Weak Links in a Dangerously Fractured Region: Fragile State as Global Threats

Tasawar ul-Rahim Baig

Old Dominion University

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.odu.edu/gpis_etds

Recommended Citation
Baig, Tasawar u.. "Weak Links in a Dangerously Fractured Region: Fragile State as Global Threats" (2014). Doctor of Philosophy (PhD), Dissertation, Political Science & Geography, Old Dominion University, DOI: 10.25777/157a-h729
https://digitalcommons.odu.edu/gpis_etds/31
ABSTRACT

WEAK LINKS IN A DANGEROUSLY FRACTURED REGION: FRAGILE STATE AS GLOBAL THREATS

Tasawar ul-Rahim Baig
Old Dominion University, 2014
Director: Dr. Simon Serfaty

In the post-9/11 period a common belief emerged that fragile states are launching pads for unprecedented and unconventional transnational threats. The rise of state fragility or state failure as a paradigm surfaced after the end of the Cold War, but their high risk factor was noticed only later. This is because increased interconnectedness allows information to spread faster and intensifies threat perceptions.

This study recognizes that the idea of weak states, small states, and political decay existed before, and that the notion of state fragility has been widely used in recent years. The conventional wisdom about political decay refers to the ineffectiveness of institutions and corrupt governance structures which enfeeble the state, and which is similar to the current literature focused on domestic factors. To understand the fragility of statehood, the study answers the following research question: “Under what conditions do weak and fragile states continue to fail?”

The analysis explores two core factors: endogenous and exogenous. The academic literature primarily focuses on endogenous factors, mainly political, security, economic, and social performance of states, to determine state capacity and capabilities. However, this study adds geography, or geopolitics, as an exogenous factor.
causing state fragility in many cases. Therefore, the study suggests a new category, “weak pivot states” in which fragility is not only the outcome of domestic factors but is also due to its geography and position as a “pivot.” The evidence suggests that the impact factor of “weak pivot states” is higher than other weak and fragile states, as they are more susceptible to great power struggles.

As “weak pivot states” sit at the crossroads of major and regional powers’ interests, one of the findings of this dissertation demonstrates that major powers have often supported undemocratic forces, with centralized authoritarian regimes benefiting the interests of a hegemon. The reduction of the threat level requires the provision of stability and the implementation of an effective political order. The findings suggest that fragile states need to reorient their constitutions and laws so as to create opportunity of equality and inclusiveness to its populations. In addition, the dissertation recommends the creation of “spheres of socialization” at intra-state and inter-state level that will allow education for democracy towards state building and establishing accountable political systems instead of interventions in weak and fragile states; and also facilitate an integration process at sub-regional, regional and then global level to tackle the burden of geography respectively.
This dissertation is dedicated to two groups of people. First, my family and teachers for their continued guidance, patronage and academic support that has enabled me to expand my intellectual horizons and develop rational understanding about the meaning of life, society, and academic responsibilities.

Second, is a group of people with whom I developed a distant though not detached relationship through this dissertation work, where I have come to realize their constant challenges seeking a ray of hope to protect their dignity in times of despair and destitute situations living in fragile and conflict inflicted societies.
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

First of all, I submit a token of gratitude to all my dissertation committee members: Dr. Serfaty; Dr. Karp; and Dr. Schulman for their best support to accomplish this project.

I would like to submit my humble and special gratitude to the chair of dissertation committee for his unflagging support, intellectual input, and for providing me enabling space to nurture and prepare for future responsibilities. My affiliation with Dr. Serfaty is not simply based on his supervision of my dissertation; rather he has been my academic advisor and mentor for the last four years. I always feel proud and privileged for being nurtured under the tutelage of his eminent scholarship and direct supervision. Without his direction, advice, and critical thoughts this project would have been difficult to accomplish.

I am also indebted to Dr. Karp, whose critical feedback during the summer course on dissertation preparation and writing class enabled me to embark on this research agenda. As an international student, it has always challenging to experience the academic and non-academic transitions in new settings. It would have been very difficult to reach this point in my academic career without her support as Program Director. I indeed learned a lot as a student in her classes, and of course her constructive feedback as committee member on this dissertation has been most helpful.
I am grateful to Dr. Schulman for his all the time encouragement and academic input during my candidacy orals and dissertation writing. I am deeply thankful to him for his time to read and critical response on my project, which has been very helpful.

My humble thanks to a few individuals who helped me in the editorial assistance, including my Fulbright Fellow from Brazil, Mr. Alessandro Shimabukuro, and my friend Mr. Aaron Sander. I also want to pay my profound gratitude to Ms. Steffani Dambruch for her best editorial support in editing the entire draft, particularly with such limited time. In addition, I would like to submit deep gratitude to my Fulbright Fellows from Myanmar, Mr. Naing Tun Lin and Ms. Ja Tum Seng for their extensive discussions to build my deep understanding about Myanmar. Thanks to Mr. Farid Safarmamad and Mr. Muhammad Fahim PhD fellows at ODU for their technical support.

I also want to pay my thanks to GIPS faculty for their tireless efforts, which have helped me to strengthen my academic credentials. I am also thankful to my GIPS fellows for their time and knowledge, it was a wonderful experience at the program with a diverse group from all over the world. My special thanks to Margo Stambleck and other GIPS staff for their best support on administrative matters.

Special thanks to my parents whose prayers are always a source of invisible strength and inspiration. Thanks to my family, friends and colleagues at Karakoram International University (KIU) for their continuous support during my doctoral studies. As well, this section of acknowledgement will not be complete without expressing a sincere thanks to my wife Aniqa Baig for her diligent support, care, and love in finishing
my academic dream. And, I am also thankful to our two little bright stars: Rohaan and Rushdaan for their presence in our life.

Last but not least, this degree would not be possible without the Fulbright doctoral scholarship, and support from KIU. I am grateful to the United States Education Foundation in Pakistan, Mr. Brian Diffley, program officer at the Institute of International Education (IIE), and IIE for taking care of this academic journey on behalf of the Fulbright Program.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Abbreviation</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>AFPEL</td>
<td>Anti-Fascist People’s Freedom League</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>APEC</td>
<td>Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ASEAN</td>
<td>Association of Southeast Asian Nations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BCIM</td>
<td>Bangladesh-China-India-Myanmar</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BIMST-EC</td>
<td>Bangladesh-India-Myanmar-Sri Lanka-Thailand Economic Cooperation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BFBA</td>
<td>Burma Freedom Bloc Organization</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BIA</td>
<td>Burma Independence Army</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BISP</td>
<td>Benazir Income Support Programme</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BSPP</td>
<td>Burma Socialist Programme Party</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CCP</td>
<td>China’s Communist Party</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CFN</td>
<td>Chin National Front</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CIA</td>
<td>Central Intelligence Agency</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CNOOC</td>
<td>China National Offshore Oil Corporation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CNPC</td>
<td>China National Petroleum Corporation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CPB</td>
<td>Communist Party of Burma</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DREP</td>
<td>De-radicalization emancipation programs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FATA</td>
<td>Federally Administered Tribal Areas</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FCR</td>
<td>Frontier Crimes Regulations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FCS</td>
<td>Fragile and Conflict-affected Situations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FDI</td>
<td>Foreign Direct Investment</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Abbreviation</td>
<td>Full Form</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>--------------</td>
<td>-----------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GB</td>
<td>Gilgit-Baltistan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GCBA</td>
<td>General Council of Burmese Association</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GAIL</td>
<td>Gas Authority of Indian Limited</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IMF</td>
<td>International Monetary Fund</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IDPs</td>
<td>Internally Displaced Persons</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ISI</td>
<td>Inter-Services Intelligence</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>KKH</td>
<td>Karakoram Highway</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>KNDO</td>
<td>Karen National Defence Organization</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>KPK</td>
<td>Khyber Pakhtunkhwa</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LFO</td>
<td>Legal Framework Order</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MDGs</td>
<td>Millennium Development Goals</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MOGE</td>
<td>Myanmar Oil and Gas Enterprise</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MSR-1</td>
<td>Modern Silk Road</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MSR-2</td>
<td>China’s Maritime Silk Route</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NACN</td>
<td>National Socialist Council of Nagaland</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NACTA</td>
<td>National Counter Terrorism Authority</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NAM</td>
<td>Non-Aligned movement</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NATO</td>
<td>North Atlantic Treaty Organization</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NDFB</td>
<td>National Democratic Front of Bodoland</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NLD</td>
<td>National League for Democracy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NISP</td>
<td>National Internal Security Policy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NSCN-K</td>
<td>National Socialist Council of Nagaland (NACN) in Khaplang</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
NSCN-M  National Socialist Council of Nagaland (NACN) in Muivah
ONGC  Oil & Natural Gas Corporation Limited
OTS  Officers Training School
PPO  Protection of Pakistan Ordinance
PML (N)  Pakistan Muslim League (Nawaz)
PPP  Pakistan People’s Party
SINOPEC  China Petroleum & Chemical Corporation
SLORC  State Law and Order Restoration Council
SPDC  State Peace and Development Council
TPP  Trans-Pacific Partnership
TTP  Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan
UNDCP  United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime
UNDP  United Nations Development Programme
UNFDAC  United Nations Fund for Drug Abuse Control
USDA  Union Solidarity and Development Association
USDP  Union Solidarity and Development Party
WTO  World Trade Organization
YMBA  Young Men’s Buddhist Association
YMCA  Young Men’s Christian Association
# TABLE OF CONTENTS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>LIST OF TABLES</th>
<th>xiv</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>CHAPTER</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>I. INTRODUCTION</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ROOTS OF FRACTURED-NESS: PAST, PRESENT, AND WHAT NEXT?</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WHAT'S THE RATIONALE?</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RESEARCH QUESTION</td>
<td>19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>METHODOLOGY</td>
<td>21</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ORGANIZATION OF RESEARCH</td>
<td>29</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>II. UNDERSTANDING STATEHOOD AND STATE FRAGILITY</strong></td>
<td>35</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>STATE: A LEGITIMATE MONOPOLY OF VIOLENCE</td>
<td>36</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ORIGIN AND CONCEPTUALIZATION OF STATE FRAGILITY</td>
<td>48</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DESCRIBING THE ESSENCE OF FRAGILITY</td>
<td>57</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IS FRAGILITY A COLONIAL BAGGAGE?</td>
<td>60</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BURDEN OF GEOGRAPHY AND GEOPOLITICS: A CRITICAL FACTOR OF STATE FRAGILITY</td>
<td>69</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GLIMPSE ON THE INDICATORS OF FRAGILITY</td>
<td>78</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CLASSIFYING STATE FRAGILITY</td>
<td>88</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PUTTING THE WEAK STATE IN ORDER</td>
<td>92</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SUM UP: DILEMMAS OF FRAGILITY</td>
<td>104</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>III. CASE STUDY - MYANMAR: IN SEARCH OF POLITICAL IDENTITY, OBSELOETING PARIAH AND GARRISON STATE TO RECAST DEMOCRATIC NORMS</strong></td>
<td>108</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>INTRODUCTION</td>
<td>108</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>COLONIZATION TO DECOLONIZATION: END OF EUPHORIA AND BEGINNING OF INSTABILITY</td>
<td>111</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TATMA DAW: IN THE MAKING OF A GARRISON AND PARIAH STATE</td>
<td>128</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>a. THE 1962 COUP: A FORMAL STEP TOWARDS THE MAKING OF A GARRISON STATE</td>
<td>130</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>b. RISE OF SLORC / SPDC: A BROKEN PROMISE VIA SILENCING DEMOCRACY, UNDOING COLONIAL PAST AND THE MAKING OF A PARIAH STATE</td>
<td>139</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNVEILING THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF THE GARRISON STATE</td>
<td>150</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SOCIETAL DIVIDES ON ETHNO-RELIGIOUS AND POLITICAL DOMAINS: POLICIES OF ACCOMMODATION, ASSIMILATION, OR EXCLUSION</td>
<td>166</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
## IV. CASE STUDY II - PAKISTAN: FROM NATION-BUILDING TO A HODGEPODGE OF CIVIL-MILITARY RULE

### INTRODUCTION
196

### DECOLONIZATION: A MOMENT OF EUPHORIA AND DYSPHORIA
205

### EVOLUTION OF VIOLENCE: THE MAKING OF THE SECURITY STATE
216

### PRAETORIANISM: THE WEAKENING OF DEMOCRATIC INSTITUTIONS AND STATE CAPACITY
220

### DYNASTIC POLITICS: A COMPROMISED DEMOCRACY OR POLITICAL CORRUPTION?
242

### SOCIETAL VIOLENCE: ETHNO-RELIGIOUS TERRORISM AS AN EXISTENTIAL THREAT
257

### POLITICAL ECONOMY OF A FRONTLINE STATE
279

### GEOPOLITICAL FULCRUM OF CENTRAL, EAST, WEST AND SOUTH ASIA
289

### CONCLUSION: PROSPECTS AND CHALLENGES
303

## V. ANALYSIS AND CONCLUSIONS

### INTRODUCTION
306

### TWO CASE STUDIES: COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS
311

#### HYPOTHESIS I: THE ABSENCE OF AN EFFECTIVE POLITICAL ORDER
313

#### HYPOTHESIS II: THE BURDEN OF GEOGRAPHY AND GEOPOLITICS IS MORE LIKELY TO EFFECT STATE FRAGILITY
328

#### IS CONTINUOUS STATE FRAGILITY MENDABLE?
337

### CONCLUSION
345

## BIBLIOGRAPHY
350

## APPENDICES
384

### APPENDIX A: THE PANGLONG AGREEMENT
384

### APPENDIX B: MR. JINNAH'S PRESIDENTIAL ADDRESS TO THE CONSTITUENT ASSEMBLY OF PAKISTAN AUGUST 11, 1947
385

## VITA
388
# LIST OF TABLES

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Table</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. Modern, Postmodern, and Postcolonial Weak States</td>
<td>43</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Salient Features of Weak Pivot States</td>
<td>76</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Weak State Trajectories</td>
<td>89</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. Taxonomy of Failed States</td>
<td>91</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. Ethnic Composition of the Armed Forces in Burma, 1931 &amp; 1941</td>
<td>119</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7. Drone Strikes in Pakistan</td>
<td>270</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

The weak states are cracks in the very foundation of our international system. Left untended, they can and they will threaten the entire edifice of political and economic stability ... The threats to our security from weak and failed states are very different from the threats we are used to, and very different from the threats we are prepared for ... Those states can destabilize their neighbors and whole regions, creating humanitarian crises as severe as any natural disaster ... We have both a humanitarian obligation and a national security mandate to pay attention.

Senator Joseph R. Biden

The post 9/11 period changed the security dynamics of the entire world. With the emergence of new spheres of influence on a global scale, 9/11 has raised numerous questions about the complexities of our time and the ways to govern new insecurities. Fragile states, trans-national movements, and geopolitical recasting breed unprecedented threats to traditional norms of political life. Among these threats, state fragility and failure are portrayed as bogeymen. Dealing with state failure resembles a swinging pendulum between an agenda of necessity and an agenda of choice for policy makers and states themselves. The decision to choose the best available option is always linked to its cost, whether political or economic.

If we delve back into the past, the history of international relations is witness to the rise and fall of political systems, whether traced in city-states, empires, or in

---

1 "Nations on the Brink," (Center for Global Development, 2004).
contemporary nation-states whose constant rise and fall are causes and consequences of various intra-state and inter-state factors.

It is important to understand the conventional wisdom that political decay is a substantive process that emerges because of a lack of political order, mainly characterized as ineffective institutional capacities in a nascent or malfunctioning aging state. The institutions of malfunctioning aging states are too deeply fractured to develop a mature and viable political system. This means the malfunctioning aging process, festered with prolonged chronic political ailment, causes the decay of a political system and potential breakout of the state. Both strong and at-risk societies are always sensitive to essential ingredients that can provide good health to function smoothly. Political order is a core ingredient that is needed to sustain the system to work efficiently. For any political system, the absence of order in a state means a higher level of fracturedness and patent weak bounds within the state’s political institutions. As a matter of truth, every state is susceptible to political decay. Surely the typology of a state, meaning its nature, type, and category determines the level of susceptibility.

Yet the weak states are troubled with a wide range of domestic and external security issues that are mainly driven by fragile nationhood, a lack of governability, higher levels of political corruption, the rise of sub-level ethno-nationalism, sectarian and inter-religious clashes, weak economic growth, the absence of accountability in the system, lawless borders, geopolitical challenges, and other forms of socio-economic and political fears. Consequently, for the citizen of fragile states, the meanings of the social contract gradually diminish, and the weak government holds an increasingly ineffective
control over its territory.

Every state and its political system experiences a constant input (new demands and support for demand) and output (decisions or policies) processes; the domestic state’s structure tries to synchronize demands and realities. A successful synchronization between input and output processes reflects maturity and the viability of the system and its resiliency to cope with the persistent change processes, while a desynchronized process in the system tends to lead towards alteration, failure, or decay.

In recent times, political discourse refers to the notion of failure or decay in connection to nation-states and their domestic systems. The political systems in Afghanistan, Congo, Haiti, Myanmar, Nigeria, Somalia, Sudan, and many more states in Africa, Asia and Latin America, abound with vivid examples of political decay and state failure. Interestingly, in recent times the issues of state fragility and failure emanate from the weakness of states in the developing regions of the world, while most of the developing states embarked on the journey of nation building and development as a result of a massive wave of decolonization process following the Second World War. Subsequently, most of the political leadership in newly independent societies has faced troubling issues of effective authority and governability in “how to exercise power over their (newly shaped) territories given the incomplete and highly invariable

---

administrative system” from colonial legacy.5

This study aims to discuss issues related to fractured statehood in weak, but geographically pivot states. It helps to draw a new category calling “Weak Pivot States.” This study first presents a theoretical framework designed to develop a basic understanding and explanation about the causes and consequences of fracturedness in weak states. Next, the case studies apply theoretical explanations and seek solutions to fix the gaps through dealing with contagious intra-state and geographical troubles in weak states. The core arguments validate the colonial legacies, domestic factors, and state policies as reasons for continued state fragility. Therefore, the discussion involves the historical and political development of weak and fragile states, which suggests establishing a viable and effective political order that may resolve domestic challenges.

The study questions the notion that domestic factors are the only reasons for state fragility. In this context, the work also re-visits the notion of political geography along historical lines, which re-affirms that geography still matters in a time of complex interdependence. A careful observation reflects that the historical geopolitical mapping and contemporary process of virtual re-mapping of the world puts a burden on a weak state. Some studies inform that the burden of geography can cause “state death,” due to external intervention.6 Specifically, the sensitivities and vulnerabilities of virtual geopolitical propositions of a globalized world creates higher political risks for fragile states, because it has already “spurred the rebirth of localisms, built in many cases on

ethnic and religious consciousness," which further widens the exiting institutional gaps of a fractured statehood. The rise of ethnic consciousness gradually awakens the ethno-nationalistic fervor that becomes a cauldron of deprived and repressed anger, waiting for the right temperature to boil over.

ROOTS OF FRACTURED-NESS: PAST, PRESENT, AND WHAT NEXT?

The historiography of pre-colonial status of fissures in weak and fragile states shows the very existence of fragmented identities, weak institutions and incompatible structures for state formation; it is for these reasons that many of these fractured statehoods are referred to as fragile, weak, failed, or quasi-states that could not manage to evolve towards matured political entities.8

In the early years of the post-colonial phase, the idea of self-determination gathered more attention and higher preference than giving a serious effort to developing a political system for a long-term survivability through political development. Subsequently, in later years gradual anarchic conditions become favorable for “civil strife, government breakdown, and economic privation.”9 Observing the state formation during the post-colonial period depicts that many developing states perceived modernization as a political will to attain the socio-economic and political goals, believing it as the reason and modus operandi for the pattern of higher-level political and economic development practiced in the developed countries.

---

According to Karl Deutsch (1963), the processes of modernization helped accelerate the rate of social mobility, while social mobilization offers multiple positive outcomes that somehow link to political development and a higher level of participation as well. Modernization is also explained as economic development; for instance, in the developed world, the higher level of economic growth provided benign conditions for political participation and democracy to flourish. In contrast, the recent history of developing states tells us how the colonial legacies, corrupt polity, and ill-planned policies towards modernization deeply affected the process of political development, resulting in the establishment of quasi-democracy, armored democracy, or the absence of civil society in democratic transitions. Hence, the effects are “directly responsible for the deterioration of political institutions” in developing states.

Forever, it seems, many developing states ignored the nation-building process as well as eschewed strengthening political institutions, which is why all weak and fragile states do not now have benign conditions to establish favorable values for “democratic state, rule of law, and system of accountability”. In this connection, Samuel Huntington (1965) observed that in most developing societies “the rates of social mobilization and participation are high, (but) the rates of organization and institutionalization are low.” As an outcome, a majority of developing countries took the path of modernization assuming it would provide a way to the political development

13 Huntington, "Political Development and Political Decay," 386.
of these states, contrarily it “produce[d] not political development, but political decay”.14

A broader scale consensus undertakes that the political decay of the system is primarily driven from within, and the decay process gradually widens the gaps within the boundaries of a nation-state. Moreover, an inquiry beyond the nation building process suggests that the “path dependency” set by the culture of colonial legacies inherited to certain state institutions, i.e. feudal lords, tribal lords, family dynastic politics, civil-military bureaucracies, led to corruption from dictatorial democracies or authoritarian regimes and witnessed some frequent recurrences of military coup d'états.15 Daron Acemoglu and James Robinson (2012) forward a different perspective and believe that prosperity and poverty conditions of a nation are not due to their geography, cultures, or leadership; rather, it is the nature of institutions they possess that matters most. These institutions can be inclusive economic and political institutions or extractive economic and political institutions.16 In addition, we could see radical approaches from the dependency school of thought, which “believes that the role of external factors (is responsible) in the creation and maintenance of weak states”.17

14 Ibid.
15 Douglass North explains that in many cases the survival of societies is dependent on efficient institutions. These institutions survive even in low performing societies because they are comparatively and actively efficient. Based on Charles Darwin’s theory of evolution, North elaborates the “path dependency” through Darwin’s idea on institutions and writes that, “over time inefficient institutions are weed[ed] out, efficient ones survive, and thus there is a gradual evolution of more economic, political and social organization.” See, Douglass C. North, Institutions, Institutional Change, and Economic Performance, The Political Economy of Institutions and Decisions (Cambridge ; New York: Cambridge University Press, 1990), 92.
Specifically, over the years, most developing states witnessed the influence and strength of a system set on praetorian oligarchy or praetorianism. The praetorian oligarchy empowered the civil-military bureaucracy to shape the state institutions vis-à-vis the political culture of state and created a “praetorian society”.\textsuperscript{18} Amos Perlmutter (1974) believes that “praetorian governments develop when civilian institutions lack legitimacy”, while “praetorianism has existed in all historical periods.”\textsuperscript{19} In modern times, praetorianism is considered one of the fundamental factors of political decay of democratic institutions. In order to reduce the powers of the military in the political arena, Samuel Huntington suggested the maximization of civilian power and maximization of military professionalism, which would become a firewall between the military and society, so the professional military would stay out of “institutional, class, and constitutional politics.”\textsuperscript{20} Professional soldiers do not have any inclination or ambitions for intervening in politics; mainly, the institutional constraints and norms limit any tendency of intervention.\textsuperscript{21} Otherwise, the decrease in civilian power lets the praetorian structures gain a deeper role in politics and obviously “military interventions frequently outweigh ... the electoral process as a means of regime change.”\textsuperscript{22} Looking at Myanmar’s military that benefited out of the weakness of political institutions and absence of norms restraining the military elites; as a result, Myanmar became a garrison

state and since 1962 continued to influence politics. Similar patterns can be observed in many other pivot states like Egypt, Pakistan, while in the recent past a vivid example can be Turkey. Therefore, it would not be wrong to blame praetorianistic regimes for weakening the political capacity of democratic institutions and further creating fractured systems as an inherited colonial legacy in Third World societies.

In sum, at the domestic level, two prone societal behaviors can be witnessed during the post-colonial period along with institutional legacies of colonialism in newly independent states or today's developing, yet weak and fragile states: a) searching for a political system, be it democratic or authoritarian b) modernization or economic development. A misinterpretation between the political system (lack of developing a political order) and economic development via the modernization process weakened the foundations of statehood.

Consequently, providing a socio-political vacuum in weak societies, social movements got some space to re-emerge and tried to fill the vacuum. For example, from the Pakistan case study: In 1994 the decision to abolish colonial legal laws in Malakand, without immediate replacement or the introduction of state's legal system, created a vacuum which allowed local cleric Sufi Muhammad to launch Tehrik-e-Nifaz-e-Shariat-e-Muhammad (TNSM) demanding Sharia law and courts for Malakand. His movement gradually engulfed the entire region including Swat and resulted in two military operations in 2007 and 2009 in Swat to curtail rising influence of radicals in the region. Hence, it is visible to account that searching for a political system and social movements go hand in hand in post-colonial societies. It provided a venue for
contentious politics, where “interactions in which actors make claims bearing on someone else's interest, lead to coordinate efforts on behalf of shared interests or programs, in which governments appear either as targets, initiators of claims, or third parties.” Interestingly, the other instances, compared to traditional social movements, are gradually being replaced with new forms of social movements under the leaderless-leadership of the digitized world of blogs and social media to vent-out frustration and achieve demands. These trends were widely witnessed during the Arab Spring in late 2010 and the following year's vis-à-vis the other socio-economic and politically oriented uprisings across the world gave a new twist to the social movements with transnational effects.

The traditional dynamics of intra-state affairs with sovereign autonomy within its territorial scope has changed dramatically too, which infers a higher level of transnational influence upon a state’s domestic political affairs. Particularly, the post-Cold War period is a crucial and unique moment for the state system. It is crucial not only because of the fall of the Berlin Wall on November 9, 1989, the demise of the Soviet Union on December 31, 1991, and the emergence of a unique unipolar international system, but also because of the rise of a highly globalized world. The new globalization sketches a different picture of the international system, which is in contrast to what was established after the Peace Treaty of Westphalia (1648) and confirmed with the Concert of Europe (1815) period.

It is worth noticing that a globalized world passes through a constant “process of

shifts, surges and feeds on the dynamic relationships" within and between state structures.\textsuperscript{24} During this period, the phenomenon of state fragility gathered a wider range of attention than ever before and had any higher levels of serious deliberations about its linkages to emerging security threats. Primarily the nature and threat of inter-state conflict shifted to intra-state conflicts, so that the threats posed to others are driven from within state groups. Moreover, the consideration of domestic threats are also gradually transitioning from humanitarian threats to national security threats and then expanding to trans-national threats driven by non-state actors.\textsuperscript{25}

The transition scenarios vindicate that international politics turned to be residing in a complex period of a highly interdependent world, where time and space is compressed in a world within a super-connected epoch. On the one hand, the epoch facilitates the individuals and ideas to flow actively and freely in “both geographic locales and scalar spaces that have been socially constructed,” and on the other hand, it becomes an “era of pervasive contradictions that give rise to polarities subject to diverse normative judgments.”\textsuperscript{26} The outcome we see with the dawn of an emergent epoch has transformed the world with “uncertainties, perplexing, ambiguities, and unending contradictions fostered by a wide range of dynamics, not the least being newly empowered individuals and expanded roles for non-governmental agents of

\begin{footnotesize}
\begin{enumerate}
\end{enumerate}
\end{footnotesize}
change".27

The transformations further help us to witness the creation of new social geography and a spatial network that has entered in a new epoch, where the traditional Hobbesian notion about the state as the monopoly of the legitimate use of violence is shifting towards abiding with legal international norms, which proves a gradual transition of authority from state to international regimes.28 These patterns of transitions portray a great deal of changes at the intra-state and inter-state level, especially for the newly empowered individuals whom are more politically awakened than ever.29 Therefore, the compression of time and space set both new challenges and opportunities. The political fates of weak and fragile states are among some serious challenges, and state fragility anticipates some urgency to deal with “the dynamics of nation-state failure (that) have become central to critical policy debates”.30

As highlighted earlier, this study also evaluates the geopolitical dynamics of state fragility. As far as domestic political order is concern, it is true that political order helps in sustaining the viability and efficiency of political institutions, maintains the implementation of rule of law at the domestic level, and also manages to control the effects of trans-national activities. Equally, geopolitics is another important factor that should be taken into consideration, first by understanding that geopolitics “is the

relation of international political power to the geographical setting."\textsuperscript{31} Secondly, the spatial or geographic connection to international power relations traces the effects of geopolitics on state fragility. Therefore, the role of geography and its impact on weak states is significant in many ways, particularly if the geographic location of the state is in the "central location of a system or subsystem and this location of strategic importance to the powers" lends to conflict for fragile states.\textsuperscript{32}

Arguably, at the tangible (physical) level the significance of geopolitics reflects two dimensions: a) resource rich geography and b) geo-strategic significance of state. The intangible (mind) level of a surge of "geopolitics of emotions" and the "mapping of emotions" may solace the existing domestic and external frustrations of societies.\textsuperscript{33}

Throughout history the cultures of emotions have faced various tides of gains and loss; therefore, at this particular junction emotional satisfaction remains premature.\textsuperscript{34}

Zbigniew Brzezinski (1997) highlighted the significance of "geopolitical pivots" as other political geographers and political thinkers did in early stages of their conceptual framework. These pivot states have an importance and influence on major events which "is derived not from their power and motivation but rather from their sensitive location and from the consequences of their potentially vulnerable condition for the behavior of

geostrategic players.” Many weak pivot states are fragile, not because they are located at an important geostrategic location or possess resource richness, but because the region itself is situated on a significant, though highly-shattered, geostrategic region. Political geographer Saul Bernard Cohen explained these shattered zones as “shattered belts” which are highly fragmentated within and trapped in great power struggle. During the Cold War era the Middle East and East Asia, two important Asian regions, were considered shatter belts or crush zones due to both a higher scale of fragmentation and a greater power competition over these regions.

The geographic significance of a state’s locality gives an edge to that state over others and valorizes it as a geographically important pivot. These pivot states can be significant for access to important regions for their resources, and in some cases they can become a defense shield (offshore balancing, buffered regions or bandwagon(ed) ally) against potential hostile states. These pivot states may also have significant influence on states that may result significant “political and cultural consequences for a more active neighboring geostrategic player.” For example, the Eurasian pivot states have remained significant throughout history.

Finally, looking back to the recent past, the contemporary political map no longer shows Austro-Hungary or the Soviet Union: the phenomenon of decay can not only end a domestic political system, but also leads to the collapse of the whole state as a unit. Interestingly, the decay or collapse observed over the past decades followed the

---

birth of a number of new states. This means after every decay, there can be a possible
birth or reincarnation of some new and old political entities. The birth process of states
can be both natural (indigenous political struggle) and surgical (external engineering to
create a buffer region) too. If that is the case, then what are the criteria for the political
decay of a state? What are the domestic conditions that make a state become weak,
failed, or collapsed? In contrast to domestic reasons of failure, one cannot eschew the
possible consideration of external interference or foreign occupation as a factor for a
state weakening or collapsing, as referenced earlier. Has any political entity ceased so
far, due to any occupation?38 There are a number of gray areas that need appropriate
inquiry, explanation, and prescription through the use of an integrated approach.

WHAT’S THE RATIONALE?

We are standing at the historic crossroads of interregnum. This junction is characterized
as a complex period in human history with acute levels of unpredictability. In particular,
the gloomy pictures of institutional fracturedness in weak and fragile states are
experiencing a tremendous amount of challenges along with contagious force. Gramsci’s
words aptly portray the situation of the interregnum that "the old is dying and the new
cannot be born; in this interregnum there arises a great diversity of morbid symptoms."
Morbid symptoms in a fractured statehood show a lack of political order and no definite
political system, resulting in administrative and coercive incapacities of state. Failing
political entities become “incapable of fully projecting power within their national

boundaries." That is why weak and fragile states are more institutionally fractured within and prone to instability with a long history of autocratic regimes, (dominantly praetorian-oligarchy) chronic and endemic corruption, the threat of nuclear proliferation, the barbaric nature of terrorism, meager implementation of rule of law, a lack of accountability, lawless ungoverned spaces, unbridled demographic momentum, and the rise of ethnic and religious tensions.

The rationale for this study is to find the reasons why weak states fail to establish a viable political order and how fractured statehood can be transformed into sustainable states with higher social cohesiveness. To what extent has political order remained important for a weak state in the past, but also in the present and future? How does the political economy of a weak and fragile state work? This research further seeks to develop an integrated approach through conceptualizing, rather than contextualizing, the phenomena of fractured statehood in weak pivot states. In some ways the notion of fracture points towards existing gaps in the structure of a weak state. These fissures can also be characterized with "gaps in the social, cultural, economic, psychological, and political spheres," as in the 1960s and 1970s when these gaps were referred to as underdeveloped societies. Hence, both at the theoretical and practical scale, there is a need to frame an integrated work that can bridge the conventional wisdom and contemporary changing dynamics with new realities. It will help to develop a consensus between disciplines, so a better understanding and prescription can be put

forward. Possible attempt through borrowing varieties of notion from “different disciplines can be applied and/or be cross-fertilized in order to create new hybrid ideas, hypotheses, theories, and approaches’ to deal with research problems and prioritize the factors involved in cause and effect.”

In the post-Cold war period the notion of state fragility has caught attention and is being discussed under various themes, including fragile states, weak states, quasi-states, failed states, or collapsed states. In real terms, we see a great level of fracturedness appear within state structure or within political institutions that make them considered fragile. However, the post 9/11 era set a different draft towards state failure due to the changing nature of intervention in weak states for reasons ranging from humanitarianism to security goals driven by global and regional interests. Believing in the transitory nature of global interest, this study discussed the classification or typology of the failed state and historiography of weak states rooted in pre-colonial and postcolonial timeframe. Following an integrated approach that includes comparative politics, transnationalism, and geopolitics, this discussion structures a basic understanding of the root causes and consequences of state fragility. A prognostic attempt built upon discussion and analysis will be a useful attempt to avoid further cracking of the weak and fragile state.

The aforementioned introduction provides grounds to understand that there are a number of cases available all over the developing world to discuss state fragility. However, this study has chosen two case studies, namely Myanmar and Pakistan, to

understand from their experiences of nation-making to state-making processes and vice versa from state-making to nation-building processes. More significantly, understanding the nature of institutional fracturedness, its origin, challenges, and implications of selected case studies and their relevance to debates about state fragility is also considered. The study intends to incorporate theoretical explanations, which tell that both endogenous and exogenous factors can cause decay. Revisiting the theories of geopolitical pivots brings additional perspective to the study.

The core objective of any doctoral research is to contribute to the existing literature pertinent to the subject matter. Similarly, this project is also meant to contribute to the literature discussing state fragility and seeks to bridge the gaps between the existing literatures. The existing literature mainly discusses the causes and consequences of the state fragility and failure within the confines of one discipline, while ignoring the explanations emanating from other disciplines of the social sciences and humanities. Jean-Germain Gros (1996) highlights that “it is neither moral, practical nor politically feasible to ignore the problems in failed states, there is a serious lack of knowledge of how best to help solve these problems”42 of state fragility. In addition, this project further tries expanding the knowledge with new inputs, in order to fix or manage the fracturedness in weak states. The theoretical framework, analysis, and results can be helpful to understand other similar cases all around. It is also important to notice that generalization is one of the great challenges to answering the variety of each unique case pertinent to state fragility.

Generally, the problem lies with our monolithic attitude of thinking of failed states. Therefore, time and space matters while comparing the cases. In addition, each selected case study has a great diverse structural setting, barely achieving merit as being considered a state. Every case study requires an in-depth area-based approach to study domestic dynamics and understand failure phenomena accordingly. After all, “failure is a fluid,”\textsuperscript{43} a term that means states can go forward and backward to failure and weak conditions. Thus, it is a graduating process depending on how the socio-political cohesion of fragile states structure and meet the basic needs of security and the material well-being of their peoples.

RESEARCH QUESTION

The above discussion helped to frame a basic research question followed by number of supporting questions to find out a better explanation from literature and real life political developments from selected case studies. This research work is primarily trying to answer these questions: Under what conditions do weak and fragile states continue to fail, and how might the fractures of statehood be fixed? To answer the questions, the discussion will stay around the concept of state polity based on traditional and modern approaches of explanations. Following traditional prescriptions to develop an effective political and social order, fixation means reinvigorating or

\textsuperscript{43} Robert I. Rotberg explains that “Failure is a fluid halting place, with movement forward to weakness and backward into collapse always possible. Certainly, too, because failure and collapse are undesirable results for states, they are neither inevitable nor unavoidable. Whereas weak states fail much more easily than strong ones, that failure is not preordained. Failure is preventable, particularly since human agency rather than structural flaws or institutional insufficiencies are almost invariably at the root”. See, Robert I. Rotberg, When States Fail: Causes and Consequences (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 2004), 10.
making a Leviathan stronger as a “symbol of law, order, power, the state, domination, and social control” against the Behemoth as a “symbol of lawlessness, chaos, disorder, anarchy, heterodoxy, and deviance,” traceable in weak and fragile states. If that is the case, then in a period of high globalization, a strong Leviathan becomes the issue of “state repression and human rights violation.” Visibly, authoritarian regimes enjoy more controlled and highly militarized systems to use the monopoly of violence as a tool of repression against legitimate voices seeking basic rights of citizenship.

Furthermore, it is mentioned earlier that if failure or collapse is a real and final destination for a weak state, then why do these weak states not collapse instantly? To unfold the question further, the following subsidiary questions help to go into an in-depth understanding: 'what factors keep the states surviving and slow progress towards failure? What are the challenges to manage continued failure? How should states cope with these challenges? More importantly, do these challenge matter to the global community? If yes, then how has the global community discussed fixing them? The issue is equivocal and imprecise for the majority, despite a silent acceptance and realization about the threat and spillover effects of the issue area.

The aforementioned questions diametrically look at broader vis-à-vis specific aspects of the issue area. Two hypotheses of research are framed to discuss issues of governability, capacities, and challenges of state fragility: 1) The absence of an effective political order (institutional ineffectiveness and bad governance) causes a gradual decay

of state structure. 2) The burden of geography and geopolitics is more likely to affect state fragility.

The first hypothesis mainly looked into domestic factors causing fragility, and primary variables were picked and discussed within the political, security, economic, and social domains. These domains helped to answer the research questions about state fragility pointing at variables such as colonial legacies, praetorian-oligarchy, family dynastic politics, ethno-nationalism, and religious violence to see their effects on state fragility. The second hypothesis helped to know the external factors affecting the capability of the state, and the geography or geopolitics (overlapping at various instances) is taken as a core independent variable. The structure and proposition of the literature review on understanding statehood, state fragility, the factual discussion on the case studies, and the comparative analysis is systematically outlined to determine the causal effects.

METHODOLOGY

The research is discussing the issue of historical lines digging into colonial legacies, as explanations of comparative political and area studies suggest adopting a qualitative research approach further based on case studies. First of all, the qualitative research provides leverage maximization, meaning “we want to explain as much as possible with as little as possible.” To do so, the qualitative research methodology also allows to select descriptive analysis to understand and explain the research problem,

---

because “description often comes first; it is hard to develop explanations before we know something about the world and what needs to be explained on the basis of what characteristics.”

Notably, the “case studies are essential for description ... [and they] provide an insightful description of complex events.” The case studies provide a testing ground with practical examples to justify the causal relation and explanation of research. This project has followed a systematic study to discuss the issues related to challenges of statehood in weak states. Discussing typology, the historical explanation of fragile or weak states, and changing dynamics of security and the globalized world anticipates and revisits, as traditional explanations face limitations to the current realities of world politics. Therefore, research disputes with one-dimensional explanation most of the work done so far focused on the domestic state of affairs. This dissertation project has incorporated multiple approaches to seek mending the gap between disciplines vis-à-vis providing a prognostic solution for cases selected or similar issues in other parts of the world. The multiple approaches include a) bridging contending theoretical discourses of comparative politics b) incorporating transnational dimension into discussion c) providing geographical pivots as a base.

Before embarking on the theoretical discussion on weak states, this dissertation has revisited the literature on the nation-state, in order to develop an in-depth understanding about the notion of state, its roles, and duties. It also helps to

---

48 Designing Social Inquiry: Scientific Inference in Qualitative Research, 44.
understand the process from nation-making to state-making on one hand. On the other hand, different forms of political systems and identities show the social mobility, conflict, and commitments towards their political identities. This procedure included various theoretical explanations about small powers and small states to construct a consensus to define the phenomena of weak states in the context of today's fragile state. In addition, by doing so it provides an understanding about the differences and categories of nation-states. The analytical part also discusses garrison states, predatory states, hybrid states and their structural linkage within weak states. It also makes the case easier to differentiate between various categories of states and further classification of weak states. The lessons try to discuss why some states are weak and fragile with tendencies of becoming parasites on others, while by contrast, some states are strong and function normal with a higher level of social cohesion and effective political institutions.

Sovereignty and territory are some of the core ingredients in the making of a modern nation-state; sovereignty matters most for all states, but transnational networks, porous state frontiers, and frequent interventions affect the sovereignty of fragile ones. First, it is easy to penetrate a fragile state and subdue its sovereignty for greater interest as a "primary responsibility for maintenance of international peace and security."\(^49\) Second, it is observed that fragility always becomes a justified intervention to fix the domestic problems of weak state, while ruling elites of weak states also anticipate foreign intervention to root out elements that may threaten their rule and

others’ interests too by lending or compromising sovereignty. Therefore, Jeffrey Herbst called the sovereignty of fragile states nothing “more than legal fiction.”

Despite the earlier identified specifications, in general the changing nature of territorial settings from hard boundaries to soft boundaries are becoming ubiquitous and pose issues to rethink with increasing clarity about sovereignty, self-determination, nationalism, and citizenship rights. Yet, there is still “resistance to re-conceptualize the static units of the inter-state system of Westphalian sovereignty, (as) there is significant nostalgia for the notion of national identity.” Above all, over the period of history, we observe that up to this point states have achieved a great variety of structural changes with inner and outer shells of their formats. These various kinds and types of states interact in the real world and continue to construct norms and cultures of the international state system.

There are some benchmarks that were followed to pick the case studies. Generally speaking, case studies are important because the literature review and theoretical discussion can be employed and tested on the selected cases. The above section under the theme “what’s the rationale?” mentioned two selected case studies for this research project: Myanmar (East Asia) and Pakistan (South Asia).

The criteria to select the cases were based on the consideration of several important factors. Primarily, it is important to mention that there are many weak and

---

fragile states located in Africa and Latin America other than Asia. Moreover, by and large, African states are suffering with ultra-poverty conditions. So, the question is, why choose cases from Asia? Despite the harsh realities of Africa and Latin America, it should be acknowledged that Asia is not only the largest continent, but most importantly, it hosts about 60 percent of the world’s population. Asia is the fastest growing region in the world, but at the same time, is a highly volatile continent ranging from the Middle East to Far East, and from South Asia to Central Asia. Waves of violence, global acts of terrorism, and desperate poor people seeking safety and security all coexist in the Asian hemisphere.

The second factor is the growing importance of Asia in the current century, both for economic and geo-strategic reasons. It is widely discussed how the twenty-first century is the Asian Century, and in 2011 then Secretary of State Hillary Clinton advocated in her think piece published in Foreign Policy that “the future of geopolitics will be decided in Asia ...[and] harnessing Asia’s growth and dynamism is central to American economic and strategic interests.”53 Following the rising importance of Asia in global politics, U.S. and Western countries gradually became keen on region, and occasions like easing sanctions on Myanmar and restoring diplomatic ties speaks for themselves. President Obama, during his historic visit to Myanmar in November 19, 2012, stressed the geostrategic, economic, and cultural importance of Myanmar in the region. His speech at University of Yangon emphasized the importance of the country because of its location “at the crossroads of East and South Asia, [which] border the

most populated nations on the planet... and the ability to help determine the destiny of
the fastest growing region of the world... [And] Myanmar is famous for its natural
resources, and they must be protected against exploitation.”54

According to the Asian Development Bank’s edited volume report, the Asian
economy will share the global gross domestic product (GDP) to 52 percent and regain its
economic position globally, as it had during eighteenth century before the industrial
revolution.55 It provides the fundamental justification that state fragility in the Asian
continent will have a severe global impact, due to Asian pivot-ness in global geopolitics.
The growing market economy in Asia and its large population will become the largest
consumers as well, setting an ideal place for economic activities. In addition, lately the
debates around the “rise of China,” and the “new influential” like India attracted foreign
policy shifts towards Asia too. The Obama administration has shown its commitment
towards “pivot to Asia” policy, which intends to “rebalance” the power dynamics in the
Asia. In October 2013, speaking at the Annual Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC),
Secretary of State John Kerry guaranteed that “there is nothing that will shake the
commitment of the United States to the rebalance to Asia, ... which we are all a part of,
[it] is by far the largest, the fastest-growing, and the most dynamic economic region in
the world.”56

Although Asia has become a “factory Asia ... [and] global hub for manufacturing
and information technology services,” the fact is that the “world’s fastest growing

54 “Remarks by President Obama at the University of Yangon,” http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-
office/2012/11/19/remarks-president-obama-university-yangon.
55 Harinder S. Kohli, Ashok Sharma, and Anil Sood, Asia 2050 : Realizing the Asian Century (Los Angeles:
region remains home to majority of world's extreme poor" who face complexities of traps. Be it poverty traps, geographical traps, traps of bad governance, conflict traps, and so on.

On strategic grounds, China is trying to revive its historical maritime power and gradually wishes to gain a leadership role in its Near Seas and possibly in Indian Ocean, which includes the coastal waters of the Yellow Sea, East China Sea, South China Sea, and growing presence in and around Indian Ocean vis-à-vis Arabian Ocean. China's slow and steady projection through putting strings of pearls in the Near Seas and Indian Ocean via developing seaports in the region alarms the U.S., India, and U.S. allies in the region. On the other hand, China considers the twelve-nation regional trade pact called the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) a U.S. strategy of containment, while the U.S and its allies in the region are seeking to frame some maritime codes of conduct under International Law to become applicable on the Near Seas to tame growing China's assertiveness in the waters.

Keeping in mind the growing influence of China, a number of accounts believe that "the new era of military competition in the Pacific will become the defining geopolitical contest of the 21st century." The U.S. policy of rebalancing Asia will need careful consideration and, the investment of extra time and energy, though not at the cost of other regions like Europe. As the allies in the region consider the U.S. as a security guarantor, any imbalance of power structure in the region may possibly prompt

---

57 Asia 2050 : Realizing the Asian Century, xxiii.
the Japanese and South Koreans to pursue their own nuclear program, making them less dependent on external support. Therefore, the Asian case is serious in this nature to retain checks and balances.

The final criterion of selecting the case studies of Myanmar and Pakistan is based on the countries' high ranking in fragility status, and most importantly, their geopolitical roles in the developing scenario relevant to the Asia pivot. The geopolitical and geo-strategic significance of the two cases qualifies them to meet the criteria of "weak pivot states." Both Myanmar and Pakistan are located directly or indirectly at the crossroads of interests of major and regional powers. For instance, Myanmar's geopolitical and economic role between the United States, China, Japan, India, and others is significant to consider. Similarly, the case of Pakistan portrays an important position for future economic and geopolitical scenarios. Pakistan has been considered an extended wing/arm of the United States in the Middle East; shifting U.S. policy towards East Asia further signifies Pakistan's role. China's eye on the deep-sea port at Gwadar, Baluchistan for its future trade activities and possible use for security purposes will have a significant impact on rebalancing the Asian continent. India's high-energy demand for its economic viability will also rely on benign relations with Pakistan to get access to Central Asian and Middle Eastern oil and gas energy facilities.

Apart from the policy of the United States to "rebalance in the Asia pivot," the Asian countries dream of making the twenty-first century an Asian century will only remain a dream if the hostile relations between Asian countries are not resolved. Alarmingly, three nuclear powers, China, India, and Pakistan, sit next to each other with
hostile memories to date. The other factors, in addition to geography, the colonial legacy, praetorian society, state capacity, governance, political economy, security, and social issues are carefully and thoroughly discussed in the research project. It is worth mentioning here that the conclusions of the case studies and discussion can be observed and applicable to other weak pivot states located in African and Latin American context.

ORGANIZATION OF RESEARCH

The dissertation is framed into five chapters including the introductory chapter. The first chapter holistically outlines state fragility and the birth of its paradigm during the post-Cold War period. The section briefly sketches the issues related to state fragility and its regional as well as global impacts on peace and stability. In view of conventional wisdom, the research agrees with general understanding about the poor performance of states due to their lack of political capacity and capabilities, but at the same time includes other explanations like “state death” due to geographical factors. Therefore, a significant part of the work is trying to introduce the concept or category of weak and fragile states called “weak pivot states.” To be clear, the research has already clarified that the discussion on state fragility in this work is actually referred to as “weak pivot states.”

The idea of the “weak pivot state” is not familiar in or referred to in the debates of international relations. Recent literature talks about fragile, weak, failing, quasi-state, failed and collapse states for poor performing states and there is also currently enriched
with contributions on pivot states, rising influentials, and so forth for those states with promising capabilities. The contribution of this project is the attempt to blend two categories, i.e. weak states with their geographical pivot. Based on the categorization, the research question tries to seek an answer to the question ‘under what conditions do fragile (weak pivot) states continue to fail?’ The chapter draws a road map through the qualitative method, picking case studies in the next chapters to find the answer both from endogenous and exogenous factors involved in ”decapitating” the state.

Following the road map, chapter II provides a conceptual base to understand statehood and state fragility. In addition, it thoroughly tracks the literature discussing the endogenous and exogenous factors causing the fragility. Revisiting the rich historical and current literature on intellectual genesis, the nature and duties of the state provides an intellectual depth to understand the role and responsibilities of the state. With reference to conventional argument, the traditional state was referred to as a “Leviathan” retaining a “monopoly of [the] use of violence” to project a symbol of law and maintain order in society against the “Behemoth,” a symbol of lawlessness and disorder. In fact, in many ways, today’s fragile states show symptoms of being a “Behemoth.”

The theoretical prism of chapter II highlighted the administrative and institutional limitations and origins, due to colonial legacies, poor governance, kleptocracies, inability to accommodate political participation, prolonged military rule, ethno-religious violence, and geographic factors. The political, security, economic, and social indicators of state fragility shows that states are weak due to various traps, i.e.
“the conflict trap, the poverty trap, the natural resources trap, the trap of being landlocked with bad neighbors, and the trap of bad governance.” Some of these traps are situational and some inherent. Situational traps can be overcome with improvement through socio-political and economic transitions, but inherent ones are almost permanent and challenging to handle. Stewart Patrick (2011) and Jean-Germain Gros (1996) have vividly drawn the trajectories and taxonomy of state fragility, which makes it easier to test and apply various situations in categories.

Chapter III and chapter IV are the case studies presented on Myanmar and Pakistan. Two cases have been done with major discussion following the roadmap drawn earlier and analysis of the indicators of fragility. The discussion looked through factual and chronological ways to analyze political development since the colonization period to the most recent time period, validating the argument of “path dependency.” The two cases are unique for many similarities as both enjoyed a colonial time period under British rule and inherited much of the British military and bureaucratic structures. Both Myanmar and Pakistan witnessed prolonged military rule undermining civilian rule.

The praetorian oligarchy became powerful in the two states, which have gradually shifted their interests into the business sector to own much of the land, resources, and industrial units, other than higher annual defense budget. Though the patterns and mechanism of military interventions and policies in both countries are similar on larger scale, the military orientation is different because Myanmar’s military (Tatmadaw) was established to liberated Myanmar from foreign occupation, which later suppressed other ethnic minorities. By contrast, Pakistan’s military was raised as a
British Colonial force, which was later inherited by India and Pakistan after their creation. The creation of the British colonial force was on racial grounds, as in Myanmar it ignored the majority of Burmans and recruited minorities into the force. On the Indo-Pak sub-continent, the phenomena of martial race picked Punjabi and Pashtun Muslims from today’s Pakistani side and Punjab’s Sikh from India side. In both cases the racial oriented militaries left the scars of a social divide in the post-colonial period still affecting the states today.

In addition, the bad governance and high level of corruption affected the states’ political capabilities. In Pakistan’s case, family dynastic politics rule has been one factor that caused bad governance and made political compromises with undemocratic forces. The argument suggests that with these undemocratic processes undermining the political development over a period of time, the result in Myanmar is an “armored democracy,” while Pakistan is a “compromised democracy” between civil-military oligarchies.

The case studies also elaborate in detail the geopolitical and geo-strategic importance of both states and identify the nature of regional and global interests in the region. China and India are the main contending regional players seeking their best bids and bets over Myanmar and Pakistan, while Japan is a secondary regional player. The U.S. and its allies brings a global dimension to the study.

Finally, chapter V is based on a comparative analysis and conclusion discussing the two assumptions based on endogenous (lack of state capacity) and exogenous (geopolitics) factors, recalling the discussions on the conceptual framework and
evidence displayed in case studies. First, the study objects to the idea which believes state fragility or related explanations are a recent origin. The research has already undertaken various historical studies or explanations about weak societies, small states, and small power that show that fragility always remained in international relations. However, the research endorses the fear that regional and global insecurities are much higher due to higher levels of interconnectedness, which was not the case in earlier epochs.

Second, the study also observed that various studies suggested different ways to tackle the problem of fragility through military, economic or democratic interventions, while interventions always suffered mostly due to issues of sovereignty. Setting aside the strengths, weaknesses, successes, and failures of interventions, the study makes a claim that the economic aid to support these fragile societies did not work properly, as it had been thought. Why? The political elites in weak societies manipulate the traditional duty of state, which is the “extraction of resources” through taxation, and in return of taxation, state should guarantee the safeguarding of basic rights and the wellbeing of citizens on equal grounds. However, in weak and fragile societies, where political corruption is rampant, political elites know exactly how to extract local resources through taxation, but at the same time and following domestic patterns of extractions, political elites “extract foreign resources and aids” which in most cases goes directly to their personal benefits.

The other crucial conclusion is the state enforced or indirectly constructed narrative that threatens the equal rights and protection of minorities. In Myanmar,
religious minorities fear the revival of Buddhist nationalism, and in Pakistan the deliberate usage of blasphemy law to seek political victimization of the minorities or political oppositions, which undermines the prospects of democratic transitions happening in both countries. Therefore the indoctrination of religious and ethnic based narratives later is causing insecurity in the form of terrorism and ethno-nationalistic hostilities. Interestingly, most of the security challenges in the two case studies resides in areas where minorities are larger in number, and they hold more resourceful geographic locations within their respective countries. Geopolitically, with the rapidly gripping notion of the Asia pivot and rising regional influentials with geopolitical interests now know that the best bid to safeguard the interests of powers is to extend their support to “praetorian-guards,” who are ruling these countries and will eventually set back the prospect of future democratization processes. Therefore, future stability and peace is certainly linked with taming fragile conditions through facilitating a vibrant civil society to establish a political culture based on inclusive and pluralistic democratic norms. In addition, on the regional and global scale, creating “spheres of socialization” can engage these weak and fragile societies to interact at a higher frequency, make them learn the evolving global norms, and help them to assimilate, accommodate, and integrate into the global system. This will ensure the best pay off for all players, without risking the interests of others.
CHAPTER II

UNDERSTANDING STATEHOOD AND STATE FRAGILITY

After half a century of imperial rollback and exaggerated warnings of neoimperialist resurgence, postcolonial sovereignty ceases to be a historical entitlement: it must be earned again – and again by quasi or contingent states that the former imperial powers created in error for their own gains and convenience, and around a religion, a clan, a tribe, a dynasty, or even for an army. Lacking legitimacy at birth, these fractured countries are at the mercy of centrifugal forces that pull them apart and which the state cannot manage or fix.

Simon Serfaty ¹

In the decades to come, the most lethal threats to the United States' safety and security—a city poisoned or reduced to rubble by a terrorist attack—are likely to emanate from states that cannot adequately govern themselves or secure their own territory. Dealing with such fractured or failing states is, in many ways, the main security challenge of our time.

Robert M. Gates, Former Secretary of Defense ²

The strength of statehood is dependent on the political capacity of a state. The effective political capacity of a state helps to maintain a viable and effective relationship between intra- and inter-state levels. However, the stability and smooth political functioning of a state relies primarily on its domestic performance. Thus, the higher the synchronized nature of the relationship at an intra-state (state and society) level, the higher the probability of keeping state subjects in control, obeying the rule of law, and norming the accountable governance system performing under a legitimate political order or authority. Eventually, this process advances towards a durable

¹ Serfaty, A World Recast: An American Moment in a Post-Western Order, 73.
political development of society, which plays a significant role in strengthening a state’s political capacity vis-à-vis establishing an effective political system. The differences between the performance of political institutions and the political capacity of strong democracies and authoritarian regimes are clear. For instance, many weak states are characterized by “aliberal (illiberal forms of governability) and authoritarian” (despotic) rule, which become predatory of their own masses.”

STATE: A LEGITIMATE MONOPOLY OF VIOLENCE

Understanding the state or statehood in a highly interconnected world is not the same as it was during the Westphalian era. The early shape of states was portrayed through the writings of Thomas Hobbes’ in his work *Leviathan*, which referred to the state, the most powerful political entity, as sovereign and holding a centralized administrative control of a given territory. This earlier notion set rules for political thinkers to define the state and seek the “duties of state,” its role, and its relation with society. Over a period of time, the state evolved through its dual responsibility of domestic “pacification and external warfare,” and lately, the nature of state-society relations has been further transformed. The transformative episodes proclaim that the

---

states are gradually transformed into modern or post-modern states with new obligations. New obligations mean the state has become significantly accountable, both at domestic and global levels, to politically informed (awakened) citizens’ vis-à-vis to institutions as contrasted to traditional functions of the state. Aligning with new realities, the modern or post-modern states become flexible, and notably the nature of state capacities shifts to cope with changing patterns and complex political dynamics.

In a period of complex interdependence, historicizing and conceptualizing the state is a complicated task to undertake. Yet, the exercise helps to develop a better understanding about the fragility of states when looking at the formation, sustainability, or political decay of institutions in modern states. In this regard, the notion of nation-state is perceived through various perspectives as an abstract, ideational form, and its objectives are explained depending on various forms of states. In the early years of the conceptual development of state discourse, the state is viewed as bound between its authority and subjects or “image and practices.”

Thomas Hobbes (1588-1679), Jean-Jacques Rousseau (1712-1778), and John Locke (1632-1704) referred to this bond as “social contract/social compact.”

---

8 Joel S. Migdal, *State in Society: Studying How States and Societies Transform and Constitute One Another* (Cambridge; New York: Cambridge University Press, 2004), 16. Migdal explains that the (1) image and (2) practices shape the state, while holistically portraying the state formation. Migdal puts it as “(1) the image of a coherent, controlling organization in a territory, which is a representation of the people bounded by that territory, and (2) the actual practices of its multiple parts.”

In addition, According to Buzan, the “Conception of state in terms of territory/population (body) and socio-political character (mind)” that helps to understand the nature and behavior of state. Buzan further insists that the “States must have a physical base of pollution and territory; they must have institutions of some sort which govern the physical base; and there must be some idea of state which establishes its legitimacy in the minds of its people”, see, Buzan, *People, States, and Fear: An Agenda for International Security Studies in the Post-Cold War Era*, 68-71.

9 The concept of social contract provided some early stage intellectual explanation to understand the ideational essence of state. A Hobbesian understanding of social contract refers to a human’s natural
As a reality, “the state as normative order” persistently engages in a “pathological homogenization” or “ethnification” of its “imagined communities,” in order to retain a “symbiotic” relationship with society to assert its legitimacy and seek “obedience” from its subjects. Barrington Moore (1966), Theda Skocpol (1979), Atul Kohli (1986), Charles Tilly (1992), Michael Mann (1993), and Joel Migdal (1988, 2001) have contributed extensive explanation of the dynamics of state structure, state power, and its relationship with society. As a broader consensus, an understanding can be traced to Charles Tilly’s (1970) definition of state, as it:

"... controls population occupying a defined territory is a state in so far as 1) it is differentiated from other organizations operating in the same territory; 2) it is autonomous; 3) it is centralized; and 4) its divisions are formally coordinated with one another.”

Hence, statehood can be depicted through “collectivities of officials” that...
enable the “capacities of state” to achieve its goals, specifically from the “actual or potential opposition of powerful social groups or in the face of recalcitrant socioeconomic circumstances.”12 This practice justifies the idea that “states are founded on forces,” while it establishes statehood in a defined territory through “compulsory political association with continuous organization ... and its administrative staff successfully upholds a claim to the monopoly of the legitimate force in enforcement of its orders.”13 In successful conditions, the state first becomes efficient in “the authoritative allocation of social values” and then enjoys the “enforcement of order through institutionalizing” the social and political power.14 The reason that the state establishes an “institutionalize[d] political power” is because it helps the “governmental institutions of coercion to maintain a stratified social order.”15

Gianfranco Poggi (2001) writes that “if the political power is to act as guardian of the social order” then it has to institutionalize that power.16 It further provides a legitimate base to hold the monopoly of violence as well as to enforce “the effectiveness of the political arrangements.”17 According to Gianfranco Poggi, three processes are involved in the “institutionalization of political power,” namely,

12 Peter B. Evans, Dietrich Rueschemeyer, and Theda Skocpol, Bringing the State Back In (Cambridge Cambridgeshire; New York: Cambridge University Press, 1985), 9.
16 Poggi, Forms of Power, 42.
17 Ibid.
“depersonalization (power no longer stays with one person as decisive force),
formalization ("the exercise of power becomes more oriented to rules, procedural
arrangements, rituals"), and finally the integrated (codified norms and rules become
"increasingly integrated into broader, encompassing order") power relationships."\textsuperscript{18}
Eventually robust codified procedural arrangements can deliver better political goods
to citizens, strengthen statehood, and enhance the political capacity of the state itself
to protect its subjects.

