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Exploring Police Shootings and Officer Survivability: A Case Study

Amanda Leigh Farrell
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EXPLORING POLICE SHOOTINGS AND OFFICER SURVIVABILITY:

A CASE STUDY

by

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A Dissertation Submitted to the Faculty of Old Dominion University in Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for the Degree of

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OLD DOMINION UNIVERSITY
August 2014

Approved by:

Elizabeth Monk-Turner (Chair)

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ABSTRACT

EXPLORING POLICE SHOOTINGS AND OFFICER SURVIVABILITY:
A CASE STUDY

Amanda Leigh Farrell
Old Dominion University, 2014
Chair: Elizabeth Monk-Turner, PhD

Police shootings are incidents that have lasting effects on the officers involved, the
department to which they belong and the community at large, yet these events are rarely
discussed holistically with consideration given to the multiple parties impacted. Given
the significant impacts, officer survivability and resilience in the aftermath of a shooting
incident have become a topic with which most modern police agencies are concerned.
While this number of lethal incidents may seem surprisingly low, there is often a narrow
focus on the shooting incident itself, with little attention paid to pre-event factors or to the
long and short term post-event factors. This study utilized a case study of a single
shooting incident to gain a more broad understanding of police shootings. The case study
drew from multiple data sources, to include interviews with participants, departmental
policies, news media, and participant observations. Paying particular attention to
Goffman’s theoretical concepts of stigma and impression management, thematic analyses
found five central themes across participant interviews. Also of note are the concepts of
near trauma and cultural competency, which emerged in various contexts but are rarely
addressed in the literature.
This work is dedicated to our first responders who run towards trauma and violence when everyone else runs away: thank you for your sacrifices and service. Also, to the families and friends of those first responders: thank you for your sacrifices and service to your community; they are rarely recognized, but no less important.
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

While Hilary Clinton said it takes a village to raise a child, it was never imagined that it would take a proverbial village to bring this dissertation to fruition. Traditionally, I understand that it is appropriate to thank your committee first. However, I have a tendency to brook tradition and there is someone else who deserves to be number one in my lengthy list of thank yous: my research partner, Chris Scallon. Chris, without your willingness to share your story—the good, the bad, and the ugly—and without your participation as an equal partner in this process, this dissertation would not exist. Thank you for everything—the laughter, brutal honesty, for vouching for me when you needed to and even for the tears—I would not trade (most of) this experience for anything in the world and I look forward to continuing our partnership. In addition to Chris, I must thank all of my participants for your honesty and willingness to be a part of this research. Without obtaining your stories, there would be no hope of approaching this case holistically.

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# TABLE OF CONTENTS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>LIST OF TABLES</th>
<th>xii</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>LIST OF FIGURES</td>
<td>xiii</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Chapter**

I. INTRODUCTION ........................................................................................................1
   - STATEMENT OF PROBLEM .............................................................................4
   - PURPOSE OF THE STUDY .............................................................................7
   - ORGANIZATION OF DISSERTATION ..........................................................8

II. LITERATURE REVIEW ..........................................................................................10
   - INTRODUCTION: DEFINING USE OF FORCE AND USE OF DEADLY FORCE .................................................................10
   - LEGAL AND POLICY CONSIDERATIONS ..................................................11
   - WHAT WE KNOW ABOUT OFFICER-INVOLVED SHOOTINGS AND IDENTIFYING THE HOLES IN OUR KNOWLEDGE .................................................................15
   - THE FREQUENCY AND CHARACTERISTICS OF OFFICER-INVOLVED SHOOTINGS .................................................................26
   - PSYCHOLOGICAL CONSIDERATIONS: THE OFFICER ................................30
   - PSYCHOLOGICAL CONSIDERATIONS: OTHER OFFICERS .......................49
   - PSYCHOLOGICAL CONSIDERATIONS: FAMILY AND FRIENDS ...............52
   - THEORETICAL CONSIDERATIONS ...............................................................57
   - THEORETICAL FRAME FOR THE CURRENT STUDY ....................................64
   - CONCLUSION ..............................................................................................71

III. PRELIMINARY STUDY ......................................................................................72
   - INTRODUCTION: A PRELIMINARY STUDY TO CONTEXTUALIZE THIS CASE .................................................................72
   - METHODS ....................................................................................................73
   - FINDINGS .....................................................................................................75
   - DISCUSSION .................................................................................................88
   - CONCLUSION ..............................................................................................97

IV. METHODS ..............................................................................................................99
   - INTRODUCTION: METHODOLOGICAL CONSIDERATIONS IN THE CURRENT STUDY .................................................................99
Chapter Page

PROPOSED METHODS: A CASE STUDY ................................................. 99
RATIONALE FOR CHOICE OF CASE .................................................. 115
THE EPISTEMOLOGICAL DEBATE ...................................................... 116
THE INFLUENCE OF FEMINIST METHODOLOGIES .................. 120
LIMITATIONS .......................................................................................... 131
CONCLUSION ....................................................................................... 132

V. FINDINGS: THE CASE ........................................................................... 134
INTRODUCTION: SOURCES OF DATA, LIFE HISTORY, AND CASE DESCRIPTION .................................................. 134
SOURCES OF DATA ............................................................................... 134
SYNOPSIS OF THE CASE AND PERTINENT BACKGROUND INFORMATION .................................................................................. 140
CONCLUSION ....................................................................................... 162

VI. FINDINGS: THEMATIC ANALYSES ..................................................... 163
INTRODUCTION: THEMATIC ANALYSES ............................................. 163
THEME: PREVIOUS EXPERIENCE WITH VIOLENCE AND/TRAUMA .................................................................................. 166
THEME: COPING .................................................................................. 182
THEME: CULTURAL INFLUENCES ....................................................... 226
THEME: IMPACT ON OTHERS ........................................................... 247
THEME: EVIDENCE OF THEORETICAL FRAME OR GOFFMAN'S WORK MANIFESTED .................................................. 264
CONCLUSION ....................................................................................... 285

VII. FINDINGS: OTHER ANALYSES .......................................................... 287
INTRODUCTION: NEWS MEDIA, POLICY AND PARTICIPANT OBSERVATION ANALYSES .................................................. 287
PARTICIPANT OBSERVATIONS ........................................................... 287
NEWS MEDIA ANALYSES ..................................................................... 324
POLICY ANALYSES .................................................................................. 326
CONCLUSION ....................................................................................... 343

VIII. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION ......................................................... 347
INTRODUCTION: REACHING THE END TO DISCOVER THE BEGINNING? .................................................. 347
PULLING IT ALL TOGETHER ..................................................................... 350
POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS ................................................................ 352
LIMITATIONS ....................................................................................... 361
SUGGESTIONS FOR FUTURE RESEARCH ........................................... 362
CONCLUSION ....................................................................................... 364

REFERENCES ......................................................................................... 365
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Chapter</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>APPENDICES</td>
<td>391</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A: NUMBER OF FATAL POLICE SHOOTINGS BY AGENCY OR DATA SOURCE, 1990-2010</td>
<td>391</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>B: DESCRIPTIVE INFORMATION FOR THE HAMPTON ROADS REGION COMPARED TO THE STATE, COLLECTED FROM THE VIRGINIA STATE POLICE'S CRIME IN VIRGINIA REPORTS AND AVERAGED FOR THE YEARS 1990-2010, AS WELL AS THE STANDARDIZED POLICE SHOOTING RATE, CALCULATED FROM PRELIMINARY STUDY DATA AND VSP POPULATION ESTIMATE</td>
<td>393</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C: IRB APPROVALS</td>
<td>395</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>D: INFORMED CONSENT DOCUMENTS</td>
<td>403</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>E: SAMPLE INTERVIEW QUESTIONS</td>
<td>411</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>F: LETTERS OF SUPPORT</td>
<td>421</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>G: AGENCY RESPONSES</td>
<td>427</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>H: FOIA REQUESTS</td>
<td>432</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I: PD ORGANIZATIONAL CHART</td>
<td>436</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>VITA</td>
<td>438</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
# LIST OF TABLES

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Table</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. Summary of PTSD Symptom Clusters, Adapted from Kirschman (2007)</td>
<td>36</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Summary of Symptoms of a Traumatic Response, Adapted from Jones (1989) and Kirschman (2007)</td>
<td>43</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Aggregate Characteristics of Police Shootings in Hampton Roads, Virginia, 1990-2010</td>
<td>76</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. Number of Police Shootings in the Hampton Roads Region by City, 1990-2010</td>
<td>87</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6. Description of Proposed Data Sources to be Used in the Current Study</td>
<td>112</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7. Selected Information on Interviews and Interviewees</td>
<td>135</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8. Final List of Data Sources Used in the Current Study</td>
<td>138</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9. Summary of Pre-Event, Event, and Post-Event Factors in Current Case Study</td>
<td>348</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Appendix A: Number of Fatal Police Shootings by Agency or Data Source, 1990-2010</td>
<td>392</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Appendix B: Descriptive Information for the Hampton Roads Region Compared to the State, Collected from the Virginia State Police’s Crime in Virginia Reports and Averaged for the Years 1990-2010, as well as the Standardized Police Shootings Rate, Calculated from Preliminary Study Data and VSP Population Estimate</td>
<td>394</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
LIST OF FIGURES

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Figure</th>
<th>Description</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1.</td>
<td>Comparison of UCR, CDC and BJS Measures of Fatal Police Shootings</td>
<td>27</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.</td>
<td>Anticipated Relationships Between and Classifications of Participants in the Current Study</td>
<td>106</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.</td>
<td>Policy Sources and Specifications for the PD</td>
<td>328</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4.</td>
<td>Appendix I: Organizational Chart for the PD</td>
<td>437</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION

Imagine you are a police officer and, on a dark evening, when you are thinking of your cozy home and warm bed, you come face to face with an armed assailant. In the seconds it takes for you to assess the situation and make the decision to use deadly force, you unwittingly become a member of an exclusive club to which no one wants membership: those who have been placed in a position to take a life in the line of duty. You are now marked as one of "them." There are those who will think your choice makes you "cool," a super cop, a modern day John Wayne or Dirty Harry, and there are others who will brand you as an enemy, a murderer. Conversation will stop when you enter the room, and people may avoid you because they are unsure what to say. Others may press you for details that you neither wish to remember or repeat. You will be questioned, interrogated and investigated. Your judgment, both before and after the shooting, will be examined. You will have to find a way to cope with this experience and your reactions to it, possibly with limited emotional and psychological from your agency and peers. You are a police officer—tough and capable. Showing weakness is not an option. Right?

The impact of that single decision to draw and fire your weapon can be far-reaching, both personally and professionally, including lasting complications like possibly developing posttraumatic stress disorder (PTSD) or having to decide to pursue an entirely different career. Those who surround the officer—his or her family, friends, and colleagues—are also caught up in the aftermath of a single shooting, forming the members of a sometimes macabre booster club. Their needs and reactions are often not considered in either the extant literature or in departmental policies and responses, and
yet their experience cannot be disentangled from that of the officer who pulled the trigger. Understanding the multiple effects of a police shooting from multiple perspectives will aid in addressing these critical incidents holistically, and will additionally allow for a focus on both best practice and officer survivability. With violent confrontations appearing to be on the rise (NLEOMF 2010, NLEOMF 2011) and the training and retention issues associated with a shooting incident (Horn and Solomon 1989, McElvain and Kposowa 2008), it is imperative that academics and practitioners work in conjunction to address these timely and critical issues facing modern police agencies. It is from this standpoint, of collaboration between practitioners and academia, which the current study seeks to explore officer-involved shootings.

As stated by F. Lee Bailey (2010), when considering the use of lethal force, no law enforcement officer is required to die. Yet, the men and women of law enforcement choose to run towards violence, dramatically increasing their risk of victimization and exposure to trauma while working within an occupational culture where perceived weaknesses have not been tolerated or discussed historically. While they have no obligation to die, it is not inconceivable that an officer will be placed in situations where there is the potential for serious injury or loss of life, especially in recent times. It is not just the actual experiencing of trauma and/or violence that separates the police officer from civilians, it is the constant potential for this experience, addressed by Skolnick (1966) as the concept of danger. It is also important to remember that, in many situations, there is another possible outcome that could have resulted each time a law enforcement officer uses deadly force—that officer may have been the one to be shot and either injured or killed. This risk is not limited to use of force or use of deadly force situations,
as officers are marked as a symbol of governmental authority, and an accessible target upon which some within our society vent their anger and hostility. In short, to be a police officer carries an inherent risk of coming face to face with danger, both on and off duty.

The reason it is important to acknowledge this alternate ending is because, while approximately 380 citizens are killed in justifiable homicides by law enforcement officers per year (FBI 1996, FBI 1997, FBI 1998, FBI 1999, FBI 2000, FBI 2001, FBI 2002, FBI 2004, FBI 2006, FBI 2007, FBI 2008, FBI 2009, FBI 2010, FBI 2011a, FBI 2012), there are many more incidents where police officers may be justified in using lethal force, but chose not to do so (Pinizzotto et al. 2012). In 2010, there were 56 law enforcement officers feloniously killed in the line of duty and, of these 56, 16 fired their weapons and seven attempted to use their weapons (FBI 2011b). Increases in law enforcement fatalities were seen in both 2009 and 2010, with firearms-related officer deaths increasing by approximately 24 percent in 2010 and multiple fatality homicides accounting for 20 percent of all officer firearms-related deaths during 2010 (NLEOMF 2010). Fatalities increased again in 2011, by 13 percent, and, for the first time in over a decade, firearms fatalities claimed the lives of more officers than motor vehicle accidents (NLEOMF 2011). While law enforcement officer fatalities are increasing, the number is rather small in comparison to both the number of calls for service (CFS) that officers complete each year and the approximately 53,500 officers assaulted in the line of duty in 2010 (FBI 2011b). It is within this context, very reminiscent of Skolnick’s (1966) description of danger as one of the two key variables in defining the police role, that the current study proceeds. Although the use of deadly force is both indicative of the ultimate manifestation of danger, either to the officer or to someone else, and is rather rare in
policing, the impact and ramifications of a single incident can be acute and far-reaching. Approaching officer-involved shootings from a holistic perspective can aid in understanding not only the situational factors that may lead to an officer deciding to draw and discharge his or her weapon, but can also inform investigative practices, protocols regarding primary and secondary exposure to trauma for officers involved in these incidents, and training and retention matters.

Statement of Problem

Police shootings are incidents that have lasting effects on the officers involved, the department to which they belong and the community at large, yet these events are rarely discussed. Much of the existing literature on police shootings refers to the decision to use and factors influencing the use of deadly force (Alpert and Fridell 1992, Belur 2009, FitzGerald and Bromley 1998, Ho 1997, Klinger 2001, Parent and Verdun-Jones 1998, Parent and Verdun-Jones 2000, Parent 2006, Perkins and Bourgeois 2006, White 2002). Literature on posttraumatic stress disorder (PTSD) can be applied (Brough 2004, Hodgins, Creamer and Bell 2001, McCaslin et al. 2008, Pole et al. 2001, Winwood et al. 2009), but few studies have examined PTSD in the context of officers who have had to use deadly force in the line of duty or the impact of a single critical incident explicitly (McCaslin et al. 2006).

Finally, of the literature available, many of the seminal pieces on police shootings were written and published in the early- to mid-1980s (Brown 1984, Doerner and Ho 1994, Donahue and Horvath 1991, Fyfe and Blumberg 1985, Fyfe 1988, Geller 1985, Griswold 1985, Horvath 1987, Stell 1986, US Civil Rights Commission 1981, Waegel 1984a, Waegel 1984b), before the widespread community-oriented (COP) and problem-oriented policing (POP) movements that occurred in the mid-1990s (2009c). COP may have significantly altered officer and agency response to these incidents because, under this paradigm of policing, there is both an increased level of accountability to the community which a police agency serves and an increased role for citizens to participate in the policing of their own community. These cooperative partnerships may be significantly taxed by officer-involved shootings, leading to an erosion of the very foundations of COP. Additionally, it is important to acknowledge the broader cultural
development of a therapeutic society in western countries, where there has been a growing influence and acceptance of psychological concepts, such as depression and the need for counseling, from the mid-1960s forward (Wright 2010). This greater incorporation of psychological concepts into both our medical and cultural awareness also includes the labeling and inclusion of posttraumatic stress disorder in the DSM-III in 1980, specifically highlighting the recognition of the extreme impact critical incidents and massive trauma can have on individuals (Friedman 2007). Previous research related to officer-involved shootings has often had a narrow focus on the shooting incident itself, with little attention paid to pre-event factors, such as psychological training and preparation, or to the long and short term post-event factors, such as value conflicts for the officer, PTSD, and changed relationships with colleagues, to name a few.

Another aspect of officer-involved shootings that is not accounted for in the extant literature is the multifaceted nature of a single shooting incident. Quantitative analyses on this topic are not even able to concur on the frequency of deadly force incidents, let alone provide consensus to the range of salient variables involved in training for, actions taken during and the post-incident effects of an officer-involved shooting. Each shooting is different, so there will be idiosyncratic differences between incidents. Yet it is likely that there are also archetypal patterns evidenced in these encounters that may be overlooked in traditional quantitative analyses, due either to the focus of data collection or to aggregation errors and biases. There are several perspectives that can inform a holistic understanding of police shootings, including those of the officer who pulls the trigger, that officer's friends and family, coworkers, supervisors, and the investigators assigned to the case.
Purpose of the Study

The ability to use deadly force marks the men and women who choose to be police officers as agents of the state who can compel citizens to comply with the law, with the ultimate tool at their disposal being lethal force. While some of the traumas experienced by law enforcement are endemic to most first responders, including paramedics and fire fighters, there are unique contours to the relationship between law enforcement and trauma that set them apart from their fellow first responders. As noted by Rutledge and Sewell (2012), officers may be the source of the trauma or cause additional trauma in the course of performing their duties and they often have to address the underlying human factors that lead to violence. These are but two of the contextual differences that separate police officers from other first responders and, as such, it is important to seek a deeper understanding of how officers experience the overall impact of both the potential for and the actual experience of job-related trauma and the impact of critical incidents on their personal and professional lives.

The current study seeks to understand officer-involved shootings holistically by exploring how these incidents impact the officer involved, his or her family and friends, colleagues, supervisors, and the detectives investigating the incident through a case study. Data will be collected through in depth interviews with individuals involved in this case, with triangulation attempted through newspaper articles, court transcripts, and personal correspondence contemporary to the shooting.

The impact of an officer-involved shooting is widespread and the complex nature of the interpersonal and professional relationships involved in a single incident, combined with informal practices to gloss over these events emotionally, may result in reduced
efforts to support officers following a shooting. The hope is that this research will aid in potentially assisting other officers, other police departments, and other individuals who have experienced a similar event better understand and respond to their situation. An additional goal of this research is to identify possible areas of best practice and training, with the aim of providing the appropriate response and support in these cases, emphasizing officer survivability. McElvain and Kposowa (2008) found that officers involved in a shooting were fifty percent more likely to be involved in another shooting incident and many officers that kill an individual in the line of duty are likely to leave the police force within five years of the incident (Horn and Solomon 1989), indicating that there are psychological, training and retention issues that cannot be disentangled from policy and practice.

Further, this study highlights potential issues of other officers needing support and appropriate response in the wake of a shooting incident in terms of secondary trauma or victimization. This research is but the first step on the road to understanding the inherently complex circumstances and interactions behind these incidents and is but a preliminary project in building an empirical foundation for policies that take into account all parties involved in an officer-involved shooting.

**Organization of Dissertation**

This dissertation consists of eight chapters, including the introduction. The second chapter will be devoted to discussing the relevant literature on this topic to include: defining use of deadly force and the existing legal guidelines that govern such incidents; examining available data on officer-involved shootings; a concise summary of the gaps in knowledge on the use of deadly force; a discussion of the psychological
considerations impacting the officer, the officer's family, and other police officers involved in the aftermath of a shooting incident; relevant theoretical considerations of officer-involved shootings; and using symbolic interactionism, with a particular focus on the works of Goffman (1959, 1963, 1967), as a theoretical frame for the current study. The third chapter presents the methodology, results and discussion from a preliminary study conducted to contextualize the case to be used in the current study. The fourth reviews the methodology and hypotheses driving this research, paying particular attention to the epistemological underpinnings of qualitative research and the influence of various methodologies on the current study. Chapter five reports both the data gathered and presents a synopsis of the current case. Chapter six is the first of two data analysis chapters, composed of a thematic categorical analysis, while the seventh chapter provides the other analyses included in the current study, to include policy analysis, media analysis and the participant observation portions of this study. Chapter eight reflects upon how the overarching patterns found in the current study may apply to other shooting incidents with suggestions for best practices and future research.
CHAPTER II
LITERATURE REVIEW

Introduction: Defining Use of Force and Use of Deadly Force

Before any discussion on use of force can be undertaken, what is meant by the term force, as well as the parameters that govern its use, must be clearly defined. Bittner (1970) argued that the central role of the police is not crime control, order maintenance or law enforcement, but revolves around their ability to use force to compel individuals to acquiesce to their demands. But what is use of force, and what constitutes use of deadly force? Some scholars argue that police presence alone is a sign of force, that the police represent the government's authority to compel citizens to do things they may not care to do (Peak 2009). While Bittner (1970) claims that the use of force by the police is relatively unregulated, Roberg et al (2009:513) provides a concise definition of the use of force that contains broad parameters or guidelines, noting that it is the most controversial facet to the role of police in modern society:

"[use of force is] the legal authority to maintain order, demand compliance, detain individuals, use weapons, and, if necessary, inflict violence. Police are granted this authority in order to shield victims from dangerous felons; to control unruly, hostile or physically abusive citizens; and to protect immediate threats to human life."

As the current study is examining a single officer-involved shooting occurring within the jurisdiction of the City, and involving an officer from the same jurisdiction, the definitions of use of force, reasonable force, deadly force and serious physical injury provided by the Police Department in their General Orders on Special Incidents, Deadly Force Incidents and Use of Force (2009b, Norfolk 2009b, Norfolk 2009c) will be used
throughout this study. These General Orders were obtained through a Freedom of Information Act request filed with the Police Department. According to the Police Department’s General Order on Special Incidents, OPR-140 (2009b), use of force is defined as "any occasion when an officer is required to use a firearm, baton, chemical agent, K-9 dog or any other physical means to carry out a law enforcement function or restrain a prisoner other than the routine use of handcuffs and/or hands to hold, guide or lead a prisoner." Within this context, General Order OPR-410, related to Deadly Force Incidents, states that the use of force is defined as reasonable if it is "reasonably necessary to accomplish legitimate police functions" and deadly force is defined as "the application of such reasonable force which is likely to cause death or serious physical injury." Serious physical injury is defined as "a physical injury that creates a substantial risk of death, causes serious permanent disfigurement, or results in long-term loss or impairment of the function of any bodily member or organ" in the General Order on Use of Force, OPR-120 (Norfolk 2009b). The definitions of these terms are critical to the following discussions of use of force and use of deadly force, as they not only apply to the case in the current study, but are also reflective of and pertinent to the discussions of legal guidelines and departmental policies surrounding these incidents in general.

Legal and Policy Considerations

Although Bittner (1970) states that discussions of lawful use of force are relatively meaningless, as there were few tangible limits placed upon police discretion to use force, standards and guidelines have been developed since he wrote his seminal works on policing. These standards and guidelines, however, are not bright line tests (Petrowski 2002). There are two key precedent cases that currently guide use of force,

Contemporary to Bittner’s (1970) writing, a broad use of force guideline called the fleeing-felon rule, dating back to the early Middle Ages, was applied to the use of deadly force (Alpert and Fridell 1992, Roberg, Novak and Cordner 2009). This rule held that agents of the law were permitted to utilize lethal force to apprehend an individual fleeing from the scene of a serious crime. However, in the Middle Ages, most crimes were listed as felonies, so this justified a very broad use of force (Roberg, Novak and Cordner 2009). *Garner* curtailed this broad application of the use of force, instead limiting the fleeing felon rule to instances where the suspect poses a threat of serious harm to the officer or others, where there must be probable cause to inflict or threaten to inflict serious physical harm to prevent escape and, if possible, officers must give the suspect a warning of their intent to use deadly force (i.e.; stop, or I’ll shoot!). In essence, officers were no longer to shoot unarmed burglary suspects running away from them.

*Garner* ushered in what most law enforcement agencies refer to as “defense of life” shooting policies, meaning that deadly force is only permissible if there is an imminent serious threat to the officer or other citizen, or to stop an extremely dangerous individual from fleeing (Alpert and Fridell 1992, Geller and Scott 1992, Roberg, Novak and Cordner 2009). This standard is reflected in the Police Department’s Use of Force policy (Norfolk 2009b) and Firearms policy (Norfolk 2009d), as officers are only authorized to use whatever means are necessary to protect themselves or others from imminent danger or imminent threat of death, or to apprehend a fleeing felony suspect where the felony involves violent physical force used against another person.
Additionally, the impact of *Garner* is seen in the Police Department's General Order on Firearms (OPR-110) with regard to when firearms use is specifically not authorized. These prohibited incidents include firing warning shots, firing to stop someone who is merely suspected of committing a crime or is just fleeing to avoid arrest, firing to halt a fleeing misdemeanor suspect or a suspect in a property-related felony, and when firing a weapon presents a significant risk to the safety and well-being of innocent persons.

To provide further guidelines regarding appropriate use of force, use-of-force continuums were developed for training purposes. Linear models utilize a stair step model that officers should progress through when encountering resistance, with force being incrementally added from mere police presence to the use of deadly force (Geller and Scott 1992, Petrowski 2002, Roberg, Novak and Cordner 2009, Skolnick Jerome and Fyfe 1993). Unfortunately, real life situations do not progress in a linear fashion, and so circular models, which allow for variability in response and reaction based on the situation and circumstances within which the officer finds him- or herself have been created (Peak 2009).

While *Garner* may have provided more coherent guidelines for the use of deadly force, almost all jurisdictions still review any application of the use of deadly force. This review is meant to determine if there has been a violation of the suspect's constitutional rights, if the officer will be criminally responsible for any injuries and/or death resulting from their actions, as well as to determine if the officer acted within the training, policies and procedures decreed by that particular law enforcement agency. This review can become rather problematic, as a reviewer's perceptions and understanding of an incident and the actions taken during a police shooting incident may be vastly different to those of
the officer on the scene. *Graham* recognized this discrepancy, noting that split second decisions are required in adverse, tense and dangerous conditions that must be subjectively assessed by the officer on the scene.

Thus, under *Graham*, the standard for reviewing the decision to use deadly force is one that is "objectively reasonable under the totality of the circumstances" (Petrowski 2002). In his discussion of both *Graham* and use of force training, Petrowski (2002) states that the use of force models and continuums, originally designed to provide guidelines in training that officers can rely on in the field, are contrary to *Graham*, as they are mechanical in application, assuming that each situation is the same, and invalidating the pragmatic reasonableness standard. Further, Petrowski (2002) suggests that these models may actually place officers in jeopardy since they imply a sequential approach that an officer must think through, leading to hesitation in actions that may be the difference between whether that officer, or nearby civilians, live or die. Reflective of the ambiguity regarding use of force continuums and what amount of force is appropriate in any given situation, the Police Department notes, under the subheading of Use of Force Continuum in the Use of Force General Order (Norfolk 2009b), that police functions should be carried out through the advice, persuasion and warnings, and once all reasonable alternatives have been exhausted to gain compliance, reasonable force (defined above) may be used. Further, in the General Order on Deadly Force Incidents (Norfolk 2009c), it is noted that officers will exhaust all reasonable alternative actions before resorting to the use of deadly force.

While not specifically tied to use of force or deadly force, an officer’s Garrity rights should be mentioned in this discussion of legal considerations. Garrity rights stem
from the 1967 court case, *Garrity v. New Jersey*, where several officers suspected to be involved in ticket fixing were interrogated, advised that their responses could be used against them, but were also told that refusal to answer questions would result in termination. As such, it was argued that the officers were coerced to answer, and that, when those coerced responses were used against them at trial, it violated the officers’ Fifth and Fourteenth Amendment rights. As such, Garrity rights state that a public official, in this case a police officer working for the government, can be compelled or ordered to answer questions, but that any information obtained through this process cannot be used against the officer in criminal proceedings as that would violate their right to avoid self-incrimination (Kruger 2009, Serpas, Olson and Jones 2003). This case can influence the investigation of an officer-involved shooting incident, or any incident where legal or criminal penalties might attach to the officer’s actions because the officer is not supposed to be placed in a position to choose between keeping their job and invoking their right to avoid self-incrimination. Ultimately, the review process is predicated upon the officer’s ability to clearly articulate the circumstances he or she faced and the reasoning for his or her actions. It is within this complicated and contradictory procedural framework that use of deadly force currently resides.

**What We Know About Officer-Involved Shootings and Identifying the Holes in Our Knowledge**

Additionally, the literature available on this topic also tends to be quite dated, as noted by McElvain and Kposowa (2008) and Terrill (2003). Many of the seminal pieces on police shootings were written and published in the early- to mid-1980s (Brown 1984, Doerner and Ho 1994, Donahue and Horvath 1991, Fyfe and Blumberg 1985, Fyfe 1988, Geller 1985, Griswold 1985, Horvath 1987, Stell 1986, US Civil Rights Commission 1981, Waegel 1984a, Waegel 1984b). Consequently, these studies temporally precede the widespread community-oriented (COP) and problem-oriented policing (POP) movements that occurred in the mid-1990s (2009c, Sun, Payne and Wu 2008), landmark Supreme Court decisions (1985, 1989) and landmark brutality and excessive force cases, such as the Rodney King case in Los Angeles, as well as the Abner Louima, Amadou Diallo and Sean Bell cases in New York. Thus the impact of these changes and events are not accounted for in much of the extant literature.

When considering use of force generally, and use of deadly force specifically, there are several findings that must be addressed. First, as Bittner theorized (1970), these are rare events (Klinger 2004, Lawton 2007, McElvain and Kposowa 2008, Terrill 2003), although Artwohl and Christensen (1997) suggest that social and cultural changes have led to more situations where officers are likely to pull their weapons and possibly have to shoot at someone or something than previous generations of police officers. While this may be true, officer-involved shootings are still a relatively rare occurrence, but they receive a great deal of public and media attention (Lawton 2007), especially in instances where a white police officer shoots a black victim/suspect (McElvain and Kposowa 2008). It should be mentioned that, although this study focuses on the use of deadly force by police in the United States, there is literature available on other cultures that relates to
the frequency and relative acceptance of deadly force by the police (Belur 2009, Belur 2010, Parent 2006, Waddington et al. 2009) and many of these statistics and perspectives may differ from those seen in this country. In addition to use of force being a rare event, academics have gradually moved from understanding use of force as a dichotomous outcome to viewing this behavior along a continuum of severity (Lawton 2007, Terrill 2003), with most cases of force involving behaviors at the lower end of the continuum (McElvain and Kposowa 2008, Terrill 2003).

The use of physical force, let alone deadly force, is rare in the context of daily police actions (Langan et al. 2001, Lawton 2007, McElvain and Kposowa 2008, McLaughlin 1992, Pate, Fridell and Hamilton 1993, Terrill 2001, Terrill and Mastrofski 2002, Terrill 2003), yet researchers have sought to understand the determinants that lead to or influence officer behaviors and decisions to use force. This is particularly salient, as the average officer-involved shooting lasts approximately three seconds, with officers having only a fraction of a second to decide to use deadly force preceding the incident (Klinger 2004, Tracy 2010). There has been a noted concentration on the influence of individual officer characteristics, such as age, education, gender and experience (McElvain and Kposowa 2008, Sun, Payne and Wu 2008, Terrill and Reisig 2003) and the situational or transactional nature of police-citizen encounters that lead to a use of force incident (McElvain and Kposowa 2008, Terrill 2003, Terrill and Reisig 2003, White 2002), with the effects of neighborhood being mentioned less frequently. Sun, Payne and Wu (2008) suggest that police behavior can be explained in terms of neighborhood demographics and institutional characteristics. Lawton (2007) notes that,
to better understand use of force, we need both a better accounting and measurement system for these incidents and a theoretical perspective from which to examine them.

Adler (2007) notes that scholars have conducted very little research on the history of police shootings in the United States, a critical lack that Ho (1997) and Alpert and Fridell (1992) attribute to the scarcity of the opportunity to observe these incidents in the field and FitzGerald and Bromley (1998) indicate is due to the rarity of these events and their sensitive nature. Klinger and Brunson (2009) further note that the general knowledge about police shootings overlooks the plethora of factors that may impact how a "reasonable police officer" views a situation that may require the use of deadly force. Whatever the reason, empirical research into police shootings is not common.

Another significant impediment to research on police shootings is the absence of access to sound data sources, which leads to measurement errors and, inevitably, to studies that cannot be compared. While there are significant data issues that are associated with determining the frequency of deadly force incidents, both Wecht, Lee, Van Blaricom and Tucker (2011) and Alpert and Fridell (1992) note that the numbers of citizens killed by police officers decreased in the early 1980s (as compared to a decade earlier), although Alpert and Fridell (1992) suggest this decrease may be associated with a marked decrease in the number of officers killed in the line of duty and Wecht et al (2011) indicate this may be related to the adoption of defense of life shooting policies. Sherman and Langworthy (1979) note that there are three basic types of data sources from which to draw information about police shootings: death certificates, police department internal affairs files, and newspaper accounts, and each is subject to methodological flaws.
The CDC’s Vital Statistics, which will be presented later, have the opportunities for subjective human error to bias the counts from the initial completion of the form, through registering the death to inputting the data in the system. Additionally, Sherman and Langworthy (1979), Alpert and Fridell (1992), and Geller and Scott (1992) cite several studies that indicate that the CDC significantly underreports the prevalence of death by legal intervention cases, making the use of this data problematic at best. Geller and Scott (1992) also suggest using the UCR’s justifiable homicide by law enforcement category, found within the Supplemental Homicide Reports since 2005 (FBI 2006, FBI 2007, FBI 2008, FBI 2009, FBI 2010, FBI 2011a, FBI 2012), but cautions that this data source does not require mandatory reporting and, much like the CDC, probably significantly underestimates the number of deaths attributable to police use of deadly force.

The Bureau of Justice Statistics (BJS) also has the Deaths in Custody Reporting Program (DCRP) (2013b, Burch 2011, Mumola 2007), which previously mandated that states who sought federal corrections funding must report information on all deaths that occurred during arrest, in local jails and in prisons. While this program appeared to address the mandatory reporting issue suffered by the UCR, vague definitions of what it means to be “in the process of arrest,” the BJS stating that the arrest-related deaths reporting was not mandatory, variations in data collection strategies employed by State Reporting Coordinators, and the expiration of the legislation that created this program and mandated reporting present limits to this data (Burch 2011). In fact, Burch (2011) states that “arrest-related deaths are under-reported. BJS did not attempt to estimate for partial or non-responding jurisdictions. Data are more representative of the nature of
arrest-related deaths than the volume at which they occur. Due to variation in reporting, caution should be used in comparing counts from year to year.” This indicates that even with fiduciary incentives tied to supposed mandatory reporting, it is still very likely there is a large dark figure of arrest-related deaths, suggesting that the dark figure related to non-fatal incidents may be staggering.

The second major data source is police records. Unfortunately, unless a researcher is affiliated with or working for a research-friendly law enforcement agency, these records are exceedingly difficult to access. Sherman and Langworthy (1979) suggest that, in addition to the unwillingness of many departments to provide such records, there are three other flaws with this data that make it difficult to use to achieve an accurate national estimate of the use of force: differences in recordkeeping across jurisdictions, differences between reported statistics and what is found in the official records, and differing definitions and terminology across jurisdictions. Geller and Scott (1992) also note that the records needed to conduct meaningful analysis of trends, or even to identify officers involved in multiple shooting incidents, are often impossible due to short term record retention before purging or is limited because linking use of force incidents requires a time-consuming manual review of each individual file. As can be seen in the section on police shootings in Virginia, the problem of access to only a few years’ worth of data is still a pressing concern.

Despite decades of the Virginia State Police’s (VSP) annual publication, Crime in Virginia, being accessible through public libraries and the internet, when asked for disaggregated statistics regarding police shootings in the Hampton Roads region, the VSP stated that they only record information on fatal outcomes and the limited information
available only spans the years 2005 to 2010. One of the experiences encountered in the current study further illustrates the difficulties regarding access to police data, cited by numerous other researchers. A Freedom of Information Act request for data on police shootings was submitted to one of the jurisdictions included in the present study. The department’s official response embodied the lack of cooperation and the unwillingness to provide information on these incidents, mentioned as problematic in the study of use of deadly force incidents by Sherman and Langworthy (1979), Geller and Scott (1992), and Fyfe (2002), as evidenced below:

"Your request for statistics...cannot be satisfied for a number of reasons. The Department does not maintain such statistics. The Department’s response is that the statistical records requested do not exist. Virginia Code §2.2-3704 (B) (4). Moreover, the Freedom of Information Act does not require the public agency to create records, and in this instance, does not require the compilation of statistics, Virginia Code §2.2-3704 (D). If we were required to compile statistics, we do not believe your request complies with Virginia Code §2.2-3704 (B), in that it does not identify the record, or the desired statistics, with “reasonable specificity.” You have not described specifically what statistics you want."

The assertion that these statistics do not exist is particularly interesting for two reasons. The Incident Based Report (IBR) form, adopted by the Commonwealth of Virginia in 1994 (2010b) to standardize reporting practices and completed in relation to criminal offenses, are entered into the city’s computer system and provides many of the relevant statistics and demographics related to police shootings. Further, within the City, at least, the Notification of Special Incident report form (PD 539) must be completed for every incident involving the use of force (Norfolk 2009b) and a Firearms Use Report (PD 529) every time an officer discharges his or her firearm unless the officer is on an authorized pistol range, provides the remaining data required to explore these incidents.
Both Alpert and Fridell (1992) and Fyfe (2002) note that agencies that either voluntarily comply or are somehow compelled to comply with research requests are likely atypical from most law enforcement agencies in the United States, thus generating doubts as to the generalizability and validity of the data gleaned from these departments. Fyfe (2002) also argues that aggregate studies that do not link jurisdictions with corresponding figures overlook a host of factors that can lead to variability in rates and characteristics of use of deadly force incidents. It has also been suggested that, in order to comprehensively understand the use of deadly force, each of the three possible outcomes associated with the decision to shoot—fatality, injury or non-injury—must be explored to understand the situational and contextual differences that contribute to differential outcomes (Fyfe 2002, Roberg, Novak and Cordner 2009, White 2006).

Alpert and Fridell (1992) further suggest that decisions not to shoot must be considered in analyses of deadly force encounters to determine how and why these incidents differ from those where the officer does fire his/her weapon. It should, however, be mentioned that collecting data on injurious and non-injurious uses of lethal force are even more challenging than collecting data on police shootings resulting in fatal outcomes. Also of interest is that, despite over three decades of vociferous calls for the establishment of a national reporting system for both lethal and non-lethal incidents (Engel 2008, Fyfe 2002, Geller and Scott 1992, Hickman, Piquero and Garner 2008b, Sherman and Langworthy 1979, Smith 2008), such a repository is not yet in existence and policy continues to be written in absentia of the guidance and support of methodologically sound empirical evidence.
While less empirical in nature, a preliminary study (Farrell n.d.) to the current case study found that police shootings are likely underreported in the Hampton Roads region of Virginia. Sherman and Langworthy (1979) did not simply cite police records as a source of data on police shootings, they cited police Internal Affairs records. After talking with one officer, and revealing one jurisdiction's assertions, as mentioned earlier, that statistics on police shootings do not exist, it was determined that, in at least one jurisdiction in the preliminary study the Internal Affairs unit would be the only source for any information related to police shootings over time. Within the General Order on Use of Force (Norfolk 2009b), the Police Department dictates that the Detective Division will maintain investigation files related to the use of force until a final decision has been made in relation to prosecution and, if there is a decision to prosecute, the case has been finally concluded, and “to the extent Detective Division procedures require further retention of files, until such procedures permit disposition.” Internal Affairs Division, under this same General Order, must maintain “a separate set of records [to include all facts, materials and evidence from the criminal investigation] and prepare cases as required for departmental board hearings, grievance panels, and trial board proceedings” (Norfolk 2009b). There is no mention in this General Order of when it is appropriate for the Internal Affairs Division to purge its files. This example is strongly associated with the issues Geller and Scott (1992) raised regarding short term retention of information before purging, leaving Internal Affairs as the unit that maintains copies of all Special Incident Reports and investigations into use of force cases.

The final type of data discussed by Sherman and Langworthy (1979) are newspaper articles, which the researchers eliminate from their consideration due to the
unreliability of news coverage. They assert that newspaper articles may provide the most accurate count of homicides, but this will only be the case in areas that deem every homicide (or even every serious crime) equally newsworthy and, as that is unlikely (Chermak and Chapman 2007, Gruenewald, Chermak and Pizarro 2013, Schildkraut and Donley 2012, White and Ready 2009), dismiss newspaper articles as a source of data. However, other scholars have shown that media reports can be used as a source of data on police behavior, particularly involving use of force (Burch 2011, Ready, White and Fisher 2008, White and Ready 2009, White et al. 2012), while others have also shown that media depictions of police and police behavior do impact citizen perceptions of officer culpability, but do not impact overall perceptions of police (Chermak, McGarrell and Gruenewald 2006). In conducting the preliminary study to contextualize this case, the author differed significantly in her assessment of the validity of the use of newspaper articles as a data source because, in the absence of officially collected and available data, newspapers provide the most information, though not necessarily the most accurate or comprehensive information, on officer-involved shootings. While not all homicides are treated equally in the media (Gruenewald, Chermak and Pizarro 2013, Schildkraut and Donley 2012), use of force incidents, especially those using deadly force, tend to be deemed newsworthy as they are the most sensational or atypical. Further, coverage in the news media is likely to also include incidents where citizens have been injured or where the police fired their weapons and did not injure anyone, although these nonfatal cases may also be overlooked due to having a less impactful headline, providing insight into both the lethal and non-lethal outcomes of the use of deadly force. Finally, as it has been shown that national statistics are likely to grossly underestimate the prevalence and
frequency of police shootings, and many police agencies are unwilling to provide access to departmental records, newspapers become the most available source for information on deadly force encounters, particularly at the jurisdictional level. They assert that newspaper articles may provide the most accurate count of homicides, but this will only be the case in areas that deem every homicide equally newsworthy and, as that is unlikely, dismiss newspaper articles as a source of data. Finally, a Public Information Officer (PIO) from one of the jurisdictions included in the preliminary study noted that the use of the local newspaper was likely to be a relatively accurate source of information, as the Virginian Pilot is known for fact checking with and receiving most of its information from local police departments.

As mentioned by McElvain and Kposowa (2008) and Fyfe (1981), there are often difficulties accessing data on these incidents, with police departments largely unwilling to cooperate or participate in empirical research on such a sensitive topic that may potentially leave them vulnerable to civil liability inquiries. Even with the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA), there are certain materials exempted and, unless the researcher knows the precise wording of what they need to request, gaining access to materials can be extremely challenging. These limitations are further compounded by the fact that many jurisdictions and agencies do not collect or record detailed data about non-fatal police shootings, which means that we are not able to empirically explore the contextual and individual differences between misses, injurious and fatal shootings fully.
The Frequency and Characteristics of Officer-Involved Shootings

Despite Sherman and Langworthy’s (1979), and Geller and Scott’s (1992), concerns regarding officially reported statistics on use of deadly force, it is important to note the frequency of fatal police shootings in the Commonwealth of Virginia found in these sources. The UCR provides very little information regarding justifiable homicides by law enforcement officer beyond total national counts and type of weapon used. According to the FBI, there were 7972 justifiable homicides committed by law enforcement officers between 1991 and 2011, with an average of 380 justifiable homicides by police officers per year (FBI, 1996, 1997, 1998, 1999, 2000, 2001, 2002, 2004, 2006, 2007, 2008, 2009, 2010, 2011, 2012). Between 2007 and 2011, the FBI shows an increase in justifiable homicides by law enforcement (N=1980, M=396) (please see Appendix A). Although the FBI provides some data on the frequency of fatal officer involved shootings, more detailed information can be obtained through both the BJS’s DCRP and the CDC’s VitalStats mortality statistics (2010a) (see Appendix A). Figure 1 presents the discrepancies between the figures published by the UCR and those published by the CDC and the BJS, underscoring the argument that there is a lack of agreement and accounting for police involved shootings within the United States.
The DCRP began collecting the mandated data on deaths that occurred during the process of arrest (so not necessarily due to use of deadly force) in 2003 and the legislation that created the DCRP and mandated reporting expired in 2006. However, BJS has continued to collect data on this topic (2013b). Between January 2003 and December 2009, 4,813 arrest-related deaths were reported to the DCRP, with 61% of these deaths being attributed to homicides by law enforcement personnel (Burch 2011). Of all arrest-related deaths, it was alleged that 45% of decedents had just engaged in assaultive behavior prior to the arrest or had been assaultive during the arrest process (Burch 2011). Males accounted for 95% of all arrest-related deaths, and over half of all arrest-related deaths occurred in individuals between the ages of 25 and 44 (Burch 2011). According to the DCRP, between 2003 and 2009, homicide by law enforcement personnel, with 73% of these cases being attributed to local police agencies, accounted for 62% of the arrest-related deaths among males and 49% of arrest-related deaths among
females, with 75% of all decedents from homicide during arrest having allegedly been engaged in violent offenses (Burch 2011). Additionally, of those killed by law enforcement during arrest, 61% were classified as White (Non-Hispanic), 32% were Black (Non-Hispanic); 20% were Hispanic, 4% were Other (which includes American Indians, Alaska Natives, Asians, Native Hawaiians, other Pacific Islanders, and those of mixed racial origins), and in 3% of cases the decedent’s racial background is listed as Unknown. Of the total number of arrest-related deaths reported between 2003 and 2009, 340 agencies in the state of Virginia reported 113 arrest-related deaths that occurred in the Commonwealth. Eighty-five of those deaths, or 75%, were classified as homicide by law enforcement officers, representing an average of 9.4 homicides by law enforcement during arrest per year (Burch 2011). The BJS does not provide situational or contextual information at the state level and does not provide regional level data.

The CDC has a classification of death called “death by legal intervention,” which is defined as “injuries inflicted by the police or other law-enforcing agents, including military on duty, in the course of arresting or attempting to arrest lawbreakers, suppressing disturbances, maintaining order, and other legal actions. Excludes injuries caused by civil insurrections” (2010a). Examining the available data for the years 1990 to 2009, there have been a total of 7414 deaths by legal intervention recorded in the United States during this time period, with an average of 370.7 deaths of this nature per year. Only national aggregated totals are currently available for the years 2008 and 2009, but between 1990 and 2007, males, in general, account for the majority of these deaths (96.76%) and Black males accounted for approximately 29 percent of these deaths. The CDC data also permits examination of these cases at the state level. In the
Commonwealth of Virginia, there were 218 deaths by legal intervention between 1990 and 2007, with an average of 12 such deaths per year. Overwhelmingly, the victim/suspects in these cases are male (n = 214), and although still disproportionate racially, there is a more even distribution between white victims (n = 119) and Black victims (n= 93) than anticipated given the literature on the use of deadly force (please see Goldkamp, 1976; Lawton, 2007; McElvain & Kposowa, 2008).

Another source of data for information on police shootings is the Virginia State Police's (VSP) annual Crime in Virginia reports (2010b). While the reports contain very limited information on these incidents, a FOIA request was submitted to this agency, requesting disaggregated statistics for the Hampton Roads region. Although the researcher was originally told that these data were not collected, after further questioning the VSP indicated that they only maintain minimal statistics on fatal police shootings and provided that information, which included a coded city category, the IBR number and the date. According to this additional data, the VSP indicates that there have been 21 fatal police shootings in the Hampton Roads region between 2005 and 2010, with ten of those fatalities occurring in Norfolk, VA and three occurring in Chesapeake, VA. As these data were sent with the city identifiers encoded, attempts to identify each city have been made with minimal success. A preliminary study (Farrell n.d.), conducted to determine the frequency of shootings in the Hampton Roads region and to contextualize the case utilized in the current research, discovered 27 fatal police shootings reported in the media within the same time frame, six more than the total provided by the VSP. Thus, it is likely that we are underestimating the frequency of police shootings at the regional, state
and national levels, with local frequencies not being readily available or accessible to criminologists or the general public.

What information is available is conflicting, with the UCR, BJS and CDC providing different, and often divergent, gross totals for deaths attributable to police shootings each year as displayed in Figure 1 and in Appendices A and B. Although these estimates draw from different data sources, they both are seeking to provide a count of citizens reasonably or justifiably killed by law enforcement each year. It would be expected that, while there may be some discrepancies between the counts, that they would be similar and that, overall, the data would display similar trends over time; but this is not the case (see Figure 1). As suggested by Geller and Scott (1992) and Sherman and Langworthy (1979), these differences are likely due to inherent flaws within the reporting systems that generate the totals on an annual basis. It is quite likely that the overall totals for justifiable homicides by law enforcement officers in Virginia, collected by the Virginia State Police and provided pursuant to a FOIA request, likely suffer from similar flaws as the UCR reporting system, specifically non-mandatory reporting, that leads to undercounting the total number of fatal police shootings.

**Psychological Considerations: The Officer**

Causes and consequences of officer stress are of great concern to scholars of modern policing (Blau 1994, Kerley 2005, Kirschman 2007, Lord 2005, Miller 2006, Stevens 2005, Stotland and Berberich 1979). As Kirschman (2007) notes, most officers will be exposed to more tragedy in their first three years on the job than most other people experience over their lifetime, often leading to compassion fatigue and cynicism. Further, this is a population recognized for high prevalence rates of several mental health
issues, to include depression, anxiety, anger management problems, substance and/or alcohol misuse and abuse, stress, difficulties in interpersonal relationships, and suicide (Wester and Lyubelsky 2005). This dissertation is focused on the impacts of an officer-involved shooting incident and will focus on critical incident-related stressors and reactions; however, it is important to recognize that post trauma reactions may amplify other job-related psychological and physiological issues plaguing an officer or that chronic stress can be concurrent with critical incident stress. Further, as has been suggested at the West Coast Posttrauma Retreat (2009a) and based on data collected by this program, the first responder personality may also play a role in critical incident reactions and resiliency. WCPR (Kirschman 2012a) has found that many first responders may develop the coping skills that make them good officers—ability to dissociate, compartmentalize and be calm in a crisis—in childhood as a result of abuse, neglect or having an alcoholic parent. Thus, these same traits that make them good officers may also be indicators that these officers are at a heightened risk for developing PTSD.

Now that the overall prevalence of shootings has been discussed, the impacts of these incidents on the officers must be addressed. While the first urban police departments were being established in this country during the 1800s (Peak 2009, Roberg, Novak and Cordner 2009), it was not until the late 1970s that the physical, cognitive and emotional responses exhibited by officers involved in shooting incidents began to merit the attention of researchers (Jones 1989). The definition of a critical incident can be broad, but is generally conceptualized as an event that involves a serious threat or loss and, while this may be vague, incidents commonly defined as such include line of duty deaths or serious injuries, shooting incidents, child deaths, significant injuries, intense
media scrutiny and facing legal charges (Best, Artwohl and Kirschman 2011, Kamena et al. 2011). A traumatic incident can also be defined as any incident whose impact overwhelms an individual’s normal coping abilities, often including death, serious injury, intense fear, helplessness and horror (Kamena et al. 2011, Kirschman 2007). In fact, it has been noted that one of the most stressful experience in a police officer’s career is killing someone in the line of duty (Best, Artwohl and Kirschman 2011, Jones 1989, Stevens 2005).

This event may have severe psychological impacts, both in the immediate aftermath of the event and in more lasting ways, it is suggested that educating officers as to what to expect, physiologically, psychologically, and cognitively, in the aftermath of a critical incident may have inoculative effects (Blau 1994, Hodgins, Creamer and Bell 2001, Honig and Sultan 2004, Jones 1989, Schlitz n.d., Stephens 2005), allowing the officer to mentally prepare and know that what they experience is a normal reaction to trauma. In other words, Norcross (2011) notes that officers need to develop a warrior’s mentality, or the mindset to do what you must do to survive, always ready to do what the job requires, and must also develop what he calls a survival retirement account, also called an emergency response mental file by Jones (1989). This account allows the officer to make “deposits” by gathering and honing mental capabilities, training, physical fitness capabilities and proper equipment. If this account or file is developed and maintained, making regular deposits in the mental, physical, training and equipment categories, there will be an available reserve for the officer to draw upon in the event of a crisis (Norcross 2011). By offering training and preparatory classes on the effects of critical incident stress, police departments can contribute to the opening and maintenance
of the survival retirement account. Current research is also looking at the impact of prior knowledge and the development of post-trauma symptoms, focusing on not only the differences in expectations of a shooting incident between officers who have been involved in a shooting and those who have not, but also upon both the anticipated and unexpected post-event affects experienced by officers who have been involved in shooting incidents (Maratea, Posadas and Myers 2011).

One reason that it is critical that departments take a preventative role is that, while statistics vary, 50 to 80 percent of officers that kill someone in the line of duty leave the force within five years (Kirschman 2007), with Stevens (2005) noting that one in three officers involved in a shooting will leave the police department within a year, representing a loss of not only an employee, but also the financial investment the department has made in that employee's training and development. To state it very bluntly, “it is likely more expensive to replace an officer than a police car” (Kamena et al. 2011). Even if the officer does not leave the department, he or she may represent a financial loss to the department in terms of decreased productivity, costs associated with workers' compensation, litigation fees, frequent absenteeism, and the list goes continues (Honig and Sultan 2004, Stephens 2005, Violanti 2005). When considering these costs for all officers involved in a single shooting incident, these costs can quickly add up to several million dollars (Honig and Sultan 2004, Jones 1989). Even at just one million dollars per shooting, and considering only fatal police shootings, this accounts for annual potential costs of at least $375 million dollars. In the current economic climate of budgetary cuts and a “do more with less” attitude, these statistics suggest that a cost
effective approach involves effective training and preparation, as well as swift intervention, to avoid officers developing long term symptoms of psychological trauma.

**Stress Reactions to a Critical Incident**

When discussing reactions to a critical incident, Kirschman (2007) differentiates between critical incident stress, which encompasses physical and psychological reactions that may persist for two days to one month after the incident, and post traumatic stress disorder (PTSD). It is also important to note that there is likely a change in the terminology on the horizon—as many in the field suggest that the term PTSD suggests that there is something wrong with the individual ("he or she has a disorder"). Several scholars and practitioners have suggested that the more appropriate term is post traumatic stress injury (PTSI), as this is a more accurate description (Schlitz n.d.). Recently, the researcher also heard this referred to as PTS, or post trauma syndrome, on a news program. Indeed, the author concurs with this change in terminology, and will paraphrase a quote from a study participant that encapsulates the mentality change that may accompany this terminology change: if I sprain an ankle chasing a suspect, I will get sent to the hospital immediately. Seeing a traumatic event or participating in a critical incident can cause just as serious, or an even more serious, an injury—you just cannot see it. This sentiment is also echoed by others in the field, as evidenced by comparisons of PTSD to broken bones (Schlitz n.d.), or describing it as an "invisible wound" (Nichols n.d.).

Best, Artwohl and Kirschman (2011) also differentiate between different post-trauma responses, noting that there are three typologies of post-incident reactions. The first is the transitory period of post-incident psychological distress, which features the
onset of psychological distress immediately following the incident that decreases over time and is usually concluded within one month of the incident (Best, Artwohl and Kirschman 2011), very similar to Kirschman’s (2007) definition of critical incident stress. The intermediate response is characterized by intermittent symptoms that develop during the initial weeks and may last several months (Best, Artwohl and Kirschman 2011). The final typology, severe psychological disability, is when an officer’s daily functioning is significantly impacted over a prolonged period of time (Best, Artwohl and Kirschman 2011). This third typology is synonymous with PTSD.

PTSD is a mental health disorder, recognized in the DSM-IV-TR (American Psychiatric Association and American Psychiatric Association Task Force on DSM-IV 2000), that can be either acute or delayed. Violanti (2005) identifies two components that are necessary for a PTSD diagnosis, the nature of the incident involved and the individual’s responses or symptoms resulting from exposure to that incident. Typically, PTSD symptoms last more than a month, cause distress that is intrusive or disruptive, and develop within three months of the traumatic incident (Artwohl and Christensen 1997, Kirschman 2007). There are three recognized clusters of symptoms associated with PTSD and a diagnosis requires that an individual experience one or more symptoms from each of the three categories. Table 1, below, summarizes the three clusters of symptoms, as outlined by Kirschman (2007).
Table 1: *Summary of PTSD Symptom Clusters, Adapted from Kirschman (2007)*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Reexperiencing the Event Behavior</th>
<th>Numbing or Avoidance Behavior</th>
<th>Increased Arousal Behavior</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Recurring intrusive and distressing recollections of event</td>
<td>Avoids thoughts, feelings or conversations related to the event</td>
<td>Sleep disturbances</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Recurring and distressing dreams of the event</td>
<td>Avoids activities, Places or people that remind the individual of the event</td>
<td>Irritability or angry outbursts</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Flashbacks</td>
<td>Inability to recall important aspects of the event</td>
<td>Difficulty concentrating</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Intense distress over exposure to stimuli associated with the event</td>
<td>Decreased interest in participating in significant activities</td>
<td>Hypervigilance</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Intense nervous system activity when exposed to stimuli associated with event, as if threat to safety exists/continues</td>
<td>Feeling detached or estranged from others</td>
<td>Exaggerated startle response</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Inability to express feelings</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Feels like future will be cut short</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

It has been noted that we cannot predict who will and will not develop severe post trauma reactions, such as post traumatic stress disorder, but it is likely that most officers involved in a shooting incident will experience some form of psychological disturbance in the aftermath of the event (Best, Artwohl and Kirschman 2011, Jones 1989, Klinger 2004, Paton 2005, Thomas 2011). Although the focus of the current research is on the impact upon and the response to the shooting incident experienced by the officer and those personally connected to him, it is important to note that the departmental response to the officer in the immediate aftermath of the shooting can impact his or her development of long term psychological symptoms (Jones 1989, Kamena et al. 2011). Specifically, if the officer feels abandoned, isolated, emotionally castrated and treated like a criminal (IACP 2012b, Jones 1989), then he or she is more likely to experience deep and lasting post trauma symptoms.
Additionally, each officer will experience the trauma differently in terms of the symptoms displayed and resilience, including factors such as education, ethnicity, previous exposure to traumatic incidents, the severity of the incident, the officer’s established coping skills and mechanisms and the presence, number and quality of protective factors in the officer’s life (Best, Artwohl and Kirschman 2011, Hodgins, Creamer and Bell 2001, Honig and Sultan 2004, IACP 2012b, Jones 1989, Kerley 2005, Kirschman 2007, McCaslin et al. 2006, McCaslin et al. 2008, Pole et al. 2001, Violanti 2005). The interaction between chronic stress, the experience of little traumas (Heglund 2009), and/or previous traumatic experiences may lead an individual to be more vulnerable to PTSD (Kirschman 2007, Stephens 2005, Violanti 2005). This may be because, if the individual has not effectively dealt with previous stressful or traumatic experiences, then the effects of previous events may compound the effects of the current trauma, leading to what Kirschman (2007) calls a double whammy.

Kirschman (2007) further notes that individuals who have experienced prior trauma, display poor coping skills and had parents with significant issues may be more likely to develop traumatic stress reactions. This increased risk is also linked to greater dissociation and emotional distress during the critical incident followed by lacking social support in the aftermath of the incident, as well as personality and intelligence (Kirschman 2007, Stephens 2005). There are also individual differences in protective factors, such as the amount of social support a person has, and a person’s ability to exhibit impulse and emotional control, that may reduce a person’s risk of developing a troubling reaction to a traumatic incident (Stephens 2005). In short, an officer’s response
to trauma is likely to be highly individualized, encompassing some combination of recognized symptoms.

*Phases of the Shooting Incident*

Jones (1989) provides one of the most clearly detailed analyses of the development and unfolding of the shooting trauma, stating that there are four phases of Post Officer-involved Shooting Trauma (POST). Other sources suggest a similar progression of trauma reactions, moving from immediate effects to long term effects of the shooting incident (Trompetter et al. 2011). These phases include the officer’s immediate reactions during the shooting trauma (which Paton (2005) divides into the alarm and mobilization phase and the response phase), that includes cognitive and perceptual distortions such as slowing or acceleration of time, tunnel vision, selective attention, and auditory distortions, involuntary urination or defecation, increased respiration, increased heart rate, increased perspiration, hallucinations, shock and disbelief, detachment, and speech impairment (Alpert, Rivera and Lott 2012, Best, Artwohl and Kirschman 2011, Honig and Sultan 2004, Jones 1989, Kirschman 2007, Klinger 2004, Miller 2006, Noble and Alpert 2013). Upon arrival, first responders may find the officer displaying a variety of reactions, ranging from agitation to being dazed and detached. It is suggested that first responders try to calm or ground the officer, depending on their state, and assure them that their reactions are normal (Best, Artwohl and Kirschman 2011). Often, investigators or other responders may offer the officer a cup of coffee or a cigarette, however, this may not be advisable as caffeine and nicotine are both stimulants and may exacerbate the officer’s stress reactions (Jones 1989).
The second phase of POST involves the officer's initial emotional and physical reactions to the shooting incident once it has ended, to include, but certainly not limited to, anger, elation, nausea and vomiting, crying, disbelief, tremors, and fatigue (Jones 1989, Kirschman 2007, Klinger 2004). During this phase is when departmental response, while conducting a professional and thorough investigation of the incident, is critical and must strive to balance the needs of the department with the needs of the officer. For example, in the International Association of Chiefs of Police (IACP) model policies for the investigation of officer involved shootings (IACP 1998) and the post-shooting personnel support (IACP 2012a), this desired balance is evidenced in the suggestions to provide emotional first aid, discretely relieve the officer of the weapon used in the shooting but replacing it immediately with a comparable weapon to avoid the "stripping effect" (Jones 1989), permitting the officer to call his or her family to simply notify them there has been an incident and that the officer is physically unharmed, to conduct extensive interviews after the officer has had some time to decompress (usually at least 48 hours) (Bailey 2010, Nichols n.d.), and to ensure that officers are aware that suspension with pay and the interrogation are standard operating procedure and in no way punitive. While the IACP suggests delaying interviews post-shooting, Alpert, Rivera and Lott (2012) and Noble and Alpert (2013) suggest that there is controversy in both the research and policy recommendations regarding when to interview officers. As stated previously, an agency must balance the needs of multiple interested parties in these investigations, and allowing officers time to decompress may appear to accord officers special status or treatment (Alpert, Rivera and Lott 2012, Noble and Alpert 2013). Indeed, the Police Assessment Resource Center (PARC) recommends interviewing
officers within a few hours of the shooting incident. In an attempt to suggest a flexible policy that recognizes both the varied responses to trauma and the gaps in the literature on this particular topic, Alpert, Rivera and Lott (2012) suggest that investigators evaluate each officer for signs of traumatic stress or shock to determine when to interview the officer. Noble and Alpert (Noble and Alpert 2013) recommend utilizing cognitive interviewing techniques as an alternative to delayed interviewing, noting that this tactic will increase accuracy while also allowing for a degree of emotional venting while telling their story. Further, the IACP (IACP 2012a, IACP 2012b, Tracy 2010), suggests that the officer be provided with a companion, preferably a trained peer support team member or chaplain with experience in similar situations, immediately following the shooting to aid the officer and help them through the process without discussing the incident. This support may lessen the feelings of isolation, especially if this companion has experienced a similar critical incident.

The afterburn phase (Jones 1989), also called the letdown and reintegration phase by Paton (2005), lasting up to three days following the incident, is especially important in addressing intervention needs, as most sources cite that this is a critical time for the officer (Best, Artwohl and Kirschman 2011, IACP 2012a, Jones 1989, Miller 2006, Paton 2005), who is beginning to come down from the adrenaline rush and will begin addressing feelings of vulnerability, helplessness, anxiety, rage, possibly guilt over taking a life and a myriad of other emotions and physiological responses (IACP 2012b, Jones 1989, Klinger 2004). During this period, the officer may experience the impulse to resign from the police department and may also crave peer support (Jones 1989). The peer support, however, may be lacking or cause the officer to feel more isolated. This is
because most officers have not been involved in a shooting and may either make comments, such as "way to go, killer," that are meant to be supportive (Artwohl and Christensen 1997) (also known as Locker Room Shock (Jones 1989)), or feel that the officer needs time to deal with the incident—to be left alone—and find it difficult to talk to the officer (Jones 1989). Additionally, the officer’s peers may be suffering from their own traumatic reactions to the incident, to be discussed in the next section, and may not be psychologically capable of providing any emotional support, let alone quality emotional support (Paton 2005).

Klinger (2004) found that, during this phase, officers may experience fatigue, headaches, loss of appetite, emotional responses, such as elation, sadness, anxiety, and numbness, and cognitive symptoms, such as recurrent thoughts, guilt, and fear of administrative discipline or possible legal repercussions for their actions. It is recommended the officers not be sent home alone during this period (IACP 2012a, Jones 1989). The officer may also suffer from sleep disturbances during this period, to include insomnia and nightmares (Honig and Sultan 2004, Jones 1989, Kirschman 2007, Klinger 2004). In addition to the physiological after effects of adrenalin, these sleep disturbances can combine to deepen fatigue, which may impair judgment and processing further (Lindsey 2007). The sleep disruptions are also of concern because, typically, officers experience more sleep disturbances than the general population due to work related stressors (Kerley 2005, Neylan et al. 2002), meaning they are likely to not be rested before the critical incident occurs, and Mohr et al (2003) have found that improvements in sleep quality (based on subjective assessments of sleep) may mediate the effects of traumatic stress reactions. In order to cope with these sleep disturbances, officers may
turn to chemical substances and self-medication, including alcohol, prescription medications, and other substances, to regulate or escape these sleep disruptions (Jones 1989, Kirschman 2007).

The final phase of the POST experience, as identified by Jones (1989), are the aftereffects. This phase occurs when the shooting incident is truly over; the administrative and criminal investigations are concluded and it is time for the officer, if he or she is still with the police department, to return to full duty, if they have not done so already. Jones (1989) notes that this phase can be problematic, as the symptoms displayed by the officer may be misinterpreted as other issues or may go unrecognized; the key factor in this phase is noticing if the officer has changed. This change may be related to sleeping and eating patterns, alcohol consumption, concentration, or social interaction. Additionally, there are three most dangerous aftereffects are withdrawal, from both peers and family; exhibiting a denial response, or trying to convince themselves and others that they are not bothered or negatively impacted by the shooting; and the discovery of the thrill, which may lead to risky behavior intended to replicate the rush experienced during a critical incident (Jones 1989). Some other symptoms the officer may display include being unable to tolerate reminders of the shooting incident, repressed guilt, being harshly critical of him-or herself, setting unrealistic standards of behavior for him- or herself, being preoccupied with death, being fearful or anxious, hesitating or avoiding stressful situations, memory and concentration impairments, and decreases in work productivity (Jones 1989). Other symptoms may present in polarized fashions; for example, although the officer may be experiencing vivid nightmares, he or she may either suffer from insomnia or be sleeping much more than they did prior to the
shooting. Also, the officer may experience sexual dysfunction, ranging from impotence and lack of interest to the development of what is called “Mistress Syndrome,” characterized by hypersexuality and promiscuity (Jones 1989). As stated previously, responses to trauma are highly individualized in terms of severity, length and symptoms displayed. Table 2, below, displays a synopsis of the varying symptoms an officer might display following a shooting incident (Jones 1989, Kirschman 2007).

Table 2: Summary of Symptoms of a Traumatic Response, Adapted from Jones (1989) and Kirschman (2007)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Emotional Signs</th>
<th>Physical Signs</th>
<th>Behavioral Signs</th>
<th>Cognitive Signs</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>• Irritability</td>
<td>• Stomach problems</td>
<td>• Impulsive</td>
<td>• Difficulty making decisions</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Anger</td>
<td>• Indigestion</td>
<td>• Reckless</td>
<td>• Poor concentration</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Increased aggression</td>
<td>• Ulcers</td>
<td>• Withdrawn</td>
<td>• Memory difficulties</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Chronic tension</td>
<td>• Headaches</td>
<td>• Avoidance</td>
<td>• Difficulty with details</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Overreaction to minor events</td>
<td>• Chest pain</td>
<td>• Sleep disturbance</td>
<td>• Confusion</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Underreaction to provocative events</td>
<td>• Difficulty breathing</td>
<td>• Nightmares</td>
<td>• Difficulty with tasks like math,</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Lack of tolerance for emotions</td>
<td>• High blood pressure</td>
<td>• Insomnia</td>
<td>writing reports</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Preoccupation with the event</td>
<td>• Hypertension</td>
<td>• Change in personal habits</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Depression</td>
<td>• Elevated startle response</td>
<td>• Change in manner of dress</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Suicide ideation</td>
<td>• Changes in sex drive or performance</td>
<td>• Change in hygiene</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Guilt</td>
<td>• Undiagnosable medical issues</td>
<td>• Change in work habits</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Anxiety</td>
<td>• Dizzy spells</td>
<td>• Change in eating habits</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Emotional numbing</td>
<td>• Tremors</td>
<td>• Change in use of drugs/alcohol</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Loss of faith in God</td>
<td>• Profuse sweating</td>
<td>• Avoid scene of shooting</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Unable to bear reminders of shooting</td>
<td>• Easily fatigued</td>
<td>• Self-criticism</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Fear of future incidents</td>
<td>• Inability to tolerate noise</td>
<td>• Self-punishment</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

While the continuance of symptoms in this phase suggests a clinical disorder that requires treatment, Kirschman (2007) suggests that critical incidents can have positive impacts on the lives of those involved, prompting what she calls posttraumatic growth.
This process is still based upon change, but instead of disruptive, intrusive or destructive changes, the individual may feel more competent and capable, may be more self-reliant, and may feel stronger. Additionally, the individual may use the incident to repair or deepen existing relationships, have more compassion for others, establish new or different priorities in their life, develop a renewed or deepened appreciation for life and those people who occupy their life, and an increased focus on spirituality or religion (Kirschman 2007). While important, posttraumatic growth does not negate or preclude negative post trauma responses and individuals still have to cope with the symptoms outlined in the previous sections. There is little to no information in the extant literature regarding the difference between officers who take advantage of support services offered to them and their families, but Artwohl and Christensen (1997) indicate that officers who seek help when they experience post-trauma symptoms are better able to manage and overcome these problems.

*Intervention and Response*

As noted in the preceding sections, there are several critical intervention points during the post trauma cycle that may impede the development of long term symptoms. Although several intervention strategies have been developed and are implemented in agencies across the country, there are obstacles that impede their application and decrease their effectiveness. The IACP (IACP 1998, IACP 2012a) recommends placing officers involved in a shooting incident on paid administrative leave, with Trompetter, Corey, Schmidt, and Tracy (2011) suggesting that the officer be given a minimum of three days of leave before being required to complete a use of force or incident report, or returning to duty. These three days will allow the officer to begin to cope and stabilize,
physiologically and psychologically, after the shooting incident. Many departments have also developed Critical Incident Stress Management (CISM) teams (Thomas 2011), or peer support teams (Tracy 2010). For the remainder of this discussion, officers engaged in peer support and counseling are referred to as CISM team members. It is suggested that the companion officers, mentioned earlier, assigned to the officer involved in the shooting come from these groups (IACP 2012a, IACP 2012b, Tracy 2010), which are usually comprised of senior officers that have been through similar critical incidents and have received specialized training to act in this capacity (Jones 1989, Thomas 2011, Tracy 2010). CISM teams are on scene and attempt to intervene as soon as possible after the incident. While their purpose is to facilitate debriefings and administer psychological first aid, Thomas (2011) notes that these officers are not clinicians and that confidentiality does not apply to these sessions. However, as of July 2012, the Commonwealth of Virginia signed into law the addition of section 19.2-271.4 to Article 1 of Chapter 16 of Title 19.2, which confers privileged status to communications between an officer involved in a critical incident and members of the CISM team. Tucker (2011) notes that, while previous research suggests that officers prefer peer-based counseling to clinicians, her research indicated that officers prefer talking to peers about job-related trauma, like a shooting incident, and would rather not discuss personal issues with peers.

Most sources recommend that officers be mandated to go through a debrief, either group or individual, or an intervention within one week of the incident (Honig and Sultan 2004, IACP 2012b, Trompetter et al. 2011). There are several critiques to mandated interventions, though. First and foremost, police officers are known to be distrustful of outsiders (Wester and Lyubelsky 2005, Woody 2005), particularly mental health
professionals (Jones 1989, Thomas 2011, Tucker 2011). Part of this hesitance and distrust is tied to historic breaches of confidentiality (Tucker 2011), and because many officers believe that, as the police department pays for the service, the agency can limit confidentiality (Thomas 2011). Thomas (2011) notes that this fear of agency interference relates to the agency's failure to define the role of the clinician; in best practice, there should be two clinicians working with the agency—one that handles only pre-employment testing, assessments and fitness for duty evaluations, and the other than handles therapy and training (IACP 2012a, Thomas 2011). Tucker (2011) suggests that accessing services through human resources or the agency results in a conflict of interests. Another breach of confidentiality may arise if the officer files a disability claim, as this grants access to medical records, including post incident interventions with mental health professionals (Best, Artwohl and Kirschman 2011). While this is a fear, and many officers note that dealing with a department's worker's compensation can cause an undue amount of stress and anxiety (Schlitz n.d.), accessing worker's compensation and/or medically retiring from law enforcement for PTSD is becoming a more accepted practice (Torres n.d.).

Further, many officers lack confidence in service providers and feel that the clinician cannot understand them or their needs (Fay 2012, Fay 2013). This raises the issue of cultural competence (Best, Artwohl and Kirschman 2011, Fay 2013, Thomas 2011, Trompetter et al. 2011), or the clinician's ability to not only recognize that the officer is nested within the police culture, but also demonstrates a knowledge and understanding of that culture. The IACP (2012a) refers to a clinician with cultural competence as a qualified mental health professional (QMHP). In addition, the IACP
(2012b) and Trompetter, Corey, Schmidt, and Tracy (2011) both state that, when encountering an officer-involved shooting, this cultural competence expands to include experience with officers who have been involved in shootings. Best, Artwohl, and Kirschman (2011) acknowledge that mandatory interventions may not prevent the development of PTSD, but that other positive effects, such as demonstrating concern for the officer, increasing understanding of the incident and mobilizing peer support often result from mandatory interventions. Klinger (2001), however, feels that negative outcomes result from forced help, especially with mental health providers that officers neither know nor trust. Stephens (2005) also finds the mandatory debrief lacking, stating that a single session does not meet the agency’s obligations to the officer and Jones (1989) notes that mandated sessions may not be beneficial, as officers may be reluctant to talk about the emotions and responses that are most troubling. If officers are ordered to attend a face-to-face intervention (IACP 2012a), any participation beyond attendance should be voluntary (Trompetter et al. 2011).

Officers may be mandated to attend a single intervention to, at a minimum, educate them about what symptoms to expect and provide them with some coping mechanisms (Thomas 2011, Trompetter et al. 2011), but simply being involved in a shooting should not mandate that an officer be subjected to a fitness for duty evaluation (Trompetter et al. 2011). In the days and weeks following a shooting incident, as officers cope with varying psychological and physiological trauma reactions, they are unlikely to utilize stress intervention services, including QMHPs, CISM teams and chaplains (Tucker 2011). Officers may also underreport symptoms (Honig and Sultan 2004). This avoidance or denial can be traced back, in part, to the officer’s fear of stigma (Tucker
2011), which is associated with feelings of weakness, being less macho, and being less reliable (Tucker 2011). Tucker (2011) also notes that this stigma of seeking help may relate to fears that reaching out will negatively impact the officer in terms of promotions, and their overall career, with some officers fearing job loss. With these limitations, the onus of reaching out to the officer falls upon the QMHP, the CISM team and the officer's supervisors. It is suggested that both the QMHP and the CISM team contact the officer at two weeks from the incident, one month from the incident and one year from the incident to screen for problems after the initial interview and remind the officer that help is available (IACP 2012b). Another source suggests that the QMHP should follow up with the officer either via e-mail or telephone sometime within the first four months following the shooting and then again just prior to the one year anniversary (Trompetter et al. 2011). It is also suggested that officers be gradually returned to full duties, preferably to the post occupied prior to the shooting (IACP 2012a, Trompetter et al. 2011), and that the officer be requalified on his or her weapon and be subjected to shoot/don't shoot scenario exercises (Tracy 2010, Trompetter et al. 2011). Fitness for duty may also be evaluated by commanding officers and supervisors (Trompetter et al. 2011).

