Beyond Carrots and Sticks: An Analysis of U.S. Approaches to Counterterrorism From 2000-2016

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BEYOND CARROTS AND STICKS: AN ANALYSIS OF U.S. APPROACHES TO COUNTERTERRORISM FROM 2000-2016

by

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B.A. May 2007, Loyola University Chicago
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Old Dominion University in Partial Fulfillment of the
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Steve Yetiv (Director)
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ABSTRACT

BEYOND CARROTS AND STICKS: AN ANALYSIS OF U.S. APPROACHES TO COUNTERTERRORISM FROM 2000-2016

Margaret M. Seymour
Old Dominion University, 2018
Director: Dr. Steve Yetiv

Soft power, a concept developed and presented by Joseph Nye in 1990, has quickly become a critical concept in U.S. foreign policy. Scholars and practitioners discuss the utility or futility of soft power. Theorists rank countries by their use of effective soft power against one another. Critically lacking in the discussion, however, is an analysis of how one country’s use of soft power changes, or remains the same, over time.

Counterterrorism policy has been a focus of U.S. foreign policy since 9/11, and while there is a robust discussion on effectiveness of various policies and strategies, scholars have routinely failed to analyze the components of approaches over time.

This study analyzes how the U.S. used soft power and hard power to combat terrorism from 2000-2016. This research analyzes the administrations of George W. Bush and Barack H. Obama in their preferences for hard and soft power approaches in their ideas, plans, and actions. Using a set of indicators against a research body of memoirs, budget levels, data on attacks, speeches, policies, and immigration data, this study concludes that ultimately counterterrorism policy in the U.S. remained relatively constant in execution despite Obama’s increase in preference for soft power approaches in ideas and plans, as compared to Bush.
Dedication to my PaPa, the first person to call me doc, to Dr. Steve Yetiv, the man who made me one, and to all my mentors in between.
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

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# TABLE OF CONTENTS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>LIST OF FIGURES</th>
<th>ix</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>LIST OF TABLES</td>
<td>x</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Chapter

**INTRODUCTION**

1.1 Introduction .................................................................................................................. 1

1.2 Explanation of Terms and Indicators ............................................................................ 5

1.3 Contribution to the Literature ....................................................................................... 17

1.4 Method ............................................................................................................................ 21

**PRESIDENT GEORGE W. BUSH 2000-2004**

2.1 Introduction .................................................................................................................... 28

2.2 Neo-conservatism .......................................................................................................... 33

2.3 National Security Strategy 2002: Not Much Focus on Soft Power ................................. 38

2.4 Unilateralism ................................................................................................................. 49

2.5 CIA Torture Report ....................................................................................................... 57

2.6 Military Spending .......................................................................................................... 61

2.7 Use of Unmanned Aerial Systems .................................................................................. 63

2.8 Preemption and Prevention ............................................................................................ 65

2.9 20 September 2001 Speech to Congress ....................................................................... 68

2.10 Terrorist Surveillance Programs ................................................................................... 72

2.11 Finance Anti-Terrorism Act .......................................................................................... 76

2.12 PATRIOT Act ................................................................................................................. 79

2.13 Department of Homeland Security ................................................................................ 85
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Section</th>
<th>Title</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2.14</td>
<td>American Exceptionalism</td>
<td>86</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.15</td>
<td>Relationship with Muslim Leaders</td>
<td>90</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.16</td>
<td>Refugee/Immigration Programs</td>
<td>92</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.17</td>
<td>Use of Language</td>
<td>94</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.18</td>
<td>Shared Values Initiative</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.19</td>
<td>Cultural Exchanges</td>
<td>105</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.20</td>
<td>Operation Enduring Freedom: The War in Afghanistan</td>
<td>109</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.21</td>
<td>Operation Iraqi Freedom: The War in Iraq</td>
<td>114</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.22</td>
<td>GITMO</td>
<td>119</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.23</td>
<td>Abu Ghraib</td>
<td>120</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.24</td>
<td>Foreign Aid</td>
<td>123</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.25</td>
<td>Department of State</td>
<td>127</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.26</td>
<td>Conclusions</td>
<td>129</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td><strong>PRESIDENT GEORGE W. BUSH 2004-2008</strong></td>
<td>130</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.1</td>
<td>2006 National Security Strategy</td>
<td>131</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.2</td>
<td>Intelligence</td>
<td>132</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.3</td>
<td>Afghanistan</td>
<td>136</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.4</td>
<td>Religion</td>
<td>138</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.5</td>
<td>Diplomacy</td>
<td>143</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.6</td>
<td>George Bush and Muslim Leaders</td>
<td>146</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.7</td>
<td>Operation Iraqi Freedom</td>
<td>148</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.8</td>
<td>Unilateralism</td>
<td>162</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.9</td>
<td>Approval Ratings</td>
<td>164</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.10</td>
<td>Military Spending</td>
<td>166</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.11</td>
<td>Foreign Aid</td>
<td>167</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
3.12 Refugee and Immigration .................................................................170
3.13 Unmanned Aerial Systems................................................................172
3.14 Department of State ........................................................................174
3.15 Civilian Reserve Corps .......................................................................176
3.16 Conclusion .........................................................................................178

**PRESIDENT BARACK H. OBAMA 2008-2012** ........................................179

4.1 Military Spending ................................................................................182
4.2 Afghanistan ........................................................................................184
4.3 Refugees and Immigration ..................................................................191
4.4 National Security Strategy – An Emphasis on Smart Power ...............192
4.5 Department of State ............................................................................196
4.6 Multilateralism ....................................................................................204
4.7 Intelligence ..........................................................................................208
4.8 American Exceptionalism ....................................................................212
4.9 Yemen ..................................................................................................214
4.10 Unmanned Aerial Systems .................................................................217
4.11 Operation Iraqi Freedom .....................................................................220
4.12 Gitmo ..................................................................................................221
4.13 Obama and the Muslim World ...........................................................223
4.14 2012 Defense Strategy .......................................................................226
4.15 Conclusions .......................................................................................227

**PRESIDENT BARACK H. OBAMA 2012-2016** ........................................229

5.1 Multilateralism ....................................................................................231
5.2 American Exceptionalism ....................................................................233
5.3 Intelligence ..........................................................................................235
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Section</th>
<th>Title</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>5.4</td>
<td>Military Spending</td>
<td>238</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5.5</td>
<td>State Department</td>
<td>239</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5.6</td>
<td>Refugee Immigration</td>
<td>242</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5.7</td>
<td>Finances</td>
<td>243</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5.8</td>
<td>2015 National Security Strategy</td>
<td>246</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5.9</td>
<td>Syria</td>
<td>248</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5.10</td>
<td>Afghanistan</td>
<td>253</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5.11</td>
<td>Gitmo</td>
<td>257</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5.12</td>
<td>Obama and the Muslim World</td>
<td>259</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5.13</td>
<td>Countering Violent Extremism</td>
<td>261</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5.14</td>
<td>Conclusions</td>
<td>263</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>CONCLUSIONS</td>
<td>264</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>BIBLIOGRAPHY</td>
<td>279</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>VITA</td>
<td>310</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
# LIST OF FIGURES

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Figure</th>
<th>Description</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1.</td>
<td>Public Opposition to Torture, 2001-2009</td>
<td>60</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.</td>
<td>U.S. Military Spending from 2001-2004</td>
<td>62</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.</td>
<td>Level of Muslim Refugees 2001-2004</td>
<td>92</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5.</td>
<td>State Department Budget 2001-2004</td>
<td>127</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6.</td>
<td>Anti-Muslim Tracts</td>
<td>140</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10.</td>
<td>Refugees from Muslim Countries 2005-2008</td>
<td>170</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12.</td>
<td>Perceptions on Obama’s Foreign Policy</td>
<td>180</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14.</td>
<td>Muslim Refugees from 2009-2012</td>
<td>191</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15.</td>
<td>State Department Budget 2009-2012</td>
<td>196</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>16.</td>
<td>UAS Strikes in Yemen 2009-2013</td>
<td>216</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>17.</td>
<td>Iraqi Civilian Deaths 2009-2013</td>
<td>221</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>18.</td>
<td>U.S. Military Spending 2012-2016</td>
<td>238</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>19.</td>
<td>State Department Budget 2013-2016</td>
<td>239</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20.</td>
<td>Muslim Refugees 2013-2014</td>
<td>242</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>21.</td>
<td>Iraqi Civilian Deaths 2013-2016</td>
<td>252</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
# LIST OF TABLES

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Table</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. Faces of Power</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Public Opinion on Torture Source: PEW Research Center</td>
<td>60</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Nonimmigrants to the United States by Selected Class of Admission and Region and Country of Citizenship</td>
<td>81</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. Research Findings</td>
<td>266</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. Analysis of Indicators</td>
<td>271</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION

International terrorism has become one of America’s top national security concerns. The goal of this dissertation is to understand how the U.S. has addressed the terrorist threat, specifically against Islamic terrorism since 2001. An understanding of how the U.S. has approached this national security problem in the past is critical to developing and implementing a coherent, comprehensive, and effective counterterrorism strategy in the future.

International terrorism became a majority security problem in the late 1960s with the July 22, 1968 hijacking of a commercial passenger flight from Rome to Tel Aviv by three members of the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP). This event changed the way the international community viewed terrorism, specifically because it had three new characteristics. Firstly, it was the first hijacking motivated by political aim with a target symbolic in nature. Secondly, it was conducted to influence a wide audience rather than result in personal gain of an individual or group of individuals. Finally, it was the first time the international community saw a terrorist group extend beyond their home or regional boundaries conduct an attack internationally, against targets not involved in their particular political struggle.1 1968 marked the year that the PFLP garnered global attention partially because the Six Day War in 1967 proved that they could not defeat Israel on a conventional battlefield and thus forced them to conduct more asymmetric attacks such as hijackings. It was also the year that Latin American guerrillas learned a similar lesson and began waging urban terrorism in their respective cities.2

2 Ibid.4.
Terrorist groups around the world adopted similar strategies to include conducting kidnappings, hijackings, and embassy raids. Not only did this create a new international terrorist threat, but these attacks also highlighted the inability of governments throughout the world to respond effectively to such tactics. Nonetheless, as these government deficiencies were highlighted, they were soon corrected. Many governments around the world developed fast-reaction teams or organizations to respond to this new asymmetric threat. These teams were specifically tailored to hijacking, raiding, and hostage-taking situations. These initial responses to terrorism were reactive and focused on hard power counters to events in place rather than a mix of approaches to prevent or deter terrorist activity. As the shock value of these operations wore off, so did the political utility for extremist groups. Various groups, Hamas, for example, began executing more lethal operations such as suicide bombings and attacks aimed at producing mass casualties. Governments were forced to respond with more comprehensive and predictive approaches to countering terrorism.

Still, prior to 9/11, terrorism was considered part and parcel of a global superpower in a modern world. The events of 9/11 and the subsequent U.S. reaction changed that perception. There now exists a spectrum of terrorism from pseudo terrorism criminal activity, including drug cartel, to terrorism, and even super terrorism, which involves extremist groups acquiring weapons of mass destruction. Terrorism and the “War on Terror” have been at the forefront of political agendas, foreign policies, and media coverage since the attacks on September 11, 2001. Strategists, journalists, and politicians continually criticize the effectiveness of particular

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3 Ibid. 5.
counterterrorism strategies or specific approaches. But what exactly has been the American approach to terrorism?

1.1.1 Statement of Question and Assumptions

This dissertation seeks to contribute to the broader discussion by answering the following questions. What were the components of the U.S. anti-terror strategy? What departments and programs were developed, funded, and implemented? What were the philosophies or views behind those strategies and actions? How has U.S. counterterrorism strategy changed, specifically in the use of hard and soft power, from 2000 to 2016? It is important to note that not all terrorist organizations are the same in composition, operations, capabilities, or desired end state. Thus, the counterterrorism approach for each group varies slightly. This work examines U.S efforts to counter Al Qaeda (AQ) and its offshoot the Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant (ISIL). This work will set out metrics in the form of observables for hard and soft power in order to assess their relative role and evolution in U.S. strategy. The basic hypotheses upon which this dissertation will elaborate in the methods section are as follows:

H1: The U.S. has increasingly focused on hard power in its counterterrorism strategy.
H2: The U.S. has increasingly focused on soft power in its counterterrorism strategy.
H3: There has been little to no change in the relative use of hard power and soft power in the U.S. counterterrorism strategy.
1.1.2 Counterterrorism Strategy

While terrorism is not a new phenomenon in the international security environment, counterterrorism strategy in the U.S. has only been official policy in the past two decades. Some scholars argued in 2010 that the counterterrorism strategy outlined by Bush would be broadly followed by whoever won the next election. This dissertation will look at the validity of that statement. The answer could help indicate whether counterterrorism strategy can change from administration to administration.

It is also important to define “counterterrorism strategy.” There is a great deal of debate around the definition of counterterrorism. In the Army field manual, it is defined as “operations that include the offensive measures taken to prevent, deter, preempt, and respond to terrorism.”6 This is a rather inclusive and expansive definition, covering strategies that seek to prevent terrorism as well as to respond effectively to existing threats. While this definition is useful to understand the military’s approach to counterterrorism, precisely because it is a military definition it is colored by a hard power perspective. The army definition is better suited, perhaps, to define the term “counterterrorism operations” rather than “counterterrorism strategy.” For the purposes of this paper I will include all governmental approaches to combat terrorism, not simply the military’s approach. The whole of these approaches will be considered the administration’s counterterrorism strategy. When discussing hard power approaches, specifically in approaches in Iraq, it is useful to define the term counterinsurgency as well. The joint publication on counterinsurgency, or COIN, defines it as “a comprehensive civilian and military

---

6 Department of the Army and Marine Corps, The U.S. Army/Marine Corps counterinsurgency field manual : U.S. Army field manual no. 3-24 : Marine Corps warfighting publication no. 3-33.5 (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2007); ibid. 4.
effort designed to simultaneously defeat and contain insurgency and address its root causes.”⁷

The publication goes on to explain that precisely because the operation is a civil-military endeavor, the mindset for mission success must be different than a traditional conventional military-on-military approach.

1.2 Explanation of Terms and Indicators

1.2.1 Hard Power

It is important to sketch what we mean by hard and soft power before proceeding with presenting the approach of this study. Hard power has a more traditional role in the discussion of international affairs and historically has been used interchangeably with “power.” Hard power, as defined by Joseph Nye, is power through means of rewards or punishments. Ray Cline, a CIA strategist from the Cold War era, gave the following equation, which helps contextualize hard power. In 1977, he published the following: Perceived Power = (Population + Territory + Economy + military) x (strategy + will).⁸ Of the elements of Cline’s power, all four can be considered hard power. These are considered sources of hard power because they can be used to provide rewards or punishments. Of note, population and territory could be resources for soft power as well.

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⁷ Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, *Counterinsurgency Operations (Joint Publication 3-24)* (CreateSpace Independent Publishing Platform, 2012), 5.
1.2.2 Soft Power

Soft Power is a concept developed and presented by Joseph Nye in his 1990 Foreign Policy article “Soft Power,” and then further developed in his 2005 text *Soft Power: The Means to Success in World Politics*. Over the past 25 years this concept has attracted the attention of mainstream journalists, political essayists, and academics. Since the 9/11 attacks, scholars have expanded the discussion of soft power to include its use to combat terrorism. The majority of the literature on soft power falls into one of two distinct categories.

The first category focuses on explaining soft power. Works in this camp are still attempting to nail down quantitative specific attributes of soft power as well as providing some insight into what soft power looks like in practice. Nye argues that power can be wielded by threat (sticks), reward (carrots), or attraction. Hard power uses threats and rewards based on resources, specifically economic and military resources. With greater resources, a state is able to offer greater rewards or threaten greater punishments. Thus, hard power is often seen as a direct result of the level of resources a country maintains.

Power, according to Nye, is not simply resources, but rather the interaction of various resources. He defines soft power as the ability to persuade or attract others as a means to securing favorable behavior or outcomes. Soft power enables Actor A to shape Actor B’s behaviors not because Actor B is looking to secure a reward or avoid a punishment, but because Actor B is attracted to Actor A and wants to behave accordingly. Nye argues that resources that

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9 Joseph S. Nye, *Soft Power: The Means To Success In World Politics* (PublicAffairs, 2009),
11 Ibid.
provide soft power include culture, values, and policies. Furthermore, he argues that the attraction is soft power and by using soft power a state can save its sticks and carrots.

A September 2009 government symposium on soft power and counterterrorism builds off of Nye’s original debate and discusses how soft power is a combination of government, private sector, and culture. The executive summary of the symposium report presents the following findings, among others: adversaries of the U.S. are succeeding by using soft power, the U.S. must use a combination of offensive and defensive smart power approaches, and the effective use of smart power (a combination of soft and hard power) rests on the principles of balance, agility, and sustainability. The first and third findings will be discussed in greater detail later, but the discussion on the second finding illuminates the nuances of soft power by dividing it into two distinct categories – offensive and defensive. Offensive soft power, according to the symposium, “deals with shaping preferences and outcomes, while defensive soft power deals with diminishing the hard and soft power capabilities of adversaries.”

Joseph Nye expands his discussion on soft power in his 2011 text *The Future of Power*. He acknowledges the common mislabeling of soft power as everything but military power. This understanding is oversimplified and inaccurate. Economic sanctions, for example, are not reflections of a nation’s military power. They are, in fact, often enacted by a collaborative group of states against another state in efforts to force a preferred outcome. As such, economic sanctions can be considered “sticks” and thus do not fit into Nye’s concept of soft power. It is

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14 Ibid. 4.
15 Ibid. 3.
much more useful to think of soft power as the ability to persuade through attraction. In determining what soft power looks like, it is useful to conduct a “face test.”

Nye, in his broader discussion of power, highlights other scholars’ ideas of the three “faces” of power as commanding change, controlling agendas, and establishing preferences.\(^\text{16}\) The first face or aspect of power was defined by Robert Dahl in his studies of New Haven, CT as the ability to get others to behave in a way that is contrary to their strategies and initial preferences.\(^\text{17}\) Preferences are defined as a ranking of possible outcomes, with the highest-ranked outcome the preference. Strategies are the means actors take in order to achieve the highest ranked outcome or preference.\(^\text{18}\)

The second face of power was developed by Peter Bachrach and Morton Baratz in the early 1960s. Bachrach and Baratz argue that the second face of power is the ability to control the discussion, now known as agenda-setting or framing.\(^\text{19}\) In this face of power, actors exercise power not by forcing others to make decisions in accordance with their own preferences, but by making those decisions “nondecisions,” by way of delegitimizing issues or keeping them out of the discussion.

The third and final face of power was presented by Steven Lukes in the 1970s and is the ability to change others’ initial preferences.\(^\text{20}\) The most effective way of doing this is by changing the environment of the actor. By changing the actor’s initial preferences, one can change the strategy of that actor to a more favorable behavior.


The “face test” in determining an action as soft power or hard power would look something like the following. First, actor A’s action must be categorized by one of the faces of power. From there, the action can be categorized as hard or soft based on what it is attempting to do. For example, a college is attempting to lower the cases of underage drinking among its students. Under the first face of power the administration can levy harsher punishments on students caught drinking illegally (hard power) or dedicate time and money attempting to convince students not to drink (soft power). Under the second face, the university could ban alcohol on campus (hard power) or use the student government to do the same, therefore making the decision more legitimate in the eyes of the student body (soft power). Under the third face of power, where the university is attempting to change the initial preferences of underage drinkers, the university could conduct a public relations campaign utilizing student groups to show underage drinking as unpopular (soft power) or more aggressively exclude and ostracize those who engage in underage drinking, or show the negative health, social, and financial results of underage drinking (hard power).

Table 1: Faces of Power

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>First Face (Dahl)</th>
<th>Second Face</th>
<th>Third Face (Lukes)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Hard Power</td>
<td>Soft Power</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Actor A uses carrots or sticks to change actor B’s strategies or behavior</td>
<td>Actor A uses attraction or persuasion to change Actor B’s existing preferences</td>
<td>Actor A uses carrots or sticks to override Actor B’s agenda</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Actor A uses carrots or sticks to change preferences</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Actor A uses attraction or legitimate or attractive institutions to set a preferable agenda</td>
<td>Actor A uses attraction/institutions to change the environment in order to shape actor B’s initial preferences.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
One scholar goes as far as to attempt to operationalize soft power for statistical analysis. Jonathan McClory published his most comprehensive study on soft power in the international system in his 2011 rankings “The New Persuaders II.” In this study, McClory notes that “measures of soft power have been based exclusively on surveys of public opinion as opposed to composite metrics across various indicators.”

McClory defines metrics for defining and analyzing soft power and then ranks 30 developed nations according to those metrics. Building off Nye’s three primary sources of soft power – culture, political values, and foreign policy – McClory develops the five categories of soft power resources: Business/Innovation, Government, Diplomacy, Culture, and Education. Within these categories, McClory looks at quantifiable and observable data. The Culture sub-index, for example, includes statistics on tourism, the spread of language, and number of cultural sites. The Diplomacy sub-index includes metrics on foreign aid, visa freedom, and online presence. To measure the soft power potential in the Government sub-index, McClory draws on measures such as democratic institutions, government effectiveness, and think tank presence. The Education sub-index looks at the number of foreign students, the quality of universities, and level of academic publishing while the Business/Innovation sub-index looks at the number of international patents, level of corruption, and foreign investments among others. McClory also includes data on the subjective side of soft power by including data from Monocle and IfG Panels on cultural output, cuisine, soft power icons, national airlines, global leadership, foreign policy direction, and commercial brands. McClory goes on to propose seven subjective categories of soft power as follows:

22 Ibid. 10.
23 Ibid. Appendix B.
24 Ibid. Appendix B, 34.
design/architecture, cultural output, global leadership, soft power icons, cuisine, national airline/major airport, and commercial brands. McClory, in his study of the soft power of various nations, understands the inherent problems with using subjective soft power and weights the objective categories at 70 percent and the subjective soft power scores at 30 percent.

One key problem in dissecting and presenting a foreign security approach is that a strategy is comprised of much more than a single policy outlined in a coherent and concise document. A foreign policy strategy is multi-faceted and incorporates a number of national, international, governmental, and non-governmental agencies. In understanding the approaches of Presidents Bush and Obama, scholars must look at myriad agencies and how the administrations interacted and employed these outside resources. This research provides baseline data and hypotheses for follow-on research into the effectiveness of these strategies over time. By looking at how U.S. foreign policy has changed over the past 16 years, follow-on research can develop indicators of success and correlate the two sets of data. In short, scholars can examine whether a foreign policy centered on hard power, soft power, or smart power is the most effective at combating counterterrorism security threats.

Another useful way to think about the difference between hard and soft power is what types of resources each requires, although this approach has its exceptions. Hard power, for example, is more material. Soft power, according to Matt Kroenig et al, is nonmaterial. In other words, hard power approaches can be dissected to show the use of material resources – money, troops, and aid.25 A hard power approach such as sanctions withholds material wealth in order to shape behavior. A soft power approach offers no such material gains or losses, at least not directly. Michael Barnett and Raymond Duvall argue that formal definitions of power required

direct links or relationships between Actor A and Actor B in order for the former to have power over the latter. Under these constraints, it is difficult to understand how soft power can work. However, Barnet and Duvall argue that power is sometimes diffused among actors without direct links or close relationships. Soft power is often reliant on that diffusion principle.\textsuperscript{26}

Those in the second category of scholars discussing soft power tend to argue that soft power is useful in combatting terrorism. These scholars often argue that administrations should not neglect the effectiveness of soft power in foreign policy and specifically charge that more soft power should be used to combat growing extremism. Joseph Nye also presents arguments in this camp, advocating for the use of soft power combined with hard power (smart power) as the only viable and potentially successful approach to combatting terrorism.\textsuperscript{27} Smart power is a relatively new concept, but not a new approach. Nye points out that the U.S. adopted an aggressive smart power policy during the Cold War by coercing with hard military power and persuading with attractive ideas. Nye points out that the Berlin Wall “was not destroyed by an artillery barrage, but by hammers and bulldozers wielded by those who had lost faith in communism.”\textsuperscript{28} Smart power is argued to be an effective and critical cornerstone of any foreign policy, to include counterterrorism.

Due to technological advancements and the changing international structure, soft power has become increasingly important over the last two decades in securing the U.S. position in international politics. Nye writes that there are two great power shifts occurring – power transition among states and the diffusion of power from all states to non-state actors.\textsuperscript{29} The

\begin{footnotes}
\item[27] Parmar and Cox, \textit{Soft Power and US Foreign Policy: Theoretical, Historical and Contemporary Perspectives}, 7.
\item[28] Ibid. 8.
\item[29] Joseph Nye, \textit{The Future of Power}, xv.
\end{footnotes}
second shift has the most impact on counterterrorism strategy. Globalization and the technology revolution have allowed non-state actors and transnational organizations access to the international system in a way that has previously been restricted to state actors. This power diffusion has rendered traditional responses to threats less effective. A state cannot combat a non-state threat with the same defense strategy as it would another state threat. This is especially true for a strategy reliant on hard power. The U.S. far outmatches any terrorist organization in terms of military training, equipment, and technology; but, that alone has not been enough to stop the spread of terrorism. In a fight against terrorism, it is not so much about who controls terrain or military objectives (goals often accomplished by the actor with the most hard power resources) but rather who controls the story. Controlling the story must include a version of the U.S. that appeals to the world. Controlling the story is about using a soft power approach to affect outcomes. At the end of WWII Joseph Stalin was cautioned against ignoring the Vatican’s warnings against the mistreatment of Catholics under his rule. He famously replied, “How many divisions does the Pope have?” Stalin ignored the values of soft power. Today, the Catholic Church still shapes behavior, without any economic or military sticks or carrots, while the Soviet Union has collapsed.

The 2009 symposium introduced above argues that the U.S.’ adversaries are succeeding by using soft power. Terrorist organizations understand the new international system and how to best exploit it to gain an advantage. “Terrorist organizations, such as Hamas, Hezbollah, and Al-Qaeda, recognize the critical importance of soft power as a complement to hard power. They have adopted a strategy of dominating the security and service sectors in contested regions,

30 John Arquilla et al., The Emergence of Noopolitik: Toward An American Information Strategy (RAND Corporation, 1999), ix-xii.
thereby limiting America’s effectiveness in exploiting those areas.” The Lebanese-based, Iranian-backed Shia group Hezbollah serves as an example. Governed by sharia law that mandates free housing, food, and clothing for all individuals under it, Hezbollah is fully enmeshed in the daily lives of Lebanese Shi’ites in part because of its extensive social service network. The group is seen as a more legitimate protector than the official government. Hezbollah has developed a formal system of social services with three distinct arms providing social support, health care, and education for many Shi’ite Muslims. Through this system, Hezbollah is able to provide water, agricultural support, scholarships, and medical treatment to those overlooked by the government. Hamas also provides a network of mosques, summer camps, orphanages, schools, and even employment to Palestinians. Al Qaeda, funded by Bin Laden and other Islamic charities, also built schools, or madrassas, across the Middle East. These approaches work. They are, to quote American policy, “winning the hearts and minds.” The U.S., through an effective use of smart power, must respond in kind in order to help its allies win the battle to govern.

1.2.3 Smart Power

Joseph Nye’s concept of soft power was quickly integrated into the discussion on foreign policy in general and counterterrorism strategies in particular. As any new term often is, in this

integration soft power was misunderstood by some as a panacea for international problems. To counter this misperception, Joseph Nye expanded on his theories of power by introducing a concept of smart power. Smart power is defined by the Center of Strategic and International Studies as “neither hard nor soft – it is the skillful combination of both…an approach that underscores that of a strong military, but also invests heavily in alliances, partnerships, and institutions of all levels to expand American influence and establish legitimacy of American action.” The argument for soft power hinges on a three-tiered view of power in the international system. The first tier is military power, in which the U.S. remains the unipolar superpower, with the second tier being economic power. This second level is more multi-polar and has been for more than a decade. In the third tier, transnational relations, power is almost wholly diffused among state and non-state actors. Smart power attempts to recognize and use all three dimensions or tiers. While Nye may have coined the phrase and explained the concept in 2003, he argues that the U.S. has long employed a concept of smart power, most notably during the Cold War as we sought to deter Russian military power at the state level and sought to appeal to communists and communist sympathizers with less state-centric cultural approaches. Nye, in 2009, argued that smart power was the only way to fight the War on Terror. “There is very little likelihood that people like Osama bin Laden can ever be won over with soft power: hard power is needed to deal with such cases…soft power is needed to reduce the extremists’ numbers and win the hearts and minds of the mainstream.” True smart power, to Nye, would be the U.S. investing in “global public goods” such as economic development, public health, climate change

41 Ibid.
42 Ibid.
solutions, and an open and stable international economic system.43 The Commission on Smart Power, led by Joseph Nye and Richard Armitage, codify smart power into five goals or areas on which the U.S. should focus. These areas are meant to complement the existing sizable power of the U.S. military and economy. These five areas are as follows: alliances, partnerships and institutions, public diplomacy, economic integration, technology and innovation, and global development.44 Suzanne Nossel argues that combatting terrorism effectively would require that the U.S. promote interests through a “stable grid of allies, institutions, and norms…marshal all available sources of power and then apply it in bold yet practical ways to counter threats and capture opportunities.”45 While this work is focused on the levels of hard and soft power used, using the above definitions, smart power will be referenced and address in this work as well.

1.2.4 Diplomacy

For the purposes of this examination, diplomacy is defined as the “established method of influencing the decision and behavior of foreign governments and people through dialogue, negotiations, and other measures short of war or violence.”46 As I have defined soft power in the narrower sense of activities absent of rewards and punishments, only diplomatic programs, initiatives, and events that meet that standard will be considered to be tools of soft power. Plainly spoken, diplomacy seeks to appeal to foreigners in order to garner favor for U.S. culture, actions, and policies. Diplomacy occurs in two forms – traditional and public. Traditional diplomacy takes place between government officials of two countries. Public diplomacy is diplomacy aimed

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43 Ibid.
46 Sally and Freeman Marks, Chas W., "Diplomacy," in Encyclopaedia Britannica Online (2017).
at the citizens of a foreign nation. Within public diplomacy there exists a subset of cultural diplomacy. Cultural diplomacy “refers to the exchange of ideas, information, art, and other aspects of culture among nations and their peoples in order to foster mutual understanding.” As such, cultural diplomacy will be considered a tool of a soft power approach.

1.3 Contribution to the Literature

This work aims to contribute in six key ways. First, there is little to no literature or studies that look at the use of hard power relative to that of soft power over time, though many examine soft power in various contexts and regions. Eleanor Albert writes on China’s expansion of soft power by establishing media networks and cultural centers around the world. While she provides some research into China’s history of soft power, she does so as a background. Her primary thesis focuses on where China is now in terms of soft power policies, and where she expects it to go in the future. Likewise, scholars have looked at how various countries, including authoritarian regimes, are hijacking soft power for their own self-promise. Jonathan McClory has been tracking soft power over the years, but in a way that compares countries to each other over time. Like Albert, his research is primarily focused on where each country stands in terms of ranking each year. The data over time is simply a secondary conclusion. Additionally, McClory does not examine the relationship between hard power and soft power as it relates to counterterrorism strategy. Other scholars look at the soft power

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49 Ibid.
approaches of the Bush administration or Obama administration, but stop short of comprehensively looking at both presidents’ ideas, plans, and actions over time. Mark Lagon, for example, provides a critique of Obama’s failure to achieve a “soft power presidency,” but does not delve into the details, nor provide the framework of ideas, plans, and actions.\textsuperscript{52}

In short, current literature focuses on soft power use alone (as opposed to in comparison to hard and smart power), as a snapshot in time, and outside of the framework of ideas, plans, and actions. This dissertation examines the use of various types of power used by the U.S. to combat terrorism comprehensively over 16 years. All four administrations have used a combination of hard power and soft power, but not equally. Using a case study method, this research will examine each administration’s relative use of power approaches. Understanding these as separate case studies will then enable a discussion on the U.S.’ changing (or consistent) approach to combatting terrorism over time. This examination therefore contributes the overall discussion of the use of smart power.

The Center for Strategic and International Studies established a commission led by Joseph Nye and Richard Armitage in 2006 to discuss, report, and recommend smart power strategies. Again, the report defines smart power as neither hard nor soft power but rather the “skillful combination of both.”\textsuperscript{53} Smart power is flexible by this definition. It does not require a certain universal ratio of hard to soft power appropriate for every circumstance, but, rather, the tailored application of both depending on the situation and desired outcomes. Instead, smart power requires balance, agility, and sustainability. Smart power requires the appropriate balance of hard and soft power approaches, resources, and policies. Smart power must also be agile in the sense of being applied quickly when needed. Smart power must also be sustainable. Smart power

\begin{footnotes}
\end{footnotes}
strategies are unlikely to produce quick, dramatic, and easily observable results like the use of hard power alone. This is a challenge for administrations as the American public is often impatient and demanding. Smart power approaches, however, need to be big picture, long-term, and consistent.\textsuperscript{54} This dissertation looks at the ratio of hard to soft power as the first step in follow-on examinations of each administration’s use of smart power, or lack thereof. By examining the application of the individuals and components of smart power, future research can then examine the application of the whole.

Second, while McClory attempts to operationalize soft power by breaking soft power into five objective categories useful for data crunching, little case study work operationalizes soft power and I seek to do so for purposes of studying it over time. McClory’s study sought to provide an international ranking of soft power resources for a given year – a snapshot in time of soft power potential.\textsuperscript{55} He compared rankings in the sense of pointing out which countries dropped or rose in the hierarchy, but only from 2010 to 2012. McClory also looked at all the sources of soft power; this work focuses on government action alone. These case studies will address cultural, education, and business categories of soft power only if an administration highlights, supports, or uses them in an attempt to make the U.S. more appealing in furtherance of counterterrorism goals. This report will narrow the focus from understanding U.S. soft power resources to understanding how those resources are actively used in government policies. It does not look at what the U.S. has or had, but, rather, what it used. McClory looks at who has more or less soft power compared to other developed countries. This work looks at how the U.S. has used its soft power and hard power over 16 years.


\textsuperscript{55} McClory, "The New Persuaders II: A 2011 Global Ranking of Soft Power."
Third, breaking new ground, this work operationalizes soft and hard power for qualitative analysis over time. It sets out specific aspects of a counterterrorism strategy as indicators of hard or soft power. Political rhetoric, foreign aid, sanctions, and overt and covert military operations, among others, signify a foreign policy strategy centered on these different types of power. The question does not directly seek to answer these bigger questions of power, but the method and metrics used help illuminate some of the nuances of the larger debate and show how useful understanding power can be. Such operationalization is vital for understanding the extent to which these approaches have been used and their relative efficacy.

Power in international studies has been a long-standing subject of interest in both traditional and contemporary schools of thought. Realists defined power in terms of capabilities, specifically military capabilities. More liberal schools argue that true power lies in the ability of one actor to produce an outcome - regardless of tangible capabilities. In this school, resources are not directly fungible and power is reflected in capabilities vice assets. A state can have the world’s largest military, but if it is unable to manipulate others’ behaviors and produce desired outcomes, it is virtually powerless. Nye specifies between three types of power - hard (traditional military and economic power), soft (culture, diplomacy), and smart (a combination thereof). Those scholars who ascribe to the liberal schools, like Nye, then open the debate to the interaction of tangible and intangible capabilities and the usefulness of those capabilities to produce said outcomes.

Fourth, this work hopes to contribute to understanding of U.S. foreign policy. As the global hegemon, the actions of the U.S. have impacts throughout the international system. If the U.S. is showing a marked shift in its counterterrorism strategy, it indicates a shift in how the U.S. addresses general security concerns. If the U.S. addresses security concerns with an increasingly soft-power focus approach, it indicates a shift in how the system is and will address the threats within.

Fifth, I will examine trends in American foreign policy. Most of the existing literature examines the policy current at the time of writing, such as Lagon’s critique of the Obama presidency, McClory’s yearly rankings, or Ernest Wilson’s evaluation as the U.S. moved from a Bush administration to an Obama-led government in 2008.\textsuperscript{59,60,61} Nye argues that U.S. soft power declined during Bush’s tenure, but does not look at whether that was an intentional approach of the Bush administration.\textsuperscript{62,63} Furthermore, in 2010 he argues that policies are the easiest soft power resources to change, but does not follow up with whether Obama did change these policies. These writings do not take a comprehensive approach to U.S. counterterrorism strategy over time. This examination will do that.

1.4 Method

An advanced debate in any field must make some core assumptions. The discussion on soft power is somewhat nascent in this regard as the definition of soft power is still up for

\textsuperscript{59} Lagon, "The Values of Values: Soft Power Under Obama."
\textsuperscript{60} McClory, "The Soft Power 30."
\textsuperscript{61} Wilson, "Hard Power, Soft Power, Smart Power."
discussion. Joseph Nye developed the concept and thus I will use his definitions. However, because of the relative “newness” of the concept, there can be many arguments for what soft power is. I will not attempt to engage in this debate. Instead, I will move along to examining how soft power is used, over time, by different administrations in varied situations against the common general threat of terrorism.

The three hypotheses of this study will be explored using the case study method. Once again, they are:

H1: The U.S. has increasingly focused on hard power in its counterterrorism strategy.

H2: The U.S. has increasingly focused on soft power in its counterterrorism strategy.

H3: There has been little to no change in the relative use of hard power and soft power in the U.S. counterterrorism strategy.

I will examine President George W. Bush’s first term, then his second term, followed by President Obama’s first term, and finishing with Obama’s second administration. For the purposes of this paper these administrations will be referred to as “Bush 1, Bush 2, Obama 1, and Obama 2.” Each term will be considered separately and then compared and contrasted with the other three. This paper will approach “the use of soft power and hard power” in three different ways – views, strategies/plans, and actions. Views are defined as ways an administration looks at or understands hard power and soft power as viable approaches to counterterrorism. Strategies are defined as what an administration plans for, or what is laid out in various plans and proposed budgets. Actions are those policies and programs implemented. For example, one administration may look at soft power approaches as the most desirable approach to counterterrorism evidenced through speeches, interoffice memos, and memoirs. However, his view may not have manifested into a coherent strategy. Strategies, likewise, may not develop into actions.
While using the case study method, I will use a set of defined metrics to better understand the administration’s approach in each term. As such, a list of metrics is useful to guide the research. These metrics, or indicators, can be grouped into four distinct categories – language, domestic, international, and institutional. The following chart shows examples of hard power and soft power indicators for all four categories.

Table 2: Indicators

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Language</th>
<th>Hard Power</th>
<th>Soft Power</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>The use of “we” in reference to the U.S. alone</td>
<td>The use of “we” in reference to multilateral groups</td>
<td>Use of the following “value” words: democracy, freedom, cooperation, equality, justice, prosperity</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Use of the following words: force, defense, power, might, superior, war, battle, military, fear</td>
<td>Use of the following “value” words: democracy, freedom, cooperation, equality, justice, prosperity</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Increased screening</td>
<td>Vigilant protection of freedom of speech</td>
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<td>Increased wiretaps</td>
<td>Anti-discrimination laws against Muslims</td>
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<tr>
<td>Increased defense spending</td>
<td>Government-sponsored forums on understanding Islam</td>
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<tr>
<td>More freedoms for law enforcement</td>
<td>Recruitment for foreign students in Muslim countries</td>
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<td>More allowances for intelligence collection</td>
<td>Open-net policies</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Increased State Department funding</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Increased human rights legislation</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Decrease in military presence in PR events</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Increased investment in pop culture (movies that make the U.S. and government look favorable)</td>
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<tr>
<td>International</td>
<td>Institutional</td>
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<tr>
<td>Increased military deployments</td>
<td>Decreased Participation in UN, WTO, IMF</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Unilateral action</td>
<td>Increased use of Department of Defense Programs</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Violation of international treaties/agreements</td>
<td>Participation in the following institutions: UN, World Trade Organization (WTO), IMF</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Decrease in foreign aid</td>
<td>Increased agenda setting in international institutions</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Increased UAS strikes</td>
<td>Focus on free and independent media</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Issues of approved torture or prisoner abuse</td>
<td>Increased use of State Department</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Increase in foreign aid</td>
<td>Language indicators are important because they reflect the message an administration attempts to send to both domestic and international audiences. Furthermore, they can indicate at whom the speech is aimed. An administration that overwhelmingly speaks to domestic audiences vice international ones is less likely to take a soft power approach as they are less likely to be attempting to engage in multilateral action and/or appeal to potential foes. The verbal and non-verbal communication of George W. Bush and Barack Obama will give substantial insight into the intent of their counterterrorism policies.</td>
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</table>
Domestic indicators are important as they highlight the values of a society. As Nye points out, cultural values are one source of soft power, or sub-index, according to McClory. A nation’s appeal is heavily reliant on how life is inside the country. A country that espouses ideals such as freedom and democracy, yet fails to implement domestic policy to uphold those ideals, are less likely to be appealing to outsiders.

How a state behaves in the international system indicates how it views itself, others, its role, and its capabilities. One of the largest indicators of a soft power vice hard power approach is the use of diplomacy over military/economic resources. Diplomacy, specifically cultural diplomacy, is a hallmark of a soft power approach. Cultural diplomacy, according to a state department report is the “soul of the nation” and represents our ideals. Effective cultural diplomacy leads to, among other positive outcomes, trust in the U.S., increased cooperation, a counterbalance in hate and misunderstanding, and a demonstration in values.64 A counterterrorism strategy that relies on diplomacy understands these soft power concepts. Likewise, a state acting unilaterally with overwhelming military force is most likely one that values hard power and realist principles while one that engages with others is most likely attempting to appeal to its fellow states and actors vice coerce them. Multilateralism, in today’s system, is seen as more legitimate than unilateralism and thus more appealing.65 As Nye points out, the changing nature of the international system and two great power shifts require nations to look at how they share power with others vice over others.66 One of the most established ways to cooperate in the international realm is through the participation in liberal institutions – institutions largely founded by the U.S. and its liberal democratic allies. A hard power approach

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to counterterrorism would have considerably less participation in such organizations. A soft power approach, however, would understand the use of agenda-setting, legitimacy, and persuasion through these institutions and thus an administration seeking to levy soft power would be more likely to participate.

There are some significant limitations to the analysis. First this work does not attempt to argue that one president might have implemented different policies in similar situations. For example, the conclusions of this work are not intended to argue that President Obama would have thought about or implement soft power counterterrorism policies immediately post 9/11. Nor is it to say that George Bush would have maintained unilateral hard power approaches ten years after the initial invasion of Afghanistan. The actions of presidents, their cabinets, and their congresses are largely determined by the time and situation each faces.

This analysis also fully acknowledges the blurred lines of hard, soft, and smart power. They are not mutually exclusive approaches, nor are they all encompassing. Much of the changes in counterterrorism across all four administrations came through the approach of military forces on the battlefields of Iraq and Afghanistan. Those changes were largely characterized as a shift from hard power traditional military operations to more civil affairs and reconstruction efforts that sought to appeal to civilians and other moderates. The first definition of “counterinsurgency,” given by David Kilcullen in 2006 was to “a competition with the insurgent for the right to win the hearts, minds, and acquiescence of the population.”

This work sets out to build on existing concepts in the discussion of power in international relations. It uses traditional, well agreed upon concepts of power as well as newer discussions and concepts such as a soft and smart power, and its usefulness in combatting

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terrorism. It does not seek to advocate for one strategy over another, nor does it seek to evaluate the overall effectiveness of different counterterrorism approaches over the years. This work is descriptive in nature, seeking to explain strategy over time. It also distinguishes between views, strategies, and actions. This work explains how the past four U.S. administrations have used soft and hard power approaches in personal ideas, planning, and execution of counterterrorism foreign policy.
CHAPTER 2
PRESIDENT GEORGE W. BUSH 2000-2004

2.1 Introduction

The purpose of this chapter is to examine President George W. Bush’s use of soft power and hard power to combat terrorism during his 2001-2005 term. The chapter is organized by theme. Using the indicators outlined in chapter one, this section analyzes policies, initiatives, speeches, operations, and key events during the first Bush administration to present a general conclusion on the administration’s use of hard power and soft power approaches to combat terrorism. The counterterrorism policy of George W. Bush during his first term was heavily influenced by neoconservative principles of unilateral action and preventative war – both solidly hard power approaches. His funding levels reflected his preference for military action over diplomacy. During his first term he greatly expanded the authorities of the intelligence community and consistently used hard power language to reemphasize his dualistic view of the world. Still, much of his expansion of intelligence departments were, at least in part, a result of a situation of confusion and sense of urgency pervading the U.S. public and government post 9/11. His policy did have few indications of soft power approaches, namely the implementation of the Shared Values Initiative, but that program was cancelled less than a month into operations. During Bush’s first term, the U.S. did fund more foreign aid programs and admitted increasing levels of Muslim refugees; however, research indicates that this was a result of Bush’s moral or religious commitments vice any strategic attempt to combat terrorism.
George W. Bush was sworn into the Office of the President of the United States on January 20, 2001. In his inaugural address, he mentions domestic and international threats to the U.S., but does not include terrorism or violent extremism in this list. According to some advisors, the Bush administration appeared unsure as to why President Clinton was advising President-elect Bush on eliminating al-Qaeda as one of his top priorities. Al-Qaeda had only killed a handful of Americans and was not considered an impending threat.68 Terrorism was of no consequence in the election; neither candidate brought the issue up on the campaign trail.69 In fact, President Bush spent the first eight months of his presidency without a clear or published counterterrorism strategy, preferring instead to refocus on the traditional threats by historic enemies Russia and China.70 His only real counterterrorism policy before 9/11 was a holdover from his predecessor. By default, he adopted Clinton’s counterterrorism policies including Presidential Decision Directive 39 (PDD 39), a 1995 directive entitled “U.S. Policy on Counterterrorism.”71 This policy was in response to the multiple terrorism events that occurred in 1993 – including the World Trade Center bombing. The policy was intended to replace the counterterrorism policy signed by Reagan seven years earlier and was largely drafted by Richard Clarke, who served on the National Security Council as the chairman of the Counterterrorism Security Group.72 President Clinton, and thus President Bush, had four main policy goals to be included in the PDD. First, he sought to answer the question of responsibility for terrorism - was it a law enforcement issue, intelligence failure, or Department of Defense problem? His answer

68 Richard A. Clarke, Against All Enemies: Inside America's War on Terror (Free Press, 2004), 228.
70 Ibid. 61.
71 Clarke, Against All Enemies: Inside America's War on Terror, 92.
72 Ibid. 90.
was that terrorism was an issue best addressed by a combined interagency approach. All departments needed to contribute.\(^{73}\) This approach was echoed a number of times by Bush. Secondly, Clinton outlined the role of the White House and the National Security Council (NSC) in domestic terrorism investigations. This was a new policy as the Federal Bureau of Investigations (FBI) had historically kept these “civilians” out of the loop on domestic terrorism issues. The agency agreed, although informally, in the Lake-Reno agreement that the White House and the NSC would be informed and consulted in investigations involving foreign terrorist actors.\(^{74}\)

The third policy outlined the federal government’s role in dealing with victims of terrorism events. PDD 39 assigned responsibility to the federal government to aid in the recovery process and provide information on investigations to survivors.\(^{75}\) PDD 39 included a fourth focus for counterterrorism - preventing terrorist organizations from developing, acquiring, and/or using weapons of mass destruction - a focus that was renewed post 9/11.\(^{76}\) While Bush did not initially develop a policy specifically to counterterrorism, he did have a general national security strategy and it was one of overwhelming unilateralism, led by Vice President Dick Cheney, and driven by a unique and new political persuasion called neo-conservatism.\(^{77}\) After the attacks on 9/11, Bush seemingly rolled this foreign policy over to a counterterrorism strategy, despite his argument that his worldview changed after 9/11.\(^{78}\)


\(^{74}\) Clarke, Against All Enemies: Inside America's War on Terror, 92.

