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Social Controls Through the Mirror of Columnists' Narratives: A Content Analysis for Framing in Media

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SOCIAL CONTROLS THROUGH THE MIRROR OF COLUMNISTS' NARRATIVES:

A CONTENT ANALYSIS FOR FRAMING IN MEDIA

by

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ABSTRACT

SOCIAL CONTROLS THROUGH THE MIRROR OF COLUMNISTS' NARRATIVES: A CONTENT ANALYSIS FOR FRAMING IN MEDIA

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Old Dominion University, 2017
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Information dissemination is a need for human beings and it is a two way process. This two-way process can be in various formats and forms. One of the oldest ways is the newspaper, which has two types: online and print. While doing this important job, every news and column is influenced by the person who writes and edits it. The influence could be part of human nature; or it could result from an intentional selection of words, facts, and narratives. The latter emerged as an academic facet in social sciences and it is called framing. Framing theory discusses the intentional act of how information is processed and presented to influence the people. There is not a universal template of frames, but they emerged from the reading of the columns and news. In this study, I used a Q-sort to determine the categories.

People choose a newspaper mostly based on the editorial line, ideological congruity, distribution area of the newspaper, the diversity in news, and the portfolio of the columnists. The readers' selection in news and columnists are not always the same. The columnist selection is rather more specific. For example, columnists have specific target audiences, and even some of them are not a regular reader of the specific newspapers. In Turkey, journalists who do not work in a newspaper, publish their work as freelancer journalists through their blogs.

This study examines the role of daily newspaper columnists in forming their audiences' opinions through the frames that used in English and Turkish articles. To do that, I scrutinized the framing of the articles of the columnists in two ways: 1) Identifying the frames and tabulating

the frequency of employing these frames, 2) Examining the framing differences of articles in English and Turkish version of the newspapers. I collected my data from the Turkish daily newspapers, *Sabah* and *Hurriyet*, and the English versions, *Daily Sabah* and *Hurriyet Daily*. I collected three articles for each columnist. In the first step, I analyzed 88 columnists and 264 articles. In the second step, I analyzed 26 columnists and 78 articles. Because of the varying schedules of the columnists, my first data collection started on July 17th, 2016 and the last data collection ended on September 21st, 2016.

According to my findings, the columnists contributed to formation of public opinion through the repetition of the certain frames in their articles.

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CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION

1.1 Importance of Study

An image can become a representation in media with the potential to inform or persuade an audience. This transformation occurs through the narration and any pictures that may accompany it. A constructed reality of a picture with a good narrative cannot be easily distinguished from a real situation, which is recently used very commonly to create disinformation.

Turkish media landscapes formed while Turkish politics was experiencing various struggles. For example, the military-dominated authoritarian state transformed to a civil government. However, the pressure on the media has become noticeable after this transformation. Other indications are imprisoned journalists, confiscation of media institutions, the closing of the media outlets, and limited editorial independence. These have become noticeable and have increased in number.

This study examines the role of *Sabah* and *Hurriyet* newspaper columnists in forming the opinions of their audiences' through the frames that they used in English and Turkish articles. The content of this study is the July 15th, 2016 coup attempt in Turkey. It is important to show whether media has become a persuasion means to form the public opinion. This means can be used in two ends: 1) strengthening the democracy; 2) weakening or ceasing the democracy.

1.2 Statement of Purpose

The coup attempt was an event with serious consequences. The ensuing societal polarization has corresponding coverage in media. My main argument is that after July 15th coup attempt, the entire Turkish media orchestrated same arguments to support Turkish democracy.

The phenomenon that I am interested in is the contribution of columnists in constructing an epiphenomenon as a perception which provides narratives to inform the public. In this regard, the July 15th coup attempt became an important event in the history of modern Turkey. The distribution of power after the coup attempt in Turkey has noticeably changed. This study aims to investigate the press coverage by identifying the framings of the columnists regarding a specific socio-political event.

1.3 Definition of Terms

The following terms will be used in this study:

- Framing theory: "selecting and highlighting some facets of events or issues and making connections among them, so as to promote a particular interpretation, evaluation, and solution" (Entman, 2004, p. 5)

- Social constructionism: A theory of knowledge of sociology and communication that examines the development of a jointly constructed event or object (by human agents) that creates an understanding of the event or object (Galbin, 2014, p. 82).

- Trans-editing: A particular form of translation that involves the overlapping area of two activities with translation and editing (Stetting, 1989, p. 374).

- Discourse: "sometimes general domain of all statements, sometimes as an individualizable group of declarations and sometimes as a regulated practice that accounts for some statements" (Foucault, 1972, p. 80).

1.4 Organization of the Remaining Chapters

This chapter is dedicated to introducing the topic and the importance of this study. I defined key terms of this study, and I expressed the statement of purpose in the first chapter. Chapter Two explores the major theoretical knowledge used as the foundation for this study, as

well as the literature. The theoretical basis mainly includes the framing theory and media effects on the formation of public discourses. However, I am also interested in the contribution of translation to the framing of columnists. Therefore, I used a synthesis theory in this study which emerges through two main theories. These theories are communicative translation (Newmark, 1981, pp. 38-39) and framing theories (Scheufele, 1999, pp. 103-122). Chapter Two concludes with the research question.

Chapter Three discusses the procedure, scope of the study, methodology, and the limitations of this study. Chapter Four starts with the background information about the July 15th coup attempt. The data analysis and discussion help answer the research question. Finally, the last chapter, Chapter Five, is the conclusion, recommendations, and thoughts on for further studies.

CHAPTER 2

REVIEW OF LITERATURE

2.1 Theoretical Basis

2.1.1   Persuasion

Persuasion means striving to convince other people to share a perspective on a subject or to change their behavior and attitudes. Through the persuasion process, a verbal or nonverbal message is conveyed from the sender to target. According to Miller (1980, pp. 29-47), a persuasive communication conveys a message that aims to shape, reinforce, and change the responses of others. Persuasion, therefore, becomes an intentional action to influence a behavior, to change a belief or a perspective.

The Greek philosopher Aristotle argued that there are three methods for persuasion. These are ethos, logos, and pathos. In this context, ethos refers to the credibility of the informer. It depends on public common sense about the persuaders' good character and goodwill. Even the appearance and word choice of the persuader affect his/her credibility. Logos is more associated with the reasoning and the evidence, which support the arguments. The evidence could be scientific facts and personal anecdotes or statistics and historical analogies. Sometimes common sense is even used as evidence. The third method of persuasion is pathos that refers to emotions, which appeals to the reader/ viewer's emotions through narratives, examples, music, or pictures.

In this study, I will focus on framing theory, as a root strategy of persuasion which is also comprised of all these techniques.

2.1.2   Framing Theory

Framing theory is a process imposed on a perceived reality. It is a process that selects and bounds that reality. Framing theory is used as a paradigm across a wide range of disciplines, for

example, sociology, psychology, communications, and media studies. It provides an understanding about what forms our comprehension of an event. Goffman (Goffman, 1974, p. 21) first introduced this theory and he defines frames, or interpretation schemas, as allowing individuals to detect, identify, place, and label the occurrence of events and information processing. Frames allow maintaining a shared understanding of reality. According to Scheufele (1999, pp. 112-113), a frame ramifies into two: media frames and audience frames. It also permits the senders of a message to communicate their version of reality and their audience. Like a picture frame, some information is included in the framed area, and other information is excluded. It is just like the Photoshop; a picture may include people who were not present when the picture was taken or may change the emphasis through enlarging or diminishing certain information.

The elaboration of this ramification by Entman (1993, p. 7) asserts the audience frames refer to the "information process schemata" whereas media frames are "attributes of the news itself." Journalists and editors decide which attributes of the news will be present in news coverage. Presentation and framing of the news affect how the target audience understands the news. These two types of framing, media frames and audience frames, are correlated and linked to each other (Zhong & Friedland, 1996, p. 13), hence evolve concomitantly.

I discern the mass media as a magical sphere. In this magical sphere, places that the people had never seen, people who have never met, shows and foods that have never been tasted can be seen. An average person, who has no access to foreign places, people, and events, can learn about these individuals and experiences through this magical sphere. It is hard to verify the accuracy of the knowledge that is gained through this method. In fact, people do not even check the accuracy of the referent. They watch, listen, read, and accept it. Thus, understanding of how

the public discourses are constructed through the fusion of ideas, concepts, and categorizations becomes necessary. Kang and Jang (2013, pp. 49-60) articulate this process as:

> In a policy formation, context, and framing are the two devices used by social actors to create inter-subjective significance. As a process, this refers to the course of paying selective attention to the partial characteristics of a policy problem and naming them according to the goal, context and binding conditions of a policy issue. A set of moral maps and frames guide how people in a policy sphere identify problems, specify and prioritize their interests. They make causal and normative judgments about efficient and appropriate policies.

