Endpoints After Empire: Explaining Varying Levels of Democracy in Post-Communist Europe

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DIFFERENT ENDPOINTS AFTER EMPIRE:

EXPLAINING VARYING LEVELS OF DEMOCRACY IN

POST-COMMUNIST EASTERN EUROPE

by

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ABSTRACT

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William John Eger, Jr.
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The varying levels of democracy in central and eastern Europe provide scholars with an interesting study of democratization. Democracy grew to different levels and in varying ways in the region since the collapse of communism. The evolution of democracy in the region offers insight into which variables affect democracy, a test for established theories of democracy, and a workshop for new theories and hypotheses addressing democratization. This study sought to determine the impetus behind varying levels of post-communist democratization in the states of the region. It explores the different theories of democratization. The work takes a regional approach to examining the states. This approach isolates less traditional factors that contribute to democratic quality: history, culture and geography.

Each of the factors is relevant to democracy in the region. The exploration of the historical background explains some of the forces still at work in the region. It presents the core causes of some of the democratic short-comings that exist. It also assists in a presentation of the next contextual factor: how the political parties and systems evolved since 1989. Religion in the region is especially relevant to the degree of rights and freedoms, as well. The area is very diverse, with some countries of predominantly Catholic, some states with sizeable Islamic segments, countries with overwhelming Eastern Orthodox majorities and states with a relevant number of Protestant Christians. Finally, the region's location has a bearing of democracy. The

region represents the eastern border of western civilization. Not only does this account for their religious diversity in many areas and ethnic diversity in others, it also helps define some of the aspects of their democracy. The region long found itself as the battlefields of wars between those of the west and those of the east. The predicament of being trapped between two giants continues today.

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

In writing this section of my work, I am confounded by the amazing people in my personal and academic life and the help support and direction they provided over the last five years. This research was intensely personal to me. My father's family is ethnic German and immigrated here in the late 19th century from the Austro-Hungarian Empire. My mother's family is from Poland, Lithuania and other parts of the Soviet Union. This paper is far more than research for me. It is about who I am. For this, I want to thank my parents for passing down our family histories. Your stories and our discussions as a younger person motivated me to find out more about central and eastern Europe. You always provided me with everything I needed for a full life and an exceptional education. Your support in this endeavor can never be fully appreciated.

This long winding road of a dissertation would have been impossible without the faculty and staff at GPIS at Old Dominion University under the fine leadership of Dr. Regina Karp I still remember meeting with her for the first time. I did not even really know what International Studies was. She was more than willing to help an older student, former Marine and ex-grocery store manager reset his career. She and the faculty at GPIS taught me about global politics, conflict, interests and even some important things about life.

Probably the largest influence on my research and my time at Old Dominion was my committee chair, Dr. Simon Serfaty. He served as a guide, mentor and critic throughout my studies and the dissertation process. Only through his boundless patience and guidance could I have completed the work before you. He labored through version after version and revision after

revision of an introduction as I worked to establish a research question. As the writing progressed, he served as my biggest advocate and harshest critic. I feel fortunate to have spent the time I have in his office discussing the topics of this research and its larger relevance to global politics. He shed new light on selected aspects of the European project, helped me refine my writing and labored to round out many of my rough edges.

Dr. David Earnest helped me navigate the very complicated issues surrounding the economic transition of the region. He urged me to clarify what was murky and illustrate better the true nature of the states of the region rejoining Europe, particularly the common market. He also offered irreplaceable shepherding through the administrative and logistical aspects of the dissertation process. Again, his patience with an unconventional student like me was exceptional.

Dr. Austin Jersild is my fellow historian. His in depth knowledge of the Soviet Union, modern Russia and the history of the region were a large help. He was always willing to discuss the historical aspects of the research, provide books and additional references. His feedback in the editing process allowed me to give the sections certain credibility. He also contributed to my analysis of the East-West Paradigm, the Russian threat and the role of NATO.

Finally, I need to acknowledge the person who was literally by my side through the entire process: my beloved wife, Heather. She tolerated my late nights, night owl writing sessions, the annexation of our home office and my occasional absence from family game night. Patience is one admirable quality. It is another thing altogether when your partner, fellow parent and closest friend is missing. Words can never describe the admiration I have for her unwavering support. Through good times and bad, fits of writer's block and adulation over another completed chapter,

deadlines missed and benchmarks met, she was a source of unquestioning support. She never

stopped believing in me even when I stopped believing in myself.

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I. INTRODUCTION

The varying levels of democracy in central and eastern Europe provide scholars with an interesting study of democratization. Democracy grew to different levels and in varying ways in the region since the collapse of communism. The evolution of democracy in the region offers insight into which variables affected democracy, a test for established theories of democracy, and new theories in hypotheses addressing democratization in comparable areas. This work aims to contribute to the literature by testing three hypotheses. First, a study of the region disproves many of the established theories about democratization. Namely, the use of economic theory as a basis for democracy falls short. Second, the region represents a "special case" in terms of studying democracy due to its history, culture and geography, especially its proximity and relations with Russia and the communist former Soviet Union. Very few other regions share this variable. In this respect, it eschews many of the theories that discuss democracy in a broader sense. Third, it challenges the notion of interconnectedness as a positive factor in geopolitics. The concept aids in democratic development is some facets of a country's affairs, but causes unintended negative consequences in others.

This work is divided into six parts. The first part is this introduction, which sets the stage for the rest of the discussion. It presents the history of the region as well as the current political economic and social aspects of life in central and eastern Europe. The second section of this work is a literature review of the many theories of democratization. The third section of the work explains the hypotheses and analytical methodology used in the subsequent case studies. Case studies of Poland, Hungary and Bulgaria comprise the fourth section. The fifth section of the work discusses the results and findings of an analysis of the hypotheses. The final section draws conclusions based on this analysis and overall study.

This introduction offers a context for the current levels of democracy. An exploration of the historical background illustrates it relevance in the region today: re-emerged nationalisms and ethnic tensions, for example. It presents the core causes of some of the democratic short-comings that exist. It assists in a presentation of the next contextual factor: how the political parties and systems evolved since 1989. These political systems, due to history and other factors, moved and changed in different fashions in different countries. This sets the stage for an analysis of the politics in the capitals of central and eastern Europe. Concurrently, the states of the region moved from a command economy governed largely by Moscow to an open market. From there, they moved to a common market and, later a union. This third change wrought a separate effect on democracy in the central and eastern Europe. Finally, society changed a great deal since the collapse of communism, as well. Both the pre-collapse and present day, post-collapse societies affected the current levels of freedom, equality and rights for citizens on the region. These four aspects of history, development and change in central and eastern European molded the resulting democracies.

Religion in the region is especially relevant to the degree of rights and freedoms, as well. The area is very diverse, with some countries of predominantly Catholic, others with sizeable Islamic segments, countries with overwhelming Eastern Orthodox majorities and many states with a relevant number of Protestant Christians. This patchwork quilt of theologies varies further when the parish and ecclesiastical structures of Catholicism and Orthodoxy are included. The theological beliefs of the persons of central and eastern Europe become important to democracy when the width and breadth of religion's hand in legislating and politics is reviewed. While it is important to note that the study of religion in government is in fashion in regards to other parts of

the world, namely the Middle East, a comparable study of central and eastern Europe is equally fruitful.

It is along this vein that we find, in many cases, the predominant religion and the government or its policies interlaced. It also introduces a whole new field of study into the analysis. It enables us to dissect many of the laws and attitudes particular to some of the central and eastern European countries. Religion helps explain the Polish attitude towards abortion. The lack of religion aids in understanding Hungary's attitudes towards outsiders, especially refugees. We find that shared religion also manifests itself in church-state relationships like that of Putinist Russia and Bulgaria. Religion matters to the quality of democracy in central and eastern Europe despite its exclusion by established theories.

Central and Eastern Europe's location has a bearing on democracy. The region represents the eastern border of western civilization. Not only does this account for their religious diversity in many areas and ethnic diversity in others, it also defines some of the democratic aspects of their modern governments. The region long found itself as the battlefields of wars between larger powers of the east and west. The Turks marauded through the countries of central and eastern Europe and fought armies from western Europe. After the Turks, the armies of Europe did much the same. By the mid-twentieth century the area was the fault line between two nuclear superpowers.

Despite the collapse of communism, despite the emergence of the European Union and their membership, and despite the absence of military conflict, central and eastern Europe sits at ground zero of the East-West Paradigm. Russia and the European Union shadow box with economic policy, trade policy, military maneuvers and political rhetoric. Each regularly entreats

the states of the region to pursue different interests. Simultaneously, some of the states have long held apprehensions or deep associations with Russia. Both the paradigm and the established relationships with Russia shade the hue of democracy and rights in central and eastern Europe.

Politics before the Iron Curtain

The history of the states of central and eastern Europe impacts their levels of democracy in two different ways. First, it creates the context for much of what is happening today: ethnic differences, religious animosities, traditional allies, to name just a few. Second, it helps explain - their democratic and economic development. It is important to note that both World Wars began in the region: the first in Yugoslavia and the second with the invasion of Poland. This is a testament to the *Sturm und Drang* that has existed in the region for centuries. While it would be superfluous to harken back to the time of the Goths and Vandals, it is pertinent to begin after the First World War. This began the period of 1914 to 1945, which illustrated a complexity that remains to this day. Since then, borders changed, communist governments collapsed, democracy emerged, and the states forged a union. The resilient diversity of the region is undeniable and continues in the 21st century with the added factor of immigration.

The Treaty of Versailles left many geopolitical facets of central and eastern Europe frozen in time.[1] In 1992, Vladimir Tismaneanu wrote that, "The conflicts that pre-existed communism have not been abolished during the four decades of state socialism."[2] The region in the early 20th century is a stark contrast to the map of 1989 or today. The early 20th century saw an area dominated by the various empires of previous centuries. The Russian, Ottoman and

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[1] Sharon L. Wolchik and Jane L. Curry, "Democracy, the Market, and the Return to Europe: From Communism to the European Union and NATO," in *Central and East European Politics: from Communism to Democracy* (Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield, Inc, 2011), 5.

[2] Vladimir Tismaneanu, *Reinventing Politics* (New York: The Free Press, 1992), 2.

Austro-Hungarian Empires controlled sizeable portions of central and eastern Europe. The Prussians did as well. [3] The First World War and the Treaty of Versailles changed this. The treaty was a punishing document. It sought retribution from Germany and the Austro-Hungarian Empire by redrawing borders. It threw various different ethnic groups together in newly created states.[4] Romania was expanded. The nations of Yugoslavia and Czechoslovakia were created. Hungary was pulled away from the larger empire and shrank to one third its previous size. Poland was reborn. [5]

During the interwar years, most countries of eastern and central Europe experienced dictatorships, monarchs or military rule. Czechoslovakia, Hungary and Poland had some success in establishing a democratic government.[6] Most of the new states were not truly "nation-states".[7] The new map of the region created large minorities in some countries. Some of these groups within the same state had centuries old animosities.[8] There was internal, ethnic strife and religious tensions.[9] Poor economic conditions compounded this. Life in the region in this period was hard. Living standards were low and unemployment was high. Political extremism emerged in places throughout central and eastern Europe. Nationalism emerged in many of the states. [10] Some saw right-wing authoritarian movements coalesce around their own brand of fascism. The

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[3] Wolchik and Curry, "Democracy, the Market, and the Return to Europe," 5.

[4] Ibid., 8-9.

[5] Tismaneanu, *Reinventing Politics*, 6-7.

[6] Wolchik and Curry, "Democracy, the Market, and the Return to Europe," 9.

[7] Judy Batt, "Introduction: Defining Central and Eastern Europe," in *Developments in Central and East European Politics*, eds. Stephen White, Judy Batt and Paul G. Lews (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 2003), 13.

[8] Adam Bromke, "Post-communist countries: challenges and problems," in *Central and Eastern Europe: The Challenge of Transition*, ed. Regina Cowen Karp (New York: Oxford University, 1994), 21.

[9] Batt, "Introduction: Defining Central and Eastern Europe," 14.

[10] Tismaneanu, *Reinventing Politics*, 8; Batt, "Introduction: Defining Central and Eastern Europe," 14.

Iron Guard in Romania and the Arrow Crosses in Hungary, who supported German Chancellor

Adolf Hitler, developed a following in the 1930s.[11]

Communist groups started in central and eastern Europe at this time, as well. One of the

seminal events of the early 20th century was the Russian Revolution. The young communist

government of the Soviet Union sought to exert influence in the region through these upstart

organizations abroad. These European communist parties tried to undermine any advancement

in democracy of the new governments. They slavishly followed the directions from the Kremlin.

They endorsed Soviet claims to territory that even placed them at odds with many of their fellow

countrymen. Their activities on behalf of Moscow led them to be banned in all central and

eastern European countries except Czechoslovakia.[12] World War II temporarily halted east

European communist development.[13]

The dynamic between eastern Europeans, their fellow countrymen who were

communists, the Soviet Union and Nazi Germany was rather complicated. The Soviet Union

found a willing collaborator in their intentions in Adolf Hitler.[14] For this, communists in

Romania, Hungary and Yugoslavia were dispassionately pro-German.[15] The Soviet Union and

Germany signed a non-aggression pact on August 23, 1939. Stalin and Hitler split central and

eastern Europe. The Soviet Union would gain eastern Poland, the Baltic States and part of

Romania. In return, Stalin agreed not to attack Germany. The Second World War began eight

days later when Germany invaded Poland.[16] Hitler's betrayal of Stalin changed everything,

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[11] Tismaneanu, *Reinventing Politics*, 9.
[12] Ibid., 11.
[13] Ibid., 16-17.
[14] Williamson A. Murray "The World in Conflict," in *The Cambridge History of Warfare*, ed. Geoffrey Parker (NY: Cambridge University Press, 2005), 322.
[15] Tismaneanu, *Reinventing Politics*, 16.
[16] Murray "The World in Conflict," 322.

including local politics. Now, many east Europeans saw communists as an alternative to the Nazis. They embraced communism as a "cause of human freedom".[17]

In retrospect, the manner in which Hitler and Stalin bargained with the fate of the countries of central and eastern Europe was typical of the role larger countries played in the region from the end of the First World War until 1989. The states of central and eastern Europe served as secondary parcels to be bargained with. There was little regard for their aspirations. There were scant attempts to pursue national interests. The end of Second World War offered an opportunity for true self determination and possibly democracy, but the victorious Allies felt otherwise. Winston Churchill and Joseph Stalin agreed to the futures of Romania, Bulgaria, Hungary and Yugoslavia in five minutes on a half sheet of paper.[18] Poland's future was determined for them later at Yalta.[19] Roosevelt himself had endorsed Soviet control of the Baltics, though he could not make his view public.[20] Roosevelt would back track the concessions to the Soviets. He telegraphed the Kremlin on October 4, 1944 and place them on notice that they would not have a "blank check" in Eastern Europe. This, some historians claim, started the Cold War.[21]

The relationships between the Soviet satellites in the region and the Soviet Union started before the end of the Second World War. It was a practice in long distance, inner-party power politics. Each country's specific relationship with the leader of the Soviet Union shaped their relationship with Moscow. Leaders of the communist groups in central and eastern Europe

[17]Tismaneanu, *Reinventing Politics*, 1`8.

[18] Churchill quoted by Joseph M. Siracusa, "The Night Stalin and Churchill Divided Europe: The View from Washington," *The Review of Politics 43*, no. 3 (July 1981): 381.

[19] J.R. Thackrah, "Aspects of American and British Policy Towards Poland from Yalta to the Potsdam Conferences, 1945," *The Polish Review 21*, no. 4 (1976): 6.

[20] Soviet Ambassador to the United States Maxim Litvinov quoted by Anna M. Cienciala, "The United States and Poland in World War II," *The Polish Review* 54, no. 2 (2009): 183-4.

[21] Albert Reis quoted by Siracusa, "The Night Stalin and Churchill Divided Europe," 384.

gambled during Kremlin power struggles like those in the party apparatus in Moscow. When Lenin died, those who did not support Stalin's initial bid for power or had crossed Stalin before were purged. He disbanded the entire communist party in Poland at one point. Stalin replaced these leaders with more hardline, pro-Kremlin communists.[22] Tismaneanu refers to them as "Muscovites"[23]. There were some communists that tried to incorporate national interest into their brand of communism. Under Stalin, this was a crime.[24]

The post-war, communist states of central and eastern Europe had varying political systems and different relationships with the Soviet government in Moscow.[25] There were different types of communists. Tismaneanu refers to their study as "comparative communism."[26] Poland allowed some private property and some free markets. The government of Romania was less tolerant and more hardline than that of Hungary.[27] Poland even had a hegemonic party system with three parties. The dominant communist party remained in control, but aligned with one of two non-communist parties.[28] The most visible example of variety in communist rule in the region was Josip Tito in Yugoslavia. Tito had fought the Nazis in the Second World War and emerged as the leader of Yugoslavia after the 1938 purges of central and eastern European communist leaders by Stalin.[29] Tito rejected Stalin's interference in his country's domestic

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[22] Tismaneanu, *Reinventing Politics*, 12.

[23] Ibid., 16.

[24] Ibid., 41.

[25] Michael McFaul "The Missing Variable: The `International System' as the Link between Third and Fourth Wave Models of Democratization," in *Democracy and Authoritarianism in the Postcommunist World*, eds. Valerie Bunce, Michael McFaul and Kathryn Stoner-Weiss (NY: Cambridge University Press, 2010), 17

[26] Tismaneanu, *Reinventing Politics,* x.

[27] Michael McFaul, "The Missing Variable," 17-18.

[28] Sten Berglund and Jan Åke Dellenbrant, "The Breakdown of Communism in Eastern Europe," in *The New Democracies in Eastern Europe*, eds. Sten Berglund and Jan Åke Dellenbrant (Brookfield, VT: Edward Elgat Publishing Company, 1994), 9.

[29] Tismaneanu, *Reinventing Politics*, 13.

affairs.[30] Shortly after Tito's ideological break with Stalin, Soviets prosecuted communists for

placing national interests ahead of that of the Soviet Union or "Titoism".[31] In 1949, senior

communists from Albania, Bulgaria, Romania and Poland were placed on trial for Titoism. This

had a dual effect. First, communism in central and eastern Europe lost ardent support outside of

Czechoslovakia and Yugoslavia. Second, Moscow became more selective about who led their

satellite states in central and eastern Europe. Now, professional revolutionaries trained in

Moscow led the communist parties in the region.[32]

Nikita Khrushchev assumed control of the Soviet Union after Stalin's death. Stalin's

policies left central and eastern Europe in economic turmoil. Khrushchev feared that there would

be uprisings and relaxed some aspects of Soviet rule over the region. This accompanied his

campaign of de-Stalinization and even reproached Tito.[33] Locals saw a possibility for reform, but

the countries of central and eastern Europe that pushed for changed all eventually faced

crackdowns. This includes the use of military force in East Germany in 1953, Hungary and

Poland in 1956.[34] Khrushchev was ousted in 1964. Leonid Brezhnev took over. Brezhnev

reasserted Soviet power in the region in the vein of Stalin. The region would remain quiet from

that point through the 1970s with the exception of the Prague Spring of 1968.[35]

All of this would change in 1985 with the ascension of Mikhail Gorbachev. He

dismantled the established system of Soviet governance over the central and Eastern European

communist states.[36] He allowed these states to "go their own way"[37], referred to as the Sinatra

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[30] Ibid., 36.
[31] Ibid., 41.
[32] Ibid., 50.
[33] Tismaneanu, *Reinventing Politics*, 56.
[34] Michael McFaul, "The Missing Variable," 20.
[35] Tismaneanu, *Reinventing Politics*, 89-90.
[36] Berglund and Dellenbrant, "The Breakdown of Communism in Eastern Europe," 2-3.

Doctrine.[38] The Soviets slowly withdrew support for more hardline European communist leaders like Honecker in East Germany and Ceauşescu in Romania. On June 4, 1989 Poland held its first free elections in 40 years.[39] After this, communism collapsed elsewhere in the region. Months later the Berlin Wall fell, taking German communism with it. Czechoslovakia, Romanian and Bulgaria soon followed.[40] Sten Berglund and Jan Åke Dellenbrant describe the spread of democracy as "reminiscent of the Domino Theory"[41], but the region-wide event was neither uniform nor synchronized.

Politics After Communism

The post-communist political systems and political parties in central and eastern Europe grew differently as each state navigated the waters of democracy, many for the first time. Politics and democracy in the region ventured through three different phases: immediate post-communism, a democratic hangover, and the era of the European Union. Along this trajectory, the political leadership and electorates became quick studies in subjects as old as traditional European parliamentary democracy and as new as supranational statehood. These states founded parliaments, dealt with scandal, rejoiced at new rights and privileges and contemplated accession. Generally, speaking central and eastern Europe's move to democracy is a success. Most people can vote; own property; have the right to free speech and worship how and where they want. Their political systems are not perfect. They remain challenged by some ghosts of the past and other specters of the future. Democracy in the region depends on how the states of the

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[37] Wolchik and Curry, "Democracy, the Market, and the Return to Europe," 22.
[38] Ibid., 22.
[39] Berglund and Dellenbrant, "The Breakdown of Communism in Eastern Europe," 3.
[40] David Ost, "East-Central Europe in Transition," in *European Politics in Transition*, eds. Mark Kesselman, et al. (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company, 2009), 411.
[41] Berglund and Dellenbrant, "The Breakdown of Communism in Eastern Europe," 4.

region will address remnants of 19th century conflicts and frictions from 21st century Union membership.

Some central and east European states took longer than others. Once more, their transitions took different forms. The transition in Hungary, Poland and East Germany took months. The same transition took weeks in Bulgaria and Romania. The Czechs only took ten days! The Baltic states remained Soviet Republics until a failed coup and the emergence of Boris Yeltsin.[42] The initial transition *from* communism was the first step, but in most cases it was not the last. Poland would have "table talks" to determine the fate of their political system. East Germany would reunify with West Germany the following year. Czechoslovakia would eventually split into two nations, the Czech Republic and Slovakia.

The manner of these initial transitions varied, as well. Poland and Hungary had "pacted transitions." There were committees formed, different topics discussed. The communists were included. In this instance, there was a collective dealing with the end of communism. Communism in East Germany, Czechoslovakia and Romania had sudden ends fueled by public protest. In Romania's case, this was accented by the show trial and summary execution of communist leader Nicholae Ceauşescu on television. Bulgaria and Albania saw other less oppressive pseudo-communist and communist regimes assume power. Yugoslavia had the most heart-breaking of destinies: a long, bloody armed conflict that involved ethnic cleansing and other war crimes. The war in Yugoslavia produced a myriad of states occupied by groups with aspirations that date back centuries.[43]

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[42] Ibid., 4-6.

[43] Carole Rogel, "Kosovo: Where It All Began," *International Journal of Politics, Culture and Society 17*, no. 1 (Fall 2003): 169-170.

The days immediately after communism in the central and eastern European states were difficult, tedious and wrought with peril. In short, all that was would be nevermore. The collapse of communism left a geopolitical vacuum. Most of the countries of the region lacked basic democratic institutions, security policies and armed forces.[44] All the while, there was an underlying fear that the Soviet s might reassert their authority with military action.[45] (There were still Soviet forces in East Germany.[46]) The states needed to move to market economies. State-owned assets needed to be sold and privatized. They needed new trading patterns. Their governments needed to establish relationships with international financial institutions.[47] There were questions about reconciliation over crimes of the communist era and treatment of minorities. The leadership of these states faced the challenge of bringing their countries into the 20th century quickly, but in a manner that would not tear their countries apart.

The history of political parties following the collapse of communism in the region begins with a very pessimistic tone. Political parties as an institution were understandably unpopular. The parties that the citizens of central and eastern Europe were accustomed to "tended to resemble organized crime"[48] not the political parties their neighbors to the west knew. The new liberal parties in the region were not parties in neither the traditional sense or in name. First, their structure and membership was different. They were umbrella groups. Many were civic initiatives and movements with supporters and followers not traditional parties with members. They named themselves alliances, movements or fronts. They did not even want to be known as parties. The

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[44] Regina Cowen Karp, "Introduction,"in *Central and Eastern Europe: The Challenge of Transition*, ed. Regina Cowen Karp (New York: Oxford University Press, 1994), 4.

[45] Zbiginiew Brzezinski, *Second Chance* (NY: Basic Books, 2007), 53.

[46] Ibid., 57.

[47] Wolchik and Curry, "Democracy, the Market, and the Return to Europe," 4.

[48] Tomáš Kostelecký, "Political Transformation in East-Central Europe," (paper presented at the CEE-Japan Forum for the 21st Century, Sapporo, Japan, September 2003), https://src-h.slav.hokudai.ac.jp/sympo/03september/pdf/T_Kostelecky.pdf, 40.

Civic Forum in Czechoslovakia, Solidarity in Poland and the Hungarian Democratic Forum were examples. These groups stood in the first elections as simply anti-communist. They had little in the way of a platform. This is why they initially succeeded and eventually fell apart.

Communism in central and eastern European politics has a remarkable history since 1989. In the immediate aftermath of communism's collapse, many communists remained. Second and third tier figures from the Soviet-era communist parties led the reformed communist parties in the initial elections.[49] Some helped form the current socialist parties in many countries. Romania, Bulgaria and Albania have reformed communist parties that are popular.[50] Montani Guido and Adam Bromke explain that the continued support for communist parties has a generational aspect. Both point out that much of the generation that fought and lived through the Second World War is retiring from professional life or passing away.[51] Furthermore, people under the age of 35 probably do not remember life under communism. This plays an important role in the current popularity of communism and democratic socialism.

Political systems in central and eastern Europe did not develop quickly or as anticipated. Few states developed capable stable political parties immediately. The consolidation of democracy enhanced many aspects of democracy and created some new national identities. However, critics point out that democracy reveals racism, chauvinism and militarism. Much of this was absent under communism. These scholars say things were better under "Sovietism".[52] Despite being democracies, the years immediately following 1989 saw ethnic rivalries, political

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[49] Ibid,, 40.

[50] Bromke, "Post-communist countries: challenges and problems," 30.

[51] Bromke, "Post-communist countries: challenges and problems," 31; Montani Guido, "European Austerity Without Growth? European Growth Without European Democracy? How European Citizens Can Revive The European Project And Defeat Euroscepticism," *Annals of Faculty of Economics* (2011): 91.

[52] Vladimir Tisnamneanu, "Revolutions of 1989: Causes, Meanings, Consequences," *Contemporary European History* 18, no. 3 (2009): 273.

bickering and government corruption.[53] This environment saw the rise of radical populist, sometimes opposed to EU membership, at times illiberal parties in many central and east European states.

There are different theories behind the rise of illiberal parties in the region opposed to the EU. Many in central and eastern Europe have strong and deep feelings against the EU, known as *euroscepticism*.[54] Euroscepticism is characteristic of many parties in Europe. Many of these parties simply wish for greater dialogue and negotiation. They are referred to as soft eurosceptic. Many mainstream parties in western Europe, including the Conservative Party in the United Kingdom fall into this category. There are other parties that are more absolute in their opposition to membership to in the European Union. These are labeled hard eurosceptic. These parties include the United Kingdom Independence Party, the Front Nationale in France and Jobbik in Hungary. Some of these parties in western Europe date back to the 1970s. Most of the eurosceptic parties in central and eastern Europe started after 2000. Many of the hard eurosceptic parties of the region are problematic to basic democracy. Many of these parties are xenophobic and scapegoat ethnic minorities. These minorities have been physically attacked in some states and legally attacked in others. Some state legislatures attempted to abridge the basic rights of these minority groups. Other states of central and eastern Europe curtailed the most basic freedoms in recent years. These forms of backsliding are a collection of much that is deficient in central and eastern European democracy.

Another theory behind the rise of eurosceptic parties is more structural. Grigore Pop-Eleches maintains that voter dissatisfaction with the traditional left and right led to support for

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[53] Ibid., 272.

[54] Montserrat Guibernau, "Prospects for a European Identity," *International Journal of Politics, Culture and Society 24* (2011): 38.

populist, eurosceptic parties. In his theory, radical populist parties of evolved over three different election cycles. The first cycle, posed post-communist, non-communist groups against reformed communists. The non-communists won easily. These anti-communist coalitions fell apart before the next elections.[55] The following elections were about the actual issues facing the states of central and eastern Europe. The pieces and parts of the initial, non-communist fronts and alliances had key policy differences. The largest issue pertained to the marketization of the economies of the former communist states.[56] New liberal democracy parties formed around more cohesive, concrete policy platforms. They won the second set of elections, but with smaller majorities and margins of victory than their forerunners, the anti-communist alliances.

There were large changes in some of the parties of central and eastern Europe following the second elections. Many of the parties reoriented themselves. Many parties changed their names. Some changed their names several times. Eventually, many of the newer parties splintered merged or simply disappeared. The total number of parties fell in this period as democracy consolidated. The second election also coincided with the first appearance of populist and extreme nationalist parties in some states of the region.[57] At this point, these parties sat on the periphery with small numbers of members and little electoral success.

The reformed communists and the liberal, post-communist democratic parties began a strange dynamic where the two alternated being in power after the second election cycle. Life in eastern and central Europe did not improve as expected. Since the collapse of the Soviet Union, large portions of the population saw falling standards of living. Because of involvement with

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[55] Grigore Pop-Eleches, "Throwing Out the Bums: Protest Voting and Unorthodox Parties After Communism," *World Politics* 62, no. 2 (April 2010): 233.

[56] Kostelecký, "Political Transformation in East-Central Europe," 42.

[57] Pop-Eleches, "Throwing Out the Bums," 234.

western countries as financiers and lenders, the IMF and the ECB, there have been limits to domestic spending and sovereign debt. This impacted social welfare programs and financial security net for citizens. Then, there were several cases of government corruption in Central and Eastern Europe. Finally, their political systems are relatively new. It is not uncommon for parties to splinter, merge, disappear or have defections to others.[58] In this second generation of elections, voters vacillated between the two major groups of parties.

The third generation of elections in central and eastern Europe was a protest vote. By this time, both the reformed communists and liberal democrats had opportunities to lead. Neither party saw any motivation to change. They both assumed that eventually they would be back in power. They never accounted for a third option, like the populist parties of the radical right.[59] Now, populist parties could run as political "outsiders".[60] Populist leaders also appealed to the people, promising "to regenerate the nation, combat privileged groups and transform the `corrupt' established institutions."[61] In the situations of central and eastern Europe, the elites include politicians from both the left and the center-right. These elections have incumbents lose by wide margins. Radical–left and nationalist parties gain in their share of the vote. New parties, usually centrist and populist, form.[62]

Former EU President Rompuy repeatedly called populism the greatest danger to the EU because these parties threaten to weave their way into the EU itself with the parliamentary

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[58] Ibid., 235-236.
[59] Ibid., 237.
[60] Cas Mudde, "Who's Afraid of the Radical Right?" *Dissent*, 58, no. 4 (Fall 2011): 9.
[61] Kevin Deegan-Krause, "Toward a More Useful Conceptualization of Populism: Types and Degrees of Populist Appelas in the Case of Slovakia," *Politics & Policy* 37, no. 4 (2009): 822.
[62] Pop-Eleches, "Throwing Out the Bums," 237.

elections in May 2014. [63] Only days after one of Rompuy's many speeches lamenting populist

parties, it was reported that the anti-EU, populist parties of several member states were creating a

"pan-European" network. [64] Their goal is to stand against EU influence from its headquarters in

Brussels. A few members of far-right parties elected to the EU Parliament currently attend as

independents, but the radical right can form a parliamentary faction if they garner 25

representatives from seven different countries.[65] A radical right faction in the European

Parliament could stymie further European integration and obstruct Union prerogatives internally.

The rise of the populist, radical right parties of Europe gave new focus to the subject of

euroscepticism. There have always been Europeans who doubted or opposed the European

Union. Support for the EU remains fluid in different countries at different times.[66] This is

common in European politics and government. Political support for anything or anyone can ebb

and flow with time. EU support fell in the wake of the economic and financial crises of 2008 and

2009. This scared many in Europe because the EU was no longer aspirational, but operational. It

asserted its power, in order to preserve the Union. The conditionality attached to the assistance

from the International Monetary Fund (IMF) made the EU unpopular.

Some scholars note that European citizens are less pro-European than politicians.[67]

Opinion polls of citizens of EU member states illustrate the roots of euroscepticism. There are

fears of member states lack of influence within the organization. Many feel the EU lowers the

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[63] Cas Mudde and Cristóbal Rovira Kaltwasser, "Populism and (liberal) democracy: a framework for analysis," in *Populism in Europe and the Americas*, eds. Cas Mudde and Cristóbal Rovira Kaltwasser (NY: Cambridge University Press 2012), 9.

[64] Deutsche Welle, "Van Rompuy warns against rising nationalism in EU," November 9, 2013. http://www.dw.de/van-rompuy-warns-against-rising-nationalism-in-eu/a-1721590. Accessed December 1, 2013.

[65] Taken from the background information for an interview with Jan Philipp Albrecht, interview by Sabrina Pabst, Deutsche Welle, November 14, 2013. http://www.dw.com/en/a-warning-for-europe-and-germany/a-17226110

[66] Guibernau, "Prospects for a European Identity,"37.

[67] Nicoló Conti, "The Radical Right in Europe, between slogans and voting behavior," *Análise Social* 46, no. 201 (2011): 634.

quality of life for citizens. Some voters in EU member states think the EU endangers jobs and

limits economic growth. Another, more moderate response is that many feel that national

governments should deal with certain important issues, not Brussels.[68] The Downsian Hypothesis

explains this growth of eurosceptic parties. The parties positioned themselves to pick up

unrepresented voters.[69] Voter sentiment shaped the radical right party's views on the EU. These

parties do not feel national governments are doing enough to protect national interests. They

protest against loss of sovereignty. They oppose more EU policies than mainstream parties.[70]

The eurosceptic parties of Europe have expanded their width and depth. The United

Kingdom (UKIP), France (Front Nationale) and Holland (Party for Freedom) are the most

notable and visible of these parties in the west. Italy, Belgium and Switzerland have comparable

parties.[71] The central and eastern region of the continent is home to the two of the more

prominent eurosceptic parties. Hungary has two such parties: Fidesz, which is the party of the

current Prime Minister Viktor Orbán, and Jobbik.[72] Elsewhere, Poland's President Andrzej Duda

is officially unaffiliated but is supported by the eurosceptic party Law and Justice. The Prime

Minister Beata Szyłdo is a member of Law and Justice, as well. Most other countries of central

and eastern Europe have anti-EU parties, as well. They vary in strength.[73] The European

Parliamentary Elections of 2014 illustrate the growing strength of eurosceptic parties. The

eurosceptic voting block earned 16 more seats than the previous election. The states of central

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[68] Guibernau, "Prospects for a European Identity," 38.

[69] Radolaw Markowski and Joshua A. Tucker,"Euroskepticism and the Emergence of Political Parties in Poland," *Party Politics* 16, no. 4 (2010): 532

[70] Conti, "The Radical Right in Europe," 634.

[71] Karsten Grabow and Florian Hartleb, "Mapping Present-day Right-wing Populists," in *Exposing the Demagogues: Right-wing and National Populist Parties in Europe*, eds. Karsten Grabow and Florian Hartleb (Brussels, BE: Centre for European Studies, 2013): 13-14.

[72] Carla Bleiker, "EU report finds rampant racism, xenophobia in Hungary," *Deutsche Welle*, June 9, 2015. http://www.dw.de/eu-report-finds-rampant-racism-xenophobia-in-hungary/a-18505689. Accessed June 10, 2015.

[73] Grabow and Hartleb, "Mapping Present-day Right-wing Populists," 13-14.

and eastern Europe accounted for three of these members of parliament.[74] These small numbers

understate the growing influence of eurosceptic groups domestically.

Figure 1. Percentage of Support for the EU By Country

These results are indicative of central and east European sentiments towards the EU. The

Czech Republic has steadily trusted and relied on the EU less. They never entered the Eurozone.

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[74] The European Union, "Parties and Elections," 2014. http://www.parties-and-elections.eu/eu.html

[75] Standard Eurobarometer 67, 2007; Standard Eurobarometer 82, 2014. The "Net Support for the EU" is taken by subtracting the number of people polled who "tend not to trust the EU" from the people that "tend to trust the EU". It is similar to the methodology used by Torreblanca and Leonard in their 2013 policy memo.

Czechs view the bailouts of southern Europe with derision. Czechs see these countries as rich and irresponsible. Recent Czech leaders are eurosceptic, which adds to the collective negative opinion of Brussels. [76] In 2012, for the first time since the poll began, Poles viewed the EU as less trustworthy. This is largely based on the economic problems that plague the Eurozone. Now many Poles do not want to adopt the Euro. Yet, their leadership knows that it would help in moving Poland into a power position in the Union.[77] The only notable improvement in the opinion of the EU was in Bulgaria. This was because of distrust in their domestic political institutions. The EU is perceived as an organization that helps correct issues in Bulgaria. Protests in Bulgaria in spring of 2013 led to impromptu elections. Bulgarians viewed the EU as the lesser of two evils.[78]

Many central and eastern Europeans are unhappy with the economic and social results of EU membership. Economically, many in the region resent migrant workers from entering their countries and see the economic difficulties as a basis for anti-immigration positions.[79] Migrants are the target of very easy criticism. There are two different sides to the debate concerning migration and benefits. First, some argue that migration and open markets will allow cheap labor to move to states with more generous welfare benefits. In turn, capital and businesses will leave these areas due to higher taxes needed to pay for increased welfare rolls. The competing view is that states need foreign workers and the relationship is mutually beneficial. Workers want work not welfare. The former of these theories, referred to as "push-pull" by Christine S. Lipsmeyer

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[76]Jose Ignacio Torreblanca and Mark Leonard, "The Continent-Wide Rise of Euroscepticism," European Council on Foreign Relations Policy Memo, May 2013. http://www.ecfr.eu/page/-/ECFR79_EUROSCEPTICISM_BRIEF_AW.pdf. Accessed May 9, 2014.

[77] Ibid., 4-5.

[78] Ibid., 2.

[79] Martin Kahanec, "Skilled Labor Flows: Lessons from the European Union," February 2013, http://www-wds.worldbank.org/external/default/WDSContentServer/WDSP/IB/2013/03/18/000442464_20130318171026/Rendered/PDF/755290revised0box374337B00PUBLIC001301.pdf. Accessed on 5/27/2014.

and Ling Zhu, is not solidly based.[80] Martin Kahanec maintains that migrants are in search of

better lives. Jobs and better living conditions drive migration. They seek higher wages, more

opportunities, and better social conditions.[81]

The legacy of the first 24 years of democracy in central and eastern Europe is one of

mixed results. Most states experienced a positive transition to democracy. There have been

obstacles and pitfalls along the way. It is obvious that lives for people in the region are more

politically free than the era under communism. These states established democratic political

systems and political parties. True democracy and the democratic ideals of the EU in the region

is a topic for debate. The greatest political challenge to democracy today is the treatment of

minorities. The epicenter of this is the political struggle between the hard eurosceptic parties and

the rest of the political spectrum. In most cases, national elections safely relegated them to third

or fourth tier parties within the government. Yet, these same parties remain a threat to democracy

at the local level in some cases. Most of central and eastern Europe already joined the European

Union. Now, these states must embrace its democratic pillars.

Economics

Creating a free market economy was almost as much a herculean task as creating a

democracy. The two are closely interwoven. Economics can play an essential part in maintaining

democratic ideals, especially equality. The establishment of a functioning economy is

considered by some to be the "single determining factor" as to when states enter a "post-post-

communist stage."[82] There have been economic successes and failures. The financial crises of

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[80] Christine Lipsmeyer and Ling Zhu, "Immigration, Globalization and Unemployment Benefits in Developed EU States," *American Journal of Political Science 55*, no. 3 (July 2011): 647.
[81] Kahanec, "Skilled Labor Flows: Lessons from the European Union."
[82] Bromke, "Post-communist countries: challenges and problems," 42

the last decade, an inability to deal with migrants and immigration and the "greying" of Europe continue to hinder economic prosperity and growth. Unemployment is still very high in some countries. Income inequality remains a serious problem in certain places. With the recent events within the Eurozone, sovereign debts, fiscal deficits, and the associated pension liabilities are worthy of review as well.

Many decisions made shortly after the collapse of communism about the economic structure in their states affect democracy, freedom and personal rights in the region today. The economic evolution of the states varied much in the same fashion as politics. Different states in the region had different starting points, strategies and philosophies about the free market, labor and capital. In addition to trying to both create and learn about the free market economy, the larger global economy endured shocks along the way. These fledgling economies experienced the various crises that plagued the global financial landscape since 1990. Along the way, some joined the Eurozone. The countries of central and eastern Europe saw different fiscal outcomes. These varying outcomes yielded different levels of income equality, differing levels of development in social programs and affected the durability of regimes.

Most of the countries of the region began their march towards a free market from nothing. The states needed to privatize businesses. There were questions about post-communist property reconciliation. Moscow practiced horrendous industrial practices that devastated the environment. Few decision makers in eastern and central Europe knew much about trade and trade patterns. Most did not know how to work with international financial institutions.[83] Key infrastructures in many places were dilapidated, unmaintained or simply missing. There was a

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[83] Wolchik and Curry, "Democracy, the Market and the Return to Europe," 24.

hazard of these states meandering on the periphery of the developed world. [84] The west provided

ample, initial funds and tutelage to prevent this.[85]

The problems facing the countries of the region were fairly consistent. Hungary was an

exception. (It started "market socialism" in the waning years of communist rule as an attempt to

save a faltering system.) [86] The states' approaches to solving the post-communist economic

problems were different. Pasquale Tridico explains that the countries had three reform options.

There was a Scandinavian option, which foresaw the political pluralism introduced and

economic liberalization to happen separately. In this blueprint, workers and unions had very

prominent role. The second proposal was known as the Washington Consensus. Foreign

advisers, like Jeffrey Sachs, espoused this. It was Reaganomics for central eastern Europe. The

third set of reforms was based on the German-French glide path. It allowed for a gradual

privatization controlled by the state. The Washington Consensus was supported by the

International Monetary Fund (IMF) and World Bank. Many policymakers in these two bodies

became high level advisors to the new countries of central and eastern Europe. Most countries

eventually adopted this plan. Only Hungary and Slovenia opted for the German-French

strategy.[87] No states adopted the Scandinavian framework.

The larger debate about the transition of the economies of the region concerned the

competing notions of action. Some economists and countries of the region implemented shock

therapy. This involved quick, sudden changes to the system and structure. Czechoslovakia,

Bulgaria and Poland implemented this. This strategy depended on prices. "Get prices right" and

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[84] Heironim Kubiak, "Poland: national security in a changing world," in *Central and Eastern Europe: The Challenge of Transition*, ed. Regina Cowen Karp (NY: Oxford University Press, 1994), 71.
[85] Wolchik and Curry, "Democracy, the Market and the Return to Europe," 26.
[86] David Stark and László Bruszt, *Postsocialist Pathways* (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 1998),52.
[87] Pasqualle Tridico, "Varieties of Capitalism and Development in Transition Economies Since the Fall of the Berlin Wall," *Challenge 55*, no. 3 (May/June 2012): 92

everything else falls into place. It depends on the relationship with everything else. The belief is that the sudden changes in price would cascade a series of changes elsewhere.[88] This includes democratic institutions. The command economy and stet ownership were abolished. It necessitated the establishment of private ownership laws, a court system to adjudicate simple economic implements like contracts and other basic parts of democracy necessary for a free market.[89] Some heralded Sach's shock therapy in Poland a success.[90]

Some scholars advocated for a gradual approach or sequencing.[91] Paul Hare and his fellow authors note that gradualism was a better choice for Hungary. They acknowledge that the transition might take two generations. However, it meant better short term conditions in Hungary. Living standards were more stable.[92] Politically, this allows the government to evolve. Over time, it learns about market forces and adapts to managing a larger debt burden. Ownership laws and policies on fiscal and monetary policy evolve with it.[93] A majority of reviewed scholars support the idea of a gradual approach to entering the free market. This avoids the gaps that form between market forces and established law. Ábel and Bonin cite Schaffer who alludes to a "legislative lag" in Poland's shock therapy.[94]

Tridico and Marie Lavigne discuss these at great length and complete their own comparison of the results. Some states implemented shock therapy on their economies and swift

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[88] John Marangos, "Was Shock Therapy Really a Shock?" *Journal of Economic Issues 31*, no. 4 (December 2003): 943-4.

[89] Ibid., 949.

[90] Peter Passell, "Dr. Jeffrey Sachs, Shock Therapist," *New York Times Magazine*, June 27, 1993. http://www.nytimes.com/1993/06/27/magazine/dr-jeffrey-sachs-shock-therapist.html?pagewanted=all. Accessed March 8, 2017.

[91] Lavigne, *The Economics of Transition*, 116.

[92] Paul Hare, et al., "Hungary's Transition to the Market: The Case against a `Big-Bang'," *Economic Policy 7*, no. 14 (April 1992): 254-5.

[93] Ibid., 256.

[94] Schaffer quoted by I. Ábel and J. P. Bonin, "Two Approaches to the Transformation in Eastern Europe: The `Big Bang' Versus `Slow But Steady'," *Acta Oeconomica 43*, no. 3/4 (1991): 228.

stabilization. Others (Hungary, Slovenia and Romania) chose sequencing, gradualism and structural reforms first.[95] The results differed, but there was a consistent disappointment in the results of both approaches.[96] Central and eastern Europeans had high expectations. The grim economic reality ended the euphoria of the democratic honeymoon for many. Tridico quotes Kovalik who wrote that even the most successful central and eastern European economies dealt with the same social problems as western Europe in the same time period: income inequality, unemployment, gender discrimination and corruption.[97]

The transition was difficult. The people of central and eastern Europe had new rights and privileges that accompany democracy, but they had the chaff as well. The new economy was characterized by large gaps of inequality, high unemployment and many people living in poverty. The economic woes of the region fueled social tragedies of prostitution, street crime, juvenile delinquency and alcoholism.[98] Tridico quotes D. Mario Nuti as saying "former communist countries passed from a central planning system to a pure and simple underdevelopment."[99] It would take years for most of the central and eastern European economies to improve.

The most current numbers economic indicators for the region are evidence of a moderately successful economic integration into Europe. Gross domestic product has grown at levels very close to that of western Europe and usually slightly higher than the rest of the European Union member states. Recently, unemployment in central and eastern Europe was

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[95] Lavigne, *The Economics of Transition*, 118.

[96] Marie Lavigne, *The Economics of Transition: From Socialist Economy to Market Economy* (NY: St. Martin's Press, 1995), 120-121.

[97] T. Kovlaik quote by Tridico, "Varieties of Capitalism in the Development of Transition Economies Since the Fall of the Berlin Wall," 99-100.

[98] Wolchik and Curry, "Democracy, the Market and the Return to Europe," 25.

[99] D. Mario Nuti quoted by Tridico, "Varieties of Capitalism and Development in Transition Economies," 100.

comparable to that of western Europe. However, workforce participation steadily declined since 1990. Per capita income in the region is far below the rest of Europe. There are large discrepancies between neighboring states within the region, as well. Income inequality improved over a long period of time with no consistent path. Only recently has income equality improved to the levels of western Europe.

Most of the central and eastern European countries rejoined Europe and face the same problems as their western neighbors. The current state of economic affairs presents Europe with a dangerous triangular dilemma. First, the states of Europe are experiencing a *graying*, as large segments of the population are reaching retirement age. Second, there are the economic implications of the contentious issue of immigration. Third, budget shortfalls challenge many of the member states of the European Union. These three issues in concert endanger fiscal solvency, the governments' abilities to provide infrastructure and essential social programs . This equates to uncertainty ripe for political opportunists.

The greying of Europe endangers the tax base of European countries. This could have a disastrous effect on quality of life for many. Unless the financial course changes in some way very basic social programs are in danger. The population of Europe has been aging for decades. Fertility decreased after the post-World War II "baby boom". [100] Europe is now experiencing a "grand parent boom". In 1960 there were three persons under the age of 14 for every one person over the age of 65. By 2060, there will be two persons over the age of 65 for every one person under 14. Families are becoming more "horizontal" and less "vertical". There are more

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[100] Gaimpaolo Lanzieri, "The Greying of the Baby Boomers," *Eurostat, Statistics in Focus, 23/2011*., 1. http://epp.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/cache/ITY_OFFPUB/KS-SF-11-023/EN/KS-SF-11-023-EN.PDF. Accessed 5/25/2014.

generations and at the same time smaller generations.[101] This change is in the European

population is "unprecedented."[102]

This poses a large challenge for the governments and businesses of Europe. In Germany

for example, Holger Schäfer, Senior Economist at the Cologne Institute for Economic Research,

states that there is a projected labor gap of 3M workers in the next three years. Ten years later,

this gap will increase to over 6M workers. Over the next 20 years, this gap will be over 9M

workers. In Germany, almost 20% of the population is already over 65. Most other European

countries are close behind.[103] As this large part of the workforce transforms from workers to

pensioners, the stress on national budgets could prove catastrophic.

