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The Treatment of Ethnic Minorities in Democratizing Muslim Countries: The Securitization of Kurds in Turkey Versus the Autonomization of Acehnese in Indonesia

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THE TREATMENT OF ETHNIC MINORITIES IN DEMOCRATIZING MUSLIM COUNTRIES: THE SECURITIZATION OF KURDS IN TURKEY VERSUS THE AUTONOMIZATION OF ACEHNESE IN INDONESIA

by

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A Dissertation Submitted to the Faculty of Old Dominion University in Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for the Degree of

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May 2017

Approved by:
David Earnest
Francis Adams
Fran Hassencahl
Samuel Huntington¹, almost half century ago, explained how the state capacity is fundamental to guarantee order in societies in transition. Francis Fukuyama², recently, recuperated this concept arguing that a strong effective state is fundamental for stability of democratizing countries. But strong institutions are not enough to make democracy and political order compatible: institutions need to be also inclusive, to foster participation of all parts of society, including ethnic minorities.

The main question this study wants to answer is: what factors explain the differences in how democratizing Muslim countries treat their ethnic minorities? Studies of social conflict or democratization in Muslim countries typically emphasize sectarian divisions but ignore ethnic differences. The research is a comparative analysis of two similar cases with different outcomes: Turkey and Indonesia. The focus of the study is to analyze specifically two cases and outcomes: the securitization (Buzan et. al., 1998) of Kurds in Turkey and the “autonomization” (Lijphart, 2004) of Acehnese in Indonesia, to understand what independent variables affect these different results. The cases chosen are the two most scholarly recognized democracies in the Muslim world. The hypotheses to test are four: the elites’ power interest, following the Rational Choice theory, the international factors, following the structural theories, the institutions and history of the state, following the Historical-Institutionalist theory, and finally the ontological security of the country, following the Critical theories. Also, by examining states with ethnic diversity but very little religious diversity, the research controls for the effect of religious conflict on minority inclusion, and so allow future generalization and comparison to minority inclusion in

democratizing states that are not Muslim. The research design is based on the ‘most similar systems’
(Miller criteria) and on ‘process tracing’, to clarify the causal chain.
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I dedicate this study to Shadia Marhaban, who has been always my anchor and my beacon, to the Kurds and the Acehnese, for a bright path, and to all minorities around the world, the disenfranchised, the underdog, the people excluded and discriminated. Here’s to you, for a future in which all humankind will find the path to social justice and human equality.
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CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION

This study examines the following: what explains the different treatment of ethnic minorities in democratizing Muslim majority countries? The answer to this question is important because democratic transitions are sustainable only if they are inclusive. Specifically, the democratic transition of the two case studies of this research, Turkey and Indonesia, took different paths also because of the differences in their approaches to the inclusion of ethnic minorities. Furthermore, the national security and the risk of radicalization in these, as well as other, democracies are affected by the inclusion or exclusion of ethnic minorities. Therefore, this study will have an important impact on our understanding of the consequences of the incorporation of ethnic minorities in modern democracies.

There are 47 countries in the world where Islam is the religion of the majority of population, but the literature on democratization has considered mostly two of them to be democracies: Turkey and Indonesia. This, in the past, has made scholars to consider the relationship between Islam and democracy as difficult and sometimes even as incompatible. Furthermore, the few studies that have examined this relationship, have mostly adopted a religious perspective, at least until the so-called “Arab Spring”.

Today, we have clear evidence that the Islamic religion is not a significant factor in explanations of

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3 Muslim majority democracies are different from the so called “Muslim democracies” that some scholars use, as the latter imply some Muslim influence in the government. One scholar speaking about “Muslim democracies” is Cesari, who argues that Westernization and nation-building processes in Muslim states have not created liberal democracies in the Western mold, but instead pushed the politicization of Islam by turning it into a modern national ideology. Also, Cesari, citing in particular Indonesia, Senegal, Tunisia and Egypt, uses the term of “unsecular democracy” for democracies that accept free/fair elections and some civil liberties, but reject liberties seen as a threat to the national community/identity based on Islam (sexual and spiritual sphere and rights of the self). See: Jocelyn Cesari, The awakening of Muslim democracies (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2014).

4 See: Edward Schneier, Muslim Democracy: Politics, Religion and Society in Indonesia, Turkey and the Islamic World (New York: Routledge, 2016). Others scholar consider other Muslim countries also as democracies (in particular Senegal and Mali, the last one until the coup in 2012), see: Paul Kubicek, Political Islam and Democracy in the Muslim World, Boulder-London: Lynne Rienne Publishers, 2015.

democratization, even if studies find a statistically significant negative relationship between Islam and democracy. This because Islam in itself, as every other religion, cannot be painted with a big brush considering it as a monolithic set of religious and cultural values impacting the political institution of a country in an essentialist view. Nevertheless majority of Muslim countries (mostly in the Arab World) are not democracies, and international factors (including the history of colonization followed by authoritarian regimes supported by external powers) are not enough to explain it. Beside this there is a real gap in the literature of comparative analysis, including in the one comparing Muslim majority democracies, on how Muslim majority countries democratize and how they include ethnic minorities in this process, and that is the reason of this study.

Studies of social conflict or democratization in Muslim countries typically emphasize sectarian religious divisions but tend to overlook ethnic differences. To redress this deficiency, this study examines the incorporation of ethnic minorities in democratizing Muslim countries, analyzing in particular two competing modes of treatment, one of repression and one of accommodation: the “securitization” of Kurds in Turkey and the “autonomization” or granting of autonomy to Acehnese in Indonesia. By examining states with ethnic heterogeneity but very little religious diversity, the research controls for the effect of religious conflict on minority inclusion. This allows the study to examine citizenship regimes independently of established religions, and permits future generalization and comparison to minority inclusion in democratizing states that are not Muslim. Therefore, a comparison only of Muslim majority countries with respect to democratization—an approach that scholars usually do not adopt to study

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6 As Schneier definitely showed, what affect the democratization problems of “Muslim democracies” around the world is not the Islamic religion but variables like poverty, nation building, civil infrastructure and belonging to regions late to achieve independence from colonial rule, and so unable to build strong nation states or civic cultures. Edward Schneier, *Muslim Democracy: Politics, Religion and Society in Indonesia, Turkey and the Islamic World* (New York: Routledge, 2016).

7 See on this among others: Charles Rowley and Nathanael Smith, “Islam’s democracy paradox: Muslim claim to like democracy, so why do they have so little?” *Public Choice*, 139 (3) 2009: 273-299.


democratization in majority Christian or Buddhist countries for—is not based on a negative evaluation of the relationship between Islam and democracy, with an Orientalist approach looking at limits of the Muslim religion for democratization (or anyway the role of Islam in democratization periods). On the contrary, the study emphasizes a comparative need for generalization and, at the same time, a need for causal analysis of an overlooked but important element of democratization in pluralistic societies, the treatment of ethnic minorities.

The importance of this research lies at the intersection of several current theoretical debates in International Relations theory and Comparative Politics field: democratization, national security, and radicalization. The study has three theoretical objectives: to understand the extent to which Muslim countries with ethnic minorities can make their democratization more efficient and sustainable; how this improvement is done in a way that guarantees stability and national security for the country; and how this can be done while avoiding social radicalization, often connected to the disenfranchisement and/or repression of minorities.

These three goals may seem in conflict at the first look. Democratization requires the inclusion of previously excluded parts of society. At the same time, concerns about national security may grow for some sectors of society and lead to a type of differentiation—including juridical discrimination or repression—for the sake of social stability and harmony. For example, democratization may encourage self-determination movements but also clashes caused by new ethnic groups migrating to a country. The prevention of radicalization may require an investment in security and, once again, control of some specific minority groups. Such control could have opposite effects of increasing polarization and extremism in a democratizing society. This study therefore is of fundamental importance because it analyzes how modern democracies may resolve the possible tensions among these three different goals while integrating minorities in an inclusive process. The study seeks to explain why some states succeed at this while others fail.
Regarding specifically the democratization processes, it is difficult to identify the moment in which a democratizing state become an established democracy. Democratization also can be reversed.\textsuperscript{11} In many cases, transitions to democracy created procedural or “formal” democracies but not liberal, “substantive” democracies. The failure or success of transition to democracy specifically in Muslim majority countries—apart from the problem of foreign interventions that may have an important impact on democratic transitions, particularly in the Arab world—often depended in the past on the exclusion or inclusion of ethnic, religious or political minorities by the new regimes. This can be considered one of the most important domestic factors of the “Arab exceptionalism”\textsuperscript{12}, and one of the causes of the failure of the recent “Arab Spring” (with the only exception of Tunisia) considered sometimes as the possible “fourth wave” or the reactivation of the “third wave” of democratization in the world.\textsuperscript{13} These failures have kept the countries of the Middle East as outliers on the global path to democracy. From the problems in Egypt, among which is the lack of inclusion of seculars and non-Muslims by the Muslim Brotherhood; in Iraq, where Sunni were suddenly excluded from the Al-Maliki regime; to the successful experience of inclusive processes in Tunisia or even Morocco, a monarchy that passed after the Arab Spring protests through democratic reforms, also with improvement in minorities’ rights; we see how strong and inclusive institutions are crucial for the stability of the democratizing regimes in the region as Acemoglu and Robinson among others argue.\textsuperscript{14} Such institutions are what many states still miss today. These institutions sometimes have suffered also from their past, the fact that the old processes of nation-state building often sidelined the self-determination right of minorities (from Armenians to Kurds, from Berbers of Maghreb to Arabs of Palestine), creating states that oppress ethnic minorities.

\textsuperscript{11} For example, Bratton and Van de Walle list four possibilities for transitions: precluded, blocked, flawed or successful transitions. See: Michael Bratton and Nicholas van de Walle, Democratic Experiments in Africa. Regime Transitions in Comparative Perspective (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997).
\textsuperscript{12} Larry Diamond, “Why are there no Arab democracies?” Journal of democracy 21 (1) 2010: 93-104.
Regarding the national security issue, the exclusion or inclusion of minorities—in particular in cases of separatist movements—has an evident impact on security questions, both in Muslim and non-Muslim countries. After the end of the Cold War, intrastate conflicts have become more frequent while interstate conflicts have almost disappeared. Samuel Huntington was right arguing that conflicts, after the end of bipolar ideologies, would follow the ethnic, cultural and religious cleavages within states rather than those between nation-states. Nevertheless, he was wrong in the positioning of these cleavages, as they would be drawn not among civilizations—with alliances of similar countries one against the other as he suggested—but instead would be inside states, with the dissolution of multi-ethnic and multi-religious countries and the subsequent re-construction of cleavages and sectarianism. The exclusion—and more specifically the exclusively security-focused approaches to minorities and local identities, including the displacement of big parts of populations to break their possible self-determination movements—is evidently contributing to insecurity and instability in the Middle East, a region already in chaos since the implosion of the post-Ottoman order. Therefore, the inclusiveness and the passage from an only “state security” approach to a more “human security” approach will be important for the future of national security.

Finally, the inclusion of minorities could also represent one of the fundamental solutions to radicalization, in particular the current form of Salafi-Jihadist terrorism. Scholars argue that DAESH/ISIS was born not only because of the exclusionary Al Maliki government in Iraq, but also because of the Wahhabi ideology spread around the region by Saudi Arabia. Even the foreign fighters that support DAESH often come from realities of marginalization and consequent radicalization—even if radicalization is a complex process based also on economic, psychological and identity alienation and crisis that are not directly related to exclusionary processes. Collective identities of populations have shifted recently in the Middle East, with construction and re-construction of ethnic and religious cleavages and sectarianism.

Nevertheless, the radicalization of ideological or religious positions is a social problem that goes beyond the Salafi terrorism in several countries. After the Arab Spring, some political groups attaining power (such as the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt or the Ennahda party in Tunisia) started to radicalize their position in part because of past political exclusion and oppression. This had negative effects on the legitimacy and sustainability of the new regimes. Even with the Acehnese of Indonesia, one of the cases examined in this study, the current application of Sharia Law happens after a long history of suppression of local religious identity, a process that also contributed to radicalization of new ideas and policies.

Pluralism and inclusion are not the only paths for a sustainable democratization but nonetheless are foundational elements in every democracy, even for mature democracies that still must strive to maintain their legitimacy and substantiality.\textsuperscript{16} For this reason, this research is important for every state that upholds democratic values in a globalized world that currently is witnessing a mutation of the old forms of nation-states. The problem of the inclusion of ethnic minorities contributes to the tensions between integration and security versus radicalization and terrorism. Today this represents one of the crucial problems that policy makers must face in order to create cohesive and peaceful societies hit by economic and identity crises, even in the so-called “West”. As Dorsey argues, to create pluralist and inclusive states in Middle East and Europe we need “fostering inclusive national identities that are capable of accommodating ethnic, sectarian and tribal sub-identities as legitimate and fully accepted sub-identities in Middle Eastern and North African, as well as Western countries, and changing domestic policies in the West towards minorities, refugees and migrants.”\textsuperscript{17}

\textbf{Theoretical Approach}

Almost all the countries in the world are ethnically diverse, apart the two Koreas, Japan, Poland and few other central European countries, from where, after centuries of wars, originated the concept of

\textsuperscript{16} Freedom House for example include in its 8 points of Political Rights checklist for all democracies one important element for minorities: “do cultural, ethnic, religious, and other minority groups have reasonable self-determination, self-government, autonomy, or participation through informal consensus in the decision-making process?”

\textsuperscript{17} James M. Dorsey, 2016, p. 3.
nation state.\textsuperscript{18} But while in some countries such as those of the former Yugoslavia federation, Rwanda or Syria, ethnic and religious differences have been used by political elites to socially construct and reconstruct identities in order to fuel sectarian and ethnic conflicts,\textsuperscript{19} in others such as Canada or Indonesia these differences have been accepted and protected as a fundamental element of pluralism and tolerance, and so as the basis for future democratic developments.

The inclusion of minorities in Europe—differently from the US where immigration of the different communities has had a longer history of integration—has been defined in two broad categories. The first is the assimilationist approach,\textsuperscript{20} along the lines of the French model, following the American one; this approach integrates minorities by substantially erasing their differences in an attempt to create egalitarianism. The other is the multicultural approach,\textsuperscript{21} based on the German and British model, but also Canada or Australia. The multicultural approach integrates minorities but permits them to maintain their identities and cultures in an attempt to create cosmopolitanism. Today, it seems that both the assimilationist and multiculturalist approaches have failed to build a real integration of migrants and autochthonous peoples in Europe: on the one side a forcing of a common identity, and on the other the classification in cultural boxes, have failed to recognize diversity while providing equal citizenship.

This has been an important environment where some Jihadist terrorist groups have been growing, with the results including the recent attacks in Europe. Some scholars such as Stuurman speak about the

\textsuperscript{18} See on this: Max Fixer, A revealing map of the world’s most and least ethnically diverse countries, \textit{The Washington Post}, May 16, 2013. From: https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/worldviews/wp/2013/05/16/a-revealing-map-of-the-worlds-most-and-least-ethnically-diverse-countries/


\textsuperscript{20} The Chicago school formulated the concept of assimilation as incorporation in a common cultural life, applied to American society, in the 1920s. See: Robert Ezra Park and E W Burgess, \textit{Introduction to the science of sociology} (Chicago, IL: University of Chicago press, 1924). Later, in the 1960s, authors like Gordon made a distinction between acculturation and ‘structural assimilation’ in which the minority group enter in the social clubs, institutions etc. See: Milton Myron Gordon, \textit{Assimilation in American life: the role of race, religion, and national origins} (New York: Oxford University Press, 1964).

\textsuperscript{21} Multiculturalism is considered when a society is unitary in the public domain but encourage diversity in private or communal matters. See the seminal work of: John Rex, \textit{Ethnic minorities in the modern nation state: working papers in the theory of multiculturalism and political integration} (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1996).
specific “Islamophobic assimilationist mood”, after the 9/11 attacks, in France and in general in Europe. The repression of Muslim identity with the goal of assimilation (for example, the French ban on the headscarf in public or the prohibition of the Halal food in public kitchens) clearly contributed to Islamic radicalization. Nevertheless, we cannot say that multiculturalism, which promoted segregation and division of cultures in “boxes”, had better results in other countries because Islamic radicalization also happened in multicultural countries including the UK, Belgium and the Netherlands.

Therefore, in one way or another, different cultural identities have to be taken into account in our modern migratory societies which today are living a transition from the traditional “nation-state” to a new polity that seems to appear gradually. An ideal policy would take the good sides of each system: the maintenance of cultural identities of multiculturalism, but not as sealed compartments, and the equality in a society of citizens of assimilationism, but without erasing different needs. In reality, on the European continent, we are looking nowadays at embryonic developments of different types of policies that we could define sometimes as the “securitization” sometimes as the “autonomization” of new migrants.

These policies could be considered actually on the same continuum: securitization as the extreme form of assimilation and autonomization as the extreme form of multiculturalism. The first approach favors constant surveillance and control of migrants (a mutation of the failed assimilation approach). The second approach supports the “autonomization” of migrants, with their attempted repatriation (like a mutation of the failed multiculturalism).

The study will explain later in detail the processes of securitization and autonomization, but here briefly is the explanation of the two terms. The securitization process comes from a critical theory based on a “broadening” process of security concepts, formulated by the Copenhagen School after the Cold

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War. According to this school, when a state labels some issue (including a minority) only as a “security issue” it puts it outside the political arena, justifying in this way extraordinary security, policing and military measures to deal with it. These security policies create a “permanent state of exception” that forms power relations of exclusion, constructing the issue as a threat to national identity. This approach leads to criminalization of minority groups and often to a violent conflict with them. The theoretical reference for this approach is the work of Buzan, Waever and de Wilde, who for the first time conceptualized this theory.

“Autonomization”, on the other side, is not a theory but a term specifically coined for this research. This study defines autonomization as a process opposite to securitization, in which the minority issue that was in the past outside the political arena (being in an armed conflict or in a securitization phase) passes or returns to the political arena. A key feature is a peace process predicated on some form of autonomy or with policies of autonomy towards the minority, responding to the minority community’s request of some form of self-determination. This process of incorporation of the minority (because the autonomous minority remains a subject of the state authority, it does not become fully independent from the nation state) can be considered a process of inclusion because there is a response to the minority’s rights and needs. Therefore, bringing the issue back into the political arena, the autonomization process provides for minority rights through devolution of authority and limited self-governance within a region, even if the process does not provide complete sovereignty.

This study does not analyze the negotiation processes that may lead to the autonomization of the minority, even if will touch them briefly in the Indonesian case. For the concept of autonomization, the first theoretical reference in political philosophy, is based on the specific minority rights that the state should guarantee, to ensure justice to national minorities, proposed by Canadian political philosopher Will Kymlicka. The main theoretical reference in democracy studies comes from Dutch political

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scientist Arend Lijphart and his concept of “consociational democracy” based on power sharing.\textsuperscript{26} The consociational approach may include policies of autonomy towards ethnic minorities.

Conventional studies on the treatment of minorities usually focus on the assimilation approach versus the multiculturalist one. By contrast, very few studies have analyzed the strategies of securitization and autonomization as alternative policies towards ethnic minorities. Nevertheless, there is evidence that these strategies are increasingly preferred policies in developing and democratizing states particularly in Muslim regions. Examples include the autonomization of Kurds in Iraq (with the creation of Kurdistan region since 2005) to the securitization of Rohingya minority in Myanmar, the Bangsamoro minority in the Philippines and in some forms the Uzbek minority in Kyrgyz Republic. The Moroccan and Senegal cases, two Muslim majority countries at different stages of democratization, are also interesting examples. On one side, Morocco started recently with more recognition and recuperation of Berber culture (for example today they can broadcast in Tamazight), policies that we could call as a form of autonomization of Berbers even if they represent the majority of the population whose language was lost due to Arabization.\textsuperscript{27} On the other side, Morocco is still applying some form of securitization to the Sahrawi\textsuperscript{28} minority in the Western Sahara region, but it seems slowly to be moving toward the autonomization phase with a negotiated peace process. Senegal had a thirty-year conflict with its small Jola ethnic minority (around half million people) in the Casamance region, but today has passed from the phase of securitization to a phase of autonomization, with a ceasefire and some form of decentralization since 2014.\textsuperscript{29}

This study analyzes only the two paths in the “differentialist” approach (to borrow a term of Brubaker, who uses it for the multicultural approaches): one more inclusive, autonomization, and one

\textsuperscript{27} Moroccan are of a mixed Arab-Berber descend, but many Berber, being “Arabized” as the majority of the Berbers in Maghreb, lost their language.
\textsuperscript{28} As with most peoples from Maghreb, the Sahrawi culture is mixed, with Berber-Tuareg characteristics, as well as Bedouin Arab and black African characteristics.
\textsuperscript{29} To be noted that the Jola minority is also a religious minority, following a syncretic religion based on traditional African religion, with Christian and Muslim influences.
more exclusive, securitization. This does not mean that some states choose only these two strategies in the long run. The fact of the matter is, however, that states seem to pass through similar paths of trying before integrative approaches to minorities (either through assimilation or multiculturalism) during the phase of nation building.\textsuperscript{30} When the nation-building phase is passed, if the issue of minorities reappears in particular with the presence of a separatist movement, the states answers first with securitization and then sometimes with policies of autonomies. This may depend on different variables that represent the independent variables of this study: the benefits accruing to the ruling elites; the influence of the international arena; the type of nationalism; and the level of ontological security.

\textbf{Case Studies and Possible Hypothesis}

This research focuses on two emblematic cases, sometimes considered in the past as models of non-Arab Muslim democracies: Turkey\textsuperscript{31} and Indonesia. First, both Indonesia and Turkey showed that democratic values and commitment to Islam are not incompatible. Turkey was considered as the only Muslim majority democracy since World War II, even if its politics feature regular military influence. Even more than Turkey, Indonesia has been considered a successful democracy in the last decade because of its ability to pass from a dictatorship to a democratic system while maintaining stability, despite ethnic conflicts and religious riots. Indonesia’s democratization proceeds also because Islamic political parties, with their exclusionary politics caused by their attacks to secularism, remain on the political fringes and cannot win national elections. Therefore, these cases are interesting cases for any study of the interrelation between Islam and democracy, as recent books also argue.\textsuperscript{32} Second, Indonesia and Turkey are good subjects to study because these countries have many similarities (the control variables of this research) even though they seem to have taken different paths in the treatment of their ethnic minorities

\textsuperscript{31} Since some years, and in particular after the Arab Spring, this has not been the case anymore. See on this among others: Paul Kubicek, “Debating the merits of the ‘Turkish model’ for democratization in the Middle East”, \textit{Alternatives: Turkish journal of international relations}, 11 (3) 2013: 66-80.
during the time of their democratization. As previously discussed, on one side the repression and securitization of the Kurdish minority—or at least of the Kurds wishing to politically mobilize as an ethnically distinctive community—with a conflict with the self-determination movement is still going on. On the other side, Indonesia represents an accommodation with the settlement of a similar armed conflict, which concluded with decentralization and autonomy for the Aceh region.

The time frame the study analyzes (including an historical introduction of the respective treatments of minorities in the past) focuses on each state’s recent democratization: for Indonesia with the end of dictatorship in 1998 to 2005 when Aceh received its autonomy; for Turkey since 2002, with the electoral success of a moderate Islamist party without the intervention of the military as in the past. Since 2011 in particular, the AKP regime started to make a gradual authoritarian drift and a shift towards the repression of Kurdish minority after few years of opening. In 2016, the peace process in Turkey ended and the Kurdish minority was securitized again. This study’s analysis is specifically related to the policies of securitization and autonomization implemented by Turkish government towards the Kurdish minority and the Indonesian government towards the Acehnese minority. Therefore, the study focuses on the time frame between the initiation of democratization and today.

The study focuses on the inclusion of ethnic non-religious minorities, as religious minorities are related with theological questions that lay outside the topic of this study. By contrast, political minorities often have an ethnic base making identity an important factor.

Indonesia seems to have passed through three periods of relations with the Acehnese: a multicultural period during nation-building after decolonization with a pluralist and multinational Constitution; a securitization period with the Acehnese minority during thirty years of war; and finally to policies of autonomy with the end of the conflict and the negotiation of a regional autonomy for Aceh in 2005 when the country consolidated its democracy (even though at the beginning of the democratization process, between 1998 and 2002, the securitization actually increased). By contrast, after a period of general assimilation in Turkey and repression of local rebellion during nation-building since 1923, the country has passed to securitization of the Kurdish minority during the insurgency of PKK in 1984,
including the depopulation of Kurdish villages by the Turkish military. When Turkish democratization made an important step forward in 2002, the new ruling party, the AKP, started to grant some minority cultural rights, and later even started a peace process that lasted two years between 2013 and 2015. Nevertheless, this process did not produce a phase of autonomy as occurred in Indonesia; on the contrary Turkey returned to the phase of securitization again, accompanied by a democratic reversal starting in particular with the increasing power of the AKP through elections in 2011 and 2015.

From the minority point of view, when the formation of the government in a new democracy continued to exclude the minority that had a history as a separatist movement, this minority community continued the insurgency as in Aceh/East Timor after 1998, or Kurdistan in Turkey after 2002. Some cases around the world show that if democratization and decentralization led to the inclusion of the minority, the insurgency would stop to the benefit of the stability of the democratization process itself. For example, in Senegal, which since 1999 has strengthened its democratic institutions after 40 years with the same party, the state started a peace process with Casamance group in 2004. Today it can be considered a “test case for advanced decentralization policy”, as President Sall declared in 2012. This does not mean, however, that decentralization has to be forced, but needs instead to come from the minority group’s requests, as the Yemeni case shows. The Yemeni civil war stemmed from this issue, when President Hadi’s concept of forced decentralization started to exclude the Shia Houthis who, destined to administer their poor mountainous region, eventually rebelled.

The possible hypothesis to explain these different outcomes refers to the independent variables that will be exposed in the third chapter. For now, it is worth noting that Kurdish nationalism in Turkey, in particular after the recent birth of Kurdish autonomous regions in bordering countries, Iraq and Syria, has threatened the national unity of a very centralized state. This threat has been not only towards the identity and institutions of a very nationalist state and the ontological security of its “Turkishness”, but also towards the political power of the ruling party. Even if at the beginning of its rule the AKP shifted

the traditional Turkish policies toward Kurds with a new accommodative approach, after a few years the strategy changed as this process did not bring the benefits to the ruling party. In particular when the AKP lost the majority in the elections of 2015 because the Kurdish party HDP (with liberal and leftist views, opposite to the moderate Islamist approach of AKP) entered the Parliament for this first time. For these reasons, the struggle for political power by the elites; international factors arising from the crumbling of the Middle Eastern order; traditional nationalistic institutions arising from the history of the state’s formation; and the level of ontological security, will be analyzed as the possible causes of the securitization of the Kurdish minority.

By contrast, in the Indonesian case, the Acehnese minority did not threatened the national unity and identity of Indonesia, because it was already a pluralistic nation. Likewise, Acehnese autonomy did not threaten Indonesia’s ontological security; because of its geography, history and culture (as in religious societies there is a high level of trust and security, Indonesia society enjoyed a high level of ontological security). Likewise, the political power of elites remained unchallenged by Acehnese autonomy, because the Acehnese minority never had the power to shift political support to or from ruling parties. Finally, the international arena had an impact not at the geopolitical and regional level, Aceh being the region at the tip of Sumatra surrounded only by the Indian Ocean, but instead by the international community that pushed for the solution of the ethnic conflict, in particular after the 2004 Tsunami.

We need to acknowledge that the study recognizes that the minority groups themselves shape the different processes and approaches of the state, reacting to the state’s policies in different ways. However, for the purpose of this study the conceptual focus is on the state, not on the societal-minority actors. Also, mediation processes have different approaches with different results, and may impact the solution of minority conflict, but again the study don’t analyze this aspect for the minority inclusion.

Organization of the Study

This study is composed of nine chapters. In the next chapter, “Literature review”, the study reviews the literature on the political incorporation of ethnic minorities and on the independent variables
studied in the research. Starting with the definition of ethnic minority identity, the chapter passes to the review of the theories with respect to the inclusion versus exclusion of minorities in democratization and to the strategies of inclusion in democracies. Then the chapter continues with the literature review on the two outcomes of the dependent variable (the treatment of ethnic minorities): the securitization and the autonomization. Finally the four independent variables: the elites and power interest, following Rational choice theory, the international factors and geopolitical situation, the historic institutions, following the Historical-institutionalist theories, and finally the ontological security, following the Critical theory.

Chapter three, “Research Method”, concerns the research methodology of the study, based on a comparative qualitative analysis and in particular on case study analysis. After explaining the case studies choice and selection criteria (with the control variables of the cases) the chapter present the causal mechanism to research in the two case studies, with the four independent variables. Chapter four, “Securitization and autonomization in Turkey and Indonesia: brief history and democratization period”, makes an introduction on the history of the two case studies, analyzing in particular the recent period of democratization of the two countries, in order to provide a background for the following chapters that test the four hypothesis of the research.

Chapter five, “First independent variable/hypothesis: political elites’ power interest and rational decision making”, analyzes the first independent variable. After a theoretical background, with the theories applied to the case studies, the chapter presents the evidence supporting this hypothesis for Turkey and Indonesia.

Chapter six, “Second independent variable: international factors”, also starts with a theoretical background applied to the case studies, and then present the different international factors for Turkey and Indonesia (from geopolitical and security issues, to the European Union for Turkey and the international community for Indonesia) showing the evidence supporting this second hypothesis.

Chapter seven, “Third independent variable: nationalism and citizenship”, explores the history and institutions of the two countries, trying to understand if the institutions created at the foundation of the two states may account for the different treatment of ethnic minorities in Turkey and Indonesia.
Chapter eight, “Fourth independent variable: ontological security”, refers not to rationalist-materialist-historical explanations, as the other variables, but to a critical theory variable, the ontological security of a state. Also this chapter like the others have a theoretical background applied to the cases and then sections based on evidences to support this last hypothesis.

Finally chapter nine draws the conclusions of the study, with some proposition for future research.
CHAPTER 2
LITERATURE REVIEW

Definition of Ethnic Minority Identity

This study uses a concept of an “ethnic minority” that is not based on a fixed and structural entity with a primordialist definition such as that of Geertz. Instead, it is a dynamic concept, that may change in time and space through constructions, de-constructions and re-constructions by internal and external factors. Minorities in this study are considered not as homogenous groups and unchangeable monoliths but instead as groups with diversity and heterogeneity inside themselves. Such a constructivist approach of ethnic minorities asserts that, as Chandra remembers, have a “structure” (with nominal attributes) and a “practice” (with activated attributes).34 This research therefore uses the term of ethnicity in its broad meaning, following Horowitz35 and others, as an ascriptive identity that can include race, language, tribe and others. In particular, the study’s definition is similar to the one given by Brubaker: “a national minority is not simply a group that is given by the facts of ethnic demography. It is a dynamic political stance, or, more precisely, a family of related yet mutually competing stances, not a static ethno-demographic condition.”36 Therefore, if we take the example of Kurdish minority, not everyone speaking Kurdish would claim to be Kurd, nor would everyone living in Kurdistan regions of Turkey, Iran or Iraq ask to be recognized as a Kurd. Only one who define her/himself as a Kurd, belonging to a distinct ethnic, cultural and social community from the Turkish nation, can be considered as belonging to the Kurdish minority per se.

In practice, the concept of minorities did not exist until very recently. According to scholars such as White,37 the concept of a minority as a group “distinguished by common ties of descent, physical

appearance, language, culture or religion, in virtue of which they feel or are regarded as different from the majority of the population in a society.\textsuperscript{38} started to exist only after World War I with the birth of national minorities in central and eastern Europe. “The re-drawing of the map of post-war Europe, justified in terms of the principle of the self-determination of peoples, had turned the continent into a crowded patchwork of new nation-states, each associated with one particular ‘people’ or nationality.”\textsuperscript{39} White’s main argument is that “the nation-state form creates the objective conditions in which people begin to consider themselves as majorities and minorities; however, these remain subjective categories.”\textsuperscript{40} Even if it is not clear when the concept of minorities was born, what is clear is that this concept cannot be considered fixed and objective but instead must be acknowledged as a more dynamic and subjective category. Therefore, identity discourse on minorities needs to be based on an historical and constructivist perspective and possibly also on a comparative perspective, to avoid generalizations and the risk of normativism. Today in particular, when the authority and capacity of the nation-state are eroded; the boundaries of belonging stretched; and societies are in search of new identities, including minority identities; migrations and diaspora extend the boundaries of belonging and the conceptualization of an “ethnic minority.”\textsuperscript{41}

This represents a shift from past nation-building processes, based often on assimilation and homologation to one nation, to new national identities based on individual and communal citizenship, with the inclusion also of the “internal others”. Actually, the countries of more recent construction and born out of immigrations, in particular in the Western Hemisphere, based their citizenship on the legal principle of \textit{jus soli} (the place of birth) differently from the European continent where in many countries laws predominately determine by the \textit{jus sanguinis} principle (the lineage, or inheriting the citizenship of a parent). This might have been one of the reasons also why the second and third waves of

\textsuperscript{39} White, \textit{The Emergence of Minorities in the Middle East}, 22
\textsuperscript{40} Ibid., 209
\textsuperscript{41} Joel S Migdal, \textit{Boundaries and belonging: states and societies in the struggle to shape identities and local practices} (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2004).
democratizations\textsuperscript{42} (in Europe and Latin America) have been more inclusive of minority rights compared to the first wave in Western Europe or the recent fourth wave of the Arab Spring. In particular, the democratization processes in Latin America have seen a more inclusive approach to minorities. This inclusion in the constitutions of new regimes has been defined by some scholar as a “multicultural constitutionalism.”\textsuperscript{43} We could say that even if Latin America still struggles with an equality between the indigenous groups and the rest of its population, the respect of minority rights—especially indigenous rights—represented a fundamental element of its democratization process, due in part to the influence of international actors and local NGOs that empowered the local civil society.\textsuperscript{44} By contrast, in Europe the model of inclusion was only in countries like the UK, the Netherlands, Belgium and later Germany. And in Asia, apart from India or China, there has also been a more nationalist building process based on the European model, in particular in Muslim countries like Turkey, Bangladesh, Malaysia and also Indonesia (even if with its “unity in diversity” motto and pluralist Constitutions it has been more open to diversity). This form of democratization also affected the rights of the local ethnic minorities, as this research will illustrate in its two case studies.

\textbf{Inclusion Versus Exclusion of Minorities in Democracies}

The inclusion of minorities has always been considered an important feature for a stable and prosperous democracy. Almost two centuries ago, Alexis de Tocqueville cautioned democracies about the risk of “tyranny of the majority.”\textsuperscript{45} Today we can say that, even if almost all practitioners and scholars of democracy agree that there is no single path or single pattern of what makes a country more or less

\textsuperscript{45} Alexis de Tocqueville, \textit{Democracy in America} (New York: Saunders and Otley, 1835).
democratic, the way a state treats its minorities is still one of the most important criteria to measure the depth, substantiability and meaningfulness of a democracy.

For the definition of democracy, we can give a minimalist definition, of an “electoral democracy” requiring only contestation (free and fair elections) and autonomy of the government, as Dahl argued in his famous work *Polyarchy*. An alternative, much broader and substantive definition is classically called a “liberal democracy”, but we could also say “substantive”, “meaningful”, or “complete” democracy, passing from what Habermas called the “procedural” into the “substantive” realm. If the minimalist definition was more typical of past democratic studies, today’s scholarship on democracy is expanding its definition. Dahl himself more recently argued that a democracy requires several political institutions: elected officials; free, fair, and frequent elections; freedom of expression; alternative sources of information; associational autonomy; and inclusive citizenship. One of the most important scholars on democracy is Charles Tilly, who takes the debate between minimalist and substantive definitions of democracy and divides the definitions of democracy into four main approaches: constitutional, substantive, procedural and process-oriented approaches. For the first one, which looks at formal rules of democracy (for example presidential or parliamentary systems), the problem is that “large discrepancies between announced principles and daily practices often make constitutions misleading.” The substantive approach concentrates on what governments do, not how they are structured, and so if they are more or less inclusive too. However, the problem with this approach is the question of what value to give to the different outcomes, and, concentrating only on the substance of how a government does well “for” the people, may forget to guarantee a government “of” and “by” the people. Procedural approaches concentrate on democratic forms, similar to the constitutional ones, and have the opposite problem of the substantive approaches: how to guarantee that the government is “for” the people, with freedoms and

equalities. Finally, process-oriented approaches start from individual autonomy and go to processes that guarantee control of our own individual lives. The problem with concentrating on processes is that it tends to overlook substance without attention to functioning governments. Therefore, the mix of procedures and substance is the best, taking into account however that democratization is a never-ending process of adjustment and renewal, as we can see also in the developed world of “mature” democracies. For this reason, it is difficult to put countries in boxes like liberal or electoral democracies, as it would be more useful to evaluate them based on more or less democratic tendencies in different dimensions. And one of the most important dimension is the equality towards all the citizens, especially to minorities.

Tilly also spoke about the importance of equal inclusion of citizens in the political sphere. He argues that “democratization never occurs without at least partial realization of three large processes: integration of interpersonal trust networks into public politics; insulation of public politics from categorical inequalities; and elimination or neutralization of autonomous, coercion-controlling power centers in ways that augment the influence of ordinary people over public politics and increase the control of public politics over state performance.”\(^5\) Therefore equal inclusion in public politics (together with freedom of expression, association, demonstration, and other rights) is becoming more and more the fundamental element of democratization and democracy.

Diamond, another well-known scholar in democratic studies, speaks about the importance of substantive definitions of democracy. In particular, he considers four key elements to define a system of government as a democracy: a political system for choosing and replacing the government through free and fair elections; the active participation of the people, as citizens, in politics and civic life; the protection of the human rights of all citizens; and the rule of law, in which the laws and procedures apply equally to all citizens.\(^5\) Likewise Diamond and Morlino listed about eight dimensions on which democracies may vary in quality: freedom, the rule of law, vertical accountability, responsiveness,

\(^5\) Ibid., p. 78.
equality, participation, competition, and horizontal accountability.\textsuperscript{53} Again, equality, participation and so inclusion of minorities are evidently becoming fundamental features for most definitions of democracy. Finally, Acemoglu and Robinson recently argued that nations failed in the past and today because of lack of inclusiveness, which means the equal distribution of power in economic and political institutions.\textsuperscript{54} They give the examples of South versus North Korea, or Botswana versus Zimbabwe, Congo or Sierra Leone, to explain why some democracies are flourishing countries while others are in poverty and violence. They argue that it is not culture, geography or history that influences these outcomes but the differences in inclusiveness: where powerful elites define the rules to benefit themselves and seek exclusive control over government, they limit social progress and inclusion, leading to a failed state.

Scholars of international relations theories also analyze the importance of inclusion of minorities. Mansfield and Snyder argue that emerging democracies are more likely to have instability, and even to initiate wars or intrastate conflict, because of different factions competing for power and nationalist ideology to rally support.\textsuperscript{55} Walby argues that to have modern states in our globalized world, we need to criminalize and delegitimize violence against women and minorities, and to do so we need to give more political representation to them for a deeper democracy based on equality.\textsuperscript{56} Fareed Zakaria argues that democracies are not always “free democracies”, as a mix of elections and authoritarianism may produce illiberal democracies with consequences such as a majority of an electorate denying rights to minorities.\textsuperscript{57} Finally, in the critical theory, Young argues that groups excluded based on gender, ethnicity or class should be included as a modern polity should extend to social and economic interactions giving more equality and justice to everyone.\textsuperscript{58} Also in the critical theory, the concept of “radical democracy” of

\textsuperscript{53} Larry Diamond and Leonardo Morlino, eds., \textit{Assessing the Quality of Democracy} (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2005).
\textsuperscript{58} Iris Marion Young, \textit{INCLUSION AND DEMOCRACY} (New York: Oxford University Press, 2000).
Laclau and Mouffe\textsuperscript{59} calls for pluralism of diversity compared to liberal and deliberative democracies that, in their attempts to build consensus, oppress diversity (similarly to Tocqueville’s “tyranny of the majority”).

Whatever definition we want to give for a pluralist democracy, the fact remains that to have substantive and not only formal democracies, minorities must be included in the civil and political life of the polity. The importance of inclusive citizenship, multicultural policies and respect of minority rights therefore are evident not only in fledgling democracies—which need to search for equality and justice to have sustainable transitions, and specifically for Muslim countries of the Middle East that are still struggling on their democratization path—but also in the maintenance of stable and peaceful societies in mature democracies that today under stress from economic, identity and political crises and migration processes.

For these reasons, this study uses a broad definition of democracy\textsuperscript{60} that includes the respect of human rights and fundamental freedoms, including minority rights, and specifically uses the criteria proposed by the “Community of Democracies”: “Free, fair and periodic elections, multi-party system, the rule of law, separation of powers, ensuring that the military remains accountable to democratically elected civilian government, the respect of human rights, fundamental freedoms and the inherent dignity of the human being”. \textsuperscript{61}

\begin{itemize}
\item Laclau and Mouffe, \textit{Hegemony and socialist strategy: towards a radical democratic politics} (London: Verso, 1985).
\item For more broad definitions of a democracy (not only minimalist definition of electoral democracy) see also: Larry Diamond and Marc Plattner, \textit{Democracy: a reader}, John Hopkins UP, 2009.
\item The Community of Democracies is an international organization, established in 2000 to bring together governments, civil society and the private sector in the pursuit of a common goal: supporting democratic rules and strengthening democratic norms and institutions around the world. Participating states pledge to uphold the democratic values expressed in the core principles of the Warsaw Declaration, among which also: “The right of persons belonging to minorities or disadvantaged groups to equal protection of the law, and the freedom to enjoy their own culture, to profess and practice their own religion, and use their own language.” From: “The Warsaw Declaration”, Community of Democracies, accessed on April 5, 2016, https://www.community-democracies.org/Visioning-Democracy/To-be-a-Democracy-The-Warsaw-Declaration
\end{itemize}
**Inclusion Versus Exclusion of Minorities in Democratization Processes**

In the latter part of the 20\textsuperscript{th} and the beginning of 21\textsuperscript{st} centuries, Western countries tried to encourage transitions to democracy in different places around the world based on the idea that democracy brings stability and good cohabitation among different parts of society, including ethnic groups. However, this conviction—besides not being a very good foreign policy idea because of all the risk of “exporting democracy”—forgot that democracy is one thing, but a transition to democracy is another. Actually, regarding the phase of transition to democracy, there is no consensus in the literature about whether this transition benefits minorities, or on the contrary if democratization brings more conflict and violence to minorities. Of course, the political reality of this process is that it is not a binary outcome but rather a continuum of possibilities.

As previously discussed, Mansfield and Snyder found evidence that new democracies are more likely to have instability, and even to initiate wars or intrastate conflict, because their politics of democratizing are more likely to exhibit exclusionary nationalism and nationalist ideology, and because democratization often precedes the institutional building necessary to create strong norms and the rule of law.\textsuperscript{62} Likewise, Bertrand and Haklai\textsuperscript{63} instead argued recently that “democratization generally does not produce more violence. Yet it does not necessarily yield substantive equality for ethnic minorities”.\textsuperscript{64} Their findings, based on the works of many scholars, show that democratization in multiethnic societies is based on procedural democracy, that is with a majority dominance and an ethnocentric leadership, more than liberal or substantive democracy. However, they do not find a clear relationship between ethnic violence and democratization. They list three possibilities in the continuum of the outcomes for minority after democratization: violence, stability or meaningful accommodation.\textsuperscript{65} This third one is when minorities can negotiate some satisfaction of their requests, like more power to manage affairs, resources

\begin{footnotesize}
\textsuperscript{63} Jacques Bertrand and Oded Haklai (eds.) *Democratization and Ethnic Minorities: Conflict or Compromise?* (Abingdon: Routledge, 2014).
\textsuperscript{64} Ibid., p. 1.
\textsuperscript{65} Ibid., p. 3.
\end{footnotesize}
or cultural expression (similar to this study’s concept of autonomization). The very process of democratization should bring minorities’ requests to the political arena, with the possibilities to create new parties, make free demonstrations, and petitions to courts. In reality, it does not always happen, nor does the state react positively to these changes. Sometimes transitions make minority situation better, sometimes they just maintain the same status quo from before the democratization, and sometimes they may fuel even more violent conflict. It depends on many factors, among which is if democratization coincides with state-building, as in the post-Communist Europe, with what Brubaker called the “nationalization of nationalism”\(^6\) (that is, a dominant group trying to “own” the state during the transition period) and so with exclusionary policies that privilege the dominant nation.

Even though the topic of this research is not the analysis of the consequences of democratization for ethnic minorities, it is important to understand that democratization does not necessarily lead directly to their inclusion in the polity. This is the fundamental reason why this study is important: to understand what are the factors that in a democratizing process bring a state to negotiate toward autonomy after decades of violence, or to choose forms of securitization in order to definitely crush the rebellion of an ethnic minority.

As we can see, a growing literature is considering inclusiveness, equality and minority rights an essential part of a meaningful, substantive and liberal democracy, even if is not clear yet if and how democratization may bring benefits to minorities. The last issue to consider when we speak about democracy and minorities is that a democracy that respect minorities does not have to be a “Western-style” democracy. Different cultures and countries may have different models and practices of democracies (like, for example India, Brazil, Senegal or South Africa) with significant variations with respect to the Western liberal democratic practices, even if these variations should not be so strong to transform the democracy into an illiberal or semi-authoritarian state. As a recent study of Carnegie Endowment argues, these democratic variations can be in different areas including personal rights,

economic justice, legal pluralism, power-sharing mechanisms or alternative forms of civic action and representation. Notably absent from these areas is the treatment of minorities. 67 One thing is certain though: the idea of Fukuyama that Western liberal democracies would have spread around the world, has been challenged by recent evidence. 68 Non-Western encounters with democracy vary widely. 69 In Islamic, Confucian and African cultures there is ground for equality but not necessarily based on rational individualism: other values like communal sharing might be more important than the individual rights of the Western concept of democracy. 70 Nonetheless, all democracies must have some form of inclusion of the different parts of societies, including ethnic minorities, in one way or another. Otherwise one cannot consider democratization complete.

Strategies of Inclusion in Democracies

How do democracies, either Western or non-Western style, create pluralistic and inclusive systems, in particular with their minorities? Several scholars studied how to “design democracy” for inclusion and pluralism; many argue that consensual democracy, in contrast to the majoritarian democracy, involves greater compromise and significant minority rights. These consensual practices allow all the parts of the society to feel included and so to support and legitimize the democracy itself.

Arend Lijphart is one of most important scholars of the design of an inclusive system of state and government in ethnically divided societies. 71 Studying in particular the Dutch political system, he spoke about the importance of “politics of accommodation” as a good solution for pluralistic democracies based on cleavages, where ethnic divisions are particularly strong. He studied 36 democracies from 1945 to

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69 See on this also: Christopher K. Lamont, Jan van der Harst, and Frank Gaenssmantel (eds.), *Non-Western Encounters with Democratization* (Surrey: Ashgate Publishing Limited, 2015).
1996, and emphasized the "consociational" or “consensus” model of democracy as a better solution for states in which a traditional majoritarian or “Westminster” model of democracy might not work due to deep ethnic, linguistic, or religious cleavages. This is because the consensual model involves the presence of inclusive cabinet coalitions (in a power-sharing system). This model acknowledges specific constitutional rights for the minorities (as we can see for example in the cases of Switzerland or Belgium) in the implementation of multiparty systems, proportional electoral systems, minority veto and rigid constitutions protected by judicial review. These institutions guarantee that only an inclusive “supermajority” can control policy, and that its ability to infringe on minority rights is limited. To avoid group polarization, the elites of major groups are given some representation and also the groups in themselves are given some communal rights, giving both the incentive to remain in the government and the state and avoid violent conflict.

Nevertheless, the division of power can happen not only at the governmental level with a power-sharing system, but can also be dispersed with separate political institutions. This is the case of federal states that can be either centralized or decentralized with local autonomies. Lijphart actually divides the 36 democracies that he analyses between unitary versus federal and centralized versus decentralized, creating four categories, with decentralization being either in a unitary state (like the Scandinavian states of Norway, Finland, Sweden or Denmark, or Japan) or in a federal state (like Switzerland, Belgium, Germany, Canada, the United States or Australia). One of the case studies of this research, Indonesia, can be put in the category of a unitary and decentralized state. Therefore, the consociational systems have not only power-sharing but a decentralization of authority to groups and regions, and finally also some autonomy in the sphere of culture with cultural rights (such as language and educational rights) guaranteed and supported with public funds.

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73 Lijphart, 1999, p. 185-200.
Another scholar who argued that ethnically divided democracies have to take special care of the problem of inclusion to prevent ethnic conflict is Donald Horowitz.74 Democracy, according to Horowitz, has progressed better in Eastern European states with little ethnic cleavages (Hungary, Czech Republic, Poland) and progressed slower in deeply divided states (Slovakia, Bulgaria, Romania, and the former Yugoslavia) precisely because of this lack of careful inclusive institution-building. “Whether party leaders terminate elections, military leaders reverse elections results, or separatist leaders attempt to constrict the area in which those results will prevail, it is clear that ethnic divisions strain, contort, and often transform democratic institutions”.75 Horowitz proposes not a consensual system but a “centripetal” system that promotes inter-communal alliances and that discourages the polarization that will happen if we institutionalize ethnic identities (in some way, an ethnic version of the confessionalism present for example in the case of Lebanon). Even if we do not have conclusive evidence of which model is more suitable to avoid conflict and polarization and to increase stability and moderation, both are important structures that take into account the pluralistic need of an inclusive democracy in divided societies.

Following the tradition of both Lijphart and Horowitz, Reynolds focuses on recent post-conflict cases including Iraq, Afghanistan, Sudan, Burma and Lebanon among a total of 66 countries.76 For Reynolds, political inclusion utilizing constitutional engineering offers the best solution to resolve conflicts, even if there is no perfect solution valid for anyone: designing democracy has to be home-grown and appropriate to a given society. Dryzek also argues that democratization is a matter of political inclusion of different groups and categories, not only in the state but in the polity in general.77 In particular, he gives importance to “deliberative democracy” in divided societies, arguing that authentic deliberation, not mere voting, solves the problems of assertions of different communities and the power-

sharing system is the best solution. Finally, Reilly, studying cases like Papua New Guinea, Sri Lanka and Northern Ireland, argued that if political institutions promote political parties that have a broad base, inclusive of different ethnic groups and minorities, they can create a good and moderate political competition and so improve their democratic transitions.

As we can see, there are many possible channels and tools to build inclusive democracies even if to analyze them is not the focus of this study. This study wants to analyze which variables affect the exclusion or inclusion of minorities in the states, specifically in Muslim majority countries, during the democratization period. In particular it examines two types of exclusion/inclusion: the securitization and the autonomization.

**Outcomes of Theoretical Interest: Securitization and Autonomization**

**Securitization**

McGarry and O’Leary, two political scientists from the UK, argued that to manage plural societies and regulate ethnic conflict, states either resort to the management of differences or to their elimination. In the first case, they can chose between hegemonic control (such as ethnic minorities in Burundi or in the case of Northern Ireland between 1920 and 1972) which according to the authors is the most commonly used throughout the history; arbitration (as in the case of European Community for Yugoslavia); cantonization and/or federalism (as in Switzerland, Belgium and Canada); and finally consociationalism or power-sharing (the Lijphart system, such as for Western Europe but also for Lebanon and Malaysia). When states wants to eliminate differences, according to the scholars, they can either resort to partition or secession, with a separation between ethnic communities (as occurred with Bangladesh and Pakistan, or the breakup of Yugoslavia). States may also try to integrate or assimilate the

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81 Ibid., p. 23.
different ethnicities (as has occurred in the United States, UK or France in the developed world or Burma, Sudan or Iraq among developing countries). In the worst scenario, states can either force mass-population transfers (such as Palestinians expelled from Israel to the Muslim of Bosnia) or choose genocide (from the Holocaust to the Kurdish genocidal campaign in Iraq in 1988).