\(^{75}\) Ibid., 92.


\(^{77}\) Festus Ugboaja Onaegbulam, "Terrorism and The Foreign Policy of President George W. Bush," in A Culture of Deference: Congress, the President, and teh Course of the U.S.-led Invasion and Occupation of Iraq (New York, NY: P. Lang, 2007).

\(^{78}\) Ibid. 22.
In order to fully understand general security foreign policy and, specifically, counterterrorism strategy, one must understand Bush’s top level officials. George Bush appointed White House veterans and leading neoconservatives Paul Wolfowitz, Donald Rumsfeld, and Richard Perle to U.S. Deputy Secretary of Defense, Secretary of Defense, and Chairman of the Defense Policy Board Advisory Committee, respectively. These gentlemen, along with Vice President Cheney, had served in both George H. W. Bush and Ronald Reagan’s administrations.

According to the indicators presented in chapter one, soft power had a limited presence in the development of these advisors’ world views and security strategies. Donald Rumsfeld, for example, focused heavily on new tools used to fight wars - specifically technology and precision weapons. However, he ignored the tools of soft power, or was ignorant of the concept altogether. During one interview in 2003, he was asked for his thoughts on soft power to which he responded “I don’t know what that means.” In fact, in much of Rumsfeld’s (and subsequently Bush’s) doctrine, diplomacy was subordinate to military force. Bush’s vice president, Dick Cheney, saw the post 9/11 security situation as a new kind of war which required a new kind of approach. This approach required increased intelligence to find terrorists and destroy their networks and their support systems. It also required placing a “high priority on identifying networks and states that were trafficking in weapons of mass destruction so that we could shut down their efforts and prevent terrorists from acquiring those weapons” This new strategy, according to Cheney, did not require soft power approaches.

80 Onaegbulam, "Terrorism and The Foreign Policy of President George W. Bush." 23.
Much of the neoconservatives’ security goals for George W. Bush’s tenure were outlined in the Defense Planning Guidance of 1992 document. The document’s focus is the post-Cold War global threat and includes a portion of guidance on the Middle East. Written by Dick Cheney, Paul Wolfowitz, and Lewis “Scooter” Libby, the document called for continued unilateral dominance in the Middle East by the U.S. It stressed the importance of maintaining U.S. access to the region’s oil reserves, as well as preventing the rise of a nation state or alliance that would threaten America’s regional hegemony. The only note to cooperation or partner operations is one urging the U.S. to support cooperative security in the Middle East. The authors were not urging the U.S. to participate in such multilateral practices but rather to encourage other countries in the region to do so.82 One of the key aspects of soft power is to appeal to potential foes and allies through persuasion vice threats or rewards (or promises of either). By failing or refusing to participate in cooperative security practices, the U.S. risks influencing others to refuse such agreements as well as coming across to global audiences as a hypocrite.

On a global scale, the document stressed the importance of the use of U.S. military power to maintain global dominance, preemptive strikes to eliminate threats, and the utility of unilateral action. This logic underpinned Bush’s counterterrorism strategy immediately following the attacks of 9/11. Bush’s top advisers identified these attacks as an opportunity to execute their neoconservative policies and strategies from a decade earlier with national and international support.83 Bush’s campaign hinged on these principles. Bush admonished the Clinton administration’s record of using military troops for nation-building and humanitarian intervention as in Kosovo, Bosnia, Somalia, and Rwanda. He argued that military strength

83 Onaegbulam, "Terrorism and The Foreign Policy of President George W. Bush." 9.
should be conserved for fighting and winning wars. This doctrine, originally developed by Weinberger after the Beirut Bombing in 1983, is most popularly attributed to Bush’s Secretary of State Colin Powell. The Weinberger or Powell Doctrine, also built on the lessons from the Vietnam War, argued that in order to use military force, a situation must pass six “tests.” First, the engagement must be vital to U.S. national interests. Second, troops should be deployed with a clear intention of winning. Third, civilian policy makers must outline clear political and military obligations. Fourth, the quantity and mission of the forces deployed must be constantly reassessed and adjusted if necessary. Fifth, the deployment of troops must have the backing of the American people and Congress. Finally, the commitment of forces must be a last resort.84

In addition, the 1992 planning document, which influenced George W. Bush’s foreign policy, stressed that the U.S. has unprecedented and unequalled military strength and from this strength the U.S. was able to take risks, dissuade potential adversaries, and maintain global peace and prosperity.85 This statement alone indicates the Bush’s administration’s willingness and desire to taking unilateral military action to deter established and potential adversaries. His policies centered on the assumption that U.S. power was derived from its superior military strength.86

2.2 Neo-conservatism

While any administration can be largely explained by the political leanings of its leaders, in the case of the first term of George W. Bush, a unique interpretation of the neoconservative

84 Walter LaFeber, "The Rise and Fall of Colin Powell and the Powell Doctrine," Political Science Quarterly 124, no. 1 (2009);
86 Ibid.
movement was instrumental in determining the administration’s initial response to terrorism. Moreover, the key leaders of the neoconservative camp occupied key positions in the administration, naturally leading to a disproportionate impact on the overall Bush 1 counterterrorism strategy. The resulting strategy focused heavily on the employment of hard power, preemption, regime change, and unilateral military action to combat terrorism. In this section, this dissertation will explore the tenets of neo-conservatism, the degree the tenets and their proponents influenced the Bush Administration’s counterterrorism strategy, and how that influence resulted in hard power or soft power approaches.

The Bush administration ushered in an age of neoconservatism - a political “persuasion” with roots in the Cold War era. Fukuyama argues that four common principles characterized neoconservatism until the end of the Cold War. Firstly, was “a concern with democracy, human rights and…the internal politics of (nation) states.” Secondly, was the “belief that U.S. power can be used for moral purposes also reflects a strong ethical core within neo-conservatism. Thirdly, was that “a skepticism about the ability of international law and institutions to solve serious security problems,” shows a preference for unilateral, or state led, action. Finally, Fukuyama argues that neoconservatives believe that “ambitious social engineering often leads to unexpected consequences and often undermines its own ends.”

Fukuyama argues that “stated in this fashion, most Americans would find little to no object in these principles.” The problem, to Fukuyama, is the way Bush interpreted these abstract principles in very concrete ways. These manifestations have led to neoconservatism being inextricably linked with the concepts of preemption, regime change, unilateralism, and benevolent hegemony (as exercised by the Bush

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87 F. Fukuyama, *After the Neocons: America at the Crossroads* (Profile, 2007), 4-5.
88 Ibid. 5.
These links made neoconservatism, as understood and practiced during Bush’s first year, a foreign policy that largely favored hard power over soft power.

The first pillar (as outlined by Fukuyama) is highlighted by the introduction of the National Security Strategy of 2002 with a quote from Bush during his West Point commencement speech: “Some worry that it is somehow undiplomatic or impolite to speak the language of right and wrong. I disagree. Different circumstances require different methods, but not different moralities.” Fukuyama argues that post 9/11 didn’t change the threat environment; it changed the American perception of it by combining WMD and terrorism - threats that had long faced America separately.

Prior to the attacks of 9/11, Bush proposed a foreign policy strategy firmly rooted in realism. During his 2000 electoral campaign, his then foreign policy advisor Condoleezza Rice penned an article for Foreign Affairs outlining the administration’s proposed foreign policy strategy to avoid the interventionist policies of President Bill Clinton and work to promote the “National Interest.” Rice proposes that a foreign policy plan under George Bush would accomplish five things: that the U.S. military can “deter war, project power, and fight in the defense of its interests if deterrence fails,” promote free trade and economic growth, renew alliances with those nations who share American values, focus on the relationships with other “big powers” to include China and Russia, and deal with “rogue regimes” with the potential for terrorism and weapons of mass destruction. Rice presented a strict realist view of the international system, arguing that those uncomfortable with the concepts of power search for the

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89 Ibid. 5.
elusive international “norms,” often to the detriment of the U.S. She cited the two major sources of American power as the economy and the military. She argued that the military must be the priority in the Bush era because the military is the guarantor of peace. Furthermore, this military must not be “stretched thin,” responding to small scale conflicts which degrade its ability to fight major threats to the international system.\(^{93}\) Neoconservatives tended to take a somewhat different interpretation of the world than what was taken in traditional realism. While they accepted the use of strength and security predominant in realist literature and recommendations, they rejected the idea of military action being used to directly provide security for a nation. Instead, they believed the aggressive pursuit of ideals such as freedom and democracy would create an international system advantageous to the U.S. which would therefore increase U.S. power and position in the world.\(^{94}\)

Some scholars argue that the neoconservative movement understood the concept of soft power in practice, if not in name, but applied the practice to securing domestic support, specifically from evangelicals.\(^{95}\) The neoconservative movement has nested, somewhat counterintuitively, with the Christian Right, especially on the foreign policy issue of Israel. The Project for the New American Century was a neoconservative think tank founded in 1997. In the founding document, the organization outlines four “consequences” or recommendations for foreign policy. First, was a “need to increase defense spending significantly if we are to carry out our global responsibilities today.”\(^{96}\) This first consequence highlights neoconservatives’ reliance on military power to achieve foreign policy aims. The use of “global responsibilities” also

\(^{95}\) Halper and Clarke, America Alone: The Neo-Conservatives and the Global Order, 162.
indicates that the movement believes in a specific brand of American exceptionalism and responsibility, which will be discussed further in this chapter. The second consequence urged American leaders to “strengthen ties to democratic allies and challenge regimes hostile to our interests and values.” While strengthened alliances indicate a multilateral approach, a key indicator of soft power, the second half of this consequence is written in hard power language. The soft power alternative, for example, could be “persuade those nations historically unfriendly” or “garner support in previously unaligned regions.” This sentence is also very dualistic in nature – a theme throughout Bush’s administration. The third recommendation is to promote political and economic freedom abroad. This recommendation could be interpreted, generally, as a soft power approach as it seeks to spread values and freedoms; however, depending on the method of promotion, this recommendation could also be the theoretical base for a hard or smart power approach. Finally, the fourth recommendation is about taking responsibility for America’s role in preserving the international order. Again, depending on the method policymakers adopt for preservation of that order, this principle could indicate a philosophical preference of hard, soft, or smart power.

The neoconservative movement also maintained a principle of American exceptionalism. In the State of Principles which founded the New American Century, key signatories attested “we need to accept responsibility for America’s unique role in preserving and extending an international order friendly to our security, our prosperity, and our principles.” The first consequence foreshadows how neoconservatives sought to fulfill such responsibilities. “We need to increase defense spending significantly if we are to carry out our global responsibilities today.” The document concludes with a recommendation for a “Reaganite policy of military

97 Ibid.
98 Ibid.
strength and moral clarity” and is signed by a number of President George W. Bush’s closest advisors - Elliott Abrams, Dick Cheney, Frank Gaffney, Donald Rumsfeld, and Paul Wolfowitz.\textsuperscript{99} What the signers seemed to forget was that Reagan saw “soft power” and the concept of “trust by verify” as the leading edges of American diplomacy.\textsuperscript{100}

This moral clarity is both the tie between the Christian right and Bush’s own faith with the neoconservative movement as well as the tie between Wilsonian school of thought and the neoconservative school of thought in terms of foreign policy. All of these influences interacted to produce a brand of foreign policy and counterterrorism strategy unique to President George W. Bush.

2.3 National Security Strategy 2002: Not Much Focus on Soft Power

The Bush Administration outlined its security strategy in September 2002. While the administration did not use terms such as “hard” or “soft” power, the goals and methods outlined in the strategy reflect a mixture of both in the effort to serve U.S. security and global stability. This document also serves as the foundation for what would eventually be known as the “Bush Doctrine.” The Bush Doctrine rests on three overarching concepts for foreign policy – the right to preemptive action, the right to unilateral action, and the obligation to spread democracy and freedom around the world.\textsuperscript{101} While the doctrine and the official 2002 National Security Strategy (NSS 2002) is aimed at general security and not specifically counterterrorism, the political and security zeitgeist resulted in a general strategy that fixated on the threat of terrorism. This section

\begin{flushleft}
\textsuperscript{99} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{100} Halper and Clarke, \textit{America Alone: The Neo-Conservatives and the Global Order}, 260.
\textsuperscript{101} Stephen Knott, "George W. Bush: Foreign Affairs," (Miller Center, University of Virginia).
\end{flushleft}
is arranged by the eight pillars presented in the security strategy and an assessment on whether that pillar is a hard power, soft power, or smart power approach using the indicators presented in chapter one. Additionally, this section will incorporate intent by pulling in personal accounts of those involved in developing these pillars – to help determine if particular aspects of the strategy were intended to increase U.S. appeal or to deter/reward certain behaviors by state and non-state actors. Determining intent is also done by examining and analyzing how the pillar and its facets are presented in the document. If they are presented using soft power language, or seeking to achieve common soft power goals, they are considered reflective of a soft power approach in ideas and plans. If the pillars are presented using hard power language and goals, they are considered hard power approaches, both in ideas and plans.

Examining the national security strategy in light of the indicators of soft and hard power laid out in chapter one yields a fairly clear picture of their relative importance. There are eight pillars in the NSS 2002, and they are as follows:

1) Champion aspirations for human dignity;
2) Strengthen alliances to prevent our enemies from threatening us, our allies, and our friends with weapons of mass destruction;
3) Work with others to defuse regional conflicts;
4) Prevent our enemies from threatening us, our allies, and our friends with weapons of mass destruction;
5) Ignite a new era of global economic growth through free markets and free trade;
6) Expand the circle of development by opening societies and building the infrastructure of democracy;
7) Develop agendas for cooperative action with the other main centers of global power;
8) Transform America’s national security institutions to meet the challenges and opportunities of the 21st century.102

From the eight pillars proposed, only two pillars focus predominantly on soft power approaches to counterterrorism from non-state actors. The remaining six reflect Bush’s preference for hard power approaches in ideas and strategy.

2.3.1 Champion Aspirations for Human Dignity

The first pillar is centered on the major premise that there are universal moral aspirations. These principles are not specific to any country, ethnicity, religion, or people. Moreover, the NSS 2002 stresses that it is the responsibility of the U.S. to defend and protect these principles. The document outlines four ways in which the United States will use the concept of universal values to guide international policy:

We will: speak honestly about the violations of the non-negotiable demand of human dignity using our voice and vote in international institutions to advance freedom; use our foreign aid to promote freedom and support those who struggle non-violently for it, ensuring that nations moving toward democracy are rewarded for the steps they take; make freedom and the development of democratic institutions key themes in our bilateral relations, seeking solidarity and cooperation from other democracies while we press governments that deny human rights to move toward a better future; and take special

efforts to promote freedom of religion and conscience and defend it from encroachment by repressive governments.¹⁰³

All four aspects of this plan fall in line with a soft power approach to increase national security by promoting the U.S.’ values of freedom, dignity, and democracy not simply as American values but as universal values. The first promise values truth and transparency as well as international institutions. The second uses foreign aid as a reward for moving towards the U.S.’ system - although this could arguably be seen as a “carrot” and therefore a type of hard power. The third promise emphasizes the usefulness and intent for multilateralism, or at least bilateralism and cooperation. This pillar does explicitly state that these partnerships will be with “other democracies,” however. Finally, the fourth promise indicates that a national security strategy must not include targeting certain religious or “conscience” groups but instead defend the right of freedom of religion. While these principles alone, in an election speech or editorial, may not be intended to increase the appeal of the U.S., when used in an official strategy, they are clearly intended to be soft power. The plan uses indicators from all four categories outlined in chapter one – language, domestic, institutional, and international. The NSS 2002 outlines the views of the administration, views that clearly understand soft power as a viable component of a national security strategy. However, understanding the use of soft power to counterterrorism must be understood within a framework of “views, strategy, and action.” The NSS is reflective of views, and arguably strategy, but not necessarily reflective of actions as outlined in the method section of this paper.

¹⁰³ Ibid. 4.
2.3.2 Strengthen Alliances to Defeat Global Terrorism and Work to Prevent Attacks Against U.S. and Our Friends

The second pillar of the NSS 2002 assumed two things - the terrorist threat is global, the threat is not a single political ideology, person, or religion. While the emphasis on alliances is an international indicator of soft power, appealing to others through these means is not the intent of this pillar. The language of this pillar is aggressive and inflexible. It states that the U.S. will “make no concessions to terrorist demands and strike no deals with them” nor will it make any “distinction between terrorism and those who knowingly harbor or provide aid to them.”\(^\text{104}\) The first priority of this pillar, according to the strategy, is disrupting and destroying terrorist organizations by attacking “their leadership; command, control, and communications; material support; and finances.”\(^\text{105}\) The strategy also states that the U.S. should firmly partner with nations dealing with localized terrorist threats to ensure the host state has all the necessary tools to complete the mission to include military, law enforcement, political, and financial tools - all assets best equipped to use hard power. This portion of the NSS 2002 outlines specific tactics using hard and soft power to combat terrorism. It states that the U.S., while seeking multilateralism, will not hesitate to act alone and/or act preemptively. It also states that the U.S. will deny support for terrorist organizations by “convincing or compelling” host states. Both intentions highlight the use of hard power. However, the strategy also states that the U.S. will wage a “battle of ideas” in which it should highlight its value system through “effective public diplomacy...to kindle the hopes and aspirations of freedom.”\(^\text{106}\) This section concludes with the

\(^\text{104}\) Ibid. 5.
\(^\text{105}\) Ibid. 5.
\(^\text{106}\) Ibid. 6.
administration expressing intent to continue to work with multi-national institutions and coalitions as well as NGOs to provide “humanitarian, political, economic, and security assistance to rebuild Afghanistan so that it will never again abuse its people, threaten its neighbors, and provide a haven for terrorists.”\textsuperscript{107} Here the Bush administration shows its belief that tools of soft power can be effective in preventing terrorism. While words are sometimes used simply for political purposes and not reflective of genuine views, in this case words were being used to appeal to partner nations and thus are indicative of a soft power approach. The second pillar, therefore, shows a mix of hard and soft power, with an emphasis on hard power ideas and plans.

2.3.3 Work with Others to Defuse Regional Conflicts

This pillar seeks to enable, equip, and support regional powers to defuse local conflicts. This pillar acknowledges the limitations of the U.S. government to intervene in every region. This section of the NSS 2002 looks at conflicts around the world to include state conflicts between Israel and Palestine as well as India and Pakistan. It also addresses non-state threats in Central and South America in addition to the link between the economy, environment, and human and state security in Africa.\textsuperscript{108} In the section on Africa, the NSS 2002 focuses on the soft power indicator of multilateral institutions but presents the African Union as the surest path to economic and political stability and security. While this statement is not meant to make the U.S. more appealing to potential terrorists in those areas, the focus on institutions is considered a soft power approach due to the concepts of legitimacy. States and non-state actors are more likely to be drawn to those governmental organizations with legitimate power. For example, the U.S.

\textsuperscript{107} Ibid. 7.  
\textsuperscript{108} Ibid. 10.
dictating policy or programs in northern Africa or Indonesia could be seen as imperialistic and therefore less legitimate than a regional organization of states. As such, the policies of a legitimate body are more appealing than those of an illegitimate body. As discussed in chapter one, multilateral institutional power is seen as more legitimate and thus more appealing.\(^\text{109}\)

2.3.4 Prevent Our Enemies from Threatening Us, Our Allies, And Our Friends with Weapons of Mass Destruction

When dealing with weapons of mass destruction, deterrence theory is at the heart of the strategic debate. As such this pillar should naturally focus on the hard power concepts of rewards and punishments. However, deterrence theory was developed to apply to state actors, not the non-state actors mostly addressed in counterterrorism strategy. As such, the approach in this pillar is a mix of both soft and hard power approaches. The strategy is three parts with the first part consisting of proactive counter proliferation efforts to “deter and defend” against the threat. It also calls for strengthened non-proliferation efforts using indicators of soft power – multilateral agreements and diplomacy as well as hard power defensive technologies and arms control. The third prong of the plan involves effective consequence management as a way to deter state and non-state actors from using such a weapon.\(^\text{110}\) Many critiques of the Bush Doctrine outlined in this document argue that this pillar is the most problematic as it argues for preemptive measures. While this research delineates pre-emptive and preventative action as hard


\(^{110}\) “2002 National Security Strategy of the United States of America.” 14
power and discusses both in greater detail later in the work, critics point out that diplomacy and other soft power tools can be used preemptively as well.111

2.3.5 Ignite A New Era of Global Economic Growth Through Free Markets and Free Trade

While economic initiatives are not always examples of soft power (sanctions, for example), extending economic ties often leads to increased security from both state and non-state actors. From state actors, economic interdependence minimizes the incentive of one state to attack another. It is mutually beneficial for both parties to continue a peaceful economic relationship.112 For non-state actors, exporting American goods and economic policies often results in exporting American cultural and values as well.113 The NSS 2002 also argues that increased trade is beneficial to all involved by increasing economic status and thereby reinforcing the principles of liberty. In this pillar, the Bush administration speaks exclusively to the effects of increased free trade on state actors rather than non-state or potential terrorist groups.114

2.3.6 Expand the Circle of Development by Opening Societies and Building the Infrastructure of Democracy

Bush then outlines eight strategies to accomplish this pillar. First, he calls for the U.S. government to “provide resources to aid countries that have met the challenge of national reform.”115 The plan calls to do this through the Millennium Challenge Account. The NSS 2002 also plans to improve the effectiveness of the World Bank to raise living standards through an 18 percent increase in contributions to the International Development Association – the World Bank’s fund for the poorest countries – as well as the African Development Fund. The increase in contribution also comes with the plan to insist upon measurable results to gauge how U.S. aid is working towards these development goals, focusing on more children with access to education, individuals with access to healthcare and clean water, and workers with access to employment. Another aspect of the plan was to shift from loans to results-based grants in order to help achieve these milestones without the poorest countries incurring more debt. The final facets of the pillar include opening societies to trade and commerce, securing public health, emphasizing education, and continuing to aid agricultural development.116 While the overall security strategy is clearly focused on the security of the state, specifically the U.S., this pillar more than any other addresses the concerns of human security. This pillar reflects a shift in how theorists and policymakers view “security” in international terms.

115 Ibid. 21.
116 Ibid. 23.
2.3.7 Develop Agendas for Cooperative Action with Other Main Centers of Global Power

This pillar returns U.S. strategy to a state-centric approach to international security. While it focuses on key alliances such as NATO, the EU, and ASEAN (soft power indicators), it also emphasizes the need for these organizations to develop new military technologies to combat terrorism (hard power). The pillar concludes by focusing on the ways increased trade and interdependence. These facets are written to address security concerns from both state and non-state or conventional and terrorist threats. While both hard and soft power approaches are discussed, the hard power indicators or increased military capabilities are geared toward non-state actors while soft power indicators are used to address state-to-state relationships. This pillar, therefore, indicates a more hard power approach to counterterrorism.

2.3.8 Transform America’s National Security Institutions to Meet the Challenges and Opportunities of The 21st Century.

The eighth and final pillar is predominantly a hard power approach as it seeks to “reaffirm the essential role of the American military strength” by building and maintaining defenses “beyond challenge.”\textsuperscript{117} NSS 2002 lays out four essential tasks for the military - to assure allies and friends, dissuade future military competition, deter threats against U.S. allies and friends, and decisively defeat any adversary if deterrence fails. Bush, in this pillar, reaffirms what he thinks the role of the U.S. military should be - first and foremost, to protect national interests. One way to accomplish this goal is by maintaining a global presence which ensures peace – a Wilsonian concept of interventionism. This section of NSS 2002 also proposes a need

\textsuperscript{117} Ibid. 29.
for a rapid increase and improvement in the technology of long range precision strikes, space, and information operations.

This section in NSS 2002 also focuses on the importance of intelligence as the “first line of defense” about both state and non-state actors. The sector calls for more authorities and technologies in the intelligence community, ensuring that intelligence organizations are both able and allowed to collect on potential threats. This focus on intelligence resulted in a number of controversial intelligence collection programs discussed later in this dissertation.

This section does highlight the importance of diplomacy on the “front lines of complex negotiations, civil wars, and other humanitarian catastrophes.” Despite Bush recognizing the importance of diplomacy and promising to increase the budget of the state department, this section shows that Bush views the role of the military as “defending America’s interests” while diplomacy’s is to “interact with other nations.” While Bush understands diplomacy has a role in security, and thus is addressed in the NSS, he stops short of directly linking this soft power approach to countering terrorism.

Despite a strategy largely centered on hard power, Bush does close NSS 2002 with ideas strongly rooted in soft power theory when he argues that the foundation of America’s strength is in its value system. “It is in the skills of our people, the dynamism of our economy, and the resilience of our institutions. A diverse, modern society has inherent, ambitious, entrepreneurial energy. Our strength comes from what we do with that energy. That is where our national security begins.”

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118 Ibid. 31.
119 Ibid. 31.
2.4 Unilateralism

Despite election claims for a humbler foreign policy approach, Bush quickly led a return to a generally unilateral approach to international affairs, putting the U.S. interests first through “assertive nationalism” or, as Bush was quoted, “distinctly American internationalism.”\(^{120}\) American military doctrine under Bush, Cheney, and Rumsfeld saw the most utility in unilateral action. Prior to 9/11, the administration opted for a number of unilateral decisions in security policy, specifically in arms control, but more generally in international security decisions. For example, post 2000 elections, the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty (CNTBT) was not sent to Congress because the likelihood of it passing was so low. The U.S. opposed multilateral plans in areas of weapons in space and the International Criminal Court (ICC), and portions of the Anti-Personnel Land Mines Ban (APLMB). Additionally, Bush made it clear that the U.S. intended to eventually withdraw from the 1972 Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty (ABMT) in order to develop new defense systems for the U.S.\(^{121}\)

Immediately after 9/11 Vice President Cheney advised the president that while partner nations would support the U.S. response to the attacks, it was important that the U.S. not allow others to define the mission. “The mission should define the coalition, not the other way around.”\(^{122}\) Condoleezza Rice, in her election article published in *Foreign Affairs*, wrote that many in the U.S. were uncomfortable with the realist concepts of power and thus were drawn to the idea that multilateralism or the backing of institutions such as the United Nations was


\(^{121}\)Paul Rogers, *Why We're Losing the War on Terror* (Wiley, 2013), 11.

necessary for the legitimate use of power. Rice argued that the “multilateral agreements and institutions should not be ends in themselves.” As discussed in chapter one, unilateralism clashes with a soft power as unilateralism is unpopular with international allies and diminishes our appeal to our allies and decreases the perceived legitimacy of U.S. actions. Likewise, polls show that multilateral action and the approval of institutions such as the United Nations increase U.S. public support for military action as well.

The ability to conduct decisive unilateral actions hinges on an unmatched military force, and such a capability may encourage a proclivity to use such force. As stated by the Law of the Instrument, if one only has a hammer then one treats everything like a nail. The Bush administration had a very large hammer and was willing to use it to bring about decisive change in the Middle East. As the only remaining superpower, it was willing, or rather preferred, to do so alone.

There was little to no role for international organizations or institutions. On February 7, 2002, George Bush, in a secret meeting, signed legislation that exempted the U.S. from the Geneva Conventions because of this new terrorist threat. Some argued that the U.S. suspended the set of international agreements inspired by and codifying of the very liberal western ideals that the U.S. was claiming to protect and promote. This action was overwhelmingly supported by Bush’s “War Council,” led by Rumsfeld and Wolfowitz. Rumsfeld justified this support by arguing that al-Qaeda and their terrorist affiliates were not nation-states and thus could not ratify treaties such as the Geneva Conventions. Furthermore, Rumsfeld argued that awarding POW

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123 Rice, "Promoting the National Interest," 47
125 Stefano Recchia, "Did Chirac Say 'Non'? Revisiting UN Diplomacy on Iraq, 2002-03," Political Science Quarterly 130, no. 4 (2015): 627.
126 Rogers, Why We're Losing the War on Terror, 43.
status and rights to these groups would belittle the spirit of the agreement.¹²８ Later that year Rumsfeld would make use of the freedom granted by suspending the Geneva Conventions and sign into law the action memo “Counter-Terrorism Techniques,” which authorized aggressive interrogation techniques to be used at the detention facility in Guantanamo Bay, Cuba.¹²⁹ The day after the administration signed the legislation, French Prime Minister Lionel Jospin warned of the dangers of unilateralism and military action to counterterrorism, calling for the U.S. to look to international cooperation to fight terrorism.¹³⁰

Likewise, there was little regard for international law or norms to include concepts of state sovereignty, specifically Iraqi state sovereignty. Ironically, neoconservatives used the concept of state sovereignty as justification to ignore international treaties and norms. They viewed treaties and norms as attempts by the international community to constrain or limit U.S. power and thus violate its rights as a state. Bush’s administration re-established the Constitution as not only the supreme law of the land, but the only framework to which the administration was beholden. The President was once quoted as telling Donald Rumsfeld “I don’t care what the international lawyer says, we are going to kick some ass.”¹³¹ The administration, specifically Paul Wolfowitz, even went as far as declining offers of support or assistance from allied and NATO nations, despite rhetoric that fighting terrorism would need to be a global undertaking. The administration attempted to legitimize these actions by citing theories outlined by Tony Blair’s advisor Robert Cooper in his 2001 article “The Post-Modern States and New World Order.” Bush and his advisors argued that while the U.S. was a modern, if not post-modern, society when dealing with the premodern societies in which terrorism flourished, premodern

¹³⁰ "France steps up criticism of U.S.," CNN.com, February 8, 2002.
rules applied. In other words, when fighting in the premodern jungle of the Middle East, the U.S. was not only allowed but was required to fight according to “jungle rules.” Therefore, the modern and postmodern rules of international institutions, liberal ideals, and international law were moot. \textsuperscript{132,133} Whether this premodern state approach was necessary or effective is outside the purview of this project. Its effect on the appeal of the U.S., however, is. For established and potential allies this unilateral action de-legitimized U.S. world appeal, influence, and power. Various military failures resulted in civilian casualties that hurt U.S. credibility around the world such as the storming of Fallujah in response to the killings of Blackwater contractors led to a mass resignation of members of the Iraqi Governing Council. The March 2003 report on the abuses at Guantanamo Bay further discredited the U.S.’ claim that the war in Iraq was meant to overthrow a brutal dictator and establish Iraq as a liberal democracy. The issue with the declining appeal of the U.S. and its policies was not the failure of political scholars to recognize it, it was the debate over whether it mattered. Key scholars such as Charles Krauthammer provided Cheney, Rumsfeld, and Wolfowitz the academic support to argue that America’s appeal did not matter, or at least not nearly as much as its hard power capabilities. Bush and his advisors would not acknowledge the value of soft power until his second term. \textsuperscript{134}

President Bush argued that the American people were rightly described as “religious” and that heritage is what made U.S. so close to the British people and government. \textsuperscript{135} Bush often boasted that the U.S. was the last remaining superpower. That was coupled with his belief that “our nation is chosen by God and commissioned by history to be a model to the world of

\textsuperscript{132} Robert Cooper, "Europe: The post-modern state and world order," \textit{New Perspectives Quarterly} 14, no. 3 (1997).
\textsuperscript{133} Hallams, "From Crusader to Exemplar: Bush, Obama and the Reinvigoration of America’s Soft Power." 7.
\textsuperscript{134} Ibid. 6.
justice.”

In some speeches, Bush appealed to multilateralism, but only when those institutions got results. He makes it clear that multilateral institutions are at times an effective means to an end; however, he does not praise the process or argue the inherent appeal in multilateralism. Institutions and multilateral action is to be praised only if effective in achieving national objectives, a means to an end vice an end independently. Bush expressed these thoughts in action when he nominated John Bolton, a critic of multilateral institutions, as the U.S. representative in 2005. Other officials in the administration, including Vice President Cheney, publicly criticized the United Nations’ plans to send inspectors to disarm Iraq. “There is a great danger that it would provide a false comfort that Saddam was somehow ‘back in his box,’ what we must not do in the face of a mortal threat is to give in to wishful thinking or willful blindness.” In this Cheney does not just critique the United Nations for inaction or an inability of the organization, but argues that the process and capabilities of the United Nations itself were flawed and potentially dangerous.

The root of this preference for unilateral action can be found, to some degree, in the neoconservative school, and the advisors in President George W. Bush’s first term. Paul Wolfowitz, one of the leaders of the neoconservative movement, penned an article for The Weekly Standard, a conservative weekly publication edited by neoconservative political analyst William Kristol. The article, printed in 1997, harshly criticized President Clinton’s foreign policy of increased sanctions, limited strikes and deference to the United Nations Security Council. The letter stated, “American policy cannot continue to be crippled by a misguided insistence on

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136 Ibid.; "Remarks at the Simon Wiesenthal Center in Los Angeles," (Los Angeles: March 6, 2000).
137 "Remarks to Whitehall Palace."
unanimity in the United Nations Security Council.140 Eight of the 18 signatories of that letter held top positions in the Bush White House. Charles Krauthammer, another notable neoconservative, once wrote that collective security was a “mirage” and that “the international community…a fiction.”141

Still, some argue that this unilateralism was rooted in Bush’s Christian faith. The Christian right has a history of preference for unilateralism, tracing its roots to the Cold War as religious groups saw America’s role in the international system as a counter to and conqueror of the “godless communism” in the Soviet Union.142 While the moral imperative to act, based in evangelical Christian faith, may well lead to more unilateralism alone, some researchers suggest that more literal interpretations of the bible have created not only pro unilateralists, but anti-institutionalists.143 This stance stems from the passage in the book of Revelations describing the world under the anti-Christ. In this world, the anti-Christ rules over “every tribe, people, language, and nation.”144 Pat Robertson’s End of Age tells a fictional account of the biblical prophecy of Revelations. In the text, Robertson replaces the United Nations with an even more unitary government called the Union for Peace. Evangelical writer and speaker Hal Lindsey echoes these themes in his texts. While key evangelical leaders are hesitant to refer to end of days prophecies as their drivers for unilateral preference, considering the popularity of these texts and their prevalence in Evangelical narratives, it is rational to assume there is some implicit or explicit influence.145 The Conservation Women for America, an evangelical public policy

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141 Ibid. p 92.
143 "The Evangelical Roots of American Unilateralism."
144 Revelations 13:7
145 Oldfield, "The Evangelical Roots of American Unilateralism."
women’s organization, lists seven core issues, one of which is national sovereignty. “CWA believes that neither the United Nations nor any other international organization should have authority over the United States in any area.”146 A similar organization, the Eagle Forum founded by conservative Phyllis Schafly, states as part of their mission, “We oppose all encroachments against American sovereignty through United Nations treaties or conferences that try to impose global taxes, gun registration, energy restrictions, feminist goals, or regulation on our use of oceans.”147

The Bush administration was willing to act unilaterally in areas other than military action as well. Before Bush took office, he discussed the role of foreign aid in his foreign policy plan with his not-yet Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice. They both agreed that Africa would be a key part of his foreign policy plan as Bush considered “America a generous nation with a moral responsible to do our part to help relieve poverty and despair.”148 In developing a plan to combat what Bush thought was the biggest humanitarian crisis on the continent – HIV/AIDS, he met with United Nations Secretary-General Kofi Annan. Despite finding the United Nations “cumbersome, bureaucratic, and inefficient,” Bush pledged to support the newly created Global Fund to Fight HIV/AIDS, Tuberculosis, and Malaria with $200 million.149 While this was a multilateral effort headed by an international institution, Bush confessed to secretly having “plans to do more.”150 By summer of 2002, the administration made good on these plans when it launched a unilateral global AIDS initiative. “We would control the funds. We would move fast. And we would insist on results.”151

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148 G.W. Bush, Decision Points (Broadway Paperbacks, 2011), 335.
149 Ibid. 336.
150 Ibid. 336.
151 Ibid. 337.
During the initial weeks of the Global War on Terror (post 9/11), the administration did turn to international cooperation in one key area – the financial sector. Because of the inherent nature of the global banking system, Bush and his advisors understood the necessity of international cooperation. Aside from ordering the U.S. institutions to freeze the assets of 162 individuals and organizations by the end of 2001, the Treasury Department also reached out to international counterparts during the Group of Seven meeting on Oct 6, 2001.\textsuperscript{152} It was during this meeting that global powers developed an initiative that eventually garnered 172 countries as signatories, freezing 1,400 accounts tied to terrorist activity by 2007.\textsuperscript{153}

The U.S. quickly understood that unilateral action in Iraq was somewhat limited and began plans to reach out to key allies. In summer of 2003, while the U.S. had convinced a number of other countries to participate in the conflict, these countries were often only willing to commit a small number of forces, usually with heavy restrictions on the use of force and complicated logistical requirements. Through a process of elimination, the U.S. reached out to India to commit a division of 17,000 troops.\textsuperscript{154} While requesting assistance with the military campaign (hard power), this request represents a soft power approach in two ways. First, the desire to increase the coalition with another major commitment for an additional partner is one of multilateralism. Secondly, the approach was framed in soft power. The involvement of India in Iraq provided a number of advantages to India. The first would be the U.S.-Indian alliance, a benefit to India due to the U.S. superpower status in the world. The second was the potential benefit of having an Indian presence in a heavy oil-producing region as oil prices continued to

\textsuperscript{153} Ibid. 18-19.
\textsuperscript{154} Rogers, \textit{Why We're Losing the War on Terror}, 101.
rise. Thirdly, it would be a signal to China of India’s political and military reach (soft and hard power).\textsuperscript{155} India did not acquiesce to the request, however, due to the overwhelmingly negative opinion of the conflict by Indian citizens.

This preference for unilateral action over multilateral action sanctioned by the international institutions once led by the U.S. in efforts to promote peace and liberal ideals alienated existing and potential allies and severely diminished U.S. appeal. In general, the more powerful a nation is the more distrust it garners aboard. Specifically, the unilateral action of the U.S. in the invasion of Iraq led large groups of people, especially Muslims and Arabs, to believe the U.S. would impose its will with little regard for others.\textsuperscript{156,157}

2.5 CIA Torture Report

For potential terrorists, U.S. actions, a result of these new relaxed rules, were often the key motivator in turning to terrorism.\textsuperscript{158} A professor who studies the effect of torture remarked that if detainees were not anti-American terrorists before detention, they most certainly were after undergoing these techniques.\textsuperscript{159} This section will examine the types of CIA interrogation techniques that were authorized by the Bush administration. For the purposes of this dissertation, in accordance with the indicators outlined in chapter one, enhanced interrogation techniques are considered wholly hard power approaches. They are intended, on a tactical level, to punish or threaten to punish prisoners in order to coerce compliance. On a strategic level, enhanced

\textsuperscript{155} Ibid. 103.
\textsuperscript{156} Diplomacy, "Cultural Diplomacy, the Linchpin of Public Diplomacy." 3-4.
\textsuperscript{157} Andrew Kohut, "Arab and Muslim Perceptions of the U.S.," (Pew Research Center, 2005).
\textsuperscript{158} Therese Postel, "How Guantanamo Bay's Existence Helps Al-Qaeda Recruit More Terrorists," The Atlantic, April 12, 2013.
\textsuperscript{159} Peter Maas, "The World: Torture, Tough or Lite; If a Terror Suspect Won't Talk, Should He Be Made To?," The New York Times, March 9, 2003.
interrogation techniques are in keeping with expanded authorities granted to intelligence agencies in order to prevent, deter, or punish those involved in terrorism.

Although the details of these techniques were not officially confirmed and released by the U.S. until December of 2014, rumors and anecdotes of the practices were circulated. The report, at the unclassified level, lists 20 key findings; those which are germane to this study are listed below:

1) The interrogations of CIA detainees were brutal and far worse than the CIA represented to policymakers and others.

2) The conditions of confinement for CIA detainees were harsher than the CIA had represented to policymakers and others.

3) The CIA repeatedly provided inaccurate information to the Department of Justice (DOJ), impeding a proper legal analysis of the CIA's Detention and Interrogation Program.

4) The CIA has actively avoided or impeded congressional oversight of the program.

5) The CIA impeded effective White House oversight and decision making.

6) The CIA’s operation and management of the program complicated, and in some cases impeded, the national security missions of other Executive Branch agencies.

7) The CIA coordinated the release of classified information to the media, including inaccurate information concerning the effectiveness of the CIA’s enhanced interrogation techniques.

8) The CIA’s management and operation of its Detention and Interrogation Program was deeply flawed throughout the program’s duration, particularly so in 2002 and early 2003.

9) CIA detainees were subjected to coercive interrogation techniques that had not been approved by the DOJ or had not been authorized by CIA headquarters.
10) The CIA did not conduct a comprehensive or accurate accounting of the number of individuals it detained and held individuals who did not meet the legal standard for detention. The CIA’s claims about the number of detainees held and subjected to its enhanced interrogation techniques were inaccurate.

11) The CIA rarely reprimanded or held personnel accountable for serious or significant violations, inappropriate activities, and systematic and individual management failures.

12) The CIA’s Detention and Interrogation Program damaged the U.S.’ standing in the world and resulted in other significant monetary and nonmonetary costs.\textsuperscript{160}

These findings suggest that the Bush administration was willing to use harsh and controversial techniques to advance national security, which certainly did not mesh with soft power approaches but instead threatened to make American policy less attractive to others. Despite what some might argue, even U.S. citizens are wholly opposed to torture techniques (see Figure 2 and Table 2).

\textsuperscript{160} Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, "Committee Study of the Central Intelligence Agency’s Detention and Interrogation Program," (Washington D.C.2014).
Figure 1: Public Opposition to Torture, 2001-2009.\textsuperscript{161}

Table 3: Public Opinion on Torture Source: PEW Research Center

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<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Month</th>
<th>Polling Organization</th>
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<tr>
<td>2001</td>
<td>October</td>
<td>Gallup/CNN/USA Today</td>
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<td>53</td>
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<td></td>
<td>November</td>
<td>Christian Science Monitor</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>66</td>
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<td>2002</td>
<td>March</td>
<td>Fox News/Opinion Dynamics</td>
<td>41</td>
<td>47</td>
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<td>2003</td>
<td>March</td>
<td>Fox News/Opinion Dynamics</td>
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<td></td>
<td>September</td>
<td>ABC News</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>73</td>
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<tr>
<td>2004</td>
<td>May</td>
<td>ABC News/Washington Post</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>63</td>
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<td></td>
<td>July</td>
<td>The Chicago Council</td>
<td>29</td>
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<td></td>
<td>July</td>
<td>PEW People and the Press</td>
<td>43</td>
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<td>2005</td>
<td>January</td>
<td>Gallup Poll</td>
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<td>PEW People and the Press</td>
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<td>August</td>
<td>Time/SRBI</td>
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<td>2008</td>
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<td>PEW People and the Press</td>
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<td>World Public Opinion</td>
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<td>Cooperative Congressional Election Study</td>
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<td>January</td>
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<td>February</td>
<td>PEW People and the Press</td>
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The administration and its agencies’ leaders surely understood the effects these practices would have on the appeal of the U.S. to potential terrorists. The acceptance of these types of practices indicated that the administration was not attempting to appeal to outside audiences to combat extremism. That is an indicator of little concern about soft power approaches.

2.6 Military Spending

This section explores the change in military spending under the first Bush administration. An increase in military spending, in accordance with the indicators outlined in chapter one would indicate an increase in hard power approach, as the military is most often used to coerce behavior through force or threats of force.

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162 Intelligence, "Committee Study of the Central Intelligence Agency’s Detention and Interrogation Program."
As the Bush administration continually depleted its soft power resources it increased its hard power resources by dramatically increasing military expenditures. As Figure 3 shows, from 2001 to 2005 the Bush administration increased military spending by roughly $200 billion or from 2.9 percent of the GDP to 3.8 percent. Despite the fact that Bush inherited a historically low budget, and thus the increase was more pronounced, the year 2000 did see the lowest military spending on behalf of the U.S. since WWII, this was a substantial increase in spending. This increase in spending, and subsequent increase in military capability, affected Bush-era policies. The capability enabled the administration to adopt preemptive tactics as they had the capability to extend to any area of the world.

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164 Ibid.
165 Colin S Gray, "The Implications of Preemptive and Preventive War Doctrines: A Re consideration," (Strategic Studies Institute, 2007).
2.7 Use of Unmanned Aerial Systems

This section examines the development and use of Unmanned Aerial Systems (UAS) as part of Bush’s counterterrorism strategy. The use of such systems are indicators of a hard power approach as they are meant to coerce action through the threat of punishment as well as eliminate those who pose a potential terrorist threat. This section will cover the technological aspects of the programs and to what degree UAS were used during the first Bush presidency. Furthermore, it will examine the tactical, operational, and strategic effects the use of these systems had on various other resources of soft power to include domestic support, multilateral support, and the hearts and minds campaign.

The U.S.’ counterterrorism strategy evolved parallel to the Revolution in Military Affairs (RMA). The RMA began in the 1970s as a stalemate between the two great nuclear powers became evident. The stalemate occurred specifically as the military utility of nuclear weapons became obsolete. History, international norms, and the threat of nuclear war forced law makers and military researchers to develop new military technologies that were politically and morally responsible. These new weapons were to allow nations to fight wars with substantially less risk to both friendly forces and civilians. The use of UAS or “drones” has been one of the most controversial aspects of the U.S. counterterrorism strategy. The use of the term “drone” itself separates humans and machines in the conduct of war, and yet they are used in very personal killings – similar to assassinations. One reporter argues, “the curious characteristic of drones—and the names reinforce this—is that they are used primarily to target individual humans, not
places or military forces as such. Yet they simultaneously obscure the human role in perpetrating the violence.”

The most common armed UAS, the Predator, has flown over a million flight hours since its inception. An unarmed version of the aircraft, initially created for intelligence collection purposes, flew its first flight in 1994. The aircraft flew its first reconnaissance mission in Afghanistan in September 2000. The armed version would fly in missions targeting al-Qaeda after 9/11. Rumsfeld praised the effectiveness of the aircraft, “In those first days of combat in Afghanistan, the Predator and other unmanned aerial vehicles (UAV) conclusively proved their value to our military and intelligence personnel.” From the onset, the UAS program was a source of contention for government officials. The first was over which department would head the program – defense or state. The program was born in the CIA. Up until 2002, the CIA had not used the system for any military operation outside the CIA. In February 2002, with the assistance of active military personnel, the CIA conducted its first armed strike, with a Hellfire missile against a target thought to be Osama bin Laden. The mission was approved and carried out in Patkia province, near the city of Khost in eastern Afghanistan. In interviews with journalists immediately following the strike, observers claimed the men were civilians collecting scrap metal – not Taliban or al Qaeda fighters. Pentagon spokespeople argued that while the

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169 Clarke, *Against All Enemies: Inside America’s War on Terror*, 221.
170 Ibid. 222.
173 Sifton, "A Brief History of Drones."
174 Ibid.
175 Ibid.
target was not Osama bin Laden, the targets were legitimate military targets, this strike and its immediate consequences were indicative of the next 14 years of UAS operations.

2.8 Preemption and Prevention

This section examines the difference between preemption and prevention and how President George Bush justified preemptive military action as part of a larger counterterrorism strategy. This section will also explore how preemption and prevention, when used with military action, is a marker of hard power – intended to punish, deter, or otherwise coerce behavior. Additionally, this section will explore to what extent policies of this nature potentially diminished the appeal of the U.S. and thus negated the gains of any soft power approaches.

The doctrine of preemption runs largely counter to what we would expect of a soft power approach. If war is the “ultimate failure of diplomacy,” preemptive war would be a preemptive failure of diplomacy. As diplomacy is one of the most long-standing soft power strategies, preemptive war reflects either a failure of a soft power approach or at the very least a preference for a hard power approach (war). Preemption is a doctrine of threat and deterrence – it does not seek to appeal to a potential enemy but rather threaten them with a punishment. This threat is “harder” as it would occur prior to an act. It means to deter through punishment before action. Still, preemption is considered a legitimate approach to a security threat. The United Nations Security Council argues that in certain situations, such as a “threat to peace, a breach of the peace or an act of aggression,” the UNSC can act preemptively. Still, the United Nations does not condone individual states acting preemptively.