One obvious solution to the quandary of a shrinking workforce is immigration. In terms

of population numbers, net immigration is the only positive addition to the population in many

EU countries. Italy and Germany have zero and net immigration, respectively.[104] Christoph von

Ingelheim, who is on the staff of Christian Social Union Bundestag minister Andrea Lindholz,

confirms this paradigm in Germany. In 2012, there were 700,000 people who left Germany and

1.1M incoming migrants. "Immigration can therefore be seen as an option for softening the aging

process."[105] Furthermore, many countries have become very dependent on migrant workers.

Migration offers Europe an opportunity to revitalize its workforce. Migrant workers are

needed not only to remedy negative and zero fertility of European countries, but also to take care

of the aged. Many countries have been relying on migrant caregivers for decades already. The

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[101] Ibid.,, 2.

[102] Alessio Cangiano, "Elder Care and Migrant Labor in Europe: A Demographic Outlook," *Population and Development Review 40*, no. 1 (March 2014): 131.

[103] Ibid., 131.

[104] Ibid., 133.

[105] Lanzieri, "The Greying of the Baby Boomers", 10.

struggle for skilled workers continues, moving through yet another challenging cycle. At this point, policies are geared towards offering opportunities to workers with two and four year degrees. This is largely hampered by bureaucracy and nativist attitudes towards immigration.

There are two important areas of fiscal policy that orbit around the twin poles of a greying Europe and the topic of migration. First is the subject of pension sustainability. This is largely a reality that many European countries are reluctant to confront. The second topic is very important to the migration conversation: social programs to include welfare and unemployment. These two issues are the most debated not only in central and eastern Europe, but in developed countries around the globe. This is due in large part to the poor economic conditions since the late 2000s. The task of sustaining these important social safety nets offers government officials with few good (read popular) answers. The question in many countries is not only how to pay for them, but who is entitled to them. There are fears specific to Europe that their coffers will be laid waste by immigrants. Pension sustainability is an authentic concern, but, fear of "welfare tourism"[106] is largely a fallacy. Set immigration aside. Many of the pension systems in Europe need systematic reform or change.

The graying population in Europe and the shrinking workforce demands large scale changes to the pensions of EU member states. In 2010 there were four people working for each person over the age of 65. By 2060, there will only be two people working to support each person over the age of 65.[107] The European Commission began addressing this problem two years ago with the "White Paper on Adequate, Safe and Sustainable Pensions". The document

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[106] Derek Scally, "German report dismisses welfare tourism claims," *The Irish Times*, March 27, 2014. http://www.irishtimes.com/news/world/europe/german-report-dismisses-welfare-tourism-claims-1.1739382. Accessed May 9, 2014.

[107] European Parliamentary Research Service, "European Union pensions policy," May 7, 2014. http://epthinktank.eu/2014/05/07/european-union-pensions-policy/. Accessed June 1, 2014.

suggests that employers do more to adapt jobs and tasks to older workers, suggests a few different options to supplement traditional pensions, and restrict access to early retirement. Old age poverty is already an issue in some parts of Europe.[108] Some of the adjustments suggested by the EC White Paper caused outrage and even violence in some member states.[109]

The current fiscal situation in central and eastern Europe is not as dire as some locales in western Europe, but the age trend is just as problematic. The states of the region do not have much of a dilemma with debt as a group. The average debt to GDP for the states is far below the European Union average, both including and excluding the states of southern Europe.

Figure 2. National Debt as a Percentage of GDP, EU States vs. Central and Eastern European States

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
[108] Deutsche Welle, "Old-age poverty soars in Germany," October 22, 2013. http://www.dw.de/old-age-poverty-soars-in-germany/a-17177616. Accessed June 3, 2014.

[109] Ariana Eunjung Cha, "Europe looks to pension changes to ease economic crisis," *The Washington Post*, July 10, 2012. http://www.washingtonpost.com/business/economy/europe-looks-to-pension-changes-to-ease-economic-crisis/2012/07/10/gJQA66fYbW_story.html. Accessed June 3, 2014.

[110] Eurostat,
http://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/tgm/download.do;jsessionid=SvIfAVq77FA7P5tWpNwg8eoHYlDlJ9LwNHm252-YNpoEFs7NihEJ!1428625494?tab=table&plugin=1&language=en&pcode=tipsgo20. Accessed January 31, 2017.

However, Croatia, Hungary and Slovenia all have debt levels that exceed the averages for the region and the EU. This combined with the changes in the median age and their current trajectories are cause for alarm. The states of central and eastern Europe are now aging faster. Poland, Romania, Slovakia, Albania and Macedonia all have age trends that exceed those of the rest of Europe. The populations of Romania and Albania are aging two years for every year the population ages elsewhere. Early in the 2000s central and eastern Europe's trend was slower than the rest of Europe. There was a lag in the trend. The lag is over and the trend accelerated.

The economic strength of the region is very dependent on growth. The economies of the states of eastern and central Europe grew faster than the economies in the rest of the European Union. They had to catch up to western Europe. They showed strong resilience following the global economic crisis of 2009. A sudden shock to these results: another currency crisis, a debt crisis elsewhere in the EU perhaps could trigger a dampening of growth. This could be the preamble to a problem in managing debt in the countries of the region already leveraged at close to 90% of GDP. A large enough lag in growth could be catastrophic to infrastructure projects, basic domestic programs like pensions, and the fiscal solvency of the government.

Ethnicity and Culture

Ethnic tensions and cultural issues often operate as a factor in the level of democracy in states. This is especially true in central and eastern Europe. Some scholars view ethnic and internal conflicts as the chief threat to democracy in the region. These tensions arise from three different phases of historical population change: pre-WWI shifts, Soviet attempts at Russificiation and post EU Schengen immigration. The first phase consists of the different imperial wars and changes to borders that affected the population of the region. The Soviet

attempts to make the areas more Russian and side effects of stationing Soviet troops in the region form the second phase. Population changes associated with EU membership and the Schengen Treaty represent the most recent changes.

Many ethnic animosities emerged in post-communist central and eastern Europe. A war erupted and Yugoslavia quickly shattered along ethnic and religious lines. The countries of the former Yugoslavia are still struggling with re-establishing a civic society with acceptable levels of law, order, rights and education. Many who are guilty of war crimes during the Balkan Wars of the 1990s remain at large.[111]Amnesty International catalogs reported widespread human rights violations. Hungary and Romania have been reported to the European Commission for "Antizigansim"[112] or racism against Roma minorities. Roma have been the victims of physical attacks by violent mobs. Their houses have been burnt down.[113] Roma also dealt with substandard housing and Antinot the only targets of injustice in the region.

Central and eastern European cultures can clash with the ideals of the EU, as well. Some governments have curtailed widely-held, basic rights endorsed by the EU. Many of these rights are the norm in democracies throughout the world. Poland was cited by the European Court of Human Rights for excessive pretrial detention. One such victim remained in prison for two years before trial. Gender discrimination remains an issue, as well. Poland failed to adopt anti-discrimination laws to protect women. Women do not always have access to abortions even

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[111] Amnesty International, Bosnia Herzegovina. http://www.amnestyusa.org/our-work/countries/europe/bosnia-and-herzegovina. Accessed May, 1, 2015.

[112] Catherine Baker, "Why were Bosniaks treated more favourably than today's Muslim refugees? On differing narratives of identity, religion and security," *London School of Economics*. http://blogs.lse.ac.uk/europpblog/2017/03/07/why-bosniaks-treated-more-favourably-than-todays-refugees/. Accessed March 8, 2017.

[113] Amnesty International, Hungary. http://www.amnestyusa.org/our-work/countries/europe/hungary. Accessed May 5, 2015; Amnesty International, Romania. http://www.amnestyusa.org/our-work/countries/europe/romania. Accessed May 5, 2015.

when legal or when their own health is at risk. Freedom of the press has come under fire in many

of the states in central and eastern Europe.[114] Many specifically note Hungary's "roll back" of

democracy. Orbán's government now controls all media outlets. They control content,

advertising and even have access to employee records.[115] This led the European Parliament to

request that the European Commission form a watchdog group. This group will monitor all

variety of rights within Union member states and report annually.[116]

Case Studies

Following a general analysis of the differing levels of democracy in the countries in

central and eastern Europe, this research singles out the cases of Poland, Hungary and Bulgaria

for closer analysis. Poland was largely regarded as the success story of post-communist

democracy. This was recently punctuated by the election of the Polish Prime Minister Donald

Tusk as President of the European Council.[117] Additionally, Tusk was the first Polish Prime

Minister to be re-elected since the fall of communism. This signaled a new found stability in

their domestic politics and a higher standing among their EU neighbors. Then in 2015, the Law

and Justice party took control of the country. They have made not too subtle changes to the

structure of government, amended various freedoms and have supported groups that politically

attack the EU and its policies. The backsliding met with fierce opposition by the Polish people.

The final political result is yet to be seen. Economically, Poland enjoys the highest GDP in

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[114] Amnesty International, Poland.

[115] Philip N. Howard, "Hungary's Crackdown on the Press," *New York Times*, September 8, 2014. http://www.nytimes.com/2014/09/09/opinion/hungarys-crackdown-on-the-press.html?_r=0. Accessed May 2, 2015.

[116] European Parliament excerpt taken from the Hungarian Free Press, June 10, 2015. http://hungarianfreepress.com/2015/06/10/european-parliament-condemns-hungarys-orban-government/. Accessed June 11, 2015.

[117] European Council, *The President's Role*. http://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/european-council/president/role/ Accessed April 13, 2015.

central and eastern Europe and the fifth highest in the European Union.[118] Arguably, Poland is the fourth strongest country in Europe.

Democracy in Hungary, our second case study, faces larger challenges. Viktor Orbán is the first Hungarian leader that will serve more than one full term since the fall of communism. Some criticize changes made by Orbán and his party, Fidesz. They replaced the liberal constitution.[119] The new more authoritarian constitution places strict regulation on the press.[120] This caused an outcry from many, especially from international rights groups. The regime has also occasionally taken pro-Russian attitudes and positions. This is troubling to many because of the implications for the European Union and Cold War memories. Additionally, immigration and minority rights in Hungary emerged as a pressing topic. Jobbik, a far right anti-immigration party, has continued gaining votes and parliament seats. They are militant, xenophobic nationalists. Their paramilitary groups have been implicated in violence against Gypsies and Jews.

Finally, this work uses Bulgaria as something of a blind test. Bulgaria is a lesser studied country in the region. It's not an economic powerhouse. Its leaders are not widely known on the world stage. Bulgaria saw harder economic times than most after the fall of Soviet communism. Many former communists remained powerful in Bulgaria years after they had faded from public life in other former Warsaw Pact countries. They maintained their Cold War ties with criminal organizations. This dark partnership developed into the modern Bulgarian mafia. It represents the largest issue for democracy in the country. Bulgaria showed recent economic improvements and

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[118] CIA, World Factbook

[119] BBC, Hungary Country Profile- Overview, http://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-17380792 Accessed April 13, 2015.

[120] Erich Follath and Christoph Schult, "Media Law Outrage: Hungary's `Orbanization' is Worrying Europe," *Der Spiegel*, December 28, 2010. http://www.spiegel.de/international/europe/media-law-outrage-hungary-s-orbanization-is-worrying-europe-a-736706.html Accessed April 13, 2015.

some stability thanks to foreign investments. It is also important to point out that Bulgaria has a demographic composition parallel to Hungary. The country is 75% Bulgarian with other minorities rounding out the population. Unlike Hungary and many other countries in the region, Bulgaria has a large Eastern Orthodox population.

Conclusion

Central and eastern Europe present an interesting study in the effect of history, culture and geography on democracy. Democratic quality grew to different levels and in varying ways in central and eastern Europe states since the collapse of communism. The political evolutions specific to the region, the states' histories with Russia and cultural receptions of interconnectedness are large factors in the different levels of freedom and rights people of the respective countries enjoy today. This work contributes to the literature by testing three hypotheses. The levels of the democracy in the region are independent of most established economic-based political theory. There are other examples of this throughout the world: the Middle East and Africa. In each case, there are variables and conditions specific to each region. The countries of all three regions share different cultures, different ethnic relationships and histories, different sometimes unique political legacies within themselves.

Measuring diverse groups of states challenges models that seek to simplify and quantify. In central and eastern Europe, we see some states with robust growth and average income equality, but horrible conditions for many based on their race, ethnicity or religion. In others, we see a lower standard of living, lower growth and higher inequality economically, but fewer challenges to what are considered basic rights. In the region and the wider entirety of Europe, there are states that are very diverse numerically with better conditions for minorities, yet much

of the same can be said for the other relatively homogenous countries, as well. The history and

cultural differences of the *specific* groups living amongst each other and the legacies

communism left behind explain these cases. They are outliers and anomalies to most traditional

democratic theories.

II. LITERATURE REVIEW

Democratization has several different facets important to explaining the varying levels of democracy in central and eastern Europe. This literature review seeks to review the scholarly writing for these different aspects. An assessment of the nature of democracy in the region needs a working definition of "democracy". Research of the established measuring methods and theories of democratization provides a broad foundation for establishing a methodology. A review of the region specific literature narrows the focus of the methodology and subsequent explanation. Each section contributes to a study of democracy in the area and formation of an educated and effective methodology.

The first step in explaining the qualitative differences in democratic governments is defining democracy. Defining democracy challenges scholars. The literature studying and discussing democracy spans decades, continents, ideologies and theories. Coppedge and his colleagues cite David Held who noted that the concept finds its origins in ancient Greece.[1] Held wrote that democracy is "rule by the people," and added that "political leaders of extraordinarily diverse views profess to be democrats."[2] Most of the scholars in the body of literature use different definitions of democracy. This is attributed to the different themes of their work. A bulk of contemporary literature uses Robert Dahl's definition of democracy in whole or as a foundation. Dahl stated that democracy is a government system that is responsive to citizens and empowers informed contestation. He enumerates this extensively with a list of different rights afforded citizens.

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[1] Michael Coppedge et al., "Conceptualizing and Measuring Democracy: A New Approach," *Perspectives in Politics* 9, no. 2 (June 2011): 248.
[2] David Held, *Models of Democracy, Third Edition* (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2006), 1.

A broad study of the contemporary measure of democracy and modern theories of democratization offers a foundation for a methodology to measure democracy in the region. The practice of coding, quantifying and *grading* governments is very popular. This work yields volumes of research every year. The combinations researchers can create and combine are virtually limitless. Many of these measuring indices attempt to operationalize different theories of democratization. These theories are only somewhat useful to a study of democracy in the region. Some successfully explain the democratic transitions in the region after the collapse of their Cold War communist regimes. Most fail to account for the subsequent democratic evolution. The literature in whole illustrates the need for a specific approach to examine the region.

Region specific study of democracy and democratization achieves two goals. First, it focuses the study on a very unique area in a very historically unique time. Second, researching the evolution and current levels of rights and freedoms in central and eastern Europe aids in developing a methodology to analyze the political realities of central and eastern Europe. Widely-used indices and other contemporary measures used for other regions fail to explain the reality of democracy in the region. The product of exhaustive region-specific study is a body of literature that attempts to explain how most found independence, many found EU membership, yet only some found true democracy.

Defining Democracy

A comprehensive, modern and applicable definition of "democracy" is one of the more elusive pursuits of the modern age. Larry Diamond points out that few subjects have been

subjected to "more prolific scrutiny" than what is democracy.[3] He joins Chris Hasselmann who wrote that there "is no agreed upon definition for democracy."[4] It is clear that democracy takes different forms and changes with time. Andranik Tangian noted that in the cradle of democracy, Greeks only voted for positions that demand special skills.[5] Indeed, Aristotle's *Constitution of Athens* cites some officials chosen "by lot", or random. Different scholars focus on different aspects of government in search of an effective definition of democracy.

Modern political science has developed variations on the concept of democracy. Alvarez, et al. takes a very minimalist focus. They look at three different distinctions in government. First, they analyze the limitations on government; whether the government is limited or despotic. Second, they see legal structure as a factor. Laws are either created by the governed – "autonomous"- or are legislators set aside from the laws they make – "heteronomous". Third, the final subject of Alvarez and his fellow scholars is the level of competition and contention in elections.[6] Hasselmann claims that there is an "underlying consensus" on a set of characteristics. These include elections, various freedoms, a system of checks and balances and a separation of powers. Each definition carries strengths and liabilities.[7] The minimalist approach omits many relevant attributes, despite its basic strength.[8] It ignores what is regarded as fair, who in the populace can vote, and other freedoms.[9] The maximalist approached is criticized as simply being too big. The numerous aspects of social justice in its definition of democracy make the definition

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[3] Larry Diamond, "Thinking About Hybrid Regimes", *Journal of Democracy 13*, no. 2 (April 2002): 21.
[4] Chris Hasselmann, *Policy Reform and the Development of Democracy in Eastern Europe* (Burlington, VT: Ashgate Publishing, 2006), ix.
[5] Andranik Tangian, *Mathematical Theory of Democracy* (Berlin: Springer, 2014), vii.
[6] Mike Alvarez, et al., "Classifying Political Regimes," *Studies in Comparative International Development 31*, no. 2 (Summer 1996): 4.
[7] Hasselmann, *Policy Reform and the Development of Democracy in Eastern Europe*, 25.
[8] Gerardo L. Munk and Jay Verkuilen, "Conceptualization and Measuring Democracy: Evaluating Alternative Indices," *Comparative Political Studies 35*, no. 1 (February 2002): 9.
[9] Diamond, "Thinking About Hybrid Regimes", 22.

useless.[10] To this point, Alvarez and his fellow scholars note that "many definitions don't describe any existing governments." [11]

Many of the theories of democracy share one common element: Robert A. Dahl's notion of contestation. Munk and Verkuilen, Schmidt, Diamond, Tangian, Hasselmann and many others included a reference to the concepts he put forth in his 1971 work, *Polyarchy*. It serves as a basis for much of the minimalist study of democracy and is included in broader studies as well. Dahl's foundations are rather basic. He wrote, "I assume that a key characteristic of a democracy is the continuing responsiveness of the government to the preferences of its citizens considered as political equals."[12] He expands on the notion of a responsive government, continuing that democracy is "a political system of which is the quality of being completely or almost completely responsive to all its citizens." He elaborates on the obligations of a truly responsive government. He wrote that democratic regimes are required to offer citizens "unimpaired opportunities" to voice their will, beliefs and preferences.[13]

Dahl illustrates his combination of contestation and responsibility with a bulleted point list of what this means for citizens, their rights and opportunities in a true democracy. Democracy by Dahl's design is not simply the right to vote. Instead, it includes rights of expression, association, eligibility for office and fair and free elections among other things. Dahl's democracy also calls for the rights of political parties and politicians to lobby for support and voter's right to choose between candidates or parties. He sets forth much of the blueprint for modern democracy. Dahl's *Polyarchy* illustrates the basis for political parties, interest groups,

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[10] Munk and Verkuilen, "Conceptualization and Measuring Democracy", 9.
[11] Alvarez, et al., "Classifying Political Regimes," 4.
[12] Robert A. Dahl, *Polyarchy: Participation and Contestation* (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1971), 1.
[13] Ibid, 2.

politicians, campaigning and legislative government in the context of a democracy. The primary

differences in the various definitions of democracy are additional rights attached to Dahl's

foundation.

Some scholars have ventured to explain democracy without basic rights. The concepts of

hybrid regimes, illiberal democracy or democracy in authoritarian regimes seeks to explain how

oppressive governments remain in power despite human rights violations, restrictions on civil

liberties and other phenomena many scholars would clearly label undemocratic. This type of

government emerged in the 1960s and 1970s in countries like Mexico, Singapore and South

Africa.[14] Their continued spread has left an "unresolved puzzle"[15]. Elections strengthen

authoritarian regimes in some countries and defeat it in others. The study of these regimes led to

different classifications of illiberal democracies, also known as electoral authoritarian regimes.

Researchers find hegemonic authoritarian regimes and competitive authoritarian regimes among

these states. The larger question is if these states should be recognized as democracies at all.

Larry Diamond referred to these types of states as "pseudodemocracies".[16] Mehran Kamrava's

Politics & Society in the Developing World chronicled the evolution of these types of states in

the Third World. He also wrote that many of these democratic states "do not really deserve the

label".[17]

The debate over the legitimacy of democracy in these hybrid regimes feeds into another

larger question about the nature of democracy. All scholars agree that one of the primary

characteristics of democracy is voting. The real variations in the levels of democracy lie within

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[14] Diamond, "Thinking About Hybrid Regimes", 23.
[15] Daniela Dunno, "Elections and Democratization in Authoritarian Regimes," *American Journal of Political Science 57*, no. 3 (July 2013): 703.
[16] Diamond, "Thinking About Hybrid Regimes", 25.
[17] Mehran Kamrava, *Politics & Society in the Developing World* (London: Rutledge, 2000), 1.

important details like voter eligibility, voting conditions, voting accessibility, and education. Politically, these are the factors above and beyond Dahl's basic foundation that effect democracy. Scholars, especially those of other fields such as sociology and economics, see other factors effecting democracy as well. Combinations of these factors, along with understood presumptions about democracy (like Dahl's foundation) imperil the notion of democracy's absolute nature.

Measuring Democracy

The past time of attempting to measure democracy is a manifestation of the debate surrounding its nature. Some scholars view democracy as a noun: "Angola is a democracy." Others see it as a descriptor; an adjective: "Angola has a democratic government." A very popular and more recent discussion is what factors can measure democracy of a varying nature. (The notion of democracy as a binary measure is not that popular.) Many researchers seek to measure democracy using complex mathematical models, using variables and indicators from different official and unofficial sources. Other scholars seek to look past measuring democracy and the associated labels. This group finds research models helpful, but seeks more insight into more non-quantifiable factors.

The rise of the hybrid regimes and illiberal democracy are at the core of the debate over the nature of democracy. There are two positions in the debate. One school of study views democracy as dichotomous. Adam Przeworski argues that democracy is a kind of government, not a degree. There is one kind of democratic government: a democracy. The proponents of this binary view argue that "efforts to look for traces of democracy in `nondemocracies' are both

invalid and error-prone."[18] Other scholars think that gradient democracy "negates the concept of regime and regime type."[19] Russia is held up as an example. Diamond refers to modern Russia as a "pseudodemocracy" while Laurel Miller calls it "imitation democracy".[20]

This argument holds a great deal validity in regards to Dahl's definition of democracy. Based on this definition, there can be no democracy without certain rights institutionally guaranteed. Some states in the world violate press freedoms. Some governments hold monopolies on TV, radio and media. There are still allegations of voter fraud and voter suppression and intimidation. Governments still jail candidates facing incumbents in some places in the world. There are significant barriers to being eligible for public office in places. Any of this disqualifies a country from being a democracy according to Dahl.

The other school sees democracy as a "matter of degrees".[21] Zachary Elkins argues that graded measures are reliable, realistic and more theoretically faithful.[22] The rise of these hybrid regimes "has encouraged attempts to empirically capture these new categories with the help of existing measures of democracy."[23] There are two widely used studies to this end: Polity IV and Freedom House. Both of these analyses assign a score to each country. Freedom House goes further and assigns various labels "free", "partly free" and not free.[24] The graduated concept of

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[18] Przeworski quoted by Zachary Elkins, "Gradations of Democracy? Empirical Tests of Alternative Conceptualizations," *America Journal of Political Science 44*, no. 2 (April 2000), 293-4.

[19] Matthiji Bogaards, "Measure of Democratization: From Degree to Type to War," *Political Research Quarterly 63*, no. 2 (June 2010): 476.

[20] Diamond, "Thinking About Hybrid Regimes", 25; Laurel E. Miller, et al. *Democratization in the Arab World* (Arlington VA: The Rand Corporation, 2012), 185.

[21] Nathan J. Brown and Craig M. Kauffman, "Introduction," in *The Dynamics of Democratization*, ed. Nathan J. Brown (Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins Press, 2011), 12.

[22] Przeworski quoted by Elkins, "Gadiations of Democracy?" 293-4.

[23] Bogaards, "Measure of Democratization," 475.

[24] Miller, et al. *Democratization in the Arab World*, 13-14.

democracy and its grey zone allows for the study of states such as Russia, Cambodia and Venezuela.

Attempting to mimic the science of Freedom House and Polity IV is a popular endeavor in political science. Researchers use the most popular datasets from Polity IV, Freedom House. Their results and datasets are available of the Internet.[25] There are others: Adam Przeworski's "DD" (a binary measure of democracy and dictatorship), Michael Bernhard, Timothy Nordstrom and Christopher Reenock's "BNR" (an index created by the Economist Intelligence Unit: the "EIU"), the "BTI" from the Bertelsmann Foundation,[26] and the work of Mark Gasiorowski .[27] There are still others that use these indices or their data as starting points for other models. Carl Henrik Knutsen cites that Ronald Ingelhart and Christian Welzel's Effective Democracy Index (EDI) is an aggregation of the Freedom House Index, Transparency International's Corruption Perception Index or Control of Corruption index from the World Governance Indicators.[28] Shawn Treier and Simon Jackman use indicators from Polity in a different model.[29]

These different indices expand on Dahl's operational definition of "democracy". The United Nations embraces representative government in Article I of its charter. More recently, the European Union promotes democratization within its candidate countries.[30] Dahl's proposition of a free press is widely embraced, as well. The United Nations sponsors a World Press Freedom

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[25] Bogaards, "Measure of Democratization," 476.

[26] Coppedge et al., "Conceptualizing and Measuring Democracy: A New Approach," 248

[27] Bogaards, "Measure of Democratization," 476.

[28] Carl Henrik Knutsen, "Measuring Effective Democracy," *International Political Science Review 31*, no. 2 (March 2010): 109.

[29] Shawn Treier and Simon Jackman, "Democracy as a Latent Variable," *American Journal of Political Science 52*. No. 1 (January 2008): 201.

[30] Kristi Ralk, "EU Accession of Central and Eastern European Countries: Democracy and Integration as Conflicting Logics," *East European Politics and Societies 18*, no. 4 (November 2004): 567.

Day[31] while UNESCO (The United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization)

concurrently "promotes freedom of expression and freedom of the press and fosters media

independence and pluralism by providing advisory services on media legislation and by making

governments, parliamentarians and other decision-makers aware of the need to guarantee free

expression."[32] Dahl's work is a foundation for democracy, but only a foundation.

International organizations, non-government organizations and various transnational

networks added to the Dahl's original democratic attributes or clarified their meaning. The most

voluminous source of additional rights is the much older Universal Declaration of Human

Rights. It was adopted by the United Nations in 1948. It calls for equality of all persons under the

law, seeks to guarantee freedom from most discrimination, espouses an individual's rights to

marry, own property and practice the religion of their choice and declares that all people have the

right to an education.[33] Many UN member states have comparable domestic rights for their

citizens. The European Union made most of these rights compulsory for membership.

The reality of these expanded rights is the basis for Elkin's argument supporting the idea

of the variable nature of democracy and expanded number of indicators in democracy indices.

Researchers consider these expanded rights when selecting variables for their indices because

they are points of difference between countries. Country A and Country B might both hold free

elections, but Country B might not allow women to vote. Country C and Country D might allow

both sexes to vote, but Country D might only allow people of a certain religion to be citizens.

Education is a large matter to consider. Countries have different levels of compulsory education

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[31] United Nations, http://www.un.org/en/events/pressfreedomday/background.shtml. Accessed August 1, 2015.
[32] United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization,
http://www.unesco.org/new/en/communication-and-information/freedom-of-expression/press-freedom/.
Accessed August 1, 2015.
[33] *Universal Declaration of Human Rights*, 1948.

and even more divergent completion rates. All of these variables matter to the researcher seeking to expound upon Dahl's work and create a realistic comparison of governments.

The various democracy indices have critics. Daniel Pemstein, Stephen A. Meserve and James Melton wrote, "There is no consensus on the reliability of any of these measures." [34] Some find fault with the theoretical aspects. Most indices do not include variables like geography, history or ethnic groups. Some researchers find operational and mathematical flaws common to the indices. There are debates over measurement and coding of data. Some take issue with the aggregation of the different variables. It is interesting to note that scholars do not dismiss the practice, but seek to improve operationalizing democracy study. Their suggestions usually involve incorporating less traditional but intriguing factors into the aggregation process. In short, these researchers want to adopt a different approach.

Many scholars cite theoretical flaws in the many democracy indices. Laurel Miller et al warn that the "hard-and-fast labeling" of Polity IV and Freedom House is not beneficial. They contend that many of the produced labels are not realistic. However, such studies can answer questions over periods of time.[35] They can illustrate changes and democratic transition or backsliding. Miller saw problems with this very scientific study of seemingly unscientific material. She sees democratization scholars pre-occupied with causes.[36] Gerardo Munck and Jay Verkuilen wrote, "Democracy indices reflect insufficient sensitivity to the key issues involved in the choice of indicators." [37] Matthiji Bogaards wrote that researchers who assume that democracy

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[34] Daniel Pemstein, Stephen A. Meserve and James Melton, "Democratic Compromise: A Latent Variable Analysis of Ten Measures of Regime Type," *Political Analysis 18*, no. 4 (Autumn 2010): 427.

[35] Miller, et al. *Democratization in the Arab World*, 15.

[36] Ibid., 17.

[37] Munck and Verkuilen, "Conceptualizing and Measuring Democracy: Evaluating Indices," 17.

has a gradual nature "treat democracy and its absence as endpoints of a continuum, on which any thresholds or boundaries are arbitrary."[38]

Researchers agree that there are operational and structural flaws in the democracy indices. Munck and Verkuilen wrote that researchers need to pick between parsimony and fidelity. [39] Freedom House has too many components for some attributes. [40] One journal article selected eleven different variables for study![41] They also highlight that indices are restricted by data. Similarly, Coppedge at al wrote there are problems with "coverage and sources".[42] Both equate to the fact that for some countries, data is available only some years.[43] Munck and Verkuilen wrote that some models, including Polity IV suffer from redundancy. Some models use components that relate to two attributes. [44] Munck, Verkuilen and Coppedge agree many indices have issues with measurement, coding and aggregation. Measurement and coding can be subject to bias. Aggregation can be either biased or wrong.[45]

While some scholars allude to the difficulty in creating accurate democratic indices, none advocate abandoning them. Most proposed ways to improve them. Coppedge and his fellow scholars proposed including a variable that addressed history. They noted, "One cannot understand the future of democracy in the world and how to shape it unless one understands the forces that produced the regime types that populate the world today."[46] Additionally, they

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[38] Bogaards, "Measure of Democratization," 476.
[39] Munck and Verkuilen, "Conceptualizing and Measuring Democracy: Evaluating Indices," 22.
[40] Ibid., 14.
[41] Abraham Dishkin, Hanna Dishkin and Reuven Y. Hazan, "Why Democracies Collapse: The Reasons for Democratic Failure and Success" *International Political Science Review 26*, no. 3 (2005): 291.
[42] Coppedge et al., "Conceptualizing and Measuring Democracy: A New Approach," 250.
[43] Munck and Verkuilen, "Conceptualizing and Measuring Democracy: Evaluating Indices," 6.
[44] Ibid.,14.
[45] Munck and Verkuilen, "Conceptualizing and Measuring Democracy: Evaluating Indices," 19; Coppedge et al, "Conceptualizing and Measuring Democracy: A New Approach," 250.
[46] Coppedge et al., "Conceptualizing and Measuring Democracy: A New Approach," 252.

offered six different forms of "rule by people" as a coded variable in an effort to measure

democracy using another six more standard variables.[47] Muck and Verkuilen warn researchers

of using systemic sources because laws change. They urge researchers to justify their indicators.

In measurements, they urge researchers to "maximize the homogeneity within measurements

with a minimum number of necessary distinctions". [48]

Some researchers focus on unquantifiable factors. Miller ponders if democracy was

contagious, occurring in geographic clusters, found in oppositional strategies (reform movements

versus the Communist governments) or there were other socio-economic factors linked to

development. She alludes to Jan Teorell's work, which uses a complex statistical model and

explains little about how democratization occurs: 40% in the long run at best.[49] Analyzing

democracy with fidelity is more than a simple math problem. There are other unquantifiable

factors at work. Teorell wrote that there can be "non-structural country specific" aspects to

democratization.[50] He proposes that a perfect theory of democratization does not exist and the

three different forms of testing theories should be combined: statistical, historical-comparative

and case studies. Each of the three methods fails on their own.[51] Grzegorz Ekiert wrote,

"Analytical lenses were therefore turned increasingly to the past, with recent work emphasizing

the importance of historical legacies at the expense of the policy and institutional choices

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[47] Ibid., 253, 255.

[48] Munck and Verkuillen, "Conceptualizing and Measuring Democracy: Evaluating Indices," 16- 17.

[49] Miller, et al. *Democratization in the Arab World*, 17-18.

[50] Jan Teorell, *Determinants of Democratization: Explaining Regime Change in the World, 1972-2006* (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2010), 11.

[51] Ibid., 14.

stressed in the earlier literature." He cites the role that history, geography, conflicts and wars can have on the political outcomes of regime change.[52]

This less statistical approach allows for more of a focus on the determination of democracy and less on establishing mathematical relationships. The product of researchers' work on indices is useful, yet not to the extent that some might argue. There are very few locales on the globe where there are absolutely no cultural or historical animosities. In terms of ethnicity, the role that diversity plays in developing democracy and the democracy's hardiness is debatable. Religion remains both a unifying and divisive force simultaneously at different points around the world. Many of these factors cannot be addressed by clever coding and contributing factors can change from region to region. Statistically explaining resulting levels of democracy, products of transition, and what determines democracy remain somewhat elusive.

Determinants of Democratization

A review of the established literature of democratization and its offspring, democracy, is essential in an analysis of the different levels of democratic quality in post-communist Europe. Most scholars view and concede a wave-like nature in democratic change and, at times, a domino-like theory. The debate over the factors that actually contribute to a democratic state with basic rights and freedoms is continuous. Many scholars attest to the role that existing conditions play. Others allude to the importance of economics and finance. Just as many researchers dismiss the primary role of these contributors in favor of other factors: history, democratic structure, or geography to name a few.

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[52] Grzegorz Ekiert, "Eastern Europe's Postcommunist Transformations," *World Politics Review*, March 20, 2012. http://www.worldpoliticsreview.com/articles/11749/eastern-europes-postcommunist-transformations. Accessed August 2, 2015.

Tracking democratic transitions is relatively new. Samuel P. Huntington was the first to attempt it in 1991.[53] Accounting for democracy is an older pursuit. Yet, the two can be studied in tandem by combining the Huntington's work and a chronological review at the dominant theories over time. Democratic transitions are grouped into different "waves" based on when they occur. This concept of waves was established by Huntington in his work *The Third Wave: Democracy in the Late Twentieth Century*. A "wave" is a "group of transitions from nondemocratic to democratic regimes that occur within a specific period of time and that specifically outnumbers transitions in the other direction during that period of time."[54] It is important to note that Huntington wrote that every wave of democratization is post-scripted by a reverse wave where some of the young democracies revert back to nondemocracy.

The date of the commencement of the first wave of democratization in the world is a point of contention. Jan Teorell marks the period after World War One as the first wave of democratization.[55] However, Huntington wrote that the first wave began in 1828 with the American and French Revolutions. Huntington bases this on the fact that more than more than half of adult males could vote and that there were representative bodies with executives chosen in the U.S. and France at this time. The reversal of the first wave began with Mussolini's reign in Italy, followed by coups all over Europe. This ended democracy in Baltics, Poland, Brazil, Argentina and Portugal. The rise of Hitler and the Anschluss imposed a single totalitarian regime over Germany and Austria.[56] World War Two occurred. According to Huntington, the second wave began with the Allied occupations in West Germany, Italy, Japan and Korea. The reversal of the second wave began in 1958. Over the next 18 years, one third of the democracies in the

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[53] Bogaards, "Measure of Democratization: From Degree to Type to War," 475.
[54] Samuel P. Huntington, *The Third Wave* (Norman, OK: University of Oklahoma Press, 1991), 15.
[55] Teorell, *Determinants of Democratization*, 2.
[56] Huntington, *The Third Wave,* 16-18.

world succumbed to authoritarianism. Most of these were in the developing countries of Latin America and Africa.[57]

The 1960s was the era of modernization theory. Western Europe was held up as an example. It was accepted that modernization could be difficult and democracy would take time.[58] The basis for the theory is the principle that development equaled democracy and freedom. Seymour Martin Lipset wrote that "this means that the more well-to-do a nation, the greater the chances that it will sustain democracy."[59] Proponents see democracy as a manifestation of economic development, industrialization and expanded education.[60] In analyzing states, Lipset wrote, "In each case, the average wealth, degree of industrialization and urbanization, and level of education is much higher for the more democratic countries [referring to his dataset]."[61] He continues, "[Statistically] the factors that subsumed under economic development carry with it the political correlate of democracy."[62] Written in 1959, Lipset and other researchers looked at the results of the post-war reconstruction of the former battlefields of World War Two and linked democracy to it.

The reverse of the second wave occurred from 1958-1975.[63] In this period, dependency theory emerged and dispatched modernization theory as the popular theory of democratization. Dictatorships in developed Latin America countries disproved modernization theory.[64] On the topic of development, Teorell cites Przeworski and others who wrote that modernization does not

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[57] Ibid., 20-21.
[58] Brown and Kauffman, "Introduction," 17.
[59] Martin Seymour Lipset, "Some Social Requisites of Democracy: Economic Development and Political Legitimacy," *The American Political Science Review 53*, no. 1 (March 1959): 75.
[60] Teorell, *Determinants of Democratization*, 3.
[61] Lipset, "Some Social Requisites of Democracy," 75.
[62] Ibid., 80.
[63] Huntington, *The Third Wave*, 16.
[64] Brown and Kauffman, "Introduction," 18.

aid in democracy, but simply hampers authoritarianism[65] and backsliding. Providing a structure helps build democracy, but only with external forces, meaning the international factors of the diffusion of democracy and pressure to embrace it. Teorell wrote that while income matters, modernization theory is pre-occupied with it.[66] Scholars of dependency theory acknowledge the role of economic development, but note that enthusiasm among key groups does not correlate with modernization theory's economic indicators.[67]

Dependency theory approaches democratization from an anthropocentric point of view. It focuses on people as opposed to other research that "has been overwhelmed by the flood of state-centric work that has dominated comparative politics for the past decade."[68] Teorell refers to it as the "social forces" theory.[69] There are two distinct schools within dependency theory. The first identifies the capitalist class as agents of democracy. Barrington Moore wrote, "no bourgeoisie, no democracy."[70] The second school identifies the working class as the agents of democracy. Both groups agree on the basics of dependency theory. Democracy is struggle with a prominent role for social forces. It is about interest, which propels change in government. This yields the pessimistic view that material interests are the highest priority. These forces are more important than economic development or history and culture. [71]

The social forces approach of dependency theory is far from ironclad. It cannot explain everything or all events. Political changes in Korea, Chile and Brazil validated the theory. Social forces theory impact was more muted in Mexico, Tunisia and Egypt. The same forces opposed

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[65] Teorell, *Determinants of Democratization*, 5.
[66] Ibid, 11-12.
[67] Eva Bellin, "Contingent Democrats: Industrialists, Labor and Democratization in Late-Developing Coutnries," *World Politics 52*, no. 2 (January 2000): 178.
[68] Ibid., 175.
[69] Teorell, *Determinants of Democratization*, 4.
[70] Barrington Moore quoted by Eva Bellin, "Contingent Democrats," 176.
[71] Eva Bellin, "Contingent Democrats," 176-178.

democracy in Indonesia, Singapore and Syria.[72] Paul James writes a detailed account of the death

of dependency theory. He regards it as "a once-relevant attempt to understand a long-gone era

(that is prior to the 1970s)."[73] He cites the rise of globalism for the demise of the once popular

theory. He cites Susan Strange, who wrote:

> It is no accident that the "dependency school" of writers of the
> 1970s have lost so much of their audience. In Latin America (where
> most of this writing was focused), politicians and professors were
> almost unanimous in the 1970s in castigating the multinationals as
> agents of American imperialism, but now they acknowledge them as
> potential allies in earning the foreign exchange badly needed for
> further development.[74]

International capitalism is now a forgone conclusion. Discussions of interdependency and post-

colonialism replaced the topics of dependency and imperialism in theories and study. [75] James

clarifies that inequality and dependence still exist in the world. Dependency theory simply did

not address their roles in democratic transition adequately.[76]

Huntington marks the beginnings of the third wave of democratization with the

Portuguese coup de-tat in April 1974.[77] In the 1980s and 1990s authoritarian regimes broke

down.[78] (The most obvious of these was Central and Eastern Europe.) These democratic

transitions were different. In the second wave, many transitions occurred through decolonization

or by having democracy imposed by an outside force.[79] Huntington divides the transitions of the

third wave into three different classes: transformations, replacements or transplacements. Elites

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[72] Ibid., 177-8.

[73] Paul James, "Postdependency? The Third World in an Era of Globalism and Late-Capitalism," *Alternatives: Global, Local Political 22*, no. 2 (April-June 1997): 205.

[74] Susan Strange cited by James, "Postdependency?" 207.

[75] James, "Postdependency?" 205.

[76] Ibid., 207.

[77] Huntington, *The Third Wave*, 3.

[78] Brown, and Kauffman, "Introduction," 18.

[79] Huntington, *The Third Wave*, 112.

in power led changes, resulting in democracy during transformations. Replacement scenarios occurred when authoritarian regimes were overthrown in favor of democracy. Transplacements were joint actions between the government and citizenry of states.[80]

A large number of democracies emerged in Latin America, Southern Europe and Asia in the third wave. Many foreign policy officials in the Reagan Administration saw a "worldwide democratic revolution". Guillermo O'Donnell and Philippe C. Schmitter compiled a *transition paradigm*. The scholars pointed out that it was not a testable theory.[81] It provided different linear steps towards democracy. The main premise is that countries are moving away from an authoritarian government are moving towards democracy.[82] The foundations of the paradigm are simple: liberalization and democratization.[83] A commitment to these two these two goals trumps all other factors. These include poverty, ethnic fragmentation, and past politics. O'Donnell and Schmitter wrote that pre-existing political institutions have little effect on authoritarian rule. At times, institutions survive and matter, as the king did in fascist Italy. Yet, early 20th century Greece saw different authoritarian groups demolish established political institutions repeatedly. Elections are the definitive step in democratization, according to O'Donnell and Schmitter. "Elections equal democracy".[84] This plan faltered with the reverse of the third wave.

A reverse of the third wave occurred in the 2000s. Several authoritarian regimes proved durable.[85] "Many countries settled into a `gray zone' of diverse forms of government where

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[80] Ibid., 114.
[81] Guillermo O'Donnell and Philippe C. Schmitter, *Transitions from Authoritarian Rule* (Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1986), 3.
[82] Thomas Carothers, "The End of Transition Paradigm," *Journal of Democracy 13*, no. 1 (2002): 6.
[83] O'Donnell and Schmitter, *Transitions from Authoritarian Rule*, 9.
[84] Carothers, "The End of Transition Paradigm," 7-8.
[85] Brown and Kauffman, "Introduction," 19.

autocratic and democratic features combined."[86] Diamond described it as a "democratic

rollback". A "powerful authoritarian undertow" caught the governments in Nigeria, Thailand,

Bangladesh, and the Philippines. Freedom and civil rights also weakened in Chile, Ghana,

Poland and South Africa.[87] This changed the landscape of democratization research and the

analyses of democracy. First, the emergence of hybrid regimes invalidated O'Donnell and

Schmitter's transition paradigm. Second, democracy study evolved into a new form of analysis.

This analysis steps away from the straight science of democratic indices and older theories noted

for their exclusive nature.

 The movement away from the most scientific of political analysis in democracy happened

in steps. The first step was the emergence of the notion of "young democracies". The second was

a less mathematical analysis. Ethan B. Kapstein and Nathan Converse explained that younger

democracies act differently than older democratic governments. Kapstein and Converse use six

years as a cut-off. This is used to explain why many recessions of the third wave and fourth wave

democratic transitions flew in the face of established mantra. These governments were simply

not old enough to be judged with their older peers. They write:

> Early indicators are, therefore, that initial conditions do significantly
> affect   the survival chances of democratic regimes. Low per capita income,
> high levels of inequality, high rates of poverty, and higher ethnic
> fragmentation all harm the prospects that democracy will endure.
> Yet these relationships are not deterministic. There are several
> countries (among them Guatemala and Mozambique) in which initial
> conditions were extremely unfavorable, yet where democracy had

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[86] Laurel E. Miller and Jeffrey Martini, "How Does Arab Spring Compare to Third Wave Transitions?" RAND Corporation, August 17, 2012. http://www.rand.org/blog/2012/08/how-does-arab-spring-compare-to-third-wave-transitions.html. Accessed August 13, 2015.

[87] Larry Diamond, "The Democratic Rollback: The Resurgence of the Predatory State," *Foreign Affairs 87*, no. 2 (March-April 2008): 36.

endured as of 2004, albeit not without difficulties.[88]
Economic factors were especially over estimated in prior study. This allows for the next step in departure from the traditional study of democratic transition.

Laurel E. Miller and Jeffrey Martini take up the second step. They note that there are several different conditions to consider when examining democracy and democratization in the third wave. Their blueprint bisects and includes several different established theories and practices. First, consider the mode of change.[89] Within the context of central and eastern Europe there were three types of transitions. Hungary, Poland and Bulgaria were regime-initiated. East Germany and Czechoslovakia were society-initiated. Romania experienced a violent overthrow.[90] Second, a country's past history with political pluralism is important.[91] Tighter the repression of dissent created more difficult the transition to democracy.[92] Third, critical policy choices during transition: role of the military in government, structure of representative bodies, transitional justice or reconciliation court are included. Fourth, both sets of scholars alluded to the importance of national cohesion. A number of states suffered from ethnic rivalries, unsettled borders or insurgent groups.[93] Some of these "frozen conflicts"[94] of the region reignited in the absence of Soviet central control. Fifth, economic stability is important. Kapstein and Converse wrote that while important, economics cannot be estimated using a single factor or determine the fate of governments. Miller and Martini hold that the last two factors towards democratization

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[88] Ethan B. Kapstein and Nathan Converse, "Why Democracies Fail," *Journal of Democracy 19*, no. 4 (October 2008): 61-62.
[89] Miller and Martini, "How Does Arab Spring Compare to Third Wave Transitions?"
[90] Miller, et al. *Democratization in the Arab World*, 181-182.
[91] Miller and Martini, "How Does Arab Spring Compare to Third Wave Transitions?"
[92] Miller, et al. *Democratization in the Arab World*, 183.
[93] Miller and Martini, "How Does Arab Spring Compare to Third Wave Transitions?"
[94] Miller, et al. *Democratization in the Arab World*, 183.

are dependent on external forces.[95] This could include regional security, the status and conditions in neighboring states, efforts by non-government organizations and involvement in international organizations to name a few items.

Post-Communist Democracy in Europe

The collapse of communism afforded scholars and researchers in democracy a very unique situation. Never before, and perhaps never again, will the countries of an entire region of a single continent break free or simply walk away from ideologically similar totalitarian regimes. The literature of post-communist democracy in eastern and central Europe tends to be very region specific. It includes different theories. The most prominent of them is Rokkan's ideas about political development.   Contemporary researchers have used much of his work to analyze the territory and culture as factors in the democratization of the region. The end of the Cold War also presented powerful international influences affecting democracy in the area. The most recent literature specific to central and eastern Europe addresses post-EU accession regression from democracy.

Many current studies about democracy in central and eastern Europe focus on historical legacies, culture, outside support and geography. This practice faces a large amount of criticism. Many researchers and member of the broader political science community view democratization as "a process that displays fairly regular contours." This creates a theoretical friction between area specialists and general democracy scholars. Separate concentrations on theme and location collide. Area scholars are referred to as "typical area scholars". They are accused of being over concerned with "trivial details of states". They can be labeled as "deficient as social scientists".

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[95] Miller and Martini, "How Does Arab Spring Compare to Third Wave Transitions?".

