

Old Dominion University
ODU Digital Commons

Graduate Research Conference (GSIS)


2023 Rising Uncertainty in World Politics

Feb 10th, 1:30 PM - 2:30 PM

DDR

Cassandra Jagroop
Old Dominion University

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.odu.edu/gsis_studentconference

 Part of the [Defense and Security Studies Commons](#), [International Relations Commons](#), [Military and Veterans Studies Commons](#), [Peace and Conflict Studies Commons](#), and the [Terrorism Studies Commons](#)

Jagroop, Cassandra, "DDR" (2023). *Graduate Research Conference (GSIS)*. 2.
https://digitalcommons.odu.edu/gsis_studentconference/2023/security/2

This Conference Paper is brought to you for free and open access by the Graduate Program in International Studies at ODU Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Graduate Research Conference (GSIS) by an authorized administrator of ODU Digital Commons. For more information, please contact digitalcommons@odu.edu.

Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration (DDR) has been a facet of post-conflict resolution since the 1980s. DDR seeks to address a wide range of issues varying from security to human rights, law, elections, and governance. One of the major issues arising from a conflict region are armed groups involved in the fighting and how to handle them. These armed groups represent the deep insecurity and lack of faith the population has in the state mechanism (Rondeau 2011, 654), thus in order to move ahead in the post conflict situation the issue of armed groups needs to be tackled. The evolution of warfare has surpassed the use of conventional, state forces. In the era of fourth generational warfare, defined by decentralised warfare and plagued with the rise of non-state actors; DDR programmes have to meet the needs of the armed groups involved in the conflicts to reach a cohesive “peace”. It is noteworthy to point out that although the United Nations (UN) work under the premise that wars end as a consequence of DDR programmes; DDR programmes are only successful when applied alongside a broader peacekeeping strategic framework (Rozema 2008, 427). Not only would the DDR programmers have to contend for conventional forces, but this paper would argue they should also contend for women and child soldiers; the non-conventional forces. This essay addresses the question of what makes an effective DDR strategy. Arguing for a more targeted approach towards DDR, it would highlight the different armed forces seen in wars today. By looking at the needs of each of these forces, and assessing how effective past DDR strategies were in addressing that group’s particular needs, this work formulates a suitable DDR strategy tailored specifically for them.

Before delving into the different armed forces prevalent in today’s conflicts, it is necessary to understand what the traditional Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration programme entails. According to the UN Peacekeeping office (UNPKO), the following terms are defined as:

- **Disarmament-** the collection, documentation, control and disposal of small arms, ammunition, explosives and light and heavy weapons from combatants and often from civilian population.
- **Demobilisation-** is the formal and controlled discharge of active combatants from armed forces and groups, including a phase of “reinsertion” which provides short-term assistance to ex-combatants.
- **Reintegration-** is the process by which ex-combatants acquire civilian status and gain sustainable employment and income. It is a political, social and economic process with an open time-frame, primarily taking place in communities at the local level. (UN Peacekeeping DDR Homepage)

From 1990-2010, this was the premise DDR programmes operated under, which focused primarily on combatants within military structures (Benner, Mergenthaler & Rotmann 2011:161). This essay focuses on the traditional DDR practice due to the impossibility to establish a functional community, when the community has failed to adequately deal with the issues of the ex-combatants wishing to integrate in their societies. For certain armed groups, the community has to be involved throughout the DDR programme, while others need to have the programme focused primarily on them before dealing with their society at large.