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177 "UN Charter," (San Francisco, CA, USA1945).
In his 2002 National Security Strategy George Bush explains why preemption is a legitimate strategy. Bush explains that international norms established over centuries and interpreted by legal scholars have argued that nations need not to have suffered an actual attack before being justified in conducting an attack, but rather simply need to be presented with an imminent threat. While historically the imminent threat threshold would be met with the amassing of armies, navies, and air forces, Bush argues that the application of the concept and its allowances must be adapted to the current threat. While Bush does not explain the specific requirements for “imminent threat,” he stresses the importance of anticipatory action to prevent non-state attacks using WMDs. The strategy acknowledges that force may not always be the correct response (or preemptive action). Bush’s logic was also influenced by his deep personal faith. As Bush explained in his first post 9/11 State of the Union address, “I will not wait on events while dangers gather. I will not stand by, as peril draws closer and closer.” Vice President Dick Cheney was also a strong advocate for preemptive action, albeit he proposed a defense influenced more by practicality and rationality than faith. He argued, in 2002, that waiting for Saddam Hussein to cross a threshold of nuclear weapons possession would be deeply flawed and serves only to allow the dictator to become stronger before the U.S. is justified in taking military action. He argued that in doing this, it would become exponentially more difficult to form a coalition to combat his reign as allies would be less willing to take the risk inherent in military operations. The vice president urged his audience to think back to Pearl Harbor as an example of history’s failed opportunity to prevent an attack before it occurred.

180 Richard Cheney, "Remarks by the Vice President to the Veterans of Foreign Wars 103rd National Convention," (Nashville Tennessee 2002).
John L. Gaddis, along with Francis Fukuyama, goes one step further and argues that the Bush doctrine, as outlined in the 2002 NSS, conflated preemptive war with preventative war and claimed justification for both.\textsuperscript{181} The 2002 NSS argued that the current security environment made preventive, not just preemptive, action necessary to survival and uses “prevent” in the title of two of the eight pillars.\textsuperscript{182} “Preemption meant taking military action against a state that was about to launch an attack; international law and practice had long allowed such actions to forestall clear and immediately present dangers. ‘Prevention’ meant starting a war against a state that might, at some future point, pose such risks.”\textsuperscript{183} The 2002 NSS explains that while preemption, legitimized through the amassing of conventional forces preparing for attack, was an appropriate standard for history, the speed and methods the terrorists seek in non-conventional attacks render the standard too restrictive. The 2002 NSS further argues that this speed combined with the ability of nuclear weapons to be easily concealed and delivered makes prevention the new standard for action.\textsuperscript{184}

Colin S. Gray argues that preventative wars are essentially wars of choice vice preemptive wars being ones of necessity. While international norms have legitimized preemptive wars, the Bush administration argues that preventative wars are acceptable as it is preferred for a national to choose a war now if it believes war is inevitable sometime in the future.\textsuperscript{185} Gaddis argues that the Bush administration launched a preventive war against Iraq and defended this decision by arguing that non-state actors (specifically al-Qaeda) existed because of support from tyrannical state actors (specifically Saddam Hussein’s Iraq), arguing that the threat was not just a

\textsuperscript{181} Fukuyama, *After the Neocons: America at the Crossroads*, 83.
\textsuperscript{182} NSS "2002 National Security Strategy of the United States of America."
\textsuperscript{185} Gray, "The Implications of Preemptive and Preventive War Doctrines: A Reconsideration."
future concern, but a current one. This concept presents a major challenge to a nation’s soft power. State sovereignty is a long practiced and respected concept in international relations. If the U.S. can justify invading a sovereign state in order to prevent a future potential attack from a non-state actor, it poses a security threat to the rest of the world and the international structure itself. It also runs the risk of being perceived as “a bully or even a rogue state” which decreases political and diplomatic support.

This doctrine of prevention/preemption also alienated historic allies of the U.S., and thus further hindered multilateralism. Jacques Chirac, the president of France at the time, argued that the “wish to legitimize the unilateral and preemptive use of force is extremely worrying. It goes against France’s vision of collective world security, a vision which depends upon cooperation between states, the respect of law and the authority of the United Nations Security Council.”

2.9 20 September 2001 Speech to Congress

It is in this speech that Bush outlines the general tools of his newly formed counterterrorism strategy. He offered to the American people, “we will direct every resource at our command – every means of diplomacy, every tool of intelligence, every instrument of law enforcement, every financial influence, and every necessary weapon of war.” Of these resources only one is clearly a resource of soft power - diplomacy. Financial influence could also

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187 Ibid. 2-15
188 Gray, "The Implications of Preemptive and Preventive War Doctrines: A Reconsideration."
189 Frontline, "Blair’s War."
be considered soft power, however Bush went on to threaten to “starve terrorists of funding,” indicating that the U.S. would be using economic means as sticks.

Bush did pay homage to multilateralism early in the speech as he recounts instances of support from around the world. He thanked partner nations and allies for their support in South Korea, Germany, and Great Britain. A few minutes later, however, he delivered one of his most famous ultimatums, “Every nation in every region now has a decision to make: Either you are with U.S. or you are with the terrorists.” With this line Bush not only declared war on an ill-defined ideological group, he pushed others to pick a side. Furthermore, he insinuated that choosing the side of the U.S. means falling in line with its counterterrorism strategy. He offered plans to neither cooperate with, negotiate with, nor appeal to potential allies using soft power resources. He forced everyone into the familiar Cold War bipolarity. He echoed this sentiment, drawing on language from the two world wars, during his January 2002 State of the Union Speech when he declared the “Axis of Evil” consisted of Iran, North Korea, and Iraq. He also stated in the speech that “some governments will be timid in the face of terror. And make no mistake about it: If they do not act, America will.” Historical allies responded to this speech with criticism. The French foreign minister said the approach was “simplistic” and dangerously and incorrectly “reduced all the world’s problems to countering terrorism.” This “with U.S. or against us” approach forced nations to concede to the U.S.’ foreign policy plans, or be considered the opposition.

Unlike the Cold War structure, however, George Bush was little concerned with the reaction of the other camp to his rhetoric, policies, and actions. During the Cold War, advisors

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191 Ibid.
192 Bush, "2002 State of the Union."
and intelligence teams were dedicated to understanding how the Soviet Union and its allies (potential and established) would react to the U.S. Bush, heavily influenced by Vice President Cheney, detested the multilateral approach to the Cold War containment strategies. The only audience he truly cared about was the American people and the only response he wanted to elicit from others was fear. The focus on domestic audience alone indicates an ignorance of soft power techniques. Soft power is inherently outward focused. It attempts to garner support and appeal from those outside of the nation.

The only coordination Bush spoke of is that of U.S. agencies - local, state, and federal. Moreover, he cited hard power agencies – agencies that are associated with threats and punishments. He called upon law enforcement, intelligence organizations, the FBI, and, specifically, the military to be on alert to fight this threat. He argued that this new terrorism threat not only endangers the U.S. and its way of life, but the entire “civilized world;” however, he does not stress the importance of multilateral cooperation or institutions.

He is silent on the potential role of Intergovernmental Organizations (IGOs) and/or non-governmental organizations (NGOs). IGOs and NGOs can be useful tools of soft power for a number of reasons. IGOs show multilateralism and offer a level of legitimacy to operations. IGOs implementing a program or plan are not direct representations of a singular government. NGOs, as they represent no government, often have no military arm. While some NGOs implement rewards-based programs or work alongside military units, the overwhelming majority of NGO programs are not hard power in nature. NGOs have the added benefit of representing the values of the U.S. and its allies without having to explain or defend sometimes conflicting or complicated foreign policies. One of the key problems with soft power, when not fully integrated with hard power into effective smart power, is that soft power messaging and attempts to appeal
to a population are undercut by hard power actions. Information operations or public relations campaigns on the humanitarian efforts of naval hospital workers are overshadowed by the bombs that erroneously kill women and children. NGOs are able to plausibly act independently of U.S. foreign policy. While representing western values, they are not beholden to western policies. This can make NGOs incredibly effective at appealing to potential terrorist populations.

Bush called upon the international community to join the fight, or rather to “rally to our cause,” but again focuses on hard power organizations - law enforcement, banking systems, and intelligence services. He did so because, in his opinion, the only way to stop terrorism was to “stop it, eliminate it and destroy it where it grows.”¹⁹⁴ In this speech Bush established the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) to accomplish such a mission. As part of that mission, and the attempt at establishing a global approach to terrorism, Bush offered American support to any nation threatened or affected by terrorism. Again, this language does not indicate true cooperation in the sense of negotiation or compromise but rather extends the resources of the U.S. to other nations to be used in accordance with U.S. strategy. Four days after the speech George Bush furthered his strategy by signing Executive Order 13224, which not only sought to punish terrorist groups and those financial institutions associated with them by freezing financial assets, but also punished those banks unwilling to cooperate in freezing such assets.

Throughout his entire speech, Bush does not discuss the root causes of terrorism. He does acknowledge, twice, that this is not a war against Islam and that the terrorism threat comes from a fringe group that perverts an otherwise peaceful religion. Beyond that, stating what is not causing extremist behavior; Bush is concerned with preventing attacks and eliminating those planning to conduct such attacks. He offers to bolster the capabilities of airliners, air marshals,

¹⁹⁴ Bush, "Speech to Congress."
law enforcement, and intelligence services - all meant to uncover plans, stop attacks, and detain potential attackers. He ignores the resources that might be helpful in curing the root causes of terrorism.

2.10 Terrorist Surveillance Programs

As a commitment to use all the tools at the U.S. government’s disposal, the domestic response to 9/11 including granting increased authorities to the intelligence committee through the Terrorist Surveillance Program (TSP). The expansion of the National Security Agency (NSA) and CIA’s collection authorities was wholeheartedly supported by Vice President Cheney and were part of a larger set of intelligence programs – the President’s Surveillance Program (PSP).195 One of the key aspects of this expansion was to authorize the NSA to monitor and record the conversations of citizens and individuals living in the U.S. if those conversations were linked to al Qaeda or other terrorist groups. Starting in October of 2001, the program continued on a rolling 45-day basis, meaning the president would review the program and its results every 45 days and resign an authorization. While this was done with input from the Justice Department and certain members of Congress, it was not vetted through the entire Congress. According to Vice President Cheney, this was due to the secretive and sensitive nature of the program.196 The program was approved through an existing law – the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act (FISA), passed in 1978. FISA’s original intent was to govern the collection of foreign intelligence in furtherance of U.S. counterintelligence efforts. Counterintelligence efforts are those missions seeking to minimize a foreign entity’s ability to conduct intelligence collection on

196 Ibid. 348.
U.S. persons, information, or missions. In its original form, FISA was relatively restrictive, allowing only eavesdropping and wiretapping. It also organized a body of judicial and congressional oversight into the activities of the intelligence community.\textsuperscript{197} It was then amended to include physical entries, pen/trap orders, and the right of the U.S. government to obtain certain business records.\textsuperscript{198} Instead of drafting completely new legislature to expand the intelligence authorities, the Bush administration opted to amend FISA once again. The bill to amend was known as the Anti-Terrorism Act of 2001 (ATA) and greatly expanded the definitions and authorities of the NSA and intelligence community. One of these expansions is the very definition of communications. The ATA expanded that definition to include electronic correspondence, effectively allowing the government the legal right to obtain emails, web surfing histories, and URLs.\textsuperscript{199} The ATA also expanded the definition of who could collect such information. In previous versions of FISA, the authority to collect within the confines of the restrictions was limited to “investigative or law enforcement officer.” Under the new ATA, this would include ‘any officer of or employee of the executive branch of the federal government.’\textsuperscript{200} The ATA also allowed the U.S. government to use any information collected on U.S. citizens by a foreign government, even if that information, if collected in the U.S., would violate a citizen’s Fourth Amendment rights to protection against search and seizure. The bill also expanded the type of data phone companies would be compelled to disclose under a subpoena. FISA formerly restricted this requirement to basic data - “the name, address, local and long distance telephone

\textsuperscript{198} EPIC, "FISA," https://epic.org/privacy/surveillance/fisa/.
\textsuperscript{200} Ibid. 3.
toll billing records, telephone number or other subscriber number or identity, and length of
service or a subscriber to or customer of such service and the type of services the subscriber or
customer utilized.” ATA expanded this to include session times and durations, assigned
network addresses, and means of payment. Additionally, the use of subpoenas versus court
orders for this type of information would not limit these sorts of disclosures to terrorism
investigations, but also to any official government investigation. Court orders can only be issued
by judges, while subpoenas can be issued by any investigator or member of a court. The act also
expanded the jurisdiction of the courts issuing those court orders. Surveillance devices could
now be ordered to be installed anywhere in the U.S. by any court. For example, a small provider
in Utah could be required by a court with jurisdiction extending only to North Carolina to install
a surveillance program such as Carnivore. Furthermore, courts or investigators could now
subpoena a broader range of “tangible things” to include business records, books, papers,
memos, and other documents. The act also allowed “roving wiretapping” or the authority for
courts to issue surveillance not on a single number or line of communications, but on all means
of communication used by a specific individual. Likewise, the new bill no longer required
intelligence agencies to prove an individual under investigation was an “agent of a foreign
power,” but rather simply had to show that the collection was in furtherance of any investigation
to collection foreign intelligence. FISA prior to 2001 was only applicable in cases which the
sole or primary purpose of an investigation was foreign intelligence gathering. Under the new
provisions, FISA would apply to any investigation in which intelligence collection was ‘a’

201 “18 U.S.C. § 2703(c)(1)(C). Required disclosure of customer communications or records.”
203 Ibid. 5.
204 Ibid. 7.
205 Ibid. 7.
Similarly, the new bill allowed for the sharing of any foreign intelligence sharing if that intelligence was obtained during a criminal investigation. The bill expanded FISA’s authorization of secret searches and amended the Federal Education Rights and Privacy Act (FERPA) which protected individuals’ education records. In efforts to attack the funding sources for terrorism, the act also amended the National Security Letter authority within the Fair Credit Reporting Act, the Financial Right to Privacy Act, and the Electronic Communications Privacy Act to allow government investigators access to a wide array of financial records.207

In March 2004, President Bush was alerted that the TSP would end due to the legal objection from members of the Department of Justice. Against the stringent objections from those in the department and the refusal of John Ashcroft to sign the reauthorization, Bush overrode their objections and signed the authorization that continued the program. The acting attorney general, James Comey, along with FBI director Bob Mueller and other prominent members of the Justice Department threatened to resign. After consultation with the dissenters, Bush amended the authorization – removing the contentious aspect of the program. No one resigned and the amended program continued.208

Expanded intelligence authorities and capabilities are not inherently a hard power approach, but in the Bush administration these expanded capabilities and authorities were used for military or other operations of hard power. These expansions were not implemented to analyze culture or appeal to potential allies/enemies, they were to punish enemies and deter others from committing acts of terrorism. Likewise, the expansion of the powers of the IC, to

206 Ibid. 6.
207 Ibid. 8.
208 Bush, Decision Points, 174.
many, was antithetical to American values – a key resource of soft power and applied unjustly to Muslims and Arabs.

2.11 Finance Anti-Terrorism Act

The new surveillance programs were passed along with the Financial Anti-Terrorism Act. The Financial Anti-Terrorism Act gave the federal government more power in terms of controlling and monitoring financial crimes linked to terrorism and was one of many financial initiatives launched during Bush’s immediate response to 9/11. Much like the dichotomous language used to describe military alliances, the Treasury Department under Bush understood that it was not enough to go after terrorist finances, but it also needed to go after the banks that supported the networks and allowed finances to be distributed amongst extremist cells. As such, the Treasury Department under Juan Zarate launched a campaign called the “Bad Bank Initiative.” The purpose of the campaign was not simply to attack financial sources of terrorist activity but also to “send a clear message to others in the banking industry that they would not be immune from our glare, especially if they did business with the same or similar nefarious actors.”

The initiative was instrumental in fining a number of banks during the second Bush administration.

Due to the overwhelmingly globalized nature of the financial system, the U.S. could not act unilaterally and coordinated with a number of multinational IGOs and NGOs to include the Egmont Group of Financial Intelligence Units and the Financial Action Task Force (FATF). The FATF was originally founded in 1989 at the G-7 summit in Paris to combat money

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210 Ibid. 90.
laundering. It expanded its mission to include counterterrorism in October 2001. To accomplish this ambitious goal, the FATF develops and promotes recommendations to countries, then monitors progress, reviews money laundering and terrorist financing tactics, and develops countermeasures. The task force is further broken down into regional and functional subgroups. The FATF requires member countries to join the Edgemont Group, which oversees 151 Financial Intelligence Units (FIU). FIUs are charged with improving coordination and cooperation among nations. In 2001, during a special plenary session in Washington D.C. FATF developed seven special recommendations to counterterrorism (and added an eighth later). The recommendations were as follows:


2. Criminalizing the financing of terrorism and associated money laundering. (Hard Power)

3. Freezing and confiscating terrorist assets. (Hard Power)

4. Reporting suspicious transactions related to terrorism. (Hard Power)

5. International Cooperation. (Soft Power)

6. Alternative Remittance, which states that those who conducted these activities should be held responsible. (Hard Power)

7. Wire Transfers, which requires countries to require financial institutions to include originator information (name, address, and account number). (Hard Power)

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8. Non-profit organizations, which calls for increased legislation and oversight of non-profit organizations that support terrorist activities. (Hard Power)

9. Cash Couriers, which requires countries to have the ability to detect and punish the physical movement of finances across borders. (Hard Power)\textsuperscript{213}

The recommendations outlined by FATF are hard power in the sense that they seek to provide deterrence, punishment, and reward to terrorists and those who support terrorism, but soft in the sense of appealing to a wide audience to participate. For example, Bahrain and the United Arab Emirate, in order to achieve legitimacy and vitality in their financial sectors, agreed to cooperate with the new recommendations.\textsuperscript{214} In a sense, countries adopted stricter regulations and oversight both to avoid the carrots and sticks and to conform to international norms and standards. In this manner, the U.S. and the international community deftly implemented a smart power approach to countering terrorist financing.

In other areas of financial warfare, the U.S. sacrificed the soft power value of upholding values and cultural norms for the hard power advantages of information and power, specifically in the value of financial privacy. The Society for Worldwide Interbank Financial Telecommunications, or SWIFT, was founded in 1973 to standardize the communications of a then-emerging global financial network. The system was, and is, accessed by thousands of financial institutions every day. After 9/11, the U.S. Treasury department determined access to this system to be critical to its ability to detect and punish financing operations in support of terrorist activity.\textsuperscript{215} The Treasury Department implemented the Terrorist Finance Tracking Program, to be carried out by the newly formed intelligence section of the Treasury department.

\textsuperscript{214} Zarate, Treasury’s War: The Unleashing of a New Era of Financial Warfare, 89-90.
\textsuperscript{215} Ibid. 48-49.
(when DHS was formed). In 2006, The New York Times, Wall Street Journal, and Los Angeles Times revealed this access, requiring a treaty to be negotiated and signed between the U.S. and the European Union in 2009.

2.12 PATRIOT Act

One of the most publicized and radical measures of Bush’s counterterrorism strategy was the development and implementation of the Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools Required to Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism or PATRIOT Act in 2001. Bush submitted the PATRIOT Act to Congress on September 24, 2001 and it was subsequently signed into law on October 26, 2001. While designed to help accomplish Bush’s mission of preventing the next terrorist attack, the PATRIOT Act drew harsh criticism for its drastic lack of checks and balances and increased rights of surveillance to U.S. intelligence agencies. Understanding that part of soft power is the appeal of a nation’s ideals to others as well as understanding the U.S. bills itself as a beacon of freedom and democracy (so said in so many words in a number of Bush’s speeches), the violation of individual freedoms and rights outlined in the Constitution again portrays the U.S. as hypocritical and thus weakens its appeal or soft power. While the language of the act is intentionally vague, it greatly expands the powers of the U.S. government. It expands the definition of terrorism to include domestic terrorism - making it legal to surveil domestic political or social groups with “extreme” views or anti-government sentiments, allows law enforcement greater access to private records during secret searches,

216 Ibid. 203.
allows for non-U.S. citizens to be detained or deported for anti-government activity without judicial review, and expands the rights of the FBI to investigate citizens for “intelligence purposes.”

As with interrogation techniques, neither the legality nor the effectiveness of the PATRIOT Act is of concern to this particular examination, the implementation is a further indication of the Bush administration’s lack of understanding of how the violation of liberal ideals domestically has an effect on international audiences. In an era of digital media and global information systems the messages intended for citizens of the U.S. are heard and interpreted by nations, non-state groups, and individuals around the world. Much of the PATRIOT Act was interpreted by both U.S. residents and groups abroad as violating some of the core tenets of western liberal democracy - individual freedoms from government.

Framing of the PATRIOT Act by its supporters, the very name of the law is equally normative and militaristic. Calling it the PATRIOT Act makes it more “American” to domestic audiences. It indicates that anyone that does not support its measures is unpatriotic. It reinforces the concept of “with U.S. or with the terrorists,” offering no room for compromise. Any other approach to the one set out by the administration is anti-American. Ironically the success of this framing attempt diminishes the appeal of the American political culture by equating patriots with torture.

The PATRIOT Act also changed the criteria for obtaining visas to travel, study, or live in the U.S. – making it much more difficult to do any of these things. As a result, the number of foreigners studying in the U.S. drastically decreased. As discussed later, hosting foreign

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219 Paden America slams the door on its foot
students is one of many cultural exchanges thought to increase public diplomacy and improve the U.S.’ image abroad. These students and visitors are the most likely future friends, supporters, and ambassadors for the U.S.220 The PATRIOT Act imposed new restrictive requirements that dramatically decreased the number of non-immigration entry (students, tourists, workers) awarded to individuals from Muslim/Arab nations. Between 2000 and 2004, the number of tourist/business visas issued to citizens of Gulf countries dropped 70 percent. Gulf countries include Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, Bahrain, Qatar, United Arab Emirates, and Oman.221 See Table 3.

Table 4: Nonimmigrants to the United States by Selected Class of Admission and Region and Country of Citizenship.222

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Selected Countries</th>
<th>2000</th>
<th>2001</th>
<th>2002</th>
<th>2003</th>
<th>2004</th>
<th>Change 2000-04</th>
<th>% change</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Students</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gulf States</td>
<td>19,696</td>
<td>19,426</td>
<td>12,387</td>
<td>8,187</td>
<td>6,826</td>
<td>12,870</td>
<td>-65.3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Egypt</td>
<td>1,926</td>
<td>1,776</td>
<td>1,137</td>
<td>979</td>
<td>911</td>
<td>1,015</td>
<td>-52.7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Morocco</td>
<td>2,455</td>
<td>2,668</td>
<td>1,982</td>
<td>1,826</td>
<td>1,449</td>
<td>1,006</td>
<td>-41.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jordan</td>
<td>2,253</td>
<td>2,522</td>
<td>1,670</td>
<td>1,492</td>
<td>1,421</td>
<td>832</td>
<td>-36.9%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lebanon</td>
<td>2,015</td>
<td>2,709</td>
<td>1,741</td>
<td>1,437</td>
<td>1,391</td>
<td>624</td>
<td>-31.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Visitors for business and pleasure</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gulf States</td>
<td>84,778</td>
<td>87,502</td>
<td>22,596</td>
<td>20,647</td>
<td>25,005</td>
<td>59,773</td>
<td>-70.5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Egypt</td>
<td>48,904</td>
<td>50,260</td>
<td>26,211</td>
<td>23,124</td>
<td>23,742</td>
<td>25,162</td>
<td>-51.5%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

220 Ibid, 9.
222 Ibid.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Year 1</th>
<th>Year 2</th>
<th>Year 3</th>
<th>Year 4</th>
<th>Year 5</th>
<th>Year 6</th>
<th>Year 7</th>
<th>Change</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Morocco</td>
<td>21,512</td>
<td>20,369</td>
<td>13,822</td>
<td>12,261</td>
<td>13,181</td>
<td>8,331</td>
<td>-38.7%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jordan</td>
<td>22,857</td>
<td>26,806</td>
<td>15,582</td>
<td>14,677</td>
<td>15,755</td>
<td>7,102</td>
<td>-31.1%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lebanon</td>
<td>23,302</td>
<td>26,155</td>
<td>17,084</td>
<td>15,201</td>
<td>18,066</td>
<td>5,236</td>
<td>-22.5%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


The number of Gulf country citizens seeking to study in the U.S. also dropped drastically between 2000-2004, down 65 percent.\(^{223}\) (See Table 3) One of the main impediments to students seeking to study in the U.S. was the implementation of the Student and Exchange Visitor Information System, or SEVIS. SEVIS was proposed by the Department of Homeland Security and implemented by the DOJ and the Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) on January 30, 2003. SEVIS is the implementation of Section 641 of the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996 with the Enhanced Border Security and Visa Entry Reform Act of 2002.\(^{224}\) SEVIS was the second attempt at implementing such a system. In 1997, in response to the 1993 attacks against the World Trade Center, the United States Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS) and the U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement (subordinate to the Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS)) in coordination with the State Department developed and proposed the program called Coordinated Interagency Partnership Regulating International Students (CIPRIS). Due to logistical problems and lobbying from some schools opposed to increased regulation, CIPRIS was not implemented beyond initial testing and was

\(^{223}\) Ibid.
retired in 1999. Like CIPRIS, SEVIS is a web-based database that requires the following updates: (a) when the student arrives on campus, (b) failure of a student to enroll, (c) full-time enrollment, (d) when a student drops below a full course load without prior authorization from INS, (e) any failure to maintain status or complete the program, (f) change in name or address within 10 days, (g) start date of each term, (h) a student’s transfer to another program, (i) program extensions, (j) off-campus employment, and (k) any other major changes to the student’s program of studies.

There were a number of problems with the initial implementation of the program – namely glitches and bugs that often resulted in students being detained through no fault of their own. The agencies needed to enforce and police these new requirements were underfunded. Likewise, many universities were unable to fully digitize their records in time or lacked the existing databases to input the required information. In addition to problems with the system, anecdotal accounts indicate the tendency “of government bureaucrats to stonewall when dealing with many foreign (particularly Muslim) visitors.”

The PATRIOT Act also required all non-immigrant male visitors from the ages of 16 to 45 from the following countries to register with the INS despite registering when first arriving in the country: Afghanistan, Algeria, Bahrain, Bangladesh, Egypt, Eritrea, Indonesia, Iran, Iraq, Jordan, Kuwait, Lebanon, Libya, Morocco, North Korea, Oman, Pakistan, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Somalia, Sudan, Syria, Tunisia, the United Arab Emirates, and Yemen.

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228 Ibid. 10.
229 Ibid. 10.
In addition to the new requirements outlined in the act, the vague language of the act allowed law enforcement agencies broad interpretations of their authorities. When more authority is given to enforcement agencies, fewer freedoms are inherently given to the individual citizens. In this particular case, more freedoms for law enforcement indicate a preference for hard power, while more freedoms for individuals indicate a preference for soft power. Freedom is a core American value and arguably one that makes the U.S. appealing to potential friends and foes. One such example of broad language is the creation of the crime of “domestic terrorism” which is defined as activities that—“(A) involve acts dangerous to human life that are a violation of the criminal laws of the United States or of any State; ‘‘(B) appear to be intended—‘‘(i) to intimidate or coerce a civilian population;‘‘(ii) to influence the policy of a government by intimidation or coercion; or ‘‘(iii) to affect the conduct of a government by mass destruction, assassination, or kidnapping; and ‘‘(C) occur primarily within the territorial jurisdiction of the United States.”

The PATRIOT Act was a clear example of an emphasis on hard power agencies – intelligence, law enforcement, and immigration services proposing punishments. Its development and implementation highlighted the administration’s lack of focus on soft power approaches. It hurt our appeal, or soft power, in two ways, one general and one specific. Generally speaking, it showed the U.S. was willing to sacrifice key values of freedom, government transparency, and diversity for national security. Specifically, it targeted Muslim Arabs and made the U.S. less appealing to a specific population – a population that a friendship with would have been critical to countering terrorism. To be fair, some of the backlash against Muslim/Arabs in America post 9/11 was a result of the attack itself, and not of any policy enacted by the Bush administration.

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230 Congress, "Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools Required to Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism (USA PATRIOT ACT) Act of 2001."
Still, the reaction of some citizens coupled with the perceived harassment from the new regulations led to a decline in the desire of Muslim/Arab individuals to immigrate to, visit, or study in the U.S. – both a reflection and reinforcement of the negative image of the U.S. to Muslim/Arabs abroad.

2.13 Department of Homeland Security

Because prior to 9/11 the Bush administration did not have terrorism at the forefront of security policy, the initial reaction to the attack was to endow existing organizations with increased capabilities and authorities to counter this new threat. Eventually, the Bush administration created new organizations specifically designed to counter the specifics of the “new” terrorist threat. The Bush administration signed the Homeland Security Act on November 25, 2002 which established the Department of Homeland Security. This department was the senior agency over a number of organizations empowered with the new capabilities and powers afforded by the PATRIOT Act.

Immediately after the attacks on 9/11, the Bush administration guarded against another immediate attack. Bush approved “National Guard forces to airports, put more air marshals on planes, required airlines to harden cockpit doors, and tightened procedures for granting visas and screening passengers.”231 While these measures were temporary, the administration also approved the creation of the Transportation Security Agency, which continued some of these measures indefinitely. President Bush also unified these new initiatives and efforts under a new department – the Department of Homeland Security. In 2002, just after the midterm elections,

231 Bush, Decision Points, 155.
Congress passed legislation to create and fund this new department and Bush nominated Tom Ridge as its first secretary.\textsuperscript{232} The mission of the Department of Homeland Security is not counterterrorism. Homeland Security has two missions – border protection and preparedness. The first mission, border protection, overlaps to some extent with counterterrorism, but also included illegal immigration, trade, and cross-border criminal activity. The second mission, preparedness, is concerned with responding to an attack and thus is less concerned with deterrence or prevention than counterterrorism strategy is. While 9/11 may have solidified Bush’s need for the department, the concept for such an agency was not new. Post-cold war domestic and international terrorism became a cause for concern for a number of policy thinkers. The Hart-Rudman Commission released their report in January 2001 which called for a new department – the National Homeland Security Agency to oversee the security of critical infrastructure. When DHS was officially formed, their missions were informed and shaped by the findings of this and like studies. Specifically, DHS became concerned with preparing for a terrorist attack using WMDs within the borders of the U.S.\textsuperscript{233}

2.14 American Exceptionalism

American exceptionalism itself is neither an indicator of soft power nor hard power. The belief in the U.S.’ unique role in international affairs is useful for this examination only insofar as the motivation for the use of hard or soft power. In some instances, American exceptionalism is used to justify unilateral action. In other circumstances the narrative of the “shining house on

\textsuperscript{232} Ibid. 157.
“hill” is used to appeal to potential friends and foes. It can be used to tell those disillusioned with western society that the U.S. is the exception. It is the multicultural mecca in which many can exist as one.

One of the major themes of Bush’s presidency and his foreign policy was that of American exceptionalism. He truly believed that the U.S. had a role to fulfill, to make the world safe for democracy. His rhetoric and policies, thus, could be mistaken as reflecting liberal or Wilsonian views. Scholars caution against this conflation and argue that Bush’s ideology and policies reflected not liberal internationalism but liberal international imperialism. This distinction is important, specifically because it derives from the way Bush sought to spread U.S. values, culture, and political system. He sought to do so by force and unilaterally. In his 2004 State of the Union address, George Bush argued that “America is a nation with a mission, and that mission comes from our most basic beliefs. We have no desire to dominate, no ambitions of empire. Our aim is democratic peace - a peace founded upon the dignity and rights of every man and woman. America acts in this cause with friends and allies at our side, yet we understand our special calling: This great republic will lead the cause of freedom.” This idea, that America has a providential mission to spread freedom and democracy, is a central component of American nationalism and Americans understanding of themselves as a nation. Condoleezza Rice addressed this concept in her 2000 Foreign Affairs article. She argued, on behalf of the Bush campaign, that “America’s military power must be secure because the United States is the only guarantor of global peace and stability.” This highlights an important link, in the minds

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234 Hallams, "From Crusader to Exemplar: Bush, Obama and the Reinvigoration of America’s Soft Power."
237 Rice, No Higher Honor: A Memoir of My Years in Washington, 50.
of Bush’s advisors, between the U.S.’ special role in international politics and our responsibility to protect and stabilize that role with hard power – specifically military power. Rice argues that the U.S. must first be concerned with maintaining an international system in which it is a great power and therefore can promote and protect American values and ideals. However, by responding to every violation of these ideals or values, Rice argues that the U.S. position is weakened and therefore threatens the international balance of power. When this balance is unstable, the long-term threat to U.S. ideals is threatened.238

A cornerstone of Bush’s counterterrorism strategy, his foreign policy in general, or at least the discourse he creates around the threat is religion. Bush’s bid for the presidency itself was a result of a religious moment. Bush revealed to Reverend James Robinson that he felt very strongly during a 1999 sermon that God wanted him to run for the presidency and that God told him his country was going to need him.239,240 The sermon, given at George W. Bush’s second inauguration as governor, was delivered by Mark Craig, who retold the story of Moses leading the Israelites out of Egypt. Craig then called upon the congregates to fill the void of moral and ethical leadership lacking the country.241 While a focus on religion need not clash with a soft power approach, his focus on religion was not especially conducive to a soft power approach.

Before 9/11, during his 2001 speech to West Point graduates, he extolled America’s exceptionalism by arguing that it had a “special destiny” to make the world safe for democracy. He argues that the nation’s cause was bigger than the nation. In his 9/11 speech he quotes a verse from the book of Psalm, as he often quotes Christian scripture in subsequent speeches. In his September 20, 2001 speech, he argues that in this new battle “God is not neutral.” While religion

238 Ibid. 53.
241 Bush, Decision Points, 61.
in many cases can be a resource of soft power, used in this way it shows a clear lack of regard for soft power. Counterterrorism strategy since 9/11 has been overwhelmingly a strategy against Islamic terrorism. Using a soft power approach would seek to appeal to those vulnerable to Islamic extremism, most likely Muslim communities and individuals. Using Christian scripture to describe the U.S. and its foreign policy risked one of two outcomes with Muslim audiences. At best, it did little to appeal to or persuade Muslims to turn from Islamic terrorism toward the U.S. At worst, it painted the U.S. as a Christian nation incompatible with Muslim traditions and values. This may be part of the explanation for the declining views of the U.S. during Bush’s first term. As favorability towards the U.S. declined, separate polls showed that many felt religion was growing in importance in its influence over life in the U.S.

Assuming soft power is directed toward potential foes in efforts to make one more appealing, the overt use of Christian religion is most likely not appealing to Muslims. Again, this invocation of religion is most likely directed toward domestic audiences - specifically the religious political base. In a May 2003 speech at West Point, Bush asserted that “We are in a conflict between good and evil, and America will call evil by its name.” In this sentiment Bush assigns a religious cause to a military fight. Moreover, he ostracizes potential foes or friends by assigned strong normative values such as good and evil. He offers no middle ground. Additionally, he assigns a “no going back” core trait of evil to enemies and potential enemies. “Evil” connotes permanency and a core characteristic. He goes further in his 2002 State of the Union to name the “Axis of Evil” to include Iraq, Iran, and North Korea. It is unclear who Bush

243 Kohut, "Arab and Muslim Perceptions of the U.S."
245 "Religion," in In Depth (Gallup).
246 Bush, "President Bush Delivers Graduation Speech at West Point."
was attempting to reach in this speech, but it is clear it was not the people of Iraq. To align the
nation of Iraq with one of their longest-standing and strongest foes (Iran) is a sure way to ensure
they understand their place in the “evil” camp.

The Bush administration, despite applying Christian themes to the U.S. mission, was
careful to repeatedly point out that the U.S. was not at war with Islam or Muslims. On a number
of occasions, Bush emphasizes to both domestic and international audiences that the War on
Terror is not a war on Islam, Muslims, or Arabs. He argues that the teachings of al Qaeda are
antithetical to the teachings of Islam.247

2.15 Relationship with Muslim Leaders

At three o’clock in the afternoon on September 11, 2001, Bush was set to meet with the
American Muslim Political Coordination Council to discuss the administration’s policy in the
Middle East to include plans for Palestine. The attacks that morning cancelled that meeting and
instead shifted the focus of the alliance to protecting the eight million Muslims living in the U.S.
against a backlash of violence, hate, and discrimination. The next week, Muslim leaders attended
the National Day of Prayer and Remembrance Ceremony at the National Cathedral. Dr.
Muzammil H Siddiqi, president of the Indiana-based Islamic Society of North America delivered
his opening prayer by reading verses from the Qur’an.248 CAIR board chairman Omar Ahmad
and executive director Award along with American Muslim Alliance director Dr. Agha Saeed
were also in attendance. Days later at the Islamic Center in DC, Bush met with key Muslim

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247 Damon Marx, "'George Bush: We Are Not at War with Islam'” AdWeek, February 19, 2015.
248 Delinda C. Hanley, "In the Wake of 9-11 President Bush and Muslim Leaders Work to Protect Muslim
leaders – Dr. Jamshed Uppal of the American Muslim Alliance, CAIR’s Nihad Awad, Yousuf Saleem of the Muslim American Society, Prof. Azizah al-Hibry representing Karamah, Dr. Hassan Ibrahim of the Muslim Public Affairs Council, Abdulwahab Alkebsi of the Islamic Institute, Georgetown University’s Muslim chaplain, Imam Yahya Hendi, and representatives from the Ministry of Imam W. Deen Mohamed.249 The meeting included topics ranging from policy in the Middle East, to the fear of anti-Muslim law and regulations, and the administration’s language choice in using “crusade” immediately post 9/11. Dr. Siddiqi presented Bush with a Qur’an, a very “thoughtful gift” which visibly pleased the president and highlighted the intentions of cooperation and respect. While this, among other meetings that week, had measurable positive impacts in controlling what could have been a massive backlash against Muslim-Americans, there were limits to success. Dr. Saeed, after working furiously post 9/11 to change the image of Arabs in the U.S., was pulled aside and questioned by five FBI agents in the airport before flying home.250

On September 26, 2011, Bush again invited key Muslim leaders to the White House for an off the record meeting and press conference. While the details of the discussion were kept private, the leaders released a statement to the public thanking the president and his administration for “setting a tone of unity, resolve, and respect,” condemning the attacks on 9/11, and emphasizing the role of Arab-Americans and Muslim-Americans in the fight against terrorism.251 These actions, on behalf of the president and his administration, undoubtedly showed both domestic and foreign audiences, Muslims, and non-Muslims, that the U.S. was

249 Ibid.
250 Ibid.
251 Ibid.
“more than just a military or financial power—it is a moral superpower.” The inclusivity these public appearances portrayed undoubtedly appealed to the moderate Muslim population.

2.16 Refugee/Immigration Programs

![Immigrants/Refugees from Muslim Countries](chart.png)

Figure 3: Level of Muslim Refugees 2001-2004 Source: Migration Policy Institute

An administration which enacts policies that increase refugee/asylum seekers migration to the U.S. indicates a soft power approach – specifically if these refugees and asylum seekers

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Ibid.
are Muslim/Arab and/or are fleeing conflict zones affected by terrorism. Allowing these moderate individuals to resettle in the U.S. accomplishes a number of things. First, it presents a narrative to the world that the U.S. is an acceptable alternative to extremism. Second, it shows that the Islamic way of life is compatible with the American way of life. Third, if done correctly, it develops thought leaders, refugees who could potentially return to their countries with positive stories of the U.S. Fourth, it shows a benevolent and compassionate superpower willing to use its resources and values to help others. This creates appeal and affection for the U.S. and its policies.

The United States Refugee Admissions Program’s (USRAP) roots can be found in World War II with the U.S. resettling over 250,000 displaced Europeans followed by the first official refugee legislation – the Displaced Persons Act – passed by Congress in 1948.\textsuperscript{253,254} Since then, refugee resettlement has been a key component of national security strategy. During the Cold War, the U.S. focused on resettling people fleeing the Soviet Union, Cuba, and other communist regimes. In the mid 1970s, the U.S. created an ad hoc Refugee Task Force which resettled hundreds of thousands of refugees from Southeast Asia. This ad hoc task force prompted formal legislation in 1980 with the Refugee Act, which provides the legal basis for the USRAP.\textsuperscript{255} The USRAP currently is a consortium of government agencies to include the Bureau of Population, Refugees, and Migration (PRM) in the Department of State, the U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS) in the Department of Homeland Security, the Office of Refugee Resettlement (ORR) of the Department of Health and Human Services, five IGOs or NGOs

\textsuperscript{253}Refugee Council USA, "History Of The U.S. Refugee Resettlement Program," http://www.rcusa.org/history/.
\textsuperscript{255}"History Of The U.S. Refugee Resettlement Program."
operating Resettlement Support Centers, funded and supervised by the PRM, nine domestic NGOs, and private citizens who work to resettle refugees. Under the program, the executive branch is responsible for meeting every year to discuss the current global refugee situation and determine what role the U.S. can and will play in resettling refugees. During this meeting, annual processing priorities are determined along with overall admission levels and regional allocations of refugees. The president, along with the consultation of congress, determines the ceiling levels of refugees to be admitted each year.

The memoirs of key personnel in the Bush administration generally do not address the administration’s rationale behind refugee programs, but from the data it is logical to conclude that the administration saw decreased levels in refugee resettlements as the path to security. Immediately following 9/11, Bush suspended the refugee resettlement program for seven months to review its components, which accounts for the drastic decline in fiscal year 2002. When faced with the decision between American values and traditional notions of security, Bush willingly chose security.

2.17 Use of Language

Language and messaging has always been an integral part of U.S. foreign policy and is an effective tool of soft power. Soft power is centered on persuading individuals. By its very

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260 Bush, Decision Points, 169.
definition this persuasion cannot be done with tanks, threats, rewards, or punishments. It is done with actions, and also with words. Bush quickly learned a lesson in the importance of language and adjusted quickly. “His first understandable outburst against terrorism led him to call for a “crusade” against terrorists. Raging reaction was instant and total among offended Muslims. The term never again appeared in White House language.”261 In fact, Bush overwhelmingly spoke positively when addressing Muslims and Islamic faith.

On September 12, 2001 Bush met with democratic and republican leaders form Congress. He addressed his two main concerns. First, he cautioned against complacency. He charged his fellow leaders to “stay focused on the threat and fight the war until we had prevailed.” Secondly, Bush expressed his deep concern over the backlash against Muslims and Arab Americans. Driven by the history of mistreatment of German and Japanese citizen, Bush decided to speak out against discrimination and racist hysteria.262 Bush, six days after 9/11, delivered a speech at the Islamic Center in Washington D.C. in which he emphasized “Islam is Peace.”263 The speech was short, but focused. The language was inclusive. Bush made it clear that the attacks were not representative of the entire Muslim population and wanted to ensure that his fellow Americans understood this point. He stressed that Muslims and Americans were not mutually exclusive monikers, nor were they to be enemies. “America counts millions of Muslims amongst our citizens, and Muslims make an incredibly valuable contribution to our country. Muslims are doctors, lawyers, law professors, members of the military, entrepreneurs, shopkeepers, moms, and dads. And they need to be treated with respect. In our anger and emotion, our fellow.

262 Bush, Decision Points, 142.
Americans must treat each other with respect.”²⁶⁴ This is the exact sentiment of the shared values initiative. In fact, Bush argues that the U.S. is great precisely “because we share the same values of respect and dignity and human worth.”²⁶⁵ The speech at the Islamic Center had dramatic and immediate positive effects. Prior to the speech, the ADC and CAIR reported about 95 percent of their message traffic – emails and telephone messages – was negative. After the speech, 80 percent of the traffic was favorable. CAIR took these positive messages and launched a campaign called “Messages of Hope” which described the support, sympathy, and encouragement received by Muslim-Americans by their fellow citizens.²⁶⁶

Bush repeatedly attempted to assure Muslims that he respected and admired the Islamic faith. He hosted Ramadan dinners, and periodically criticized evangelicals. Still, evangelical missionaries, practicing the same faith as Bush, did not “hide their desire to convert Muslims to Christianity, even—if not especially—in Baghdad. If one of the goals of ousting Saddam Hussein is to bring freedom of worship to an oppressed people, how can the president object?”²⁶⁷

Franklin Graham, who delivered the invocation at Bush’s first inauguration, repeatedly disparaged Islam in a number of interviews and sermons. “True Islam cannot be practiced in this country. You can’t beat your wife. You cannot murder your children if you think they’ve committed adultery or something like that, which they do practice in these other countries.”²⁶⁸

This statement provides three distinct problems in the Bush administration to appeal to moderate Muslims. The first is to claim there are no moderate Muslims. By stating that “true” Islam is synonymous with domestic violence and murder, Rev. Graham groups all practicing Muslims in

²⁶⁴ Ibid.
²⁶⁵ Ibid.
²⁶⁶ Hanley, “In the Wake of 9-11 President Bush and Muslim Leaders Work to Protect Muslim Americans.”
a criminal organization. Secondly, the statement directly argues that the Islamic faith and American society are incompatible. Precisely because of the calls to violent crime, true Muslims cannot live in the U.S. This meant Muslims living in the U.S. had to choose between being true believers in their faith and law-abiding citizens of their country. Finally, in a more indirect way, Rev. Graham fuels the “us vs them” or “other” narrative. His language of “they” and “these other” countries does not specify who “they” are or in what countries these atrocities are allowed, but he does not have to. His comment simply needs to describe them as “other” than American. While these comments prompted Bush to distance himself from the preacher and even rescind an invitation to the National Prayer Breakfast in 2011, the temporal distinction in the relationship between the two is hard to discern for some Muslims. As such, recruiters for various radical Islamic groups could capitalize on this confusion and appeal to moderate Muslims.

Bush’s religiosity and rhetoric not only potentially worried Muslims, but non-Muslims as well, as evidenced in a September 2001 editorial in the London Observer in which the writer expressed disgust and outrage at her God being “high jacked” in the wake of 9/11. The author argued that George Bush’s justification of impending retaliation on Christian grounds was “bad religion covering dirty politics.” C. Welton Gaddy, a Baptist preacher and once president of the Interfaith Alliance, issued a statement after a particular religion-tinged speech by Bush. He argued that “When he speaks in these terms,” said Gaddy, “he leaves out whole segments of America,” highlighting the inherent divisiveness that stems from strong Christian language. Strong religious rhetoric risks alienating not only those of other faiths, but those of weaker Christian beliefs. Countries and areas of the world, Europe, for example, not only fail to respond positively to such rhetoric but are often less tolerant. The editor of the French publication Le

Monde wrote that “People are afraid of this religious language in the political landscape…This kind of language sounds very odd to us, very bizarre, and it does not cross the ocean well.” Robert Kagan, a scholar on European-U.S. relations argued that for domestic audiences, the dichotomy of good and evil was simple and understandable, and thus effective. For Europeans, however, many were “stunned and perhaps even horrified by that speech.” German scholars posed that the German public looked at this speech as the start of a crusade. This further hinders potential multilateral cooperation and action. Others argue that while Bush does invoke religion as an answer to a number of situations, he is careful to avoid mentioning Jesus Christ and other Christian-specific figures and does call for a tolerance of all faiths. While Bush’s religious rhetoric may have ostracized some historical European allies, it seemed to have the opposite effect on the UK-US alliance. Tony Blair’s government was one of, if not the only, staunchest allies of the U.S.-led invasions in Afghanistan and Iraq. Tony Blair, an Anglican during the majority of the George W. Bush administration, was considered a religious man by the U.S. president. Reportedly, the two prayed together during a 2002 summit at the Crawford Ranch in Texas. Further reports claim that during this prayer time, both leaders agreed on a partnership and plan to invade Iraq and overthrow Saddam Hussein. During the 2010 Chilcot inquiry, Tony Blair denied these claims. He did concede that during the summit both leaders agreed to address the threat from Iraq together, but in general rather than specific terms.

