Dispersion or Re-Segregation: A Spatial and Temporal Analysis of Public Policies and Their Impact on Urban African American Mobility

Brandi Lynette Blessett

Old Dominion University

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DISPERSION OR RE-SEGREGATION: A SPATIAL AND TEMPORAL ANALYSIS
OF PUBLIC POLICIES AND THEIR IMPACT ON URBAN AFRICAN AMERICAN
MOBILITY

by

Brandi Lynette Blessett
B.S. May 2003, University of Michigan
M.Ed. December 2005, Wayne State University

A Dissertation Submitted to the Faculty of Old Dominion University in Partial
Fulfillment of the Requirements for the Degree of

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URBAN STUDIES

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Approved by:

Mohamad E. Abdesry (Director)

Thomas E. Chapman (Member)

Berhanu Mengistu (Member)
ABSTRACT

DISPERSION OR RE-SEGREGATION: A SPATIAL AND TEMPORAL ANALYSIS OF PUBLIC POLICIES AND THEIR IMPACT ON URBAN AFRICAN AMERICAN MOBILITY

Brandi Lynette Blessett
Old Dominion University, 2011
Director: Dr. Mohamad G. Alkadry

This study seeks to test Hirsch’s second ghetto thesis in the city of Baltimore, Maryland. Hirsch suggested that the role of government, public policies, and administrative discretion were responsible for the re-segregation of African Americans into second ghetto communities in Chicago. Many scholars have used Hirsch’s framework to explain ghetto formation. This investigation seeks to extend the literature in several ways. First, several national policies were investigated to determine their impact on African American mobility in Baltimore: the Housing Act of 1937 (public housing), the Housing Act of 1949 (urban renewal), and the Interstate Highway Act of 1956 (transportation). Second, Baltimore officials were specifically highlighted as facilitators of second ghetto development based on the unprecedented discretion devolved from the above public policies. Third, Geographic Information Systems (GIS) technology was used to underscore the spatial and temporal parameters of urban African American mobility based on the public policy decisions of local administrators.

Historical data (e.g. census reports, city ordinances, and local newspapers) were gathered produce a timeline of events in Baltimore from 1850 – 2010. GIS was used to produce a series of maps (e.g. 1940 – 2000), which specifically identify the location of public housing facilities, urban renewal projects, and highway routes in relation to
African American neighborhoods. Both sources were used to tract African American mobility based on the specific policy decisions at the federal and local levels. Consequently, longitudinal analysis allowed for African American mobility changes to be tracked over time. The findings of this study have implications with regard to the effects of administrative discretion and the impact of public policy outcomes on vulnerable populations.
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This dissertation is dedicated to my family. Mom and Dad, you have been the foundation for which I stand. I cannot imagine my life without your unconditional love and support. Your commitment to my brothers and me can never be overstated. My core values and work ethic were instilled by you, and for that I am forever grateful. I work hard to make you both proud of me. Brandon, you are the best little ‘BIG’ brother a girl could have. Thank you for always putting us first! Bryan, you have guided my journey. I appreciate your ability to keep me safe and focused. I miss you! Brandon Jamal, auntie will forever be in your corner. To my extended family – grandmothers, aunts, uncles, and cousins – I would not be here without you. Your collective support is immeasurable. Great things await us. Last and definitely not least, Shaneka, thank you for being my best-friend, my confidant, my biggest supporter, and most of all – my partner. We made it – crossing the finish line! I love you all.
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# TABLE OF CONTENTS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>LIST OF TABLES</th>
<th>x</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>LIST OF FIGURES</td>
<td>xi</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LIST OF MAPS</td>
<td>xii</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

## Chapter

I. **INTRODUCTION**
- Background
- Statement of the Problem
- African American Mobility Examined
- Purpose of Research
- Research Questions
- Conceptual Model
- Methodology
- Definitions

II. **THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK**
- Critical Race Theory
- Foundations of Sanctioned Segregation
- Public Administration Foundations
- Administrative Discretion Facilitated by the Federal Government
- Government Sanctioned Discrimination
- A Shift in Federal Philosophy: A Historical Perspective
- The Politics of Urban Development
- Economic Outcomes of Discrimination

III. **METHODOLOGY**
- Type of Study
- Rationale for City Selection
- Overview of Baltimore

IV. **TIMELINE**
- Foundations of Racial Distinction: 1851 – 1900
- Stages Heuristic: 1901 – 1950
- Public Housing
- Urban Renewal
- Inner Harbor and Downtown Development
- Neighborhood and Community Development
- Transportation
- The Evolution of Urban Housing
V. RESULTS

GIS Maps Depict African American Concentration

Urban Development’s Impact on African American Mobility

Dispersion or Re-segregation: Baltimore and the Making of the Second Ghetto?

VI. CONCLUSION

Limitations

Future Research

REFERENCES

APPENDICES

A. BALTIMORE TIMELINE OF EVENTS FROM 1850 – 2010

B. DECADE BY DECADE COMPARISON, 1940 – 1950

C. DECADE BY DECADE COMPARISON, 1960 – 1970

D. DECADE BY DECADE COMPARISON, 1980 – 1990

E. BALTIMORE DEVELOPMENT OVER TIME, 1940 AND 2000
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Table</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. 2000 Census: Characteristics of Baltimore</td>
<td>72</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. 2000 Census: Maryland County Population by Race</td>
<td>170</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
### LIST OF FIGURES

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Figure</th>
<th>Description</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>Conceptual Model</td>
<td>22</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>Timeline of Events in Baltimore</td>
<td>78</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
# LIST OF MAPS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Map</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. 1940s African American Concentration</td>
<td>147</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. 1940s Public Housing by Race</td>
<td>148</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. 1950s African American Concentration</td>
<td>150</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. Public Housing by Decade</td>
<td>151</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. 1950s Urban Renewal</td>
<td>152</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6. Development in Baltimore through the 1950s</td>
<td>153</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7. Public Housing by Decade Baltimore</td>
<td>155</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8. 1960s Urban Renewal</td>
<td>157</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9. Development in Baltimore through the 1960s</td>
<td>158</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10. African American Dispersion</td>
<td>159</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12. 1970s Public Housing in Baltimore</td>
<td>161</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13. Public Housing in Baltimore through the 1970s</td>
<td>162</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14. 1970s Urban Renewal in Baltimore</td>
<td>163</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15. 1980s Racial Segregation in Baltimore</td>
<td>165</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>16. Comprehensive Public Housing in Baltimore</td>
<td>166</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>17. 1980s Urban Renewal in Baltimore</td>
<td>167</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>18. Rehabilitated Public Housing in Baltimore</td>
<td>168</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>19. 1990s Urban Renewal in Baltimore</td>
<td>169</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20. Comprehensive Urban Renewal in Baltimore</td>
<td>171</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>21. 1940-2000 Baltimore Mean Center</td>
<td>173</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

There is a racial and economic disparity in American society. African Americans and the poor are largely concentrated in inner city communities, while Whites and the affluent usually reside in the outer metropolitan area. This disparity can be attributed to many factors. Ecological theory suggests that the residential location of groups is related to their socioeconomic status, which suggests a link between social and spatial mobility (Darden & Kamel, 2000). The place stratification model directs attention to the hierarchical ranking of places and social groups and the means by which advantaged social groups distance themselves from disadvantaged groups, particularly African Americans (South & Crowder, 1997). According to the social distance premise, racial or ethnic segregation is positively associated with differences between groups (Jargowsky, 1996). Finally, the assimilation hypothesis assumes that the better-off strata within a minority group will translate gains into spatial assimilation (Jargowsky, 1996). Although these theories are diverse, all of the theories focus on the preferences or capabilities of one group to distance themselves from another. However, these theories do not acknowledge the over-arching influence of administrative actions in dictating the patterns of African American mobility into impoverished ghetto communities. This research will attempt to fill that gap.

Arnold Hirsh is the first to identify the interplay between public administrators, public policies, and public resources as facilitators in determining the residential patterns of African Americans in urban areas, specifically Chicago. During the 1940s, when
Hirsch begins his case study investigation on Chicago, the urban environment was deteriorating, racial tensions were threatening civility, and the housing stock was characterized as crumbling and inadequate. The atmosphere required intervention by the federal government, especially if central cities were to sustain their autonomy and compete with an emerging suburban periphery. These problems were amplified as the urban elite attributed the erosion of property values and the instability of the central business district to the proximity of African Americans and their communities to these areas. Based on these factors, local officials and business leaders used their authority and expertise to formulate policies that would simultaneously revive the inner city, while relocating poor African Americans. Hirsch identified these actions as a purposeful attempt to re-segregate and contain African Americans into second ghetto communities, while trying to save the declining central business district (Hirsch, 1983).

To build on the multi-faceted literature on racial residential segregation, this study attempts to investigate the role of government, public policies, and administrative discretion on the re-segregation of African Americans into second ghetto communities. The re-segregation concept describes the effects of self-interested actors who eagerly sought financial incentives at the expense of vulnerable African Americans and their respective communities. These actions destroyed neighborhoods, severed communal ties, and denied African Americans equal opportunity to accumulate wealth. This study emphasizes the effects of an impenetrable public-private relationship, massive resources, and the vast authority of local officials in the dislocation of African Americans and their re-segregation into second ghetto communities in urban areas across the United States. These factors, and not some internal community or cultural reason, have concurrently
contributed to the immense isolation and poverty experienced by African American ghetto residents up until today.

A conceptual model has been developed for this study and it highlights several factors that have contributed to the re-segregation of African Americans. The environment is an important consideration, because it explains the climate at all levels of government and provides a framework for how public policies emerged to handle the social ills of the time. Enablers are essentially the public policies that emerged as an attempt to address wide-ranging social and economic problems. Land management strategies emerged from public policy and assisted public administrators tackle issues within the urban environment. These activities cumulatively lead to several outcomes. Central city governments and the private sectors positively benefited from the authority and resources handed down from the federal government. Negative outcomes, on the other hand, were concentrated on African Americans and their communities. This chapter introduces factors that contributed to the residential isolation experienced by African Americans at the hands of Whites in central cities across the United States (US). Next the statement of the problem and the purpose of the research are articulated, which is followed by a conceptual model. Finally, the proposed research methodology, importance of study, and definition of terms are provided.

Background

"What we want in America is less government in business and more business in government" were sentiments echoed by three successive Republican presidents – Warren Harding, Calvin Coolidge, and Herbert Hoover starting in the 1920s (Jansson, 2004, p. 166). This response restricted the influence of the federal government in the
affairs of the private sector. Trickle-down economics dominated the discussion whereby capitalism was promoted through an unregulated labor and stock market. In theory, profits generated by businesses would filter to poor and working-class families. In this regard, poverty and unemployment were personal problems that would not and should not involve the federal government, but were the responsibility of local governments or philanthropic organizations (Jansson, 2004). Even direct assistance by the federal to local governments was non-existent based on a philosophy of federalism. However, as the US experienced a tremendous economic downturn, the role of government in business and the lives of private citizens would be revisited. This section will discuss the environment that lead to a paradigmatic shift in the role and responsibility of government action, which lead to direct involvement in the lives of private citizens.

The Great Depression was a catalyst in the emerging discussion about the role of the federal government in addressing the social welfare issues of its citizens. Numerous issues contributed to the collapse of the American economic system, including market failures, inflation, and unprecedented unemployment. Although all communities and jurisdictions were greatly affected, central cities were excessively burdened based on the demographic shifts, financial disinvestment, and infrastructure deterioration. President Roosevelt responded with the New Deal programs, which addressed widespread poverty, promoted fair labor practices, and introduced several social insurance programs. Additionally, New Deal programs initiated spending programs in urban communities, which was rarely the focus of federal intervention (Light, 2009). As a result, government established ground-breaking strategies to diminish the adverse effects of urban
deterioration, characterized as blight, inadequate housing, and the out-migration of middle-class families to the suburban periphery (Light, 2009).

Central cities were the pulse of American society as they represented the diverse social, ethnic, and economic stains of urban life, which were together bounded by working, spending, speculating, and investing (Teaford, 1993). Class and racial differences were less of an issue as laborers lived in alleyways behind the homes of the elite; therefore the mix of social strata was a common fact of urban residence (Boger, 2009). Downtowns and central business districts were the economic hubs of their respective localities, essentially responsible for the business and entertainment needs of its residents. Hence the arrival of the Great Depression dramatically impacted major revenue sources for central city governments and the business sector. These collective actions proved to be devastating and crippling for the survival of central cities.

During these trying times, government action was absolutely necessary. With the formulation of public policy and the distribution of resources, the federal government became directly involved in the recovery of central cities. However, intervention was administered through vague policy language, non-existent accountability measures, and tremendous authority devolved to state and local authorities. Therefore, under such circumstances, federal involvement is related to the significant disparities between social classes and the races, specifically poor and African American communities. Ultimately, the drastic steps needed to reverse urban decline are also responsible for sustaining class and racial inequalities. Neuman and Smith (2010, p. 22) state

[T]he networking of society is in debt to the capital invested in networking infrastructures, which have recast relations among people, institutions, and places.
While social, political, administrative, and economic forces also have played key roles in the transformation of urban space, the transformation of social space in general and urban space in particular is partly due to the transformation of infrastructure, and the transformative power of infrastructure.

The need for infrastructure (e.g. utilities, community facilities, and roads) created an atmosphere that promoted private sector development, which essentially ignored the long-term social implications of low-income African American communities (Neuman & Smith, 2010). When asked about displaced families affected by highways, federal and state highway officials contended that their business was to finance and build highways, and the social consequences of highway construction were the responsibility of other agencies (Mohl, 2001). Mohl (2001) further acknowledges that the victims of highway building were overwhelmingly poor and black. Combined with expansive urban renewal, the plight of poor African American communities would be threatened at every turn, as city officials were given the authority to raze neighborhoods that did not ‘fit’ the redevelopment plans of the central city. Public housing thus became the bait that led African Americans to predetermined areas based on the severe need for quality housing.

The success of the interstate highway program and urban renewal can be attributed to the tremendous infusion of federal dollars into local, state, and private economies. These resources were provided under the guise of economic development, job creation, and business growth (Jansson, 2004).

The economic and demographic challenges of central cities became exposed by the 1940s (Hirsch, 1983; Keating & Smith, 1996; Massey & Denton, 1993; Mohl, 1995; Osofsky, 1968; Sugure, 1996; W. J. Wilson, 2009). During this time, World War II was
underway and advancements in technology lead to an exodus of employers to locations outside of the central city core. This created a financial void for urban governments by decreasing their tax revenues and greatly contributing to unemployment hikes. Population mobility was exacerbated as African Americans and immigrants migrated to cities in the northeast and midwest in search of better opportunities. Severe overcrowding elevated racial tensions, leading to riots and the destruction of property, which facilitated middle-class “white-flight.” This pattern of racial tension, violence, and disinvestment could be witnessed in cities all across the country. In 1943, Detroit sent shock waves through the nation as a deadly and costly race riot ensued, essentially signifying the start, not the culmination of racial problems in America (Disorders, 1988; Hirsch, 1983). For example, Hirsch (1983, p. 41) describes post-WWII Chicago as “…chronic urban guerrilla warfare that was related less to ideological currents than to the ebb and flow of populations.”

Public and private actors pooled their resources to formulate suggestions that would address the declining tax base and changing demographics. These factors collectively stifled the central business district and flared racial anxiety due to financial insecurity and an inadequate housing stock respectively (Hirsch, 1983; Mohl, 1995). As a result, policy enablers were developed in an attempt to address the social and economic ills facing urban communities. The Housing Acts of 1937 and 1949 and the Interstate Highway Act of 1956 were crafted to assist with the revitalization of central cities by ensuring business expansion and promoting profitable investments by removing any and all threats to redevelopment – slums, blight, and African Americans (Dluhy, Revell, & Wong, 2002; Hirsch, 1983, 2000a; Mohl, 2002). These policies devolved specific
strategies that provided state and local officials with unprecedented power to utilize vast resources with seemingly unlimited discretion. In essence, federal funds were allocated to state and local governments for land clearance and the construction of housing and roads based on the preferences of the urban elite.

The era from 1940 to 1960 is known as the period of ghetto expansion (Massey & Denton, 1993; Sasaki, 1993-94). During this time, significant public policies and resources were dedicated to urban rehabilitation, which also facilitated the making of second ghetto communities (Hirsch, 1983). Policies, authority, and resources contributed to the residential homogeneity that is largely seen in urban and suburban environments, particularly the concentration of very poor minority communities in impoverished urban areas. As a result, discrimination against African Americans was openly demonstrated in the racial steering practices of real estate agents, the informal use of restrictive and deed covenants by neighborhood associations, and the redlining of African American communities by mortgage and insurance companies (Bauman, 1987; Gotham, 2000; K. T. Jackson, 1985; Power, 1983; Sasaki, 1993-94). Utilized by public administrators, business leaders, and local residents, a collective effort was waged to confine African Americans to specific neighborhoods within the central city. These actions targeted African Americans, because they were disenfranchised politically and economically, which made them easy casualties of urban development.

Ghetto expansion occurred as a consequence of the need to revitalize struggling urban economies. The waning tax base mandated immediate action by the local government, if central cities were to remain independent, viable, and competitive jurisdictions. Therefore, attracting investments became the number one priority for the
urban political and business leaders. Slum clearance was used to rid the central city of abandoned, inadequate, or dilapidated homes and buildings (Bristol, 1991; Sasaki, 1993-94). Unfortunately for African Americans, these actions resulted in the destruction of their communities, as the ‘slums’ were their primary place of residence. Facilitated by the government power and resources, land accumulation was made possible as private property was obtained and then sold or rented, donated to or retained by the private sector for the purposes of attracting and retaining business investment (Anderson, 1967). Collectively these policies were responsible for massive African American dislocation, African American neighborhood destruction, and their subsequent containment in second ghetto communities.

The second ghetto thesis by Arnold Hirsch prompted this investigation and will serve as the secondary theory that will guide this investigation. In his case study analysis of Chicago from 1940-1960, Hirsch identified the role of administrators and public polices as fundamental factors that contributed to the re-segregation of African Americans in urban areas (Hirsch, 1983). Due to the declining status of Chicago’s central business district, business leaders and public officials used their collective influence to formulate policy for the purposes of rehabilitating the distressed city. The local government and business elite were solely focused on initiating new and sustaining existing economic development opportunities. Average citizens, through the use of neighborhood improvement associations also engaged in the use of intimidation tactics and violence to keep African Americans immobilized and disenfranchised from civic engagement and the political process. These groups were specifically concerned with maintaining racially exclusive neighborhoods. In both situations, African Americans
were viewed as impediments toward the successful redevelopment of Chicago’s downtown and the sanctity of neighborhood homogeneity. Therefore Hirsch’s thesis suggests that informal and formal, public and private partnerships were utilized to displace African Americans, destroy their neighborhoods, and re-segregated them into second ghetto communities.

In the US, racial hierarchies have been used to create two separate societies – the worthy and unworthy whereby benefits and punishments are distributed respectively. African Americans have always held the latter status and were therefore purposefully targeted to endure the adverse effects of public policies, specifically urban renewal. Therefore, African Americans often occupied spaces characterized by unsanitary conditions, dilapidated infrastructure, extreme overcrowding (Hirsch, 1983; Massey & Denton, 1993; D. Wilson, 2007). Hence, it became easy to target these communities based on their external appearances. However, race and racism dictated the exclusivity with which African Americans resided in these spaces in the first place. The ultimate displacement of African Americans and the widespread destruction of their neighborhoods is attributed to their status as a vulnerable population – easily manipulated and oppressed by White society. Institutionalized by government agencies, articulated through public policies, and implemented by public administrators, discrimination against African Americans became embedded in American society, essentially sanctioning injustice.

**Statement of the Problem**

Enablers, both formal and informal, materialized to address urban decline. Public polices empowered private actors and public administrators to capitalize on the lowly
political and economic status of African Americans as a way to promote their own self-interest. Therefore, without the expertise, influence, or resources to stop the federal bulldozer, African Americans were consistently targeted based on their marginal status in society. In a formal sense, public policies legitimized the second-class citizenship of African Americans by limiting their residential preferences and promoting discriminatory practices. Informally, deed restrictions and restrictive covenants were utilized by neighborhood associations and civic groups to prohibit African American entry into racially and ethnically defined communities. Both practices lead to the systematic re-segregation of African Americans into second ghetto communities in urban cities across the US.

**African American Mobility Examined**

The research has identified several triggers to African American population movement. First, the migration of African Americans from the rural south to the urban north was facilitated by potential economic opportunities and the pursuit of a better quality of life (Massey & Denton, 1993; W. J. Wilson, 2009). Hence upon their arrival to these northern cities, African Americans were contained in original ghetto communities. These were places that were inhabited by African Americans and served as a melting-pot for new arrivals. However, as African American populations continued to grow, their respective neighborhoods were inelastic and resisted expansion. As a result, overcrowding and deterioration ravaged scarce housing stocks and depleted community resources in ghetto neighborhoods. These collective issues led to the endorsement and enactment of the Housing Act of 1937. This policy was designed to rectify the substandard housing available in urban communities.
Second, the Housing Act of 1949 was developed to save urban communities from decline by providing administrators with a variety of tools. Some of which were used to facilitate the displacement of African Americans from existing communities, both self-sufficient and struggling (Dluhy, et al., 2002; Hirsch, 1983). Rhetoric for urban revitalization was articulated and promoted under the guise of economic development, housing production, and job creation programs. As a result, if African Americans or their communities were in the path of these goals, then they were uprooted from existing segregated communities, and temporarily relocated to similar or worse environments. Consequently, because of their inability to afford better accommodations, racial steering practices by realtors, or due to deed restrictions and restrictive covenant agreements, African Americans were denied opportunities to rent or purchase homes in non-Black areas (Marcuse, 2001; Orfield, 1974-75; W. J. Wilson, 2009; Witt, 2006). Ultimately, African Americans were viewed as negative representatives of cities and as a threat to investments. Therefore, their proximity to the financial center guaranteed their immediate evacuation from these high-profile areas in the name of the public interest and urban redevelopment (D. Wilson, 2007). Essentially, African Americans were re-segregated into newly-formed ghettos away from downtowns and the central business district (Bauman, 1987; Fernandez, 1996; Jenkins, 2001).

Third, the Interstate Highway System (IHS) of 1956 evolved as a public policy enabler to reverse the trends of urban deterioration. Transportation policy was promoted to address national security, unemployment, and interstate commerce issues (Mohl, 2003a, 2004). However, this enabler proved detrimental to African Americans and their communities as destruction and dislocation became widespread as a result of highway
Like the Housing Acts of 1937 and 1949, the Interstate Highway System (IHS) provided state officials with the funds and power. In this case, authorities used their discretion to determine construction standards and to route highways at the local level (Schwartz, 1976). It has been noted that this shift in authority altered metropolitan freeway in the way of form and function: from planned networks intended to ameliorate uneven development to construction designed to attract and concentrate high-speed and longer distance travel (B. D. Taylor, 2000).

The Housing Acts of 1937 and 1949 and the Interstate Highway System of 1956 (e.g. enablers) provided state and local administrators unprecedented power and diverse tools to fight urban deterioration. The authority devolved includes: the ability to use eminent domain to clear and accumulate land, to select public housing locations, to determine occupancy ratios, and route highways significantly (Hirsch, 1983, 2000a; Justia.com, n.d.; Mohl, 2002; Schwartz, 1976). All of which contributed significantly to the re-segregation of African Americans. These strategies empowered administrators to transform central cities in ways that would reverse urban decline and make them financially prosperous jurisdictions. Despite the social implications of these actions, the outward focus of administrators and private actors centered on quantifiable and economic objectives. Therefore, African American dispossession and neighborhood destruction was considered collateral damage, especially since the need to revitalize central cities was the primary concern.

Collectively, public policy enablers and urban redevelopment strategies funneled African Americans into specific communities. Based on formal discrimination practices
that denied home loans to African Americans, an unwillingness of White homeowners to sell to African Americans or the impending threat of violence for breaching all-white neighborhoods, Blacks were confined to designated areas (Hirsch, 1983; K. T. Jackson, 1985; Massey & Denton, 1993; Osofsky, 1968). Although these events occurred decades ago, they still have profound effects on African Americans, their communities, and their overall quality of life today. The conscious and purposeful decisions of administrators, politicians, and business leaders suggest a pattern of neglect, isolation, and residential steering. Facilitated by public policies, resources, and administrative discretion, this research suggests that African Americans were re-segregated into second ghetto communities. Often characterized as resource-deprived, dysfunctional, and violent neighborhoods, the second ghetto emerged as an “unintended consequence” in the efforts to promote urban economic development by the local government and private sector. Hence, the pervasiveness of residential segregation and alienation experienced by African Americans today may be explained by the cumulative decisions that were made more than 70 years ago.

**Purpose of Research**

The living conditions of African Americans are not very different now in 2011 than what could be experienced in any urban community during the 1960s, 1970s, or 1980s. In fact, conditions for some urban residents are worse, when the cumulative effects of public housing, urban renewal, and transportation policies are considered over time. The long-term psychological consequences of living in resource-deprived, crime-ridden, and opportunity-absent communities have contributed to tremendous feelings of hopelessness and a lack of trust in the system. Therefore, this research will serve to
provide a historical background, which led to the current state of affairs in central cities. It will also serve as an opportunity to explicitly identify the complicit stance of government officials and agencies in directing residential patterns and sanctioning the segregation of African American communities.

The mobility patterns of African Americans were influenced by three constituent forces: government intervention, public administrators, and the business community (Anderson, 1967; Hirsch, 1983; Massey & Denton, 1993). Government intervention enabled urban jurisdictions the ability to revitalize their struggling economies through the formulation of public policies and the distribution of public resources. Public administrators, therefore, focused on the need to attract investment, secure revenue, and retain existing business relationships in the urban core. Business leaders were able to articulate the benefits of urban renewal to form an unfathomable public-private partnership. Essentially, these constituent forces had the resources and the motivation to shape the policy discussions, whereby urban renewal and transportation policies were promoted as ‘must have’ initiatives, in order to keep central cities vibrant and autonomous.

Consequently, the physical rehabilitation of the central city occurred at the expense of African American quality of life and well-being. Quantitative measures dictated how resources would be used and distributed. For example, administrators and business leaders were concerned with the amount of land that could be accumulated, the number of buildings that could be constructed or the extent of expansion, the impact of highway construction on urban commerce, and the types of financial incentives that could be reaped as a result of all of the previously mentioned actions. On the other hand, the
qualitative measures regarding quality of life, emotional well-being, and access to services were overlooked without consideration for the long-term effects for urban families, especially African Americans. Therefore, the physical rehabilitation of urban America greatly contributed to the residential mobility cycle experienced by African Americans: original settlement into segregated communities and their subsequent re-segregation into second ghetto communities. A variety of factors ultimately encouraged and sustained the isolating effects of second ghetto communities, specifically federal legislation, public resources, and public-private partnerships resulted in intended and unintended consequences, which led to the transfer and re-segregation of African Americans in inner cities across the country.

This research is designed to spatially examine the residential mobility patterns of African Americans to determine if dispersion or re-segregation occurred in relation to administrative action and public policy decisions. For clarification, dispersion is the extent African Americans displaced by urban renewal, public housing, or transportation policies moved freely to any neighborhood suitable to their needs. This finding would demonstrate that the identified public policies and the public-private partnerships were not fundamental drivers of African American containment in second ghetto communities, and that other factors should be considered. However, if African Americans where collectively grouped and moved to specific communities in the urban environment, then this relationship would reveal a pattern of re-segregation. Re-segregation, as suggested by Hirsch, would expose the effects of numerous policies and practices that steered African Americans into predetermined ghetto communities.
clustering of African Americans from one community to another would empirically demonstrate that a re-segregation did indeed occur in central cities.

**Research Questions**

The second ghetto thesis is critical for understanding the interplay of urban renewal, unrestrained authority, and vast resources. Its effects have proven to be detrimental to comprehensive urban development, particularly as these actions isolated African American communities and concentrated poverty within them. In trying to understand segregation, other scholars have developed frameworks to explain the exclusiveness of Black urban ghettos and their long-term impact on the psyche of its residents (Bauman, 1987; Bickford & Massey, 1991; Massey & Denton, 1993; Osofsky, 1968; Sidney, 2005; Sugure, 1996; D. Wilson, 2007). However, the second ghetto thesis is significant, because it identifies a relationship between the actors, policies, and resources as prominent factors in the making and maintenance of segregated ghetto neighborhoods in the United States.

Despite the influential role of administrative discretion or the damaging effects of public policy on the marginalization of African Americans, the fields of public administration and policy studies have remained unresponsive to issues of discrimination. Sexism, ageism, and homosexuality have been relatively nonexistent topics in the study of public administration scholarship and practice throughout its existence. Although unacknowledged by the field, these issues remain critically important with regard to the way policies are formed, resources are distributed, and public opinion is shaped. The futile attempts of public administration to address societal ‘isms’ has done little to advance the field or to make it responsive to a diverse 21st century American society.
More specifically, race and racism have received much less attention, particularly during the most momentous movements of American society. Witt (2006) acknowledges that during the time periods of Reconstruction, Jim Crow, and the Civil Rights Movement, public administration scholarship regarded race relations as out-dated and irrelevant. During the most violent and tumultuous times of American history, public administration remained silent, essentially sanctioning discrimination and the terror used to intimidate African Americans. Consequently, this study will contribute to an almost non-existent literature regarding the adverse effects of administrative actions and public policies on disenfranchising African Americans.

Based on this framework, the research questions that will guide this study are:

1) What role did public policy play in directing the mobility patterns of African Americans in urban communities?

2) How did administrative actions contribute to African Americans' mobility?

3) Were African Americans re-segregated into specific neighborhoods as suggested by the second ghetto thesis?

**Conceptual Model**

Numerous factors and relationships have contributed to the changing landscape in urban America. The key focal points of the conceptual model concentrate on the relationships between the environment, policy enablers, implementation strategies, and outcomes. The environment represents the historical foundation of contemporary urban society. This section of the model identifies the interacting factors that altered the philosophy of federal intervention into individual lives and the private sector. The New Deal culture emerged in response to the financial crisis of the 1920s and 1930s by
enacting several policies designed to protect citizens, regulate businesses, stimulate employment, and encourage homeownership (Jansson, 2004). Federal dollars were used to support public projects at the state and local levels. Ultimately, public policies and resources initiated an informal public-private partnership that would be solidified over time to support private enterprise, promote economic growth and facilitate urban redevelopment.

The physical and economic outlook of central cities was bleak and unrelenting. As a result, policy enablers evolved to help offset the rapid deterioration that was sweeping across urban environments across the country. Although the central business district was hit hard by the out-migration of industrial and commercial businesses, neighborhoods were rapidly being abandoned at the prospect of pristine living in the suburban periphery (Hirsch, 1983; W. J. Wilson, 1987). Therefore, the public policies and its subsequent strategies that evolved were initiated by the political actors and implemented by state and local public administrators. Their power and influence transformed the Housing Acts of 1937 and 1949 and the Interstate Highway Act of 1956 into policy enablers that contributed to the residential mobility patterns of African Americans. Discrimination was sanctioned and perpetuated by way of the vast discretion that was afforded to public administration officials. The public discourse regarding the need for urban rehabilitation justified the containment of African Americans into second ghetto communities based on need to re-image the city to make it attractive for future investors (D. Wilson, 2007).

Aided by the preferences and influence of business leaders, urban administrators defined the public interests in terms of benefits that would stabilize urban economies and generate profits for local area businesses (Hirsch, 1983). Consequently, the use of
several land management strategies assisted administrators in the rehabilitation of the urban core and the systematic re-segregation of African Americans. The Housing Act of 1937 produced public housing and devolved authority to local housing authorities to determine occupancy and site locations. The Housing Act of 1949 resulted in ‘slum clearance’ which enabled administrators to identify ‘slum’ areas to be razed for development. The Interstate Highway Act of 1956 gave administrators the authority to use eminent domain to forcibly move occupants off land that was deemed valuable by local officials and business leaders. These strategies were effectively used to create a dual society. African Americans would be economically, politically, and socially isolated in the central city, while Whites would be freely mobile to enjoy the vast amenities of life wherever they chose. African Americans would be deprived of resources and opportunity, while Whites were able to take advantage of new housing construction and employment. These stark differences in access initiated and formalized the racial divide that currently exists in this country.

African Americans and their communities were targeted for a variety of reasons: their inferior status in American society, the decaying conditions of their neighborhoods, their proximity to the central business district, or due to the ease of manipulating a vulnerable population. Regardless of the reasons, African Americans and their communities were devastated by urban redevelopment. Some estimates state that upwards of one-million people were dispossessed as a result of urban renewal and 66% of those were African Americans (Fullilove, 2001). Consequently, racism and prejudice set the tone for the treatment of African Americans with regard to these policies and its burdens. Additionally, these enablers disseminated significant discretionary power to
state and local officials to use eminent domain, route highways, and determine public housing construction locations based on their specific preferences (Bristol, 1991; Mohl, 2002; B. D. Taylor, 2000).

These cooperative forces resulted in tremendous benefits for the central city governments and the private sector, but at the detriment to African Americans. For example, the tax credits and subsidies by federal and local governments, incentivized existing businesses to remain in urban localities (Anderson, 1967). As a result, urban governments were able to generate revenue to maintain their autonomy, become competitive with suburban communities, and attract capital investment for entertainment and tourism (D. Wilson, 2007). African Americans, on the other hand, were displaced and their neighborhoods destroyed in order for these events to occur. Based on the negative social construction of African Americans and their communities, their presence in cities, especially near the downtown area or central business district was viewed as a threat to entrepreneurship, the city’s image, and its revitalization efforts. The conceptual model below demonstrates these relationships (Figure 1).
Figure 1 - Conceptual Model

Environment

New Deal Culture
- Urban Deterioration
  - Blight
  - Disinvestment
  - Substandard housing

Public investment

Public-private partnerships

Economic growth/Business expansion

Strategies

Housing Act of 1937 (Public housing)

Housing Act of 1949 (Slum clearance)

Interstate Highway System of 1956

Enablers

Racism

Site public housing

Use eminent domain

Accumulate land

Route highways

Outcomes

Business expansion
- Secure profits
- Attract capital investments

African American displacement
African American neighborhood destruction
African American re-segregation
Methodology

The research design for this study is aggregated into two parts: a qualitative assessment of primary and secondary source data and a time-series analysis using Geographic Information Systems (GIS). The qualitative assessment encompasses a thorough review of local planning documents, research articles, archival data, and census data. The public policies decisions of the federal, state, and local levels will also be charted to highlight all the key actors and events that impacted the migration patterns of African Americans. A timeline has been developed to identify when federal, state, and local policies that were implemented in Baltimore to emphasize important events and decisions that occurred within each decade. This information was collected for each decennial census and collectively utilized with the GIS data to identify whether a relationship exists between policy decisions and African American residential preferences.