Conventional Forces

To comprehend the extraordinary challenges faced by non-conventional forces, a look at DDR practices for conventional forces would be useful, not just for comparative measures but also to showcase their unique challenges as well. The Practical Manual of Guiding Principles and Best Practices serves as the blueprint for DDR approaches for conventional forces (Bratt, 1996; Howard, 2008;). The manual describes a reduction/dissolvement of the armed group as visual proof of the transition from war to peace. The demobilisation aspect for conventional forces includes administrative, disarmament and the initial discharge of the forces, with particular emphasis on the compensation packages and assistance programmes available to them. The compensation packages as well as the assistance programmes serve as the reintegration facet of the DDR initiative (Principles & Guidelines for UNPKO). However, in war to peace changeovers, the challenge facing reintegration is the need for some form of political participation in order for the reintegration process to be seen as legitimate. Kieran Mitton (2008) takes this argument further by claiming that reintegration requires the form of political participation to reinforce the primary peaceful political interaction for affecting change in the region. Even though, conventional forces are the most popular form of armed groups, the DDR operations launched for them have not been fruitful. The UN Transitional Authority in Cambodia (UNTAC) showcased some of the major downfalls of the DDR operations for conventional forces. Critical to the disarmament process was the surrendering of ammunition to UNTAC, their ultimate disposal would be decided upon by the winner of the elections as outlined in the Paris Agreement of 1991 (Mayall, 1996). The disarmament process eroded with the steady disintegration of confidence and trust between the Cambodian government and the two Khmer forces (Rungswasdisab, 2016). Contributing to this distrust was the inability of UNTAC to provide the Khmer Rouge a neutral political environment leading up to the election and UNTAC's inability to corroborate the withdrawal of the Vietnamese from Northern Cambodia (Keller, 2005). Additionally, the fact that the surrendered weapons were not destroyed fuelled uncertainty, causing numerous Cambodians to keep their weapons as a security measure (Mugumya, 2005). At the end of disarmament in Cambodia, only 10 percent of the conventional forces had been disarmed (Leitenberg, 2003). Light artillery still circulated among the civilians linked to illicit trafficking occurring in the state. Scholars and politicians alike discuss the necessity of trust-building especially in the disarmament phase of the programme (Barakat, 2009; Knight & Ozerdam, 2004; Spear, 2006;). A common criticism about disarmament is the public relations angle. Disarmament is the one phase where it looks like something is being done to address the issue, so most of the funding for DDR programmes tends to go towards it. Scholars such as Mark Knight and Alpaslan Özerdem (2006) argued that the concentration on disarmament leads programming efforts to fall short of the socioeconomic needs of the combatants and their dependents (506). Mats Berdel (2008) also concluded that there was no significant relationship between disarmament and security unless it is connected to a reconciliation process (24,38). Thus, even though so much funding is pumped into the disarmament phase of DDR, it is not the most vital phase of the DDR programme. As seen in Cambodia, without the establishment of trust between the factions and the DDR handlers, disarmament can easily break down. Without a strong trust building mechanism, the foundation of the DDR programme will slowly but surely dismantle.

Another issue arising in the literature on DDR and conventional forces is the best way to compensate veterans in the aftermath of war, this question plagues both the developed and developing world (Gade, 2013; Moore, 2016). The war effort leaves a tremendous financial burden on the veteran and their family members. DDR for conventional forces is ingrained within the veteran policy of the respective state. The policy is expected to accommodate for individuals who have been demobilised and those who have not (Witte, 2016). The policies tend to constitute around benefits to service men and women following retirement from the armed services. In instances of liberation struggles or a new government, the new government needs to establish a policy toward veterans (Clapham, 2012). The connotations of providing benefits for numerous veterans can pose a significant problem for a new or post-conflict state (Mhanda, 2011). DDR programmes are established to avoid a vengeful peace, however if the policy established by the new government has vengeful attributes; violence is guaranteed to erupt once again.

States tend to have their own successful DDR tactics. Many of these laws focus on establishing a strong relationship between the state, government and its armed forces, for example the Armed Forces Covenant in Great Britain and the Department of Veteran Affairs in the United States (Fox, 2016; Dept. of Veteran Affairs website). These policies and departments were established with the understanding that in the post-conflict phase, these soldiers need some form of rehabilitation and plan for their lives after war. By right, these programmes are part of the developed world, looking at an example of the developing world, in Mali the DDR programme prioritised conventional forces (Camara, 2015; Nyirabikali, 2015). In order to gain entry into the DDR encampments, the conventional combatants were offered employment opportunities in the newly framed security sector and civil service (Caparini, 2015). Also, they were offered twice as much monetary incentive to demobilise as other armed groups in the region. The difference of success between the American/British veteran policies and Mali's policy is the encompassment of all the armed forces. In the United Kingdom and America, the armed forces are conventional forces, apart from the IRA in Great Britain, the armed forces are conventional forces. Mali had a mixture of both conventional and non-conventional forces, and the Malian programme, initiated and ran by the UN was only accessible to the conventional forces. The civilian population within Mali were highly opposed to this policy because it gave the impression of rewarding the violence committed during the conflict and no attention whatsoever were given to the non-conventional forces involved in the conflict (Wohl & Sambanis, 2010). The exclusivity of the DDR programme in Mali led to the ultimate failure of the programme, not all the forces involved in the conflict were granted access to the benefits of the DDR programme.

