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Clinton's Foreign Policy and the Politics of Intervention: Cases of Ethnic Cleansing and Democratic Governance

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CLINTON'S FOREIGN POLICY

AND THE POLITICS OF INTERVENTION:

CASES OF ETHNIC CLEANSING AND DEMOCRATIC GOVERNANCE

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ABSTRACT

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This dissertation examines the sources of U.S. President Bill Clinton's foreign policy, with special attention to understudied political elements of intervention. The basis of this study is the Clinton Doctrine, in which Clinton opposed ethnic cleansing, and supported democratic governance worldwide. The primary research question asks to what extent and why was there a variation in Clinton's application of his own doctrine in the specific cases of Rwanda in 1994, Haiti in 1994, and East Timor in 1999. To address this question, the following five hypotheses are posited:

H_1: The more vital interests are at stake, and the closer the United States is to the crisis, the more the president will push for intervention. Conversely, the more peripheral interests are at stake, and the more distant the United States is from the crisis, the less the president will push for intervention.

H_2: The more a U.S. ally is likely to intervene, the less the president will intervene. Conversely, the less a U.S. ally is likely to intervene, the more the president will intervene.

H_3: The more the United Nations is likely to call for intervention, the more the United States is likely to support it.

H_4: The more the U.S. Congress is likely to call for intervention, the more the

president will intervene. Conversely, the more the U.S. Congress is likely to oppose intervention, the less the president will intervene.

H_5: The more the media opposes the president's policy, the more public opinion will engage during crisis, and the more cautious the president will be regarding intervention. Conversely, the more the media endorses the president's policy, the less public opinion will engage during crisis, and the less cautious the president will be regarding intervention.

These hypotheses pertain to the five variables examined, including support for intervention from international allies, the United Nations, the U.S. Congress, U.S. public opinion and the media, and U.S. interests under the Clinton administration.

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ABBREVIATIONS

AIETD	All-Inclusive Intra-East Timorese Dialogue
APC	Armored Personnel Carrier
APEC	Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation
CARICOM	The Caribbean Community
CBC	Congressional Black Caucus
CNRT	National Council of Timorese Resistance
DIA	Defense Intelligence Agency
DPKO	Department of Peacekeeping
DPA	Department of Political Affairs
INTERFET	International Force for East Timor
MICIVIH	United Nations International Civilian Mission
NMOG	Neutral Military Observer Group
OAS	Organization of American States
OAU	Organization of African Unity
RPF	Rwandan Patriotic Front
RTLM	Radio et Télevision Libre Mille
SHZ	Safe Humanitarian Zone
UNAMET	United Nations Mission in East Timor
UNAMIR	United Nations Assistance Mission in Rwanda
UNHCR	United Nations High Commission on Refugees
UNMIH	United Nations Mission in Haiti
UNOMUR	United Nations Observer Mission Uganda-Rwanda
UNTAET	United Nations Administration in East Timor
UNUROM	United Nations Uganda-Rwanda Observation Mission

CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

This dissertation examines the apparent contradiction between President Clinton's foreign policy discourse (stated as a "doctrine") and his policies, by focusing on international and domestic politics during times of crisis, to examine pressure placed on the president to implement particular foreign policy regarding intervention. Intervention covers a broad array of actions, including the use of military force, humanitarian assistance, economic or financial sanctions or incentives, diplomatic or political negotiations, and inaction. In this dissertation, the focus is placed specifically on military intervention. This examination considers events in Haiti, Rwanda, and East Timor during the 1990s.

This dissertation is important for four reasons. First, presidential doctrines lend credence to foreign policy because they provide direction and momentum, and they explain that direction. It is important for each president to assert distance from his predecessors. Doctrines are a tool for doing this, because they tell the world the course that will be set by the leaders who articulate them. Second, presidential doctrine clarifies where the president places value. Doctrines are important strategically because they help communicate intent. During the cold war, for example, doctrines repeated variations of the message that the United States would contain communist expansion, even if that meant using military power. Third, presidential rhetoric gives clues to upcoming

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The format for this dissertation follows current style requirements of *The Chicago Manual of Style: The Essential Guide for Writers, Editors, and Publishers*, 14th ed. (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1993).

decisions.[1] Former National Security Advisor Zbigniew Brzezinski explained, "if doctrines capture the essence of a challenge and formulate a response that is geostrategically coherent, they have a lasting effect."[2] The containment doctrine endured for fifty years during the cold war. Fourth, the Clinton Doctrine is an expression of humanitarian ideals not expressed in previous doctrines. Therefore, the Clinton Doctrine provides an example of unprecedented intent to end ethnic violence against innocent civilians around the world, even though such a doctrine could violate laws of sovereignty. Thus, presidential doctrine is an important indicator of long-term foreign policy direction that merits study. The following historical examples demonstrate the lasting nature of presidential doctrines.

After Word War II, the United States provided aid to Greece and Turkey to bolster their efforts to contain the aspirations of the Soviet empire. When then-president Harry Truman went to Congress to ask for that aid, he established the Truman Doctrine, arguing that it "must be the policy of the United States to support free peoples who are resisting attempted subjugation by armed minorities or by outside pressures."[3] The Truman Doctrine initiated and shaped foreign policy toward the containment of Communism that lasted throughout the cold war.

Richard Nixon became president after the strain of the Vietnam War ended the political career of his predecessor, Lyndon Johnson. Nixon recognized that the United States could not sustain extended engagement in too many overseas commitments. As a

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1. See Clark D. Edwards, "Predicting Presidential Decision Making from Presidential Language and Mass Media Reportage," *Presidential Studies Quarterly* 25, no. 1 (1995): 43–66.

2. Quoted in Bob Davis, "Pledging a 'Clinton Doctrine' for Foreign Policy Creates Concerns for Adversaries and Allies Alike," *The Wall Street Journal*, 6 August 1999, A12 (http://ptg.djnr.com/ccroot/asp/publib/story/asp, accessed on 19 April 2002).

result, the Nixon Doctrine established that the United States would help those countries that helped themselves. The Nixon Doctrine branched out from strict containment policy to embrace a more flexible stance on resolving conflict abroad. It did this through the application of third-party politics, such as "Vietnamization," in which the United States supplemented and replaced U.S. soldiers in the field with those of a host country, thereby limiting costs of foreign conflict.

The Carter Doctrine came in the wake of the Iranian revolution and the 1979 Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. The Carter Doctrine pronounced that the United States would intervene unilaterally and militarily to protect its vital interests in the oil-rich Persian Gulf. The Carter Doctrine maintained the momentum of cold war Communist containment, and foreshadowed the eventual Persian Gulf war.

The Reagan Doctrine pronounced a return to Manichean foreign policy for containment of the "evil empire" in the developing world. The Reagan Doctrine stated that the United States "must not break faith—on every continent from Afghanistan to Nicaragua—to defy Soviet aggression and secure rights which have been ours from birth."[4] The Reagan Doctrine was more sweeping than earlier containment doctrines, because it was not confined to Europe.

As these examples show, presidential doctrines should set the tone of foreign policy decisions during a given administration. The Truman, Nixon, Carter, and Reagan doctrines demonstrate that for fifty years, cold war doctrines remained deeply rooted in anti-communist rhetoric and sentiment that served to divide the East from the West. The

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3. Quoted in Mary Beth Norton, David M. Katzman, Paul D. Escott, Howard P. Chudacoff, Thomas G. Patterson, and William M. Tuttle, Jr., *A People and a Nation: A History of the United States*, 3rd ed. (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1990), 826.

4. Ronald Reagan, *Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents* 21, no. 6, 11 February 1985, 146.

Clinton Doctrine evolved, as do most presidential doctrines, from those seeking to understand the direction of the president's foreign policy, rather than from an explicit announcement by the president himself. Charting a new course was not simple in the early years after the end of the cold war, and Clinton had to make many hard choices.[5] In the post-cold war era, Clinton had the rare opportunity to define the course of foreign policy at a time when the slate had been washed clean. As the first post-cold war president, Clinton had within his grasp the power to form foreign policy at a critical juncture in American history, when world politics was adjusting to tremendous and unsettling shifts in the international geopolitical balance. Therefore, the Clinton administration was selected for this study for one overarching but very profound reason: Clinton was the first post-cold war president with an opportunity to set the pace, tone, and agenda for U.S. foreign policy for the foreseeable future.

The end of the cold war ushered in a new era and along with it, new post-cold war rhetoric. Jim Kuypers explains that the post-cold war approach needed fresh new rhetoric to replace that of the outdated cold war containment-based rhetoric.[6] Rhetoric could no longer be founded in communist containment, and under Clinton, there was a return to moralistic rhetoric, justifying intervention on humanitarian laws, norms, and principles. This new rhetoric eventually led to what would be termed the Clinton Doctrine. Glimmers of a future Clinton Doctrine began to take shape as early as his presidential campaign. In a campaign speech on 1 October 1992, Clinton noted that since

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5. Difficult ethical choices regarding humanitarian actions are discussed in the collection of essays, see Jonathan Moore, ed., *Hard Choices: Moral Dilemmas in Humanitarian Intervention* (Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, 1998).

6. Jim A. Kuypers, *Presidential Crisis Rhetoric and the Press in the Post-Cold War World* (Westport, CT: Praeger, 1997).

democracies do not go to war against one another, democracy abroad helps protect Americans at home.[7] Clinton termed this speech "one of the two most important speeches of his presidential campaign." The other was about the economy.[8]

Clinton stood at the threshold of a changed international order. The post-cold war world had filled with "teacup wars,"[9] and theory held that increasing the number of democratic states would reduce war, and increase stability. As the leader of the only world superpower, Clinton could grasp the opportunity to define the nature of the international environment, and could thereby shape a world in which the United States would prosper.[10] In this regard, Clinton went on record on 23 March 1999, saying "I want us to live in a world where we get along with each other, with all of our differences, and where we don't have to worry about seeing scenes every night for the next 40 years of ethnic cleansing in some part of the world."[11] Clearly, he envisioned a world environment where peaceful relations as well as basic human rights could prosper, and at least rhetorically, he was willing to use force to make that happen.

Clinton turned to democratic enlargement and the strengthening of international institutions as methods for stabilizing security in the international system. Democratic enlargement speaks to the very essence of why we study international relations: how to overcome anarchy. Democratic enlargement is rooted in the democratic peace thesis, which posits that democracies do not go to war against one another. Clinton's early

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7. See A. M. Rosenthal, "On My Mind: The Clinton Doctrine," *New York Times*, 6 October 1992, 23A.

8. Paul Gigot, "Clinton Doctrine? China and Bosnia Will Offer Clues," *The Wall Street Journal*, 20 November 1992, A14 (http://ptg.djnr.com/ccroot/asp/publib/story.asp, accessed on 19 April 2002).

9. Leslie Gelb, "Quelling the Teacup Wars: The New World's Constant Challenge," *Foreign Affairs* 73, no. 6 (1994): 2–6.

10. Hegemonic theory suggests that the nature of the system hegemon determines the nature of the system. Thus, if the United States wants a benevolent system, it must use benevolent measures to shape it.

11. Charles Krauthammer, "The Clinton Doctrine," *Time* 153, no. 13, 5 April 1999, 88.

foreign policy emphasized strengthened international systemic constraints to provide stability in a U.S.-dominated post-cold war world. Therefore, the Clinton administration started out supporting democracy under the umbrella of a strengthened United Nations, because such institutions provide legitimate authority for intervention in the internal affairs of sovereign countries. To bolster international stability, the Clinton administration supported democratic enlargement, as exemplified in the case study of Haiti, where Clinton demonstrated a willingness to use force to restore democracy and promote regional stability. Without the legitimacy provided by international institutions such as the United Nations, these interventions would be tantamount to invasion and declaration of war.

Clinton's early support of international organizations was called "assertive multilateralism" in his campaign speeches. Clinton's efforts to strengthen the UN were demonstrated as early as April 1992, when the United States advocated a UN Rapid Deployment Force.[12] The United States indicated that it was prepared to incorporate the UN into its foreign policy in a serious manner, despite the fact that Congress increasingly criticized the UN, especially concerning contributions. For example, when Madeleine Albright became UN Ambassador, she spoke of the UN being "poised to take a central and positive role for peace."[13] Shortly thereafter, she embarked upon the policy of

12. See Ivo H. Daalder, "Knowing When to Say NO: The Development of U.S. Policy for Peacekeeping," in *UN Peacekeeping, American Politics, and Uncivil Wars of the 1990s*, ed. William J. Durch (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1996), 41.

13. Quote from Madeleine K. Albright, "Statement at Confirmation Hearing of U.S. Ambassador to the United Nations," 23 January 1993, *U.S. Department of State Dispatch* 4, no. 15 (1993): 229.

assertive multilateralism, indicating that a renewed American interest in the United Nations would be "more than a short-term fad."[14]

In response to the pivotal events of 3 October 1993 in Somalia that culminated with the humiliation of U.S. troops, Clinton altered his foreign policy strategy from multilateralism to "limited engagement."[15] The U.S. Marines arrived on the beaches of Mogadishu, Somalia in December 1992, in what started out under the Bush administration as a U.S.-led humanitarian operation, but became a nation-building mission in May 1993 under Clinton. The U.S. commitment in Somalia ended with the tragic deaths of eighteen U.S. Army Rangers on 3 and 4 October 1993.[16] The highly publicized images of U.S. troops fighting and dying in Somalia shocked America. For fear of a public backlash, Clinton reduced the mission mandate to humanitarian assistance only, and ordered U.S. forces to withdraw from Somalia within six months. Thus, warlord General Mohamed Farah Aideed defeated the United States and demonstrated that it could be frightened away by a public display of killing U.S. soldiers.

Until Somalia, the United States had lacked explicit policy guidelines on participation in peacekeeping missions, but this changed quickly. Three pivotal speeches took place after the Somalia debacle. First, UN Ambassador Madeleine Albright raised several tough questions at the National Defense University to qualify the types of conditions that should be present before the United States should consider intervention. Second, Clinton criticized the UN's over-commitment, saying that "if the American

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14. Madeleine K. Albright, "Myths of Peacekeeping," Statement before the Subcommittee on International Security, International Organizations and Human Rights of the House Committee on Foreign Affairs, 24 June 1993, *U.S. Department of State Dispatch* 4, no. 26 (1993): 464–7.

15. Heinz A.J. Kern, "The Clinton Doctrine: A New Foreign Policy," *The Christian Science Monitor*, 18 June 1993, 19 (http://ptg.djnr.com/ccroot/asp/publib/story.asp, accessed on 19 April 2002).

16. For a policy discussion of the lessons from Somalia, see Walter Clarke and Jeffrey Herbst, "Somalia and the Future of Humanitarian Intervention," *Foreign Affairs* 75, no. 2 (1996): 70–85.

people are to say 'yes' to UN peacekeeping, then the United Nations must know when to say 'no.'"[17] Third, National Security Adviser Anthony Lake addressed Johns Hopkins University and reminded the world that "multilateralism is a means, not an end," and that it is "one of the many foreign policy tools at our disposal."[18] These speeches were widely understood as a foreign policy reassessment.

As a direct response to events in Somalia, Clinton not only withdrew troops, but also completely reformulated peacekeeping guidelines initiated in April 1993. These guidelines would soon become known as Presidential Decision Directive 25 (PDD 25). PDD 25 was an attempt to deal quickly with the loss of American troops in Somalia, before political rivals could use the opportunity to make it more damaging and politically costly for Clinton. The debacle in Mogadishu immediately created a backlash in Congress against participation in UN peacekeeping operations altogether. The Somalia debacle forced the Clinton administration to take a more restrictive line on UN peace operations in general, and an even tougher position on U.S. involvement in these missions. Thus, the PDD 25 was the administration's major policy response to the Somalia humiliation, in an effort to prevent a public backlash against the use of American forces in UN missions.

The shift in policy was profound. During May 1994, Clinton's budget requests found little support in Congress. Moreover, Congress had become staunchly opposed to paying UN peacekeeping dues, and made such payments conditional on UN reform. From the American perspective, the UN could no longer be considered a tool for serious

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17. Quoted in Jeane Kirkpatrick, "Clarifying the Clinton Doctrine," *The Los Angeles Times*, 4 October 1993, A19 (http://ptg.djnr.com/ccroot/asp/publib/story/asp, accessed on 19 April 2002).
18. Quoted in Kirkpatrick, "Clarifying the Clinton Doctrine."

foreign policy issues because of leadership and managerial inefficiency, not to mention an unruly membership. This stance would come back to haunt the Clinton administration, however, because Madeleine Albright, then Ambassador to the UN, delayed and blocked UN peacekeeping measures in Rwanda. Meanwhile, the UN Secretariat and member states, to varying degrees, considered the United States irresponsible, because it made payment on already outstanding dues conditional on reform.

Officially issued in May 1994, PDD 25 announced new limits on U.S. commitment to peacekeeping, as well as the administration's intention to seek reform of UN peace operations.[19] From this point on, if ground troops would be inserted into ongoing civil conflict, then the United States would not deploy them for UN peacekeeping missions. Most broadly, PDD 25 "signaled a complete reversal of Clinton's earlier declarations and returned foreign policy to the Republican, Weinberger-Powell doctrine of extreme caution and non-support for international peacekeeping operations."[20] Robert Worth writes that the establishment of a "Clinton Doctrine" of limited intervention forced the military to adjust to "a steady diet of small-scale interventions."[21] While Clinton's foreign policy did not require significant reforms at the Pentagon, Clinton was content, according to Professor Eliot Cohen, as long as the military "did not make headlines or get him into trouble."[22]

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19. For the unclassified Executive Summary of the directive, see White House, "The Clinton Administration's Policy on Reforming Multilateral Peace Operations (PDD25)," Annex One, *USUN Press Release*, 5 May 1994, 74.

20. Michael G. MacKinnon, *The Evolution of US Peacekeeping Policy under Clinton: A Fairweather Friend* (London: Frank Cass, 2000), vii.

21. Robert Worth, "Clinton's Warriors: The Interventionists," *World Policy Journal* 15, no. 1 (1998): 43.

22. Eliot Cohen quoted in ibid., 48.

Upon deeper examination, policy variation under Clinton shows that he was in fact cautious in forging policy. Clinton said, in a 14 September 1994 speech, that he wanted to promote democracy abroad and that this was in the U.S. interest. His objective over three years was to "make sure that the military dictators leave power and that the democratically elected government is returned."[23]

Despite clear signs that the Clinton administration was pulling back from its initial statements supporting assertive multilateralism, confusion remained on what exactly the Clinton Doctrine was. For example, in December 1997, the doctrine was said to involve "avoiding war but using American troops in modest numbers in many places to create space for democracy (as in Haiti) or to keep warring factions from fighting again (in Bosnia)."[24] A few days later, another article pointed to "geoeconomics" and domestic special-interest groups as the roots of the Clinton Doctrine.[25]

In June 1999, President Clinton helped clarify the Clinton Doctrine when he said, "If somebody comes after innocent civilians and tries to kill them en masse because of their race, their ethnic background or their religion, and it is within our power to stop it, we will stop it."[26] For some, this overarching goal looked like a recipe for inaction.[27] Moreover, the goal itself was established with such clauses as "if it is in our power," thereby making the policy a rhetorical device, rather than a tool for action. As a result, Clinton has been accused of operating in an "ad hoc" fashion that led to the "reality of

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23. William J. Clinton, "Address to the Nation on Haiti," *Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents* 30, no. 38, 18 September 1994 (http://frwebgate5.access.gpo.gov/cgibin...D=56249622997+11+0+0&WAISaction=retrieve, accessed on 19 March 2002).

24. E.J. Dionne, Jr., "The Clinton Doctrine," *The Washington Post*, 26 December 1997, A29 (http://ptg.djnr.com/ccroot/asp/publib/story.asp, accessed on 19 April 2001).

25. Robert A. Manning and Patrick Clawson, "The Clinton Doctrine," *The Wall Street Journal*, 29 December 1997, A10 (http://ptg.djnr.com/ccroot/asp/publib/story.asp, accessed on 19 April 2001).

26. Davis, "Pledging a 'Clinton Doctrine.'"

27. For a critique of the breadth of the Clinton Doctrine, see Krauthammer, "The Clinton Doctrine."

inconsistency."[28] By relying on a number of case studies, this dissertation seeks to clarify this seeming inconsistency.

Placing each case study in the context of the Clinton Doctrine is meaningful because it highlights differences between policy launched and policy implemented during the Clinton administration. As shown at the outset of this chapter, rhetoric emanating from the White House during times of international crisis should echo the doctrine announced by the president. Any policy departure away from doctrinal logic should be an indicator that there were other, more compelling factors. In this study, the Clinton Doctrine is the yardstick against which foreign policy decisions and implementation are measured. This study seeks to establish why extreme variations in the Clinton foreign policy occurred.

The three case studies introduced in this dissertation examine the uneven application of the Clinton Doctrine in Haiti, Rwanda, and East Timor. This examination clarifies the doctrine by exploring the administration's actions as well as the explanations it offered for its policy. Although the end of ethnic cleansing was the fundamental goal of the Clinton Doctrine, that goal was not consistently pursued. This is seen particularly in the case of genocide in Rwanda, where the United States was unwilling to risk deploying ground troops to protect peripheral interests such as ending ethnic violence.

Chapter II lays out the literature regarding foreign policy and intervention. Chapter III puts forward the dissertation research design, and provides the methodology for examining the hypotheses against three specific case studies, which are instrumental

28. Arnold Kanter, "Memorandum to the President," in *Humanitarian Intervention: Crafting a Workable Doctrine*, ed. Alton Frye (New York: Council on Foreign Relations, 2000), 1.

in discovering *how*, and more importantly, *why* Clinton's foreign policy appeared inconsistent with his rhetoric.

Chapters IV, V, and VI consist of case studies of crises in Rwanda, Haiti, and East Timor. The three case studies represent international crises, in which the U.S. policy on intervention addressed issues such as humanitarian aid, ethnic cleansing, or democratic governance. Chapter IV examines the case of ethnic cleansing in Rwanda in 1994, when the United States selected a humanitarian aid-only policy. Chapter V analyzes the U.S. diplomatic and military intervention in Haiti in 1994, focusing on democratic governance. Chapter VI considers U.S. non-intervention in 1999 in East Timor, where the United States remained on the sidelines despite the failure of democratic reforms. These three case studies demonstrate conflicting policy choices, and bring to bear the research question: to what extent and why was there a variation in Clinton's foreign policy relative to the Clinton Doctrine. All case studies are similarly arranged around five specific variables: the United Nations, U.S. allies, the U.S. Congress, U.S. public opinion and the media, and U.S. interests.