In contemporary world politics, the democratic and stable states have
successfully institutionalized political capacity, while weaker ones struggle with
formalizing the process. In a broader sense, George Sorenson (2005) has identified
some features of states, such as functions of government, nationhood, and economy of
stable or successful (post-modern states) and weak states, presented in table 1.
Empirical evidence shows that successful states have achieved higher levels of
transparency in governance, nationhoods with collective loyalty in mind, and vibrant
economies to sustain the smooth functioning of the state. Weak states are hampered
by inefficient and corrupt institutional orders that are further weakened by the
domination of diverse ethnic or religious communities, resulting in diverse groups
extending their support and loyalty to their own ethnicities or religious affinities.

The fragile nationhood scenarios develop favorable conditions for dominant
ethnic or religious groups to attain sway over state power. Ethnic and religious divides
draw power struggles on the basis of majority and minority; unfortunately, in weak

\textsuperscript{18} Ibid.
states, minorities are always the target of “discrimination and victimization.”19 It is important to take into account that the politics of ethnic and religious divisions also occur in stable and highly democratic states; however, weak and undemocratic states experience the “deadly outcome” of these divides.20 For instance, during the 1990s, the Hutu and Tutsi ethnic groups engaged in mass scale genocide in Rwanda, Burmese nationalists persecuted non-Burmese ethnicities, and Pashtun and non-Pashtun civil war erupted in post-Soviet Afghanistan. These are considerable examples which echo that ethno-nationalism significantly weakens statehood on the one hand, while on the other side the “minority or suffering ethnicities feel their right to spark ethno-nationalistic fervors to protect their rights” dwelling in a fragile but “imperial state.”21

The challenge of fragile statehood is missing phenomena of unified nationhood, which means weak and fragile states are continuously in search and making of a unified nationhood.22 As a matter of fact, creating a common identity as a nation is becoming more complicated in recent years than it would have been perceived in an earlier pre- and post-decolonization period. This is because, multi-ethnic nation states in the developing world are failing to accommodate and assimilate minority groups through developing inclusive political culture, and are, rather, adopting exclusive policies

---

19 Rita Manchanda, States in Conflict with Their Minorities: Challenges to Minority Rights in South Asia (New Delhi, India; Thousand Oaks, Calif.: SAGE Publications, 2010), 15.
20 Tilly and Tarrow, Contentious Politics, 144-45.
undermining the rights of minorities.\textsuperscript{23} Despite the complexity of political situations in weak states, a sincere political effort can help weak states to mend their problems. At an initial stage, humanitarian-based interventions involving international regimes (such as the UN) could coerce and help in resolving the "state-minority conflicts and strengthen ethno-cultural pluralism."\textsuperscript{24} At a later stage, they could motivate ruling elites in weak states to show their viable commitment towards democratizing the system of governance, which possibly requires "guardianship" by the international community in extreme cases e.g. Somalia and Afghanistan.\textsuperscript{25} The nature of guardianship may also act as a "surrogate sovereign," if a weak state is on the verge of a complete breakdown, so the zones of weakness in a state can be fixed.\textsuperscript{26}


Table 1: Modern, Postmodern, and Postcolonial Weak States

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>The Modern State</th>
<th>The Post-Modern State</th>
<th>The Weak, Postcolonial States</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Government</strong></td>
<td>A centralized system</td>
<td>Multilevel governance in several</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>of democratic rule,</td>
<td>interlocked arenas overlapping each other. Governance in context of</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>based on a set of</td>
<td>supranational, international, trans-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>administrative, policing, and military organizations, sanctioned by a legal order, claiming a monopoly of the legitimate use of force, all within a defined territory</td>
<td>governmental, and transnational relations.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Nationhood</strong></td>
<td>A people within a territory making up a community of citizens (with political, social, and economic rights) and a community of sentiment based on linguistic, cultural, and historical bases. Nationhood involves a high level of cohesion, binding nation and state together.</td>
<td>Supranational elements in nationhood, both with respect to the community of citizens and the community of sentiment. Collective loyalties increasingly projected away from the state.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Economy</strong></td>
<td>A segregated national economy, self-sustained in the sense that it comprises the main sectors needed for its reproduction. The majority part of economic activity takes place at home.</td>
<td>Deep integration: the major part of economic activity is embedded in cross-border networks. The national economy is much less self-sustained than it used to be.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Source: George Sorenson, State Transformation and New Security Dilemmas, 85-89.*
While making a comparison between strong and weak states, it is important to note ‘institutionalized’ state capacities and legitimacies of political order that enforce and retain the bond between the state’s image and practices. In addition, the geographic location and resources of the state will provide a valued addition to determine the pivot-ness of the state.\(^27\) It consolidates a balanced viewpoint to understand endogenous and exogenous factors causing state fragility.

As mentioned earlier, states, whether strong or weak, still hold the position as primary unit among other potential components of the international system.\(^28\) However, it is necessary to remember that in the post-Second World War period, a gradual shift shows that “power is decentralized, the once homogenous system is broken down into a number of subsystems, the number of actors is large, and the factors determining their policies are innumerable.”\(^29\) Therefore, the recurrence of transformative global political episodes, their sequences, and significantly, their relationships, has changed the nature of states as well. Specifically, during the late twentieth century, most of the debate has been focused around the role and future of the state. The political debates paid less attention to issues of weak and fragile states or issues of post-conflict development in warring societies centered in the Third World.

In the wake of the disintegration of the Soviet Union, democracies rejoiced and announced the end of history; however, some scholars proposed new security agendas,

\(^{27}\) Handel, *Weak States in the International System*, 51.
\(^{29}\) Stanley Hoffmann, *Gulliver’s Troubles; or, the Setting of American Foreign Policy*, 1st ed. (New York: Published for the Council on Foreign Relations by McGraw-Hill, 1968), 57.
such as Samuel Huntington’s (1992) ‘Clash of Civilizations,’ believing future problems would emerge from cultural differences. Gerald Helman and Steven Ratner (1992-1993) suggested that failed states would become a high priority on the security agenda, and Robert Kaplan’s (1994) alarmist work ‘The Coming Anarchy’ suggested an outlook towards the environment, stating that resources and over-population would potentially trigger security dilemmas.

The post-Cold War era is considered an “age of optimism;” however, the tragic events of September 11th 2001 shook the confidence of optimism with new waves of security threats.30 Also following were “political anxieties,” particularly with the “erosion of rule of law” in many weak states.31 Gideon Rachman (2011) emphasized four new forces that determine future security agendas. First, global political problems emanate from a variety of common issue areas; these are the environmental issues of climate change, terrorism, economic recession, or stagnation. Second, the weak and controversial global governance system hampers resolving global political problems. Third, the gaining momentum and renewed confidence of authoritarian powers is another challenge, specifically backed by Russia and China. Finally, there are an increasing number of failed states with non-traditional threats rooted in failed societies.32 Failed societies are more susceptible to adopting authoritarian forms of governance, becoming ideal places for terrorists to reside, proliferate chemical and

nuclear weapons, and present poor economic activity that all together lead to humanitarian crises and human rights violations.

Since the demise of the Soviet Union, policy makers and academics started to seriously investigate the proposed alarming and complex issue areas highlighted above. Initially, the notion of state failure did not gather momentum; nevertheless, when the traumatic events of 9/11 shocked the global community, the realization that policy makers and the international community now faced an unprecedented type of threat from non-conventional structures of transnational elements elicited renewed interest in the subject.\(^{33}\) Therefore, the psychological and emotional fear was obvious, because no one knew the severity of transnational threats of stateless forces and the effects of a state failure. Even if one asked a layperson to list the countries "most geopolitically irrelevant to our interests because of their being so remote, poor, and weak, the list would surely have begun with Afghanistan and Somalia ... [BUT] today the world no longer faces just the circumscribed risk of an Easter Island society or Maya homeland collapsing in isolation, without affecting the rest of the world."\(^{34}\) The effects have multiple dimensions and political, economic, and social implications. At political scale, after the horrific events of 9/11, transnational threats stemming from weak and fragile states gripped many parts of the world with new modes of violence, specifically linked to terrorist attacks on innocent civilians. The economic cost of transnational threats after 9/11 has soared. In 2012, the cost of dealing with violent insecurities across the

\(^{33}\) Andersen, Møller, and Stepputat, *Fragile States and Insecure People?: Violence, Security, and Statehood in the Twenty-First Century*, 16.

world reached to $9.45 trillion, which is 11% of global GDP. Subsequently, the notion of fragile states reached a crescendo and it quickly came under the radar of the global community to deal with the issue of state fragility with urgency.

This research section develops an understanding about the challenges to statehood prevalent in the fragility of states through a theoretical prism, which paves the way to identify and assess the existing gaps in the administrative and institutional structures of weak and fragile states. Many of these gaps are linked to colonial legacies, while many of the problems are linked to domestic governance issues; highly corrupted, centralized political structures are especially troubling factors in weak states. It further seeks to explain how the widening structural gaps turn weak and fragile states into decapitated states with higher institutional ineffectiveness and incompetency in governance. In addition, the impact of institutional fracturedness within weak states answer the question ‘why does it matter?’ In this regard, the core theoretical framework and explanations are developed and derived from theories on weak and fragile states, political order with reference to governability, political capacity, political capability with reference to political economy of weak states, and geopolitical approaches with reference to the concept of the resource curse and geo-strategy.

The theoretical framework is categorized into two parts. The first part primarily builds on the literature on weak and fragile states, which provides a base to understand under what conditions weak or fragile states continue to fail or become fractured within. The second part of the theoretical literature provides a ladder or tool towards
fixing the state fragility to tackle issues such as economic stagnation, endemic corruption, political instability, weak institutions, and social conflicts (due to a polarized socially structured society). The entire exercise helps in understanding, explaining, and extrapolating the research agenda, significantly contributing to the field of study.

ORIGIN AND CONCEPTUALIZATION OF STATE FRAGILITY

In this study fragility is actually referred to as the 'weak pivot states,' like others, weak pivot states also potentially face the challenges of state fragility or quasi-states in contrast to completely failed or collapsed ones. They are weak and fragile because their political institutions are fractured or ineffective to deliver political goods, and their societies are highly polarized by deep fragmentation within the nationhood.35

Significantly, they are ‘pivot’ due to the geo-strategic and geopolitical importance of their location or resources, which are lacking in many other weak and fragile states. In general, while the outcome of state failure is the same, whether a weak state is a pivot or not, but the impact factor is significantly different in both cases.

If weak states were placed in a continuum and facing challenges of state fragility, they could be demoted to a “Fourth World” category from their current placement in the Third World grouping.36 The origin of fragile states is not new. Throughout history states have faced domestic challenges, regional issues, and international pressures that eventually posed political deadlocks. In a few accounts,

35 Tilly and Tarrow, Contentious Politics, 180.
nature driven factors, such as floods, earthquake, hurricanes, etc. beyond human control, have also raised existential threats to various societies. Hence, societies have suffered with both “man-made” factors as well as “nature made” factors like ecocide (polluting the environment).\textsuperscript{37} History demonstrates the diverse experiences “of a society’s birth, growth, peak, senescence, and death” that continues on a constant basis.\textsuperscript{38}

A weak state demonstrates an inability to tackle the duties and challenges of statehood. Such a lack of ability causes cracks within its political institutions and subsequently weakens the state’s political capacity to retain its authority. A number of political historians, scholars, and analysts like Paul Kennedy (1987), Jared Diamond (2006), and Peter Turchin (2003) explain the rise and failure of societies, governments, and even stronger empires that have met a similar fate. In recent times, specifically during the post-Cold War, the global community has been exposed to non-traditional and unpredictable challenges and security threats.

In a way, these non-traditional security threats either stem from non-state or ‘stateless’\textsuperscript{39} actors (more likely residing in fragile states) or from the contagious effects of state fragility itself that pose threats to the rest by creating “bad neighborhoods”\textsuperscript{40} that end up becoming “ungoverned, under-governed, misgoverned”\textsuperscript{41} spaces. Alarming situations emerge once territorial integrity becomes “politically disordered,” gradually

\textsuperscript{38} \textit{Collapse: How Societies Choose to Fail or Succeed}, 6.
\textsuperscript{40} Michael Ignatieff, "Intervention and State Failure," \textit{Dissent} 49, no. 1 (Winter 2002): 117.
shattering the bounding features of statehood.\textsuperscript{42} Ungoverned social spaces are “social, political, and economic arenas where states do not exercise effective sovereignty or where state control is absent, weak, or contested.”\textsuperscript{43} Hence, the fragile statehood of weak states provides fertile ground for non-state or stateless actors to use geographical spaces to thrive, reside, and act against host states vis-à-vis foreign territories, because of the weak states’ “deficit in the efficacious display of state power.”\textsuperscript{44}

Furthermore, the vulnerability and sensitivity of fragile statehood potentially triggers regional and domestic conflicts. Some of these conflicts are witnessed in Africa stemming from ethno-nationalistic fervor, which led to mass genocides and human rights violations during the 1990s. The ethnic conflicts in Myanmar, Rwanda, Bosnia, and Afghanistan raised the number of internally displaced persons (IDPs) and refugee issues which led to mounting political and socio-economic burdens on neighboring countries.

The origin of the concept and the acute nature of the political problem of a state’s fragility in today’s world can be linked to original work of Gerald B. Helman and Steven R. Ratner. Gerald Helman and Steven Ratner coined for the first time the terminology “failed states” in their article “Saving Failed States,” published in late 1992. The article emphasized that many of the newly independent states which colonization had left with “no tradition of statehood or practice in self-government” ... showed a

\textsuperscript{42} Anne L. Clunan and Harold A. Trinkunas, \textit{Ungoverned Spaces : Alternatives to State Authority in an Era of Softened Sovereignty} (Stanford, Calif.: Stanford Security Studies, 2010), 17.

\textsuperscript{43} Ibid.

\textsuperscript{44} Gros, "Towards a Taxonomy of Failed States in the New World Order: Decaying Somalia, Liberia, Rwanda and Haiti," 458.
“lack of experience in government, weak civic institutions, limited economic prospects, and ethnic strife,” making them fragile and possibly failed societies.\(^4^5\) Over the years, in most cases their commitment to govern themselves gradually decayed, and they became ‘client states’\(^4^6\) to look for their day-to-day survivability and to resist any move towards de-recognition of statehood. Interestingly, in some cases like Myanmar, if a weak state holds a pivotal geostrategic location, and retains client state status, then geography becomes a burden. In contrast, if a weak state gradually improves its status then the state can enjoy the “power of the weak” as leverage over other influential states.\(^4^7\) For example, the Cold War, the Vietnam War, and the Afghan War demonstrated that the “power of the weak” developed a harsh, but negociated order between weak states and superpowers.\(^4^8\)

Early works by Arnold Wolfers (1962), Robert Rothstein (1968, 1977), Thomas Franck (1968), Marshall Singer (1972), Michael Handel (1981), Robert H. Jackson and Carl G. Rosberg (1986), and Joel Migdal (1988) help conceptualize the phenomena of fragility and fracturedness within the framework of weak and fragile states. These early academic contributions further noted the domestic problems of weak states and also the weak diplomatic positioning of these states in the international system. Moreover, in later years, the significant contributions by Robert Jackson (1987, 1990), I. William

\(^4^5\) Helman and Ratner, “Saving Failed States,” 5.
\(^4^6\) Handel, Weak States in the International System, 41, 132-33.
\(^4^7\) Arnold Wolfers emphasized that most likely the weak but geo-strategically important countries enjoy some political leverage in world politics, e.g. during Cold War period, Cuba and Albania retained an advantage over great powers; therefore, the “power of the weak stems from the relationships among the great powers themselves”. See, Wolfers, Discord and Collaboration: Essays on International Politics, 111.

From the outset, it has remained a daunting challenge to define, categorize, and draw a clear distinction between various categories of weak states. Similarly, in retrospect and broadly speaking, the major and small powers phenomena or categorization remain in usage instead of strong and weak states. Small powers were considered relatively weaker compared to major powers due to insufficient capabilities in retaining social cohesion and in deterring major external threats. Robert L. Rothstein (1968) developed an acceptable definition for small powers that in many ways can be applicable to today’s weak or fragile states too. The author defines small power as:

"... a state which recognizes that it cannot obtain security primarily by use of its own capabilities, and that it must rely fundamentally on the aid of other states, institutions, processes, or developments to do so; the small power’s belief in its inability to rely on its own must be recognized by the other states involved in international politics." 49

Similarly, the literature shows that the small states also share some commonalities with small powers. Primary among them is being insufficient in power capabilities, which frequently encounters a small state with a sense of inferiority at the systemic level. Amry Vandenbosch (1964) portrays small states with following quote:

“A small state is a vacuum in a high pressure area. It does not live because of its strength but because nobody wants its territory, or because its preservation as a buffer state or as a weight in the balance of power is of interest to a stronger nation. When the balance disappears, the small state usually disappears with it.”

In these circumstances, weak positioned small powers or states ideally look for “neutrality” or “non-aligned movement,” as they are arguably incapable of resisting any coercive attempt by much powerful states. As an instance, before World War II, Belgium ensured its neutrality from then great powers. While, India during its early years of independence preferred to join the non-aligned movement as a more attractive policy to secure its survivability. Those weak states, which realized neutrality is an inexpedient option in Realpolitik and “wish to survive,” dare to come out of neutrality because the weak states “are more preoccupied with survival.” In most cases, the decision to say farewell to neutrality forced small states or powers to bandwagon with great powers in order to accrue their relative power capabilities against their archrivals. Many weak states enjoyed the support of major powers while balancing their archrivals, and it is a win-win situation for both weaker and stronger states. Note, the dynamics of weak and strong states in global political systems revolves around balancing, buffering and bandwagoning.

The established relationship between weak or fragile states and strong states is usually an asymmetrical power relationship. The general understanding about weak and fragile states is that they opt to bandwagon, because the anarchic nature of

---

systemic pressure prompts them to do so. In contrast, weaker states are rational actors too; despite fragile and weak conditions, weaker states rationally calculate the available options to maximize the gains. In this regard, weaker states also try best to exploit the interests of great powers and develop bargaining options. These bandwagoning bargains become “bandwagoning for profits,” as the stronger states, driven by the desire to avoid losses, are more interested in balancing, while the weaker states are comfortable with bandwagoning, which provides maximum opportunity for gain.53

It is witnessed during the Cold War period that Pakistan allied with the United States, which helped Pakistan to balance India through acquiring military and economic support. In a way, Pakistan’s status as a weak state during its time of birth maximized its gains while offering to protect U.S interests to contain communism in the region. Observing these historical guidelines, without external support and alliances for security arrangements, a weak state trying to exert power is like “the mouse that roared” in real world scenarios.54 Finally, there are few states advocating for liberal-institutionalism to safeguard their interests under systemic pressures. These institutionalists heavily rely on the support of a “super-leviathan” or take shelter under the umbrella of international organizations, e.g. UN, NATO, Warsaw Pact, EU, AU,

ASEAN, etc., for legal protections provided through a “negotiated order, bargaining order, or imposed order” of “international regimes.”

Recent studies have led to overlaps when analyzing the weak states category because the notion of weak states itself is discussed under a number of titles, such as small states, fragile states, quasi-states, failing states, failed states, and so forth. In some cases, malfunctioning and human rights-abusing weak states are considered rogue states, praetorian states, garrison states, or predatory states as well. Therefore, there is a blurred distinction between vaguely used phenomena in the literature. In addition, each study undertakes different parameters to judge the strength and capacity of a state. On the one hand, the procedure provides multiple criteria to understand and evaluate diverse cases of contemporary weak states, but on the other hand, it fails to develop an agreeable path to tackle the problems of weak states or generalize the issue area. Similarly, it is hard to suggest any generalized description for all fragile states, because there are many factors that contribute to determining fragility, and each case study has its own uniqueness. However, this study inculcates various distinctive explanations into one comprehensive study for an in-depth understanding and prescribes some fundamental guidelines to improve the fragile conditions of weak states.

---

Despite the variation in titling the subject matter, it is understandable that weak states can be distinct from strong or successful states on the basis of psychological and material grounds. On that note, most of the explanations on the subject affirm that the weakness of states means a substantial lack of effectiveness in mobilizing its tangible and intangible factors of power in contrast to stable ones. This means the "major components (tangible) of power were considered to be wealth, organization, and status," while weak states considerably lack them or are not fully capable of harnessing them.\textsuperscript{56} According to Kenneth Waltz, the differentiations between strong and weak are based on "power capabilities," which require every state to behave under anarchic conditions to follow "self-help or decline and perish."\textsuperscript{57} Subsequently, a state's lack of economic, military and diplomatic power also weakens its international posture among global members as an effective unit to enforce its persuasive diplomatic agenda.\textsuperscript{58}

Similarly, at the domestic level, the "scope" of state empowers state institutions to enforce the rule of law in order to retain a legitimate monopoly of power.\textsuperscript{59} The rationale of the state's legitimacy is linked to "the state's unique ability to provide a territorially-centralised form of organization."\textsuperscript{60} Therefore it becomes possible through

\textsuperscript{56} Singer, \textit{Weak States in a World of Powers: The Dynamics of International Relationships}, 368.
the “strength of state power, or the ability of states.” Historically, in many societies, the monopoly of violence was achieved through “despotic powers” which meant “the range of actions with which the elite is empowered to undertake without routine, institutionalised negotiation with civil society groups.” Without much surprise, the comparable type of despotic power mechanism is also practiced and wielded in many of the authoritarian systems in contemporary political settings. In fact, in the case of weak and fragile states, it rather holds “an inability to maintain a monopoly of the internal means of violence,” proving to be a more fractured political system. In contrast, in modern democracies, the legitimacy of power is retained through “infrastructural power” of state institutions.

DESCRIBING THE ESSENCE OF FRAGILITY

Seeking the essence and describing the fragile conditions of a state primarily rely on literature explaining weak states, failed states, and collapsed states. Additionally, to understand the fragility, it is especially important to understand the normative ontology of state sovereignty and territorial integrity. The performance of both the state and the nation offers some common characteristics and indicators of fragile statehood that are equally traceable in weak, failed, and collapsed states. In contrast to stable and strong states, others faced with fragile conditions are considered

---

63 Ignatieff, "Intervention and State Failure," 117.
64 The infrastructural power, according to Michael Mann: “the capacity of the state to actually penetrate civil society, and to implement logistically political decisions throughout the realm.” See, Mann, "The Autonomous Power of the State: Its Origins, Mechanisms and Results," 189.
as weak states with unpromising coercive and non-coercive state capacity. The extreme condition of weak states is that of a failed or collapsed state. There is a transition that can move a state from strong to weak, weak to failed, and failed to collapsed.

Political scientist William Zartman (1995) argues that the fragility of states should be referred "to a situation where the structure, authority (legitimate power), law, and political order have fallen apart."\(^{65}\) It is pertinent to note that every collapsed state reached its status of breakdown after experiencing the transition of failed and early fragile statehood. But it is not mandatory that every weak state meet a similar fate; a weak state can be resilient and improve its fragile conditions. The later part of the discussion on political development in weak states, establishing political order for an effective political capacity, elaborates on how weak states can undertake efforts to improve their status of weak statehood.

Senior Fellow and Director of the International Institutions and Global Governance Program at the Council on Foreign Relations, Stewart Patrick, defines a weak state as "one that struggles to fulfill the fundamental security, political, economic, and social functions that have come to be associated with sovereign statehood."\(^{66}\) Most weak states face tremendous challenges and gaps in four areas; i.e. security, political, economic and social arenas identified in an earlier definition. Once a state struggles with performing its basic functions, it shows the symptoms of weakness and state fragility. According to Zartman, when fragile statehood reaches its apex, then


“the basic functions of the state are no longer performed.”\(^{67}\)

Once a state becomes incapable of performing its basic functions, then the bond between citizens and the state becomes an unfulfilled social contract. Stephen Baranyi and Kristiana Powell’s work based on Robert Rotberg and William Zartman’s literature suggests that the notion of state fragility, weakness, or failure is based on two ideas: first, the “states’ inability and/or unwillingness to provide essential public goods like protection from external threats, rule of law and basic social services to most of their citizens;” and second, fragility is a matter of degree -- ranging from states that have ceased to exist in all but name and cannot provide protection or welfare to anyone, to certain states that can deliver most public goods to most of their citizens."\(^{68}\).

The wide-ranging body of literature on fragile statehood agrees that when states fail to ensure the provision of political goods to their citizens, the concept of statehood shatters. Failure to meet these basic requirements causes a gradual loss of a state’s credibility, at which point the idea of “being a citizen becomes meaningless” for the political community of a state.\(^{69}\) Subsequently, the breach of the social contract between citizens and the state also leads to a “loss of control over political and economic space.”\(^{70}\)

Analyzing the nature and hierarchy of political (public) goods, Robert Rotberg has explained that political goods:

\(^{67}\) Zartman, *Collapsed States: The Disintegration and Restoration of Legitimate Authority*, 5.


"... are those intangible and hard to quantify claims that citizens once made on sovereigns and now make on states. They encompass expectations, conceivably obligations, inform the local political culture, and together give content to the social contract between ruler and ruled that is at the core of regime/government and citizenry interactions ... therefore... political good enables citizens to participate freely, openly, and fully in politics and the political process. This good encompasses the essential freedoms: the right to compete for office; respect and support for national and regional political institutions, like legislatures and courts; tolerance of dissent and difference; and fundamental civil and human rights."\footnote{According to the author, the provision of security is the most critical hierarchy of political goods, because, it "prevents cross-border invasions and infiltrations, and any loss of territory; to eliminate domestic threats to or attacks upon the national order and social structure; to prevent crime and any related dangers to domestic human security; and to enable citizens to resolve their differences with the state and with their fellow inhabitants without recourse to arms or other forms of physical coercion." See, Rotberg, When States Fail: Causes and Consequences, 2-3.} 

IS FRAGILITY A COLONIAL BAGGAGE?

The lack of provision of political (public) goods due to weak state capacity is rooted in post-colonial state structures in Third World societies. Most of the weak and fragile states gathered anti-colonial momentum to establish new nation-states through nationalistic fervors.\footnote{Yale H. Ferguson, "The State Concept and a World of Polities under Perpetual Siege," in The State, Identity and Violence: Political Disintegration in the Post-Cold War World, ed. R. Brian Ferguson (London ; New York: Routledge, 2003), 82.} However, they paid less attention towards nation building and establishing an effective statehood. In other words, enjoying the spirit of self-determination through the UN charter did not assure any viable political support to the challenges of 'sovereignty' and adopting new models of a state system. Gerald Helman and Steven Ratner narrate the situation that the "UN made the self-determination of peoples -a right enshrined in the U.N. Charter-a primary goal. Self-determination in
fact, was given more attention than long-term survivability."73 The new models adopted by the newly independent states in the Third World were in process of replacing traditional structures of political societies or colonial experiences, as they were explicitly a "repudiation of the old" system.74 Walter Opello and Stephen Rosow portray the final movements of Colonial dynamics:

"The colonial encounters complemented and clashed with local conditions, generating certain spaces in which sovereignty was contested ... Ethnicity provided an alternative identity around which political life could be organized in and against the new territorial state. Ethnicity should not be thought of as a given attribute of people; it is an identity that people come to adopt under the conditions set by the struggles for independence, and just as with nationalism, its specific features, such as language, racial characteristics, shared histories, and religion, are constructed under modern circumstances."75

Newly independent weak states in Asia, Africa and Latin America grappled with new forms of challenges. Relying on outside support to ensure state sovereignty and the provision of basic security and political goods to its population developed a notion of dependency on external help.76 Jeffrey Herbst emphasized that granting sovereignty to many of decolonizing states was unexpectedly got quicker due to decline of colonial powers and sovereignty became "little more than a legal fiction," because soon after independence they got entangled with greater scale of socio-economic and political hardships.77 The early foundation of statehood was already shattered with non-preparedness to project effectiveness in governance structure. The non-preparedness

---

75 Walter C. Opello and Stephen J. Rosow, The Nation-State and Global Order : A Historical Introduction to Contemporary Politics (Boulder, Colo.: Lynne Rienner, 1999), 203.
76 Evans, Rueschemeyer, and Skocpol, Bringing the State Back In, 186.
77 Herbst, "Responding to State Failure in Africa," 122.
can be reflected through "postcolonial forms of authority [that] were from the outset partial, fragmented, and unsettled ... [and, the] structure of governance was deeply bifurcated between rural and urban forms of governance."  

The political elites not only manipulated the fragile conditions of statehood, but also collaborated with military institutions to form a new power alliance. This alliance justified the military rule to stabilize the security threats posed both on a domestic and external scale. It can be agreed that most weak states received domestic support in the conduct of foreign policy, while society remained fragmented over domestic issues. Robert Rothstein writes that during the post-independence period, "unity on foreign policy seems much easier to achieve than unity on domestic policy. Domestic conflicts may be sharp and pervasive, but contending groups can usually agree on the elements of an external policy: economic nationalism, anti-colonialism, nonalignment, and so forth."  

As a result, political leadership exploited the notion of fear from foreign interventions with the use of bitter examples of their colonial past. These political manipulations helped the political elites to retain their despotic power through "redistributing wealth to themselves and their cronies [rather] than creating growth and wealth for [the] nation, and used [the] state apparatus to stay in power."  

---

78 Andersen, Møller, and Stepputat, Fragile States and Insecure People?: Violence, Security, and Statehood in the Twenty-First Century, 8. 
the beginning, the political culture and institutions of state building were corrupted.\textsuperscript{81}

Over the years, the legitimacy of political power under military rule was mostly retained through the justification of providing domestic stability and protection from existential threats posed by neighbors. These justifications to stabilize the country witnessed frequent military interventions in Third World politics and became a routine fashion of the day.\textsuperscript{82}

Military interference in political life impacted political development as military coups proved to be more politically repressive of popular discontent. The expression of political and socio-economic repercussion can be seen in the form of "low governance effecting provision of goods needed for economic growth causing economic stagnation."\textsuperscript{83} Ultimately, it will not long last as the world awakens politically, and weak states with a long history of military interventions will be prompted to think "beyond sticks, stones, and severing limbs"\textsuperscript{84} against mass discontent.

In these circumstances, when military interventions become regular, the establishment of democratic norms of political development and political participations gradually wither away and crises of political development evolve. Frequent and continuous crises of political development in weak states widen the "gaps in the social, cultural, economic, psychological, and political spheres," whereas in strong states these

\textsuperscript{82} Mahfuzul H. Chowdhury, \textit{Democratization in South Asia: Lessons from American Institutions} (Burlington, VT: Ashgate, 2003), 51.
\textsuperscript{84} Davenport, "State Repression and Political Order," 9.
gaps are generally absent. Whilst authoritarianism paved the ways for Praetorians to establish their own forms of political order, a praetorian-framed political order gradually undermines the political participation in post-colonial societies, so a process of decay affects political institutions and the effectiveness of statehood. The late Samuel Huntington emphasized the historical roots of oligarchic praetorianism and its evolution towards radical praetorianism, which undermines political institutions resulting in decapitation of the state. He further elaborates that a “praetorian society lack[s] community and effective political institutions” because the authoritarian regimes and military dictators do not allow political communities to flourish and participate. If political institutions are allowed to flourish in society, then in an “institutionalized society the participation” becomes an important feature in a political system to establish an efficacious political order.

The inefficacy of political orders in weak and fragile states is also due to the direct or indirect control of authoritarian regimes. These regimes have self-justified legitimacy to intervene in a political system as saviors of sovereignty and internal security. It is significant to mention that the role of military is equally important in every society, but the nature of civil-military relations more importantly determines the nature of the political system of the state. In strong states, the civil-military relations are comparatively different than in the weak and fragile ones. To put another way, in strong states, the civilian control of institutions, including the military, is effective. Samuel Huntington has answered the question of civilian control in two ways: 1)

85 Binder, "Crises of Political Development," 29.
86 Huntington, Political Order in Changing Societies, 197-98.
Subjective civilian control through maximizing civilian power means empowerment of governmental institutions, social classes, and constitutions that can restrain any possible military influence in politics.\textsuperscript{87} 2) Objective civilian power through maximizing military professionalism means “the distribution of political power between military and civilian groups which is most conducive to the emergence of professional attitudes and behavior” of officers in corps.\textsuperscript{88} Hence, the end result of subjective civilian control is “civilianizing the military (making them mirror of state),” while objective civilian control tries for “militarizing the military (making them as tool of the state).”\textsuperscript{89} Huntington further clarified that in objective civilian control, the core essence is “the recognition of autonomous military professionalism,” and for the subjective civilian control, the core essence is “the denial of an independent military sphere.”\textsuperscript{90} What happens in weak states is that the less fear there is of any constitutional or institutional restraint, the military actively involves in political spheres. In modern times, frequent military interventions are observable in various regions of world, specifically in the Africa, Asia, Latin America, and have always undermined the electoral processes.\textsuperscript{91}

To understand the role of the military in strong and weak states, the typology of civil-military relations helps to portray the significant involvement of the military in the political system as a partner; dominant or hegemonic determines the maturity and viability of political process.

Ayesha Siddiqa’s work \textit{Military Inc.} explains six topologies of civil-military

\textsuperscript{87} The Soldier and the State; the Theory and Politics of Civil-Military Relations, 80-81.
\textsuperscript{88} The Soldier and the State; the Theory and Politics of Civil-Military Relations, 83.
\textsuperscript{89} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{90} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{91} Perlmutter and Bennett, \textit{The Political Influence of the Military : A Comparative Reader}, 4.
relations, which are important to understand the differences between strong and weak states. They are: 1) civil-military partnership, in which the military is subservient to civilian rule, and the military gains advantages from this partnership. 2) Authoritarian political party-military partnership: in this type the military is still dependent on civilian rule, while enjoying the benefits from the dominant political party. The difference between the first two types is the assertive/participatory and controlled civil society, because a dominant political party mostly controls the society. 3) Ruler-military, which believes itself to be a guarantor of the state's security and has the right to control the state. 4) Arbitrator-military, this type provides a justification that the military's legitimate monopoly as a political and social arbitrator is to fix the governance issues created by political leadership. 5) Parent-guardian military, in which the military employs constitutional and legal rules to strengthen its roots as a permanent political actor in domestic and external politics. 6) Warlord, the final type, is the extreme condition of an anarchic situation of state, in which military partners with dominant political/civilian ruling elites loot and plunders the society.\(^9\)\(^\text{2}\) The evolution of military interventions started soon after decolonization; however, the cases and justification of each case varies from region to region. The commonality among all the cases is that these interventions are legitimized as saviors of newly born states from internal and external threats.

Since decolonization, the entire effort of creating new nation-states looks only like a political struggle to join a consortium of the international state system, while

there is no serious effort made to fill the domestic political vacuum in the actual political transitions. It projects a dichotomy between traditional and modern formats, which were “modified and reconstituted” political cultures for newly born nation-states.\textsuperscript{93} Louise Anderson emphasized that even earlier attempts of creating new states after decolonization was actually a “failed universalization of the imported state within the postcolonial world.”\textsuperscript{94} Anderson further explains that there is a dire need to find ways that can show “how to deal with degrees of statehood and zones of statelessness not insisting on helping by (re) constructing states that were never truly states in the modern sense of [the] word anyhow.”\textsuperscript{95}

The journeys of the creation of new states did not halt after the decolonization period. Recent reports show that there are more than “300 developed or emerging national groups without their own state worldwide, known as stateless nations,”\textsuperscript{96} and some other studies have also pointed to almost “8000 potential ethnically pure states” that can struggle for sovereign territorial units.\textsuperscript{97} Many of them have launched non-violent political struggles for their independence, while many rely on armed struggles. For instance, the Kurdistan issue could involve Turkey, Iraq, Iran, and Syria in a regional conflict. Interestingly, the majority of all national groups are weak and fragile and surrounded by hostile neighbors.

\textsuperscript{93} Opello and Rosow, \textit{The Nation-State and Global Order : A Historical Introduction to Contemporary Politics}, 206.
\textsuperscript{95} ibid.
\textsuperscript{97} Opello and Rosow, \textit{The Nation-State and Global Order : A Historical Introduction to Contemporary Politics}, 237.
What should have been done? The literature suggests for two options. The UN could have mandated that then super powers stop the creation of new weak states, whose weakness and fragility could create more “anarchy and disorder.” Or, alternatively, agreement might have been reached to create a compatible, effective and self-reliant political order in fragile states. Instead, new independent states emerged on a fragile foundation of statehood and were troubled with difficulties of self-governance.

Actually, many newborn weak states end up immediately experiencing issues of “dispersed domination” (in which the state lacks capabilities in achieving country wide domination) rather than “integrated domination” (in which state establish broad power and acts in a coherent fashion). It would not be wrong to admit that fragile and weak links in state structure and incapable political institutions leave the idea of sovereignty in doubt. The question is whether weak states can continue to survive for long, when the fragility is a constant feature of their existence and may pose an existential threat to them at any stage.

Political scientist Robert Jackson’s earlier work termed the fragile statehood with “negative sovereignty” and called them “quasi-states.” Robert Jackson writes that quasi-states “lack the institutional features of sovereign states.” He further emphasized that, due to negative sovereignty and limitations of statehood, the fragile

---

state's "populations do not enjoy many of the advantages traditionally associated with independent statehood. Their governments are often deficient in political will, institutional authority, and organized power to protect human rights or provide socio-economic welfare." The reason is that the populations of weak states do not enjoy political, social, and economic advantages because the state institutions are highly exclusive in its nature. American economists Daron Acemoglu and James Robinson stressed the need to strengthen the capacity of the state through development of inclusive political institutions for effectiveness of state capabilities. The phenomena of inclusiveness will harness greater support from the population and vice versa, the population will in turn be able to gain political, social and economic benefits.

BURDEN OF GEOGRAPHY AND GEOPOLITICS: A CRITICAL FACTOR OF STATE FRAGILITY

Above explanations about state fragility explained that the ill-preparedness and weak capabilities of state power feature its fragility, which possibly becomes or is considered an endogenous or domestic factor of failure, i.e. insufficient provision of security, prevailing political corruption, structural weakness, controlled and malfunctioning economy, misadministration, and so forth. However, its exogenous or external forces, such as macroeconomic and political policies, diplomatic ties, and foreign interventions due to geopolitical reasons, cause fragility too. Stewart Patrick

---

102 Ibid.
104 Chiara Giorgetti, A Principled Approach to State Failure: International Community Actions in Emergency Situations (Boston: Brill, 2010), 44.
calls it the "external environment" that can possibly "mitigate or exacerbate the state’s vulnerability."  

Describing the distinction between three concepts i.e. geography, geopolitics, and geostrategy, Jakub Grygiel writes that the "geography is the physical reality" and geological features of earth, i.e. includes mountains, rivers, and so forth. While the geopolitics and geostrategy engages at systemic and state level respectively. Geopolitics engages with the "human factor within geography, [means] it is geographic distribution of centers of resources and lines of communication, assigning value to locations according to their strategic importance." And, finally, the geostrategy is linked with "geographic direction of a state’s foreign policy" that shows the power of concentration (both, the hard power (military) and the soft power (diplomatic)) of a state towards a geographic location. The change patterns vary among all three concepts. The geopolitical changes takes times to shift, even it can take centuries, because it depends on the "rise and decline of centers of resources and shifts in routes, placement at inter-section, ideological affiliation; in contrast, geography is more constant or permanent unless a natural calamity hits and changes, while geostrategy can be expected to shift rapidly.

Among all the possible exogenous factors, it is particularly important to understand the systemic image of world politics and geopolitical maneuverings that

---

108 Ibid.
109 Ibid.
substantially weaken a state. It is not only weaker states that have suffered due to
geopolitics. In a number of cases great powers have suffered too, as shown for example
with Paul Kennedy’s thesis on “imperial over-stretch.”\textsuperscript{110} Weaker powers suffered
worse, however, because power struggles completely disfigured the state institutions
and social order. For instance, during the nineteenth century, the core aim of great
power involvement was the strategic management of regions like Central Asia, the
Middle East, South-East Asia, and South Asia. These regions were important
geostrategic zones that were central to the great game rivalry “on the chessboard of
Imperial diplomacy” between Russia and Britain.\textsuperscript{111} Even during the Cold War the two
super-powers supported their client states to keep their influence in various regions of
the world, which resulted in undermining democratic transitions, as authoritarian
forces were allowed to suppress dissidents.

Moreover, historians share the notion that the great powers engaged in surgical
partitions while carving out the geopolitical map of the world, e.g. the decolonization
period offers many instances of surgical partitions. Hans J. Morgenthau has called these
power struggles “power politics into the periphery of the earth.”\textsuperscript{112} In other contexts it
was considered to be a contest for the “heartland-dominated land power” (Halford
Mackinder), or even the contest for the “maritime-oriented Rimland” (Nicholas John

\textsuperscript{110} Paul M. Kennedy, \textit{The Rise and Fall of the Great Powers: Economic Change and Military Conflict from
\textsuperscript{111} George Nathaniel Curzon Curzon of Kedleston, \textit{Russia in Central Asia in 1889, and the Anglo-Russian
Question} (London and New York,: Longmans, Green, and co., 1889), 326.
\textsuperscript{112} Kaplan, \textit{The Revenge of Geography: What the Map Tells Us About Coming Conflicts and the Battle
against Fate}, 47.
Whether it is a land or maritime contest, such great power struggle affected the future stability of weak states. Though in recent years, contrary to the past, territorial expansion through colonizing a peripheral region has changed, the “private logic of the global economy’ still relies on “territorial expansion [as] a route to control over new productive assets.”

The geopolitical or geographical factor provides a distinction between a “weak pivot state” and other weak or fragile states. It has already been mentioned that in both categories they share some indicators of fragility, but in addition, the “weak pivot states” face fragility due to geographical reasons that may not be the case for other weak or fragile states. The recent debates on geopolitics or geographical contest have been given less attention due to the erosion of time and space phenomena in a highly inter-connected globalized world. Still, the return of geopolitics at this particular time can be traced to “a certain serendipity in the convergence of political semantics and international relations.” Although the significance of geography remains constant, and “human society is still related to the facts of geography,” each phase of history has had its own perspective on geographical explanation, while we witness crises and sequences of political development, the “view of the geographical realities is colored for practical purposes by our preconceptions from the past.”

---

113 The Revenge of Geography: What the Map Tells Us About Coming Conflicts and the Battle against Fate, 96.
Even during the recent past, like in the Cold War period, the bipolar power struggle competed over regional gains. The bipolar power competition around shatterbelts left severe impacts of state fragility on countries located in or around these zones. For instance, in the late 1970s Soviet invasion over Afghanistan, the US containment of Soviets in Afghanistan affected the peace and stability of the entire region. The concept of “Shatterbelts” help us to understand the dangerously fractured regions or zones, in which fragile states have very weak links to sustain the regional peace and sustainability of its own risky society. According to Saul Bernard Cohen, shatterbelts are also referred as “Crush Zone” or “Shatter Zone;” these zones are “strategically oriented regions that are both deeply divided internally and caught up in the competition between Great Powers of the geostrategic realms.”

The Middle East and East Asia remained the suitable examples of shatterbelts during the Cold War bipolar rivalry between U.S. and former USSR. In the post-Cold War period, however, the political remapping of regions and sub-regions demarcated new zones of insecurities i.e. Middle East transformed into the greater Middle East. On similar lines, the notion of “new Global Balkans” also expands the traditional boundaries of Balkan. According to Former National Security Advisor, Zbigniew Brzezinski, the new Global Balkans are:

“... Extending from Egypt’s Suez Canal to China’s Xinjiang region, from northern Kazakhstan to the Arabian Sea, the Global Balkans of today mirror the traditional Balkans of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries in that they are internally unstable and their geopolitical importance causes foreign rivalries. The contemporary “New Global Balkans” inhibited by about 500 million people, are burdened by internal instability derived from ethnic and religious tensions, 

117 Cohen, Geopolitics: The Geography of International Relations, 44.
poverty, and authoritarian governments. Ethnic conflict within the Global Balkans involves 5.5 million Jewish Israel and 5 million Arab Palestinians; 25 million Kurds and their partitioning states of Turkey, Iraq, and Syria; and between India and Pakistan in the dispute over Kashmir, as well as numerous potentially severe ethnic and minority conflicts in Iran and Pakistan. Religious conflicts involve the Muslims and the Hindus, Muslim Shiites versus, and a variety of others. In 2005, unemployment was as high as 50 percent in the Gaza Strip, 40 percent in Afghanistan, 25 percent in Iraq, and 20 percent in the West Bank, and 18 percent in Kyrgyzstan.”

In this regard, the geographic factor is critical to frame a rationale, as Michael Handel (1981) highlights the critical role of geographical location of weak states in the international system. Handel notes that it is a disadvantage for weak states to be located near a “large number of bordering countries, more powerful and with conflicting goals that build high border pressure.” For example, Myanmar suffered both during the colonial and post-colonial time period due to frequent external interference in its domestic politics. Despite the fact that, in recent years, the direct threat from a neighbor coming over to capture territory has largely diminished, the threat cannot be ignored. In that sense, many weak pivot states are fragile, and they face high amounts of indirect interferences. Myanmar’s neighbors India and China, to return to the example, have sponsored the armed ethno-nationalist movements against the state itself.

If they cannot handle the geostrategic threats, weak states face “state death” due to the burden of geography and geopolitics. Tanisha Fazal’s research has focused on the politics of geography, suggesting that in earlier times conquest and occupation

119 Handel, Weak States in the International System, 76.
has caused the decay of states. Fazal defines state death as “internal state collapse or failure, regime change, conquest, or division” meaning “loss of sovereignty.” Fazal emphasizes that it is foreign intervention that causes the loss of sovereignty, and as a result, the state further loses its domestic capabilities, which means a state formally loses its “foreign policy making powers” as well.

In addition, many weaker states present an abundance of natural resources like oil, gas, gold, and diamonds, which can be considered either a blessing or a curse. The post-colonial history of Africa shows that former colonial powers re-engaged in the region to exploit its natural resources. In order to extract these, former colonial powers constructed new relationships with non-democratic forces. These relationships gave a fair amount of legitimacy to intervene with the approval of the local leadership, and in return, major powers endorsed the despotic authoritarian leadership. Weak states were already experiencing frequent clashes between rival ethnic groups fragmenting the nation with increased turmoil. With the primary interest in extracting resources, such internal turmoil became an opening for direct involvement by major powers in the name of stability.

---

121 Fazal, State Death: The Politics and Geography of Conquest, Occupation, and Annexation, 17.
122 State Death: The Politics and Geography of Conquest, Occupation, and Annexation, 19.
124 Opello and Rosow, The Nation-State and Global Order: A Historical Introduction to Contemporary Politics, 204.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Feature</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Security</strong></td>
<td>Higher political instability and violence due to lack of effective security measures; criminalized groups; acts of terrorism; state struggles to establish legitimacy; loosely based home and political order; weak measure on its borders; ungoverned spaces.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Political (Governamentality)</strong></td>
<td>Excessive Burdens on Governing Capacity of institutions; Political malfunctioning and Flabbiness degenerating legitimacy of authority; Institutionalized Political Corruption undermine the integrity of basic state institutions; ineffective rule of law; absence of transparent judiciary; and if state is authoritarian and weak then state becomes repressive and predatory violating human rights.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Nationhood</strong></td>
<td>Predominated by ethnic divides; lack of cohesive national identity, minority versus majority power struggles on ethnic and religious lines weaken nationhood, frustrated or suppress ethnic groups; minorities try to undermine legitimacy of state authority through seeking help from transnational advocacy networks (TAN) or through armed struggles, e.g. irredentist movements.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Economy</strong></td>
<td>Extractive political capacity relying on heavy taxation; ruling elites establish a corrupt political economy to exploit state fragility to extract foreign aid, donations and loans for personal wealth accumulation; Based of traditional agricultural sector, fledgling industrial and urban sector with acute shortage of power supply effects production.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Social</strong></td>
<td>Weak social cohesion; deeply fractured society; Compromised dignity of humans through human rights violation; Patrimonialization; lack of access to health and education; improper infrastructure; human trafficking; poor water &amp; sanitation; malnutrition; high mortality.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Pivot of Geography or Resources</strong></td>
<td>Geo-Politics; Geography becoming burden with the direct or indirect external involvement, either due to geo-strategic location or resource curse or could be of two.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
The decay of societies is part of world politics; we have witnessed numerous
decays throughout the political history of world with the rise and fall of city-states and
empires. Now, possibly, some dysfunctional nation-states will face the same fate.
Krasner writes that “conflict prevention must become a routine element of
policymaking ... [because] State death as a result of external invasion, common before
World War II, has almost disappeared since 1945. The lack of good governance in weak
states means they often do not have the ability to deal with disaffected or criminal
groups within their own borders.” Among many scenarios, countries like
Afghanistan, Pakistan, Nigeria, Sudan, and Myanmar are victims of external and
internal troubles, which certainly demand further inquiry into endogenous and
exogenous reasons of fragility with reference to geopolitics. The consequences of the
endogenous and exogenous factors, weak states encounter a number of dire
challenges; in his work *People, States and Fear*, Barry Buzan (2007) has identified the
following conditions that prevail in weak states. According to Buzan, first, the intensity
of political violence is relatively higher in weak states. Second, the freedom and liberty
of citizens is always at stake, since there is a conspicuous role of political police in the
everyday lives of citizens. Third, in weak states the core political conflict is over which
ideology will be used to organize the state; this is visible in Pakistan between
secular/liberal and non-secular forces. Fourth, there is an identity vacuum that is the
reason for a lack of a coherent national identity, or the presence of contending national
identities within the state. Fifth, the chaotic struggle for domestic political hegemony

---

shatters the legitimacy; as a result, state structure feels a lack of a clear and observed hierarchy of political authority. Finally, freedom of expression is subject to censorship in failing states. With various intervals, failing states feel a protective or legitimate right to have a light degree of state control over the media.\textsuperscript{126}

Both the endogenous and exogenous factors help to develop a balanced understanding that describes state fragility. After reviewing the above literature and looking at the effects of state fragility and the political decay of state institutions, it can be understood that weak states are grappling with issues of governamentality. These issues arise when a state is incapable of enforcing its political order, and such enforcement depends on political capacity or state’s capacity. In other words, political order, political capacity, and governamentality are interdependent. The above explanation concludes that weak states are required to establish an effective order, so it can tackle domestic challenges, which ultimately help to use pivot of geography, not as a burden but rather an opportunity.

GLIMPSE ON THE INDICATORS OF FRAGILITY

Drawing some broader lines from the literature discussed above, we can identify four domains where a weak state suffers from fragility or fracturedness. These are critical for stability and improving the conditions of any state, namely security, political, economic, and social arenas. Moreover, these four domains are basic functions as well as indicators that measure the performance of a state. Normalcy in

\textsuperscript{126} Buzan, \textit{People, States, and Fear : An Agenda for International Security Studies in the Post-Cold War Era}. 
these four areas is a prerequisite for any stable country to ensure that its citizens are enjoying basic rights anticipated out of the four spheres.

As previously mentioned, security is a top priority on the hierarchy of political goods that every citizen of a state seeks. A state’s primary purpose is to “ensure basic social order and protect inhabitants from the threat of violence from internal and external forces.” Due to a lack of effective security arrangements in weak states, citizens feel insecure from criminals and terrorists and fear for the safety of their private belongings. As a state also fails to impose its monopoly of the use of force, it can feel insecure on its frontiers due to a mirage of existential threats from neighbors and seem less interested in imposing an effective political order. Highlighting the importance of the security dimension, the former Resident Representative of UNDP in Ghana and Nigeria, Alfred Fawundu, feared that fragile and violent societies produce a negative outlook for their own people and neighbors too. He stressed that, while the “security of states worsens, the proliferation of small arms flourishes, and as the arms proliferation flourishes, the conflicts expand across boundaries.”

On political grounds, a state is responsible for providing “legitimate, representative, and accountable governance under the rule of law.” As a result, a transparent system helps citizens to enjoy a greater deal of freedom, and their fundamental rights are protected. In contrast, the fragile statehood of weak and

---

“decapitated” states fails to create proper institutional checks and balances.\textsuperscript{130}

Eventually political corruption empowers chronic and despotic leadership, and these corrupt political elites then enjoy political freedom without any fear of accountability.

The higher the position these elites occupy, the higher the desire to stay longer in power. The desire for reaching higher and staying longer in power encourages corrupt political elites to prepare for “grabbing and retaining power at all costs, forming alliances, and taking decisions with longer personal objectives in mind.”\textsuperscript{131}

States in Africa, Asia, and Latin America witnessed a prolonged permanence of despotic and corrupt elites, as they legitimized their corrupt rule through constitutional amendments. Michael Comer and Timothy Stephens, whom have done extensive work on corruption focusing both on least developed and developed countries, quote John Mukum Mbaku while describing the ramifications of poverty and corruption on African polities, explaining that the “internal causes of poverty in the African continent, which significantly outweigh external ones, includes excessive control of economy, massive and pervasive corruption, merciless exploitation of the peasantry and ethical violence verging on genocide.”\textsuperscript{132} With the passage of time, corruption becomes institutionalized exacerbating the coercive corruption, which undermines the “integrity

\textsuperscript{130} Huntington, \textit{Political Order in Changing Societies}, 198.
\textsuperscript{131} Michael J. Comer and Timothy E. Stephens, \textit{Bribery and Corruption: How to Be an Impeccable and Profitable Corporate Citizen} (Burlington, VT: Gower Pub., 2013), 12.
\textsuperscript{132} \textit{Bribery and Corruption: How to Be an Impeccable and Profitable Corporate Citizen} (Burlington, VT: Gower Pub., 2013), 14.
of basic state institutions.”\textsuperscript{133} So the entire society becomes a victim to the completely unjust and no speedy justice system.

The economic sphere is the third important domain of a state’s responsibility, that is, to “create a legal and regulatory framework conducive to economic growth and development.”\textsuperscript{134} The economic framework process enables a market to grow, attract foreign investment, create favorable conditions for entrepreneurs, and enrich human capital. The state defines a set of rules and regulations so private entities and investors feel attracted to market friendly policies. The political economic conditions of fragile and weak states are always fluctuating and remain doubtful to domestic and foreign investors.

The development economist and former director of the Shell Foundation, Kurt Hoffman, explicitly refers to the problems of corruption that cripples domestic economic conditions and discourages entrepreneurs support initiatives that would counter poverty and help fragile economies. Hoffman writes that the “entrepreneurs and businesspeople can help governments and the major donors map out the value chain of activities and stages where corruption or lack of government capacities impinges on enterprise creation.”\textsuperscript{135} As common features in weak states, such as

\begin{footnotesize}
\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{134} Patrick, \textit{Weak Links : Fragile States, Global Threats, and International Security}, 25.
\end{itemize}
\end{footnotesize}
frequent capital flights, bankruptcy, and seeking bribes from foreign investors become customized traditions, unemployment and poverty increase.

To sustain the state’s costs, a state becomes involved in “extraction of resources” through taxation and imposition of duties. However, political elites and decision makers can also engage in additional “extraction of foreign resources” i.e. foreign aid and loans. In the case of weak states, most of the foreign extracted resources “may be sought to pay off supporters,” or used for personal wealth accumulation through justified means. In other words, the chronic political economy of weak states establishes various ways of legitimate corruption, where domestic taxpayers fund as well as “aid funds are misappropriated through patronage-swollen” (meaning, the misappropriation of resources under the legitimate protection of corrupt political elites). The notion of legitimate corruption and tactics used at international forums to extract foreign resources can be understood in the following words, as the author writes that;

“Domestic instability, or the fear thereof, tempts insecure leaders to use foreign policy as a supplementary resource in their political [and economic] struggles. A rising defense budget, or efforts to secure high levels of military assistance, may be a way to keep the army happy.... Foreign aid may be sought to pay off supporters, not to raise domestic investment rates ... use meetings and speeches at the UN may be designed to alleviate psychic insecurities, not to deal with substantive problems.”

Corruption can be controlled if political and legal institutions become stronger

---

and economic entities enjoy more open and orderly access to the political decision-making process.\textsuperscript{140} Due to the absence of effective judicial structures, the accountability system could not succeed to curb the menace of corruption. Interestingly, in most weak states, a judiciary exists, but it is either under the control government or there is too much of a gap between implementation and enforcement.

The social sector is the final arena where weak states fail to provide social services to society. Society expects that a state provide “basic social welfare” to its inhabitants, which is considered one of its primary functions.\textsuperscript{141} That includes access to proper health care and education, water and sanitation, environmental protection, access to the Internet, means of communication, infrastructure, etc. In retrospect, history proves that social issues of malnutrition, starvation, ultra-poverty, diseases, and societal violence are deeply rooted in poor and decapitated societies.\textsuperscript{142} Overall, the fragile conditions of weak states do not allow them to provide basic goods and perform their functions in all four arenas. Some weak states present strength in one sector or another, but lack symmetrical strength, which ultimately translates into an overall poor performance.

Many crimes and transnational security threats also stem from issues of ultra-poverty. When a person sees the degradation of human dignity and when his/her family and friends suffer with illness, hunger, and material deprivation, the individual becomes frustrated and feels pushed to rebel against the system. Ted Gurr refers the

\textsuperscript{140} Funderburk, \textit{Political Corruption in Comparative Perspective: Sources, Status and Prospects}, 3.
\textsuperscript{142} Jared M. Diamond, \textit{The World until Yesterday: What Can We Learn from Traditional Societies?} (New York: Viking, 2012), 286-300.
societies with high scale deprivation accumulates aggregate frustration, and eventually, it can be observe that the greater the intensity of deprivation, the greater the magnitude of violence can be anticipated.\textsuperscript{143} Around one-sixth of the world population (1 billion) lives in extreme poverty and destitute conditions, called the “poorest of the poor,” and roughly 1.5 billion more face difficulties in attaining basic social rights. By and large, the greater portions of this 2.5 billion population live in weak states, whose populations are “caught in a poverty trap, unable on their own to escape from extreme material deprivation.”\textsuperscript{144} On moral grounds, it is unfortunate to see the “bottom billion” suffering on “large islands of chaos,” when the rest of the world is enjoying the benefits of an interdependent globalized economy which generates zones of comfort and establishes islands of peace.\textsuperscript{145} These zones of chaos actually become “zones of silence” proving the geopolitical (and economic) unevenness of globality ignored the root causes of Third World societies.\textsuperscript{146} The growing feelings of transnational insecurities, stemming from the zones of chaos, are finally seeking attention to resolve the fundamental socio-political and economic problems.

According to statistical data, around “17 million of the world’s youth are refugees or IDPs, 130 million are illiterate, as many as 300,000 fight as child soldiers,

\begin{flushright}
\textsuperscript{146} David Slater, \textit{Geopolitics and the Post-Colonial: Rethinking North-South Relations} (Malden, Mass.: Blackwell Publishing, 2004), 171.
\end{flushright}
and collectively, young people make up almost 60 percent of the world’s poor.”147

Alarmingly, the age groups most involved in criminal activities are youths, a majority of which belongs to these strata of global poor. Expressing the acute importance of tackling poverty, Former Secretary of State Colin Powell stressed that “the United States cannot win the war on terrorism unless we confront the social and political roots of poverty.”148

The UN Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) acknowledge the notion that poverty contributes to many criminal and violent activities across the world and desire to tackle the issue of poverty. Tackling the issue of poverty before a state exterminates the root cause may be only a cosmetic fixation not endured for long. Bertram Spector develops a correlation between corruption, bad governance, and poverty in a society. Spector writes that “corruption has direct consequences on economic and governance factors, intermediaries that in turn produce poverty.”149 Similarly, Jaffrey Sachs’ work also illustrates that most of the “poverty trap” is due to bad governance and corrupt leadership of weak and poor societies. Consequently, “the poor face structural challenges that keep them from getting even their first foot on the ladder of development.”150 In most of African countries, corruption is one of the basic factors that contribute to causing poverty and negatively affecting socio-economic conditions of the continent, and the similar conditions prevail in Asian and Latin American context.

149 Spector, Detecting Corruption in Developing Countries : Identifying Causes/Strategies for Action, 25.
too.\textsuperscript{151} Paul Collier defines the leaders of these poor societies as “psychopaths who have shot their way to power, sometimes crooks who have bought it, and sometimes brave people who, against the odds, are trying to build a better future.”\textsuperscript{152}

There are numerous external efforts made through various agencies to bring some structural reforms to poor performing states. However, most socio-economic reforms promoted by external donors develop a vertical hierarchy in which domestic agencies are more accountable to donors, which again fail to achieve a horizontal output, or the impact factor is not known.\textsuperscript{153} Since 1991 $8 billion have been invested in Somalia in an attempt to give life to its society and strengthen its fragile statehood.\textsuperscript{154} Yet the world community has had troubles with Somali pirates, and militants have used Somalia as a safe heaven. In September 2013, Al-Shabab, a Somali militant terrorist group, crossed into neighboring Kenya and terrorized locals and foreigners by taking them hostage in one of Nairobi’s busiest shopping malls. The militants brutally killed more than 60 innocent people, injuring more than 200 civilians, with dozens remaining missing. A country which has been the focal point of the international community’s attempt in improving its security situation became one of worse cases of failed states.

The above-mentioned example dramatically vindicates the real threat scenario that emanates from failed states with its transnational affects. The entire effort to fix

\textsuperscript{151} The End of Poverty: Economic Possibilities for Our Time, 191.

\textsuperscript{152} Collier, The Bottom Billion: Why the Poorest Countries Are Failing and What Can Be Done About It, 4.


Somalia’s failure seems in vain. A possible reason could be that an externally engineered process to implement and test new formats on a traditional society is not viable. The models of improvement could be incompatible for such a society, or society itself could not be socio-politically mature enough to synchronize with modern norms. A number of African countries have tried to establish a “hybrid state” that may temporarily help to tackle domestic security challenges and territorial integrity. Without engaging local stakeholders, and without devolving responsibility back to the state itself, the task to fix the state fragility is not a viable option.

Evaluation of the security, political, economic, and social aspects of weak and fragile states portrays a frightening image of increased inequality, unemployment, and poverty that worsens the situation in weak states, and ultimately breeds favorable grounds for transnational crimes through “new authoritarianism” and violence. One limitation of weak states can be predicted through its dealing with crime and violence in society. Noticeably, weak states remain oblivious to the fact that “unpunished violence by organized crime groups is perhaps the most visible sign of state impotence.” It is highly possible that most criminal groups emerge due to higher rates of poverty, and these groups are likely to embrace crime and become perpetrators of violence activities. The UNDP Human Development Index has vividly highlighted the worsening conditions in Third World societies, which host most of the

internal conflicts and human rights violations due to the absence of effective governance systems and high frequency of social fragmentation.