A successful DDR programme as far as conventional forces are concerned and embedded within the state (Munive & Stepputat, 2015). According to Jennifer Loten (2001:69), successful reintegration lies in the ability of combatants to be accepted into society by the non-combatants. If the state fails to create a pathway for this to occur, resentment would ensue because the ex-combatants are benefitting from their livelihoods. Civilians who join their state armed forces, do that in an effort to defend their country. Conventional forces have the benefit of being seen as the legitimate utilizer of force on behalf of the state, thus acceptance by the general community is a given; despite the civilian's feeling towards the conflict (Hensel, 2016). When the state exhibits support for the troops who defended their state, there would be a willingness to continue protecting the state and it shows the

combatants as well as the rest of the world; this state values their soldiers. The combatants would want to re-enter society and give up their life of violence if such conditions existed for them.

WOMEN

The following portions of this paper focuses on the non-conventional forces prevalent in today's conflicts. As mentioned earlier, this trend of non-conventional forces are commonly seen in fourth generational warfare. According to William Lind, fourth generational warfare places emphasis on "collapsing the enemy internally rather than destroying him physically" (2010:15). In this generation of warfare, the enemy's population and their culture becomes the targets as well. Due to the blurred lines caused by fourth generational warfare, pockets of societies who were never typically targeted in times of war; have now become the new faces of armed groups (Thompson, 2014). In this modern age, women are not just combatants in the conflict but are constantly victimised (Cohen, 2013). Despite the prevalence of policy papers affirming the gender-specific needs of women in peacebuilding processes, programming efforts continuously fail in meeting these needs. The UNPKO, the UN Development Programme (UNDP) and UN Women all possess guidelines for gender targeted DDR programmes and yet the marginalisation of women is seen throughout DDR programmes (Cockburn, 2001). In Sierra Leone, 506 of the estimated 12,056 females affiliated with armed groups participated in DDR (Douglas & Hill, 2004). In Liberia women and children formed 38% of armed groups and only 17% were participants in the DDR programme (UNIFEM, 2004; McKay & Mazurna 2004:99). An effective DDR strategy for women lies in the design of future gender-sensitive DDR programmes to be linked to the ability of the existing programmes to demonstrate their success in giving support to women in armed groups. As Alycia Ebbinghaus (2007) explains, one of the main downfalls of the DDR programme in Sierra Leone was the lack of explicit gender sensitivity in the execution of the programme.

In women DDR programmes, disarmament efforts tend to view women only as vulnerable victims. In 2010, the UN General Assembly passed Resolution 65/69 establishing the need for gender equality in disarmament. Women potentially can act as combatants as well, their roles in war are not limited to vulnerable victims. For demobilisation, it is best to look at it as a demilitarisation process. Peter Batchelor (2004:99) argues that militarisation involves "cultural as well as institutional, ideological and economic transformations". Militarisation involves both men and women and the militarisation of women is a key ingredient for that of men (Cock, 1992). Therefore, demilitarisation is a social process causing a decline in a societies' participation in warfare through the altering of resources from wartime activities, curtailing the strength of the armed groups and welcoming combatants into civilian life. Vanessa Farr (2002) favours DDR as a part of a larger demilitarisation process which encompasses both the demilitarisation of the state and the demilitarisation of society. This focus on demilitarisation includes an increasing role of different members of a community, not just the male combatants affected. Reintegration of women must deal with the issue of female combatants as soldiers and abductees of war (Nilsson, 2005). Additionally, the peacebuilding and democratisation processes needs to include women. It would be counter-productive to create a "peace" without the input of one facet of the society present (Mazurna & Proctor, 2013).