At the same time, researchers specializing in certain regions accuse their detractors of using "faddish theories" and showing "overeagerness".[96]

Researchers point out that there are similarities with other regions of the world, but that the shock of communism's collapse in central and eastern Europe was unique. Many of the states of the region had no democratic tradition.[97] Many of the new states had been parts of the Austro-Hungarian, Ottoman or Russian Empires. There was little memory or experience with a capitalist economy.[98] The military played little or no role in the end of communism in most central and eastern European countries. Economically, most of these states started from a position of almost perfect equal wealth distribution.[99] It led Ekiert to write that, "Explanations emphasizing geographic locations, deep historical preconditions and affinities for dense relations with the West pose significant limitations to our thinking about policy lessons that can be transferred to other regions."[100]

Analysis about democracy in central and Eastern Europe evolved over time. Valerie Bunce sees the democratic transition of central and eastern Europe in two distinct stages. The first occurred from 1989 to 1996. The second occurred from 1996 to 2009. The first stage included the democratization of approximately half of former Soviet states in the region. It was characterized by increased political diversity, relative nonviolence and political cohesion of post-communist parties. In the second stage, the "laggards" moved in a more democratic direction,

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[96]Valerie Bunce, "Comparing East and South," *Journal of Democracy 6*, no. 3 (July 1995): 87.
[97] Ibid., 89.
[98] Bunce, "Comparing East and South," 89; Thomas Gale Moore, "Privatization in the Former Soviet Empire," in *Economic Transition in Eastern Europe and Russia*, ed. Edward P. Lazear (Stanford, CA: Hoover Institution Press, 1995), 161.
[99] Bunce, "Comparing East and South," 89.
[100] Ekiert, "Eastern Europe's Postcommunist Transformations,".

some to relative democracy.[101] Researchers pursued several popular theories of democratization. Some theorized that the age of the state would reflect the quality of democracy after communism. Bunce points out that Bulgaria and Romania were two of the older countries in the region, yet evolved into illiberal democracies and hybrid regimes. Another theory attempted to establish a correlation between religious and ethnic diversity and democracy. Bunce points out that Poland and Albania are both very heterogeneous, but have completely different governments. Some scholars saw that a difference in communist policies linked to a difference of democratic result.[102]

A very popular attempt to explain democracy in the region emphasized elites and their choices. This used the same templates researchers used in studying democratic transitions in Latin America and elsewhere.[103] Ekiert and Ziblatt, as well as Bunce, state this was conceptually flawed.[104] Reusing analytical frameworks used on Latin America and Africa overlook that the process in Europe after the fall of communism is "distinctly European".[105] Ekiert and Ziblatt write:

> To compare the post-communist experience to democratic experiments in other temporally proximate third-wave cases in other world regions is to make the mistake of the drunkard whose search for his keys leads him to the spot he can most easily see – under the lamppost.[106]

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[101] Valerie Bunce, "The Political Transition," in *Central & Eastern European Politics from Communism to Democracy*, eds. Sharon L. Wolchik and Jane L Curry (Plymouth, UK: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, Inc., 2011), 48.

[102] Ibid., 37-38.

[103] Ekiert, "Eastern Europe's Postcommunist Transformations,".

[104] Grzgorz Ekiert and Daniel Ziblatt, "Democracy in Central and Eastern Europe One Hundred Years On," *East European Politics and Societies and Cultures 27*, no. 1 (February 2013): 91; Valerie Bunce, "Comparing East and South," *Journal of Democracy 6*, no. 3 (July 1995): 88.

[105] Ekiert and Ziblatt, "Democracy in Central and Eastern Europe One Hundred Years On," 91; Bunce, "Comparing East and South," 91.

[106] Ekiert and Ziblatt, "Democracy in Central and Eastern Europe One Hundred Years On," 91.

This approach used "proximate factors", such as mode of transition and framework decisions. The theory was dismissed.[107] Most of the transitions in central and eastern Europe were similar.[108] The election results in central and eastern Europe were not. [109]

New theories about the democracy in the region combine much of these other theories. They are akin to Stein Rokkan's analysis of western European nation-building. First and foremost, they are intended to study only central and eastern Europe. Rokkan wrote that "smaller political systems tend to be so heavily dependent on their cultural contexts that there is likely to be very small payoffs in attempts at indiscriminate comparisons across distinctive cultural regions." [110] The theories account for the factors contributing to economy, territory and culture. Rokkan's earlier model addressed these different forces along continuums containing four thresholds: legitimacy, incorporation, representation and executive power.[111] The factors have different impacts depending on "various historical conditions", such as the national revolutions (until 1789) or industrial revolutions. The impact of economics depended on economic growth. Territory impacted democratization based on geopolitical position, periphery control and timing of national unification. Culture comprised of church-state relations and language.[112] Regional experts use Rokkan's approach to explain that democracy in the region can be linked to the history, geography, culture and external forces in addition to the more conventional economic factors.

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[107] Ekiert, "Eastern Europe's Postcommunist Transformations,".

[108] Bunce, "The Political Transition," 37-38.

[109] Ekiert, "Eastern Europe's Postcommunist Transformations,".

[110] Stein Rokkan,"Models and Methods in the Comparative Study of Nation-Building," *Acta Sociologica 12*, no. 2 (1969): 60.

[111] Svante Ersson, "Revisiting Rokkan," *Historical Social Research 20*, no. 2 (1995): 161.

[112] Ibid., 165.

There are deep historical roots in many of the resulting democracies in central and eastern Europe. The history of the region affected the immediate post-communist regimes, the more developed democratic governments and subsequent accession to the European Union. There are smaller debates and differences within the literature. Researchers contemplate which past matters more. The first debate draws on the pre-1940s history and the legacy of the empires. Grzegorz Ekiert and Daniel Ziblatt view democratization in the region on an unbroken continuum. Communist and Soviet domination was simply a pause. The states of central and eastern Europe simply started moving towards democracy again.[113] Arista Maria Cirtautas and Frank Schimmelfennig quote Jeffrey Kopstein:

> The relevant past has been identified as the policy choices in the initial post communist years that have been influenced by the path of extrication from Communism. Whether roundtables or revolutions, that have in turn been determined by the types of Communist regimes that are themselves the product of the types of postcommunist state and society, which ultimately reflect the level of modernization at the time of national independence after World War I.[114]

Sten Berglund and Jan Åke Dellenbrant point out that many of the political parties in central and eastern Europe immediately after communism's fall had roots in pre-World War II political parties.[115] Also, countries with pre-Second World War parliamentary traditions had higher levels of political pluralism in the immediate aftermath of communism.[116]

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[113] Ekiert and Ziblatt, "Democracy in Central and Eastern Europe One Hundred Years On," 90-91.

[114] Jeffrey Kopstein quoted by Arista Maria Citrtautas and Frank Schimmelfennig, "Special Section The European Union and Post-Communist Eastern Europe: Conditionality, Legacies and Europeanisation," *Europe-Asia Studies 62*, no. 3 (May 2010): 427.

[115] Sten Berglund and Jan Åke Dellenbrant, "The Breakdown of Communism in Eastern Europe," in *The New Democracies in Eastern Europe*, eds. Sten Berglund and Jan Åke Dellenbrant (Brookfield, VT: Edward Elgat Publishing Company, 1994), 9.

[116] Sten Berglund and Jan Åke Dellenbrant, "Prospects for the New Democracies in Eastern Europe," in *The New Democracies in Eastern Europe*, eds. Sten Berglund and Jan Åke Dellenbrant (Brookfield, VT: Edward Elgat Publishing Company, 1994), 240.

Ekiert and Ziblatt advance their idea further. They write that varying quality of freedom, rights, economic development and political stability in central and eastern Europe correlate to two different forces: pre-communist political patterns and more current events (reforms, wars and crises). The challenge to researchers is combining the two stimuli. Researchers should recognize the importance of pre-communist legacies, but that they are not deterministic.[117] The Czech Republic was industrialized before communism. Poland had limited experience with democracy before communism. Hungary's right-wing politics reflect the legacy of the Soviet crackdown in 1956, the failed communist revolt of 1919 and angst over the punishing Trianon Treaty.[118] Pre-communist patterns and current events are combined by the "institutional mimicry" caused by sudden changes or shocks. Discontinuous changes do not allow for evolution. Gaps form when governments simply collapse; disappear.[119] This is why "critical antecedents": religion, imperial legacies, pre-communist voting patterns, matter.[120]

A second issue in discussing historical relevance is the role of communism. Frank Schimmelfennig, Hanno Scholtz and Arista Maria Cirtautas point out that in terms of states within the former Soviet Union, there are two groups. Communism emerged in one group around the time of World War One and the Russian Revolution. Another group became communist after falling victim to Soviet, post-Second World War domination.[121] Bunce points out a strong correlation between the duration of communist rule and the resulting quality of democracy in the former Soviet Union. Most of the more democratic states became communist following World War Two. Democracy is weaker or non-existent in other parts of the former U.S.S.R. where

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[117] Ekiert and Ziblatt, "Democracy in Central and Eastern Europe One Hundred Years On," 94.
[118] Ibid., 95.
[119] Ibid., 96-7.
[120] Ibid., 97.
[121] Frank Schimmelfennig and Hanno Schultz, "Legacies and Leverage: EU Political Conditionality and Democracy Promotion in Historical Perspective," *Europe-Asia Studies 62*, no. 3 (May 2010): 448; Citrtautas and Schimmelfennig, "Special Section The European Union and Post-Communist Eastern Europe," 426.

communism began after World War One: Belarus, Uzbekistan, the Ukraine (before 2004),

Armenia and Russia. Bunce reasons that longer communist rule and "deeper penetration"

conditioned these states for authoritarianism.[122]

Democracy in central and eastern Europe has an internal geographic aspect to it as well.

In short, location and proximity to Russia matters. One only needs look at a map of the region

and its periphery to understand that the farther east a researcher looks, the lower the chance of

finding even a moderate democracy.[123] Bunce reverses this viewpoint. She wrote that states'

geographic proximity to the West is a factor in the results of democratic transition. Before

communism, many central and eastern European countries were trading partners, shared cultural

ties and political ideas with the West.[124] Michael Emerson and Gergana Noutcheva agree and

wrote "fast and deep democratization is explained to a significant degree by the proximity and

possibly of anchorage and integration with a major world centre of democracy."[125] More

recently, Russia, a historical symbol of oppression to many in the region, reasserted themselves

militarily in the republics of Georgia[126] and the Ukraine. History causes concern. Current events

compound it.

The security questions surrounding geography overshadow larger issues than proximity

and history with the former Soviet Union present. There are factors of ethnicity and religion to

ponder. Many of the states of the region had large minority groups when communism

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[122] Bunce, "The Political Transition," 44-45.

[123] Ekiert and Ziblatt, "Democracy in Central and Eastern Europe One Hundred Years On," 94.

[124] Bunce, "The Political Transition," 45.

[125] Michael Emerson and Gregana Noutcheva quoted by Alina Mungiu-Pippidi , "When Europe Meets Transformation," in *Democracy and Authoritarian in the Postcommunist World*, eds. Valerie Bunce, Michael McFaul and Kathryn Stoner Weiss (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2010), 59.

[126] Kaarel Kaas, "The Russian Bear on the Warpath Against Georgia," International Center for Defense and Security, May 25, 2009. http://www.icds.ee/publications/article/the-russian-bear-on-the-warpath-against-georgia/. Accessed August 2, 2015.

collapsed.[127] 10% of Slovakia's population was Hungarian. There were two million Hungarians in Romania and another 400,000 in Serbia. There was a large German minority in Poland and a Polish minority in Lithuania.[128] Soviet policy dictated immigration and, at times, forced it. In the immediate aftermath of communism in the region, Berglund and Dellenbrant classified regimes into three different groups. First, Poland, the Czech Republic and Hungary underwent successful government reforms and showed reasonable levels of stability. Second, the Baltic States established independence and made progress towards democracy. There are some lingering concerns over sizeable Russian minorities. Ethnic conflicts and nationalism racked the third group. Berglund and Dellenbrant included Slovakia, Romania and Bulgaria in this group.[129] The former Yugoslavia would have definitely belonged in this group, as well, but the editors decided not to include an analysis of the country in their study.

The study of religion as a factor in democratization became popular in contemporary literature due in great part to developments in the Middle East. Natalia Vlas and Sergiu Gherghina wrote that "For a long time, religion has been peripheral to the concerns of political scientists."[130] The wars in Afghanistan and Iraq, the collapse of Gaddafi, and the Arab Spring changed this. Interest in the Middle East yielded a useful by-product: an analysis of religion's impact on democracy. The resulting body of work supports both a regional approach to the study, but also a Rokkansian approach. The literature explores four different religious groups: Protestant Christians, Catholics, Orthodox Christians and Muslims. It aids explaining different

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[127] Adam Bromke, "Post-communist countries: challenges and problems," in *Central and Eastern Europe: The Challenges of Transition*, ed. Regina Cowen Karp (New York: Oxford University Press, 1994), 21.

[128] Ibid., 35.

[129] Sten Berglund and Jan Åke Dellenbrant, "Prospects for the New Democracies in Eastern Europe," in *The New Democracies in Eastern Europe*, eds. Sten Berglund and Jan Åke Dellenbrant (Brookfield, VT: Edward Elgat Publishing Company, 1994), 244.

[130] Natalia Vlas and Sergiu Ghergina, "Where does a religion meet democracy? A comparative analysis of attitudes in Europe," *International Political Science Review 33*, no. 3 (2012): 336.

developments in post-communist governments, different levels of democracy and persistence of some authoritarian regimes.

Any broad generalization about Christianity and its relation to democracy is an error. The relationship between Christianity and democracy is "often taken for granted."[131] The new literature on the topic cracks the perceived political monolith of Christianity. Peter Berger writes that "Modern democracy originated in one part of the world - Western Europe - and there only, through the course it has spread throughout the globe. In religious terms, it originated in the part of the world crucially shaped by Christianity, and by Western Christianity at that."[132] Natalia Vlas and Sergiu Gherghina see Western Europe as being built on a Christian foundation forged by the victory over Holy Roman Emperors. However, the process was not as simple as Papal supremacy. Two key events in Catholicism would play a role: the Protestant Reformation and the Second Vatican Council.

The Protestant Reformation, its progeny and democracy have close relationships in the context of a Rokkansian model. Robert D. Woodberry and Timothy S. Shah use the colonization of the New World and the subsequent 18th century revolutions in explaining the positive impact Christian Protestant religion has on democracy. Berger refers to it as a "natural affinity".[133] Unlike the scholars of Catholicism, Orthodoxy or Islam, Woodberry and Shah pointed to the favorable conditions for democracy Protestantism provides. From this point, the Woodberry and Shah cite a basic blueprint of modernization as a path to democracy: education, economic development, democratic practices and pluralism.[134] Berger notes that the Lutheran Church in

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[131] Ibid.,340.

[132] Peter L. Berger, "The Global Picture," *Journal of Democracy 15*, no. 2 (April 2004): 76.

[133] Ibid., 78.

[134] Robert Dudley Woodberry and Timothy S. Shah, "The Pioneering Protestants," *Journal of Democracy 15*, no. 2 (April 2004): 52-54.

East Germany played a role similar to that of the Catholic Church in Poland in the last days of communism.[135]

The separation of Church and State and religious pluralism present in Protestantism and Catholicism are absent in Orthodox Christianity. This separation is essential in liberal democracy.[136] The Eastern Church never experienced a reformation or anything like the Second Vatican Council. The only religious pluralism experienced by Orthodox churches has been hoisted upon them or accepted hesitantly. The Russian Orthodox Church today is aligned with the Putin Regime.[137] The Romanian Orthodox Church collaborated with the communist regime in Bucharest. The Greek Orthodox Church had no role in the various democratic movements in that country.[138] Some scholars form a consensus that Orthodoxy impedes progress towards democracy.[139]

Berger and Daniel Philpot explained that the Catholic Church only recently endorsed democracy. The church played two basic roles in relation to authoritarian regimes before the Second Vatican Council in the early 1960s. It was either outlawed, as it was in Eastern Europe, or it was aligned with authoritarian governments. The Catholic Church collaborated with rulers like Franco in Spain.[140] The Second Vatican Council espoused individual rights and the

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[135] Berger, "The Global Picture," 79.

[136] Vlas and Ghergina, "Where does a religion meet democracy? A comparative analysis of attitudes in Europe,"340-1.

[137] Berger, "The Global Picture," 80.

[138] Vlas and Ghergina, "Where does a religion meet democracy? A comparative analysis of attitudes in Europe,"341.

[139] Schimmelfennig and Schultz, "Legacies and Leverage: EU Political Conditionality and Democracy Promotion in Historical Perspective," 447; Berger, "The Global Picture," 80; Vlas and Ghergina, "Where does a religion meet democracy? A comparative analysis of attitudes in Europe,"344.

[140] Daniel Philpott, "The Catholic Wave," *Journal of Democracy 15*, no. 2 (April 2004): 37.

separation of church and state and the Catholic Church became proponents of democracy.[141] Philpot explores the implications of Catholicism in central and eastern Europe. He implies that the democratizing impact of Catholicism depends on the size of the catholic community. He cites the large role the church played in Poland and notes that more than 90% of the country identified themselves as Catholic. He compares it to Czechoslovakia, that lacked a Catholic-based opposition to communism.[142]

The literature concerning democracy's compatibility with Islam is extensive, theoretically deep and very theological. The academic literature delves farther into Islam than the other three counterparts discussed. It is a contemporarily contentious issue due to the aforementioned events in the Middle East. The scholarly debate between Niklas Potrafke and Marek Hanush in the pages of *Public Choice* in 2012 and 2013 prove that the question of democracy's viability in Islamic countries is not settled.[143] Some Arab scholars cite that there are inconsistencies between the basic principles of separation of religion and state and individual rights with some interpretations of Islamic law and teachings.[144] Sometimes researchers gloss over them because democracy became "fashionable" in the 1980s.[145] Güneş Murat Tezcür and others point out that many citizens may not understand democracy. They cited data from Vietnam, Egypt, Jordan and Iraq. Scholars speculate that citizens in emerging democracies have unrealistic expectations about it.[146] This can lead to disappointment, frustration and skepticism in the notion of

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[141] Vlas and Ghergina, "Where does a religion meet democracy? A comparative analysis of attitudes in Europe," 341.
[142] Philpott, "The Catholic Wave," 37-38.
[143] Niklas Portafke, "Islam and Democracy," *Public Choice 151* (April 2012): 185; Marek Hanusch, "Islam and Democracy: a response," *Public Choice 154* (March 2013): 315.
[144] Fauzi M. Najjar, "Democracy in Islamic Political Philosophy," *Studia Islamica*, no. 51 (1980): 109.
[145] Ibid.,107.
[146] Güneş Murat Tezcür et al, "Support for Democracy in Iran," *Political Science Research Quarterly 65*, no. 2 (June 2012): 236.

democracy.[147] Additionally, Tezcür and his fellow scholars found that religious fervor in a state like Iran has an inverse relationship with attitudes about democracy.[148] Scholars agree that Islam effects democratization and can make it a precarious proposition.[149]

International influences have a strong impact on central and eastern European regimes. This was especially true following the collapse of communism. Scholars reason that there are different combinations of outside influences that affect the region. Neighboring states, modern Russia, the United States and NATO, and the European Union influence domestic affairs. [150] These different actors affect politics, trade and security in the region. They also interact with each other. Relations between the West and Russia can place the region in the middle of larger geopolitical tensions and chess games. This complicates political life in central and eastern Europe. The most contemporary literature shows regimes balance improving their economies through trade and being aware of military and security matters. This can recreate a Cold War dynamic where countries in central and eastern Europe choose between being more pro-Western or more pro-Russian. This balance was greatly affected by two events: Vladimir Putin's rise to power and the initial foreign policy decisions of the Obama Administration.

The influence countries of the region have on one another markedly changed following the successful transition away from communism. Berglund and Dellenbrant noted a domino theory behind the spread of democracy and Huntington's idea of waves. Yet, much of this is absent in more recent politics within the region; between the states of central and eastern Europe.

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[147] Fauzi M. Najjar, "Islam and Modern Democracy," *The Review of Politics 20*, no. 2 (April 1958): 180.

[148] Güneş Murat Tezcür et al, "Support for Democracy in Iran," 235.

[149] Güneş Murat Tezcür et al, "Support for Democracy in Iran," 235; Vlas and Ghergina, "Where does a religion meet democracy? A comparative analysis of attitudes in Europe," 339; Schimmelfennig and Schultz, "Legacies and Leverage: EU Political Conditionality and Democracy Promotion in Historical Perspective," 447.

[150] Bunce discusses three of these, in "The Political Transition," 45-46.

There are completely different levels of priority afforded to regional politics by the different countries. Andrew Curry pointed out that "Poland may be the most assertive of all of the new EU countries in using its foreign aid budget to influence its neighbors." He attributes this to Poland's long legacy as victims of invasion and foreign influence. He noted that Poland assisted democratic efforts in the Ukraine, Georgia and Belarus.[151] Yet, András Rácz describes regional politics as a "limited priority" for Hungary. They limited their initial direct involvement to the countries of the Ukraine and Moldova. Most states concentrate their efforts within regional groups: the Visegrad Cooperation, the Eastern Partnership and the Danube Strategy.[152] Slovenia's foreign policy is similar, concentrating assistance efforts to the Western Balkans. This is due in great part to both the shared Yugoslavian history and current political fragility of the area.[153] The influence the countries have on one another pale in comparison to that of Russia and the West.

Immediately after the collapse of communism, central and eastern European countries received ample support from the West. There were large benefits to EU and NATO membership.[154] Membership in the European Union equated to being civilized. Their return to Europe offered the states of the region to "catch up" to other European countries.[155] The onset of accession for countries of central and eastern Europe offered a positive outlook for the future.

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[151] Andrew Curry, "Poland's New Ambitions," *Wilson Quarterly 34*, no. 2 (Spring 2010): 39.

[152] András Rácz, "A Limited Priority: Hungary and the Eastern Neighborhood," *Perspectives 19*, no. 2 (2011): 143.

[153] Polona Bunič and Zlatko Šabič, "Slovenia and the Eastern Neighborhood," Perspectives 19, no. 2 (2011): 165-6.

[154] Sharon L. Wolchik and Jane L. Curry, "Introduction," in *Central & Eastern European Politics from Communism to Democracy*, eds. Sharon L. Wolchik and Jane L Curry (Plymouth, UK: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, Inc., 2011), 26.

[155] Judy Batt, "Introduction: Defining Central and Eastern Europe," in *Developments in Central and East European Politics*, eds. Stephen White, Judy Batt and Paul G. Lews (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 2003), 20.

The recent Euro crisis hurt the image of the European Union in the region.[156] The Euro is no longer a symbol of stability. The fiscal policies from the EU are undemocratic dictates.

The specter of modern Russia looms large over many of the countries in central and eastern Europe. F. Stephen Larrabee points wrote that this has a geographic element. Countries close to Russia have a greater fear of Russian military might.[157] Guido and Bromke pointed out the generational aspect of feelings towards communism and Russia.[158] Most scholars attribute the increase in fear of Russian influence with Vladimir Putin's ascension to power.[159] He began the reassertion of Russian power with the intervention in Georgia in 2008.[160] Russia also seeks to redevelop their Cold War era spheres of influence using other means, specifically through oil trade. Various countries in the region have felt these commercial repercussions for resisting Russian influence and leaning towards Brussels and the West.[161] These tactics yielded numerous Moscow-friendly governments on the periphery of Russia. Larrabee and Alex Palmer see this creation of buffer states one of their minor goals in regional hegemony.[162]

Security concerns over Russia as a "revisionist power"[163] involve the region's relationship and perception of the NATO and the United States. The literature does not discuss

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[156] Montserrat Guibernau, "Prodpects for a European Identity," *International Journal of Politics, Culture & Society* 24 (2011): 40.

[157] F. Stehpen Larrabee, "Russia, Ukraine, and Central Europe: The Return of Geopolotics," *Journal of International Affairs 63*, no. 2 Spring/Summer 2010): 45.

[158] Bromke, "Post-communist countries: challenges and problems," 31; Montani Guido, "European Austerity Without Growth? European Growth Without European Democracy? How European Citizens Can Revive The European Project And Defeat Euroscepticism," *Annals of Faculty of Economics* (2011): 91.

[159] F. Stephen Larrabee, "Russia, Ukraine, and Central Europe: The Return of Geopolotics," 35; Alex Palmer, "Russia Rising: Moscow's Quiet Resurgence," *Harvard International Review* 33, no. 3 (Fall 2011): 32; Helena Yakolev-Golani, "Foreign Policy of the Russian Federation in the Slavic Triangle," *Canadian Slavonic Papers 53*, No. 2/4 (June-Sept.Dec. 2011), 399.

[160] Larrabee, "Russia, Ukraine, and Central Europe: The Return of Geopolitics," 35.

[161] Ibid., 43-44.

[162] Larrabee, "Russia, Ukraine, and Central Europe: The Return of Geopolitics," 37; Palmer, "Russia Rising," 33.

[163] Larrabee, "Russia, Ukraine, and Central Europe: The Return of Geopolitics," 34-5.

the military role of the EU in terms of defending members from a Russian threat. There are

minor discussions about the outside agreements some member states forged with Russia.

Larrabee alludes to Russia's growing ties with Germany.[164]

Most scholars agree that much of the fear of Russia is wrought in the escalating doubt in

U.S. and NATO resolve.[165] They all allude to the cancelled missile defense commitment

cancelled by U.S. President Barack Obama in 2009. The U.S. decided to deploy missile

interceptors on naval ships in the vicinity instead. Undeterred by the change, Russian President

Dimitri Medvedev announced increased radar systems and advanced warheads in the area of the

Polish border.[166] Countries in central and eastern Europe did not feel like the region was a

priority to U.S. foreign policy in the early 21st century.[167]

Everything points to this concern as misplaced. First, the change to the missile defense

program actually helps the governments of central and eastern Europe, as well as the United

States. Second, the increased conventional American military presence does not support doubt in

the U.S. commitment to the defense of the region. These two aspects of the situation reaffirm the

traditional European reliance on American military might.

The alterations to the U.S. missile defense plan serve two purposes. One is a foreign

policy issue. The other is more military. From a foreign policy stand point, the move benefits the

states of the region and the United States. The missiles will not be on foreign soil. Putin cannot

allege a military threat. There won't be any domestic opposition.   The states of the region are

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[164] Ibid., 46.
[165] Larrabee, "Russia, Ukraine, and Central Europe: The Return of Geopolitics," 44; Alex Palmer, "Russia Rising," 34; Curry, "Poland's New Ambitions," 39-40.
[166] Tom Z. Collina, "U.S.-Russia Missile Defense Talks Deadlock," *Arms Control Today 42*, no. 1 (January/February 2012): 42.
[167] Larrabee, "Russia, Ukraine, and Central Europe: The Return of Geopolitics," 45.

defended without much of the typical war of words. From a military standpoint, the United

States is more comfortable and enjoys versatility. They remain in command of the missiles and

fears of missile security or government stability in the host countries are assuaged. The missiles

can also can be dispatched anywhere a guided missile destroyed can go.

President Obama's pivot to Asia might have had all of the best intentions of refocusing

U.S foreign policy to China. He felt that the Bush administration had been pre-occupied with

other areas and other priorities.[168] However, the Russian invasion of the Ukraine contributed to

pre-empting it. America has a strong cultural connection to Europe. This yielded the largest

American military deployment to Europe since the Cold War. NTO was the key. American

ground forces were sent to Poland.[169] NATO performed Operation Atlantic Resolve that included

former Soviet satellites Poland, Romania, Bulgaria and Hungary and the Balkans.[170] Even the

most loyal Soviet satellite, Bulgaria, received American troops.[171]

The feelings are widespread affecting newer members and old alike. European specialists

acknowledge a "democratic fatigue" in the EU.[172] "Distance between Central Europe's new EU

members and others has been growing," wrote Ekiert. East-Central Europe thrives. The Balkans

struggle. The Eastern Slavic countries ride a carousel between instability and authoritarian

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[168] Kenneth Lieberthal, "The American Pivot to Asia," *Foreign Policy*, December 21, 2001.
http://foreignpolicy.com/2011/12/21/the-american-pivot-to-asia/.

[169] Laura Smith-Spark and Atika Shubert, "Poland welcomes thousands of US troops in NATO show of force," *CNN*, January 14, 2017. http://www.cnn.com/2017/01/14/europe/poland-us-troops-nato-welcome/. Accessed March 8, 2017.

[170] U.S. Army, *Operation Atlantic* Resolve, http://www.eur.army.mil/atlanticresolve/. Accessed March 8, 2017.

[171] BBC, "US troops set for Bulgaria bases," April 28, 2006. http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/4951726.stm. Accessed March 8, 2017.

[172] Jacques Rupnik and Jan Zielonka, "Introduction: The State of Democracy 20 Years on: Domestic and External Factors," *East European Politics and Societies and Cultures 27*, no. 1 (February 2013): 3-4.

rule.[173] Fligstein and his colleagues note this with a major exception. They observed that already connected governments of EU members, grew even closer.[174]

Backsliding

Most researchers agree that Diamond's democratic recession[175] is real and global. Several scholars noted that countries in different parts of the world backslid away from democracy. Francis Fukuyama wrote that authoritarianism was on the march in 2014.[176] There are several different explanations for the incidents of illiberal democracy, hybrid regimes and higher levels of authoritarianism in central and eastern Europe. This backsliding occurs in two different ways. First, it occurs in the nature of the EU structure. Mihai Dinescu defines the democratic deficit in the EU as "growing with the extension of competencies and prerogatives, which Brussels claims from national capitals in a constantly larger number of policy domains."[177] Peter Vesterdorf stated that "It [the EU] often replaces national legislation and edges National Parliaments out of the game."[178] The second manner of backsliding occurs when member states depart from EU expectations and norms. These two phenomena drive differing schools of analysis on the topic.

A major failed assumption was that EU membership was the best way to democratize central and eastern Europe. Jürgen Habermas wrote extensively about the topic, noting that

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[173] Ekiert, "Eastern Europe's Postcommunist Transformations,".

[174] Neil Fligstein, Alina Polyakova and Wayne Sandholtz, "European Integration, Nationalism and European Identity," *Journal of Common Market Studies* 50, no. S1 (2012): 107.

[175] Diamond, "The Democratic Rollback," 36.

[176] Francis Fukuyama, "Why is Democracy Performing So Poorly," *Journal of Democracy 26*, no. 1 (January 2015): 11.

[177] Mihai Dinescu, "EU Democratic Deficit and the Civil Society: A Theoretical Perspective on European Democracy," *Acta Politologica 6*, no. 3 (2014): 366.

[178] Paul Vesterdorf quoted by Jens-Peter Bonde, "The EU's Democratic Deficit: How to Fix it," *The Brown Journal of World Affairs 17*, no. 2 (Spring/Summer 2011): 148.

"there has always been a democratic deficit" in the EU. The capitals of Europe wanted the EU more than the people of their countries.[179] His work noted the large initial economic interests behind forming and expanding the EU and how the political aspects of it floundered from neglect. This created vexing issues for Brussels. First, many see the Union as lacking legitimacy. Second, the heralded economic benefits for many have soured as there are deadlocks between member state governments and central bodies of the EU.

Richard Rosseau supports Habermas' assertion that the EU had legitimacy issues from the start.[180] Rosseau and Viven A. Schmidt share Fritz Scharpf's definition of legitimacy. It is either input legitimation (government by the people) or output legitimation (government for the people).[181] Rosseau wrote that despite how scholars analyze the Union, it has legitimacy.[182] Schmidt wrote in a different voice that *throughput*, what happens between the democratic input and output, tells a different story.[183] In two different pieces, Schmidt examined the EU structure and cited several disconnects from theoretical legitimacy and the true reality of representation in the Union. Members lack equality on the European Council. Germany and other larger more affluent countries hold sway.[184] The European Parliament is shut out of much what goes on when heads of state or the high level EU appointees strike agreements behind closed doors.[185] Jens-Peter Bonde noted that in 49 different areas, authority and control moved away from member

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[179] Jürgen Habermas, "Bringing the Integration of Citizens into Line with the Integration of States," *European Law Journal 18*, no. 4 (July 2012): 485.

[180] Richard Rosseau, "The `Democratic Deficit' and Legitimacy Problems of the European Union: Elements of the Debate," *Online Journall Modelling New Europe 12* (2014): 10.

[181] Vivien A. Schmidt, "Democracy and Legitimacy in the European Union Revisited: Input, Output and `Throughput'," *Political Studies 61*, no. 1 (2013): 2; Rosseau, "The `Democratic Deficit' and Legitimacy Problems of the European Union," 11.

[182] Rosseau, "The `Democratic Deficit' and Legitimacy Problems of the European Union," 12- 13.

[183] Schmidt, "Democracy and Legitimacy in the European Union Revisited," 14.

[184] Viven A. Schmidt, "Dealing with Europe's other Deficit," *Public Policy Research 19*, no. (May July 2012): 103.

[185] Schmidt, "Democracy and Legitimacy in the European Union Revisited," 14; Bonde, "The EU's Democratic Deficit: How to Fix it," 149-150.

capitals to the supranational EU level.[186] He highlighted the fact that there are 90,000 rules that voters can do nothing about. Even their elected European Parliament members are powerless to act on many of them.[187]

The faulty structure of the EU hampers the development of a modern European identity. Habermas points out that this is one of the chief criticisms of the EU: there is "no demos"; no common people.[188] They claim the EU is "built on sand."[189] The subsequent effect of the EU structure is that European's do not feel important. This keeps voter turnout low. Habermas and Schmidt see political involvement is imperative for the formation of a different national identity for the EU.[190] European citizens need to forge a new identity through developing a European civic society, building a politically oriented public and creating a political culture. This will enable Europeans to form political parties across state borders, create a belief in a democratic EU process and learn to live with differences amongst other nations and states.[191] Habermas envisions this as a post nationalist democracy.[192]

This could resolve many of the deadlocks between the European capitals and the EU leadership. The early economic prospects and coordination clash with the current lack of political integration. Attila Agh cited economic woes for the ebb of democracy in the EU and the region. He wrote that the three consecutive crises account for backsliding in central and eastern Europe. First, there was a transformation recession. A post EU Accession crisis followed. The global

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[186] Bonde, "The EU's Democratic Deficit: How to Fix it," 148.

[187] Ibid., 154.

[188] Schmidt, "Dealing with Europe's other Deficit," 107; Jürgen Habermas, *The Crisis of the European Union: A Response* (Cambridge, UK: Polity Press, 2012), 6.

[189] Jürgen Habermas, *The Crisis of the European Union: A Response* (Cambridge, UK: Polity Press, 2012), 6.

[190] Habermas, *The Crisis of the European Union,* 17 ;Schmidt, "Dealing with Europe's other Deficit," 108.

[191] Jürgen Habermas, "Toward a European Political Community," *Society 39*, no. 5 (July/August 2002): 60.

[192] Ibid, 61.

economic crisis completed the triumvirate.[193] Agh's explanation is very popular. Habermas, however, refers to the EU structure again. He wrote that the crisis exposed major flaws in the EU. First, The EU had no regulatory capacities.[194] Second, the EU only controls half of its member's economies: monetary policy. National parliaments still control fiscal policy. Governments are walking a tightrope of free markets, social security and public debt.[195] Habermas advocates further integration to resolve this and most issues.

Problems from a lack of political integration are not only economic. A failure to adequately address other areas of policy allowed some undemocratic institutions and practices to continue, contrary to EU principles. Some of the states in central and eastern Europe had bad starts on the path to democracy and very troubled pasts. Othon Anastasakis wrote that transition decisions caused instability in some areas of former Soviet rule. These states had illiberal starts and strong communist pasts and suffered sustained democratic deficits.[196] Transition decisions propelled this political legacy. In other situations, domestic factors (often rooted in history) created variations in approaches and solutions to problems. In this regard, the literature points to three concepts. First, history matters. Second, perhaps Ekiert and Ziblatt were more correct than they thought. Not only did states pause along their paths to democracy, but during accession to the EU as well. This leads to the third idea: Ekiert and Ziblatt's institutional mimicry. Cirtautas and Schimmelfennig pointed out that EU enlargement lost momentum. Member states were left to deal with crises and problems on their own. Their separate histories shaped their decisions

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[193] Áttila Agh, "The Triple Crisis in Hungary: The "Backsliding of Hunarian Democracy after Twenty Years," Romanian Journal of Political Science 13, no. 1 (summer 2013): 25.

[194] Habermas, *The Crisis of the European Union,* 3.

[195] Ibid., 4-5.

[196] Othan Anastasakis, "Post-1989 Political Change in the Balkan States: The Legacy of the Early Illiberal Transition Years," *Perceptions 18*, no. 2 (Summer 2013): 91-92.

absent EU enticements. Pop-Eleches wrote that researchers neglect post-communist legacies in this respect.[197]

The rush to enlarge the Union is also suspect in a decline of democratic ideals in some member states. Problems existed in these fledging states before EU accession and were simply covered by what Alina Mungiu-Pippidi called "the EU "anesthetic".[198] Then, it was too late. Rupnik and Zielonka agree with Mungiu-Pippidi's assertion that the EU lost leverage and control over states after accession.[199] EU influence weakens without these domestic reforms.[200] Agh wrote that several changes implemented to gain membership were not operational. They were simply changes; boxes to check. The post accession result was what Venelin Ganev called "hooliganism". Ruling elites chose to violate established norms.[201] This is characterized by government cronyism, corruption and suppression of the media.[202] This is only one product of backsliding the region has experienced.

Conclusions

The literature on the state of democracy in central and eastern Europe illustrates a politically evolving region with a very unique political and cultural history, subject to many different factors. Close study revealed that democracy is not a monolith. It has several strains, forms and fashions. Measuring it can be easily done using equations and computers. Accurately measuring it requires other, sometimes less quantifiable information. Furthermore, events in

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[197] Grigore Pop-Eleches, "Pre-Communist and Communist Developmental Legacies," *East European Politics and Societies and Cultures 29*, no. 2 (May 2015): 402.

[198] Alina Mungiu-Pippidi, "EU Accession Is No `End of History'," *Journal of Democracy 18*, no. 4 (October 2007): 16.

[199] Rupnik and Zielonka, "Introduction: The State of Democracy 20 Years on," 4.

[200] Mungiu-Pippidi , "When Europe Meets Transformation," 77.

[201] Venelin I. Ganev, "Post-Accession Hooliganism: Democratic Governance in Bulgaria and Romania after 2007," *East European Politics and Societies and Cultures 27*, no. 1 (February 2013): 39.

[202] Mungiu-Pippidi , "When Europe Meets Transformation," 77.

central and eastern Europe require historical and cultural context. The literature illustrates that this is probably true for most regions of the globe.

There are tentative debates about the difference between democracy in a classical sense, a modern European democracy in a contemporary sense and the role the EU will play in central and eastern Europe. Dahl provides a neat and packaged definition of democracy. Yet, this is in a more classical sense. Despite being far from parsimonious, it also does not address many modern realities of global politics. Habermas' and Schmidt's contributions take a discussion of modern European democracy to a more complete conclusion. The problems with transparency in Schmidt's research into throughput legitimation illustrate the problems in developing a modern European identity needed to achieve Habermas' post-nationalist democracy. This civic identity provides the EU with a demos.

Most mainstream measurements of democracy are inundated with empirical, mathematical data. Many of the conclusions depend largely on modernization theory. The literature makes very valid arguments against these measures. Whether it is per capita gross domestic product or income inequality, this information needs some context. Information on regional culture and history enhance models. Yet, alone they too are faulty. No one empirical factor or cultural aspect is deterministic. The two schools of research need to be combined for the best assessment about political life.

Determinants of democracy vary region to region and, sometimes, within regions. There are several different factors: internal political history, neighboring states, global trends and external forces. This demands democracy development account for individual histories. Memories can be powerful. Geography can be a strong factor. Regional events can pressure

governments and motivate domestic political groups. Changes in the global economy can manifest tensions or assuage fears. External forces can offer aspirational goals, instill fear or provide stability.

The best research methodology accounting for the differing levels of democracy in central and eastern Europe is one that is regionally specific. The literature illustrates that the region is different from others elsewhere in the world. The states that comprise the area are very diverse. They have different languages, religions, and heritages. A methodology seeking to explain political difference in these states needs to include and incorporate the different histories, regional trends, states' economic performances, cultural issues and traditions and the pressures of global actors.

III. METHODOLOGY

The research question of this work is "does history, culture, and geography effect post-communist democracy in central and eastern Europe?" The study used a combination of methods and a regional approach. The lion's share of research and data deals with history, culture and geography. These are qualitatively assessed. There are a limited number of factors used to help measure democracy that are quantitative. It attempts to avoid either extreme posed by the arguments Bunce highlighted: completely relying on empirical data or material from simple area studies. It includes analysis of certain aspects important to political life specific to the region. These might not be as important elsewhere. Yet, it also incorporates a limited number of variables that political science researchers use in assessing states globally.

This approach is based on a combination of different theoretical approaches and assessments: Dahl, Rokkan and Teorell. Dahl's definition lays the foundation for a useable criterion to examine the quality of democracy. Teorell interjects ideas about the role of economics and democracy. The work analyzed case study subjects according to the assembled criterion of democracy. Then, it reviews their different aspects of history, culture and geography. Rokkan's work established that these different variations in society effect government and politics. This illustrates any impact that history, culture and geography have on democracy.

This paper purposefully does not do a number of things. First, it does not look to establish a set of specific variables to explain the quality of democracy to be used in other places. The work uses a regional approach. However, Rokkan's different aspects of culture, history and territory might be useful to future researchers. The countries of Southeast Asia might operationalize the aspect of geography by their proximity to China. The countries of South

America might include the role indigenous Indians into an assessment of their culture. The same can be said about the role of the European Union. There are few other organizations like it in the world. Yet, there are minor similarities to ASEAN and the African Union. These are decisions for others to make.

The work also does not attempt to reformulate a numeric measure or quantitative scale for democracy. The work seeks to illustrate democratic differences due to a set of factors; not estimate the exact amount of difference. It embraces the idea of democracy's relative nature and seeks to incorporate the unquantifiable. Democracies will be compared to one another and the general conditions of the region, not placed on a scale. It also does not attempt to assess democracy in the region compared to the rest of the world.

The methodology of this work contains three subsequent parts. First, it establishes criterion to analyze democracy. This uses a combination of works from the literature review with Dahl's definition of democracy as a basis. This section also establishes different criterion to research the impact that history, culture and geography have on post-Communist governments in the region. It is a Rokkansian approach that draws on specific theories related to the political roles of history, culture and geography. Next, it presents various hypotheses to be tested and measured. Finally, it discusses and presents three countries of the region for subsequent case studies using the presented criterion.

Criterion

Democracy

O'Donnell and Schmitter wrote that "elections equal democracy."[1] However, elections are simply one of a variety of conditions required for democracy. True liberal democracy is not about the singular event of voting and holding elections. Dahl educates us that, in its truest form, democracy is more about conditions and different concurrent institutions. Democracy is impossible without multiple political parties. These parties cannot truly operate without a free press and methods of expression. This educates and informs an electorate made of responsible adults.[2] The ability to vote is yet another aspect. Then, the nature of elections is a question. Liberal democracy demands a certain level of competition and contention. Second, the depth and width of voting rights matter. Finally, without a peaceful transition of power, the system fails.

This work does not seek to create the ever allusive absolute definition of democracy. It combines several notions of democracy and creates criteria to measure it in a relative manner. It assumes that no country is a completely free and liberal state. Central and eastern Europe is no exception. The research seeks to explain differences in democratic conditions. Are there differences in who can vote? Why? Are there free and fair elections? If not, how are they unfair? Why are they unfair? Are the factors of history, culture or geography the cause of any of this?

The criterion is assembled from Dahl's ideas in *Polyarchy*, Habermas' regionally specific work and Teorell's observations of the role economics plays in political systems. Dahl and Habermas furnish the appropriate philosophical material and structural benchmarks. Dahl provides a broad view and observations about the general practice of liberal democracy.

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[1] Carothers, "The End of Transition Paradigm," 7-8.
[2] Dahl, *Polyarchy*, 3.

Habermas contributes a modern European context to the concept. Teorell injects some of the

economic realities of globalism felt by populations and governments. The conditions of rights

and freedoms in the modern states of central and eastern Europe can be assessed using the

subsequent criteria.

This study incorporates the aspects of Dahl's broad definition of democracy to analyze

the status of current post-communist states of central and eastern Europe. Dahl wrote that there

were eight different "requirements for democracy among a large number of people." These eight

structural requirements are:

1. The freedom to form and join organizations

2. Freedom of expression

3. Right to vote

4. Eligibility for public office

5. Right of political leaders to compete for support

    5a. Right of political leaders to compete for votes

6. Alternative sources for information

7. Free and fair elections

8. Institutions for making government policies depend on votes and other

    expressions of preference[3]

Most researchers agree that these requirements are the bare essentials to a truly free, liberal

democratic government.

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[3] Dahl, *Polyarchy*, 3.

More specifically for European Union countries, their involvement in EU politics, participation in EU Parliamentary elections, is an important facet of modern European democracy. It is true that EU membership led to the sacrifice of some sovereignty on the part of the capitals of Europe. Europeans still have a voice in Brussels. This is achieved by participating in the elections for their own heads of state that comprise the European Council and their representatives in the European Parliament.

While democracy is a global phenomenon, it has a regional aspect, as well. The democratic deficit highlighted by Dinescu, Vesterdorf, Rousseau and Schmidt is a structural issue for the countries of the region and the entire EU. The disconnect from Dahl's portents of democracy and the EU structure occurs in relation to his last point: institutions for making policies depend on votes and other expressions of preference. This is evidenced further by Schmidt's observations on throughput and Bonde's noted 90,000 rules that Europeans can seemingly do nothing about. This causes low voter turnout.

Habermas contributes an essential aspect to this study's by citing the imperative of political involvement. Increased involvement will forge a new European identity. In relation to Dahl's broader points about democracy, his eight points will apply to the larger union and not just their sovereign members. Hypothetically, political parties will form of people from different states. Supporters of large causes will include people from different countries. Habermas' post-national democracy will form. Democracy will be in practice, blind to EU member state borders.

Another important facet of democracy is the general economic condition of a country over time. This is can be an important factor in politics. Economic health and wealth is far from the ultimate barometer of freedom and rights. China is a trading juggernaut and is far from a

democracy. Many of the richest countries of the Middle East treat women as second class citizens or property. (These situations can be addressed by another factor relating to liberal democracy covered in this research: culture.) However, the poor economic conditions over time can lead to stress and strain on a liberal democratic system.

Some of the established definitions of democracy fail to acknowledge the role of economics. These definitions treat democracy as a noun. Both modernization theory and dependency theory dealt with income and capitalism in terms of democratization. Teorell encapsulated the reality of globalization. While, poor countries are not always authoritarian, becoming poorer can lead to it. In this regard, relative economic health is important to democracy. This explains the popularity and widespread support enjoyed by modernization and dependency theory in the past. It also illustrates the different role that economics plays in democracy in the globalized world.

In summary, this study uses criterion wrought from the combination of Dahl, Habermas and Teorell to illustrate the differences in the quality of rights and freedoms in the former communist states of central and eastern Europe. Dahl presented a widely accepted model of democracy that is applicable most anywhere in the globe. Habermas presented solutions to the structural issues presented to the countries of the continent that are members of the EU. Teorell dealt with the economic impact of globalization on the politics. Dahl's structure, Habermas' political participation and Teorell's economics present an adequate tool in looking at the politics of the countries in question.

Figure 3. Operationalized Democratic Criteria

Field of Assessment	Criteria
Right to form and join political parties and interest groups.	Are there any laws forbidding certain political groups from forming?
Freedom of Speech and Expression	What protests are permitted? Are there restrictions on press, Internet or other media?
Right to Vote	Who votes? 18 and older? Men and Women? Are citizens of all races or religions allowed to vote?
Eligibility for Public Office	What restraints are there on holding office?
Right of political leaders to compete for support/votes	Is there any systematic repression of opposition leaders (imprisonment, etc.)?
Alternative sources of information	Is there a viewpoint opposing the government's available? Is there Internet freedom? Are certain languages banned? Who controls television and radio?
Free and fair elections	Is there voter intimidation? Domestically, who declares elections valid?
Institutions for making government policies depend on votes and other expressions of preference	Who is elected?
Political participation in the European Union	Is there higher than average participation in EU elections? What is the government's role in this?
General Economic Conditions over Time	GDP Growth and GINI Change over Time

History

Incorporating history into the methodology of the study is important because of the

intensely turbulent history of the region. Rokkan cited that history affected the impact of more

contemporary forces in the development of government.[4] This part of the globe witnessed the start of two world wars with the rise of communism in different countries after each one, the first in 1917 and the second in 1945. Prior to this, many of the current states were holdings or part of far flung empires or repressive, non-democratic regimes of various types. This history helps explain why different forms of democracy evolved after much of the area achieved true self-determination.

The states of central and eastern Europe experienced many different forms and fashion of rule before the collapse of communism. Researching the different political systems in the states of the region and the events that yielded them are important to current levels of democracy in these states today. Before the First World War, some states were parts of large empires. Others were smaller monarchies. Some countries were run by different unstable combinations. An entirely different patchwork quilt of comparable varieties occupied the states of central and eastern Europe following the Second World War. While Soviet domination was a common characteristic of rule after the wars, it took different shapes in some countries. Their post-communist governments had similar differences, as well. There are four distinct different eras in the political history of the region.