The framing functions for the political discourses are associated with the "self-interests." Politicians use the frames, which are identified by media, to give explanations and to communicate their ideas or proposals to the target audience (Azpiroz, 2013, pp. 176-197). Politicians use language that strengthens their position in the debate while weakening their opponents' position and hope that media frame their message in a similar pattern.

The frames help to simplify controversial issues by highlighting certain dimensions of the particular topic. For instance, journalists or news agencies always strive to make their preferred frames more visible than the alternative frames promoted by their competitors (Peng , Abu, & Fauziah, 2012, pp. 455-474). It is a matter of strategic employment of frames to define issues for their preferred outcomes and to affect audience's behavior and thoughts. In other words, framing means, "central organization of ideas or a story line that provides meaning" (Gamson & Modigliani, 1987, pp. 1-37).

2.1.3   Media Effects on Public Discourse

Mc Quail (1994, p. 328) emphasizes that the history of media effects was formed in four stages. The first stage started in the early 20th century and lasted through the late 1930s. This first stage is because of World War I when the mass media maintained a strategic propaganda to influence people's attitudes that resulted in growing fear of enemies. Governments set up bureaus and institutions to use media as a "ways" to influence public opinion. Until the late 1960s, the second stage focused on progress. The significance of this stage is that the effects of media became less noticeable. For instance, according to Klapper (1960, p. 303), campaigns do not change the people's attitude but reinforce it, so the effects are minimal. The early 1970s gave rise to something new in media effects. It was a shift from the attitude change to a cognitive change, and this is called the third stage in media effects. The last and present stage started in the early 1980s. In this stage, mass media contributes to the construction of social reality and aims to impact the public discourse, and this was also occurring much earlier.

Social construction means that our realities are shaped by our experiences and our interactions with others. This process has changed with the information age. In contemporary time humans' social interactions happen over mass media and social media. This is an interaction through these constructs, in a cyber environment. These interactions enable the media to affect relationships between individuals. By doing so, biases can be formed, buying preferences of products can be affected, daily discourses are shaped/manipulated, and physical and psychological insults can occur because of what transpire in this social environment. The perception in the media is what the writer or journalist sees and recasts about reality. Hence, the distinction between conveying a message, and conveying information manifest itself in this context (Gamson, Croteau, Hoynes, & Sasson, 1992, pp. 373-393).

There is an interesting story about Tolstoy's visit to Germany on an educational tour (Margalit, 2010, pp. 66-72). Tolstoy attended a class in which the teacher showed the students a picture of a fish. "What is it?" the teacher asked. "A fish," answered the students. "No," said the teacher. The students were puzzled. The teacher kept repeating his question, and eventually, the students became even more curious. Then the teacher said, "It is not a fish. It is a picture of a fish!" In this story, the teacher shows the difference between reality and representation. The word fish points out both the real fish and its picture. The changes in the technology of reproduction have led to perceive a subliminal representation of reality (Baudrillard, 1988, pp. 166-171). A picture of fish with a good narrative can create a perception of having a fish. Perception management, therefore, through all kinds of media, is a political tool that is used very effectively and efficiently.

2.1.4   Framing Through Translation

Framing can even start with translation. According to the *Merriam-Webster* dictionary, translation means to change words from one language to another. However, some words have more than one meaning, and the words have synonyms that convey the same meaning. According to William Weaver (1984, pp. 17-18), the problem of translation of words is about the word in living discourse, in the context of the daily conversation and reading. As a matter of fact, this is the most significant point to distinguish a translator from computer-aided translation machines such as Google Translate from a real human translator.

Translation machines do not have a bias, motives, intentions, and perspectives to affect the translation process but they are only as good as the algorithms they possess. According to Baker (2007, pp. 151-169), translators make choices between adverbs, pronouns, and another type of words when they translate a text from one language to another. Translation of a text is

constrained with how translator labels an event, place, or groups, positioning individuals and communities in a social or political context. This process is called reframing of a subject. This framing process also determines the position of translators and embed them in a concrete political reality. Bell (1991, p. 161) points out that as "Current thinking among translation theorists … insist that a translated text be a new creation which derives from careful reading; a reconstruction rather than a copy."

Mastermind defines this re-creation process as "trans-editing," which involves both translation and editing to adapt the text to the target language culture (Stetting, 1989, p. 374).

Kyle Conway (2010, pp. 187-205) defines two types of cultural resistance, which journalists engage in the translation of the news. The first resistance is related to the problem of localization of a text. He argues that journalists shape the text according to their readers' profiles to make the translation meaningful. The second one is more about the language and its rhetorical and figurative dimensions. For example, the flag of nations has different meaning groups in various cultures. The second cultural resistant definition of Kyle Conway is introduced as a cultural dissonance between the source and target cultures by Davoudi et al. (2013, pp. 94-99). To bridge, these gaps, authors offer two basic translation strategies which are domestication and foreignization. Both these strategies provide linguistic and cultural guidance. According to these strategies, translators translate a text, not in a writer-oriented, word-to-word translation style but rather, in a reader-oriented sense-to-sense style which is called communicative translation. However, it is hard to separate a translator's stereotypes, worldviews, and ideologies from the act of translating.

During my childhood, my mom used to watch Turkish-vocalized American soap operas, for example, "The Young and the Restless." Nowadays, Korean soap operas are more popular in

Turkey. One manifestation of this is that the Turkish soap operas have been adapted from Korean stories. These soap operas include Turkish cultural objects, such as Ramadan evenings and the programs have adjusted to being more acceptable to their audiences. The remaking process of the international phenomenon is not limited to soap operas. The advertisements, movies, and smartphone applications are all part of this trend. In literature, the remaking process is not just from pages to screen, but also in the translation of language. Interpretation of a novel, a narrative or news involves a process of framing or reframing (Goffman, 1974, p. 53). Valdeón (2014, pp. 51-62) called this re-making process an adaptation He asserts that journalists adapt the source news text according to readers' expectation. It also allows the media to select what to publish, when, and how. Therefore, a cultural adaptation may turn out to be a power turn for the media.

The earlier studies on the ethical perspectives of translations and the relation between power and translation go back to 1950s. According to Tymoczko and Gentzler (2002), academic communities became aware of how translated texts; 1) could manipulate the reader; 2) could serve to achieve the desired effects regarding a religious faith, consumption of products, or become a literary success (Arrojo, Cronin, Fenton, Gutiérrez, Larkosh, & Lianeri, 2002, p. Introduction). A significance study in this framework belongs to James R. Holmes (1970). He analyzed the impacts and the purposes of the translation techniques of the news. Since then, scholars have articulated the issues of power and translation and manipulation of perception in each society to achieve the desired culture (Arrojo, Cronin, Fenton, Gutiérrez, Larkosh, & Lianeri, 2002, p. introduction).

Scholars such as Bassnett and Levefere (1990, p. 5), and Venuti (1995, p. 216) define the translation process as a "cultural turn" between sources of culture and the target cultures. For translators, the big challenge is that how to negotiate meaning while still transferring knowledge.

A category can have different cultural meaning codes in two different societies, for example, the notion of race. The socio-cultural representation of the context is different for instance in the US and Turkey. This misrepresentation means that some texts can have different versions of the meaning in various cultures. In this regard, translators give rise to cultural change, and it challenges public discourse. According to Foucault (Foucault, 1972), social practices produce discourse, and these discourses represent knowledge. Besides, it is true that discourses produce social practices. If one says and the other one does, it turns out to be "power turn" more than "cultural turn" (Arrojo, Cronin, Fenton, Gutiérrez, Larkosh, & Lianeri, 2002, p. 1). Therefore, the outcome of translation challenges the structure of the society.

Among the translations of written texts, the translation of news is distinguished from the others in two aspects; these are an editorial process and national boundaries. Schaffner and Bassnet (1990) emphasize that first editing of the news is completed in the original language. After this editing, the translated texts are summarized, and they are translated into another language. The following steps are editing them down by considering national boundaries. The capability of global circulation of the news has transformed news to a political tool. This tool impacts the perceived image of the nations. Austermuhl (2007, pp. 39-51) points out:

> …become part of a global political discourse that plays such an important role in the creation of representations of both individuals and nations alike, such representations being so central to the creation, affirmation or contestation of national identities in a globalized world.