CLASSIFYING STATE FRAGILITY

Facing a problem of legitimacy and centralized order exists in all fragile states, whether they are weak, failing, failed, or on the verge of break down. The difference can be measured through hard and loose forms of centralized authority over the physical features of a state, i.e. territory and population. Jonathan Hill argues that there are three forms of state categories: successful states, which are effective in providing political goods to its citizens; weak or quasi states, which face some serious levels of difficulties in the provision of political goods to their subjects; and failed or collapsed states, which are completely unable to perform their basic function as states, with their subjects hardly receiving any political goods.\(^{159}\)

Similarly, it is hard to view all weak and fragile states with the same standard; in fact, each fragile state has its unique characteristics and features of fragility. A common problem among all is legitimate forms of governance and authority. Stewart Patrick (2011) and Jean-Germain Gros (1996) have outlined the taxonomy or typology of fragile states into various formats, specifically on the basis of pessimistic and optimistic scenarios of state performances (see table 3 & table 4).

### Table 3: Weak State Trajectories

**State Collapse**
- Strong state faces challenges of complete breakdown, absence of central authority, an ad hoc mechanism established at domestic level to protect local communities.

**Endemic Weakness**
- Aid dependent countries, with less chance of violent situation. Weak economic conditions are driving force, e.g. Bangladesh.

**Resource-rich Poor Performers**
- Client state, possess rich natural resources, while corrupt political elite harness resources for personal gains, e.g. Nigeria.

**Brittle Dictatorship**
- Praetorian system, fragile states ruled by military dictators or experience authoritarian regimes, e.g. North Korea, Myanmar.

### Chronic Situation

**a. Prolonged Political Crisis**
- Dwindling performance of political institutions, economic stagnation, increasing violence, e.g. Pakistan.

### Deteriorating Situations

**b. Conflict-ridden Countries**
- Center losing much control of its territory to fighting groups, e.g. Tamils in Sri Lanka, Kurds in Syria, Sudan, Yemen.

**a. Post-Conflict Recovery**
- Negotiated settlement or decisive victory after political deadlock or prolong conflict, e.g. Mozambique.

### Improving Situations

**b. Democratic Transitions**
- Governments progressive reforms; overcoming authoritarian system, military coups, and controlling bad economic policies, e.g. Georgia after Rose Revolution.

Source: Stewart Patrick, "Weak Links: Fragile States, Global Threats and International Security."
Those states have a long history of weakness and the "chronic situation" of the worst among them generates more "anarchic" conditions, as in Afghanistan, Haiti, Somalia, Rwanda, and Congo. The next group of weak states face a deteriorating situation with long, internal armed struggles and stagnant economic conditions which cause the "deteriorating situation" of state fragility. These are "anaemic states."

Many global insurgency movements are taking root in anaemic states, further creating chaos for these host states. Militancy in Pakistan has sharply deteriorated its security conditions, while law and order are at high risk. Stewart Patrick singles out a category of states whose conditions are significantly improving due to democratization, economic reforms, and conflict control. However, Jean-Germain Gros has discussed a new category called "mediate states" for those states making serious efforts to improve their fragile conditions. Gros also identified the "aborted state," a scenario in which a state experiences failure before its formal creation, as with Bosnia.160

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>The Anarchic</th>
<th>Lacks a centralized government; Warlords dominates the political space, most likely leads death squads of teenagers and emotionally immature young fighters to gain control of strategic buildings, cities or regions, e.g. Somalia, Liberia, Afghan Warlords during civil war in 1990s.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>The Phantom</td>
<td>The Phantom states are also referred as mirage state, similar to anarchic state. The central government retains some sort of authority over limited areas, for instance protecting head of state or core political leadership, e.g. Zaire.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Anaemic</td>
<td>Center holds a modicum legitimate authority over its organs. Two sources of scenarios cause a fragile state to face the anaemic conditions, 1st, either state lose its political capacity fighting a prolonged and no ending counter-insurgency factions, who seeks formal ways of power or authority. 2nd, when modes of modernity were not addressed and never employed, while its citizens and populous growth assert demands on archaic structures, e.g. Haiti, Cambodia has experienced the anaemic situations.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Captured</td>
<td>Holds a strong centralized authority, but political power is captured by rival groups and engages in ethnic cleansing or executing most of political rival group affiliates, e.g. one million killed during Rwandan genocide.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Aborted</td>
<td>States experience failure before their formation, e.g. Traumatic events in Bosnia, former Soviet Georgia experienced a quasi-federation status to independence.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Jean-Germain Gros, "Towards a Taxonomy of Failed States in the New World Order."
PUTTING THE WEAK STATE IN ORDER

The narratives of state weakness include the episodes from pre-colonial to post-colonial epochs, which primarily try to evaluate the capabilities of the state and performances of the nation. During these periods, weak and fragile states have experienced a variety of political transitions, experimented with various forces of economic structures, and modified societal customs multiple times. Every changing moment forms a new political identity, however, cultural and institutional transformations took a while to change, based on path dependence. The path dependence is a significant consideration because it helps the evolution of institutions that occurs on constant interaction between political and social groups, interests, and exchange of ideas. These interactions rely on historical contexts as a path to define the nature of institution. These frequent external and internal inputs in the system weaken social cohesion with deeply fractured societies and provide the basis for malfunctioning political systems. This means “political institutions develop, often slowly and painfully, overtime, as human societies strive to organize themselves to master their environments ... political decay occurs when political system fail to adjust to changing circumstances.”

Putting the weak and fragile states in order germinates a few questions, such as, what does order mean? Why establish an order? And how are orders established? In rapidly changing times, one cannot rely on a single factor to solve the problem of
fixing the “political system.” In fact, the earlier discussions and indicators show that there are multiple ingredients that cause statehood weakness and fragility. Political will as a first step to strengthen nationhood and democratic decision-making processes through establishing inclusive and pluralistic political culture can play a key and pragmatic role in building a society, its infrastructure, and future growth. The process will further ensure fortifying the viability of social cohesiveness because political will instigates a determination to deal with “traps” in order to leave behind the baggage of weakness and fragility. Paul Collier presents four traps that keep society backward and poor in all aspects of development and are core factors of fragility: “the conflict trap, the natural resources trap, the trap of being landlocked with bad neighbors, and the trap of bad governance.” Some traps are temporary or situational, while others like “the trap of being landlocked with bad neighbors” are inherent. Both of them need to be tackled in subtle ways. According to Robert Rotberg, weakness is inherent because of “geographical, physical or fundamental economic constraints.” Conversely, states are temporarily or situationally weak or fragile (situational ones seems more strong, which should not) due to the “internal antagonisms management flaws, greed, despotism, or external attacks.” Most domestic antagonism and tensions are generated by flaring up the ethnic, religious, linguistic, or other inter-communal rifts.

---

163 The political system that includes the state as a “legally empowered and legitimately coercive institutions—but it also included these new extralegal and paralegal institutions of political parties, interest groups, media of communication, as well as social institutions such as family, school, church, and the like, in so far as they affected political processes.” See, Almond, “The Return to the State,” 855.
164 Collier, The Bottom Billion: Why the Poorest Countries Are Failing and What Can Be Done About It, 5.
165 Rotberg, When States Fail: Causes and Consequences, 4.
Overcoming the problems of weak states requires establishing an effectual order in domestic politics. In this study order is referred to as “political order” at the state level that helps to retain the domestic political, social and economic life in order. And the domestic stability can create equilibrium with external pressures or geographical burdens. Therefore, the concept of order is crucial in political, economic, and social life at the micro and macro level. It means the notion of order is applicable both at intra- state and inter-state levels, called political order and world order respectively.

Hedley Bull’s work “the Anarchical Society” primarily discusses world order, and his work relies on the social life or social order as a basic principle to explain his main thesis. However, Bull’s explanation of social order is pertinent to understanding “political order” as this study also seeks to trace or establish order in weak societies. Bull emphasizes that, in Hobbesian accounts of the state of nature, individuals live in a condition of “fear and insecurity;” in response to the fear, insecurity, and uncertain social conditions, societies set some goals to preserve social safety and personal goals. Bull identified three elementary or primary goals which by and large societies have recognized: “a) Societies seek certain measures to secure their selves against violence b) Societies seek to maintain and undertake the promises made under various agreements with each other c) Possession of property will remain stable to some
extent and will not be subject to challenges, which in a way constant and without limit."\(^{166}\)

Keeping the nature of social life in mind, Hedley Bull tracks the linkage (relationship) between social life and order. He defines the relationship,

"... to rules, or general imperative principles of conduct. Social order is sometimes defined in terms of obedience to rules of conduct; sometimes it is defined, more specifically, as obedience to rules of law. In fact, order in social life is very closely connected with the conformity of human behavior to rules of conduct, if not necessarily to rules of law."\(^{167}\)

Francis Fukuyama’s recent work The Origins of Political Order argues that three sets of institutions “the state, the rule of law, and an accountable government” together sustain an enforcing political order.\(^{168}\) Fukuyama bases his arguments on Samuel Huntington’s earlier work “The Political Order and Political Development” and notes that:

“Political order emerges as a result of the achievement of some equilibrium among the contending forces within a society ... change occurs internally and externally: the actors established the original equilibrium themselves evolve or disappear; new actors appear; economic and social conditions shift; the society is invaded from outside or faces new terms of trade or imported ideas ... preceding equilibrium no longer holds, and political decay results until the existing actors come up with a new set of rules and institutions to restore order.”\(^{169}\)

It infers that the rule of law is a core ingredient that retains the order in a viable state. The establishment of rule of law itself is a long process that engages “extensive construction not just of laws but also of courts, judges, a bar, and enforcement

\(^{168}\) Fukuyama, The Origins of Political Order: From Prehuman Times to the French Revolution, 16.
\(^{169}\) The Origins of Political Order: From Prehuman Times to the French Revolution, 139.
mechanisms across the entire country.” Emphasizing the importance of the rule of law, Ashraf Ghani and Clare Lockhart note that the “rule of law is a glue that binds all aspects of the state, the economy, and society” through establishing “governance arrangements decision rights, processes, accountabilities, freedoms, and duties.”

The troubling factor is that neither the conformity of human behavior to rules of conduct, nor the rule of law are properly executed in weak states. Primarily it is because most weak states are in postcolonial settings where they “are still struggling to define and identify their statehood vis-à-vis other social institutions and actors.”

Moreover, the ethnic, religious, and inter-communal violent incidents are gradually “eating away society from within, which subsequently tear the system of state order.”

In successful states, the established order provides a political capacity to the state and its organs that ensures the rule of law, provides security to its citizens, and ensures protection of their property. In order to strengthen state capacity, “states fundamentally extract resources (mainly taxation and duties) from society and deploy these resources to create and support coercive and administrative organizations.”

Hence, the state extracts, regulates, reaches, distributes, and seeks responses towards whole processes, which show legitimate authority and political capacity by the state. Therefore, once a state establishes a legitimate order, society can notice the state’s

---

174 Theda Skocpol, States and Social Revolutions: A Comparative Analysis of France, Russia, and China (Cambridge; New York: Cambridge University Press, 1979), 29.
capabilities, which effectively "penetrate society, regulate social relationships, extract resources, and appropriate or use resources in determined ways."\(^{175}\)

Already known political problems like corruption, weak governance, unjust systems, and so many other socio-economic troubles, are daunting challenges of weak states. More likely, as the daunting challenges become more acute, weak states further rely on "extractive economic and political institutions," while successful states succeed with flourishing democratic norms and facilitate their subjects through "inclusive economic and political institutions."\(^{176}\) A political order with an inclusive institutional system empowers institutional capacity, in Francis Fukuyama's words, this capacity is to "formulate and carryout policies and enact laws; to administrate efficiently and with a minimum of bureaucracy; to control graft, corruption, and bribery; to maintain high level of transparency; and accountability in government institutions; and most important, enforce of laws."\(^{177}\)

Once a state has the capacity to regulate and execute policies effectively, it shows a higher level of social cohesiveness. In contrast, if a state faces problems of execution and "failures of implementation," this means a state is lacking the capacity to enforce.\(^{178}\) Jacek Kugler and Ronald Tammen's edited volume *The Performance of Nations* agrees that the political capacity of a state revolves around extraction, reaches (government influences and penetrates into society), and then allocates resources.


Measuring the processes involved in extraction, reach, and allocation can help evaluate the political performance of a state. Jacek Kugler and Ronald Tammen note that an “effective government will achieve desired policy outcomes; a weak one will not,” (because), “political performance emulates in the political and institutional arena,” and weak states encompass weak political structures and poor performing institutions.\(^{179}\)

Why is it that the political capacity of weak states seems lacking in resilience or show no signs of improvement, yet these states still survive against all odds? Samuel Huntington’s early works on political development noticed that in the wake of decolonization, most of the newly independent states in Africa, Asia, and Latin America adopted the path of modernization as the only way out to achieve political stability and economic viability. As a result, modernization processes supported mobility in society, and urbanization and some efforts towards industrialization become visible in weak societies. Samuel Huntington argues that “economic development and political stability are two independent goals and progress towards one has no necessary connection with progress toward the other,” it rather created an illusion among weak states.\(^{180}\)

To create an order, there is need of sincere efforts by weak states themselves (meaning all stake holders, including civil society) to take serious responsibility, and there is also a need of “close collaboration” by the international community in fixing zones of fragility that lies with governability.\(^{181}\) A transparent governance system that maintains order, rule of law and legitimate monopoly, in addition to strengthening

---


governance system, is important for other functional sectors of state, i.e. development, defense, diplomacy.

There are some serious but ad hoc efforts made indigenously in Africa. Such as, when Somalia faced collapse, with death squads and militias threatening its population, the local population used cultural or tribal codes to establish “an alternative system” of order (with deterrence mechanisms against possible threats by rival clans/tribes) called a hybrid “mediate state.”\textsuperscript{182} The ad hoc but hybrid political order in a scenario of collapse shows a promising step through the establishment of an indirect government structure, while the center fails to form a formal order, stabilize political conditions, enforce rule of law, and establish its legitimate monopoly into peripheral areas.\textsuperscript{183}

The role of indigenous associations in diffusing the social space is significantly important in improving the conditions of weak statehood. These associations, which reside in civil society, can become a resilient force in creating a viable order by laying the foundations for democratic norms. Subsequently, these norms provide a healthy base for “ethno-cultural pluralism,” so the fruits of the entire process can bring different ethnic, tribal, and religious groups together to think on collective and congenial grounds to strengthen nationhood. Strengthening the nationhood will support the shaping of a political identity because both nation-building and nation-making are a very important dimension of a nation-state. They help to define the state’s future course of action and what objectives and ambitions it has for potential

\textsuperscript{182} Menkhaus, “Local Security System in Somali East Africa,” 68-70.  
\textsuperscript{183} Andersen, Møller, and Stepputat, Fragile States and Insecure People?: Violence, Security, and Statehood in the Twenty-First Century, 6.
growth as a unified nation.

Though it seems quite an idealistic narrative, the above example of hybrid political order makes a rational case that weak states could utilize the "symbiotic relationship between state and civil society," as it proves that, even in the cases of "complete collapse of order" in a state, the "reemergence of intermediate social groups, ... have come together with the definition and reassertion of state capacities, highlighting the close connection between civil society and stateness." In fact, the age of communication can facilitate to speed up the process, which ultimately produces a political system that respects accountability as a part of renewed social contract.

The role of the international community is significant as well in establishing a close collaborative effort to support and monitor the improvement of weak states. As discussed earlier, international support in weak or fragile states has not achieved what was expected at the time of conception for developmental projects, even though support is witnessed through security and humanitarian interventions. The security interventions in the Bosnia war, Iraq war, and Afghan war are examples of this recent history. Similarly, humanitarian interventions were carried out in response to a number of natural catastrophes and violent conflicts within the states, for example, the number of UN peacekeeping missions in Africa to protect local populations who are at constant risk of ethnic/tribal fights. The other substantive examples of humanitarian

---


185 Herbst, States and Power in Africa: Comparative Lessons in Authority and Control, 255; Chazan, "Engaging the State: Associational Life in Sub-Saharan Africa," 278.
interventions made were after natural calamities, such as the one that hit Pakistan in 2005, with 7.6 magnitude earthquake and 100,000 deaths, and Haiti in 2010, where a 7.0 magnitude earthquake caused 100,000 to 316,000 deaths.

When considering interventions in conflict, it is a matter of fact that war is a constant phenomenon in international politics. As Charles Tilly noted "war made the state, and the state made war." However, the tendency of major wars has reduced in the post-Cold war period, while intra-state level conflicts, rooted in ethnic or religious differences, have increased and pose greater threats to regions. The shift in the nature of war or conflict also changed the state's national interest priorities, which ensures future “trade expectations” and economic activities should not be disrupted. After all, states fundamentally extract resources and run state machinery depending on the smooth functioning of economic activities. Commenting on Charles Tilly's famous quote, Michael Mandelbaum explains the contemporary nature of intra-state conflicts and notes that:

"... institution with which war historically has been connected is the state", and it's the "sovereign states remain a central presence in human affairs at the end of the twentieth century. But in the societies that waged the modern era's major wars, the state has found a different purpose. It has become an economic institution. To spur production and manage redistribution has become its twin missions."

Interventions to support states are not always successful, but they have significance in controlling the spillover effects. Criticizing international organizations

---

186 Tilly, The Formation of National States in Western Europe, 42.
and their lack of effectiveness and issues of powers, Peter Lyon argues that:

"...problems of trusteeship were the problems of power, of the responsibilities of the strong towards the weak. The unequal distribution of political and economic power in the world, which was the fundamental basis of colonialism, has not been suddenly abolished by the accession of most colonies to political independence.... But the rich and powerful countries of the world are not thereby absolved from further responsibility towards those countries." 189

In general, interventions are helpful and considered as "moral justification" to assist a weak or a state in extreme need of help. 190 These interventions provide legal protection to insecure populations, and most of these "protected jurisdictions are characteristic of post-colonial international society and also to a lesser extent of post-Soviet Union international society." 191 Interventions in Afghanistan (2001) and Iraq (2003) were justified to change the repressive and tyrant regimes. 192 When it comes to humanitarian interventions, they "are selectivity on the basis of the 'national interests' of the interveners." 193 Many interventions face huge resistance with issues of violation of sovereignty, and in some cases, the interventions are referred to as steps towards "securitization of development," when external support should help in "Regulation of sovereignty." 194

Despite the limitations of interventions, whether it is a warring situation or

189 Kenneth Robinson quoted as, Lyon, "The Rise and Fall and Possible Revival of International Trusteeship," 106.
192 Bellamy, "Ethics and Intervention: The Humanitarian Exception and the Problems of Abuse in the Case of Iraq," 141.
194 Andersen, "Dilemmas of Engagement in Fragile States," 37; Opello and Rosow, The Nation-State and Global Order: A Historical Introduction to Contemporary Politics, 205.
humanitarian need, supporting international interventions through the UN and creating surrogate sovereignty in collapsing or failing states, Peter Lyon writes:

“It is in the desperate situations of state collapse or near-collapse that the United Nations, or some other international body, is invoked to act as a surrogate sovereign and support system in the face of anarchy and human misery - and the signs are that such situations are currently on the increase ... UN trusteeship would almost certainly be an improvement on the anarchical conditions of the several quasi-states the world has now.” 195

The point of departure here is to stress that domestic efforts are needed to be made by weak and fragile states through engaging its civil society or using a “state-in-society” approach to build viable support. In the meantime, democratic societies can assist in political development of institutions and democratic norms. It is important to note that “democratizing societies” are always at risk of getting hijacked or losing the democratization tempo under the influence of traditional “praetorian guards,” “non-democratic forces,” or potentially “quasi-democratic,” but cronies of corrupt political elites. Thus proper nurturing and monitoring is needed to sensitize the population.

Today, most weak states are enthusiastically adopting democratic principles as part of their constitutions, but they need to get rid of historical institutions of domination specifically inherited from colonial times. If given support or a chance to develop parliamentary institutions, democracy is more likely to endure and fragile states can be “rescued by democratic” norms. 196 Establishing a democratic order requires patience and gradual devolution of power to state institutions. The order will eventually create checks and balances between state pillars.

195 Lyon, “The Rise and Fall and Possible Revival of International Trusteeship,” 106.
SUM UP: DILEMMAS OF FRAGILITY

The literature explains serious statehood deficiencies in the domains of services that are shaped through the provision of political goods primarily linked with security, political (governability), economy, and social welfare. The capacity, autonomy, legitimacy, and effectiveness of states determine their ability or willingness to provide basic public goods. Unwillingness to perform the basic functions of state certainly rings the alarm bells that something is wrong with state capability.

The dilemmas of weak pivot states are two pronged. The first, endogenous dilemmas are strong and enduring domestic troubles along the lines of the burdens of colonial traditions. The second, exogenous dilemmas, are inherent to the geographical pivot and become an inescapable factor; a “geo” phenomenon invites frequent external interferences and makes geography a burden on the state. The dilemmas of the weak state's fragility are influenced by multiple elements within the endogenous and exogenous realms, such as “political system, military and police, bureaucracy, pre-colonial, colonial, and post-colonial histories, economic structure, cultural traditions, and relative position in the regional and international systems [which] shape[s] the extent of state control over social groups and the extent that social forces reshape, reinforce, or undermine state strength.”197

The reviewed literature thoroughly identified prominent indicators such as corrupt incumbent political elites (wealthy and feudal) or praetorian guards (military dictators) manipulating state authority without being checked and frequently using

---

violence to deter opposition and shun voices speaking for freedom and rights.

Unfortunately, suppression was a means used by colonial rulers; once colonial rulers left, the power shifted to political elites or a praetorian system. Colonial powers retained their better relations with the new ruling elites, so the status quo was sustained. The tragic factor of weak statehood is a divided population with many weak states’ nationhood shattered from the early days of independence when ethnic, religious, sectarian or inter-communal clashes erupted into violence and spread, which shows a divided society has weakened the nationhood due to regular violent clashes.

Despite all the transnational security fears emanating from weak and fragile states, the review shows that, first, fragility affects within the boundary of the weak state, because, even failed states are safer today from formal takeover by neighbor or regional force.198 This means “the crippled Leviathan, whose life-support system might give way at any time. But reports of its near-death seem decidedly premature – state weakness has not meant state collapse.”199 It implies that state weakness is essentially bad for the state itself, first, due to its own vulnerabilities, and then for others.

As a matter of fact, the globalized world gets credit for helping nations to become more politically informed, awakened, and connected to other political communities or associations across the world. In times of awakening, states and incumbent political elites are well informed that the traditional policies of state based on exclusive authority will not get popular support. This is suggested by the recent


199 Migdal, State in Society: Studying How States and Societies Transform and Constitute One Another, 137.
turmoil in the Middle East, particularly, in Tunisia, Egypt, Libya and Yemen, where the authoritarian regimes lost their power to mass mobilization.\textsuperscript{200} Mass mobilizations and constant political changes facilitate the establishment of new political orders. These recent trends of political participation show the growing democratic trends; however, the trends need careful treatment to establish an effective state order respecting the rule of law and supporting a transparent system.

To meet the exigencies of a complex world, weak states will be favored if adopting the culture of global norms practiced widely by the global community, i.e. institutionalized market economy, democratic rule, and human rights norms.\textsuperscript{201} It will support the weak states to create an effective order prone to ethno-cultural pluralistic and democratic norms (pluralistic political culture). The reason to support the argument that most weak and fragile states also face challenges is due to their multiple nation or heterogeneous societies; such diversity should in fact be viewed as a strength, not a fragmenting and centrifugal factor. The fragmenting and centrifugal forces emerge due to weakness in the state’s capacity and political vacuums in certain regional settings within the state. Therefore a thriving, pluralistic political culture is strongly advocated, which involves participatory and inclusive forms of governance. In this regard, international cooperation is crucial to nourish a viable democratic political culture. Therefore, international support and cooperation will facilitate “global awakening to the better things available” to needy states, so that they can adopt some

\textsuperscript{200} Serfaty, "The Folly of Forgetting the West," 39.

\textsuperscript{201} Neumann and Sending, \textit{Governing the Global Polity: Practice, Mentality, Rationality}, 178.
useful norms and lessons from enriched democracies.\textsuperscript{202} The process ends up not only enhancing the capability of a weak state, but also supporting the building global capacity.

\textsuperscript{202} Serfaty, "The Folly of Forgetting the West," 36.
CHAPTER III

CASE STUDY - MYANMAR: IN SEARCH OF POLITICAL IDENTITY, OBSELOTHING PARIAH AND GARRISON STATE TO RECAST DEMOCRATIC NORMS

"If the army shoots, it has no tradition of shooting into the air. It shoots straight to kill."

General Ne Win¹

"I would like every country in the world to recognize the fact that the people of Burma are being shot down for no reason at all."

Aung San Suu Kyi²

“We will extend a hand if you are willing to unclench your fist. And over the last year and a half, a dramatic transition has begun, as a dictatorship of five decades has loosened its grip. Under President Thein Sein, the desire for change has been met by an agenda for reform. A civilian now leads the government, and a parliament is asserting itself. The once-outlawed National League for Democracy stood in an election, and Aung San Suu Kyi is a Member of Parliament. Hundreds of prisoners of conscience have been released, and forced labor has been banned. Preliminary cease-fires have been reached with ethnic armies, and new laws allow for a more open economy.

President Barack Obama³

INTRODUCTION

On February 12, 1947, the Panglong Agreement established the Union of Burma, now known as the Republic of the Union of Myanmar. At Panglong, the representatives of the Shan, Kachin, and Chin ethnic states agreed with the government of Burma to unite the fragmented or autonomous principalities into a union with no expectation that

¹ During the valedictory address, on 23 July 1988 in, Shelby Tucker, Burma: The Curse of Independence (London; Sterling, Va.: Pluto Press, 2001), 228.
³ "Remarks by President Obama at the University of Yangon".
the naïve commitment to Panglong would later become a curse. The agreement assured greater autonomy vested to frontier areas of these representing states. The unification of principalities is another example of continuous disintegration and re-integration that Myanmar has experienced in various historical cycles over the past centuries. A quick overview of the past century shows that the last Myanmar dynasty disintegrated during 1824-1886, and meanwhile, re-integrated as a British colonized Burma until 1842. Burma again fragmented during the horrific war between British-India and Japanese rule, and despite the Panglong Agreement and the internal ethnic disputes with the center, Myanmar remained fragmented until 1962. The military takeover in 1962 and its decades long rule ostensibly projected to re-unite a socially divided Myanmar. However, the recent history of military rule itself left scars of traumatic memories in the hearts and minds of the people of Myanmar.

Since 2010 Myanmar has shown some flexibility to reform its praetorian structure of political system. Soon after gaining independence and establishing the union of states, the union became entangled with ethno-nationalist conflicts. To clarify, the notion of union remains differing to various socio-political groups and antagonistic interpretations “from quasi-centralized civilian rule, to authoritarian unitary military control, to minority proposed but rejected federal structures, to blatant secessionist attempts, to ambiguous relationships.” The ambiguities are a result of the brief honeymoon phase of independence followed by ethno-nationalist feuds and political deadlocks, which provided justification for the military regime to take over power.

---

Democratic institutions experienced decay at their nascent stage. Throughout the Cold War period until today, most of Myanmar’s history has been dominated by the centralized rule of the military establishment. The military establishment has succeeded in enforcing rigid centralized power that engaged in a brutal war with its own people isolating itself from the rest of the world community, and becoming a pariah state.

The world community witnessed widespread repressive state policies, which caused human rights violations, political revenges, and endemic corruptions within the governance structure. Myanmar has an abundance of natural resources and is located in a geostrategic location between two of the world’s largest populous and growing economies. Despite being blessed with a richness of resources and strategic pivot-ness, the people of Myanmar face ultra-poverty conditions and meager economic growth due to a corrupted order established under the military junta. The relative deprivation and frustrations over human rights violations are exacerbated by a continuous downfall of the state’s political, economic, cultural, and environmental capacities.

To date Myanmar has faced continuous political transitions since the period of high colonialism and then the Japanese occupation followed by independence, the Cold War, and obsoleting pariah state status until recent reform policy initiatives. The country’s status as a pariah state began to be overcome when in late 2000s the international community welcomed the democratic commitment assured by the government of Myanmar. In October 2013, during the closing of the East Asia Summit, the president of Myanmar/ Burma, Thein Sein, accepted the gavel of ASEAN affirming its positive commitments towards becoming a responsible member of the global
community. In November 2013, the government of Myanmar released 69 political prisoners and affirmed that a committee is deliberating on granting amnesty to remaining prisoners by the end of 2013. It is important to remember that anti-change forces always resist reforms. Though the journey of transformation is long, a sincere job well done is only half done.

To understand the fracturedness of statehood in Myanmar and its regional implications, the study requires looking through historical trends. The historical episodes explain that Myanmar’s colonial and postcolonial political processes resulted in the formation of a weak union. The union struggled from within because diverse ethnic groups were not formally constructed together as one nation, but rather sought their own security and the protection of individual communities from a larger or dominant one. Additionally, the decolonization period shows an apparent farewell to external powers. In reality external influence remained, continuing invisibly in the domestic affairs of Myanmar. The military regime was seen on a number of occasions undoing these external links or creating an image for society of detaching from history reminders of any external relations. Changing the name of Burma to Myanmar, and Rangoon to Yangon, are some examples found in recent years.

COLONIZATION TO DECOLONIZATION: END OF EUPHORIA AND BEGINNING OF INSTABILITY

During the mid-eleventh century, the Pagan Emperor Anawrahta Minsaw established a unified Buddhist empire by gradually absorbing the peripheral
principalities of the Irrawaddy valley, which encompasses Myanmar’s contemporary mainland. However, the Pagan Empire could not entirely incorporate the princely states of Kachin, Arakanese, and a few others facing external challenges. Many of the challenges primarily emanated from the Arakanese, Mons, Mongols, Shans, and so forth. The decline of the Pagan Empire was initiated due to internal problems and centrifugal forces trying to break out, which eventually proved the empire’s incapability to cope with domestic and external challenges.\(^5\)

The Pagan Empire established the strong roots of Buddhism and religious tolerance in the culture of Myanmar. Eventually, this notion of tolerance provided conditions for external forces to control the region or permit flexibility for ruling elites to establish despotic orders.\(^6\) The external powers found the domestic socio-political environment more conducive to micro-management in the political system and reaped the fruits of Myanmar’s geographical “pivot-ness.” Ultimately, by January 1\(^{st}\), 1886, the once Pagan Empire encompassing the majority of Burmans was annexed to British India as its province. Myanmar became a British colony and lost its complete sovereignty in three phases, as a result of three conflicts, the Anglo-Burmese War of 1824-1826 (gaining Assam, Manipur, Tenassrim and Arakan); the Second Anglo-Burmese war of 1852 (with the annexation of Pegu province, which the British called “lower Burma”); and the Third Anglo-Burmese War of 1885 (complete annexation of the remaining upper

---


Burma territory).7 There was a famous rumor after the third Anglo-Burmese war of 1885 that the “Burmese King was not aware that a war had been begun until he heard gunfire just outside his palace closure.”8 The annexation of upper Burma was not a casual business, as the British enjoyed a very calm situation in the aftermath of the two earlier Anglo-Burmese wars. It was reported that after the final conquest of 1885 British forces were welcomed as “deliverers from tyranny.”9 Many women were reported to be harassed, young men executed for their resistance, and other Burmese psychologically tortured by the photographing of those executed.10 During the colonial interregnum, a political vacuum emerged resulting in a challenge of popular legitimacy to colonial rule, because the British accommodated Burma as a province of India and ignored its historical identity.11 The nature of British unpopularity can be traced through the people of upper Burma, who became rebellious; the guerilla forces targeted British military troops and their garrison posts.12 Despite a British reinforcement of 40,000 troops, tactics to shoot anyone found possessing arms, and threats to burn the entire village as punishment, such actions backfired.13

8 Michael W. Charney, Powerful Learning: Buddhist Literati and the Throne in Burma’s Last Dynasty, 1752-1885 (Ann Arbor: Centers for South and Southeast Asian Studies, University of Michigan, 2006), 256.
11 David I. Steinberg, Turmoil in Burma: Contested Legitimiies in Myanmar (Norwalk, CT: East Bridge, 2006), 49.
By 1890 British forces comprised of minority ethnic groups and Indian soldiers subdued the resistance. Over this period of Anglo-Burmese wars, colonial rule gradually altered Burma's political-economic and social system. After the second Anglo-Burmese war, colonial rule experienced a sudden rise of a rice exporting economy. In lower Burma, under British rule, there was a 600% increase in acreage under cultivation.\textsuperscript{14} A huge influx of domestic migration from upper Burma to Lower Burma took place in order to benefit economic gains. However, the new settlements had to follow colonial regulations, not the traditional accustomed village style of headman dealing villages. British rule appointed its own headman, called an agent. Under the "colonial village act," British rule modified a number of traditional practices. Among these changes, "Shiko," a traditional salutation supposed to be observed for sacred Buddha, monks and entitled elders, was now made mandatory for ordinary Burmese to perform to "British officers as recognition of submission to British mastery."\textsuperscript{15} In addition, the colonial village act also required obeying the appointed political agent; villagers would render duties as night watchmen in the assigned areas of village. Moreover, villagers were responsible for providing inter-village transportation, food, and other materials on arrival of British military or civil officials. Punishment of villagers without trial was a normal judicial format for political agents.\textsuperscript{16}

In response to many exploitative acts, cultural and religious-driven factors became fundamental Burmese resentments that challenged British rule. These

\textsuperscript{15} \textit{A History of Modern Burma} (Cambridge, UK; New York: Cambridge University Press, 2009), 7.
\textsuperscript{16} Ibid.
resentments later transformed into nationalist movements that created anti-colonial force towards independence of Myanmar. Many Buddhist Burmans referred to the colonial period as persistently distorting their cultural and religious identities. The influx of immigrants from other British colonial regions, like India and China, gradually changed the demographic structure of main cities. The consensus of 1872 shows that more than two-thirds of Rangoon’s population was comprised of Burmese, and by the 1920s the majority of residents were of Indian descent. By 1937 out of 400,000 residents in Rangoon, only 127,000 residents were Burmese. In addition, many Christian missionaries were allowed to convert ethnic minorities at frontier areas to Christianity and promote the positive image of Europe.

In India, British rule was already working on educational reforms to adopt secular forms of education and encouraged similar patterns in Burma too. Secular education was either welcomed or encouraged among the colonial ruling elites to be trained. The repercussion was a Burmese society culturally, intellectually and politically divided between “British educated colonial elites and Buddhist traditionalist[s].” Historian Michael W. Charney (2009) emphasized the nature of external involvements that changed the domestic socio-political and economic dynamics of Burmese society. He writes that the colonial authority backed the “broad intrusion of foreign institutions and practices that regulated or interfered with rural life to a degree greater than any indigenous, central institution had attempted in the pre-colonial past.” Hence,

---

18 The History of Myanmar, 52-53.
19 Charney, A History of Modern Burma, 8.
Myanmar in the past and present has persistently experienced foreign interference; however, the level of interference was higher during colonial times which resulted in the establishment of a mixture of a modern-traditional social milieu.

In 1906, Buddhist monks established the Young Men’s Buddhist Association (YMBA), a model copying the Young Men’s Christian Association (YMCA). Initially the objective of YMBA was to address society’s religious and social issues; however, with the passage of time, it transformed into a political movement. Many young lawyers, Buddhist monks, and nationalists transformed YMBA into a political association called the General Council of Burmese Association (GCBA) to promote nationalistic objectives. Until the 1930s the domestic unrest and riots were well-directed by Buddhist monks. British officials agreed that Buddhist monks were chiefs among the resistance groups. Most Burmans believed that British rule not only transformed their culture to adjust a newly constructed social milieu but also became disrespectful to Buddhism. Instances show the blending of English words or practices into Burmese society started to alter the social structure. Terming Burma a new British-Indian province itself constructed a new identity over a historical one. Moreover, British officials or soldiers did not take off their shoes while entering pagodas, monasteries, or other Buddhist sacred places. Buddhist tradition calls for the respect of places of worship by entering with bare feet. In 1916, an active member of YMBA and young lawyer U Thein Maung resisted the shoe question in response to the colonial authority’s

erected banner stated that “No one is permitted to wear shoes in this Pagoda but Englishmen and Asiatic Europeans.” In resistance Maung placed a banner that inscribed the banning of shoes in pagodas for everyone in order to replace a banner erected by the colonial authorities at Shwe Sandaw Pagoda in Prome.24

Two monks, U Ottama and U Wisara who had been exposed to Western culture and political norms due to foreign tours, decided to use political platforms to protect the threatened religious sanctity of Buddhism. Their political maneuvering did not align with colonial rule. They were imprisoned for anti-colonial speeches and actions. During imprisonment, U Wisara called for a hunger strike against the colonial regulation that forbade the wearing of monk's robes. His strike lasted for 166 days, when he died on September 19th, 1929. As a result, a revolutionary mindset started to take shape across Burmese society, even those “Burmese who had not concerned themselves with politics before” stepped into the nationalist struggle against the colonial rule.25 The nationalist's movements accelerated its pace, and British rule experienced its first armed rural rebellion in 1930 under Hsaya (teacher) San. Hsaya San was a traditional-medical practitioner and active member of GCBA.26 During the rebellion he disguised himself as a monk named U Nyana to escape his arrest. The colonial force suppressed the rebellion and tried Hsaya San.27 He was sentenced to death, and on November 28th, 1931, hanged in Tharrawaddy jail.28 The U Wisara and Hsaya San events were significantly symbolic to

gather nationalistic fervor, and the events were also substantially supported and published by the Burmese press.

To satisfy the Burmese nationalists, the Government of Burma Act of 1935 separated Burma from India. It should be noted that Burmese nationalists developed a positive nationalist inspiration from political activities of the Indian Congress party and Mahatma Gandhi; eventually the British realized the rise of political protests in Burma too. It became one of factors that lead to the separation of Burma from India.\(^29\) The act came into force in 1937. The Governor retained executive powers, and the new act established two legislative houses. However, the legislatures were subject to veto by the Governor and Secretary of State.\(^30\) In a way, Burma was separated from India as a province, and gained a half-autonomy with less legislative or governing powers. Unhappy young nationalists started to look for help from neighboring Asian countries.

While 1939 saw the start of the Second World War, Dr. Ba Maw (who later held government position during the Japanese occupation) created the Burma Freedom Bloc Organization (BFBA) under the secretary-ship of Aung San. The objective of BFBA was to set a clear timeframe for independence from British rule, as Britain was engaged in the Second World War, but the proposal for independence was turned down.\(^31\)

In the following years, Aung San flew to Japan and recruited his thirty comrades mainly from Burman ethnic group, which shows a division of Burmese ethnicities since the early days of independence. These thirty comrades were trained under Japanese

authorities at Bangkok to learn "command, combat, espionage, guerilla warfare, and political tactics."\textsuperscript{32} It might be the reason that Burmans felt segregation from other ethnic groups as British rule always remained doubtful towards Burmans and used other ethnicities to maintain rule.\textsuperscript{33} Therefore, most of the nationalists, particularly Burmans, were striving to get more representation in the legislature because, by and large, Burmans believed that "British policy to dismiss Burmans from the armed forces (deliberately) segregated the races (see table 5)."\textsuperscript{34}

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Ethnic Group</th>
<th>Army of Army</th>
<th>Proportion of Army</th>
<th>Proportion of Population</th>
<th>Army of Army</th>
<th>Proportion of Army</th>
<th>Proportion of Population</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Burman</td>
<td>472</td>
<td>12.30</td>
<td>75.11</td>
<td>1,293</td>
<td>23.71</td>
<td>75.11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Shans and Japans</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Karen</td>
<td>1,448</td>
<td>37.74</td>
<td>9.34</td>
<td>2,797</td>
<td>35.03</td>
<td>9.34</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chin</td>
<td>868</td>
<td>22.96</td>
<td>2.38</td>
<td>1,258</td>
<td>15.76</td>
<td>2.38</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kachin</td>
<td>881</td>
<td>22.96</td>
<td>1.05</td>
<td>852</td>
<td>10.61</td>
<td>1.05</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other</td>
<td>168</td>
<td>4.38</td>
<td>12.12</td>
<td>168</td>
<td>2.40</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Minorities</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yunnanese</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>32</td>
<td>0.04</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chinese</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>330</td>
<td>4.13</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Indians</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>2,578</td>
<td>32.29</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>3,837</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>7,984</td>
<td>100</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Mary P. Callahan (2003). \textit{Making Enemies: War and State Building in Burma}


\textsuperscript{33} Steinberg, \textit{Burma/Myanmar: What Everyone Needs to Know}, 29.

\textsuperscript{34} Callahan, \textit{Making Enemies: War and State Building in Burma}, 35.
The British, who neglected raising a Burmese Army and relied heavily on Indian forces, came too little too late in 1937 as they rushed to establish a "Burma Command," which eventually led to the loss of Burma to the Japanese.\textsuperscript{35} Even after the establishment of the Burma Command, the ethnic disparity was visible and divided the country suffering until now. For instance, in the Battalion of Burma Rifles to command more than 6,000 soldiers, out of twenty-two officers and others ranked seven hundred and fifteen officers belonging to non-Burman ethnicities or foreigners deliberately ignoring the 65% of Burmans. This means almost 50% of officers were of Karen ethnicity, 25% Chin and 25% Kachin, while only 4 officers were of Burman ethnicity.\textsuperscript{36}

Aung San established the Burma Independence Army (BIA) under Japanese training and assistance to liberate it from British rule. In December 1941, Aung San and his BIA entered Burma with the help of 60,000 Japanese troops that helped Japan to occupy Burma and wrest it from British rule. By 1942 the collapse of the colonial system of governance was complete and was replaced by a BIA administration of young nationalists under Japanese supervision. Crime rates reached their peak during the first half of 1942, as more than 15,000 convicted prisoners were released from jail.\textsuperscript{37} Over the years, the law and order situation could not be controlled under BIA, and the brief euphoria from self-governance faded away under Japanese occupation. BIA engaged in communal riots as they were collecting money and arms to support BIA. Unfortunately,

\textsuperscript{35} Making Enemies: War and State Building in Burma, 40.
\textsuperscript{36} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{37} Making Enemies: War and State Building in Burma, 52.
“they turned on everyone suspected of British sympathies;” in this regard, people in Karen suffered the most due to their allegiance to British rule.38

The Japanese banned BIA from addressing law and order situations and later disbanded BIA soldiers were remobilized as the Burma Defense Army (BDA) to support the Japanese campaign in the Second World War.39 However, the BDA’s war office gradually became independent and Aung San more in control than the Japanese, which played a crucial role later in defeating the Japanese during anti-Japanese resistance. Interestingly, when many of the BIA officers were sent to OTS (Officers Training School) in Mingaladon, the Japanese instructors had some harsh attitudes towards the soldiers and slapped officers during training.40 These behaviors increased anti-Japanese sentiments among the cadre of officers at OTS, which eventually were vented during the war against the Japanese occupation along the United Front. In addition, the people in Burma noticed that the popular Japanese slogan “Asia for Asians” was no more honored in Burma, as it was propagated in China.41 Overall anti-Japanese sentiment grew within the military and civilian circles in Burma.

During the last years of the Second World War between 1943-1945, the British and U.S. clandestinely armed and trained local guerillas to launch the attacks against the Japanese. As in the past, because the frontier areas of northern Burma with dense jungle remained problematic, relying on the local population was a good option to fight

38 Tucker, Burma: The Curse of Independence, 43.
40 Callahan, Making Enemies: War and State Building in Burma, 63.
back. As Winston Churchill remarked, "the idea of fighting the Japanese in the jungles of northern Burma [is like] to a man going into the water to fight a shark."\textsuperscript{42} The United Front against the Japanese was comprised of Communist Party Cadres, the American Kachin Rangers, the British Kachin Levies, the Chines, the Socialists, the Indian Army, the British Fourteen Army, British Special Forces, the Anti-Fascist Organization Leaders (AFO, during post war period May 1945, the AFO renamed as Anti-Fascist People's Freedom League (AFPFL)), and young officers in the Tatmadaw (BIA).\textsuperscript{43} During the post-independence period, many of these groups would later start fighting over political power in a unified state of Burma.

Despite the important role of various factions that fought against the Japanese, the role of Aung San is crucial. San successfully established a future national army for Burma and also secretly raised anti-Japanese resistance in the shadows of Japanese rule. Lt. Gen. William Slim, commander of the Fourteenth Army acknowledged the astute maneuver by Aung San. During the anti-Japanese campaign, the terrible war in Burma caused enormous destruction. More than 80% of cities required rebuilding. The horrific war in Burma caused the deaths of 27,000 Anglo-Indian soldiers out of 606,000, while the death toll reached 73,909 due to wounds, tropical diseases, and lack of medication. Japan lost more soldiers; 144,000 were dead and 56,000 wounded. It is said that, when elephants fight, it is grass that suffers; similarly, the people of Burma were inflicted with

\textsuperscript{42} Edward M. Young, \textit{Meiktila 1945: The Battle to Liberate Burma} (Botley, Oxford: Osprey, 2004), 8.
\textsuperscript{43} Callahan, \textit{Making Enemies : War and State Building in Burma}, 70.
the greatest rates of death. Over one million people died due to battles, war crimes, famine, and diseases during this war period.\textsuperscript{44}

Despite all, the British fought back, getting Burma to preserve and restore its imperial power in east (Asia), and slightly fading over due to the decline of the British empire. Its global retrenchment sped up the wave of independence and empowered decolonization movements, becoming a turning point for the unification of Burma and its elevation as a sovereign state in January 1948.\textsuperscript{45} Before that, in January 1947, Aung San and the British Prime Minister Clement Attlee signed the Attlee-Aung San Agreement in London, which assured the independence of Burma in a year’s time. In the meantime, the Karens also aspired to seek independence, while the Shans, Kachins, and Chins whom also wanted to be represented at the Attlee-Aung San talks were not allowed; therefore the agreement was not considered binding for them.\textsuperscript{46} Similarly, it can be noted that during the early years of nationalist moves, divided factionalism existed within the GCBA during 1930s.\textsuperscript{47} It was obvious to expect the division along ethnic lines when the entire region was on the course of independence, especially when the political destiny of each ethnic state was to be determined.

In response to grievances by frontier area people, Aung San led a delegation to meet representatives of the Shan, Khachin, and Chin groups at Panglong in Shan state (see the Appendix A for Panglong Agreement). The Panglong Agreement between Shan,

---

\textsuperscript{44} Frank McLynn, \textit{The Burma Campaign : Disaster into Triumph, 1942-45} (New Haven; London: Yale University Press, 2011), 1.


\textsuperscript{46} Tucker, \textit{Burma : The Curse of Independence}, 121.

\textsuperscript{47} Topich and Leitich, \textit{The History of Myanmar}, 55.
Kachin, and Chin ethnic representatives and the Burmese government, signed on February 12th, 1947, allowed them to join the union of Burma. Aung San assured the representatives a guarantee of representation, financial aid, and full autonomy under a transitional government that later became a curse for not knowing that the ethnicities would be fighting to protect their territories from the central government.\footnote{Aung-Thwin and Aung-Thwin, \textit{A History of Myanmar since Ancient Times: Traditions and Transformations}, 237.} For many nationalists, they believe the Panglong agreement helped unify the divided union into a greater Burma; however, in contrast, many ethnic communities on frontier regions believe the Panglong agreement was the beginning of new ethnic troubles in the newly emerging state.

In retrospect, the Attlee-Aung San Agreement outlined a road map for the Panglong meeting. According to para 8 (b) of Attlee-Aung San agreement, “the leaders and representatives of the peoples of the Frontier Areas shall be asked ... to express their views upon the forms of association with the Government of Burma which they consider acceptable during the transition period [to independence].”\footnote{Tucker, \textit{Burma : The Curse of Independence}, 123.} The preamble of the Panglong agreement also reflects the provision of independence given to Frontier Areas, as the preamble notes that: “the members of the conference, believing that freedom will be more speedily achieved by the Shans, the Kachins and the Chins by their immediate co-operation with the Interim Burmese Government, have accordingly ... agreed...”\footnote{Ibid.}
The agreement, in return for cooperation to joining the union, guaranteed full autonomy, as article (V) of the agreement ensured the “full autonomy in internal administration for the Frontier Areas is accepted in principle (see the Panglong Agreement in appendix).” Shelby Tucker emphasizes and echoes the similar voice of Frontier Areas, who believed that “they were assenting to early independence from Britain and the perpetuation of their freedom from British and Burman interference in their internal affairs; that, whatever commitment, it was not to permanent and irrevocable integration in an independent Union of Burma ruled by Burmans.”

Interestingly, during the early years of independence, the Union of Burma faced great complications because, on the one hand, the original structure of the Union allowed Shan and Karenni to secede after 10 years, while on the other hand, it denied the same rights to the rest of the contending ethnic groups. Moreover, citizenship rights to Chinese and Indian and Muslim Rohingya populations were denied as non-native Burmese ethnicities. Furthermore, 10 years after independence, when the military took control as a caretaker it sensed that Shan and Kayak ethnicities were trying to secede and break away from the union, which eventually justified the military coup against U Nu’s government. Therefore the Panglong agreement’s commitment to join the Union vindicated the fractures within the Union. Fracturedness of statehood ultimately witnessed a backlash to the democratic process and political development in the new state.

51 Ibid.
52 Topich and Leitich, The History of Myanmar, 72.
After clinging to support from Frontier Areas through the Panglong pact, Aung San became de facto head of two dominant organizations, the AFPFL political party and Burma National Army (BNA). The scheduled national elections of April 1947 gave a clear victory to Aung San’s Anti-Fascist party, elected to the assembly. On June 1947, AFPFL passed a majority resolution to leave the Commonwealth, severing relations with the British Empire. Two months immediately after the elections, political rivals assassinated the thirty-two year old Burmese national hero, Aung San, along with six cabinet members, during a meeting of the executive Council at Secretariat building in Rangoon. These unwelcome political episodes gradually plunged the newly emerging state into political chaos, though the British, as agreed through Attlee-Aung San Agreement, granted independence to the Union of Burma on January 4th, 1948. But the fate of the Frontier Areas within the Union was not clear, and it was the beginning of a new internal conflict by the newly constructed nation.

Prime Minister U Nu took charge of the fragile state that hosted diverse groups of fractured nationhood. Despite being the Prime Minister who replaced Aung San after his assassination, Nu gathered widespread support both in rural and urban corners for his determination to tackle issues of corruption and bad governance. But a persistent psychological threat of foreign intervention and domestic unrest, prompted by military institutions, motivated him to give the military a bigger role in politics. For instance, soon after independence, the Karen-Mon State demanded for more territories in Tennasserim area, some parts of Irrawaddy districts and claimed areas from lower

---

54 A History of Myanmar since Ancient Times: Traditions and Transformations, 237.
Burma. Finally, in 1949 the Karen National Defence Organization (KNDO) actively engaged in an armed rebellion against the government and took control of most of Rangoon.\textsuperscript{55} U Nu's government faced tremendous challenges at multiple fronts including the issues of a weak federation and the breakout of civil war due to ethnic groups seeking autonomy or independence along ideological lines.\textsuperscript{56} Civil war was also aggravated by the armed struggle of communist party factions. The red flag communist faction, a splinter of Communist Party of Burma (CPB) had already launched their anti-government struggle in March 1946 under the leadership Thakin Soe. The remaining CPB became the white flag communist party led by Thakin Than Tun and started armed struggle in March 1948, leading around 15,000 armed fighters declaring themselves the people's liberation Army of Burma. The CPB leadership and members believed that Burma has become a quasi-colonial and quasi-feudalistic society in the post-independence period.\textsuperscript{57}

The role of the CPB cannot be underestimated in understanding its role in setting back Myanmar's nascent democratic regime in the 1950s. The CPB enjoyed strong support by communist China, and without a doubt, the democratization process in Myanmar is primarily reliant on Chinese attitudes as well.\textsuperscript{58} Because it has a long history, China plays the role of a big brother in trying to micro-manage Myanmar's policies, denying democratic voices true representation. In the early years of independence, despite Burma's warm relations with China, Mao considered the neutralist policy of

\begin{itemize}
  \item \textsuperscript{55} A History of Myanmar since Ancient Times: Traditions and Transformations, 239.
  \item \textsuperscript{56} Topich and Leitich, The History of Myanmar, 71.
  \item \textsuperscript{57} Nakanishi, Strong Soldiers, Failed Revolution: The State and Military in Burma, 1962-1988, 51-52.
  \item \textsuperscript{58} Steinberg and Fan, Modern China-Myanmar Relations: Dilemmas of Mutual Dependence, xviii.
\end{itemize}
Burma as pro-Western. China was not motivated that, in a time of polarized worlds, one can stay neutral. Therefore China’s Communist Party (CCP) portrayed Aung San’s nationalistic movement as traitorous and U Nu as a “running dog” of imperialism. The CCP supported Burma’s Communist party as legitimate representation of a true revolutionary army. Mao believed that without the CPB’s revolutionary change, Burma would remain a semi-independent country.59

TATMADAW: IN THE MAKING OF A GARRISON AND PARIAH STATE

The effects of colonial policies of divide and rule could be witnessed in Myanmar, which are some of the fundamental factors of fractured statehood. In addition, the protection of praetorian society by military junta became another prime factor that further weakened the state foundations in the post-colonial period. From 1962 to 2011, the military or low profile dictators directly or indirectly ruled Myanmar through two military coups, 1962 and 1988.60 However, the military involvement in politics has a history prior to independence, as was noted earlier when Myanmar’s military organization (Tatmadaw) was established to seek independence. History and the role of the military before, during, and after independence became a perfect match for military elites to retain their influence during post-colonial times.

Once the military formally stepped in as a self-declared legitimate actor in domestic politics and sidelined the democratic forces, the foundation was laid for a garrison state. According to Harold Lasswell, a garrison state is a “world in which the

59 Modern China-Myanmar Relations: Dilemmas of Mutual Dependence, 13-14.
specialists on violence are the most powerful group in society."61 This means the military as an institution is specialized in drills that function primarily through coercive applications, repression, and violence.62 Political suppression by any means cannot be neglected under military rule; in fact, political repression remains a useful tool to maintain the praetorian nature of political order by diminishing any possible resistance. Similarly, since 1962 onwards, civil society in Myanmar experienced various episodes of human rights violations, even before (mentioned in the colonial section, the role of BIA during the Japanese occupation) and after independence, or military connivance towards violent unrest against minority groups. In a way, the military organization had a positive posture in the eyes of the people, who believed in the national sanctity of the military organization because of its founding father and national hero General Aung San. Though, after establishing the military organization, Aung San was assassinated six months before independence, his leadership succeeded in establishing a unified nationalist movement that had later helped liberate the country.

It is important to understand the active role of the military in the politics of Myanmar, which provides an intellectual base to analyze the praetorian structure and policies implemented in Myanmar. In this regard, Tatmadaw’s (Myanmar’s Armed Forces) role and actions need to be explored to better understand the harsh policies that Myanmar has witnessed over the past five decades. As Myanmar opens towards the rest of the world, many political mysteries will be unraveled. Hence, the political intricacies of Myanmar can be portrayed through the famous words of former US

Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld, that the world still is in a phase to distinguish between “known knowns, known unknowns, and unknown unknowns” about Myanmar’s armed forces. Andrew Selth explained Myanmar’s case since the first military coup of 1962 to recent developments. According to Selth, on 1962’s coup, much of the world community is informed and aware about “known knowns,” however, “the Tatmadaw’s role since the abortive 1988 pro-democracy uprising is still a large number of “known unknowns.” Also, Myanmar has its share of mysteries, and its armed forces continue to surprise observers, reflecting the many “unknown unknowns.”  

a. THE 1962 COUP: A FORMAL STEP TOWARDS THE MAKING OF A GARRISON STATE

The episodes of known and unknown military ventures in domestic politics begins with General Ne Win, who was earlier involved in suppressing the rebellious armed struggle of KNDO in 1949, the military intervention that helped U Nu avert the collapse of his elected government. In fact, on September 26th, 1958, U Nu invited Gen. Ne Win and his military to form a caretaker setup to resolve the law and order situation and return power to civilian government. Moreover, the Tatmadaw proclaimed its determination to overcome the existing corruption with police and administrative structure, eliminate local pocket armies of upcountry politicians, and lead operational control. Therefore, the military gained a much higher role in domestic politics; eventually, the warriors became state-builders not only during the 1950s, but rather

64 Aung-Thwin and Aung-Thwin, A History of Myanmar since Ancient Times: Traditions and Transformations, 239.
65 Callahan, Making Enemies: War and State Building in Burma, 181.
justified the continued rule in the following decades.\textsuperscript{66} Despite U Nu’s electoral win in 1961, his regime did not reach the end of his term because his regime was ousted through a military coup.

Earlier, many Burmese politicians believed that the 1958-1960 caretaker setup of Gen Ne Win was also an indirect military coup, but U Nu refused the popular notion, until his own elected government was ousted in 1962, and then he acknowledged that he was forced to declare a caretaker set up.\textsuperscript{67} Ne Win promulgated that U Nu’s soft policy towards ethnic-minorities’ demands for political reform had threatened the territorial integrity of the state.\textsuperscript{68} To control the damage, Gen. Ne Win arrested political leaders, dismantled the court system, forcibly retired many civil bureaucrats and abrogated the constitution, fearing that a judicial decree against his coup would threaten his actions.\textsuperscript{69} These steps helped the military under General Ne Win to justify the coup of March 2, 1962 as a revolution to save the country and unify the fractured nation. Gen Ne Win became chairman of the Revolutionary Council responsible for administering the political system, with the council membership being comprised of 17 military officers.\textsuperscript{70} A number of council members, such as Aung Gyi, Tin Pe, San Yu, and Sein Win, were active with Gen. Ne Win during the anti-colonial struggle. Later on many of them were purged because Ne Win was suspicious about them or used the purge as face saving of bad policies of his regime. The self-propagated, so-called revolution failed,

\begin{footnotesize}
\begin{itemize}
  \item \textsuperscript{66} Making Enemies : War and State Building in Burma, 172-77.
  \item \textsuperscript{67} Aung-Thwin and Aung-Thwin, A History of Myanmar since Ancient Times: Traditions and Transformations, 241.
  \item \textsuperscript{68} Callahan, Making Enemies : War and State Building in Burma, 202.
  \item \textsuperscript{70} Ibid.
\end{itemize}
\end{footnotesize}
and instead made soldiers stronger, who then dominated domestic politics. The process of domination extended for over five decades because of the amalgamation of three institutions, i.e. "dictatorship, party-state, and defense-state."\(^7\)

Yoshihiro Nakanishi’s (2013) work shares a reference to three kinds of dictatorships: personal, single-party, and military dictatorships, retaining authoritarian power on average for ten years, eight years, and three years respectively.\(^7\) Nakanishi argues that if the average mortality of authoritarian rule by military regimes is three years, then the case of Myanmar is an “outlying observation” in political science, or the military regime’s prolonged endurance was due to an amalgamation of the three institutions mentioned previously.\(^7\) Furthermore, Nakanishi refers to the survey research conducted by Barbara Geddes, who focused on the mortality rate of authoritarian regimes from 1945-1994.

According to Nakanishi, Geddes’ work concludes that “the proportion of military regimes that fell during any particular five years between 1945 and 1994 was about 50 per cent higher than the proportion of personalist regimes and about four times the proportion of single-party regimes.”\(^7\) It shows that the military regime in Myanmar prolonged its stay in power in contrast to the results shown in that research. It is significant to mention that military dictators alone cannot stay in power for a long period, so they cleverly adopt a civilian political garb or establish civilian support to

\(^7\) Ibid.
\(^7\) Ibid.
prolong their stay. General Ne Win adopted a similar policy, using a civilian posture to stay in power for decades until 1988.

What policies helped the military to strengthen its roots in the politics of Myanmar, and also entrench itself as an economic beneficiary? The policies can be looked at in two phases; first, during his despotic rule from 1962 to 1988, Gen Ne Win enjoyed absolute authority through his Burma Socialist Programme Party (BSPP) and used his own constructed ideology called “Burmese ways to Socialism.” The events of 1988 became not only the cause of the BSPP’s collapse, but also a first step towards democratic transition. The second phase, 1988 to 2010, was another coup replacing Gen Ne Win, which considered whether a caretaker setup would handle the administrative affairs of Myanmar until a constitutional regime was elected. The caretaker military power retained rule through the establishment of the State Law and Order Restoration Council (SLORC), later becoming the State Peace and Development Council (SPDC). Moreover, the discussion under the theme “unmaking the political economy of Garrison state” helps draw attention to the economic benefits the military junta has been enjoying up until now.

During the first phase from 1962 to 1988, Ne Win avoided or abrogated all the policies of U Nu including U Nu’s mission of making Myanmar a pure Buddhist country strictly following a Buddhist code of conduct. Ne Win feared that the continuation of U Nu’s policies could draw some harsh condemnations and actions by the international community if Christian minorities became subject to discrimination. Ne win had a good reputation before the 1962 coup because of his active role during the anti-colonial
struggle and subjugating the ethno-nationalist struggles in the early independence years. In later years he became a tyrant against his own people. It is commonly believed, and to an extent true, that “most of tyrants arise from popular leaders who were trusted.”

Similarly, under Gen. Ne Win’s rule, Myanmar was tested by the limits of brutality against ethnic groups, a bad performing economy, the rise of a drug economy, the rise of corrupt and chronic authoritarian-political elites, transnational crimes, and geopolitical challenges.

Many of the issue areas identified above are discussed separately in later discussions. In many ways, Gen. Ne Win gained his absolute authority through brutal force and by purging many of the military and political elites, from whom he feared any set back. Popular political parties were forced to give up their activities in this regard, including their assets which were seized. Most political parties including popular AFPFL and other ethno-based political parties were required to follow one state political party modeled on Leninist lines, indoctrination social, economic and political policies, named the Burma Socialist Programme Party (BSPP).