271 Frontline, "Blair’s War."
Despite the veracity of these reports, other researchers argue that Tony Blair saw the war in Iraq in the same dichotomous “good vs evil” frame as Bush.277

This type of language is troublesome when dealing with the complex issues of international security and counterterrorism. This language was used immediately post 9/11. Research in the religious rhetoric of Bush over his two terms shows a sharp increase in religious rhetoric present in foreign policy speeches after 9/11. One specific example of religious rhetoric is the use of the term “evil,” a word used only twice during the Bush administration prior to 9/11 – once in reference to the Axis Powers during WWI and once during a meeting with Pope John Paul. In the six months following the attacks, however, Bush used the term 199 times (in the speeches analyzed by the researchers).278 Bush not only divided the world into two camps, he designated one as “good” and one as “evil.” To be considered part of the good, moral, and just camp one had to side with the U.S. There was no other option. Bush did not even present a third neutral option for those who preferred not get involved. In his speech announcing military operations in Afghanistan, Bush was explicit in this regard: “Every nation has a choice to make. In this conflict, there is no neutral ground.”279 A view echoed from the counsel of his vice president during planning sessions, “right now people have to choose between the United States and the bad guys.”280

Overall, George Bush’s language was often militarized, especially when it came to religion. During his campaign for presidency in 1999, he often called for “armies of compassion”

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278 Black, "With God on Our Side: Religion in George W. Bush's Foreign Policy Speeches."
280 Bush, Decision Points, 190.
to help solve some of the domestic problems plaguing American society. This type of language justified military action on religious, or at the very least, moral grounds. Bush found support for this approach in the major faith communities in the U.S., as they supported military action in order to restore peace and justice after the attacks. The United States Catholic Conference, the Executive Council of the Episcopal Church, the United Methodist Board of Church and Society, along with officials from the Presbyterian Church (USA) all released statements of varying degrees of support for “just war” and “limited use of force to protect the weak.” Bush found his deepest support in his evangelical and Jewish base. Evangelical leaders supported a military response more forcefully, echoing Bush’s militarized language. Jewish leaders drew parallels between the terrorist attacks to similar attacks in Israel and even the Holocaust.

2.18 Shared Values Initiative

Charlotte Beers was sworn in as the Under Secretary of State for Public Diplomacy and Public Affairs at the State Department on October 2, 2001. The State Department has historically been in charge of diplomacy, or as Secretary of State Colin Powell once described, “selling a product…American diplomacy.” Beers was in charge of public diplomacy, or selling the U.S. message and foreign policies to populations abroad. She was the supervisor of the Bureau of Public Affairs, Bureau of Educational and Cultural Affairs, and the Office of International

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283 Ibid. 347.
284 Ibid., 347.
Information Programs. All three bureaus in the department exercised soft power initiatives. The Bureau of Public Affairs coordinated briefings, press releases for both domestic and international audiences to distribute timely and accurate information about U.S. foreign policy and national security interests. The Bureau of Education and Cultural Affairs (ECA) is charged with increasing “mutual understanding between the people of the U.S. and the people of other countries by means of educational and cultural exchange that assist in the development of peaceful relations.” The last portion of this mission statement indicates that leadership understands the role of such exchanges in promoting a peaceful security environment. Secretary Beers also supervised the Bureau of International Information Programs, which seeks to “support people-to-people conversations with foreign publics on U.S. policy priorities” using traditional and contemporary forms of media and technology.

SVI understood that not all of America’s values translated abroad. As such, Beers consulted the data available through the RoperASW Worldview research tool known as ValueScope™ which identifies 57 discrete values and evaluates their importance to citizens of 35 countries. Using this data, Beers concluded that some values such as modesty, obedience, freedom, duty, and perseverance were valued quite differently among the U.S. and various Muslim countries. However, three values – faith, family, and learning – were highly regarded among both the U.S. and predominately Muslim nations such as Indonesia and Saudi Arabia. Based on Beers’ background in advertising and the common rule to focus on one objective in a

287 “Bureau of Educational and Cultural Affairs” https://eca.state.gov/about-bureau.
289 Fullerton and Kendrick, Advertising’s war on terrorism: the story of the U.S. State Department’s Shared Values Initiative, 27.
290 Ibid., 28.
campaign, Beers chose faith as the common value to stress in the SVI campaign. As the polls showed that many non-American Muslims viewed the U.S. as immoral and intolerant of the Muslim way of life, Beers designed the campaign to show Muslims in the U.S. freely practicing their religion in accordance with the Koran’s teachings.291

As Beers understood that the SVI spots would have limited success if viewers knew they were developed and broadcasted by the U.S. government, Beers asked Malik Hasan to help found the Council of American Muslims for Understanding. The non-partisan non-profit would be the official organization behind the SVI television spots.292 The campaign officially launched in October of 2002 with speeches by diplomats and regular American Muslim citizens, town hall events, internet sites and chat rooms, a magazine titled Muslim Life in America, newspaper ads, and, most famously, five television commercials or “mini-documentaries.” These advertisements were the primary focus of the SVI.

These mini-documentaries were produced by advertising agency McCann-Erickson for $15 million (of the $595 million State Department budget).293 The five spots looked at five ordinary Muslim Americans. The first chronicles a baker, Abdul Kaouf Hammuda, in Toledo, Ohio and his family. The two-minute video focuses on the interaction between the Muslim business owner and his non-Muslim customers as well as his children’s lives in school, to include a high schooler in an Islamic school founded by the baker. “It’s not hard to live the straight path in America.”294 The second, “School Teacher” features Lebanon-born Rawia Ismail wearing a hijab and teaching non-Muslim children in a public school. Other scenes include

291 Ibid., 29.
292 Ibid., 30.
293 Ibid., 32.
playing baseball and performing the daily prayers. “Our neighbors care as much about family as we do.”

The third, “Firefighter” features two Muslims, a paramedic with the New York Fire Department, Farooq Muhammad, and a chaplain with the Metropolitan Transportation Authority police department, Abdul Malik. This video emphasizes the community of diversity in the U.S. and stresses that “you have more freedom to work for Islam in the U.S. than any other country.”

The fourth features perhaps the more prominent citizen of the five, Dr. Elias Zerhouni, the Bush-appointed director of the National Institutes of Health (NIH). This spot focuses on the mission of the NIH as well as Dr. Zerhouni’s background in Algeria and positive personal experiences in the U.S. He, too, emphasizes the tolerance of the American people and government as well as highlights the success Muslims can find in the U.S.

The fifth features Indonesian-born Devianti Faridz, a Masters in Journalism student at the University of Missouri. Faridz focuses on how the values of her Muslim childhood are the same values emphasized in her journalism program. “There is an opportunity for mutual understanding.”

One of the SVI programs was the television show “Next Chapter,” broadcasted by the Voice of America Iran. “Next Chapter,” a MTV-like channel, which features the lives of young Persia-Americans, was the first of a series of broadcasts in Iran after it was declared to be part of the “axis of evil” in Bush’s 2002 speech. The second, Radio Farda (“tomorrow” in Persian), was a radio program that broadcasted 24 hours of music and news. The third, a news

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broadcast, was “News and Views,” which aired domestic news stories in Persian. The intent with all of these programs was to engage Iranians, specifically younger crowds, and offer them an alternative view of American life, values, and culture than offered by their anti-American government. The president asserted that these programs were meant to build bridges with the Iranian people and to let them know that “America stands squarely by their side.” These programs were in addition to the long standing “Roundtable with You” program which started airing once a week in 1996, and featured guests such as banned Persia artist Googoosh. These four Iranian programs reached 12 percent of Iranians over the age of 18 or four million people per week. In comparison, Radio Farda reaches 7 percent, while VOA Persia radio reached only 2 percent—impressive considering these programs were broadcasted in a country that regularly jams non-state run communications and media. Other programs included a traveling exhibition of photographs from 9/11 and videos and pamphlets highlighting the life of the Muslims in the U.S. With under one month of operation, the SVI was cancelled due to lack of impact. As the controversy around the impacts of SVI show, the results of diplomacy are hard to measure. As such in 2004, on the urging of key leaders in public diplomacy, Bush expanded the Department of State by creating the Evaluation and Measurement Unit (now part of the Policy Planning and Resources for Public Diplomacy and Public Affair office). The EMU is designed to provide long-term strategic guidance for the Undersecretary by measuring and evaluation public diplomacy programs beyond the standard anecdotal feedback.

305 Ibid.
306 Wise, "U.S. Writers Do Cultural Battle Around the Globe."
2.19 Cultural Exchanges

One program under the SVI sought to exchange “thought leaders” from Muslim/Arab countries and the U.S. The U.S. had similar exchange programs to combat communism during the Cold War with much success.\(^{307}\) Soviet Union hosts were surprised and impressed with the freedoms afforded the journalists and artists representing the U.S. One less formal way of doing a cultural exchange is through student visas. Undergraduate, and to some extent, graduate school are formative years for individuals. This is the time where students are focused on learning, not just from texts and professors, but from their own experiences. Allowing, even encouraging international thought leaders to study in the U.S. exposes them to our culture, institutions, and societal norms. They, in turn, provide “bridges of knowledge and understanding that greatly improve the strategic position of the United States in the world.”\(^{308}\) A number of current and recent world leaders – Kofi Annan, Prince Saud Faisal, Gloria Macapagal Arroyo, and Vicente Fox – all studied in the U.S. Student visas ensure that the next generation of leaders continues to build those bridges. The number of non-immigrants who are issued visas and admitted to the U.S. as tourists, students, or temporary workers dropped drastically post-9/11, with the largest numerical drop between 2000 and 2004 (70 percent) being in the number of tourist and business visas issued to individuals from Gulf countries, which include Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, Bahrain, Qatar, United Arab Emirates, and Oman.\(^{309}\)


\(^{308}\) Ibid., 9.

\(^{309}\) Kayyali, "The People Perceived as a Threat to Security: Arab Americans Since September 11."
The SVI, along with the State Department as a whole, did attempt to conduct other more formal cultural exchanges and advocated for such as part of a comprehensive national security strategy. Christopher Ross, the State Department’s special coordinator for public diplomacy, argued that official cultural exchanges were a “cost-effective investment to ensure U.S. national security” and a way to combat “the skewed, negative and unrepresentative” image of America prevalent in the international media scene.\(^{310}\) The State Department produced a booklet of stories by U.S. authors, to include two Arab-Americans, Naomi Shihab Nye and Elmaz Abinader. While the project was overseen by the State Department’s Office of International Information Programs; the intent was to show the diversity of the American citizen, to include those who dissented with the Bush administration’s policies. The State Department also organized a tour of the American writers and “thought leaders” to provide readings and, subsequently, a different, positive, narrative of American culture to those areas prone to terrorism.\(^{311}\)

There was considerable dissension among Bush advisors on the role of foreign aid and cultural exchange and foreign aid programs. Donald Rumsfeld once advised, “do no good, no harm will come of it,” Rumsfeld was talking about the $170 billion worth of aid going to refugee camps along the border in Afghanistan.\(^{312}\) The problem with aid is that some will say it is not enough while others will say it is going to the wrong people.\(^ {313}\) George Tenet wanted to tie aid to alliances, a way to incentivize participation in taking Kabul – turning a typically soft power approach to a rewards-based hard power approach.\(^ {314}\) Likewise, Colin Powell called for more publicity on the aid available to Afghans as an incentive to support U.S. forces.\(^ {315}\)

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310 Wise, "U.S. Writers Do Cultural Battle Around the Globe."
311 Ibid.
312 Bob Woodward, Bush at War (Simon & Schuster, 2002), 223.
313 Ibid., 222.
314 Ibid., 223.
315 Ibid., 159.
understood Bush’s desire for humanitarian relief, and she understood the role aid could play in both military operations and stabilizing a country.

Bush did want to start a program paring U.S. elementary school kids with Afghan children, calling for $1 donations to the Afghan Children’s Fund as well as appeal to women as the Taliban have historically mistreated their women. Laura Bush also got involved with the call to the women and children of Afghanistan. In November 2002, immediately following the fall of Kabul, the first lady addressed the U.S. and the world in her account of the brutal treatment of women and children under Taliban rule. She is careful to avoid comparing Afghan society and women to American society. Instead, she compares the role of women in Taliban society to their treatment in other Islamic cultures, stating “the poverty, poor health, and illiteracy that the terrorists and the Taliban have imposed on women in Afghanistan do not conform with the treatment of women in most of the Islamic world, where women make important contributions in their societies.” She draws on universal ideals – love of children and respect for all humans – as cause for action and advocacy. The soft power approach is appealing to those seeking to maintain religious and cultural differences while joining the U.S. in the fight against terrorism.

In May of 2002, the first lady (FLOTUS) sent a literal message to the people of Afghanistan via Radio Free Europe. FLOTUS opens the broadcast with a Farsi (linguistically close to both Dari and Pashto) greeting “America ba shooma ahst” or “America is with you.” The address highlighted the collaborative nature of the aid – citing partnerships with the United Nations and coalition partners as well as its successes. FLOTUS goes on to explain the priorities

316 Ibid., 216.
of aid as agriculture, education, and health care. The second half of the address was targeting the women and children of the nation. FLOTUS emphasized the role American children had in collection funds and supplies for the nation, even quoting some American schoolchildren as “the voices of America.” FLOTUS also speaks to the women of Afghanistan, carefully highlighting the respected differences between American and Afghan culture, urging them to participate in their new government and new society. She argues that “the isolation the Taliban regime forced on you is not normal – not by international standards, not by Islamic standards, and not by Afghanistan’s own standards,” and points out the role of women in Afghan society prior to the Taliban. The tone of the message is not that Afghan society should be built in the image of the U.S., but rather that it can be developed as a unique culture that respects traditions and human rights. FLOTUS closes with a reiteration of the partnership message, “We are with you.”

Laura Bush’s words were matched with action as she met with Afghan teachers, students, and mothers, led programs to deliver school supplies, and supported a new U.S.-Afghan Women’s Council (USAWC) and helped fund the program with more than $70 million in private development. USAWC is a private-public foundation based out of Georgetown University that seeks to “encourage dynamic and collaborative partnerships in support of Afghan women and children in the areas of education, health, economic empowerment, and leadership development.” While the foundation does not have security-specific goals, nor is it wholly intended to improve the security situation of terrorist-prone Afghanistan, it does serve as an example of one of Bush’s partner initiatives that sought to exchange ideas, resources, and culture.

319 Laura Bush, "Radio Address of Mrs. Bush " (Prague, Czech RepublicMay 21, 2002).
320 Ibid.
321 Bush, Decision Points, 201.
Less than a month after 9/11, Bush announced that the U.S. had begun executing its counterterrorism strategy in Afghanistan on October 7, 2001. Bush recounts this day and the days of planning leading up to the start of the operation. He recalls the meeting with the CIA four days after the attacks to determine the U.S.' strategy to dismantle the Al Qaeda network. A large portion of this plan was covert action conducted by the CIA to include blanket permission for CIA missions to kill or capture al Qaeda operatives.\footnote{\textit{Decision Points}, 186.} Another pillar of the strategy was to deploy CIA teams to northeast Afghanistan to join forces with anti-Taliban Northern Alliance. Bush understood the importance of partnering with local forces: that it would help mitigate any images of a conquering or invading nation.\footnote{Ibid., 187.} While he does not use the terms soft or smart power, these details of the plan were attempting to achieve appeal and persuasion through a positive international image.

As George Tenet, head of the CIA at the time, briefed, Osama bin Laden had been identified as a threat prior to the attacks, but not to the U.S. and thus no there was no real impetus to execute plans to neutralize him.\footnote{Knott, "George W. Bush: Foreign Affairs."} Amongst the meetings and strategy sessions, as he did with all major decisions of his life and presidency, Bush prayed.\footnote{Bush, \textit{Decision Points}, 190.} Ultimately, the administration decided to press forward with military operations in Afghanistan named Operation Enduring Freedom. During the press conference on October 7, Bush revealed the initial targets to be Al Qaeda training camps and Taliban military installations. He disclosed that

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\begin{itemize}
  \item \textit{Decision Points}, 186.
  \item Ibid., 187.
  \item Knott, "George W. Bush: Foreign Affairs."
  \item Bush, \textit{Decision Points}, 190.
\end{itemize}
he offered a peaceful solution to the Taliban if they were willing to hand over Al Qaeda leaders, close training camps, and return all detained foreign nationals. This was the desired outcome. Bush did not attempt to appeal or persuade the Taliban to do this (soft power) but, rather, threatened them if they did not (hard power). When the Taliban failed to provide the desired outcome, the president authorized military force. Attacking the Taliban was reflective of the new “us or them” policy and outlook of the Bush administration. As Vice President Cheney argued, this new policy was necessary. Precise, isolated strikes against individual cells or leaders needed to be replaced with attacks against networks of support.327

Bush believed that the U.S. states had lost credibility with state and non-state actors by previously issuing empty threats of military force.328 As bin Laden himself had claimed in a 1998 interview, the American soldiers were “paper tigers” with low morale and who ran from the first set of blows. Bin Laden cites the U.S. intervention in Somalia as evidence of the U.S.’s false claim to be the world’s only superpower.329 Bush was determined not to repeat these past foreign policy mistakes. The desired effects were to deny Al Qaeda the use of Afghanistan as a base of operations and to degrade the military capabilities of the Taliban government. These operations were carried out in concert with NATO allies – namely Great Britain, Canada, Australia, Germany, and France.330 Additionally, on September 12, 2001 the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) invoked Article IV of their charter which entitled all members of NATO to the collective defense of the entire organization.331 This was the first time the article was invoked since the inception of NATO. On October 4 NATO agreed to eight measures to support

327 Cheney and Cheney, In My Time: A Personal and Political Memoir, 332.
328 Knott, "George W. Bush: Foreign Affairs."
329 Laden, "Frontline Interview."
330 Bush, "Bush Addresses the Nation."
the U.S. These included intelligence sharing, assistance to allies and countries threatened by terrorism, provide increased security for the U.S. and other allies, to backfill U.S. assets diverted from NATO’s area to combat the war on terrorism, to provide overflight clearances for U.S. flights as well as access to ports and airfields necessary for refueling and other logistical requirements, and to deploy NATO forces to the Eastern Mediterranean as well as Airborne Early Warning assets to support counterterrorism operations.\textsuperscript{332} NATO troops were deployed on October 26, 2001 to the eastern Mediterranean and later the operation was expanded to include the entire Mediterranean.\textsuperscript{333}

Bush’s plans also hinged on cooperation and support from non-NATO allies, but at a cost. On September 13, Colin Powell called Pakistan’s President Musharraf and “made it clear he had to decide whose side he was on.”\textsuperscript{334} He then went on to detail the demands of such a partnership. Pakistan was instructed to condemn the attacks on 9/11, deny Al Qaeda refuge in Pakistan, share intelligence reporting with the U.S., grant the U.S. use of Pakistani airspace for overflights, and break all diplomatic ties with the Taliban.\textsuperscript{335} While multi and bi-lateral agreements are considered a soft power indicator for this research, details like these highlight the administration’s preference for hard power tactics with dealing with both allies and enemies.

After much deliberation, combat operations in Afghanistan began on October 7, 2001 and involved some 40,000 personnel, 400 aircraft, and 30 naval vessels.\textsuperscript{336} The plan for Afghanistan had four major components. The first was setting up major logistical bases in countries neighboring Afghanistan. This component served two functions, one supporting hard power

\begin{flushright}
\textsuperscript{332} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{333} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{334} Bush, Decision Points, 188.
\textsuperscript{335} Ibid., 188.
\end{flushright}
approaches and the other serving soft power approaches. It was first and foremost a way to overcome impending logistical challenges for military troops, transport, and equipment. It was also designed to counter Chinese and Indian political influence in the region (soft power). The second component was to ensure enough air power to sustain an enduring campaign of air strikes against targets in the region (hard power). Thirdly, the plan required the preparation to send limited numbers of ground troops into Afghanistan if needed (hard power, but limited). Finally, the plan’s fourth component was to align with the Northern Alliance. As the Northern Alliance engaged in heavy fighting throughout the conflict, the decision to arm, train, and equip this force was partially hard power. The decision to support a largely popular local force, however, exhibits a soft power approach of winning the mass base.

During his October 7 speech, George Bush also revealed a soft power side of his military operations. He told domestic and international audiences that “as we strike military targets, we will also drop food, medicine, and supplies to the starving and suffering men and women and children of Afghanistan.” He re-emphasized earlier sentiments on the friendship of the U.S. to all Muslims and the desire for peace, delivering the speech symbolically from the White House Treaty Room. He also posited that the military operation was but one aspect of the war on terror with the others being intelligence, financial, law enforcement operations, and diplomacy. The first three were determined earlier as hard power while the fourth is more of a soft power approach. He argued that the military operation was not simply to defend the freedoms of the U.S., but the universal freedoms he believed it was America’s responsible to promote and protect around the world.

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337 Rogers, *Why We’re Losing the War on Terror*, 73.  
338 Ibid., 73.  
339 Bush, "Bush Addresses the Nation."  
340 Ibid.
From the onset of the conflict, Bush did understand the need for humanitarian aid in campaigns and called for a number of humanitarian drops coordinated between USAID and the military. Unfortunately, because of the threat level and logistical requirements for such a drop (the military cargo planes which perform these types of operations were highly vulnerable to the existing air defense sites of the Taliban), these desires were not always possible. This, combined with his staff’s less enthusiastic approach to humanitarian relief, led to a lesser focus on the soft power aspects of war.\textsuperscript{341} Accounts such as these highlight that Bush had ideas of soft power occasionally, but rarely was able to translate them into plans or actions. Bush’s primaries were somewhat surprised at the president’s insistence that aid be included in the immediate plans. Bush, however, felt a moral obligation to assist the citizens of the region. Moreover, he understood the importance of image. He did not want the U.S. to be seen as a conqueror vice liberator. He viewed the Afghan people not as the enemy but rather pawns of the Taliban in need of U.S. assistance. He understood that this war would not be like wars in history in which the people were attacked in order to force the government into submission, but rather we needed the people’s support in order to reconstruct a just and democratic government. Easing the suffering of the Afghan people was critical to the overall success of the military and political goals in the country.

The Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRT) serve as one of the Bush administration’s first smart power approaches to winning the war in Afghanistan. These teams originated under a program called Coalition Humanitarian Liaison Cells and consisted of five to 10 Army civilian affairs officers.\textsuperscript{342} Originally a U.S. only concept and comprised of only military members, the

\textsuperscript{341} Woodward, \textit{Bush at War}, 124.
concept of PRT evolved over the years to include multi-national led PRT and the addition of civilians to the teams. This addition led to a number of issues among some of the ISAF partners that had restrictions on the role of the military in PRT and the missions of these teams.\textsuperscript{343}

2.21 Operation Iraqi Freedom: The War in Iraq

While terrorism was not high on the list of security concerns as Bush took office in 2001, Iraq was. At the first meeting of the National Security Council in January of 2001, CIA head George Tenet briefed imagery of a potential chemical or biological plant in Iraq. Later that week, Colin Powell discussed increased economic sanctions on Iraq while Donald Rumsfeld proposed an alternate future with Iraq unburdened by Hussein’s leadership and as a regional power friendly to the U.S.\textsuperscript{344} Post 9/11, during a Camp David meeting on the Saturday after 9/11, Rumsfeld and Wolfowitz argued that strikes against Afghanistan were not a strong enough response to terrorist organizations and the states that sponsored them. They argued that Iraq must be included in the plan. Despite the urging of many of his advisors to include an Iraq invasion in the immediate response to 9/11, Bush preferred to focus on eradicating the Taliban and al Qaeda in Afghanistan. He told both his secretary of state and Prime Minister Blair that eventually they would need to “return to that question.”\textsuperscript{345}

In late 2001, the administration quietly began receiving briefings from U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM) on the threat from Saddam Hussein.\textsuperscript{346} As a result of these briefings

\textsuperscript{343} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{344} Logevall, "Anatomy of an unnecessary war: The Iraq invasion," 90.
\textsuperscript{345} Ibid., 94.
\textsuperscript{346} Knott, "George W. Bush: Foreign Affairs."
and intelligence sharing with the United Kingdom, the administration concluded that Saddam Hussein “now has weapons of mass destruction. There is no doubt that he is amassing them to use them against our friends, against our allies, and against us.”347 This belief alone justified the use of military force in accordance with the 2002 NSS outlined above. However, the administration went one step further by connecting Saddam Hussein’s WMD program with the threat from non-state or transnational actors, specifically al Qaeda. In a speech to the Veterans of Foreign Wars (VFW) 103rd National Convention, Vice President Dick Cheney outlined the dangers from a continued Saddam regime. While he stopped short of explicitly stating that Saddam Hussein intended on sharing his WMDs with al Qaeda, the structure of his speech produced that logical inference. He disclosed that documents found in al Qaeda hides proved their intent to acquire and use nuclear, chemical, biological, and/or radiological weapons. He then immediately moved on to explain the progress of Iraq’s nuclear program since the Gulf War, concluding with the statement above and a reminder that Iraq has long been on the State Department’s list of state sponsors of terrorism for almost 20 years.348 In discussing what action to take with Iraq, some of Bush’s advisors, namely Colin Powell, argued for United Nations or congressional resolutions, while others, led by Vice President Dick Cheney, advised a more aggressive unilateral plan. Colin Powell argued after a United Nations resolution was passed and subsequently broken, that the U.S. would have more legitimacy and support to launch more aggressive action. While officially Bush opted for United Nations action first, privately, some argue that he had already decided to go to war with Iraq. As discussed above, much of this decision was a result of “a large number of individuals associated with the radical wing of the

347 Cheney, "Remarks by the Vice President to the Veterans of Foreign Wars 103rd National Convention."
348 Ibid.
Republican Part or conservative and pro-Israel think-tanks moved into the inner sanctums of power.\textsuperscript{349} In March of 2002 Bush sent Cheney to the Middle East for a conference with 11 other countries to build support for impending military action. In the fall of 2002, Bush and his vice president appeared to wage an aggressive campaign to garner public support for military action.\textsuperscript{350} On November 8, 2002, the UNSC passed UN Resolution 1441, which gave Iraq a final chance to prove compliance with previous United Nations resolutions ordering the disarmament of long-range ballistic missiles and cessation of WMD programs as they had failed to do multiple times in the past.\textsuperscript{351} Iraq failed to respond to the resolution and its demands. Under the urging of Secretary Powell, the U.S. prepared a presentation to the United Nations on the Iraqi threat. Then deputy director of the CIA John McLaughlin prepared the first draft focusing on Iraq’s WMD program, which was received with lukewarm response by the White House. Eventually, the task was assigned to Secretary Powell with the guidance to focus on three themes – terrorism, human rights, and WMDs.\textsuperscript{352} Powell instead chose to focus only on the WMD in his hour and a half presentation in February 2003. The presentation failed to convince the United Nations to authorize military force.\textsuperscript{353}

On March 17, 2003, Bush ordered Saddam Hussein to flee Iraq within 48 hours or “face confrontations.” In this speech, Bush argued that all other available means of compliance had been exhausted and thus the U.S. was justified in taking military action to force the dictator to adhere to the international laws. Saddam Hussein, despite having secretly complied with the

\textsuperscript{349} Ali A. Allawi, \textit{The Occupation of Iraq: Winning the War, Losing the Peace} (US: Yale University Press, 2007), 78.
\textsuperscript{350} Knott, “George W. Bush: Foreign Affairs.”
\textsuperscript{352} Douglas J Feith, \textit{War and Decision: Inside the Pentagon at the Dawn of the War on Terrorism} (HarperCollins, 2009), 352.
\textsuperscript{353} Ibid., 353.
resolution by dismantling key weapons programs, chose confrontation – most likely in an attempt to bluff the U.S. and that United Nations. On March 19, 2003, Bush and Prime Minister Blair authorized a bombing campaign on government targets in Baghdad followed by a ground invasion.\footnote{Knott, "George W. Bush: Foreign Affairs."}

Despite having no ties to the attack of 9/11, Bush was able to capitalize on the post-attack mood, the “rally around the flag” effects to garner popular support for the invasion.\footnote{Frank Newport, "Seventy-Two Percent of Americans Support War Against Iraq," \textit{Gallup News}, March 24, 2003.} Likewise, his dualistic language of “us vs them” and the “axis of evil” allowed average citizens to conflate terrorist leaders such as bin Laden with other “evil” leaders such as Saddam Hussein. The U.S. was not at war with bin Laden, the Taliban, or even al Qaeda. The U.S. was at war with “terror.”\footnote{Bruce Hoffman, \textit{Inside Terrorism} (Columbia University Press, 2006), 20.} The initial invasion was led by General Tommy Franks who readied his commanders by screening “Gladiator” starring Russell Crowe in the CENTCOM command center.\footnote{Michael R. Gordon and General Bernard E. Trainor, \textit{Cobra II: The Inside Story of the Invasion and Occupation of Iraq} (United States: Vintage Books, 2007), 188.} Days after the pre-war huddle, special operations forces scheduled to initiate the attack by destroy Iraqi observation posts and infiltrating the western border of Iraq.\footnote{Ibid. 188.} Days later the massive air campaign known as “Shock and Awe” commenced with bombers, fighters, and the launch of Tomahawk Land Attack Missiles followed by a conventional ground invasion from Iraq ultimately ending in the capture of Baghdad and Saddam Hussein.\footnote{Ibid. 209.}

Prior the initial volleys of the war, General Franks assumed the military would lead the efforts in Iraq only until the ousting of Saddam Hussein. After that, it was understood that the State Department would take the lead on reconstruction and transformation.\footnote{Ibid. 158.} General Franks
would be wrong in both his assessment of the military’s limited role and the turnover to the State Department. As the initial invasion settled, Bush and his planners looked to transferring authority to the Iraqi people through an interim government – the Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA) led by L. Paul “Jerry” Bremer. Bremer took office on May 6, 2003. Bremer was a career diplomat and student of Henry Kissinger with a knowledge of counterterrorism but no real background in the Middle East or Arabic culture. During his first weeks in Iraq, Bremer issued orders that effectively banned Ba’athists from holding positions in government and dissolved the Iraqi security and military forces. Bremer was tasked with providing a placeholder of stability, security, and peace until the Iraqi government could maintain those goals itself. On his last week in country he was mortared and a C-130 was attacked. The year had not gone as smoothly as planned and the security situation prevented Bremer and his team from implementing a number of planned economic reforms.

While Bush clearly advocates for the justification of preemptive war in dire cases, it could be argued that this particular incident was not preemptive, but, rather, a result of Iraq’s failure to comply with United Nations resolutions. Under this framework, the Iraq Invasion was a hard power action committed as a result of the failure of institutions (soft power), necessary and arguably a sign of smart power. Bush and his advisors did attempt the diplomatic route by presenting to the United Nations. Military analysts largely agree that the campaign in Iraq “went wrong” due to an overemphasis on the initial military campaign (hard power) and little thought...
into the post-conflict rebuilding (hard/soft/smart power). The level of civilian deaths alone indicates a propensity for military action over diplomatic appeals (see Figure 5).

![Civilian Deaths in Iraq 2003-2005](image)

**Figure 4: Civilian Deaths in Iraq 2003-2005** Data Source: Iraq Body Count

### 2.22 GITMO

In dealing with the guilt or innocence of suspected terrorists Bush commissioned a military council instead of a civilian court - again highlighting his use of military resources and hard power to combat the problem. He does acknowledge the need to uphold American liberal values and believed the tribunals did that while protecting the U.S. from a new type of threat.\(^{366}\) Bush authorized this order in November of 2001 and by early 2002 the construction of a prison at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba began.\(^ {367}\) The Office of Legal Counsel, led by director Jack Goldsmith, advised Bush against looking for legislative backing for such practices. He wrote that White House insiders “believed cooperation and compromise signaled weakness and

\(^{366}\) Bush, *Decision Points*, 168.

emboldened the enemies of America and the Executive Branch.” The detention center saw its highest levels of detainees during the first Bush administration with 684 detainees in June of 2003.

The administration began authorizing legal memos which justified enhanced interrogation techniques to include sleep deprivation, slapping, waterboarding, and cold treatments. Eventually, a number of detainees held at Gitmo brought their cases to the Supreme Court. In the 2006 decision in *Hamdan vs Rumsfeld*, the court ruled that Bush had overstepped his authority by setting up tribunals without congressional approval.

2.23 Abu Ghraib

The abuses at Abu Ghraib prison in Baghdad did much to harm the image of the U.S. and its military and foreign policy. Photos of prisoner abuse along with reports of the CIA using rendition to move suspected terrorists across national boundaries for the purposes of interrogation further damaged the U.S. appeal. Under Saddam Hussein, Abu Ghraib was a notorious torture and execution prison located 20 miles west of Baghdad. After the fall of the regime, the prison was reopened under the U.S. military and used to house three categories of inmates – common criminals, those suspected of low-level “crimes against the coalition,” and High Value Individuals (HVI), or leaders of the anti-coalition forces. In June 2003, Army Reserve Brigadier General Janis Karpinski was assigned as commander of the 800th Military

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368 Ibid., 45.
370 Knott, "George W. Bush: Foreign Affairs."
371 Ibid.
Police Brigade and put in charge of the Iraqi prison system. Karpinski and a majority of her 3,400 soldiers were reservists with little to no training or experience in a prison or handling detainees. By January of 2004, BGen Karpinski and two of her subordinate commanders at Abu Ghraib were relieved and formally admonished after complaints of prisoner abuse.\(^{373}\) In addition to leadership changes, the Army launched a formal investigation into the complaints and found credible evidence of the following most egregious abuses: breaking chemical lights and pouring phosphoric liquid on detainees, threatening detainees with loaded weapons, pouring cold water on naked detainees, beating detainees, threatening detainees with rape, allowing one guard to stitch the wound of an abused detainee, sodomizing a detainee with a chemical light and possibly a broom stick, using military working dogs to threaten detainees resulting in one instance of a bite, piling naked detainees and jumping on them, forcing detainees to masturbate on camera, simulating electric torture, taking photographs of dead detainees, one male military police officer raping a female detainee, forcing detainees to remain naked for several days at a time, placing a dog collar around a male detainee and forcing him to pose with a female soldier, forcibly arranging naked detainees in sexually explicit positions, and numerous instances of physical abuse – kicking, slapping, and jumping on bare feet.\(^{374}\)

The incidents at Abu Ghraib were initially, claimed the administration, to be isolated events involved undisciplined soldiers. As further reporting indicated, this was not the case. Abu Ghraib was one of the most publicized, but not the first, case of detainee abuse in Iraq. In 2003, reports of detainee abuse at Camp Bucca surfaced with detainees accusing four soldiers from the


320th Military Policy Battalion of “kicking and beating them.” In June 2003, guards at Camp Copper outside of Baghdad shot five detainees during a riot while guards at Abu Ghraib shot seven detainees after one prisoner escaped. The incidents at Abu Ghraib were part of an overall degradation of rules and regulations upheld and enforced in the new fight against terrorism starting with the president publicly announcing that the Geneva conventions were not applicable to this fight or these combatants. This idea was further promoted with Attorney General Gonzales positing that the president was above international law and redefining torture to allow severe beatings. In the case of Abu Ghraib, Donald Rumsfeld’s memo that these new modified interrogation techniques being used in Gitmo should also be used on prisoners in Iraq in order to prepare for the treatment at Gitmo, undoubtedly contributed to the event. While Rumsfeld’s endorsement of such interrogation techniques was rescinded a month after its issuance, an 18-month investigative report into detainee abuse argued that the damage was irrevocable. The report finds that Rumsfeld’s approval of stress positions and forced nudity led to the abuses at Abu Ghraib. The report found that a number of these methods were adopted from Survival Evade Resistance, and Escape (SERE) training conducted by the U.S. military. The training uses some of the harshest interrogation or torture techniques to show U.S. military members what they may face while being held captive by enemy forces.

Overall, the administration and the DOD’s emphasis on military strength, threats, coercion, and punishment were part of a hard power approach to terrorism and greatly diminished the U.S. soft power capabilities in Iraq. Aside from the abhorrent abuses suffered by

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375 Post, "Chronology of Abu Ghraib."
376 Ibid.
379 Ibid.
Iraqi citizens while detained, the detentions themselves violated international law. The fourth Geneva Convention states that citizens of an occupied country can be detained by the occupying force, but that the force must establish regulations to ensure that only those individuals posing a grave danger to the force be kept in custody. In other words, the occupying force must set up and respect a basic system of law. Civilians with little or no threat to U.S. military forces were kept in Iraqi prisons for months without charges – a clear violation of the convention according to Human Rights Watch, an international watchdog organization.\textsuperscript{380}

2.24 Foreign Aid

Foreign aid has long been understood to help decrease the threat of terrorism. Studies have shown that as Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) increases aid to specific countries, there is a corresponding decrease in terrorist attacks from that country. Other studies show mixed results on the effectiveness of terrorism. What these studies uniformly indicate, however, is that foreign aid is used as part of an overall strategy to combat terrorism.\textsuperscript{381} A great deal of evidence of the Bush administration’s understanding and use of soft power to accomplish counterterrorism goals can be found in its approach to foreign aid or development assistance. In his speech to the United Kingdom Parliament, Bush argues:

\begin{quote}
As global powers, both our nations serve the cause of freedom in many ways, in many places. By promoting development, and fighting famine and AIDS and other diseases, we're fulfilling our moral duties, as well as
\end{quote}

\textsuperscript{380} Hersh, "Torture at Abu Ghraib."
encouraging stability and building a firmer basis for democratic institutions. By working for justice in Burma, in the Sudan and in Zimbabwe, we give hope to suffering people and improve the chances for stability and progress. By extending the reach of trade we foster prosperity and the habits of liberty. And by advancing freedom in the greater Middle East, we help end a cycle of dictatorship and radicalism that brings millions of people to misery and brings danger to our own people.382

George Bush’s first budget led to a major increase in foreign aid, an indicator of a soft power approach. However, this increase was tied to faith-based organizations and while it capitalized on the renewed sense of civic duty found after 9/11 it was not directly tied to countering terrorism.383 George Bush claims that prior to the attacks on 9/11, his foreign policy decisions on foreign aid were largely a result of his belief in America’s role to alleviate suffering and despair. After 9/11, however, he understood the role development assistance played in combatting extremism and national interests. “Our national security was tied directly to human suffering. Societies mired in poverty and disease foster hopelessness. And hopelessness leaves people ripe for recruitment by terrorists and extremists.”384 Bush authorized the launch of a number of foreign humanitarian programs in efforts to both spread compassion and combat the conditions that allow terrorism to spread, many designed to battle the HIV/AIDS epidemic in Africa. The first, The International Mother and Child HIV Prevention Initiative, announced in June 2002, was a $500 million program designed to battle the epidemic in two ways.385 First, the

382 Bush, "Remarks to Whitehall Palace."
383 Reichley, Faith in Politics, 349.
384 Bush, Decision Points, 336.
program sought to increase the availability of preventative care to include a drug called Nevirapine that could reduce the mother-to-child transmission rate to 50 percent.\textsuperscript{386,387} Second, the program sought to build healthcare systems through hospital/clinic training, volunteer training, and partnerships with NGOs and governments. One of the key components of the plan was an exchange of information in three ways, first to pair American hospitals with African hospitals, second to send American volunteers to assist in setting up HIV/AIDS prevention programs in African hospitals, and third to recruit and sponsor African medical and graduate students to provide care and treatment.\textsuperscript{388} The initiative was designed to be launched in both Africa (Botswana, Cote d’Ivoire, Ethiopia, Kenya, Mozambique, Rwanda, South Africa, and Uganda) and the Caribbean (Guyana and Haiti).\textsuperscript{389} Meant to be scalable at its inception, Bush expanded the program to what would eventually be known as the President’s Emergency Plan for AIDS Relief (PEPFAR). PEPFAR, at its inception, had three strategic objectives: treat two million AIDS patients, prevent seven million new infections, and care for 10 million HIV-infected people living in 12 African countries and two in the Caribbean.\textsuperscript{390} The intent was to partner with local leaders, allow them to develop solutions to meet the objectives and serve as an example for the United Nations-sponsored Global Fund to emulate.\textsuperscript{391} Bush understood the risks of lukewarm domestic support when developing the plan and tabulating its costs. Still, he thought he could convince the American people that the costs were worth the benefits when it came to the area of national security. He intended to explain how healthier societies were less

\textsuperscript{386} Bush, \textit{Decision Points}, 337.
\textsuperscript{388} Bush, “Speech on New Mother and Child HIV Prevention Initiative.”
\textsuperscript{389} “Policies in Focus: The International Mother and Child HIV Prevention Initiative.”
\textsuperscript{390} Bush, \textit{Decision Points}, 339.
\textsuperscript{391} Ibid., 339.
susceptible to terrorism and foreigners unclear of U.S. motives would see the generosity of the U.S. government and the American people.\textsuperscript{392} The strategy worked with the PEPFAR passing Congress with bi-partisan support and with an overwhelming majority of 375 to 41 in the House of Representatives. Furthermore, Bush intended to use the success of the bill to encourage multilateral support as he signed it days before the 2003 G-8 summit, further displaying his commitment to soft power in international development.\textsuperscript{393} Despite claiming to, in part, develop the initiative in furtherance of security goals, Bush never mentions the benefits to security or counterterrorism in his speech announcing the pilot program in 2002. Instead, his language is meant to appeal to the moral and compassionate angles of the audience.\textsuperscript{394} In this case, it is difficult to determine whether the program was intended to be part of an overall approach to countering terrorism.

\textsuperscript{392} Ibid., 339.
\textsuperscript{393} Ibid., 341.
\textsuperscript{394} Bush, "Speech on New Mother and Child HIV Prevention Initiative."
During Bush’s first administration, funding levels for the Department of State steadily increased, with large increases in the funding of security, construction, and embassy costs as well as in diplomatic security and border security costs. While an increase in State Department funding may initially seem like an increase in soft power approaches (in views, plans, and actions), understanding the individual components of the budget leads to the opposite conclusion. The state department funding reflected an increase in the intent to use increased hard power resources to combat terrorism, even within the department traditionally charged with soft power initiatives.

In 2004, Secretary of State Colin Powell announced the creation of the Office of the Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization (S/CRS). The mission of this new office was to
coordinate the civilian response to armed conflict – to prepare or prevent post-conflict situations. This new department was part of the whole-of-government approach outlined in National Security Presidential Directive 44, which called for a more integrated and formalized response to failing states in an effort to create a more lasting and sustainable peace. The NSPD 44 directs the Office of the Secretary of Defense to assist and coordinator this new office on areas such as budget, capabilities, assets, plans, resource and program management, current evolving situations, and contingency plans. The directive is clear that both the DoD and the DoS would not only have a role in foreign security policy, but must work together to maximize results. This department, while focusing on a smart power approach to security threats, further increased the appeal and legitimacy of U.S. foreign policy by integrating with a number of international organizations to include the United Nation’s Peace Building Commission, the EU, World Bank, International Monetary Fund, regional banks, Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe, and NATO. In addition, The S/CRS immediately partnered with like offices in the U.K., Canada, Australia, Denmark, and Finland. One of the five core missions of the S/CRS was to “coordinate with international partners.”

While the office was proposed by the Bush administration, the initial funding was inadequate to accomplish the ambitious goals and reforms. The Executive Branch requested $17.2 million to fund the new office in FY2005 and was allotted only $7.7 million. In FY2006, the administration requested an additional $100 million to set up a Conflict Response Fund and was denied. Congress did approve the transfer authority of $100 million from the DoD to the

397 Ibid. 14.
398 State, "About S/CRS."
DoS for reconstruction operations – indicating that Congress understood that the DoS could be used to achieve the same objectives as DoD, but DoD was still given a predominance of the funds.\textsuperscript{399} Secretary of State Colin Powell also oversaw the launch and expansion of the AlumniState.Gov, a program seeking to connect alumni of the State Department’s various exchange programs.\textsuperscript{400}

2.26 Conclusions

George Bush, during his first administration, showed signs of understanding soft power and its utility in combatting terrorism, but never named it or recognized it as a viable approach. His speeches immediately after 9/11 highlighted his understanding of appealing to and protecting Muslims, but he never translated that instinct into plans or actions, with the exception of the Shared Values Initiative. The SVI is by far the “softest” approach to counterterrorism in the first Bush administration. That program showed George Bush’s use of soft power in ideas, plans, and actions. Unfortunately, the program was short lived. Moreover, it was the exception to the rule.

George Bush responded to 9/11 overwhelmingly with hard power. He authorized military intervention in two countries, passed increasing draconian surveillance laws against U.S. citizens, and damaged U.S. appeal throughout the world with unilateral action. While his faith led to increased international aid and refugee admittance in Africa, it also led to military intervention, including civilian casualties, in Iraq. Overall, George W. Bush’s first term counterterrorism strategy was one of hard power with minor soft power touches in ideas, plans, and actions.

\textsuperscript{399} Carrig, "Post-Conflict Stability Operations and the Department of State," 15.
CHAPTER 3

PRESIDENT GEORGE W. BUSH 2004-2008

Bush replaced Donald Rumsfeld with Robert Gates in December of 2006. The appointment, opposed by Vice President Cheney, was seen by many Americans as a hope to end the war in Iraq. While Gates supported Bush’s invasion of Iraq to dispose Saddam Hussein and dismantle any remaining weapons programs, he advocated for limited military action replaced by a multinational peacekeeping force after only a few months. The counterterrorism strategy of George Bush’s second administration was largely an extension of the policies enacted during his first term. His second National Security Strategic reaffirmed his commitment to hard power approaches in both content and tone. He did introduce the “whole of government” concept, closely akin to smart power hybrid approaches. He demonstrated that he understood the important of language and worked to improve his relationship with the Muslim world; however, he did so privately while publicly maintaining a hardline approach to addressing terrorism. Bush’s policies in Iraq, largely a result of the Iraq Study Group report and Gen. David Petraeus, did show a marked shift toward smart power approaches in combat. His foreign aid levels were sustained but his refugee levels declined, mostly as a result of the end of combat in Somalia. Overall, Bush maintained his hard power approaches to counterterrorism, reflected in increases in military spending. His levels of spending for the State Department are a bit less clear, with an overall increase despite two years of decreasing. However, the increased funding levels for the department largely went to the more hard power areas such as border and embassy security.

As the 2002 NSS served as the foundation for the Bush Doctrine, the 2006 NSS reaffirmed its tenets and Bush’s pillars of security policy. The doctrine was based on power and purpose and the relationship between the two as “purpose without power was impotent, while power without purpose was ephemeral.”

The Bush Doctrine has been criticized as having deep religious undertones – a legitimate claim when one understands Bush’s personal faith. For example, the doctrine, like much of Bush’s rhetoric during his first administration, was dualistic in nature. For world order, the international community was given two options – American superpower acting as a benevolent hegemony, or complete anarchical chaos. The Bush Doctrine came at a time of unprecedented American strength – both military and economic strength – and many of its suppositions were a direct result of this capability. In other words, the doctrine was a direct result of a specific individual (Bush) in a specific situation (unipolarity) spurred by a specific event (9/11).

A number of aspects of the Bush Doctrine can find history in the 1992 Defense Policy Guidance written by Wolfowitz, Cheney, Libby, and Kahlilzad (who all served positions in the Bush administrations). The guidance argued that the purpose of U.S. foreign policy should be to establish a peaceful world order backed by the strength of the U.S. The document does not mention working with multilateral institutions such as the USN or NATO and advocated for “ad

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403 Ibid. xxxvii.
404 Ibid. 3.
hoc” coalitions to be formed to address crises and then dissolved once a solution was achieved.405

3.2 Intelligence

President Bush began his second term as president months after the release of the 9/11 commission report. This report did more than simply explain the factors leading to the attacks of 9/11; it questioned the ability of Cold War institutions to combat a modern non-state enemy in a globalized, interconnected world. One of the major findings of the commission was the massive intelligence failures stemming from gaps in collection coverage. In response to the later revelation of these gaps, former head of the National Security Agency (NSA) Michael Hayden argued “The JIC findings were published a lot later, of course, but frankly, we didn’t need any help figuring out where our gaps in coverage were,” and maintains the SIGINT programs such as Stellarwind were the logical solution to the gap in coverage problem.406 His opinion was largely echoed by all in the administration and across the intelligence community, again supporting the argument that much of the decisions made immediately following 9/11 were made out of perceived necessity.