The final chapter in this dissertation brings together findings from the three case studies. It draws on similarities and differences in the findings to formulate a framework for understanding why and how Clinton apparently failed to consistently implement the Clinton Doctrine.

CHAPTER II

LITERATURE ON FOREIGN POLICY AND INTERVENTION

The literature on foreign policy and intervention contains several fields of study that portray different approaches to the debate over when, whether, how, where, and why to intervene. These include philosophy, law, theory, military operations, and foreign policy. The following section frames this debate from each perspective, and concludes by explaining how this dissertation fits into such a diverse body of literature.

PHILOSOPHY AND INTERVENTION

The philosophical discourse on intervention examines the fundamental moral and ethical essence of what it means for an actor to take steps to alter a situation in another country, in which that actor was not originally involved. There are proponents and opponents of intervention who base their arguments along the lines of just war or pacifism.[1] Richard Haass presents these schools of thought along Christian and legal norms.[2] In general, both the just war and pacifism are defensive measures.

Just war assumes that individuals are left to negotiate the struggle to survive under conditions where there is no grand arbitrator and where attempts to mitigate anarchy have failed.[3] Anarchy is conducive to a general state of war, because there is no government, law, police, or sense of community. A just war is waged as a last resort by a

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1. See Robert L. Phillips and Duane L. Cady, *Humanitarian Intervention: Just War vs. Pacifism* (Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, 1996).
2. Richard N. Haass, *Intervention: The Use of American Military Force in the Post-Cold War World,* rev. ed. (Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution Press, 1999).
3. Michael Walzer gives extensive theory of just intervention in *Just and Unjust Wars: A Moral Argument with Historical Illustrations* (New York: Basic Books, 1997).

legitimate authority for a worthy cause, is expected to achieve success with the use of appropriate force, and respects the welfare of non-combatants.

This approach to intervention assumes that in the fight for survival, groups develop that share a common bond of similar values, norms, and principles. One value, for example, is that everyone has the basic and undeniable right to self-defense. By banding together in large groups with similar belief structures, people can live together without constant existential threat. An outgrowth of the concept that man has the undeniable right to self-defense extends to and justifies the idea of national sovereignty, because even larger groups band together within a specified territory that is defensible and demarcated. Therefore, common morality within groups is a precursor for cultural differences between groups, which justify the establishment and defense of sovereign nations that are founded in the principle of non-interference. This calls to mind Samuel Huntington's classic work regarding the eventual conflict between seven major civilizations that disagree on what is just and unjust.[4] Conflict operates similar to tectonic plates that move against one another, generating friction in the process.

When combined, morality and sovereignty lead to the idea of just intervention as a means to protect given groups or nations. Intervention, in this view, is necessary when a system is corrupted to the point that survival is so threatened as to make it morally retrograde not to intervene to safeguard life and rights. James Mayall builds on this point, arguing that international institutions reflect progress in cultural and human understanding. This is because it is now possible for the UN Security Council, which derives legitimacy and authority from the international community, to intervene in civil

4. Samuel P. Huntington, *The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of the World Order* (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1996).

conflicts "to protect the victims of sustained human rights abuse, even when the perpetrators were their own governments."[5] At this point, military intervention to stop ethnic cleansing is not only appropriate, but also justified, necessary, and responsible based on international values. In this line of thinking, it was the responsibility of the international community to intervene in Rwanda to stop genocide.

The opposing view to the just war is the pacifist perspective on intervention. Pacifism stems from the concept that countries wish to influence the development or internal fabric of other countries and can do so without the use of military force. Along the lines of pacifism, there are those who support non-violent intervention—which is to say that they oppose the use of force in general.[6] There are various approaches to the concept of non-violent intervention, including various forms of aid and assistance programs, as well as diplomatic intervention to protect human rights. In a nutshell, non-violent intervention consists of methods of persuasion other than the use of military force (such as visiting mediators, transnational broadcasting), and economic activity (such as investment or sanctions). David Baldwin's work on economic statecraft explains many forms of economic political and diplomatic persuasion.[7] An example is positive and negative sanctions that are low-risk and low-cost to implement. While the jury is still out regarding levels of success enjoyed by sanctions, they are nonetheless important forms of peaceful intervention and should not be ignored.

Economic expansion based on trade is another example of non-violent

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5. James Mayall, *World Politics: Progress and its Limits* (Cambridge: Polity, 2000). Mayall builds on Josef Joffe's four criteria for intervention, including moral imperative, national interest, chances of success, and domestic support. See Josef Joffe, "The New Europe, Yesterday's Ghosts," *Foreign Affairs* 72, no. 1 (1992/93): 33.

6. Yeshua Moser-Puangsuwan and Thomas Weber, eds., *Nonviolent Intervention across Borders: A Recurrent Vision* (Honolulu: University of Hawaii, 2000).

7. See David Baldwin, *Economic Statecraft* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1985).

intervention. It is intervention because it crosses national boundaries and brings change to the receiving country. For example, expanding a domestic economy into a porous target economy gains access and influence for the country of origin, making slow, less noticed change in the target country.[8] Economic expansion by liberal democracies brings cultural and social changes in the target country, and generates a process of liberal democratic socialization of sorts.[9] Here, economic expansion would bring stability by improving the standard of living in less wealthy places, thereby allowing the growth of liberal capitalism and an acceptable system for political unity. Stability is derived from the fact that once a standard of living has been improved, no one wants it to drop.

This raises a problem with pacifism though, because as economic expansion proceeds, receiving countries often become increasingly dependent on continued economic interaction for a sustained and improved standard of living. The more recipient countries become dependent on economic aid, foreign investment, or trade, the more vulnerable they are to shocks in the system. For example, when the Thai Baht fell in 1997–98, the banks in Indonesia collapsed and virtually wiped out the assets of the middle class. People took to the streets, creating turmoil that forced the government to step down. To restore order, Indonesia resorted to force. Thus, pacifists ignore that a potential consequence of economic expansion could be the use of force, if the expected levels of wealth are disrupted. As a result of increased economic dependence, therefore, military intervention can be called upon to defend threatened economic enterprise, the loss of which could jeopardize an improved standard of living.

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8. This phenomenon can be examined as transnational relations. See Thomas Risse-Kappen, ed., *Bringing Transnational Relations Back In: Non-State Actors, Domestic Structures and International Institutions* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995).

The philosophical debate regarding intervention is informative regarding how morality leads to sovereignty, and why it could legitimize intervention. As such, it helps in this study to explain the basis for Clinton's call to end ethnic cleansing if and whenever possible. Moreover, the philosophical discussion clarifies the importance of U.S. public opinion and the media as variables, because the American public is the essential group with values such as the right to life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness, and the media are a transmission belt without which the public might not be aware of activities abroad. In addition, American values have expanded into the international community to produce a larger group with international values, norms, principles, and laws against crimes against humanity. For example, Charles Shotwell and Kimberley Thachuk discuss the UN Charter, revealing intervention as an increasingly accepted international norm.[10] Therefore, the philosophical debate informs general discussion in this dissertation regarding two of the five causal variables; however. it is insufficient to fully explain U.S. foreign policy regarding military intervention.

THE LAW AND INTERVENTION

There is a considerable amount of literature on the law and intervention. Laws function to limit the ways and reasons for going to war. In general, the right to self-defense is paramount. This debate focuses on the international and legal implications of intervention.

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9. See Joshua Muravchik, *Exporting Democracy: Fulfilling America's Destiny* (Washington, D.C.: AEI Press, 1991).

10. Charles B. Shotwell and Kimberley Thachuk, "Humanitarian Intervention: The Case for Legitimacy," *Strategic Forum*, National Defense University Institute for National Strategic Studies, no. 166 (1999).

In the twentieth century, global interconnectedness reached unprecedented levels, enabling the establishment of international organizations such as the United Nations to improve international order and stability.[11] In particular, the UN, as it grew to embody the legitimizing authority regarding international matters, introduced international regulation into world politics. Sean Murphy examines the UN's role in intervention and argues that technology has made the world so small that the violation of humanitarian law is almost immediately known internationally.[12] Increased international awareness—especially in Western developed countries—of when and where human rights violations occur, often generates pressure on the UN and its members to remedy horrors of violations against human rights. In addition, unilateral or multilateral intervention without UN approval and mandate are growing less acceptable.

The enhanced importance of the UN is especially reflected in the growing body of international law.[13] We are witnessing the institutionalization of the international environment. Institutionalization occurs when democratic values are embedded into formal practices within an organization or institution. This is seen in the United States in the form of the executive, the legislature, and the judiciary. Without sufficient institutionalization, society and culture would be unable to withstand challenges to stability from constituent groups. Lester Brune, for example, argues that economic and political interdependence is a method to prompt stability, because unstable conditions

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11. For a critique of the UN, see the collection of essays edited by Ted Carpenter, *Delusions of Grandeur: The UN and Global Intervention* (Washington, D.C.: Cato Institute, 1997).

12. Sean Murphy, *Humanitarian Intervention: The United Nations in an Evolving World Order*, vol. 21, Procedural Aspects of International Law Series (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1996).

13. John Norton Moore and Alex Morrison, eds., *Strengthening the United Nations and Enhancing War Prevention* (Durham, NC: Carolina Academic Press, 2000).

stem from insufficient system at the state and local levels.[14] The international Tribunal at The Hague has existed for many years, and has been instrumental in developing international consensus regarding war crimes. The deepening of the international institution for law recently reached new heights with the establishment of the International Criminal Court (ICC) on 11 April 2002.[15] Despite its drawbacks, the ICC created a new and important avenue for international justice and stability.[16]

The trouble with international law, however, is that it is difficult to enforce, and therefore introduces delicate questions regarding the function of intervention. Debate on law enforcement and intervention often focuses on crimes against humanity, issues surrounding violations of sovereignty, and sanctioned/unsanctioned or multilateral/ unilateral intervention. Fernando Tesón justifies humanitarian intervention based on international law that is founded in the fundamental human right to defend life as argued under the just war assertion above.[17] Even though international law is difficult to enforce, it is useful for resolving conflict by strengthening norms of behavior and mechanisms for settling disputes. The effectiveness of international law is based in the willingness of states to observe it.

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14. Lester H. Brune, *The United States and Post-Cold War Interventions: Bush and Clinton in Somalia, Haiti, and Bosnia, 1992–1998* (Claremont, CA: Regina Books, 1999).

15. For debate in the United States regarding the ICC, see "An Unjust International Court," *The Washington Times*, 11 April 2002, 20; "Red Meat for Unilateralists," *The Washington Post*, 11 April 2002, 28; and "No Court Dates for America," *The Washington Times*, 11 April 2002, 21.

16. Two of the dominant arguments against U.S. membership in the ICC are that it is unaccountable to any governing body, and that rogue or unfriendly states could become members and utilize the ICC bureaucracy to bring harm to the United States or its citizens. The argument favoring the U.S. membership in the ICC is that U.S. participation in the development of an international court is crucial, even if it is not perfect.

17. Fernando R. Tesón, *Humanitarian Intervention: An Inquiry into Law and Morality* (Irvington-on-Hudson, NY: Transnational Publishers, 1997).

THEORY AND INTERVENTION

The theoretical literature on intervention deals primarily with causes of civil conflict and conflict prevention. Theory about the causes of civil conflict includes various security dilemmas that are brought on by transition or change.[18] A security dilemma occurs when efforts to increase security in one state bring an increase in insecurity to another. A classical security dilemma was the East-West competition during the cold war that ended in a tremendous arms race.

To find alternatives for resolving security dilemmas at the core of conflict, Barbara Walter and Jack Snyder explore why civil conflict breaks out.[19] Much of the security dilemma is caused by fear of change and unstable conditions. For example, changes in the political environment may be found in governmental breakdown, as was seen in Somalia. Stephen Van Evera examines how increased nationalism contributed to war, for example, in the former Yugoslavia.[20] Another example is when changes in the political balance of power between groups within a country bring on social turmoil, especially if the system is not institutionalized to withstand such changes, as in Iran. Furthermore, shifts leaving one ethnic group geographically isolated or vulnerable can spell doom to peace, as happened in Rwanda. Shifting distribution of economic wealth can also bring about civil conflict, as the standard of living could drop precipitously and spark public outrage, as was seen in Indonesia. When civil order breaks down, lawless

18. Stephen Van Evera, *Causes of War: Power and the Roots of Conflict* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1999); Chiam Kaufman, "Possible and Impossible Solutions to Ethnic Civil Wars," *International Security*, 20, no. 4 (Spring 1996): 136–76; and Barbara F. Walter and Jack Snyder, ed., *Civil Wars, Insecurity, and Intervention* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1999).

19. Ibid.

20. Stephen Van Evera, "Hypotheses on Nationalism and War," *International Security* 18, no. 4 (1994): 5–39.

warlords take over, as in Rwanda and Yugoslavia.[21] Military disarmament after a peace agreement can bring on a "reverse security dilemma" between antagonists, increasing insecurities and leading to a breakdown in the peace agreement.[22] Kenneth Schultz examines a type of security dilemma that is brought about by conditions of open social structures under democracy, as opposed to non-democracy.[23] He determines that open information in democratic states can increase or diminish the credibility of a state's threat, and can therefore bring about or ameliorate an information-driven security dilemma that alters perceptions due to public response to policy during crisis.

Theory on conflict prevention is largely an answer to the causes of conflict and how to stop conflict from breaking out. The most influential theory on conflict prevention is the democratic peace thesis, as coined by Michael Doyle in 1983, in which democracy is thought to contribute to peaceful relations between states.[24] The democratic peace thesis, based on Immanuel Kant's idea of "perpetual peace," posits that democracies do not make war against one another.[25] Tony Smith endorses intervention in support of democratic governance for three reasons.[26] First, it functions as a bulwark against nationalistic extremism that could lead to instability. Second, it provides a stable

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21. John Mueller, "The Banality of 'Ethnic War,'" *International Security* 25, no. 1 (2000): 42–67.

22. A reverse security dilemma can occur when distrust between parties leads to cheating on disarmament, or when one party reduces real capabilities and the other reduces surplus or outdated capabilities.

23. Kenneth A. Schultz, *Democracy and Coercive Diplomacy* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001).

24. Michael W. Doyle, "Kant, Liberal Legacies, and Foreign Affairs," *Philosophy and Public Affairs* 12, nos. 3 and 4 (1983).

25. For more on influential works regarding the democratic peace thesis, see the following two volumes, which consist of previously published articles: Michael E. Brown, Sean M. Lynn-Jones, and Steven E. Miller, eds., *Debating the Democratic Peace: An International Security Reader* (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1997); and Miriam Fendius Elman, ed. *Paths to Peace: Is Democracy the Answer?* (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1997).

26. Tony Smith, "In Defense of Intervention," in *Foreign Affairs Editors' Choice Series* (New York: Council on Foreign Relations, 2001), 26–27.

modern institutionalized government founded on a constitution that reduces the chances of civil war, which could spill into the larger region. Leslie Gelb and Richard Betts give an example of how the system worked to stop the United States from escalating the war in Vietnam.[27] Even though there were hawks, there were also doves, and the resultant policy was a compromised solution. Thus, institutionalized government adds to stability because varying constituencies and actors make it difficult to implement extreme policies such as war. Third, democratic enlargement increases peaceable relations between like states with similar values that foster economic prosperity. Once attained, no one wants to have war disrupt wealth or liberty.

William Dixon advances that democracies are better equipped to diffuse conflict among themselves at an early stage prior to military engagement.[28] There is a delicate period when a newly democratized country, especially one that has a non-democratic tradition, would be more likely to revert to previous types of governance. Christopher Layne criticizes the democratic peace thesis because it relies on "persuasiveness" found in institutional constraints, such as cultural norms and principles to promote peace, that are insufficient to provide long lasting results.[29] Mansfield and Snyder conclude that states in the process of democratizing are more likely to engage in war than are mature democracies or stable autocracies, but they leave hope that international stability can prosper in the presence of mature, established democracies.[30] Therefore, democratic

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27. Leslie Gelb and Richard Betts, *The Irony of Vietnam: The System Worked* (Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution, 1979).

28. William Dixon, "Democracy and the Peaceful Settlement of Disputes," *American Political Science Review* 88, 1 (1994): 14–32.

29. Christopher Layne, "Kant or Cant: The Myth of the Democratic Peace," *International Security* 19, no. 2 (1994): 6.

30. Edward D. Mansfield and Jack Snyder, "Democratization and the Danger of War," *International Security* 20, no. 1 (1995): 5–38.

enlargement must be accompanied by a commitment to see young democracies through a less stable transition period in which they develop and institutionalize deeper democratic norms, values, and principles.

U.S. support of democratic enlargement reflects a highly valued component of American society. Some argue that democratic enlargement takes on imperialistic tones.[31] For example, Mark Peceny examines important turning points in America's identity as a great liberal power, and demonstrates that the American presidents' efforts to legitimize intervention, both in the international and domestic spheres, are essential for the cause of democracy and liberal peace.[32] Whether acknowledged or not, the Clinton administration's effort at democratic enlargement involved the promotion of democracy to legitimate continued American leadership in the post-cold war international system.[33] As a result, promoting democratic enlargement is a method for fostering international stability and is in the interest of the United States.[34] This is especially so in bordering regions and nations, but also as a whole, and invokes the U.S. "grand strategy" of democratic enlargement for engendering international stability favorable to overarching U.S. goals.[35]

Gideon Rose explains that debate in the United States has a classic division about

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31. See Michael Cox, G. John Ikenberry, and Takashi Inoguchi, eds., *American Democracy Promotion Impulses, Strategies, and Impacts* (Oxford, NY: Oxford University Press, 2000). This is a collection of essays written by well-known authors such as Michael Doyle, Randall Schweller, and Ole R. Holsti, among others, regarding intervention and democratic governance.

32. Mark Peceny, *Democracy at the Point of Bayonets* (University Park: Pennsylvania State University Press, 1999).

33. See Naom Chomsky, *A New Generation Draws the Line: Kosovo, East Timor and the Standards of the West* (New York: Verso, 2000).

34. For the Clinton administration's thoughts on democratic enlargement, see Strobe Talbott, "Democracy and the National Interest," *Foreign Affairs* 75, no. 6 (1996): 47–63; and G. John Ikenberry, "America's Liberal Grand Strategy: Democracy and National Security in the Post-war Era," in Cox, Ikenberry, and Inoguchi, *American Democracy Promotion*, 103–26.

35. See Michael Mastanduno, "Preserving the Unipolar Moment: U.S. Grand Strategy after the Cold War," *International Security* 21, no. 4 (1997): 49–89.

the promotion of democracy as a foreign policy goal.[36] This division exists between those who argue that the United States should be content to provide an example of democracy for others and those who feel that the United States should proactively shape political developments in other countries according to American ideals. Rose points out that "rhetorically the Clinton administration fell into the 'crusader' camp,"[37] declaring that "promoting democracy" was an important element in its national security strategy.[38] Huntington explains that there have been three waves of democracy—the first in the 1950s, the second in the 1960s, and the third in the late 1980s to early 1990s—in which dozens of countries became democratic converts.[39] Larry Diamond argues that after the third wave of democratization—which is drawing to a close—those remaining democracies without institutionalization or legitimization will likely consolidate.[40]

Thomas Carothers cautions that democratization abroad suffers from limited accomplishments because an American model for democratization that does not consider local circumstances often generates a negative image of democracy in the minds of locals.[41] As a result, such practice is doomed because of local barriers to progress. Chalmers Johnson provides a bitingly critical examination of U.S. intervention in terms

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36. Gideon Rose, "Democracy Promotion and American Foreign Policy: A Review Essay," *International Security* 25, no. 3 (2000–2001): 186–203.

37. Ibid., 188–9.

38. See White House, "Documentation: A National Security Strategy of Engagement and Enlargement," February 1996, reprinted in *America's Strategic Choices: An International Security Reader*, Michael E. Brown, Owen R. Coté, Jr., Sean M. Lynn-Jones, and Steven Miller, eds., (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1997), 286.

39. Samuel P. Huntington, *The Third Wave* (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1991).

40. Larry Diamond, *Developing Democracy: Toward Consolidation* (Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1999), 23.

41. Thomas Carothers, *Aiding Democracy Abroad: the Learning Curve* (Washington, D.C.: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 1999). For a similar argument that includes lessons on exporting democracy, see Abraham F. Lowenthal, ed., *Exporting Democracy: The United States and Latin America* (Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1991).

of commitment to maintaining a global empire after the cold war.[42] His book is an account of foreign resentment of U.S. policies that have built up over time, and of the kinds of economic and political international retribution that may return to the United States in the twenty-first century. Johnson views imperial expansion as the root of terrorism and other international trouble. To avoid harsh resentment, the United States could benefit by enabling democratic and institutional consolidation under stable conditions. To do so, the United States could continue implementing democratization based on the American model, albeit with more sensitivity to local needs, while remaining flexible, so that a mid-stream change of course is possible, rather than abandoning the project altogether. Understanding how democratic enlargement is a long-term goal for U.S. foreign policy, supports discussion in this dissertation of powerful belief structures that slumber in the American psyche. Values founded in democracy are important especially in considering U.S. actions in Haiti; however, they do not explain the full breadth of U.S. foreign policy.

THE MILITARY AND INTERVENTION

The literature on military intervention is considerable and generally addresses the question of how to use military force. The answer to the question of how to intervene, involves military capabilities, as well as the types of warfare to be used. It is not specifically addressed here because that literature does not apply directly to analysis in this dissertation. Rather, this section examines literature regarding policy aspects of

42. Chalmers Johnson, *Blowback: The Costs and Consequences of American Empire* (New York: Metropolitan Books, 2000). The term "blowback" was invented by the CIA for internal use. It refers to the unintended consequences of policies that were kept secret from the American people. Johnson concludes with the question as to whether the United States has become a "rogue" superpower.

military intervention that have to do with broader policy, such as military doctrine. Clausewitz wrote that war is politics "by other means," and this is clearly the case with military intervention.[43] Just as international law functions to limit the ways and reasons for use of military force, so do military doctrines. Military doctrines provide guideposts for decisions on military intervention, including peace making, peace enforcing, and peacekeeping. This is demonstrated clearly in the following three examples of military doctrine.

The attack on the U.S. military barracks in Beirut brought about high-level considerations in the Department of Defense in 1984. The resulting Weinberger Doctrine presented six guidelines for informing decisions on military intervention: 1) a vital interest or ally must be at stake; 2) there must be support from popular opinion and Congress; 3) force must be used only as a last resort; 4) only commit with the intent to win wholeheartedly; 5) clearly define objectives; and 6) reassess and update the size, composition, and disposition of the forces as conditions change. A few years later, in 1992, the Powell Doctrine changed the military approach to intervention by formulating policy around four specific points: 1) force should only be used as a last resort; 2) define clear objectives; 3) clarify the basis for withdrawal; and 4) commit with overwhelming force.