At this point in time, a large burden is also placed upon the officer's supervisor who, as noted below, may be suffering from secondary victimization following this incident. The IACP (2012a) states that the supervisor must be trained to identify post shooting trauma symptoms, are responsible for monitoring the behavior of officers for post traumatic stress symptoms, and is the individual responsible for making officers in his or her unit aware of available support services. The supervisor can also order officers to seek help from a QMHP if they believe that the stress symptoms are interfering with or
Other officers involved in the critical incident, either through witnessing, investigating or simply through membership in the police culture, can experience secondary trauma. In policing, this potential for trauma sustained by other officers is rarely discussed and it is assumed that only those officers directly involved in the incident will be affected (Thomas 2011). Yet, Thomas (2011) suggests that secondary victimization or trauma is not limited to the groups identified by Kirschman (2007) above, but that anyone in helping professions that can emphasize with the critical incident or stressors involved can be adversely impacted, which may contribute to compassion fatigue (Panos 2007) or Emergency Responder Exhaustion Syndrome (ERES) (Fay et al. 2006).

Paton (2005) also recognizes the possibility of secondary victimization, but identifies a more limited population likely to be impacted, much like Kirschman (2007). Vulnerability to secondary trauma can be increased in police officers responding to a critical incident when the primary victim is another police officer, particularly if the responding officers personally know the primary victim (Paton 2005). Although the current study focuses on understanding the multiple effects at the individual level, the entire department may be impacted by a shooting incident, be that through extensive and possibly negative media coverage or through civil litigation. How the department is portrayed and their response may also be a source of additional stress for both the officer(s) directly involved in the shooting and those suffering vicarious or secondary trauma, especially since Bonifacio (1991b) notes that officers are often less impacted by their individual low status in the community than they are by their department's low status in the community and city government.
The idea of secondary trauma is not a new concept in discussions of policing and critical incidents; Jones (1989) recognized, over two decades ago, that officers who have peripheral involvement in shooting incidents are often overlooked by police departments but are vulnerable to having a post-trauma reaction. Even though this problem has been recognized, there is very little extant literature available addressing secondary trauma and police officers, particularly in the context of shooting incidents. It is not farfetched to imagine that officers' vulnerability to secondary victimization is also impacted by personal and situational factors, much like the primary victim. These factors may include previous experiences of trauma, severity, length of exposure, and coping strategies. There is an awkward and brief acknowledgement of the possibility of secondary victimization in more modern responses to critical incidents, with Trompetter (2011:30) stating that “the well-being of dispatchers, nonsworn personnel, and other centrally involved in the incident should also be considered.” The IACP (2012a), in the model policy for post-shooting personnel support, however, does not address secondary victimization. The only mention of other officers in this policy regards making an agency briefing as soon as possible after the incident to avoid rumors and to encourage personnel to demonstrate their concern for the officer involved in the shooting incident.

Although not directly related to officer-involved shootings, Holt, Wall, Burruss and Blevins (2011) have recently studied secondary traumatic stress reactions in cybercrime examiners, noting that all types of cases should be considered for secondary traumatic stress-related issues because this type of trauma is universal to law enforcement officers. In this study, the researchers noted that most agencies had in-house counseling or peer support programs, but that most officers did not use these resources, with twenty
negatively impacting the officer’s job performance (IACP 2012a, Schwartz n.d.). Street level supervisors are not that far removed from street officers and may be placed in a position where there is psychological distress or additional trauma. The supervisor may also distrust outsiders, QMHP and feel that the agency can use the officer’s stress reactions against him or her. Yet, if their job mandates that they monitor behavior and make appropriate recommendations, they may be caught between the proverbial rock and a hard place. To whom do they owe their allegiance, with loyalty being one of the critical components of the police culture (Woody 2005)? Contrarily, though, Norcross (2011) states that supervisors know their personnel and are capable of looking for deviations, making them important in the recognition and management of the officer’s post trauma symptoms.

**Psychological Considerations: Other Officers**

The police culture creates a sense of solidarity and unity among officers that can, conversely, also further isolate officers from other cultures or subcultures to which they might belong (Woody 2005). While we often recognize the existence of, and imply the effects of, the police culture, it is often overlooked in the response to critical incidents. Kirschman (2007:87, 90) best identifies this issue, stating:

*Behind the primary trauma victim are the nearly invisible family members, friends and coworkers whose lives are also deeply affected by the trauma—but for whom few services exist... When a traumatic event occurs, those most intimately associated and exposed to it will probably be the most disturbed by it, but those on the periphery can be affected as well. People on the periphery—witnesses, helpers, bystanders, coroners, evidence technicians, communications dispatchers, and families—are most at risk for falling through the cracks and not getting the help they need. This occurs because, in police agencies, the officers are on top. Civilian employees are often considered second-class citizens, if they are considered at all, and families frequently don't even enter the equation.*
percent of respondents feeling that counseling would have a negative impact. Some of the issues identified regarding why secondary trauma is not being adequately addressed included stigma, failure of the agency to meet the needs of those suffering from vicarious trauma, trauma not being included in departmental wellness programs, peer-to-peer counseling being substituted for professional counseling, and professional counselors lacking cultural competence (Holt et al. 2011). Suggestions resulting from this study seem to also suggest that increased training and awareness of secondary trauma at all levels of the agency may have inoculative effects (Blau 1994, Hodgins, Creamer and Bell 2001, Jones 1989), and that secondary trauma should be included in discussions of officer safety and wellness (Holt et al. 2011).

**Psychological Considerations: Family and Friends**

While the impact an officer’s career in policing may have on his family is mentioned in several texts (Artwohl and Christensen 1997, Avdija 2011, Best, Artwohl and Kirschman 2011, Blau 1994, Bonifacio 1991a, Bonifacio 1991b, Gilmartin 2002, Kirschman 2007, Matsakis 2005, Niederhoffer and Niederhoffer 1978, Rutledge and Sewell 2012, White and Honig 1995), it is also acknowledged that secondary victimization is not limited to other police officers. Family and non-officer friends are also overlooked when considering the psychological impact of a critical incident. However, generally, the nature and consequences of police work can cause familial and interpersonal issues, and especially marital discord, leading to breakdown in communication, infidelity, anger, resentment and possibly divorce (Blau 1994, Bonifacio 1991b, Jones 1989, Kerley 2005), and these strains can be exacerbated or magnified following a critical incident. Bonifacio (1991b) suggests that significant others will cope
best with the effects of being in a relationship with a police officer if they accept that the
officer will always be in a three way relationship with both the significant other and the
job, what Niederhoffer and Niederhoffer (1978) referred to as a ménage a trios in the
emotional sense. Schwartz (n.d.) and Henry (2004) both reference the fallacy that
officers are able to leave work at work and suggest that, in trying to adhere to this
expectation and protect his or her family, the officer may default to the “nothing
syndrome.” This is when a significant other asks what is wrong and the officer’s
response is nothing, often leading to communication break downs and arguments. Best,
Artwohl and Kirschman (2011) find the oversight regarding the impact of policing on the
family, particularly when considering critical incidents, to be especially troubling, as the
family can suffer from secondary victimization (White and Honig 1995), limiting the role
they are able to play in mitigating the effects of critical incident stress upon the officer.
Kerley (2005) notes that, when considering police officer stress, we often forget that the
officer is a human being occupying different roles beyond that of a law enforcement
officer. This means that, quite often, the officer’s family, their needs and coping abilities,
are given little to no consideration in addressing how officers manage cumulative job-
related stress, let alone critical incident stress. Although there are no children involved in
the current study, Uribe (2014) demonstrates how a critical incident, in her example a line
of duty death, can increase fear and stress in law enforcement families, particularly in
what she calls line of duty kids.

Best, Artwohl and Kirschman (2011) note that, initially, the officer’s family will
fear for the officer’s physical safety upon notification that a critical incident has occurred.
If it is known that that officer in particular was involved, there may also be concerns for
the physically safety of the officer's partner, spouse and/or children, due to possible retaliation (Best, Artwohl and Kirschman 2011). Once the family is assured that the officer is physically safe, concerns regarding the officer's psychological well being are likely to arise, particularly related to possible changes in the officer's personality, attitude, ability to work, relationships with relatives, etc.

The family, particularly the spouse or partner, is also likely to experience feelings of anger that their lives were interrupted by this incident, anger towards a police department that is perceived as abandoning or betraying the officer-partner or spouse, fear that they will never again achieve normalcy in their home life, and anxiety that this incident will impact the family's financial security in the form of lost wages and possible civil litigation (Best, Artwohl and Kirschman 2011). Additionally, if the incident is highly covered in the press, the family is likely to come under intense public scrutiny and may have to witness their loved one being portrayed as a monster in the media (Best, Artwohl and Kirschman 2011, Jones 1989). The family may lose their privacy, have media attempt to contact them or come to their home, and may experience repetitive questioning from others, which may lead the family to withdraw from social contacts (Best, Artwohl and Kirschman 2011, Jones 1989). It is likely that this is one of the key reasons Tracy (2010) advocates that police departments adopt a 48-hour release policy, where the officer's name and the name of the individual who has been shot are not released to the media for 48 hours after the incident. Best, Artwohl and Kirschman (2011) also recommend that the police department work with the officer and his or her family to prepare them to deal with the media, be it television, newspaper or internet.
While dealing with their own post trauma reactions, the officer may appear to be self-absorbed, fixate on the incident, or cling to their peer group (Best, Artwohl and Kirschman 2011, Jones 1989, Kirschman 2007). Further, the officer may be hypervigilant or have an extreme startle response, leading to angry outbursts and/or social and emotional withdrawal; as Kirschman (2007:98) observes, “this cycling is often unpredictable and hard on the family.” The officer may also try to protect the family by not discussing the incident, potentially leading the family to feel shut out, ignored and devalued (Best, Artwohl and Kirschman 2011, Jones 1989, Kirschman 2007). As stated above, the family may be experiencing a secondary trauma response or victimization in relation to the officer’s shooting. Family members may feel angry or neglected when all of the attention is focused on the officer and their contributions and concerns are ignored (Best, Artwohl and Kirschman 2011, Jones 1989, Kirschman 2007). The incident may also intensify the family’s fears regarding the officer’s physical safety at work, or cause the family to realize how dangerous the job of a police officer is, possibly leading to the family pressuring the officer to leaving the police department and find a less dangerous career (Best, Artwohl and Kirschman 2011). Spouses or partners may also experience vicarious traumatization, visualizing the officer’s experience, absorbing or catching the officer’s feelings or emotions, and finding it incredulous to think that he or she was likely doing something mundane while their partner was involved in a critical incident (Kirschman 2007).

Further traumatizing the partner or spouse, and possibly further attenuating communication in the relationship, the officer may also be experiencing sexual dysfunction and may become physically assaultive or combative towards his or her
partner or spouse during the vivid nightmares often associated with PTSD, which may frighten the partner, further strain the relationship and contribute to the partner feeling he or she has no choice but to leave the relationship (Jones 1989, Kirschman 2007). While children were not involved with the case examined in the current study, both Kirschman (2007) and Best, Artwohl and Kirschman (2011) discuss the impact of critical incidents on, and the coping mechanisms commonly utilized by, children of police officers. Kirschman (2007) is one of the few sources that acknowledges and addresses a modern trend in policing: the dual cop relationship, where both partners in the intimate relationship are police officers. This provides yet another perspective and may lead to an increased likelihood for secondary victimization, as the spouse may be relating to the critical incident as a colleague and as an intimate partner. Communication may suffer because, as Kirschman (2007) notes, while a dual police officer relationship may facilitate discussing the distressing things seen and experienced on the job, there may still be a desire to shield and protect the significant other from particular horrors of the job. Further, the dual cop relationship may mean that the significant other not involved in the shooting is both expected to be strong and supportive for the officer involved in the trauma, as well as answer the questions and receive comments both as a colleague and a significant other, magnifying the potential stress placed upon the officer/significant other.

While these potential issues may paint a grim picture of family units or intimate relationships doomed to fail, these are not a predestined event. Much like with officers being informed of the effects of critical incident stress as a form of inoculation, so too can police families be inoculated against some of the potential strains of loving a law enforcement officer and develop effective communication strategies between the police
officer and his or her partner prior to a critical incident (Jones 1989, Kirschman 2007). It is suggested that the police department educate spouses early in the officer’s academy career about the risks of police work, the changes the officer will likely experience and in effective stress management techniques. It is also suggested that resources, to include post critical incident counseling and support groups, be established by the police department and provided for immediate family members (IACP 2012a, Jones 1989, Kirschman 2007). With these efforts, it is possible to not only improve the family’s coping mechanisms, and thus reduce their likelihood of developing post trauma reactions, while also strengthening this vital source of support for officers who have experienced a critical incident. Kirschman (2007:136-37, 40-41) provides lists of helpful tips for both dealing with a cop in crisis and for how family members can help themselves when their officer is in crisis. These include accepting that a trauma will impact the relationship with the officer and that this disruption may make the significant other angry, express commitment and affection for the officer while also expressing anger appropriately, avoiding substance abuse, fighting feeling guilty, considering attending a family debriefing, avoiding bottling up emotions and trying to make everything all right, and recognizing that, as someone close to the officer, significant others, family and friends may also have an emotional response to the trauma (Kirschman 2007).

Theoretical Considerations

Several theoretical approaches have been employed to understand use of deadly force incidents. While this study is exploratory and descriptive in nature, and thus limited in its application and testing of theory, it is important to address these applications and acknowledge that, should better and more reliable data on these
incidents become available, theoretical testing may be more useful in these types of analyses. Social disorganization (Sampson, Raudenbush and Earls 1997, Shaw, McKay and Hayner 1942) is a theory commonly applied to urban crime and its spatial concentration. The underlying principles of this theoretical orientation, racial or ethnic heterogeneity, population mobility, and concentrated poverty, are seen throughout the literature on police shootings and use of force. However, it is more appropriate to combine this perspective with both Black's theory of law (1976) as it applies to the police (1980) and Klinger's (1997) ecological theory of police behavior to provide a more comprehensive understanding of these incidents.

Black (1976, 1980) hypothesized that individuals vary in their abilities to apply and use the law, especially with regards to the amount and effectiveness of the law used; when specifically considering the police, use of force is akin to the application of law, which is in turn impacted by the quantity and quality of law available. Further, Black (1976) indicated that police would show increased aggression and punitiveness towards those who exist outside the dominant groups, particularly those who are poor, minorities and young, which strongly aligns with Bayley and Mendelsohn's (1969) argument that increased aggression and punitiveness will be displayed in lower class and high crime neighborhoods, as well as with White's (2002) conflict model of police use of force.

The concerns regarding over-policing of minorities were addressed by Goldkamp (1976) in a rather controversial way. Goldkamp (1976) asserted that those who are concerned with the disproportionate representation of minorities in deadly force encounters tend to fall into two theoretically polarized groups: those who believe minority crime statistics are reflective of differential policing that is rooted in prejudice
and discrimination, which also ties strongly to Black's theory of law (1976, 1980), and those who believe that disproportionate crime rates, and involvement in police shootings, are attributed to the fact that minorities are disproportionately involved in crime. In his discussion of each position, Goldkamp (1976) links each side of the debate with a theoretical underpinning—those who believe law enforcement is used as a categorical mechanism of inequality to target and oppress those of lower socioeconomic strata are aligned with a quasi-labeling perspective and those who believe that minorities are simply committing more crimes are framed as ascribing to a more sub-cultural approach, with Goldkamp providing limited evidence in support of the subcultural position. Although controversial, echoes of this dichotomy are still seen today, particularly in citizen reactions to news stories on deadly force incidents.

In newspaper editorials and letters to the editor, there appears to be a segment of the population that blames the police for harassing and murdering young black males and there is a segment of the population that asserts the victim is responsible for his or her own death by the choices they have made. This is not to say that those who author these responses are representative of the population at large, though, as there may be a self-selecting bias for individuals with polarized opinions to respond to such incidents. The second perspective commonly expressed, however, incorporates elements of von Hentig's (1940) attribution of blame to victims in his typology, Feather's (1998) related concept of deservingness of victim and Dietz's (1977) victim-precipitated homicide.

Von Hentig (1940), in his classification of victim typology, exemplifies this tendency to blame the victim: for example the greedy to gain victim, in their desperate pursuit of easy cash, is willing to lower his or her inhibitions and put themselves at
increased risk of victimization; and the tormentor is a victim acting as a source of constant oppression to the offender, who, under that strain over time, eventually explodes into violence (von Hentig 1940). In both of these classifications, it is easy to see that the characteristics attributed to the “victim” are less than ideal, deflecting blame away from the offender who committed the act, in the context of the current study, the police officer, and onto the individual who suffered victimization. Thus, in the course of understanding and analyzing a deadly force encounter, society assesses and categorizes the amount of responsibility attributable to each individual involved, in that responsibility refers to personal causation and intentionality (Feather 1998). As a result, society may, instead of recognizing the victim or the officer as an individual worthy of sympathy, stigmatize the individual and assign a label of blame.

Feather (1998) discussed the deservingness of victims, a concept tied to beliefs of fairness and justice and also related to an individual’s perceived responsibility for his or her actions and the outcomes of those actions. Barclay et al. (2004) referenced Feather’s (1998) work, finding that presence of communal attitudes concerning the deservingness of victims not only increases with perceived responsibility of the victim, but that these attitudes are also influenced by factors such as whether or not the victim is liked by the person passing judgment, whether the victim is seen to have a strong or a weak character, whether or not the victim belonged to the judgment maker’s in-group and whether or not the victim belonged to an out-group.

Additionally, Barclay et al (2004) found that these attitudes regarding deservingness can aid offenders in avoiding accepting a “criminal” self-label by providing the neutralizing justification that their action was not really a crime because
many people in the community would agree that the victim deserved what happened to them (Barclay et al., 2004). In terms of Goldkamp’s (1976) dichotomous perspectives on use of force, deservingness can be applied to both groups, as it can be argued that labeling members of the lower classes as less deserving feeds into the racist system that oppresses them, while it can also be argued that subcultural groups will hold different characteristics and qualities as valuable, leading to differing perspectives of deservingness and blameworthiness.

The last component of deservingness and blameworthiness is linked to the actions of the suspect or victim. An active victim (as opposed to someone in the wrong place, at the wrong time, victimized by an unknown offender), engages in the criminal event; crime does not simply just happen to that person. Dietz (1977) and Karmen (2004) both discuss the idea of victim-precipitated homicide. In this scenario, the victim is an active player in his or her own death, meaning that he or she has somehow provoked the offender to act violently against them, possibly in the context of an assault or under the influence of alcohol (Nielsen and Martinez, 2003). As it relates to the current study, suspects who commit crimes, challenge or fail to comply with police commands and/or assault police officers can be seen as active participants in bringing about a use of deadly force encounter.

From a different and less polarized perspective, Smith (1986) used Black’s (1976) theory in the context of variables commonly associated with social disorganization, finding that there were significant racial differences in the application of force and suggesting that there is an interaction between the individual and place in these incidents, as the use of force increases were seen in minority and racially heterogeneous areas. This
perspective was supported by the findings of Sun, Payne and Wu (2008), who noted increases in coercive behaviors and interactions by police in poor neighborhoods, suggesting that, from a social disorganization perspective, the increased use of force may stem from the causal chain of increased disorganization leading to increased crime leading to increased calls for service and thereby resulting in increased police presence and interaction in disadvantaged communities. Yet, Sun, Payne and Wu (2008) also acknowledge that these results could simply indicate that minorities and the poor are subject to increased coercive police behavior, suggesting a conflict orientation.

There are also conflicting findings regarding the importance of race in these incidents. Lawton (2007) found that race was not significant when controlling for situational characteristics (severity of the crime, presence of multiple officers, citizen behaviors) and individual officer characteristics, particularly a previous use of force incident within the past year. Similarly, White (2002) found limited support for racial differences, with only encounters between non-white suspects and non-white officers demonstrating significant explanatory and predictive effects. White (2002) also found strong support for the consideration of situational determinants (type of incident, multiple officers present and suspect behavior), finding that, in his sample, although there were a disproportionate percentage of black males shot, this was partially a consequence of those victims/suspects committing gun assaults against police officers and not due to discriminatory police behavior. Yet McElvain and Kposowa (2008) found that race and gender of the officer do matter in police shootings, with young, white male officers significantly more likely to be involved in a shooting incident. However, like Lawton (2007), McElvain and Kposowa (2008) also noted strong effects associated with
individual officer characteristics, particularly previous history of shooting incidents, increased education and increased experience as a police officer.

Klinger (1997) suggests that there is an interaction that occurs between the crime rate, the seriousness of an offense, and the vigor with which an officer responds, while also noting that use of force does not equate to vigor. Instead, Klinger (1997) suggests that officers in a given area perceive a normative amount of deviance for that particular area and only react to those transgressions that violate that perceived standard, thus formal police work decreases in areas with high rates of deviance. Terrill and Reisig (2003) suggest that Klinger's ecological theory may support the use of neighborhood context as an explanatory factor for police use of force, but caution that Klinger's work utilized police districts, which are much larger than neighborhoods, as the primary unit of analysis, thus making application and comparison of this theory at the neighborhood level problematic. However, there have been several other studies that suggest an ecological or geographic patterning of police behavior. Kania and Mackey (1977) and Fyfe (1980) both found significant correlations between measures of community violence and violence perpetrated by police. Much like Skolnick's (1966) symbolic assailant, Terrill and Reisig (2003) found that police display an increased use of force in high crime areas, suggesting that problem places and increased perception of danger lead to the labeling of symbolic neighborhoods. This finding is also supported by Werthman and Piliavin's (1967) concept of ecological contamination, where officers tend to associate neighborhoods with the rate at which they encounter potential suspects.
Theoretical Frame for the Current Study

While the theories mentioned above consider deadly force incidents, they often consider the incident in isolation—isolated from the previous experience and understandings of the officer involved, isolated from the aftermath of the incident, isolated from the impact the incident has on the lives of those close to the officer, and isolated from the meanings and symbolism that flow from and through officer-involved shootings. When considering the officer's role and response to these incidents, psychological theories, such as psychodynamic theories or transactional analysis, are often employed, overlooking that, while the officer's experience is central to the shooting incident, there are multiple effects, experiences and interpretations of any event, critical or mundane. As the current study seeks to holistically explore the impact of officer-involved shootings on the officers and those close to the officer, the most appropriate theoretical frame to use to explore and understand the pre-incident, incident and post-incident factors of officer-involved shootings from several perspectives is symbolic interactionism (SI). SI diverged from the more positivistic and behavioralist approaches that were en vogue at the time of its emergence (Lauer and Handel 1977), embracing more qualitative methodologies, such as participant observation, ethnography, non-participant observation, archival research and content analyses (Einstadter and Henry 2006).

In our daily lives, we attach meaning to everything that surrounds us—objects, persons and events—and our lived experiences also shape those meanings. This is no less true for an officer involved shooting. To a symbolic interactionist, meaning in the world is constructed through the interpretation of symbols and gestures that are used in
interactions with other members of a social group (Lemert 1951, Mead 1964, Mead 1982, Simmel 1950, Simmel 1959, Tannenbaum 1938, Vold, Bernard and Snipes 1998). This suggests that, to the various participants involved in a critical incident, as well as those involved after the critical incident has occurred, the incident can encompass different meanings.

Simmel (1950, 1959, 1971) felt that a group or society was incapable of existing as objects separate from the individuals, that society only exists in the minds of the individuals who were participating in relationships with other individuals. Thus, Pampel (2000:137-38) states that social interaction can be defined as the process by which “individuals form groups when, as a way to satisfy their needs and desires, they interact or associate with and influence one another.” In these interactions, Simmel (1950, 1959, 1971) believed that individuals need to somehow organize and catalog their social experiences, leading to an interpretive process where an individual, through the use of contents and social forms, imposes order. Contents, according to Pampel (2000) would be whatever is within the individual that leads them to interact socially with others, while social forms are the scripts that exist to guide those social interactions.

George Herbert Mead was greatly influenced by Dewey and the Chicago school in his work (Pampel, 2000), and believed that individual experiences and behavior had a common root in the communication and interaction with other individuals and groups in society, which leads to the development of the social self (Mead 1934, Mead 1964, Mead 1982). From childhood, individuals are immersed in learning shared meanings of words, symbols and gestures, which all must be constantly examined and redefined, that allow them to communicate and interact with others and this became the central focus as
Herbert Blumer continued Mead's work on what Blumer called "symbolic interactionism" (Blumer 1969). Newburn (2009) notes that the development of symbolic interactionism was strongly influenced by Mead's social psychology approach and by the sociological approach utilized by Blumer, both of whom sought to understand the meaning of interaction. This influence makes the application of symbolic interactionism particularly relevant to the current study because it allows for the recognition of the importance of both the individual as a thinking, creative actor while concurrently acknowledging that the individual is shaped and influenced by, and nested within, subculture(s) and a larger culture.

Blumer (1969) identifies three foundational premises that form the basis for SI: that how we act towards things is dependent upon the meanings we give them; that meaning is constructed through social interaction; and meaning is gleaned and altered through an interpretive process. One of the primary assumptions underlying SI is that humans are active in the construction of their social world, although Mead felt that this was a reciprocal creative process where the individual creates social forms and those same social forms cause the individual to grow and change (Einstadter and Henry 2006). This interpretive process means that behavior is not static, that it is continually subject to interpretation, negotiation and reform (Blumer 1969). Evidence of this interpretive process of generating, applying and modifying meaning is found throughout the literature on police officers and critical incidents. Violanti (2005), for example, notes that resilience is related to "interpretations that people attach to events around them, as well as to their own place in the world of experiences," and the first of Kirschman's (2007) five basic principles of trauma-related stress is that trauma is in the eye of the beholder.
Best, Artwohl and Kirschman (2011) even suggest that, when defining an incident as “critical,” the meaning may attach more to the officer’s reaction to the incident, rather than to the incident itself.

Lauer and Handel (1977) identify ten key concepts associated with SI—symbol, interaction, attitude, socialization, role, role taking, self, generalized other/reference group, and situation—with role taking being particularly important in the interpretive process because it allows humans to anticipate and react to the responses of others. While we can attempt to understand how others think and act, there is no guarantee that we all interpret situations and symbols in the same way (Einstadter and Henry 2006). As a result of our ability to anticipate responses, we are also subject to the control of others during interactions (Einstadter and Henry 2006). Of great salience to the current study is the work of Erving Goffman (1959, 1963), particularly the concepts of impression management and stigma. Impression management incorporates the key concepts of role, role taking and self, acknowledging that we strive to present ourselves in the best light possible to others and hide what we consider to be our true selves during interactions (Goffman 1959). Goffman (1959) likened this process to a theatrical performance where the individual presents a particular role or character to the audience sitting in the theater, but is able to hide their true identity, which is expressed in the back stage area where theater patrons are not permitted to go. The concepts of roles and impression management are particularly important in addressing the psychological components of officer-involved shootings. Officers are known to develop an occupational persona that banishes “softer” emotions (Stone n.d.), like fear and uncertainty, to the back stage area, primarily due to the fear of losing the respect of one’s peers and appearing weak.
In the aftermath of a shooting incident, the post trauma reactions the officer experiences may be contrary to his or her projected role of the stoic officer, thus impacting his or her self concept, and he or she may continue to attempt to play this role in front of peers, supervisors and family members (Cullen and Agnew 2011, Jones 1989). This need for impression management may also underlie why Tucker (2011) found that officers do not take advantage of stress intervention services: they are afraid of appearing weak or less macho; they are afraid of negative career impacts, such as failure to promote, impeding ability to testify in court and/or job loss; and they are afraid they will be viewed as mentally unstable. Malmin (2012) echoes these findings, suggesting that at the organizational level, the stereotypes perpetuated by the police subculture are replicated through policies that reflect a lack of understanding of trauma, minimal service provision, and a lack of attention to personnel. If treatment for or response to officers in the aftermath of a shooting incident can break through these barriers built to manage impressions, it can potentially have preventative effects, particularly in the areas of future use of force incidents, maladjustment issues, the development of post traumatic stress reactions and possibly even future deadly force incidents. Yet, officers are often presented with subculturally proscribed behaviors and attitudes when they are at their most vulnerable, facing sarcasm and ridicule for showing weakness instead of compassion and support (Malmin 2012).

The second concept from Goffman (1963) that is particularly relevant to the current study is stigma, defined as “the situation of the individual who is disqualified from full social acceptance.” With stigma, there is a great reliance on perceptions of the stereotype associated with the stigma, while the reality of the individual may diverge.
greatly from this depiction. A stigma can be based upon something that is physically visible, such as a physical handicap or deformity, or it can be based on something internalized that, once known by those with whom an individual is interacting, causes the recognized others to turn away from or have a different perception of the individual (Goffman 1963). This can be evidenced in the discussion of Locker Room Shock (Jones 1989) and similar feelings of being different from other officers who have not been involved in a shooting incident, leading to possibly deepened feelings of isolation (Jones 1989, Kirschman 2007, Tucker 2011). Many of the reactions Goffman (1963) noted the stigmatized individual might experience—not feeling accepted, feeling numb, awkwardness when dealing with “normal” individuals, suspicion, depression, hostility, anxiety, bewilderment, and being unsure of how “normal” people will identify and relate to him or her—are reflected in the literature on officer post trauma responses, as described in an earlier section. Impression management also becomes key because, in anticipating the response of others to his or her stigma, the officer involved in a shooting may feel like they are perpetually on stage, hiding his or her true self and reactions from all persons. The concepts of impression management and stigma may also be intertwined in what can be considered the gendered nature of police work (Chan, Doran and Marel 2010, Chan, Devery and Doran 2003, Martin and Jurik 1996/2006, Martin 1999, Morash and Haarr 2012, Prokos and Padavic 2002). If police work is indeed a manifestation of hegemonic masculinity (Prokos and Padavic 2002) and a means of doing gender (Chan, Doran and Marel 2010, Morash and Haarr 2012), then appearing weak or giving into more “feminine” emotions would be unacceptable for an officer that has been involved in a critical incident. This desire to avoid the stigma of not being a tough, macho man may
lead to efforts to manage impressions so that colleagues and supervisors are not aware of maladaptive coping strategies, impeding recognition of a problem and appropriate intervention efforts. Similarly, the more positive responses of stigmatized individuals, seeing the effect of being stigmatized as a secret blessing and leading to a change in perspective (Goffman 1963), may be related to Kirschman’s (2007) concept of posttraumatic growth.

Finally, Goffman (1963) acknowledges that “the first set of sympathetic others is of course those who share his [or her] stigma,” which explains why the need for peer support members who have experience in police shootings is reiterated throughout the literature on this topic. While stigma is a theoretically applicable concept when discussing officer-involved shootings that may help understand the phenomenon and the responses to a given incident, it must be clearly stated that not all officers may be stigmatized, or feel stigmatized, in the aftermath of a police shooting. While it is not the intent of the author to label these officers as “damaged goods,” for indeed they are no, it is the author’s intention to highlight the fact that if the theoretical concepts of impression management and stigma are addressed in developing and implementing best practices in responding to and treating officers involved in shooting incidents, there is the potential for preventative effects, such as decreasing officer maladjustment, preventing increased aggression and/or use of force incidents following a shooting incident, decreasing the risk for developing PTSD and possibly even preventing future shooting incidents (McElvain and Kposowa 2008).
Conclusion

As demonstrated in this chapter, there are still several questions related to officer-involved shootings that are not answered by the extant literature. From ambiguous guidelines to uncertainty regarding frequency, many of the essential two-dimensional statistics are either lacking or bolstered by insufficient data. Additionally, the post trauma responses exhibited by the officer, his or her colleagues, and the officer’s family and friends are highly personalized, reflective of that individual’s personal history, situational and environmental circumstances. What is known is that most officers will experience some form of post trauma response, but are often afraid of the consequences of utilizing support services and have little faith in the systems in place meant to serve their needs. The issues discussed in this chapter are neither simple nor static and utilizing symbolic interactionism as an analytical lens may facilitate understanding the multiple roles, perspectives and meanings associated with a single shooting incident. Addressing an issue this complex, with so many individuals and groups potentially impacted by a single shooting incident, requires flexibility, creativity, and balance.
CHAPTER III
PRELIMINARY STUDY

Introduction: A Preliminary Study to Contextualize this Case

As indicated in the previous chapter, to understand the use of deadly force in a given city, region, or relationally between adjacent jurisdictions, a comprehensive examination of the frequency and factors impacting the use of force must be undertaken. But, as noted by Geller and Scott (1992:18), "...enumerating a jurisdiction's shooting cases is merely the first step in attempting to understand the causes and control methods for police-involved shootings...Behind every shooting that is presented as a two-dimensional statistic is a complex human story that must be understood if one is to make genuine progress in devising feasible systems for safeguarding police and their clientele."

While the author agrees with this approach, in an effort to contextualize the complex human story behind one police shooting through a case study, it became apparent that the critical first step—having valid and reliable statistics that document the frequency and characteristics of police shootings—was absent. What is known about police shootings is sadly lacking, and quite shocking, especially when considering that highly regarded policing scholars have been calling for some sort of basic accounting of these incidents for over thirty years (Engel 2008, Fyfe 2002, Geller and Scott 1992, Hickman, Piquero and Garner 2008b, Sherman and Langworthy 1979, Smith 2008). In the absence of available and accessible two-dimensional statistics that Geller and Scott (1992) suggest are but the first step in understanding police shootings, a preliminary study was conducted, seeking to explore the use of deadly force in the seven cities of the Hampton Roads region of Virginia between April of 1990 and September of 2010 in order to
provide a platform from which to consider and understand police shootings in this area. This is important for building the bridge to connect the overarching themes from the case study at the heart of the preliminary study by providing the reader with an understanding of what police shootings look like in the region and city of study. As much of the literature applying to this preliminary study was included in the previous chapter, the current chapter will only contain the relevant methodology, results, discussion and limitations.

**Methods**

The data for this study were derived from a content analysis of newspaper articles from the Hampton Roads region of Virginia. As noted previously, there is a lack of official, detailed and available data at the national, state and municipal levels related to officer-involved shootings, leaving newspaper articles as the most abundant source of information on these incidents and making a content analysis an appropriate methodology to collect this data. Further, in addition to suffering from significant limitations, the official data often does not provide circumstances surrounding fatal and non-fatal police shootings; thus, following the example set by White and Ready (2009), this study turned to news media reports to gather this data. Original data were collected through keyword searches of the online archives of the *The Virginian Pilot*, spanning the time period from April 1990 to September 2010. This time period encompasses the oldest articles in the *Pilot*'s archives to the month that the preliminary study began. While it cannot be assumed that all police shootings are reported in the media, the *Pilot* was chosen because, as noted by a local Public Information Officer, this newspaper has a reputation for fact checking with local police departments before publication of materials. The archives
were searched using the terms “police shoot*,” “police shot,” and “police kill.” These search terms were utilized to capture information about all lethal and non-lethal police-involved shootings in the Hampton Roads region during this time period.

The unit of analysis in the preliminary study is the individual incident; data were gathered from initial and follow-up articles, editorials and letters to the editor. Taken together, these articles often provided additional information beyond that found in official data sources, including a sense of the community’s reaction and response to use of force incidents, block addresses of most incidents, the events leading to the shooting, and decedent and officer characteristics, that allowed for a more comprehensive understanding of individual incidents and will provide multiple avenues for potential future research.

During the analysis of the articles obtained in the initial searches, approximately 26 additional incidents were identified that were not in the results of the initial keyword searches. These additional incidents were mentioned in the initial articles found and a second search was conducted for those specific incidents, most commonly using the victim’s name or the date of the incident as the search term. In turn, these additional articles yielded an additional four incidents that required further research. In total, this study includes data from 239 newspaper articles regarding 121 officer-involved shooting incidents.

In the content analysis, several variables were coded in addition to a brief summary of the article, editorial, or letter to the editor. These variables, when reported in the press, include: the date the article was published; the page and section of the paper where the article was published; the author; the incident date, time and day of the week;
if the article was a follow-up to a previous story and the number of follow-ups per incident; the city in which the incident occurred as well as the section of the city in which the incident occurred and the address of the incident; the suspect’s name, gender, race, and age; whether or not the officer(s) involved were named in the press, and if named, the officer’s unit, race, age, and years on the force; whether or not the suspect was armed and the type of weapon; if the shooting occurred in the context of a pursuit, the commission of another crime, following a domestic violence incident, or in a hostage or barricade environment; whether there was an explicit mention of alcohol use, drug use or involvement, or mental health issues by the suspect; whether the suspect threatened to harm another civilian or themselves; evidence of possible suicide by cop; if and how the suspect was injured or was killed, including designations as fatal, injurious or non-injurious incidents; if and how the officer was injured; if the officer was placed on administrative duties or leave; any charges filed against the suspect or accomplices; any civil litigation mentioned; and general comments about tone and orientation of articles.

Findings

The preliminary study identified 121 police shootings covered in the Virginian Pilot between April 1990 and September 2010. One case from March 1990 was addressed in follow-up articles thoroughly enough that it was included in the dataset. Data were first analyzed as an aggregate of all seven cities before each city’s incidents were analyzed separately. Table 3 presents the aggregate totals of the variables for the Hampton Roads region.
Table 3: Aggregate Characteristics of Police Shootings in Hampton Roads, Virginia, 1990-2010

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variable</th>
<th>Frequency</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Total Shooting Incidents</td>
<td>121</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Legitimate Defense of Life</td>
<td>92</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total Articles</td>
<td>238</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Articles in Front Section of Paper</td>
<td>38</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Articles in Local Pages 1-3</td>
<td>118</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Editorials, Letters to Editor, Commentary Articles</td>
<td>31</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Classification of Shooting
- Fatal: 62
- Injurious: 39
- Non-Injurious: 7
- Animal: 10

Suspect's Weapon
- Knife: 14
- Gun: 63
- Shotgun: 10
- Assault Rifle: 2
- Vehicle: 16

Suspect Characteristics
- Male: 93
- Female: 8
- Age: 84 ($M = 30.53$)
- Race: 10

Officer Characteristics
- Officer Named in Press: 43
- Officer Age: 14 ($M = 34.3$)
- Years on Police Department: 19 ($M = 6.7$)
- Officer Race: 2
- Unit/Assignment
  - Vice and Narcotics: 7
  - Precinct/Patrol: 6
  - K-9: 5
  - SWAT: 4
  - Off Duty: 4
  - Bicycle Patrol: 3
  - Metro Tactical: 1
  - Sheriff's Deputy: 1
  - Airport Police: 1

Day of Week
- Monday: 13
- Tuesday: 12
- Wednesday: 20
- Thursday: 25
- Friday: 21
- Saturday: 12
- Sunday: 14

Time of Day
- Morning (6am-12pm): 16
- Afternoon (12pm-5pm): 15
- Evening (5pm-12am): 50
- Night (12am-6am): 30
Table 3: Aggregate Characteristics of Police Shootings Continued

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Context of Incident</th>
<th>Count</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Foot or Vehicle Pursuit</td>
<td>47</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Commission of Crime</td>
<td>54</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Domestic Disturbance</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hostage/Barricade Scenario</td>
<td>24</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mental Health Issue</td>
<td>19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Drug Use or Involvement</td>
<td>22</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Alcohol Use</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Shots Fired at Officer</td>
<td>29</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Threat to Others</td>
<td>40</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Threat to Self</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Possible Suicide by Cop</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Officer Injured</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Shot</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cut or Stabbed</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hit by Car</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Killed</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Administrative Action Pending Investigation</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Administrative Duty</td>
<td>28</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Administrative Leave</td>
<td>22</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Civil Litigation Mentioned</td>
<td>18</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

It should be noted that this study is not considered to be a population of shooting incidents, as there are several fatal and non-fatal incidents that have occurred within this region of which the author is aware that did not appear in the newspaper articles examined in this study. It is likely that there is still a significant dark figure (Biderman and Reiss 1967, McClintock 1970, Messner 1984, Snortum and Berger 1986) associated with police involved shootings that will only be addressed by open access to police records, to include all instances when officers discharge their weapons. However, even acknowledging the existence of an unknown or unaccounted for number of police shootings, the preliminary study identified 27 fatal police shootings in the Hampton Roads area between 2005 and 2010, six more incidents than reported by the Virginia State Police. On average, there were six shooting incidents per year, and an average of 17 incidents per city, covered in this study.
A modified version of White's (2006) classification of fatal, injurious and non-injurious shootings was used, with the addition of the category of animal to cover the number of dogs, and the single steer, shot by police that were reported in the *Pilot*. Using this classification system, the outcomes of these use of force incidents were 62 fatalities, 39 injuries, 7 non-injurious cases, 10 animals, and the remaining cases could not be classified. While most incidents included a single victim/offender, there were several where multiple offenders were involved. For example, the bank robbery turned pursuit turned shootout that occurred in Norfolk on May 29, 1992 involved three suspects—two males and one female. One male was killed, one was injured, and while there is no mention of an injury to the female, she was later taken to the hospital.

Of the individuals involved, 93 were males and eight were females, with an average age of approximately 31 years. The officer or officers involved were publicly identified in 43 incidents. It should be noted that in one of the most controversial police shootings, the "blue on blue" death of Norfolk Police Officer Seneca Darden, Officer Gordon Barry was not initially identified by the Norfolk Police Department, but by "sources." Information regarding the officers, such as their age, race, duty assignment and years on the police department were inconsistently reported. The officer's duty assignment was only noted in relation to 35 incidents, with seven incidents involving Vice and Narcotics investigators, six incidents involving Patrol officers, five incidents involving K-9 officers, four incidents involving SWAT officers, four incidents involving off duty officers, three incidents involving Bike Patrol, one incident involving a Sheriff's deputy on duty, and one incident involving a Norfolk International Airport Police officer on duty. There were also three incidents where officers were involved in shootings
outside of their jurisdiction, including one incident involving an off duty officer. Officer ages were provided in only 14 incidents, with an average of 34.3 years. Years on the police department were mentioned in 19 incidents, with an average tenure of almost seven years ($M = 6.7$ years).

In 93 of the incidents included in the preliminary study, there appears to be clear evidence of the need for the officer to defend him- or herself, or to protect a citizen, from a suspect brandishing or actively demonstrating the intent to use a weapon. To be clear, many comments in editorials and commentaries noted that officers shot “unarmed” drivers, but this research considered an automobile, when driven at officers or other citizens, to be a weapon. Officers were fired upon in 29 incidents, and officers were shot in 16 incidents, with three officers and one K-9 dog being fatally wounded in the newspaper articles included in the preliminary study. It should be noted that these articles did not include at least three officers who were shot and killed in the line of duty, according to the Law Enforcement Officers Killed and Assaulted (LEOKA) sections of the *Crime in Virginia* reports, during the time period examined. Six officers were hit by cars and four officers were cut or stabbed, including one officer that was stabbed in the neck. One officer was severely beaten with a piece of lumber, one was choked and one officer suffered injuries from a motor vehicle accident where the suspect hit the officer’s patrol car. In the articles analyzed in the preliminary study, 29 injuries to officers were noted in the 20 year period considered. Yet, information derived from disaggregated LEOKA information obtained from the VSP through a FOIA request, shows that between 2005 and 2009 there were 1931 injuries sustained by officers in the line of duty in the Hampton Roads area. This suggests that the media may underreport the frequency
with which officers are injured in these encounters. Further, only 50 incidents noted whether the officer was placed on administrative duties (n = 28) or administrative leave (n = 22), pending the departmental and Commonwealth Attorney’s Office investigations that follow any officer involved shooting, with administrative leave being frequently mentioned in high profile shooting cases. There were 18 civil litigations mentioned in the wake of these incidents, several of which involved officers suing the city or civilians involved in the incident.

It should also be noted that the race of the offender, officer, or both, was typically only mentioned in cases where there was some sort of allegation that the shooting was racially motivated. The one exception to this was the initial reporting of one incident which described the victim of a fatal police shooting as a white male before his identity was released. In total, the offender/victim’s race was identified in ten incidents, with the officer’s race only being identified in two incidents, both of which occurred in the same jurisdiction. In February 2007, an article was published in the front section of the Pilot that examined all officer involved shootings or incidents where officers were shot in the city of Norfolk between 2002 and 2005. While race is often not mentioned in the articles on these shootings, this report found that 15 of the 17 individuals shot by police during the time period considered were Black.

In terms of situational characteristics, these shooting incidents were found to occur more frequently between Wednesday and Friday (n = 66), between the hours of 5:00pm and 12:00am (n = 50), where the suspect had a gun (n = 63). In 40 incidents, the individual shot by the police presented a threat to other citizens, but only posed a significant threat to themselves in seven incidents. There were 15 incidents where there
are indications that the individual may have been looking to commit suicide by cop. Suspect drug use or involvement (n = 22) and alcohol use (n = 7) were specified less frequently in the news articles than expected.

Also surprising was the fact that the suspect was presented as having mental health issues in only 19 incidents, however, these incidents often generated a great deal of community response that was unfavorable to the police departments involved, regardless of the circumstances of the incident. For example, in August of 1997 Chesapeake Police responded to a call regarding a young woman, bloody and wearing little clothing, walking down the street holding a bowling pin and a knife. Officers had been to the woman's home earlier in the day and taken her to the hospital, but she had been released and returned home. Family members kept telling the police, who were ordering the woman to drop the knife, that the young woman was sick. The woman then threatened to kill the officers and lunged at them, cutting two officers. A third fired at her and she was injured. Community residents immediately vented their anger at the police for shooting the woman, noting that she was obviously mentally ill and suggesting the community could have handled the situation better themselves, without police involvement.

Forty-seven shooting incidents occurred within the context of a pursuit, either foot or vehicle, of the suspect and 54 incidents occurred during the commission of another crime, with those crimes ranging from domestic disputes to armed robbery and murder. Only 20 incidents occurred within the context of a domestic disturbance or domestic violence call for service. There were also 24 incidents that involved a hostage or barricaded suspect scenario.
With respect to the media coverage allotted to these incidents, not all shootings are created equal. Of the 239 articles reviewed in this study, only 38 were located in the front section of the paper, indicating higher importance. The articles that appeared in the front section were often related to highly controversial shootings, such as the blue-on-blue shooting of Seneca Darden, the shootings of both Bruce Quagliato and Bryan Dugan in Virginia Beach, and the shooting of Albie Schatzhuber in Chesapeake. Of the remaining articles, only 118 appeared within the first three pages of the Local section of the paper, with the remaining articles located farther back in local section. There were 16 articles that displayed a clear pro-police orientation, many of which were published after an officer was seriously injured or killed in the line of duty. Additionally, there were 18 articles that presented clear negative sentiments towards the police, often following an incident where there was a suggestion that the shooting was racially motivated or the suspect was known to have mental health issues. There were 11 incidents where articles explicitly stated that there was a suspicion that the shooting had a racial component involved.

While the aggregated regional context is helpful in both furthering and deepening our understanding of police involved shootings in Virginia in comparison to national trends, it is the differences between the seven cities in the Hampton Roads area that were most surprising and provided the most insight. Table 4 below displays the differences between the seven cities in the data collected in the preliminary study.
Table 4: Characteristics of Police Shootings in Hampton Roads, Virginia, by City, 1990-2010

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Chesapeake</th>
<th>Hampton</th>
<th>Newport News</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Total Shooting Incidents</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Clear Evidence of Legitimate</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Defense of Life</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total Articles</td>
<td>43</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Articles in Front Section of Paper</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Articles in Local Pages 1-3</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Editorials, Letters to Editor, Commentary Articles</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>White's Classification</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fatal</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Injurious</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Non-Injurious</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Animal</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Suspect Weapon</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Knife</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gun</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Shot Gun</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Assault Rifle</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vehicle</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Suspect Characteristics</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Male</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Female</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Age</td>
<td>15 (M = 32.3)</td>
<td>2 (M = 39)</td>
<td>3 (M = 31.7)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Race</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Officer Characteristics</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Officer Named in Press</td>
<td>7</td>
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<td>0</td>
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<tr>
<td>Officer Age</td>
<td>3 (M = 33.3)</td>
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<td>Years on Police Department</td>
<td>1 (M = 5)</td>
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<td>Officer Race</td>
<td>0</td>
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<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unit/Assignment</td>
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<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vice and Narcotics</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Precinct/Patrol</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>K-9</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
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<tr>
<td>SWAT</td>
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<tr>
<td>Off Duty</td>
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<tr>
<td>Bicycle Patrol</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
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<tr>
<td>Metro Tactical</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sheriff's Deputy</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Airport Police</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
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<tr>
<td>Day of Week</td>
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</tr>
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<td>Monday</td>
<td>2</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tuesday</td>
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<td>Thursday</td>
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<td>Friday</td>
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<td>Saturday</td>
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<td>0</td>
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<tr>
<td>Sunday</td>
<td>3</td>
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<td>0</td>
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<tr>
<td>Time of Day</td>
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<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Morning (6am-12pm)</td>
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<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Afternoon (12pm-5pm)</td>
<td>5</td>
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<td>0</td>
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<tr>
<td>Evening (5pm-12am)</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>4</td>
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<tr>
<td>Night (12am-6am)</td>
<td>2</td>
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</table>
Table 4: Characteristics of Police Shootings Continued

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Context of Incident</th>
<th>Chesapeake</th>
<th>Hampton</th>
<th>Newport News</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Foot or Vehicle Pursuit</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Commission of Crime</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Domestic Disturbance</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hostage/Barricade Scenario</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
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<tr>
<td>Mental Health Issue</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Drug Use or Involvement</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Alcohol Use</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Shots Fired at Officer</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Threat to Others</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Threat to Self</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
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<tr>
<td>Possible Suicide by Cop</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
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<tr>
<td>Officer Injured</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Shot</td>
<td>4</td>
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<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cut or Stabbed</td>
<td>3</td>
<td></td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hit by Car</td>
<td>1</td>
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<td>Other</td>
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<tr>
<td>Killed</td>
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<td>Administrative Action Pending Review</td>
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<td>Administrative Leave</td>
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<tr>
<td>Civil Litigation Mentioned</td>
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Table 4 continued: Characteristics of Police Shootings in Hampton Roads, Virginia, by City, 1990-2010

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Norfolk</th>
<th>Portsmouth</th>
<th>Suffolk</th>
<th>Virginia Beach</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Total Shooting Incidents</td>
<td>45</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>35</td>
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<tr>
<td>Clear Evidence of Legitimate Defense of Life</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>25</td>
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<tr>
<td>Total Articles</td>
<td>91</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>69</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Articles in Front Section of Paper</td>
<td>21</td>
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<td>0</td>
<td>12</td>
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<tr>
<td>Articles in Local Pages 1-3</td>
<td>44</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>35</td>
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<tr>
<td>Editorials, Letters to Editor, Commentary Articles</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>White’s Classification</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fatal</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Injurious</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Non-Injurious</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Animal</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Suspect Weapon</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Knife</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>5</td>
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<tr>
<td>Gun</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Shot Gun</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Assault Rifle</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vehicle</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Suspect Characteristics</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Male</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>33</td>
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<tr>
<td>Female</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Age</td>
<td>31 (M = 27.19)</td>
<td>4 (M = 46.75)</td>
<td>1 (M = 49)</td>
<td>28 (M = 29.5)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Race</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
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**Table 4: Characteristics of Police Shootings Continued**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th><strong>Officer Characteristics</strong></th>
<th><strong>Norfolk</strong></th>
<th><strong>Portsmouth</strong></th>
<th><strong>Suffolk</strong></th>
<th><strong>Virginia Beach</strong></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Officer Named in Press</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Officer Age</td>
<td>2 (M = 38.5)</td>
<td>3 (M = 32.7)</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>6 (M = 34.2)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Years on Police Department</td>
<td>7 (M = 7.29)</td>
<td>2 (M = 11.75)</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>9 (M = 4.8)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Officer Race</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
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<tr>
<td>Unit/Assignment</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vice and Narcotics</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Precinct/Patrol</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>3</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>K-9</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>SWAT</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>3</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Off Duty</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>2</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bicycle Patrol</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Metro Tactical</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sheriff's Deputy</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Airport Police</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

| **Day of Week**             |             |                |             |                   |
| Monday                      | 6           | 0              | 0           | 5                 |
| Tuesday                     | 3           | 0              | 0           | 4                 |
| Wednesday                   | 8           | 2              | 1           | 8                 |
| Thursday                    | 11          | 2              | 0           | 4                 |
| Friday                      | 8           | 1              | 0           | 3                 |
| Saturday                    | 3           | 4              | 0           | 5                 |
| Sunday                      | 5           | 0              | 0           | 6                 |

| **Time of Day**             |             |                |             |                   |
| Morning (6am-12pm)          | 5           | 2              | 0           | 5                 |
| Afternoon (12pm-5pm)        | 6           | 2              | 1           | 1                 |
| Evening (5pm-12am)          | 17          | 4              | 0           | 14                |
| Night (12am-6am)            | 12          | 1              | 0           | 13                |

| **Context of Incident**     |             |                |             |                   |
| Foot or Vehicle Pursuit     | 18          | 2              | 0           | 14                |
| Commission of Crime         | 27          | 2              | 0           | 15                |
| Domestic Disturbance        | 6           | 0              | 0           | 10                |
| Hostage/Barricade Scenario  | 8           | 5              | 0           | 6                 |
| Mental Health Issue         | 4           | 3              | 0           | 9                 |
| Drug Use or Involvement     | 10          | 0              | 0           | 7                 |
| Alcohol Use                 | 2           | 0              | 0           | 3                 |
| Shots Fired at Officer      | 14          | 1              | 0           | 7                 |
| Threat to Others            | 16          | 0              | 1           | 12                |
| Threat to Self              | 1           | 1              | 0           | 4                 |
| Possible Suicide by Cop     | 3           | 1              | 0           | 8                 |

| **Officer Injured**         |             |                |             |                   |
| Shot                        | 7           | 2              |             | 1                 |
| Cut or Stabbed              | 1           | 0              |             | 0                 |
| Hit by Car                  | 2           | 0              |             | 0                 |
| Other                       | 1           | 0              |             | 2                 |
| Killed                      | 3           | 0              |             | 1                 |

| **Administrative Action Pending** |             |                |             |                   |
| Investigation               | 12          | 1              | 0           | 11                |
| Administrative Duty         | 5           | 1              | 1           | 8                 |
| Administrative Leave        |             |                |             |                   |

| **Civil Litigation Mentioned** |             |                |             |                   |
|                              | 8           | 1              | 0           | 9                 |
It must be acknowledged that there may be a reporting bias in how these incidents are covered, as the main offices for the *Pilot* are located in Norfolk and considering the crime rates across the jurisdictions. In particular, discussing these findings with local officers and long term residents led to a common consensus that police shootings in Hampton and Newport News were grossly underreported in the *Pilot*. This discrepancy may be attributable to the fact that, even though the *Pilot* is a regional paper, there is a smaller paper, also owned by the *Pilot* and called the *Daily Press*, published that focuses on news occurring on the Peninsula area of Hampton Roads (particularly Hampton and Newport News).

These shooting incidents were not distributed evenly across jurisdictions or years, with Norfolk having, by far, the most shooting incidents (n = 45) in the time period studied. Virginia Beach and Chesapeake followed Norfolk in terms of frequency of police shootings, with 35 and 22 incidents respectively. There was a wide disparity in frequency of events between the cities, with Suffolk (n = 1), Hampton (n = 3), Newport News (n = 5) and Portsmouth (n = 10) having far fewer police shootings covered in the newspaper. Additionally, the number of shootings ebb and flow, with multiple jurisdictions having multiple incidents some years and other years, like 1993, there being no police shootings reported across all seven jurisdictions. Table 5 displays the frequency of shooting incidents by year for the seven cities in Hampton Roads.
Table 5: Number of Police Shootings in the Hampton Roads Region by City, 1990-2010

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Chesapeake</th>
<th>Hampton</th>
<th>Newport News</th>
<th>Norfolk</th>
<th>Portsmouth</th>
<th>Suffolk</th>
<th>Virginia Beach</th>
<th>Total by Year</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1991</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1993</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1995</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1997</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1999</td>
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<td>0</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2001</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
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<td>2003</td>
<td>3</td>
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<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>2</td>
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<tr>
<td>2007</td>
<td>4</td>
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<td>0</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2009</td>
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<td>3</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>0</td>
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<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total by City</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>45</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>121</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Norfolk also had the most incidents where suspects had guns (n = 27), although Virginia Beach had the most incidents where vehicles were used as weapons (n = 6) and where the suspect had a knife (n = 5). Virginia Beach had the most incidents involving domestic disturbances (n = 10), mentally ill individuals (n = 9) and potential suicide by cop incidents (n = 8). Norfolk had the most incidents involving a pursuit (n = 18), police shootings in the context of the commission of a crime (n = 27), the most incidents involving drug use or involvement (n = 10), the most females shot by police (n = 3), and the most officers injured or killed in the context of a police shooting incident (n = 14).

The *Pilot* reported the most animals shot by police in Chesapeake (n = 4) and the only jurisdictions where non-injurious shootings were reported in the media were Newport News (n = 1), Norfolk (n = 3) and Virginia Beach (n = 3). It was most
frequently suggested that police shootings were racially motivated in Norfolk (n = 7), followed by Chesapeake (n = 3), and Hampton (n = 1). Other jurisdictions, specifically Portsmouth, Chesapeake, Virginia Beach and Norfolk, were strongly criticized for their management of critical incidents involving mentally ill individuals. Portsmouth, for example, was strongly criticized in the media for the deaths of Marshall Franklin, Sr., in 2009, and David Lewis Warren in 2010, both of whom were older with strong documented histories of mental illness. The media reports suggested that earlier intervention and/or better training in dealing with the mentally ill could have avoided both deaths. Civil litigation related to shooting incidents was most common in Norfolk (n = 8) and Virginia Beach (n = 9), with only one other jurisdiction, Chesapeake (n = 1) having civil litigation mentioned in the newspaper articles reviewed.

Discussion

The preliminary study is but an initial foray into establishing basic statistics related to the frequency and context of police shootings in the Hampton Roads region of Virginia utilizing the currently available data. One of the key elements to this discussion is acknowledging that it was necessary to conduct the present study to obtain these basic, two-dimensional statistics (Geller and Scott 1992). The fact that these data were not collected or maintained in some fashion, despite 30 years of academics and practitioners calling for accountability with regards to police shootings (Fyfe 2002, Geller and Scott 1992, Hickman, Piquero and Garner 2008b, Sherman and Langworthy 1979, Smith 2008), is quite startling, given that the use of deadly force is one of the most controversial and contested aspects of modern policing. It is also surprising that, given the implications and costs associated with shooting incidents, police departments themselves
do not appear to be more concerned with maintaining accurate and detailed statistics to develop and support evidence based policies.

What information is available is conflicting, with the UCR, BJS and CDC providing different, and often divergent, gross totals for deaths attributable to police shootings each year, as displayed in Figure 1. Although these estimates draw from different data sources, they are each seeking to provide a count of citizens reasonably or justifiably killed by law enforcement each year. It would be expected that, while there may be some discrepancies between the counts, that they would be similar and that, overall, the data would display similar trends over time; but this is not necessarily the case (see Figure 1). As suggested by Geller and Scott (1992) and Sherman and Langworthy (1979), these differences are likely due to inherent flaws within the reporting systems that generate the totals on an annual basis. It is quite likely that the overall totals for justifiable homicides by law enforcement officers in Virginia, collected by the Virginia State Police and provided pursuant to a FOIA request, likely suffer from similar flaws as the UCR reporting system, specifically non-mandatory reporting, that leads to undercounting the total number of fatal police shootings. These total counts, disaggregated to determine a regional statistic, were only available for 2005 to 2009 and indicated that there were 21 fatalities within that time period. The preliminary study, however, discovered 27 fatal police shootings reported in the media within the same time frame, six more than the total provided by the VSP. Thus, it is likely that we are underestimating the frequency of police shootings at the regional, state and national levels, with local frequencies not being readily available or accessible to police administrators, criminologists or the general public.
While newspapers provided the most data regarding local shootings, they by no means provide full and complete coverage of all police shootings. As stated previously, all police shootings are not equally newsworthy and those that result in death or serious injury are much more likely to make the news, meaning that exploring the contextual and situational differences between fatal, injurious and non-injurious shootings, as advised by Fyfe (2002), Roberg et al (2009), and White (2006), is virtually impossible at this time. This also means that there is still a large dark figure associated with police shootings, likely composed of not only fatalities, but also of a large number less serious injurious and non-injurious shootings.

In the course of talking with officers in one particular jurisdiction, it became apparent where and how information is stored within a given police department may significantly impact its availability and accessibility, even under FOIA. Sherman and Langworthy (1979) did not simply cite police records as a source of data on police shootings, but rather they cited police Internal Affairs records. In at least one jurisdiction in the preliminary study the Internal Affairs unit would be the only source for any information related to police shootings over time. This is strongly associated with the issues Geller and Scott (1992) raise regarding short-term retention of information before purging, leaving Internal Affairs as the unit that maintains copies of all Special Incident Reports and investigations into use of force cases.

Although the news media also fails to provide a population of shooting incidents in equal coverage, it is important to acknowledge that situational and contextual variables that may play a role in developing EBP, such as drug or alcohol use, domestic violence, pursuits, etc., or the locations of shootings to determine if there are geographic or
ecological factors that need to be factored into policy development, can be identified in many of the cases reported in the media. In terms of identifying situational and contextual variables that are not always readily available in official data sources, it was anticipated that the controversy over race and its importance in these incidents could be explored in the preliminary study, however, race was only specifically mentioned when there were allegations that the shooting was somehow racially motivated. Despite the controversy over the importance of race in the empirical literature (Lawton 2007, McElvain and Kposowa 2008, White 2002), this study indicated, while further exploration of basic situational data may cancel out the effects of race, race is most definitely important to the media. This is most likely because racial conflict is considered newsworthy, especially if it stirs community tensions and sells papers.

In addition to providing more, and disaggregated data, to examine frequencies at the local level, using newspaper articles, particularly editorials and letters to the editor, allowed for the exploration of public reaction to particular police shootings. The assignment of blameworthiness (Feather 1998), as expected, was most clearly tied to instances where the victim's actions provoked a lethal police response (Dietz 1977). For example, letters to the editor explicitly stated that Andrea Nicole Reedy, who refused to stop her vehicle and then attempted to drag a police officer trying to remove her from her vehicle after colliding with another police cruiser in Hampton in 2001, and Albert Michael Schatzhueber, who also failed to pull over for a traffic stop and drove at an officer in Chesapeake in 2001, were instrumental in their own deaths. One letter to the editor regarding the death of Jamarr Hassell in Norfolk in 2010 suggested that the young man's death should be labeled as a natural death due to his choice to engage in a lifestyle
of “thuggishness and making a habit of lawlessness and disrespect for authority.” The same editorial regarding Hassell’s death also embodied elements of Goldkamp’s (1976) polarized views regarding why Black males are disproportionately represented in police shootings, suggesting that if more friends, family, and clergy would chastise young men for engaging in violence, there would be far fewer vigils for young Black men.

In February 2007, the Pilot published an article reviewing police shootings and officers shot in Norfolk between 2002 and 2006, which mentioned that 15 of the 17 individuals shot by the Norfolk Police during this time span were Black and also mentioning that the Black on Black crime rates may play a role in police shootings within this jurisdiction. In letters to the editor published three days after the article ran, one citizen, clearly in the group described by Goldkamp (1976) as ascribing to a subcultural perspective, noted that maybe the high Black on Black crime rates are why more Blacks are shot by police.

Blameworthiness was not only assigned to the suspects or victims in these encounters. There were numerous editorials that, despite the existence of defense of life policies ushered in by Garner (1985) and the standards set by Graham (1989) that seek to avoid applying perfect hindsight to decisions made under extreme duress without the time to weigh all lesser options, suggested police should have “shot to wound” the individual or used less lethal means of subduing them. These criticisms often accompanied citizens minimizing the lethality of weapons other than guns, such as vehicles and knives. However, there were other citizens, sometimes officers or relatives of officers, who noted that a vehicle can be a weapon and that knives can be quite dangerous to officers within a 21 foot radius—the suspect can attack before the officer can draw his or her weapon and
bullet resistant vests are not designed to defend against knife attacks. In a commentary written by the uncle of Bryan Dugan, a young man who was shot after he refused to drop the knives he was holding and lunged at officers, it was stated that officers are abusive, aggressive and escalate situations unnecessarily, even going so far as to suggest that officers are proud when they shoot an individual. These viewpoints were further exacerbated when the individual shot and/or killed was mentally ill, such as in the cases of Carlett Karim in Chesapeake, Mark Jessup in Virginia Beach, and Marshall Franklin, Sr. and David Lewis Warren in Portsmouth, or when there was an allegation that the shooting was racially motivated, such as in the cases of Carlett Karim in Chesapeake, Larry Alfred Greene in Virginia Beach, and Seneca Darden in Norfolk.

When considering the city level statistics (see Appendix B), including the number and severity of officer injuries, the number of shootings that occurred within the context of other criminal situations, and the number of shootings overall, the situational characteristics identified in the preliminary study seem to lend preliminary support to ecological theories of police shootings (Fyfe 1980, Kania and Mackey 1977, Klinger 1997, Terrill and Reisig 2003, Werthman and Piliavin 1967) and provides an additional area for future research. The interaction of the above mentioned factors suggest that there may be something occurring in Norfolk that differentiates it from the other jurisdictions in the Hampton Roads region. Just as Terrill and Reisig (2003) adopted Skolnick’s symbolic assailant (1966) to discuss symbolic neighborhoods, characterized by higher crime rates and increased officer perceptions of danger, Norfolk may be a symbolic city a la Skolnick (1966). This finding, however, must be used with caution under the same arguments that Terrill and Reisig (2003) applied to Klinger’s (1997)
analysis: where Klinger analyzed patrol districts, which are larger than neighborhoods and may obscure support for the impact of neighborhood or ecological context, this exploratory study looks at citywide demographics, possibly further obscuring these effects. Yet, using existing data sources, this type of theoretical application and exploration would not be possible.

The preliminary study faced several limitations. First, the police shootings considered in the preliminary study were identified through media articles, which may be subject to reporting biases and subjective determinations of newsworthiness. Due to the fact that it is likely police shootings are underreported, particularly those where the suspect is not killed, important differences may exist between fatal, injurious and non-injurious shootings, as well as between those shootings reported in the Pilot and those that were not. However, White and Ready (2009) address a similar potential reporting bias in their research on TASER deployments, finding that because there is such a high level of interest and controversy surrounding the use of TASERs, it is possible that most, if not almost all, incidents are reported in the media. This interest and controversy is also found regarding police shootings. Also, similar to White and Ready’s (2009) work on TASER deployments, non-fatal shooting incidents may be more newsworthy when there is some other “hook” or variable of interest that drives the story, meaning that it is possible the preliminary study likely captures shooting incidents that are newsworthy because of their characteristics (White and Ready 2009), which resulted in the varied outcomes identified by Fyfe (2002), Roberg et al. (2009) and White (2006).

The second limitation that must be addressed is access to information on police involved shootings in general. This work serves as yet another voice calling for a
reporting system that will provide for better access to information about these incidents. While Sherman and Langworthy (1979) had valid criticisms of the use of news media to determine the frequency or prevalence of police shootings, their outright dismissal of this source of data was premature, especially given the discrepancies between the limited data sources available and the reluctance of police agencies to open their files to researchers. With a lack of access to both quantitative and qualitative empirical information on police shootings at the national, regional, state and local levels, newspaper articles have been the most abundant and accessible, though by no means the most accurate or complete, source of information on police shootings. This is clearly demonstrated in the fact that the articles analyzed in the preliminary study accounted for more incidents, and specifically more fatal incidents, than the official counts provided by the Virginia State Police. Additionally, as noted previously, the Virginian Pilot was chosen because this paper has a reputation among law enforcement agencies for thorough fact checking. Similar again to White and Ready’s (2009) suggestions that data that were commonly missing—such as suspect and officer age and race, drug use and mental illness (which consequently were also information that was consistently missing in the preliminary study, unless it was a key feature of the incident)—indicate some degree of data consistency across article type.

While Canter and Wentink (2004) note that using published material that is not created for the purposes of a particular research project means that biases likely to weight the data in favor of the hypotheses are minimized, Kraemer, Lord and Heilbrun (2004) note that reliance on popular media as a data source may result in inaccurate case details and oversampling of highly publicized cases. Additional limitations related to the use of news articles in the preliminary study are related to the nature of police involved
shootings: these incidents are rare and highly controversial, having the potential to inflame poor community relations and engender further dislike and distrust of the police. As a result, articles tend to focus on fatal police shootings and those that are most contentious. Thus, information may not be equally available for each incident or case details may be confused in the press, especially if several incidents are being discussed in a single article. In the preliminary study, coding did not allow for speculation on the features of the case; variables were absent or present, and multiple articles related to a single incident allowed for fact checking and the identification of discrepancies (White and Ready 2009).

Further, there is a smaller paper, the *Daily Press*, which is owned and operated by the *Pilot*, which focuses on news from the Peninsula area of Hampton Roads. A review of the archives from the *Daily Press* suggest that there may be 200 related articles published in this paper between April 1990 and September 2010, although these articles may include incidents from jurisdictions not included in the preliminary study. However, skimming the contents of these articles also reveals that numerous cases included in the preliminary study were also included in these additional articles, indicating a great degree of overlapping coverage. While the articles from the *Daily Press* were not included in the preliminary study, and may contain additional incidents that would be relevant to this research, the presence of overlapping coverage of incidents between the two papers minimizes the detrimental effects of not including data from both papers due to time and budgetary constraints.
Conclusion

It is surprising that, in a country known for demanding official accountability and governmental transparency, there is little known, empirically, about even the frequency of police shootings. These incidents are the manifestation of the ultimate form of coercion available to the state: the ability to invoke death to assure compliance. It is not the intent of this paper to suggest that there is a malicious or nefarious reason for the paucity of information regarding police shootings, but, as Fyfe (2002) noted, the holes in our knowledge about these incidents are a great cause for concern. As such, the preliminary study seeks to draw attention to a critical oversight in data availability, collection, and validity, especially given the emphasis placed upon evidence based policing in modern times. This study also demonstrated that newspapers may provide a wealth of situational and contextual data at the incident level, although there are limitations associated with these data, as well, that may be useful in guiding future research and aiding in policy reforms. Future research should include expanding data collection to include more recent shooting incidents, as well as attempts to collaborate with the jurisdictions included in this study to compare the data from the media reports to police data in an effort to address data reliability and validity concerns, similar to the approach taken by Ready, White and Fisher (2008). Also, because the newspaper often provides the block address for the shooting incidents, this means that spatial analysis of these incidents can be conducted. Finally, future research may benefit from the application of media distortion analysis.

As citizens, it is understandable to desire accountability from the police regarding how often and the contexts in which deadly force is used. As researchers and
practitioners, this lack of information is disturbing, given the serious nature of these incidents and the potential ramifications of policies made in the absence of sound empirical data. Determining the frequency and most basic trends and situational differences of police shootings, the two dimensional statistics, as Geller and Scott (1992) call them, are but the first step on the road to understanding the inherently complex circumstances and interactions behind these incidents and are but a preliminary project in building an empirical foundation for evidence based policies that take into account all parties involved in a single shooting incident.
CHAPTER IV
METHODS

Introduction: Methodological Considerations in the Current Study

As stated in the first chapter, the current study seeks to understand officer-involved shootings holistically by exploring how these incidents impact the officer involved, his or her family and friends, colleagues, supervisors, and the detectives investigating the incident through a case study. This is the research question driving the current study, as well. This question has been addressed through the use of a case study, approaching the incident from the personal dimension. In this case study, the aim was to describe and understand the pre-event, event and post-event (both short and long term) forces at play in an officer involved shooting from several interrelated perspectives, covering a variety of topics, such as: officer preparation and training (physical, psychological/emotional), perceptions of response (of individual, of family and friends, of peers and coworkers, of supervisors, of agency, of community), perceptions of personal support, professional support, organizational support, experiences of value conflict, the impact of determining whether or not the action was justified (and how this judgment then impacts other issues), and officer survivability.

Proposed Methods: A Case Study

This study was a case study, defined by Creswell (2007) as research involving the study of one issue, explored through one or more bounded cases, through the use of detailed, in-depth data collection that involves multiple information sources, with the intent of producing a detailed case description and a thematic analysis of the case. More
simply stated, Berg (2007) defines a case study as a way to describe an event or series of events in a systematic manner, gathering the information to do so through an individual, social setting, event or group. Creswell (2007) defines a category as a "unit of information composed of events, happenings and instances," which, while there is no exact definition of a case-based theme drawn from a case study, it is possible that these themes can be seen as somewhat similar in nature to the open coding process that generates categories in grounded theory research. Punch (1998 in Silverman 2005) echoes Creswell's (2007) definition, adding that the "general objective of a case study is as full an understanding of a case as possible," whether through a holistic analysis of the entire case or an embedded analysis of a particular element or issue in the case (Berg 2007, Creswell 2007).

Stake (1995, 2005 in Berg 2007, Creswell 2007, Silverman 2005, Tight 2010) identifies three types of case studies: intrinsic, instrumental and collective. In this particular study, a blend of the intrinsic case study approach, where the goal is to better understand the case, and instrumental case study, where the goal is to provide insight into a particular issue or aspect associated with the case, will be employed. In his review of descriptions of what, exactly, case studies are, Tight (2010) summarizes that a case will have the following elements:

- Temporal characteristics which help to define their nature
- Geographical parameters allowing for their definition
- Boundaries which allow for definition
- May be defined by an individual in a particular context, at a point in time
• May be defined by the characteristics of the group
• May be defined by role or function
• May be shaped by organizational or institutional arrangements

The beauty of qualitative research, and a case study in particular, is that it allows the researcher to capture an event, either admittedly from one facet, or by attempting to approach it from multiple angles. Whether a phenomenological approach is used to understand how women cope with aging, or a case study of one infant death investigation is conducted, there will be individualistic differences intermingled with some sort of basic consensus, or themes common to most, if not all, people who experience these events. Likewise, if ten people in a room were asked to describe a clown, in one person’s reality, that clown may be terrifying, and, while that specific terror may be shared with a handful of others, the general experience of terror is shared by many—meaning that gaining an understanding of that one person’s fear, reactions and coping mechanisms can then be applied to a larger group.

The idea of generalizability is addressed best by Silverman (2005), who notes that the goal of generalizability, which is often seen in quantitative research, may not be as heavily weighted as an outcome of qualitative research. However, while generalizability may not be a foremost concern, Berg (2007) draws attention to the fact that the academy rarely embraces results from any single study, qualitative or quantitative, as generalizable. Most qualitative research utilizes purposive sampling (Silverman 2005), where you have chosen your participants for a reason, such as a particular event they have experienced—so it is neither a large, nor a random sample—and that, depending on the type of case study (intrinsic, instrumental or collective), the issue being studied and
your intended outcomes, generalizability may even result from a single case study, or may not even matter at all. However, if generalizability is a concern, Silverman (2005) suggests using a mixed methods approach, utilizing purposive sampling that is guided by time and resources, using theoretical sampling, and using an “analytic model which assumes that generalizability is present in the existence of any case.”

Difficulties with generalizability notwithstanding, one reason that it is permissible to examine much smaller samples in qualitative research is that these researchers are asking different questions that simply cannot be reduced to numbers and large datasets analyzed through SPSS, SAS, or STATA. Although there may not be 500 identified cases, a qualitative methodology is time-intensive in its execution and a plethora of data may result. This point is made succinctly by Richards (2005), who suggests starting off thinking about data, not in terms of quantity, but in terms of scope: collect data that will thoroughly answer the question asked and data collection is complete it is felt that that goal has been accomplished. While, ideally, this is the case, a number of interviews sought or cases to be included may have to be preliminarily identified for numerous reasons that include time management, funding, or getting IRB approval. This number, however, need not be etched in stone: Richards (2005) also recommends always including a “stage of data expansion” within the project design.

Two other common concerns tied to sample size are validity and reliability and these issues must be addressed in the research design. Richards (2005) only briefly discusses these concerns in a rather dismissive manner—suggesting that multiple data sources may not measure the same thing the same way, so triangulation may be pointless, and also that consistency is not necessarily expected or desired in qualitative research, so
reliability is also not an issue. Silverman (2005), however, argues that transparency in the research process, to demonstrate reliable methods that lead to valid conclusions, is critical. The problem of anecdotalism, as defined by Silverman (2005), is the tendency to provide examples or description without giving full criteria as to why this comment/image/data was included and why it is representative, thus making the analysis appear less valid. Like Richards (2005), Silverman (2005) mentions the use of triangulation, in addition to respondent validation, as means of improving data reliability and therefore ensuring validity.

However, where Richards (2005) dismisses triangulation because there is no way to triangulate something if it is not conceptualized or measured the same across the different sources of information, Silverman (2005) suggests that triangulation and respondent validation are both flawed in their attempt to achieve validity. As for reliability, Silverman (2005) and Richards (2005) again present a similar argument: it may be possible that reliability is unattainable due to “mutual interpretations which are inherently local and non-standardizable” (Silverman 2005). Despite this mutual penchant to dismiss reliability, Silverman (2005) suggests that it can be sought in the use of low-inference descriptors, such as providing readers with actual portions of text, rather than summaries of conversations where the researcher has interpreted what occurred and thus applied their own inferences. Reliability can also be addressed in terms of consistency in coding, which is again addressed by both Richards (2005) and Silverman (2005).