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[4] Svante Errson, "Revisiting Rokkan: On the Determinants of the Rise of Democracy in Europe," *Historical Social Research 20*, no. 2 (1995): 165.

Figure 4. Historical Criteria

Political Eras of the Region	Criterion
Pre-First World War	What type of government?
Interwar Governments	What type of government?
Communist Rule	Length of Communist Rule. Nature of Communist Rule.
Post-Communist Rule	References to Pre-Communist Antecedents. Score settling. Traditional animosities.

The first political era, Pre- First World War, saw little government by the people in central and eastern Europe. Many of the modern states did not exist in the period. Parts, portions or the whole of the Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, Serbia, Slovakia and Romania lay within the borders of the Austro-Hungarian Empire. The Ottoman Empire held some of the same territory intermittently within the previous 50 years. This dynastic control affects the culture of the modern state today.

The interwar governments of the era following the First World War were the first opportunity for many of these states to exercise self-government. The victorious Allies created some of the states in the region from the remnants of the defeated Austro-Hungarian Empire. The period was relatively unstable. Various small wars between countries of the region honeycombed the period. Politically, a small number of countries had some success in liberal democratic government. Some started as liberal democracies only to fall under authoritarian regimes. Notably, Czechoslovakia was exceptionally successful at establishing a resilient democratic government.

The analysis of the communist rule of the states of central and eastern Europe is a more complicated endeavor. The states of the region experienced different communisms. First, the duration of communist rule varied. Some became communist after the First World War and others after the Second World War. Bunce wrote that states ruled by communism for longer periods are more tolerant of lower levels of democracy.[5] Second, the states experienced different levels of systematic oppression internally under communist rule. This refers to the nature of communist rule. There was more than a cosmetic difference between Ceauşescu's Romania and Tito's Yugoslavia. Late in the communist era, Polish leaders were blasted by Ceauşescu and Honecker for allowing liberal reforms. There were differences between regimes, their ideologies and their relationships with Moscow.

The final era of political history is post-communist rule. The literature review revealed a consensus that the pre-Second World War politics helped mold the political landscape after communism. This is the basis from Eikert and Ziblatt's proposal that democratization in these states started after the First World War and continues despite being interrupted by communism. Kopstein agrees with them. Some states politically reverted to "critical antecedents" or "institutional mimicry"[6], referring to what they historically knew. Some of the same pre-World War Two parties formed. Many of the same institutions evolved. Some of the produced regimes are still in place. This involves the different decisions made in relation to political and economic framework. An important aspect is also EU membership, NATO membership and the states' relationships with Russia. The democratic level of these current governments is the topic of the research.

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[5] Bunce, "The Political Transition," 44-45.

[6] Grzegorz Eikert and Daniel Ziblatt, "Democracy in Central and Eastern Europe One Hundred Years On," *East European Politics and Societies and Cultures 27*, no. 1 (February 2013): 97.

It is important to understand that the role history plays in democracy, politics and government in the region is not always positive. History's power is subject to one universal constraint: memory. The generation that survived of the Second World War is slowly dying off. Many people in the region who lived through communism and Soviet domination have retired from public life. Few people under the age of 30 remember either period. This generational amnesia provides fertile ground for some of the same far right and far left political ideology of that characterized Europe in the early 20th century. The ideas of isolationism, nationalism and, in some cases, xenophobia are popular with many. These are generally found in the eurosceptic parties. Even some mainstream political parties in Europe seem to be migrating back to the politics of eras past. Notions of a "Fortress Europe", the United Kingdom's "Splendid Isolationism" and perceived threats to "Polishness" are examples.

Culture

Examining the cultural differences in the states of central and eastern Europe is important in helping explain their different levels of rights and freedoms. The region offers a very diverse group of peoples living among different states with vastly varying cultures. Few other regions in the world have a more dense population that is more culturally heterogeneous. Bunce notes this extensively. This supports taking a regional approach to the area. Culture is made up of a number of things: cuisine, language, music and religion to name a few. This work draws on Rokkan and Bromke to set criteria to research and analyze culture's political impact.

Religion, language and ethnicity collectively impact the level of liberal democracy in the region. In many states, these different aspects of culture have the strongest impact. Rokkan chose to use language and religion as the primary sources for studying the effect culture has on

government and politics. He noted that the two were important in the culturally based policies of governments.[7] Bromke pointed out that large minorities were a factor immediately after communism. Ethnic diversity persists as a political factor in many of the countries.

Religion remains one of the strongest unifying and divisive factors in central and eastern European life. All three Abrahamic religions are represented. It serves as the crossroads for Christianity and Islam. It sits between the two ancient Christian churches, Roman Catholic and Eastern Orthodox. It is home to millions of Jews. It borders Germany, the home of the Protestant Reformation. Many countries are religiously homogenous and at peace. Others are religiously diverse and much the same. However, some states experience contemporary tensions from age old religious wars. The states of the former Yugoslavia contend with animosities dating back as far as the 14th century.[8]

Religious beliefs help mold domestic policies in central and eastern Europe. It is one of the strongest social institutions remaining after the fall of atheistic communism. Rokkan alludes to the relationship "the church" has to the government in his discussion of nation-building in Western Europe.[9] Select works of Philpot, Bergen and others who deal with contemporary religion and democracy. Many of their themes are seen operationalized in this respect. Religion affects many different types of laws by serving as part of its moral foundation. It helps form social policy, like abortion. It informs an essential aspect of the judicial systems of the region. Religious beliefs are evident in the extension of voting rights and rights of minorities.

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[7] Rokkan, "Models and Methods in the Comparative Study of Nation Building," 61.
[8] Paul Wood, "World: Europe… Bitter Memories of Battle of Kosovo," *BBC News,* June 28, 1999. http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/379934.stm. Accessed November 29, 2015.
[9] Rokkan, "Models and Methods in the Comparative Study of Nation Building," 61.

The literature review presented different aspects of the debate over the role religion plays in democracy. Religion and its relation to government and politics is a rather popular subject today because of the more recent wars and military options in the Middle East. Islam is a primary, popular focus. The literature review offered beneficial secondary research: the comparisons of the different denominational families of Christianity. In terms of this study, a comparison of Catholicism, Protestantism and Orthodoxy are important. A vast majority of the population in the region is Christian.

Minorities of different varieties play a very important part in the democratic process in the states of central and eastern Europe. Many of the states were left with very large minorities following the collapse of communism. The policies towards these groups by the newly birthed democratic regimes varied from state to state. Some states opted to treat them as citizens first and relegated ethnicity in the name of providing universal rights to all citizens. Others states did not prioritize rights and freedoms. These states were susceptible to ethnic fragmentation and even scapegoating in the subsequent years.

This is also an important aspect to the role ethnicity plays and the larger topic of culture is language. Rokkan's analysis feeds into Dahl's democratic principles in interesting fashion. Rokkan notes that there tend to be three different ways governments deal with multilingualism. States can declare a national language and ban others, passively declare a national language without suppressing others or embrace multilingualism.[10] This is vital to the model of democracy Dahl's sketches. The ability to communicate, campaign and engage in political discourse is essential to liberal democracy. Forbidding a certain language or alternatives to a national language would be antithetical. Citizens have the right to express themselves and form and join

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[10] Rokkan, "Models and Methods in the Comparative Study of Nation Building," 61.

political groups in Dahl's democracy. Candidates also have the right to compete for support.
Much of this is achieved by providing and accessing information. Much of Dahl's portrait of
liberal democracy is impossible with an institutionalized language barrier.

Figure 5. Cultural Criteria

Aspects of Culture Impacting Democracy	Criterion
Religion	Toleration. Dominant Principles. Church-State Relations.
Ethnicity	Minority Rights: Economic and Political… Voting rights, Employment Discrimination, Hate Crime Laws
Language	Toleration or Banishment

Geography

Geography in select fashions affects the quality of democracy in central and eastern
Europe. Broadly speaking, the notion of geography became popular in the Cold War era with the
ballyhooed concept of Domino Theory. This idea of a political concept spreading continued as
analysts, historians and politicians fashioned theories around an updated concept: the contagion.
While the terms "Domino Theory" and "contagion" might seem recent additions to the lexicon of
political science, the term is not as new as it seems. Rokkan discussed the concept of territory in
relation to the formation of modern Western Europe in terms of democratic consolidation. This,
of course, pre-dates Cold War literature about the spread of communism. Subsequent
researchers continued the exploration of the relationship between geography on the quality of
democracy.

The Literature Review revealed that there are different theories about geography and the level of democracy in central and eastern Europe. This takes shape in several different ways. First, the states of the region face an aged old dilemma. While a residually strong Putinist Russia stands at its doorstep, Brussels and the European Union also try to exert influence. These two competing forces wage geopolitical war over what could be described as the region's soul. This forms an East-West dynamic. A closer relationship with the EU, its members and further integration into the European experiment offer great benefits.

This stands true in terms of commerce, but also democratic quality. The economic benefit is well established. The political benefits for citizens for EU member states is not always clear. There are difficulties. The EU is still, in many ways, a work in progress. Access to the affluence of the European market as a member state came with prerequisite directives. These directives had to be met to the satisfaction of Brussels before membership was granted. There are several aspects that some members continue to improve on, but this is the nature of the EU state. Membership is conditional and aspirational even if it is already operational. In terms of democratic rights and freedoms, accession to the EU benefited democratic quality and membership helps ensure it.

The other side of the paradigm is Putinist Russia. There are some very contemporary things to consider when analyzing Russian relations with central and eastern European states: trade, especially in energy, and military threat. There are also parts of the relationships that bleed into other areas of history and culture. Addressing the contemporary aspects, Russia is a large trading partner with many in the region. This is especially true in the trade in natural gas and oil. While this relationship is symbiotic, it is important to note the political leverage this give Putin and the oligarchs in Moscow. This is unfortunate for the relationship with the EU since Russia

sees the EU as representative of a West it does not trust. Putin uses Russia's economic leverage and military threat to create a Cold War-like set of buffer states around Russia's periphery.[11] He has punished some states for failing to support Russian interests. The military threat is obvious, especially after the annexation of the Crimea and the American retrenchment.[12]

The second political of geography is the deeper, unilateral relationships the countries of the region have with Moscow. This is a strange collection of cognitions from different groups in the region. First, there are large Russian minorities in some states. Many of these minorities embrace Russia as their homeland, while living in neighboring countries of eastern Europe. Second, there are still dark memories of Soviet domination, gulags and life under communism. This is seen in the citizens of the states that are old enough to remember life in Soviet satellites. This apprehension can also hurt relationships in the region. Third, there are some non-Russians that feel cultural ties with Russia. Many speak Russian and practice Eastern Orthodoxy. This latter aspect alone affects democratic rights and freedoms in an adverse manner. The consensus is that certain aspects of Eastern Orthodoxy hamper democratic development. This is evidenced by various traits of the religion. They do not allow female priests. Orthodox dioceses are also very nationalistic in nature. They lack a linguistic toleration. (The services are in the specific languages.) Orthodox churches are specifically non-Western.

The final democratic impact of geography is Miller's notion of democratic contagion.[13] The first two of these is highly regional. The East-West notion is based on the nature of Orthodox Christianity and regional history. This religion and political history of domination is rather rare outside of central and eastern Europe. The idea of distance to the Soviet Union/Russia

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[11] Larrabee, "Russia, Ukraine, and Central Europe: The Return of Geopolitics," 37.
[12] Ibid., 43-4.
[13] Miller, et al. *Democratization in the Arab World*, 17-18.

is both regional and temporal. Note that Finnish democracy remained intact for decades, even

thru the Cold War and borders Russia. Additionally, Russia has not always been the threat they

represented under Soviet communism or the threat they represent today under Vladimir Putin.

Finally, not every country east of Europe is less democratic, of course. Several states including

the largest democracy in the world lie to the right of Europe on a map.

The final theory behind democratic quality in central and eastern Europe is Miller's

Democratic contagion idea. Many researchers used this to explain the spread of democracy in the

final days of communism. Berglund and Dellenbrant agreed.[14] The question is if the theory

applies to countries of the region more than two decades later. The spread of higher levels of

rights and freedoms continues but at an inconsistent rate. Much of this is now done through the

European Union when it occurs. The negotiating format, dissimilar parliamentary composition

and different political priorities in spreading EU principles help account for the asymmetrical

spread.

Figure 6. Geographic Criteria

Geography	Criterion
East-West Paradigm	Russia v. Western (EU)
Domestic Soviet/Russian Factors	Relations with Russia, including the related threat
Democratic Contagion	Look at Neighboring States' policies.

Hypotheses

Central and Eastern Europe has a very unique history. It was part of the Roman Empire

and later overrun by Barbarians in Classic Antiquity. It was sliced, portioned and traded by the

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[14] Berglund and Dellenbrant, "The Breakdown of Communism in Eastern Europe," 4.

kings and queens of early Europe. The region was invaded by Muslim Turks. It reverted back to the empires of Europe. It furnished the spark that started the First World War. It was conquered by Germany in World War Two and was dismantled by an agreement between Allies following the war. Then, it existed under communist rule for forty years. Now, these states turn to democracy.

The region offers a very unique set of questions pertaining to democracy. Is the current quality of democracy in central and eastern Europe affected by the history before the First World War? or the Second? Does the duration or nature of communist rule have an impact on contemporary politics in the states of the region? How consistent is the impact of these forces across different states? If it is not consistent, why not? While history helps shape states, governments and peoples everywhere, this work endeavors to two tests hypotheses about central and eastern Europe:

> H_1: *The earlier democracy is achieved historically, the stronger the post-communist democracy in the region.* The region democratized in two different groups: the initial states that emerged democratic shortly after communism collapsed and another group later.[15] . Bunce said that states that experienced longer periods of communist rule are the more tolerant of lower levels of democracy.[16] Ekiert and Ziblatt's contention of a continuous movement towards democracy support this.[17] Logically, the sooner a country shed communism and continued their move towards democracy the stronger it would be.

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[15] Bunce, "The Political Transition," 48.
[16] Ibid., 44-45.
[17] Ekiert and Ziblatt, "Democracy in Central and Eastern Europe One Hundred Years On," 90-91.

H₂: The level of former communist oppression does not appear to affect the quality of liberal rights and democratic quality in the region. There were major differences in the communist regimes across the region.[18] Many even changed over time. Miller wrote that high levels of oppression hampered the transition of democracy.[19] This also connects to the psychological impact of Bunce's notion of duration.

The research looked at specific political policies, practices and institutions in relation to democracy and the countries' histories. There is, of course, a general relation to history and political systems. The past is part of the evolution of any country's political system. The study looked at how specific differences in democracy can be traced to historical relationships and events and shocks specific to each country. For example, is there a seminal event in history that helped shape laws on voting in a specific state? Is there a traditional animosity with another group that affords them a lower level of democracy? The work seeks to explain how much history matters to democracy in central and eastern Europe.

The history of the region created a culture that is as diverse as any in the world. Central and eastern Europe is a combination of more than ten different peoples and nations, with a similar number of languages all living amongst one another in the different states. Three of the five major religions in the world have substantial populations in the region. Central and eastern Europe is a unique opportunity to study how different people can live with alongside each other successfully and unsuccessfully. Contemporarily, migration has contributed to the discussion of culture in the region.

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[18] Michael McFaul, "The Missing Variable," 17-18.
[19] Miller, et al. *Democratization in the Arab World*, 183.

These facts make it basically impossible to make generalizations about religion in central and eastern Europe. Several questions emerge. Does religious homogeneity aid democracy? If there is religious homogeneity, do the facts support past work about the positive effect of Western religions? Does diversity impact democracy? If it does, are there consistent exceptions across multiple states? Finally, with the Internet, cell phones and international media conglomerates, does language matter like it used to? This study researched three hypotheses about the impact of ethnicity:

> *H$_3$: Western religions tend to promote a higher quality of democracy in the region.* This question pertains to the states of the region that widely practice Catholicism and Protestant Christianity. It further investigates Vlas and Ghergina's contention that the relationship between Christianity and democracy is "often taken for granted".[20] Modern democracy began in Western Europe.[21] Many in central and eastern Europe practice the same religions with different democratic rights. Is there causation?

> *H$_4$: Western ethnic heterogeneity has no effect on post-communist democracy in the region, while the presence of non-Western minorities does.* This is a new and different theory. Most researchers look at homogeneity in a vacuum. This study analyzes the role that non-western minorities have on democracy. The purpose is to see the political and legal reaction to migration in the region and potential backsliding.

The study seeks specific laws in the countries of region and traces their relationship to culture. The research delved into the motivations behind regulations placed on language use. It

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[20] Vlas and Ghergina, "Where does a religion meet democracy?," 340.
[21] Berger, "The Global Picture," 76.

reviewed government policies on both diversity and hate crimes. It examined any faith-based laws or policies. It questioned how much culture impacts laws, rights and privileges in the central and eastern Europe.

Geography plays a prominent role in the political history of central and eastern Europe. It defined the intensity of threat from land invasions; from the various conquerors throughout the ages. Many say that it played a part in the collapse of communism. Today, it plays a role in international trade and relations between the rest of Europe, the United States and Russia. While the Cold War relationships changed, is there a comparable dynamic: East versus West? Do the states of the region find themselves "caught in the middle"? Is there a larger East/West paradigm that is at work? If this is true, what does this mean to the notion of political contagion? If such a contagion exists, what does it mean to democracy within the region, excluding outsiders, namely Brussels and Moscow?

H5: Relations with Russia have little to do with the quality of democracy in the region. The traditional relationships between Russia and some central and eastern European states are strong. However, there are some scholars that argue the pre-1940s political history matters more.[22] This leads to question the impact of EU membership. A break from the traditional subservient role to the Russians would be historic for many countries in central and eastern Europe.

H6: Democracy spread through parts of the region like a contagion, but now this type of effect is sporadic. Looking at the first group of emerged democracies Bunce named, there

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[22] Berglund and Dellenbrant, "The Breakdown of Communism in Eastern Europe," 9.

is a good case to be made for the contagion argument.[23] Perhaps EU accession is the

terminus of the contagion. Perhaps, these states can be referred to as mature democracies.

The advancement of rights and freedoms comes in the hand of domestic pressure,

international trends from international organizations like NATO, the UN and the EU.

However, there can be arguments made for illiberal contagions.[24]

The specific impact of geography on rights and freedoms is more difficult to clearly see. The

Russian aspect of geography can be assessed through foreign policy and the treatment Russian

minorities. More important democratically is the government's reaction to domestic opinions

about affairs with Russia. The impact of an East-West paradigm can be read through policy

towards the EU, NATO and Russia and to public sentiment. Voter sentiment is evident in the

notion of contagion, as well. States often mimic their neighbors for a variety of reasons. This is

especially true in a region with widespread viewership of international news, an unfettered

Internet and open borders.

This research examines select states of central and eastern Europe and determine the

effect that history, culture and geography have on the quality of democracy. The analysis is

based on he works of Dahl, Rokkan, and Teorell. Each contributes to a mixed criterion of

democracy. The work then looks at history, culture and geography to explain the differences in

democratic quality. It seeks to review theories found in the established literature, ideas formed

from recent scholarship and historically held notions. It explains that the history, culture and

geography of the states of central and eastern Europe help account for the difference in

democracy in the states of the region.

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[23] Bunce, "The Political Transition," 48.
[24] Fukuyama, "Why is Democracy Performing So Poorly," 11.

Selection of Case Studies

The diversity of central and eastern Europe is well established. Selecting three countries to serve as a representative cross section of the region is challenging. Many have sizeable minorities. Countries in the region include states that fought on both sides of both World Wars. This primes one's focus to the political. None of the states had democracy before the First World War. Only a few had any success with it afterwards. Some states were established after World War One. Others were created after World War Two. Some gained independence in the 1990s. Economically, the region is a mosaic of successes and failures.

Poland is an obvious choice for a case study. They are arguably the fourth power in the European Union. It has the sixth largest population with 38M people.[25] It is also large: over 300,000 square kilometers.[26] They are the largest and most populous in central and eastern Europe. They have the healthiest economy in the region and one of the healthier in the EU. The country has a tragic history until the late twentieth century. After the First World War, their attempt at democracy was an unstable failure. Then, they were invaded by Germany. After the war, they fell under Soviet domination. Poland offered the world most of the first images of opposition to Moscow. Unusual for the region, Poland is largely homogenous. Demographically, the country is very Polish and very Catholic.

Hungary has a far different history. The country existed as part of the Austro-Hungarian Empire and fought on the side of Imperial Germany. During the Second World War, the country aligned itself with the Nazis. Communism followed. Today, the country is largely Hungarian. It is 37% Catholic. Other religions make up the reminder with 27% not specifying a denomination.

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[25] Eurostat
[26] World Bank

It is an economically stable state.[27] While similar to Poland in many ways, their politics took a nationalist veer. The government faces widespread criticism due to its policy towards domestic opposition, minorities and immigration.

Bulgaria is a solid choice for a case study because of its unique characteristics. The country is markedly different historically, geographically and culturally. It experienced a half century of Ottoman domination.[28] The state's southern border is the southern border of central and eastern Europe. Bulgaria is also home to one of the largest Orthodox populations in the region.[29] This might explain their traditionally close ties to Russia.[30] (Russia has the largest Orthodox population in the world.[31]) It is also important to note that it has minority populations of Turks, Russians and Armenians. The country has a small number of very large issues. They are the poorest country in the EU.[32] Groups like Human Rights Watch and Reporters Without Borders are critical of the government in Sofia.[33] Yet, Bulgaria's real albatross is their reputation for corruption. This has earned international criticism and hurt foreign direct investment in the country.[34]

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[27] CIA World Factbook, "Hungary," https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/hu.html. Accessed November 28, 2015.

[28] BBC, "Country Profile: Bulgaria," http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/country_profiles/1059735.stm. Accessed December 6, 2015.

[29] Nationmaster, "Orthodox population: Countries Compared,". Accessed December 1, 2015. http://www.nationmaster.com/country-info/stats/Religion/Christian/Orthodox/Orthodox-population.

[30] Yassen Boyadjiev and Alexander Andreev, "Why Putin is Courting Bulgaria," Deutsche Welle, August 21, 2015. Accessed December 5, 2015. http://www.dw.com/en/why-putin-is-courting-bulgaria/a-18663257.

[31] Nationmaster, "Orthodox population: Countries Compared,". Accessed December 1, 2015. http://www.nationmaster.com/country-info/stats/Religion/Christian/Orthodox/Orthodox-population.

[32] CIA World Factbook, "Bulgaria," https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/bu.html. Accessed December 4, 2015.

[33] Human Rights Watch, "Bulgaria: Investigate Police Violence at Protest," July 25, 2013. Accessed December 5, 2015. https://www.hrw.org/news/2013/07/25/bulgaria-investigate-police-violence-protest; Reporters Without Borders, "2015 World Press Freedom Index,". https://index.rsf.org/#!/index-details. Accessed December 5, 2015.

[34] Tsvetelia Tsolova and Angel Krasimirov, "Bulgarian minister quits after judicial reform plan rejected, Reuters, December 9, 2015. http://www.reuters.com/article/us-bulgaria-justice-minister-idUSKBN0TS21S20151209. Accessed December 11, 2015.

The study uses Poland, Hungary and Bulgaria as subjects of case studies because of their shared communist experience and very different internal characteristics and post-democratic results. It is the contention of this study that examining these differences helps explain the different levels of quality in their democratic governments. One country was dominated by a non-Western empire. Another was dominated by a traditional European power. Two of the three countries aligned with Germany during the Second World War. The other was Hitler's first victim. One of the states experienced a communist revolution in 1919. The other two states only experienced communism after Soviet domination. Two states are dominated by denominations of Western Christianity. A third is home to a large Orthodox majority. Despite these differences, all began their current democratic regimes at the same time, but provide different levels of rights and freedoms to their citizens.

IV. CASE STUDYS

POLAND

History, culture and geography have a profound role in molding the post-Communist government and quality of democracy in the modern state of Poland. The subsequent political product is a semi-liberal, *Catholic democracy*. The chronicle of oppression and suppression of the nation of Poland helped form a national identity. This identity espouses the main pillars of liberal democracy: equality, freedom and individual rights. This modern Polish identity is also distinctly Catholic. It is impossible to untwine the two. Polish Catholicism originated in with the Polish state in Antiquity. There are Polish Catholic beliefs that are contrary to some widely held individual rights: abortion and gay marriage. However, in the grand scheme Poland's geography helps counter these restrictions. Poland's lean to the west of the East/West paradigm, EU membership, and liberal rights in neighboring countries, counter weigh some of this restriction and act as a safeguard from illiberal policies.

This includes the policies and tactics of the Law and Justice supported regime led by President Andrzej Duda and Prime Minister Beata Szydło. A dark cloud of uncertainty befell Poland and its democracy in 2015. The Duda government staged various attacks on the fundamental freedoms and rights. This imperils the notion of liberal democracy in Poland. Yet, recent events illustrate that the Polish people will protect these rights if the government violates the constitution or tries to abridge the rights them. Steps taken by the current government to change the media landscape and alter the formulation of the constitutional tribunal sparked outrage and protest. Many fear that the right-wing contagion perceived in Hungary might spread to Poland. This fear remains in the hearts of many Poles after waiting for over a millennium to gain true self-determination and democratic rights.

Democracy

The de jure political structure and quality of rights and freedoms in Poland fulfills much of the operationalized democratic criteria set forth in the previous methodology section. The government in Poland seems relatively liberal when one reads their constitution. The prevailing document is the Constitution of the Republic of Poland, signed into effect on April 2, 2997. It insures the rights and privileges enjoyed in most other liberal democracies in the world: freedom of religion, freedom of the press, freedom of assembly among other basic rights. There are articles in the Polish Constitution that stand out. One article specifically outlaws Nazism, Fascism, Communism and any group that sanctions national or racial hatred. Other articles provide for traditional rights and freedoms, but seem more modern. It does not only ensure the freedom of the press, but also "social communication." Gender equality and minority rights are also addressed. These are items absent from the Constitutions of many other older liberal democracies of the West. Likewise, there are a group of articles that set forth economic rights and freedoms: establishing a minimum wage, holidays and a social security system. These articles make these standards constitutional rights, whereas in other Western countries they are only federal laws.[1]

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[1] *The Constitution of the Republic of Poland of 2nd April, 1997*, http://www.sejm.gov.pl/prawo/konst/angielski/kon1.htm. -Accessed January 12, 2016.

Figure 7. Democratic Criteria of Poland

Field of Assessment	Criteria
Right to form and join political parties and interest groups.	Polish Constitution, Chapter 1, Article 11-12
Freedom of Speech and Expression	Chapter 1, Article 14
Right to Vote	Chapter 2, Article 62
Eligibility for Public Office	Chapter 4, Article 99 & Chapter 5, Article 127
Right of political leaders to compete for support/votes	Chapter 1, Article 11-12
Alternative sources of information	Chapter 1, Article 14
Free and fair elections	Chapter 4, Article 101
Institutions for making government policies depend on votes and other expressions of preference	Chapter 4, Article 99 & Chapter 5, Article 127
Political participation in the European Union	23.8% versus 42.5 Member State Average in 2014 EP Elections
General Economic Conditions over Time	GDP growth: +96% from 2003-2013. GINI: -4.9 points over 10 years

The Constitution establishes a three branched, parliamentary democratic government. Any Polish citizens over 18 years of age can vote. The President is the chief of state, but not head of the government. He serves as a check and balance on the legislative branch of the government. The President is directly elected by a simple majority. The Polish Head of State is the Prime Minister. The Prime Minister is appointed by the President and confirmed by the *Sejm* (the lower house of a bicameral legislature). The Sejm and the upper house of parliament, the *Senat*, are both popularly elected. Their legislative system is not unlike the bicameral legislature

in the United States. The Senat is 100 seats and the Sejm is 460. The Senat is based on single constituency, while the Sejm is proportional.[2]

The Judicial Branch of the Polish government is established by a separate article of the Polish Constitution. There are several different levels of courts. The highest being the Constitutional Tribunal. All judges are appointed by the President of the Republic and the National Council of the Judiciary. It is very difficult to remove judges from their posts. It is a lifetime appointment. They cannot even be detained except for a special court appointed by special legislation approved by the Senat and Sejm. The National Council of the Judiciary is made up of the First President of the Supreme Court, 15 other judges, four members of the Sejm and 2 members of the Senat, these chosen by their peers.

The Constitutional Tribunal addresses questions pertaining to the Constitution, rights, freedoms and general democracy. It provides judicial review for legislation and new laws as well as the ratification of international treaties. A variety of different parties may bring cases before the court: the President of the Republic, the Prime Minister, leaders of either of the legislative houses, the National Judiciary Council, churches, and labor unions. The members of the Tribunal are elected by the Sejm for 9 year terms. The members of the Tribunal nominate the President of the Tribunal, who is selected from the nominees by the President of the Republic.

Poland enjoys a higher quality of rights and freedoms than in other areas of the world. However, there are two aspects of modern Polish democracy criticized by some in the democratic community, Europe, and the European Union. First, some are alarmed by specific Polish constitutional articles. Second, there are subsequent government actions. There are Polish

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[2] Piotr Rakowski and Robert Rybicki, "An Overview of Polish Law," *Hauser Global Law School Program*, August/September 2010. http://www.nyulawglobal.org/globalex/Poland1.html. Accessed January 15, 2016.

constitution contains some very unpopular constraints on the rights of some citizens. Abortion is a prominent topic when researchers critique the quality of democracy in Poland. Chapter I, Article 38 establishes that the government will protect "the life of every human being". This specifically alludes to unborn fetuses. Poland is only one of three EU members with an exemption on abortion restrictions. Others criticize the establishment of marriage between a man and a woman in Chapter I, Article 18. It is doubtful that either article will be changed in the future

Since the collapse of communism and the advent of modern Polish democracy, Poland enjoyed a relatively healthy quality of democracy. This changed in 2015. Poland was plunged into a constitutional crisis. The Duda regime undertook sweeping political moves against established democratic rights and practices. Poland was rocked in the first days of the year as the Law and Justice-led government passed two very controversial pieces of legislation. First, Duda signed a law to "reform" the Constitutional Tribunal. Many saw the changes as an attack on its independence and ability to act as a safeguard against a runaway Law and Justice Government. [3] Then, the Duda government passed a law that gave authorities greater ability to conduct surveillance.[4] Later in the spring, the administration took over the power to dismiss and appoint heads of public media channels. An independent committee had the task previously.[5] In June, the parliament passed new counterterrorism laws that limit the freedom of assembly, allow the arbitrary detention of foreigners and empowered the state security service, Agencja Bezpieczeństwa Wewnętrzneg (the ABW), to block Internet sites the government declare

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[3] BBC, "Poland court reforms signed into law despite protests," December 28, 2015. http://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-35189057. Accessed July 9, 2016.
[4] Deutsche Welle, "Polish protesters decry new surveillance law," *DW*, January 23, 2016. http://www.dw.com/en/polish-protesters-decry-new-surveillance-law/a-19000735. Accessed January 26, 2016.
[5] BBC, "Polish media laws: Government takes control of state media," January 7, 2016. http://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-35257105. Accessed January 15, 2016.

national security threats.[6] Later in the year, NGOs faced a government crackdown following criticism of the laws passed by the Law and Justice regime.[7]

Poland's Constitutional checks and balances stymied the Law and Justice agenda. The Duda government took aim at the Constitutional Tribunal. They force through measures to weaken the court.[8] These tactics took the shape of executive action on the part of Duda personally and legislative acts produced by the Law and Justice dominated parliament. Collectively, they impaired the impartiality of the court, left the members of the court subject to the same political currents as the legislature and all but ended the principle of judicial review. Some characterize the results as "a complete takeover of the constitutional court" by the Law and Justice backed regime.[9]

Duda's administration broke from established political practice and even rewrote several the very basic laws governing the Constitutional Tribunal. There were five vacancies on the tribunal when Law & Order took power in November 2015. The former government had already selected three of the justices. This left Law and Justice to select two more justices and seat all five of them. Instead, Duda selected all five justices, replacing the three from his predecessor.

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[6] Jan Rydzak, "Now Poland's Government Is Coming After the Internet," *Foreign Policy*, June 10, 2016. http://foreignpolicy.com/2016/06/10/now-polands-government-is-coming-after-the-internet/. Accessed January 9, 2016.

[7] Christian Davies, "Polish PM angers human rights campaigners with plans to shake up NGOs," *The Guardian*, November 28, 2016. https://www.theguardian.com/world/2016/nov/28/polish-pm-beata-szydoa-angers-human-rights-campaigners-ngos. Accessed November 30, 2016.

[8] R. Daniel Kelemen, "Poland's Constitutional Crisis," *Foreign Affairs*, August 25, 2016. https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/poland/20D16-08-25/polands-constitutional-crisis. Accessed November 11, 2016.

[9] The Financial Times, "Illiberal democracy on the Polish horizon," December 21, 2016. https://www.ft.com/content/145d41fc-c782-11e6-8f29-9445cac8966f. Accessed January 11, 2016.

Thus, he packed the court with Law and Justice aligned jurors.[10] Simultaneously, the government took legislative steps to subjugate the court.

At the same time as Duda's moved to pack the court, the parliament passed a series of measures altering the status and independence of the members of the Constitutional Tribunal. The new laws make it easier to investigate and remove judges. This leaves the court subject to many of the political winds as that of the legislature. The Law and Justice sponsored changes to the court laws also require a 2/3s majority to invalidate a law. The legal change cripples the court's basic ability of judicial review.[11] Striking down laws that violate the constitution is essentially impossible. The court now serves as little more than a rubber stamp for the government in Warsaw.

This muting of the court by the Law and Justice Party make true democracy impossible in Poland. From the standpoint of Alvarez, et al and the minimalists, one of the primary aspects of democracy is the limitations placed on government.[12] The judicial review of an independent branch of government serves this role in most liberal democracies. Absent of this check on unbridled government power, democracy cannot truly exist. The maximalist perspective of Hasselmann finds the events in Poland problematic as well. This view demands among other things a system of checks and balances and a separation of powers.[13] The packing of the court with party loyalists, implementation of a supermajority to render a decision and all around

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[10] Emily Tamkin, "Polish Ruling Party Passed Unconstitutional Laws, Now Controls Constitutional Tribunal," *Foreign Policy*, December 19, 2017. http://foreignpolicy.com/2016/12/19/polish-ruling-party-passed-unconstitutional-laws-now-controls-constitutional-tribunal-trump-law-justice/. Accessed January 11, 2017; Deutsche Welle, "Protests in Poland Against PiS Court Substitutes," December 13, 2015. http://www.dw.com/en/protests-in-poland-against-pis-court-substitutes/a-18914456. Accessed November 11, 2016.
[11] Noah Feldman, "Poland's new government takes aim at democracy," *Bloomberg*, December 31, 2015. https://www.bloomberg.com/view/articles/2015-12-31/poland-s-new-leaders-take-aim-at-democracy. Accessed January 15, 2016.
[12] Alvarez, et al, "Classifying Political Regimes," 4.
[13] Hasselmann, *Policy Reform and the Development of Democracy in Eastern Europe*, 25.

subjugation of the court violate these tenants of Hasselmann's view and model. This tampering

with the Constitutional Tribunal might sound the death knell for modern Polish democracy.

The regime in Warsaw abridged other basic rights. In June 2016, the government passed

other laws in the guise of anti-terror legislation. The wave of terror attacks across Western

Europe lent credence to enhanced government powers that breached several basic rights under

most definitions of liberal democracy. There were several attacks in Western Europe in late

2015 and early 2016, but even the government admits that the risk of an attack in Poland is

low.[14] The need for counterterrorism efforts was clearly "imported".[15] Despite this black letter

confession by those in the Duda regime, the government curbed basic rights. This chipped away

further at the quality of liberal democracy in the state.

The enhanced surveillance law in Poland went into effect despite that it denies individual

privacy.[16] The government gave the ABW the ability to look at citizen's tax reports, vehicle

information, banking records and insurance information.[17] It serves as a dark reminder of the

nation's communist past. The law allows for covert surveillance based on "vague conditions"[18]

to investigate an "unspecified catalogue of crimes"[19]. The law does not provide for any judicial

oversight. The law does not require any type of probable cause before the government

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[14]Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Republic of Poland, "Counter-Terrorism Activities of Poland", n.d.
http://www.mfa.gov.pl/en/foreign_policy/security_policy/international_terrorism/. Accessed January 11, 2017.
[15] Kacper Rekawek, "Referenced but Not Linear?", *East European Politics and Societies and Cultures* (December 2016): 4.
[16] Wiktor Szary and Marcin Goettig, "Poland Increases government surveillance powers despite protests", *Reuters*, February 4, 2016. http://www.reuters.com/article/us-poland-rights-government-idUSKCN0VD236. Accessed December 11, 2016.
[17] Rydzak, "Now Poland's Government Is Coming After the Internet."
[18] Amnesty International, "Poland: New Surveillance law a major blow to human rights," EUR 37/3357/2016, January 29, 2016.
[19] Ibid.

surveillance.[20] It sparked outrage among many Poles and led to the creation of new opposition groups like the Defense of Democracy (KOD).[21]

The Duda government attacked press freedom, as well. It forced through a law that placed the power to hire and fire broadcast executives in the hands of the Treasury Minister. The task formerly belonged to a supervisory committee. Admittedly, past regimes replaced broadcast executives, but the Law and Justice law goes "faster and farther".[22] The government stated that it sought to make the media presented in the country more balanced. They cited that the media was largely made of parties opposing the Law and Justice Party. Media freedom advocates from all over voiced the concern and disapproval in the changes. It placed very large, popular television and radio stations under much tighter control of the government. One of the media companies, TVP, has two popular television channels. They combine for a market share of 30% and reach 90% of Polish viewers weekly. The other large outlet is Public Polish radio, which reaches over half the population and have 200 stations.[23]

The same law also limits two of the most basic rights of democracies: the right to assemble and seeks to censor and control the Internet. The law gives government officials the authority to ban demonstrations that counter government approved events. Before, local authorities had the power.[24] The mustered domestic control of the Internet allows the ABW "to block websites deemed a threat to national security". The law also codifies a "kill switch"[25].

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[20] Ibid.

[21] Andrzej Kijowski, interview by Jo Harper, *DW*, January 16, 2016. http://www.dw.com/en/polands-extra-parliamentary-opposition-stresses-need-for-civil-society/a-18984110. Accessed January 26, 2016.

[22] BBC, "Polish media bill triggers concern for freedom," December 20, 2015. http://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-35202280. Accessed January 11, 2017.

[23] Ibid.

[24] Marcin Goettig, "Polish rights grous urge president to veto freedom of assembly bill," Reuters, December 14, 2016. http://www.reuters.com/article/us-poland-politics-protests-idUSKBN1432D0. Accessed

[25] Rydzak, "Now Poland's Government Is Coming After the Internet."

During a state of emergency the Polish authorities have the power to disable all

telecommunications. These laws have brought widespread protest from NGO watchdogs, civil

rights groups, and domestic political opposition.[26]

These abridgements of fundamental rights strike at the heart of Dahl's consensus

definition of democracy. The premise of a conditional right to assemble undercuts the basic right

to assemble and further injures the right to expression (through protest) and freedom to form and

join organizations.[27] The Solidarity movement that was at the forefront of modern Polish

democracy would not have succeeded under laws like this. Furthermore, the implementation of

warrantless surveillance, data collection and control of Internet content all have implications on

citizen's rights to alternative sources of information and potentially the rights' of political leaders

to compete for support.[28] With no check or balance in a system containing these laws, the

phenomena of Polish democracy is in peril.

The final move of 2016 by the Law and Justice regime in Warsaw came when Prime

Minister Beata Szydło new announced plans to control NGOs in the country. NGOs have been

widely critical of the Law and Justice changes to the government, especially Constitutional

Tribunal.[29] The President's spokesman, Marek Magierowski, called the NGOs' allegations "one-

sided" and uninformed.[30] The government half-heartedly justified the retribution against its NGO

critics. Szydło stated that too many NGOs were working under the policies of the former

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[26] Ibid.

[27] Dahl, *Polyarchy*, 3.

[28] Ibid.

[29] Human Rights Watch, "Joint Letter to the President of Poland," October 19, 201. https://www.hrw.org/news/2016/10/19/joint-ngo-letter-president-poland. Accessed January 11, 2017.

[30] Marek Magierowski qutoted in "Polish president's spokesman accusses NGOs of `one-sided arguments'," *Radio Poland*, October 20, 2016. http://www.thenews.pl/1/9/Artykul/276364,Polish-president%E2%80%99s-spokesman-accuses-NGOs-of-%E2%80%98onesided-arguments%E2%80%99. Accessed January 11, 2017.

government[31] and that the government wanted to "clean up the country's civic sector."[32] The measure would leave the primary public funding for NGOs in the hands of a new department, the "national centre for the development of civic society".[33]

The government has fought a quiet, subtle war against NGOs. The radio and television stations brought under government control in 2016 openly attack NGOs. These media stations allege that the groups are counter to Polish interests and "lackeys of Western powers".[34] Additionally, the government sponsors competing groups, like Solidarni and Ordo Iuris. These two groups promoted the conspiracy theory behind the plane crash that took the life of former President Lech Kaczynski and supported a near complete ban on abortion. The government peddles these state-sponsored groups as speaking for the consensus of Poles.[35]

Duda's tactics and challenges to democracy in Poland will be telling for the futures of both Poland and the EU. Before, many trumpeted Poland as an example for other EU member nations. Polish turnout for EU elections increased since their accession to the Union.

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[31] Davies, "Polish PM angers human rights campaigners with plans to shake up NGOs." .
[32] Aleksandra Erikkson, "Polish government in bid to defund NGOs," *Eurobserver*, December 2, 2016. https://euobserver.com/nordic/136124. Accessed January 11, 2017.
[33] Ibid.
[34] Ibid.
[35] Ibid.

Figure 8. Voter Turnout in EU Elections: Poland, EU and Central and Eastern Europe

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
According to Habermas, this enhances the quality of Polish rights and freedoms by developing a

post nationalist democracy.[37] The President of the European Council is former Polish Prime

Minister Donald Tusk. Poland holds over 6.5% of the seats in the European Parliament.[38]

Poland's broader European political future seems bright. However, Law and Justice's

euroscpeticism increases the chances of allowing Poland's democratic progress to backslide. The

EU reaction might be the catalyst to stopping Poland from possibly developing into an illiberal

democracy.

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[36] Eurostat,
http://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/tgm/table.do?tab=table&init=1&language=en&pcode=tsdgo310&plugin=1. Accessed
August 11, 2016.
[37] Haberma, "Toward a European Political Community," 60-1.
[38] European Parliament, Results of the 2014 European elections, http://www.europarl.europa.eu/elections2014-
results/en/seats-member-state-percent.html. Accessed January 10, 2016.

There are conflicting theories about what legal action from Brussels could bring. Habermas argues that EU action against the Duda regime might force Poles to take a greater interest in European Union policies and politics.[39] Teorell disagrees. He observed that organizations like the European Union help democratization, but measures like sanctions can initiate backsliding. Ironically, the final results to either have little to do with Duda's government and far more to do with Polish voters. They could react adversely to an EU attempt to exercise power over their elected parliament. Alternatively, an EU challenge to Duda's unpopular and illiberal initiatives could garner broad based support for Brussels with Polish voters.

Poland's economic performance helps maintain their political system and level of democracy. This supports the scholarly consensus that economics do aid in democratization and supporting democracy. Kapstein and Converse wrote that this cannot be left to only a single factor. Ersson contributed that an economy's true impact is growth. The Polish economy proved durable through the most recent financial crisis.

Poland's GDP growth shows a healthy rebound since 2011. Per capita GDP improved over time, as well. This aided in the relative stability of Poland's political system.

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[39] Habermas, *The Crisis of the European Union*, 61.

Figure 9. GDP Growth by Year, Poland

Figure 10. Per Capita GDP (PPP) by Year, Poland

[40] Eurostat, http://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/tgm/download.do?tab=table&plugin=1&language=en&pcode=tec00115. Accessed August 11, 2016.

[41] World Bank, http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GDP.PCAP.PP.CD. Accessed August 11, 2016

GDP growth is important in managing sovereign debt. This enhances confidence in the

established political system. Poland finished 2005 with a national debt level of 46.7% of GDP. It

increased to 53% of GDP in 2010 and leveled off at just over 50% by the end of 2014. This

shows an overall improvement and an improvement versus the EU trend. The EU ended with a

cumulative debt of 85% its GDP.[42]

There are other economic performances that bode well for democracy in Poland. Noted

scholars allude to the effect of income disparity as measured by GINI. Kapstein and Converse

refer to this. Teorell discusses the prevalence of GINI as a factor in the established literature.

Poland's economy improved in this regard as well. Poland's level of economic disparity fell

every year since 2005. Poland's GINI is now in line with the rest of the EU member states.

Figure 11. GINI Index, by Year, Poland

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[42] Eurostat, http://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/tgm/download.do?tab=table&plugin=1&language=en&pcode=teina225. Accessed August 11, 2016.

[43] World Bank, http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SI.POV.GINI. Accessed August 11, 2016.

The collective positive effect of a reasonable debt to GDP, increasing per capita GDP and improving GINI have helped maintain democracy in Poland. Its performance kept the larger economy out of the political arena. The largest opportunity is continuing to improve infrastructure and diversifying its energy sector.[44] According to Teorell, energy dependency on oil is a hazard for most western countries. A crisis in this arena could hurt the stability of the government. Another global economic shock could also prove hazardous to democratic stability and quality. Poland had a lower debt in 2009 during the last financial crisis. A higher debt along with another comparable financial calamity would really test the strength of Poland's economy. It might also fuel illiberalism and backsliding as some of the literature predicts.

The health and quality of Poland's democracy might be somewhat challenged under the new Duda government. This cannot overshadow the political progress achieved since 1997. Poland never enjoyed true self determination before the late 1990s. One interesting point to highlight is that despite the efforts by the Duda's government in the country, the people and the opposition seem readily resilient and willing to protect their rights. Their ability to do so is a characteristic of the stable, well-functioning system in place. Despite the efforts of the eurosceptics in Poland, the country still enjoys a reasonably high level of democratic rights and freedoms.

History

Early Polish history establishes the seeds for some of the characteristics of the modern Polish state. Most importantly, this period established the Polish state's Christian heritage. The country remains largely Catholic. History also provided the seeds for democracy. The legislative

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[44] CIA World Factbook, *Poland*. https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/pl.html. Accessed January 21, 2016.

bodies, the Sejm and the Senat, are examples of prominent historical antecedents. These are referred to in the preamble of the modern Polish constitution as "the best traditions of the First and Second Republic."[45] Finally, larger external powers partitioned Poland numerous times. This formed angst over the *Polishness* of the nation and the state and helped create a Polish identity. This is a popular topic of conversation in political circles in relation to the role Brussels plays in Polish law. These attributes from pre-First World War history contribute to the nature of government, as well as the political structure of Poland today.

There are five political periods in Polish history. The timeline begins shortly after the death of Christ with the Monarchy. The Partitions of Poland follows 16 centuries later. This era concludes with the First World War. The Second Polish Republic spans the interwar years. Communism followed the defeat of the Axis Powers in 1945. The final era is the Third Polish Republic, declared in 1989. It is important to point out that external forces demarcate the middle three political eras. Partitions at the hands of European powers ended Polish control of the original state. World wars gave way to the second republic and, later, Soviet domination. The legacy started by the partitions of Poland created what Poles felt as "the need to fight against the loss of national identity."[46]

The first century reign of Mieszko I started the Christian monarchy that would rule Poland in different forms until 1795. The nation and state would undergo turbulence and different regional wars under the control of different kings, queens, emperors and collectives of junior nobility. The early Polish Christian monarchy survived the Golden Horde of Genghis

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[45] *The Constitution of the Republic of Poland of 2nd April, 1997.*
[46] Anita J. Prażmowska, *A History of Poland* (New York: Palgrave Macmilln, 2011), 157.

Kahn that invaded Europe in the 13th century.[47] This version of the Polish state reached its high point during the Jagiellonian Dynasty after the union with Lithuania in 1386 and the defeat of the Teutonic Knights in 1410.[48] This Polish Monarchy was an autocratic regime. There was a very rigid class system in place. The nobility made up the highest class. Only this 8-10% of the population enjoyed the rights and privileges. Serfs made up 72% of the population. Along with Urghers and Jews, they had no rights at all and were not considered citizens.[49]

Poland developed its democratic ideals in several stages. Jan Olbracht, a Jagiellonian King, first introduced the notion of democracy in 1493. He created the Sejm and the Senat to advise the king and serve to protect the wider interests of Poland and its nobles.[50] In 1573, the Jagiellonian line of kings ended and *electio virilum*, or "elected monarch"[51] was established. Nobles were now allowed to vote for a king. This king was constrained by Henrican articles: protecting noble rights, supporting religious toleration and convening the Sejm twice a year.[52] These minor advances exposed Poles to limited examples of democratic rights. They introduced the ideas of a restrained central authority and created political antecedents of the Sejm and Senat. However, their contemporary effect was minor. It was still the sixteenth century and there was still a ruling class. Prażmowska wrote, "the word `free' when applied to the description of a Pole invariably was applied to the nobility and not the community as a whole." The peasant class remained unrepresented and enserfment continued.[53]

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[47] Ibid., 27.