The timeline will represent a time-series analysis of initial policy actions and changes over time. O’Sullivan and Rassel (1999) states that time-series studies allow baseline measurements to be made, describes changes over time, maintains records of trends, and enables forecasting of future trends. This study examined the historical residential patterns of African American using census data from 1940-2000 for Baltimore, Maryland. The maps depict the mobility patterns of African Americans at the census tract (e.g. neighborhood) level. Consequently, each decennial census presents spatial information regarding the migration patterns of African Americans, the location of public housing, urban renewal developments, and highway construction which will demonstrate demographic changes over time in Baltimore. These findings are used in
conjunction with qualitative data to specify laws and reveal policy decisions that were associated with the final residential locations of African Americans in the city.

The 1940 census provided data regarding the initial settlement locations of African Americans into central cities upon their arrival from the rural south. As time progressed, public policies were enacted to address urban decline, housing shortages, unemployment and national security. Each subsequent decennial timeline will identify the major policies and local decisions that affected the urban landscape – especially the residential restrictions placed on African Americans. Therefore, this research spatially examines the residential mobility patterns of African Americans to determine whether populations were dispersed or concentrated over time. Dispersion means that African Americans were relocated by urban renewal, public housing, or transportation policies and could move freely to any neighborhood suitable to their needs and preferences. This outcome would contradict the re-segregation thesis proposed in this study by acknowledging that African Americans were not residually confined to specific second ghetto communities. The concentration of African Americans into specific African American communities, on the other hand, would authenticate the re-segregation thesis. This research would associate the visible hand of discrimination, racial steering, and the impact of public-private partnerships in the systematic isolation of African Americans into poor ghetto communities.

**Definitions**

These terms are used throughout the study and definitions are provided for clarity.

*Desegregate:* to free of any law, provision, or practice requiring isolation of the members of a particular race in separate units (Dictionary, 2010a).
**Opportunity:** a situation or condition that places individuals in a position to be more likely to succeed or excel (Reece, 2009).

**Segregation:** the separation or isolation of a race, class, or ethnic group by enforced or voluntary residence in a restricted area, by barriers to social intercourse, by educational facilities, or by other discriminatory means (Dictionary, 2010b).

**Re-segregation:** the transition and concentration of a group from one location to a new location.

**Social mobility:** the possibility or ease with which one may change position in the social stratification system (Eller, 2009).

**Spatial mobility:** The rate of moves or migrations made by a given population within a given time frame (EIONET, 2010).
CHAPTER II

THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK

Critical social theory is the overarching framework used to guide this study. Brian Fay (1975, p. 94) states that critical social science seeks "...to uncover those systems of social relationships which determine the actions of individuals and the unanticipated, though not accidental, consequences of those actions. The critical model is one which requires that its practitioners seek to discover quasi-casual and functional laws of social behavior in particular contexts." This study seeks to identify the social relationships that institutionalized discrimination against African Americans and facilitated the making of the second ghetto. Government policies and institutions, public administrators, private actors, and urban residents developed formal and information relationships for the purposes of limiting African American entry into all-white neighborhoods. These quasi-casual relationships thrived in the urban environment where resources were met with opportunities. Hence economic development provided justification for the dispossession, transfer, and re-segregation of African Americans off valuable land and away from the central business district into second ghetto communities.

Originating from the Frankfurt School, critical social theory emerged during the time of Enlightenment in Europe and the Americas, as people were trying to cast off religious and government authority (Box, 2005). Reason and capitalism became effective tools to oppress and dominate the larger society in order to maintain the status quo. Reason is referred to as rational thought whereby instrumental means or quantitative processes dictated policy actions to produce objective results. These
narrow outcomes did not account for the social implications of residential
displacement, neighborhood destruction, or quality of life for African Americans.
Marcuse (as stated in Box, 2005, p. 18) also attacked common sense and positivism
because of their ability to contain and neutralize criticism as they induce “thought to be
satisfied with the facts, to renounce any transgression beyond them, and to bow to the
given state of affairs.” Therefore, individuals are guided by a false consciousness of
reality, whereby people accept the oppression and domination of marginalized
populations or even themselves based on how issues are framed in the public discourse.

According to Box (2005) critical social theory consists of contradiction,
dialectic, change; critical reason and imagination; and emancipation and self-
determination. If considered within this frame, these factors have the potential to
empower administrators to realize and acknowledge the incongruence in American
values and actions. It requires an intellectual consciousness that enable administrators
to critically think about the world in alternative and non-traditional ways, particularly
with regard to power, authority, and the availability or distribution of resources.
Finally, it requires the initiation of social change through education. “The purpose of
education in terms of knowledge provided by critical social science is the
transformation of the consciousness of the actors it seeks to understand, a
transformation which will increase their autonomy by making it possible for them to
determine collectively the conditions under which they live” (Fay, 1975, p. 105).
Critical social theory challenges the status quo by enlightening vulnerable groups about
their artificial conceptions of reality. For example, capitalism has produced a society
full of consumers, such that people work to possess material goods instead of working
to be self-fulfilled. As a result, the destructive nature of capitalism is shielded from criticism or alternative points-of-view based on society's perception of its market guided success and wealth-building capacity.

This framework is integral for understanding the evolution of second ghetto communities, and how they became containment reservoirs for African Americans. From a critical social theory perspective, it is possible to "...make explicit the historical/political/economic context that frames and constrains action" (Box, 2005, p. 21). The historical backdrop of this research will describe the environmental climate of the 1940s. For example, as the US faced financial crisis, advances in technology, and population diversity, the philosophical stance of the government changed dramatically. In response, government initiated a series of domestic programs to ensure individual protections against physical and financial downturns, otherwise known as the welfare state. The political climate was influenced by the sentiments of business leaders and urban residents with regard to how to address central city decline, substandard housing, and inadequate commercial infrastructure. As a result, public policies were formulated and land management strategies evolved to address urban problems. Consequently, the intermingling of the environment, political, and economic factors culminated in systemic spatial inequality, which has concentrated African Americans in cities and Whites in the suburbs.

**Critical Race Theory**

In this study, critical social theory is used as a macro-level theory to discuss the broader societal environment that contributed to the making of the second ghetto. The intellectual foundations of positivism, the economic institution of capitalism, and long-
standing racial oppression of women and minorities have created a framework that
supports and maintains the interests of the status quo – middle-aged White males.
Critical Race Theory, on the other hand, is used to provide an in-depth analysis of the
micro-level factors that continue to sustain systems of oppression against women and
minorities generally, but specifically African Americans. Critical race is described as the
ability to challenge “...the universality of white experience/judgment as the authoritative
standard that binds people of color and normatively measures, directs, controls, and
regulates the terms of proper thought, expressions, presentation and behavior” (Tate IV,
1997, pp. 196-197). Further, it is argued that “CRT [critical race theory] is a framework
that can be used to theorize, examine and challenge the ways race and racism implicitly
and explicitly impact on social structures, practices, and discourses” (Yosso, 2005, p. 70).

Critical race theory evolved as legal scholars attempted to offer a different
representation of race, racism, and the discourse that involved communities of color (Tate
IV, 1997). It quickly became an interdisciplinary framework as it was used by scholars
in education, sociology, ethnic and women’s studies, and history to explain
disproportionate experiences of women and minorities across academic disciplines (Tate
IV, 1997; Yosso, 2005). Critical race theory has been applied across diverse fields, and
therefore, its widespread use seeks to counterbalance the intellectual and genetic
inferiority discussions of historic and contemporary research. Stephen J. Gould (1996)
extensively refuted flawed biological and anthropological studies from centuries ago used
to ‘explain’ racial and gender disparities. Books like the Bell Curve (1994) and Losing
Ground (1994) offer modern discussions of racial and ethnic differences with regard to
intellect, culture, and power. Consequently, discourse and rhetoric have been used to characterize society into socially constructed deserving and undeserving groups.

Schneider and Ingram’s (2005, p. 334) theory suggests

The social construction of target populations has a powerful influence on public officials and shapes both the policy agenda and the actual design of policy. There are strong pressures for public officials to provide beneficial policy to powerful, positively constructed target populations and to devise punitive, punishment-oriented policy for negatively constructed groups. Social construction becomes embedded in policy as messages that are absorbed by citizens and affect their orientations and participation patterns. Policy sends messages about what government is supposed to do, which citizens are deserving (and which not), and what kinds of attitudes and participatory patterns are appropriate in a democratic society.

Ultimately, the realities of this framework provides an essential foundation toward understanding the implications language, symbols, perception and behaviors can have regarding the allocation of resources among diverse constituencies.

Critical social theory is ultimately used to explain the broader environment that impacted second ghetto formation (e.g. court cases, New Deal Culture, public investment, economic growth, and business expansion). Subsequently, critical race theory extends the analysis toward understanding the experiences of African Americans based on those historical and structural factors (e.g. displacement, neighborhood destruction, and re-segregation). Overall, federal legislation and action/inaction established the rule of law and modeled by default the behaviors that informed public and private organizational
decisions, administrative discretion, and public perception. Consequently, the re-
segregation of African Americans in second ghetto communities did not happen by chance, although it was not wholly intended. David Rusk (1999) acknowledges that the federal public housing program was a well-motivated social policy, but its unintended consequences exacerbated concentrated poverty. Purposeful and conscious decisions were made by numerous people and institutions to ensure the residential settlement pattern specifically confined to African Americans. For clarification, many groups regardless of race, ethnicity, and class have been negatively impacted by government actions. However, with regard to urban redevelopment, African Americans have been overwhelmingly burdened by public policies and administrative discretion.

**Foundations of Sanctioned Segregation**

Public policies and administrative discretion have created a disparity between African American and Whites with regard to their residential locations in urban and suburban communities respectively. A study published by the Urban Institute states that 72 percent of suburban neighborhoods are either exclusively or predominantly White, whereas 38 percent of central cities are predominately or majority-mixed African Americans (Rawlings, Harris, Turner, & Padilla, 2004). The authors acknowledge that the number of suburban relative to central city neighborhoods is much greater, therefore demographic change is dominated by what is happening in the suburbs (Rawlings, et al., 2004). It becomes obvious that the residential options available to Whites are much more diverse than what has been traditionally accessible to African Americans. Public policy and power reinforced and extended discriminatory practices, despite their potential to ameliorate systemic racial separation, they essentially were used to deepen the divide
Public Administration Foundations

Public administration is important to American society. It has been identified as the “fourth” branch of government, because the duties beholden to the profession dictate the day-to-day activities of everyday citizens. However, since its inception, the field of public administration has struggled to find its intellectual identity, therefore complicating the responsibilities and obscuring the actions of practitioners. Consequently, the field has yet to agree on a universal doctrine, because public administration is a unique, complex, and interdisciplinary field. This section examines the philosophical role the academy has played in shaping the actions of public administration practitioners. This foundation provides a basis for understanding the values, demands, and performance measures that guide public administrators within their respective jobs.

Numerous scholars have attempted to define the core principles of the discipline, adopt a philosophical worldview to guide the development of theory, and bind administrative action to those theoretical precepts. Richard J. Stillman (1996) lists several definitions that scholars have used to communicate the tenets of public administration:

1) “Public Administration is the production of goods and services designed to serve the needs of citizens-consumers” – Marshall Dimock, Gladys Dimock, and Douglas Fox (Public Administration, Fifth Edition, 1983);

2) “In ordinary usage, public administration is a generic expression for the entire bundle of activities that are involved in the establishment and
implementation of public policies” – Cole Blease Graham, Jr., and Steven W. Hays (Managing the Public Organization, 1986);

3) “Public administration:
   a. is a cooperative group effort in a public setting.
   b. covers all three branches – executive, legislative, and judicial – and their interrelationship.
   c. has an important role in the formulation of public policy, and is thus part of the political process.
   d. is different in significant ways from private administration.
   e. is closely associated with numbers of private groups and individuals in providing service to the community” – Felix A. Nigro and Lloyd G. Nigro (Modern Public Administration, Seventh Edition, 1989);

4) “Public administration is concerned with the management of public programs” – Robert Denhardt (Public Administration: An Action Orientation, 1995).

The breadth and depth of these definitions are varied and the way academics define public administration dictates the philosophy and methodology that is used in scholarship and practice.

The range and depth of the definitions listed above underscore the complexity of public administration scholarship and practice. Woodrow Wilson (1887) asserted that administrators must be free from political influence, impassive to subjectivity, and most importantly, they should execute policy not formulate it. His legendary politics-administration dichotomy envisions administrators as behind-the-scenes rational officials
that solely focus on management and following the directives of the legislative body. Simon (1946), on the other hand, discussed the need for administrators to balance conflicting values, such as effectiveness and efficiency with democracy and equality. These standards were achieved through the use of technical-rationality, which was lauded as the most appropriate method to pursue normative objectives without shaping human affairs, specifically in regard to public administration and public policy (Adams & Balfour, 1998). Using this framework, administrators must carefully navigate the competitive preferences of individuals, groups, social classes, or whole societies (Frederickson, 1997). Overall these factors play an integral role in the way problems are defined, people are characterized, and the way benefits and penalties are distributed throughout society. When taken in together, these standards pigeonhole administrators as strict executors of public policy without any discretion or input in the process.

Although the stated principles may be theoretically grounded, Lipsky (1980) acknowledged that administrators do indeed make policy based on relatively high degrees of discretion and their relative autonomy from organizational authority. This reality has raised issues of accountability, social equity, and citizen trust in government (Holzer & Yang, 2005). The concerns of discretion are particularly meaningful to African Americans, gays and lesbians, the disabled, and immigrants. Therefore, issues of equity and discretion have been examined in public administration scholarship. Social equity comprehends an array of value preferences, organizational design inclinations, and management style preferences, such as the equality of government services, responsiveness to the needs of the citizenry, and responsibility for decisions and program implementation by managers (Frederickson, 1980). In essence, social equity attempts to
level the playing field for groups that may not be socially, financially, or politically resourceful, but still have a right to be engaged in the democratic process.

Despite these conversations in scholarship and practice, evidence is available that substantiates the inequities produced by bureaucracy and administrative practices (Alexander, 1997; Arendt, 2004; Barrett, 1995; Witt, 2006). In the *Origins of Totalitarianism* Arendt (2004) specifically discusses how bureaucracy was used by British imperialist functionaries as a tool to marginalize the “subject races” in Egypt and India. Imperialism evolved a philosophy that suggested a need to use military and political forces to control, expand, and invest outside of Britain’s national boundaries. As a result, her investigations identify British administrators as solely focused on territorial expansion and the accumulation of wealth. Economics facilitated the extensive use of power against any group outside of the administrators’ home constituencies. Its widespread success is associated with the fulfillment of hidden desires and the secret convictions of the economically and socially dominant classes to alienate and marginalize the other. Consequently, the British model of domination and oppression of the “subject races” has been mainstreamed. In the US, public administrators became facilitators of business expansion by securing profits in order to re-capture profitable land through the social and economic isolation of African Americans based on their inferior status. Hence, economics are the driving force, but race is used to justify such unwarranted actions against a disenfranchised group.

Adams and Balfour (1998) acknowledge that, when social policies are combined with technical goals, the potential to drive out ethics is great, consequently producing administrative evils. Through the use of technical language, administrators are able to
emotionally distance themselves from their actions, particularly if the group being hurt has been identified as not "normal," unlike the majority, or not good Americans (Adams & Balfour, 1998). These groups become dehumanized based on the social constructions of the dominant classes, whereby racial categorizations are used to institutionalize racism (Alexander, 1997). Stivers (2007) suggests that the ideology of race contributes to negative administrative actions, due to its deeply embedded nature. Public administrators therefore unconsciously engage in behaviors that harm certain groups, while society has created a culture of acceptance based on the conceptions of vulnerable populations. Alexander (1997, p. 344) articulates this point best stating "if administrative action must embody the will of the people, and racism is integral, yet largely invisible, component of the customary morality, then administrators have little anchor for justifying action outside of that context."

Racism, both hidden and revealed, is rooted in the very social institutions and structures that were created to ensure justice and opportunity for all. Therefore, within the confines of an institution, policies and outcomes will consistently work against the interest of powerless groups. For example, tools like zoning and eminent domain were initially developed to protect and promote the public interest (Levy, 2009). However, Ross and Leigh (2000) identify these same devices in the hands of planners as a misappropriation of power, especially with regard to African Americans and their communities. These contradictions substantiate the racialized histories of academic disciplines, which give legitimate authority to the discriminatory and intolerant actions of practitioners. In conjunction with the practices of administrators, the depth and extensiveness of inequity is maintained and perpetuated by the institutional structures of
society. Taylor and Cole (2001, p. 5) define structural racism as “a distributive system that determines the possibilities and constraints within which people of color are forced to act. The system involves the operation of racialized structural relationships that produce the unequal distribution of material resources, such as jobs, income, housing, neighborhood conditions, and access to opportunities.”

Essentially, bureaucracy and administrators have become tools of the private sector to achieve benefits and maintain the status quo. Coupled with the lack of diversity, the bureaucratic structure of government and administrative actions have manifest the racist opinions of the public and the academy (Alexander, 1997; Barrett, 1995; Witt, 2006). Prejudice, in this regard, is noticeable in terms of the attitudes, perceptions, and behaviors of ordinary citizens. Discrimination projected by citizens onto a marginalized group is without a doubt harmful. However, consider the same narrow-mindedness coupled with the authority to develop, implement, or interpret policies that will directly impact disenfranchised groups in more comprehensive ways. These circumstances are fundamental to understanding the re-segregation of African American communities based on the collective actions of administrators, politicians, and business leaders. From a broader perspective, the biased actions of administrators rationalize outcomes that distressed powerless communities based on the values of American society.

Administrative Discretion Facilitated by the Federal Government

The US governments at the federal, state, and local levels and the academy worked in tandem to sanction discriminatory practices against African Americans. Academicians informed policy decisions regarding the inferior class status of African Americans with books like The Bell Curve, Losing Ground, and the report The Negro
Family: A Case for National Action. These reports concluded that dysfunction in the African American community could be attributed to lack of intelligence, an unstable family structure, and a hostile communal environment (Herrnstein & Murray, 1994; Moynihan, 1965; Murray, 1994). These tenets were the topics of public debate and ultimately provided justification for policy decisions. Therefore, as authority was devolved to local governments, administrators implemented policies based on the dictates of academic research and public opinion, which consequently contributed to the subjugation of African Americans (Coates, 2003; Massey & Denton, 1993; Orfield, 1974-75; Witt, 2006). To be fair, the detrimental consequences of policy decisions and their subsequent actions were unknown initially, but when administrators at all levels of government became aware of the effects of concentrated poverty and racial isolation, behaviors remained unchanged.

Administrators essentially became stewards of discrimination by aimlessly following orders regardless of the social implications for African Americans and their communities. Adams and Balfour (1998) characterized this complacency as administrative evil, whereby administrators deliberately inflicted pain and suffering on human beings. In Nazi Germany, “the significance of the connection between the Holocaust and the civil service in Germany is such that responsibility for the event shifts to include not only those who planned and committed overt acts of killing innocent human beings, but also routine and seemingly neutral acts of state and municipal authorities and thousands of ordinary public administrators” (Adams & Balfour, 1998, p. 54). In the US, African Americans were denied access to better employment, education and housing. Intimidation and violence was a common tool used to deny voting rights or
restrict the use of city services and public resources. Collectively these actions led to the development of a Black underclass population. Although administrators were fully aware of these explicit oppressive acts, nothing was done to rectify the issues to prevent further harm.

Although administrators played a tremendous role in the marginalization of African Americans, federal policies set a precedent for how private and professional agencies would treat African Americans. These rules and regulations enabled public and private entities to capitalize on the negative perceptions of African Americans. Hirsch (2000a) uncovered the collective effects of federal housing agencies establishing rules for sanctioned discrimination against African Americans. He states

Examining the policies and practices of the Housing and Home Finance Agency (HHFA) and its constituent bodies – the Public Housing Administration (PHA), the Federal Housing Administration (FHA), and the Urban Renewal Administration (URA) – the commission asserted that the agency had not “moved far or very fast” in eliminating segregation. The commission also made it clear that the government and its minions were more contributing architects than passive bystanders in the residential isolation of African Americans (Hirsch, 2000a, p. 158).

The actions orchestrated by the federal government, the most authoritative voice in the land, opened the flood gates for explicit racism and prejudice against African Americans from all aspects of society.

With regard to African American residential segregation, three factors have been identified in facilitating the process: public and institutional discrimination,
discriminatory practices in FHA loan distribution, and new exclusionary zoning ordinances (Darden, 1995). For example, the Federal Housing Administration’s (FHA) Underwriting Manual considered any change in the social or racial occupancy of a given neighborhood as factors that would likely contribute to instability or declining property values (Witt, 2006). The Home Owners’ Loan Corporation (HOLC) became known for consistently undervaluing older central city communities that were racially or ethnically mixed (K. T. Jackson, 1985; Massey & Denton, 1993). Ironically, each of these federal agencies was an outgrowth of the New Deal movement, which was designed to protect families and stabilize local economies. Unfortunately for African Americans, their families and neighborhoods were excluded from such efforts.

Private organizations formalized prejudice in the publication of manuals, bylaws, and regulations (Bauman, 1987; Hirsch, 1983; K. T. Jackson, 1985). The National Association of Real Estate Brokers (NAREB) made introducing African American homeowners into all-white communities by realtors a breach of professional standards (Mohl, 1995). These actions attempted to preserve racially homogenous communities, by denying African American entry, while simultaneously funneling mortgages and resources away from African American neighborhoods. The American Road Builders Association and the American Association of State Highway Officials all took a firm stance to eliminate slums, contribute to the appreciation of property values, and counter the threat posed to slum housing (Mohl, 2001). The result ultimately racialized urban spaces. Gotham (2000) notes that urban neighborhoods are traditionally characterized as pathological, dangerous, and nefarious places. Under such scrutiny and disregard, it is not difficult to comprehend the adverse policy actions that impact these communities.
The differentiated treatment of African Americans and Whites led to a dual housing market. Blockbusters and speculators capitalized on the panic of Whites that African Americans would breach the color line and purchase homes in their communities. Blockbusting is the "...intentional act of a real estate operative to settle an African American household in an all-white neighborhood for the purpose of provoking white flight in order to make excessive profits by buying low from those who fled and selling high to those who sought access to new housing opportunities" (Orser, 1994, p. 4). Hence, if one Black family moved into a neighborhood, then a domino effect would ensue. In other words, Whites assumed their property values would decline, and blockbusters obtained the properties and quickly sold to African Americans at much higher costs (Massey & Denton, 1993). The racial turnover of a neighborhood dictated its demise. As more and more Whites abandoned their homes, African Americans would readily accept the opportunity for better living accommodations. The increasing presence of Black families resulted in the decline of city services to those neighborhoods, which contributed to these communities being a revolving door for a transient population. Consequently, the cycle of ghetto formation crept into these once thriving communities.

Despite the long-range consequences, real estate speculators were a mixed blessing for African Americans interested in homeownership. Since African Americans did not qualify for traditional mortgages, speculators provided the property and the money needed for home purchases (Hirsch, 1983). The disadvantages of this relationship were the stringent and temperamental demands placed on African American homeowners. For example, if payments were late or maintenance was too burdensome tenets could be evicted from their property at a moment's notice, therefore creating
incredible risks for the homeowner, particularly the loss of equity that had built up over
time (Hirsch, 1983). For blockbusters and speculators, on the other hand, this was a win-
win situation, because exorbitant profits were guaranteed based on the sheer number of
African Americans that wanted to become homeowners, but were denied mortgages
based on race.

Realtors and speculators did not act alone, as their actions were made possible by
the discretionary powers of local administrators. Administrators solicited assistance from
the federal government, generated public support for its initiatives, and executed plans
that would ensure the financial prosperity of its respective jurisdictions and its private
investors (Jenkins, 2001; D. Wilson, 2007). In this regard, administrators pursued
objective and quantifiable goals such as: securing capital investments to increase local
revenues, diminishing the number of blighted structures to attract positive attention to the
urban environment, and by creating an entrepreneurial- competitive city that will remain
autonomous and self-sufficient (D. Wilson, 2007). Administrators at all levels of
government facilitated the systematic dispossession of African Americans. Without
them, the segregation and inequality between urban and metropolitan communities would
not be as pervasive.

**Government Sanctioned Discrimination**

This section focuses on the historical, political, and economic factors that led to the
dispossession and re-segregation of African Americans. Critical theory identifies these
factors as significant in understanding how issues are framed and action is constrained.
These factors are the over-arching themes that help explain the conceptual model
described earlier. The history of urban development established the cultural, political,
and economic environment of the early 1940s. These dynamics set the stage for political intervention in the development of public policies and land-use strategies that assisted urban redevelopment and the making of the second ghetto. Finally, economics was the ultimate driver behind all actions, as business expansion, profits, and investments were necessary for urban survival. Collectively, these factors were used to promote influential interests, while concurrently suppressing the will and desires of less-influential groups.

**A Shift in Federal Philosophy: A Historical Perspective**

In the late 19th century, cities were small in scale, amenities were rather primitive, and had a reputation that was associated with problems and great economic disparities (Teaford, 1993). However, despite these perceptions, urban communities emerged as America’s best kept secret, and they began to flourish. Historically, urban environments were the places where people could work, live, and play within a relatively confined space. However, several factors would change the urban landscape: an increasing influx of divergent populations, the burgeoning industrial and manufacturing sectors, and infrastructure development. This section will discuss the transition of central cities as thriving environments to economically instable environment. These changes coincide with a paradigmatic shift in the political philosophy and climate at the federal level and the driving forces behind city planning.

Direct federal involvement in local affairs and in lives of private citizens was uncommon during the early years of American society. The tenets of capitalism and laissez-faire economics limited the influence of government in business and the markets. As a result, the political power of corporations dominated policy decisions, specifically
regarding labor conditions, safety standards, and limiting worker rights (Jansson, 2004). These powers attempted to constrain other aspects of life for Americans, particularly the ability of lower class workers and African Americans to obtain sanitary housing, enjoy reasonable employment accommodations, and the ability to participate in politics. However, the unscrupulous involvement of the private sector in the affairs of government and policy making would cease for a time as the US faced the financial meltdown of the Great Depression. All Americans were affected. In the private sectors, corporations faced massive unemployment, lost fortunes, deflated prices, and depressed stock prices (Jansson, 2004). These actions changed the sentiment of government from hands-off centralized overseers to becoming fully engaged with the intentions of establishing safety nets for various segments of the population.

Although these issues affected the broader society equally, its impact was detrimental to urban areas, especially as population and economic shifts were happening at record levels. Central cities were experiencing a flood of immigrant arrivals from Europe and an influx of African Americans into the northeast and midwest. Businesses were losing employees as many men were fighting in the war. As a result employment and profits levels were erratic. The automobile also expanded the residential options of middle-class, essentially making the convenience of central city less of a necessity. The industrial/post-industrial era witnessed the nature, scale, and location of industry change, observed population dispersal transform urban formations, and watched globalization exert a profound change on contemporary metropolises (Neuman & Smith, 2010). Collectively these actions contributed to the blight, disinvestment, and decline of urban jurisdictions, especially the central business district. Economic insecurity threatened the
American way-of-life, its business industry, and the economy at-large, lead the federal government to react in bold and unprecedented ways.

Over the next two decades, President Roosevelt’s New Deal and Truman’s Fair Deal initiatives marked an era of liberal, activist domestic policy, which tremendously benefited urban communities (Hirsch, 2000a). For example, resources became available for development (e.g. creation of the Tennessee Valley Authority Act), reform (e.g. taking the United States off the gold standard), and regulation (e.g. the National Industrial Recovery Act) (Manza, 2000). Other policies that evolved from these programs include the Social Security Act (e.g. unemployment and old-age insurance), Labor and Public Works Legislation (e.g. enables workers to join unions), and the Housing Acts of 1937 and 1949 (e.g. provided low-interest loans to local authorities to build public housing) (Jansson, 2004). These policies aided in the recovery of central city redevelopment and provided some degree of advantage for African Americans. Although northern cities provided African Americans with more opportunities than the south, Blacks were consistently relegated to the worst living space, occupying substandard homes, and utilizing inadequate community facilities. Federal resources were initially designed to offset the dysfunction experienced in African American communities. However, local discretion altered the “benefits” of public policy and directed resources away from this vulnerable group.

Despite the traumatic economic events of the 1920s, racial tension within American society was not stagnant, but thrived during these times. In Chicago 1919, territorial clashes between Whites and Blacks merged with economic, political, and ideological conflicts to produce a model communal riot (Hirsch, 1983). This incident
proved to be the tip of the iceberg, because between 1956 and 1958, 256 incidences of racial violence were reported, culminating in five deaths and thirty-eight cases of arson (J. Q. Wilson, 1960). Similar conflicts occurred in Detroit, Newark, Baltimore, and Atlanta up through the 1960s in response to insufficient housing, police brutality, the ‘separate but equal’ doctrine of Jim Crow, and political disenfranchisement (Disorders, 1988). These conflicts revealed a complacent government with regard to the plight of African Americans in the US. From Emancipation in 1863 to the Civil Rights movements of the 1960s, government at all levels endorsed discrimination against African Americans. These riots that ensued across the country and the lack of government response validated this stance. Dwight Waldo recognized that “...much government action in the United States has not been simply discriminatory but massively and harshly so,” whereby “...action to assure assimilation and uniformity has sometimes been insensitive and coercive” (Frederickson, 1980, p. 36).

Wide-ranging political discourse perpetuated ideologies about African American people and spaces, which were used to shape public policy decisions. David Wilson (2007) identified planners, mayors, City Council people, newspaper writers, developers, realtors, editorial pundits, and corporate CEOs as the “talking heads” responsible for disseminating information to the public about the urban populace. These “talking heads” regarded African Americans as debilitated and disengaged residents, while their communities were unworthy and incapable of reform. He further acknowledged their ability to shape the urban landscape and create perceptions of its residents based on their capacity to identify a problem, create a platform, and sell it to the public (D. Wilson, 2007). Therefore, horrific and unjust atrocities were committed against African
Americans by an oppressive and intolerant White society that has fought tirelessly to stigmatize and isolate African Americans from mainstream society. As a result, the preferences of the “talking heads” implicitly became the wants and needs of the broader society. This would ultimately ensure policy development and disbursement was targeted in the direction of the dominating classes.

Issues of economic disinvestment, urban unemployment, neighborhood abandonment, commercial blight, and infrastructure deterioration have long been disproportionate issues affecting urban environments. However, these problems led to the development of numerous policies, devolved significant responsibility, and provided abundant resources to administrators and business leaders for the purposes of urban revitalization. Although the autonomy and competitiveness of urban environments were at stake, local elites used this ‘window of opportunity’ to execute a three-pronged plan against African Americans. This approached involved “Negro clearance” from profitable land, converting racially flexible areas to those of racial exclusion, and reducing the overall area available for African American residence (Hirsch, 2000a, p. 167). This essentially began a pattern of dispossession, relocation, and re-segregation that would be modeled in central cities across the country. The widespread success of racial exclusion can be attributed to public policy enablers and the land-use management strategies that evolved as a result of urban decay.

**The Politics of Urban Development**

The Housing Acts of 1937 and 1949 and the Interstate Highway Act of 1956 were created to reverse the patterns of urban decline and deterioration. These policies were enacted during a time when the ideological foundations of government were changing.
The Housing Act of 1937 was responsible for establishing the public housing program (Development, 2007). The Housing Act of 1949 established a direct relationship between the federal and local governments, whereby power and funds surpassed the states and were funneled directly to city agencies (Lang & Sohmer, 2000). This policy made homeownership possible for more Americans through its FHA loan provisions for rural and working-class families. Additionally, it acknowledged that the housing problems of the poor were a public concern by providing federal funds for the development of 810,000 public housing units (Anderson, 1967; Development, 2007b). The Interstate Highway System (IHS), on the other hand, provided federal subsidies for up to 90 percent of construction costs, making it the largest public works program to date (Administration, n.d.; Anderson, 1967). Hence federal engagement in local affairs, public policies, and administrative discretion provide a critical basis for understanding how African Americans became re-segregated in American central cities.

The National Industrial Recovery Act was passed in 1933, which authorized the use of Federal funds to finance low-cost and slum clearance housing and subsistence homesteads (H. M. Jackson, 1958). This policy initiated the production of the country’s first fifty low-rent housing projects in thirty-seven cities across the country (H. M. Jackson, 1958). Hence, subsequent housing policies became more inclusive regarding the financial commitment of the government to the program, the pool of eligible actors involved in design and implementation, and the overall target population, whom the program benefited. From this initial legislation, the federal public housing program evolved. The first wave of public housing helped alleviate overcrowding and provide decent homes for poor and low-income families. However, the second wave of public
housing, when combined with slum clearance, became a mechanism used to systematically relocate African Americans to predetermined areas within the city.

The federal public housing program's policies evolved in two stages. The first stage produced the Housing Act of 1937, which initiated the first stage of public housing development. The policy established the United States Public Housing Authority, which authorized loans and provided technical assistance to local public housing agencies for lower-rent public housing construction (Development, 2007b). The second stage would evolve as a result of rampant urban deterioration. Central cities began to experience substantial middle-class population loss, disinvestment, and overcrowding by poor immigrant and migrant populations (Hirsch & Mohl, 1993; Massey & Denton, 1993; Sugure, 1996). Urban leaders were faced with difficult decisions regarding their ability to remain independent despite a shrinking tax base and unprecedented blight (Massey & Denton, 1993). Inner cities, more specifically Chicago officials, sought assistance from the federal government regarding ways to circumvent the continued downward spiral of their localities. Ultimately, Illinois would became the vanguard for urban renewal policy because of a state law that was passed in 1947, which permitted the use of eminent domain for slum clearance (Hirsch, 1983). This would later become the model legislation for the Housing Act of 1949, or as it popularly known “urban renewal” (Hirsch, 1983; Mohl, 2003b).

The responses of this legislation lead to several developments, ultimately concentrating the benefits with urban elites and the destruction with African Americans. First, Title I of the 1949 Housing Act provided local government officials with the authority to identify and clear slum areas through the use of eminent domain (Anderson,
Eminent domain is defined as the use of government power to take property for public use (Levy, 2009). Therefore, government was able to force residents off their land for the purposes of urban redevelopment based on a criterion of blight, decay, or overall instability. Unfortunately, African Americans often lived in slum areas, so eminent domain enabled local administrators to raze Black communities (Marcuse, 2001). Eminent domain requires government to pay property owners market value for their land. However, this monetary settlement was not enough to maintain or upgrade living conditions for African Americans, because the property was worth so little, due to it being classified as the slums. This trend ultimately resulted in African Americans being displaced to areas more impoverished and destitute than their original residences, hence the designation of second ghetto communities (Anderson, 1967; Bristol, 1991; Hirsch, 1983; Orfield, 1974-75).

Second, the economic and financial gains for public officials and private actors were tremendous. In his analysis of the urban renewal program, Martin Anderson (1967) estimated that $3 Billion used for urban renewal projects, of which 66.8 percent was used to purchase land and buildings, 19.5 percent for site improvement and support facilities, and 13.7 percent was used for planning, relocation, and rehabilitation (p. 33). At least 45 percent of those funds were supplied to local governments by the federal governments as a cash grant. Consequently, once razed the land was turned over to private developers at little or no costs (Anderson, 1967; Hirsch, 1983). With little seed money invested, compared to the federal government, the private sector was able to generate windfall profits through capital development and business expansion with their newly acquired land (Anderson, 1967). Local governments benefited because of the abundance of land
that was available which enticed new investments and their ability to offer numerous tax 
subsidies to maintain existing relationships. Additionally, the biggest perceived threat to 
economic development was no longer within proximity to downtown or the central 
business district – African Americans or their communities (Massey & Denton, 1993; D. 
Wilson, 2007).