Ne Win created a news agency to control domestic media and counter foreign media criticism and strongly propagate the “Burmese way to Socialism” as policy. A popular belief among the people of Myanmar was that freedom of expression was more defended and exercised during 1948 to 1962. However, many Colonial laws remained intact; even after independence the Official Secrets Act of 1923 remained in practice,

---

which provided the government a significant amount of control over information.\textsuperscript{77} Though after the 1962 coup new laws, such as the Printers and Publishers Act of 1962, established the Press Scrutiny Board, which enjoyed full authority to censor any material detrimental to the socialist system or state ideology.\textsuperscript{78}

University students were arrested so as to stop any political resistance emanating from university campuses. Tragically, university campuses were closed for almost for two years from 1962 to 1964 to subdue any resistance. During these years, Ne Win’s policy legitimized the single party, when he resigned from his military post in 1972 and was elected through a referendum in 1974. Before the referendum, until 1972, the military ruled the country directly, while from 1974 onwards the BSPP became an indirect way by which the military legalized a means to retain political power as a constitutional dictatorship.\textsuperscript{79}

Ne Win also targeted military personnel, from whom he felt insecure, or made them scapegoats for his bad governance. Listing a few prominent military personnel who lost their positions goes back to 1948, during an internal mutiny within the Burmese Armed forces in which Karen and Kachin officers were forced to remove themselves, and Gen. Ne Win became head of the Tatmadaw. Following that in 1961 top ranked military personal Brig. Gen. Maung Maung was removed due to suspicion of his ties with the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA). Even after the military coup in 1964 Gen. Ne Win’s proclaimed successor Gen Aung Gyi was sacked for his public criticism of

\textsuperscript{77} Steinberg, \textit{Turmoil in Burma: Contested Legitimacies in Myanmar}, 106.
\textsuperscript{78} Ibid.
Gen. Ne Win's economic policies. In later years, Tin Pe was removed for believing his bad economic policies, and Tin Oo removed due to a conceived threat to Ne Win's power. Many of them joined the democratic political struggle against Ne Win and faced imprisonment as well.

Ne Win prolonged his stay in power through the inclusion of some civilian or political personalities on his advisory bodies to justify the referendums and retain the position as head of state. Even in the BSPP single state party, by and large, the top portfolios remained in the hands of military personalis. In the late 1980s his political opponents succeeded in launching a democratic movement for political change. In March 1988, a clash broke out between a university student group and a local youth group over preferences of a modern or traditional music in society at a local teashop.80 The clash gradually gathered a huge mass of protestors, which eventually was supported by unhappy monks and a frustrated population against the socio-economic conditions generated by thirty years policies of the Burmese way of socialism.81 Thousands of protestors came out across the country, Ne Win ordered a crackdown, and as a result the entire world witnessed the brutality of the military, whom killed around three thousand anti-regime demonstrators.82 Among them dozens of university students were

81 Aung-Thwin and Aung-Thwin, A History of Myanmar since Ancient Times: Traditions and Transformations, 256.
82 Benedict Rogers, Than Shwe: Unmasking Burma's Tyrant (Chiang Mai, Thailand: Silkworm Books, 2010), 79.
killed. According to one incident report, almost 41 students died due to suffocating in locked police vans.\textsuperscript{83}

Finally, the popular uprising of 8888 (Four-Eight Uprising), which was unhappy with the BSPP government, denounced Ne Win's authority and demanded his resignation.\textsuperscript{84} Ne Win agreed to step down and transfer power to a caretaker setup with a promise to support a multi-party system. Unfortunately, he appointed the most detested person, U Sein Lwin, as his successor to look after the political transition. Sein Lwin was known as the "Butcher of Rangoon" because of his excessive use of force in response to demonstrations.\textsuperscript{85} On September 27\textsuperscript{th}, 1988, the National League for Democracy (NLD) was established, and Gen Aung Gyi became chairman, Gen. Tin Oo vice chairman, and Aung San Suu Kyi Gen. Secretary to contest democratic elections. By early 1990, the NLD had reached 2 million members.

The May 27, 1990 elections gave a crystal clear victory to the NLD, sweeping 82 percent of the seats, while the military-backed National Unity Party (NUP) won only 2% of seats. The NLD demanded to provisionally restore the 1947 constitution so the new government could take charge and write a new constitution.\textsuperscript{86} However, the SLORC rejected the idea, and in July 1990 issued a council ruling (SLORC Order No. 1/90) as a road map towards a future democratic transition. The ruling only authorized the elected

\textsuperscript{83} Aung-Thwin and Aung-Thwin, \textit{A History of Myanmar since Ancient Times: Traditions and Transformations}, 256.


\textsuperscript{85} Steinberg, \textit{Myanmar/Myanmar: What Everyone Needs to Know}, 63.

representatives to draft a constitution for a future democratic state. While the SLORC retained power as the interim power to facilitate the process, it also gave priority and safeguarded the SLORC’s responsibilities towards the following three domains:

1. The three national causes of prevention of disintegration of the union, prevention of disintegration of national unity, and perpetuation of sovereignty;

2. Prevalence of law and order and regional peace and tranquility, secure and smooth transport and communications, and easing of people’s need for food, clothes, and shelter; and

3. Development of all national people in all of Myanmar.87

Unfortunately, it turned to be a false promise, and power shifted to a new military leadership under SLORC, who further ignored the election results and justified that Myanmar was not ready to be ruled under democratic governance. In 1994 the UN General Assembly suggested a Tripartite Dialogue between the regime and two oppositions including NLD and ethnic minorities, but now, the military regime remains in fear of losing power and does not want to see the empowering of ethnic minorities.88

---

87 Pedersen, Promoting Human Rights in Burma: A Critique of Western Sanctions Policy, 130.
b. RISE OF SLORC / SPDC: A BROKEN PROMISE VIA SILENCING DEMOCRACY, UNDOING COLONIAL PAST AND THE MAKING OF A PARIAH STATE

The Rise of SLORC was a second phase of the direct continuation of military rule. It is highlighted above that the military continued to rule in various forms and at various time periods, whether it was as a caretaker setup in 1958, direct military coup in 1962, or self-legitimized adopted and enforced political garb under BSPP in 1974 to 1988, and even within military coups against each other. The impact of the first phase of military rule paved the way in the making of a garrison state, while the developments in the second phase of the 1988-90 coup tried to undo its colonial past through reviving or reinventing history. By the process of reinventing history the military establishment thought of gaining legitimacy in order to sustain popular support, in contrast, the totalitarian actions by the military created a pariah state, isolating itself from the global community and facing heavy political and economic sanctions.

The rise of SLORC was a broken promise to the people of Myanmar. During the general elections, the people of Myanmar overwhelmingly refused to vote for a military backed political party and preferred instead to support the NLD. SLORC completely gagged the democratic transition in revenge of its loss in the elections.

SLORC, which was comprised of 19 military leaders, made Gen Saw Maung its new commander-in-Chief and chairman. Interestingly, instead of a civilian regime which could revoke the political arrangements of the BSPP, the military under the platform of SLORC abolished the 1974 constitution, and BSPP was created under the military rule of Gen Ne Win. One of the reasons was that the military was not in a mood to be further
patronized under political guidance, like the BSPP had done earlier. Despite the prolonged military rule, a divided and insecure military leadership seemed engaged in an internal coup against senior officers or purging of potential junior opposing military commanders. For instance, the NLD was expecting a possible power transfer to democratically-elected public representatives, but the hopes of NLD members and supporters were dashed when Gen. Saw Maung was relieved from his position and retired.

Gen Than Shwe, who planned the removal of Saw Maung, succeeded in developing a case that Saw Maung had demonstrated some erratic behavior. It is argued that Gen Saw Maung believed that the famous Burmese king, Kyanzitta of the Pagan Dynasty, had returned through reincarnation in his form. Moreover, a number of Saw Maung's associates agreed that he had become delusional as a result of the military backed political party's loss to the NLD. However, military doctors believe that Saw Maung had been drugged. Finally, after consultation with Ne Win Gen, Saw Maung retired, while on March 30, 1992 Gen. Than Shwe, the second most senior official after Saw Maung, became Commander-in-Chief and Chairman of the SLORC. Soon after, Than Shwe picked Gen Maung Aye as army chief who later became vice-chairman of the SLORC in 1994. Gen Maung Aye was a hardliner against ethnic minorities, which entailed negative ramifications for any possible peaceful settlement with ethnic conflicts in the country.

89 Steinberg, Burma/Myanmar: What Everyone Needs to Know, 83.
90 Min, "Looking inside the Burmese Military," 163.
The other case of purging top ranked military commanders is important to discuss here. It was Gen Khin Nyunt who was among the first members of the SLORC. Gen Khin Nyunt was one of Ne Win's closest aides. After 1992, Nyunt retained the position of prime minister tasked with looking after international dealings and countering any international pressure through his media watch. Though Than Shwe never trusted Khin Nyunt because he was a follower of Ne Win, simultaneously Gen Maung Aye was also not on good terms with Nyunt. A divide was shown due to a lack of trust between the armed command and intelligence command of Khin Nyunt. In 2004, after the death of Ne Win, Than Shwe and Maung Aye purged Khin Nyunt on corruption charges. Khin Nyunt denied the allegations, and he insisted that if he or any of his subordinates were believed to be corrupt, then it would be equally applicable to all members of the SPDC or ministers, because no one was exempted of the system and everyone enjoyed the same benefits. In fact, Than Shwe's involvement in corruption was not a hidden episode too, rather Than Shwe needed an excuse to purge Khin Nyunt. As an example, Than Shwe, before becoming dictator, and his family were not economically well off. His sister was running a grocery store at Kyaukse (town where his family lived). Once he became dictator, the military seized the property and bungalows of affluent people at Kyaukse; later, Shwe gave them to his sister, making her rich overnight.

The decision to purge Khin Nyunt was not in favor of Myanmar's general interest for several reasons. Though Khin Nyunt was part of the military junta, he understood

---

91 "Looking inside the Burmese Military," 172.
the importance of international interaction and the role of international agencies working for the development of Myanmar. In contrast, Than Shwe and Maung Aye believed the INGO’s were “potential foreign spies or neocolonists.”93 In addition, Khin Nyunt was the architect of the cease-fire agreements with ethnic groups, while Maung Aye was a hardliner who believed that ethnic armed forces could be crushed easily with force. In fact, Gen Maung Aye violated on a number of occasions the cease-fire agreement.94

The SLORC was facing challenges on multiple fronts, for example, domestic mass resistance by those who voted for the NLD and pressure by the international community for violating human rights and depriving citizens from basic rights. Than Shwe adopted some policies to counter the mounting challenges. First, he ordered the establishment of a political platform like the BSPP so members could contest elections against political rivals of the democratic alliance. In this regard, a pro-military political platform was planned, and Than Shwe oversaw the establishment of the Union Solidarity and Development Association (USDA), which later won a controversial election in 2010. In the meantime, the SLORC morphed into the SPDC, which was working on a new constitution for the country.

Second, Than Shwe took a couple of measures to tackle domestic challenges, though most were of course criminal actions against his own people. His policies tried to divert the attention from domestic challenges, i.e. military repression, poor economic performance and to cover up with these challenges, he started to project a positive

93 Min, "Looking inside the Burmese Military," 173.
94 Ibid.
image of the military and Myanmar's history by recalling the bad memories of its colonial past. Than Shwe exemplified the role of the military against colonial rule. In addition, his rule glorified the history of its kings as great warriors, especially three kings who unified the state, namely Anawratha, Bayinnaung, and Alaungpaya. Tatmadaw massively engaged in rebuilding the historic palaces to support their words of glorifying the past and undoing colonial legacies.\footnote{Steinberg, \textit{Turmoil in Burma: Contested Legitimacies in Myanmar}, 102.} At the capital Naypyidaw, Than Shwe raised giant statues of Anawrahta, Bayinnaung, and Alaungpaya to support his glorification of the history of Myanmar and holy warrior kings.\footnote{Rogers, \textit{Than Shwe: Unmasking Burma's Tyrant}, 166.}

In a process of re-inventing the past, the SPDC engaged in some projects that reflected the undoing of colonial initiatives. For instance, the name of the country Burma was replaced with Myanmar, Rangoon with Yangon, along with a list of name changes for cities, rivers, divisions, and states to imitate historical Burmese orthography; a tangible shift was moving the capital from Yangon to Naypyidaw.\footnote{A list of changes from older form to newer form as follow: Akyab to Sittwe (city); Arakan to Rakhine (state); Chindwin to Chindwinn (River); Irrawaddy to Ayeyarwaddy (Division and River); Karen to Kayin (State and ethnic group); Magwe to Magway (Division); Maymyo to Pyin-U-Lwin (City); Mergui to Myeik (City); Moulmein to Mawlamyine (City); Pagan to Bagan (Old Capital); Pegu to Bagu (Division); Prome to Pyay (City); Rangoon to Yangon (City); Salween to Thanlwin (River); Tenasserim to Thanintharyi (Division). Steinberg and Fan, \textit{Modern China-Myanmar Relations: Dilemmas of Mutual Dependence}, xii.} A deliberate attempt was made to link Burma to colonial times and delinking it to adhere to populous support from non-Burmans, yet the spoken usage of Burma was in practice prior to colonial times. In addition, Tatmadaw wanted to give an impression that a unified Burma now as the Union of Myanmar was not only for Burmans; rather it was a consensual political and geographical space for all ethnicities.
Exceptionally, the NLD leadership, particularly Aung San Suu Kyi, rejected the change of the country’s name and preferred to keep the older one.  

\[98\]

It arguably may be because either she wanted the name Burma to continue as it was during its independence period when her father was in the lead, or the notion that rejection meant not accepting the legitimacy and authority of the military to decide a national matter on its own. The debate also drew some divide across continents as neighboring countries, including organizations as the UN and ASEAN, accepted the change, while the United States, Canada, U.K and Australia retained the usage of the old name, and the European Union took a middle-way solution terming it “Myanmar/Burma.”  

\[99\]

On November 4, 2005 the change of capital was completely a political decision. Though the name Yangon referred to the revival of an old name, the decision to relocate the capital to Naypyidaw, however, was for political and strategic reasons. The capital change not only physically relocated the capital, but also hundreds of civil servants and infrastructure. Interestingly, the SPDC kept the name of the new capital city secret, except ordering the relocation to a new place. Once most of the workforce had been transferred to the new city in February 2006, on March 26, 2006, the SPDC announced the name of the new capital Naypyidaw. Naypyidaw means the site of the royal country or royal city.  

\[100\]

The new capital city was located 320 KM north of Yangon, and the political reason to shift the capital was previous political protests against military regimes mainly

---


\[99\] Ibid.

in Yangon. Moreover, Yangon was becoming more urbanized and populous, so it would be hard facing other massive rallies against the military. Ne Win witnessed students from Rangoon University leading the protest; therefore, among the military commanders was a common perception about “Yangon as an enemy.” The SPDC even avoided considering the traditional capital Mandalay, which remained the center of Burmese culture and religion for centuries. Building a new city and capital was primarily to secure their own interest against political challenges.101

The second reason for changing the capital was based on geo-strategic considerations by the SPDC. The military commanders of Tatmadaw felt insecure in Yangon for any possible foreign invasion, keeping in mind the historical evidence of British invasions and possible attack on Yangon for its closeness to the shores. Earlier, after the 1988 democratic protest, a rumor about the US Navy’s Seventh Fleet entering into Myanmar’s waters led to fears by the Tatmadaw, who thought US forces had come to rescue the democratic forces.102 This persistent notion of fear that they may face possible attack remained in the back of the mind of the junta.

Similarly, after 9/11, when US forces launched attacks against Al-Qaeda operatives in Afghanistan, Tatmadaw feared Myanmar could become a possible target for its bad human rights record and brutal actions against democratic groups.103 Therefore, pushing a new capital city in the heart of Myanmar was a psychological relief for the SPDC. In addition, the junta believed that in Yangon they were always under

surveillance by foreign embassies and agencies. In recent years classified documents proved fear loomed among the SPDC members of a possible US attack. One account notes that Than Shwe had ordered his subordinates to "prepare for the worst and hope for the best;" in the case of a U.S invasion, the SPDC was ready to kill all imprisoned NLD members. In truth, apart from a sense of psychological insecurity, the new capital city was also built to benefit the junta and their families with luxurious life.

Than Shwe used all coercive tactics to bridle any possible threat to his military rule, and, in fact, military leaders remembered from colonial days when Buddhist monks took the lead in provoking nationalistic fervor. Similarly, Buddhist Sangha once again became a resistant force against Than Shwe's bad socio-economic policies. The SLORC decided to bring the Buddhist Sangha's in its control, so it could avert any future resistance. Until the late 1980s the Buddhist Sangha's remained autonomous, and its members numbered almost 120,000 monks, 180,000 novices and 20,000 nuns. A strategy was adopted to register members of Sangha's and banned any new Buddhist Sangha organization to operate other than the nine approved by the military controlled State Clergy Coordination Committee. Earlier, a similar natural step was taken when Ne Win tried to implement the registration of monks in the 1960s and faced resistance from them. He arrested more than 90 monks and forcibly executed the orders.

The other domestic challenge for Than Shwe was popular democratic resistance from NLD leaders particularly Aung San Suu Kyi, who was blatantly criticizing the

105 Rogers, Than Shwe: Unmasking Burma's Tyrant, 166.
107 Silverstein, Burma: Military Rule and the Politics of Stagnation, 98.
dictators over the massacre of 1988 and deprivation from making a democratic government. With the rise of the SLORC, Aung San Suu Kyi gained a prominent public role, and she referenced her father, Aung San, to gain more credibility. The SLORC tried to undermine the rule and role of her father. Pictures of her father were removed from all buildings and a narrative constructed that his past political contributions were for his own political gains and interests. Moreover, Aung San Suu Kyi was kept under house arrest and hundreds of supporters were tortured.

It was the beginning of the end of a garrison state, becoming instead an authoritarian-pariah state, which violated international norms, promises, and the will of its people. The list of humanitarian crimes includes countless episodes of inhuman treatment by Than Shwe’s despotic rule. Hundreds of people were killed through extrajudicial murders, and hundreds of women raped in front of their families and their husbands. Suspected political opponents and ethnic minorities were kidnapped and their mutilated and beheaded bodies dumped with signs of torture. Many body organs were missing, demonstrating the height of cruelty during the torture. Ethnic cleansing and millions of internally displaced persons (IDPs) were forced to leave their ancestral roots and kept on the run in the jungles. From 1992 to 2009 around 2100 political prisoners remained in detention as punishment for raising their voices for political rights.

The military’s governance record remains unpopular not only because it brutally suppresses its minority ethnicities, but also violates international norms through the

---

recruitment of underage soldiers. Myanmar is on top ranked country in the world in terms of young children recruited in the military. Many of these young boys are exploited and used in ethnic combats. According to a recent report published by The Washington Post, the recruitment process has developed into corrupt informal enterprises in which businessmen are involved in providing young recruits to the military. These businessmen receive a sum of $30 and a bag of rice in return for each young recruit they provide. These poor young boys between the ages of 14 to 16 end up working in military farms and forced to fight in conflict zones against armed rebels. From the income of poor boys, a major percentage of their salaries is also taken by corrupt superior military ranked personnel. Due to their poor economic backgrounds, the recruiters trap the young boys, and then their families never see them for long periods of time or hardly know why their kids have disappeared. These policies are a glimpse of the heinous actions the military has been undertaking for decades against its own citizens, and these actions further isolate Myanmar from its earlier position as a non-aligned state to a pariah state, due to ongoing actions that go against the standards of global norms.

The international community imposed economic sanctions against the military rule, which completely ignored promises made to its public, continuous human rights violations, and the suppression of elected representatives in the post 1988 elections. Due to a meager economic performance and harsh policies, the public becomes

---


frustrated once again and the SPDC brutally crushed the peaceful demonstrators in September 2007, known as the Saffron Revolution. Persistent episodes of despotic actions against its citizens and minorities were no longer tolerable in the view of the United Nations. The majority of the world community condemned all actions by the SPDC. Being further isolated, Than Shwe’s annoyed regime blamed Western countries for sanctions as the cause of unrest instead of accepting the undemocratic steps it had taken against demonstrators. On October 24, 2007, with the release of UN remarks over the humanitarian crisis, Than Shwe’s regime expelled Charles Petrie; he was head of the UNDP and the UN’s resident Coordinator in Myanmar.\textsuperscript{112}

The international community eased the sanctions on humanitarian grounds due to the annihilation caused by Cyclone Nargis in May 2008. Importantly, Than Shwe and the SPDC realized they could not retain power based on violence, so a new constitution in 2008 promised general elections. Again, the SPDC facilitated a military-backed Union Solidarity and Development Party (USDP) and won the elections. Apparently, the 2010 election allowed symbolically a transfer of military power to a so-called democratic government. However, with optimism for the openness of a pariah state, the new government of President Thein Sein is considered to be moderate and reformist, but in reality the military retains its share of power in the elected parliament. The unknown-unknowns about civil-military relations and democratic processes are yet to be explored in the months and years to come.

\footnote{\textsuperscript{112} "Myanmar Still Enlists Boy Soldiers Despite Reforms," 1.}
UNVEILING THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF THE GARRISON STATE

The British at one time referred to Zimbabwe as “the jewel of Africa and the breadbasket of Africa;” similarly, Burma was known as “the rice bowl of Asia.” The natural resources in Myanmar have been renowned since colonial times; its current notable resources include oil, gas, minerals, gems (jade, ruby), timber, and teak. Myanmar is the largest Southeast Asia oil and gas exporter and the world’s tenth largest in terms of natural gas reserves. Unfortunately, this was not the case during the post-independence period; Burma became famous as a “beggar with a golden bowl” for being rich in resources but failing to harness them. Mismanagement and rapid nationalization policies by the military rulers became the core reasons for the country’s fragile social and political economic conditions. However, in recent years, the growing financial potential of Myanmar’s energy sector could become a resource curse, as rapidly growing economies are scrambling to obtain access to Myanmar’s energy resources.

57 percent of Myanmar’s economy is based on agriculture, employing over 70 percent of its workforce in the agricultural sector, which makes it an overwhelmingly agro-based society. Over the years production has shown negative signs of growth; for instance, rice exports fell from 870,000 tons in 1983 to 600,000 tons in 1986. To meet the challenges of an economic downfall, though quite late, in 2003 the Burmese

---

113 Than Shwe: Unmasking Burma’s Tyrant, 13.
114 Steinberg and Fan, Modern China-Myanmar Relations: Dilemmas of Mutual Dependence, xx.
government formally announced the liberation of the rice sector. However, the rice trade was still under indirect state control and was unable to achieve its target to revive its image as the “rice bowl of Asia.” Indeed it was the result of complete negligence of the agriculture sector; the government failed to provide fertilizers to farmers and offered no incentives to farmers, such as agricultural loans and proper irrigation systems, as more than 80 percent of agricultural land lacks an irrigational structure.117

The deficient policies became clear after the 1962 military coup. Previously, Myanmar benefitted from the Cold War’s bipolar engagements, owing to its non-aligned movement strategy. In a way, Myanmar succeeded in securing funds and projects both from the U.S. and the former Soviet Union. However, in the post 1962 military period, Myanmar inclined towards China for economic support as it became isolated from the rest of the world due to the aforementioned anti-democratic steps. For a brief moment during the late 1960s, China and Myanmar developed some rough diplomatic relations as a result of anti-Chinese riots, which broke out in June 1967 across Myanmar. China blamed the Burmese Government for indirectly supporting the popular uprising that targeted Chinese nationals, which helped the military rulers support Burmese nationalism and also successfully divert popular attention from its economic failure within Myanmar.118

Starting in 1962, Ne Win adopted a rapid nationalization process and advocated the notion of Burmanization. In contrast, Gen. Aung Gyi, who was Minister for trade and

---
industry, was not in favor of the rapid nationalization of firms. He was purged in February 1963 due to the military's internal power struggle and lobbying, mainly because of his disagreements with Ba Nyein and Tin Pe's economic proposals. Tin Pe as new minister of commerce was catastrophic at facilitating a rapid nationalization process and had unfriendly policies towards foreign business nationals. Overall, Ne Win's nationalizations led to a systemic destruction of the private sector, as an estimated 15,000 firms, including heavy industries and banking, were nationalized. This also resulted in the takeover of foreign businesses, and the exodus of over 200,000 Indians, largely from the business community.119

The impact was severe. The nationalization process broke the backbone of the economy, and Ne Win sensed the gradual growing frustration among the people. To curb economic problems, the military occasionally abolished banknotes and introduced new ones to artificially retain its value closer to the US dollar. The popular 1988 protest that broke out all over the country, leading to Ne Win's forceful resignation, was actually a result of economic frustrations, not democratic change. On September 5, 1987, the government suddenly announced the abolition of the 75-, 35-, and 25- Kyat banknotes in order to punish merchants for their undue profits and control the circulating currency in the black market. The demonetization happened before in May

1964 and in November 1985 as well, but each time the people were given a grace period to exchange the soon-to-be cancelled currency for other bills.¹²⁰

By late 1980 Burma faced an acute financial crunch with a staggering debt of US$3.5 billion and only US$ 20 to 30 million in currency reserves. The UN Economic and Social Council stepped in and declared Myanmar’s status as a Least Developed Country (LDC). The reaction to economic fallout was seen during 1988’s massive protest to demand a fix for the economy. Though Ne Win’s brutal retaliation tried to suppress the protestors, the mass mobilization forced the Burmese government to pass Foreign Investment Law (FLI) in November 1988, which eventually opened its market to outside investors. Retired Gen Aung Gyi openly criticized the flaws of Ne Win’s socialist policies under “Burmese Way to Socialism” as the cause of economic failure.¹²¹ If we compare the overall economic performance of Myanmar, statistics show that the economy grew more during the period of parliamentary democracy (1948-1962) with a rate of 5.3 percent per year, while during Ne Win’s socialist period (1962-1988) the economy grew at a rate of 3.5 percent a year.¹²²

The post-1988 period was expected to be a phase for setting up a democratic parliamentary system, which could help fix the economic fallouts from military rule. On the contrary, the military, under the umbrella of the SLORC/ SPDC, took over power. The economy remained heavily reliant on aid money, the heroin industry’s contribution towards sustaining the economy, and more recently, the revenues from the energy

---

¹²¹ Boudreau, Resisting Dictatorship : Repression and Protest in Southeast Asia, 192.
sector. SPDC rule in some ways tried to shift the country’s heavy reliance on an illegal means of economic gains towards opening up the market to attract foreign direct investment (FDI), particularly in Myanmar’s rich energy sector. Despite an attempt to revive economic activities under SPDC during 2003-2005 through FDI in energy sector, the shortfall remained between revenues and government over spending. In addition, to evaluate the performance of the regime throughout the military’s rule from 1962 to 2010 remained a daunting challenge because the information made public by regime is biased, showing a lack of an accountable and transparent system that can provide an independent report. In other words, Burma’s military has not published data on its overall fiscal position since 1999/2000; it has only published tax data, but no data about government spending.\(^{123}\) Even when there is any data made available to the public, it is either artificially created to mislead or hides the actual information.

Jared Bissinger (2012) has conducted thorough research on FDIs in Myanmar from 1988 to 2011. The statistical explanation of his research expounds that during this period Myanmar succeeded in attracting US$36 billion in approved investments for 445 projects. Out of the US$36 billion, almost US$ 20 billion alone was approved for 25 megaprojects during fiscal year 2010-2011. In comparison, this means prior to 2010-2011 the total approved FDI since 1988 was US$16 billion and much of this, almost US $6 billion, was approved for the construction of the Tasang Dam.\(^{124}\) A higher percentage

\(^{123}\) Turnell, “Burma’s Poverty of Riches: Natural Gas and the Voracious State,” 212.

\(^{124}\) The Tasang Dam almost 300 miles northeast of Rangoon will be first dam on the Salween River (Largest dam in Myanmar and tallest in Southeast Asia) and is planned to be completed by 2020. Thailand’s MDX Group is the major investor of this multi-billion dollar project, which will cost US $6 billion. After completion, 85% of hydro-electricity is planned to export to Thailand as par initially understanding. Though planned in 1990s and inaugurated in 2007, the project was delayed for various political reasons.
of the remaining investment was approved for projects during the mid-1990s, including the first natural gas exploration at the Yadana gas fields in the Andaman Sea.\textsuperscript{125}

At the moment, most of the economic gains are projected because of the higher rate of investment in energy sector. Specifically, since early 2000 Myanmar has increased the exploration of oil and gas resources. In fact, in addition to the noted US$ 20 billion FDI approved for 2010-2011, between 2004 and 2007 Myanmar also attracted a moderate amount of FDI (US$ 3.24 billion) for its energy sector. Since 2000, Myanmar has signed agreements with thirteen countries, including Russia, China, India, South Korea, France, and the U.S.\textsuperscript{126} Most of these agreements were initiated between the national oil company, Myanmar Oil and Gas Enterprise (MOGE) and Total Oil (France), Unocal (US), PTT Exploration and Production (PTTE, Thailand), Premier Oil (UK), Nippon Oil (Japan), Petronas (Malaysia), and other Chinese and Indian national oil and gas companies.

Ostensibly, from 1988 to 2011, the approved FDI and increased rates in trade show impressive economic gains. But, in actuality, the number is lower for the 1990s. Numerous political and economic events contributed towards Myanmar receiving low FDI. After the events of 1988, it was expected that Gen Maung, then chairman of the SLORC, would transfer power to parliament. Instead, he was deposed. In the wake of the military retaking power under Than Shwe, foreign investors were discouraged. The SLORC gained some confidence to attract FDI, but unfortunately 1997’s Asian financial


\textsuperscript{126} Steinberg and Fan, \textit{Modern China-Myanmar Relations : Dilemmas of Mutual Dependence}, 167.
crisis, along with US investment sanctions, drastically affected the investment plans.

When auditing the overall economic performance of Myanmar, a researcher usually encounters two data sets, one provided by the military regime and the second by international financial or research institutions. Great discrepancies exist in both data. Military authority under the SPDC claimed that GDP under its rule remained in excess of 10 percent a year. In February 2006, Myanmar's Minister of National Planning and Economic Development, Soe Tha, announced that his country's growth rate for 2005 would be 12.2 per cent. Turnell Sean contradicts the claim of above 10 percent for a decade long period. Sean argues rather that, if this was the case, then Myanmar should have been considered the fastest and most consistently growing economy of the world; in contrast, it is considered to be a LDC with a highly malfunctioning economic society.\textsuperscript{127} Turnell Sean further presented two sets of statistical information for each year that explains the growth rate from 2000 to 2006. As per official data provided by the SPDC, the growth rate in the following years are; 1999(10.9 %), 2000 (13.7 %), 2001(11.3%), 2002(10.0%), 2003(10.6%), 2004(12.0%), 2005(12.2%), while in contrast, the actual growth estimate suggests that the GDP growth in the following years was 2001 (5.3%), 2002(5.3%), 2003(−2.0%), 2004(−2.7%), 2005(3.7%), 2006(1.8%). The data shows a clear difference between official data provided by the SPDC and actual data, making it an existing information hole patent in the country's system.\textsuperscript{128}

Referring to Myanmar's rich resources and poor economic policies from military rule that closed the doors of official trade with most of the world raises the question:

\textsuperscript{127} Turnell, "Myanmar's Economy in 2006," 108.
\textsuperscript{128} "Myanmar's Economy in 2006," 110-11.
how did the military rulers manage to sustain a fragile economy and its administrative machinery? On reasonable grounds, it can be argued that the meager foreign aid and minimum rate of economic growth was indirectly supported through illicit trade and a narco economy. Most illicit trade in Myanmar is concentrated in areas controlled by armed groups, areas that are facing a governance vacuum. The vacuum and chaos is sometimes lucrative for the “survival of [a] weak and unaccountable state may well be enhanced by its ability to capture or profit from illicit economies.” In this regard, the illicit narco economy played a crucial role in funding a continuous war with various armed groups and also supported Myanmar’s economic needs. Myanmar is the world’s second largest illegal opium producer after Afghanistan. The famous golden triangle between Laos, Myanmar, and Thailand is the main source of illegal drug trafficking, becoming a significant economic activity for the military in Myanmar. At the same time, the illicit trade and informal economies also contributed to the country's social and economic failure.

Shan state, Kachin hill, and Wa hills are some popular areas that are involved in the poppy trade. In 1989 1.6 kg of opium packets were sold for 9600 kyats ($1000 exchange rate in 1989). Villagers sold opium to Chinese traders, and most of Kachin opium goes to Myitkyina and into further southern areas for refinery, as Kachin areas lack morphine factories or heroin refineries. In fact, Kokang and Wa opium goes to Shan state refineries like Mong Ko, Mong Hom, Nam Kyaun, Kunlong, and Kang Mong, then is

transported to Mandalay and Hong Kong. In addition, some of the Wa and most of the Akha and Lahu opium are refined in Shan state sent to Hong Kong and Thailand.131

A similar pattern, as noticed earlier regarding economic growth data, is the little reliable data that exists about the drug production. For instance, the official Burmese government’s estimate of 247 tons of drug production in 1989-90 was less than what the U.S government estimated of 2,350 tons for 1990-91.132 As argued previously, Myanmar was an information vacuum for decades in which military rule completely isolated and reported fabricated information to hide the truth. Regarding drug production, it was obvious that drug production and trade was a worldwide illegal activity, and military rule never wanted to reflect an image that one of its main economic resources relied on the drug economy until the late 1990s.

Historical lessons from colonial times served Myanmar’s military rulers specifically when the British opium trade was established to meet the financial difficulties of British rule, which as a result led to the Opium War of 1839-1842 (in which China had to pay indemnities equal to US $21 million and ceded Hong Kong Island as penalty) and the Arrow War of 1856-1858 (in which the British forced China to legalize the opium trade).133 British policies of using opium trade as a lucrative business to support its foreign expenses were historical examples for economic remedies, in a time when military rulers were in isolation creating a pariah state promising its people an

---

ideal economic and peaceful society under military rule.

Not only did the military rely on getting perks and revenues from drug production and trade, in fact, many ethnic armed groups relied on opium trade to fund their war with Tatmadaw. On many occasions Tatmadaw also encouraged its favorable rebel groups to become part of a counter strategy against rival armed groups. Therefore Tatmadaw supported and encouraged Wa rebels, and other armed groups, including defectors from Communist Party of Burma (CPB), to produce more opium and ship it to the North American continent.134

Drug production and its trade was controlled and operated through drug lords, some of whom were rivals to the military and some whom were under the protection of government institutions. Among many drug lords, a few, such as Khun Sa (a CPB leader, drug lord, who fought against the military and lost thousands of his men in fights until 1996, when he surrendered to the government), Wei Xuegang (in 1998, the U.S. Government announced US $2 million on his arrest), and Lo Hsin Han kingpin (who recently died (2013) as one of biggest business tycoons of the region) gained high ranking in the drug and heroin traffic in Southeast Asia.135

The Burmese government shielded these drug lords and facilitated drug money laundering. The money in many ways was channeled to state projects and international

dealings. According to Monique Skidmore, MOGE is mainly used for money laundering of revenues earned from the drug trade.\textsuperscript{136} Skidmore further explains that:

In a deal signed with the French oil Giant Total in 1992, and later joined by Unocol, MOGE received a payment of US$15 million. Despite the fact that MOGE has no assets besides the limited installments of its foreign partners and makes no profit, and that the Burmese state never had the capacity to allocate any currency credit to MOGE, the Singapore bank accounts of this company have seen the transfer of hundreds of millions of US dollars...Funds exceeding US$60 million and originating from Burma's most renowned drug lord, Khun Sa, were channeled through the company. Drug money is irrigating every economic activity in Burma ... and big foreign partners are also seen by the SLORC as big shields for money laundering."\textsuperscript{137}

Myanmar government officials always denied the fact that there was any government involvement in the drug business and claimed to not support any drug lords. However, popular drug lord Lo Hsin Han, a kingpin, received protection from Burma's military for helping them in repelling the CPB during a decisive fight at Kunlong Bridge, gaining the trust of the military. His drug convoys were given protection, and the military got their share from the partnership too. In 1973 the Thai police arrested him, and the U.S. declared a great victory against the drug war. The Thai government handed him over to Burmese authorities; Lo Hsin Han was pardoned, and the Myanmar government instead facilitated his narcotics business.\textsuperscript{138} He became a core security operator against an armed CPB faction, so the military benefitted in two ways, first by getting money, and second, crushing CPB fighters.

\textsuperscript{137} Quoted Dennis Bernstein and Leslie Kean in ibid.
In response to the illicit trade, the U.S. remained on the forefront to curb the menace of the drug trade through UN agencies vis-à-vis offering Myanmar direct assistance. Interestingly, over the years the persistent political events in Myanmar have also softened U.S behavior towards Myanmar. Shelby Tucker observed the following two statements were contradictory and in a way tried to exonerate the Myanmar military for not being responsible of any illicit drug trade. For instance, in 1996 President Bill Clinton vehemently expressed that “the role of drug[s] in Burma’s economic and political life and the regime’s refusal to honour its pledge to move to multiparty democracy are really two sides of the same coin, for both represents the absence of the rule of law.”139 Yet in 1999 the U.S Department of State’s Bureau for International Narcotics reported that “there are persistent and reliable reports that officials, particularly corrupt army personnel posted in outlying areas, are either involved in the drug business or paid to allow the drug business to be conducted by others,” which means some corrupt individuals are involved, while the Burmese government is not involved in the drug trade.140

There are several reasons that support the idea of the Burmese government under the military rule’s being involved into the narco economy. Primarily, the Burmese government remained comprised of military officers, and the same military officers are responsible for enforcement of anti-drug laws. Military officers get a share in drug revenue, and more importantly, revenue is required for the military institution to fight

139 *Burma: The Curse of Independence*, 179.
140 Ibid.
its decades long rebel conflict. A more important argument to evaluate the Burmese government’s involvement can be made considering the country’s staggering economic conditions and the government’s overspending on modernizing its military and other expenditures, which certainly needed investment. Myanmar, by and large, used hard currency earned from the narcotics trade for domestic and foreign procurements. By the late 1980s, more than 90 percent of Myanmar’s revenue was absorbed by foreign debt, and it requested the status of LDC, which the UN generously awarded to protect it from further worsening its economic conditions. Soon after gaining LDC status, the IMF reported that the foreign exchange reserves were below US$30 million, which were insufficient to pay for one month’s imports.

Still under acute economic pressure, the Burmese government planned to spend extravagantly over the next decade. With a planned procurement of “approximately US$2 billion,” Myanmar initially purchased weapons worth US$ 20 million from 1988 to 1997 and only $280 million in 1997. In addition the number of military “personnel increased from 200,000 in 1988 to 270,000 by 1992 with target of 500,000 and by 2007 reached 400,000.” The defense spending of Myanmar during fiscal year 1991-92 was 30.8 percent to 39.9 percent (3.4 percent of GDP) of the state budget, while David Steinberg has noted that it was around 50 percent of the annual budget. Similarly in 1997-98 the government allocated 31.6 percent of annual budget in defense

---

spending.144 Other big spending was recorded during the shift from the old capital Yangon to the newly constructed capital Naypyidaw, which absorbed huge investments to plan, develop, and construct an entirely new city as a capital. In addition, in 2006 there was a dramatic increase in the salaries of civil servants and military officers from 500 percent to 1,200 percent during a high-inflation economy.145

Finally, Tatmadaw was also found connected to an incident in which it persuaded and facilitated local farmers and even forced laborers “to grow opium instead of rice and beans and military guarding the routes leading to both the family’s and the UWSA’s (United Wa State Army) refineries in the Doi Sam Sao, Soi Loilem and Doi Mak-on hills and Nam Yawn valley.”146 Recent revelations from Wa government documents prove that from 1990 to 1994 the local population was encouraged to cultivate poppy and become involved in the business of heroin refineries. The government collected 6 million Yuan (US $730,000) tax from these refineries and some total 30 million Yuan (US $3.6 million) during the 1990-94 period. Due to state encouragement and the booming of the drug industry, the price of opium skyrocketed, a joi or viss147 of opium priced at 1,000 Yuan ($120) in 1993 soared to 4,000 Yuan (US $484) in 1994.148 All these reasons help develop a strong linkage between drug production and trade under the secret supervision of the Burmese government.

---

144 Steinberg, Burma: The State of Myanmar, 78.
147 Choi or Joi in Mainland Southeast Asia and viss in Southern India and Burma used as standard unit of weight for opium, equivalent to 1.657 Kilograms or 3.652 pounds.
To curb the challenges of drug trafficking, from 1989 to 1992 the UN took the lead in forming a sub-regional arrangement between China, Thailand, and Burma to adopt strict measures to curtail the drug trafficking and production. Initially the discussion was carried out between the United Nations Fund for Drug Abuse Control (UNFDAC) and the Burmese government. Later, from 1992 onward, the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNDCP) and the three governments adopted a sub-regional strategy, including reducing trafficking in drugs and chemicals, eliminating opium cultivation at border areas through economic and social reforms, incentives to the local population, and reducing demand and consumption of drugs in affected areas. To eradicate opium production, in 2001 veterans of the Office of Strategic Services (OSS-101), who lived in Burma’s Kachin areas during the Second World War, launched Project Old Soldier (POS), a gesture of thanks to the Kachin people for their service during the war. The US congress appropriated funds for the veterans of OSS-101, who volunteered to train the local population to substitute poppy for cash crops, so the menace of poppy cultivation could be replaced with agro-products and provide a viable economic base for the local community. Tatmadaw was not comfortable with the project; in fact, a number of Kachin locals who were supervising the project were killed. This entire discussion demonstrates how over the decades the Burmese military’s rule over a garrison state isolated the country from the global community and heavily engaged in illicit political and economic activities.

A booming energy sector and the recent lifting of US sanctions helped Myanmar to concentrate on licit avenues of trade. The SPDC’s signal to open up its market and promise to hold elections accelerated trade activities and built some trust with foreign investors. So far two countries, China and Thailand, control 75 percent of Myanmar’s economy, followed by Singapore and India. Fiscal year 2013/2014 has reached a record high total trade volume of nearly US$ 16 billion. According to official figures, in the first 9 months of the 2013 fiscal year, trade volume has reached US$ 15.92 billion that is US$ 3.65 billion more than last year’s trade volume. Overall, Myanmar is expecting to meet its target of US $ 25 billion in FY 2013/14 (20% from border trade, while 80% from overseas trade).

In sum, the history of Myanmar’s political economy provides evidence of a wealthy past and the gloomy phase of ultra-poverty the country has endured under military rule since 1962. Military rule initially focused more on the exploitation of timber and teak, with no efforts towards its management and conservation. Unfortunately, a great resource was pushed towards decay and rapid deforestation. Many border communities, like Kachin, lament the loss of their resources with no gains, while the military engaged in misuse of resources and illegal trade. Similarly, the nationalization process harmed banking and the mining and energy sector. Despite all, recent economic gains have shown some promising outcomes. Still, the remnants of the old chronic political economy is in need of fixing within an institutional framework, so it can

---

contribute effectively towards economic development of the entire society as well as its integration into the region.

SOCIAL DIVIDES ON ETHNO-RELGIOUS AND POLITICAL DOMAINS: POLICIES OF ACCOMMODATION, ASSIMILATION, OR EXCLUSION

Ethnic Burmans, or Bama, residing mainly on the mainland of the country, primarily dominate the Union of Myanmar, while eight main other ethnic minority groups can be further divided into 135 sub-groups. The general belief that diversity is strength has proven to be a bad augury for the Union of Myanmar's nation-building process since 1948. During independence in 1948, statistical composition records estimated Burmans/ Bama at 65-69 %, the Shan at 8.5 to 10 %, Karen 6.2%, Arakanese 4.5 %, Mon 2.4 %, Chin 2.2 % Kachin 1.4%, and Wa at 1.4%, while the 1983 consensus projected the same numbers as recorded in 1948.152

The ethnic minorities in opposition reject this classification because they believe it repudiates the existence of many other ethnicities, so categorization on the basis of ethnic state is not acceptable.153 To note, a number of Myanmar's ethnicities have trans-border ethnic kinships in neighboring countries, for example, substantial "Mon, Karen and Shan communities live in Thailand; Naga and Chin live in India; Kachin

(Jingpaw) can be found in India (Singpho) and in China (Jingpho).”¹⁵⁴ These ethnic
groups are also in minority status in neighboring countries becoming a convenient
source to be exploited by opposing regimes on both sides of the border for political
gains.

The earlier sections discussed in detail the historical period during and after
colonial times, which outlined the military’s ventures against its own people in violating
their basic political and human rights. Therefore, since independence, political unrest
has remained a persistent characteristic of Myanmar’s political landscape. Myanmar has
two dimensions of socio-political unrest, first, ethnic minorities fighting the center
(Naypyidaw) for greater autonomy, and second, Muslim-Buddhist clashes due to
historical grievances.

As noted before, ethnic-minority grievances started before and after the
Panglong agreement. In fact, before the Panglong agreement, ethnic leaders from
Kachin, Karen, and Muslims of Arakan, whom supported the British war against
Japanese occupation during 1942-1945, were certain that “when the war ended the
British would reward their loyalty, granting them independence from Burma.”¹⁵⁵ Issues
of ethno-religious strife in Myanmar have simultaneously accommodated, assimilated,
and excluded a number of ethnic groups during the nation building process; similar
patterns remained in practice before the independence of the country. In the post-

¹⁵⁵ Moshe Yegar, Between Integration and Secession : The Muslim Communities of the Southern Philippines, Southern Thailand, and Western Burma/Myanmar (Lanham, Md.: Lexington Books, 2002), 34.
independence period, Myanmar failed to develop a pluralistic and inclusive policy towards each single community living in the country.

The seeds of divide and rule were obviously sown during colonial times when British rule facilitated immigrants from the Indian sub-continent and China to take over office and business jobs. Also, statistical data quoted about colonial times indicates security personnel in higher percentages belonged to minority ethnic groups. One of the reasons for Burman exclusion was British distrust due to the Burmese resistance. The Burmans were irked for being segregated while other ethnicities actively worked for the British; this made minorities concentrate power against the majority. Soon after their independence, the minority ethnic groups, i.e. Karens, Mons, Kachins, Muslim Mujahideen from Arkan/Rakhine State and the CPB, lost administrative powers and started an armed struggle.

The situation became worse when the military regime under Ne Win adopted the policies of Burmanization forcing thousands of ethnic minorities to flee or being forcibly expelled. Similarly, after Ne Win’s resignation, the brutal era of Gen Than Shwe during the 1990s focused on reinventing Burman history, and other ethnicities became victims within their own land. That Tatmadaw under Than Shwe used brutal and destructive policies against other ethnicities was no surprise. Than Shwe, as noted earlier, was inspired by reviving the glorious past of Burman kings. King Bayinnaung was his main inspiration, among others. King Bayinnaung, who ruled five hundred years ago, engaged in relentless, brutal war and destruction to unify the peripheral areas from

\[156\] Steinberg, Burma/Myanmar: What Everyone Needs to Know, 29.
\[157\] Burma: The State of Myanmar, 73.
neighboring powers. Comparing the 500 year old repressive policies of King Bayinnaung, Benedict Rogers has quoted Thant Myint, who explains that “the Burmese army still sees itself, in [a] way, as fighting the same enemies and in the same places, subjugating the Shan hills or crushing Mon resistance in the South, their soldiers slugging their way through the same thick jungle, preparing to torch a town or press-gang villagers. His (Bayinnaung’s) statues are there because the ordeal of welding a nation together by force is not just history.”

As a result of harsh state driven policies against ethnic minorities from 1962 until now, thousands from minority groups were forced to migrate to neighboring countries and were internally displaced due to fear of execution. 400,000 ethnic Indians were forced to leave the country under Gen Ne Win’s rule in 1964. No compensation was given to families who had lived in Myanmar for generations when they were uprooted. Similarly, more than 100,000 Burmese-Chinese left Burma under Ne Win’s rule, and in a recent attempt to take control of the Kokang minority area, Tatmadaw forced 35,000 refugees to flee to China. Since 1988 military actions under Gen Than Shwe, “refugees belonging to the Karen, the Shan, the Karenni, the Kachin, the Wah, the Rohingyas, and other ethnic groups of Burma, Mon refugees are among the more than 300,000 people who have fled Burma.” A recent report noted the miseries of around 130,000 Karens on the Thai border where refugees have been in need of urgent

---

158 Rogers, Than Shwe : Unmasking Burma’s Tyrant, 166-67.
159 Topich and Leitich, The History of Myanmar, 88.
160 Dittmer, Burma or Myanmar?: The Struggle for National Identity, 6.
humanitarian attention to be accommodated and reintegrated in society. During these armed struggles thousands of people were killed, and a recent estimation emphasized that around 40,000 armed troops of various ethnic groups replicate a situation of a “contained balkanization” in Burma, in which armed conflict could resume at any moment.

With the help of Government Organized NGO (GONGO), the Myanmar Peace Center moved to broker peace with the rebels. In 1989 and the following years, various ethnic armed groups agreed for a temporary ceasefire agreement between the military and different ethnic groups. The ceasefire agreement allowed the armed rebels to keep their arms and autonomy over their region. It also provided an option for those armed groups to facilitate development and economic activity in case of surrendering their weapons. Despite the ceasefire, so far the government has failed to reach any political settlement with the ethnic groups. Armed groups also wanted clarification over the terms and definitions of a rebel, because there are many ethnicities who do not seek independence, but rather seek a federal system that ensures the basic rights of citizens, the autonomy of the area, and an assurance for the due ownership rights over natural resources in their jurisdiction, which are being forcefully depleted under governments supervision. After all, there is still a lack of trust of the military.

162 Mark Fenn, "Life Gets Harder on Thai-Myanmar Border," The Diplomat December 2, 2013.
Apart from ethnic conflicts, episodes of religious clashes between Muslims and Buddhists have been aggravated since 2012. Almost 80 percent of the population in Myanmar follows Buddhism in comparison to 4 percent of those following Islam. Most Muslims are settled in the Arakan/Rakhine State; however, there are small percentages living in central Myanmar or parts elsewhere. Two prominent Muslim ethnic groups are the Kaman and Rohingyas. In November 2013, an angry Buddhist mob attacked a Muslim village and stabbed a 94-year-old, paralyzed old lady, which saddened many inside and outside Myanmar.

A history of communal clashes existed prior to Myanmar's existence and even before colonial rule. However, hatred intensified in the 1920s-1930s, when British rule encouraged immigrants from the sub-continent. Frustrated with low economic incentives for local Burmans, anti-Indian and anti-Muslim resentment existed among Burmans. This resentment was manifested in nationalist policies of the 1940s and 1960s which forced Indians to leave. Burmans used terms Kala (from “Kula” in Burmese for “foreigner” and in hindi/urdu same “kala” is called for “black”). Burmans also knew that most of the Muslims came from Chittagong to seek work and Arakan women, who

---

165 Kaman means bow, settled in 1660 along with Mugul Prince Shah Shuja, who escaped following defeat during a power struggle and served as special archer’s unit to Arakan’s king, in past, most of Kaman remained settled Ramree island. Rohingya are also known as Rohiga or Roewengya, settld mostly in Northern Arakan. 1960’s the total population of Rohingyas was estimated 300,000 and mostly Burmese consider them illegal immigrants, instead call them Bengali and reject to hold them with their identity. See Yegar, Between Integration and Secession: The Muslim Communities of the Southern Philippines, Southern Thailand, and Western Burma/Myanmar, 24-25.

166 Thomas Fuller, “Elderly Woman’s Killing Lays Bare Myanmar’s Religious Divisions,” The Newyork Times November 9, 2013.

later assimilated into the local cultures.\textsuperscript{168} During the nationalist struggle against colonial rule, Buddhist nationalists also spread anti-Indian and anti-Muslim slogans to encourage foreign immigrants to leave; the popular slogans strongly propagated that these foreigners are “exploiting our economic resources and seizing our women, [and] we are in danger of racial extinction.” Subsequently, in July 1938, hundreds of Indians were killed during the riots, which occurred in Yangon.\textsuperscript{169} In addition, Muslims from Arakan/ Rakhine supported British forces, while Buddhists supported the Japanese, which forced Muslims to leave Southern Arakan and to settle in the north, with a similar movement by the Buddhist population towards the South. In a way, a divided Arakan/ Rakhine was carved in the 1940s.\textsuperscript{170}

Recent observations show that the Muslim-Buddhist clashes have acquired a transnational nature. For example, Buddhists felt angry when the Taliban destroyed the Buddha statue in Bhamiyan in Afghanistan, and they began to target Muslims in central Myanmar.\textsuperscript{171} Similarly, in response to 2012’s Buddhist attacks, in May 2013, Indonesian police foiled a plot by Islamists planning to bomb the Myanmar embassy in Jakarta, and in July 2013, Islamists were blamed for bombing Bodh Gaya, one of the revered sites of Buddhism in India.\textsuperscript{172}

\textsuperscript{168} Yegar, \textit{Between Integration and Secession: The Muslim Communities of the Southern Philippines, Southern Thailand, and Western Burma/Myanmar}, 27.
\textsuperscript{170} \textit{Between Integration and Secession: The Muslim Communities of the Southern Philippines, Southern Thailand, and Western Burma/Myanmar}, 33-35.
\textsuperscript{171} "The Dark Side of Transition: Violence against Muslims in Myanmar," 3.
\textsuperscript{172} "The Dark Side of Transition: Violence against Muslims in Myanmar," 21.
Islamophobia is rapidly growing among Buddhists, who believe that the Muslim population is growing fast in contrast to a decline in the population growth of Burmans. A general tendency found among Buddhists is that a rapid increase in the Muslim population would help the Islamic jihadists from surrounding countries to take over Myanmar. The Head of the Rakhine State has asked Muslims to reduce their population growth by limiting to two children. In this regard, Buddhist monks have initiated a number’s campaign called the “969” movement. The 969 campaign is led by prominent Buddhist monks like Wirathu and Wimala spreading similar messages as observed during the 1930s anti-Indian movement. These claims include the idea of a Muslim population’s plan to take over the country with the help of jihadi infiltrators, seeking to get Buddhist women through marriage and then converting Buddhist women into Islam. To denounce the plot, the 969 movement is trying to strengthen Buddhist identity and practices by asking Burmans for a socio-economic boycott of Muslims and by demanding for laws to restrict inter-faith marriage.

Growing fear has intensified tensions, and frequent attacks and counter attacks have no longer stayed limited towards Rohingyas. Other Muslim ethnic groups and mosques are being targeted, and similarly many Buddhists are killed and their places of worship burnt. In response to these events, and due to growing global pressure,

173 The 969 movement is started to counter the growing Muslim population in Myanmar. Muslims use a number 786 as a symbol of Halal meat at their shops or as a symbol to express, “in the name of God.” However, Buddhist cosmological calculations sum up the number 786= 7+8+6 =21, meaning Muslims planned to occupy Myanmar in the twenty-first Century. To counter this plot, the 969 movement required every Buddhist to place this number on their shops to identify them. The number campaign has severely affected the business of Muslims and made them feel isolated in their own country. The philosophy behind the 969 numbers is 9 attributes of Buddha, 6 attributes to Dhamma means Buddha’s teaching and 9 attributes to Buddhist Sangha.

President Thein Sein on August 17, 2012 established an investigation commission, which included representatives from all parties. The commission’s report includes some controversial aspects, particularly “the report [that] included the fact that it declined to use the term Rohingya, instead adopting the government usage Bengali,” which denies Rohingyas to claim their identity and recognition in the country.  

The prolonged ethno-nationalistic conflicts temporarily came to a halt when the military regime struck a deal with the core 17-armed groups in 1989. Despite the ceasefire agreements, the events of October 2012 show that the military is still actively fighting the Kachin Independence Army (KIA) military wing of the Kachin Independence Organization (KIO), civil unrest between Rohingya Muslims and Buddhist in Arakan/Rakhine State is allegedly backed by government forces, and there is ongoing conflict between minority groups of the Shan, Lahu, and Karen State with the government forces. There are a number of criticisms, doubts, and questions which still remain unanswered. The Tatmadaw reacted quickly in response to the Saffron revolution when monks peacefully protested against price hikes and bad economic conditions in 2007, resulting in the military using brutal force to suppress protestors. Surprisingly, the military did not bother to take any action against those involved in religious riots. In fact, it creates doubt that either religious riots do not directly threaten the military’s interests, or the military itself remains silent to derail the nascent democratic transition. In addition, Nobel Peace Laureate Aung Sang Suu kyi’s silence over religious clashes has raised many questions that either she has made a compromise with the military to save

the democratic transition, or she is seeking a constitutional amendment to run for presidency. According to the new constitution, the military still retains 25 percent of reserved seats in legislation, and her eligibility is linked with the military's consent to amend the constitution, so she can run for presidential elections.

Without creating a new political landscape towards the inclusive and pluralistic nature of federative systems of union, it will be hard to foresee a long-term stability. An unstable Myanmar will have severe transnational effects, as some glimpses of the religious effects noted previously can already be observed.

GEOPOLITICAL FULCRUM OF EAST, SOUTH, AND SOUTHEAST ASIA

There is no doubt about the significance and geographical pivot-ness of Myanmar in the Asian continent, and with rising economies such as China and India, the future geopolitical impact of Myanmar gains a higher profile in global politics. Myanmar is on a junction to provide a continental gateway for China and India due to its location at a junction that provides a land bridge to East, South, Southeast Asia, and an unbridled coastline along the Andaman Sea and the Bay of Bengal. In retrospect, during the colonial period, Myanmar was a key geographical unit for British rule to use as a shield against French colonizers reaching further towards the Indian sub-continent, as the French were enjoying the suzerainty over the Indo-China area. In addition, Myanmar helped allied forces during the Second World War in defeating the Japanese forces.

Apart from the geopolitical importance of Myanmar in contemporary politics, it is an abandoned country with valuable natural resources. Myanmar is blessed with large
oil and gas resources in the region along with gems, teak, and mineral resources. Regional influentials like China, India, Japan, South Korea, and other neighbors, including Thailand and Bangladesh, are vigilant towards the resources in Myanmar. Moreover, most of these countries are engaged in competition to gain influence over Myanmar vis-à-vis each other in order to gain more shares in resource exploitation.

The rising economies from Asia specifically India and China, are believed to be seeking more of their interests in Myanmar both for strategic and economic reasons. China, so far, is enjoying a greater leverage over India for being in better relations with Naypyidaw since the early days of the independence period, while India is a little frustrated, but hopeful it will win Naypyidaw’s substantive trust and confidence. What specific geopolitical interests can be traced while comparing the historic Chinese and Indian rivals struggling to counter each other for resources in Myanmar? How is the geopolitics of Myanmar becoming a fulcrum between the East and South? More importantly analyzed is whether these external and internal geopolitical maneuverings are a cause of domestic instability in Myanmar. These questions help to understand that even though Myanmar is in an asymmetrical power relation in regards to India, China and others, it still holds leverage due to its geography and resources. Myanmar’s military junta believes that in the contemporary period Myanmar is “caught in triangular rivalry between China, India and United States.”176 Furthermore, the military leadership in Myanmar widely propagates that the U.S. is trying to use a “containment policy” to

control China’s rise, and in this regard, the geostrategic location of Myanmar “is a loop in their containment policy.”

a. BEIJING’S GEO-STRATEGIC BUFFER ZONE

Looking at Beijing’s interest in Myanmar’s geopolitical setting takes us back to 1954, the early years of Myanmar’s independence period when the then Chinese Premier, Chou En Lai, paid his official visit to India and Myanmar and affirmed China’s commitment towards the Five Principles of Peaceful Co-existence. Both India and Myanmar signed these principles, which included the mutual respect of territorial integrity and sovereignty, policy of non-aggression, non-interference in domestic affairs, and projects of mutual benefit so that peaceful co-existence could be maintained. However, on many occasions, aggression and interventions have proven the commitments to be unfulfilled.

Myanmar shares a 1,384 mile long border with China’s Yunnan province, and an asymmetrical power relationship has existed between the two countries for more than five decades. David I. Steinberg and Hongwei Fan (2012) note that since the beginning of the Cold War, “Beijing has regarded Burma/Myanmar as a geo-strategic buffer zone, whether in its confrontation with the West, its rivalries with the Soviet Union and Vietnam, or its Peaceful rise strategy in the post-Cold War era.”

It is true that in the post-Cold War epoch China’s geopolitical and economic interests in Myanmar have been no mystery. Myanmar has become one of the crucial

---

177 “China-Burma Relations: China’s Risk, Burma’s Dilemma,” 270.
178 Steinberg and Fan, Modern China-Myanmar Relations: Dilemmas of Mutual Dependence, 174.
lifelines for China’s supremacy in the region and its future economic growth. In late 2009 the leaders of Myanmar and China officially reaffirmed the continuation of their “paukphaw (fraternal) friendship,” while the military junta in Myanmar, taking an additional step, considered the relationship as that of “blood relatives (swemyo paukphaw) that are argued to have existed since 1950.”\(^\text{179}\) However, the relationship was never harmonious and without trouble, there were moments when both countries went to almost zero-level diplomatic ties. For instance, during Gen Ne Win’s rule, there was indirect support to popular anti-Chinese uprising in Myanmar, which actually diverted the attention from its economic failure within Myanmar and also to signal China that Myanmar would not be influenced with forceful acts.\(^\text{180}\)

In recent years, Myanmar has significantly reduced its reliance on military and economic aid from China, but largely still relies on political and diplomatic protection for the regime’s survival. The ruling military junta understands that China will not be comfortable with any attempt to confine its geopolitical and economic influence in Myanmar. China’s policy of peaceful rise and its apparent commitment through a new foreign policy of non-interference in other’s domestic politics will be a litmus test to see whether China allows Myanmar to act on its own while choosing future partners.\(^\text{181}\) On the other hand, China’s growing energy demand has made it the largest oil importing country in the world. To meet these energy demands, Chinese companies are heavily


\(^{180}\) Topich and Leitich, The History of Myanmar, 88-92.

engaged in pipeline and dam construction in Myanmar to transport oil, gas, and power from the Middle East and the shores of Myanmar to Yunnan province.