In April 2002, after the dramatic events of September 11, a new, broader approach to military intervention emerged. Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld updated military policy to clarify new considerations in light of military success in the war on terrorism in

43. Carl von Clausewitz, *On War*, ed. Michael Howard and Peter Paret (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1976), 87. See also Clausewitz, *The Principles of War* (Harrisburg, PA: Telegraph Press, 1942), 6.

Afghanistan.[44] Rumsfeld included eight points: 1) use all elements of national power (economic, diplomatic, financial, law enforcement, intelligence, and overt and covert military operations); 2) forces must be able to communicate and operate jointly; 3) accept help from other countries; 4) coalition warfare should not be fought by committee; 5) use prevention and preemption to take the war to the enemy; 6) rule out nothing, including ground troops; 7) place special forces on the ground early; and 8) be honest with the American people.

These doctrines show the development of policy for U.S. military intervention over the last twenty years. Each doctrine shows a distinct appreciation that military intervention must enjoy at least minimal popular support, especially for prolonged intervention. Over time, the necessity of public support became an understanding, demonstrated by the fact that Powell did not mention it. Instead, his inclusion of an end game directly speaks to the Vietnam hangover, as public support had become an underlying factor for policy. Barry Blechman and Tamara Cofman Wittes explained this important limitation to military action, in that the U.S. threat to use force is insufficient to bring compliance to its demands abroad, because everyone knows that killing Americans will drive them away.[45] It could drive them away, because the American public only tolerated a zero casualty level. A clear example of this is the media frenzy and public outcry over images of American soldiers dragged through the streets of Mogadishu in October 1993. Clinton immediately reduced the mission and withdrew as early as possible. Such hard truths present the president with a dilemma, because to achieve

44. Donald H. Rumsfeld, "Transforming the Military," *Foreign Affairs* 81, no. 3 (2002): 31–2.
45. Barry M. Blechman and Tamara Cofman Wittes, "Defining Moment: The Threat and Use of Force in American Foreign Policy," *Political Science Quarterly* 114, no. 1 (1999).

success when using force, the United States must select engagements carefully and then display staying power. The recent war on terrorism promises to change the post-Vietnam catering to public opinion, because this war is expected to be long and to generate unknown numbers of American casualties. Instead of catering to the public, Rumsfeld proposes to inform the public, but public support remains an important element in military policy.

Rumsfeld's recent reevaluation and broadening of military doctrine shows that prevailing classic definitions for intervention are too narrow for modern warfare. For example, Oliver Ramsbotham and Tom Woodhouse assert that peacekeeping is no longer a matter of self-help by states; rather it is mainly about collective response organized through the United Nations.[46] Moreover, they argue that the main role of military forces in intervention is to establish a secure environment for non-military operations such as electoral monitoring, refugee repatriation, and the distribution of humanitarian relief by civilian agencies. Issues on intervention go beyond this, however. In the wake of Somalia, humanitarian relief in situations of civil conflict has been called into question. Richard Haass provides a recent analysis of military intervention in which he concludes that relying solely on air power to wage intervention is insufficient, because ground troops are necessary to protect vulnerable populations.[47] He argues that there are four considerations in the decision to intervene, including action to prevent genocide, costs and consequences of action, availability of military partnership with others, and the likely results of alternative action or inaction. The above development of military doctrines

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46. Oliver Ramsbotham and Tom Woodhouse, *Humanitarian Intervention in Contemporary Conflict: A Reconceptualization* (Cambridge, MA: Polity Press, 1996).

47. Richard N. Haass, "The Use and Abuse of Military Force," *Brookings Policy Brief*, no. 54 (1999): 1–8.

shows a broadening of elements and considerations that cannot be ignored, because it informs decisions regarding intervention. In this dissertation, military considerations are informative to the evaluation of U.S. interests, but are insufficient to explain broader foreign policy.

FOREIGN POLICY AND INTERVENTION

The debate on foreign policy and intervention focuses on what it means to make decisions on intervention. Thus, it is concerned with a larger context than any of the above categories, and actually encompasses them and more. The policy debate on intervention examines overarching questions such as the who, whether, when, why, and how of intervention. The broader context of policy therefore must take into consideration the philosophical, legal, military, and political issues involved in any given intervention, and leads to policy on a case by case basis. For example, it would be unrealistic for the president to call for intervention without first considering ethical implications, legal limitations, international or domestic support, military capacity to perform necessary operations, or the political and historical background of each specific situation.

In the United States, the decision to intervene ultimately falls to the president. This does not mean, however, that he can intervene at will. The debate on who makes the ultimate decision regarding intervention generally revolves around the question of war powers of the president. This points out the recurring vigorous debate regarding congressional oversight and accountability of the president. If the president holds

supreme control over the nation's military, as is commonly believed,[48] then the question arises as to how that power is kept in check. James Meernik examines 458 crises between 1948 and 1988, and surprisingly concludes that there is political value in taking advantage of opportunities to use force.[49] After examining the role of international and domestic factors in American foreign policy, he consoles us that decisions to intervene are more often motivated by national interest than personal political gain. This is certainly a relief, but it raises the murky debate over what exactly is a national interest. For the purposes of this dissertation, the concept of national interest is not used, even though considerable emphasis is given to U.S. vital and peripheral interests as defined under the variable "United States interests" in Chapter III.

In making decisions about how to intervene, the president must take into consideration many different perspectives. The president is pressured from numerous directions, including those stemming from the international as well as the domestic environments. We have already explained the importance of the United Nations and international law as an example of international factors that the president must take into consideration when determining how to intervene. Within his own cabinet, though, the president is confronted with varying alternative perspectives. The Council on Foreign Relations provides an excellent illustration of these perspectives in the form of fictional memos to President Clinton from the National Security Advisor, the Secretary of State, the Secretary of Defense, and the Joint Chiefs of Staff. As each of these actors justifies

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48. See C.V. Crabb and P.M. Holt, *Invitation to Struggle: Congress, the President and Foreign Policy* (Washington, D.C.: Congressional Quarterly Press, 1980); C.F. Hermann, *Crisis in Foreign Policy* (Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill, 1969); John T. Rourke, *Congress and the Presidency in U.S. Foreign Policy Making* (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1983); and H.K. Tillema, *Appeal to Force* (New York: Thomas Crowell, 1973).

49. James Meernik, "Presidential Decision Making and the Political Use of Military Force," *International Studies Quarterly* 38, no. 1 (1994): 121–38.

their position, and recommends a different policy approach, we gain a fuller understanding of the overall issues involved in the decision-making process, because each advisor suggests a different policy.[50]

Since the end of the cold war, increased struggle within and across borders threatened to lead to far greater conflicts. Richard Haass eloquently reviews recent cases of U.S. military intervention abroad, and argues that the post-cold war era is characterized by "international deregulation," when new actors have new capabilities and alignments but lack new rules.[51] This situation increases the number of violent conflicts within and across borders. Haass concludes that in the modern world, policy on intervention reflects ongoing political and technological characteristics. The relatively recent technological development of "compellent force"[52] by "smart munitions" such as precision-guided bombs increases the political uses of force as called for by Clausewitz.[53]

THE CONTRIBUTION TO THE LITERATURE

In looking through the literature on foreign policy and intervention, the author has not found any work that specifically addresses intervention in terms of the five variables found in this study, which include the UN, allies, Congress, public opinion and the media, and U.S. interests. The approach adopted in this dissertation examines the influence of these five variables on the foreign policy decisions under Clinton. This

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50. Alton Frye, *Humanitarian Intervention: Crafting a Workable Doctrine* (New York: Council on Foreign Relations, 2000).

51. Haass, *Intervention.*

52. Compellent force is the ability to strike specific military/political targets in one location to influence behavior elsewhere. Ibid., 16.

53. This corresponds with Les Aspin's view. See "The Use and Usefulness of Military Forces in the Post-Cold War, Post-Soviet World," Address to the Jewish Institute for National Security Affairs, Washington, D.C., reprinted in Haass, *Intervention*, 207–14.

section examines Michael MacKinnon's analysis regarding foreign policy and intervention, as his work comes closest to the approach used in this dissertation.[54]

There are three main differences between our analysis and the MacKinnon examination. First, he examines the international environment by looking at the United States and the UN, but not U.S. allies. He is particularly interested in extreme policy shifts in the United States toward the UN. For example, many expected that the end of the cold war would loosen the deadlock in the UN Security Council, providing conditions for unprecedented cooperation amongst the more influential member states, but that did not exactly happen. Although President Clinton initially promised to strengthen the UN, after Somalia, he reconsidered participation in peacekeeping efforts and stepped away from assertive multilateralism. In May 1994, PDD 25 raised an obstacle to effective and timely international action, as well as to any chance of improving and strengthening the UN's operational capacity. MacKinnon's work is centrally focused on U.S.-UN relations, while this dissertation is a more broadly focused deductive study to isolate the elements of influence on decisions regarding intervention.

Second, MacKinnon's analysis is based on Roger Hilsman's "political process model," which is the basis of the bureaucratic politics model.[55] Hilsman's model offers three rings of power. The inner ring is the president and his staff, political appointees, Congress, the bureaucrats. The second ring includes interest groups and the press/ television. The outer ring includes public opinion and the electorate. These three rings

54. MacKinnon, *The Evolution of US Peacekeeping.*

55. Roger Hilsman, with Laura Gaughran and Patricia A. Weitsman, *The Politics of Policy Making in Defense and Foreign Affairs: Conceptual Models and Bureaucratic Politics*, 3rd ed. (Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice Hall, 1993).

have two outputs of power: foreign affairs and defense policy. Hilsman's model is similar to, yet different from, the analysis in this dissertation.

MacKinnon alters Hilsman's model to suit his cases more closely. MacKinnon examines four actors in the domestic environment: the executive, the bureaucracies (Department of State and Department of Defense), Congress, and public opinion. MacKinnon argues that Congress dominated the flexible Clinton administration in setting policy towards international organizations, and uses PDD 25 on U.S participation in UN peacekeeping to show the "true nature and the twisted roots of the U.S. attitude to the UN."[56] He concludes that PDD 25 was "largely the result of a self-perpetuating cycle of confrontation and conciliation played out between the White House and Congress."[57]

This dissertation differs from MacKinnon, because our analysis does not consider the bureaucracies per se, but rather considers decisions taken by the Clinton administration to encompass the president's advisors, including various ranking department heads, but not singling each out individually. Moreover, it is similar because it considers Congress and public opinion; however, it differs because in this dissertation Congress is separate from public opinion, while the media is part of it. MacKinnon does not make any specific treatment of the media. Finally, this dissertation considers U.S. interests as a launching pad for examination of foreign policy in the cases provided.

Third, while MacKinnon is specifically interested in the erratic U.S.-UN relationship regarding peacekeeping in the early post-cold war years leading up to the PDD 25, this dissertation covers a wider span of time: until the turn of the century. In short, whereas MacKinnon's work most closely resembles the analysis in this

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56. MacKinnon, *The Evolution of US Peacekeeping*, vii.
57. Ibid., 105.

dissertation, it differs significantly because it is based closely on the political process model and does not include all five variables. Thus, this dissertation contributes to the literature on foreign policy by using a holistic approach that differs from any other approach.

Overall, the current project builds upon all of the above categories in the literature on intervention, but strictly falls into none of them. The gap in the literature, filled by this dissertation, is that this approach to intervention is holistic in nature. That is, policy decisions are seen as outcomes of the interplay of various international and domestic constraints placed on presidents. In this regard, this study differs from previous work on intervention, as it is more concerned with policy making within a broader international and domestic context. At the international level, the importance of international organizations and regional allies is investigated. At the domestic level, presidential decision making is constrained by Congress in an institutional manner. This assumes that there will be bipartisan consensus against the president; however, as we have seen in recent decades, partisan divisions within Congress can weaken its ability to constrain the president. In addition, public opinion and the media can influence presidential policy decisions. Thus, this dissertation approaches U.S. foreign policy by focusing on constraints on presidential decisions to intervene, which are found in international and domestic politics.

CHAPTER III

RESEARCH DESIGN

There is no clear or convincing theory for foreign policy decisions regarding military intervention. On the whole, such decisions often seem ad hoc and are commonly made on a case-by-case basis. This study seeks to clarify patterns of interaction between five variables across three specific case studies to help us understand how decisions regarding intervention are formed and the extent to which these five variables influenced President Clinton's foreign policy decisions to resolve small-scale international crises, in the context of his stated Doctrine.

This study of the politics of intervention unfolds at the international and domestic levels, and looks at the field of foreign policy by breaking it into its component parts. This dissertation builds on the existing foreign policy literature by inquiring to what extent five specific variables impacted Clinton's foreign policy. In addition, it builds on existing foreign policy literature on intervention to define to what extent these five variables influenced the type of intervention policy that is ultimately implemented, such as inaction, diplomatic, economic, humanitarian, and military intervention. Each option is the result of a process of interaction between the five variables identified for this study. This dissertation is specifically concerned with U.S. intervention in small-scale crises, to clarify what it takes for the United States to intervene in areas of peripheral as opposed to vital interests, what type of intervention might be expected, and why.

The primary research question asks why there were such variations in the implementation of the Clinton Doctrine in Rwanda, Haiti, and East Timor. For example,

why did the United States intervene militarily in Haiti, but not in either Rwanda or East Timor? Furthermore, why did the United States provide substantial humanitarian aid to Rwanda's refugees, but not to Haiti's or East Timor's? Most of all, why did Clinton not call for military intervention to stop the genocide in Rwanda, or the civil violence against the East Timorese, when his doctrine specifically promises that he would do so whenever possible? In response to these questions, this study clarifies what is required for the United States to intervene in areas of peripheral interest. To answer the primary research question, five foreign policy variables are explored. After a review of these variables, this chapter will describe the methodology to be utilized in the dissertation.

THE VARIABLES

Nothing exists in a vacuum, and that is particularly so with American foreign policy. Scholars have worked for many years to explain the intricacies of international relations. For example, this dissertation draws on Kenneth Waltz's three main levels of analysis—the individual, the state, and the system.[1] In examining the individual level, this dissertation considers U.S. interests as defined by the Clinton administration. This analysis does not examine the individual level in terms of Clinton's personality or ideological inclination. Therefore, this study examines the way the Clinton administration explained U.S. interests, which tend, especially in the case of vital U.S. interests, to have enduring characteristics that transcend presidential administrations. For example, any U.S. president would define the Persian Gulf as a vital security interest because of its impact on regional U.S. strategic and economic interests.

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1. Kenneth N. Waltz, *Man, the State and War: A Theoretical Analysis* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1959).

This dissertation examines the relationship between the U.S. intervention and five specific sources of foreign policy, or variables. The variables in this study include U.S. interests during the Clinton administration, U.S. allies, the United Nations, the U.S. Congress, and U.S. public opinion and the media. As explained in the literature review in Chapter II, some authors approach either foreign policy or intervention by examining one or more of these variables, but this author has found no literature that examines foreign policy and intervention by analyzing the political implications of all five.

This dissertation explores the relationship between foreign policymaking under President Clinton and the extent to which foreign and domestic forces shape policy regarding U.S. intervention. Figure 1 illustrates the relationship between the variables. The process of foreign policymaking is very complex and, depending on the context and situation, the variables have different levels of importance.[2] For example, given a situation in which the variable domestic public opinion is strong enough to engage, organize lobbies, and divide elites at the decision-making level, then this variable's importance to and impact on decision making rises to the forefront of all five variables. The independent variable is U.S. interests; the intervening variables at the domestic level are the U.S. Congress, and public opinion and the media, and the intervening variables at the international level include U.S. allies and the United Nations. The dependent variable is the type of intervention policy selected.

Intervention decisions are generally made on a case-by-case basis, because the importance of each variable relative to the others may differ in each circumstance.

2. This highlights the complexity of foreign policy.



Fig. 1. Variable Flowchart*

* Note: The dashed arrows denote hypothetical feedback loops not analyzed.

Moreover, each variable does not necessarily apply consistent pressure on decision makers either throughout each case or across the case studies, nor do they always interact in a consistent manner. Thus, the interaction of these variables adds complexity to decision making for intervention. The following explanation of the variables clarifies specific application of each one in this study. This section establishes the relevance, and method of examination, measurement for each variable.

U.S. Interests under Clinton

"U.S. interests" are the independent variable in the following analysis.[3] For this dissertation, a distinction is made between vital and peripheral U.S. interests. Vital interests are the most important interests to a state's survival, and they cover security and economic issues. As explained in the literature review, under conditions of anarchy, the state's survival depends on measures of self-help. Therefore, one method to improve security is for the state to maximize stability in the international environment. There are two main methods for a state to promote international stability. One method is to enforce stability in the system through military or strategic means. A second method is for the state to maximize its financial well being as it also improves the financial well being of other states, as discussed. Thus, vital interests pertain to military, strategic, and economic policies.

Peripheral interests also affect international order, but they do not respond to existential threats to the state in the same manner as do vital interests. Peripheral

3. U.S. interests differ from U.S. national interests, which are delineated into three categories: vital (survival, safety, and vitality), important (national well-being or regional development), and humanitarian (disaster relief, violations of human rights, rule of law, joint recovery operations, development,

interests include international values, norms, principles, and laws. Values, norms, and principles have an important role in the process of stabilizing international order, because they function to bring differing countries into closer understanding with one another. If it is possible to overcome extreme differences through internalization of overarching values, norms, and principles, then it is possible to reduce the effects of international anarchy. Thus, it is in the U.S. interest to promote acceptable international values, norms, and principles in the world community, because as these spread, a greater consensus can grow. Consensus regarding values, norms, and principles makes international law possible. International law codifies values, norms, and principles in an enforceable way that improves international stability and reduces the impact of anarchy. It follows then, that it is in the U.S. interest (albeit peripherally) to establish accepted standards of international law, because they provide a basis for regulating the effects of anarchy and thus promote coherence rather than chaos in the international system. Therefore, even though international values, norms, principles, and laws do not protect the United States in the same concrete and immediate ways as military, strategic, and economic interests, they are nonetheless very important to far-reaching efforts for promoting long-term international stability. Peripheral interests are akin to the icing on the cake, while vital interests are the cake itself.

Table 1 lists reasons for some post-cold war intervention according to vital and peripheral interests. This list is instrumental in the case study selection (described below) because it provides a broad overview of real-world interventions for the independent interests with pertinent examples. Table 1 also lists the justification and examples of

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environment, and demining). See The White House, *A National Security Strategy for a Global Age* (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 2000), 4.

Table 1

Reasons for Post-Cold War Intervention

Vital Interests
Military Interests
Territorial Defense (Panama 1989, War on Terrorism 2001)
Classical Deterrence (Taiwan Straits 1996)
Strategic Interests
Terrorism (Sudan 1998, Afghanistan 1998, Afghanistan 2001)
Regional Stability
Collapsed Government (Somalia 1993, *Haiti* 1994, *Rwanda* 1994, Yugoslavia/Bosnia/Kosovo 1991–1999, *Indonesia/East Timor* 1999)
Refugees (*Rwanda* 1994, *Haiti* 1994, Bosnia 1995, Kosovo 1999, *Indonesia/East Timor* 1999)
Balance of Power (Middle East-Persian Gulf War 1991, N/S Iraq 1993)
Democratic Enlargement (Panama 1989, Somalia 1993, *Haiti* 1994)
Economic Interests
Regional Stability
(Europe-Yugoslavia/Bosnia/Kosovo 1991–1999, Middle East-N/S Iraq 1993)
Drug Trade (Panama 1989, Colombia ongoing, *Haiti* 1994)
Economic Turmoil (Somalia 1993, *Rwanda* 1994, *Haiti* 1994, *East Timor* 1998)
Peripheral Interests
Norms, Values, and Principles
Humanitarian Assistance
(Sudan 1990–1992, Somalia 1992–1993, Bosnia 1993–1995, *Rwanda* 1994, Kosovo 1999, *East Timor* 1999, Afghanistan 2002)
Nation-Building (Somalia 1993, *Haiti* 1994, *East Timor* 1999)
International Law
Violation of Sovereignty (Persian Gulf War 1991, Kosovo 1999)
Drug Trade (Panama 1989, Colombia ongoing, *Haiti* 1994)
UN WMD Inspections (Iraq 1998)
War Crimes (*Rwanda* 1994, Kosovo 1999)

intervention according to vital and peripheral interests. The cases in this study are italicized in Table 1, and fall into a variety of different categories of interests. For example, the case of Haiti is listed under vital interests in both the Strategic Interests category and the Economic Interests category, but it is also listed under Peripheral Interests both for Humanitarian Assistance and International Law.

To examine vital and peripheral interests, this section considers the implications of the post-cold war environment including collapsing states, civil conflict, and refugee flows. Many of the crises noted in Table 1 included some aspect of collapsed government. At the end of the cold war, there were a growing number of disintegrating, or collapsing, states.[4] They cease to be states because they degenerate into ungoverned territory. Collapsing states commonly experience a variety of side effects that impact the interests of other states, including democratic breakdown and human rights violations. During the process of collapse, state leadership often turns the governing apparatus against the citizenry or a portion of it. Under such circumstances, it is not at all uncommon for collapsing states to experience ethnic or religious violence that results in the flight of threatened civilians. Collapsing states often generate considerable movement of refugees and displaced persons, because the governmental control mechanisms have broken down, giving lawless marauders the opportunity to rob, brutalize, and murder other citizens.[5]

Refugee flows are demographic shifts of persons who are not allowed to return

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4. See I. William Zartman, ed., *Collapsed States: The Disintegration and Restoration of Legitimate Authority* (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 1997).

5. John D. Steinbrunner explains this phenomenon in *Principles of Global Security* (Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution Press, 2000), 141–2.

home. Nana Poku and David Graham confirm that since the end of the cold war, there has been a broadening of the term "security" in developed countries to include threats from refugees, asylum seekers, forced migrations, and undocumented migrants, with special emphasis on those from less developed countries.[6] Receiving countries often view refugees as problems for multiple reasons: they can challenge existing patterns of political representation, drain the economy, damage the environment, threaten law and order, introduce health risks, become terrorists, alter the existing cultural composition, and dilute national identity.[7] As a result, refugees may not be welcome. Alejandro Portes and Rubén Rumbaut explain that immigration without assimilation can lead to ethnic solidarity.[8] This situation can increase domestic political concerns, especially for politicians who have large sub-populations as constituencies. Political concerns of this type were seen in Florida, for example, with the arrival of Haitian refugees. More importantly, large numbers of refugees sometimes use refugee camps as a base to organize and militarize. Such conditions generated a great deal of regional instability for Rwanda's neighbors, especially Zaire and Burundi. Moreover, once organized and militarized, refugees may invade their country of origin to gain power, as was also seen in Rwanda.