Third, Title III stipulated the construction of 810,000 public housing units to 
address the overcrowded conditions, substandard residences, and deteriorated housing 
stock available to African Americans. The Housing Act of 1949 devolved discretion to 
local administrators, which permitted them to identify site locations for construction, 
determine occupancy requirements, and decide on the design and number of units to be 
built (Jenkins, 2001; Sasaki, 1993-94). For instance, the Newark Housing Authority’s 
slum clearance proposal identified a plan to locate all public housing for African 
Americans in existing Black areas, while private development would occur in the least 
dilapidated spaces (Sasaki, 1993-94). The Cleveland City Council revoked the authority 
of the City Planning Commission, whereby any decision regarding public housing had to 
be voted on by the City Council (Jenkins, 2001). This essentially empowered the City 
Council to deny the construction of public housing in all proposed areas outside of the 
existing Black neighborhoods. In St. Louis, the infamous Pruitt-Igoe projects were 
constrained by size, location, occupancy, and density at the behest of the Housing 
Authority (Bristol, 1991).

Local housing authorities, city councils, and neighborhood associations prohibited 
African American entry into their communities based on the assumption of depreciated 
property values and neighborhood instability (Massey & Denton, 1993; Mohl, 1995;
Sugure, 1996). Therefore, in unparalleled fashion, public housing designated for African Americans or sites with more than marginal proportions would be denied entry into mixed-race or all-white communities. Despite altruistic efforts on behalf of many social reformers, politically it would be impossible to introduce public housing into places other than existing ghetto areas (Hirsch, 2000a). This initiated the making of the second ghetto and institutionalized racial segregation using public and private means. These actions did not go unchallenged as Gautreaux v. Chicago Housing Authority and the Taylor v. City of Millington court cases attempted to confront the segregationist and exclusionary practices of local government agencies regarding site and tenet selection for public housing (Peel, Pickett, & Buehl, 1970; Stewart, 1974).

The Gautreaux v. Chicago Housing Authority challenged public housing site selection and occupancy practices of the local housing authorities. The plaintiff’s complaint stated the defendants intentionally chose sites for public housing and adopted tenant assignment procedures for the purposes of maintaining existing patterns of residential separation in the City of Chicago (Justia.com, n.d.). The suit also states that the defendants failed to select sites for public housing in a manner that would alleviate existing patterns of racial separation (Justia.com, n.d.). Collectively, these actions lead to the severe isolation and alienation of African Americans. Public housing located in destitute and resource-deprived areas is, therefore, directly related to the lack of employment opportunities, violence, and increased incarceration rates among urban residents (Wacquant, 2001). These outcomes continue to be disproportionate to urban communities, which are predominately inhabited by poor and working-class African American families.
Finally, urban renewal ultimately became known as “Negro removal” because of its disparate effects on African Americans and their respective communities (Marcuse, 2001). The economic motivation to revitalize cities was coupled with the racist nature of American society made African Americans easy targets for displacement and their neighborhoods for destruction. The impact of urban renewal has been well-documented, and its consequences have been detrimental to African Americans across the country (Bauman, 1987; Bayor, 1996; Dunn, 1997; Silver, 1984; Sugure, 1996). Based on an ethnographic study about the effects of displacement, Dr. Mindy Fullilove coined the term “root shock.” Root shock is defined as “...the traumatic stress reaction to the destruction of all or part of one’s emotional ecosystem” (Fullilove, 2001, p. 11). Hence, while administrators may view urban redevelopment in terms of simply moving a community, the victim’s experience is associated with a life-threatening blow to the body’s internal balance (Fullilove, 2001). Therefore, the outcomes of dispossession have serious, long-lasting, and detrimental effects on the well-being of those displaced. However, despite the lessons learned, public policies and administrators continued to target African Americans and their communities in the name of urban revitalization.

While urban renewal was conceptualized as a remedy to deteriorating urban cores, the interstate highway system (IHS) was enacted in 1956 by President Eisenhower to help boost the economy. Although under consideration since the early 1900s, Eisenhower was eager to move forward with IHS, because it offered many benefits to American society. First, in anticipation of a foreign attack, Eisenhower wanted improved evacuation routes to ensure escape for persons living in major American cities (Mohl, 2003). Second, as central city decline was associated with traffic congestion, limited parking and failing
central business districts, local officials looked to the IHS as an economic development opportunity (Rabin, 1980). This was particularly favorable for local governments, because most of the costs (e.g. approximately 90 percent) would eventually be absorbed by the federal government (Schwartz, 1976). Third, Eisenhower acknowledged suburbanization had intensified traffic congestions, which was responsible for clogging up roads (Mohl, 2003a). Finally, the affordability of automobiles decreased public transportation ridership, therefore overloading an inadequate infrastructure system (Mohl, 2003a, 2004).

For example, General Motors (GM) specifically had a hand in dismantling public transportation in Baltimore. Haeuber (1974, p. 55) acknowledged that GM purchased the electric trolley system and eventually replaced them with diesel buses:

> Diesel buses have 28 percent shorter economic lives, 40 percent higher operating costs, and nine percent lower productivity than electric buses... In short, by increasing the costs, reducing the revenues, and contributing to the collapse of hundreds of transit systems, GM’s dieselization program may have had the long-term effect of selling GM cars.

This is just one example of how private actors maximized their profits at the expense of the public good, specifically a comprehensive transportation plan that would have decreased dependence on the automobile. The effects of these actions are definitely relevant today, as the cost of fuel has increased dramatically, US dependence on foreign energy has compromised American safety and security, and infrastructure for highways, bridges, and tunnels nationwide suffers from serious deficiencies. The American Society of Civil Engineers gave infrastructure a ‘D’ grade stating that it would take
approximately $2.2 trillion dollars to upgrade the existing infrastructure in the US (Stern, 2009). These types of projects have a long-standing history of high initial investments, but long-term neglect, particularly as it relates to the condition of public housing projects in cities across the country.

To date, the IHS is known as the largest public works project, which consists of a 46,876 mile network that connects all cities with populations of over 300,000 and most cities with populations of over 100,000 (Administration, n.d.). Once the IHS was approved at the federal level, responsibility for its implementation was devolved to the state officials. Similar to urban renewal and public housing legislation, the federal government provided general guidelines and distributed funds, but left the planning, implementation, and execution of policy in the hands of state and local agencies (Rabin, 1980). For example, in Detroit the Lodge freeway, whose route originates downtown and extends into the suburbs, displaced approximately 2,222 buildings and hundreds of residents (Sugure, 1996). In Atlanta, the Metropolitan Planning Commission used highway development to regulate and confine African Americans to the western parts of the city, but also to displace Blacks from the areas in close proximity to downtown (Bayor, 1996). Similar examples of African American dispossession have been documented in cities across the country, Mohl (2001) specifically mentions Richmond (VA), Chicago (IL), San Francisco (CA), and Kansas City (MO) in his study.

With authority concentrated in the hands of state officials, the African American communities that survived slum clearance would almost certainly meet their demise with the routing of highways through the urban environment. According to Mohl (2001), it was apparent that public officials and policy makers used expressway construction to
destroy low-income, especially Black neighborhoods in an effort to reshape the physical and racial landscapes of postwar American cities. To compound issues, the IHS did not require relocation provisions as was mandated with urban renewal, thus leaving displaced residents to fend for themselves in terms of shelter (Mohl, 2003a). State transportation officials, like local urban renewal administrators, were narrowly focused on outcomes of their assignments. The highway program was attractive for state and local governments, and private interests, especially the highway lobby, because it would pour millions of dollars into local economies, while also attracting investments in rehabilitated business districts (Mohl, 2002, 2003a, 2004). Interstate highways would provide access from the suburban periphery to the urban core, which resulted from the out-migration of residents, retail, and manufacturing after WWII.

In Miami, administrators considered constructing a highway system long before the IHS initiative was passed by the federal government. Their original 1955 plan saved existing residential areas and aligned the highway along an abandoned rail corridor, through a warehouse and “low value” industrial areas (Mohl, 2004). However, when the federal plan emerged in 1956, Miami officials realized that project would be subsidized by federal resources. Therefore all power was concentrated in the hands of the Florida Road Department. They were responsible for changing the route of highway construction from along the railroad and directly into the path of the Overtown community. Overtown was the largest Black settlement in South Florida, accommodating approximately 33,000 people as of 1960 (Dluhy, et al., 2002). Due to its proximity to Miami’s downtown and waterfront properties, state officials utilized their authority to achieve their racial goals by recapturing central city space for business purposes by “...removing every Negro family
from the present city limits" (Mohl, 2004, p. 685). Consequently, cities like New York, Detroit, Cleveland, and Kansas City used expressways to clear blighted areas in order to make them fit for more productive uses (Mohl, 2001).

Several notable public housing desegregation cases had come before US Courts: *Thompson v. Housing Authority of Miami, FL* and *Gautreaux v. Romney* in Chicago, IL in 1966; *Hicks v. Weaver* in Bogalusa, LA in 1969; *Shannon v. HUD* in Philadelphia, PA in 1970; and *Adker v. HUD and Miami-Dade County* in 1999. Although most cases offered reprieve, local housing authorities continued with ‘business as usual.’ In both the Chicago and Miami cases, judges ordered consent decrees to be in-effect for approximately 10 years. However, despite acknowledgement of wrongdoing by federal and local authorities and a vow to correct behavior, public housing practices changed very little. Victories in the courtroom essentially did little to change the effects of long-standing and explicit racist practices that marginalized, disenfranchised, and isolated African Americans into public housing facilities. Therefore, in Baltimore a similar case was brought forth by public housing residents based on the continued site selections policies that concentrated poverty amongst African Americans.

The *Thompson v. HUD* specifically addressed the concentrated and detrimental effects of administrative actions with regard to the site selection of publicly assisted housing in the city of Baltimore. *Thompson* was a class-action lawsuit brought forth in 1994 by Black public housing residents in response to the demolition of a high rise public housing project and the ultimate relocation of new structures in areas with similar conditions of poverty ("Carmen Thompson, et al. v. HUD, et. al," 2003). This case is at the heart of a long fought battle by African Americans to hold HABC responsible for
explicitly violating their rights of equal protections against housing discrimination. Similar to this study, the *Thompson v. HUD* case highlighted administrative actions as purposeful in maintaining racially isolated and economically deprived African American communities. While the narrative between both investigations may be related, this study is unique based on several factors.

First, this study used critical social theory as a broad framework to understand the environment and institutional structures that sanctioned prejudice against African Americans. This historical backdrop sets the stage for examining the development of public policy, the language used to categorize populations in society, and the long-term impact of racial distinctions in society. Second, critical race theory specifically address the adverse effects of policy actions from the African American experience. Third, this study seeks to test Hirsch’s second ghetto thesis, whereby he suggests the role of government, public policies, and administrative discretion were used to re-segregate African Americans into second ghetto communities in inner cities. While many scholars have used Hirsch’s framework to explain ghetto formation, this investigation extends the literature by utilizing GIS technology to underscore the spatial and temporal parameters of urban African American mobility.

**Economic Outcomes of Discrimination**

Louis Wirth (1927) described the modern ghetto, as a place found in every city of even moderate size. This space could be traced back to the medieval European urban institution, in which Jews were segregated from the rest of the population (Wirth, 1927). In the early 20th century, ghettos represented the initial residential spaces for immigrants arriving from Eastern Europe and African Americans migrating from the rural south.
These places were located in impoverished parts of town, but were not completely segregated from mainstream society. Ghettos were places that were utilized to house undesirable populations based on beliefs that these areas contributed to the social pathologies of urban life with the loose morals, bad habits, intemperance and idleness of its population (Corburn, 2007). Although in existence everywhere, ghettos have essentially become containment reservoirs for the inferior factions in American society – specifically African Americans, because once they enter these spaces many remain there for a lifetime. In this regard, race makes space and the lowly status of African Americans in the US has contributed to the conceptions of crime, violence, filth, and dysfunction associated with ghetto communities (Delaney, 2002; Hirsch, 1983; Sugure, 1996; Wacquant, 2001; D. Wilson, 2007).

Immigrant populations descended upon American cities and into ghettos, because they represented places where communities could be formed among like people, affordable housing was available, and due to its relative proximity to employment and other amenities (Osofsky, 1968). For immigrants, the ghetto represented a community that would support their assimilation into American society and help spur upward mobility. Jewish people specifically rose through the economic ranks of society and were not hindered by the isolating effects of their environment. Ghettos would present African Americas with an entirely different fate. The conditions African Americans were subjected to were much more cruel, unsanitary, and inhumane than anything other immigrant populations would experience (Connolly, 2006; Osofsky, 1968; Wacquant, 2001). The Black ghetto would have a tremendous impact on the psyche of its
inhabitants, because racial degradation and prejudice has been formally institutionalized to keep these populations concentrated in squalor (W. J. Wilson, 1987, 2009).

It is important to make distinctions between the immigrant and African American experience in ghettos. Although immigrants experienced discrimination upon their arrival into the country, these attitudes did not prevent upward mobility. Immigrants were not systematically discriminated against by the use of restrictive covenants, deed restrictions, and redlining by mortgage and insurance companies, which were the methods used to restrict the mobility of African Americans (Marcuse, 2001; Orfield, 1974-75; Witt, 2006). As a matter of fact, immigrants were given preferential treatment with regard to Section 8 opportunities and public housing occupancy (Mohl, 2003b). These acts created hierarchies among non-Whites, which would further fuel animosity and create divisions between racial and ethnic groups, therefore limiting the possibility of collaboration and collective action against the dominant interests. Immigrants would be accepted into mainstream society and, African Americans were denied the most basic and fundamental rights of citizenship, leading to their concentration in urban ghetto communities.

Postwar federal programs like urban renewal and the interstate highway program solidified the federal government’s involvement in the making of the second ghetto (Mohl, 2003b). For clarification, a distinction should be made regarding the transition from the first ghetto to the second ghetto. The first ghetto represents the original places where African Americans resided in urban areas upon their arrival to the north from the south (Fernandez, 1996). The second ghetto resulted from the forced transfer of African Americans from valuable land (e.g. downtown areas) to undesirable land (e.g. poor...
spaces) within urban communities. Residence in the first ghetto was voluntary, while the second was strictly involuntary. Sanctioned and orchestrated by all levels of government, the second ghetto was renewed, reinforced and reshaped through policy decisions and public-private partnerships (Hirsch, 1983).

Seligman (2003) identifies the three distinct periods of the modern urban ghetto as 1880-1933, 1933-1968, and 1968 to the present. She elaborates on each phase of ghetto expansion. “The first ghetto was characterized by acutely segregated, privately owned residential enclaves whose boundaries were enforced by hostile white urbanites; the second period by “a growing federal presence in urban affairs”; and the third by “persistently high levels of segregation despite the legal prohibition of discrimination by the federal Fair Housing Act of 1968” (Seligman, 2003, p. 274). Thus, with the help of the federal government, the creation of the second ghetto became a profitable enterprise for white elites during a time of racial tension and central city rehabilitation. Subsequently, vague legislation provided state and local governments considerable autonomy to implement policies that generated political consensus and enabled financial gain. Thus, central cities in the northeast and midwest experienced a new form of urbanism, where systematic economic restructuring was coupled with the great migrations of African Americans inward and another great migration of whites outward (Sugure, 1996). Consequently, the evolution of the second ghetto can be attributed to the deliberate acts of city officials and business people to segregate and stigmatize African American communities.

Second ghetto evolved as a necessary action by city officials and business leaders in order to rehabilitate struggling urban economies. The presence of African Americans
in cities, especially downtown or the central business district was specifically attributed to negative conceptions, disinvestment, and declining property values. Therefore, attracting capital and removing all threats to development and security, African Americans and their communities, was imperative to urban elites. This process was aided by federal resources and public policies, which helped re-image the city by attracting middle-class residents and promoting tourism and entertainment (D. Wilson, 2007). African Americans and their communities were marginalized, based on the profit motivations of urban governments and business leaders. Policy enablers to land management strategies have produced devastating outcomes for African Americans and their communities. These factors contributed to the institutional structures that have overwhelmingly concentrated African Americans in impoverished second ghetto communities.

African Americans and their communities have consistently been targeted by the government, administrators, private actors, and residents based on their perceived inferiority. The long-lasting ramifications of these actions had lead to ridicule, isolation, and concentrated poverty in urban communities. These examples provide some insight into the role of government and administrative discretion in the re-segregation of African Americans. This study will expound on this relationship, as it will attempt to directly correlate policy decisions at the local, state, and federal levels to the migration patterns of African Americans in Baltimore, Maryland. Using spatial data, policy decisions and administrative action are associated with the residential migration patterns of African Americans to test Hirsch’s second ghetto thesis.
CHAPTER III

METHODOLOGY

The second ghetto thesis has been utilized by several scholars to explain the re-segregation of African Americans into ghetto urban communities (Bayor, 1996; Hirsch, 1983; Mohl, 1995, 2003b; Sasaki, 1993-94; Sugure, 1996; W. H. Wilson, 1998). Although all of the studies were diverse in perspective, place, and time period, the overarching theme that emerged is that – local administrators used public policies, public power, and public resources to displace, destroy, and re-segregate African Americans. Raymond Mohl (1995, 2003b) conducted an extensive investigation on the experiences of African Americans in Overtown, a neighborhood in Miami. He revealed the blatant plan of the urban elite to “move” the community 5 miles outside of city limits to a newly constructed town called Liberty City. The experience of African Americans in Newark was less explicit, whereby restrictive covenants, deed restrictions, and informal methods were used to restrict African American mobility, therefore confining them to ghetto communities (Sasaki, 1993-94). In Atlanta, a mix of formal and informal practices were used to steer African Americans away from all-white communities and off valuable land near the central business district (Bayor, 1996). Each case study provides a wealth of information regarding the formulation of pubic policies and the role of administrators. However, an empirical analysis has not yet tested whether African Americans were re-segregated as a result of these actions.

This study investigated the migration patterns of African Americans during the time periods between 1940 – 2000. The 1940s represent a time when droves of African Americans migrated to industrial northern cities in search of better employment
opportunities. This is important, because during this time African American residence in ghetto communities were voluntary, based on private choices (Seligman, 2003).

However, with each subsequent decade, public policies were enacted and used by local authorities to steer the residential patterns of African Americans. Based on this framework, each decennial census was investigated to visually depict the movements of African Americans at the neighborhood level. This investigation extends into the year 2000 to determine the long-term impact of policy decisions, which may have contributed to the spatial discrepancy that exists today between predominately Black inner cities, and traditionally White suburban jurisdictions.

**Type of Study**

This study used a mixed-method approach to investigate the re-segregation of African Americans. First, qualitative data was collected for Baltimore, Maryland. The qualitative component of this research is important, because it provided a historical backdrop of the environment, the actors, and the political and economic factors that contributed to African American segregation and re-segregation. Primary and secondary sources were gathered and used as data to understand the role of administrators and public policies in facilitating the migration patterns of African Americans in these respective cities. Primary documents included archival data, such as city ordinances, planning papers, city memorandums, and local agency records. Secondary sources consist of research articles, newspapers, federal and state reports, and census data. Both data sources provided information regarding the actors involved, the political climate, types of policy decisions made, and the outcomes of those collective actions. This information was utilized to create a timeline of the city from the periods of 1940-2000.
An abbreviated timeline is presented in chapter 4, and a thorough presentation of events in Baltimore is available in Appendix A.

The second aspect of the study includes a time-series analysis using Geographic Information Systems (GIS) technology. GIS is a set of tools for collecting, sorting, retrieving at will, transforming, and displaying spatial data from the real world for a particular set of purposes (Huxhold, 1991). For this study, GIS tracked African American migration over time in the city of Baltimore. Hirsch's second ghetto thesis suggests that African Americans were re-segregated in urban communities based on the dictates of local administrator preference. This study analyzed census tracts, because it allowed for a detailed analysis at the neighborhood level. The U.S. Census Bureau defines census tracts as small, relatively permanent statistical subdivisions of a county... Census tract boundaries normally follow visible features, but may follow governmental unit boundaries and other non-visible features in some instances; they always nest within counties. [Census tracts are] designed to be relatively homogeneous units with respect to population characteristics, economic status, and living conditions, census tracts average about 4,000 inhabitants” (U.S. Census Bureau, n.d.-b).

This study utilized three different databases. The US Census Bureau website offers users a wealth of information regarding population characteristics, economic indicators, and geographic maps and databases. All census reports, in their entirety, are available using the US Census website (www.census.gov). The National Historical Geographic Information System website aggregates census data into GIS-compatible boundaries available to users dating back to 1870 (Center, 2004). This site is published
by the Minnesota Population Center in conjunction with University of Minnesota. Finally, the Neighborhood Change Database (NCDB) is the third data source, which was used for years 1970-2000. The NCDB data was gathered by the Urban Land Institution in union with the Rockefeller Foundation. This dataset contains 1970-2000 Census Long Form information such as: population, household, housing characteristics, poverty status, education level, employment, housing costs, immigration, etc (GeoLytics, 2010). The NCDB data is aggregated out to the census tract level. The dataset is also offered in normalized and non-normalized versions, which is important, because the researcher does not have to control for changes in boundary data over time.

Boundary information needed to be collected for each decennial census year from 1940 to 2000, because geographic areas change over time. As stated above, two different databases were used to gather all the demographic and GIS boundary data: the National Historical Geographic Information System website for years 1940-1960 and the NCDB for the years 1970-2000. Once obtained, the boundaries for all of the years needed to be reconciled and normalized to the 2000 census tracts. According to Geolytics website (2010) normalizing the data enables the researcher to view and display data as if the 2000 existed, and all the data is weighted to these areas. Therefore, “...the data will appear as it did for that census year, and the maps will be drawn according to that year’s boundaries” (GeoLytics, 2010).

Reconciling historical census geographies for normalizing population data over time has created numerous challenges over the years for researchers (Alvanides, Oppenshaw, & Rees, 2002; Gregory & Ell, 2005; Voos, Long, & Hammer, 1999). This is a particularly daunting task when attempting to measure demographic change over time.
with tract or block group geographies, since boundaries oftentimes change significantly between decennial censuses (Howenstine, 1993). Using ArcGIS™, the researcher applied a polygon overlay methodology to weight population according to the extent of boundary intersection overlap. This was not a perfect solution, but given both the small number of spatially incongruous boundaries, along with a relatively small study area, aerial allocation errors were kept to a minimum. It is often helpful to measure demographic distribution over time with centrographic methods such as mean center and standard radius analysis (Green & Pick, 2006). These methods also measure segregation by taking into account the level of dispersion for minority population around a central, or core point. This method can help identify which racial groups in a city are more or less dispersed.

ArcGIS was used to calculate the weighted mean of the African American population in Baltimore for each decade. A standard radius was also calculated for each decade – the central ‘core’ location of the African American population – which illustrated the level of African American population dispersion across the city of Baltimore for each decade. The radius calculated is one standard deviation around the central core, or about two thirds of Baltimore’s African American population. The larger the circle, the more dispersed the population. Initially, African Americans were clustered in racially exclusive neighborhoods. Therefore, any shifts in their residential mobility is documented using census tract information. Based on administrative decisions at the local level, African American migration will reveal either population dispersion or re-segregation.
In this regard, dispersion would contradict the idea that policies and administrative actions concentrated African Americans in specific communities. Therefore, African American residential preferences would dictate where they lived. African American concentration, on the other hand, would support the idea that public polices and public administrators contributed to their re-segregation into designated communities. The level of segregation can be measured in several ways. Massey and Denton (1988) conceives residential segregation using five measurements: evenness (the differential distribution of two social groups); exposure (the probability of interaction between minority and majority groups within a geographic area); concentration (the relative amount of physical space occupied by a minority group in the urban environment); centralization (the degree to which a group is spatially located near the center of an urban area); and clustering (the extent to which areal units inhabited by minority members adjoin one another, or cluster, in space).

This conceptualization was an outgrowth of the many conflicting definitions and statistical techniques used to measure segregation as an attempt to provide some consistency in the research (Massey & Denton, 1988). Although all of the segregation measures listed important considerations. Johnston, Poulsen and Forrest (2007) describe clustering as isolated groups of one race or ethnicity within a census tract. “Those tracts may be randomly scattered across the urban area, however, or they may be concentrated into one part of it, with each neighboring another. The closer the situation is to the latter ideal, the more clustered the group’s residential areas are” (Johnston, et al., 2007, p. 483).
Rationale for City Selection

Case selection for this study was difficult because of the wide-ranging effects urban renewal and transportation policy had on many urban communities across the country. Therefore, the sites were selected based on their uniqueness and ability to offer new insights on the re-segregation of African Americans. Case selection for this study was facilitated by the Kerner Report on Civil Disorders, which was initiated by President Johnson in response to the civil unrest experienced in the 1960s. The report highlights the devastating effects of African American isolation and disenfranchisement, which is recognized and attributed to several factors: pervasive discrimination and segregation, Black in-migration and White exodus, and the Black ghetto (Disorders, 1988). The in-migration of African Americans into northern cities contributed to the racial tension with Whites and other ethnic minorities, as the fight for housing, employment, and city services became hotly contested. The Commission was able to make correlations between the cities with the largest proportions of African Americans and the amount of civil unrest that was being witnessed at the time.

The Commission identified the top 30 cities with the highest proportions of African Americans at the time of the 1950 census. The top 11 are mentioned here: Atlanta and Memphis (37%), Washington D.C. (35%), New Orleans (32%), Baltimore (24%), Houston (21%), Philadelphia (18%), Newark (17%), and Detroit, Cleveland, and Cincinnati (16%). Next a comparison was made with the 1960 census to determine population gain and loss in the respective cities. Of the eleven cities, the areas with the largest populations gains were: Washington D.C. (+19), Newark (+17), Detroit and Cleveland (+13), and Baltimore and St. Louis (+11). Any of these cities were eligible for
site selection based on the sheer number of African Americans inhabiting these locations. It is the assumption of the researcher that the cities with the greatest proportion of African Americans were the best cases to test their respective residential mobility patterns. Particularly, as you begin to observe the original settlement patterns of the group and follow the migration trends over each decennial census. Cases could also be selected based on location, whereby regional effects are considered when, explaining residential mobility patterns.

The Great Migration contributed to the vast in-flux of African Americans into central cities during the 1940s. African Americans were attracted to the industry and manufacturing sectors, which were primarily located in the northeast and midwestern cities. Therefore, this study will focus primarily within those regions. Based on the available data and literature reviews, the city that was identified for investigation is Baltimore, Maryland. As African Americans were concentrated in existing urban communities, the decision to undertake urban renewal in these areas was solidified by administrators and the urban elite. These actions were based on the assumptions that if African Americans were in close proximity to downtown or the central business district, property values would be threatened, and it would be difficult to attract capital investment (Gotham, 2000; Rice, 1968; Witt, 2006). Therefore, the ability for the city to return to economic vibrancy would be diminished.

Baltimore has well established archival databases, which will allow the researcher to delve into primary source documents from the respective cities to establish a timeline of activities and policy decisions. While research on second ghettos have been predominant in places like Chicago, Miami, Oakland, and Atlanta, the experience of
African Americans in Baltimore will contribute to this broad literature. Therefore, with the use of primary and secondary data, demographic information and GIS technology, a comprehensive timeline and a series of maps were created from 1940-2000. The timelines combined with the maps would serve as evidence that public policies and administrative discretion contributed to the residential locations of African Americans. Although urban renewal and transportation policies were enacted almost sixty years ago, their effects continue to dictate the demographic landscape in the urban environment.

*Overview of Baltimore*

The American Community Survey is an estimate of the average characteristics of population and housing between January 2006 and December 2008 (U.S. Census Bureau, n.d.-a). A general description of each case study city’s population, housing, economic, and social demographics are listed below (Table 1).
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Baltimore</th>
<th>MD</th>
<th>US</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Land Area (sq mi)</strong></td>
<td>80</td>
<td>9,774</td>
<td>3,537,438</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Population</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total Population</td>
<td>651,154</td>
<td>5,296,486</td>
<td>281,424,603</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>African American</td>
<td>418,951</td>
<td>1,477,411</td>
<td>12.3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(64.3%)</td>
<td>(27.9%)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>White</td>
<td>205,982</td>
<td>3,391,308</td>
<td>75.1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(31.6%)</td>
<td>(64%)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Asian</td>
<td>9,985</td>
<td>210,929</td>
<td>3.6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(1.5%)</td>
<td>(4%)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Housing Characteristics</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Owner occupied</td>
<td>129,869</td>
<td>1,341,751</td>
<td>66.2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(50.3%)</td>
<td>(67.7%)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Renter occupied</td>
<td>128,127</td>
<td>639,108</td>
<td>33.8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(49.7)</td>
<td>(32.3%)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vacant housing units</td>
<td>42,281</td>
<td>164,424</td>
<td>9%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(14.1%)</td>
<td>(7.7%)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Economic Characteristics</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Median family income</td>
<td>$35,438</td>
<td>$61,876</td>
<td>$50,546</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% Families below poverty</td>
<td>27,864</td>
<td>83,232</td>
<td>9.2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(18.8%)</td>
<td>(6.1%)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Social Characteristics</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>High school graduates or higher</td>
<td>286,882</td>
<td>2,930,509</td>
<td>80.4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(68.4%)</td>
<td>(83.8%)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bachelor’s degree or higher</td>
<td>80,324</td>
<td>1,099,360</td>
<td>24.4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(19.1%)</td>
<td>(31.4%)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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</tbody>
</table>
CHAPTER IV

TIMELINE

The timeline presented in this chapter seeks to provide background information about the events that have occurred in Baltimore, Maryland. The timeline is divided into 4 distinct eras: the foundations of racial distinction (1851-1900); stages heuristic (1901-1950); policy execution and population movement (1951-2000); and outcomes as unintended consequences (2000-present). Although this study concentrates on specific policy decisions from 1940 to 2000, the timeline begins at the point when Baltimore City became an independent jurisdiction from Baltimore County in 1851. Almost a decade later, African Americans were emancipated from slavery. Once freed, White Americans began to establish a philosophical tone regarding the second-class status of Blacks in America. This ideology manifested itself in numerous ways. Consequently, throughout the rest of the 19th Century, federal and local policy initiatives are presented to highlight the racial climate and political agenda which informed policy formulation and implementation decisions over the next half century. The first period of the timeline can be described as the foundations of racial distinction. The policies enacted during this time established a precedent for ways public opinion and discrimination influenced policy-making.

The second time period extends from 1901 to 1950. This era in Baltimore history coincides with the major social, political, and financial obstacles that impacted the country. These factors are integral to the political environment that facilitated policy development and the subsequent population migrations that happened as a result. Two of the three policy initiatives investigated in this study were enacted during this time period:
the Housing Acts of 1937 (public housing) and 1949 (urban renewal). Both policies were designed to ease the housing and infrastructure inadequacies that central cities experienced. The second period of the timeline can be described as stages heuristic. Sabatier (1991) describes stages heuristic not as a causal theory, but one that enables the division of the policy process in manageable units of analysis. For the purposes of understanding African American population movement in Baltimore, it is important to understand the interrelatedness of these seemingly discrete events. Hence, each subsequent decade builds onto the traditions of the past, and incrementally the original intentions were modified due to vague policy language and narrowed focus by administrators.

The influx of immigrant populations from Europe and Asia and the subsequent immigration of African Americans into northern cities helped usher change into the American economy. During this period, the country transitioned from farming to industry, fought in several wars, and was sustained through the Great Depression. All of these issues overwhelmed local infrastructure, transportation, and employment. The pervasiveness of these problems led government to change its engagement techniques with local jurisdictions and private sector actors. In turn, government invested heavily in public works projects at the local level and subsidized business growth and expansion. These new partnerships promoted a thrust in urban and business investment, which focused on competition, sustainability, and profitability. Therefore, quantitative and tangible results were valued more than qualitative and social outcomes. The political and economic environment essentially justified the marginalization of poor and minority populations as urban communities were revitalized.
The third period of timeline can be characterized as policy execution and population movement from 1951 to 2000. The final policy under investigation in this study, the Interstate Highway system was enacted in 1956. During this time, the Housing Act of 1937 was executed and underway. By the 1950s, 12 public housing developments were fully operational in the city of Baltimore, and the first two urban renewal projects were being planned: Broadway and Waverly. The lag-time between federal enactment and implementation was relatively small for public housing – 3 years – and bit longer for the Broadway project to be completed from beginning to end – approximately 10 years. Transportation experienced specific delays, and the program never materialized to its full potential. However, this segment of the timeline discusses the various events that impacted the completion of various federal programs.

Urban renewal was a force to be reckoned with in its heyday. The program is responsible for drastically re-imaging central cities after de-industrialization and suburbanization crippled the viability of these jurisdictions. Therefore, in order to accommodate new construction and highways, populations were forcefully relocated to other areas of the city. Many factions were affected by renewal: small and large business owners, middle and working class residents, communities near the central business district and neighborhoods away from the city core. As a result, urban renewal and transportation policies initiated a push-pull phenomenon that forced (e.g. pushed) people off of valuable or desirable real estate, while public housing essentially captured (e.g. or pulled) those populations into their confines. Consequently, since Blacks often lived in the ‘slums,’ they were overwhelmingly burdened by purposeful displacement. These
events ultimately led to the final period under investigation in this study – outcomes and unintended consequences.

From 2001 and beyond, represents the time when policy outcomes and the unintended consequences of those decisions are revealed. By this time, all of the original programs were no longer in existence and have been replaced with modern variations. Subsequently, they attempt to address the age old problems of concentrated poverty, substandard housing and infrastructure, and racial and economic segregation in central cities. Baltimore’s reality mirrors the experiences of other cities. Detroit, Cleveland, and St. Louis have all attempted to rehabilitate themselves at the expense of comprehensive planning and social engagement. As a result, despite the billions of dollars in federal subsidies and public and private investments, these cities have failed to live up to their heyday reputations as economic and entertainment powerhouses. Obtaining financial security by charting a path for investment and business expansion took precedence over racial disparities within the same structures and institutions administrators sought to improve. The underlying racial tensions of urban redevelopment facilitated the segregation of African Americans in second ghetto communities via public housing facilities. Eventually, Whites fled the city altogether and Baltimore became a predominately African American city.