At the moment, 78% of China's electric-power needs are met through coal burning, while China plans to reduce electricity from coal production to 68% by 2010 and to 60% by 2020, which is not yet accomplished. Therefore China is keen to look at hydropower electricity projects, which are ideal as a renewable energy resource. Similarly, India is very much keen to harness water resources at Chin State. Both India and China are independently in business to construct dams on rivers closer to their border areas so electricity can be transmitted to their countries. The investment in hydropower projects will counter the environmental challenges posed due to higher levels of carbon emission in China. Beijing has signed agreements with Naypyidaw to finance seven dams in Kachin State along the Ayeyarwady, N'Mai Hka, and Mali Hka Rivers to generate and transmit 13,360-megawatt electricity.

According to the EarthRights International report, there are 69 Chinese corporations actively involved in 90 major projects of hydropower, mining, oil, and natural gas explorations. Despite the one-sided leverage of Chinese corporations, there is a good sign that these projects will attract foreign investment in Myanmar. During only 2008-2009 around US $856 million, or 87%, of foreign investment was directed at the energy sector. China's three major oil corporations are dominating the most of energy exploration projects in Myanmar. China National Petroleum Corporation

---

182 Steinberg and Fan, Modern China-Myanmar Relations: Dilemmas of Mutual Dependence, 195.
183 Ibid.
(CNPC), China Petroleum & Chemical Corporation (SINOPEC), and China National Offshore Oil Corporation (CNOOC) have already established a strong presence in Myanmar. Having the largest natural gas resources in South-East Asia, Myanmar faces other neighboring countries in the region as potential contenders in the exploration and sharing of energy resources, including India, China, Japan, South Korea, Thailand, and Singapore. On many occasions, these contenders are not able to win contracts on the basis of merit; rather, contracts are awarded on the basis of political interests. For example, after the crackdown on Saffron revolution protestors in August 2007, Shwe gas reserves were sold to China’s state owned CNPC at a lower price than to other bidders due to Chinese and Russian diplomatic protection provided at the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) when both vetoed a US led resolution for democratic and inclusive political culture in Myanmar.\(^\text{185}\) The politically awarded contract to CNPC will allow the investment of 50.9 percent, the cost of two pipelines reaching Kunming (Yunnan) through Mandalay and Muse (Myanmar’s border area with China). The approved oil pipeline and gas pipeline will cost US$1.5 billion and US$ 1.04935 billion respectively.\(^\text{186}\)

On strategic grounds, these pipelines are expected to overcome Beijing’s psychological perception over the insecurity of the Strait of Malacca called “Malacca dilemma.” Almost 80% of Chinese oil flows into China through the Strait of Malacca. Therefore, China is heavily reliant on the U.S. to guarantee the safe passage of oil imports as well as overall other types of transits, through the Strait of Malacca. Beijing

\(^\text{185}\) “China-Burma Relations: China’s Risk, Burma’s Dilemma,” 276.
\(^\text{186}\) Steinberg and Fan, Modern China-Myanmar Relations : Dilemmas of Mutual Dependence, 170.
believes that if any disruption in the flow of oil were to occur it would strangle China’s growing economy. These disruptions are possible scenarios for Beijing due to any crisis over Taiwan or Beijing’s crisis with other U.S. allies in Asia-Pacific. From a historical point of view, China knows the importance of Myanmar, as during the Second World War years of the Sino-Japanese war, Chiang kaishek used Chungking (now known as Chongqing) as the capital for his legitimate authority and protection and relied on Myanmar to connect to the outside world. Once the Japanese occupied Burma, he had to rely on airlift provision support of Allied powers, which strangulated the economy and transportation leading to failure. With the successful completion of pipelines, China believes it can mitigate its fear of the Malacca dilemma and counter India’s growing influence in Myanmar. Additionally, China will maintain its “valuable geo-strategic buffer zone” that can counter any potential threat to Beijing’s interest.

b. DELHI’S “LOOK EAST” VENTURES THROUGH ITS “EXTENDED NEIGHBOR”

Comparing Beijing’s interest in Myanmar, Delhi is not pleased to see its “extended neighborhood” further drifting away into a rival’s camp. Historically, India and Myanmar have experienced ups and downs in the diplomatic, economic, cultural, and people-people relations. At one time, India’s liberation leaders were greater ideals to Myanmar’s founding fathers, but the post-independence period under Gen Ne Win’s military rule changed the scenario, forcing ethnic groups of Indian origin to leave the country. India’s continued support for pro-democratic forces suffered a backlash,

187 Modern China-Myanmar Relations: Dilemmas of Mutual Dependence, 168.
188 Modern China-Myanmar Relations: Dilemmas of Mutual Dependence, 175.
annoying Myanmar’s dictators and making them sterner against India. During the Cold War the two countries supported the non-aligned movement (NAM) until 1979, when Myanmar decided to leave NAM as a result of the growing relationship between India and the Soviet Union, and their request for Myanmar to join the Commonwealth of Nations.

Naypyidaw and Delhi developed a higher level of mistrust when India voiced its support in favor of 1988’s pro-democratic protests. In the following years, Delhi welcomed democratic groups to India, especially from ethnic minorities that were not well received by the military junta in Naypyidaw. Delhi’s growing economy, over population, and need to fulfill its energy demands prompted India to cautiously compromise its traditional policies. A new “Look East” policy framed to reduce the trust deficit between its neighbors, particularly Myanmar, where India not only foresees economic gains, but also addresses its rapidly rising energy requirements to counter growing Chinese influence.

Historically for Indians, Burma is called “suvarna Bhumi” meaning the “Golden Land” in Sanskrit, because, during colonial times, Burma became a land of opportunities for minority Indians to get rich and contribute to the Indian economy too. The historic notion of the “Golden Land” faded away during Ne Win’s era. Indians in general may not be enthusiastic about the repeat of political episodes of Gen. Ne Win who expelled thousands of Indian business community. The Indian government was very critical of these heavy-handed gestures by Myanmar’s military. Therefore, the Indian government

---

189 Egreteau, "India’s Unquenched Ambitions in Burma,” 297.
remained one of the opposing proponents to military rule in Myanmar, resulting Delhi and Naypyidaw both supporting armed proxy groups on the border region against each other.

Similar to Myanmar's troubles with its ethnic minorities dominating border regions, India's northeast region, bordering Myanmar, is one of the country's troubled regions that encompasses 40 million people, with 200 tribal groups in demarcated areas in the states of Arunachal Pradesh, Assam, Manipur, Meghalaya, Mizoram, Nagaland, Sikkim, and Tripura. Anti-India armed groups in the Northeast are also engaged in arms and drug trafficking, smuggling, extortion through using training camps and jungle bases in the Sagaing division and Kachin areas in Myanmar. The military junta in Myanmar in fact showed connivance to these activities and used it as bargaining tool to get military assistance from India to crack down on the armed groups. However, there was no honest action carried out in reality against groups fighting in India, though the Tatmadaw conducted military operations against Myanmar's own ethnic minority groups in these border regions. Similarly, Indian intelligence agencies helped train Kachin rebels to create a buffer zone between its Northeastern armed rebels and Tatmadaw. Other than providing a secretive support to armed groups, India widely supported the pro-democratic groups and highly welcomed Kachin and Chin groups in New Delhi, which further strained relations between India and Myanmar. Tatmadaw increased its support to anti-India groups like the People's Liberation Army of Manipur (PLA) and the United Liberation Front of Assam (ULFA). In the late 1980s Tatmadaw's

---

ceasefire agreement with ethnic armed groups prompted India to change its policies
towards Myanmar and softened its strict behavior towards the Tatmadaw.191

Finally, in 1995, India and Myanmar agreed to launch joint operation “Golden
Bird” against alleged armed groups on both sides including PLA, ULFA, and the two
factions of National Socialist Council of Nagaland (NACN) in Khaplang (NSCN-K) and
Muivah (NSCN-M) and the Chin National Front (CFN). The unsuccessful plan faded away
as Myanmar withdrew in reaction to India conferring the Nehru Award to pro-
democratic leader Aung San Suu Kyi.192

As noted earlier, India’s growing economic activities and domestic demands
prompted Indian policy makers to change their traditional policy approaches. It is
pertinent to observe that India always had a policy of self-reliance and supporting
domestic output. Marie Lall (2006) notes that “India’s age-old priority of swadeshi or
“self-sufficiency” is no longer a feasible goal and regulating relations with states who
can provide the badly needed gas and oil is seen as central to India’s new foreign policy
(particularly “Look East Policy”).”193 In this regard, with Bangladesh a recalcitrant
partner, India’s Look East policy was targeted at opening markets in Southeast Asia and
cooperation with Myanmar was important for its implementation.194 For the
implementation of the “Look East” policy, during the 1990s India came up with a new
regional strategic vision towards the east with an idea of an “extended neighborhood”

191 Egretneau, “India’s Unquenched Ambitions in Burma,” 300-01.
192 Nardi, “Cross-Border Chaos: A Critique of India’s Attempts to Secure Its Northeast Tribal Areas through
Cooperation with Myanmar,” 163; Egretneau, “India’s Unquenched Ambitions in Burma,” 302.
193 Marie Lall, “Indo-Myanmar Relations in the Era of Pipeline Diplomacy,” Contemporary Southeast Asia:
A Journal of International and Strategic Affairs 28, no. 3 (December 2006): 427.
194 Rieffel, Myanmar/Burma : Inside Challenges, Outside Interests, 135.
in Burma. India’s new vision primarily focused on three main areas: stabilizing India’s troubled northeast region ("Golden Bird Operation 1995"), economic opportunities in Myanmar ("Look East Policy of 1991") and counter-balancing the growing Chinese influence in Myanmar and the region as a whole (Military Aid). 195

Recently, like Beijing, Delhi is investing in a number of mega projects in Myanmar. Myanmar being a geographic pivot, India initiated the Bangladesh-India-Myanmar-Sri Lanka-Thailand Economic Cooperation (BIMST-EC) agreement in 1997 and also the Mekong-Ganga Cooperation (MGC) agreement in 2000. A similar initiative by Beijing, known as China’s Kunming Initiative or Bangladesh-China-India-Myanmar (BCIM) in 1999, provided an avenue for Myanmar to gradually come out of isolation as a pariah state and enjoy the benefits of regional diplomatic ties other than ASEAN. 196 The earlier section of political economy highlighted the top four countries trading with Myanmar and showed a recent increase in the high volume of trade between India and Myanmar.

Among India’s many mega projects, prominent ones include the construction of highways and oil and gas pipelines connecting Myanmar with India’s Northeast region. A few examples: In 2001, Former Indian Foreign Minister Jaswant Singh inaugurated a 160 KM long road, the India-Myanmar Friendship road (cost US $2.58 million), which connected the Indian Northeast and Mandalay. 197 Delhi is also moving forward with its $400 million Kaladan “multi-modal” project; this project will link India’s Mizoram and

196 "India’s Unquenched Ambitions in Burma," 303.
197 Lall, "Indo-Myanmar Relations in the Era of Pipeline Diplomacy," 437; Egreteau, "India’s Unquenched Ambitions in Burma," 303.
Assam to the southwestern port of Akyab in Myanmar.\textsuperscript{198} Moreover, during the early 2000s, Indian oil and gas firms, such as Oil & Natural Gas Corporation Limited (ONGC), Gas Authority of Indian Limited (GAIL), and Essar Oil (a private Indian company) were allowed to exploit natural gas in the Arakan (Rakhine) fields.\textsuperscript{199}

On strategic grounds, Delhi wanted to counter Beijing’s growing influence in Myanmar. Delhi’s bitter experience with the 1962 war with China and recent media reports propagating the notion of a “rise of China” is obsessing many Indian policy makers. As China is the main arms supplier to the military establishment of Myanmar, a Chinese arms deal worth US$ 1 billion and an additional $400 million in 1994 to modernize Tatmadaw has raised fears in India. India is also alarmed by suspicions that China is establishing a facility for surveillance and monitoring purposes at Great Coco Island, north of the Andaman archipelago.\textsuperscript{200} As a response, recently Delhi has been trying to play catch-up. In November 2013, on an official tour, the Indian Army chief General Bikram Singh shared India’s plan to provide military aid, including supply of military equipment and spare parts, training and border cooperation, with President Thein Sein, Foreign Minister U Wunna Maung Lwin, and Commander-in-Chief of the Defense Services, Senior General Min Aung Hlaing. Myanmar comfortably agreed to accept the offer and was willing to balance China’s rule in Myanmar through welcoming Indian military trainers for training purposes, as well as agreeing to send 100 special

\textsuperscript{199} Lall, "Indo-Myanmar Relations in the Era of Pipeline Diplomacy," 429.
\textsuperscript{200} Egreteau, "India’s Unquenched Ambitions in Burma," 306.
forces yearly to acquire training at the Indian Army’s counter-insurgency and jungle warfare school at Vairengte in Mizoram.  

Despite Delhi being historically at odds with Naypyidaw, Delhi is slowly and steadily progressing towards restoring benign relations with Myanmar. Delhi needs to tackle troubling border issues immediately in order to gain long term and effective ties with Myanmar. As discussed earlier, other than armed struggles in the northeast, it is important to highlight the geographic reality of India’s northeast, which is choked between Bhutan, Nepal and Bangladesh with a narrow link, a “chicken neck,” connecting it to mainland India. It is a completely different case from that of China’s Yunnan province, because India’s northeast is a troubled zone and presents comparatively higher poverty problems. The armed groups like ULFA has bases in all neighboring countries around the region. In 2009 a bomb blast killed more than 60 people and injured more than 300 in Assam by National Democratic Front of Bodoland (NDFB) due to political and economic grievances. India needs to resolve the grievances of its northeastern region; otherwise, India’s dreams towards the east may face major problems.

C. OTHERS AS LYNCHPIN OF GEOPOLITICAL FULCRUM?

Other than India and China, Japan has been a long time silent donor and investor in Myanmar. In that sense, Japan has developed a soft image in the minds of the people.

---

201 Rajat Pandit, "India Steps up Military Aid to Myanmar to Offset China’s Might," The Times of India November 1, 2013.
of Myanmar. For Japan, the growing market economy of Myanmar is an economic strategic asset in the coming years. Bangladesh and Thailand are also contending neighbors in terms of gaining a share in energy and economic opportunities in Myanmar. Despite this, Myanmar enjoys its largest trading economy with Thailand, but Naypyidaw is always suspicious of Thailand’s closeness to the United States.

Highlighting some significant projects in Myanmar, Bangladesh has shown its desire to join the economic revival through the construction of highways. In 2010 Bangladeshi Prime Minister Sheikh Hasina, during her visit to Kunming (Yunnan), agreed to construct a railway road connecting Chittagong to Kunming through Ramree (Myanmar) to enhance communication and trade activities.\(^3\)

Thailand and Myanmar have planned a mega project to harness Myanmar’s resources through the establishment of an industrial hub at the Tavoy/Dawei area in the Tanintharyi Region (former Tenasserim Division). The initial investment is estimated at US$8.6 billion with an additional US$58 billion to follow. The industrial project will develop a deep-sea port, chemical plants, oil refinery, and highways connecting Thailand, China, Laos, Cambodia, and the rest of Southeast Asia, which would eventually reduce reliance on the usage of the Strait of Malacca. Unfortunately, these projects are planned at the cost of environmental devastation. Thailand plans to shift all industrial units that are harmful to this area, meaning in the future Myanmar will have to bear the environmental effects.\(^4\) Recently Myanmar’s English newspaper “Eleven” gave coverage to protestors opposing the industrial projects. According to the newspaper, in

\(^3\) Where China Meets India: Burma and the New Crossroads of Asia, 320.
September 2013, residents of the Dawei area in Tanintharyi Division launched campaigns against the construction of the oil refinery and industrial projects that cause environmental damage to their area.\textsuperscript{205}

The above discussion highlighting the competition over mega projects in Myanmar vindicates the valuable resources and geo-strategic location of Myanmar. These examples support the notion that there is always a foreign involvement due to attraction to resources and creation of buffer zones for geo-strategic reasons. Similarly, in the past, it was the British-Japanese colonization and occupation episodes that are vivid examples of direct involvement by external powers. Whereas, most recently, regional powers like China and India are indirectly engaged in expanding their presence inside Myanmar. Moreover, the rise of democratic forces in Myanmar cannot be ignored, eventually involving Western forces, especially the United States, when it is in a process of rebalancing towards the Asia-Pacific region. This external political engineering helps with the understanding that at large the local culture remains a great tool of exploitation for geopolitical and geo-economic reasons.

Since the end of the Second World War, the U.S has been the security guarantor of its Pacific allies, and rebalancing the rising influentials in the region is one U.S strategy to maintain the status quo. Therefore, the U.S. does not want to push Naypyidaw hard over human rights violations and democratic forces, as the U.S. tried in the wake of the 1988 protests. The result then was Tatmadaw deciding Myanmar had to become closer to China. In addition, U.S. investors will not be happy with any forceful attempt by

\textsuperscript{205} "Residents Protest the Building of Oil Refinery in Dawei," \textit{ Eleven} September 25, 2013.
Washington towards Naypyidaw risking their recent investments, so Washington will be under pressure to deal cautiously with Naypyidaw. Additionally, the U.S. is also carefully observing the diplomatic maneuverings of Naypyidaw in the region, as Naypyidaw is active in choosing new partners and assigning projects to countries to maintain its historical image of a non-aligned state.

A nuclear Myanmar and any linkage with North Korea will of course be a matter of concern for the U.S. and its allies within and outside the region. In the scenario of Myanmar going nuclear, this fractured zone of Asia-pacific will become one of the most dangerous shatterbelts of the world, where all hostile neighbors are equipped with nuclear weapons. Already China, India, Pakistan and North Korea share borders with no good relations, and if Myanmar decides to choose the nuclear camp, it will not be an ideal situation for global peace, let alone the future stability of the country itself. The controversial project about Myanmar's nuclear plan came to light after its defectors disclosed Myanmar's nuclear ambition. Many analysts believe it is potentially an inspiration from North Korea for strategic reasons. It obviously raised concerns of the West and its allies in the region.

According to Alexis Rieffel, "Myanmar’s interest in a nuclear energy program has been made public, [and] the government has kept secret its plans to build an underground complex below Naung Laing Mountain (near Pyin Oo Lwin) in northern Myanmar with possible North Korean help. This site is close to the civilian research reactor being assembled by Russia. Photographs taken of the complex between 2003 and 2006 are reported to show more than 800 tunnels ... North Korea is suspected of
having passed nuclear technology to Myanmar."206 The suspected cooperation was brought to a halt when Myanmar foiled a North Korean attempt to assassinate South Korean president Chun Doo-hwan in 1983 during his planned visit to Myanmar. Kim II-Sung failed to restore relations with Myanmar, until the historic mass protests of 1988. As a result of mass mobilization, the relations seem to have been restored after 1988's pro-democratic protest, especially when Western diplomatic pressure for the transfer of power prompted SPDC (military junta) to join its old rogue block. Finally, in 2000, Myanmar's military regime made public its plans to purchase a small reactor from Russia.207

Seeing a possible nuclear proliferation in the region, in 2003 the then chairman of the U.S. Senate Foreign Relations Committee, Richard G. Lugar, showed concern over Myanmar's nuclear ambitions and referred to it as a "source of instability throughout South and Southeast Asia."208 In 2007 Myanmar agreed to terms with Russia to construct a nuclear reactor. The deal was actually discussed in 2000, and stalled during 2002 due to Myanmar's inability to make an advance payment. However, the booming energy industry is helping Myanmar to accumulate its foreign reserves. As per the initial plan, the reactor will generate 10-megawatts of power. The cost of the project was not disclosed; however, according to Russian hints, it will be around US$500 million.209 Due to the recent rise of energy sector investments, Myanmar has apparently been silent on nuclear reactors for energy purposes; however, its threat perceptions cannot be ruled

---

208 *Myanmar/Burma: Inside Challenges, Outside Interests*, 188.
out. If the promised reform policies fail and Myanmar decides to return to its earlier status, the U.S. and its allies will need to retain better working relations with Tatmadaw until responsible civilian power takes the charge.

Overall, the geostrategic and geo-economic avenues have become favorable to Myanmar. Myanmar needs to propose friendly economic policies and move forward towards a democratic transition and economic development of the entire country without being limited to a few groups and excluding the rest. In this regard, U.S. policy makers also understand that regional economic interdependence has strengthened the relations of China with other Asian countries; so, it is unlikely that the U.S. will block the Strait of Malacca. However, a reasonable assumption is the fear that if democratic forces are quelled or human rights violations persist in Myanmar, it may potentially threaten all the mega projects.\(^\text{210}\) The security of pipelines and roads are a serious matter as most of these linkages are passing through ethnic minority areas, which are under the control of ethnic militias. It is a serious issue for China too, as the oil and gas pipelines of the Shwe Gas project will pass through 22 towns along 980 KMs (officially 771-793 KMs) of Myanmar. For the protection of the pipelines, forty-four infantry and light infantry battalions are stationed, which demonstrates that without resolving issues with ethnic minorities the security of these pipelines are at high risk.\(^\text{211}\) The construction of new roads and railroads across Myanmar by India and China is itself the creation of a new Silk Road in the twenty-first century. Though Myanmar connects two big world economies directly or indirectly to the rest of the world, critically Myanmar would be


\(^{211}\) *Modern China-Myanmar Relations: Dilemmas of Mutual Dependence*, 178.
accomplishing this task through odd connections through “vast hinterlands of India and China, much less visible to the outside, poor and with a spine of violent conflict running right through.”\textsuperscript{212} Without resolving its domestic problems with ethnic minorities, mainly political and economic grievances, sooner or later the turmoil may turn Myanmar into a quagmire for the rest of the country and affect the economic opportunities of entire region.

CONCLUSION: PROSPECTS AND CHALLENGES

Suppressing its own people who rose up to seek their basic rights, Myanmar has experienced one of the most brutal military regimes in recent history. Unfortunately historical and societal divides have given the military regime leverage to play with emotions and nationalistic fervors on those dividing lines. For a stable Myanmar, the country needs to establish a federal army recruiting from all ethnic groups, not discriminating against others by recruiting only Burmans. In addition, Myanmar, a geographical pivot state balancing between China and India, two important rising regional powers, has its own geopolitical and economic challenges, while the entire Southeast Asian region has been undergoing a process of transformation for the last two decades.

During the political and economic transformations, the military regimes in Myanmar consolidated the roots of a praetorian society. However it grappled with diverse political developments of regimes in its neighboring countries. For instance,

Vietnam and Laos became rapidly growing market oriented party-states, the Philippines and Indonesia experienced the transitions of post-developmental dictatorship democracies, Thailand became democratized but with an unstable democracy with a political monarchy, and Singapore and Malaysia enjoyed successful economic ventures under competitive authoritarian states. Meanwhile, Burma became economically stagnant seeking political direction under a military regime. The military regime continued its rule for five decades, and finally in 2010, the military agreed to transfer power to a so-called democratically elected regime.

The 2010 elections apparently provided a ray of hope towards a democratic transition and the establishment of rule of law that can respect the egalitarian rights of every member of Myanmar through inclusive policies towards political settlements. During November 2013, on her visit to Australia, Aung San Suu Kyi said, “We are just starting out on the road to democracy. We are not there yet, as some people seem to assume ... without amendments to the constitution, we can never become a truly democratic society.” Along with the political transitions, the economic revival is seen as a sign of relief for Myanmar’s impoverished people after decades of ultra-poor conditions due to its isolationists and bad economic policies by the military regime. The new projects about the economic, political, and social initiatives in Burma is expanding in the landscape of Myanmar, including the social “space, legal and political protections and opportunities for the poor, uneducated, unhealthy, malnourished, and

---

disenfranchised citizenry... [BUT]... there is no full consensus, much insider and outsider opinion prioritizes creating contending power centers able to challenge the status of the military machine as the essential political actors." The reason for this is the status of the military machine a crucial actor; most information has to be channelized through the regime under the influence of the military, and outside Myanmar, opinions are skeptical about the legality of any positive initiatives. Moreover, most countries', especially China and India, are solely concerned about the security of their investments in Myanmar. If Myanmar fails to reach a political settlement with ethnic groups, then it may have negative repercussions on the mega projects started recently, and there will be no security guarantee for safe passage through economic corridors in the troubled zones.

At the moment, the entire world is predicting the prospects and challenges on the basis of known-knowns about Myanmar, yet, there is an information black hole, so the unknown-unknowns need more time and patience so the intentions of the regime and the outcomes of current ventures can be evaluated. Myanmar's existing fragile and weak diplomatic links, lack of stability, and inability to be properly integrated into the regional and global stage is damaging to the aspirational growth of Asian countries, and its impacts will be negative to the rest of the world.

---

CHAPTER IV

CASE STUDY II - PAKISTAN: FROM NATION-BUILDING TO A HODGEPODGE OF CIVIL-MILITARY RULE

Our Beloved country (Pakistan) is facing severe challenges of power outage/Load shedding, rising cost (inflation), Mountain of Debts, unemployment, Chaotic economic situation, despondency among youth, extremism and unrest, rising poverty, fractured government institutions, widespread corruption, and Pakistan’s weak global image ... these are like a dense jungle of problems ... for his new government.

Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif¹

Pakistan is the pivot of the world ... the frontiers on which the future position of the world revolves.

Founder and First Governor-General of Pakistan, M. A. Jinnah²

Pakistan is an enormous country; it is strategically an important country not just for the United States but also for the World. It’s a country, whose people has an enormous potential, but it is also right now a country that within it has extremists elements... (The United States) engaged aggressively with Pakistani government to communicate that we (U.S) want nothing more than a stable, prosperous, peaceful Pakistan... (And) work with the Pakistani government in order to eradicate this extremism that we consider a cancer within the country that can potentially engulf the country.”

President Barack Obama³

INTRODUCTION

A historic moment in the political history of Pakistan, May 11, 2013, saw for the first time a successful democratic transition of power from one democratically elected government to another. Despite the positive indicators of the democratization process,

¹ During the maiden speech at parliament after electing third time Prime Minister of Pakistan in June 5th, 2013.
² During conversation with American wartime correspondent Margaret Bourke-White in September 1947.
³ During official visit to India, and responding to a question asking, “Why has the U.S reluctant to label Pakistan as a terrorist state?” In November 2010.
Pakistan is still referred to as a deep state or security state, where its military is believed to be the most powerful institution that sways political processes, as opposed to other political institutions. The political leadership is branded as incompetent, corrupt, and on many occasions a shadow of doubt has been cast on the loyalty of politicians to their country. Thus the politicians have remained less fortunate in Pakistan’s political landscape, while the two colonial inherited institutions, the civil bureaucracy and the military, have taken charge of and penetrated deeply into the political system. The domestic power struggles for political authority and bargaining between political and military elites affected the establishment of any proper political and social order. On many occasions the country’s constitution, which is believed to be the supreme law, has been abrogated via frequent coups. Every coup or military intervention was legitimized as in the greater interest of the nation-state. The effects of power competition between the political institutions led the “Pakistani masses in a state of semi-literacy, making them prone to adopt a religiously based culture of resentment while depriving them of the theoretical and practical tools [of inclusive or participatory politics] that would allow them to challenge the existing social order.” Today, Pakistan is not in an ideal situation in terms of its social cohesion as a nation compared to its early days of nationhood, when it embarked on a journey of nation and state-building in the 1940s.

---


The deeply polarized nation-state requires a complete overhaul. Over the last six decades the domestic and regional power politics have drastically affected the entire Pakistani nation, which is extremely polarized and fractured between the pro-liberal and anti-liberal camps under the colorful shades of revolutionaries, seculars, moderates, the religious, fundamentalists, ethno-nationalists, and so forth. Subsequently a huge portion of the bewildered population seems to be sandwiched between the contending poles. This dangerous scale of polarization can be depicted in the perspective that for many Malala Yousafzai (a girl who was shot by Taliban for promoting and defending women’s right to education) and Salman Taseer (killed for supporting the amendment of Blasphemy law) are heroes, while for fundamentalists they are agents of the West. In fact, Islamists in the country see Osama Bin Laden and Mumtaz Qadri (personal police guard and killer of Governor of Punjab Salman Taseer) as their heroes. Moreover, the state narrative of dealing with terrorism and extremism is lately based on the idea of a “good” and “bad” Taliban, or extremism itself creating a divide in society.

Polarization has gradually created great confusion and controversy among the citizens; if asked to define Pakistan’s identity, it is quite easy to get multiple interpretations and definitions. It is true to accept that identity is shaped by narrative, and depends on the state’s policies that have molded its identity during the nation-building process. Benedict Anderson writes that nations are “imagined communities,” and with the passage of time, there is a persistent change process in social

---

consciousness, therefore, "identity … cannot be remembered, [and] must be narrated."\(^8\)

In Pakistan’s contexts, the identity of the nation is visible in various contending forms.

Pakistani journalist Ahmed Rashid has smartly sketched the various images of Pakistan’s identity through various viewpoints, as he writes that:

“the military defines Pakistani national identity defensively, in terms of the country’s vulnerability, as a national security state, with a permanent mistrust of India. The politicians in power have never seriously tried to challenge this isolating self-definition by offering alternative policies, such as promoting good neighborliness, ending support for Islamic extremism, fostering economic development, and providing education. The Pakistani Taliban, for their part, would define Pakistan in religious terms: they call for the establishment of a state based on Sharia or Islamic law and for a caliphate.”\(^9\)

The deep polarization of society has evolved around the “holy battles” between secular or liberals and orthodox religious or anti-liberal groups; and in many ways these societal drifts towards extremism are coxed by state policies countering regional security challenges, pending unresolved political disputes and political interests. Over the years, due to regional geopolitical maneuvering, there are occasions where policies directly and indirectly support certain divisive groups, which has from time to time further widened the fissures of fragmentation in the societal structure with overwhelmingly mind-numbing ramifications for the political development of the nation-state.\(^10\) Diverse opinions and opposition exist in every political society, but the lack of tolerance and empathy to accommodate minorities and the denial to accept each other’s rational viewpoints is a troubling factor in Pakistan’s evolving political culture.

---

\(^8\) Anderson, *Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism*, 204.


Looking at the journey of nation-building in Pakistan, a British Pakistani writer, Tariq Ali in his book *Can Pakistan Survive?* explains that the sequential political development involved the “triune influence of military dictatorships, failed populism and rural conservatism on the political development has reduced the country to a state of permanent crisis.” However, in response to the prevailing alarming situations, Anatol Lieven calls Pakistan a tough country which has shown resilience against all the “divided, disorganized, economically backward, corrupt, violent, unjust, often savagely oppressive towards the poor and women, and home to extremely dangerous forms of extremism and terrorism and yet it moves and is in many ways surprisingly tough and resilient as a state and a society.”

The holistic image of the country projects that Pakistan’s weak but self-centered political elites are continuously confusing the entire nation, but the majority of citizens are seeking the proper direction that the country’s founders envisioned (see the Appendix B for a glimpse of Mr. Jinnah’s vision). The entire nation is completely confused over its core interests and national agendas. While the situation on the ground is complex, the Pakistani people anticipate some bold and careful decisions to reorient state narratives towards the forgotten ideals of the nation’s founding father Mr. Jinnah, who outlined the ideals during his historic speech delivered to the constituent Assembly of Pakistan on August 11, 1947.

---

Due to geo-strategic and geopolitical reasons, mainly an Indian-centric existential fear, Pakistani political leadership immediately decided to become a Western ally so it could benefit from its bipolar politics for its own safety in the region. Conversely, at the domestic level, nation-building was based frequently on religious ideals that possibly eschewed any secessionist or irredentist struggle. The decades long military rule signified a higher role of religion in political life, which helped military rulers frame a "policy of tripod," meaning decision-making and outcomes centered around three priorities: religious nationalism, Indian-centric foreign policy, and an alliance with the West.\(^{14}\) The notion of religious nationalism gathered more space in civic and political public spheres. The implicit policies of facilitating non-state actors, especially during the Cold War, resulted in the indoctrination of ideas like Gazwa-e-hindi (Battle of India) establishing the caliphate in greater Khorasan, further cementing a confrontational ideology in the minds of conservatives. The past policies of supporting and facilitating radical groups created a social space that entertained and empowered extremely hardline religious leadership.\(^{15}\) These trends tend to develop a confrontational mindset towards political and economic modernization, which unfortunately hollows the foundations of the state within. Sometimes the economic sanctions also isolate it from the rest of the world. However, the notion of isolation breaks away due to Pakistan’s geographical pivot, such positioning always keeping it as one of the most important units in the geo-strategic structure of world politics.


\(^{15}\) Ibid.
The policies of manipulating religious nationalism seems to negate Mr. Jinnah's first presidential address to the Constituent Assembly of Pakistan on August 11, 1947. In his address Jinnah clarified that Pakistan was created as a country for Muslims, who were politically marginalized. Keeping in mind the past memory of marginalization, the role of religion in the governance of the state should be evaded in newly formed Pakistan, he declared, and the governance structure should be relegated to the private domain. As in his August 11, 1947 speech, Jinnah fundamentally outlined the following principles as the basis for a political culture for the newly established country (see the entire speech in appendix B):

"You are free; you are free to go to your temples, you are free to go to your mosques or to any other place or worship in this State of Pakistan. You may belong to any religion or caste or creed that has nothing to do with the business of the State... We are starting in the days where there is no discrimination, no distinction between one community and another, no discrimination between one caste or creed and another. We are starting with this fundamental principle that we are all citizens and equal citizens of one State... Now I think we should keep that in front of us as our ideal and you will find that in course of time Hindus would cease to be Hindus and Muslims would cease to be Muslims, not in the religious sense, because that is the personal faith of each individual, but in the political sense as citizens of the State."  

The fundamental guiding principles were important for Jinnah, because Jinnah did not want to see other religious minorities suffer or feel inferior, as Muslims had during the early colonial era. In this regard, an effective political order needed to be reoriented through a careful look at historical decisions. After all, reorientation is a

17 Malik, Pakistan: Founder's Aspirations and Today's Realities, 6.
challenging course of action to alter an established political culture, but the current
times demand an effort be made to achieve the goal.

In the process of reorientating the state, Pakistani policy makers need to be
prudent in observing the crucial period of 2013-2014. The reason it is a crucial phase of
the twenty first century is because it will be a defining moment for Pakistan itself, the
region, and the entire world to set an agenda for the rest of the century. The phase is
specifically significant for Pakistan because the state is in a process of political transition.
This transition helps with the maturing of the political system with democratic ideals,
though the state struggles to put its political order on track. Additionally, Pakistan has a
key role in the “global war on Terror,” which has entered an important and conclusive
stage of the war in Afghanistan. While presenting Pakistan’s National Internal Security
Policy (NISP) 2013-2018, the Interior Minister of Pakistan, Chaudhry Nisar Ali Khan
categorically mentioned the “existential threat to the integrity and sovereignty of the
state” is looming due to terrorism.\textsuperscript{18} The cost of the recent high magnitude of terrorist
activities is high; cost can be witnessed through the loss of control of territory to foreign
terrorists, who established their authority on ungoverned spaces within Pakistan’s
territorial jurisdiction and challenged the writ of the state. Economically terrorism has
cost $78 billion, and more importantly, civilian casualties have crossed the figure of
48,994, including 5,272 security personnel, from 2001 to November 2013.\textsuperscript{19}

If the existential threat becomes acute, then it will certainly prompt the
international community to be vigilant about Pakistan’s nuclear assets, and the

\textsuperscript{18} Ismail Khan, “Pakistan Most Terror-Hit Nation,” \textit{Dawn} 02-23-2014, para. 2.
\textsuperscript{19} “Pakistan Most Terror-Hit Nation,” \textit{Dawn} 02-23-2014, para. 8.
transnational effects across the region and the whole world. At the moment, the safeguard of nuclear weapons is protected under a strict command and control system, which satisfies international agencies. However, Pakistan's nuclear program was put and remains under an international watch list since the Pakistani government was alerted over A. Q. Khan's clandestine transfer of nuclear technology, a discovery which led to international observers and analysts to liken it to "a nuclear WalMart."²⁰

Secondly, this phase of history is important for the region because Pakistan's two important neighbors, Afghanistan and India, will elect new governments. Therefore, the newly elected regimes in the region such as in Afghanistan, Iran, India and Pakistan will be seeking to achieve favorable win-sets to preserve their political, geo-strategic, and economic interests. Also, the waves of instability across the Middle East are alarming and pose transnational challenges for Pakistan and its neighboring countries, forcing them to tackle complex issues on multiple fronts. Finally, Pakistan is located at a junction of the region which is unique as it converges South Asia, East Asia, Central Asia, and West Asia, providing a suitable base for potential global economic activities, i.e. the rise of Chinese and Indian economic markets and their regional influence. At the same time, the entire convergence zone is dangerously fractured from within, as it hosts three of the world's nuclear powers, China, India and Pakistan. The powers are also the world's top three arms importers, and they are hostile to each other and represent a

²⁰ Christopher Clary, "Dr. Khan's Nuclear Walmart," (The Acronym Institute for Disarmament Diplomacy, 2004), para. 2.
bitter history of past wars and continuous border skirmishes. \footnote{Siemon T. Wezeman and Pieter D. Wezeman, "Trends in International Arms Transfer 2013," (Stockholm: Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI), March 2014), 1.} Preserving peace and stability and carrying out smooth political economic activities in the region is in the greater interest of the entire world.

The agenda of this chapter is to identify the core problems that Pakistan has witnessed during its journey of nation and state-building processes. What are the factors that facilitated in weakening state institutions, ineffectiveness, and unaccountable state-society relations, which subsequently undermined the rule of law? The discussion focuses on historical and contemporary analysis of four broader areas to explain the driving factors, i.e. security, political-economic, social, and geopolitical dimensions, to understand the evolution of violence, corruption, human rights abuse, and geo-strategic troubles in Pakistan.

DECOLONIZATION: A MOMENT OF EUPHORIA AND DYSPHORIA

The decline of the British Empire resulted in a speedy decolonization process across the world. The anti-colonial and independence movement in the Indian sub-continent resulted in the creation of two states on the basis of the two-nation theory. \footnote{Maleeha Lodhi, \textit{Pakistan : Beyond the Crisis State} (New York: Columbia University Press, 2011), 10.} The notion of the two-nation theory advocated two separate states on the basis of religion, i.e. Hindu majority areas were to form India, while Muslim majority areas were to become Pakistan. \footnote{Owen Bennett Jones, \textit{Pakistan : Eye of the Storm}, 3rd ed. (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2009), 14.} The state’s formation process was shaped by an act of a surgical partition of the Indian sub-continent in August 1947. A population of 42 million lived in
East Pakistan, while 33 million resided in West Pakistan, based on their religious identity. Interestingly, India was located in between and divided both eastern and western wings with a territory stretched over 1,000 miles.\textsuperscript{24} Partition resulted in one of the largest human mobilizations in the history; more than one million people died, and ten million migrated as refugees. In fact, decolonization was a moment that brought an end to the British Empire, but left a legacy of hatred and violence in the region that continues to this day.\textsuperscript{25} Bruce Riedel, Director of the Brookings Intelligence Project, notes that “India and Pakistan were born with a wound, and the wound has not healed in the decades since; instead it has become more infected, giving rise to terror and violence.”\textsuperscript{26}

As an outcome of the two-nation theory, Pakistan became the first country to be created in the name of religious ideology, later followed by Israel’s creation on ideological grounds in 1948. Former President of Pakistan and military dictator Gen. Zia ul Haq compared Pakistan with Israel during an interview in \textit{The Economist} in 1981, categorically pointing out that religion’s role is pivotal in the existence of Pakistan. He affirmed if one were to “take Islam out of Pakistan and make it a secular state; it would collapse.”\textsuperscript{27} Thirty years after his interview, the situation now is more complex, highly intolerant, and violent. Over the years, it has resulted in producing intolerance and

\textsuperscript{25} Riedel, \textit{Avoiding Armageddon : America, India, and Pakistan to the Brink and Back}, 48.
\textsuperscript{26} \textit{Avoiding Armageddon : America, India, and Pakistan to the Brink and Back}, 47.
\textsuperscript{27} Faisal Devji, \textit{Muslim Zion : Pakistan as a Political Idea} (USA: Harvard University Press, 2013), 4.
disseminating hatred towards oriented ideals, in the name of religion, towards
opponents for political gains by specific classes and for strategic reasons.

During the early days of Pakistan’s independence, the developing nation
struggled to construct a national identity on ideological grounds. The founding political
leadership “aspire(d) to Western constitutionalism” which to the leaders seemed likely
to address various issues of national identities and the territorial legitimacy of the state
in becoming acceptable to all ethnic groups.28 Aspiration towards Western
constitutionalism can be traced to Jinnah’s vision for the newly born nation-state. Jinnah
trusted that democratic ideals would be suitable for the constitution of the country, as
for him, the Pakistani “soil is perfectly fertile for democracy” for its political
orientations.29 Jinnah did not realize, however, that in the future many of the colonial
legacies would hamper the democratic orientation of the country by strengthening its
praetorian structure.

The moments of euphoria over independence faded away quickly with both
domestic and external factors, as Pakistan scrambled with a number of socio-economic
and geopolitical challenges. From its inception, these challenges caused Pakistan’s
fledgling political institutions to be established on weak and fragile foundations. Mainly
on political grounds, the newly born nation-state was “lacking both a well-defined basis
of nationhood and a sufficient administrative structure.”30 On the economic front, the
poor economic conditions did not promise to support the state’s financial needs. After

28 Shaikh, Making Sense of Pakistan, 1.
29 Haqqani, Magnificent Delusions: Pakistan, the United States, and an Epic History of Misunderstanding, 21.
independence, the exchequer of Pakistan was empty; the lack of funds to pay employee
wages and salaries was a hard situation for the newly born country.

Ian Talbot writes that one of the reasons for Pakistan’s economic challenges was
the delay in receiving the share of assets from divided India. As per the partition plan,
Pakistan was entitled to receive 17.5 per cent of the assets, including a share of the Rs.
550 million cash balance, while India was willing to share a smaller percent to what was
agreed in principle. An agreement was reached in December 1947 to share the cash
balance. As India was already in shock to see a divided land, and due to the geopolitical
conflict over Kashmir further cementing a higher level of distrust, India moved to
withhold the transfer of the agreed cash balance, though the amount was released at
later stages.31 However, the year’s earlier unresolved political and geographic issues
over Kashmir with India on its Eastern frontiers, and at the same time, Afghanistan’s
question over the Durand Line on its Western Frontiers, became a security challenge for
years to come. Afghanistan’s alignment with India quickly prompted the Pakistani
security establishment and political elites to align with China for regional balancing,
while opting towards the West for technological, military, and economic assistance.32 In
order to counter two fronts, one at its eastern and the other on its western border, a
policy to support non-state actors as proxies became active in order to fulfill the political
and security agendas in Kashmir and Afghanistan. In recent decades this policy has

31 Ian Talbot, Pakistan, a Modern History, Expanded and updated ed. (New York, NY: Palgrave Macmillan,
2005), 98; Jalal, Democracy and Authoritarianism in South Asia : A Comparative and Historical Perspective,
22.
32 Haqqani, Pakistan : Between Mosque and Military, 15.
backfired, and the non-state actors are now transformed into an anti-state force fighting against the Pakistani people and state institutions.

Another tragedy of the newly born nation was the early death of the founder of the nation-state, Mr. Jinnah (mainly known as Quaid-i-Azam, meaning “great leader”) in 1948. After his death, political events gradually receded from the dreams built for the country’s future to be a modern Islamic state that proclaimed pluralistic democratic norms through inclusiveness and the assimilation of every individual who lived in the country.33 In fact, state policies became more emphatic on promoting orthodox Islamic ideals as the unifying force for the nation and to deter the nationalistic issue of Bengalis in Eastern Pakistan, and Pashtun and Baluch nationalists in West Pakistan, which had already opened a number of domestic fronts for Pakistan to tackle. These issues gradually provided appealing circumstances for the military elites to take over power, whom had already established praetorian roots in the sub-continent under colonial rule.

Another setback to Pakistan’s fledging democratic institutions was the assassination of its first Prime Minister Mr. Liaquat Ali Khan (also known as Quaid-i-Milat, meaning “leader of the nation”) during a public speech in 1951. Police personnel on duty soon killed the assassin, and the reason behind the assassination was buried, along with the PM’s corpse, as a mystery. After his assassination, the civil bureaucrats took complete command of governance, and later military coups completely sidelined the political leadership.34

33 Lawrence Ziring, Pakistan: At the Crosscurrent of History (Oxford: Oneworld, 2003), 53.
34 Ali, Can Pakistan Survive?: The Death of a State, 43.
The hodgepodge of civil-military leadership constructed a new state narrative portraying Pakistan, which affirmed it was created in the name of Islam, should stand with the principles of religion. Over time, the "political commitment to an ideological state gradually evolved into a strategic commitment," which turned into a symbiotic relation between military and religious elites endorsing each other's acts.35 Systematic processes attempted at various stages may explain the "attempts at Islamizing the state, at Islamizing the law, at Islamizing political life, at Islamizing the economic and banking system, at Islamizing Knowledge;" however, the degree of success for each attempt varies depending on the type of regime in Pakistan.36 After the events of 1971's war, Pakistani state officials gave a serious look at recasting the state's history.37 History books and texts for schools and academic purposes were designed in a way that could support religion as a basis for Pakistan and its way of life.38 Since the late 1970s the redesigned history books have included a subject called social studies; the subject has become mandatory and has been taught from primary schools to professional degree programs in universities, so future generations are embedded with the constructed narratives. It is important to note that the Pakistan history and social studies books describe that the independence struggle was not linked with British colonial times and an undivided India, but rather date back to 712 AD when Mohammad Bin Qasim, at the

35 Haqqani, Pakistan: Between Mosque and Military, 3.
behest of Umayyad Caliphate, came from Baghdad and attacked Sindh (now part of Pakistan) to free some imprisoned Arab traders.  

The history of romanticism continues and includes the Mughal period of rule, the war of liberation of 1857 against British rule, and surprisingly the roles of Mehmud Gaznawi (who ruled in 10th century over most of Afghanistan, some parts of Iran and today's Pakistan) and Ahmed Shah Abdali (father of modern day Afghanistan) are also included in the spreading or preaching of Islam that eventually provided the basis for Pakistan. The historiography process through textbook curriculum includes chapters on Muslim rulers from the past to balance the religious rulers with authoritarian leadership. Through narratives, creating a nexus between religion and authoritarian rule provided an opportunity to use religion as a justifying factor that endorses rulers or their political actions; the ruling elites knew that Muslims become submissive when religious discourse is employed. Additionally, in recent times blasphemy laws have been used for political or personal reasons. Historian Ayesha Jalal quotes from one of Dogar’s history books that shows how historical narratives were framed to declare military rulers as true leaders following religious guidance and democratically elected Prime Minister Bhutto as a dictator; the Dogar’s book referred the democratic regime of Bhutto as a “...cruel regime ... a worst dictatorship of a staunch Communist ... Bhutto, a drunkard, characterless and an un-Islamic-minded man, was totally inclined to-wards the unnatural and anti-Islamic principles of Communism and Socialism. (While), the Islamic regime of Zia, (is) the blessed advent of the Martial Law regime of Pakistan under the

blessed leadership of... General Muhammad Zia-ul-Huq, an Islamic-minded man, came on the blessed day of July 6, 1977.”

The re-writing of history also rebranded national heroes. In recent decades, Mr. Jinnah was portrayed as a staunch religious personality seeking a theocratic state. Looking at Jinnah’s words, it is clear he did not imply the creation of a theocratic state. As Mr. Jinnah says, “Make no mistake. Pakistan is not a theocracy or anything like it. Islam demands from us the tolerance of other creeds and we welcome in closest association with us all those who of whatever creed, are themselves willing and ready to play their part as true and loyal citizens of Pakistan.” In fact, Mr. Jinnah admitted that following core ethics of religion based on equality, inclusiveness, tolerance, and justice should be prevalent for all citizens without any discrimination. For Jinnah, there were socio-economic and political priorities at the top of the list during Pakistan’s struggle for nationhood. While addressing a gathering in Delhi in 1946, he asserted, “What are we fighting for? What are we aiming at? It is not a theocracy nor a theocratic state. Religion is there and religion is dear to us. All the worldly goods are nothing to us when we talking of religion: but there are other things which are very vital – our social, our economic life.” In contrast, lawmakers ignored the road map defined by Jinnah, especially in the 1980s, a time when Jihadis poured into the region from various parts of the Muslim world to fight against Soviets, help the ruling elites to re-construct

---

40 Jalal, “Conjuring Pakistan: History as Official Imagining,” 82.
41 “Conjuring Pakistan: History as Official Imagining,” 81.
narratives based on hagiographic and hyperbolic orientations put forward as ideal, and romanticized the nation about Islam’s glorious pasts and adventures.

In a sense, Pakistan ignored the rich cultural diversity and history of heterogeneous communities dwelling on its soil for thousands of years in order to support the legitimacy of membership based on an idea of belonging to a religious ideology. Implicit state policies to homogenize its heterogeneous communities did not work well; in fact, when diverse identities were ignored or forced to mold into a new identity, issues of polarization surfaced. Pakistani Historian Mubarak Ali says, “history should not be influenced by religious beliefs since history has no religion. Pakistan came into being in 1947, but our history existed before this which cannot be deleted.”

In today’s Pakistan, what is witnessed and observed is that it is high time to reset the political input and output procedures in the political system that allows the state narratives to evolve around value-consensus not by artificially framed or externally engineered for the benefit of any specific domestic group, class, institution, or external actor. Pakistan’s former Ambassador to the United States Ms. Maliha Lodhi writes that Pakistani policy is “devaluing (the actual) history for political and ideological reasons, Pakistan has found it difficult to project a national identity that can strike a sympathetic chord with its heterogeneous people...(Therefore, today) Pakistan is trying to define the inner and outer contours of its national identity.”

---

45 Lodhi, *Pakistan: Beyond the Crisis State*, 11.
Since the birth of Pakistan as a nation-state to the present, the paranoia of an existential threat has been deeply embedded in the mindset of policy makers. In some ways it could be true when one genuinely looks into earlier episodes of its post-independence period, i.e. Afghanistan’s denial to admit Pakistan’s UN membership and the conflict over Kashmir. But after the Cold War, Pakistani policy makers should have come out of this paranoia. Now the changing tendency is to believe that the global power’s agenda is to disarm Pakistan’s nuclear strength (as it is the only Muslim nuclear power) and dictate the terms of rule. Therefore, the dilemma of Pakistan’s policy makers is that they are largely occupied with the Cold War politics trends of “ideological divide and enduring friendships or enmities ... (and) the major powers (mainly pointed towards India) of the world are out to destabilise, if not destroy, Pakistan.”

Ms. Maliha Lodhi believes that it is important to understand five factors in order to know the history of political developments in Pakistan. These are, a) “the power asymmetry between political and non-political or unelected institutions. b) A feudal-dominated political order and culture that fosters clientelist politics. c) Reliance on an oligarchic elite that has growth based on borrowings and bailouts to address the country’s chronic financial crises and its resistance to taxing itself and its network of supporters. d) The intersection between efforts to leverage geography in pursuit of national security goals and the role of outside powers. e) The persistence of centrifugal

---

46 Haqqani, Magnificent Delusions: Pakistan, the United States, and an Epic History of Misunderstanding, 23.
47 Hasan Askari Rizvi, "Foreign Policy Dilemmas," The Express Tribune March 9, 2014, para. 1.
forces and bitter ideological controversies over the role of Islam in the state and society."  

After 67 years of independence, the challenges are much higher in all domains whether it is political, social, economic or environmental. Other than political and economic arenas, in the social domain Pakistan is among the top risk societies which are dangerous to journalists, present deadly attacks against minorities, human right abuses, malnutrition, higher infant mortality rates, hosting and possible spreading polio virus (as in Syria the polio cases detected believed to be came from Pakistan) and deadly attacks on polio workers, lack of proper health and educational facilities which further traps the country’s fragile political economic situation. The energy short fall has already hampered industrial output, while ineffective governance has significantly nurtured the centrifugal actors or forces of fragmentation within the state in the form of non-state actors. Despite the fears of the burdens of its past, the country has great potential and resilience to revive due to its young and growing skilled human resources, natural resources, as a geographic pivot on both economic and geopolitical grounds, but with a big if, meaning that the political leadership must reset its policies and strategies, diverting from traditional defense-oriented policies and frame a balanced policy for symmetrical growth of the state’s pillars i.e. parliament, judiciary, executive branches, and the emerging role of media in a vibrant, civil society.

---

48 Lodhi, *Pakistan: Beyond the Crisis State*, 52.
EVOLUTION OF VIOLENCE: THE MAKING OF THE SECURITY STATE

Since the first day Pakistan was created, its journey of nation building was not an easy task. To resolve the political, economic, and security challenges, the civil and military bureaucracy supported the popularization of the idea of having a strong national army that would keep the country moving ahead as a savior. Strengthening and investing on defense was justified with the assumptions of an Eastern border threat from India as a top national security threat and the Durand line issue with Afghanistan.\(^{50}\) In this regard, Pakistan’s engagement in Kashmir with India and in response to “Afghanistan’s persistent interference in (Khyber Pakhtunkhwa (KPK) and Baluchistan by supporting liberation movements”\(^{51}\) provided a legitimate reason for the military establishment to strengthen its roots in the political decision-making process. Especially in the last thirty years the military leadership supported the narratives of the Afghan Jihad during the Cold War against the USSR, eventually culminating in domestic and regional violence. In continuity, Pakistani strategists heavily relied on the same strategies of relying “non-state actors to advance its fictional strategic interests has come full circle.”\(^{52}\)

While Pakistan is geographically a pivot and a militarily nuclear power with one of the largest standing armies, it is also ranked among the most fragile and weak states in the world. Today, Pakistan’s tribal belt is considered the “epicenter of terrorism” and ungoverned space, which has mostly cost Pakistan at all fronts. And the global

\(^{50}\) Talbot, Pakistan, a Modern History, 99.
\(^{52}\) Talat Masood, “Pakistan’s Drift Towards Isolation,” The Express Tribune February 4th, 2014, para. 11.
community is on alert about any mishap in the region which could badly affect global stability.\textsuperscript{53} By and large, Pakistan's India-centric policy, countering ethno-nationalist struggles, coupled with a number of political events (namely the Afghan War of 1979, and the Iranian revolution of 1979) occurred in the neighborhood and intensified the level of violence in the country. Therefore, the evolution of violence in Pakistan exists in different forms; the violence exists on ethno-nationalistic grounds, sectarian and religious grounds, and for geo-strategic reasons.

To understand the evolution of violence, it is significant to study the causes and effects of violence in the country. One of the major causes in making Pakistan a security or police state to deal with is the fear against India. Subduing nationalist trends through the use of force, using religious sentiments to diffuse nationalist tendencies, undermining progressive movements, and nurture of extreme ideologies due to geopolitical reasons results in the emergence of various militant outfits posing an existential threat to Pakistan. Should recasting nationalist tendencies will reset the balance or repeat the history and allow irredentists to become active again? A rational approach to understanding Pakistan's praetorian society is an important factor, because out of 67 years of history, the military ruled for more than half of Pakistan's history, while civil bureaucrats only ruled a little more than one decade. Moreover, supporting non-state actors for use as proxies remains a core feature in the entire region, be it the case of Kashmir, Afghanistan, or Baluchistan. Therefore, the politics of South Asia is based on reactionary politics, first, by creating self-anxiety against each other and

consequently establishing a niche between governments and non-state actors to
achieve objectives based on the self-created anxieties.

The post 9/11 era has changed the dynamics of proxy warfare in general, which
is trying to move away from the state’s traditional policies of supporting the non-state
actors for strategic reasons. Despite a global shift in policy, the remnants of proxy
warfare continue in various conflicts affecting the zones of fragile states like
Afghanistan, Syria, and many African states which become fertile fields of proxy warfare.
Therefore, it is unfortunately not easy for many Third World states to exonerate
themselves from web-traps woven for proxy warfare.

In order to reduce the severe effects of security challenges, Pakistan needs to
prioritize its domestic and foreign policies so its negative image can be countered, and
the role of the state can be regarded notably in regional and global contexts. Pakistani
political and defense analyst Hasan Askari Rizvi suggests that Pakistan needs first to
focus on its “internal political stability and cohesion, and economic resilience (which
will) increase the capacity of a state to counter external pressures and increase its
foreign policy options.”54 An increase in state capacity will encourage greater economic
integration that will potentially help Pakistan to defuse its diplomatic rows and pave the
way towards effective regional and global integration.

Ahmed Rashid points out that there are four reasons which actually prevented
the stabilization and social cohesion of Pakistan as a nation-state. First, Pakistan is still
struggling to outline the proper definition as a nation, so there is a lack of clarity over

54 Rizvi, "Foreign Policy Dilemmas," para. 3.
national identity. Second, there is a distinct divide over its security paradigm between the military’s India centric policy and the political leadership’s alternative outlook for restoring neighborly ties. Third, the abnormality of the state’s continued support of non-state actors or Jihadi groups, which is now psychologically affecting military personal, and many of these groups have become anti-state guerilla factions. Finally, the inability to accommodate ethnic groups into a political balance and access to a fair share of resources among provinces hampers a social and political cohesion among its nationals.55

With the prevalence of the above-mentioned factors, the future image of the entire region depicts a soaring level of violence. At the very least, to avert internal security threats, Pakistan essentially needs to frame “visionary and integrated policies” that will help in “harmonizing external and internal policies.”56 While admitting the national, regional, and global transformations and political transitions, Pakistan’s Adviser to Prime Minister on Foreign Affairs and National Security Mr. Sartaj Aziz emphasized a new policy outlook at the National Assembly of Pakistan, which will be a comprehensive national security policy through integrating internal security, defense security, and foreign policy with available economic resources. According to these new policies, Mr. Aziz assured the parliament that the new government is putting sincere efforts into the design and implementation of a policy on “Internal security and policy of non-interference; economic development through trade and not aid; fully benefiting

from geographical location; and promoting Pakistan's image by strengthening democracy and economic institutions in the country. The proposed policy is setting its agenda on the basis of neutrality, however, it needs to see the interest of traditional stakeholders; a clash of interest with stakeholders will potentially hamper any proposed collective wisdom. As in the past, many such proposals failed due to military adventures in the region (e.g. the Kargil conflict in 1999), military doctrines (e.g. Cold Start (Indian); Azm-e-Nau-III (Pakistani)), or terrorist attacks (e.g. the Mumbai attack allegedly involving the support of Pakistan) causing severe setbacks to political developments and lingering mistrust against each other.

PRAETORIANISM: THE WEAKENING OF DEMOCRATIC INSTITUTIONS AND STATE CAPACITY

The role of the military in Pakistani politics is central and retains a "quasi-monopoly," being significantly influential in domestic politics vis-à-vis policy formulation. The origin of Pakistan's military can be traced back to before the creation of the country when it was formally established as the British-Indian colonial army. However, in the post-independence period, the evolution of the military strengthened its capabilities and established itself as a disciplined institution following the patterns of colonial legacies inherited by the British military, but also deepened its settings into the politics of the country, which led to frequent military coups and prolonged military rule.

---

58 Grare, "Rethinking Western Strategies toward Pakistan: An Action Agenda for the United States and Europe," 8.
over the country. The frequent interventions continued to be legitimized in the interest of national security, and the military projected its actions “as an ultimate arbitrator ... and eventual savior of the nation-state.” The ramifications of military interventions and military rule, on the one hand, established a benign praetorian political system favoring the military elites; on the other hand, political institutions other than the military became ineffective. In general, praetorian societies primarily undermine democracy, equity, and economic growth, and their long-term effects suffer the political communities and democratic institutions of the state.

Praetorianism in Pakistan’s political system evolved through a number of factors which included institutional legacies inherited from colonial times, and domestic and regional factors that also provided opportunities for civil bureaucrats and military elites to institutionalize central authority in the political system. The institutionalized framework affirmed the notion of the military’s “right to intervene” in domestic politics, remaining visible in various formats, i.e. as an arbitrator, paternal, or guardian’s role to fix political troubles. It is hardly surprising that the continued role of the military and bureaucracy to act as guardian or arbitrator in politics is due to practices from colonial traditions. The colonial forces were not subservient to the elected representatives of the sub-continent, but rather directly subordinated to the governor-general. Military elites were in the executive hierarchy of legislative process, in which the military had a more

---

prominent role in the sub-continent than what was practiced in England. The similar patterns of military engagement in decision-making and political involvement continue after the decolonization as well; even after independence in 1947 the British generals and officers retained military command until 1951.

Obviously, after the partition of the Indian sub-continent in 1947, both India and Pakistan primarily relied on colonial state methods, strictly following bureaucratic control and centralization. For instance, the colonial Government of India Act of 1935 was adopted (until the Objective Resolution of 1949 was passed) and provided a concrete base (known as steel frame) for bureaucratic authority during British rule. The same act was inherited and adopted by both sides. South Asia historian Ayesha Jalal identifies the problem, noting that soon after the birth of the new independent states, there was a need of a "massive reorganization of the administrative apparatus of the colonial state to guarantee the supremacy of elected institutions" instead of providing a popular legitimacy "on the grounds of pragmatism and the need to maintain some sort of administrative continuity to cope with the massive dislocations and law and order problems that followed in the wake of partition."

At the time of partition, Pakistan was too weak and faced strategic and institutional challenges. The notion of oneness of nation was already challenged on multiple fronts through sub-nationalist movements. To tackle the strategic challenges, mainly from India over Kashmir and Afghanistan over the Durand line, most of the

---

64 *Democracy and Authoritarianism in South Asia: A Comparative and Historical Perspective*, 19.
budget was invested in defense. To train a professional army, Pakistan employed almost 500 British officers due to a shortfall of qualified Pakistan military officials. As Pakistan already inherited one-third of the British Indian army, meaning 30 percent of the army, 40 percent of its navy, 20 percent of the air force, while only 17 percent of revenue, such a huge military and less economic provisions burdened the country. Due to the lack of resources and institutional strengthening, the Pakistani state avoided crucial areas of investment, like health and education, instead preferring to shield the safety and security of the state in suspicion of any possible hostility from much bigger and stronger neighbors. The state-building process fundamentally focused on defense capabilities, while political and apolitical state building capacities remained ignored; this gradually became visible in the form of asymmetrical power relations between state institutions.