This formed image can give rise to the misrepresentations about a nation. This misrepresentation can result in possible problems both in domestic and foreign affairs. While doing this, it is crucial to be careful about the balance between the freedom of the media and ethics of the media.

Freedom of the media comprises two aspects of human rights. These are the freedom of expression and right to access to the information. The developments in technology, communications, and information systems engender diverse media platforms. These platforms, unfortunately, might exploit different ideologies, beliefs, intentions, and agendas. Andrew Puddephat (2011, p. 9) expresses that the freedom of expression (a means of communication) has public dimensions. These dimensions are the exchange of opinions, ideas, and information. However, it is not an absolute right and needs to be restricted to protect the rights of others. For example, we prohibit speech that incites violence or hatred against a racial group. The media and states have responsibilities in the society. The media must abide by the international press ethic codes and judicial decisions while maintaining editorial independence. The responsibility of the states is to maintain media's independence and the right of others to the rule of law. The states should avoid restricting the freedom of expression and should not use the power of media to form public opinion.

2.2 The Literature

There are various studies about the translation and the framing in academic literature. Goffman (1974, p. 10).was the first person who identified the framing theory A subsequent contribution by Entman and Schufele introduce the media effects of framing theory as ''perceived reality'' (Entman, 1993, p. 52) and ''social constructionism'' (Scheufele, 1999, pp. 103-122). There are remarkable academic contributions about how public opinion formed through framings, which belongs to such as Mc Quail (1994) and Gamson and Modiglioni (1989). The formation of public opinion through news coverage is largely studied in mass communication. However, a small number of works studied editorial and opinion columns in framing research. For instance, Guy Gaylon (2013) examined framing of op-ed columnists about

the Egyptian revaluation. Ahmet Sahlane (2012) studied the framing of op-ed columnists about the 2003 Iraq War. This study will be the first that investigates the framings of columnists regarding the July 15th coup attempt that occurred in Turkey.

The influence of news making in translation has become noticeable in the literature. The interest in the literature is the emergence of the disparity between the original text and the translated text with the influence of editing process (Baker, 2007) and cultural resistance (Kadhim, 2014). There are a couple of works which examine framing differences emerge through translation (Darwish, 2009). In this study, I investigate the framings that columnists used in their newspaper articles. As a part of this study, I also examine the framing differences of the same articles in two languages: Turkish and English. I could not find any study in my literature review about the framing difference between translation and original articles of the columnists.

The significance of this work from the literature perspective has two aspects. First, framings of the columnists, who were employed to inform public about July 15th coup attempt, will be examined for the first time. Second, framing differences that emerge through the translation process for the same articles of these columnists will be studied for the first time.

2.3 Summaries and Research Question

Articles of columnists are among the significant merits for newspapers' credibility. The balance of political power can be manifested in newspapers through these articles, for which the columnists are a part of a broad ideological spectrum. The columnists communicate with their audience through their articles which also possess an influential power. The message that is conveyed through the articles and the employed techniques to convey this message in a robust way is known as the process of persuasion. The persuasive purpose mostly serves to change or reinforce the audiences' attitudes, beliefs, values, and behaviors.

Framing theory is also known as a persuasion strategy. Framing and reframing processes of the daily news affect the daily discourses of individuals. Every individual perceives things differently, for instance, the duality in understanding. One person can understand a situation with excitement; on the contrary, another person can understand the same situation with horror. An incident can have different narratives or descriptions. The variations in intention and motive affect the narratives. Consequently, framing and reframing of the news affect the perception of the audiences about public issues.

The different motives and the intentions of the translators affect the interpretation of the news. The incongruity in the meaning of an utterance, the problems of untranslatability, and the complex relationship between language and culture all impose different understanding of the news. In addition to this, the hegemonic powers such as states or interest groups' media institutions affect both the translation and framing of the news. In this study, I focused on as a research question: How did Turkish newspaper columnists contribute to the understanding of subsequent events of July 15th, 2016 coup attempt?

CHAPTER 3

SCOPE AND METHODOLOGY

3.1 Scope

The methodology in this study is inductive empirical work. I focused on how columnists frame the July 15th coup attempt in their articles. To understand the contribution of columnists to the manipulation of the society, I conducted a comparative research analysis between the *Sabah* and *Hurriyet* newspapers under the guidance of a qualitative content method. Hsieh and Shannon (2005, pp. 1277-1288) explain content analysis as a method for a subjective interpretation of textual data. This qualitative analysis provides a holistic meaning and insights through a systematic classification of the coding process and identifying the themes and patterns (Kracauer, 1952, pp. 631-642). Moreover, I used a q-sort to determine the categories that deal with subjective issues. There is not a universal template of frames, however they emerged from the reading the columns. In addition, I employed a discourse analysis with close reading to specify the persuasion techniques used by the columnists.

3.2 Procedures

I scrutinized the framing of the articles of columnists in three ways: a) Identifying the frames the columnists of the newspapers used in their articles and tabulating the frequency these frames; b) Framing differences of the articles in the English and Turkish version of the newspapers.

Four research questions guided my research. These are:

1. *RQ₁: What are the frames that columnists used in their articles for each newspaper?*
It is crucial to identify the frames to discover the framing differences. In this study, the categories are identified after the coding process. They emerged from the reading the looking

at the columns and I used a q-sort to determine the categories. The four emerged categories are legitimization, legality, enemies of democracy, and power. Then, I identified the frequency of using in each framing category according to the newspapers. I only choose major frames, rather than isolated frames that might have occurred once or twice. As a result of identifying frames process, four categories ensued. The content of categories presented in Table 2.

Table 1. Content of Framing Categories

Categories	Framings
Power	The citizens prevented the Coup attempt
	Stay in the street; we are still in danger
Legality	State of Emergency Decrees (SEDs) are necessary; execution of SEDs is legal
	Fair trial
	Not quality but affiliation
Enemies of Democracy	Gulen is behind the coup attempt
	Other countries are behind the coup attempt
	All dissenters are responsible
Legitimization	The Ergenekon terror network is a fabricated terror network
	The first coup attempt was the 17-25 December accusation

I observed that the articles could include more than one framing. Hence, the total numbers of articles are not equal to the total number of framing items.

The second step of this inquiry is to identify the differences and similarities in framings that emerge through the translation process. Consequently, the second and the third research questions are;

2. *RQ2: What are the framing differences that emerged after the translation process of the articles in the Sabah newspaper and the Daily Sabah newspaper?*

3. *RQ₃: What are the framing differences that emerged after the translation process of the articles in the Hurriyet newspaper and the Daily Hurriyet newspaper?*

To answer this question, I categorized the data into five areas;

    1) Heading differences

    2) Deletion

    3) Addition

    4) Example differences

    5) Term differences

4. *RQ₄: Is there any shifting of columnists' framings before and after July 15th coup attempt? If there exist, what are they?*

In addition to the above-mentioned research questions, I decided to look into the shifts in the forming of the columnists before and after the July 15th coup attempt. These research questions seek to understand whether (and how) the Turkish media played a role in the formation of public opinion.

3.3 Data Collection

I collected data through the *Sabah, Daily Sabah, Hurriyet* and *Daily Hurriyet* newspapers web archives. I collected three articles from each columnist. The total number of columnists analyzed was 88. I did not collect the articles of columnists who wrote on the subjects such as the economy, celebrities, sports, and health. The reason for the selection of these newspapers is that only these two newspapers maintain English versions. According to the time intervals that I examined, my first data is on July 17th and the last data is on September 21st. Each columnist writes with a different schedule in the newspapers. Some of them write once in a week, and some write three days in a week. The coup attempt occurred on the evening of July 15, 2016.

Columnists submit their articles the night of the preceding day. Therefore, the July 16

newspapers had no articles about the coup attempt. Thus, the best possible starting date was July

17, and I collected three articles from each columnist. The article and number of columnists for

to newspapers for each step is presented in Table 22.