This research examined a single officer-involved shooting that occurred on the night of April 15, 2007, in Norfolk, Virginia, paying particular concern to the perceptions and understandings of this event as relayed by the officer and those closest to him.
Whether to anonymize this case was a debate that was considered by the research team. However, there are contextual factors, particularly the blue-on-blue police shooting that occurred in the jurisdiction approximately a year prior to the primary participant’s shooting and the Virginia Tech shootings that occurred the day after his shooting, that may condition responses and reactions to this particular shooting incident. Sergeant Chris Scallon, the primary participant, shall be referred to as “Chris” throughout this manuscript; while there may be some concerns as to revealing his identity, he has stated that he never intended to remain anonymous and is, in fact, an active member of the research team. Further, this study was approved with the understanding that the research team would not be generalizing or anonymizing this case. Chris’ shooting garnered local, state and national attention, which resulted in him receiving numerous awards for his heroic behavior and with this shooting incident being reported in a national police publication (Scoville 2011). As this case was not anonymized, there were admitted and documented concerns regarding maintaining the confidentiality and anonymity of individual participants. These potential breaches were acknowledged in both Chris’ letter of informed consent and in the general letter of consent provided to other participants (See Appendix D).

This case was clearly bounded in time, geography and participants. While the specifics of the interactions and meaning constructed by the participants in this research may be unique to this particular case, it was also found that the general themes, such as coping mechanisms or interpersonal relationships post-incident, may be applicable to other cases of officer-involved shootings. This case also lent itself to purposeful sampling, as the interviewees were limited to the officer involved in the shooting and
those personally connected to him. The individuals deemed to be personally connected included, but were not limited to, his intimate partner, close friends/colleagues—especially those who have also been involved in a shooting—and supervisory personnel. Figure 2, below, identifies the roles and relationships of participants that were originally considered to be approached for interviews, similar to an initial sampling frame in quantitative research. As noted in Chapter 5, in the description of the participants, several of these individuals did not participate in the current study for a variety of reasons. However, there were seven participants that participated in the interview process. This research was been approved by Old Dominion University’s Institutional Review Board (IRB Identifiers 10-009, 11-016 and 12-057, 13-065) (See Appendix C) and it should be noted again that this approval included not keeping the current case completely anonymous.
Figure 2: Anticipated Relationships Between and Classifications of Participants in the Current Study

As noted above, a case study calls for an analysis of multiple data sources—such as documents, archival records, interviews, direct observations, participant-observations and physical artifacts (Creswell 2007)—to uncover repeated, categorical themes within the data. This study used unstructured interviews with participants as the primary means of data collection. While this is a case study of Chris’ shooting, and he was the principle interviewee, others who are close to him were interviewed because, as noted by Berg (2007), “all the aspects of an individual’s social life are interconnected and often one of them cannot be adequately understood without consideration of others.” Potential interviewees were approached by the researcher and/or Chris and asked if they were
willing to participate in this research. By this, it is meant that Chris was asked, where necessary, to facilitate introductions to interviewees and verbally acknowledge his role and support in the research process. Although there are three persons on the research team, only one conducted the interviews with participants and only the primary researcher and her supervisor have access to the interview recordings, transcripts, signed informed consent documents or other identifying information. Chris was not present during the interviews, nor does he have access to interview recordings, interview transcripts, signed informed consent documents, or other identifying information. Informed consent was obtained at the beginning of each interview and was affirmed when the interviewee reviews the transcript of the interview (see Appendix D for Informed Consent Documents).

These interviews were open and unstructured, allowing participants the freedom to discuss issues that are most salient to their experience and allowing for flexibility in probing or following up on certain topics. This also allowed the interview experience to be less formal, more like a conversation, permitting the development of rapport and a more natural interaction between the researcher and the participant. However, while unstructured, a list of topical elements was compiled prior to each interview that the researcher brought up if the participant did not address them. These topical prompts involved issues like previous experiences with violence and changes in the relationship with Chris. Further, the interviews with Chris generated additional topical prompts for subsequent interviews with other participants, such as asking another participant about a specific interaction or event to obtain their perspective of what occurred. It was anticipated that each interview would last approximately two hours in length, with some
interviews running longer and others shorter. It was also anticipated that Chris, as well as those closest to him, would require more than one interview session, while others would only require one, two-hour interview session.

As this is a case study, the selection of research participants was purposive in that only individuals involved with this case were asked to participate. The data collection consisted of a series of free-form interviews, beginning with several interviews with Chris, before additional participants were interviewed. With Chris, in particular, cognitive interviewing techniques were utilized to elicit detailed responses. Appendix E contains sample questions regarding topics that were explored during the interviews. As these were free-form interviews, a script was not be used and each interview, while having some consistent themes discussed, was different. Interviews were tape recorded, with the interviewee's consent, transcribed and then analyzed to extract dominant themes. While the transcriptionist is a city employee, she acted in the capacity of a private transcriptionist while working on the interviews from the current research and agreed to confidentiality before commencing to transcribe any interviews. Being a qualitative piece of research that involves purposive sampling, the mention or discussion of statistical techniques is not inappropriate in the current study.

As the study focused on the personal impact of this incident, interview questions will focus on issues such as the impact of this incident on Chris' personal relationships, both from his perspective and from those close to him who consent to be interviewed. Interviews were conducted at the participants' convenience and at locations they indicated were comfortable for them. Attempts were made to meet with participants prior to scheduled interviews to build rapport and allow the participant to develop a level of
comfort with the researcher. All research participants were provided with two copies of an informed consent letter (one for them to keep, and one for the researchers’ files) (Appendix D), a letter from Chris supporting this research (Appendix D), and were also be informed that Chris would not have direct access to their recorded interview responses or the transcripts of their interviews.

To reiterate, both the data collection and data analysis involved two steps. The data collection began with a series of interviews with Chris, with the second step involving interviews with those individuals classified as predominantly involved in the personal dimension of this incident. The data analysis involved an open coding process, where dominant themes were extracted from the interview transcripts and, where appropriate, bolstered by other sources of data. This thematic analysis involved looking for both commonalities in responses, for example, similarities in perceptions, emotional responses, and coping mechanisms employed, and distinct differences in responses. The second step involved discussing the emergent themes with the research team, to address potential meanings, classifications, and implications of these themes. During this second step, Chris would have the opportunity to contribute to the thematic analysis of aggregated quotes. He still did not have access to the transcripts, but, as he has personal experience with witnessing and being involved in a shooting incident and educates other officers about these experiences, it is was assumed that he would have a unique viewpoint on emerging themes.

Chris also signed a letter of informed consent and was aware that he has the right to withdraw his support at any point. Chris wrote an additional letter of support for this research, which is contained in Appendix D. Additionally, as Chris does have a diagnosis
of PTSD, his therapists, both of whom treated Chris in relation to this incident, were consulted prior to commencement of this research. His psychologist, while acknowledging that he cannot speak for his psychiatrist, was enthusiastic about this research, provided a letter of support (see Appendix F) and agreed to participate in the current study as an interviewee. However, this interview was not completed due to scheduling conflicts. If any complications arose during the course of this research, Chris agreed to immediately notify both the researcher and his therapists. In the case that this research was found in any way detrimental to the health, emotionally or physically, of Chris, plans were in place to halt the research immediately.

As Chris is still an active member of the Police Department and one researcher is currently an intern with the same police department, a research proposal was submitted to, and a letter of support was been requested from, the Police Department. Appendix G contains the letter from the City Attorney, noting what materials will and will not be provided. The requested General Orders have already been received. Also included in Appendix G is a letter from the former Chief. Understandably, the Police Department is concerned regarding liability issues and cannot grant a blanket letter of support. Since the planning of this research commenced, the former Chief has resigned, an acting Chief has come and gone, and the agency has had a new permanent chief of approximately one year. This is a transitionary and politically unstable time in the Police Department and led to additional complications in the research process. Both Chris and the researcher were aware that the stance taken by the agency may limit both the purpose and intent of this research and are were to compromise. Any limitations imposed by the agency were
I will thoroughly documented when writing up this research and, if necessary, in any publications stemming from this research.

Triangulation was attempted by consulting numerous other sources, including the court transcripts from the getaway driver’s trial, audio recording of the 9-1-1 call, all news articles related to this case, the text of awards received, the General Orders of the Police Department, and photographs and personal correspondence provided by Chris. Further, Chris has agreed to sign a Health Information Patient Portability Act (HIPPA) waiver allowing the researchers access to his psychological file. The administration of the Police Department was asked if they would permit the researchers to view the Standard Operating Procedures (SOPs) from the Office of Professional Standards (OPS), the Homicide Unit and the Field Forensics Unit, as well as case materials related to Chris’ shooting, and discuss the steps involved in investigating such an incident and the toll it takes on investigators with personnel from the units specified above. After agreeing to support the current study, limited access to data was provided. To strengthen this research and indicate its timeliness and utility to the Police Department, letters of support (See Appendix F) were solicited from the local chapters of Fraternal Order of Police and International Brotherhood of Police Officers, the Homicide Unit Sergeants and the Critical Incident Stress Management Team Coordinator. Table 6, below, provides a list and description of the various data sources that the original research methodology planned in this case study, including the materials obtained for triangulation purposes.
Table 6: Description of Proposed Data Sources to be Used in the Current Study

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Data Source</th>
<th>Specific</th>
<th>Details</th>
<th>Collection Method</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Interviews</td>
<td>Chris</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>Each interview will be conducted in an approximate two hour time frame. There may be multiple interviews with participants. Only the participant and Ms. Farrell will be present during the interview. Interviews will be recorded digitally and will be transcribed by an external transcriptionist.</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Significant Other</td>
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<td>Step-Father</td>
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<td>Sister</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Partner</td>
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<td>Roommate</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Peer Support</td>
<td>Four different individuals</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Psychologist</td>
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<tr>
<td>Public Documents</td>
<td>Court Transcript</td>
<td>Commonwealth of Virginia v. Torron Lucas</td>
<td>Obtained copy of transcripts from accomplice's trial and sentencing</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Awards</td>
<td>Commonwealth Attorney’s Award of Valor Virginia Public Safety Medal of Valor</td>
<td>Copy of Award Press release documenting award</td>
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<td>Newspaper</td>
<td>Virginian Pilot</td>
<td>Seventeen Articles</td>
<td>Access News Search</td>
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<td>Port Washington News</td>
<td>One Article</td>
<td>Provided by Chris</td>
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<td>Table 6: Proposed Data Sources Continued</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Other</strong></td>
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<td><strong>9-1-1 Call</strong></td>
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<td>Recording of the 9-1-1 call of shooting</td>
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<td>Provided by Chris</td>
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<tr>
<td>Chris</td>
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<td><strong>PD SOPs</strong></td>
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<td>First, Second and Third Patrol Divisions; Detective Division; Office of Professional Standards</td>
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<td>Freedom of Information Act Request to PD (originally ignored)</td>
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<td>Pending</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Psychological Case File</strong></td>
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<td>Chris to complete HIPPA waiver</td>
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<tr>
<td>Psychologist</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Contemporary Documents</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td>Photos, journal entries, etc.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Request participants to provide whatever supplemental information they can</td>
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<tr>
<td>Participants</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Field Notes</strong></td>
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<td>Participant observation experiences</td>
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<td>N/A</td>
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</table>
Finally, there is an element of participant observation that influenced this research. These experiences will be more thoroughly explicated in the following discussion of reflexivity, but as a source of triangulation, it must also be mentioned here. The author has interned with the Police Department for approximately five years and has worked in the immediate aftermath of two officer-involved shootings to date. One suggestion that has been made by the Homicide Sergeants is that the researcher be called in to shadow and observe any subsequent officer-involved shootings to gain insight into the investigative process, as well as the emotional and psychological impacts these cases have on other officers. Further, the researcher was invited to attend a training seminar on Police Officer Stress and Police Suicides designed for Police Peer Support and Counseling Teams and Hostage and Crisis Negotiations teams, hosted by the Police Benevolence Association in Norfolk, Virginia, in March 2012.

Initial literature searches for this research included an article in the Federal Bureau of Investigation's Law Enforcement Bulletin (Heglund 2009) that discussed a program developed in California that sought to aid first responders (EMS, Firefighters and Police) suffering from trauma-related disorders. This program, the West Coast Post-Trauma Retreat (WCPR), is affiliated with the First Responders Network and is one of only two such programs in the world. WCPR provides twelve, one-week retreats for first responders and one retreat for significant others and spouses of traumatized first responders each year. In addition to providing these retreats, WCPR is the only advanced peer counseling class approved by the Commission on Peace Officer Standards and Training (POST) (Heglund 2009).
After reading about the WCPR, the researcher contacted the program to determine if they accept volunteers, and was contacted by WCPR’s clinical director. The clinical director informed the researcher that observers and volunteers are rarely permitted to attend the retreats, but that he was interested in hearing more about this research and was willing to consider making an exception. After providing a vita and references for review, the clinical director informed the researcher that she was welcome to attend a WCPR session as a volunteer. She attended the WCPR retreat scheduled for July 15 to July 20, 2012. Attending a WCPR event further developed understandings of the multiple impacts of critical incidents, thus enhancing the interviews to be conducted with the participants in this case study. This experience allowed the researcher to both observe and converse with the clinicians, peer support staff, and traumatized officers to identify potential areas that may not be explicitly covered in the literature, due to its confidential and sensitive nature. She became more aware of the psychological and sociological components of said incidents and be able to translate those concerns into insightful interview questions and follow-up questions.

**Rationale for Choice of Case**

The case studied in this research was chosen for several reasons. First, there was an element of convenience in the selection of this case. This particular officer-involved shooting occurred in a local jurisdiction where one researcher already had contacts established. Not only was this case easier to access in terms of geography and initial contacts, Chris was willing to not only be interviewed extensively, but was also eager to be an active collaborator in the research process. Second, this case was well-covered in the media and also led to Chris receiving numerous awards and citations for his actions.
This is considered to be a “good” shooting, which means there is not the stigma of controversy that will impede people from talking. Also, due to the amount of attention this case received, the amount of materials available for triangulation increased. Third, due to the nature of the incident, several of the areas of concern are highlighted, such as PTSD and the impact on interpersonal relationships, while other issues, such as the involvement of other officers or offenders in the shooting incident, were minimized. Several issues that the research seeks to understand were magnified as a result of details specific to this case, such as the extended duration of the gun fight with the offender and the officer’s willingness to speak openly about the incident and its impact, and therefore make this an ideal case for an in-depth study.

The Epistemological Debate

While the above discussion would appear to be a rather direct definition of a case study, Tight (2010) implies that the use of the term “case study” has taken on an overly broad meaning to both encompass and validate any and all close examinations of small samples. However, this need to validate or legitimate the use of detailed analyses of small samples will never, as Tight (2010) notes, convince those of the belief that larger, more “representative” samples are the only sources of data that merit investigation.

As seen repeatedly throughout history, a single, poignant or heart-wrenching case can have a marked impact on society in various ways, such as social recognition of a problem and/or a dramatic political response (Gelsthorpe 2007, Maruna and Matravers 2007), as seen in the wake of cases like the Lindbergh baby kidnapping, the murders of Polly Klaas and Megan Kanka, the beating of Rodney King or the Virginia Tech massacre. Although high profile cases continue to emerge and impact society, Tight
(2010) suggests that the use of case study methodologies fell out of favor after the Second World War and experienced a mild return to favor in the 1980s. Although we do not see case studies employed as commonly as other methodologies in contemporary research, this methodology is not totally uncommon in criminology, with several seminal pieces hailing from this tradition (King and Chambliss 1972, Shaw 1930, Snodgrass 1982, Steffensmeier 1986). Miller (2001), in his discussion of Anderson (2001), laments that modern sociologists and criminologists seem to have abandoned the case study, a tool to “plumb[ing] serious public issues through a single case,” while avoiding “that Great Satan…the ‘meaning’ that a particular action might carry for the individual in a given society” (emphasis in original). Indeed, as suggested by the 2007 special issue of Theoretical Criminology dedicated to reanalyzing Shaw’s (1930) classic case study of a single individual, there is much to learn from a sample size of one (Maruna and Matravers 2007). The suggestion is that, as the academy has moved towards complex analyses of large datasets, we have effectively removed the narrative, the human story and the living individual, from most forms of social science (Maruna and Matravers 2007, Miller 2001)

This very acknowledgement underscores the epistemological divide that characterizes much of the research within the social sciences. If it is assumed that there is but one knowable answer, then it is presumed that a large sample will approximate the reality for all members of the population under study. However, if one acknowledges the possibility of multiple realities, or simply multiple perspectives to every story or experience, then sometimes, (and, as a female in a traditionally male-dominated field, this is said with a grin and in a tongue-in-cheek manner) size really does not matter. All
humor aside, this is true. Sometimes, the goal of the research is not to analyze aggregate data with sophisticated statistical models; sometimes the research seeks to understand the meanings that people attach to particular events or to focus on the confluence of circumstances that led to a particular event, rather than the general causal explanations for all similar events (Bachman and Schutt 2011).

Within the social sciences, there are some scientists who see qualitative and quantitative research methodologies as separate and distinct. Quantitative methods tend to focus on explanation, description and evaluation of countable phenomenon, and examining numbers or attributes that can ordered and measured through the use of surveys, scales and experiments (Bachman and Schutt 2003). Qualitative methods look to promote understanding and capture the essence of experience from the participants' perspective, using words to describe and explain phenomenon that are not easily quantified (Bachman and Schutt 2003). Bachman and Schutt (2003) suggest that it is the underlying research philosophy, not the methodology employed, that is the true source of distinction. In fact Harding (in Danner and Landis 1990) differentiates between methods (how data are gathered), methodology (theories on research) and epistemology (underlying research philosophy). Even Mills (1959) distinguished between methods (or rigor) and craft, with a strict adherence to method at the expense of craft being highly undesirable.

The philosophy of positivism, often associated with quantitative research, can be defined as a belief in a singular, knowable external reality, a single truth, as it were, with measurable causal relationships that can be tested with theory-driven research. This definition of positivism may oversimplify the complexities of the term and, by
association, quantitative research. Indeed, Silverman (2005) defines a positivistic model as one which looks to establish a relationship between variables that have been operationally defined by the researcher and argues that, while there is often a great divide seem between qualitative and quantitative research, this divide is unnecessary and perpetuated by such things as critics of quantitative research calling said researchers positivists (Silverman 2006). Becker (1996) concurs that the gap between quantitative and qualitative research is not as big, in the classical sense, as is portrayed. Creswell (2007) also defines positivism in a more neutral context, noting that it is a scientific approach to study that focuses on empirical data collection, causal relationships, and is based in theory.

There are multiple philosophies linked to qualitative methodology, including interpretivism (Bachman and Schutt 2003), critical and feminist empiricism (Daly and Chesney-Lind 1988, Danner and Landis 1990), and critical and feminist standpoint (Daly and Chesney-Lind 1988, Danner and Landis 1990). Interpretivism, according to Bachman and Schutt (2003), encompasses the belief that there is not a single, knowable reality, but that reality is socially constructed, with social science research seeking to decipher the meanings attached to reality. Critical and feminist empiricism attempt to highlight the flaws in traditional positivistic methodology by utilizing, not rejecting, quantitative methods, just using these methods in a better fashion to minimize bias (Danner and Landis 1990). Critical and feminist standpoint theories advocate changing the existing knowledge base, which requires a new (and non-positivistic) philosophy and methodology (Danner and Landis 1990).
The Influence of Feminist Methodologies

The research design for the current study also borrowed heavily from both critical and feminist criminology in an effort to develop a more comprehensive and honest qualitative study. While it is not the contention of this research to argue that officer-involved shootings are inherently gendered, as noted in Chapter 2, police work may be viewed as a way of doing gender in our society (Chan, Doran and Marel 2010, Martin and Jurik 1996/2006, Morash and Haarr 2012). It is argued that officers involved in such incidents can be both difficult to access and vulnerable, making feminist research methodologies particularly applicable to this study. Comack (1999) cites Cain's definition of what a standpoint is, noting that it is a "site which its creator and occupier has agreed to occupy in order to produce a special kind of knowledge and practice of which he or she is aware in a special, theoretical way." Feminist standpoint methodology also supports the idea of locating the researcher within a research project and addressing power differentials in a research process, paying particular care to theoretical reflexivity (Comack 1999). In borrowing from these methodologies, this project was not aligned with traditional positivistic thought, but plans to acknowledge the roles and viewpoints of participants and the researchers.

Power Differentials in the Research Process

Both feminist and critical criminology address power differentials between the researcher and the subject; this issue has been of particular concern in designing this study. As officer-involved shootings are highly controversial and sensitive topics, those involved in this research can be considered vulnerable in a manner similar to those used
by O'Keeffe (2004) and Blagden and Pemberton (2010) in identifying their samples of offenders as vulnerable. For example, Blagden and Pemberton (2010) note that sex offenders, while often not socially constructed as such, are in reality a vulnerable group due to media representations of their crimes which fuel extreme public reactions, and the intense public stigma associated with their crimes that is manifested in multiple environments. While it is a bit uncomfortable comparing officers who have been involved in shooting incidents to sex offenders, there are parallels that would indicate these officers, also typically not portrayed as vulnerable, are quite vulnerable in spite of assumptions or sometimes outward appearances. There is a great deal of media attention that focuses on officer-involved shootings, often fomenting community unrest and anger directed at the police in general and the officer in particular following a shooting incident. As there are few officers that are involved in this type of incident, there is a stigma that is attached to the officer, which will be manifested differently in the work, home, social and public environments of the officer. Further, in terms of ethical research, Chris' diagnosis of PTSD also enhances his vulnerability as a research participant. Provisions for reporting any adverse psychological effects of participating in this research were made and the IRB was aware of Chris' psychological history.

It must be acknowledged that this is Chris' story and that, as someone who has experienced this type of incident, as someone who trains others on these incidents, and as a frontline supervisor, his contributions and insights to this project went beyond being a mere subject or interviewee. After careful consideration and discussions with Chris, it was decided that he would serve multiple roles in this research, acting as both an interviewee and also as a co-researcher. He did not, however, hold these roles
simultaneously; his role as an interviewee was fulfilled before he participated in any categorical analysis. While some may consider this an unusual and unprecedented decision—to empower the subject to the point of designating him or her as a co-researcher—the author would like to point out that Harry King, the subject of Chambliss' (1972) *Box-Man*, is listed as first author on this text. This sets a precedent for sharing ownership of the data generated between the interviewee and the interviewer and acknowledging the subject as an active collaborator in the research.

This decision to list Chris as a co-researcher was also supported by some of the ideas expressed in Whiteacre and Pepinsky (2002). Specifically, Whiteacre and Pepinsky (2002) note that there is a need to “research with and learn from illicit drug users without objectifying or pathologizing them.” While this statement explicitly references drug users, it can also be applied to research with police officers to gain a more true understanding of their experiences and perspectives. Also, Whiteacre and Pepinsky (2002) address the fact that, in research, interviewees can occupy multiple roles, stating that

> there are a number of possible social scientific approaches to knowledge. In one, we make our informants subjects. In another, our informants become our teachers (Pepinsky, 1991, p. 302). Or they can be our collaborators, where the relationship between participant and researcher is more equal. The point is to avoid viewing the subject as a source of information to be interpreted by the professional researcher. Both sides have something to offer the project.

It is from this orientation, as equal collaborators, that this research was conducted.

There are other power differentials that were considered when approaching the current study. First, while it is often presumed that the interviewer holds the more powerful position in the research process, this research embodied more of an exchanging
or ebb and flow of the power dynamic. This results from several intersecting components of this particular case study, to include the gender of both the researcher and the interviewee, and Chris’ status as an insider with “rank.”

While Bachman and Schutt (2011) note that entering the field is a critical stage in participant observations, a point that will be discussed further in the reflexivity section below, they also note the importance of developing a trusted insider within the group or organization to be studied. They worked at establishing a deep sense of rapport and trust with Chris. It should be noted that Chris showed an increased willingness to provide entrée into situations and interactions that were relevant to this study, as well as assist with establishing necessary contacts. Chris was not the only potential participant to express willingness for taking part in the current study; his wife and friends indicated that they were also prepared to participate in the interview process.

As a member of both organizations, Chris was a liaison between the Union and the Fraternal Order of Police executive boards in the process of securing letters of support. Chris conducted several preliminary interviews—not recorded—with the researcher, suggesting topics she needed to consider. Chris also assisted the researcher in gaining entry to certain venues that increased her understanding of these events, specifically attending the Virginia Gang Investigator’s Association Annual Meeting and also observing Chris’ lecture on officer survivability at the Police Academy. Attendance at these events afforded the researcher the opportunity to hear from several investigators who had been involved in shootings, been injured in the line of duty and to observe the reactions of other law enforcement personnel to the related incidents.
Embracing the Outsider Within Perspective

While general feminist methodologies informed the current study, there were two in particular that merit special attention. The first was the concept of the outsider within. Collins (1986, 1999) developed this perspective as a means of acknowledging the voice and the uniquely situated work of black feminists in sociology who were operating at the margins of the discipline but within it. Collins (1986) notes that, from this position, a particular way of "seeing reality" is developed, as the outsider within is not fully accepted nor embraced by the culture due to membership in a marginalized racial, gender, and/or class group, and yet is afforded the intimate cultural knowledge of an insider. From this vantage point, the outsider within can see through cultural distortions and identify anomalies or problems that those fully immersed within the culture may not be able to perceive.

The outsider within standpoint is not limited to black feminists within sociology (Clark 1998, Collins 1986, Watts 2006), but may apply to any individual occupying marginalized social locations due to a history of unequal power. This research is quite unique in that it incorporated a doubly situated outsider within perspective. The researcher is a white female partial insider to the police organization. Police organizations tend to be male-dominated, patriarchal institutions with a strong subculture. As such, the researcher was an outsider within the police department; she is a female, in a female body (Del Busso 2007), in what many consider to be a man’s world. The gender of the researcher may be a double-edged sword: Bachman and Schutt (2011) suggest that the gender dynamic involved in females interviewing males may facilitate communication and the exchange of information, while Huggins and Glebbeek (2003)
note that, in policing contexts in particular, male officers may resist sharing things that they believe are not appropriate for a woman to hear.

This is further compounded by a perception of police and police cultures as secretive, violent and dangerous (Huggins and Glebbeek 2003, Miller and Tewksbury 2010). Miller and Tewksbury (2010) further explicate this potential barrier in their discussion of restricted research settings inhabited by those who are unlikely to disclose damaging information to outsiders; this resistance and secrecy may also be related to a notion that existing socio-political power arrangements favor these institutions and they resist scrutiny in order to protect that privilege of power. Although she has a deep understanding and appreciation for the culture and mannerisms of the police, as will be further discussed in the following section on reflexivity, the researcher has never been a police officer. Thus, she is an outsider within the police agency, understanding it and having access, but not truly of it.

The second outsider within perspective contained in this research is that of Chris. While he is both a male and a police officer, he also comes from a cultural background that differs from that of many of his fellow officers. Chris is a Hispanic male who was born in London, raised in South America, and was naturalized as a United States citizen. Being raised as a Catholic by his grandmother in Colombia until he immigrated to the United States in the fifth grade has instilled within him values and beliefs that are, at times, contradictory to those projected by the dominant police culture. Additionally, Chris spent the rest of his youth in Brooklyn in a very impoverished area; as he openly jests, English is his third language—Spanish and Broklyneese are his first two. Within the police department, there is an informal, yet rather tangible, divide between officers
who are from northern states and those who hail from southern states. Thus, Chris’
background, beliefs and even his willingness to participate in this research and openly
discuss that which is commonly believed to be held as secret or for insiders only, permits
his to adopt an outsider within perspective.

*Reflexivity*

Both Lincoln and Denzin (2003) and Rubin and Rubin (2005) noted that the role
of the researcher is critical in qualitative research. Indeed, Lincoln and Denzin (2003)
discussed how knowledge is always “partial, incomplete and situated...All writing
reflects a particular standpoint: that of the inquirer/author.” Rubin and Rubin (2005)
discussed qualitative interviewing as a conversation, acknowledging that the researcher
participates and engages with the participant, rather than treating them as devoid of
humanity, a number, a subject or another response to a Likert scale. Essential to this
critique of the quest for objectivity is that, as humans, we are inherently unobjective,
despite positivists’ belief that, if they rigorously adhere to the scientific method, then
their research will be objective, neutral and emotionally detached (Danner and Landis
1990). Hahn (2006) summarizes the struggle between the researcher being an active part
of the research setting and the positivistic goal of detached objectivity, stating “you see, I
am situated inside of me, I see, I hear, taste, smell, and think this from me. When I take
me out to do fieldwork, me always tags along.”

As researchers and human beings, we have values, beliefs and emotions that
influence everything from what we choose to study to how we approach any given
research project. Gelsthorpe (2007) succinctly identifies this influence of self by
acknowledging that “what scientists bring to scientific discovery unavoidably contributes
to what science discovers." Becker (1996) noted that we act on values and assumptions on a daily basis, yet we rarely inspect what those values and assumptions are, let alone how they influence our behavior. The researcher can overlook their role in the story and the influence of their past experience on the research setting and subjects (Gelsthorpe 2007). True objectivity simply may not be achievable and, as many qualitative researchers argue, should not be something that is strived for. Instead, researchers are encouraged to locate themselves within the research process, acknowledged their biases and beliefs, and to make the effort to know the participants in order to get as close as possible to their reality, their truth, and their experience. To further this point, Daly and Chesney-Lind (1988) noted that so-called objective, empirical systems of knowledge are androcentric, and therefore are neither objective nor generalizable to the entire population. Daly and Chesney-Lind (1988) also suggested that "...objectivity can serve to mask men's gender loyalties as well as loyalties to other class or race groups." Thus, this so-called objectivity that is achieved through a positivistic approach may actually encourage, entrench and replicate forms of social stratification (based upon class, gender and racial differences) in what is considered unbiased knowledge.

As the researcher is also a person, the researcher's underlying values and assumptions can influence those interpretations—what and how you observe can be influenced by who you are (Becker 1996). While scholars such as Wilson (1983) and Laub et al (Laub et al. 1995) have advocated divorcing, or at least separating ideology from research, many others in the field acknowledge that the very topics chosen for research are influenced by the personal experience and viewpoint of the researcher (Belknap and Potter 2007, Danner and Landis 1990). To further this idea, some scholars
suggest that a good researcher not only acknowledges these influences, but draws from them to strengthen and shape their work, which is why reflexivity is key within this research process to confront and manage biases (Irwin 2002, Mills 1959).

In recognizing this need for reflexivity, or the awareness of the researcher and his or her experiences as related to the shaping and conduct of research (Gelsthorpe 2007, Gilgun 2008, Hahn 2006), the researcher must acknowledge several aspects of her personal history that have made this research possible and that impacted the researcher while conducting this study. To begin, her father is an active member of the Police Department with 34 years of distinguished service to his credit. There are people on the PD who have, quite literally, watched the researcher grow up, acting as figurative uncles and aunts. These relationships simultaneously provide a modicum of entrée, while at the same time placing the researcher at a distinct power disadvantage because she may be viewed as a child, rather than a trained social scientist.

While a Masters student at the University of Liverpool, the researcher was required to conduct at least two full weeks of a placement experience, which was directly authorized by a high-ranking department official and carried out with the Detective Bureau of the Police Department. The reason it is important to acknowledge this departmental official’s role is three-fold. First, the researcher grew up and went to school with the official’s children, so there was a personal history involved. Second, the researcher later found out that the detectives only knew that she was a psychology graduate student and had been sent to them by a member of the command staff when she commenced her internship; it was later admitted that they believed she had been placed in the Detective Bureau to conduct covert psychological evaluations of the detectives for the
command staff. This further compounded the researcher's position as an outsider and presented additional obstacles to overcome early in her internship. Finally, although this official had been supportive of the researcher's educational pursuits, when discussions of this particular research project began, this official became a staunch gatekeeper, barring access, using bureaucracy as a shield, and suggesting that another area of research be pursued.

This internship proved to be critical to the development of the current study. The researcher spent two weeks over the Christmas holidays in 2007 and one week of Easter break in 2008 working primarily with the Field Forensics Unit. This time spent in the field was the initial foundation of several professional relationships and friendships that exist to this day. The researcher resumed her internship in March of 2009 and the researcher has spent an average of one, eight-hour shift per week working with the Detective Bureau and continues to maintain this internship schedule. This time in the field has allowed the researcher to, over an extended period of time, gain insider knowledge and become what Huggins and Glebbeek (2003) call a partial professional insider. Throughout the course of the internship, the researcher has been able to establish trust and rapport, and demonstrate that she "has what it takes" to work with the police. This includes, but is not limited to, demonstrating her ability to complete job-related tasks and apply job-related knowledge, demonstrating that she can "handle" herself and cope with the often traumatic experiences involved in police work, and proving that she can be useful as an unofficial consultant on several homicide cases. Being asked for her opinion and hearing comments like "why don't you just go through the academy and get it over with?" or jests about the member of the unit not receiving a paycheck suggest a
relative acceptance as a peer. Thus, over the course of the last five years, the researcher's identity has evolved from “his daughter,” to “the intern,” to a whole person and colleague, worthy of attention and interest in her own right.

This internship also provided the opportunity for the researcher to meet Chris, although at the time of the initial meeting, he was a homicide detective and, unbeknownst to the researcher, still greatly struggling to cope with the aftermath of his shooting incident. Chris had previously worked with the researcher's father in Vice and Narcotics and was willing to talk to her about using his case as a research project in the fall of 2009. At the time, it was anticipated that this would be a rather quick study, resulting in one, maybe two, publications. After that initial meeting, both Chris and the researcher realized that this study would be a much larger undertaking than either had assumed. This led to almost two and a half years of collaborative groundwork, building rapport and trust, and eliciting critical support from other primary and secondary gatekeepers.

The researcher has also had the experience of working in the immediate aftermath of two shooting incidents, both of which involved fatalities. In the first, she was able to experience the resulting tension between the officers and the community, being told by an officer while out on the street to “let me know if you see anyone with a gun and, if you do, get down and stay down.” In the wake of the second incident, while assisting in the location and collection of evidence, the researcher was physically thrown out of the way by a detective when the victim’s family swerved their vehicle at the officers when exiting a parking lot. These experiences have allowed an immersion in the tensions following an incident and provided a unique opportunity to observe and probe the vulnerability and fears these incidents evoke in officers. The researcher's experience and history plays a
role in the current study, providing a situated and contextual knowledge that influences her perceptions and understandings in the research setting.

Limitations

While the positivistic epistemology underlying some quantitative approaches may undermine the ability to develop comprehensive or deep understanding of an area of inquiry, qualitative methodologies and their underlying philosophies are not without their flaws, including suggested issues of validity and reliability, as well as errors in the researchers' interpretations of participants' realities (Burman, Batchelor and Brown 2001, Gadd 2004, Short 2002, Whiteacre and Pepinsky 2002). Becker (1996) refers to the instability of the real world, likening trying research to attempting to obtain meaning for a constantly moving target. Lincoln and Denzin (2003) echoed this point in their reference to Seale, who, after critiquing numerous frameworks for qualitative methodology, suggests that "subtle realism," or acknowledging that the world as we know it is constructed, may be a firm starting ground for approaching research. This argument for multiple realities is contradictorily furthered by one of the very flaws of the ideologies associated with qualitative methodologies: if there are truly multiple realities unfolding concurrently, in research focusing on an actor or actors, there is the chance for misinterpretation of the observation (Becker 1996).

Not only must there be concern for misinterpretation by the researcher, but the motivated nature of memory (Gadd 2004) must also be recognized. As such, each of us attempts to present ourselves favorably, managing impressions and minimizing recollections that may be negatively associated with the individual (Goffman 1959, Huggins and Glebbeek 2003). To state it in colloquial terms, Chris and the other
interviewees have a horse in this race, both professionally and personally. While they have related their memories and experiences, it is critical to remember that these are subjective and may reflect a need to both protect and present a positive self-image. Berg (2007) also reminds us that personal documents in and of themselves are incredibly subjective, but that this subjectivity can provide insight into the views and perceptions of the authors.

As this case was widely publicized, and, as a result of his actions in this incident, Chris has received local, state and national awards, it will be almost impossible to grant anonymity to the Police Department in this research. While the current study attempts to protect the confidentiality of participants, this will be particularly difficult. As the case is identified, and Chris is identified, it may be easy to identify statements from his girlfriend, for example, and thus determine the identity of the individual. All interviews were numbered, rather than identifying the participants by name, in an attempt to protect the identities of participants. Another potential impediment to maintaining confidentiality is the possible use of a transcriptionist, although to mitigate this risk, the transcriptionist was asked to sign a confidentiality agreement.

Conclusion

This is a case study, and, as such, the selection of research participants was purposive in that only individuals involved with this case were be asked to participate. The data collection consisted of a series of free-form interviews, beginning with several interviews with Chris, before proceeding to interview any additional participants. The use of cognitive interviewing techniques were utilized in some interviews to elicit detailed responses. Interviews were be tape recorded, with the interviewee’s consent, transcribed,
and then analyzed to extract dominant themes. In an effort to triangulate the data collected, as well as to incorporate multiple sources of information, all relevant media, any personal correspondences and documents provided by Chris or other interviewees, official policies and other official documents were be reviewed and analyzed.

The hope is that this research will aid in potentially assisting other officers, other police departments, and other individuals who have experienced a similar event understand their situation. An additional goal of this research was to identify possible areas of best practice and training, with the aim of providing the appropriate response and support in these cases, emphasizing officer survivability. This study seeks to approach the issues involved with police shootings holistically, looking at precipitating factors/influences, the event itself and post-event factors, across several dimensions, as opposed to a narrow approach only examining one dimension in regard to one stage of the event.
CHAPTER V
FINDINGS: THE CASE

Introduction: Sources of Data, Life History and Case Description

This chapter will discuss in detail the sources of data used in this case study before delving into the analysis of said data. The analysis is broken into three chapters: this chapter, which describes the sources of data in the current study, provides a condensed life history of the primary participant, and a detailed synopsis of the shooting incident from April 2007; chapter six, which details the thematic analyses of the interview transcripts; and chapter seven, which includes the policy and media analyses conducted, as well as the observations gained from the participant observation components of the current research.

Sources of Data

The data for the current study come from various sources. There were 11 interviews completed with seven participants, which accounted for approximately 16.5 hours of interview time. Participant interviews were purposive, as outlined in Chapter 4, and interview sessions ranged in duration from 49:19 to 2:14:45. These interviews covered a variety of topics, although certain topics, such as stigma and the police culture, were deliberately discussed with each participant. Interviews were conducted in a variety of locations, including private residences, university office space, and in various PD locations (even including interview/interrogation rooms in the Detective Division that were not in use). Some participants asked to have the interviews conducted during their working hours and openly told their colleagues that they were participating in this
research, others asked to meet privately, when they were off duty. Table 7 displays some information regarding number of interviews and total hours of recorded interviews per interviewee.

Table 7: Selected Information on Interviews and Interviewees

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Participant</th>
<th>Number of Interviews</th>
<th>Total Interview Time</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>498 minutes or 8.3 hours</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>127 minutes or 2.1 hours</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>133 minutes or 2.2 hours</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>53 minutes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>66 minutes, or 1.1 hours</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>49 minutes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>65 minutes, or 1.1 hours</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The participants were predominantly male (n = 6) and all participants are sworn law enforcement officers, with a range of time served ranging from 13 years to 40 years (μ = 21.1 years). The average age of participants was 43.7 years and four participants self-identified as White, two as African American, and one was Hispanic. Most participants self-identified as either Christian or Catholic. Educationally, the participants varied from having a high school diploma with some college (n = 2), to having Bachelors degrees (n = 3), to having Masters degrees (n = 2), with two participants currently pursuing Masters degrees at a local university. Five participants are currently married, two are divorced, and five have children. Three participants are military veterans and two had served as law enforcement officers at another agency prior to joining their current departments. Four participants were Virginia natives, with two being "locals."

Three participants had a parent that was a law enforcement officer and one had a parent that served in the military. Four participants had some form of upheaval or instability in their childhood, due to immigrating to the United States (two participants), moving cross country, or being poor in a gang and drug infested neighborhood (two
participants). All participants had been involved in multiple critical incidents during their law enforcement careers, including five who have been involved or present during at least one shooting incident, four who have been involved in the investigation of officer involved shootings, two who have previously been shot in the line of duty and six who are actively involved as peer counselors with a CISM team. Most participants have investigative experience, often specifically related to either violent crimes, vice and narcotics or both areas, although only two participants were currently investigators. All other participants hold ranks ranging from Sergeant to Captain.

It should also be noted that the interviews varied greatly in terms of quality, with some participants being open, honest and engaged in the interviews, and others being more aloof, displaying closed body language and providing very brief, terse responses. Some participants became quite emotional during these discussions, while others were more detached or matter-of-fact in their delivery. During the planning phase of the current research, it was anticipated that the number of participants would be greater, however, due to scheduling conflicts ($n = 3$), non-response ($n = 3$) and lack of current contact information or facilitated introduction ($n = 8$) (see previous chapter for further information), there were several interviews that were not conducted. For example, Chris’ roommate at the time of the shooting has since retired from the PD and no one seems to have valid contact information. Also, subconsciously or consciously, Chris may have exhibited efforts to act in a self-protective manner, as three of the more sensitive interviews originally planned—those with two of his immediate relatives and his psychologist—were not completed due to Chris’ scheduling conflicts. These particular interviews would have required Chris to introduce the parties and, in the case of his
psychologist, sign documents attesting to his consent to have his doctor discuss protected health information. Finally, due to requests from Chris, his mother was not included as a potential participant because he feared participation would be traumatic for her and may have adverse health effects. As noted previously, the primary participant in this study, Sergeant Scallon, is referred to by his first name throughout this manuscript. This is done to primarily signify not only the trust and partnership that was required to complete the current study, but to also avoid any perceived artificial distance or quasi-positivistic influence imposed by the researcher while documenting the results and conducting the analyses to follow.

These interviews were considered to be the primary data source, yet there were also news media and policy analyses completed, court transcripts examined and field notes and recollections of experiences from participant observation were also included. Table 8 is a revised version of Table 6 and details supplemental data sources that were considered in the current study.
Table 8: Final List of Data Sources Used in the Current Study

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Data Source</th>
<th>Specific</th>
<th>Details</th>
<th>Collection Method</th>
<th>Obtained From</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Interviews</td>
<td>Chris</td>
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<td>Each interview was conducted in an approximate two hour time frame. There were multiple interviews with some participants. Only the participant and the researcher were present during the interview. Interviews were recorded digitally and were transcribed by an external transcriptionist.</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Significant Other</td>
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<td>Partner</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Co-workers/Friends</td>
<td>Four individuals</td>
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<tr>
<td>Public Documents</td>
<td>Court Transcript</td>
<td>Commonwealth of Virginia v. Torron Lucas</td>
<td>Obtained copy of transcripts from accomplice's trial and sentencing</td>
<td>CWA</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>City Employee Benefits Documents</td>
<td>Bon Secours EAP Brochure Employee Wellness Handbook</td>
<td>Available on <a href="http://www.norfolk.gov">www.norfolk.gov</a></td>
<td>Publicly available on City Webpage</td>
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<tr>
<td>PD General Orders</td>
<td>ADM-130: News Media</td>
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<td>FOIA Request to Police Dept./Anonymous</td>
<td>PD, Anonymous Sources</td>
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<td>OPR-110: Firearms</td>
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<td>OPR-120: Use of Force</td>
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<td>OPR-140: Special Incident Report</td>
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<td>OPR-410: Deadly Force Incidents</td>
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<td>OPR-620: Line of Duty Deaths</td>
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<td>Draft of ADM-435: Peer Support Team</td>
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<td>Awards</td>
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<td>Copy of Award</td>
<td>Chris</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Virginia Public Safety Medal of Valor</td>
<td>Press release documenting award</td>
<td>Governor's website</td>
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<td>Table 8: Final Data Sources Continued</td>
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<td><strong>Newspaper</strong></td>
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<td>Virginian Pilot</td>
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<td>Seventeen Articles</td>
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<td>Shots Fired Column</td>
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<td>Online retrieval</td>
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<tr>
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<td>PD SOPs</td>
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<td>First, Second and Third Patrol Divisions; Detective Division; Office of Professional Standards, Criminal Intelligence Unit, Public Information and Outreach Division, Vice and Narcotics Division</td>
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<td>Accreditation Standards and Model Policies</td>
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<td>IACP: Officer-Involved Shooting Investigation, Post-Shooting Personnel Support, &amp; Critical Incident Stress Management</td>
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<td>Example Policies from other Agencies</td>
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<td>Copies of policies provided by other jurisdictions for comparison</td>
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<td>Agency A (Large West Coast Municipal Police Agency)</td>
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<td>Anonymous Sources</td>
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<td>Agency B (Large Consolidated Midwest Police Agency)</td>
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<td>Field Notes</td>
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Synopsis of the Case and Pertinent Background Information

To fully understand this case, especially given the theoretical framework being utilized and the influence of feminist methodologies in this research, it is important to examine more than just the shooting incident and its aftermath. It is important to understand the officer who pulled the trigger as an individual who is nested within a given familial, occupational and cultural setting and that those connections, relationships and positions both influenced and were influenced by the shooting incident in this particular case. As one participant in this study summarized, “Here's the shooter at the epicenter... And then you have his family is over here, you have an administration over here, you have the investigators that are investigating the incident here. You have his other colleagues that were involved but didn't shoot over here. You just got this whole web of things going on.”

Life History

Chris was born on January 25, 1974, in London, UK, while his mother, Judith, was traveling. Chris’ mother is Colombian and his father, Miguel, was French Argentinean. Chris and his mother lived in the Kensington section of London for approximately one year before returning to the rest of the family in Colombia. In Colombia, Chris was a part of an extended familial living situation that included his mother and father (Judith and Miguel), his older brother (Antonio), nine aunts, two uncles, grandmother and numerous cousins. Due to the number of women in his life and the fact that he acknowledges that his grandmother was the primary source of discipline,
it appears the family had a more matriarchal structure. However, traditional gender roles are also present, as evidenced in the quotes below:

*but you had to take care of girls. In other words, if the girls needed something or somebody was bothering them, it was your role to kind of step in and kind of take care of them and like matriarch grandmother needed something, then you stopped everything and you did it...*

[On his father] *Typical let the younger, let the females or let the younger men take care of raising, provides money, or provides services to get in trade for whatever it is, food, whatever we needed, very coarse, very abrupt, not very from what I remember, not very, just wasn't very personable. I don't know if that's the right word but not jovial at all, very strict.*

The family lived in poverty: there was no running water and most meals were eaten at the local Catholic church, which was a central feature of life in this environment. Not only were meals provided by the church, it also served to educate the local children, supplementing what older family members were teaching their children.

*there was a handful of male cousins but the majority are all female, so with nine aunts and all the other female cousins you would just...they would interact with you as far as kind of passing down stories and stuff like that, somewhat home schooled but the most part was in the church. It was just really, you didn't know any better so it wasn't bad and I don't have any bad memories about it, gathering food, cleaning the house, and just daily chores, just very mundane...I probably started school when I was five, four or five. School was given in the church and just family members and stuff like that...*

*In Colombia went and ate breakfast, lunch, and dinner at the church, beautiful church, wood, gold, brass, silver, when you think about everything around it was very poor, not poor in a sense of just, you know, dilapidated kind of stuff but just the running water kind of stuff but yet the church had everything.*

Even though they lived in a rural village, the family was not immune to violence, particularly Cartel-related violence—“a lot of violence with the Cartels going around but it was common, several kidnappings and so it was just like living literally in like a Third
World nation"—and political violence. In particular, Chris witnessed his father being shot while on a family outing in Medellin as a small boy, sometime between 1979 and 1981. While discussing this incident, a pattern of learned familial coping mechanisms—particularly avoiding or misdirecting attention from a troubling situation or issue—comes to light and will be discussed further in the thematic analyses. According to Chris, one of the main factors that motivated his mother to immigrate to the United States was a desire to escape the violence surrounding them in Colombia.

Chris was quite close to his mother as a child, noting that he was often called mono (monkey) because of how he clung to her, particularly after the family immigrated to the United States. Although Chris is still close to his mother, he has gained autonomy and independence, as noted throughout his personal history, and has taken on a more protective role as an adult, as noted above. Chris' mother left Colombia when he was around eight or nine years old and moved to New York City. She was in New York for about a year before she had saved up enough money to bring both of her sons to New York. Chris notes that his father was "already gone at the time," and so it was just his mother, his older brother and himself as a family unit. The family initially moved to Queens, an area Chris remembers as being quite racialized and segregated, from both the ethnic enclaves found in the neighborhoods to his initial educational contacts, and the family was still living in relative poverty:

I remember it sucked because I went to the Montessori academy and they really didn't have, at the time over in Queens, they really didn't have a good... they called it TESL, teaching English as a second language. They really didn't have good curriculum...their idea of TESL was put all the Hispanics together and...some teacher with minimal Spanish skills would talk... And it was horrible but growing up in Queens was...my mom worked all the time so I would leave
when she left for work. I would leave and when I was done with school I would walk back to the apartment...

Queens at the time was very segregated. You had a lot of Asian, you had a lot of black, and you had a handful of Hispanics but it was different. You had a lot of Puerto Ricans. You had Dominicans, handful of Colombians. We were the minority within the minority. So you kind of get cliqueish with the people you hang around with. So he [his brother] wound of kind of going his own way. I would just go to school and come back...

The family did not remain in Queens for very long before moving to Brooklyn in 1981. Chris was still in grade school at the time and remembers his brother having to walk him to school each day. Also during this time period, his mother met and subsequently married his stepfather, Richard. Chris did not particularly like this change in the family dynamic, stating,

*I didn't like him. I didn't like him being involved. I remember specifically telling him when he said he tried to discipline me or tried to yell at me for something and I said, Well, you're not my dad, and you can't tell me what to do kind of thing, and that was like that for a while and to this day I don't refer to him as dad. For a long time I just called him Rich because just I didn't want him...he wasn't replacing anything and I for all intents and purposes, that's my mom so...I made it known that I didn't like him at all

After Chris' mother remarried, he was naturalized as a United States citizen and was adopted by his stepfather in 1982. Chris' mother and stepfather had one miscarriage and eventually had a child, Jennifer, born on May 5, 1983, who is nine years younger than Chris.

Although the family had immigrated to the United States as a means of fleeing the violence in Colombia, they were not immune to violence in Brooklyn. Violence was a relatively constant feature of their lives, as exemplified in the following quote:

*I remember maybe fifth grade, one of the kids came in and like he was a grade ahead of us. One of the kids came in and shot one of the teachers...But you
figured this was the '80s, maybe somewhere in the '80s. So in New York it was just off the hook... Like drugs and violence and stuff like that. Kind of trade just a warmer climate with a cooler climate with the same kind of violence... Stealing cars, there was nothing... it was big Latin King population, which my brother was involved in, fights, shootings.

While previous experiences of trauma and violence will be explicated in later thematic analyses, it is also important to discuss the murder of Chris' older brother, Antonio, in the context of his background and personal history. Chris' brother was five years his senior and, as mentioned above walked Chris to school every day in Brooklyn. Also, as mentioned in the quote above regarding violence in Brooklyn, Chris' brother was an active member of the Almighty Latin King and Queen Nation (Brotherton and Barrios 2004). In 1982, when Chris was around nine years old, he was meeting his brother in the courtyard of his building so that his brother could walk him to school. His brother was shot and killed in front of him; not only was this a product of gang violence, but the family heard that this shooting was related to infighting within the gang and that Chris' brother was likely mistaken for someone else. This homicide was never solved. Shortly following his brother's murder, his mother miscarried. Again, learned coping mechanisms that will be discussed in the thematic analyses were also present in the discussions of this incident.

Chris' family moved "out towards Long Island" in 1986, after his brother's murder. Another participant in this study credits his stepfather with helping to provide stability and assisting the family in escaping the violence and poverty they had experienced in Brooklyn. It has been suggested that Chris was spoiled, and may still be spoiled, by his mother. There were many opportunities that Chris was able to participate in when he was living on Long Island, to include music lessons and tennis camp. When
Chris was in high school, he was involved in multiple extracurricular activities, including being in a band and playing lacrosse. He appears to have been an average student, doing well in English and Science, but not so well in History; he failed Spanish. It is also during high school that Chris begins his career in public safety, joining the local fire department as a volunteer in 1988; as evidenced below, this was something he enjoyed:

> Volunteer and what you could... God, I don't even... was it 10th or 11th grade? I forget what grade it is, but if you were a [volunteer] you could park in the front of the school and if there was a fire or alert went out, you could leave school to go to the fire... Which was pretty awesome, not to mention that the fire department that I belonged that had a bar in it... A lot of city firemen were there, a lot of city cops, you know, that [volunteered] out there, so it was, we had a very good crew, very good crew out there.

Even though he was involved in numerous activities and clearly enjoyed his volunteer work with the fire department, Chris attempted suicide towards the end of high school. This suicide attempt was fueled by failures in interpersonal relationships and in school, because Chris graduated late, as well as alcohol. While Chris admits this was not a “serious” attempt, he also acknowledges that he was hospitalized and was taken off of the roster at the fire department as a consequence of his actions. After graduating high school late, Chris enrolled in Nassau Community College where, much like his high school experience, he was more interested in extracurricular activities than his academic studies. During this time he was also as a medic working out of Long Island College Hospital in Brooklyn. It was also during this time that he “met probably the most one of the most significant girls I ever met and dated her for a while in college... I was best friends with her family, her brother. It was just a great thing.” Chris left Nassau Community College after “a couple of semesters,” and went to speak with a Navy recruiter with a friend. He enlisted the same day he spoke with the recruiter.
He stated that his mother was not surprised he had joined the military, but that she "just hated it." Chris was sent to boot camp in Illinois, where he held various leadership positions and received the Navy League Award at his graduation from boot camp. During boot camp, his girlfriend, who had told him she would wait for him, notified him that their relationship was not working for her. According to Chris, he was like "oh, man, so you kind of just pour into the school or the training." Immediately following boot camp, Chris was sent to Gunner's Mate A School, also in Illinois, for six months. Just before graduating from A School, the night before he was due to pick orders, Chris was arrested while out partying with some of his fellow sailors. He was able to pay a fine and was released in enough time to get back to base. Because he was told that he "smelled like a brewery," he was almost barred from choosing orders.

While in A School, Chris also met his first wife, Yvette, who was also in the Navy. Chris' orders had him assigned to the USS Nassau, which was deployed in the Mediterranean Sea at that point in time. Just before he deployed, Yvette, whom he had been dating, informed him that she was pregnant. They were married in 1995 and he was sending the majority of each paycheck home to her to get ready for the baby. When asked how involved or invested he was in his marriage to Yvette, Chris stated, "oh, that was strictly because she lied and said that I got her pregnant. There was no emotion. There was an obligation and that is as cold—similarities between the way I acted with my first wife, identical to the way my dad treated my mom, identical." Upon returning from deployment, not only was there no wife waiting to greet him, there was no baby and there was no money left in their checking account. Several of his friends were able to help him find a place to stay and he was able to file for divorce, which was finalized in 1999.
While in port in Norfolk, Virginia, Chris was in a rather serious motorcycle accident in 1996 where he went through the rear windshield of a car that had cut him off going approximately 80 miles per hour. In this accident, Chris broke his hands and ribs, and did significant damage to his knee. The Virginia State Trooper that responded had the crew from “Real Stories of the Highway Patrol” with him. Chris ended his active duty with the Navy when he was assigned to SIMA in the Hampton Roads area of Virginia. He was applying for police and fire positions in Hampton Roads and in New York, but he was already dating his second wife, Kathleen, who was a student at a local university at this point in time. They were married in 2002 and divorced in 2007. He was hired by the Police Department and began the police academy in January 1998 and was scheduled to be out of the military (utilizing terminal leave) in February 1998, although he remained in the reserves until 2002.

Chris became fully immersed in the police culture almost immediately. Although the impact of police culture will also be explored in the thematic analyses, Chris’ embracing of this culture impacted several other areas of his life, as well interacted with other themes, such as gender and coping. For example, this is how Chris has described his experiences in law enforcement:

*just immediately just becoming kind of, you know, immersed into police culture and out of the gate going into narcotics for several years, working undercover, plain clothes, working like plain clothes... it was just kind of growing distant because I was never home. I was always working. I probably netted the most money on the police department, even more than I make now, ten times more than I make now, working because we worked nonstop. We worked overtime and overtime and overtime, just kind of just did that and for the longest time [I] was like, that's it. That's all I'm going to do. I don't want to get promoted, I don't want to do anything. I want to work narcotics and that's what I want to do.*
Chris acknowledges that this full commitment to policing contributed to the collapse of his second marriage and, once it was clear that he and Kathleen were heading towards divorce, Chris turned to familiar coping mechanisms: alcohol and work.

So it was [only] a matter of time before she's like, This ain't working, and I was like, All right. You're right. This ain't working and I wind up leaving but I wound up -- I think she came -- she's like, Probably be good if we just separated and it was like everybody knew it but no one was talking about it so I was like, Okay. And I was like, I tell you what, I'll be gone. We'll take care of the divorce. Whatever you want, it's yours... So it was very amicable and towards the end you're like, Wow -- because we went to not talking to each other, not sleeping in the same room. I would sleep downstairs. I would drink like a case of beer and then pass out and then wake up and go to work kind of thing. Then we started getting along like right before the end so it was like, Oh. We were like, No, this is the right thing. You know, we'd just be miserable so we wound up separating and I wind up going to live with Tennis until I got my own place off of Maple but living with Tennis, you know, the bachelor pad again but a little bit more mature in where I was working but still work, work, work, work, and that kind of just forced me to just continue to keep doing work.

As noted above, Chris went to narcotics very quickly after completing the police academy. In his police career, he has worked in narcotics, criminal intelligence, major case, homicide, and in patrol, K-9 and central records as a sergeant. Many of these assignments can be considered high impact or high stress. Indeed, Chris mentioned numerous potentially traumatic incidents that occurred over the course of his career, to include the line of duty death of a close friend from the police academy; confronting violent, mentally unstable individuals; nearly losing his hand during a search warrant (which was in a large dog's mouth seconds before another officer shot the dog in an attempt to protect Chris); going into high-risk situations; and being present when two colleagues were shot in a drug buy gone wrong. In fact, in the situation where the two officers were shot, Chris rode in the ambulance with the officer who had received a stomach wound and was put in the position to tell this officer's wife that they were not
sure her husband was going survive his wounds. Despite being exposed to numerous traumatic situations, overall, Chris views his career favorably:

*Other than that, it's literally it's been I've worked every, every choice assignment you could possibly want on the police department for action or for just challenging, whether it be narcotics, vice, criminal intel, working out how motorcycle clubs, working terrorists organizations, or terrorist threats, working homicides, you know, working robberies to working a dog in K-9. I mean, just a hundred miles an hour and it's that fun adrenaline, kind of always challenging, not sitting in an office somewhere.*

Chris' career also brought him into contact with his third wife, a police officer from another jurisdiction that he met during a narcotics training class. They were friends for several years, maintaining professional contact and seeing each other at police social functions. In February of 2007, they saw each other at a post-Polar Plunge party at an Irish bar at the Virginia Beach Oceanfront. Chris jokingly asked how her firefighter boyfriend was doing and she informed him that they had broken up. She asked him how his wife was and he told her they were separated and divorcing. In fact, Chris had recently moved out of the home he had shared with his second wife and was living with a fellow officer in the room above his garage. He describes sleeping on an air mattress and his possessions/living conditions have been described by others as “sad.” For example, one participant noted that:

...he was sad that his marriage didn't work out but again, it wasn't -- to me it was he wasn't broken up, but sad that it didn't work out, if that makes any sense. I know he lived in Chesapeake and they owned a house or he owned a house. I don't know if she was on it or not but he pretty much moved out of the house and gave her the house. And from the looks of what he had property wise, gave her everything in it...he had like a chair, a blow-up mattress, a dresser, a table, and some clothes. That's about it.
During this time period, Chris was also studying to take the sergeant's promotional exam. When it was revealed that they were both single, Chris informed his future third wife that he was going to “stalk her,” and her roommate told her that she though Chris was serious. They started dating soon after. Their official first date occurred on April 1, 2007, and less than three weeks later, they faced a challenge that can cripple couples that have been together for years: Chris was involved in a shooting incident.

*The Shooting*

To preface the details of Chris's officer-involved shooting incident from April 15, 2007, it is important to describe how these events were discussed in the interview process. The shooting was not discussed until Chris' third interview. When this discussion commenced, Chris was simply asked to "walk me through it," with no other guidance and little to no attempts to interrupt his recollection or clarify any statements he made. After he finished telling his story, Chris was instructed to close his eyes and calm his breathing. He was led through a meditative exercise to calm him and then he was asked if he was prepared to review the incident again, keeping his eyes closed, this time utilizing sensory and emotional context reinstatement and a more guided interview. This means that, rather than allowing Chris to repeat the same story he commonly uses in training or the version of events he has relayed multiple times, he was asked to focus on things like visual acuity, smell, touch, and emotional responses to attempt to obtain a more detailed and nuanced recollection of the event. For example, at one point he was asked what the store smelled like and he was able to recall that he could smell burnt popcorn. Having discussed this incident several times prior to this interview and having seen Chris present this case at numerous trainings, that is a detail that had never been
revealed. Also telling were the emotional responses, as documented below, which were obtained during the second recounting. This approach yielded a great amount of detail and provided a more comprehensive understanding of Chris’ experience.

On April 15, 2007, Chris remembers waking up excited because he was involved in the International Tattoo at a large, local entertainment venue and was scheduled to practice all day. The day was overcast and cool. Even though he was off duty, Chris stopped by the Police Operations Center to take care of something before heading to practice. He did not interact with anyone while he was in the office and headed directly from the office to the Scope. Rehearsal for the Tattoo lasted between eight and nine hours and Chris, along with some of the members of the Royal Canadian Regiment, went to a sports bar on Granby Street for their lunch break. Chris describes the rehearsal as fun, but exhausting, because it is very repetitive and monotonous, carrying his drum back and forth across the arena floor. Rehearsal ended between 9:00pm and 9:30pm. From the Scope, he drove directly home, unloaded his gear and then took a shower. After he got out of the shower, he called his girlfriend, who was also working in Narcotics for another city, and it was decided that he would go see her at her home, about a half an hour away. He changed clothes and left the house, headed to get gas and cigarettes before he went to his girlfriend’s house. According to Chris, he was only home for around 20 minutes before leaving. He left the house wearing a light blue Brooklyn Cyclones pullover with white writing, a tee shirt underneath, blue jeans and tennis shoes. He had recently cut his long hair off, but had a full beard and weighed between 250 and 255 pounds. He describes himself as looking visibly fatigued and not like a cop.
As he approached the gas station, he was considering where he was going to park so that he could get out quickly and go right onto the interstate. As he pulls up, he realizes he cannot turn around and park at the pump he wanted to use, because there are people outside of the store, so he pulls straight up to another gas pump. Chris said something about the three people struck him as odd, but he started to open his door and may have even opened his gas cap. But his attention kept reverting to the three individuals standing outside the store. He was familiar with the area, had bought drugs there as an undercover officer, and said that the odd feeling was enough for him to lift his pullover over his weapon, which was holstered. As soon as he displayed his weapon, he heard a shout of “Boom” or “Moon” from his right.

When asked to consider what was so odd, he noted that it must have been the fact that, at approximately 10:40pm, the clerks were outside. Typically, the clerks at this gas station close and lock the doors, conducting business only through a bank teller-type slot in the window, after 10:00pm. Chris described the two clerks—whom he recognized from previous trips to that gas station—as Santa Claus (because he was an older gentleman with a white beard) and old Crack Lady and stated that they were facing him, with a male in a black hoodie, with the hood up, facing them. The male clerk pushed his hand out, not aggressively or frantically, and Chris says their facial expressions did not indicate that they were afraid. In terms of the man in the hoodie’s body language, he was not animated or aggressive. When asked about the lighting in the parking lot, Chris says it was “amazing. It’s like—it’s dark out but under there [gas station canopy] it’s like being in a stadium.”
When Chris heard the yell off to his right, he did not stop looking at the male in the hoodie, who also did not glance to his right, but instead “turns over his left shoulder and kind of cants his whole body.” This behavior led Chris to assume the yell was a warning. When the man in the hoodie turned, Chris saw that he had a dark bandana high up on the bridge of his nose covering the lower half of his face and that his eyes were huge—Chris could see a lot of white and describes it as a “deer in headlights” look. Chris also noticed that the man’s hands were in front of his stomach in something like “interview stance,” holding something. Chris also immediately recognized that the man was wearing latex gloves. According to Chris, “no sooner did he turn around and his eyes got even bigger, once he focused and saw it was me, because at that point I’m pulling my gun, did he turn around and—I don’t know how they got the door open and he got them in that fast—but he got them in there. As soon as Chris saw the man, he immediately thought the clerks were being robbed and that he had to do something.

After quickly crossing the parking lot from the gas pumps to the store, Chris was placed at an immediate tactical disadvantage. Due to the placement of an ice machine and the way the door opened outward, Chris was going to have to stand directly in front of a glass door and open it to make entry into the store. The view through the glass was also obscured by stickers and other items posted on the door, so Chris scanned for a “big body part” and tried to enter as quickly as possible after seeing the back of the black hoodie approximately four feet in front of the door. Chris entered the store, yelling “Police!,” and took two steps into the store when the suspect turned and fired at him. He saw the muzzle flash and the bullet struck the door jamb to Chris’ right; he could feel the
debris from the impact hitting his right side. At this point, Chris almost immediately returned fire. When asked what he was thinking or feeling at the time, Chris said

he's shooting at me... all I can equate it to and I want to say I saw it but I didn't. I envisioned seeing something, but obviously right there I'm not daydreaming, if that makes sense. I saw a green light almost like it was—like that [as I] was coming in, if he had a gun in his hand... I could probably shoot—[but] there was no question, no doubt about it; there was no hesitation. I come in, the gun goes off. I'm immediately firing back center mass... and hit him. And when he backed up, I figured he was going to fall and he didn't, then he ran down one of the aisles. So I immediately got cover.

When asked to slow down and recall specific sensory details, Chris describes the store as smelling "disgusting. Like a greasy—like they had been—something had been burnt because they had popcorn. They had rotisserie hot dogs, pickled eggs, but it was like a greasy smell. They never cleaned it and just nasty." He also describes being in the mostly glass store like being in a fish tank—people can see in, but you really cannot see out. This made him concerned regarding the suspect's potential partner outside, but Chris had to focus all of his attention on the suspect he could see and that presented a threat to both Chris and the clerks. Chris' first shot hit the suspect in the center of his chest, near his sternum. Chris noticed that his bandana was still up and that his hoodie was partially zipped up, layered over a gray shirt. Chris quickly states that he was able to get concealment, rather than cover, as the shelves in the store are not very high and are made of a grated material, holding chips and other items typical to a convenience store, that you can see through. He remembers seeing the clerks crouched down and telling them to get behind the counter. Then he would address the suspect and try to see where he was. The suspect would shoot at Chris and Chris would return fire, aiming at center mass. Chris states "I could tell [the shots were] hitting him because it's backing him up
and he's making big movements, like a wince, not his face so much, but his shoulder, shrugging type thing."

It is important to note at this point that Chris’s shooting lasted for approximately 15 minutes, as opposed to the typical five to seven seconds noted in the literature review. Due to the physiological and psychological mechanisms enacted in this type of event, memory encoding is impacted and Chris is unable to recall all events or even all actions in temporal order. He is able to recall significant turning points or moments in the gun battle. In fact, the following quote gives some perspective on both the length of the gun battle and its impacts on Chris; Chris was asked if he knew how many times he went back and forth in the aisles with the suspect:

...I tried to remember that forever, I just, it's one of those things that was so—it took so long and you're like holy smokes, this is never ending. It's not like I'm missing him. If I'm missing him, I'd be like, all right, it's understandable to try to get away. I was like no, this—I'm hitting him, and hitting him, and hitting him, and hitting him, and nothing. I'm like, wow... [I was] very confused, like it wasn't supposed to make sense because I know when you shoot them you're supposed—they’re supposed to go down, whether it be TV or whether it be any other shooting we were involved in. People get shot once or twice and this was it and this fight was over. This guy was shot multiple times and he wasn't doing shit and he was running and I remember the entire time, not once whenever he was shot or anything, did he ever make a sound. Never made a sound... It didn't make sense at all. I was like—and I knew he wasn't wearing a bullet—it came in my head a second, maybe a fraction of a second if he was wearing a vest, it was the worst vest you could possibly wearing because he was bleeding through it.

Chris also discussed how the floor, already greasy, became very slick with the suspect’s blood. He notes that if you tried to run, you would fall and he slipped several times, trying to keep his gun out and to stay close to the shelves. The clerks, by this point, were huddled behind the counter and Chris remembers hearing the female clerk screaming, noting that she was audible but not intelligible. The other sounds he can
remember are the guns, and the movement of the feet on the floors. One of the distinct moments in this incident was when Chris became discouraged because the suspect was not falling down or stopping. He decided to attempt to physically rush and tackle the suspect. The suspect faked to the right and then went left and Chris’ plan was to buttonhook around the corner and rush him. According to Chris:

...I remember being hesitant to just run out because again, the floor right there is where the first shot was any way, so there was a lot of blood right there. So I come around and kind of cleared it with my head and the gun and he stuck the gun and I remember looking, staring at the barrel of the gun as it went off...[it looked] like a giant—the gun is probably small as shit but from that point of view and as I remembered, it reminded me of like an old cartoon gun, like[when] somebody pulls out a little gun and then somebody would take out this huge gun. I saw the cylinder, saw the barrel was like a giant hole, like a shotgun kind of barrel. I knew it wasn’t, but to me that’s how it looked, and then it’s real bright as I’m pulling away and I kind of went to buttonhook and then I just went back the other way because it happened and I was like shit, I’m not going to—he’s still got bullets. I’m not going to mess around with that anymore...that was the defining moment right there. My plan was to kind of tackle him but I remember the second it happened going, I can’t tackle. I may as well just shoot myself because he’s going to shoot me if I try to—there’s no way I could gain speed. It’s like a cat on a slick floor trying to run away, so I was like, forget that.

At the time Chris attempted to rush the suspect, he believes he had shot the man between six and eight times and the man was still an active threat. When asked how he felt when he came around the corner and saw the gun, Chris stated that he thought “oh shit” and “bad decision,” but also admitted that not once through the entire shooting was he scared. This moment during the shooting was a defining moment because, not only did Chris come very close to being shot in the head, and it is almost a miracle that he was not injured at that point in time, but because it became the moment that Chris made another decision. It was at that moment in time that Chris knew he was going to have to
take a head shot. As with other sections of this event, Chris’ words serve his story better, so here is how he relayed this portion of the shooting:

...I remember because my hands always shake. They always shake. They always have. So I remember lining up the sights. I made the decision. He sticks his head up, I’m going to blow it off and I remember picking the gun up, looking over. I see him in the corner and I just tracked him. It was super—I remember it was like a machine was holding the gun because it was so still and it was so smooth. There was no jerking. It was very relaxed, taking a breath at the same time and just (demonstrating) and then firing and hitting him right in the face, and I’m like, Yep...it’s very basic. You forget about everything. Like, the lower part of your body, gone, I don’t even—you don’t even think about anything other than that, sights, just the sight, and you see the back lined up with the front and it was just—it was the perfect sight-picture alignment and just following. When he got to the point, take the breath and you point, head cocks back like he got punched in the face with a hammer, and I never lost sight of his head, which really bothered me because I figured he’d go down and I’d have to peek around the corner, but he just kept on running...I remember feeling good about that until his head didn’t go down, until he didn’t fall. And I thought, oh, this is—I was like, it just didn’t make sense...He ran all the way up the length of the aisle, came up two or three aisles and at this point I didn’t know what to do...so I was going to go behind the counter. For some reason I thought I’d have better coverage from there and just keep an eye on him. But he never made it past that one aisle and he grabs the—he grabs like this rack on the end of the aisle by the cooler and you can tell he’s hurt and struggling. Then he eventually falls down but his head is still up. So his head is still up and falls down and he’s not making a fucking sound, which is creeping the hell out of me, not like scary but just sounds silly, but you think like a fucking zombie or something or he’s dead already. He’s just like fucking superhuman. So you’re like, fuck. If he comes up, I’m just going to shoot him in the head again.

At this point, the male clerk, Santa Claus, was already on the phone with the 9-1-1 dispatcher. The audio recording of this 9-1-1 call confirms that you cannot hear the suspect at all—there are several gunshots exchanged, and Chris is heard intermittently challenging the suspect, demanding that he show his hands, and letting the suspect know that he had an ambulance coming for him. After the suspect fell, he would hold his hands
up and drop them back towards his waistband. To Chris, this appeared to be a very deliberate gesture, rather than appearing as if the suspect could not just hold up his hands. According to Chris, if the suspect came up with a “shiny Snickers bar,” he would have shot him again and he wanted to make sure that he had ample space to react if the suspect came back up again.

At this point, the suspect was on the ground with his hoodie still up, but his bandana was down around his chin. As Chris was watching the suspect, who was continuing to raise his hands and drop them towards his waist, he notes that he still did not say anything and that,

> his eyes were open but it looked like—it didn’t look like anger. It looked like despair and I remember thinking so much stuff that I told him, I’ve got an ambulance coming for you, buddy. Like I felt bad for him... I remember his eyes clear as day, white, and just in his eyes you could tell there was despair, like he was hurting and he wanted help and he knew that I wasn’t going to help him until I knew it was good to go. I felt bad in that instance. I felt sorry. I felt bad for him. Because he wasn’t this big—I mean, he was still a threat but he wasn’t as scary a threat.

In querying Chris about other sensory perceptions, he noted that by this point in the shooting, the smell of gun smoke and cordite was very prominent. The ceiling had lowered, impairing vision. He also noted that he could smell the food still, that the “fucking hot dogs are pungent as shit,” and that the smell in the store is horrible on its own, but that with the blood and gun smoke, it was infinitely worse. Chris states that he remembers thinking that the first responding officer would be scared upon seeing the blood and all of the smoke in the store, as well as from the scents. At some point, two young sailors (as identified on another 9-1-1 call), attempted to enter the store and the clerk told them to get out. Chris barely even glanced at the sailors. In his words,
I remember not wanting to take—and this is going to sound stupid, I remember all these horror movies that I watched where they're running away from the bad guy and then they just take their eyes off of him. Why would you take your eyes off of something that's been trying to kill you? So I remember distinctly every second, every second, like I would break loose for one fraction of a second and then look back at him because I never wanted to take my eyes off of him.

Chris had notified the 9-1-1 dispatcher, when he briefly took the phone from the clerk while still keeping the suspect at gunpoint, that he was off duty, in plain clothes and that he had his badge displayed. Chris was quite concerned that he would not be recognized by the first responding patrol officers, as he had been in narcotics for quite some time and did not interact with officers that often and did not “look like anything like a police officer.” In fact, he described himself as looking like a “northern thug.” According to Chris, he was not going to argue with the first responding officers if they challenged him. He noted that he had had officers point their guns at him before and, at that point in time, if a fellow officer challenged or charged him, he would put his gun down, even if it meant that the suspect would have the opportunity to kill him. Chris stated that he was “not going to take the change of having [the officer] shoot me and feeling bad.”

The first responding officer hesitated to enter the store when he arrived. Chris was holding his gun with his right hand, keeping his eyes on the suspect, and holding his badge where the officer could see it when the officer entered. Chris did not recognize the officer and stated that he was “very pale.” Chris said he was trying to “talk to him like another police officer and then I just heard him screaming. So it's almost like I understood that he knew who the bad guy was and who the good guy was eventually.” After the officer had approached the suspect, Chris came out from behind the counter and
told the officer to stop and put gloves on before touching the suspect. Chris recalls that he told the officer to “put some gloves on because all of the blood, I kept thinking, oh, this guy is going to have fucking AIDS or fucking Hep C and all sorts of nasty shit and I didn’t want the officer—I was covered. I was like, fuck it. If it goes bad, I can dive on [the suspect]...so he holstered and put gloves on.”