In 1948 Pakistan is estimated to have allocated 75% of its budget on defense, which undermined other important sectors to provide basic social and political goods. Despite a weak military and dilapidated economic base, India and Pakistan went to war soon after their birth in 1948 over Kashmir, resulting in the division of Kashmir that endures to this day. Pakistan's apparent decision to go to war with the help of tribal militias was in reaction to India's decision to retain Hyderabad and Junagadh because

---

65 Talbot, *Pakistan, a Modern History*, 99.
68 Haqqani, *Magnificent Delusions: Pakistan, the United States, and an Epic History of Misunderstanding*, 32.
69 Riedel, *Avoiding Armageddon: America, India, and Pakistan to the Brink and Back*, 47.
Pakistan anticipated getting these two princely states in the view of the June 1947 partition plan. Pakistan’s military repeated similar tactics of 1948 to get Kashmir in the 1965 war and in the 1999 Kargil conflict, but the outcome further increased distrust between the two states.

Interestingly, when the Indo-Pak conflicts over Kashmir of 1948 and 1999 [other than the two wars of 1965 (over Kashmir) and 1971 (over Bangladesh), because the military was already ruling during these years], are compared, it can be noted that each were on an occasion when a civilian government was in place. After an unsuccessful outcome, the military leadership and its cadre had grievances against the political leadership for being lenient and giving up on the wars, which the military always believed to be going in their favor. The grievances by the military on both occasions were followed by military coup attempts, with the first case being unsuccessful, when “Major-General Akbar Khan, chief of the general staff and coordinator of the Kashmir campaign, unsuccessfully plotted the first military coup in 1951, citing as his main motive the mishandling of the Kashmir issue by civilians.”70 While in 1999 Gen. Musharraf was successful in overthrowing PM Nawaz Sharif over a plane scandal, however, the military cadre was unhappy with PM Nawaz Sharif’s decision to back up from Kargil heights, as the military command’s belief it had a better control and position in the large area.71

Another important feature to bear in mind is how military interventions during post-colonial societies are linked to racial divides. It is important because military

71 Jones, Pakistan: Eye of the Storm, 119.
institutions are more influential in Third World societies, and "ethnic composition plays a major role in the country's politics," especially in regards to politics of ethnicities and power relations between a center and its provinces. During the British colonial period, colonial authorities raised local armies and picked soldiers from selected ethnic groups; as in Burma/Myanmar, Burmans were ignored, and in Nepal the British enlisted Gurkhas as a martial race of the subcontinent to support its fight. Similarly in the Indian sub-continent when the British were planning on dismantling the "Bengal Army after 1857's mutiny" or because of rebellions against British rule, colonial British rulers prudently recruited Pashtun and Punjabi Muslims (from today's Pakistan), Punjabi Sikhs (from today's India) into the military as ethnic martial races, while other Muslim populations or ethnicities were ignored. After the creation of Pakistan, the military trends continued the colonial legacy and in general ignored other ethnicities, while India, through a policy procedure, gradually controlled the disproportion of ethnic influence of Sikhs over its military. In Pakistan's case, since most of the inherited military personnel belonged to Western Pakistan, and the center remained in the hands of Western Pakistan, in that scenario, East Pakistan become a peripheral unit.

Recent statistics still show that the demographic representation in the military continued as inherited from colonial settings. According to military analyst Ayesha Siddiqa, 75 percent of military personnel are recruited from three to four districts of Punjab, called "Salt Range," 20 per cent from three to four districts of Khyber

---

Pakhtunkhwa, while 5 per cent from remaining two provinces, Sindh and Baluchistan.\textsuperscript{74}

To further break down the composition, a recent statistical data set indicates that 67 per cent of the officer corps and 43 percent of the soldiery in the army is composed of Punjabis; around 25 percent of the officer corps and 22 percent of the soldiery in the army is Pashtun, while the remaining percentage is divided among other ethnic groups.\textsuperscript{75} In fact, the Cold War period also facilitated the colonial legacies of picking allies based on “racialist concepts,” with Pakistan becoming “America’s most allied ally” for joining hands with NATO partners South East Asian Treaty Organization (SEATO in 1954) and Central Treaty Organization (CENTO in 1955) to help the West by providing bases in South Asia against the Soviet Union.\textsuperscript{76} The U.S administration under President Eisenhower assumed Pakistanis were Ghurkas who fought for the British colonial army and hoped Pakistanis would help in the fight against Communism.\textsuperscript{77} This became a reality in the 1980s, and eventually the world witnessed the demise of the Soviet Union.

The first decade of Pakistan’s history was crucial as it actually molded the shape of political dynamics with the early death of its founding father, and the disintegration of political parties allowing bureaucrats to rule the country for 11 years. This was followed by military rule in 1958, which continued until the debacle of East Pakistan in 1971 which resulted in the creation of Bangladesh as a new nation-state. The creation of

\textsuperscript{75} Schofield, "Diversionary Wars: Pashtun Unrest and the Sources of the Pakistan-Afghan Confrontation," 41.
\textsuperscript{76} Haqqani, \textit{Magnificent Delusions : Pakistan, the United States, and an Epic History of Misunderstanding}, 71; Riedel, \textit{Avoiding Armageddon : America, India, and Pakistan to the Brink and Back}, 55.
\textsuperscript{77} \textit{Avoiding Armageddon : America, India, and Pakistan to the Brink and Back}, 55; Haqqani, \textit{Magnificent Delusions : Pakistan, the United States, and an Epic History of Misunderstanding}, 71.
Bangladesh initiated serious debates about the performance of the military, the role of political leadership, and more importantly, flummoxed the entire nation with questions regarding the validity of its ideology. Religious ideology remained the essential factor in unifying the heterogeneous communities during the struggle for independence.\textsuperscript{78} One aspect of the argument debate, talked about the failure of the two-nation theory, which undermines the role of religion in retaining the national cohesion. The counter argument still proves that Bangladesh did not decide to re-join India, as half of the Bengal ethnic Hindu majority still lives in India and India was a winning party that supported the people of East Pakistan's independence, but rather that Muslim Bengalis preferred to have an independent country on the basis of a religious divide. In response to the loss of the war and 90,000 military personnel held as prisoners of war (PoW), the Pakistani military was forced to give up power and provide a chance for Z. A. Bhutto’s democratic government to control the system.

Referring back to 1958’s martial law government and military rule, Gen. Ayub Khan promised the nation an immediate democratic election. Interestingly, later on Gen. Zia ul Haq in the late 1970s and Gen. Musharraf in the late 1990s followed the same pattern as their predecessor did regarding immediate and transparent democratic elections. Promises and pledges are always withered away shortly after coming into power, and each one’s rule was prolonged for almost a decade. As in most Third World states, the waves of democratization were taking place, and by contrast “Pakistan's

\textsuperscript{78} "The Ideology of Thought Control in Pakistan," para. 4.
democracy died” soon after authoritarian regimes replaced the democratic order.79

With the gradual influence over domestic and foreign policies, the role of the military also becomes effective in proposing and framing foreign policy. The military’s superiority complexity over political elites believed that it has a better assessment of national, regional, and global threat perceptions. Therefore, the fact that most military rulers enjoyed strong and positive strategic relations with the U.S., and the U.S. heavily supported the militarization of Pakistan’s army both through training and equipping with modern weaponry demonstrates how democratic institutions were given less attention. Intriguingly the global and regional geopolitical scenarios co-incidentally became significant during the time of military rule, which already focused and projected the geopolitical importance of Pakistan, and helped Pakistan become a beneficiary of the Cold War rivalry between the U.S. and the Soviet Union.80 The geopolitical situation prompted U.S. policy makers to pour economic and military aid into Pakistan. For example, during Gen. Ayub’s rule (1958-1969), the U.S. relied on Pakistan to curtail the expansion of communism; the policy remained for Gen. Ayub’s successor, Gen. Muhammad Yahya Khan (1969-1971). During Gen. Zia ul Haq’s period (1977-1988), Pakistan became a frontline state in fighting against the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan. Finally Gen. Pervez Musharraf’s period (1999-2008) once again made Pakistan a frontline state; this time in the global War on Terror (WoT).

During the Cold War, Pakistan comfortably became the “West’s eastern anchor

79 Riedel, Avoiding Armageddon: America, India, and Pakistan to the Brink and Back, 55.
in an Asian alliance structure.” To cement the long term strategic interests, in early 1950 Gen. Ayub Khan, as Pakistan's army commander during his visit to the U.S., requested military assistance through Assistant Secretary of State Henry Byroade, declaring, “I didn’t come here to look at barracks. Our army can be your army if you want us. But let’s make a decision.” Pakistan was desperate to strengthen its military capabilities because geographical and existential fears and insecurities hovered continuously in the minds of Pakistan’s military and political elites. Pakistan won the support of the United States’ political and military leadership as it perceived India being inclined towards the Soviet block and Pakistan as an ally ready to allow use of its military bases against communism. Though Pakistan’s political elites and military leadership did not make the sharing of Badaber airbase (near Peshawar) public.

The airbase became an issue when the Soviet Union shot down a U2 surveillance plane in 1960, making it the center of public attention and international politics. Similar to its earlier period of military cooperation, in the post 9/11 period Gen. Musharraf’s rule also provided the military bases for operational matters, while in public it was told that Pakistani forces would not provide any base except in logistical support in the global war on terror as an ally. However, with the passage of time and unpopular drone attacks, political pressure built to seek answers about the provision of military bases and any agreements regarding drone attacks between the U.S. and Pakistan. The military remained in denial until U.S. Navy Seals hunted down Osama Bin Laden (OBL) in

---

81 Haqqani, Magnificent Delusions: Pakistan, the United States, and an Epic History of Misunderstanding, 61.
82 Ibid.
83 Magnificent Delusions: Pakistan, the United States, and an Epic History of Misunderstanding, 89; Riedel, Avoiding Armageddon: America, India, and Pakistan to the Brink and Back, 57.
Pakistan in 2011, and after the NATO airstrikes killed 25 Pakistani military personnel at Salala in November 2011, the Afghanistan-Pakistan border area. In protest of Salala incident, Pakistan asked the U.S. to vacate Shamsi Airfield, also known as Bhandari Airstrip located in Baluchistan (actually leased to the UAE, after 9/11 the US took charge of Shamsi through a sub-lease, obviously with the consent of Pakistan).84 In addition, Gen. Musharraf mentioned after his retirement that there was an agreement between the U.S. and Pakistan for limited drone strikes, and Shamsi airfield was one of the facilities in the region used for drone operations.85

The vicissitudes of the U.S. and Pakistan's alliance is based on a happy and unhappy marriage relationship, which are reflected in various diplomatic highs and lows and strategic ties. Such highs can be seen when on the diplomatic front Pakistan played a crucial role in bringing the U.S. and China closer, and President Nixon mentioned in his memoir after the trip to the region that he found India's leader Nehru "the least friendly leader," and showed his commitment to extend greater support towards Pakistan.86 A low is considered, however, when Pakistan faced severe economic sanctions in response to its nuclear program in the 1990s under civilian rule.87 An all-time low was witnessed after the Salala incident in November 2011. In protest Pakistan blocked NATO supply lines into Afghanistan that cost millions of dollars to the U.S. as it forced an extremely expensive reliance on supply routes via Afghanistan's north and by air. The Salala

---

86 Haqqani, Magnificent Delusions : Pakistan, the United States, and an Epic History of Misunderstanding, 65-66.
87 Pakistan : Between Mosque and Military, 230-31.
incident was proceeded by two earlier events, i.e. in January 2011, the arrest of CIA contractor Raymond Allen Davis in Lahore, and in May 2011, the U.S. Navy Seals’ Operation Geronimo to hunt down Osama Bin Laden in Abbottabad, events which already indicated the emerging diplomatic gaps between the two states.88

Unlike Gen. Ayub’s military regime, the post-1977 martial law period led by Gen. Zia ul Haq is known as the Islamization of Pakistan. Gen. Ayub’s period is largely considered Pakistan’s pro-modernization phase with a lesser tendency to find a relation between the military and the mosque.89 However, Gen. Ayub did facilitate temporarily the use of religion for his electoral gains. Though the temporary support by religious groups cannot be singled out, it eventually strengthened the roots for religious ideologues and the decay of a democratic future. The full-fledged support and imposition of an orthodox Islam as a political ideology under Gen. Zia’s period (1977-1988) became an ideal match for clerics and Islamists to deeply penetrate society’s social structure as well as the state’s institutions.

At the same time, during the late 1970s the Soviets invaded Afghanistan, and the Western Allies and states from Middle East sent 35,000 holy warriors that further supported Gen. Zia’s enthusiastic Islamic ideology of violent jihad narratives.90 In military and economic aspects Pakistan temporarily benefitted from the bipolar conflict, but in the long run, its socio-political conditions suffered. Ms. Maleeha Lodhi explicitly draws the troubles inherited by Pakistan for its supporting of jihad in Afghanistan and

89 Jones, Pakistan : Eye of the Storm, 18.
90 Hussain, Frontline Pakistan : The Struggle with Militant Islam, 16.
Islamizing Pakistani society. Ms. Lodhi writes jihad ideology from Zia’s time brought problems to Pakistan, which included the “induction of Islamic militancy, proliferation of weapons, spread of narcotics, exponential growth of madrasahs, growing violence and a large Afghan refugee population (three million during the war time and around two million today)... resulting Pakistan’s own instability.”

Gen. Zia highly encouraged the reshaping of the state’s law, educational system, and way of life according to conservative religious thoughts and imposition of Sharia as the rule of law for Pakistan. Ostensibly Gen. Zia, like his predecessors, promised to support an inclusive political system, but in reality his “single-minded commitment to anti-liberal, anti-democratic, anti-minorities and anti-women agenda” was seeking a political and social order in which “administration, judiciary, banking, trade, education, agriculture, industry and foreign affairs are regulated in accordance with Islamic principles,” consequently creating the monopoly of “an Islamic garrison in Pakistan.”

Contrary to Zia’s ideals, the actual teachings of religion demands inclusive, democratic, and equal rights for all without any discrimination.

Zahid Hussain explains that in Zia’s period, the Islamization of state and society occurred at two levels: a) “Changes were instituted in the legal system; b) Islamization was promoted through print media, radio, television and mosques.” Religion was strictly indoctrinated in civil services, the armed forces, and the educational system. As

---

94 The impact of Islamizing armed forces could be observed when a group of armed officers under the leadership of Major Gen. Zahirul Islam Abbas planned a military coup in 1994-95 to topple the government of then Prime Minister Benazir Bhutto and purge the core army leadership in GHQ. Their aim
an instance to vindicate the argument, the introduction of Hudood Ordinance in legal affair that was promulgated in 1979 is a vivid example. The Hudood Ordinance outlined and defined the punishments for any immoral or unethical acts through traditional Islamic ways. Harsher punishments included death by stoning for adultery, 100 lashes for fornication, 100 lashes for false accusation for adultery, 80 lashes for drinking alcohol, amputation or cutting off the right hand for theft, whipping (ta'zir) and death for derogatory remarks against the Prophet. With the inclusion of a blasphemy law in 1982 prohibiting anyone from using derogatory remarks against the Prophet, initially the maximum punishment was life imprisonment; an amendment to the blasphemy law in 1986 maximized the punishment to the death penalty for any derogatory stance. Society became more hostile than before, and blasphemy laws became a political and revenge tool on many accounts.

To implement these laws religious clerics (ulema) were required to sit on the Shariat Benches of the High Courts, which were established in 1981. However, in 1986, a full-fledged Federal Shariat Court replaced the Shariat Benches. The outcome of promoting and infiltrating a religiously oriented political ideology threatens the cohesiveness of the state by creating divides between those who follow the ideology and those who do not. Over the period of time, once society is radicalized, then it was to create an Islamic caliphate, as earlier Gen. Zia also envisioned. The coup's plan failed, and all the senior military officers were court martialed. This time the coup was planned by Gen. Zahirul Islam Abbasi, director general infantry corps at GHQ. GHQ became sensitive of the matter, and appointed a new ISI head, Gen Ashraf Qazi, to purge all those officers in military ranks who were highly inclined towards conservative Islam.

anticipates sharing power with the center and aggressively demands and paints the entire society with a single color, which eventually undermines the diversity of opinion and diversification of society. As it happened in Afghanistan, when the religious regime led by the Taliban systematically destroyed Afghan society's rich culture, societal structure, and pre-Islamic heritage. Similarly, after 9/11, the Pakistani government and its civil society faced challenges from various contending Islamist ideologies, and state institutions are still grappling with these ideational threats; these ideological bases are the creation of its own past and facilitated by geopolitical events of the Cold War.

Gen. Pervez Musharraf's period (1999-2008) is the latest military rule in the political history of Pakistan. Gen. Musharraf removed the democratically elected Prime Minister, Nawaz Sharif, in a military coup on October 12, 1999. Unlike earlier military rule, Musharraf did not declare martial law or appoint himself as chief martial law administrator, but rather an "emergency" was imposed and Musharraf picked a corporate title called "chief executive" (later becoming president of the country), with powers equivalent to that of prime minister.

By the time Gen. Musharraf took power, Pakistan was suffering under economic sanctions due to its May 1998 nuclear tests conducted in response to India's nuclear explosions. In addition, the Kargil conflict of 1999 brought a negative image to Pakistan on a global level. Finally, the overthrowing of a democratic government was also viewed negatively as another derailed chance at a democratization process. In fact, the UN

---

Secretary General censured the military act of removing Sharif, and the International Monetary Fund (IMF) decided to suspend its loans until democracy was restored. Musharraf announced his seven point agenda in a time of national despondency and assured the people that it would help Pakistan to stabilize by: 1) "rebuilding national confidence and morale, 2) strengthening the federation with the removal of inter-provincial disharmony, 3) revival of the economy and restoration of the investors’ confidence, 4) ensuring law and order and dispensing speedy justice, 5) depoliticization of state institutions, 6) devolution of power to the grassroots level, and 7) ensuring swift and across the board accountability." The actualization of the wish list was not easy for a military ruler to achieve in smooth order while the country’s diplomatic and economic standing was in a dilapidated condition. As noted previously, Pakistan always benefited from geopolitical conflicts, and once again the traumatic events of 9/11 changed the entire script of economic sanctions and diplomatic pressures on Pakistan. Pakistan once again became a frontline state, this time in the global war on terror. U.S. President George W. Bush quickly helped Pakistan by easing off its sanctions in response to Gen. Musharraf’s commitment to become a pivotal partner in the war in Afghanistan. Through Musharraf’s rule the U.S. provided more than $10 billion to Pakistan.

During most of this period Musharraf remained focused on the war on terror in Afghanistan, with a vague strategy about how to deal with the war, the gradual “spread of radicalization, intensification of violence and the further undermining of a febrile

100 Kukreja, Contemporary Pakistan: Political Processes, Conflicts and Crises, 267.
economy.¹⁰² Like Gen. Ayub, Musharraf is also considered a pro-modernization personality. Keeping in mind the changing global patterns of globalization, Musharraf opted to re-shape Pakistan’s image with his famous slogan “enlightened moderation,” in which he was determined to “repair Pakistan’s image as a beacon of moderate Islam;” he remained unsuccessful due to Pakistan’s deep rooted Kashmir policy and support for jihadi factions who fought against Soviets in Afghanistan, Indians in Kashmir, and even the broader scale notion of a caliphate deep into central Asia.¹⁰³ Unlike his military predecessors, Musharraf unprecedentedly opened the media, which became one of the most powerful institutions allowed to express public and political opinions. In addition, his reforms in higher education were revolutionary, a needed credit to Musharraf for his government’s outstanding investments. However, during the last years of his rule, his decision to ban the media and his coup against the judiciary provided an opportunity for his political opposition to mobilize a political struggle and force him to resign as a head of state in early 2008.

Looking into the impact of praetorianism in the Pakistani political system, as mentioned above, a number of analysts argued that the role of the military in the colonial Indian sub-continent was given a high portfolio. Therefore, it is not surprising to see a continuation of the military’s arbitrary role in a post-colonial setting. However, in Pakistan’s case, the role of the military can be viewed in two different periods, a) 1947-1971, b) 1977-2008. The first period of military interventions is considered to be like engaging the military in politics through an arbitrary role and is focused more on

¹⁰² Lodhi, *Pakistan : Beyond the Crisis State*, 49.
budgetary demands to strengthen the military's capabilities. Budgetary demands are always more appealing to military strategists, whom believe Pakistan was in need of securing its threatened borders to its east, as India opposed the recognition of Kashmir and the west, where Afghanistan supported an irredentist struggle against Pakistan.\textsuperscript{104}

The second period of the military's role in politics was a systematic institutionalization of the military in domestic politics. The institutionalization of strategic thinking in domestic polity helped the military not only to deal with the long term limitations of military interventions but to identify its political way-out. Moreover, military personnel successfully stepped into corporate industry too.

According to Mazhar Aziz, in the post-1977 period the "institutionalization of military control, formally through introducing constitutional provisions, penetrating the public sector by appointing serving and retired military officers, and by occupying the economic space through its business activity, has made it increasingly difficult for the political elite to roll back its influence."\textsuperscript{105} As an example, during Gen. Zia's period of rule (1977-1988) two important steps empowered his authority and penetration into the civil-bureaucracy to safeguard the interests of the military. First, Gen. Zia amended the country's constitution and included article 58 (B) 2 through 8th amendment in 1985. Article 58 (B) 2 vested the president with power that allowed him to dismiss the national and provincial assemblies, and dissolve the parliament.

Interestingly, due to emerging differences, his own selected prime minister Muhammad Khan Junejo, became the first victim who was removed through the use of


\textsuperscript{105} Aziz, \textit{Military Control in Pakistan: The Parallel State}, 45.
58 (B) 2 powers. Later, the same article was invoked to dismiss all of the elected regimes. In addition, Gen Zia’s plan to further empower his authority was to establish the National Security Council, although it did not come to fruition, while during Musharraf’s military rule Musharraf succeeded in institutionalizing the supremacy of the military through his “Legal Framework Order (LFO)” which amended the constitution and allowed the military to look after the country’s affairs through the establishment of the National Security Council (NSC) in April 2004. Already enjoying the powers of 58 (B) 2, the establishment of the NSC strengthened Musharraf’s authority and further cemented his rule through institutionalization.

At the grassroots level, Musharraf introduced monitoring cells that were supposedly meant to keep an eye on corruption in public offices, which in fact empowered deputed military officers over public offices. In his rule, Musharraf regime by 2004 there were about 150 serving and retired military officers “heading the government’s major corporations, holding ministries, controlling education, leading police, subjecting Musharraf’s opponents to accountability, running foreign missions, managing cricket, and so forth” this number is in addition to the regular 10% quota for military in civil services. In addition, a frequent posting of military personnel in the civil-bureaucracy was also noticed on a higher scale, which was rolled back in Gen. Kiyani’s tenure as the new military Chief. Gen. Kiyani spent his time strengthening the image of the military in the public eye. The military had been significantly criticized

---

107 Mauka, "Recnstructing the Constitution for a Coas President: Pakistan, 1999 to 2002," 78.
during Musharraf’s last years of rule. Musharraf’s actions against the media and judiciary were widely criticized, directly affecting the military’s public posture.

After President Musharraf’s resignation in 2008, the PPP led a coalition government under the rule of President Zardari to once again amended the constitution and relieved the powers of president, who will not be able to use 58 (B) 2 that has derailed the democratization processes. Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif, elected in 2013, passed a motion to change the structure of the NSC. PM Sharif’s government believed that since Pakistan has a parliamentary system, the NSC should be headed by the PM, not the president. Therefore, the new amendments empowered the PM as head of the NSC and included more civilian representatives in the council to create an equilibrium.

A second important initiative was the creation of a quota of reserved seats for military officers in the civil service or bureaucracy. It is important to remember that the military’s political weakness is its technical inability and skills to govern the political community; additionally, the lack of legitimacy always challenges the military rule. Although the military enjoys legitimacy for its interventions in most Third World societies but cannot prolong its rule, a professional military is trained for a different domain than retaining power in the political sphere. The colonial legacy of a quota for military personal continued in Pakistani polity. The first President of the country, Mr. Iskander Mirza, also became a bureaucrat through his military service career. The civil-bureaucracy is referred to as a steel frame in Pakistan’s polity, having significant control over the planning and execution of national policies. The induction of military officers

109 Aziz, Military Control in Pakistan: The Parallel State, 39.
through a quota helps military officers understand the political culture of society. It further provides an insight into political life and civic culture that helps military bureaucrats create a nexus between the military and society. In this way, military rulers tried to fill the vacuum of political leadership through the establishment of roots within the institutions and derive support from the public.

Finally, in recent years, it has been greatly debated that military coups and interventions into politics are a response by a military “defending its corporate and status and privileges.” First of all, it needs to be acknowledged that economic opportunity costs provide a window of opportunity for military rulers to prove their interventions as pro-development, as the Turkey and Egypt military tried to prove. Following the pattern, Pakistan’s military rulers engaged in development activities. Instead of showing any keen interest in political mobilization or participation, they invested in the industrial sector as a better payoff for country. This was in a way a positive sign, though at the same time military elites involved into economic activities. During his era in Pakistan, Gen. Ayub focused more on development projects, eventually bringing the military into the corporate sector. For instance, public institutions, namely the Frontier Works Organization (FWO), the National Logistic Cell (NLC), and the Special Communication Organization (SCO) are linked under the military’s supervision; these institutions are the largest of their nature to deliver services for construction, transportation, and communication services respectively in Pakistan.

---

109 Ibid.
111 Military Inc. : Inside Pakistan’s Military Economy, 113-16.
The military's other economic institutions, categorized as subsidiary organizations, like the Fauji Foundation (FF - Army), Army Welfare Trust (AWT - Army), Shaheen Foundation (AF - Air Force), and Bahria Foundation, (BF - Naval) provide employment and welfare services to ex-servicemen and also provide employment opportunities to civilians who work at the industrial units. Under these subsidiary organizations, industrial investment in oil and gas, cement industry, pharmaceuticals, sugar mill, fertilizer mill, banking, insurance, housing schemes, overseas employment, and so forth are industries run under retired military personnel.112 Some of the industrial units are the largest handlers of their kind in the country and enjoy a greater share in economic activities across the country.

Apart from domestic resource extraction, the U.S., China, and Saudi Arabia have remained the main donors to Pakistan and its military. Ishtiaq Ahmed emphasized that “Pakistan can continue as a post-colonial garrison state as long as the donors are willing to provide it with the required resources and it can convince or coerce its population that the struggle for survival necessitates prioritisation of the allocation of scarce resources to security.”113 On these grounds, it is obvious that the praetorian roots in Pakistan's political system have settled firmly. Despite the global political awakening, the geopolitical competitions and unresolved political disputes in the region will provide an advantage to Pakistan's military in retaining its traditional influence over national security, foreign policy, and obviously the safeguarding of its economic interests and privileges.

DYNASTIC POLITICS: A COMPROMISED DEMOCRACY OR POLITICAL CORRUPTION?

Democracy is widely accepted as a suitable and popular form of governance throughout the world. Democracy on a broader scale shares some common norms, i.e. pluralistic tendencies based on inclusiveness, political trust, accountability, and will of the majority in the political system. Despite knowing the pros about democratic political systems, Third World countries are still troubled with issues of frequent military interventions, single party authoritarian rule, absolute monarchy, totalitarian regimes, rule by one family, rule by tribal lords or feudal lords, or in anarchic conditions, and rule by warlords. Interestingly, in most of cases these undemocratic structures promote dynastic politics. According to Farrukh Saleem dynastic politics is a “succession of rulers from the same family or line,” dominating the quasi-democratic forms of governments and weakening the democratization process through compromises with undemocratic forces.\(^{114}\) The fragile and weak status of the Pakistani state is a suitable example of compromised democracy in which a nexus between civil-military elites engages in entertaining its own interests.

Looking back into Pakistan’s history, the past script and political episodes reflect that the democratic initiatives have been given little chance to perform. Although on a few occasions democracy was provided some space to flourish, it ended up as a political transition in domestic politics that was used as a bargaining chip or compromise between the troika, i.e. political elites, bureaucrats, and the military. The major dilemma

with Pakistan’s political elite is its roots in the feudal class, or the family fiefdom.\textsuperscript{115} This feudalism is blamed for equally affecting the political maturity of institutions and delinking the state from society for personal gain, the same reason why many analysts criticize non-democratic forces. Farruk Saleem highlights the correlation between dynastic politics and societal backwardness and political parochialism. Saleem argues that out of 1.7 billion poor, why is it that 51 percent of world’s population lives in South Asia? He links the answer to dynastic politics or feudal structures that deliberately kept societies highly illiterate, poor and dependent on these family lineages, so that influential families retained their authority. With reference to continued argument, Larkana in Sindh is a vivid example, which produced two of Pakistan’s most popular prime ministers, but illiteracy and ultra-poverty rates are high, while people still pledge allegiance to the same family authority, demonstrating the political parochialism and dependency of a controlled society.\textsuperscript{116}

Historically, political power in Pakistan is derived from the biradari system (brotherhood, kinship group, clan) under the supervision of feudal landlords, which facilitated the dynastic politics. The biradari system is highly influential in Punjab, and it plays a pivotal role in the electoral process.\textsuperscript{117} For example, out of 342 seats for the National Assembly (272 General Seats, 60 reserved for women, 10 for minorities), Punjab has 183 seats, making it alone eligible to form a national government from only one province. The feudal elites use biradari for political mobilization during political


\textsuperscript{116} Saleem, "Dynastic Politics," para. 8.

\textsuperscript{117} Talbot, Pakistan, a Modern History, 30.
campaigns, and its influence spills over into urban politics as well. Therefore the social order influenced under landlords (biradari system) in Southern Punjab, Wadero (title for feudal) in Sindh, Sardar (title for tribal leader) in Baluchistan, Malik (title for Pashtun tribal leader) in KPK or Tribal Areas, have shaped the power dynamics both at a provincial and national level. Interestingly, many of the newly emerged feudal families in northern Punjab have no landowning background, however, some turned feudal due to an increase in urban property ownership or successful corruption through state services.  

During the colonial era, power was considered a symbol of pride, and mostly the landlords, civil servants or military elites enjoyed power, which further continued in the post-colonial setting. As noted, power corrupts and absolute power corrupts absolutely. Over the years, the political oligarchy corrupted the power and resource sharing in Pakistan. According to a Pakistani political scientist Dr. Mohammad Waseem, “the pervasive nature of corruption in that country (Pakistan) can only be understood through a structural analysis of the legal, administrative and judicial framework of the state as it was inherited from colonial India and subsequently preserved and sustained by the ruling elite after independence.”  

Ian Talbot’s work highlighted three major criticisms towards feudalism: 1) “The bulk of the agricultural population has remained effectively depoliticized; 2) the perpetuation of feudal power relations has contributed to Pakistan’s distinctive political culture of violence and intolerance; and 3) the parochial

---

and personalist character of Pakistan’s political parties with their rapid changing loyalties is rooted in this predominance of landlords."\(^{120}\)

With the influence of dynastic politics, political leadership is drawn from the feudal families and national politics stays around personality-based politics, which creates a leadership vacuum to thrive at the grassroots level. Most influential political families are the Bhutto family from Sindh and the Sharif family from Punjab; both enjoy power and are likely to continue their influence in the future politics of the country. Other influential families such as Gilanis, Khars, Dreshaks, Qureshis, Tamans, Khosas, Mazaris, Legharis, Mehars, Bijraniss, Rinds, Raisanis, Jhakaranis, Makhdums of Hala, Shahs of Nawabpur, the Khan of kalabagh’s family, etc. continue to retain their dynastic political power over their respective jurisdictions and constituencies.\(^{121}\)

In Pakistan’s early years a number of initiatives were designed to carry out land reforms, which were thought to be able to restructure the social divide and political gaps within society. Prominent land reform initiatives of Z. A. Bhutto promised people that he would abolish feudalism, since his political slogan was based on Islamic socialism (food, shelter, cloth). Despite Bhutto’s promise and comprehensive land reform plan (150 acre for irrigated land and 300 for non-irrigated land was set as a maximum limit), a comparatively better reform offer than Gen. Ayub’s reform plan (maximum possession of 500 acre for irrigated and 1000 for non-irrigated land), Bhutto himself was a landowner.\(^{122}\) Therefore, anticipating effective outcomes was in vain. In short, most of

---

\(^{120}\) Talbot, *Pakistan, a Modern History*, 31.

\(^{121}\) Lodhi, *Pakistan : Beyond the Crisis State*, 57.

\(^{122}\) Jones, *Pakistan : Eye of the Storm*, 253; Talbot, *Pakistan, a Modern History*, 37.
the parliamentary or democratic regimes in Pakistan are directly or indirectly influenced through feudal structures. Pakistan Peoples Party (Bhutto) retains a stronghold in rural Sind and Southern Punjab, while Pakistan Muslim League (Nawaz) retains influence over mercantilist and biradari system. Maleeha Lodhi writes that in the Pakistani polity feudal influence is a fault line, which needs to be addressed. She explains that there is a “Clientelist politics” between feudal lords and their subjects, in which the “governance is embedded in the notion of rewarding their clients rather than electorate. Their preoccupation with rulership rather than public service is in keeping with the patrimonial structures of traditional society.”

The patterns of politics in Pakistan’s urban-rural settings have only empowered the influential, feudal families. In return, these oligarchic groups compromised the sanctity of citizens’ votes in lieu of political and economic corruption. Political corruption not only hollowed out the foundations of true democracy and civilian rule, but also kept the doors open for military interventions and valid reasons against “corruption and bad governance heaped on Pakistan’s popular politicians.” A general tendency among the masses is to view their political elites as the most corrupt and less sincere with people and providing them political goods.

There is a deep nexus between corruption and the compromising of democracy that helps political elites, military rulers, and civil-bureaucrats to create a win-set, so each party can be comfortable without interfering into others’ matters. However, the dilemma is that political elites are more divisive in their ranks than the military or

---

123 Lodhi, *Pakistan: Beyond the Crisis State*, 56.
124 Haqqani, *Pakistan: Between Mosque and Military*, 327.
bureaucrats, and their divisive opinion and opposition creates political space for the military to play a role as guardians to intervene. Unfortunately, the two tenures of P.M. Benazir Bhutto and P.M. Nawaz Sharif in 1980s and 1990s, respectively, were spent engaging over corruption charges through the establishment of accountability mechanisms against rival political parties and workers, while both were removed from power on corruption and bad governance charges.

The Bhuttos (branded to be secular) and the Sharifs (branded to be sympathizers to right wing parties) are today's two ruling families, and there is a chance that the family dynasty trend likely to continue. Like the Bhuttos and Sharifs' roles in national leadership, family dynasty is not a unique case in provincial set ups too. The personality-based polities are popular in the rest of Pakistan's provinces. In reference to the other provinces, the Bugtis, Maris, Mengals etc. dominate in Baluchistan; and the late Bacha Khan's family in KPK are some of the most vivid examples of family rule in the respective provinces. Meanwhile, both the Bhutto and Sharif families have sealed a historical rivalry. In 1972, then Premier Z.A. Bhutto's nationalization process had affected the family business of the Sharifs, and the Sharifs were disgruntled about the loss of their industry. Once Gen. Zia came to power in the late 1970s, he picked Bhutto's opposition members in his cabinet in order to diffuse any political pressure from the public. At the same time the Sharifs regained their business Ittefaq industries. The revenue from the Sharifs' family business is more than $400 million. On returning to Pakistan in the 1980s, Benazir Bhutto, who was unhappy with the military because her father was executed under military rule, felt the Sharifs one of the close-linked parties to the military.
Therefore, both Bhuttos and Sharifs remained opposed, while compromising the
democratic transition with non-democratic forces.

During the early rule of Nawaz Sharif, the government alleged that in the past
Benazir Bhutto’s regime was involved in massive corruption activities including hiring
thousands of party workers on state positions without merit and misusing state
resources. Most of the allegations to Benazir were pointed towards her husband, Mr.
Asif Ali Zardari (who later became President of Pakistan after her assassination in late
2008). Mr. Zardari was alleged to have received a percentage through kickback during
the deals of foreign and domestic contracts; while he used “front men (the money) went
to the Bhutto-Zardari combine.”

During Bhutto’s first term as premier, her husband Mr. Zardari, “acquired a
succession of nicknames: Mr. 5 Percent, Mr. 10 Percent, Mr. 20 Percent, Mr. 30 Percent,
and finally, in Bhutto’s second term when he was appointed minister of investments,
Mr. 100 Percent.” The investigators estimated to “trace more than $100 million to
Benazir’s secret accounts in foreign banks.” In addition to facing opposition from
political opponents and corruption charges, the military also considered Ms. Bhutto a
threat to strategic assets who doubted her plans were to rollback Pakistan’s nuclear
plan for economic bargains. With the fear of losing the nuclear program along
corruption charges, Benazir Bhutto’s government was toppled, and former intelligence

126 Ibid.
chief, Lt. Gen. Asad Durrani admitted in Pakistan Supreme Court about the bribing of political and religious parties in opposition against Ms. Bhutto.¹²⁸

Similar to Ms. Bhutto’s removal, Mr. Sharif was also removed from his premiership in the same patterns. President Ghulam Ishaq Khan justified his action to dissolve Sharif’s government on the basis that corruption charges cost Pakistan $20 billion; he also accused Mr. Sharif’s government of extra-judicial killings, victimization of opposition, and so forth.¹²⁹ Raymond W. Baker has thoroughly shared the statistical data on corruption charges and off-shore investments of both Bhutto-Zardari and Sharif’s families. As a glimpse at the alleged accusations on premier Sharif’s earlier terms, Baker mentioned contracts with Daewoo (a South Korean company). According to Baker:

“Mr. Sharif authorized importation of 50,000 vehicles duty free, reportedly costing the government $700 million in lost customs duties. Banks were forced to make loans for vehicle purchases to would-be taxi cab drivers upon receipt of a 10 percent deposit. Borrowers got their “Nawaz Sharif cabs,” and some 60 percent of them promptly defaulted. This left the banks with $500 million or so in unpaid loans. Vehicle dealers reportedly made a killing and expressed their appreciation in expected ways. Under Sharif, unpaid bank loans and massive tax evasion remained the favorite ways to get rich. Upon his loss of power the usurping government published a list of 322 of the largest loan defaulters, representing almost $3 billion out of $4 billion owed to banks. Sharif and his family were tagged for $60 million. The Ittefaq Group went bankrupt in 1993 when Sharif lost his premiership the first time. By then only three units in the group were operational, and loan defaults of the remaining companies totaled some 5.7 billion rupees, more than $100 million.”¹³⁰

During both civil and military rule, the ruling elites were quick in establishing accountability intuitions, e.g. in Sharif’s time the Ehtesab (Accountability) bureau, and in

Musharraf’s period the National Accountability Bureau (NAB). But these bureaus were used for political scoring and victimizing the opposition and government opponents. In the early years of Musharraf’s rule, he used NAB for all those who were involved in corruption, but dropped all corruption cases against political absconders who were living in self-exile and who returned home on the basis of a controversial ordinance decreed on November 2007 called the National Reconciliation Ordinance (NRO). The NRO dropped all the cases between January 1, 1986 and October 12, 1999. This controversial ordinance, in a sense, indemnified the corruption in the country, and provided a source of strength to anyone who continued to violate the rule of law.

President Musharraf thought the NRO would help him retain another tenure as president, but he miscalculated and was forced to resign in 2008. In the post-Musharraf period, the PPP once again was given a chance to rule the country as a democratic regime. As President Zardari came to power, he gathered sympathy on the basis of his wife Ms. Bhutto’s assassination. The PPP government under Zardari’s rule was the first time any democratic government in the history of Pakistan successfully completed its term and transferred power to another democratic regime through elections in 2013.

The track record of corruption remained the same during this period (2008-2013), as a number of recent instances suggested that the scale of corruption and money laundering in billions was higher. During this period, on a number of occasions, the PPP-led government and its coalition political parties (Pakistan Muslim League – Quaid-i-Azam (PML-Q) in Punjab, Awami National Party (ANP) in KPK, and Muttahida
Qaumi Movement (MQM) in Karachi were charged with corruption charges for being involved directly or indirectly in some of the major state-owned corporations.

In 2010, the Federal Minister for Religious Affairs, Hamid Saeed Kazmi (member of the PPP) was charged in the Hajj (Pilgrimage) Scam. During the annual Hajj (Pilgrimage) the government charged each pilgrim about Rs. 230,000 ($2,700) for providing transport and accommodation in Saudi Arabia, earning Rs. 5.8 billion in revenue, but was blamed for providing poor lodging. The misappropriation of funds forced the minister to resign. Moreover, the Federal Investigation Agency (FIA) also accused Mr. Abdul Qadir Gilani, son of then Pakistani PM, Yousuf Raza Gilani, of receiving Rs. 20 million as kickbacks in the Hajj Scam. According to the Asia Times, the previous PPP government was plagued with corruption charges. Another son by Former PM Gilani, Mr. Ali Musa Gilani, was charged in a drug scam during his father’s rule. The Anti-Narcotics Force (ANF) accused Musa Gilani of being involved in a Rs. 8 billion ($8 million) drug scam (Ephedrine (poor man’s cocaine) is used in manufacturing medicines to treat common cold, flu, and asthma) rewarding a contract to two local pharmaceutical companies through the PM secretariat and former PM’s son.

In 2011, the PML (Q)’s top leadership known as the Chaudhry Brothers (landowners from Punjab), Moonis Elahi was accused of looting Rs. 220 million in the National Insurance Company Limited (NILC) corruption scandal. Another case of the PML (Q)’s Chaudhry Brothers were also tried in court over Rs. 44 billion corruption

---

charges in Employees Old Age Benefit Institution’s (EOBI) scandal.\textsuperscript{134} Railways Minister Haji Ghulam Ahmad Bilour (member of the ANP, a coalition party to the PPP govt.) and railway officials were accused of a multi-billion dollar scrap scandal. The accused officials valued Rs. 300 to 600 million for 39,000 metric tons of scrap, which was actually valued at more than Rs. 3 billion.\textsuperscript{135} Similarly, the minister for ports and shipping, Babar Ghauri (an MQM member) is accused of overlooking the loss of 19,000 NATO containers from Karachi port during Mr. Ghauri’s ministerial tenure. According to the Director General of the Sindh Rangers (a paramilitary force), these containers were carrying arms, which could be used in destabilizing and creating volatile conditions in Karachi, as it is the main port used for supplies to NATO forces in Afghanistan.\textsuperscript{136}

Political corruption has continuously existed in Pakistan; however, the political elites have devised more subtle ways to avoid corruption charges by engaging in legitimized corruption. The general public believes that political decisions to devalue the country’s currency always benefits the political elites, whose bank accounts are in foreign banks or holding foreign currency, and without any corruption involved like kickbacks, the currency depreciation preserves their profits. Moreover, after coming to power in 2008, the PPP government initiated a poverty reduction programme through an act of parliament to help the poor by providing monetary benefits. Named after Ms. Bhutto, the programme was called the Benazir Income Support Programme (BISP). Yet, the BISP turned out to be a legitimate corruption scheme. As the programme itself

\textsuperscript{134} Arif Rana, "Eobi Scandal: Ex-Minister Implicated in Rs.44 Billion Scam," \textit{The Express Tribune} October 28, 2013.


gained wide popularity domestically and internationally for its pro-poor policies, under the garb of legitimacy and popularity, funds were given to political elites mainly associated with the ruling party or coalition to distribute to their constituencies and workers so future votes could be secured.\footnote{Pamela Constable, \textit{Playing with Fire : Pakistan at War with Itself}, 1st ed. (New York: Random House, 2011), 269.}

Due to the mismanagement of funds and corruption, the new BISP officials under the Nawaz government have requested NAB officials to conduct serious inquiries into fraudulent activities. According to NAB, the BISP has spent Rs. 165 billion, of which 15 percent came through donors and interest based loans, and almost 85 percent directly from the government exchequer.\footnote{Khawar Ghumman, "Corruption Cases in Bisp to Be Probed," \textit{Dawn} Jan. 12th, 2014.} An instance of mismanagement shows that the previous officials under PPP government during 2008-2013 spent more than Rs. 3 billion on media campaigns, and the contracts awarded to the advertising company lacked any formal procedure.\footnote{Ibid.}

Pakistani masses are in a gradual process of understanding the factors and actors behind such political deprivation. The public understands that family dynasties and feudal lords are “pretentious, self-interested, unprincipled, reactionary snobs who constitute a major obstacle to social and democratic development.”\footnote{Jones, \textit{Pakistan : Eye of the Storm}, 248.} The hodgepodge of civil-military compromises and power struggle has transformed Pakistan into an “hourglass society,” which means the “state and the public are mutually related through
a minimum of institutional links, and people are generally disengaged from politics except for the occasional exercise of their right to vote.”

Political Scientist Aqil Shah has mixed feelings about the democratic viability and future of Pakistan, and he writes that “democracy in Pakistan is likely to remain stillborn unless the officer corps’ praetorian norms and prerogatives undergo erosion and the military is brought under firm democratic-civilian control. The growing internal threat from terrorism, and the sense of public insecurity that it generates, do not augur well for democratic civil-military relations. For now, Pakistan’s “resurrected civil society” will likely to come forward and ensure that the military has no real occasion openly to undermine or overthrow an elected government.”

Ian Talbot has nicely concluded the political system and dynamics of Pakistan’s quasi-democracy in the following statement:

“The political system and its practitioners in the 1990s appeared as ineffectual and bankrupt as their counterparts in the first troubled decade of independence. In both eras, politicians raised charges of corruption against their opponents while at the same time using patronage to secure power. The only difference is that with the passage of time both the resources available for corruption and the media’s ability to uncover it have dramatically increased. Now, as during the 1950s, the disorderly struggle between opposition and government encourages military intervention in the political process. This very authoritarianism has in the past perpetuated the weakly institutionalized personalist politics which have become Pakistan’s hallmark.”

The 2013 general elections were historic in many other ways besides being a historic transfer of power from one civilian regime to other. They were significant also because Pakistani society witnessed the rise of a new democratic party, the Pakistan Tehreek-i-Insaf (PTI led by a former Cricket star, Imran Khan), which challenged the

143 Talbot, *Pakistan, a Modern History*, 369.
status quo of the traditional domination by two parties i.e. the PPP and PML (N). By and large, the educated youth joined PTI to bring change to the country. Following this trend, many influential political leaders, including some with powerful feudal backgrounds, quit the old parties and joined PTI. In a way, it is like old wine in new bottles, but the overall trend is positive and will eventually filter the political deadwood burdening the system. Remarkably, this positive trend can also be linked with provincial election results of 2013, in which Dr. Abdul Malik Baluch (a middle class and self-made politician) of the National Party (NP) changed the status quo of consecutive rule by tribal leaders. Similar trends can somehow be attributed to PTI forming a government in KPK. In contrast the remaining two provinces, which hold a majority of the seats of representation in parliament and regional settings, retained the old political patterns.

The other features of the 2013 political change were the strengthening of the media and judiciary as important pillars of the state. Even before the 2013 elections, the rise of free media and the restoration of an independent judiciary is believed to have set in motion trends of accountability in Pakistan’s political system. Both media and judiciary already played a crucial role in President Musharraf’s forceful resignation, which may not have been anticipated a decade earlier. In addition, it is the first time in Pakistan’s history that a military chief is facing a trial for treason for suspending the constitution during the imposition of a state of emergency under military rule. His political opponents struggled to indict him in four cases, the first a high treason case under “article 6 of constitution.” Former President Musharraf was indicted by a court

144 Article 6 of Pakistan’s Constitution: High Treason
that accused him of abrogating and suspending the constitution through the imposition
of an emergency and detaining superior court judges in November 2007; he was also
indicted for unconstitutionally and unlawfully amending the constitution soon after
imposing a state of emergency. Second, he was indicted in the assassination case of
former premier Benazir Bhutto, third for the killing of Baluch nationalist leader Nawab
Akber Bugti and fourth, for the Lal Masjid (Red Mosque) operation; all are possible
attempts from his political opponents to place him on trial. Musharraf is defiant with
the term high treason, as he responded in court after charges were leveled that
“Whatever I did, I did for the country and its people. I am sad that I am being called a
traitor,” and in fact, for military elites are also upsetting to witness the politicized
charges for a military chief who served the state for 45 years.\(^{145}\) Musharraf believes it is
a political victimization and questions, why not put on trial all judges and politicians who
endorsed his rule and enjoyed its perks? While witnessing a historical precedent being
set against a former military chief, there is a higher possibility that the military is set to
intervene to avoid any further judicial trial of the former military chief in various courts
of the country.

\(^{145}\) Peer Muhammad, "Treason Charges Indicted," \textit{The Express Tribune} April, 1 2014.
Along with the judiciary, the media's role was significantly realized, and yet at the same time, Pakistan is considered a dangerous country for journalists, having been victims of targeted killings, kidnappings, and terrorist attacks. Until last year, Pakistan retained the top rank as the most dangerous country for journalists, being surpassed due to the higher intensity of fighting in Syria. However, the situation still shows a positive trend in terms of the media gaining greater freedom of expression and speech and establishing checks and balances, but there are many occasions which demand enforcement of media ethics as well so that the media does not become a party or manipulator. To strengthen democracy all pillars of the state have to support each other in order to bridle the traditional oligarchy and family fiefdoms.

SOCIETAL VIOLENCE: ETHNO-RELIGIOUS TERRORISM AS AN EXISTENTIAL THREAT

Pakistani society is facing multiple aspects of violence. The nature of violence varies at different levels, which range from traditional violation of human rights on one side of the spectrum, to extreme violent ethno-religious insurgencies at the other end, which threatens the Pakistani social fabric and state security. In recent years Pakistani society has held a track record in protecting human rights, women’s rights, the provision of education, proper healthcare and sanitation, religious freedom, freedom of speech and expression.

During the last decade, persistent violence has been at the epicenter of socio-political life. Pakistani lawmakers admit the acute intensity of the violent insurgency that is gripping the whole of Pakistani society poses a grave threat. As mentioned
previously, Pakistan’s Interior Minister Chaudhry Nisar Ali Khan notified the National Assembly about the real existential threat from ongoing severe terrorist activities. The rapidly deteriorating law and order situation and human insecurity challenge the meaning and duties of a nation-state in which loyal citizens seek returns for their allegiance, tied to social bonds and the contract between state and society. The multi-layered violence and terror activities across the country are the end product of the evolution of violence in Pakistan, primarily started in the early years of independence that gradually intensified. Over the years, Pakistan has become a security state wrestling with pre-existing and self-created security issues, which became a reasonable justification for the military to interfere in domestic security threats with its highly transnational roots and engagements.

The roots of Pakistan’s traditional violence in society and evolving episodes of terrorism are the outcome, or fallout, of national, regional, and global agendas. In other words, three factors contributed in the evolutionary process of Pakistani violence, namely evolving radicalization, unjust intra-provincial, political-economic policies; regional unresolved political disputes; and the global geopolitical struggle during the Cold War. The latter two factors are discussed later on in the section on geopolitics.

The multi-layered violence and terrorist activities are linked to various factors and ambitions. Unfortunately the Pakistani geographical space has become a useful shelter for various foreign and domestic militant and mafia groups, and each militant group has its own agenda. James Piazza explains that fragile and risky societies have a higher probability of “experience terrorist attacks, have their citizens join in and
perpetrate terrorist acts, and see their territory used as bases from which to launch attacks abroad. This pattern occurs because failed and failing states are easier for terrorist movements to penetrate, recruit from, and operate within.\textsuperscript{146}

There are more than 40 militant groups operating in various parts of Pakistan, some threaten and directly denounce the state’s legitimacy and its constitution, some threaten society, and some threaten the integrity of the state. The threat to state authority emanates from religious ideological groups, whose ambitions are not only in seeing Pakistan as a theocratic state, but also seek to spread transnational influence. Major groups like Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) and its affiliations with Al-Qaeda, and Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan, etc. are vivid examples here. The threat to society is linked to all politically motivated or sectarian based groups threatening domestic peace and stability, e.g Lashkar-e-Jhangvi (Sunni - LeJ) and an offshoot of a banned Sunni organization, Sipah-e-Sahaba Pakistan (SSP), whose primary targets are Shia community, while Sipah-e-Muhammad (SMP), a banned Shia militant organization, counters the rival Sunni groups. The threat to state integrity is always generated from nationalists’ movements; i.e. the Baluchistan Liberation Army (BLA) poses the same threat as the creation of Bangladesh in 1971 that was through nationalistic struggle.

To understand the core reasons why religious groups became such powerful entities and established ungoverned spaces, particularly in the Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) and the Afghan-Pakistan border region, it is necessary to revisit some of the earlier discussion on radicalization, or Islamization processes.

\textsuperscript{146} Piazza, "Incubators of Terror: Do Failed and Failing States Promote Transnational Terrorism?", 471.
In Pakistan's early years its political elites seems comfortable to allow the benign conditions for religious groups to flourish, so the usage of religion can help to homogenize or promote the "ethnification" of diverse ethnic groups. The homogenization policies became divisive factors instead. When Prime Minister Liaquat Ali Khan rectified the Objective Resolution in 1949, it endorsed state sovereignty vested in God's authority. According to Ishtiaq Ahmed, the ulema / religious clerics interpreted the reference of sovereignty under the Objective Resolution as endorsing Sharia law as the law of land, while P.M. Liaquat Ali Khan "did not mean a theocracy or a rejection of democracy and minority rights; rather, democracy and minority rights were to be sublimated in accordance with Islamic percepts." On the other hand, a number of political analysts believe that the notion of religion was used deliberately and cautiously as per the nature of the audience. Hussain Haqqani writes "when Liaquat Ali Khan addressed "Western audience ... his Islamic rhetoric was diluted by couching it in cultural terms", and domestically he continued to use the term Islamic ideology providing a legitimate base for religious groups to assert the role of religion in determining state policies and actions.

Using religion benefited the political elites in enforcing and legitimizing their powers. Rulers such as Gen. Ayub, Premier Z. A. Bhutto, and Gen. Musharraf, whom were believed to be pro-development and modernization rulers, also had adopted Islamization policies, while projecting slogans like "Pakistan Islam ka Qila hai (Pakistan is

148 Haqqani, Pakistan: Between Mosque and Military, 32.
a fortress of Islam)" and gaining political benefits.\textsuperscript{149} Earlier, when Ms. Fatima Jinnah contested elections against Gen. Ayub in 1965, Gen. Ayub relied on religious backing and sought out clerics to support and promulgate Fatwas (religious decree) against women’s eligibility to run for office through religious interpretation.\textsuperscript{150} During Gen. Zia’s rule in the 1980s his government was highly motivated in seeking an “Islamic renaissance,” which turned out to be a perfect condition for the U.S. to take advantage of strategically against the Soviet Union in Afghanistan, though the impact was disastrous for Pakistan’s economic, political, and institutional future.\textsuperscript{151} The US backed anti-Soviet war in Afghanistan and Gen. Zia’s Islamic renaissance became a perfect marriage, it allowed Gen. Zia’s regime to patronize the political, ethnic, and sectarian groups to counter his political oppositions that gradually widened the fissures of social cohesiveness of society. Subsequently, Pakistani society witnessed the mushrooming of Madrasahs, sparking sectarian strife, an influx of foreign fighters and their permanent settlement in Pakistan’s tribal areas (also disrupting tribal life), and an exodus of three million Afghan refugees that disrupted the local economy along with spreading drug and Kalashnikov culture.

Although after 9/11 the waves of violence soared with insurgencies, suicide attacks and terrorist activities, it should be noted that the religious indoctrination process was started much earlier, and the seeds of militancy were already sowed. Since 2001, waves of terrorism have killed more than 50,000 Pakistanis (See the table 6 for

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{149} Ahmed, Pakistan the Garrison State : Origins, Evolution, Consequences, 1947-2011, 323.
\item \textsuperscript{150} Riedel, Avoiding Armageddon : America, India, and Pakistan to the Brink and Back, 55.
\item \textsuperscript{151} Ziring, Pakistan : At the Crosscurrent of History, 218; Lodhi, Pakistan : Beyond the Crisis State, 48.
\end{itemize}
details), while the intensity of violence has increased every passing year. By and large the deaths were due to an increase in suicide attacks, in which terrorists targeted government installations, places of worship, schools, and Western NGOs. When asked where terrorism’s epicenter in Pakistan lies, general public opinion affirms that the tribal region near the Afghan-Pakistan border is the nexus of extremism and militancy. However, terrorist networks have lately been penetrating into urban settings like growing influence in biggest city Karachi. Pakistan is regularly being asked through diplomatic channels to “do more” in the tribal areas, but there is not much willingness to understand the tribal structure and its dynamics. It is the tribal areas that have suffered the most, and outsiders are forcefully terrorizing the locals and occupying these lands.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Civilians</th>
<th>Security Force Personnel</th>
<th>Terrorists/Insurgents</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2003</td>
<td>140</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>189</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2004</td>
<td>435</td>
<td>184</td>
<td>298</td>
<td>863</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2005</td>
<td>430</td>
<td>81</td>
<td>137</td>
<td>648</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2006</td>
<td>608</td>
<td>325</td>
<td>538</td>
<td>1471</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2007</td>
<td>1522</td>
<td>597</td>
<td>1479</td>
<td>3598</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2008</td>
<td>2155</td>
<td>654</td>
<td>3906</td>
<td>6715</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2009</td>
<td>2324</td>
<td>991</td>
<td>8389</td>
<td>11704</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2010</td>
<td>1796</td>
<td>469</td>
<td>5170</td>
<td>7435</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2011</td>
<td>2738</td>
<td>765</td>
<td>2800</td>
<td>6303</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2012</td>
<td>3007</td>
<td>732</td>
<td>2472</td>
<td>6211</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2013</td>
<td>3001</td>
<td>676</td>
<td>1702</td>
<td>5379</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2014</td>
<td>534</td>
<td>180</td>
<td>355</td>
<td>1069</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total*</td>
<td>18690</td>
<td>5678</td>
<td>27217</td>
<td>51585</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Source: South Asia Terrorism Portal, March 2014.*
It is recognized that as radicalization increased, acts of terrorism, intolerance and violence in Pakistan evolved concurrently. However, why the state could not succeed in controlling or tackling the root causes of terrorism must also be analyzed. One of the mostly overlooked prime factors is the institutional vacuum in certain areas, which provides an atmosphere for militants to flourish. The convergence of charged radicalized groups in areas of ineffective and decapitated political institutions empowers these outfits. For instance, Pakistan retained post-colonial laws, such as the Frontier Crimes Regulations (FCR), considered draconian laws, which empowered one government representative to imprison or punish a person without trial.\(^{152}\) The FCR remains in effect in fifteen designated tribal areas, including the FATA region. In the vicinity of FATA, some tribal zones are ruled through the Provincial Administered Tribal Areas (PATA) system implemented in Malakand. The Peshawar high court in 1994 repealed PATA, but its jurisdiction did not extend to FATA. As a result of this judicial vacuum, a local religious leader, Sufi Muhammad, launched Tehrik-e-Nifaz-e-Shariat-e-Muhammad (TNSM) demanding Sharia law and courts for Malakand, which gradually spilled over into tribal areas and other parts of the country.\(^{153}\) Despite the fact that FCR is a draconian law, it performed a role of justice and established order without leaving any political vacuum.

Today, FATA is considered one of the most dangerous zones in the world, terming it an ungoverned space and safe haven for global terrorists. The general tendency shows that "all major terrorist plots are now being hatched in Pakistan's tribal

\(^{152}\) Fair, "Addressing Fundamental Challenges," 92.
\(^{153}\) Talbot, *Pakistan, a Modern History*, 59.
belt." Why is it that the tribal areas of Pakistan became an epicenter of global terrorist networks? First, the continuous religious penetration for the last three decades for geopolitical reasons helped to consolidate various militant groups to establish their bases there; second, these external groups gradually dismantled the traditional power structure and created a political vacuum. Militant outfits quickly filled this political vacuum with their own legal standpoint in reference to Sharia law, regularly conducting targeted attacks within and beyond Pakistan's frontiers. Interestingly, various criminal networks, drug traffickers, and mafia groups with their extended financial interests joined militants in order to permeate the radicalization in other parts of the country, resulting in "the Islamization of criminal activity and criminalization of segments of Islamism in Pakistan." 

The tribal areas are historically famous for being difficult to tame or subjugate by force, as earlier in history great powers like imperial Britain and Russia suffered too. Most of the population in the tribal areas are ethnically Pashtun, while the tribal Pashtun society is referred to as segmented by many authors, meaning it is "a subtype of what are technically known as acephelous or headless societies." The tribal belt is internally organized through diverse stratification. The tribal elders (Maliks), who serve as administrators under a tribal chief (or Khan), control the tribal system. "The elders represent lineage-base authority vest in the Jirga (council of elders), and expressed

155 Shaikh, Making Sense of Pakistan, 173.
through Puktunwali or Pashtunwali (tribe’s code or the way of the Pashtuns)" and follow
“terms of the charter or Nikkat. The first and foremost aspect of Pashtunwali is about
the honor (or Nang), meaning a tribe takes it as a prime honor to observe the tribal
codes. The important tenets of Pashtunwali are hospitality to a traveller, guest, or
stranger through the offering of food and shelter (known as melmastia or
mehrmapalineh), risking life and property to provide shelter and protection to any
person, friend or enemy, who desires sanctuary (know as nanawatai), defending
belongings, with property as pride (ghayrat), deference and respect (known as ehteram)
to elders (called masharan), and deterrence through revenge or retaliation (known as
badal), along with the traditional institution of the Jirga. Other codes, like
tarboorwali, settls rivalries between male cousins and marriages between cousins,
which shapes and preserves power, wealth, and authority within families and protects
lineages.