This study specifically investigates the Housing Act of 1937, the Housing Act of 1949, and the Interstate Highway System of 1956. Each policy produced numerous initiatives to address inadequate and substandard housing, deteriorating commercial and industrial infrastructure, and the quality of roads that limited interstate travel and commerce. Although numerous projects resulted from these federal policies, this study
will discuss 10 prominent citywide initiatives that facilitated population movement through the use of administrative discretion, political consensus, and economic power. The 10 initiatives were aggregated broadly as public housing/housing, urban renewal, and transportation projects. Ultimately, the outcome of administrative actions produced second ghetto communities that were segregated, isolated, and contained majority African Americans populations in spaces away from downtown, the central business district, and other profitable investment areas. Figure 2 is a visual representation of the major federal and local policies that impacted Baltimore from 1850 – 2010.
Figure 2 – Timeline of Events in Baltimore

Key
Local policy: square dot
Court cases: solid
Federal policy: long dash
Public housing: shaded square dot
Urban renewal: shaded solid
Transportation: shaded long dash

1851: Baltimore County and Baltimore City become independent jurisdictions
1899: Baltimore city’s slogan ‘A White Man’s City’

1857: US Supreme Court *Dred Scott v. Sanford*
1896: US Supreme Court *Plessy v. Ferguson*

1863: Emancipation Proclamation
1865: Civil Rights Act of 1866
1871: Civil Rights Act of 1871
1875: Civil Rights Act of 1875; deemed unconstitutional

1900:
1905: Disenfranchisement Act initiated
1910: Baltimore ‘idea’ enacted; first legal segregation ordinance
1919: Baltimore last successful attempt at annexation – tripled city size
1930: Distinct ghetto communities emerge

1917: US Supreme Court *Buchanan v. Warley*
1938: Maryland Court of Appeals *Meade v. Dennistone*
1937: Housing Act of 1937 passed

1940: Census reports 859,100 people in Baltimore; 7th largest urban

1940:
1940: Poe Homes opened; first Black public housing facility
1942: Highway planning started
1944: Federal Aid Act of 1944
1945: General Motors bought the electric trolley company

1945:
1945: City needed to replace or rehabilitated 26,000 existing structures and construct 6,814 units for African Americans

1947: HABC announces plans to raze black neighborhoods and build high density public housing
1949: Housing Act of 1949 passed
- 12 public housing facilities fully operational

1948: US Supreme Court *Shelley v. Kraemer*

1950:
1945: City needed to replace or rehabilitated 26,000 existing structures and construct 6,814 units for African Americans
1949: Housing Act of 1949 passed
- 12 public housing facilities fully operational
Figure 2 (continued)

1954: US Supreme Court *Brown v. Board of Education*
1957: Civil Rights Act of 1957

1950: Broadway Area 3-C expansion stated
1951: Waverly development initiated

1954: US Housing Act of 1954 passed

1956: Interstate Highway Act passed in 1956
- BURHA created by Ordinance No. 692
1957: Mount Royal Plaza started
1958: Charles Center planning initiated

1950: Census reports 949,708 people in Baltimore; 6th largest urban place
1955: 18 public housing developments fully operational

1950: Bay Bridge construction started
1951: Ordinance 1612 approved for Jones Falls Expressway (I-83)
1955: Beltway (I-695) construction initiated

1955: Beltway (I-695) construction initiated

1960: Census reports 939,024 people in Baltimore; 6th largest urban place
1961: Harlem Park I and Shot Tower Industrial Park started
1962: Camden and Harlem Park II started; One Charles Center completed
1963: Mount Royal-Fremont I started

1961: Jones Falls (I-83) phase I completed
1962: Beltway completed (I-695)

1965: Mount Royal-Fremont II and Harlem Park II completed
1966: Sun Life Building

1966: Interstate Division for Baltimore city created
Franklin-Mulberry land acquisition started

1960: US Supreme Court *Gautreaux v. Romney*
US Supreme Court *Thompson v. Housing Authority of Miami, FL*
1968: US Supreme Court *Jones v. Mayer*

1966: US Supreme Court *Gautreaux v. Romney*
US Supreme Court *Thompson v. Housing Authority of Miami, FL*
1968: US Supreme Court *Jones v. Mayer*

1968: Civil Rights Act of 1968 passed
HUD Act of 1968 passed

79
1970: Census reports 905,759 people in Baltimore; 7th largest urban place

1974: Housing and Community Development Act passed; Section 8 started

1972: Highway Act of 1972 passed; funding ends for all programs not completed

1973: Legg Mason Building completed
1974: CDBG started, urban renewal ended
1975: Charles Center South and IBM Building completed

1976: Baltimore Science Center completed
1977: Community Reinvestment Act passed and Maryland Port Authority completed
1978: Housing and Community Development Act passed; UDAG started
1979: 43 public housing developments fully operational

1980: Census reports 786,741 people in Baltimore

1980: Harborplace proposal passed by Baltimore City Council

1983: Jones Falls phase II completed
1985: I-70 and I-170 abandoned due to political opposition

1985: Charles Center officially completed
1988: Rouse’s Gallery at Harborplace completed
1989: UDAG terminated

1986: Harbor Court and Scarlett Place Apartments completed

1986: Harborplace opens to 50,000 people
1981: National Aquarium and Hyatt Regency opened
Figure 2 (continued)

1990: Census reports 736,000 people in Baltimore

1992: HUD Act of 1992 passed; Move to Opportunity (MTO) started
1993: Hope VI initiated

1991: IBM Building Tower II completed
1993: Camden Yards-Oriole Park completed

1994: US Supreme Court *Thompson v. HUD*

1998: Ravens Stadium completed

1998: 1st Hope VI development completed – Pleasant View Gardens

1999: *Adker v. HUD and Miami-Dade County*

2000: Census reports 651,154 people in Baltimore
American Homeownership and Economic Opportunity Act passed

2008: Housing and Economic Recovery Act Passed
2009: American Recovery and Reinvestment Act passed
Foundations of Racial Distinction: 1851-1900

The legacy of discrimination in Baltimore runs deep and has remained steadfast in its resolve to create distinctions among the races. Since the mid-1850s, Baltimoreans separated citizens by class and race; however, these initial distinctions did not stir up hostility or animosity amongst residents. It was commonplace for poor laborers and affluent citizens to live in close quarters. During this time, cities and towns were relatively dense places where everyone lived, worked, and socialized within close proximity to one another (Boger, 2009; Connolly, 2006). However, tensions ran high as slaves were given freedom in 1865 and consequently altered the disreputable racial and economic divisions between Blacks and Whites. The Civil Rights Act was passed in 1866 to legally establish equal access and opportunities for Blacks to have the ability to purchase, sell, lease, or transfer land (Educational, n.d.). Despite federal action, little altered the adverse societal attitudes Whites held about living in close proximity and engaging in business with African Americans.

The institution of slavery was eliminated, but the degradation and prejudicial stance against African Americans were institutionalized at all levels of government. Jim Crow laws were established as early as 1870 for the purposes of establishing a ‘separate but equal’ lifestyle for Blacks that segregated them from Whites in recreation, education, housing, and employment. From 1870 to 1957, the state of Maryland passed 15 statues that prohibited interracial education, marriage, and mandated separate Black areas on public transportation (Jim Crow, n.d.). Violators were threatened with jail time from a minimum of 18 months to upward of 10 years (Jim Crow, n.d.). Maryland, like many other states, sought to minimize the influence of African Americans, while counties and
cities mirrored similar efforts within their respective jurisdictions. As a result, Baltimore promoted a new slogan “A White Man’s City,” which set the racial tone for the city in the as it embarked on the 20th Century (Pietila, 2010, p. 27). Consequently, racism remained an underlying factor in how policies were interpreted and allocations were dispersed to the public.

The next era specifically focuses on the political, social, and economic factors and the informed policy decisions at the local level. Oftentimes, these issues are viewed as separate and distinct, but this study attempts to understand the select policies from a broad, more comprehensive lens.

**Stages Heuristic: 1901-1950**

Locally, neither Democrats nor Republicans were supportive of the upward mobility of African Americans. Each political party used various tactics to disenfranchise African American voters. This struggle for power initiated both the reactions and behaviors used to castigate African Americans through rhetoric, policy decisions, and violent behavior. Subsequently, Republicans viewed African Americans as a threat to their political base, particularly as newly arriving immigrants were the target of constituents for upcoming elections, while Democrats endorsed the city’s new slogan (Pietila, 2010). Ultimately, African Americans were the undesired constituents of both the Democratic or Republican parties. This reduced the collective influence of African Americans in the policy process, particularly as it related to local politics and programs that directly affected their communities. Early political battles established civic and business relationships and built political consensus on a variety of policy issues. These coalitions forcefully pushed a policy agenda that benefited their respective
constituents, essentially leaving African Americans underrepresented and politically vulnerable.

Baltimore’s location made it a prime spot for migrants and immigrants alike to settle into the city. However, enclaves were quickly established to divide communities by race. Although many of these emerging neighborhoods were poor, great distinctions were made to highlight the destitute conditions of African American residences. Mayor Hayes described these spaces as “...menacing to both health and morals. They are breeding spots from which issue the discontents and heartburnings that sometimes spread like a catagion through certain ranks of our laboring element” (Power, 1983, p. 294). Essentially, this rhetoric was used to instigate the development of several disenfranchisement acts and a segregation law, which sought to marginalize the African American vote in Baltimore and prohibit the integration of neighborhoods respectively. These conscious actions solidified public opinion and contributed to the policy actions that targeted African American neighborhoods for destruction. Ultimately, African Americans and their communities became the scapegoat for declining neighborhoods, the city’s economic downturn, and crime.

In 1910, Baltimore became the first city to enact a segregation ordinance, the ‘Baltimore idea,’ as ‘An Experiment in Apartheid’ for the purposes of legalizing the separation of Blacks and Whites (Power, 1983). The ‘Baltimore idea’ evolved at a time when social segregation was manifested through the restricted use of public facilities, such as restaurants, steamboats and railcars. Although the segregation ordinance was well received, its implementation was never fully actualized, as each ordinance was defeated based on loopholes that existed in the policy. The popularity of the ‘Baltimore
idea’ moved rampantly through neighboring jurisdictions. Power (1983) states similar segregation policies were adopted in Mooresville, Winston-Salem, and Asheville, North Carolina; Richmond, Norfolk, and Roanoke, Virginia; Louisville and Madisonville, Kentucky; Atlanta, Georgia; Greenville, South Carolina; Birmingham, Alabama; and St. Louis, Missouri. Despite Baltimore’s successful fourth attempt at enacting the segregation ordinance, the U.S. Supreme Court ruled against the Louisville, Kentucky ordinance in 1917, essentially banning the practice nationwide. (Power, 1983; Rice, 1968).

The *Buchannan v. Warley* decision overturned a Kentucky city ordinance that banned ‘colored’ people from purchasing or renting property whereby the majority of people in the community were of a different race, specifically white (School, n.d.). The Supreme Court deemed the ordinance unconstitutional. In the U.S. Constitution, Section 1 of the 14th Amendment specifically states

all persons born or naturalized in the United States, and subject to the jurisdiction therefore, are citizens of the United States and the state wherein they reside. No state shall make or enforce any law which abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any state deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of the law; nor deny any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws (U.S. Constitution, amend. XIV).

Additionally, these segregation ordinances were in direct conflict with the Civil Rights Act of 1866 which gave all persons regardless of color the right to lease, rent, or purchase property based on their personal preferences (Educational, n.d.). However, despite the federal statutes that were already in place, cities still chose to pursue policies that
blatantly discriminated against people based on race. City attorneys argued that ‘coloreds’ could own property in white neighborhoods; they simply could not occupy it, while Justice Day argued that “property is more than the mere thing which a person owns. It is elementary that it includes the right to acquire, use, and dispose of it. The Constitution protects these essential attributes of property” (as quoted in Rice, 1968, p. 193). Although the Supreme Court decision legally banned the use of such segregation ordinances, neighborhood associations and realtors successfully utilized informal arrangements to prevent African American entry into White neighborhoods. In Baltimore, as with many other urban communities, it was not uncommon for law enforcement, the courts, and local authorities to turn a blind eye to injustices committed against African Americans.

By 1918, Baltimore was growing in size and population, as its last successful annexation tripled the city’s area. This action proved to be detrimental, as it limited the expansion capabilities of Baltimore over time, particularly as the population grew to upwards of approximately one-million people by mid-century. David Rusk (1995, 2003) observes that annexation is detrimentally important for cities, if they want to grow and adjust with the population; therefore, if cities can’t grow, they start shrinking. Cities that are unable to accommodate the changes in populations become surrounded by suburbs that not only thwart urban expansion, but also confines large numbers of minorities in cities that are socially and economically declining (Rusk, 2003). This phenomenon – annexation – described by Rusk characterized the actions of many central cities that exploded with population and needed additional land mass to accommodate newly arriving migrants and immigrants. However, the population influx made central cities
less attractive to businesses and the white upper class. As a result, cities became enclaves that experienced a drastic decline in resources and political affluence, while the suburbs captured prosperous middle-class families that were attracted to less dense, newly constructed suburbs, outside of the central city.

The changing backdrop of urban communities started in the 1920s and refined itself over time as African Americans migrated to the north and immigrants arrived to American shores. Central cities became the destination of choice because they offered the convenience of work and play. The central business district, textile and manufacturing industries, and the shipyards provided employment. Also, entertainment was centrally located with theatres, restaurants, and music halls nearby. Housing, although not always of the highest quality, was also readily available. Consequently, the influx of minorities and foreigners was initially subtle, but the changing demographics were noticeable to White Baltimoreans. Pietila (2010) discusses the subtle changes in the 14th and 17th wards as initially areas of White concentration at the turn of the century, but within two decades, the areas were predominately occupied by African Americans. As African Americans entered communities, Whites fled almost immediately. In response, neighborhoods were becoming rigidly homogenous. Although the concept of ‘white flight’ was coined during the 1950s, its patterns were recognized decades earlier as a response to the racial transition of neighborhoods.

Next, the study will delve specifically into each of the programs that evolved as a result of public housing, urban renewal, and transportation legislation. First, the Housing Act of 1937 initiated the public housing program in the United States. Due to inadequate infrastructure, limited dwellings because of population surges, or the financial inability of
low-income families to compete in the marketplace, public housing was specifically
designed to ease the housing insecurities of families and central cities alike. However,
since that time, subsequent policies have evolved to enhance the aesthetics of public
housing or provide an alternative to low-income housing altogether. Public housing is
examined in the next section.

**Public Housing**

Nationally, several prominent housing laws were passed during this time in the
1930s. These laws were enacted to combat the stresses of the Great Depression by
infusing millions of dollars into the economy to promote homeownership, increase
employment, and to offer a sense of protection for low-income families. The Federal
Home Loan Bank Act (1932) was the first federal regulation of the housing and savings
and loan industry, which was designed to create a credit reserve to increase the supply of
credit available for people to purchase and maintain their homes (Landsberg, 2004). The
National Housing Act of 1934 was enacted to relieve unemployment and stimulate the
release of private credit from banks and lending institutions for home repairs and
construction (Research, 2009). Finally, the United States Housing Act of 1937 was
enacted to authorize the development and subsequent funding for public housing and
low-income housing. The first two laws were not applicable to African Americans,
because *de facto* practices made them ineligible for mortgages, home improvement loans,
and insurance. The last policy was not specifically designated for Blacks, but broad
administrative discretion and a lack of federal oversight with regard to site selection and
occupancy requirements resulted in African American being overwhelmingly confined to
public housing facilities.
The 1937 policy identified basic criteria for local administrators to identify the site locations for future public housing developments. Gottlieb (1975) identified the four criteria that local public housing officials must consider when selecting a location for developments. First, the permanency of character criteria specifies that the public housing development must be aesthetically pleasing and mesh with the existing structures of the community throughout the term of its existence. Second, the site selected must accommodate the size and density of the planned development. Administrators were to make considerations for zoning regulations and economic conditions of the existing area. Third, site selection was not supposed to formalize a sectional distribution of housing. In other words, the Local Housing Authority (LHA) was not to use their power to locate public housing development in spaces that would restrict the mobility of its residents or limit their access to educational and employment opportunities based on race or preference. Finally, public housing was not to infringe on the existing preferences or characteristics of the community in the location the development was built. Ultimately the racial characteristics of criteria specifically states that “...the aim of the authority should be preservation not disruption of community social structures” (as cited in Gottlieb, 1975, p. 15).

The regulations were clear. Public housing should be built with longevity in mind using quality materials to ensure their physical appearance. Developments were to be an adequate size to decrease incidences of overcrowding and rapid deterioration of infrastructure. When looking for site locations, local administrators were to find spaces that would integrate the projects within the existing structures of the city. They were not to be isolated in separate sections of the city, whereby residents were inconvenienced of
basic necessities and amenities. The first three criteria attempted to decrease discriminatory practices by providing local administrators with a framework for the comprehensive integration of public housing into the urban environment. However, the fourth criteria essentially invalidated the previous three because it was recommended that LHA’s do not infringe upon the preferences of existing residents within the community. Therefore, if constructing a Black public housing facility in a white community was likely to led to violence or interfere with residential preferences, then the LHA would have to find an alternative location for the development.

In Baltimore, the earliest public housing development was conceptualized as early as 1939 – the Herring Run project – but due to its close proximity to white working class families, the housing authority contemplated its construction for about 5 years (Pietila, 2010). It immediately became clear to Baltimore administrators that it was politically impossible to build any public housing facility for African Americans within close proximity to White neighborhoods, schools, or businesses. Despite this roadblock, officials worked with immediacy to secure a location for a Black development to ease the severe housing shortage faced by African Americans. Within 3 years of the enacting the Housing Act of 1937, Baltimore had planned, approved, and constructed the first ever public housing development for African American residents in Baltimore – the Edgar Allen Poe Homes in 1940. Although the lag time between enactment and execution was minimal in Baltimore, a formidable opposition emerged in response to preliminary discussions of public housing, its beneficiaries, and the respective location of public housing facilities.
However, once established, public housing proliferated immensely in the city of Baltimore. From 1940 – 1950, twelve public housing developments were constructed to serve the needs of low-income Blacks and Whites with six designated for each racial group. Four of the white developments were located in outlying areas, while two (Latrobe and Perkins) were within the core of the city. By contrast, all but one (Cherry Hill) of the African American developments were located within the areas that were comprised of more than 50% of the Black residents. The public housing developments constructed during the 1940s accounted for 5,858 new dwellings. However, this did not even begin to address the housing shortages that were specific to African Americans. Pietila (2010) cites a report from 1944 by the Baltimore housing authority, whereby it recommends that approximately 26,000 dwellings be rehabilitated or replaced, and about 7,000 new units were needed to meet the demands of the growing African American population. Therefore, public housing only addressed a fraction of the housing shortage problems.

As a scarce commodity for African Americans, any housing proved to be helpful in easing the tensions of the housing shortage. Therefore, public housing became a blessing and a curse. Public housing was attractive to African Americans, because it provided better living conditions, such as privacy, indoor heating and plumbing, and recreational areas. However, the pull of public housing greatly contributed to the re-segregation of African Americans into second ghetto communities. Initially well-kept and manicured, public housing offered families safety and security. The Afro-American (1950), Baltimore’s all-Black newspaper, cited that the Poe Homes was composed of a family-like atmosphere and offered a variety of activities for its residents, such as men’s
and women's groups, sponsored the Boy Scouts and the YWCA. Over time, these facilities transitioned from 'stepping stones' of upward mobility to permanent residences, resulting in public housing officials being negligent in the maintenance and upkeep of these communities. Consequently, public housing became the bastions of African American containment and concentration, which ultimately facilitated the making of the second ghetto.

Combined with the ongoing use of restrictive covenants by neighborhood associations, racial steering by realtors, and redlining practices used by lenders, African Americans were restricted to the most impoverished areas of the city (Hirsch, 1983; Marcuse, 2001; Pietila, 2010; Power, 1983; Rice, 1968; Samuels, 2008). Despite the 1948 Shelley v. Kraemer decision by the US Supreme Court that prohibited the use of restrictive covenants, such tactics were implicitly used by groups and individuals to limit African American access into white neighborhoods. Public housing essentially became the only housing option for most poor and working-class African Americans. Middle-class African Americans did not fare much better. Although some families were able to rent or purchase homes in transitioning communities, the quality of housing had deteriorated greatly, the neighborhoods were in decline, and city services would almost cease once the population majority was Black. Therefore, if not contained within the institutional dwellings of public housing, then African Americans were forcibly segregated as Whites and resources communities fled upon their arrival.

Racism and discrimination combined with the use of both formal and informal policies, restricted where African Americans could live. In the adjacent counties, racial steering and intimidation tactics were explicitly used to direct the mobility patterns of
Blacks out of and away from the suburbs. Baltimore, like Miami, Chicago, St. Louis, and Cleveland promoted public housing as the only housing option available to African Americans, regardless of profession, status, or means (Birmingham, 1999; Bristol, 1991; Hirsch, 1983; Jenkins, 2001; Mohl, 1995, 2003b). When African Americans could not gain access to public housing they sought residence in neighborhoods throughout the city. Consequently, an attempt to ‘breach the color line’ and gain entry in to predominately White neighborhoods occurred. The Fulton Street barrier was the first to experience racial transition. This proved to be a double-edge sword. Although African Americans were able to upgrade their living conditions, White residents panicked. Their outrage spurred hostility, induced violence, and ultimately initiated the mass exodus of Whites from the neighborhoods and the central city altogether. With the help of FHA, the Housing and Home Finance Agency, the Veterans Administration (VA), and HOLC, White residents were encouraged to seek homeownership opportunities in the burgeoning suburbs (Massey & Denton, 1993; Orfield, 1974-75; Pietila, 2010; Witt, 2006).

Although housing was a major sustainability issue for Baltimore, infrastructure was just as important. In response to vast suburbanization and deindustrialization, which deeply impaired central city autonomy, the federal government enacted a policy to address aging infrastructure, advance business expansion, increase investments, and encourage homeownership to American citizens across the country. The Housing Act of 1949 was passed by Congress for the purposes of providing urban communities with the tools to redevelop and revitalize their struggling central business districts. The policy was designed to address four overarching problems:
1) eliminate substandard and other inadequate housing through clearance of slums and blighted areas;
2) stimulate housing production and community development sufficient to remedy the housing shortage;
3) realize the goal of a descent home and a suitable living environment for every American family; and
4) permit the FHA to provide financing to rural homeowners (Anderson, 1967; Development, 2007b).

Despite its name, the Housing Act of 1949 made some provisions for housing, but it is known for its slum clearance initiatives. Through the use of eminent domain, local governments were able to obtain desirable property and transfer it to private entities for redevelopment and investment opportunities (Anderson, 1967).

African American communities were predominately identified as slums because they often lived in neighborhoods that were characterized by deterioration, blight, and abandonment (Hirsch, 1983; Massey & Denton, 1993; D. Wilson, 2007). African Americans initially settled into slum communities upon their arrival into central cities. Their homes were often makeshift apartments that housed numerous families at a time, which led to vast overcrowding and decaying conditions. Additionally, formal and informal mechanisms prevented Black families from seeking better accommodations in other areas of the city. Therefore, these initial ghettos emerged based on discriminatory practices by residents and administrators alike. Consequently, as the Housing Act of 1949, empowered city officials to identify slum areas and raze them under the guise of
urban renewal, African American neighborhoods became the primary targets due to their insolvent conditions.

Eminent domain was the most powerful tool that emerged from the Housing Act of 1949 because it provided administrators with the discretion to identify slum areas and legally displace thousands of Blacks in Baltimore. Hence, once the land was cleared, it was transferred to private actors for development at little or no costs (Anderson, 1967). This enabled businesses to accumulate considerable parcels of land in prime real estate locations near downtown or the central business district. Displaced families, especially African American, were often relocated to communities that were in similar or in worse conditions than they had previous lived, based on rent and access to work, school, and other communal institutions. BURHA estimates that approximately 17% of the nearly 3000 families that were displaced by urban renewal from 1954-1964 relocated into substandard dwellings (Agency, 1965). It must be noted, the statistics above, represent only the families that provided a forwarding addresses to BURHA, therefore a significant number of families were not tracked. Displaced residents, whether tracked and untracked, were subjected to living in second ghetto communities, which contributed to the alienation and compounded poverty amongst African American families.

Urban renewal became the second factor in the push-pull phenomenon that dictated population movement. Areas designated for clearance required that all residents, institutions, and buildings be cleared before redevelopment began. Regardless of the redevelopment project: residential, commercial, industrial, or mixed-use, the original population was forced out, and upon project completion, a new group of stakeholders were moved in. Oftentimes, residents would relocate to adjacent communities or be
captured by available public housing facilities. In this regard, urban renewal and public housing worked together to push African Americans off of desirable real estate, while public housing pulled Blacks into their confines, as private rental options were limited for a variety of reasons. Therefore, African American families had few options: either obtain quality housing, whereby a substantial portion of their income was used for rent, relocate to substandard dwellings in impoverished communities based, on the ability to pay and access, or utilize public housing because of its availability and affordability (Agency, 1965). Overall, the last two options were common outcomes for African Americans, as discrimination and prejudice continued to deter families from seeking housing outside of existing Black communities. Ultimately, the destruction of neighborhoods, the displacement of residents, and the re-segregation of African Americans made urban renewal and public housing fundamental drivers of second ghetto creation. While Baltimore officials were solely focused on the physical and aesthetic aspects of redevelopment, the social implications of those decisions were detrimental to African American mobility and opportunity.

These contrasting outcomes (e.g. physical v. social implications, quantitative v. qualitative measures of redevelopment) are fundamental toward understanding the dynamics of capitalism in the United States. Harvey (2000, p. 23) argued that “the accumulation of capital has always been a profoundly geographical affair. Without the possibilities inherent in geographical expansion, spatial reorganization, and uneven geographical development, capitalism would long cease to function as a political-economic system.” As capitalism and politics have become the lifeblood of American society, these interrelated entities justified the subjugation of African Americans based,
on their inferior status in the United States. Racism was a secondary factor in the disenfranchisement of African Americans; profit ultimately dictated the motives of business leaders and city officials. In essence, the need to secure and amass wealth for private interests and the sustainability of the urban environment steered the restructuring patterns of downtown, the central business district, public housing, neighborhoods, and industry.

Hence, by mid-1940, Mayor Theodore McKendin shifted his attention to downtown redevelopment by the mid-1940s. The rebirth of the Inner Harbor, the highway construction program, and an airport was all conceived during his tenure (Pietila, 2010). The Inner Harbor had always been the core financier of Baltimore’s livelihood, and since the early 1900s, it suffered from several iterations of destruction and development. The Fire of 1904 destroyed over 140-acres and 1,545 buildings (Olson, 1997). Olson (1997) acknowledges that the damage was extensive, but there were no deaths, few injuries, and few homeless, because the area was primarily commercial, so its impact hampered small business owners. Over the decades, the Harbor was rebuilt with sewers, roads, a water system, and underground electrical conduits (Olson, 1997). Each project addressed the blight and abandonment that characterized Baltimore’s Inner Harbor district through the use of local resources and federal policies, which funneled exorbitant resources into central cities for more cosmetic and structural upgrades. However, these objectives led to revitalized urban cores and African American communities that were isolated from mainstream society.

The second phase of the timeline provided a context to the racial, political, and economic environment of American society. Despite mandates handed down by the
Supreme Court in the *Buchanan v. Warley* and the *Shelley v. Kraemer* that respectively prohibited de jure segregation and made the use of restrictive covenants unconstitutional, Blacks were still being denied basic American rights. Federal agencies like FHA, VA, and HOLC promoted disinvestment in Black neighborhoods with redlining and security maps, which made it virtually impossible for prospective buyers and homeowners to be granted home improvement loans, insurance, or mortgages. Additionally, public opinion and political rhetoric formed the policy decisions that directly affected Baltimore’s most pressing issues: housing and infrastructure. The context for how Baltimore would handle urban decline was established during the first fifty years of the 20th century. The third period of the timeline specifically focuses on the execution of the Housing Act of 1937 and 1949. Additionally, the Interstate Highway Act of 1956 is examined as the final policy enabler, which contributed to population movement in Baltimore city.

**Policy Execution and Population Movement: 1951-2000**

By the mid-20th century, the ideology of capitalism had prevailed and manifested itself in a variety of ways to promote economic stability for entrepreneurs in urban areas. Although the goals of the Housing Act of 1949 were to promote housing production and eliminate slums, its vague language enabled administrators to interpret the policy very broadly. Gotham (2001a) explains the effects of privatism as depoliticizing policy making by systematically excluding the voices and interests that reject the sanctity of the “free-market” and the desire to maximize profits through the use of public policy and government subsidies. In this regard, the Housing Act of 1949 is a perfect example of how public policy was manipulated to further the interest of the business community at the expense of the poor, minority populations, and comprehensive urban development.
For example, the policy empowered developers to construct Levittown (mass-produced suburban tract house), promoted racial segregation and job discrimination in cities and suburbs, contributed to sunbelt-style sprawl, and caused urban rioting in the 1960s (Lang & Sohmer, 2000). This expression of policy revealed a conscious effort to unequally distribute resources, eliminate impoverished neighborhoods (e.g. predominately African American communities), and use public housing as a concentration and containment facility for African Americans.

An ACLU (n.d., p. 61) report characterized Baltimore’s urban renewal strategy as a three-pronged system designed for “...Negro clearance, the conversion of a racially flexible area to one of racial exclusion, and the reduction of land areas available to Negro residence.” Subsequently, all planning decisions were consciously made without input from African American residents. Therefore, outcomes are the result of purposeful actions by administrators to disperse existing communities and deliberately direct the mobility patterns of African Americans in the city. As sites for development were identified, African Americans were forcibly displaced to ensure redevelopment in the identified ‘slum’ areas. Therefore, while housing was limited, public facilities became the number one option for Black displaced families.

In 1985, HUD would later admit in congressional testimony that [t]he link [of public housing] with urban renewal was explicit, in that the Act [1949] required housing authorities to give priority to families displaced by urban renewal and highway construction. Moreover, [public housing] siting policies promoted the provision of replacement housing in the same general area as that from which the displacement occurred...progressive urban renewal policies and
their dependence upon public housing as a relocation resource that the tenant population of our urban public housing authorities became predominately minority (ACLU, n.d., p. 63).

In essence, the public housing and slum clearance initiatives successfully reduced the appearance of blight and deterioration. Consequently, urban renewal was lauded as a great economic development tool, because it dispossessed all African Americans that were within proximity to revitalization areas. Its effectiveness led to the policy being known as ‘Negro removal.’

Baltimore’s population peaked in 1950 at 949,708 people with 83% of White growth occurring in the suburbs and 83% of Black growth happening in the city (Pietila, 2010). Over the decade the 11 new census tracts were added bringing Baltimore’s total to 168 (U.S. Census Bureau, 1951). During this time, the number of census tracts that excluded African Americans decreased from 19 to 9. Unfortunately, the reason for the decline is unknown. When isolating census tracts by race, 98 census tracts contained White populations of greater than 4000 people and there were 25 for African Americans. The White census tracts were dispersed throughout the city, while the Black tracts were clustered near the city core. Such statistics demonstrate the severe overcrowding that Baltimore residents experienced regardless of their race. However, in Black neighborhoods overcrowding is often associated with crime, violence, and disorder. These perceptions greatly influenced the amenities that were available for African American residents in the city. Baltimore’s population growth exposed the inadequacies of a struggling central city. From housing and roads to investments, Baltimore was at a crossroads about its future.
City officials immediately responded with a plan to rejuvenate the city by increasing public housing production and initiating a variety of urban renewal programs. However, administrative actions created a dire situation for African Americans, particularly as racial tension and restrictive covenants made entry into White or mixed communities improbable. Single-family homes for African Americans were almost nonexistent. For example, within the years 1950 to 1953, less than 130 building permits were approved for African American housing, but over 53,000 permits were authorized for White housing production (Pietila, 2010). These actions facilitated the explosive production of public housing developments and extensions to existing facilities. In 1954, the ‘separate but equal’ doctrine was deemed unconstitutional in the landmark Brown v. Board of Education decision. In response, Baltimore officials announced a plan to desegregate its low-income housing developments and was also among the first cities to publicly support the integration of public schools ("Carmen Thompson, et al. v. HUD, et. al," 2003; Pietila, 2010). The Lafayette Homes was the first public housing development characterized as integrated in Baltimore, and it contained 816 units (Gottlieb, 1975).

Quick action on behalf of Baltimore officials would impress observers to believe that the city was progressive with regard to race relations, but their efforts proved to be futile based on the changing demographics within the city.

Urban Renewal

In 1941, Downtown property lost $53,000,000 or 30-percent of its $175,000,000 assessed value (Agency, 1959). Hence the second plan to revitalize the city was to initiate a variety of urban renewal programs to upgrade and modify residential, commercial, and industrial areas throughout the city. Urban renewal and downtown
revitalization was officially underway. Neighborhoods all over the city were touched by redevelopment in some capacity. Poor areas were susceptible to their entire communities being razed and residents relocated. Historic districts were threatened with the clearance of some buildings and spaces, but overall these areas were refurbished. The central business district experienced a complete overhaul to accommodate new buildings, parking facilities, restaurants, and shops. While each of the projects cosmetically enhanced the city, it deepened the gulf between the affluent and the poor residents. Demolitions and relocations stigmatized African Americans, because their communities were disproportionately identified as ‘slum’ areas, and their presence was directly related to the decline and deterioration. In this regard, African Americans and their communities were approached with an ‘out of sight, out of mind’ mentality, as they were purposefully relocated to areas away from new development. Therefore, as redevelopment ensued, the new structures were designed to attract future investors and middle-class residents to the area.

Although the city executed dozens of urban renewal plans over the course of the program’s 25 year lifespan, this study will investigate five projects: Area 3-C (Broadway), Inner Harbor, Charles Center, Harlem Park, and Mount Royal-Fremont. Area 3-C is the first urban renewal program to be initiated in Baltimore. The Inner Harbor and Charles Center projects are major downtown renovations that added office space, entertainment, and brought a variety of new amenities to the city. Harlem Park was Baltimore’s first full-scale rehabilitation area. Finally, the Mount Royal-Fremont program was equivalent to redesigning an entire community. Each project will highlight the effects of administrative actions and the subsequent population movements that result.
Area 3-C

By the early 1950s, Baltimore had declared that most of the inner city suffered from blight, and the urban renewal was fully underway (Gottlieb, 1975). The Waverly project, a 21-acre clearance and redevelopment initiative was actually the first redevelopment project in the city of Baltimore and the second in the city to be completed (Agency, 1961b). Area 3-C or the Broadway project, as it was commonly referred, became the second urban renewal initiative in Baltimore City. The area was characterized by an overwhelming proportion of dilapidated homes that occupied the nine-acre clearance tract; approximately 89% of residents lived in such homes (Agency, 1961b). Consequently, the Baltimore City Council approved this community as one of the first urban renewal projects. However, opposition soon mounted, as the NAACP and the Baltimore Urban League objected to the disproportionate number of African Americans that were displaced. The Johns Hopkins-Broadway project specifically uprooted 90% of African Americans, while 85% of the new dwellings were set aside for Whites (Hirsch, 2000b).

According to BURHA (1961b), 199 families were relocated from Area 3-C and a vast majority relocated within the same section of the city that redevelopment occurred. Of the 199 households impacted by renewal, 27 households were captured by 9 different public housing facilities. Twenty families specifically were relocated to the Douglass, Somerset, Latrobe, and Lafayette Homes – all within the immediate vicinity of Area 3-C. The elimination of existing residential facilities exacerbated the housing shortages experienced by African American families. However, despite this awareness, city officials remained steadfast in their approach to revitalize Baltimore at the expense of
Black neighborhoods in the name of redevelopment. Although relocation services were offered, the assistance did little to ease the suffering experienced by African American families. Renters were especially hit hard because they were not entitled to any type of compensation for their loss or inconvenience, especially since 157 of the displaced families were nonwhite renters (Agency, 1961b).