Another defining moment for Chris was when the patrol officer put the suspect in handcuffs, noting that it was like the weight of the world was lifted from his shoulders and very suddenly it was over. Very quickly, the emotions and fear came crashing down on Chris, as he noted,

...like the end, boom, so the threat and then it all came down on me. I went over to walk away because at this time all the fear and all the—you know, the nerves and everything are starting to catch up with you—almost until I feel like scary, scary and I rounded the corner and I saw his gun there and I realized he didn’t have a gun all that time I’m sitting there yelling at him and I remember getting so—I had seen the gun. I was like, hey, I was pissed that he—this mother fucker actually shot at me for that long and he didn’t say anything about not having a gun or just keeping his hands up or anything and I may have killed him. Because I was considering literally walking up and just putting it to his head and shooting him and I was like, no, I can’t do that unless I see a gun. So I got so pissed off [that] I kicked the big soda thing over. I was like, dam it, and the I looked back and I see the clerks and I’m thinking to myself, kind of get yourself together.

As the shooting dragged on, Chris became very frustrated with the lack of police response and felt very much alone. In other conversations, Chris has noted that the call was accidentally dispatched on the wrong channel, which is why the response was so greatly delayed. The suspect and his accomplice had robbed another Shell gas station that evening, and most of the detectives were at that location at the time of Chris’s shooting. Chris’s frustration was made evident at several points during this interview, making comments like “when the fuck are the police coming? It’s been a while. Like a
long, long time, [and] I'm thinking where the fuck are these guys coming from? Where are they? I'm expecting to hear them. This is a shootout.” A bit later in the interview, his feelings of frustration surfaced again, stating, ...that was—literally felt like—the shootout was very long. That felt like, all right. This is fucking ridiculous. Someone needs to be here...more frustration than anything else and concern that I want to get some—help this guy, but at the same time I want to get him in custody so this can be over, so we can—you know, all right, move on from this. It was kind of just a stalemate, just waiting and waiting. Like we [were] hung out to dry, like fuck. When you mother fuckers coming?

Another interesting point that came up was Chris' physiological reactions during the shooting. In listening to the 9-1-1 audio, Chris sounds winded, like he has been running for a great distance and is also yelling information to the dispatchers. He is clearly distracted when speaking to the dispatcher, not answering questions that were asked, etc. This is a typical response to a critical incident. Chris also recalls feeling numb. He says that his fingertips tingled and he could not feel his lower half. Chris believed these symptoms meant that he must have been shot and was just not aware of it yet, noting that he had “been stabbed before and didn’t know it.” After the suspect was in custody, Chris noted that “Goddamn, my throat is starting to hurt a little bit, and I realize I have been yelling for a good 11, 12, 13, 14 minutes, just yelling.” Chris was coated in the suspect’s blood and, when a friend and fellow investigator arrived minutes after the suspect was in custody, Chris was still unsure if he had been shot. He asked this investigator to check him out, and proceeded to pull his shirts up to his neck and spine around. The other investigator not only did a visual examination, but he physically checked his legs. When Chris was told he was not injured, he was certain he had been
wounded, due to the numbness. The investigator then quickly removed Chris from the store and placed him in the back of the Lieutenant's car.

Conclusion

This chapter presents an overview of the data sources utilized in this case study, as well as presented a condensed life history and a detailed accounting of the shooting event from Chris' perspective. The synopsis and the detailed account of the shooting were presented to familiarize the reader with some of the life events that surfaced in the thematic analyses and to contextualize elements of Chris' personal and professional life at the time his shooting incident occurred. Additionally, there are themes that were seen in the shooting incident itself. In short, it was necessary to discuss the past to understand what happened in the aftermath of this shooting. The following chapters will provide thematic analyses, identifying common ideas that came up repetitively not only in Chris' interviews, but in the interviews conducted with other participants, as well as policy analyses, news media analyses and reflections on participant observations obtained during the research process.
CHAPTER VI

FINDINGS: THEMATIC ANALYSES

Introduction: Thematic Analyses

As noted previously, the current study seeks to holistically explore officer-involved shootings and their aftermath from the multiple perspectives of the individuals impacted by a single shooting incident. Thematic analysis of interviews suggests that there are five distinct, yet often interrelated, patterns emerging, each with sub-themes. These themes encompass various elements, from lived experience, to coping mechanisms, to cultural influences and the impact on others. Although treated as a separate theme, Goffman’s concepts of impression management (1959) and stigma (1963) were interwoven through the other four themes that emerged. These analyses also exploited a strength of the current study: the use of a multidisciplinary approach to a multifaceted problem. These analyses draw on the disciplines of sociology, psychology, criminal justice and criminology to gain a deeper understanding of the thick and rich responses provided by participants.

While the current study utilizes a case study methodology with a significant influence from feminist methodologies, there are also elements of grounded theory research seen in the analysis of the data. Grounded theory research, as identified by Creswell (2007), includes a specific role for theory in the research process; theory’s role in this process is significantly different than that traditionally seen in quantitative research. Typically, research “grounded” in theory is, not surprisingly, driven by a particular theory or theoretical perspective in quantitative research, but in grounded theory qualitative research, participants who have all experienced a particular process are
chosen and it is expected that a theory will emerge from the research (Creswell 2007), thus moving beyond the idea of qualitative work as merely descriptive or explanatory. This emergent theory is not necessarily invented, but may involve the application of an "off the shelf" theory—such as the use of Goffman's (1959, 1963) work as a theoretical frame in the current study—as well as elaboration of an existing theory, or an integrated use of multiple theories (Tittle 1995). Case study research alone does not specify a specific role for theory. Instead, the researcher conducts an in-depth exploration and analysis of a specific issue through the use of one or several bounded cases by collecting data from multiple sources and providing both a detailed case description and a thematic case analysis (Creswell 2007). Grounded theory research seeks to move beyond descriptive analysis by allowing a theory to emerge from the research, while case study research seeks a deep understanding and explanation of a particular issue, drawing out overarching themes relevant to that issue from multiple data sources. In this particular case study, while the aim is to achieve a deep understanding of the issue of officer involved shootings; this understanding is achieved with theoretical sensitivity.

Although these approaches are presented as conceptually distinct, there are some similarities, as well as differences, seen in the procedures associated with each approach. To begin, as previously stated, a case study calls for an analysis of multiple data sources—such as documents, archival records, interviews, direct observations, participant-observations and physical artifacts (Creswell 2007:75)—whereas a grounded theory approach specifies the need to conduct several interviews, utilizing a zigzag process, in the field, with a suggested number of 20 to 30 interviews provided, in order to saturate the data into categories (Creswell, 2007). Creswell (2007) defines a category as a "unit
of information composed of events, happenings and instances,” which, while there is no
exact definition of a case-based theme drawn from a case study, can be seen as somewhat
similar in nature to the open coding process that generates categories in grounded theory
research. It is suggested that, as a part of the zigzag process, researchers continually
collect data and then compare it to the emerging categories, known as the constant
comparative method of data collection (Creswell, 2007), which can also occur in case
studies, especially if there are multiple sites or cases involved. In particular this
comparative approach can be used to facilitate the use of themes between within case
analysis and cross-case analysis, particularly if similar or comparable information for
each can be obtained to help with the generation and clarification of those themes.

In the current study, the zigzag approach was used and an open coding (Creswell
2007) process was conducted to identify recurrent themes that arose in the interviews.
These themes are topics or ideas that were seen multiple times, as well as typically in
varied contexts, during the course of the interviews. This study utilized a two-step
coding process. The full transcripts were reviewed and themes, ideas of interest,
background information on the case or participants, and discussion or evidence of critical
incident/PTSD symptoms were all noted using the track changes functions in Microsoft
Word. Based upon this analysis, there were five distinct, yet often interrelated, themes
that emerged in the data analysis. Several themes also had emergent sub-themes that
were also captured and considered. Quotes or excerpts related to themes were then
copied from the full interview transcripts into separate Word documents for thematic
analysis. This process of excerpting was also conducted to comply with IRB
requirements that would allow Chris to provide some insight and input into the data analysis.

The emergent themes were then analyzed in light of the extant literature, discussed individually below. These themes were previous experience with violence and/or trauma; coping; cultural influences; the impact the incident had on others; and evidence of the theoretical frame used in this study (the work of Goffman, particularly as it relates to stigma and impression management). Data from participant observations will be discussed in a separate section, but it is worth noting that there are also thematic connections seen between that data and the participant interview data discussed in this section. These thematic analyses seek to incorporate the multiple voices or perspectives of those individuals impacted by Chris’ shooting. These analyses seek to incorporate the findings from the literature, where appropriate, and identify gaps in the literature, and to demonstrate the utility of Goffman’s work as a theoretical frame from which to approach this topic.

**Theme: Previous Experiences with Violence and/or Trauma**

The first theme that emerged was defined as previous experiences with violence and/or trauma. As discussed in Chapter 2, previous experience with or exposure to previous traumatic experiences may lead an individual to be more vulnerable to PTSD (Kirschman 2007, Stephens 2005, Violanti 2005). It can be argued that officers, as a function of their career choice, may be a population that is particularly vulnerable to PTSD as a result of the amount of trauma and violence to which they are exposed. This may be because, if the individual has not effectively dealt with previous stressful or traumatic experiences, then the effects of previous events may compound the effects of
the current trauma, leading to what Kirschman (2007) calls a double whammy. Additionally, WCPR (Kirschman 2012a) has found that many first responders may develop the coping skills that make them good officers—ability to dissociate, compartmentalize and be calm in a crisis—in childhood as a result of abuse, neglect or having an alcoholic parent. Thus, these same traits that make them good officers may also be indicators that these officers are at a heightened risk for developing PTSD.

These findings in the literature suggest that awareness of previous exposure to violence and trauma may not only shape an officer's reactions and coping abilities, but can also lend another perspective from which research may examine shooting incidents. In the current study, it was found that Chris was exposed to numerous traumatic events, both as a child and as an adult. While the researcher was somewhat aware of previous traumatic incidents prior to completing the interviews with Chris, the number and depth of the critical incidents he has experienced were not anticipated. Additionally, much like the experience of near trauma discussed in Chapter 7, it was not anticipated how many critical incidents the participants of the current study had experienced, both on and off duty, as an aggregate and how those lived experiences influenced their thoughts and responses during discussions of Chris' shooting incident. The theme of previous trauma or violence was further broken into two categories—those events experienced during childhood and those experienced as an adult—to facilitate the exploration of this emergent theme.

Sub Theme 1: Childhood Experiences of Loss/Trauma/Violence

As mentioned in Chapter 5, Chris grew up in Colombia, amidst poverty and rampant political and cartel-related violence, until he immigrated to the United States as a
boy. While in Colombia, he witnessed his father shot in front of him on a family outing. Until he was much older, Chris was led to believe that his father died from this shooting incident, but relatively recent information suggests that his father is alive and still residing somewhere in South America. When asked to describe his father’s shooting, this is what Chris said:

_We were going to a place called renkitos (phonetic), which is Spanish for -- it's like an endearment term for jump, like a jumpies, like the best translation is jumpies, which is a trampoline place in Colombia, and I was going with my uncle, my cousins, and my father, not rare but wasn't routine, but we were going. We were all excited to go over there and drink apple sodas and jump up and down, burp, whatever, and on the way back -- however, having said that, my uncle at the time was very political in some of the local Colombian governments, very political, and at that time you're talking mid to late '70s going into the '80s was very, very volatile. He had -- he did not have children at the time. As we're walking I'm holding my uncle's hand so and again, this is hindsight, they knew my uncle had no children. So my uncle is holding my hand. It was a presumption on my part that the individual that they wound up shooting because remember -- I remember it specifically, a black car pulling up, people getting out, not really focused on anything, but I remember the car because you didn't see a lot of, you know, black shiny cars. You saw a lot of dirty, you know, old kind of dilapidated kind of pickup trucks so this kind of stood out. A car pulls up, firing starts, couple shots, wasn't a lot, and my father goes down... Uncle takes me away and kind of -- just kind of goes vague from there. I remember that. I remember almost like taking a snapshot of it, just kind of fits in a frame. What occurred after, it's kind of hard._

In his interviews, Chris discussed how the familiar familial coping mechanisms of preoccupation, avoidance and distraction were utilized in the wake of his father’s death. He also notes that he was extremely close to his mother after this incident, never wanting to be far from her side. When he was asked if his father immigrated with the family, Chris’ response was that he was “already gone.” This is a topic about which Chris has some difficulties talking, displaying hesitancy to answer or providing somewhat evasive answers. This may be an indicator that Chris either has been provided with very little information about his father or it could be an artifact of those learned coping
mechanisms, particularly not talking about an incident, that inhibit conversations about his father. As another participant observed when discussing the absence of Chris' father, Chris has "felt kind of neglected on that end and I know his mother won't talk about it with him. She has said very few things and that's just recently about his father...I think he's a little lost [sometimes] when it comes to family."

As if the traumatic loss of a parent and immigrating to another country was not significant enough, Chris bore witness to second critical incident before high school: the murder of his brother, Antonio. After the family moved to New York City, they eventually settled in Brooklyn. In Chapter 5, the level of violence and social disorganization of the neighborhood community was addressed. Due, in part, to some of these same factors, Chris' mother had his brother walk him to school each day.

According to Chris:

[I] walked down. There's an open courtyard in the projects over there. I'm saying projects, but not like here, talking ten stories up, you know, millions of people. He used to wait in the courtyard for me to walk up from the house to the school and I remember walking down and looking over and heard like -- heard a gunshot. When I was looking there was a kid on the swing. The kid like falls off the swing awkwardly. I'm like, Man, that was weird. I look over and my brother had been shot. I was like, Oh, no. So I go over to him, dead, and it was one -- and then like for weeks after that and you have to understand, he was as much a part of the family, but he was so distant doing his own thing. He was kind of going his own way. That obviously devastated the family but they kind of come to expect that. We've had enough violence go on in the family or around the family that it's not unexpected, but it's shocking when it happens...someone pulled me off of him because I was just kind of like dumbfounded. Somebody pulled me off of him and it was kind of like busy but it's always busy. There's always people out and it went from being busy so only a handful of people out in the courtyard and stuff like that, so kind of like -- it was surreal, very -- I can't equate a sound to it, no noise, and then I probably spent like the weeks following that just spending a lot of time in the house, in the room for obvious reasons, and just kind of relegated to my block, like not venturing off anywhere else but when it got dark, I was coming in. There was no questions.
Chris, as explained in Chapter 5, and his family, believe his brother’s murder was gang-related and possibly a case of mistaken identity. Chris stated that he was closer to his brother than others in his family and when asked about his emotional response to his brother’s murder, particularly if he was angry, he stated that he was 

*Upset more than anything. You have to understand, if you see -- I can't -- God, whether in Colombia, whether in Queens, whether in Brooklyn, violence just is -- you become numb to it. I mean, it affects you obviously, but you become so numb to it that I was sad that it happened to us. I don't think I ever became angry at any -- maybe for a brief moment in time, maybe angry at him but looking back for some of the decisions he made, but mostly just sad, you know, kind of like an empty kind of sad. I was -- that was my man, you know, we kind of hung out together. He took care of me. If I needed like some money he would give me money, stuff like that. So it wasn't -- but never angry. I don't remember -- however, I did take -- I can see how I can take that out on my step dad because I was a dick to him.*

Also of interest was that, during one interview, Chris drew parallels between his father and brother, noting their roles as protectors, expression of emotion and their absence in his life—both before their shootings and after:

*You know, just the positioning of the relationships, both caregivers, both distant, I was more dependent or more aligned and open comforted by the women or my mom, whereas the relationship I was -- I will tell you, I was closer with my brother than I was with my father, hands down. He took a very -- my father was protective as the father. My brother was protective of me if that -- it's on a smaller scale or very smaller scope. Brother gave me a lot more stuff but at the same time, my brother was off doing his thing. My dad was off doing his thing. So in that aspect, I know I could rely on him. If I ever went to my dad and said, you know, Hey, something happened, this and this, I know he could take care of it. If I went to my brother, I know he'd do whatever it took to do whatever it is to handle it. But both were very absent but not really...It's -- there's a fine line between just an absent person because they're both very much -- brother was probably a little bit better at showing emotions or how he was feeling. I can't remember my dad being that overt with his emotions.*

These two significant traumatic events, the loss of his father and his brother, resurfaced during the counseling sessions he received after his shooting. However, it
should be noted that Chris was not the one to bring these previous traumatic events to the attention of his therapist; when asked why she thought he was taking the shooting so hard, Chris' girlfriend asked his therapist if the amount of violence and trauma he had seen growing up may be a factor in his reaction to his own shooting incident. When Chris reflects back on why he did not disclose his history to his psychologist, he indicated that, at the time, he did not think it was relevant or related—he was there to talk about the shooting and the deaths in his family were separate incidents. In fact, it is only after reflection and learning more about trauma that Chris was able to admit:

_I believe I recovered from it well, you know, fast forwarding years and years and years later, it's one significant piece of what probably eventually kind of affects you kind of like one trauma on top of another, trauma on top of another trauma. Then when you kind of retrospectively look back on it you're like, Oh, yeah._

Chris also disclosed less severe traumatic experiences, such as being stabbed in a nightclub (which was only disclosed in passing), being involved in numerous fights, and his experiences as a volunteer firefighter in high school. Additionally, as was also mentioned in Chapter 5, Chris attempted suicide in high school. This suicide attempt may hold more meaning that is superficially evident, as noted in the last line of the following quote from the transcript:

_School was sucking, you know, realizing that I'm not going to graduate with everybody. Girl winds up like hooking up with some other guy who I thought was my friend and just all this -- and it became like I think a lot of it culminated and came into a very dark place and I think just one night wound up going drinking by myself and I was like, Fuck this place, and I was like, Oh, I'm going to hurt myself and I remember because I wound up cutting my wrists which led to a whole -- but it was just -- it wasn't anything -- I don't want to say it wasn't hesitation, but it was like, Oh, I'm going it, but you're not really doing it that much, but it was significant but it wasn't -- I could have -- they could have -- it would have been fine. Then they find out and they put me up in the hospital. I was taken off the_
roster at the fire department and I remember the day after they had a huge fire. They took me off the roster because obviously for other reasons...

This experience of being taken off of the roster after his suicide attempt, while understandable, may also contribute to perceptions of mental health issues and perceived weakness. These messages, if internalized, may have supported negative coping mechanisms, such as alcohol use or avoidance, because Chris had experienced what may happen if you were in need of help as a first responder—he was unable to work and had the stigma of being pulled off of the roster.

Other participants also disclosed traumatic or impactful incidents in their youth, although no other participants admitted to witnessing one, let alone two, murders. Yet, some participants shared other critical experiences with Chris—one participant was an immigrant, moving from Europe to the deep South at a young age, experiencing some of the same culture shocks as Chris trying to assimilate; another participant disclosed growing up in a gang- and drug-infested community, suggesting that this participant, also like Chris, experienced violence and social disorganization as a youth. Finally, as Chris lived with his grandmother and his extended family during the year his mother was in New York, trying to earn the mother to bring Chris and Antonio to New York with her in an effort to escape the violence in Colombia, another participant spent at least a year living with a grandmother while his single parent was deployed overseas in the military. These shared experiences may also impact the level of empathy or relatedness perceived between the other participants and Chris, and may, in turn, increase the potential for the experience of secondary or tertiary trauma.
Sub Theme 2: Adult Experiences of Loss/Trauma/Violence

Before discussing the multiple traumas experienced by both Chris and the other participants after becoming police officers, it should be noted that three of the participants, including Chris, served in the military before becoming police officers. Chris served in the Navy, as detailed in Chapter 5. Some secondary traumas were disclosed when discussing his time in the service—such as the accidental death of a fellow soldier as a result of a gas leak and explosion and the rape of another soldier—as well as more active traumas that included searching for remains from a downed military aircraft and determining whether or not to fire upon possible combatants approaching his carrier in small boats. The other two participants in the current study with military experience served in the Marines and both alluded to traumas that were more traditionally associated with military service, those seen in active combat theatres or while engaged in operations in foreign countries.

Each of the participants disclosed multiple traumas experienced after becoming law enforcement officers, supporting Kirschman’s (2007) statement that officers will likely see more trauma in their first three years on the job than most citizens see over their entire lives. These traumas varied in terms of intensity and also included primary traumas (where the officer was actively involved in the incident) and secondary traumas (where the officer was present after the fact, but still impacted), as well as near traumas (discussed in Chapter 7). Chris, in particular, disclosed numerous traumas. Some of these traumas were relayed in passing, such as mentioning two fellow officers, two friends, who committed suicide, when trying to address finding the balance between becoming cynical and jaded and enjoying the job. Another participant also discussed one
of these suicides. Another participant discussed the impact of a particular civilian suicide and another motor vehicle accident, and how these events have “stuck with” this officer for years. Other incidents, such as the ones detailed below in Chris’ own words, were discussed at length.

Chris discussed two shooting incidents that particularly impacted him. The first was the shooting where a female officer that he had worked with was killed. As Chris stated,

[She] was a beautiful girl, worked undercover, had annihilated, had she got to go would have annihilated, Huntersville, Park Place heroin ring and remembered going to -- you know, a long time undercover operation, you would have a party. So we were having a party. We were having a get-together. We're all having a great time. Oh, you did a great job, and then she gets, I think, a week on the street and she gets shot and killed. I remember going to the -- because that was the first time I really knew, knew that I was present for that. I really worked around, sure, James got killed right away but we're talking a year or two, two, three years on the police department, so really still novice, really a beginner or just a rookie for lack of a better term, and there was a reality to it. There was just a very sadness to her death that hit me with a baseball bat at the viewing. I remember going into the viewing, long hair, beard, you know, we're Narcotics. We stuck out like a sore thumb and this beautiful girl walks in, spitting image of [her]. It was her twin sister. Completely, no one had mentioned anything. No one had mentioned it and it was one of those like you thought you were having -- you're like, Oh, my God, I'm seeing [her] everywhere. It was her twin sister. I became friendly with her since then we did a couple motorcycle rides for her benefit, but really struck me seeing her, which is again seeing [her] in front of you again, but realizing that, you know, that's not her. She's gone and that really hit hard and there was -- you kind of -- and unfortunately like I said earlier, we learn from our mistakes and then time goes on and then we completely dismiss them.

So there was that time initially with the months following that you took care. You were safety conscious and then you start getting away with it and get complacent, complacent. You're back to your old ways before you know it and then two undercover officers get shot in front of you and the realness creeps up again...

In discussing this officer’s murder, Chris also mentioned two other shootings where officers were injured or killed. In referring to James getting killed, he is discussing the murder of another officer, his closest friend from the police academy.
James' death was a traumatic event that was a secondary or tertiary trauma for Chris, but two other participants also addressed secondary trauma related to this event. One participant was a responding supervisor on the scene and addressed having to calm and focus the other officers on scene, trying to maintain order and remember what he needed to do to fulfill his role as a supervisor. Another participant discussed working with another officer that was dramatically impacted by James' murder because he was on scene, watched it happen and survived the encounter. This provided an example of possible tertiary trauma, as this participant said,

_I remember when—I remember the first one I really remember having an issue with. I didn't know James...as well as like Chris. Chris and James were good friends. So I didn't know him that well and I had only been on the department a short time. But I knew [the officer with James that night] and I saw what it did to [him]. So you kind of start internalizing those things._

The second shooting that Chris mentioned above is particularly salient to the current study. Chris mentions witnessing two officers getting shot in front of him. These two officers were also participants in the current study and served as peer support for Chris in the aftermath of his own shooting. One of the two officers shot described the incident this way:

_A. ...Then in 2004, that was my second one when I got shot at Military Circle Mall. [we] were undercover covering UC5 with [another] Investigator at the time and we were the cover team in the parking lot and one of the guys in the car had been arrested previously and had saw [the other officer who was shot] in our office. So when he saw him close to where they were, they panicked thinking we were the police, which we were, and when they got arrested in the hotel room they told us to go make the arrest and as we approached the car, everybody started shooting and that's how I got shot. I got shot twice in the stomach and I shot the guy who shot me four times and [another officer], who also was with us at the time, shot another guy that was shooting so it was a bunch of shooting. [Other officer shot] got shot in the leg and it was big old chaos that night._

_Q. Was Chris there?
A. He came -- he was in -- he was working that night but he was at a different area but he came -- he was there like almost immediately because when I was laying on the ground he took my watch and my ring. He took my personal stuff off me and rode in the ambulance with me from the scene to the hospital...And held my hand to whole way, all the way down to the hospital.

This officer was out of work for almost two years, recovering from injuries that nearly killed him. As noted above, Chris was actively involved in this incident. He describes that night, stating:

A. I mean, I got the bullet out of [the officer shot in the stomach] and was holding onto all their guns and their wedding rings and stuff like that. It felt crappy...just thought that he was going to die. I knew [the other officer who was shot] was all right. It sounds horrible but I saw his leg. I was like, All right, it's in his leg. Which you could probably die from but [the officer shot in the stomach] because I rode in the ambulance back with him holding onto his stomach and then we get to the hospital and I get taken away from him or not taken away, but I had to back up and [a homicide investigator] was like, I'm here to collect the guns and evidence. I was like, Here you go.

Q. So anything else stick with you about any of them?
A. Having to tell his wife. Because [she] came in and she was like, Tell me what happened. I was like, He got shot. I said, They're working on him right now and I remember because [she] is very -- not -- to the average person, probably extremely intimidating. But given the severity because we didn't know if [he] was going to make it, the fact that I had to like tell her that we didn't know what was going on, I said, He was shot in the stomach, that's all I know. I said, He was talking to me in the car or in the ambulance and I didn't tell her like when he passed out when he lost consciousness and (inaudible) come back after shooting that guy and winds up and smacks [him] in the face to wake him back up. He wakes up. He's like, Don't fucking fall asleep, don't die. [Another investigator on scene], because he shot, he had to stay there but he was attending to [the officer shot in the leg] but we jumped -- I got [the officer shot in the stomach] and the medics and we put him in the bus and hauled ass.

Both of the officers shot in the incident described above discussed the additional traumas that stemmed from the departmental response to their shooting incident. Specifically, one investigator notes being interrogated by departmental representatives while medicated in
the hospital. Both officers did not receive pay while they were out of work recovering from their injuries, which was explained to the researcher in this way:

A. Because of the bad press of the shooting, they actually didn't pay me the whole time I was out.

Q. What do you mean because of the bad press? Can you explain that to me?
A. Yeah, at the time [a] Councilman, he was so upset before he even knew anything that happened. He made a statement in the news that some white officers were chasing down some black boys in the mall and shot them up in front of the mall without no concern for anybody else around.

Q. So you and [the other officer shot] are white now?
A. Yeah, not knowing that me and [the other officer shot] are black, [another officer involved] is Hispanic, you know, everybody else involved in the shooting except for [yet another officer involved], she was the only white person. Everyone else was black, you know, when he made that statement, which got everybody inflamed. So the City Council was all upset about what happened and we didn't find out until after this happened because I thought it was preposterous that they couldn't pay me for being injured in the line of duty at work, but it's some kind of clause in the City Charter that they choose--pick and choose which ones to pay out and they chose not to pay mine because of the bad press. So I went 22 months with just the workmen's compensation check, which is only a third of your normal paycheck, and everything else was done so that was a big stressor on my family.

Q. I can imagine. I can imagine. That's a lot of anger when you're trying to recuperate.
A. I'm trying to recuperate, but I'm worried about bills being paid. My wife working, and I'm getting nothing at all from the City...for what happened to me in the line of duty. It's not like it was sketchy, what happened. I mean, we tried to arrest somebody. They shot at us. It's open and shut as that and they did us pretty bad. I mean, I think that was the most disgusting thing I ever heard.

The other officer shot also detailed the frustrations related with the workers compensation process, providing the following account of his interactions with workers compensation in the days following his shooting:

A. You're talking in terms of actually officers being injured during a critical incident. God, you've got to go something about this. This workmen's comp thing, this is a bunch of bull. I heard arguing with the girl on whether or not it was me involved in the shooting. I mean, it was my picture in the paper, my name in the paper, and you know, I always told
her, I said, you know, I remember first couple days, Why don't you look in
the paper and tell me what the guy's name is? His name is ------. Yeah,
who are you talking to? You're talking to ------, yeah, that was me and
trying to figure out if it was work-related.

Q. No, it was just for fun.
A. You know, I went to the City's -- one of the City's doctors like a day after I
was out of the hospital. He told me I could come back to work in like
three days. Yeah, like told me I had to come back light duty.

Q. Okay.
A. This was no scam here. I got a couple bullet holes in me. It's not a scam.
As far as that goes, maybe the department has got to offer some type of
support to that officer because it is pretty traumatizing.

These negative experiences related to the PD's response to this shooting incident
underscore the relevance of the finding in the literature that indicates quality or nature of
departmental responses to the officer in the immediate aftermath of a shooting can impact
his or her development of long term psychological symptoms (Jones 1989, Kamena et al.
2011). Further, as noted by both officers who were shot, the PD failed to provide a
timely debrief after this critical incident; instead, it was only after at least one investigator
broke down emotionally in court while testifying that the PD realized this service had not
been provided and that the officers involved in this incident were in need of assistance.
The quotes below demonstrate, in the officers' own words, the way in which the
departmental responses, or in this case lackthereof, were viewed.

Q. What kind of support did your family receive?
A. From Narcotics, wonderful support. I mean, we had a sergeant on the
department, but he was an investigator at the time. He was like one of my
best guys because he would pick the kids up, take them to school, take my
wife wherever she's needed. They would cut our grass. They would take
care -- they took care of us tremendously. The police department on a
whole didn't do anything.

A. ...I know the guys involved in my shooting, like my shooting occurred in
June, by November we had our first defendant in court and [an]Officer,
who was involved in the shooting, he actually broke down on the stand
testifying about what happened and one of the bosses were in the
audience. Of course, they were like -- it struck them, did these guys ever talk to anybody? Never talked to anybody. Except for me, [that officer], and a couple other guys that were involved in the shooting, they were told to come back to work the next day without having any counseling or anything. Then months later we in court. Now they're saying, Okay, now it's mandatory everybody go to counseling tomorrow and that made a lot of people mad, like the guys that was with us. I mean, it was -- I think it was like nine people in our unit that day when the shooting happened, and they said, Okay, now all you go to counseling tomorrow, five months after the incident in court. So it was kind of bad. I mean, I don't think that they -- I know they had a policy in place, but they didn't follow the policy until it was way too late.

Q. Okay. And it was just probably the nine people that were immediately on scene?
A. Right.
Q. So nothing -- so somebody like Chris, who was in the ambulance with you and that side of it?
A. Right, uh-huh.

Q. All right. So in terms they didn't have you see anybody?
A. No.
Q. They were just like, okay, come on back?
A. No, that was -- we as a department, we kind of drop the ball on that whole thing.
Q. Okay.
A. Back then.
Q. You had mentioned that. So there was no debrief for everybody who was involved?
A. No, the debrief only came, like I said, like months after the shooting and we were all back to work.

As noted earlier, Chris was very much involved in this shooting incident even though he did not fire his weapon. Yet, when asked about who was offered the opportunity to participate in the eventual debrief for this shooting, one of the officers shot stated that Chris—who most rational individuals would argue was likely traumatized while rendering aid to a friend he thought was going to die—was not included among those officers. This also speaks to the gap in the literature related to the impact of critical incidents upon other officers, those who did not necessarily fire their weapons, but were somehow involved in the incident. This idea of other officers being secondary victims of
trauma surfaced in other participant interviews, as well. One participant, when discussing his participation in the investigation of the murder of a fellow officer, became quite emotional; when the researcher asked this participant if anyone had ever asked him if he was "okay," he paused for a moment and, startled, responded "you just did." In fact this was a relatively common response of participants when asked if, outside of critical incidents in which they were directly involved, anyone—coworkers, supervisors, administrators—had inquired about their well being, the overwhelming response was no.

In addition to the shootings referenced above, there were several other shooting incidents disclosed. Chris and the two officers who were involved in the shooting above each had been involved in more than two shootings, with both Chris and one of the officers disclosing many more incidents than two. Another participant made the following disclosure:

A. Yeah, I've been involved in shootouts where police are killed, you know, people in the house, vehicles, I've been involved in a lot of police shootings.
Q. Okay. How many?
A. If I had to guess, I'd probably say 11 or 12.
Q. Okay.
A. And I would say the majority of those, the far majority ended up in death.

Multiple participants discussed being involved in cases where officers had been killed, from acting as a liaison to the families, to being an investigator on the case, to being a member of the fugitive task force searching for the suspect that killed the officer. One participant had been involved in the investigation of at least ten officer-involved shootings, three of which involved the death of a fellow officer and one involving the injury of an officer. The death of one officer in 2006, in particular, was mentioned by several participants, making comments such as:
A. ...but when [he] was killed in 2006 I was part of a -- you know, team assigned to go and look for the fugitive and I actually responded to the scene.

Q. Okay.
A. That's when I seen him laying there after he got shot.
Q. Okay. So how do those cases impact you?
A. I mean, it's fucked up.
Q. Fucked up how?
A. It's fucked up it happened. He's got a wife. He's got kids, but let's go get the scumbag that did it.

... I did know [him] and I was -- you know, I was knee deep in that investigation and just the brutality of the investigation, whether he made tactical errors or not is not even an issue with me. The brutality of the shooting made me a hateful, hateful person, just because violence can be used as a tool to gain a certain objective and sometimes it's necessary but violence just for the sake of being violent is -- it amazes me how people treat each other. It's just depressing.

In addition to the obvious traumas that can be experienced in the course of doing the job, there are times when events in the officer's personal life may intersect with events at work, increasing the impact of the trauma. For example, one participant recalled the following incident:

\[
\text{When I first got into General Assignment my wife and I, we were trying to have a baby and she ended up losing a baby during birth. He had an umbilical cord wrapped around his neck. I stayed at home for about a week over it and sure enough the first call that we get when I'm back in the bureau is a baby death.}
\]

These experiences of trauma, varied as they are in duration, intensity and degree of participation, influenced the officers that participated in the current study in equally varied ways. Not only does previous experience of trauma potentially skew the office's perception of subsequent events and possibly inflict psychological damage, in the current case, there was a large degree of shared and overlapping trauma between participants. These traumatic events, in particular, conditioned other themes that emerged in the
current study, such as coping responses and the impact Chris’ shooting had upon other officers.

**Theme: Coping**

The second theme that emerged was coping, which can be defined as an individual’s ability to handle stress or trauma and the associated methods used to do so. In the current study, coping was of particular concern, as it is a strong component of both officer survivability and resilience. As noted in the literature review, each officer will experience the trauma differently in terms of the symptoms displayed and resilience, including factors such as education, ethnicity, previous exposure to traumatic incidents, the severity of the incident, the officer’s established coping skills and mechanisms and the presence, number and quality of protective factors in the officer’s life (Best, Artwohl and Kirschman 2011, Hodgins, Creamer and Bell 2001, Honig and Sultan 2004, IACP 2012b, Jones 1989, Kerley 2005, Kirschman 2007, McCaslin et al. 2006, McCaslin et al. 2008, Pole et al. 2001, Violanti 2005). Participants in this study exhibited a wide array of coping strategies, encompassing both positive mechanisms, such as talking with co-workers and seeking professional assistance, and negative coping approaches, such as anger and drinking. In the current study, particular attention was also paid to Chris’ learned familial coping mechanisms, as they may have contributed to his reaction to his shooting and his eventual PTSD diagnosis. One example of these coping mechanisms, seen from two perspectives (Chris’ and another participant’s), shows how Chris learned that avoidance of difficult or painful topics is absolute in the aftermath of his brother’s murder:
...my mom just completely putting out of it. Like just shutting down like, boom, move on, not in a bad way kind of like to protect herself kind of thing. And that kind of just rubbed off and my family is notorious for hiding some shit.

There's some things you don't talk about, and his brother being one of them... There's no pictures of his brother. Like I went through a box of pictures when we were trying to get our save the date pictures for my mom to get that magnet made and I'm thinking if there was a picture of his brother, it's got to be in this box because it was all old pictures of him when he was little.

Some additional examples of these learned coping mechanisms, primarily involving avoiding addressing the problem and distraction, can be seen in the excerpts below:

(when discussing the time period after his father's shooting) ...You immediately get -- the only thing that I can equate it to is when something ever bad happens at home, you're immediately inundated with family, aunts, uncles taking care. You have to eat, you got to do this, kind of keeping you preoccupied and it gets to the point where you're so preoccupied that you eventually, it works and you start forgetting about it.

A. (talking about his mother leaving for New York) ... Remember really not liking it. I cried then, hands down. But again, it's the same routine. Grandmother starts, you know, making me do busy stuff. Other aunts were out there. We always joke, it's like a gaggle of witches, just kind of like pouncing and just pulling you all different directions and you get so caught up in the routine that you eventually -- you're upset for a little bit, you know, a temper tantrum, they smack you around like, you know, get out of it. Oh, you got to do this, this, and this. It kind of takes you away from everything, which I don't know, is a general response, like a way that they, you know, been ingrained to kind of deal with, you know, any kind of stress or, you know, bad stuff happening to immediately misdirect your concentration on something else but they seem to do it. They're great at avoiding or confronting any type of -- like if something bad happened to you, they are never the ones to be like, Let's sit down, let's discuss this. They are going to start telling you, you know what, I hurt my leg the other day, this is ridiculous and just kind of completely takes you somewhere else.

Q. Do you see elements of that in yourself?

A. I would say earlier on but not -- I do, but not to that degree. I think I'm more Americanized and more -- not to that degree because of the generational gap but also not to the degree I was when initially or prior to the shooting.
These learned coping mechanisms would resurface in the wake of Chris' shooting, as noted in the follow excerpts.

Q. Okay. I was going to say, do you also think that that might have something to do -- we talked about avoidance as a coping tactic that your family kind of instilled.
A. Probably.
Q. Okay.
A. Probably, but there's -- like at a level that is just insane. If something's bad, just don't talk about it.
Q. Okay. So what do you mean about also feelings? How do you avoid feelings and what were you trying to do?
A. Just feeling sad or feeling upset or anxious. People would try to be nice and be like other, If you need anything. You don't want to hear it so you be like, Oh, you blow it off like, Oh, that's nothing, and then you change the subject or you do something else to try to get going somewhere else.

However, of note is also the fact that these coping mechanisms conditioned the interactions between Chris and members of his family. In a way, the coping mechanisms he observed and learned as a child support, possibly even mandate, the use of impression management to avoid upsetting others. This tendency to protect others, particularly his mother and sister, may also be tied to machismo and gender role identification.

Q. Okay. Do you notice whether or not you still avoid the thoughts, feelings, or conversations occasionally?
A. About the incident or about anything?
Q. About anything.
A. Probably the only people that I would avoid talking stuff like that, that's emotionally charged, would probably be my mom and my sister...
Q. So it more for you or for them that you avoid talking about it?
A. Oh, family, for them.
Q. Okay.
A. It's too hard for them, I would imagine. I'm not going to stress them out over something if I can avoid it.

Chris also demonstrated other forms of avoidance in the aftermath of his shooting, to include using sick leave, avoiding conversations about his shooting with people, withdrawing from friends and coworkers, and he even notes that, for a period of time, he
stopped playing the drums and stopped participating in motorcycle runs, two activities that he had greatly enjoyed and engaged in quite frequently before the shooting.

The impact of these learned coping mechanisms were not recognized and acknowledged by just Chris, as one participant discussed his avoidance of emotions following the shooting:

Q. Okay. So do you think that some of these -- do you think these kinds of interactions with his family and kind of this learned behavior of how to deal with things that are going on have impacted him and how he copes with different things?

A. Yes.

Q. Okay. How so?

A. I would think like the avoidance I think when -- I know we're getting into this eventually with his shooting and kind of like trying to avoid the feelings that he would have or being able to talk about it in a healthy way, avoidance like I mean, because if you're not allowed to bring certain things up for so long... Chris' big thing throughout most of like after the shooting was I wish I would have been hit, then that way I have like a physical scar, like I'm hurt instead of I think he wanted to trade physical pain for emotional pain because it's not always okay to have emotional pain for some people. Some people don't believe you can have emotional pain and he wanted the physical pain to replace the emotional pain and he didn't get shot, thank God, close but didn't get shot, but I think he felt he could cope with it better had he been shot.

Another participant also observed Chris' penchant for avoidance, noting that he uses humor as a defense mechanism or a way of avoiding certain conversations. In a way, this participant alludes to the use of humor as a tool of impression management, noting that:

Well, you know, Chris uses his sense of humor like a weapon. Chris can hide behind a good joke and that's one of the things that I noticed that, you know, I knew Chris before his shooting, but he also had a lot of other interpersonal things going on prior to his shooting happening. So he could have been using that same sense of humor all along to mask other underlying issues that never came up as a result of law enforcement, but the problem with being in law enforcement is that when you're doing that, little interpersonal issues outside of work are just -- A,
they're a big deal to you but they're made worse by the fact that you're going out
trying to help other people and they turn around and complain that
administration doesn't have your back, they will do what they need to do in order
to protect themselves and I understand that... It is a result of what I have seen
about myself, is somewhat like Chris does. We will deflect a lot. Things will
come at us and we with internalize it but publically kind of deflect it. So I'll play
it off like it doesn't bother me. Chris is always known as a really vibrant
gregarious and humorous person... It's similar with Chris in that he uses that
sense of humor, again at will, because he's so smart. It's because he's so
intelligent.

Although Chris and his shooting are the focus of the current study, it is also
important to note that he is not the only participant in the current study that exhibited the
use of avoidance as a coping mechanism, as evidenced in the following quote:

Q. Does that ever come home with you at all?
A. No.
Q. Not at all?
A. Uh-uh.
Q. Okay.
A. The only time it does is every now and again if I ever get the thought into
my head that I think about my own mortality. Then I'll be like, Fuck, geez,
what am I doing this for? Then it quickly goes away.
Q. Quickly goes away?
A. Uh-huh.
Q. So how do you keep with it when you get those thoughts?
A. Just be like, No, fuck it. I've been in tons of shit, ain't nothing happening
to me.

Other coping mechanisms were also addressed among the various participants to
include some talking about the use of alcohol (as seen in the following section) and food
as tools to deal with stress, while others attempt to ruthlessly compartmentalize and avoid
discussing troubling topics. As one participant stated:

No, I don't talk to my wife. I've been in shootings and stuff. I don't talk to my wife
about it. It's a personal choice I made back when I was in the service. I don't tell
my wife about what I do. That's my professional life. I don't involve my wife with
my professional life. That's just the way I do things. I'm not saying it's the best
way, best anything. I mean, she knows Chris, you know, we've hung out and stuff like that. I told her, you know, he was in a shooting. He was okay and she knows that that's pretty much all I'm going to relay about it.

Other participants, also suggesting an attempt to compartmentalize or detach from their exposure to trauma on the job, stating:

Q. So what have your reactions been to these incidents that you've been involved in?
A. Gosh, it sounds kind of screwed up because that makes me sound screwed up, but I guess it's just part of the job. I don't want to say I'm desensitized to the violence. I don't want to say that, but I guess I am in a way.
Q. And it's expected at some levels.
A. Yeah, yeah.
Q. It is, but it's also interesting that you talked about when you heard about Chris', thinking about your own shooting. So that shows that it's not quite as desensitized.
A. Gosh, I hope not. Make me more screwed up than I am.

...I mean, we've been at death scenes together. It just don't affect me like that. Maybe there's a disconnect but it's kind of like, This is my friggin' job. I've got to check emotions at the door because if I don't, if I'm emotionally doing this, I could mess up. So that's why I operate the way I do.

I'm just, you know, I'm an emotional person, I really am. I can get emotional and stuff like that, but when it comes to just like work stuff, I don't know. For some reason it just don't really get to me.

These learned coping mechanisms for dealing with trauma, when combined with many of the other themes that emerged in the current study, such as alcohol, impression management, and machismo, created the conditions for a perfect storm of sorts, a breeding ground for psychological disturbance and struggle in the wake of Chris' shooting, as noted in the excerpt below. Again, this particular excerpt, while long, demonstrates the interconnectedness of the emergent themes in the current study, providing insight into how these issues not only related to each other, but how they feed and condition other areas of consideration.
The shooting put me into a place where I got so disgusted with myself that I self-destructed, you know, self-medicated, whether it be with alcohol initially, you know, just the inability to sleep, and then you know, seeking help, then finding help, then recognizing that the medication I was getting to help me fall asleep worked better if I combined it with the alcohol, which is -- I was getting better but at the same time, I immediately saw that ability, Oh, get some sleep. Combine the two and it's almost comical the way like, Oh, my God, you're taking Ambien and you take like a 5th of rum and you're done. You're golden. You're getting legitimate sleep and I started feeling like this is -- that's the solution. It's simple, you know, not sleeping. You drink...you wake up, you don't feel too good. Then I get medicine like Lexapro, which doesn't work right away. It's not like you take a pill and, boom, you're better. It's gradual. Whereas the Ambien was an immediate response or immediately addressed a major significant symptom, which I thought was the cause of the stress—not sleeping, reliving everything. So for a good period of time it was me again and again looking back. I can see it. It was me again using something to suppress it. Then, you know, eventually it doesn't become good enough because you're so focused on not sleeping and just feeling shitty the whole time that once you start getting into that routine of, okay, feel shitty during the day, but I have my relief when I go to sleep or when I take the medicine I can function enough knowing that I'm -- but then it doesn't become enough. Then that part doesn't so much bother you as parts not involved in sleeping, the day-to-day stuff, the interaction with people, the hair trigger, the just being completely miserable and just completely having just a horrible outlook and on top of that there was a -- you feel so sad, like emotionally drained, but you suppress that. So now it becomes a battle of it was the sleep, but it was feeling like crap and now it's like you don't want to show weakness. So then it's like, well, you know what, maybe I'll self-medicate some more. Maybe I'll try to even go further or just kind of separate myself from everybody. So it's an extreme kind of behavior and eventually gets tiring. I mean, physically tiring, emotionally draining, and it took a lot of outside people saying, You know what, you're acting like a dick. The shooting is bad but you know, fucking suck it up, which I initially took as reinforcing, just keep it down, keep it down, but then I started, you know, because the Lexapro starts to work, you know, at that time because it takes like a month or so. So it starts to kind of kick in. You start to get a little bit more balanced again, not right away, still addressing all the stuff talking about it with the professional...

Further, Chris noted the interrelated nature of many of the topics that were discussed during his interviews, stating:

...again, it bleeds into all the anger, irritability, tolerance, preoccupation. I criticize myself. Whereas now, I understand that some of that is normal, maybe
not to the degree that it should be, but it's normal. It was a normal response to a very stressful situation, which stressful, it's not all the shooting. The shooting creates -- it's like throwing a rock in the water. That's the shooting, but then all the ripples of it, the effects of it kind of branches out and then as it branches out. It hits another rock and then there's more ripples from that, not as significant as the initial rock thrown in but it's not just a linear event. It's events that create other events, that create other situations, creates other interpretations of environment of people so with all that, initially I would criticize myself, self-criticize. Where I'd be like, Why you feeling like that? Why would you be so upset? Why would you be so angry? This guy is this or, yeah, is that bothering you or why are you trying to hold in all this stuff? So you know, just man up at certain times and at certain times you're like, don't be such a rigid person. So anything I did was criticized more so by myself than anybody else.

Unfortunately, many of the elements of coping that emerged during the analysis of the interview transcripts dealt with negative reactions to and attempts to cope with trauma. Two such responses, the use of alcohol and increased anger, were noted not only in Chris' reaction to the shooting, but also featured in the interviews with other participants. Several participants recognized these coping mechanisms as ones that they also utilized, although some attempted to minimize the role these mechanisms play in their lives or tried to suggest that alcohol, in particular, is an accepted part of the police culture. The following two sections will specifically discuss these coping strategies and their appearance in the current study.

Sub Theme 1: Alcohol

As noted by many scholars, alcohol is a commonly used coping tool in general, and has a particularly high occurrence within the police culture (Kirschman 2007, Kirschman 2012a, Wester and Lyubelsky 2005). Indeed, alcohol is considered by many to be a component of the first responder culture; as one participant noted “...he [Chris] drinks a little bit. We all drink a little bit...” Another participant echoed this sentiment,
saying “No, we were cops, you know, so we all like to drink.” This suggests that the use of alcohol is normalized and acceptable as a form of coping within the police department; this mentality is also observed in the following excerpts:

*For me I tell my wife I'm going to get a six pack and watch the hockey game, but for other people, I don't know.*

*...So police officers are supposed to be everything to everyone when the truth is they're having a hard enough time just making it some days just being themselves, and then when they need help, there's nobody that has their back and that's when officers start becoming nasty and they start becoming aggressive and mean and hateful because all they do is look around and say, Well, you know, who is here to help me? I need help. Who is here to help me? And they damn sure aren't going to say that out loud. You know, they'll say it to themselves. So that's how they find themselves at the FOP at 2:00 in the morning with a bunch of like-minded people who are all thinking the same thing, but nobody is going to say it and so what they do is they turn on TV and they watch what, cop shows, and make fun of them using their sense of humor to make sure of what these guys are doing and get drunk.*

In the current study, alcohol played, and in some ways continues to play, a key role. As one participant noted,

A. *I think the drinking, obviously it was his first coping mechanism to begin with so I'm sure --*
Q. *It's a go-to.*
A. *Right.*
Q. *All right.*
A. *It's a go-to but I mean, I'll get like to the point where I get my ass on my shoulders about his drinking and then he won't drink for like, I don't know, like eight, nine days. But then he'll be like, Okay, I want to drink now. I wish he would not, but he does and I'm not his mother.*

This notion that alcohol was Chris' first coping mechanism is supported by statements he made about how he had previously coped with stress or other negative experiences by turning to alcohol. For example, when discussing his suicide attempt in high school, Chris notes that this attempt happened after he “wound up going drinking by myself.”
Another example involves Chris' second divorce, where he noted that he "would sleep downstairs. I would drink like a case of beer and then pass out and then wake up and go to work kind of thing." This particular example is telling because it provides almost an eerie foreshadowing in the form of a question: given his large investments and identification with the police culture and image, and given his penchant to utilize both alcohol and distraction/avoidance to cope with negative events, how would he respond to a significant negative event that made him feel isolated from his career, his identity as a police officer, and even his fellow brothers and sisters in blue?

While Chris had already demonstrated the use of alcohol to cope with personal trauma, he also acknowledged that, by the time of his shooting incident, this was an established coping mechanism:

Q. True, true, didn't know if you noticed any difference in that, if you noticed any increase in alcohol intake or self-medicating?
A. I got to tell you something, it was a steady -- I think the adrenaline and all the rush from doing all that stuff you maintain a level of self-medication so definitely but when those things happen it's -- I wouldn't say more, I'd just say even

So that, when his shooting occurred, Chris immediately turned to his go-to coping mechanism, even in the immediate aftermath of the shooting. Chris notes that he experienced cottonmouth as one of his stress responses and, when another officer asked him if he needed anything, he recalls that he "was like, I could use a drink. And I think I was meaning like I could use a drink and he was like, 'what do you want?' I realized Diet Coke or whatever." Soon after he returned home after his shooting, he was able to get the drink he had been referring to:

A. ...I went upstairs to my room and tried to lay down and I was like, Fuck it. I literally laid down for five seconds, got up, went downstairs, made myself a big, big drink with almost no coke or anything like that. Then
just drank, drank, drank. I just kind of chilled. And I think maybe I closed my eyes but then I would get up. My phone was ringing off the hook so I threw that through the fucking window because, you know, just people wanting to know what happened. So I eventually just turned it off and for the next week it was just the same routine, drink, stay awake, and don't do anything, no eating, no nothing...

Q. What are you drinking?
A. Captain, Captain Morgan. Captain with literally no more than a splash of soda.

The problem was that, as Chris noted, his turn to alcohol as a coping mechanism did not involve just that one drink, instead he acknowledges that he was a “heavy, heavy drinker, heavy drinker, and then after the shooting I became—you couldn’t register the amount of alcohol I was drinking.” Several of those people close to Chris recognized that he was drinking quite a bit, although several participants admit that their knowledge of his drinking was largely secondhand. However, the following observations were made about his drinking following his shooting:

I think I saw him -- the next time I saw him was at the FOP and it was one of those, Hey, brother, how you doing things. And he was, Yeah, I'm good, you know, everything is great, and immediately the conversation turned to, you know, who is buying the next round. It quickly turned to that.

...when we were over at his house studying, I did notice he was drinking a whole lot but, you know, everybody deals with things their own way. Personally I was really hoping it wouldn't damage him for life. I was hoping he would come back to work.

...not that I know by my own knowledge but I heard from someone else that he had been drinking a lot and I was worried about that, too, but when I talked to him he never gave me any feedback of whether he was drinking too much or not, but I heard from other sources that he may have been drinking a little much.

Q. How would you describe his coping mechanisms?
A. Self-medicating with alcohol a lot.
Q. Okay. So a lot, a lot like --
A. Like a lot. Like too much.
Q. Okay. And behavioral changes with that, did it impact the anger or did it just --
A. Yeah, you know, he's not -- he was drunk a lot, but he's never been a violent drunk. So he became -- and even before when he drank he was like a happy-go-lucky drunk so he went from being a happy-go-lucky drunk to just an angry drunk, not a violent drunk, an angry drunk.

...I don't think Chris drank during that. I don't know if he did or not. I never had a drink with him...

With some of these examples, it is clear that alcohol was not only a form of suppressing or avoiding emotions, but also, such as the example with the FOP, was an attempt at managing impressions and trying to present that he was still the same happy-go-luck guy that was always ready to have a good time. Apparently, he was either somewhat successful managing his impression, or, more likely, the participant that thought Chris was not drinking during this time period was exhibiting signs of avoidance himself through deliberate ignorance.

When discussing whether or not his use of alcohol as a coping mechanism impacted other areas of his life or if he was taking professional and personal risks due to his drinking, he made the following statements:

Q. When you were going into work like that, were you going in drunk at all?
A. Uh-uh, no.
Q. Hung over?
A. Yeah, like a champ.
Q. Okay.
A. Big time.
Q. How long would you stop drinking before you had to go to work?
A. God, I definitely stopped at least eight hours, at least. One of the things I didn't want to happen is kind of mar the whole issue by like coming in and doing something fucked up but I'd be miserable because understand, I wasn't eating anything. So I would just drink and go to sleep and if I wasn't feeling like I would go to work or could go to work, I'd just let them know, Hey, don't even -- fuck it, I'm sick today...
Q. All right. So you weren't going to work drunk. Were you going anywhere else?
A. Going anywhere else?
Q. Were you driving? Were you --
A. Oh, no, I situated myself. Where I was is where I stayed.
Q. Okay.
A. Somebody around that time before the shooting or something -- Oh, God, [another officer] got jammed up for that and had a lot of people get jammed up for that, and I think maybe on a handful of occasions that I ever tried to make it back to a house, but not after that shooting, no, that was -- I was getting rides.

What becomes quite interesting is that this may be an example of impression management after the fact, as another participant made these comments:

Q. So other than the drinking, were there any other more self-destructive behaviors that you were worried about?
A. Drinking and driving.
Q. Okay.
A. Not a big proponent of that at all.
Q. No, most people aren't.
A. Right, but I think -- again, I think he was at the point, I just don't care. He was at the point, I just don't care.
Q. Did he drink and drive at any point?
A. Yes.
Q. That you know of?
A. Yes.
Q. Okay.
A. Yes.
Q. Okay. That's a very different answer than what I was given. So how often?
A. Maybe -- well, maybe four or five times unless I caught a case of the ass and ripped into him about it. I was like, Really, do you want to be on the front page of the paper, you know, because you will be. Is this worth it? Is your career worth it? Again, I'm not being a hypocrite. I'm not saying I've never done it; however, will you be a little smarter? Be smart, right now, I mean, drink at home, don't go nowhere. So, yes, we -- it was a few times before I got a case of the ass about it.
Q. Okay. After that did it curtail?
A. Oh, yes.

Even though Chris, as he has noted, was able to again manage his drinking, he still uses it as a coping mechanism:

...I will tell you that it went away and it became manageable and I would only just be social with the stress of dealing with other officers and I didn't
realize it. [Wife] comes in and says, You're drinking way too much. I would literally with dealing with it, not even thinking about it, go home and start drinking. I never get violent, I never get emotional or anything like that. It was one of those muscle memory kind of things drinking, drinking. I wasn't even me. I would just drink and fall asleep and then wake up. That was it, but it was significant.

This continued use of alcohol as a coping mechanism had not escaped the attention of those close to him, as noted in other participants' responses. One respondent, for example, made the following statement about Chris' drinking:

*Chris drinks a lot. I mean, Chris raises drinking to like an Olympic level, and I'm an Irish cop and I'm telling you, I think that guy drinks a lot, and it's not like he drinks just a lot of light beer. He drinks rum specifically.*

*I think Chris' coping mechanisms, I think a lot of what he uses is — well, you know, he drinks a lot. He drinks a shit ton.*

Another participant, in discussing both Chris' drinking and his own, provided a very perceptive response when asked if Chris' drinking was a "problem:"

*I think that any of us who drink -- because I can tell you, I drink a lot. I can drink 15 pints of beer in a single evening and get up and go to work. So we would not classify ourselves as having an issue. The problem is, why are you -- why does 15 pints of beer seem normal to you when most people are either, A, passed out or, B, throwing up? I have never seen Chris where he could not perform. I have never seen Chris -- and believe me, when we've traveled we've definitely both indulged. I've never seen Chris falling down drunk. I have never seen him get louder than he normally would be. I have never seen him so bad the next morning that he could not get up and function when he needed to. So to categorize that as a problem based on observation, I would say it has not affected his work performance that I could see, but then again, I've never seen him when he has not had a drop to drink for a month. Who knows? At that point he may be a superstar, even more productive than he is now, but as it is right now he is still someone who you can go to for good ideas to get hard work done when it needs to be done, and you can count on Chris when you need to have somebody to count on. You can count on him to get things done. So to say would I categorize it as a problem, professionally I would say no. Personally I would say that's probably not doing any justice to his liver.*
Again, Chris may be attempting to manage impressions when discussing his current alcohol use and intake, and this is particularly evident in the following exchange between the researcher and Chris during an interview, seen below. He not only appears to attempt to manage the impression he is providing to the researcher, but he also appears to attempt to manage the impression he gives to his wife:

A. *So since then, like maybe a month or two ago I stopped so I don't drink during the week, maybe have one or two during the weekend. I literally made that change and I think I only can make that or have only been able to do that because of I know what the result is. I know it's going to wind up being stupid. So it's sort of self-monitoring; however, I didn't recognize it right away, which is kind of a little bit freaky but somebody -- and that's the importance of putting home first. My wife goes, Hey, you're drinking way too much. So then I was like, Okay. And then you make the effort to change.*

Q. *Did that kind of scare you at all, especially given some of the statistics?*
A. *No.*
Q. *No?*
A. *To be honest with you, no.*
Q. *Okay.*
A. *It concerned me that it concerned her.*
Q. *Okay.*
A. *To be as honest as you can be. I said, Okay, you know what, maybe that's the case. The problem was there was no-overt act. I don't go out and drink. I don't go -- if I go out and I have a drink, somebody else is driving. It's just one of these things where I'm not going to make it 17 years here and then just get a DUI and get kicked out. That's just ridiculous and I wouldn't want to hurt somebody. So it's only at home. I never go out and act stupid, you know, I never do something crazy at somebody's house, standing on the roof. But it was literally one of those, Hey, you're drinking too much. So that's what made it difficult obviously. You're drinking too much. Well, what am I doing wrong? Nothing, you know, I'm not really affecting anybody other than health issue. I did the whole during the week, I don't drink; however, I had a four-day weekend and I have three-day weekends now.*

Chris was not the only participant to acknowledge alcohol use as a coping mechanism. As noted earlier, one participant stated that "we all drink a little bit,"
referring to police officers drinking habits and suggesting that this is a normal and accepted practice. Yet, there were two participants who clearly stated that they either rarely drink or do not drink at all. Even though the one participant suggested that drinking is a recognized component of the police culture, another participant recognized that there is a very negative side of drinking to escape or avoid the stressors associated with the job, as this participant discussed his own drinking habits, he became quite emotional as he made the following admission:

*I don't drink liquor. I drink a lot -- I love good wine, but you know, I'm not opposed to stopping by 7-Eleven on the way home and picking up a case of beer and just sitting totally alone. I don't -- you know, and I hate this because I feel like it takes away from my ability to be a good father. But you just -- you know, I just want to sit and watch something on TV that is mindless. I don't have to think, you know, have a couple of drinks and just sit and that's it. You know, I know -- I know I should work out. I know I should get some exercise. I know I should do all these other things and just don't because at the time that I am involved in that I just really don't give a fuck, to be honest with you. That's really what it come down to. I just don't have anything left. I just don't have anything left to give. There's no energy left.*

This participant was not the only one to recognize the negative impacts of utilizing alcohol as a coping tool. In fact, another participant pointed out that, in terms of providing peer support or being a good friend to a fellow officer who has been involved in a critical incident, drinking should not be encouraged. As astutely stated by this participant, “don’t be the first one to suggest like, let’s go to the bar and talk about it. That’s probably not a good thing...when you know a guy likes to drink, it’s probably not a good idea to go like, hey, let’s go drink about what’s really fucking bothering you.”

The emergence of this particular theme was not surprising as it is suggested in the literature and has been observed that the use of alcohol is a normative feature of the police culture, used to celebrate achievements and accomplishments as well as to drown
failures and pain. This theme takes on additional weight in the current analysis because in my impact and inform how an individual attempts to manage his or her impression. The use of alcohol as a coping mechanism may impair judgment and functioning at work and at home, possibly leading to role frustration as noted by the participant who disclosed its impact on his ability to be a good parent and Chris' discussions of its impact in his marriage. Additionally, the use of alcohol may also increase poor decision making and risk taking, such as driving drunk, although the officer involved may vehemently deny both as a form of impression management. These features, as well as the interplay between alcohol and the other themes discussed in the current study, are likely to be of particular significance to supervisors, fellow officers, CISM team members and QMHP who will need to attempt to intervene and mitigate problematic alcohol use. These interventions may be particularly difficult for the men and women operating within the police agency, as they too may view the use of alcohol to be an acceptable and normal coping strategy, and may possibly utilize this strategy themselves.

Sub Theme 2: Anger/Aggression

While the use of alcohol, and specifically Chris' use of alcohol, was a dominant theme that emerged across numerous participant interviews another symptom or coping mechanism that emerged just as frequently in multiple participants was that of anger. Anger, as expressed in many of the comments below, is likely a more acceptable and normative response, much like the use of alcohol, in the police culture. This default to anger is likely a form of impression management, employed to mask vulnerability and/or feelings of helplessness or impotence, as well as to express emotion in a format that receives masculine approval and support. One participant provided a fantastic
perspective on anger as a coping response in policing and how that anger, unchecked, can permeate an officer’s personal life.

You know, you go to a domestic violence call where a family member has just had the brakes beaten off of them and you just got to wonder, you know, you're pissed, you're angry, and then you look at this life, you look at the life these people lead. There’s kids everywhere, you know, it’s just like these kids are just destined for failure, you know. How are you going to break this cycle?

Well, then you take that back to your station house or your precinct and you get off work and you, you know, go home and now you have your spouse who is being a bitch or spent money that they weren't supposed to or is giving you a hard time or a kid who is being what appears to be disrespectful and chances are, they just don’t know any better at the time, you know, they’re having their own issues because you’re gone all the damn time. So when you are there and all you want to do is sit in silence and not have anybody mess with you, but the insurance payment is due, the grass hasn’t been cut, nobody took the trash out. Your kid is failing a class, you know, you start going into cop mode on your family. Well, they don’t deal well with that.

In this case, Chris exhibited an anger response in the immediate aftermath of the shooting, as seen in the two excerpts below. This use of anger as a mask for vulnerability is alluded to at the end of the second excerpt, where Chris partially admits to the fear that would have manifested had he run out of bullets during the shooting incident.

Anger. Well, you know, depending on the first -- I can tell you the exact time that I came into it as a real abrupt emotional response was what, the second they were trying to place him in custody and I walked away from him, I was livid that he made me do it, clear as day. It was very vivid and I walked around and I kicked the cooler of sodas over. I remember doing that. I was absolutely out of my mind angry with the individual for forcing my hand.

Now, then it transitions to obviously going through the various changes, emotional stages, but it was such an acute point in the instant, that was the one time without a doubt I went from, you know, just being -- just going from survival to the threat is gone. The second the threat was gone, immediate anger, immediate anger, and then it dissipates a little bit and then obviously going into like an irritability or being the hypersensitive and then it takes on all these different forms. So it’s not anger of the thing like, Grrrr. Initially it was that. Then it was becoming angry at all the various, you know, emotional inconsistencies, like having to gauge to how I responded to somebody so that they wouldn’t think I was, you know, too upset or too angry -- or not angry but just unsettled, and then you get irritated and it was a natural progression, I would
imagine, so would become irritable at certain things and those little things that would just make you irrate, you'd hold back a little bit, but by the time it blew up it goes into that you're angry at it and then you're angry at people for creating like the next chain of the events that would occur...
Then you realize what's going on and then I became angry that the people even initiated but then it would also be anger at myself for allowing something as stupid as that. So it's not just a very linear thing, it's multiple and conceptual. He was like you've got a job to do. He wasn't there so I know he's not emotionally, you know, influenced by anything. He's like, Well, all right, you know, how many times did you shoot? Because he was Car 8 so he had to -- he's ultimately responsible right now as far as for this investigation getting kicked off and notification. So I remember thinking, Man, he's got a lot of shit to do, and you know, I caused it, and he's like, How many times did you shoot? And I remember I was still being pissed. I was still maintaining like, Fuck, I can't believe he made me do that. I was like, I don't know, fucking a lot. Like very -- like that's a dumb question. Not realizing no one was there, no one knew how long it was before no one showed up, but I remember saying -- and something like I was like, I don't know, fucking a lot, and he takes my gun. I hand him my gun. I unload it, give it to him. He kind of looks at the magazine, sees there's nothing in there, ejects the round. He goes, Holy shit, you have one round left. I remember thinking flat, Oh, my God, if I would have shot again that slide would have locked back. I don't know what the fuck I would have done.

This tendency towards anger did not dissipate once the initial surge of emotions passed. Chris noticed this change, finding that he

Q. Did you notice before the shooting that you had any of those clearly vivid anger moment like you talked about or did you see those more after the shooting?
A. No, God, that was -- maybe three or four times in my entire life I've ever been like that. Other than that I'd get frustrated, but that was truly -- that was legitimate anger. I've never -- that kind of anger maybe three or four times in my life. That being the apex of it. Other than that, it's been frustration, irritability, and just being a dick.

Another participant also noticed this change in Chris, observing that,

I mean, he was angry a lot and not so much at me but just at anything, like anything that would make him angry. Of course he was angry at work. You know, the conditions at work and things that wouldn't make him angry before that
would be like, Oh, whatever, you know, that was like a big deal and everything. Everything made him angry. I don't think there was one thing that didn't make him angry.

A particular incident involving anger and jealousy was relayed by Chris and his wife, as Chris' reaction was so extreme and marked a significant moment in their relationship. As Chris recalled,

A. Irritability or angry outburst. Oh, yeah, definitely, definitely.
Q. Talk to me about it.
A. Definitely I think the most significant one was almost when me and [girlfriend] split up. We were out somewhere at Nags Head and some guy, she was doing karaoke and some guy came up and hugged her or like gave her a kiss on the cheek and fucking lost -- I went from zero to like five-million miles an hour.
Q. What did you do?
A. Well, [a friend] gracefully escorted me out because I was going to kill the guy. I was going to fucking rip his head off. I was so pissed. And it wasn't like a -- it wasn't a jealous thing. It was like I can't believe this mother fucker -- which was even worse for me because if it was a jealousy thing, get over it kind of thing. I just went -- that was the one time I realized. I said, Oh, this is an issue. Now I'm sure I've done it -- I couldn't tell you when, but if someone said something I'd be like, Oh, shut the fuck up, or get out of my face, but that one was -- she's like, We're done. You're fucking insane.
Q. Okay.
A. Because it was -- people were scared and initially afterwards, I was scared.
Q. Tell me what exactly you did.
A. I think I said something to [my friend]. I was like, Do you believe what this fucking guy -- and then he was like, Whoa, whoa, whoa, because we were at the Jolly Roger and he's kind of like -- I was like, Fuck that. And so now everybody is looking at me and fucking[friend] is dragging me out and we wound up going outside and I wound up going back to the -- not the room but the house or where we were staying at.
Q. Okay.
A. It was ugly.
Q. So tell me about the aftermath.
A. She was no bounds about it. She was like, You need to -- you need to do something because this is crazy.
Q. Okay.
A. So that was probably the catalyst. That was the one -- that's the one I remember the best. I was like, Nope, I can't do that anymore.
His wife recalls the incident this way,

_A._ And we had a little episode, not sure if he talked about it.

_Q._ I'm thinking yes.

_A._ During my birthday week in Nags Head.

_Q._ Uh-huh.

_A._ Loved at that time to karaoke. Me and my girlfriend, I think we sang a song together at some rundown -- I think it was a Jolly Rancher in Nags Head and some drunk guy, just as nice as he could be, Oh, that's beautiful, and you know, just hugged me and maybe kissed me like on the cheek or the ear or something, and boom, here comes Chris, Oh, what the fuck, you know, just never seen him like that.

_Q._ Oh, wow.

_A._ And then I -- you know, he was like (demonstrating). I'm like, Shut up. I think, [Chris' friend] was there. One of his friends because [he] was dating [my girlfriend] at the time and somehow we wound up outside, and I remember telling him, I dated you, meaning the jealous type of guy, and I will not do it again. This is not going to happen, and I remember asking [Chris' friend] that night, I'm like, Is he like this? You know, because again, my birthday is in May. The shooting was in April and we hadn't dated before. So is this how it is? And [Chris' friend] was like, I don't know. You know, because guys don't know what to say to guys. Yeah, the jealousy kind of got bad and me and [her ex] being friends, he was very jealous of my friendship with [the ex] because [the ex] and I were engaged before.

Additionally, anger may also serve as a tool to facilitate withdrawal and isolation, as evidenced in the following excerpt.

_No one is going to fuck with you after you've just been involved in a shooting. No one is going to be like, Hey, shut up, dick. But after a while that wears on people and they're like, Hey, dick head, you're fucking like yelling at everything. I was like, Fuck you. I would revert to being like, Oh, you fucking suck, you know, just kind of over the top, but you really aren't just being subtle about it._

Again, not only is this a form of impression management to avoid displaying "softer" emotions, but there was also a degree of impression management that was observed as participants explained various ways anger manifested. The researcher noted the use of synonymous words, such as frustration, irritability or aggression, and there
were discussions of how anger is not synonymous with violence, as well as vocal versus physical aggression.

A. People would piss me off and I think I was more vocal with it, but I think as being aggressive as a physical act and I...

Q. And not in any other aspect either, no punching walls, that kind of stuff?
A. No, no, I've never been like that. Probably because I mostly vocalize everything. I didn't hold anything in and I had held a lot of stuff in there but not -- I can't pinpoint a part

A. But I mean, he just -- again, it's a difference between he wasn't violent, he was angry.
Q. Uh-huh.
A. A lot. He didn't punch shit in here. He didn't -- it was -- you know how you have just angry people. He was just angry at that point, not violent. I don't think I've ever seen him violent.

In informal conversations, Chris and the researcher have discussed the McElvain and Kposowa (2008) finding that officers who have been involved in one shooting incident are 50% more likely to be involved in another shooting incident. Theoretically, there are several plausible reasons for this finding, to include the ecology of the area or beat to which the officer is assigned (Fyfe 1980, Kania and Mackey 1977, Klinger 1997, Terrill and Reisig 2003, Werthman and Piliavin 1967). Another potential explanation is that several of the post-trauma symptoms discussed and disclosed in the current research, such as hypervigilence, anger, or anxiety, may predispose the officer to get into violent altercations. In short, there may be a form of self-fulfilling prophecy operating in that the officer is paradoxically so hyperaware of his or her surroundings and afraid of being in another shooting that he or she may be more aggressive or combative, potentially escalating situations that may not have resulted in violence previously. These concerns, which are theoretically and practically supported, were discussed on numerous occasions with Chris, and he disclosed a fear of freezing or not being able to perform, which may
result in injury to a colleague. In one interview, he addressed how the increased aggression he experienced in the aftermath of his shooting was like a double-edged blade...

A. Well, I think the increased aggression. I think more than increased aggression. It was a fear of an increased aggression because I remember coming back down the search warrant and being concerned that I would be hypervigilant or just completely go beyond like have a hair trigger kind of thing.

Q. Uh-huh.

A. So it was a fear but I didn't see the increased -- I didn't see an increased aggression. People would piss me off and I think I was more vocal with it, but I think as being aggressive as a physical act and I --

Q. Okay.

A. I probably in taking people down afterwards, especially during search warrants, was probably more forceful, which maybe might have been a good thing, but as far as increased aggression but the fear of having that increase.

Although this study focused on Chris and his shooting incident, it is important to acknowledge that other participants referenced their own anger in response to a shooting incident, as described below.

A. That was for two reasons. Like I said, I screwed up and got in an argument with my corporal. One, I was trying to save my cushy job in Narcotics.

Q. Okay.

A. Two, I did realized that maybe some things had changed about me. I was a lot angrier than I usually am.

Q. Okay. So what do you mean you were angrier than you usually are?

A. Well, I'm pretty angry all the time so they call me angry black guy, but I guess because of the things that happened after the shooting, the dealing with workmen's comp, trying to get paid, you know, the treatment that I kind of received from the department, as far as them trying to kick me out. I took two bullets for this city and then, you know, them proceeding to try to kick me out of Narcotics, I voluntarily went and saw somebody, you know, try to deal with my anger issues in reference to the shooting.

Q. Did those come home at all? Did you notice you were angry at home, too?

A. No, no.
This manifestation of anger and the potential negative career ramifications from being hostile, aggressive and insubordinate to an officer of higher rank was also disclosed by Chris, where he recalls the incident below. This is important because it highlights how supervisors need to be aware of personality and behavior changes in the aftermath of a critical incident, as these may be a symptom of a larger problem that requires intervention.

"...I can tell you some of the -- he was a lieutenant at the time, said something to me like, What, are you just going to just like take off, you know, all the time? And for some reason -- like blame it on this [anger or irritability] or whatever and I was, you know, detective. I was like, Go fuck your -- I didn't go for, Hey, man, that ain't cool. I went from listening to him to yelling at him to where he was like, You need to get the fuck out of my face. I was like, Well, you go fuck yourself. You don't know shit about shit.

Another participant, likely without intent, disclosed two instances of anger or aggression, one in relation to the murder of an officer in 2006 and the other related to the frustration of not being able to close a homicide case:

"I mean, I knew all three like officers, the last three officers that have been killed here, but I didn't know them well, you know what I mean, but I didn't see the first -- but that last one...I mean, I seen him fucking dying on the street, but I mean, I was just more pissed...Like you know, these scum bags in this country, you know. It's like just no respect. I mean, I was out for, you know, I wanted to go get the dude. I wanted to be the one to go find him, you know what I mean.

A. ...between all these other homicides, you know, I mean, anybody would be crazy to be like this. Oh, man, you've seen some fucked up shit. You've got to be fucked up, but the reality is, you know, what really does fuck me up about it?
Q. What?
A. Fucking not solving it. That I would say honestly is what bothers me. Now, not about this but just talking like a particular case and not having the answers for that sticks with me.
Q. That I can definitely understand."
A. Like that [one] case, that's haunted me since 2008, never left me. Not that it's -- it's just my mind is always like how can I not find the answers to get this guy. That's -- see --

Q. I definitely get that one.

A. Not the whole, but it's just like, you know, this son of a bitch and especially, too, because she's a real victim. She's not some shit bag selling dope. That is like what really bothers me.

In the course of the current study, it became evident that anger or an anger-like response was often a façade for a deeper emotion. Occasionally, the vulnerability or softer emotion the participant was afraid to display—be it because of the fear of stigma or some other justification for the need to manage impressions—would be exposed, other times, it was not as obvious. These reactions also have ties to the thematic exploration of gender and machismo seen in this chapter, as this may also proscribe that anger is a more accepted response within the police culture. If family, colleagues, supervisors or even mental health providers observe increased anger and hostility in an officer that has been involved in a critical incident, it may be worth the effort of attempting to peel back the emotional response to determine if and what is actually driving the anger. Addressing the underlying emotion or concern may help the officer understand, reduce, or at least better manage, the anger he or she is experiencing.

Sub Theme 3: Observations of Personality or Demeanor Changes

Chapter Four provided the reader with a detailed methodology that was employed in the current study. While the interviews conducted with participants were free form in nature, many of the interviews followed a very lose structure of speaking specifically to Chris' shooting—the case involved in the study—before broadening the discussion to address other traumatic incidents. This allowed the researcher to explore the relationship
each participant had with Chris prior to the shooting—to include their first impressions of
Chris—as well as explore what changes, both temporary and lasting, they noticed in both
Chris and their relationship with Chris.

First impressions of Chris prior to the shooting were relatively consistent, noting
his engaging and vibrant demeanor, sense of humor and gregarious nature, as evidenced
in the various descriptions provided below. These descriptions also suggest Chris’
commitment to his job, and the police culture, as well as how the nature of police work
can forge strong bonds between colleagues.