“The first essential component of effective counterterrorism is intelligence.”407 The 9/11 Commission released its final report and closed on August 21, 2004. Part of that reporting included recommendations for sweeping reform and restructuring of the intelligence community. A large portion of the blame of 9/11 was attributed to failures in the IC, and Bush, already a

405 Ibid. 6.
believer in the power of intelligence to prevent terrorism, swiftly implemented a number of the commission’s recommendations to include the creation of the Director of National Intelligence (DNI). The purpose of this office was a single supervisor for the entirety of the national intelligence effort.\textsuperscript{408} John Negroponte served as the first DNI.\textsuperscript{409}

Expanded intelligence, as used by the Bush administration, indicates a hard power approach. It was not used to understand populations in order to persuade or appeal to them – except in COIN which this dissertation will discuss later. It was used to detect, punish, deter, and interrogate terrorists and suspected terrorists. It did not seek to promote universal or universally respected American values (soft power), but, rather, to occasionally sacrifice those civil liberties in the interests of a hard power approach.

Bush 2 saw the uncovering of a number of intelligence and surveillance programs launched during the Bush 1 administration. The public backlash against such government collection was immediate and sustained. As a result, Bush 2 had to both explain and apologize for the conduct of the last four years as well as develop new programs and capabilities to cover the contributions of the now defunded, illegal, or simply unpopular programs of the first administration.

3.2.1 Terrorist Surveillance Program

In Bush’s second term, under the guidance of Vice President Cheney, the president greatly expanded the terrorist surveillance programs implemented during his first term.

\textsuperscript{408} Director of National Intelligence, "History," https://www.dni.gov/index.php/who-we-are/history.
\textsuperscript{409} Rice, No Higher Honor: A Memoir of My Years in Washington, 554.
The 2006 revelation of various surveillance and financial programs challenged the presidential authorities, but only nominally. Shortly after the New York Times published its investigation into U.S. spying, President Bush publicly admitted that he authorized such programs.\textsuperscript{410,411} Public opinion was split on support for the spy programs, with Bush retaining much of his Republican base’s support.\textsuperscript{412}

### 3.2.2 Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004 (IRTPA)

In addition to the creation of the Director of National Intelligence, the IRTPA also established the National Counterterrorism Center. The NCTC was developed to provide both operational and intelligence coordination among the various DC agencies in combatting terrorism, bringing a “whole-of-government” approach to counterterrorism. That whole of government aspect indicates, at least in views, that the 2nd Bush administration understood the applicability of smart power in views, if not in plans or actions.\textsuperscript{413} The IRTPA, in response to a number of intelligence oversight issues, also established the Privacy and Civil Liberties Oversight Board. It also added language to the Department of Homeland Security’s mission to “ensure that the civil rights and civil liberties of persons are not diminished by efforts, activities, and programs aimed at securing the homeland.”\textsuperscript{414}

\textsuperscript{411} David Sanger, "Bush Says He Ordered Domestic Spying," ibid, December 18, 2005.
\textsuperscript{413} Director of National Intelligence, "National Counter Terrorism Center: How We Work," https://www.dni.gov/index.php/nctc-how-we-work.
\textsuperscript{414} "The Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004," https://it.ojp.gov/PrivacyLiberty/authorities/statutes/1282.
Executive Order 13440, Interpretation of the Geneva Conventions Article 3 as Applied to a Program of Detention and Interrogation Operated by the Central Intelligence Agency, was signed July 20, 2007 to reaffirm the February 7, 2002 declaration that the Geneva Conventions did not apply to al Qaeda, the Taliban, and associated forces. Furthermore, the EO and Office of Legal Counsel memorandum released the same day argues that these techniques did not constitute torture or violate any provisions of the Geneva Conventions, the Detainee Treatment Act, or the War Crimes Act. In March of 2008, Bush further solidified his position on these techniques and his interpretation of the agreements by vetoing the Intelligence Authorization Act for FY2008. This act would have limited the techniques available to the CIA to those used by the U.S. Army and banned the use of waterboarding. Supporters of the bill argued that it was critical for the international community to know that the U.S. did not conduct torture and that “these rough techniques were compromising American values and undermining our international moral authority.” After years of investigation and debate on public release, the Senate Intelligence Committee released its findings as detailed in chapter two.

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3.2.4 Enhanced Interrogation Program

As a result of the CIA Torture report as well as the revelation of other questionable practices by the CIA and the U.S. military, Bush 2 had to rescind a number of programs he used during the first administration to detect, deter, and punish suspected terrorists. The Bush administration designated detainees as illegal enemy combatants and thus not protected by the rules of law or the Geneva Conventions.419

3.3 Afghanistan

While Afghanistan started as a multinational operation, invoking Article 5 of NATO, by 2006 Bush’s administration had determined that the multilateral approach to the rebuilding of the country was failing and the strategy for Afghanistan needed an overhaul. At the same time as ordering a very public surge of troops in Iraq, Bush switched to a unilateral approach and a “silent surge” in Afghanistan. Much like in Iraq, this surge in hard power resources was complemented with a doubling of funds to be used in reconstructing the nation and an increase in civilian experts deployed to assist the efforts.420 In the fall of 2006, Bush ordered an increase from 20,000 to 30,000 U.S. troops in Afghanistan along plans to increase the Afghan National Army (hard power), expand intelligence, and work to reduce corruption in the new Afghan government.

Bush met with Afghan President Hamid Karzai on September 26, 2008 to discuss the relationship between the two countries and the U.S.’ continued involvement in Afghanistan’s

419 Knott, "George W. Bush: Foreign Affairs."
420 Ibid.
national affairs. At the press conference after the meeting, Bush described one aspect of the military’s campaign in Afghanistan – the Provincial Reconstruction Teams – as military and civilian experts to “help local communities fight corruption, improve governance, and jumpstart their economies.” While the use of military is often a clear indicator of hard power approaches, in this case, PRTs represent a physical manifestation of the concept of smart power. As Joseph Nye articulates, soft power is not about what resources are used (means), but the method in which they are used (ways) to achieve an outcome (end). As Bush continued, these teams were developed and employed “to ensure that our military progress is accompanied by the political and economic gains that are critical to the success of a free Afghanistan.”

Established in 2002, PRTs became a major focal point for the military strategy in Afghanistan during Bush’s second term in office. The model PRT in Afghanistan consisted of 80 soldiers led by an Army Lieutenant Colonel with one civilian from the State Department, USAID, and the Department of Agriculture.

One of Bush’s central strategies in Afghanistan was the use of CIA teams and intelligence collection cells. The collection teams, called JACKAL teams, fed intelligence information and analysis into the greater IC, leading to more precise and accurate targeting utilizing UAS in Pakistan. In addition to an expansive intelligence network, the Bush administration also funded the CIA’s 3,000-man covert army, organized into Counterterrorism Pursuit Teams (CTPT). These teams were composed of CIA-trained and sponsored Afghan special forces. While the teams were designed to hunt, capture, and kill terrorists (hard power),

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422 Nye, "Get Smart: Combining Hard and Soft Power."
423 “Policies in Focus: Rebuilding Afghanistan.”
they were often used to conduct soft power operations to pacify and garner support from tribal areas. ⁴²⁵

3.4 Religion

Bush’s faith continued to influence his decision making in all realms of the presidency to include counterterrorism. He recalls the summer of 2006 as “the worst period of my presidency.” ⁴²⁶ In order to alleviate his anxiety and doubt, Bush turned to religion to help him make critical decisions. He recounts the letters from families that gave him strength to continue the mission against the real and present evil in Iraq. Bush’s second inauguration was a day of prayer much like his first, although the 2005 inauguration included an invitation for a Muslim cleric. While the cleric was unable to attend, the planned inclusion highlights Bush’s understanding of the important role of religion in attempts to appeal to Muslims and include Islam in the national narrative. ⁴²⁷, ⁴²⁸ The Rev. Kirbyjon Caldwell delivered the benediction at both events, with the differences between the two highlighting a shift in rhetoric. The first benediction concluded with “in the name that’s above all other names, Jesus the Christ. Let all who agree say Amen,” a phrase offensive to some of the non-Christian faiths, as they felt it ranked the Christian faith above all others. ⁴²⁹ The second benediction, however, concluded with

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⁴²⁵ Bob Woodward, Obama’s Wars (Simon & Schuster, 2010), 9.  
⁴²⁶ Bush, Decision Points, 367.  
the much more inclusive closing of “respecting persons of all faiths, I humbly submit this prayer in the name of Jesus Christ. Amen.”

Bush describes himself as a born-again Christian. This evangelical faith led him to adopt a Wilsonian approach to foreign policy. Post 9/11, the Bush “administration appeared to embrace the Wilsonian idealist tradition in its foreign policy.” Other scholars argue that “in the sweep of his ambitions to make the United States the driving force for democratization of the world [Bush] resembled no president as much as the idealist Woodrow Wilson.” Bush refers to Wilson’s approach to world politics after the first World War in a speech to British Government in November 2003 and proposes that the U.S., with the aid of the United Kingdom, were to continue that legacy of idealism in its fight against terrorism. Bush was not simply a Christian president, or, even as some suggest the most religious president in U.S. history, he was the president, who more than any other blurred the lines between religion and politics. Part of evangelicalism is the sense of mission or purpose. President George W. Bush displayed his belief in his own sense of mission in a number of ways – through speeches, appointing devout Christians to advisor positions, and the general culture of the Oval Office. This sense of mission is what prompts evangelical presidents to shape foreign policy based on an ideal of what the world should be rather than what it is. This is the key difference between idealists and realists.

Bush often surrounded himself by evangelical leaders, at times to the detriment of his appeal to Muslims. While Bush was careful not to conflate the war on terrorism with a war

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434 Bush, "Remarks to Whitehall Palace."
435 Berggren and Rae, "Jimmy Carter and George W. Bush: Faith, Foreign Policy, and an Evangelical Presidential Style." 615.
against Arabs or Muslims (aside from his initial crusade remark), some of his closest religious allies were not as careful. Reverend Richard Dozier, a founding member of the World Wide Christian Center, served as an advisor on Bush’s campaign. In 2006, he publicly called Islam a “cult” and distributed anti-Islam tracts to his neighborhood in Florida once he discovered plans for the building of a mosque.

Reverend Dozier was also quoted as countering George Bush’s message by publicly stating, “We are at war with Islam.”

Religious beliefs catalyzed by the events of 9/11 solidified foreign policy, providing the motivation and ends, if not the means. That is where Obama and Bush differ. Bush sought to

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“rally the armies of compassion,” not exporting religion but exporting the principles of it as well as letting the principles of his faith serve as the foundation for all decision making. While George Bush clarified the relationship between his faith and his decision making in the Iraq war by stating, “I was praying for strength to do the Lord’s will… I’m surely not going to justify war based on God. Understand that. Nevertheless, in my case I pray that I be as good a messenger of His will as possible.” In other interviews he confessed to appealing to “a higher father” when it came to seeking advice and strength. In one with a Palestinian delegation, he allegedly confessed, “I’m driven with a mission from God, God would tell me ‘George go and fight these terrorists in Afghanistan.’ And I did. And then God would tell me, ‘George, go and end the tyranny in Iraq.’ And I did.” His faith made him beholden to a higher power, and solidified his cause and purpose beyond national interests. This nested well with the neoconservative movement and helps explain the shift from foreign policies based on a realist interpretation of the international system towards more idealistic Wilsonian policy based on a new neoconservative interpretation of the world.

The dichotomy of good and evil is a reflection of Christian beliefs, rather than careful interpretations of the international system. George Bush did not see world affairs in complex, multi-faceted problem sets, but rather in two-dimensional constructs of good and evil – “us and them” – which is echoed in the neoconservative school of thought. This strong faith caused Bush to be unshakable in certain foreign policy decisions, the Iraq War being one such example. Joe Klein writes, “George W. Bush’s faith offers no speed bumps on the road to Baghdad; it does not give him pause or force him to reflect.” While George Bush understood the weight of his

438 Black, "With God on Our Side: Religion in George W. Bush's Foreign Policy Speeches."
440 MacAskill, "George Bush: 'God told me to end the tyranny in Iraq'."
decision to invade Iraq, he also saw the conflict as inevitable, because of his ideas of good and evil rooted in his faith. The president argued that America had to see that it was fighting evil in Saddam Hussein and that the country had “no choice but to confront it, by war if necessary.”

George Bush’s faith also led him to adopt a fatalistic view to American politics abroad. As he once claimed at a National Prayer breakfast, God was an active participant in history and current events and “behind all of life and all history there is a dedication and purpose, set by the hand of a just and faithful God.” If George Bush truly believed this, and most scholarship suggests he did, his belief in the inevitability of a U.S. conflict with evil was coupled with a belief in the inevitability of U.S. success, as good always trumps evil. “There is a fatalistic element,” said David Frum, the author and former Bush speechwriter. “You do your best and accept that everything is in God’s hands.” The result is unflappability. “If you are confident that there is a God that rules the world,” said Frum, “you do your best, and things will work out.”

Bush’s religious and moral beliefs, at times, supported practical smart power approaches – the initial push for humanitarian relief during the Afghanistan War, for example. The idea that the “first bombs must be food,” stemmed not only from an understanding of asymmetric warfare but also from the president’s moral obligations of his faith. “There is a value system that cannot be compromised – God-given values. These aren’t United States-created values…there are the values of freedom and the human condition…we’re all God’s children.”

442 Fineman, "Bush and God."
443 Ibid.
444 Ibid.
445 Woodward, Bush at War, 131.
3.5 Diplomacy

In 2004, there were $2.7 million allotted for cultural presentations, substantially lower than what would be necessary to implement a robust cultural diplomacy program. For comparison, France budgets over $600 million to send their performers to international events.\textsuperscript{446}

As a supplemental measure, embassies could have reached out to private individuals and organizations – assisting and supporting logistically or administratively – but they did not. There existed neither a formal authority nor an informal culture to host individuals and groups who could favorably represent American culture. When individuals such as Nobel laureate poet Rita Dove made personal trips, embassies and the American government failed to capitalize on an opportunity to increase the appeal of the U.S. abroad.\textsuperscript{447}

Bush understood the importance of language in terms of appealing to Muslims, not just in the immediate aftermath of 9/11 as displayed by the Shared Values Initiative and the speech at the Islamic center in Washington D.C., but with his administration’s commission of the advisory committee on Cultural Diplomacy in 2003.\textsuperscript{448} Congress, under Public Law 107-228, established and funded the Advisory Committee on Cultural Diplomacy in March 2004 to “advise the Secretary of State on programs and policies to advance the use of cultural diplomacy in U.S. foreign policy paying particular attention to: 1) increasing the presentation aboard of America’s finest creative, visual, and performing artists; and 2) developing strategies for increasing public-

\textsuperscript{447} Ibid. 160.
private sector partnerships to sponsor cultural exchange programs that promote the national interest of the U.S.\textsuperscript{449}

In 2005, the Advisory Committee on Cultural Diplomacy presented its study and findings on cultural diplomacy along with recommendations to the Department of State. These recommendations included the following: increased funding for cultural diplomacy, specifically, and public, in general; increased training for foreign service officers; to develop a national organization or clearinghouse separate from the State Department charged with bringing U.S. artists, writers, and other cultural figures to foreign nations; set aside funding for translation projects; streamline visa issues for international students; implement recommendations from the Center for Arts and Culture proposed in its 2004 research; revamp al Hurra – the Arabic language television channel first launched in 2004; and to expand cultural exchange programs.\textsuperscript{450}

Ambassador Karen Hughes was appointed to the Under Secretary of State for Public Diplomacy in August 2005.\textsuperscript{451} Later that year, the Secretary of the Department of Homeland Security, Michael Chertoff, met with the Muslim Public Affairs Council. Among the issues addressed during the meeting were the termination of the National Security Entry-Exit Registration System (NSEERS), ICE and FBI enforcement actions surrounding the election, detention and enforcement standards and alternatives, due process issues with regard to post-9/11 detentions, asylum issues, and racial profiling.\textsuperscript{452} Again, in May 2007, Secretary Chertoff met with leading Muslim thinkers in the U.S. to discuss a broad range of topics on how to promote peace and deter radicalization of Muslims living in the U.S. Part of this discussion centered on

\textsuperscript{449} Diplomacy, "Cultural Diplomacy, the Linchpin of Public Diplomacy," 6.
\textsuperscript{450} Ibid. 4.
the role of language in winning the hearts and minds of Muslims in and out of the national borders and promoting security. While no formal recommendations were made during these discussions, eight months later, DHS’ Office for Civil Rights and Civil Liberties released a paper entitled “Terminology to Define the Terrorist: Recommendations from American Muslim” which did outline specific recommendations for language to be used by the incoming administration.\textsuperscript{453}

The following eight recommendations were made:

1) Respond to ideologies that exploit Islam without labeling all terrorist groups as a single entity.

2) Do not give the terrorists the legitimacy that they seek.

3) Proceed carefully before using Arabic and religious terminology.

4) Reference the cult-like aspects of terrorists, while still conveying the magnitude of the threat we face.

5) Use “mainstream,” “ordinary,” and “traditional” in favor of “moderate” when describing broader Muslim populations.

6) Pay attention to the discourse on takfirism.

7) Emphasize the positive.

8) Emphasize the success of integration.

9) Emphasize the U.S. government’s openness to religious and ethnic communities.\textsuperscript{454}

These recommendations on language were all attempting to use soft power to counterterrorism by appealing to allies and potential allies. It sought to hamper terrorist recruitment and radicalization efforts not by threatening punishment or offering rewards, but by


\textsuperscript{454} Ibid.
persuading audiences that the U.S. was not at war with Islam, nor did we conflate all terrorist groups, nor were Islam and U.S. systems of values and ways of life incompatible.

In 2006 President Bush also launched the National Security Language Initiative (*under ECA) to include the ECA’s NSLI-Y, which focused on the youth population in America. This program sought to educate U.S. youth in both language and culture which remains vital to U.S. security. Languages include Arabic, Chinese, Korean, Russian, Hindi, Persian, and Turkish. Locations include China, Russian, India, and Tajikistan. The ECA also launched, in 2008, ExchangesConnect, a social media platform for ECA programs.

The understanding of culture is not only important in developing public or cultural diplomacy programs, but also in military operations. General Petraeus understood this and included guidance in his doctrine. Much like Charlotte Beers understood that the values important to typical U.S. citizens were most likely different from the values prized by Muslim or Arab individuals, Petraeus cautioned soldiers against cultural relativism. Under the Petraeus Doctrine, the U.S. military began an “unprecedented level of cultural awareness training.”

3.6 George Bush and Muslim Leaders

This was not the first time the State Department attempted to highlight the parallels in Islam and Christianity. In 1951, the department developed guidelines for what was then known as “religious propaganda.” In efforts to fight communism, the State Department sought to

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456 "History and Mission."
contrast the lack of religious freedom in communist states with the tolerant and open society of the U.S. Images featuring the Islamic Center in Washington D.C., the site of Bush’s post 9/11 speech on September 17, 2011, were posted in key embassies around the Muslim world, to include the United States Information Center in Baghdad and sites in Algeria, Ghana, Syria, India, Tunisia, Pakistan, and Yugoslavia. These posters were complemented by a film script and a mosque-drawing contest.\textsuperscript{458} The State Department understood the role of religion in the Middle East and how effective these approaches could be if done correctly.\textsuperscript{459} A few months after the completion of the center, the State Department commissioned a video, \textit{The Washington Mosque}, which portrayed a cosmopolitan narrative of Islam and the U.S. capital by proposing that “in the Washington mosque, East and West are one.”\textsuperscript{460}

Bush rededicated the mosque on its 50\textsuperscript{th} anniversary, June 27, 2007. In his speech he reaffirms President Eisenhower’s remarks during the original dedication.

\begin{quote}
Today we gather, with friendship and respect…to renew our determination to stand together in the pursuit of freedom and peace. We come to express our appreciation for a faith that has enriched civilization for centuries. We come in celebration of America’s diversity of faith and our unity as free people. And we hold in our hearts the ancient wisdom of the great Muslim poet, Rumi: “The lamps are different, but the light is the same.”\textsuperscript{461}

Bush continues to speak on the cosmopolitan nature of the U.S., and its respect for, and protection of, all religions. His language denounces any claims that the U.S. is at war against Islam. Instead he argues that the fight is in defense of Muslims – their holy sites, their people,
\end{quote}

\textsuperscript{459} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{460} Ibid.
and their rights to practice their religion freely. He also announces the first-ever special envoy to the Organization of the Islamic Conference. The remarks conclude with an appeal to Muslim communities around the world, an offer of friendship, and a blessing. On March 3, 2008, Bush appointed Sada Cumber to the special envoy position. Later that year he sent Condoleezza Rice to discuss a number of issues with the organization’s leadership to include the rise of Islamophobia in the West and its effects on counterterrorism strategies.

3.7 Operation Iraqi Freedom

3.7.1 Iraq Study Group Report

The Iraq Study Group Report was mandated by Congress, facilitated by the U.S. Institute of Peace, and released in 2006. In the executive summary of the report, the group advises a combination of approaches. The first recommendation is an aggressive diplomatic offensive “to build an international consensus for stability in Iraq and the region.” Using diplomacy to achieve multilateral action are hallmarks of a predominant soft power approach. As part of this multilateral consensus the report recommends engaging with Iraq’s neighbors – Iran and Syria. While the language is more diplomatic in the report – calling for United Nations involvement and constructive engagement – it calls for the use of all “disincentives and incentives” at the U.S.’ disposal. This type of approach is best described by the concept of smart power.

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462 Ibid.
465 Ibid. xv.
first section of the report provided a detailed analysis of the current (2006) situation in Iraq with a conclusion on the importance of a stable and secured Iraq. The second part of the publication focuses on recommendations for a “responsible transition.” These recommendations call on the U.S. to “immediately employ all elements of America power.”

One of the most dramatic recommendations of the report was a huge increase in combat troops – not to conduct combat operations but, rather, to facilitate the transfer of responsibility from the U.S. troops to the Iraqi people. These new deployments would be to advise and assist newly formed Iraqi Army Brigades.

While the recommendations include increased support for political, military, and economic development, it came at a cost. These approaches, which could be considered a smart approach, are in actuality more of a hard power approach as they are held as rewards or incentives to behave a certain way.

At one level this recommendation is a smart power approach, at another it is reflective of a wholly hard power approach as it used as incentives and rewards for the Iraqi government:

If the Iraqi government demonstrates political will and makes substantial progress toward the achievement of milestones on national reconciliation, security, and governance, the United States should make clear its willingness to continue training, assistance, and support for Iraq’s security forces and to continue political, military, and economic support. If the Iraqi government does not make substantial progress toward the achievement of milestones on national

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466 Ibid. 41.
467 Ibid. xvi.
reconciliation, security, and governance, the United States should reduce its political, military, or economic support for the Iraqi government.\textsuperscript{468}

3.7.2 The Surge

While the deployment of tens of thousands of additional troops initially appears to be the hallmark of a hard power approach to counterterrorism, it is important to understand why the troops were deployed and what role they were sent to fill. Bush, in his memoirs, argues that the troops were deployed to “protect the Iraqi people and enable the rise of democracy.”\textsuperscript{469} Bush goes on to explain the administration’s policy in combating terrorism in Iraq had always been to enable the Iraqi people to meet certain milestones in governance, security, and their economy. These goals would be largely accomplished through the use of American military muscle and sustained through the effective training of the Iraqi security forces.

The deployment of additional military troops was complemented by the doubling of civilians, mostly from the State Department, in one of the largest civil-military operations undertaken by the U.S. This increase in personnel was married to a change in war strategy. After 2006, the U.S. goals in Iraq were no longer to dispose of Saddam Hussein and ensure no weapons of mass destruction remained, it was a counterinsurgency fight against al Qaeda, fueled by sectarian violence. The U.S. military was no longer in Iraq to fight Iraqis, but, rather, to protect them and provide security for their ongoing operations.\textsuperscript{470}

\textsuperscript{468} Ibid. xvii.
\textsuperscript{469} Bush, \textit{Decision Points}, 356.
3.7.3 The Military Surge

Bush’s counterterrorism strategy for Iraq during his second term was largely influenced by his national security advisor Steve Hadley. Hadley served the administration from 2005 to the end of Bush’s second term in 2009. It was his security team led by Hadley that developed the “surge” as the best plan for winning the war in Iraq. During this portion of his memoirs Bush recalls strategy meetings in Camp David in which a number of prominent scholars and military leaders proposed various solutions to the Iraq problem. All of the solutions Bush describes are military in nature – more troops, more special operations, more focus on Iraqi troops.\(^\text{471}\) By November of that year, Bush had agreed that the counterterrorism strategy in Iraq needed a complete overhaul to include a change in leadership. The original brainstorming of ideas at Camp David had been refined into three options – accelerate the existing strategy of training Iraqi forces while redeploying U.S. troops, pull troops out of Baghdad until sectarian violence had been quelled, or surge troops to perform full-scale counterinsurgency.\(^\text{472}\) All three of these options were almost exclusively military, or hard power, responses. Bush also recounts his meeting with then Prime Minister Nouri Malaki. Bush had met with the Iraqi leader to offer his plan to surge troops in Iraq. He writes on this interaction, “I’m willing to commit tens of thousands of additional American troops to help you retake Baghdad, but you need to give me certain assurances.”\(^\text{473}\) Bush then lists the particulars of agreeing to a surge. This serves as an important example of the continued unilateral action the administration preferred. Bush did not

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\(^{471}\) Bush, *Decision Points*, 364.

\(^{472}\) Ibid. 372.

\(^{473}\) Ibid. 374.
develop a counterterrorism strategy with the Iraqi leadership. Rather, his administration
developed the plan independently then offered it to Iraq along with certain conditions.

Bush ordered the Pentagon to determine a blueprint for a surge in troops on December 13, 2006. Despite recommendations from the Iraq Study Group and dissent from his own National Security Council and advisors, Bush wanted to implement a plan to “double down” on the U.S.’ commitment to Iraq. Part of the dissent was that, despite a relatively small footprint, the hard power of the U.S. displayed by the presence of U.S. military troops actually enflamed sectarian violence and destabilized the security situation in Iraq. He defended his position with the fatalistic, “Failure was no option…I never thought I had to give up the goal of winning.” Bush found equal determination and understanding in his national security advisor, Steve Hadley.

Bush’s newly appointed secretary of defense, Robert Gates, was a critical player in the new plan for Iraq. As a member of the Baker-Hamilton commission (which produced the Iraq Study Group report), Robert Gates was “pro-surge” and told the president as much prior to both his appointment and the president’s official decision. While, privately, the president might have solidly decided on increasing troops, he still abided by the formal decision-making process and ordered an interagency review for options in Iraq. Part of this formal review process highlighted the concerns from Bush’s top military leaders – one of which was that military was playing too large a role in Iraq. The generals demanded civilians from the State Department increase their participation as well.

Although not formal, Bush had decided on the next top military leader in Iraq and consulted David Petraeus with the recommendations of sending one or two more

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474 Barnes, "How Bush Decided on the Surge."
475 Ibid.
476 Ibid.
brigades. Petraeus said he would need at least five. Bush acquiesced, “if you’re going to be a bear, be a grizzly.”

3.7.4 Diplomatic Surge

The new strategy was not devoid of soft power approaches, however. Bush does acknowledge that this surge in military forces was matched with a surge of civilian forces led by Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice. And, vice versa, a renewed focus on a political and diplomatic strategy required an increase in troops to provide security. In response to a plan to pull military troops out of Baghdad to allow the sectarian violence between the Sunni leaders and Shia militia groups to resolve itself Bush quipped, “I don’t believe you can have political reconciliation if your capital city is burning.”

This diplomatic or civilian surge was intended to integrate military and civilian counterinsurgency efforts and deploy U.S. personnel among the people to deliver population security, reconstruction, and governance.

In 2007, Secretary of State Rice testified in front of the Senate Appropriations Committee in part to deliver the plan for the diplomatic surge and, moreover, attempt to convince the senate to fund such an ambitious campaign. While she felt encouraged by the new relationship with Secretary of Defense Gates and emboldened by a coherent and effective plan to combine the civilian-military operations in Iraq, the committee was less trusted and eager to continue funding operations in what was largely seen as a complete foreign policy failure in Iraq. After testifying to Congress, Rice flew to the Middle East to meet with the members of the Gulf

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477 Ibid.
478 Ibid.
479 Rice, No Higher Honor: A Memoir of My Years in Washington, 547.
480 Ibid. 548.
Cooperation Council (GCC), indicating her understanding of the importance of regional allies in a secure and stable future for Iraq. The U.S. even allowed Iran to participate in some of the meetings in Baghdad.\textsuperscript{481} The current DNI, John Negroponte, joined Secretary Rice in the State Department in 2007 in preparation for the diplomatic surge. Also, in preparation for massive State Department work in the Middle East and central Asia, Bush requested an additional $6 billion dollars be earmarked for DoS operations in Afghanistan, Iraq, and Lebanon.\textsuperscript{482} Understanding that this would not be enough, Rice coordinated with private donors from Intel, Cisco, Citigroup, and Lebanese corporations.\textsuperscript{483}

The “civilian surge” strategy was centered on the doubling of Provincial Reconstruction Teams in which military personnel were stationed with civilian experts. While the Bush administration understood the utility of such smart power teams, the DoD (hard power) still took the lead on these stability operations.\textsuperscript{484} The concept of the PRT was first introduced in Afghanistan in 2002 while the first PRT in Iraq was inaugurated by Secretary Rice in Mosul in 2005.\textsuperscript{485} In Iraq, these teams were comprised of diplomatic civilians, aid workers, and military personnel and operated in remote locations. Contrary to Afghanistan’s model, the PRTs in Iraq were almost wholly civilian and led by a state department foreign service officer. Additionally, the teams usually had representatives from USAID, justice and agriculture departments, contractors, and Iraqi experts.\textsuperscript{486} The military members were usually a deputy, a liaison officer, and civil affairs soldiers.\textsuperscript{487} As the state department and aid workers had no ability to establish or enforce security, not even personal security, they were wholly dependent on their military

\textsuperscript{481} Ibid. 548.
\textsuperscript{482} Ibid. 555.
\textsuperscript{483} Ibid. 556.
\textsuperscript{484} Carrig, "Post-Conflict Stability Operations and the Department of State," 15.
\textsuperscript{485} Peace, "Provincial Reconstruction Teams in Iraq."
\textsuperscript{486} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{487} Ibid.
members for that mission. As such, military leaders argued that the PRTs should report to the brigade commanders or the military chain of command. The ambassador in Iraq, however, wanted “his people” to report to him. Secretary Rice agreed with the military leaders and the PRTs fell under the military.488

With the surge, Bush authorized the introduction of 10 “ePRTs” or embedded PRTs to deploy within the Combat Brigade Teams (CBT). Smaller than the normal PRT, these teams were still state department led with eight to 12 political and economic advisors. Also, in 2007, the U.S. Institute for Peace, a non-partisan publicly funded federal organization established in 1984 to promote international peace and conflict resolution, got involved in the war effort.489 USIP’s role was to provide conflict resolution training to Shia and Sunni groups. USIP also negotiated a peace between the sects in Mahmoudiyah, part of the “Triangle of Death” to the southwest of Baghdad.490

Separate from the PRTs, the diplomatic surge required creative planning for security as the military would not be able to provide security for the thousands of state department workers about to enter the country. As such, private contracting firms such as Blackwater were hired to augment the State Department’s existing diplomatic security force (DS). As discovered after Blackwater contractors killed 17 civilians in Baghdad, contracting security had inherent problems of command and control. Ironically, the influx of civilians to attempt soft power approaches to the war in Iraq led to an increase in private security (hard power) and a lack of control, which resulted in civilian deaths like those in Baghdad, greatly diminished the appeal and soft power of the U.S.491

488 Rice, No Higher Honor: A Memoir of My Years in Washington, 555.
490 "Provincial Reconstruction Teams in Iraq."
491 Rice, No Higher Honor: A Memoir of My Years in Washington, 599.
3.7.5 Petraeus Doctrine

In preparation for the military surge, President Bush appointed David Petraeus to replace General Casey as the senior American command in Iraq. The appointment was considered one of an “outsider,” and prompted by a Bush meeting with senior strategists. In 2006 General Petraeus authored FM 3-24, the Army Field Manual on Counterinsurgency. This manual opens with a quote from President Kennedy on the importance of military leaders understanding not just military tactics and strategy, but also diplomacy, politics, history, and economics. Petraeus writes that “Successful COIN requires unity of effort in bringing all instruments of national power to bear.” In 2007, he got the chance to implement and test his theories in Iraq. One of the key tenets of this strategy was the importance of gaining popular support. “Protracted popular war is best countered by winning the “hearts and minds” of the populace and separating the leaders, cadre, and combatants from the mass base through information operations, civil-military operations, economic programs, social programs, and political action.” With this publication, the highest leader of the U.S. military in Iraq, the senior executor of hard power argued that the way to accomplish success was through soft power approaches. The “hearts” part of the approach included “persuading people that their best interests are served by COIN’s success” while the “minds” portion meant “convincing them that the force can protect them and that resisting it is pointless.” The language here is important to note. The persuasion Petraeus calls

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494 Ibid. 61.
495 Ibid.168.
for mirrors Nye’s language of soft power. Winning the minds, however, is a smart power approach. Petraeus explains that winning the hearts and minds does not mean simply getting the populace to “like” the troops, but, rather, to get the populace to understand that the troops’ success is in their best interest. In this sense, the hearts and minds campaign seeks to use rewards and punishments to achieve an objective. The reward is the security and prosperity achieved by the success of COIN while the punishment is the threat of a negative outcome produced by the failure of the COIN operations.

The strategy goes on to advise that COIN objectives are achieved through the moderate populace. As discussed earlier, soft power is relatively useless against extremists. Appealing to key leaders or al Qaeda strongholds is a waste of energy and resources. The point is to appeal to those still capable of persuasion. This is what Petraeus calls the “mass base.” Petraeus inherited an Iraq that had largely swayed the local populace away from the U.S. mission. One common tactic of U.S. military units was to “Clear, hold, build” an area. During the “clear” phase, military members would often aggressively kick down doors, arrest and abuse inhabitants, and, at times, further abuse those individuals. Classified reporting showed that these tactics made “gratuitous enemies” of the people. One of the most publicized examples of this was the scorched earth type of combat seen in Fallujah in 2004. During the second battle for control of the city, entire city blocks were destroyed and more than 250,000 residents displaced. While the U.S. military was able to secure Fallujah, the infrastructure was so badly damaged that many families did not return. Insurgents also fled the city to Mosul, where mass violence erupted after the U.S. invaded Fallujah. The violence was so intense that the Iraqi forces in Mosul collapsed,

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496 Ibid. 191.
497 Lesch, "Problematic Policies Toward the Middle East," 229.
forcing the U.S. to eventually move troops back into the city. The most telling result of this type of approach was the number of Iraqi citizens who served as “part-time” fighters with al Qaeda and other insurgent groups. The DNI estimated in 2005 that 200,000 Iraqi citizens assisted the 400,000 AQI fighters with weapons, safe houses, or logistical support. When Petraeus took command, the U.S. forces did not have the hearts and minds of the general populace.

The “Petraeus Doctrine” took a general foreign policy concept and applied it specifically to counterinsurgency by emphasizing “the emerging idea of Smart Power as the basis for waging counterinsurgency by synthesizing the use of precision hard power’s force and coercion with that of soft power’s engagement and co-option to take a new approach.”

One of the key problems with the hearts and mind campaign is that in order to achieve its ambitious goals, the military must follow restrictive rules of engagement – often to the frustration of military leaders. These frustrations were evident in both Iraq under Gen. Petraeus and in Afghanistan under Gen. McChrystal.

Another key tenet of the Petraeus Doctrine is that “COIN is an intelligence-driven endeavor.” This emphasis on intelligence in fighting an insurgency is different from Bush’s overall reliance on intelligence to counterterrorism. In COIN, the manual state, the focus of intelligence should be on three groups – the people, the country, and the enemy. It should also give a commander insight into cultures, perceptions, values, beliefs, interests, and the decision-making process. Of these three groups, only one is considered the enemy. The other two – government and people – are considered friendly or neutral. This means these groups are

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498 Ibid. 229.
499 Ibid. 229.
500 McCorkel, "The Development and Application of the "Petraeus Doctrine" During the 2007 Iraq Troop "Surge,"
503 Ibid. 57.
“targeted” not with bombs to deter, punish, or threaten, but with campaigns and programs to persuade and convince. Intelligence is aiding that effort. Unlike some of the other intelligence programs discussed in this dissertation, intelligence in COIN is used to support soft power approaches. Commanders must understand the cultural aspects of the mass base in order to avoid any disrespect as well as understand what is likely going to persuade individuals to side with the COIN operations. Much like Charlotte Beers understood the role of values in the decision and opinion making process, Petraeus knew that in order to understand how people form opinions of a COIN force not only depends on the actions of the force, but also on the values and biases of the population.

The British experience in Palestine in 1945 provides some historical context for the importance of intelligence in a counterinsurgency, as well as the importance of a combination of hard and soft power to both defeat belligerents and win over the mass base. The British, despite overwhelmingly superior military power, could not achieve political or military victor in Palestine because of poor intelligence collection. The collection was poor because, as in most counterinsurgencies, the majority of intelligence is derived from the population. The Palestinians, in this case, refuse to provide such information as a result of various acts of British repression and reprisals. The British grew frustrated with their lack of intelligence sources, and responded with harsher military force (hard power) which began the cycle anew.504

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3.7.6 Reconstruction Efforts

The plan for reconstruction in Iraq began before military operations began. While military operations, however, are consistently reviewed and updated (including the one for Iraq), the plan for post-war reconstruction started from scratch. Douglas Feith, the undersecretary for defense policy, was tasked with building a new team and office, the Office of Reconstruction and Humanitarian Assistance (ORHA) to assist CENTCOM in its reconstruction mission. The office was not, as misreported, in charge of post-war reconstruction but intended to serve as civilian advisors to General Tommy Franks during post-hostility operations.\[^{505}\] This was an interagency team with representatives from state, defense, and the White House and headed by Gen. Jay Garner.\[^{506}\] The intent was to highlight gaps in planning prior to execution in order to preemptively rectify them. Aside from the standard problems with interagency coordination, the execution efforts in Iraq highlighted a number of problems with the reconstruction plan, to include overall problems with the traditional soft power institutions of the U.S. These soft power agencies include the Office of Democracy and Government under USAID, National Democratic Institute, Middle East Partnership Initiative, and the Office of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor at the Department of State, and the Broadcasting Board of Governors. Before 9/11 these institutions were disorganized and underfunded with serious cultural problems. The policies of Bush 1 were not enough to affect any real change and thus the reconstruction efforts led by these institutions were mismanaged with poor results.\[^{507}\] Prior to the Afghan War, Bush had tossed out the Clinton-signed Presidential Decision Directive 56, which sought to capture nation-building

\[^{505}\] Feith, *War and Decision: Inside the Pentagon at the Dawn of the War on Terrorism*, 348.
\[^{506}\] Ibid. 349.
\[^{507}\] Fukuyama, *After the Neocons: America at the Crossroads*, 150.
lessons learned from Haiti, Somalia, Bosnia, and Kosovo. PPD 56 also sought to define agency roles and missions for post-conflict or disaster reconstruction. The neocons led by Dick Cheney understood the reconstruction efforts for Iraq would be massive prior to the start of combat operations, but they were optimistic that most of the costs could be underwritten by Iraqi oil production. Unfortunately, decades of economic policies had damaged Iraq’s oil production process and the U.S. was forced to take a larger role in reconstruction efforts.

The biggest problem with reconstruction was that it was done largely by the military or the CPA under the department of defense and the military was largely seen as an occupier, vice liberating, force. In efforts to streamline the processes and clearly appoint responsibility, all reconstruction fell under the DoD. This had the dual effect of making hard power (military action) unattractive while turning what should have been soft power (reconstruction) into an operation which made the U.S. less appealing vice more.

3.7.7 Sunni Awakening

While the surge is often credited with pulling Iraq from the clutches of military failure, a second concurrent phenomenon also had dramatic and lasting effects on turning the war toward the U.S. The Sunni Awakening, or Anbar Awakening, is used to describe the change of alliance of the Sunni Arabs in the western portion of Iraq. Until 2006 the Sunni tribes had aligned, to various degrees, with the Sunni al Qaeda, mostly for religious and security reasons. However, economic ties turned out to be stronger than sectarian ties and when al Qaeda began overtaxing goods smuggled from Jordan and Syria and imposing strict moral codes, the tribal elders began

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508 Ibid. 152.
509 Halper and Clarke, America Alone: The Neo-Conservatives and the Global Order, 223.
looking for new alliances. They found these in the newly increased soldiers. In exchange for their cooperation, the tribal leaders requested money – hard and soft power. AQ failed to appeal to them, and while the U.S. did not necessarily appeal (although we turned a blind eye to the smuggling), we offered economic rewards for their participation in the conflict.\textsuperscript{510} Civilian deaths in Iraq remained steady with spikes correlating with major offensives, which, as discussed above, harmed the Petraeus Doctrine of “Hearts and Minds.” (see Figure 7)

![Civilian Deaths (Iraq) 2005-2009](image)

Figure 7 Iraqi Civilian Deaths 2005-2009 Source: Iraqi Body Count

3.8 Unilateralism

George Bush “focused on expanding hard presidential power in terms of strengthening the institutional muscle of the office and using brute force to achieve its objectives.”\textsuperscript{511} Alberto

Gonzales, White House counsel, developed a plan to “liberate the executive branch and military officials from most international and domestic constraints when dealing with the detainment and prosecution of prisoners.”\textsuperscript{512} George Bush believed in unilateral action – both within the U.S. government and on behalf of the U.S. government in foreign affairs.

There is an importance of working with institutions, especially when it comes to military action. “It is important that the U.S. show evidence to the world community before launching a military attack. This will not undermine the U.S. presenting the evidence to the world community and going through the UN will mobilize an international coalition that will support any U.S. military action.”\textsuperscript{513} The inherent price of “seeing everything in terms of the need for unilateral action, specifically a reduction in ‘soft power,’ that is the power to persuade by example, instead of coercion.”\textsuperscript{514}

Unilateral action is an indicator of a hard power approach; this is not to say that all hard power approaches are bad or to say that unilateral action is not at times a hallmark of smart security strategy. From 2001 to 2008, the U.S. maintained a policy against unilateral action in Pakistan due to the strategic importance of maintaining that alliance. The U.S. agreed to notify the Pakistani government of any impending cross-border operations prior to the commencement of the operation. This posed a significant problem for counterterrorist operations in the Afghanistan/Pakistan region. Not only did the Taliban and al Qaeda simply move from Afghanistan to the federally administered tribal areas (FATA) of Pakistan, but when operations were developed to pursue targets across the border, leaks in the Pakistan government, military, and intelligence services often neutered any potential successes.

\textsuperscript{512} Ibid. 34.
\textsuperscript{513} Peter Katona, Michael D. Intriligator, and John P Sullivan, Countering Terrorism and WMD: Creating a Global Counter-Terrorism Network (Taylor & Francis, 2007), 81.
\textsuperscript{514} Nye, The Paradox of American Power: Why the World's Only Superpower Can't Go It Alone, 8-12.
3.9 Approval Ratings

A soft power approach to international politics requires a country to appeal to other state and non-state actors. The Bush’s administration’s disregard of soft power approaches in his views, plans, and actions were, in part, reflected in approval ratings from Muslim, Arab, and western countries over the course of two years. (See Figure 8).\(^{515}\)


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The Pew Research Center’s Pew Global Attitudes Project polled over 175,000 people from 2002 to 2008 in 54 nations and the Palestinian territories. One of the major findings of this study was that “numerous tensions exist between Muslim and Western publics on values, policies, world events, and perceptions of one another.”\textsuperscript{516} For example, in 2006, 51 percent of American said the ousting of Saddam Hussein made the world safer, while in predominantly Muslim countries, eight to 16 percent of those polled believed this. That same survey found the majority of those surveyed in Indonesia, Jordan, Turkey, and Egypt did not believe that Arabs were responsible for the attacks on 9/11.\textsuperscript{517} Suzanne Nossel argues that the administration’s counterterrorism policies of “undermining alliances, international institutions, and U.S. credibility…triggered a cycle that is depleting U.S. power…encouraged distrust of U.S. motives, hampering U.S. effectiveness in Iraq, and fanning hostility.”\textsuperscript{518}

Despite Bush’s attempts referenced above to portray the US-Arab/Muslim relationship as one of mutual respect and partnership based on similar values, polls show a large disconnect between how each group views the other. The 2004 study showed the majority of Muslim nations, and a few European nations, believed the War on Terrorism was in actuality a war against Muslim governments unfriendly to the U.S. The majority of Muslims polled expressed negative opinions of the U.S. and other western countries, describing them as “violent” and “selfish.”\textsuperscript{519} Additionally “in the 2007 survey, in nine of the 47 countries polled, fewer than 30% of respondents rated America favorably. With the exception of Argentina, all were predominantly Muslim.”\textsuperscript{520}

\textsuperscript{516} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{517} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{518} Nossel, "Smart Power."
\textsuperscript{519} Center, "Global Public Opinion in the Bush Years (2001-2008)."
\textsuperscript{520} Ibid.
While non-Muslims had slightly better views of Muslims than vice versa, there still existed some reflections of Islamophobia. Majorities in two of six western nations surveyed viewed Muslims unfavorably. Non-Muslims in European countries tended to think Islam mistreated women.\(^{521}\)

3.10 Military Spending

![Military Spending from 2005-2008](image)

Figure 9: U.S. Military Spending 2005-2009 Source: SIPRI Database\(^{522}\)

By 2009, the U.S. had 60 percent of the world’s military equipment and 70 percent of the world’s military spending.\(^{523}\) During President Bush’s second term, the U.S. government

\(^{521}\) Ibid.  
\(^{522}\) "SIPRI Military Expenditure Database."  
increased military spending by percent of the GDP and overall. In terms of percent of overall federal budget, the funding for defense remained relatively stable. See Figure 10.

During the post-Cold War period, a number of nations around the world cut their military spending. The U.S. cuts were not significant so much in quantity as in changes in type. In other words, strategic nuclear forces were cut in the interests of lighter, more technologically advanced forces. Tanks, nuclear weapons, and submarine forces were scaled back while expeditionary capabilities such as an aircraft carriers and long-range strike assets were maintained or bolstered.524 The Marine Corps, known for being highly adaptive and expeditionary, suffered the least in terms of growth during the 1990s, maintained for their history of counter-guerilla and small scale interventions.525 This was the military that George Bush inherited, and the effects of these transformations had impact on foreign policy, counterterrorism strategy, and counterinsurgency operations well into Bush’s second term.