However, states that opt for more centralization and exclusionary nationalism—for what McGarry and O’Leary call “eliminating differences”—may also use to the so called “securitization” of their minorities, often organized as separatist movements or self-determination groups. Securitization is a process of treatment of an issue outside the political arena, with only security means, in particular with a state-security, not human-security, orientation. Securitization theory is a constructivist theory based on a process of broadening security concepts, formulated by the Copenhagen School after the Cold War. Differently from the deepening of the security concept (from the critical theory approach) that considers the individuals, and no longer only states, as primary subject of security (opening space for the concept of “human security”), the broadening of security still considers states as the main actors subject of security. At the same time, however, instead of limiting security to the national-military area, the broadening of the concept divides security into five sectors: military security, environmental security, economic security, societal security and political security.\(^\text{82}\) This is because, according to the Copenhagen School, the classical threat perception and traditional security studies could no longer represent the post-Cold War situation, with the growth of intrastate conflicts and global threats like migrations, pollution and epidemics. International relations theory needed therefore to expand the security concept to other spheres.\(^\text{83}\)

On this path the Copenhagen School described securitization theory, which argues that when a state labels something as a “security” issue gives it a sense of urgency that justifies special measures to deal with it outside the political arena. Buzan, Waever and de Wilde, in their famous book that launched


this theory, described securitization as an “extreme version of politicization”, a process that happens when one issue is promoted from non-politicized (when the state does not deal with it) to politicized arena (entering the sphere of public policy and governance) and finally securitized (creating an existential threat that cannot be treated in the political arena but only through emergency measures). When this happens, the “securitizing actors” pass from the political sphere (the “market place of ideas” where everything can be negotiated and addressed by policies) to a non-political but politicized space beyond the ordinary norms of the political domain, that is based on extreme security measures. As Waever puts it: “by uttering ‘security,’ a state-representative moves a particular development into a specific area, and thereby claims a special right to use whatever means are necessary to block it.” Other scholars later analyzed this theory, explaining how securitization develops when national security elites depict a domestic issue as dangerous for the nation’s security, and so they need to use repressive measures to solve it. When domestic groups for examples are labeled as enemies of the state, representing a threat to security and territorial integrity, they are put in a place that is beyond peaceful political bargain and so need to be treated with security measures.

Securitization therefore is a process based on three elements: a) the referent objects, or objects that can be existentially threatened. First of all this the state and the nation (that means the sovereignty and the identity) that represent the traditional “middle level limited collectivities”; b) the securitizing actors, actors like governments, political elites, military or civil society, that do the so called “security speech act”, declaring the referent object as existentially threatened; and c) the functional actors who influence decisions on security, or that have a stake in the issue, like a private company or a political party that will benefit from the securitization process.

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87 Buzan et al., 1998, 36.
88 Ibid., 36.
89 Ibid., 40.
The securitization process happens in general in two stages. The first stage is based on identifying an issue or an actor as an existential threat to the referent objects. The second is when the audience (public opinion, politicians or other elites) is convinced by the securitizing actors, through a “speech act”, about the extraordinary measures needed. We could say that this second phase is more successful in dictatorial or militaristic states than in democracies, as propaganda tools are stronger in the creation of an “us-versus-them” narrative. But the narrative, the speech act, of stigmatization and so securitization of an issue can happen in democracies as well. This study is based on the argument that this is what happened with the Kurdish issue in Turkey.

Regarding specifically the securitization of minorities, other than a few authors the literature concentrates mostly on migrants, specifically in Western countries. Kymlicka is one of these authors who assesses the securitization of minorities using the concept of Weaver. According to Kymlica, the securitization of minorities and in general of ethnic relations erodes both the democratic space and the possibility to respond to demands of minorities. In particular, analyzing the countries in transition of Central and Eastern Europe in the 1990s, he argues that “there is enormous resistance in virtually every ECE country to the idea of federalism or other forms of territorial autonomy to several national minorities.” This is also because of their “security objection”, the national security issue that minorities represent, based on the fact that minorities are disloyal (collaborating with past, current and potential enemies) and strong states needs weak minorities. In this way they need to securitize them.

To escape this vicious cycle of repression and de-legitimization, therefore, a minority needs to be “de-securitized”. The de-securitization process is supported by the Copenhagen School and in particular

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91 The speech act is when the securitizing actor declares the referent object as existentially threatened. See: Buzan et al., 40.
94 The term Central and Eastern Europe (CEE) has today displaced the alternative term East-Central Europe (ECE) in the context of transition countries.
95 Ibid., p. 131.
96 Ibid., p. 138.
by Wæver as necessary in order to go back to the political arena in democracies.\textsuperscript{97} Some scholars like Aras and Polat argue that there are several factors that can push towards de-securitization, among which is the pressure of international actors.\textsuperscript{98} For example, the democratization process of a country, with the erosion of military power and the inclusion of civil society and media, but also the role of external actors such as the EU, have been pushing Turkey towards a more liberal and pluralistic approach towards minorities.\textsuperscript{99}

Nevertheless some scholars argue that, specifically for the minorities, the de-securitization process is not an appropriate solution. Roe for one claims that the minorities have a certain “societal security-ness” based on minority identity, that if removed would threaten the minority existence in itself.\textsuperscript{100} “In seeking to maintain their collective identity, minorities are necessarily imbued with a certain ‘societal security-ness’, which, if removed, results in the death of the minority as a distinctive group.”\textsuperscript{101} The author therefore suggests not to de-securitize but to manage securitization, that is, to put in place certain mechanisms that guarantee the existence of the minority and at the same time guarantee the existence of the state framework too. “Management in this sense is about ‘moderate’ (not excessive) securitization, about ‘sensible’ (not irrational) securitization. Where societal security dilemmas occur, management is about ‘mitigating’ or ‘ameliorating’ them, not transcending them.”\textsuperscript{102} According to Roe:

the minority can feel secure when certain provisions/legislations/mechanisms are put in place that will guarantee its existence (in identity terms), while similarly the majority can also feel secure in the knowledge that the minority will thus work (politically, economically and also societally) within the existing framework of the state.\textsuperscript{103}

Therefore, for Roe minorities need to remain securitized, as otherwise they would lose their identity. This is because maintaining policies that guarantee the security of the minority and the majority is important,

\textsuperscript{99} Ibid., p. 499.
\textsuperscript{101} Ibid., 279.
\textsuperscript{102} Ibid., 292-3
\textsuperscript{103} Ibid., 293
as they guarantee their existence. To manage the securitization means to normalize minority rights and regulate minority-majority relations with democratic tools.

In conclusion, securitization of a minority is a process of defining the minority issue as outside the political space, in order to threat it only as a state-security issue. Therefore, the important thing for the inclusion of minorities in a democracy is to go back to the political arena, in order to pass from a “state-security” centered approach to a “human-security” centered approach, where the needs of the minority are answered, either with some rights or some process of autonomization.

**Autonomization**

Following the method of management of differences of Mc Garry and O’Leary\(^\text{104}\) we could say that in addition to cantonization and/or federalism, states can resort to some form of policies of autonomy, in particular after a period of repression/securitization of the ethnic conflicts. In democratizing regimes in particular, when they opt for decentralization they face a dilemma of how much autonomy of power give to their minority groups, particularly in peripheral regions. The solutions of possible conflicts with these minority groups to avoid secession (as happened in the former Yugoslavia) range from a semi-independent state (such as the two administrative entities in Bosnia and Herzegovina) to some form of autonomy inside the state (as in the case of Aceh in Indonesia or Kurdistan in Iraq or Northern Ireland in the UK).

This type of territorial, economic, political and cultural autonomy, based on a decentralization of governance that allows the minority to manage some of its resources, protect its cultural identity and have some type of local administration, could be called “autonomization” because sovereignty remains at the nation-state level. This study therefore defines this process of giving some type of autonomy as “autonomization” of the minority, as juxtaposed to securitization. Autonomization is the realization of policies of autonomy towards the minority, either through a peace-mediation process, with the guerrilla

group transformed in a political party, or a reform process of decentralization of the state, whether it is a unitary or federal state in the categories of Lihphart.

Already Dahl\textsuperscript{105} has written about the importance of autonomy in pluralist democracies, arguing that all types of social organizations in a democracy need some form of independence or autonomy besides control, the difficulty being to find a balance between this autonomy and the control of the state. He was referring to every type of inequality and diversity: “Like polyarchies, authoritarian regimes exist in countries with varying amounts of diversity (…) potential cleavages appear to exist along every kind of difference that is familiar in democratic countries: language, religion, ethnic group, race, religion, status, occupation, ideology.”\textsuperscript{106} And among the problems associated with pluralism, he listed functions of variations in national regimes, including conflict and cleavages or inclusiveness and “concentration”. As he says:

Adherents of a particular culture often view their political demands as matters of principles, deep religious or quasi-religious conviction, cultural preservation, or group survival. As a consequence, they consider their demands too crucial to allow for compromise. They are nonnegotiable. Yet under a peaceful democratic process, settling political conflicts generally requires negotiation, conciliation, compromise.\textsuperscript{107}

Also Diamond\textsuperscript{108} argued that federalism and other forms of decentralization can strengthen democracy, with greater stability and unity that reduces the risk of secession. He gives the examples of India, Spain, Mexico, and Nigeria versus Sudan and Sri Lanka that instead had increasing conflict and had refrained from giving more autonomy and decentralization. Incidentally, he spoke about this in a conference in Baghdad in 2004 actually, arguing for the importance of federalism to build a peaceful and democratic state in Iraq and avoid the risk of breakup of the country. Instead of following the advice of a world expert on democracy, in 2006 the US turned to al-Maliki as the candidate for the new

\textsuperscript{105} Robert A Dahl, \textit{Dilemmas of pluralist democracy: autonomy vs. control}, (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1982).

\textsuperscript{106} Ibid., p. 41


government.\textsuperscript{109} He would have stayed in power for eight years, with an exclusivist Shia government that represented one of the causes of the creation of Al Qaeda in Iraq (later DAESH), the division of Iraq and the enormous consequences on regional instability that continue today.

Among studies of decentralization and policies of autonomy, the most important scholars for the inclusion of minorities, one in the sense of minority rights the other in sense of political power and administrative decentralization, are Kymlicka from cultural studies and Lijphart from democratic studies. Kymlicka\textsuperscript{110} argues that the practice of pluralistic democracies should be based on a multicultural approach to membership, a “diverse citizenship” that gives equal membership of a political community, including minority groups. Furthermore Kymlicka\textsuperscript{111} claims that community rights should supplement human individual rights, with some form of power-sharing or federalism, in order to guarantee justice for national minorities. Nationalism and multiculturalism or cosmopolitanism should not be considered opposite or incompatible according to Kymlicka, but instead as complementary in the creation of a “liberal nationalism”, either with some form of “substate nationalism” for immigrated minorities or some form of cultural protection and self-government rights to indigenous minorities in order to sustain themselves as a distinct society in a unitary state. This second form is the process of autonomization analyzed in this study. Processes of autonomization face challenges in states whose polity is based on an “ethnic nationalism” (where the citizenship is given only by \textit{jus sanguinis}, typical of some Eastern European countries but also Italy, Greece, Turkey, and Germany too until 2000) because they are states that define their nation based on the belonging to the ethnic group. Forms of decentralization and autonomy instead are more probable in states with “cultural nationalism” or “liberal nationalism” (where the national identity is shaped by a shared culture, like in the United States for example, and the citizenship is based on \textit{jus soli} like in most of the Americas).

Other authors agree with the positions of Kymlicka. Gutmann for example argues that individual and groups’ rights should both exist in democracy, and identity politics should not be suppressed because they support justice and democracy for all groups. Miller too agrees that nationalism and cosmopolitanism are not necessarily in conflict, as the principles of nationality can accommodate the demands of minority nations and does not necessary lead to secessionism. This is an important claim for all countries today, not only democratizing states, in this phase of migrations and crisis at different levels, but also in Western countries for example, where the failure of both assimilation and multiculturalism policies is pushing towards old nationalisms and tribalisms.

As noted earlier, Lijphart is the scholar who speaks about power sharing systems for states and governments in ethnically divided societies. Regarding his concept of “consociational democracy” specifically, he claims that this type of inclusive democracy is based on power-sharing but also groups’ autonomy, proportional system and minorities veto. Autonomization processes therefore include legislative and executive systems and state decentralization that Lijphart analyzes, as well as the philosophical approach on pluralism and inclusion that Kymlicka emphasizes.

There are several examples of autonomization that have been quite successful besides Aceh, Northern Ireland and Kurdistan Iraq. Lyon gives the example of Macedonia to show how decentralization really can help to reduce ethnic discrimination in divided societies and multiethnic states and, by extension, the risk of conflict or secessionism. Political, administrative, and fiscal dimensions of decentralization are important according to the author but the fundamental factor to make decentralization and self-government successful is that it has to be “substantial” and not only formal. Another interesting


prospective case of autonomization is Morocco, which has considered autonomization for the Western Sahara since 2006. This case has several features that could make it emblematic. First of all, the ceasefire has remained in place since 1991 (the conflict started in 1976) thanks in part to the intervention of foreign countries and the UN (even if the UN Mission for the Referendum in Western Sahara is not able yet to make the referendum on self-determination). Second, the presence of a “Moroccan Autonomy Plan” that is still in process of negotiation creates space to make it better and more sustainable. Finally, this process can benefit from further democratization of the Moroccan regime that seems on the right path for more reforms. Morocco is probably the only positive example of democratization efforts after the Arab Spring together with Tunisia, as even if it is a constitutional monarchy it has an elected parliament and an independent judiciary. After the protests, the Constitution was reformed in a more democratic form, giving more powers to the government and less to the monarchy. The process of autonomization of Western Sahara could arrive at a final solution with this gradual reforming process of the Moroccan state.

Independent Variables. Four Schools: Rationalism, Structuralism, Historical Institutionalism, and Critical Theory

This study examines four different sets of variables that may account for the securitization or the autonomization of ethnic minorities. The first set is based on the rational choice theory; the second on the international structuralist approach; the third on historical-institutionalist approach of comparative politics; and the fourth on critical theory, using a psychosocial-identity framework.

Rational Choice Theory: Elites and Power Interests

There is quite a consensus in the literature that the power interest of the ruling elites decide which approach the state takes towards minorities, and specifically to construct minority identities and identity conflicts to take advantages from the clashes.
First of all, Fearon and Laitin\textsuperscript{118} famously argued that ethnic identities are socially constructed to create ethnic violence with the goal of enhancing elite power. Their argument is that elites are competing for power so they deliberately form and construct ethnic identities to compete with each other for power. There are two ways in which ethnicity is socially constructed, with individual actions or with “supraindividual” discourses of ethnicity that motivate actions (similar to the “speech act” of securitization).

In 1991 Paul Brass published “Ethnicity and nationalism: theory and comparison”,\textsuperscript{119} which made two arguments: that ethnicity and nationalism were social and political constructions, and that they were modern phenomena strictly related with the centralizing state. He presented, with a rationalist approach, the theory of “elite competition”, arguing that in the early modernizing societies, both ethnicity and nationalism were products of conflict between the leadership of centralized states and the elites of non-dominant ethnic groups. He writes “this process invariably involves competition and conflict for political power, economic benefits, and social status between competing elite.”\textsuperscript{120}

Besides constructing ethnicities, elites may promote national policies in order to maintain power. Other ethno-nationalist theorists argue that it is the elite interest that determines a state’s approach to the minorities. According to Marx\textsuperscript{121} elites intentionally use nationalist policies to create inner group cohesion. Gill\textsuperscript{122} argues that politicians and religious actors make a cost-benefit analysis and then decide on restrictions against religious minorities. In the ethnic cleansing politics of the former Yugoslavia, several authors show the importance of the construction of the ethnic identity. Gagnon\textsuperscript{123} for example illustrates how the political and economic elites in Yugoslavia created the sectarian ethnic conflicts in order to block the dynamics of political change, manipulating populations that were threatening the

\textsuperscript{120} Ibid., p. 25.
existing structures of power. Kaufman\textsuperscript{124} shows instead how the construction of identities was based more on symbolic narratives and symbolic politics. In particular, he argues that ethnic conflicts in the former Yugoslavia were based not on ancient hatreds but on “myths and symbols”, the narratives that the ethnic groups tell about themselves. Finally, Petersen\textsuperscript{125} argues that, exactly in order to escape the Western rational way of thinking based on “carrots and sticks”, elites in the former Yugoslavia used emotions like fears, anger and vengeance as resources for their political goals (similarly to Kalyvas and his analysis of the Algerian war).\textsuperscript{126}

In the democratization phase, when the transition starts, political elites may change strategies towards minorities to gain from the changed situation. Snyder\textsuperscript{127} famously argued that elites promote nationalism once they fear the loss of power. For this reason, many democratic transitions often do not merely fail to prevent but actually cause nationalist conflicts, with elites appealing to parochial arguments to mobilize support and so creating more inter-ethnic conflict. Rotchild\textsuperscript{128} and Young\textsuperscript{129} also argue that democratization can sometimes associate with ethnic tensions and conflicts. Rotchild in particular argues the Burundi civil war in 1993/94 was a direct consequence of elites’ attempts to make gains from democratization mobilizing ethnic identities. Sometimes violence can come even from intragroup competition because democratization brings more organizations that compete to represent an ethnic group.\textsuperscript{130}

Elites do not always manipulate and re-construct identities for political gains, nor do ethnic groups split in different political groups creating polarization that causes more violence. Sometimes

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{125} Roger Dale Petersen, \textit{Western intervention in the Balkans: the strategic use of emotion in conflict} (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2011).
\item \textsuperscript{127} Jack Snyder, \textit{From voting to violence: Democratization and nationalist conflict}. New York: Norton, 2000.
\item \textsuperscript{128} Donald Rotchild, “Liberalism, democracy and conflict management”, in A. Wimmer et al (eds) \textit{Facing ethnic conflicts: toward a new realism} (Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield, 2004).
\item \textsuperscript{130} Jacquest Bertrand and Sanjay Jeram, “Democratization and determinants of ethnic violence: the rebel-moderate organization nexus”, Ch. 6 in Jacques Bertrand and Oded Haklai (eds.) \textit{Democratization and Ethnic Minorities: Conflict or Compromise?} (Abingdon: Routledge, 2014).
\end{itemize}
peaceful compromise can happen, in particular when elites reach a bargain for ethnic group representation as in Taiwan’s transition;\textsuperscript{131} or when dominant elites limit democratization with ethnically based redistributive policies to avoid giving power to extremist elites that creates polarization. This was the case in Sri Lanka and Malaysia. Both started as highly inclusive democratic governments in their transitions, which coincided with their post-colonial independence, but as the interethnic cooperation worsened elites used democratic competition to maintain their dominance with these redistributive policies.\textsuperscript{132} Nevertheless, these finally became exclusionary policies, in particular in Sri Lanka with the Tamil insurrection in the 1980s.

Therefore we can say that the main points of rational choice approach to elites are four: (1) elites seek to preserve their status and power in a rational cost-benefit calculation; (2) elites craft policies toward minorities that seek to divide their opponents, and thus preserve power, sometimes even socially constructing ethnic identities; (3) because democratization creates pluralism, it can actually increase intragroup competition of minorities that skillful elites can exploit; (4) growing ethnic tensions thus create incentives for autonomization or securitization.

\textit{International Structure and Factors/Geopolitical Situation}

Since the breakthrough studies on geopolitics of Mackinder,\textsuperscript{133} almost one century ago, international relations theories have examined geography and territory as a fundamental variable of their analyses. Without going towards the extremes of environmental determinism, the concept of geopolitics has continued to this day to influence international studies and comparative politics. This perspective argues there is no public policy, either international or domestic, that can disregard the fact that political

processes are affected by geographical structures. Many political actions in the past and even today are justified on the bases of economic-geographical or political-geographical needs, from invasion and seizure of other lands, as in Ukraine, to the maintenance of the status quo without allowing territorial decentralizations as in Kurdish region of Turkey.\footnote{Actually Mackinder can also be considered a supporter of decentralization ante litteram, as he argued that modern human societies should go back to a more human scale provinces and cities, like the ancient Greek city states or Renaissance communes, and so that national organization of the state should be based on decentralized and autonomous communities. See: Mackinder, 1919, Ch. 7, The freedom of men.}

Therefore, almost one hundred years after his groundbreaking argument, there is evidence that human and political geography still matters, and that regional situations may affect the domestic treatment of minorities. In increasingly hostile regional environments like the one of the Middle East, the the fear of transnational support and spillover effects of minority conflicts can worsen the treatment of minorities, threatening the sovereignty of the nation state. If the minority receive economic support from diaspora or other governments, or if the minority has advocacy support from international community, either governmental or non-governmental, these also could impact the state’s treatment of the minority.

Besides this, if the minority dwells in several bordering states (as usual it is), the state tends to feel threatened and so go towards repression more than accommodation, towards securitization instead of towards autonomization. As noted earlier, a state rarely will be inclusive towards a minority if it feels that this minority may represent the fifth column of a foreign country, as Weiner argues.\footnote{Myron Weiner, “The Macedonian syndrome: An Historical Model of International Relations and Political Development”, \textit{New Balkan Politics- Journal of Politics}, 2 (2001); originally published in World Politics (1971).} An important scholar who analyzed how the regional situation and the foreign policies of a state affect its treatment of ethnic minorities is Harris Mylonas.\footnote{Harris Mylonas \textit{The Politics of Nation-Building, Making Co-Nationals, Refugees, and Minorities part of problems of international politics} (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2012).} Studying the Balkan case, he explains systematically how the politics of ethnicity in the international arena influence which ethnic minorities are assimilated, accommodated, or annihilated. He argues that the foreign policy of the state in the nation-building process—either revisionist or accepting the international status quo—and its relations with the external patrons of the minority groups—either in alliance or rivalry—will influence policies towards ethnic
minority groups. In particular, if the external patrons of the ethnic group is an enemy of the host state, then the state will use repression, while if it is an ally, then accommodation may follow. Cederman, Girardin and Gleditsch\textsuperscript{137} also find that a conflict is more likely when an excluded minority ethnic group has transnational kin in neighboring countries. While in the case-based literature ethnonationalist conflicts are often related to kin groups, quantitative studies treat ethnic conflicts only at the state level. These scholars instead integrate transnational links among minorities and find that transnational ethnic support can facilitate insurgencies, which are difficult for governments to target or deter. Therefore, in case of minorities with relations in neighboring countries, there is a high possibility of ethnic conflict.

Regarding influences of the international community, there is no consensus in the literature if these system-level variables have an impact on the relationship between a state and its ethnic minorities. Nevertheless in globalized times and with increasing regimes the international arena remains important. This is also because today soft power, besides hard power, is another tool of foreign policy. The prestige and acceptance of a state in the international community is fundamental for the continuation of its power and the international status quo.

Kymlicka\textsuperscript{138} argues that international organizations and NGOs contribute to the diffusions of norms, but at the same time recent actions such as Russia’s intervention in Ukraine demonstrate that the politics of great powers can be more influential than international regimes and norms. The many recent declarations of the international community on minority rights,\textsuperscript{139} even if not enforceable, show that minority rights are considered an expression of human rights and so universal principles recognized by the United Nations. This may influence push the states to respect minority rights in some way.

Nevertheless the Turkish case, at least recently, does not appear to support such an argument, given the


\textsuperscript{138} Will Kymlicka, Multicultural Odysseys: navigating the new international politics of diversity (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007).

fact that is going backwards on its democratic elements and in particular in its treatment of Kurdish minority.

**Historical Institutionalism: Nationalism, Citizenship and State Capacity**

**Nationalism and Citizenship in State Formation**

When the bipolar world was ending—actually exactly the year of the dissolution of Soviet Union and Yugoslavia, 1991—some scholars published groundbreaking texts on the relationship between nation-states, ethnic identity and citizenship, the crisis of nation-states and at the same time the resurgence of nationalisms, from all the different theoretic schools (realist, liberalist-institutionalist, constructivist and critical theory). Academics proposed that we were at a crossroad, with the end of an era, the one of the nation-state as the Holy Grail for any structured societies, and the start of a new one. The new one was the era of globalization but also localization, the era in which nation-states would have strained under tensions that would move them towards the creation of new polities, either supranational, subnational or transnational, to adapt to the evolving needs of changing societies. And we are still living today in this era, that we don’t know how long will last. This process of integration and fragmentation has been defined by James Rosenau as “fragmegration”, but will take a long time before the transmutation is complete. Simply looking at the slow unification of Europe, the place where the nation-state was born, it has been almost 25 years since the Maastricht Treaty, and almost 60 since the Treaty of Rome. Institutional innovation will be gradual and slow. At the same time, the current populist and nationalist movements in Europe shows a resurgence of old nationalism and state sovereignty. As there are trends there are also countertrends and so we don’t know where the future of nation state will be.

In 1991, Etienne Balibar and Immanuel Wallerstein published “Race, nation, class: ambiguous identities”, a critical theory approach about the exclusionary conditions of political rights in the

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formation of a nation-state. They argued that social structures—the nation-state, the division of labor, and the division between center and periphery in the world—were at the base of modern exclusion, and that the crisis of the nation-state would coincide with a dangerous rise on nationalisms.

Rogers Brubaker, in 1992, following the Institutionalist approach and looking at path dependency, published *Citizenship and Nationhood in France and Germany.* Deepening the analysis on the formation of the nation-state and studying specifically the cases of France and Germany, he argued that the concept of citizenship—and in particular the inclusion or exclusion of aliens—reflected the political culture of these two countries, one based on *jus soli* (France) and so more open to naturalization among French aliens, and one based on *jus sanguinis* (Germany) and so more exclusive. The exclusion from political rights that passed through generations of resident aliens, according to Brubaker, was influenced by this concept of *jus sanguinis.*

Finally, even if not in 1991 but few years before, in 1983, Benedict Anderson published *Imagined Communities,* masterly explaining with a constructivist approach how national communities were based on their collective imagination: “It is imagined because the members of even the smallest nation will never know most of their fellow members …. it is imagined as a community, because regardless of the actual inequality and exploitation that may prevail in each, the nation is always perceived as a deep, horizontal comradeship.” People have imagined belonging to a socially constructed community since the birth of the nation-states, starting with the Industrial Revolution and its “print capitalism” (as he defines the process in which the vernacular languages created the concept of nation). This epochal shift affected the way people felt about themselves and, as Anderson says, “ultimately it is this fraternity that

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142 The Path Dependency theory, inside the theory of Historical Institutionalism, asserts that decisions one faces are limited by the decisions in the past, even though past circumstances may no longer be relevant. See: Skocpol T, Pierson P. “Historical Institutionalism in Contemporary Political Science”, in: Katznelson I, Milner HV, *Political Science: State of the Discipline* (New York: W.W. Norton, 2002).
145 Ibid, 6-7
made it possible, over the past two centuries, for so many millions of people, not so much to kill, as willingly to die for such limited imaginings.”

These studies have been important to analyze deeper the relationship between ethnic identity, nation states formation and the subsequent inclusive or exclusive citizenship. For this independent variable, it is crucial to understand how the inclusion of minorities in a full equal citizenship may reflect not only the process of state formation but also the process of democratization. According to a scholar of political culture who like Brubaker studied France and Germany, Tomas Hammar\textsuperscript{147} found that when the state preceded the formation of the nation, as in the case of France, citizenship laws had a territorial base (reflected in the \textit{jus soli} principle) while when the nation preceded the formation of the state, as in the German case, citizenship had a lineage base (reflected in the \textit{jus sanguinis} principle). Following the historical-institutionalist theory, Hammar argued that the history of these two countries created a different approach to citizenship and so also to the inclusion of aliens. Germany was a nation in search of a state (that united quite recently, in 1871) while France was a state in search of a nation (being a centralized state since Richelieu and the Peace of Westphalia in 1648). As a result, with respect to citizenship and national identity, Germany gave importance to the belonging to the ethnic nation while France emphasized the belonging to the state.

Another scholar, Stuurman, studying France and the Netherlands, argued that while in France the model of citizenship was historically “liberal-Republican based on individual rights, the Dutch model was “communitarian-liberal” or based more on community rights.\textsuperscript{148} With this model France went towards some form of cultural assimilationism, actually with a strong repression of minority languages in the 19\textsuperscript{th} century, while the Netherlands (similarly to the UK) adopted some form of multiculturalism. Contrary to France, the Netherlands in their history of national identity have been more inclusive, in part because of

\begin{footnotesize}
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\item \textsuperscript{146} Ibid., pp. 6-7
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the number of residents born in other nations, as Prak remembers,\textsuperscript{149} that made the Dutch provinces allow non-natives to become citizens. As Earnest, retaking the work of Prak, puts it: “Dutch citizenship is unique, then, in its combination of French republican liberalism, Protestant religious toleration, and colonial multiculturalism.”\textsuperscript{150} This has been reflected also in the Dutch colonies; Indonesia had a more communitarian model of citizenship also thanks to the Netherlands heritage.

In conclusion, the history of state formation shapes its institutions and laws of citizenship, in particular their relationship with the country’s ethnic minorities. To say it with Acemoglu and Robinson: “Different patterns of institutions today are deeply rooted in the past because once society gets organized in a particular way, this tends to persist.”\textsuperscript{151} Founding definitions of citizenship, then, continue to shape the state’s treatment of ethnic minorities today, including autonomization or securitization.

\textit{State Capacity}

Huntington\textsuperscript{152} has explained how state capacity\textsuperscript{153} is important for political order in changing societies. According to him, state institutions and leaders, in particular in the Global South, must slow development because the rate of social and economic changes of modernization (urbanization, literacy, education, mass media) often create social instability. As the middle class is too weak to win elections the masses could move toward socialism and communism; hence, the politics of order requires strong leaders and institutions. Beside this, in traditional societies, entrepreneurship had been monopolized, Huntington argues, often by an ethnic minority, such as the Greek and Armenians in the Ottoman Empire.\textsuperscript{154} This could be one of the reasons for discrimination against minority discrimination: exclude the minority to avoid instability, or make the state intervene to maintain the power of the elites, much as the Turkish

\textsuperscript{149} Prak, 1997.
\textsuperscript{150} David C. Earnest, \textit{Old nations, new voters: nationalism, transnationalism, and democracy in the era of global migration} (Albany: SUNY Press, 2008).
\textsuperscript{153} State capacity can be defined as how governments function, based on their bureaucratic procedures, capacity (in the sense of the ability to get things done) and autonomy (in the sense of protection from political micromanagement). See: Francis Fukuyama, \textit{What Is Governance?}, \textit{Governance}, Volume 26, Issue 3, July 2013.
\textsuperscript{154} Ibid., 55
military intervened “to curb the rise to power of a new business class supported by the peasants.”\textsuperscript{155}

Therefore when a state had strong institutions relative to societal actors, modernization can occur without instability but at the cost of the exclusion of minorities.

The argument that states with strong institutions are more able to curb violent ethnic conflicts is supported by other studies of democratic transitions.\textsuperscript{156} However, some scholars such as Przeworski,\textsuperscript{157} Cordell and Wolff\textsuperscript{158} give importance to state capacity for the inclusion of minorities, arguing that strong institutions will be more pluralist because they can avoid concentration of political and economic power. Wolff in particular argues that strong states—with effective policies, thorough economic structures and resources—are more likely to accommodate political and economic demands of their minorities. Brubaker and Laitin\textsuperscript{159} make similar arguments: weak states, with ineffective administrative and political institutions and limited economic resources, are less capable of dealing with minority demands and more likely to resort to inexpensive strategies such as isolation or assimilation.

To measure state capacity one can use many parameters. The Worldwide Governance Indicators Report,\textsuperscript{160} produced by Brookings Institute and World Bank every year, use several variables: the voice and accountability of people; political stability and absence of violence; government effectiveness; the rule of law; and the Control of corruption.

The Worldwide Governance Indicators Report of 2014 shows how Turkey, apart from the “voice and accountability” indicator (that represents perceptions of people on their power in selecting the government, as well as freedom of expression, freedom of association, and a free media) and “political stability and absence of violence” (perceptions of the likelihood of political instability and/or politically-motivated violence, including terrorism), is in a better situation than Indonesia for governance indicators.

\textsuperscript{155} Ibid., 221
\textsuperscript{157} Adam Przeworski et al., \textit{Democracy and development: political institutions and well-being in the world, 1950-1990} (Cambridge; New York: Cambridge University Press, 2000).
\textsuperscript{159} Rogers Brubaker; David D Laitin, \textit{Ethnic and Nationalist Violence} (Los Angeles: Sage, 2009).
\textsuperscript{160} See here: \url{http://data.worldbank.org/data-catalog/worldwide-governance-indicators}
This means that Turkey has a more efficient state capacity compared to Indonesia, but a lower level of democracy and stability. Since 2002 Turkey has seen an improvement in government effectiveness and rule of law, but a worsening (apart from the first few years) of political stability and voice and accountability. This could relate with the treatment of minorities, making the stronger Turkish state more exclusive.

Unfortunately, there is no consensus in the literature on whether strong institutions and state capacity would promote inclusion or exclusion. For this reason, this study will not use this variable as it is not clear which impact it has, but will touch on it in the chapter seven on Nationalism and Citizenship.

**Ontological Security and Political ideology: The Sociological-Ideational Approach**

**Ontological Security**

The ontological security concept was firstly created by Anthony Giddens\(^{161}\) and later transferred to the IR field in particular by Jennifer Mitzen and Brent J. Steele\(^{162}\). Ontological security in IR refers to the needs of states to have a secure notion of the “self” in the sense of its national identity. Every state it’s a different ontological interpretation of security depending on its history, geography, culture and other factors. If this notion of the self and its position in the world is stable, a state enjoys a stable ontological security, otherwise the state’s ontological security becomes unstable and temporary. Ontological security may change over time as during some periods a state can feel a higher ontological security, while during others it may feel a lower one, depending of internal or external threats. Usually, after the implosion of an empire or a federation of states, such as after the end of the Ottoman Empire or the Soviet Union, the heir of the previous powerful actor feels a low level of ontological security as it fears its own dismemberment and disappearance. Isolated countries may also feel low level of ontological security because they tend to mistrust because of lack of interaction with international community and so tend to react with a defensive


attitude (from North Korea to Iran). Ontological security may be affected by the level of conflict that the state experiences, feeling threatened in its existence and sovereignty when conflicts appear (for example a state passing through a civil war has obviously a low level of ontological security). However, a recent book edited by Rumelili, studying the cases of Cyprus, Northern Ireland and Israel/Palestine, argues that prospects of peace can also generate anxieties in the ontological security of the states, as peace may threaten the stability of self-narratives created with the long-term conflicts. Nevertheless, it is evident that low levels of ontological security make states fearful and, by extension, unaccommodating towards any request of regional autonomy or decentralization. A state will not be inclusive and accommodating towards a minority in particular if it feels that this minority may collaborate with foreign countries against the nation state, as Weiner argued with respect to the case of Macedonia. Also Kymlicka claims that one of the biggest block to the autonomization of minorities is the fact that “minority groups are often seen as a kind of ‘fifth column’, likely to be working for a neighbouring enemy.” When seen as an internal threat connected with an external one, minority groups are stigmatized and as such disempowered.

There is not much literature on ontological security during democratization phases but it seems that there is a consensus among scholars on the importance of this variable in general on the relationship between a country and its minorities. One may hypothesize that when states feel insecure, they reacting in an exclusive and nationalist way, including with the securitization or repression of minorities. By contrast, when states enjoy a higher level of ontological security, they are more willing to consider and accept autonomization. Because this variable cannot be considered an independent variable though as it is not independent from the other factors, it will be defined as “interacting” variable, being both intervening (being affected by the other variables and affecting the final outcome) and preceding/affecting the other variables.

Political Ideology: Political Islam or Marxist Approach of Separatist Movements

As the Arab Spring demonstrated, to have successful democratization as occurred in Eastern Europe there is a need not only of a strong civil society but also structural and institutional elements: strong political parties, check and balances among the political powers, inclusive Constitutions, absence of a hereditary executive, and other. Elites must also have a political will that is rare to find. Among these institutional elements, Linz and Stephan argue that for the success of democratic transitions it is important that political parties will be committed to liberal principles and inclusive, pluralistic approaches. Most of these elements were absent in the post-Arab Spring. For example, the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt was not very inclusive and pluralistic, and even Turkey seems having many problems with its brand of Political Islam. Therefore, in Muslim countries where religion and politics today are still very much interrelated (and where political Islam being was repressed during the colonial times and the authoritarian regimes) the question to ask is: what is the role of political Islam in successful and inclusive democratization processes? Are secular parties more conducive to liberal elements and pluralism (including the inclusion of minorities) or which forms of Political Islam can be so?

Even if some scholars like Hamid argue that repression in the Middle East authoritarian regimes may have “forced” Islamists to moderate their politics and democratic openings in the Arab Spring pushed Islamists back toward their original conservatism, there is no consensus in the literature on this. Nevertheless, at least there is no longer a division in the literature between a “modern, democratic and secular” single West culture versus a “traditional, illiberal and religious” single Middle Eastern culture, as Huntington or Lewis would have said. Reality is much more complex than that, and the “clash of civilizations” narrative based on this superficial vision has been abandoned. As we saw in the

cases of Turkey and Indonesia, Muslim organizations actually contributed a lot to the democratization of Muslim countries. Besides this, Muslim regions like Central Asia, for long time under the Soviet Union, have been insulated from both the Western and Middle Eastern Islamic traditions. With their independence the conflict started not between the ideas of the West and Islam but instead between the West and Soviet traditional authoritarianism, in the middle of which were militant Islamic ideologies imported from the Mujahadeen in Afghanistan.\footnote{See on this: Ahmed Rashid, \textit{Jihad: The Rise of Militant Islam in Central Asia}, (New York: Penguin Books, 2003).}

Among other scholars, Esposito, Sonn and Voll\footnote{John Esposito, Tamara Sonn, John O. Voll, \textit{Islam and democracy after the Arab Spring} (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2015).} argued recently that there is a new politics of democracy that transcends both secular authoritarianism and Political Islam. Ghobadzadeh,\footnote{Naser Ghobadzadeh, \textit{Religious Secularity: A Theological Challenge to the Islamic State} (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2014).} giving the example of Iran, argues that both “authoritarian secularization” and “authoritarian Islamization” may exist, defining the politico-religious discourse of the Islamic research for a “democratic secular state” as “religious secularity”. Cesari\footnote{Jocelyn Cesari, \textit{The awakening of Muslim democracies} (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2014).} speaks about “unsecular democracies”, democracies that accept free and fair elections and some civil liberties (freedom of the press to a certain extent, freedom of association, and other rights) but reject some liberties seen as a threat to the national community and identity based on Islam (in particular sexual and spiritual sphere and rights of the self). Hashemi\footnote{Hashemi, Nader, \textit{Islam, Secularism, and Liberal Democracy: Toward a Democratic Theory for Muslim Societies}, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012).} challenges the belief that religious politics and liberal-democratic development are incompatible, proposing a theory of “Muslim secularism” that is not only possible but necessary. Finally, Bishara\footnote{Marwan Bishara, \textit{The invisible Arab}, (Nation books, 2012).} argues that liberty and justice reconciled with religion and nationalism are the bases for stability and progress to flourish in the Arab world. If we look at recent studies, there is also evidence that supports the fact that secular parties not necessarily are more pro liberal reforms than Islamist parties; on the contrary often they are not able
to make a liberal alternative to either old regimes or Islamist parties. Boduszyński, Fabbe and Lamont\textsuperscript{177} for example supported this argument testing it in three countries: Egypt, Tunisia, and Turkey. They assessed the secular party’s liberal effects (analyzing among other factors the history of exclusivist and statist positions). Their results did not find that the secular parties were more liberal and inclusive of the Islamist ones (including in Turkey, where the main secular opposition voice is the one of the secular-statist-exclusivist CHP). Finally, Sener Akturk\textsuperscript{178} argues that if new elites, representing an electorate with ethnically specific grievances, come to power with a new narrative and a hegemonic majority, they can change the approach to minority groups. He gives the cases of changes in in policies related to ethnicity and nationality in German, the removal of ethnicity from Russian passports, and the beginning of public broadcasting in Kurdish and other minority languages in Turkey since the AKP regime, as an example of such changes.

Much like state capacity for the historical-institutionalist theory, this variable seems less important as there is no consensus in the literature if political ideology like political Islam would promote more inclusion or exclusion. For this reason, this study will not use this variable as it is not clear if it has a real impact, but will touch it in the ontological security chapter.

Conclusions

The four theoretical approaches explained in last part of this chapter are following four principal schools of comparative politics: Rationalism, Structuralism, Historical Institutionalism, and Critical Theory (looking in particular at the psychological/sociological level of the country). For the first school the variable analyzed is the elites and their power Interests, for the second the international factors and the regional geopolitical situation, for the third the citizenship and institutions of the state and for the last one the ontological security of the country.


\textsuperscript{178} Sener Akturk, “Regimes of Ethnicity: Comparative Analysis of Germany, the Soviet Union/Post-Soviet Russia, and Turkey”, \textit{World Politics}, Vol. 63, Issue 01, January 2011, pp 115-164.
Next chapter will delineate the research method of this study, which follows the case study analysis. The chapter will introduce before the case studies choice and their selection criteria (the control variables of the study) and then will explain the causal mechanism to research in the two case studies with the four principle independent variables and hypothesis.
CHAPTER 3
RESEARCH DESIGN

Research Method and Sources

To study securitization and autonomization, this research relies on case study analysis. Comparing cases aims to test hypotheses but, as Collier observes, can also “contribute to the inductive discovery of new hypothesis and to theory building.”\(^{179}\) This is the aim of this study: to test an argument but also open space for theory development, based on the findings.\(^{180}\) That is why the research has fewer cases than variables. The study does not control for some confounding variables because the purpose of it is also theory building: to look at several factors in order to identify “if and how” these factors may affect the two different outcomes analyzed in the treatment of minorities. Finally, as Van Evera says, a good theory, besides having explanatory power and being falsifiable, parsimonious and clearly framed, should have “prescriptive richness. It yields useful policy recommendations.”\(^{181}\) The theory drawn from this study aims to have some prescriptive elements and policy suggestions to fledgling democracies facing the challenge of inclusion of minorities.

There are several reasons to use qualitative analysis. First, a case study may be suitable to understand the falsifiability of a theory because of its in-depth analysis. Qualitative research, as King, Keohane and Verba argue, gives the possibility “to explain as much as possible with as little as possible.”\(^{182}\) To do so, qualitative methodology uses descriptive analysis to understand the research problem in depth and with its nuances that statistical analysis cannot give because “description often comes first; it is hard to develop explanations before we know something about the world and what needs

to be explained on the basis of what characteristics.” In particular, case studies are important because they “provide an insightful description of complex events,” an in-depth analysis to explain the causal relationship of the research.

Second, as this research seeks to explain the causes of the differences in treatment of minorities, the “causes-of-effects” approach of qualitative analysis is more appropriate to explain the specific outcomes of particular cases, rather than the quantitative “effects-of-causes” approach, which, according to Mahoney and Goertz (2006) “seeks to estimate the average effect of one or more causes across a population of cases.”

Third, the narrative approach is more appropriate for the comparison of two discrete outcomes such as the securitization or autonomization of minorities. Understanding of such outcomes requires an interpretation of facts that a statistical analysis cannot give. To show the relationship between the dependent and independent variables in this study, the best approach is qualitative analysis.

To make better causal inferences through the qualitative analysis this study uses in particular the method of process tracing. This methodology is based on dissecting the causation chain through the different causal mechanisms between the observed variables, looking in particular to the set of events and processes that build the cause-effect mechanism. Process tracing is appropriate especially for small-n studies (or even just a single case) in order to validate a theory or develop a new one, because the few cases can be thoroughly researched and analyzed. As Bennets explains, process tracing involves empirical tests with evidence that have different kinds of probative value. Usually process tracing needs original data based on field work or primary resources in the local language. However, because scholars have studied both Turkey and Indonesia, both their democratization processes and in their relation with their

183 Ibid., p. 34.
184 Ibid., p. 44.
ethnic minorities (even in Turkey more than Indonesia), the study will rely on secondary resources. Also, as the two countries have been studied either separately or in comparison but without the question or the causal analysis proposed in this study (see Al Qurtuby\textsuperscript{188} for example), I will consult both scholarship analyzing the case studies, but also non-scholarly work (from government or NGOs/media reports) to find evidence in more factual sources.

Several informal interviews, conducted in both Turkey and Indonesia, contribute to this research, in particular to understand if the study can really make a case of securitization versus autonomization and which factors may affect state choice. This consultation with subject matter experts (in particular academics and activists) contributed to a deeper understanding of the issue.

The research design is based on the “most similar systems”\textsuperscript{189} and the “method of difference” (Mill’s criteria).\textsuperscript{190} In the most similar systems design, because common factors are controlled for the differences in cases constitute the explanatory variables. This study follows the most similar systems because the two countries are Muslim democracies with similar factors, as explained in the next section, and it is based on the method of difference because it deals with different outcomes in similar cases.

**Case Studies Choice and Selection Criteria**

Even if Turkey and Indonesia have very different sizes of minority populations, both had 30 years of insurgency of the respective ethnic minority but with different results: Turkey is currently experiencing an escalating conflict, with an increase in the securitization of Kurds in the Eastern region of the country and a democratic regression for Turkey. By contrast the insurgency in Indonesia ended ten years ago with the autonomy of Aceh and a step forward in the “substantiality” and meaningfulness of the Indonesian democracy. The purpose of the research is to understand why two similar secular, modern and relatively

\textsuperscript{188} Al Qurtuby analyzes the dynamics of political reconciliation and attempts at conflict resolution and peacebuilding to understand the differences between Kurdish conflict and Acehnese conflict. See: Sumanto Al Qurtuby, *Interethnic Violence, Separatism and Political Reconciliation in Turkey and Indonesia*, India Quarterly 71(2) (6/2015): 126–145.


successful Muslim democracies chose different strategies to deal with their ethnic minorities. The
selection of the cases is based on a variation in the treatment of minorities (the dependent variable of the
research) but also on a similarity in the following several factors, that may otherwise confound the
hypothesized relationships between independent and dependent variables. These factors represent the
control variables of the study:

1) **Ethnic versus religious heterogeneity**: Both nation-states have a prevailing ethnic group (Turks
around 70%, Javanese 40%)

191 but also minorities with substantial populations (Kurds in Turkey, many groups in Indonesia). Islam is the predominant religion in both states: 98% in Turkey
(majority of Sunni but a good part Shia Alevi sect

192) and 88% in Indonesia, mostly Sunni.  

193 While the Turks clearly define themselves as Sunni or Shia,

194 Indonesians define themselves mostly as non-sectarian. They all have strong traditions of mystic Sufism (from Rumi to Gulen in Turkey, and from Fansuri to Javanese court poets in Indonesia). In Turkey, Islam resisted Arabization (as Ottoman Empire ruled over the Arab world) more than Indonesia.  

195 But in Indonesia Islam was more pluralistic: as Geertz argued,

196 the Islam in Indonesia was born as a syncretic religion that combined Hindu and polytheist traditions. As Hefner states, “Muslim politics…was varied from the start. At a few times and in a few places, there were pluralist tendencies not just in politics but in literature and religious practices as well.”

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192 There is no independent data on the numbers of Alevi (as well as Kurds): we go from 10% to 30% of the population. Another thing to take into account is that in Turkey every citizen finds automatically Muslim as religion on the personal ID, and only if requested the definition is taken out.
2) **Common constitutional secularism**: Both Turkey and Indonesia are secular countries. Turkey has gradually imposed secularism since the birth of the Republic in 1923, with Kemalist reforms that, from the Constitution of 1924 on, brought slowly to the final secularism based on the division between governmental and religious affairs, with a Constitutional amendment on February 5, 1937. Secularism since then has been always strong in Turkey, but it has weakened recently with the moderate Islamist party AKP trying to influence politics with some Islamic values, even if without changing the Constitution for the time being.

By contrast, Indonesian secularism was not explicitly declared or forced by an ideology like Kemalism. Instead, it comes from Pancasilla values of tolerance and pluralism reflected in its history of diversity and in its constitution, since the independence in 1945, even if the level of secularism is debatable. For example, as first principle of Pancasila[^198] is “the belief in one and only God” and the Constitution recognizes only six official religions. However, secularism is based on a public sphere that is separated from the private sphere of religion, and a state that has equal distance to all religions with equal rights.[^199] Both Indonesia and Turkey uphold the separation of these public and private spheres.

3) **Recent history of democratization with a clear and unique path towards it**: Turkey fully democratized in 2002; for Indonesia it was 1998. In Turkey the 2002 “democratization” was not seen as a break from the past (because the past had already experienced some form of pseudo or electoral democracy) while for Indonesia the revolution brought democracy for the first time. One can date Turkish democratization to 2002 because that year marked the first time an Islamist party won an election and the military did not intervene. Today both states are considered[^198][^199]

[^198]: Islam in Indonesia is separated from the nation building because of Pancasila (from Sanskrit: panca, meaning five, and sila, meaning principles) the five principles at the bases of the Indonesian state: 1) Belief in the one and only God 2) Just and civilized humanity 3) Unity of Indonesia 4) Democracy guided by the inner wisdom in the unanimity arising out of deliberations amongst representatives 5) Social justice for all the people of Indonesia.

[^199]: See again: Martin van Bruinessen, 2014. The separation between church and state is not very clear in many Western secular countries: England still have a state religion; in Germany the state collects church taxes on behalf of the church; in Norway the King is required to be a member of the Church of Norway and the church is regulated by a special church law unlike other religions; Italy had a state religion and compulsory teaching of Catholic religion in public schools until recently and the crucifix is still present in the school buildings, even if the European Court of Human Rights defined it a violation of religious freedom already in 2009.
procedural democracies even if scholars and well-know indices do not identify them as liberal democracies. Freedom House for example consider both as “partly free”, because they are still on their path to democratization. The Economist Intelligence Unit in its Democracy Index defines Turkey as “hybrid regime” while Indonesia a “flawed democracy.” Finally Democracy Ranking scores them respectively 65 (Indonesia) and 69 (Turkey) in a total of 100 democracies. They both represent a contrast with respect to their neighbors: Turkey is an exception respect to the other Middle Eastern Muslim countries and Indonesia an exception with respect to Southeast Asian countries. Regarding the impact of Muslim identity in the democratization process, in Turkey and Indonesia Muslim associations and parties have played important roles in the transition to democracy. In Indonesia, Muhammadiyah and Nahdlatul Ulama gave stability in the post-Soeharto transition; in Turkey the Islamic party AKP was able to make important reforms since it won elections in 2002. The AKP is the first Islamist party, even if moderate, to win elections in a Muslim country and increase power in the following elections.