He was a goofball. He actually sat next to me. That's probably how I got to know
him. There was probably 50 people in the class, all different jurisdictions in the
class and he was -- I remember him being tattooed and I remember thinking
sitting in the class next to him, we're in an undercover school, and what fool is
going to buy drugs from him more than once when he has permanent tattoos on
his arms. That's what I remember thinking. But he was a cutup, very funny, good
personality. Again, first impressions. Later I learned very hard-worker, very
dedicated to work. He was a nice-looking man obviously. Funny, I guess funny
would probably be a cutup... In general like Chris is one of those people I'm sure
that people will say this about him as well, he can fit in anywhere so he could fit
in with scholars, he could fit in with the homeless. He could fit in with the
working class. It doesn't matter where he's at, he could fit in. So while we had
one-on-one interaction because he sat next to me, he could have the same
interaction with the other 48 people in the class, too, and be just as comfortable.
So it was kind of a mix of both... Fun-loving, caring, good guy, easy to talk to,
makes people laugh, and I knew that from the years that I've known him, made me
laugh, just a good guy, and I knew again from when I met him to that point that he
was a very hard worker. I know he worked a lot. I knew he didn't have a very
good marriage at that point...

Chris has a very vibrant, energetic, charismatic way about him and that is a
typical Aquarium trait and it was not a surprise. His birthday is right before
mine. So we got along really well, clearly super funny guy, sense of humor that
is -- that runs the gamut from absolutely positively offensive to that's just so smart
I don't think most people in the room are going to get it. So he has the ability to
go at will, which is the great thing. It's not an accident. He can go at will
between those two ends and it went until 2007 when I got transferred that I talked
to him and didn't really talk to him that much anymore because he was in -- he
took my spot in Homicide... But always the same type -- always the same type of person, very energetic, very out there, and it seemed very genuine.

A. ...Cool kid. We had a good time together. Initially me and him were on the SWAT team initially and then between one or both of us getting hurt we ended up just going back to Narcotics... And then we stayed in Narcotics and got in the same squad... We just had a ball, you know, so we all just got so tight together, like our squad come in in the morning, worked long hours together, loved each other like brothers, you know, and that's the way our relationship just grew.

Q. ...So can you describe his demeanor and sort of interactions with people?
A. Yeah, very cool, down to earth. He's not like -- like the kind of person I am, I'm the kind that I don't judge people. I judge the situation and the choices they make. So unfortunately our paths happened to cross while I'm at work and you're going what you do, so I got to do my job and put you in jail the right way. Chris is the same way. I mean, he doesn't abuse his authority. I've never seen him like even though we have old people when we arrested them, I never seen him abuse that, you know, like all the guys that I consider dear friends, all of us have the same mindset. So Chris is the same way. I mean, he does his job well, doesn't abuse his authority. He knows how to relate to people. Me and him together, we're so much alike. We grew up in the department together. So we're pretty much the same kind of people.

What attracted me to him were those tattoos. Gosh, who in the world is this guy getting all these tattoos? The name Scallon but I used to call him scallion for onion. It was kind of funny because I called him that one day and he was like, Oh, God, as if I hadn't heard that before, and of course my first thought was this guy is a dick and then I thought about and then I thought, Oh, well, you know, if he's had that name all these years I'm sure he's heard it a thousand times... Then I switched up and said, Well, maybe I was a dick for calling him that... Somewhere in there there was a big switch where, you know, some of us, we were doing real narcotic work. We decided that we're going to grow our hair out and we're just going to go all in to this thing and it's real funny because at the time I was growing out my locks. Chris was growing his hair, too. So I mean, we got a little bit closer because of that and we would go to DC together to the police memorial, just hanging out and doing narcotic work together. We became really tight... From the start I knew that guy was really smart. You know, I listened to the way he talked to people and saw the way that he interacted with people. I knew that he was really smart and if he wanted to he could go really far in this police department.
I had met him way before then but my -- he was just one of many, many officers on the department who you would see around a lot. You didn't necessarily know who they were. I believe he was assigned to Vice & Narcotics for a lot of years. I remember he had this real long hair, you know, and I used to think, you know, that's got to get in the way, you know. But I always knew who he was and he was always pleasant. He always went out of his way to speak, just a very, very friendly guy and when he was involved in his shooting incident I knew who he was. I really didn't know him well.

He's from New York, you know, I'm from New York, too, so he was cool. Funny guy, you know, liked to party, you know, hung out, you know, just like one of the guys. He was like a cop's cop. He wasn't into, you know, the corny stuff of police work, you know, writing traffic tickets and stuff like that. He was more into a little bit more dangerous, going undercover, you know, we both were, all the people we worked with. That was our thing, was we didn't want to really kind of do that regular stuff. We were exciting but doing the little bit more adventurous things... he takes things like, you know, personal, especially if you call in to his integrity or -- because he prides himself on how he does his job and stuff like that... it's hard to kind of gauge Chris because Chris is happy-go-lucky and if there's a good time to be had, he's definitely not going to be Debbie Downer.

This last description of initial impressions of Chris, much as disclosed by another participant noted his use of humor to avoid and deflect, evidence his facility with impression management and some of his coping mechanisms in place prior to the shooting incident.

Most participants noticed changes in Chris' behavior and demeanor in the aftermath of his shooting incident. Some of these changes were noticed immediately, others took time to develop. In terms of length of time until Chris was "better," the time frame provided ranged from a year and a half to three years. Some changes were easier to observe (and, in one participant's case, rationalize or explain away) because they were physical. Other changes were more ephemeral. Many of these observations were distressing or caused the participants sadness, and most participants appeared to have
been very concerned for Chris' well being at different points during this period. The
collection of excerpts below document those changes observed.

Just distraught, torn up from killing somebody, being involved in that. I think his
adrenaline had dumped but he couldn't rest after that and he was just sad, sad
and that was hard because I had not -- I don't think I had seen him sad. I don't
think I had seen him sad like that before...I guess people kept calling him nonstop
on his cell phone and I believe at one point he finally just turned it off. He
didn't -- he tried to sleep but maybe he'd sleep for like five minutes and then shake
and jar awake out of like a fear. I guess I would assume nightmares that he had
and just sad...At that point I just think he was sad. He was depressed that he had
killed somebody. Eventually his biggest thing, I can't believe I had to kill
somebody...it eventually got harder but it was hard for me to see him sad and
distraught about that and I wouldn't want to take somebody's life, even if they had
shot at me either...He had a lot of guilt about killing another person. ...I think he
needed like I got to be with somebody, I got to be next to somebody, even though
I'm not being nice to them, I got to be with somebody, a lot, let's just say a lot.

...he lost his light. That's how I describe it because Chris has a light. His
personality is very bright and he lost that light, like it was a 200-watt bulb that
went down to like 20. That's the best way I can describe it. He lost his light and
it was very, very dim.

Chris' hands shake all the time and I asked him specifically if that has always
been something he had and he's like, No, and I let it go because I knew -- I could
pretty much guess where that demarcation line was from, when they didn't until
where they did. So if you watch Chris eat you can see that his hands -- it's almost
like an onset of Parkinson's when you watch him. He has that shaking, quivering,
and he can be in a discussion where he seems perfectly level-headed and rational
and still kind of enjoying himself and it's -- but you see that and it's anybody that
recognizes that in people, that type of behavior, you know, it screams like a
beacon that there's something that caused that because that's not normal.

A. Yeah, initially he had a lot of guilt that he had to kill that guy, which is
Chris, you know what I'm saying. He's a good guy, like 90 percent of cops
don't want to shoot anybody.

Q. And when you saw Chris, did you notice anything about him right after the
shooting?

A. Yeah, he seemed pretty stressed.

Q. So how so?
A. He was definitely not jovial like he normally is and he was looking a little sad and I was hoping he was going to be okay and I couldn't get to him to talk to him like I wanted to but like I said, shortly after that is when I gave him that first phone call.

Q. Okay. So you talked about his demeanor. He wasn't as jovial. What about your first interactions with him when you were first able to talk to him?

A. When we first face-to-face talked, he teared up a little bit and I felt for him, you know, and we just talked about what happened and he was feeling so bad and I just kept trying to push him, you know, he was feeling so guilty about what he had to do, and I kept trying to push to him, You don't have to do this but you could see the pain in his face.

Q. So other than those immediate changes, did you notice any other changes in his personality, demeanor, behavior?

A. Yeah, he lost a lot of weight. He was a little bit bigger than he is now. But he lost significant amount of weight quickly. He had his place but he would stay home a lot. Like back in the day we would work hard and then go to the FOP, you know, everybody would play pool and drink and play cards. He started doing that kind of stuff, you know, and he kind of just like stayed to himself a lot, which initially I was really worried about him, but he then kind of -- like I don't think not even initially, he just kind of like went away from the group a little bit. Because like I said, we were all so close and you know, we would do things on duty all the time, off duty all the time, things like that...Yeah, like when he started to withdraw a little bit seems like next time I saw him he had lost so much weight. Next time he lost even more, and then not that I know by my own knowledge but I heard from someone else that he had been drinking a lot and I was worried about that, too.

Q. So what about any changes after the shooting? Did you notice anything with Chris?

A. Personally, no. I heard that it took him a while to come back to work.

Q. Okay.

A. And that's understandable. Nobody gets on this job, nobody joins the police department with the intent to kill somebody...Nobody does that and I'm sure it was pretty hard for him...Yeah, I heard he didn't go back to work for a little while. He lost a lot of weight. I could tell he lost a lot of weight and I heard he was maybe drinking a little too much...I did notice he was drinking a whole lot but, you know, everybody deals with things their own way. Personally I was really hoping it wouldn't damage him for life. I was hoping he would come back to work.

Q. So when you saw him, did you notice anything?

A. Yeah, yeah, he was in shock.

Q. Okay. Describe that for me.
A. Well, it's not the first time I've ever dealt with a coworker through military and stuff like that, somebody that's been through a traumatic experience and stuff like that, he was trying to process it and he was having a hard time with it... But he was more transparent and open with it and the thing that struck me about it was that there was absolutely no whiff of bravado about him, which is not typical... I definitely knew that he had been through something and he wasn't cool with it early on. I knew that the first day just by looking at him... so he basically told me that, you know, it's not something that he was comfortable with, taking a life... You know, which I've never heard anybody -- I know people that have killed people before: I mean, it's not the response people say, whether it be the truth or not. I just thought it was, you know -- I thought it was pretty honest, you know, for him to admit that he was having a problem processing... So ultimately he's responsible for what happened.

Q. ...So what about his behavior at work? Did you notice any change?
A. Yeah, he had -- when he did come back, I mean, he wasn't working for a while. When he came back, I mean, he just seemed like, you know, number one, he was determined he wasn't going to stay in Narcotics. He was determined he was going to go to Homicide... But I mean, at first it was like, Oh, seems like he's really kind of down. Then I was thinking to myself, I don't know if I'd be feeling that way, you know what I mean, regardless of the situation. Then I was like, Well, I don't know how I can say that because I've never been to a gas station, this, that, and the other but I mean, he was going to therapy and then it seemed like he was doing -- you know, getting a lot better. It was quick. It's not like he was like feeling like not himself for an extended period of time. It was just issues he was dealing with. He could still laugh, maybe not as much, but it was definitely on his mind.

Finally, participants were asked if they observed any lasting changes to Chris' behavior and demeanor following his shooting incident. Many of the responses are reflective of Kirschman's (2007) idea of post traumatic growth and participants expressed a range of positive emotions while discussing.

I mean, he's gotten a lot better. I think for Chris it's very therapeutic for him to teach about it. So I think every time he teaches that he's able to incorporate what happened to him into any type of teaching he does at the academy or outside of the academy, that helps him. So I think helping share his story helps him. So I like that. He's open with it now. He doesn't mind saying -- he's gotten more open about, I was an asshole. I drank a lot. I wasn't very nice, admitting to others and himself that he was that way, I think, helps him -- you know, he'll never be the same guy he was before.
...When I work with Chris now, Chris still has that personality. He still has it. My — so I know it comes to him naturally...He is -- I can tell you that currently he has a real desire to help other people and he has a real -- his attitude towards the municipal government, the administration of our department, things like that, he definitely does not hide where he may have been less likely to be as boisterous before or is now, and part of that is that he seems to take it very personally, how officers are treated, that look to be or appear to be or have some type of mental health issue that needs to be addressed and I will constantly hear from Chris that the department is very good at just treating specific symptoms but never looking at the underlying cause to prevent it from happening in the future, which is an accurate assessment.

Q. Makes sense. All right. So after these incidents, both with Chris and other people, have you noticed any permanent changes in personality or demeanor?
A. With Chris?
Q. Uh-huh.
A. No, he just seems more focused, more grounded.
Q. Okay.
A. No, mature.
Q. Okay. Chris more mature?
A. Well, but I think a lot has to do with [his wife] and stuff like that.
Q. Okay.
A. He wasn't really an adult, adult for a long time. I mean, I was married with two kids and I wasn't an adult, adult, you know, out there acting like we were, you know, but he's definitely more grounded and I think he's benefitted from it.
Q. How so?
A. Because I think it was one of the major things. I know he's been through a lot of things in his life, you know. I'm familiar with his personal background and I think it was just one of those one more things that he was able to get over. It didn't destroy him. It didn't defeat him and I think it gave him like an air of confidence to be confident with who you are as a person.

This theme was deliberately included because, while there are clearly links to other themes explicated in this chapter, particularly the impact of Chris’ shooting incident on others and the manifestation of critical incident stress and PTSD symptoms, this section examined observable changes and the interpretation of those changes. As such,
these observations may suggest different ways and points for intervention efforts, as well as highlight how others observing these symptoms and signs might rationalize them, leading to a lack of activity and intervention. Further, it is clear in many cases that these individuals were impacted by what was happening to Chris, suggesting issues of secondary and tertiary trauma. Finally, the manifestation of these symptoms may call attention to the behaviors exhibited by other officers who have been involved in a critical incident, making others more aware of the range of behavioral changes that may indicate that the officer is struggling and needs help, even if he or she would not admit to needing professional assistance.

*Sub Theme 4: Critical Incident Stress and PTSD Symptoms*

Kirschman (2007) and Best, Artwohl and Kirschman (2011) discuss how stress reactions to a critical incident can be viewed in phases or stages, with some symptoms appearing immediately while others may manifest weeks or months after the critical incident concluded. There may be variations in the constellations of symptoms an officer experiences or is observed to experience and these symptoms may be more or less intense, as well as transitory or long lasting, and are conditioned by a host of factors that are internal and external to the individual officer (Best, Artwohl and Kirschman 2011, Hodgins, Creamer and Bell 2001, Honig and Sultan 2004, IACP 2012b, Jones 1989, Kerley 2005, Kirschman 2007, McCaslin et al. 2006, McCaslin et al. 2008, Pole et al. 2001, Violanti 2005). The current study found that this was also the case, that Chris developed symptoms at varying times, of varying intensities and durations and that those symptoms were observed or not observed by others in his life. Additionally, his symptoms were impacted by other factors, to include his personality, coping mechanisms,
position in the police department. This section provides the resultant commentary and thematic evidence that details Chris’ experience with critical incident stress and PTSD, as well as how others witnessed and perceived those stress reactions.

Chris displayed several of the perceptual distortions discussed in Chapter 2. For example, when discussing whether or not he could see the clerks’ faces, Chris stated that, “Oh, I couldn’t see their faces like out of the corner peripheral type stuff,” which suggests he may have experienced tunnel vision. Another visual distortion, discussed in the previous chapter, was how the suspect’s gun appeared to Chris—like a cannon or huge cartoon gun—when he was near the ATM and was almost shot in the face. Chris also made numerous references that would suggest that he experienced time distortions throughout the shooting event. These time distortions, however, must be considered in the context of this shooting in that it was much longer than the average police shooting. As such, all statements related to how long the event lasted may not be time distortions, but legitimate concerns over the length of time it took first responders to arrive.

However, the quotes below are more likely indicative of a true perceptual distortion:

No, no. It was almost like -- well, it's like being in a -- the only way I can equate it to, I know it was probably out of breath and dry mouth and throat sore, but it's like in the middle of a car crash, like while it's crashing you probably don't know how you're feeling but the second it's over you're like, Oh, yeah, oh, yeah, that was horrible but this was just like that. Despite the fact that it was so prolonged, it was still all like if you were to take, I don't know -- it's like time freezes so all that time, even though it felt long, I knew it was like four seconds

Just it's very basic. You forget about everything. Like the lower part of your body, gone, I don't even -- you don't even think about anything other than just that, sights, just the sight, and you see the back lined up with the front and then it was just -- it was the perfect sight, picture sight alignment and just following. When he got to the point, take the breath, and you point, head cocks back like he got punched in the face with a hammer
All I know is it seemed to me like it was 100 miles an hour, running up and down the aisles, turning this way, run up this way, peeking your head up, peeking up. It was almost that I just stopped. I was like, you know what, I'm going to stand up straight. I'm going get my sight good and I'm going the squeeze and squeeze until it goes off just, a perfect -- a perfect procedure and a perfect -- the mechanics of it were just perfect and I remember thinking, God, my sights aren't even moving because normally like imagine holding a gun up for like an hour, your hands start to shake. That's what I felt like but when I calmed myself, like an instantaneously get just a perfect, like you have the sights. They can go up and down like this. They can go this way. It was perfect and they were all the same piece and I remember shooting.

The excerpts above represent both the perceived slowing and acceleration of time.

Other perceptual distortions evidenced during the shooting included increased respiration and heart rate (as noted in interviews and observed when reviewing the 9-1-1 tape), numbness, tingling in his hands, dry mouth, not being able to feel the lower half of his body, selective attention (ignoring the potential second offender outside and the two military personnel that attempted to enter the store mid-shooting), shock and disbelief (seen repeatedly in the detailed account of the shooting in Chapter 5) and possibly hallucinations. Statements that suggest there may have been hallucinations or illogical/magical thinking include:

...but I remember wanting to make my bullets count. So I didn't want to shoot through anything. I wanted to get a clean shot, which I don't know. I thought that would be better so I could literally like you're standing on a shelf, like a metal shelf in between us and it's not like the food is packed over there. So you can see through it and so I just waited for him to -- he did like one of these, like I'm going to go to the right but I'm actually going left, and I caught him when he was going this way and I was like, I bet you he's going to do that, kind of like you had this ESP kind of like, Oh, he's going this way.

Oh, fuck, I hope -- because I'm not shot, maybe they're shot. I was like, Are you guys good? Is everybody -- I remember yelling it specifically, You guys good, good, good? And whether they said yes or no, if they said no I would have remembered it, but they didn't say anything or maybe like, yeah, or okay.
Something vague, but I remember being like, Oh, shit, I hope they're not -- I'm standing over two dead people but I didn't. I got swept up out of there. I don't even remember them leaving the store, to be quite honest. The last time I saw them they were behind the counter.

The final cognitive or perceptual distortion Chris described in his interviews is detachment. At several points he noted an almost out of body experience—stating at one point that he was “like a machine,” and at another that he was never scared during the incident. Even in the immediate aftermath—when he was sitting in a police car waiting for investigators to arrive, he describes watching the scene as if he were at a drive-in movie. These symptoms mirror those described by Jones (1989) and Paton (2005) in the immediate reactionary phase of being involved in a shooting.

After the shooting ends, the second phase of stress response begins. In this case, that line of demarcation is quite clear, with Chris stating that:

...the second he put that second handcuff on it was like the weight of the world -- like it was over. Like that was -- you know, like the end, boom, so the threat and then it all came down on me. So I went over to walk away because at this time all the fear and all the -- you know, the nerves and everything are starting to catch up with you and almost until I feel like scary, scary and I rounded the corner and I saw his gun there and I realized he didn't have a gun all that time that I'm sitting there yelling at him and I remember getting so -- I saw the gun. I was like, Hey, I was pissed that he -- this mother fucker actually shot at me for that long and he didn't say anything about not having a gun or just keeping his hands up or anything and I may have killed him. Because I was considering literally walking up and just putting it to his head and shooting him and I was like, No, I can't do that unless I see a gun...So I got so pissed off I kicked the big soda thing over. I was like, Damn it!

This is consistent with the list of symptoms provided in Chapter 2 (Jones 1989, Kirschman 2007, Klinger 2004), which noted the officer may be angry. This anger was also manifested in his responses to the Lieutenant who checked and secured his firearm, as noted in the discussion of anger as a coping mechanism. Chris also experienced
crying, disbelief, tremors and fatigue, also noted in the literature. Chris specifies three
distinct points when, in the immediate aftermath of the shooting, he broke down
emotionally. These break downs included multiple symptoms, including disbelief and
fatigue. The first occurred when he was walking around the building to complete a
walkthrough with the investigators. According to Chris,

A. ...there's a little alleyway all like -- all the commotion kind of stops and
it's just like us in the alleyway and I remember the gravity of everything
just kind of hit me at once and that's when I stopped...Just like a dump,
like an emotional dump, just download everything, like very heavy and
somber and scared and frustrated and angry all combined into one and
just tired, you know, fatigued mentally, physically, and just able to just
kind of let everything go...

Q. What's going through your head?
A. That I almost died...That I killed somebody. I thought I killed him
immediately when they took him. I was like, He's dying, he's dying. He's
going to die. So I felt bad about that, but I also felt like, Damn, I could
have got killed. Or you know, I just wanted cigarettes. That's all I
wanted.

The second break down started when he walked into the convenience store, but he was
able to maintain his composure until he began exhibiting another symptom of a critical
incident stress reaction—the inability to recall detail:

Then I remember breaking down because I remembered thinking what I was
going to tell him, how it went down, and I forgot. I couldn't understand. I knew
the beginning, the middle, and the end, but the stuff in between was just so out of
place, seemed like just like a puzzle, just all messed up, but you had the outline
done. So that's what it felt like, and that got me upset again. So we stopped.
Then I remember thinking, I was looking at all the blood. I'm looking at -- the
smoke is going out because they left the door open a little bit. So it was kind of
going out, a little bit cooler in the store and just looking at just everything, the
bullet holes. I remember looking at the door on the way out thinking, Oh, my
God. I was inches away. Looking at the ATM, looking at all the -- I think with
the bullet holes, just like it looked a lot more chaotic than I remembered. I was
like, Oh, my God.
The third break down came after Chris had been interviewed by those conducting the criminal investigation into his shooting. Chris remembers asking the investigators at least ten times how the suspect was doing. He was repeatedly told “we’ll get to that.”

After the interview was completed, Chris says,

...[The investigator] was like, He's dead. And then that was it. It was like a good five, ten minutes. I was out of it. I was just very emotional, crying.

Q. What were you thinking?
A. I felt miserable that I killed somebody. I felt absolutely miserable like I did something very, very wrong, but I know I wasn't getting in trouble for it but I just felt like it was wrong, in your soul it was so wrong to your core. You were like, Oh.

Q. Any other thoughts going through your head?
A. No, I was disgusted with myself at that point. I was like, I can't believe it. I'm responsible for that guy's death. I just felt so miserable. It was horrible. That was one of the worst feelings.

In the literature, it is also stated that the departmental response in the immediate aftermath of a shooting is critical. In this case, it is possible that Chris experienced secondary trauma that may have been unnecessary. First, the Lieutenant’s response when clearing his weapon may have caused additional trauma. Second, the same Lieutenant, after relieving Chris of his firearm, decided to stop at a convenience store on the way back to the Police Operations Center. Chris, now feeling decidedly vulnerable and unarmed, was placed in a similar location to the gas station where his shooting occurred. Also, Chris was kept at the police station until after 0700 the following morning, waiting for NowCare to come administer the requisite urinalysis. When a tech had still not arrived by 0715, Chris was dismissed by the Commanding Officer of the Detective Bureau. Finally, when Chris was dismissed, he realized that his vehicle was still at the crime scene and that he still needed gas in his truck. Another officer retrieved his vehicle and told him that he had “taken care of him” and put $3.00 of gas in his car. As Chris
recalled, “…gas was super expensive so that didn't do shit for me and he drove farther out. So I was like, Fuck it. So I get in my car…Tank's on E and I'm like, Fuck it. I'm just going to drive until it runs out. Fortunately I made it to the driveway before it started (demonstrating) plucking away, went in there.”

The afterburn or letdown and reintegration phases (Jones 1989, Paton 2005) of an officer-involved shooting were also clear in this case. This phase can last up to three days after the event and is not only a critical time for the officer, but is also a key intervention point (Best, Artwohl and Kirschman 2011, IACP 2012a, IACP 2012b, Jones 1989, Miller 2006, Paton 2005). There are a plethora of symptoms and feelings that can manifest during this time. Chris takes on blame and displayed guilt during the immediate aftermath and during this phase, as well. He mentions being the reason everyone was woken up in the middle of the night and he blamed himself for inconveniencing others, stating “I remember thinking -- I was like, Fuck, this sucks, because it sucks because [the investigator] is my friend and [the other investigator] I was friendly with, but it was just like, Oh, man, it just sucked. It didn’t feel good. It felt like I put them in an awkward position.”

Chris admits that he displayed numerous symptoms during the week following the shooting. While Jones (1989) states that the officer may crave peer support during this period, Chris isolated himself from everyone but his girlfriend. As Chris explains, “I had the look of don't fucking ask me nothing. I don't want to talk about anything. I just want to sit here and drink and watch whatever is on fucking TV. That's all I wanted to do and that's all I did.” In addition, he discussed how he would try to talk to his girlfriend about what he was experiencing, but would often become frustrated and angry;
I was a dick... Just very distant, just very sorry for myself, kind of stupid, trying to explain it to her and then getting mad that I had to explain it and then getting mad that I'm explaining it and having to relive it and go over everything. It was all in all just a downward cycle into just shittiness and I was very abrupt with everybody.

He experienced a loss of appetite, emotional responses, sadness, anxiety, recurrent thoughts and sleep disturbances (Honig and Sultan 2004, Jones 1989, Kirschman 2007, Klinger 2004) and, although the use of alcohol as a coping mechanism is explored thematically elsewhere in this chapter, the use of alcohol during this time period in an attempt to reduce or regulate the sleep disturbances is also common (Jones 1989). While the literature suggests this phase lasts for up to three days, Chris states that, for a week, he was

... in a state of shock and like every 20 or so minutes you start going through everything all over again but it's not from beginning to end or it is beginning to end but it's beginning and then all sorts of jumbled shit, middle, that one shoot, the one shot around the ATM, jumble, last shot, and just going over and over and over and over and over. What if I pull up this way, what if I pull up that way, or why didn't I check over here? I don't know. It was just constantly going over it and you'd just be sitting there and when you think you're not thinking of it, boom, you're right in the middle of thinking of it again and I was just like, This is just fucking miserable... And then I just -- because we kind of wound up going (inaudible) just hanging out and I think maybe I'd pass out for like -- felt like a second, maybe couple minutes, woke up again just in a panic, just like, Oh, shit, not knowing I was not in something, but something like I was like something just bad happened, kind of wake up.

Many of these symptoms did not dissipate after this initial week. He states that, for months, he exhibited a lack of appetite, barely ate and drank alcohol, just trying to "maintain." After the first week, Chris notes that his sleep disturbances continued, stating that he was,

Just exhausted, but couldn't go to sleep. You'd close your eyes and then you'd be like dropped right in the middle of it and that despair and like, Oh, my God, right in the middle of it but it's different. It's right in the middle of it afterwards. So
like during the shooting you're fine. You're just reacting. But when you're done, you put yourself back in that position and -- but you introduce all the fear and all the anxiety and everything like that. So when you wake up or when you try to go to sleep, you wake up, and you're immediately thrust in there where the initial act had none of the emotional shit going on, now you have this emotional shit. So it feels like you're reliving it with all the emotions. It's like going through surgery without anesthesia type thing, like the shooting was -- I was under anesthesia, the actual shooting because you're numb, but imagine being worked on during surgery without any of that and that's -- you come up and you're dreadful, you're sweating and just scared. You feel nauseous. You don't want to do anything. So it got to the point where I lost so much weight and was becoming physically ill, just sickly that I needed something to get to sleep, and that's all I thought. You know, if I get some sleep... The nightmares didn't start until like several months later, like bad, like terror waking up. Prior to that it was you close your eyes and you're reliving the whole thing over again, like a loop, just over and over, and if you close your eyes you wake up and take the good like one to two seconds, like, okay, I'm not there kind of thing, very, very vivid stuff and on the Lexapro it started kicking in, whatever, wicked nightmares. I mean, bad and strange and just nonsensical but you'd wake up in a panic.

Chris' let down phase seems to have bled into his aftereffects stage. As noted in Chapter 2, this phase is where PTSD manifestations are noticed, where those who knew the officer prior to the shooting begin to notice that he or she has changed. At the time, the only mental health or debrief services offered to Chris were rather informal in nature. He was sent to another jurisdiction to meet with a Sergeant who "knew what he had been through." When Chris asked this Sergeant and the psychologist that was also present, if they had ever been in a shooting incident, and both indicated that they had not, Chris became angry and left the appointment. This outburst was reported to Chris' supervisors and he was then asked to go to yet another jurisdiction to meet with an officer who had been involved in a shooting where his partner was killed. Chris met with this officer and found comfort in talking about everything but the shooting. This officer told Chris that he needed help. At some point, due to the extreme weight loss and sleep disturbances,
Chris went to a NowCare doctor in an attempt to get a prescription for a sleep aid. The doctor asked Chris if he had experienced anything that triggered these symptoms and when he said he had been involved in a shooting, Chris was referred to a psychologist.

Chris described many of the symptoms outlined in Chapter 2, to include continued sleep disturbances, hypervigilence, anger, anxiety, intrusive and recurring thoughts, the inability to concentrate and mood swings. The quotes below, while large, illustrate some of the myriad of symptoms experienced and their impact on Chris. This section does not aim to exhaustively cover these symptoms, but to give the reader an understanding of the breadth and debilitating impact they can have on an officer. Chris exhibited most of the symptoms described in Tables 1 and 2, in varying forms and intensities. Further, Chris experienced two of what Jones (1989) identified as the three most dangerous aftereffects: withdrawal and denial of impact. When discussing intrusive thoughts and flashbacks, Chris stated that,

*it was like you'd be working on something or focused on something else and something like a bottle -- like a bottle cap. For example, you'd see a bottle cap and immediately take you back to the scene because of the grocery store. So anything related to that, like whether it be soda, whether it be smells, grease, like little things, like obviously I know why but at the time you just -- you look and be like, Oh, my God, I remember that at the store. Or beer or something like -- you know, ATMs, shit like that...oh, God, I'd preoccupy myself, half an hour. Then it would be like another half an hour trying to get yourself down from that. Because it's -- it's building on each other, playing on each other. So you'd get that one thing and be like, Oh, I remember that and then that reminds you of something else and you're doing this and you're not doing anything else. It's literally out of the blue. I mean, in seeing it you're kind of like expect it with all the shit that's happened. You expect that maybe seeing it again or going to a store or anything like that, you're going to -- is going to come up as a result of it, but they've gotten so much better than they were initially because initially afterwards I was sitting in the office one day and I just had a get up, had to get up and I had to leave the office, whether it to be outside to get a cigarette or go to another office, change of venue completely, because I thought that I was associating any kind of venue, it didn't have to do anything with it but if I was in someplace and I started feeling like that, which would last like a couple minutes,*
I'd leave...Just you get there's an anxious -- there's not really -- there's not like a sense of dread that something is going to happen. It's happening as you speak, like while it's happening in the moment. So it's not like anything like -- I never really worried about getting those or having them because it was just for some reason I just didn't think that way. So when it happens you just kind of live in it and then it's done and there's a relief but there's like, Oh, geez -- like hiccups kind of thing.

Chris also exhibited many of the behaviors discussed at WCPR (Kamena and Kirschman 2012, Kirschman 2012a), particularly related to being a compliant patient. Once he was prescribed medications—an antidepressant and sleeping pills—he was initially resistant to take them as directed. He claimed that the made him lethargic and acknowledged that he experienced sexual side effects while on the medication. However, after several arguments related to medication between Chris and his girlfriend, he began to take the medication as directed. He admits he was on the sleep medication for approximately a year. Eventually, with medication and therapy, Chris began to address and process his emotions and saw a reduction in symptoms.

Much like Kirschman's post traumatic growth, which is addressed in Chapter 2 and is not mutually exclusive from experiencing negative critical incident and post traumatic stress, Chris has had positive change come out of his shooting, such as reevaluating the relationships in his life, and placing work secondary to those relationships, as well as pursuing a Masters degree in psychology and working to assist other officers in crisis. However, while there are elements of growth, there are long-term impacts of the shooting that still persist, as noted in the excerpt below:

*Everywhere I went I had a gun on, me absolutely anywhere I went. To the point where even in the house if I was -- I have -- probably -- not probably, I kept the practice. I've got guns everywhere. So no matter where I'm at in the house I have a gun that I can get to within a couple seconds... I think as recent as a month or so ago I drove -- I was doing something and I'm like, you know, I'm going to go to...*
the store. I jump in the car. I'm like almost halfway to the store and I realize I
don't have my fucking gun on me or I don't have a gun, fucking turned around
and, man, I was like, I got to get back. I got to get back to the house. It sounds
worse than it is but it was -- I was driven to get back to the house. I'm getting
back to the house and it was one of those things I got it and I was like all right
and go on with the day... I don't walk anywhere. After the shooting I would avoid
places or I wouldn't even go in, but I'm to a point where I can go in anywhere. I
can go in any store. I probably -- I know I can go into the gas station but I
wouldn't like it, but no matter where I go now, I don't care where it is, I'm -- I got
a plan and if something goes down I know who I'm going to hit first, but that's me
constantly thinking about it

While the above disclosure may appear quite negative, suggesting hypervigilence and
that the shooting is still impacting Chris' daily life, there is, as stated above, evidence that
Chris has made some positive changes following his incident. Below are several
excerpts, not only from Chris, but also observations from other participants in the current
study, that demonstrate signs of post traumatic growth:

Work to me at the time was -- I mean, that's it. Work was the be all, end all. I
lived for work. I didn't work to live. Afterwards you get better perspective of it,
albeit not right away, but you get a better perspective that if you stopped doing
the work, it would still be there but if you stopped focusing on just living and just
being happy and, you know, making other people happy and interacting with
people, that's more important. It's more substance to it, where it was more part of
the shooting, it was a theory after the shooting. It was more of a mantra kind of,
if that makes any sense... after a while I started seeing the benefit of opening up.
I started seeing the benefit or the release of just anxiety with just being able to
either cry, to be upset. It wasn't just like a sadness, but it was a frustration of the
anger to be able to -- healthy not to take it out on somebody but that it was okay
to be angry. It was okay to be sad. It was okay to be just out of control, not being
able to control your emotions within reason. It's one thing to be sad and to be
upset and it's another thing to be on the floor pounding, like having a temper
tantrum like a child who didn't get something. So then it's -- but it's such a
gradual transition from suppressing it from years and years of learning to do that
to eventually breaking down, having that bottom, and then building yourself up
from it.

I think I knew he was going to be okay after court... Something happened with [the
case], and it finally went to court and the guy wound up getting 38 years maybe.
Okay. So I think he was starting to be able to get his closure with it so maybe I
thought, Okay, this is going to be okay. I'm going to tell you why he broke my heart though...the parents, maybe it was the parents of the dead guy or the parent of the second guy involved...and I remember him telling me about it and he was open about it. He was like, Yeah, his mom called me a murderer and screamed it out in court. Broke his heart. You could tell it broke his heart. It broke my heart to see his heart broken but I think that's when I thought, okay, things are going -- he's going to be better. He's getting some of the closure, getting past it, going to Homicide, getting out of the narcotics-type environment was probably good for him even though it wasn't really out of the -- I don't know. It worked for him, I think...I mean, he's gotten a lot better. I think for Chris it's very therapeutic for him to teach about it. So I think every time he teaches that he's able to incorporate what happened to him into any type of teaching he does at the academy or outside of the academy, that helps him. So I think helping share his story helps him. So I like that. He's open with it now. He doesn't mind saying -- he's gotten more open about, I was an asshole. I drank a lot. I wasn't very nice, admitting to others and himself that he was that way. I think, helps him -- you know, he'll never be the same guy he was before...he has a passion for helping people, which I guess I really didn't know that before. I knew he was a good person but not that he had a passion for helping people, that I think he's learned to like self-evaluate where he didn't before, probably had no need to before. I don't know but that he can bounce back. Again, not to the same person but you can be the best person you can be now because he'll never be that same person. It's almost like an innocence lost kind of situation.

No, he's just as crazy as ever. I think I guess that could be for him and [us], it's the importance of life. Is a little bit more, you know, value and we actually understand, you know, this job a little bit more than the average person, you know, having been involved in a shooting. I mean, he's smarter than ever. Gosh, he is. He is smarter than ever now.

As can be deduced from the comments above, this incident has changed Chris in ways that continue to impact his daily life seven years after his shooting incident and provides a clear illustration of how an officer can achieve posttraumatic growth while still suffering from negative effects of being involved in a critical incident.

**Theme: Cultural Influences**

The third theme that emerged related to cultural influences. Sociological literature suggests that an individual can simultaneously belong to multiple cultures and
that these various roles and memberships can influence and condition membership in other groups. As such, it is expected that there will be considerable overlap among the themes discussed in this section of the analysis. However, these themes did emerge from multiple participant observations and may provide further insight into officer-involved shootings, as well as a more nuanced and holistic understanding of the multiple facets associated with a single shooting incident.

**Sub Theme 1: Machismo and Gender**

Machismo can be seen as an integral component of the police culture, as policing is a way of doing gender in our society (Chan, Doran and Marel 2010, Morash and Haarr 2012). This means that there is likely a great degree of overlap between what is expected of a tough, competent male and what is expected of a tough, competent police officer. Due to this overlap, which also ties into Erving Goffman’s work on the roles individuals play and the presentation of self in society, many of the quotes found in the analyses on the police culture may display gendered nuances. These cultural thematic analyses, in particular, highlight the interrelated nature of many of the themes that emerged from the interviews in the current study. The following two excerpts, one from Chris and one from another participant, highlight how the role of gender, policing and, in Chris’ case, ethnic background and age in the other respondent’s statement, coalesce to inform both perception and behavior, particularly stigma and impression management:

*Now, the shooting, I think the weeks following, even the months following the shooting I probably made an overt effort to suppress everything because there’s that engrained machismo that most Latin guys or Latin culture has that you don’t show a weak side, but at the same time, so Americanized that it’s like a conflict, like you should. At the same time I’m dealing with a law enforcement, the public safety aspect, whether it be the fire department or the police department, you’re a*
tough guy. There's no crying in police work. Which is obviously, it's just insane now that you look back on it, but the shooting didn't change it.

Not as much as it used to because when I was a younger officer, everything was macho this, macho that. You know, we're a bunch of tough guys. Nothing bothers us. We're stoic. You know, I could walk into a triple homicide and then leave there and go have lunch at Spaghetti Warehouse or something like that, you know, but I think as time has gone on and it may be a generational thing, I think it's always affected people the same way but I think the newer generation, you know, the Generation Xers and the Millennials, you know, I think that they're more sensitive to things out there and they're not afraid to express that they really do need help. They need the counseling, you know, I mean, they certainly -- we go out there and work in the field and, you know, fight with somebody and get skinned up and all that and come in the next day limping because we wouldn't report that we were hurt in the line of duty, but you know, the newer generation doesn't do that... You know, I mean, they kind of give into pain, I think a little bit too easily, but no, I think the newer generations are much more sensitive to emotional trauma.

As exemplified by the quotes above, there is not only a very distinct understanding of what it is to be male, suggesting ideals that are very much in line with hegemonic masculinity (DeKeseredy 2007, Miller, Forest and Jurik 2007, Prokos and Padavic 2002), but also the image of a police officer as masculine in nature. For example, one participant made the following statement: "I mean, some guys handle it easy, some guys don't. I don't think it's really got anything to do with the job just as it does your personal like who you are, what you're made of really because but, yeah, there's definitely like that, you got to be tough," illustrating this connection between masculinity and policing.

Additionally, these understandings of the relationship between gender and violence—that being tough is an asset—may have been particularly present during Chris' formative years. As seen in Chris' life history, although his family operates more along a matrilineal authority structure, there are very clear elements of machismo that were ingrained at a young age, particularly along the lines of protecting females. Another area
in which these tenets of hegemonic masculinity can be seen are in Chris' discussions of being involved in numerous fights as a child:

because you kind of -- you kind of go into that where -- the fights, yes, fights all the time, but you never really -- if you got bullied, I played it to like prison. If you fight back you may not always win, but you kind of get -- there's a respect. All right. You know, I know if I mess with him, he's going to fight back so let me go pick on somebody else.

Clearly, violence and the willingness to use violence were sources of positive stigma or respect, for a young male in Chris' socio-cultural strata and it is quite interesting that he likens schoolyard fighting to prison, another hypermasculine environment often perceived to being the opposite of law enforcement (Corcoran 2007). This apparent value placed on violent action as an expression of gender may also provide an interesting theoretical perspective from which to consider locker room shock (Jones 1989).

While violence, as a male police officer, may be accepted or even encouraged in certain contexts, the expression of “softer” emotional responses are often discouraged. This avoidance of expressing emotion was discussed in the context of reviewing the PTSD symptoms Chris had experienced and how those symptoms had manifested. When the symptom of “inability to express feelings” was addressed, this was Chris' immediate response:

A: Inability to express feelings. I don't know that it was so much an inability maybe than it was a decision, like internal decision.
Q: How so?
A: Again, the police officer machismo thing. You don't want to -- like on several occasions I was sitting...either at work or someplace while I was working and you'd start getting emotional and then you'd quickly have to like -- so it wasn't that I was unable, but I forced myself not to.
Q: Okay. What do you mean when you were getting emotional? What would happen?
A: You're like, Oh, I'm going to cry.
Q: So what would you do?
A: Immediately try to think of something else. I'd start walking somewhere, just physical -- oh, I used to pinch the inside of my hand, kind of like the pain kind of thing. Oh, okay. But, yeah, that's more than inability. It's a decision not to... because at the doc's office with [Psychologist], that was no problem. All day long that was good.

This avoidance of feminine responses in policing is not only internalized, so that officers police their own responses in an effort to manage the impression their coworkers may have and avoid the stigma of being perceived to be weak, but is achieved through external censure, as well. Malmin (2012) discussed how, when officers are at their most vulnerable, they may be subject to ridicule for their emotional response to a given incident or scene. This was evidenced in the current study, with two participants discussing how, particularly at scenes where other officers have been seriously injured or killed, they have told other officers on scene to stop crying, that those emotional responses were not acceptable at the crime scene when they had work to do:

...I don't know. For me, I had a police shooting where I got there and two cops had just been involved in a shooting. The guy is dead on the street and one of the officers, he was a young guy. He was crying. I fucking told him, Knock that shit off. We'll do that another day. Right now we got to fucking do what we got to do. Everything is going to be all right. Just you got to knock that -- don't do that out here... So it's just one of those things where it's, Hey, man, you know, there's a time and place for it, just like on the battlefield, you know, somebody goes down, I mean, I've seen [a] dead cop's blood, you know, pouring out in the gutter, you know, and I went over and told another officer, Man, you got to knock that shit off. Ain't no fucking time out here to be crying. Now's the time to get to work. We'll do the crying later, but I mean, and I'm not trying to say that to be like I'm tough, because I'm not...

In short, these participants had instructed fellow officers to detach and put the job, rather than their emotions first. Also of interest, the same two officers who reprimanded colleagues for displaying emotions both also suggested that, while critical incident stress
and PTSD are real, agencies need to beware of “fakers” or those attempting to use a PTSD diagnosis as a crutch or a means of escaping disciplinary matters.

Not only did the idea of male officers following proscribed and normalized emotion absent or neutral behavior patterns get addressed in several interviews, one participant discussed how these expected behaviors are applied to women. Particularly of note was how, when women embrace and replicate these expected behaviors, male officers may feel even less “manly” if they show emotion:

A. ... Females go out there and overcompensate a lot when they really probably don't have to, but when they get back they really can't because they're already labeled as emotional, you know, emotional individuals, whereas you may have a female and guy go out at the same time. They come back, female is fine, guy is nervous as shit, but then the guy will see the female overcompensating and be like, Oh, she's really fucking scared, you know what I mean? So it's just smoke and mirrors, is all it is.

Q. Okay. Do you see that happening though also with like family?

A. Oh, yeah. But it's cultural and the same guy that's a tough guy here, may be a pussy at the house. I mean, the wife may run shit. Tough girl out on the street in uniform may not be a tough girl at home. Maybe very submissive. Hispanic male maybe okay here, but maybe over dominating here. So it's cultural and it's changed. There is no set [role]. Everybody's cool here.

However, another participant suggests that women no longer feel the same overwhelming pressure to adopt the mannerisms and traits associated with hegemonic masculine models of policing. This participant, instead, suggested that women in policing may be a part of the reason some of the stigma surrounding admitting to critical incident stress or other emotional struggles may be lessening. He said,

*I think women coming into the organization has played a role in that as well. I remember the first women who came into the department. They tried to be stoic as well, but you know, women I think come into law enforcement, they're much more open and sensitive to things. They're not locked into this macho attitude where they've got to be tough. They're more inclined to be diplomatic, which is something that I think takes some officers on the street years to learn, you know,*
we want to go out there and be tough guys, and if you make an arrest and you tell the
man to get in the police car and he doesn't get in there, you start thinking,
Well, I'm going to put him in that police car if he's not going to get in there.
Women come into this organization with a diplomatic skill that it takes us a long
time to learn, you know, they know how to talk to people. They know how to
diffuse an aggressive situation from the very beginning.

Even Chris, when discussing how he may be viewed as having an atypical gendered
response by being willing to participate in the current study and to be so forthcoming
about his feelings and reactions, indicated that there is a time and a place for emotion,
stating:

*I think there was a time probably earlier on where you kind of suck it up. You
don't say anything. The events of the shooting, I have taken away that
there's -- what used to be uncomfortable for me to talk about is not uncomfortable
because really there's a perspective thing. Before any of this happened I had no
real understanding of -- someone tell me, Hey, it's important to express your
emotions. I was like, Yeah, whatever. I mean, I've had major significant events in
my life and critical incidents and traumatic events but nothing as acute as this,
nothing as significant and lasting as this. So I think I see myself as I'm not afraid
because I don't care what other -- I really don't. I don't care what they think of
me, but I see the benefits of having somebody to step up. It's contrary to a lot and
there's a lot of people, a good majority of this law enforcement, especially males,
are very ashamed or hesitant to share emotions, but it's got to be in the right
context. You can't be in the middle of a coffee shop or in the middle of 7-Eleven
talking shop and then all of a sudden, you know, what I just don't feel good.
That's something that has to be done with tact and unfortunately, guys in general
don't have tact, let alone about when they communicate amongst their peers.*

The final element of this portion of this section of the thematic analyses finds that
gender may not only inhibit officers from seeking help to avoid stigma, but may also
contribute to medication non-compliance, as discussed at WCPR (Kamena and
Kirschman 2012). The emotional responses and upheaval perceived by some officers to
be emasculating in and of themselves, can be further compounded by impacting the
officer's virility and/or sex drive in a number of ways. As noted in Chapter 2, many
officers experiencing critical incident stress or PTSD may exhibit either a disinterest in
sex or may become hypersexualized (Jones 1989, Kirschman 2007). Sex drive and
performance may also be impacted by the medications, or by the particular combination
of medications, prescribed by a doctor to treat the myriad of symptoms associated with
PTSD. While discussing side effects of medications commonly prescribed to treat PTSD,
sexual dysfunction was a topic that came up in both Chris and his significant other's
interviews. At first, it appeared that Chris was going to attempt to manage impressions
with regards to this topic, making a flip joking statement about being a pervert, but then
disclosed that he had experienced sexual side effects:

A. Change in sex drive or performance. No, still a perv.
Q. Good to know. Good to know.
A. No, the only thing that changed was the side effect of the Lexapro. You're
not complete in anything. You are going and going and going and going,
which got to the point where people were like -- can I get a second?
Q. Yeah.
A. But that by itself is the only -- I take that back. Week or so after, maybe
even a month I had no urge to do anything, you know, with anybody, not at
all. I think I attribute that to being preoccupied.

Chris' disclosure, while surprising, was rather matter of fact, in that it was a side effect
that he experienced. His significant other also discussed the sexual side effects of the
Lexapro, an antidepressant that Chris was given in conjunction with Ambien, to treat his
PTSD. She stated that:

A. I'm caring about him, starting to love him, you know. I could put myself in
his shoes. What if it was me going through this and I'm sure he would be
there for me, you know. There were some points where you got to stop
drinking, you've got to stop, and he got prescribed medication. He refused
to take it. I'm like, You better take it, like it got down to you need to take
this medicine. You're an asshole, take the medicine. What about the side
effects? I don't give a shit about the side effects. Take the medicine. See
if it helps, you know, it calmed him down a little bit like, but then he was
like, I'm lethargic, it has side effects and you know, blah, blah, blah. I was like, Whatever, just --

Q. He did talk about the side effects of the medication. Did you notice any of the side effects?
A. Sexual ones, yes.
Q. So how so?
A. That he could not ejaculate.
Q. Okay.
A. And that was one of -- I didn't care. I didn't care. That was -- but men are funny.
Q. It's a huge issue. I know.
A. Right. Men are funny, but it's like taking their control away.
Q. Uh-huh.
A. So but I didn't care. I wanted him to take that medication because I wanted him to feel better, to feel happier. Then he said it made him lethargic, one or the other. He started taking it. He stayed with it for a while.

These disclosures, in conjunction with the discussing of sexual side effects found in the participant observation analyses in the following chapter, suggest that this can be of concern for officers struggling to cope with PTSD. Indeed, if they internalize conventional beliefs about what it means to be a man, negative sexual impacts may impact their self-esteem, possibly leading to additional impression management in multiple facets of their lives, as well as potentially adding additional strain and stress in their interpersonal relationships.

Sub Theme 2: The Police Culture

Ever since Westley (1953) discussed the impact of the police culture on behavior, this has been an accepted area of study and research in the disciplines of sociology, criminology and, more recently, criminal justice. When discussing the influence of police culture, or as some refer to it, the police subculture (Chappell and Piquero 2004), it is important to recognize that there is no singular, universal police culture (Roberg,
Novak and Cordner 2009). Rather, there are some elements that appear to be universalistic, such as the value placed on loyalty or the macabre sense of humor, but each individual agency is going to have its own unique culture that blends these broader themes with idiosyncratic nuances unique to that jurisdiction. Malmin (2012) indicates that, in terms of critical incidents, the stereotypes perpetuated by the police subculture are replicated through policies that reflect a lack of understanding of trauma, minimal service provision, and a lack of attention to personnel.

In terms of roles, discussed further in the thematic analyses related to the work of Erving Goffman, it is not uncommon for those in the police culture to adopt their career as their master status label and, investing greatly in the police culture may lead to reduced participation in other cultures or subcultures to which the officer may belong (Woody 2005). Chris also displayed another common tendency that is addressed in the literature, the lifelong desire to be a first responder (Peak 2009), which is a tangent of the debate as to whether policing attracts a certain type of individual as a career or if becoming a police officer molds the person in a way (Peak 2009, Roberg, Novak and Cordner 2009). This lifelong interest can be seen in the following excerpts:

*Probably the earliest I can remember even wanting to do any kind of work would probably be right before I left [Colombia], like a fireman or something. The term is "public safety" but back then it was just fireman or policeman or military... I later found out from my mom that my -- her grandfather was a bombero. It's a fireman, but I didn't know that.*

*I took public safety more seriously than I took traditional academics and I'll say it by this, I graduated before I went to college, I graduated from a Nassau County Fire Search Academy. It's the place you get certified to be a fireman, where you get certified to do everything that's involved with actual firefighting and just overhauling and rescue work, whether it be breaching doors or doing stuff. The fire sciences of understanding the fire city tetrahedron, what you need for a fire to*
exit and all this stuff. To me, very scientific, very, very important so because it was more important, I excelled in it. It was important to me. I excelled in it.

So that kind of went away and I just started seeing a theme that I was more focused on the public service stuff, the fire department, the medic stuff...

Q. Okay. So other than it was here and they said yes first, anything else that led you to pick policing?
A. It was only two choices, either police department or the fire department.
Q. Okay.
A. And that was it. If the -- yeah, if I had gotten called up to New York, I would have been there first. It literally was one of those roll the dice.
Q. But why those two?
A. You know, just drawn to it.

Chris also is very honest about immersing himself in the police culture, claiming his identity as a police officer as his master status role. For example, the following excerpts show that Chris placed more energy, emphasis and priority on his career than on his second marriage.

...as I joined the police department so leaving the military, joining the police department, and then just immediately just becoming kind of, you know, immersed into police culture and out of the gate going into narcotics for several years, working undercover, plain clothes, working like plain clothes and I remember like me and my partner were -- we were out with our wives for Valentine's Day and someone calls up. One of the guys call up and says, Hey, we've got this amount of dope coming in. We need people, so we're like, boom. All right. Girls, you're going to have to, you know, do what you got to do and it was just wind of growing distant because I was never home. I was always working. I probably netted the most money on the police department, even more than I make now, ten times more than I make now working because we worked nonstop. We worked overtime and overtime and overtime, just kind of just did that and for the longest time was like, that's it. That's all I'm going to do. I don't want to get promoted, I don't want to do anything. I want to work narcotics and that's what I want to do.

[second wife], as a matter of fact her dad was a DC cop. So she understood a little bit or at least I thought she did about the lifestyle of a police officer kind of stuff, which she understood, but it's a little bit different from hearing about it to living it. So that kind of -- it was -- we're both at fault. I would venture to say that I probably dismissed a lot of the family obligations to do work, but that's
because long hair, beard, buys drugs, drink, you know, going to bars. It was just like fun stuff. So I would venture to say I had a great deal to do with it but there was stuff on both sides.

Even today, after all of the traumas he has experienced as a police officer, when asked about his favorite part of the job Chris still displays an affinity for the job, much of which stems from cultural aspects, such as the camaraderie and the status of the profession.

Q. Okay. Favorite and least favorite aspect of the job.
A. The job now?
Q. Uh-huh, or in general.
A. Thrill of investigation, both narcotic -- the thrill of working undercover work. I've done every -- each assignment that I've been to, I've really tried to excel in, not forceful. It just came natural to really try to do the good job because I enjoyed it. Narcotics I wanted to buy as much drugs and as much stolen properties, murder for hires, everything. I did it. I did every aspect of that and Homicide I investigated every type of homicide, general type of death investigation whether it be child, whether it be drug, whether it be violent, I was exposed to all that. Police officer none, police officer family, police officers family, law enforcement. That was fun. Getting a woman to admit to killing her child, as crazy as it sounds, it's invigorating. It's CIU, working with all Federal agencies doing dignitary protection. With K-9 getting a bite and just working with the dog and with the camaraderie that we had there and then finally an administrative job that you have like three days off. You're off holidays and weekends. That's the best part of that, but also being in the position to effect change on something I'm really passionate about. Those are all -- the coolness. Whoever invented this job is -- you know, cheers to him because that's a great job. Having said that, standing next to a widow waiting for a meeting with the chief who is in charge of the financial aspect of a funeral, who doesn't show up because he forgot, is a shitty part. Finding that your very good friend killed himself; that's a horrible spot, but however, in those times, as bad as those are, it's a camaraderie. Then at the same time, it's a lack of camaraderie so it's like the good and bad of both sides. Job is by far fun but readily I'd walk away from it tomorrow if I could do something else, but I enjoy it. Plus, it's a cool job.

While the majority of the participants also showed an affinity for the job, due to the nature of this research, most also disclosed the negative aspects of the police culture, particularly as it related to officer-involved shootings and issues associated with officer
mental health and well-being. The stigma and cultural expectations associated with both of these aspects of the police culture begins in the police academy, as well as the elements of machismo endemic to the police culture, as noted below.

...The one thing in hindsight looking back at what the academy wasn't or where it was lacking was clearly the atmosphere that you would feel comfortable expressing difficulty with any given situation, whether it be loss of life and I'm not talking about the touchy feely part, whether [an officer] came in or some, you know, mental health professional came in and was like, It's okay to talk about it. That doesn't generate or that doesn't garner any type of, you know, true response or true understanding. It needs to be reinforced and having taught the academy for, I don't know, over 12 years regularly I try to -- I try to bring that to — like it's okay. You're going get made fun of. Someone's going the be like, Oh, you're a fag, quit being a pussy kind of thing, but you know, it's a defense mechanism, but it was blatantly missing from the academy, the structure. You know, just general core values that you need are important but the tactics involved that I learned and everything played a great role in keeping me alive but it was such a void in knowledge of the aftermath, whether it be a second after, whether it be two years after, whether it be ten years after, it was a distinct and I look at now knowing what I know now, and it's almost negligent in its structure.

I am not saying we should sit in a room for six months or however long the academy is and hold hands all day long, I'm not saying that, but there needs to be a realistic, a legitimate exposure that takes the stigma away from being able to express it. What it is, a culture shift that I think you need and again, this is just my experience and what I've seen and how I envision it. I see the shift happen but —

Q. It's very slow.
A. It is ten times slower than the slowest it could possibly be

Q. All right. So when you were in the academy did they give you any formal training on stress and coping mechanisms and kind of the pitfalls of the career, other than with the mental health person that everybody was like, whatever.
A. Yeah, you get some -- you know, some real mushy kind of like four-hour block of, you know, talk to somebody. The message, that kind of message is only -- only comes across and is only accepted by people who have gone to that level, whether it be educationally, academically, or experience wise you're not going to tell some young or not necessarily young, but some new recruit that wants to be Robo Cop that, slow it down. Think with your emotions kind of thing. That's just it's ridiculous but to think back on, you
know, what it was, the mentality was each -- the war stories were the best in the academy from some of these officers and just how to top it, how to top one thing over the other. Oh, I've seen guys' heads blown off. Then the next guy come and be like, I saw a guy eat another guy's head and his head blew off. You know, kind of just like topping each other; however, earlier on in the training, because I was attempting to go -- not in the training, but once I got out I was a newer officer. I remember doing hostage negotiation training where it was very important to appreciate the emotional aspect or the emotional climate of any given situation, which was I mean, just a complete 180 from what you remember in the academy. And I vividly remember the one thing that sticks out, [an officer], who retired was talking -- he taught the negotiators school, talked about negotiating with this individual who had his family held up there or trying to negotiate for hours and going in later hours, later after they cleared it with SOT or ERT or SWAT and the entire family had been killed. What really got to him was that had they gone in, they would have been able to save a couple of them and it stuck with him and it resonated with him and he went into a great depression about it and it was such a refreshing, albeit, awkward, that's the first I ever heard of something like that, because you don't know what you're going to feel until you feel it, but it's like preparing for a sucker punch.

You can never really prepare for a sucker punch to a degree. You walk down the street every day at the same time at the same point in the street, someone comes out and, boom, hits you in the face with right or left side. Now, initially you're just so overwhelmed with it, you don't know. As it goes on, you become attuned to, All right, listen, I don't know where it's coming from, but I'm going to be hit. If someone tells you this ahead of time, the preparation that you do mentally doesn't wholly prepare you but lessens the impact of it.

Q. Okay. So you would say that's the first time you heard of anything?

A. That absolutely and it was so significant that I remembered who told me. I remembered the story. I remembered that the family was dead, the whole family. I think four or five people. I remember when they went in, which he reflected on, said he should have never gone on as the lead negotiator. He should have never gone in there, but he did and he regrets it, but at the same time, there's that regret, but the morbid curiosity, also the satisfaction of not leaving it to, well, maybe it could have, maybe this, there was a definitive answer. You either come in earlier, you would have saved a life. Not his call but still affected him the same. Hands down, first time I heard it really, really open to it and thought that something like that, that kind of experience needs to be shared from a tough officer.

Q. Okay. So nothing like that, anything about issues in law enforcement with divorce, alcoholism, suicide, any of those things?

A. I tell you the big topics, women, if you're a male police officer, men, if you're a female police officer. Don't fuck with dispatchers because they'll get you fired. I mean, this is like legitimate, like may not be on a syllabus,
but that's what was said kind of very don't steal, listen, you know, you need to talk to somebody, but it's a tough job, you're going to see stuff. There was no -- they throw out -- they throw out statistics as if it were a badge of honor. You know, you're getting into a job that 50 percent of the people get divorced. You know, listen, five years after you leave this place you're probably going to drop dead. They threw it out there as kind of like a bravado kind of like we're doing this despite the inevitability of being miserable and, you know, stuff but they owned it. It was very like a machismo kind of thing, kind of puffing your chest out like we do a job that it's going to fuck us up, but we do it, you know, kind of.

One participant, in discussing the police culture, noted that the officer is “supposed to be everything to everyone when the truth is they're having a hard enough time just making it some days just being themselves.” From this perspective, it becomes easier to see how officers transform from eager, fresh-faced recruits into hardened, cynical officers (Gilmartin 2002). Several participants spoke to this experience, noting that they routinely struggle to avoid giving in to cynicism, with two specific examples provided below:

Q. All right. We got up to you choosing to go into the police department and before we get into your academy experience, you said something that was really interested about over glamorized, you know, over-glamorized military. Did you have the same kind of approach to policing?
A. Oh, yeah, definitely, but I didn't realize it until later. And I'm not talking about right away. I would say -- I would say I encountered a -- I encountered a rape victim early on that really kind of stuck with me. There was such -- you could just -- when you see somebody in just such despair and lost and of course you're new, you want to get everything right, you don't want to mess any paperwork up, you know, ma'am, just Joe Friday kind of thing, you know, just the facts and blah, blah, blah, blah, but you see, I saw the person very emotionally just distraught and vulnerable and in trying to -- like if I was in her position would I be telling somebody and I remember really thinking about it and going like, yeah, that's not fun at all. I didn't like that. I started seeing the difference between -- I was able to and I don't know if I was different than anybody or maybe everybody did it, but I saw a distinct difference between veterans, officers, and supervisors that had become callous, had become very course or just very easily separated from what was going on to
somebody from how it affected them and I remembered there was that distinct -- there's a distinct difference between the younger guys and younger girls that were just go right through, you know, run into the burning building, run into, you know, the shots fired kind of call and the effects. Now, both would kind of run in. Some wouldn't on both sides of them but how it affected each of them was so significantly different. You get back and, you know, you bullshit with the guys or the people on the platoon and the younger guys was like, Oh, that was awesome and then the older guys would be, you know, like salty dogs like, Oh, routine day in Norfolk. You saw a dead guy, you're going to see hundreds of them. We had more enthusiasm where they had been beaten down, but there's this fine area of, I guess, when you make the transition from being new and enthusiastic to maybe becoming exposed to it enough that you're not -- you're not experiencing the known. You're addressing it the way you should but you've not yet become completely jaded. You've not yet become callous. You still reserve that and you're in tune to how somebody's feeling. You're in tune to how you're feeling but it's a very brief moment and the way I see it is we all pass that moment. We all go through it as officers. Some maybe never get to that point but we all go through it at some point in time... The further you are away from that, the harder it is to be in that zone to come back to that area... You know, you get all these things and it's kind of how you end, kind of go back and forth from enthusiasm to callous, to a great blend of not allowing the bullshit to bother you but still being enthusiastic about the job... Now, staying in that area is difficult for me and you'll shoot past it sometimes but shooting is a prime example of being in that area, being in that zone, you know, understanding and then it just -- you're thrust into that callous, this is bullshit. I don't want to do this work. I'm done kind of stuff. Then gradually getting back to that.

...I don't know if [that is a] lasting impact. Of course, if I'm still thinking about it 17 years later on some of them, yes, they had a lasting impact. But I'm glad they do, only because in law enforcement you can get soured or you can get stone-faced from things, from experiencing things, but I'm glad they still affect me because I wouldn't want to be non-feeling because I think a lot of times we lose our emotions or try to lose our emotions so they don't affect us. So I'm okay with it. I'm okay with it coming back up.

While both participants above discuss the struggle to maintain their humanity and emotions, this flies in the face the typical emotionally detached cop stereotype often held up as a model for officers, with one participant referring to the expectation of being the
“police robot.” However, another participant noted that, if you cannot handle what you see, if you become emotional, maybe you are not cut out to do this job, thus demonstrating the internalization and replication of culturally transmitted values. This participant was the only one who clearly “bought into” many of these culturally proscribed stereotypes, as was evidenced by numerous statements made during the interview process. Most other participants recognized that, in spite of the camaraderie and fun of the career, there is a negative side that can have tremendous impacts on an individual, as seen in the following excerpt:

A. Yeah, yeah, you're a police officer. You're supposed to suck this up.
Q. It's a flesh wound, you're okay.
A. Yeah, it's a flesh wound, put some dirt on it, get back out there. Here, put some dirt and a Band-Aid on it. Get back out there.
Q. Okay. So do you think that there's any way we can change that?
A. Yeah, a lot of it is changing. The SOPs and doing the studies and look at the studies and, you know, police officers aren't dying, you know, from being involved in traffic stops or, you know, being involved in critical incidents. Police officers are dying by their own hand.
Q. Uh-huh.
A. You know, because they did not receive the support from that department or they didn't, you know, receive any type of training or, you know, some way to deal with this critical incident. So we have to look in to finding ways to support our police officers.

When specifically discussing the interaction between cultural expectations and officer-involved shootings, there were several interesting statements and observations made by the participants in the current study. In particular, there appears to be a subculture within the larger police or agency culture that is comprised of officers that have been involved in shooting incidents. These officers, in particular, were vocal about the impact these culturally approved stereotypes can have on an officer who is involved in a critical incident. As one participant noted,
Q. How many officers have you seen go through an officer-involved shooting before yours?
A. One, two, three, four, five, six, seven, eight, nine, ten. Before the shooting, seven.

Q. Okay. What do you remember from those experiences?
A. Adrenaline, just it sounds more horrible than it actually is. You're kind of excited. This is the apex of what cops do. We're involved in shootings. Statistically you're really not but that is it. That is it. It's the -- it's being involved in the last play of my last sport -- minute of a sporting event that determines the victory of a championship kind of thing. That's the Super Bowl. You feel exhilarated. This is -- this is being involved. This is also showing up involved on a peripheral aspect, not actually shooting, actually shooting is a little bit different. There is a just. I'm a cop sense of curiosity and wanting to be in the know because, you know, it's going to be on the news and you have a sense of you're watching the news later on and you're like, I was there. Oh, there's my car. And interacting with some of the people that were involved in it. Some were distant and obviously hindsight after being involved in my own shooting, there's that initial numbness, the shock of the whole surrealness of it, which now I know that's what they were experiencing. Some weren't, but for the most part they were and thinking I had a comprehensive understanding of what they were going through because I was in proximity to it, if that makes any sense...

Q. Okay. How many shootings -- how many have you been exposed to after yours?
A. After my shooting, one, two, three, four, five, I almost forgot, six, seven. Seven or eight.

Q. Okay. Have you noticed any difference?
A. Oh, yeah. Shit, yeah. Prior to my shooting I was more concerned with what occurred. After my shooting more concerned with how the officer is doing. I mean, just that's a night and day difference. The facts of the case are what they are. I was more concerned with them prior to understanding what that experience is and then after that, understanding the emotional impact that it has on you and just the where that -- I felt it almost in a sea of people that were more fucking concerned about how many times you shot or what did the guy do, are you okay with what happened, as far as legally and all this, just I felt like a ruined person, watching another individual go through the same bullshit that I went through and where you say making that effort to go talk to them, making that effort to make sure that they're okay. To make sure that -- to prepare them for the sucker punches that are coming down the road, to prepare them for the, you're going to feel like shit, to prepare them for, you're not going to sleep, to prepare for -- you're going to be a dick head to everybody that you come across and if not, there is that potential and just really focusing on getting that out to them.
Another participant discussed how fear, which is not supposed to impact the robot cop, plays a central role following a shooting incident, stating:

...I mean, for someone like a police officer who is living their life the right way, the things in the back of your mind, I'm losing my house. I'm going to be unemployed. How am I going to take care of my kids or my family, you know, that's the kind of stuff you worry about. If I was a dirt bag, I don't have nothing to lose anyway so I could care less, but for someone who is doing the right thing and you throw their legal rights in their face right after the incident, your heart is still pumping, your mind is running a thousand miles a minute. Tell me what happened. Well, I ain't really processed what happened yet. Give me a couple days to calm down. Let me talk to somebody else who is not going to jam me up so I can help process this. Then I can sit down and tell you what happened.

The participant above referred to “throwing...legal rights in their face,” which also raised the interesting potential for role confusion or frustration. As police officers, on a day-to-day basis, these officers enforce the law, make arrests and a part of that camaraderie is related to the knowledge that we are the “good guys,” and they are the “bad guys.” This us and them dichotomy serves to promote cohesive behavior and unites officers by providing a common enemy. Yet, when an officer is involved in a shooting, he or she will be put into the role of suspect unexpectedly. As one participant noted:

_I understand what they're saying, but evidentiary matter but as a person who you just prior to this incident you deemed as a colleague, to treat them now like they're, you know, a leper to the side, leave them alone, don't say nothing to them, they need that support and I don't think that -- I don't think that's a good policy._

The culture also impacts how officers think they should act in the wake of a shooting incident, drawing particularly from those ideals of hegemonic masculinity addressed in the previous section. As such, one participant discussed,

_Q. So what about the police culture? Do you think there's an issue with that when you talk about critical incidents?_
_A. I mean, there's a bravado of it, you know._
_Q. Okay._
A. It's a false bravado, you know. There ain't nothing cool about killing somebody, you know what I'm saying. Some people like to say they are -- you know, they're full of it. They're lying. You know, I've had plenty of chances on this job where I could have shot and killed somebody and I didn't do it. I don't feel bad that I didn't. I most likely wouldn't have felt bad if I did. It's -- for me it's just not that big of a deal and it's just part of my job.

Q. Okay.

A. I mean, I don't look at it as it doesn't make you tough. It doesn't make you bad because criminals kill people every day in this country and they don't -- but there is a definite sense of how you're supposed to be like after you get in a shooting.

This expectation for emotional detachment, or bravado, is a part of the "suck it up culture," as one respondent called it, noting that this did not work for Chris. Chris also talks about how the police culture conditions coping and behavior following a shooting incident, as well as resistance to having someone who admits to the emotional vulnerabilities sharing their story with other officers and recruits, finding that

Q. [Talking] With [your psychologist] that's one thing. After you started seeing him, did you have a hard time going back from that position to not?

A. No, because it's a culture that you're not supposed to talk about it. I don't think it was until a good year or two after when I started doing the academy on that, when they asked me. Because they initially didn't want me to do anything with the academy after that but I started -- you try to, especially for the people coming onto the department, you try to take that out of the equation, the whole, you got to be a touch guy all the time, but that was a good couple years before.

Q. Your first academy class when you decided to talk about it, was that difficult?

A. Very, very.

Q. Tell me about it.

A. Rough in the sense that I went over it a couple times so that I knew which portions were going to make me upset and I would either move something around or eliminate like the parts coming up to it and it really doesn't take away from anything. They're getting what they need, but certain things were like, Oh, God. I would say, like talking about the aftermath or getting ready -- going through the whole shooting and getting to the end, because I remembered I would always associate that with just a dump of emotions and then I would start -- so I would immediately jump from the shooting was over to the aftermath, like you know, no sleep, stuff like that,
take the chunk out inside of just saying, you know, that was a tough time afterwards, but you know, over the years it gets easier but that was rough.

Q. Did you notice any of the other symptoms coming back after you did your first academy?

A. Oh, yeah. Oh, God, yeah...

The final element of the police culture that was emergent in the interviews conducted was the perceived distinction or separation between command personnel (also referred to as "brass") and frontline or street personnel (Roberg, Novak and Cordner 2009). This discrepancy in perspective was noted in how issues within the agency were identified and framed in discussions related to departmental responses and obligations, but several participants made statements to this effect, as well, including the examples below:

Q. So what about supervisors and support from supervisors?

A. Like the Narcotics guys were wonderful, even up to our captain and like I say, I say this because they were old school and they knew how it was supposed to be done. They gave us everything we needed. I mean, our captain at the time, he got so mad at the news that he blasted them. He got transferred out because of what he said. I mean, he was the best captain I ever worked for. He knew the job. He knew how to support his people and he had our back 100 percent but outside of Narcotics, even the past shootings I've been in when your life was in danger, I've seen supervisors help because everyone had to go to a shooting review board. I've seen them telling us, You should have did this, you should have done this, why did you do this. You know, you acted recklessly. I was being shot at. You know, I mean, but they sitting back telling us what we should or shouldn't do, and they haven't been on the street in ten years...And the higher they get up on the food chain – the worse it gets.

Q. What about supervisors and administrators, any suggestions?

A. I don't know. Fuck them.

...I talked to [a] Lieutenant. He's like, Are you ready to come back to work? I mean, you're all right. I'm like, No. I'm going to take off. I hung up on him. I remember thinking, What a fucking dick head. He just -- he just doesn't care. It wasn't that he doesn't -- he just doesn't care. I remember thinking, What a complete scumbag.
Yeah, because we stand behind that blue wall of silence so long. I mean, sometimes the way the news portrays stuff is 99.9 percent wrong and it would be so helpful like when Riddick was up there spouting off about all these white officers shooting these black kids, if somebody from the police department would have stood up and said, look, on the news, these officers were black. They put their life on the line doing their job and these bad guys make a bad decision, nobody ever does that. So they say something which is totally wrong. Police department says nothing, feel like you're throwing the officer who was involved under the bus and then the citizens give the opinion that these guys are a bunch of bad guys and they're running around shooting, like at what Riddick said. He's a councilman, he got to be right. He was dead wrong but nobody from the police department stood up and said anything until [a] Captain said something and then they punish him for saying it. So it's definitely bad police culture to me.

As should be evident from the discussion and the excerpts above, the police culture is neither a static nor a standalone theme. Officers are indoctrinated into their agency's culture, which may include elements of machismo, impression management, and stigma, and learn to operate within that culture. In the event of an officer involved shooting, the cultural stereotypes that officers are encouraged to adopt and replicate may be at odds with the experiences and feelings that emerge after being involved in a critical incident. As the officer feels the need to maintain appearances, he or she may engage in impression management and/or isolate themselves from their peers to avoid stigma. Further, as discussed elsewhere in this study, the response of the police agency may appear to bolster these cultural ideals, demonstrating yet another way administrative response may contribute to the development of long-term symptoms of trauma.

**Theme: Impact on Others**

The fourth theme that emerged was related to how an officer-involved shooting impacts other individuals. In the literature, the focus is primarily placed upon the officer that pulls the trigger, and that particular focus is understandable for a variety of reasons.
Despite contrary contentions from Simon and Garfunkel (2001), no officer is an island. He or she is situated within their familial, professional and social networks, which means that those connected to this individual may also experience trauma through this relationship. As in Chapter 2, these impacts are divided into two sub-sections—impact on the family and impact on fellow officers—as there are different concerns and relationships involved that may condition both the experience of and response to trauma. These others, who are not only potentially traumatized, may be a part of the officer’s support system and may be required to act as a catalyst for or facilitate intervention efforts. As such, their experiences deserve more attention than is currently paid to this topic in the literature.

Sub Theme 1: Family

As discussed in Chapter 2, those surrounding the officer are often not given much attention in terms of their experience of secondary trauma or how they interact with and respond to an officer who has been through a shooting incident. In the current study, the exploration of this impact was somewhat limited, as Chris acknowledged that he isolated himself from his family and did not really discuss his shooting with them. However, speaking with his significant other provided insight and another perspective into how poor coping skills, critical incident stress and PTSD can impact an intimate partner. Further, several of the participants in the current study had been involved in previous shooting incidents, as discussed above, and disclosed how their own experiences had impacted their families, albeit only from their perspective.

At least two respondents addressed the general impacts of their career choice on their families. Both officers indicated that, while not completely to blame, their careers
were a factor in the dissolution of their respective marriages, as seen in the excerpts below:

I will tell you, you know, the reason my marriage failed, yeah, there's a lot of reasons. There's always reasons. Marriage is hard to begin with. But when I look back on my responsibility or my part of why things went the way they did, my ex-wife looks at me today and says, Yeah, you are nothing like you were when you got out of the police academy. You are not the same person at all and I haven't had to shoot anybody here. It's still that sense of -- so the families are dealing with -- they start out with Person A five years, ten years, 15 years down the road they're dealing with Person B they don't even know and they didn't ask for it and they don't want it and they know they don't want it but they feel an obligation or loyalty to that person because they knew them back when they knew them when they were somebody different

A. ...Families, families need to understand that that person is no longer the same. They will look the same. They will appear the same. They may even act the same in certain situations but they are not the same anymore and you need to understand that the person you married, the person that is your dad or your child, they are not the same.