The need to revitalize this area was important, due to its location near the illustrious Johns Hopkins University. As a powerful institution with an abundance of resources, it is politically necessary for administrators to accommodate the elimination of slums and the expansion potential of the university. The desire to revitalize urban communities was forefront in the minds of the urban elite. Therefore, renewal projects were planned throughout the city. As a result, displacement, relocation, and a variety of other social issues were neglected in the name of redevelopment. BURHA (1966) acknowledged that although many of the families displaced by renewal had a history of poverty, poor health, and anti-social behavior, relocation greatly exacerbated these issues. Additionally, the report states that displaced families were unable to capitalize on their move or raise their standard of living and often experienced discrimination as residents in the less blighted communities. They were fearful that the displaced residents would contribute to the rapid deterioration of their neighborhoods (Agency, 1966). Hence, as one of the first projects and one of the smallest in Baltimore, Area 3-C foreshadowed the complexity of urban renewal and policy decisions at the local level, regardless of the type and size of the project.

Downtown renewal emerged as a prominent solution to combat the economic woes of the city by the 1960s. At the height of urban renewal planning and
implementation, over 1180-acres of land was slated to be redeveloped. Each project was
designed in some way to address blight, attract industrial or commercial investors,
rehabilitate housing, and preserve Baltimore’s culture and character. These projects
impacted nearly every community in Baltimore and were facilitated by several influential
actors: Mayor Theodore McKeldin, the GBC, the Baltimore Urban Renewal and Housing
Authority (BURHA), and the Citizens Planning and Housing Association (CPHA).
Teaford (2000, p. 444) broadly explains the expectations of each constituency

Central-city business interests viewed it [urban renewal] as a means of boosting
sagging property values; mayors and city councils perceived it as a tool to
increase tax revenues; social welfare leaders hoped it would clear the slums and
better the living conditions of the poor; and more specifically, advocates of low-
and moderate – income housing thought it would increase the stock of decent,
affordable dwellings in the central cities.

Although each group represented a different type of stakeholder, they all shared a
common goal of wanting to support and preserve the economic, political, and cultural
legacy of Baltimore.

**Inner Harbor and Downtown Development**

Rebuilding the Inner Harbor after the devastating fire of 1904 was slow, but
incremental progress was made up until the Great Depression. A number of public works
projects propelled the city into modern times, businesses were investing in the area, and
the economy was beginning to stabilize (Olson, 1997). However, by the early 1930s, the
impact of the Great Depression had taken its toll on Baltimore’s central core once again.
De-industrialization and the recession contributed to the decimation of the area and its
proximate communities. By the mid-1950s, infrastructure was crumbling, workers and industry were relocating to the suburban periphery, and the city’s largest department store O’Neil’s closed its doors for good (Dannes, n.d.). This ordeal required immediate action. In response, the Greater Baltimore Committee (GBC) initiated the rebirth of Baltimore’s urban core. The GBC was comprised of executives and large property owners from the declining central business district. They collectively sought to improve the city of Baltimore by initiating and offering commentary to the various urban renewal projects carried out by city officials (Dannes, n.d.; Incorporated, 1955).

According to Haeuber (1974), the GBC is partially responsible for the Civic Center, Jones Falls Expressway, the Maryland Port Authority, Baltimore’s open housing law, Charles Center, and the Inner Harbor development plan. Each of these initiatives proved to be transformative for the city of Baltimore. The city initiated a $900 million rehabilitation plan headed by BURHA. Subsequently, the Inner Harbor and over 10 different residential, commercial, and university expansion projects began, which facilitated widespread Baltimore renewal. Throughout the 1960s, over 2400-acres of land was redeveloped all over the city. Estimates from 1965 to 1970 reveal that renewal programs contributed to the displacement of over 1,300 households (Agency, 1965). The Harlem Park II development, Madison Park North and South, Mount Vernon I and II, and the University of Maryland accounted for over half of the household displacements. These actions crippled Black communities as they were razed to accommodate revitalization. Patterns of dislocation and relocation, segregation and containment characterized the experiences of African Americans during urban renewal. Although
services were offered to families to help them adjust, many residents opted to leave areas upon speculation that urban renewal would invade their neighborhoods.

The next section will discuss the various projects that were executed near downtown and the Inner Harbor. Most of these projects were planned in the late 1950s and early 1960s and were fully executed by the mid-1970s.

Charles Center

David Wallace was hired by the GBC to initiate the Charles Center project – a 33-acre redevelopment site. BURHA identified Charles Center as the heart of Downtown, and its further neglect would result in the “...continued deterioration of the city proper, including declining property valuations and increasing inability to render essential municipal services without impositions on its tax-paying citizens” (Agency, 1959, p. 1). The significance of this project was monumental; therefore planning and consensus building took several months and occurred in phases. Approximately 51 properties with 90 businesses would be relocated as a result of redevelopment (Agency, 1960). As an assessment study reveals that the median length for businesses on site was 40 years for wholesalers and 29 years for other groups; approximately 84% operated their businesses out of that one location; over 1,500 people were employed in the area; and just over half (51.7%) of firms wished to remain in the downtown area (Agency, 1960).

The expediency of this project dramatically impacted the lives of the business owners in the area. For example, planning for Charles Center began in 1958. By 1960 land acquisition has started, and the first phase of the development was completed in 1962 – One Charles Center (Agency, 1961a). Over the next decade, more facilities were added to the Charles Center complex: the Vermont Federal Savings and Loan Association
(1964), the Sun Life Insurance Company (1966), Mechanic Theater and the Federal Office Building (1967), Mercantile Safe-Deposit & Trust (1969), and Charles Center South (1975) (Agency, 1964b). Underground parking and other amenities were planned for the site upon its completion. Consequently, the success of the Charles Center project led Mayor McKeldin to hire David Wallace to coordinate the waterfront development, which consisted of a 30-year, $260 million plan to revitalize the Inner Harbor (Dannes, n.d.).

The Shot Tower Industry Park area was intended for light industry. The area housed some of the worst residential slums, which were eventually razed as a result of this project. Approximately 24-acres of land was redeveloped to form Baltimore’s first industrial park (Agency, 1961c). This area displaced approximately 180 households, of which 90 percent were non-white residents (Agency, 1961a). The Camden Industrial Park was a $7 million initiative which targeted 87-acres of mixed use space—both residential and commercial—to be razed for light industry (Agency, 1961a, 1961c). Approximately 5 ½-acres were slated for largest disposition in the area, overall 736 households, of which 574 or 77 percent were non-white residents.

The Mount Vernon Project designated 190-acres of land for redevelopment. This area was proposed for urban renewal, because the infrastructure quality was so diverse. Substandard housing sprinkled through the community, while brownstones and historical landmarks remained of sound quality. BURHA (1964a, p. 1) stated “...this vitality, real though as it is, is not strong enough unaided to combat the blight that threatens the area.” BURHA estimated that less than 10% (175 out of 1895) of occupied dwellings would be razed and about 17% of rooming units were slated for clearance (141 out of 841)
Overall, the Mount Vernon project was planned for reclaiming areas that were desirable for in-town residences, attracting professional offices and specialty shops, and emphasizing the culture center – the famous Mount Vernon Place (Agency, 1961c). The estimated budget for the first stage of development was approximately $5.6 million.

**Neighborhood and Community Development**

The University of Maryland expansion began in 1961 and was aggregated into three different phases – all of which were identified as clearance projects (Agency, 1964b). The growth of the city and the university necessitated rehabilitation of the university and its proximate communities. Although designated as a clearance project, those facilities that belonged to the University of Maryland, the cemetery where Edgar Allen Poe was buried, and the Westminster Church were preserved (Agency, 1964b). Stage one consisted of a 7-acre project for a gymnasium and outdoor recreation facilities. Phase II was the 14-acre construction of the Law School. Project III, a 4-acre space, was identified as the site for the School of Dentistry, parking garages, and other decorative landscapes. Similar to the expansion of Johns Hopkins University, the University of Maryland was able to engage with the city in a 10-year plan to expand its graduate school campus. Therefore, administrators were completely aware of the policy implications of university expansion having just completed the Area 3-C program in 1960. Although the University of Maryland was a smaller project displacing a total of 155 (33% nonwhite) households the realities of displacement does not make it any easier, particularly if any of the family units could be characterized as vulnerable (Agency, 1964b, 1966).
The Mount Royal-Fremont was a planned community development proposed to increase the tax base and attract permanent residents workers to strengthen the city (Agency, 1962a). The project would occur in phases: Mount Royal Plaza, Madison Park-North, Project II, and Madison Park-South. The first phase of development was the Mount Royal Plaza – the site of the State Office building complex. Approximately 333 structures or 1,650 dwelling units were acquired for clearance, and over 13,000 people were displaced – 84% were nonwhite residents (Agency, 1962a, 1964b). Although displacement was mandated, not all residents left their homes without grievance. In early 1963, Douglas Knott, sued the city over the market value of his home in the Plaza area. Eminent domain requires financial compensation to all homeowners displaced by renewal, and city appraisers depreciated the value of Mr. Knott’s home by almost half. Ultimately, a Superior Court Jury sided with Mr. Knott, requiring a substantial increase in his final payment (unknown, 1963). The conditions of clearance areas usually justify low financial settlements. The result leaves families with very little to improve their living conditions. In this case, Mr. Knott was compensated based on his ability to litigate his complaint. However, not all dispossessed residents have the resources and time to seek alternatives. Despite this delay, demolition continued. As early as 1961, the Baltimore Life Insurance Company building was completed, soon to be followed by the National Cash Register Company and the United States Food and Drug Administration (Agency, 1964b). This area was essentially the employment core designed to support the vast residential construction that was planned for later phases.

Madison Park-North, a 120-acre development was the second phase of the program. The project consisted of mixed use redevelopment for commercial and
residential structures. Unlike many renewal areas, Madison Park was a moderately blighted neighborhood that was racially diverse and very civic minded. The Mount Royal Democratic Club was a collective voice that represented the interests of residents and business owners in the community. However, despite cooperative action, over 1,800 families and 194 businesses were relocated (Agency, 1962a). This area was integrated into the public transportation network, playgrounds and parks, churches and community centers were planned for the area. Madison Park-South was a 93-acre project that focused on the rehabilitation of 424 existing structures (Agency, 1962a). The area would also house the new fire house that was constructed. Finally, about 4-acres of land was developed (e.g. Project II) to house the elementary school, several community buildings, and the Murphy Homes public housing facility (Agency, 1962a). All 108 nonwhite households that resided in this community were displaced.

**Harlem Park**

The Housing Act of 1954 emphasized the importance of rehabilitating existing urban homes. Financial assistance was made available to localities for the planning and execution of projects, public improvements, and upgrading for structures and neighborhoods (Agency, 1962b). Consequently, this policy focused on rehabilitation instead of complete demolition like the urban renewal program. As federal funds were allocated with the program, Baltimore quickly identified an area that could benefit from government subsidy – Harlem Park. The community was chosen as an experiment to identify and remove roadblocks for other residential rehabilitation projects across the country – essentially the model for national implementation. In a joint partnership with FHA and URA, BURHA initiated the full scale residential rehabilitation project. Its
collaboration was described as "... an intensive and cooperative application of attention and manpower, to come to grips with some of the most difficult and complex problems which residential rehabilitation presents and to develop effective procedures for dealing with them" (Agency, 1962b, p. 3).

The report reveals that by the mid-1950s, "...Harlem Park’s 150 acres contained almost 14,000 people – a density of over 90 persons per gross acre (Agency, 1962b, p. 13). BURHA’s Director Steiner described Harlem Park as "...an area of lower income Negro residents, is probably at the lower end of the scale of neighborhoods susceptible to private rehabilitation. If rehabilitation can be made to succeed here, it can probably succeed in any other reasonably selected area in the country (Agency, 1962b, p. 10). This among other issues led to the approval of the Harlem Park School Condemnation Ordinance by Mayor Thomas D’Alesandro on March 7, 1958, which commenced clearance on all properties in the 1400 and 1500 blocks of Harlem Avenue (unknown, 1958). Despite the dire conditions of the community, the Harlem Park Homeowners Association and the NAACP opposed the project, stating that "...erection of the school would result in the destruction of substantial housing, when blighted housing would be left standing and it would also take park land” (unknown, 1958, p. 22).

The opposition made valid points about the adverse impact of destroying quality and suitable homes, particularly as the city’s existing housing stock was unable to accommodate the immediate need of African American residents. However, protests fell on deaf ears, as the Mayor was fully supported by the School Board, BURHA, and several other organizations (unknown, 1958). Once underway, the project was aggregated into two phases. Project I was the construction of an elementary and high
school. Construction started April 1961 and facilities were in full operation by the fall 1963 school year (Agency, 1964b). The residential rehabilitation characterize Project II as nearly 2,000 properties were identified for redevelopment (Agency, 1964b). Both projects displaced over 1,300 nonwhite residents from the area. By 1964, the Afro-American reported that after 5 years of execution, only 1,714 structures had been rehabilitated to BURHA standards, and the agency was lagging behind in the construction of new parks (unknown, 1964). Consequently, “after five years of operation, BURHA’s Harlem Park rehabilitation project is still in an experimental stage, and agency officials say as much, though carefully not directly” (unknown, 1964, p. 1).

Outside of the downtown area, several other neighborhoods experienced an overhaul of vacant, abandoned, and deteriorated infrastructure. By September 1964, Harlem Park renovated 200-acres, the Mount Royal-Fremont community redeveloped 925-acres, and the Gay Street neighborhood designated 325-acres for renewal (Agency, 1964b). These projects contributed to the economic and physical reimagining of Baltimore. As a result of these programs and numerous others throughout the city, over 25,000 people were displaced by urban renewal, public housing, and school construction during the time frame of 1950-1964, and 90 percent of those relocated were African American (Samuels, 2008). The outcome created two cities: one affluent, white and business-oriented and the other poor, Black, and disenfranchised. Despite all quantitative good that was occurring in the city (e.g. overall numbers of acres set for redevelopment, the building roads and homes, refurbishing historic areas), the quality of life (e.g. the racial and social tension) for African American residents continued to worsen.
While public housing contributed to the city’s housing stock and urban renewal promoted economic development, transportation was the final piece to the full-scale redevelopment initiatives of Baltimore’s urban elite. Although discussions of interstate highways had been a constant throughout the 1930s and 1940s, there were numerous obstacles that stood in the way of its execution. Since that time, dozens of proposals were presented, modified, and approved; policy amendments added; and political and residential debates scheduled – all factors that significantly delayed or contributed to the termination of many highway projects. For example, Haeuber (1974) cites problems with financing the construction of the expressways, the lack of a strong coalition to overcome the diverse and uncoordinated opposition, and the need to comply with federal statutes and regulations. Money was also a point of contention initially, particularly as highways funding evolved from a 50-50 split to the federal government providing 90% of the funds needed to acquire land, prepare it for construction, and building, leaving 10% of the responsibility to local governments (Anderson, 1967; Power, 2000; Schwartz, 1976). Opposition to expressways was fueled by homeowners, advocacy groups, and business owners who sought to challenge the razing of their communities and the forced displacement of homes and businesses. As a result, all of these issues would prove to be formidable opponents in the fight to control the routing and construction of expressways in the city of Baltimore.

In 1944, the Federal Aid Act was passed to offer some financial assistance for the construction of highways and roads throughout the country. During this time Robert Moses, an influential New York builder, proposed that an east-west expressway be build
in Baltimore, which would cut through a predominately Black area between Franklin and Mulberry Streets (Pietila, 2010). Moses’ plan was designed to raze over two hundred city blocks and dislocate close to 1900 residents, but he assured the public “Nothing we propose to remove will constitute any loss to Baltimore” (Pietila, 2010, p. 219). His sentiment was widely popular with residents and officials who deemed their urban renewal and highway projects more important than preserving or attempting to rehabilitate existing African American communities. Despite his influence and credential, Moses’ first condemnation plan for the east-west highway did not get approved by the city council until 1965 (Montgomery, 1996). Although plans were altered momentarily, the federal bulldozer exerted its force on all communities, but especially in African Americans neighborhoods.

Unlike the success of its predecessors, transportation policy was a highly divisive and contentious issue for all stakeholders regardless of race, class, or ethnicity. Therefore, when the Federal Aid Highway Act of 1944 was passed, Baltimore officials immediately identified stakeholders, investors, and technical experts – the Highway Lobby – to help execute a highway plan in Baltimore (Power, 2000). The Jones Falls Expressway (I-83) became the first phase of infrastructure that connected the outer suburbs with downtown Baltimore. The plan was proposed in 1949 and approved by the voters with a $10 million bond two years later (Haeuber, 1974). Also, the Baltimore County Planning Commission proposed the construction of the beltway (I-695), but due to unforeseen circumstances with funding, a change in routing plans, and a state takeover of the project, the beltway was not completed until 1962 (Power, 2000). At its completion, the beltway was thirty-three miles around, with one exit and two bridges per
mile, which would be surrounded by numerous radial roads that would help people travel around the city (Olson, 1997). The beltway project proved to be very prophetic of the challenges that future highway projects would face in Baltimore.

Hence, the immediacy for transportation infrastructure in Baltimore did not negate the need to generate consensus on a highway plan that would appeal to both public and private interests (Power, 2000). For example, Mayor Thomas D’Alesandro, Jr. recommended that Philip Darling create a new transportation plan for Baltimore. He had successfully consulted and engaged with civic groups and private businesses to obtain ‘buy-in’ from earlier plans, so Mayor D’Alesandro felt he was best qualified to propose a new plan. However, in 1956, the Interstate Highway System (IHS) was enacted and it was designed to federally fund the construction of a network of expressways across the entire country. Subsequently, the Highway Act of 1956 required an independent consulting agency to review and approve plans before the Department of Planning could move forward with construction (Power, 2000). As a result, the “Expressway Consultants” – a conglomerate of Baltimore firms – was hired as an independent firm to review Baltimore’s highway plan. Due to the ‘Expressway Consultants’ tremendous expertise, political clout, and significant interest in the routing of highways, all of Darling’s plans were virtually altered creating an uproar in the community and ultimately changing the fate of highways in Baltimore (Power, 2000). The efforts of the ‘Expressway Consultants’ outraged citizens, because they virtually ignored citizen input and their preferences.

Although a powerful entity, the ‘Expressway Consultants’ were not prepared for the public’s response to their revised plans. Baltimore’s east and west sides had diverse,
well-organized, and politically astute citizens that were ready to oppose any highway project that interfered with the social fabric of their community. Therefore, the ‘Expressway Consultants’ faced vehement disagreement with the Citizens Planning and Housing Association (CPHA), who rejected the routing I-70. The CPHA essentially called the plan racist, because it planned to uproot the families that occupied the Poe Homes and subsequently targeted African American residents on the west side of the city (Haeuber, 1974). Whereas, the westside residents could make claims about the social and environmental impact of the expressways, Baltimore’s east side residents protested highways, because they wanted to sustain their historic sites: Fort McHenry and Fells Point (Haeuber, 1974). Although legislation to protect historic sites from redevelopment was not passed by the federal government until 1966, Baltimore residents used various stall tactics to preserve historic sites from demolition. Highway construction in Baltimore was a very tumultuous issue. As a result, each highway plan and its subsequent alternatives were either highly diluted or permanently dropped altogether.

The Jones Falls Expressway (I-83), the Beltway (I-695), I-95, and I-70 were significant highway projects that offered Baltimore hope of survival through job creation and downtown redevelopment (Haeuber, 1974; Montgomery, 1996). Montgomery (1996, p. 3) explains the planned interconnectedness of Baltimore’s highway system:

I-83 would provide north-south access and meet an east-west highway inside the city to the east of the downtown core; I-70 would bring traffic through the city on an east-west alignment and would be linked together with larger, east-west route: I-95. Perring Parkway to the northeast, a Northwestern Expressway, the continuation of the Arundel Expressway into the city, I-395 from the beltway to
Pratt Street and various routes across the harbor also figured prominently in early plans.

This network of highways was conceptualized as the key factor in Baltimore’s thrust to become one of the premier cities in the country, particularly as the growth of the suburbs proved to be indirect competition to its viability. Interstates, the beltway, and the ports were viewed as economic development ventures that would enhance the accessibility to downtown Baltimore from the neighboring communities and industries.

Expressways would also attract industry, accommodate the thousands of residents that traveled from the suburbs, and boost the competitive spirit of a city that was on the verge of demise as a result of deindustrialization and suburbanization. However, the decision-making structure of the highway program compromised the fruition of this vision. Routinely, the states had final authority over routing highways, but in Baltimore those powers were devolved to the City Council. Consequently, as their respective constituents were faced with highway construction, proceedings were stalled based on vehement opposition (Montgomery, 1996). Authority concentrated in the hands of local officials, at least with regard to highway construction, was politically damaging for politicians and administrators alike. Highway discussions proceeded as urban renewal and slum clearance program emerged as a supplemental effort to revitalize depressed central cities. Ultimately, the comprehensive highway plan was never fully realized, and the project eventually fizzled into an incomplete set of roads (Montgomery, 1996).

Highways were such a contentious topic in Baltimore that the deadlines articulated in the Highway Act of 1956 legislation threatened the future of construction in the city. The law imposed a deadline that all highway construction must be complete by
1972. The city risked forfeiting almost $257 million in federal funding, if plans were not approved (Montgomery, 1996). However, funding was only part of the issue, because highways were so disruptive to many communities in the city. As long and expansive networks, dozens of communities were affected by highway construction. Therefore, collective opposition successfully modified or caused the abandonment of highway plans altogether. As a result, the major arteries that would penetrate the city: I-70, I-95, and Jones Falls Expressway (I-83) never fully met, and they never pierced the downtown core (Montgomery, 1996). Secondary roads were built, and streets were repaved, but the comprehensive system that was conceived over 20 years ago did not manifest.

Essentially, transportation became the third factor in the push-pull phenomenon that dictated population mobility. Similar to urban renewal, the IHS forcibly displaced residents, homes, businesses, and communal institutions. Therefore, relocated families were either captured by public housing or other impoverished neighborhoods. Collectively, urban renewal and transportation were push policies, while public housing pulled residents into their confines – specifically African Americans. Political consensus from civic leagues, neighborhood improvement associations, and other groups successfully delayed or modified highway construction. However, significant damage still occurred after whole communities were razed or partitioned off to accommodate new highways (Mohl, 1993, 2001, 2002, 2003a).

Collectively, public housing, urban renewal, and transportation policies had detrimental effects on comprehensive development with the city. Planning became fragmented, as neighborhoods were selected based on the presence of blight, an attempt to salvage historical sites, or proximity to the downtown without any real integrated plan
for all-inclusive development. Consequently, the long-term implications of urban sustainability were indistinctly considered. Therefore, despite the many renewal projects that were being planned or underway, the significant investments by public and private actors, and the 20 public housing facilities already in-use, Baltimore was still losing residents, businesses, and political clout. Between 1955-1965, at the peak of urban renewal planning and redevelopment, the city of Baltimore had lost 82 industries, of which 65 relocated to Baltimore County (Pietila, 2010). The outlying counties welcomed the influx of affluent residents and profitable businesses to their respective jurisdictions. These areas benefited greatly from the federal aid that promoted homeownership and business expansion, while restricting the criteria to White middle-class families. HUD Assistant Secretary Roberta Achtenberg (ACLU, n.d., p. 36) admitted

FHA policies enabled and encouraged middle-class white families to obtain financing for new housing in the burgeoning suburbs, while lending institutions denied loans to older, inner-city neighborhoods and appraisal practices discouraged racial mixing. As a whole, FHA policies contributed to residential segregation, high foreclosure rates, and neighborhood disinvestment.

Another caveat regarding the location of public housing is related to provisions in the law that required all communities that wanted to participate in the program establish a Local Housing Authority (LHA) (Gottlieb, 1975). The suburbs and outlying counties opted-out of creating such a department and were, therefore, ineligible to build public housing within their jurisdictions. This issue single-handedly contributed to the overwhelming concentration of public housing in the city of Baltimore. As a result, whites were advantaged by pristine communities, vast amenities, and numerous educational and
employment opportunities. Conversely, African Americans were held captive by impoverished central cities, where employment opportunities were limited, education was grossly inadequate, and violence was an everyday occurrence.

The Civil Rights Act of 1964 was passed to end racial and sexual discrimination with regard to voting, access of public facilities, and public education (ACLU, n.d.; Gottlieb, 1975). Although enacted by the federal government, this mandate did not immediately alter the behavior of administrators, politicians, or residents. While the Brown v. Board of Education decision was legally decided by the Supreme Court ten years earlier, its directive did little to eradicate educational segregation. Locally, the Baltimore city council put forth a fair housing bill 1966 that was soundly defeated. Pietila (2010, p. 175) describes Baltimore during this time of racial transition as a city divided “...there was no common language, no agreement about terminology. What whites condemned as destructive blockbusting, blacks hailed as liberating desegregation, a long-awaited opportunity to move into better housing.” Consequently, neither of the three branches of government or local initiatives were successful in changing the tide of racial discrimination and prejudice. By this time attitudes were hardened and policy implementation remained focused on preserving the status quo.

Racial tension and violence had always been present throughout the history of the United States. However, the 1960s witnessed a volcanic eruption with regard to the number of incidents that had occurred across the country, stemming from a variety of social and political issues that specifically targeted African American citizens. Police brutality, Jim Crow, voter disenfranchisement, and unsanitary community conditions contributed to the explosive reactions of African Americans in cities all across the
country from Baltimore to Watts (Disorders, 1988). In Baltimore since the beginning of the 20th century, Whites encouraged initiatives, programs, and regulations to prohibit African Americans from achieving the ‘American Dream.’ Those conscious decisions and the collective effort of administrative actions and racial prejudice created an environment that marginalized African American opportunity and, subsequently, their access to a better quality of life. Racism’s hostility and pervasiveness forever changed the urban landscape, therefore solidifying and justifying the separation of the races through the concentration of African Americans in deprived and politically vulnerable central cities.

Over time these issues were so pervasive that numerous lawsuits were filed to contest the deplorable conditions of public housing facilities, occupancy requirements, and site selection criteria. In 1966, the Housing Authority of Miami, Florida was challenged on the grounds that it violated the non-discriminatory policy mandated by Executive Order 11063 “Equal Opportunities in Housing” (Gottlieb, 1975). The lawsuit was premised on evidence that approximately 2,600 families, mostly African American, were relocated due to urban renewal and expressway initiatives in Miami. In order to accommodate the families, the Housing Authority built several public housing developments in predominately Black neighborhoods. The lawsuit argues that the Housing Authority used its position to enforce de facto segregation ("Thompson v. Housing Authority of the City of Miami Florida," 1966). According to Gottlieb (1975, p. 27)

The plaintiffs feared that segregation would inevitably result from the construction of public housing units in predominately Negro neighborhoods, since
the applicants (displacees from the county’s urban renewal project) would also be predominately Negro. The court denied an injunction on the grounds that the official policy of the Housing Authority has not always been nondiscriminatory, and that the selection and approval of sites was motivated solely by community needs and was accomplished with full concurrence of Negro representation from the affected neighborhoods.

In Chicago and Bogalusa, Louisiana, lawsuits were filed against the respective Housing Authority after individuals complained they were denied equal protection of the 14th Amendment. In the Gautreaux v. Chicago Housing Authority (CHA) case of 1966, it was decided that the CHA intentionally and unconstitutionally discriminated on the basis of race, in its public housing and tenant assignment procedures in Chicago ("Gautreaux V. Chicago Housing Authority," 1974). CHA’s actions resulted in public housing residents being almost exclusively African American, and these developments were confined to predominately poor and impoverished Black areas. A similar case was made against the Bogalusa Housing Authority (BHA). While the city operated 6 public housing developments, two were located in White communities and the other four were in Black neighborhoods. In contemplating where to build new facilities for a newly dispossessed African American population, Bogalusa officials identified several sites in exclusive Black areas. These actions, therefore, confirmed that segregation was being perpetuated by the BHA. Ultimately, the court decided with the plaintiff. It was decided that location can be associated with discrimination, particularly regarding school and public housing construction, but it does not always mean rights have been violated ("Hicks v. Weaver," 1969). However, without the appropriate explanation, inferences
can be made to support discrimination as a conclusion. These issues further escalated racial tension and the 1960s would witness racial strife as a result.

In inner cities across the country, African Americans were outraged at site selection and occupancy policies, maintenance, and safety of publicly owned facilities. By the late 1960s, public housing carried a negative stigma, particularly as they were primarily concentrated in impoverished central cities and occupied by an overwhelming majority of African Americans. In the case of Baltimore, 95 percent of all low and moderate income rental housing financed by HUD and the FHA was located in the city of Baltimore (Samuels, 2008). This statistic does not include the public housing developments currently in use. Public housing seemed to be the only housing option for local administrators, because single-family homes were not built for Blacks. Therefore, in order to accommodate the growing Black population, BURHA, the Baltimore City Housing Authority, and other city administrators sanctioned the construction of 20 new public housing projects between the years 1970 to 1980. Hence, the complaints and protests did little to modify Baltimore’s long-standing pattern of housing segregation ("Carmen Thompson, et al. v. HUD, et. al," 2003). Ultimately, administrators were unwavering in their approach to support the use of public housing as a viable strategy to ease the housing crisis.

The Evolution of Urban Housing

Since 1940, public housing significantly contributed to the housing stock in central cities by offering low-income families access to affordable homes. Proliferated throughout urban areas across American, public housing became the staple of racial segregation in America. For instance in 1970, HUD Secretary George Romney stated
that federal housing policy was ‘clearly indefensible’ with regard to FHA redlining and contributing to the creation of segregated housing patterns (ACLU, n.d., p. 36). The insidious effects of public housing led to numerous Congressional testimonies before Committees on Equal Education Opportunity, Housing and Community Development, and the U.S. Committee for Civil Rights, to name a few (ACLU, n.d.). The hearings were used to acknowledge the prejudicial treatment of African Americans and the long-standing implications to their quality of personal and communal life. As a result, segregation evolved as an out-growth of long-standing preferences and biases by Whites in America. Unfortunately, the presence of Black bodies in predominately white schools, neighborhoods, and jobs conjured up a variety of misconceptions, stereotypes, and ill-feelings. Ultimately, these conceptions facilitated the creation of barriers to limit African American access into suburban and rural counties throughout Maryland.

Within 20 years, from 1950-1970, 350,804 Whites fled to Baltimore County as a response to the increased African American population in the city. During that same time, African American presence in the counties declined from 6.6 percent to 3.2 percent (Pietila, 2010). Subsequently, this push of African Americans out of the county likely contributed to the influx of African Americans that relocated to the city. By the end of the 1970s, over 40 public housing developments were fully operational (Gottlieb, 1975). As these developments were spread across the city, it became more evident that Baltimore was predominately an African American city. Therefore, as public housing was most often located in central cities, African Americans were the primary occupants in these developments. Ultimately, Blacks were essentially confined to urban areas as the suburbs catered to White affluence. As a result, urban areas were terribly stigmatized
based on the rhetoric and images that depicted public housing and its residents as unworthy and undeserving of the housing accommodations (Parson, 2007). However, despite the uproar related to initiative, the public housing program thrived, because it succeeded as the principal housing option for Blacks.

The policies of the 1970s also changed the focus of urban housing programs. Efforts were not solely concentrated on public housing, but on rehabilitating older homes in neighborhoods throughout the city. Therefore, the ‘scattered site’ program was utilized to address blight and vacancy on the city blocks that were not selected for urban renewal’s complete overhaul. Whereas, urban renewal razed complete communities, the scattered site programs rehabilitated existing structures, which helped ease some of the housing pressures for African Americans. Neighborhoods were not eliminated, but redeveloped, so this program was viewed more favorably than urban renewal programs. Subsequently, Jacobson (2007, p. 14) describes the program as an alternative to ‘project’ living, particularly as close to 2,800 units were renovated. While policy amendments and several court decisions restricted the criteria for where public housing could be located, the same mandates were not outlined in the ‘scattered site’ program. As a result, the Housing Authority of Baltimore City (HABC) used its discretion to rehabilitate homes that were concentrated in largely minority and disaffected communities ("Carmen Thompson, et al. v. HUD, et. al," 2003).

The ‘scattered site’ program offers more evidence that Baltimore officials were clearly focused on maintaining the existing patterns of segregation, particularly as they did not chose to rehabilitate homes outside of impoverished ghetto areas. It is true that any rehabilitation efforts in these communities were helpful, but without consideration
for comprehensive neighborhood development, the overall impact to the community and its residents would be minimal. The new laws enabled officials to seek alternative ways to address the inadequate housing stock that impacted neighborhoods, particularly those in impoverished areas. However, administrators continued to pursue goals that encouraged African American isolation, while leaving their respective communities deprived of necessary resources. For example, CDBG and UDAG funds were provided for the purposes of rebuilding low-income areas, but Baltimore officials continued to divert funds away from these initiatives and promote the interest of commercial developments (Dannes, n.d.). These purposeful actions were counterproductive to the creation of productive and engaging African American communities.

Additionally, data reveals that as the number of African Americans increase in any respective neighborhood, the number of mortgage loans and the amount of funding decreases (Sangree, 2009). Banks and insurance companies consciously alienated Black neighborhoods from funding, which further contributed to the isolation and deterioration of some viable communities. Such practices at the local level were modeled after federal organizations (e.g. FHA and HUD), professional standards (e.g. the National Association of Real Estate Boards), and public opinion (e.g. political discourse) in order to maintain the status quo. Therefore, regardless of the number of housing and community development programs enacted, officials continued their manipulation of the system by creating or utilizing loopholes to divert money away from the areas that need it most. This is evidenced by the Section 8, Hope VI, and the Move to Opportunity (MTO) programs that evolved in the 1980s and 1990s to address the same tattered issues: housing and urban blight. Interestingly enough, Baltimore received hundreds of millions
of dollars to embark on a citywide facelift, but the narrowed preferences of the urban elite resulted in expensive cosmetic enhancements. The comprehensive urban development of the city was marginalized as a result and the social ramifications divided the city by class and race. Collectively, these actions contributed to the steady decline and neglect of impoverished neighborhoods in Baltimore.

Section 8

The Housing Choice Vouchers Program or Section 8 was authorized when the Housing and Community Development Act was passed in 1974. This policy was designed to prohibit discrimination on the basis of race, color, national origin, sex or religion in programs and activities receiving financial assistance from HUD’s Community Development Block Grant Program (CDBG) (Development, 2009). The initiation of the CDBG ended the urban renewal program. Therefore, urban redevelopment would continue, but under new guidelines for implementation and execution. The Community Reinvestment Act of 1977 provided a framework for financial institutions within state and local governments and community organizations to collectively promote banking services to all members of the community (Treasury, n.d.). Finally, the Housing and Community Development Act of 1978 made significant changes to the Community Development Block Grant Program by establishing assistance payments to owners of multi-family projects and extending elderly and handicapped provisions (Development, 2000a). These policies initiated new programs and offered alternatives to housing shortages and urban deterioration.