3.11 Foreign Aid

Bush continued aggressive foreign aid, or developmental assistance, during his second term in office. He hosted a summit in October of 2008 to highlight some of the achievements made during his time in office, entitled “Sustaining the New Era.” According to one U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) official, Bush authorized the largest expansion of foreign development assistance programs since the Marshall Plan since World War II.526 In his remarks at the summit, Bush acknowledges the link between development assistance and

524 Rogers, Why We’re Losing the War on Terror, 24.
525 Ibid. 25.
counterterrorism strategies. “We believe that development is in America’s security interests. We face an enemy that can’t stand freedom. And the only way they can recruit to their hateful ideology is by exploiting despair – and the best way to respond is to spread hope.”\textsuperscript{527} In this, Bush not only justifies his foreign aid through moral or religious reasons, using compassionate language about the duties of the U.S. to spread democracy and freedom, but argued that developmental assistance was part of an overall strategy to combat terrorism, vital to national interests. Condoleezza Rice echoed this defense when she remarked, “For the United States, supporting international development is more than just an expression of our compassion. It is a vital investment in the free, prosperous, and peaceful international order that fundamentally serves our national interests.”\textsuperscript{528} Highlighted in Secretary Rice’s comments were a number of development programs expanded or introduced by the Bush administration – some of which could be logically tied to fighting terrorism.

3.11.1 Millennium Challenge Corporation

The Millennium Challenge Corporation was first announced in 2002 and fully funded by Congress in January 2004. The idea behind the corporation, and the account that funded its initiatives, the Millennium Challenge Account (MCA) was a noble one – to overhaul the way foreign aid was awarded. President Bush sought to turn what was once aid into investment.\textsuperscript{529} Under the new constraints, in order to receive aid from the U.S., the receiving country had to

\textsuperscript{528} Condoleezza Rice, ”Remarks From White House Summit on International Development: Sustaining the New Era,” (White HouseOctober 21, 2008).
\textsuperscript{529} Bush, \textit{Decision Points}, 348.
meet three requirements – a corruption-free government, pursuance of market-based economies, and investment in the health and education of its populace.530 During its first six years, MCA invested $6.7 billion dollars in 35 “partner” countries.531 While foreign aid was part of Bush’s overall mission to improve the international community, the MCA was not developed for the primary or tertiary intent of combatting terrorism. Furthermore, the countries MCA invested in are not traditional areas of terrorist activity, with the Middle East and Northern Africa receiving only eight percent of the compacts and 10 percent of the overall budget. Sub-Saharan Africa is the most invested region with 52 percent of the programs and 56 percent of the allotted funds.532

The MCA is important to this dissertation because it highlights some key nuances of how Bush viewed the role of foreign assistance. One of the key critiques of the program is that it incentivized foreign aid, putting too many subjective requirements on the ability of one country to receive aid. In short, it made soft power hard power by making foreign aid a carrot and the rescinding of such aid a stick to coerce countries into a certain set of behaviors. Likewise, it drew criticisms from traditional U.S. allies such as Jacques Chirac as “too unilateral.”533

530 Ibid. 348.
531 Ibid. 349.
533 Bush, Decision Points, 150.
3.12 Refugee and Immigration

As discussed in chapter two, increased refugees and immigration, particularly from Muslim or Arab nations, indicated views, plans and actions utilizing soft power approaches. The acceptance of refugees highlights key American values of “inalienable human rights,” making the U.S. more appealing to international actors. Refugee levels are largely dependent on acute crises, as well as subject to U.S. interests abroad. As evidenced by his dedication to PEPFAR,
George Bush had a passion for assisting and developing African nations – some of which were Muslim or Arab majority. From Figure 11, one can see the overwhelming majority of Muslim immigrants/refugees were from Somalia, specifically in 2005-2006, coinciding with the U.S. backed “Battle for Mogadishu.”

In 2005, Ellen R Sauerbrey was nominated to the State Department’s refugee program with a $1 billion annual budget. In her 2007 remarks to Congress she addresses the often-discussed tradeoff between security and refugees when she references impacts on the refugee program as a result of the “terrorism-related inadmissibility provisions of the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA).”\textsuperscript{534} Sauerbrey was referring to the expanded definitions of terrorism and new provisions offered by the PATRIOT ACT and the REAL ID Act of 2005. The REAL ID Act of 2005, while implementing regulations and standardizations of ID requirements for U.S. citizens, also impacted asylum seekers in two specific ways. First, it impacted their chances of being granted asylum due to an increased burden of proof of their need.\textsuperscript{535} Second, it greatly expanded the understanding of “terrorist related activities” to include asylum seekers who had ever associated with not only persons “who have engaged in “terrorist activity,” but also members of “terrorist organizations,” persons who have received “military-type training” from such organizations or persons who endorse or espouse “terrorist activity” or persuade others to endorse or espouse a “terrorist organization,” as well as the spouses and children of persons inadmissible under these provisions.”\textsuperscript{536} In short, these new laws made it much easier to deem an asylum-seeking refugee inadmissible because of terrorism.

\textsuperscript{534} Senate Judiciary Committee Subcommittee on Immigration, Border Security, and Citizenship, Testimony of The Honorable Ellen Sauerbrey, September 27, 2006.


Still, Sauerbrey’s speech acknowledged that security concerns should not be the only factor in determining admission to the U.S. “It is the Administration’s view that important national security concerns and counterterrorism efforts are compatible with our historic role as the world’s leader in refugee resettlement.” These sentiments support a conclusion that the Bush administration understood increasing refugee levels, in keeping with historic tradition, could increase rather than detract from security. Unfortunately, the laws enacted and enforced still show a propensity of hard power in plans and actions until 2007, the end of Bush 2, where Muslim asylum seekers began to rise more dramatically (see Figure 11). Toward the end of Bush’s second term, his views on soft power and refugee admissions were reflected in the administration’s plans and actions.

3.13 Unmanned Aerial Systems

The U.S. military underwent rapid transformation during the post-Cold War period in three distinct ways – forced disposition, decreased levels of military personnel, and rapid advancements in technology. These last two changes had substantial impacts on the conduct of war in Afghanistan and Iraq.

Originally developed along with other precision guided munitions to decrease human casualties and support “real-estate” wars against locations, the use of UAS in Afghanistan and Iraq resulted in a number of very human-centric effects. UAS became HVI hunters, attempting to dismantle terrorist and insurgent organizations by killing select leaders. Additionally, these

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537 Testimony of The Honorable Ellen Sauerbrey.
539 Rogers, Why We’re Losing the War on Terror, 23.
weapons were developed concurrently, but more publicly, with weaponry designed to inflict the maximum amount of damage over a maximum area.\textsuperscript{540} It is fitting that the first UAS strike in the war on terror occurred on the first night of the offensive in Afghanistan. UASs have played a critical, at times primary and controversial role in the U.S. counterterrorism and counterinsurgency strategy.

The war in Afghanistan was a diplomatic and military challenge. By 2008, the problem was no longer the Taliban in central seats of power, but rather the essentially ungoverned tribal area along the Pakistan/Afghanistan border. Moreover, the U.S. relationship with Pakistan, specifically with the intelligence service ISI, was tenuous, at best. Before mid-2008, the U.S. had a policy of notifying Pakistani allies in the ISI and military of planned UAS strikes within Pakistani sovereignty. After President Bush was briefed by his intelligence team that key leaders in the ISI were warning Taliban and al Qaeda targets of impending strikes, Bush adopted a more aggressive “concurrent notification” policy in which Pakistani officials would be notified of strikes as they were occurring, not before.\textsuperscript{541}

\textsuperscript{540} Ibid. 26.
\textsuperscript{541} Woodward, Obama's Wars, 5.
During Bush’s second administration, funding levels for the Department of State continued to increase, despite a slight drop in 2007. As seen in the first administration (Figure 6), the largest increases in funding, relatively and overall, were in the security programs of border security, diplomatic security, construction, and counterterrorism efforts. Funding in these areas steadily increased, with large increases in the funding of security, construction, and embassy costs as well as in diplomatic security and border security costs. See Figure 12.
While the plans and actions, as reflected in budget decisions, show a preference for hard power, Secretary of Defense Robert Gates understood the limitations of military power to promote and defend U.S. security abroad and called on Congress to “commit more money and resources to soft-power tools including diplomacy, economic assistance, and communications.” He further pointed out the difference between the defense budget of half a trillion dollars compared with the $36 billion allotted to the State Department. He stated, “Our civilian institutions of diplomacy and development have been chronically undermanned and underfunded for far too long.”

In 2007 Bush called for an increase in State Department funding, a portion of which was earmarked for the diplomatic surge discussed earlier. The money was to fund 254 new positions in critical countries and 57 new positions in the S/CRS. One of the most symbolic changes during Bush 2 was the change of the State Department to a “national security agency,” for budgetary purposes. While this had few tangible effects in the way the budget was reviewed and approved, it did send a message that the State Department was an important player in foreign security policy.

In 2005 Condoleezza Rice was appointed to succeed Colin Powell. The State Department under Secretary Rice understood the usefulness of cultural exchanges and attempted to conduct some with the Iranian people in hopes of stabilizing the Middle East. Rice requested $75 million in additional funding for programs in Iran to include student programs, cultural exchanges, and the popular broadcasting programs discussed in chapter two. Secretary Rice even approved a

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545 Ibid. 557.
plan for a U.S. wrestling team to compete in Tehran and sponsored a group of Iranian artists to display their art in Washington DC.\textsuperscript{546}

In Iraq specifically, after Paul Bremer, head of the Coalition Provision Authority (a “stand-in” government for Iraq during the military operations in 2003-2004), turned Iraq back to the Iraqis, the U.S. began making plans for its embassy. The newly appointed ambassador to Iraq, John Negroponte, arrived to head what was supposed to be the largest U.S. embassy in the world. It was budgeted $480 million in construction costs, 1,000 American employees, 700 local supporting staff, and 200 Iraqi advisors in four missions throughout the country.\textsuperscript{547} While this level of commitment by the State Department might indicate an emphasis on soft power, some argue that the department was not in Iraq to conduct diplomacy operations as much as it was to keep an eye on the newly appointed Iraqi government. This was detrimental to the image of the U.S. mission in Iraq as the population saw these plans as indicative of a lasting invading presence of the U.S. in Iraq.\textsuperscript{548}

3.15 Civilian Reserve Corps

The idea for a civilian reserve corps was formed during the end of Bush 1 and further developed in early 2005 after Douglas Feith visited Iraq and was impressed with an Army reservist’s plan to bring clean water to residents in Baghdad.\textsuperscript{549} The newly formed S/CRS had 40 personnel in 2005.\textsuperscript{550} President Bush, with support from the new Secretary of Defense Robert

\textsuperscript{546} Ibid. 563.
\textsuperscript{547} Rogers, \textit{Why We’re Losing the War on Terror}, 98.
\textsuperscript{548} Ibid. 98.
\textsuperscript{549} Feith, \textit{War and Decision: Inside the Pentagon at the Dawn of the War on Terrorism}, 451-452.
Gates, sought to expand this department and its utility in foreign security strategy. In Bush’s 2007 State of the Union address, he called for the creation and funding of a Civilian Reserve Corps to match the call for an increase in Army and Marine Corps forces. “Such a corps would function much like our military reserve…would give people across America who do not wear the uniform a chance to serve in the defining struggle of our time.” The Civilian Response Corps received support in Congress, most notably by Senators Richard Lugar (R-Ind.) and Joseph Biden (D-Del.) This renewed call sought to reenergize and properly fund the ideas set forth in 2004 with the creation of the Office of the Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization. The Civilian Stabilization Initiative requested $248.6 million in the FY2009 budget to “strengthen civilian capacity to manage and implement R&S activities.” Part of these funds would be used to fund active, standby, and reserve components of the Civilian Response Corps across the following nine civilian agencies: USAID, departments of state, agriculture, commerce, energy, health and human services, homeland security, justice, and transportation. The active component is staffed with 250 USG employees trained and prepared for field deployment within 72 hours. The standby component is also comprised of USG employees and 2,000 members available for deployments within 30 days for up to six months. The reserve component is comprised of 2,000 volunteers outside of the government and would be set to deploy within 90 days for sector-specific employment. While the administration does not identify this civilian reserve as part of a soft power approach, or its integration with other agencies as smart power, the whole of government approach draws a number of thematic parallels with the ideas proposed

552 Scott Carlson; Michael Dziedzic, "Recruitment of Rule of Law Specialists for the Civilian Response Corps," (United States Institute of Peace, 2009).
553 State, "About S/CRS."
554 Public Health Emergency, "Civilian Response Corps," http://www.phe.gov/Preparedness/international/crc/Pages/about.aspx
555 State, "About S/CRS."
in smart power literature. This initiative and funding request highlights Bush’s growing understanding of the role of appeal to potential security threats. The whole of government approach focuses on enabling host nations to secure and sustain peace and development – thus seeing the U.S. as an appealing supporter and allies, versus an occupier or imperial power.

3.16 Conclusion

Overall, Bush changed little from his first term to his second in plans or actions. He maintained a unilateral approach, focusing on hard power deterrents and punishments to counter terrorism. His largest shift in policy occurred in Iraq with the appointment of Gen Petraeus and the implementation of the smart power counterinsurgency doctrine. His second term National Security Strategy reaffirmed the neoconservative tenets of his first administration’s strategy. During his second term, Bush also expanded the intelligence collection program and increased the use of unmanned aerial systems to prosecute targets abroad. He did maintain his language that the U.S. was not at war with Muslims and even reached out to a number of leaders in the Muslim community to better understand how to clarify the administration’s counterterrorism ideas and policies. Bush did increase foreign aid during his second term, but evidence overwhelmingly indicates that this was a function of religious commitments vice attempts to combat extremism.
In his run for presidency, Barack Obama campaigned with the promise of a different approach to foreign policy and international order – specifically one based on soft power. In his 2007 article for *Foreign Policy* he highlighted great American leaders from history – Truman, Roosevelt, and Kennedy – and noted that while all three of these men understood the utility and importance of a strong military, they coupled their military growth with the other “softer” approaches. Roosevelt gave his four freedoms to aid in the war against fascism, Truman helped execute the Marshall Plan for a peaceful united post WWII order, and Kennedy, in the midst of the Cold War, felt it important enough to create the Peace Corps and the Alliance for Progress.\(^{556}\)

During his campaign, Obama had been critical of Bush’s overreliance on military solutions to security problems. He also argued against Bush’s conflation of Islam and terrorism. During his first year, he would be pressured to find alternatives to military action and find a way to distinguish his administration’s idea of Islam and its idea of terrorism.\(^{557}\) He deliberately moved away from phrases like “war on terror” and called for a more holistic and nuanced approach. His chief counterterrorism advisor, John Brennan, argued that counterterrorism needed to “be much more than a kinetic effort, an intelligence, law enforcement effort. It has to be much more comprehensive.”\(^{558}\) This approach sought to attack not just terrorism, its acts and perpetrators, but the root causes. These root causes called for a different approach than hard power.

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\(^{556}\) Barack Obama, "Renewing American Leadership," *Foreign Affairs*, July/August 2007, 2-16.


In Obama’s speech accepting his 2009 Nobel Peace Prize, he gave a nod to military power, explaining that often peace is only secured through force. “Evil does exist in the world. A nonviolent movement could not have halted Hitler’s armies. Negotiations cannot convince al Qaeda’s leaders to lay down their arms. To say that force may sometimes be necessary is not a call to cynicism – it is a recognition of history; the imperfections of man and the limits of
reason.” He goes on to highlight that the men and women in uniform of military around the world have helped underwrite peace while institutions and economies helped stitch together a sustainable and stable international system. With one of the very first honors of his presidency—a peace prize awarded not for his tangible accomplishments but the symbolism of his achievements and hopeful potential, Obama acknowledged the role of both hard and soft power.

Obama’s election did bring hope, not just for those on the Oslo board, but for many citizens around the world. In the 2008 Pew Research Global Attitudes study, the results showed a number of countries with majorities believing the newly elected Barack Obama would change U.S. foreign policy for the better. See Figure 13. Barack Obama’s use of soft power to appeal seemingly began on election night. Nonetheless, as U.S. foreign policy is known to do, Obama retained, and expanded, many of the Bush era hard power policies and increased funding levels for traditionally hard power departments such as the DoD and the security divisions of the DoS. His relationship with the Muslim world was tentative, most likely a result of domestic political pressure. He drastically increased the use of UAS to target militants abroad, to include the infamous killing of an American citizen, decreased levels of Muslim immigrants/refugees, and failed to close Guantanamo Bay despite public dissent and an earlier promise to do so.

Obama did show the most shift from his predecessor in ideas, if not plans or actions. His security strategies and language throughout speeches leaned heavily on soft power concepts such as appeal, diplomacy, military restraint, and multilateralism. He, at least nominally, reinstated the State Department as the vanguard of U.S. foreign policy, even as the department saw a cut in funding of diplomacy programs. His military approaches to Iraq, much like his predecessors,

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560 Center, "Global Public Opinion in the Bush Years (2001-2008)."
showed a great deal of hybrid smart power approaches most likely due to the leadership of David Petraeus and Stanley McChrystal.

4.1 Military Spending

![Military Spending from 2009-2012](image)

**Figure 13: U.S. Military Spending 2009-2012 Source: SIPRI**

Military spending increased during Obama’s first three years overall, dropping in 2012; however, as a percentage of GDP and the overall federal budget, military spending stayed relatively stable, meaning the Obama administration spent more money on defense, but also spent more money on everything else. See Figure 14. By 2011, military spending was at $718 billion, $431 billion more than pre-9/11 budgets.\(^{561}\) This meant that in 10 years of fighting

terrorism, the DoD had spent $2 trillion. In 2011, Secretary Panetta decided to reduce the military as a “smaller highly capable and ready force is preferable to a larger, hollow force.” Panetta’s plan contains five essential elements. First, the new military would be smaller and leaner. Second, the forces would rebalance to Asia. Third, the military would switch from large scale, long-term deployments to short-term deployments focusing on military exercises to build partnerships and alliances with new and traditional allies. Fourth, the military would be able to maintain a capacity to fight two wars at once. Finally, the new military would include a focus on increasing special operations forces and capabilities, unmanned systems, intelligence assets, and cyber and space-based programs. Part of this new military included a drastic expansion of special operation forces under General Stanley McChrystal.

The largest dollar increase in discretionary spending under the Obama administration has been for military programs, which increased by $92 billion from 2008 to 2011, as a result of the expanded war in Afghanistan and bringing the war in Iraq to a close. In addition, spending for veterans benefits and assistance increased by 50 percent from 2008 to 2011. Brad Plumer, a writer for the Washington Post revealed the following, highlighting the internal budget of the DoD:

In 2011, the Pentagon spent about $161 billion on personnel pay and housing, $128 billion on weapons procurement, and $291 billion on operations and maintenance—the last largely in Iraq and Afghanistan. Those three items made up the bulk of the budget. Smaller amounts also were spent on R&D (about $74 billion) and nuclear programs ($20 billion), as well as construction, family housing and other programs ($22 billion).

562 Ibid. 378.
563 Ibid. 384.
564 Democrats of Greene County, "Federal Spending During the G.W. Bush and Obama Administrations."
4.2 Afghanistan

If President Bush turned to his advisors for initial advice after 9/11, President Obama was forced to make early judgments on his own. As a requirement of President Bush, only president-elect Obama was to be read into top secret briefings on sources, methods, and strategies for the war in Afghanistan, not his transition team.\textsuperscript{566} As part of these briefings, Obama quickly learned there was no real strategy for the tribally administrated areas FATA, along the Pakistan/Afghanistan border.

Obama largely categorized the war in Iraq as one of choice. The war in Afghanistan, however, was a war of necessity. During his campaign, Obama proposed a new strategy in Afghanistan – one that would expand the military and lift restrictions on force while also implementing a robust diplomatic strategy.\textsuperscript{567} The new Obama strategy promised to be creative and holistic and even included an Afghan version of the popular children’s show “Sesame Street” called “Baghch-e-Simsim,” or Sesame Garden.\textsuperscript{568} The show was adjusted for cultural norms and traditions, but maintained the format of bright, cheerful puppets teaching children their alphabet, numbers, and creative approaches to social situations.

As president, Obama was charged with developing and implementing a plan to stabilize the country and withdraw military troops. In June of 2009, Gen. Stanley McChrystal was appointed commander of U.S. and International Security Assistance Forces in Afghanistan, just prior to the commencement of Operation Khanjar, the U.S. military-led offensive in Helmand

\textsuperscript{567} Obama, "Renewing American Leadership."
\textsuperscript{568} Ben Farmer, "Sesame Street to be broadcast in Afghanistan," \textit{The Telegraph}, November 30, 2011.
province in southwest Afghanistan. In August of 2009, Gen. McChrystal submitted his 66-page “Commander’s Initial Assessment” to Secretary of Defense Gates.569 The assessment was not to be resigned to the military realm, but was to address non-military concerns and solutions to the conflict in Afghanistan. The summary addresses a key tenet of a successful counterinsurgency – legitimacy. McChrystal highlights the necessity of credibility of the government of Afghanistan and U.S. forces among the Afghan population and the international community. The work being done in that country must be respected and appeal to the masses – a key concept of soft power.570 The assessment, much like that of the Iraq Study Group, calls for a new strategy – one that emphasized the effectiveness of civil-military operations. In his bid to redefine the fight, McChrystal echoes the Petraeus doctrine of gaining the support of the population by protecting them in two ways – against the insurgency (using hard power) and against a lack of confidence in the US/GiROA mission (soft power).

McChrystal highlights how overemphasis on conventional military power often hurts the U.S. credibility and appeal (soft power) tactically, operationally, and strategically, especially in instances of civilian casualties or collateral damage. He argues that strategy in Afghanistan must change dramatically in two ways. First, by changing the operational culture to force U.S. troops to interact and engage with the local populace. Second, to change the command structures to provide more unity of command. The first is important in understanding the soft power approaches to counterinsurgency or security in general. McChrystal argues that an overemphasis on force protection has led to U.S. forces concentrated on forward bases, heavily armed, and away from population centers. This, according to McChrystal, has not only led to a mistrust and misunderstanding between Afghans and U.S. forces, but actually decreased security and put

570 Ibid. 1-1.
troops at a high risk. He aptly states, “security may not come from the barrel of a gun. Better force protection may be counterintuitive; it might come from less armor and less distance from the population.” Obama campaigned partly on a promise of a very different foreign policy than Bush, specifically in the Middle East. In some ways he fulfilled this promise, focusing a great deal on operations in Afghanistan and closing out combat operations in the “dumb war” in Iraq. However, Obama’s strategy in Afghanistan, specifically in the surge and the Bin Laden raid, closely mirrored that of Bush.

4.2.1 The Surge

Much like Bush’s surge in Iraq, during Obama’s first administration it became clear that the desired strategy for Afghanistan included a surge of both military troops and civilian experts. Some military leaders called for the National Guard to fill the role of both civilian and military power. Aside from a new population-centric COIN strategy, McChrystal argued that the war in Afghanistan must be properly resourced with both military and civilian resources. In October 2009, McChrystal provided three options or Courses of Action (COA) for President Obama in terms of resources – a 10,000, 40,000, or 85,000 troop surge. Obama’s advisors were divided again on this proposal. Some, such as Vice-President Biden, cautioned against the incremental increase of troops without a clear exit strategy. Interestingly enough, Secretary of State Hilary Clinton advocated for the general’s plan, further displaying the State Department’s reciprocal

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571 Ibid. 1-3.
understanding of smart power (mirroring Secretary Gates’ call for increased funding for diplomatic programs in Bush 2). In early 2009, President Obama agreed to deploy 30,000 more troops to Afghanistan. During his briefing to his generals regarding his plan, he emphasized the desire to turn the Afghanistan mission over to the Afghans within 18 months. He asked his top military leaders, Robert Gates, Mike Mullen, and David Petraeus, if they could accomplish such security with the additional troops in that amount of time. Each said “yes.” Later Petraeus was asked why he would agree to such an aggressive and arguably impossible timeline he responded that the meeting was of the type where he was expected to take orders rather than discuss options.

4.2.2 Osama Bin Laden Raid

Obama had made it clear to Leon Panetta that capturing or killing Osama bin Laden was the top priority for the CIA. As such, intelligence collection and analysis efforts were increasingly dedicated to that mission. By February 2011, enough information had been collected and analysis had been conducted to propose COAs to the President. COA 1 was a bomber strike, COA 2 a helicopter assault with Special Forces, COA 3 was a CIA raid, COA 4 was a joint raid with Pakistan, and COA 5 was to notify Pakistan of the location of bin Laden and urge them to act. While all five options included hard power, the first was decisive hard power – using overwhelming military force through 32 precision guided 2,000-pound bombs – 64,000 pounds of explosives. The second two were hard power, but on a smaller scale. The fourth option was

576 Kaplan, The Insurgents, 317
577 Ibid.
still using military force, but with regard to the state sovereignty of Pakistan and the benefits of multilateralism. The fifth was arguably the least hard power centric – providing intelligence to an ally for their best judgment.\footnote{Panetta and Newton, Worthy Fights: A Memoir of Leadership in War and Peace, 310.} COA 2 was eventually selected and preparations began for the mission. As the plan was refined, the administration approached the problem with a smart power plan – including military force, back up military force, and a diplomatic team on standby to deal with any repercussions from Pakistani authorities.\footnote{Ibid. 316.} The operation was a success; bin Laden was killed, promptly flown to the USS Carl Vinson aboard a USMC MV-22B Osprey, and buried at sea – mitigating any chance for a burial site to become a pilgrimage site. The unilateral operation was not without cost, however. The exclusion of Pakistan from the planning and execution of the raid further strained the relationship between the two governments’ military, political, and intelligence bodies, with some damage unable to be repaired.

The bin Laden raid was one of many events that contributed to a tense relationship between Pakistan and the U.S. UAS strikes and suspected links between Pakistani intelligence (ISI) and extremist groups like the Haqqani network led to mistrust on both sides. On November 26, 2011, these tensions turned kinetic when miscommunication and misidentification led to a border skirmish between NATO troops and Pakistani border guards resulting in 28 Pakistani soldiers killed and 12 wounded. In response, Pakistan shut down NATO supply lines until Secretary of State Hillary Clinton, against the wishes of Secretary of Defense Leon Panetta, apologized in July 2012.\footnote{CNN Wire Staff, "Pakistan reopens NATO supply routes to Afghanistan," CNN, July 4, 2012.}
4.2.3 Hearts and Minds Campaign

General Petraeus took command of U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM) shortly before the 2008 election. He had written the *Counterinsurgency Field Manual*, which emphasized the limitations of military power (hard power) in winning a counterinsurgency fight. Coupled with air strikes and ground operations, Petraeus argued that ground troops needed to “protect and win over the population.” The ideal soldier to Petraeus was a “social worker, urban planner, anthropologist, and psychologist.” One of the key tenets to Petraeus’ version of counterinsurgency was not to kill or capture terrorists, but, rather, to bring them to the U.S./coalition side – generally by appealing to some aspect of their character or history (soft power). Petraeus lamented that there was no such cell or network doing this in Afghanistan. Reports showed that “attempts to collect ‘humint’ (human intelligence) were ‘virtually fruitless.’ A ‘leader engagement’ tea party goes awry when two senior Afghan police officers get into an argument.” Petraeus understood the need for the development of such a network to develop and execute soft power initiatives.

Petraeus also understood the damage previous operations and policies had done to the appeal of U.S. involvement to Afghan peoples. “Former Secretary of Defense William Cohen said McChrystal is basically saying the U.S. strategy and tactics to date have been, in fact, ‘creating more animosity, more insurgents than we've been winning.’” In 2009, a public opinion poll in Afghanistan showed a 52 percent unfavorability rating towards U.S. involvement

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582 Ibid. 15.
in the conflict. A great deal of the animosity toward U.S. troops was a direct result of increased civilian casualties, which rose 40 percent from 2007 to 2008. This increase was, in part, a result of Bush era policies. For example, under Bush, Special Forces had been given a great deal of flexibility and autonomy in conducting COIN operations. This freedom, however, often led to increased civilian casualties and even cover-ups of those casualties. According to the United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan, over half the civilian casualties attributed to the ISAF mission in Afghanistan were a result of special operation forces’ night raids and search operations. As a result, part of McChrystal’s plan for Afghanistan was to bring special forces under his command, to provide more oversight and transparency to their operations.

In addition to moving special operations forces under his command, McChrystal sought to minimize civilian casualties and increase the appeal of U.S. forces by tightening restrictions on air power engagement. Specifically, McChrystal’s orders limited airstrikes in heavily populated areas to cases in which U.S. or allied troops were about to be overrun. “Air power contains the seeds of our own destruction if we do not use it responsibly,” McChrystal told senior leaders, displaying an understanding of how hard power approaches can often damage soft power appeal and an overall counterterrorism strategy.

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590 Ibid.
4.3 Refugees and Immigration

During one of then president-elect Obama’s first intelligence briefings, DNI Mike McConnell briefed him on the dangers of Al Qaeda’s intent to target the U.S. homeland by recruiting members with passports from countries that did not require visas to visit the U.S. In 2008 there were 35 countries which did not require such documentation. Still, the first year looked promising for a turn in refugee/immigration policy. The U.S. resettled 18,838 Iraqis during the 2009 fiscal year, an increase of almost 5,000 over the previous year. The increase was short-lived. Obama, like Bush, slowly decreased refugee levels from Muslim countries over the next three years. See Figure 16. This decrease also included an alleged halt of Iraqi refugee

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requests for six months during 2011. After a foiled attack in Bowling Green, KY, the administration discovered bomb making in the U.S. tied to two individuals who had attempted to enter the U.S. through the Iraqi refugee program.\textsuperscript{593} This included a special program for Iraqi interpreters and informants who had served alongside American troops in Iraq. According to sources in the Federal Bureau of Investigations, this led to the assassination of at least one Iraqi aid, killed as he waited for his application to be processed.\textsuperscript{594} Official sources argue that no official ban was ever put in place. Rather, all new applications had to be vetted against new databases in the DHS, DoD, and NCTC, which greatly slowed down the process.\textsuperscript{595} Still, Obama administration officials point out that “refugees continued to be admitted to the U.S. during that time, and there was not a single month in which no Iraqis arrived here.”\textsuperscript{596} Despite an overall decrease in refugee admission and resettlement, the Obama administration did authorize an overall increase in funding for resettlement programs from $715.4 million in FY2009 to $2141.3 million in FY2017.\textsuperscript{597}

4.4 National Security Strategy – An Emphasis on Smart Power

Like Bush, the Obama administration argued that a weapon of mass destruction in the hands of terrorists was the greatest danger to the U.S. His approach to preventing this event,

\textsuperscript{593} Sean Davis, "The Obama Administration Stopped Processing Iraq Refugee Requests For 6 Months In 2011," \textit{The Federalist}, November 18, 2015.
\textsuperscript{596} Jon Finer, "Sorry, Mr. President: The Obama Administration Did Nothing Similar to Your Immigration Ban," \textit{Foreign Policy}, January 30, 2017.
\textsuperscript{597} Bruno, "Refugee Admissions and Resettlement Policy." 9.
however, was very different. As Secretary Clinton explained in her confirmation hearings, the Nonproliferation Treaty was the cornerstone to the nonproliferation regime, and the multilateral nonproliferation regime was the best tool against terrorist groups acquiring nuclear weapons. While Bush argued that preemption, even prevention, against oppressive dictators was a necessary to this foreign policy, Obama was to first focus on international and institutional agreements. In May 2010, Obama signed his first National Security Strategy (NSS). In his opening paragraph he acknowledges that increasing globalization has brought new dangers to national security, to include – terrorism, the spread of deadly technologies, economic upheaval, and a changing climate. In this he includes three of the same dangers George Bush outlined in his first NSS but adds climate change. The tone of Obama’s introduction, however, is markedly different from Bush’s. Bush claimed that the U.S. way of life was the only sustainable form of government and society, and argued that the U.S. power arsenal consisted of “military power, better homeland defenses, law enforcement, intelligence, and vigorous efforts to cut off terrorist financing.” Obama, on the other hand, argued that while “our Armed Forces will always be a cornerstone of our security…they must be complemented.” In additional to military force, Obama argued that a strong national security strategy had to factor in diplomats, development experts, intelligence and law enforcement partnerships, and strong justice systems. Obama also stresses the importance of alliances and institutions, two indications of a more soft power approach to security.

598 Senate Confirmation Hearing: Hillary Clinton.
602 Ibid.
The 2010 NSS repeatedly emphasizes that the source of American power comes not just from a strong military or economy, but also through its ideals of democracy, alliances, and commitment to international institutions. “The work to build a stronger foundation for our leadership within our borders recognizes that the most effective way for the United States of America to promote our values is to live them.”

This idea of showing the world that the U.S. practices what it preaches is identical to the approach of George Bush’s Shared Values Initiative. Unlike his predecessor, however, Obama includes these ideas in the major security publication of his first term. He also acknowledges the effectiveness of persuasion and appeal of these values rather than force when he promises we “will not seek to impose these values through force. Instead, we are working to strengthen international norms on behalf of human rights, while welcoming all peaceful democratic movements.”

The NSS acknowledges the shortcomings of international institutions, but maintains that these shortcomings are not “a reason to walk away from it,” highlighting the new administration’s commitment to organizations such as NATO and the United Nations. The NSS also argues that a new security strategy starts with building and repairing alliances, showing Obama’s preference for bilateralism and multilateralism over the unilateral policies of Bush.

Like Bush, Obama gives priority to stopping the spread of nuclear weapons – a key to any security approach. Unlike Bush, however, Obama proposes “pursuing a comprehensive nonproliferation and nuclear security agenda, grounded in the rights and responsibilities of nations.”

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603 Ibid.
604 Ibid. 5.
605 Ibid. 3.
606 Ibid. 11.
607 Ibid. 4.
focused on keeping them out of the hands of “rogue states,” such as Iraq, Iran, North Korea, and potentially India.\textsuperscript{608}

The 2010 NSS also proposes a concept called “whole-of-government approach” when it comes to national security. This concept argues that the best approach to security threats is holistic in nature, utilizing all the tools of American power. These tools, as outlined in the 2010 NSS, are defense (hard power), diplomacy (soft power), economic (hard or soft power), development (soft power), homeland security (hard power), and intelligence (hard power), strategic communications (soft power), and the American people (soft power).\textsuperscript{609} Combined, this whole of government approach is clearly one utilizing the concept of smart power.

In summary, National Security Strategies reveal the security ideas of an administration. In both the 2002 and 2010 strategies, similar threats were discussed. The desired approach and tone between the two documents, however, was different. The 2010 NSS emphasized and re-emphasized smart power, without calling it by name. To succeed in security the American people and interests, according to the 2010 strategy, “we must balance and integrate all elements of American power…We must maintain our military’s conventional superiority, while enhancing its capacity to defeat asymmetric threats. Our diplomacy and development capabilities must be modernized, and our civilian expeditionary capacity strengthened.”\textsuperscript{610}

\textsuperscript{608} “2002 National Security Strategy of the United States of America.”
\textsuperscript{609} “2010 National Security Strategy.” 16.
\textsuperscript{610} Ibid. 5.
4.5 Department of State

State department funding in Obama’s first term continued to increase the first two years but decreased overall the second half of his first term, most likely a result of midterm elections and a new fiscally conservative Congress to approve a budget. Still, this, coupled with other spending priorities, indicates a decline in a soft power approach, specifically in the plans and actions frames. Within the budget, public diplomacy funding and the budget for international organizations both decrease while funding for the traditionally hard power sections of the
department – border security programs and diplomatic security – increased (see Figure 18), further supporting the argument that while Barack Obama and his secretary of state understood soft and smart power as effective approaches to counterterrorism, they failed to plan for or execute any major shift in policy.

Hillary Clinton was sworn in as secretary of state in 2009. In her confirmation hearings, she stated, “America cannot solve the most pressing problems on our own, and the world cannot solve them without America…We must use what has been called ‘smart power,’ the full rand of tools at our disposal.”611 This statement highlights three philosophies of Obama’s first administration. The first is an emphasis on multilateralism and the use of institutions. Secretary Clinton sought to emphasize the ineffectiveness of the unilateral action of the Bush era. The second part of the statement emphasized American exceptionalism and interventionism and the role the international system needed the U.S. to play. Here, Clinton acknowledges that as the U.S. was the world’s only superpower, the international system was reliant on the U.S. to help solve issues. Finally, the last portion of the statement emphasizes Clinton’s and Obama’s understanding of soft and hard power and the criticality of using both to advance national interests abroad.

More than that, Clinton goes on to argue that “diplomacy will be the vanguard of our foreign policy,” moving the Department of State in front of the Department of Defense as the leader in implementing and promoting U.S. policies abroad.612 She acknowledges that force may be necessary in some cases, and that work with NGOs and other institutions – specifically the United Nations – will be encouraged. She testified that the counterterrorism strategy under

\[ ^{611} \text{Senate Confirmation Hearing: Hillary Clinton.} \]
\[ ^{612} \text{Ibid.} \]
Obama would focus on integrating diplomacy, development, and defense while exemplifying American values abroad.

As depicted in the figure/graph, Obama initially increased funding to State Department programs including diplomacy, foreign aid, and contributions to the U.S. during his first two budgets; in 2010 the republicans regained control of Congress and funding for the State Department was cut by 11 percent and 14 percent less than what was requested by President Obama. Further cuts of 20 percent were made during the FY2012 budget approval. Some congressional members went as far as to suggest voluntary discretionary spending on United Nations programs – allowing the U.S. to pick and choose to what programs to contribute.

On November 22, 2011, Obama replaced the S/CRS with the Bureau of Conflict and Stability Operations (CSO). In 2012 he abolished the G Bureau or the Under Secretary for Democracy and Global Affairs with the J Bureau or the Under Secretary for Civilian Security, Democracy, and Human Rights.\(^\text{613}\) This bureau oversaw seven offices to include the CSO as well as Bureau of Counterterrorism and Countering Violent Extremism (CT/CVE), Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor (DRL), Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs (INL), Bureau of Population, Refugees, and Migration (PRM), Office of Global Criminal Justice (GCJ), and the Office to Monitor and Combat Trafficking in Persons (TIP).\(^\text{614}\)
4.5.1 Foreign Aid

The Obama administration immediately understood the links between foreign aid and security: “in Africa, the foreign policy objectives of the Obama administration are rooted in security, political, economic, and humanitarian interests, including combating Al Qaida's efforts to seek safe havens in failed states in the Horn of Africa.”

Over his first four years, Obama increased foreign aid by 80 percent from the Bush level spending. In one speech to the United Nations, Obama called foreign aid a “core pillar of American power,” and vowed to increase foreign aid during his tenure. It is important to note that his increase was directly linked to national security interests. Unlike Bush era policies of foreign aid, which were most likely a result of religious or moral motivations, Obama saw foreign aid as a critical component of security policy. Despite his ideas of increased soft power through foreign aid, Congress approved cuts to foreign aid to a number of countries in the 2012 budget. As a result of midterm elections and overall shifts towards fiscal conservatism, Obama’s ideas were never translated into plans or actions.

In 2011, President Obama began to shift focus in Afghanistan to the political aspects of the strategy. Vice President Biden asked how long Afghanistan would require aid from the U.S. and the intelligence estimate was 15 years at $6-8 billion a year. Additionally, despite a deteriorating relationship with Pakistan after the Bin Laden raid, Obama hesitated to threaten to

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615 Senate Confirmation Hearing: Hillary Clinton.
618 Ibid.
cut off aid to Pakistan citing that the U.S. has a “great desire to help the Pakistani people strengthen their own society and their own government,” he said. “And so, you know, I’d be hesitant to punish flood victims in Pakistan because of poor decisions by their intelligence services.” This statement shows a preference for appeal over threats, soft power over hard.

4.5.2 Quadrennial Diplomacy and Development Review

One of Clinton’s first tasks was to conduct a review of the Department of State’s core missions of development and diplomacy. The 17-month review resulted in the first Quadrennial Diplomacy and Development Review (QDDR), modeled after the Department of Defense’s Quadrennial Defense Review. The intent of the review was threefold – to strength the department in certain areas, give the department more influence in interagency decision-making, and assist the department in securing more resources from Congress. The review was officially led by Deputy Secretary of State Jacob Lew, USAID administrator Rajiv Shah, and State Department Policy Planning Director Anne-Marie Slaughter. The first QDDR was released in 2010 and titled Leading through Civilian Power, and focused on the role of both the DoS and USAID to confront modern international challenges. The QDDR set out to accomplish four goals for the whole of the U.S. civilian power – set clear priorities, manage for results, hold civilian power accountable, and unify efforts. Civilian power is defined in this document as “the combined forces of women and men across the U.S. government who are practicing diplomacy,

622 Ibid. 749.
implementing development projects, strengthening alliances and partnerships, preventing and responding to crises and conflict, and advancing America’s core interests." The document worked under the philosophy that civilian power should be developed and implemented as a partner to military power or an “equal pillar of U.S. foreign policy.” This smart power approach was reflected in President Obama’s National Security Strategy.

The QDDR presents the findings of the review in four separate sections. The first addressed the subject of Diplomacy for the 21st century and called for three changes. The report encouraged that Chiefs of Mission across the world be empowered as CEOs of multi-agency missions. Those missions should also extend beyond the capitals and leverage the modern technology available. The report also called for a restructuring to include the creation of several new departments – “an Under Secretary for Economic Growth, Energy and the Environment and an Undersecretary for Civilian Security, Democracy, and Human Rights; a new Bureau for Energy Resources and a Chief Economist; and a proposed Bureau for Counterterrorism.” The report recommended changing the existing S/CRS into the Conflict and Stabilization Operations Bureau and the counterterrorism office also into a bureau as bureaus typically had more influence than departments within DoS. While the increased focus on diplomacy and development alone indicates the Obama administration focused more on soft power, the recommendation of a new counterterrorism department within the State Department shows the administration understood the potential role of soft power in national security. Additionally, this portion of the document emphasized the importance of non-traditional diplomacy. The reviewers

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624 Ibid. 9.
recognized that the changing dynamics limited the power of government to government diplomacy while creating new space for public diplomacy to play a role in foreign policy.\textsuperscript{627} By engaging “outside the capital” the QDDR urges civilian power to expand their use of soft power resources by partnering with NGOs, multinational corporations, and religious groups. “We cannot partner with a country if its people are against us.”\textsuperscript{628} One of the ways to accomplish this mission is to make public diplomacy a core diplomatic mission and to incorporate women and girls into all public-engagement efforts. This clear soft power approach seeks to appeal to populations by direct approach and by displaying the values of equality. The report also stresses the importance of bilateral, regional, and multilateral diplomacy and building partnerships with allies – both indicators of a soft power approach.

The second set of recommendations sought to transform development to deliver results. Much like Bush, the Obama administration understood the importance and utility of foreign aid, while also understanding the inherent problems with mismanagement and less than stellar results. The 2010 QDDR cites the 2010 NSS key objective for the U.S. to argue that development is not simply a moral imperative, but also a useful approach to stability in the security and economic realms. In other words, development was not simply something the U.S. engaged in out of some sense of responsibility – a moral ends – but, rather, a means to an end. In order to achieve the results expected of development, the QDDR argued for a number of reforms. First, the QDDR recommended focusing development on six key areas – sustainable economic growth, food security, global health, climate change, democracy and governance, and humanitarian assistance. In addition, initiatives in these areas should switch focus from

\textsuperscript{627} State, "The 2010 Quadrennial Diplomacy and Development Review (QDDR): Leading Through Civilian Power."
\textsuperscript{628} Ibid. viii.
assistance to investment, looking to achieve strategic chance rather than simply provide a service.\textsuperscript{629}

The QDDR made a number of recommendations to increase USAID’s role not just in development, but in overall foreign policy. The QDDR recommended, “make development a core pillar of U.S. foreign policy by elevating USAID’s voice through greater interagency policymaking process.”\textsuperscript{630} This is one of the faces of power discussed in chapter one – agenda setting. By giving USAID a stronger voice in embassies around the world, the Obama administration sought to give a key soft power resource the ability to frame the issues and provide solutions through the lens of development. The report recommended increased personnel (and thus increased funding) for USAID under the understanding that diplomacy and development were mutually supporting missions.

In most direct relation to this dissertation, the 2010 QDDR tied the role of diplomacy and development to the prevention and fighting of terrorism. As a result of globalization, the conflicts in an area far removed from the U.S. geographically has the ability to directly impact the security of the U.S. As such, a key component of U.S. foreign policy and the QDDR recommendations is to address these failed states as a way to prevent havens for “terrorists, insurgencies, and criminal syndicates.”\textsuperscript{631} In order to do this, the QDDR argues that civilian power must be integrated with military power and given a clear mission. The mission is to “prevent conflict, save lives, and build sustainable peace by resolving underlying grievances fairly and helping to build government institutions that can provide basic but effective security and justice systems. In order to accomplish this mission, the QDDR recommends new

\textsuperscript{629} Ibid. x.
\textsuperscript{630} Ibid. xi.
\textsuperscript{631} Ibid. xii.
departments to be created, staffed, and trained in conflict transition and to replace the Civilian Reserve Corps with a more flexible Expert Corps.

4.6 Multilateralism

Obama campaigned heavily with the promise to restore the U.S.’ position in the world through multilateralism. During remarks to the Chicago Council on Global Affairs in 2007, then Senator Obama acknowledged that “many around the world are disappointed with our actions” and proposed that he was “led a new chapter of American engagement.” Obama’s first term foreign policy was largely focused on repairing and strengthening alliances and the U.S. position in multilateral organizations such as NATO and the United Nations. “Smart power requires reaching out to both friends and adversaries to bolster old alliances and to forge new ones.” During his first term, historic allies abroad were eager and optimistic about this promised “new era” of multilateralism – so much so that Obama was awarded the Nobel Peace Prize nine months into his first terms in part for his promised shift in American foreign policy. The Nobel committee’s press release in 2009 explained the award, “Obama as a president created a new climate in international politics. Multilateral diplomacy has regained a central position, with emphasis on the role that the United Nations and other international institutions can play. Dialog and negotiations are preferred as instruments for resolving even the most difficult international conflicts.” In his Nobel lecture accepting the prize, Obama emphasized his foreign policy

633 Senate Confirmation Hearing: Hillary Clinton.
philosophy, a philosophy described by some as “multilateralism with teeth,”\(^{635}\) or “hybrid multilateralism.”\(^{636}\) In Obama’s words, “if we want a lasting peace, then the words of the international community must mean something. Those regimes that break the rules must be held accountable. Sanctions must exact a real price. Intransigence must be met with increased pressure – and such pressure only exists when the world stands together as one.”\(^{637}\)

Obama’s approach to multilateral engagement in security issues is mirrored in his approach in other foreign policy areas. Almost immediately after inauguration, Obama “emphasized the larger Group of 20 major economies over the smaller G-8 forum. He has also tried to balance China’s rise by bringing Asia and Latin America into one great big trans-Pacific partnership.”\(^{638}\) During his first year in office, Congress approved supplemental budget requests to begin to clear arrearages accumulated by the U.S. on the peacekeeping account. Additionally, during Obama’s first term, the U.S. won a seat on the Human Rights Council and regained cabinet status lost during the Bush administration. Obama also became the first U.S. president to preside over a meeting of the United Nations Security Council.\(^{639}\)

In the areas of military action, Obama also displayed a willingness to not only seek multilateral engagements but also take a secondary role in them. In Libya, for example, there existed overwhelming international support to overthrow Mumar Qaddafi’s regime to include key NATO partners. There existed a desire for democracy among the Libyan rebels – values the U.S. believed to stabilize a region. Yet, Obama did not want to engage in a third protracted war

\(^{637}\) Obama, "Nobel Lecture."
in the Middle East – committing time, money, resources, and possibly American lives. As a
comprise Obama committed limited U.S. air assets, refused to commit ground troops and
proposing a plan for a U.S. exit. In this way, Obama offered hard power resources in a soft
power framework by assisting in an allied coalition to spread the values of democracy.\textsuperscript{640} In
Libya, perhaps more than any other security situation, Obama displayed his dedication to
consensus, to some criticism. One analyst wrote, “if President George W. Bush was ‘The
Decider,’ Obama is ‘The Deliberator,’” criticizing the president’s preference to wait, even when
it made tactical military sense to attack sooner.\textsuperscript{641}

In the last year of Obama’s first term, his administration launched two major global
multilateral initiatives – the Open Government Partnership (OGP) and the Global
Counterterrorism Forum (GCTF).\textsuperscript{642} Founded by eight nations, including the U.S., the OGP is a
“multilateral initiative that aims to secure concrete commitments from governments to promote
transparency, empower citizens, fight corruption, and harness new technologies to strengthen
governance.”\textsuperscript{643} The GCTF is “an international forum of 29 countries and the European Union
with an overarching mission of reducing the vulnerability of people worldwide to terrorism by
preventing, combating, and prosecuting terrorist acts and countering incitement and recruitment
to terrorism.”\textsuperscript{644} While the GCTF was in part launched by the U.S., it is co-chaired by the
Netherlands and Morocco, further highlighting the willingness of the Obama administration to
take a backseat and emphasizing the true multilateral nature of the forum.\textsuperscript{645}

\textsuperscript{640} Panetta and Newton, \textit{Worthy Fights: A Memoir of Leadership in War and Peace}, 382.
\textsuperscript{642} Bosco, "Foreign Policy: Obama's Hybrid Multilateralism."
\textsuperscript{644} “Global Counterterrorism Forum,” https://www.thegctf.org.
\textsuperscript{645} Ibid.
Still, President Obama held unilateral action as a “fallback” when necessary – most notably in the raid into Pakistan that killed Osama bin Laden. In this specific sense, Obama refused to cooperate, share, or request permission from the allied nation of Pakistan for a raid into sovereign territory – a campaign promise criticized by Bush who advised against unilateral action into Pakistan. In other cases, European leaders of historic U.S. allies were less optimistic about Obama’s promise for multilateralism by 2010, claiming they were “stung by a perception of America’s indifference to its historical alliance with Europe.”