Table 2. Number of Articles and Columnists According to Newspapers for Each Step

Newspaper	Step 1		Step 2	
	Columnists	Articles	Columnists	Articles
Sabah	20	60	5	15
Daily Sabah	22	66	5	15
Hurriyet	27	81	8	24
Hurriyet Daily	19	57	8	24

3.3.1 The *Hurriyet* Newspaper and the *Hurriyet Daily* Newspaper

The *Hurriyet* has become Turkey's largest circulating newspaper in 2016. In Turkey,

large multi-sectorial groups dominate media ownership, such as the Dogan Group. The Dogan

Group owns the mainstream daily *Hurriyet* and the English daily *Hurriyet Daily* News. The

Hurriyet newspaper's editorial line is nationalistic, pro-military, pro-state, and pro-secular

(Scientist, 2008). The economic concerns and business interests of Dogan Group results in a shift

of the group's political stance, which forms the *Hurriyet* Newspapers coverage and editorial line.

This change occurs overtime depending on the ideological hegemony, e.g. laicism or political

Islam. For example, the Turkish government in 2009 controversially fined Dogan Holdings $2.5

billion for alleged unpaid back taxes. The fine was equivalent to four-fifths of Dogan Holdings'

market value of $3.1 billion (Holding & Grubu, 2014). Following this incident, on October 4th,

2015, Aydin Dogan, the founder and the honorary chairman of Dogan Holding made a statement

to the media (Hurriyet Newspaper, 2015):

"My media group is the most careful media group in covering news about President Recep

Tayyip Erdoğan and his family. However, we are independent. I do not have to be pro-

government, but I cannot be anti-government, either."

As indicated by Mr. Dogan, the media cannot maintain a single stance regarding the

government. It is difficult to maintain while sustaining the business relations. Hurriyet has been

among the highest circulated newspapers in Turkey and according to the Dogan group sources,

the group paid a reduced amount, which was 700 million dollars.

As seen at Table 3, *Hurriyet* still has the highest circulation. This highest circulation

means that it plays a major role in shaping public opinion as take a side by hegemonic power.

Table 3. Circulations of Newspapers for January 2017

Newspaper	Circulation	Price
Hurriyet	315 654	1 TL
Sabah	315 201	1 TL
Sozcu	274 500	0,75 TL
Posta	263 537	0,5 TL
Turkiye	143 909	0,75 TL

3.3.2 *Sabah* Newspaper and *Daily Sabah* Newspaper

The *Sabah Newspaper* is recognized as a pro-government newspaper and owned by a pro-government media group (Rethink Institute Washington DC, 2014). The media ownership was in a swing during the AKP's second term. The 2015 Media integrity report indicates that tax penalties forced newspapers into bankruptcy. The bankrupted newspapers were bought by the new emerging business groups

The Nielsen Company's Advertisement Expenditure (ADEX) published an advertising information report regarding Turkish press and, in this report, 18 national newspapers were examined. The findings are interesting, because *Sabah* received the most public advertising slots in the first six months of 2014, shown in Figure 1. According to this *Zaman* has the highest circulation and the fewest commercial ads, as seen in Figure 2 and

Figure 3. It is interesting that a government choose not to advertise in the newspaper that reaches the highest number of people. This is an indication of how the political polarization manifests itself in the media.

HANGİ GAZETE KAMUDAN NE KADAR REKLAM ALDI?*	Sabah	Star	Milliyet	Hürriyet	Akşam	Habertürk	Yeni Şafak	Takvim	Türkiye	Yeni Akit	Posta	Cumhuriyet	Zaman	Bugün	Sözcü
GAZETELERİN TİRAJI (**)	326.900	129.627	164.295	395.660	104.110	201.044	123.230	109.226	174.779	62.289	407.107	52.051	1.089.878	165.468	361.742
Türk Telekom	5.322	5.001	796	5.763	1.173	590	1.117	673	594	785	414	200	1.116	413	150
Emlak Konut GYO	4.442	3.080	3.640	4.050	2.997	3.739	3.066	1.362	3.080	4.121	3.038	0	0	0	0
Halkbank	4.268	5.454	1.373	1.802	1.585	531	2.961	1.449	1.089	0	1.081	0	0	0	0
Vakıfbank	3.643	2.174	1.980	1.080	3.161	833	0	1.945	2.356	0	0	0	0	0	0
Ziraat Bankası	3.132	826	180	323	532	295	180	1.134	180	180	258	0	0	0	0
Ankara Büyükşehir Bel.	3.042	0	2.511	3.015	0	4.012	0	2.574	0	0	234	0	0	0	0
Bursa Büyükşehir Bel.	1.719	0	6.927	1.892	234	1.033	234	0	0	0	1.099	0	0	0	0
Ttnet	1.397	5.167	1.393	1.393	1.580	1.372	1.100	1.577	1.217	180	1.143	280	420	354	0
İstanbul Büyükşehir Bel.	1.334	610	873	366	528	398	1.011	0	540	548	240	536	0	0	0
Özelleştirme İdaresi	1.230	45	0	0	775	0	385	0	0	476	0	0	0	0	0
Türksat	936	936	936	936	936	1.180	936	936	936	972	1.206	0	0	0	0
İller Bankası	936	927	936	1.182	936	0	936	0	936	963	0	0	0	0	0
Türk Hava Yolları	761	234	234	0	234	288	234	234	234	234	0	0	0	0	0
İstanbul Şehir Tiyatroları	648	640	644	360	624	398	648	0	648	656	0	644	0	354	0
Borsa İstanbul A.Ş.	567	230	895	0	963	33	280	280	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
TOKİ	540	540	540	490	790	0	540	540	540	546	540	0	0	0	0
GAZETELERİN ALDIĞI TOPLAM İLAN MİKTARI	33.917	25.864	23.857	22.651	17.048	14.702	13.628	12.704	12.350	9.661	9.252	1.660	1.536	1.121	150

(*) The Nielsen Company araştırma şirketinin basın ilanlarının takibi için geliştirdiği ADEX sisteminin 2014 ilk 6 aylık verilerinden hazırlanmıştır, sütun santim.
(**) Yay-Sat ve BBD gazete dağıtım şirketlerinin 2014 ilk altı ayındaki gazete satış verilerinin günlük aritmetik ortalaması alınmıştır.

Figure 1. Public Advertising Slats

Figure 2. Government Agency Distribution

Circulation Distribution

Bugun 4%
Sozcu 9%
Sabah 9%
Star 3%
Milliyet 4%
Hurriyet 10%
Aksam 3%
Haberturk 5%
Yeni Safak 3%
Takvim 3%
YeniAkity 2%
Posta 11%
Turkiye 5%
Cumhuriyet 1%
Zaman 28%

Figure 3. Circulation Distributions of Newspapers

3.4 Limitations

This research focuses on the articles of the columnists in both the *Sabah* and *Hurriyet* newspapers as a case study. The ensuing implications of the state of emergency regulations in Turkey resulted in the closing of all English language newspapers but the *Sabah Daily* and the *Hurriyet Daily*. These closings might lead to a concern about the objectivity of this research in the sense of reflexivity. The reflexivity could have been bettered, if I were able to collect data that represent not only pro-government but also diverse dissident opinions.

Another limitation of this research is that I am not a professional translator. I am a native Turkish speaker and English is my second language. In this regard, I consulted two academics, whose native language is Turkish, to control the translation differences between Turkish and English versions of articles to sustain the credibility.

CHAPTER 4

DATA ANALYSIS

4.1 The Background Information

4.1.1 July 15th, 2016 Coup Attempt

The Turkish people learned the existence of a faction within the Turkish Armed Forces on the night of July 15th, 2016. This faction called themselves the *"Peace at Home Council."* This faction claimed responsibility for the attempted a coup against the government and President Erdoğan on July 15, 2016. Lower ranking military personnel invaded the National Turkish Television and Radio Agency (TRT) in Ankara. Allegedly, soldiers coerced the anchor to read the statement of the council. On that night, President Erdoğan spoke to CNN Turkish via FaceTime and urged people to the streets to protect their country and democracy. After this call, people filled the streets to protect their sovereign state against any invasion. The civilians stayed in the street for days. The unfortunate and sad outcome of July 15, 2016 is that 265 people were killed (161 of them proclaimed as martyrs by the government) and more than 1,440 were wounded (154 of them civilians) in Turkey.

The following 25 days of the coup attempt, people were voluntarily on the streets all over the Turkey. These people believed that they were out to guard the public places while celebrating a sovereign democracy. Both the government and President Erdoğan urged people to be on the streets. The rhetoric was that the "threat against our democracy and freedom, is not over yet." The following days of July 15th coup attempt unfolded into unprecedented developments such as heroic stories of that night, purges, and state of emergency in Turkey. The newspapers, television, and radio broadcasts were full of heroic narratives about that night and how people stopped tanks and F-16 jets to protect democracy while demonizing the coup plotters.