Female active participation in armed groups is recent. Marie Vlachova (200:135) argued that this recent trend is due to women's overly active formal and informal roles in armed groups since the Second World War. Women played an active role in numerous conflicts in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Namibia, Nicaragua, Zimbabwe, Mozambique, Djibouti and many others (Barth 2006, 85). Their involvement called into question the traditional portrait of women in conflict, principally their experience merely as victims (Vlachova 2005:136). Reasons behind female involvement in armed groups vary accordingly. Armed groups tend to rely on incentives and coercion to secure female participation. Rachel Brett and Irma Specht (1998:9-38) asserted that it is possible to differentiate between females who were abducted and who joined "voluntarily". However, it is difficult to judge whether or not these women joined voluntarily due to the disadvantages they face in their respective societies. Dyan Mazurana (2002:100) also contested the idea of females voluntarily joining armed forces saying, "Many girls' options are already limited that the idea that they freely make this choice is doubtful". For instance, females raped by members of an armed group often come across community stigma that urges them to join the armed group of their attackers.

In highly militarised societies environmental factors such as militarisation is a poor explanation for understanding female voluntary participation in armed groups (Brett & Specht 1998:85-104). They point out numerous causes such as the influence of family and friends, employment opportunities, escape from poverty and cultural and traditional influences. Brett and Specht go on to describe gender-specific factors for females such as domestic abuse and exploitation, vulnerability to abuse during conflict and a desire to assert gender equality. Vlachova claimed that women's involvement plays an important propaganda tool for rebel groups by serving as a compelling reminder of "the emancipating intentions of future political leaders" (2005:136). The Eritrean People's Liberation Front (EPLF) serves as a contender for her claim. Eritrea is traditionally seen as a patriarchal society, in order to garner the support of women in the state's development; the EPLF promoted gender equality within their ranks (Barth 2004:152). Numerous scholars challenge the notion of females gaining gender equality in their society through participation in the conflict. Cynthia Cockburn believes the body specificity, their roles in society and the gender ideologies of the society would inevitably be reinserted back into society once the conflict is over (2001:21). Cynthia Enloe describes the appeals to females on the basis of gender equality to be a "cruel hoax" whereby the armed groups remain ideologically and physically dominated by men (2000:48).

An effective DDR strategy for women must translate into gender sensitivity in DDR programmes at the operational level. There is a substantial difference between the number and substance of provisions for women and girls in DDR at the policy level. Policies intended for girls materialised earlier than policies on women. Among these are the Cape Town Principles of 1997, the International Labour Organisation Convention 182 on the Worst Forms of Child Labour in 1999, and the Paris Principles of 2007 (UN Women Website; Flowers, 2009). All of these address the concern of girls as child soldiers (a topic we will get to in a later section), however most notably for women the Paris Principles outlined the needs of "bush wives" and child mothers (Maeland, 2010). The Principles also shed light on the stigma faced by women when trying to access DDR and the importance of their participation in programme development (UNICEF). Gender advocates stressed the importance of addressing gender in

all stages of DDR, making recommendation on topics such as information campaigns and communication strategies for women, recommendations for females' needs and the specific services for women (de Watteville, 2003). Macartan Humphreys and Jeremy Weinstein (2005) challenge the assumption that combatants' post-conflict acceptance into their societies depend on their participation in DDR. Their studies in Sierra Leone indicated acceptance depended on the abusiveness of the units which the combatants participated in. They found meagre empirical evidence that women faced significantly more difficulties during post-conflict reintegration. They chastised the "growing chorus" calling for targeted women DDR programmes. However, Humphreys and Weinstein fail to contend for the fact that community segregation encountered by females isolated from DDR jeopardises the long-term community security by making their children vulnerable to future recruitment and abduction into armed group (Farr 2005:22).