Rainer Muenz and Myron Weiner argue that the end of the cold war gave many citizens of less developed countries the opportunity for "reducing unemployment, earning remittances, and reducing demographic pressure" by migrating to more developed

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6. Nana Poku and David T. Graham, *Redefining Security: Population Movements and National Security* (Westport, CT: Praeger, 1998).

7. For more about types of threats presented by refugees, see Mark J. Miller, "International Migration and Global Security," chap. 2 in *Redefining Security*, Poku and Graham.

8. Alejandro Portes and Rubén G. Rumbaut, *Immigrant America: A Portrait*, 2nd ed. (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1996), 138.

countries, especially to Western Europe or the United States.[9] Myron Weiner lists three reasons why migration has been on the rise since the end of the cold war: there is more conflict within states themselves; modern conflicts produce more refugees than previously; and clusters of countries that drive away refugees form "bad neighborhoods."[10]

There are three typical responses to mass migration observed in the receiving countries. First, countries can introduce restrictive border regimes and immigration laws to limit undesired mass migration. Second, they might develop preventive or interventionist strategies against the countries of origin. This may be either by non-violent means, such as sanctions, or by the use of force. Third, as a humanitarian gesture, they may accept a number of the migrants, but reject others. There is occasionally a positive impact of refugees on the receiving country, in that they sometimes provide cheap, skilled labor. In the recent past, however, refugee migration has significantly contributed to regional instability, and was the case in Haiti, Rwanda, and East Timor.

Barry Posen cites other methods to stem migration once it is already under way.[11] Long-term private sector solutions, such as trade and foreign investment, require a great deal of patience and have few short-term affects. Such remedies have many problems, due to the lack of financial security found in politically unstable regions. Governments, however, can bring about short-term results through aid. The trouble with foreign aid,

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9. Rainer Muenz and Myron Weiner, eds., *Migrants, Refugees, and Foreign Policy: U.S. and German Policies toward Countries of Origin* (Providence: Berghahn Books, 1997), vii.

10. Myron Weiner, "Bad Neighbors, Bad Neighborhoods," in *Migrants, Refugees, and Foreign Policy: U.S. and German Policies toward Countries of Origin*, ed. Rainer Muenz and Myron Weiner, (Providence: Berghahn Books, 1997), 208.

11. Barry Posen, "Can Military Intervention Limit Refugee Flows?" in *Migrants, Refugees, and Foreign Policy: U.S. and German Policies toward Countries of Origin*, ed. Rainer Muenz and Myron Weiner, (Providence: Berghahn Books, 1997), 273–322.

however, is that it may be rerouted to corrupted bank accounts with few desired results, as occurred in Indonesia under Suharto.

In sum, collapsing states commonly threaten vital interests of other states, including military, strategic, and economic interests, because internal instability caused by a collapsing government threatens to spill civil turmoil into the larger region, and threatens regional stability. Refugee movement is an indicator of severe dysfunction in a state. Alan Dowty and Gil Loescher argue that it is the responsibility of other states to intervene to restore order, lest hordes of refugees requiring care invade other countries. As a result, "grievous human rights abuses are not an internal matter when neighboring states must bear the cost of repression by having refugees forced on them."[12] Thus, the importance of international stability can override the right of sovereignty, as other states have not only an interest but also a responsibility to intervene to stop civil turmoil and violence, since they trigger refugee movements that can result in areas where they gather to organize and militarize. The importance of this variable on Clinton's foreign policy is estimated by examination of speeches, interviews, and other statements.

U.S. Allies

Theoretical patterns of international interaction rooted in balance of power politics explain that alliances are an outgrowth of self-help interaction between states that are seeking to survive in an anarchic international environment in which less powerful states join to balance more powerful threatening states.[13] As explained earlier, conditions

12. Alan Dowty and Gil Loescher, "Refugee Flows as Grounds for International Action," *International Security* 21, no. 1 (1996): 59.

13. See Stephen M. Walt, *The Origins of Alliances* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1987).

of anarchy exist in the absence of government, laws, police, and sense of community. Without these, there is no regulation either at the individual, state, or international level. This variable considers patterns of interaction formed between the United States and other friendly countries, or allies.

Alliances are formal or informal arrangements between states that share common aims to overcome anarchy, and are aimed principally at security and military concerns. Alliances demonstrate the willingness of states to cooperate and make mutual commitments to act to protect each other under threatening situations. During the first post-cold war decade, there was an increase and then a marked decrease in the U.S. willingness to perform unilateral operations abroad, as the absence of the bipolar international environment no longer regulated the actions of states of all sizes. This unwillingness partly stems from the importance placed on multilateral coalitions.

The Gulf War launched the post-cold war era with a dramatic example of American commitment to working in a coalition of allies. In this respect, the Gulf War set the tone of U.S. operations by providing a stellar example of successful coalition operations, which proved that coalitions increase legitimacy and authority. When Iraq violated Kuwait's sovereignty, the United States led the coalition to send the message that international law is indeed enforceable. A country's intervention in the internal affairs of another country can be especially controversial because it challenges this most important international principle upholding the post-Westphalian international order. It is wise for leaders to seek the support of allies, because there is greater legitimacy in numbers. Riding this wave of multilateral success, the Clinton administration for a time brought into the White House an unprecedented air of

assertive multilateralism that reflected a new American vision of international cooperation.

For this study, U.S. allies are U.S.-friendly countries or regional international organizations that played an important role in a crisis and thereby exercised some influence on the U.S. decision regarding whether, how, or when to intervene. In the case of Rwanda, for example, France unilaterally intervened to create a safe haven, thereby relieving the United States of responsibility to act. In Haiti, regional OAS members spearheaded economic and political pressure on the insurgents, and worked with the UN and the United States to reinstate democracy. Haiti's neighbors cooperated in shutting down trade and crippling the Haitian economy. In East Timor, regional actors such as Australia took on a critical function by intervening, again relieving the United States of the responsibility. Thus, in all three crises, U.S. allies were instrumental in the developments and resolution of the crisis. This dissertation examines how the allies' position and actions during such crises contributed to Clinton's decisions regarding intervention. The influence of U.S. allies on Clinton's foreign policy is estimated by examining the actions and declarations from U.S. allies or regional international organizations that had an integral association with the crisis at hand. Patterns in the relationship between U.S. and allied actions are included in this examination, to assess the influence of U.S. allies over Clinton's decisions.

The United Nations

The examination of the United Nations is based on the same grounds as the above examination of alliances, and is treated in a similar fashion. Even though the UN is not a

world government, it does function to ameliorate anarchy, because it provides a forum for dialog aimed at resolving disputes and designing the type of world that is most acceptable to its members. Thus, the UN, through consensus, legitimates international laws and authorizes policing of those laws, even though the United States does not intervene every time the United Nations mandates it. In addition, the UN provides a collecting place for world leaders to get to know one another and thereby increases a sense of international understanding and community. This dissertation examines UN actions to ascertain the influence these activities exerted over U.S. foreign policy decisions regarding intervention in our three specified cases.

The end of the cold war released the UN Security Council from deadlock between the Soviet Union and the United States, making it difficult to form a UN consensus regarding the relationship between sovereignty and community.[14] The post-cold war era was a time of heightened international nervousness, in which disturbances in the international system, even in small countries, generated a wave of instability throughout the world. Richard Haass aptly calls this post-cold war environment "international deregulation."[15] The mission of the United Nations continued to facilitate the peaceful resolution of differences between members and to provide a forum for interaction between nations and peoples.

The UN role thus took on added significance in the post-cold war environment, and made possible new international norms. Such norms included a deeper understanding of the relationship between internal political crisis and international

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14. See Michael J. Glennon, "Sovereignty and Community after Haiti: Rethinking the Collective Use of Force," *American Journal of International Law* 89, no. 1 (1995): 70.

15. Haass, *Intervention*, 5.

security. Norms promoted a wider acceptance of UN authority to impose mandatory sanctions on countries that threaten international security. Moreover, the UN was the only international body equipped with the legitimacy and credibility to mandate international military action in crises. The precedent was set during the Persian Gulf War for the UN to authorize military intervention in a country that threatens peace. For example, despite reservations voiced by important members such as China and India, the OAS convinced the UN to impose sanctions on Haiti, even before the United States decided on a course of action.

The Clinton administration's response to each crisis was not independent of other countries around the world; in part, it varied because of the UN influence. This study considers the development of UN support for intervention of each crisis. The United Nations pressured the United States to increase support for peacekeeping operations and succeeded, until October 1993. As already explained, after Somalia, Clinton's PDD 25 "all but ruled out U.S. participation in, and perhaps even support for, UN-led peace-enforcement operations."[16]

The influence of this variable on Clinton's foreign policy is estimated by reviewing Security Council resolutions during each crisis, as well as events and activities surrounding or involving the UN Security Council. Consensus within the UN regarding intervention in another country is an important variable for determining U.S. foreign policy, because UN backing legitimizes intervention. This is because the UN is comprised of members from throughout the world and places onerous pressure to conform on members. Thus, the UN legitimizes intervention policies because they are

16. MacKinnon, *The Evolution of U.S. Peacekeeping*, 115.

brought before the General Assembly and the Security Council, debated, and documented in a legal and transparent fashion. This is important because the more an issue is debated, the more it is legitimated. Kepplinger, Brosius, and Staab argue that the more frequently recipients are confronted with one side of an adversarial argument, the more likely they will adopt that point of view and thus strengthen that position.[17] Countries with grievances can defend themselves and possibly gain international support. This occurred, for example, in the establishment of Israel in 1948, and more recently in the case of East Timor. However, the very essence of intervention violates sovereignty: it is an act of war that can cause many complications, as demonstrated in the case of Indonesia's occupation and annexation of East Timor. Therefore, any state that wishes to intervene in the internal affairs of another state for any reason should first seek a UN blessing. Such UN mandates commonly specify conditions of the intervention, as occurred with France in Rwanda, the United States in Haiti, and Australia in East Timor, and they lay the ground rules for the operation.

In this dissertation, UN policies, mandates, and actions influence the U.S. policy-making process regarding intervention, because without its legitimization through collective mandates, any intervention would be problematic. This speaks to the concept that the United States needed UN support for intervention, and therefore had to generate support in the UN. One problem with this variable however, is that the United States sits on the UN Security Council, which means that this decision making may be circular rather than causal. This having been said, this dissertation examines how the UN contributed to Clinton's decisions regarding intervention during each crisis. Analysis of

17. H.M. Kepplinger, H.B. Brosius, and J.F. Staab, "Opinion Formation in Mediated Conflicts and Crises: A Model of Cognitive-Affective Media Effects," *International Journal of Public Opinion Research*,

the UN examines Security Council resolutions about each crisis. These resolutions are credible indications of the intent and actions of the most influential UN body. As applicable, the relations between the United States and the UN are included in this examination to establish the influence of the UN on Clinton's decisions regarding intervention.

The U.S. Congress

The U.S. Congress is one of the three institutions of democratic power in the United States. It shares power with the executive and judiciary. Congress is a powerful institutional force that every president must work with to forge successful policies. The literature regarding the president and the Congress is divided between two schools of thought.[18] First, the "two presidencies" theory suggests that "while often frustrated in the sphere, . . . presidents do not fail on any major foreign policy initiatives."[19] Whereas this argument has been shown faulty in recent history, it did pave the way for a better understanding of the fact that the president tends to experience more congressional support in foreign affairs than in domestic initiatives. Second, there are those who

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no. 3 (1991): 132–56.

18. There is considerable literature regarding this topic. See, for example, Lance T. LeLoup and Steven A. Shull, *The President and Congress: Collaboration and Combat in National Policymaking* (Boston: Allyn and Bacon, 1999); Thomas E. Cronin, "A Resurgent Congress and the Imperial Presidency," *Political Science Quarterly* 95, no. 2 (1980): 209–37; Douglas Foyle, "Public Opinion and Foreign Policy: Elite Beliefs as a Mediating Variable," *International Studies Quarterly* 41, no. 1 (1997): 141–69; Eugene R. Wittkopf, *Congress and the Politics of U.S. Foreign Policy* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1994); James McCormick, "Decision Making in the Foreign Affairs and Foreign Relations Committees," in *Congress Resurgent: Foreign and Defense Policy on Capitol Hill*, ed. Randall B. Ripley and James M. Lindsay (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1993); James L. Sundquist, *Beyond Gridlock? Prospects for Governance in the Clinton Years—and After* (Washington, D.C.: Brookings, 1993); and Gerald Feliz Warburg, *Conflict and Consensus: The Struggle between Congress and the President over Foreign Policymaking* (New York: Harper & Row, 1989).

19. See, for example, Aaron Wildavsky, "The Two Presidencies," *Trans-Action*, no. 4 (December 1966): 7–14; and Jeffrey E. Cohen, "A Historical Reassessment of Wildavsky's 'Two Presidencies'

believe that partisan voting in Congress impacts foreign as well as domestic policy.[20] Brandon Prins and Bryan Marshall, for example, state that "it is evident that post-cold war congressional decision making on issues relating to the president's foreign policy agenda have become increasingly characterized by less congressional consensus and greater partisanship."[21] In this dissertation, legislative voting is the measure for this variable.

Clinton's early months in office were marred by several political battles. For example, his nomination of Zoe Baird to Attorney General failed because she had illegally hired a nanny and failed to pay social security. In addition, his early fight over gay rights in the military hit Clinton especially hard with opposition from Congress. Topping it all off, his defeat on the health bill came on the eve of the 1994 midterm election. Not long after Clinton came to office there was a congressional Republican resurgence, in the midterm election of 1994. For a period of time, the administration "remained in a state of shock, having lost its footing and confidence as a result of the midterm election."[22] Thus, opposition in the 104th Congress played a large role in moderating Clinton's policies.

The Clinton White House was domestically oriented and was careful about raising political costs at home by appearing to refuse to work with Congress on foreign policy initiatives abroad. For example, Michael MacKinnon argues that PDD 25 resulted from a

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Thesis," in *The Two Presidencies: A Quarter Century Assessment*, ed. Steven A. Shull (Chicago: Nelson-Hall, 1991), 3.

20. See, for example, Richard Fleisher, Jon R. Bond, Blen S. Krutz, and Stephen Hanna, "The Demise of the Two Presidencies," *American Politics Quarterly* 28, no. 1 (2000): 3–25.

21. Brandon C. Prins and Bryan W. Marshall, "Congressional Support of the President: A Comparison of Foreign, Defense, and Domestic Policy Decision Making During and After the Cold War," *Presidential Studies Quarterly* 31, no. 4 (2001): 672.

22. William C. Berman, *From the Center to the Edge: The Politics and Policies of the Clinton Presidency* (Oxford, England: Rowman & Littlefield, 2001), 46.

perpetual cycle of confrontation between the Congress and the White House, in which it seemed that "the harder Congress pushed, the more pliable the Executive appeared to be."[23] PDD 25 is an example of how Clinton's flexibility in bargaining was a great asset. PDD 25 "was designed to avoid any future confrontations with Congress over U.S. support of a UN mission, or participation in such a mission," not to strengthen peacekeeping.[24] Along these lines, PDD 25 "was directed and formulated based on the self-interested, political calculations of what the Clinton administration believed was necessary to appease hostile congressional positions."[25]

Congress retains a considerable measure of *de facto* control over the approval or denial of any proposed mission because it controls funding for the annual Department of Defense budget. This forces the executive to make funding requests for each individual case as it arises. In this way, Congress is able to maintain checks and balances on foreign policy, regardless of whether the UN gives its go-ahead to intervene. MacKinnon concludes, "domestic politics have led the United States to become a 'self-restrained' power."[26]

Apparent inaction in Congress results in part from differentiated roles of the executive and legislative branches. Michael Smith argues that the executive and legislature reached a stalemate during the twentieth century, contributing to "a situation in which each side depends on the other when committing the United States to a major

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23. MacKinnon, *The Evolution of US Peacekeeping*, 105.
24. Ibid., 106.
25. Ibid., xviii.
26. For more on this argument see Stanley R. Sloan, *The United States and the Use of Force in the Post-Cold War World: Toward Self-Restraint?* CRS 94–581 S, Washington D.C.: Congressional Research Service, 20 July 1994, 16–17. For similar views see Thomas L. Friedman, "Theory vs. Practice: Clinton's Stated Foreign Policy Turns into More Modest 'Self-Containment,'" *New York Times*, 1 October 1993, A3.

military operation."[27] Smith explains that this stalemate between the president and the Congress has led to a bifurcation in the roles of each institution. The president "provides energy and expediency in ordering forces overseas, acts as the highest level in the chain of command when forces are actually engaged, and serves as the focal point for U.S. interests on the world stage."[28] Philip Trimble argues that the president has greater legitimacy, based on a greater constituency than is found in Congress.[29] Indeed, says Trimble, due to the president's accountability to this greater constituency base, the president has more authority to exercise his right to use force than the Congress has the authority to require him to petition it for permission. The Congress serves as a forum for intense debate and provides support for U.S. forces sent abroad. As a result of their shared power, these two bodies are forced into a bargaining situation that often influences presidential decisions during foreign crises.

In this study, Congress has the capacity to impact foreign policy because it has the authority to question long-term military intervention. Thus, if the president anticipates that a particular intervention may last longer than the sixty days allowed by the war powers resolution, then he must be cognizant of, and consider the views in, Congress. Thus, there is less congressional oversight in the short term, but intervention in crisis is often a longer-term affair than sixty days. Without congressional approval of foreign policy decisions, the president would still run into roadblocks in implementing policy, including crisis situations when the president's popularity tends to rise.

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27. Michael Smith, "Congress, The President, and the Use of Military Force: Cooperation or Conflict in the Post-Cold War Era?" *Presidential Studies Quarterly* 28, no. 1 (1998): 51.

28. Ibid.

29. Phillip R. Trimble, "The President's Constitutional Authority to use Limited Military Force," *American International Journal of Law* 89, no. 1 (1995): 84–87.

The president must remain attuned to views in Congress to determine whether or not he has support for his policy agenda. If he does not, then he may wish to act to persuade Congress to support him. Congress, for example, could deny funding for military operations that it finds unnecessary or unappealing, as occurred in the East Timor crisis, when it cut off military aid to Indonesia. The president's awareness at the outset of a crisis that Congress does not support intervention will impact his decision. Under such circumstances, the president may be required to bargain for support and take a different approach, such as appealing for public support.[30] Thus, the case study analyses here consider the orientation of the Congress to be a vital element in shaping foreign policy.

The evaluation of congressional debate on intervention is important because the more an issue is discussed, the more important it becomes in the minds of the discussants. If a crisis is of high importance, then the consensus regarding intervention policies should be clearly delineated. In this study, the level of support in Congress for U.S. policy on intervention is established by determining the extent to which Congress pressured the president on foreign policy. A review of congressional debates regarding intervention should reveal what type of approach Congress is willing to support. There are two measures of support in Congress for intervention. First, this study examines resolutions on each crisis to uncover the formal decision on each case. Whenever possible, evaluation of votes should clarify partisan politics impacting each resolution. Second, consideration of the debate surrounding intervention for each case should outline the

30. Since Neustadt's seminal study, others have written on the bargaining president including: Aaron Wildavsky, *The Politics of the Budgetary Process* (Boston: Little, Brown, 1964); Graham Allison, *The Essence of Decision: Explaining the Cuban Missile Crisis* (New York: Harper Collins, 1987); Hugh Heclo,

specific issues involved in the congressional decision. Thus, an exploration of committee and subcommittee hearings should include the number of committee and subcommittee hearings, and highlight efforts made by members of Congress to influence the president's decisions regarding each crisis. This research should reveal the extent of support in Congress for intervention in each case as well as overview the issues.

Public Opinion and the Media

This section examines the role of public opinion and the media in foreign policy decision making. There are three specific factors to consider regarding public opinion: the relationship between the president and public opinion, the role of public opinion polls in the decision-making process, and the impact of the media in crisis situations. For its part, the media plays three vital roles in the relationship between the president and public opinion: to relay the president's message, to educate or inform both the president and the public, and as a lobby to elites for the public. Since the media is so flexible, it is important for the president to "manage" the media carefully.

First, we shall examine the relationship between the president and public opinion. The president of the United States receives power from popular support. Yet, as Robert Dallek points out, the president holds an elected position and public opinion also has power to pressure him.[31] In this respect, President Clinton was well known for his domestic orientation. Since the president is theoretically accountable to the public for

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The Government of Strangers (Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution, 1977); and Nelson W. Polsby, *Consequences of Party Reform* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1983).

31. Robert Dallek, *The American Style of Foreign Policy: Cultural Politics and Foreign Affairs* (New York: Knopf, 1983).

making policy that will not harm them, there has been extensive analysis of the relationship between the president and public opinion.[32]

Shapiro and Jacobs, for example, examined the pattern of elite[33] responsiveness to public opinion, and concluded that interest groups and partisan politics substantially drive policy decisions.[34] They show that developments in the relationship peaked during the Vietnam War and have declined since then.[35] Prior to World War I, it was thought that elites in Congress or the executive drove policy. After World War II, it was thought that public opinion increasingly drove policy. These findings correspond to the debate on the Almond-Lippmann consensus.[36] Holsti explains that World War I led to the belief that public opinion impacts foreign policy, but that World War II led to the Almond-Lippmann consensus, wherein the elites drive foreign policy. However, the Vietnam War led to refutation of the Almond-Lippmann consensus. Thus, democratic responsiveness rose after 1934, peaked in the 1970s, and has declined since.

There is, however, a natural balance in this relationship between the president and

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32. For an overview of the debate on whether public opinion impacts policy making, see Bruce Russett, *Controlling the Sword: The Democratic Governance of National Security* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1990); Benjamin Page and Robert Shapiro, *The Rational Public: Fifty Years of Trends in Americans' Policy Preferences* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1991); John Aldrich, John Sullivan, and Eugene Borgida, "Foreign Affairs and Issue Voting: Do Presidential Candidates Waltz before a Blind Audience?" *American Political Science Review*, no. 83 (1989); and Robert Shapiro and Lawrence Jacobs, "The Relationship between Public Opinion and Public Policy: A Review," in *Political Behavior Annual*, vol. 2, ed.. Samuel Long (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1989).

33. For an excellent examination of the elite in America, see Thomas R. Dye, *Who's Running America: The Bush Restoration*, 7th ed. (Upper Saddle River, NJ: Prentice Hall, 2002).

34. Robert Y. Shapiro and Lawrence R. Jacobs, "Source Material: Presidents and Polling: Politicians, Pandering, and the Study of Democratic Responsiveness," *Presidential Studies Quarterly* 31, no. 1 (2001): 150–67.