4) Armed independence struggle for both national independence and ethno-national minority independence: In contrast to many other Muslim-majority nation-states, Turkey and Indonesia

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200 Freedom House still considered Turkey and Indonesia as “partly free” (“electoral” but not “liberal” democracy) in its most recent evaluation of 2017. “Turkey’s political rights rating declined from 3 to 4, its civil liberties rating declined from 4 to 5, and it received a downward trend arrow due to the security and political repercussions of an attempted coup in July, which led the government to declare a state of emergency and carry out mass arrests and firings of civil servants, academics, journalists, opposition figures, and other perceived enemies”. Indonesia scored 3, with 2 and 4 for political rights and civil liberties, like the former year. Indonesia is in a better situation among other things because in 2014 elected a new leader, the first president not emerged from the country’s political-military elite, while Turkey has the same leadership and party since 2002. See: Freedom in the world 2017, Freedom House, 2017, accessed February 6, 2017, https://freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-world/freedom-world-2017 The Economist Intelligence Unit defined Indonesia in 2016 as “flawed democracy” and Turkey as “hybrid regimes”, between democracy and autocracy. The Democracy Index analyzes 60 indicators with 5 categories: electoral process and pluralism; civil liberties; functioning of government; political participation; political culture. See The Economist Intelligence Unit's Democracy Index, The Economist Group, 2017, accessed February 6, 2017, https://infographics.economist.com/2017/DemocracyIndex/

201 Democracy Ranking is an initiative of the "Democracy Ranking Association" located in Vienna, Austria, that creates an annual global ranking of democracies integrating some characteristics of the political system with non-political dimensions like gender, economy, knowledge, health, and environment. The Democracy Ranking 2015 covers countries that are categorized by Freedom House as “free” or “partly free” in the years 2013 and 2014. Accessed May, 20, 2016, http://democracyranking.org/ranking/2015/data/Scores_of_the_Democracy_Ranking_2015_A4.pdf

achieved independence after a long armed struggle viewed as a fight against alien occupying forces, particularly in Turkey. This history also allowed the armed forces to keep a dominating role in politics for long time to maintain secularism against Islamism and order against social rebellion.\textsuperscript{203} Also, the two ethnonational groups\textsuperscript{204} studied here, Kurds and Acehnese, picked up arms for their liberation movements in different periods (middle of 1970s and 1980s) as they did not find other ways to fight for self-determination. In both cases, the resistance to the national government is rooted not only in ethnic diversity and lack of autonomy but also in the perception that the minority has not benefited from economic development; in the legacy of suffering because of government counterinsurgency operations; in the resentment for social migration policies (in particular in Aceh); and finally in a rejection of the secular orientation of the state. Finally, both insurgencies were seen by their government and citizens as the most serious challenges to the respective territorial integrity.

The difference between the two cases, though, occurred during the democratization process. The Indonesian state increased the violent repression of the minority at the beginning of its democratic transition and after few years went to negotiations and autonomization with a final solution to the conflict. By contrast, the Turkish state started with accommodation for the first years but suddenly the autonomization process was blocked and securitization re-started. Therefore, while in the Indonesian case the outcome is clear at this moment in history, as the autonomy of Aceh exists already since 2005, the Turkish case is still in process. Actually, in the Turkish case there is no clarity yet. Will policies of inclusion, decentralization and autonomy take place sooner or later in the future? Or will the securitization continue for long time, until the Kurdish issue disappears in Turkey (perhaps with the creation of a Kurdish state between Syria and Iraq and the movement of part of the Kurdish minority from Turkey to the new state)?

\textsuperscript{203} Martin van Bruinessen, 2014, p. 4.
\textsuperscript{204} Ethno-national groups can be defined as “populations which express an ethnic identity and make a claim to being recognized as nation. The ethnic identity is often grounded in region, common culture, religion or language, or a combination of some of these.” See: Ellis Cashmore, \textit{Encyclopedia of race and ethnic studies}, London and New York: Routledge, 2004, p. 148.
5) **Non-Arabic Muslim countries with plural cultural heritage:** Both Indonesia and Turkey are heirs to great civilizations. In Indonesia, these civilizations were the Buddhist Sriwijaya empire from Sumatra, the Hindu Majapahit from Java, the Muslim sultanates of Aceh, Mataram, Banten and other parts of the Archipelago (as well as Christianity spread by Portuguese and Dutch colonists). In Turkey the Hittite, Byzantium and Roman empires, and after those the Seljuq and Ottoman empires, provide the country’s civilizational heritage. Both states represent “bridge countries” among continents, cultures and religions: Turkey between Europe and Middle East/Asia, Indonesia between Southeast Asia and Australia (but also India and China).

6) **Growing economical, geopolitical, and strategic countries:** Both Turkey and Indonesia have made impressive progress improving standard of living for their citizens, performing well in the Millennium Development Goals, and with big potential for further economic development.

   Turkish GDP growth in 2013 and 2014 was 4.2 and 2.9 percent, while for Indonesia it was 5.6 and 5.0 percent,\(^\text{205}\) with a total GDP of $1.5 trillion (PPP) for Turkey and $2.6 trillion for Indonesia.\(^\text{206}\) Both belong to the G20 and are part of the so called MINT group (Mexico, Indonesia, Nigeria, and Turkey)\(^\text{207}\) and the Next Eleven group, identified by Goldman Sachs as having a high potential of becoming, along with the BRICs, among the world's largest economies in the 21st century.\(^\text{208}\) Both also belie the myth that Muslim countries have difficulty in processes of modernization, defined largely in terms of economic development. Also, Turkey and Indonesia have growing geopolitical and strategic importance, reflected in their growing hard and soft power, ambitions for regional leadership, and their international roles.

7) **Close relationship to the Western countries:** Both Turkey and Indonesia are strong partners of the US, NATO and the EU, even if Turkey is more so than Indonesia: Turkey has been a NATO

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member since 1952, hoping to enter the EU for long time. Indonesia is a strategic partner of the US, a member of ASEAN, and has regular meetings with NATO (even if in the past was the leader of the non-alignment movement). Both were anti-communist bulwarks during the Cold War, albeit with a massacre of hundreds of thousands of “communists” in Indonesia in the 1960s.

To explain the study’s case selection, Table 1 reports the most important 4 control variables in 15 democratizing Muslim majority countries.
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Bangladesh</td>
<td>Partly free</td>
<td>Hybrid regime</td>
<td>Low (Bengali 98%)</td>
<td>Low (Muslim 89%)</td>
<td>0.0454</td>
<td>0.2090</td>
<td>No (state religion)</td>
<td>1991</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>1971</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Burkina Faso</td>
<td>Partly free</td>
<td>Hybrid regime</td>
<td>High *</td>
<td>High *</td>
<td>0.7377</td>
<td>0.5798</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>2014</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Indonesia</td>
<td>Partly free</td>
<td>Flawed democracy</td>
<td>High *</td>
<td>Low (Muslim 88%)</td>
<td>0.7351</td>
<td>0.2340</td>
<td>Yes (but ambiguous)</td>
<td>1998</td>
<td>Yes (1945/49)</td>
<td>Yes (Acehnese 74/04, Timorese 75/99, Papuans 61/today)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Iraq</td>
<td>Not free</td>
<td>Hybrid regime</td>
<td>High *</td>
<td>Low (Muslim 99%)</td>
<td>0.3689</td>
<td>0.4844</td>
<td>No (state religion)</td>
<td>2005</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>(Kurds 1961/2005)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kyrgyzstan</td>
<td>Partly free</td>
<td>Hybrid regime</td>
<td>High *</td>
<td>Low (Muslim 86%)</td>
<td>0.6752</td>
<td>0.4470</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>2005/2011</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>No (but armed clashes between Uzbek and Kirgiz in 2010)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lebanon</td>
<td>Partly free</td>
<td>Hybrid regime</td>
<td>Low (Arab 95%)</td>
<td>High *</td>
<td>0.1314</td>
<td>0.7886</td>
<td>No (confessionalism)</td>
<td>1990</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>No (but 15 years civil war among different religions)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Malaysia</td>
<td>Partly free</td>
<td>Flawed democracy</td>
<td>High *</td>
<td>High *</td>
<td>0.5880</td>
<td>0.6657</td>
<td>No (state religion)</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>No</td>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Mali</td>
<td>Partly free</td>
<td>Hybrid regime</td>
<td>High *</td>
<td>Low (95% Muslim)</td>
<td>0.6906</td>
<td>0.1820</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>1991</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>No (even if recent Tuareg rebellion 2012/2013)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Morocco (constitutional monarchy)</td>
<td>Partly free</td>
<td>Hybrid regime</td>
<td>Low (Arab-Berber 99%)</td>
<td>Low (99% Muslim)</td>
<td>0.4841</td>
<td>0.0035</td>
<td>No (state religion)</td>
<td>2011</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Yes (Sahrawi rebellion in Western Sahara 1976/1991)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nigeria</td>
<td>Partly free</td>
<td>Hybrid regime</td>
<td>High *</td>
<td>High *</td>
<td>0.8505</td>
<td>0.7421</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>1999/2011</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pakistan</td>
<td>Partly free</td>
<td>Hybrid regime</td>
<td>High *</td>
<td>Low (96% Muslim)</td>
<td>0.7098</td>
<td>0.3848</td>
<td>No (state religion)</td>
<td>2008</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Yes (Balochistan conflict since 1948)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Senegal</td>
<td>Free</td>
<td>Flawed democracy</td>
<td>High *</td>
<td>Low (95% Muslim)</td>
<td>0.6939</td>
<td>0.1497</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>1991</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Yes (Jola minority, also religious, 1982/2014)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sierra Leone</td>
<td>Partly free</td>
<td>Hybrid regime</td>
<td>High *</td>
<td>High *</td>
<td>0.8191</td>
<td>0.5395</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>2002</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tunisia</td>
<td>Free</td>
<td>Flawed democracy</td>
<td>Low (Arab 98%)</td>
<td>Low (99% Muslims)</td>
<td>0.0394</td>
<td>0.0104</td>
<td>No (state religion)</td>
<td>2011</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
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Table 1: Continued

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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Turkey</td>
<td>Partly free</td>
<td>Hybrid regime</td>
<td>High *</td>
<td>Low (100% Muslim)</td>
<td>0.3200</td>
<td>0.0049</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes (1919/1923)</td>
<td>Yes (Kurds 1984/today)</td>
<td>Yes (Kurds 1984/today)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Turkey in the Alesina indicator has low fractionalization probably because the Encyclopedia Britannica didn’t consider the Kurds as a minority, recognizing only the small minorities with legal status in Turkey: Jews, Greek and Armenians (same for Iraq).

Data sources:

As we can see from table 1 and Figure 1, the two cases that have common ethnic diversity and religious homogeneity, as well as constitutional secularism, recent democratization, an armed independence struggle, and minority self-determination armed conflict are Turkey and Indonesia. Actually according to the index of Minority at Risk, both the Kurds and Acehnese minorities are defined as “ethno-nationalist groups”, both of which increased their armed rebellions after the democratic transition (together with other minorities like Mayans in Mexico or Chechens in Russia).\footnote{Minorities at Risk (MAR) is a university-based research project that monitors and analyzes the status and conflicts of 283 politically-active communal groups in many countries from 1945 to 2006. MAR confirms that the Acehnese minority and the Kurdish minority as ethno-nationalist groups (“regionally concentrated peoples with a history of organized political autonomy with their own state, traditional ruler, or regional government, who have supported political movements for autonomy at some time since 1945”). See: "Minorities at Risk Dataset", 2009, College Park, MD: Center for International Development and Conflict Management. Retrieved from http://www.cidcm.umd.edu/mar/ on: March, 2, 2016.} Obviously today, that the Aceh rebellion found a peaceful solution while the Kurdish one not, the two cases are in a
different situation. The Minority Rights Group International, for example, defines in 2015 the Kurdish rebellion still an ongoing conflict while the Acehnese rebellion as a “contained armed conflict.”

Actually, in the Global peace index 2015 Indonesia scores 1.5 (considered high level of peace) while Turkey 2.09 (considered low level of peace) on a scale from 1 to 5 (Iraq, the least peaceful country in the world, scores 4.4). And in 2016 the score of Turkey would be surely worst. But still it worth to compare the two cases as for several years they had improvement in their democratization and at the same time an ongoing ethnic conflict.

Causal Mechanism to Research in the Two Case Studies

The study’s dependent variable (DV), the state’s treatment of ethnic minorities, is a variable with two different outcomes: securitization and autonomization (or policies of autonomy).

To test the four hypothesized explanations for minority incorporation, I operationalize the measures for the each of the four main theories.

1) *Elites power interests.* This variable is related to rational choice theory.

According to this theory, political actors are motivated to stay in power and so political elites often promote exclusive nationalist policies once they fear the risk of losing power. This could be the case for Turkey, with a politically threatening minority, the Kurds, that for the first time had a party representing them in parliament; and Indonesia, without a political threatening minority, with the ex-GAM party contesting only local elections. Another important actor is the Army, as in Turkey this is very strong and represents a block to more Constitutional rights and decentralization for minorities. The Army views these as a step towards autonomy and even independence, which is not acceptable.

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213 Minority Rights Group International is an international human rights organization founded in London in the 1960s. Their annual index, *Peoples under threat,* ranks countries according to the degree of physical danger facing communities. In the 2015 index, out of 70 countries, Turkey was ranked 52, with five communities at risks (Kurds, Alevi, Roma, Armenians and other Christians), a score of 5 for self-determination conflicts (which means “ongoing armed conflict”, the one in Kurdistan region) and a score of 1 for the major armed conflict. Indonesia was ranked 64, with 5 communities at risks (Acehnese, Chinese, Dayaks, Madurese, Papuans besides religious minorities) and with a score of 4 for self-determination conflicts (which means “contained armed conflict”). Accessed March, 2, 2016

http://peoplesunderthreat.org/.

These studies on elite interests in power suggest the following hypothesis:

Hypothesis 1: When elites face electoral or direct political challenges from minority groups, they are more likely to pursue securitization policies. Otherwise they are more likely to pursue autonomization policies.

2) International/geopolitical situation: These variables are related to international-geopolitical-structural situation.

The minorities’ conflicts can be also a game of geopolitics. The Kurdish conflict can also be considered a geopolitical issue. First of all, the end of WWI didn’t see the birth of a Kurdish state, as expected by Kurdish people. More recently, the situation in the Turkish neighboring countries became a geopolitical question: in Iraq, with the autonomous Southern Kurdistan region, and in Syria, with a correspondent Western autonomous region for Kurds (and both regions may hope to build in the future a unitary independent state). For Indonesia, the Acehnese minority is not a geopolitical issue, because apart from the diaspora of some Acehnese, there is no risk of spillover of the conflict, partly because Aceh is the tip of Sumatra Island. Also important has been the role of the Western powers: Turkey is a NATO member and candidate for EU membership since 1999; a state whose importance has grown during the Syrian migration crisis and instability in the Middle East. One can hypothesize that this increased importance has affected Turkey’s treatment of its minorities. In the past, for example, Turkey may have been influenced by the EU on the Kurdish issue, but today it seems the opposite: facing the prospect of millions of refugees, the EU seems dependent on Turkish decisions and so does not pressure Turkey as it has in the past.

Indonesia, even if it is an important country, is not so pivotal for regional stability as Turkey is in its area. For this reason, it might have benefitted from more independence in its decisions but in reality international pressure has pushed Indonesia to accommodate its minorities, in particular in East Timor and Aceh. In addition, from the perspective of the self-determination movements, the Free Aceh Movement (GAM) was mostly free from external influences, avoiding negative consequences such as the West labeling it a terrorist organization (as it did the PKK in Turkey) but also positive ones (while Kurds have drawn the advocacy of the EU, UN and the US, in the case of Aceh only international NGOs were
interested in the conflict). At the same time, in the Aceh peace process the role of third party international actors is evident, with the Henri Durant Center and especially the Finland government during the negotiation phase. By contrast, with the Kurds there is no third party interested in the negotiations (apart from minor assistance from the Berghof foundation) both because of Turkish rejection and the international community not interest in falling into a very complex conflict with the risk of a quagmire.

Finally, geographical elements could be important too. The fact that Aceh represents only a small tip of Sumatra island, while the Kurdish region represent a big part of Turkish territory, could have had an influence on the political decisions toward autonomy or not. By contrast, while Kurdistan has no natural resources, Aceh has lots of them. While the Kurdistan region is very much underdeveloped with respect to the rest of Turkey, the Aceh region was not so different in its development from many other areas of Indonesia. When the region is rich in natural resources, the state does not want to leave it to the minority while the minority wants its independence or at least autonomy for management of resources (as in the case of Aceh). Instead, usually when the region has no resources and is quite poor the state may be interested in some form of decentralization but the minority does not necessarily wants that (as in the case of the Houthi in Yemen). Besides this, because differences in the sizes of population and territory have always existed, this cannot explain the policy changes between autonomization and securitization for Turkey and the opposite for Indonesia. Therefore, there is no clarity on how this geographical-material variable may have affected.

These studies suggest the following hypotheses:

_Hypothesis 2:_ When facing an external security threat, states are more likely to securitize minority demands for independence. In the absence of an external threat, states are more likely to choose policies of autonomization.

_Hypothesis 3:_ When external actors intervene in minority issues, states are more likely to provide autonomy to minorities. In the absence of pressure from external actors, states are more likely to securitize minority issues.
3) **Nationalism and citizenship.**\(^{215}\) This variable is related to historical institutionalism and theories of path dependent institutional development.

This variable examines how processes of decolonization and state formation have shaped conceptions of national identity in these democratizing Islamic societies, with a particular attention on the role of elites in identity formation. Since the Millet system in the Ottoman Empire, for example, Turkey has had constructions of citizenship based on nations of religions, not nations of ethnicities, and the system was divided among religious minorities, sometimes considered second class citizens respect to the Muslims. With the Western model of a “monoethnic” nation-state building, the Turkish Republic was based on the Kemalist concept of one nation and one language, for which reason the Constitution granted legal status to non-Muslim small minorities but not to Muslim large minorities such as the Alevi (Shia) or Kurds (Sunni but with different ethnicity). Today, with the new Islamic nationalism of the AKP, Turkey still excludes Kurds from the legal status of a recognized minority even if during the early years of the AKP, for the first time in Turkish Republic granted cultural rights to Kurds.\(^{216}\) By contrast, since the colonial era Indonesia had a different approach to minorities that combined the multinationalism of Dutch origins and the “Unity in diversity” motto with the Pancasila principles in the Constitution of 1945. This, following the idea of path dependence, could have limited the ability of Turkey to make inclusive policies or policies of autonomy for minorities.

These studies suggest the following hypothesis:

*Hypothesis 4:* When comparing states, those that are former colonies are more likely to offer autonomy to minorities. States that evolved from medieval institutions are more likely to adopt policies of securitization.

4) **Ontological security:** These variables are related to the culturalist-social-identity approach and critical theories.

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Ontological security is the security of the self, the security of a national identity, that could be evaluated as low for Turkey (for its historical fear of invasion, siege and risk of dismemberment) and high for Indonesia, an archipelago (or “maritime power” as defined recently by President Jokowi) that has never feared dismemberment nor destruction by a foreign conquest. Indonesia also is a state born from decolonization and not implosion of a former empire invaded by foreign countries. Nevertheless, ontological security may change over time, as it is related with the disruption of past routines that contribute to the challenges to the self-identity creating anxieties and fears, as discussed in chapter 8.

Being related to the perception of the self-identity, ontological security is also connected with the political ideology of both the state (being secular or with Islamist ideology as in Turkey before and after the democratization of the 20th century) and the minority represented by the separatist movement (being either Marxist like the PKK or more liberal like the GAM). In Turkey the political ideology the Kemalism and its assertive secularism and nationalism against any religious values in society and state contributed to the marginalization of minorities such as the Kurds (the first rebellion was done by a Shia cleric) with the army also playing a role in the repression of Political Islam. Also, the recent “conservative democracy” ruling in Turkey (with the moderate Islamist AKP), even if it implemented reforms for minority rights, did not accept any form of power-sharing, and after a failed attempt of negotiation resorted to securitization. On the opposite side, the “national democracy” coalition currently ruling in Indonesia with President Jowo Widodo, includes small Islamist moderate parties (National Awakening Party and National Mandate Party) in a secular government, as these parties do not push for more religion into politics but use religion just as inspiration. As Cesari argues, while Turkey has a “hegemonic Islam”—with exclusive legal, economic or political rights denied to other religions—Indonesia (similar to Lebanon or Senegal) has not, even if discriminatory practices exist in the country.

As previously stated, the secular leftist ideology of the self-determination movements may play an important role too. The PKK in Turkey, and also its correspondent in Syria, the PYG, are leftist groups that draw their political ideology from the Marxist-Leninist current, and therefore rarely find support in the international community (apart from Russia). By contrast the GAM movement in Aceh does not have a leftist-communist ideology nor a political Islam ideology, despite all the attempts to bring such ideology to Aceh (from Wahhabism to ISIS).

From these studies one can derive the following hypothesis:

*Hypothesis 5:* As a state’s ontological security worsens, it is more likely to adopt securitization policies. As its ontological security improves, it is more likely to pursue autonomization.

**Conclusions**

This chapter presented the research methodology. It explained that the aim of the study is not only test the four hypothesis but also open space for theory building. The purpose of the research is to understand why two similar secular, modern and relatively successful Muslim democracies (Turkey at least until recently) chose different strategies to deal with their ethnic minorities.

After presenting the research method and the sources of the research, the chapter explained the reasons of the case studies choice with the selection criteria. The factors that represented the control variables of the two cases are: the ethnic but not religious heterogeneity, the common constitutional secularism, the recent history of democratization, the non-Arabic plural cultural heritage, the growing economical, geopolitical, and strategic level of the two countries, the armed independence struggle for both national and minority independence and finally the close relationship to the Western countries.

Finally the chapter presented the causal mechanism to research in the form of 5 hypothesis. Here the table to present synthetically these hypotheses related with their theoretical background.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Theories</th>
<th>Hypotheses</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Rational choice theory</td>
<td>Hypothesis 1  When elites face electoral or direct political challenges from minority groups, they are more likely to pursue securitization policies (and opposite).</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
| International-geopolitical structuralist theories | Hypothesis 2 and 3  When facing an external security threat, states are more likely to securitize minority demands for independence (and opposite).  
When external actors intervene in minority issues, states are more likely to provide autonomy to minorities (and opposite). |
| Historical-institutionalist theory            | Hypothesis 4  When comparing states, those that are former colonies are more likely to offer autonomy to minorities. States that evolved from medieval institutions are more likely to adopt policies of securitization. |
| Critical theories                            | Hypothesis 5  As a state’s ontological security worsens, it is more likely to adopt securitization policies (and opposite). |
CHAPTER 4

SECURITIZATION AND AUTONOMIZATION IN TURKEY AND INDONESIA: A BRIEF HISTORY AND REVIEW OF THE PERIOD OF DEMOCRATIZATION

This chapter intends to present a brief history of the treatment of the two ethnic minorities in the two case studies, the Kurds in Turkey and the Acehnese in Indonesia, especially since the start of democratization, which, as explained in chapter 3, can be considered 1998 for Indonesia and 2002 for Turkey. This in order to provide some background for the subsequent analytic chapters that will take into account the four variables/hypothesis of the research. But before we need to apply the securitization theory to the Kurdish case.

Securitization Theory Applied to Kurdish Case

Among others, one scholar that has studied the securitization of Kurds in Turkey is Birdisli.220 He argues that Turkish leaders have viewed Kurdish demands for autonomy and identity as a threat to national integrity, for which reason the state has used extraordinary securitization measures during the history of the Republic. These extraordinary measures have been first of all military intervention, with hundreds of thousands of Kurds forced to resettle in the Western region or go in exile outside Turkey, in particular after military coups. Then there are political restrictions, with 58 political parties banned between 1924 and 2009, eight of which were related with Kurdish question. Finally, the state also encouraged the assimilation of Kurds through nationalist education, with the teaching of one nation, one language and one identity.221

221 Ibid., 9-10.
Another scholar that analyze the repression of Kurds during the history of Turkish Republic is Kadıoğlu. Resembling a situation of securitization, Kadıoğlu uses Giorgio Agamben’s argument about a permanent “state of exception” to apply to the Kurdish case. He argues that the state of exception was applied for the first time in 1925 after the first Kurdish rebellion, but since 1984 the military has used a “rhetoric of necessity” to reproduce this state permanently. Even today, after the initiation of Turkey’s official candidacy to the European Union in 1999, according to the scholar, Turkey does not live in a “post-exceptionality” phase as we might think. The state of exception for Kurds might resemble the securitization phase as, according to Kadıoğlu, after 1980’s military coup it was based on visible and active presence of armed forces in the so called OHAL region; on the imprisonment of many Kurdish intellectuals and activists; and on controlling the daily life of Kurds, including extreme measures like the internal displacement of Kurdish citizens or the presence of “village guards” (that became paramilitaries of the state, turning the villages often in detention camps). After then “an estimated 30,000 lives were lost. The Kurds of Turkey found themselves in a permanent state of exception.” After 1999, the state of exception might have given space to a “post-exceptional state”, but in reality the repression of Kurdish parties and the operations of Turkish armed forces demonstrated, as Kadıoğlu again says, that policy still “[constrains] Turkey’s Kurdish issue into the framework of security. By 2012, it became impossible to declare post-exceptionality in Turkey.” So, Kadıoğlu concludes, in Turkey “the rhetoric of the need to

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222 The OHAL region (Olağanüstü Hâl Bölge Valiliği, in English: Governorship of Region in State of Emergency) was a “super-region” created in the Kurdish area in 1987 under the state of emergency that lasted until 2002. Ayşe Kadıoğlu, “Necessity and the state of exception. The Turkish state’s permanent war with its Kurdish citizens”, in *Turkey between nationalism and globalization*, ed. Riva Kastoryano (London and New York: Routledge, 2013).

223 Giorgio Agamben, *State of exception*, (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2005). Agamben argues that the state of exception (the concept of Carl Schmitt regarding the ability of a state to transcend the rule of law in the name of the public good) became in the twentieth century a normal phase of democratic governments instead of their “exception”.

224 The OHAL region (in Turkish: Olağanüstü Hâl Bölge Valiliği, English: Governorship of Region in State of Emergency) was a region in Kurdistan created by the Turkish state in 1987, after the state of emergency legislation was passed to deal with the Turkish–Kurdish conflict, until 2002.

225 Kadıoğlu, *Necessity and the state of exception*, 150-151.

226 Ibid., 153.

227 Ibid., 155.
‘preserve a state with its nation’ has consistently contributed to the justification of the state of exception."²²⁸

Other scholars also speak about a state of exception. Kurban for example argues that “since the establishment of the Republic in 1923, some form of state of exception was operative in Turkey most of the time.”²²⁹ The state of exception therefore can be considered as one of the tools of the “extraordinary measures” typical of the securitization process, that has been carried out towards the Kurdish minority in different moments of Turkish history. Actually the most important feature of the securitization process is to put an issue above politics, in the realm of “extraordinary measures”, as the “security is the move that takes politics beyond the established rule of the game and frames the issue either as a special kind of politics or as above politics.”²³⁰

Therefore, using the Buzan, Wæver and de Wilde structure, we can give a brief application of the three elements of securitization to the case of Kurds, before explaining the extreme and extraordinary measures taken during the history of the Turkish Republic and, in particular, during its recent democratization period. Regarding the referent objects—that is, objects that can be existentially threatened—in the Turkish case these objects have been represented by the sovereignty, the unity and the identity of the country. Turkish sovereignty and identity are evidently existentially threatened by the Kurdish claim of autonomy and maybe even independence in the future. Regarding securitizing actors, these has been primarily the Turkish government, with its political elites who have used the so called “security speech act” to declare the referent objects as existentially threatened, in order to escalate the conflict with the PKK, stigmatize the political wings of the Kurdish minority and marginalize them in the political arena. But a securitizing actor has been also the Turkish military, which performed the actual “security action” with the militarization of the Kurdish region and the conflict in itself. Finally, regarding the functional actors—the actors that influence the decisions on security as they have a stake in the

²²⁸ Ibid., 156.
issue—theese are represented by non-state actors, first of all mass media that contributed to create the
narrative of “us-them” and to delegitimize the political factions of the minority as supporting the terrorists
or wanting separatism.\textsuperscript{231} But functional actors has been also the political parties that have benefited from
the securitization process, first of all the political parties that ruled Turkey like the Republican People’s
Party, CHP, and the Nationalist Movement Party, MHP but also today the AKP, that benefited recently
from the re-securitization as explained later on in the chapter. These parties compete for power and so
evidently strongly benefit from the securitization of the Kurdish issue. The ten percent vote threshold for
representation in Turkey’s proportional representation system—the highest threshold in the world—also
gave existing parties strong incentives to keep the Kurdish issue in the security sphere limiting the
possibility of a Kurdish party.

The following section examines the history of exclusion and securitization of the Kurdish
minority in the Turkish state, which started to change with the EU Candidacy and the AKP arriving to
power.

The Kurdish Issue in Turkey: A History of Exclusion and Securitization Changing with EU
Candidacy

The nation-states of the Middle East long have struggled to include minorities in the political
community. As Picard explains, the choice between majoritarian democracy (the \textit{Tocquevillian}
democracy) and consensus democracy (the \textit{Lijphartian} democracy) shaped state-society relations—and
by extension the state’s relations with minorities—differently in each country of the region.\textsuperscript{232} Therefore
in the region, as Picard says, the “respect for minority rights has become—together with women’s

\textsuperscript{231} See on this: Derya Erdem, “The representation of the Democratic Society Party (DTP) in the mainstream Turkish
media”, in: Gunes C. and Zeydanlioglu W. ed., \textit{The Kurdish question in Turkey: new perspectives on violence,

\textsuperscript{232} Elizabeth Picard, “Nation-building and minority rights in the Middle East”, in: Roald, A. S. and Longva A. N.ed.,
\textit{Religious minorities in the Middle East: domination, self-empowerment, accommodation}, (Leiden, Boston: Brill
Academic, 2015).
rights—the barometer of a successful transition to democracy.” But rarely have states and governments of the region given importance to the minorities’ inclusion, mostly to maintain the power as ruling elites. Obviously, the historical legacy of the Ottoman Empire and the post-Ottoman period, with its lack of real democracies and external imposition of autocrats, have shaped the question of minorities in the Middle East. Kymlicka and Pföstl argue that there are in particular three legacies that created the current situation and struggle of the minorities in the Middle East: the first is the Millet legacy, the second the colonial legacy, and the final one the post-colonial nation building legacy.

Although Turkey did not pass through a period of Western colonization, like the rest of the territories of the Ottoman Empire after World War I, the threat of Western powers dismembering Turkey had an impact on the state’s future treatment of minorities. This danger of dismemberment actually convinced General Mustafa Kemal—later self-nominated “Atatürk” the “father of the nation”—to fight a war of independence between 1919 and 1923, when the Turkish Republic was created. The war started when European powers occupied the state and decided to partition Turkey in the Treaty of Sèvres in 1920. The new Republic, as a direct reaction to this foreign threat, was founded therefore on a strong nationalism to create a united and secular Turkish state, following the ideology of Kemalism, with one people, one language, one state, and so with the “Turkification” of all its population.

The two most important features of the new Turkish Republic identity since 1923, both divergent from the state’s Ottoman origins, became therefore exclusionary nationalism and Western secularism—or a particular form of it, an “assertive secularism” that aimed to exclude religion from public sphere. Actually according to some scholars, like Akturk, Turkey was founded on a contradiction between its Islamic origins of war of independence and its secular nation-building. Much like Algeria and Pakistan,

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233 Ibid., p. 57
235 The six fundamental pillars of the Kemalist ideology are Republicanism, Populism, Nationalism, Secularism, Statism, and Reformism
Akturk argues, Turkey was created on the basis of an Islamic mobilization against non-Muslim opponents, but when the “religious war” was won its political elites chose a secular and nationalistic state model. This was because they thought that only secular nationalism could improve the socioeconomic status of the Muslim communities, according to them since long left underdeveloped exactly because of non-secular Islamic identity. Therefore, since Turkey’s foundation, the nationalistic state has always struggled with the inclusion of minorities, religious ones \(^{238}\) and, even more, ethnic ones. \(^{239}\) Nevertheless, the Turkish treatment of minorities changed through its history, with periods of more accommodation and almost inclusion punctuated by periods of more repression and total exclusion. Actually we can say that Turkey passed through three main phases in the treatment of Kurdish issue:

1) The original phase of repression and securitization during the 20\(^{\text{th}}\) century, in different degrees and with different means, from the foundation of the Republic to the late 1990s (in particular since the PKK full-scale insurgency since August 1984);

2) A phase of de-securitization, dating from the PKK ceasefire declared in September 1999; the starting of Turkish candidacy for full membership in the EU in December 1999 (and in particular since the AKP governments in 2002); and the AKP’s new propositions to include Kurds in Turkish society. This phase lasted until 2011/2013;

3) Finally the current phase of re-securitization, started in some way in 2011, with the resumption of hostilities, but especially since the summer of 2015, after the end of the peace process that had started in 2013, and further increased since the failed coup in July 2016. \(^{240}\)

So let us see more in details the first phase. The new Turkish Republic gave legal status only to small numbers of ethnic and non-Muslim minorities: Armenians Catholics, Greek Orthodox and Jews.


\(^{240}\) According to some reports Turkey’s state of emergency after the coup made the situation of Kurds even more repressed. For example the Ministry of Interior seized control of 28 elected municipalities in the weeks following the coup, mostly run by the Kurdish Democratic Regions Party, in the name of saving democracy. See on this: Naomi Cohen and Nuhat Mugurtay, “Kurds are paying the price of Turkey's post-coup crackdown”, \textit{Middle East Eye}, September 20, 2016. \url{http://www.middleeasteye.net/columns/turkeys-kurdish-question-turns-new-page-894865406}
The Kurds were left out because Turkey refused to recognize any ethnic minority within its borders, for the belief that this could have threatened the nationalist model of the Turkish state. Founders of the Turkish Republic believed that an ethnically heterogeneous society was the main reason behind a weak state and the end of Ottoman Empire. For this reason, they wanted the new Turkish Republic to follow the nationalist model of one language, one nation, and one state that found wide acceptance at the Paris peace negotiations that ended the world war and founded the League of Nations.

Ethnic Albanians, Pontics, Kurds, Arabs, Bosniaks, Circassians and Chechen people—many of them coming from the lands lost by the Ottoman Empire—also started to be considered Turkish under Turkish law, assimilating in the Turkish identity even if they were still ethnically diverse from Turks.241 The new republic also expected Kurds to assimilate in this way. Therefore, since the beginning of the Turkish state, Kurds started to lose their language and identity, in a process of assimilation, or acculturation as some scholars define it,242 in the Turkish nation. Scholars refer to these processes also as “Turkification”. Nevertheless, as Mesut Yeğen remembers,243 Turkish state officials before the foundation of the Republic, needing the support of Kurds for the war of independence, declared that they would recognize Kurds as an ethnic group, with minority rights, as reflected in the Amasya Protocol of 1919.244 But since the mid-1920s, the state denied not only their rights but their very existence, at least until the end of 20th century. However, Yeğen argues that for several reasons this changed during the century:

Turkish nationalism mostly saw the Kurdish issue in terms of a rivalry between the backward and tribal past and the prosperous present and future in the first half of 19th century; in the 1950s and 60s it was more a tension between the peripheral economy and the national market; and in the 1970s the Kurdish rebellion was seen as a communist incitement. But the assimilation had always the same goal: that Kurds...
would have become Turks sooner or later. To do this, the state also implemented small-scale population
relocations to reduce concentrations of Kurds in areas where some nationalist uprisings could have
happened. When and where such uprisings happened, the government neutralized nationalist movements
with deportations and arrest or execution of leaders; dismemberment of traditional institutions; and finally
the support to Kurdish feudal landowning class (ağas) and tribal leaders (şeyhs) to block any nationalist
desire in their communities.²⁴⁵

The Kurds were not the only minority excluded since the founding of the republic. If Kurds were
the ethnic minority excluded from the construction of the Turkish Republic, the Alevis (Shia) were the
religious minority excluded (and sometimes the two discriminations added up) as the only Islam
recognized in Turkey was the Sunni denomination. Nonetheless, their religious exclusion included some
efforts at cultural inclusion. As an interesting book of Tambar explains,²⁴⁶ the cultural inclusion of Alevi
within the ethno-national imaginary of Turkey was based on “public display”, as example of Turkish
diversity—in particular with the Alevi “revival” in 1980s and 1990s—but not for a substantive political
incorporation. In the Turkish Republican history there has always been tension and ambiguity between,
on the one hand, the recognition of cultural rights of minorities like Alevi, as “an element of Turkey’s
folkloric heritage”,²⁴⁷ and on the other sectarian religious and political hostility towards them. This
tension exists even today, if we consider that the majority of the people repressed in the Gezi Park
protests in 2013, for example, were Alevi.²⁴⁸

As a reaction to the Kurdish exclusion and securitization, in 1925 the Sheikh Said—a famous Sufi
Naqshbandi religious and Kurdish leader—mobilized tens of thousands of people in a rebellion against
the Turkish government. Two years later another Kurdish rebellion, this time secular nationalist, broke

²⁴⁵ Denise Natali, The Kurds and the State: Evolving National Identity in Iraq, Turkey and Iran (Syracuse, NY:
Syracuse University Press, 2005).
²⁴⁶ Kabir Tambar: The Reckoning of Pluralism: Political Belonging and the Demands of History in Turkey (Stanford
University Press, 2014).
²⁴⁷ Ibid., p. 21.
²⁴⁸ Hurriyet Daily News, “78 percent of Gezi Park protest detainees were Alevi: Report”, November 25, 2013,
Accessed February 2, 2016, http://www.hurriyetdailynews.com/78-percent-of-gezi-park-protest-detainees-were-
alevis-report-.asp?PageID=238&NID=58496&NewsCatID=341
out in Agri (Ararat). The state violently repressed these rebellions resulting in thousands of casualties, as they were considered threats to the foundation of the new Republic.\textsuperscript{249} Between 1937 and 1938, the Turkish militaries also killed around 14,000 people, to repress the rebellion in the Kurdish Alevi region of Dersim, for which current Turkish Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan recently asked forgiveness.\textsuperscript{250} Since WWII and the start of a multi-party system in Turkey, political parties tried to engage with Kurdish leaders in order to find political allies,\textsuperscript{251} but they didn’t allow Kurds to have their “Kurdishness” represented in the Parliament, creating the highest threshold for a party to enter a parliament in the world: ten percent. This lack of political opportunity for the Kurdish minority contributed later to the creation of the Partiya Karkaren Kurdistan or the Kurdish Workers Party (PKK) that was also building on the revolutionary left movements in Turkey. In fact, as a reaction to assimilation and repression, half a century after the foundation of the Republic, in 1974 a group of Kurdish activists, called “The Revolutionaries of Kurdistan”, started a campaign for Kurdish rights and, after the government crackdown on this movement in 1978, the PKK was founded. Few years later, in 1983, during a period of military rule, a new law (2932) was incorporated in the constitution that prohibited the use of Kurdish language “in the expression and dissemination of thought” (Art. 28) aiming for the final assimilation of Kurds. This renewed offensive against Kurdish identity, together with armed clashes and crackdowns by the government, made the PKK decide on a full-scale insurgency in 1984.

Since then, about 45,000 people have been killed and the war is at one of its highest levels today, with an increased involvement of the civilian population in the Southeastern region. Besides casualties, the conflict has created many refugees and internally displaced people. The displacement of Kurdish citizens, with many forced out of villages under attacks or curfews, has increased the asymmetrical power relationship between the state and the Kurdish population that is often caught in the middle of the conflict.

\textsuperscript{249} Ayse Kadioğlu, “Necessity and the state of exception. The Turkish state’s permanent war with its Kurdish citizens”, in: Riva Kastoryano ed. \textit{Turkey between nationalism and globalization}, (Abingdon: Routledge, 2013): 145
\textsuperscript{250} Akturk, \textit{Religion and Nationalism: Contradictions of Islamic Origins and Secular Nation-Building in Turkey, Algeria, and Pakistan}, pp. 780.
between the state and the PKK. The number of Kurdish villages depopulated in Turkey between the 1980s and 1990s is estimated at around 3,000, with the displacement of almost 400,000 people. But in total, the Kurdish refugees sum up to three million people today, an estimated million of which were still internally displaced as of 2013. The causes of the depopulation and displacement included village raids and forced evacuations by the Turkish state’s military operations and the PKK attacks against unsupportive Kurdish clans (and recently even the destructions of Kurdish towns like Cizre, Sur and Silopi by the Turkish security forces). Aside from the conflict, the poverty of the southeastern region made many Kurds migrate to the rest of the country or abroad, though mostly the reasons are to be found in the armed conflict between Turkish Army and the PKK. Therefore, as we can see, the militarization of the Turkish-Kurdish conflict—and with it the “securitization” of the Kurdish issue—fluctuated for long time but since 1984 until the end of the century was intensified. As Unver argues, in the 1990s the Kurdish question was reduced to a terrorist problem and territorial threat, completely for the attention of the military forces. Only the Turkish President Turgut Özal approached the conflict differently from only military means and seemed open to a new inclusion in the Turkish state, not necessarily based strictly in one nation, one language, and one state of Kemalism. Unfortunately Özal died while in office in 1993, under suspicious circumstances.

The second phase in the treatment of Kurdish minority by the Turkish state started with the rise in November 2002 of the Justice and Development Party (in Turkish: Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi, AKP) the first Islamist, even if moderate, party to arrive to the power in Turkey. Since the beginning it seemed that the full democratization of Turkey finally could bring a real process of inclusion, not only of the Islamist, most pious and conservative people excluded at the foundation of the Republic, but also of ethnic

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minorities, in particular the Kurds. Due in part also to its increased interest in EU membership, the AKP started to speak a language of “diversity within unity” (like the European motto) and proposed to accept the religious, linguistic and ethnic differences of the country in a vision of a new pluralist society.256 We can say that already since as early as 1999 Turkey passed through a phase of de-securitization also thanks to EU candidacy.257 Supporters of an accommodative approach to the Kurdish question, like former Prime Minister (between 1997 and 1999) Mesut Yılmaz, started to express the need of a reduction of the old Kemalist structures.258 But with the AKP things improved even more. The new AKP elites represented the so called “Black Turks”, as also Erdogan defined himself, the more Islamic Turks of Anatolia, similar to the pious people of the Kurdistan region, and different from the secular republican elites of the Western Turkish cities, the so called “White Turks” (the term meant to be similar to the American White Anglo-Saxon Protestant in America). The AKP, and in particular Erdogan, decided therefore to start to recognize the Kurdish identity giving it the “rights of difference”. This acceptance was clearly a deviation from the official traditional policy of deleting the difference among ethnic groups in Turkey and merging it in the Turkish nationality.

An important moment for the shift of strategy was the historic visit of Erdogan (at that time Prime Minister) in Diyarbakır in 2005. With the new AKP ruling, Kurdish-language books became legal, even if the government controlled them, and Kurdish broadcasting was allowed on the TRT (state television station) even if for only 30 minutes a week, until 2009 when a government-run Kurdish language TV channel started. Finally, parents could start to call their children with Kurdish names, even if not “subversive” ones or containing letters like q, w, x that are not in the Turkish alphabet.259 The AKP even prepared a partial amnesty law aimed at PKK militants and introduced the “Return to Village and

Rehabilitation Project” for the repatriation of internally displaced Kurds.\textsuperscript{260} Therefore a clear line was drawn between the PKK (a security problem) and the Kurdish minority rights (a political problem), with a clear de-securitization process.\textsuperscript{261}

This shift in attitude and policies towards accommodation increased even more since 2009, when local elections in Southeast were lost by the AKP. At that point, the AKP understood that the identity and autonomy were very important for the Kurdish electorate and so something had to be done. PKK leader Abdullah Ocalan, in jail since 1999, had proposed a Road Map, based on ten principles, among which “Democratic Nation, Shared Homeland, Common Individual and Collective Rights and Freedom.”\textsuperscript{262}

After secret talks between the AKP and the PKK between 2009 and 2011 known as the Oslo Process,\textsuperscript{263} in March 2013 Ocalan announced the end of armed struggle and the start of a ceasefire and peace talks with the government. As the International Crisis Group concluded,\textsuperscript{264} in 2013 and 2014 favorable conditions including strong leadership on both sides; broad public legitimacy; the unilateral PKK cease-fire; a reciprocal understanding that neither side could reach a military victory; and well-established principles for negotiations, were preparing the road for a successful peace process. But in reality large-scale hostility had restarted since 2011. The situation became more difficult since 2014, also due to spillover of the Syrian Civil War, and in July 2015 the peace process collapsed definitely after the PKK interrupted the ceasefire and Turkey started to bomb PKK positions in Iraq as a response to the Suruç bombing attack (that targeted leftist Kurdish supporters’ activists). The PKK resumed targeting Turkish police officers, to which the government retaliated with the bombing of PKK positions in Turkish Southeastern region of

\begin{thebibliography}{99}
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the Kandil Mountains. With the military conflict the civilian population also re-started to be affected, caught between the conflicts, the curfews and the radicalized youth affiliated with PKK (i.e., Yurtsever Devrimci Gençlik Hareketi, the Patriotic Revolutionary Youth Movement/YDGH) that declared autonomy in cities like Cizre. Finally, renewed alienation and polarization between the Kurds of the Southeast region of Turkey and the Turkish Republic led to demonstrations and political assassination, as well as a crackdown on media and academicians as the study will discuss later.

So what went wrong? Why did Turkey revert to re-securitization of the Kurdish nationalist movement and Kurdish minority in Turkey’s Southeastern region? Why have hundreds of civilians have been killed since July 2015,\textsuperscript{265} cities destroyed and the Kurdish issue is as far as ever from being solved in a peaceful and negotiated way? There could be many reasons. First is the fact that the freedoms and rights granted to the Kurds by the AKP were intended as “negative freedoms”, in the sense that aimed to end the oppression of Kurdish society and identity, but not necessarily as “positive freedoms”, in the sense of real recognition of a different nationality, territory or political body in the form of decentralization and autonomization, as the Kurdish political movement sought. Also because, as Murat Tezcur rightly points out, “in the long run, it is unreasonable to expect that the Kurds in Turkey would be satisfied with the status quo while their ethnic kin in Iraq and Syria enjoy political and cultural autonomy.”\textsuperscript{266}

But this study, rather than seeking to understand what the inclusion of Kurds in the Turkish state would look like or analyze the point of view of the minority, investigates the causes that may have shifted the state’s strategy towards the minority during the democratization years, from an engaging and accommodating one to a repressive and securitizing one. So before answering these questions with the analysis of the four hypothesis of this study, here is a brief discussion of the recent developments with Turkish democracy, to put the recent re-securitization in perspective.


\textsuperscript{266} Gunes Murat Tezcur, “Prospects for Resolution of the Kurdish Question: A Realist Perspective”, \textit{Insight Turkey}, accessed February 2, 2016 \url{http://file.insightturkey.com/Files/Pdf/15_2_2013_tezcur.pdf}
Turkish Democracy: Recent Developments

Since the second part of the 20th century, Western scholars have considered Turkey favorably as a “Muslim democracy”. The country had not held democratic elections until 1950 but, even if it formally became a democracy based on a multiparty system since then, several times the military seized power in the second half of 20th century when elites had some concerns, in particular communism and Islamism threatening capitalism, nationalism or secularism. Military coups occurred in 1960 and 1980 and military memoranda, or “soft coups”, that deposed elected governments happened in 1971 and 1997, the last one in particular deposing PM Necmettin Erbakan, who was accused of violating the separation between religion and state and was a founder of several parties banned by Constitutional Court that preceded the AKP’s foundation in 2001. While in 1980 the target of the coup were the communists in 1996 Turkey had its first pro-Islamic government since 1923, and so the military blocked it with the “soft coup” and the Constitutional Court ban of Islamist parties until 2002. Therefore, even if Turkey is one of the only two countries in the Middle East that experienced an early democratic history since the beginning of 1900, with the Young Turk Revolution in 1908 (the other country being Iran with its Persian Constitutional Revolution in 1905), it is only with the beginning of the 21st century that the Turkish state started to be on the right track toward a real and substantive democracy, when the popular vote was respected and the military remained in the barracks. Even if compared to the other Muslim countries of the Middle East Turkey had developed some type of democratic system, the idea that this system was really democratic was in reality a myth. The population was not free to choose who would govern, even if in a multiparty system, and was not benefiting from the liberal elements of a democracy like freedom of speech, press or assembly. So why was Turkey considered the only Muslim democracy according to the West and how was the concept of Turkey as a “model” of Muslim democracy built?

Bernard Lewis has been one important scholar in this process. He started from the point of view that Turkey had never been colonized; on the contrary it won its war of independence and so it learned by itself how to build democratic institutions (differently from countries that have seen these

267 Bernard Lewis, “Why Turkey Is the only Muslim Democracy”, Middle East Quarterly, March 1994, pp. 41-49
institutions imposed after a war or left after decolonization). Second, according to Lewis, Turkey like Tunisia had been strongly connected with the West, and it had therefore a westward political orientation, first of all with its experiment in parliamentary power that dates back to the 19th century (since the First Constitutional Era in 1876, which created a constitutional monarchy); second with its secularism since Ataturk and the Turkish independence in 1923; and finally with its NATO membership since 1952. These elements therefore made Turkey’s political institutions close to emulating European democratic values. This was one of the reasons why Turkey has been considered a model democracy in a non-democratic area like the Middle East.

Nevertheless, Turkey introduced democracy gradually, in small but increasing steps, with stronger trade unions, freer press, civil society organizations etc. This is also because Turkey had one of the strongest economic developments in the MENA region in the 20th century, thanks to natural resources, strategic geopolitical position and strong institutions. This wealth created a broad middle class that started to push for an active civil society without which democratic institutions cannot work. Turkey already had a tradition of an active civil society since the Ottoman Empire, which in particular in its last period had intermediated the power between the sultans and the people and could effectively restrain the sovereign authority of the sultan. Nevertheless, it is not until the second half of 20th century that Turkish civil society really grew in presence and power. And it is not until the 21st century that Turkey reached a higher level in its democratic status, with an Islamist party coming to power without the Army blocking it with another coup.

In fact the Justice and Development Party/AKP attained power in 2002, representing the first moderate Islamist party (even if they prefer to define themselves as “conservative democrats”) elected in the country without a subsequent intervention of the army or the Constitutional Court. The AKP has been ruling Turkey since then very successfully, both in terms of politics and economy. Nevertheless to keep
winning elections is not exactly a good sign for democracy, as Przeworski\textsuperscript{268} and others showed, speaking about the need of alternation in power (in particular if the use of power becomes increasingly exclusionary and authoritarian as in the Turkish case). Turkish democracy therefore became again a \textit{de facto} dominant party system (even if not a single party one) as the AKP held office for four terms, including the last one that started in November 2015. Besides this, its leader Recep Tayyip Erdogan has been Prime Minister for three terms and is currently the Turkish President, pushing to create a Presidential system since long time and very close to attain it with the April 2017 Referendum. This could weaken even more what can be defined increasingly a “sick” Turkish democracy (even if in a very healthy Turkish economy) since already the elections of 2011, but even more since the last ones in 2015 and finally the failed coup in 2016. So how did Turkey arrive to this point in the last fifteen years?