The federal program also provided subsidized housing to eligible low-income, elderly, and disabled Americans. Initially, the Section 8 program focused on three areas:
New Construction, Substantial Rehabilitation, and Existing Housing Certificate programs. The program was administered by local housing authorities and participants generally contributed 30 percent of their monthly income toward housing, while the rest was subsidized by a government grant (Institute, 2000). In cities across the country, Section 8 represented a program that enabled low-income families to exercise choice with regard to their living accommodations beyond public facilities. Since low-income families were primarily restricted in their residential preferences due to costs, this program allowed people to identify homes in their desired communities and receive financial assistance to help cover expenses. Theoretically, this program was less invasive than building a public housing development in an affluent community, additionally families would not be stigmatized in the same manner.

In Baltimore, the HABC established admissions criteria to determine the eligibility for participation in the Section 8 program. Although federal mandates specifically prohibited discrimination, the HABC limited access to residents in public housing, which overwhelmingly targeted African American families ("Carmen Thompson, et al. v. HUD, et. al," 2003). These actions perpetuated racial discrimination, despite the program's vision of dispersing low-income families into affluent communities throughout the city. The pervasiveness and intent of HABC's actions resulted in a lawsuit being filed against the Department of Housing and Urban Development by Carmen Thompson and several other plaintiffs. The lawsuit alleges that Baltimore's public housing system is "...racially segregated and has been racially segregated since its inception" (ACLU, n.d., p. 1). The ACLU (n.d., p. 1) further concluded
The composition of Baltimore’s public housing is over 97 percent black. The family projects are 97 percent black and the overwhelming majority of them are located in high poverty black neighborhoods. The scattered site program is 98 percent black, and the overwhelming majority of scattered site units are located in high poverty black neighborhoods. And the overwhelming majority of Section 8 voucher users live in high poverty, minority-concentrated neighborhoods.

Although the statistics presented only focus on African Americans, Whites were also deeply afflicted by poverty as well. However, residential restrictions were not placed on Whites with the same fervor as it was with Blacks. Therefore, regardless of a White family’s economic status, they were still preferred over the most prestigious and respected African Americans.

In Miami, the HUD and Metro Dade County faced a class-action lawsuit headed by Ann-Marie Adker. The lawsuit charges that the local and federal housing agencies confined and restricted low-income African Americans to blighted public housing projects, while the more desirable Section 8 housing was directed to non-blacks, particularly Hispanics (Mohl, 2003b). Mohl further suggested that the disparities in Section 8 vouchers awarded to Blacks versus non-blacks in Miami were the result of the racial consequences of second ghetto formation. In other words, African Americans have traditionally been contained in these unsightly and impoverished areas away from mainstream society. Therefore, their integration into mixed or affluent communities was negatively perceived and limited altogether. Ironically, in both cases the programs identified in the lawsuits were created to alleviate poverty, promote desegregation, and improve the quality of life for low-income Americans. However, decades of research has
revealed that these objectives have not been met and actually has increased the prevalence of poverty, segregation, and hopelessness (ACLU, n.d.; Disorders, 1988; Massey & Denton, 1993; Sangree, 2009).

Consequently, the conditions of Baltimore in the 1980s were not very much different than in the 1940s, when calls for redevelopment and revitalization were prominent. Urban renewal projects of the 1950s and 1960s expanded college campuses, enhanced downtown, beautified the Inner Harbor, and constructed many communal and recreation facilities. Although these efforts were situated throughout the city, the projects as a whole were not planned for comprehensive development of the urban space. Urban renewal modified the physical aesthetics of the city, but the social fabric was compromised due to racism and discrimination. In essence, African Americans and their communities were dislocated to accommodate urban renewal and highways, because they were viewed as an impediment to the rehabilitation and reimaging of the city. In the beginning, public housing offered Black families better amenities than what was available in the market. During this time, absentee landlords remained non-compliant with building code regulations, which further exacerbated the number of substandard and inadequate housing in the city. However, as public housing began to deteriorate, and poor communities marginally benefited from housing and urban development programs, it became clear that administrators were clearly negligent in their implementation and execution of public policies. Ultimately, Baltimore administrators used their discretion to sidestep and manipulate policies to promote the physical, commercial, and industrial development of the city at the expense of Blacks and their neighborhoods.
For example, changing from the urban renewal program to the CDBG empowered administrators with more discretion design redevelopment projects. Urban renewal was a categorical grant program that restricted how money was spent, and what it could be used for, whereas the Community Development Block Grants (CDBG) and Urban Development Action Grants (UDAG) programs were block grants that enabled administrators to use funds with more general provisions. The CDBG emphasized using federal funds more effectively, but as Gotham (2001b) notes, the program was faced with two contradictory objectives: on the one hand, CDBG monies were to be used in low- and moderate-income communities, but cities were also encouraged to use CDBG money to stimulate private sector investment. UDAG was a program designed to dispense money to local government to encourage private investment in depressed areas. However, evidence would reveal that cities were awarded funds and used the money to repair streets and provide services to private residential, commercial, and industrial projects that benefitted the wealthy (Gotham, 2001b).

Although designated for underserved neighborhoods, Baltimore officials dedicated CDBG funds to supplement Inner Harbor development. Indeed the CDBG program is structured differently than urban renewal, but the discretion devolved to administrators produced the same results. While both the Section 8 and the CDBG programs represented an opportunity to improve the living and neighborhood conditions that afflicted the poor in central cities. Instead, Section 8 vouchers still concentrated African Americans in minority and highly impoverished areas and diverted significant proportions of CDBG funds from these communities to support commercial and industrial development ("Carmen Thompson, et al. v. HUD, et. al," 2003). From
highway construction to historic preservation to slum clearance, African Americans experienced the worse of redevelopment (unknown, 1977). Therefore, by the 1980s, it is estimated that 94,000 people, most African American, were relocated by urban renewal projects (Pietila, 2010).

**Hope VI**

The 1990s witnessed another wave of housing programs designed to alleviate overcrowding, poverty, violence, and ease racial segregation. Census data reveals that there were 303,706 housing units in Baltimore city, 276,484 were occupied, leaving over 27,000 units vacant 2% by homeowners and 7% by renters (U.S. Census Bureau, 1990). These are staggering numbers, as abandonment and vacancy is dispersed throughout the city. The ‘theory of broken windows’ states that minor forms of public disorder leads to serious crime and a downward spiral of urban decay ensues (Sampson & Raudenbush, 2004). Such dysfunction has always characterized African American communities as resources were intentionally diverted away from these areas toward initiatives that benefit the urban elite. Therefore, despite the number of housing programs that have been enacted, none to date have completely refurbished Black neighborhoods in the city of Baltimore. The ‘scattered site’ program initiated in late 1960s, enabled low-income families to rent a variety of rehabilitated homes throughout the city of Baltimore. As a result, public housing construction slowed considerably after the 1970s. Section 8 proliferated in the 1980s, but still inadequately addressed Baltimore’s housing problem. By the 1990s, a new housing program was introduced by the federal government.

The Urban Revitalization Demonstration or Hope VI program was established in 1992 and was designed to revitalize the Nation’s most severely distressed public housing
By the 1990s, most developments were upwards of 40 years old and were in drastic need of a makeover. Therefore, to qualify to participate in the program, applicants either had to be a Public Housing Authority (PHA) located in one of the 40 most populous US cities or a PHA on HUD’s Troubled Housing Authority list as of March 2001 (Fosburg, Popkin, & Locke, 1996). Applicants had to propose a plan that covered up to 500 units, grants were capped at $50 million, and at least 80 percent of Hope VI funds were to be used for physical improvements such as rehabilitation, reconfiguration, demolition, or development of low-income housing (Fosburg, et al., 1996). This infusion of federal dollars represented an opportunity for cities, specifically Baltimore, to upgrade their deteriorating housing stock. Although public housing was initially a temporary accommodation for war-workers and low-income families, it eventually transitioned into permanent housing for Blacks. Consequently, the quality of construction, routine maintenance, and the overall upkeep of the facilities was severely neglected.

Federal funding was used to essentially rebuild whole communities with better amenities. Lafayette Homes was the first Hope VI project completed in Baltimore. Constructed in 1955, the development consisted of 816 units aggregated over four buildings. In 1998, the entire facility was imploded to make way for the Pleasant View Gardens, a 311 unit public housing project (Jacobson, 2007). Overall 5 public housing sites were redeveloped based on the use of Hope VI funding: Lexington Terrace, Murphy Homes, Julian Gardens, the Broadway, and Flag House Courts (Jacobson, 2007). The result produced a mix of affordable housing for homeownership, low-income rental properties, and less dense public housing facilities. Although these programs greatly
improved the aesthetics of their respective communities, many housing units were demolished as a result. Consequently, the availability of housing for poor families in the city decreased dramatically.

Although beneficial, the massive housing and renewal programs did little to affect widespread blight and abandonment in Black areas, it was similar to placing a bandage on a hemorrhaging wound that had been gushing for decades. African Americans and their communities were an afterthought in the planning of Baltimore, and although the existing outcomes may not have been intended, the cumulative effects were pervasive, damaging, and unrelenting. These programs have represented a catch-22 for Baltimore residents. The promise of quality housing was articulated through federal policies. However, when implementation is left in the hands of local administrators, significant change is rarely witnessed. Subsequently, Baltimore’s housing infrastructure has continued to deteriorate over time despite the constant infusion of federal dollars to help these areas. Decay has been so widespread that it almost seems that no amount of money can rehabilitate these spaces. Housing Commission Paul Graziano estimated that it would cost upwards of $862 million to maintain Baltimore’s public housing inventory in standard condition over the course of seven years (Jacobson, 2007). So what next? It is highly improbable that the HABC can generate that type of funding from federal grants and private investments to upgrade public housing. Therefore, Baltimore’s affordable housing stock will deteriorate further.

Beyond housing, urban redevelopment was still the center of the ‘urban elites’ agenda. With input for the GBC and the Rouse Company, a Baltimore based planning agency, both worked with the city to conceptualize the types of attractions and additions
that were needed to make the Inner Harbor a unique representation of Baltimore. Dannes (n.d.) characterizes the Harbor Project as infill development that incorporated adaptive reuse strategies to maximize capacity of existing structures. Implementation would reveal that redevelopment under this guise would be very expensive. Initial plans were funded by a $2 million bond that was passed by voters. However, a $10 million UDAG was needed before substantial changes and additions could begin (Dannes, n.d.). As discretionary funds, the CDBG and the UDAG enabled Baltimore officials to pour all of those resources into the Inner Harbor development. These flexible funding streams empowered local officials to diversify its revitalization initiatives. Overall $285 million was poured into the Inner Harbor redevelopment from the city, the federal government, and private investors.

The Inner Harbor project underscores the major redevelopment initiatives of the 1970s, but several other projects continued well into the 1980 and 1990s: Baltimore Science Center (1976); World Trade Center and Maryland Port Authority (1977); Harborplace (1980); National Aquarium and Hyatt Regency (1981); IBM Building (1975) and Tower II (1991); Camden Yards (1993); and Raven’s Stadium (1998) (Pike, 1984). Development in the Inner Harbor extended into the proximate communities of downtown. Therefore, the Fells Point, Federal Hill, Canton, and the Johns Hopkins community of Guilford were the primary beneficiaries of commercial development (Dannes, n.d.). Hence, African American communities were set aside and excluded from the type of redevelopment that brought White and ethnic neighborhoods back to life after years of disinvestment and abandonment.
By the turn of the century, Baltimore had changed little with regard to African American housing problems. Thirty-nine public housing developments were in operation. Some facilities were demolished altogether; many were remodeled to decrease the density, still more were constructed (Jacobson, 2007). The overwhelming African American presence opened the opportunity for homeownership. However, Sangree (2009) states that by the 1990s, Baltimore was targeted by predatory lenders. Predatory loans have destroyed viable communities in Baltimore, because homes were foreclosed, property values decreased, and tax revenue declined. Ironically, private actors (e.g. lending institutions) mirrored the actions of local administrators. While both entities focused on profits and economic stability, the social fabric of the community dwindled. Neighborhood infrastructure in Black areas remains inadequate, while the central business district and the Inner Harbor absorb most of the interest, resources, and attention.

Research suggests that the conditions in Baltimore specifically, but among other urban communities make them vulnerable for predatory lending. The Office of Policy and Research Development has conducted a nationwide research initiative to discuss the impact of subprime lending in urban communities. Their analysis reveals that “...subprime lending is more prevalent in lower-income and minority neighborhoods than in higher income and white neighborhoods” due to the likelihood that inner city borrowers are a higher credit risk, which reduces their options to receive prime loans (Development, 2000b, p. 2). Overall in Baltimore, analysis revealed

1) The number of subprime refinance loans originated in Baltimore increased over ten-fold between 1993 and 1999;
2) Subprime loans are seven times more likely in low-income neighborhoods in Baltimore than in upper-income neighborhoods;

3) Subprime loans are six times more likely in predominately black neighborhoods in Baltimore than in white neighborhoods;

4) Homeowners in middle-income predominately black neighborhoods in Baltimore are almost four times as likely as homeowners in middle-income white neighborhoods to have subprime loans;

5) The findings are similar when borrowers (rather than neighborhoods) throughout the Baltimore metropolitan area are examined; and

6) Like the originations, the subprime share of foreclosures is highest in low-income and predominately black neighborhoods (Development, 2000b, pp. 3-4).

Consequently, as Baltimore has become a predominately African American city, the effects of subprime lending are pervasive and threatens the economic feasibility of the city as a whole.

In testimony before the United State House Judiciary Committee Subcommittee on Commercial and Administrative Law, Suzanne Sangree (2009) stated that due to Baltimore’s past of racial segregation, it was vulnerable for predatory lending based on two issues: a history of denying minorities access to credit, and a history of racially segregated living patterns. Redlining and racially restrictive covenants perpetuated patterns of segregation long after legislation and court decisions deemed them unconstitutional. These characteristics, therefore, increased Baltimore’s susceptibility to predatory lending practices. The city of Baltimore suspects that Well Fargo contributed
to the unprecedented number of foreclosures because of their racist lending practices.

Sangree (2009) further argues

In 2006, Wells Fargo made high-cost loans to 65 percent of its African American mortgage customers in Baltimore, but only to 15 percent of its white customers in Baltimore. Wells Fargo’s refinance loans were worse: in 2004, 2005, and 2006, a Wells Fargo refinance loan to an African-American borrower was 2.5 times more likely to be high cost than a refinance loan to a white borrower...equally credit worthy borrowers in predominately African-American neighborhoods pay higher interest rates than their counterparts in white neighborhoods.

The financial, political, and social implications of such blatant discrimination have jeopardized the well-being of neighborhoods and the entire city. Despite the despicable actions of Wells Fargo, the city of Baltimore engaged in racist and inequitable behavior for nearly a century. The difference is that the city of Baltimore and its urban elites were the primary financial benefactors, whereas now it is a private company that has capitalized on African American suffering.

Overall, Baltimore was overburdened by population surges, deindustrialization, and the need to accommodate low-income populations without support from any of the adjacent jurisdictions. The affluent moved out of the city and into the county, therefore, concentrating considerable political power, financial resources, and social capital in the outlying suburbs. Baltimore was poor and Black, while the suburbs were affluent and White – both became racially homogenous spaces. Politics, economics, discretion, and policy contributed to racial separation, the inequitable distribution of resources, and the downward spiral of a city. The decisions made more than 50 years ago have had
tremendous implications on the livelihood of a city. Beyond downtown, communities are fractured and race divides the city more than ever.
CHAPTER V

RESULTS

This chapter presents the findings from the research questions identified in chapter 1. First, an explanation is provided to demonstrate a relationship between the role of government, public policies, and administrative discretion using the timeline and maps. Second, the questions are first re-introduced and addressed specifically. Finally, a summary of findings will conclude the chapter.

The timeline presented in the previous chapter identified the important policy decisions that occurred in the city of Baltimore over the last 160 years. The second entry in the timeline is the US Supreme Court case Dred Scott v. Sanford. In 1857, the US Supreme Court denied Dred Scott his rights as a free man and maintained his condition of servitude. This ruling set a precedent for how African Americans would be treated in American society. Consequently, numerous court cases are highlighted in the timeline to establish a record of civil rights violations against African Americans from all levels of government and both public and private citizens. These collective actions led to numerous policy decisions that disproportionately burdened African Americans, based on White perceptions of unworthiness and inferiority.

All federal and local public housing, urban renewal and community development, and transportation policies are identified in the timeline. This information offers a framework to understand when federal policies were enacted and the lag-time of local implementation via Baltimore administrators. For example, the first public housing legislation was enacted in 1937, and Baltimore opened its first development in 1940, three years after passage. The response to urban renewal happened much quicker. Urban
renewal was officially established as a program when the Housing Act of 1949 was passed by the federal government. Soon thereafter, Baltimore officials were breaking ground only one year later with the small scale Broadway/Area 3-C program. Many renewal programs proliferated thereafter, but the lag-time was minimal between enactment and implementation. It should be noted that both programs had varied stakeholders, unique funding requirements, an aspect of necessity, and different expectations. Despite these differences, most programs were intertwined as part of the broader conception of urban revitalization.

Although specific dates and events are explicitly stated, the timeline only represents one-half of the investigation. GIS maps were generated for this study to offer a visual depiction of African American population migration over time in the city of Baltimore. Therefore, using both sources, offers a descriptive profile of Baltimore from a historic and geographic framework.

**GIS Maps Depict African American Concentration**

The maps highlight the racial and mobility changes experienced in Baltimore over a 60 year time period. The city of Baltimore is the base image represented in all of the maps presented in this study. However, each map is overlaid with a variety of layers (e.g. public housing, urban renewal, transportation) to help explain how specific programs contributed to both population dispersion and concentration. Beginning in 1940, African American concentration is represented on the maps via the various shaded census tracts. Lighter colors represent marginal African American presence, whereas darker shadings represent census tracts with higher concentrations of Blacks. Hence, each decennial census identifies the outmigration of Blacks from the core into broader communities.
within the city. Subsequently, the increased mobility of African Americans resulted in a ‘white flight’ epidemic that eventually shifted the racial demographics of the city making Baltimore majority Black by 2000. Appendix B provides a decade by decade comparison of comprehensive development over time.

As stated earlier in the study, public housing was the first initiative enacted by the federal government to address urban decline. However, its placement, regardless of location attracted (e.g. pull factor) families to public housing facilities, because of the limited access to quality affordable housing for low-income residents in Baltimore. Since its inception, the public housing program has undergone several transformations with regard to funding and occupancy requirements. For example, public housing initially constructed just as many developments for white families as it did for black families up until the 1970s. After that time, the white exodus to the suburbs was fully underway, elderly and disabled residents were in grave need of public assistance, and all while poor Black families continued their tenure in public housing facilities. Consequently, the public housing maps demonstrate the proliferation of the program, but also highlight the demographic (e.g. race, age, and physical ability) changes over time.

The urban renewal and transportation programs represent push factors that contributed to the initial displacement of people off valuable real estate, specifically African Americans. Starting in the 1950s, the urban renewal projects were characterized by massive slum clearance projects that cleared acres upon acres of land. This was the first push factor that purposefully displaced African Americans. For two decades, 1950 and 1960, shapefiles were created to represent the locations of urban renewal projects in the city. Based on BURHA reports, the specific street names that bounded each project
were provided. Therefore, it was possible to accurately depict the size and scope of the project. By the 1970s, the urban renewal program ended and so did the widespread clearance of slum neighborhoods. The focus of officials shifted to the redevelopment of the downtown and Inner Harbor areas. Therefore, from the 1970s to the 1990s, urban renewal is depicted by pushpins that identify specific buildings that were erected under the guise of redevelopment. These structures are centrally located within the downtown and Inner Harbor area.

The construction of highways represents the second push factor that contributed to population movement. In Baltimore, the impact of highway construction was less significant, particularly when compared to a place like Miami, whereby the I-95 interchange displaced over 10,000 Black residents from the Overtown community. Baltimore residents were much more politically astute; therefore, they were able to galvanize a very successful anti-highway lobby that halted the network of roads planned by the urban elite. Whereas, Miami targeted an exclusively Black community, in Baltimore a wider demographic of residents were impacted by highways. As a result, coalitions were created regardless of race and class to lessen the blow of the federal bulldozer on established neighborhoods. The Jones Falls Expressway and the Baltimore Beltway represent the success of a very controversial and highly contested highway program. Other roads were conceived, but never materialized. Therefore, the Jones Falls Expressway is the only major highway that directly penetrates Baltimore’s downtown. Unfortunately, it was never completed and did not extend into the suburbs. The Beltway, on the other hand, remained on the outskirts of the city and all radial roads that were to
connect to the highway from the city were vehemently opposed and ultimately disregarded.

Over 20 maps were generated for the purposes of explaining African American population mobility in Baltimore. Each map is unique in that it represents the respective policy decisions made by Baltimore administrators via public housing site selection and occupancy, urban renewal location, and transportation construction. Consequently, these distinct layers are placed on top of the base Baltimore map to articulate when (e.g. decade) and where (e.g. census tract) programs were initiated with respect to the existing residential locations of African Americans.

**Urban Development’s Impact on African American Mobility**

From 1940 – 2000, racial demographics changed dramatically in the city of Baltimore. The 1940 Census (1941) reported that Baltimore City had 859,100 people and it was designated as the 7th largest urban place in the United States. Further analysis revealed the city was partitioned off into 157 census tracts, of which 19 were exclusively White outside of the downtown area. Such statistics may imply that Blacks were widely dispersed across the city; however, census data reveals African American families were heavily concentrated. Smaller proportions of African Americans were scattered throughout the city, but larger concentrations were established in 37 census tracts -- each with greater than the 4,000 person average established by Census Bureau standards (U.S. Census Bureau, 1941). Overall in 1940s Baltimore, 81-percent of the census tracts had more than the average number of inhabitants within its designated statistical boundaries. As a result, the quality and quantity of housing in Baltimore did not keep pace with the
demand for all races. Overcrowding and deterioration were becoming an impending threat to the stability of Baltimore.

During the 1940s, the racial settlement patterns of the city were being established. Map 1 visually depicts African American concentration in Baltimore and reveals two trends: African Americans initially resided in the densely populated core areas of the city, while the tracts immediately outside of the central business district were exclusively White. The urban core was a common place for new arrivals to settle and get assimilated into city life. Accommodations were plentiful, people were in close proximity to stores and shops, employment and entertainment were nearby. Consequently, being centrally located was a benefit to all Baltimoreans – Black and White, working and middle class – as personal transportation was a luxury at that time. This spatial relationship ended as the need for urban redevelopment took priority, resulting in population shifts that impacted all Baltimoreans – some by choice and others by force.
Public housing was one of the first issues that drastically impacted population movement. The lack of available housing throughout the city pulled poor and immigrant populations into communities, where low-income public facilities were located. The population surge experienced by Baltimore officials led to the construction of a dozen public housing developments throughout the city. The initial developments were racially homogenous and located in racially mixed or exclusively Black neighborhoods. White Baltimoreans rejected all discussions of a majority or exclusively Black public housing development to be constructed in their community. Consequently, the public housing facilities whether for Black or White residents were generally contained within
predominately Black areas. Map 2 identifies the location of each of the 12 public housing facilities that were constructed in the 1940s. Eight developments were located in the core of the city, while 4 were built on the outskirts of the environment. The four facilities built outside of the core initiated the pull of low-income families away from the Baltimore central business district. Collectively, the facilities O'Donnell, Cherry Hill, Brooklyn, and Fairfield added 2,300 units to Baltimore’s housing stock. Although the developments drew thousands of families out toward the perimeter of the city, it did little to ease congestion within the city. As a result, subsequent maps reveal population movement toward those tracts that were built in areas with marginal African American presence.

Map 2: Public Housing by Race

Legend
Racial Occupancy
- Black
- White
Census Tracts
% Black
- less than 10%
- 10% - 25%
- 25% - 50%
- 50% - 75%
- Over 75%

B. Blessett, Old Dominion University, March 9, 2011
By 1950, Baltimore’s population grew by 9-percent as the population surged to 949,708 people (U.S. Census Bureau, 1951). Map 3 highlights the racial changes of the city. Population growth spurred the need for more public housing facilities, and officials responded with the construction of six new developments: Cherry Hill Extensions 1 and 2, Claremont, Lafayette, Flag House, and Lexington Terrace. Cherry Hill was a massive development that provided nearly 1,600 units for low-income families. In a remote location, Cherry Hill contributed to the movement of African Americans toward the southwest perimeter of the city – further demonstrating the pull effect public housing had attracting Blacks into their confines. Whites immediately fled communities where public housing was constructed, while Blacks flocked to those same areas in search for quality residential accommodations. Therefore, mixed census tracts at the center of the city in the 1940s quickly transitioned into racially homogenous communities by the end of the 1950s, as White flight to the suburban periphery ensued. Map 4 is a comprehensive list of public housing through the end of the decade.
Map 3: 1950s African American Concentration

Legend
1950s Census Tracts
% Black
- less than 10%
- 10% - 25%
- 25% - 50%
- 50% - 75%
- Over 75%

B. Blesset, Old Dominion University, March 9, 2011
Decay and deterioration was inevitable, as housing and infrastructure was unable to keep pace with the influx of people moving into the city. These factors were critical to the survival of the central city, but also to the health and well-being of its near one-million residents. Consequently, the Housing Act of 1949 was enacted to help reverse the signs of blight and urban abandonment. The Housing Act extended funding for the construction of more public housing facilities, but also initiated 'slum' clearance in communities throughout the city. By the 1950s, Baltimore officials planned for numerous redevelopment activities, and this study investigates five programs during this decade: Broadway and Area 3-C, a Johns Hopkins University expansion; Charles Center,
downtown redevelopment; Mount Royal Plaza, new community construction; and Waverly, a clearance and redevelopment project. Each project was located in areas identified as severely distressed or 'slums,' which also happened to be spaces with heavy African American concentration. Map 5 pinpoints exactly where renewal occurred in relation to where Blacks resided.

According to reports from BURHA (1964b), the collective projects displaced approximately 2,900 households (88% were African American). Although BURHA provided baseline data for the number of households affected, reports scarcely tracked the movement of displaced families immediately after relocation for all projects. Therefore, it is difficult to make specific inferences of where each displaced family ended up. It is, however, safe to assume that families forcefully displaced by renewal migrated to
adjacent communities due to affordability and convenience or moved into public housing developments, if units were available. By law, Baltimore officials were only required to financially compensate homeowners displaced by renewal. Therefore, all renters had to fend for themselves in order to find replacement housing. BURHA did However, partner with the Housing Authority of Baltimore City (HABC) to make displaced renters priority candidates for public housing openings. Consequently, public housing captured both voluntary and involuntary residents, as the need for quality low-income housing was much greater than the infrastructure Baltimore had available. Map 6 highlights the progress of public housing through the 1950s and the location of the initial urban renewal projects.
On through the 1950s, Baltimore’s population grew substantially, but by the 1960 Census, the population count began to experience a slow and steady descend that continued to present day. In 1961, Census reports noted a slight drop in Baltimore’s population at 939,024 – nearly 11,000 people less than the previous decade (U.S. Census Bureau, 1961). Despite the decline, the city maintained its position as the 6th largest urban place from 1950. Consecutive census reports reveal that African Americans were no longer located in the heart of the city, but were migrating to census tracts immediately adjacent to the core. Additionally, public housing production was steady, so new developments contributed to the ebb and flow of movement.

By the 1960s, the size and presence of the African American population justified the proliferation of public housing developments around the city. In response, Whites began a steady exit from the city proper, as the inability to contain public housing to one central location created friction, when traditionally White communities were within proximity to new developments. Consequently, middle-class families migrated to areas with newer amenities, more space, and less people. Divergence ensued, which divided the city and county along the lines of race, space, and class. Therefore, while middle-class Whites were afforded the luxury of homeownership in the urban periphery, lower income Whites remained in the city and took full advantage of public housing availability. Public housing production from the previous decades yielded just as many developments for White families as there were for African American families. However, despite their economic status, low-income Whites had many more residential options. They could reside in any community of their choice without fear of harassment.
African American residents, on the other hand, did not have the same experiences. Consequently, when housing became available African Americans flocked to those areas. This is demonstrated by the census tract that contained the three Cherry Hill developments. In the 1960 Census, it was the most heavily populated census tract with over 13,000 residents living within its boundaries. Facilitated by clearance and renewal, population movement was inevitable, and public housing captured those most affected — African Americans. Over 20 facilities were fully operational, and all but three housing developments: O’Donnell, Claremont, and the Brooklyn Homes were in locations that had less than 10-percent African American occupancy. Map 7 identifies all public housing facilities by race in Baltimore’s through 1960.

Map 7: Public Housing by Decade

Legend
Racial Occupancy
1940s
- Black
- White
1950s
- Black
- White
- Integrated
1960s
- Black
- White
Census Tracts
% Black
- less than 10%
- 10% - 25%
- 25% - 50%
- 50% - 75%
- Over 75%

B Blessett, Old Dominion University, March 9, 2011
Consequently, African American families were more dispersed than in previous decades. African Americans moved around the city for a variety of reasons: the search for better homes to purchase or rent, the appeal of public housing facilities due to their amenities and cost, forced movement because of public works and utilities programs, and widespread revitalization. Movement was more fluid as the city’s African American population steadily increased. Therefore, prior tactics used to restrict migration, such as intimidation and the use of restrictive covenants were becoming ineffective. In response, Whites moved further out toward the city boarders or into the adjacent county jurisdiction. This pattern of African American dispersion throughout the city and White exodus reinvigorated discussions amongst the urban elite about the necessity of highway construction. Suburbanization shifted economic, political, and social resources out of the central city and into neighboring jurisdictions. Therefore, unless administrators and the urban elite could find a way to facilitate movement from the county into the city, the autonomy and sustainability of Baltimore’s future was in jeopardy. County locales were becoming formidable opponents of the city of Baltimore.

The Interstate Highway System was enacted in 1956, and local administrators skillfully argued that highways were fundamentally important to the economic recovery and long-term stability of Baltimore. The Jones Falls Expressway was conceived in the late 1940s. The completely planned project sought to penetrate downtown and extend into Baltimore County. The Jones Falls corridor displaced thousands of families and destroyed dozens of neighborhoods. The first stretch of road – 5 ½ miles was not completed until 1962. Consequently, multiple phases were added to the Jones Falls Expressway, but various phases of the project experienced significant delays. Therefore,
with a highway plan in place, Baltimore officials again focused on redevelopment. BURHA (1961a) identified several urban renewal projects that would be initiated during the first part of the 1960s: Camden and Shot Tower Industrial Parks, redesigned for commercial and warehousing; Harlem Park, full-scale rehabilitation area; Gay Street, commercial development; and Mount Royal, new neighborhood redevelopment and construction. Map 8 identifies the location of each renewal program mentioned.

Map 9 is an exhaustive representation of the public housing, urban renewal, and transportation programs investigated in this study. Map 9 also reveals that all renewal projects occurred in areas of heavy minority concentration, which disproportionately burdened Blacks with dispossession from primary communities of choice. Population
movement was inevitable. The effects of renewal are revealed in Map 10 as it further illustrates the residential separation of the races. African Americans dispersion throughout the city is much greater when compared to earlier census records, particularly as people migrated to communities in the northwest section of the city. Whites subsequently responded by moving to the east side of the city. Consequently, each decade highlights African American settlement into the next adjacent census tract, and their presence spurred massive exodus by Whites to the hinterland. Baltimore’s population continued to decline to 905,759 – a decrease of almost 30,000 people – and African American’s represented 46-percent of the city’s population (U.S. Census Bureau, 1971).
Although the city’s population was shrinking, the housing disparity of urban residents remained inadequate. To address these consistent disparities, the federal government passed several policies in the 1970s. The Housing and Community Development Act of 1974 initiated the Section 8 program and offered to diversify housing for low-income residents. The Community Reinvestment Act of 1977 encouraged investment into all local communities and the Housing and Community Development Act of 1978 extended public housing provisions to elderly and disabled citizens. Slowed from its initial boom, public housing development was reinvigorated as resources were provided to address the needs of a society’s vulnerable populations. In response BURHA and HABC partnered to construct 5 public housing projects before the end of the decade, bringing the total inventory to 42 facilities. Map 11 identifies only the
public housing developments that were built in the 1970s. Comprehensive public housing is depicted in Map 12.
Additionally, the new federal programs enabled Baltimore administrators the ability to re-route funds designated for underserved communities into downtown and Inner Harbor development to service the needs of the urban elite. While the central business district was mostly cleared of its slums, downtown development consisted of erecting office buildings, shops, restaurants, and parking lots to meet the demands of the growing businesses and tourism. Charles Center was the first office complex to be built in Baltimore. However, by the end of the 1970s, numerous companies were venturing into the city: IBM, the World Trade Center, and the Maryland Port Authority maintained major headquarters in Baltimore. Map 13 highlights the centralized focus of development in the 1970s. The revitalization of Baltimore’s core was the primary focus of administrators, to the detriment of full-scale neighborhood rehabilitation throughout
the city. Hence, despite their purpose CDBG and UDAG resources repaired only the communities within the immediate vicinity of downtown projects: Fells Point, Federal Hill, and Guilford, near Johns Hopkins University (e.g. highlighted in the map by the pushpins).

By the end of the decade, the urban renewal program officially ended and provisions of the IHS of 1956 stated that all roads not built by 1972 would not be eligible for the 90-percent government construction subsidy. Additionally, public housing production slowed after the 1970s, adding only 5 facilities for the elderly and disabled. As a result, redevelopment would not resemble the full-scale projects of the early 1950s and 1960s, but included part and parcel additions to the Harbor, downtown businesses,
and some home rehabilitation scattered throughout the city. The 1980 Census (1981) reported 30 years of population decline in Baltimore at 786,741 people. Map 14 provides an overview of population movement in Baltimore and the massive dispersion of African Americans throughout the city. Consequently, the map also highlights the shift of exclusively White neighborhoods to opposite sides of the city. Essentially, the widespread accessibility of Blacks in communities throughout the city resulted in the purposeful isolation of Whites in select neighborhoods in the city of Baltimore.

Maps 15 and 16 provide a comprehensive view of public housing in Baltimore and downtown revitalization projects in the 1980s respectively. Harborplace officially opened in 1980 and represented the newest economic development opportunity for the
city – tourism. The National Aquarium, the Hyatt Regency, and the Rouse’s Gallery at Harborplace were all attractions that drew thousands of visitors to the area. In this respect, Baltimore was emerging from financial vulnerability with regard to the ability to generate long-term revenues. However, the final piece of the puzzle, the interconnected highways envisioned by Baltimore administrators never materialized. The last leg of the Jones Falls Expressway was completed in 1982, adding only several miles of road – never reaching Baltimore County. Despite this small defeat, administrators were successful in the comprehensive facelift of the central business district in Baltimore. African Americans were forcefully displaced from the downtown area; consequently, their removal led to the construction of new office buildings and facilitated traffic into downtown via the Jones Falls Expressway.
Map 15: Comprehensive Public Housing

Legend

- 1940s Public Housing
- 1950s Public Housing
- 1960s Public Housing
- 1970s Public Housing
- 1980s Public Housing

Census Tracts

% Black

- less than 10%
- 10% - 25%
- 25% - 50%
- 50% - 75%
- Over 75%

B Blessett, Old Dominion University, March 9, 2011
By the end of the decade, the oldest public housing developments were almost 50 years old. In response, a demolition and redevelopment plan was coordinated by BURHA and HABC for the 48 existing facilities. In the 1993, the Hope VI program was enacted to raze substandard public housing facilities and created a variety of mixed-use communities. HABC identified several developments that could benefit from the program. Map 17 is a depiction of all public housing developments based on their rehabilitated status through the 1990s. Lafayette Homes was the first facility to be demolished and redesigned as Pleasant View Gardens in 1995 as a result of Hope VI funding. Eight facilities were significantly rehabilitated into mixed-use spaces, and five units were leveled completely. The rest of the housing inventory consisted of 42
developments – each at various ages and stages of redevelopment. Eight facilities underwent extensive rehabilitation, and 17 were constructed in the 1970s and 1980s for elderly and disabled citizens, and the final 17 were designated as family developments. Additionally, the 'scattered site' program at its peak added over 2,800 units of affordable housing to low-income residents in the city (Jacobson, 2007). However, by 1992, vandalism and poor management left over 400 properties vacant, which greatly contributed to abandonment and disorder in many of these communities.