35. Ole R. Holsti, "Public Opinion and Foreign Policy: Challenges to the Almond-Lippmann Consensus Mershon Series: Research Programs and Debates," *International Studies Quarterly* 36, no. 4 (1996): 439–66.

36. For an excellent analysis of the Almond -Lippmann consensus, see Maxine Isaacs, "Two Different Worlds: The Relationship between Elite and Mass Opinion on American Foreign Policy," *Political Communication* 15, no. 3 (1998): 323–45; and Lawrence Jacobs and Robert Shapiro, "Lyndon Johnson, Vietnam, and Public Opinion: Rethinking Realist Theory of Leadership," *Political Science Quarterly* 29, no. 3 (1999): 592–616.

public opinion. If this balance goes too far in either direction, the other operates to pull it back into balance. For example, lobby and interest groups form in response to unresolved issues and thereby function to balance the responsiveness of elites to public opinion. Accordingly, if public opinion is excessively ignored by decision-making elites, then the public will begin to be engaged, and apply pressure on Congress. Once Congress responds to public pressure, it will in turn place pressure of its own on the president. Therefore, once public opinion is engaged it is transformed into a lobby of sorts, threatening the elite decision-making apparatus with internal division that alters the balance of power between decision makers and bureaucracies. It is at this critical juncture that public opinion begins to impact the decision-making process, because it gains access to representatives, infiltrating the ranks of the elite decision makers to generate a shift in policy.

If the president wishes to maintain a cohesive administration while having a relatively free hand in foreign policy, he must hold a finger on the pulse of American public opinion to know if it remains moderate and steady. There is a distinction to be made between public opinion and public mood. Public opinion is dynamic, but public mood tends to remain static for a period of time. James Stimson describes the public mood as a cyclical process whereby the public strives for moderate policies.[37] Based on a normal distribution, public mood might enjoy rhetorical extremes, but the electorate

37. James A. Stimson, *Public Opinion in America: Moods, Cycles, and Swings*, 2nd ed. (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1999).

patterns indicate that the public prefers moderate policies.[38] This cycle bears out in the ever present shifting between conservatism and liberalism, because the public constantly seeks the middle but is only presented with a two-party system and therefore must either lean left or right.

Clinton keenly evaluated public mood. He knew that the public wanted to hear that America supported humanitarian good deeds (mood), but would only pay for such policy to a point (opinion). The public will not support a long drawn out and involved war because costs are too high and quickly become extreme. This understanding aided Clinton in forming moderate policies that found rhetorical favor with the public. Looking at this from another angle, as long as public opinion remains steady and moderate, there is little reason for it to organize a lobby to impact the president's decisions and the president will maintain relatively greater freedom—moderately speaking, of course. Thus, if the president has steady public support, or even disinterest for his policies, he has a better position vis-à-vis representatives in Congress.[39] This is especially true when the president must sell a moderate policy in the face of extreme voices in Congress.

Second, the president uses polls for two important but very different purposes. On one hand, the president uses polls to ascertain what types of rhetoric would find favor with the public. Polls are thus important for informing how the president should best formulate explanations of policy. Knowing how to talk to the public is critical at times of crisis, when the president must call for some action that may not find favor among the

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38. Philip Converse was the first to argue that the normal distribution for public opinion is problematic, because aggregate public opinion does not reflect coherent attitudes, since foreign policy is far too complex and remote. See Philip Converse, "The Nature of Belief Systems in Mass Publics," in *Ideology and Discontent*, ed. David Apter (New York: Free Press, 1964); and John Zaller, *The Nature and Origins of Mass Opinion* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992), esp. chap. 5.

public at large. The president must generate sufficient public support, if not prior to intervention, then soon afterward, before there is time for a lobby or interest group to form. Otherwise, Congress could invoke the War Powers Resolution; this was one of the most powerful lessons of the Vietnam War. After Vietnam, to avoid domestic or international resistance or hindrance to U.S. policy, foreign policy decision favoring intervention may need to be "sold" to the public.

Selling foreign policy means that there should be a solid rationale for decisions, and this requires careful use of rhetoric to explain goals and expectations.[40] If the president is to generate public support, it is imperative that his message makes its way intact to the public, Congress, and international audiences if at all possible. Press Secretary McCurry and his colleagues were "engaged in a daily struggle to control the agenda, to seize the public's attention, however fleetingly, for Clinton's wide-ranging initiatives. They had to package the presidency in a way that people would buy the product."[41] Presidential rhetoric during crisis is "about the creation of stable contextual frames through which to view the event and justify any action taken in response to the event."[42]

The president's ability to sell his policy makes the public more likely to accept or support a policy that could affect and displease large numbers of citizens. This was seen

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39. See Samuel Kernell, *Going Public: New Strategies of Presidential Leadership* (Washington, D.C.: Congressional Quarterly Inc., 1997), 3; and Richard Neustadt, *Presidential Power* (New York: John Wiley and Sons, 1980).

40. John Maltese examines the White House Office of Communications from Nixon to Bush and concludes that a modern president must communicate goals, achievements and agendas directly to the public or indirectly through the press. See John Anthony Maltese, *Spin Control: The White House Office of Communications and the Management of Presidential New* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1992).

41. Howard Kurtz, *Spin Cycle: How the White House and the Media Manipulate the News* (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1998), xv.

42. Kuypers, *Presidential Crisis Rhetoric*, 195.

in the U.S. involvement in Somalia. Many in the United States saw little reason for an intervention in that country. The president's explanation emphasized the need to reduce human suffering and increase democracy abroad. On 26 February 1993, he said, "we must challenge the changes now engulfing our world toward America's enduring objectives of peace and prosperity, of democracy and human dignity."[43] Such an explanation said little about U.S. strategic interests in the region, but it did resonate well with American beliefs and values based in liberal democracy. Thus, in Somalia, the president was able to promote public support for intervention by using a rhetoric that spoke to the American identity.

Public opinion that fails to engage has a lower probability of generating a lobby in Congress. As a result, when public opinion shifts, attentive decision makers in Congress tend to shift as well. As this occurs, attentive representatives are more likely to lobby the president on behalf of the public. As a result, there would be increased debate and opposition to policy that counters public opinion. As a result, it is important for the president to understand what the public wants to hear, so that he can use rhetoric to enunciate policy in ways that will appeal to the public, even when the content of the message is not what the public wants to hear. By doing so, the president can reduce the chances that public opinion will initiate a shift in Congress to oppose the president's policy. Thus, the president has more latitude to operate. It is beyond the scope of this dissertation to examine the polls in terms of informative rhetoric.

The president also uses polls to examine public levels of policy receptivity. As explained above, it is important for the president to know the extent to which his policy

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43. Alvin Z. Rubinstein, Albina Shayevich, and Boris Zlotnikov, eds., *The Clinton Foreign Policy Reader: Presidential Speeches with Commentary* (Armonk, NY: M.E. Sharpe, 2000), 9.

direction differs from the sway of public opinion. This is so that he can take steps to moderate public opinion before it begins to engage and assert influence or opposition to preferred policy. All modern presidents take polls, but in the Clinton administration "they were virtually a religion."[44] Whenever "Clinton went before the press to argue this or that position, he was, in most cases, leading where he knew the public would follow."[45] This approach is part of managing the media in the modern age.[46] By polling the public, the president remains alert to the public opinion, and can take action as necessary to explain policies to the public. In this way, the president is motivated not only to maintain acceptable policies, but also to stay one step ahead of the public in forming policy. In this study, poll data are examined to establish levels of public acceptance and support for intervention.

Third, the media plays a vital role in the U.S. democratic system. While the term "media" is often used in the literature, it is not a monolithic entity and in fact encompasses a variety of media outlets, including television broadcasting, newsprint, magazines, and increasingly today, the internet.[47] This study primarily examines the role of the elite print media (i.e., the *New York Times* and the *Washington Post*) in shaping public opinion and covering the crises we examine. To assess the impact of the media, several methods can be explored.[48] First, we can count the number and length of articles or broadcasts on a particular issue or event to establish the extent of coverage. Second,

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44. Kurtz, *Spin Cycle*, 203.
45. Ibid., 204.
46. For an examination of varying ways that presidents from Franklin Roosevelt to George Herbert Walker Bush used to interact with the media, see Mary E. Stuckey, *The President as Interpreter-in-Chief* (Chatham, NJ: Chatham House Publishers Inc., 1991).
47. For more about the mass media in the political process, see Doris A. Graber, *Mass Media and American Politics*, 6th edition (Washington, D.C.: Congressional Quarterly Inc., 2002).
48. See John T. Woolley, "Using Media-Based Data in Studies of Politics," *American Journal of Political Science* 44, no. 1 (2000): 156–73.

we can calculate the number of times a particular word or phrase is used in articles or broadcasts, such as "ethnic cleansing" or "genocide." Third, we can examine the ideological slant of particular news firms, to establish the extent a newspaper favors a more liberal or conservative position. The extent to which a newspaper might favor a more liberal or conservative position inherently shapes what is considered newsworthy and how a given event is depicted. This study did not intend to and does not provide a highly quantified measure of this variable, but it does examine the elite newspapers along these lines.

In an ideal democracy, the media is the gatekeeper for the public good; unfortunately, however, this is not always true in practice. The media can remain neutral, work for the president, inform the president and the public, or even represent the public as an informal sort of lobby. This dissertation considers the media as an intervening variable that is an essential part of the political process. Here, the media is an intervening variable because the government recognizes that information is power and therefore routinely works to manipulate the press as an instrument of national power.

If the media endorses the message of the president, it can diminish the ability of the public to engage elite attention. The media can, however, encourage or enflame public opinion to produce a lobby, by pointing out flaws in the administration's policies or actions. If the president manages the media well, he may enjoy their endorsement, making it less likely to either enflame public opinion or allow it to publicize anti-administration items.

The media plays a critical role because the president relies on it to relay his

message to the American public and to the world at large.[49] Since John F. Kennedy, the importance of the media has grown in the White House. President Richard Nixon, for example, was the first president to have a White House Office of Communications that was dedicated to developing good media relations. President Ronald Reagan was the first modern president to fully utilize the power of the media available to the executive. White House insider David Gergen reveals a "chaotic" White House under the Clinton administration; however it was one that paid close attention to relations with the media.[50]

Today, it is expected that the White House generates news of the day stories, which keep the executive in a positive light and set the tone for media relations. An example is the rally-around-the-president phenomenon that frequently occurs during crisis situations.[51] This characteristic of the media stems from the idea that in a liberal democracy, the U.S. government provides the media with reliable and credible news. This leaves the government to set the course of media relations, as explained by Timothy Cook, via a "fourth institutional branch" of political government.[52]

The media is important to the president as a conduit of information both to and from the White House. It can tell the president about powerful undercurrents in America that could threaten the president's agenda. Thus, despite official efforts to manipulate the news, the media retains the potential to turn against policy makers in Washington in situations where public opinion becomes extreme and begins to use the media to lobby

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49. For discussion of various strategies on how a president might gain and maintain popular support, see Samuel Kernell, *Going Public*, Chapter 7.

50. David Gergen, *Eyewitness to Power: The Essence of Leadership, Nixon to Clinton* (New York: Simon and Schuster, 2000), 292.

51. For an explanation of how the rally-round-the-flag phenomenon works, see Matthew A. Baum, "The Constituent Foundations of the Rally-Round-the-Flag Phenomenon," *International Studies Quarterly* 46, no. 2 (2002): 263–98.

52. Timothy E. Cook, *Governing with the News: The News Media as a Political Institution* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1998).

elites. News reporting is an essential element for democracy, because the press "plays a major role in rendering opposition effective."[53] The media is a tool for educating the public on important matters that it would otherwise be unlikely to learn about. It is also a mouthpiece for public opposition, and thereby becomes a lobby and can impact elite decision makers by generating division among them.

The media works as a constraint on the president because it speeds up time. For example, Clinton knew that intervention must have an end strategy that is not too far in the future, because the public expects to see results quickly and is reluctant to see American boys put into harm's way for an extended period. For example, when the public saw images of American soldiers as victims of brutality, it reduced support and increased opposition for the intervention to the point that elites challenged policy. For fear of a public backlash, Clinton withdrew U.S. participation from Somalia operations within six months. As a result, the media played a large role in the U.S. entry into and exit from Somalia. Clinton's retreat from the press was prompted by the "CNN effect," which "suggests that policy makers only respond when there are scenes of mass starvation on the evening news. It also suggests that policy makers obtain most of their information about ongoing disaster from media reports."[54] While the direct influence of the CNN effect on the president is overstated, it can have a mobilizing effect on the public.

Therefore, the media can become an actor in and of itself, as images and stories are used to make a profit in a competitive environment. Recent examples include media

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53. Leon V. Sigal, *Reporters and Officials: The Organization and Politics of Newsmaking* (Lexington, MA: Lexington Books, 1973), 193.

photos of atrocities that generated revulsion in the American public. Images of suffering or atrocities are highly influential on shaping public opinion in favor of finding a remedy, even in cases where they are misleading.[55] The public just does not want to see horrible images on TV, and policy makers are therefore pressured to do something about the problem. In such cases, by showing the atrocities—for whatever reason—the media becomes an influencing factor in the policy-making process.

The media often puts its own spin on the news. There has been considerable research on what is called "indexing" in media reporting.[56] Indexing refers to the extent to which the news staff adheres to a particular point of view in news reports, be that official, public, or their own. Indexing could prove important in cases where the administration's activities are explained with an underlying or overt spin. It is unclear whether indexing actually impacts public opinion regarding the president and policy; however it holds the potential to do so because it represents news with some preexisting bias. For example, if the media and the president sit in adversarial positions, then the media might present the president's message with a critique that could damage the tendency of the public to offer the president support for policy. Clinton, for example, increasingly operated at arms length with the media after sensational stories were published about him. Thus, it remains likely that the media, by interjecting bias, can intervene between the president and the public by reshaping the rhetoric used by the

54. Andrew Natsios, "Illusions of Influence: The CNN Effect in Complex Emergencies," in *From Massacres to Genocide: The Media, Public Policy, and Humanitarian Crises*, ed. Robert I. Rotberg and Thomas G. Weiss (Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution Press, 1996), 150.

55. See Tim Allen and Jean Seaton, *The Media of Conflict: War Reporting and Representations of Ethnic Violence* (London: Zed Books, 1999), 2.

56. See, for example, Lance Bennett, "Toward a Theory of Press-State Relations in the United States," *Journal of Communication* 40, no. 2 (1990): 103–25.

president to explain policy, and this gives the media the power to influence public opinion.

As media shapes news about the president, it also shapes public opinion. In doing so, the media acts as an intervening variable, sifting the president's message as it is relayed to the public. The media, for example, could reawaken powerful images of domestic opposition that occurred during the Vietnam War as a warning of foreign policy gone afoul. In informing the public, the media becomes an integral part of the information chain. To be sure, Clinton's performance "had helped create the sense that the country was doing just fine on his watch. But it was a carefully honed media strategy—alternately seducing, misleading, and sometimes intimidating the press—that maintained this aura of success."[57]

In this study, public opinion is measured by analyzing public opinion polls. Polls give an indication of how the American public viewed U.S. action during each crisis under study.[58] It is, however, beyond the scope of this study to examine how the Clinton administration analyzed the polls to design rhetoric that would be amenable to public receptiveness. The examination of the polls reveals the level of support or opposition to policy set by the administration under a given crisis situation and reveals the extent of public influence over policy makers.

In this dissertation, the examination of public opinion includes the role of the media, and considers the extent to which the news supports the position of the

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57. See Joe Conason and Gene Lyons, *The Hunting of the President: The Ten Year Campaign to Destroy Bill and Hillary Clinton* (New York: St. Martin's Press, 2000), xiii.

58. For a clarification of how polls may portray misleading results, see Kurt Taylor Gaubatz, "Intervention and Intransitivity: Public Opinion, Social Choice, and the Use of Military Force Abroad," *World Politics* 47, no. 4 (1995): 534–54.

administration, or provides its own index of the crisis, or reflects the position of public opinion. Since the media is considered to hold the potential to impact public opinion, it is approached as an intervening variable between the president and his public. Moreover, the media is an intervening variable because it can become a catalyst for action, either by influencing public opinion, or by turning itself into a lobby to divide elite policy makers.

TESTING THE HYPOTHESES

Each variable has a corresponding hypothesis. The hypotheses are listed at the beginning and in the conclusion of this dissertation. The case study findings and analyses are given in the concluding chapter. The following section explains why the cases of Rwanda, Haiti, and East Timor were selected for analysis in this study.

Case Study Selection

This dissertation uses the Method of Structured, Focused Comparison to examine three case studies.[59] The case studies are occurrences of small-scale intervention in which the United States faced risks to vital and peripheral interests. The case studies for this analysis were selected for six reasons. First, each crisis is similar to the others, in that it engaged world attention and had its roots in history that went back decades—if not centuries—prior to the crisis. Consequently, they are all crises that resurfaced in the deregulated post-cold war environment. These crises could no longer be sublimated without U.S.-Soviet cold war competition. In addition, cold war rhetoric favoring

59. See Alexander L. George, "Case Studies and Theory Development: The Method of Structured, Focused Comparison," in *Diplomacy: New Approaches in History, Theory, and Policy*, ed. Paul Gordon Lauren (New York: Free Press, 1979): 43–68.

containment and U.S.-Soviet animosity cannot be properly compared with the rhetoric of the post-cold war era, due to the demise of the foundation for and acceptance of containment rhetoric. Therefore, for comparative purposes, the case studies of Haiti, Rwanda, and East Timor fall into the same post-cold war rhetorical category and time frame.

Second, all three cases occurred during the same administration—under Clinton. For example, Haiti drew direct economic, political, and military intervention, whereas the United States balked against involvement in international intervention in Rwanda, and in East Timor, the United States had mixed responses. The explanation of existing dissimilarities should therefore be discernable for reasons other than differences between administration styles or time periods.

Third, the case studies selected for analysis in this dissertation represent a cross-section of instances in which vital and peripheral interests were at stake. For example, in Haiti, refugee issues posed a threat to regional stability and therefore engaged vital U.S. interests regarding security and economy. Moreover, it was an example of how democratic disruption engaged further vital U.S. strategic interests. Peripheral U.S. interests in Haiti included humanitarian issues. In Rwanda, vital interests referred to strategic interests and regional stability. Ethnic cleansing and genocide threatened peripheral U.S. interests regarding international law and human rights. In East Timor, U.S. interests focused more narrowly on military/security and economic stability of the larger region, placing high priority on Indonesia-U.S. relations. In this case, only peripheral U.S. interests were threatened in East Timor—specifically, the American values represented in ideals of self-determination and the right to life, liberty, and the

pursuit of happiness. Thus, the three cases selected represent situations that engaged vital and peripheral U.S. interests. This combination of cases gives examples of each type of interest plus a combination of the main categories of U.S. interests. As a result, a comparison between these specific case studies should reveal variances in U.S. policy on military intervention based on the level of interest involved.

Fourth, each crisis represents a different area of the world. Selection of these three case studies places importance on varying geographic proximities to limit influences on foreign policy due to potential bias based on region, culture, or other affinity. Therefore, varying geographic regions are considered, including Rwanda in Africa, Haiti in the Caribbean, and East Timor in Southeast Asia.

Fifth, each crisis represents one of three different causes of crisis, including ethnic genocide, civil violence, or democratic crisis. Accordingly, the case studies for this dissertation include ethnic cleansing in Rwanda, civil violence in East Timor, and democratic governance in Haiti. The case on ethnic genocide was selected because directly invokes the Clinton Doctrine. The cases on civil violence and democratic governance both fall into strategic goals of the Clinton administration for democratic enlargement, as covered in Chapter II. All three cases involve elements of human rights, self-determination, and regional stability.

Sixth, each case study represents a small-scale crisis with different degrees of intervention. High-intensity crises, such as Bosnia and Kosovo, are not considered because this study focuses on small-scale, low-intensity crises where the United States has only marginal interests and where the risks are limited. This is an important distinction, because when U.S. vital interests are at stake, and the costs of non-

intervention are substantial, the United States is more likely to intervene. This study, therefore, focuses on instances of low-intensity crises where the likelihood of U.S. intervention is not a foregone conclusion. In this study, Rwanda represents a crisis in which the United States experienced very low intensity in terms of urgency. The United States chose not to intervene with force to stop the killing in Rwanda. Furthermore, the United States experienced low intensity in terms of urgency to provide humanitarian aid once the killing eased. Similarly, East Timor is low-intensity non-intervention in military terms and low intensity in humanitarian relief. Haiti, however, ranks as medium-intensity military intervention, because the United States did use military force, but with low risks. The case studies cover only the lower spectrum of intensity of intervention. The selection of case studies reflects a range of foreign policy initiatives from sanctions to incentives, and from apathy to military force.

Table 2 illustrates important elements of each case. In the table, "Interest" points to the type of U.S. interest at stake. As discussed, interests are divided into two categories: peripheral and vital. Peripheral interests have little or no impact on the United States. Peripheral interests rank lower in priority than vital interests. Vital interests include those of high importance to the United States. In this study, peripheral and vital interests were at stake for all cases selected.

"Intensity" refers to the level of engagement to which the United States was willing to commit. In other words, it entails those items that matter enough to call for intervention. Low-level intensity, for example, refers to a lack of U.S. resolve to address the crisis in a significant way, including a lack of long-term commitment. Any

Table 2

Case Study Typology Overview

Case	Interest	Intensity	Reason	Time	Location
Rwanda	vital and peripheral	very low	humanitarian representation	1990–94	Africa
Haiti	vital and peripheral	medium	democracy/ humanitarian	1991–94	Caribbean
East Timor	vital and peripheral	low	humanitarian self-determination	1991–99	SE Asia

engagement in this category would only be done at very low risk, very low cost, and very short-term. A low-intensity crisis would most likely encounter U.S. policy, which without reference to duration resists committing troops, equipment, or economic assistance. For this study, East Timor is considered a low-level intensity crisis. Rwanda was a very low-intensity crisis for the United States. Medium-level intensity indicates willingness to engage, however only with moderate risk, moderate cost, and for a limited time. A crisis in this category would likely encounter U.S. policy placing limitations on troop levels and movement, equipment, and economic resources, and will generally demand a specific objective. For this study, Haiti is a case in which the United States displayed moderate intensity. High-level intensity refers to high U.S. willingness to provide troops, equipment, and resources, and often demonstrates a willingness to commit to a longer-term resolution. Such crises may have an open-ended time frame, such as was seen in Kosovo, but are not examined in this study.