In brief, Erdogan and the AKP came to power in the 2002 on a moderate Islamic-based platform that promised to build a gradual “conservative democracy” based on government accountability and civic pluralism. Since then the AKP kept growing in power also because of the impressive economic growth that Turkey experienced under the AKP regime: between 2002 and 2014 the Turkish economy tripled in size reaching $1.4 trillion (with an annual average real GDP growth between 2002 and 2013 of 4.9 percent).\textsuperscript{269} But the economic growth went together with a democratic reversal, at least in the last few years. The AKP at the beginning of its rule avoided a confrontation with the traditional powers of judiciary and military actors. Nevertheless in the 2007 election, when the AKP grew in electoral support, the party and its elites started trying to reduce the power of the old secular and nationalist Kemalist establishment, and infiltrated in the civilian and military institutions. After 2007 therefore the AKP gradually worked for a new social contract with the people, in order to rewrite a civilian constitution together with different forces in a consensual process, as the last Constitution of Turkey has been written by the Army in 1982.


\textsuperscript{269} The Annual Average Real GDP Growth Forecast between 2014 and 2016 is 3.4%, the highest in OECD Countries. From: Economic Outlook, Turkish Statistical Institute, retrieved on 19 May 20015.
But after the following elections in 2011, when the AKP realized that its growing power could reach soon the absolute majority in Parliament, it postponed the constitutional writing to wait for a majoritarian position in order to change the Constitution by itself. This plan was finally blocked in the last elections of July 2015, because of the success of the pro-Kurds People’s Democratic Party (*Halkların Demokratik Partisi*/HDP), a leftist secular party that gave voice not only to the Kurds but also to the young part of the population worried about the authoritarian and Islamist, even if moderate, drift of the regime. This can be considered one of the main turning points in the strategy of the AKP towards the Kurdish minority, caused in particular by the elites’ perceived risk of losing power, as this study will explain later in the chapter 5 regarding the elites’ power struggle.

In the parliamentary elections of 2011 and 2015, 87% and 84% of Turks voted respectively, compared with 79% in the 2002 elections that brought the AKP to power. But even as the turnout at the polls increased, the ability to contest politics has been reduced and Turkey became in practice a dominant-party state today. Erdogan centralized and strengthened his power and that of the AKP, founded by him after his term as mayor of Istanbul in the 1990s, in partnership with different figures, in particular Abdullah Gul and Bulent Arinc, the other two founders of the AKP, and more recently Ahmet Davutoglu, a diplomat and academic who represented the good face of Turkey abroad, at least until he was on the same track of Erdogan. When Davutoglu started to disagree with Erdogan, in particular on the presidential system, he had to resign as Prime Minister and was substituted by Binali Yildirim in June of 2016. Erdogan passed from Prime Minister to President in 2014 with direct election by the population, a result from the 2007 constitutional referendum that changed the Constitution introducing a direct national vote for the presidency as Erdogan himself wanted. But the economic boom started to slow around 2013 and, gradually, Erdogan began to abandon civic pluralism and liberal democratic values in favor of authoritarianism. As some analysts argue, while the AKP was supported because of breaking the
monopoly of the statist elite that had mismanaged the country’s economy in the past, today it could lose that support exactly because it also is becoming the statist elite that it had sought to eliminate.\textsuperscript{270} The democratic erosion was also accompanied by suspects on “internal enemies” of the AKP and Erdogan. Classical claims about “deep state” and conspiracy theories against AKP have emerged in particular since 2007, when hundreds of people, among which especially retired militaries, were arrested for the alleged “Ergenekon” plot to topple the AKP government.\textsuperscript{271} Unfortunately, even if the scandal started as a preoccupation with the possible secret group of militaries, intelligence, judges and others, it ended with the persecution and imprisonment of AKP opponents, among which journalists, academics and politicians of the opposition.\textsuperscript{272} This raised serious concerns both about the democratic elements of the AKP and the quality and independence of judicial institutions, with the start of the authoritarian drift of the Erdogan regime towards media and political opponents.\textsuperscript{273} Therefore the process of increasing popular support and political power for the AKP went together, through the years and in particular after 2011, with a process of authoritarization of policies, especially after the election of Erdogan as president in 2014. Since this election, Erdogan has actually transformed the presidency from a ceremonial role to an important and powerful actor of the state, and has tried to change the constitution to codify this new balance of power leaning towards the Presidentialism.\textsuperscript{274} As President he has been using his power with a strong hand, reducing freedom of speech and assembly, attacking critical media, human rights activists and even international actors.


This shift in strategy since 2011, and increasingly every year since then, was caused not only by the success of the elections but also by two international events happening around that time: the Arab Spring and the civil war in Syria, from which arose ISIS (the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria) in 2013. The Arab Spring made the AKP government worried of possible internal repercussions, in particular with the increased internal tensions with the Gulen movement\footnote{The Gülen movement is a religious and social movement, with a strong impact in the education area, both nationally and internationally, guided by a Turkish Islamic scholar Fethullah Gülen. At the beginning of AKP government Gülen was a supporter and friend of Erdogan but with the time the relationship deteriorated. See next chapter that speaks about the relationship between these two elites. Today Gülen is exiled in the US, the movement is referred by Turkish government as the Gülenist Terror Organization (FETO), accused by Erdogan to be a “parallel state” that aim to weaken the AKP government (for example Erdogan has blamed Gülen's followers to orchestrate the 2013 government corruption scandal). Also state administrator is running the Gülen newspaper, that was the only anti-government newspaper, \textit{Today's Zaman}, since March 2016.} and the Gezi park protests in 2013 which represented the growing frustration of the youth with the Turkish regime (actually the overwhelming majority of Gezi Park protesters were Alevi, and this could have affected the way how the government reacted, but this is another topic of research). But the situation created by ISIS in Syria and Iraq has been even more important as it threatened not only the AKP government but the Turkish state in itself, first of all ontologically (see the chapter eight on Ontological Security) because suddenly it was possible for an independent proto-state to be born inside another state as a type of “cancer” (actually in this case supported also by the same Turkey as a tool against Assad regime). Second, materially, because the Syrian war made space for Kurdish autonomy with the creation of the Rojava region (also known as “Western Kurdistan” or “Syrian Kurdistan”) since 2013 that facilitated the collaboration between the Syrian Kurdish forces (known as the PYG) and the PKK in Turkey. The AKP as a consequence started a process of authoritarianization to maintain a strong unitary state, in order to protect the country from a possible implosion with the birth of a Kurdish area inside the state. But this process of return to authoritarianism, besides facilitating the re-securitization of Kurds, opened at the same time a polarization in the country, first of all between young forces of civil society, often more liberal and leftist oriented, and old establishment elites who are more conservative. Second, between exactly the two main “nationalist souls” in Turkey, that is between who consider themselves predominantly as Turks and who...
consider themselves predominantly as Kurds. This increased polarization can be seen also in general between who support the Kurdish request of some form of self-rule – like public education in Kurd and regional autonomy – and who believe that these request represent the biggest menace to Turkish unity and national identity.

Therefore, regarding the level of democracy in Turkey, scholars today no longer consider Turkey as a real effective and substantive democracy, nor do well known international indices of democracy. As said earlier the Economist Intelligence Unit defined Turkey as a “hybrid regime” between democracy and autocracy in its 2017 Democracy Index, while Freedom House (FH) considered Turkey as a “partly free” country (“electoral” but not “liberal” democracy) in its 2017 index. The evaluation of FH is due to the state’s political interference in the legislative and judiciary system as well as media, academia and civil society, in particular with the repercussions of the attempted coup in July, which led the government to declare a state of emergency and carry out mass arrests and firings of civil servants, academics, journalists, opposition figures, and other perceived enemies. The ISIS fight at the Turkish border since 2014 also pushed the AKP to deal with very important national security threats, as did the state failure of its two bordering countries, Syria and Iraq. In this scenario, as Kinzer says, “taboos that limit the freedom of ethnic groups and other minorities remain strong” and so the relationship between the Turkish state and the Kurds has been deteriorating. The ceasefire that had started in 2013 broke down in 2015, restarting what has been for several times in the past a “securitization” process of this minority.

But this has not been always the case during the AKP rule. As discussed earlier, the AKP since 2002 had started a process of inclusion of both parts that had been traditionally excluded by the Turkish secular Kemalist philosophy: the Islamist part, the conservative pious people, with the symbolic elimination of the ban on headscarves and other policies in favor of a moderate Islam, but also the Kurdish minority, with the enactment of new laws that allow for example the Kurdish language to be used for the first time in private schools and broadcasting. As Cavanaugh and Hughes put it, the AKP together

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with the HDP brought the Kurdish issue back in politics from the “political cold.” But while the first process of inclusion of the conservative part of society worked successfully and is still going on, the second one—the inclusion and equal participation of Kurdish minority in the Turkish polity—which seemed to eventually bring to a peace process with the PKK, has been reversed since 2011 and more since 2015, with a re-securitization process put in place by the same AKP that had started its inclusion.

This is affecting today not only the level of inclusiveness and so of substantiality and meaningfulness of Turkish democracy, but also the process of Turkish integration in the European Union, a long-running process that has been delayed also because of the Turkish treatment of minorities. Actually, the most recent EU reports of Turkey’s candidacy progress from 2014 to 2016 state that the dialogue between the government and representatives of minorities continued but is not enough. The 2016 Report says that with respect to the previous year there was no change:

> Turkey considers Turkish citizens as individuals with equal rights and only recognizes non-Muslim communities as minorities, in line with its interpretation of the Lausanne Treaty. However, hate speech and threats directed against minorities remained a serious problem and long delays in cases where religious representatives or their property were attacked amount to impunity. School textbooks need to be revised to delete remnants of discriminatory rhetoric.

> With respect specifically to the Kurdish population the report states that: “the settlement of the Kurdish issue through a political process is the only way forward; reconciliation and reconstruction are also becoming key issues for the authorities to address.” And regarding the crackdown after the attempted coup the report clarifies that the Kurdish issue has been deteriorated: “the crackdown has continued since and has been broadened to pro-Kurdish and other opposition voices”. The report has a special part also on the situation in the East and South-East that “remained one of the most critical challenges for the country” explaining how “the government also used post-coup measures to suspend many municipal counsellors and mayors and teachers and to close a number of Kurdish-language media

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279 Ibid., 6.

280 Ibid., 28.
and also how “In the aftermath of the coup attempt (…) 23 out of 39 TV channels and radio channels broadcasting in Kurdish language have been closed.” Finally the report is worried about the political repression: “the adoption in May of a law allowing the immunity of a large number of deputies to be lifted and the ensuing detentions and arrests of several HDP Members of Parliament, including the two Co-Chairs, in November is a matter of grave concern.”

Some International NGOs like Human Rights Watch and Amnesty International went even further with the denunciation of human rights violations and civilian casualties caused by Turkish government in the last years. This “lighter” pressure of the EU today on Turkey, with respect to other representative of the international community, is caused by different reasons, first of all the refuges crisis in Europe that needs the support of Turkey but also the conflict with ISIS that keep expanding and needs Turkey as the bastion against this threat (see Chapter 6 on international factors on this). So it is clear that the EU keeps pushing Turkey towards more inclusion of minorities, in particular the Kurdish community, to improve its situation for the possible future integration. However there is not a strong criticism or condemnation for some acts that may have permanently jeopardized the democratization process of Turkey, as the continued securitization of the Kurdish minority, caught often in the middle of the conflict between the PKK and the Turkish government. The next section will examine in detail how the Turkish state has carried the securitization process of the Kurdish minority.

**Turkish Recent Re-securitization of the Kurdish Minority**

It is difficult to say exactly which side first broke the truce, derailing the peace process between Turkey and the PKK in 2015, as information from the Eastern region is never easy to find or clear. However, the government is always the actor that should maintain the negotiations alive, in order to find a peace agreement sooner or later, and it is the government that finally decided to go back to the securitization of Kurdish issues and Kurdish minority, including its main representative political actor, the

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281 Ibid.
282 Ibid. 10.
HDP. Actually, the first thing that President Erdogan did, as the election results of June 2015 blocked the AKP to form a new government by themselves, was to jeopardize the possibility of a coalition government and call for a snap election in November, as usually snap elections result in increased majorities for the party already in power. The goal of Erdogan in the meantime was to make a strong campaign against the HDP, based on de-legitimization and stigmatization of a party that was not clearly detached from the violent struggle of PKK. By restarting the conflict with the PKK in July 2015, Erdogan sought to make the Turkish population afraid of instability and insecurity and so vote in big numbers for the nationalist AKP. To help with this strategy, the worst terrorist attack in the Turkish history happened in Ankara during the electoral campaign on October 10th, against a rally held by several trade unions and the HDP to protest against the growing conflict between the Turkish Armed Forces and the separatist PKK. In the attack more than one hundred people died, including two HDP candidates. This attack had the effect to block definitively the HDP from leading rallies during the campaign and contributed to an increase in polarization and extremism in Turkey. ISIS has been considered the responsible of the attack even if the HDP accused the government of being behind it and similar previous attacks against Kurdish targets. The results of this strategy of targeting the HDP party and in general the Kurdish minority of Eastern Turkey have been that the elections of November 2015 could not be considered anymore “free and fair” as in the past, also because the media freedom was kept under control by Erdogan regime. The HDP lost votes, even if maintained the presence in Parliament, and the AKP regained its absolute majority. The strategy worked well as the AKP obtained its goals with the new phase of re-securitization.

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285 The Economist, Turkish extremism. Heightening the contradictions, October 17, 2015.

286 Despite the fact that now to make constitutional changes, which require either 2/3 of Parliament or 331 MPs plus a referendum (AKP got 316 MPs), the AKP will need the support of other parliamentarians.
This case study starts from the premises that Turkey has recently shifted its strategy toward Kurds with a re-securitization of the Kurdish minority, in particular in its geographical region of the southeastern part of the country. So let us see in specific the elements of this re-securitization. Regarding the recent extraordinary measures taken by securitizing actors, these have been first of all the restarting of the war with the PKK and second the “state of exception” (a state of emergency) re-created for the Kurdish minority in the Kurdish region. Since the end of the peace process in 2015 this state of emergency in the Southeastern region had several consequences: the killing of hundreds of civilians besides the PKK fighters; the destruction of parts of Kurdish cities (in particular Cizre but also others like Sur and Silopi); the application of curfews in many towns; and the forced displacement of population. This caused the intervention of international human rights associations which asked the government to stop abusive use of force in Kurdish areas. However, as said, the European Union and the rest of the international community were more reluctant to criticize Turkey because of the need for Turkey’s support in the refugee crisis and the war against ISIS. Other extreme measures by the regime included the targeting of the pro-Kurdish political parties, in particular the judicial attacks in order to eliminate them, already started with the ban of Democratic Society Party or the KCK trials in 2009, and continued with recent charges filled by Erdogan against the HDP in 2015, including the accusation of HDP support for terrorism. Finally the two leaders of HDP, Selahattin Demirtas and Figen Yuksekdağ,

288 For the reconstruction of these towns there is a crowd-funding campaign. See: Room4life in Turkey, accessed on March 16, 2016, https://www.generosity.com/emergencies-fundraising/room4life-in-turkey-support-rebuilding-sur-cizre.
291 The KCK, Koma Civakên Kurdistan or “Group of Communities in Kurdistan” was an organization founded to put into practice Ocalan’s ideology of “Democratic Confederalism”. Thousands of people were arrested, on dubious charges of propaganda of a “terrorist organization”.
292 After the HDP entered the Parliament in June 2015, its 80 parliamentarians elected had been reported by Erdogan to the judiciary with the accusation of supporting terrorism, in order to make them lose the parliamentary immunity
and others members of HDP, have been arrested in November 2016, with the accusation of spreading propaganda for militants fighting the Turkish state.  

Actually, thousands of Kurdish politicians-activists have been imprisoned (and hundreds murdered) for supporting the Kurdish cause already in the last decades. As Watts argues, Kurdish parties used the legal political system to promote Kurdish national agenda in the last decades, they have been an integral part of the Turkish politics, with benefit for Turkish democratization, but their incorporation in the system didn’t necessarily bring the moderation of their position. For this reason, the Turkish state has justified their repression because of the fear of Kurdish independence. The problem is that the 2006 modifications to the Anti-Terror Law failed to distinguish peaceful political dissent from the promotion of violence, for which reason the state has applied the law broadly against young Kurdish demonstrators to restrict their freedoms of expression and association. Therefore the respect for principles of fair trial, *habeus corpus* and other rights, requested by the Copenhagen Criteria, have been declined in Turkey. The EU actually criticized Turkey on its definition of terrorism. In 2015, for example, Turkish authorities rounded up hundreds of Kurdish activists, many of them political figures with no apparent connections to violence. Therefore one can also consider as extreme measures the targeting of parties, human rights associations, civilian associations, and bar associations, all of which the regime of Erdogan has been increasingly attacking since 2011 and especially 2015. This harassment, based on de-legitimation and demonization, also opened space for more political violence that resulted in

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suspected killings of lawyers like the one, in March 2015, of the prosecutor Mehmet Selim Kiraz,\footnote{Suspected members of the Revolutionary People’s Liberation Party-Front (a Marxist party in Turkey considered a terrorist group) took prosecutor Kiraz hostage demanding that the police announced the names of members of the security services who they said were connected to the death of a young boy during Gezi Park protests. The police intervened and the lawyer was killed as a result of the operation.} involved in the investigation of one death occurred in the Gezi Park protests; or the assassination in November 2015 of the Kurdish prominent lawyer, Tahir Elci, who one month before had been arrested for saying that the PKK was not a terrorist organization.\footnote{Erdogan accused the PKK for the killing but many people protested in the capital defining it a “homicide of the regime”, as there was no reason why the PKK should have kill someone who was legitimizing the PKK itself.} Therefore today in Turkey the state views the Kurds in the southeastern region once again as a security concern, not only as guerillas and militants (that could be explained through national security reasons) but also as activists, political parties, media and in general as a civilian population protesting against the militarization of the region. Even academicians have been targeted: hundreds of them have been put under investigation and arrested at the beginning of 2016 for signing a petition asking the government to stop the violence in the Southeastern region.\footnote{Elizabeth Redden, “Turkish Academy Under Attack”, \textit{Inside Higher Education}, February 12, 2016. Retrieved from https://www.insidehighered.com/news/2016/02/12/more-1000-turkish-scholars-are-under-criminal-investigation-signing-petition on March, 2, 2016.} The attack and de-legitimation of non-mainstream media that have criticized the regime’s conduct of policies towards the Kurdish minority or other issues, happened first of all with incarceration of journalists critic of the regime, such as the ones of \textit{Cumhuriyet}, since 2015 and even more in the aftermath of the 2016 attempted coup.\footnote{The Guardian, “Turkey detains editor and staff at opposition Cumhuriyet newspaper”, October 31, accessed November 6, https://www.theguardian.com/world/2016/oct/31/turkey-detains-editor-and-staff-at-opposition-cumhuriyet-newspaper.} But also other tools have been used: for example the \textit{Zaman}, a journal supported by the Gülen movement, besides the arrest of some of its journalists received the imposition of a state administrator in March 2016 (with the unsurprising result that the journal is not anymore critical of the government today).

This process, unfortunately, increasingly resembles the end of the Sri Lankan civil war between the Tamil and the government, when in 2009 the Sri Lankan Army decided to do a final offensive to end the Tamil resistance, destroying the Tamil villages making tens of thousands of civilian casualties, and the government made a final crash on independent journalism, activists and politicians, to end the “Tamil
terrorism”. The AKP actually today openly says that there is a terrorist issue, not a Kurdish issue, in Turkey. The securitization process of the Kurdish minority aimed therefore to reduce the Kurdish issue to a security-militarized problem, a “terrorist” problem, concentrating on attacking the militant organization coming from this minority, the PKK, and delegitimizing the rest of the minority, in its social and political sides, both repressing the civilian population of the region and attacking the political expression of the party. Obviously, the PKK does not have a monopoly of the representation of Turkey’s Kurdish population; indeed many Kurds consider it a terrorist organization too. More conservative Kurds cannot support a Marxist-Leninist group on the PKK style, and many independent Kurdish factions asking for language rights and regional autonomy oppose the PKK’s ideological rigidity. But the government’s focus on the PKK helped Turkey to erase any elements of legitimacy of the Kurdish requests, based on a “value rationality” of dignity and self-identity, as Varshney\textsuperscript{302} defined it, blocking any possibility for Kurds to channel their demands and abandon the armed struggle for a political inclusion. This process has been actually a common trend in the Middle East states, that since the end of the Ottoman Empire de-legitimized and securitized minorities requests, concentrating the issue on the militant groups that fought for their self-determination (from Hezbollah to Hamas) and fighting them as “terrorist organizations”.

As said, the securitization of Kurds has been under observation especially because of Turkey’s candidacy for EU membership; this has not been seen well by the EU. Unfortunately, the end of the ceasefire in 2015 corresponded with the ISIS crisis and the refugee crisis in Europe. So the EU started to close an eye on the relationship with Turkey, viewing it as a bastion against ISIS expansion and a buffer zone for millions of refugees. This, indirectly, also contributed to give Turkey more freedom in the recent re-securitization of the Kurdish minority, but will not be very helpful for the democracy in Turkey, much as US support for the El-Sisi military regime in Egypt undermined democracy there. The process of securitization of Kurdish minority by the Turkish government is not only currently making the domestic situation unstable, but also is causing a dangerous reversal of Turkish democratization. The fact that the

HDP has been heavily targeted by the crackdown under Turkey’s state of emergency after the attempted coup in 2016, shows how democratic regression in Turkey pass also, and may be especially, by the repression and securitization of the Kurdish minority and its social and political expression.

The following chapters analyze the possible causes of the initial autonomization towards Kurdish minority and the re-securitization, trying to explain why Turkey chose a path while Indonesia another.

**The Acehnese Issue in Indonesia: a History of Securitization**

Indonesia is an emblematic case in Southeast Asia of the treatment of minorities as it had different approaches in different times. At institutional level Indonesia has been a highly centralized states, similarly to Turkey, from its time as a Dutch colony, even if the Dutch tried to decentralize their structure in specific moments, like for example with the 1903 Decentralization Law of the Netherlands Indies. With the independence in 1948, Indonesia started to fear losing national control over parts of the vast archipelago, for which reason the government refrained from giving autonomy to its regions or provinces. Actually during the Indonesian national revolution for independence, Aceh supported the nationalist movement expecting to maintain some form of autonomy after the independence. But this was not the case so, in 1953, many Acehnese joined an Islamist rebellion guided by Daud Beureu’eh, from the *Darul Islam* (House of Islam) movement, a national Islamist movement that aimed to the establishment of an Islamic state of Indonesia. The rebellion ended only in 1959 when Aceh obtained a “Special Region” status, with the right to enact Islamic laws.

So we can say that as for Turkey also for Indonesia the rebellion started as a religious element against the secularization of the state, even if later the rebellion will be related with identity and territory. But while Turkey was more worried about identity Indonesia was more worried about territory: Indonesian security was based on a concept of social order guaranteed by the state that could not allow any loss of sovereignty. This concept was developed already in the Dutch East Indies with the principle of
“peace and order” (rust en orde)\textsuperscript{303} and later with Suharto, when the New Order of its dictatorship starting in 1967 revitalized this concept calling it “safety and order” (keamanan dan ketertiban). And this had been one of the main drivers of rebellions of several Indonesian regions: the failure of a centralized Indonesian state to address regional demands because it sought to assure safety and order as well as a monopoly of resources. The Aceh case is emblematic because at the beginning Aceh wanted a federalist system in order to have some control in particular on the natural resources and culture and religious issues, but Jakarta resisted. Therefore after Darul Islam rebellion and the semi-autonomous status another rebellion started, in 1976 with Free Aceh Movement (GAM) asking this time for full independence.\textsuperscript{304}

Specifically, the causes of the secessionist rebellion in Aceh have been a mix of factors based on repression and exploitation, rather than accommodation toward minority requests. According to Larry Niksch, in a quite detailed report of the US Congressional Research Service, the separatism in Aceh was a combination of at least four factors: 1) Distinct history as an independent kingdom from the 15th century until the beginning of the 20th century; 2) Progressive alienation of the population in reaction to the policies of successive Indonesian governments; 3) Extensive human rights abuses by the Indonesian military; and 4) Aceh’s wealth gone to the central government.\textsuperscript{305} These facts make the Acehnese case quite different from the Kurdish one, as the Aceh rebellion has been more a question of sovereignty than a question of identity\textsuperscript{306} (even if as said religious identity played a role for the first insurrections) but also because in the pluralistic approach of Indonesian state the language rights and other cultural features were more respected. The Acehnese independence movement was related therefore mostly to territorial and political control\textsuperscript{307} while the Kurdish one was related to the territory but also to the identity recognition

and even the national participation to the public sphere, in the political arena and national government. This is important to take into consideration because these differences may have affected the type of response of the national government and also the type of ontological security that the country had, as the chapter 8 will explain.

Therefore the Acehnese rebellion also had at least three phases: as said the first one was the Darul Islam (“House of Islam”) rebellion, a religious rebellion with the goal to establish an Islamist state in Indonesia, fighting together with other regions like West Java and South Sulawesi between 1953 and 1959. This rebellion was fought for two main reasons, the first was a rejection of the new nationalist and “secular” (or at least not only Islamic) Republic of Indonesia. The second was the Indonesian government’s decision in 1950 to deprive Aceh of its status as a province, with its privilege of Islamic laws but also blocking the free trade between Aceh and foreign countries.

The second phase started in 1976, when a former Darul Islam member, Hasan di Tiro, created the Free Aceh Movement (Gerakan Aceh Merdeka-GAM) and started an insurrection that concentrated on attacks against Mobile Oil Company, in response to the Indonesian government’s centralization of recently discovered oil and gas reserves and the consequent lack of redistribution of their incomes. This rebellion therefore was not the continuation of the earlier Darul Islam one, but more the continuance of the war against the Dutch and the Japanese, a national struggle to regain sovereignty for Aceh, dormant for a few years during the euphoria of the earlier days of Indonesian independence and the twelve years of the Darul Islam conflict. Even though leaders of GAM tried to get support saying that secession would

308 Ibid.
310 According to someone he was a descendant of the last sultan of Aceh, before the Dutch conquer, according to others he was the eighth-generation descendant of the great di Tiro family of ulemas (religious leaders). Whatever the truth he was an aristocrat and Western educated businessman.
turn the province into another Brunei\textsuperscript{311}, the rebellion failed to garner a popular support, neither locally
nor internationally, and was repressed one year later.\textsuperscript{312}

In 1989 GAM tried again, this time better equipped with some funds from Iran and Libya\textsuperscript{313} and
with hundreds of GAM fighters returning from Libya after military training. However, the Indonesian
state organized strong counter-insurgency operations that lasted until 1996, with many casualties and
human rights violations.\textsuperscript{314} During this time, the Indonesian government considered the area one of the
“Military Operation Zones”, which allowed to implement a tight repression. However, this also increased
the local population’s support for GAM, making of it a symbol of resistance,\textsuperscript{315} particularly when
government forces tortured and killed many innocent civilians.

**Indonesian Recent Autonomization of the Acehnese Minority**

After 1998, with the fall of the dictatorship of Suharto, the “New Order”, and the starting of the
democratization process, Indonesia feared the opposite of what it had feared during the dictatorship: that
without giving some autonomy to regions secessionist forces could disintegrate the state in a kind of
Balkanization.\textsuperscript{316} Actually, although the following processes of decentralization and autonomization made
Indonesian democracy more viable, stable and sustainable, in practice liberal localization also fostered
conflictual politics.\textsuperscript{317} One year after the Reformasi, in 1999, Indonesia created eight new provinces when
the national parliament approved two laws on decentralization: Law 22 concerning administrative
decentralization, and Law 25 concerning financial administration. Today Indonesia has a total of 34

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{311} Michael Ross, *Oil, Drugs, and Diamonds: How Do Natural Resources Vary in Their Impact on Civil War?* (New
\item \textsuperscript{312} Eric Morris, *Islam and Politics in Aceh: A Study of Center-Periphery Relations in Indonesia*. Unpublished PhD
dissertation, Cornell University, 1983.
\item \textsuperscript{313} Michael L. Ross, *Resources and Rebellion in Aceh*, Indonesia, The World Bank (2007).
\item \textsuperscript{315} Jacques Bertrand and Sanjay Jeram, “Democratization and determinants of ethnic violence: the rebel-moderate
organization nexus”, Ch. 6 in Jacques Bertrand and Oded Haklai (eds.) *Democratization and Ethnic Minorities: Conflict or
\item \textsuperscript{316} Regional autonomy in Indonesia, IDEA International, From:
http://www.idea.int/publications/country/upload/6_regional_autonomy.pdf
\item \textsuperscript{317} Henk Schulte Nordholt, “Decentralisation in Indonesia: Less State, More Democracy?” In *Politicising Democracy* *The New Local Politics of Democratisation*, edited by Harriss, J., Stokke, K., Törnquist, Olle, p. 29/50
\end{itemize}
provinces, of which five have special administrative status, but this does not mean that the process has always been beneficial to the minorities. As Duncan argues, 318 for example, sometimes ethnic minorities in Indonesia, instead of going back to local forms of land and resource management, have faced the exploitation of local governments that started resource extraction exactly as the Dutch and Indonesian central states had done. Another scholar, Vedi Hadiz, 319 criticizes the neo-institutionalist perspective supporting decentralization in Indonesia, arguing that decentralization has often failed to reach higher levels of democracy and good governance, because of power interests and struggle, like in the Indonesian case. Nevertheless decentralization and autonomy have been important policies for the inclusion of minorities in the national polity of the new democratic Indonesia, even as the Indonesian state treated differently the three main regions that fought for independence with armed guerrilla: Timor-Leste, Aceh and West Papua. The first received its independence in 2002; the second received its autonomy as a special region in 2005; while the third is still to be solved, with the longest conflict, going on since the 1960s between the Indonesian government and the Free Papua Movement, which has caused hundreds of thousands of casualties. 320

Aceh today is one of the five provinces in Indonesia that have a special status, together with Papua and West Papua (for their implementation of sustainable development), the city of Yogyakarta (as a special “sovereign monarchy” within Indonesia) and the city of Jakarta (as the capital region). But Aceh is the real only semi-autonomous region of Indonesia. The “Law on Governing Aceh” was passed by the Indonesian House of Representatives on July 11, 2006 and signed by President Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono on August 1, 2006, translating the Aceh peace agreement of 2005 into law for implementation. Soon thereafter, GAM’s former intelligence chief, Irwandi Yusuf, became governor in 2006, and after him, in 2012, another GAM representative, Zaini Abdullah, was the first governor elected.

This process of autonomization allowed the region to have local parties, maintain the 70% of the natural resources revenues and implement some cultural and religious laws, in particular the sharia law as its regional law, which has been criticized recently, raising concerns regarding the respect in Aceh of the democratic and liberal values of Indonesia. However, other opportunities were missed in Helsinki to secure agreement on fiscal policy, and on investigations into human rights abuses (thousands of crimes against humanity remain unresolved). Aceh today is still one of the poorest regions of Indonesia, but the fact that it represents a successful story of policy of autonomy and partial self-government, makes it an interesting case to analyze, in order to understand why, unlike Turkey, the Indonesian democratic government chose autonomization when faced with a rebellion of a minority.

In Aceh, with the start of the democratization of Indonesia in 1998, several actors tried to take the lead of the situation. First of all, some religious leaders tried to take a leadership role, like in the 1950s but nonviolently, in particular with Daud Beureueh, an ulama who was the first governor of Aceh after Indonesia independence. Nevertheless, the ulama already had lost their leadership roles in the Acehnese society and could not do much. Another group that could have taken a leadership position was the middle class of Acehnese working in universities (like Syiah Kuala University in Aceh), government positions and business, who opposed independence and supported autonomy. Nevertheless, they did not have the support of the population, in particular the technocratic local and parliamentary representatives, because of their past connections to the Suharto regime. Finally, Syamsuddin Mahmud, the governor of Aceh since 1993, and some Jakarta based Acehnese also tried to assume leadership of the region, proposing to the Indonesian parliament autonomy for Aceh, and getting the special autonomy law of 2001, but it was

323 During the Helsinki negotiations Indonesia didn’t want to discuss independence and GAM rejected autonomy so “Self-government” was agreed as a workable compromise. See on this: Nur Djuli and Nurdin Abdul Rahman “Reconfiguring politics: The Indonesia-Aceh peace process”, Conciliation Resources, Accord issue: 20, 2008.
already too late. GAM was the actor best able to take leadership again for the Acehnese request for independence after democratization, and started the third phase of Acehnese rebellion, being more organized and powerful than the previous two phases.

This time, however, there were new Indonesian democratic governments, guided before by the transitional president Habibie, between May 1998 and October 1999, and then by the first elected president Abdurrahman Wahid, between October 1999 and July 2001. Habibie sought to address grievances and undermine GAM leadership role with some political concessions, without giving autonomy and less independence to the region. At the same time he supported the adoption of Islamic law in Aceh, with the Law n. 44 (1999), and removed the status of “theater of military operations” from Aceh. He also visited Aceh to apologize for past abuses and appointed an independent commission to investigate those abuses. Finally he passed a Regional Autonomy Bill, Law 22, in April 1999, promising more power and government funds to the provinces.

Habibie’s successor Wahid at the beginning implemented this Law 22 on Regional Autonomy, apologized also, to the peoples of East Timor, Aceh and West Papua for past misdeeds of the army, and pledged to withdraw troops and listen to local grievances. He also signed a temporary cease-fire (called a “humanitarian pause”) with Aceh to bring aid to the Acehnese people in May 2000. This opened space for negotiations but also started again the fear of a “national disintegration.” Wahid’s plan in Aceh was to give the people a referendum about various modes of autonomy rather than to decide on independence like in East Timor. However, the military believed GAM was taking advantage of the cease-fire and President Wahid failed to find an agreement between Aceh and the Indonesian government. Therefore Wahid, one year after the “humanitarian pause”, issued a Presidential Instruction in April 2001, re-

325 Ibid. See also: Jacques Bertrand, Nationalism and ethnic conflict in Indonesia (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004).
328 Ibid.
329 Ibid.
starting the repression of the insurgency with 25,000 troops deployed, causing many losses and much suffering among the population.\footnote{330 Rabasa and Haseman, The military and democracy in Indonesia, 2002.} By July, Wahid even asked Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono, the Coordinating Minister for Politics and Security to declare a State of Emergency. When Yudhoyono refused, Wahid suspended him. At that point Wahid lost the support of the military and finally accepted to resign, succeeded by Megawati Sukarnoputri, appointed as the first woman president of Indonesia. Megawati, daughter of Sukarno, had founded few years earlier the Indonesian Democratic Party of Struggle, heir of one of the only three political parties recognized by President Suharto’s during the “New Order” (the party’s centre-left ideology is based on the concept of Pancasila and is the same party in power today with Joko Widodo).

Megawati, who would remain as President until October 2004 when the first President direct elections were held in Indonesia, adopted a similar strategy to Wahid’s of allowing some autonomy and at the same time implementing military repression. As soon as she was elected she signed the Special Autonomy Law for Aceh (Law No. 18 of 2001) however the law approved by the parliament fell short of expectations and the new revenues coming from natural resources opened space for corruption while the conflict was not yet solved. So in December 2002, two months after the Bali bombing that led to GAM being labelled as a terrorist group, the Indonesian government and GAM signed a Cessation of Hostilities Agreement in Geneva, organized by a Swiss based NGO the Henri Dunant Center (or Center for Humanitarian Dialogue/HDC, the same group that facilitated the humanitarian pause in 2000) and supported by foreign countries that sought a more stable Indonesia. Unfortunately, a wide gap in interpretation of the terms of the agreement and weak monitoring capacity (only 150 foreign and domestic observer) soon led to its collapse. According to some scholars, as often happen, the agreement was used by both conflicting parties to regroup and reconsolidate their positions.\footnote{331 Olle Törnquist, “Dynamics of peace and democratization. The Aceh lessons”, 2010, p. 832.} Therefore, the government once again proclaimed a Military Emergency in May 2003, and President Megawati signed the emergency decree to institute martial law. Megawati, like Wahid, rejected GAM’s request for independence, after
already permitting East Timor’s independence in 2002, and so allowed a final strong offensive of the Indonesian army in 2003-2004 that severely disabled the rebel movement with many deaths. Some scholars argue that the consequent reduction of GAM’s control of areas contributed to the decision of GAM to drop the demand of full independence and to be more accommodating during the post-Tsunami negotiations.\textsuperscript{332} It seems likely that the government’s strategy of ceasefires and later crackdowns on the rebel movement (that actually seem similar to the ones used by Turkey against PKK) played a role in the decision of the two parts to finally engage in constructive negotiations. The stalemate caused both parties to understand that they would have not be able to win by force. This was not the case for Kurdish minority and Turkish state instead.

But besides GAM’s new leadership and strong resurgence, and despite the government’s most violent repression in the history of the conflict, the democratization process introduced a new positive element in Indonesia: an empowered and mobilized civil society. Student groups and NGOs were formed since 1998 to ask for justice for past atrocities and to call for a referendum on the autonomy of the region, in particular on the wave of the East Timor referendum of 1999. SIRA (\textit{Sentral Informasi Referendum} or Referendum Information Centre) especially, founded by some local activists and students, organized large demonstrations in November 1999 and January 2000, with hundreds of thousands of people participating. This represented a moderate nonviolent alternative to the armed rebellion, at least at the beginning, even if later SIRA lost its appeal because of the lack of organization and the increased crackdown of the government. SIRA started to align its position with GAM, as both finally had the same goal: Acehnese independence or at least a strong autonomy\textsuperscript{333}. Therefore, we can say that with democratization the Acehnese rebellion lived its most violent episode, but during these years moderate democratic forces of civil society emerged too. Even if the alternative nonviolent leadership of the civil society was not able to

\textsuperscript{333} Rabasa and Haseman, \textit{The military and democracy in Indonesia}, 2002, p. 112.
gain legitimacy any more than GAM, it likely drove the solution of the Acehnese issue, at least from the Acehnese perspective, toward a final autonomization of the region.\footnote{334}{An interesting comparison would be the one with West Papua region, where the moderate, supported by the local Christian bishops (West Papua is majority Christian) and stronger than the rebels, took the leadership. But today the region, separated in two provinces, has a flawed autonomy and people discontent create a continued conflict.} In 2004, the first-ever direct presidential election brought to power the retired General Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono, and the businessman Jusuf Kalla as his deputy. The new government started to adopt peaceful means to end various regional, ethnic and religious conflicts. Kalla and Yudhoyono already had experience with peace agreements: Kalla, as Coordinating Minister for Social Welfare, had negotiated peace agreements in 2001 and 2002 in the provinces of Central Sulawesi and the Moluccas with the consent of Yudhoyono (at that time the Coordinating Minister of Political and Security Affairs).\footnote{335}{Olle Törnquist, “Dynamics of peace and democratization. The Aceh lessons”, 2010.} In January 2005, the Crisis Management Initiative (CMI) of Helsinki, chaired by former Finnish President Martti Ahtisaari, offered a new mediation effort, later backed also by the European Union. After six months of negotiations, the Helsinki Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) was signed on 15 August 2005 between the Indonesian government and GAM, ending a bloody 30-year conflict that caused around 15,000 dead.\footnote{336}{Human Rights Watch and Amnesty International estimated that between 10 and 20 thousand people were killed} The core content of the peace agreement was the self-government rule for Aceh and is expressed in the MoU Chapter 1.1.2 a):

> Aceh will exercise authority within all sectors of public affairs, which will be administered in conjunction with its civil and judicial administration, except in the fields of foreign affairs, external defense, national security, monetary and fiscal matters, justice and freedom of religion, the policies of which belong to the Government of the Republic of Indonesia in conformity with the Constitution.\footnote{337}{“Memorandum of Understanding between the Government of the Republic of Indonesia and the Free Aceh Movement”, CMI, 2006, accessed October 14, 2016, http://www.acehpeaceprocess.net/pdf/mou_final.pdf}

Unfortunately, only around one third of the clauses have been introduced into the Law on Governing Aceh (UUPA no.11/2006). Among the ones implemented there are the creation of regional parties for the regional government and the possibility to retain 70% of the revenues from natural resources. The incomplete implementation of the MoU is putting at risk today the success of Aceh’s autonomization, as some external observers argue. Nonetheless, the result is that after 30 years of civil
war in Aceh, the democratizing Indonesian state, after a first strong securitization, finally implemented a process of autonomization and the guerrilla group became a political party (even if it divided in different factions with different candidates for the governorship). So what have been the factors that brought the Indonesian government, willing or not, to accept Acehnese autonomy?

From the perspective of the Acehnese rebels, the repression by the Indonesian military forces and the Tsunami of December 2004 that caused 120,000 deaths played an important role. Actually the tsunami, some says, triggered the negotiations and the necessity to reach an agreement as soon as possible to allow massive assistance from the international community to be distributed without hindrance. From the perspective of the state the Helsinki MoU of 2005 was also the result of the democratization process, and the following decentralization process, that started with the new century. Without the Reformasi in 1998 that ended the Indonesian dictatorship, Aceh would not have received its autonomy for some time. The new democratic Indonesia at the beginning engaged in increased repression of this independence movement but later opted for the road of negotiations, decentralization and inclusion. This is different from other countries that, like Turkey, even if it chose similar paths in some moments of its democratization process, failed in achieve the same results and resorted to re-securitization of the independent movement. So what exactly have been the factors that made the process go one direction in Aceh and toward another for the Kurds?

It is evident that for the Indonesian Government the costs in terms of human lives of the insurgency—be they of the soldiers, policemen, civil servants or the ordinary Acehnese people—could no longer be ignored in the era of democracy and free press. Also, the world financial crisis that hit Indonesia very severely made military spending more difficult: in 2004, the newly elected President Yudhoyono told the nation that peaceful solution was the only way to end the conflict in Aceh. His Deputy, Jusuf

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338 The elections of 2006 were won by Irwandi Yusuf, a former GAM negotiator, while the ones of 2012 by his rival Zaini Abdullah, a former GAM activist. Today there are still many problems of corruption, internal conflict and other issues both inside the Aceh party (former GAM party) and in the other smaller Acehnese parties.
Kalla said that the war in Aceh has become too expensive to maintain. “Peace is cheaper”, he said. But this research wants to understand which role played four more important variables related with the main theories of comparative studies.

In the following four chapters, therefore, this study will attempt to explain the different outcomes in Turkey and Indonesia using four theoretical perspectives: elite’s power, international factors, historic institutions and ontological security.

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Yuji Uesugigi, *Peacebuilding and Security Sector Governance in Asia*, LIT Verlag, Geneva Centre for the Democratic Control of Armed Forces (DCAF) 2014, p. 34.
CHAPTER 5

POLITICAL ELITES’ POWER INTEREST AND RATIONAL DECISION MAKING

Introduction

The first hypothesis that this study examines to explain the different treatment of minorities during democratization period—that is early securitization and later autonomization for Indonesia and early autonomization (or at least de-securitization) and later securitization for Turkey—concerns the struggle of elites for power. According to rational choice theory the political elites in charge of decision making about ethnic minorities analyze costs and benefits to decide about which policies to implement. State elites are motivated to satisfy their political and economic interests; therefore they often promote exclusive nationalist policies when they fear the risk of losing power.

This chapter discusses rational choice theory in comparative politics, an approach that sees elites’ rational decision on costs and benefits as the reason for every policy. In brief, when the political costs of toleration are higher than the political costs of repression, the state will chose a path of accommodation; in the opposite case the state will chose repression and securitization. After this presentation, the chapter will analyze evidence from the two case studies to test the hypothesis. In the cases of Turkey and Indonesia, the findings are that the elites’ power interests have been important in contributing to the changes between autonomization and securitization of ethnic minorities.

At the beginning of democratization in Turkey, the inclusive and accommodative approach towards Kurds likely was caused by the shift of ruling elites between the nationalist Kemalist and military elites and the moderate Islamist elites, who had in Islam an important commonality with the Kurds. Later, the re-securitization of the Kurdish minority started because of the risk of power loss by the Islamist elites, represented in particular by the AKP, which caused a change of strategy of AKP with a rebalancing of strategies between the Islamist elites and the military-Kemalist ones. Nevertheless, even if the rise and later difficulties of the AKP as political party are important to understand this policy change, the most important explanatory factors for these outcomes are how the AKP elites interacted with other elite
groups. We cannot understand the electoral strategies of the AKP without understanding the power struggle with the other national elites. How these other elite groups responded (or failed to respond) to the rise of Islamist elites with the AKP explains the change of strategies and the processes of autonomization versus securitization towards the Kurdish minority.

For Indonesia, by contrast, at the beginning the state increased the repression because the military and nationalist elites were still strong: the change in balance of power between elites has been more gradual than the one in Turkey. Later, when the military and nationalist elites started to lose their power to new civilian elites, the state started to use processes of autonomization toward minorities and in particular the Aceh region. Islamist elites in Indonesia have not been as decisive as in Turkey, not having a corresponding political party that could reach the government of the country.

**Theoretical Background**

As Collier argues, political elites (as opposed to social ones defined by class differences) can be defined either as the incumbents (including the oppositions of governments) or the leaders.\(^\text{340}\) For the second group, she refers to the classical definition of Burton, who identifies political elites as “persons who are able, by virtue of their strategic positions in powerful organizations, to affect national political outcomes regularly and substantially. Elites are the principal decision makers in the largest or most resource-rich . . . organizations and movements in a society.”\(^\text{341}\) This study, therefore, following Burton and Collier, defines political elites as either actors within the state or in society who are leaders because of their position in deciding political outcomes. Actors in the state are represented by the ruling parts of the state political institutions, either civilians or military, that decide national police. This includes the highest ranks of the government, the parliament, the judiciary and the military as well as the highest ranks


of the political parties that are in charge of the government, as often they are in exchangeable positions (between the party and the government). Political elites outside the state are represented by business, religious or civil society leaders who have enough economic power to influence politics.

Regarding the main interest of the state elites, both the civilian political elites and the military ones have as the main interest to get and remain in power in order to gain first of all political power; second, material resources; and finally status or ideational resources (such as social esteem or prestige). Geddes argues in particular that some elites “value office because they want to control policy, some for the pure enjoyment of influence and power, and some for the illicit material gains that come with office in some countries.”

Non-state business elites have instead as their main interest to get as much revenues from the market and/or subsidies from the state (in case they are rent-seekers) as possible.

To follow their interests, elites make a cost and benefits analysis before taking decisions: this is the basis of rational choice theory, borrowed by the political sciences from the economic sciences. This theory is not to be confused with the “elite theory”, which argues that a minority of economic and political elites have power independently of formal state institutions. Rational choice theory claims instead that patterns of behavior in societies reflect the choices made by rational individuals, as they try to maximize their benefits and minimize their costs. It is a utilitarian approach based on perfect information, cognitive ability and time to weigh every choice against other. From this perspective, elites—the leaders who impact policies—also calculate costs and benefits before to take a decision. Political science has used rational choice theory extensively for several decades even if has been also criticized.

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344 The Elite Theory was developed at the end of 19th century by the so-called “Italian School of Elitists”, composed by Gaetano Mosca, Vilfredo Pareto and Robert Michels. More recently Charles Wright Mills published the classic “The Power Elite” in 1956, arguing about a system of power in the United States, based on political, economic and military groups that make ordinary citizen powerless actors in the hands of these groups. For contemporary scholars see: David Rothkopf, Superclass: The Global Power Elite and the World They Are Making (Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 2009).
With respect to democratic studies, Dahl in the 1970s spoke about “costs of repressions” and “costs of toleration” in a regime’s decision to “liberalize” or not, which means to go towards democracy or maintain authoritarianism.³⁴⁶ Dahl specifically argued that when there is a power shift from a dictatorship to a democracy it is because the dictator calculates that the costs of repression of the opposition parties or the people who want more freedom is higher than the costs of toleration of the same opposition and people’s demands. Therefore, the cost of repression is the cost of maintaining the dictatorship while the cost of toleration is how much power the elites lose to accept the transition—the cost of democracy. More recently, other scholars such as Weingast have analyzed how the difference between these two type of political costs is fundamental in elites’ decision to engage in a democratization process or not.³⁴⁷ In particular, Weingast claims that if public officers have incentives to respect the limitations on their behaviors without resorting to repression, democracies have more stability based on the rule of law. If there are no such incentive, democracies are more instable because of the lack of group cohesion, a collective action problem as Mancur Olson would characterize it.³⁴⁸ Besides a lack of incentives, according to Weingast, ethnic divisions also increase collective action problems, in particular on the appropriate role of the state, and undermine democratic stability. This is related to the difficulty of transition to democracy in pluralistic societies, as this study argued in the chapter 3, with the literature review on democracy in divided societies.

Finally, Bueno de Mesquita also supported the Rational Choice Theory in one famous book regarding economic development.³⁴⁹ According to Bueno de Mesquita, political leaders pay attention in their policies first of all to the people and systems that allow them to remain in power, because they are foremost power maximizers and second wealth maximizers. Therefore, their economic policies are the

³⁴⁸ The problem of collective actions, also called “coordination dilemma”, is based on the fact that coercion or specific benefits must be present in order for a group to act collectively for the common interest. For public goods, for example democracy, we need groups, but is difficult to get everybody to collaborate and pay the costs as individuals prefer to free ride, that is why we need organizations, like a bureaucratic state to make individuals do their part, like paying taxes for example. See: Mancur Olson, *The logic of collective action: public goods and the theory of groups* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1965).
ones that satisfy the winning coalition—that is, the constituency that maintains the elites in power. This is an important argument for this research, because as we will see the political leadership in Turkey changed strategies towards the Kurdish minority precisely because of the risk of losing the winning coalition.

Going back to the concept of costs of tolerations and costs of repression, this approach can also be applied to minorities: when the cost of giving some autonomy to the minorities (cost of toleration) is lower than the cost of maintaining the status quo with the securitization or repression, then the state may allow some policies of autonomy (as could be in the case of Indonesia). Conversely, the securitization as form of repression could be maintained or re-started (as occurred in Turkey). Elite power and rational choice is, then, the first hypothesis.

**Theories Applied to Case Studies**

Scholars of ethno-nationalist theories affirm that elites often promote exclusive nationalist policies once they fear the loss of power, and so it is the elite interest that may determine a state’s approach to the ethnic minorities. Snyder in particular argued that the transition to democracy often brings ethnic conflict because of nationalism supported by the elites to gain in the popular ballot, especially when there are no preconditions like an adaptable ruling elite or institutions such as the rule of law and a free press. Again, the hypothesis emerging from this theory is that new elites in power, and by extension the shift of power among elites during a democratic transition, could change the state’s approach to minorities based on the power calculations among new elites.

Therefore, to understand elites’ fear of accommodating minorities or oppositions, it is also important to analyze the democratization processes besides the new democracy in itself. Following the argument of Cesari, there are three main ways to deal with old elites during the transition to democracy: make a tabula rasa of the old regime and start from zero, marginalize the actors of the former

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351 Cesari, 2014, P. 229-233
regime, or destroy the former regime from within. Among Muslim majority countries, the first path has been followed by the Islamic revolution in Iran and the post-Saddam Hussein era in Iraq. While the first resulted in a theocracy, the second failed completely in its democratization, precisely because of the lack of inclusiveness of the old regime and system (besides the disasters of the American war). The second way instead has been followed by Turkey, with the AKP party in power since 2002, building alliances among the excluded forces in order to marginalize the old regime and gradually excluding the old Kemalist-military elites. This seemed to be a path that gave more democratic fruits, at least in regard to the stability of Turkish democracy until the failed coup of July 2016. In reality, however, the current difficulties of stability and of the relationship with the Kurdish minority show some problems with this marginalization of the old regime. This could indicate that these forces have reacted to their loss of power with the revitalization of strong nationalist sentiments, something very much related with the recent terrorist attacks and the repression of Kurdish minority in the eastern region. Finally the third type has been followed by Indonesia after its democratization in 1998, with a gradualism that democratized the structures but kept the old political cadres for a while, gradually excluding them from the political and economic power, until finally the transition can be considered concluded with the first new president not belonging to the old establishment, Joko Widodo, being elected in 2014. This path seemed to work better in the long term regarding the inclusion of minorities, at least if we look at Indonesia today.