[48] CIA, *Poland Country Studies: A Brief Study of Poland*, February 2012, Kindle edition.

[49] Marian Hillar, "Polish Constitution of May 3, 1791: Myth and Reality," *The Polish Review 37*, no. 2 (1992): 187

[50] Prażmowska, *A History of Poland*, 64.

[51] Mark F. Brzezinski, "Constitutional Heritage and Renewal: The Case of Poland," *Virginia Law Review 77*, no. 1 (February 1991):55.

[52] Prażmowska, *A History of Poland*, 90-91.

[53] Ibid., 85-86.

Democratic and constitutional development slowed throughout the period of Poland's

partitions. The partitions and the subjugation of Poland to foreign powers followed numerous

European wars. Poland was first partitioned in 1771, in which it lost a third of its lands.[54] A

second partition came in 1793, making it smaller.[55] The third partition of Poland wiped it from

the map. This started a period of domination by Russia, Germany and Austria.[56] Several

milestones contributed to the concept of Polish democracy in the late eighteenth century. First

was the Polish Constitution of 1791. Then, there was the Polaneic Manifesto in 1794. The third

and final of the period was the 1807 Polish Constitution imposed by Napoleon following his

defeat of Prussia.

The Polish Constitution of 1794 was an important document for a number of reasons.

First, it was Europe's first written constitution.[57] Mark F. Brzezinski sees the document as the

culmination of seven centuries of "constitutional evolution". It recognized the will of the people

and separation of church and state. For this, it is often spoken of in the same high regard as the

U.S. and French constitutions of the same era.[58] Marian Hillar is far more critical. He noted the

mythology and romanticism in the analysis of the constitution. He wrote that it as "a measure to

guarantee the continuation of a stratified society."[59] Brzezinski concedes that what it provided

was "a far cry from popular sovereignty".[60]

The slow slog of Poland towards real democracy continued. The Poleanic Manifesto was

put into effect the following year. This act protected serfs from eviction. More substantively,

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[54] Prażmowska, *A History of Poland*, 124.
[55] Ibid.,, 127.
[56] Ibid., 130-1.
[57] Brzezinski, "Constitutional Heritage and Renewal: The Case of Poland," 51.
[58] Ryszard Cholewinski, "The Protection of Human Rights in the New Polish Constitution," *Fordham International Law Review 22*, no. 2 (1998): 239.
[59] Hillar, "Polish Constitution of May 3, 1791: Myth and Reality," 186.
[60] Brzezinski, "Constitutional Heritage and Renewal: The Case of Poland," 66.

Napoleon's defeat of Prussia in 1807 placed Poland within is realm. The accompanying

Constitution of 1807 implemented key tenants of the Napoleonic code. This included more

political antecedents to modern Polish democracy: concepts of equality under the law and

religious tolerance. The document also abolished serfdom. Six years later Napoleon would lose

the Franco-Prussian War and Poland fell under the control of Czarist Russia.[61] This all but halted

the democratic progress in Poland.

Democracy, rights and freedoms continued to elude Poland after the Congress of Vienna.

Austro-Hungary, Prussia and Imperial Russia divided what is the state of Poland today. The

newly minted "Kingdom of Poland" still had a Sejm. It comprised of nobility only with only

nobles and landowners voting, but the body had no legislative power. The Russian Czar served

as the Chief Executive. This rendition of the Kingdom of Poland was completely dependent on

Russia during this period.[62] Landowners still controlled peasants, who could not vote. Local

nobility enforced landlord rights and could conscript troublesome peasants into the army.[63] There

were intermittent, unsuccessful revolts. Romanov Czars dissolved the Sejm countless times.

Russian leaders would occasionally abolish the constitution. As Prażmowska titles one of her

chapters, Poland was a "Polish nation without a state".[64]

The Second Polish Republic emerged after the First World War. Article XIII of

Woodrow Wilson's Fourteen Points called for "an independent Polish state".[65] The government

was modeled after the Third French Republic. The government had a weak executive and a

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[61] Prażmowska, *A History of Poland*, 136.

[62] Prażmowska, *A History of Poland*, 137-138; Adam Zamoyski, *Poland: A History* (London: Harper Press, 2009), Kindle edition.

[63] R. F. Leslie, "Politics and Economics in Congress Poland, 1815-1864," *Past & Present*, no. 8 (November 1955): 45.

[64] Prażmowska, *A History of Poland*, , 159.

[65] *President Woodrow Wilson's Fourteen Points*, January 8, 1918.
http://avalon.law.yale.edu/20th_century/wilson14.asp. Accessed May 5, 2016.

powerful legislature with a large number of political parties.[66] Unfortunately, this system proved

dysfunctional in Interwar Poland. Democracy advanced very little most and receded for others.

There was no reliable, consistent democratic leadership. The political parties were unstable.

They pulled in various directions at different times. Different governments attempted to rule the

country with no effect. The first Polish President was assassinated. Four years later there was a

military coup led by Józef Piłsudski.[67] This began the period known as the "Rule of Colonels".[68]

Piłsudski tried changing the Constitution to place limitations on established democratic practices.

When the Sejm blocked this, he sent troops to the building. He became Prime Minister and

imprisoned opposition leaders. [69] The military government ceased any democratic advancement

in Poland[70]

The political landscape in Poland was organized chaos. There were various parties based

on political ideology, there were other parties based on ethnicity. New parties formed, combined,

aligned and opposed each other constantly. Fragmentation earmarked the Polish elections of

1919, 1922 and 1928. Piłsudski launched a party, the Government Bloc meant to place the

country's interests over politics. Ethnic political groups divided and subdivided, while other

minority groups emerged. [71] The Government Bloc displaced the traditional right. Minority

voters saw their votes being diluted by an increasing number of minority parties.[72] These voters

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[66] Ray Taras, *Condsolidating Democracy in Poland* (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1995), 39.

[67] Prażmowska, *A History of Poland*, 174.

[68] Andrzej Paczkowski, *The Spring Will Be Ours: Poland and the Poles from Occupation to Freedom*, tans. Jane Cave (University Park, PA: The Pennsylvania University Press, 1995), 9-11.

[69] Ibid.,, 175.

[70] Ibid.,, 175.

[71] A. J. Groh, "Polish Election 1919-1928," *Slavic Review 24*, no. 4 (December 1965): 653.

[72] Ibid., 656.

threw their support behind the Communists, the Socialists or other parties of the left. [73] Some of

this was aided by Soviet influence and Russian Communism's contemporary success.[74]

The democratic result of the Interwar Period in Poland was inertia at best. Piłsudski's rule

bypassed the legislature. Minority rights were neglected. The Polish government took steps to

strip the Ukrainian language and culture from their Orthodox Churches. More seriously,

Ukrainians were often victims of physical and property violence. The state sponsored some of

this activity.[75] William W Hagen's study shows that the plight of Jews in Interwar Poland as

comparable to that of pre-WWII Germany. He quotes Mariam Kosciałkowski, an interwar

government official in Poland, who stated that anti-Semitism was "common" and used by "all

parties for election purposes."[76] Even noted leaders of the Catholic Church in Poland blamed

Jews for the poor conditions in the new republic.[77] As a whole, Poles suffered high

unemployment, insufficient infrastructure,[78] income disparity, poverty and legal inequality.[79]

The interwar years also saw external conflicts that established domestic political feelings

in Poland. First, the Poles had border disputes with Lithuania and Czechoslovakia. Second, the

Bolshevik Revolution in Russia occurred in 1917. This changed the political landscape of central

and eastern Europe. Many countries feared Russia more than Germany. The Poles fought a war

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[73] Ibid., 658; Jeffrey S. Kopstein and Jason Wittenberg, "Who voted Communist? Reconsidering the Social Bases of Radicalism in Interwar Poland," *Slavic Review 62*, no. 1 (Spring 2003): 89.

[74] Ibid., 88; Prażmowska , *A History of Poland*, 15.

[75] John-Paul Himka, "Western Ukraine between the Wars," *Canadian Slavonic Papers 34*, no. 4 (December 1992): 400.

[76] Mariam Kosciałkowski quoted in William W. Hagen, "Before the `Final Solution': Toward a Comparative Analysis of Political Anti-Seimitism in Interwar Germany and Poland," *The Journal of Modern History 68*, no. 2 (June 1996): 355.

[77] Anna Lysiak, "The Rev. Kruszynski and Polish Catholic Teachings about Jews and Judaism in Interwar Poland," *Kichliche Zeitgechicte 16*, no. 1 (2003): 56.

[78] Prażmowska, *A History of Poland*, 173.

[79] Lysiak, "The Rev. Kruszynski and Polish Catholic", 56.

with the Soviet Union until the countries signed a treaty after two and a half years of fighting.[80]

Communists came to power in Hungary and Romania. Peoples of the region feared Stalin's

policies and increased violence from Communists groups.[81] This fear led the Poles to decline an

offer of protection from Stalin and the Soviets.[82] Poland's military leadership turned to Hitler to

no avail.[83] Three weeks later Hitler and Stalin signed the Soviet-German Non-Aggression Pact.

Hitler attacked Poland while the ink on the agreement was still wet.[84]

There were two large factions resisting the Nazis in Poland by 1942. First, there was the

Home Army backed by the Polish government in exile in London. The other was the Soviet-

backed People's Guard. The People's Guard later helped form the Polish Worker's Party. The

Homeland National Council developed in 1943 and became the Polish Committee of National

Liberation. It proclaimed itself the legitimate government of Poland. Moscow recognized it 12

days later.[85] Churchill rebuffed appeals from the Polish government in exile that asked for

British help.[86] This changed the future of Poland for the next 45 years.

Inept and betrayed describe the interwar governments of Poland best. The period of true

democracy between the wars was barely brief enough to mention. It, however, is typical of many

European governments of the period, like Weimar Germany, for example. While crafters of these

governments sought the diffusion of power away from monarch-like heads of state, their political

pluralism showed little stability. Large numbers of political parties can make a consensus

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[80] Andrzej Paczkowski, *The Spring Will Be Ours: Poland and the Poles from Occupation to Freedom*, tans. Jane Cave (University Park, PA: The Pennsylvania University Press, 1995), 9-11.

[81] Mark Kramer, "Stalin, Soviet Policy, and the Establishment of a Communist Bloc in Eastern Europe, 1948-1953," in *Stalin and Europe: Imitation and Domination, 1928 – 1953*, eds. Timothy Snyder and Ray Brandon (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2014), 266-267.

[82] Antony Beevor, The Second World War (New York, NY: Little Brown, 2012): 16-17.

[83] Pråzmowska, *A History of Poland*, 174-5.

[84] Beevor, 19.

[85] Taras, *Consolidating Democracy in Poland*, 43-44.

[86] Churchill quoted by Taras, 44.

impossible. In many cases this leads to the rise of strong men. In the case of Poland, it was the Colonels. (Present day Egypt witnessed a similar turn of events recently.) The interwar governments represented the last opportunity for Polish self-determination. Throughout World War II and the Cold War, much of Polish policy was dictated by Hitler, victorious the Allies of the Second World War or the communist leadership of the Kremlin. A clear political reference to this is the Constitutional ban on fascist and communist political parties. Another contribution from the period is the growing desire for true Polish leadership and the preservation of Polish identity.

The failure of the United States and Great Britain to defend the idea of democracy in Poland left the country firmly in the hands of the Soviets. However, non-communist political parties, the Peasant Alliance and the Socialists helped form the provisional government. The communist party was the weakest of the three coalition partners, but wielded great power. Red Army forces and the NKVD undercut opposition to the party and the party held key positions in the government. The communists staged a national referendum in 1946 and a general election in 1947. By the end of 1948, the Peasant Alliance was destroyed and the communist party absorbed the Socialists. This ended Poland's post-war political plurality.[87]

The 49 years of Communist rule in Poland were brutal, especially for the Catholic Church. Initial Soviet policies in Poland were shaped by moves to make Poland more homogenous and minimize or eliminate the role of the Catholic Church. Ultimately, the country became more Polish and more Catholic.[88] Stalin was keenly aware of the nationalistic sentiments of Poles. He sought to suppress this nationalism and any future pressure to unify the country by

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[87] Prażmowska, *A History of Poland*, 196-197.
[88] Ibid, 194-195.

dividing Poland by ethnic lines. The Soviets moved Belarussians and Ukranians into other areas of the Soviet Union and repatriated ethnic Germans.[89] Polish leaders were replaced by Moscow-trained communist leaders. They attacked the Catholic Church, confiscated its property and incarcerated priests.[90] Following the death of Stalin, Polish workers took to the streets. Polish troops fired upon them and killed around a hundred protestors. The protests spread. The party rehabilitated a communist figure jailed by Stalin, Władyslaw Gomułka.[91] As communist leader of Poland, conditions in Poland improved to "bearable".[92] Gomułka allowed private farming and small enterprise and gave the Catholic church more freedoms.[93] A faltering economy and increased tensions with the church started in the mid-1960s.[94]

Economic problems continued throughout the 1970s and in the 1980s. [95] The underground opposition to the communist government grew to include several human rights groups and what is described as a "press empire".[96] Polish communist party leader Edward Gierek sought to placate the Polish people. He reassured them of improvements in life in Poland. His government borrowed money from the West and purchased new factory equipment. The investment failed and price increases were needed to meet the loan payments. This sparked the protests in the shipyards of Gdansk, led by Lech Walesa. The striking workers were joined by

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[89] Geofrey Robert, "Stalin's Wartime Vision of Peace, 1939-1945," in *Stalin and Europe: Imitation and Domination, 1928 – 1953*, eds. Timothy Snyder and Ray Brandon (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2014), 235.
[90] Prażmowska, *A History of Poland*, 199.
[91] Jane Leftwich Curry, "Poland," in *Central & East European Politics from Communism to Democracy*, eds. Sharon L. Wolchik and Jane Leftwich Curry (New York: Rowman & Littlefield, 2015), 238.
[92] Prażmowska, *A History of Poland*, 201.
[93] Curry, "Poland," 238
[94] Prażmowska, *A History of Poland*, 208-9.
[95] Ibid., 212-3.
[96] Curry, "Poland," 238

many other groups from around the country. The government was forced to sign the Gdansk Agreement. Solidarity became a nationally recognized reform movement.[97]

The Gdansk Agreement was the first step in establishing modern democratic rights in Poland. It contains many of Dahl's criteria for democracy.[98] Despite being written in consult with the communist government in Warsaw, it espoused much of the democratic rights guaranteed in liberal democratic officiating documents of the world today, including modern Poland. It guaranteed the role of religious organizations. It provided for a plurality of political views in media. It insured the right to self-expression. The document provided for landownership and areas of rural self-government. Most Poles including many communist party members became Solidarity members.[99] The central controlled economy continued to flounder and the demonstrations and strikes continued. The government made more and more concessions as the economic problems mounted in Poland.

The neighboring communist states and the Kremlin were deeply alarmed by this and called for a crackdown. Faced with a Soviet invasion, Polish communist leader Wojciech Jaruzelski declared martial law. The government imprisoned opposition leaders, former party members who embraced reforms and other activists. Jaruzelski reversed all of the reforms made by Solidarity and the Gierek regime. Soldarity was outlawed. Press censorship returned. Soldiers patrolled the streets. The poor conditions in Poland persisted through the 1980s.[100] Gorbachev succeeded as Soviet Premier in 1985. His policies gave more freedom for the communist

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[97] Ibid., 239.
[98] Dahl, *Polyarchy*, 3.
[99] Khronika Press, "The Gdansk Agreement: Protocol of Agreement between the Government Commission and Interfactory Strike Committee Concluded on August 31, 1980 at Gdansk Shipyards," World Affairs 145, No. 1 (Summer 1982): 13-14.
[100] Curry, "Poland," 240.

governments of central and eastern Europe to govern their own affairs. Moscow encouraged the communist government in Warsaw to invite Solidarity to negotiations.[101] The Catholic church aided in establishing the dialogue.[102] These Round Table Talks started the end of communism in Poland.[103]

Poland lacked a free civil society, political parties and a government that could be a "mediating establishment" after the collapse of communism.[104] There was only one non-communist institution in the country: the Catholic Church. The new parliament went right to work, restoring the country's name, ended the communist monopoly on power, and declared Poland a "Democratic state". Many of the communist groups changed their names and handed their leadership over to a younger, less experienced generation. Most socialist practices and institutions were repealed in the first months of 1990. This included the Security Service of the Ministry of Internal Affairs (the secret police).[105]

The different political periods of Poland contributed to the current quality of modern Polish democracy. The early history of the country rendered the antecedents of the bicameral legislature made of the Sejm and Senat, close ties to the Catholic Church and the idea of a cherished Polish identity. The Interwar Period and Communist Period contributed to the Constitution in the bans on fascist and communist parties and rock-ribbed protections for religious freedom, namely the Catholic Church. In sum, the two most resolute historical narratives are that of a Polish identity and the role of the Church. Throughout history, the nation

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[101] Prażmowska, *A History of Poland*, 216.
[102] Curry, "Poland," 240.
[103] Prażmowska, *A History of Poland*, 216.
[104] Heironim Kubiak, "Poland: national security in a changing environment," in *Central and Eastern Europe: Challenge and Transition*, ed. Regina Cowen Karp (Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press, 1993), 71.
[105] Andrzej Paczkowski, *The Spring Will Be Ours: Poland the Poles from Occupation to Freedom*, ed. Jane Cave (University Park, PA: Pennsylvania State University Press, 2003): 512-3.

of Poland remained strong, intact and self-aware even when there was only a marginalized Polish state. Understanding the role of the Catholic Church is essential to understanding how these Polish ideals perpetuated down through the ages.

Culture

The impact of Roman Catholicism on the nature of Polish rights and freedoms cannot be overstated. Church leaders had a large role in writing the modern Polish Constitution. Today, Church leaders remain a strong political force. While very Catholic, the Polish people are not very free. Catholicism and the rights it insures, instills and provides are limited. This leads to very undemocratic and even *uncatholic* practices at times. Democracy in Poland is limited by its strong interconnectedness to Catholic dogma.

The prevailing cultural feature of Poland is its Catholic religion. Lech Walesa wrote that without the Catholic Church, there would be no Poland.[106] It is a defining institution for the Polish people. Ewa Morawski calls the Catholic Church the "major public spokesman for Polish society." Catholicism was essential to opposing communism.[107] During the Cold War, the Catholic Church took a defining role in the political future of Poland. This is accounted thoroughly in Cardinal Stanislaw Dziwisz's work *A Life with Karol*. Poland, of course, was intensely personal for John Paul II, a Pole who referred to himself as the "Slavic Pope." [108]

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[106] Lech Walesa, *The Struggle and the* Triumph (New York: Arcade Publishing, 1992), 8.
[107] Thomas A. Byrnes, *Transnational Catholicism in Postcommunist Europe* (Oxford, UK: Rowman and Littlefield Publishers, Inc., 2001), 31.
[108] Stanislaw Dziwisz, *A Life with Karol* , Trans. Adrian J. Walker (New York, NY: Doubleday, 2008), 117.

Abortion, divorce and contraception were common in the region under communism.[109] He

envisioned a free Poland as "The Christ of Nations", which could be the Savior of the continent.

With a Polish Pontiff and a large Catholic population, the Church took an active role in the

creation of the modern Polish state. Catholic bishops had concrete demands for Poland's new

constitution. The demands helped dictate rights and freedoms in the new Poland. The church

sought a reference to God, subjugation to God by the state, a ban on abortion and Gay marriage

and no separation of Church and State.[110] Most of these theological aspirations for the new state

of Poland were fulfilled. Chapter 1, Article 18 defines marriage as the union of a man and a

woman and Chapter 2, Article 38 commits the new state of Poland to the protection "of every

human life".[111] The Polish Constitution also set religious holidays as federal holidays,

guaranteed religious instruction in school, and made Catholic charities equivalent to its public

counterparts in later articles.[112] The rendered Polish Constitution created a Catholic democracy.

Pope John Paul IIs personal involvement in Poland and his religious awakening during

Vatican II played a defining role in shaping post-communist democracy in Poland.[113] The two

major points from Vatican II found in modern Polish democracy were tolerance and the

supremacy of the Catholic Church. Several of the Vatican II texts advocate religious and racial

tolerance is mentioned in. *The Decree on Ecumenism, Unitatis Redintegratio* mentions the

protestant denominations and the Orthodox Church. The manuscript calls for a unity among the

followers of Christ. Another passage goes even further. It states, "The Church reproves, as

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[109] Sabrina Ramet, "Religious Organization in Post-Communist Central and Southeastern Europe: An Introduction," in *Religion and Politics in Post-Socialist Central and Southeastern Europe,* ed. Sabrina Ramet (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2014), 4-5.
[110] Byrnes, *Transnational Catholicism in Postcommunist Europe*, 36-7.
[111] *The Constitution of the Republic of Poland of 2nd April, 1997*, http://www.sejm.gov.pl/prawo/konst/angielski/kon1.htm. Accessed January 12, 2016.
[112] Byrnes, *Transnational Catholicism in Postcommunist Europe*, 39.
[113] Dziwisz, *A Life with Karol* , 117.

foreign to the mind of Christ, any discrimination against men or harassment of them because of their race, color, condition of life, or religion"[114] This idea of tolerance is present in the modern Polish Constitution.

Vatican II's produced texts call for unity among Christians and tolerance, but also sets the Holy See above other practiced, Christian religions. It refers to them as "deficient in some respects." Another passage declares, "For it is only through Christ's Catholic Church, which is `the all-embracing means of salvation,' that they can benefit fully from the means of salvation."[115] Furthermore, to aid in the spread of the Catholic message the *Declaration on Christian Education, The Gravissimum Educationis* calls for Catholic instruction in schools.[116] The Polish Constitution provides and funds Catholic teachings and Catholic schools. The Vatican II documents also mentions a regulated press. It acknowledges the great power of media, television radio, ad film, but warns of its misuse. The document advocates using it to serve "the cultural and moral betterment of audiences".[117]

Poland is a Catholic democracy, but there are limits on personal rights. Polish democracy is best described as *semi-liberal*. Many question the true worth of written Catholic teachings in

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[114] Pope Paul VI, "Declaration on the Relation to Non-Christian Religions, Nostra Aetate," The Second Vatican Council, October 28, 1965, http://www.vatican.va/archive/hist_councils/ii_vatican_council/documents/vat-ii_decl_19651028_nostra-aetate_en.html. Accessed February 23, 2016; Pope Paul VI, "Declaration on Religious Freedom, Dignitatus Humanae," The Second Vatican Council, December 7, 1965, http://www.vatican.va/archive/hist_councils/ii_vatican_council/documents/vat-ii_decl_19651207_dignitatis-humanae_en.html. Accessed February 23, 2016.

[115] Pope Paul VI, "Decree on Ecumenism, Unitatis Redintegratio," The Second Vatican Council, http://www.vatican.va/archive/hist_councils/ii_vatican_council/documents/vat-ii_decl_19651207_dignitatis-humanae_en.html. Accessed February 23, 2016.

[116] Pope Paul VI, "Declaration on Christian Education, Gravissium Educationis," The Second Vatican Council, October 28, 1965. http://www.vatican.va/archive/hist_councils/ii_vatican_council/documents/vat-ii_decl_19651028_gravissimum-educationis_en.html. Accessed February 23,2016.

[117] Pope Paul VI, "Decree on the Media of Social Communications, Inter Mirifica," The Second Vatican Council, December 3, 1963, http://www.vatican.va/archive/hist_councils/ii_vatican_council/documents/vat-ii_decree_19631204_inter-mirifica_en.html. Accessed February 23, 2016

Poland today.[118] Some allege that homophobia is passively supported by the Church. The Church

opposes gay marriage[119] and abortion. Abortion remains a very partisan issue that divides the

country.[120] Many are unhappy with Church leaders after it was revealed that some Church

leaders collaborated with the communists during the Cold War. Others are upset and

disillusioned by sex abuse scandals involving clergy.[121] Many Poles wish the church would stay

out of politics.[122] They question the Church's motives. [123] The Church's top concern is

preserving its prominent role in everyday life.[124] Bishops in modern Poland are comparable to

lobbyists in the American political system.[125] Religion and politics and the interests of the state

and the Catholic Church intersect and overlap.

Real ethnic equality in Poland is understandably challenging. The country makes

admirable attempts to provide rights and freedoms for minorities despite being one of the more

ethnically and religiously homogenous countries in the world. The Polish Constitution provides

for the toleration and pluralism examined by Vlas and Ghergina. The Polish Constitution seeks

to establish a welcoming, even religiously diverse, liberal society. Article 13, Chapter 1 of the

Polish Constitution forbids national or racial hatred. Article 35, Chapter 2 protects minority

rights. There a substantial federal laws seeking to implement these core constitutional

prerogatives. However, there are still gaps in enforcement, opportunities to achieve true ethnic

equality and other areas where Polish law falls short.

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[118] Byrnes, *Transnational Catholicism in Postcommunist Europe* , 34.

[119] Ramet, "Religious Organization in Post-Communist Central and Southeastern Europe: An Introduction,", 6.

[120] Byrnes, *Transnational Catholicism in Postcommunist Europe* , 46-47.

[121] Sabrina Ramet, "The Catholic Church in Post-Communist Poland: Polarization, Privatization and Decline in Influence," in *Religion and Politics in Post-Socialist Central and Southeastern Europe,* ed. Sabrina Ramet (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2014), 25 .

[122] Ibid., 28.

[123] Byrnes, *Transnational Catholicism in Postcommunist Europe* , 34.

[124] Ibid., 36,

[125] Ibid., 49.

Poland has an extensive criminal code dealing with hate crimes. Crimes based on race, creed, color and national origin have risen the past few years and the government reacted. Imposed reforms have improved the legal responses to hate crimes.[126] The government formed special police forces with human rights officers known as Human Rights Protection Teams. The Prosecutor General now has prosecutors who specialize in hate crimes.[127] More importantly, in the past many hate crimes were not prosecuted and were classified as a "minor social harm". Polish prosecutors discontinued the practice.[128] Unfortunately, these advances in combating racial and xenophobic crime accompany a complete absence of protections for member of the LGBT community.[129] An Amnesty International report from 2015 states that the police and prosecutors are not even obligated to investigate homophobia or transphobia as a motive.[130] Much of this can be attributed to widespread Catholic beliefs.

Employment rights and protections in Poland are more effective. Despite a lack of protections for some against hate crimes, most groups including the LGBT community enjoy employment equality. There are very strict economic rights and freedoms set forth in the Polish Constitution (Articles 64-69, Chapter Two). This includes minimum wage, working conditions, holidays and the provision of social security. True wage equality remains an issue.

Many studies illustrate that gender equality in the workplace illustrate that gender equality, especially in wages, remains an opportunity in Poland. Only 45% of women believe

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[126] Amnesty International, "Targeted by Hate, Forgotten By Law: Lack of a Coherent Response to Hate Crimes in Poland," 2015, 14. http://www.amnestyusa.org/pdfs/PolandHateCrimes2015.pdf. Accessed March 2, 2016.
[127] Ibid., 19-20.
[128] Ibid., 24.
[129] Ibid., 31.
[130] Ibid., 33.

enough is being done to fight workplace discrimination.[131] In 2014, the World Economic Forum (WEF) placed Poland ranked 75th out of 145 countries in economic participation and opportunity for women. This sets them in the top half. Part of this assessment is a wage survey. The survey cited a higher than actual level of disparity between men and women working at the same job. Additionally, over eight years of the study, Poland has shown small improvements on the WEF's scale. [132] While better than average, Poland still has opportunities to improve workplace rights for women. They sit at the lower half of countries in the world and lag behind other countries in central and eastern Europe.

Here again, equality for women contrasts more accepted traditional roles for genders in a predominantly Catholic country. A recent European Union report gender inequality cites lower than needed childcare subsidies, gender stereotypes and "a conservative view of the family" as roots of gender disparity. The government has various programs to try and expand roles for women in education and the workplace. The Church launched campaigns to oppose "gender ideology" behind these initiatives. The report cites young Poles and their interaction with other non-Poles they interact with and meet as a positive factor in the results..[133]

Many of these non-Poles, more specifically, non-Polish speakers play a prominent role in the definition of Polish democracy. Traditional Polish ideals of identity clash with the new realities of globalization and free trade. Despite ethnic and religious homogeneity, modern Poland embraces multilingualism. The Constitution declares that Polish is the official language.

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[131] Magdalena Grabowska, "Gender equality in Poland after EU accession. Expectations and reality," Heinrich Böll Stiftung, July 22, 2014. https://pl.boell.org/en/2014/07/22/gender-equality-poland-after-eu-accession-expectations-and-reality. Accessed March 3, 2016.

[132] World Economic Forum, "Global Gender Gap Report 2015," http://reports.weforum.org/global-gender-gap-report-2015/economies/#economy=POL . Accessed March 3, 2016.

[133] European Parliament, "The Policy on Gender Equality in Poland – Update 2015," 25-27. http://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/IDAN/2015/510023/IPOL_IDA(2015)510023_EN.pdf. Accessed March 3, 2016.

It also provides for language rights for non-Polish speakers (Chapter 1, Article 27). Poland is

also a signatory to the European Charter for Regional or Minority Languages. Fourteen different

languages are covered. Poland invests money in using some of these languages on TV, radio and

educational materials. [134] Foreign language proves to be a restrictive element in the lives of many

in Poland.

A recent report cites language as a major barrier to integration and the success of many

foreigners in Poland.[135] This affects the integration of the Roma minority, especially children. A

failure to learn basic Polish impedes their academic progress in the class room drives high

dropout rates and causes ostracism by Polish students. The end result is continued poverty and

poor social development. These affects are compounded for Roma children with special needs.[136]

Another report cites the obstacles for other minority groups.

> Poles are not used to cultural, religious or linguistic diversity.
> There is a very strong reluctance among the majority of Polish
> society towards accepting refugees, especially Muslims. Muslims
> are often perceived as a threat to Polish culture and heritage. However,
> 3,000 Muslim Chechens live currently in Poland with causing any public
> outcry. This negative attitude, based on fear of the unknown, is alarmingly high
> among young people.[137]

The cited situation of Muslim Chechens and the large number of Lithuanian workers[138] points to

both, an ethnic and linguistic dynamic. Geography and an East-West dynamic account for the

different reactions by Poles to these noted groups.

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[134] The Council of Europe, *The European Charter for Regional or Minority Languages.*
https://www.coe.int/t/dg4/education/minlang/default_en.asp. Accessed January 20, 2016.
[135] European Economic and Social Committee, "Mission Report – Poland," January 18-19, 2016, 1.
http://www.eesc.europa.eu/resources/docs/poland_migration-mission-report_en.pdf. Accessed March 15, 2016.
[136] European Commission, "Programme for the Integration of the Roma Community in Poland for the Period 2014-2020," 2014, 15-16. http://ec.europa.eu/justice/discrimination/files/roma_poland_strategy2_en.pdf. Acessed March 10, 2016.
[137] European Economic and Social Committee, "Mission Report – Poland," 2.

Geography

Geography plays a unique role in shaping Polish democracy after communism. Their location provides for this in three different ways. Poland leans west towards the EU in the East-West paradigm. They opt for a society and laws favoring the individual freedoms denied to them historically endorsed by modern Catholic teachings. Poland lies safely out of reach for Vladimir Putin and Russian political interests. Poland is surrounded by some strong democracies, but also other neighboring countries rules by illiberal democratic regimes or despots. These three factors help mold the nature of Polish democracy.

This westward influence created a more liberal democracy in Poland. Much of the rights and freedoms included in the Polish constitution are found in the constitutions in the constitutions of Western Europe: press, religion, assembly and association. It guided the evolution of the political system, as communism and fascism were banned. The communist parties slowly faded as former communists retired and more liberal socialists took their place to counterweigh liberal democrats on the domestic political scene. Due in large part to their westward predilection in the paradigm, Poland's political structure and landscape now resembles that of France, Germany and other European powers.

Accession to the European Union accounts for some of this Europeanization The negotiations for Poland's accession resulted in a more liberal democracy. These negotiations were no small task. They involved the Sejm and Polish government accepting as much as 100,000 pages of legislation and this was the easy part. Implementation and the changes of

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[138] Ibid., 1.

Polish law to align with EU Directives was more challenging and follow.[139]Unrealistic

expectations compounded the difficulty. A majority of Poles believed that joining the EU would

mean access to Western wealth without changing or concessions. With many changes unpopular,

the EU's image was somewhat sullied. Thus, it became the target of many political groups

including specifically eurosceptic parties.[140]

The alterations to Polish government affected every aspect of Polish life. There were

numerous improvements to worker's rights. Employment contracts, mandated time off for

workers and parental leave regulations all changed. The EU directives also mandated changes to

youth employment laws.[141] Joining the European Union meant changing immigration and

refugee laws. These laws changed incorporated the EU directive on temporary protection for

refugees. This resulted in more affirmative decisions on refugee applications.[142] A large change

to the grand scheme of Polish government was accepting the supremacy of some EU regulations.

EU membership obligates Polish courts to interpret laws in accordance with EC law and the

European Courts of Justice. In the event of a conflict with established Polish law, jurors are to

use the EU law.[143]

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[139] Bartłomiej Nowak,"Implementation of Directives into Domestic Legal System. The Case of Poland," *Yearbook of Polish European Studies 9,* (2005): 68. http://www.ce.uw.edu.pl/pliki/pw/y9-2005_Nowak.pdf. Accessed January 12, 2017.

[140] Ania Krok-Paszkowska and Jan Zielonka, "Poland's Road to the European Union," *Journal of European Integration History 10*, no. 2 (2004): 13-14.

[141] Simone Leiber, "Implementation of EU Social Policy in Poland: Is there a Different `Eastern World of Compliance,?" (paper presented at Ninth Biennial International Conference of the European Studies Association (EUSA), Austin, Texas, March 31-April 2, 2005). http://aei.pitt.edu/3173/1/LeiberComplianceInPoland_EUSA2.pdf. Accessed January 11, 2017.

[142] Peter Vermeersch, "EU enlargement and immigration policy in Poland and Slovakia," *Communist and Post-Communist Studies 28*, (2005): 81. https://lirias.kuleuven.be/bitstream/123456789/81945/1/Article%2BCPCS%2BVol%2B38%2Bno%2B1_Peter%2BVermeersch.pdf. Accessed January 11, 2017.

[143] Nowak,"Implementation of Directives into Domestic Legal System. The Case of Poland," 86.

The Polish ambition for self-rule and their strong ties to Roman Catholicism led them to look west in the context of the East-West Paradigm. The impetus behind this lay within the core concepts of "Western democracy". One of the primary pillars of this democracy is a belief in the role of the individual. This is shared in *Dignitatis Humanae* produced by Vatican II. Poles see themselves as being caught in the middle, serving as a crossroads between east and west. The Polish situation remained unchanged for centuries: fighting off Mongol attacks, conquered by Germany, divided by larger powers and dominated by the Soviets. This created an aspirational environment for Polish self-determination and democracy. In this regard, some see Poland as "the Christ of Nations". It was repeatedly crucified by partition and occupation and will return as the Savior of the continent. Poland is an "essential foundation of Europe's true authentic unity." [144] This differs from the role of the political submissive many nations play in the states east of Poland.

Poland's democracy is further aided by its safe proximity to Russia. Over the last decade, Putin's regime sought regional hegemony over some of its former satellites. Poland's location prevents Russian military adventurism and large Russian minorities from easily entering the country. There are few Russian speakers and few ethnic Russians.[145] Polish is Catholic, where Russia is Eastern Orthodox. The Polish population has no segment or group that is pro-Russian. Therefore, Russia has little political influence in the country. The speedy expansion of NATO and enlargement of the European Union aided in buttressing any attempts by Russia in exert political influence in the country. This is reinforced today by sharing borders with Germany,

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[144] Thomas A. Byrnes, *Transnational Catholicism in Postcommunist Europe* (Oxford, UK: Rowman and Littlefield Publishers, Inc., 2001), 34-5.
[145] CIA World Factbook, *Poland*.

Lithuania, the Czech Republic, and Slovakia. Each state is a democracy free of any worrisome

Russian influence.

The resulting effects of Poland's safe distance from Russia increase the quality of

democracy in Poland in an especially regional manner. These effects allow there to be a unified

voice against Putinist Russia. This is important in two ways. First, there are no large pro-Western

and pro-Russian groups that clash. This can result in oppression of one group at the hands of the

other. Clashes such as these come in the form of oppressive governments that seek to silence or

dissolve opposition to their policies, either pro-Western or pro-Russian. This was all seen in the

Ukraine. Second, it leaves Poland to embrace most of the pro-Western, liberal democratic ideals

of the European Union.

The final role that Poland's geography plays in its quality of democratic rights and

freedoms is in political contagion. During the Cold War and early in the post-communist period

this was related to the spread of liberal democratic ideals viewed positively by most people. The

more recent wave of irregular, eurosceptic parties has changed the bright view of the

phenomenon of political movements spreading internationally. Poles see successful democracies

to the north, little democracy and Russian invasion to the east and backsliding to the south. Thus,

the trajectory of most Polish governments has been clearly towards the liberal democracies of the

West. This is punctuated by the military cooperation with the U.S.[146] The new Law and Justice

Government's perceived moves against some of the most basic individual rights and freedoms

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[146] Matthew Holehouse, "US confirms it will place 250 tanks in eastern Europe to counter Russian threat," *The Telegraph*, June 23, 2015, http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/europe/11693497/US-confirms-it-will-place-250-tanks-in-eastern-Europe-to-counter-Russian-threat.html. Accessed January 2, 2016; Associated Press, reposted by The Guardian, "Poland considering asking for access to nuclear weapons under Nato program," December, 6, 2015, http://www.theguardian.com/world/2015/dec/06/poland-considering-asking-for-access-to-nuclear-weapons-under-nato-program. Accessed January 2, 2016.

sparked protests in several Polish cities. Some Poles worry that their new leader will emulate Hungary's Orbán.[147] They fear the spread of illiberal democracy into their Polish, liberal democratic state.

The effect of Poland's location on a globe helps mold the true nature of rights and freedoms in their country. Their quality of democracy is increased by their lean to the west in the East-West Paradigm. Poland enjoys a higher quality of democracy because of their safe distance from Putin's Russia. However, Poland occupies a place in an increasingly dangerous neighborhood. A new government similar to neighboring Hungary took post in 2015. The regime attempted to rebalance the Constitutional Court, implement domestic surveillance and limit the established press freedoms. Geography matters to Polish democracy.

Conclusion

The history, culture and geography of Poland play an operative role in the strength and quality of their semi-liberal, Catholic democracy. Though they may be under threat, Poland offers many liberal rights and freedoms. This is an achievement for a country that is decades younger than its Western counterparts and formerly communist. Their history of oppression and victimhood created a nation of people seeking a state. This state is distinctly Roman Catholic. These two reasons led the country to adopt the framework and foundational rights of modern, Western, liberal democracy. Poles have, so far, shied away from their former Soviet masters, who they have little in common with. Despite the decision to look west, embrace NATO and embrace the EU, Polish democracy is not perfect.

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[147] Deutsche Welle, "Polish protesters decry new surveillance law," *DW*, January 23, 2016. http://www.dw.com/en/polish-protesters-decry-new-surveillance-law/a-19000735. Accessed January 26, 2016.

Their Catholicism is their democracy's foundation and their spiritual strength. The religious basis for much of their democracy, their freedoms and their rights also serves as a limiting factor. Large groups are denied basic rights in the name of Catholic teachings. Many crimes are not investigated for the same. Poland's ethnic homogeneity serves as a divisive point for many Poles as well. Ironically, this seems specific to non-Europeans, but not just Muslims. Poland and its Catholicism evolved into the basic European nation-state.

Polish democracy's future looks bleak under the leadership of Duda and the Law and Justice Party. In terms of political rights and freedoms, the barbarians are at the gate. While much of the power grab of 2016 is contingent on a threat to national security or national interests, the act itself is astounding. A country that seemed to be a model for democracy in the making; a state that produced the President of the European Council now offers many basic rights conditionally. Many Poles rose up to oppose the Law and Justice agenda in 2016. They took to the streets in protest and formed groups reminiscent of the Solidarity movement. This and further pressure from the European Union and other international players might be the only hope to stave off the wave of authoritarianism some see sweeping through the region.

HUNGARY

History plays a large part in the quality of modern Hungarian politics. From the end of communism to present day, its role dwarfs that of economics, culture or geography. It was the impetus behind the evolution of Orbán's illiberal democracy. It is not enough to say that Hungarians have a long collective memory. They have a strong *memory culture*[1] in Hungary. Hungary enjoyed one short period of true democracy before 1989. Before this, the Hungarian people lived under various undemocratic systems, sometimes quite contently. It is as if electoral authoritarianism suits them. There are other more specific historical antecedents. Anti-Semitism, Antiziganism, and other forms of xenophobia exist in many countries of the region. However, few places see these narratives as institutionalized as Hungary. For their part, political parties and politicians use religion and language to reinforce pre-existing historical mantras.

The Orbán government fostered Hungary's decent into illiberalism. It passively deals with crimes and rights violations against certain minority groups, if at all. The administration used the *New Fundamental Law of Hungary* passed in 2012 to consolidate Fidesz power. The document offers a wide variety of rights, but also implemented supermajority voting practices. Furthermore, the provided rights are difficult to enforce. Orbán took steps to eliminate true judicial review of the government and restrain the press. These moves by the Fidesz government drew widespread condemnation. Hungarian democracy under Orbán is clearly illiberal, something he openly embraces.

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[1] Bazinger, "The Funeral of Imre Nagy," 143.

Democracy

Hungarian democracy is maintained by a constitution, *The Fundamental Law*. The current Fidesz government led by Viktor Orbán wrote and passed new constitution into effect on January 1, 2012. This is the first post-communist constitution in Hungary. Before this, Hungary was governed by the amended communist constitution passed in 1949.[2] *The Fundamental Law of Hungary* sketches an image of a relatively liberal, modern democracy. There are some interesting aspects to the document specific to Hungary. The "Preamble" speaks of a "Christian Europe", while at the same time commits to promoting both Hungarian and minority languages. It also mentions supporting a Hungarian diaspora. *The Fundamental Law* provides the basic rights afforded most people in most western democracies: voting, property, religion, speech and association. It also establishes equal rights, specifically gender equality, bars child labor and establishes working conditions, social security and guarantees universal education.

The document addresses popular constitutional issues from the late 19th and early 20th, as well as the 21st centuries. There are articles obviously based on religious tenants despite also establishing a separation of church and state. Article L of the "Foundation" defines marriage as that of a man and a woman. Article II of the "Freedom and Responsibility" section insures for the protection of the unborn. The document addresses more contemporary issues, as well. Article III of "Freedom and Responsibility*"* prohibits human trafficking, a large problem in the region. This article also bans human cloning. Article VI establishes a protection of personal information. The constitution creates limits and restrictions on spending and sovereign debt in Article 36 of "The State". It places limits on budgets versus gross domestic product and

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[2] Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Hungary, *Announcement of the New Fundamental Law of Hungary.* http://www.europarl.europa.eu/document/activities/cont/201202/20120207ATT37498/20120207ATT37498EN.pdf. Accessed March 3, 2016.

addresses debt reduction measures. Article 37 limits international bailout terms. The document attempts to preserve basic 19th century religious beliefs while providing 21stcentury rights.

Links to Hungary's past are further reinforced by Article U of the "Preamble". It is a lengthy entry that names the Hungarian Socialist Worker's Party as a criminal organization. It lists the various crimes of the former communist party, including submitting to foreign interests and betraying a country. Furthermore it seeks to establish an investigative body to uncover the crimes committed during the Soviet communist period. Many different states undergo reconciliation following authoritarian regimes, but this as different tone. It leaves the statute of limitations on communist era crimes open ended. The passages have a strong aroma of score-settling.

The Constitution establishes a three branch government. The power is concentrated in the legislature known as the National Assembly. The Assembly is the basis for Hungarian democracy. It is the only regular instance of voting in the Hungarian political system. The members of the National Assembly choose a President and Prime Minister. The President must be 35 years old and can only serve two 5 year terms. The President deals in domestic matters and serves as the Chief of the Hungarian Armed Forces. Most importantly, the President nominates a Prime Minister. The Prime Minister nominated by the President and elected by the members of the National Assembly serves as Head of State for the Republic of Hungary.

Figure 12. Democratic Criteria of Hungary

Field of Assessment	Criteria
Right to form and join political parties and interest groups.	*Freedom and Responsibility*, Article VIII
Freedom of Speech and Expression	*Freedom and Responsibility*, Article IX
Right to Vote	*Freedom and Responsibility*, Article XXXIII
Eligibility for Public Office	18 years old*
Right of political leaders to compete for support/votes	*Freedom and Responsibility*, Article IX
Alternative sources of information	*Freedom and Responsibility*, Article IX
Free and fair elections	*The State*, Article I
Institutions for making government policies depend on votes and other expressions of preference	*The State*, Article 8 (Referendums) *The State*, Article 5
Political participation in the European Union	29% versus 42.5% Member State Average in 2014 EP Elections
General Economic Conditions over Time	GDP Growth:+10.23 points in five years, but trailing pre-crisis figures GINI: +3.3 points in the last 12 years

*Not included in the Fundamental Law[3]

The Hungarian election system is "one of the most complex in Europe".[4] There are

single-member constituency lists and national lists. The single member-constituency lists are for

specific locations: town, village and city. The national lists are published by voting blocs:

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[3] Euronews, *How Do Hungary's Elections Work*, March 25, 2014. http://www.euronews.com/2014/03/25/how-do-hungary-s-elections-work/. Accessed April 10, 2016.
[4] The Hungarian Parliament, *The Hungarian National Assembly*. http://www.parlament.hu/fotitkar/angol/general_info.htm. Accessed March 27, 2016.

primarily political parties or minority groups. Hungarians vote for one of each. Single-member

constituency candidates win by securing the most votes. These officials account for 106 seats.

The other 93 seats are disbursed proportionately based on the national list votes and "fragment

votes" (candidates that earned votes but lost their single-member constituency seats). There is

also a 5% threshold. No party can seat a representative unless it is met.[5]

The constitution provides for a judicial branch of government to provide for judicial

review. This branch is led by a fifteen member Constitutional Court. Again, the National

Assembly elects members to the Court. There are two other bodies that attempt to insure

constitutionality of laws: the Curia and the National Office of the Judiciary. The head of these

national offices are, again, elected by the National Assembly. The President of the Republic

appoints lower level judges. *The Fundamental Law* also states that the National Assembly elects

Prosecutors and a Commissioner for Fundamental Rights. This Commissioner's primary task is

protecting the rights of "nationalities living in Hungary."[6]

Hungary's constitution maps out a liberal democracy. However, the quality of democracy

in Hungary has come under widespread criticism in recent years. First, many legal scholars,

international organizations and constitutional specialists object to the fashion the new

constitution was passed into law and the democracy it yields. Many warned of the development

of an autocratic regime and a "simulated democracy" in Hungary.[7] Second, human rights groups

have long scolded Budapest for the treatment and policies towards minorities, namely the Roma.

This group is not alone. Anti-Semitism has reemerged as well. Finally, the domestic policies of

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[5] Euronews, *How Do Hungary's Elections Work*, March 25, 2014.
[6] *The Fundamental Law of the Republic of Hungary*.
http://www.kormany.hu/download/e/02/00000/The%20New%20Fundamental%20Law%20of%20Hungary.pdf
. Accessed March 3, 2016.
[7] György Lengyel and Gabriella Ilonszki, "Simulated democracy and Pseudo-Transformational Leadership in
Hungary," *Historical Social Research 37*, no. 1 (2012): 108.

the government in Budapest raised eyebrows of other EU member states and the European

Union.

Democratic scholars point out structural and procedural issues with the new *Fundamental

Law* emerged. First, the government made the constitution the law of Hungary using heavy

handed tactics. Many view the passage of the new *Fundamental Law* as an abridgement of liberal

democracy. Amnesty International, Human Rights Watch and the Vienna Conference (the

Council of Europe's constitutional advisory body) characterize the way the new constitution

passed into law as "rammed through".[8] Most opposition parties boycotted the vote. Second,

important parts of the constitution unfairly favor the Fidesz government in power. Certain

provisions of the new constitution and Orbán's tactics strip much of the democracy from

government in Hungary.