On the individual level, women participation in DDR needs to be rooted in the rebuilding of the society itself. The UN's Integrated Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration Standards (IDDRS) makes the distinction between female combatants and female dependents, females who are socially and economically dependent on ex-combatants (Hosein, 2011). Although the IDDRS document identifies factors influencing women's marginalisation at each phase of DDR programming, it still remains a policy oriented document. Causing analysis of the origins of these factors to be very limited. The psychological and physical stigma faced by women as a combatant as well as a dependent not only need to be prioritised during the DDR programme execution but there needs to be an element of reassurance (Carlson, 2004). This reassurance would show the women and the society as well that the DDR programmers are there and willing to help them. A level of trust building needs to be present in order for the women to feel comfortable enough to seek out DDR programmes. In Sierra Leone, the Lomé Accords (1999) established the framework for the DDR phases. Article XXVIII highlighted women's victimisation during the war and the importance of special attention to their needs during post-conflict reconstruction. Additionally, the women's movement in Sierra Leone played a role in promoting peace at the local grassroots level. The peace negotiations establishing Lomé Accord included two women. The Accords contained gender-inclusive language. Although, there were still issues with the Sierra Leone DDR programmes, it brought to light the difference including women in the production and execution of a DDR programme can make on a society. A successful DDR strategy for women, would address not only the needs of them as victims but also combatants in the conflict. The strategy would also be known and made available to them without fear of societal stigma.

CHILD SOLDIERS

Another member of non-conventional armed forces are child soldiers. There has been a growing consensus that the coerced or compulsory recruitment of children (girls and boys under the age of 18) and their use in conflicts by both armed forces and armed groups is illegal and one of the worst forms of child labour (Tiefenbrun, 2007; ILO; Conradi, 2013). Under international law, the recruitment and use of children under 15 is a war crime. These sentiments are codified in the Optional Protocol to the Convention on the Rights of the Child and the Rome Statute creating the International Criminal Court (Waschefort, 2017). Protocol

I deals with interstate wars and establishes the minimum age of participation in armed conflict at fifteen. It promotes state parties to prioritise the recruitment of older children first while also permitting “voluntary enrolment” of children under the age of fifteen (Kuper 2000, 34; Rosen 2007, 300). As for Optional Protocol II, it addresses the issue of child soldiers in intrastate wars. It implies that children under the age of 15 can voluntarily participate in intrastate conflicts and national liberation movements but cannot participate in intrastate conflicts, civil wars and insurgencies (Rosen 2007:301). This distinction between the two types of conflicts, according to David Rosen (2007), is a reflection a time when governments would benefit from the use of child soldiers in their own anti-colonial and national liberation struggles and wanted to ensure their resources were protected while simultaneously denying the use of child soldiers to future insurgencies or civil wars against their own government. Certain international treaties like the Cape Town Principles, the 1999 African Charter on the Rights and Welfare of the Child all set the age of 18 as the minimum age of participation in an armed conflict and does not recognise any form of voluntary recruitment under the age of eighteen (Francis, 2007:207). However, the Rome Statute uses the age of 15 as the set point for participation in armed conflict (Cohn, 2004; Kargbo, 2004; Singer, 2004).

Due to their illegal recruitment status, the prevention measures created regarding child soldier recruitment, and efforts to reintegrate them back into society; cannot be seen as a traditional segment of peace-making. Instead it should seek to prevent and rectify a violation of a child’s human rights (UN DDR Resource Centre). In attempt to address the specific needs of child soldiers, the World Bank created certain guidelines for DDR programmes: “child soldiers must be separated from military authority and protected through the establishments of special reception centres during demobilisation, as long as their stay prior to being reunited with their families and communities is as short as possible” (Knight 2004:507). The guidelines also emphasise three key pillars: family reunification, psychological support and education, and economic opportunity.

The current Child DDR programme established by UNICEF and World Bank begins by separating the children from adults at the disarmament and demobilisation locations. This enhances the notion of breaking away from the authoritative link between the child soldiers and their commanders and to ensure they receive the proper reintegration packages developed for them (Williamson 2006:190). The children are reinserted and reintegrated through local Interim Care Centres (ICC) initiated, funded and ran by Intergovernmental organisations such as UNICEF and Save the Children, alongside local NGOs (The Save the Children Fund, 2007; Wessells, 2004; Williamson, 2006). Once at the site the children would live there for an average of 2-6 months and receive various service that were created to address their needs. These services include food, clothing and medical treatment. Once their medical conditions have been normalised; they would gradually be reintegrated into a local school. Older children can take education programmes for basic reading, writing and mathematics skills (Boothby, 2006; The Save the Children Fund, 2007; Zack-Williams, 2006). Additionally, the ICC also provide psychosocial support activities which includes the arts, sports, and group discussion (Boothby, 2006; Wessells, 2004; Williamson, 2006). The Centre is also tasked with finding the families and communities of child soldiers and preparing them for their return. Once located, the family and community undergoes an awareness and sensitisation campaign which would inform them of the experiences of that child as well as their future needs as they transition to civilian life (The Save the Children Fund, 2007). Certain

