turkey.

07.05.2008 Russian President Dmitriy Medvedev met Turkish President Abdullah Gül in Astana.

07.18.2008 Russian Prime Minister Vladimir Putin had a telephone conversation with Prime Minister of Turkey Recep Tayyip Erdoğan

07.18.2008 Russian warship 'Perekop's visit to Istanbul.

08.01.2008 Russian Prime Minister Vladimir Putin had a telephone conversation with Prime Minister of Turkey Recep Tayyip Erdoğan

08.13.2008 Russian President Dmitriy Medvedev had a telephone conversation with Turkish President Abdullah Gül.

08.26.2008 Russian Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs V.G. Titov meets Turkish Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs Ü. Çeviköz

09.02.2008 Russian Federation Minister of Foreign Affairs Sergey Lavrov makes a working visit to Turkey and has a press meeting with Turkish Minister of Foreign Affairs Ali Babacan.

10.12.2008 Patriarch of Moscow and Russia Eleksiy II visits Turkey.

10.26.2008 Russian warships visit Turkey.


07.02.2009 Turkish Minister of Foreign Affairs Ahmet Davutoğlu visits Russia.
07.03.2009 Russian President Dmitriy Medvedev held a telephone conversation with Turkish President Abdullah Gül.

09.26.2009 Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov meets with Turkish Foreign Minister Ahmet Davutoglu

10.22.2009 Teleconference between Erdoğan, Putin and Berlusconi (Erdoğan emphasized the energy cooperation between the three countries in the teleconference)

11.09.2009 Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs Vladimir Titov Holds Consultations at the Turkish Foreign Ministry

01.13.2010 Talks between Prime Minister Vladimir Putin and his Turkish counterpart Recep Tayyip Erdoğan in Moscow.

01.15.2010 Minister of Foreign Affairs Sergey Lavrov Speaks to Turkish Minister of Foreign Affairs Ahmed Davutoglu by Telephone

01.30.2010 Dmitry Medvedev had a telephone conversation with President of Turkey Abdullah Gül

03.05.2010 Consultations between First Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs Andrey Denisov and Turkish First Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs Feridun Sinirlioğlu

04.26.2010 Minister of Foreign Affairs Sergey Lavrov Speaks to Turkish Minister of Foreign Affairs Ahmet Davutoglu by Telephone

05.11-12.2010 Official visit of Russian President Dmitry Medvedev to Turkey

06.08.2010 Prime Minister Vladimir Putin’s working visit to Turkey

06.09.2010 Russian Prime Minister Vladimir Putin has telephone conversation with Turkish Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdoğan

06.27.2010 Meeting of Russian President Dmitry Medvedev with Prime Minister
of Turkey Recep Tayyip Erdoğan

11.06.2010 Deputy Foreign Minister Vladimir Titov’s Consultations at the
Turkish Foreign Ministry

10.16.2010 Russian Prime Minister Vladimir Putin has telephone conversation
with Turkish Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdoğan

11.11.2010 President of Russia Dmitry Medvedev met with Prime Minister of
Turkey Recep Tayyip Erdoğan on G20 Summit

11.30.2010 Deputy Foreign Minister Vladimir Titov Meets with Murat Mercan,
Chairman of the Foreign Affairs Committee of Turkey’s Grand National Assembly

12.01.2010 President of Russia Dmitry Medvedev met with President of Turkey
Abdullah Gül on OSCE Summit

12.02.2010 Telephone conversation of Russian President Dmitry Medvedev with
Prime Minister of Turkey Recep Tayyip Erdoğan

12.02.2010 Agreement between Russia and Turkey on joint construction of
Akkuyu Nuclear Power Plant has been ratified

12.08.2010 Russian Prime Minister Vladimir Putin has telephone conversation
with Turkish Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdoğan

02.10.2011 Negotiations between the Russian Minister of the Interior and the
Turkish Minister of the Interior were Held in Moscow

05.07.2011 Ratification of Agreement between Russia and Turkey on cooperation
in peaceful use of nuclear energy

05.28.2011 Deputy Foreign Minister Vladimir Titov Meets with Turkey’s Deputy
Foreign Minister Ayse Sezgin
189

06.14.2011 Russian Prime Minister Vladimir Putin congratulates Turkish Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdoğan on the victory of his party at the parliamentary elections

06.14.2011 Telephone conversation with Prime Minister of Turkey Recep Tayyip Erdoğan

10.08.2012 Russian President V.Putin, Turkish Prime-Minister R. Erdoğan have telephone conversation

11.22.2013 President of Russia V.V.Putin met with Prime Minister of Turkey, November 22, 2013

11.22.2013 Meeting of High-Level Russian-Turkish Cooperation Council, November 22, 2013

11.22.2013 News conference following a meeting of the High-Level Russian-Turkish Cooperation Council

02.07.2014 President of Russia V.V.Putin met with Prime Minister of Turkey

03.04.2014 President of Russia V.V.Putin held telephone conversation with Prime Minister of Turkey

03.31.2014 President of Russia V.V.Putin held telephone conversation with Prime Minister of Turkey

04.17.2014 President of Russia held telephone conversation with Prime Minister of Turkey, R.T. Erdoğan

05.16.2014 Telephone conversation between President of Russia V.Putin and Prime Minister of Turkey T. Erdoğan

05.30.2014 Russia President V.Putin, Turkey Prime Minister R.T. Erdoğan had telephone conversation
08.11.2014 Telephone conversation between President of Russia Vladimir Putin with President-elect of Turkey Recep Tayyip Erdoğan

08.22.2014 Telephone conversation between President of Russia and President-elect of Turkey

09.27.2014 Meeting between the Russian Foreign Minister, Sergey Lavrov, and the Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Turkey, Mevlüt Çavuşoğlu

10.11.2014 Telephone conversation between President of Russia and President of Turkey.
# VITA

SALTUK BUĞRA KARAHAN

## EDUCATION

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Institution</th>
<th>Location</th>
<th>Field</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1991-1995</td>
<td>Turkish Army Academy Ankara, Turkey</td>
<td>Ankara, Turkey</td>
<td>Major /System Engineering</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1998-2000</td>
<td>Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, California</td>
<td>Monterey, California</td>
<td>M.S. Modeling / Virtual Environments and Simulation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2003-2005</td>
<td>Turkish Army War College, Istanbul, Turkey</td>
<td>Istanbul, Turkey</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Feb. 2012 – July 2012</td>
<td>Turkish Armed Forces Staff College, Istanbul, Turkey</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

## WORK EXPERIENCE

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Position</th>
<th>Location</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1995-1998</td>
<td>Platoon Commander, Göle, Ardahan, Turkey</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2000-2003</td>
<td>Database Manager in Wargaming and Simulation Center, Istanbul, Turkey</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2007-2010</td>
<td>Experimentation Staff Officer in NATO Allied Command Transformation, Norfolk, VA</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2010-2012</td>
<td>Force Development Staff Officer in Turkish Army HQ, Ankara, Turkey</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2012-2013</td>
<td>Mot.Inf. Battalion Commander, Kabul, Afghanistan</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2013-2015</td>
<td>Force Development Branch Head in Turkish Army HQ, Ankara, Turkey</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>