British colonial rule understood the importance of Pashtunwali for tribal peoples;
considerately, the British introduced FCR, preserving the tribe’s code, but also adding an
influential pillar called the “political agent,” the sole authority representing the colonial
rule. After the creation of Pakistan, a third pillar also emerged, i.e. the role of the

157 Akbar S. Ahmed, The Thistle and the Drone : How America’s War on Terror Became a Global War on
159 Hilary Synnott, Transforming Pakistan : Ways out of Instability, Adelphi, (Abingdon: Routledge for the
International Institute for Strategic Studies, 2009), 107-08; Mohammad TaqI, "The Federally Abandoned
Tribal Areas," Daily Times March 27, 2014; Groh, "A Fortress without Walls: Alternative Governance
160 Ahmed, The Thistle and the Drone : How America’s War on Terror Became a Global War on Tribal
Islam, 50.
religious cleric and mosque. Pakistan, in fact, did less to integrate the tribal society into its mainstream political structure, but let it continue through colonial patterns, which helped Pakistan prevent the emergence of a de facto Pashtunistan with the help of Afghanistan. Therefore, since 1947, there were three sources of authority in the tribal structure: the first pillar being the tribal elders, or Malik, the second pillar with the religious leader, or Mullah, who has a lesser role in political decisions or in a traditional Jirga, but plays a pacifying role and diffuses violence, and the third pillar introduced through colonial settings the political agent, representing the central government with more authoritative powers.

With the influx of foreign fighters in the tribal area during the 1980s, the demographic structure gradually changed and even empowered and transformed locals into militant groups. These groups then started to challenge the traditional authorities of Jirga comprised of tribal elders. In fact, the Taliban killed most of the influential tribal elders, which replaced the tribal leadership with hardcore fundamentalists. Interestingly foreign fighters, especially the Al-Qaeda leadership, cleverly blended some tribal codes, like the nanawatai (seeking sanctuary) and using badal (revenge or retaliation) to achieve its own agenda. Over the years, Al-Qaeda tacitly adopted the “tribal codes called for revenge” into their interpretation of religion. The Thistle and the Drone: How America’s War on Terror Became a Global War on Tribal Islam, 96.

161 The Thistle and the Drone: How America's War on Terror Became a Global War on Tribal Islam, 96.
Taliban shura established its own courts, denying the legitimacy of Pakistani courts, law, and its constitution. The hardline religious schools in many parts of the country were used to recruit potential fighters and volunteers and to collect donations. To finance the insurgency and terrorist activities, "the militant groups have managed to generate a self-sustaining model that involves patronage from foreign groups like Al Qaeda, domestic and foreign charitable contributions diverted for their use, forced contributions, ransoms, shares in the narcotics trafficking from Afghanistan, thefts in Pakistani cities."\textsuperscript{162}

Facing rising militancy and sectarian violence, Pakistan lacked laws or policies capable of trialing militants. The other tactical problem with military operations was that Pakistan's military was by and large trained for conventional warfare against India on its eastern front. Thus, responding to guerilla warfare was a great challenge, which is why a higher number of causalities was initially inflicted when Musharraf formally launched operations in the tribal areas to hunt Al-Qaeda and other foreign militants. Currently Pakistan has 150,000 troops deployed in tribal areas out of the 500,000 strong army on its western border.\textsuperscript{163} Over the past 13 years the new battle zone provided training and preparedness for military personnel to fight a guerilla campaign.

The impact of rising militancy in the tribal areas has affected the local population more than any once. The tribal areas became a launch pad for terrorists' attacks inside and outside of Pakistan. To tackle the militants, the local population became victims and

targets for allowing their territory to be used by militants. Without proper security provided by the state, it is difficult for locals to stand against militants. In fact, local tribes are unhappy with militants, who have brought great suffering to them and their families. The local population is sandwiched between military operations from Pakistan, terrorists’ threats within the tribal areas, and CIA drone strikes.

The drone strikes have succeeded in eliminating high value targets since 2004, but at the same time became highly unpopular (also known as Angel of Death among local population - see the data about Drone strikes in table 7). There is great confusion over the accuracy of the data on the number of civilians and militants killed during drone strikes. In 2013, when Interior Minister Chaudhry Nisar briefed senators about the statistics, the opposition parties boycotted the senate session and walked out in protest over the presentation, claiming the data was wrong, and demanded that the minister correct the data, while calling it a “pack of lies.” According to the Interior Minister “no civilians were killed in 235 drone strikes in 2012 and 84 attacks in 2013,” while he agreed that the highest number of drone strikes were 115 in 2010, in which 751 terrorists were killed while 2 civilians were killed. Militants and their political sympathizers used the images of civilian casualties to gain sympathy and seek legitimacy from the population. U.S.-based scholar and writer Akber Ahmed, who was a former political agent in the tribal areas and a retired Pakistani bureaucrat, explains in his recent book that “the tribal population is traumatized not only by American missiles

165 Ibid.
(drones) but also by national army attacks, suicide bombers, and tribal warfare, forcing millions to flee their homes to seek shelter elsewhere and live in destitute conditions as hapless refugees.”

### Table 7: Drone Strikes in Pakistan

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Number of Strikes</th>
<th>Total</th>
<th>Total</th>
<th>Total</th>
<th>Total</th>
<th>Total</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Reported</td>
<td>Reported</td>
<td>Killed</td>
<td>Reported</td>
<td>Killed</td>
<td>Reported</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2004-2009</td>
<td>51</td>
<td>410 - 595</td>
<td>167 - 335</td>
<td>102 - 120</td>
<td>175 - 227</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2009</td>
<td>52</td>
<td>465 - 744</td>
<td>100 - 210</td>
<td>36 - 39</td>
<td>262 - 397</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2010</td>
<td>128</td>
<td>751 - 1,109</td>
<td>84 - 196</td>
<td>19 - 20</td>
<td>351 - 428</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2011</td>
<td>75</td>
<td>363 - 666</td>
<td>52 - 152</td>
<td>6 - 11</td>
<td>158 - 236</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2012</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>199 - 410</td>
<td>13 - 63</td>
<td>1 - 2</td>
<td>100 - 212</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2013</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>108 - 194</td>
<td>0 - 4</td>
<td>0 - 1</td>
<td>43 - 89</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: The Bureau of Investigative Journalism, 2013, UK.

With the threat of terrorism, Pakistan has suffered greatly due to the lack of social cohesion. The issue of non-cohesiveness is due to the undermining of the diversity of opinion, belief, and existence. In general, it is noted that diversity is a source of strength, but unfortunately Pakistan is divided along ethnic, racial, and sectarian lines, which constantly weaken its statehood. People are persecuted for their affiliation with minority sects and religious beliefs. According to the Pakistan Institute of Peace Studies (PIPS), sectarian violence caused the death of 687 people in 2013, which was a 22

percent increase in the number of sectarian causalities reported in 2012. The PIPS report predicted that trends of sectarian and racial violence will continue at a high ratio. From January to March 2014, 70 people were killed and 92 were injured in 26 sectarian related incidents reported by the South Asia Terrorism Portal (SATP). One of the reasons for the chaotic situation is the internal displacement of people due to military operations and the fight against militants. In 2009 alone, 3 million people were internally displaced due to military operation and fight with TTP. Large numbers of displaced groups moved to larger cities, with the change in demographic settings creating further tensions in various parts of country.

Besides sectarian divides, the other major issue that weakens Pakistan is the distrust over resource distribution and political economic competition at the intra-provincial level, i.e. between Sindhis and Muhajirs (Urdu speaking groups) in Sindh, between Baluch and Pathans in Baluchistan, with Hindko speaking Hazara people seeking a new province in KPK, and the Saraiki belt in Punjab’s demands for a new province in South Punjab leading to grievances within provinces, all of which continue to challenge and hamper building a national identity.

Among all the provinces Baluchistan presents a serious challenge, as some of its ethno-nationalist groups, such as the Baluchistan Liberation Army (BLA) and the Baluchistan Republican Army (BRA), are fighting for independence. The Baluch tribes’ grievances are rooted in political economic complaints over the distribution of resources and demand for political autonomy. During Z.A. Bhutto’s rule the military conducted

---

168 Lodhi, Pakistan: Beyond the Crisis State, 64.
operations against these groups in the 1970s. Since the 1970s, nationalist movements had been suppressed, but in early 2000, Baluch leader Nawab Akkber Khan Bugti re-launched his political protest. This political protest was further supported by an incident in which an Army officer was blamed for raping a female doctor posted in Baluchistan. Nawab Bugti demanded justice for violating tribal codes. Nawab Bugti and his fellow tribesmen took the arms as resistance. Musharraf issued the ultimatum to Bugti that “Don’t push us. It is not the 70’s (referring to earlier military operation against nationalist insurgency in 1970), when you can hit and run, and hide in the mountains. This time, you won’t even know what hit you.”\footnote{Ahmed, \textit{The Thistle and the Drone: How America’s War on Terror Became a Global War on Tribal Islam}, 136.} In 2006, Nawab Bugti was killed in his mountain hideout. Baluch nationalists believe he was killed in a military operation, while military leadership denies it. Military reports claimed that local police forces, with the help of military elite forces the Special Services Group (SSG or Commandos), went into the hills in order to arrest Nawab Bugti, but he detonated the cave with explosives killing himself and scores of elite military personnel.

In the aftermath of Nawab Bugti’s death, the nationalist groups, whose demands were for greater autonomy of the province and a greater share in resources, joined the Baluch groups whom were seeking full independence of Baluchistan. Unfortunately, due to anger over the military, BLA members began targeted killings, kidnappings, and the torturing of settlers (mainly from Punjab). At the same time, Baluch intellectuals, lawyers, doctors, and journalists also went missing and were found dead, their bodies
dumped in various locations, believed to be victims of extra-judicial killings.\textsuperscript{170} Baluch liberation parties blamed Pakistani intelligence agencies, while Pakistan blames India for funding Baluch insurgents, who are believed to be hiding in Afghanistan.

The issues of missing persons are gaining attention in Pakistan, and many groups, including nationalist, religious, and civil society organizations are demanding legal action from the Supreme Court. So far, the blame has been leveled against intelligence and law enforcement agencies for the kidnapping of alleged terrorists. There is a widely held perception among all ranks of law enforcement agencies that there is no proper legislation regarding the trial of terrorists or militants. Previously a number of terrorist suspects were presented in courts, but a lack of proper laws and unwillingness of eyewitneses to appear in court, fearing death threats from militants, has led to the release of many high value terrorists. Believing the same will occur with other prisoners, law enforcement agencies refrain from keeping any such persons in custody.

Afterwards, in late 2013, due to mounting pressure from the Supreme Court of Pakistan, some missing persons appeared in court. The Court desired to see and hear about many other suspected missing persons. Upon failing to meet the demands of the court in March 2014, the court was assured to file a First Information Report (FIR) against serving army officials. Interestingly, at the same time, the government presented a controversial ordinance called “Protection of Pakistan Ordinance (PPO)” in

\textsuperscript{170} The Thistle and the Drone: How America's War on Terror Became a Global War on Tribal Islam, 137.
The government has justified that the proposed ordinance will help to fill a legal vacuum, which has allowed militants and mafia members to be released without trial and roam freely. The PPO was already approved by the President, Mr. Mamnoon Hussain in October 2013. The opposition parties and even PML (N) coalition parties, like Jamiat Ulema-e-Islam and the Fazal ur Rehman group (JUI - F), have resisted the move, stating it will allow further extra-judicial killings and also allow arresting people without warrants. Despite the resistance from political parties and a walk out from a National Assembly session, the majority of parliamentarians belonging to PML (N) passed the PPO in April 2014. Opposition parties are determined to challenge the PPO through the legal system. The ordinance may provide an escape or indemnity to persons, who are being accused of being involved in missing person cases.

To conclude, the Pakistani political elites, lawmakers, and civil society candidly agreed that the multiple types of violence in society have threatened its statehood. For the existence and survival of statehood, all the responsible stakeholders need to frame short term and long-term policies and mechanisms to eliminate the threat of terrorism.

In 2013, the All Parties Conference (APC) decided to give peace a chance by reaching out to militants and attempting to dialogue. The dialogue process was halted as a result of a U.S. drone strike that killed Pakistani Taliban chief Hakimullah Mehsud in November 2013. The peace talks resumed in the tribal areas with an agreed cease-fire.

\footnotesize{171 Azam Khan, "Protection of Pakistan Ordinance: Govt Moves Controversial Bill in National Assembly," The Express Tribune April 3, 2014. 172 Ibid.}
Initially, two demands by the Taliban were the release of their comrades and family members and a demand of a peace zone in South Waziristan\footnote{South Waziristan formerly in the hands of Taliban, during a major military operation in 2009 codenamed Rah-e-Nijat routed out the Taliban from the area} in the tribal areas, so that the mobility of Taliban members could be assured without the threat of being targeted. The demand for establishing a peace zone means relinquishing the established authority of the state in the area and allowing non-state actors to form a state within a state. It is unlikely that Pakistan will grant the demand for a peace zone, as the military lost a great number of its soldiers in its campaign to clear the area.

For many political elites like the PTI leadership, the peace talks are the only solution for stability, but they need to be reminded that there were six agreements established earlier between various militant factions and Pakistan, and these past agreements did not assure a long-term peace. Peace talks are a useful strategy to contain the level of violence but are not an end point. As long as militants receive foreign and domestic funding directed at radicalization and access to terror breeding units in radicalized madrassahs, short-term peace talks are not effective. For example, in 2011 a U.S. diplomatic cable reported that Saudi and UAE financing of $100 million towards religious seminaries in Southern Punjab was approaching poor and multiple children families and providing free education, food, and shelter. Once these organizations seemed confident in the willingness of parents to send their sons, issues, and the importance of Martyrdom in religion were also discussed, and in the case of
martyrdom of a son, the family would receive a remuneration of Rs. 500,000 ($6,500 according to the 2011 exchange rate).174

In this regard, the government should seriously consider its educational system. The country is producing three social classes, namely a class of private schools (an upper middle class), public schools (middle or lower middle class), and religious schools or Madrassahs (enrolling poor with no incentives, no provisions, and no access to modern day schools), which creates a social divide. Therefore, understanding the importance of education is an integral part of a state’s internal security and stability, requiring it to revisit school syllabi or curriculums, and the entire educational system. The extremists seek to demoralize those who wish to attend schools and lure those who are out of school or destitute and desperate. By 2011, more than 6 million children between the ages of 5 and 9 were out of school due to poverty.175

Investment in education is the most important factor for Pakistan’s growth, prosperity, viable change, and political stability. On the importance of education, the youngest nominee for the Nobel Peace Price, Malala Yousafzai (who was shot by the Taliban for seeking and promoting girls education) expressed her views at the United Nations and challenged that “let us pick up our books and our pens, they are our most powerful weapons. One child, one teacher, one book, one pen can change the world.”176

With the exception of a few madrassahs, which have proper domestic and
foreign sources of funding, the majority of the remaining religious seminaries are poor

175 Riazul Haq, "Primary Education: Plan to Enrol 5m out-of-School Children by 2016 a Pipe Dream," The Express Tribune September 6, 2013.
and crowded. During his government, Musharraf tried to bring all madrassahs under
government control through registration and offered incentives, but this policy program
failed due to the influence of clerics fearing they would lose their sources of influence
and power over villages and economic privileges. In addition, Madrassahs are becoming
enterprises generating economic gains through the collection of donations in the name
of religion. The new PML (N) government has shown interest and commitment to enroll
22,000 religious madrassahs under government control. Reforming the educational
sector and bringing madrassahs into the mainstream public educational system will pay
long-term benefits to Pakistani society.

Arrested extremists and Taliban fighters have been indoctrinated; therefore, de-
radicalization programs are essential. Pakistan’s military, after some successful
operations in some parts of the tribal areas, have established “de-radicalization
emancipation programs (DREP)” also known as “Rehab”. Hundreds of militants under
the DREP program’s rehabilitation process are re-educated as responsible people with
civic consciousness, who undergo educational, moral, vocational, and psychological
training to stay away from extremist elements, and also to accept their social
responsibilities and not misuse religion for harmful acts.

After 13 years of fighting against militancy and terrorism, in early 2014, the
Nawaz government finally agreed to push for a legal structure (PPO) and proper internal
security policy (NISP) to deal with issues of violence and terrorism. The PPO has yet to
be approved by parliament, which is considered controversial by opposition parties, so a

permanent law still needs to go through some refinement. However the NISP outlined the causes and ways to deal with terror-related activities including “organized anti-state actors; their use of religious ideology to garner local support and recruit from amongst the poor and vulnerable; use of mosques and madressahs to nurture hate-based narratives; external patronage and funding for terror; inadequate capacity and inefficient performance of law-enforcement agencies; an intelligence black hole due to lack of coordination; dysfunctional governance and criminal justice systems that neither incentivise citizens nor deter crime.” The improvement NISP requires is to further categorize the levels and types of terrorist activities or organizations engaged in Pakistan because some have transnational roots, some regional, and some are sub-national ethnic based terrorist or rebel groups. To implement the NISP, the government reactivated and revamped the earlier established National Counter Terrorism Authority (NACTA). NACTA’s job is to coordinate between national intelligence networks and law enforcement agencies, so as to improve efficiency. In addition, to support NACTA, the Counter Terrorism Rapid Deployment Force (CTRDP) will ensure a quick and effective response to any unexpected events. Still, Pakistan relies heavily on police forces in cities. Though the Frontier Constabulary (FC), or militia scouts are employed because of their law enforcement agency’s better rapport with the local population, they unfortunately are less trained and incapable of dealing with militants. The proper training and equipping of these units is far more important than asking military or para-military forces to intervene all the time.

With the successful implementation of proper anti-terror laws, Pakistan can improve domestic stability and project a positive image abroad. According to Hasan Askari, “Pakistan’s negative image abroad cannot be countered unless the government controls religious and cultural extremism, and eliminates terrorism. The rhetoric of Pakistan being the victim of terrorism gives only one side of the truth. The other side is that Pakistan is also a source of transnational terrorism. Furthermore, the terrorist groups in Pakistan are indigenous and will not give up violence until the Pakistan government adopts a tough policy to eliminate them.” The Pakistani nation has paid a high cost of war against terror; any delay in the proper formulation of law and policies and their implementation will bleed the nation and society, risking highly its existence as a nation.

POLITICAL ECONOMY OF A FRONTLINE STATE

Pakistan has remained a pivotal and “frontline state” since the Cold War, especially during the 1980s and the post 9/11 period. On both occasions the flow of foreign aid was high and stimulated economic growth in some sectors of the economy. However, the core concentration of aid was focused on the defense sector. In Pakistan, most of the economic troubles originate from three factors: a) a dominating feudal order, b) high defense expenditure, and c) debt burden. Over the last decade, the burden on the economy has also been aggravated by the rise in terrorism and domestic

---

179 Rizvi, "Foreign Policy Dilemmas."
181 Kukreja, Contemporary Pakistan : Political Processes, Conflicts and Crises, 75.
security issues and frequent natural calamities. Overall, the economic output of recent years shows a gloomy outlook. The core troubling aspect of Pakistan’s economy is its small tax base. The tax collection system is in disarray, as the richer, ruling elites avoid paying taxes, as well as small and medium class business elites, with only salaried employees sustaining the tax base through salary deductions.

Political elites take advantage of the domestic extraction of resources by direct and indirect taxation levied on the middle class, and also extract foreign resources in the name of foreign aid. Following these patterns, the tax evasion syndrome is deeply embedded in the domestic system. For example, due to the economic hardship of minimal foreign reserves during his rule in the 1990s, P.M Nawaz Sharif allowed tax evaders and corrupt elites to “whiten [the] ill-gotten income with no taxation and no fear of detection” for foreign currency deposits (FCDs). Therefore, the system lacked a proper tax collection mechanism, which resulted in huge deficits between spending on public goods and revenues.

Pakistan’s 45 percent workforce is employed in the agricultural sector, and the lack of landownership and skewed distribution of resources have resulted in higher poverty in rural areas. Those who own the land are feudal and wealthy politicians, who mostly enjoy the exemption of direct taxes on agricultural land or income, because landowners argue that they are already paying implicit taxes through concessions to

183 "Human Development in South Asia 2006 ", in Poverty in South Asia: Challenges and Response (Muhbub ul Haq Human Development Center, 2007), 121-22.
support the government’s price system.\textsuperscript{184} The dilemma of Pakistan’s political economic system is that individuals gain wealth, but collectively the state lacks the resources, eventually widening the rich and poor gap.

A historical overview of Pakistan’s political economic performance and economic outlook in terms of growth or stagnation can be divided into four to five phases. These phases also show particular distinctions because of democratic and undemocratic periods of rule. Matthew McCartney’s work, focusing between 1951 and 2009, categorized the growth of the economy into five episodes: 1) episodes of growth 1951/52 – 1958/59 (civil-bureaucratic rule) 2) episodes of growth 1960/61 – 1970/71 (military rule) 3) episodes of stagnation, 1970/71 – 1991/92 (military rule) 4) episodes of stagnation 1992/ 93 – 2002/03 (democratic rule) 5) episode of growth 2003/ 04 – 2008/09 (military rule).\textsuperscript{185} Additionally, the post 2009 phase of democratic rule is considered a period of stagnation in terms of economic growth.

Along the general trends based on the growth or stagnation of Pakistan’s economy, each historical phase of political economic performance is unique. Each of these unique trends can be characterized as: the flat fifties, 1947 to 1958; the golden sixties (Gen. Ayub Khan’s period), 1958 to 1969; the socialist seventies (P.M. Z.A. Bhutto), 1971 to 1977; the revivalist eighties (Gen. Zia ul Haq), 1977 to 1988; the muddling nineties (civilian rule of Benazir Bhutto and Nawaz Sharif’s era), 1988 to 1999;

\textsuperscript{184} Talbot, \textit{Pakistan, a Modern History}, 38.
and the reforming hundreds (Gen. Musharraf), 1999 to 2007. It is noteworthy that each phase of governance set different economic trends, which was either completely changed by the following regime, or faced challenges due to earlier policies. Ayub’s period is recognized in many ways as a golden period, though his policies benefited the ruling elites – known as the twenty-two ruling families. Soon after military rule ended, Bhutto nationalized the system that drastically affected future economic trends. This setback due to the nationalization process took years to rebuild Pakistan’s economy.

Instead of improving economic trends, Pakistan’s volatile and unpredictable domestic political scenario has severely affected the economy. Ishrat Hussain explains the correlation between the domestic political conditions and Pakistan’s economic performance, as he writes:

"Pakistan, transitions from one political regime to another have been quite difficult, causing uncertainty and short-term reductions in the speed of economic growth. The transfer of power from the military to civilian regimes in 1971, 1988 and 2008 were marked with macroeconomic instability, a slow down in economic activities, rising unemployment and inflation and the adoption of a wait-and-see attitude by investors. But economic recovery has also been resilient; short-term losses caused by political volatility have not been large enough to offset the positive long-term secular economic movement."

At the end of the day, Pakistan’s journey as a nation-state thus far has been marked by poor governance and bad economic output, which further poses challenges to the larger economic sphere, i.e. “macroeconomic instability, high inflation, poor public services, criminal neglect of the social sectors, widespread corruption, crippling

188 Hussain, "The Role of Politics in Pakistan's Economy" 10.
power outages, growing unemployment, deepening poverty and a deteriorating debt profile."\textsuperscript{189} Moreover, the current economic challenges emanate and are interlinked with problems of terrorism, illegal trade, drug trafficking, IDPs and Afghan refugees, and many unheeded social problems that have deteriorated the security situation, deterring local and foreign investors.

Pakistan's fight against terrorism since 2001 to FY 2012-13 has cost it $98 billion.\textsuperscript{190} However, on diplomatic and economic terms, the early years of the war on terror were favorable to Pakistan as it was under the shadow of economic sanctions, and its foreign reserves were around $1 billion.\textsuperscript{191} Pakistan's decision to support the U.S.-led War on terror helped increase its foreign reserves to $4 billion with the flow of foreign capital under the Coalition Support Fund (CSF) and strong remittances.\textsuperscript{192} Up until now, Pakistan's economy has highly relied on CSF and foreign remittances. The recent date shows that during the first half of FY 2014, Pakistan received a higher amount of foreign remittances in the amount of $7.9 billion, 9.4 percent higher than the previous year.\textsuperscript{193} Overall, since 2002, Pakistan has received an average of $825 million from the United States for economic assistance, and during the last 4 years, Pakistani expatriates have sent nearly $1 billion every month in remittances.\textsuperscript{194}

With a full-scale military engagement in the tribal areas and other insurgency-hit areas, Pakistan's economy has been severely affected with imbalances between

\textsuperscript{189} Ahmed, "An Economic Crisis State," 169.
\textsuperscript{190} "Undue Pressure?: War on Terror Chapter Chucked out at Eleventh Hour," \textit{The Express Tribune} June 12, 2013.
\textsuperscript{191} "An Economic Crisis State," 177.
\textsuperscript{192} "An Economic Crisis State," 178.
\textsuperscript{193} "Remittances up 9.4\% in First Half of Fy14," \textit{The Express Tribune} Jan 11, 2014.
\textsuperscript{194} Murtaza Haider, "Can Pakistan Survive without Us Aid?," \textit{Dawn} Feb 15, 2012, para. 8.
revenues and its expenditures. In addition, the financial crisis of 2007-08 and increasing oil prices dealt a blow to Pakistan’s economy. To survive in the face of economic difficulties, Pakistan convened a conference called Friends of Democratic Pakistan (FDOP), which was launched on September 26, 2008. FDOP includes Australia, Canada, China, Denmark, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, Norway, the Netherlands, the Republic of Korea, Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, Spain, Sweden, Turkey, the UAE, UK, USA, and the Asian Development Bank. This conference’s aim was to gain some economic support through donor countries and to promote a greater demand for Pakistani goods in the international market. The economic burden further increased when floods in Pakistan hit more than 14 million people in 2010. It destroyed infrastructure that forced internal displacement, destroyed cash crops, livestock, and above all, led to the loss of a great number of human lives. The World Bank promised a $900 million loan for recovery from this natural calamity. In February 2012, the WTO also approved a pending bill that would give Pakistan a two-year waiver on 75 Pakistani products in the European market. The allowed items, mainly textiles, would amount to 900 million euros in import value and accounts for 27% of EU imports from Pakistan. Similarly, Pakistan had already suffered the effects of a traumatic and massive earthquake to its northern regions, particularly Kashmir, in 2005. The effects of the 2010 flood, however, were far harsher than the earthquake on the Pakistani economy.

Pakistan’s history reflects that regional geopolitical odds have temporarily benefited Pakistan, but in the long run Pakistani society has to bear the burden entrusted upon them due to mismanagement and the wrong policies of its political-
oligarchy. Example of regional odds includes the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in 1979, which caused the exodus of millions of Afghans into Pakistan affecting Pakistan’s socio-economic and political dynamics. Today, there are officially more than 1 million, while unofficially 3 million Afghans integrated into Pakistani society. The new Afghan generation born in Pakistan has developed deeper roots in Pakistan. Until now Pakistan has reported that it has spent $200 billion on Afghan refugees since 1979. On the request of international agencies, Pakistan has extended the stay of officially registered Afghans until 2015. The added foreign demographic is upsetting the domestic system, ultimately affecting economic trends, and burdening the entire society.

Pakistan is facing tremendous challenges from its own demographic issues due to rising poverty and an increasing labor force. The fragile economic conditions make it difficult to accommodate the labor force, which keeps a high number of youths unemployed. By the year 2012-13, more than 3.5 million people are estimated to be unemployed. According to the International Monetary Fund (IMF), with a lower GDP growth rate in 2014, Pakistan’s unemployment rate will continue to grow in the coming years. The unemployment rate in 2013 was 6.7 percent, and it is forecasted to be 6.9 and 7.2 in 2014 and 2015 respectively. Past governments initiated a number of poverty reduction programs through economic activities, i.e. the Social Action Programme (SAP) in the 1990s which failed due to weak governance problems; the Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper (PRSP) in the 2000s adopted through social

195 "Burdened Economy: Pakistan Has Spent $200b on Afghan Refugees," The Express Tribune October 26, 2013.
mobilization under the Rural Support Program Network (PRSN); and BISP in late 2000s (discussed earlier in the previous section). Without investment in human capital to prepare skilled labor, economic sustainability, and a reduction in poverty, the large population will continue to suffer.

Why should the Pakistani government worry about rampant unemployment? The answer is that a high ratio of Pakistan’s population is young, and gradually a greater number of youths are joining the ranks of the unemployed. Out of Pakistan’s approximately 180 million people, 59 percent means 101.95 million people are below the age of 24. The number becomes approximately 116 million people, if one includes the age group below age 29. To delve into past terrorist and criminal activities during the last 10 years in Pakistan, most of the perpetrators are below the age of 30. By and large, Third World countries have a higher percent of youth population. 60 percent of Egypt’s population, like Pakistan’s, is under the age of 30, while 74 percent of Yemen’s population is likewise below age 30; both countries are facing massive political unrest. Economic demands, especially unemployment, are propelling frustrated youths in Third World countries to come out into the streets and protest, or in many cases engage in illegal trade, drug trafficking, and terrorism. As an example, Karachi, Pakistan’s economic hub, contributes more than 42 percent of Pakistan’s GDP. For the last couple of years, Karachi has been plagued with ethnic, religious, and political violence and sectarian crises. GEO News, a private TV network, unearthed the realities

---

of black market and illegal economic activities in Karachi. According to the GEO News documentary, it cost the people of Karachi around $ 8.5 million per day for extortion, kidnap ransoms, loot, plunder and street crime.\textsuperscript{202} A more fearful scenario is predicted, when Mr. Altaf Hussain, the head of Karachi’s largest political party Muttahida Quami Movement (MQM), categorically mentioned that the flow of terrorists in Karachi is going to make Karachi a global center for terrorism. Recently, Karachi and major cities in Pakistan have become a source of economic activities for terrorists. Karachi particularly faces a power struggle between radical groups that seek to dominate the city. Frustrated and unemployed youth are easily entrapped for criminal activities in such instances.

The new government of P.M. Sharif has taken some initiatives to tackle economic problems. To address unemployment, P.M. Sharif has initiated the Youth Business Loan Scheme with the allocation of Rs. 3.7 billion; the scheme will provide 100,000 youth loans every year. The industrial sector has not been efficient lately, losing productivity due to a shortage of energy supplies. Currently Pakistan is dealing with a 7,000 MW shortfall despite the fact that it contains the world’s third largest coal reserves and utilizes less than 1 percent towards energy generation. On the other hand, the acute problem with power supply is the electricity theft and line losses. In March 2013 then State Minister for Water and Power, Tasnim Qureshi, informed the senate that over the last five years Pakistan had lost Rs. 59 billion (US $ 590 million) and Rs. 90

\textsuperscript{202} "'Kala Budget' Deprives Karachiites of Rs. 830 Million Daily," \textit{The News} September 4, 2013.
billion (US $ 900 million) respectively on account of theft and line losses. Lacking proper management and mechanisms to control huge losses is further corrupting the system. In order to meet the demands of energy shortfalls, like the previous PPP government (2008-13), the current government of PML (N) has shown a willingness to temporarily rely on rental power plants (RPP). In the past, however, such RPP projects were highly plagued by nationwide scandals with the involvement of political authorities in corruption and kickbacks during the RPP deals that resulted in not meeting the target.

Finally, it is obvious that Pakistan has paid a high cost for fighting the war against terrorism; the direct and indirect costs have deterred investors. Exclusively, Pakistan has relied on foreign capital to pay its bills and debts. Reliance on foreign aid pampered the political elites, who artificially fix the economic crises, but in a longer period the real problem resurfaces. Pakistani policy makers could not succeed in harnessing the resources and opportunities for economic development. The first step to begin is to neutralize the militancy and insurgency in the country; doing so will boost the confidence of local and foreign investors. Higher economic investment leads to higher economic activity and benefits a larger portion of the population.

---

GEOPOLITICAL FULCRUM OF CENTRAL, EAST, WEST, AND SOUTH ASIA

Pakistan’s geographic location is unique for economic, geopolitical, and geostrategic reasons; it is a convergence point and provides a gateway to Central Asia, East Asia, West Asia, and South Asia. This convergence point is one of the fundamental factors that make Pakistan a pivot state. The geographic features qualify Pakistan as high value for possessing natural resources, like its coal deposits at Thar, Sindh; copper-gold deposits in Chagai, Baluchistan; iron ore deposits in Deddar, Baluchistan, natural gas in Baluchistan, etc. Geopolitically, Pakistan is the most suitable economic corridor for trade and transit activities connecting the sub-regions of Asia with the rest of the world. As the geostrategic role of Pakistan remained important throughout the Cold War and in the post-Cold War so has its geographic position.

Pakistan is a neighbor to the important rising economies of India and China, which are experiencing an unprecedented increase in the domestic demand for energy consumption and the need for a more stable region, so that a smooth economic rise can be achieved and sustained in the long run. As discussed in Myanmar’s chapter, China and India’s energy thirst is leading them to seek new fields and routes for energy pipelines. In regional context, India basically depends on oil and coal-based fuel supplies; almost 50 percent of India’s power generation comes from coal-based fuel, 32 percent from oil, and the rest of its energy production from natural gas, hydro, and nuclear programs. In 2006, India’s total domestic demand for natural gas was 43 billion cubic meters and it soared to 110 billion cubic meters by 2010. India has been keen to materialize two important gas pipeline projects, which are designed to pass through
Pakistan. These are the Iran-Pakistan-India gas pipeline (IPI) and Turkmenistan-Afghanistan, Pakistan, and India (TAPI). The violence in Afghanistan and insurgencies in Baluchistan and KPK provinces of Pakistan has stalled these projects.  

China’s economic interest is very much linked to the geopolitical importance and stability of Pakistan. Beijing and Islamabad have been in close friendly relations since the 1960s, and as a gesture of friendship, the mega project in the 1970s was the construction of the Karakoram Highway (KKH) passing through Gilgit-Baltistan (GB), which connects the two countries. China has always admitted the diplomatic affinity between Beijing and Islamabad. To explain the friendly relation between Beijing and Islamabad, the Chinese ambassador to Pakistan, Luo Zhaohui, in 2009, said:

“Pakistan was one of the first countries to recognize New China. Ever since our diplomatic relations began in May 1951, we have enjoyed mutual understanding, respect, trust, and support and our friendship and cooperation have flourished. We are truly good neighbors, close friends, trusted partners, and dear brothers. When China was in difficulty caused by the Western blockades in the 1950s and 60s, it was Pakistan which opened an air corridor linking China with the outside world. In the 1970s it was Pakistan, which served as a bridge for the normalization of China-U.S. relations.”

The expanding Chinese interests in Central Asia, South Asia, the Middle East, and Africa will keep China highly dependent on Pakistan. Both Beijing and Islamabad have reaffirmed their friendly relations calling it “higher than the Mountains and Deeper than the Oceans.” Pakistan already handed over the most strategically located deep-sea port of Gwadar in Baluchistan to Chinese authority, who are looking after operational

---

206 Ibid.
matters. Gwadar, which is close to the Straits of Hormuz, is expected to be a game changer in terms of trade and transit in years to come that potentially will link China and landlocked Central Asia to the rest of the world.\(^{207}\)

Similarly, the U.S. strategy proposed under former U.S. Secretary of State Hillary Clinton of undertaking the “New Silk Road Initiative,” connecting Afghanistan and Central Asia with the global market to ease the sources of unrest and economic challenges, has a great potential link to the port of Gwadar.\(^{208}\) The objective of the U.S. strategy for connecting Afghanistan and landlocked Central Asia is due to a “missing link for the Modern Silk Road (MSR-1), a unified Eurasian continental trade and transport system that would enhance the prosperity and security for all involved.”\(^{209}\)

Apparently the individual agenda points of both the U.S. and China on Silk Road projects are plans to establish the sources of communications for the isolated and landlocked states in the region. But, at the same time, the U.S. policy of rebalancing towards Asia, and China’s Maritime Silk Route (MSR-2), potentially projects a competing feature in the Asian continent. China’s MSR-2 provides a window of opportunity to “improve China’s geo-strategic position in the world”, but is linked with domestic stability in the region and its relations with other contending powers in the region\(^{210}\)

This is not to forget that in the Central and South Asian context Afghanistan is historically considered a buffer state between powers, and its recent extension to some

\(^{207}\) Christopher Ernest Barber, "The Pakistan-China Corridor," The Diplomat February 27, 2014.


\(^{210}\) Rajeev Ranjan Chaturvedy, "Reviving the Maritime Silk Route," The Hindu April 11, 2014.
parts of Pakistan also shows symptoms of buffering to a major power, though within the region all of the member states are balanced against each other. Therefore, any future clash of interest in the region will sooner or later become a direct or indirect foothold for a power clash.

With reference to Afghanistan as a historical buffer zone, and in the wake of the withdrawal of International Forces from Afghanistan in 2014, Anatol Lieven emphasized that “long after Western Forces have left Afghanistan, Pakistan’s survival will remain a vital Western and Chinese interest. This should encourage cooperation between Beijing and Washington to ensure Pakistan’s survival. By contrast, a Sino-US struggle for control over Pakistan should be avoided at all costs, as this would add enormously to Pakistan’s destabilization.”

Presumably, China will gradually connect “the string of pearls” around the Indian Ocean, creating a sense of fear and insecurity for India. Despite China’s assurances, India is engaged in its own counter balancing of China in the region. Fearing China’s growing maritime power through Gwadar, India is funding the Zaranj-Delaram highway connecting Afghanistan, Central Asian republics, and Iran’s Chabahar port, so the highway and port can help reducing dependency on Pakistan. Yet India’s investment will grant it leverage on the countries it is investing in “developing a competing port at

---

Chabahar ... is not as well situated as Gwadar for the continental trade” and transit in future.\textsuperscript{214}

Chinese to Pakistani geographic assets suddenly become easier to get hold as a result of Pakistan’s deteriorating diplomatic relations with the U.S. significantly over the hunt of Osama bin Laden and the Salala incident on the Afghan border. Pakistan’s growing perception of the U.S. is closer to its traditional rival India, which further motivates Pakistan to strengthen its strategic relations with China.\textsuperscript{215} In this regard, a recent agreement between P.M. Sharif’s government and Beijing will start a mega railway project connecting Gwadar to China’s easternmost province of Xinjiang, proving the fast growing interdependency between both countries.\textsuperscript{216} China’s interest of economic expansionism and Pakistan’s response to create a corridor through its territory seeks to overcome Pakistan’s prolonged economic vulnerabilities and shows the intensity of mutual-and-asymmetrical interdependency. Beijing has pledged to invest $50 billion in various projects in Pakistan.\textsuperscript{217} Most of these projects are building and upgrading highways, infrastructure development, fiber-optic cabling, and in the energy (mainly hydro and nuclear) sector.

Pakistan has also adopted the slogan and insists on reviving the Silk Road for trade and transit activities. While speaking to Asian leaders during the annual Boao Forum for Asia 2014 at South China’s Hainan province, P.M. Sharif emphasized the revival of New Silk Road. Mr. Sharif noted that the steps taken between Beijing and

\textsuperscript{215} Serfaty, \textit{A World Recast: An American Moment in a Post-Western Order}, 175.
\textsuperscript{216} Barber, “The Pakistan-China Corridor.”
Islamabad to establish the Pakistan-China Economic Corridor is actually the southern extension of the New Silk Road.\textsuperscript{218} He further stated that “[Pakistan’s] geography links China and the New Silk Road to the warm waters of the Arabian Sea and the Persian Gulf. This is the linear dimension of our relevance with the Silk Road”, and “Pakistan is at the confluence of China, the Eurasian land-bridge and the Middle East which enables it to be the route to a three-pronged economic corridor between China, Central Asia and the Middle East.”\textsuperscript{219}

The truth in economic benefits and leverages through the creation of the economic corridor is crucial for Pakistan, and the potential benefits are viable too. However, these economic opportunities are highly linked with resolving domestic security and political issues on the one hand, while addressing regional geopolitical dynamics on the other, requiring subtle approaches to avoid any impediments to the dream projects. On a domestic scale, the security related issues have already been discussed in earlier sections. However, two important instances are significant for Pakistan to address the future viability of creating an economic corridor. First, since 1947, GB (a 72,971 sq. km or 28,174 sq. mile gateway or border zone of South Asia, East Asia and Central Asia located on extreme northern parts of Pakistan) is a constitutionally deprived region of the country with no rights to participate in national elections or have representation in parliament and senate, while GB allows the KKH to pass through its territory. The fate of GB is linked to the Kashmir dispute. If Pakistani lawmakers

\textsuperscript{218} "'Instrument of Prosperity': Pm Calls for Unlocking Silk Road Potential," \textit{The Express Tribune} April 11, 2014.

\textsuperscript{219} Ibid.
continue to ignore addressing the issues of political deprivation of this region, then it will gradually evolve into a power vacuum and threaten Pakistan’s greater interest in the region and beyond. After all, India claims GB as an integral part of greater Jammu and Kashmir. India’s bid to get GB means cutting off China from Pakistan and gaining direct access to Central Asia’s oil fields and markets. However, the situation on the ground is not in India’s favor, as locals are highly integrated into the Pakistani system and structure, but political grievances and deprivation are basic sources for political movements.

The second domestic instance is the political settlement of grievances of ethnic Baluchs, who are seeking greater autonomy over the resources they possess (ethno-nationalist unrest is discussed in early sections). 80 percent of Pakistan’s natural resources are located in Baluchistan, and more importantly the port of Gwadar exists in Baluchistan as well. A dominating perception among Baluch ethnic groups is that national policy is facilitating the non-local immigrant work force from other parts of the country, especially from Punjab. This changes the demographic ratio on the ground, and in fear of losing in the population ratio, a number of nationalist rebel groups are targeting non-local works and settlers. Therefore, focusing on political grievances of both GB and Baluchistan needs to be a priority because for an economic corridor to exist and be successful, both GB and Baluchistan will play simultaneously the role of entrance and exit for trade and transit activities in the region.

Another coming geopolitical anarchy between Pakistan and its neighbors will be its disputes over water, which is severe and given less attention. To elaborate, the issue
of Kashmir primarily has been argued around the notion of "integral part" claims on both sides in India and Pakistan. For decades, the political solution to Kashmir has remained unresolved. Similarly, to counter Pakistan's claim over Kashmir, India supported Afghanistan's claim over the Durand line issue, which eventually made them natural allies. Interestingly, to counter India, in 1963 Pakistan gave up its claim to over 2,050 sq. miles of border area to China and agreed to accept China's offer to withdraw for only 750 sq. mile of land, helping Pakistan and China to become allies and balancing India in the region. The issue of Kashmir will become serious not for demographic affinity or claims, but rather both Delhi and Islamabad now weigh the importance of Kashmir on the value of water resources. As a matter of fact, Pakistan is a lower riparian, as Pakistan's four main rivers in Punjab other than the Indus river originate in Indian administered Indus Basin.

The rapidly growing population, agricultural, and energy demands have speed up the construction of mega dams on both sides. Pakistan has shown serious concern over construction of dams on Pakistan's allocated water resources, which may cause shortfalls to its agricultural sector and possible flooding during monsoon season. Similarly, on the Western front of the country, Pakistan is an upper riparian for Afghanistan's Kunar River, which eventually merges into the Kabul River, and re-enters Pakistan, making Kabul an upper riparian. Kabul has shown its concern to Pakistan for a number of dam projects that may affect its water resources, though there is no water treaty signed between Afghanistan and Pakistan, whereas in the case of India, both countries already signed an Indus water treaty under the auspices of the World Bank in
the 1960. Despite the treaty and growing India’s domestic demand, India has already started construction of number of dams. Pakistan has shown its worrisome and reached Permanent Court of Arbitration over India’s construction of Baglihar dam and Kishanganga hydroelectric plant on River Chenab and the Jhelum River. Under Indus Water Treaty three Western rivers of Indus system namely the Indus River, the Jhelum River and the Chenab rivers were exclusively allotted to Pakistan, while the three Eastern Rivers of Indus system, the Sutlej, the Beas, and the Ravi were exclusively entitled for India. There is a high chance that if all parties do not pay attention to the water factor, and fail to conclude some terms, then the entire region can be engulfed in high scale conflict over this resource.

The complex regional geopolitical dynamics of South Asia have evolved through weak links that have badly affected the political development of the entire region. Mainly, the geopolitics of South Asia has been centered on the geographical disputes within the “Pakistan-China-India triangle.”220 The politics of triangular relations are quite common in the case of South Asia in its extension to relationships with neighboring countries in the Middle East and East Asia, e.g. during the Cold War triangular relations between “China-Pakistan-U.S. vs USSR-Afghanistan-India” remained focal points.221 Stepping out of triangular premises, on a greater scale Afghanistan and Pakistan have become the nexus points between two “shatterbelts [of the world], the South East Asia

220 Brzezinski, Strategic Vision : America and the Crisis of Global Power, 162.
221 Graham Chapman, The Geopolitics of South Asia from Early Empires to the Nuclear Age (Burlington, VT: Ashgate, 2003), 279.
and the Middle East." On some occasions, the South Asian region is also considered to be a shatterbelt, but more often it plays the role of fulcrum between two crush zones. In reality, South Asia "is internally fragmented, wracked by internal rebellions and tension between states," with a moderate scale foreign involvement existing to qualify it as a shatterbelt. India’s resistance, however, to allowing any foreign interference is the core factor that excludes the South Asian region from being considered a shatterbelt.

Exclusion from being considered a shatterbelt does not imply that South Asia is not a violent region. Pakistan has lost more than 50,000 people just in the last decade; India has lost more than 22,000 soldiers over the course of a number of border skirmishes and domestic security challenges. Today Maoist rebels are considered the most high profile threat to India’s security than any other entity. Bangladesh is in trouble with restoring relations with India and Pakistan, Sri Lanka experienced a bloody insurgency, Nepal is trying to shift its traditional pro-Indian policy to balance with Chinese ties, and Afghanistan continues to suffer as a failed state due to more than three decades of war. While the world has entered into the twenty-first century with new aims and ambitions, most Third World countries have yet to cross this threshold, carrying unresolved disputes of the past that hamper political development.

According to the latest report published by the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI), during 2009-2013 the world’s top three arms importers were India, China, and Pakistan. India and Pakistan have their arms imports increased by 111

---

222 The Geopolitics of South Asia from Early Empires to the Nuclear Age (Burlington, VT: Ashgate, 2003), 256.
223 Cohen, Geopolitics: The Geography of International Relations, 329.
224 Ibid.
percent and 119 percent as compared to imports during 2004-2008.\textsuperscript{225} According to the International Institute of Strategic Studies (IISS), although Pakistan has already surpassed India in keeping a higher number of nuclear weapons due to fear of India’s conventional strength over its own, lately Pakistan has been engaged in developing short-range tactical nuclear weapons. Theoretically speaking, Pakistani strategists believe this development creates a deterrent against any conventional war or is capable of inflicting heavy losses in case of an attack.\textsuperscript{226} With a highly a fractured region and low level of mutual trust, the potential for war between India and Pakistan, and of any nuclear war between the two would, according to the Nobel Peace Prize-winning International Physicians for the Prevention of Nuclear War and Physicians for Social Responsibility, cause the deaths of 2 billion people, ending civilization, and causing famine in the entire region.\textsuperscript{227}

Despite Pakistani political elite’s choice of the United States as a security guarantor soon after its independence and the recipient of economic and military aid since 1951, Pakistan could not strengthen its democratic institutions. According to data compiled by the Center for Global Development, from 1951 to 2011, the United States provided $67 billion in aid to Pakistan. Although the flow of aid fluctuates, it remained higher in times of U.S. geopolitical interest in the region. Throughout this entire period, Pakistan has relied on external support, especially against India, and “most of Pakistanis believe that Americans are not aware of India’s longstanding hegemonic goals and the

\textsuperscript{225} Wezeman and Wezeman, "Trends in International Arms Transfer 2013," 6.
\textsuperscript{227} "Indo-Pak Nuclear War to 'End Civilisation' with Famine: Study," \textit{Dawn} December 11, 2013.
dangers to Pakistani and U.S. interests that they entail.228 In recent years, the United States has increased its diplomatic and economic ties with India and other Asian countries, in reference to a general belief about the twenty-first Century as an Asian Century. Pakistani strategists worry about U.S. inclinations towards India and approving a civil nuclear deal with India. Pakistan is seeking a similar deal on the transfer of nuclear technology for peaceful usage. Pakistan noticed that U.S. apprehensions about nuclearization were not focused on disarmament, but nuclear terrorism.229 Keeping in mind security concerns and issues of nuclear terrorism, Pakistan under a new government presented once more its case to acquire a nuclear deal for peaceful usage at the third National Security Summit (NSS) in the Hague in March 2014. The Pakistani premier assured attendees about the security of its program under five pillars: “a) a strong command and control system led by the National Command Authority; b) an integrated intelligence system; c) a rigorous regulatory regime; and d) a comprehensive export control regime; and active international cooperation.”230 Overall, Pakistan received positive appreciation for its nuclear arsenal’s safety measures, but U.S. lawmakers shifted the focus of institutional building and aid support towards education, health, and civil-society in Pakistan. In fact, the Kerry-Lugar bill pledged $7.5 billion split over 5 years in a program supporting socio-economic domains and other possible avenues to support energy issues instead of agreeing to a civil-nuclear program.

American lawmakers are cautious about transferring nuclear technology, especially in the case of an unstable situation where nuclear technology can be leaked to any rogue forces, which could be highly detrimental to regional and global peace. Recently, there was controversy when media reports surfaced regarding Saudi Arabia’s likely demand for Pakistani nukes if Iran goes nuclear. Pakistan denied such revelations. However, another controversy is still unfolding about Saudis seeking Pakistani arms (mainly anti-aircraft and anti-tank rockets) and human resources to support Islamists and rebels against Bashar al-Assad’s regime in Syria. Pakistani officials have denied any weapons to be sent to rebels, but agreed that it has been selling weapons to different countries including in Middle East way before Syrian civil war started. The Saudis have pondered their discomfort over the U.S.’s reconciliation policy with Iran and Syria due to their ideological differences and decided to reach out to other possible options and actors to carry on its own policy against the Assad regime and indirectly against Iran.

In early 2014, frequent visits by high officials from Saudi Arabia and Bahrain have already grabbed attention in Pakistan. To great surprise, Pakistan’s Finance Minister announced that Saudi Arabia has donated $1.5 billion and another $1.5 billion will be gifted at a later stage. Analysts and opposition leaders are doubtful about Pakistan’s Middle East policy, and a number of predictions suggest that the $1.5 billion gift is payment for arms against Assad and other demands. The Nawaz government has denied

233 Hasan Askari Rizvi, "The Middle East Puzzle," The Express Tribune March 24, 2014.
these speculations and assured that Pakistan maintains balanced relations with all Middle Eastern states. However, if Pakistan becomes a “partisan in intra-Arab conflicts,” then all hostile neighbors, including Iran, Afghanistan and India, will pose multiple scale security challenges to Pakistan. As a result, it will be the beginning of another wave of extra-regional geopolitical proxy conflict based on ethnic and sectarian violence affecting the entire society.

Despite the row over a number of security issues, both Washington and Islamabad know the value of each side. Pakistan still depends on military and economic aid from the U.S. to complete other mega projects and certainly needs investments from the World Bank and IMF. Without U.S. support it will be hard to obtain loans and aid. Reciprocally, the U.S. understands the importance of Pakistan in the region, especially when the U.S. is preparing to conclude its offensive mission in Afghanistan, which is considered to be one of the largest mobilizations of war machinery since the Second World War. In that sense, Western Allies are anticipating Pakistani support in the withdrawal and commitment for restoring peace in the region once international troops have departed. Therefore, Pakistan needs to deal with its security issues and stabilize its domestic challenges so it can help to respond effectively to geopolitical and geo-strategic challenges.

234 "Pakistan’s Policy Tilt in the Middle East," The Express Tribune February 23, 2014.
CONCLUSION: PROSPECTS AND CHALLENGES

Over the past 67 years, Pakistan has been ruled under a political oligarchy through dynastic family, civil bureaucracy, and military rule. The political oligarchy adopted the colonial structures of power and retained power for a long span of time. Most importantly, Pakistani political elites have utilized their geographic status as a frontline state over and over again, and the benefits remain distributed among the members of the oligarchy. The military enjoys authority as a guardian of the entire nation and system, but seems hesitant to relinquish this role. In the same way the inherited British colonial "steel frame," i.e. the bureaucracy, "still carry the burden of maintaining a colonial bureaucracy that is crippling the nation down to its core, [so there is a need to] decolonise [Pakistani] bureaucracy from the colonial mindset, and make it performance based and accountable." Ironically, the dynastic family, feudal structure, and political elites or rulers remaining in "power have always been obsessed by self-interest rather than national interest," and the rest of nation is being fooled with the notion that waiting for God's miracle will bring justice and fix the system.

Pakistani society is politically tamed into a subjective-parochial political culture and has impacted the overall social cohesion of the state.

Weak socio-political cohesion has gradually hollowed out Pakistan's political culture's foundations. Mainly, political elites have allowed subjective parochial political system functions through centralized and controlled political systems, while the overall

---

235 Grare, "Rethinking Western Strategies toward Pakistan: An Action Agenda for the United States and Europe," 43.
236 Hussain Nadim, "Decolonising Our Civil Services," The Express Tribune April 4, 2014.
system lacks the social cohesion in society. The resulting higher level of corruption provides room for dictators to intervene and stay in power for a longer period, which keeps the institutions weak, and repatrimonialization in the system. Times have changed; the population nowadays is becoming more informed and "the resilience of a population is frustrated with corruption and civil disorder, and determined to do something about it," so a viable political order needs to be established. Otherwise, if the state is not cured, then as usual one will see the vicious circle repeating: the "political condition of weak states often propel the military into government as the only organization possessing the power and/ or the national legitimacy to hold the state together," and democratic institutions will gradually face a political decay.

Pakistan has been temporarily benefiting from all of these odd events by taking advantage of its status as a frontline state, but these benefits did not last long enough. The consequences of becoming a frontline state, particularly with the use of religious ideologies, have backfired for Pakistan. Pakistani lawmakers now understand the limits of religious ideology as it failed to preserve unity in 1971. The viability of Pakistan’s stability demands policies that respect and protect diversity and the opinions of others. By doing so, Pakistan can be in a position to overcome the issues of a weak and feeble civil society.

241 Schofield, "Diversionary Wars: Pashtun Unrest and the Sources of the Pakistan-Afghan Confrontation," 46.
Pakistan is entangled with multiple challenges emanating from security, political, economic, and social realms. But Pakistani society is so resilient that it has the capacity to emerge again as a stable and responsible state. Seth Kaplan writes that although Pakistan is facing conditions of state fragility, “dealing with Pakistan is not a hopeless option. Pakistan has a significance experience with competitive elections, a court system and legal profession that prize their independence, a reasonably free and critical media, and a strong opposition.” The capacity and capability of a stable Pakistan depends on a political order that respects the rule of law, treats every member of the state on equal terms, finds a balance between its defense and non-defense spending, and restores friendly ties with neighbors, the path towards stability and prosperity. With a successful leap, both the citizens of Pakistan and the global community will respect the positive image, credibility, and legitimacy of Pakistan.

---

CHAPTER V
ANALYSIS AND CONCLUSIONS

Around the world today, we still see children suffering from hunger and disease. We still see run-down schools. We still see young people without prospects for the future. Around the world today, men and women are still imprisoned for their political beliefs, and are still persecuted for what they look like, and how they worship, and who they love.

President, Barack Obama¹

Democracy is the Best Revenge.

Benazir Bhutto²

We cannot make the world safe for democracy without first making the world safe for diversity.

The Aga Khan³

INTRODUCTION

Why study fragile or weak pivot states? Does the study of fragility matter in a highly interdependent world when extra-territoriality or deterritoriality enable individuals, groups, firms, and organizations to carry overlapping loyalties beyond the state of origin? First of all, the notion of state fragility resonates with the global fear about transnational effects on global peace and stability. Cracks in the state system permeate with a higher frequency of insecurity. Now, these cracks are emanating from state fragility, referring to those states with poor performance in terms of an

¹ Remarks by President Obama at Memorial Service for Former South African President Nelson Mandela, December 10, 2013.
³ The Canadian Prime Minister, Stephen Harper, quotes the Aga Khan, while welcoming His Highness the Aga Khan at Canada’s Parliament, February 27, 2014.
inefficiency to provide political goods to citizens, unsatisfactory economic output, domestic instability, and socio-political insecurities which threaten state and regional harmony. As described in chapter two, Robert Rotberg (2004) argued that as these insecurities challenge the "legitimacy and creditability of state," the value of the social bond between citizens and the state gradually fades.

The coming security and humanitarian challenges are alerted by statistical data, which most likely emanate from fragile societies and their growing instabilities: as highlighted, 2.5 billion poor live in weak societies, and the majority live in zones of conflict. According to a World Bank estimate, approximately 1.5 billion people live in fragile and conflict-affected situations (FCS). By 2015 the FCS will host 32 percent of world's poor, and this number will reach 40 percent by 2030. The World Bank report suggests that such fragile conditions due to weak institutions, poor governance, political, and social instability are often accompanied by continuous endemic violence, which eventually impedes developmental agendas in these fragile parts of the world.

The track record on human rights is highly worrying in FCS, and most of these countries are in Africa, Asia, and Latin America. These regions are lagging behind the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs). Most of the conflict-affected fragile societies in Africa, Asia, and Latin America are spending an average US $22 billion a year on arms, and most of the small arms are accessible to violent groups endangering the peace in their respective regions. Appropriating the same amount towards some of the MDGs will help the states achieve some targets, such as universal primary education and the reduction

---

4 Sachs, The End of Poverty: Economic Possibilities for Our Time; Collier, The Bottom Billion: Why the Poorest Countries are Failing and What Can Be Done About It.
of infant and maternal mortality, estimated at US $10 billion and US $12 billion respectively.\textsuperscript{5} The resolution of health and educational problems can overcome most political and security issues. As an instance, Boko Haram, a Nigerian radical terrorist group, is actively fighting the pursuit of education. The Boko Haram insists that western education is illegal, and a similar pattern persists in Pakistan in which some target schools and resist the development of a knowledge-based and responsible society. This notion infers that the higher ignorance, the higher the chance of clash; in contrast, the higher the knowledge base, the more society can pave the way for a more civilized orientation that reduces any expectation of clash.

Most prominent explanations rely on domestic factors as the root cause of fragility; however, looking beyond domestic reasoning, this study adds one external dimension to the study of state fragility. Therefore, at the domestic or endogenous scale, the evidences show that the weakness of the state arises from political, security, economic, and social domains. All of these domains are interdependent, meaning that failure in one aspect can cause the failure of all. In most of the cases of state fragility identified in the case studies, weak and fragile states “display a paradox: they are at once strong in the category of despotic power, but weak in infrastructural power.”\textsuperscript{6} The literature and case studies emulate the existence of a political vacuum, political oligarchy, and kleptocracy, which become prominent factors of the ineffectiveness of institutions and governance. The exogenous factors are linked with geopolitics, which

cause a burden on the state due to its position and resources. The addition of the geopolitical factor expounds upon an enduring and valid discussion; whether during colonial times or in the post-colonial era, these geographical pivots have remained zones of importance for regional and major powers.

The “birth of [the] paradigm” of state fragility or failure surfaced after the end of the Cold War, highlighted the “risks [that] were posed by the fragility of state structures and recommended profound shifts” in security and foreign policies. The paradigm mainly suggested military interventions in weak states, considering them to be “factories of volatility,” the interventions whittled down the intensities of “chaos, violence, and grievances.” Global interventions based on lack of commitment, geopolitical interests, and short term policies retained the worsening conditions of state fragility, and in many situations like Iraq, conditions become highly volatile. Similar patterns are yet to seen in a number of fragile states, i.e. Nigeria, Sudan, Yemen, and many other geographical pivots, which are highly volatile islands of chaos that need more than externally engineered interventions. For instance, in the post 9/11 period, international forces in Afghanistan and the U.S. intervention in Iraq focused on “state building and counterinsurgency (COIN)” agendas, presuming they could help overcome fragile statehood conditions and curtail the magnitude of violence. Over the years, however, the notion of state-building in these weak states has received less attention, with the focus remaining on dealing with COIN options.

---

8 Ibid.
The problem of dealing and ignoring issues of state fragility in a number of violent situations was the lack of understanding of the actual root causes of fragility and weakness; even if the causes were tracked, they would be compromised for security reasons in battling against insurgents and terrorists. Therefore, in recent decades, the hype about threats posed by weak states took flight very quickly, but simultaneously lost momentum. It is not unique to observe the high amount of attention given to terrorism instead of state-building, because the contemporary threat paradigm emanates from transnational terrorist activities instead of any fear of a state attacking another state. Though traditional security threat perceptions retain their weightage, scenarios like Russia’s move into Georgia and Ukraine validate the conventional explanations about security threats.

This research doubts and questions the idea about the rise and fall of the paradigm of state fragility within the scope of the last two decades, because the history of weak and strong societies existed before. There is always an asymmetrical power relationship between the weak and the strong, and states that seek maximum gain through dealing with each other via buffering, balancing, and bandwagoning. It appears that fragility and weakness are not new sources of threats or problems both on the conceptual and contextual scale. In fact, traditional concepts such as small states, small powers, and weak societies were replaced with the contemporary usage of concepts like weak, fragile, failing, quasi-state, failed, and collapsed state. In general, both historical and contemporary narratives still seek to fix the domestic issues of the state and its institutional weaknesses. Most importantly, the core difference between then and now
is the compression of time and space, resulting in the height of a security threat, which may not be possible to perceive in early years at the same scale. In reference to Jared Diamond's argument, cited in chapter II, that in the contemporary time period the world cannot stay safe witnessing societies collapse in isolation, the ripple effects of collapse are more severe today than ever. For example, as discussed in chapter IV, India and Pakistan fought several wars in the past, which had less of an impact on regional and global peace. But now the scenario has changed, and a full scale nuclear war between these two countries will cause the deaths of or affect nearly 2 billion people, wipe an entire civilization off the region, and trap millions into hunger and struggles with displacement, a humanitarian situation beyond one’s imagination. Overall, the severity of the problem is higher, which prompts a serious examination of how to fix such fragile states.