The assessment of the proceeding ten days of the July 15th coup attempt is

- 15,846 people detained (10,012 of them are soldiers);

- 8,133 arrested;

- 934 private schools, four military academies closed;

- 35 hospitals, 105 dormitories, 15 universities, 1,229 civil institutions closed;

- 19 worker unions shut down.

- The government confiscated assets and buildings of all these institutions and arrested individuals.

- More than 5,000 medical personnel.

- 21,738 teachers.

- 44,669 state officers fired.

- More than 150 journalists jailed,

- 1,557 deans of different universities asked to leave their positions.

Although the general perception is that the July 15 coup attempt failed, the ensuing situation, however, is counter-intuitive for the half of the country.

 Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan declared a state of emergency to protect democratic values. Emergency rules allowed the government to issue a decree with the force of law and allowed for detaining any detainee for extended periods, e.g. 30 days, without a court appearance.

The government held the Gulen Movement responsible for the coup attempt and accused Fethullah Gulen of being the mastermind of the failed coup attempt.

4.1.2 Fethullah Gulen and the Gulen Movement

Fethullah Gulen is a 75-year-old Islamic cleric who has lived in Pennsylvania since 1999 and leads the Gulen Movement. The Gulen Movement is a faith-based civil society movement that inspired by Fethullah Gulen's life and works. Gulen prefers "the Hizmet Movement" because that emphasizes the service of those involved instead of him (Ebaugh, 2010, pp. 47-64). The Movement emerged in the late 1960s in Turkey with a handful of people and this circle has expanded ever since (Kalyoncu, 2008, p. 1). Participants of movement are from every part of life and include students, teachers, business people, academicians, politicians, employees, officials, singers, and journalists. From a variety of backgrounds, people joined together and claimed to be no more than "volunteers," rich, poor, Turks, Kurds, and even non-Muslims (Bulent & Omer, 2000, pp. 30-43).

Since the coup attempt, more than 100,000 people have been detained and jailed with a label of belonging the Gulen Movement. In fact, nobody knows how many of the accused even have an organic connection with the movement. All the allegations are either based on so-called confessions and narration. There are concerns about the confessions because they may have been derived through torture and other human right violations.

4.2 The Analysis of Framing Types

I have introduced the general categories of the framings. In this chapter, I articulate the constituent framing types.

4.2.1 Power

According to my data analysis, the articles mostly address power in two types of framings;

1. The coup attempt was prevented by Turkish civilians;

2. Stay on the street; we are still in danger.

For the first framing, the patriotic Turks are depicted as heroes. These heroes save not only the democracy but also the sovereignty of the state and the life of the president.

The second framing is that the coup threat is not over, a second attempt is imminent. Therefore, everybody should be alert.

According to Foucault, social practices produce public discourse and public discourse produces new social practices. In this regard, the resistance of individuals to the coup attempt albeit a very brave action, but a dangerous one. Because first, if tanks and jets had responded with their lethal capabilities, the lives of thousands of innocent people could have been lost. Second, although it was after the government took over control, calling people to the streets to guard their country resulted in uncountable groups, which were prone to any provocation. Hence, it could have resulted in chaos. After the coup attempt, two main discourses emerged. The first was personal gun ownership and the second was the death penalty for the coup plotters. The term "coup plotter" has become a bandwagon term to purge any dissent. The justification narratives that are comprised of nationalistic sentiments gave rise these two discourses. The ensuing public discourse influenced the people and mobilized to protect democratic values, and this gained huge support from the representatives of the incumbent party and state officials. The percentage of these two frames with respect to the newspapers are presented in Table 4 and Figure 4.

Table 4. The Percentage of Power Frames with Respect to the Newspapers

Newspaper	Number of Articles	Coup Attempt Prevented by the Turks	Stay in Streets
Sabah	60	40	10
Hurriyet	81	26	2
Daily Sabah	66	37	5
Hurriyet Daily	57	13	2

Figure 4. The Percentage of Power Frames with Respect to the Newspapers

The columnists of the *Sabah* and *Daily Sabah* newspapers used two framings more than

the *Hurriyet* newspaper. Specifically, the columnists of the *Sabah,* with one exception, Mehmet

Barlas, consistently highlight that Turkish civilians prevented the coup attempt. They used

mostly heroic and patriotic narratives and analogies between the resistance to the coup attempt

and the Independence and the Canakkale wars. Besides, all the columnists in the *Sabah* pointed out that they were on the streets on that night like everyone else, "*who loves their country*." A minor group of columnists, such as Hasan Bulent Kahraman, retrospectively analyzed Turkey's coup history. Kahraman asserted that the awareness of democracy of the Turkish citizens prevented a coup and the entire incident is a sign of this. For example, he says earlier coups in Turkish history were supported by Turkish civilians. Seven columnists of the *Sabah* newspaper underlined the fact that the "*job is not done yet*." Therefore, people need to stay in streets to support the government and to utter the democracy message to the face all the enemies of the Turkish Republic and the Turkish people.

The *Daily Sabah* used fewer two frames than the *Sabah* newspaper. It is remarkable that the columnists highlighted the diversity of the people in the street and narrated that "*it was not just the supporters of President Erdoğan and the government*." There were people from all the diverse constituents of Turkish population regardless of the ethnicity, ideology, and background (e.g. Kurds). The columnists, who used this frame frequently, narrated this point to demonstrate the agreement among the Turkish people regarding the coup. In doing so, consequently, the narrations provided rational to support the government's decisions, which occurred after the coup attempt.

The *Hurriyet* and the *Hurriyet Daily* have used these frames less than the *Sabah* and the *Daily Sabah* newspapers have. It was difficult initially to grasp the outcome of the heroic narratives. After a retrospective analysis, a comprehensive understanding emerges. The narratives provide the necessary justification of the macro level decision and actions. These narratives provide coherent justification. For example, a common heroic narrative and framing is very dominant regarding rebellion action against the tanks and F-16 jets, which have the

destructive capabilities. Since there is no power balance between the civilians and these powers, a narrative becomes indispensable to make the editorial line acceptable.

The columnists of the *Hurriyet* also used heroic and patriotic narratives, however, with less exaggeration with the limits of causality. For example, one cannot find news about the "hero," who attacked to a flying F-16 fighter jet. One can find the *Hurriyet* columnists, criticizing the government for calling the people to the streets every night. After the coup attempt, President Erdoğan and his government organized democracy celebrations with opposition parties with the exception of Democracy Party of People (HDP), which is known as a Kurdish political party. The *Hurriyet* and the *Daily Hurriyet* also criticized the government for this discrimination and emphasized that Kurds also denounced the coup attempt immediately on that night.

4.2.2 Legality

Under the legality category, there are three frames;

1. State of Emergency Decrees (SED) are a need and the execution of them is legal;
2. Fair trial;
3. Not quality but affiliation.

After the July 15th coup attempt, the State of Emergency Decrees were implemented by the government to maintain the governing. The number of people influenced by the decisions is high. As a result, the first framing is to provide rational for the decision, which were executed during the State of Emergency Decrees. There are columnists who stressed fair trials for the detained and jailed people. According to the public statements of the attorneys of the detainees, who have not seen any evidence, and yet they do not know the allegations and accusations. Consequently, there is a big concern for fair trials. The columnists, who criticized the

government's use of SED, employ the fair trial frame, which is the second frame. The third

frame was used mostly as a legitimate reason for the dismissal of people from their jobs,

assignments, and confiscation of individual property. These columnists assert that expelled

people got their positions, established the businesses through an affiliation, not because of their

abilities.

With respect to the newspapers, the percentage of these three frames presented in and

Figure 5.

Table 5. The Percentage of Legality Frames with Respect to the Newspapers

Newspaper	Number of Articles	SED is Legal; Execution is Legal	Fair Trial	Not Quality, but Affiliation
Sabah	60	11	0	1
Hurriyet	81	6	23	11
Daily Sabah	66	13	0	3
Hurriyet Daily	57	3	16	6

Figure 5. The Percentage of Legality Frames with Respect to the Newspapers

The *Daily Sabah* and the *Sabah* newspaper used the first frame more frequently.

Columnists justified the exploitation of the SED by the government as a routine procedure.

These columnists promulgate that this is also employed in Western countries when necessary. In

this regard, the columnists often give France and the US as examples. One day before the coup

attempt, the French government declared a SED regarding the Nice attack. The other example,

which the columnists articulated, is the 9/11 case for the US. The US government used SED to

justify the high number of detainees. For example, the *Sabah* newspaper columnist, Mehmet

Barlas, stresses the point that the US practiced Guatemala Law for detained people after 9/11

attacks.