Map 17: 1990s Rehabilitated Public Housing

Legend
Public Housing
- Demolition
- Elderly
- Family
- Hope VI
- Mixed-use
Census Tracts
% Black
- less than 10%
- 10% 25%
- 25% 50%
- 50% - 75%
- Over 75%

Poor neighborhoods continued to struggle in Baltimore, but the resurgence of downtown was reaching its peak. In the early 1991, IBM added a second tower to their headquarters in the central business district. Subsequently, the urban elite were able to
generate significant revenues for the construction of two ball parks in the heart of
downtown: Camden Yards for the Baltimore Orioles in 1993 and the Baltimore Ravens
Stadium was completed in 1998. Map 18 pinpoints the locations of each place. Map 19
highlights all of the urban renewal projects that have occurred since the 1950s. The maps
over time reveal the effects of urban renewal on African American population movement.
The centralized location of redevelopment forcefully and purposefully pushed African
Americans away from reinvestment areas. As a result, proximate communities absorbed
African American influx and forced the widening of the cast net, which successfully
contained African Americans to the core of the city – over time African Americans
ventured into the next outermost circle.
At the turn of the century, Baltimore’s population was recorded at 651,154 people – a 31-percent decline from 1940. Sixty-four percent of Baltimore’s population was African American. Racial demographics in the city teetered near a 50-50 split between African Americans and Whites, but changes over time facilitated the evolution of a predominately Black city. Even at this time, the Latino and Asian populations were marginal – approximately 2-percent (U.S Census Bureau, 2008). Table 3 provides a racial breakdown of the counties in the state of Maryland and reveals Baltimore city and Prince George’s County as the only jurisdictions in Maryland with an African American majority. This is an interesting statistic, because Prince George’s County borders Washington DC, which is 60-percent African American (U.S. Census Bureau, 2000). Therefore, African Americans are largely concentrated in urban communities, while
Whites are more dispersed throughout the state. These racial and economic differences have contributed to the disparity of experiences, access, and opportunity between African Americans and Whites in the United States.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>County</th>
<th>Total Population</th>
<th>Total White</th>
<th>Percent White</th>
<th>Total Black</th>
<th>Percent Black</th>
<th>Median Household Income</th>
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<tr>
<td>Allegany</td>
<td>74,930</td>
<td>69,702</td>
<td>93%</td>
<td>4,006</td>
<td>5%</td>
<td>$30,821</td>
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<td>Ann Arundel</td>
<td>489,656</td>
<td>397,789</td>
<td>81%</td>
<td>66,428</td>
<td>14%</td>
<td>$61,768</td>
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<tr>
<td>Baltimore County</td>
<td>754,292</td>
<td>561,132</td>
<td>75%</td>
<td>151,600</td>
<td>20%</td>
<td>$50,667</td>
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<tr>
<td>Baltimore City</td>
<td>651,154</td>
<td>205,982</td>
<td>32%</td>
<td>418,951</td>
<td>64%</td>
<td>$30,078</td>
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<td>Calvert</td>
<td>74,563</td>
<td>62,578</td>
<td>84%</td>
<td>9,773</td>
<td>13%</td>
<td>$65,945</td>
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<tr>
<td>Caroline</td>
<td>29,772</td>
<td>24,322</td>
<td>82%</td>
<td>4,398</td>
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<td>$38,832</td>
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<tr>
<td>Carroll</td>
<td>150,897</td>
<td>144,399</td>
<td>96%</td>
<td>3,433</td>
<td>2%</td>
<td>$60,021</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cecil</td>
<td>85,951</td>
<td>80,272</td>
<td>93%</td>
<td>3,361</td>
<td>4%</td>
<td>$50,510</td>
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<tr>
<td>Charles</td>
<td>120,546</td>
<td>82,587</td>
<td>69%</td>
<td>31,411</td>
<td>26%</td>
<td>$62,199</td>
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<tr>
<td>Dorchester</td>
<td>30,674</td>
<td>21,302</td>
<td>69%</td>
<td>8,708</td>
<td>28%</td>
<td>$34,077</td>
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<td>Frederick</td>
<td>195,277</td>
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<td>12,429</td>
<td>6%</td>
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<tr>
<td>Garrett</td>
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<td>29,496</td>
<td>99%</td>
<td>128</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>$32,238</td>
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<tr>
<td>Harford</td>
<td>218,590</td>
<td>189,678</td>
<td>87%</td>
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<td>$57,234</td>
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<tr>
<td>Howard</td>
<td>247,842</td>
<td>184,215</td>
<td>74%</td>
<td>35,730</td>
<td>14%</td>
<td>$74,167</td>
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<tr>
<td>Kent</td>
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<td>15,288</td>
<td>80%</td>
<td>3,343</td>
<td>17%</td>
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<td>Montgomery</td>
<td>873,341</td>
<td>565,719</td>
<td>65%</td>
<td>132,256</td>
<td>15%</td>
<td>$71,551</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Prince George</td>
<td>801,515</td>
<td>216,729</td>
<td>27%</td>
<td>502,550</td>
<td>63%</td>
<td>$55,256</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Queen Anne</td>
<td>40,563</td>
<td>36,120</td>
<td>89%</td>
<td>3,560</td>
<td>9%</td>
<td>$57,037</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Saint Mary</td>
<td>86,211</td>
<td>70,320</td>
<td>82%</td>
<td>12,003</td>
<td>14%</td>
<td>$54,706</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Somerset</td>
<td>24,747</td>
<td>13,949</td>
<td>56%</td>
<td>10,172</td>
<td>41%</td>
<td>$29,903</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Talbot</td>
<td>33,812</td>
<td>27,720</td>
<td>82%</td>
<td>5,193</td>
<td>15%</td>
<td>$43,532</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Washington</td>
<td>131,923</td>
<td>118,348</td>
<td>90%</td>
<td>10,247</td>
<td>8%</td>
<td>$40,617</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wicomico</td>
<td>84,644</td>
<td>61,438</td>
<td>73%</td>
<td>19,717</td>
<td>23%</td>
<td>$39,035</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Worcester</td>
<td>46,543</td>
<td>37,791</td>
<td>81%</td>
<td>7,754</td>
<td>17%</td>
<td>$40,659</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Washington DC</td>
<td>572,059</td>
<td>176,101</td>
<td>.30%</td>
<td>343,312</td>
<td>60%</td>
<td>$40,127</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Families attempted to find accommodations around the city and entered into neighborhoods previously occupied by White residents. Whites, therefore, responded by moving to areas with a minimal presence of African Americans near the perimeter of the city. This cycle continued until the African American population was both dispersed throughout the city, but also contained within its borders. Whites fled to the neighboring counties, and African Americans remained clustered together in and within proximity to urban jurisdictions. Map 20 depicts the racial turnover of Baltimore in 2000. By this time, the city was 60-percent African Americans, while the surrounding counties maintained marginal populations.
Map 21 represents the mean center of African American population movement. The mean center represents the balance point of the population, both north-south and east-west (U.S. Census Bureau & Commerce, 2001). Map 21 reveals the mean center population for each of the 7 decades under investigation for this study. When looking at the map, the dot representing 1940 is located within the proximity of downtown and the central business district. Consequently, each subsequent decade, the mean population center for African Americans shifted away from Baltimore’s core. Between the years 1940 to 1960, African American migration was relatively contained within the immediate vicinity just outside of the downtown area. However, by 1970, the distance between points widened, whereby much of the Black population had moved into other communities within the city. White flight was in full swing by the 1970s, Black Baltimoreans gained access to most of the housing throughout the city. Neighborhoods that were once exclusively white quickly transitioned to racially or ethnically mixed areas. Therefore, minorities became the majority within the city of Baltimore and probably for the first time were able to exercise their residential preferences with regard to desired neighborhood location.
The experiences of Baltimore are not unique with regard to the effects race, policy, and administrative discretion. Suburbanization and deindustrialization crippled urban communities across the country. Therefore, urban leaders were eager to pursue initiatives that enabled them to regain their competitive edge. Urban renewal and highway construction were viable options offered the cities to revitalize their respective jurisdictions with considerable financial assistance from the federal government. However, the complacency with which administrators considered issues of race, discrimination, and segregation have contributed to a variety of social ills that continue to plague Baltimore and other urban communities like it. The maps generated for this investigation offer evidence that there is a relationship between policy decisions made by local administrators and the mobility patterns of African Americans.
Dispersion or Re-segregation: Baltimore and the Making of the Second Ghetto?

The data provided from the previous chapter enabled the researcher to answer the research questions posed in chapter 1.

**Question 1:** What role did public policy play in directing the mobility patterns of African Americans in urban communities?

Since the 1940 Census, the African American population migrated out from Baltimore’s downtown area. This outward migration can be attributed to several factors. First, federal laws and agencies were created to address unemployment, substandard housing, deteriorating infrastructure, and social unrest. However, despite the tremendous resources provided to revitalize the physical characteristics of cities, racial disparities were exacerbated – hence, the focus was quantity, not quality of life for African Americans. Consequently, local governments focused on quantitative measures to determine the success of urban redevelopment, such as the number of housing developments constructed, potential return on investment from urban renewal projects, and the financial impact of highway development on long-term sustainability. The Federal Housing Administration and the Department of Housing and Urban Development were the parent agencies that devolved money, power, and resources to localities based on individualized plans of action. Therefore, programmatic oversight was indirectly managed, and compliance with regard to implementing the ‘intent’ of the legislation was gravely misconstrued.

Public housing, urban renewal, and transportation policies empowered administrators to purposefully dispossess African Americans. Agency administrators at BURHA and the HABC used these programs to fulfill the racial preferences of the urban
elite – remove African Americans from downtown and segregate them into isolated communities. For example, the public housing program started out as an affordable housing option for all low-income families regardless of race. However, by the end of the 1960s, public housing almost became an exclusively Black program. Low-income Whites had greater residential options than African Americans, so when such opportunities presented themselves, White families left public housing altogether.

Urban renewal was also a very powerful program that drastically impacted African American mobility. The program evolved in response to urban decay, however, these were the very same communities inhabited by African Americans. Racism and discrimination limited economic self-actualization for large proportions of African Americans as jobs paid minimum wages. Hence, the economic constraints placed on African Americans, by society, limited their social and political legitimacy. The spiral effect of marginalization began as African Americans were heavily concentrated in the worse neighborhoods in the city. This significantly contributed to urban decline, especially during the 1940s and 1950s when Baltimore saw its largest population surges. Consequently, urban renewal devastated existing Black communities, even as stable working-class neighborhoods were never considered for rehabilitation and were instead razed completely.

Highways were also used to facilitate the racial preferences in many cities, but in Baltimore, stopping the practice was moderately successful. Numerous civic groups and neighborhood associations joined forces and created a powerful anti-highway lobby that defeated most of the proposals to build networks of roads in and around Baltimore. The issue of highway construction was one issue that enabled citizens of all races, ethnicities,
and economic classes to band together to limit the destruction of their respective communities and institutions. Ultimately, each policy represented an opportunity to tackle pressing issues within society. However, vague language, limited federal oversight, and an unwillingness to distribute sanctions to noncompliant localities demonstrate the complicit role of the federal government to ineffectively address racial disparities.

Question 2: How did administrative actions contribute to African American mobility?

During the timeframe for this study, administrative actions were focused on the overall redevelopment of the city. In the case of African Americans, the adverse policy outcomes that disproportionately burdened them were the residual effects of decisions made by administrators. Administrators worked within the framework of an elite urban society. In other words, urban businesses were in jeopardy of leaving the central city altogether. Therefore, as large contributors to the tax revenues, administrators needed to make decisions that would not only maintain existing businesses, but develop a plan that would attract investment in the future as well. Prior to the Housing Act of 1949 being passed, the central business district had fallen victim to crumbling and inadequate infrastructure, overcrowding and decay, and became residence to large proportions of African Americans. All of these factors proved to be detrimental to the re-imaging and revitalization efforts in the city. Buildings needed to either be rehabilitated or demolished, and quality residential dwellings were needed to accommodate low-income and working-class families to disperse populations into other parts of the city – away from downtown. Consequently, public opinion supported the redevelopment effort,
particularly urban renewal, which was known as the slum clearance program. Unfortunately, for African Americans they overwhelmingly inhabited these impoverished and declining neighborhoods.

The urban redevelopment policies mentioned in this study devolved a significant amount of responsibility to local administrators. Public housing policies enabled administrators to select sites for housing facilities. It should be noted that in the site identification stage of the initial developments in 1940s, administrators actively sought to locate public housing facilities in communities across the city. However, it was immediately realized that locating Black public housing in or near existing White communities stirred racial tensions. Hence, after several attempts, boisterous protests, and significant delays to construction, administrators began to build Black public housing in majority-Black census tracts and White public housing in either White or mixed tracts. In other words, the location of public housing initially determined the race of its occupants. While it was easier to build public housing for Whites in any neighborhood; Black developments could only be erected in exclusively African American areas. Locating Black public housing in largely minority areas contributed to the stigma of these spaces and its residents. Additionally, homeownership was restricted due to a variety of discriminatory practices (e.g. redlining and restrictive covenants), and public housing essentially became the only quality housing option for African Americans in the city. Public housing essentially served two purposes: it provided affordable housing to low-income families in the city, and it also fulfilled racial preferences of the urban elite, as African Americans public housing was concentrated in areas away from the central business district.
Urban renewal projects were often needed in areas with the greatest abandonment and decay – spaces inhabited by African Americans. The sheer size and depth of deterioration made it necessary that local administrators have enough authority to accumulate large parcels of land for comprehensive clearance projects. Therefore, urban renewal legislation granted Baltimore officials the power to use eminent domain to obtain occupied land, raze it, and transfer it to a third-party for development at marginal costs. Administrators had the authority to designate a neighborhood as a slum, which made the area eligible for clearance initiatives. African Americans were, therefore, excessively burdened by renewal, resulting in widespread dislocation.

Unfortunately, the presence of African Americans became directly related to crime, disorder, and disinvestment. This perception created a self-fulfilling prophecy, because African American entry into an area generated panic that preceded a variety of irrational actions. Officials specifically limited city services, where African Americans relocated, greatly contributing to neighborhood decline (Pietila, 2010). White homeowners often undersold their homes to blockbusters who in return made exorbitant profits as they offered Blacks their first chances at homeownership (Massey & Denton, 1993; D. Wilson, 2007; W. J. Wilson, 2009). Consequently, these collective actions led to drastic declines in property values, in response to the presence of African Americans and further justified their indiscriminate dispossession and isolation.

As stated earlier, transportation policy did not have the full-scale impact in Baltimore, as it did in other cities. For example, the Rosemont neighborhood had a stable Black community (e.g. 72-percent were homeowners, as compared to the city average of about 55-percent), but a condemnation ordinance was passed to accommodate highway
construction (Haeuber, 1974). In response, the Bureau of the Public Roads – now the Federal Highway Administration – requested Baltimore Concept Team to identify six alternate routes, ultimately delaying and destroying the construction plan (Haeuber, 1974). However, the fight unnerved many families, as nearly half left in anticipation of a city victory, leaving the community absent of its original residents. However, despite the success or failure of these programs, in Baltimore these issues were also used to promote a racial agenda that marginalized African Americans socially, politically, and economically.

Question 3: Were African Americans re-segregated into specific neighborhoods as suggested by the second ghetto thesis?

Arnold Hirsch’s second ghetto thesis provides a unique framework to study the factors that impacted African American mobility in urban communities. Hirsch performed a case study on Chicago from 1940 – 1960, the time period he designates as the era of ghetto development. He focuses specifically on housing and community development policies, as they were the relevant issues in Chicago at that time. While Chicago experienced many of the same social ills as other urban cities, local administrators and urban business leaders had the advantage of informing state legislators of ways to improve the economic conditions of central cities. Consequently, it is this relationship between public and private actors at the city and local levels that contributed to the re-segregation of African Americans in impoverished second ghetto communities.

Using his theory, this study investigated the factors that affected African American mobility in Baltimore, with regard to public housing, urban renewal, and transportation policies. Additionally, spatial analysis was used to identify the original
settlement locations of African Americans, highlight policy decisions, and track their respective impact on Black mobility. Therefore, based on the analysis conducted in this study, it is safe to assume that African Americans were purposefully contained in specific communities in Baltimore, with the aid of public housing. In Baltimore, public housing became ‘the’ housing option for blacks, as homeownership was limited due to racism, racial steering, or the lack of economic resources. Subsequently, protests by Whites limited public housing construction to exclusively Black areas, ultimately reinforcing racial and economic segregation.

By the 1970s, the effects of ‘white flight’ were noticeable, as a larger distribution of African Americans spread across wider sections of the city. The tactics used to restrict Black movement were insignificant without a White population to pursue such initiatives. Therefore, African American dispersion ensued in the city of Baltimore, which eventually resulted in Blacks becoming majority residents by 2000. Urban redevelopment policies essentially initiated two waves of racial and economic segregation. First public housing drew low-income families into their confines, as they were quality dwellings at an affordable price. Dilapidated structures characterized Baltimore’s housing stock at the start of the public housing program; therefore, the program became a necessity and was widely popular with low-income residents that had few other options. However, the restrictions placed on where African American developments could be built reinforced racial residential patterns. Consequently, African Americans were purposefully concentrated in second ghetto communities.

Second, urban renewal and transportation policies displaced thousands of residents in Baltimore. As a result, families migrated to adjacent neighborhoods to find
housing. Since majorities of the dispossessed were African Americans concentrated in the core of the city, their migration into predominately White communities was met with protest, fear, intimidation, violence, and ultimately mass exodus. Therefore, urban policies are indirectly responsible for the changing racial dynamics in cities, as Whites fled to distance themselves from Blacks. Suburbanization facilitated the transition from moving to Baltimore’s perimeter neighborhoods to relocating to suburban counties altogether. African Americans simply shuffled into the communities once occupied by Whites. These migration patterns have led to the second wave of racial and economic segregation between the White affluent suburbs and the African American working-class city.

Finally, when investigating 6 decennial census reports, the long-term impacts of urban development on African American mobility are revealed. Public policies provided resources and authority to administrators. Public opinion justified the marginalization and disenfranchisement of African Americans, based on their inferior status as American citizens. Therefore, these collective actions triggered a series of population shifts that changed the racial and economic demographics of both cities and counties in Maryland. Hirsch, initially suggested that housing and renewal policies contributed to the making of the second ghetto. Longitudinal analysis of Baltimore census data reveals that second ghetto neighborhoods transitioned into second ghetto cities by the end of 2000.
This investigation uncovered a legacy of willful neglect by public administrators toward African Americans and their communities in the city of Baltimore. Focusing specifically on three prominent national policies: the Housing Acts of 1937 and 1949 and the Interstate Highway System of 1956, this study sought to understand the relationship between urban redevelopment, administrative discretion, and African American mobility. Broadly speaking, policies represent a framework for achieving the desired goals and objectives for any given societal issue. Although devolved from the federal or state government, the interpretation and execution of public policies is strictly the responsibility of public administrators. Therefore, due to the vaguely articulated and inconclusive language used in the laws investigated in this study, administrators were empowered to manipulate the process in order to achieve very defined and self-interested objectives. Several strategies enabled administrators to marginalize African Americans, while promoting urban development, such as the ability to site public housing, accumulate land, and route highways. In return, local administrators used their authority to fulfill the racial preferences of White society and the urban elite. Collectively, these actions contributed to the forceful displacement and re-segregation of African Americans in urban communities. However, before discussing the impact of these actions, it is imperative to conceptualize the environment that contributed to the marginalization of African Americans.

The Emancipation Proclamation was signed by Abraham Lincoln in 1862. A few years later, the United States government passed the Civil Rights Act of 1866. This act
officially declared that all people born in the U.S. were citizens, regardless of race, color, or prior condition (Educational, n.d.). Under this law, all citizens were given the right to purchase, lease, sell, hold, and convey real and personal property (Educational, n.d.). These conditions were designed to outlaw discrimination and enable all citizens the freedom to pursue life, liberty, and happiness. Seven other Civil Rights Acts were passed over the years, and each law attempted to alleviate some form of violence, discrimination or lack of access imposed on minority groups, but particularly African Americans. However, despite the formal authority of federal legislation, African Americans and other minority groups were restricted from a variety of public, social, political, and economic opportunities. Over the next 150 years, numerous laws were enacted but not enforced, particularly as it relates to the well-being and quality of life of African American populations and their communities. Government's inability or unwillingness to demand compliance demonstrates their complicit acceptance of a racial and economic hierarchy that helped define the 20th century in America.

In Baltimore, the policies mentioned were significantly important in its resurrection as deterioration, suburbanization, and deindustrialization were fundamentally changing the demographics of the urban population. Initially, the policy decisions made by local administrators were unforeseen. Crumbling infrastructure, population overcrowding, and social unrest required administrators to respond in ways to ensure the vitality and sustainability of Baltimore. Public housing added needed structures to an inadequate housing stock. Urban renewal gave central cities the power and resources to engage in widespread redevelopment. Highways, on the other hand, were viewed as the key to economic stability. It provided a means for interstate commerce, promoted safety
and security for daily automobile travel, and helped ease unemployment during the recession. However, despite the abundance of benefits these programs offered to society at-large, pursuit of these initiatives marginalized African Americans spatially and economically as they were overburdened by dispossession, relocation, and segregation – initially in public housing but ultimately in central cities.

Unlike the segregation theories mentioned earlier in this study (e.g. ecological theory, place stratification, and the social distance premise), whereby groups selectively distance themselves from undesirable people and places, African Americans were unable to exercise residential preference, because their social and economic status restricted movement outside of predetermined neighborhoods. Either through the use of formal policies (e.g. the Baltimore idea) or informal agreements (e.g. restrictive covenants and deed restrictions) African Americans were purposefully denied access to better housing accommodations. Hence, although the marginalization of African Americans was never explicitly stated by administrators in citywide memos or reported across the local papers, the history of urban redevelopment in the United States reveals a different picture. The policies investigated were groundbreaking pieces of legislation that changed the mindset of how government addressed social problems (e.g. housing, unemployment, the Depression); created a direct relationship between federal and local governments; and engaged with the business community in unprecedented ways to address the blight and disinvestment of urban communities.

Therefore, the experiments and interactions were new and the long-term outcomes were unknown. However, when becoming fully aware of the harmful effects public housing, urban renewal, and transportation policies had on African Americans and their
respective communities, administrators continued with a ‘business-as-usual’ mentality ("Carmen Thompson, et al. v. HUD, et. al," 2003). Consequently, the short-term outcomes for African Americans resulted in families residing in substandard dwellings, trying to combat overcrowding and minimizing health and sanitation issues. The long-term implications, on the other hand, resulted in communities that were racially and economically isolated from mainstream society. Therefore, African American residents and impoverished urban communities became heavily stigmatized. Despite the Constitutional tenants of freedom and equality, African Americans were deemed as second-class citizens. This status influenced the mindset of most White Americans, which limited the impact of Blacks to laborers, domestic aides, and field hands, but not as citizens worthy of respect and opportunity.

The Kerner Report (1968, pp. 215-216) reveals the horrific conditions Blacks faced stating

By the 20th century, the Negro was at the bottom of American society. Disenfranchised, Negroes throughout the country were excluded by employers and labor unions from white collar jobs and skilled trades. Jim Crow laws and farm tenancy characterized Negro existence in the South. About 100 lynchings occurred every year in the 1880’s and 1890’s; there were 161 lynchings in 1892. As increasing numbers of Negroes migrated to Northern cities, race riots became commonplace.

Baltimore, specifically, sought to disenfranchise African Americans from the right to vote. Those cities that did not enact laws used violence and intimidation tactics to keep ‘Blacks in their place.’ During that era, African Americans were confined to specific
roles in employment, in residence, and within the broader society. Public opinion dictated the actions of politicians, administrators, and citizens. Collectively, these actions justified the disparate treatment of Blacks in American society. As a result, the living conditions, educational and employment opportunities, interactions with the criminal justice system, morbidity and mortality, and the political participation of African Americans is grossly insufficient, when compared to Whites or other ethnic groups that have immigrated to this country.

Although racism initially dictated the negative treatment of Blacks, the influx of federal resources into urban communities changed the conversation. Consequently, skin color became a residual issue, as central cities focused on economic pursuits to maintain autonomy, attract investors, and remain viable jurisdictions. Over time, money, not race, dictated how African Americans were treated, particularly as their proximity to downtowns and central business districts limited the investment potential of those areas. The marginalization of African American people and spaces was facilitated by all levels of government, and its effects continue to impact the sustainability of urban communities around the country. Using reports, city memos, administrative correspondence, newsletters, newspapers, and census data, this study examined the era, when these policies were being formulated and executed from 1940-2000 in the city of Baltimore.

The maps generated offer evidence to support the forceful dispossession of African Americans off prime real-estate. First, the initial maps reveal a concentrated cohort of African American residents near the downtown area. Public housing layers initiated a story of population movement, as residential facilities attracted families to their facilities based on amenities, cost, and convenience. Additionally, as
homeownership opportunities were almost nonexistent for African Americans, public housing was the best option available for low-income families. Maps 2, 4, 7, 11, 12, 15, and 17 provide an overview of African American concentration population and public housing in Baltimore. By the 1970s, public housing was no longer identified as either Black or White, but as family or elderly. The racial distinctions had vanished, as working-class Whites were able move more fluidly throughout the city and into county. As a result, public housing became an almost exclusively African American institution in Baltimore.

Maps 5, 8, 9, 13, 16, and 19 specifically highlight where urban renewal and highway construction occurred in the city of Baltimore through the 1990s. The earlier projects were initiated in heavily concentrated African American neighborhoods, which facilitated massive dispossess and relocation. These initial projects in the 1950s and 1960s were full-scale slum clearance projects, whereby whole neighborhoods were razed to accommodate development. This created a response that pushed African Americans out from their initial communities in the city center and into the broader urban community. White residents subsequently relocated to the next perimeter neighborhood or out of the jurisdiction altogether. Widespread population movement can be attributed to African Americans being heavily concentrated in impoverished communities. Therefore, as the federal bulldozer moved in, Blacks moved out and into other parts of the city. White responded by fleeing those neighborhoods completely.

Hence, each decennial census thereafter shows that populations have moved outward in response to urban redevelopment. Therefore, when examining the respective public housing and urban renewal maps, a relationship can be identified with regard to
the location of specific programs, and their ability to attract or dispossess populations. Public housing captured residents, while urban renewal and highways displaced them. This combination of events led to the widespread spatial and social re-organization of central cities. Although these policies were enacted over 50 years ago, their effects have been detrimental to the social well-being of Baltimore residents. The median income for the city of Baltimore is $35,438 – $26,438 below Maryland’s average. Additionally, 18.8-percent of families in Baltimore live below the poverty line, while the number is significantly less in Maryland at 6.1-percent, and slightly higher with a national average at 9.2-percent. Consequently, Baltimore has been economically isolated and overburdened with addressing the needs of poor and vulnerable populations (e.g. the elderly and disabled).

The findings of this study, as generated by a documents review of various reports, newspaper articles, newsletters, and census data demonstrate a relationship between the role of government, public policies, and administrative discretion. The documents were used to understand the context of the environment during the time of policy enactment. Racial tension has always existed in American society. Although the federal government has enacted laws to prevent discrimination, other techniques have emerged to marginalize and subjugate African Americans. For examples, FHA mandated that realtors do not introduce ‘adverse influences’ into stable and racially homogenous neighborhoods. Subsequently, HUD officials failed to sanction local public housing officials for the disrepair of the public housing stock in the 1980s and 1990s. HUD acknowledged wrongdoing on behalf of the city of Baltimore, but did not penalize HABC for failure to comply, when occupancy requirements for the ‘scattered site’ project revealed that 95-
percent of the units were in census tracts, that were at least 88-percent minority ("Carmen Thompson, et al. v. HUD, et. al," 2003).

The federal government established the tone for how African Americans were to be treated in the United States. Although policies were enacted, enforcement and oversight were secondary concerns. In response, private actors and local administrators pursued objectives that fulfilled their financial desires of profit, investment, and expansion, while African Americans were objectified as elements to be disregarded. African Americans were viewed as impediments to the physical restructuring of the city, so their presence needed to be completely eliminated from the area. Therefore, with unprecedented discretion, administrators were able to manipulate the policy strategies (e.g. eminent domain, site and occupancy requirements), to fulfill the racial desires of the urban elite. This essentially started the push-pull tension, whereby slum clearance pushed families off valuable land, and public housing pulled them into their confines. This pattern became institutionalized, because redevelopment was necessary, if Baltimore were to regain its vitality. However, the sheer proportions of African Americans displaced as a result fueled the production of public housing in Baltimore, particularly since private contractors did not build for Blacks.

The long-term result shifted the racial, economic and political dynamics of the city. The overall neglect of communities across the city led to the out-migration of middle-class residents to the adjacent suburbs and counties. As a result, Baltimore became a predominately African American city, surrounded by majority White counties. Abandonment and blight has always characterized some part of Baltimore’s space, but its effects are much more far-reaching and damaging for its residents. Sangree (2009)
reports that the city lost over $17 billion in revenues, due to foreclosures. Widespread vacancy contributes to disorder and crime, therefore creating a cycle of urban disrepair. Consequently, such income deficits affect city services like trash collection, public safety, education, and health services. These basic city services are fundamentally important in low-income communities and can be the difference between bridging and widening the racial disparity gap. Additionally, Baltimore is a predominately African American jurisdiction surrounded by over a dozen counties, all with significant White majorities, except Prince George’s and Somerset counties. In terms of state government, Baltimore’s interest and that of its citizens are grossly underrepresented politically.

This study articulates the relationship between government, public policies, and administrative discretion. Although all of these policies have formally ended, many lessons can be learned from the way they were implemented and executed. First, affordable housing disparities continue to exist, so more consideration should be given to short and long-term implications of future legislation. In this study, four housing programs were discussed: public housing, ‘scattered site,’ Section 8, and Hope VI. Each program offered more than the last, but all were inadequate representations of a comprehensive urban housing program. Second, social outcomes must be heavily considered, when pursuing initiatives that disproportionately burden one group over another. Whether constructing highways or removing mountain tops, those directly affected should be informed of and engaged in the planning process. Citizens, also have a responsibility to be informed and involved. Finally, the extent of administrative discretion should be monitored. Discretion is necessary, but its abuse with regard to the
ill treatment of vulnerable groups or against the principles of democracy should not be tolerated.

**Limitations**

As a case study, the findings of this investigation are not generalizable to other cities. The economic, political, and social environment in Baltimore was uniquely different from other urban areas throughout the United States. Although some commonality existed with urban deindustrialization and suburbanization, cities responded to these problems and used government resources, based on the specific needs and constituents of the community. Therefore, despite the flexibility of program requirements and the distinctiveness of individual cities, public housing led to the creation of second ghetto communities. Consequently, the process may have been different, but the outcomes remained the same – the isolation of African Americans away from valuable real estate and their relative containment in predetermined spaces.

Hirsch (1993) and Sasaki (1993-94) identified the years from 1940-1960 as the era of ghetto expansion in Chicago and Newark, respectively. In Miami, the process begin in the mid-1930s when Liberty City was conceived by administrators “...effectively moving every Negro family present in city limits” (Mohl, 2003b, p. 247). Public housing was specifically used to lure families away from their original communities in Overtown, an all-Black neighborhood near the central business district. In Miami, the construction of I-95 resulted in the dispossession of thousands of African American families that resided in Overtown. In Baltimore, urban renewal was the policy enabler that facilitated population movement. Therefore from 1950-1970, the period of ghetto expansion was well underway. Regardless of city, urban renewal and highway
construction initiated population movement, and public housing captured the displaced. Consequently, the stigma associated with public housing is directly related to the way these facilities were utilized to cordon off, segregate, and ridicule African Americans.

A second limitation of this study is its inability to take into account the immigration of new African American residents over time. In this study, the decennial census represents a snapshot of the existing population in Baltimore during the time of the survey. Therefore, it does not specifically address the number of African Americans that migrated into Baltimore city within each decade. Third, this study cannot make causal relationships regarding the direct causes of population movement. The documents reviewed and maps generated attempt to create a framework to understand what happened, when it happened, who was involved, and how population movement was effected by these collective actions in Baltimore. Therefore, while families had to contend with personal decisions, administrators were confronted with political demands, and the urban elite were motivated by self-interest. Consequently, any or none of these things had the potential to influence movement; therefore this study acknowledges the inability to make direct correlations. In controlled environments, variables can be manipulated to determine its direct impact on the subject. However, social problems are infinitely connected and abstract, which makes it very difficult to quantify and manipulate issues independently.

Despite the limitations of this study, the results offer a basic understanding of the events that created sustained racial and economic inequality in the city of Baltimore. Public housing disproportionately confined African Americans to impoverished areas, homeownership was restricted because of discriminatory practices, and racism enabled
the subtlety of such adverse outcomes to go unchallenged for decades. Whites, on the other hand, were freely mobile to reside in any community they desired. Hence, the homeownership programs of the 1940s were important in financing suburban growth, which drew Whites to areas outside and concentrated Blacks inside the central city. Consequently, the outcomes related to the role of government, public policies, and administrative discretion on urban African American mobility can be examined using the framework provided in this study.

**Future Research**

This case study on Baltimore represents the experience of one city. Therefore, future research will include comparative studies of second ghetto development in cities like Cleveland, OH; St. Louis, MO; Cape Town, South Africa; and Brazil, South America. This research is important, because it provides historical contexts that help explain the current state of affairs in central cities. Issues of financial instability, disinvestment, abandonment, poverty, crime, and violence plague urban communities across the country. Conversely, proximate suburban jurisdictions are characterized by completely different standards. Hence, by acknowledging the severe and damaging systemic barriers that have marginalized African Americans, improvements can be made with regard to policy formulation and implementation. Therefore, one stream of research will focus the process of deliberative democracy, whereby all stakeholders are active participants in the policy process.

The release of 2010 Census data enables further investigations into the socioeconomic factors that impact Baltimore present day, such as the demographic changes, foreclosures, and housing vacancy. As the public housing program has ended,
the housing crisis in urban communities is likely to be exacerbated. In Baltimore’s case, the quality and quantity of housing in low-income neighborhoods are counterproductive issues that limit the city’s long-term stability. The disparities that exist between urban and suburban communities are colossal. Therefore, future research endeavors will seek to investigate ways to empower urban residents in ways that allow them to control their communities.
REFERENCES


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Hicks v. Weaver (United States District Court E.D. Louisiana, New Orleans Division 1969).


