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Crises in European Integration: Challenges and Responses, 1945-2005

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rative of the Great Patriotic War, a narrative that had been undermined by perestroika. These essays raise many important topics, and we need not fear the demise of POW research any time soon.



Ludger Kuhnhardt, ed., *Crises in European Integration: Challenges and Responses, 1945–2005*. New York: Berghahn Books, 2009.

Reviewed by Simon Serfaty, Old Dominion University and Center for Strategic and International Studies

The theme of this short collection of essays is stated early and plainly: “In the end, crises have strengthened European integration” (p. 3), and “There has never been more European integration than in the context or aftermath of crisis” (p. 6). These statements are true but are hardly new. The same point has been made by many in the past. This is perhaps why the process “causes both fascination and frustration” (p. 79), resulting in too much crisis talk that, Jurgen Elvert notes, is “inspired by staunch euro-skeptics to back up their respective points of view” (p. 53). “Of all the international bodies I have known,” Belgium’s Paul-Henry Spaak once thundered, “I have never found any more timorous and more impotent.” This was when the European project was small and rather modest, not yet even a Common Market. Even so, the theme is worth repeating, especially now when an existential crisis threatens Europe’s capacity to sustain its past achievements, let alone proceed with new steps toward institutional finality.

The case studies presented by the authors of this volume, who are all Germans, paradoxically make of each crisis a compelling reason for hope in the future. They take the analyst away from fashionable predictions of an imminent collapse of European institutions, an outcome that has often been announced but has never actually materialized. No surprise that the *relance européenne* to which this pattern refers escapes translation: Europe, too, has a logic that is difficult to comprehend—even in French. What Mathias Jopp and Udo Diedrichs conclude from the Yugoslav crisis is meant specifically for the foreign, security, and defense policy of the European Union (EU), but it applies equally to the entire EU process: “It is more promising to analyze [Europe] in a long term perspective” and compare what the EU can do now to what it (in its earlier incarnations) was able to do many years or decades before (p. 105).

These essays were written at a time when two negative referenda on the European Constitutional Treaty, in France and the Netherlands, looked especially damaging and potentially fatal. To guide the “time of reflection” ahead, Ludger Kuhnhardt, an able scholar but also a past policy practitioner, helped organize a series of seminars at St Antony’s College, Oxford. From the European Defense Community to the failed ratification of the Constitutional Treaty, we are reminded of past crossroads when Europe was seemingly about to go astray: the identity crises of the 1960s, the “empty

chair” crisis and the Luxembourg Compromise, the Werner commission’s feckless plans for economic and monetary union, the Danish “No to Maastricht” (and the near-no from the French), and the endless debate over a so-called constitution for the then-12 EU members—not to mention the “unexpected detours” of enlargement and economic and monetary union. We know now that these were not all “existential crises,” though we must also remember they were “severe” in their days (p. 50). Even though the cases are well known, they still remind their readers of this odd reality about hard things: they are indeed hard. Bringing Europe back to life after the suicidal wars fought in the first half of the century, and recasting it as the European Union it is today, is “truly remarkable,” insists Hans-Gert Pottering (at the time president of the European Parliament), and is “perhaps the most seriously underrated political achievement” of the past century (p. 132). On this score at least, there can be no doubt: the three phases of the integration process—implementation, reconstruction, and Europeanization—have produced an unfinished “region-state” (as Vivien Schmidt puts it) and, whatever happens next, the age of the Westphalian nation-states is finished.

Although this short volume delivers on its main theme, its individual case studies are often incomplete, certainly uneven, and regretfully dated. Given the caliber of the contributors, this is likely to be a matter of space: most of the cases introduced here need more than the few pages they were offered. Sources, too, are surprisingly limited—almost exclusively in English or German (and few in translation). Nor is much attention placed on the U.S. role in precipitating or defusing any of these crises. Yet, surrounding the European Defense Community (EDC) was the U.S. (empty) threat of an “agonizing reappraisal,” and between the “no” vote at the French National Assembly and the *relance* meeting in Messina the following year was the U.S.-managed Paris Treaty in October 1955. The volume, however, contains not a word about the U.S. role, as if the EDC debate had unfolded in an Atlantic vacuum. The U.S. role is similarly neglected, even ignored, when discussing the Yugoslav crisis and several attempts at fiscal and political union.