In five major campaign speeches on foreign policy delivered by Obama in 2007-2008, “multi-lateral” appeared only twice, with seven mentions of international “institutions” and seven references to the United Nations. He did, however, use the term “diplomacy” 25 times in those combined speeches. However, Obama also called for major reform of international institutions and called the United Nations an “imperfect institution.” Critics of Obama’s foreign policy argue that while rhetoric from the State Department’s Hillary Clinton and Anne-Marie Slaughter called for improved foreign relations and additional cooperation among partner nations, it calls for informal or unconventional “ad hoc” diplomacy akin to Bush’s “coalitions of the willing.” In one such example, the 2010 47-nation Nuclear Strategy Summit resulted in no formal agreements or treaties but rather voluntary agreements of support.

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646 Greenblatt, "Is Obama Following In Bush's Footsteps?."  
649 Obama, "Remarks of Senator Barack Obama to the Chicago Council on Global Affairs."  
651 Skidmore, "The Obama Presidency and US Foreign Policy: Where’s the Multilateralism?." 47.
4.7 Intelligence

During his campaign, Obama argued that the 2007 U.S. intelligence community was woefully inadequate and needed an overhaul beyond “rearranging boxes on an organizational chart.”\(^6\) He called for increases in investments into both the technology of intelligence surveillance and collection but also the training, skills, and knowledge needed in the human intelligence discipline.

Leon Panetta was appointed the head of the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) in 2009 in part to help the department regain the accountability and credibility it had lost through the Bush administration’s programs discussed above. Panetta had participated in the Iraq Study Group, but most of his expertise was with budgets and administrative tasks. Panetta had served in the government for most of his life through various administrations as a representative and then as Bill Clinton’s chief of staff. In his history, he established a reputation of standing by his beliefs, remaining objective, and willing to withstand political backlash. This reputation was what Obama believed would restore the standing of the CIA after public disclosure of rendition, enhanced interrogation techniques, and poor analysis of weapons of mass destruction in Iraq.\(^5\) During his confirmation hearing, Panetta testified that he firmly opposed enhanced interrogation techniques such as waterboarding and the process of rendition – echoing sentiments in Obama’s Executive Order 13491 signed January 22, 2009, just two days after swearing in as president.\(^4\) In this order, Ensuring Lawful Interrogations, Obama sought to send a clear message that previous method of interrogation, largely unpopular and detrimental to the appeal of the U.S.,

\(^5\) Obama, "Renewing American Leadership." 10.
would not be allowed under his administration. The executive order revoked all previous ones, to include Executive Order 13440 discussed above and limited the interrogation techniques authorized for use by the CIA to those listed in the Army Field Manual.\(^{655}\)

In August of 2009, an administration taskforce recommended an interagency group to develop best practices for interrogation. Additionally, Attorney General Eric Holder appointed a special prosecutor to investigate allegations of illegal interrogations during the Bush administration.\(^{656}\) Additionally, Obama signed an executive order to close CIA prisons, however still allowed the CIA to detain prisoners on “short-term, transitory” basis, effectively continuing the policy of rendition. Furthermore, while Obama immediately signed an executive order closing the detention facility at Gitmo, at the end of eight years as president Gitmo remained open. He also continued the Bush policy of preventative detention to include prisoners held abroad at Bagram Air Base in Afghanistan.\(^{657}\) Again, this highlights the failure of the Obama administration to translate ideas on soft power approaches to plans and actions.

Over the next three years, Panetta would lead the CIA in a number of internal reviews to both understand the organization’s history with detainees as well as provide transparency to help restore some of the moral high ground, respect for, and appeal to U.S. counterterrorism strategy. Part of that effort to be transparent resulted in Obama’s decision to release Bush-era “torture memos” in April of 2009. The decision to do so was contentious, with CIA head Panetta arguing against the release. Obama’s decision to release the memo is not as telling as the discussion surrounding the decision. Those opposing the release argued that it would hurt the U.S. image and appeal around the world, emphasizing the damage to soft power. They further argued that it

\(^{655}\) Ibid.


\(^{657}\) Ibid.
was detrimental to the CIA officers and the partner nations that participated in rendition – further focused on the importance of multi-lateral relationships. Those who argued for releasing the memos did so because they believed it would increase the appeal of the U.S. by demonstrating domestically and internationally that the U.S. was transparent and held itself to a higher standard of moral accountability.\textsuperscript{658} Both sides argued their points in the framework of soft power – a marked shift from the decision making of President Bush.

While Bush greatly expanded the role and authorities of intelligence, Obama revoked a number of these allowances. This is not to say Obama was not “pro-intelligence.” In early policy discussions on Afghanistan, Obama was generous in approving CIA plans, stating “CIA gets what it wants.”\textsuperscript{659} He also continued a number of Bush era policies which strengthened intelligence collections along with financial targeting.\textsuperscript{660}

4.7.1 Surveillance

While Obama promised more transparency in government with more respect for individual liberties, government surveillance continued and, in some ways, expanded greatly during his first term. Documents showed that the unpopular NSA programs first approved immediately post-9/11 continued until 2011 under Obama, with re-approval granted every 90

\textsuperscript{659} Ibid. 252.
\textsuperscript{660} Greenblatt, "Is Obama Following In Bush's Footsteps?."
days.  

After an interagency review, however, the executive branch did disband one NSA program of collecting metadata from various forms of communication.  

Despite campaigning for less secrecy among NSA programs, Senator Obama, just months before the election, voted for a law to expand the government’s ability to monitor communications.  

After the election, he continued this expansion in a number of ways. As technology improved and public use became more widespread and vulnerable to exploitation, so did the government’s monitoring. Edward Snowden’s release of classified information and programs revealed that the National Security Agency was collecting and recording the metadata from U.S. cell phones from all the major cellular networks. In 2010, Obama extended some provisions of the PATRIOT Act to include the ability of the government to compel communication companies such as Verizon or AT&T to hand over phone records. Set to expire in 2011, Obama renewed the PATRIOT Act, authorizing the use of tactics such as roving wiretaps and the surveillance of individuals with no known ties to terrorist organizations under the “lone wolf provision.” In 2012, Obama extended the FISA Amendment Act, which allows for widespread government surveillance without an open and public warrants process, to 2017.

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661 Glenn Greenwald and Spencer Ackerman, “NSA collected US email records in bulk for more than two years under Obama,” The Guardian, June 27, 2013.  
662 Ibid.  
664 Jessica Stern, “Obama and Terrorism: Like It or Not, the War Goes On,” Foreign Affairs 2015. 65.  
666 Ibid.  
4.8 American Exceptionalism

Obama, like Bush, believed that the U.S. was a special country in the international system. Obama, also like Bush, believed that as a result of that exceptionalism, the U.S. had a responsibility to act and to lead in the international community. Early in his campaign, Obama argued that, “to see American power in terminal decline is to ignore our great promise and historic purpose.” In his words, the purpose of America was to be powerful. Where they differed is the source and extent of that exceptionalism. Bush argued the "superior among peers" phenomenon of the U.S. was rooted in hard power and divine right. Obama argued that American exceptionalism is not rooted in overwhelmingly superior military might or the world’s strongest economy, but the “rule of law and universal rights, as well as the grit, talent, and diversity of the American people.” He also argued that the U.S.’s willingness to protect that value system contributed to American exceptionalism. “What makes the United States special, and what makes you special, is precisely the fact that we are willing to uphold our values and our ideals even when it’s hard, not just when it’s easy, even when we are afraid and under threat, not just when it’s expedient to do so. That’s what makes U.S. different.” While Bush was comfortable suspending these values in order to provide security and thus allow those values to spread in the future, Obama saw these values as the primary goal, to be maintained even at the risk of threat. Other examples exist in which Obama officials refused to bend laws or constitutional rights for the sake of intelligence. The Abdulmutallab failed attack is one such

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668 Obama, "Renewing American Leadership."
example. The suspect, after initially being questioned by the FBI under a clause that allows interrogation of terrorist suspects without Miranda rights, was eventually read his rights and granted a lawyer.671

For Obama, American exceptionalism was inward and personal. In his election night victory speech in Chicago he opens with his story as proof of the exceptional nature of his nation. “If there is anyone out there who still doubts that America is a place where all things are possible; who still wonders if the dream of our founders is alive in our time; who still questions the power of our democracy, tonight is your answer.”672

Obama, at times in his first administration, differed in the extent of that exceptionalism. “In a 2009 press conference, Obama dismissed the idea that America is ‘uniquely qualified to lead the world,’ saying, ‘I believe in American exceptionalism, just as I suspect that the Brits believe in British exceptionalism and the Greeks believe in Greek exceptionalism.’”673 Obama was often criticized for what others claimed to be a lackluster belief in the role America was destined to play abroad, as a moral force for good.674 While he did include ideas of American exceptionalism in his 2010 National Security Strategy, Obama was less vocal than Bush about America’s special place in the international order during his first term. Nonetheless, by the end of his presidency Obama had formalized, solidified, and vocalized his ideas of his country’s special status among nations.

671 Ibid. 260.
672 Barack Obama, “Election Night Victory Speech,” (Grant Park, ChicagoNovember 4, 2008).
Yemen became a growing problem for the Obama administration’s counterterrorism strategy. By 2008, al Qaeda in Iraq and al Qaeda central in Afghanistan/Pakistan had largely been disabled, but the organization’s affiliates began to rise to prominence in other areas, to include Yemen, where the group was known as Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP). AQAP was driven out of Saudi Arab largely by the efforts of His Highness Prince Muhammad bin Nayef, the head of Saudi Arabian intelligence, Mabahith. AQAP found refuge in Yemen. From there they were able to establish a base of operations and even conduct attacks like the attempt on bin Nayef in the spring of 2009. One of the leaders of those operations was the American-born cleric Anwar al-Alwaki. Alwaki posed two unique problems for counterterrorism strategy. First, he was an American citizen and thus afforded all the rights and protections of any American citizen. Second, and equally important, Alwaki was one of the first terrorist leaders to understand and capitalize on the utility of the internet. 9/11 highlighted the dangers of globalization in terms of the movement of personnel; Alwaki highlighted the dangers of an increasingly interconnected world in terms of the movement of ideas. His influence was far reaching and included the radicalization of Army Major Nidal Malik Hassan, who killed 13 people and injured 42 more at Fort Hood. Later, FBI agents would discover that Alwaki personally sent Umar Farouk Abdulmutallab to attack an airliner bound for Detroit via Amsterdam on Christmas day 2009. In 2011 Alwaki was approved by Obama to be added to the HVI list. On September 30, 2011, Alwaki, along with two other American citizens not on the HVI list, was killed in an attack conducted by a U.S. UAS, sparking a very public debate and an

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676 Ibid. 260.
American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU) lawsuit against Panetta and the CIA for unlawful deliberate and premeditated killings of American citizens.\textsuperscript{677} The case was eventually dismissed in 2014, but severely countered Obama’s claims of American exceptionalism – claims which argued that the U.S. upholds their deepest constitutional and moral values even when it is inconvenient or dangerous to do so. He also sent a strong message that he was willing to use hard power against threats, even native-born threats operating in remote areas of sovereign nations.

This was not the first case of a U.S. citizen killed by a UAS in Yemen. In November 2002, a Predator launched a Hellfire against Abu Ali al-Harithi, the alleged mastermind behind the USS Cole attack. Also killed was U.S. citizen Ahmed Hijazi. While this prompted legal concerns, the U.S. government maintained that Hijazi was neither the target of the attack nor known to be possibly co-located with Harithi.\textsuperscript{678}

In 2009, U.S. CENTCOM under General Petraeus and Admiral McRaven began a more aggressive approach to Yemen, authorizing cruise missile attacks against al Qaeda training sites.\textsuperscript{679} Furthermore, after the bin Laden raid in 2011, the Obama administration argued that “al-Qaeda 1.0” was effectively destroyed. The more centralized and formal organization no longer had the ability to effectively threaten the U.S. The threat was now from a more decentralized “al-Qaeda 2.0” largely based in Yemen. These operations also included many more dual-passport holders, making the ability to conduct attacks globally much more likely. Additionally, this new approach to terrorism rendered previous hard power approaches to detection, deterrence, and punishment less effective. Still, the Obama counterterrorism approach remained relatively

\textsuperscript{678} Leila Hudson, Colin S. Owens, and David J. Callen, ”Drone Warfare in Yemen: Fostering Emirates Through Counterterrorism?,” Middle East Policy 19, no. 3 (2012):145.
\textsuperscript{679} Panetta and Newton, Worthy Fights: A Memoir of Leadership in War and Peace, 257.
unchanged in terms of concept. Simply put, the UAS campaign in FATA simply shifted in geographic location and began to be a central tenet of U.S. strategy in Yemen. Over the first four years of the Obama administration, UAS attacks in Yemen went from one per year to 41 in 2012. (see figure 19) The approach in Yemen was no longer to stabilize the country through political, diplomatic, and military partnerships, but rather to defeat one specific enemy – al Qaeda. UAS were the cheap, effective, and low-risk way to do that.

Figure 16: UAS Strikes in Yemen 2009-2013 Source: The Bureau Investigates

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681 Ibid.149.
4.10 Unmanned Aerial Systems

If Petraeus was Bush’s czar on COIN, he served as President Obama’s czar on UAS warfare. From 2004 – 2007 12 UAS strikes were authorized and conducted, all in Pakistan against HVIs. The second half of 2008 saw four to five a month. Under Panetta at the CIA, there were 53 UAS strikes in 2009 and 118 in 2010. The Alwaki strike in 2011 brought the technology and programs which employed UAS to the public space where it was hotly debated. The used of UAV was largely appealing to the Obama administration because of their superior accuracy and subsequent decrease in collateral damage. Additionally, UAS were seen as “less intrusive” on other states’ sovereignty as they required a much smaller operational footprint. UAS could stay airborne longer than manned flights and, most obviously, the lack of a pilot in the aircraft all but eliminated the risk of losing American lives. The control of the UAS program also provided unique advantages for the administration. The control oscillated between the Joint Special Operations Command (JSOC) and the CIA. The authority of JSOC allowed the administration to use UAS in the military “War on Terror,” but the inclusion of the CIA allowed the administration to use a black budget and conduct highly classified operations not subject to the same level of scrutiny as regular DoD operations. At first, the use of UAS seemed like a political win as well as it was easier to convince partner nations to allow UAS operations out of bases than it was to convince more traditional combat flights, as they were undoubtedly a focal point for Obama’s military strategy against terrorist cells throughout the Middle East. One

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682 Sale, "General Petraeus and the Drone War."
683 Ibid.
684 Hudson, Owens, and Callen, "Drone Warfare in Yemen: Fostering Emirates Through Counterterrorism?." 149.
estimate puts UAS strikes at 95% of all air-to-ground strikes in the region by 2013.\textsuperscript{685} Still, the technology was not perfect and was wholly reliant on accurate and timely intelligence reports.\textsuperscript{686}

The problem was the perception of opaqueness. Obama started his presidency by committing, in words and actions, to transparency – highlighting the mistakes and programs of the Bush era. Some of his critics argue that he was not subjecting his own administration to the same level of disinfecting sunshine. Moreover, Obama kept the program strictly in the confines of the Executive Branch, citing the need for quick decision making as justification.\textsuperscript{687} Prior to 2012, the U.S. conducted “personality strikes” in Yemen, strikes that target individuals determined to be a threat through an opaque process of the U.S. government and authorized by the executive branch.\textsuperscript{688} In early 2012, Obama authorized “signature strikes” in Yemen which allowed “wider parameters, quicker response, and authorization at a lower command level.”\textsuperscript{689} Signature strikes were first used in 2008 to describe the policy of allowing individuals to be targeted with UAS based on suspicious behavior or other “signatures” consistent with terrorist behavior.\textsuperscript{690}

UAS, while designed to minimize collateral damage and civilian casualties, as well as protect friendly forces (arguably making war more appealing to both sides – soft power), have a uniquely hard power effect psychologically. UAS technology has been found to have a profound impact on civilians and enemy combatants. UAS seem to appear from nowhere and engage – a robot from the sky. It is a threat, and a really effective threat.

\textsuperscript{685} Cora Currier, "Everything We Know So Far About Drone Strikes," (ProPublica, 2013).
\textsuperscript{686} Stern, "Obama and Terrorism: Like It or Not, the War Goes On." 64.
\textsuperscript{687} Panetta and Newton, \textit{Worthy Fights: A Memoir of Leadership in War and Peace}, 389.
\textsuperscript{688} Hudson, Owens, and Callen, "Drone Warfare in Yemen: Fostering Emirates Through Counterterrorism?."152.
\textsuperscript{689} Ibid. 151.
\textsuperscript{690} Cora Currier and Justin Elliott, "The Drone War Doctrine We Still Know Nothing About," (ProPublica, 2013).
That threat and UAS operations have been shown to decrease the appeal of U.S. operations in Afghanistan more so than typical bombing. Attacks against a CIA compound in Khost in 2009 and an al Qaeda attack on a natural gas pipeline in 2012 were both claimed to be retaliation against the seemingly unrelenting UAS strikes. Additionally, reporting indicates that al Qaeda has been able to use UAS strikes to recruit new members, specifically with those killed by the strikes.691

The use of UAS provides a unique conundrum for both. To use UAS indiscriminately, too often, or against unlawful targets greatly diminishes the moral credibility of U.S. counterterrorism policy and the U.S. government overall – hurting our soft power. However, not using UAS allows enemies sanctuary in remote locations. Due to globalization, sanctuary in one area could lead to a danger to American forces abroad and within our own borders. In short, not using UAS is to deny the usefulness of hard power. The threat of a strike from a UAS is real and credible. Potential enemy fighters understand this and change their tactics. This makes UAS strikes a very effective deterrent. Additionally, UAS allow the U.S. to strike more precisely. Without UAS, targets would either not be struck at all or be struck with less accurate weapons – leading to civilian casualties and collateral damage and a decrease in the appeal of U.S. counterterrorism policy. The proper use of the UAS program, therefore, can be considered a smart power approach to terrorism in theory. In practice, however, the use of UAS have been wholly hard power.692

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4.11 Operation Iraqi Freedom

Obama campaigned on a promise to end the war in Iraq, emphasizing his early opposition to the war. As a senator in 2002, Obama spoke at an anti-war rally in Chicago calling the Iraq War a “dumb and rash war,” and a “cynical attempt by Richard Perle and Paul Wolfowitz and other armchair, weekend warriors in this administration to shove their own ideological agendas down our throats, irrespective of the costs in lives lost and in hardships borne.” During the campaign, candidate Obama promised to “re-double diplomacy in the region” by “talking to our friends and enemies” to include Iran. He also promised that he would end combat operations in Iraq by 2013 while maintaining a troop presence to protect diplomatic forces and U.S. interests.

President Obama declared the end of combat operations in Iraq in August 2010. As part of the transition, the U.S. and Iraqi government needed to decide on how many U.S. troops to leave behind in the country and what the mission of these troops would be. In this discussion, Obama’s team used hard power concepts in diplomatic channels. The U.S. needed Iraq to sign a Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA) to protect U.S. military members stationed in Iraq. Prime Minister Maliki argued that any SOFA must be approved by Iraqi parliament – no simple task considering the internal politic processes and culture of the Iraqi government. The U.S., however, offer threats of withdrawing reconstruction aid and forces. In this instance, the threat (hard power) of withdrawing aid used a soft power program in a hard power framework, making

693 Barack Obama, "Obama's Speech Against The Iraq War," (ChicagoOctober 2, 2002).
694 Interview by Laura Knoy, November 21, 2007.
695 Ibid.
it a hard power approach. By issuing the threat of retraction, the administration negated chance of persuading behavior through appeal in favor of forcing behavior through threats.

Despite the end of combat operations, Iraqi civilian deaths remained relatively stable through Obama’s first term (see figure 20), further hindering any appeal the U.S. had left after more than six years of combat.

Figure 17: Iraqi Civilian Deaths 2009-2013

4.12 Gitmo

Obama campaigned heavily with a promise to close the detention center at Guantánamo Bay. One of his first acts as president was to sign an executive order directing the Pentagon to close the facility within a year. This order, Executive Order 13492, was a concrete attempt to pivot away from a key Bush era counterterrorism policy. The facility was home to a number of

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696 Greenblatt, "Is Obama Following In Bush's Footsteps?"
issues. Records were poorly kept, detainees were transferred with erroneous rap sheets, and it was costing the U.S. political capital among its allies. One undersecretary at the State Department, Daniel Fried, who later became the State Department’s Special Envoy for the Closing of Guantanamo, complained that “Gitmo was a goddam weight around our neck, it hurt everything we tried to do. I went to Germany to talk about Russia, I got a lecture on Gitmo. I’d talk about energy security, I got a Gitmo lecture.” Two years later, after fierce bipartisan opposition to the plan, Obama ordered the resumption of military operations at the site and approved the indefinite detention of suspected terrorists held without charge. In a later town hall, Obama conceded that the political opposition was too much and that the “path of least resistance was just to leave it open.” Furthermore, Obama never put a full stop to the practice of rendition or holding prisoners at other sites around the world, to include Bagram Air Base in Afghanistan.

Treatment of prisoners at Gitmo continued to cause friction and public media attention for the Obama administration. One notable case was of Omar Khadr, a 15-year-old Canadian citizen, who was captured in Afghanistan in 2002 and retained at Gitmo. In 2009, Attorney General Eric Holder announced that Khadr would undergo a trial by a military commission for crimes committed when he was as young as 10. The ACLU immediately argued that the prosecution and detention of Khadr violated U.S. obligations under the Optional Protocol on the Involvement of Children in Armed Conflict. This agreement, signed during the Convention on the Rights of Children in 1989 by more than 40 countries requires that all captured children be

698 Ibid.
699 Stern, "Obama and Terrorism: Like It or Not, the War Goes On." 63.
700 Bruck, "Why Obama Has Failed to Close Guantánamo."
provided with “protection, rehabilitation, and all appropriate assistance for their physical and psychological recovery and their social reintegration.” Seven years after capture, Khadr became the first Gitmo prisoner to be brought to military tribunal, further highlighting the unpopular practice of detention without due process.

Obama did reform the military commissions process in 2009, bringing back the Bush era policy of military courts trying detainees, with expanded protections for detainees. Some argued that this reform was a “step in the right direction” towards comprehensive reforms, others argued that it brought too little revisions and progress to a policy that was deemed unconstitutional in 2006. Obama’s resurrection of military tribunals came shortly after he decided not to release photos of detainee abuse to the general public, a decision that sharply contrasted his political promises for more transparency.

4.13 Obama and the Muslim World

As an Illinois senator, Barack Obama wrote in the *Chicago Defender* that in order to effectively and efficiently counter terrorism, the U.S. must first understand the root causes. In the article, the root causes included poverty, poor education, suffering, and oppression. In his list of causes, Islam did not appear. He was often criticized for his refusal to even use the term

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“Islamic Terrorism,” preferring the broader phrase “violent extremism.” Later, in the 2015 NSS, Obama would reaffirm that “we reject the lie that America and its allies are at war with Islam.”

Still, during his first term, Obama failed to visit a single Islamic mosque. This was potentially a political move, an attempt to avoid rumors of his allegiance to Islam over America, but still shows a missed messaging opportunity for a candidate who ran on a platform of religious acceptance. In one interview with New Hampshire public radio, Obama argued that the Muslim world will have confidence that Obama will listen and that Obama will work with Muslim countries to make a safer world. He argued that his background of living in a Muslim country as a child with a sister who is half Indonesian gives him credibility when he says that he understands Muslim’s views, respects them, and has an “intimate concern” with what happens to those predominantly Muslim nations.

Furthermore, Obama referred to the rumor of being a Muslim as a “smear,” potentially alienating American Muslims offended at their religion being used as a pejorative. Obama did immediately reach out to the international Muslim community during his first weeks as president in an interview with Hisham Melhem of the Al-Arabiya television network based in Dubai. In the interview Obama shares that his guidance to Senator Mitchell, Obama’s special envoy to the Middle East, was “to listen.” “And so what I told him is start by listening, because all too often the United States starts by dictating -- in the past on some of these issues -- and we don't always know all the factors that are involved. So let’s listen.” His interview also focused on his task

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709 Obama, "The Exchange: Barack Obama."
710 Interview by Hisham Melhem, 2009.
711 Ibid.
of convincing not just the Muslim world of the mutual respect and friendship critical to the security of both the Middle East and the U.S., but also of convincing the American population of the potential for friendship and cooperation between Muslims and non-Muslims at home and abroad.\textsuperscript{712} He argues, “and my job is to communicate to the American people that the Muslim world is filled with extraordinary people who simply want to live their lives and see their children live better lives. My job to the Muslim world is to communicate that the Americans are not your enemy.”\textsuperscript{713} He promises to offer the broader Muslim world a hand of friendship while aggressively pursuing al-Qaeda and other terrorist organizations, to include Iran – “it is very important for the U.S. to make sure that we are using all the tools of U.S. power, including diplomacy, in our relationship with Iran.”\textsuperscript{714}

During his first year Obama also made remarks to the Islamic world in an event in Cairo, Egypt, co-hosted by Al-Azhar and Cairo University. In the speech Obama acknowledges the tensions and mistrust between the U.S. and the Muslim world, but makes it clear that he is looking to usher a new era of cooperation between the two worlds. He posits, “I have come here to seek a new beginning between the United States and Muslims around the world; one based upon mutual interest and mutual respect; and one based upon the truth that America and Islam are not exclusive, and need not be in competition.”\textsuperscript{715}

While Obama focused on mutual trust and cooperation publicly abroad, his work with American Muslims was much quieter. While Obama failed to visit a mosque or publicly meet with Arab and Muslim leaders during his first year, his administration did meet with Muslim

\textsuperscript{712} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{713} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{714} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{715} “Speech to Cairo,” (Cairo, Egypt June 4, 2009).
advocates on a variety of topics to include health care, foreign policy, immigration, national security, and the economy, seeking to include the Muslim communities in policies outside security. His administration, through Hilary Clinton as the Secretary of State, reversed the Bush era decision to ban prominent Muslim academic Tariq Ramadan and paved the way for a second Arab thinker, Adam Habib, to visit the U.S.

4.14 2012 Defense Strategy

Unveiled by President Obama at the Department of Defense – a first, apparently – the Defense Strategic Guidance or “Sustaining U.S. Global Leadership: Priorities for 21st century Defense” outlined Obama’s plan for forces, training, and operations to 2020. In his intro, Obama acknowledged the broader set of security challenges and the need for more innovative and comprehensive approaches to these problems. “Meeting these challenges cannot be the work of our military alone, which is why we have strengthened all the tools of American power, including diplomacy and development, intelligence, and homeland security.” These four tools – two soft power approaches and two more hard power approaches – reflected an intent to use smart power to combat the security challenges of the 21st century. While the intro alludes to smart power, the guidance itself keeps the military almost wholly in their traditional hard power roles of deterrence, countering WMDs, and defeating adversaries. Obama talks about the necessity of a free and open market to spur democracy, stability, and progress and argues that a

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717 Ibid.
strong military presence is required to protect and promote these flourishing economies. In short, it is hard power to achieve soft power objectives.\textsuperscript{720} The guidance is heavy in language of partnerships and multilateralism among all the tools of national power. The president advises military leaders to continue to work with regional coalitions, abide by international law, and honor treaty obligations. The bulk of the document is dedicated to the primary missions of the armed forces and the vision for what those forces will look like in 2020. Of those missions, only one of 10 could be considered a soft power approach – “Conduct Humanitarian, Disaster Relief, and Other Operations” – underlying an intent of the Obama administration to retain the military in its traditional hard power roles. In talking to AIPAC about Iran – “Of course we prefer a diplomatic path – military action is the last alternative when all else fails. But make no mistake, when all else fails, we will act.”\textsuperscript{721}

4.15 Conclusions

Barack Obama campaigned on a new foreign policy strategy. His campaign speeches championed soft power approaches such as multilateralism and diplomacy. The ideas reflected in his first National Security Strategy, along with the publication of a State Department Quadrennial review, show a preference for soft and smart power approaches. In furtherance of these ideas, Barack Obama did display a commitment to multilateralism and deference to international institutions. However, his ideas and verbal commitments to soft power failed to manifest into plans and actions. His funding levels for hard power department remained stable or increased, while funding levels for traditional soft power programs decreased or increased only

\textsuperscript{720} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{721} Panetta and Newton, \textit{Worthy Fights: A Memoir of Leadership in War and Peace}, 408.
marginally. He expanded intelligence collection programs, despite campaign rhetoric championing increased transparency. While the U.S. did officially end combat operations in Iraq during Obama’s first term, the event reflected neither a calculated soft nor hard power policy. Obama’s focus on Afghanistan did reflect a smart power approach similar to George Bush’s second term. Obama did display an increased preference for hard power specifically in the UAS program, increasing U.S. use of this new technology to not only target foreign combatants, but U.S. citizens.
In Obama’s farewell speech in December 2016, he outlines how he viewed his strategy on counterterrorism, and how a future counterterrorism strategy should look. He argued that many of the successes eradicating terrorism and preventing attacks on the homeland should be credited to the appendages of hard powers, specifically the military and law enforcement. As such a strong network of prevention, deterrence, and defense is critical for any counterterrorism strategy; but, he cautions against overreach of those assets to the detriment of security. He also argues that “we need the wisdom to see that upholding our values and adhering to the rule of law is not a weakness; in the long term, it is our greatest strength.”722 This speech highlighted a truly smart power approach to counterterrorism in which hard power and soft power not only balance each other but also integrate with one another to present a coherent and sustainable approach to countering terrorism.

During Obama’s second term, he expressed frustration with the government’s unwillingness to fund soft power initiatives during his first term. In an interview with Vice News in 2013, Obama argued that “we can’t keep on thinking of counterterrorism and security as entirely separate from diplomacy, development, education — all these things that are considered soft, but in fact are vital to our national security. We don't fund those.”723 He went on to point out that those investments could “ultimately save U.S. from having to send our young men and women to fight or having folks come here and doing great harm.”724 Obama’s second term was

722 Barack Obama, "Remarks by the President on the Administration's Approach to Counterterrorism," (TampaDecember 6, 2016).
724 Ibid.
similar to his first in this regard. In his language and ideas Obama showed a preference for soft power approaches in concert with traditional hard power strategies, but often failed to translate those ideas into plans and/or actions. He did increase the level of refugees, but arguably not substantially considering the drastic increases of refugees seeking asylum as Obama’s second term saw the start of the Syrian civil war. He did decrease military spending, but as part of overall decreases in government spending. Likewise, he increased funding for the Department of State, but the majority of those increases were in the hard power areas of border and embassy security. His 2015 NSS was in keeping with the ideas and values presented in his previous NSS, a focus on smart power approaches to counterterrorism, indicating a sustaining preference for mixed approaches in ideas and plans. He renewed his commitment to multilateralism, most notably in the case of Syria, clearly preferring diplomacy and respecting the process of institutions at the expense of personal “redlines.” He had limited success in ending the war in Afghanistan and closing Guantanamo Bay, reducing numbers but falling short of achieving goals outlined before his first administration. He continued Bush era foreign aid programs and increased his appeal to the Muslim world, but his appeals to the community were to be more active in combatting terrorism. Arguably, his approach to ISIS was limited military with a small footprint, again focusing on partner nation support, but still increased airstrikes resulting in a spike in civilian casualties in Iraq. Obama’s second term also saw the Snowden leaks, highlighting to the world Obama’s expansion of intelligence programs, often in contradiction to statements of American values of freedom and hurting the U.S.’ relationship with partner nations – damaging the good will cultivated by two terms of multilateral approaches.
5.1 Multilateralism

President Obama, in his second term, continued speaking on the strength that comes from multilateralism. In his 2014 commencement address at West Point, one of the country’s premier service academies and a traditional institution of hard military power, he stressed the importance of multilateralism in his remarks. “Now, there are a lot of folks, a lot of skeptics, who often downplay the effectiveness of multilateral action. For them, working through international institutions like the U.N. or respecting international law is a sign of weakness. I think they’re wrong.”

He goes on to provide examples of the Russian invasion into the Ukraine and the Iranian nuclear deal as case studies of the effectiveness of a multilateral approach. These multilateral approaches through institutions were not simply effective, they lessened the burden of the U.S. government by preventing the use of unilateral action. In this speech, Obama also highlights the link between American exceptionalism and multilateral cooperation. As discussed in previous chapters, Obama maintained the idea of American exceptionalism, much like his predecessor; but, as highlighted in this speech, it manifested very differently for the 44th president. Obama affirmed, “I believe in American exceptionalism with every fiber of my being. But what makes U.S. exceptional is not our ability to flout international norms and the rule of law; it is our willingness to affirm them through our actions.”

Obama displayed this commitment to multilateralism in the Mali intervention in 2013. In 2012, the United Nations and ECOWAS authorized the draft planning for military intervention

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725 Barack Obama, "Remarks by the President at the United States Military Academy Commencement Ceremony," (West Point, NYMay 28, 2014).
727 Obama, "Remarks by the President at the United States Military Academy Commencement Ceremony."
into the rapidly declining state.\textsuperscript{728} In January of 2013, after Islamist fighters took control of much of northern Mali, the Malian president requested immediate French intervention.\textsuperscript{729} Because the Malian government was the result of a military coup and not an election, U.S. policy prohibited direct aid to the country; however, the U.S. did provide intelligence, communications, and air lift support to the French troops.\textsuperscript{730}

Obama’s philosophy of multilateral approaches to some of the most complex security concerns were challenged by the Syrian Civil War. Four years after accepting the Nobel Peace prize in part because of his commitment to multilateralism, Obama returned to Europe to sell his “multilateralism with teeth” approach, to the United Nations Security Council in St. Petersburg, Russia.\textsuperscript{731} In 2013, Obama went to the G-20 summit with the hopes of securing alliances and support in military action against the Syrian government in response to the regime’s use of chemical weapons. Again, Obama emphasized that international norms against chemical weapons must be enforced by the institutions who purport to champion such norms. Obama failed to secure support of even our closest allies – the United Kingdom.\textsuperscript{732}

Despite setbacks in Syrian, criticized policy in Libya, and unilateral action in Pakistan, Obama’s second term was marked with a renewed commitment to multilateralism. Obama, in 2016, explained that his reasoning for this approach was twofold. First, he argued that partnerships should be equal – both in power and responsibility. That same year he told Prime Minister David Cameron that the United Kingdom would not be able to continue to claim a special relationship with the U.S. if they could not pay their “fair share,” in this case at least 2

\textsuperscript{730} "Mali and the Conundrum of U.S. Military Interventions."
\textsuperscript{731} Shapiro, "Syria Puts Obama’s Multilateralist Philosophy To The Test."
\textsuperscript{732} Ibid.
percent of their GDP towards defense.\textsuperscript{733} In one interview with Atlantic editor-in-chief Jeff Goldblum, Obama confessed, “Free riders aggravate me.”\textsuperscript{734} The second reason for the multilateral approach is to “regulate hubris,” specifically U.S. hubris when it comes to foreign policy.\textsuperscript{735} Obama believed that bold unilateral moves sometimes did more to hurt the international system, and the U.S. soft power appeal, than to help it.

5.2 American Exceptionalism

As discussed in the previous chapter, Obama struggled to present a strong consistent idea of American exceptionalism during his first term. His second, however, showed Obama’s ideas of America playing a special role not only in the security of the international order, but its development and prosperity as well. In the opening paragraph of his second inaugural speech he argues that:

What makes U.S. exceptional -- what makes U.S. American -- is our allegiance to an idea articulated in a declaration made more than two centuries ago:

“We hold these truths to be self-evident, that all men are created equal; that they are endowed by their Creator with certain unalienable rights; that among these are life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness.”\textsuperscript{736}

In his last state of the union address, he echoed these sentiments of exceptionalism, arguing that “our optimism and work ethic, our spirit of discovery, our diversity, our

\textsuperscript{733} Good, "The Obama Doctrine: Multilateralism With Teeth."
\textsuperscript{734} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{735} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{736} Barack Obama, "Inaugural Address by President Barack Obama," (US Capitol, January 20, 2013).
commitment to rule of law” were “unique strengths of America.” It was his 2015 speech marking the 50th anniversary of the attack at Selma bridge known as “Bloody Sunday,” where his loose views of American exceptionalism, rooted largely in personal experience, tempered with humility coalesced into a coherent idea. His speech was written as a counter to Reagan’s “Shining City on a Hill” farewell speech which painted the U.S. as a finished beacon of moral good and perfection for others to aspire to be. He wanted to dismiss the idea that America was exceptional because it was more perfect or more powerful. America, according to Barack Obama, was exceptional because its citizens strove to improve it.

Fellow marchers, so much has changed in 50 years. We’ve endured war, and fashioned peace. We’ve seen technological wonders that touch every aspect of our lives, and take for granted convenience our parents might scarcely imagine. But what has not changed is the imperative of citizenship, that willingness of a 26-year-old deacon, or a Unitarian minister, or a young mother of five, to decide they loved this country so much that they’d risk everything to realize its promise.

That’s what it means to love America. That’s what it means to believe in America. That’s what it means when we say America is exceptional.

Rooting his arguments in not only his personal story of success, but in the collective history and literature of America, Obama acknowledged the past failures of the nation while celebrating the continuous striving toward the ideals of its founding fathers. As opposed to Bush’s ideas of

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738 Jaffe, "Obama’s New Patriotism."
739 Ibid.
740 Barack Obama, "President’s Remark on 50th Anniversary of Selma Bridge Attack," (Selma, AL, March 7, 2015).
exceptionalism, Obama argued that the responsibility of that destiny lies in the people, not the policies of the U.S. Likewise, it was the determination and action of citizens, not the divine, which gave the country its exceptional nature. Additionally, Obama focused on the domestic changes and progress of American exceptionalism, rather than comparing the nation to others.

5.3 Intelligence

In May 2013, Edward Snowden, a 29-year-old contractor working at the National Security Agency (NSA) released a number of top secret intelligence documents to British newspaper The Guardian, detailing intelligence collection programs at the NSA and other dubious practices at the CIA. These documents revealed, in addition to programs like Boundless Informant, that collected metadata of NSA collection, the NSA broadly collected and stored content of communications. Among the top secret information released was a memo from the government to private phone company Verizon directing the company to release all of their telephonic data daily to the NSA in addition to details about a program called Prism that tapped directly into the servers of nine internet companies including Google, Apple, and Facebook. The program allowed the NSA “to collect material including search history, the content of emails, file transfers, and live chats.” While the changes that allowed this type of surveillance were first introduced during the Bush Administration, they were reapproved by Obama in 2012.

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743 Angus West, "17 disturbing things Snowden has taught us (so far)," GlobalPost, July 9, 2013.
744 BBC, "Edward Snowden: Leaks that exposed US spy programme".
These leaks did not just reveal how U.S. agencies were spying on their own citizens, but further releases revealed unlawful, or unpopular, surveillance of United Kingdom spy agencies and U.S. surveillance of foreign universities, European Union offices, and European leaders. Most famously, Angela Merkel’s personal communications were bugged along with 34 other world leaders. These revelations hurt American credibility, and thus appeal, in two major ways. First, it undermined American claims to be a free and open democracy. The value of privacy was eroded during the Bush administration through the PATRIOT Act and other legislation passed for the sake of security, and Barack Obama’s administration appeared to be doing nothing to stop these programs. In fact, the PRISM program, approved by the Obama administration, sidestepped the already controversial FISA Amendment Act of 2012. PRISM allowed the NSA to avoid getting consent to monitor communications without the consent of telecommunications companies “as it allows the agency to directly and unilaterally seize the communications off the companies’ servers.” Secondly, these revelations did much to hurt the U.S. relationship with state leaders, sparking outrage from the German chancellor and dominating a European Union summit on privacy in 2013. Brazilian President Dilma Roussef cancelled a planned visit in protest of the behavior. Foreign leaders from historic allies of the U.S. felt rightfully betrayed by an administration that spoke at great lengths about rebuilding ties, trust, and multilateralism. Not only did these leaks reveal that the U.S. was spying on various embassies around the world, but also bugging the personal devices of allies such as the chancellor of Germany and president of France. Additional leaks in 2014 to the Washington

746 BBC, "Edward Snowden: Leaks that exposed US spy programme".
747 MacAskill, "NSA Prism program taps in to user data of Apple, Google and others."
750 "Edward Snowden: Leaks that exposed US spy programme."
Post revealed that errors in the system had mistakenly picked up on “a large number” of calls from Washington D.C. instead of the intended Egypt. Another program, Dishfire, allegedly collected and stored almost 200 million text messages in “untargeted and unwarranted” sweeps.\footnote{James Ball, "NSA Collects millions of text messages daily in ‘untargeted’ global sweep," The Guardian, January 16, 2014.}

Increased funding, authorizations, and allowances for intelligence agencies are indicators of a hard power approach in ideas, planning, and actions. In the case of Obama’s second administration, his intelligence programs were not only heavily funded through traditional means, but also had a reported “black budget” of $53 billion in 2013.\footnote{Barton Gellman and Greg Miller, "‘Black budget’ summary details U.S. spy network’s successes, failures and objectives," The Washington Post, August 29, 2013.} Despite a campaign of transparency, the Snowden leaks evidenced that Obama preferred expansive intelligence reach as part of a hard power approach to counterterrorism and national security.
5.4 Military Spending

As acknowledged in the 2012 Strategic Defense Guidance, the cuts in defense spending were, in part, a reflection of the current situation – the end of combat operations in Iraq, the dismantling of al Qaeda 1.0, and the intended transition of responsibility in Afghanistan.\textsuperscript{753} Moreover, the cuts in military spending were part of overall cuts in federal spending as outlined in the 2011 Budget Control Act.\textsuperscript{754} Specifically, the act called for one trillion dollars in cuts in defense discretionary spending from 2011 to 2021.\textsuperscript{755}

\textsuperscript{755} Todd Harrison, "What Has the Budget Control Act of 2011 Meant for Defense?," (Center for Strategic & International Studies, 2016).
While these cuts came across the board of all federal spending and military spending, some reports indicate two areas of increased spending – special forces and UAS/other robotic technology.\textsuperscript{756} These shifts indicate a preference to send unmanned systems and special operations into areas previously invaded and held by conventional land forces.

5.5 State Department

Figure 19: State Department Budget 2013-2016 Source: U.S. Department of State

\textsuperscript{756} Spencer Ackerman, "Humans Lose, Robots Win in New Defense Budget" \textit{Wired}, January 26, 2012.
Barack Obama’s second term saw similar trends in State Department funding as his first term. While the overall budget increased, soft power programs such as public diplomacy and educational and cultural exchanges were fractions of the budget compared to the security departments of border security, construction, and law enforcement. See Figure 22.

As a potential presidential nominee, John Kerry ran a campaign promising to strengthen multilateralism in U.S. foreign policy, cite the Iraq War as a historical example of the failure to create multilateral coalitions, and the negative effects of that failure.757

In 2014, the State Department, in an attempt to match public diplomacy and technology to counter violent extremism, launched the “Peer to Peer Challenge,” or “P2P.” The initiative, managed by EdVenture Partners, has both a domestic program sponsored by DHS and an international program supported by Facebook. The program encourages university students to create “credible, authentic, and believable” digital campaigns to help counter violent extremism.758 Twice a year, these students present their campaigns and their results to the Department of State in a competition format.759

The 2015 NSS announced new exchange programs from young Americans and young people from Africa to Southeast Asia, building off the successes of the International Visitor and Young African Leaders Initiatives.

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757 John Kerry, "John Kerry on Building International Support for our Mission in Iraq" (San Francisco 2004).
5.5.1 Foreign Aid

On December 2, 2013, Obama reaffirmed commitments to PEPFAR by signing into law the PEPFAR Stewardship and Oversight Act of 2013, ensuring, at minimum, a five-year commitment to funding the Bush era program.\footnote{Jenny Ottenhoff, "PEPFAR 3.0: The Easiest Decision for Congress This Week," \textit{Global Health Policy Blog} 2013.} \footnote{"PEPFAR Stewardship and Oversight Act of 2013," ed. Congress (2013).}

On December 16, 2014 Obama signed into law H.R. 83, the Consolidated and Continuing Appropriations Action, FY2015 which provided the Millennium Challenge Corporation (MCC) with \$899.5 million in FY2015, an increase of \$1.3 million from FY2014. The administration requested a \$350 million increase for FY2016, but was only granted a \$1.5 million increase. The proposed FY2017 budget called for continued funding to total \$1 billion. Since 2016, the MCC has signed 32 grant agreements with 26 countries.\footnote{Curt Tarnoff, "Millennium Challenge Corporation," (2017).}

5.5.2 Public Diplomacy

Obama expanded the Office of Public Diplomacy in March 2016 with the creation of the Global Engagement Center, an “interagency entity, housed at the State Department, which is charged with coordinating U.S. counterterrorism messaging to foreign audiences” through Executive Order 13721.\footnote{US Department of State, "Global Engagement Center," https://www.state.gov/r/gec/index.htm.} The center was primarily created to lead the efforts to counter messaging from extremist groups, specifically the Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant, as Obama understood that military action was not sufficient to achieve victory over such a group.

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\item \footnote{Jenny Ottenhoff, "PEPFAR 3.0: The Easiest Decision for Congress This Week," \textit{Global Health Policy Blog} 2013.}
\item \footnote{"PEPFAR Stewardship and Oversight Act of 2013," ed. Congress (2013).}
\item \footnote{Curt Tarnoff, "Millennium Challenge Corporation," (2017).}
\item \footnote{US Department of State, "Global Engagement Center," https://www.state.gov/r/gec/index.htm.}
\end{itemize}
\end{footnotesize}
The concept of public diplomacy was also addressed in the 2015 National Security Strategy as Obama writes, “democracy depends on more than election, or even government institutions…through civil society, citizens come together to hold their leaders accountable and address challenges.”