The *Hurriyet* and the *Hurriyet Daily* columnists mostly criticized SED. There is a limited

number of articles which argues that SED is necessary to provide stabilization of a country in a

short period. The first SED was declared on July 20th by the Turkish government. More than

8,000 policemen, 6,000 officers, around 3,000 judges and prosecutors, 20,000 teachers, 1,500

university deans and many more civilians had already been dismissed. I think it is an interesting point. Because, with the exception of one article from the *Hurriyet Daily*, no one questioned why the government needed a declaration of SED. No columnist asked the question of the content of this declaration and how would it apply and impact freedom of individuals.

The European Union criticized and expressed their concern regarding the limits of the SED. They expressed the fact that this would suspend the rights and freedom granted by the European Union. They urged the government to stop this procedure. The *Hurriyet* and the *Hurriyet Daily* warned the government not to exploit SED and to be careful about fair trials. The columnists expressed their concerns about jeopardizing the Turkey's EU negotiations because of the unlawful treatments to SED detainees and jailed people. The *Sabah* and the *Daily Sabah* did not have any discussion about fair trials or EU negotiations.

The *Hurriyet* and the *Hurriyet Daily* anchored the third framing to justify the purge. The promulgated framing is that these dismissed people were promoted based on affiliation, rather than quality or ability. The columnists held the government responsible for letting these people infiltrate the state structure. For example, Mehmet Yilmaz, who is a columnist of both *Hurriyet* and *Hurriyet Daily*, complains: "This is the consequence of appointing civil servants according to their loyalty to organizations such as a community, sect or cult."

Another claim of the columnists is that these people were able to attain the central matriculation exam questions and got their job in that way. These are all still allegations at this stage and requires further evidence. A leap faith or legendary narration can be used during the trial process. One of the columnists of the Hurriyet, Ahmet Hakan, asserts that all of the dismissed people have links to the Gulen Movement, which means, according to him, they trained for years in Gulen schools to seize state control. Therefore, they can do anything to

implement their aim and attaining the exam questions beforehand is nothing for them. Thus, this is how they got key positions in the government's bureaucracy.

The *Sabah* and *Daily Sabah* newspapers do not have any framing about fair trials and have very small number of framing about 'not quality but the affiliation'. Since 2002, the AKP has been an incumbent ruling party in Turkey. Consequently, a pro-government newspaper should not provide a framing that eventually could hold the government responsible for a possible infiltration to the state by specific group.

4.2.3 Enemies of Democracy

The notion of "*The Enemies of Turkish Democracy*" is the dominant cliché in the discourse of President Erdoğan. The newspapers adopted the same cliché notion in the editorial rhetoric and had been using it frequently after the coup attempt. There are three entities, which are framed for the responsibility of the coup attempt;

1. Fethullah Gulen,

2. Other countries, and

3. All the other dissenters.

The first framing is about Fethullah Gulen, who resides in the state of Pennsylvania in the USA. The newspapers, government officials, and other media outlets had been orchestrating the idea that Gulen is the mastermind of the coup. Since July 15th, Gulen denied and continues to deny any relation with the coup. He requested an international commission to investigate the coup attempt. Turkish government has not initiated formation of an international commission yet. Turkish government requested from USA an extraction for Gulen to Turkey, yet no progress has been attained.

The second framing, depending on the context, is that other countries were depicted as masterminds of the coup. One example of this is an international consortium, which is composed of Israel, the US, and the United Kingdom. In this frame, there is an interesting narrative, which promulgates the idea that Turkey is becoming an international power with military and economic power. Therefore, this consortium appeared to want to diminish Turkey's influence. The last framing is that all the dissenters of the incumbent ruling party are in collaboration with other countries and Fethullah Gulen. This framing generates a very loose pretext, and anybody could fit into it.

The usage frequency with respect to some articles for these three frames is presented in Table 6 and Figure 6.

Table 6. The Percentage of the Enemies of Democracy Frames with Respect to the Newspapers

Newspaper	Number of Articles	Gulen is Behind the Coup Attempt	Other Countries are Behind the Coup Attempt	Dissidents are Responsible
Sabah	60	43	11	18
Hurriyet	81	35	7	7
Daily Sabah	66	55	50	1
Hurriyet Daily	57	37	15	0

Figure 6. The Percentage of the Enemies of Democracy Frames with Respect to the Newspapers

The English language newspapers *Daily Sabah* and *Hurriyet Daily* have more frames regarding the masterminds of the coup. These frames hold Gulen and certain countries responsible for the coup. The columnists of these newspapers and the Turkish versions assert that there is a consensus about Gulen. The Turkish people think that he is the mastermind. Therefore, there is no need for any proof. However, both the American and Europane media have not resorted to blaming anyone and will not without substantial evidence. Moreover, countries like the USA, Canada, and Germany accept supporters or volunteers of the Gulen Movement who have sought asylum.

The columnists used these supporting statements and the acceptance of the asylum application as a leveraging point for their argument and they indicated that this is because it means that Gulen planned everything. He received support and help from the other countries, which cannot accept a super power Turkey. According to this argument, Gulen works for other

countries' intelligence services. The consortium planned everything and used Gulen to attain the desired end state. Various Turkish government officers and spokespeople also expressed both possibilities. However, countries like the US and Germany denied all these claims repeatedly.

The *Sabah* newspaper has a special stance regarding the other dissidents' frames. The columnists in this newspaper maintain a wide spectrum for the supporters of the coup attempt. The columnists did not target exactly a group or society; rather they implicitly described them. For example, Engin Ardic describes these groups as bourgeois, intellectual, and White Turks who have fun in the South Seas coast region or traveling to different countries and do not have even a basic knowledge of Islam. Also, he asserts that CHP was supporting Gulen since the 2013 December 17-25 allegation, which depicted the incidents during this period as coup attempt as well. The interesting point is that after the coup attempt, the *Sabah* columnists blamed CHP followers as being supporters of Gulen and the *Hurriyet* columnists blamed the AKP followers as being supporters of Gulen before 17-25 December allegation.

4.2.4 Legitimization

After the July 15th coup attempt, the Gulen Movement was described as a terrorist network by the government. The movement became the scapegoat for everything, for instance, human right violations for the previous incidents in Turkey. The assertion is that the violations are intentional and being executed by the Gulen Movement followers to jeopardize the government in international platforms. In this regard, columnists used two main frames;

1. The Ergenekon terror network is a fabricated terror network;

2. 17-25 December accusation.

To better understand these framings, I briefly discuss what are Ergenekon and 17-25 December cases. The first framing is about the Ergenekon trials in Turkey, which were started against the

Turkish Gladio in Turkey. In 2007, an investigation was officially launched about a gang organization called "Ergenekon." Over one hundred people had been detained in eight waves of arrests in the controversial operations. One of the most important parts of this investigation was about "Balyoz" (The Sledgehammer) coup plans. The allegations were based on documents published in the daily newspaper *Taraf* on 20 January, 2010. According to the news, a detailed coup preparation had been made against to ruling part AKP. The newspapers and television channels run by the Gülen Movement such as the *Zaman*, *Today's Zaman* and *Samanyolu TV* have vigorously supported the Ergenekon investigation.

Diverse academics and intellectuals also supported the Ergenekon and the Sledgehammer trials. They expressed their support, and clearly articulated their reasons such as being against coups and another anti-democratic means to topple the government. One salient reason was that these trials could bring the rule of law to Turkey. While these trials were breaking news in Turkey, the media institutions associated with the Gulen Movement openly supported the government and judiciary process. There is an interesting subtle point, which could only be noticed through a retrospective analysis. The *Zaman* newspaper and STV broadcasting demonstrated an overwhelming support for Ergenekon trials. As a result, they could not distinguish any judiciary violation or any human right violation in their news coverage. Also, the same retrospective analysis reveals the fact that a couple of media institutions portrayed the Gulen Movement as the mastermind of the Ergenekon and Sledgehammer trials. The ensuing image of this movement is akin to the hidden and strong organization, which can do anything they want. This rendered this framing implementable for the post-coup attempt period.