Rather than examining established elites, other scholars give importance to the actions of leadership for the solution of the separatist conflicts. Regarding the Indonesian case, for example, Miller argues that “agency, or political will, was the most crucial factor in the resolution of Aceh conflict, supported by structural preconditions and circumstances.” In particular, the structural constraints after the 1997 financial crisis and the 2004 Tsunami reduced the Indonesian state’s capacity and this contributed to the final settlement. As Miller remembers, the Indonesian government passed through different approaches to the Acehnese issue since its democratization in 1998, including military

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repression; offers of autonomy; peace talks; and a combination of them. During the first seven years of Indonesia’s transition to democracy, there was a “high level of disconnect between Jakarta’s security and autonomy policies about Aceh”, but when both parties understood that they could not defeat each other they were pushed to the resolution of conflict with some type of self-government. We could also argue that for the Turkish case there has been an important impact of the new AKP leadership, in particular with the figure of Recep Tayyip Erdogan as Prime Minister and later President, on the treatment of the Kurdish minority. Structural preconditions such as the great Turkish economic development during the AKP regime, and specific circumstances such as the Syrian civil war, affected the securitization of Kurds. But the structural elements are related with other variables that will be treated later in the next chapters, while the importance of the agency of the leadership, supported by Miller, is not analyzed by this study, leaving the possibility for future research.

Finally we need to remember that elites’ power often is treated at a deeper level, behind the scene, not in a transparent way but in a hidden and covert way, that often make analysts and scholars speak about “deep state” or “guardian state”, in a manner not too different from a conspiracy theory. In this case there can be some relationship with the Elite Theory and in particular with the “shadow elites” as someone defines them. In Turkey, for example, is common to speak about the deep state as an anti-democratic nationalist coalition between government representatives, bureaucrats, security, intelligence and armed forces. These elite coalitions may be involved in organized crime, corruption, and human rights violations in order to defend their power and the status quo. Others speak about a “guardian state”, slightly different from the deep state, being a reincarnation of the Kemalist one-party state ideals in the current elites. In order to retain power, the guardian state elites would use the “divide and rule” strategy, fueling ethnic, religious and political conflicts to marginalize, or repress with military power, whomever

353 Ibid., 183.
the state considers its enemies.\textsuperscript{356} When this deep state feels a lack of control, elites may re-start some chaos in order to retain the control of the situation. After the Ergenekon allegations, as explained in the previous chapter, this deep state could have felt beaten and reacted as a consequence. By contrast, in Indonesia the concept of the deep state is not so common, apart from some scholars speaking about it in the Yudhoyono presidency.\textsuperscript{357} Therefore, elites seem more transparent to show what may affect their decisions. Only during the time of massive killings of Communists and alleged leftists in Indonesia (sometimes referred to as the “Indonesian genocide”) after the “30 September Movement” failed coup in 1965, and especially after the start of “New Order” of Suharto in 1966, some form of deep state has played a role in maintaining the status quo at a high cost, but after democratization this does not seem the case anymore.

Concluding, all of these approaches give importance to elite power struggles based on rational and utilitarian reasons, the first hypothesis of this study. The following sections, therefore, look for evidence in the two case studies that may support this hypothesis.

\textbf{Evidence for Turkey: from Autonomization to Securitization}

Turkish policy has moved from securitization to autonomization as the AKP arrived in power, and then back to re-securitization when Erdogan and the AKP elites felt blocked in gaining absolute power in recent years. To understand these changes in policies over time, we need to analyze the declining influence of military and Kemalist elites, the ascendance of the AKP elites, and fluid coalitions with Gulenist elites who later were excluded from power. We should therefore analyze the role of at least three types of state elites and one non-state elite that became a state elite for a period: 1) the moderate Islamist elites at the base of the AKP, which is the ruling party since 2002, that accompanied the last democratic transition of Turkey; 2) the Kemalist elites, present in the state and bureaucracy of Turkey


\textsuperscript{357} Marcus Mietzner, “The president, the ‘deep state’ and policy making in post-Suharto Indonesia: a case study of the deliberation of the civil service act”, Report for the Partnership on Governance Reform (Jakarta: Kemitraan, 2014).
since its foundation; 3) the moderate Islamist elites belonging to the Gulen movement or *Hizmet* (“service”, the terms that the movement use to refer to itself)\(^{358}\) that became part of the state supporting the AKP government during AKP’s early years; and 4) military elites who also have been powerful, in collaboration with the Kemalist elites, since the foundation of Turkish state. There is no evidence that another important non-state elite, the business class, had a decisive impact in the decision-making towards minorities in Turkey.\(^{359}\)

The story that comes out from this study’s analysis of elites is that three pivotal changes led to the outcome of autonomization attempts and later the outcome of resumption of the securitization of the Kurdish minority. The first event is the growing marginalization of military elites in Turkey during the period of democratization. The second is a similar gradual exclusion of the old Kemalist elites from the decision-making and bureaucratic power of the state. Finally, the third and probably most important event, is the end of the alliance between the Islamist elites of the AKP and the ones of the Gulenists. This third marginalization is quite important because represents the final step for the achievement of absolute power of the current elites in power. This exclusion of the Gulenists started since 2011 but in particular since 2013, after the corruption scandal with investigations against the AKP (for which Erdogan accused the Gulen movement) and became an open conflict in 2015, since when the Gulen movement has been accused of building a “parallel state” inside Turkey and have been classified as a

\(^{358}\) The Gulen movement is as an Islamic transnational civil society movement that look for a balance between Islamic and modern values, considering Islam a “way of life”, in the Sufi spiritual tradition, a “service” to all the community that set examples. Differently from other transnational Islamic movements like Wahhabism, its goal is not to evangelize or proselytize but to serve in a kind of “missionary” and tolerant spirit, so instead of building mosques or madrasas it builds schools (still teaching only Islam though and no other religions), hospitals and is active in interfaith dialogues. It is guided by a Turkish preacher, ex imam, Fethullah Gülen, who lives in exile in the US since 1999. See: [http://fgulen.com/en/](http://fgulen.com/en/)

\(^{359}\) With the lack of freedom of press and transparency in Turkey and not much information on the relationship between the Turkish economic elites and business class and the government, it is difficult to analyze the power of these elites. There are only allegation that Erdogan is enriching his family and the business elite close to him like the accusation in December 2015 when Russia accused Erdogan family of profiting from the illegal smuggling of oil from territory held by ISIS. See: Reuters, Turkish leader's son denies Russian allegations of Islamic State trade, 12/8/2015, accessed 5/15/2016, [http://www.reuters.com/article/us-mideast-crisis-turkey-russia-idUSKBN0TR15120151208](http://www.reuters.com/article/us-mideast-crisis-turkey-russia-idUSKBN0TR15120151208)
terrorist organization (in December 2015). The showdown arrived after the last failed military coup in Turkey, in July 2016, after which Erdogan started a crackdown on thousands of people from all parts of society, both in Turkey and abroad, accused to be Gulenist, with a witch hunt that resembled a paranoia. Tens of thousands of militaries, journalist, teachers, public officers, judges, jail staff and ordinary people have been suspended and arrested in the months after the attempted coup.

Therefore this marginalization in particular represents an important story of two traditional Islamists groups gradually fighting for power in a competition between rising elites: the Gulenists and the “Erdoganist” Islamist elites. This story interacts with the electoral ascendance of the AKP party and Erdogan, which played a fundamental role in the strategy chosen by the AKP with respect to the Kurdish minority. The Islamist elites represented by the AKP and the Erdoganist group, thanks to the growth in their electoral and political power, were able to exclude the other Islamist elites, more related with institutional and social position than political ones (from judicial and security powers to media, businesses and schools). This also allowed the AKP also to support the process of autonomization for Kurdish minority, opposed by the Gulenist movement, without concern for its power. But when the AKP lost the election in 2015, these elites took the occasion to change strategy towards Kurds in order to regain electoral power. The AKP therefore favored autonomization as a viable strategy at the beginning, in order to get electoral support also from Kurds, but then moved to securitization in order to regain electoral support from the majority of population, that it had lost as the strategy of autonomization did not

362 Erdoganism today has been compared with Kemalism, given the attitude of Erdogan as a “new sultan” or “new Ataturk” wanting to monopolize the power (with elements very close to dictatorship like media and civil society repression) in order to create a new Islamist even if moderate Turkey. See on this among many: Doug Bandow, “Why Both Erdoganism and Kemalism May Finally Be Dead in Turkey”, Huffington Post, 06/27/2015, accessed 05/15/2016, http://www.huffingtonpost.com/doug-bandow/why-both-erdoganism-and-k_b_7677712.html
work. The Gulenist elites, who had entered in the new AKP administration as a partner, represented a more liberal professional class of Turkey, also with some ability to influence masses given their concentration in the education sector. However, Gulenists were excluded by the power aims of Erdogan, because of the fear of building “another state” inside the state, leaving the AKP elites as the only one able to decide the policy-making toward Kurds and so channelizing it at the beginning towards autonomization and later towards securitization.

Before analyzing in detail the different goals and strategies of the elites, we need to remember that both the military and the Kemalist elites (and later also the Islamist elites of the Gulenists) had a conception of the Turkish nation based on an ethno-cultural understanding of who Turks are. This conception in turn affected their understanding of the Kurdish problem during the history of the Republic. By contrast, the Islamist elites of the AKP had a more religious conception of the Turkish nation based on Muslim identity. Both of those conceptions stayed quite constant over time (even if the Muslim conception of Turkishness was not expressed by state elites until the AKP arrived to power) while the policies did change, that is from securitization they passed to autonomization and back to securitization. This variation in policy toward the Kurds suggests elites used these conceptions tactically to negotiate the autonomization versus the securitization strategies in order to maintain and/or regain their power.

In fact, traditionally the Turkish secular-nationalist elites of the military and the Kemalists approached the Kurdish issue either within the security paradigm or the modernization paradigm. According to the first one, the Kurdish problem was a question of order and security, of violence and terrorism, which required a military solution. The second paradigm looked at the development solution, as the problem was the economic and social backwardness of the Kurdish region. Both approaches excluded political solutions, seeing the solution not with recognition of Kurdish rights but instead as a security or economic solution. The new Islamist elites who came to power in 2002 with the AKP instead had a different approach, based as said on a religious view of commonality between Turks and Kurds.

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363 Senem Aslan, “Different faces of Turkish Islamic nationalism”, in Rethinking Nation and Nationalism, Project on the Middle East and Political Science, POMPES studies n. 14, June 2, 2015, p. 10.
perspective suggests that the Kurdish problem arose from the lack of recognition of Kurdish diversity, one of the two identities denied with the foundation of the Turkish Republic, together with the Islamist one. Due to this common history of marginalization, the AKP and its elites felt in some way morally and historically obligated to include Kurds in the new polity of Turkey and started with a new approach based on recognition of and support for Kurdish rights. However, this obligation aligned closely with the goal of this elites—as for every elites, getting and keeping power. When the policy of inclusion no longer served this goal, the strategy changed.

Since winning the elections of 2002, the AKP of Erdogan increased gradually but consistently its power and with it its plan to build a new and powerful Turkey, one with a strong presidential system and a moderate conservative Islamist approach to politics and social life. Besides the exclusion of the old elites and the alliance with the more liberal forces to dismantle the old authoritarian nationalistic system, the fundamental strategy of the AKP was to seek the electoral support of a majority of the population, including the Kurds. Kurds of the Turkish eastern regions generally had voted for pro-Kurdish parties even if they failed to reach the 10 percent threshold to enter in the Parliament (from the People's Democracy Party/HADEP in 1999, to the Democratic People's Party/DEHAP in 2002). Because of competition among political parties competing for the Kurdish votes, the “democratic deepening” that started since 2002 therefore made the state, the AKP ruling party, and the elites behind it reflect on the approach to ethnic minorities. As examined in chapter 4, the need for Kurdish votes made the Islamist elites in the AKP to choose—in contrast to Kemalist, military and later also Gulen elites—an accommodative approach toward the minority. This could be done because the AKP was gradually excluding the other elites from the political decision-making process and it lasted until this strategy of inclusion and accommodation towards Kurdish request bore electoral fruits. When it started to become a failing strategy to give AKP the political support needed, starting in 2011 but particularly since the summer of 2015, the AKP changed the strategy and went on the opposite direction of securitization. This was consistent with the already authoritarian drift that Erdogan had undertaken since 2011, as discussed in chapter 4.
Also, before analyzing in detail the different goals and strategies of the elites, we need to remember that Erdogan path towards absolute power have played a decisive role in pushing the AKP toward extreme positions on the Kurdish question. The internal fight for the control of the AKP would be another study altogether. Here it is sufficient to say that positions taken on domestic and foreign policies have played an important role in the power struggle also inside the AKP: Erdogan made sure to exclude from this struggle the most moderate and liberal figures. He had disagreements, for example, with his former Deputy Prime Minister and co-founder of AKP party, Bulent Arinc, when he was still supporting peace with the PKK at the beginning of 2015.\footnote{This is one of the reasons why he chose Ahmet Davutoglu, when he became President in 2014, to substitute him as Prime Minister and not Arinc and neither Abdullah Gül. Gül was the third founder of the AKP, together with Erdogan and Arinc, who served as president of Turkey before Erdogan between 2007 and 2014, but Erdogan did not like him because he opposed the proposal for a Presidential system.} This is one of the reasons why he chose Ahmet Davutoglu, when he became President in 2014, to substitute him as Prime Minister and not Arinc and neither Abdullah Gül. Gül was the third founder of the AKP, together with Erdogan and Arinc, who served as president of Turkey before Erdogan between 2007 and 2014, but Erdogan did not like him because he opposed the proposal for a Presidential system.\footnote{Finally, when also Davutoglu (until then the best candidate for Erdogan as he did not have a strong support in the AKP base) did things of which Erdogan, now President, did not approve—such as reaching an agreement with the EU on the Syrian refugee crisis—he asked also Davutoglu to step down and chose another Prime Minister on his path towards, what seems now clear, the creation of his absolute power.} So, going back to the elites, regarding the Kemalist ones, the nationalist-secularist elites who founded the modern Turkish nation state since 1923, we have to say that they marginalized the Islamist elites at the beginning of the Republic, as well as the Kurdish or other minorities’ elites.\footnote{Eighty years later, when the Islamist elites could come back to power, the AKP and Erdogan did not sideline the...}
Kemalist elites in the same way, at least in the beginning. As Bechev argues, Erdogan “re-legitimised power by replacing the tutelage of the Kemalist elites with top-down rule backed by an electoral majority.”\(^\text{368}\) Nevertheless, as other scholars remember, the AKP, with the support of the Gulen movement, as soon as it arrived in power started “the weakening of the power of the military and secularist judiciary.”\(^\text{369}\) Obviously, the nationalist secularist Kemalist elites have never been in favor of an accommodative attitude towards the Kurdish issue, and the AKP new approach to the Kurds therefore may have threatened not only their power but also the values and the beliefs of the Kemalist elites. But the Kemalists no longer had much power to influence the AKP’s policies toward minorities after being gradually replaced by the new Islamist elites of the AKP, not only in the parliament and government but also in the bureaucracy and state positions, during the so called “AKP’s decade long political Tsunami.”\(^\text{370}\)

Regarding the Gulenist elites, as said they started to conflict with the AKP elites since 2011, and in particular since 2013, with the scandal of corruption allegations against President Erdogan and the AKP supposedly made by followers of the Hizmet, the Gulen movement. They had played an important role in gradually reducing the power of military and secularist judicial elites and, sharing the idea of “Muslim nationalism” with the AKP, they blamed the Kemalist nationalists for the loss of Turkey’s role in the international community in the last decades.\(^\text{371}\) Nevertheless, the Gulen movement supported an ethno-cultural understanding of Turkishness, while the AKP gave more importance to the religious understanding. This played a role in the conflict between AKP and the Hizmet, with important consequences on the re-securitization of the Kurdish issue by the AKP. Actually, the AKP had a more pragmatic approach to Kurdish conflict, less related with Turkish identity. By contrast, the Hizmet never

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369 Senem Aslan, “Different faces of Turkish Islamic nationalism”, 2015, p. 10.
371 Ibid.
supported negotiations with the PKK, and actually was for a military solution of the insurgency in the southeastern region, a strategy that has been followed vigorously by the AKP since 2015.\textsuperscript{372} However, after 2013 the Hizmet elites had no role in political decisions, and actually today the movement is considered a terrorist group, responsible of the attempted coup in 2016. At the same time, while the Hizmet have been supporting the small ethnic groups of Greek, Armenians and Jews, the AKP has been very exclusive towards them, and recently with Erdogan even some hate speech has been used against them.\textsuperscript{373} This would confirm that the accommodative approach towards the Kurds was based on a political calculus, besides the religious commonality, more than on the “inclusion of ethnic diversity” by the AKP. The Gulen elites therefore were no decisive in the decision making towards the Kurdish issue, as their strategy has not been used until they had been excluded from the decision making sphere.

Finally, we need to analyze the military elite, one of the most important group in Turkey, being the bastion of the Kemalist identity of Turkey and defending its national security against external and internal enemies. This elite also has been gradually excluded from the political power by the AKP since 2002, helped in part by the EU accession process that shifted the balance more towards civilian institutions and away from the military. The Turkish armed forces have considered themselves as the protector of the values of the Turkish republic since its foundation, which is why they have staged coups when the party in charge did not follow those values, especially when the party claimed an Islamist or socialist identity. This was true at least until 2002, when for the first time, even if the new ruling party was a moderate Islamist one, the military did not intervene. This happened also because the AKP and Erdogan emphasized the secular nature of their government and did not try to alienate military elites, at least at beginning. However, this changed over the years, in particular since 2007. Before the May 2007 elections, the militaries tried again to intervene in politics as in the past, declaring their role as guardian of secularism and their opposition to Islamist candidates. Nevertheless the Turkish government, as well as the EU and the US, declared that the military should have not entered in political matters, and so the

\textsuperscript{372} Ibid., 11.  
\textsuperscript{373} Ibid., 12.
democratization of Turkey went on. Moreover, in 2007 a court case known as “Ergenekon” started, accusing the army of a plot against the AKP regime. This was the beginning of the end of the military’s power and its recognition as the country’s most trusted institution. In 2010, changes approved by referendum amended the 1982 Constitution, reducing the power of militaries in Turkish political life (and expanding that of the President). Finally, the military power was reduced economically with democratization, as their budget increased over the years in absolute value but reduced as a percentage of GDP, passing from $9 billion US (3.9 percent of the GDP) in 2002 to $12 billion US (2.5 percent) in 2005 and $15 billion US (2.1 percent) in 2015.374

Regarding the Kurdish issue, the militaries had, in particular after 2007 and 2010, a reduced role in decisions about the domestic politics, which helped the AKP to engage in an accommodative approach towards the Kurdish minority. Obviously this did not please military elites. With the recent strategic shift of the AKP towards re-securitization, however, there seemed to be a new realignment, at least in goals and interests, between the AKP elites and the Military elites. Also, we need to remember that the Turkish Armed Forces are the second largest standing military force in NATO, after those of the United States (600,000 personnel in 2015, ranked as eight in the world as military strength)375 and this obviously still gives some kind of power to the nationalist militaries. Therefore, the Turkish army, even if without political power, remains a strong actor and influential institution in Turkey. In some ways it is a limit to the solution of the Kurdish issue,376 because the primary domestic threats for the military in Turkey are considered fundamentalism, leftist extremism and separatism (that is, the Kurdish issue).377 Nevertheless after the attempted coup in 2016 many militaries have been dismissed (or arrested) and this weakened

definitely the military power, as the military institution lost many officials and personnel formed and trained during last decades.

Let us see now the evidence testing the hypothesis that AKP elites chose accommodation and even negotiations the first years of transition, and securitization later, not only because of the elites’ power and identity struggle but also because of specific electoral benefits.

According to Romano, “the logic of electoral politics can dictate greater accommodation to win votes, particularly where an ethnic minority commands sufficient numbers to influence electoral outcomes”. 378 The AKP was on the right path in the subsequent elections in 2007 and 2011, when it won and increased the votes, including in the Kurdish region (even if lost seats in parliament because of the Turkish electoral system). Also, fewer people voted for the pro-Kurdish candidates that were able to enter the Parliament. 379 This result therefore showed that the AKP strategy was working well.

Regarding specifically the peace process, there are alternative arguments and explanations for this renewal of the AKP’s accommodative approach not only to the Kurdish minority but even with the PKK. According to Tekdemir and Goksel, for example, the peace process started because both parties understood that “the conflict could not possibly be resolved via the conventional approach of the Turkish state which securitized the issue.” 380 But the recent re-securitization makes this argument flawed, as the AKP seems to believe now that the conflict can actually be solved by a conventional military approach. Other scholars, such as Serhun Al, speaking about the accommodative approach to Kurdish minority, argue that “granting liberty for the Kurdish identity has also been primarily motivated by the state security.” 381 That is, “both exclusionary and inclusionary policies have been primarily motivated by state

379 This was possible because the candidates presented themselves as independents in an alliance with left wing parties, the Thousand Hope Candidates in 2007 and the Labour, Democracy and Freedom Bloc in 2011.
381 Al Serhun, “Kurds, state elites, and patterns of nationhood in Iraq and Turkey”, in Rethinking Nation and Nationalism, Project on the Middle East and Political Science, POMPES studies n. 14, June 2, 2015, p. 6.
security concerns rather than rights-based concerns.”  

This is because when the Kemalist worldview of one language, one nation, one state—which was the raison d’état throughout the twentieth century—was substituted by a new narrative of nationhood with the new century (a neo-Ottoman identity with the overarching Muslim identity), the AKP started to recognize the Kurdish identity because the status quo policy of the 20th century had become a threat to the security of the state. In reality, however, this concept of the lack of security because of exclusion clashed with the high level of ontological security that Turkey finally felt with the new century, not only because of the EU application but also because of finally having the inclusion of the Islamist identity in Turkey.

We could argue therefore that Erdogan and the rest of the Islamist elites inside the AKP in reality initiated a peace process with the PKK for the same reason that an accommodative approach to Kurdish minority started at the beginning of the democratic transition. That is, when they saw it beneficial for the regime—when the political costs of toleration, accepting an accommodative approach, were calculated as lower than the costs of repression—they supported a negotiated solution. Because the AKP needed votes from the Kurds to reach the absolute majority, to go on with repression and avoid the peace process with a negotiation would have had great political costs. Also, because when Ocalan said that PKK was not interested in independence anymore, or even “democratic autonomy” but just cultural rights, 383 the costs of toleration were suddenly reduced, being not related anymore with an independent Kurdistan but just with some form of cultural autonomy.

The main reasons for the peace process seem therefore to have been a political calculus of the AKP Islamist elites, in particular to reach their political goals, because the strategy changed when this calculus appeared wrong in the middle of 2015, when re-securitization started. Actually the AKP, as explained in Chapter 4, inverting its growing trend, lost almost 10% of the votes in the election of June 2015, and with it its dream to reach two thirds (or at least three-fifths) majority in the Parliament for the

382 Ibid., p. 8.
The plan had to be postponed because of the surprising success of the pro-Kurdish HDP party. The AKP strategy of granting cultural rights, at least at the individual level, to Kurds and even try a dialogue with PKK had not worked: what seemed an opportunistic approach of Erdogan and the AKP to the peace process with the PKK did not bear the expected fruits. Consequently the government resorted to the re-securitization of the PKK conflict and with it of the entire Kurdish minority issue. Some analysts speculate that Erdogan actually had already suspended the peace process shortly before the June elections, when he saw it did not fit with its strategy anymore, not bringing more popular or electoral support. Already in the past the AKP had reduced policies of accommodation towards Kurdish minority to fuel nationalist passions for electoral purposes, in particular in the 2007 and 2011 elections. While according to some other analysts the AKP would have accepted to advance the peace process if the PKK and HDP would have supported Erdogan’s executive presidency wishes.

Whatever is the case, one thing is evident: in order to recuperate the votes of the moderate Kurds lost in June 2015, Erdogan and the AKP Islamist elites decided not to follow the peace process as it represented a strategy that did not bear its political fruits. The political costs of toleration had become suddenly too high, higher than the costs of repression, and therefore the strategy changed. All these evaluations confirm that the change of strategy of AKP has been caused by the need of the AKP ruling Islamist elites to recapture the political power lost in the former elections, in order to guarantee not only the political survival and power for a long time, but also to carry on the program of transformation of

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384 Constitutional amendments in Turkey need a three fifths majority to be put forward to a referendum and a two-thirds majority to be ratified directly. The AKP reached an agreement on the Constitutional amendment with the three fifths majority in January 2017, thanks to the support of the far right Nationalist Movement Party (MHP), that has been supporting the AKP since the end of peace negotiations with PKK and the re-securitization of Kurdish issue.


Turkey towards a Presidential Republic. For these reasons, we can conclude that there is enough evidence to support the hypothesis that the shift in power from the old military-Kemalist secular elites to the new moderate Islamist elites provoked the phase of accommodation and autonomization towards the Kurds. But the obstacle to obtain absolute power by Erdogan, AKP and its correspondent moderate Islamist elites, posed by the same strategy of autonomization that gave the Kurds the desire to bring a Kurdish party into the Parliament, made the AKP shift its strategy toward re-securitization.

Evidence for Indonesia: from Securitization to Autonomization

In contrast to the Turkish case, Indonesia experienced an increase in securitization at the beginning of democratic transition, but after few years the state engaged in the autonomization of the Aceh region. Similar to Turkey, to understand these changes in policies over time in Indonesia, we need to analyze the declining influence of the military in the country. The early securitization corresponded to when the military still had power but they felt were losing it, while the later autonomization period happens when the military started to have less effective power.

The slow and gradual exclusion of the armed forces from politics in Indonesia was also accompanied by a decentralization of the government. These processes contributed as well to changes in policies towards the minorities. By devoting authority to the regional level, the problem of minorities, in particular the Acehnese, were no longer a Jakarta problem but a regional one. For this reason, one important group of elites (the armed forces) no longer had the institutional, material and bureaucratic benefits of securitization: decentralization made the costs of repressions much higher as they would have required a dual system with a centralized security apparatus while at the same time devolving authority to the provinces.

To analyze the Indonesian case, we first need to explore a couple of background elements regarding the elite’s power and their perception of national sovereignty. First of all, we need to say that Indonesian political elites had less fear than their corresponding Turkish ones of losing political power to ethnic minorities during the democratization process. This is due to several reasons, among which is the
fact that minorities, including Acehnese, are geographically concentrated in some peripheral islands, without the possibility to have a real impact on the central state’s power in the case of achieved autonomy. Besides this, minorities cannot aspire to a national voice in the parliament and less in the government, not having political parties that can represent them at national level. Therefore, we could say that during the democratization transition the costs of tolerance for Indonesian elites to accommodate minorities, with a decentralization or autonomization process, have been much lower than the costs of repression.

Nevertheless, at the beginning of its democratization, Indonesia engaged in the repression of its ethnic minorities, even more than during the last period of the authoritarian regime, in particular with the minority that had an armed guerrilla rebelling for decades: Aceh. This is because of the second background element regarding the elite’s perception of national sovereignty: that at the beginning of the democratization the Indonesian political and military elites feared the risk of dismemberment of the national territory, with centrifugal forces that would have fought for ethnic and territorial independence. For this reason, at the beginning the strategy toward Aceh, as explained in chapter 4, was based on balancing between some ceasefires and concessions but also military repression. The national strategy shifted from repression to accommodation only some years after 1998, particularly around 2003/2004. This section of the chapter explains why this shift to autonomization occurred, using the rational choice theory of calculation of political benefits for the Indonesian political and state elites.

For the Indonesian case, and the state’s relationship with the Acehnese minority, this study analyzes the role of two types of state elites and one non-state elite: 1) military elites; 2) nationalist political elites; and 3) Islamist elites (mostly from civil society). Non-state elites such as the business class did not have had a decisive impact on the decision making towards minorities neither in Indonesia.

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This study does not analyze the possible deep and hided relationship between the business and the political elites, apart few evident elements like President Yudhoyono choosing the rich businessman Yusuf Kalla as his vice president in 2004 also in order to bring the business elites inside the government.
Regarding the military elites, first of all we have to say that Indonesia is a unique country (but in this sense similar to Turkey) that without a military dictatorship was able to build a strong military, with political power and a so called “dual function”, known in Bahasa as “Dwi Fungsi”. The military were considered during the Surkarno and Suharto era as a sociopolitical actor as well as the defenders of national security, allowing them to be in a position of power (with guaranteed seats in Parliament and top positions in public service) and at the same time to control civilian population in a legitimate way. This is also because in countries with contentious politics based on regional rebellions, the militarization of the state is quite common as occurred in Turkey and in Indonesia. This is the reason for the other peculiar element of the Indonesian Armed Forces: the fact that they have always been based on territorial lines, in order to be prepared against both external but above all internal enemies, which was the main focus of the Army, with the islands of the Archipelago having experienced several insurgencies.

The hypothesis for this elite is that the military pushed for securitization before and in anticipation of losing power. By contrast, when later the military started to lose power, other elites were able to put in practice policies of autonomy. The military, therefore, was not excluded suddenly at the beginning of democratization. On the contrary, their reformation and marginalization from the politics of the state was gradual and even the military elites experienced internally a smooth and organized transition, with a very slow replacement of the leaders. Nevertheless, they started to feel a little abandoned and unheard by the massive democratic changes accompanied by decentralization, as the Indonesian Army saw always themselves as a defender of the “Unitary State of Indonesia”. Both the retaining of power and the fear of losing it contributed to the repression and securitization towards Aceh at the beginning of democratization.

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393 Indonesia, Current Data on the Indonesian Military Elite, April 2008–September 2013, Southeast Asia Program Publications at Cornell University, No. 98 (October 2014), pp. 91-139.
But how did the military’s gradual reformation and marginalization from security issues and public policies happen? First of all, the Tentera Nasional Indonesia (TNI, Indonesian National Armed Forces) had itself already adopted a new doctrine in August 1998, a few months after the fall of Suharto, the so called “New Paradigm.” This doctrine, created by a group of senior officers headed by General Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono, future President of Indonesia, proposed to move the traditional focus of the military from internal security to external defense, transferring internal security functions to the national police. Nevertheless, the declarations and the facts on the ground were quite different, understandably as a system cannot change suddenly but has to proceed slowly in order to maintain stability and efficiency. For this reason, police functions were separated from military ones only gradually, as only the army had the capability to guarantee public order and fight armed separatist movements. Indonesia’s parliament for example passed legislation in 2001 that still gave four internal security goals to the TNI: operations against separatists, insurgent forces, drug trafficking, and smuggling.

However, the “dual function” was revoked gradually, making of the military only a defense agency but no longer a political actor, along with the civilianization of the public administration and the end of the armed forces in the Parliament (the military still had 38 seats for the 1999–2004 period of transition). Individuals with military backgrounds continued to serve in the government and other public positions but active duty officers had to retire before serving in public positions (even though the ex-general Yudhoyono served as president for a decade, from 2004 to 2014). Even if gradual, these changes were nevertheless important because they made it less likely for presidents to co-opt the TNI for personal political gain. Finally, military-controlled businesses were gradually limited until 2009, when all military businesses were surrendered to a civilian institution, significantly reducing the economic power and autonomy of the military. This went together with a reduction of the military expenditure in the country. Similar to the Turkish case, military spending was quite high during the period of dictatorship

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395 Ibid., p. 27.
396 Ibid., p. 49.
but passed from 1.5 percent of GDP in 1997 for a total of $3.2 billion (in current prices) to 0.8 percent of GDP in 1999 for a total of $1.1 billion. In 2016, military spending still constituted around 0.9 percent of GDP for a total of $7.6 billion.\(^{398}\)

All these processes may have contributed to an attempt by the army to retain some of their power, or at least to have the “permission” of the new political elites to use their power in peripheral territorial disputes, crushing minority movements and even fueling more religious and ethnic conflict in order to intervene (as in the case of the Maluku and Sulawesi sectarian conflicts between 1998 and 2002). In this way the army could keep its institutional structure for at least the first few years, blocking reform of its territorial command structure.\(^{399}\) This allowed the military to maintain a control of the territory and so of the possible problems of minorities. Nevertheless, the result of the armed forces’ initial repression of the centrifuges forces of independents movements was either the opposite, at least in a region like East Timor which got its independence in 2002, or the failure to crush completely the independence movement (like in Aceh or even Papua). This also could have played a role in the following accommodating approach by the political civilian elites in Indonesia, which saw that repression and securitization were not helpful to reach the goals established. The costs of toleration for the military were higher than the costs of repression, because the Army already had in place the apparatus to keep repressing and securitizing the Acehnese guerrillas who had been rebelling during the last decades. To tolerate some form of autonomy or even independence would have been too much for a military that saw itself as the guarantor and keeper of the territorial integrity and state sovereignty. Nevertheless, at some point the Army likely understood, as did the national political elites, that neither of the two parties could win. After the Tsunami in December 2004, a struggle inside the Army seems to have pushed toward a more accommodative leadership. For example, while the Chief of the Army, Lt. General Ramizad Riyacudu, openly rejected negotiations with GAM in 2005, resulting in his sudden decision to take the “early retirement”, his


superior, the Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces, General Endriartono Sutarto, declared his full support of the Helsinki peace negotiations, saying: “Enough of the war, the armed forces also lost their men in the battle. No general would sacrifice his men.”

In conclusion, one can argue that the relative staying of power by the military elites at the beginning of the democratic transition, together with the threat of losing that power, allowed them to push the Indonesian state to repress ethnic minorities, and specifically Acehnese, for the first few years. Later, because the armed forces started to lose power and because increased political decentralization reduced the cost of toleration, the new political elites were able to engage more on processes of autonomization, particularly having seen the failure of the securitization process to end separatist conflicts.

Moving on to the traditional nationalist-secular political elites, first of all we have to say that these elites have been very much interrelated with military ones throughout Indonesian history, similarly to Turkey. However, while in Turkey the new AKP regime started to remove from power the old military-Kemalist elites as soon as arrived to the government in 2002, in Indonesia the change happened more gradually, leaving to the Army and the old nationalist-secular elites more power to decide the strategy towards independent movements, at least at the beginning of the transition. These elites in Indonesia, supported by oligarchs and influential families, were guided by Suharto and his family, as in many similar cases of dictatorships around the world. According to some scholars, with the democratic transition elites that had belonged to the new order’s system of patronage received political benefits from the new reforms, while actors marginalized under the new order, such as organized labors, remained excluded. Others, like Slater, confirm that with the transition the “party cartels” formed by new political parties and old military elites cooperated more than competed, sharing power and money in cabinet positions. This confirms that political nationalist-secular elites and militaries elites were not marginalized during the democratic transition and so played an important role in the early repression and securitization of

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minorities. Since 2004, however, Indonesia introduced direct presidential elections, and since 2005 direct elections also for local government executives (after the Law of Regional Governments of 2004) and made all the seats in Parliament directly elected. This process started to reduce the system of corruption and clientelism, and hindered the power of old political and economic elites. We can therefore argue that the political and military old elites were excluded only gradually from the power positions. This gradual process contributed both to the initial securitization and to the later policies of autonomy implemented by Indonesia, in particular with the autonomization of Aceh.

Finally, regarding Islamist elites in Indonesia, we can say that they are composed by two types of elites: the non-state ones, represented by the influential Islamic civil organizations Muhammadiyah and Nahdatul Ulama (NU); and the state ones, represented by small but important Islamist parties. The Islamic civil associations, with dozens of millions of members, have been important in social and educational activities, either as reformist associations (like the NU) or more traditionalist but still progressive and pluralist ones (like Muhammadiyah). They indirectly influenced the politics in Indonesia. NU even tried to create some Islamist parties between 1950s and 1980s, but it did not succeed in achieving a national majority and so decided to go back to religious and social activities. Nevertheless, these elites did not play a big role in the decision making towards ethnic minorities during the democratization phase, also because they represented an inspirational elite that looks for an improvement of the society, more than elites with political or economic power. This is very different from the Turkish case in which an Islamist elite finally attained power with the AKP party starting to govern. Nor have other Islamist party elites been so decisive in the policy making during Indonesia’s democratization process.

Nevertheless, these parties and their elites had an important role in supporting and strengthening the democratization process, as some scholars argue. These parties have existed since Indonesian independence but during the dictatorship Islam was repressed as political ideology, even if a “political

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403 As Jocelyn Cesari argued for the Indonesian case, see: Cesari, 2014, P. 229-233
Islam” was not considered an enemy of the secular elites as occurred in Turkey. With the Reformasi process, several Islamist parties were re-created, some of them won some seats in the Parliament and four Islamic parties (in particular the most influential one, the Partai Keadilan Sejahtera/Prosperous Justice Party, PKS) were even represented in the six-party coalition of the government of President Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono between 2009 and 2014. As Woischnik and Müller say, these parties have been quite influential as “their leading officials and elites occupy important posts in the politics, the cabinet, the administration and the institutions of the Indonesian state.” Nevertheless, this does not mean that they actually played a role specifically in the decision-making regarding the treatment of ethnic minorities in the country, as their power is still small with respect to other elites and big parties. The PKS, for example, which is the strongest party representing these elites, reached only about 8 percent of the popular vote in the 2009 elections, when it entered the Government, and less than 7 percent in 2014 (and today stands in opposition rather than in the government). Therefore, we can conclude that these non-state and state Islamist elites did not play a decisive role in deciding the policy-making towards minorities, and specifically toward the Acehnese case in Indonesia.

Conclusions

From this analysis of elites’ interest, one can identify two similarities and two differences between Turkey and Indonesia. Regarding the similarities, we see that in both cases the armed forces lost authority, even if the Turkish military lost it quicker than the Indonesian one, and in both cases the reduction in military power seems the decisive element for policy shifts. But to explain the different outcomes (the initial autonomization and the later re-securitization in Turkey, and the intensified securitization and the later autonomization in Indonesia) there are at least two main differences that seem to have affected elites’ decision on the treatment of ethnic minorities.

First, the old elites that dealt with the transition in Indonesia, for reasons unrelated with Aceh, pursued a policy of decentralization. By contrast Turkey, even with new Islamist elites in power, 

405 Ibid., p. 61.
remained a centralized state. Administrative devolution in Indonesia contributed to change the background (unlike in the Turkish case). This made the costs of repression higher and the costs of toleration lower for elites who decided to engage in autonomization after the failure of securitization.

Second, the fact that old Indonesian secular elites had no need for Acehnese support for their political power made those elites uninterested in accommodation with the minority at the beginning. This was different from the Turkish case, in which new Islamist elites in the AKP needed minority support, first of all to reach the goal of power to transform Turkish society, and secondly because for the first time the politics towards Kurds were dealt on a religious-integrative basis, more than an ethnic-differentialist one. In Turkey, the search for accommodation was also a way to find a common ground at the religious level, based on the final inclusion of Islamist reality, both majoritarian and in the minority, in an imposed secular state.

All of this demonstrates that changes in elites’ interests affected the different treatment of minorities in the two countries. Because of the need of Kurdish support, new Turkish Islamist elites started with autonomization, but when they saw that the strategy failed to get the benefits they desired, they changed policies. Still having a very centralized state, the costs of repression in Turkey were lower than the costs of toleration. Differently, in the absence of a need for Acehnese support, the Indonesian old secular elites started at the beginning to increase securitization of this minority, hoping to solve the issue with military means. However, Indonesian elites then accepted autonomization thanks also to decentralization policies that made the costs of repression higher and costs of toleration lower.

Nonetheless, other factors affected the solution of these ethnic conflict and the consequent different outcomes in the treatment of minorities in these two case studies. The next chapter will assess whether and how international factors shaped the autonomization and securitization policies of Indonesia and Turkey.
CHAPTER 6

INTERNATIONAL FACTORS, SECURITIZATION AND AUTONOMIZATION

Introduction

The second set of variables that this study analyzes to explain the outcomes of autonomization versus securitization are international factors. This chapter first of all will introduce the theoretical background to these variables, applying them to the two case studies and arguing that international factors are important for domestic policies. This will be done by developing three sub-hypotheses: one related to geopolitical issues, one concerned with the impact of the international community (intended as governmental or non-governmental actors); and one with the impact of the minority diaspora. After that, the chapter will analyze the case studies in detail, in order to assess whether there is the evidence supporting the international hypotheses.

Briefly we can say that regarding the geopolitical issues in the Turkish case, it seems that the Syrian-Iraqi crisis, with the Kurdish kinship and Kurdish regional autonomy in both countries, played an important role in the shifting strategy from autonomization to securitization of Turkey’s Kurdish minority. For the Indonesian case, it seems that the lack of regional spillover (Aceh being a tip of Sumatra Island and surrounded by the Indian Ocean); the case of East Timor with repression ended in independence; and finally the 2004 tsunami disaster, with the need of international support, pushed for an end to the separatist conflict and so to policies of autonomy by the Indonesian state. Actually, the Syrian-Iraqi chaos and the Tsunami disaster both can be considered as “Black Swan” events (a definition coined by Nicholas Taleb) that is, highly improbable events that have massive consequences. But while the tsunami, even if indirectly, accelerated the solution of the Acehnese conflict, the Syrian-Iraqi crisis increased the exacerbation of Kurdish conflict. The puzzle is to explain the different outcomes with these similar Black Swan events.

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Regarding the importance of the international community, we can say that in both cases these actors played an important role. In the Indonesian case, some international organizations were decisive for the autonomization of Aceh. By contrast, in the Turkish case the only really important international player—the EU—had some influence at the beginning of Turkish democratization in the relationship with Kurds. However, the lack of progress in the EU membership, in particular because of Cyprus veto, and the Syrian refugee crisis in Western Europe, gradually eroded the EU’s influence on Turkey. While we would expect that a strong actor like the EU would have played an important role in the solution of the Kurdish conflict, and that a weak actor like the international civil society would have not impact much the Acehnese conflict, the results were the opposite. This shows, first of all, that the “persuasive” power of the international NGOs has been stronger or more efficient than both the “hard and soft” powers of the EU. It also illustrates that a smaller involvement of “great powers” in a strategically less important area like Sumatra Island has been more conducive to the solution of the conflict. Furthermore, the case studies show that the ontological security of a country (as analyzed in chapter eight), in the sense also of its acceptance of external interventions without fear of invasion, played a role too. Finally, the consensus decision-making in the EU weakened the ability of the EU itself to demand a solution to the Kurdish issue because of different priorities—first the Cyprus issue and then the refugee issue.

Regarding the diaspora, the evidence shows that while the Turkish diaspora has not been decisive in the shift between policies of securitization and autonomization and for the final solution of the conflict, the Acehnese civil society through international networks and diaspora has actively participated in lobbying for the negotiations and so contributed considerably to the final autonomization of the minority.

**Theoretical Background Applied to Case Studies**

Regional geopolitical issues may play a fundamental role in the decision-making of domestic actors who deal with the treatment of ethnic minorities. The hypothesis is that when the regional geopolitical situation is unstable and with risk of spillover (because of minority kinship, diaspora or migration in transborder regions) the domestic outcome for ethnic minorities will go more towards
securitization. By contrast, in cases where regional geopolitics are more stable and/or have best practices and examples of solution to minority conflicts, the treatment of minorities will go more towards policies of autonomy.

There are scholars that studied similar arguments for the Turkish case. Bozarslan for example argues that the regional dimension of the Kurdish issue played an important role in the foreign policies of Turkey, Iran, Iraq and Syria, which always treated the Kurdish demands of autonomy as a potential threat to their national security and territorial integrity, therefore implementing policies of regional security against Kurdish separatism.\(^\text{407}\) Comparing cases of transition to democracy in Europe, Middle East and Asia, Haklai shows that in the transition to democracy the presence of trans-border ethnic groups (like Kurds in Turkey, Albanians in Macedonia or Russians in Latvia and Estonia) make the tensions bigger and the conflict worst.\(^\text{408}\) These arguments are important background for our hypothesis as they illustrate that the regional geopolitical situation may be important to the domestic treatment of ethnic minorities in the Turkish case. Regarding Indonesia, there is no much study of Aceh, in part because ethnic minorities in Indonesia live in islands separated from each other, not in region with borders that have been drawn dividing ethnic or religious communities like in the Middle East. Hence Indonesia and its neighbors do not worry about trans-border spill-over of ethnic conflicts.

The second theoretical background relates to the role of international community, in particular the EU for Turkey and some INGOs, but also the US and European governments, for Indonesia. The hypothesis here is that when the international community (being it represented by IGOs, INGOs, individual governments or media) has a strong interest and an effective ability to influence the actions of a state, the treatment of ethnic minorities will be more toward accommodation and autonomization. By contrast, where the international community is not interested or decisive in impacting the state policies, the state is more likely to emphasize securitization.


\(^{408}\) Oded Haklai, “Regime transition and the emergence of ethnic democracies”, Ch. 2 in Jacques Bertrand and Oded Haklai (eds.) Democratization and Ethnic Minorities: Conflict or Compromise? (Abingdon: Routledge, 2014).
Some scholars argue that the EU had an impact on the communal rights in the post-communist countries while others says that local variables have been more important. For example, Kelley shows how European organizations helped to solve ethnic tensions, related with language, education and citizenship issues, in Latvia, Estonia, Slovakia, and Romania, in the 1990s.\textsuperscript{409} Csergo on the other side, studying similar countries, Romania, Hungary, and Slovakia, argues that the improvement in the treatment of minorities was not based on simple compliance with the international requests of the EU but instead on the role of the domestic political actors who guided the democratization process.\textsuperscript{410} These arguments are important because they show that the EU had some role even if at the end of the day domestic institutions of the candidate states, or the new member states, are the final maker of their domestic policies, including the treatment of minorities. The same discourse would be valid for the international community in general, as the Indonesian case was impacted positively by the pressure of the international community (not so much governmental but more from international NGOs).

Finally, the third theoretical background is related to the minority abroad, the diaspora composed of immigrants and refugees. The hypothesis is that when the diaspora has an organized voice to support its cause, to advocate for its kinship inside the country, and to lobby the international community to intervene, the state is pushed to start a trend towards accommodation that may end in a process of autonomization of the minority.

There are scholars who examined similar hypotheses to those of our case studies. Regarding Turkey, Grojean argues, for example, that thanks to the work of the Kurdish activists in Europe, with their transnationalization and skills at organization, identity production and political engagement, the Kurdish questions has been kept constantly in the agenda of the EU membership for Turkey.\textsuperscript{411} Regarding Indonesia, the Acehnese diaspora has been important too. Misbach, for example, argues that the Acehnese

immigrants in Scandinavia, the US, Malaysia and Australia played an important role in the resolution of
the Aceh conflict, with exchange of people, financial resources and ideas.\textsuperscript{412} The importance of the
minority diaspora allows us to understand that the international community is complex and not only based
on nation-states but also on actors coming from civil society.

We now turn to the evidence with which to test these two main hypothesis regarding the
international actors influence in the treatment of ethnic minorities.

**International Factors for Turkey**

*Geopolitical and security issues*

For the Turkish case, one cannot understand the contemporary Kurdish problem without first
understanding the three regional security challenges related to the Syrian and Iraqi civil wars. First of all
is the Kurdish autonomy in both Syria and Iraq. Second is the terrorist group of ISIS, with its attacks and
infiltration in Turkey. Third is the issue related to the refugees coming from the wars in these countries.
These three phenomena contributed to create a police state in Turkey, a permanent state of emergency
that, as explained in chapter 4, can be defined also a “state of exception”, to the detriment of the
democracy and the treatment of minorities, particularly Kurds. Regarding the importance of geopolitical
situation, Turkey therefore looks at its domestic issues very much in the context of regional issues. Let us
review these three security challenges.

First, the recent territorial and political gains in the Kurdish areas of Syria by the PYD (*Partiya
Yekitiya Demokrat*, or the Democratic Union Party movement), in some way an offshoot of the PKK,
made Turkey fear a similar situation in its country. The Kurdish population of Syria has created three
autonomous cantons since 2013 in Jazira, Kobane and Afrin (called together as *Rojava*, or Western
Kurdistan), which Turkey fears might be a step toward full statehood for the Kurdish people.\textsuperscript{413} This

\textsuperscript{412} Antje Missbach, *Separatist Conflict in Indonesia: The Long Distance Politics of the Acehnese in Diaspora* (New

\textsuperscript{413} Tol Gönül, “Syria’s Kurdish Challenge to Turkey”. *Middle East Institute*, August 29, 2012, accessed May 18,
2016, [http://www.mei.edu/content/syrias-kurdish-challenge-turkey](http://www.mei.edu/content/syrias-kurdish-challenge-turkey)
Syrian reality, together with the Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) that exist in the Kurdistan Autonomous Region of Iraq since 2005, made Turkey fear it may be encircled in the future by a Kurdish supra-state entity. For these reasons, regional events have had a significant influence on the changing attitude of Turkey’s relations with its Kurdish population, starting in 2013 and more so since 2015. This has pushed Turkey towards a re-securitization of the Kurdish minority in the eastern Turkish region. Also, the successful fight of the YPG (Yekîneyên Parastina Gel, or People’s Protection Forces, the military wing of the PYD) against ISIS has worried Turkey of a similar strong military force in the PKK. Turkey even prevented, with tanks and soldiers, Turkish Kurdish volunteers from crossing into Syria to support their ethnic kin during the Kobane siege in September 2014, even if after a while, under international pressure in particular from the US, Turkey accepted the arrival of some supporters from the KRG.

The evidence shows that Turkey cannot accept the presence of a Kurdish autonomous region on its borders with Syria. This is why it does not accept the PYD at the negotiating table for Syria and will never accept a role for the PYD in the post-Assad Syria. This situation influenced the re-securitization of the Kurdish issue in Turkey, going back to the old Kemalist and military philosophy of viewing domestic minority groups through the lens of regional security issues. The Turkish government, but moreover Erdogan, again became suspicious that the demands for decentralization and legal reforms for cultural rights represented a thinly veiled separatist agenda. Actually, we can see that Erdogan made a strong shift in the narrative since the facts of Kobane, starting with equating the PKK with ISIS even as Turkey was still negotiating with the PKK until 2015. Erdogan also insisted on unconditional PKK disarmament, without offering any concession such as allowing Kurds who were displaced in Turkish military

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operations to return to their native villages. The attitude of the Turkish president became even more authoritarian after the YPG fighters captured from ISIS the northern Syrian border town of Tal Abyad in June 2015. The conquest of this town increased the Sèvres syndrome of Turkey, the fear of future invasions and dismemberments, first of all because it connected the two cantons of Kobane and Jazira making a mini-state in Northern Syria; second there were accusation of ethnic cleansing of Arabs and Turkmen; and finally, the US air support to the YPG exacerbated Turkey’s concerns about future risks of dismemberment. This, in the minds of Turkey and foremost Erdogan, showed that the US was supporting the PYD’s territorial needs and that the Kurds of Syria were not interested in a coexistence with the Turks. As some scholars like Yavuz and Ozcan state, this created “the realization that the Kurdish issue cannot be resolved within the borders of Turkey alone; it has become part of a larger regional problem.”