Q. There's a quote from Ellen Kirschman that says it's not just the officer that gets PTSD, it's the whole family.

A. Oh, I believe it 100 percent, 100 percent. I know my kids. I know my kids have said they're scared of me.

Q. So how do we go about addressing that with families?

A. Families have to be incorporated more from the beginning. At the academy level where you have an ombudsman of sorts that can go in and say, Okay, look, here's what your spouse is getting ready to take on. They still aren't going to really grasp it but at least when it happens they'll be able to recognize things so they won't think they're crazy. They won't think their spouse is out cheating on them because they're completely different now. They won't think a lot of things that naturally come to mind because hopefully they will have been educated enough where they can say, Yeah, they said this would happen. They said this would happen. Because a part of that, you know, it's been suggested and I know a couple other jurisdictions do this, they do what's called a spouse academy where they go over not just the changes in the individual but the common issues, money, and part time and overextension and all of these.
Q. Okay. We've talked a little bit of stress. Did this put additional stress on your relationship with your wife when you went through your [shooting]?
A. She would say no but I would think yes.
Q. Okay. How so?
A. It ended up being she was a little more worried when I would leave and I think, like I said, we're still such good friends and I think that stress is kind of what pushed us apart, you know what I'm saying.
Q. Uh-huh.
A. Because it was nothing major that happened to say that you did this, I did that. I want to get a divorce. It was just like she had detached herself. So much worrying that eventually we just grew so far apart to the point where we just woke up and were like, It's not working, you know what I'm saying, but it was nothing that I could say, you know, because knowing your dad unfortunately in Narcotics, there are a lot of long hours and days on days we're stuck at work and it just pushed us so far apart. I guess she had to detach herself from me because she would have been worrying so much and then a year or so, two years, three years down the road for whatever reason, I'm not happy, and then we just decided to break, you know, but it was nothing like I cheated on her, she cheated on me. I hit you, you hit me. Nothing like that. We still broke up though. So she would say no but I would say yes.

Although not expected or solicited, there were three participants that discussed how significant others received the notification of their loved one’s shooting. These notifications are likely quite traumatic for the wife or husband of the officer involved, especially as two of the three disclosures in this study involved officers who had themselves been shot. It should be noted that, with regards to the Chris’ girlfriend being notified of his shooting, as a participant in the current study, she was able to provide her perspective, whereas the other two notifications were relayed from the officer’s perspective. Additionally, Chris’ girlfriend acknowledges that, as a dual cop couple (Kirschman 2007), she had a better understanding of the process and could empathize with Chris more because she is a police officer herself.

Q. Okay. That makes sense. Do you remember how you found out about his shooting?
A. Yes.
Q. Okay. Tell me about that.
A. Yes. I think it was a Sunday night.
Q. Okay.
A. Was it a Sunday? It was either a Saturday or Sunday. I think it was a Sunday because I think I had a three-day weekend where I was working so he had been practicing for the tattoo, pipe and drum, and he called me late like 9:30, 10:00 maybe, somewhere around there, 9:00ish, late, and he was like, What are you doing? I was like, Well, I'm doing my homework. I was sitting in my bedroom typing and he's like, Why don't you come over? No, you come over. No, you come over. Like it was just back and forth and I was like, I'm doing homework. Why don't you just come over here? And he was like, Fine, I got to stop and get gas and smokes and then I'll come over. I was like, Okay. Hung up, whatever, typing.

Maybe like an hour-and-a-half, two hours go by. I'm like, Okay. You know, thinking maybe he got tied up or something. Then I got a call, don't know what time it was. I don't know, 11:00ish. I don't know, late. He's like screaming, screaming into the phone, and I remember just hearing his voice. I mean, it was fear, screaming, excited, like I think I killed somebody, I just shot somebody. I think I killed him. I think -- all I can remember hearing is he got in a shooting, I think I killed somebody, I shot somebody, blah, blah, blah. I think he's dead. Again, not that calm screaming. All I could say is, Okay. All right. Okay. Like I don't know what mode I got in, like okay, all right, like very calm, and I'll call you when I get in and, boom. I'm kind of sitting there like, Oh, my God.

So I ran down the hallway and my friend was going through a divorce at the time and she was living with me and I went and woke her up. I was like, Oh, you've got to come here. Okay. Chris just got in a shooting and blah, blah, blah, blah, blah. And so I remember she and I sat there and talked for a little bit and I sat there in my room, turned on the TV, and waited for the 5:00 news, 5:00 in the morning news, saw it come on the news, saw his car inside the crime scene tape. I saw the bullet holes in the glass at the Shell station.

So I don't know, maybe 6:00ish in the morning, the following morning, he finally called me back and said he was going to his house... and then I remember driving over there early in the morning... being a police officer all I could -- and his girlfriend at the time all I could do is try to calm him down... I don't know, 9:00ish I'm still awake. I'm sitting there and I have a remote and I'm watching this little TV again with the five things that he took from his previous marriage in his room, one was a TV so I'm looking at TV and all of a sudden breaking news, blah, blah, blah, shooting, mass shooting at Virginia Tech, and the volume is up and I'm like, Oh, my God, because I'm thinking he does not need to hear that right now. So I'm turning the volume down and I'm thinking, Oh, God, how -- I'm thinking how can we keep him from finding out about that. Impossible, but to me
both of those, Virginia Tech is in my mind, that triggers Chris' shooting for me.

My boss at the time, he's a lieutenant now at the department, I asked him to go pick [my wife] up. So he went himself to go get her and back in the day I used to have a dark blue Impala with tinted windows and he had a black Impala with tinted windows. So when he came to the house, he knocked on the door and I remember her telling me when she looked out she saw the car, she thought it was me. I just left my keys. So when she opened the door, she saw [the] Lieutenant. She was like, [he] is not here. He was like, I know. I got to tell you something and from his inflection of his voice and the way he looked, she knew it was bad and she said -- the next thing she said, she was like, Is he dead? And he said, I don't know but we got to hurry up and get to the hospital and so she just like lost it. So she kind of fainted and he picked her up and threw her in the car and he hauled it on down to Norfolk General... At the time it was very stressful because she works in the courts so, you know, she's around the justice system. She knows how it goes and everything and when it first happened, they brought her to the hospital and that first night before I went to surgery and it was definitely stressful to her. I mean, she will tell you -- I mean, even though we're divorced, we're still good friends, and she'll tell you, you know, it took ten years off her life when that happened, and it definitely affected her in a big way.

I made a couple phone calls when they were loading me on to the bus. I called my brother. I called my best friend. I called my best friend to tell him to go get my wife and have him meet me at the hospital. I mean, I know I had been shot in the thigh and it was when the paramedic cut my pants off, then I realized I had been shot the second time. So I wasn't really sure how serious it was. I mean, I knew I could talk on the phone because I grabbed the paramedics' phone and said, Man, I got to use your phone. I called my brother to have him go pick my mom up. But my brother screwed up and called my mom on the phone and she went spastic. She called my dad. He came and picked her up and he's going lights and sirens to the hospital. My buddy screwed up and called my wife's twin sister. So she had to tell her and she got to the hospital. She was -- she was worried and I was told that I was sitting in the hospital bed telling jokes. I don't really remember that, but I was told that I was telling jokes and she was upset with me because I was in there telling jokes.

The notification process, as noted above, can be quite frightening and traumatic.

Yet, after the shooting, when the officer begins to go through the symptoms of critical incident stress, or if he or she develops PTSD, this, too, may provoke a strong emotional
response in the officer's family members. This continued impact can be seen in the
discussion of fear, which emerged in multiple interviews. Fears held by family members
ranged in intensity and severity, and often included a fear of the officer returning to work
in the same unit, with participants finding that:

Q. Okay. What about were you ever afraid?
A. Of?
Q. With him harming you/himself in the middle of a nightmare, anything?
A. Yes.
Q. Okay.
A. Because he was very close -- he's always close to his gun anyway but he
was very -- I got to have my gun.
Q. Any other times you were afraid?
A. I was never afraid for me. I mean, I never
the only thing I was afraid
our relationship wasn't going to work out because of the shooting and that
kind of made me like sad.
But then it did work out so, you know what I mean, I was never afraid of
him. I was afraid of him becoming an alcoholic. I was afraid of him not
enjoying work anymore because I knew him as a person who loved to
work, loved, you know, everything about work. So I was afraid he was
going to lose his interest in police work.

Initially it was pretty rough, especially my youngest daughter. My youngest
daughter and my middle daughter, we both had to take them to counseling. My
wife and I at the time had to take them to counseling, which went on for a little
over a year, and so when I was recovering. When I first got the okay to go back
to work, my kids didn't want me to come back to Narcotics. So I came back and I
went to Homicide, but it was only for like nine months, and I was hating it at the
time and my wife could see I was upset. She was like, You want to go back to
Narcotics, don't you? I was like, Yeah. So after the girls went through their
counseling we sat them down and I talked to them and they felt a little better
about this. So I was like, you know, Dad really wants to go back to Narcotics.
They were like, Well, okay, I guess we'll be okay with it. So I went back to
Narcotics for another like seven years until I came back over here to Homicide.

Q. Okay. So did she kind of have some concerns, you know, after you were
home and getting ready to go back to work?
A. Yeah, yeah, she had a lot of concerns of me going back to Narcotics. It's
funny because I remember the day I was transferred. I was in the Vice
Unit and I was going to -- I got myself into trouble in the Vice Unit so they
were moving me to Narcotics. That was my punishment.
Q. Yeah.
A. Yeah, me going to Narcotics is where I really wanted to be and I remember the day that I came home and I told her I was going to Narcotics. She started crying. I told her, No, Narcotics is the safest place you can be because you're going to always know who you're dealing with, you know, as opposed to a traffic stop or in uniform you respond to a domestic or anything. I was like, No, no, it's always calculated. It's tactical. We're always going to know who we're dealing with...When, you know, when I told her I was going to go back, I had to I guess...Part of it was, you know, male bravado. You know, part of it is, you know, my pride and the other part is I just really wanted to be there...

Chris described how his sleep disturbances impacted his significant other, stating that his wife “would be like, Holy shit, I thought you were going to hit me. Because I'd get up and just be manic and that was it for sleep. You weren't getting back to sleep for that day.” His wife also mentioned several times in her interview how tired she was in the aftermath of Chris’ shooting, making comments like,

Q. Okay. Was there anything that you struggled with during the immediate aftermath and then the following months in particular?
A. I was tired because he didn't sleep and of course he slept over and he didn't sleep. I didn't sleep. The nightmares he had, like he'd wake up after two hours of sleep. Sometimes he didn't sleep at all or he'd just drink and hoping that drink would make him go to sleep. So of course he's up, I'm up. So I was tired a lot, dealing with his anger was kind of -- but I'm kind of blunt, too, so I'm like, You're an ass. You're really being an ass. So I think he knew it but, you know, you hurt the ones you love, you know, you can be that way with the ones you love, and at least he was getting it out some way... I remember just being tired. Because when something bothers me, I don't sleep. Even to this day if something is on my mind, I don't sleep

Another issue that impacted Chris’ wife was that he became extremely jealous. There is an incident, detailed in the section on anger, which provides a clear example of the strain this behavior put upon their relationship. However, as demonstrated in the excerpts below, this was not the only incident.
He got very jealous, which was very difficult for me.

(about Chris having given her an ultimatum to be friends with her ex-fiancé or date him)... but it was just very jealous and I can't say clingy, that he wanted to hold me all the time, but just very wanted to be around me, which is fine because I wanted to be around him, too, but I never knew if it was the happy Chris, was it going to be the angry, the sad, you know, I wanted to be there for him.

...well, I guess myself and I didn't think that I would put up with all that but our relationship -- I mean, obviously it made it through that so that's saying something. I know this is going way back but I never -- I wasn't really ever one to ever get married and I think like three months into dating, [he says] let's get married. That's [a bit] much. He was like, Come be with me. No, we're -- like he got mad at that, because I said no. Why don't I move in? No. Like it was one of those -- yeah, so our relationship but it made it.

Of additional concern was the idea that she never knew what Chris' mood would be like, and so she felt like she had to constantly be on guard and had to judge his mood, as described below.

I guess I judged his mood. I would have to judge his mood daily... So based on his mood is, you know, how much I would, you know, try to talk and I always try to get him to talk about it and reassure him, you know, as a fellow police officer, you did nothing wrong. You did the right thing, you know, he put you in that situation. You were just stopping to get gas. That wasn't your fault. You know, and I'd try to turn it around for him. You could have saved those people's lives. You were put there for a reason and that could be it, you know...

Additional frustrations came from the fact that this was a new relationship, so she was unsure how far to push certain issues. She also disclosed that she

... was frustrated because that's not how a new relationship should start. I was frustrated like, Come on, give me a break, but then you know, like I said, I made like a decision that I was going to be with him and I was going to help him get through it and you know, again, I knew him before so I kept hanging onto that, that he was going to once again become that person again... because matter of fact, one of my girlfriends, she was like, You need to dump him. Like it was that bad. Like you need to dump him.
Further, she noted that

*I thought whoever gave him a copy of that audio, I know it was one of the detectives, don't know who, I was livid that that happened. Because I'm going to tell you what, that was Chris' favorite hit for about two months. Every day he would sit there and listen to it and just you could see him getting in his funk every time and over and over and over. Whoever that was should have never given that to him. That person should have realized that wasn't the Chris Scallon that he was before that incident happened. He should have never had that, that early...I'm not saying he never should have heard it, but it shouldn't have been -- maybe they should have let him come in and listen to it and they kept it, not give him a copy of it, my opinion.*

Chris' wife, even though it was a new relationship, acknowledged that, in terms how she coped with this situation, which is a very optimistic and supportive stance to take.

*I just -- I mean, I think -- I made a decision maybe like three months into it. I was like, Okay. I'm there for him. I'm caring about him, starting to love him, you know. I could put myself in his shoes. What if it was me going through this and I'm sure he would be there for me, you know.*

*...it was super fun and I -- during that seminar and I've told other people, thank God I knew him before because if I hadn't have known him, I would have obviously been his friend and helped him through anything as his friend because I was his friend before but if I hadn't known him, I don't know if our relationship would have lasted...It must have been meant to be because I put up with a lot more than I ever imagined I would put up with in any other circumstance, and then of course we eventually got married so it was worth it. It was meant to be. Everything happens for a reason. People are put in your life for a reason. That's my belief and I think that at that time, that that February that Chris and I were meant to run into each other where I wasn't dating someone, he wasn't married. That was meant to happen.*

However, when asked if there was a point where she drew a line in the sand, if there was something beyond what she would tolerate, this was her response:

*...Yeah, I think -- the line in the sand, I think the most was you're going to take that medicine, like it was to that point, you've got to do something for yourself besides drinking, like you will take this medicine. I remember that being the line in the sand. Like if you're not willing to help yourself in there, but he did eventually take the medicine and stay with it. Like I would check it. Like he kept*
it in the drawer and I'd be like, Okay, I'm making sure you're taking your medicine. But again, I'm not your mother, but I was at that point that you've got to want to help yourself in this... Got to help yourself because I'll be here no matter what. I don't care about side effects and medication. That wasn't important to me. What was important to me was seeing him happy at some point.

In the course of her interview, she was concerned that, by talking about her experiences with Chris in the aftermath of his shooting, that it would appear unduly negative, acknowledging that he was good to her during this time period. Chris, on the other hand, was quite aware of the impact his PTSD and related behaviors had on his wife and their relationship, as well as his other relationships, stating:

Q. Greatest source of support following the shooting and were you surprised at the level of support from certain people?
A. [Wife] took the brunt of it and shockingly -- you know, not shockingly. I'll say this for a fact, I'm surprised she stuck around, that she stuck around...those -- the ones closest to me were supportive without being overly supportive kind of. I don't need a shoulder to cry on but always available. I mean, without a doubt, if I needed to call any one of them -- we never discussed it. There's never like a -- and I may be completely off base with somebody. They might be like, Oh, I got to call. I'd be like, Fuck you, but for me, I felt and knowing that somebody was out there to help out was probably more important than having somebody helping me out.

Q. Okay.
A. That was it.
Q. How do you think this incident impacted those closest to you?
A. Scared some close to me, sobered some up as to the reality of the work that I do. There's a sense of pride. There's also the sense -- it runs a gamut, scared to death, some people I can imagine would be maybe afraid for me, which this turn, you know, making them upset, more closer with relationships, but I don't know. I think mostly it was me -- people that knew me, it was a validation that they knew that if something went down, they knew they could count on me because I've done it. You don't know what you're going to do until it happens to you. Fortunately and unfortunately it happened to me as opposed to somebody else because I think it was a great outcome ultimately. So in that respect, having somebody feel a certain way is good, whether it's good or bad, the way they feel.
Q. Okay. Do you think the impact was enough that anybody had to cope with certain things or emotionally? You talked about your wife taking a brunt of it.

A. My wife definitely, yeah, my wife sought counsel. She came to a couple sessions. I think it changed the way -- it's fleeting. If you're not involved, the initial shock of somebody, you know, being involved in something changes you for that moment and then it's, you know, a week or two later that you're back to yourself. It's like driving and falling asleep and you realize you fall asleep and you wake up you're like, Holy shit. Four seconds later you fall asleep again. It's kind of what it is, but for me it's life-altering. For others I think close to me was a significant event in their life, but for me, it was life-altering and I think maybe for my wife it was almost life-altering. She was probably the most -- because I didn't talk to really anybody other than her initially.

From this section, it can be surmised that there is, indeed, a significant amount of secondary trauma that can be visited upon an officer's family in the wake of a shooting incident, particularly spouses and children. These individuals are expected to support the officer, to help him or her heal, but without knowledge as to what to expect and support of their own, they are facing a very difficult task. Additionally, with minimal literature addressing this topic available, there are few resources that assure them that many of these symptoms are normal responses to trauma and that they are not the only people to ever experience these traumas. Chris, when asked what advice he would give to the significant other of an officer who had been in a shooting, made the following statement, which acknowledges that trauma can strengthen the relationship, but that the significant other also has to be willing to protect him- or herself.

I got to be brutally honest, got to be not really afraid to part ways if that's the way it goes and I was -- you know, if it needed to go, it needed to go, not maybe something I wanted but for their benefit, but at the same time, that kind of shit, you know, going through that does really solidify a relationship, just kind of holds it together because really after that, there ain't much shit that we can't get through.
Sub Theme 2: Fellow Officers and Friends

The literature often overlooks other officers who may be impacted by a shooting, mentioning secondary trauma in passing. In fact, these officers are only mentioned in passing in the IACP Model Policies (1998, 2012a). As Paton (2005), Thomas (2011) and Kirschman (2007) note, officers are vulnerable to secondary victimization upon responding to a critical incident, particularly when the primary victim is an officer and even more so when the officer responding knows the officer that is the primary victim. Additionally, like the primary victim, secondary victimization can be conditioned by personal and situational factors, such as previous traumatic experiences, severity, length of exposure and coping strategies.

In this particular case, the potential for secondary victimization is increased for all first responders because Chris, a fellow first responder, was a primary victim. Chris even recognized the potential trauma for the first officer on scene, stating that

...the gun smoke, the ceiling had lowered because of all the -- like it's like being in a fish tank and smoking a cigarette. Eventually all the smoke -- like in a club where all the smoke starts settling and I remembered thinking, you know, when the officer got there that had to be scary, blood everywhere, smoke from the guns alone, just smoke from the guns and just the smell of the gun smoke, the smell of the store.

Another participant, recalling his own shooting and the much delayed debrief, also observed how being on scene, even if the officer was not there during the shooting, can be particularly difficult for responding officers:

Q. Okay. Did you notice any demeanor changes in other people that had been there the night of your shooting?
A. No.
Q. Okay.
A. No, everybody held it in pretty well until the debrief and then the actual real feelings came out because I was there. I was in it. I'm sure it's pretty
tough to see one of your fellow police officers, you know, laying on the curb, you know, bleeding.

Additionally, the first responding investigator qualified for both of the factors that increase vulnerability to secondary trauma: the primary victim was a fellow law enforcement officer that he knew. As this investigator noted,

A. ...And I was responding out to the first robbery on Tidewater Drive at the Shell station. I responded to the first one, which was the two guys. They were actually taking turns on robbing the Shell stations and I got to the first robbery shortly after it happened and I was on scene when they put out the second robbery, which was the Shell station right there at Admiral Taussig where Chris was involved in the shooting. They put it out there there was an off-duty officer involved in a shooting or involved in the robbery. He was in a shooting so of course, you know, I hauled ass in there because it wasn't that far from where I was.

Q. So any other reactions kind of going on for you as soon as you heard it was an officer-involved? What goes through your head?

A. Well, I thought back to my own shooting and, you know, I was really hoping that whoever it was, he was okay and he wouldn't be shot.

Q. Okay. What about when you found out it was Chris?

A. Oh, when I got there, well, crazy because when I got there I saw his car, you know, right there at the gas pumps and you know, I kind of freaked out like, Oh, shit. You know, that's Scallon's car there. I was the first detective there and there was a couple uniformed guys there. When I got there I ran right in the place and the suspect was already down and some guys were in there handcuffing him and I looked up and I saw Chris and I ran up, you know, I kind of grabbed him up and I took him around there. I asked if he was okay, you know. It was pretty obvious what happened. Well, the basics of it, you know, he was in a gun battle with the guy and we talked for a couple minutes. I remember he kept saying, I can't believe I didn't get hit. He was patting himself, you know, saying, I can't believe I didn't get hit because it's really weird how Chris, how our lives and your careers just crossed paths so much because the night [we] got shot Chris was out there... He was there so I thought it was really weird, you know, he's involved in a shooting that I'm right there on scene for him as he was out there for Jemal and I and, you know, he kept saying that and you told him, you know, focus on the fact that you're still here. Focus on the fact that you got the guy and he didn't get you.

In this case, it was found that potential secondary trauma was not limited to just those officers who were on scene. There were numerous opportunities for secondary
victimization observed in the interviews with the participants in the current study. Two of the participants in the current study were notified of Chris' shooting through the police information network. These officers received phone calls, late at night, while they were at home. According to their testimony, both officers reacted immediately:

*I mean, initially I was like first (inaudible) hoping he was okay, and the fresh information was coming in and I was like, Well, let me know if he had been hit or what. You know what I mean, trying to get as much information as I could. Where is he? You know, and they said he was here. I was off but I came here to try to get with him, but by the time we got here, they had already had him in an interview doing what they're doing, whatever. So I couldn't get to him but we all waited here to see for him to get out, you know. So I was definitely worried at first and hearing what was going on and we knew it was one other guy that got away and this and that, you know, so we were all worried.

Well, we were off. I was at home in bed when I received a phone call from a coworker who said, you know, not to worry but Chris had been involved in a shooting. So, you know, I got up, took a shower, got dressed, went to work, seen him, made sure he was all right. You know, I didn't want to bombard him with questions because I knew everybody was. So I just made sure everything was all right, gave him a hug, told him anything you need, I'm here for you, blah, blah, blah, and that was pretty much it. I didn't really get into it too much because I didn't really feel it was any of my business.

Also overlooked in the literature is the potential for secondary victimization of those officers investigating an officer-involved shooting, usually holding the rank of a sergeant or higher. One participant in the current study has investigated numerous officer-involved shootings and told the researcher that

*Every case comes home with me. They all come home with you in one way or another. In one way or another they all come home with you, especially when they involve police officers. Any death investigation, any homicide comes home with you in some way, but when they involve colleagues and you are looking at those people because, you know, I work with this guy, I know this guy's kids, I know her from when I did her polygraph when she came on the police department. I know him from working together at some other place and I know that if I don't do a good job, if I screw this up, potentially this person could end up
on a docket somewhere because that's why we're there. We're there to investigate in a crime has happened, not did you have your gun clean at the time. So the pressure to get it perfect the first time is self-induced. If you care enough to do it right then you should care enough to do it perfectly and I would put that pressure on myself... You can't live like that without it affecting you and every one of these cases you would see these guys and a lot of them kids and you would just go home and thank God nothing happened, you know, and then you start playing what if this and what if that and what would I have done differently or what could I have done better to make this better for him or her? What should I do in the future to prevent these type of situations from happening? They all come home.

Another point of potential secondary trauma occurred when one officer was asked to review the 9-1-1 tape of Chris' shooting, with this participant revealing that

...one day like towards the end of it he showed me a tape and he was like, Hey, it's my 911 tape. Do you want to listen to it and I told him, I said, No, Chris, I'd rather not. And I kind of regretted saying it because I didn't know if he wanted me to listen to it, but I wasn't prepared to listen to it.

Q. Okay. Why weren't you prepared to listen to it?
A. Because I just didn't want to hear it.
Q. Okay.
A. You know, I mean, it was -- it kind of gives me chills just thinking about it. That was his thing... But I kind of felt bad because I felt like he wanted me to and I didn't, maybe he didn't. Maybe he was just offering it but I did think about that, like maybe I should listen to it for him. Maybe he wanted me to listen to it but that's just how I felt at the time.

As cited in the literature, previous experiences of trauma, a theme previously discussed in this chapter, can condition secondary trauma victimization, just as it does primary victimization. In the discussion of previous traumatic experiences, it was revealed that every officer that participated in the current study had experienced multiple traumas in the course of their law enforcement careers. The following two excerpts show the impact Chris' shooting had on two of the participants, as they reference other experienced traumas while discussing Chris' shooting:

...No, it pretty much, you know, I pretty much handled a lot of things and answered a lot of questions for him because he didn't want to. We had a
conversation early on where, you know, he told me about it and I mean, it was within the first couple days because I think he was off a couple days and then he came back and, you know, he used to go -- I don't know if it was mandated or whatever, but I used to take him to some appointments. It was all the way in Portsmouth. So on the way we would talk so he basically told me that, you know, it's not something that he was comfortable with, taking a life.

Q. Okay.
A. You know, which I've never heard anybody -- I know people that have killed people before: I mean, it's not the response people say, whether it be the truth or not. I just thought it was, you know -- I thought it was pretty honest, you know, for him to admit that he was having a problem processing and, you know, without getting involved in trying to, you know, put myself in his shoes and I don't like to do that...for me, I think it was like a gut check. I mean, back in the day we were all pretty wild, you know, it seemed to me like after that, Chris really kind of put things in perspective because it was right around that time that him and his now wife got real close and I think he started to look at his life in the perspective of -- and I can only assume this, I'm not speaking for him, but holy shit, I mean, I'm off duty buying a pack of cigarettes and I could have lost my life in that gas station, and I think it probably -- you know, he re-evaluated how he was going to look at things.

Q. When Chris' shooting came up, did it bring anything up for you? Did you have any --
A. Oh, yeah.
Q. Okay. So what happened.
A. I mean, when I first heard about it and I heard how many shots were fired, it definitely made me think back to mine. Because during mine, four people were shooting in a space smaller than this room, over here 70 rounds fired. Like I could put myself in Chris' shoes because I could hear them bullets going past my head and even after the first time I was shot, I stayed in the fight and going back out there thinking, don't let me get hit again, trying to stop this, and then I got hit again. So I can imagine how Chris felt, like it was never going to end, because that's how you feel, like even though in reality it's probably less than two minutes long, it feels like it's a day-and-a-half long, you know what I'm saying. So it definitely made me flashback and I definitely could put myself in Chris' shoes then.

This section examines the impact a single shooting incident can have on other officers beyond the officer that fired his or her weapon, a topic not covered well in the literature. As Thomas (2011) suggested, secondary trauma extends beyond responding to
the scene and the current study supports this contention. There were multiple opportunities for secondary and tertiary trauma disclosed by participants, and this was only a limited number of the individuals involved in this case. Further, each of the participants had experienced multiple traumas prior to (and in many cases since) Chris’ shooting. Also increasing the vulnerability of the participants in the current study were the severity of both Chris’ shooting incident and the previous incidents experienced, as well as evidence of potential poor coping strategies, such as avoidance and alcohol use, as addressed earlier in this chapter.

Theme: Evidence of Theoretical Frame OR Goffman’s Work Manifested

The fifth and final theme was both emergent and tied to a grounded theory approach (Creswell 2007). The literature review and preliminary interviews conducted with Chris indicated that Goffman’s work (1959, 1963) may be applicable in the current study, but the researcher did not anticipate how well this theoretical approach would fit the data obtained. Indeed, evidence of Goffman’s work is located throughout this chapter, interwoven with the other themes previously addressed. Two particular elements of Goffman’s work—impression management and stigma—were relevant and applicable to the current study. Most participants spoke specifically to these issues and, while these concepts are intermingled in the previous thematic analyses, the following analyses focus on the most clearly addressed elements of this theoretical approach that were observed in the current study.
Sub Theme 1: Impression Management

To review, impression management occurs when we strive to present ourselves in the best light possible to others and hide what we consider to be our true selves during interactions (Goffman 1959). This is like a theatrical performance where the individual presents a particular role or character to the audience sitting in the theater, but is able to hide their true identity, which is expressed in the back stage area where theater patrons are not permitted to go; for an officer, backstage may consist of a more emotional, as opposed to tough and stoic, response to incidents. Impression management can be seen as a general mechanism for coping with daily life as a first responder, where there is often a cultural mandate that demands presenting a detached and unemotional professional face to citizens. However, as a participant identifies below, this public face is not limited to the public:

A. ...It's a false bravado, you know. There ain't nothing cool about killing somebody, you know what I'm saying. Some people like to say they are -- you know, they're full of it. They're lying. You know, I've had plenty of chances on this job where I could have shot and killed somebody and I didn't do it. I don't feel bad that I didn't. I most likely wouldn't have felt bad if I did. It's -- for me it's just not that big of a deal and it's just part of my job.

Q. Okay.

A. I mean, I don't look at it as it doesn't make you tough. It doesn't make you bad because criminals kill people every day in this country and they don't -- but there is a definite sense of how you're supposed to be like after you get in a shooting...I applauded Chris for his honesty because I have never heard it and I don't know that it would come out of my mouth and I don't know how I would have felt either if I hadn't felt that way, you know, I'm a Catholic, you know, I believe in God, you know, it's the way I came up and, you know, I don't think anybody wants to really take anybody's life. It's not a cool thing but you know, at the end of the day I think a lot of people just -- they gave you -- they show you on the outside what they believe you're supposed to be, tough.
Oh, yeah, yeah, you've got to -- you've got -- we have certain ideas of what we think we should look like or how we should act or how we should do stuff. You don't ever want to be seen as weak on the street. Unfortunately that carries over into the station or whatever house, bureau. Not being weak on the street is an important aspect of this job. You're weak on the street you're going to get challenged and you're going to get targeted. So you put up a good front on the street but there should be a safe place, you know, the locker rooms. Unfortunately acting tough on the street and then coming back and saying, Man, that guy really scared me, it's just -- that doesn't happen. Being involved in something, coming back and seeking out people who you know (inaudible) the same thing, you're more likely to be, Hey, that was rough, and even still you're not getting the whole truth. You're getting a very, you know, tempered with I'm tough but, you know, little bit scary there, when in actuality maybe the individual was scared to death the entire time.

Not only does the officer tend to manage impressions with his or her fellow officers, in this case, Chris managed impressions with his family, as demonstrated in the following exchange:

Q. Do you remember telling your family [about your shooting]?
A. I think I waited like a day or so because I probably wasn't in the right frame of mind. I said, Hey, I just want to tell you I'm all right. I think I talked to my dad. I said, I just want to tell you I'm all right and really it was maybe once or twice. That was it.

Q. Okay. Do you remember talking to your mom at all after?
A. Briefly. I'm like, I'm all right. She's like, Oh, we're going to come. I was like, Don't worry about it. I said, I'm all right, everything is cool. I don't think they realized the gravity. I don't think they realized the degree of it. If you're not hurt, you should be good to go, which is fine because that's what they needed to know.

As noted in the discussion of the police culture, the idea that officers fully commit to their police identity and membership in the law enforcement culture, often at the expense of their other roles, can impact coping with trauma. One participant made the following observation about the varying roles an officer holds and the need for balance, stating:
...one of the bad things about this job is that you respond to some pretty bad stuff, like a homicide scene, you know, where people have shot each other or somebody who has, you know, drowned, they've been in the water a few days and SIDS deaths and things like that. These are really traumatic incidents that unless they understand that they need to have an outlet, they can't go to work every day and see things like this without it having some effect on them, and you need to understand that and one of the things I always tell these families in these recruit classes is that you have some interest outside this job. This job is important because it's how you make a living, but you know, I'm a -- heck, I'm a police [officer], but that's my job. That's what I do. That's how I make my living, but over the years I've been a husband and a father and a grandfather and little league coach and a PTA member and a civic league member, and you know, I've got a lot of roles out there that are more important to me than this job is and it's how I identify myself and you need to have other interest, your family hobbies. You need to have hobbies. You need to have things that are going to keep you interested and relieve that stress, you know, when you're not working.

Following a shooting incident, the post trauma reactions the officer experiences may be juxtaposed to his or her construction of what an officer is and how they behave, so he or she may continue to attempt to play this role in front of peers, supervisors and family members (Cullen and Agnew 2011, Jones 1989). As discussed in Chapter 2, this need for impression management may also underlie why Tucker (2011) found that officers do not take advantage of stress intervention services: they are afraid of appearing weak or less macho; they are afraid of negative career impacts, such as failure to promote, impeding ability to testify in court and/or job loss; and they are afraid they will be viewed as mentally unstable.

This need to maintain the tough officer façade, to project the expected image, came up repeatedly in the interviews. Some of these instances were better illustrations of the other emergent themes, thus again demonstrating the interconnectedness of the themes that emerged in the current study, and are presented elsewhere accordingly. Yet,
there were several disclosures that spoke very clearly to Goffman’s (1959) concept of impression management, as evidenced below:

(speaking about officers from shootings this participant has investigated)...And I will tell you this: The guys all seem -- they all display a demeanor that you would expect to see from police officers on duty, which is, I'm great. I'm okay. I'm great...

...So I got so pissed off I kicked the big soda thing over. I was like, Damn it, and then I looked back and I see the clerks and I'm thinking to myself, kind of get yourself together...

Q. All right. So you go back to work. How is it interacting with other people?
A. Oh, it's fucking miserable. Every four seconds someone is asking me what's happening, what's happening. So much so that I jump in the car with [my partner] and we'd go take off somewhere. Because we were in the middle of a big operation when it was all going down and [he] never asked me once about it. Never asked me once. So it was like a nice, like getaway but no sooner did he hit -- hey, man, oh, what happened. Oh, my God, yo, that's crazy. I was like, Oh, I just get so fucking tired. You don't want to be a dick so you kind of the like, Oh, you know -- getting gas and cigarettes, I went in there, and the guy starts shooting and I shot back. I mean, literally it would be that quick.

A. (on anxiety attacks or flashbacks) No, no, and that's what -- that's the unnerving part of it, but it's not debilitating. Like it's happening in my head like, Oh, where as the other ones, I mean, like you're physically, if you're holding something, you're squeezing it or you're breaking a pen or doing something, trying to take your mind off of it kind of thing, but it's happening as I speak but in the last year or two it's so infrequent and it happens, it's all contained like you're stressing about it, but there's no outward -- there's no outward display of it.

Q. Before the last couple of years did anybody else ever notice any of this going on?
A. Maybe once or twice people like, What the fuck are you thinking about? Or what happened? Then I was like, What? You know, like nothing, then let it go.

While some of the impression management appears to be either subconscious reactions or so normalized that it is an immediate response—particularly when dealing
with the public—many other times participants disclosed how very deliberate this
management of impressions is, due, in large part to the fear of repercussion should
anyone know the reality of their emotions and coping abilities.

Q. You talk about having a short fuse. Do you have any other examples these
angry outbursts, irritability?
Q. How long did that go on?
A. You know, until I started taking Lexapro, I wasn't stable at all, kind of up
and down.
Q. So give me a time frame. Were you still in Narcotics? Were now you now
in Homicide?
A. Probably like halfway through my time in Homicide but again, it's -- it
diminishes. It wasn't like crazy all the way through. It eventually
got -- after that big one, oh, yeah, I was like, Oh, I need to watch myself,
that I go off the handle quick. Which I'm not like -- prior to that, there
was nothing anybody could say that would really piss me off or get me
riled up.

A. Exaggerated startled response?
Q. Yep, tell me about it.
A. Again, the best one was the -- the best one example is me pulling a gun on
the fucking car that ran over the thing (a soda bottle). That was scary as
shit for me. I literally thought I was getting shot at.
Q. Okay. And so how long -- did it take you just a split second or did you
process?
A. No, it took me a little bit to process it. Not a split second, a couple
seconds, but it was no means like, Oh, okay. It was an, Oh, shit, because I
had my gun out. I literally had to say, All right, put your gun back in your
holster and get the fuck out of here because this is -- I could just imagine a
police officer driving by or a uniformed guy driving by and I'm pulling my
gun at a car, plain clothes. Oh, let me put that back up.

Q. Did you realize when you were reacting?
A. No, no, not all the time.
Q. What about when you did?
A. That I was being irritable?
Q. Uh-huh.
A. I think you were just at a constant -- at that time it was a constant state of
irritability, just trying to deal with everything that was coming in, but we
just -- it's like the ringing in my ear. It's always there, but because it's
always there, sometimes I zone it out, whether something's playing in the
background. So at times it will peak a little bit higher than what is normal
is and you'll be like, Oh, I'm being irritable but you pay it no mind. I paid it no mind.

Q. Did anybody call you on it?
A. Oh, yeah, sure. [My wife] called me on it. Maybe [my partner] called me on it, couple folks at work, but it wasn't until I had been back from my little hiatus from when I took time off that they would start, I guess, seeing me and initially they would treat it like, okay, you know, he's just in a mood because of what happened. Then as it went on they realized that, well, he's still in a mood. We'll tolerate it, but if it gets to a point then we'll say something. You'd get a little bit but people were very cautious when talking about it.

Q. How did you feel when they would call you on it, did you get pissed off?
A. It depends. It depends on who and when and the times. Sometimes I would get pissed off and then shut down and just put on a good front. Other times I'd be like, you know, you do this and just kind of counterpoint kind of thing.

Q. Did you feel that you had to maybe even further isolate at that point?
A. Oh, sure, yeah, you get -- you're like, well, you don't want to be too irritable. You don't want to make other people more uncomfortable. At the time I was very perceptive, not perceptive, but very self-conscious about how I made people feel or how I was feeling, tried to hide it or maybe when I felt like I needed to show a certain emotion to something. For example, somebody was saying something, then it was humorous, everybody would laugh. I'm not really focused on a lot of stuff other than just maybe when everybody was laughing. So you kind of like maybe overcompensate, like what, what, that was really funny, and then everybody was like, That's not really funny, but I would be irritated and then become irritable because it was just you're constantly trying to measure how to react so that you would appear normal.

...you know, he'll never be the same guy he was before. I'll tell you, I remember we had to go to the FOP one night because prior to the shooting he had already said he would be the MC and they were doing the Gong Show. So I remember we had to go like shopping at the thrift store to find him something to wear, blah, blah, blah. He got there and I felt so bad for him and I don't know if anybody else saw it, but he was acting. I mean, he was acting, trying to be the old Chris Scallon and while he was MCing that event. It was exhausting for me to watch him trying to be okay. I don't remember what month it was. I just remember it wasn't too, too long after but maybe a couple months. Six months, I don't know. But I just remember that was exhausting, to watch him faking being happy.

In some instances, participants would state that they were not concerned or that they did not have a problem with a particular topic, but would simultaneously disclose
incidents of impression management related to that topic, which presents interesting
dynamics as the question could be raised to or for whom are they managing these
impressions: coworkers, the researcher or, in part, themselves?

A. Sleep disturbances, yeah, obviously having to take an Ambien and stuff.
Q. Okay. How long were you on the Ambien?
A. Nine months maybe, maybe almost a year.
Q. Okay.
A. And I wasn't prescribed it. I kept on getting sample -- I looked like a
crackhead coming out of -- I got a paper bag with a bunch of sample
packs of the Ambien.
Q. Okay.
A. So I was like, Okay.
Q. Were you afraid that anybody was going to find out that you were on
medications?
A. No, I don't think I was afraid of that. However, I do remember several
times because I take the -- I'd take like all the Ambien, kind of like put
them in a container so that they're all -- so I'm not like popping all this
shit open every time and I kept -- because I love just throwing shit in my
car. I remember one day walking out, it was in the POC, and I opened up
the back and I'm like, Oh, my God, there's like 100 packets of this Ambien
inght or the Lexapro and Ambien and all that shit like so I kind of was like
putting it in a bag and put it back in my car and I drove away and I think I
threw it out somewhere else like at a gas station, yeah.

One participant in particular, who voiced several commonly held cultural
stereotypes during the interview process as well as suggested at other factors that
potentially increase vulnerability to traumatic stress, made the following statement very
early on:

_I've never had a problem. I've been involved in shootouts, you know, I've been
involved -- I seen a lot of bad stuff. I've never had any issues with that. I've never
had stress from that. I've never -- it's never overwhelmed me. The most
frustrating thing is just the politics of the police bureaucracy and how things
work._

As suggested in the literature, the concepts of roles and impression management
are particularly important in addressing the psychological components of officer-involved
shootings. Several participants spoke to this interaction, recognizing the impact that the conflict between behavioral expectations and real experience, as well as the process of impression management can have on officers, noting that:

...if an introvert is involved in something that internalized something and then tries to maintain a front, this system will fail catastrophically and it will fail to the degree that the officer is either going to, A, take his life, take somebody else's life, going to be put into a situation where maybe an officer returns to work and shit doesn't need to be at work, that is just a single impact. Officer's significant other, spouse, officer's friends, officer's family, officer's coworkers, officer's immediate supervisors, officer's -- I mean, it's going to explode and ultimately we have nothing in place right now that will support an officer in crisis that will not be vocal about it or right now you got to hope that the officer gets physically ill in order to be evaluated or they hear about myself or somebody that's been dealing with this...

A. Yes, it does. It adds more stress to that officer.
Q. Yes.
A. So now he's dealing with what whatever critical incident he's been involved in. You know, whether being de -- focused on it or just being on the outskirt on it, now he has to focus on that as far as now my fellow police officers don't trust me or they think I'm weak, they think I can't handle the job.

What may be worse is that, based on the responses from several participants, other officers are aware of these attempts to manage impressions and can see through them, yet, without policy and procedure in place (as discussed at various points in this chapter, as well as in Chapter 7), as well as the fear of betraying a brother or sister in blue, these struggles are overlooked without intervention:

...and don't self-medicate. You know, don't seclude yourself. Don't, you know, not talk to people, you know. Because everybody else knows that you're screwed up. You know you're screwed up. You know you're not fooling anybody, but you know, get yourself to that point where you just make that decision. Everybody says, no, I would never do that. I've worked a lot of suicides. I've seen a lot of people dead who would have told you the exact same thing. I mean, I'm a firm believer after, you know, seeing some things that everybody -- it maybe so far way
off that it never happens, but there's something that, you know, mentally, physically, I don't know what happens, snaps in your brain that just tells you fuck it.

I'd seek help, counseling, peers or counsel from somebody. You know, I can't tell you how many times I went and talked to a pastor or priest or something of the same faith. To not be so worried about what other people think because that's a good percentage of it, that you're trying to get help. So you're not even trying to get help. You're worried about how to get help without having anybody know that you're getting help or so that's -- it's exhausting, so not being afraid to do it.

There were two remaining points that emerged when discussing impression management that were of note in the current study. First, there was the idea that impression management was not limited to the officer that pulled the trigger. This idea is illustrated in the discussions of the police culture and machismo, where officers on scene are scolded for an emotional response. One participant disclosed that, as someone in an investigative or supervisory capacity, the need for impression management also impacts this group of personnel, stating that:

...I'm sitting here thinking in my head, I'm supposed to call somebody. Who -- oh, I'm supposed to call the chief, the assistant chief, and the commanding officer of the Detective Division, commanding officer of Professional Standards. I'm trying to go through these things in my head. So I'm trying to focus, too, keep my head in the game, and I have this sensation. I don't know what it was, but I was walking across the floor, I had a sensation that I was like walking on a sticky surface or something, you know. I don't know why I had that, but it was just a sensation that I had. It's funny what goes through your head but you've got to force yourself to focus on what you're supposed to do. I mean, I don't care who you are, how much experience you have, how many times you've seen this, when you've got an event of this nature, you've got to bring yourself down to earth. You know, you've -- perhaps that's something that we can teach people, that you've got to get your head in the game, you know. You realize that, you know, something really, really bad has happened here. There's plenty of time to deal with that later, you know, your personal feelings and your emotions. Right now you've got to deal with taking care of the investigation, making sure there's nobody else here that's hurt, making sure that officers involved are safe. That's the most important thing for us to do right now. Everything else comes later. Our personal feelings, we'll deal with those later.
The final interesting observation was that, even though many participants acknowledged the deleterious effects of the police culture and the need to maintain the expected façade, several participants qualified their statements about expressing emotion or vulnerability, utilizing the same rhetoric they had just critiqued, making comments like:

"No, because you know, there's two type of people in the world. You know, there's those that are genuine and then those who want to appear overly genuine... You know, so for me, you know, when I go to these funerals and stuff and people like -- I just don't feel it, you know what I mean? Maybe I'm just real, but I'm like, I'm sorry but I can't cry because I don't even know the dude. I mean, it sucks but you know what I mean? So for me, I'm just like, you know, Are you all right? Yeah, I'm all right. All right. Good. You know, I don't know. I mean, people seem to ham it up a lot to be quite honest with you, on those things. I've seen like deaths in the Marine Corps and stuff like that and some on the police department. Some people are just like, come on, man..."

"...At the same time, be very careful that you're not becoming overly like, Oh, woe, is me and using it in that aspect to gain something. It should be genuine."
know, people that are just -- they're characters, just weep from the get-go... you
know what I mean, you're always going to have like that 10, 20, some may say
30 percent of people who shouldn't even be freaking doing this job in today's day
and age, not your father's day and age. It was must lower because people were
doing this job. They wanted to do the job for the career, you know, be a cop. You
know, today a lot of people, you know, 2004, 2005 got out of college, couldn't find
a job.

This section addresses the theoretical relevance of Erving Goffman’s (1959)
concept of impression management in officer-involved shooting incidents. This concept
works through and in conjunction with many of the themes discussed in this chapter and
is often a mechanism deployed to avoid stigma, to be discussed in the following section.
Further, while it can be expected that the officer who pulled the trigger may feel the need
to manage his or her impressions, particularly with colleagues and supervisors, it was
apparent that there are multiple individuals managing impressions—to include family and
friends who feel they have to gauge the officer's mood, colleagues who may be suffering
from secondary or tertiary trauma victimization, and supervisors who must remain a
command presence and stifle their own reactions—and that these managed impressions
are often occurring in the midst of interacting with each other. As such, it is easy to see
how a shooting can be a dramaturgical production, with each player attempting to
maintain a semi-scripted role while relegating their emotional responses and other
contradictory responses to the backstage area. If these attempts to maintain the façade of
what should be, and if, as several participants suggest, these efforts are transparent, then
there is the possibility that effective and swift intervention may be made for all parties
suffering from trauma-related symptoms, provided there is adequate policy and procedure
in place. This potential for intervention is particularly critical because, as noted in
multiple locations in this study, the effects of stress and trauma can impact not only the
officer's coping in terms of drinking, but also interpersonal relationships and their behavior when interacting with citizens. Thus, intervention may decrease personal stress (Bartol and Bartol 2008) for the officer, but may also have the added benefit of preemptively avoiding negative or escalated interactions with citizens, possibly even future shooting incidents.

Sub Theme 2: Stigma

The second concept from Goffman (1963) that is particularly relevant to the current study is stigma, defined as “the situation of the individual who is disqualified from full social acceptance.” With stigma, there is a great reliance on perceptions of the stereotype associated with the stigma, while the reality of the individual may diverge greatly from this depiction. While not necessarily related to the perception of the stereotype associated with the stigma, perceptions did play a role in the discussions of this topic, with participants stating that:

_It's a funny thing about these things, but you have officers themselves like Chris who's involved in a shooting and it stays with him because he's the one that's involved in it, you know, you hear about it, and you're concerned, of course, but over in a very short period of time, everybody else moves on from it, and you don't even think about it anymore. So you know, I can sit here and probably name a few people that themselves have been involved in shootings but for the most part, you don't retain that. Everybody else kind of moves on with their lives and that's one of the things that kind of struck me about these types of incidents, that it really sticks with the person who was involved. Everybody else moves on. But it really sticks with those who are involved... Look, these things happen in this business, you know, what you're feeling is normal. You feel like when you're walking down the hallway everybody is looking at you thinking, yeah, he was the one involved in that shooting two weeks ago. That's true for about the first few days. They know you've been involved in a shooting but I'm here to tell you, after that nobody thinks about that anymore but you do because it involves you, but nobody even thinks about that anymore but that's what we try to really express to those that we're sitting down with, that you know, you're not going through_
anything that nobody else around here has gone through. Anybody who has ever been involved in an incident like this are going to have the same feelings that you do. It's absolutely normal.

Q. Do you feel that people reacted or responded to you differently after your shooting?
A. Hands down, yes.
Q. Can you tell me about it?
A. Cautious, maybe overzealous. It depends on who they were before or they knew -- or if we knew each other before. Handful of recruits are comfortable in coming to me, a handful of officers that I met as recruits are comfortable. I think the stigma is less significant with them, whereas officers I have known for a while, I had a recent officer who was in crisis, who knew me prior to my shooting. It was a little bit more awkward for that individual but ultimately everybody -- some people treat me fine and some of those people that treat me fine I may be thinking treat me different. So it's one of those -- they may not and I may think. So they may and I may not think so, like a perception kind of thing.

A stigma can be based upon something that is physically visible, such as a physical handicap or deformity, or it can be based on something internalized that, once known by those with whom an individual is interacting, causes the recognized others to turn away from or have a different perception of the individual (Goffman 1963). In the case of officer-involved shootings, unless the officer is physically injured and bears some visible manifestation of that injury, stigma is usually related to the invisible and the internalized. Stigma, although often associated with something negative, may also be positive. This duality of positive and negative stigma can be seen in the current study, with participants stating:

Q. Do you think there's a stigma associated with being involved in a shooting?
A. No, there's a stigma in the reaction to it and the treatment of it. Being in a shooting is actually very it's glorified.
Q. Okay. Because there can be positive and negative stigma?
A. Yeah, it's a positive like, Hey, that guy's, you know, man's man or police person or police person. He stood up. He handled business and
depending on the situation or the incident, Oh, my God, that person shouldn't have been firing this and that. So again, it's dependent really. There's stigmas both ways.

Q. Okay.
A. Good and bad, with critical incidents. Now, being open about it, I think the greatest stigma is negative and where just suck it up really. To this day we're hearing people say that. I had a supervisor when I tried pulling when I pulled somebody out of a situation into an administrative position be like, What's the matter with this individual? He can't handle stress or anything? That's not the case. That's the supervisor who's inept of unable to identify an individual in a legitimate crisis and because of that, he refers to or defaults to just man up. You know, so I think that's the negative stigma and if you're identifying or you're claiming, hey, you know what, I'm having some problems, I think it shows a weakness in a profession that capitalizes and thrives on somebody's ability to self moderate or to fight through the adverse positions. That's true for a short period of time. We're supposed to suck it up. I don't want somebody breaking down in the middle of a gunfight or the middle of a fight, but to expect the individual to keep that degree of, you know, kind of manning up, for lack of a better term, for a long duration is insane, it's inhumane. We can't do that.

As far as being treated differently by our peers, you know, they saw us as heroes. I don't necessarily think I was a hero. I was just doing my job... All that stuff in the paper and all those awards and everything, you can keep all that crap. That's not what I got into this for.

Q. All right. Talk to me about the honors and awards you got from your shooting.
A. Commonwealth Metal of Valor, Top Cop from NAPO. I'm sorry, it was a Commonwealth something. The Commonwealth gave me something but then there was also the Commonwealth Public Safety Metal of Valor, which is by the Governor Top Cop, National Top Cop, I think I got officer of the quarter and officer of the year.

Q. So how did you feel about receiving those awards?
A. Good and bad. It's a nice recognition but at the same time it's... I think I explained it to somebody that they're more... they're more of a reminder of the people that have gone because the higher the award, the likelier it was that you should have been dead, is the way I look at it, but the awards are there to remind you that there's a hierarchy of (inaudible) of exposure and it's a visual way to gauge it. Like I always wear the awards. I always do. If I wear this uniform, I do. I think it's important. Some guys make jokes about it and it's funny because some guys tell it just to be funny because they know me and some guys say it and you can tell there's a little I ain't got shit. I ain't got recognized. In the same time, everybody that's worked for me, everybody that's a supervisor, I've written up. In K-9, I wrote
people that didn't even work for me in K-9, but everybody received awards whereas the mentality is that somebody shouldn't. Your job is to do that. You know what your job is, to literally, is not get in trouble for 8, 10, 12 hours, whatever shift you're working. That's it. When you start going out there and beating the bushes and doing above and beyond the minimum standards, you know what, you need to be recognized for it. It's just...it's a battling, you know, idea of what's right, what's wrong, but good and bad at times to me, it's a reminder of the experiences and I have these and (inaudible) with my military awards and I just...it's a nice reminder. You want to forget, but at the same time, you don't want to forget, but it's a nice reminder. It's a happy reminder, but at times, having people ask you know what's, that sometimes, I don't like that. Sometimes, Oh, it's for a shooting, not 15 minutes, it was prolonged, an involved, just a shooting. You know, this one was for, you know, going in a burning building when somebody was holding somebody hostage, you know, I got that for arresting somebody. So I'll play it down because, A, I don't know the person. I don't talk to them, or I don't think it warrants getting into.

Q. So did you get any other awards with your shooting?
A. Yeah, I got Virginia Department of Valor Award, couple others like Police Chief Associate Award for Bravery, you know, for like the longest they just sat in boxes in my room, but then I had a nice man room when I was married to my wife, put them all up, but if it wasn't for her hanging them up they probably would have still been in the box, but yeah, got a couple of awards.

Q. Okay. How do you feel about those?
A. I mean, don't get me wrong, I appreciate them, but not that I did anything that I would never expect them, you know, if they did it then that's good, but definitely don't do this for an accolades or the pats on the back.

Q. Because they're not always going to come.
A. No, ma'am.

It appears that the participant that suggested that positive stigma was associated the actual shooting and negative stigma tends to be associated with the reaction to the shooting voiced a rather perceptive understanding of the police culture. While the comments above note awards and being viewed as heroes (even if the officers did not internalize these positive stigma), the comments below reveal the negative stigma associated with being in a shooting and, the most damning of all, needing help in the aftermath to cope with the emotions and behaviors experienced.
I think I wish there was something like mandatory for him, like not him, but when he went through that, like mandatory, you have to go to this psychologist or you have to go talk to this person where it doesn't become a choice anymore. Like, Oh, if I go talk to a doctor, people are going to think that I'm crazy, and if you make it mandatory everybody has to do it while you might still be crazy, but everybody else has to do it, too, so just making somebody get help that's too proud to get it themselves and I hope that you know that would come out of the work.

... That's just the alpha personality I think to me because they figure if you ask for help then you're weak and then people start saying you're weak and they'll say, We can't trust [him]. He don't have our back. It doesn't mean he don't have your back because you need some help with something, but most people will say that and they have not been doing anything but they're quick to say that, you know what I'm saying. Oh, he don't have our back no more. You don't even know what it is to have our back. You haven't been what me and Chris been through, you know, but if I ask for help, you telling me I'm weak, now you can't trust me. So, yeah, that's something that should not be done.

... all critical incidents are different and all people deal with them in different ways but, you know, if it's officer involved shooting or an officer has gotten injured in a car accident or something, you've got to have somebody out there that's been through that. They can be out there and talk to the officer and you brought it up and also talk to the officers that are out there on scene, you know, to get everybody in the room and discuss what's happened, you know, to get their feelings out there. Nobody wants to, you know, let the fellow officer know I'm a little disturbed about what happened. It makes you seem like you're weak.

Q. So do you think there's a stigma with that?
A. Oh, of course it is. Oh, yes, it is.

Q. Okay. So what happens if somebody appears weak?
A. I think he's shunned by his fellow police officers.

Q. Which compounds the issue?
A. Yes, it does. It adds more stress to that officer.

... but there is a definite sense of how you're supposed to be like after you get in a shooting.

Q. So do you think that makes it a little bit more difficult if you are struggling with it, to kind of put it out there?
A. Yeah, I mean, can I speak bluntly?
Q. Yeah.
A. Oh, yeah, because people are going to look at you like you're a pussy.
Q. Yeah.
A. And they're not going to think that you're if you become a blubbery idiot, they're going to be like, I don't want to work around that dude. When things get tough he's going to go running.

Q. What about mandatory psychological evaluations?
A. Mandatory, I don't think so... It should absolutely be made available for somebody who feels that they want to reach out and talk to somebody, but mandatory, no, and there's two different, you know, like schools of thought. One is some guys would just be like, I don't need it, and they very well might not need it. Other guys are like, Whoa, shit, I don't want them sending me, like I'm going to go see a shrink. Next thing you know they'll have me in the rubber gun squad, you know what I mean. So people are also going to get, you know, he can't even handle it, you know, which is all fake. That's all like false bravado like, you know, some of the biggest tough guys run the other way when stuff happens, but that's just problems, you know, I guess genetically within our society that we have to deal with.

One participant, upon discussing the obligation to act when an officer is off duty, made a statement that implies that an officer may be stigmatized no matter what they do (as in the current case) or do not do (not in the current case), as noted below.

For Chris there was nothing he could do. I don't even know if he was like, You got to be fucking kidding me. This is the last thing that I needed, but knowing Chris, he's going to do the right thing whether it cost him his life. That night he was going to go in and make sure the clerk was okay because he recognized it was a robbery. If Chris would have got in that car and drove away he would have been a fucking scum bag and you would never have had nothing to say to him.

In Chapter 2, it was suggested that stigma can manifest in the form of Locker Room Shock (Jones 1989) and similar feelings of being different from other officers who have not been involved in a shooting incident, leading to possibly deepened feelings of isolation (Jones 1989, Kirschman 2007, Tucker 2011). This was supported in the current study, with participants making comments such as the following:

So I know some called and checked on him and I know some like, Yeah, good job, way to get him, and that bothered the shit out of him, too. So I didn't want him
to be upset about something else so I really didn't bring up the whole friend part. I just did my best to be there for him.

Q. Did you have because I know Chris was really bothered by some of the comments like, you know, way to go, killer, good job, you know?
A. Yeah.
Q. Did you get any of those?
A. Yeah.
Q. And did it bother you?
A. Yeah, because people say that and they're not in the situation. They don't know. Because like my guy, like going through the incident, the one who shot me, the last shot we were like right in front of each other, and I choose to shoot him in the chest, and they was like, You should have shot him in the fucking head, you know, like you know, what is that to say, you know what I'm saying, you should have just shot him in the head and just killed him. You should have just emptied your clip in him. That's what people would say, and I am thinking, You weren't there, you know what I'm saying. Why would you give this opinion, you know, so it definitely bothers you. I know how Chris felt about that because everybody when they should have done what they would have done, but you don't know that... They should stop Monday morning quarterbacking and stop giving their suggestions, what they would have done, how they would have handled it, because you don't know. It's easy to talk the talk, but once the rubber hits the road, you're not going to know how you act until that happens.

...Absolutely, and there's plenty and I forget who mentioned it. I'm almost going to say it was [my psychologist] because he had done, I guess, a lot of research on officer involved shootings and things of that nature, and he says, You've joined the ranks of an elite group of law enforcement. I said, How so? He said, The majority of law enforcement that are involved in this are very minimal, like time wise. You were in a long, drawn out encounter. He goes, There's only a handful of people that understand that and when you constantly get in the, Oh, man, I wish I was there or good job or way to take that fucking scumbag out kind of shit, you're just like, they don't understand and just distance myself. I literally wouldn't and again, it was only a handful, maybe [an officer] and with [this officer] I was there when he was shot. I was there when [another officer] was shot, maybe talked to them once or twice, nothing in depth and then you just feel like no one gets it. So you avoid people and we literally, if [my partner] had to pick me up from home and we went to work I'd, we'd drive around and we'd go get something to eat and drive around some more and he just kind of did that because I said, I'm not sitting in that fucking office
listening to people because they have no idea and I hated walking down the hall to do whatever because they knew they just didn't get it. There's a definite disconnect between me and everybody.

Most participants recognized the negative impacts that stigma has on an officer who has been involved in a shooting, particularly related to the officer's willingness to admit to needing help, professional or otherwise. As one participant observed,

A. Talk to somebody. You have to talk to somebody.
Q. Okay.
A. Can't hold it in.
Q. Okay.
A. You can't. You can't do it. Forget, you know, what you've heard in the past talking about your feelings makes you seem weak. No, it doesn't. You can't bottle that stuff up. You got to get it out there or else it will eat you up inside... But like I said, we've got to get away from that, you know, get back on the horse, you know. So what, you got shot or so what, you killed a guy. Get back on the horse. I need you back at work tomorrow, you know.
Q. Do you find that there's any at least in your experience or anything, you know, who has been through a critical incident that there's almost a facade that they put up, yeah, I'm great, I'm fine, I got this, I'm good?
A. Some do, yeah, some do.
Q. And do you think that ties into both the police culture and the stigma?
A. Uh-huh.
Q. So how do we break through with that?
A. Critical incident team properly trained and ready to go out to talk to these police officers and a lot of it is going to be the team convincing that officer that it's okay to talk about it. It's okay to show your true feelings and that it's not okay to bottle this up inside because it will lead you down the dark path and maybe, you know, eventually suicide.
Q. Or other some form --
A. Yeah, some other self-destruction, you know, type of thing.

Participants also acknowledged that efforts need to be made to reduce the stigma associated with seeking help. This discussion often contained an element associated to policy changes or veiled references to departmental politics, as seen in the quotes below:

...This is the damage we're doing to our investment. By this time these officers -- we've already invested $100,000 in these kids between salary, benefits, training, equipment, all this other stuff. We've invested all this money and now this kid is worthless. So we've just pissed away $100,000.
Q. Uh-huh.
A. Or we could spend a little bit extra and let's revamp our mental health processes here. Let's look at not just the guys that are involved in acute traumatic incidents but these guys that are in these chronic situations where day after day, year after year it's just little tiny layers building -- you know, one snowflake doesn't hurt anything but a million of them blowing 50 miles an hour becomes a blizzard. Well, it's still a snowflake. It's just one at a time but now you've got all of them piled on at one time and eventually that -- the weight of that cracks some people. Those guys need to be addressed. Now, the stigma needs to be taken away from it, which is hard to do, but if you start early and continually repeat that message there's an opportunity to break through that barrier and say, Okay, this is part of what we do. Part of what we do now is you have an annual physical evaluation to be fit for duty. You have to go to it every year on your birthday month. Every year you have to go. What's the harm in hiring a professional to have a mental health evaluation as part of your fit for duty letter? Hey, yeah, this guy is going to have some issues or this guy has been drinking has ass off. If nothing else, that should be a red flag for the people trying to protect themselves from the liability issues.

Q. All right. How do you incorporate your experience into the training you provide to other officers, both formally and informally?
A. How do I what?
Q. Incorporate your experience.
A. I'm honest.
Q. Okay.
A. I think I highlight the faults of it and I highlight the pitfalls. I don't do that -- well, you know, saying, Hey, I've made it through. I'm good. That's -- no one in the beginning or in the inception of their crisis is -- they don't see that far ahead. I tell them I drink. I tell them I didn't sleep. I tell them I was upset emotionally. I was scared. I cried. I was afraid. I was angry. I tell them the stuff that is not cool to tell somebody and in doing so, I think they -- they start to see that we share some common themes here, that what I initially thought what got me upset and what I thought was I was by myself was actually not so much by myself, that it's, normal. But it's so abnormal in the culture so I bring that into it and I make no holds barred. I don't make myself out to be somebody that's great. I highlight the fact that I have fallen. But at the same time, I did get up and I wasn't by myself. It was through the help of my family, through the help of my friends, through the help of professional help despite the bravado, and the more I've gone through it, the more I've taught and the more I've counseled with people and just talked with them and stuff. The more I see those individuals acting out and in one place the lieutenant at the time, who was a guy, Just suck it up and get back. He has
no clue and he's in charge. He's near a command level position and he has no concept of what's good. The funny thing is he is not one of those that is old enough to be one of those, Oh, back in the day. I was back in the day the same time you were. You're an idiot and he's very -- and that's just a lack of exposure to anything. That was somebody that spent more time studying being promoted than he ever did doing anything.

As noted in the quote above, one potential way to reduce the stigma associated with officer-involved shootings is for officers to come forward with their stories in an effort to normalize the post-trauma symptoms, as Chris does. Another avenue, as suggested by Malmin (2012), for reducing stigma is for administrators to make a commitment to changing policy which should, over time, begin to impact the culture.

Conclusion

This chapter examined the five major themes, as well as their components, that emerged from the analysis of interview transcripts in the current study. These themes—the role of previous trauma, coping, cultural influences, the impact on others and application of Goffman’s (1959, 1963) work on impression management and stigma—were found to be interrelated and often were difficult to disentangle. Additionally, these themes allowed for a deep and rich exploration and understanding of a shooting incident from various perspectives, to include the officer who pulled the trigger, his partner, his spouse, supervisors, investigators and colleagues and friends. Some of the concepts and groups explored in this chapter are often overlooked in the literature and should be given attention in future research. The author found that Goffman’s (1959, 1963) work was quite applicable to the given research questions and data and provides a strong theoretical approach to understanding the current case. Additionally, the researcher has not previously seen Goffman applied as a theoretical lens through which to examine policing.
Goffman's concepts of impression management and stigma. These concepts become key because, in anticipating the response of others to his or her stigma, the officer involved in a shooting may feel like they are perpetually on stage, hiding his or her true self and reactions from all persons. The concepts of impression management and stigma may also be intertwined in what can be considered the gendered nature of police work (Chan, Doran and Marel 2010, Chan, Devery and Doran 2003, Martin and Jurik 1996/2006, Martin 1999, Morash and Haarr 2012, Prokos and Padavic 2002). If police work is indeed a manifestation of hegemonic masculinity (Prokos and Padavic 2002) and a means of doing gender (Chan, Doran and Marel 2010, Morash and Haarr 2012), then appearing weak or giving into more "feminine" emotions would be unacceptable for an officer that has been involved in a critical incident. This desire to avoid the stigma of not being a tough, macho man may lead to efforts to manage impressions so that colleagues and supervisors are not aware of maladaptive coping strategies, impeding recognition of a problem and appropriate intervention efforts. Similarly, the more positive responses of stigmatized individuals, seeing the effect of being stigmatized as a secret blessing and leading to a change in perspective (Goffman 1963), may be related to Kirschman's (2007) concept of posttraumatic growth. Utilizing both the themes that emerged, as well as this theoretical frame, this chapter provides a starting point to examine the topic of officer-involved shootings in a way that they have not been studied in the extant literature while also acknowledging that there are multiple individuals whose perspectives must be sought and integrated to garner a truly holistic understanding of these events.
CHAPTER VII
FINDINGS: OTHER ANALYSES

Introduction: News Media, Policy and Participant Observation Analyses

The current study is a case study and, as such, a variety of sources of data were utilized to achieve a full and rich understanding of the single officer-involved shooting at the heart of this research. In achieving that understanding, the current research incorporated a variety of analyses, some of which went beyond Chris's shooting incident in the effort to contextually situate it within the broader political and psychological understandings of officer-involved shootings. The following chapter provides the remaining analyses, conducted on the various data sources in the current study, excluding the interviews conducted with study participants. This chapter will provide detailed accounts of significant events related to the researcher's participation in the police culture as well as how those events influenced the current study, a news media analysis on all known articles related to Chris's shooting, and finally a policy analysis to situate the PD's current policies within the standards set by national and state accreditation commissions and best practice models.

Participant Observations

As outlined in the methodology for the current study (see Chapter 4), this study had a significant degree of positionality that had to be explicated, due to the researcher's identity—her background as the child of a police officer and her position as a long term intern with the PD. These experiences influenced the current research because they not only aided in refining the research process as it evolved, but they also provided a deeper
level of interaction with the topic and understanding that would not have been possible if the researcher had merely been an "outsider" exploring this topic. Ho (1997) and Alpert and Fridell (1992) suggested that the lack of comprehensive research on officer-involved shootings may be due to the scarcity of the opportunity to observe these incidents in the field. Yet, due to the researcher's position as an intern, she has been able to observe both events that could have resulted in the application of lethal force, as well as the procedural and psychological aftermath of shooting incidents.

Further, as Hahn (2006) summarized, "you see, I am situated inside of me, I see, I hear, taste, smell, and think this from me. When I take me out to do fieldwork, me always tags along;" this is true in the current study. The researcher cannot be divorced from her role as an intern, her role as a friend and colleague, her role as a social scientist or her role as the child of a law enforcement officer, as they are some of the many facets that together comprise who the researcher is as an individual. Each of these roles feeds and informs each other, so that knowledge gained in the field provides insights that impact the research process and, in turn, the research influences the researcher's behavior in and observations while in the field. Outlined below are some of the more salient experiences the researcher experienced while researching this topic; again, as noted in the methodology, the researcher was an active participant in these events, several of which involved highly emotional situations that impacted the researcher deeply.

The current study did not begin as a planned topic for a doctoral dissertation, rather, it was initially supposed to be a relatively small summer research project that would be interesting and yield a publication or two. Conversations between the researcher and Chris began during the Fall Semester of 2009, which was the researcher's
first semester in the doctoral program. After one or two conversations, it was quickly recognized by both Chris and the researcher that this would be a much larger endeavor than originally assumed and thus began the current study. The events outlined below provided the researcher with a variety of learning opportunities while, in some cases, also immersing her more deeply within the police culture, thus increasing her access to information and credibility among officers.

*A Death in the Family*

To situate this incident in time, relationships and impact, it is important to backtrack a bit. The researcher first began her internship with the PD in December 2007 to complete a requisite field placement for her Masters degree. She was assigned to the Detective Bureau and spent the majority of her time with the Field Forensics Unit due to her background, interests and training. This field placement consisted of two weeks over the Christmas holidays and one week over the Easter break, working 40 hours each week. Initially, fitting in to this unit was difficult. Everyone was nice and polite, but distant. It was discovered after several days that the detectives only knew that the researcher was getting a graduate degree in psychology and that she had been placed as an intern by an Assistant Chief of Police; the assumption was that she was there to perform covert psychological evaluations of the detectives and report back to the Assistant Chief. Once that misperception was refuted, the researcher became quite close with her colleagues and her immediate supervisor. Indeed, the researcher is still quite close with several of the individuals that she encountered during that initial intern experience. The Sergeant in Field Forensics was open and welcoming, and over time, the researcher grew quite fond of him. During non-busy periods at work, the researcher and the Sergeant would have
long discussions on a host of topics, ranging from personal lives—such as his marriage and health—to literature to politics to the state of the criminal justice system.

The researcher completed her field placement and her Masters degree, and spent a year working in private maritime security. After deciding to pursue her doctorate, the researcher was given special permission to return to the PD as an indefinite intern to maintain her practical experience. The researcher’s former Sergeant had been promoted and was now a Lieutenant in one of the precincts. However, he was still open and welcoming—always taking a few minutes to stop and chat with the researcher when they came into contact, even taking all of the forensics personnel—his old crew—out to eat in the wee hours of the morning on an overnight shift.

On the morning March 21, 2011, the researcher had several missed calls from one of the forensics detectives during a doctor’s appointment. The researcher’s mother, who had gone to the appointment with the researcher, also received text messages and missed calls from the same detective, asking if she was with the researcher. As many people would also assume, this was not considered to be an indicator of good news, and the researcher sent the detective a text, asking what was going on. She was immediately asked if she was sitting down and if someone was with her. After receiving an affirmative response, the detective called the researcher and told her that she wanted her to “hear from family” and not on the news, but their former Sergeant was dead. The researcher asked what had happened and was informed that both the Lieutenant and his wife were found in their home with fatal gunshot wounds after his wife failed to report to work. Immediately, the researcher asked if it had been a home invasion or if it was somehow work-related and the detective started to become emotional, revealing that it
was an apparent murder-suicide. Immediately, the researcher was in disbelief, asking if the detective was certain.

The next few days were a blur for the researcher, talking to colleagues from the police department often. During one of those conversations, a colleague remarked that they were confused—very sad at one moment and angry at the Lieutenant the next. These sentiments were echoed by the researcher. One memory that stood out during that time period involved the researcher becoming physically ill when viewing news media coverage of this incident, demonstrating the significant emotional and physiological toll this incident took on the researcher. Further, due to another traumatic incident that occurred within the researcher's academic community just over two weeks prior to the Lieutenant's suicide (which was also still impacting the researcher and her colleagues), the researcher did not disclose the tragedy to her academic peers or supervisors immediately. At one point, the researcher's father confronted the researcher, stating that she needed to talk about these incidents. When she responded that she did not want to talk about it, her father, a career law enforcement officer with over thirty years of experience, told her that he did not want to see her "make his mistakes" by trying to maintain a tough façade and bottling up her emotions and reactions. This moment, for the researcher, was a very needed reality check because, in that moment, she realized that she was tacitly accepting and replicating the very stereotypes and behavioral expectations that her research (still in its very early stages at that point) indicated were problematic and detrimental to officer well-being.

There was a great deal of confusion over how and why this had happened—no one had seen warning signs. It was known that the Lieutenant had a diagnosis of PTSD,
but that he was medically managed. He and his wife had not been having any marital
difficulties that anyone knew of—indeed were one of the happiest and most “in love”
couples ever seen—and had made plans to have construction work done on their home.
There was no excessive debt, no signs of marital infidelity. The Lieutenant had not been
involved in any recent critical incidents and had not experienced any major stressors or
losses, as far as anyone could see. This confusion was underscored in an interview with
one participant in the current study who expressed his disbelief in the following words:

... we had an officer who -- a lieutenant who took his own life, killed his wife and
took his own life... He was my good friend. I knew him before he joined the police
department. He was a young 16-year-old stock worker at the old Center Shops at
Wards Corner. You know, he worked there as a stock clerk and some other
officers and I worked part time there and he came on the department about ten
years later, after he spent some time in the Army, but just the type of person to
this day, I don't know what could have possibly happen in his life because I never
saw anybody that I felt was more well-adjusted than him, just a good personality
and a bright outlook all the time, never seen him angry and to this day that
puzzles me. I think something like that bothers me more than anything I've been
involved in. What was going on in this guy's life, what was going on in his head,
and we've all taken a great deal of training involving police officer suicide and
looking for those signs that would point you in that direction to think this person
has a possible -- I can see the danger signs here. There were no danger signs
there. Nobody saw them.

It was later determined that the medications used to treat the Lieutenant’s PTSD
had been changed and that he had told a colleague that he was having terrible nightmares
on the new medications. The best hypothesis of the event involves the Lieutenant having
a nightmare/night terror, firing his weapon (which he was known to keep close to his bed)
and killing his wife. When he realized what he had done, it is assumed he turned his
weapon on himself.

The researcher chose to attend the funeral services when many of her colleagues
decided not to attend. There was also quite a bit of discussion related to whether or not
this would be a “police” funeral or if the department should even send an announcement regarding planned services as an official e-mail, if officers could or should wear their uniforms, etc. To be quite honest, attending this funeral was one of the most difficult things the researcher had ever done, especially when a male sergeant who was quite close to both the Lieutenant (their wives worked together and his wife was the one who reported that the Lieutenant’s wife had not come into work) and the researcher, began crying when he saw the researcher. After a brief embrace where he continued to weep, the Sergeant pushed the researcher away and stated that he had held it together until he saw her and he needed to be strong right now because people—his wife included—expected him to be strong. When this incident was discussed well over a year later, the Sergeant stated that, for some reason, seeing the researcher at the funeral “broke” him and he recalled how emotional he became. He disclosed that, in some ways, he wished the researcher had not been there because her presence triggered such a strong and emotional reaction.

This event was horrific and had a significant impact on the current research. When the current study began, it was an interesting topic, but was not a topic in which the researcher was highly invested. After the Lieutenant’s suicide, witnessing the way that PTSD and mental health issues were talked about in hushed whispers and officers were attempting to avoid discussing the event at all and conceal or suppress their grief, the current research became personally significant to the researcher. It was a moment of clarity about the police culture, stigma, and the far reaching impacts of critical incidents. Another clear memory involves discussing this insight with another colleague, where the researcher effectively stated that “enough was enough.” The researcher was unable to
give her class the planned lecture on police suicide that semester without sobbing, but every semester since then, utilizing the model provided by the Police Benevolence Association (PAB) (see www.pbfi.org), the researcher starts her lecture on officer stress, survivability and resilience with a story that begins with “I wish you knew my old supervisor....”

As noted above, this incident made this research personal in a way that added significant depth and understanding to what PTSD can do to an officer, his or her family, and all officers that know that officer. By experiencing this trauma, sharing it with the police family, the researcher not only truly experienced this incident as “one of the family,” but further solidified her position within that family. That phone call in April 2011 was the first notification where the researcher was called so that she would be informed of something before it was released to the media, but it certainly would not be the last; since then, the researcher has received numerous phone calls related to incidents such as the murder of an PD officer, officer-involved shootings, miscarriages and failed interpersonal relationships, arrests and PTSD/mental health incidents involving officers.