The second framing is related to the 2013 corruption scandal in Turkey, which has been pronounced by the government as the first coup attempt of Gulen Movement. The struggle

between President Erdoğan and Gulen Movement became noticeable in 2013. Before this date,

Fethullah Gulen was not considered an enemy of President Erdoğan. The coverage of the pro-

government media was emphasizing the alliance and harmony between the two. Fethullah Gulen

clearly expressed support President Erdoğan in the September 2010 referendum. On December

17-25, 2013, Turkish police arrested the sons of three cabinet ministers because of a corruption

allegation. The ruling part, AKP, blamed Fethullah Gulen and his movement and accused them

of attempting a civil coup against his government. The "powerful Gulen Movement" depiction

provided the necessary foundation to proclaim the corruption operations as a coup against the

government. Since then, all media institutions that belonged to the Gulen Movement were shut

down. The government confiscated companies with billions of dollars just because they openly

supported the Gulen Movement. In addition, police officers and prosecutors of the December 17-

25 allegation were jailed. At that time, the pro-government media claimed that this was the

Gulen's first coup attempt against the government. After the December 17-25 allegation, the

government started to call the Gulen Movement the "Fethullah Terror Organization (FETO)."

After the coup attempt, they claimed that FETO used the Turkish army as their armed force and

the coup attempt was provided as proof of this. For example, one of the columnists of the *Sabah*,

Mahmut Ovur, indicated this assertion in his article on July 17th, 2016 (Ovur, 2016).

In April 2016, the country's highest appeals court said the lower court's convictions were

being overturned because prosecutors had been unable to prove that Ergenekon existed.

The percentage of these two frames with respect to the newspaper is presented in Table 7

and Figure 7.

Table 7.   The Percentage of Legitimacy Frames with Respect to the Newspapers

Newspaper	Number of Articles	17-25 Accusation was First Coup Attempt	The Ergenekon Allegation is Fabricated
Sabah	60	11	1
Hurriyet	81	2	8
Daily Sabah	66	20	9
Hurriyet Daily	57	3	9

Figure 7. The Percentage of Legitimacy Frames with Respect to the Newspapers

The columnists claimed that the prosecutors of the Ergenekon allegation were members of the Gulen Movement. Therefore, they dismissed some of the high ranking military officers by utilizing the Ergenekon allegations and assigned their members to these posts. According to this

narrative, new job holders attempted to topple the government with the coup on July 15. Except

for one, all the columnists of the *Sabah* newspaper have maintained these narratives since the 17-

25 December accusations. The English version of the *Daily Sabah* employs this frame to

legitimize their claim, which asserts that Fethullah Gulen is the mastermind of the coup attempt.

The reason to maintain this frame in the English version is to foster their claims so that they can

inform the readers in other countries and foreign nationals in Turkey.

The *Sabah* and the *Daily Sabah* columnists blamed the other countries' journalists for not

believing that the 17-25 December was a coup against the government. They asserted that the

July 15th coup attempt proves their claims. Even then, The *Hurriyet* and the *Hurriyet Daily*

newspapers appeared to not use the second frame because of ideological differences.

4.2.5 Discussions and Findings

These four newspapers covered the July 15th coup attempt as a democracy struggle for

Turkey. The main narration that is used is the coup attempt was to topple the elected government

and elected president. It is not acceptable to topple a government with a military coup as this

would ruin the democracy. I think the problem is that promoting the democracy should also be

through democratic means. For example, constructing a discourse about the union of diversity

for democracy struggle and in practice, jailing most of the elected Kurdish parliamentarians and

the mayors contradicts the discourse. Columnists described loyalty to the nation and democracy

by using "the coup attempt was prevented by Turkish civilians" and "stay on the street; we are

still in danger" frames.

Individuals can only demonstrate this loyalty by being civilian guards on the streets and

supporting government decisions. Besides heroic, patriotic narratives and analogies between the

coup attempt and the Independence wars antagonized the populace against the detained, jailed,

and dismissed people. I think the contribution of the columnists' framing to the mobilization of individuals towards a desired end becomes noticeable. Individuals who would never approve the same action for themselves were suddenly ready to act to defend democracy in various ways. Moreover, rising popular public discourse, such as gun ownership and the death penalty, is one of the consequences of this. This public discourse was criticized by columnists of the *Hurriyet* and the *Hurriyet Daily*. On the other hand, the columnists of *Sabah* and *Daily Sabah* supported the gun ownership and death penalty discourse. The values such as equality and freedom are in delay because of the declaration of the state of emergency rules. This is narrated as a necessity to gain stabilization of the country in a short period.

Columnists of the *Sabah* and the *Daily Sabah* compared Turkey with other democratic countries for the declaration of SED. Unfortunately, they did not discuss or compare the rule of law and the right to a fair trial. There are columnists who criticized the illegal treatments because they think these violations would jeopardize the joining to the European Union. They insist that there should be a consensus about Gulen and the Turkish people agreed that he is the mastermind. Therefore, whoever has a link to the Gulen Movement is a potential criminal and need to be punished. These columnists claimed that other countries that have criticized Turkey for violations of human rights and freedoms have hidden aims against Turkey's democratization.

The columnists were looking for an answer to the question as to why Gulen and his followers attempted a coup. To provide a legitimate answer to this question, the columnists asserted that Gulen has a desire of power. In this regard, I observed two different narratives that the columnists have promulgated. The first one starts with the Ergenekon allegation and the second narration starts with the 17-25 December allegations. According to my findings, there is a systematic use of the frames and narratives in each newspaper. Considering narratives that were

used in micro-level justifications, the contribution of the columnists via frames and narratives enhanced and supported judicial acts.

4.3 Translation to Transformation

The audiences of the English and Turkish version of newspapers are different. The English newspaper audience is mostly foreigners or immigrants who work in Turkey. Minority citizens, such as Europeans, also read the English versions of the newspapers. Before the closure of *Today's Zaman*, academics in social sciences were among the audience of the English newspapers. Finally, the readers from other countries who wonder about Turkey also follow English newspapers. Thus, the desired frames may change in different language newspapers according to interests and agendas of the various dominant groups such as the owner of the media group or the hegemonic political structure. To identify the translation difference of between the articles in the Turkish and English version of a newspaper, I conducted a comparison analysis. According to my data, four columnists wrote in both the *Sabah* and the *Daily Sabah* newspapers, and eight columnists wrote in both the *Hurriyet* and the *Hurriyet Daily* newspapers. Some of the columnists did not require translators.

At this point in time without contacting them, I could not determine who was bi-lingual. Columnists often come from the ranks of reporters and while they have more leeway in expressing their opinions, they have the same basic training as journalists. There are a couple of columnists who work in both newspapers but write different articles for the Turkish and English version of the newspaper. These columnists are not included in my comparison analysis. I collected three translated articles for each columnist involved.

I completed my comparison analysis of the data with respect to the following categories:

1. Heading differences;

2. Deletions;

3. Additions;

4. Example differences; and

5. Term differences.

I did not analyze the articles semantically- and syntactically-oriented; rather I analyzed them according to trans-editing process. I looked for these changes by considering the Turkish article as the original article. There are heading differences, which emanated from poor translation. The author or the translating editor translates syntax. They did not translate meaning. There are headings that are entirely different. I monitored headings because it is a fact that readers select the reading list not only because of the columnist but also how heading reads. Therefore, a headline should be concise, and have a message conveying attractive heading. Since I have identified a desire to convince the people outside of Turkey about the coup mastermind, I investigated the writing in detail to find out the reasons for the changes in headings.

For example, in the *Hurriyet Daily*, one of Melis Alphan's articles heading is translated as "*Only those unable to digest human rights*." The heading in the Turkish version was "*Only those unable to digest human rights could endorse torture and capital punishment.*" The original article also mentions concerns about fair trials and torture for detained and jailed people. Moreover, the author also insists that she is against capital punishment and believes that it should not be a punishment option. In the translated version these parts are deleted. An article in the *Hurriyet Daily* mostly complained about the impenetrableness by other countries. Considering the EU's remarks about fair trials and human rights, these deletions would be expected because EU would criticize these.

Deletion and addition categories are the most important categories. Some of the alterations changed the meaning and would raise the question whether it was done intentionally. For example, in the *Hurriyet*, one of Ismet Berkan articles quotes from Taha Ozhan's article. First of all, he mentioned his name as Taha Ozkan both in original and translated article. The second problematic part is the translation of Taha Ozhan's quote. The original quote is "*FETO (Fethullah Terrorist Organization) is such self-sustainable and independent state that it would not be awkward to call as Fethulahistan*." In the *Hurriyet Daily*, this quote is translated as "*the FETO was such a self-sustainable arrangement that it could well be called Fetullistan*." Taha Ozhan is one of the congressmen of AKP (ruling party), and this is mentioned in the original text. However, in the translated text in the *Hurriyet Daily*, it is changed to one of the congressmen of CHP. One of the CHP congressmen could sound more objective, reasonable, and less biased than one of the AKP congressmen considering the fact that Europe would most likely take the comments of the CHP more seriously than those of the AKP. These alterations change the meaning and form and become a context for further narratives. I do not think it is a style issue because in the original article, Ismet Berkan gives a brief introduction about Taha Ozhan, to include his position and responsibilities in the AKP. In the *Hurriyet Daily*, this introduction is deleted.