cultures have cleansing rituals which the child is expected to undertake to gain acceptance into the society. The centre would pay for and help organise these rituals (Williamson, 2006). Once the child has been reintegrated, a follow-up service is offered and a Centre staff would visit the family to help them resolve any issues they may be facing. A successful reintegration DDR programme for children is highly dependent on community acceptance and reconciliation (Stark, 2008) and efforts that emphasise acceptance and reconciliation are community sensitisation (Boothby, 2006; Stark, 2008; Honwana, 2007) traditional cleansing rituals (Boothby, 2006; Wessells, 2004; Williamson, 2006) and psycho-social work that is conscious of local social and cultural practices. Sensitisation campaigns assist a community in understanding the realities the child soldier went through. Once the community has a better understanding, traditional cleansing rituals help child soldiers reconnect with their communities. These rituals can help the child soldier to secede from their past and take on a new identity. This new identity is important for child soldiers who identified their armed group as their family.

Despite the “good” the Centres can do for child soldiers there are various shortcomings as well. Although they are meant to separate adults and children, in reality that is not the case at all. The close proximity between adult and children camps have led to significant problems and the security at these camps are ineffective. Thus, separating children from the influence of fighting groups, leaving them vulnerable to abuse, violence and re-recruitment has been ongoing (Williamson, 2005). Another major issue plaguing DDR research, is the lack of DDR processes for girls and on the experiences of girl soldiers in general. There is no accurate process by which to identify these girls and reintegrate them into society. Noting the social stigmatisation, exclusion and threats to their personal safety a girl soldier would potentially face; these girls might purposely avoid a formalised DDR process (Hague, 2015; Kostelny, 2004; McKay, 2004; UNIFEM). Once recruited girls would hold several positions including frontline fighters. According to Mazurna, (2004) 44% of women recruited receive basic military and weapons training from their commanders or “husbands”. Many of the issues facing girl soldiers are similar to that of women, however the psychological impacts differ.

DDR practices for child soldiers although trying to be as thorough as much as possible, still faces numerous issues in dealing with adequately reintegrating the children back into society. Both boys and girls face issues in the reintegration phase that would have serious implications on them as they enter into adulthood. Furthermore, an understanding of the cultural context and studies on child soldiering in different states have disregarded the cultural implications of imposing western psychological analysis and intervention on non-Western populations affected by conflict (Pauletto and Patel 2010:37). Additionally, with the lack of the full scope of the children whether boy or girl as child soldiers, makes the creation of an effective DDR for a child soldier on a case by case basis. Successful child soldier DDR programmes need to take into consideration the cultural context the child would be immersed in as well as the long- term effects of the ordeal they have gone through.

TERRORISTS

The UN has increasingly been asked to undertake numerous disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration of belligerents with ongoing military operations and counterterrorism (CT) activities in the absence of a peace deal, treaty, or framework. In Afghanistan, DDR

programmes encompassed counterinsurgency and CT operations (Gossman, 2009; Hartzell, 2011; Derksen, 2014). Critical Terrorism scholars over the years have explored new forms of De-radicalisation programmes, known as 'soft' approaches to counterterrorism. According to Jessica Stern (2010:108), a soft approach to CT explores ways to reverse the radicalisation process by "engineering the individual's return to moderate society, usually by providing them with a stable support network, probing their original reasons for radicalising and divorcing them from their extreme beliefs and social contracts". In order to thwart radicalisation and violent extremism it is vital to comprehend and discredit the ideology behind it, rather than eliminating every terrorist in the world. Advocates of this approach believe an effective DDR for terrorists would emphasise efforts on fighting the "War on Ideas" just as much as governments are fighting the "War on Terror". Their aims have been to disengage, de-radicalise and rehabilitate ex-terrorists.