"Reason" in the above table refers to the accepted understanding by policy makers about what type of crisis is involved. For this dissertation, the case study crises are all humanitarian in some form, including peacekeeping, human rights, and ethnic cleansing, and Haiti experienced democratic breakdown. This column in the table refers to the decision taken in Washington on each particular crisis, according to the U.S. perspective. It does not refer to the position taken by other international entities or actors.

The "Time" column in the table refers to the years that the crisis occurred. The crisis in Rwanda began in October 1990 and ended in late 1994. The crisis in Haiti began in September 1991 and ended in late 1994. The crisis in East Timor started in November 1991 and ended in late 1999. These crises all began within two years of the beginning of the post-cold war period, which bespeaks the deregulated international environment discussed earlier.

The "Location" of the crisis refers to the area of the world in which the crisis took place. As explained earlier, the geographic proximity of the crisis to the United States influences the U.S. sense of urgency. Rwanda is in Africa. Haiti is in the Caribbean. East Timor is in the Southeast Asia. As a result of varying geographic distance from the United States, each case has a different sense of urgency, with the closest having the highest level and the farthest having the lowest. The study of geographic proximity is made by other authors and is therefore accepted in this dissertation as a natural phenomenon.

Case Study Structure

Each case study begins with an historical background summary, after which each

variable is examined at length. All case studies are similarly arranged around the same five specific variables. The initial variables under examination in each case are found in the international environment. The first variable includes important U.S. allies or international organizations other than the UN. The second variable, the United Nations, represents the international organization as an approximation of a legitimizing world body, as already explained. The remaining variables are found in the domestic environment. The third variable is the U.S. Congress, as the body for domestic political representation and debate. The fourth variable reveals what U.S. public sentiment means in terms of foreign policy, and includes an examination of the media. The last variable encompasses U.S. interests under the Clinton administration, including how Clinton or his advisors portrayed interests in public statements. Each case study concludes with a brief overview of critical turning points for each variable as it influenced Clinton's foreign policy. Case study findings and analysis are in Chapter VII.

CHAPTER IV

CASE STUDY ON ETHNIC CLEANSING IN RWANDA

The 1994 crisis in Rwanda resulted in at least a million lives lost in war between the Hutu and the Tutsi tribes, and culminated in the largest known case of ethnic cleansing since World War II. This chapter explores U.S. policies during the crisis to examine why and how the Clinton administration chose not to intervene militarily to stop the violence. We begin with a brief historical section, then examine the five international political variables outlined previously, and conclude with a brief summary of our findings.

HISTORICAL OVERVIEW

The Hutu and Tutsi people of Rwanda had longstanding differences. Historians are divided on the Hutu-Tutsi relationship prior to colonization.[1] Some argue that it was symbiotic and friendly between Hutu cultivators and Tutsi cattle owners. While the Tutsi kings ruled most of Rwanda, the country's administrative leadership was frequently given to Hutu. Rwanda was initially a German colony that was placed under the League of Nations after World War I. It was then turned over under trusteeship to Belgium, as were Burundi and Zaire. The colonizers disrupted the existing relationship, placing Tutsi in

1. For an overview of Rwandan history, see United Nations, *The United Nations and Rwanda: 1993–1996*, United Nations Blue Book Series, vol. 10 (New York: The United Nations Department of Public Information, 1996); Tor Sellström, Lennart Wohlgemuth, The Nordic Africa Institute, with contributions by Patrick Dupont and Karin Andersson Scheibe, *The International Response to Conflict and Genocide: Lessons from the Rwanda Experience*, 5 vols. (Copenhagen: Steering Committee of the Joint Evaluation of Emergency Assistance to Rwanda, March 1996); and Larry Minear and Randolph C. Kent, "Rwanda's Internally Displaced: A Conundrum within a Conundrum," in *The Forsaken People: Case Studies of the Internally Displaced*, ed. Roberta Cohen and Francis M. Deng (Washington, D.C.: The Brookings Institution Press, 1998).

power positions over the Hutu majority, and instituting a polarized social structure that caused hatred of Belgians, who issued the controversial identity cards bearing ethnic origin that was later key in the genocide. Other historians contend that prior to colonization, Tutsi rule had led to a two-tiered societal structure, which was deepened and institutionalized by colonization. Both schools of thought agree, however, that during the colonial period the Tutsi minority gained significant power, exploited the Hutu majority, and spread myths of Tutsi intellectual and political superiority that inflamed social tension.[2] Rwanda-Urundi, as it was known, was split into Rwanda and Burundi in the 1950s, when decolonization swept across Africa.

Decolonization meant more than throwing off the yoke of foreign colonizers. It was Hutu emancipation from Tutsi rule and resulted in the flight of around 120,000 Tutsi refugees to neighboring states.[3] Formal independence was granted on 1 July 1962 to Hutu president Grégoire Kayibanda, but did not ensure domestic stability. For many years, periodic violence between the groups caused large numbers of refugees to collect in neighboring states. Relentless attacks from Tutsi refugee rebels were launched from refugee bases in Uganda and Burundi, and caused difficulties for Tutsi in Rwanda as well as increasing the number of refugees. Violent exchanges occurred with the Hutu/Peasant Revolution in 1959–61, and crises in 1963–64 and 1973 in which an estimated 600,000 Tutsi became refugees in Uganda, Tanzania, Kenya, and Zaire by the early 1990s.[4] After the Hutu regime up-scaled retaliatory Tutsi killings in 1967, the Tutsi rebel attacks eased.

In a military *coup d'état* in mid-1973, Hutu Major-General Juvénal Habyarimana

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2. See Catherine Newbury, "Ethnicity and the Politics of History in Rwanda," *Africa Today* 45, no. 1 (1998): 7.

3. The United Nations, *The United Nations and Rwanda*, 9.

seized power and set up single-party rule. Even though Rwanda remained one of the poorest countries in the world, the economy thrived for fifteen years, but a slump in world prices for coffee hit Rwanda's main export and disrupted the agricultural economy. In an effort to help, the International Monetary Fund, the World Bank, the African Development Bank, and the European Union contributed $216 million in 1990 and increased aid to $375 million in 1991 for structural reforms.[5] After seventeen years without ethnic violence, this severe economic downturn set off a disastrous spiral of events, as Habyarimana renewed discriminatory policies that worsened competition for scarce resources in one of the most densely populated countries in the world.

The Crisis

For nearly thirty years Tutsi refugees were a source of regional instability, involving Burundi, Kenya, Tanzania, Uganda, and Zaire. For example, by 1990, there were over 470,000 Tutsi refugees in other countries, with 280,000 in Burundi, 80,000 in Uganda, 80,000 in Zaire, and 30,000 in Tanzania.[6] The economic drain on these host countries prompted the OAU and UN to resolve refugee issues, pressuring Habyarimana beginning in the late 1980s to implement power sharing reforms. Habyarimana stood to lose power by these reforms, and he was slow to implement them, but he did allow the organization of other political parties.[7]

Tutsi refugee rebels invaded from Uganda on 1 October 1990, marking the

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4. See Sellström et al., "Historical Perspective: Some Explanatory Factors," vol. 1, *The International Response to Conflict and Genocide*, 30.
5. United Nations, *The United Nations and Rwanda*, 11.
6. Ibid., 11
7. These included the Mouvement démocratique républicain (MDR), Habyarimara's main opposition party, but also the Parti social démocrate (PSD), the Parti libéral (PL), and the Parti démocrate chrétein (PDC).

beginning of the crisis in Rwanda.[8] They killed hundreds of Hutu and set off intensified anti-Tutsi activity in Rwanda, such as political arrests and intermittent massacres of Tutsi in the countryside. The October Tutsi invasion prompted France, Belgium, and Zaire to aid the Hutu regime to quell the invasion.

The economic downturn, along with renewed civil war in 1990, left Rwanda's economy in ruins. International development assistance did little to end the violence, and may have exacerbated tensions due to exclusionary politics in elite Hutu circles.[9] Two weeks after the invasion, the leaders of Rwanda and Uganda agreed to attend a conference supervised by the United Nations High Commission on Refugees (UNHCR) and the Organization of African Unity (OAU) to discuss the refugee issue. They agreed to negotiate with the Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF) and reached a cease-fire on 26 October. The cease-fire lasted until the RPF violated the agreement on 8 February 1993 and accused Habyarimana of human rights violations,[10] including a massacre in January 1993 in northwest Rwanda.[11] A day later, the Dar Salaam Declaration committed the Rwandan government to offering Tutsi refugees a threefold choice. They could return home to Rwanda, remain in the host country and retain Rwandan citizenship, or become nationals of the host country. A cycle of cease-fire violations and extensions eventually led to the creation of an OAU-monitored buffer zone.

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8. Such Tutsi activity was repeated on five other occasions prior to the 1994 genocide.

9. For further discussion of this issue, see Peter Uvin, *Development, Aid, and Conflict: Reflections from the Case of Rwanda* (Helsinki: UN University/WIDER, 1996).

10. Claims that the government of Rwanda violated human rights were subsequently substantiated by the International Commission of Inquiry, "alleging serious and widespread human rights abuses and concluding that the majority of offenses had been committed by the Rwandese Government soldiers or officials," United Nations, *United Nations and Rwanda*, 20.

11. United Nations, "Report of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights on his Mission to Rwanda of 11–12 May 1994," E/CN.4S–3/3, 19 May 1994, reprinted in United Nations, *The United Nations and Rwanda*, 285–89.

Progress in international negotiations was slow. In August 1992, the OAU and the government of Tanzania sponsored peace negotiations in Arusha.[12] Under domestic and international pressure, Habyarimana finally signed the Arusha Peace Accord on 4 August 1993,[13] ending the civil war that had raged since October 1990.

The Accord arranged power sharing between the Hutu government and the Tutsi-led RPF, and arranged for the repatriation of refugees and resettlement of displaced persons. It favored the RPF and the opposition, which received the majority interim cabinet and legislature seats before elections, as well as half of the officer and 40 percent of the enlisted positions. This arrangement amounted to an implicit negotiated surrender of the Hutu army to the Tutsi rebels.[14] In the accords, the RPF and domestic opposition would receive 50 percent of the officer and 40 percent of the enlisted positions. Thus, Habyarimana grasped at the remaining chances to retain leadership and reintroduced age-old anti-Tutsi rhetoric as a method for splitting opposition.

Relations between the Hutu government and the Tutsi RPF were further complicated by unexpected political trouble in neighboring Burundi. In June 1993, democratic reforms in Burundi ushered in the first Hutu president. Shortly thereafter, on 21 October, Tutsi rebels assassinated Burundi's new president and killed thousands of Hutu. As a result, approximately 375,000 Hutu refugees fled into Rwanda, heightening Hutu fears there and prompting further anti-Tutsi propaganda.

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12. Belgium, Burundi, Germany, France, Senegal, and Zaire also participated.

13. For a general overview of the fourteen months of negotiations leading to the Arusha Accord with analysis based on interviews by a former UN diplomat, see Bruce D. Jones, *Peacemaking in Rwanda: The Dynamics of Failure* (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 2001), esp. chaps. 3 and 4; and Amare Tekle, "The OAU: Conflict Prevention, Management and Resolution," in *The Path of A Genocide: The Rwanda Crisis from Uganda to Zaire*, ed. Howard Adelman, and Astri Suhrke (New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction Publishers, 1999), chap. 6.

14. See Alan J. Kuperman, *The Limits of Humanitarian Intervention: Genocide in Rwanda* (Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution Press, 2001), 11.

Rwanda was in a state of near collapse, and Habyarimana began the groundwork for genocide to eliminate his political opposition and maintain power.[15] Habyarimana and his supporters, threatened by their loss of power, quickly sought to undermine the accord by splitting domestic Tutsi-Hutu party alliances. For example, he offered political moderate leaders, such as Prime Minister Agathe Uwilingiyimana from the Mouvement démocratique républicain (MDR) opposition party, positions within his administration. Such appointments made it possible to monitor and control their activities more closely, while at the same time breaking them away from previous political cooperation with opposition RPF elements.[16]

These events unfortunately fed Habyarimana's plan to undermine the Arusha Accord and hold on to power by planning genocide.[17] The genocide was highly organized and planned, with initial perpetrators recruited and trained to kill. Hutu governmental extremist preparations for the coming genocide included amassing weapons and machetes, recruiting and training extremist anti-Tutsi militants, expanding anti-Tutsi networks, and starting up a private radio station, used to incite ethnic violence against Tutsi. Catherine Newbury proposes that the Hutu placed generalized blame for social problems on the Tutsi, thereby making all Tutsi in the country "enemies of the

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15. See Timothy Longman, "Rwanda: Chaos from Above," in *The African State at A Critical Juncture: Between Disintegration and Reconfiguration*, ed. Leonardo A. Villalon and Philip A. Huxtable (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 1998), 75–89.

16. She surprised Habyarimana with her unwillingness to conform to his ideals and may have contributed to her assassination. See Linda Melvern, *A People Betrayed: The Role of the West in Rwanda's Genocide* (London: Zed Books, 2000), 104–5.

17. Proof of a plot for committing genocide includes the 11 January fax from the UN Force Commander General Dallaire, reporting that the Hutu militia called the *interhamwe* was preparing to kill large numbers of Tutsi in the Kigali area. See United Nations, *The United Nations and Rwanda*, 31.

state."[18] The genocide was set into motion as a program to eliminate enemies of the state, and when Tutsi rebels learned about these activities, they earnestly trained for war.

On 6 April 1994, the president's plane was shot down by a surface-to-air missile during its landing approach to Kigali, killing both President Habyarimana and President Ntaryamira of Burundi. The double assassination is attributed to extremist forces within Habyarimana's Rwandan Army, and Hutu extremists immediately took hold of the government. The killing was goal-oriented but departed from common bureaucratic channels of authority that would later complicate calls for justice.[19] Rwanda, one of the most densely populated countries in Africa with approximately one-half of its population under age 15, was also very poor. Dire economic conditions made recruitment less difficult. John Mueller examines Rwanda and shows that ethnic violence used "common, opportunistic, sadistic, and often distinctly non-ideological marauders," who were "recruited and permitted free reign by political authorities."[20] This explains why the RPF relatively quickly took control of the country: because the killers were cowardly opportunists, who fled in the face of military opposition.

Ethnic violence began with the downing of Habyarmana's plane. According to some observers, "within 30 minutes of the plane crash, barricades were thrown up around Kigali and the killing began."[21] Elimination of political opposition and moderates was the first step in launching the genocide. The initial killings targeted not only Tutsi, but also moderate Hutu politicians, including the much-publicized case of the first woman

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18. Newbury, "Ethnicity and the Politics of History in Rwanda," 7.
19. For more, see Alison Des Forges, *Leave None to Tell the Story: Genocide in Rwanda* (New York: Human Rights Watch, 1999), 9.
20. John Mueller, "The Banality of 'Ethnic War,'" 43.
21. Holly Burkhalter, "The Question of Genocide: The Clinton Administration and Rwanda," *World Policy Journal* 11, no. 4 (1994): 47.

Prime Minister, Agathe Uwilingiyimana. She had taken office as Prime Minister in July 1993 in accordance with the Arusha Accord. A moderate, who worked toward diminishing discrimination, she had visited a Tutsi refugee camp in November 1991, where Tutsi army training was underway. After the visit, she insisted that such training end, but was ignored by camp directors and local authorities.[22] She was assassinated in her home on 7 April 1994, because she "called for reforms, which would avert further internal conflicts," and because she openly opposed existing class structure in Rwandan society.[23]

A central element in the extremist strategy was to sow confusion with disinformation and communications blackouts, so that neither foreigners nor nationals knew what was happening. In addition, the Hutu government contributed to international misunderstanding of the genocide by explaining the massacres as a "spontaneous civilian outbreak as a result of incitement from the RPF."[24] It also charged the RPF with responsibility for the massacres, despite U.S. reports to the contrary. Further complication stemmed from the difficulty for outsiders to recognize that this new outbreak of violence was not a continuation of previous conflict, because it appeared to be chaotic and anarchic, rather than highly organized.

By 21 April, an estimated 250,000 Tutsi were already dead. This occurred surprisingly fast, as many seeking refuge were killed by grenade or machete in churches, schools, stadiums, athletic fields, and hospitals. Sometimes massacres occurred within

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22. For more see Des Forges, *Leave None*, 136.

23. Peter Anyang' Nyong'o, "Governance, Security and Conflict Resolution in Africa," *Diogenes* 46/4, no. 184 (1998): 136.

24. United States House Committee on Foreign Affairs, *Hearing before the Subcommittee on Africa of the Committee on Foreign Affairs House of Representatives*, 103 Cong., 2nd sess., 4 May 1994, 6.

sight of clergy or UN observers, who lacked the mandate to intervene. Communication from Kigali to the countryside by phone was interrupted, so news spread slowly. Different regions had different rates of violence throughout the country. By the end of April, the largest massacres were already completed.[25]

Unlike most researchers, Robert Kuperman finds that the genocide in Rwanda happened faster than the West learned of it. He argues that even if action had been taken immediately, the genocide would have been achieved anyway, because it was swifter than a reasonable required response time necessary. The killings were largely over by April 21, and President Clinton later said that the killers "did their work five times as fast as the mechanized gas chambers used by the Nazis."[26] Extremists strategically announced on 11 May that the genocide was already finished, possibly to avoid UN military intervention. Kuperman argues that "three-quarters of the Tutsi victims would have died even if the West had launched a maximum intervention immediately upon learning that a nationwide genocide was being attempted."[27]

Reports have since come to light detailing the UN communications breakdown,[28] and declassified U.S. documents point to the likelihood that some U.S. officials "knew the potential for mass slaughter" at the outset, and held an even higher level understanding of the situation three weeks in.[29] The international community

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25. For a chilling account of personal stories of genocide, see Philip Gourevitch, *We Wish to Inform You that Tomorrow We will be Killed with Our Families: Stories from Rwanda* (New York: Farrar Straus and Giroux, 1998).

26. President Clinton's speech, "Clinton's Painful Words of Sorrow and Chagrin," *New York Times*, 26 March 1998, A12.

27. Kuperman, *Limits of Humanitarian Intervention,* viii.

28 See Barbara Crossette, "Inquiry Says U.N. Inertia in '94 Worsened Genocide in Rwanda," *New York Times*, 17 December 1999: A1, A14.

29. Neil A. Lewis, "Papers Show United States Knew of Genocide in Rwanda," *New York Times*, 22 August 2001, A5.

misunderstood the conflict, however, seeing it as renewed civil war. Former UN diplomat Bruce Jones explains that the posture taken by any given state was most likely dominated by the state of their previous relationship with Rwanda. For the United States, the crisis was "driven by bureaucratic, not political actors, never reaching the level even of secretary of state, let alone the White House."[30] Consequently, the international community, and especially the United States, sought to bring the two sides to a cease-fire. The difficulty with negotiating a cease-fire was that condemning the Hutu regime for committing genocide would make it impossible to support their continued rule. Such condemnation would ultimately bring the RPF to the political fore, and France and Belgium in particular did not want this to happen. Thus, the international effort had to remain neutral.

From late April until the end of June, the war moved across Rwanda from east to west.[31] Seeing that the Hutu were unable to stop RPF progress, France intervened on 23 June to provide a safe haven in the southwest for their former Hutu allies. The RPF continued to gain the upper hand until a cease-fire was declared on 18 July 1994. Rwanda returned to Tutsi rule, but there were massive numbers of displaced persons and the economy was a shambles. In addition, Hutu refugees in the French safe haven presented new opportunities for inverted refugee-inspired instability. Jan Vansina suggests that a result of the biased and incorrect information is that there are two general views on the RPF military move through Rwanda.[32] First, renewed myths of Tutsi

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30. Jones, *Peacemaking in Rwanda*, 61.

31. For a clear explanation of the international military component of the Rwanda crisis, see Larry Minear and Philippe Guillot, *Soldiers to the Rescue: Humanitarian Lessons from Rwanda* (Paris, France: Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, 1996).

32. Jan Vansina, "The Politics of History and the Crisis in the Great Lakes," *Africa Today* 45, no. 1 (1998).

superiority credit Tutsi with vanquishing the morally deficient Hutu and saving Rwanda from extremists, even though the Tutsi fought for survival. Second, the RPF conquered the weakened Habyarimana regime in a move of geopolitical opportunism.

The crisis in Rwanda occurred in three distinct periods: October 1990 to 6 April 1994 (sporadic civil war), between April 6 and June 23 (the genocide), and after June 23 (severe refugee movement). During the first period, the international effort led to the Arusha Accord and was followed by attempts to keep the peace agreement in force. The second period began with the assassination of the presidents of Rwanda and Burundi by extremists, who seized the opportunity to commit genocide. The third period began with unilateral military intervention by France in Operation Turquoise, and includes U.S. humanitarian relief effort Operation Support Hope, which ended 27 August 1994.

U.S. ALLIES

France and Belgium were the primary U.S. allies that concerned themselves with the crisis in Rwanda. Other countries that showed interest included regional actors concerned with instability and massive refugee movements. Indeed, the genocide set off a chain reaction that led several African nations into war in the Congo (former Zaire). The secondary regional actors included Britain, Zaire, Uganda, Burundi, Ghana, Ethiopia, Senegal, Nigeria, and Zimbabwe. These secondary actors are addressed in the analysis of primary actors, such as France, Belgium, and the Organization of African Unity, or in later sections.

France

French involvement in this crisis complicated the strained relationship between the Hutu and Tutsi peoples, because France remained supportive of Hutu leadership in Rwanda, and partly because of the belief that political legitimacy is derived from majority representation. This ideology left little room for Tutsi minority in a Hutu-dominated Rwanda. Thus, the political implications of the Rwanda genocide suggest that even though Habyarimana made promises of integrating Tutsi into political representation, they remained marginalized because they represented only 7–10 percent of the Rwandese population. Therefore, a democratic system was insufficient to quell the fears of opposing Tutsi and Hutu parties, and the Tutsi were compelled to fight for a voice in leadership.

In repeated exchanges between the Hutu and Tutsi, Hutu extremists massacred an estimated 300 Tutsi in 1993, raising the number of victims to around 2,000 since 1990, and confounding ongoing peace negotiations. The Tutsi rebels in the RPF retaliated by launching a well-organized offensive toward Kigali, the capital of Rwanda. In response, France nearly doubled the 250 troops already in country. The RPF agreed to a cease-fire, lest they appear overly militant and thereby risk losing international diplomatic support. France wanted to reduce its troop levels, but this step might have threatened Hutu rule since French military support was essential for Habyarimana to maintain power. Consequently, France maintained a military contingent in Rwanda, even though Tutsi rebels retreated to the mountains along the Ugandan border.