After the facts of Tal Abyad, together with the June 2015 elections when the pro-Kurdish People’s Democratic Party (HDP) reached an amazing result of 13%, the securitization of the Kurdish issue restarted. With the ISIS attacks in Suruc in July, the breakdown between the Turkish government and the PKK accelerated the securitization of the Kurdish issue. The elections were very important for pluralism because they created one of the most representative parliaments in Turkish history, as beside the pro-Kurdish party many Alevi were elected in the Republican People’s Party (CHP) and the HDP, and representatives of religious minorities—Armenians, Assyrians and Yazidis—were also elected. However, Erdogan had lost the elections and with it his desire to reach an absolute majority to transform

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421 Yavuz and Özcan, *Turkish Democracy and the Kurdish Question*, p. 80.

422 Ibid., p. 73.
Turkey in a Presidential system. This, as said in the precedent chapter, also contributed to his strategic shift, accompanied by a regional shift in the Syrian situation with the YPG empowerment concerning the Turkish government and president.

Regarding the impact of ISIS attacks on the worsening of the relationship between Turkey and the Kurds, one must say that ISIS attacks in Turkey concentrated mostly on tourists and on left-wing Kurdish groups. Since mid-2015, ISIS started to claims attacks made to the HDP party, before to its Adana and Mersin offices, in June to its Diyarbakır rally, and finally in July the infamous Suruç bombing at a youth-socialist gathering, killing 34 people. These attacks exacerbated the conflict between the Turkish government and Kurdish rebellion, and contributed to the re-securitization of Kurdish issue as Turkey accused also the PKK to be behind the attacks. Out of the 1,300 people arrested by Turkey after the bombs, 847 were accused of being related to PKK and only 137 to ISIS. Many Kurds in Turkey started to suspect that the Turkish discourse of fighting ISIS in reality was hiding a fight against the Kurdish nationalist movement. The Turkish government and president increasingly blurred the distinction between ISIS and PKK, as well as conflating peaceful and violent elements of Kurdish activism. These are important indicators of re-securitization. Securitization requires in fact to treat an issue only as a security issue, without any possibility of political engagement using a narrative to do it defined as a “speech act” by the securitization theory (see chapter 4 on this). But as Unver remembers, this approach wasn’t and isn’t bearing any fruit, neither for international support nor for internal social peace. This because “the Kurdish conflict is sapping immense security resources and making it very difficult for Turkey to get the international community on its side. (…) The open-ended nature of security operations also serves to significantly alienate Kurdish public opinion within Turkey, creating another long-term radicalization problem.”

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Finally, regarding refugees Turkey is by far the country with the most Syrian refugees, with almost 3 million refugees registered in 2016 (out of a total of 5 million).\textsuperscript{425} The presence of Syrian refugees obviously raises the possibility of many Syrian Kurdish and ISIS-affiliated people in Turkey, with a sure increase in security issues for Turkey. The EU actually was obliged to make an agreement with Turkey, signed in March 2016, to block illegal immigration from Turkey to Europe, specifically agreeing that “all new irregular migrants crossing from Turkey to the Greek islands as of 20 March 2016 will be returned to Turkey” in exchange of €3 billion (and an additional €3 billion at the end of 2018) and the lifting of the visa requirements for Turkish citizens by June 2016.\textsuperscript{426} This also impacted the Kurdish issue, as this chapter will explain it later in the section regarding the EU impact on Turkish domestic politics.

For these reasons, all three regional security challenges related with the Syrian and Iraqi civil war represented a big challenge for the Kurdish question in Turkey; contributed to the end of the peace process and the re-securitization of the Kurdish issue; and in the future will make the treatment of the Kurdish minority in Turkey even more difficult and complex. Furthermore, this geopolitical chaos contributed to the current reversal of democracy in Turkey, in a process of centralization of powers with the strengthening of the executive power moving toward a presidential system; a weaker Parliament because of the prosecution of opposition legislators; no independent judicial power; and no free press. In other words, it seems that Turkish political elites are using these legitimate security challenges also to affect domestic politics in its totality, not only to restart the securitization of Kurds but to create a state of emergency, re-structure the country from a parliamentary system to a more centralized presidential system and actually eroding completely the democratic institutions returning to authoritarianism.

Although this process falls outside from the scope of this study, it is important to mention it here as the situation is very much in progress. When this study will be ended there may well be a new political

\textsuperscript{425} “UNHCR Syria Regional Refugee Response – Turkey”, Data from UNHCR, accessed May 25, 2016, \url{http://data.unhcr.org/syrianrefugees/country.php?id=224}

system in Turkey (especially after the referendum in April 2017 on the Presidential system) that will have to be analyzed in light of all these events.

*The International Community-European Union*

If we cannot understand the contemporary Kurdish issue without taking into account regional security challenges for Turkey, neither can we understand it without considering the role played by the international community. Specifically, the EU for long has been the international-supranational organization to which Turkey would like to belong. Since the Copenhagen meeting in 1993, the EU started to commit itself to ensuring the protection of minorities in its candidate states. Did this commitment have a fundamental impact in the domestic politics of Turkey, or was it just a carrot without a stick? And from the Turkish perspective, has the respect for the Copenhagen criteria been a real engagement for the future of its Republic, or just another bus to ride until destination and then step off, as Erdogan said about democracy according to Jordan’s King Abdullah?\(^{427}\) It seems that up until recently the EU played an important role in helping Turkey on its path to democratization and that Turkey was interested in taking that path. This may no longer be so. After twenty years of unfruitful negotiations, after the democratic reversal of Turkey in the last few years, and after the chaos of Syrian civil war, with its security consequences for both Turkey and the EU itself, the two actors seem no longer able to impact each other, or even interested in helping each other along a democratic and pluralist path. A brief review of the timeline of the Turkish EU membership process illustrates how the prospect for membership historically impacted Turkish domestic politics toward the Kurdish issue.

Turkey first applied for associate membership in the European Economic Community (EEC) in 1959, and in 1963 signed the Ankara agreement for a customs union with the EEC but also acknowledging the idea of future membership. When the EEC became the EU, Turkey considered the moment right for applying again and so in 1995 it signed another customs union agreement with the EU.

It was officially recognised as a candidate for EU membership in 1999. Since then, the negotiations have been blocked many times, for political and economic problems, both domestic and external, in particular because of the Cyprus issue.

The slow pace of the Turkish membership process became a hot discussed debate among European and Turkish politicians and people. On one side, historical supporters of Turkish admission have been few, mostly Poland, the UK and, outside the EU, the US, while the opponents—preferring instead a “privileged partnership” that recognizes economic, political, cultural and geographical differences—traditionally have been the majority of EU members, guide by France, Austria, Germany and the European Commission. Nevertheless, in order to fulfill the Copenhagen criteria rules that since 1993 have defined whether a country is eligible to join the EU, Turkey tried to improve its treatment of the Kurdish minority after being recognized as official candidate in 1999. First of all, the Turkish parliament started to make some constitutional amendments in October 2001, August 2002 and June 2003, and new legislation allowed broadcasting and publishing in Kurdish, Arabic, Zaza and other minority languages. In October 2002, in order to align with the Copenhagen criteria, the Parliament even abolished the capital punishment, transforming for example Ocalan’s death sentence to life imprisonment. With the AKP regime, in power since 2002, things for Kurdish minority improved even more. In December 2002, one month after the AKP won its first elections and started its first government in Turkey, the Copenhagen European Council decided that the EU would open negotiations with Turkey if the European Council of December 2004 would have decided that Turkey was trying to fulfil the Copenhagen criteria. This was an important moment for the AKP because it showed that the new regime could do what Turkish governments for decades could not do: to start finally the negotiations with the EU. At the same time, this process also was important for the Kurdish minority, who benefited from these negotiations as the AKP changed norms first of all for the Kurdish language. Erdogan himself pushed

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429 Kiriçi, p. 279.
some EU harmonization packages in the Parliament between 2003 and 2004, including the elimination of
torture; expansion of the freedom of association; restoration of Kurdish names to Kurdish villages; and
broadcasting in the Kurdish language. The Parliament also approved a partial amnesty law for PKK
militants and a program for the repatriation of internally displaced Kurds to return to southeast region.430
As reported by BBC, the Interior Minister of then, Abdulkadir Aksu, “thanked the deputies for choosing
the path to peace and reconciliation (…) he said, Turkey had to learn the lessons of the past and it has to
embrace all of its people, including some of its terrorists.”431 Quite a different approach from today’s
Turkish policies towards PKK.

This was also because, according to some scholars like Romano, the EU membership
requirements on human rights and respect of minorities pushed the AKP government to ally with some
part of Kurdish population, both to get the political benefits and to marginalize the armed insurgency.432
Furthermore Turkey, again to follow the Copenhagen criteria, had to undertake important reforms such as
the one in 2004 “which gives precedence to international human rights law over Turkish law when the
two conflict. This has allowed individuals in Turkey to bring for arbitration in European courts human
rights cases against Ankara.”433

Official negotiations with the EU started finally in October 2005, and again both the AKP and the
Kurdish minority believed that they could benefit from it. Nevertheless, because of the issue of Cyprus,
things started to get worst and the negotiations came to a halt in December 2006, with the EU freezing
talks in eight of the 35 key areas, over Turkey's rejection to open its ports and airports to traffic from
Cyprus. This did not discourage Turkey, as the country believed that EU accession would happen sooner
or later. According again to Romano, playing the card of EU accession, the AKP actually could gain even

430 Özlem Pusane, “Turkey’s Kurdish Opening: Long Awaited Achievements and Failed Expectations”, Turkish
431 BBC, “Turkey approves amnesty for Kurds”, July 29 2003, accessed October 1, 2016,
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/3108539.stm
432 David Romano, “The long road toward Kurdish accommodation in Turkey: the role of elections and international
pressures”, Ch. 9 in Jacques Bertrand and Oded Haklai (eds.) Democratization and Ethnic Minorities: Conflict or
433 Ibid., citing Hochleitner, p. 175. Erich Hochleitner, “The Political Criteria of Copenhagen and their application to
Turkey”, Working Paper, Austrian Institute for European Security Policy, August 2005
protection from the Kemalists and military elites who tried to blame the AKP for the attempted “e-coup” in 2007 and a judicial accusation in 2008, for violating the Constitutional prohibition of “religious politics.” Consequently, for the AKP the European card was an important one also for internal politics.

Therefore in 2009, with the “Democratic initiative process”, Turkey resumed democratic progress, in particular towards the Kurdish minority, in order to show the respect of Copenhagen criteria. However, the steps were unclear. The country gave a license to a public satellite television channel offering exclusive programming in Kurdish, for example, and reduced restrictions on the use of Kurdish in election campaigns, prisons and universities. Nevertheless, the language was still not allowed in public primary or secondary education or in official public services, even in cities where a majority of population speaks Kurdish. Neither was the constitution changed to recognize the status of Kurdish to a second national official language. Regarding the solution of the conflict, the AKP tried to show good intentions. First, it prepared a partial amnesty law aimed at PKK militants and then introduced the “Return to Village and Rehabilitation Project” for the repatriation of internally displaced Kurds. At the same time, however, since 2009 thousands of Kurdish activists started to be arrested on terrorism charges. Therefore both these actions of cultural rights and peaceful solution of conflict, which seemed to go towards the respect of Copenhagen criteria, in reality were neither answering basic Kurdish demands nor creating a peaceful environment in the Kurdish region. Actually, in its annual reports on Turkey the EU kept saying for all these years since the start of negotiations, that the Kurdish issue saw some improvement, but still fell short of the complete inclusion of the minority and resolution of the conflict.

Besides this problem, the Cyprus one was still present. In December 2009, Cyprus blocked six out of thirty five EU negotiation chapters arguing that Turkey needed first to normalise relations with Cyprus itself. Since then, the negotiations have stalled. Again, the Cyprus-Turkey conflict proved to be

434 Ibid., p. 176-177.
one of main issues in the Turkish accession and since 2009 the Kurdish conflict has gradually progressed toward more securitization by the Turkish side. At this point, one could argue that the Cyprus accession to the EU could have represented even a limit to the solution of the Kurdish issue in Turkey. A brief excursus of Cyprus membership in the EU illustrates this possibility. Cyprus applied for membership in 1990 and the EU accession started to be seen on one side, by the Greek-Cypriots, as a protection against Turkish possible aggression, and on the other side, by the EU, as possible motivation for a future resolution of the Turkish-Cypriot conflict given also the interest of Turkey to enter the EU. Unfortunately, 14 years later, when Cyprus became a member of the EU in May 2004, it became member not as a single “United Republic of Cyprus”, as the Annan Plan for Cyprus had hoped, but as Republic of Cyprus (with a part of the island that the Greek Cypriot Government cannot control) because the Greek Cypriots rejected the plan in a referendum one week before. So the separate Turkish Cypriot state, the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus—recognized only by Turkey and established in 1983 almost ten years after the Turkish invasion of 1974 (after the Cypriot military coup ordered by the military Junta in Greece)—is still considered by the EU as an illegal occupation of European territory (actually the European Court of Human Rights has asked Turkey to pay damages for the invasion).

As discussed, Cyprus has blocked the entrance of Turkey in the EU since 2009 until the issue of its country would be solved. Actually Cyprus, among others, has been one of the major advocates for not accelerating Turkish negotiations even regarding the recent Syrian migrant deal, threatening to use its

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438 The Annan Plan for Cyprus was a UN proposal to resolve the Cyprus issue with a federation of two states.
439 Actually the EU safeguarded accession was one of the reason for Greek-Cypriots to reject the UN Plan. So the earlier good intention of the EU became an opposite effect. See again Kyris, “The European Union and Cyprus: The Awkward Partnership”.
veto to block it if Turkey did not recognise the Greek Cypriot government.\footnote{Barbara Tasch, “One of the smallest countries in Europe is standing in the way of a massive migrant deal between the EU and Turkey — here's why”, Mar. 17, 2016, accessed June, 1, 2016, \url{http://www.businessinsider.com/eu-turkey-deal-could-fail-because-of-cyprus-2016-3?r=UK&IR=T}} This evidence indicates that because of the accession process to the EU, as well as external agreements, are consensual and unanimous, Cyprus has used its veto to block Turkish accession. One could say that the Greek population in Cyprus has asserted its rights in a strong way towards the Turkish membership, while the Kurds have not had the same power of advocacy, as they cannot have a voice in the process of accession. This shows first of all the power of even small states in a consensus-based decision-making process, that has always been a concern for the EU. It is also an evidence that the Cyprus issue may even have reduced the power of the EU towards the Kurdish issue. The Cyprus problem had to take priority for the EU, because of the presence of Greece as member of the EU, and that meant that as important as the Kurdish concern was, it was a secondary element in the negotiations with Turkey. To put it succinctly, the EU could not credibly offer membership to Turkey as long as Cyprus demonstrated its willingness to veto agreements. This may have given to Turkey some margin and flexibility in its respect of other Copenhagen criteria, and consequently some discretion on how to deal with Kurds.

Turkey, to give a new boost to the process of EU admission, in June 2011 even created the Ministry of EU Affairs, in order to reinforce the role of the Chief Negotiator for Turkish Accession to the EU (a position that has existed since January 2005) who since then is appointed concurrently to serve also as Minister of EU Affairs. These formal changes were not accompanied, however, by substantial democratic improvements. Besides, there was another wrong step toward Cyprus, when in the second semester of 2012 Turkey froze relations with the EU because of Cyprus’ rotating presidency. Therefore, as we can see, geopolitical issues related with the past of Turkey, administrative issues related with the consensual process to enter the EU, and also the relationship of the EU itself with its minorities, like the Turkish minority in Cyprus (for which also Turkey often speak about double standards in the EU) have represented some of the major causes of the blocking of the Turkish admission in the EU, besides the slow pace caused by democratic and economic standards of Turkey.
Today only fifteen out of 33 chapters are open for negotiation, 17 are frozen and only one provisionally closed (the one on science and research). A positive conclusion of the Turkish membership in the EU seems unlikely. Actually, in 2015 things got even worse due to two specific circumstances, one domestic and one international: the HDP was the first pro-Kurdish party to enter in the parliament causing great fear and a consequent strategic shift for the AKP to re-securitize the Kurds; and the Syrian refugee crisis, connected also with the terrorist threat, made the EU reduce its international pressure because of more urgent needs. with the refugee crisis Turkey increased its leverage and the EU was obliged to conclude an agreement in March 2016, accepting that in exchange for blocking the flow of refugees the EU will give, besides 3 billion Euros, tourist visas free to Turkish citizens, allowing an increase in the size of the Turkish population in the Europe Union (already with a strong presence, between five and ten million people). In reality, however, if the process of membership has to be pushed under pressure, and with the blackmailing attitude of the Turkish state, this will not be conducive to a better relationship between the EU and Turkey. On the contrary, it could worsen in the near future the already weak ties that connect these two actors.

In conclusion, the evidence suggests first of all that the presence of Cyprus in the EU has been important in reducing EU pressure on the Kurdish issue because of the Cyprus issue being a priority versus the Kurdish one (in particular since 2009 when Cyprus frozen the chapters on Turkish admission). Second, the reduced pressure, but also openness, of the EU towards Turkey’s membership—in the sense of the diminished use of the “stick” of the Copenhagen criteria because of more urgent priorities, and the diminished use of the “carrot” of membership openness because of Turkish democratic regression—contributed to the re-securitization of Kurdish minority that happened in particular since 2015. From the Turkish perspective, to see that the EU membership has been so difficult has also played a role in the bold attitude of Turkey towards the EU, reducing its cooperative attitude toward the fulfilment of the Copenhagen criteria, also because of the more urgent issues of Syria’s civil war.

The Diaspora

Finally regarding the diaspora, the last of the international factors analysed in this chapter, we have to say that the Kurdish diaspora didn’t have any impact in shaping Turkish domestic policies. Kurds from Turkey represent the 85 percent of the Kurdish in Europe. They went in particular to Germany and France during the 1960s and 1970s as immigrant workers and as political refugees since the 1980s, mostly to Northern Europe (fewer Kurds from Turkey went to the US as refugees). Some authors argue that the diaspora played an important role in the EU’s support of the Kurdish cause, while others claim that the “Europeanization” of Kurdish minority in Europe, with the growing importance of European institutions, represent both a good and bad thing for the lobbying of the transnational diaspora.

Obviously the Kurdish diaspora cannot be ignored today because the Kurds in Europe have economic and political associations, newspapers, television stations, are elected in the European Parliament and are capable of bringing tens of thousands of people into the streets for demonstrations against Turkey. But as Kurt says “the diaspora is not only radical, but also has no confidence in Ankara.”

Therefore, the effectiveness of this diaspora is different from the one of other ethnic minorities, first of all Acehnese. The fact is that the Kurdish diaspora, connected with its Kurdish civil society in Turkey, even if strong and organized, has been not able until now, as much as its Acehnese counterpart did, to make powerful actors such as governments, IGOs like the UN, or INGOs take the lead in the negotiations, or at least to convene international conferences in which the two parts could meet to discuss possible negotiations (as Acehnese international civilian organizations were able to do). The conferences organized on the Kurdish issue actually usually are quite confrontational with the Turkish government and so cannot open space for peaceful solution of conflict. This does not mean that the diaspora failed to

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444 Grojean, Bringing the Organization back in: Pro-Kurdish Protest in Europe, 2011.
447 Ibid.
play a role in lobbying the EU or raise consciousness in the international community. Such efforts were not enough, however, or it was not the correct approach, to have a decisive impact in the resolution of the conflict.

The conclusion for Turkey is that besides regional geopolitical factors, and in relation to them, the international actors—in particular the EU—had an important impact on both the early autonomization and the late re-securitization of the Kurdish issue during the democratization of Turkey. Today, at the beginning of 2017, the European impact is less important, because of the refugee crisis on one side, and the evident Turkish democratic reversal, including the Kurdish issue, on the other.

**International Factors for Indonesia**

*Geopolitical and Security Issues*

Indonesia geopolitics is very different from those of Turkey. Indonesia is an archipelago of 17,000 islands, with no neighbouring countries apart from Malaysia on Borneo Island and New Guinea on Papua Island. Unlike Kurds, Acehnese are located entirely within the national borders of Indonesia (as Aceh is a tip of Sumatra Island surrounded by the ocean) and do not have a trans-boundary community. The lack of regional spillover therefore played an important role for Indonesia to accept the autonomization of Aceh without risking any regional destabilization, transborder migrations, or expansion with kin in neighboring states.

Regarding security, apart from some sporadic problem of piracy, illegal fishing, arms smuggling or Rohingya refugees from Myanmar, the Malacca Strait and the Indian Ocean surrounding Aceh do not compare with the recent chaos of the Middle East. Some foreign military vessels, especially American, often crisscross the Malacca Strait but Indonesia does not object, protesting only if planes from the US carriers sometimes enter Indonesian air space. There is nothing parallel to the Middle East situation of Turkey, with regional powers mistrusting each other and reacting to even small provocations or mistakes, as we saw in 2016 with Turkey’s shooting down of a Russian plane.
From the independent movement perspective, geographic isolation also play a role in its identity and goals. To be surrounded by water makes a self-determination movement obviously weaker, with less possibility to have close external support, and so more conducive to possible accommodations. To flee the country across the sea for Acehnese belonging to the GAM guerrilla meant living abroad as refugees, not as retreating fighters ready to regroup and return to fight again, as for the PKK forces escaping to Syria or Iraq. Therefore, the first element to analyse in the international arena, the regional geopolitical, security and strategic situation, has always been for Indonesia a quite safe environment that was more conducive to autonomization. Consequently, the first sub-hypothesis is confirmed by the Indonesian case too: when the regional geopolitical situation is stable, the environment is more conducive for autonomization policies.

Nevertheless, like Turkey with the Syrian civil war, Indonesia also experienced an unexpected regional crisis: the Indian Ocean earthquake and tsunami of December 2004 that killed an estimated 170,000 people and left homeless about half a million people (of a population of 4 million people). This recalls the concept of “Black Swan”, improbable events that have massive consequences. Even if not a perfect parallel, there are deep similarities between the two humanitarian crises, notwithstanding the fact that one is a chronic manmade crisis and the other an acute natural disaster. Both required a strong international aid response and forced the international community to make pronouncement on the treatment of the two ethnic minorities. Both seem to have had an impact on the minority conflict, one toward autonomization and one toward re-securitization.

Actually, according to several views from politicians, journalists and activists, the tsunami was one, if not the, crucial cause that ended the conflict and started the process of autonomization for Aceh, mostly because of the need to allow international help to arrive to the region. The International Crisis Group declared, for example, that the tsunami “brought Aceh into the international spotlight, made it politically desirable for both sides to work toward a settlement, offered ways of linking the reconstruction

effort and peace process, and ensured the availability of major donor funding outside the government budget." But in reality, even if this event might have played an important role in facilitating the final solution to the conflict, it cannot be considered the fundamental factor in the solution of this conflict, representing more a contingent fact that just accelerated a process that had already started (like the black swan for the securitization of Kurds in Turkey). As some important scholars argue, comparing the similar cases of ethnic conflict in Aceh and Sri Lanka, the tsunami actually was not a real decisive factor but rather an important event that reinforced pre-existing political trends. According to Stokke, Törnquist and Syndre, for example, the tsunami that hit Sri Lanka as well Aceh was used by elites and different actors for strategic reasons. Consequently it brought autonomization to Aceh on one side and instead restarted the repression in Sri Lanka, after the attempts of a joint efforts between the government and the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam rebels for the post-tsunami reconstruction failed. This is because in Sri Lanka the competition over post-tsunami resources produced a form of ethnic and religious chauvinism that sustained the conflict.

Edward Aspinal also remembers how a few months after the tsunami the progress toward peace in Aceh was still difficult because of oppression, exploitation and violence framed by two rival national identities. Therefore, we can conclude that among the international factors the one related with the reconstruction post-tsunami was probably the less impactful one, even if the Indonesian state used the crisis differently from Turkey and accelerated the autonomization process in Aceh. Instead, the geopolitical regional situation in itself—the fact that Acehnese are an insate community concentrated in a tip of an island while Kurds are a transboundary community in process of creating independent states in two Turkish neighboring failing states—played a crucial role in the different outcomes.

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Regarding geopolitical and regional security factors, there could be another international element, or better yet a domestic element that became international—that is, the East Timor case, which could have play a role in the final solution of conflict with the Indonesian policies of autonomy towards Aceh. In other words, did the experience with East Timor’s independence shape how Indonesia negotiated the end of Aceh conflict? In reality we need to say that the two cases are not exactly the same because East Timor was not, like the rest of Indonesia, part of the Dutch colony that formed Indonesia in 1949. Instead, it was a Portuguese colony, with different language, story and institutions, annexed by Jakarta in 1975 when Portuguese left, and so the situation was different from Aceh. Besides this, after East Timor’s independence in 2002, Aceh’s situation was still in troubling waters, with a strong military offensive of the Indonesian army in 2003-2004 during the Megawati Presidency. Actually, we could argue that East Timor precedent, the fact that there had been already a fragmentation of one of the Indonesian island with the creation of a new state, may have had an opposite effect by blocking the strategy of accommodation and autonomization that was already in process in Aceh. President Megawati, after seeing the East Timor independence in 2002, may have been worried again about the possible centrifugal forces of Indonesian democratization, and so may have thought to better allow another strong offensive of the Indonesian army in Aceh rather than risk another secession. The role of national leadership actually is an important area for future research, and may clarify the relationship between the systemic impact of international factors and the Indonesian domestic agency in the Aceh autonomization, and in general in the treatment of ethnic minorities in democratizing Muslim majority countries.452 Finally, the international intervention in East Timor (the International Force for East Timor, a multinational non-United Nations peacekeeping taskforce) was not well received by Indonesia. As a consequence, the country may have opposed a possible similar international intervention in Aceh.453

452 For the Yudhoyono Presidency for example scholars argue that he was famous for his lack of resolution, even if the Aceh autonomy arrived exactly under his Presidency. See on this: Greg Fealy, “The politics of Yudhoyono, majoritarian democracy, insecurity and vanity”, in The Yudhoyono presidency: Indonesia’s decade of stability and stagnation, ed. Edward Aspinall (Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian studies, 2015), 35-54.
The International Community

With respect to the second hypothesis, the interest and impact of the international actors, again the Indonesian situation is quite different from the Turkish one. The interest and efficiency of the international community (both governmental and non-governmental) during the democratization process, but a smaller involvement of “great powers” in a strategically less important area, had a positive impact and affected the final Indonesia policies of autonomy towards Aceh. Actually, the EU, some of its member states, and European NGOs, contributed in lobbying the Indonesian government and bringing the parties to a negotiating table for the solutions of the separatist conflict. The EU intervention with its soft power of financial, political and moral support (for example for the Aceh Monitoring Mission) helped to assure the success of the Helsinki peace negotiations. But the most important actors that arrived at those negotiations were not governmental actors, in particular the Henri Dunant Center (or Center for Humanitarian Dialogue/HDC), a Swiss based NGO, and later the ex-Finland President Martti Ahtisaari, with his NGO Crisis Management Initiative (CMI).

By contrast, the corresponding regional authority in South East Asia, ASEAN, did not seem to play a crucial role in the peace process and autonomy for Aceh. Some scholars argue that the funding principles of ASEAN, with the guidance for ASEAN countries foreign policy, opened space for the involvement of these countries in domestic issues of others members, such as the Aceh Monitoring Mission (AMM) for the Aceh peace process, established by the EU with the contribution of five ASEAN countries. Still, the AMM was established by the EU rather than ASEAN, and the small contribution of ASEAN was after the peace process, not during it. For this reason, one can reasonably argue that ASEAN offered peripheral support to Aceh but had no effective power in the solution of the Aceh conflict. Let us

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therefore see how other actors of the international community played a stronger role in the autonomization of the Acehnese minority in Indonesia.

Until the end of 20th century, the Acehnese case was quite isolated from international interests. There was practically no international intervention beyond regular reports and protests from human rights NGOs such as Human Rights Watch, Amnesty International, Forum Asia, and others. Since Indonesian democratization, however, this started to change. First, given the importance of a stable and strong Indonesia in the new geo-political reality, in particular after the economic and financial crisis of South East Asia in 1997/1998 (that had also contributed to the end of dictatorship in Indonesia), Western governments realized that the conflict in Aceh was limiting the growth of the Indonesian economy. Added to this, there was a surge of protests and pressure from the civil society, human rights movements and humanitarian organizations in Europe and the US, for their governments to end military support of Indonesia. The free press and free speech coming with democracy allowed open discussions organized by several international human rights organizations in the country. Cultural visas to visit Aceh were granted to some foreign researchers, and well-known journalists were coming to Aceh somewhat illegally (arriving in Jakarta or Medan with tourist visas and continuing to Aceh without obtaining the special permit which was still required). In brief, the isolation of Aceh had started to end, differently from the isolation of Southeastern part of Turkey, perceived as very instable and insecure in particular in last years of terrorist attacks, and so isolated from the rest of the world.

At that point, starting with the mediation of the HDC since 2000, there were several stages of ceasefire and peace talks known as the Geneva Peace Process, culminating in the Cessation of Hostilities Agreement (CoHA) in December 2002. It is also reported that a retired US Marine Corps general, Anthony Zinni, played an important role in the signing of the agreement. In addition to this agreement, Japan, the US, the EU, and the World Bank hosted a “Preparatory Conference on Peace and Reconstruction for Aceh” in December 2002 in Tokyo, Japan, to raise funds for initiatives in the

457 Ibid., p. 148.
province. Nevertheless, in May 2003, after last-minute talks in Tokyo with representatives of the Government of the Republic of Indonesia and GAM collapsed, martial law was declared in Aceh again. Indonesia carried out the largest military operation in the country since 1975, again with many dead and human rights violations.

However, after the tsunami another international actor, former Finnish president Martti Ahtisaari (and future Nobel peace prize recipient in 2008) and the CMI restarted the talks. This time they succeed. The Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) was signed in 2005, and this international mediator had played an essential role in the final agreement. Let us analyzed briefly the reasons of such success. According to several scholars, Ahtisaari’s approach was much better than the former ones, first of all because the proposition included a comprehensive political settlement, allowing for example GAM to become a political party. As Törnquist argues, the assertiveness of Ahtisaari in proposing possible solutions (different from his Norwegian counterpart in Sri Lanka whose passive approach led to failure) was accompanied also by a “constitutionally-democratic approach towards a comprehensive agreement, to which were added the issues of justice and the reintegration of victims and combatants (but unfortunately not the Sharia law and the role of women).” It was therefore the democratic process that accompanied the negotiations, with the transformation of the GAM into a political party since October 2005, that made negotiations successful. In the words of Törnquist: “The Helsinki negotiations and especially the open-ended agreement on democratic governance of Aceh were more inclusive and politically oriented than the elitist and ‘economic carrot driven’ negotiations held in other parts of Indonesia and in Sri Lanka.” Again, Törnquist explains also how GAM received from Ahtisaari the definition of “self-government” that was not used in the final agreement but allowed both GAM and Indonesia to accept something different from “independence” and “special autonomy”. In Törnquist’s words: “the term was never used in the final document but it nevertheless paved the way for the decisive

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discussions and wider consultation on what would characterize a de facto self-governed province. This was the eventual successful path to the autonomization of Aceh. All this should represent important lessons learned also for the Turkish case: negotiations that would include elements of democratization of Turkey, for example transforming the PKK into a political party, or elements of “self-government”, instead of speaking of autonomy, could have a higher probability of success. Therefore, regarding the role of the international community, we can see how in particular third party mediators played an important role in Aceh, very differently from Turkey, where there has not been a respected and trusted third party to negotiate between the government and the PKK.

The Diaspora

Finally, the last international factor to analyse is the Acehnese civil society at international level is its diaspora. The Acehnese diaspora has also been very influential in lobbying the international community in order to defend human rights and help in the solution of the conflict. One of most important Acehnese international NGOs for this has been the International Forum for Aceh (IFA), established in 1998 in New York to build networks with Amnesty International and Human Rights Watch, and to start lobbying American government. In July 1999, they organized a conference in Bangkok, in which the Support Committee for Human Rights in Aceh (SCHRA) was created and the first meeting ever happened between an Indonesian government official delegation and leadership of GAM, starting to “agree to disagree” in a very friendly atmosphere. Two years later, in September 2001, the IFA held another conference in Bangkok, the “Aceh Brotherly Dialogue”, where the Acehnese Civil Society Task Force was formed, starting to work together with the SCHRA to increase lobbying in the United States against the Indonesian military’s and police’s violations of human rights in Aceh. At this point, Megawati

463 This also because the Turkish government doesn’t accept generally any external intervention in its domestic affairs, as we can see with the recent declarations of Erdogan towards the EU and other international actors comments on the democratic regression in Turkey. National leadership and the role of agency therefore should be analyzed too, in future researches, to understand the systemic impact of international factors.
Sukarnoputri was the new President of Indonesia (since July) and had already signed special autonomy legislation for Aceh (see Chapter 4). The December 2002 Cessation of Hostilities Agreement (CoHA) suggests the international awareness fostered by IFA also contributed to the path to this agreement. Then, with the Helsinki agreement, the Acehnese civil society, both in diaspora and locally, played an important role. Because the agreements were based on a “democratic roadmap”, old Acehnese CSOs and political associations became important for the processes of peace-building and democratization.\(^{465}\)

As we can see, the civil society activity and the social capital of a minority, in particular with its international diaspora, played an important role in pushing the state towards accommodation with the Acehnese minority and finally negotiations for its autonomization. This could be another future area of research: the study of the role of the civil society of the ethnic minority, with a more cultural and civic approach to explain the different outcomes.

To conclude for the Indonesian case, all the three international factors analyzed—the geopolitical situation, the international community and diaspora roles—seem to have impacted the final outcome of the process of autonomization, with the most important factors being the international actors that took the lead in the negotiations, above all ex-Finnish President Ahtisaari and its NGO.

**Conclusions**

To conclude, we can say that for Indonesia the non-governmental international community was the external factor that had the greatest impact on the state’s decisions to go from securitization to autonomization. By contrast, both geopolitical factors and the international community of governments were important for Turkey. The catastrophes that happened for both countries, the tsunami for Indonesia and the Syrian war for Turkey, led to opposite outcomes because the two states already had different trends.

For Turkey, the geopolitical situation based on Kurdish transborder kinship, the Kurdish autonomous region born in Syria since 2014, and the relationship between PKK and YPG, have increased

security concerns for the country, with a threat to national security, borders and national sovereignty. This contributed strongly to the re-securitization of the Kurdish minority. For Indonesia, the geopolitical situation was never as unstable because the country is an archipelago (even if the risk for sovereignty could come from far islands, but the military has always been organized territorially in order to avoid this risk) with no transborder kinship for the Acehnese and no eventual autonomous regions in border states. But this can be said also of other independence movements in Indonesia, like in Papua, that had not the same results. The sudden event of the tsunami of 2004 only accelerated a trend of decentralization already in place and so enhanced the processes of conflict resolution and autonomization.

Regarding the international community, while for Turkey the most important international actor has been a governmental one, the EU, for Indonesia it has been a non-governmental one, the ex-Finnish president’s association CMI. Therefore, the second track diplomacy, based on INGOs efforts, had more power than the supranational diplomacy of the EU, to help the state solve the ethnic conflict and start policies of autonomy instead of securitization. Because of limits of the power of the EU—specifically, a system of consensus—political priorities like Cyprus case, the Syrian refugee crisis, and Turkey’s general skepticism of external influence led to a breakdown on the path toward the Copenhagen criteria.

This seems the most important fact that impacted the Turkish case. As we can see, a paradox about the EU consensual rule weakened the bargaining position of the EU respect to the one of Turkey. According to the logic of two-level games,466 domestic ratification procedures can affect bargaining at international level, increasing the bargaining leverage. In this case, paradoxically, the rule of unanimous ratification of a new membership weakened the EU bargaining position. The EU was offering Turkey benefits with the membership but the opportunity to join the EU was not a credible offer, as it was based on empty promises until the Cyprus situation was solved. The EU therefore could not offer credible incentives to Turkey; in the absence of those, Turkey felt free to re-securitize the Kurdish issue. Finally with respect to the diasporas, for Indonesia this has been quite decisive, with an effective international

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advocacy work, while for Turkey a wrong approach and again a closure by the Turkish state did not allow the Kurdish diaspora to play an important role in the solution of the conflict.

Concluding, generally we can say that the second independent variable of the international factors (and correlated Black Swan events) played a role in the treatment of ethnic minorities, but these factors (as it was for the first variable of elites power) built upon trends already present, based on different levels of self-security by the two countries and on different histories of institutions and territorial structures. The next two chapters therefore will analyse these elements.
CHAPTER 7

NATIONALISM, INSTITUTIONS AND CITIZENSHIP OF ETHNIC MINORITIES:
HISTORICAL INSTITUTIONALISM AND SECURITIZATION

Introduction

After analyzing the rational choice thinking of elites and the effects of the international arena, this chapter explores the history and institutions of the two countries compared in this study. This historical analysis examines how the institutions created at the foundation of the two states may account for the different treatment of ethnic minorities in Turkey and Indonesia.

Historical institutionalism is one of the major theoretical schools in comparative politics, together with rational choice theory, culturalism and structuralism. Historical institutionalism gives importance, as the name says, to two specific variables in the political analysis: history and institutions, more than to material elements, cultural elements or rational thinking of decision makers. Historical institutionalism seeks to explain political outcomes by evaluating a “range of state and societal institutions that shape how political actors define their interests and that structure their relations of power to other groups.” It is also a method of research, in the sense that it relies on case studies, analyzing in particular institutions and history, to understand the trends and the countertrends across time. Also, historical institutionalism speaks about the path dependency of the states—that is, the decisions states face are shaped by the history and the decisions of the past.

This chapter, as the others, starts with an introduction of the theoretical background of this approach applied to the two case studies, arguing that history and institutions are fundamental for understanding the current political outcomes in domestic politics. This will be done presenting four variables related to the history of state formation and its institutions; the nature of their citizens’ rights; the history of discrimination against ethnic minorities; and the institutionalization of the ethnicity with the

creation of “ethnic democracies”. After that, the chapter will analyze the case studies in specific to examine whether the evidence supports the historical institutionalism thesis.

Briefly we can say that there are fundamental differences in the historical path between the Turkish case and the Indonesian one that may have impacted the treatment of ethnic minorities over the long run. Turkish history and institutions actually can be defined as more exclusive both before and after democratization, due to the experience of nation-building preceding state-building; an individual-rights model of citizens’ rights; a “social engineering” of the Kurdish minority since the foundation of the Republic; and finally an ethnic-based democracy. By contrast, Indonesia had a more inclusive path, both before and after democratization, because state formation preceded nation formation; because Indonesia adopted a communitarian-liberal model for the citizenship, and because it did not view itself as an ethnic democracy but, on the contrary, implemented decentralization during the period of democratization.

In particular, while Turkey’s foundation relied on a very exclusive nationalism based on Kemalist philosophy of one nation, one language, one secular, centralized and strong state, Indonesia had at its foundation a pluralist ideology called Pancasila, literary “five principles” that aimed for unity, democracy and social justice. Indonesia’s motto “Unity in diversity” expresses the ideal pluralism with the respect to ethnic and religious diversity, even if Indonesian law only recognizes six religions and does not recognize non-believers. All this played a role in the different final outcomes of the two countries with securitization of Kurds and autonomization of Acehnese.

Therefore, looking at the historical configuration of forces at the moment of national formation, we can say that Turkish sense of the nation as an ethnic community emerged endogenously, in the sense that the model of citizenship emerged within a nation before it formed a state. Many multiethnic empires (from the Austro-Hungarian to the Russian) recognized the differences of their ethnicities, as they acknowledged that they were not homogenous societies. However, while the European model (often including the European colonies) was founded on nations based on ethnicities, in the Middle Eastern model—in particular in the Caliphate of Ottoman Empire—nations based on religious identities were more important than ethnic ones (see later about the Millet system). Instead, with the formation of the
state a Turkish ethnic identity was institutionalized in a “monoethnic” exclusive nation-state, Western style, which resulted in a de facto multinational country with a juridically mononational state. This coincided with a post-World War I view of nationalism in which every nation should have had a state, but following this Western model of nation-state building Turkey opened space for a Turkish-Kurds conflict because the Kurds were the only ethnic group after the implosion of the Ottoman Empire that were not given a state. This was reinforced also by the Kemalist elite, a secular nationalist elite, who searched for foundations other than religion to create the state, and found in ethnicity a cohesive alternative to Muslim identity. Likewise, the military elite that allied with Kemalist elites in the foundation of the Republic, aiming to defend territorial sovereignty of the Turkish nation, always saw the Kurdish identity—for example the use of the Kurdish language in public but also in private—as a violation of the Turkish constitution, and hence helped to establish Turkish as the only official language. All this made the path of autonomization of Kurds very difficult and the securitization as the most apt strategy and policy for a country like Turkey.

The model of nation-state building in Indonesia instead was more exogenous. The conception of the Indonesian community derived from the Dutch model of communitarianism, which is intrinsically pluralist. While Kurds as a community threatened the identity of Turkishness and the idea of an ethnic state, the claim of the Acehnese was related more with a sovereign right than with an identity one, affirming the pluralistic principles of Indonesia, in a way that was consistent with the founding myth. The Acehnese claim therefore was less threatening, and so it was easier for the state to autonomize when the moment of democratization arrived.

This does not mean that Indonesia did not have its period of securitization too, as we saw in chapter 4. This is why this study examines several variables, to try to understand those periods with other explanations. Obviously, each of these variables and frameworks have some limitations but historical institutionalism in particular has difficulties explaining some nuances and changes over time.

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Theories Applied to the Case Studies

There are different historical institutional experiences for the two states analyzed here, that can represent four independent variables that may have shaped the contemporary securitization and autonomization of ethnic minorities. The first is the timing and type of state formation; the second is the nature of citizen rights (either individuals or community rights); the third is the presence of historical discrimination, or at least “intrusion” of the state inside the life of ethnic minorities; and finally, the fourth is the institutionalization of ethnicity in the creation of the so called ethnic democracies. This section analyzes one by one these four elements.

Regarding the first element, Turkey and Indonesia have different histories of state formation that created differing approaches to nationalism and citizenship through their institutions. Following Brubaker and Hammar’s arguments, explored in the third chapter, one can argue that for Turkey (as for Germany) the nation antedated the state.\(^{469}\) One consequence of this pattern is that the history of citizenship and institutions has been more exclusive than inclusive, being based not only on *jus sanguinis*—the legal doctrine that citizen derives from parentage, which is the way in which one can get citizenship in Turkey (as in many European countries) but that excludes new minorities born to migrants—but also on the principle of one state, one nation and one language, to exclude the native minorities like Kurds. In Indonesia, on the other hand (as in the case of France) the state predated the nation, with its history as a Dutch colony. This pattern of state formation resulted in citizenship principles and institutions that have been more inclusive, for both autochthonous and immigrant minorities. This greater inclusiveness existed since the foundation, even if Indonesian citizenship today is based on a mix of *jus sanguinis* and *jus soli* principles (to be a citizen one needs to have one Indonesian parent, and dual citizenship is not recognized). These differences in state formation have consequences today for the treatment of minorities, making one (Turkey) more prone towards securitization of minorities, and the other (Indonesia) more apt to the autonomization of minorities.

Regarding the nature of citizenship rights and the type of citizenship law, if we look at the institutions that created their national law, we see how Turkey resembles the French model, while Indonesia resembles a mix of the French and the Dutch models, the latter from its colonizer. Following Stuurman, we can say that the Indonesian case, similar to the Netherlands, built a communitarian-liberal model, based more on a conception of rights adhering to communities rather than to individuals.\textsuperscript{470} The Turkish case, by contrast, follows the French models since already the Tanzimat reforms (see chapter 4 on this) was more based on liberal-Republican or individual rights model that rejected the notion of communal rights, and by extension the recognition of communities and minorities. Nevertheless, the Indonesian state also has a history of state centralization on the French style because, as Vickers argues\textsuperscript{471}, the “colonial multiculturalism” of Indonesia had to cohabit with a strong centralized state power, and experienced real multiculturalism only with decentralization following the democratization process in the 20\textsuperscript{th} century. These observations suggest the different types of citizenship rights and national laws have facilitated for Turkey an approach of repression and securitization of minorities, and for Indonesia the inclusion and autonomization of them with the democratization.

Regarding the historical discrimination of states against minorities during the era of nation-building, we can take the cue from a scholar who compared Turkey and Morocco. Aslan argues that the reason why some ethno-national groups conflict with the state authority, while others do not, resides in the implementation of specific state policies during the period of nation-building.\textsuperscript{472} Sometimes states, in their striving to build a cohesive national identity, demand minorities to change their everyday behaviors such as what language to speak, how to dress or what names give to children. Minorities may react to these requirements as a threat to their own identity. When policies are too intrusive, they may provoke violent ethnic mobilization, as in the case of Turkey, while when they do not abridge the values, habits and lifestyle of minorities, they may lead to state-minority reconciliation, as in Morocco. The reason why

\textsuperscript{471} Adrian Vickers, \textit{A History of Modern Indonesia} (Cambridge University Press, 2005).
states differ in their actions towards minorities, Aslan argues, depends on the type of nation-state building: states follow a radical nation-building strategy, as in Turkey, when they are autonomous from other social centers of power. For example, in Turkey, according to Aslan:

a military-bureaucratic elite, which inherited a large state apparatus from the Ottoman Empire, founded the Turkish Republic and consolidated the central state at the expense of local authorities, more specifically the tribal leaders and religious sheikhs. In their attempt to create a homogeneous nation, these political elites aimed at an “extreme makeover” of the society and sought a wide range of changes in people’s behavior, values, habits, and lifestyles. As the largest minority and living in areas that are hard to control, Kurds became the main targets of this social-engineering project.\textsuperscript{473}

Indonesia, one could argue, represents instead a case similar to Morocco. As in Indonesia, the state did not intrude too much in the life of minorities, leaving them free to follow their habits and customs. Accordingly, the argument of Aslan could be applied to the Indonesian case, as the elites in Indonesia were not autonomous from other centers of power, these centers being very much spread and considered important in the archipelago. The Indonesian state therefore, different from the Turkish one, needed the support of the local authorities to consolidate state institutions, and so avoided a strategy of invasive and transformative homogenization of the society. These local authorities helped also in maintaining stronger security during the democratic transition with decentralization, as explained in next chapter. Here again we could argue that the different history of approaches to minorities by the nation-state created different paths that led Turkey and Indonesia either to more repression (Turkey) or to more autonomy (Indonesia).

Finally, besides the path-dependent consequences of different institutions or historical experiences, to understand the inclusion or exclusion of minorities during the democratization period, we can examine the literature’s concept of an “ethnic democracy”. Scholars of democratic studies like Linz and Stepan, and later Smooha, use this term to refer to regimes that combine democracy with some kind of “ownership” of the state by a dominant ethnic group, creating in this way “exclusive democracies”.\textsuperscript{474}

\textsuperscript{473} Ibid., 4
\textsuperscript{474} Juan Linz and Alfred Stepan, Problems of democratic transition and consolidation: Southern Europe, South America and Post-Communist Europe (Baltimore, MD: John Hopkins University Press, 1996). Sammy Smooha,
When a state is a multiethnic state—not like Japan or South Korea that are very homogeneous states but in many cases of American states for example—and has the dominance of an ethnic group, as in one of the case studies of this research, it is defined as “ethnic democracy”. While Linz and Stepan used this definition for states that deny basic citizenship rights to ethnic minorities and hence are less democratic, Smooha considers as ethnic democracy a state that gives “citizenship to all but institutionalizes superior status for the ethno-national majority.” According to another scholar, to define a state as an ethnic democracy we need even a “formal ownership” by the dominant group: Haklai argues that the “ethnic ownership of the state is formalized and the state is officially cast as an expression of the ethno-national identity of the dominant group.” This formal ownership is demonstrated, according to the scholar, first of all by the name of the country, which reflects the dominant group (like Romania for Romanians, Latvia for Latvians, Italy for Italians or Turkey for Turks). Likewise, in an ethnic democracy the constitutions and laws of a country formalize the ethnonational identity and guarantee the superiority and privilege of the predominant group identity at the same time that they guarantee the individual rights of a democracy. Because of this, according to Haklai, the Indonesian case would not be an ethnic democracy, while the Turkish case is. This therefore could be another distinction between the two case studies that could have affected the outcome of this study: Turkey as an ethnic democracy makes it difficult for the country extend even basic rights to other ethnic groups.

Based on these four variables, let us see now which is the body of evidence supporting the hypothesis that Turkey and Indonesia had different nationalistic institutions and different histories in the approach to their citizens and minorities. Did these differences in state formation lead to different outcomes of securitization or autonomization of their ethnic minorities?

“The model of ethnic democracy: Israel as a Jewish and democratic state”, Nations and nationalism, 8 (4) (October 2002): 475-503.
475 Ibid., p. 499.
476 Oded Haklai, “Regime transition and the emergence of ethnic democracies”, Ch. 2 in Jacques Bertrand and Oded Haklai (eds.) Democratization and Ethnic Minorities: Conflict or Compromise? (Abingdon: Routledge, 2014) p. 22.
477 To notice that ethnic democracies are not a transitional phase between authoritarianism and liberal democracies, as they can endure and even going backwards, if they don’t develop sufficient pluralism and substantive advancements of minority or communal rights, as we are seeing today in Turkey.
Evidence from Turkish History

Regarding the state formation and creation of citizenship law, first of all we have to say that in the Middle Eastern region these processes had different histories than in the states of Europe. The caliphates that came in succession during many centuries had a different nation building and a different system of citizenship, based on non-territorial religious identities and “nations”, respect to the territorial ethnic identity of the nations in the European case. Since the 15th century, under the Ottoman Empire the so called “Millet system” (from Arabic millah for “nation”) allowed every confessional community to rule itself under its own system through a separate legal court.478 This created therefore a system of communal rights instead of individual rights.

Later, starting in 1839,479 the Tanzimat reforms influenced by the French Enlightenment aimed to bring Western “modernity” to the Ottoman Empire, giving equality to all citizens under the law: individual rights started therefore to become important instead of community or religious rights.480 This pre-colonization phase of the Ottoman Empire showed that the West already had started to influence the Middle East, precipitating the rise of nationalism, in particular the Arab one, under the Ottoman Empire ruled by Turks. This eventually caused the breakdown of the Ottoman millet concept.

When the Ottoman Empire fell, European colonization imposed this concept of secular nationalisms and “monoethnic” nation-state building with the creation of Iraq, Syria, Lebanon and Palestine as nation-states, blocking Arab nationalist hopes for a politically united self-determination. Turkey also, as the non-Arab center of the Ottoman Empire, created a state based on a strong nationalism, following the ideology of Kemalism, again influenced by French ideals, to build a strong, united and secular Turkish centralized state. This seems therefore strong and compelling evidence that Turkey’s history of exclusionary nationalism and individual rights more than communal rights shaped its

479 The reforms were executed starting with the Imperial Reform Edict (hatt-i hümâyûn) in 1856, which promised equality in education, government appointments, and administration of justice to all regardless of creed.
subsequent policies toward ethnic minorities, particularly its ultimate securitization of the Kurdish community.

The relationship between Turkish model and European model is not always seen, however, as so direct by the literature. For one, Akturk states that because the religious nationalism at the base of foundation of Muslim states differs from the ethnic nationalism of the European states, we need to be careful in using nationalist theories based on European cases for understanding Muslim nation-states. According to the scholar, Turkey (like Pakistan and Algeria) was founded because a multiethnic Muslim population was reunited against non-Muslim opponents in order to create a new state based on a religious war (jihad). Therefore, the idea of opposition to foreign invasions was identified with the Islamic identity of the country—similar to the current re-appropriation of Islamic identity in the Turkish state with the AKP regime—that often feels threatened by external actors. Likewise in Indonesia, even if the country had a different war of independence, during the Dutch rule the Ulama (the scholars of the Islamic religious studies) led the opposition and, as Esposito says as reported by Schneier, “renewalist, ulama-defined Islam became identified with opposition to foreign rule … giving added strength to the process of Islamization of social life among the peasantry.”