The release of this volume’s first paperback edition in 2011 is not surprising. Once again, Europe faces a serious crisis—truly existential, this time. Surprisingly, no new contribution was specifically written for this edition. I know: the conference is over, the funding is exhausted, the publisher was unwilling to wait, and the participants may have been unavailable. But somehow a not-so-“select” bibliography with nearly 240 titles should include more than only one entry with a publication date past 2006. More substantively, at least an editor’s preface to the paperback edition would have helped update the relevance of the book. As it now stands, the volume’s contributions all look so dated as to be nearly quaint. Thus, Michael Gehler relies on the Austrian presidency as “a case study for the structural dilemmas of short-term EU presidencies” (p. 110), and, closing the book, Pottering’s “final reflection” is limited to “European and German politics as they have developed in 2005 and 2006” (p. 140)—“in” 2005 and 2006, not “since.” That allows George W. Bush and Angela Merkel to make their first and only appearance (p. 141), as if the U.S. president had been a pot-

ted plant during the previous five to six years, “in” 2001–2006, and as if the German chancellor has not been testing the boundaries of any new *relance* “since” that time. That is not enough.



A. Dirk Moses, *German Intellectuals and the Nazi Past*. New York: Cambridge University Press, 2007. 293 pp. \$80.00.

Reviewed by Carole Fink, Ohio State University

In this meticulously researched, well-written account, A. Dirk Moses challenges the widespread belief that the Federal Republic of Germany “developed a healthy democratic culture centered around [*sic*] memory of the Holocaust” and, indeed, “has become a model of how post-totalitarian and postgenocidal societies ‘come to terms with the past’” (p. 1). Underscoring the many shocks that have racked the Federal Republic of Germany (FRG) since 1990—the assaults on asylum seekers and foreigners, the persistent gulf between *Ossis* and *Wessis*, the fierce controversy over the Holocaust memorial in the country’s capital, the revelations of the Nazi pasts of key FRG eminences, the swell of literature of Allied war crimes and of German victimization during and after World War II, and the calls to “normalize” and extol the German identity—Moses has set out to reexamine the political, intellectual, and cultural history of Cold War West Germany and the nature of its transformation since 1949.

According to Moses, for 60 years the “1945 generation” has been the key interpreter of West Germany’s “legitimacy dilemma” (p. 51): its links with the Third Reich and the Holocaust. After coming of age in Nazi Germany and experiencing the full brunt of defeat at the end of World War II, a distinctive cohort of primarily male historians, social scientists, writers, and journalists immediately split into two camps: the “German Germans” who, despite the Nazi aberration, held largely positive views of the German past and its institutions and promoted an “integrative” republicanism; and the “non-German-Germans” who stressed the need to cleanse German politics and society of totalitarian remnants and promoted a “redemptive” republicanism. For Moses, this fundamental dichotomy—far more than the economic modernization of the 1950s or the cultural modernization that emerged from 1968—formed the essential political and intellectual structure in which the past and present were assimilated by the West German population and also permeated the early years of the Federal Republic.

After presenting his intellectual framework in chapters 1–3, Moses selects two representative figures: in chapter 4, the German-German Wilhelm Hennis (b. 1923), a World War II sailor, front soldier, prisoner of war, and prominent postwar right-liberal political scientist who sought to distance the FRG from the Third Reich by linking fascism with the travails of modernizing societies; and in chapter 5 the non-German-German Jürgen Habermas (b. 1929), a former Hitler Youth member, wartime field nurse, and prolific postwar social philosopher who from the start cast doubt