The current system lacks the limitations on government of Alvarez's minimalist view of

democracy or the checks and balances of Hasselmann's competing maximalist approach.[9] EU

leaders in Brussels are concerned over Fidesz's supermajority tactic used to steamroll opposition

in the National Assembly.[10] A "qualified majority" or a "two thirds" vote is needed in over

twenty instances. The constitution requires a supermajority to do much of anything. Others

allude to the changes to the Constitutional Court. The government enlarged the court and

"packed" it, placing members politically aligned with the current administration. With the new

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[8] Paul Taylor, "Confronting `illiberal democracy,' in Central Europe," *New York Times*, June 8, 2015.
http://www.nytimes.com/2015/06/09/business/international/central-europe-confronts-illiberal-
democracy.html?_r=0. Accessed March 3, 2016; Wendy Zeldin, "Hungary: New Constitution Signed into Law,"
Global Legal Monitor, April 29, 2011. http://www.loc.gov/law/foreign-news/article/hungary-new-constitution-
signed-into-law/. Accessed April 3, 2016.
[9] Hasselmann, *Policy Reform and the Development of Democracy in Eastern Europe*, 25; Alvarez, et al, "Classifying
Political Regimes," 4.
[10] Zoltan Simon, "Orbán Scraps Sunday Shopping Ban to Avoid Hungary Ballot Defeat," *Bloomberg*, April 11, 2016.
http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2016-04-11/Orbán-scraps-sunday-shopping-ban-to-avoid-hungary-
ballot-defeat. Accessed April 14,2016.

constitution, the court has little authority over fiscal matters of budget or spending. The court now has far less power in reviewing laws passed by the Fidesz controlled National Assembly.[11]

Many view the plight of the Roma minority as the largest deficiency in Hungarian democracy. The Roma represent the largest minority in Hungary. They experience widespread systematic discrimination in education, employment and housing. Many even refuse to self-identify in fear of reprisal, violence or discrimination.[12] 70-80% of the Roma in Hungary live below the Poverty Line. Segregation, discrimination and a lack of equal opportunities in most facets of life are hallmarks of the modern Roma experience in Hungary. 60% of Hungarians claim that the Roma are genetically pre-disposed to crime. Racial profiling and unwarranted violence by the police is also a concern.[13]

The Roma are easy scapegoats for right-wing politicians and targets for paramilitary groups. Fidesz came to power and the ever more far-right Jobbik party emerged with substantial support in the Hungarian Parliamentary elections in 2010.[14] Jobbik (the Movement for a Better Hungary) rails against "Gypsy crime" and is led by Gabor Vona, who also founded Magyar Garda. Magyar Garda serves as the foot soldiers of a violent far-right wing front that developed. They wear traditional "folk dancing dress". Their symbol is an ancient Hungarian crest that was

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[11] Euractiv, *New constitution cements Hungarian ruling party's powers.* April 19, 2011. https://www.euractiv.com/section/central-europe/news/new-constitution-cements-hungarian-ruling-party-s-powers/. Accessed April 3, 2016; Kim Lane Scheppele, "Hungary's Constitutional Revolution," *The New York Times*, December 19, 2011. http://krugman.blogs.nytimes.com/2011/12/19/hungarys-constitutional-revolution/?_r=0. Accessed April 3, 2016.

[12] Jennifer Leaning et al, *Accelerating Patterns of Anti-Roma Violence in Hungary*, February 2014, 13-14. https://cdn2.sph.harvard.edu/wp-content/uploads/sites/5/2014/02/FXB-Hungary-Report_Released-February-3-2014.pdf. Accessed July 10, 2016.

[13] Ibid., 15-16.

[14] Dan Bilefsky, "Hungarian Right, Center and Far, Make Gains," *The New York Times*, April 11, 2010. http://www.nytimes.com/2010/04/12/world/europe/12hungary.html?_r=0. Accessed March 31, 2016.

first revitalized by the fascist Arrow Cross regime in the 1940s.[15] There have been numerous

crimes perpetrated by Magyar Garda members against Roma in Hungary.[16] These occurred

despite a national ban on the group.

Members of Jobbik and Magyar Garda are not only anti-Ziganist but anti-Semitic, as

well. In 2012, Jobbik parliament member Márton Gyöngyösi suggested that all Hungarian Jews

be cataloged because they were a security threat.[17] In 2012, three Holocaust monuments were

vandalized. Other aligned groups have contributed to the anti-Semitism in Hungary, as well. The

leader of the Outlaws Army stated that Adolf Hitler was not yet appreciated, but his time would

come. Another group, Pax Hungarica, made a statement commemorating Hitler's birthday.[18]

Despite outcries from advocacy groups, international organizations and non-government

organizations, little is done about anti-Ziganism or anti-Semitism.

The steps the Orbán administration took were largely cosmetic and did little to relieve the

suffering or end the hate. Fidesz does not condemn Jobbik.[19] Orbán's government does nothing

about their rhetoric.[20] A local Budapest court banned Magyar Garda in December 2008.[21]

Despite the ban, a Jobbik member of the European Parliament wore his Magyar Garda uniform

[15] Siobhán Dowling, "The Right Wing and the Roma: EU Presidency a Test for Tolerance in Hungary," *Spiegel Online, December* 21, 2010. http://www.spiegel.de/international/europe/the-right-wing-and-the-roma-eu-presidency-a-test-for-tolerance-in-hungary-a-737283-4.html. Accessed April 3, 2016.

[16] Leaning et al, *Accelerating Patterns of Anti-Roma Violence in Hungary,* 40.

[17] The Economist,"Márton's List," November 28. 2012. http://www.economist.com/blogs/easternapproaches/2012/11/anti-semitism-hungary. Accessed March 3, 2016.

[18] Leaning et al, *Accelerating Patterns of Anti-Roma Violence in Hungary*, 20-21.

[19] Siobhán Dowling, "The World from Berlin: Neo-Facist Magya Garda in `Hungary's Shame'," Spiegel Online, August 27, 2007. http://www.spiegel.de/international/germany/the-world-from-berlin-neo-fascist-magyar-garda-is-hungary-s-shame-a-502184.html. Accessed April 2, 2016.

[20]Jens Becker, "The rise of the right-wing populism in Hungary," *SEER: Journal for Labour and Social Affairs in Eastern Europe 13*, no. 1 (2010): 35.

[21] Euronews, "ECHR upholds ban on Hungarian far-right group," July 9, 2013. http://www.euronews.com/2013/07/09/banning-hungarian-far-right-group-was-legal-says-echr/. Accessed April 2, 2016.

to the European Parliament.[22] While many fault Orbán for the rise of anti-Semitism and anti-Roma feelings, others point to a larger issue. Henriett Dinok said, "It has become a standard practice for many politicians to use the `Roma issue' as a vote-winning strategy in elections."[23] Unfortunately, Dinok is right. Despite the visceral message and the negative implications, Fidesz and the right wing won by large margins in the last two Hungarian elections. Fidesz, its conservative partner the Christian Democratic People's Party and Jobbik combined for over 69% of the electorate in 2010 and 65% in 2014.[24]

The de facto conditions in Hungary are far different from what would be expected from the written law. The new *Fundamental Law of Hungary* outlines countless rights. It loosely mirrors the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. Many sections of the new constitution address very specific groups: women, religious minorities, ethnic minorities and non-Hungarian-speaking citizens. The failure of the government, either orchestrated or unintentional, to enforce their own constitution supports negative contentions about democracy in Hungary. The conditions in Hungary lend themselves to Diamond's definition of a hybrid regime: democracy without what are considered basic rights. A failure to preserve and secure basic rights is not the only problem with the quality of modern Hungarian democracy. Orbán's other political tactics and changes support the allegation that Hungarian democracy might be dead.

Another problem for democracy in Hungary is freedom of the press. Throughout 2013 and 2014 the government in Hungary has been lambasted by observers, analysts and members of the press. Even the head of the European Commission, Jean-Claude Junker, greeted Orbán by

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[22] Amnesty International, *Hungarian Human Rights.* http://www.amnestyusa.org/our-work/countries/europe/hungary. Accessed March 16, 2016.

[23] Henriett Dinok, letter to the OSCE-ODIHR Human Dimension Meeting 2015, October 9, 2015. http://www.osce.org/odihr/191221?download=true. Accessed April 3, 2016.

[24] Parties and Elections in Europe, *Hungary*, http://www.parties-and-elections.eu/hungary.html. Accessed April 3, 2016.

saying "hello, dictator" in Latvia in May 2015.[25] The government now has more control over the media, including a "Media Council" that can shut down outlets. The political leanings of the government body meant to enforce the personal information protections of the new constitution are being questioned.[26] The government is accused of exerting influence on private outlets to gain favorable coverage. Reporters are often brought up on charges for breach of good repute and hooliganism". Broadcast licenses are denied to stations critical of the Orbán government.[27] These steps against press freedom disqualify Hungary from being a democracy according to Dahl.[28]

The European Union and several of its courts have ruled that much of what Hungary is doing is wrong. The European Court for Human Rights ruled against new Hungarian surveillance laws and practices. They pointed out that the law contained no judicial oversight.[29] They criticize this, Orbán's cronyism and dispute the validity of his 2014 re-election. Some say the election was neither fair nor free.[30] Despite criticisms, Hungary has done very little to improve the quality of democracy.[31] They have instead, opposed the idea of EU sanctions against Poland and

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[25] Taylor, "Confronting `illiberal democracy,' in Central Europe."

[26] Freedom House, *Freedom of the Net 2015: Hungary*, https://freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-net/2015/hungary. Accessed April 10, 2016.

[27] Freedom House, *Freedom of the Press 2015: Hungary.* https://freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-press/2015/hungary. Accessed April 10, 2016.

[28] Dahl, *Polyarchy*, 1-2.

[29] EurActiv.com, "Hungary anti-terror spy law breaches privacy: European rights court," January 13, 2016. http://www.euractiv.com/section/justice-home-affairs/news/hungary-anti-terror-spy-law-breaches-privacy-european-rights-court/. Accessed April 3, 2016.

[30] Zoltan Simon, "Orbán Scraps Sunday Shopping Ban to Avoid Hungary Ballot Defeat."

[31] Wendy Zeldin, "Hungary: Constitutional Amendments Planned," *Global Legal Monitor*, September 10, 2013. http://www.loc.gov/law/foreign-news/article/hungary-constitutional-amendments-planned/. Accessed April 3, 2016.

the sanctions against Russia.[32] Rights advocates called for a full audit of Hungarian democracy under the Orbán regime or a suspension of their voting rights.[33]

An analysis of contemporary Hungarian democracy and the Hungarian democratic system yields a very unflattering assessment of their democratic quality. The current political situation in Hungary fails all three of the distinctions Alvarez and his fellow scholars earmark as a liberal democracy.[34] First, the government seems despotic. The Constitutional Court provides little limitation or legal constraint on the government. Orbán's government lowered the mandatory retirement age to replace judges with more Fidesz leaning jurists.[35] Second, the legal structure is hamstrung by a supermajority clause. This results in virtual one party rule. Third, election observers questioned the fairness and legitimacy of Orbán's 2014 re-election.

The Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) report on the Hungarian Elections of 2014 is very critical of the election process and question the fairness of the elections. The report stated that Fidesz enjoyed an "undue advantage" due to tight campaign regulations, a biased media and campaign activities that "blurred the separation between political party and the State". The report points out that much of this is the product of recent legislation passed by Fidesz. Political radio and TV ads were banned in the country. The ban was later found to be unconstitutional, but for the election of 2014 media access was limited. Fidesz took advantage of its role as the ruling party by creating government public service messages that

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[32] Deutsche Welle, "Hungary would block EU sanctions on Poland: Orbán," January 8, 2016. http://www.dw.com/en/hungary-would-block-eu-sanctions-on-poland-Orbán/a-18967254. Accessed April 3, 2016; BBC, "Hungary PM Orbán condemns EU sanctions on Russia," August 15, 2014. http://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-28801353. Accessed April 3, 2016.

[33] Paul Taylor, "Confrongting `illiberal democracy,' in Central Europe."

[34] Mike Alvarez, et al., "Classifying Political Regimes," *Studies in Comparative International Development 31*, no. 2 (Summer 1996): 4.

[35] Nicole Orttung, "Hungary's Slide Into Authoritarianism, and Europe's Toothless Response," *The Wilson Quarterly*, July 1, 2015. http://wilsonquarterly.com/stories/hungarys-slide-into-authoritarianism-and-europes-toothless-response/. Accessed June 1, 2016.

were virtually campaign ads. The report also highlighted recent changes that "removed checks and balances" from the current government. The changes reduced the number of members of the National Assembly from 386 to 199. Government officials redrew the voting districts and gerrymandered them to benefit Fidesz. The report concluded that the elections were not fair and advised the OSCE to push Budapest for reforms in their electoral law.[36]

There are clear fundamental differences between Budapest and Brussels. Many blame Orbán.[37] Most Hungarians take issue with how the government decides to negotiate with the Union, but not with the European Union itself.[38] The Hungarian turnout in European Parliamentary elections has fallen, but remains higher than the rest of the region.Hungary's approval of the European Union is in line with the rest of the member states. According to the Standard Eurobarometer 84, pollsters offered Hungarians three choices to classify their general outlook of the Union as "positive", "negative" or "neutral". The percentages of the Hungarian responses were within two to three points of the respondents from other countries.

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[36] OSCE, *Hungary Parliamentary Elections, 6 April 2014, OSCE/ODIHR Limited Election Observation Mission Final Report*, 2014. http://www.osce.org/odihr/elections/hungary/121098?download=true. Accessed June 1, 2016.
[37] Andrew MacDowall, "Illiberal Democracy: How Hungary's Orbán is Testing Europe," *World Politics Review*, December 18, 2014.
[38] Søren Riishøj, "Europeanisation and Euro-scepticism," *Central European Political Studies Review*, Autumn 2004. http://www.cepsr.com/clanek.php?ID=211. Accessed April 10, 2016.

Figure 13. Voter Turnout in EU Elections: Hungary, EU and Central and Eastern Europe

Like most other member states, around 40% of Europeans hold a positive outlook, another 40% have a neutral view and 20% disapprove of the Union.[40] This is within five points of the numbers Hungarians voted in to approve of their country's membership in the Union in 2003, when only 16% of Hungarians voted "No".

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[39] Eurostat, http://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/tgm/table.do?tab=table&init=1&language=en&pcode=tsdgo310&plugin=1 Accessed August 11, 2016.

[40] European Commission, *Eurobarometer 84*, Autumn 2015. http://ec.europa.eu/COMMFrontOffice/PublicOpinion/index.cfm/Survey/getSurveyDetail/yearFrom/1973/yearTo/2015/surveyKy/2098. Accessed April 1, 2016.

There are probably several reasons to account for the lack of change in these numbers. First, Hungary enjoys a moderate level of representation in the European Parliament. They hold 2.8% or 212 seats. Second, Fidesz is a member of the large and popular European People's Party in the European Parliament. This insures that Hungarian interests are heard.[41] Third, there are large economic benefits that accompany EU membership. Hungary benefitted from a €20 billion IMF bailout in 2008. It rescued the Hungarian economy from a free fall during the financial crisis of 2007.[42] The Hungarian economy subsequently stabilized.

The current financial outlook for Hungary is carefully optimistic. Financial analysts cited both growth and expansion in the Hungarian economy since the bailout. Despite tax increases on certain sectors, retail sales growth was at an eleven year high in spring 2015.[43] Following the IMF bailout, Hungarian GDP tracked reasonably well. This expansion of the economy coincides with material positives for Hungarians.

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[41] European Parliament, *Results of the 2014 European elections*, http://www.europarl.europa.eu/elections2014-results/en/seats-member-state-percent.html. Accessed January 10, 2016.

[42] David Jolly, "IMF bailout lifts Hungarian markets," *The New York Times*, October 28, 2008. http://www.nytimes.com/2008/10/29/business/worldbusiness/29iht-forint.1.17341173.html. Accessed April 10, 2016.

[43] Zoltan Simon, "Hungary's Economy Defies Forecast for Slowdown as Industry Soars," *Bloomberg*, March 6, 2016. http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2015-03-06/hungary-s-economy-defies-forecast-for-slowdown-as-industry-soars. Accessed April 12, 2016.

Figure 14. GDP Growth by Year, Hungary

Figure 15. Per Capita GDP (PPP) by Year, Hungary

[44] Eurostat, http://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/tgm/download.do?tab=table&plugin=1&language=en&pcode=tec00115. Accessed August 11, 2016.

[45] World Bank, http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GDP.PCAP.PP.CD. Accessed August 1, 2016.

Per capita GDP doubled in Hungary from 2000-2015. Post bailout, there was nearly a 25% improvement for Hungarians. Unemployment dropped from 7.7 to 7.1% from 2014 to 2015.[46] This is great progress since the double-digit unemployment figures of 2011-2013.[47] The employment market has rebounded to pre-2008 crisis levels.[48] Hungary's per Capita income PPP now sits at around $25,000 (PPP), the same level as their counterpart Poland. This is where the balance sheets of the two countries diverge. There are other economic factors that have not improved and even gotten worse in Hungary in recent years. Hungarians disproportionately benefited from the recent recovery. Hungary's long term solvency could be in peril, as well.

Income inequality increased steadily from 2009 to 2012 and remains an issue. This is a recent trend that began after the bailout. This lends credence to Teorell's. External, targeted economic forces from international organizations, like sanctions, can hurt the quality of democracy. Hungary illustrates that the same forces in the form of external bailouts can prove damaging, as well.

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[46] CIA, World Factbook, Hungary.

[47] http://portalseven.com/employment/unemployment_rate_euro.jsp?region=hu. Accessed April 12, 2016.

[48] Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development, *Harmonized Unemployment: Total: All Persons for Hungary©* [LRHUTTTTHUA156N], retrieved from FRED, Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis https://research.stlouisfed.org/fred2/series/LRHUTTTTHUA156N. Accessed April 19, 2016.

Figure 16. GINI Index, by Year, Hungary

It is important to note the domestic political repercussions. The 2009 bailout also served as the

impetus behind the section of the new constitution restricting bailout terms and austerity.

In terms of these bailouts and macro policy, Hungary is less stable than many of its

central and eastern European neighbors. It carries a sovereign debt of 94% of its GDP.

This amount of debt is higher than the European Union average. Hungary's debt is more than

double most of the other countries in the region. A sharp downturn in the future could affect the

current GDP and employment levels causing a crisis or even default. The 2011 constitution

addresses these situations. Articles 36-38 set limits on government spending whenever the debt is

higher than 50% of GDP. They also give the Constitutional Court broad powers in annulling

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[49] World Bank, http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SI.POV.GINI. Accessed August 11, 2016.

laws in the event the debt reaches these levels. Furthermore, the results of these acts by the court remain in effect even after the debt recedes.

The improvements in the Hungarian economy since 2008 have probably stymied the eurosceptic movement within the country. However, the tactics of Viktor Orbán's regime have degraded the quality of democracy in Hungary. Orbán's illiberal democracy is enshrined in the compact forced upon the country by a party line vote with no opposition. The true harm, the long term implications arise from the need for supermajorities throughout the constitutional process. These can be yielded like a broadsword against any opposition working to reform Hungarian democracy. Fidesz erected a government not unlike that of Moscow, who they occasionally gravitate towards.

History

History is a large factor in the quality of liberal democracy in modern Hungary. The strong effect history has on contemporary politics in Hungary is due to a very strong *memory culture*.[50] The wide variety of different forms of governments and democratic arrangements over Hungary's history had a few characteristics which have re-emerged in modern Hungary. First, it is important to note that until 1989, Hungary had no real democracy other than the two years of the Second Hungarian Republic. Second, when the Third Hungarian Republic was declared, Hungarians kept their traditional unicameral National Assembly. Finally, their long history is full of former enemies and perceived threats. Some are valid, while others are completely false narratives that are widely held. Unfortunately, this last fact is reflected not only in written law, but in the political conditions in the country for certain groups.

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[50] Bazinger, "The Funeral of Imre Nagy," 143.

The history of Hungary begins at the turn of the first millennium with eight centuries of monarchy. This is followed by the Duel Monarchy known as the Austro-Hungarian Empire. Following the First World War there was a short communist period. Then, there was a period known as the Kingdom of Hungary. It lasted from 1920 until the Second World War. During the Second World War, the Arrow Cross Party led the country for a short time. There was a short period of somewhat liberal democracy known as the Second Hungarian Republic from 1946 to 1949. The Hungarian People's Republic lasted until 1989 when communism collapsed and the Third Republic of Hungary was declared.

What is essentially Hungary and Hungarian started in the first century. Magyars asserted themselves over six other tribal groups in the region of central Europe. The Magyars fought their German neighbors and endured a "tug of war between Catholicism and Orthodoxy". A marriage resolved this in feudal fashion. The Hungarian monarchy was established on Christmas Day on 1000 AD with the coronation of St. Stephen following his marriage to the daughter of a rival Catholic, Bavarian prince.[51] Stephen established a safe, functioning, Christian country through peace treaties, marriages, and a strong government system.[52] St. Stephen welcomed immigrants and embraced the linguistic diversity. He stated, "…for a state which owns but one language and one habit is feeble and fragile."[53]

Hungary was a prototypical European feudal monarchy. Very few people had any democratic rights, Landowners and nobility wielded the little power they had over their lands and estates. The first real glimpses of Hungarian democracy came in the 13th century. A collection of tribal chiefs evolved into a Diet, which chose the king. The Diet gained more power

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[51] Bryan Cartledge, *The Will to Survive: A History of Hungary* (New York: Columbia University Press, 2011), 10-11.
[52] Ibid., 14.
[53] St. Stephen quoted by Cartledge, *The Will to Survive*, 15.

over time and became a legislative branch that would send legislation to the king for approval.[54]

In 1526, Ottoman Turks invaded Hungary.[55] This left Hungary divided between Royal Hungary,

the Turks and a separate Transylvania.[56] It is most interesting to point out that Jews in Hungary

flourished under Turkish rule. In exchange for Turkish tolerance many Jews fought alongside the

Turks against Habsburg forces.[57]   After repeated defeats at the hands of Habsburg armies, the

Turks relinquished control of Hungary after 156 years.[58]

Hungary lost its independence to the Austrian Hapsburgs. Despite this loss, Hungarian

nobles retained much of their power.[59] In 1608, the Diet took the shape it kept until 1848. It

became bicameral. The upper house was occupied by the nobility. The lower house comprised of

middle class members of specific areas. The peasantry was not represented. In this system, only

7% of all Hungarians were represented.[60] The 18th century saw a flurry of wars.[61] The start of the

19th saw the Hungarian's revolt against Austrian rule and christen what is commonly referred to

the Reform Period by many historians.[62] The revolution yielded the April Laws which

"constitute a charter of the breakthrough of modern Hungary"[63] and "laid the foundations of the

modern Hungarian state"[64]. Act IV of 1848 expanded democracy, yet didn't really improve its

quality. Many feudal practices were abandoned and Hungarian was declared the official

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[54] Ibid., 18-19.
[55] Ibid., 76.
[56] Ibid., 87.
[57] Ibid., 89-90
[58] Ibid., 114-115.
[59] Gábor Gángó, "1848-1849 in Hungary", *Hungarian Studies 15*, no. 2 (2001):39.
[60] Róbert Hermann and Sándor M. Kiss, "Hungary's Parliament," in *The Hungarian National Assembly*, trans. Iván Sellei (Budapest: The Hungarian National Assembly, 2011): 9-10. http://www-archiv.parlament.hu/fotitkar/angol/book_2011.pdf. Accessed June 1, 2016.
[61] Cartledge, *The Will to Survive*, 121-122.
[62] Gángó, "1848-1849 in Hungary", 39.
[63] Ibid.,41.
[64] Carteledge, *The Will to Survive*, 197

language.[65] More Hungarians gained voting rights, but there were the expected 19th century

restrictions. Only male landowners of a specific income and certain trades could vote.[66]

The main contribution of the 1848 Diet and the April laws was a new, modern political

structure that offered representation, albeit limited. The Upper Chamber remained unchanged. It

would be made of nobility. The lower chamber would be made of 446 deputies elected by the

new expanded electorate. This government would be able to communicate with the Austrian

monarch as an equal.[67] Shortly after the creation of the new, more modern legislative body

differences on monetary policy and Hungarian military reinforcements would cause Vienna and

Pest to meander away from each other again. Yet another war was fought.[68]

The Compromise of 1867 ended the conflict with Austria. The compromise established

the Dual Monarchy and began the Austro-Hungarian Empire. In the agreement, Hungary

regained most of its legal sovereignty except for "common affairs" to include defense,

international trade and treaties. These issues would rest with the Crown.[69] The compromise

began moves towards becoming a mainstream European democracy. Steps were taken to make

Hungary more open. Minorities were granted more rights. Foreign languages were permitted.

"Nationality schools" and cultural groups were established to help migrants. Quality of life and

infrastructure was improved too. The government started public schools and a public health

service.[70] There were subsequent moves to liberalize Hungarian democracy. Laws were passed

providing for civil marriages and the registration on births, deaths and marriages by local

governments. There was also a law recognizing the Jewish religion and providing for Freedom of

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[65] Gángó," 1848-1849 in Hungary", 40.
[66] Hermann and Kiss, "Hungary's Parliament," 13.
[67] Carteledge, *The Will to Survive*, 196.
[68] Ibid.205.
[69] Ibid., 232-233.
[70] Hermann and Kiss, "Hungary's Parliament," 23-24.

Religion. [71] Geopolitically, the Dual Monarchy sought security through a mutual defense agreement with Germany. [72] The First World War followed.

The Treaty of Trianon ended the First World War between the victorious allies and what became the Kingdom of Hungary. The new Kingdom's borders were redrawn and Hungary lost territory to various European states. The treaty gave Hungarian territory to a new "Czecho-Slovak state", known as Czechoslovakia and the new "Serb-Croat-Slovene state" of Yugoslavia. The agreement made the new Hungarian state agree to insure minority and non-Magyar speech rights, equal rights for all and freedom of religion. Hungary also forfeited all of their overseas holdings. [73] Trianon is considered by some as the "greatest tragedy" in Hungarian history. [74]

The Trianon Treaty has a tremendous impact on Hungarian democracy and the quality of rights for some in Hungary. Some scholars trace the roots of today's right wing politics to the "lingering trauma" [75] of the Trianon treaty. Some refer to a "Trianon syndrome" that makes Hungarians "bristle with resentment" [76]. László Kövér, the current Speaker of the National Assembly called it a sad day in Hungarian history and a tragedy. [77] Several Hungarian government representatives lamented the loss of land, the plight of the Hungarian diaspora and vowed to strengthen the Hungarian identity. In June 2016, young nationalist radicals held a march through the middle of downtown Budapest. The route passed in front of the Serbian,

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[71] Ibid., 28.

[72] Carteledge, *The Will to Survive*, 240.

[73] *Treaty of Trianon*.

[74] Paul Lendvai, *Hungary: Between Democracy and Authoritarianism*, trans. Keith Chester (New York: Columbia University Press, 2012), 57.

[75] Ekiert and Ziblatt, "Democracy in Central and Eastern Europe One Hundred Years On," 95.

[76] James Traub, "Hungary's 500-Year-Old Victim Complex," *Foreign Policy*, October 28, 2015. http://foreignpolicy.com/2015/10/28/hungarys-500-year-old-victim-complex-nazis-habsburgs/. Accessed June 5, 2016.

[77] Magyar Hirlap, "Strong Hungarian Community Worldwide," June 3, 2016. http://magyarhirlap.hu/cikk/57338/Strong_Hungarian_Community_Worldwide. Accessed June 6, 2016.

Romanian and Slovakian embassies.[78] As far back as 2010, mainstream Hungarian politicians called the treaty "a robbing peace, an unjust peace which was concluded on the basis of ignoring fundamental human rights and freedoms."[79] This is the basis for xenophobia and resentment of non-Hungarians for many in the country.

Count Mihály Károlyi declared Hungary's First Republic on November 16, 1918.[80] Negotiations over post-war borders led to President Károlyi's resignation. He handed the government over to a coalition of Social Democrats and Communists. A Soviet Republic was declared on March 21, 1919.[81] The parties merged and took their orders directly from the Bolsheviks. Bela Kun, a journalist close to Lenin, became the head of state.[82] Their economic policies mimicked those of the Soviet Union: nationalization, collective farms to name a few. [83] They also endeavored to establish an internal police force like the Soviet Union's NKVD. The number of their victims ranges from a few hundred to a few thousand.[84]

The Hungarian Soviet Republic contributed to the nature of modern Hungarian democracy. This is due in great part to the number of Jews who led the short-lived, communist government. It lasted only 133 days and met a bloody end.[85] Entente-backed Romanian armies invaded and defeated the Hungarian Red Army in November. The Entente engineered a Romanian withdraw and Hungarian Admiral Mikos Horthy marched his Hungarian National

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[78] Hungary Today, "Trianon: Hungarian Communities Commemorate Historic Tragedy on the Day of National Cohesion," June 6, 2016. http://hungarytoday.hu/news/trianon-hungary-commemorates-historic-tragedy-day-national-cohesion-43034. Accessed June 12, 2016.

[79] Jozsef Torgyan quoted by BBC, "Bitter Hungarians recall Trianon," June 5, 2000. http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/world/monitoring/media_reports/777320.stm. Accessed June 1, 2016.

[80] Miklos Molnar, *A Concise History of Hungary*, trans. Anna Magyar (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2001), 250.

[81]Ibid., 252.

[82] Ibid., 254.

[83] Ibid., 256.

[84] Ibid., 258.

[85] Lendvai, *Hungary*, 57.

Army into Budapest the next day. This chapter of communism in Hungary ended with revenge and reciprocity. Horthy looked away while military units launched a White Terror. Military units targeted supporters of the Kun Regime, socialists, democrats, and Jews. Several historians note that anti-Semitism swelled following the collapse of the Moscow-backed regime.[86]

The Kingdom of Hungary was established with a caretaker government to negotiate with the Entente until elections. The government operated "flawlessly" until 1939.[87] In the end, it would be Hungary's association with Hitler's Germany that would spell the end of the realm. Admiral Nicholas Horthy was elected Regent of Hungary on March 1, 1920.[88] There were several changes to voting rights and election laws in the limited time of the Kingdom. First, in 1919, the government made a decree that extended limited voting rights to women. Potential female voters could vote if they could speak and write one of a number of approved languages.[89]

Three years later the government applied a number of restrictions to voters. Voters had to have been citizens for 10 years and have four years of primary education. Women had additional requirements to be met. Women voters had to be married, have three children or have an independent income. Interestingly, the age requirement for women was waived if they were university educated. The secret ballot was abolished in rural areas and party lists replaced individual constituencies in major towns and cities. The government intended to protect their

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[86] Michael J. Jordan, "The Roots of Hate," *World Policy Journal 27*, no. 3 (Fall 2010): 57; Stanley Pech, "Right, Left and Center in Eastern Europe 1860-1940: A Cross-National Profile," *Canadian Journal of History* 16, no. 2 (August 1981): 251.

[87] Hermann and Kiss, "Hungary's Parliament," 35.

[88] Nicholas Horthy, *Memoirs* (Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, Publishers, 1978), 110.

[89] Hermann and Kiss, "Hungary's Parliament," 32.

hold on power with the changes. The number of eligible voters dropped from 3.1M voters to just over 2M. [90]

In 1926, the government underwent a structural reform. Despite the initial advances in democracy in the early days of the kingdom these changes, again, sought to preserve the power of the elite. The Upper House, known as the House of Magnates, was changed. Up to this point, the Upper House consisted of senior, wealthy nobility. The new Upper House contained four different groups. Certain noble families elected some of the members. Other members were drawn from the leadership of the predominant religions: Catholics, Protestants and Jews. Some were elected from the academic ranks. Others were senior tradesmen. Most were elected in one fashion or another. Hungarians exercised universal suffrage and elected both the Upper and Lower Houses of the Parliament for five year terms.[91]

A series of Prime Ministers guided the Kingdom's government. These prime ministers politically migrated towards Berlin as Germany gained more geopolitical power in the region. The government signed the Anschluss with Nazi Germany in March of 1938. This meant aligning domestic politics with those of Berlin. Codified anti-Semitism came in three successive legislative waves over the next three years.[92] Hungary regained much of the territory lost under the Trianon Treaty under the hand of the Nazis. [93] This and the reintroduction of the secret ballot aided in support for Hitler in Hungary. Many Hungarian Nazi supporters came from the reclaimed territories lost in the Treaty of Trianon.[94] This aided the Hungarian fascists of the Arrow Cross Party. The party was the third largest Fascist Party in Europe in the 1930s. It

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[90] Hermann and Kiss, "Hungary's Parliament," 34-35.

[91] Horthy, *Memoirs*, 130.

[92] Molnar, *A Concise History of Hungary*, 278-279.

[93] Lendai, *Hungary*, 59-60.

[94] Robert Gerwarth and John Horne, "Vectors of Violence: Paramilitarism in Europe after the Great War," *The Journal of Modern History 83*, no. 3 (September 2011): 489.

emerged as the second largest party in Hungary after the elections of 1939.[95] The Arrow Cross Party seized power with German assistance in 1944. Their hit squads sought and executed thousands of Jews.[96] The tenure of the Arrow Cross Party was short lived. Soviet forces occupied the country months later.[97]

The pro-Nazi Arrow Cross government neither holds a monopoly on anti-Semitism in Hungarian history nor did anti-Semitism end with the groups' downfall. In fact, this anti-Jewish rhetoric proves to be one of the stronger historical antecedents of modern Hungary. Jen Becker wrote, "A culture of resentment of Jews, `gypsies' and `communists; has intensified." It is all historic.[98] Anti-Semitism was the intellectual property of right-wing political groups before the First World War. Three anti-Semitic trends emerged afterwards. They were scapegoated for the defeat of the Central Powers in Germany and Hungary. [99] In late 1918, a Roman Catholic Bishop accused Hungarian Jews of evading military service. Bishop Prohászka warned that Hungary might "become a Jewish country". More specifically he warned of Jewish revolutionaries.[100] This fostered a second trend in anti-Semitism: a perceived "a `natural' attraction of Jews and international communism." [101] This Bishop and others like him throughout the region focused on Jewish communists. This created what Hanebrink coined the "Judeo-Bolshevik Myth".

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[95] Pech, "Right, Left and Center in Eastern Europe 1860-1940: A Cross-National Profile," 251.

[96] Lendvai, *Hungary*, 62.

[97] Hermann and Kiss, "Hungary's Parliament," 39.

[98] Jens Becker, "The rise of right-wing populism in Hungary," *SEER: Journal for Labour Social Affairs in Eastern Europe 13*, no. 1 (2010): 31.

[99] United States Holocaust Memorial Museum, Holocaust Encyclopedia, "Antisemitism in History: World War I." Accessed June 1, 2016. https://www.ushmm.org/wlc/en/article.php?ModuleId=10007166.

[100] Paul Hanebrink,"Transnational Culture War: Christianity, Nation, and the Judeo-Bolshevik Myth in Hungary 1890-1920," *The Journal of Modern History 80*, no. 1 (March 2008): 55.

[101] United States Holocaust Memorial Museum, Holocaust Encyclopedia, "Antisemitism in History: World War I."

Hanebrink wrote that such paranoia was not unusual in central and eastern Europe after the First World War, but also that the effect was especially powerful in Hungary.[102]

The final anti-Semitic products of the First World War were associated with the Treaty of Versailles. These were the myths of a Jewish conspiracy to wrest control of Europe, the ever popular "stab on the back" narrative (Jews betraying European countries), and the idea that Jewish bankers profited from the payment of war reparations.[103] Some scholars view the Treaties of Versailles and Trianon differently. They feel the losses of Hungarian lands and money in the treaties left Hungary crippled and demoralized. It was easy prey to the enticements of Hitler's Germany. He offered Hungary a return of their lands. This left Hungarian Jews "caught in the middle". 600,000 Hungarian Jews and Roma were exterminated by the Nazis and the aligned Arrow Cross Party.[104] Regardless of the cause, one would think that such a horribly, dark period of history might serve as a formidable warning to present day Hungarians. It has not.

Several authors allude to a common, broad denial of the past on the part of Hungarians. Laszlo Somorjai feels that history is important to Hungarians because so many have simply refused to deal with the past. This leaves the country open the racist nationalism of groups like Jobbik.[105] Paul Lendvai agrees with him.

> Polls on recent Hungarian history reveal a rejection of any
> attempt to come to terms with the past and a strong tendency
> to embrace nationalistic and xenophobic stereotypes. Everything
> in Hungarian history that was a failure or `unpleasant' is blamed on
> neighboring countries, on minorities or on foreigners living in Hungary.[106]

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[102] Hanebrink , "Transnational Culture War,"57-58.
[103] United States Holocaust Memorial Museum, Holocaust Encyclopedia, "Antisemitism in History: World War I."
[104] Jordan, "The Roots of Hate," 103-104.
[105] Ibid., 104.
[106] Lendvai, *Hungary*, 64.

He notes that only 4% of people between 18 and 30 know what "Holocaust" means." Two-thirds of Hungarians believe Jews are too powerful in business. 50% of Hungarians believe Jewish financers are responsible for the world economic crisis of 2012. 40% think that Jews worry more about Israel more than their mother country". In 2009, 46% of Hungarians said Jews talk about the Holocaust too much.[107]

Not only does the "iron silence" about Hungary's role in the Holocaust continue, but anti-Semitism and crimes against the Roma minority continue. Márton Gyöngyösi, a member of Jobbik, called for Hungarian Jews to be cataloged and screened as national security threats. Another Jobbik candidate recently accused Jews of using gypsies as a "biological weapon" against Hungarians. Alarmingly, he won his seat despite this. Other right-wing and eurosceptic parties in Europe reject Jobbik's anti-Semitism.[108] Wilders of the Netherlands and Le Pen of France refused to form a European parliamentary voting block with Jobbik in the European Parliament. Jobbik remains the third largest party in the Hungarian parliament despite their extremism.[109]

There are few peoples more maligned in Europe than the Roma. The problem goes back to the 12th century.[110] They were banned from the Holy Roman Empire in 1501. In 1666, French king Louis XIV said that Gypsy men should be imprisoned, the women sterilized and children placed in poorhouses. Spain declared a "Great Gypsy Round Up" in the late 18th century. The

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[107] Ibid., 62-64.
[108] The Economist, "Anti-Seimtiism in Hungary: Márton's list," November 28, 2012. http://www.economist.com/blogs/easternapproaches/2012/11/anti-semitism-hungary. Accessed June 1, 2016.
[109] Csaba Tibor Toth, "Hungarian far right pushes moderate image – and wins," *Deutsche Welle*, April 13, 2015. http://www.dw.com/en/hungarian-far-right-pushes-moderate-image-and-wins/a-18378981. Accessed June 1, 2016.
[110] Belinda Cooper, "`We Have No Martin Luther King': Eastern Europe's Roma Minority," *World Policy Journal 18*, no. 4 (Winter, 2001/2002): 69.

Kingdoms of Wallachia and Moldova enslaved Gypsies until the 19th century.[111] The 1910 Encyclopedia Britannica states that Gypsies "have no ethical principles and they do not recognize the obligations of the Ten Commandments. There is extreme moral laxity in relation to the two sexes… At the same time they are great cowards."[112] During the period of the Austro-Hungarian Empire, Empress Maria Theresia implemented a program of forced assimilation. This included removing children from their parents.[113]

The plight of the Roma in Europe continued into modern Europe. There are varying reports about the numbers of Roma killed by the Nazis. Belinda Cooper wrote that approximately a half million Roma were killed. The Office of the Commissioner of Human Rights in the Council of Europe notes that some European states lost half of their Roma population. Central and eastern European Soviet satellites saw a "Gypsy Problem". Their policy included breaking up families and dispersing them to different countries of the Warsaw Pact. Despite this, even then, Gypsies occupied the worst jobs.[114] Even today some EU states fingerprint, segregate or expel Roma populations.[115]

Hungary has the largest issue with anti-Roma activity. This should be no surprise for two reasons. First, the Roma represent the largest minority in Hungary.[116] They are a large, ready-made target for xenophobic, nativists. Second, oppressing Roma is probably second nature to many Hungarians because of Hungarian political history. The Dual Monarchy saw them as

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[111] Nils Muižnieks, "Time to cure amnesia about the history of Roma in Europe," *The Council of Europe, Commissioner for Human Rights,* July 3, 2015. http://www.coe.int/en/web/commissioner/-/time-to-cure-amnesia-about-the-history-of-roma-in-europe. Accessed June 15, 2016.

[112] 1910 Encyclopedia Britannica quoted by Belinda Cooper in "We Have No Martin Luther King," 69.

[113] Muižnieks, "Time to cure amnesia about the history of Roma in Europe,"

[114] Cooper, "`We Have No Martin Luther King'," 70.

[115] Muižnieks, "Time to cure amnesia about the history of Roma in Europe,"

[116] Robert Koulish, "Hungarian Roma Attitudes on Minority Rights: The Symbolic Violence of Ethnic Identification," *Europe-Asia Studies 57*, no 2 (March 2005): 311.

inferior and attempted to assimilate them. The Nazis and their Arrow Cross brethren exterminated them. The communists tried destroying their culture by breaking up their basic family units. One of the few consistencies in Hungary's political history is a lack of rights and equality and poor treatment of the Roma.

Democracy in Hungary after the Second World War had an unfulfilled and short life. This period is the closest Hungary came to liberal democracy before 1989. The government was started in the adverse conditions highlighted by Kapstein and Converse.[117] The country had a large war debt and indemnities. There were some institutional weaknesses. Hungary had no political system following the war. However, parties coalesced. They successfully forged coalitions to govern. Kenez wrote that Soviet support for authentic coalition government in Hungary was "perfectly genuine".[118] Molnar differs. He summed the period up best. He wrote, "For three years, Hungary lived a limited and supervised democracy under Soviet occupation."[119] Perhaps, if left alone, the Second Hungarian Republic stood a chance.

The Yalta agreement called for elections. The Soviet leadership abided by the agreement. Elections were held in August of 1945. The electorate was the most expanded of any in Hungarian history up to that time. All Hungarians, male and female could vote. Property and education requirements were dropped.[120] The Small Holders' Party won 57% of the seats. They formed a coalition government that included the communists.[121] In short, the Soviets needed this type of election. Moscow allowed the creation of multiparty system to give their future plans

[117] Kapstein and Converse, *The Fate of Young Democracies*, 3-4.
[118] Peter Kenez, *Hungary from the Nazis to the Soviets* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2006): 13.
[119] Molnar, *A Concise History of Hungary*, 295.
[120] Hermann and Kiss, "Hungary's Parliament," 40.
[121] Molnar, *A Concise History of Hungary*, 296.

legitimacy. It attempted to lull the Allies into some sort of false hope, but more importantly it provided the Soviets with a method to take charge later.

Moscow's political moves in Hungary immediately following the end of the war look like parts of a larger plan aimed at taking power. These moves culminated in the rigged elections of 1947. [122] Molnar wrote that the key to Moscow's plan were the certain political "mines" planted in the different parties and the political system. Historians refer to these political maneuvers as "salami tactics." When detonated, the communists could take charge. [123] Leaders of prominent non-communist parties were arrested and sent to the Soviet Union others fled the country in fear. Communist operatives infiltrated non-communist parties. In 1947, the National Assembly passed laws disenfranchising large numbers of people: former Nazi sympathizers, people who fled the entering Red Army at the end of the war and other political opponents of the communist party. [124] The stage was set. The communists faced fragmented parties in the election after the salami tactics of Moscow. [125] Despite 49% victory, the communists further consolidated power two years later. [126] The Hungarian People's Republic began with the elections of 1949, which were even less democratic than the elections of 1947.The parliament was basically dormant from 1949 to 1956. [127]

The Hungarian communist leaders modeled their rule after Soviet policy. This included forced industrialization, agrarian collectivization and using education as propaganda. They imposed a state security apparatus like most other communist regimes. In1950, state security, AVH, monitored an estimated 1.3M Hungarians. 6,000 were jailed without trial. 387,000 were

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[122] Hermann and Kiss, "Hungary's Parliament, 43.
[123] Molnar, *A Concise History of Hungary*, 299.
[124] Hermann and Kiss, "Hungary's Parliament," 42.
[125] Molnar, *A Concise History of Hungary*, 299.
[126] Hermann and Kiss, "Hungary's Parliament," 43.
[127] Ibid., 45.

condemned for various crimes against the state.[128] When Stalin died, the leadership in Moscow saw fit to relax tensions by easing political oppression. Stalin's successors felt "that the screws of Stalinism had been tightened too recklessly."[129] The Hungarian General Secretary, Mátyás Rákosi was replaced by Imre Nagy, a more moderate member of the party.[130] This was the first in a chain of events that led to the Hungarian Revolution of 1956.

Nagy had a few immediate goals. First, he ended of softened some of the more oppressive measures of Stalinism. He rolled back some of the economic policies. Nagy granted amnesty to political prisoners. Politically, he bravely sought to modify single party system.[131] Nagy wanted to revive some parties excluded from Hungarian politics by the one-party policy. These parties would be known as the Patriotic People's Front. This would pursue national instead of Soviet oriented themed socialism.[132] This plan worried hardline communists. Rákosi organized their support and overthrew Nagy. The following year, Nikita Khrushchev gave his famous renouncement of Stalin at the 20th Party Congress. Many hopes democracy might follow. This included university students of Budapest.[133]

Hungarian University students saw a possibility for change in the death of Stalin. The Hungarian Communist Party permitted the students to demonstrate. The students sought free elections, wanted Soviet forces out of Hungary and demanded Imre Nagy be named Prime Minister. The student demonstration of a few hundred grew into a mass demonstration of a few

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[128] János Ranier, "The Hungarian Revolution of 1956: Causes, Aims, and Course of Events," in *The 1956 Hungarian Revolution: Hungarian and Canadian Perspectives,* eds. Christopher Adam, et al (Ottawa, Canada: Ottawa University Press, 2010), 14.

[129] Cartledge, *The Will to Survive*, 434.

[130] Ibid., 434.

[131] Ranier, "The Hungarian Revolution of 1956," 15.

[132] Cartledge, *The Will to Survive*, 436.

[133] Ranier, "The Hungarian Revolution of 1956," 15.

thousand.[134] A ceasefire was brokered and Nagy was named leader of the government and started to move to a multi-party system. He declared Hungary's neutrality and withdrew from the Warsaw Pact. In response, Soviet forces attacked Budapest and crushed the revolution. Nagy was tried and executed in 1958.[135]

The 1956 Revolution is a prime example of how history can affect democracy. It is "at the core of contemporary political culture" in Hungary.[136] The events of the nine days on October of that year played a part in the collapse of communism, figured into the rise of Orbán and made their way into the Hungarian Constitution. Central to the memory of the Revolution was the fate of Imre Nagy. Before the end of communism in Hungary, over 300,000 Hungarians attended a formal burial for Nagy. This "delegitimized" the communist regime and illustrated the power of the Hungarian people.[137] Karl P. Benziger wrote that "Memory culture in Hungary is powerfully reinforced through various rites of memorial that include not only the burial of the dead but also the remembrance of symbolic figures who help link Hungarian identity to the connect of community and nation."[138]

Some of the first acts of the new Parliament in 1990 involved the 1956 Revolution. These included rehabilitating Nagy and others and commemorating October 23rd. It is important to note that some of the participants of the revolt served in Parliament at the time.[139] There other aspect of the Revolution politically addressed was justice. Many Hungarians seek the prosecution of

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[134] Ibid., 17-18.

[135] Ibid., 19-20.

[136] Heino Nyyssönen, "1956 and the Republic of Hungary since 1989," in *The 1956 Hungarian Revolution: Hungarian and Canadian Perspectives,* eds. Christopher Adam, et al (Ottawa, Canada: Ottawa University Press, 2010), 152.

[137] Karl P. Bazinger, "The Funeral of Imre Nagy: Contested History and the Power of Memory Culture," *History and Memory 12*, no. 2 (Fall/Winter 2000): 142.

[138] Ibid., 143.

[139] Nyyssönen, "1956 and the Republic of Hungary since 1989," 153-4.

those who collaborated with the Nazis, member of the Arrow Cross Party and worked with the communists.[140] The soldiers who helped put down 1956 revolution are primary targets for this movement.[141] The judicial principles and democratic ideas behind such a prosecution are wrought with peril: extending statutes of limitation, ipso facto laws being enforced. Yet, the Constitutional Court granted that such prosecutions were legal citing the Geneva Convention. The massacres on October 1956 fall under crimes against humanity.