De-radicalisation and disengagement target persons who currently participate in violent extremism. The difference is that the former seeks to establish cognitive shifts, while the latter strives to adjust behaviour. De-radicalisation is defined as the "social and psychological process whereby an individual's commitment to and involvement in, violent radicalisation is reduced to the extent that they are no longer at risk of involvement and engagement in violent activity." (Horgan 2009:153). Disengagement is the modification of behaviour. It is necessary for DDR terrorist strategies to include elements of both de-radicalisation and disengagement. Some scholars like Bjørge and Horgan argue that disengagement should be the main objective and then de-radicalisation would come later in the process (2008) however these authors fail to understand that this straight and narrow route is difficult to apply when dealing with extremists due to the multiple paths radicalisation can take as well as the numerous reasons why individuals break way from extremist groups (Rabasa, 2010). There is no blanket de-radicalisation process, instead these efforts have to be case specific and able to undermine the pragmatic and ideological elements that hinder the radicalised to exist outside of the organisation. Moreover, religious extremists are challenging due to their radicalisation being entrenched in their religious obligations, thus engaging in an ideological debate would be more beneficial by challenging the extremist interpretations of the religion. If the extremist understands they are following a twisted understanding of the religion, it would undermine their militant view of the world and potentially cripple the recruitment strategy of the group since it was discredited (Blair, 2009).

The main premise behind the DDR programmes for terrorists, no one is born a terrorist but an individual becomes one over time, grants a possibility of reverse terrorism. Even though imprisoning and killing terrorists have become the common CT approach, only a few number of countries have attempted to disengage, de-radicalise and rehabilitate ex-terrorists. By undermining the bedrock which extremist movements and terrorism is built upon, paired with defensive tactics and occasional offensive strikes; the movements would disintegrate from within. Audrey Cronin (2009) researched the history of abandoned terrorist organisations and highlighted the reasons for their demise. Cronin suggests that terrorism ends with an unsuccessful generational transition. The older generation fails to inspire younger people to join because they do not share the same objective or beliefs of the older generation. Soft approaches are relatively new in the counterterrorism initiatives such states like Yemen, Saudi Arabia and the United Kingdom have implemented soft approaches to counterterrorism; however, one state's model is not transferable to another. The De-

radicalisation and counter-radicalisation programmes must be specific to the state's cultural, societal and legal traditions (Porges & Stern, 2010). However, these soft DDR approaches would likely continue to play a significant role in counterterrorism strategies. Partly due to the realisation that the Global War on Terrorism has not eradicated the threat of terrorism (Depetris, 2016). In order to have a successful DDR strategy for terrorists, facing and countering the extremists' ideological messages and providing appropriate reintegration policies, can potentially pave the way for the unsuccessful generational transition away from extremism and by extension lessen the number of terrorists in the world.

CONCLUSIONS

In conclusion, this essay has demonstrated how focusing on specific armed groups prevalent in today's conflicts would enhance the success rate of DDR strategies in the world today. As this paper has highlighted, there are numerous groups to consider and within those particular groups there are certain measures that must be taken in order to eliminate the degree of backlash felt by the individuals and members of the society they are reintegrated into. In certain instances, successful demobilisation and disarmament has prevented recourse to conflict, but essentially this can be traced back to the willingness of the parties involved in the conflicts as opposed to the strength of the DDR. Ultimately, a successful DDR strategy lies in the ability to understand the factions involved in the fight and how to better meet their needs in a post conflict world. Conventional forces are not the only armed forces seen in conflicts today. Women have been marginalised from DDR programmes over the years and yet they constitute a significant portion of an armed group in modern conflicts (UNIFEM:6). The dichotomy of the issue of child soldiers lies in the destruction of their childhoods and the ability to provide DDR to girl child soldiers as well. However, both women and child soldier DDR programmes would be successful if the programmers provide a mode by which to address their needs. The controversial topic of terrorist DDR programmes, would be difficult but the "hard" approach to counterterrorism has failed to stop the spread of terrorism, a new approach is necessary. The international community must adequately address these needs in order to create a successful DDR.