**Working in the Aftermath of Shooting Incidents**

The researcher has had the opportunity to work in the immediate aftermath of two officer-involved shootings in the course of her internship. The first shooting occurred in the early morning hours of July 11, 2010. The researcher was scheduled to work the evening shift with the Field Forensics Unit (1330 to 2130). Upon arriving at the Police Operations Center, it was discovered that the forensics detective from the previous night shift (2130 to 0530) was still finishing up his paperwork in the office. Around the precinct, there was an expected amount of tension—everyone was asking who was
involved, what had happened, etc. The most commonly heard response to those questions was that the officers involved were “new officers, just cut loose” assigned to the second precinct.

The researcher was told that this shooting had gone out as three separate calls that no one knew were related—a hit and run, shots fired and a fight. Officers responded to the hit and run and were getting a victim/witness statement when the citizen said that’s the car that hit ours driving down the street. A brief vehicle pursuit followed. The suspect exited his vehicle and officers noticed a weapon. A foot pursuit ensued. At some point the suspect made a furtive movement/turned and the police opened fire. This all occurred at the top of the “Hole” (a pejorative nickname for a crime ridden section of the city), and the shooting occurred in a grassy lot near Sewells Point Road and F Avenue. It was later discovered that this 18 year old man had had multiple violent felony warrants outstanding in several local jurisdictions, including Norfolk. This was not known to the officers at the time of the shooting.

The researcher and the forensics detective took pictures of the original hit and run vehicle when the victim brought it to the POC to complete the report. Later, upon seeing the suspect vehicle at the forensics garage bay, there were paint transfers of the appropriate color, but damage to both vehicles indicates that the offender was likely driving on the wrong side of the street. It was quite eerie and unsettling to see a patrol car in the forensics garage. During the shift, the researcher and the forensics detective drove past the shooting scene twice—a makeshift memorial had been erected in the field. There were many people out and about, glaring at the police vehicle. There were a few politically incorrect jokes made about the citizenry not trusting the “po-po” in the car and
the detective was quite glad they were not openly displaying firearms. The researcher was instructed that, should she see a weapon, she needed to warn the detective, then get on the floorboard of the van and stay there. Needless to say, tension and discomfort were high, particularly when transiting or answering calls in the general vicinity of the shooting.

Around 2000 hours, a call went out regarding a female who had collapsed at a vigil for the suspect. The caller stated that EMS and police should be sent before disconnecting the call. Everyone the researcher spoke with was on edge as police responded—afraid this was a powder keg or that a potential situation might develop. Officers cleared the scene and reported that there were approximately 100 people at the vigil. By this point, media had already had the crying mother and friends of the suspect on TV stating that he had been “shot in the back,” “warning shots should have been fired,” “someone was going to pay for this,” and that the “police were covering stuff up.” The fatal shot was to the back, but the researcher was informed it was in an area consistent with turning. After the collapse call, approximately a half an hour later there was a call for four shots fired at Sewells Point Road and F Avenue—the same location of the officer-involved shooting the night before. Tension increased again and the researcher and several officers discussed the possibility that the police were being baited into the area (which has little to no cover) or if “they” were waiting for only one unit to respond to retaliate.

At the end of the shift, the researcher realized that extended period of anxiety and unrest pervades the police department, not just the community, in the aftermath of a shooting incident. This fear and tension post-shooting is a topic that may have
potentially been raised in a participant interview, but it is equally likely that the researcher would not have been aware of this facet of a shooting event. This experience further informed the understanding of secondary and tertiary victimization of other officers, including those who may not have even been on duty, let alone on scene, when the shooting incident occurred. Additionally, this experience provided insight into coping mechanisms, such as humor, as well as the concerns regarding retaliatory violence from the community.

The second shooting incident occurred in December of 2010. The call began as a domestic incident where a woman was reported to have been chasing her husband with a sledgehammer. When the officer arrived on scene, the woman was in a car. She refused to comply with orders to turn off the vehicle and get out of the car. The officer reached through the window to turn off the ignition and the woman bit down on his forearm and rolled up the driver's side window, trapping the officer as she began to reverse into a busy street. The officer ordered the woman to stop and indicated he would shoot her. She again did not comply and, fearing for his life, as he was being dragged, hanging predominantly outside of the car, he shot her twice in the chest.

This incident happened in the evening on a Saturday and the researcher received a phone call notifying her that the event had occurred while she was at a restaurant, having dinner with family. During the week prior to this shooting, the researcher and Chris had discussed how unsettled he was by the statistic that states he is at an increased risk to be involved in another shooting. When the researcher was notified that there had been an officer-involved shooting, the person who called her made some comment to the effect of "guess who was involved in another shooting." Due to the conversation the week before,
the researcher assumed that the officer involved was Chris and was immediately preparing to leave the restaurant. The officer on the phone realized the assumption and promptly apologized. The researcher did know the officer involved, but was told to be prepared to come into work early for day shift (0530 to 1330) the following day.

When the researcher arrived for work, she and the detective she was working with were sent to the shooting scene, which was still active, to provide "fresh eyes" in the search for one missing cartridge case from the officer's weapon. Again, the researcher was able to observe firsthand the tension and gallows humor, as well as the need for perfection in the investigative process due to the intense media and public scrutiny in the aftermath of a shooting incident. The researcher also obtained firsthand experience of a different variety: the very real fear and threat of retaliation by family members of victim and the community. Soon after arriving on scene, the researcher and the detective she was partnered with located the missing cartridge case. Another detective asked the researcher to stand with the evidence while they retrieved the necessary documentary and collection equipment from the van.

While the researcher was waiting near the evidence, which was outside of the asphalt parking lot of the apartment complex where the shooting occurred, some of the victim's family members returned to the complex. After a few moments in the residence, the family members got into their vehicles and prepared to leave. They were visibly and audibly upset. As they were leaving the complex, it appeared the family was potentially going to hit the researcher with their car. It was a serious enough threat that the researcher was tackled and thrown into some nearby bushes by a detective. Obviously, this incident brought the threat of retaliation from an abstract concept to a very stark
reality in a matter of seconds, providing an understanding that few "outsiders" will ever achieve. This incident was also another favorable mark in the eyes of some of the officers on scene, further entrenching her status as more "us" than "them."

_Ear Shootings—When "Nothing" Happens_

One of the most interesting observations that has come out of the recorded interviews, numerous informal conversations with multiple officers, and lived experiences is the impact of near traumas. Once the researcher had entrée and other officers knew of her research interests, several officers offered to share their stories with her. Some informally disclosed details about shooting incidents, but many more discussed incidents that could very easily have ended as a shooting incident. These include a scenario where the officer came around a corner and an offender fired multiple shots at him; he returned fire but did not hit the suspect. In this particular instance, the officer, who has been involved in multiple shooting incidents, stated “the one that messed me up the most, man, that’s the one where no one actually got shot, but I came around the corner and he was shooting at me and the bullets went right by my head. Yeah, that one really messed with my head.”

In discussing these close calls with numerous officers, it is clear that these incidents do have a significant impact: many officers have vivid recall of these events and exhibit increased respiration, agitation and changes in their normal conversation pattern when relaying their stories. They can describe locking eyes with an armed suspect and preparing to pull the trigger, or being concerned about cross-fire issues. For example, the passage below is when a participant was discussing an altercation with a mentally ill, knife-wielding man:
just kind of slowed down, waiting for him and he knew -- I could tell he was like, I know, I can only go so far if I cross this threshold because I wasn't backing out. I was right in there -- more in than I was out. I mean, maybe ten feet at best. So the second he clears that, you're talking maybe like seven feet and at that point it's fair game. So he knew that. I said, If you come over, I'm going to shoot you. The gun's out already. He, you know, trying to tempt you, like half go -- I said, [suspect's name] I'm going to shoot you. By that time you hear cars pulling up. Everybody comes up. The second he hears somebody coming up he's like, I'm coming up behind you. I said, It's going to happen now...So as soon as somebody comes up I move in and they act like going in, I said, in the kitchen. So we turn and face him. He dropped the knife.

The officers who disclose near traumas often discuss the weight after the fact, when "nothing happened," of knowing that they nearly killed a person and would have killed them, if necessary. They may also have to come to terms with a situation that highlighted their mortality and/or vulnerability. In short, the officer could have died and is not an invincible hypermasculine god of truth and justice. Another example comes from Chris, discussing a search warrant where he was almost seriously injured:

A dog jumped up and I stuck my gun in its mouth. So my whole gun was in its mouth, giant, giant dog, couldn't bite down because his back teeth etched the bottom of the gun on the Smith & Wesson, the steel ones. So I'm dragging him out and I went to go shoot as [another investigator] runs behind the dog and I'm thinking if I shoot, because [a second investigator] wound up running back there, too, I was like, it will probably go through the dog and kill them. So I just pulled it back and the second I pulled it back and I'm dragging him away from the door one of the guys, I thought one guy from SOT turned around and lit it up with a sub gun because I heard (demonstrating) and the dog lets go and just kind of collapsed there and rounds were hitting the raid van. Lieutenant was walking around as rounds were hitting the van and he goes back. Turns out like two, three people turned around and fired in succession. The first round hit the dog in the side, which released the gun. The second round, which was a .45 went through his face, which could have come through the top of my hand when they first got the .45s. So thankfully the first shot hit him in the side, released the gun and then -- because I wouldn't have let the gun go and let him run away with the gun...I remember looking at the dog and thinking, Shit, that was it. I almost lost my career because my hand would have been gone with that .45 round. I was like, Jesus Christ, one of those like that almost went really bad.
Yet, because "nothing happened" or "no one was injured," these officers are expected to just go back to their normal routines and carry on. One of the best analogies presented by Chris on several occasions is that, if an officer sprains their ankle in the line of duty, they are sent immediately to get medical attention. Yet, if there is a shooting with no physical injuries, there is a pervasive mentality that you should simply do your paperwork and get back to work. This contributes to the mentality that unseen injuries do not count and that "real cops suck it up."

In this arena, too, the researcher has been able to experience near trauma firsthand through her internship on at least three occasions, meaning that, where the literature states these events are hard to observe in the field, the researcher has seen situations unfold that could go badly in seconds. In two of these instances, the researcher was taken completely by surprise, assuming that she was not in any danger. The first incident occurred while the research was assisting with evidence documentation and collection in a house where a search warrant had been executed. The house had been secured; indeed, the police had been at this location for hours. The researcher was in the kitchen of the home, talking with a detective, when someone started to open the rear door of the home. The detective immediately began challenging whoever was opening the door, loudly stating, "Police! Who is coming in the door?" When the detective received no response, he drew his weapon, focused intently on the door. At this point, the researcher realized that she was between the detective and the door and, should this situation become violent, she was not in an enviable position. Simultaneously, she noticed the detective's focus and was afraid to move, lest he be experiencing perceptual distortions and consider her to be a threat. In mere seconds, the incident was over; another detective had decided to
come through the rear entrance instead of using the front door, like the other police personnel. The detective who had drawn his weapon was clearly not able to return to normal immediately and took a walk. The researcher was also not unaffected and had to take a few minutes of down time before returning to her colleagues as if nothing out of the ordinary had occurred.

In another incident, the researcher had agreed to meet with a detective who was struggling with PTSD after being involved in multiple critical incidents as a patrol officer. The detective had reached out to the researcher, asking if she would talk with him, particularly about her experience at and assessment of the West Coast Posttrauma Retreat (WCPR). They met while the detective was on duty, on night shift after the researcher had had a full day at the university. Because there was another person present in the detective's office for the first 45 minutes of the shift, the researcher and the detective sat in an uncomfortable silence. When a call came in about a shooting into an occupied dwelling, the researcher quickly volunteered to ride with the detective (as she is cleared to do so through her internship), hoping that the detective would begin talking in the vehicle. He did and, because patrol found a man shot multiple times near the scene just as the detective and the researcher arrived, there was a great deal of down time waiting for a search warrant for the residence where the victim was shot. During the wait, the detective disclosed the details of each of his critical incidents, how he struggled with PTSD and anxiety, how he felt when fellow officers teased him or called him killer. He talked about the flaws he saw in the culture, the organization, and the policies governing shooting investigations. The researcher and the detective talked for hours and finally the search warrant arrived.
The shooting occurred in a small townhouse in Section 8 housing. The victim had been shot in the living room. After forensics had processed the immediate scene in the living room, detectives began searching other rooms in the residence for a weapon and other relevant evidence. The precinct was short staffed that night; it was determined that the front door was locked and therefore there was no need to post an officer on the front door for security. There was an officer posted on the back door, but he had wandered away several times. As the detectives and the researcher were upstairs searching the bedrooms, someone downstairs yelled, “is there anyone here?” The researcher went to the top of the stairs and yelled back “Yeah, we’re upstairs,” assuming that it was another police officer. Immediately, the person yelled back “Who’s in my house?!?”

The researcher quickly moved away from the stairs and hugged the wall as the detective who had been through multiple critical incidents posted at the top of the stairs and drew his weapon. The researcher was again in a situation that “went bad” in a matter of seconds, when she least expected it. In field notes, she documented the thoughts that quickly passed through her mind and included sentiments like “I cannot believe this is happening,” “he cannot go through another shooting,” and, oddly enough, “no, no, no! I study officer-involved shootings—I do not need to be IN one!” Seconds later, the patrol officer stuck his head around the stairwell wall, laughing. His eyes got very large, seeing the detective posted at the top of the stairs, pointing a firearm at him. The officer put his hands up and said something to the effect of “Don’t shoot me, bro! I was just joking! I forgot who I was dealing with…” The surge of anger that overcame the researcher was intense and immediate—she was ready to do physical harm to the patrol officer—and tempered quickly upon looking at the detective, shaking and sweating profusely, trying to
holster his weapon. Anger was quickly sublimated as concern for the detective became the primary focus. He was upset and several of the points that they had just discussed—the teasing, the lack of understanding displayed by his fellow officers, the fear of being in another incident—had just played out in stark reality before the researcher's own eyes. Other concerns in the moment involved how to get the detective outside to get some air (a) without embarrassing him by calling attention to his reaction and (b) having minimal interaction with the various police personnel on scene.

The third near trauma entered in the researcher's field notes that warrants attention involved a felony traffic stop. The researcher and a forensics detective were out, driving around between calls and talking, at approximately 0200 on a Sunday night. It had been an easy or a relaxed shift, not too busy and "cut off time" was just over three hours away. The detective noticed that the car in front of them had a "wonky" rear license plate and decided to run it. As the detective was waiting for dispatch to provide the requested information, he explained that "wonky" license plates are an indicator of potentially stolen plates and/or stolen cars. The dispatcher responded, providing the vehicle description that was associated with the car in the system. That was not the vehicle being observed.

The detective called it in as a non-active pursuit, requesting assistance and indicating that he would not engage until backup had arrived. It must have been a slow night throughout the precinct, as over six units—including K-9—came alongside the forensics van and all vehicles activated their lights and sirens. The detective knew this was going to be more intense than a "typical" traffic stop and, as he was getting out of the van and drawing his weapon, instructed the researcher to "stay in the car and stay behind the
engine block.” The officers all had their weapons drawn and were screaming instructions at the occupant. A rookie tried to reposition himself and almost created a crossfire scenario, until his field training officer literally grabbed him by the collar with one hand and shoved him behind him. The suspect complied and the scenario deescalated. What was interesting was watching the officers as they milled about, joking with each other, trying to wind down after experiencing such a surge in adrenaline. Other officers came by to see what had happened and to socialize. When the researcher was cleared to leave the vehicle, one of the veteran officers who had worked several cases with her, included her in the joking, stating that she had been doing this long enough that she “could at least help...you know, throw a clipboard at him if he ran or something.”

These incidents were not gratuitously included in this section, but were carefully chosen to illustrate real life lessons that do not appear in the literature often, if at all. The researcher realized how quickly a critical incident or potential critical incident can develop—often when it was least expected and taking those parties present by surprise. After the immediate threat was eliminated in each near critical incident, all personnel, including the researcher, were expected to return to business as usual seamlessly, as if nothing had happened. All personnel were balancing the need to maintain the image of the officer that they assumed they were supposed to project, often embodying stereotypes related to the “tough, stoic, nothing bothers me” police officer, while at the same time trying to process what just happened or almost happened and the resultant ramifications. Not only did these incidents provide the opportunity observe the variety of coping mechanisms displayed by officers, as well as the struggle to maintain the expected tough police façade, they gave the researcher firsthand experience of some of the physiological
symptoms associated with a shooting incident, including shortness of breath, accelerated heart rate, and tunnel vision. Also, the researcher has noted that she exhibits some of the same behaviors as the officers who relayed their near traumas when she shares or recalls these events—particularly the near shooting over a patrol officer’s joke.

The researcher, who does not routinely wear a bulletproof vest and does not carry a firearm, was starkly aware of both her vulnerability in these situations and that she was being observed by the officers just as much, if not more so, than she was observing them. Each of the incidents, and there were several others not documented here, was an unintended test of sorts for the researcher, to see if she could “handle it.” Additionally, being present for these events deepened rapport with some officers and facilitated informal discussions that allowed for probing questions related to perceptions, coping mechanisms evidenced, and cultural expectations.

An Officer in Crisis Resigns

The detective referenced above that had been through numerous critical incidents continued to struggle with his PTSD, displaying symptoms such as hypervigilance, heightened levels of anxiety, sleep disturbances and difficulties in interpersonal relationships. The researcher and this detective developed a friendship and would chat through text messages, occasionally through phone calls, or when they were both at the police department. The detective had reached out to numerous individuals, of varying ranks, indicating that he was not coping well. Around Thanksgiving, he went home to visit his family for two to three weeks. When he returned, he texted the researcher about a trivial work-related topic. When the researcher asked how his vacation had been, he disclosed that he was now separated from his wife; he had been betrayed by a friend; and
was having active night terrors, to include an incident where his family witnessed him screaming, yelling and cursing. At that point, the detective stated that he would not be making any major decisions in the near future.

The researcher stayed in contact with the detective through the next few days, predominantly via text message. In mid-December, the detective told the researcher that he wanted to speak with her at shift change (he was coming off of night shift and she was working day shift), but the researcher unfortunately slept through her alarm and was late to work that morning. When the researcher texted the detective to apologize, he informed her that he was resigning from the police department and was coming in to turn in his resignation later to the sergeant. He was planning to move out of state and wanted to move within the week. The researcher was concerned that the detective was making rash decisions due to his recent personal crises and the resurgence of his PTSD symptoms, as these were the types of major decisions that he had stated he would avoid making less than two weeks prior. When the researcher spoke with him, she noted that she would support him in his decision—if that was what was best for him—but asked him to take some time to make the decision (to include taking sick leave) and to utilize services available. The researcher also asked if she could reach out to a trusted contact on the CISM team; the detective agreed to talk to the CISM team member, but emphatically stated that he would not change his mind. After the CISM team member talked to him, he indicated that he shared the researcher's concerns regarding the detective's ability to make logical, rational decisions in his current frame of mind. Further discussions with other members of the police department resulted in the CISM contact being told, short of involuntary commitment, there was nothing that could be done for this officer.
A few days later, the researcher received two text messages from the detective in the morning. During the week prior to turning in his resignation, the detective had moved out of the home he shared with his estranged wife (a police officer from another jurisdiction) and had moved into a home with two of his fellow officers. The text messages received described a PTSD episode the detective had experienced the night before. During this episode, the detective woke up while he was screaming, cursing and punching the wall. In his words, he “scared the shit out of [his] roommates. Epic fail, lol.” A second text stated that he needed a massage, a hot tub and a drink, indicating the use of some of the same coping mechanisms—specifically alcohol and avoidance/minimalization—that emerged during the thematic analysis, as seen in Chapter 6. The researcher was concerned and that concern escalated when her texts and phone calls to the detective went unanswered and she was unable to make contact with her CISM team contact.

As noted in the researcher’s field notes, she was “quite upset because he has been failed at every level—including having our sergeants rush his paperwork through to ‘help him,’ when they needed to slow his ass down.” The researcher was finally able to talk to the detective and they discussed him attempting to at least get back in to see the psychologist he had seen previously before leaving town. The detective asked the researcher if she really thought he needed to go see his doctor and she indicated that yes, she did, because if his night terrors were that severe, he represented a danger to himself and others. The detective admitted that his sleep issues from his PTSD had never been ameliorated. The researcher and the detective discussed talking to his doctor about a medication that, when used in low doses in a patient with PTSD, has show positive
results in stopping nightmares without stopping the ability to dream completely. This was less than two weeks before Christmas and due to the speed with which the detective’s resignation was being processed, he would lose his health insurance by January 1. The detective stated that he may contact his doctor to see if he could recommend a new doctor where he was moving. Even though she was quite frustrated, the researcher discussed that, given the holidays, it was highly unlikely that the detective would be able to get in to see a psychologist as a new patient prior to the termination of his insurance.

After they had spoken about medications, the detective texted the researcher again later that afternoon to follow up on their discussion from earlier in the day. He had researched the medication they had discussed and, while there were promising results documented, it had been noted that this medication, when used in conjunction with another medication for sleep issues commonly associated with PTSD that had been prescribed to the detective, could cause a lasting erection that would not go away. The detective jokingly asked what the researcher was trying to do to him. They jested about which was the lesser of the evils—the lasting erection (which the researcher stated would not matter if he was asleep) or the night terrors. The detective indicated he guessed the erections would be the lesser of the evils, unless he was staying at his grandmother’s house, which would be awkward. The detective was supposed to attend a Christmas party that the researcher was also attending later that evening, but he received word that there had been a death in the family. He packed up quickly and left the area the next morning. The detective, no longer a police officer, and the researcher have stayed in touch through Facebook and text messages. He seems to be doing well now, but he is no
longer in law enforcement. He had considered pursuing employment with another police agency, but decided he could not go back into that kind of stressful situation.

Through her involvement in this detective’s PTSD crisis, the researcher was able to observe both the symptoms of and impact of PTSD in an officer’s life, while also affording her the opportunity to observe the reactions of colleagues and the response/services available through the police department. It was an eye-opening experience, on multiple levels, for the researcher. From observing interactions and hearing conversations between colleagues, responses to this detective ranged from glad that he was getting out to apathy to confusion over the entire situation. It was clear that his fellow officers, for the most part and even including some of those working with him closely, were not educated on the signs and symptoms of PTSD nor were they aware of how these signs and symptoms impact relationships and decision-making processes. This also demonstrated how officers struggling with PTSD may try to minimize symptoms and may not be medication compliant (as this officer still had the medication prescribed for sleep because he did not take it as instructed). One colleague, another participant in the current study, was aware of the situation and commented on this detective’s leaving the PD, stating:

...He was hooked, immediately turned in his transfer letter, went to Forensics and had a successful career in Forensics until he eventually left but he was -- he was publically and openly disturbed about the series of circumstances he had been involved in. He did not hide it. He did not try to hide it. He was just distraught. I don't think I could -- I don't think I could think of a better word than that about everything...Yeah, [he] was a good boy. He was. He was a good officer. He was motivated. He was a good person and just the combination of all the things that happened one right after the other, the young woman that he shot out in Ocean View, you know, right, wrong, or indifferent he was trying to do his job and our job investigating that was not to bust his chops on why were you in the car -- why were you leaning in the car the first place, it was from the criminal standpoint, what needs to be understood is from the criminal standpoint. It is was there a
crime committed when this use of force was engaged. No. Great, goes to administration. Let OPS do the administrative side and say, All right, this was a violation of this. This was a violation of that and handle that part. Okay. Then of course the officer still has the civil issues that he's got to deal with, but that's down the road. After he's just getting over the criminal investigation where he's getting his ass whipped, then he goes into the administrative investigation and depending on who is handling that he takes another ass whipping and as soon as all of that starts dying down he's dealing with his own personal issues. Then it comes, the civil case. It's a scary thought and it really affected [him]. It really did.

Further, at least one individual in a command position attempted to tell the researcher that this particular officer “never reached out for help,” so there was nothing that could have been done to help him, which was not true. He represented one of what are likely many officers like him, struggling and failing to cope with critical incident and/or cumulative stress with minimal support and services available. Second, it became abundantly clear that the process, or lack thereof, in place is insufficient and there are no clearly articulated guidelines of what help is available. These issues will also be discussed in the policy analyses below. There is little duty of care or responsibility evident for these officers, even when they give of themselves to the breaking point to a department that is either unwilling or unable to provide a minimal level of assistance.

Teaching and Training

During the course of this research, the researcher has been invited to attend several training opportunities related to the topic at hand, to include two of Chris’ classes at the PD Academy on stress and survivability, Norcross’ lecture on survivability (2011) given at the 2011 Annual Virginia Gang Investigator’s Association Conference, the PBA’s Behind the Badge Training on officer stress and suicide (Rutledge and Sewell 2012), and the West Coast Posttrauma Retreat (2009a). Each of these opportunities not only
provided increased understanding and awareness of issues germane to the current study, but allowed the researcher the opportunity to interact and discuss these issues with a variety of practitioners in the field, as well as observe the myriad of reactions and coping mechanisms displayed during these discussions and training sessions.

Observing Chris' class on multiple occasions provided an opportunity to observe how he relayed his experience to police recruits and to see where, if at all, he struggled in telling his story. As Chris has admitted, the retelling becomes easier with practice and is almost cathartic for him, yet there are some details that he still rushes through because it is difficult for him to discuss those points. This also allowed the researcher to listen to Chris's routine and rehearsed recounting of his shooting and its aftermath, which meant that she was more prepared to probe the nuances and push for deeper recall in their subsequent interview sessions (see Chapter 5 for additional details on the techniques utilized and the information retrieved). Observing these academy classes also permitted the researcher to observe the recruits' reaction to the presentation. Unfortunately, as discussed with Chris, the recruits were likely exposed to his presentation and story too early in their academy experience, often before they had received firearms training and scenario training. This suggests that the information provided to them may not only be lost in the miasma of DCJS objectives and standards that must be memorized and met to complete their academy training, but that it also may not be "real" to young recruits who may not have even fired a gun yet. Upon hearing Chris' description of his shooting and its aftermath, as well as listening to the 9-1-1 call from the clerk present during the shooting, recruits displayed a wide variety of reactions. Some became very quiet and introspective, some asked pointed questions about his interpersonal relationships or
returning to “normal,” others fidgeted, others appeared to lose interest, and some responded in a manner consistent with locker room shock (Jones 1989), stating how they would have “blasted” the suspect and not felt bad at all.

These reactions contrasted sharply to those observed at both Norcross' (2011) presentation about his shooting incident and Rutledge and Sewell’s (2012) presentations at the PBA training on stress and survivability. It is likely that the VGIA members, many of whom had likely been in potentially dangerous scenarios given their assignments, could relate to Norcross and the horror of not only being shot in the line of duty, but losing a sibling who was also a brother in blue in the same incident. Similarly, Rutledge and Sewell presented a mix of “book” and “street” knowledge to a group of predominantly experienced officers who had chosen to attend their course. Representatives from a variety of local agencies were present, meaning that not only were there universal understandings that transcended idiosyncratic cultures of individual agencies, but that this training illuminated a common problem and provided an opportunity to discuss and work towards shared solutions. Of particular note were the reactions of officers during breaks, discussing their own incidents or experiences, and the private confessions to colleagues that the information presented “hit a bit close to home,” especially concerning stress, depression and suicide ideation. Of course, officers who disclosed that another officer had stated these insights were often unwilling to reach out to either supervisors or the officer in question regarding support service available to combat depression.

One of the most significant learning experiences in the research process involved the researcher spending a week at the West Coast Posttrauma Retreat, acting as a member of
the clinician team. With permission of the clinical director, the researcher was able to attend one of the five day inpatient retreats, interacting with peer support staff, clinical staff and clients, as well as participating in and observing therapeutic sessions and staff meetings, in a picturesque location in the mountains near Tomales Bay, California. This experience also had a profound impact on the current research and upon the researcher. To respect the confidentiality of the participants, specific details of this experience will not be disclosed here, however, the transformation that was observed in the clients was remarkable—some almost seemed like different people and one client, who reminded the researcher of her father, smiled for the first time in years, as far as he could remember. The unique approach utilized at this retreat combines the best aspects of peer support, matching clients with peer support from previous clients who have been through similar situations, with world class QMHP, and high impact therapeutic techniques, such as EMDR.

Clients are educated about medications, recognizing triggers, coping mechanisms, and rebuilding interpersonal relationships that may have been damaged during their struggles with stress related disorders. The camaraderie and trust that are fostered during these five days are beyond amazing—with clients disclosing alcoholism, sexual and physical abuse they suffered as children, details of their critical incidents, details of their intimate lives, well developed suicide plans, and many other “secrets.” Though there were many serious moments, these moments were tempered by humor and understanding. This experience, much like the other field experiences the researcher has been privy to, helped guide and shape the current study by providing intimate insight into how trauma reactions can manifest, the array of coping mechanisms utilized, and those
topics so private and personal that they are rarely noted in the literature. This retreat also helped the researcher pull out her own experiences and confront them, allowing her to talk about things that she did not previously like to talk about and to become more aware of her biases and predispositions in the current research. This process, in conjunction with the other field experiences mentioned in this chapter, forced reflexivity, in a sense, and highlighted why the back and forth—the researcher going into the field, reflecting on what has been learned and locating herself within the observations—is so critical to this research and analysis. A final point of interest was discovered during the course of this research. At WCPR, it was discovered that several officers had macabre mementos or souvenirs of their critical incident—in the form of photos, reports, etc., that they keep. The case at the heart of the current analyses also involved critical incident memorabilia because Chris disclosed the following information:

Q. How did you feel when you got your gun back?
A. Good, super good. I was asking all the time, Can I get my gun back? Almost like not a security blanket but there was a very significant, I hate to say this, but like a memorabilia kind of thing. And I've kept all the guns that have been involved in like serious -- and I think I've used every single one, every gun that I've had that first 6906 with the dog, the second one during the search warrant, and obviously the nine millimeter that we got, that one. So every gun that I've had, I kept it and it sounds horrible, as a momento, but it's not in a bad way, kind of like this was there that day, like the clothes, the jersey. I still have that. That doesn't bother me. That doesn't concern me as much as having that gun. Like if I lost the jersey that would suck but no big deal.

Chris also has a copy of the 9-1-1 recording which, when he received it, he listened to it repeatedly. The presence of macabre memorabilia is not a topic that was found in the literature related to officer-involved shootings and stress responses. If QMHPs ask
clients about these behaviors, they may gain insight into the client’s particular struggles and may be able to alter treatment approaches accordingly.

In short, the five days provided much insight and introspection, strengthening multiple facets of the current study while also strengthening the researcher as a colleague and as a person.

The Highs and Lows of Becoming a Public Criminologist

FOIA requests were submitted to the PD at two separate points in the current study, in December 2009 and again in October 2011. Materials related to these requests can be found in Appendix G and Appendix H. The response to the initial request stated that such statistics did not exist and that the PD was not required to create such statistics pursuant to a FOIA request. This lack of statistics is surprising for two reasons, the second of which is discussed in more detail below in the policy analyses: first, this would indicate that the PD does not report justifiable homicides by law enforcement to the VState Police, who, in turn, report to the UCR; second, given the requisite forms an officer must complete any time a firearm is discharged, as well as where and how this data is housed, it is improbable that basic frequencies of officer-involved shootings do not exist. The second request was much more specific in terms of documents requested, time frame of consideration, and situational factors to be included. From this request, the researcher received fifteen highly redacted, partial IBRs, which accounts for only 35% of the shooting incidents discovered during the preliminary study conducted to contextualize the current study (see Chapter 3).

Soon after the first FOIA request was made to the PD, a request for information was also made to the State Police (SP), the CDC’s Vital Statistics, and the FBI’s UCR
program. The SP was happy to provide information regarding LEOKA data, but when asked for data relevant to officer-involved shooting, particularly disaggregated data for the seven cities in the region being considered, the SP also initially claimed that the requested data did not exist. After several conversations, the information available was sent to the researcher, but it was encoded and of limited use, as discussed in Chapter 3. As for requests made to the CDC and the FBI via their websites, the CDC responded that individualized assistance cannot be provided to researchers (although the researcher was told where to look for state level statistics) and the FBI never provided a response.

Throughout the research process, as mentioned previously, both the researcher and Chris have attempted to not only be transparent with the PD, but to also invite the PD to be an active collaborator in the research process as a department striving to improve itself and take better care of its personnel. Initial approaches, under previous administrations, were met with the blue wall of silence; the previous chiefs had no interest in even considering the current research. The current administration was willing to at least discuss participation with the researcher. The researcher and Chris were afforded an opportunity to meet with the Chief and then the researcher was asked to present this research proposal to the Senior Staff of the PD. At the initial meeting, it was acknowledged that the researcher could not be barred from talking to people, provided they had the right to refuse to participate in the current research.

When presenting to the Senior Staff, the researcher provided information not only about the current study and the benefits it would provide to the PD, but also related to the costs associated with officer-involved shootings, evidence based policy and the statistics suggesting that violent confrontations between police and citizens are increasing. While
one assistant chief openly supported the research, another was clearly against the research, stating that the researcher should not need to see SOPs or other department documents. The researcher explained that, to evaluate policy or strive for best practice, current practice and policy had to be examined. This is consistent with the varied administrative responses to officer survivability and resilience noted in the policy analyses.

Two things happened the day that the researcher presented to the Senior Staff: first, the researcher received an e-mail from the PD stating that they had decided to support the current research and that she needed to provide a wishlist of documents, and second, there was an officer involved shooting that afternoon. While this marked progress where previous administrations had refused to even consider the current research, there would be many hurdles, including a lack of access, superficial support and circuitous routes to gain certain pieces of information.

The researcher has participated in several meetings with various members of upper management about different components of this study, many of whom vocally support the current research. However, the researcher must admit a certain degree of naïveté in the earliest of these meetings, as she genuinely believed these individuals wanted this research to do well and that the agency wanted to be proactive and confront the issues identified. The researcher believes that there is an acknowledgement that this is an array of issues that can be problematic, but for what is likely multiple reasons—these include, but are certainly not limited to egos, the police culture, perceived liability, fear and discomfort, and financial concerns—support for the current study has often been superficial. For example, in lieu of official requests that could be denied by the
administration or the City Attorney, on several occasions, the researcher was directed by
one or more command staff to utilize more informal means to access certain materials,
providing plausible deniability for the PD and its command staff.

Other meetings related to the formation of policy and/or services within the PD were
attended, which were met with mixed reactions. Often, the researcher and Chris were
informed that there was no money to do anything and were told the EAP was sufficient.
This highlights the tension between verbal support or interest and committed action,
indicating that this is a systematic issue. Change in the culture needs to be preceded by a
change in the policy and attention/respect from the upper management levels (Malmin
2012). These conversations and the resultant frustrations can be summed up through the
words of one participant, who noted that,

_It's not the fault of the current administration; however, it's not yet the fault of the
administration. Each administration to come in has that ability to shift and make the
change to pull from the other people that are experts or that have experienced but
until that happens, they're just doing a great injustice... It's like some baby animal
awkwardly trying to figure out how to walk, kind of has it, but doesn't. The biggest
issue being that we don't learn from our mistakes, we have yet to learn from our
mistakes. Then we learn from our mistakes and we have such a short memory that we
forget a minute later and that's the problem... Listen, people are going to
self-medicate. They're going to do whatever they can. We can have the greatest
system in the world, there's still going to be people that are going to fall through the
cracks. It's just going to happen. It's just a matter of time before it really blows up. I
think it's not that we have a bunch of people. I think you're going to have a
significant incident. One individual may be alone that either takes his life or takes
somebody else's and then his own or her own and then it's going to be in such a light
that they have to address it. My biggest fear is that they're not going to be proactive
about it. That they're going to be reactive no matter what, as long as it gets
something done. If that's the way that it's going to change, then unfortunately as
calm as it may seem, something bad needs to happen sooner than later, which is
crazy._
Another participant also acknowledged the need to evaluate current policies and take a proactive stance, stating that,

Yeah, you can look at line of duty death policies all day long and again, that is the legally correct response. We have a line of duty death policy. That's great. We have policy for everything. I have a policy for how I'm supposed to wear my shirt. That's great, but at some point we have to go beyond that. We have to go outside of these boundaries and do things and innovate and think beyond, okay, well, the policy says this so we must do this or wait for these circumstances to happen. Well, why in the fuck are we waiting for something to happen if we know it's going to come? We know it's going to happen. It's going to happen. Another officer is going to be involved in a shooting in this city. Another officer is God forbid going to die in the line of duty. It's going to happen. So why do we wait for something to happen before we make a change when we know it's coming?

The researcher, in her field notes, documented this contradiction, stating, “I am beginning to think that the PD would rather treat this as an issue of broken people, rather than a broken system or process. Then it is a problem with the individual, not the department, and there is no perceived obligation to act/intervene/change.” A participant also echoed some of these same statements, articulating that,

...it continuously gets buried and if not for a select few of us who continue to vocalize and have an audience with the right people, this is not -- despite our best efforts, the agency and the department is doing everything it can to passively ignore this or passively resist it, which is amazing...I've essentially predicted the future. You're going to have officers in crisis. We don't have policies. We've made it known. I've definitely made it known to the chiefs. It's out there. You can't unring that.

This was also evidenced in the flurry of concern after an incident or in situations of management by crisis, yet the concept of planning and establishing process and procedure to handle crises of a similar nature (as detailed later) were not a priority when the media was not watching and there was not an immediate impetus to act. This was evidenced on multiple occasions where the researcher or Chris would provide information related to policies (IACP Model Policies or example policies from other
jurisdictions) or when training opportunities were presented. Certain instances where the tension between verbal support and willingness to act were particularly disheartening because, not only did it illuminate the perceived inaction on the part of certain segments of the PD has to these issues, but it projects a poor image of the PD in the larger community while also having the potential to be detrimental to the researcher and Chris's professional relationships outside of the PD.

Other Notable Moments in the Field

The participant observation component, as detailed previously, was an integral part of the researcher gaining not only the requisite academic knowledge, but the depth of understanding and acceptance that was necessary to speak with authority on the topic of officer-involved shootings and their varied impacts. In short, without these lived experiences and challenges, it is unlikely that the current study would have been as multifaceted and the researcher may have fallen short of achieving her holistic vision. Some experiences or interactions were purposeful, in that the researcher chose to attend a training or scheduled a meeting with the express intention of discussing a given topic, others were more organic in nature, evolving during normal conversation or interactions. Many of these organic interactions occurred after the researcher had "proven" herself to the officers she worked with, allowing her the freedom to participate in discussions that would traditionally be reserved for police officers only.

For example, one evening the researcher was standing on the back porch of the Police Operations Center (POC) with several officers. Someone engaged in the conversation mentioned either that the researcher was studying critical incidents or working with Chris. After much of the group had left, another Sergeant began a conversation with the
researcher about the current study. This Sergeant discussed the nature of police work and the police culture generally, discussing how it had negatively impacted his family, his friends, his intimate relationships and his ability to be a participating member of his faith community. As a result of failed relationships that were, in part, undermined by his career, the Sergeant disclosed depression, alcohol abuse and suicide ideation. This Sergeant stated that "[we need] something for families...we’re killing our families and no one tells us how to make that side of things work, how to help them..." This disclosure underscores the multifaceted nature of being a first responder and that those varying commitments and relationships that can become attenuated by normal or chronic stress from the officer’s career can be overwhelmed or strained to breaking in the aftermath of a critical incident. In another casual conversation, an officer who had been in a shooting incident told the researcher that at one point he had been scared that he would freeze and not be able to fire his weapon should he need to do so. When asked how that fear could have been mitigated or addressed, he provided a startlingly simple and practical response: he stated that he believes all officers who have fired their weapons on duty should be offered an hour alone at the pistol range, working one-on-one with the range master, to re-familiarize him- or herself with their weapon, muscle memory and the mechanics of aiming and firing. This is not a policy suggestion that the researcher would have ever generated alone, yet, it makes sense and may be an appropriate suggestion to pursue.

Due to the nature of the current study and the relationship between Chris and the researcher, there have been times that the researcher has been informally consulted when officers are in crisis. Chris handles a large number of the requests for peer support because officers either seek him out directly or are referred to him through informal
mechanisms. As such, it is easy to see the pressure this could create for Chris, what with limited, and sometimes ineffective, policies in place and a lack of resources available from which to work. At one point, when he had been involved with over five officers in crisis in a one month period, Chris admitted to the researcher and the Chief of Police that these incidents and the related frustrations and constraints were taking a psychological toll. He stated that he may need to return to therapy if he continues to be involved in these matters and, to the researcher, he admitted increased alcohol consumption that concerned his wife. In two of these incidents, officers displayed high potential for self-harm, including one of which Chris brought into his own home as a protective mechanism. Chris also took an officer suffering from multiple compounded traumas to the Employee Assistance Program (EAP) for help and that officer was reportedly told to “take a Benadryl and come back in a few days.” Not only is this response wholly inappropriate and negligent, but it is further evidence of the need for culturally competent professionals (Best, Artwohl and Kirschman 2011, Fay 2013, Thomas 2011, Trompetter et al. 2011) who understand not only the police culture, but the development and impact of critical incident stress and PTSD within this community and the need to act swiftly when help is sought due to the courage it takes to come forward in spite of perceived risks (Tucker 2011).

In short, this is a potential situation of damned if they do, damned if they do not, for the PD. Yet, given the costs associated with a shooting incident outlined earlier in this study, and with the costs associated with civil liability, departments can no longer afford to choose inaction. There is a grave concern related to liability, likely one of the reasons this area of concern is treated as a small scale problem impacting only a small number of
individuals rather than a widespread cultural issue, yet, should an officer who has either reached out for help and been told to "go take a Benadryl" or who has been exhibiting clear signs of poor coping, then the PD may have the risk of increased liability if the officer harms him- or herself or someone else after a problem has been recognized.

**News Media Analyses**

There were only a limited number of news articles related to the current case, largely due to the fact that another event superseded the coverage of Chris's shooting. In some ways, as Chris has noted, he was spared intense media scrutiny because his shooting occurred the evening before the Virginia Tech mass shooting incident. The newspaper articles ranged in tone from predominantly factual (Benn 2007, Washington 2007a, Washington 2007c) to portraying Chris in a favorable light (2007, 2008a, Washington 2007b), calling him a hero and commending him for his actions. Several articles detailed the awards and honors bestowed upon Chris for his actions (2008a, 2008b, Online 2008, Thomas 2008, Warren 2008, Washington 2008a). One article did have a potential negative slant, opening with the sentence "a Norfolk police officer will not face charges for an incident in which he fatally shot a Newport News man in a gunfight during an alleged robbery," (Holtzclaw 2007). The comments sections found below the online versions of the news articles (Roy 2007, Washington 2007b), however, provided a mixture of comments related to the shooting and the police in general, with the commentary providing a potential secondary source of something akin locker room shock for officers that have been involved in a shooting incident (Jones 1989), being congratulated by citizens for killing someone and calling the suspect a "thug" and a "scumbag." As Chris noted, when asked about the comments about his shooting that
appeared in the news media, "I didn't like some of them. I didn't like the majority of them. Most were nice but there was a handful of them that were just -- you would think it would be nice and you would think I would interpret them as nice but it really didn't sit well for me, but that was just my view of it." One comment that, in future studies, may bear more exploration appeared at the end of Washington's (2007b); it was titled "Chris, am proud of you," and stated "Chris, I was on the other side of the radio that night, right there with you. Congrats, C." This suggests that these critical incidents impact the dispatchers who are "on the other side of the radio," indicating that they, too, may be victims of secondary trauma.

In this case, three of the most intriguing articles were written by Washington (2007b, 2008b, 2008c), focusing on the impact of the shooting on Chris. Due to previous interactions with Chris, they knew each other this reporter may have been more attuned or inclined to cover the psychological and physiological manifestations of critical incident stress and PTSD. However, one article notes that Scallon had "done everything [he could] and he's still coming," and that he struggled with killing another individual (Washington 2007b). The other two articles detailed the impacts of critical incident stress—the weight loss, isolation, and hypervigilence (Washington 2008b); in fact, Washington (2008c) states that "Scallon's unusual testimony dramatizes the personal costs for the officers. It is all the more reason to give them respect for the choices they are prepared to make on our behalf." This type of coverage, humanizing the officer and articulating the painful aftermath of the shooting, is not consistent with the typical news articles published on officer-involved shootings (see Chapter 3 for details of the newspaper content analysis conducted as a preliminary study).
The way this case has also brought positive publicity to the PD. Chris has been able to participate in multiple media enquiries into his shooting incident that were approved by the PD. These stories portrayed the PD and Chris favorably in practitioner-oriented outlets (such as Scoville 2011), giving only brief mention to Chris’s struggles in the aftermath and noting that he has overcome these issues. Indeed, this coverage is superficial and is considered “good press” for the police department.

Policy Analyses

In the course of conducting this study, it became apparent that this shooting incident and the experiences of the various participants needed to be situated within multiple contexts, one of which is current policies of the Police Department and how that policy compares to current policy trends. As a component of the current study, the relevant general orders were reviewed; to include a draft proposed general order for the CISM team, as well as standard operating procedures (SOPs) for a numerous divisions. These reviews were supplemented by meetings with upper management. These policies were read for mentions of use of force, particularly officer involved shootings, to determine if and where an official protocol for these events was outlined, as well as to determine what support services are available and where those services are delineated, for the officer who pulls the trigger, for his or her co-workers, and for his or her family.

One of the more informative components to situating these analyses was an informal policy education session that was provided by one of the participants in this study. The police department is organized into Bureaus (meaning that there is an Assistant Chief of Police in charge of that segment of the PD, example: Investigative Services), Divisions (meaning that there is a Captain in charge of that segment of the PD,
example: Vice and Narcotics), Units (meaning that there is a Lieutenant in charge of that
segment of the PD, example: K-9 or Criminal Intelligence), and Squads or Sections
(meaning that there is a Sergeant in charge of that segment of the PD, example: a
particular patrol platoon unit or Homicide). Appendix I depicts the current organizational
arrangement of the PD, as presented in the 2012 Annual Report (NPD 2012).

The author was provided a visual diagram of the sources of PD policy and how
those sources work and interact. A modified copy of that diagram is provided below in
Figure 3. One of the concerns that arose when compiling data for this portion of the
analysis was that multiple individuals were unable to locate SOPs for the Personnel and
Strategic Management Divisions of the PD. According to an anonymous source, this area
of the PD must have an SOP because it is a Division, meaning that an SOP is required.
This absence was of further significance because the Personnel Division is where
information and points of contact to access the wellness programs and services offered to
personnel should be outlined, as well as how to effectively manage an employee in crisis,
and the Strategic Management Division is where policies and procedures are housed and
cataloged. In short, as one anonymous source said in jest, “yeah, not so ‘transparent,’ are
we?” Another source also suggested that information pertinent to the current study may
be found in PD Memos and Special Orders, references to these documents were also
found in the introduction of the Office of Professional Standards SOP (2013a), but these
documents are not publicly available and are not indexed by topic. Instead, Memos and
Special Orders are indexed by year and a manual search of each document must be
conducted to determine the content and/or topic. A source searched again for the
“missing” SOPs and for relevant Special Orders and Memos. This source did not find any additional materials.

![Flowchart of Policy Sources and Specifications for the PD](image)

**Figure 3:** Policy Sources and Specifications for the PD
After reviewing PD policies, an effort was made to situate their policies within a larger context and to get a sense of policy trends occurring in a broader scope, to include state and national levels, as well as compare the PD's policies to three other law enforcement agencies that graciously provided copies of their investigative protocols and personnel support policies. In terms of situating the PD policies within a broader context, they were compared to two national standards—the model policies posted by the International Association of Chiefs of Police (IACP) and the standards for law enforcement agencies provided by the Commission on Accreditation for Law Enforcement Agencies, Inc. (CALEA) (2006)—and at the state level with the standards presented in the Virginia Law Enforcement Professional Standards Commission's (VLEPSC) Accreditation Program Manual (2012). The VLEPSC and CALEA standards were chosen because those are the standards most applicable to the PD. As of September 2012, the PD was re-accredited through VLEPSC (Virginia Law Enforcement Professional Standards Commission 2012) and is working towards CALEA accreditation (CALEA 2006); in fact, the SOPs from the PD reference which VLEPSC and, in the most recently updated SOPs, CALEA standards are reflected within those documents. The PD's VLEPSC accreditation is valid through 2016 (NPD 2012).

IACP Model Policies were included in this analysis because these model polices are generally considered to be acceptable practices in law enforcement. With regards to the comparison policies, these were achieved through convenience sampling—by simply asking colleagues in various jurisdictions to provide copies of their policies and using those that were submitted. Luckily, both agencies represent different arrangements, policy approaches, and are influenced by contextual variables, such as size, organization
and type of jurisdiction. Agency A is a very large, urban department from the West Coast of the United States of America and Agency B is a medium sized Midwestern consolidated jurisdiction that represents multiple smaller townships.

The General Orders listed in Table 8 were reviewed as the first step of the policy analysis, followed by the SOPs. As noted in Chapter 2, the General Orders provide definitions that were utilized throughout the current study. In terms of the use of force, officers may use physical force—the amount of which is reasonably necessary to accomplish a legitimate police function—to effect an arrest, prevent an escape, overcome resistance, or to defend themselves or a third party from injury or death (Norfolk 2009b). OPR-120 also outlines who is responsible for what portions of a use of force investigation, when an officer is placed on administrative duties, when medical treatment should be provided, notifications that must be made within the command structure, guidelines for weapons other than firearms, and when and how investigative documents should be retained. Of particular interest in OPR-120 is §III.C(Norfolk 2009b), which states that “the commanding officer will refer the officer, as soon as is practical, for critical incident debriefing via the department’s designated clinician and, if necessary, psychological counseling and/or treatment.” While, superficially, this appears to be in line with the other findings of the current study, the application or reality of this standard is far from ideal. According to the interviews conducted in this study, critical incident debriefs are not always provided and, if one is provided, there is no official psychologist contracted with the PD. Thus, this task often falls to clinicians through Community Mental Health or the EAP program, who are not always qualified mental health providers (QMHP) in accordance with IACP Model Policies (IACP 2012a, IACP 2012b). While
there is no universal definition of what exactly cultural competence entails, the IACP (2012a) defines a qualified mental health professional (QMHP) as “any individual who is licensed as a mental health professional and has an in-depth understanding of the law enforcement culture.” Perhaps police departments can also determine if a local mental health professional is a member of the both the APA’s Division 18 (Psychologists in Public Service) and Division 56 (Trauma Psychology) as a starting point to find culturally competent clinicians.

The EAP is another area of great interest to the current study, and, as such was included in the policy analyses. Additional focus was placed upon the EAP because, in a meeting with command staff, it was suggested that there was an EAP in place and this should be sufficient for dealing with critical incident stress and PTSD. When asked about General Orders or SOPs that outlined EAP services, none could be found. Indeed, when asked about support services for families of an officer involved in a critical incident, the researcher was referred to the Line of Duty Death Policy (Norfolk 2009a); this is the only mention of support services for families identified in existing policies.

There is a limited amount of information available at the city level on the EAP and mental health services; the EAP is available to all city employees and their dependents and employees are referred to a two page brochure on the EAP for additional information (n.d.). As advertised in this brochure, the EAP offers assistance with issues such as “job stress, depression, marital distress, grief and loss, alcohol/drugs, legal concerns, family distress and financial concerns.” This is a broad range of issues that may impact any employee in the city, but noticeably absent were mentions of critical incident stress services or any culturally competent services for first responders (Best,
Artwohl and Kirschman 2011, Fay 2013, Thomas 2011, Trompetter et al. 2011). In fact, as detailed through the participant observations above, the City’s EAP appears to be lacking the training that is essential to recognizing the unique issues that apply to first responders and therefore may not be able to provide optimal care to PD personnel.

Officers’ lack of confidence in the EAP was reflected in the statements of participants, finding that,

> EAP is sort of one of those free services that are offered. As far as the level of expertise that counselors have, I don't have a lot of faith personally in the type of counselors that are offered to us. These are people under contract through Bon Secours. It's provided through our medical provider, which is Nowcare and that contract continues with our EAP program and these people are under contract. They're the low bidders, you know, and they don't necessarily have the type of expertise to deal with police-related problems so it's there. I think to me it's more like family problems, you know, marital problems, things like that, maybe substance abuse possibly, but as far as any type of law enforcement related trauma, I just don't think so...

The City also provides a handbook on employee wellness available to city personnel, but its predominant focus on physical wellness and the prevention of chronic illness; there is a brief section on meditation (Carter and Vogel n.d.). CALEA, in standard 22.2.6, states that minimally an EAP for a police agency must include: a written directive describing program services; procedures for obtaining said services; confidential, appropriate and timely problem assessment services; referrals for appropriate diagnosis, treatment and follow-up; written procedures and guidelines for referral to and/or mandatory participation; and training for supervisory personnel. As such, the current minimal documentation, combined with the “take a Benadryl and come back later” mentality and lack of training for supervisors, suggests that the EAP program in place is likely not sufficient to meet CALEA standards and may not be able to provide
optimal service for the first responders in the city. In fact, another participant in the
current study discussed the EAP in the city, noting that:

The City itself, the City...itself has what is called an employee assistance
program, an EAP. EAP is thought of as the source of mental health counseling
for people with issues. Unfortunately what EAP really is, is it is a triage and I
use that term very generously. It’s a triage for officers where an officer says, I’m
having an issue with this, and they say, Okay, well, you should probably call
somebody or if you’re having trouble sleeping maybe you should take some
Benadryl before you go to bed at night and get some rest because that’s what you
need to sleep. You’re right. What the guy does need is sleep, but he doesn’t need
to take Benadryl, and if that’s the best advice you have, maybe we should
probably consider sending this kid somewhere else. That’s not the fault of the
people in EAP. The people that answer the phones, the people that these officers
come in to, if they haven’t been police officers they don’t really know a lot of the
stuff this guy is going through or this lady is going through.

It is the responsibility of the City to know that. It is the responsibility of the
government, the municipal government to understand that, Hey, we work in a city
that is violent... So I understand no city wants to recognize that it has a higher
crime rate than other cities. That’s not something anybody wants to talk about,
but it is there and it needs to be handled and is it not better to get out in front of it
and say, This is what we’re doing to be proactive. Yeah, we recognize and we
accept that we have these challenges but put a spin on it, do something with it but
don’t leave the officers hanging out there because you say, Well, we don’t have a
gang problem. We don’t have a drug problem. We don’t have this problem...
You know, that’s the reality that we deal with. And the City is not privy to that.
They don’t have that understanding but they have their employees who do.
So that consideration needs to be given that, you know, this is -- I’m just talking
from the police officer. I’m sure we’ve got paramedics out here, you go down to
Station 2, that’s called the gut bucket for a reason. Okay? You’ve got
Huntersville, Park Place, all the, you know, NRHA parks over there that they
respond to, gunshots, stabbings, domestic.

While the EAP alone is not sufficient, the development of a CISM team that can
funnel personnel to EAP as needed is a positive step. Literature on the topic suggests that
EAPs may be losing their stigma within law enforcement agencies (Albrecht 2011), but a
hybrid model involving an internal peer support team and an external EAP seems to be a
more promising avenue for law enforcement (Goldstein 2006, Huguley 2000). In a
hybrid model, peer support functions as the first response and triage, involving the
external EAP when professional help or other external assistance is required. It should be noted that, although positive, the CISM team at the PD is still in its infancy, as evidenced by the fact that this research references a draft General Order. Several of the participants in the current study also discussed the CISM team during their interviews, making the following comments:

*CISM is nothing more than a name given to an untrained group of individuals who've expressed the intent to be available in the event somebody wants to talk. It's not proactive. It doesn't gauge anything other than the only qualifying standard is that you have been involved in a critical incident, whether you're healthy afterwards, according to their unwritten standard, if you're involved in a critical incident today, you are automatically a member of the team and available... if you were to really say who's involved in it, there's maybe three or four people... Three or four people consistently talking to these individuals. There's people on the CISM team. They don't even know they're on the CISM team but there was some training that they gave it and then everybody was there and it's really -- it's not formal and it needs to be.*

A. Well, we have a loosely organized group of people that participate in that but there is no formal structure. I know I've been to individual CISM training and that was probably 2005.

Q. So you feel it can be improved?

A. It can't go anywhere but up.

Q. Okay.

A. I'll tell you this, if it wasn't for Chris Scallon and now by slight extension, I do mean slight extension, me, but more Chris who has taken the lead on that, there isn't a CISM.

*I think after hearing how they kind of dropped the ball on [our] shooting, they attempted to put a team together with officers that had been involved in critical incidents and we were receiving some training. I thought it was going pretty well. You know, I don't really know what happened to it. It kind of fell apart, but I know I was -- you know, I was on the team and I was really inspired but that and I know every since, every chance I got I would go out to speak to officers*

...we've gone as far with our program as we can take it and I've got to tell you, I don't feel that right now we're in a position where we'd be capable of dealing with a large scale traumatic situation like a police officer killed in a line of duty...We would do our best, but I wish we had better training, more exposure to the types
of things that we need to do... It's more than just counseling with one individual or a group of individuals. It may take the form of a lot of different times of intervention-type sessions where you're dealing with different people who have different relationships. You might have an officer killed and the officer that usually works that district car had taken off that night and stayed home and then comes back the next day and feels guilty because he feels if I had been here last night, this wouldn't have happened. It can go in a lot of different directions and I just feel like we need more intense training in that type of situation.

To date, there is no officially recognized CISM team operating within the PD, as is clearly articulated by multiple participants above; the reality is that a small number of officers who have been through a critical incident of their own that have received minimal to no training volunteer to assist other officers in crisis and the PD does not appear to have a psychologist and/or psychiatrist on retainer, culturally competent or not. As this is a draft General Order, and not current policy, further analysis is not possible at this time.

In reviewing the General Orders and SOPs, it was determined that, with the exception of General Order OPR-410: Deadly Force Incidents (Norfolk 2009c), most of the written policies treat the topic of officer-involved shootings in a cursory fashion. Other than noting when it is appropriate to use a firearm (Norfolk 2009b, Norfolk 2009d) and that an officer will need to explain and/or justify his or her decisions before the Firearms Review Panel (Norfolk 2009d), most SOPs identify general command responsibilities and notification chains (2012a, 2012b, 2012c, 2012d, 2012e, 2013a). The Forensics Unit SOP (found as an Appendix in the Detective Division SOP) provides more specific instructions related to collecting weapons, scene rechecks during daylight hours, and completion of scene diagrams (2012c).
OPR-410, however, outlines how deadly force incidents should be handled. This General Order includes policies such as providing a companion officer to the officer involved in the shooting until Homicide Supervisors arrive on scene, mandatory drug and alcohol screenings of involved officers, and how to notify the family of an officer injured or killed in a shooting incident. The investigative steps provided are rather generic, but this is reflective of the phrase utilized by command staff on numerous occasions: an officer-involved shooting is just like any other shooting or homicide investigation and the officer is treated similarly to any other suspect. One interesting point found in OPR-410 was that, in §X.A.2.c, it indicates that an officer must complete a critical incident debrief before being returned to full duty (Norfolk 2009c). While this is likely a change from when Chris, as well as several other participants in the current study, was involved in a shooting, there is no description provided regarding how this debrief will be completed, what constitutes successful completion, who conducts the debrief, etc. This is particularly troubling as there is specialized training involved in conducting a critical incident debrief and also speaks again to potential issues related to cultural competency (Best, Artwohl and Kirschman 2011, Fay 2013, Thomas 2011, Trompetter et al. 2011).

The IACP has a model policy for Officer-Involved Shooting Investigations (IACP 1998), suggesting that best practice involves recognizing that these incidents are not like every other shooting or homicide and that officers are not like every other suspect. Additionally, the IACP clearly details not only investigative steps, mentions post-shooting trauma more than once, providing a companion officer to both the officer involved and second companion officer to his or her family and also advises that the officer’s gun be taken discretely and arrangements should be made to provide another
firearm to the officer (IACP 1998). This model policy was effective as of November 1998, which means that these practice guidelines are not new or extremely progressive and, as such, it is highlights the ongoing and persistent nature of this issue in modern policing, since it is still being discussed almost 16 years later. The PD does mention providing the officer a companion officer until the Homicide Supervisors arrive and mandating critical incident debriefs, but beyond that the existing policy appears to be unclear and in need of review. In January 2012, the current IACP Model Policy on Post-Shooting Personnel Support became effective, outlining best practices for addressing the professional and psychological needs of officers involved in a shooting incident (IACP 2012a). This policy, rather than just stating that a debrief must occur, outlines the roles of the peer support or CISM team, the investigative team and qualified mental health professionals in this process, from simply explaining what will happen to the officer following the incident to the services provided by CISM team members acting as companion officers to the officer and their family. VLEPSC (Virginia Law Enforcement Professional Standards Commission 2012), in Standard ADM.05.03, also mentions debriefing and counseling, although, like the PD, this process is not articulated or defined, but VLEPSC does acknowledge that the officer’s family may also need to be included in the debrief or counseling process.

This model policy also reflects the delayed manifestation of some adverse psychological symptoms (Best, Artwohl and Kirschman 2011) and advocates regular training on post-trauma reactions and behaviors, and their recognition, to both officers and supervisors (IACP 2012a). The wording of this model policy suggests that a single four hour block of stress and survivability training is not sufficient to prepare officers.
Supervisors not only need to be able to recognize and address stress-related symptoms in their subordinates, but they are also “responsible for making available to their unit members information about the agency’s peer support, chaplains, and mental health services” (IACP 2012a). This is similar to CALEA’s commentary on Standard 1.3.8, which discusses personnel and family support, as well as training, as well as Standards 22.2.3, 22.2.4, and 22.2.6, as well as related commentary (CALEA 2006). These standards document that require written descriptions of benefits and support services be available to personnel in a variety of circumstances, particularly those who are injured, those who are killed in the line of duty and those who need to access the EAP. As noted above, written explanations of the services available to the men and women of the PD appear to be missing, incomplete or vague. As such, this suggests that the agency fails to meet both the CALEA standards and best practice as outlined by the IACP.

In terms of comparing the PD to Agencies A and B, Agency B also fails to consider and/or mention post-shooting trauma and makes statements, such as “law enforcement employees have the same rights and privileges as citizens, including the right to consult with legal counsel prior to the interview and the right to have their lawyer present during the interview.” This suggests that this agency also adopts a “same as every other shooting or homicide” approach to officer-involved shootings. This is a double-edged sword, in that the agency cannot show favoritism, and therefore must treat an officer-involved shooting as they would any other shooting, but due to the potential costs associated with these incidents, they must find the delicate balance between legal obligations and serving the community at large, and caring for an officer that has experienced a critical incident. Agency B differs from the PD in providing a very
detailed protocol of how the investigation must proceed and what steps must be followed. This level of detail may, however, be an artifact of the agency being a consolidation of multiple smaller jurisdictions.

Agency A did not provide guidelines for the investigation of an officer-involved shooting, but did provide documents and General Orders related to their Behavioral Science Unit (BSU). This agency, according to the programs and resources outlined in the BSU, has an EAP, a Critical Incident Response Team (CIRT), a Peer Support Program, a Catastrophic Illness Program, a Psychological Professional Group of Clinicians (Police Specialty Providers), Confidential Mental Health Counseling, a Stress Unit (dealing with alcohol and chemical dependency) and Police Chaplains. In particular, their CIRT team is available 24 hours and can provide “debriefing for officers, dispatchers, family members and others as appropriate.” All Peer Support Team members have been through at least 24 hours of training and are able to utilize active listening, problem solving, assessment and can refer officers to other resources. This agency also maintains a list of QMHP, licensed therapists and mental health professionals that this agency has vetted to be culturally competent. This issue of cultural competence also arose in the interviews conducted in the current study, with multiple participants citing the need for mental health professionals that “understand” police officers in various, but similar ways:

For seeking help? I think it's important that not only within the first couple days you be offered the opportunity to speak to somebody, it's got to be the right person. It's got to be something that is not going out of your way. I had to drive to [another jurisdiction], living in [a city] -- or actually living in... I had to drive to Virginia Beach. There was nobody closer that could have talked to me. I think proximity to it, I mean, maybe finding somebody, maybe determining whether or not I have already seen somebody who I would feel comfortable with or who somebody else has experienced something with. For me, anybody that I come in
contact with that's been involved in any kind of shooting or any type of situation where police-related, police-significant I'd send to [a specific psychologist] and I only do that because I know how effective he was and I only trusted him on a couple different levels because [another officer] went, I was friends with [that officer], and if he would go and he trusted him and he had faith in him, then I had all the faith in him. So I think it's got to be peer recommended. I don't think it's just some arbitrary person. I think they really need to be vetted. And rather than just saying, Hey, we need a psychologist, boom, well, insert psychologist, I think there needs to be a process of selection and I think there needs to be for the liability reasons, just effectiveness, the department needs to look into or assign somebody with a vested interest, not somebody that says we need to make this happen and it can't be at the level of captain and above. It needs to be lower because it needs to be more frontline-oriented.

To know officers before one walks through that door, to have somebody that's willing to come into our culture and to be competent to a certain degree before treating. Now, there's nothing to say they can't effectively treat somebody without having any understanding of it, but just the mental issue but we're a culture that is inherently distressful. So I think if there's somebody that's able to talk to somebody, that I'd say, hey, this guy has talked to cops before and not in a bad way like, hey, anybody talks to him, they wind up fucking leaving, there's got to be that and it's got to be put out there, who it is.

A. ...Some people need it and some people don't. Some people it works good for. It wouldn't work good for me.
Q. Okay.
A. Because there's no amount of books. You could tell me everything the book says, but unless you're out there and seen what I've seen and done what I've done, you know, I mean I'm obviously going to, you know, say your opinion. It's relevant; however, for me, I don't think it should be mandatory.
Q. Okay. So what would you say because like you know the textbooks don't tell you everything. There are several clinicians, not a lot in this area, who are former police officers who did go and get advanced degree so that they can be --
A. Well, then they -- I would say they would be at the top of the list to go see, and if I felt like I needed to go see somebody, I definitely would want to go see somebody that would be able to relate on a personal level the things, you know, that I'm trying to convey.

...to specialize in public safety because the level of credibility just isn't there for people that haven't done it. Now, if you come from a cop family, you've been around cops all your life, you have been a cop, you're married to a cop, you know, you're involved. But, you know, if you are one and you're sitting across
from someone who is involved in a situation and they're having issues you can say with a straight face, I know where you've been. I've been there. I've done it. That lends itself that sense of credibility and I just don't think there's enough people out there that understand that police officers are expected to uphold each semblance of order and security that people think they can come up with in their mind.

Agency A's Stress Unit not only provides counseling on substance abuse, but assists with treatment and recovery, to include a 28-day residential recovery program and AA meetings. In the General Order related to the Peer Support Team, Agency A is very clear that this group of trained volunteers is a preventative resource, meant to assist fellow officers with any issues before they grow into something larger.

The CIRT, as outlined in a relevant General Order, will respond to any incident where a citizen dies during a police incident and it is mandatory that all affected personnel participate in the de briefing by a qualified professional that must occur within 24-72 hours of the incident and all affected personnel will be provided information regarding reactions to critical incidents and the resources available to them. Agency A also states that “CIRT should be notified when it is determined that an incident may adversely impact the psychological well-beling of the member or members involved. Members include first responders as well as back-up units and Communications personnel working the channel at the time of the incident.” Finally, while police recruits in the academy, Agency A provides all personnel with a laminated card that says “You have just been involved in an officer involved shooting.” This card outlines what will happen in the next few hours and days—administratively, psychologically and physiologically—for the officer. The back of the card provides the relevant contact information, including the BSU contact information, and provides common stress
reactions. The card also informs personnel that the BSU will be contacting them periodically throughout the next year to perform follow up care. As can be seen, Agency A’s approach to officer survivability and wellness is vastly different to those evidenced by the PD and Agency B. This agency was not included to show how policy and procedure should look, as this is an extremely progressive jurisdiction and the same response cannot be expected in all agencies, but to show the range of responses to these issues that have been developed. The PD is not alone in being slow to change policy to address issues of officer survivability and resilience, as evidenced by Agency B’s policies, yet given the IACP Model Policies, CALEA and VLESPC accreditation standards, and policy examples from Agency A, there are many alterations that could be made to existing policies to better address these incidents and issues.

In addition to the policy issues addressed above, a very interesting fact came to light during this analysis: in spite of claims that data on police shootings does not exist (see Chapter 3, page 24): officers are required to complete a Special Incident Report (PD 539 Form) for a variety of situations, to include use of force incidents and discharge of a firearm, and copies will be retained by multiple commands and will be help for at least three years until purging of records may be considered (2009b). When a firearm is discharged, a Firearm Use Report (PD 529 Form) must also be completed (2009b). Use of force reports, discharge of firearms, discharge of firearms that resulted in injury, and discharge of firearms that resulted in death are all outlined as incidents that would be entered into the Office of Professional Standards’ (OoPS, or Internal Affairs) Records Management Software (RMS) (2013a). Further, the OoPS SOP also outlines that hard copies of Special Incident Reports must be filed alphabetically by officer name and
chronologically by date when multiple incidents exist (2013a). Given these provisions, it is unlikely that statistics on use of force and officer-involved shootings do not exist. Indeed, given the specifications that non-injurious, injurious and fatal discharges of firearms be entered into the OoPS RMS, it is possible that PD could provide data that would align with the analysis called for by Fyfe (2002), Roberg et al (2009), and White (2006). Additionally, CALEA (§52.1.5) (2006) mandates that police agencies should compile annual statistical summaries that are drawn from the records of internal affairs investigations and that these reports should be available to agency personnel and the public. This annual report could be merged with the overall annual report required by VLEPSC (§ADM.20.02) (2012), a standard with which the PD already complies (NPD 2012).

Conclusion

This chapter provides an analytical approach to the data related to the current study, mostly with the exception of the interview data addressed in chapter six. These analyses address multiple components of this research, to include reflexivity and positionality, academic versus practical sources of information, how officer-involved shootings are portrayed in the media (and how this case was atypical in that aspect) and how policy and practice are related to officer survivability and resilience. This last section of analysis in particular places the case at the heart of this study in a larger context, exploring best practice and accreditation standards, as well as showing policy variations from other jurisdictions. This chapter provides a platform for numerous future studies, looking at comparative analyses that highlight issues germane to many police agencies.
Another interesting aspect revealed in the analyses in the current chapter are two findings that do not appear in the literature. The first is this issue of near traumas and the impact they have on officers. This could be significant because, if these incidents do have a marked impact on the officer, then these may function similarly towards previous exposure to or experience of trauma and may contribute to later development of PTSD, should the officer be involved in a critical incident. The second key finding is that, as discussed in the policy analysis and as mentioned previously in this study, cultural competency may play a strong role in the ability of trained professionals to relate to and treat officers who have been involved in a critical incident. However, cultural competency appears to extend beyond QMHPs, and may also apply equally to researchers. The participant observations, documented above, provided insight that could not have been gained in a classroom or from a textbook. Not only was the researcher able to see and experience situations from a perspective similar to those of the officers involved in the study, she was able to explore topics or ideas that were raised that are either not presented frequently or at all in the extant literature. Further, due to those participant observations, entrée was granted and rapport with interviewees was strengthened. This is suggested by one participant statement, although this does not identify the researcher as culturally competent:

Q. Okay. How do you feel about participating in this research?
A. I don't mind. Chris asked me to do it.
Q. If Chris hadn't said anything would you have been like, No, I'm not going to talk to you?
A. I might have talked to you, just because I know, you know, who your family is... And I've seen you around. If I didn't know you I wouldn't never talk to you.
This indicates that the officers themselves, possibly latently or overtly, recognize the need for cultural competence or that, at the very least, the absence or presence of this trait in the researcher may impact a given study’s access and outcome. In all, the analyses in the current study provided a more complete understanding of the varying dynamics involved in studying such complex incidents, as well as provided several avenues for potential future studies. Although it is a long excerpt, one participant identified not only why researchers need to be culturally competent, but why academics and practitioners need to collaborate upon the topics similar to those addressed in the current study:

Q. Has anything about this research process surprised you?
A. How far removed the academic is from the practical aspect of it. It literally is so far removed. I envisioned a mad scientist with a magnifying glass looking at little people, you know what I mean, and be like, Oh, he’s doing that because of this, you know, and there was no -- I can study behavior all day long but there’s -- you’re removed when you haven’t experienced. I’m not saying you have to be in a shooting but you have to understand the culture that it’s in and you can read all the books in the world you want, but unless you know what it’s like to be next to somebody or to know somebody who puts their life on the line, you have no idea. You’re losing that aspect of it, that legitimacy of it. And I think especially coming to some of these places and just seeing how obtuse these people are is just fucking phenomenal. I never realized how very educated and smart. You can’t take that away from them, the learned people they are, but they’re fucking retarded when it comes to the fucking everyday things and I think they really do at times look down their nose and it shows and it comes across that way. Some have a genuine concern and some have a genuine, you know, drive to, you know, understand it and some are just associated with it so they know but some are just fucking out there.

Q. Have you learned anything?
A. You know, just the research and how people respond and more identifying than normal reactions to adverse situations and it’s kind of I used any way I felt and what I went through and kind of like, yeah, I get that difference between someone telling you that, hey, you’re going to feel nauseous after a shooting and actually, yeah, I remember feeling nauseous as opposed to just reliving it...

Q. So do you see academic and practitioner collaborations as a venue for progress?
A. It’s the only way... Literally you have to have a combination. You have to have the right combination. At certain times you need to be academic
more than the practical and certain times you need the practitioners or the subjects more than the academics, sometimes, but it's that balance. When you go to present something, it has to be academic and it has to be -- you know, it has to be presented in a way that will be received and respected, but at the same time, you can dress up a turd all day long and it's still a dressed up turd. That's why you need the genuine -- you need the people that have experienced it to bolster the academics, so it's hand in hand. One can't -- academics shouldn't be just as successful as the practical stuff does or the practical people can, but together it's like a synergy that will blow through the roof.
CHAPTER VIII
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION

Introduction: Reaching the end to discover the beginning?

The current study began as an effort to answer two basic questions related to the discussion of officer-involved shootings: the first is how do these incidents impact the multiple parties involved, and the second is what are we missing and what are we not discussing in the literature that might contribute to explanations of why officers are leaving this profession after an incident that is often given a positive connotation among peers. The answer to these questions was less simplistic. In short, there are small pockets of the literature that address portions of the question at hand, but there is little that takes a holistic view of the shooting incident and considers all of the parties impacted when there is an officer-involved shooting. What are we missing? The missing component is two-fold: there are those impacted by secondary or tertiary trauma that are frequently overlooked in the literature, particularly those investigating these cases, and the other missing piece is the interconnected nature of the facets impacting officer survivability and resilience post critical incident. What this means is that, for example, while the literature may reference the police culture or machismo, too often those references are mutually exclusive, failing to identify and explore the conditioning link between the two areas of inquiry. Table 9, below, depicts how the pre-event, event and post-event factors are related, although there are thematic influences, particularly those of stigma, impression management and coping mechanisms, that influence each of these facets.
Table 9: Summary of Pre-Event, Event, and Post-Event Factors in Current Case Study

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Pre-Event Factors</th>
<th>Event Factors</th>
<th>Post-Event Factors</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>• Personal stressors</td>
<td>• Off duty—Unexpected</td>
<td>• Critical Incident Stress symptoms</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Investment in police culture and image</td>
<td>• Length of the event—atyypical</td>
<td>• Interpersonal difficulties</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Established coping mechanisms—Alcohol and Avoidance</td>
<td>• Perceptual Distortions—visual, auditory and time</td>
<td>• Personality/demeanor changes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Experience of Trauma and Violence (Child and adult, completed and near)</td>
<td>• Dissociation</td>
<td>• Lack of available resources</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Differences between reality and expectations</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Impact of investigative process</td>
<td>• PTSD symptoms</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>• Impression management and stigma</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>• Poor coping mechanisms</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>• Seeking help</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>• Post-traumatic growth/resilience</td>
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Further, the researcher did not find previous work on this topic that addressed the role Goffman’s (1959, 1963) concepts of impression management and stigma. Utilizing this theoretical lens to explore the emergent themes—from multiple perspectives—in the current study allowed for the flexibility to examine how larger cultural gender stereotypes, particularly those related to hegemonic masculinity, are embedded and often times exaggerated within the police culture. As a result of these facets, combined with poor or inadequate coping mechanisms, officers experiencing the symptoms of critical incident stress or post-traumatic stress may fear being perceived as weak or “feminine,” and thus preemptively try to manage impressions, and do not seek help, to avoid the negative stigma such behaviors and actions would garner. The current study provided the opportunity to explore these interactions, as well as policy and news media, as they are perceived by the officer who used his firearm (the typical focus of this genre of research), as well as his spouse, his partner at work, his co-workers and friends, command
personnel and homicide supervisors that run these investigations. This multifaceted approach permitted reflexivity and theoretical consideration to determine what was consistent with the extant literature, what emergent ideas were divergent or missing from the literature, as well as which views were similar across participants and where there were differences of opinion. Additionally, the current study uncovered two topics that were not discussed in the literature at all: the role of near trauma and the perceived need for cultural competency in researchers and others seeking to explore this issue. This idea of cultural competence was particularly surprising as it emerged, as it impacts researchers, clinicians, the EAP, supervisors and a host of others who may be called upon to interact with officers involved in or others traumatized by an officer-involved shooting. The concept of near-trauma also was unexpected, but also quite salient to the current topic, especially when considered in conjunction with the experience of cumulative trauma, critical incident stress and the certainty that officers will experience trauma on the job, all of which can and often do combine to create a toxic level of stress.