207


Thompson v. Housing Authority of the City of Miami Florida (United States District Court S.D. Florida, Miami Division 1966).


**APPENDIX A – BALTIMORE TIMELINE OF EVENTS FROM 1851 – 2010**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Event</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1851</td>
<td>Baltimore City and Baltimore County become separate entities</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1857</td>
<td>U.S. Supreme Court Dred Scott v. Sanford</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1865</td>
<td>The Emancipation Proclamation was issued by Abraham Lincoln and freed an upwards of 3 million slaves.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>April 9, 1866</td>
<td><strong>Civil Rights Act of 1866 passed</strong>&lt;br&gt;The law declared all persons born in the United States are citizens regardless of race, color, or previous condition. As citizens they could make and enforce contracts, sue and be sued, give evidence in court, and inherit, purchase, lease, sell, hold, and convey real and personal property.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Prior to 1870</td>
<td>Laborers (poor) and the elite lived in close proximity to one another without any perceived negative influences on neighborhood quality</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1871</td>
<td>Civil Rights Act of 1871 passed&lt;br&gt;This Act prohibits ethnic violence against Blacks, also known as the Ku Klux Klan Act</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1875</td>
<td>Civil Rights Act of 1875 passed&lt;br&gt;Prohibits discrimination in ‘public accommodations’</td>
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<tr>
<td>1883</td>
<td>Civil Rights Act of 1875 found unconstitutional because Congress could not regulate the conduct of individuals</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1899</td>
<td>Baltimore’s city slogan &quot;A White Man's City&quot;</td>
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<tr>
<td>1902</td>
<td>Maryland segregated railroads and steamboats</td>
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<tr>
<td>1903</td>
<td>Mayor Thomas Hayes expressing discontent for Baltimore’s emerging slums</td>
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<tr>
<td>1904</td>
<td>The Great Baltimore Fire destroyed 140 acres of prime business location; Baltimore fire jerked city into the 20th century; opened the flood gates to suburbanization, severe damage led to massive planning and comprehensive planning projects</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1904</td>
<td>Isidor Raynor, US Senator from Maryland, campaigned to disenfranchise Blacks on the grounds of self-preservation</td>
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<tr>
<td>1905</td>
<td>Racial interaction was likely in restaurants and other public places; the rigidity of separation was not hardened yet</td>
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<tr>
<td>1905</td>
<td>Disenfranchisement Acts initiated: 1905, 1909, 1911 -- Republicans voted against the act for fears it would hurt their constituents ability to vote (e.g. new immigrants who may not know about the American government system)</td>
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<td>Date</td>
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<tr>
<td>1909</td>
<td>Isaac Lobe Straus wrote a constitutional amendment to disenfranchise African Americans, but it was defeated</td>
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<tr>
<td>Approx 1910</td>
<td>Milton Dashiell drafted anti-encroachment law, which was presented by Councilman Samuel L. West</td>
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<tr>
<td>June 9, 1910</td>
<td>Ashbie Hawkins purchased a home on McCulloh Street</td>
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<tr>
<td>July 4, 1910</td>
<td>Black boxer Jack Johnson defeated James Jefferies contributing to increased racial tensions</td>
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<tr>
<td>December 17, 1910</td>
<td>City Solicitor Edger Allen Poe cites ordinances as constitutional</td>
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<tr>
<td>December 20, 1910</td>
<td>First segregation ordinance signed by Mayor Mahool designated as 'An Experiment in Apartheid'</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1880-1910</td>
<td>Baltimore's population nearly doubled to 558,485 (88,065 Blacks)</td>
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<tr>
<td>1907-1910</td>
<td>Segregation of public facilities became more pervasive and hardened</td>
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<tr>
<td>April 7, 1911</td>
<td>Second segregation ordinance signed</td>
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<tr>
<td>May 11, 1911</td>
<td>Mayor J. Barry Mahool signed the third ordinance to preserve peace between races to legally sanction segregation; states to follow GA, SC, VA, NC, KY</td>
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<tr>
<td>May 16, 1911</td>
<td>Democrat James H. Preston defeats Mahool in election</td>
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<tr>
<td>1912-1914</td>
<td>Segregation ordinance adopted by result of “Baltimore idea” in the following cities: Asheville, NC; Richmond, Norfolk, and Roanoke, VA; Atlanta, GA; Louisville and Madisonville, KY; Greenville, SC; Mooresville and Winston-Salem, NC; Birmingham, AL; St. Louis, MS</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1914</td>
<td>Baltimore slum clearance begins as City began purchasing properties used as flats or third-rate rooming houses</td>
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<tr>
<td>1880-1914</td>
<td>Marks the apex of foreign immigration into the US</td>
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<td>1917</td>
<td>U.S. Supreme Court <em>Buchanan v. Warley</em> ruled against the Louisville, KY segregation ordinance</td>
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<tr>
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<td>George R. Morris, white real estate man advised Morgan College on ways to enact a restrictive covenant agreement barring Whites</td>
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<tr>
<td>1918</td>
<td>Annexation tripled the Baltimore area -- the last successful attempt at annexation</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Mayor Preston appointed a Commission on Segregation; City promoted the use of racially restrictive covenants; Baltimore Sun endorsed &quot;fair and permanent segregation policy&quot;</td>
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<td>Date</td>
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<tr>
<td>1914-1919</td>
<td>Preston pioneered a condemnation law that would raze and dislocate African American and their institution (e.g. newspapers headquarters, office buildings, and churches) based on their advancements to the affluent Mount Vernon, high-class white neighborhoods</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1900-1920</td>
<td>Neighborhood racial transition begins: 17th ward racial transition (White): 1900: 18,926; 1910: 10,946; 1920: 3,900; (Black): 1900: 1,499; 1910: 12,738; 1920: 16,736  14th ward racial transitions (White): 1900: 18,264; 1910: 13,738; 1920: 11,189; (Black): 1900: 3,043; 1910: 8,393; 1920: 14,012</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1922</td>
<td>National Association of Real Estate Brokers (NAREB) published Principles of Real Estate</td>
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<tr>
<td>1923</td>
<td>Baltimore’s original zoning ordinance passed, but did not consider comprehensive land use planning</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1926</td>
<td>US Supreme Court affirmed a DC court’s decision to enforce a covenant against Black home buyers</td>
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<tr>
<td>1930</td>
<td>Distinct ghetto communities emerge as 20% of the African American population confined to 2% of the City’s land area</td>
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<tr>
<td>1930</td>
<td>1930 Census recorded 362,072 gainful workers in the city – 28% female, 72% male; 22% Black, 78% White – city’s unemployment rate exceeded 20%</td>
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<tr>
<td>1910-1930</td>
<td>Nationwide the African American urban population doubled from 2.6 million to 5.2 million</td>
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<tr>
<td>1931</td>
<td>1 in 5 people in Baltimore are without a job Comprehensive ordinance passed providing use for residential, residential and office use, first commercial, second commercial, and industrial</td>
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<tr>
<td>1932</td>
<td><strong>Federal Home Loan Bank Act</strong> passed; <strong>Home Loan Bank Board and Bank Systems</strong> created</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1933</td>
<td><strong>Homeowner Refinancing Act</strong> passed <strong>National Industrial Recovery Act</strong> passed <strong>Homeowners Loan Corporation (HOLC)</strong> formed Study of Blighted Areas in Baltimore conducted and “...found areas in which the physical condition of dwellings is below the standard rehabilitation, and with substantial health and sanitary problems – were predominantly populated by Blacks”</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>December 25, 1933</td>
<td>By Christmas, 1 in 6 families was on relief</td>
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<td>1934</td>
<td><strong>National Housing Act</strong> passed;</td>
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<td>Date</td>
<td>Event</td>
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<tr>
<td>1934</td>
<td>Study prepared for Mayor Jackson rationalized segregation</td>
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<td>Mid-1930s</td>
<td>Eugenics-influenced government policies have promoted racially restrictive covenants as necessary bulwarks against &quot;inharmonious elements&quot;</td>
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<tr>
<td>1937</td>
<td>Federal involvement with FHA to enforce segregation, resulting in 3,400 middle-class Black families were immediately impacted by the conspiracy of containment</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1937</td>
<td>US Housing Act of 1937 (Housing Act of 1937) passed; Created the Public Housing Administration (PHA) and Fannie Mae (the National Mortgage Association)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1938</td>
<td>Meade v. Dennistone: Maryland Court of Appeals upholds restrictive covenants by ruling against a Black man, Edward Meade who moved into a White block in Baltimore</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1940</td>
<td>Edgar Allen Poe Homes was the first low-rent housing for colored -- cost $2 million on a 7 1/2 acre lot (298 units); the community was civically engaged with a men's and women's groups, boy scouts and YWCA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1941</td>
<td>Baltimore lacked approximately 9,000 low-income homes and those lucky enough to find housing were living in scandalous conditions</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>McCulloh Homes completed (434 units)</td>
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<td>Latrobe Homes completed (701 units)</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Douglass Homes completed (393 units)</td>
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<tr>
<td>1942</td>
<td>National Housing Agency formed</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Perkins Homes completed (688 units)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Fairfield Homes completed (300 units)</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Brooklyn Homes completed (500 units)</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Westport Homes completed (200 units)</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Gilmor Homes completed (587 units)</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Highway plans are initially conceived and would be modified, or changed consistently over the next 20 years</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1943</td>
<td>O'Donnell Homes completed (900 units)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1943</td>
<td>Somerset Homes completed (257 units)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1944</td>
<td>Federal Aid Act of 1944 passed</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1944</td>
<td>City housing authority stated city needed to replace or rehabilitate 26,000 existing dwellings and construct 6,814 new units to house the</td>
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</tbody>
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218
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Event</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>April 1945</td>
<td>General Motors buys the transit company, which operates the electric trolley -- begins the demise of public transportation and reliance on automobiles</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1945</td>
<td>City housing authority stated city needed to replace or rehabilitate 26,000 existing dwellings and construct 6,814 new units to house the Black population</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1945</td>
<td>Blockbusting initiated in Eutaw Place</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1943-1947</td>
<td>Mayor Theodore McKeldin initiated the rebirth of the Inner Harbor, tunnels underneath, a new airport, a massive highway construction program, and the Baltimore Beltway</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1947</td>
<td>Housing and Home Finance Agency formed</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1948</td>
<td>HABC announced its post-war housing plan to raze black inner-city neighborhoods and to build higher density public housing projects on the slum clearance sites.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1949</td>
<td>U.S. Supreme Court <em>Shelley v. Kraemer</em>: prohibits restrictive covenants</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1949</td>
<td>U.S. Housing Act of 1949 passed</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1949</td>
<td>Urban Renewal Administration formed</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1950</td>
<td>First zoning law enacted</td>
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<tr>
<td>1950</td>
<td>The Jones Falls Expressway was proposed and two years later the voters approved a $10 million bond issue to begin work on it</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1950</td>
<td>State Road Commission announced the Bay Bridge construction would begin; completed July 30, 1952</td>
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<tr>
<td>1950</td>
<td>Population peaked at 949,708; 83% of White growth occurs outside of the city, while 83% of African American growth happens inside the city</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1950</td>
<td>Baltimore City Council approves first urban renewal plans and sanctions segregation in the name of redevelopment</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1950</td>
<td>The Waverly Development was the first redevelopment project in the city and the second in the country to be completed. The other initial projects include: No. 3-C which razed 9-acres of residential slums south of Johns Hopkins Hospital; the Broadway Redevelopment Area was a 39-acre slum clearance site for the Johns Hopkins expansion and other community institutions</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Date</td>
<td>Event</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>From 1950 to</td>
<td>Baltimore City Housing Authority published a report (Baltimore's Blighted Areas) declaring most of the inner city blighted, which marked the beginning of the urban renewal movement, though it did not become an official program in Baltimore for another few years.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>August 1953</td>
<td>City Council enacted an Ordinance authorizing HABC and the City to develop up to 10,000 units of additional public housing under the federal Housing Act. However all future housing would require City Council approval, veto power over the HABC site selection, and all future public housing was limited to the slums.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1950</td>
<td>East Baltimore Low-Rent Housing Project Described: 14 1/2 acres, 650 units for 'colored' occupancy; This development clears one of the worse slums in the city -- site selection is determined by neighborhood planning and redevelopment prospects.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Cherry Hill Homes Extension 1 completed (637 units)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1953</td>
<td>Baltimore Housing Authority moved toward construction of high-rises on cleared sites in two major areas of land East and West</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>From 1950 to</td>
<td>53,161 building permits were issued from housing units, only 127 for Blacks.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>August 1953</td>
<td>Brown v. Board of Education decision handed down by the US Supreme Court</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1954</td>
<td>Baltimore to desegregate the city's low-income housing units and the schools.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>August 2, 1954</td>
<td>U.S. Housing Act of 1954 passed</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>O'Neils Department Store closed (a Baltimore landmark); proved to be the last straw for local retailers</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Urban Renewal expanded to include Urban Planning Grants</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Claremont Homes completed (292 units)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1955</td>
<td>Edmonson Village (working-class neighborhood) underwent racial transition -- Morgan Park -- Ashburton (affluent Black neighborhood)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Windsor Hills community becomes affected by decreases in city services</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Lafayette Homes, the first integrated public housing development is completed (816 units)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1955</td>
<td>Flag House Homes completed (487 units)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>February 26, 1955</td>
<td>Mayor D'Alesandro breaks ground on a 362 unit addition to the Cherry Hill homes; 2nd addition will bring total to 1509, built by John A. Johnson and Sons, Inc. of Brooklyn, NY for $3,165,000</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

220
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Event</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>November 1955</td>
<td>Mount Royal-Fremont land acquisition begins (urban renewal project)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1956</td>
<td><strong>Federal Aid Highway Act of 1956</strong> passed</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>David Wallace city planner and architect, was hired by GBC to develop a plan for the revitalization of downtown; the first project would revitalize and rebuild 33 acres of office space at Charles Center</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Maryland Port Authority (MPA) is created</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>First 10 year $56 million urban renewal plan turned into a 20 year $200 million plan a bigger investment expected in 1990s</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Black expansion to the east side of Baltimore was slow until the late 1950s</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>City Council to enforce hygienic concerns amid racial neighborhood change</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1956</td>
<td>Cherry Hill Homes Extension 2 completed (360 units)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>December 31, 1956</td>
<td>Ordinance No. 692 created the Baltimore Urban Renewal and Housing Commission and the Baltimore Urban Renewal and Housing Authority (BURHA)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Another plan is proposed to move the East-West Expressway further north, but it cut through a prosperous White neighborhood, Mount Vernon, whose inhabitants fought the expressway bitterly -- plans were scrapped</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1957</td>
<td><strong>Civil Rights Act of 1957</strong> passed; Established the Civil Rights Commission</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>March 1957</td>
<td>Mount Royal Plaza construction begins (urban renewal project)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1958</td>
<td>Lexington Terrance completed (677 units)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>January 1959</td>
<td>Area 3-C land acquisition begins (urban renewal project)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>March 1959</td>
<td>BURHA contracted with the Planning Council of the Greater Baltimore Committee to make studies and subsequently draw up a plan for the renewal of Mount Vernon</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>May 1959</td>
<td>Harlem Park Project I: School Site land acquisition begins (urban renewal project)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>June 1959</td>
<td>314 Demonstration Project land acquisition begins (urban renewal project)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1950s</td>
<td>Federal Race Relations Office warns Baltimore urban renewal enacts a &quot;triple threat&quot; approach toward African American: Negro removal became equated with clearance, exclusion, and containment</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>The decimation of the Inner Harbor was complete; it spread of blight affected proximate communities</td>
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<tr>
<td>Date</td>
<td>Event</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>1960</td>
<td>Civil Rights Act of 1960 passed</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Established federal inspection of local voter registration polls</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Wallace focused on waterfront development: 30 years, $260 mission</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>plan for revitalizing the Inner Harbor</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Revitalization occurred in subareas - using neighborhoods would have</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>required acknowledgement of economic and social boundaries of a given space</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Westport Homes Extension completed (232 units)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1960</td>
<td>Planning Commission offered another recommendation the so-called</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Harbor Route based on the following criteria:</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>a. It should be planned so to be eligible for the 90 percent federal funding</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>b. It should be designed so as to allow for a feasible interchange with the Jones Falls Expressway</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>c. It should be designed so as to provide good service to the CBD</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1930-1960</td>
<td>&lt;1% of African American were able to obtain a mortgage</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Baltimore’s Black population grew from 142,000 to 326,000</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Programs displaced large numbers of households</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>A large number of families were displaced because of school building, slum clearance, urban renewal, and expressway construction</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Baltimore lost 113,000 Whites and gained 102,000 non-Whites, with most population change occurring in the inner and middle rings of the city</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Baltimore expressways emerge</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>February 1960</td>
<td>Shot Tower Industrial Park land acquisition begins (urban renewal project)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>June 1960</td>
<td>314 Demonstration Project rehabilitation begins (urban renewal project)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>June 1, 1960</td>
<td>Urban Renewal Projects in Development</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1960</td>
<td>Fremont Area: 74 acres incorporating the State Office Building and other commercial structures</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Downtown Area: 22 - Charles Center development land acquisition begins</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Area No. 2: 70 acres north of Broadway</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Area No. 9: 63 acres surrounding the Poe Homes on Fremont</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>July 9, 1960</td>
<td>Urban Renewal program a multi-million dollar business</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>City’s third year of a $900 million rehab program planned over 20 years under the BURHA</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>17th George Street Homes under development</td>
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<td>Date</td>
<td>Event</td>
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<td>------------</td>
<td>----------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>February 1961</td>
<td>Area 3-C construction begins (urban renewal project)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Camden Industrial Park land acquisition begins (urban renewal project)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>April 1961</td>
<td>Harlem Park Project I: School Site construction begins (urban renewal project)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Harlem Park Project II construction begins</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>University of Maryland Project I land acquisition begins</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>May 1961</td>
<td>Urban Renewal Projects in Development</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Camden Industrial Park (Area 7): 87 acres for industrial, commercial, and warehousing use</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Harlem Park Project I (school site): 20 acres for two public schools</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Harlem Park Project II, 152 acres for residential and commercial structures</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Mount Royal-Fremont, Project I: 93 acres for shopping center, playgrounds, park, and a firehouse</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Mount Royal-Fremont, Project Extension: 117 acres residential and commercial</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Shot Tower Industrial Park (Area 4): 24 acres for industrial, commercial, and warehousing</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>314 Demonstration Project: 3 acres for residential use</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>University of Maryland, Project I: 5 acres for university expansion</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>University of Maryland, Project II: 16 acres for university expansion</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Waverly: 23 acres for residential and shopping center</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Camden Industrial (Area 7): 87 acres for industrial, commercial, and warehousing use</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>July 1961</td>
<td>Charles Center construction begins (urban renewal project)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>September 1961</td>
<td>Mount Royal-Fremont Project II land acquisition begins</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>October 1961</td>
<td>University of Maryland Project I construction begins</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1962</td>
<td><em>Executive Order 11063 &quot;Equal Opportunities in Housing&quot; is enacted to</em></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Date</td>
<td>Event</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>prevent discrimination in &quot;the sale, leasing, rental or other disposition of rental property or related facilities&quot; owned, financed or insured by the federal government</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>January 1962</td>
<td>Beltway construction completed</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>March 1962</td>
<td>Mount Royal-Fremont Project I land acquisition begins (urban renewal project)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>June 1962</td>
<td>Camden Industrial Park construction begins (urban renewal project)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>July 1962</td>
<td>Harlem Park Project II construction begins (urban renewal project)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Mount Royal-Fremont Project II construction begins (urban renewal project)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1963</td>
<td>Gywnn Oaks Amusement Park desegregated</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Murphy Homes completed (758 units)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>The last electric trolley lines are eliminated in exchange for the diesel bus system as provided by GM</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>March 1963</td>
<td>Mount Royal-Fremont land residential and commercial disposition begins</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>April 1963</td>
<td>Mount Royal-Fremont Project I land clearance begins</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>May 14, 1963</td>
<td>Baltimore City Council approves the Gay Street urban renewal area (Ordinance No. 1668)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1964</td>
<td>Civil Rights Act of 1964 passed; Prohibits discrimination based on race, color, religion, sex, and national origin by federal and state governments as well as some public places</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Agnew had urban renewal plans, but was defeated in referendum</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Status of Urban Renewal Projects:</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Harlem Park I completed</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Harlem Park II executed</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Mount Royal Plaza executed</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Madison-Park South executed</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Madison-Park North executed</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Mount Royal Project II completed</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1964</td>
<td>Downtown Projects:</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Charles Center executed</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Mount Vernon executed</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Mount Vernon II executed</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Shot Tower Industrial Park executed</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Date</td>
<td>Event</td>
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</tbody>
</table>
| 1950 - 1964     | University of Maryland I completed  
                     University of Maryland II completed  
                     Gay Street planned                                                                                                                |
| 1965            | 25,000 people displaced by urban renewal, public housing, and school construction (approximately 90% African Americans)                |
| 1966            | *Voting Rights Act of 1965* passed  
                     *Department of Housing and Urban Development Act* passed  
                     Baltimore officially integrated its public housing program                                                                        |
| 1955-1965       | The city lost 82 industries, 65 to Baltimore county                                                                                     |
| 1966            | *Model Cities Act* passed                                                                                                               |
| February 16, 1966| Department of Transportation Act of 1966 states that the Secretary of Transportation cannot approve "any program or project which requires  
                     the use of land from a .... historic site unless there is no prudent and feasible alternative" and the planning had been done to limit the impact  
                     on the historical site as much as possible                                                                                       |
| February 21, 1966| City Council puts forth a fair housing bill, but is vehemently opposed                                                                    |
| March 1966      | Rosemont community relocation                                                                                                            |
| June 26, 1966   | Interstate Division for Baltimore City was created under the State Highway Administration to manage the construction and completion of  
                     Baltimore's highways                                                                                                               |
| 1967            | *Thompson v. Housing Authority of Miami, FL* denied an injunction on the grounds that the official policy of the housing authority had always  
                     been nondiscriminatory, and that the selection and approval of the sites was motivated solely by community needs and with full concurrence of  
                     Negro representatives from the affected neighborhoods                                                                            |
<p>| 1967            | The Policy Advisory Board of the State Roads Commission's Interstate Division for Baltimore City was established                           |
| June 26, 1966   | Over $6.5 million of federal funds was given to the city to start acquiring property in the Franklin-Mulberry corridor                    |
| 1967            | African Americans homeowners displaced my McCulloh Extension referred by Baltimore officials to homes that were substandard or unaffordable |
| 1967            | Second Baltimore Harbor tunnel to be built amid fears of overcrowding and for emergency; opened 1973                                  |
| April 16, 1967  | 5 Black families introduced into the Curtis Bay homes                                                                                     |
|                 | Of the 15 housing projects, only two have not integrated: Claremont and O’Donnell                                                        |</p>
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Event</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>mid-1967</td>
<td>Schaefer as Chairman of the Judiciary Committee of the City Council and D'Alesandro as City Council President were instrumental in the</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>passable of condemnation ordinances for an alignment through a previously stable, black middle-class community called Rosemont</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>October 3, 1967</td>
<td>The Urban Design Concept Team was created and under contract with the Maryland State Highway Administration to develop highway plans</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>for the city of Baltimore</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1968</td>
<td><em>Civil Rights Act of 1968 (Fair Housing)</em> passed</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>U.S. Supreme Court <em>Jones v. Mayer</em></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Bars all forms of housing discrimination, both public and private</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1968</td>
<td>Black and White housing markets merge</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Scattered site rehabilitation housing program begins (2584 units)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Activists for Fair Housing alleged Baltimore was operating a segregated and discriminatory housing program</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>April 6, 1968</td>
<td>Three proposals offered to Mayor D'Alesandro regarding the expressways:</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1. The previously adopted 10-D route</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2. A new route, labeled 3-C: contained an Inner Harbor crossing, but providing a much smaller bridge than the massive one proposed by the</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>10-D plan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>3. A New route labeled 3-A: completely eliminated the Inner Harbor crossing. D'Alesandro selected the 3-A proposal which satisfied</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>southeastern industry and the federal government, it also required the relocation of 890 fewer families than the 10-D route</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>September 3, 1968</td>
<td>Rioting broke out in Baltimore after the assassination of Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Tenants will compose public housing board</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>New tenant advisory board established to work with the Housing Commissioner Robert C. Embry Jr. on public housing management;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>representatives are selected from each of the 16 housing projects. The group was created to advise on rent structure, occupancy standards,</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>eviction policy, modernization programs, and maintenance programs.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Mount Winans Homes completed (140 units)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Oswego Mall Homes completed (35 units)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>January 14, 1969</td>
<td>Baltimore had acquired 43 commercial and 496 residential properties of the 609 existing in the corridor and over 960 families were displaced</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>End of 1969</td>
<td>95% of all low and moderate income rental housing financed by HUD and FHA was located Baltimore City</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Date</td>
<td>Event</td>
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<tr>
<td>1960s</td>
<td>Baltimore’s downtown was feeling competition from other cities with better accommodations and amenities</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1970</td>
<td><em>Emergency Home Finance Act</em> passed</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1970</td>
<td>George Romney, Secretary of HUD, announced the federal government had &quot;refused to provide insurance in integrated neighborhoods, promoted the use of restrictive covenants&quot; -- engaged in other methods of redlining</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Lakeview Tower Homes completed (161 units)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1950-1970</td>
<td>Whites fled to Baltimore County 270,273 to 621,077; African American presence in the county declined from 6.6% to 3.2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1971</td>
<td>Schaefer is elected as Mayor (expressway advocate)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1971</td>
<td>McCulloh Homes Extension completed (516 units)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1972</td>
<td>Broadway Homes completed (429 units)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Highway Act passed provides provisions that all segments of the highway not currently built could be used for alternative means of transportation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1973</td>
<td>West 20 Homes completed (357 units)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Claremont Homes Extension completed (152 units)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>early 1973</td>
<td>Council member Barbara Mikulski of the 1st District, began introducing legislation to all or parts of the expressway construction in Baltimore due to the political debate and opposition of the highway</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1974</td>
<td><em>Housing and Community Development Act</em> passed</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1974</td>
<td><em>Community Development Block Grants</em> initiated and officially ended the urban renewal program</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1975</td>
<td>Bel Park Tower Homes completed (274 units)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1975</td>
<td>Govans Manor Homes completed (199 units)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1975</td>
<td>Somerset Homes Extension completed (60 units)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1975</td>
<td>Wyman House completed (168 units)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1975</td>
<td>Rosemont Homes completed (106 units)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1975</td>
<td>Dukeland Homes completed (30 units)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>February 3, 1975</td>
<td>The City Council approved a tunnel crossing south of Fort McHenry instead of a bridge crossing, and I-95 would go through the railroad yards south of the Locust Point residential areas instead of through the neighborhood</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1976</td>
<td>Only 15,000 public housing units were available</td>
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<td>Date</td>
<td>Event</td>
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<tr>
<td>1976</td>
<td>Hollander Ridge Homes completed (1000 units)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Brentwood Homes completed (150 units)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1977</td>
<td><strong>Community Reinvestment Act</strong> passed</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Community Development Block Grants (CDBG) and Urban Development Action Grants initiated and replaces 'urban renewal' programs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Baltimore secured $10 million UDAG (federal funds)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>October 25, 1977</td>
<td>The Highlandtown Business Area Urban Renewal Plan was approved by the Mayor and City Council of Baltimore by Ordinance 511</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1977</td>
<td><strong>Housing and Community Development Act</strong> passed</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1978</td>
<td>Chase House completed (189 units)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>November 1978</td>
<td>Harborplace proposal put forth before voters; 59,045 voted YES; 42,728 voted NO; difference of 16,317</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1979</td>
<td>Spencer Gardens completed (20 units)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Julian Gardens completed (23 units)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Mason Apartments completed (223 units)</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Lakeview Tower Homes Extension completed (144 units)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1970s</td>
<td>Baltimore poured all discretionary funds (CDBG and UDAG) into waterfront development regions — Inner Harbor, Fells Point, Federal Hill, and Canton, also university community Gilford — all experienced &quot;healthy increase in neighborhood commercial development&quot;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1980</td>
<td>Charles K. Anderson Homes completed (121 units)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>July 2, 1980</td>
<td>Harborplace opened to a crowd of 50,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1950-1980</td>
<td>Turner Station in Baltimore County had nearly 9,000 Black residents in 1950, but declined to 3,557 by 1980</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1964-1980</td>
<td>94,000 people (mostly Black) were relocated by urban renewal projects</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1981</td>
<td>Only 1.3 miles of the I-170 was constructed through the Franklin-Mulberry corridor and I-70 stopped at the west edge of Leakein Park</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1982</td>
<td>Primrose Place completed (125 units)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>I-395 was completed and serves the CBD and the Baltimore twin's Stadiums</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1983</td>
<td><strong>Housing and Urban Recovery Act</strong> passed</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Hollins House completed (130 units)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Date</td>
<td>Event</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>------------</td>
<td>-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1984</td>
<td>Rosemont Tower completed (203 units)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1985</td>
<td>Allendale Homes completed (164 units)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1970-1985</td>
<td>16 housing projects containing nearly 3,000 units were built for the elderly and disabled</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1980-1985</td>
<td>Chief of the Interstate Division for Baltimore City, William Hellman, organized a task force to expedite the permit process for I-95, the project was started and completed within 5 years</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>mid-1980s</td>
<td>The I-70 and I-170 projects were officially abandoned due to political opposition which contributed to the rising costs to complete the project - $600 million</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1987</td>
<td>McKinney Act passed</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1973-1988</td>
<td>Baltimore lost 45,800 jobs or 25% of its total manufacturing employment (p. 16)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1989</td>
<td>Fair Housing Amendments Act, HUD Reform Act</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Urban Development Action Grants terminated</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1980s</td>
<td>Data shows that the increased African American presence in any given Baltimore neighborhood, resulted in fewer mortgage loans and funding available to the community</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Privatization of urban services is a widespread trend -- do not provide adequate living expenses for living (e.g. no health insurance, pensions, job security)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1990</td>
<td>National Affordable Housing Act (Cranston-Gonzalez) passed</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>The built section of I-170 was designated at US 40</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>HOME program initiated</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1950-1990</td>
<td>90% of public housing and &gt;70% of all HUD assisted housing in the Baltimore region was located in the city</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1950-1990</td>
<td>71% of African Americans employed by the private sector, represents 59% of the total population as of 1990 Census</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1950-1990</td>
<td>Chronic fiscal crisis</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1950-1990</td>
<td>Baltimore lost 23% of its population</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Black population increased to 60% in city as a result of white flight</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Decreased an average family income 92% to 59% compared to suburban families</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Experienced a decrease in regional importance -- 71% to 31% of its metropolitan population</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1991</td>
<td>Civil Rights Act of 1991 passed;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Provides the right to trial by jury on discrimination claims and</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Date</td>
<td>Event</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>------------</td>
<td>-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1992</td>
<td><em>Housing Community Development Act</em> passed</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td><em>Move to Opportunity (MTO) program</em> initiated</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1993</td>
<td><em>Government Performance and Results Act</em> passed</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td><em>HOPE VI program</em> initiated</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1994</td>
<td>The city of Baltimore passed the &quot;first&quot; living wage law</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>September 24, 1994</td>
<td>Move to Opportunity (MTO) program will move 285 inner city families to more prosperous neighborhoods in Baltimore, Hartford, Howard, Carroll, Anne Arundel, and Queen’s County as well as Baltimore City</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1995-1996</td>
<td>The living wage expenditure only increased the city's budget by 1.2% ($20,273,909 to $20,510,301)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1998</td>
<td>First HOPE VI development completed, a redevelopment of the Lafayette Homes from 1955; currently Pleasant View Gardens (311 units)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Heritage Crossing (260 units) replaced the Murphy Homes (758 units) development</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Broadway Overlook (132 units) replaced Broadway Homes (429 units)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td><em>Public Housing Reform Act (CHWRA)</em> passed</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td><em>Public Housing Reform; voucher and certificate merger</em></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>The vast majority of Section 8 users live in census tracts in which most residents are black and poor</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1990s</td>
<td>Baltimore was targeted for predatory lending</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2000</td>
<td><em>American Homeownership and Economic Opportunity Act</em> passed</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td><em>Community Tax Relief Act</em> passed</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1970-2000</td>
<td>Baltimore 14th most segregated metropolitan region in the USA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2004-2005</td>
<td>Consider the impact of population change on first-tier suburbs in Baltimore</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2004-2006</td>
<td>Wells Fargo refinance loans to an African American was likely to be 2.5x more likely to be high-cost than a refinance to a White buyer</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2004</td>
<td>Wells Fargo made over 1,200 mortgage loans per year in Baltimore City</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2005-2006</td>
<td>2/3 of Wells Fargo foreclosure were in census tracts with &gt;60% African Americans; only 16% in tracts with &lt;20% African Americans</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2006</td>
<td>Wells Fargo made high-cost loans to 65% of African American mortgage customers, only 15% made to Whites in the city</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Baltimore lost $41.9 million in tax revenue due to foreclosures</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Date</td>
<td>Event</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>--------------</td>
<td>----------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2007</td>
<td>From the 1st to the 2nd quarter foreclosure activity increased five-fold</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2008</td>
<td>4,300 adjustable rate mortgages (ARM) were raised to rates borrowers could not afford -- 1st quarter 1,447 foreclosure filings</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>January 8, 2008</td>
<td><em>Housing and Economic Recovery Act</em> passed</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2008</td>
<td>Baltimore City filed suit against Wells Fargo in the federal district court in MD alleging reverse redlining</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2009</td>
<td><em>American Recovery and Reinvestment Act</em> passed</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2009</td>
<td>2000 ARMs will greatly impact families and the city</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2000s</td>
<td>33,000 homes have been subjected to foreclosure filings</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2010</td>
<td>John Manley House completed (30 units)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
APPENDIX B – DECADE BY DECADE COMPARISON, 1940 – 1950

Development in Baltimore
1940-1950

Legend
- Public Housing
- Urban Renewal

Census Tracts
% Black
- less than 10%
- 10% - 25%
- 25% - 50%
- 50% - 75%
- Over 75%

Legend

Census Tracts
% Black
less than 10% □ 1950
10% - 25% □ 1960
25% - 50% □ 1970
50% - 75% □ Jones Falls I-83
Over 75% □ Baltimore Beltway I-695

Development in Baltimore
1960-1970
APPENDIX D – DECADE BY DECADE COMPARISON, 1980 – 1990

Legend
- Elderly
- Family
- Mixed-use
- Demolition

Expressways
- Jones Falls I-83
- Baltimore Beltway I-695

Census Tracts
- % Black
  - 1950
  - 1960
  - 1970
  - 1980
  - 1990

Harborplace
- 1990

Development in Baltimore
1980-1990
APPENDIX E - BALTIMORE DEVELOPMENT OVER TIME, 1940 AND 2000

Legend
- Elderly
- Family
- Mixed-use
- Demolition
- Expressways

Development in Baltimore
1940-2000