Nevertheless, after that religious foundation the post-independence government of Turkey founded the state on a secular and monolingual nation-state model that ultimately pushed Islamist or ethnic separatist movements to challenge the state, as the Kurdish community did. “Instead of an Islamic state with a religious legal system and multiple official languages accommodating the ethnic diversity, they adopted a single official language and a secular legal system.” To choose for example a single official language, in particular the language of the majority of the population, was a symbolic action of internal homologation and assimilation toward one national identity dominated by the majority. There was an historical “disjuncture” at the origins of these nation-states that led to a crisis of legitimacy, and so

481 Sener Akturk, “Religion and Nationalism: Contradictions of Islamic Origins and Secular Nation-Building in Turkey, Algeria, and Pakistan”, Social Science Quarterly, Volume 96, Number 3 (September 2015): 778-806
483 Akturk, Religion and Nationalism, p. 785.
to several challenges in the form of Islamic and ethnic separatist movements according to Akturk.\textsuperscript{484} It is evident therefore that the external example of centralized and exclusive ethnic nationalistic institutions did not conduce to an environment where minorities could have been included. This disjuncture is useful to understand also the shift in ontological security, as will be explained in chapter eight, with changes in routines of the self-identity, both at the foundation of the Republic and with the new Islamist AKP party, that tried to recuperate the old past by breaking the Turkish Republic “routines of self-identity” during the democratization phase of the new century.

Also, following the arguments of Brubaker and Hammar, one can argue that Turkey had its state formation subsequent to its nation formation. This sequence created an exclusive citizenship, on the German style, with a nationality law based primarily on \textit{jus sanguinis},\textsuperscript{485} as the majority of the European states. For example, the first article of the first Turkish Constitution in 1921 (later article 3 in the 1924 Constitution) states: “sovereignty is vested in the nation without condition”\textsuperscript{486} showing the presence of already a nation, the Turkish one. This was clearly reiterated later in the Constitution of 1961, which states in its preamble: “the Turkish Nation, prompted and inspired by spirit of Turkish nationalism, which unites all individuals, be it in faith, pride, or distress, in a common bond as an indivisible whole around national consciousness and aspirations, and which has as its aim always to exalt our nation in a spirit of national unity as a respected member of the community of the world of nations enjoying equal rights and privileges.”\textsuperscript{487} This nationalism was reinforced with the choice of official language, making Turkish the only language taught in public schools and used in the public sphere since the foundation of Republic, and making it even clearer with the prohibition of its use in media after the military coup of 1981. In 1983, Law No. 2932, “The Law Concerning Publications and Broadcasts in Languages Other Than

\textsuperscript{484} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{485} \textit{Jus soli} and \textit{Jus sanguinis} are two different principles of nationality law, two different ways of getting citizenship in a country. In the first case the citizenship is determined by the place of birth, in the second by having one or both parents as citizens of that state, and so giving rights to ethnic citizens and their descendants (like in the majority of the states in the world, apart in the Americas, for the obvious reason of being the Western Hemisphere land of immigration).
\textsuperscript{486} Accessed September 10, \url{http://genckaya.bilkent.edu.tr/1921C.html}
\textsuperscript{487} Accessed September 10, \url{http://www.anayasa.gen.tr/1961constitution-text.pdf}
Turkish,” was passed, declaring that “the mother tongue of all Turkish citizens is Turkish” and forbidding the use of any language in the media but Turkish.

This nationalist exclusive concept at the foundation of the Turkish state favored the annihilation of threatening ethnic minorities from its territory or national identity, either with a genocide as in the Armenian case during the last years of the Ottoman Empire, or with the assimilation as in the Kurdish case since the first years of the Turkish Republic. Nevertheless, according to other scholars the nationalism of Turkey had different forms during the history of its republic. As Kastoryano argues, for example, there are different terms of Turkish nationalism depending on the historical period, from the “Ataturk nationalism” to Kemalism, from patriotism to just Turkism, from the Turkish word for nationalism _ulusçuluk_ (used by anti-Imperialist left in the 1960s and 70s) to _ulusalçılık_ (again “nationalism” but more anti-West EU-skeptical).

Whatever is the case, the fact is that Turkish identity based on Turkish nationalism has been at the foundation of the Turkish Republic and has remained as influential up to today in national and citizenship law. This may have facilitated not only the exclusion but the repression and securitization of the Kurdish ethnic minority.

For example, recently Turkey used a new concept of “Turkishness”, introduced in 2005, with the intention of increasing freedom of opinion as part of reforms adopted for the admission into the EU. However, the law has been amended in 2008 to change “Turkishness” into “the Turkish nation”, to avoid the risk of intending it as a big umbrella, under which various identities could find place, as some scholars like Oran and Kaboglu argued. So as we can see again the risk of losing the national Turkish identity to a plural identity has been blocked, excluding the possibility of having the Kurdish identity included in the definition of Turkishness.

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Regarding the history of discrimination against minorities and the intrusion of the state in their daily life, looking at history this process of discrimination and assimilation of Kurds is evident, as explained in chapter 4, confirming the evidence brought by Aslan. Not only Kurds but much smaller ethnic Albanians, Pontics, Arabs, Bosniaks, Circassians and Chechen people (many of them coming from the lands lost by the Ottoman Empire) started to be considered Turkish under Turkish law, assimilating into the Turkish identity even if they were still ethnically diverse from Turks. Since the beginning of the Turkish state, therefore, Kurds started to lose their language and identity in a process of assimilation, or acculturation as some scholars define it, into the Turkish nation, called also “Turkification.” This assimilation always had the same goal: that Kurds would have become Turks sooner or later. To do this, the state implemented also small-scale population transfers, to reduce concentrations of Kurds in areas where some nationalist uprisings could have happened. When it did happen, nationalist movements were neutralized with deportations and arrest or execution of leaders, dismemberment of traditional institutions, and finally the support to Kurdish feudal landowning class (ağas) and tribal leaders (şeyhs) to block any nationalist desire in their communities. Therefore, it is evident that the assimilation attempts of Kurds at the foundation of the Turkish state created a history of discrimination and securitization that through different periods and phases continued until today.

Finally, regarding the institutionalization of ethnicity and the creation of an “ethnic democracy”, we can say that the criteria of Smooha and Haklai—that is, a state that gives citizenship to all but institutionalizes superior status for the ethno-national majority—can be seen first of all in the legal status granted at the foundation of Republic only to small non-Muslim minorities such as Armenians, Greek and Jews, but not to a large Muslim ethnic minority, or nation inside the Turkish state, the Kurds. As again explained in detail in chapter 4, the Kurds were left out as Turkey refused to recognize any ethnic

492 Heper for example argues that the theory of acculturation is more proper of the one of assimilation in the Kurdish case in Turkey, given the centuries of amicable relations between the state and the Kurds. See: Metin Heper, State and Kurds in Turkey: The Question of Assimilation (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2007).
minority within its borders based on the belief that recognition could threaten the unity of the new 
Turkish state. Today, privileges for the ethno-national majority are present. Even if some steps recognized 
the cultural rights of Kurds, the plain recognition of their parity with Turks in the Turkish democracy (for 
example with the Kurdish language in the public schools) has not yet been realized.

Evidence from Indonesian History

Regarding the state formation and creation of citizenship law, Indonesia had a multinational 
identity that her colonial period, different from the *divide et impera* of the Middle East history, could not 
destroy. With the formation of the state after World War II (26 years after Turkey and with a different 
approach than the destruction of the multiethnic empires after World War I) this multi-nationalism was 
supported by the *Pancasila* principles of the Indonesian constitution and her “Unity in diversity” 
(*Bhinneka Tunggal Ika*) motto. As said, one could argue that Indonesia was once “a state in search of a 
nation”, following Brubaker’s distinction, and therefore more inclusive in its political foundations giving 
importance to the belonging to the state rather than the belonging to the nation. To put it with President 
Sukarno:

Gandhi said, “I am a nationalist, but my nationalism is humanity”. The nationalism we advocate 
is not the nationalism of isolation, not chauvinism, as blazoned by people in Europe who say 
“Deutschland über alles”…do not let us say that the Indonesian nation is the noblest and most 
perfect, whilst belittling other people. We should aim at the unity and brotherhood of the whole 
world.494

The first Constitution of the Republic of Indonesia, the *Undang-Undang Dasar* 1945 (UUD 45), 
was drawn up by revolutionary leaders, containing 33 chapters, with very strong presidential powers 
meant to cope with the situation of the Indonesian war of independence that lasted until 1949 and that 
needed quick and decisive decisions. In 1950, this system was replaced with a parliamentary system 
called the *Undang-Undang Dasar Sementara* 1950 (UUDS-50) with the 1950 Provisory Constitution. 
Independent of the system of government, the most important feature of the Indonesian constitutions was

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494 President Sukarno speech, “The birth of Pancasila” June 1, 1945. From: Clive J. Christie, *Southeast Asia in the 
the concept of Pancasila and the national motto of “unity in diversity”. The five principles Sukarno had listed for Pancasila at the beginning were: Indonesian nationalism; Internationalism (or humanism); consent (or democracy); social prosperity; and belief in God. Finally, the constitutions changed the order: 1) Belief in the one and only God; 2) Just and civilized humanity; 3) Unity of Indonesia; 4) Democracy guided by the inner wisdom in the unanimity arising out of deliberations amongst representatives; and 5) Social justice for all the people of Indonesia. As we can see, there is no reference to an ethnic group (Javanese, for example, who were the majority). Instead, there is the importance of a unity of the different groups of the country based on democracy and social justice.

These principles, together with the motto of “Unity in diversity”, brought pluralism into the institutions in Indonesia, even if unity and pluralism did not necessarily lead to equality and inclusion. Also, because of the vast difference in number between the majority of Javanese and the small minorities of other ethnic groups from the outer islands, some form of discrimination in practice was present in many sector of life, from politics to economy and culture, from development to employment, and from representation to education. However, discrimination was not institutionalized like it was in Turkey, as Indonesia has more than 300 ethnic groups who speaks more than 700 languages. It was difficult to exclude specifically some part of the population based on ethnicity, making it an “improbable nation” as some scholars have defined it. This does not mean that the Indonesian nation did not exist, but that it had to be built and re-built after state formation (following Brubaker concept). For this reason, one of the keys to the discourse on treatment of ethnic minorities and on separatist movements has always been the idea of Indonesian national unity, considered as natural and final.

Actually, the country’s great number of cultures and ethnicities is reflected not only in the state’s institutions but also in the identity of Indonesians, who often considers themselves as first of all belonging

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495 Ibid.
to their ethnic group and only secondary as belonging to the country. This because Indonesia did not have a clear assimilation policy at its foundation as other countries like Turkey had, such as limiting the use of local cultures, traditions, and languages in favor of Indonesian language and culture. On the contrary, the state was open to a form of “pluralistic nationalism”, allowing the different identities to express their culture, first of all not prohibiting local ethnic languages (Acehnese included).\footnote{Sumanto Al Qurtuby, Interethnic Violence, Separatism and Political Reconciliation in Turkey and Indonesia, India Quarterly 71(2) (6/2015): 126–145.} Actually, in Indonesia besides the national lingua franca (Bahasa Indonesia) people speak either a majority indigenous language or a minority indigenous language.\footnote{Widodo and Fardhani, 2011, p. 131.} This is because for its national language, in another action typical of its pluralist identity and different from Turkey, Indonesia chose Malay and not Javanese—even if Javanese was spoken by the majority of the population—because Javanese was concentrated in the Java island while Malay was spoken across the islands, being the language of the traders and the ports. Malay as an Indonesian language, before being formally adopted by the 1945 Constitution, was already institutionalized as a national language since 1928, with the “Youth Pledge”\footnote{The Youth Pledge was a declaration made on 28 October 1928 by young Indonesian nationalists (among who Sukarno) during the “Indonesian national awakening” that culminated in the Indonesian independence.} of one motherland, one people and one language, a fundamental step in building Indonesian nationalism but at the same time interethnic solidarity.\footnote{Ibid., p. 132.} Besides this, the model of Sukarno of “guided democracy”, based on the traditional village system of discussion and consensus, allowed for some path of consensus decision making (even if still centralized at the national level) reducing the risk of the “tyranny of majority” and opening space for inclusiveness in the long run of the Indonesian Republic.\footnote{Daniel Lev, The Transition to Guided Democracy: Indonesian Politics 1957–1959 (Asia: Equinox Publishing, 2009).}

Regarding citizens’ rights, therefore, since its foundations Indonesia was looking at communal identities more than individual rights, not only in languages but in identities and religions, which led the Indonesian constitution to recognize six religions. Nevertheless, cultural rights did not correspond to a decentralization of the Indonesian state, which on the contrary was quite centralized being fearful to lose...
national control and so refraining from giving autonomy to its regions or provinces. Therefore, as explained in chapter 4, more than their identities the ethnic groups—above all the Acehnese—were looking for territorial sovereignty, often being heirs of ancient independent “states” before colonial times.

As we can see, the history and institutions of the Indonesian Republic have differed from the Turkish case and made Indonesia an environment in which plurality was the norm, both in the identity of the nation and, in part at least, in its institutions. For this reason, the autonomization, even if not put in practice until the decentralization of the Reformasi era, was in the spectrum of possibilities thanks to the background of the state’s formation as a pluralist one; a communitarian-liberal model of community rights; and a daily life of ethnic minorities that was not changed by the majoritarian ethnic group.

Nevertheless, as Bowen among other scholars remembers, during the New Order under Suharto since the 1960s things started to change:

one could only speak in terms of the residents of a geographical region, as in “people of South Sulawesi” and not mention ethnic names, lest one be guilty of exacerbating ethnic tensions. The forbidden categories for public discussion were known by the acronym SARA: suku (ethnicity), agama (religion), ras (race), and antargolongan, literally ‘intergroup’ and applicable to nearly any discussion of group identity.\(^{504}\)

Therefore discrimination, even if not institutionalized, became evident under the Suharto regime, and with it the securitization of ethnic separatist movements like GAM. Actually, as Bertrand argues,\(^ {505}\) at the end of the New Order, the narrow and constraining reinterpretation of Indonesia's “national model” created tensions that opened space for ethnic conflicts with the start of democratization. The process of decentralization during democratization, therefore, was fundamental to address the risk of increasing secessionist conflicts, and to avoiding the risk of the creation of an “ethnic democracy”, as Smooha and Haklai label it.

During the period of democratization, the Indonesian Constitution had its first amendments, introducing human rights, the separation of powers, and decentralization. The Acehnese rebellion always hoped for the disintegration of the Republic because of its internal conflicts and despotic leadership, but


this hope vanished with democratization when Indonesia was transformed into a decentralized system, making the provinces no longer interested in seceding. Nevertheless, there is no consensus in the scholarship about how processes of decentralization opened space for resolution of ethnic conflict and the autonomization of the ethnic minorities. Actually, the fact that substantial decentralization and autonomization of Aceh in reality did not arrive until the Helsinki agreements in 2005 would show how historical institutionalism has not been the only fundamental factor to explain it. Until other factors impacted decision-making, autonomization did not arrive.

Stokke, Törnquist and Syndre for example argue that the resolution of the conflict in Aceh and its transition to peace and democracy was influenced by structural evolutions like decentralization. However, it was also shaped by strategies of elites and popular political forces. Törnquist specifically argues that at the beginning, the radical process of decentralization promoted centrifugal forces, motivating the renewed military intervention of Wahid and mostly Megawati, but by 2004 signs indicated that Indonesia was not going to fragment and that a decentralized but unified system was emerging. By contrast Hadiz, comparing the Philippines, Thailand and Indonesia, argues that the local system of power remained strong and resilient after the democratization and decentralization period. In particular, the scholar shows how the decentralization of the Reformasi period just dispersed corruption and predatory politics, failing to transform power relations on the ground, for which reason local elites hijacked democracy. This means that decentralization in reality was not much of a democratization process, but does not change the fact that it could have facilitated some form of autonomization for local authorities, as in the case of Aceh and its region. To reinforce this argument, Miller posits that the three offers of special autonomy made to Aceh in 1959 (Special Region formula), 1999 (Law n. 44 for Special Status), and 2001 (Law n. 18 for Special Autonomy) all failed because of the central government’s lack of

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commitment; its failure to address human rights violations; and the GAM’s rejection of autonomy as compromise. Finally, according to Bubandt, securitization happened precisely to re-assert the state during the phase of decentralization. Therefore, decentralization could have produced even more securitization instead of favoring autonomization. Actually, during the first phase of decentralization Aceh experiences its highest level of violence, between 1999 and 2003.

So one could argue that during the first phase of decentralization, the outcome of the state was more securitization of the ethnic minorities, with a typical approach of giving some autonomy or cultural rights but clamping down on the independence movement. Later, however, when it was clear that the armed conflict was not going to end, the state resorted to a negotiation of some sort of self-rule. The point is that Indonesia never became an ethnic democracy as Turkey because it never institutionalized the superior status of an ethnic group over others. This is the fundamental difference from Turkey, coming from different histories of nation-state building, citizenship law and assimilation of ethnic minorities.

Conclusions

In conclusion, one can say that even if nationalism and the institutions assumed different forms in Turkey, there remains the fact that nationalist and exclusive institutions created a path dependency for Turkey. This history created different elites and international factors that have played a role shifting from securitization to autonomization during the democratic period and back to securitization in the recent years. Despite the nuances exposed in the creation of an exclusionary nationalism, one can argue that this feature of Turkey’s foundation has played an important role in the securitization of the Kurdish minority, in particular during the history of the Republic but also with the democratization process since 2002. Emblematic of this history of ethno-nationalism is the rejection, during the autonomization phase, of

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cultural rights such as public education in Kurdish language, or territorial concessions such as decentralization of some form of self-government.

By contrast, for Indonesia the more open nationalism and more inclusive institutions dating to the beginning of its independence opened space for more decentralization and autonomization. Even if discrimination of ethnic minorities was evident with respect to the Javanese majority, in particular in the New Order times, political institutions guaranteed a plurality of identities and created the framework necessary for the decentralization put in practice during the democratization period.

Nevertheless, the fact that the securitization process was up and down in different moments of both Turkish and Indonesian history, and in particular during their democratization, shows that historical institutionalist hypotheses can be considered mostly as background factors, giving importance to the other changing variables including elites’ struggles for power and international factors, and the interacting variable of ontological security. This is the last hypothesis of the study treated in the next and last chapter: how different levels of ontological security impacted the treatment of ethnic minorities in Turkey and Indonesia.
CHAPTER 8
INTERACTING VARIABLE/HYPOTHESIS: ONTOLOGICAL SECURITY

Introduction

This chapter refers not to rationalist-materialist-historical explanations, as until now this study has done, but to a sociological-ideational explanation that identifies structural conditions affecting the ontological security of a state. As constructivist theory teaches us, just as there are material structures that affects the actions of states, there are also psychological, sociological and ideational structures that impact the state actions. Ontological security should not be considered as a rival explanation to rational and material explanations but instead as a complement to them.

Being a sociological-ideational explanation, ontological security cannot be really considered an independent variable of this study like the others. Rather, it is an “interacting variable” that interrelates with the three main independent variables, being impacted by them but at the same time having an effect on them. This is because all the former variables—history and institutions, elites’ power, and international factors—may impact the level of ontological security of a state, which in turn affect the securitization or autonomization of ethnic minorities. For example, a state may have an history of strength and trust or a history of fear and insecurity (depending on the history of state formation) with strong or weak institutions; a state may have military elites allied with political ones, either secular or Islamist, or elites that struggle among them; and a state may dwell in a stable and safe region or in a chaotic and conflicting region. All these elements affect the ontological security of a state, how the state feels about itself, either secure or insecure, with trust or with anxieties. These in turn impact the final outcome of treatment of ethnic minorities. In this respect, ontological security should be considered an intervening variable.

At the same time, though, all the scholarly works share the idea that ontological security is a concept that can be defined in a relational sense. There are processes of identity that states exercise in relation to other actors; for this reason, ontological security doesn’t occur in isolation. Being a relational concept, if something happens at the international level (in particular at the geopolitical and regional
level) a country can begin to feel ontologically insecure, and this in itself can shape how the elite’s power struggle impact the final outcome. For example we could argue that elites do not directly create but in reality exploit the ontological insecurity already present in the masses to perpetuate a conflict or a securitization of a minority group.\footnote{See on this: Bahar Rumelili, *Peace Anxieties: Ontological Security and Conflict Resolution*, Seminar at Koç University, May 2 2014, accessed July 5, 2016, \url{https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=wkOUBY7BH4}} In this case, the ontological security comes before the independent variables and so is a “background variable,” one could say.

For these reasons, ontological security should be considered an interacting variable, more than an intervening one, as it may have recursive effects on and with the study’s other independent variables. We should add here that as a relational process, the interaction can happen at the domestic level, with different and new relations among the actors and parts of a society and a state, but also at international level, as the relationship of the state with its neighbors and the international community can affect the level of ontological security of a state, as we will see with the cases of Turkey and Indonesia. Therefore the concept of ontological security applied to a state is used in this study both for international interactions and domestic ones.

As explained in chapter 2 of literature review, “ontological security” is a psychological concept applied to states. In International Relations (IR) theory, ontological security refers to the needs of a state to feel safe and secure, not only physically in the sense that its survival is guaranteed, its national security maintained and its borders protected (following the realist approach), but also “ontologically” (following the constructivist approach) in the sense of its being—that is, its national self-identity feels safe and not threatened by external or internal challenges. We can say that forms of uncertainty sometimes threaten this identity security, with a state feeling “ontologically insecure”. This could explain irrational actions of the states like protracted conflicts caused by security dilemmas,\footnote{See: Jennifer Mitzen, “Ontological Security”, in *World Politics: State Identity and the Security Dilemma*, European Journal of International Relations, vol. 12 no. 3 (2006).} but also, as in the case of this study, the treatment of minorities, specifically in democratizing countries.
Because this study is about comparative politics rather than international relations, it analyzes this concept for its consequences at internal rather than international level. Nonetheless, it is still based on the ontological security of the state, considering the state as the main level of decision making (more than the individual level of the agents)\(^\text{513}\) and so as the main actor impacting policies in the country, more than other actors like the population, elites or civil society organizations. This does not mean that an abstract concept such as the state or its institutions may feel emotions—it is still the individuals, leaders and elites inside the states that feel a low or high ontological security—but it is the state that represents these aggregate feelings and act as a consequence.\(^\text{514}\)

As background to this variable, and as a premise to the following literature review that will try to operationalize this variable, we need to say that every state has different ontological interpretation of its “self-security” depending on the environment in which the state lives, meaning its geography, culture and geopolitical situation. Besides these differences in space, ontological security may also change over time, depending on the domestic and international conjuncture that the state itself experiences. For example, a state may feel for some periods safer, given its geopolitical and international situation, and so exhibit a high level of ontological security. At other times it may feel threatened and so manifest a low level of ontological security. The important thing to understand about the ontological security of a state threatened by the insurrection of an ethnic group is that when the violent actions of the armed group are rising in scale, with broad attacks on militaries, state institutions or even civilians, they start to become not only a problem of security but also an existential threat to the state. Actually, this is one of the reasons for the state labelling a rebel group as a terrorist group, not only to delegitimize the requests of the group, but also to make sure that the group is framed as an existential threat to the self-identity of the state. By this logic, the state must take specific measures that range from repression to securitization.

\(^{513}\) Regarding the problem of passing a psychological concept from individual to state level see the literature on the role of emotion and biases in IR (for example: Steve Yetiv, *National Security through a Cockeyed Lens: How Cognitive Bias Impacts U.S. Foreign Policy*, Baltimore: John Hopkins University Press, 2013).

Besides this study’s cases, there are many cases of in-state armed groups that have been considered as an existential threat and labelled as terrorist groups: from the FARC in Colombia to Northern Ireland’s IRA and Spain’s ETA in its Basque region. This connection makes the case for the importance of ontological security, which can be considered therefore as an important factor for the treatment of ethnic minorities. To securitize minorities means to target the origins of the existential and self-identity threat in order to defend the state’s ontological security.

The hypothesis for this variable therefore is that when the ontological security of a country is low, the state tends to resort to repression and securitization of internal issues and challenges. In particular, the state will securitize minorities considered enemies specifically of the national identity or the sovereign territory, and in general a risk to social peace and internal stability. Conversely, when the ontological security of a country is at a high stage, the country tends to engage more in accommodation of the internal social conflicts and issues, including ethnic minority requests regarding autonomization.

As historical introduction, we can say that regarding the two case studies, the Turkish case has historically experienced a low level of ontological security arising from at least four elements: a delicate geopolitical position between Europe, Russia and the Middle East, often under risk of instability and tensions with bordering countries; a history of implosion of an old empire contrasted with a proud resistance to external invasion (with the “Sèvres syndrome” of being dismembered still present in the identity of the state) but also with a top-down imposition of a secular and centralized state structure; a complicated and complex identity since the foundation of the Republic dwelling in a bridging world, having a Western model to follow, without being Western, and an Eastern identity to avoid, having been Eastern (actually Turkey has been in part a Western enclave in the Eastern world, a NATO member that resided for a century between the Islamist and the Communist threats, with a stressful role of a bastion against both); and finally values of unity and homogeneity that, even if in theory should have facilitated a higher ontological security, in reality created an exclusion for values of tolerance of diversity and a disruption of the preceding acceptance of pluralistic society that favored a low ontological security.
Indonesia, on the other hand, has historically experienced a higher level of ontological security, with a geographic structure of an archipelago, impossible to be conquered completely even if dismembered, in a relative stable area; a history of trade and exchange between the Indian and the Pacific Oceans that brought more openness towards different cultures; a pluralistic identity coming from hundreds of languages and ethnic groups; and finally Asian (and in particular Southeast Asian) values of acceptance and tolerance. These experiences and values increased the trust and the pluralism among the populations, languages and religions of the country. Such pluralism was conducive to the autonomization that Indonesia adopted in Aceh.

**Ontological Security as a Concept**

The concept of ontological security was first developed by Anthony Giddens, as a sense of continuity and order in events of an individual’s life, in order for the person to feel a sense of agency.\(^{515}\) Later, the work of Jennifer Mitzen and Brent J. Steele adapted Giddens’s concept to the study of international relations.\(^{516}\) One can also draw the concept of ontological security from securitization theory. Even if Buzan et al. do not speak precisely of ontological security, in their theory, as explained in chapter 2, there are five different sectors of security: military, environmental, economic, societal and political. The societal sector of security is defined also as “identity security”,\(^{517}\) a concept that is similar to the concept of ontological security, what they define as the “security of the self-identity”. This social security, according to the scholars, can be characterized by a horizontal or vertical competition;\(^{518}\) the first is related to the threat of neighboring cultures, while the second is the threat coming from above or below the state, which is from a wider identity (as in the EU case for example) or a narrower one (as in the case

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\(^{517}\) Buzan et al., 1998, p. 120.

\(^{518}\) Ibid., p. 121.
of a local actor). Both the Kurdish and Acehnese cases evidently represent a case of vertical societal securitization, with a narrower identity of an ethnic minority that threatens the national identities.

The point to argue here is that the security of identity, and so we could say ontological security, is low when the state feels an ontological concern for its national identity because of internal or external threats. Actually, the securitization process, according to Bahar Rumelili, a scholar that devoted a recent interesting deep study to this concept of ontological security, can be considered precisely a means of dealing with ontological insecurity, because it transforms the anxieties of the self-identity into concrete fears based on threats that can be managed, in particular in the presence of a conflict.\(^{519}\) Also, according to Rumelili, to contain anxiety and ontological insecurity the state, besides securitization, may “construct meanings” in order to maintain ideational stability: even conflict resolution, therefore, can be referred to as the management of anxiety without securitization.\(^ {520}\) This is important to consider in the ontological security concept because the narratives behind the ontological security of the state represent exactly the creation of a meaning of stability and security.

However, Rumelili argues in particular that there needs to be a process of coping with “peace anxieties” because not only conflict but also peace can create anxiety. This process formulates alternative self-narratives that situate the self in relation to others with new conflicts and threats, which become embedded again in habits and routines. For example, the end of the Cold War created anxieties because international system did not know any more on what it was based, with clear enemies. However, one could argue that with 9/11 a new enemy was created for the US, and with NATO expansion a new enemy was created for Russia. As a contraposition, we can also say that to cope with anxieties created by conflict the narrative is important, to clarify the enemy and the threat. This, one could argue, is what Turkey has been doing with the Kurdish issue, reinstated in particular after the anxiety of the Iraqi and Syrian civil wars.

\(^{519}\) See on this also: Bahar Rumelili, *Conflict resolution and ontological security: peace anxieties* (New York: Routledge, 2015).

Regarding specifically ethnic minorities, other scholars show, even if without speaking about ontological security, that states feeling threatened by internal minorities will not incorporate them into the body politic. As Weiner argued with respect to the case of Macedonia,\textsuperscript{521} for example, a state will not be inclusive of a minority if it feels that this minority is the “fifth column” of an external enemy against the nation state. Likewise, Kymlica claims that “minority groups are often seen as a kind of ‘fifth column’, likely to be working for a neighbouring enemy”;\textsuperscript{522} they are therefore stigmatized or repressed. This is an important concept therefore with respect to the Kurdish issue, considered by Turkish leaders sometimes as a fifth column of international terrorism or external powers.

But the threat can arrive also from the independence of a new state on one’s borders, in particular if there is a transborder kinship group as in the cases of Syria and Iraq for Turkey. It is important, therefore, to evaluate how the autonomy of kinship groups in bordering countries may represent a threat not only to the national security but also to the ontological security of a country. It is interesting to see also the case of Greece, which felt threatened by the autonomy of a neighboring country, Macedonia, few years ago—as a member of NATO and much stronger than Macedonia, Greece’s concerns were not so much a question of national security as they were of identity security. Actually, as Kymlicka reports, for Greece it was a question of ancient foundational myths, as Greece claimed that “the use of the name ‘Macedonia’ by its neighboring state was a threat to Greece’s very existence.”\textsuperscript{523}

Going back to the ontological security theory, how can one operationalize this variable in order to examine in which times and which cases its level changed and possibly affected the outcomes of this study?

Mitzen argues that ontological security is achieved with routines that give importance to social relationships at individual level as well as to international relationships at state level. However, she does


\textsuperscript{522} Kymlicka, 2002, p. 19.

not operationalize precisely this variable with indicators. She just posits that “most states follow international law most of the time, and that they do so unreflectively or routinely, irrespective of regime type, leader personality, or position in the balance of power”524 and so “leaving old routines behind generates ontological insecurity.”525

Also for Steele, in order for states “to be ontologically secure”, they must give answers to existential questions. In order to do that, they tend to turn their actions into routines for “continuity and order” that is so important to their sense of self. When a critical situation undermines a state’s identity, causing anxiety or shame, the state may take actions that seem irrational but are caused by this reduction of ontological security.526 Taking a different approach with respect to the realist and neoliberal ones (based on rational self-interest) and the constructivist and English School ones (based on collective identities and principles), Steele argues therefore that state actions can be rational also when they follow the protection of self-identity, which is based on emotions too, in particular in feelings of honor and shame.527

Steele lists four important factors for ontological security seekers that can be useful to evaluate better the variable: material and reflexive capabilities; crisis assessment; biographical narratives; and discursive framing by co-actors.528 The first factor that impacts ontological security is based on the fact that stronger states, with more material capabilities, are under more stress with respect to small states as they have to influence more outcomes in international politics. Ontological insecurity therefore appears for great powers in specific cases, for example when they do not intervene in humanitarian crisis or solve a minority issue. Consequently this may produce shame based on “reflexive capabilities”, that is how the state feels about itself in the world.

525 Ibid., p. 362.
527 Trying to explain why Belgium decided to fight Germany in World War I, Steele argues for example that the cause has to be found in the Belgium’s conception of honor: analyzing the statements and speeches of the foreign policy elites, Steele shows how feeling of honor played an important role in its decision to fight a stronger adversary. The same thing for the shame, analyzing the feeling for the UK and NATO allies with respect to Milosevic actions, feeling related with a possible ontological insecurity that played a role in the Kosovo war.
528 Ibid., p. 69-75.
The second factor is how a state assesses a crisis. To decide on policies, it is important for states gather information, foremost with its own intelligence but also through media (today more and more through grassroots social media), CSOs and INGOs. For example, Steele illustrates how humanitarian INGOs played an important role in lobbying for the Kosovo military intervention. To assess a crisis, there are three related abilities: “(1) discursive abilities, in the sense of constructing a situation as a crisis; (2) plausibly linking that crisis to the national Self; and (3) identifying which policy might effectively terminate the crisis.”  

These abilities are very much related with the third element that builds a sense of ontological security: the biographical narrative, which is how agents build their self-identity and in turn how states create meanings for their actions. The narratives change over time, and follow a gradual process according to Steele: “understanding of what drives critical situations → what those situations mean about self-identity → state’s security interests → policy choices → narratives about the actions of the state ‘self’. The narrative therefore contributes to the construction of a stable sense of self-identity in order to transcend the anxiety of the fragile nature of biography (as Giddens says). A state that is able to have a coherently organized narrative about itself and its routines actions will have a stronger ontological security. This is because if a state realizes that its narrative no longer reflects its actions, then this creates ontological insecurity (one could say almost like a cognitive dissonance, in psychological terms) and forces the state to establish new routines to maintain its sense of self and identity.

The last element is the “co-actors” discourse strategies, which are the narratives of the international community (Steele calls it “co-actors”) to remember one state’s past failure, pushing as Steele says, to “insecuritize” targeted agents, in order to learn from past mistakes and change their future behaviors. This factor therefore can contribute to the ontological insecurity of the state.

So, given the fact that the literature is not specific on how to operationalize this concept of ontological security, one could consider in particular the third factor of Steele framework, the

529 Ibid., p. 71.
530 Ibid., p. 73.
531 Ibid., p. 72-73.
biographical narrative of the state (intended especially as its government and the corresponding elites and leadership supporting it). This is sometimes related as well to the fourth factor, the narrative of the international community, as an indicator of the ontological security, or at least as the element that reflects and shows the high or low level of ontological security. This is useful to analyze the Turkish and Indonesian cases.

The idea here is that when the narrative of a state, through its leaders, shows an “identity crisis” and “identity insecurity” based on elements of anxiety, paranoia, fear, shame, anger and other negative emotions, this type of narrative can be considered indicative of a low level of ontological security. Also, when a narrative feels the need to refer to nationalistic elements, or other elements related with the self-identity like religion or foundational myths, this also can be considered emblematic of a low level of ontological security. This is because when we, as people, feel lost or in identity crisis, in order to regain ontological security we resort to the traditional inner nucleus of our identity, which is related with our ethnical, nationalistic and also religious background and heritage.532

**Turkey: Ontological Insecurity and Securitization of Kurds**

First of all, before analyzing the evidence of Turkish ontological security during its democratization phase, and in particular during the recent re-securitization of Kurds, one needs to remember that Turkey has experienced generally a low level of ontological security since the foundation of its Republic. This insecurity derives the fear of dismemberment before the Turkish war of independence—and even before with the secession of many territories from the Ottoman Empire (in some way similar to the implosion of the Soviet Union).533 This foundational ontological insecurity, because of external or internal threats, has been reinforced through the century with conspiracy theories, deep state

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532 According to Kinnvall for example people feeling ontological insecure in the increasing global world resort to group with strong nationalistic and religious characteristics. This can explain also the recent religious revivals and success of radical groups. See: Catarina Kinnvall, “Globalization and religious nationalism: self, identity and the search for ontological security”, *Political psychology*, 25, n. 5 (2004): 714-767.

533 Actually Russia too can be considered with a low level of ontological security today, and this could be also one of the reasons of the current degradation of the relationship between the two states besides great power politics.
concepts and military coups, and manifests today as the repression of Kurdish minority considered an internal threat (see chapter 4 for the history). The Turkish homogeneous identity that was imposed with the Kemalist philosophy of one state, one nation, one language and one ethnic group makes diversity a threat to Turkish identity. To say it again with Kinzer: “something about the concept of diversity frightens Turkey’s ruling elite. It triggers the deep insecurity that has gripped Turkish rulers ever since the Republic was founded in 1923, an insecurity that today prevents Turkey from taking its proper place in the modern world.”

The process of stigmatization of any ethnic diversity, and in particular of the Kurdish one, has accompanied a specific construction of the Kurdish question through the political narrative of the state. Actually, as Akin Unver argues, the Kurdish question in Turkey has divided and often polarized the society on the definition and even existence of this question, often denied or reduced to the accusation of separatism by the political discourse. Therefore the Kurdish question has not been resolved because it has not been clearly defined (and there is no scholarly analysis on a discourse survey of the Turkish definition of Kurdish question).

According to another scholar, Ferhat Kentel, the historically based “anxious” feelings of Turkey (feelings of ontological insecurity) are based in particular on the reconstruction of grand narratives of past traumas, representing a constant tension between loyalty and resistance. This anxiety has been intensified recently not only for Turkey but also for many other countries because of the general erosion of the nation-state as an institution and the old boundaries fading in globalization. The past trauma of Turkey was the end of the Ottoman Empire and its dismemberment. Traditionally, the Turkish state discourse is based on the fact that Turks are the descendants of a great empire and civilization. An important part of this discourse is the belief the West has always wanted to weaken Turkey, a “siege paranoia” that scholars

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534 Kinzer, p. 10.
and historians have labeled the “Sèvres Syndrome”.\textsuperscript{537} The Sèvres Syndrome arose in Turkey because at the end of World War I the country feared dismemberment at the hand of external power, often affiliated with internal enemies, which found expression in the Treaty of Sèvres\textsuperscript{538} and other treaties.\textsuperscript{539} The Sèvres Syndrome has impacted the actions of Turkey since then as, according to Guida: “this paranoia (also) inevitably leads to irrational overreactions and apparently irrational behaviors by the masses and by politicians.”\textsuperscript{540} Therefore Turkish ontological security can be evaluated historically as low. For this reason Turkish national identity, the “Turkishness”, always feels threatened by external or internal challenges. When the PKK started the insurgency in 1984, the ontological security of the country declined, considering a possible independence or even autonomy of the Kurdish region as an attack not only to the state’s unity but also on the nation’s identity as a secular, mono-ethnic political community. Mesut Yegen, another expert on the Kurdish issue, explains how the Kurdish question has been constructed by the Turkish state with different identities during the history of the Republic.\textsuperscript{541} At the beginning, the Kurdish question was seen in terms of a backward, pre-modern, tribal past of Turkey, in contrast to the progressive and modern present and future of Turkey. In the 1950s and 1960s, it was considered more a problem of a peripheral economy versus the national market, while in the 1970s the Kurdish question was more a question of communist threat (similarly to the red terrorism in Italy during the same time). In general, however, Kurds were seen always as “future Turks”, people that would sooner


\textsuperscript{538} The Treaty of Sèvres was one of a series of treaties that the Central Powers had to sign after WWI. It was the beginning of the partition of the Ottoman Empire and included the fragmentation of Anatolia (the current territory of Turkey) in “zones of influence” under the direction of European powers, leaving to Turkey a small part of the peninsula. The treaty was refused by Ataturk that started the Turkish war of independence.

\textsuperscript{539} To put things in perspective on this variable we can look at the incarceration of Turkish academicians that had signed a petition to criticize the government of Turkey and its actions in repressing the PKK, in January 2016. These people have been defined as terrorists by Erdogan, affiliated with some obscure “international forces”. The same has been repeated with the Gulenist after the attempted coup in the Summer of 2016. See: Human Rights Watch, “Turkey: Academics Jailed For Signing Petition Hundreds Investigated for ‘Terrorism’” March 16, 2016, accessed July 6, 2016, https://www.hrw.org/news/2016/03/16/turkey-academics-jailed-signing-petition


or later integrate in the Turkish society and community as new Turks. Since the 1980s, according to Yegen, and increasingly until today, Kurds have not been seen as such anymore, in part because of their resurgent nationalistic identity. In some way, then, one could argue that the ontological security of Turkey started to feel more and more threatened by this resurgence of Turkish identity (along with the birth of the PKK) that eliminated the possibility of a future of “identity fusion”.

In another text, Yegen, in contrast to the literature’s assertion that the Kurdish questions was considered an issue of tribal backwardness but not an ethno-political question, argues that the “Turkish State Discourse” is not misrepresenting the Kurdish question but instead it “enunciates the exclusion of Kurdish identity and thus has been the language of that exclusion.” Again one can see how the ontological security of Turkish identity, or Turkishness, has always depended on this juxtaposition and contrast to the Kurdish identity.

Nevertheless, in the new century Turkey started to experience a self-confidence rarely felt previously, reducing the Sèvres Syndrome with a new trust toward the future and toward the world based on a new self-identity. One would expect an improvement in its ontological security. This happened first of all because Turkey was able temporarily to stop the war with PKK with the capture of Ocalan in 1999 which started to reduce this identity threat. Second, with the start of the EU membership application in 1999 Turkey opened the doors to a new democratic and modernizing path. Finally with the AKP in government since 2002, a new democratization started for Turkey as the first moderate Islamist party won elections without a military intervention. This marked the re-inclusion in Turkey of an Islamist identity excluded during the century of Kemalism, and started a new economic and status growth that made Turkey aspire to become not only a regional but a world power. Turkey began to engage for the first time the Kurdish issue in a different way, specifically with an accommodative approach towards cultural rights, as explained in chapter 4. Nevertheless, in spite of this progress, this seemingly increased level of

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ontological security would not last for long; actually, ontological insecurity reappeared quite soon. As Kinzer had foreseen in his book of 2008: “Turkey is finally being shaped by its hopes rather than its fears, but the fears have not disappeared.” Why did ontological security revert again to a lower level during the last few years?

One scholar, Ayse Betul Celik, studying precisely the ontological security of Turkey with respect to the Kurdish issue, argues that Turkey in reality felt secure during the PKK insurgency years. Ontological security started to decline only since 2009, specifically because of the “Kurdish opening” in 2009 (a government initiative to address the Kurdish issue) that furthered the original Turkish fears. The scholar shows how after the first phases of escalation (1984-1999) and de-escalation (1999-2005), the conflict between Turkey and the PKK passed through a phase of re-escalation (2005-2009), with physical but not ontological insecurity for Turkey, and finally with the Kurdish opening in 2009 ontological insecurity started to emerge. Celik’s argument, based on the work and narratives of some workshops of civil society on the Kurdish issue, showed how the Kurdish minority was more concerned on identity recognition while the Turkish majority with territorial integrity. Turkish ontological security therefore was reduced because of the anxieties raised with the peace process. Likewise another scholar, Kardaş, speaks about the end of the Turkish-Kurdish peace process initiated in 2009 because of a “security trilemma”, based on politics of identity and dynamics of contra-identity.

Besides Celik’s and Kardaş’s arguments regarding the internal “peace process” that may have moved the people and state anxieties about the self-identity, this study also argues that, in particular since 2011, the regional and international situation did not play in favor of a stronger ontological security for

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544 Kinzer, Crescent and star, xiv.
545 Following the framework of Rumelili, Celik explains how the Kurdish conflict in Turkey is an “unstable conflict”, that is a conflict with high levels of both anxiety and fear, with different levels of physical and ontological insecurity because of the asymmetric relationship, and with different levels of conflict (between Turkish state and ethnic minority at cultural and political level, between the Turkish state and the PKK at military level, and between Turks and Kurds with tensions at social level). See: Ayşe Betül Çelik, “The Kurdish issue and levels of ontological security”, in Conflict Resolution and Ontological Security, ed. Bahar Rumelili, New security studies, PRIO (Abingdon: Routledge, 2015).
546 Ibid., p. 57.
547 Tuncay Kardaş, “Inter-societal security trilemma in Turkey: understanding the failure of the 2009 Kurdish Opening”. Turkish Studies, Volume 17, Issue 1, 2016.
Turkey. The birth of autonomous regions in Iraq in 2008 and especially in Syria in 2013—with the fear of a “Northern Kurdistan” to be created also in Turkey—the challenges of ISIS and the Syrian chaos; the international terrorism and refugee crisis; the failure of progress on EU membership; and anxieties about the peace process, all contributed to reduce the ontological security of Turkey.

At the end of the day, the self-identities that stay at the base of ontological security, and the narratives that reflect them, are often influenced not only by domestic but also by international issues. In some moments there are rapid “identity negotiations” because of sudden traumas or changes. As Barnett says:

> Although national and state identities are always in negotiation, these negotiations can be expected to be particularly intense during moments of rapid changes in international and domestic politics. At the international level, a change in systemic patterns, caused either by transnational, economic or military politics, can trigger wide scale domestic change and debates concerning the national identity and the state’s relationship to the wider community.\(^{548}\)

So since 2013, Turkey started a phase of re-securitization of Kurdish issue with the resumption of large-scale hostilities. This escalated especially during the summer of 2015, after the end of the peace process that had started in 2013. As explained in chapter 4, re-securitization went together with an authoritarian drift of the Turkish government caused by several elements, including the overwhelming popular support to the AKP; the events of the Arab Spring that made the regime afraid of internal issues; and the Middle Eastern chaos that made the government feel in need of becoming more centralized and strong even if at the expenses of liberal elements of its democracy, such as free speech or the rule of law.

The year 2013 can be considered the pivotal year in the change of strategy of Turkey towards the Kurds and also of the reawakening of the ontological security. First of all in 2013 the threat of the Arab Spring came to Turkey, with the events of Gezi Park, but also its final failure (a part the Tunisian case) was completed, with the removal of Egyptian President elected Mohamed Morsi by the Egyptian military. This important event made Erdogan and the AKP feeling very much threatened as they became the last representatives, even if more moderate of the Muslim Brotherhood, of the political Islam approach to

democracy. Therefore we can affirm that the ontological security of the self-identity of the AKP, and with it of the Turkish state, started to reduce strongly since then.

Also, since 2013 the presence of ISIS in Syria and Iraq threatened not only the AKP government but the Turkish state in itself, at least on three levels: the territorial level, the state-identity level and the ideological level (the second two being connected with ontological security). First of all, the threat was territorial because the Syrian war and ISIS created space for Kurdish autonomy (the Rojava region since 2013). This facilitated the collaboration between the Syrian Kurdish forces of PYG and the Turkish ones of PKK, with exchange of people, weapons and goods (besides the already present exchange between the PKK and the Kurds in Iraq). Second, the threat was also related to the identity of the modern nation-state because suddenly it was possible for a proto-state to be born inside another state, like a type of “cancer” of a state even Turkey supported this cancer as a tool against the Assad regime in Syria (creating also a type of “cognitive dissonance” for Turkey). This showed as well that inside Turkey another proto-state could emerge from scratch, with a new Kurdish nationalism competing with Turkish nationalism. Finally, the threat was also ideological because increasingly due to the chaos in Syria and Iraq the PKK was organizing new forms of self-autonomy in some areas of Turkish Kurdistan (the so called “Democratic Autonomy in Northern Kurdistan”). These forms were based on alternative models with respect to the free market and at the same time a moderate Islamist model of the Turkish state, close to Marxist philosophy and communist views, even if somewhat different from them, being based on the “Democratic Confederalism” concept, influenced by communalism and libertarian socialism. This part

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551 Communalism is a libertarian socialist political philosophy created by American activist Murray Bookchin as a political system to complement “social ecology”, including also feminist positions. Communalism proposes that markets and money be abolished and that land and enterprises - i.e., private property - be placed increasingly in the custody of the community, with the custody of citizens in free assemblies and their delegates in confederal councils. See: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Communalism_(political_philosophy)
is not so much studied in the conflict between Turkey and the PKK, but it plays an important role on how Turkey configures the Kurdish issue in its southeastern regions.

Nevertheless, the AKP started a peace negotiation process with the PKK in 2013 in an attempt both to obtain more political support by the Kurds and to solve once and for all the Kurdish issue, which was becoming dangerous given the region’s geopolitical earthquakes. The negotiations would have solved—or at least contained—the Kurdish question and avoided a risk of spillover with uncontrollable consequences, as was happening in Syria with the birth of Rojava Kurdish autonomous region. However, when the AKP saw that the peace process did not bear the expected fruits, as the elections of 2015 were lost, the Kobane siege showed that Kurdish forces were growing in strength. As self-autonomous municipalities were developing in the Eastern part of the country, the ontological security of the government started to decline and with it the one of the state (given also the fact that Turkey became a dominant party system). This contributed to the AKP’s change in its strategy, ending the peace process and re-starting the securitization phase (see chapter 4 for more details on this).

Finally, the Kurdish internal ontological threat to Turkey came also from political forms, in particular with the entrance of the HDP, the pro-Kurdish party, in the Parliament for the first time in the summer of 2015. This represented a significant threat again both to the political power of the AKP and to its identity and so to its ontological security. This is because the pro-Kurdish HDP identity, close to the communalism and libertarian socialism concepts, challenges basic foundations of the new Turkey built since the Erdogan era, with a stronger Islamist approach and presidential system that Erdogan and the AKP want to create. Among other things, for example, the HDP has a co-presidential system of leadership, with one chairman and one chairwoman; a guarantee of a 50% quota to women and 10% to the LGTB community; and has a modern progressive identity very different—indeed, practically the opposite—from the Islamist conservative identity of the AKP. To block the “biographical narrative” (in Steele’s terms) of the HDP that threatens the “biographical narrative” of AKP and so its identity, President Erdogan and the AKP started to delegitimize and stigmatize the pro-Kurdish party since it entered in the Parliament. This process included passing a law to remove parliamentary immunity from
MPs under criminal investigation for terrorism, that means mostly HDP representatives, as also in the preamble of the draft bill the AKP accused HDP lawmakers of “providing physical, spiritual and moral support to terrorism” (see also chapter 4 on this).

Erdogan’s Narratives Expressing Ontological Insecurity

Returning to the main indicator that identifies the level of ontological security of a state—that is, narratives of the politicians and leaders in charge of decision-making—we can say that in the first decade of democratization these narratives showed some ontological security, based on a safe ‘self-identity’ and trust to the future for the solution of the Kurdish issue. However, in the period since 2013 and particularly since the summer of 2015, the narratives mostly of President Erdogan and the AKP indicate increasing fears of terrorism, connected with the Kurdish issue, sometimes expressed as a “siege or invasion” paranoia, understandable also because of the geopolitical facts of the region and recalling the old Sèvres Syndrome. Just to remember how this paranoia and fear were expressed in the first narratives of Turkish Republic, here is how Ataturk addressed the country’s youth in a speech in Ankara the 20th October of 1927 (still used today to make young generations understand what they have to do for their country):

Oh Turkish Youth! Your first duty is to preserve and defend forever Turkish independence and the Turkish Republic. This is the only foundation of your existence and of your future. This foundation is your most precious treasure. In the future, too, there will be malevolent people at home and abroad who will wish to deprive you of this treasure. If one day you have to defend your independence and your Republic, you will not tarry to weigh the circumstances before taking up your duty. These possibilities and circumstances may be extremely unfavorable. The enemies nursing designs against your independence and your republic, may have behind them a victory unprecedented in the annals of the world. It may come to pass that, by violence and ruse, all the fortresses of your beloved fatherland will be occupied, all its shipyards captured, all its armies dispersed, and every part of the country invaded. And what is sadder and graver than all these circumstances is that the people in power inside the country may be blind, misguided. They may even be traitors. The men in power may join their personal interest to the political designs of the invaders. The country may be impoverished, ruined and exhausted. Oh, Child of Turkey's future, even in these circumstances it is your duty to save Turkey's independence and the Turkish Republic. You will find the power you need in the noble blood in your veins.