Another deletion example is related to summarizing the numbers. In the *Hurriyet Daily* newspaper, Mehmet Yilmaz's article entitled "*The Result of Letting Communities and Cults into State Institutions*", the number of detained and dismissed people is not given. In the original article in *Hurriyet*, he says "*Bu bakanlıkta görevden uzaklaştırılanlar arasında 7 bin 899 emniyet personeli, 1'i il valisi, 29'u merkez valisi olmak üzere 30 vali, 52 mülkiye müfettişi, 16 hukuk müşaviri, 1 genel müdür yardımcısı ve 2 daire başkanı da bulunuyor*.". In the translated text,

numbers summarized as *"Thousands of people have been detained since right after the coup attempt….. There are thousands of police and several governors, inspectors, legal experts, deputy general managers and heads of departments among them"*. Using numbers to influence the perception of the people is more efficient and target-oriented. Mehmet Yilmaz complains about retaining people who have a link with the Gulen Movement as government employees for all past years. The numbers are not small, and they demonstrate the spectrum and the impact of the purge. Consequently, deleting the numbers in the English version is beyond being a naïve shortening effort. Because the numbers are high enough to confuse the reader about how the government was able to identify these members in such a short period. In the *Daily Sabah* newspaper, Fahrettin Altun's article,"We are Here to Defend the Country", also has similar deletions and changes to statistical facts between the original text and the translated one.

Another article of Mehmet Yilmaz in the *Hurriyet Daily*, with the title of "We Have to Strengthen our Democracy" has deleted parts in the translated version. Almost half of the article was deleted. In the deleted part, there are critics of the government, national intelligence organizations, and the Ministry of the Interior. Yilmaz blames the government for the coup attempt. His argument is that the AKP, as the government, allowed the infiltration of Gulen supporters to the state posts (e.g. military, judiciary, ministries, police). Moreover, he holds the national intelligence service responsible for not informing the government of the coup attempt earlier. The interesting point is that the last article of Mehmet Yilmaz's article that I examined titled "Attention to Turkey's Self-Declared Guardians" demonstrates similar editing. The criticism of the government was deleted.

Another deletion example from the *Hurriyet* is columnist Fatih Cekirge's "*Reopening Talks with Armenia*" article. In the original article, Cekirge questions the conflicts between the

testimonies of the soldiers who were charged after the coup attempt. In the *Hurriyet Daily*, these parts were deleted. I think it is important because conflicts between the testimonies gave rise to ambiguity and a discussion started in the media.

In terms of differences and examples, there were not any differences between the original and the translated version of any articles. The findings of the comparison analysis in these five categories with respect to the newspaper are presented in Table 8. There are ensuing framing differences because of the heading differences, deletions, and additions. These changes may not end up with a different framing category. However, they influence the perspective of the reader. Highlighting a part of a subject or hiding some parts is a way of framing that is used mostly for the original text and the translated one.

Table 8. Number of Changes According to the Translation Categories with Respect to the Newspapers

Newspaper	Articles	Heading Difference	Deletion	Addition	Term Difference	Example Difference
Sabah and Daily Sabah	12	6	4	1	0	0
Hurriyet and Daily Hurriyet	24	15	16	7	0	0

CHAPTER 5

CONCLUSION

5.1 Conclusion and Summary

In this study, I conduct an analysis to identify the framings regarding the July 15th coup attempt in the articles of the *Sabah, Daily Sabah, Hurriyet* and *Hurriyet Daily* newspapers in three perspectives. I used framing types which were "the coup attempt prevented by Turkish civilians", "stay in the streets, we are still in danger", "State of Emergency Decrees (SED) are needed and the execution of them is legal", "Fair trials", "not quality but affiliation", " Gulen is behind the coup attempt", " Other countries are behind the coup attempt", " All dissenters are responsible", "The Ergenekon terror network is a fabricated terror network", "The 17-25 December accusation". I investigated framings that emerged through the translation of data and the framing shifts before and after the coup attempt.

My findings demonstrate a correlation between the columnists' frames and newspapers. For example, the *Hurriyet* and *Hurriyet Daily* newspapers columnists did not use "stay on the street" and "17-25 accusation was the first coup attempt" framings. The *Hurriyet* and the *Daily Hurriyet* did not agree that the 17-25 accusations were fabricated and the coup attempt cannot be a proof of this assertion. The *Sabah* newspapers columnists did not utilize the "Ergenekon allegation was fake," "fair trials" and "not quality but affiliation" framings. As a pro-government newspaper, the *Sabah* newspapers columnists avoided writing contradictory views of government actions. The English versions of both newspapers did not promulgate the idea of "dissidents are responsible" framing, which is hard to explain in a legitimate way to foreign journalists and intellectuals. The existing hegemonic powers affect the agenda of a newspaper. The influence on the columnists is rather indirect as opposed to the editorial line of the

newspaper. The framings that the columnists used are important because they could form the readers' perspectives and contribute the formation of their opinions.

In the second perspective with regard to translation to transformation, I monitored the framings that emerged through the translation process, which is also related to the independence of the editorial line. The findings demonstrate that the articles were further processed through deletions, additions, and other changes. The reasons for these extra processes may vary; however, they affect the meanings and framings of the articles.

The last thing that I examined in this study is the persuasion role of these newspapers. According to Aristotle, there are three possible ways for a persuasion. These are ethos, logos, and pathos. All these newspapers, because of the target reader variation, have credibility in different segments of the society. For example, the *Sabah* newspaper is known for their pro-government editorial line that is Political Islam. In this regard, the columnists wear headscarves, have beards, and use Islamic rhetoric to generate credibility. On the contrary, a columnist wearing a headscarf would have no credibility to the *Hurriyet* audience. I observed all these notions in the *Sabah* newspaper's choice of columnists. Credibility for a columnist is gained by identifying with the values and practices of the target audience.

Logos refers to proof and the reasoning for the arguments that the columnists used. In all the newspapers, columnists used common consensus for reasoning. The lack of information regarding the coup attempt generated an ambiguous environment. Despite having few facts and conflicting information, all the columnists conveyed the same conclusion, which is "Fethullah Gulen is the mastermind of the coup attempt."

The last persuasion method, pathos, refers to narration and emotions. I observed that all the columnists of the *Sabah* and the *Daily Sabah* newspapers used patriotic and heroic narratives

to influence the emotions such as national feelings and fear. The *Hurriyet* and the *Hurriyet Daily* used the same argument, albeit in a less aggressive way.

These findings are not enough to claim that these media institutions have become a persuasion instrument.

This study contributes to the field of communication research because it manifests how media might become a persuasion instrument. Each of the newspapers that I examined in this study has different perspectives. They demonstrate a desire to influence the perception of the audiences so the premise could be controlled regarding public issues. The coup attempt is a nice example of this. My findings confirm the fact that framing is a practice of repeating certain information. For instance, the framing of "Gulen is behind the coup attempt" was used 170 times by 88 columnists. On the other hand, the framing of "stay in streets, we are still in danger" is the least employed frame used just 19 times by 16 columnists. In recent years, the increment of polarization in Turkish society is an indication of this. In this regard, it is the social responsibility of media not to misinform the public.

5.2 Recommendations for Future Research

In this research I focused on the contribution of columnists in forming the public opinions through frames. Framing in the news coverage of newspapers and news broadcasts should also be investigated in the future research to be able to interpret more objectively how the media contributed to forming public opinion about this particular incident. By examining news coverage and the writing of the columnists, a better picture of the entire framing process used by the newspapers could emerge. Moreover, another future study could include an analysis of the arguments used in the columns in how they utilize the persuasion methods of logos, pathos, and ethos.

In this research, I did not analyze the articles linguistically. One of the reasons is that the main concern of this study is framing. Therefore, I concentrated on the trans-editing process of the articles more than the translation details. These articles can be scrutinized for a more detail translation analysis. The translation differences of the newspaper coverage can also be a research project.

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