Around that time, Belgium withdrew its forces, and France absorbed the Belgian sphere of influence. According to some analysts, France experienced competitive

concerns about the waxing influence of the United States. For example, Peter Schraeder recently described the U.S.-French relationship as one of competition—for a sphere of influence in francophone Africa—that functioned as a zero-sum game. He argues that due to "ongoing changes in the foreign policy regime of the cold war era that we are witnessing the rise of U.S.-French competition and conflict in francophone Africa."[33] He based his analysis on growing economic blocks that are a result of competition between France, the United States, Germany, and Japan. He explained that democratization was made a precondition for improvement of economic and political relations between the two countries. Moreover, he stated that bold "rhetoric was obviated by the reality of ongoing foreign aid programs designed to keep pro-French elites in power."[34] Thus, the French involvement in the Rwanda humanitarian crisis had everything to do with perceptions of democratization that were the trappings of a zero-sum game between Paris and Washington.

To take this argument one step further, the civil war in Rwanda was carried out between French-speaking Hutu and English-speaking Tutsi. France therefore supported the Hutu, a longtime ally, and the United States would have had more interest in seeing the RPF gain dominance in Rwanda, since it used English and was trained in the Ugandan army by the British.[35] In addition, France has been charged with finding it difficult to adapt to its changed role in francophone Africa—including Rwanda—despite the fact that Rwanda had not been French but rather a German colony and a Belgian trust.

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33. Peter J. Schraeder, "Cold War to Cold Peace: Explaining United States—French Competition in Francophone Africa," *Political Science Quarterly* 115, no. 3 (2000): 405.

34. Ibid., 407.

35. See Marlise Simons, "France's Rwanda Connection: Military Intervention by Paris Reveals Some African Links," *New York Times*, 3 July 1994, 6L.

To illustrate, American officials indicated that Secretary of State Warren Christopher's bitter position against a U.S. visit to Africa was due to "French anxiety over losing its grip on a region it has long controlled."[36] Although denied by U.S. officials, the United States stood to gain an English-speaking ally in Rwanda with RPF leadership, an ally with pre-existing and attractive ties to the U.K.[37] Mahmood Mamdani argues that France has not been held accountable for its imperialist intervention, which was explained away as a humanitarian intervention, regardless of the fact that it stepped in to save the very government which had only a short time earlier committed genocide.[38]

To its credit, France's threat of withdrawal placed increasing political, military, and financial pressure on Habyarimana to implement democratic reforms. The Rwandan army remained heavily dependent on French military support, since the Tutsi rebels claimed a small territory in the north, and by 1990 it had advanced to within forty miles of the capital city of Kigali. Tutsi rebel alliances with political parties in Rwanda generated internal political threats to Habyarimana. Hutu elite fears were exacerbated with the departure of French troops and the arrival of a UN peacekeeping force in late 1993, because they saw their influence slip away.

Beyond language ties between France and Rwanda, the Hutu government had enjoyed strong relations with France for many years, which were particularly close between François Mitterrand and Habyarimana. For example, Habyarimana's private Mystère Falcon airplane had been a personal gift from Mitterrand's son Jean-Christophe,

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36. Howard W. French, "United States and French Sniping Heats up over Paris's Links to Africa," *New York Times*, 17 October 1996, A13.

37. Simons, "France's Rwanda Connection," 6L.

38. Mahmood Mamdani, "Humanitarian Intervention: A Forum," *The Nation* 270, no. 18, 8 May 2000: 22.

who served as special advisor at the Elysée Palace. Despite such close relations with Rwanda, France adamantly opposed Belgium's April 1994 UN request to authorize a multinational militarily force to intervene, France worried that the RPF would stand by its earlier pledge to fight the French. More disconcerting was the fear that past French involvement in Rwandan politics could make any military intervention, even a UN authorized mission, to "be mistaken for an attempt at supporting the provisional government and lead to military clashes with the RPF."[39] These worries compelled France to initiate Operation Amaryllis, on the same day, to evacuate foreign nationals from Rwanda, and from the French embassy in Kigali, which was closed on 12 April.

Despite its earlier hesitation, France "offered" to conduct a UN humanitarian intervention under Chapter VII of the UN Charter,[40] an offer that was eventually accepted with UN Security Council Resolution 929 of 22 June 1994. "Operation Turquoise," launched the very next day,[41] revealed the poor condition of the Hutu army. The Hutu were disappointed that France refused to lend military assistance to their cause, but France wanted to avoid confrontation with the RPF whenever possible. Its troops secured a Safe Humanitarian Zone (SHZ) to protect Hutu from Tutsi reprisals. In spite of such caution, an exchange of fire with the RPF in mid-July convinced the French that the RPF was not afraid to confront their troops, even though it did not want a full-blown military confrontation. Consequently, the RPF accepted French presence even though they

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39. Gérard Prunier, *The Rwanda Crisis: History of a Genocide* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1995), 234–35.

40. J. Matthew Vaccaro, "The Politics of Genocide: Peacekeeping and Disaster Relief in Rwanda," in *UN Peacekeeping, American Politics and the Uncivil Wars of the 1990s*, ed. William J. Durch (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1996), 385.

41. For background on the development in Paris of Operation Turquoise, see Prunier, *The Rwanda Crisis*, 281–311. For more about Operation Turquoise, see Kuperman, *Limits of Humanitarian Intervention*, 44–51.

divided Rwanda and protected Hutu. For the most part, the RPF had control of Rwanda and was in the process of institutionalizing its legitimacy.

By mid-July, France was the only country that still acknowledged the former Hutu regime as the legitimate government of Rwanda. By this time, it had become clear that this regime had planned, initiated, and committed genocide of Tutsi in Rwanda. Moreover, the French presence in southwest Rwanda was increasingly criticized for protecting and assisting a genocidal regime. France stayed in Rwanda for two more months, but withdrew on 21 August as agreed. As the time for French departure came, an estimated two million refugees streamed out of the SHZ in July and August.[42] Despite the now well-known fact that Operation Turquoise assisted and protected the Hutu government in Rwanda, "France has never sought to apologize, admitted any fault or even publicly questioned its backing of the Hutu-dominated regime before, during and after the massacre."[43] A 1998 parliamentary inquiry initiated an investigation into the question of French complicity in the genocide, including providing arms to the Rwandan government during the time after Habyarimana's assassination.

Not only did the French intervention in Rwanda protect the French sphere of influence in Africa, but also, more importantly, when France unilaterally intervened in Rwanda, no one else needed to. Thus, the French intervention took the pressure off the United States to end the genocide. As will be shown, the United States only reconsidered inaction after France departed Rwanda, leaving the Hutu to flee in fear of reprisal killings at the hands of angry Tutsi. Thus, the United States would not need to take action until a new refugee problem appeared.

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42. See Prunier, *The Rwanda Crisis*, 312.
43. "Humanitarian? France and Rwanda," *Economist* 347, no. 8065 (1998): 48.

Belgium

As a post-colonial power, Belgium had troubled relations with the Hutu regime in Rwanda partly because it had historically supported Tutsi rule, and relations in Rwanda deteriorated severely for the Belgians during the time leading up to April 1994. Habyarimana already felt betrayed when the sale of Belgian weapons to Rwanda was stalled after the October 1990 RPF invasion. When Belgium supported the 1993 Arusha Accord, which favored the RPF, relations with Rwanda worsened further.

Habyarimana started a pro-government radio station, *Radio et Television Libre Mille* (RTLM), that accused Belgium of supporting the RPF. Reasons for this mistrust were varied. First, the RPF located its European office in Brussels—lending credence to the idea that Belgium was the enemy alongside the RPF. Second, Belgium sought to enlarge the UN mandate several times in early 1994, but remained unable to conduct security operations without prior notification of the Rwandese government. Fearing an explosive violent outburst, Belgium again asked the UN for a less restrictive mandate. The United States and the U.K. opposed such requests however, because they would have changed the peacekeeping mission into a more confrontational peace-making mission. Third, Belgium aimed at stopping the violence, but only as part of a multilateral UN operation. When asked later, Dallaire said that his forces were neither sufficient nor trained to perform such rescue operations, even if he had known what was happening at the time where Belgian soldiers were killed. He later said that if he had been given 5,000 well-trained troops in April, he could have stopped much of the killing.[44] But having

44. See Scott R. Feil, *Preventing Genocide: How the Early Use of Force might have Suceeded in Rwanda* (New York: Carnegie Corporation, 1998), 33.

already been humiliated in Somalia, Boutros-Ghali objected to converting peacekeeping into peacemaking in Rwanda.

The UN response was to provide Belgium with 200 Ghanaian peacekeepers in Kigali, who redeployed from the northern demilitarized zone of Rwanda. In essence, this adjustment was of little help to Belgium because it needed well-equipped and experienced peacekeepers. In mid-March, the Belgium government again asked the UN to reconsider its mandate. These efforts convinced Habyarimana that Belgium could not be trusted, and he authorized propaganda that resulted in Belgians being the only foreign nationals targeted by RTLM after the killings began.[45]

In a horrible incident on the morning after Habyarimana was killed, ten Belgian Blue Helmets were killed while protecting the moderate Prime Minister Agathe Uwilingiyimana, who was assassinated. UN Commander Dallaire had not rescued the Belgian peacekeepers held hostage at the army base, because he was en route to a crisis meeting called by Hutu extremist Colonel Bagosora. Here is a description of his ride:

> In the car with him were a Rwandan and a Belgian officer. All were unarmed. As Dallaire later recalls events, when passing Camp Kigali he saw bodies on the ground inside the compound; they appeared to be Europeans. Making inquiries, he was told that they were not Belgians, and that he could not enter to investigate due to chaotic conditions in the compound where the soldiers were rebelling.[46]

Just as Somalia shocked the U.S. public, this event shocked Belgium, and it recoiled. Within three days, Belgium sent 250 soldiers to rescue nationals from Kigali. Belgian foreign minister, Willy Claes, asked the UN to modify the UN Assistance Mission in

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45. African Rights, *Rwanda: Death, Despair, and Defiance*, rev. ed. (London: African Rights, 1995), 1114.

46. Astri Suhrke, "Dilemmas of Protection: The Log of the Kigali Battalion," in *The Path of a Genocide: The Rwanda Crisis from Uganda to Zaire*, ed. Howard Adelman and Astri Suhrke (New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction Publishers, 1999), 261.

Rwanda (UNAMIR) mandate, allowing military intervention to stop the killing in Rwanda, because he believed that removing foreign nationals from Rwanda would give a free reign to the violence. France and the United States again opposed military intervention. As a result, Belgium formally withdrew its troops from UNAMIR on 14 April, partly because of increased domestic ethical and financial objections, not to mention growing military discomfort since the violent end of its colonial power in Congo.[47] The last Belgian peacekeeper departed Kigali five days later.

The departure of the Belgian forces from UNAMIR severely hampered the UN capabilities to operate in Rwanda. Belgian withdrawal meant the loss of the most specialized and highly trained UN troops in Rwanda at the time. As a result, Commander Dallaire ordered UN troops to follow strict rules of conduct, including a curfew and restricting movements.

The Belgian withdrawal from UNAMIR reverberated through the international community. For this study, it is relevant to note that the UN peacekeeping force in Rwanda depended greatly on the experienced and well-equipped Belgians. Moreover, Belgium had long-term interests in Rwanda, and to pull out overnight surprised the UN and the United States. Their withdrawal disheartened and weakened remaining peacekeeping forces, and increased the belief in the UN and the United States that nothing could be done to help Rwanda.

The Organization of African Unity

The OAU is charged with promoting regional stability, but its efforts to resolve

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47. See Alain Rouvez with the assistance of Michael Coco and Jean Paul Paddack, *Disconsolate Empires: French, British, and Belgian Military Involvement in Post-Colonial Sub-Saharan Africa*

the conflict were hampered by structural weaknesses common to post-colonial African states, and suffered from limited economic means. The OAU's mission was based on principles of nonintervention, noninterference, and the sanctity of colonial boundaries, with a jurisdiction limited to interstate conflict. The OAU's deep concern with the crisis in Rwanda was limited because its mission is conflict resolution, not prevention. It established a Neutral Military Observer Group (NMOG), as spelled out in the N'sele cease-fire agreement of 29 March 1991, to monitor the cease-fire between the RPF and the Rwandan Army. Even though the NMOG reported to the OAU Secretary of the Security Council, it was plagued with severe logistical and financial limitations that left the it dependent on contributions from wealthier and more capable non-member states such as France, Belgium, Germany, and the United States.[48]

Despite its shortcomings, the OAU succeeded in negotiating an agreement that was signed in Arusha, Tanzania in 1993. Because the OAU recognized early the potential for regional instability and violence from civil war in Rwanda, it attempted to enforce the Arusha Accord negotiations, and even delayed fifty monitors in Rwanda to keep a watch on its border with Uganda. Yet, due to limitations in mission and capabilities, the OAU could not stop the civil war in Rwanda prior to, during, or after the April genocide, and the OAS sought international assistance from the UN, thus reducing its role. Furthermore, member states resisted sponsoring OAU missions in Rwanda for three reasons. First, the Rwandan government viewed the OAU as "predisposed to the RPF position and not reliable."[49] Second, the unsatisfactory performance of the OAU-sponsored troops during the NMOG mission, meant that the troops it could muster were

(Lanham, MD: University Press of America, 1994), 378.

48. Tekle, "The OAU," 119.

mostly poorly trained, and did not have the necessary equipment or resources for peacekeeping. As a result, the UN requested other members to provide equipment and training. Third, the UN opposed the proposal, because the inability of the OAU to effectively promote peace in Rwanda was often due to a breakdown in negotiations caused by disputes over the performance of NMOG. Such division led to increased involvement of the UN in peacekeeping operations, and the NMOG was absorbed into the UN Uganda-Rwanda Observation Mission (UNUROM) operations in June 1993.

Despite the OAU's interest in resolving the crisis, it was no more ready than the UN "to call genocide by its rightful name,"[50] but instead called the massacres "carnage and bloodletting" and "massacres and wanton killings."[51] Like the rest of the international community, the OAU publicly recognized the genocide in early June, as France was preparing for intervention.

THE UNITED NATIONS

The Arusha Accord notified the UN that the government of Rwanda would work honorably with the RPF to build a new nation based on shared power. This misjudgment contributed to the international misunderstanding that it was, in fact, the Rwanda government that was committing genocide against the Tutsi minority, and that the Tutsi-led RPF was invading Rwanda to protect Tutsi civilians. This error allowed the Rwandan representative to remain in the UN Security Council, where he misconstrued facts. The resulting inaction on the part of the international community to stop the genocide in

49. Jones, *Peacekeeping in Rwanda*, 104.
50. Des Forges, *Leave None*, 643.
51. United Nations Security Council, 3377th Meeting, Monday, 16 May 1994, S/PV/3377, quoted in Des Forges, *Leave None*, 643.

Rwanda, therefore, generated an ethical morass for all involved—or not involved, as the case may be.

The UN approached the crisis in Rwanda by demanding that a cease-fire be maintained prior to UN assistance, and underscored the lack of understanding of the situation at hand. Despite warnings from the field, UN headquarters did not recognize the genocide in a timely manner. As Turid Laegreid explains, UN operations in Rwanda were implemented according to political and financial considerations to avoid another Somalia, leaving those in the field ineffective due to logistical incapacity,[52] and helpless to convince headquarters of what was happening around them.

To bring the warring sides together, UN Resolution 846 on 23 June 1993 created the UN Uganda-Rwanda Observer Mission (UNUROM) to facilitate ongoing negotiations of the Arusha Accord and to monitor troop movements at the Uganda-Rwanda border.[53] Commander Romeo Dallaire was appointed commander of UNUROM, but securing troops for UNUROM was very slow, and it was deployed after the Arusha Accord was signed on 4 August 1993. To support the cease-fire agreement, the UN Secretary-General recommended in September that the Security Council send a peacekeeping force, and on 5 October UN Resolution 872 created UNAMIR to arrange and deploy a 2,500 neutral military monitoring force to ensure implementation of the Arusha Accord. At this time UNUROM was integrated into UNAMIR.

After the unfortunate peacekeeping humiliation in Mogadishu in early October 1993, UN members pressured for reduced peacekeeping operations. The Somalia

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52. Turid Laegreid, "U.N. Peacekeeping in Rwanda," in *The Path of a Genocide*, ed. Adelman and Suhrke, chap. 11.

53. UN, "SC/RES 846," 23 June 1993Reprinted in United Nations, "The United Nations and Rwanda, 1993–1996," 167–8.

debacle happened just two days before the date that the UN was to vote on sending troops to Rwanda and generated pressure against peacekeeping altogether, particularly from the United States and U.K. The world thought that it was seeing a renewed civil war in Rwanda, and therefore placed a mandate into effect, which required the warring parties to come to a cease-fire prior to making peacekeeping arrangements. This belief was, as we now know, incorrect.

Rwanda received its seat as a non-permanent member of the Security Council in January 1994. Given that Rwanda held a revolving seat on the Security Council at the time, it is highly plausible that extreme versions of the situation were either not presented or were misconstrued to the Council by the Rwandan representative. Linda Melvern evaluated the ability of the UN to handle complicated peacekeeping missions and argued that secrecy in Security Council decision-making had made the Security Council "unaccountable."[54] In addition, Jan Vansina argued that "the small volume of more valuable evidence remains unavailable" to researchers.[55] Many accounts testify to the fact that the Hutu Rwanda representative in the Security Council at the time presented the situation to the Council as a civil war in which both sides were equally involved, and it could therefore not be considered genocide. Thus, if the Security Council had been presented the intelligence indicating preparations for genocide, it is likely that it would have been rebuffed or misconstrued by the Rwanda representative. Under such conditions, it is likely that the Security Council could have remained unconvinced for a

54. Linda Melvern, "The Security Council: Behind the Scenes," *International Affairs* 77, no. 1 (January 2001): 102.

55. Vansina, "The Politics of History," 38. Vansina argues that this scarcity of valuable information makes historiography of the Rwanda crisis problematic.

longer period of time than would have been the case had Rwanda not held a seat on the Security Council.

Adding to the response time, it is not uncommon to seek confirmation of initial reports in the field, especially if they are extreme. In this case, President Habyarimana was linked to the genocide, so confirmation requests may have prolonged Hutu extremist leadership, rather than stopped it. This issue is complex, however, because the UN peacekeepers were only in Kigali with the permission of the Rwanda government and therefore could just as easily be asked to leave.

On 11 January 1994, UNAMIR Commander Romeo Dallaire faxed the UN about a report from an informant that extremists were planning to provoke new civil war. They were also planning to kill Belgian peacekeepers in hopes of prompting their withdrawal, and use a 1,700-member *interahamwe* militia to kill Tutsi. Dallaire was denied an expanded mandate for permission to conduct arms seizures. Linda Melvern argues that the Secretariat staff, who received the 11 January fax from Dallaire, failed to convey its contents or other dire warnings to the Security Council.[56] Moreover, what little information held by the United States and France was not shared with the Security Council. The failure to inform the Security Council of Dallaire's fax or requests for increased mandate was to avoid clashing with such major powers as the United States.[57] It could have also happened to avoid sticky relations within the Council—on which the genocidal Rwandan government held a rotating seat—or because the fax was of such an extreme nature that it was dismissed as overreaction on the part of Dallaire. Such claims needed to be substantiated by other sources. Thus, the Secretariat staff failed to fully

56. Melvern, "The Security Council," 103.
57. Des Forges, *Leave None*, 19.

inform the Security Council regarding the severity of the situation in Rwanda as the momentum toward genocide grew. It is possible, however, that France, Belgium, and the United States had at least an inkling of what was happening, because "Dallaire, on Annan's orders, passed along the informant's allegations to those ambassadors."[58]

It was difficult for Dallaire to convince headquarters that preparations for genocide were being made, partly because he was forced to work through the Rwandan government. On 14 January, the UN denied Dallaire permission to raid arms caches without seeking prior confirmation of such information from President Habyarimana. Such prior confirmation from Habyarimana ultimately compromised the success of any future raid, because it was under the Habyarimana regime that preparations for genocide were made. In February 1994, Dallaire learned about the deteriorating situation, continued weapons distribution, and lists of targets for death squads, and requested reinforcements from UN headquarters in New York to no avail.

In an attempt to reach a cease-fire, the UN Security Council passed Resolution 909 on 5 April 1994, renewing the UNAMIR mandate, but threatening to pull out within six weeks unless the Arusha Accord was implemented. At the time of President Habyarimana's assassination, UNAMIR had three infantry battalions in Rwanda authorized under Chapter VI, and was therefore not mandated to intervene with force. After Habyarimana's plane crash on 6 April, the UN peacekeeping troops initially tried for a few hours to hold the peace according to the terms of the Arusha Accord, but they were neither outfitted nor trained for such operations, and were therefore ordered to withdraw to their posts. While this left the local population more vulnerable to the

58. Bruce Wallace, "The Rwanda Debacle: United Nations Issues Report on Rwandan Genocide," *Maclean's*, 10 Jan 2000, 34.

impending genocide, the UN mission was one of peacekeeping, not peace making or enforcement. Other reasons that the international community did not intervene include the lack of accurate intelligence, the speed of the killings, the difficulties of airlifting sufficient forces to Africa, and the lack of political will to intervene.

In the initial days after 6 April, it was widely thought that the violence was due to the resumption of the civil war, since there were both Hutu and Tutsi casualties. As a result, the UN was more concerned with stopping the spiraling costs of peacekeeping, or helping to settle a civil war, than in the possibilities that the unthinkable was taking place in the middle of Africa.

With the deaths of the Belgian peacekeepers, Western countries began evacuation of all foreign nationals beginning on 9 April. France began Operation Amaryllis, in which 190 French paratroopers took control of the Kigali airport for emergency evacuations. The next day, Operation Silverback brought in 450 Belgian and 80 Italian troops to evacuate nationals. By 13 April, almost all Westerners had been evacuated.

Belgium's withdrawal from UNAMIR on April 14 generated concern among other troop contributors, because of the low number of troops in the country during the genocide, who were not trained or equipped to deal with attackers in confrontational situations (such as protecting large groups while being pursued by attackers). The withdrawal of the highly trained Belgians diminished international confidence, and member states grew less willing to commit troops. The deaths of the Belgian peacekeepers demonstrated that violence would extend to anyone attempting to interfere, including the UN. Secretary General Boutros Boutros-Ghali wrote a letter to the Security

Council President Colin Keating of New Zealand with concerns about the possibility of ending the UN peacekeeping mission to Rwanda, after the pull-out of the Belgians.[59]

On 15 April, Dallaire identified local unrest as mutual violence in which both sides were pounding "each other."[60] Such early reports portrayed violence as a civil war type of conflict, rather than as genocide. Former UN diplomat Bruce Jones explains that UN actions were not of neglect, or aimed to prevent genocide, but "to prevent an escalation of the crisis and to lay the groundwork for peace."[61]

Three weeks into the crisis, the killings and massacres were clearly suspicious, and it became clear that the violence was highly centralized and that chaos and anarchy did not rule the day as thought. Carefully planned propaganda campaigns represented chaotic internal turmoil to the outside world. Initially, fears of another debacle in a decentralized African state, such as occurred in Somalia, increased pressure to hold down peacekeeping costs and mandates from the UN. This led to a reduction of the Rwanda mission force to 270, one-third the size of that originally proposed. Moreover, the mandate was further reduced from that spelled out in the Arusha Accord. Thus, the crisis in Rwanda found the UN ill-prepared and without mandate to counteract the highly organized genocide that took place in April 1994. On 1 May 1994, Dallaire again requested 5,000 troops.