The analyses specifically on Erdogan’s perspective and narrative on the Kurdish issue date back to the beginning of the 1990s, when he was chairman of Istanbul district networks of the Welfare Party. At that time, as reported by Unver, Erdogan prepared a report for the party about the Kurdish question, stating that:

What is termed as the ‘Eastern problem’ or ‘southeastern problem’ is in fact the ‘Kurdish problem’ [...] What is today defined as ‘the east’ or ‘southeast’ are in fact parts of what is historically known as Kurdistan. Kurdish is irrelevant to Turkish and is a language spoken exclusively by the Kurds. [...] Due to PKK attacks that began in 1985 [sic] the region is squeezed between state terror and PKK terror. The region’s people are put under sustained pressure and torture citing their alleged help to the PKK. The special forces’ activities in the region are almost non-legal.554

The report goes on suggesting revision of state policy towards the PKK, proposing a comprehensive approach based on “complete democracy and cultural plurality”. This is actually what the AKP did when it assumed power at the beginning of the new century.

However, since 2011 and particularly since 2013 events changed the attitude of the government towards the Kurdish question, and with that the narrative about the Kurdish issue. This does not meant that the narrative of Erdogan did not change during the first ten years, as it actually changed a lot depending on audience, contingent situations, and electoral calculus among other factors.555 However, the narrative did not seem to show a low level of ontological security for the first ten years of the AKP regime, thanks also to its increasing electoral success, the relative stability of the Middle East until the Arab Spring, the growing Turkish economy, and finally the restrained Kurdish separatist movement.

However, since 2013 the narrative of Erdogan, who had been Prime Minister for already ten years (and since 2014 became President) clearly became harsher, mistrustful and almost paranoid, often delegitimizing the Kurdish issue, increasingly putting together Kurdish requests with violent actions. His narrative also delegitimizing Kurdish politicians, considered close to known rebel fighters, and asserted their connection to external enemies. Even during the peace process Erdogan declared: “Turkey should

continue to conduct operations against those groups that shed blood in the interests of foreign countries. Indeed, when the PKK lays down its arms, operations will automatically stop.”

This got worse since 2015, with the growing number of terrorist attacks in Turkey from ISIS, often mixed with the Kurdish issue, either accusing the two parts of plotting together against the Turkish state or denying the fact that there is still a Kurdish issue in Turkey. Erdogan actually often says that there is no Kurdish issue in Turkey, just terrorism:

... in Turkey, there are those who have one-track minds: ‘Kurdish problem and Kurdish problem, Kurdish problem and Kurdish problem.’ You cannot get anyone to buy it (...). We closed this matter in my Diyarbakır speech in 2005. We said then, ‘There is no such problem in Turkey anymore, you cannot explain this to anybody. There is a terror problem in Turkey.’ And again: “What Kurdish question? There is no such thing anymore! What are you [Kurds] lacking? Have you been President in this country? You have! [...] What do you want? For God’s sake, what’s the difference you have from [Turks]? You have it all!”

Again the problem of low ontological security associates in the narrative with the problem of clear definition of Kurdish question. This in turn raises the question of what is the identity of Turkey and Turkishness in a new globalized and migratory world in which all national identities are “under threat”.

The clear tendency in Erdogan’s recent narrative is to equate all who support Kurdish autonomy as terrorists. For example, at the beginning of 2016, academics who signed a petition of “Academics for Peace”, to protest the military intervention against the PKK and civilians in the Eastern region, have been harassed and arrested. The day after the Ankara terrorist attack of March 2016 Erdogan declared that, “there was no difference between ‘a terrorist holding a gun or a bomb and those who use their position and pen to serve the aims’ of terrorists.”

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557 In a 2005 rally in Diyarbakır, Erdogan made a famous declaration that the answer to the Kurds’ long-running grievances was not repression but democracy. Unfortunately the democracy that Erdogan meant was the bus to step down when arrived to the last stop, as since 2011 and 2013 things have changed a lot for Turkish democracy and Kurdish issue.
559 Unver, Turkey’s Kurdish question, p. 166.
Also after the failed military coup in July 2016, Erdogan’s public pronouncements again illustrates relatively low ontological security. He accused external and internal enemies of plotting against him and Turkey, in particular the Gulen movement. In his speech after the failed coup he said: “We will not hand this country over to a few terrorists. We will fight this parallel state structure with our principle of a single state (…) The operation of getting rid of them, of cleansing our system, is under way.”

Actually, few months after the attempted coup, the state of emergency was still in place, and Erdogan declared that it could last even more than one year, as he said “this state needs time to be purged of these terrorist organizations’ extensions.”

Also nationalist and right wing parties (like the far-right Nationalist Movement Party/MHP) have taken their classical role of fueling the fear of a threat to Turkish identity and nation, having all the interest to create feelings of insecurity, following the typical nationalist right wing strategy to attract votes for more authoritarian and repressive policies. In 2015, for example, the leader of MHP, Bahçeli, compared the agreement between the HDP and the Turkish government during the Kurdish-Turkish peace process to the Treaty of Sèvres, saying that it “will lead to the collapse of the Turkish Republic.”

For these reasons, we can say that since 2011 but especially since the end of the peace process in 2015, the Turkish leadership’s narrative identified the Kurdish issue more and more as a terrorist threat, reviving the old concept of an internal enemy against the Turkish nation and Turkish identity. This shows once again a low level of ontological security.

Regarding the second element of Steele’s indicators, the discourse of international community, one can also see how Turkey manifests low ontological security. The president and government have reacted with angry declarations when some external power, in particular the EU, criticize Turkey

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regarding its democratic retrogression and the treatment of Kurds. Such insecurity also manifests in Turkey’s tense reactions to historical mistakes or possible errors that Turkey may have done.

One particular example that shows the pride of Turkey and its consequent feeling of external intrusion is the Armenian genocide during the First World War. Zarakol argues that precisely because of concerns of ontological security, states adopt strategies of denial as Turkey did with its denial of the Armenian genocide.\(^{564}\) Recently Germany joined the 29 states around the world, in particular in Europe, that officially recognized the genocide (Turkey and Azerbaijan are the only states that directly and officially deny it).\(^{565}\) As it has every time some state declares the existence of the Armenian genocide, Erdogan threatened Germany and the EU with serious economic, political and security consequences including withdrawal of the ambassador. Turkish history textbooks teach that the Armenians were traitors. Turks who have acknowledged the genocide, like the writer Orhan Pamuk, have faced criminal charges for “insulting Turkishness.”\(^{566}\) These behaviors and narratives again demonstrate a low level of ontological security, an inability to deal with its own past. Turkey cannot accept that the founding fathers may have committed mistakes or even atrocities, even if the international community increasingly say so. Nevertheless, to admit past errors is the only way for reconciliation with our past, for individuals as for countries. No country in the world can say to have been born with only good thoughts and righteous actions: think only about slavery in the United States for example.

Besides past issues, there also are current issues that make Turkish identity feel threatened by the actions and the narratives of the international community. For example, recently the Turkish government was angered when its closest Western ally, the US, started to support the YPG, the Kurdish faction in the Syrian war against ISIS. The Turkish narrative became very tense even about small issues, such as its


The conflictual relationship with the US worsened when Erdogan accused Fethullah Gulen, exiled in the US, to be responsible of the attempted coup in July 2016, calling for the US to arrest and extradite him: “Dear Mr. President: I told you this before. Either arrest Fethullah Gulen or return him to Turkey. You didn’t listen. I call on you again, after there was a coup attempt. Extradite this man in Pennsylvania to Turkey. If we are strategic partners or model partners, do what is necessary.”

In conclusion, one can say that the ontological security of Turkey since the democratization period grew at the beginning but later declined, in particular since 2009. With this decreasing sense of ontological security, the securitization of the Kurdish issue has increased. This suggests that there is an important relationship between this interacting variable and the final outcome.

**Indonesia: Ontological Security and Autonomization of Aceh**

Indonesia differs historically and geographically from Turkey’s situation. It is not the heir of a dismembered empire but a former Dutch colony. It is an archipelago of 17,000 islands that cannot be conquered completely or dismembered. Besides this, the Indonesian identity is pluralistic and diverse; is not caught between two competing realities (like West and East for Turkey); and relies on Asian values of harmony and balance and Islamic religious and ethical values of trust towards the future and “others”. Furthermore, the secularization process was not imposed from outside as it was in Turkey. Paradoxically, secularization did not hinder values of Indonesian faith and spirituality, but instead came from a tradition of religious pluralism and even religious syncretism. With this history and identity, Indonesia experienced a higher level of ontological security compared to Turkey in general. Nonetheless, the internal divisions of ethnic groups have always represented a possible threat to Indonesia’s national self-identity. During the period of dictatorship, as every authoritarian and military regime that does not feel legitimate or supported

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by its population, President Suharto often felt threatened and created enemies to justify to the population his authoritarian rule.569

Even if the traditional and historical ontological security of the country may have been at a higher level than the Turkish one, during its history the Indonesian state at times experienced anxieties, fears and almost a sense of paranoia. As explained in chapter 6 about geopolitics, the possible fears for Indonesia did not come from external enemies, but instead mostly from internal ones. Such fear of internal security threats had a great impact on the repression of ethnic minorities—besides the repression of the communist threat with the hundreds of thousands of killings during the 1960s—specifically the Acehnese minority because Aceh had a long history of rejecting foreign rule at any cost. However, while one can consider the communist threat an identity threat to the Indonesian state, ethnic concerns threatened territorial unity and sovereignty. This is another important difference between Indonesia and Turkey, even if this study does not examine it (as it does not look at the inclusion from the perspective of the ethnic minority): the history of the separatist movement, the causes for its rebellion, and how this affected the feeling of national or ontological security of the country.

As discussed in chapter 4, Acehnese rebellion arises from a distinct history as an independent kingdom from the 15th century and a progressive alienation of the population in reaction to Indonesian policies. These policies created extensive human rights abuses and the spoiling of resources and wealth by the central government.570 This made the Acehnese rebellion more a question of sovereignty than a question of identity,571 while the Kurdish one was related to territory but also with the recognition of Kurdish identity and even national participation to the political sphere. Therefore, the threat to the ontological security of the two countries can be considered different: the “Turkishness” felt threatened by Kurdish separatism while “Indonesiannes” was not, being more a threat to national sovereignty and

territorial integrity. This also can be seen in the different nature of the repression in Turkey and Indonesia: apart from the common direct violence in the military repression, the long term “structural violence” for Aceh was based more on an economic marginalization. For the Kurdish case it was more a cultural and symbolic violence. For these reasons one can say that historically Indonesia had stronger ontological security, foremost for its history, geography and identity but also for the type of ethnic rebellion that was more a territorial than an identity issue.

For example, during the 1958 rebellion in the “Outer Islands”, in particular Sumatra and Maluku with the “revolutionary governments” established by some rebel colonels, the ontological security did not feel threatened but the physical and national security, the territorial integrity and sovereignty of the Indonesian state was clearly threatened. For this reason, the state reacted with the repression.

However, in the 1960s the “safety and order” motto of the New Order regime of Suharto made security a fundamental element of the Indonesian state based on the control of “subversive forces” that at the time they were mostly Communist forces (in concert with US Cold War policies and the Vietnam War) and some ethnic minorities related to that. This created in some parts of the Indonesian state a sort of “political paranoia” of internal enemies, similar to the one of Turkey, which could have threatened an Indonesian identity based on democracy and national independence from foreign influence. During these times, therefore, one can consider Indonesia’s ontological security as at a low level. As a consequence the state resorted to securitization policies, in particular with the killings of 1965-66 targeting alleged communists but also ethnic Chinese whom the state associated with the same threat.

During decolonization and the subsequent annexation of East Timor in 1976 (as well as the starting of the GAM fight in Aceh), the Indonesian state seemed to experience again a threat to its

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national territory, similarly to the Outer Islands rebellion of the 1950s. Once again, however, the threat was not so much to its national identity or ontological security.

With the democratization process starting in 1998, the ontological security of Indonesia did not seem to decline much, at least at the beginning, even though the Indonesian state could have feared losing part of its national sovereignty with the risk of fragmentation into independence movements in different islands. Likewise, the delicacy of the transition could have jeopardized the stability of the country and its identity given the fact that the transition could have been amended or rewritten the constitution. Besides this, before the democratic transition the Asian financial crisis in 1997 could have made the state feel a low level of ontological security, given the problems of living in globalized times with external threats impacting the economies of nation-states. Therefore the securitization of minorities, with the escalation of violence under the Presidencies of Wahid and Megawati, could have been put in place not only to fight ethnic separatism but also to redress the ontological (in)security of the democratic transition and globalized times. However, in reality ontological insecurity did not seem to happen under the Megawati presidency that was affected by the Bali bombing and the US Global War on Terror after 9/11.

This surprisingly resilience of ontological security during Indonesia’s democratization happened, according to some scholars, because the risks of ethnic centrifugal force and the threat to Indonesian identity given by the democratic transition and globalization were counteracted by traditional local authorities who played an important role in maintaining a sense of security of the self-identity of the country. Bubant in particular argues that in Indonesia, the ontological insecurity created by globalizing forces as well as by the fight against secessions and terror, interacted with a “vernacular”, a local grassroots sense of “onto-political” security.\textsuperscript{575} Administrative decentralization, according to the scholar, opened new possibilities for traditional and local identities that gave some sense of self-security based on spirituality and custom besides the rational national approach to security. For this reason, instead of weakening the sense of the nation-state, decentralization reinforced the sense of security with former

bureaucrats who had “traditional legitimacy” (for example with sultanate titles). As he says: “against the rationalism of ‘securitization’, these neotraditional bureaucrats built an alternative political imaginary in which what they saw as a truly democratic tradition ensured ‘ontological security’.”

Besides this argument though (for which other evidence is shown in the previous chapter regarding decentralization during democratization), one can argue that the ontological security of Indonesia did not decline during the first phase of democratization in part due to the other factors analyzed in this study. First, the gradual transition maintained the old elites in spaces of power (see chapter 5 on this). Second, the international and geopolitical situation was stable, much more than in the Turkish case (see chapter 6 on this). Third, as previously discussed, Indonesia has historically experienced a traditionally higher level of ontological security in its institutions (see chapter 7 on this). Finally, with the democratization process there was little disruption of older routines and identity (in contrast to Turkey with the reinsertion of Islamic identity with AKP regime) as the old routines of a pluralistic identity were maintained and even reinforced with the democratization process (see chapter 4 on this). Also, the “Aceh openings” of peace negotiations did not seem to create peace anxieties as they did in the Kurdish case. Aceh did not have a national party threatening Indonesian identity, as in the HDP case. Therefore, we can conclude that the ontological security of Indonesia, differently from the one of Turkey, remained robust during the time of democratization. This in turn contributed to open space for the decentralization process, and specifically for the autonomization of Aceh.

**Narratives of Indonesian Presidents in Democratic Transition**

How specifically did the first presidents of the Indonesian democratic transition express the feeling of ontological security of the country towards the ethnic minorities and in particular Aceh? As recounted in chapter 4, during the first phase of democratic transition Indonesia had two presidents: Habibie, between May 1998 and October 1999, and Wahid, between October 1999 and July 2001. Their narratives did not show much fears and anxiety toward the ontological security of the Indonesian state as

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576 Ibid., p. 2.
they did during Suharto’s time, even if the second President escalated the violence against Acehnese separatism. Habibie was a supporter of human rights and democracy. As some scholars argue, Indonesia was lucky to have him to manage the country in transition, a trained engineer with managerial capacity but without political ambitions, with a leadership style based on a relaxation process and approximation approach.\(^{577}\) Habibie was a technocrat, an intellectual even if devoted Muslim, educated in Germany where he had a career as engineer. He was a disciple of Suharto but Suharto (together with many other Javanese people) considered him a traitor when he supported the referendum in East Timor that gave independence to one province of Indonesia that moreover had a Roman-Catholic majority.

In some of his speeches we can see his approach of pluralism and lack of fear of dismemberment or ontological insecurity. At the opening of an Asian-German Editors Forum in February of 1999, he said that “Indonesia is like one huge piece of sponge which absorbs every new cultural strain and in the process strengthens itself. (...) We will not declare Indonesia a Muslim state even though 95 per cent of the Indonesians are Muslims” confirming that Indonesia will always follow its secularism and state ideology of Pancasila.\(^{578}\) He also said at the same time that “burning churches is unnatural to them”\(^{579}\) (Indonesians) explaining that these acts were done by criminals and troublemakers not because of some type of sectarian conflicts.

Wahid, the first President of Indonesia elected by the Parliament, was instead a Muslim religious, long-time president of the religious association Nahdlatul Ulama, who had created a new party after the Reformasi (besides the three parties that existed during Suharto regime). He had won just for few votes more than Megawati. His presidency was affected by party and elites competition, who among other objections did not want a party full of Nahdlatul Ulama people ruling the country. Differently from

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\(^{578}\) Zainon Ahmad, “Habibie - the 'unpresidential' master of Indonesian politics”, *New Sunday Times*, 21 February 1999, accessed October 11, 2016, [https://www.library.ohiou.edu/indopubs/1999/02/21/0018.html](https://www.library.ohiou.edu/indopubs/1999/02/21/0018.html).

\(^{579}\) Ibid.
Habibi he was not able to manage very well the centrifugal forces and fear of national disintegration added to growing opposition to him.\textsuperscript{580}

His speeches towards the end of his presidency showed a defiant attitude towards the risk of “national disintegration”, that was the criticism and narrative of fear (justified by the rise of collective violence in the country) of some political elites: “I know Indonesia. I know what they want. The public as well as the armed forces are behind me.”\textsuperscript{581} But actually the risk of instability made the military to remove him one year after he was elected, when he decided finally to declare the state of emergency in July 2001, substituting him with the first woman president, Megawati (see chapter 4). During the presidency of Megawati in 2003-04, the Aceh conflict passed through its most brutal period, showing a worry not only about national sovereignty but also about foreign interference: Megawati tried to connect the Aceh rebellion to international terrorism.\textsuperscript{582}

In her narrative at the beginning there was more trust and wish to accommodate than the previous President even if maintaining firmness on the national unity: “Concerning the intention of some citizens to separate from Indonesia, in my opinion there is no country in the world that would tolerate, disintegration (…) I believe that we can provide more room for people to regulate themselves especially during the implementation of regional autonomy.”\textsuperscript{583}

But one year after President Megawati was elected, she had to answer to the Bali bombing in October 2002 that made her policies evolve. As the 1960s fear of communism encouraged Indonesia to follow US Cold War policies, now the fear of Islamic extremism aligned Indonesia with the US Global War on Terror, an alignment that could have affected the ontological security of Indonesian state and shifted its internal security policies. However, according to some scholars, US global politics that always


\textsuperscript{581} Ibid.

\textsuperscript{582} Dewi Fortuna Anwar and Bridget Welsh, \textit{Democracy Take-Off}, 2013, p. 214.

\textsuperscript{583} “Megawati Pledges National Unity”, \textit{The Jakarta Post}, June 1, 2001, accessed October 13, 2016, https://www.library.ohiou.edu/indopubs/2001/06/01/0046.html
considered Indonesia as the key actor in Southeast Asian security played a major role in this shift.\textsuperscript{584} As fundamentalist Islam did not plant any root in Indonesia, like communism instead had in the 1960s, the Bali bombing was used as an occasion for the re-securitization of ethnic minorities like in the New Order during Suharto.

After the Bali bombing, the government started to define GAM as a terrorist group in order to make it an “existential threat” to the state that had to be repressed. As a strong believer in a unitary state, Megawati was afraid that the terrorist attacks might contribute to the chaos of ethnic independence movements. For this reason, she increased the securitization of ethnic minorities with a new hard line against sectarian violence, in particular in Sulawesi, Maluku, Papua, and especially Aceh. She famously made a speech in Aceh on July 30, 1999, before being elected, declaring “for the people of Aceh, believe me, I will not let a single drop of blood spilled in Aceh.”\textsuperscript{585} However, in reality she was the President that escalated the securitization of Acehnese, sending 40,000 troops to Aceh, in the framework of the martial law between 2002 and 2003.

When a military officer, Susilo Bambang Yudoyono, a retired Army general, attained power in 2004, Indonesia’s ontological security seemed to improve once again. First of all, military elites got again some form of power even if not in a position of a “dual function” anymore (see chapter 5 on this). The ruling general gave the population the ontological security of a gradual and stable transition. Second, the decentralization process started to bear its fruits. Special regional autonomies gave to the minorities the satisfaction of the needs they had requested. Finally, the fear of terrorism that started at the end of 2002 and the reaction of Megawati Presidency were reduced. This contributed therefore to make the peace process with Aceh successful in finding a final positive solution after the Tsunami disaster.

\textsuperscript{584} Dibb, Paul, “Indonesia: The Key to Southeast Asia’s Security”, \textit{International Affairs}, 77(4) 2001: 829-842.
\textsuperscript{585} Megawati speech in Aceh, from \textit{Atjehcyber.net}, July 30, 1999 (published in 2013) accessed October 13, 2016, \url{http://www.atjehcyber.net/2012/08/janji-cut-nyak-megawati-di-tanah-serambi.html#ixzz4CLrvDR7A}
Therefore even if Yudoyono, when Minister for Political, Social and Security in Megawati presidency, had said that “armed revolt can never be resolved through dialogue,” after the Tsunami he declared: “The time for peace - real peace, permanent peace - is now.”

We can conclude that in Indonesia, as in Turkey, the state’s ontological security varied during its history and corresponded with periodic intensification of securitizing policies. However, with democratization the ontological security did not decline much, apart from the period between the Bali bombing and the end of Megawati presidency. This pushed the government to strengthen the process of peace negotiations and a final autonomization that failed to materialize in Turkey.

Conclusions

The goal of this chapter was not to prove or disprove the ontological security thesis. It is a relatively new theoretical approach to apply emotions and psychological issues to a state, which in part explains why scholars have not yet effectively measured what it means or operationalized the variable in a clear way. Nonetheless, the chapter composed a plausible argument regarding ontological security in Turkey and Indonesia. It found sufficient evidence that suggests ontological security is a driving factor in the treatment of ethnic minorities in both countries, but specifically in Turkey where the Kurdish issue was also an identity issue, not one of territory, security or sovereignty. It is also important to stress that ontological security is different from the other variables of this study because it is a socio-psycho-ideational explanation, not a rationalist-materialist one like the others. Besides this, ontological security cannot be considered an independent variable like the others but more an interacting variable that recursively affects the materialist factors of elites and international structure.

At least three elements impact the ontological security of a country: geography, history and identity. Regarding geography, if the country is in a stable area ontological security will be higher. Also,

the geographic form of the country could have an impact: to be a flat country makes invasions easier than
being a mountainous one; to be an island makes invasions more difficult. Island countries should be more
worried of dismemberment but they cannot be conquered completely, so this make the ontological
security of the country stronger. For example, Turkey has more fear of conquest, fragmentation and
dismemberment by foreign powers than. But ontological security is shaped by history as much as by
geography. Turkey has been historically fearful because of how it emerged from an empire dismembered
by foreign powers, while Indonesia gained independence as a whole. Also, the type of identity can create
a higher or lower ontological security. A loose island country such as Indonesia, even if it is a unitary
state like Turkey, is founded on a pluralistic identity. It never has had a sense of ethnic homogeneity and
closed identity from which the fear of losing identity might arise.

In conclusion, we can say here that for Turkey its sense of self-identity, based on the Kemalist
secular nationalist philosophy but also on military strength, had been more or less stable for seven
decades, since its foundation at least until the 1990s and in particular the 2000s, when the first moderate
Islamist party was elected and a real democratization started. The democratization that brought the
inclusion of Islamic identity and a first attempt to include Kurdish identity (at least with cultural rights if
not self-rule and local autonomy) required the Turkish identity to transform and adapt to a new reality.
This could have challenged the self-identity of Turkey with new anxieties that threatened the ontological
security of Turkey. In reality, economic growth and the new approach to foreign policy (Turkey had been
quite isolated until then but with the new century started a new assertive diplomatic approach based on
the so called “zero-problem with neighbors”) made its ontological security remain more or less stable and
even increase. Later though, as the regional situation started to change, the events of the Arab Spring and
the regional turmoil introduced new tensions to the sense of Turkish self-identity, causing the old
ontological insecurity to re-emerge.

Based on Pancasilla nationalist philosophy and military strength, Indonesia also had a stable
sense of identity for five decades, from decolonization until the end of the dictatorship. When
democratization started, however, there was a new need of inclusion of ethnic minorities. This resulted in
administrative decentralization and some form of local autonomy even if not cultural rights at national level. This process of decentralization occurred in a rather fluid and changing international (from end of Cold War to Asian economic crisis) and internal environments (from decentralization to referendum for independence of East Timor). At the beginning these could have created some insecurity in the self-identity of Indonesia, but in fact did not reduce much its level of ontological security. Its sense of self-identity and so its ontological security maintained their strength.

Hence, we could say that with the beginning of democratization in the 20th century the level of ontological security of the two countries went in the same direction at the beginning but then changed direction: Turkey after few years went back to its traditional ontological insecurity, in particular due to the Middle Eastern chaos and the threat of trans-border terrorism. By contrast, Indonesia kept its ontological security towards traditional higher levels thanks to decentralization, the stability of the region and an ethnic minority whose threat was more territorial than related with identity. These different levels of ontological security therefore had an impact in the opposite treatment of the ethnic minorities analyzed in this study: the Kurdish securitization and the Acehnese autonomization.
CHAPTER 9
CONCLUSIONS

These conclusions are divided in three short parts, exploring three different questions. First, the chapter provides a summary of the findings in order to see if one of the different hypotheses contributes more to securitization or autonomization than the others, or which variables is either a necessary or sufficient cause of the outcomes.\(^{589}\) The second section is dedicated to meta-questions asking why both assimilation and multiculturalism (of which securitization and autonomization are extreme parts on the continuum) are not sufficient to solve conflict with ethnic minorities not only in fledgling but also mature democracies,. The final section discusses next possible steps or future research that can contribute to our understanding of securitization and autonomization, in particular with rival explanations and with new case studies.

Summary of the Findings

Let us briefly review the findings for each of the four approaches analyzed in this study to assess the impact of the different variables and, in particular, if any of these variables are either necessary or sufficient. First, we can fairly say that none of them are necessary and sufficient, as none of them alone can cause the outcome of the dependent variable studied here: they are not uniquely sufficient to cause either securitization or autonomization. Nevertheless, one of them seems necessary: in both Indonesia and Turkey, low levels of ontological security correspond strongly to securitization, while high levels associate strongly with autonomization. The other independent variables seem neither exclusively sufficient nor exclusively necessary, as we can have either securitization or autonomization without any one of them—elites who rationally seek political gains; international factors such as diasporas,

\(^{589}\) A “necessary and sufficient” independent variable means that a dependent variable (the outcome) happens only if that independent variable is present (necessary) and no other variables are necessary (sufficient). See on this: Causal Reasoning, Inquiry for Scientific Thinking and Reasoning, iSTAR Assessment, [http://www.istarassessment.org/srdims/causal-reasoning-2/](http://www.istarassessment.org/srdims/causal-reasoning-2/) accessed November 1, 2016.
intergovernmental organizations, or nearby civil strife; and historical institutions that reproduce an
exclusive conception of the political community.

Which of the four approaches seems therefore more persuasive? In a sense we can say that the
study finds evidence for all four approaches, even if with different impact in different periods. So we can
fairly state that these different factors have a synergistic, complex and dynamic interaction that impacts
securitization and autonomization. In particular, we can say that the historical institutionalist variables
and the ontological security variables are more background variables (changing slower with respect to the
other two) while the international environment and the elite power variables are more contingent variables
(changing faster respect to the other two) that can drive the timing of the securitization or autonomization.
Therefore, the four approaches of the independent variables arguably are complementary. However, the
ontological security variable can be understood as an interacting variable, one that impacts and is
impacted by the other independent variables, in particular by the ways elites compete for power.

In fact, elites’ competition and ontological security interact in a surprising way: when ontological
security is low, the fear of the minority becomes a political tool that elites may use in competition for
power—for example, elites can compete for the claim to be the protectors of the state or repressors of
minorities. But the opposite can be true too: elites can create fear of minorities to legitimate their policies,
in turn exacerbating ontological insecurity. Elites may use the strategy of “othering” to achieve their
goals. This can be seen today not only in the case studies researched here but also in mature democracies:
in Europe or North America many politicians appeal to the people in a populist and demagogic way,
creating the fear of Muslim minorities and so reducing the country’s ontological security, as part of party
competition and power struggle.

Therefore ontological security can go in two directions: when it is high it pushes the state towards
autonomization and when it is low towards securitization, but also elites can create lower level of
ontological security as part of their struggle for power, in a self-reinforcing dynamic. The interaction of
ontological security with this other variable is not a linear process. It is characterized by feedbacks that
may amplify securitization: cultural fear may legitimate the state securitization, while elites’ power
struggles can manufacture cultural fear. The theoretical model of this study therefore is not a simple “additive relation” between independent variables, as the variables of elites and ontological security can work together in a reinforcing dynamic, shaping the model in a more nuanced way.

Let us do a small excursus now specifically on the impact of the different variables. For the case of Turkey, in particular for the first variable, the study found that the reduction in the authority and power of military elites represents an important explanation of policy shifts, as well as the fact that the state remained a centralized state after moderate Islamists took power. The new Islamist elites needed the support of Kurdish minority for its plan for power and Islamist reintegration, and so started with engagement and accommodation. When the elites failed to get this support, they opted for securitization. Having a very centralized state, the costs of repression in Turkey were still lower than the costs of toleration, for which reason it was to restart the securitization.

For the second variable composed by geopolitical issues, the international community and diaspora, the study finds that regional wars and transborder Kurds kinship; the reduced European pressure because of Cyprus veto and refugee crisis; and the lack of an active diaspora in the solution of the conflict pushed the state towards the final securitization of the Kurdish minority.

For the third variable, a history of nationalist and exclusive institutions created a path dependency for Turkey that did not allow for much accommodation with minorities. In Turkey, because the nation preceded the state formation, citizenship laws emphasize group rights and a nationalist-assimilationist model. For this reason, Turkey is an ethnic democracy that associates rights with ethnic groups, predominantly the Turkish ethnicity. Even when Turkey, with the new Islamist elites in power during the last democratization, engaged in some form of accommodation for Kurds, it refused to talk about another official language in the country or another language taught in the publish schools or any type of territorial decentralization. The absence of these accommodations reflects Turkey’s history as an ethnically defined nation prior to the establishment of modern state institutions. To allow such accommodations would require a reconceptualization of the nature of the nation.
Finally, for the fourth variable Turkey had an historically low level of ontological security. This arises from the historical implosion of the Ottoman Empire; a delicate geopolitical position between Europe, Russia and the Middle East; a complicated and complex identity with a Western model to follow and an Eastern identity to avoid; and finally values of unity and homogeneity that traditionally excluded tolerance of diversity. Inclusion of the Islamist identity in mainstream politics and starting the peace process did not seem to reduce too much the ontological security as expected, but the turmoil after the Arab Spring in neighboring countries did contribute to reduce it.

Regarding the Indonesian case, in particular for the first variable, the study found that the power shift from military nationalist elites to the new elites was more gradual. Notably, Indonesia did not have an Islamist party coming to power like as occurred in Turkey. Besides this, the secular nationalist elites did not need Acehnese support for their national power so at beginning continued policies of repression and securitization, in large part due to fears of disintegration. But when decentralization occurred, the costs of repression increased with respect to the cost of toleration, for which reason it was rational to accommodate and autonomize the minority.

For the second variable regarding the geopolitical situation, the study finds that the lack of regional spillover and the example of repression in East Timor producing independence favored policies of autonomy. Regarding the international community and the diaspora, the study finds that the active role of NGOs as well as the diaspora in Aceh (but not the involvement of foreign governments or international organizations) played a positive role in the solution of the conflict and the autonomization of the region.

For the third variable, the inclusive type of historical institutions in Indonesia opened space for inclusion of the Aceh in the long run, and in particular allowed for decentralization when democratization arrived. In Indonesia, the state formation preceded the nation formation, the citizenship adopted a communitarian-liberal model of accommodation. Because of this history, Indonesia is not an ethnic democracy based on a singular ethnic group as Turkey is. This conceptualization of the nation is more favorable to policies of autonomization.
Finally for the fourth variable, Indonesia experienced a high level of ontological security, being an archipelago difficult to conquer, a history of trade and exchange, a pluralistic identity and Asian values of tolerance and harmony in diversity. Although the processes of democratization and decentralization happening in a rather fluid and changing international and internal environments could have created some insecurity in the self-identity of Indonesia, in fact these did not reduce its level of ontological security.

In conclusion, we can say that for the Turkish case the international factors of instability and minority kinship in the Middle Eastern region, supported by structural historical preconditions of exclusive nationalist institutions and low ontological security—itself reduced by the regional situation besides the historical identity—made it rational during the democratization period for elites to go towards the solution of the minority conflict with a previous attempt of autonomization but a final action of securitization.

Regarding the Indonesian case, the relatively isolated environment and the interests of the international community; structural preconditions of inclusive-decentralized nationalist institutions; high ontological security; and specific circumstances (in particular the Tsunami disaster), made the elites during the democratization process go towards a final autonomization for Aceh.

In table 3 these results are schematically compared. As we can see the different factors interact, in a synergistic, complex and dynamic interrelation that suggests all the variables affect the final outcomes. No variable is either exclusively sufficient or exclusively necessary, as we can have either securitization or autonomization without any one of them. Nevertheless, one of them seems necessary: in both Indonesia and Turkey, low levels of ontological security correspond strongly to securitization across times, while high levels associate strongly with autonomization.
### Table 3: Results of comparison

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Theories</th>
<th>Impact on Turkey</th>
<th>Impact on Indonesia</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Rational choice theory</td>
<td>Hypothesis 1 (Elites’ power struggle)</td>
<td>+ Securitization</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>International-geopolitical structuralist theories</td>
<td>Hypothesis 2 (External security threat)</td>
<td>+ Securitization</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>International-geopolitical structuralist theories</td>
<td>Hypothesis 3 (External actors intervention)</td>
<td>+ Securitization</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Historical-institutionalist theory</td>
<td>Hypothesis 4 (Indonesia former colony Turkey Mediaeval born institutions)</td>
<td>+ Securitization</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Critical theories</td>
<td>Hypothesis 5 (Ontological security, when low securitization)</td>
<td>++ Securitization</td>
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Therefore, we can conclude that prescriptive elements or policy suggestions to fledgling democracies facing the challenge of inclusion of minorities, in particular if there is an open armed conflict with a self-determination movement of the minority, should go towards intervention of external mediators, processes of decentralization, and a gradual transition of power among elites, hoping to have inclusive historical institutions, a peaceful and secure regional situation and a trustful country history that make high levels of ontological security.

Some Meta Questions

The first meta question that comes out of the research starts from the point that the two cases studied here are both newly democratized states. A possible question to ask is what is it about transitional or emerging democracies that make them more susceptible to securitization and autonomization? Is there something about transitional democracies that make them vulnerable to this?

One explanation could be that electoral competition creates incentives for short-terms policies and gains. As the book Electing to Fight\textsuperscript{590} shows, when a new democracy starts the electoral competition, the different parties tend to have conflicting relationships. This in turn could facilitate an environment of securitization, but would not explain the autonomization. Another factor could be that democratizing states need to come into terms with the level of inclusiveness in the society. As Fukuyama writes, “identities can also be altered to fit the realities of power politics or established around expansive ideas like that of democracy itself that minimize exclusion of minorities from the national community.”\textsuperscript{591}

Beside the intrinsic value of inclusiveness, there is also a pragmatic reason for the inclusion of minorities in new democracies: in democracy, without the support of the different parts of society, ethnic minorities included, new parties cannot build coalitions that win elections. This clearly has been one of the reasons for the process of autonomization for the Kurds. At the same time, if the support of the ethnic minority is

\textsuperscript{590} Edward D Mansfield and Jack L Snyder, Electing to fight: why emerging democracies go to war, (Cambridge: MIT Press, 2005).

lost, the government and its elites may resort to violence and repression to maintain order in a relatively fragile emerging democracy. This has been one of the reasons for the process of securitization after the peace process with Kurds failed to produce electoral benefits for the governing parties in Turkey.

Nevertheless, early in the research the study noted that autonomization and securitization are extreme points on the continuum between multiculturalism and assimilation. These can be defined as the two principal policies in mature democracies that deal today with immigrant minorities. So abstracting from this point another meta question to ask is: why are assimilation and multiculturalism insufficient to solve conflict with ethnic minorities in mature democracies today? The tentative answer is that both fail to produce sufficient inclusion and incorporation. Both can be considered failure of the inclusion of minorities as they are not really integrating the minorities in the polity and the society, either suppressing their identity or allowing them to keep it but without integrating in the national society in its whole.

Today, we see these examples in Europe. The assimilationist approach in France and the multiculturalist approach in UK failed to build a real integration of migrants with autochthonous identities. On one side is the forcing of a common identity (assimilation), and on the other side is the classification in cultural boxes (multiculturalism). Both failed to recognize diversity and at the same time give equal rights for a full citizenship. An ideal policy would take the good sides of each system: the maintenance of cultural identities of multiculturalism and the equality in a society of citizens of the assimilationist model. In reality, on the European continent, we are looking nowadays at embryonic developments of different types of policies, sometimes with the securitization of new migrants, with their constant control and even repression (like a mutation of failed assimilation) and sometimes with their autonomization, with their attempted repatriation (like a mutation of failed multiculturalism). However, neither one seems a very wise and efficient solution for the future. So are France, Belgium, Hungary and even the US, moving towards the securitization model?

On the other side devolution or decentralization has been a process in many states, not only states with ethnic minorities: for example, Italy and Spain have autonomous regions and communities but they are not specifically related to ethnic minorities concentrated in these areas. A real process of
autonomization for ethnic minorities seems difficult in mature democracies because of the historical spread of ethnic minorities throughout the country rather than their settlement in specific regions.

Furthermore the urbanization of communities and the large settlement of ethnic minorities in cities makes autonomization impractical as one cannot separate out the different communities within the metropolitan area. One cannot envision a Kurdish autonomous area in Istanbul any more than one can foresee a Turkish autonomous area in Berlin.

Besides history, geography also matters: the placement of Aceh as the tip of an island made autonomization a feasible strategy. Not many countries are like that. But there are mature democracies that do have conflicts with ethnic minorities concentrated in specific regions and have solved them either with autonomization or securitization. So the question now is which mature democracies have succeeded in finding a solution for the autonomization of ethnic minorities, as Indonesia did with Aceh, and which ones have failed going towards securitization of the minority as Turkey did?

Regarding the first question, we need to look in particular at UK with Northern Ireland. Northern Ireland started as political and nationalist conflict but it had also an ethnic and religious dimension. It was primarily a sovereignty and territorial issue, similarly to the case of Acehnese, and actually ended in a similar way with an autonomous region inside the UK since 1998, after around 30 years of war. In fact, one could argue that also the establishment of the Republic of Ireland as the Free Irish State in 1922 is an important historical example of autonomization. By contrast, the physical barriers in Belfast manifest the securitization of Catholics in Northern Ireland during the “troubles”.

Regarding the second question, Sri Lanka with the Tamil minority seems a similar example to Turkey. Even if the minority conflict was in reality a civil war between the national government and the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam that had the total control over an entire region, and even if the Tamil language is one of the two national languages, the securitization of Tamils has been evident during the history of the conflict and with the end of it after 26 years. The national government crushed the armed Tamils with a final offensive in the north of the island in 2009, and as a result no autonomous region was created for the Tamil people. To study these cases could bring new insights into the causal analysis
studied here, besides the general view that when the minority is concentrated in a specific region and it does not threaten national politics, governments tend to accept some form of autonomization. In the opposite case, securitization is preferred by the state to deal and solve the ethnic minority struggle.

Finally, the narrative of the War on Terror legitimated and often facilitated securitization of autochthonous or migrant minorities, in fledgling democracies, from the Philippines to Thailand, from Pakistan to Myanmar. Recent terrorist attacks in Europe, supposedly by ISIS even if many times the terrorists are just lone wolves, actually give governments of mature democracies new ways to securitize Islamic minorities. From the current securitization of Muslims in the UK and France592 to the US, with its recent ban on citizens from seven Muslim Middle Eastern countries, this is often the discourse before the securitization of immigrant minorities, not the threat of minorities in itself. So the question would be: Is combating terrorism in reality a disguise for the securitization of minorities, either ethnic or religious? To answer this question, we need to understand that an important factor in this process of identification of the minorities with terrorism is the depiction of the threat through media, which delegitimizes the minority with the terrorist discourse. Therefore, a deeper critical study of the rhetoric of securitization would be required. “Speech acts” construct securitization in terms of terrorism rather than in terms of minorities, which can be an excuse just to disguise more social control and power.

Rival Explanations and Next Steps

In conclusion, we can ask ourselves where this research may take us. What are the rival explanations that can be studied, what the next steps that can be done, and what other examples in the world this research might help us to understand?

Regarding the variables and explanations, besides the four hypothesis tested, the study acknowledges that there are at least four other rival explanations.

First of all, the action of individual leaders, not necessarily based on rational choice or ontological security but maybe on personal characteristics or biases, may have mattered. Therefore, a future agency-oriented perspective on the treatment of ethnic minorities in these countries might be a useful approach to expand the research.

Second, the political culture and ideology of both the government in place and the minority armed group might be important too in the final outcome. The fact that the Kurdish minority struggle had for long time a Marxist approach to the independence movement may have played a role in a country like Turkey, where Western capitalism and Islam were both against such socialist philosophies. For this reason, this study suggests that future research should look also at the role of political culture and ideology in the resolution of the minority conflict, and in its consequent inclusion or exclusion of ethnic minorities.

Third, socioeconomic elements may have played an important role in securitization versus autonomization. We could study, for example, to what degree the socioeconomic class of the minority and the wealth of the region affected the dynamics between the minority and the state. We could ask to what degree the lower economic level of the Kurds in Turkey, versus the more favorable status of Acehnese in Indonesia, may have influenced the different outcomes. Or to what degree the richness of the territory in Aceh, with its natural resources, and the poverty of Kurdistan region may have played a role. In theory, the outcome should have been the opposite: the securitization should have gone towards the richer area of Aceh and not the poorest one of Kurdistan, but a deeper study should be done to have evidence.

Fourth, as said at the beginning, the most evident geographic and demographic elements—the fact that one minority, the Kurds, makes around 20 percent of the state population and is located in a large part of the country adjacent neighboring states with Kurds, while the other, the Acehnese, make just 1.4 percent of the national population and is located on the tip of one of the many islands—may have had the biggest consequence for the final exclusion/inclusion of these minorities.

Another possibility would be to study how the state may use the treatment of ethnic minorities for foreign policy purposes. For example, we could argue that Turkey used the Kurdish question before in a
positive way, to improve its position toward the European membership, and then in a negative one, to legitimate intervention in Syria. In service to the aspiration of being a strong regional power, Turkey could have the need to legitimize its interventions in Syria and Iraq, so the securitization of the Kurdish issue could become a tool of foreign policy. In such a case, the terrorist narrative may serve not only for internal repression but also for external interventions (as we saw already with other great power militaries intervention abroad, like US, Russia or Israel). Nevertheless, it is more difficult to explain a domestic policy action with foreign policy goals when the minority has no kinship and subsequent spill-over effects in neighboring countries, like in the Indonesian case.

Other possible researches may also develop a better theoretical understanding of different kinds of securitization and autonimization, given the fact that the types of repression or accommodation of ethnic minorities may take different paths inside the continuum between assimilation and multiculturalism. Also, another nuance to study would be the different impact of the majority of the voters on the rational choice of elites. In the Turkish case, we could research how the majority of the Turks, not only the Kurds, voted towards the AKP after the Turkish engagement with the Kurdish minority, if supporting it or not. In the Indonesian case again by contrast, this specificity would be less important probably, as the majority of Indonesian voters didn’t feel affected too much by the negotiations with the Aceh region, suggesting voter preferences favored autonimization rather than securitization.

This study may help us also to analyze other case studies. As explained in chapter three on methodology, the choice of these two countries is based on commonalities that serve as control variables, nevertheless, other countries could be included in the comparison. First of all past cases like as said Northern Ireland and Sri Lanka. Looking at other Muslim majority countries that are current democratizing, we could ask: would we have different conclusions if we had different cases? The particular models studied here are obviously contextual models, appropriate in particular areas, so what would be the outcomes if the conditions in which those models worked would not be there anymore? This could be an important extension of the research first of all for countries like Senegal and Kirgizstan, which have a strong ethnic minority with a history of conflict and a recent democratization process (see
chapter 3 on this). Also Bangladesh, Pakistan and Malaysia, even if with a more limited success in democratization, could represent some of the case studies to expand the analysis.

This study controlled for the religious variable to open space for the possibility of expanding the research to non-Muslim majority countries that have a multicultural/pluralistic society trying to build a democratic polity. New independent states like Montenegro and South Sudan, for example, have very heterogeneous societies at the ethnic level but are religiously homogenous, with a majority of Christians. These countries could be studied in order to see how they deal with the ethnic minorities, if in a multicultural or assimilationist way. A concluding speculative question would be: would we see these tensions in other democratizing states that are not Muslim majority countries? What would be the result of these tension? Researchers may wish to look into this in the future.

Concluding the study, we can say that the level of inclusiveness remains a, or probably the, fundamental criteria for the substantiality, meaningfulness and sustainability of a democracy. Actually the most important implication of this research is that Turkish democratization process with the new AKP regime finally failed also, and probably especially, because of the final inability to completely include the Kurdish minority in the Turkish state, society and polity. On the other side the Indonesian democratization process finally succeeded also, and probably especially, because of the final ability to include all the minorities, first of all the Acehnese one, in the state, society and polity.

But the results of this study also imply that we should be worried today about the democratic decline we are seeing not only in fledgling but also in mature democracies, that both arises from and contributes to the lack of inclusion of minorities in a reinforcing cycle of exclusion and democratic regression. Elements of polarization; populism; the poverty of middle class and economic inequality; globalization with its complex interactions and domestic effects; institutional weakness of states; and ontological insecurity of nations because of the increasingly complex and chaotic world, create challenges for societies to maintain the social contract at the base of a democratic state. Besides this, the lack of visionary leaderships makes the agency of individuals another crucial factor in the retrocession of democracies. In post-modern liberal democracies, leaders do not guide masses anymore: they mirror
them. This is creating more and more problems for the inclusion of minorities, in particular immigrants, who leaders and citizens alike often scapegoat for internal problems of economy or political crisis.

Although this study is about emerging democracies, it is evident that there is a growing backlash against minorities in mature democracies as well, including Western liberal democracies, as recent events show. All countries are passing through the current complex transitional phase of a cultural reaction against liberalism that could reverse the democratic future to a past of racism, nationalism, and securitization of minorities, in particular immigrant ones. Populist movements in Europe, from France to Austria, from Hungary to Italy, are increasingly proposing the securitization of minorities. Even in the US there could be problems of securitization, as evidenced by the Trump Administration’s proposal to remove three million undocumented immigrants, besides the ban on Muslim countries.

The nation-state as an institution has less than 400 years of history, and as with all the predecessors (city-states, kingdoms, secular or religious empires) it will not be eternal. New supranational states are seeing the light, first of all the European Union, but also organizations like ASEAN or Shangai Cooperation Organization. Mono-ethnic identities of traditional European model are challenged by different nations-state model with a more pluralistic identity, from Asia (India) to Africa (several states in Central Africa), from the Middle East (Afghanistan) to North-America (Canada). Although the future is unpredictable, if globalization and migrations are unstoppable phenomena and democracy has to be inclusive to evolve, then multinational, supranational or other forms of pluralistic states shall see the light as new forms of polities and social contracts, to continue to bend the arc of history toward human liberation and justice.
APPENDIX

Data for Ethnic and Religious diversity in Table 1: Level of democracy and principal control variables

* Ethnic diversity

-Burkina Faso: Mossi 52.5%, Fulani 8.4%, Gurma 6.8%, Bobo 4.8%, Gurunsi 4.5%, Senufo 4.4%, Bissa 3.9%, Lobi 2.5%, Dagara 2.4%, Tuareg/Bella 1.9%, Dioula 0.8%, other 7%
-Indonesia: Javanese 40%, Sundanese 15.5%, Malay 3.7%, Batak 3.6%, Madurese 3%, Betawi 2.9%, Minangkabau 2.7%, Buginese 2.7%, Bantenese 2%, Banjarese 1.7%, Balinese 1.7%, Acehnese 1.4%, Dayak 1.4%, Sasek 1.3%, Chinese 1.2%, other 15% (2010 est.)
-Iraq: Arab 75%-80%, Kurdish 15%-20%, Turkoman, Assyrian etc. 5%
-Kyrgyzstan: Kyrgyz 71%, Uzbek 14%, Russian 7%, other 6% (Uyghur, Tajik, Turk, Kazakh, Tatar, Ukrainian, Korean, German)
-Malaysia: Malay 50%, Chinese 23%, indigenous 12%, Indian 7%, non-citizens 8%
-Mali: Bambara 34.1%, Fulani (Peul) 14.7%, Sarakole 10.8%, Senufo 10.5%, Dogon 8.9%, Malinke 8.7%, Bobo 2.9%, Songhai 1.6%, Tuareg 0.9%, other Malian 6.1%
-Nigeria: more than 250 ethnic groups; the most populous and politically influential are: Hausa and the Fulani 29%, Yoruba 21%, Igbo (Ibo) 18%, Ijaw 10%, Kanuri 4%, Ibibio 3.5%, Tiv 2.5%
-Pakistan: Punjabi 44.68%, Pashtun (Pathan) 15.42%, Sindhi 14.1%, Sariaki 8.38%, Muhajirs 7.57%, Balochi 3.57%, other 6.28%
-Senegal: Wolof 38.7%, Pular 26.5%, Serer 15%, Mandinka 4.2%, Jola 4%, Soninke 2.3%, other 9.3% (includes Europeans and persons of Lebanese descent)
-Sierra Leone: Temne 35%, Mende 31%, Limba 8%, Kono 5%, Kriole 2%, Mandingo 2%, Lokko 2%, other 15% (includes refugees from Liberia's recent civil war, and Europeans, Lebanese, Pakistanis, and Indians)
-Turkey: Turkish 70-75%, Kurdish 18%, other minorities 7-12%
*Religious diversity*

-Burkina Faso: Muslim 61.6%, Catholic 23.2%, traditional/animist 7.3%, Protestant 6.7%, none 0.9%

-Lebanon: Muslim 54% (27% Sunni, 27% Shia), Christian 40.5% (includes 21% Maronite Catholic, 8% Greek Orthodox, 5% Greek Catholic, 6.5% other Christian), Druze 5.6%

-Malaysia: Muslim 61.3%, Buddhist 19.8%, Christian 9.2%, Hindu 6.3%, Confucianism, Taoism, other traditional Chinese religions 1.3%

-Nigeria: Muslim 50%, Christian 40%, indigenous beliefs 10%

-Sierra Leone: Muslim 60%, Christian 10%, indigenous beliefs 30%
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