5.6 Refugee Immigration

Figure 20: Muslim Refugees 2013-2014 Source: Migration Policy Institute

In Obama’s second term, immigration increased from all Muslim nations, but no major shifts were seen in the key areas of refugees. See figure 19. While this data would seem to support an increase in a soft power approach, considering the Syrian civil war produced a

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dramatic increase in refugees seeking asylum, the data should show a corresponding drastic increase in admissions, much like the numbers from Somalia during the Bush administration. Through the framework of ideas, plans, and actions, immigration is another area in which the Obama administration failed to translate their ideas of increased appeal through increased refugee admissions into plans or actions. In 2015, for example, Obama publicly announced an increase in the Syrian refugee quota to 10,000 admissions in the next year. In comparison, Germany agreed to accept 800,000 while Venezuela promised to process 20,000 admissions. Considering the estimated number of Syrians displaced by the war was around 70 million, the Obama administration was not looking at increasing refugee admissions as a viable security approach in any significant way. Still, while final data is not available for 2015-2016 admissions, some reporting indicates that Obama increased refugee admissions in his final weeks in office, most likely in response to the incoming administration’s rhetoric on Muslim refugees. Still, it was too little too late.

5.7 Finances

As part of the fallout of the 2006 revelation of U.S. access to the SWIFT database, the U.S. and the European Union began negotiating a treaty to allow the U.S. continued access to the network. The Agreement between the European Union and the United States of America on the processing and transfer of Financial Messaging Data from the European Union to the United

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States for the purposes of the Terrorist Finance Tracking Program was first rejected by the European Union Parliament, but after increased safeguards against violation of privacy laws and a visit from U.S. Vice President Joe Biden, the treaty was signed on July 27, 2010. Obama mentions his approach, and success, in attacking the financial networks of ISIL during his final foreign policy speech, “we have attacked ISIL’s financial lifeline, destroying hundreds of millions of dollars of oil and cash reserves. The bottom line is we are breaking the back of ISIL.”

Obama’s approach to counterterrorism in Africa included both partner nations and the use of financial tools, “the United States and our African partners are committed to countering terrorism in Africa through counterterrorism partnerships that draw on all of our tools: military, diplomacy, financial action, intelligence, law enforcement, and development alike.”

As a founding member of the FATF, the U.S. under Obama continued and increased compliance with the international body’s national requirements. In 2015, the Treasury department submitted both the National Money Laundering Risk Assessment (NMLRA) and the National Terrorist Financing Risk Assessment (NTFRA). The NMLRA was an extension and update to the 2005 report and the NTFRA was the first such report submitted by the U.S. These reports stood to show FATF that the U.S. had both an understanding of global financial crimes and a commitment to stop criminal financial behavior. The NTFRA found that increased regulations and progress in this field had made it substantially more difficult for terrorist

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768 Obama, "Remarks by the President on the Administration's Approach to Counterterrorism."
organizations to use U.S. financial networks.\textsuperscript{771} As a result, terrorist organizations were forced into more expensive, slower, and riskier methods of financing, such as cash smuggling, a method more vulnerable to attack.\textsuperscript{772} The report filed found that while methods and strategies employed since 2005 greatly decreased U.S. financial network’s vulnerability to terrorist networks, there remained a residual risk.

The 2016 FATF evaluation of the U.S. came to a similar conclusion, “the AML/CFT framework in the U.S. is well developed and robust. Domestic coordination and cooperation on AML/CFT issues is sophisticated and has matured since the previous evaluation in 2006.”\textsuperscript{773} The report, likewise, found residual gaps in the U.S. financial network. Obama, in an attempt to address these deficiencies and in response to the release of the “Panama Paper” exposing off-shore accounts, announced steps to continue to improve financial safeguards in May 2016. These steps included final treasury regulations that require financial institutions to “know and keep records on who actually owns the companies that use their services,” and a proposal to close the IRS loophole that allowed foreigners to “hide assets or financial activity behind anonymous entities established in the United States.”\textsuperscript{774} Obama also called on the Legislative Branch to pass laws to increase the transparency of domestic financial networks as well as to better equip law enforcement to combat financial crimes. These advancements under Obama show a commitment

\textsuperscript{772} Ibid.
to the hard power approach of attacking terrorist financial networks and preventing future exploitation of U.S. financial systems.

5.8 2015 National Security Strategy

The February 2015 NSS begins by asserting that America’s strong economy is the foundation for national security. Furthermore, Obama argues that the U.S. has a responsibility to lead in a “rules-based international order,” – language that suggests of a philosophy of multilateralism and institutions. Obama also includes the efforts to eradicate Ebola as part of his summary of ongoing security operations. This is important as eradicating disease and/or responding to medical humanitarian emergencies are not traditionally considered security operations. This indicates that Obama understood the relationship between personal security in areas of economics, personal freedoms, and health and the overall security of the state. This type of language suggests a more soft power approach to combatting the threats of 2015 and beyond. While he acknowledges the U.S.’ willingness to act unilaterally in defense of the nation’s core interests, he argues that these actions are stronger when part of a coalition. Furthermore, he argues that security cannot be the sole dominion of the military and that the U.S. must look toward long term cooperative solutions with partner nations.775

The NSS reaffirms the 2010 NSS categorization of four enduring national interests – security of the U.S. and allies, a strong growing economy, respect for universal values, and a rules-based international order. Furthermore, it prioritizes the threats against these core national interests as follows”

775 NSS 2015
• Catastrophic attacks on the homeland
• Threats against U.S. citizens abroad
• Global economic crisis
• WMD proliferation
• Infectious disease outbreaks
• Climate change
• Major energy market disruptions
• Security consequences associated with weak or failing states

In terms of security, the 2015 NSS argued that the U.S. is not only responsible for the security within its own borders but throughout the international order. This responsibility exists because security throughout the world is beneficial to the U.S. It is also the only effective way to combat truly global security problems such as terrorism. In that regard, the NSS argues that the U.S. should shift away from military operations and move toward “building the capacity of others to prevent the causes and consequences of conflict to include countering extreme and dangerous ideologies.”

The 2015 NSS also stresses the important of the U.S. “living our values,” specifically in the realm of combatting terrorism. In the document, Obama argues that the U.S. should define the boundaries of the counterterrorism fight. Obama argues that “we strengthened our commitment against torture and have prohibited so-called enhanced interrogation techniques that were contrary to American values, while implementing stronger safe-guards for the humane treatment of detainees.”

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777 Ibid. 7.
778 Ibid. 19.
779 Ibid. 19.
5.8.1 National Military Strategy

The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, General Joseph Dunford, signed the 2016 National Military Strategy on November 11, 2016. In the forward Gen. Dunford outlines four main themes for the future of the U.S. armed forces. First, he presents the five key challenges of Russia, China, North Korea, Iran, and violent extremist groups. The document goes on to cite the necessity of interagency cooperation in combatting the final group, specifically coordination with soft power agencies of USAID and Department of State as well as hard power agencies such as Homeland Security and the Intelligence Community. Second, he argues that the joint force must maintain its comparative advantage. Third, he argues that allies and partners are critical to the way the joint forces operations, and the joint forces prefer to work in multi-national coalitions. Finally, he argues that the old regional construct of forces is no longer appropriate and the joint forces must be able to integrate globally across multiple regions, domains, and functions to provide the best array of options for decision makers.  

5.9 Syria

The Syrian civil war began in 2011 as part of the larger “Arab Spring,” a series of uprisings and demonstrations across the Middle East and Northern Africa. Syrian President Bashar al Assad responded to these protests with violent retribution. Later in 2011, defectors

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from the Syrian military formed the Free Syrian Army and the country continued to descend into civil war.\textsuperscript{781} When faced with the regionally destabilizing civil war in Syria, Obama’s NSC met to discuss options. Direct military action was always an option, but a largely unpopular one among all of Obama’s advisors. Other courses of action included limited air attacks on military targets and working with Jordan and Israel, supporting Syrian rebels, and planning for a no-fly zone if necessary.\textsuperscript{782} In 2013, Obama announced his intent to strike Syrian government targets, but sought congressional approval first. Congress denied Obama’s request for approval for military action, forcing Obama’s advisors to develop a new policy of action.\textsuperscript{783} That plan eventually became the controlled and willing surrender of 13 tons of chemical weapons from the Assad regime, offered by Russia and overseen by the international community.\textsuperscript{784} As discussed earlier in this chapter, Obama’s response to the conflict in Syria was a preference for diplomacy and multilateral solutions over military action – perhaps the most telling display of a soft power approach to violent extremism and internal state conflict.\textsuperscript{785} Obama’s policy on Syria can also be displayed as a wasted opportunity to respond to a catastrophic humanitarian crises and therefore a missed opportunity to display American values and generate appeal through soft or, rather, smart power.\textsuperscript{786}

\textsuperscript{781} Al Jazeera Staff, "Syria's civil war explained from the beginning," \textit{Al Jazeera}, Oct 1, 2017.
\textsuperscript{782} Panetta and Newton, \textit{Worthy Fights: A Memoir of Leadership in War and Peace}, 448.
\textsuperscript{785} Nolan McCaskill, "Obama: Syria's civil war 'one of the hardest issues' of my presidency," ibid, December 16.
While Obama never authorized military intervention in Syria against government targets, he was quickly forced into developing a plan to target violent extremists in both Syria and neighboring Iraq. The most famous of these extremist groups was the Islamic State in Iraq and Syria, or ISIS. ISIS began as an offshoot of al Qaeda, gaining a foothold in Syria during the Syrian civil war and then moving into Iraq in 2014.\(^787\)

On August 9, 2014 the U.S. led coalition began air strikes on ISIS targets in Iraq.\(^788\) On September 10, 2014 Obama addressed the U.S. with an outline of the U.S. foreign policy to counter ISIS. During this address, Obama definitively acknowledges that “ISIL is not “Islamic.” No religion condones the killing of innocents. And the vast majority of ISIL’s victims have been Muslim.”\(^789\) Much like Bush was careful to point out that the 9/11 attacks were not the opening volley of a war against Islam, Obama seeks to remind the American people, and Muslims around the world, that the U.S. government understands the conflict is not against an entire religion – appealing to the values of American soft power. Obama goes on to explain that the policy against ISIS cannot be one of U.S. military might alone, but rather requires the partnership and resources of Arab partners and a multinational coalition.\(^790\) The plan is further defined by the administration as attacking five “lines of effort” – a military term useful in delineating facets of a complex plan. These lines of effort include: 1. Providing military support to partners; 2. impeding the flow of foreign fighters; 3. Stopping ISIL’s financing and funding; 4. Addressing

\(^{787}\) Craig Whiteside, "New Master of Revolutionary Warfare: The Islamic State Movement (2002-2016),” Perspectives on Terrorism 10, no. 4 (2016).
\(^{789}\) Barack Obama, "Statement by the President on ISIL," (State FloorSeptember 10, 2014).
\(^{790}\) Ibid.
humanitarian crises in the region; and 5. Exposing ISIL’s true nature. 791 These five lines of effort show an intended smart power approach to countering ISIL. The military support is a traditional form of hard power, but as the line suggests, it is not simply using American military might to counter the group but, rather, extended resources, training, and other support to partner nations – a multilateral or, at a minimum, bi-lateral approach typically seen in soft power. “The Obama administration’s strategy was predicated on the principle of working ‘by, with, and through’ U.S.-supported local partners as an alternative to large and direct applications of U.S. military force and/or large investments of U.S. personnel and resources.” 792 This smart power approach remained unchanged throughout Obama 2. Likewise, cutting off funding to the terrorist organization is a very big stick to wield against ISIL cells and those financial institutions that are willing to support their financial infrastructure. Stopping the flow of foreign fighters should be both hard and soft power – depending on the technique used. Stopping fighters by travel bans, increased security, and increased intelligence would be considered hard power approaches while countering the ISIL narrative in online recruiting efforts would be a soft power approach to appeal to potential ISIL fighters. Despite the opportunity to use soft power in a new space (social media, internet), major policy recommendations focused solely on the hard power approach to stopping terrorist travel. In the 66-page report of the U.S. House of Representatives Homeland Security Committee, eight members of Congress were charged with examining the threat to the U.S. from “foreign fighters” – individuals who leave home, travel abroad to terrorist safe havens, and join or assist violent extremist groups. Their final policy recommendations included the development and dissemination of the national strategy to combat terrorist travel, nationwide exercises, and end-to-end review of cases of Americans travelling abroad to terrorist safe havens.

and any subsequent legislative recommendations, intelligence reports, and identifying terrorist sanctuaries.\textsuperscript{793} The strategy for this line of effort could have included soft power approaches to specifically stop foreign fighters from joining the group that would have been integrated with the final line of effort of countering the ISIL narrative – perhaps the “softest” line of the strategy. Countering the narrative seeks to win the information war for the hearts and minds of those individuals and groups in the middle – specifically those who could be swayed to either side. Finally addressing the humanitarian crisis in the region would also be the soft power part of this smart power strategy, one that most critics argue Obama failed to operationalize and thus failed to add to our soft power coffers, or even deducted from it.

Also reducing our appeal to Muslims and citizens both in the region and globally was the reported civilian casualties of air strikes against ISIL targets in Iraq and Syria.

\begin{figure}
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\includegraphics[width=\textwidth]{Iraqi_Civilian_Deaths_2013-2016.png}
\caption{Iraqi Civilian Deaths 2013-2016 Source: Iraqi Body Count\textsuperscript{794}}
\end{figure}

\textsuperscript{794} Air Wars, "Air Wars Data."
From this data one can see that civilian deaths were somewhat sporadic throughout operations with noticeable spikes in the summer and fall of 2014 (initial strikes), the summer of 2015, and the winter of 2016, most likely concurrent with major ground offensives.

5.10 Afghanistan

Much like Bush’s problems with atrocities at Abu Ghraib and Gitmo, Obama’s tenure saw public outrage and the diminishment of U.S. appeal in Afghanistan as a result of a series of events to include videos of Marines urinating on dead bodies, the mistaken burning of books to include the Koran in southeastern Afghanistan, and, most egregiously, the attacks conducted in March 2012 by SSgt. Robert Bales. Despite attempts at bilateralism and diplomacy (soft power ideas), Afghanistan in the second Obama administration was a classic display of how hard power, misused, hurt diplomatic talks and overall foreign policy appeal.

Richard Holbrooke—Special representative for Afghanistan and Pakistan began Taliban renegotiations without the knowledge of GIRoA and much to the chagrin of General Petraeus in 2011.795 His successor, Marc Grossman, continued those talks and encouraged Afghan leadership to engage in negotiations with Taliban leaders either directly or through a special office in Qatar.796

In 2012, Obama visited Afghanistan to meet with Afghan President Hamid Karzai and to sign a bilateral agreement to continue drawing down U.S. forces in Afghanistan and to transition power smartly to the Afghan government.797 In negotiations to end combat operations in Afghanistan, the U.S. and GIRoA settled on three major agreements. First, was the future of the

796 Bruce O. Riedel, interview by Bernard Gwertzman, January 24, 2012.
797 Barack Obama, "Address to the Nation from Afghanistan," (Bagram Air Base, AfghanistanMay 1, 2012).
Parwan Detention Center on Bagram Airbase. The prison was used to hold battlefield prisoners, who, while they had not been criminally charged, otherwise posed a credible threat to U.S. forces. The second agreement was to establish rules and restrictions for nighttime raids – a tactic that many Afghan citizens protested against. Nighttime raids gave a unique advantage to U.S. forces, who were equipped with night vision devices against the less technologically advanced Taliban fighters. This agreement forced Secretary Panetta to decide whether the advantage in hard power was worth the damage to the appeal of the forces. The final agreement was one of smart power. The U.S. ceded the lead on these operations to the Afghan national forces, which allowed for the continuation of effective hard power techniques but allowing GIROA to take the lead and maintain oversight meant the raids become more palatable to the host government and its people – increasing the appeal of U.S. operations in Afghanistan utilizing basic counterinsurgency techniques. The third agreement was to determine the relationship between the U.S. military and GIRoA. In this agreement the war in Afghanistan remained a multilateral effort until the very end. Secretaries Panetta and Clinton (further highlighting smart power) developed a plan to leave a residual presence of 9,800 American troops in Afghanistan tasked with the mission of support and training. Once the details were decided, the U.S. representatives presented the plan to NATO partners, who approved under the concept of “in together, out together.” Obama announced this agreement from Bagram airbase, an agreement which outlined the future of the two countries. While not committed to a floor or ceiling number, Obama affirmed that troop levels would continue to decrease and by 2014 the Afghan people would be “fully responsible” for the security of Afghanistan. In order to get there, Obama promised that the U.S. would continue to train, equip, and advise Afghan security forces as well.

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as build an enduring partnership with the nation.\textsuperscript{799} This agreement shows a preference for a smart power approach. The drawdown of U.S. troops and the enduring partnership in which GIRoA promises a transparent government and human rights for all citizens is a soft power approach, while continuing to increase GIRoA forces highlights the need for a hard power counterbalance. Obama also acknowledged the diplomatic talks ongoing with Taliban leaders, highlighting the use of diplomatic power (a soft power indicator) as well as building a coalition of support for Afghanistan’s security to include buy-in from Pakistan.\textsuperscript{800}

This speech, and all of its smart power indicators, is indicative of Obama’s ideas on the best approach to counterterrorism. In terms of plans and actions, however, the U.S. failed to attain these goals by their proposed timeline. Despite the implication that the U.S. military would be out of Afghanistan by 2014, and remarks by Vice President Biden that the U.S. would be “totally out in 2014” in spring of that year Obama announced the decision to keep 9,800 troops in the country.\textsuperscript{801,802} During his announcement to the public on May 27, 2014 Obama returned to his 2012 language by assuring the American people that the Afghan people were now “fully responsible” for their own security. He declared the combat mission in Afghanistan complete and claimed that the remaining troops were to act in an advisory role only. Furthermore, the U.S. support to Afghanistan would be in “two narrow missions after 2014: training Afghan forces and supporting counterterrorism operations against the remnants of al Qaeda,” and this support would only continue if the Afghan government signed the bilateral security agreement negotiated.

\textsuperscript{799} Obama, “Address to the Nation from Afghanistan.”
\textsuperscript{800} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{801} Toby Harnden, "Joe Biden says troops will leave Afghanistan by 2014 'come hell or high water'," The Telegraph, December 20, 2010.
earlier in the month.  The agreement was eventually signed on the last day of the fiscal year in 2014. While the speech defined the counterterrorism mission as “narrow,” analysts argued that the definition of a counterterrorism mission was wholly dependent on the “resilience of the Afghan forces against what experts expect to be a major Taliban challenge.” In other words, “counterterrorism” inherently allows for broad interpretations.

Obama, in his announcement, did not mention that many bases in Afghanistan were used as launch sites for UAS strikes into neighboring Pakistan, a practice (and hard power approach) that continues today. Obama did present a clear plan for the military withdrawal, promising 9,800 troops at the beginning of 2015, with roughly half that number by the end of 2015. By 2016, the last year of his presidency, Obama promised a “normal embassy presence in Kabul, with a security assistance component, just as we have done in Iraq.” Again, this speech highlights a preference for less military involvement and more of a soft power approach to ensuring security in Afghanistan, at least in ideas. In plans, and certainly in actions, however, Obama maintained a troop presence in the country until the end of his second term. In July of 2016, Obama announced troop levels would remain at 8,400, citing a “precarious” security situation in Afghanistan. He maintained that the narrow missions would not change, however, he expanded the authorities of Gen. Nicholson to attack the Taliban.

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805 Ackerman, "Obama announces plan to keep 9,800 US troops in Afghanistan after 2014."
806 Ibid.
807 Obama, "Statement by the President on Afghanistan."
808 Ibid.
809 Gregory Korte and Tom Vanden Brook, "Obama: 8,400 troops to remain in Afghanistan," USA Today, July 6, 2016.
As a result of perceived failed policies, instances of civilian deaths and atrocities outlined above, and/or general war fatigue, U.S. support for the war in Afghanistan declined through the Obama administration. In 2014, for the first time since the onset of combat operations, more Americans thought the war was a mistake (49 percent) than thought the war was not a mistake (48 percent) according to a Gallup poll.\textsuperscript{810} That same year, civilian casualties in Afghanistan hit an all-time high.\textsuperscript{811} By the end of Obama’s administration the war was such a political grenade that neither Hillary Clinton nor Donald Trump opted to broach the subject on the campaign trail.\textsuperscript{812}

5.11 Gitmo

While Obama failed to close Guantanamo Bay during his first term, he stayed commitment to attempted during the last year of his administration. In the official plan sent from the Defense Department to Congress, the administration cites three key reasons for shutting the facility down, “its continued operation weakens our national security by furthering the recruiting propaganda of violent extremists, hindering relations with key allies and partners, and draining Department of Defense resources.”\textsuperscript{813} While the third reason is a practical resource-based factor, the first two points demonstrate a view and plan for a more soft power approach. In Obama’s view, the benefit of the threat of detainment at the facility (hard power) was outweighed by the


negative effects the prison had on U.S. appeal to allies and potential enemies (soft power). He makes this clear in his speech announcing the plan when he opens with the following:

“...In our fight against terrorists like al Qaeda and ISIL, we are using every element of our national power -- our military; intelligence; diplomacy; homeland security; law enforcement, federal, state and local; as well as the example of our ideals as a country that’s committed to universal values, including rule of law and human rights.” 

In this, Obama highlights his understanding of soft power as a viable approach to counterterrorism and plans for increasing appeal by removing threats. The plan included a process of transferring 35 detainees to other nations, accelerating the periodic review of detainees to determine who could be released, using available legal tools to deal with detainees already in the military commission process, and to transfer appropriate detainees to other facilities in the United States. Despite being able to translate views into plans, the plan for closing Guantanamo Bay was immediately met with resistance among Republicans and hesitation from some Democrats. It was equally unpopular among voters. Despite an inability to close the facility, under Obama detainee levels went from 242 to 41 over his eight years as president, signally soft power ideas and plans, but only abridged actions.

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815 Melanie Garunay, "President Obama Presents the Plan to Close Guantanamo: "This Is About Closing a Chapter in History,"” February 23, 2016.
5.12 Obama and the Muslim World

While Obama’s first term relationship with the Muslim world could be characterized as an attempt to repair relationships with mutual trust and respect, Obama’s relationship with the Muslim world in his second term included Obama repeatedly calling on leaders of Islam to play a more active role in countering terrorism in their own communities. These ideas were present, if not overly public, in Obama’s policies since 2002. In his Chicago anti-war speech in 2002, for example, Obama proposes Middle Eastern policy calling on President Bush to:

- fight to make sure our so-called allies in the Middle East, the Saudis and the Egyptians, stop oppressing their own people, and suppressing dissent, and
- tolerating corruption and inequality, and mismanaging their economies so that their youth grow up without education, without prospects, without hope, the ready recruits of terrorist cells.  

His 2009 speech in Cairo during his first term had some references to the Muslim communities’ responsibility to fight terrorism when he said “the sooner the extremists are isolated and unwelcome in Muslim communities, the sooner we will all be safer.” His tone and remarks during his second term, however, were much more explicit, even forceful at times. His 2014 remarks to the UN General Assembly included a call to action “for the world — especially Muslim communities — to explicitly, forcefully, and consistently reject the ideology of organizations like al Qaeda and ISIL,” and an emphasis on shared responsibility with comments like “the task of rejecting sectarianism and rejecting extremism is a generational task — and a

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819 Obama, "Obama's Speech Against The Iraq War."
820 "Speech to Cairo."
task for the people of the Middle East themselves.” After terrorist attacks in Paris, Obama declared that the “Muslim community has to think about how we make sure that children are not being infected with this twisted notion that somehow they can kill innocent people and that that is justified by religion.” He went on to argue that “and to some degree, that is something that has to come from within the Muslim community itself. And I think there have been times where there has not been enough pushback against extremism.” This indictment of the Muslim community for “not doing enough,” is indicative of a less soft power approach in ideas as expressed through public rhetoric. In 2015, after the San Bernardino shootings in California, Obama even went as far as to suggest this problem was specific to Muslim communities, providing for the first time a direct link between the religion and terrorism attacks when he argued that despite the fact that Muslim communities had been necessary and active allies with the U.S. against terrorism did not mean “denying the fact that an extremist ideology has spread within some Muslim communities. This is a real problem that Muslims must confront, without excuse.”

In 2016, Obama visited his first Islamic mosque during his presidency. His remarks were directed at three groups – Americans in general, American Muslims specifically, and the broader Muslim world. The message to American citizens was clear – to accept Muslims as American and to understand that to attack Muslim communities is to attack the American nation as a whole. He argues that Islam has always been a part of America and quotes Thomas Jefferson

822 Montanaro, "6 Times Obama Called On Muslim Communities To Do More About Extremism."
824 Ibid.
825 "Address to the Nation by the President," (Oval OfficeDecember 6, 2015).
826 Khorri Atkinson, "President Obama to visit mosque, hold talks with Muslim leaders," MSNBC, January 30, 2016.
827 Ibid.
and Benjamin Franklin in their support for Islam. In this approach he is directly attempting to refute the “us vs them” narrative promoted by his predecessor. In the least, Obama is attempting to reclassify Muslims as part of “us.” He tells his audience to think of the mosque as similar to their own church, temple, or synagogue, “Kids play baseball and football and basketball — boys and girls — I hear they’re pretty good. Cub Scouts, Girl Scouts meet, recite the Pledge of Allegiance here.” While this speech was given in response to perceived anti-Muslim sentiments espoused by political candidates during the 2016 election, its language shows a consistency of Barack Obama’s ideas on the clear delineation between violent extremist and Islam.

5.13 Countering Violent Extremism

In February of 2015, the Obama administration convened a three-day White House summit on countering violent extremism. In this summit, Obama brought together local, national, and international delegates to help brainstorm solutions to policy problems of countering terrorism through community-based approaches. The major goal of CVE is preventative in nature and seeks to understand the root causes of terrorism and to counter the narratives espoused by these violent ideologies. In an 2015 interview with VICE News, Obama argued that “we can’t keep thinking about counterterrorism and security as entirely separate from diplomacy, development, education, all these that are considered soft but in fact are vital to our

828 Barack Obama, "President Obama's remarks at Islamic Society of Baltimore," (Baltimore, MarylandFebruary 3, 2016).
national security – and we do not fund those.” The language alone marked an intended shift in policy from “Counterterrorism” and “counter insurgency” which indicated a specific enemy to defeat to a more broad approach to preventing the extremism which leads to physical threats. The summit sought to understand and discuss the “root causes” of terrorism, rather than simply prevent terrorist attacks or capture/kill terrorists. Those root causes, according to the summit leaders, were to engage communities in three ways – building awareness, countering extremist narratives, and emphasizing community-led intervention. During the summit, the Obama administration also offered evidence of this new approach by highlighting the new steps to be taken to include the appointment of a full-time CVE coordinator at the Department of Homeland Security, the establishment of the Los Angeles-based Office for Strategic Engagement with follow on organizations in Boston and major metropolitan areas, requested funding from the Department of Justice, awarding $3.5 million in grants to understand and address domestic radicalization, and working with partner nations to provide the best knowledge to the local practitioners. As part of a new strategy of multilateralism in CVE, the U.S. participated in and promoted the inclusion of CVE on the agenda at the 2015 United Nations Secretary General Assembly. That agenda included focusing on countering foreign fighter recruitment, widening the base of CVE stakeholders, and using social media solutions.

During this summit he renewed his call to Muslim communities and specific leaders to do more to combat CVE. While firmly acknowledging that terrorism does not represent all


832 Secretary, "FACT SHEET: The White House Summit on Countering Violent Extremism."
Muslims, in his closing remarks he argued that “Muslim leaders need to do more to discredit the notion that our nations are determined to suppress Islam, that there’s an inherent clash in civilizations. Everybody has to speak up very clearly that no matter what the grievance, violence against innocents does not defend Islam or Muslims, it damages Islam and Muslims.”

5.14 Conclusions

Obama’s second term was largely an extension of his first, displaying little to no change in ideas, plans, or actions of hard and soft power approaches. Revelations of expanded intelligence collection approved during his first term greatly diminished U.S. appeal domestically and abroad. Obama did solidify his brand of American exceptionalism during his second term. However, his ideas of championing internal values were largely left at ideas. His commitment to multilateralism, a hallmark of his campaign and first term approach, remained a central tenet to his relationship with the international structure. He failed to intervene in Syria due to the lack of international institutional support and curtailed interventions in Africa – preferring to follow instead of leave in a number of operations. Immigration levels during his second term remained low in comparison to overall numbers during the Bush administrations. Furthermore, he failed to conclude combat operations in Afghanistan as well as close the infamous prison at Guantanamo Bay, two key promises made during his first election and administration.

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833 Obama, "Remarks by the President in Closing of the Summit on Countering Violent Extremism."
CHAPTER 6
CONCLUSIONS

Any foreign policy strategy is made up of multiple policies and approaches, thus an administration’s counterterrorism strategy similarly encompasses a variety of policies, departments, and actions. Despite the inherent challenges, understanding the counterterrorism policy of the U.S. is critical to understanding its history and shaping its future. Modern U.S. foreign policy does not, and has not, wholly consisted of hard power approaches, but rather a mix of hard and soft power policies designed to appeal to allies and potential foes while deterring or punishing established threats. The purpose of this research is to determine the degree to which this mix occurred in counterterrorism policy in the U.S. from 2000-2016.

As discussed in chapter one, this dissertation set out to determine the change, if any, in the use of hard and soft power in U.S. counterterrorism policies from 2000-2016. This change was to be examined in the ideas, plans, and actions. This work accomplished that research goal by developing a set of metrics, prior to the start of data collection, filing, and analysis, that help frame the analysis. The metrics sought to direct and frame the research, without confining it to a narrow quantitative analysis. As discussed above, each metric was used as an indicator of a soft or hard power approach rather than a direct reflection, or proof of one approach over another. Those metrics were then compared against a body of research to include funding levels, immigration levels, aircraft strike trends, military approaches to counterterrorism and counterinsurgency, speeches, and memoirs. In further efforts to structure the inherently fluid research questions, the analysis was framed through three lenses – ideas, plans, and actions. Data, documents, and other research material from each administration was used to determine
how each viewed soft power in terms of understanding the concept and its applicability to
foreign policy in general and counterterrorism policy in specific. The material was also analyzed
through the lens of plans to determine how each administration planned to incorporate soft power
relative to hard power in their published policies and strategies. Finally, the data was used to help
understand how each administration used soft and hard power approaches in practice – through
funding levels and actions. Each administration was evaluated separately to establish
independent baselines, understanding the ideas, plans, and actions in the context of the various
other factors that influence foreign policy decision making. Those findings were then compared
to those of other administrations. Bush 2 was compared to Bush 1, Obama 1 was compared to
Bush 2, Obama 2 was compared to Bush 1, and finally Obama 2 was compared to Bush 1 to
determine overall change. The hypothesis for the research were as follows:

H1: The U.S. has increasingly focused on hard power in its counterterrorism strategy.

H2: The U.S. has increasingly focused on soft power in its counterterrorism strategy.

H3: There has been little to no change in the relative use of hard power and soft power in the
U.S. counterterrorism strategy

Again, while the research and thus its findings are complex and qualitative vice
quantitative and simple, it is helpful to present this research’s findings in the parsimonious table
below, as a starting point for the larger discussion of findings.
Table 5: Research Findings

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From Bush 1 to Bush 2, hypothesis 3 is appropriate throughout the three lenses. Bush’s counterterrorism approach changed very little in plans, ideas, or actions. The largest change in Bush’s approach was in his approval of counterinsurgency strategy in Iraq, commonly known as the adoption of the “Petraeus Doctrine.” Bush’s first administration was largely focused on reacting to and preventing a follow-on attack to 9/11. His predecessor had developed some policies designed to counter terrorism, but nothing like the robust strategy Bush would need during his first four years. As a result, a number of his policies were reactionary and firmly rooted in the neoconservative ideals of his inner circle. Two of these ideals, unilateral action and preventative war, were hallmarks of the Bush Doctrine. The invasion in Iraq, followed by the occupation, largely reflected the commitment to using hard power to protect and spread U.S. ideals, specifically democracy. One program, during his first administration, did highlight a well-funded attempt to appeal to Muslims in the Middle East. The Shared Values Initiative, developed and implemented by the state department, can be wholly considered a soft power campaign. However, it was cancelled less than a month after launch and no similar efforts were attempted throughout the first or second Bush administrations.

In an effort to prevent additional attacks, Bush greatly expanded intelligence capabilities and authorities, which, when later revealed, would greatly diminish U.S. soft power to include
electronic surveillance and enhanced interrogation techniques. Bush’s foreign policy outside of counterterrorism did include a large humanitarian relief package, notably directed at various countries in Africa, which also would be havens for AQ offshoots. While this might, on the surface, indicate a soft power approach to countering terrorism in that region, memoirs and speeches indicate that these programs were functions of religious commitments vice counterterrorism strategies. A similar case can be made for the levels of Muslim refugees entering the U.S. during Bush’s two terms. While these levels diminished from Bush’s first year to his last year in office, they were still higher, on average, than levels during the Obama administration. Furthermore, the declining level of refugees was a result of the resolution of the civil war in Somalia.

From Bush 2 to Obama, there was little change in overall executed policy, despite Obama demonstrating an increase in soft power preferences in ideas and plans, as evidenced in his language, multilateralism, and published strategies. Obama campaigned heavily on a new approach to foreign policy. He heavily criticized the war in Iraq as one of choice and promised to end combat operations in the nation in addition to withdrawing troops from Afghanistan. While he did declare the end of combat operations in Iraq during his first term, it was not a function of attempting to “soften” Bush-era policies or programs in the nation. Obama did shift policies in Afghanistan during his first term, approving a military and diplomatic surge in the country under Gen McChrystal. McChrystal’s approach to the war was similar to Bush-era General Petraeus in the sense that it focused on using smart power approaches to target enemy combatants with threats and punishments (hard power) while appealing to the population in the campaign to win “hearts and minds” (soft power). This shift in strategy did include curtailing hard power approaches on the battlefield by implementing restrictions on special operations forces, air
strikes, and nighttime raids. However, Obama did oversee an increase in the use of UAS – both in quantity and expanded territory of strikes, specifically in the country of Yemen. Toward the end of Obama’s first term, he approved the targeting and killing of a U.S. citizen, bringing the use of UAS by U.S. military forces into sharp focus in the international and domestic communities. The Bin Laden raid, while successful, highlighted Obama’s disregard for traditional notions of state sovereignty in addition to his disregard for due process in the conduct of UAS strikes.

Obama did focus his foreign policy on multilateralism, the most notable shift in approaches from Bush 2 to Obama 1. Obama deferred to international institutions and apologized for the unilateral action of his predecessor. As a result, the appeal of the U.S. increased abroad during Obama’s first term. However, revelations of intelligence surveillance in Obama’s first term harmed these bi-lateral and multilateral relationships and indicated that Obama was willing to promote hard power approaches out of the public eye.

In terms of the relationship with the Muslim world, the election of Obama did improve the U.S. appeal among Muslim and non-Muslim nations alike. However, Obama failed to visit a single mosque during his first administration. In contrast, Bush delivered a speech from a mosque the week after 9/11, and then later gave remarks at the rededication of the Islamic Center of Washington D.C. Funding levels for military spending and Department of State from Bush 2 to Obama 2 showed a lack of change in priorities for countering terrorism. Hard power departments saw a steady increase in funding while more soft power programs and departments saw budget cuts or marginal increases in funding. Likewise, the levels of Muslim refugees admitted into the U.S. declined from Bush 2 to Obama 1.
From Obama 1 to Obama 2 there is little to no change in his ideas and plans for soft power approaches to terrorism, but there is a slight change in his actions, reflecting an increase in hard power policies implemented, funded, and executed. While Obama maintained his preference for multilateralism and diplomacy throughout his tenure, his increased use of UAS, increased DoD spending, and decreased funding for soft power initiatives in the DoS show an increase, albeit slight, in hard power actions, bringing foreign policy back to a level seen by George Bush at the start of his counterterrorism strategy. Obama continued to expand intelligence capabilities and authorities during his second term, culminating the revelations of extensive data mining, collection, and storage of both U.S. citizens and traditional U.S. allies. He failed to conclude combat operations in Afghanistan as well as failed to close the contentious prison at Guantanamo Bay – two key soft power campaign promises. The number of Muslim immigrants and refugees were higher in Obama’s second term, but only slightly when understood in the context of the massive number of refugees seeking admittance as a result of the Syrian War. Obama did show a deference for multilateralism and international institutions by not committing a large force to the conflict in Syria, but did keep combat troops in Iraq to target ISIL fighters.

Similar to Bush, Obama believed in American exceptionalism. Speeches during his second term, however, showed the nuanced differences between the two men’s ideas of where that exceptionalism comes from and what freedoms and restrictions that exceptionalism imposed on U.S. foreign policy. This is one of the biggest shifts in ideas from the two administrations, and arguably from Obama 1 to Obama 2. Bush believed that American exceptionalism came from a divine right, was protected by the overwhelming military strength of the country, and afforded the U.S. privileges abroad. Obama, during his first term, never clearly defined how he
viewed American exceptionalism – only that he believed the country was different. During his second term, however, he argued that the U.S. was a leader because of its values. Furthermore, those values were protected by the citizens upholding those values and instead of affording the U.S. privileges domestically and abroad, imposed restrictions on U.S. actions by holding the U.S. to a higher standard of conduct in war, domestic policies, and international actions. These ideas, expressed in speeches and interviews, highlight Obama’s views on the value of soft power. His failure to manifest those ideas into plans or actions is outside the purview of this research.

Ultimately, the U.S. approach to counterterrorism, in terms of hard power and soft power policies, remained relatively unchanged from 2000-2016. The ideas presented by each leader, and his advisors, show Obama’s preference for soft power, but funding levels, number and location of military strikes, refugee levels, and overall policies show little to no change.

It is useful to return to the indicators to understand the final conclusions. The final assessment considered a number of factors, some quantifiable, others not so much. Still, it is important to understand the portions of analysis in order to better understand overall conclusions. Much like the hypothesis summary table above, Table 6: Analysis of Indicators, is provided as a useful visual representation of the conduct of the research. Designed to highlight the process of analysis, each administration is evaluated against the body of a work for each indicator to establish a baseline (Columns 1-5), then those results were compared to each other to determine change (Columns 6-9).
Table 6: Analysis of Indicators

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Key</th>
<th>Presence of Indicator</th>
<th>Change in Presence of Indicator</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Bold: Hard Power Indicator</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Italic: Soft Power Indicator</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Bush 1</strong></td>
<td><strong>Bush 2</strong></td>
<td><strong>Obama 1</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Language</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Hard Power Language</strong></td>
<td>X</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Soft Power Language</strong></td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Domestic</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Expanded Domestic Intelligence</strong></td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Increased Defense Funding</strong></td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Increased State Department Funding</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Government Sponsored Forums on Understanding Islam</strong></td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Increased levels of Muslim Refugee/Immigration</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>International</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Unilateral Action</strong></td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Increase use of UAS</strong></td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Violations of International Treaties/Norms</strong></td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Issues with Torture and Prisoner Abuse</strong></td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Increased Multilateralism</strong></td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Increase in Foreign Aid</strong></td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>PR Campaigns</strong></td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Preference for Diplomacy</strong></td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Institutional</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Decreased participation in UN/WTO/IMF</strong></td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Increased participation in UN/WTO/IMF</strong></td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
The biggest change in policy, in terms of actions, occurred between Bush 1 and Bush 2, specifically in the conduct of the Iraq War. The implementation of a smart power approach, support by a military and diplomatic surge, was repeated later in Obama’s approach to Afghanistan. Still that change reflected one portion of an overall counterterrorism strategy and was not dramatic enough to support the second hypothesis.

Part of the difficulty of changing counterterrorism policy from one administration to the next is how deeply ingrained the concept of counterterrorism is on the American public psyche. The anti-terrorism measures imposed by the Bush administration were the first the public has seen and, thus, they became instantly normalized as the proper way to combat terrorism. Any deviation from this anti-terrorist narrative and subsequent measures were met with instant skepticism.834 Not only was Bush able to set the baseline for how Americans and their policymakers viewed appropriate counterterrorism strategies, the counterterrorism rhetoric was fully infused with pre-existing American cultural norms such as American exceptionalism, manifest destiny, and the chosen nation.835 It is also inherently difficult to make sweeping changes from one administration to the next as changes are often a result of events, public opinion, technology, and public opinion. This research highlights the increased use of UASs in the Obama administrations, but one must understand that the technology was not as widespread, cheap, or available during the Bush administration. This context makes it difficult to argue how Bush would have viewed the platform and its abilities if it was more readily available.

834 Jackson, "Culture, Identity and Hegemony: Continuity and (the Lack of) Change in US Counterterrorism Policy from Bush to Obama." 390-411.
835 Richard Thomas Hughes, Myths America Lives by (University of Illinois Press, 2004),
Although funding a program is arguably the best way to show support for an approach, spending is more than simply a reflection of an administration’s priorities and approach. Spending is, in part, a reflection of power dynamics in Congress and also mostly a reflection of current situations. The same is true of refugee levels. Bush’s difference in Muslim refugee levels over the years is largely reflective of the conflict in Somalia rather than any change in ideas, plans, or actions. Similarly, Obama’s increase in refugee levels is a reflection of the overall increase in world refugee numbers as a result of the Syrian civil war. While Obama did increase the levels of Muslim refugees admitted, relative to the number of refugees seeking asylum, this analysis argues that the levels needed to be much higher to truly reflect a soft power approach in this indicator.

The biggest change was the amount of attention paid to the concepts of hard, soft, and smart power— but little changed in terms of approach.\(^3\) One of the most drastic changes between the two administrations was the shift from unilateral to multilateral preference. As chapters two and three highlight, the Bush Doctrine was largely centered on not only the acceptance, but, at times, the preference for unilateral military action. Furthermore, it was preferred that this military action be conducted preemptively. Though Bush did support partnerships with traditional allies (namely the United Kingdom), which would indicate a multilateral and thus soft power preference, those partnerships were still within a hard power framework. While Obama preferred to spend money on partnerships, those partnerships and funds were often with foreign military forces, such as the 2015 $5 billion “Counterterrorism Partnerships Fund,” which sought to train Middle Eastern and African forces in counter extremisms operations. While the revelations of surveillance hurt alliances in Europe, Obama did

\(^3\) Christopher Ford, "Counter-Terrorism and the Obama Administration," (Hudson Institute, 2010).
show a strong preference for multilateral action in both words and actions – or lack thereof.

During his administration the U.S. supported, but did not lead, coalition efforts in Mali and Libya. Likewise, Obama declined to authorize large-scale military action in Syria when it was clear that he did not have international support.

It is important to revisit the limitations of the research in the sense that hard and soft power approaches, even when discussed through lenses of ideas, plans, and actions, are not always clearly delineated. Moreover, the ideas, plans, and actions of a government are largely influenced by the events in which they are developed and implemented and should be understood within that context. Likewise, the change in ideas, plans, and strategies must be understood in the context of the time, the players, and foundation inherited. Framing analysis this way highlights the correlation between events, both domestically and abroad, and subsequent policies. Budget cuts during Obama’s administration were reflected in the funding levels of programs and departments. Initial uncertainty, fear, and a surge of presidential support immediately following 9/11 influenced, and drove, a number of Bush’s policies and ideas during his first term, along with the ideas and preferred actions of his inner circle and Congress. That immediacy, uncertainty, and solid support were absent eight years later when Obama took power. Thus, an administration’s ideas, plans, and actions must be understood in relation not only to previous administrations but only relative to the situation in which they were developed and implemented.

Operationalizing soft power has limitations as well. In efforts to describe the administrations of two presidents over 16 years, it is important to understand the assumptions made. For example, some of the metrics outlined in chapter one are not clearly indicative of hard or soft power approaches, or only weakly show support for one or the other. For a deeper analysis, the metrics were analyzed in context of events and delivery. For the sake of objectivity,
the metrics, outlined carefully before the research, were unchanged during the conduct of the research and analysis. This approach did maximize objective data collection and analysis and provided little room for flexibility as trends and limitations arose during the conduct of the research.

The structure of the research has inherent limitations as well. The research compartmentalized ideas, plans, and actions into four distinct categories – the first administration of George W. Bush, his second administration, the first administration of Barack H. Obama, and the second and final administration of Obama. This structure, while providing useful framework for analysis, betrays the reality of the narrative. For example, the policies and plans enacted in Iraq did not follow election cycles, nor did the events of terrorist and state actors. The formation and ascension of ISIL, as another example, is not cleanly tied to four-year administrations.

While research shows Obama had a slight preference for increased soft power approaches to countering terrorism, he failed to translate those ideas to plans or actions for any number of reasons. The reasons why these changes failed to matriculate are outside the purview of this research, as are the core reasons why the foundation of the U.S. counterterrorism policy was founded in predominantly hard power strategies. Despite the possible causes behind each administration’s approaches, this research shows little to no change, ultimately, in the way the U.S. combatted terrorism from 2000-2016.

While there are a number of limitations and caveats for this research, and its conclusions, it does inform the debate and provide evidence for further research into soft power, counterterrorism, and U.S. foreign policy.

Understanding “what” is the first step in understanding “why.” In the context of counterterrorism policy, this research has attempted to illuminate what the policies and strategies
were over four administrations. This provides a foundation for future research into the reasons behind each strategy. Further research could analyze the degree to which faith impacted foreign policy decisions or how individual leaders, their personalities and experiences, influenced decision making. Other research may look at the role of domestic public opinion in the budgetary concerns of Congress or how interpersonal relationships between presidents and their staff affect the strategies implemented by an administration.

Understanding what a strategy really was, in terms of hard and soft power, is also the first step in evaluating the role and effectiveness of hard and soft power in U.S. foreign policy, specifically in combatting terrorism. History shows the U.S. relied heavily on soft power approaches post-WWII and during the Cold War, even if the concept had neither been named, developed, nor operationalized at the time. Going further, it is important to understand how soft and hard power function, which, if either, is more effective at countering certain threats, and how both should be used to maximize effectiveness. Using this baseline analysis, other scholars can operationalize and evaluate the effects of hard, soft, and smart power policies, specifically in counter terrorism. These researchers may find that soft power is less or more effective against non-state actors than traditional state actors.

This research also provides support for answering the question of the importance of ideas, plans, and actions in terms of U.S. foreign policy and specifically counterterrorism. As highlighted by the limitations and conclusions above, the following questions remain: “How much does the president influence strategy?” and “Do ideas of soft power really matter in policy?” While Obama showed an understanding and preference for soft power approaches such as multilateralism, institutional approved action, and diplomacy during his presidential
campaigns, those ideas did little to influence the plans and, most notably, the actions of his administration when it came to counterterrorism.

This research also informs the larger body of work detailing the change, or lack thereof, of U.S. foreign policy over time. Although a small snapshot, the results of this analysis can be used as a case study in support, or refutation, of larger hypotheses and research on how little presidential elections affect U.S. actions abroad. As discussed above, U.S. foreign policy decisions are a result of a number of factors – domestic events, leadership, current events, economic situations, and public opinion. This research shows that presidential leadership, ultimately, affected counterterrorism policy very little relative to other factors. The ideas and intentions, as outlined in election campaigns, were very different in terms of their ideas of soft and hard power, American exceptionalism, and U.S. foreign policy, but still the strategies developed, funding, and implemented were very different.

Overall, this research found little to no change in the counterterrorism policy of the U.S. from 2000-2016. The changes that did occur were neither clearly defined, nor linear. That is to say there was not a smooth increase or decrease in the use of hard or soft power approaches over time. Each administration saw minor changes in the way soft or hard power policies were implemented across the spectrum of counterterrorism strategy, but there is no clear trend across the administrations.


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Experienced intelligence analyst with expertise in communication, adult learning, and research. Trained and educated in structured analytical tools, critical thinking, and in-depth research. Research focus areas include Middle Eastern affairs, cultural studies, and foreign policy.

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Civilian (2017 – 2018)
Leader in non-profit startups with expertise in event planning, fundraising, and strategic communication. Serves as the executive director of two non-profits and works on the development staff of a third, specializing in community engagement and communication to include social media manager. Serves as a capacity-builder, developing and implementing practices, procedures, and structure specific to an organization’s unique mission and desired growth.

Military (2008 – Present)
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