A very recent political reference to the Revolution of 1956 came in 2006, when protestors took to the streets to show their opposition to the election of Prime Minister Ferenc Gyursany. It became known that he lied to the Hungarian people about promised tax cuts and fiscal policy to get elected. The protests were staged at the very same places on the very same calendar days as the Revolution. Viktor Orbán took advantage of the historical imagery to call for Gyursany's resignation.[142] His Fidesz Party staged a mass gathering at Astoria Square and other demonstrations later on the Elisabeth Bridge. The two locations were prominent in the events of the Revolution.[143]

Janos Kadar became the Secretary General after 1956. He knew that the socialist utopia had come partially unraveled. Kadar seemingly pushed the limits of Moscow's toleration. There is no indication that he ever entertained the notion of liberal democracy, but he offered a more tolerable authoritarian rule. He restored churches, their subsidies. The government reformed the criminal code and granted a partial amnesty. When he felt pressure from regional communist

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[140] Ibid., 155-6.

[141] Carol J. Williams, "37 Years After Uprising, Hungarians Still Seek Justice: Europe : At anniversary rallies, survivors of 1956 anti-Communist revolt call for prosecution of those who thwarted revolt," *Los Angeles Times*, October 24, 1993. http://articles.latimes.com/1993-10-24/news/mn-49394_1_hungarian-uprising. Accessed July 1, 2016.

[142] *Der Spiegel*, "Revolution Redux in Budapest," October 24, 2006. http://www.spiegel.de/international/street-battles-in-hungary-revolution-redux-in-budapest-a-444362.html. Accessed July 3, 2016.

[143] Nyyssönen, "1956 and the Republic of Hungary since 1989," 169-170.

peers, he re-collectivized agriculture, but he used tax incentives to lure farmers. He is famously

quoted as saying "Those who are not against us are with us."[144]

The material goods of "goulash communism" made life in Hungary more tolerable. This

same liberal Hungarian model held the roots of its own downfall.[145] Allowing Hungarians

precious nibbles of free market capitalism and very limited liberal rights gave them an alternative

when the economy took a downturn and the Soviet system faltered. Eventually, Moscow

replaced the intransient Kadar and started negotiations with opposition groups. On October 23,

1989, the Third Hungarian Republic, the Hungary known to the world today, was declared. In

the first few years of the republic, the state took great steps in securing human rights. The

National Assembly amended the 1949 constitution which "recognizes the inalienable an

inviolable, fundamental rights of law, and regards their observance and protection as the state's

primary responsibility." It provides for equality regardless of race, color, religion, sex, political

views national or social origin, wealth or ancestry.[146]

The history of Hungary is a chronological mix of different political leaderships. It has a

long period of traditional European monarchy, a short period of constitutional monarchy,

subservience to a foreign European power, two different eras of communism, a short period of

fascist rule and, now, two periods of democracy. The historical antecedents are limited, but

resilient. The lack of a substantial period of democracy until now seemingly makes them tolerant

of rule that smacks of authoritarianism. The structure of the Hungarian legislature remains

unchanged, but they also retain some age old racist attitudes towards Jews and the Roma. These

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[144] Cartledge, *The Will to Survive,* 469-470..
[145] Molnar, *A Concise History of Hungary*,333.
[146] Stephen I. Pogany, "Human Rights in Hungary," *The International and Comparative Law Quarterly 41*, no. 3 (July 1992): 676-7.

groups historically served as scapegoats and this continues today. Hungary proves how history can dominate a political landscape and not always in a positive manner.

Culture

Culture affects the quality of Hungarian democracy in marginal, yet negative ways. The country is largely secular. Many declared Catholics and Protestants would be best described as lapsed. The co-opting of pre-Vatican II themes and use of the Church as a bully pulpit for Far Right endeavors are the lone impacts religion has on politics and democracy in modern Hungary. Ethnicity and language are used in much the same manner. Most Hungarians view European migrants and ethnic groups as benign. Others from outside the continent or who are regarded as less European are kept from their exercise of full rights. In this, language barriers prove useful. Religion, ethnicity and language aid in lowering the quality of democracy in modern Hungary. .

Religion in post-communist Hungary is a multi-faceted conversation. First, Hungary is religiously diverse. There is a large Catholic congregation in Hungary. It also has the largest Protestant population in the region.[147] One might suspect to see Woodberry and Shah's link between Protestantism and democracy or the positive effect of post-Vatican II Catholicism noted by Berger and Philpot. You would be disappointed. A large number of Hungarians are religiously unaffiliated. This unaffiliated group is the largest of its kind in the region. Researchers attribute this to either church collaboration with the communist government or oppression by the regimes. For whatever reason, modern Hungary today is largely secular.

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[147] Sabrina Ramet, "Religious Organization in Post-Communist Central and Southeastern Europe: An Introduction," in *Religion and Politics in Post-Socialist Central and Southeastern Europe,* ed. Sabrina Ramet (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2014), 2.

Research shows even those who claim a religion attend infrequently.[148] For most Hungarians,

religion is something that has been reduced to the tool of the Far Right political parties.

The pluralistic quality of Christianity in Hungary dates back to the Reformation. The

Reformation was very popular in Hungary.[149] Measures taken by the Austro-Hungarian Empire

further distanced Hungarian society from the Catholic Church.[150] The end result is a religious

diverse population that maintains a shrinking Catholic population. In 1992, Catholics accounted

for 50% of Hungarians.[151] Today, Catholics account for 45% of the population and Hungary is

15% Protestant.[152] Yet, the fastest growing number is the group that associates with no church.

Hungarians claiming no religious preference are the second largest group at 27%. 18% state

"none" when asked about their religious preference.[153]

These figures lead to a discussion of central and eastern Europe: secularization. The

existing literature lends three different theories credit for secularizing Hungarians. First, some

scholars use modernization theory to account for it. Second, some scholars point to communist

oppression. Third, others cite church collaboration with the Hungarian communist regime. This

has the most support among analysts and researchers. The other two are not only supported by

fewer in the field, but they do not stand up to critical analysis. Gautier wrote that modernization

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[148] Tim Müller and Anja Neundorf, "The Role of the State in the Repression and Revival of Religiosity in Central Europe," *Social Forces 91*, no. 2 (December 2012): 564.

[149] Jospeh Pungur, "Protestantism in Hungary: The Communist Era," in *Protestantism and Politics in Eastern Europe and Russia: The Communist and Post Comunist Era*, ed. Sabrina Ramet (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 1992), 107.

[150] Claus Hofhansel,"Recognition Regimes for Religious Minorities in Europe: Institutional Change and Reproduction," *Journal of Church and State 57*, no. 1 (Winter 2005): 100.

[151] Pungur, "Protestantism in Hungary," 107.

[152] Bogdan Mihai Radu, "The Word of God Comes into the Voting Booth. Church Attendance and Political Involvement in East and Central Europe during the Early 1990s," *Polish Sociological Review*, no. 184 (2013): 458.

[153] CIA World Factbook, *Hungary*.

accounts for a decline in religious beliefs and activity.[154] Máté-Tóth, a former theologian,

supports this. He advanced the notion that EU influence indirectly secularizes member states. [155]

This simply does not stand up to scrutiny when observing other countries in the region, namely

Poland.

There is evidence that communist repression of religion initiated secularization in central

and eastern Europe.[156] Communists in Hungary were relatively hard on religious leaders. Their

tactics included prison sentences, torture and internment.[157] Müller and Nuendorf researched the

effect of differing generations and established the age of fourteen as an essential benchmark in

developing religion.[158] There is a high disparity between religiosity between the pre-Cold War

and Cold War populations in Hungary.[159] However, some facts support that there is not a direct

causal relationship between communist oppression of religion and recent secularization. Many

scholars point to the church reaction to the anti-religious, government tactics.

The final explanation for Hungary's secularization was the churches cooperation and

collaboration with the communist regime in Hungary.[160] The Catholic and Protestant churches

discovered that aligning itself with the communist regimes was the only way to survive.

Protestant churches accepted the role of a "church within socialism". [161] The Catholic Church

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[154] Mary L. Gautier, "Church Attendance and Religious Belief in Postcommunist Societies," *Journal for the Scientific Study of Religion 36*, no. 2 (June 1997):290.

[155] András Máté-Tóth, "The Catholic Church in Hungary Now," *Religion in Eastern Europe XXIV, 6* (Deceber 2004): 3. http://digitalcommons.georgefox.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1543&context=ree. Accessed July 1, 2016.

[156] Gautier, "Church Attendance and Religious Belief in Postcommunist Societies," 289

[157] Krisztián Ungváry, "The Kádár Regime and Subduing of the Roman Catholic Hierarchy," in *Religion and Politics in Post-Socialist Central and Southeastern Europe,* ed. Sabrina Ramet (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2014), 87.

[158] Müller and Neundorf, "The Role of the State in the Repression and Revival of Religiosity in Central Europe," 562.

[159] Ibid., 564.

[160] Pungur, "Protestantism in Hungary," 108; Nathalie Gagnere, "The Return of God and the Challenge of Democracy: The Catholic Church in Central Eastern Europe," *Journal of Church and State 35*, no. 4 (Autumn 1993): 861.

[161] Gautier, "Church Attendance and Religious Belief in Postcommunist Societies," 290.

often "appeared as an official Church serving the interests of the government."[162] The decision

to work alongside and, in some cases, with the government cost them credibility.[163] Many

Hungarians associate church with socialism.[164] 54% of Catholics today have little or no

confidence in their church.[165] The result is a far less religious country.

The secular nature of the Hungarian populace is evident in their post-communist politics.

Religion had very little to do with the transition to democracy in Hungary after communism.

There is a trend away from religion in the contemporary written law of Hungary. [166] When

communism collapsed in 1989, Hungary did not adopt a new constitution like most other states

in the region. The old Soviet-styled 1949 constitution was kept in-place although it was heavily

amended. The new Constitution passed into law in 2013 has the earmarks of a more secular

document. The Preamble mentions Christianity, but in the context of "nationhood". It lists some

rights and laws that are based on widely held Christian beliefs. There is no mention of a specific

church nor is there any real reference to theology specific to a single denomination. A large

portion of the document addresses practical issues (specific rights in the work place) and says

little about anything spiritual. The document is reflective of the more secularized contemporary

Hungarian state.

Paradoxically, religion plays a role in the everyday, domestic politics of modern

Hungary. Politicians, specifically Orbán, use religion for political purposes.[167] Most are not

liberal or very democratic in spirit. Both churches essentially support far-right groups. Catholic

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[162] Patrick Michel, *Politics and Religion in Eastern Europe: Communism in Hungary, Poland and Czechoslovakia*, trans. Alan Braley (Oxford, UK: Polity Press, 1991): 26-27.
[163] Gautier, "Church Attendance and Religious Belief in Postcommunist Societies," 290.
[164] Müller and Neundorf, "The Role of the State in the Repression and Revival of Religiosity in Central Europe,"561.
[165] Máté-Tóth, "The Catholic Church in Hungary Now," 7.
[166] Ungváry, "The Kádár Regime and Subduing of the Roman Catholic Hierarchy," 103.
[167] Müller and Neundorf, "The Role of the State in the Repression and Revival of Religiosity in Central Europe,"566.

priests give politicized sermons and distribute pro-right leaflets.[168] The Catholic Church ignores the plight of the Roma and is careful not to confront Fidesz or Jobbik. Reformed Calvinist priests gave blessings at radical right-wing events. [169] Church leaders from both denominations attended the inauguration of Magyar Garda.[170] This political alignment with the far-right is the extent of religion's impact in Hungarian democracy. These far-right political efforts tend to target minorities.

The ethnic minorities in Hungary are small, but growing. 85% of the population claim to be at least partially Hungarian. The Roma minority make up 3.2% of people living in Hungary, while ethnic Germans comprise 1.9%. This can be deceiving. More than 7% of the population claims to be multi-ethnic and 14% are classified as "unspecified". [171] These figures compare to a Hungarian population 15 years ago that was measured as 92% Hungarian.[172] Over the last decade Hungary became less Hungarian. Many see this as a negative side-effect of open borders, migration and the older "problem" of the Roma. This contributes to established historical second class status for non-Hungarians.

Ethnic minorities, religious minorities and different groups of every ilk enjoy basic rights under the 2012 constitution. Yet, none of it really seems to matter. First, simply put, "migrants aren't welcome in Hungary." Orbán opposes a multicultural society and fears Hungarian people "dying out". Some in the Fidesz government want the ability to round up and arrest asylum

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[168] Lavina Stan and Lucian Turcescu, *Church, State and Democracy in Expanding Europe* (Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press, 2011), 76.

[169] Ungváry, "The Kádár Regime and Subduing of the Roman Catholic Hierarchy," 108.

[170] Stan and Turcescu, *Church, State and Democracy in Expanding Europe*, 77.

[171] CIA World Factbook, Hungary.

[172] NationMaster, Hungary. http://www.nationmaster.com/country-info/profiles/Hungary/People. Accessed Jly 1, 2016.

seekers and end immigration. [173] Many political parties and paramilitary groups, like Magya

Garda, regularly engage in hate speech directed at migrants, along with Jews, the long-hated

Roma and members of the LGBT community. The Budapest Pride Parade celebrating gay rights

was attacked by neo-nazis.[174] Newer laws addressing hate crimes go unenforced. Ethnic minority

children are segregated in schools. These minority groups suffer from inadequate housing. [175]

Some NGOs familiar with the migrant situation in Hungary see the improvements in the asylum

process and steps towards integration as "window dressing".[176]

Another opportunity for improvement for minority groups in Hungary is gender equality.

There is little published about women's rights, violence or more of the physical threats to women

in Hungary. Like most other former Soviet satellites, women achieved suffrage in the early

1900s. Abortions are not unreasonably restrained.[177] Most of the advances for women in

Hungary came from NGOs and the government under the new 2013 Penal Code. Domestic

violence has larger jail sentences and stronger restraining orders. A new women's crisis hotline

was established. There are generous maternity leave options. There are more generous

government stipends for stay at home parents and parents of disabled children.[178]

Despite government efforts, women lag behind in other areas. Politically and

professionally, women are legally equal to men according to the written laws and constitution in

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[173] Carla Bleiker, "EU report finds rampant racism, xenophobia in Hungary," *DW*, June 9 ,2015.
http://www.dw.com/en/eu-report-finds-rampant-racism-xenophobia-in-hungary/a-18505689. Accessed July 3, 2016.

[174] European Commission Against Racism and Intolerance, *ECRI Report on Hungary*, June 9, 2015, 9.
https://www.coe.int/t/dghl/monitoring/ecri/Country-by-country/Hungary/HUN-CbC-V-2015-19-ENG.pdf. Accessed July 1, 2016.

[175] Ibid., 10.

[176] Bleiker, "EU report finds rampant racism, xenophobia in Hungary,".

[177] Stan and Turcescu, *Church, State and Democracy in Expanding Europe*, 84.

[178] European Parliament Directorate General for Internal Policies, "The Policy on Gender Equality in Hungary, Update 2013". http://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/note/join/2013/493017/IPOL-FEMM_NT(2013)493017_EN.pdf. Accessed July 1, 2016.

Hungary. Women have large problems in public and private sector jobs. Daycare is hard to find in more rural areas.[179] This keeps workforce participation lower. Women are paid just over half of what men are for equal work despite laws against it. There are few women in government and virtually none at the higher levels. The World Economic Forum ranks Hungary in the bottom half of the world and the worst in Europe when it comes to the overall lives of women. In political empowerment, Hungary is only sixth for the bottom.[180]

Language rights impact democracy in modern Hungary three ways. First, there is the legal framework. This is found in the new Constitution and the newer Penal Code. The next aspect lies in the educational approach by the government. The third and final part of languages function on democracy is the implementation of liberal language rights and gaps between de jure rights and de facto conditions. The 2012 Hungarian Constitution ensures equal rights regardless of spoken language.[181] Much like many other EU member states Hungary ratified the European Charter for Regional and Minority Languages.[182] Legally speaking, non-Hungarian language speakers should enjoy the same rights and opportunities as any other Hungarian. This is also reflected in the multi-lingual approach seen in Hungarian schools.

Hungary has a law that provides for primary education for children in either Hungarian or the language of their national or ethnic group. The kindergarten program in Hungary is very liberal and open to minorities. "An increasing number of kindergartens provide care, nursing and

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[179] European Parliament Directorate General for Internal Policies, "The Policy on Gender Equality in Hungary, Update 2013".

[180] World Economic Forum, "Gender Gap Report, 2015 - Hungary". http://reports.weforum.org/global-gender-gap-report-2015/economies/#economy=HUN. Accessed July 3, 2016.

[181] *The Fundamental Law of Hungary*

[182] List of signatories to the *European Charter for Regional and Minority Languages*. http://www.coe.int/en/web/conventions/full-list/-/conventions/treaty/148/signatures. Accessed July 3, 2016.

education for children of foreign citizens."[183] It is very interesting to note that the source of this data said very little about the Roma minority. It discusses nationalities and language speakers from other EU states, but nothing about Roma children. This highlights one of the largest gaps for integration into Hungarian political life for Roma and migrants from other non-European spaces

The efforts made by the Hungarian government in terms of language neglect the people it needs to help the most. The 2015 Mission Report collected material from various NGOs about language. In summary, much of the information offered to Roma and asylum seekers is not in the right language. Much of it is offered only in Hungarian.[184] MGYOSZ, the largest organization of employers in Hungary, cite that language is the largest obstacle to integrating newly arrived persons into the labor market.[185] One researcher notes that the difficultly of learning the Hungarian language and increased xenophobia against migrants makes teaching Hungarian difficult.[186]

The difference between the written law and actual conditions of rights for foreign language speakers is substantial. Officially, non-native speakers are protected from workplace discrimination.[187] Yet, the new Penal Code fails to safeguard non-Hungarian speakers from discrimination or hate crimes.[188] This lack of legal support for language rights is even worse at

[183] European Commission, "Country Summaries on Language Policy," July 4, 2011.
http://ec.europa.eu/languages/policy/language-policy/documents/ellphb-summaries_en.pdf. Accessed July 5, 2016.
[184] European Economic and Social Committee, "Mission Report – Hungary," 2.
http://www.eesc.europa.eu/resources/docs/hungary_migration-mission-report_en.pdf. Accessed July 4, 2016
[185] European Economic and Social Committee, "Mission Report – Hungary,"4.
http://www.eesc.europa.eu/resources/docs/hungary_migration-mission-report_en.pdf. Accessed July 4, 2016
[186] Balint Bardi, "Xenophoniba running high before Hungarys migrant referendum," *Eurobserver*, July 18, 2016.
https://euobserver.com/migration/134363. Accessed July 20, 2016.
[187] *ECRI Report on Hungary*, 13.
[188] *Ibid.,* 12.

the local level. The 2015 European Commission assessment of Hungary's integration plan

mentions a lack of implementation and oversight at the local level numerous times.[189] In

summary, minority rights, whether it is language or otherwise, are approved in Budapest, but

mean very little outside of the National Assembly.

Geography

Geography is relevant to the discussion of the quality of democracy in Hungary, but far

greater in terms of the region. There is little to be found in reference to east and west religiously.

The East-West paradigm and Hungary's geographic relation to Russia effect Hungarian

democracy in a limited manner. Hungary's geography has a greater impact on the rest of the

region. It presents a possible source for a reinvigorated wave reversal of Huntington's Third

Wave. In this regard, contagion does not affect democratic quality in Hungary. Politics in

Hungary could affect the politics in neighboring central and eastern European countries. It

illustrates what a contagion might look like from the source.

The East-West paradigm plays a minor role in shaping democratic quality in Hungary.

There were essentially three stages in its function. First, NATO and the west helped form the

initial post-communist government. Second, the rise of Vladimir Putin and his subsequent

overtures and threats altered the dynamic. Finally, the rise of Fidesz and Orbán place the

paradigm's effect were it is today. For it seems that Hungary is sitting closer to Putinist Russia

than the United States and even the EU leadership in Brussels. Orbán marked the new embrace

of power politics and self-interest in lieu of many of the founding principles of the European

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[189] European Commission, Assessment of Hungary's National Social Inclusion Strategy.
http://ec.europa.eu/justice/discrimination/files/roma_hungary_strategy2_en.pdf. Accessed July 20, 2016.

Union. This illustrates not only the power of the East-West paradigm, but how it evolved over time since 1989.

Hungary and most former Soviet satellites moved itself politically closer to the west following communism. It joined NATO in 1999 and the European Union in 2004. The notion of belonging to a modern Europe, implied promises and possible economic benefits motivated post-communist, pro-western regimes for a quite a number of years. Culturally, it made sense, too. There are few ethnic Russians in Hungary. There are few Eastern Orthodox adherents. The number of Russian-speaking Hungarians is not noted it is so small. The celebrated "return to Europe", the new world order and prospects of western affluence made the alignment logical.

This period illustrates the positive effect EU membership has on democracy in Hungary. Hungary had extensive work to complete before their membership to the European Union was granted. Some changes to laws and structure met with opposition. The government in Budapest cut their deficit, their healthcare system was modernized and somewhat privatized and wages were increased.[190] New food safety regulations were passed to align with EU standards.[191] Protection of personal data was bolstered.[192] The parliament passed new amendments to the Labor Code.[193] There were large scale changes in the treatment of the Roma minority. The responsibility was reassigned to the office of the Prime Minister.[194] The government made large

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[190] European Commission, "Comprehensive monitoring report on Hungary's preparations for membership," November 4, 2003, 7-8. http://ec.europa.eu/development/body/organisation/docs/CMR_HU.pdf. Accessed January 12, 2017.
[191] Ibid, 19.
[192] Ibid., 22.
[193] Ibid., 34.
[194] Ibid., 36.

changes to their visa and asylum policies. They also aligned their border security with EU

standards with neighboring countries.[195]

Over the next few years, the economy deteriorated. Orbán and the conservative Fidesz

Party won control of the government in 2010. Relations with the west and the European Union

soured over the next few years. Initially, this was caused by the international outcry over

Hungary's immigration policy. The Union's demands for reform placed Budapest in less than

good standing with EU leadership. Many have discussed revoking Hungary's European

Parliamentary voting rights over their opposition to EU migration policy and contemplating re-

introducing the death penalty in Hungary.[196] Viktor Orbán drew Hungary closer to Putin. In

light of the sanctions against Russia for the invasion of the Ukraine, Orbán was characterized as

a "disloyal member [of the EU] agitating it from within."[197] Hungary broke with Brussels and

signed a bilateral gas deal with Moscow. This flew in the face of EU efforts to punish Russia

over their invasion of the Ukraine and support for Assad in Syria.[198] Orbán continues to oppose

the EU on further integration and migration policy.

It is important to note that Hungary's proximity to Russia has little to do with Hungarian

domestic affairs and rights. Orbán does emulate the illiberal democracy of Russia. He and Putin

rule in much the same manner. They differ in that Putin seeks to destroy the EU and Orbán

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[195] Ibid., 47.

[196] Georgia Gotev, "Hungary could lose EU voting rights, MEPs warn Orbán," *Euractiv*, June 20, 2015. https://www.euractiv.com/section/central-europe/news/hungary-could-lose-eu-voting-rights-meps-warn-Orbán/. Accessed July 5, 2016.

[197] Matthew Day and Tom Parfitt, "Vladimir Putin receives a warm welcome from Hungarian PM Viktor Orbán," *The Telegraph*, February 17, 2015. http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/vladimir-putin/11418959/Vladimir-Putin-receives-a-warm-welcome-from-Hungarian-PM-Viktor-Orbán.html. Accessed July 4, 2016; Paul Hockenos, "Vladimir Putin's Little Helper," *New Republic*, April 19, 2016. https://newrepublic.com/article/132778/vladimir-putins-little-helper. Accessed July 7, 2016.

[198] Edith Balazs and Zoltan Simon, "Orbán Attacks EU Energy Plan as Putin Link Nets Hungary Gas Deal," *Bloomberg*, February 17, 2015.http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2015-02-17/hungary-s-Orbán-seals-russia-gas-deal-as-putin-nexus-pays-off. Accessed July 10 , 2016.

simply wants member states to have sole control over domestic affairs. He has no issue with the free trade zone which benefits Hungary a great deal. In this respect, Orbán is not pro-Putin. He is Pro-Orbán. He seeks to ingratiate himself to the Hungarian people and the oligarchs that profit from Hungary's economic success.[199] One only needs to see Orbán's pro-NATO comments after the July 2016 NATO Summit in Warsaw to see how thin his ties to Russia are.[200] It illustrates that Orbán is not pro-East or pro-West. He is pro-Orbán.

Orbán's government plays a specific role in the contagion model. Miller wrote of the democratic contagion in the days following communism. Huntington spoke of democratization comparably: in waves. Orbán represents what might prove to be something akin to Cold War domino theory. It is a palpable example of a wave reversal or Diamond's "democratic rollback". Hungary represents the contagion in this situation. It is a possible starting point for an erosion of liberalism in democracies or democracies as a whole. Some fear Poland is already a victim. The phenomenon does not stop there. Following the Brexit, Orbán's government proposed a national referendum on the proposed EU migration quotas. Some researchers predict a "referendum contagion".[201] While not a victim of the contagion, Hungary seems like it might prove to be patient zero. This might lead to other countries breaking with Brussels on large issues. The contagion could signal a reversal on EU integration.

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[199] Hockenos, "Vladimir Putin's Little Helper."

[200] Jeffrey Gedmin, "NATO cannot be strong if democracy is weak," *POLITICO*, July 7, 2016. http://www.politico.eu/article/nato-cannot-be-strong-if-democracy-is-weak-kosovo-defense-viktor-oban/. Accessed July 15, 2016.

[201] Paula Kennedy, "Europe warns of `referendum contagion'," *BBC*, March 2, 2016. http://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-35697130. Accessed July 12, 2016.

Conclusion

History is the dominant force in molding a modern illiberal democracy in Hungary. Culture and geography play far smaller roles in shaping its character. The press faces obstacles to its freedom. Women face legal and economic hurdles to equality. Minorities experience discrimination and hate crimes, often with little recourse. The Orbán Regime oversees this lack of fundamental rights and seeks to control power by manipulating the judicial branch of the government and safeguarding their power with supermajority requirements in the legislature. It is comparable to a historian picking some of the worst of Hungarian history and implementing it as law.

Much of the deficiencies in democratic rights in Hungary are historical antecedents. Anti-Semitism is rooted in the national memory of betrayal by Jews who formed the interwar communist regime of Bela Kun. This hate and animosity was fed by European contemporaries and Hitler's Germany. The second class treatment of the Roma is another age old institution that Hungarians inexplicably embrace. These attitudes towards threats to Hungarian identity flourish today and include similar attitudes about non-European migrants and refugees. Even native Hungarians are left with the scraps and trappings of democracy and lack a clear voice as the National Assembly represents an institutional mimicry[202] of the Diet under a monarch. Today, Fidesz is the nobility and Orbán their king.

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[202] Ekiert and Ziblatt, "Democracy in Central and Eastern Europe One Hundred Years On," 91.

BULGARIA

Geography, the East-West Paradigm and accompanying contagion infected the emerged contortion of Bulgarian government. The state's post-Communist government is a *mafia state* with limited democratic rights. The situation is deceiving in researching Bulgaria since the collapse of communism and social democracy. There are plenty of historical antecedents that lead one to suspect history is the prime influence on Bulgarian politics today. The same can be said of Eastern Orthodox. Yet, deeper investigation reveals that the common denominator is their neighbor across the Black Sea. The former Soviet Union and the subsequent Russian state established strong ties with the country centuries ago, but remain exerting influence through extra-political means. Complicating the research of post-communist Bulgarian democracy is its current state of transition.

The portrait of political rights and democracy in Bulgaria today is a snapshot of a *medias res*. Russian influence (communist, religious and criminal) stymied the initial quality of democracy and liberal rights after the declaration of a democratic state. These influences started to decline with Bulgaria's accession to the European Union. Advocates for democracy can only hope that Bulgarian President Rosen Plevneliev will continue reforms and break control of the oligarch's "thick necks"[1]. This will give EU influence more time to develop Habermas' theory of post nationalist democracy.[2] It can produce freedoms and rights to the point where Bulgaria Is on par with other liberal democracies seated in Brussels.

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[1] Colin Freeman, "Inside Europe's corruption capital: how Bulgaria's crime mafia plunders EU grant money," *The Telegraph*, November 15, 2008. http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/europe/bulgaria/3463957/Inside-Europes-corruption-capital-how-Bulgarias-crime-mafia-plunders-EU-grant-money.html. Accessed July 16, 2016.
[2] Habermas, "Toward a European Political Community," 60-1.

Democracy

Democracy in Bulgaria was established on July 13, 1991 by the *Constitution of the Republic of Bulgaria*. The document guarantees most of the liberal rights enjoyed in liberal democracies around the world: universal suffrage for all persons over 18, protection from discrimination based on race, sex or ethnicity, political plurality and religious tolerance. The constitution also bans torture, ensures the rights of the accused, and provides for basic privacy rights, the right to petition and the right to an education. The document also contains an extensive number of obligations for the state. It establishes universal healthcare and state run hospitals. It sets up a pensions and disability fund, as well as financial safety nets for the unemployed. It states that the state will play a role in raising the children of the country. It also seeks to provide free school up through college.

The Constitution of the Republic of Bulgaria addresses many of the basic liberal democratic rights found in other Western democracies. The document, however, is far less thorough in terms of rights and privileges than most of its central and eastern European neighbors or fellow European Union members. This is most evident in the number of amendments to the constitution originating from ratified treaties with the European Union. If anything, the document can be read like the rings of a tree. The original document illustrated a refined communist influence. This accompanied the obvious influence of the Orthodox Church. The pull away from the communist past and the work of post-communist, pro-democracy groups is evident, as well. Membership to the European Union accounts for the most recent changes to Bulgaria's constitution.

Bulgaria's constitution illustrates lingering post-Cold War support for collectivism and core communist beliefs. The first article of the first chapter declares the inviolability of popular sovereignty. Such "people power" rhetoric is common among communist and socialist regimes. The constitution is hefty with communal ideals and sets out to establish a large strong government that theoretically defends its people from harms, dangers and even themselves. Article 16 guarantees and protects "labour". It creates a constitutional right to a job for Bulgarians. Article 18 establishes state ownership over natural resources, the right to regulate radio licenses and a monopoly over telecommunications, railways and mail. Later in the document, it declares a freedom of expression (Article 39), but this is limited by challenges to the "established order". Also, Article 43 states that some political groups will have to register. The implication is that some parties could be dangerous.

The document has several historical antecedents from its communist past, but the true dangers to liberal democracy in Bulgaria's constitution are what are not included. Article 43 does not state what kind of political groups will be registered. Furthermore, there is no reference to the Communist past, past party members or the communist party itself. Many other countries in the region have bans on the communist party, fascist parties or comparable groups. Bulgaria's constitution does not reference the 40 years as a Soviet satellite at all.

The Orthodox Church left its impression on the form of Bulgarian democracy. The writers of the Bulgarian constitution incorporate the most basic, and some of the more controversial, tenants of Orthodox dogma into the document. This is somewhat surprising. Orthodoxy is the largest denomination and religion in the country, but there are a large number Bulgarians that claim no official religion, 27.4%. Article 13 declares Eastern Orthodox is the "traditional religion" of Bulgarian. This despite pledges for religious tolerance and no official

religion. Article Four guarantees "life" and Article 28 guarantees the "right to life". This means

opposition to abortion. Article 46 declares that a marriage be between a man and a woman.

These measures continue in Bulgaria despite membership in the European Union. Perhaps, this

will change as much in the country is in transition.

Figure 17. Democratic Criteria, Bulgaria

Field of Assessment	Criteria
Right to form and join political parties and interest groups.	*Fundamental Principles*, Article 6
Freedom of Speech and Expression	*Fundamental Rights and Obligations of Citizens*, Articles 39 and 40*
Right to Vote	*Fundamental Principles*, Article 10
Eligibility for Public Office	*National Assembly*, Article 65: 21 years old, *President of the Republic*, Article 93: 40 years old
Right of political leaders to compete for support/votes	NOT GUARENTEED
Alternative sources of information	NOT GUARENTEED
Free and fair elections	*Fundamental Principles*, Article 1
Institutions for making government policies depend on votes and other expressions of preference	*Fundamental Principles*, Article 1
Political participation in the European Union	35.8% versus 42.5% Member State Average in 2014 EP Elections
General Economic Conditions over Time	GDP Growth: Doubled in the last three years to nearly 3% GINI: +36% and increasing steadily

*Amended by approved EU Treaty

The Bulgarian government is divided into the three traditional branches: executive, legislative and judicial. The executive branch is led by the President. Candidates must be 40 years old. They are directly elected for five years terms with a two term limit. 240 elected members comprise the unicameral legislature, known as the National Assembly. Members must be 21 years old and serve four year terms if elected. The members of the National Assembly nominate the Prime Minister, who is the head of the government. The President is the head of state and appoints the nominated Prime Minister. Both the legislative and executive branches have input into the composition of the judicial branch.

The judicial branch provides judicial review and oversight of the government. Three main courts exist in addition to courts in the various localities. The three most important courts are the Supreme Court of Cassation, the Supreme Administrative Court and the Constitutional Court. The chief justices are appointed by the President for five year terms. After that, they can remain on the court until they are 65 years old. The Supreme Judicial Council is chaired by the Justice Minister and selects judges for the courts. The Supreme Court of Cassation over sees the conduct of justice within the courts system. The Supreme Administrative court oversees the government and the Council of Ministers, the President's cabinet. The Constitutional Court provides the true judicial oversight. This court is comprised of 12 justices. Four are elected by the National Assembly. Four justices are appointed by the President. The final four remaining justices are selected by the Supreme Courts or Cassation and Administrative Law.

The largest challenge to Bulgarian democracy is corruption. The Bulgarian government was infiltrated by modern day gangsters after the Cold War.[3] These crime organizations misused and plundered money given to Bulgaria in efforts to revitalize its economy and modernize the country. Corruption in Bulgaria is three times higher than the European Union average.[4] These criminal organizations embezzle cash, commit tax fraud and circumvent countless other violations of domestic and international law.[5] The Mafia in Bulgaria is deeply involved in contraband cigarettes, human trafficking and illicit drugs (heroin and amphetamines). These groups "exercise a considerable influence over the economic activities in the country."[6] This makes their support important to politicians. This level of corruption is a threat to Bulgaria's sovereignty.[7] A U.S. intelligence memo from 2005 noted that corruption infects all three branches of Bulgarian government. Mob bosses have purchased their way into the political arena.[8] More recent analysis by Moisés Naím cites that "the national interests and the interests of organized crime are now inextricably intertwined."

The EU investigated Bulgaria various times for government fraud, but some say Brussels has made matters worse.[9] Critics say that Bulgaria reverted to totalitarianism in 2009 with the election of Boyko Borisov to Prime Minister. Borisov still has connections to the former communists who are important figures in the underworld.[10] Many of these men were former

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[3] Freeman, "Inside Europe's corruption capital: how Bulgaria's crime mafia plunders EU grant money."
[4] Marco Giannangeli, "Bulgaria – the melting pot of poverty," *The Express*, February 10, 2013. http://www.express.co.uk/news/world/376710/Bulgaria-the-melting-pot-of-poverty-and-corruption. Accessed July 16, 2016.
[5] Freeman, "Inside Europe's corruption capital: how Bulgaria's crime mafia plunders EU grant money."
[6] Giannangeli, "Bulgaria – the melting pot of poverty."
[7] Andrew Rettmann, "EU raises alarm on Bulgarian corruption," *EUObserver*, January 28, 2015. https://euobserver.com/justice/127402. Accessed July 16, 2016.
[8] Moisés Naím, "Mafia States: Organized Crime Takes Office," *Foreign Affairs 91*, no. 3 (May/June 2012) 104.
[9] Freeman, "Inside Europe's corruption capital: how Bulgaria's crime mafia plunders EU grant money."
[10] Giannangeli, "Bulgaria – the melting pot of poverty."

communists who "are fond of European money, but not European regulations." [11] In 2008, the

European Commission cancelled hundreds of millions of dollars in aid to Bulgaria due to

corruption concerns.[12] These types of punishments were the impetus for stronger efforts on the

part of the Bulgarian government to wipe out corruption and curtail their money making

schemes, like drug trafficking.[13] Yet, there has been little progress made.[14] Naím characterizes

Bulgaria as a *mafia state*.[15] A Bulgarian politician was quoted as saying that "other countries

have the mafia; in Bulgaria the mafia has the country."[16]

The mafia in Bulgaria is intertwined with the government. The Bulgarian mafia, as it is

today, was started by former state security leaders. They had taken bribes and allowed the drug

smuggling during the communist era. When communism collapsed throughout the region, they

were already in business. Illicit drugs are a big business for the mafia in Bulgaria, which makes

the situation complicated. The depth of the involvement in government by the mafia is

incredible. It is on every level. Some fear that the country might not be able to exist without it.[17]

The corruption in Bulgaria damaged public confidence in both parties. Representatives

from every part of the political spectrum participate in corruption. Members of GERB, the

center-right party, and its main opposition the Socialists have each had high profile allegations

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[11] Freeman, "Inside Europe's corruption capital: how Bulgaria's crime mafia plunders EU grant money."

[12] Bruno Waterfield, "Bulgaria loses £187mn in EU punishment," *The Telegraph*, November 25, 2008. http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/europe/bulgaria/3520412/Bulgaria-loses-187mn-in-EU-punishment.html. Accessed July 17, 2016.

[13] Ari Shapiro, "Bulgaria Steps Up Efforts Against Drug Trafficking Across Its Borders," *National Public Radio*, June 24, 2015. http://www.npr.org/sections/parallels/2015/06/24/417000427/bulgaria-steps-up-efforts-against-drug-trafficking-across-its-borders. Accessed July 17, 2016.

[14] Rettmann, "EU raises alarm on Bulgarian corruption."

[15] Naím, "Mafia States: Organized Crime Takes Office," 101. .

[16] Atanas Atanasov quoted by Naim, 105.

[17] Vanya Eftimova Bellinger, interview by author, via Skype, September 2, 2016.

and revelations about involvement in dirty politics, cronyism and ties to organized crime.[18] Some

Bulgarians turned to alternative parties. One of these parties was ATAKA. The party drew on

principles of both the far left and far right. It emerged as the union between splinter groups from

across the political spectrum in 2005. Instead of debating ideology and politics, the group took to

capitalizing on the malaise of the country.[19]

ATAKA attacked the status quo, the established political system and its associated

corruption. Along the way, a dangerous nationalism rose. ATAKA used "a discourse of ethnic

and religious intolerance to garner popular support on the far right for what is essentially a far-

left political agenda."[20]They openly declare the infallibility of the state, a ban on all non-

Bulgarian language and leaving NATO. At the same time, the party calls for a very robust set of

social programs and state that these programs take precedence over military spending.[21] Much of

their platform might sound soft-eurosceptic albeit extreme. However, they are not eurosceptic

and make no mistake they are a far-right group.

ATAKA is vocally critical of ethnic minorities and the Roma.[22] The party founder Volen

Siderov blames the recent increase in crime, which he cannot factually support, with

international organizations that tell people that come to Bulgaria that they "should act

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[18] John O'Brennan, "Corruption still dominates political landscape as Bulgarians go to the polls," *Irish Times*, October 3, 2014. http://www.irishtimes.com/news/world/europe/corruption-still-dominates-political-landscape-as-bulgarians-go-to-the-polls-1.1950754. Accessed August 1, 2016; Maria Guineva, "High-Profile Court Hearings in Bulgaria Against Backdrop of OLAF Visit," *Organized Crime and Corruption Reporting Project*, October 26, 2015. https://www.occrp.org/en/daily/4531-high-profile-court-hearings-in-bulgaria-against-backdrop-of-olaf-visit. Accessed August 4, 2016.

[19] Stoyan Sgournev, "The Explosive Rise of a Political Party: The Logic of `Sudden Convergence'," *European Sociological Review 26*, no. 6 (December 2010): 642.

[20] Kristen Ghodsee, "Left Wing, Right Wing, Everything," *Problems of Post-Communism 55*, no. 3 (May/June 2008): 28

[21] ATAKA, *20 Principles of the ATAKA Party*.
http://www.ataka.bg/en/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=14&Itemid=27.

[22] Sgournev, "The Explosive Rise of a Political Party," 642.

differently." He declared that "Racism was never an issue in Bulgaria. However when crime

rates rise, and all this crime originates with these ethnic groups, people start having negative

sentiments. So there is not a single village in Bulgaria that has not been robbed by Gypsy

groups."[23] This extremism appealed to many Bulgarians. Many attended ATAKA's

Independence Day political rallies.[24] In June 2005, the party garnered 8.8% of the national vote.

In 2014, their support slipped to 4.5%.[25] The party has not seen the popularity it did before

Bulgaria's accession to the European Union.

Membership to the EU has a positive effect on Bulgaria's transition to higher quality

democracy. The transition from mafia state to true liberal democracy in Bulgaria is slow. Union

membership accounts for the most recent advances in liberal democratic rights in the country.

Article 4 commits Bulgaria to aid in the building and integration of the EU. The National

Assembly amended Article 22 granting land rights for foreigners. Article 85 establishes the

mechanics for integrating EU treaties and policies into Bulgarian law. Articles 42 and 105 sets

the parameters for Bulgarians electing Ministers to the European Parliament and how the

ministers work with the government on Sofia. Bulgarian President Plevneliev voiced his support

for EU policies as a whole and endorsed the idea of a closer Europe. He advocates for greater

European solidarity in the face of the migrant crisis and other matters, like fighting organized

crime.[26]

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[23] Volen Siderov quoted by John Feffer, " Bulgaria's Ataka Party: An Unlikely Blend of Left and Right,"*Foreign Policy in Focus*, August 15, 2013. http://fpif.org/bulgarias-ataka-party-an-unlikely-blend-of-left-and-right-2/.

[24] Ghodsee, "Left Wing, Right Wing, Everything," 27.

[25] The National Assembly of the Republic of Bulgaria, *Elections for the 43rd National Assembly*. http://www.parliament.bg/en/electionassembly.

[26] Rosen Plevneliev, interview by Andreï Beketov, *Global Conversation*, April 14, 2016. https://youtu.be/66kTZM8lwWw. Accessed on July 7, 2016.

Bulgaria is a very pro-EU country. 51% of Bulgarians have a positive opinion of the European Union. Most of their opinions about Brussels' policies are more pro-EU than most other members states. The only notable objection is to adopting the common currency. [27] This approval of the Union is also evident in their participation in EU elections.

Figure 18. Voter Turnout in EU Elections: Bulgaria, EU and Central and Eastern Europe

[28]

[27] European Commission, Eurobarometer 85, Spring 2016.
http://ec.europa.eu/COMMFrontOffice/PublicOpinion/index.cfm/Survey/getSurveyDetail/instruments/STANDARD/surveyKy/2130. Accessed August 10, 2016.
[28] Eurostat,
http://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/tgm/table.do?tab=table&init=1&language=en&pcode=tsdgo310&plugin=1. August 11, 2016.

Unfortunately, Eurobarometer 85 highlights what most Bulgarians are concerned over: their economy. Unemployment and the economic situation in their home country is the largest concern Bulgarians have by far. Concerns over immigration are half of what they are in other member states. Fears about terrorism barely register in the study. [29]

Economics are problematic for Bulgaria. In many cases, economics cause problems for developing democracies. In Bulgaria's case, the slowly developing democracy caused economic problems. The "legacy issues" from the early post-communist period, the crisis in 2008 and the political instability of 2013-14 have hampered the development of Bulgaria's fledgling free market economy.[30] This partially accounts for being the poorest country in the European Union with one of the highest degrees of income inequality. Regionally, only parts of former Yugoslavia have a lower per capita GDP. [31]

The sovereign debt crisis hit Bulgaria very hard. Unemployment rate jumped nearly 30% from 2009-2010. [32] Both the labor market and the economic structure of the country have problems. Large numbers of younger people are leaving Bulgaria for other countries. Low labor participation and skills mismatches are problematic, too. This leads to the problems endemic to other parts of Europe suffering from "greying". Large numbers of the disabled and elderly are at

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[29] European Commission, Eurobarometer 85, Spring 2016. http://ec.europa.eu/COMMFrontOffice/PublicOpinion/index.cfm/Survey/getSurveyDetail/instruments/STANDARD/surveyKy/2130. Accessed August 10, 2016.

[30] World Bank, *Bulgaria – Overview*, July 11, 2016. http://www.worldbank.org/en/country/bulgaria/overview. Accessed August 11, 2016.

[31] Eurostat, http://appsso.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/nui/show.do?dataset=une_rt_a&lang=en#. Accessed August 13, 2016.

[32] Eurostat, http://appsso.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/nui/show.do?dataset=une_rt_a&lang=en#. Accessed August 13, 2016.

risk. The healthcare system faces major financial challenges.[33] Bulgaria is now the oldest country in Europe and faces the sharpest decline of in the number of working age persons in the world.[34]

**Figure 19. Per Capita GDP (PPP) by Year, Bulgaria**

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[33] European Commission, *Country Report Bulgaria 2016*, February 26, 2016.
http://ec.europa.eu/europe2020/pdf/csr2016/cr2016_bulgaria_en.pdf. Accessed August 13, 2016.
[34] World Bank, *Bulgaria – Overview*, July 11, 2016. http://www.worldbank.org/en/country/bulgaria/overview. Accessed August 11, 2016.
[35] World Bank, http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GDP.PCAP.PP.CD. Accessed August 1, 2016.

**Figure 20. GINI Index, by Year, Bulgaria**

The structural problems are few, but large. The Bulgarian financial system is unpredictable at best and seen as unsupportive to business. There was a domestic banking crisis in 2014 and there are still few reforms in place. The economy lacks structure and safeguards, especially in pensions and banking. Companies are leery of entering a marketplace or labor market with a reputation for corruption like Bulgaria's. The legal framework and justice system are view with skepticism by those with foreign dollars. The lack of speed in instituting reforms and positive change simply compound the existing problems. There are substantial risks to the economy of the country despite improvements over the last few years. [37]

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[36] World Bank, http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SI.POV.GINI. Accessed August 11, 2016.
[37] European Commission, *Country Report Bulgaria 2016*, February 26, 2016. http://ec.europa.eu/europe2020/pdf/csr2016/cr2016_bulgaria_en.pdf. Accessed August 13, 2016.

There are short term positives results. Today, the unemployment rate sits at 9.2%. This is lower than the European Union average. This measure improved over the last three years.[38] Overall GDP growth increased over the last few years. The European Commission predicts higher than normal GDP growth in the next few years. [39]

Figure 21. GDP Growth by Year, Bulgaria

[38] Eurostat, http://appsso.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/nui/show.do?dataset=une_rt_a&lang=en#. Accessed August 13, 2016.

[39] European Commission, *Country Report Bulgaria 2016*, February 26, 2016. http://ec.europa.eu/europe2020/pdf/csr2016/cr2016_bulgaria_en.pdf. Accessed August 13, 2016.

[40] Eurostat, http://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/tgm/download.do?tab=table&plugin=1&language=en&pcode=tec00115. Accessed August 11, 2016.

Bulgaria saw a 20% increase in foreign direct investment in 2015. So far two large companies including Coca-Cola opened manufacturing plants in the country in 2016. Chinese companies are looking to invest, as well.[41] Additionally, the country has improved its greenhouse gas emissions. This enables more energy efficiency and independence. [42] Other projects are simply waiting on further reforms. Eliminating inefficiency in government and barriers to commerce will enhance foreign trade. (Four of the top five trading partners are EU members.[43]) This will foster better relations with other Union members and increase the integration of Bulgaria to the rest of Europe.

The supersession of criminal interests over that of the Bulgarian people defines the lack of democracy in Bulgaria. It is the antithesis of Dahl's expanded notion of governmental responsiveness.[44] Sofia experienced this democratic deficiency multiple times. First, there were a series of anti-mafia protests that turned violent in 2013. While political in nature, the protests targeted the entire system of graft and corruption instead of particular political parties.[45] Little has changed. Second, attempts by reform forces within the government to end corruption have stalled in the National Assembly. A report to the European Commission and European

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[41] Angel Krasimirov, "Bulgaria targets 20 percent rise in FDI this year to $2.1 billion: inward investment agency," *Reuters*, May 31, 2016. http://www.reuters.com/article/us-eeurope-summit-bulgarianfdi-idUSKCN0YM2QN. Accessed August 13, 2016.

[42] European Commission, *Country Report Bulgaria 2016*, February 26, 2016. http://ec.europa.eu/europe2020/pdf/csr2016/cr2016_bulgaria_en.pdf. Accessed August 13, 2016.

[43] CIA World FactBook, *Bulgaria*.

[44] Dahl, *Polyarchy*, 1-2.

[45] Emma Jane Kirby, "Bulgarian protests: Students determined to overthrow the system," *BBC*, November 21, 2013. tp://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-25014732. Accessed August 13, 2016; Sean Carney, "Bulgaria Anticorruption Protests Turn Violent," *The Wall Street Journal*, July 24, 2013. http://www.wsj.com/articles/SB10001424127887324783204578624051005021068. Accessed August 13, 2016.