The introduction to this final chapter is titled “reaching the end to find the beginning” because there were many more questions raised as this study unfolded. The answer to those questions, often involving further exploration of how trauma impacts people in various roles and relationships, what policy solutions should be considered and how to achieve best practice, and so on, were considered, but were not the central focus of the current study and were not answered to their fullest extent. So, in brief, by addressing the two questions at the heart of the current study, a host of other tangential questions were raised, leading to a beginning of sort by calling attention to the paucity of literature that combines multiple perspectives and the mutually conditioning relationships
that influence coping, survivability and resilience. As we seek to answer these questions, there are very real policy questions that may be answered and better policies—ones that balance the needs of the community, the police agency and the officer that may also address prevention and fiscal concerns—may be developed.

Pulling It All Together

By using a case study methodology, complemented by elements of feminist research methodology and epistemology, the current study enabled the amalgamation of numerous strands of the literature to inform the research process and additionally allowed for various analyses of differing types of data sources. There are elements of various disciplines represented in the current study, to include criminal justice, criminology, sociology, and psychology. This interdisciplinary approach was a strength of the current study. This approach allowed the researcher to identify and discuss the varying constellations of symptoms of critical incident stress and PTSD (Jones 1989, Kirschman 2007)(as seen in Table 2) in a thick and rich description that not only detailed the psychological symptoms, but how those symptoms made the officer and those around him feel and react, thus integrating the interactionist tradition from which Goffman hailed. This is also a departure from much of the literature, save select examples, such as that seen in Klinger’s (2004) work, in that these experiences were not catalogued and reported in detached, clinical terms, but were presented in the participants’ own words. These words have an emotive power that facilitates understanding, both as an academic, but also in the establishment of a human-to-human connection with the reader that does not rely on familiarity with the literature. This connection is important, not only so that the reader is exposed to the rich description and reality of what the experience entails, but
also because, in terms of arguing that there is a clear need to address officer-involved shootings and their after effects more comprehensively, likely starting with policy change and implementation, these connections allow even a lay person to become aware of problems with the current approach and mechanisms in place.

These interactions were also conditioned by peer group expectations, social expectations, and occupational expectations that do not easily permit the expression of “weak” or softer emotions, leading to both the exploration of the concepts of impression management (Goffman 1959) and stigma (Goffman 1963) and the impact that the agency administration and policy has on these types of incidents. As suggested by Malmin (2012), the administration and the policies they craft and enact may be the key to beginning to diminish the stigma associated with mental health concerns in the police culture. Further, there are many people who fall outside of not only the practices of the PD, but also outside of the best practice models with regards to stress and its impacts. To state it simply, the literature and the participants in the current study agree that there is ample evidence that the police culture needs to change because the negative psychological and physiological impacts of adhering to these cultural standards and maintaining this requisite image are doing a great amount of harm—in many cases unnecessarily—to our officers. Police suicide, as well as other self-destructive coping mechanisms, are beginning to gain more attention (Best, Artwohl and Kirschman 2011, Kirschman 2012a, Kirschman 2012b, Rutledge and Sewell 2012, Territo and Sewell 2013), but the sweeping culture shift necessary to significantly mitigate or ameliorate these issues appears to still be quite far off.
Policy Recommendations

While there was a policy analysis component of the current study, the aim was not to develop a holistic best practice model, as there are still many unanswered questions to be explored before that point may be reached. However, the current study did contain two components that allow the researcher to provide preliminary policy recommendations. First, the researcher discussed with each participant how they feel the PD responds to officer-involved shootings and how they felt this response or process might be improved. The second component involved the researcher becoming quite familiar with what other agencies (at federal, state and municipal levels) are doing in terms of training and policy modifications in this area, partially due to requests to provide more information on these opportunities to various personnel from the PD and partially due to participation in opportunities that were presented throughout the research process (to include attending WCPR, meeting and discussing this topic with personnel from the Federal Law Enforcement Training Center (FLETC), etc.)

Participant Policy Suggestions

Most participants indicated that they believed that the PD handles these incidents poorly and that there are not adequate policies in place. Some of these sentiments are supported in the policy analysis section found in chapter seven. However, while it is acknowledged that there were reported deficiencies in the existing policies, this is not meant to be a sweeping incrimination of the agency and administration. It is hoped that these suggestions, as several participants articulated, are seen as an impetus for positive growth and development and a move away from the traditional "but we have always done
it that way” mentality. The most favorable assessment of the current policies in place, stated in terms of how the department handles these incidents, is provided below.

Q. So in terms of how the department as a whole handles these incidents, how would you rate them, how would you grade the department?
A. As a whole?
Q. Uh-huh.
A. Well, I'd give the department a 70 or 75 in that they're concerned about these things. They put it into the hands of people that I think they have faith in, comfortable that matters are being handled, but we're still sort of subject to budgetary constraints as far as the additional training resources that we need to do this.

With regards to policy suggestions, the participants provided a variety of responses. Many of these responses related to the services available and training for various personnel in the department. In terms of services available, participants indicated they would like to see increased family support available—to possibly include counseling for significant others and children, the provision of a liaison or companion officer/spouse, establishing a spouse support network ideally headed by the chief or one of the assistant chief's wives, and establishing a spouse academy to discuss the common issues that are problematic (finances and part-time, becoming cynical, communication, stress, trauma, etc); providing a liaison or some form of guidance for the workers' compensation process; and providing better access to qualified mental health professionals—to include having a psychologist and/or psychiatrist on retainer. Various training opportunities were suggested by participants as potential mechanisms for improving response. Many participants suggested training supervisors about critical incident stress and PTSD so that they can recognize the symptoms, if present, in their personnel and make an appropriate intervention. Other participants suggested generalized training for all officers in the hope of developing a “see something, say something” mentality. Yet other participants felt
that the CISM team desperately needs more organization and that each team member needs to go through a formalized training program. One participant suggested that the homicide supervisors and investigators, specifically, need to be trained in critical incident stress and the spectrum of behaviors that can indicate an individual has been traumatized. This training, in particular, would facilitate acknowledgement that the interview may have issues due to shock or other mental health concerns, as well as increase compassion when interacting with fellow law enforcement officers who have been through a shooting incident.

Participants also suggested altering existing investigative and administrative policies related to how these investigations are handled by the PD. One participant acknowledged that formulating policy in this area is difficult, not impossible, noting that policy evaluation and refinement is needed:

...*My point was always what we need to do is have a real discussion about are we doing things the right way that provide a balance because I do understand the agency has an obligation to protect itself and there's a liability issue with the government, with the City. I understand that. Where do we strike a balance between the rights of the officer, the rights of anybody that's involved in some type of deadly force incident and, you know, the liability and protection issues that the City and the agency need? Where do we find that crossroad and then let's write a protocol. Let's write a standard operating procedure that supports that protocol conceptually, not just specific events. It's got to be -- because none of these situations are the same except that somebody fired a gun.*

Some of the suggested changes involve drafting and implementing an official CISM SOP, as well as an SOP developed specifically for officer-involved shooting incidents. One participant suggested that, in terms of prevention and being financially responsible, the implementation of an early warning system to identify problematic behavior and intervene may be an optimal solution. While participants could not agree
on how long the officer needs to be at home following the shooting incident, participants were universal in their agreement that three days was not sufficient time to begin to “come down” and process the shooting before returning to work, even to modified or administrative duties. The SOPs available suggest that a critical incident debrief is required for the officers involved in a shooting incident; one participant suggested that the debrief process be expanded or that a separate debrief be mandated for the investigative team.

There were two points of contention in the policy suggestions where there was polarity of participant responses observed: whether or not to delay the full interview with the officer who fired their weapon and whether or not mandatory individual psychiatric evaluations should be required after a shooting incident. Several felt that mandating a counseling session would remove the stigma and one participant suggested mandating more than one session so that symptoms that develop later can be addressed. But there were two participants who feel that, while the option for counseling should be available, it should not be forced upon the officer. There were several participants who felt that intensive interviews with officers (note that this does not preclude conducting a walk through or giving a brief statement on scene to investigators) should be delayed at least 24 to 72 hours to allow the initial physiological symptoms to dissipate and for the officer to begin to process what he or she experienced. Some of the commentary related to these suggestions is provided below:

...That's how they do it. They don't listen to nobody. I understand you saying we don't give a murder suspect, but this murder suspect you will hope kill somebody without cause. A police officer hopefully would not kill somebody without cause. So because he had to do something, give him a cool down time, let him talk to a counselor, get his thoughts together so when he say something you all can't -- because the biggest thing is that when IAD come, they're going to hem
him up for no reason and try to hammer him and that's a big fear for somebody who just went through something like that. They do need a cool down time.

... Not at all, you know, like I said, the studies have shown three days, you've got to give three days to give that officer time to, you know, realize what's happened... You know, time to, you know, go over the scenario in his head so when he does give that statement it's a correct statement with as much as he can remember because putting that guy in the office, trying to get his statement shortly after it happened, this guy has been traumatized and it's so much he's trying to, you know, figure out, you know, and take in everything that's happened. You have to give him that time to, you know, think about it. Let him calm down so he does give the accurate statement because you don't want your statement that you give, it doesn't match the forensic evidence and then it looks like you're lying when, in fact, the guy could not be lying. He just doesn't remember a lot of things that happened. I know they kept asking me, How many times did you fire? All I could say was this was months after it happened and I still don't -- in my mind I said two, is what I gave him and I think it was like four or five times that I shot. I don't remember that.

I believe that -- the decompression time you have to have. I know there's a (inaudible) policy and I know there's certain policies that indicate that's good. I have not read those policies. I will tell you that if you would have given me the time to collect my thoughts, it would have saved me a lot of grief and I would have probably been a little bit better at how I was able to express it. I did my interview almost six hours after the incident, maybe four, between four and six hours. That is just when you're realizing all the shitty part of it. You're really realizing, Oh, shit. That needs to pass. That needs to come down. Now, I understand the need to kind of walk through everything, but to be quite honest, if I went in there and said this is when we're going to do a walkthrough, I want my attorney. I'm entitled to it. I think it would scare them to death. They wouldn't know what to do. Are they going to charge me?

While most participants felt that delaying the interview would be better for the officers, one participant felt the opposite, as noted below. Thus, the participants mirrored the arguments made by Alpert, Rivera and Lott (2012) and Noble and Alpert (2013).

... My responsibility in the police department is to handle police-involved shootings. However, I don't interview the officer. That is something the supervisor does. It's our job to interview the witnesses, take the -- you know, take the evidence, do all that stuff. I would say that the Homicide Squad who did it back then and you know, the Cold Case Squad, which has the responsibility today, you know, we do a good job. I mean, it's kind of hard because on one side of it
you want to be comforting and, you know, let people know that everything is
going to be okay, but the second part and what a lot of people don’t get, is that
these things are under huge scrutiny and that things have to be done to the letter
to show that there is no impropriety that the general public could ever use to say
that we covered up a police shooting, that the police protected their own. So
that’s a hard part of having to talk to the officers about it because, you know,
nobody wants -- I’m not Internal Affairs but I think they do a pretty good job...I
mean, I can see the advantages to that and I can see the disadvantages to that.
The advantages are somebody can decompress, they're not in a stressful situation,
they've had time to kind of put everything together. You know, the downside to
that is -- and it's unfortunate but it's the reality, but if I had the possibility to
give -- I would not give a murder suspect 48 hours because I would want to get
the freshest closest recollection to what happened closest to the event because I
believe that it gives the most raw and you know, honest account of what
happened. You're going to miss some details because they're going to be blocked
out, but those are usually not details of any great consequence. They're usually
little things that you can fill the gaps in. You give 48 hours to somebody that's
done a police shooting it's not good, they're going to come up with a story to
come back in and tell you, which is going to contradict the evidence, but still you
know, at that point it becomes interview versus really interrogation.

Several suggestions were also directed towards administrators and largely
indicated that participants felt that the administration is scared of negative press and is
more concerned with politics than personnel. One participant stated that administrators
need to recognize that this is someone’s life and they need to stand up for that person.
Another respondent noted that they expect more than just a cursory appearance, that that
is not support. Yet another participant stated “[the department treats them] poorly
because they're all worried about press and how it's going to make them look. So they
pretty much throw the officer under the bus.” This statement reflects how these
appearances can decrease morale, widen the gap between street and command personnel,
and, effectively, lead the officer to feel abandoned by the police department, which Jones
(1989) and the IACP (2012b) suggest may contribute to the development of long term post trauma symptoms.

Other Policy Recommendations

Many of the participants made logical policy solutions that reflected suggestions in either the literature or existing model policies. One of the most insightful statements made by a participant related to policy was that “…we don't have to write the book here. All we need to do is look around and find out what type of programs some of the more progressive cities in this country have and what they're doing right now. We can model our program after them.” This is quite true, the PD can adopt the IACP model policies, could model themselves on Agency A (see Chapter 7), or could find another agency whose policy conforms to their idea of best practice, should they choose to evaluate and revise their policies to address reported oversights mentioned by participants in the current study.

That said, there are other policy recommendations that are equally relevant. First and foremost, the PD should formalize the CISM team by approving a version of General Order ADM-435 (Norfolk n.d.), creating an SOP, and seek training for CISM team members, as this would lay the foundation for creating the hybrid model supported in the literature (Doka et al. 2008, Goldstein 2006. While training may require a financial outlay (FRSN and WCPR 2009, VALEAP n.d.-a), this is a long term investment and there are programs that are tuition-free for law enforcement personnel (FLETC n.d.-a, FLETC n.d.-b, FLETC n.d.-c). Other training opportunities exist for law enforcement agencies (BJA 2014, Cops Alive 2014) and there are resources available to help guide an agency that is looking to develop or bolster programs that address officer safety, survivability and resilience (IACP n.d.). Once the CISM team is trained, not only can
they begin to serve the PD in a more efficient, professional manner, but their presence, provided EAP services are refined, means that the PD can implement fully functioning hybrid peer support-EAP model that may be more effective than simply having one or the other (Doka et al. 2008, Goldstein 2006).

CISM team members are not the only ones on the department that would benefit from training. As several participants suggested, others on the department, such as supervisors, homicide investigators or even officers in general, would benefit from attending trainings related to stress, survivability and resilience. Hosting these training events, in conjunction with positive policy changes, may begin to reduce the negative stigma surrounding this topic. The PD may also want to consider other outreach opportunities that would reduce stigma and bolster support and morale, such as hosting family academies and workshops, establishing a family support team, or hosting a screening of Heroes Behind the Badge (NLEOMF 2014).

The final component of strengthening their policy should involve bolstering resources for officers who have been involved in a shooting. This includes, ideally, having at least one qualified mental health professional on retainer. In the process of the current research, at least three clinicians—a psychologist, a psychiatrist, and a therapist specializing in EMDR—have indicated an interest in working with the PD to build their survivability and resilience programs, with at least two of them indicating to the researcher and others that they would consider providing their services pro bono. Efforts should also be made to ensure that the city's EAP program is able to provide the necessary specialized services that first responders might need. As the EAP is a city level program, not an agency level program, this may unfortunately be beyond the scope of the
PD’s ability to change. Finally, and again this may require financial outlays, the PD needs to consider establishing more formalized relationships with the advocacy groups and support programs that offer services to officers who struggle with their post-trauma reactions (including secondary and tertiary victimization) (C.O.P.S. 2014, FRSN and WCPR 2009, VALEAP n.d.-b), and their families (C.O.P.S. 2014, FRSN and WCPR 2009, VALEAP n.d.-b, Wives Behind the Badge 2013). Once the PD begins developing a program, they can begin considering applying for program grants to further develop and support these efforts. Once the program is running, should the PD partner with a research entity (such as a university), they may also be eligible for research grants and program evaluation grants. This means that, although the PD may have to contribute financial contributions to establish the program, there is the potential to seek external funding once a foundation for a program has been established.

Again, as stated previously, this is not meant to be an incrimination of an individual agency. As suggested in the policy analyses conducted in chapter seven, there are a variety of responses available, and each agency will need to tailor their policy and procedures to their unique needs and situation. It is anticipated that even the most progressive, trend-setting agency may have deficiencies and in highlighting existing flaws or oversights in any given agency, the intent is not to embarrass or shame the agency, but to provide opportunities for organizational growth and development. With regards to the topic of officer resilience in particular, police departments cannot afford to adopt a position of deliberate indifference in the most literal sense. Initial financial outlays to establish services, provide training and construct infrastructure may appear overwhelming and unnecessary, but when weighed against the costs associated with a
shooting incident—to include the investigations, media management, workers’
compensation, litigation, decreased productivity, and the potential loss of an employee—
those initial outlays will likely prove to be a profitable investment paid out in controlled,
and planned, amounts; in other words, addressing the issues raised in the current study
should be viewed as a form of risk management or risk mitigation to reduce or prevent
future liability and incidents, rather than as an unnecessary expense.

Limitations

As an exploratory case study, it must be acknowledged that there were limitations
to the current research. First, this study explored a single case in detail. Although
qualitative research does not place the same emphasis on generalizability, this is a
limitation that must be considered. While it is likely that there are commonalities across
most shooting incidents, there are also likely elements that are unique to this case. For
example, the average officer-involved shooting lasts approximately three seconds
(Klinger 2004, Tracy 2010), but Chris’ shooting lasted for approximately 15 minutes.
This means that there may be significant qualitative differences between Chris’ shooting
incident and another officer’s, simply because his shooting was 300 times longer than the
average. Additionally, because Chris was eager to participate and the research was
approved without the requirement to anonymize the case, he may be qualitatively
different from other officers who may be hesitant to or refuse to discuss their shooting
incidents.

In terms of policy development, as Berg (2007) notes, the academy rarely accepts
any single study—quantitative or qualitative—as generalizable. The same expectations
would apply with regards to this research, even if the intention to develop policy was
limited to only the PD. The results of this study would need to be replicated to increase the likelihood of generalizability, even within the PD.

Additionally, there were limitations involving complete access to materials related to this case. The PD would not permit the researcher to examine any investigative materials. Also, as noted in Chapter 7, there were SOPs that could not be located in the current study. Finally, as noted in Chapter 5, there were several participants that were expected to participate in the current study who, for a variety of reasons, did not complete interviews in the current study. These individuals may be different—be it in terms of information they could contribute, their perspective, or their relationship with Chris—from those participants that consented to an interview or interviews.

Suggestions for Future Research

As it was acknowledged in the introduction to this chapter, this study does not simply provide one or two potential areas for future research. Rather, the current study is more like a springboard for an entire research agenda. The first avenue for future research would consider obtaining the missing information from this case, particularly focusing on Chris' relatives and/or non-law enforcement friends, as well as administrative and investigative personnel. Future research will also use the thematic documents to work with practitioners to gain insight and find a mid-range perspective to contribute to the analysis and policy suggestions that combines the concerns of street officers and administration. Additionally, the formation of a working group, consisting of practitioners, academics, and clinicians, would also be an avenue to consider in continuing this research.
Another way to build the current study would be to collect additional cases, possibly from just the PD or from other jurisdictions, to conduct a more phenomenological study that would be more generalizable. One topic that also became apparent was the roles that QMHP play, or should play, in these cases and a qualitative study with recognized QMHP to determine areas for additional research and to explore policy and practice would be beneficial. Another way to incorporate QMHP, would be to coordinate with WCPR to gain access to their data and see if the results from the current study are supported through a mixed methods approach. Just as QMHP may add a different perspective to the topic at hand, the limited interviews in the current study suggested that there are differences in the responses, particularly related to policy and practice, between command staff and street level officers. While this was not a complete surprise, the gravity of the situation means that this gap must be bridged. Future research may continue to probe these differences to determine how they influence working relationships and the way that these cases play out, as well as seeking common ground in an effort to reconcile the management and staff perspectives in order to best address fiscal, political, and legal considerations associated with officer-involved shootings.

As noted above, this study indicated that near trauma may be just as significant as experienced trauma. This finding should be explored in future research. Likewise, as the extant literature does not provide many resources discussing secondary and tertiary victimization, these topics need to be explicated, as the current study found that, indeed, trauma is not limited to pulling the trigger or being on scene. Finally, as more agencies address the issues of stress, survivability and resilience, the policies they generate and implement will need to be evaluated so that, as an overall profession, we can move
Conclusion

The current study represents a five year journey that was undertaken by the entire research team. This journey consisted, as any research does, of highs and lows, particularly because the researcher, as a public criminologist, eschewed the clinical detachment demanded by a more traditional, positivistic approach. Unfortunately, the use of deadly force is a highly controversial topic that will continue to remain at the forefront of modern policing, meaning that officers, in addition to the cumulative traumas they experience as a component of their career, will continue to be exposed to acute and critical incident trauma.

Another commonality among the majority of the participants in the current study, one that was shared by the researcher, was that one goal of this research is to begin a discussion about topics that, in many circles, are considered sensitive or controversial. The hope is that, by digging deep into this case, and bringing the human stories associated with it, to the light of theoretical and academic inquiry, there is the potential to reduce the stigma associated with stress responses and mental health issues in the police community. Additionally, many participants stated that they hoped their participation in the current study would help others in a similar situation understand that the PTSD symptoms are normal and that they are not alone. Finally, a shared hope is that research of this nature will bring about changes in practice that recognize the emotional and mental health needs of those serving their communities as first responders.
REFERENCES


Deadly Force Incidents (G.O. Opr-410), Departmental General Order OPR-410 (City of Norfolk Police Department 2009c).


Detective Division Standard Operating Procedures Manual (Norfolk Police Department 2012c).


Firearms (G.O. Opr-110), Departmental General Order OPR-110 (City of Norfolk Police Department 2009d).

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Graham V. Connor, 109 S. Ct. 1865 (United States Supreme Court 1989).


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Peer Team (Proposed G.O. Adm-435) (City of Norfolk Police Department n.d.).


Public Information & Outreach Division Standard Operating Procedures Manual (City of Norfolk Police Department 2012e).


Rutledge, Timothy and James D. Sewell. 2012. "Behind the Badge: A Ptsd and Suicide Outreach & Prevention Seminar." March 28, Norfolk, VA.


Second Patrol Division Standard Operating Procedures Manual (City of Norfolk Police Department 2012b).


Special Incident Report (G.O. Opr-140), Departmental General Order OPR-140 (City of Norfolk Police Department 2009b).


Third Patrol Division Standard Operating Procedures Manual (City of Norfolk Police Department 2012a).


Use of Force (G.O. Opr-120), Departmental General Order OPR-120 (City of Norfolk Police Department 2009b).


Appendix A
## Appendix A: Number of Fatal Police Shootings by Agency or Data Source, 1990-2010

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>FBI Justifiable Homicide by LEO</th>
<th>CDC Death Justifiable by Legal Intervention</th>
<th>CDC Death Homicide by Legal Intervention—Virginia Only</th>
<th>BJS Justifiable Arrest-Related Homicides—Virginia Only</th>
<th>VSP Justifiable Homicide by LEO—Hampton Roads Preliminary Study—Hampton Roads Preliminary Study—Hampton Roads Preliminary Study</th>
<th>Total</th>
<th>Average</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1991</td>
<td>367</td>
<td>259</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>373.89</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1993</td>
<td>455</td>
<td>356</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>390.21</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1995</td>
<td>389</td>
<td>343</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>398.71</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1997</td>
<td>353</td>
<td>355</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>358.75</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1999</td>
<td>294</td>
<td>398</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>348.75</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2001</td>
<td>378</td>
<td>396</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>384.75</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2003</td>
<td>373</td>
<td>423</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>376</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>398.75</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2005</td>
<td>347</td>
<td>414</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>377</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>390.21</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2007</td>
<td>391</td>
<td>412</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>455</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>418.71</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2009</td>
<td>406</td>
<td>372</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>497</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>418.71</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>7104</td>
<td>7414</td>
<td>218</td>
<td>2931</td>
<td>59</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>398.75</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Average: 373.89, 390.21, 12.11, 418.71, 14.75, 3.5, 2.9
Appendix B
Appendix B: *Descriptive Information for the Hampton Roads Region Compared to the State, Collected from the Virginia State Police’s Crime in Virginia Reports and Averaged for the Years 1990-2010, as well as the Standardized Police Shootings Rate, Calculated from Preliminary Study Data and VSP Population Estimate*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>State</th>
<th>Chesapeake</th>
<th>Hampton</th>
<th>Newport News</th>
<th>Norfolk</th>
<th>Portsmouth</th>
<th>Suffolk</th>
<th>Virginia Beach</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Population (1,000)</td>
<td>7337026</td>
<td>193851</td>
<td>140865</td>
<td>178922</td>
<td>239281</td>
<td>100044</td>
<td>66422</td>
<td>421943</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total Sworn Personnel</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>324</td>
<td>251</td>
<td>361</td>
<td>716</td>
<td>231</td>
<td>136</td>
<td>721</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Crime Rate (per 100,000)</td>
<td>3983.14</td>
<td>5521.58</td>
<td>6749.98</td>
<td>8665.55</td>
<td>9457.29</td>
<td>10885.35</td>
<td>7068.54</td>
<td>6132.56</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Number of Murders</td>
<td>434.9</td>
<td>9.8</td>
<td>10.5</td>
<td>22.1</td>
<td>47.2</td>
<td>20.4</td>
<td>6.57</td>
<td>17.85</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Murder Rate (per 100,000)</td>
<td>6.28</td>
<td>4.93</td>
<td>7.33</td>
<td>12.54</td>
<td>20.08</td>
<td>20.71</td>
<td>11.35</td>
<td>4.32</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Police Shooting Rate (per 100,000)</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>11.35</td>
<td>2.13</td>
<td>2.79</td>
<td>18.81</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>1.5</td>
<td>8.29</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Appendix C
EXPLORING POLICE SHOOTINGS AND OFFICER SURVIVABILITY: A CASE STUDY

NAME OF PROJECT

Please be informed that your research protocol has received approval by the Institutional Review Board. Your research protocol is:

- Approved
- Tabled/Disapproved
- X Approved, (Progress Report) contingent on making the changes below*

Contact the IRB for clarification of the terms of your research, or if you wish to make ANY change to your research protocol.

The approval expires one year from the IRB decision date. You must submit a Progress Report and seek re-approval if you wish to continue data collection or analysis beyond that date, or a Close-out report. You must report adverse events experienced by subjects to the IRB chair in a timely manner (see university policy).

* Approval of your research is CONTINGENT upon the satisfactory completion of the following changes and attestation to those changes by the chairperson of the Institutional Review Board. Research may not begin until after this attestation.

* In the Progress Report
  - Under 8a, erase the circled “Yes”, and leave that blank.
  - # 10 should be revised to succinctly reflect activity that addresses what has taken place in the study over the past year. Remove the references to what research has been reported in the field or what the training session consisted of.
  - Under # 11, Dr. Monk-Turner and Ms. Farrell need to provide current renewal CITI training certificates.

In the Informed Consent
• In the sixth paragraph of the letter, remove the sentence that states, “If you request confidentiality...” Confidentiality is already described as being provided to the subjects in other sentences in this document.
• Remove the second signature line for the participants found at the end of the document. Agreement to participate in the study need only be obtained once. If subjects wish to withdraw their participation they may do so at any time during the interview without penalty.

Attestation

As directed by the Institutional Review Board, the Responsible Project Investigator made the above changes. Research may begin.

[Signature]
IRB Chairperson's Signature

May 16, 2013
date
No.: 12-057

OLD DOMINION UNIVERSITY
HUMAN SUBJECTS INSTITUTIONAL REVIEW BOARD
RESEARCH PROPOSAL REVIEW NOTIFICATION FORM

TO: Elizabeth Monk-Tumer
Responsible Project Investigator

DATE: April 19, 2012
IRB Decision Date

Exploring Police Shootings and Officer Survivability: an Elaborated Case Study
Name of Project

Please be informed that your research protocol has received approval by the Institutional Review Board. Your research protocol is:

___ Approved
___ Tabled/Disapproved
___ Approved, contingent on making the changes below*

[Signature]
IRB Chairperson’s Signature

April 19, 2012
date

Contact the IRB for clarification of the terms of your research, or if you wish to make ANY change to your research protocol.

The approval expires one year from the IRB decision date. You must submit a Progress Report and seek re-approval if you wish to continue data collection or analysis beyond that date, or a Close-out report. You must report adverse events experienced by subjects to the IRB chair in a timely manner (see university policy).

* Approval of your research is CONTINGENT upon the satisfactory completion of the following changes and attestation to those changes by the chairperson of the Institutional Review Board. Research may not begin until after this attestation.

In the Informed Consent
• Remove the additional signature and date lines at the end of the document so that there is only one signature and date box/line.

Attestation

As directed by the Institutional Review Board, the Responsible Project Investigator made the above changes. Research may begin.

[Signature]
IRB Chairperson’s Signature

May 8, 2012
date
No.: 11-016

OLD DOMINION UNIVERSITY
HUMAN SUBJECTS INSTITUTIONAL REVIEW BOARD
RESEARCH PROPOSAL REVIEW NOTIFICATION FORM

TO: Elizabeth Monk-Turner
   Responsible Project Investigator

DATE: February 17, 2011
   IRB Decision Date

RE: Exploring Police Shootings and Officer Survivability: an Elaborated Case Study
   Name of Project

Please be informed that your research protocol has received approval by the Institutional Review Board. Your research protocol is:

___ Approved
___ Tabled/Disapproved
X Approved, (Progress Report) contingent on making the changes below*

[Signature]
February 17, 2011

Contact the IRB for clarification of the terms of your research, or if you wish to make ANY change to your research protocol.

The approval expires one year from the IRB decision date. You must submit a Progress Report and seek re-approval if you wish to continue data collection or analysis beyond that date, or a Close-out report. You must report adverse events experienced by subjects to the IRB chair in a timely manner (see university policy).

* Approval of your research is CONTINGENT upon the satisfactory completion of the following changes and attestation to those changes by the chairperson of the Institutional Review Board. Research may not begin until after this attestation.

* Dr. Monk-Turner needs to take the CITI Human Subjects Protection on-line training and provide an updated certificate of completion since the previous NIH certificate has lapsed (over 1 year).

Attestation

As directed by the Institutional Review Board, the Responsible Project Investigator made the above changes. Research may begin.

[Signature]
February 18, 2011
TO: Elizabeth Monk-Turner  
Responsible Project Investigator

DATE: February 18, 2010
IRB Decision Date

RE: Exploring Police Shootings and Officer Survivability: An Elaborated Case Study

Please be informed that your research protocol has received approval by the Institutional Review Board. Your research protocol is:

[ ] Approved  
[ ] Tabled/Disapproved  
[ x ] Approved, contingent on making the changes below*

Contact the IRB for clarification of the terms of your research, or if you wish to make ANY change to your research protocol.

The approval expires one year from the IRB decision date. You must submit a Progress Report and seek re-approval if you wish to continue data collection or analysis beyond that date, or a Close-out report. You must report adverse events experienced by subjects to the IRB chair in a timely manner (see university policy).

* Approval of your research is CONTINGENT upon the satisfactory completion of the following changes and attestation to those changes by the chairperson of the Institutional Review Board. Research may not begin until after this attestation.

* In the Application

- Under # 9, the role of Sgt. Scallon should be clarified as a person who would only make an introduction to prospective interviewees; informing them of his endorsement of the study. It should be noted that he would not be present or have access to the individual interview tapes/transcripts.

- Under #11, it should state that there is no direct benefit to individuals who participate. An in-depth discussion ensued addressing the issue that Dr. Dwayne, Sgt. Scallon’s psychiatrist, has not yet supplied a letter of endorsement relating to the study or of Sgt. Scallon’s ability to participate in the study. The committee determined that we may provide approval of
the study pending the receipt of this letter to the investigators. The investigators are instructed to provide the IRB Chairperson with the approval letter from Dr. Dwayne before they may commence the interviews.

- Committee members discussed the letter from the Chief of Police from the Norfolk Department of Police and its limited nature in terms of release of information and approval for interviews. Ms. Farrell, the co-investigator of the proposed study, stated that the research team will continue to work with the Police Department closely to establish the relationship necessary for successful completion of the research and will honor any restrictions/limitations imposed on the investigators related to obtaining information from the Police Department.

- Under #13 – Informed Consent, the IRB committee recommends that the investigators change the procedures that will be used to obtain informed consent so that potential subjects initially sign after the investigators explain the research and present the informed consent, and then after the interview has been conducted, transcribed, and reviewed by the subjects for content and veracity.

- Under #16, the investigators need to explain the procedures for assuring subjects’ confidentiality and how Sgt. Scallon’s participation in the analysis section of the study will only take place when the information is presented in the aggregate form. The investigators are directed to use the verbiage outlined in #11 in the description of protecting confidentiality. The investigators are directed to assign a number to each subject and inform the subjects that their signed informed consent document will not be kept in the same place, or linked to, the transcript of their interview. The transcript will therefore only reflect the assigned numbers of the various subjects.

**In the Informed Consent**

- An unsigned copy of the informed consent letter to Sgt. Scallon needs to be submitted to the IRB chairperson for approval.

- The investigators should review the informed consent letter that is addressed, Dear Sir or Madam. The investigators should not demonstrate persuasion/coercion in the verbiage or bias in their own role in the research. On the second page of the letter the 4th paragraph that starts, “As a member of a law enforcement family...” should be removed. The third paragraph that describes the purpose of the study should be moved to the first paragraph and simplified into a shorter description which does not inform the subjects as to the expected results of the study. In the second paragraph, the investigator should clearly articulate that the study will be a two step process in terms of analysis, where Sgt Scallon will not have access to the interview tapes or transcripts, but in the second stage will assist the investigator in identifying themes from the aggregate material that has been collected.
• Dr. Monk-Turner's name and signature also needs to be included at the end of the letter. Remove the third subject signature line and date.

In the Letter from Sgt. Scallon to the prospective participants, committee members recommend re-wording the letter to include the phrase that Sgt Scallon encourages or endorses the participation of the subjects in the study in addition to introducing Ms. Turner to them.

Attestation

As directed by the Institutional Review Board, the Responsible Project Investigator made the above changes. Research may begin.

IRB Chairperson’s Signature

April 27, 2010
Appendix D
Amanda L. Farrell  
Doctoral Candidate and Adjunct Instructor  
Department of Sociology and Criminal Justice  
Old Dominion University  
Norfolk, VA 23529  

June 11, 2013  

Chris  
Police Department  
Central Records Division  
Police Operations Center  

Dear Chris:  

Subsequent to previous informal discussions, I, in collaboration with Dr. Elizabeth Monk-Turner (the Responsible Project Investigator) and Dr. Mona J. E. Danner, have expressed an interest in describing and understanding pre-event, event and post-event factors in officer-involved shootings, with an aim of improving officer survivability, using your experience as a case study. This study will involve in-depth interviews (recorded and transcribed with your permission) with you that cover both biographical and topical elements of your story. Additionally, interviews with others involved in this incident may be requested. Understandably, these issues can be considered sensitive and, as such, you have the right to not only voluntarily agree to this project, or decline to participate, but to also withdraw from it at any point without concern or fear of repercussions. It is possible that interviews will be transcribed by Ms. ----. Although Ms. ---- is a transcriptionist for the Police Department, her role in this research will be as a privately hired transcriptionist and she will sign a letter of confidentiality prior to commencing transcription. If this arrangement is of concern to you, for any reason, please inform the researcher and other arrangements for transcription will be made. You will also have the right to review all materials resulting from these interviews to ensure accuracy and clarity of meaning; you will have the right to request that certain issues or conversations be kept off the record, confidential, or revisited for further discussion. You will also have the right to decline to pursue certain avenues of conversation. Any and all information you choose to share is voluntary and will help in creating a more complete picture of this event. The researchers will take reasonable steps to keep private information, such as your involvement and responses, confidential. While efforts will be made to protect your confidentiality, because we are not anonymizing this particular case and you have agreed, to date, to be openly involved in this research, there is a heightened risk of breach of confidentiality. There is also a risk of breach of confidentiality for other participants, and this risk may be heightened for individuals who have very specific relationships with you or who played particular roles in this case. The researchers will make all reasonable efforts to maintain confidentiality; however, we are obligated to advise all participants of this increased risk of breach of confidentiality.
Data will be stored in a locked filing cabinet prior to its processing, as well as in encrypted and secured computer files after transcription and analysis. The results of this study may be used in reports, presentations, and publications; but the researcher will not identify you, if you so request. Of course, your records may be subpoenaed by court order or inspected by government bodies with oversight authority.

If any information comes to light during the course of research that may impact your decision to consent to participate, you will be notified immediately. You will not receive any form of monetary compensation for your participation in this research.

As previously discussed, to ensure that there are no adverse effects of this research, great care will be taken to ensure that any potential areas of concern are mitigated, to the best of our ability, in advance. Of particular note, we will be consulting with your therapists, prior to beginning this research to ensure that they are aware of your participation in the proposed research, what that participation will entail, and that they are willing to support this effort. Additionally, you must agree to notify both myself and your therapists immediately should you notice any adverse effects. Research will be promptly halted upon presentation of adverse effects. Also, to ensure that there are no adverse professional effects of this research, we will be coordinating with the Police Department (PD), asking that the PD to acknowledge that they are aware this research is taking place, that we are requesting access to certain materials and documents, and that the PD has no significant issues with this research. Due to liability concerns, the PD cannot issue a blanket letter of support, meaning that their involvement and correspondence regarding the status and progress of this project will likely be ongoing.

If you say YES, then your consent in this document does not waive any of your legal rights. However, in the event of harm arising from this study, neither Old Dominion University nor the researchers are able to give you any money, insurance coverage, free medical care, or any other compensation for such injury. In the event that you suffer injury as a result of participation in any research project, you may contact the responsible principal investigator or investigators at the provided phone numbers or e-mail, or Dr. George Maihafer the current IRB chair at 757-683-4520 at Old Dominion University, who will be glad to review the matter with you.

I have also previously indicated to you that I would like to take your role and participation in this research a step beyond the collaborative interviewee or conversational partner seen in most qualitative research; I would like this to be a co-authorship situation, if that is agreeable to you. This allows you the opportunity to help define and frame significant emerging themes and make recommendations based on both your personal experience and your membership in the law enforcement community. Further, this research provides you the opportunity to co-author professional papers and co-present on this information at professional conferences. Also, as previously noted, should my dissertation stem from this research, that aspect of the project will be singularly authored by me, to meet with university requirements. If this research does extend to interviewing others involved, you will be consulted on who is approached for interviews and may be required to facilitate these interviews. As a matter of ethical care,
especially in light of the fact that you may be acting as both a researcher and an
interviewee, you will not have unlimited access to other interviewees' responses, in order
to protect their rights and facilitate their honesty and candor in responding. You will be
given access to, and asked to participate in, the second stage of data analysis, which will
involve exploring emergent themes or ideas to address potential meanings,
classifications, and implications of these themes. My resume and references, as well as
samples of my previous work, have been provided to you, should you wish to verify my
background or reliability as a researcher.

By signing this form, you are saying several things. You are saying that you have read
this form or have had it read to you, that you are satisfied that you understand this form,
the research study, and its risks and benefits. The researchers should have answered any
questions you may have had about the research. If you have any questions later on, then
the researchers should be able to answer them:

Elizabeth Monk-Turner, PhD E-mail: etumer@odu.edu
Amanda L. Farrell, MA, MSc E-mail: afarrell@odu.edu

If at any time you feel pressured to participate, or if you have any questions about your
rights or this form, then you should call Dr. George Maihafer, the current IRB chair, at
757-683-4520, or the Old Dominion University Office of Research, at 757-683-3460.

And importantly, by signing below, you are telling the researcher YES, that you agree to
participate in this study. A copy of this letter will be provided to you for your records.

Sincerely,

Amanda L. Farrell, MA, MSc
Doctoral Candidate and Adjunct Instructor
Co-Investigator

Elizabeth Monk-Turner, PhD
Professor of Sociology and Criminal Justice
Responsible Project Investigator

I, ________________________, have read and understood the contents of this letter. I
understand that my participation in this research is voluntary and that I can withdraw
from the research at any time, without concern or fear of repercussions.

Name (Printed)                          Signature                          Date
To whom it may concern,

In speaking with Amanda Farrell, on several occasions, we have discussed analyzing officer involved shootings. Having been involved in a shooting, I am intimately familiar with the resulting emotional and professional consequences. In an effort to fully understand the short and long term effects, and aid in the survivability of myself and other officers; I would like to fully participate in a case study, with Amanda Farrell.

Expressing my interest, I have spoken with Amanda Farrell at length. I completely understand the in-depth nature of this type of case study, and look forward to all it involves. Furthermore, I am absolutely aware that at anytime, I will be able to withdraw from the study.

Respectfully,

Chris
June 11, 2013

Dear Sir or Madam:

You have been asked to consent to being interviewed in relation to your experience related to the shooting that Chris was involved in on April 15, 2007. The aim of this research is to gain a more broad understanding of police shootings by thoroughly exploring one case, approaching the incident from the following three dimensions: personal, professional, and organizational/systemic. Chris is not only aware of this research and consenting to be interviewed; he is also a collaborating researcher, as is evidenced by the attached letter of support. In addition to Chris, Elizabeth Monk-Turner, PhD (Responsible Project Investigator); Amanda L. Farrell, MA, MSc; and Mona J. E. Danner, PhD, will be involved in this research.

Police shootings are incidents that have lasting effects on the officers involved, as well as their friends, family and colleagues; the departments to which they belong; and the community at large—yet these events are rarely discussed. Your involvement in this research will aid in potentially assisting other officers, other police departments, other friends and family, and any other individuals who have experienced a similar event understand their situation. It is hoped that this research is able to identify possible areas of best practice, with the aim of providing the appropriate response and support in these cases, with an emphasis on officer survivability. This study seeks to approach the issues involved with police shootings holistically, looking at precipitating factors/influences, the event itself and post-event factors, across several dimensions, as opposed to a narrow approach only examining one dimension in regard to one stage of the event.

Your role in this study will involve in-depth interviews (recorded, with your permission, and transcribed) with you that cover both biographical and topical elements of your involvement in this case. The time required to conduct and complete these interviews will vary, but all interviews will be scheduled at a time and location convenient and comfortable to you. Understandably, the issues to be discussed can be considered sensitive and, as such, you have the right to not only voluntarily agree to this project, or decline to participate, but to also withdraw from it at any point without concern or fear of repercussions. If any information comes to light during the course of research that may impact your decision to consent to participate, you will be notified immediately. You will not receive any form of monetary compensation for your participation in this research.

You will also have the right to review all materials resulting from these interviews to ensure accuracy and clarity of meaning; you will have the right to request that certain
issues or conversations be kept off the record, confidential, or revisited for further
discussion. You will also have the right to decline to pursue certain avenues of
conversation. Any and all information you choose to share is voluntary and will help in
creating a more complete picture of this event. It is possible that interviews will be
transcribed by ----. Although Ms. ---- is a transcriptionist for the Police Department, her
role in this research will be as a privately hired transcriptionist and she will sign a letter
of confidentiality prior to commencing transcription. If this arrangement is of concern to
you, for any reason, please inform the researcher and other arrangements for transcription
will be made.

Chris will not have direct access to your recorded interview responses or the transcripts
of your interviews. To clarify, both the data collection and data analysis will involve
two steps. The data collection will begin with a series of interviews with Chris, followed
by interviews with various individuals involved in this case. The data analysis will
involve an open coding process, where dominant themes will be extracted from the
interview transcripts and, where appropriate, bolstered by evidence from other sources,
such as court transcripts. Your informed consent documents will be kept separate from
the transcripts, which will be assigned random numbers to enhance confidentiality. Only
Dr. Monk-Tumer and Ms. Farrell will have access to the informed consent documents
and full transcripts. The second step of the data analysis will involve discussing the
emergent themes (in the forms of aggregate groupings of unidentified quotes of a similar
nature or topic) with the research team, to address potential meanings, classifications, and
implications of these themes. Additionally, emergent themes may generate additional or
follow-up questions for Chris or other interviewees.

This means that, should you request any topic be kept off the record, your initial
statements will only be available to Dr. Monk-Tumer and Ms. Farrell. The researchers
will take reasonable steps to keep private information, such as your involvement and
responses, confidential. Data will be stored in a locked filing cabinet prior to its
processing, as well as in encrypted and secured computer files after transcription and
analysis. The results of this study may be used in reports, presentations, and
publications; but the researcher will not identify you, if you so request. Of course, your
records may be subpoenaed by court order or inspected by government bodies with
oversight authority. While efforts will be made to protect your confidentiality, because
we are not anonymizing this particular case and Chris is openly involved in this research,
there is a heightened risk of breach of confidentiality. This risk may be greater for
individuals who have very specific relationships with Chris or who played particular roles
in this case. The researchers will make all reasonable efforts to maintain confidentiality;
however, we are obligated to advise participants of this increased risk of breach of
confidentiality.

As researchers, we must strive to mitigate any risks, potential or real, that might be
associated with participation in this research. To protect current members of the Police
Department, the administration has been advised of this research and has provided a letter
attesting to that notification and the position of the department. This letter can be viewed
upon request. Due to the nature of this topic, it can lead to heightened emotions. You
have the right to decline to talk about certain topics and, if there is any evidence of
emotional distress, the interview will be halted. If any other negative affects arise from participation in this research, whether they are emotional, psychological, physical or professional, please notify us immediately so that we can work to remedy the situation.

If you say YES, then your consent in this document does not waive any of your legal rights. However, in the event of harm arising from this study, neither Old Dominion University nor the researchers are able to give you any money, insurance coverage, free medical care, or any other compensation for such injury. In the event that you suffer injury as a result of participation in any research project, you may contact the responsible principal investigator or investigators at the provided phone numbers or e-mail, or Dr. George Maihafer the current IRB chair at 757-683-4520 at Old Dominion University, who will be glad to review the matter with you.

By signing this form, you are saying several things. You are saying that you have read this form or have had it read to you, that you are satisfied that you understand this form, the research study, and its risks and benefits. The researchers should have answered any questions you may have had about the research. If you have any questions later on, then the researchers should be able to answer them:

Elizabeth Monk-Tumer, PhD  E-mail: eturner@odu.edu
Amanda L. Farrell, MA, MSc  E-mail: afarrell@odu.edu

If at any time you feel pressured to participate, or if you have any questions about your rights or this form, then you should call Dr. George Maihafer, the current IRB chair, at 757-683-4520, or the Old Dominion University Office of Research, at 757-683-3460.

And importantly, by signing below, you are telling the researcher YES, that you agree to participate in this study. A copy of this letter will be provided to you for your records.

Sincerely,

Amanda L. Farrell, MA, MSc  Elizabeth Monk-Tumer, PhD
Doctoral Candidate and Adjunct Instructor  Professor of Sociology and Criminal Justice
Co-Investigator  Responsible Project Investigator

I, __________________________, have read and understood the contents of this letter. I understand that my participation in this research is voluntary and that I can withdraw from the research at any time, without concern or fear of repercussions.

Name (Printed)  Signature  Date
Appendix E
Sample Questions for Interviews Regarding Police Shooting Case Study

Sample Questions for Chris

- Basic Demographics: DOB/AGE...Ethnicity...How long been a police officer? Religious orientation?

- Please describe and explain your background. Where did you grow up? What was your childhood like? Did you do well in school? What did you want to be when you grew up? Did you play sports? What was your family like? Your friends?

- What are your first memories? What do you remember about living in Colombia? What do you remember about moving to the US? Can you describe that experience?

- Ask about dad’s incident...memories, coping mechanisms, who was there, what was said, thoughts, feelings, what did the adults around you do/how behave?

- Ask about brother’s incident...memories, coping mechanisms, who was there, what was said, thoughts, feelings, what did the adults around you do/how behave?

- Ask about mom’s remarriage...and relationship with mom...feel like you had to take care of her/be the man?

- First marriage

- Second Marriage

- Meeting wife

- What jobs did you have before becoming a police officer? How did you end up in the area? Are you married/divorced/separated? What is your educational background?

- Why did you decide to become a police officer? What factors or events in your childhood or early adulthood do you think influenced your career decision? In turn, how has your career as a police officer influenced other aspects of your life?

- Please describe your formal and informal training regarding use of force in general, and use of deadly force in particular. What about stress and coping mechanisms?

- How many officers have you seen go through an officer involved shooting, both before and after your own? What do you remember from their experiences? What “lessons” did you learn? Has this changed since you have been through your own shooting incident? Do you think your educational background now influences your understanding of critical incidents and gives you insight into your own behavior?

- What are your typical reactions when you are under stress? Have these changed since before the shooting?
• Had you been involved in use of force incidents prior to this incident? Deadly or otherwise? Please discuss those incidents. What did you feel? How did you react? Is there anything that sticks with you about those incidents.

• Please tell me about the events of April 15, 2007. I would like to use focused retrieval (closing eyes) and emotional context reinstatement (remembering how you felt). Please start from waking up that day and walk me through that day in as much detail as possible from the time you woke up—how were you feeling, was there anything that made you happy/sad/angry throughout the day, what the weather was like—any detail, no matter how seemingly small or insignificant should be left out. Do not censor yourself. We’ll take it slow and, if at any point you start to feel anxious or upset, we can take a break. If you wish to discontinue this conversation at any point, that is perfectly acceptable.
  o Please discuss/describe the physiological, emotional, etc. alterations you experienced from the time you pulled into the gas station parking lot until you returned home the next morning.
  o You use the Cooper Color Code in the training you conduct. Please go through this event in terms of this code. Also, please discuss how this color code manifested in the weeks following the event.

• Of course, hindsight is perfect, but is there anything you would have done differently that night? In the following days and weeks?

• Can you provide context for the events that occurred on April 15, 2007? What was going on in your personal life? Had there been any big cases or events in the department that you were aware of/had been part of? What was going on in your professional life? Were there any current events that had impacted you?

• Please explain and describe what happened in the days and weeks following the shooting.
  o What were your thoughts and feelings?
  o Did you notice any behavioral or attitudinal changes?
  o Were there any changes to your relationships with friends, families, co-workers, supervisors, etc.?
  o You’ve noted that you didn’t talk to anyone for a week. Why? What were you thinking or were you trying to escape from what had happened—if you didn’t talk about it, it would go away?
  o You’ve also mentioned that you were quick to fly off the handle and an asshole to be around, in general. How did this impact your closest relationships? Can you discuss this behavior and, if possible, why you would react or behave in this manner? Did anyone call you on this and, if so, did it matter, help or further anger or isolate you?
  o What was the most challenging or difficult aspect faced? Were there multiple difficulties?
Please describe the investigation of the shooting incident and its outcome.

- What was your reaction when your firearm was taken?
- Did you feel isolated as a result of the no communication policy? How do you think this issue might be better addressed?
- How did you feel being interviewed? How long were you on administrative leave? Were you on leave pending administrative clearance? Do you think this time off is sufficient? What about the mandatory psychiatric consultation—is this procedure/policy adequate? What changes would you suggest be made? The written policy is --------, is that what is done in reality?
- You've mentioned the advent of CSIM. Please describe the role this group plays in these types of incidents. While this is an excellent form of support, do you think it could potentially serve to isolate officers already struggling even more from their non-police support system?
- Did you feel that people reacted or responded to you differently?
- Do you feel that your case was exploited in any way?
- How did you react to the editorial comments you were reading. Did you closely follow the press coverage at the time, or did you compile the articles later? How did you react when your name was released to the media?
- Were your needs met, based on the current policies and procedures following an officer-involved shooting? Do you feel that your needs were overshadowed by either organizational concerns or other events that were occurring/had occurred?
- Professionally, did you have any fears or concerns during the investigation? Following the investigation, did you struggle with returning to work? Upon returning to full duty, did you feel ready? Had you received any counseling or preparation to return to duty? Please describe and explain.
- Emotionally, do you feel that the policies and procedures set forth by the department met your needs? Is counseling mandatory? Is there a psychologist employed by the department? Did you go through a fitness for duty evaluation after the shooting? How soon after? How does the PD address the emotional needs of officers who are placed in a use of force situation? In a use of deadly force situation? With anyone officially connected to the department, did you feel that you could be honest about what you were experiencing? Do you feel that you have regained emotional stability following this incident? If yes, how long did it take you to feel that something akin to "normalcy" had been regained?
Spirituality, which does differ from religiosity, can be impacted by an incident, such as you experienced. How would you describe your spirituality and religious beliefs prior to the shooting? After? What has changed? You have mentioned that you were raised as a Catholic. How did this aspect of your upbringing impact your experience? What have you struggled with the most in relation to the conflict, if any, you experienced between your faith and the situation you found yourself in? Did religion play a role in the healing process?

What, if any, were your greatest concerns, in general, during this period?

- Do you believe that better training for and response to these types of incidents can be developed? What are your procedural and policy suggestions?
- How do you incorporate your experience into the training you provide to other officers, both formally and informally?
- Do you have a professional mentor or role model? Why is this person a role model? How do you think they would have reacted in your situation? Has this person been a source of support after the shooting?
- What is your favorite/least favorite aspect of the job? Has this incident impacted that and/or how you do your job?
- What are your career/professional plans? What role has this incident played in shaping those plans?
- Have you been involved in other use of force incidents? If yes, how many? What about use of deadly force? If yes, how many? Can you explain the difference—not just between use of non-lethal and lethal force, but also between use of deadly force situations? If you were involved in any incidents prior to this shooting, how were they different? If you were involved in any incidents following this shooting, how were they different? How has this shooting impacted your approach to different situations? Your reaction and thought processes?
- You have received several prestigious honors and awards following this incident. At the time, how did you feel about receiving these awards? Now? Did you have any mixed feelings?
- What were your greatest sources of support following the shooting? Were you surprised at the support, or lack thereof, you received? Were there any experiences that could have been more supportive/constructive?
- How do you think this incident impacted those closest to you? Your family? Your friends? Your co-workers? How did they cope, to your knowledge? Did any of their reactions surprise you?

You stated you did not want your parents to come here. Was that an attempt to protect them or protect yourself emotionally? How did they react?
• Would you describe and explain the coping strategies you used—the good and the bad? How did you identify which ones were negative? Were you taught these coping techniques? Do you still use any of these techniques on a regular basis?
• May we discuss the therapy sessions that followed the shooting? How did you end up working with Dr. Dwayne? Did you seek therapy, or was it mandatory? What made you choose CPA? Can you describe your first appointment/visit? Were you initially receptive to the idea of therapy, or were you just going because it seemed like you had to? Or did you just want medication? How long were you in therapy? What surprised you the most about the therapy process? What, if anything, was the most helpful? Have you engaged in any other types of therapy or any other attempts to help yourself "recover" from this incident?
  o You've mentioned sleep and appetite disruptions. Did you have nightmares or flashbacks? As for the hyper vigilance following the shooting, how did that impact your mental and physical well being? What medications were you prescribed? Were there any side effects—adverse or otherwise—emotional, physical/sexual, etc? How did you handle these side effects on top of the other issues you were dealing with? How did they make you feel? Did they help, hurt or did you not notice a difference? Did you struggle with the fact that you had to see someone, to get psychological and medical help, to cope/recover from this?
• Some people might say that your willingness to talk about this incident is not only contrary to the typical to the response expected from a member of the law enforcement subculture, but also an atypical gender response. How would you respond to that assumption? What are the factors that influence your decision to openly discuss this incident and its impact on you? Would you advise that all officers involved in a shooting incident be as candid? Do you seek to mentor or counsel other officers who have been involved in shootings?
• How has this incident changed you?
• How often do you think about this incident? If there was one thing that you would like other officers to know about this incident, what would it be?
• What advice/suggestions would you give to others handling a similar incident?
  o The officers involved
  o Their partners
  o Other officers
  o Their family, friends, children, and other intimates
  o Those investigating the case
  o Supervisors
  o Administrators
  o Therapists
  o Community members
Sample Questions for Family and Friends

- How did you meet Chris? What was the nature of your relationship? How long had you known each other?
- Would you please describe your relationship with Chris prior to the shooting? What was his personality/demeanor like?
- How did you react to the news of the shooting? Can you explain and describe your response—emotionally, verbally, physically?
- How soon after the incident were you able to interact with Chris?
- What immediate changes did you notice in Chris following the incident?
- Was there anything that you struggled with? How did you cope? Were you unsure of how to act or what to say? Were you ever frustrated?
- How has this incident impacted you?
- What was your role in his healing process? Also, how did you work to heal from this event?
- Have you noticed any permanent changes in his personality/demeanor? Can you describe your relationship after the shooting?

Sample Questions for the Investigators

- How long have you been a police officer? How long with the PD? Would you provide some background on your career? How many uses of deadly force investigations have you been involved in—both before and since this incident?
- What are the department policies and procedures regarding this type of investigation? Do you believe these policies are adequate? Please explain. How do they impact the officer under investigation? How do they impact you and your ability to conduct the investigation?
- Please describe and explain the pressures—both formal and informal—of being involved in this type of investigation.
- Did you have any interactions/a relationship—both personal and/or professional—with Chris prior to the shooting? If yes, please explain and describe. How would you have described Chris prior to the shooting?
- Please describe and explain your involvement in this investigation. What were your observations? Thoughts? Feelings? Responses?
- Did your prior relationship with Chris facilitate your investigation, or was it a source of strain/stress?
- Investigating an officer-involved shooting must hit a little close to home. How did this investigation impact you personally/emotionally? In turn, how did those personal feelings impact your investigation? Your attitudes and approach to the job? How did you cope?
• How did your involvement in this investigation impact your relationship, personal and/or professional, with Chris, if at all? Did it impact your relationship, personal and/or professional, with anyone else?
• Has this experience changed how you think of Chris?
• What changes did you notice in Chris during and following the investigation? In yourself? In anyone else?
• Looking back, is there anything you would have done differently in this investigation?
• What advice/suggestions would you give to others involved in a similar situation?
  o To the investigators
  o To supervisors
  o To administrators
  o To other officers
  o To family and friends
  o To the officer being investigated

Sample Questions for Supervisors
• How long have you been a police officer? How long with the PD? Would you provide some background on your career? How many use of deadly force incidents have you been involved in—both before and since this incident?
• What are the department policies and procedures regarding this type of incident? Do you believe these policies are adequate? Please explain. How do they impact the officer under investigation? How do they impact you and your ability to be an effective supervisor?
• Please describe and explain the pressures—both formal and informal—of being involved in this type of incident as a supervisor.
• Did you have any interactions/a relationship—both personal and/or professional—with Chris prior to the shooting? If yes, please explain and describe. How would you have described Chris prior to the shooting?
• How long had you supervised Chris?
• Please describe and explain your involvement in this incident. What were your observations? Thoughts? Feelings? Responses?
• Did your prior relationship with Chris facilitate your involvement, or was it a source of strain/stress?
• Being involved in an officer-involved shooting, even peripherally, must hit a little close to home. How did this investigation impact you personally/emotionally? In turn, how did those personal feelings impact your investigation? Your attitudes and approach to the job? How did you cope?
• How did your involvement in this incident impact your relationship, personal and/or professional, with Chris, if at all? Did it impact your relationship, personal and/or professional, with anyone else?

• What impact did this incident have on Chris’s work? Did you alter your expectations or thoughts of him based on this experience? What changes in Chris did you observe following the shooting? In yourself?

• How did you offer support to Chris throughout this process? Were other officers shaken and, if so, what support was offered to them? Were other officers encouraged to support Chris?

• Looking back, is there anything you would have done differently in handling this incident?

• What advice/suggestions would you give to others involved in a similar situation?
  o To the investigators
  o To supervisors
  o To administrators
  o To other officers
  o To family and friends
  o To the officer being investigated

**Sample Questions for Administrators**

• How long have you been a police officer? How long with the PD? Would you provide some background on your career? How many use of deadly force incidents have you been involved in—both before and since this incident? What was your rank and position at the time this incident occurred? Did you have any direct involvement in this incident?

• What are the department policies and procedures regarding this type of incident? Do you believe these policies are adequate? Please explain. How do they impact the officer under investigation? How do they impact you and your ability to be an effective administrator? Are the policies and procedures routinely evaluated to ensure that they are as effective as possible?

• Please describe and explain the pressures—both formal and informal—of being involved in this type of incident as an administrator. Is there a hierarchical ordering of concerns? If yes, what are those concerns and how are they ranked? What is your role, in your current position, in these types of incidents? What impact does this involvement have on you, both personally and professionally? Do you feel distanced from these events?

• How do you balance the needs of the community, the needs of the officer involved in the incident, the needs of other officers, and the needs of the department in these situations? How is the chain of information structured?
• Did you have any interactions/a relationship—both personal and/or professional—with Chris prior to the shooting? If yes, please explain and describe. How would you have described Chris prior to the shooting?
• Please describe and explain your involvement, even peripherally, in this incident. What were your observations? Thoughts? Feelings? Responses?
• Did your prior relationship with Chris facilitate your involvement, or was it a source of strain/stress?
• Being involved in an officer-involved shooting, even peripherally, must hit a little close to home. How did this investigation impact you personally/emotionally? In turn, how did those personal feelings impact your involvement? Your attitudes and approach to the job? How did you cope?
• How did your involvement in this incident impact your relationship, personal and/or professional, with Chris, if at all? Did it impact your relationship, personal and/or professional, with anyone else?
• What impact did this incident have on Chris’s work? Did you alter your expectations or thoughts of him based on this experience? What changes in Chris did you observe following the shooting? In yourself?
• How did you offer support to Chris throughout this process? Were other officers shaken and, if so, what support was offered to them? Were other officers encouraged to support Chris? If so, how? What processes, if any, are in place to promote officer support and survivability in the aftermath of such incidents? Are these options offered consistently, or is there only a certain time frame in which they are available? How do you combat the machismo and code of silence mentalities that may inhibit officers from reaching out for assistance?
• Looking back, is there anything you would have done differently in handling this incident?
• What advice/suggestions would you give to others involved in a similar situation?
  o To the investigators
  o To supervisors
  o To administrators
  o To other officers
  o To family and friends
  o To the officer being investigated
• Do you have any policy or procedural changes you would like to see implemented? Do you believe there is a “best practice” in handling this type of incidents that can be developed and implemented? Are there other incidents that you believe would benefit from a similar analysis, or from a similar approach, as far as some policies and procedures go? Please describe and explain.
Appendix F
Ms. Amanda L. Farrell, MA  
Old Dominion University College of Arts and Letters  
Department of Sociology and Criminal Justice BAL 6  
Norfolk, VA 23529

Dear Ms. Farrell:

Thank you for contacting us in regard to your research concerning police officer shootings. As you might imagine, this is an issue of critical importance to our association, which is composed of over 28,000 law enforcement and support personnel throughout the Southeast. At any time, day or night, we are on call to help our officer members who might find themselves involved in a duty-related shooting or other critical incident.

We have learned over the years that officer-involved shootings may have many long-lasting effects on the officers involved, their department and co-workers, and the support system around them. Once an officer fires his weapon, he has justified concerns regarding his employment, his finances and even his freedom. It is our responsibility to provide officers with the legal representation they need to address such concerns. In addition to those practical concerns, many officers feel guilt and post-traumatic stress that may follow them for years. In fact, the Police Benevolent Foundation—our 501(c)(3) supporting foundation—conducts PTSD/suicide prevention seminars to help officers get the help they need after dealing with such life-altering events.

We support your efforts to research the comprehensive impact that duty-related shootings have on police officers and others. If there is anything further we can do to assist, please let me know.

Sincerely,

Joni J. Fletcher  
Director of Legal Services

The Voice of Law Enforcement Officers
To Whom It May Concern,

We have been asked to review the research proposal for Ms. Amanda Farrell’s dissertation research on officer-involved shooting and officer survivability. After a comprehensive review, it has been determined this research proposal embraces the goals of the International Brotherhood of Police Officers. The IBPO seeks to protect the men and women in the law enforcement community with regards to working conditions, benefits and other such concerns. It appears this research will positively impact the working environment of these officers, particularly in how these incidents are managed and the consideration given to officers in their aftermath.

It is agreed that this research presents the opportunity for the Norfolk Police Department and its affiliated organizations to enforce their progressive and proactive stance with regards to addressing officer survivability, as well as embrace evidence-based policies related to officer-involved shootings. As such, the International Brotherhood of Police Officers, Local 412, is happy to support this research. It is our opinion that this research, especially as it represents a true collaboration between an active law enforcement officer and a local academic, supports the goals and beliefs of the IBPO and we can clearly see its potential value to our current and future membership.

Sincerely,

Randolph E. Brann

www.ibpo.org
To Whom It May Concern,

The Fraternal Order of Police has a strong history of police officers representing and supporting our brother and sisters in policing and seeks to provide a voice to active and retired officers. We acknowledge that officer involved shootings can have lasting impacts on not only the officer, but their families, their department and the communities they serve. An officer involved shooting is likely one of the most critical adversities an officer will face in his or her career.

As a result of this unique position in the police community we have been asked to review the research proposal for Ms. Amanda Farrell’s doctoral dissertation research on officer involved shootings and officer survivability. This request was not taken lightly. Our review has determined that, in her approach to this research, partnering with Sergeant Scallon to explore and understand his particular shooting incident, Ms. Farrell is addressing a contemporary issue that is of extreme importance to the Fraternal Order of Police, our Auxiliaries, other police officers and the law enforcement family in general.

We agree that this research presents the opportunity for the Norfolk Police Department and its affiliated organizations to further its reputation progressive and proactive approaches to modern issues facing the policing community, paying particular attention to addressing officer survivability, as well as seeking to embrace evidence-based policies related to officer-involved shootings. The Fraternal Order of Police, Commodore Lodge #3, has chosen to support this research endeavor. We believe it complements the goals of our organization and will almost certainly benefit current and future members, police officers, their departments, and their families and communities.

Sincerely,

[Signature]

President #3

Commodore Lodge #3, Norfolk VA
To Whom It May Concern:

As coordinator of the Norfolk Police Department's Critical Incident Stress Management (CISM) Team, I have been asked to review the research proposal for Ms. Amanda Farrell's dissertation research regarding officer-involved shootings, and officer survivability. After a comprehensive review, I have determined that this research proposal embraces the goals of this department. The CISM Team seeks to address the emotional needs of the men and women of the Norfolk Police Department who may become involved in a duty-related traumatic critical incident. Ms. Farrell's research has the potential to positively impact the working environment of these officers, particularly in how these incidents are managed, and the consideration given to officers in the aftermath of a traumatic event.

It is my belief that this research presents an opportunity for the Norfolk Police Department, and affiliated organizations, to enhance our response to the emotional survivability of officers who may become involved in a traumatic critical incident, specifically officer-involved shootings. I am pleased to support this research, especially since it represents a true collaboration between law enforcement and a local academic. I can clearly see the potential value to our current and future officers/employees.

Sincerely,

[Signature]

Captain W. R. Driskell
Commanding Officer
Personnel Division
Norfolk Police Department
March 1, 2010

Amanda L. Farrell, MA, MSc
FAX: 410-3574

Dear Ms. Farrell:

I am writing to confirm that I have reviewed your proposal for dissertation research focusing on police shooting incidents with a specific focus on Sergeant Scallon’s shooting incident on April 15, 2007.

I treated Sergeant Scallon for Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder symptoms following this shooting, and I have no reservations about his participation in an “elaborated case study” of this particular incident. Further, should the need arise, I will continue to offer follow-up services to Sergeant Scallon at his request.

Respectfully,

William J. Duane, Ph.D.
Licensed Clinical Psychologist
Appendix G
Ms. Amanda Farrell  
Old Dominion University  
College of Arts and Letters  
Department of Sociology and Criminal Justice  
Batten Arts and Letters 6th Floor  
Norfolk, Virginia 23529  

Re: FOIA request  
Our File No. 09-136693-WR

Dear Mr. Farrell:

Your letter dated December 22, 2009, and addressed to Senior Assistant Chief of Police Chamberlin, together with the attached Research Proposal, has been forwarded to me with respect to your request for various materials. We are obliged under law to treat these requests for materials as requests made under the Virginia Freedom of Information Act.

The requested General Orders and policies you request will be produced. Personnel are gathering those. Depending on the volume of them, there may be a copying charge, and we will let you know what that is.

Your request for access to the "complete case file" is denied. The Department declines to produce the case file, because it is a criminal investigation file exempt from production pursuant to Virginia Code §2.2-3706(F)(1), and your request may also include material that is considered a confidential administrative investigation, which is exempt under Virginia Code §2.2-3706(G)(3).

You request for statistics (expanded in the body of the Research Proposal to "statistics and demographics") cannot be satisfied for a number of reasons. The Department does not maintain such statistics. The Department's response is that the statistical records requested do not exist. Virginia Code §2.2-3704(B)(4). Moreover, the Freedom of Information Act does not...
Ms. Amanda Farrell  
December 31, 2009  

Page 2

require the public agency to create records, and in this instance, does not require the compilation of statistics. Virginia Code §2.2-3704(D). If we were required to compile statistics, we do not believe your request complies with Virginia Code §2.2-3704(B), in that it does not identify the record, or the desired statistics, with "reasonable specificity." You have not described specifically what statistics you want.

Sincerely yours,

Wayne Ringer  
Chief Deputy City Attorney  

WR: tbn
January 25, 2010

Ms. Amanda Farrell
Old Dominion University
College of Arts and Letters
Department of Sociology and Criminal justice
Batten Arts and Letters 6th Floor
Norfolk, Virginia 23529

Dear Ms. Farrell,

We have reviewed your December 22, 2009, request for a letter in support of your research proposal for Exploring Police Shootings and Officer Survivability, as supplemented by your letter dated January 4, 2009, and we have reviewed the Research Proposal itself. We support academic research and believe study that would benefit police officers in how they cope with the aftermath of shooting a citizen would be salutary.

However, the Department's ability, in fact, to support your efforts is constrained by a number of considerations touching on confidentiality and on communications by, from and of the Department. In part, the confidentiality considerations are recognized by the exemptions from the Virginia Freedom of Information Act as described to you in Mr. Ringer's letter of December 31, 2009. Several topics which you indicate an intention to explore necessarily would invade matters which the Department holds in strict confidence, including administrative internal investigations and evaluations of justifications for an officer's actions, and also including comments on personnel matters, as would be likely to arise in interviews of supervisors. As you point out, it will be impossible for anonymity to be protected.

Also, it is the Department's policy that information relating to the Department or its operations shall be released only by the Chief of Police or his designee. We cannot give blanket approval to your freely interviewing personnel of the Department about this case, partly because some of the personnel may be involved in those matters which we consider confidential, and partly because some judgment may need to be made about who is a proper spokesperson with regard to particular information and issues.

We stand ready to produce any information required by and not exempt from the Virginia Freedom of Information Act, but the Act reaches only records, and contains no requirement that we grant interviews. With respect to your interviewing Departmental personnel, we will consider on an individual basis any request you make to interview a particular person about a particular subject. I hope this letter will adequately serve your needs in light of the conflicting considerations involved.

Sincerely,

Bruce P. Marquardt
Chief of Police

Post Office Box 358 • Norfolk, Virginia 23501
Ms. Amanda Farrell
Old Dominion University
BAL 6000
Norfolk, VA 23529

Re: Freedom of Information Act Request by Amanda Farrell for
IBR reports and special incident reports for both NPD officers
and law enforcement officers other than NPD officers and
SOP's regarding discharging of weapons and officer-involved

Dear Ms. Farrell:

Enclosed please find the information you requested regarding the above-captioned matter.

If I can be of further assistance or answer any questions you may have, please feel free to give me a call.

Sincerely,

Mary E. Keough
Program Supervisor

Enclosures
Appendix H
FREEDOM OF INFORMATION ACT (FOIA)
REQUEST FOR PUBLIC RECORDS
Section 2.2-3700, Code of Virginia

1. DATE OF REQUEST: October 12, 2011

2. INDIVIDUAL REQUESTING INFORMATION

   Full Name: Amanda L. Farrell
   Company (if applicable): Old Dominion University
   Address: BAL 4000
   City: Norfolk ______ State: VA ______ ZIP: 23529
   Telephone: (Home) 757-547-4378 (Work) 757-338-4379

3. RECORDS REQUESTED (Provide as much detail as available):

   Date(s)/Time(s) of record(s) (Ex. 01/01/2004 at 3:45 p.m.) January 1990–Present
   Detailed Description of Request: Copies of all IBR reports and Special Incident Reports related to the discharge of firearms by law enforcement officers other than NPD officers that have occurred within the City of Norfolk outside of authorized firearms training for the time period of January 1, 1990 to present date.

4. PURSUANT TO VIRGINIA CODE §2.2-3704(F), IT WILL BE NECESSARY FOR YOU TO REIMBURSE THE CITY FOR ALL COSTS INCURRED IN THE PRODUCTION OF THESE RECORDS.

   SIGNATURE OF REQUESTER: Amanda L. Farrell

OFFICE USE ONLY

Request Delivered to Office of City Attorney:

Date: _______ Time: _______ By: _______

G.O. ADM-455: Freedom of Info Act Attachment A Date of Issue: 01/12/11
FREEDOM OF INFORMATION ACT (FOIA)
REQUEST FOR PUBLIC RECORDS
Section 2.2-370C, Code of Virginia

1. DATE OF REQUEST: October 12, 2011

2. INDIVIDUAL REQUESTING INFORMATION
   Full Name: Amanda L. Farrell
   Company (if applicable): Old Dominion University
   Address: BAL 6000
   City: Norfolk State: VA ZIP: 23529
   Telephone: (Home) 757-547-4378 (Work) 757-338-4379

3. RECORDS REQUESTED (Provide as much detail as available):
   Date(s) / Time(s) of record(s) (Ex. 01/01/2004 at 3:45 p.m.): January 1990 - Present
   Detailed Description of Request: Copies of all IBR reports and Special Incident Reports related to the discharge of firearms by Norfolk Police officers, including on- and off-duty incidents and involving either duty weapons or other weapons, outside of authorized firearms training for the time period of January 1, 1990 to present date.

4. PURSUANT TO VIRGINIA CODE §2.2-3704(F), IT WILL BE NECESSARY FOR YOU TO REIMBURSE THE CITY FOR ALL COSTS INCURRED IN THE PRODUCTION OF THESE RECORDS.

SIGNATURE OF REQUESTER

OFFICE USE ONLY

Request Delivered to Office of City Attorney:

Date: ___________________ Time: ____________ By: ___________________

G.O. ADM-455: Freedom of Info Act Attachment A Date of Issue: 01 12 11
FREEDOM OF INFORMATION ACT (FOIA)
REQUEST FOR PUBLIC RECORDS
Section 2.2-3700, Code of Virginia

1. DATE OF REQUEST: October 12, 2011

2. INDIVIDUAL REQUESTING INFORMATION

Full Name: Amanda L. Farrell
Company (if applicable): Old Dominion University
Address: BAI 6000
City: Norfolk State: VA ZIP: 23529
Telephone: (Home) 757-544-4378 (Work) 757-338-4379

3. RECORDS REQUESTED (Provide as much detail as available):

Date(s) / Time(s) of record(s) (Ex. 01/01/2004 at 3:45 p.m.) N/A
Detailed Description of Request: Copies of the Standard Operating Procedures (SOPs) from both the Homicide Division of the Norfolk Police Department's Detective Bureau and the Norfolk Police Department's Office of Professional Standards regarding police officers discharging firearms and officer-involved shootings

4. PURSUANT TO VIRGINIA CODE §2.2-3704(F), IT WILL BE NECESSARY FOR YOU TO REIMBURSE THE CITY FOR ALL COSTS INCURRED IN THE PRODUCTION OF THESE RECORDS.

SIGNATURE OF REQUESTER: 

OFFICE USE ONLY

Request Delivered to Office of City Attorney:

Date: ___________ Time: ___________ By: ____________________

G.O. ADM-455: Freedom of Info Act Attachment A Date of Issue: 01 12 11
Appendix I
VITA

Amanda L. Farrell
Old Dominion University
Department of Sociology and Criminal Justice
Norfolk, VA 23529

Education

MSc. Investigative Psychology, University of Liverpool, Liverpool, United Kingdom, December 2008

M.A. Criminal Justice and Criminology, Sam Houston State University, Huntsville, Texas, December 2006

B.A. Criminal Justice and Sociology, Marymount University, Arlington, Virginia, December 2003

Publications