TWO CASE STUDIES: COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS

This chapter is focused on the comparative analysis of the two case studies, Myanmar and Pakistan. The analysis seeks an answer derived from contributions from earlier chapters on conceptual framework and evidence. Earlier chapters thoroughly investigated an answer to the research question, “under what conditions do weak states continuously fail to perform?” They also expand the debate into an issue of fixing fragility and posit that traditional fixation is linked with different forms of interventions. Therefore, should it be accepted that interventions are the only solution to deal with the continuous fragile conditions of these two cases, or should weak states make it their
own responsibility to tackle problems of stability and viability of their loose statehoods? The explanation is drawn over two hypothetical statements mentioned earlier; 1) The absence of an effective political order (institutional ineffectiveness and bad governance) causes a gradual decay of state structure, 2) The burden of geography and geopolitics is more likely to affect state fragility. Within the parameters of these hypothetical statements, the previous chapters discussed thoroughly how the core factors of fragility, colonial legacies, the effects of corruption on governance, and geopolitical maneuverings, gradually dwindle statehood.

A positive indicator of the contemporary, complex, and interdependent world is the decline of inter-state wars, but at the same time, the propensity of conflicts is rising at the intra-state level. Domestic conflicts in affected societies are contagious; as one can see from the ramifications of the Syrian civil war that has multifold contagious affects involving the entire region. The seeds of similar intra-state conflicts exist in most weak and fragile states, just waiting for fertile situations for reaction. For example, since independence, the security apparatuses in Pakistan and Myanmar have been continuously engaged in fighting against insurgents, rebel nationalist groups, and lately the intensity has increased to the extent that a political will is needed to resolve the problem for the betterment of both societies.

Keeping in mind the violent situation in both countries, the overall trends of state performance in Myanmar and Pakistan are not positive. According to the Failed State Index, in 2009 Myanmar and Pakistan were ranked at number 10 and 13 respectively. Myanmar’s commitment to democracy and path to openness substantially
changed the situation. Similarly in Pakistan, though the security situation is still at risk, political transitions are promising. Compared to 2009, the latest Failed State index of 2013 ranked Myanmar and Pakistan 13th and 26th respectively. The trend suggests a slow and steady recovery, as the democratic transitions in two countries are promising features that eventually overcome major domestic challenges and strengthen institutions. Still, the rankings remain in the high-risk category of fragility.

HYPOTHESIS I: THE ABSENCE OF AN EFFECTIVE POLITICAL ORDER (INSTITUTIONAL INEFFECTIVENESS AND BAD GOVERNANCE) CAUSES A GRADUAL DECAY OF STATE STRUCTURE

In the rapid decolonization process during the 1950s and 1960s, the phenomena of political order remained a focal point for a number of political scientists, including Samuel Huntington, whose work on *Political Order in Changing Societies* outlined challenges and opportunities for newly independent states. Huntington argued that newly independent countries confuse the modernization process as a way out for their fragile statehood, rather he emphasized the pursuit of political development ultimately helping those weak states in their nation-building processes. But what is observed in many weak states, for example Myanmar, Nigeria, and Pakistan that soon after independence they either quickly started to seek economic gains due to an immediate economic crunch and paid less attention to the political development of their institutions, or the institutional legacies established during the colonial times continued

---

to rule the complex and heterogeneous political communities. Jeffrey Herbst called the
decolonization process granting sovereignty to many decolonizing states "little more
than legal fiction." Herbst's idea in many ways reverberates with the idea of Gerald B.
Helman and Steven R. Ratner (1992), who argued that ill-planned and quick
decolonization that do not prepare the newly establishing states for their future
responsibilities cause state failure, Guinea for example.

These arguments seem appealing; almost all newly decolonized states struggled
with political, economic and societal challenges. As discussed in chapter IV, soon after
independence Pakistan suffered economically, as it lacked funds to pay the salaries of
state servants. Contrary to Herbst's idea about sovereignty as legal fiction, William
Zartman (1995) argues that the legality of the sovereign state is in fact granted and
assured by the international community, so it should not be fictitious; rather, the
problem of weakness and state fragility completely depends on the weakness and
performance of state institutions. Similarly noted before, Daron Acemoglu and James
Robinson (2012) built their argument around the importance of institutions, as they
negate the notion that culture, history, and geography cause nations to fail; it is
institutions.

Acemoglu and Robinson's argument has partial strength, but as this study shows,
geography cannot be ignored. Culture matters too: for instance, in the context of the
Indian sub-continent, we can evaluate the role of culture allowing political participation
and democratic transitions in post-colonial time. Three political parties were established

---

10 Herbst, "Responding to State Failure in Africa," 118.
during British Colonial time, namely the Indian National Congress (1885), All India Muslim League (1906), and Young Men’s Buddhist Association (1906), and all three parties led nationalist political struggles against colonialism and created three independent countries, India, Pakistan, and Burma (now Myanmar). Is there any individual, sociocultural influence on these organizations that at a later stage inflicted any cultural norm on the political processes in the countries and their respective political systems? Michael Ignatieff agreed that multiple reasons cause state fragility instead of only a single factor causing decay. As Ignatieff writes about state fragility, “sometimes the cause is the colonial legacy; sometimes it is maladministration by an indigenous elite; sometimes, failure is a legacy first of interference by outside powers, and then abandonment ... and most important, many failed or failing states are poor and have suffered from the steadily more adverse terms of trade in a globalized economy.”12

Deliberating on the institutional dimension, Daron Acemoglu and James Robinson’s argument about the importance of “inclusive institutions” for the viability of society is convincing, if focused on domestic factors of fragility and the weakening of political order. Douglass North explains institutions as they “are the rules of the game in a society or, more formally, are the human devised constraints that shape human interaction.”13 Pointed out in chapter II, there are three sets of institutions significantly important to enforce the political order, i.e. the state, the rule of law, and an accountable government (democracy). The enforcement of order has remained

12 Ignatieff, "Intervention and State Failure," 118.
13 North, Institutions, Institutional Change, and Economic Performance, 3.
ineffective in both Myanmar and Pakistan, because institutions remained unstable, and on a number of accounts, states become “predatory” against their own citizens with lesser accountability on actions they have taken.

The first core factor in the weakness of fragile states is the idea of colonial legacies that accounted for the asymmetrical growth of institutions, in which authoritarian regimes eventually become powerful and state institutions become weaker. The colonial legacy not only allowed authoritarian powers to rule, but completely undermined the heterogeneity and diversity of society. Similar patterns were adopted in post-colonial times, when state machinery forcefully engaged in “homogenization” and “ethnification” processes without offering agreeable bargains to pluralistic communities. The artificial process of ethnification is being resisted in weak states that have internal violence. For example, the Kachins are fighting against the Burmese army believing they only represent ethnic Burmans, who tried to occupy their land and resources; this case is not different from how Baloch nationalist groups feel about Pakistan’s military for its major population ratio drawn from ethnic Punjabis. Harris Mylonas emphasized that the process of homogenization is a way of excluding non-core groups or re-orienting a new identity. Still, it is important to remember that the ethnic groups are always conscious of their national and ethnic differences, and in modern times, consciousness is supported by the idea of self-determination. Therefore, based on the state’s policies of assimilation, the accommodation and elimination of non-core ethnic groups has caused great uproar in many accounts of weak states. Fearing problems with heterogeneity, the state engages in forceful homogenization, in
which non-core groups seek the popular, political incentive of self-determination. As violence grows, the non-core or minority groups start seeking support from various external forces, and the provision of “safe havens” is the main “good” that one state can provide against the rival. Similarly the enemy state looks for similar groups unhappy with the state, so it can utilize them in reciprocity (a tit-for-tat policy) for what rival state is doing against it.\textsuperscript{14} In an instance in the case studies, Myanmar blames India for supporting Kachin rebels, and India blames Myanmar over its shelter and support for rebels from India’s northeast province; in a similar situation, Pakistan and India blame each other for supporting insurgent groups in India’s administered Kashmir and Pakistan’s Baluchistan regions respectively.

Therefore, in the “paradox of Decolonization, (for instance) ... heterogeneous political heritage was brushed aside in the rush by nationalists to seize the reins of power of the nation-states as defined politically and geographically” by the colonial rulers.\textsuperscript{15} Particularly, Nigeria, which has more than 250 ethnic groups, these groups were forced to join state as a process of colonization and decolonization outcomes. Their diverse and past history is ignored, which allowed a number of centrifugal forces to join anti-state and terrorist groups. As one of the country’s richest in energy resources, and with the highest fertility rate, Nigeria faces huge internal security threats with transnational linkages between terrorist networks.

Another similar account is the Asian context, where in the case of Myanmar, a total of eight major ethnic minority groups and 135 sub-groups under the umbrella of

\textsuperscript{15} Herbst, "Responding to State Failure in Africa," 120.
core ethnic groups, were forced to join the union during the British period, and were later trapped into internal war between the center and periphery. In many accounts, weak and fragile states learned to dominate small or non-core groups as ethnic minorities. As highlighted, in Myanmar the Burman majority (composition 70%) dominates other non-Burman ethnic groups, and in Pakistan, the province of Punjab dominates over other provinces based on its high ethnic and political domination. Barry Buzan (2007) has referred to these societies as “imperial states,” in federative structure, in which one ethnic group dominates the other and continues to keep internal fragmentation and power struggles among diverse ethnic groups; this consequently weakens the social cohesion of the nation-building process.

Francis Fukuyama described the two ways that contribute to the political decay of a political system; 1) ineffectiveness of institutions, and 2) Repatrimonialization. About institutions, Fukuyama writes that “institutions wouldn’t be institutions that is, stable, valued, recurring patterns of behavior – if they were not further reinforced by strong social norms, rituals, and other kinds of psychological investments in them...in case of disjunction (in investment process) cause political decay or deinstitutionalization.”16 The second form of political decay, in which ruling elites allow favoring family, and friends to retain power through lineages, which “constanty put the pressure to repatrimonialize the system.”17 Here, Pakistan’s model is a most suitable scenario; its many institutions remain dysfunctional with dynastic politics embedded in the repatrimonialization of political culture.

If looking at conditions for why political institutions are weak in fragile states, the literature and evidence suggest that one reason is the prolonged rule of authoritarian rule establishing praetorian hierarchical structures that gradually cause the decay of political institutions. As aforementioned, the paradox of weak states is that they are powerful in the category of despotic power and its coercive capabilities, while weak in a non-coercive state capacity. In Myanmar and Pakistan, the vacuum of political leadership (at the landscape of the political process) allowed military regimes to fill the gap. For instance, in 1947, a few months before the independence of Myanmar, national hero Aung San was assassinated; comparably Pakistan’s founding father, who wished to see a democratic Pakistan with equal rights for all the citizens, died soon after its independence. These events plunged the newly independent countries into political chaos, providing military elites the opportunity to take political charge.

The patterns of military interventions are common across all the fragile states, when they witnessed political chaos soon after their freedom and engaged in political strife. The earlier postcolonial glimpse of Nigeria shares the common faith that military intervention occurred in less than a decade of independence and continued its influence until 1998. Should it be assumed that the colonial rulers trusted the military elites to retain social cohesion through the use of force, instead of allowing an evolutionary process via democratic transitions? Since 2001 in Afghanistan, the international community has allocated a huge amount of investment in resetting the fragmented societal cohesiveness. After a decade of political and economic management, the international community is charging Afghans to take care of their future—mainly the
country’s newly raised 350,000 security personnel. The comparative imbalance between strong Afghan security and weak government institutions suggests that the future threat is not from terrorist or internal political divides but from a “coming military coup” based on belief, as in post-colonial times, that the militarily must intervene to save the democracy. The case of a military coup in Afghanistan against the historic democratic transitions right now developing will prove the traditional trends of the past, when most newly independent weak states faced military interventions. These interventions gradually hollowed the effectiveness of the institutions.

Ironically, the military elites always legitimize their domestic political ventures. Now legitimacy at large does not mean the “civil society’s acceptance of the military’s role, but to the mechanism through which military justifies its political influence.” For example, Former Pakistan Army Commander Gen. Khalid Mahmud Arif argues that the Army’s take-over of democratically-elected governments is in a way to avoid political instability. Gen. Arif emphasized that Pakistan inherited political instability as part and parcel since independence. It is because Pakistan completely lacked the proper structure of a state; the flow of millions of Muslim refugees from India; the early death of founding father (a leadership vacuum); nascent political system and internal disorder further weakened the system; and inexperienced, inefficient, or not properly trained politicians caused the derailment of democratic system in country. Despite the fact that the military always institutionally seeks justification for its interventions as an

---

19 Siddiq-Agha, Military Inc. : Inside Pakistan’s Military Economy, 36.
20 Malik, Pakistan : Founder’s Aspirations and Today’s Realities, 19.
appropriate step to tackle existing problems of political development, it is significantly important to understand that “political disorder as a cause of the military's intervention” as well.21

The duplicity in words and actions of praetorian guards have gradually lost the confidence of people's opinions about any promises made regarding democratic transitions or handing over power to civilian regimes. Meaning, by and large, military interventions have promised immediate free and fair elections and a transfer of power. But, in contrast, once military elites come to power, either they forget the promise or enjoy political power, showing less inclination to handover the power. In 1958 Gen. Ayub Khan’s martial law in Pakistan and in 1962 Gen. Ne Win’s military rule in Myanmar promised elections, as similarly their military predecessors followed the patterns of offering electoral pledges, but when it came to the elections, either the elections were rigged or did not oblige with results. In fact, during the electoral campaigns, the military elites themselves became candidates to contest elections, as in 1960’s Gen. Ayub contest against Ms. Fatima Jinnah (sister of Pakistan’s founding father); and in the case of Myanmar military-backed retired generals contents against Aung San Suu Kyi (daughter of national hero and founding father) after the revolution of 8888.

In both instances, in Myanmar and Pakistan, the state machinery was utilized to undermine the populous support for civilians. For example, in Pakistan, clerics were asked to promulgate religious decrees (Fatwa) against the eligibility of the female contestant (Ms. Jinnah). These actions were planned to subside her popularity and avoid

---

21 Aziz, Military Control in Pakistan: The Parallel State, 59.
any support she could have gained, as her blood relation to the country’s founding father Mr. Jinnah. Likewise, in Myanmar, Aung San Suu Kyi gained popular support and used her father Aung San for more credibility. The military rule under the SLORC tried to undermine the rule or posture of her father. Pictures of her father were removed from all buildings and a narrative was constructed that his past political contributions were for the gain of his own political interests.

Fearing the rise of democratic voices, military regimes always avoid free and fair elections and prefer controlled referendums and legal approval from supreme courts. To avoid populous resistance, military regimes in Myanmar and Pakistan moved their capitals from urban and populous centers to newly built capitals close to military headquarters. Pakistan shifted its capital from Karachi to Islamabad, and Myanmar shifted from Yangon to Naypyidaw. The official explanation argues that it was in the strategic interests for the transfer of capitals.

Another interesting commonality between Myanmar and Pakistan is the state’s role in reorienting the state’s narrative based on identity and ideology. As pointed out and discussed in detail as evidence in chapters III and IV, military rulers in Myanmar started to revive glory of past famous kings and erected their statues at various public places. A parallel instance was mentioned before that the Pakistani ruling elites, especially during the 1980s, re-invented past religious glory introducing Arab, Central Asian, and other Muslim warriors into the educational curriculum. They believed these actions would allow them to gain popularity among the people, but in Pakistan’s case, many of the policies backfired and redirected public a support for religious narratives
based on reviving orthodox thoughts on establishing caliphate. Today, many
conservative groups nurture these principles and embedded with these ideas as a core
agenda to establish global caliphate. Results of these actions have flared up communal
and sectarian violence against minorities in Myanmar and Pakistan.

The military elites in Myanmar and Pakistan believe that it is their responsibility
to protect the integrity of the state, so it has the legitimate right to decide which
domestic actor is more reliable. To protect the national interest, it is observed that
military regimes have supported stateless actors, as Tatmadaw is allegedly involved in
supporting drug lords, whom in return supported the economy of Myanmar during the
times of sanctions, supported financing energy ventures, and also helped Myanmar’s
security forces to fight against domestic ethnic rebels. The case of Tatmadaw is not
different; if compared to Pakistan’s geopolitical role in the first Afghan war in 1979
supporting Islamist Jihadist to fight against Soviets. Later the same jihadists perceived as
a useful tool to seek its “strategic mirage” or so-called strategic depth and countering
irredentists in KPK and Baluchistan. To clarify, the nationalist groups fighting against the
center in Myanmar and Pakistan are for political rights and over resource distribution;
while, in contrast, the stateless geostrategic assets of the past have developed an
ideological motive seeking its implementation as the rule of law, like Taliban and
likeminded factions in Pakistan are asking for the imposition of Sharia law and challenge
the legal validity of constitution of Pakistan through their way of religious perspectives.

However, the problem becomes severe when states craft laws that are used on
political grounds against minorities. As, under the military regime in the 1980s evolved
Pakistan’s blasphemy law that awarded the maximum death penalty. The law has recently become a main tool to target minorities or individuals with different views on various social and political issues. Alarmingly, the level of intolerance has grown, and even lawyers and judges now fear dealing with legal petitions that are linked with blasphemy related matters. Scores of judges and lawyers are killed e.g. in 1996, Justice Arif Bhatti (killed in Lahore, after clearing a case on blasphemy) and many who have tackled the cases simply left the country: such as, for example, Justice Pervez Ali Shah, who issued a death sentence on Mumtaz Qadari a security official who killed Governor Salman Taseer for his views to amend the law.  

It proves all three sets of institutions, the state, the rule of law, and an unaccountable government is on loose practice, which does not allow an enforcing political order to retain a social cohesion in the state. In Myanmar, the military has been ruling since the early 1960s: the recent democratic transition is a sham, and is, in fact, an armored democracy run by retired military officials. In the case of Pakistan, the political system has established a “compromised democracy” between military and civilian political elites. Military rulers promised to fix socio-economic and political problems, while alleging that these problems are the outcome of inefficient political elites and their chronic corruption. When the pledges are not fulfilled, it is because military elites themselves found governing through the same political elites, as the military has never been strong enough to endure its political rule without endorsement from quasi-parliaments (and referendums) and judiciary. Ultimately parliament is drawn

---

from the same feudal or traditional political elites, whom have been blamed for repeated involvement in political corruption. The recurrence of similar patterns, involving the repatrimonialization of the system, allows the corrupt political elites to enjoy power through lineages or dynastic politics.

In Myanmar’s case, the current ruling party is actually a king’s party, and the opposition party is on a compromising stage because Aung San Suu Kyi seeks amendments in the constitution allowing her to run for head of government in next elections, as her deceased husband’s foreign nationality disqualifies her. She also seems compromising over the military’s weight in the assembly. In addition, many former military elites, who were purged during the power struggle within the military brass are still in leadership problems with Aung San Suu Kyi. Therefore, Myanmar’s case is still an unknown situation with many political mysteries.

Constitutionally or theoretically Pakistan’s military, compared to Myanmar’s, is accountable to the Prime Minister’s office, but the “administrative control of the armed forces and general military planning are areas where the armed forces do not allow any interference.” In 1999, when then Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif planned military downsizing and reduced the military’s influence in politics, he was sacked. Similarly, in 2008, the government of Pakistan’s People Party (PPP) tried to shift the control of Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) under the ministry of interior; this turned out be a bad plan, as PPP government back tracked from their decision within 24 hours. They decided to

---

24 Aziz, Military Control in Pakistan: The Parallel State, 52.
continue the old structure, in which theoretically ISI will report to Prime Minister's office.\textsuperscript{25}

The problem of domestic politics is not only with military intervention, but the competing dynastic politics and rival feudal families dominate the national political parties. Therefore, they allow the military elites to form alliances with them from time to time. By doing so, the political decaying of institutions and repatrimonializing of the political system goes hand in hand. The dilemma of Pakistan's politics is that military interventions are successful because oppositional political parties support the loss of the ruling political party, and "a large politicized citizens are not offended by the government's demise, if not positively delighted with its overthrow."\textsuperscript{26} For instance, when Gen. Musharraf removed Nawaz Sharif, a number of Pakistan's political parties remained quiet and comfortable. No one resisted the undemocratic step taken by the military, and even the late Benazir Bhutto rather blamed "Sharif of antagonizing and provoking the military against his own government."\textsuperscript{27} Unless there is a thorough shift in political processes in these fragile states, institutions will have to rely on compromises and power struggles between groups. Until then the leadership and political vacuum will continue to benefit and sustain the traditional status quo.

As noted in chapter II, with reference to Samuel Huntington's (1968) work, mentions that praetorianism has historical roots in various forms i.e. oligarchical to radical praetorianism. Historical oligarchical praetorianism had decapitated the state

\textsuperscript{25} Jones, \textit{Pakistan : Eye of the Storm}, 247.
\textsuperscript{26} Eric Nordlinger in Haqqani, \textit{Pakistan : Between Mosque and Military}, 129.
\textsuperscript{27} Kukreja, \textit{Contemporary Pakistan : Political Processes, Conflicts and Crises}, 265.
and created an institutional vacuum, so societies highly remained oligarchic and feudal.

Huntington further argued that the oligarchical praetorianism evolved into radical praetorianism, which dominates social forces and destroys the indigenous political institutions. 28 To balance and mitigate the direct role of the military in domestic politics, Huntington's other (1957) classic work on the Soldier and the State: The Theory and Politics of Civil-Military Relations, tried to deal with questions regarding civilian control of the military. Huntington argued that the professionalization of the military is necessary and the neutrality of the military in politics is much needed to ensure civil control of the military. The military's focus on external borders will also keep them away from domestic politics, so civil leadership can engage in evolving the social cohesion. This process will require "equilibrium," if not, the military will always find ways to intervene. 29

Despite the fear that the military establishments in Myanmar and Pakistan are likely to continue their influence on domestic politics, the military elites understand the dynamics of the contemporary political landscape is changing. Myanmar's constitution, written under military rule, still provides 25 percent of weightage for the military in parliament, which eventually retain its influence. In the case of Pakistan, the military has a compromising structural adjustment with political elites who manage the power like a musical chair game. A gradual awakening of political consciousness is in progress, which is ultimately the challenge of the traditional repressive systems and subjective parochial political culture. As Christian Denvorpt agreed, traditionally the "closed, unresponsive,

28 Huntington, Political Order in Changing Societies, 198-99.
29 The Soldier and the State; the Theory and Politics of Civil-Military Relations, 94.
paranoia inducing governments run by a few individuals (i.e., autocracies) were the ... systems believed to use repression in an effort to protect leaders as well as elites who were otherwise incapable of staying in power, (but now) political leaders carefully weigh the costs and benefits of coercive action,” as the rapidly growing media and judicial watchdogs have prompted to reduce the frequent usage of coercive measures, though not completely controlled yet.30

Finally, the political decay of institutions can be controlled and mended if inclusive and accountable political systems are put emplace to make sure the rule of law is implemented and respected at all levels. In doing so, chronic problems of corruption and internal violence are curtailed, and the maturity of the political system will build a favorable and guaranteed investment environment as well.

HYPOTHESIS II: THE BURDEN OF GEOGRAPHY AND GEOPOLITICS IS MORE LIKELY TO EFFECT STATE FRAGILITY

Geography is an important variable that persistently engages the statesmen’s perceptions originating from tangible and intangible sources of power and security concerns. The literature on weak and fragile states has generally ignored the geographic factor that becomes a burden on statehood. As discussed in earlier chapters human societies have clashed for geographical gains, whether their struggle remained focused on the hegemon’s engagements into “the periphery of the earth” (Hans J. Morgenthau); or for the “heartland-dominated land power” (Halford Mackinder); or to gain control

over “maritime-oriented Rimland” (Nicholas John Spykman). Many of these struggles have become a cause of “state death.” The colonial rulers conquered and caused a number of small and medium states to die, and later colonial powers combined these small entities into single nation-states during the decolonization process. Tanisha Fazal (2007) has argued that state death has declined after 1945 because there are now few opportunities of direct conquest for land, or hardly any colonization process is in place that could directly occupy a territory. In the post-1945 period, however, there is “an increase in interventions to replace regimes and leaders when conquest is prohibited, and also an increase in the number of state collapses as leaders exploit state resources knowing that they face little or no risk of conquest.”

What does theory tell? A point noted earlier was that weak and fragile states as rational actors weigh the cost and benefit through their asymmetrical power relationship with the stronger one. States tend to balance against the immediate proximate threat, because “if states bandwagon with proximate powers, spheres of influence come into being; if they balance, a checkerboard system of alliance arises.”

What we see in many parts of the Third World is most states having disputes and conflicts with their immediate neighbors. They are persistently engaged in balancing each other, while preferring to provide a buffer zone or bandwagon with an external player. For instance, Afghanistan and Pakistan tried to balance against each other, similar to India and Pakistan, or India and China, and so forth, but at the same time

31 Fazal, State Death: The Politics and Geography of Conquest, Occupation, and Annexation, 8.
32 Grygiel, Great Powers and Geopolitical Change, 17.
Afghanistan and India aligned with the former Soviet Union, while Pakistan aligned with the United States, buffering their territories against immediate neighbors.

Another important dimension of geographical significance is geopolitics. If the state is on the crossroads of a major power's interest, it is hard to escape or change reality until the state itself is internally stable and understands how to utilize its geographical importance as a strength. Jakub Grygiel explains that “states cannot alter geopolitics to match their interests, or at best they are very limited in their capacity to do so. A change in geopolitics involves a change in routes or in the location of resources, and a state cannot single-handedly effect such a change.”

Strategist A. T. Mahan’s emphasis on controlling sea-lanes can project the superiority of states’ power, but it should not undermine the value of historical land routes. For instance, the traditional silk route helped connect East Asia to Europe. In later years, the oil and gas pipeline and railways became changing patterns of connection. Moreover, the new ways of air routes provided a possible way to reach geographic points but remained an expensive option. Geopolitics takes time to change, and it changes along the alterations introduced through establishing new routes. For example, Panama and the Suez Canal completely changed the geopolitical importance of the surrounding area.

It is pertinent to clarify that many political elites in weak and fragile states are in search of excuses and strategic scapegoats, so they can blame others or external forces to cover up their own domestic mistakes. According to Holsti, strategic scapegoating generally invokes an “irrational hatred against others” and it involves “carefully

---

33 Great Powers and Geopolitical Change, 25.
34 Great Powers and Geopolitical Change, 28-29.
calculated strategies by political leaders ... to distract their publics from gross
mismanagement at home by point to the [Others] as the source of their problem.”35 By
finding strategic scapegoats, political elites try their best to preserve “the state, and
guaranteeing it against sedition, rebellion, and civil war is to ... find a common enemy
whom (the subjects) can make common cause.”36 This study has avoided those
instances, which may show that the idea of using geography is to find a strategic
scapegoat. In fact, the study based on “weak pivot states” justifies the geopolitical
significance of the cases, which engage major powers in the region. In the cases of
Myanmar and Pakistan, both countries reside on a “crush zone” or Cold War
“shatterbelt,” which indirectly engaged the two super-powers during the Cold War. Still,
today the high fragmentation and increasing level of violence exists in the region.

Why is geography an important variable? Stewart Patrick concludes his book
Weak Links, Fragile States, Global Threat, and International Security, while answering
the question, “Which weak states matter?” He answered that those weak and fragile
states are most worrisome, “in terms of their recent connection to transnational
terrorism, WMD proliferation, transnational crime, energy insecurity, an infectious
disease.”37 Ironically Patrick narrows down his fears of state fragility: out of fifty-six
weak and fragile states, only a handful of them are said to cause real problems.

Whether these problems are related to the opium trade in Afghanistan (Golden
Crescent) and Burma (Golden Triangle); proliferation issues in North Korea and Pakistan;

35 Ole R. Holsti, To See Ourselves as Others See Us : How Publics Abroad View the United States after 9/11 
36 Quoting French Philosopher Jean Bodin in ibid.
of global energy supply, with only 7 percent coming from these weak states; transnational terrorist related threats from Somalia, Afghanistan, Pakistan, Nigeria, and Yemen with lesser scale support to terrorist from Iraq, Bangladesh, Mali, and Mauritania. Patrick's explanation of considering a few and handful of weak and fragile states could have more of an impact among a large group of weak states, which implicitly links the argument with the approach on geopolitics. As Patrick agrees to notify a few names like instability in Iraq, Nigeria, Angola, Uzbekistan, and Turkmenistan can disrupt energy supply and price control, which vindicates the importance of geographical pivots, though the author has not explicitly made the argument in reference of geographical pivot-ness.38

Looking at the cases, both Myanmar and Pakistan are geopolitical linchpin states due to their geopolitical and geostrategic premises in Asia. Zbigniew Brzezinski's emphasis on the new "global Balkans," former U.S. President G.W. Bush's initiative on the "greater Middle East" and former Sectary of State Hillary Clinton's inclusion of the Indian sub-continent in the definition of "Asia-Pacific," time and again show that the selected cases Myanmar and Pakistan reside on in drawing geographic pivots.39 Both are immediate neighbors to regional powers India and China, which are also highly dependent on the greater stability of and positive relations with Myanmar and Pakistan. Conversely Myanmar and Pakistan's balanced and friendly policies towards India and China help stabilize their political, security, and economic challenges.

Overall, it is widely argued that the twenty-first century is the Asian Century during which the economic shift towards Asia will allow Asian influential to gain leverage and balance the other regional power centers of the world. Despite such talks, there are many Asian countries that struggle with core economic and political challenges. In addition, domestic challenges are supplemented with interstate geographical disputes, internal security issues in the entirety of Asia; for example, geographical disputes between China, Japan, Vietnam, Philippines, and other neighboring countries have always caused an optimum of distrust between regional members. As China seeks to gain a leadership role in its Near Seas (Yellow Sea, East China Sea, and South China Sea), the U.S. is rebalancing in Asia to keep its post war leadership in the region.

While the Chinese policy of encircling the entire region through strings of pearls persists for economic reasons, simultaneously the U.S and its allies have initiated a twelve nation regional trade pact called the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP). China considers the TPP a U.S. strategy of containment towards China; however, the U.S. and its allies will seek to establish a maritime code and trade alliance to bridle any geostrategic assertiveness emanating from China. More specifically, China claims its sovereign rights over Senkaku Islands, while Japan disputes it, under article 5 of the U.S.-Japan Mutual Security Treaty; any future clash between Japan and China will be directly or indirectly bound and will engage U.S. involvement in the region. In April 2014, during President Obama’s tour of the Asian region, he reaffirmed the long-term security guarantee of its allies and affirmed that “America is and always will be a Pacific nation,”
and the United States will continue to hold the leading role.\textsuperscript{40} Similar to the Pacific region, geopolitical and security challenges have expanded elsewhere, including South Asia, the Middle East, and Central Asia. Severe problems in one state or region will affect all. Therefore, fixing the problems of weaker members of Asia and finding peaceful solutions for unresolved geopolitical disputes assures a brighter future for the Asian Century.

Economic prospects through Myanmar and Pakistan are promising, if the two countries are provided with, or emerged as, an economic and energy corridor to their powerful economic neighbors and the entire region. As discussed in chapters III and IV, China has invested billions of US dollars on projects, and at the moment Chinese companies have been supervising more contracts. 80 percent of China’s oil flows through Strait of Malacca, and 60 percent of China’s energy supply comes from the Middle East. As mentioned earlier, establishing new routes, also changing the geopolitics, similarly to China’s plan to become less dependent of Strait of Malacca through establishing new ports and oil and gas pipeline through Myanmar and Pakistan, will make it less dependent on routes that are under U.S. regulation or supervision. Tracking the changing dynamics in the region demonstrates how the U.S. and India have developed greater economic and diplomatic ties. For China, growing U.S. ties with India is less worrying factor, “so long as their [the Chinese] trading routes remain opened and

\textsuperscript{40} "Q&A: Japan’s Yomiuri Shimbun Interviews President Obama," \textit{Washington Post} April 23, 2014.
their identity respected — including a territorial integrity about which they are likely to remain most intransigent.”

On the ground, both Myanmar and Pakistan have a long history of fighting with ethno-nationalists groups and recently religious groups as well; China is carefully dealing with the growing insurgency in Xinxiang and lately a suicidal attack in Yunnan province. China is not feared about balancing arch-rivals in the region only but is seriously concerned about pivotal neighbors like Myanmar and Pakistan; should any “go astray or fall apart in a radical surge of Islamic fervor or in the counterrevolutionary takeover of a nationalist army,” it will shatter China’s dreams of becoming a rising power.

Democracies, such as the U.S. and India, have also shifted their policies towards Myanmar; they have realized that in the past supporting openly democratic forces prompted the military regime drifting towards China, North Korea, and even towards Russia with nuclear ambitions. Keeping the tone low, the new policies tried to work along the military backed Thein Sein’s Union Solidarity and Development Party (USDP), who came into power after 2010’s election. India’s “Look East policy” is trying to counter China through investment in the energy and communication sectors and offers defense equipment along with training facilities. New Delhi believes that Beijing’s “effort to establish an economic and political presence in Myanmar’s and Pakistan’s Indian Ocean ports are strategic ambitions of China to encircle India.” India is observing the growing influence of China around its waters, as Beijing is engaged in

---

41 Serfaty, “The Folly of Forgetting the West,” 42.
42 A World Recast: An American Moment in a Post-Western Order, 75.
43 Brzezinski, Strategic Vision: America and the Crisis of Global Power, 163-64.
helping to build or upgrade a number of ports around India: in Kyaupyu, Burma; Chittagong, Bangladesh; Hambantota, Sri Lanka; and Gwadar, Pakistan, and interestingly, most of these are not free from violent troublesome activities.44

Compared to Myanmar, Pakistan has become more violent in recent years, as Baluch nationalists fight over economic and political grievances, and Pashtun’s suffer in FATA with the flow of various radical and terrorist networks occupying their areas. Following recent elections, new governments in Afghanistan, India, and Pakistan should seize this opportunity to take a fresh start; otherwise: staying in the past will maintain the burden of history and geography for the entire region. There are many other serious issues that need attention, especially the acute problem of the scarcity of water a potential source of full-scale conflict. Pakistan has already gone to international arbitrary courts over India’s construction of the Baglihar dam and Kishanganga electric-power plant on Chenab and Jhelum River. The flow of the rivers makes India an upper riparian, but water of these two rivers are exclusively allotted to Pakistan through Indus Water Treaty on 1960. In addition, prolonging the Kashmir dispute and playing the blame game over proxy support to rebels and insurgents on both sides have widened the trust gap. The result was Pakistan’s elected cabinet deciding to award India with MFN status, but a lack of trust withheld it.

Finally, the first case Myanmar is trying to employ a policy of not becoming dependent on one state, so it is carefully picking and selecting partners as everyone is putting their bid. Myanmar is welcoming FDI, projects, and development. However, its

44 Kaplan, The Revenge of Geography: What the Map Tells Us About Coming Conflicts and the Battle against Fate, 250.
harsh stance towards ethnic minorities and Rohingya is deplorable. Internally
Myanmar’s geographical units are for the time being quiet due to a temporary ceasefire.
The sooner the fight starts, the more foreign investors feel insecure, similar to what is
happened to Pakistan since 2005, where the height of terror and suicide attacks badly
affected the economy.

The second case Pakistan can benefit from its resources and provide an
economic corridor to the region, but it must put its house in order. Changing dynamics
in the Middle East are scary too. As the intensity of sectarian fighting is gaining
momentum, Pakistan can play a geostrategic role, between Saudi Arabia and Iran, as
Pakistan did between Washington and Beijing during the Cold War. If these issues are
not resolved, Pakistan will be badly affected, not through transnational affects, but from
within its own sectarian groups.

IS CONTINUOUS STATE FRAGILITY MENDABLE?

Fixing fragile states requires a serious strategy. The socio-economic, political,
and security conditions are more deplorable for those who live in violent situations than
those who fear the intensity of threat. The spillover effects are worrisome for regional
countries and beyond, but humanitarian conditions are more threatened by the affected
population. The performance of weak states has been poor since the decolonization
period and should be considered a structural problem. If so, then Samuel Huntington’s
work strongly advocated a path of political development, while ignoring the
modernization process.
Assessing Huntington's argument with reference to contemporary times shows that economic development and modernization are essential features enhancing and strengthening political and administrative capacities of state. Francis Fukuyama suggests that political development takes the lead in stabilizing institutions, i.e. state building, rule of law, and democratic accountability enforce the political order. However, Fukuyama further argues that "beyond the establishment of a state that provide for basic order, greater administrative capacity is also strongly correlated with economic growth." Fukuyama links higher scale corruption in institutions to low salaries and incentives in poor and weak states.

How to fix the problem? James Piazza has synthesized recommendations of earlier works on state fragility, as the earlier contributions suggest various options in favor of robust multi- or unilateral intervention to prevent state failure and proscribe a range of policy courses, such as: building stable democratic institutions, increasing economic assistance, multilateral military intervention." These options are valid, but the geopolitical troubles and unresolved regional political disputes still risk peace and stability.

First of all, the duty of the state is to provide political goods to the population, which includes security and the freedom of expression of its citizens. The state is responsible for maintaining order and the supremacy of the law; if it fails, the integrity of nation-hood is in question. In a number of cases like East Timor, Sudan, Rwanda, and many others, poor performing states have experienced foreign interventions and

45 Fukuyama, The Origins of Political Order: From Prehuman Times to the French Revolution, 469.
46 Piazza, "Incubators of Terror: Do Failed and Failing States Promote Transnational Terrorism?," 470.
peacekeeping forces to safeguard the human rights abuse on humanitarian grounds.

Now, every weak or low performing state does not necessarily require peacekeeping forces or interventions. In many cases, interventions are also resisted based on issues of sovereignty; article 2 (7) of United Nations (UN) Charter avoids intervention in the domestic affairs of any state. However, the UN has made interventions when responding to humanitarian crises such as mass scale genocide, famine situations, and natural disasters.

Francis Fukuyama and many others have suggested that if there is a large-scale humanitarian crisis and human rights violations persist, then the international community has "not just the right but the obligation to intervene."47 In Pakistan, when a massive earthquake hit in 2005 and disastrous floods ravaged the human settlements and destroyed the crops in 2010, Pakistan allowed the flow of foreign aid and humanitarian interventions to help with rescue operations, rehabilitation processes, and capacity building of affected populations. In contrast, we have cases like in Myanmar, where according to the UN, thousands of Rohingya people are suffering from malnutrition and health problems, and hundreds of thousands of refugees belonging to Karen, the Shan, the Karenni, the Kachin, the Wah, the Mon, the Rohingya groups are displaced due to internal war. They are seeking humanitarian interventions, which the state does not allow due to its own security reasons. Therefore, interventions have their own limitations.

Foreign aid has been the main tool of providing assistance and helping weak and fragile states sustain their institutional capacities. Some authors suggest that foreign aid is ineffective, while other believe foreign aid is helpful if allocated in the right direction and the right place. Umar Wahedi and Marina Rabinowitz argued that “foreign aid is ineffective with respect to economic performance... (Because) economically weak states may strongly fail to enhance private economic activity through the provision of good institutions.”48 The work of Umar Wahedi and Marina Rabinowitz has analyzed under what conditions foreign aid becomes ineffective: first, those “countries that are prone to insurgencies and have conditions such as the presence of rough terrain which allows insurgents to form their movement without being destroyed at an early stage,” and second, “when there is an inequitable distribution of resources or the control of local assets without participation of benefit;” e.g. the author refers to the Chinese construction of deep-sea port at Gwadar, which will become a dispute between Islamabad and Baluch nationalists over the issue of the inequitable distribution of revenue and resources.49 A problem of a similar nature is gradually arising in the Dawei area of the Tanintharyi Region (former Tenasserim Division) in Myanmar, where Thailand is building a huge industrial hub, a deep-sea port to connect Thailand, China, Laos, and Cambodia with the rest of the region. Local resistance has already started not for resource distribution, but mainly environmental damages for the area.

Burcu Savun and Daniel C. Tirone suggest that foreign aid is helpful if the program supports the democratization process in weak societies. Suvan and Tirone argued and analyzed that foreign aid investment in democratic programs have experienced less chance of internal violence or civil war than those that did not receive the aid for democracy. The spending on democracy promotion program under the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) has climbed from $121 million to $722 million per year during 1990 to 2003.\(^5\) Suvan and Tirone share the example of 1999, when the USAID played a key role during the political transition in Indonesia, in which the power shifted from Suharto's regime to democracy. USAID ensured the implementation of democratic reforms, the decentralization of power, protection of minorities, and the accountability of political systems at the grassroots level, which helped to avert any backlash in the power transition.\(^5\) However, with Pakistan one of the largest recipients of U.S. foreign aid, then why is the situation still volatile? Which of Umar Wahedi and Marina Rabinowitz's two explanations should apply in a Pakistani context? The problem with Pakistan's case is that the foreign aid is mostly spent in the defense sector, not the civilian. If there is a plan to spend the aid in civil society projects, the political elites extract foreign aid as a resource for personal gains.

Facilitating democratic transitions in weak and fragile states will be a suitable stride towards the political maturity of a system. Instead of interventions to contain contagious effects, ideally the global community should step forward and facilitate the

---


process. It is argued, “the successor to a doctrine of containment must be a strategy of enlargement—enlargement of the world’s free community of market democracies.”

Indonesia has experienced a prolonged dictatorship under Suharto, but soon an Indonesian transition determined to adopt democratic values and market economy will positively change Indonesia’s course of action. Since the transition has begun in 1999, Indonesia has leaped from its then position of the world’s twenty seventh largest to today’s sixteenth largest economy, and in the coming decade, Indonesia is expected to surpass leading economies like Germany and the UK. It shows that the democratic “formula of that linked democracy with peace, and peace with prosperity, appeared to work well enough” as the rest of the world feels politically conscious that democratic values are the most reliable way out of the clutches of authoritarian rule and poor performing economies.

It is important to facilitate the growing political consciousness of weak and fragile societies so a long term bond can grow out of it and evolve a mutual trust towards the facilitator, rather than as a perceived as intervention. Analyzing the impact of successful transitions in weak societies, Larry Diamond explains that “Improving governance effects directly the strengthening state capacity; liberalizing and rationalizing economic structures; securing social and political order while maintaining basic freedom; improving horizontal accountability and controlling corruption.”

---

55 Larry Jay Diamond, Consolidating the Third Wave Democracies (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1997), xxiii.
Diamond informs that most Third World states practice “delegative democracies,” meaning they lack “horizontal accountability and provides benign condition for corruption. Absence of accountability in a state engages in power struggle between institutions and flares up other social and ethnic issues. Effective pluralistic democratic political culture assures the protection of individual’s rights, respecting and ensuring rule of law, safeguarding the citizen’s interest, assimilating marginalized groups, and institutionalizing the horizontal accountability of different branches of officeholders to one another (check and balances), and abolishing the reserved and self-legitimized domains of power exercised by either military or other social and political forces that has no problem of encountering the accountability to the electorate.”

The argument that successful democratic transitions in weak states brings domestic peace and stability should be analyzed with the idea of whether democracy precedes stability or if first stability is necessary to initiate democratic initiatives. To respond to the argument, the general tendency is to believe that democracies do not fight against democracies, which vindicates the idea that democratic institutions help stabilize society and enhance levels of cooperation with other democracies in the region and beyond the region. During the period of decolonization, most weak and fragile states were polarized due to a bipolar world, and most of the newly independent states faced military interventions and dictatorships. The great powers maintained the status quo and continued to support undemocratic regimes, until recently when the politically awakened world challenged the status quo in some parts of the Third World. Another

56 Ibid.
explanation informs that the growing “demographic insecurities,” due to “youth bulge,” will severely provoke political unrests in risky societies. This means that the countries with current turmoil have a population with more than sixty percent below 24 years of age. The recent study shows that out of 7.2 billion of the world’s population, 44 percent is below 24 years of age and 26 percent is below 14 years of age; interestingly, 82 percent of this youth live in weak and fragile states specifically in sub-Saharan Africa and Asia.57 The unsatisfied youth are demanding change from leadership; therefore investment in education for democracy will payoff well; otherwise, ongoing political unrests and growing unemployment could be a more serious issue. For example, Egypt, whose population includes 60 percent below 30 years of age, has in recent years gathered hundreds of thousands against 30 years of dictatorial rule; these political transitions are serious in nature and should be dealt accordingly.58 Other alarming instances include the forcing of young children to work as soldiers in conflicts in Africa and Asia; according to an estimate out of 300,000 children soldiers, Myanmar’s military regime is believed to recruit highest number: 70,000 boys serve in the military and are lured through economic incentive and forced to join military.59

An attempt to traditionally support dictatorial rule through interventions will cause more trouble to the interest of great powers and the region itself and will allow the “rise of illiberal democracy” with weak institutions and poor governance structures.

Foreign aid programs, like the Kerry-Lugar Bill, primarily focus on civil society programs

57 "Is Youth Bulge a “Magic Indicator” for the Failed States Index?," Wilson Center, http://www.newsecuritybeat.org/2013/10/youth-bulge-magic-indicator-failed-states-index/#.U0WCfIdV8E.
58 Kingsley, "Does a Growing Global Youth Population Fuel Political Unrest?."
such as health and education which preferably become fruitful decisions for promoting
global norms of inclusive democracy. Before coming to the office of President, Obama
had established his "Soft Security Agenda" to avoid war or conflict-oriented
peacemaking and nation-building processes. Then Senator Obama believed that bases
of Soft Security Agenda would facilitate to "serve our (US) long-term security interests
then we will have to go beyond a more prudent use of military force. We will have to
align our policies to help reduce the spheres of insecurity, poverty, and violence around
the world, and give more people a stake in the global order that has served us so
well."60

CONCLUSION

For centuries, politics has been in transition, but in recent decades, the pace of
transition has been accelerated. During these transitions political societies are
continuously witnessing the birth, growth, peak, senescence, and decay of societies,
either due to God-made or man-made reasons. The difference between earlier epochs
of transitions and today's political activities reside in a bit of different settings of time.
For instance, compared to the past, today's societies cannot ignore a state decaying in
isolation. The scale of the ramifications is much higher than ever before.

To answer the research question of this project, literature on a conceptual
framework helped to understand the role, duties, and responsibilities of states in the
contemporary time period. The hypothetical discussions based on endogenous and

exogenous factors allowed the address of challenges and conditionalities of contemporary weak, but pivot states in terms of state fragility. The discussions draw some conclusions through seeking explanations regarding going back to the colonial episodes of weak states to contemporary era challenges.

First, most of today's weak and fragile states are grappling with the number of domestic and regional issues that are actually remnants of being colonial past. The formation of nations and then states through surgical processes in various parts of the Third World immediately became a source of conflicts. There are three important areas that cause weak and fragile states to suffer: 1) ethnic compositions were done on the basis of geopolitical interests, which forcefully divided or included independent states into a bigger dominion, e.g. in Nigeria, Myanmar, Pakistan, and a number of other cases faced the challenges of irredentist struggles based on ethno-nationalism. Therefore, authors such as Jeffery Herbst term the creation of such states as nothing more than a legal fiction that challenged the vertical authority and legitimacy of statehood most of the time 2) the geographical disputes continued, as colonial rulers allowed the newly independent states to decide on such claims with their neighbors; this gave birth to conflicts in the region over resources and land, e.g. the Kashmir dispute lingers for decades and became more complex and dangerous due to the nuclearization of the region. 3) The continuation of colonial legacies or institutions that enabled authoritarian regimes and dynastic politics to take over the political process further weakening the institutions and accountable systems of governance.

Second, feeble socio-economic conditions due to bad governance and wrong
policies turned into a poverty trap for the population. For instance, the Buddhist
Socialism in Myanmar under Gen. Ne Win in 1960s and Islamic Socialism in Pakistan
introduced under Prime Minister Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto in 1970s rapidly nationalized the
institutions and industries in the two countries that forced foreign and domestic
investors to suffer at their peaks, while the decision weaved the poverty web for their
own people. The downfall of economic transitions can be measured through falling
economic output, as a result of early years’ nationalization processes that eventually
turned Myanmar’s status as “the rice bowl of Asia” to a “beggar with a golden bowl.”
Likewise, Pakistan’s golden days of economic progress stumbled into murky economic
days.

Third, during the Cold War period many weak states were governed by dictators,
and for geostrategic reasons and positions of states at the crossroads of major powers’
interests, the global powers maintained the status quo through allowing dictators to
rule these countries. This resulted over the period of time in the support of
undemocratic forces to strengthen the roots of praetorianism and led to an
asymmetrical growth of institutions that lacked checks and balances.

The consequences of the above-mentioned developments are prevailing
frustrations and political deprivations in weak states reflected through the
unprecedented rise of violence, widening rich and poor gap, corruption, lack of proper
justice, and absence of punitive measures for criminals encouraging crime and violence,
high mortality rates, spreading epidemic diseases, human rights violations, and growing
intolerance against non-core groups. In order to reduce the intensity of threats and
violence, the study recommends creating spheres of socializations at intra-state and interstate levels.

At the intra-state level, spheres of socialization allow the democratization process at the grassroots level, which will help to own the system and develop synchronization between domestic values and global norms of democracy. In this regard, if external support takes the role of facilitation to advocate education for democracy, it will become a beacon of equality and inclusiveness for all the citizens. The role of facilitator is a proactive approach to dealing with issues of fragility, instead of waiting for the worst scenario and becoming interventionist to address the problem. Facilitation can improve a positive relation on the basis of mutual respect, while in opposite scenarios the adversaries always wait to exploit the situation. Here the natural calamities are exceptions, which anticipates humanitarian interventions as a last minute call from nature.

Successful transitions eventually support a political culture that cultivates tolerance, political trust, and a willingness to compromise on diverse opinions. These processes of political development support the enhancement of capacities of state, its institution, and the entire political system. As Larry Diamond has nicely portrayed the effectiveness of the social contract between a participatory citizen and state in following lines, :

....the “citizens of new democracies form judgments about their political systems based not only on what they deliver economically, but also on the degree to which they deliver valued political goods: freedom, order, a rule of law, accountability, representativeness, and overall efficacy ... citizens expect their democracies to govern democratically, in compliance with the constitution and
the laws, and to govern efficaciously, in terms of choosing and implementing policies that address the most important problems the society confronts.\textsuperscript{61}

At the interstate level, the spheres of socialization allow the weak states, especially the pivot states, to integrate themselves into the market economy, facilitate economic interdependency through transparency, and integrate into sub-regional, regional, and then the global level to tackle the burden of geography, which can become opportunity. Both cases, Myanmar and Pakistan are right now at the crossroads of a major power shift. New economic corridors are going to shift geopolitical dynamics, and accordingly power politics will shift as well. Both states success in creating spheres of socialization with a greater integration will be beneficial; becoming partisan or choosy may cause fragility to continue.

Finally, the study finds room for further research in the analysis of the conditions of state fragility in the future. What we see in most of the weak and fragile states is a struggling with the fundamentals of a nation-state, like issues of identity, nation-building, and state-building. Looking ahead at years to come, one may affirm a unique junction point of human history: First, more than fifty percent of world’s pollution will start to leave urban areas; this will change the traditional supply and demand balance, core and periphery debate, and raise issues and norms for cosmopolitan systems of states and societies. Second, growing environmental challenges and the scarcity of resources are turning into potential threats, mostly looming in weak societies. Last but not least, the emerging issues of demographic insecurities as briefly highlighted demand more research and additions to the literature.

\textsuperscript{61} Diamond, \textit{Consolidating the Third Wave Democracies}, xxiv.


Charney, Michael W. *A History of Modern Burma*. Cambridge, UK ; New York:


Denyer, Simon. "Kerry Worried About Asia's Sea Disputes, Citing Moves by China."


Huntington, Samuel P. "Political Development and Political Decay." *World Politics* 17, no. 3 (1965): 386-430.


Lall, Marie. "Indo-Myanmar Relations in the Era of Pipeline Diplomacy."

*Contemporary Southeast Asia: A Journal of International and Strategic Affairs* 28, no. 3 (December 2006): 23.


Langford, Tonya. "Things Fall Apart: State Failure and the Politics of Intervention ".


Mazarr, Michael J. "The Rise and Fall of the Failed-State Paradigm." *Foreign Affairs* 93, no. 1 (Jan/Feb 2014).


"Remarks at the APEC CEO Summit."


"Remarks by President Obama at the University of Yangon."

"Remittances up 9.4% in First Half of Fy14." *The Express Tribune*, Jan 11, 2014.


"Undue Pressure?: War on Terror Chapter Chucked out at Eleventh Hour." *The Express Tribune*, June 12, 2013.


APPENDICES

APPENDIX A: THE PANGLONG AGREEMENT

THE PANGLONG AGREEMENT

Dated Panglong, the 12th February 1947.

A Conference having been held at Panglong, attended by certain members of the Executive Council of the Government of the Federated Shan States, the Lushai Hills and the Chin Hills;

The Members of the Conference, believing that freedom will be more speedily achieved by the Lushai, the Kachins and the Chin by their immediate co-operation with the Eastern Frontier Government ;

The Members of the Conference have accordingly, and without dissentient, agreed as follows:

1. A Representative of the Hill Peoples, selected by the Governor on the recommendation of the responsible authorities of the Shan States, the Lushai Hills and the Chin Hills, shall be appointed a Councillor to the Government to deal with the Frontier Areas.

2. The said Councillor shall also be appointed a Member of the Governor's Executive Council without portfolio, and the subject of Frontier Areas brought within the purview of the Executive Council by Constitutional Convention as in the case of Defence and External Affairs. The Councillor for Frontier Areas shall be given executive authority by the Governor.

3. The said Councillor shall be assisted by two Deputy Councillors representing races of which he is not a member, while the two Deputy Councillors should deal in the first instance with the affairs of their respective areas and the Councillor with all the remaining parts of the Frontier Areas; they should by Constitutional Convention set on the principle of joint responsibility.

4. While the Councillor, in his capacity as a Member of the Executive Council, will be the only representative of the Frontier Areas on the Council, the Deputy Councillors shall be entitled to attend meetings of the Council when subjects pertaining to the Frontier Areas are discussed.

5. Though the Governor's Executive Council will be augmented as agreed above, it will not operate in respect of the Frontier Areas in any manner which would deprive any portion of those Areas of the autonomy which it now enjoys in internal administration. Full autonomy in internal administration for the Frontier Areas is accepted in principle.

6. Though the Governor's Executive Council will be augmented as agreed above, it will not operate in respect of the Frontier Areas in any manner which would deprive any portion of those Areas of the autonomy which it now enjoys in internal administration. Full autonomy in internal administration for the Frontier Areas is accepted in principle.

7. Citizens of the Frontier Areas shall enjoy rights and privileges which are regarded as fundamental in democratic countries.

8. The arrangements accepted in this agreement are without prejudice to the financial assistance which the Kachins, the Lushai, and the Chin Hills and the Chin Hills are entitled to receive from the revenues of Burma, and the Executive Council will assume with the Governor and Deputy Councillors the responsibility of satisfying for the Kachin, the Lushai, and the Chin Hills financial arrangements similar to those between Burma and the Federated Shan States.

[Table of names and signatures]

APPENDIX B: Mr. JINNAH'S PRESIDENTIAL ADDRESS TO THE CONSTITUENT ASSEMBLY
OF PAKISTAN AUGUST 11, 1947

Mr. President, Ladies and Gentlemen!

I cordially thank you, with the utmost sincerity, for the honour you have conferred upon me - the greatest honour that is possible to confer - by electing me as your first President. I also thank those leaders who have spoken in appreciation of my services and their personal references to me. I sincerely hope that with your support and your co-operation we shall make this Constituent Assembly an example to the world. The Constituent Assembly has got two main functions to perform. The first is the very onerous and responsible task of framing the future constitution of Pakistan and the second of functioning as a full and complete sovereign body as the Federal Legislature of Pakistan. We have to do the best we can in adopting a provisional constitution for the Federal Legislature of Pakistan. You know really that not only we ourselves are wondering but, I think, the whole world is wondering at this unprecedented cyclonic revolution which has brought about the clan of creating and establishing two independent sovereign Dominions in this sub-continent. As it is, it has been unprecedented; there is no parallel in the history of the world. This mighty sub-continent with all kinds of inhabitants has been brought under a plan which is titanic, unknown, unparalleled. And what is very important with regards to it is that we have achieved it peacefully and by means of an evolution of the greatest possible character.

Dealing with our first function in this Assembly, I cannot make any well-considered pronouncement at this moment, but I shall say a few things as they occur to me. The first and the foremost thing that I would like to emphasize is this: remember that you are now a sovereign legislative body and you have got all the powers. It, therefore, places on you the gravest responsibility as to how you should take your decisions. The first observation that I would like to make is this: You will no doubt agree with me that the first duty of a government is to maintain law and order, so that the life, property and religious beliefs of its subjects are fully protected by the State.

The second thing that occurs to me is this: One of the biggest curses from which India is suffering - I do not say that other countries are free from it, but, I think our condition is much worse - is bribery and corruption. That really is a poison. We must put that down with an iron hand and I hope that you will take adequate measures as soon as it is possible for this Assembly to do so.

Black-marketing is another curse. Well, I know that black-marketeers are frequently caught and punished. Judicial sentences are passed or sometimes fines only are imposed. Now you have to tackle this monster, which today is a colossal crime against society, in our distressed conditions, when we constantly face shortage of food and other essential commodities of life. A citizen who does black-marketing commits, I think, a greater crime than the biggest and most grievous of crimes. These black-marketeers are really knowing, intelligent and ordinarily responsible people, and when they indulge in black-marketing, I think they ought to be very severely punished,
because the entire system of control and regulation of foodstuffs and essential commodities, and cause wholesale starvation and want and even death.

The next thing that strikes me is this: Here again it is a legacy which has been passed on to us. Along with many other things, good and bad, has arrived this great evil, the evil of nepotism and jobbery. I want to make it quite clear that I shall never tolerate any kind of jobbery, nepotism or any influence directly or indirectly brought to bear upon me. Whenever I will find that such a practice is in vogue or is continuing anywhere, low or high, I shall certainly not countenance it.

I know there are people who do not quite agree with the division of India and the partition of the Punjab and Bengal. Much has been said against it, but now that it has been accepted, it is the duty of everyone of us to loyally abide by it and honourably act according to the agreement which is now final and binding on all. But you must remember, as I have said, that this mighty revolution that has taken place is unprecedented. One can quite understand the feeling that exists between the two communities wherever one community is in majority and the other is in minority. But the question is, whether it was possible or practicable to act otherwise than what has been done, a division had to take place. On both sides, in Hindustan and Pakistan, there are sections of people who may not agree with it, who may not like it, but in my judgement there was no other solution and I am sure future history will record is verdict in favour of it. And what is more, it will be proved by actual experience as we go on that was the only solution of India's constitutional problem. Any idea of a united India could never have worked and in my judgement it would have led us to terrific disaster. Maybe that view is correct; maybe it is not; that remains to be seen. All the same, in this division it was impossible to avoid the question of minorities being in one Dominion or the other. Now that was unavoidable. There is no other solution. Now what shall we do? Now, if we want to make this great State of Pakistan happy and prosperous, we should wholly and solely concentrate on the well-being of the people, and especially of the masses and the poor. If you will work in co-operation, forgetting the past, burying the hatchet, you are bound to succeed. If you change your past and work together in a spirit that everyone of you, no matter to what community he belongs, no matter what relations he had with you in the past, no matter what is his colour, caste or creed, is first, second and last a citizen of this State with equal rights, privileges, and obligations, there will be on end to the progress you will make.

I cannot emphasize it too much. We should begin to work in that spirit and in course of time all these angularities of the majority and minority communities, the Hindu community and the Muslim community, because even as regards Muslims you have Pathans, Punjabis, Shias, Sunnis and so on, and among the Hindus you have Brahmans, Vashnavs, Kathris, also Bengalis, Madrasis and so on, will vanish. Indeed if you ask me, this has been the biggest hindrance in the way of India to attain the freedom and independence and but for this we would have been free people long long ago. No power can hold another nation, and specially a nation of 400 million souls in subjection; nobody could have conquered you, and even if it had happened, nobody could have continued its hold on you for any length of time, but for this. Therefore, we must learn a lesson from this. You are free; you are free to go to your temples, you are
free to go to your mosques or to any other place or worship in this State of Pakistan. You may belong to any religion or caste or creed that has nothing to do with the business of the State. As you know, history shows that in England, conditions, some time ago, were much worse than those prevailing in India today. The Roman Catholics and the Protestants persecuted each other. Even now there are some States in existence where there are discriminations made and bars imposed against a particular class. Thank God, we are not starting in those days. We are starting in the days where there is no discrimination, no distinction between one community and another, no discrimination between one caste or creed and another. We are starting with this fundamental principle that we are all citizens and equal citizens of one State. The people of England in course of time had to face the realities of the situation and had to discharge the responsibilities and burdens placed upon them by the government of their country and they went through that fire step by step. Today, you might say with justice that Roman Catholics and Protestants do not exist; what exists now is that every man is a citizen, an equal citizen of Great Britain and they are all members of the Nation.

Now I think we should keep that in front of us as our ideal and you will find that in course of time Hindus would cease to be Hindus and Muslims would cease to be Muslims, not in the religious sense, because that is the personal faith of each individual, but in the political sense as citizens of the State.

Well, gentlemen, I do not wish to take up any more of your time and thank you again for the honour you have done to me. I shall always be guided by the principles of justice and fairplay without any, as is put in the political language, prejudice or ill-will, in other words, partiality or favouritism. My guiding principle will be justice and complete impartiality, and I am sure that with your support and co-operation, I can look forward to Pakistan becoming one of the greatest nations of the world.

Source: Columbia University Web site:
Academic Qualification:

- PhD studies at the Graduate Program in International Studies, Old Dominion University, Norfolk, VA during 2009-2014.

- M.A. from the Center for East and Southeast Asian Studies, Lund University, Sweden during 2006-2008.

- M.A. from the Department of International Relations, University of Karachi, Pakistan during 2002-2003.

- B.A. (Honours) from the Department of International Relations, University of Karachi, Pakistan during 1999-2001.

Professional Experience:

- Full time faculty member at Department of International Relations, Karakoram International University, Gilgit Pakistan since 2003.

Awards & Honors:

- Won Fulbright Scholarship (2009-2014) to pursue PhD in International Studies in USA.

- Best University Teacher Award received on 26th January 2008. The Award was conferred by Dr. Atta ur Rehman, Chairman Higher Education Commission, Pakistan at HEC, Islamabad.