Parliament points out that legislation to fight corruption and organized crime stalled. Observers and the people of Bulgaria wait for legislation introduced two years ago.[46]

Bulgaria fits neither Hasselmann's maximalist definition of democracy nor that of Alvarez and his fellow scholars. A main component of Hasselmann's notion is checks and balances.[47] There are no checks and balances when judges are bribed and participating in corruption. Additionally, there is no separation of powers if the power is resting with a group of oligarchs that hold sway over large, different parts of the government. This second aspect of the nature of Bulgarian politics can be applied to Alvarez's minimalist notion.[48] The people who make the laws are not acting for the will of the people. They are acting out of self-interest.

An interview with Bulgarian President Plevneliev in April 2016 created the feeling that Bulgaria is a country in transition. All the forces seem to be at work to create a true liberal democracy, but it is highly questionable if enough will change in the country to achieve it. The people are pro-European and look towards closer ties to other European countries through trade and economic opportunities. The President, who is an independent, seems ready to continue trying to reform domestic politics in Sofia. The European Union and its member states, as well as the United States could provide willing partners in democratic development. The question is if these forces can combine to eliminate the power of organized crime. It stands in the way of foreign direct investment from the private sector. It earns the country skepticism from organizations like the EU who have the ability to help. A healthy economy and strong democracy

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[46] European Commission, *On Progress in Bulgaria under the Co-operation and Verification Mechanism*, January 28, 2016, 7-8. http://ec.europa.eu/cvm/docs/com_2015_36_en.pdf. Accessed August 13, 2016.
[47] Hasselmann, *Policy Reform and the Development of Democracy in Eastern Europe*, 25.
[48] Alvarez, et al, "Classifying Political Regimes," 4.

with liberal rights n stop the exodus of working age Bulgarians and diffuse the octogenarian time bomb Bulgaria perches on.

History

Bulgaria existed in different forms before the first millennium. The First Bulgarian Empire was established in 681 by a Bulgar noble named Aspruch. It was the standard medieval arrangement with boyars occupying councils and an assembly with tribal chiefs.[49] Two hundred years later, one of Aspruch's successors, Boris I, sought a national religion. He decided on Eastern Orthodox.[50] This started the Bulgarian tradition of Orthodoxy that exists to this day. In 1018, Byzantine Emperor Basil II incorporated Bulgaria into his empire.[51] Tsar Peter II and his brother defeated Byzantine forces and started the Second Bulgarian Empire.[52] This lasted until the 14th century when the Ottoman Turks defeated the Bulgarians. Turkish rule lasted some 400 years.[53] In the 18th century Russia earned the right to protect Orthodox Christians in the Balkans. For this Bulgaria grew closer to their fellow Orthodox in Russia.[54]

The 19th century saw a flurry of development in Bulgaria highlighted by their independence and their first of four constitutions. Early in the century, Bulgarians elected councils to communicate with the Turks and Greeks. They started schools that taught Bulgarian language. Bulgarians gained an independent Bulgarian Orthodox Church in 1849.[55] In March 1878, Russia and the Ottoman Empire signed the Treaty of San Stefano at the end of the Russo-Turkish War. The treaty gave independence to Serbia, Montenegro, Romania and Bulgaria.

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[49] Fredrick B. Chary, *The History of Bulgaria* (Santa Barbara, CA: ABC-CLIO, LLC., 2011), 3.
[50] Ibid., 6.
[51] Ibid., 12.
[52] Ibid., 17-18.
[53] Ibid., 21-2.
[54] Ibid., 25-6.
[55] Ibid., 28-30.

Bulgaria was "intrusted for two years to an Imperial Russian commissioner" until Bulgaria

elected a prince. Turkish troops withdrew from Bulgaria. Russian troops remained until the

Bulgarian militia could stand up.[56] The Treaty of Berlin signed shortly thereafter revised San

Stefano and clarified that Bulgaria would be an "autonomous tributary principality" of the

Ottoman Empire.[57]

This initiated the Third Bulgarian State. Their first order of business under the watch of

Russian Administrator General Prince Aleksander Dondukov-Kosakov was writing a

constitution. The Turnovo Constitution established the Principality of Bulgaria. The Constitution

was written at a Grand National Assembly comprised of 231 delegates. 89 were elected. The

Russian Administrator chose some delegates, as well. Orthodox bishops, the Muslim Chief Mufit

and Grand Jewish Rabbi were included. The rendered Turnovo Constitution was "one of the

most democratic in Europe". It provided for freedom of speech, press, and assembly. It outlawed

slavery and called for compulsory education for boys and girls. Liberals in the assembly

defeated attempts to establish an upper house. This created a unicameral legislature.[58]

It was not without weakness. Power was concentrated in the monarchy. The monarch

could dissolve National Assembly and held the legislative prerogative. The Council of Ministers

could legislate by royal order. The judiciary acted on behalf of the monarch.[59] The result was that

clashes erupted because the Prince was so strong. Most of the Princes and members of the

executive branch were Russian nobility. The prince eventually used the power to reduce the

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[56] *Treaty of San Stefano*. https://ia801600.us.archive.org/12/items/jstor-2212669/2212669.pdf. Accessed July 31, 2016.
[57] *Treaty of Berlin*. http://archive.thetablet.co.uk/article/20th-july-1878/11/the-treaty-of-berlin. Accessed July 31, 2016.
[58] Chary, *The History of Bulgaria,* 35-7.
[59] Emil Konstantinov, *Constitutional Foundation in Bulgaria.*
http://www.cecl.gr/RigasNetwork/databank/REPORTS/r1/Bu_R1_konstantinov.htm. Accessed August 5, 2016.

number of members of the National Assembly, curtailed civil liberties and created authoritarian rule.[60]

Bulgarian declared its full independence from the Ottoman Empire in 1908 and entered a period of three different wars: the two Balkan Wars and the First World War. [61]   Russia and Germany courted Bulgaria for their support. Germany paid Bulgaria to join the Central Powers. Most Bulgarians were pro-Russian. The government used martial law to shutdown newspapers, retired pro-Russian Generals and started German propaganda. Bulgaria joined the fighting in 1915.[62] Opposition to the war led to the birth of the modern Bulgarian communist party. The Bulgarian "Narrow Socialist" Party joined the Communist international started by Soviet leader Vladimir Lenin. They changed their name to the Bulgarian Communist Party. In 1919, the party took 47 of 236 seats in the National Assembly and became the second largest party in Bulgaria.[63]

The Treaty of Nuilly concluded the First World War between Bulgaria and the victorious Triple Entente. The results for Bulgaria were similar to that of the other Central Powers. They lost territory. The treaty limited the size of their military and manufacture of weapons. Bulgaria acknowledged newly formed Czechoslovakia, Yugoslavia as well as the protectorates of Morocco and Egypt. Bulgaria adopted several of Woodrow Wilson's *Fourteen Points*. These represented changes to the liberal rights afforded some in the country. It guaranteed religious freedom, minority rights and equality before the law. Another large change was the obligation to provide education in languages other than Bulgarian. [64]

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[60] Chary, *The History of Bulgaria,* 37-8.
[61] Ibid., 45.
[62] Ibid., 52-53.
[63] Ibid., 55.
[64] *Treaty of Nuilly*. https://wwi.lib.byu.edu/index.php/Treaty_of_Neuilly. Accessed July 31, 2016.

The Interwar Period in Bulgaria was a turbulent political period earmarked by coups and uprisings by democratic factions, socialists, the communist party and members of the military. In 1923, Macedonian radicals captured and executed Prime Minister Aleksander Stamboliiski.[65] The communist uprising ended after they bombed a church and killed 100 people.[66] The period was also punctuated by a reeling economy and rampant corruption (illegal drugs, weapons and embezzlement). The political system was paralyzed to act against it. In 1934, *Zveno*, a group of social democrats backed by the military, overthrew the government. They banned political parties, replaced elected officials with appointees, dissolved the parliament and strengthened the role of the church.[67]

In 1937, King Boris III restarted local elections. The following year, elections for the National Assembly were allowed using new election laws. Communists were banned from running. This was unenforceable. Political parties were still illegal. There was a literacy requirement for voting. For the first time, women could vote, but only if they were married or widowed. The elections were not fair or free. The government selectively used the ban on political parties to disqualify candidates opposing the government.[68] At the same time, Germany signed the Non-Aggression Pact with the Soviet Union. Due to this and less censorship, communists had a strong showing in elections the following year. The 1939 elections were neither fair nor free either. [69]

Germany offered Bulgaria restoration of traditional lands the country lost after the First World War. Unfortunately, anti-Semitic tactics followed from the government in Sofia. The

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[65] Chary, *The History of Bulgaria,* 66.
[66] Ibid., 69.
[67] Ibid., 76-77.
[68] Ibid., 86-7.
[69] Ibid., 90-1.

National Assembly passed "Law for the Defense of the Nation". They were Bulgaria's version of the Nuremburg Laws that stripped Jews of many of their basic rights.[70] Other laws passed later: restrictions of movement, special taxes, confining Jews to ghettos. When it came time for Bulgaria to deport their Jews as part of Hitler's Final Solution, there was an outrage led by the Orthodox clergy and dissenting members of the National Assembly.[71] Eventually, Boris II and the royal family intervened and prevented the 50,000 or so Jews in Bulgaria proper from being deported to concentration camps.[72]

The situation became very complicated when Germany attacked the Soviet Union. This plunged Bulgaria into violence. Communists in Bulgaria organized into bands of partisans. One of the more popular groups was called the Fatherland Front. They attacked government buildings and assassinated government figures. They were joined by the Jews. Soon, every anti-Fascist and anti-German faction was fighting the government as partisans. The Soviet Union and other Allies sent aid and officers to fight alongside the partisans, too.[73] The government collapsed in May of 1944.[74] The situation in the streets became more dangerous. Now, Bulgarian soldiers, German forces and the partisans were all fighting each other.

The Soviets declared war on Bulgaria on September 5, 1944. Four days later there was a communist coup and the streets of Sofia were drenched in blood. 30,000 Bulgarians were executed in two months of "spontaneous purge campaigns". Stalin directed the communist forces to target politicians, judges and non-communist activists in a "judiciary purge campaign".[75] Half

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[70] Ibid., 94.
[71] Ibid., 106-107.
[72] Ibid., 109-110.
[73] Ibid., 100-101.
[74] Ibid., 114.
[75] Nassya Kralevska-Owens, *Communism Versus Democracy: Bulgaria 1944 to 1997* (Sofia, Bulgaria: American Research Center in Bulgaria, 2010), 54-55.

the members of the National Assembly were executed.[76] In spring of 1945 and other 2,730 death sentences were summarily carried out.[77] Many partisans gained positions in the new government or the new communist Bulgarian Worker's Party after the coup.

The new government attempted to impose an un-Soviet socialism called the "People's Democracy." It had all of the trappings of a social democracy: party pluralism, a free press and other basic fundamental freedoms, including private property. Stalin admonished him personally for it.[78] Soon after, the Bulgarian communists took its cues directly from Moscow.[79] They completely ignored the existing constitution. They ruled using decrees, issuing new laws and amending current ones.[80]After rigged elections the opposition parties boycotted, the communist government abolished the monarchy.[81] On December 4, 1947, they adopted a new constitution.[82]

The new constitution was Bulgaria's second. It is known as the Dimitrov Constitution, named for the Chairman of the Central Committee of the Bulgarian Communist Party, Georgi Dimitrov. The document was modeled after the Soviet Constitution of 1936. It proclaimed the new People's Republic of Bulgaria. It placed much of the economy under state control. It outlawed public ownership "at the detriment of public interest". Executive power was exercised by the Council of Ministers with no judicial oversight. The legislative body was now the Presidium of the National Assembly. It replaced the Supreme Court of Cassation and Supreme

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[76] Ibid., 57.
[77] Ibid., 59.
[78] Pavel Pisarev, "To Communism and back again," *SEER: Journal for Labour and Social Affairs in Eastern Europe 9*, no. 3 (2006): 26.
[79] Kralevska-Owens, *Communism Versus Democracy*, 105.
[80] Ibid., 90-91.
[81] Ibid., 110.
[82] Ibid., 132.

Administrative Court with a single Supreme Court. Despite having many rights included in the document, there was nothing democratic about life in Bulgaria under communism. [83]

Communist life in Bulgaria was different than in other Soviet-styled states. Bulgarian communists operated an oppressive state to be sure. Between 1944 and 1962, 285,000 Bulgarians were sent to concentration camps.[84] Yet, the regime softened after Stalin's death. There was some private property permitted. 80% of households owned their home or apartment. Most farms were never nationalized. There were healthy expenditures on education. Bulgaria had a large network of government run hospitals. More than half of Bulgarians enjoyed relatively nice vacations with their families at beaches or mountain resorts. There was no unemployment. Furthermore, a "soft socialism" in the 1970s started in the 1960s when the concentration camps were closed. Much of this was due to robust economic times based on and a steady Soviet market for Bulgarian exports and cheap Russian oil.[85]

The history of Bulgaria presents two linked and constant historical antecedents to modern Bulgarian democracy: the Orthodox Church and Russian influence. At several different points in history, political figures used the power of religion to their advantage. The Trunovo Constitution included Orthodox bishops into the Grand National Assembly. Later, Zveno bolstered their power by incorporating the Orthodox Church into their government system in 1934. This prominence of The Church still exists today. A related historical phenomenon repetitiously presents itself throughout Bulgarian history: the Russians.

Russia established strong bonds with its little Orthodox cousin, Bulgaria, very early in its history. The official declaration of this relationship occurred in the 18th century although it

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[83] Konstantinov, *Constitutional Foundation in Bulgaria.*
[84] Kralevska-Owens, 174.
[85] Pisarev, "To Communism and back again," 27.

already existed and can be found in Tsar Peter II's earlier defense of Bulgaria from the western Orthodoxy of Byzantium. This ecclesiastical based relationship manifested itself in the secular relationship between the two states over time. Thus, while Bulgaria and Russia shared much in the way of politics in the past, the true cohesive force was The Church. This presents ample material to study in terms of the East-West Paradigm for Bulgaria.

The leader of Bulgaria for most of the period of "soft socialism" was Todor Zhivkov.[86] His regime introduced Bulgaria's third constitution in 1971. It confirmed the single party state. It ended the separation of powers that the Dimitrov Constitution made allusions about. The National Assembly combined the executive and legislative power of the government. The State Council would be a creation of the party and the state. It has a list of liberal democratic rights the reads like a Western European democracy, yet there are seemingly minor wording differences that make large differences. Freedoms are guaranteed by the State by "placing the necessary material conditions for the purpose at the disposal of the citizens." [87]

The 1980s were different in Bulgaria than the rest of the Soviet satellites. It barely started at all and then it started late. Bulgarian glasnost started in 1987. Bulgaria was different because of its history and culture. First, Bulgaria never had any uprisings like Prague in 1968. There was never a cohesive anti-communist opposition. In terms of anti-government activity, "nothing ever happened". Second, Bulgarians looked to the Turks and Greeks instead of eastern Europe. Finally, most Bulgarians did not hate the Russians. Giatzidis wrote that the Bulgarians found

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[86] Kralevska-Owens, *Communism Versus Democracy* 163.
[87] Konstantinov, *Constitutional Foundation in Bulgaria.*

security in the predictable communist system.[88] The economics and lifestyle of post-1960 Bulgaria surely played a part in this.

This changed in 1988 and 1989. Opposition groups started to form. Many were concerned about apolitical issues like the environment. The stronger challenge to the regime came from within its own party. In an ill-conceived move to inflame nationalistic feelings, Zhivkov started forcing ethnic Turks to assimilate. This triggered demonstrations that turned into a bloody fiasco when police opened fire into groups of protestors. To make matters worse, the communist leader then facilitated an exodus of ethnic Turks into Turkey. A new generation of communists had enough. [89]

There was an internal coup and the new leaders pledged to forge a new democratic socialist government. It advocated for political pluralism, the rule of law and to end corruption.[90] They entered into round table talks with anti-communist groups. Bulgaria adopted their present constitution in 1991.[91] These groups knew little about politics or elections. The new Bulgarian Socialist Party (reformed young communists) won the first three elections. One major issue that emerged in the period was the activities of the old communist elite. They used their old connections and money to their advantage. This was the origins of the contemporary mafia in Bulgaria. "Corruption became the rule" in Bulgaria.[92] The Socialists were finally voted out of power in 1997 after disappointing economic policies and allegations of corruption.[93]

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[88] Emil Giatzidis, *An Introduction to post-Communist Bulgaria* (Manchester, UK: Manchester University Press, 2002), 45-6.
[89] Ibid., 47-48.
[90] Ibid., 49.
[91] Ibid., 50-51.
[92] Ibid., 54-55.
[93] Ibid., 69.

Culture

Eastern Orthodoxy impacts the quality of democracy in Bulgaria with some of its archaic beliefs and its concepts about individuals and their rights in relation to government. These deficiencies are serious in Bulgaria because of the large number of practicing Orthodox in the country. Today, 80% of all Bulgarians are Eastern Orthodox. [94] It is "an ancient church, newly charred and chastened by decades of oppression and martyrdom."[95] Unlike other Christians, Orthodoxy never had a Reformation or a Vatican II. Much of their teachings remain as they have been for thousands of years. It opposes cremation and abortion, yet does not condemn capital punishment. It allows for divorce under very strict circumstances. It allows for remarriage (referred to as a "second" marriage) and "in exceptional cases" a third, but only with the "appropriate penance". A fourth marriage is never allowed in the Orthodox Church.[96]

The church's policies in dealing with other religions seem to lack toleration and counter to religious plurality. Orthodox priests are barred from participating in religious services with non-Orthodox clergy. They may not "co-celebrate" with them in marriages, baptisms or funerals. Orthodox congregants are discouraged from attending social events in non-Orthodox religious settings, particularly non-Christian events. "Mixed marriages" with non-Orthodox are only permitted as exceptions. The diocesan Bishop must grant permission before hand. The non-Orthodox celebrant must promise and plan to convert to Orthodoxy shortly after the marriage and the man and woman must sign an agreement that any children from the union be baptized in

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[94] Angel Krasimirov, "Bulgarian church joins calls for cancellation of Sofia gay march," *Reuters*, June 26, 2015. http://www.reuters.com/article/us-bulgaria-church-anti-gay-idUSKBN0P60XZ20150626

[95] John Witte Jr. and Frank S. Alexander, "Introduction", in *The Teachings of Modern Orthodox Christianity*, eds. John Witte Jr. and Frank S. Alexander (New York: Columbia University Press, 2007), xxvii.

[96] Bulgarian Eastern Orthodox Diocese of the USA, Canada and Australia, Bulgarian Patriarchate, *Policy Statements on Contemporary Moral Issues*. http://www.bulgariandiocese.org/files/Policies-Statements-on-Contemporary-Moral-Issues.pdf. Accessed August 1, 2016.

the Orthodox Church. These marriages are a major exception as many Orthodox priests refuse to conduct them at all.

The Orthodox religion does not acknowledge the individual in relation to the government. The Slavophile approach taken by Eastern Orthodox rejects materialism, liberalism and individualism. They contrast political freedom with spiritual freedom.[97] The church believes in a separation of the church and state but seeks *symphonia*. This is the belief that the church and state are equals; "two parts of an ensemble whose conductor is Christ."[98] This conveys the notion that both the Church and the State are ordained by God. It allows Orthodox adherents to honor political leaders as *isapostoloi* or "equals as apostles."[99] This notion of a government ordained by God and leaders as the messengers or agents of God is preposterous to most non-Orthodox. It has no place in the concept of Western liberal democracy.

An important assumption in the belief in symphonia is that the State is a Christian State. Monarchs of Orthodox kingdoms were deemed messengers of God when welcoming or sending missionaries and general of the same countries displayed Orthodox icons before battles and during sieges.[100] This accounts for countries with a long Orthodox legacy or large Orthodox population declaring Orthodoxy as the "state religion" or in Bulgaria's case, its traditional religion. The State, as well as the Church, conduct God's will. It is a century old belief reminiscent of the pre-Vatican II beliefs of Catholicism. They used the motto "God wills it!" as they marched off to the Crusades.

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[97] Paul Vallerie, "Vladimir Soloviev, Comentary," in *The Teachings of Modern Orthodox Christianity*, eds. John Witte Jr. and Frank S. Alexander (New York: Columbia University Press, 2007), , 8-9.

[98] Ibid., 11.

[99] Ibid., 11-12.

[100] Ibid., 12.

Another Orthodox belief is their refusal to acknowledge gay marriage and condemnation of homosexuality. There is a constitutional ban on gay marriage in Bulgaria. Their beliefs about homosexuality are commonly held in Bulgaria. "Homosexuals in Bulgaria mostly have to live their lives in the shadows. Those who come out risk losing their friends and their jobs. The only freedoms are in the shadows." Most view homosexuality in religious terms set by the Church: it's a sin.[101] The "Don't ask, Don't tell" attitude of Bulgarians was violated by a Gay Pride march in 2015. None other than the Church joined anti-gay activists in trying to have it cancelled. These marches in the past have been met with counterdemonstrations and violence. The Bulgarian Orthodox Church is in lockstep with its Russian counterpart, referring to any display that acknowledges the LGBT community as "propaganda of homosexuality".[102]

Members of the LGBT Community are not the only targets of the Church's sociopolitical statements. In 2006 the Church endorsed the activities of ATAKA. In addition to the LGBT community, they target ethnic minorities, including the Roma population. These groups endure hate speech and violence. Their living conditions are substandard. Many groups lived in segregated areas. Their children suffer from a lack of educational opportunities, healthcare and other services. There are many instances of police harassment and disproportionate prosecution. Sometimes, they are even targets of physical violence.[103]There have been some improvement in the national strategy to integrate the Roma and arrived migrants, but further efforts are needed. All minority groups, including the LGBT community, would benefit from simple diligent

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[101] Naomi Conrad, "Bulgarian homosexuals have to keep quiet ," *Deutsche Welle*, October 9, 2013. http://www.dw.com/en/bulgarian-homosexuals-have-to-keep-quiet/a-17147426.

[102] Krasimirov, "Bulgarian church joins calls for cancellation of Sofia gay march."

[103] European Commission, Directorate-General for Justice and Consumers, *Country Report, Non-discrimination, Bulgaria, 2015*. http://ec.europa.eu/justice/discrimination/files/ad_2014_country_reports/2015-bg-country_report_nd_final.pdf.

application and a fair judicial process.[104] Hate speech, which precipitates violence, is on the rise. Hate speech is rarely punished.[105] When these crimes are prosecuted two things usually happen. They are either treated as "hooliganism", which bypass the more severe penalties under the criminal law.[106] Sometimes the courts opt to no prosecute hate speech because of exclusions made for free speech and political platforms.[107]

Fortunately, not all minority groups deal with the same level of vitriol and hate as the aforementioned. Women have excelled in Bulgaria since the collapse of communism. This is despite their second tier status in the Orthodox religion. The World Economic Forum ranks Bulgaria in the top ½ of the countries in the world for overall quality of life for women. They are ranked first in the world for the number of women in professional and technical fields versus male Bulgarians. Educational opportunities and literacy for men and women are almost the exact same. They have the highest life expectancy versus their male counterparts.[108] Opportunities for women in Bulgaria are improving.

This is especially true in the political arena. In the last five years the gender gap between men and women in Bulgarian politics dropped by a third. [109] In 2010 Prime Minister Boiko M. Borisov promoted several women to high levels positions in the government. Women served as Justice Minister, the Mayor of Sofia and Speaker of the Parliament. There are several reasons given for the appointment of so many women. Tatyana Kmetova alluded to the gender equality

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[104] European Commission on Racism and Intolerance, *ECRI Report on Bulgaria*, June 19, 2014, http://www.coe.int/t/dghl/monitoring/ecri/country-by-country/bulgaria/BGR-CbC-V-2014-036-ENG.pdf.

[105] Ibid.

[106] Amnesty International, *Bulgaria 2015/2016*. https://www.amnesty.org/en/countries/europe-and-central-asia/bulgaria/report-bulgaria/. Accessed August 14, 2016.

[107] European Commission, Directorate-General for Justice and Consumers, *Country Report, Non-discrimination, Bulgaria, 2015*.

[108] World Economic Forum, "Gender Gap Report, 2015 – Bulgaria." http://reports.weforum.org/global-gender-gap-report-2015/economies/#economy=BGR. Accessed July 7, 2016.

[109] Ibid.

found in communism. Under communism Bulgaria had the highest percentage of working

women in the world, represented in a wide variety of sectors of work.[110] There reality is that the

increase in political empowerment is due to not only the former communist tradition and high

levels of education, but also the retirement of the initial generation of post-Communist

politicians. In the 21st century, in a Bulgaria open to the world, young educated Bulgarian

women see the possibilities democracy offers.

The rights of linguistic minorities are preserved in the Bulgarian constitution just like the

rights of women. Yet, language is a barrier to many in Bulgaria. Article 36 of the Constitution

guarantees minorities the right to study their mother tongue "alongside" Bulgarian. Article 53 of

the document establishes the right to an education up to the age of 16. However, the language

rights are subject to various obstacles both political and practical. First, there is hesitation to

commit to this politically. Bulgaria is not a signatory to the European Charter for Regional and

Minority Languages.[111] There is also the historical antecedent of the Zhivkov regime that tried

ending Turkish identity, including their culture. Practically speaking, there are problems with

establishing the schools and the children attending. Many asylum seekers arriving in Bulgaria

have no education and are not literate in their own language. Some languages are hard to find

instructors for (Kurdish).[112] Many Roma parents think that the schools are inhospitable because it

seeks to strip their identity away.

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[110] Dan Bilefsky, "Women's Influence Grows in Bulgarian Public Life ," *The New York Times*, February 7, 2010. http://www.nytimes.com/2010/02/08/world/europe/08iht-bulgwomen.html?_r=0. Accessed July 12, 2016.
[111] European Economic and Social Committee, *Mission Report - Bulgaria*, 25 and 26 January 2016. http://www.eesc.europa.eu/resources/docs/bulgaria_migration-mission-report_en.pdf. Accessed August 10, 2016.
[112] Ibid.

Geography

An analysis of the effect geography has on democracy in Bulgaria is very challenging to the paradigm outlined in the methodology section of this work. At the core of the complication is the established fact that Bulgaria is a state in transition. Looking across the last ten years, there are a dearth of articles discussing the relations between Bulgaria and the west and Bulgaria and Russia. Within this period, Bulgaria is reminiscent of a non-aligned state of the Cold War. The articles are informative and illustrate where Bulgaria sits along the spectrum between Moscow and Brussels but only in relation to the topic of the article. Not only does Bulgaria vacillate between the two at different times, but according to geopolitical question. Example: At a particular moment in time, Bulgaria may seem pro-Western in terms of security, while being pro-Eastern in regards to trade. Yet in a month or two, the exact opposite might be true. The movement between East and West are based on security issues, democratic issues, larger economic matters and energy trade.

A scholar will find very obvious Eastern tendencies in Bulgaria in terms of history and culture. Bulgaria was regarded by some as the Soviet Union's most loyal ally.[113]Robert A. Sanders wrote, "Bulgaria… remains a bright spot in the old Eastern Bloc due to its cultural and linguistic affinities with Russia." At two different points in their history, Bulgarians sought to become the sixteenth republic of the Soviet Union.[114] Of course, there is the most contemporary historical observation: Bulgaria remained communist while the rest of the Eastern Bloc abandoned the system. This highlights another point about the Bulgarian transition out of

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[113]Chary, xiii.

[114] Robert A. Sanders quoted by John R. Haines, "The Suffocating Symbiosis: Russia Seeks Trojan Horses Inside Fractious Bulgaria's Political Corral," *Foreign Policy Research Institute*, August 5, 2016. http://www.fpri.org/article/2016/08/suffocating-symbiosis-russia-seeks-trojan-horses-inside-fractious-bulgarias-political-corral/. Accessed August 10,2016.

communism. There was no anti-Russian fervor. The Bulgarians viewed Russians as historical allies.

The strong ties to Russia only get stronger when looking at Bulgarian culture. Bulgaria is 80% Orthodox and Russia has the largest Orthodox population in the world. The nature of the religion illustrates the strength of this connection. It is a relationship you do not see in countries that share other religions. There are not especially strong ties between Ireland and Poland or Germany and Switzerland. The *sobornost*, the willing sacrifice self-benefit for the community, runs strong.[115] Aleksander Solzhenitsyn wrote, "Our ingrained and wretched Russian tradition: We refuse to learn how to organize *from below*, and are inclined to wait for instructions from a monarch, a leader, a spiritual or political authority."[116] This is nothing to say of their shared written language[117] and a shared body of water, the Black Sea.

Perhaps this centuries old exchange of language and religion is an ancient contagion. If this cultural sharing is considered such, then so is the influence of the Ottomans and the present day Turkish minority. The Eastern Orthodoxy and Cyrillic alphabet used in Bulgaria today are popularly, and arguably incorrectly known as, "Russian". One of the larger political parties in the National Assembly is made up of Turkish minorities. Cases can be made that the contagions that effected contemporary Bulgarian democracy are centuries old.

The allure of the west and Bulgaria's accession to the EU challenge these historical aspects of Bulgaria. Their more recent move to democracy not only meant that Bulgaria was further entrenched into communism and social democracy, but that there was more to be gained in

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[115] Vallerie, "Vladimir Soloviev, Comentary," 22.
[116] Solzhenitsyn quoted by Vallerie, "Vladimir Soloviev, Comentary," 21.
[117] Ilin Stanev, "Bulgaria – Russia: Historical gratitude – to a certain extent yes, but love – no way," *Diplomaatia*, http://www.diplomaatia.ee/en/article/bulgaria-russia/. Accessed August 10, 2016.

turning west. These gains include trade, economics and commerce, but also in democratic freedoms and rights. While the democratic improvements in Bulgaria may appear underwhelming to observers, Bulgaria's late start and starting point as "Russia's most loyal satellite" should not be disregarded.

Bulgaria's accession was a more difficult task than that of its neighbors. Their extended period of time under communist/social democrat rule left large pieces of their economic structure and economy farther from the EU directives than other central and east European candidate states. The voluminous pages dealing with privatization in EC reports evidence it. The reports lend the notion of Bulgaria being a slower than average track star running to catch up. While faced with many remedial in changes in terms of democracy and rights, the negotiation process and Bulgaria's accession, in fact, illustrate the transformative power of EU membership.

The negotiations and EU accession process improved the structure of the Bulgarian judiciary and the nation's economic framework. Laws and amendments changed tenures of judges, provided for the immunity and removal of judges. They clarified rules for selecting judge and magistrates.[118] The penal code was also changed a number of times to reflect EU directives. Bulgaria adopted the Council of Europe Civil law Convention and the UN Convention against Corruption. They also ratified the Additional Protocol to the Council of Europe Criminal Law Convention against Corruption.[119]

EU accession aided the privatization of the Bulgarian economy and embrace of free market institutions and ideals. The process is slower than in other countries of the region. It is

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[118] European Commission, "2004 Regular Report on Bulgaria's progress towards accession," October 6, 2004, 17.https://ec.europa.eu/neighbourhood-enlargement/sites/near/files/archives/pdf/key_documents/2004/rr_bg_2004_en.pdf. Accessed January 20, 2017.
[119] Ibid., 20.

reminiscent of taking an automobile from the 1950s and updating it with all of the trappings of a 21st century sedan. The negotiators were faced with deconstructing a command economy and assembling one durable and capable of full integration into the EU's common market. Private ownership increased. Noted privatizations were in banking telecommunications and shipbuilding. The price structures are shifting from administrated to market based. This involves a quantitative easing of prices. Prices of basic utilities were brought up to cost recovery levels slowly as the household incomes grew. Eventually, they will be allowed to fluctuate as a free market sectors develop.[120]

The process of EU membership provided an opportunity for sweeping human rights improvements in Bulgaria. Their courts started enforcing the decisions of the European Court of Human Rights. Their parliament passed comprehensive anti-discrimination legislation. The Penal Code was changed to provide for equal treatment of the LGBT community. They also completed a battery of regulations to curb human trafficking.[121] The government also addressed children's rights by establishing a National Strategy and program for child protection. [122]

The Labor Code was changed to meet EU directives and include protections for workers found in most other industrialized countries. The government established an unemployment fund, obligated employers to disclose employment conditions and offered protections to displaced workers. Work place equality was advanced with the codification of an equal pay regulation and transposition of EU directives on workplace discrimination. Workplace safety improved, moving closer towards EU standards. The government also restructured the resources

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[120] Ibid., 33.
[121] Ibid.,20-1.
[122] Ibid., 24.

for unemployed. Employment Agencies replaced larger Regional Employment Services facilities.[123]

Examining the East-West Paradigm in terms of politics and economics finds a more transient state in Bulgaria. Politically, things have changed a great deal in the 20 years after the end of communism and social democracy. EU membership, regional security challenges, global geopolitics have occasionally pulled Bulgaria West. Even now, when they move back towards Moscow, they are not as close as they once were. The forces that shape Bulgaria now are larger in number and different. Traditional relationships and history are secondary to economic needs and national interests. There are forces that might temporarily pull Bulgaria more to the East, but they are the same forces that will pull it away again in a matter of time. These are largely related to commerce, especially in the energy sector. [124] This is something that even Russian President Vladimir Putin accepts.[125]

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[123] Ibid., 84.

[124] Slav Okov, "Bulgaria May Restore Russian Gas Pipeline, Nuclear Plant," Bloomberg, August 8, 2016. Accessed August 10, 2016.

[125] Sofia News Agency, "Putin: Bulgaria's NATO Membership Does Not Mean End to Relations with Russia," August 17, 2015.
http://www.novinite.com/articles/170396/Putin%3A+Bulgaria%27s+NATO+Membership+Does+Not+Mean+End+to+Relations+with+Russia. Accessed July 4, 2016.

Conclusion

The seeds of the current mafia state in Bulgaria lay in the Russian contagions hidden in the spread of influence and religion throughout history. Constitutions, elections, voting and rights are meaningless with corrupt politicians and a judiciary available to the highest bidder. Most Bulgarians enjoy many of the same rights as their fellow Europeans and EU members. However, without Dahl's responsive government, Alvarez's democratic legal structure and Hasselmann's checks on government power there is no real democracy in Bulgaria. The political leadership of contemporary Bulgaria must continue reforms and eradicate the criminal scourge from the political landscape if there is to ever be a true democracy based in Sofia.

Bulgaria's journey towards liberal democracy continues, half completed to this point. The work of the Plevneliev regime and recent voter turnout in EU elections gives hope that Habermas' ideas about the positive effect of EU membership.[126] Perhaps, a liberal democratic government system in Bulgaria will be the side effect of a larger idea of European democracy based on the European Union. Moscow seems to be ready to accept a certain amount of change in this regard. At least temporarily, the forces that affect the quality of liberal democracy in Bulgaria seem to be changing.

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[126] Habermas, "Toward a European Political Community," 60-1.

V. RESULTS AND FINDINGS

The analysis of the hypotheses from the Methodology section rendered two supported hypotheses, two unsupported hypotheses and two instances where the case studies were inconclusive. This is noted in the statement of the results by hypothesis below. There is an additional section after the statement of results. This section contains findings germane to the topics of democratic quality in central and eastern Europe, the effect history, culture and geography have on democracy in the region and observations vital to draw an accurate conclusion on the subject.

H_1: *The earlier democracy is achieved historically, the stronger the post-communist democracy in the region.* The case studies support this hypothesis. The three case study countries share two different starting points for democracy. Two of the states, Poland and Hungary established the current democratic structures in late 1989. They are in the first group of states to convert to democracy documented by Bunce. Bulgaria fell into the "laggards" group.[1] Despite the end of the official Bulgarian communist regime in 1991, the country was led by reformed communists. This government practiced a modified version of communism commonly referred to as social democracy.[2] This party ruled until 1997.[3] Only then did Bulgaria really start down the road to democracy. The result was predictable. Reports from the accession process showed that there were very basic free changes needed to be a true democracy and EU member. For example, large portions of the economy were still state-owned in 2002. [4]

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[1] Bunce, "The Political Transition," 48.

[2] Giatzidis, *An Introduction to post-Communist Bulgaria,* 49.

[3] Ibid.*,* 69.

[4] European Commission, "2004 Regular Report on Bulgaria's progress towards accession," 33.

H₂: The level of former communist oppression does not appear to affect the quality of liberal rights and democratic quality in the region.

The case studies do not support this hypothesis. The level of communist oppression reflects an inverse relationship to rights, freedoms and democracy in modern central and eastern Europe. Poland experienced the harshest documented oppression of any of the three states included in the case study and they had the highest quality of democracy before the recent rise of the Law & Justice regime. Soviet troops cracked down on the Catholic Church, one of the only persistent institutions in Polish society. There were occasional protests. Sometimes protesters were fired upon.[5] Kadar implemented the relaxed "goulash communism" after he took power following the 1956 revolution.[6] Meanwhile, in Bulgaria, post-Stalin life was confortable. They had good schools, no unemployment, there was a decent amount of private ownership and families even took vacations.[7]

H₃: Western religions tend to promote a higher quality of democracy in the region. The results for this hypothesis were inconclusive. Poland is largely Catholic. Most Hungarians do not claim a religion. Bulgaria has one of the larger Eastern Orthodox religions in the world. Poland is the only case study to test this hypothesis. Much of the more recent impact Catholicism has on democracy in Poland is negative. This is an interesting divergence from the modern history of the country. Pope John Paul II is

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[5] Jane Leftwich Curry, "Poland," in *Central & East European Politics from Communism to Democracy*, eds. Sharon L. Wolchik and Jane Leftwich Curry (New York: Rowman & Littlefield, 2015), 238.
[6] Cartledge, *The Will to Survive,* 469-470.
[7] Pisarev, "To Communism and back again," 27.

credited with aiding in the end of communism.[8]   However, the Catholic Church in

Poland is not like the Catholic Church elsewhere. The Catholic Church embraces

religious pluralism and individual rights.[9] Yet, the Catholic Church in Poland vehemently

opposes gay marriage[10] and abortion.[11] This may be attributed to their isolated position

behind the Iron Curtain during the institution of the Second Vatican Council.

H_4: *Western ethnic heterogeneity has no effect on post-communist democracy in the*

region, while the presence of non-Western minorities does. The results for this hypothesis

were inconclusive. The case study countries offer differing results in terms of the effect

ethnicity has on the quality of democracy. The Roma present an example of

discrimination and disenfranchisement based on ethnicity. Yet, the Turkish minority in

Bulgaria shares a comparable quality of democracy with ethnic Bulgarians. Poland

contributes little to the discussion because of the homogeneity. It is tempting to use

ethnicity as a factor in the level of rights and freedoms in the region because of the long

history of strife based on the variable. There were the post-communist Balkan Wars.

Moscow intermittently banters about preserving the rights of Russian minorities.

However, ethnicity as a factor is minor compared to others such as, history, religion and,

even economics.

One might conclude that the idea of an ethnic impact on democracy has a temporal aspect

to it. The Turks in Bulgaria are a long established and integrated minority. Yet, the plight of the

Roma is long and storied. The ethnic strife that plagued the former Yugoslavia was managed by

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[8] Dziwisz, *A Life with Karol* , 117.
[9] Vlas and Ghergina, "Where does a religion meet democracy?," 341.
[10] Ramet, "Religious Organization in Post-Communist Central and Southeastern Europe: An Introduction,", 6.
[11] Byrnes, *Transnational Catholicism in Postcommunist Europe* , 46-47.

Tito. In short, the true effect ethnicity has on democratic quality is not the presence of minorities, but their role in the political landscape. Turks in Bulgaria are political established with their own party. They have a place in the political establishment. The true damage to the quality of democracy in the region occurs at the hands of reactionary governments. Fully educated and integrated minorities could be a threat and at least cause uncertainty to the status quo. This helps explain the recent more restrictive migration policies of many central and east European states. These policies can pit the capitals of the region in opposition to Brussels and in the context of refugees in conflict with international law.

> H_5: *Relations with Russia have little to do with the quality of democracy in the region.* The case studies do not support this hypothesis. Each of the case study countries has a different relationship and different history with Russia. These relationships can be broken down into political, economic and social. In short, all three understand that Russia could be or is presently a threat.[12] Yet, Moscow's true strength in the East-West Paradigm is economic for Poland and Hungary. The Russian leadership can use the economic blackmail of energy availability or price to extort political gains. This is only countered by the power of the EU. Bulgaria is in a different class altogether. Bulgaria and Russia have a common religion. Their history shared religion help explain the level of democratic quality in Bulgaria. The remnants of the secret police who established the organized criminal activity and current mafia state represent Russia's impact on modern Bulgarian democracy. The European Union and the West offer all three states an alternative to Russian influence. The tug of war between the EU and Russia, especially in economic matters, illustrates the East-West paradigm.

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[12] Larrabee, "Russia, Ukraine, and Central Europe: The Return of Geopolitics," 43-4.

H_6: Democracy spread through parts of the region like a contagion, but now this type of effect is sporadic. The case studies support the hypothesis. The collapse of communism that started in Poland rolled through the region like a virus. Yet, years later, things have seemingly changed. This supports Kapstein and Converse, who say that a democracy matures after six years.[13] Most advances in democracy now come from domestic pressure or international organizations. The domestic pressure is more regular now because the political system has matured. People know their rights. There are developed parties and interest groups. International organizations now have power because the countries are members of organizations like the EU and NATO. The governments have obligations, even though they might not always meet them. The result is the countries of central and eastern Europe achieving democratic advancements at different points and times. This is according to their pressures and priorities.

There are additional findings wrought from the analysis of these three countries. Some speak to the democracy in the region. Others speak to the effect of history, culture and geography on democracy in central and eastern Europe. There are a few that address some very salient points about democracy.

One observation about the status of democracy in central and eastern Europe pertains to the lack of rights and freedoms in some states and the prospect of a "democratic rollback"[14]Democracy, in all its forms, can be ugly, hard work. To say otherwise is to be as deceived as the Poles who thought Accession would be easy.[15] Many highlight that the states of

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[13] Kapstein and Converse, "Why Democracies Fail," 61-62.
[14] Diamond, "The Democratic Rollback: The Resurgence of the Predatory State," 36.
[15] Krok-Paszkowska and Jan Zielonka, "Poland's Road to the European Union," 13-14.

central and eastern Europe are longer "young democracies"[16]. Many of their trials and tribulations are similar to those of much older democratic states. Use the United States as an example. The U.S. was not much better at the same point in their statehood. Using 1989 as a starting point, the oldest of the states is 28 years old. The comparable year in American history was 1809. At this point, the U.S. had not finished expanding to the West. There were still tensions with Great Britain. Slavery had not been abolished and still divided the country. One of the largest debates of the first half of the 19th century was yet to be made: fiscal policy and the National Bank. Today's Superpower was racked with social problems, economic questions and faced an unsure geopolitical future. Only a few years later, the invading British soldiers burned the White House to the ground.

They key to states surviving is the resilience of the established systems. This includes the European Union. There will be disagreements. There could be crises. There is even a remote chance of armed conflict. This doesn't change the progress the states of the region have made. We have already seen examples of each. The debate over refugees rages on. The debt crisis was abated for the time being. Europe survived a series of Wars in the Balkans. The countries of central and eastern Europe still rose from the ashes of communism to become fledgling democracies with at least a smattering of liberal rights.

Another observation from the case studies is that history should be regarded when studying the politics and democracy of central and eastern Europe. History can prove to be at least informative and perhaps, in some cases, predictive. Note the terms "historical antecedent", "institutional mimicry"[17] and "memory culture"[18].While in many cases we speak of the first two

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[1616] Kapstein and Converse, "Why Democracies Fail," 61-62.
[17] Ekiert and Ziblatt, "Democracy in Central and Eastern Europe One Hundred Years On," 91.

terms in positive terms: reviving the trappings of democracy, naming the parliaments traditional names from history, the terms along with the latter can refer to negative phenomena. Just because something is historical, that does not make it a positive aspect of politics. Think of Jobbik in their fascist brown shirts with the Arrow Cross symbols. The re-emergence of the dark chapters of history can be as dangerous as the emergence of revived democratic practices is to be celebrated.

Another interesting aspect is the study of religion in regards to rights and freedoms. One of the more recent political science fads is researching the compatibility of Islam with democracy. The campus library database is awash with articles analyzing the topic any number of ways. Yet, there are few volumes looking at the other Abrahamic religions. While Woodberry and Shah correctly point out the "natural affinity" between Protestant Christianity and democracy,[19] Orthodoxy is quite different. In fact, it is rather restrictive when it comes to individual rights. Most agree that the religion is antithetical to democracy.[20] The obvious observation is that Islam, often maligned for being incompatible with democracy[21], and Orthodoxy, which most reluctantly agree the same, are both eastern religions. However, without a comparable assessment of Judaism and other non-western religions a conclusion is hazardous at best.

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[18] Bazinger, "The Funeral of Imre Nagy," 143.

[19] Berger, "The Global Picture," 178.

[20] Schimmelfennig and Schultz, "Legacies and Leverage: EU Political Conditionality and Democracy Promotion in Historical Perspective," 447; Berger, "The Global Picture," 80; Vlas and Ghergina, "Where does a religion meet democracy? A comparative analysis of attitudes in Europe,"344.

[21] Fauzi M. Najjar, "Democracy in Islamic Political Philosophy," *Studia Islamica*, no. 51 (1980): 109.

VI. CONCLUSION

History, culture and religion contribute to the varying quality of democracy in central and eastern Europe. The countries of the region emerged from communism in two different waves. The states were hampered by different problems. Many did not have a political system at all. Many saw their economies in shambles. The systems and processes created were partially guided by the past history their culture and the location between the rest of Europe and their former masters in the Kremlin. The region contradicts many of the established theories and methods of study. Central and eastern Europe has a very unique history. The states are populated by a very diverse collection of peoples. They sit in a very unordinary sometime perilous spot on the map. The area is best studied using a regional approach with a regard for their past identity and location. More recently, pessimism, xenophobia and a euroscepticsim confront these states.

No other area in the world has a history comparable to central and eastern Europe. Many states were settled in the first century. Unfortunately, some of the regional rivalries and grievances are just as old. Through the millennium, the landscape was pockmarked with battles, claims to sovereignty, invading armies, passing crusaders, attacking armies and communist domination. The occupants collectively practice all three of the Abrahamic religions. This alone made peace difficult at times. Many different languages are spoken. Central and eastern Europe is the home to several different national identities. Additionally, the countries live in the shadow of their former oppressor, Mother Russia. The region's singular history, unique culture and unusual geography are one of a kind.

Because of this uniqueness, many theories cannot fully explain their democratic quality and government. Traditional economic based models fail. Poland and Hungary are economically

stable, but still lack many liberal rights. Social theories that use ethnicity are not adequate either. Many of the countries are rather ethnically homogenous, but are still democratically deficient. Poland and Hungary are comprised largely of white Christians Most of these theories and models based on quantitative measures fail to accurately explain the differences in rights and freedoms citizens from different countries in the region enjoy. Turks are readily accepted in Bulgaria and have their own political party. The same Bulgarian Turks would face xenophobia and hate in Hungary.

Religion plays a large role in the quality of rights and freedoms in many of the states of central and eastern Europe. This large role in select states can be explained for a variety of reasons. For example, the Catholic Church remains the only constant in the society. The establishment of the church in Poland goes back thousands of years. A large part of being Polish is being Catholic for many Poles. The Catholic Church's preponderance of power in modern Poland is evident in their laws and post-communist constitution. The Church took a large role in is writing and Catholic dogma is incorporated into it. The Orthodox Church takes a different attitude towards secular government. It believes that both the Church and the government sit equals. This harkens back to the period of divine rite monarchs.

The location of the region is important to the politics. As it is the frontier of the western civilization. They are bordered by non-western countries and Russia. This position grants them the unenviable role of the object of both western enticements from Brussels and eastern propositions from Russia. EU membership and a close relationship with other member states to the west improved the quality of democracy in the region. The participation in the European common market aided in the stability of their post-communist governments. Russia, who opposes this close partnership between the EU and its former satellites use both carrot and switch

to protect its own interests Some states, like Bulgaria, are more inclined than others to work with Russia due to close cultural ties, namely the Orthodox Church.

The unique past, diverse population and particular geography of central and eastern Europe help determine the quality of democracy in the states of the region. Other more popular and traditional factors are still at work, but they are less important in this particular region. A regional approach is the optimum method for researching the throughputs of government and democracy in the area. This could be used elsewhere, but definitely not as written here. Few places have a comparable history. No place has such a differing mix of people with the history. Even fewer have all of this while pinned between the state that served as the twentieth century regional hegemon and the twenty-first century supranational state. Central and eastern Europe is far from just being different. The states are collectively distinct.

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