After Oxfam announced genocide against the Tutsi was underway in Rwanda, the Security Council debated the official use of the word at length, because using the word "genocide" would invoke the 1948 Geneva Convention and automatically require the UN

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59. See Reuters, "U.N. Considers Pulling Troops Out of Rwanda," *The Washington Post*, 14 April 1994, A26.

60. Quoted in Kuperman, *Limits of Humanitarian Intervention*, 25.

61. Jones, *Peacemaking in Rwanda*, 2–3.

to intervene. Six weeks into the crisis, the world understood that it was genocide, not civil war. Reports of genocide led to an international public outcry, and the UN passed Resolution 918, authorizing military intervention under UNAMIR II on 17 May. The resolution declared that the crisis "constituted a threat to peace and security in the region," placed an arms embargo against Rwanda, increased the number of authorized troops to 5,500, and authorized safe zones for "displaced persons, refugees and civilians," and to "provide security and support for the distribution of relief supplies and humanitarian relief operations."[62]

Securing troops was very slow; however, the United States did not want to place troops into a confrontation between the RPF and the Rwandan army, and required additional information on the situation in the field. The delay was also partly due to unwillingness of other members to commit troops and the inability of those willing to actually get their troops into the theater. On 25 May, Ghana, Ethiopia, and Senegal committed to provide 800 troops each with Zimbabwe and Nigeria making similar promises quickly. Actual deployment was slow because until mid-August there was no transportation for the 800 troops that were promised by Ethiopia. On 1 June 1994, Dallaire publicly appealed to the United States to supply fifty armored personnel carriers (APCs) to UNAMIR to use in evacuating trapped civilians.[63] In less than a month, the United States had Dallaire's APCs in Uganda ready to use.

UN Security Council Resolution 925, adopted on 8 June employed the term

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62. UN, "SC/RES 918," 17 May 1994 (www.un.org/docs/scres/1994/9421836e, accessed on 21 September 2001), 4 (hereafter cited as UN "SC/RES").

63. See "UN Commander in Rwanda Asks United States Aid," *New York Times*, 2 June 1994, A5.

"genocide" for the first time in a Security Council document., agreed to dispatch troops.[64] It also banned the use of the media as a vehicle to incite violence and ethnic hatred. UNAMIR II never fully got off the ground, and by the time troops arrived in Rwanda it was too late to stop the genocide. On 11 June, the UN sent special rapporteur Dégni-Ségui to Rwanda to investigate human rights violations. His report was published in Geneva in late June, and revealed that massacres had occurred across Rwanda as part of a planned and systematic genocide campaign. The early genocide in Rwanda had been perpetrated by the Hutu extremist government by using special forces called the *Interhamwe* that had been specially recruited and trained. The Rwandan army helped the *Interhamwe*. Once the RPF began to advance through Rwanda and the genocide against the Tutsi stopped; however, killings of soldiers, political, and military leaders with their families began to arise in RPF held territories. UN Security Council Resolution 928 reiterated a general and complete arms embargo against Rwanda.[65]

With a new understanding of the nature of the violence, UN Security Council Resolution 929 authorized France to intervene in Rwanda on 22 June 1994 after France announced that it would unilaterally intervene. The mandate was of "strictly humanitarian character" to be "conducted in an impartial and neutral fashion," rather than as "an interposition between opposing forces."[66] The mission was only authorized to

64. UN, "SC/RES 925," 8 June 1994 (www.un.org/docs/scres/1994/944454e, accessed on 21 September 2001).

65. See UN, "SC/RES 928," 22 June 1994 (www.un.org/docs/scres/1994/9425620e, accessed on 21 September 2001).

66. UN, "SC/RES 929," 22 June 1994 (www.un.org/docs/scres/1994/9426027e, accessed on 21 September 2001).

operate for two months, and Operation Turquoise began at dawn on 23 June and fell under considerable international critique.

As a result of these killings, the UN began further investigations on 1 July 1994 with UN Security Council Resolution 935, establishing an "impartial Commission of Experts" to investigate allegations of serious violations of human rights, including "possible acts of genocide."[67] Moreover, it spelled out that an international tribunal would handle prosecutions. Robert Gersony, a consultant to the UN High Commissioner for Refugees, determined in August that the "RPF had engaged in widespread and systematic slaughter of unarmed civilians."[68] In September, the UN "suppressed the culminating report," but demanded that the RPF stop the killings, after which they subsided.[69]

The violence in Rwanda generated the fastest mass exodus of refugees that the international system had ever faced. On 5 July, French forces established a humanitarian sector in southwest Rwanda, again triggering extreme refugee movement into and out of the area. When the violence began in April, there were a quarter of a million refugees crossing into Tanzania within the first 24 hours. Many of these were Tutsi fleeing from Hutu violence. Within a few days, that number swelled to half a million. By the end of July, numbers of refugees in Goma had reached a million. The later refugees not only included Tutsi, but also many Hutu, who were fleeing from possible Tutsi reprisal violence. Conditions in Goma during this time worsened as the camps there were overwhelmed, and a Cholera outbreak took the lives of around 50,000 in a few weeks.

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67. UN, "SC/RES 935," 1 July 1994 (www.un.org/docs/scres/1994/9427351e.htm, accessed on 29 January 2002).
68. Des Forges, *Leave None*, 14.
69. Ibid.

By August, there were around 1.3 million refugees in Zaire, 530,000 in Tanzania, and 200,000 in Burundi.[70]

The UN Security Council decided on 25 August that it would not allow Rwanda to take its turn as the revolving president of the council. Ironically, this decision came after the Hutu regime was replaced by the RPF led regime, thereby removing the regime that stopped the genocide rather than the one that committed it.

It was approximately six months before the UN could gather the troops and equipment to fill the May mandate. By then the fighting had largely ceased the RPF had control. The Chapter VI mandate was insufficient for the monumental task at hand: humanitarian assistance and reconstruct. Additionally, in the aftermath of the crisis, bringing genocide perpetrators to justice was very slow and problematic, despite UN Security Council Resolution 955, which established an international criminal court for criminals in Rwanda in November 1994.

THE U.S. CONGRESS

In March 1993, even before the Somalia humiliation, Congress debated financial issues in conjunction with UN peacekeeping missions. At the time, there were 12 UN peacekeeping missions, with the mission in Cambodia thought to be the most costly ever. With over 22,000 people involved in the country, that mission had already cost $2 billion, and corruption was a problem. As a result, in June 1993, Congress rejected Clinton's request for $293 million for additional 1993 peacekeeping assessments and in July, "both

70. These figures are from United States House, "Testimony of Dennis McNamara, Director, Division of International Protection, UN High Commissioner for Refugees," in *Hearing before the Subcommittee on International Operations and Human Rights of the Committee on International Relations House of Representatives*, 105 Cong., 2nd sess., 5 May 1998, 21.

the House and the Senate approved fiscal 1994 spending bills that cut the administration's peacekeeping request by 32 percent."[71] This legislation killed the possibility of a UN proposed peacekeeping contingency fund, allowing U.S. funds to be used for emergency startup for yet unknown peacekeeping operations.

Indeed, the Congress was so preoccupied with domestic issues, that it removed all international organization assessments from the budget for 1993. This alarmed some, for example, House Foreign Affairs committee Chair Lee Hamilton (D, Indiana) wrote a letter to Clinton to appeal that we "have reached a crisis point in U.S. financial support for U.N. peacekeeping" and urged Clinton "to make a personal public appeal for this funding."[72] After Clinton appeared before the assembly on 27 September 1993, Congress began with a $533 million ($233 million to the regular budget and 300 million to peacekeeping) payment on October 6 to pay for its UN arrears.[73] In October 1993, the United States owed $900 million in assessments for peacekeeping and other expenses. Congress voiced concerns that the United States would over-commit to peace operations, thereby compromising U.S. credibility abroad.

As explained, the October debacle in Somalia occurred only days prior to the UN vote on troop deployment in Rwanda, and held significant persuasion on policy-makers in Washington. Congress prepared a Peace Powers Act in response to Somalia's efforts, to make it impossible for the president to commit U.S. troops to UN operations. As early as 10 April, Senate Republican Leader Bob Dole indicated "that he opposed any

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71. Steven A. Dimoff, "Congress's Budget-Cutting Fervor threatens United States Standing at U.N.," United Nations Association of the USA, *Interdependent* 19 (1993): 6.

72. Quoted in ibid.

73. This payment left $472 million in arrears: $284 million to the regular budget and $188 million to peacekeeping.

American role in Rwanda as no vital national interest was at stake there."[74] Dole insisted that the United States stop placing the UN agenda before the interests of the US.[75] Congress categorically resisted placing U.S. troops under UN command. Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs, George Moose, testified to Congress that the U.S. response to the crisis in Rwanda was to pursue a strategy with five main goals. These goals were to: stop the killings, achieve a durable cease-fire, return the parties to the negotiating table, contain the conflict, and address humanitarian relief needs.[76] As such, the position in the United States was not conducive for increasing either troop levels or mandates in the Rwanda crisis.

The response of Congress to the crisis in Rwanda was plagued by fears brought on by the Somalia debacle, especially that humanitarian aid could become more involved. Such "mission creep" could lead the United States into a "political quagmire." Here is an example to illustrate the significance of this point. In the After Action Review, the comments of the Commanding officer LTG Daniel Schroeder, indicated that mission creep was difficult to avoid because "maintaining the focus on what we had been told to do—avoiding 'mission creep'—took constant attention and emphasis at all levels of command."[77] Moreover, fears of spiraling dangers were reinforced after ten Belgian peacekeepers were killed in Kigali, and Belgium pulled out of the Rwanda mission. In response, the United States supported withdrawing the bulk of the UN force for its own

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74. Referenced in Arthur Jay Klinghoffer, *The International Dimension of Genocide in Rwanda* (Washington Square: New York University Press, 1998), 91.

75. Quoted in Melvern, *A People Betrayed*, 78.

76. See United States House, prepared statement of George E. Moose, "Testimony of Assistant Secretary of State before the House Subcommittee on Africa on the Crisis in Rwanda," in *Hearing before the Subcommittee*, 4 May 1994, 45.

77. United States European Command Headquarters, *Operation Support Hope, 1994: After Action Review* (Carlisle Barracks, PA: The U.S. Army Peace Keeping Institute, 1995), 1.

safety. The United States demanded that the mission to Rwanda be only peacekeeping, not an intervention for peacemaking or enforcing.

Apathy in Congress was demonstrated in a hearing on 4 May 1994, when the Chair of the Subcommittee on Africa, Harry L. Johnston of Florida, said that reductions in the UN presence "demonstrates the urgent needs for Africans to find an African solution to their problems."[78] In his testimony, Assistant Secretary of State George Moose, backed this up, saying that "in the end, only the Rwandans can bring peace to their country, and no outside effort can succeed without a commitment to peace by the combatants themselves."[79] He explained that the U.S. position demanded that the RPF and the Rwandan Army come to negotiations. Indeed, this demand expressed the U.S. misunderstanding of the situation in which the Rwandan government was bent on eliminating the Tutsi opposition, and therefore the RPF could not stop fighting as long as Hutu extremists ran the Rwandan government. Moreover, by continuing to recognize and negotiate with the Rwandan government, the international community legitimated the continuation of a genocidal regime.

There were those in Congress who endorsed strong support for a more active U.S. role in Rwanda. In late April, nine representatives from the House African Affairs Subcommittee wrote a letter to Clinton to ask for support, but they stopped short of being willing to commit troops.[80] Senator Paul Simon (D, Illinois), a member of the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations and Chair of the Subcommittee on African Affairs, hand delivered a letter to President Clinton on May 14, asking that the United States

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78. United States House, *Hearing Before the Subcommittee*, 4 May 1994, 1.
79. Ibid, 47.
80. Melvern, *A People Betrayed*, 190.

immediately request the UN to send troops to Rwanda to stop the slaughter. The letter went unanswered for twenty-seven days, and the reply on 9 June was a long list of efforts and initiatives that the administration had made to resolve the crisis, including a statement that the President agreed that an effective UN mission was needed.

The Congressional Black Caucus (CBC) also petitioned the White House to take a leading role on Rwanda. One CBC letter dated 4 May, signed by the then-Chair, Kweisi Mfume and Donald Payne Congressman of New Jersey, requested that the United States "urge the UN to move."[81] A second letter dated 16 June, suggested three steps for improving the situation in Rwanda. In the third letter dated 20 July, the CBC requested the president send assistance to Rwanda. In addition to these efforts by the CBC, the Senate Foreign Relations Committee urged Clinton in a letter 16 June to "acknowledge formally that genocide is occurring in Rwanda," and the letter was "signed by virtually all the committee members, including Senator Claiborne Pelt of Rhode Island, the ranking Democrat, and Senator Jesse Helms of North Carolina, the senior Republican."[82] In June, these members of Congress criticized Clinton for allowing delays in assistance and deployments. After this, Clinton stepped up efforts to help for UN forces to Rwanda, for example by delivering Dallaire's APCs to Uganda on 23 June.

On 25 July there was a hearing before the Committee on Armed Services. Mainly the hearing consisted of a briefing about logistics and problems involved in humanitarian relief in Rwanda. There were four main concerns: numbers of displaced persons, water, distribution capabilities and reducing negative media reports. In a country of 8 million

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81. See United States House, "Testimony by Donald M. Payne," in *Hearing before the Subcommittee*, 5 May 1998, 18.

82. Michael R. Gordon, "United States to supply 60 Vehicles for U.N. Troops in Rwanda," *New York Times*, 16 June 1994, A12L.

people, 8 to 12 percent had been killed, 40 percent of the people were refugees out of country, and 60 percent were either refugees, displaced or both.[83]

The sheer numbers of refugees and displaced persons resulted in overcrowding camps. To alleviate this condition, airdrops were sent to "demagnetize the refugee attraction" of the camps to further numbers.[84] Moreover, efforts were made to convince Rwandans to return home, where crops awaited them. The water in camps available to most refugees was contaminated, contributing to the spread of Cholera. Water purification systems were brought in from many countries to alleviate this problem, however, distributing water, food, and other relief items was complicated because of poor infrastructure and refugee clogged roads.

In the hearing, there was considerable attention to the role played by the media. Some effort had been made to strategically place the press within range of relief efforts, however negative reports continued to place pressure on Congress to be more efficient. Estimates for the cost of the operation were at $250 million and the Department of Defense raised this supplemental total to $370 million. To demonstrate Congress's change of heart, $100 million was ear marked to restore the Emergency Response Fund, which Congress had offered earlier, and it was agreed that efforts needed to be undertaken to increase public awareness and support for relief efforts in Rwanda.[85] In general, the committee supported U.S. relief efforts.

In a 26 July hearing before the Senate Subcommittee on African Affairs, Illinois Senator Paul Simon questioned whether the United States responded "as adequately as

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83. See United States Senate, *Hearing before the Committee on Armed Services United States Senate: Department of Defense Briefing on the Situation in Rwanda*, 103rd Cong., 2nd Sess., 25 July 1994, 23–4.
84. Ibid., 15.
85. Ibid., 16–7, 24.

we should have early on."[86] Brian Atwood, Administrator for the Agency for International Development said, "I think the response of the United States since the exodus began, only a few days ago on the 13th of July has been beyond reproach."[87] The subcommittee largely credited the United States for responding to the plight of the refugees, even though it began to question why and how the United States had failed to take action earlier in response to catastrophes abroad.

Congress did not support involvement in Rwanda until the media became involved and CNN began to broadcast images of refugees in Goma. Once public pressure came to bear, Congress was more willing to commit financial resources to reduce the humanitarian suffering. In late July, Congress was more willing to allocate funds for the relief effort, and also contributed to the Emergency Relief Fund that had been cut completely after Somalia. When it came to sending troops, however, Congress stipulated that funds were to be used only for non-military, humanitarian operations and set a pull out deadline for 1 October 1994.[88] Increased willingness to assist those in need did not mean injecting American troops into civil conflict.

AMERICAN PUBLIC OPINION AND THE MEDIA

During the early weeks of the crisis in Rwanda events were understood by the American public as violence in a collapsing state that was torn apart by ancient tribal hatred. A front-page article in the *Washington Post* on 14 April 1994, reported a: "Free-

86. United States Senate, *Hearing before the Subcommittee on African Affairs of the Committee on Foreign Relations*, 103 Cong., 2nd sess., 26 July 1994, 1.
87. "Testimony of Honorable Brian Atwood," in ibid., 5.
88. See Klinghoffer, *International Dimension of Genocide*, 94.

For-All Slaughter ... Among Tribes, Rebels, Army and Roving Gangs."[89] The media, like the international community, did not understand the planned genocide in Rwanda for what it was: violence by the Rwandan government against its own people, while being misrepresented to the outside world. According to Linda Melvern, the "media's failure to report that genocide was taking place, and thereby generate public pressure for something to be done to stop it, contributed to the international inaction."[90] Certainly, this failure contributed to the fact that the American public was unwilling to sacrifice American soldiers to settle an ongoing conflict on a distant continent, until the injustice of it all came to light. As Catherine Newbury stated, "the deaths and brutality that have most mesmerized public attention."[91]

While American public opinion was generally not in favor of military intervention in Rwanda, this shifted once the media showed the suffering in the Goma refugee camps. Steven Livingson and Todd Eachus examine the impact of television coverage in Rwanda on public opinion.[92] The television coverage is broken into three phases: no coverage prior to April 6, little coverage from April 6 until mid-July, and exclusive coverage of the Goma refugee camp but not the civil war after July. Livingston and Eachus conclude that television coverage almost exclusively focused on images of suffering after the genocide mainly because in April 1994, conditions in Rwanda were too dangerous to send reporters, not to mention inadequate staffing levels in African offices. Livingston and Eachus also point out that those "who carry out the massacre of civilians have no qualms

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89. Jennifer Parmelee, "Rwanda's 'Sad, Sad, Sad' Self-Imolation: Free-For-All Slaughter Continues among Tribes, Rebels, Army and Roving Gangs," *The Washington Post*, 14 April 1994, A1.

90. Melvern, "The Security Council," 109–10.

91. Catherine Newbury, "Background to Genocide: Rwanda," *A Journal of Opinion* 23, no. 2 (1995): 12.

92. They used quantitative analysis of ABC World News, CNN, NBC Nightly News, and CBS Nightly News for the five-month period of April to August 1994.

about killing journalists, as data from the Committee for the Protection of Journalists can attest."[93] Reporting was therefore largely left up to parachute journalists, who knew little or nothing about the region and its history.

Media coverage followed the development of U.S. policy, rather than informed it. Therefore, television coverage had a "minimal effect" on policy and gave the president latitude for a "limited policy response."[94] In addition to the low amount of media coverage of the Rwanda crisis, there was an emergence of other news, which was "actually eclipsing coverage of Rwanda by a significant degree."[95] These included the O. J. Simpson trial and the growing situation with Haitian refugees.

There were three news "stories" from the crisis in Rwanda. The first began in October 1990 with the Tutsi offensive into Rwandan territory that ultimately brought the French in to assist the Hutu government. The second began with the downing of Habyarimana's plane that killed not only the president of Rwanda, but also the president of Burundi. This event, the beginning of the genocide, was largely missed by outside viewers due to extremely hazardous conditions in Rwanda at the time. The third story began with Operation Turquoise, as it sparked the tremendous flow of displaced persons in Rwanda and refugees across the borders. It was during this time that the media made compelling footage of human suffering and consequently drew attention to the plight of the people there. As a result, the United States was pressured to act after CNN aired disturbing images of refugees and the American public saw them, then the Clinton administration expressed sympathy and horror with the victims.

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93. Steven Livingston and Todd Eachus, "Rwanda: United States Policy and Television Coverage," in *The Path of A Genocide*, ed. Adelman, and Suhrke, 223.
94. Ibid., 224, and 210.
95. Ibid., 218.

The role of the international and U.S. media during the Rwanda crisis was that it missed reporting the genocide, until it was nearly over. This was because few reporters in Africa received information, as outside attention was diverted. Besides, misinformation campaigns from within, Rwanda decried accusations of atrocities. Moreover, leadership in Rwanda shut down communications so that information was difficult to receive.

The Director of the U.S. Committee for Refugees, Roger Winter, attempted to dispel the belief that the conflict was merely tribal in nature, but his article was only picked up by a Toronto paper and made little impact in the United States.[96] On 28 April Oxfam published a report with the first use of the term "genocide." This article reportedly placed pressure on the Clinton administration shifting rhetoric from hard line noninvolvement to sympathy and concern. An international inquiry determined that "although the coverage had been handicapped by danger on the ground, the press, in characterizing the genocide as tribal anarchy, was fundamentally irresponsible."[97] Such reporting contributed to the ability of the Rwandan government to commit genocide without being discovered until too late to save lives. Moreover, this type of reporting also increased the impunity of those involved, as events and names were not documented and were more easily forgotten or covered up.

In an oft-cited article from 10 June, Douglas Jehl explains that "the Clinton administration has instructed its spokesmen not to describe the deaths there as genocide,

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96. Roger Winter, "Power, not Tribalism, Stokes Rwanda's Slaughter," *Globe and Mail*, Toronto, 14 April 1994.

97. Linda Melvern, *A People Betrayed*, 138.

even though some senior officials believe that is exactly what they represent."[98] The check on rhetoric was partly aimed at the American public, according to administration officials, if the United States used the word genocide, then "it would be natural—and unwelcome—for voters to expect that the response would include dispatching troops."[99]

Media reports about U.S. delaying tactics to provide assistance in Rwanda helped pressure the administration to move faster on delivering promised APCs by air, rather than surface, saving three weeks delivery time.[100] When the French intervened to create a safe zone on 23 June 1994, Hutu refugees went into, and Tutsi fled away from the area. Photographs taken from the refugee camp in Goma were published around the world, and increased pressure on the international community to help. Thus, the "CNN factor" prompted an "uproar of public outrage,"[101] and within three days, U.S. troops were in Goma distributing humanitarian aid.

Polling data regarding public opinion at the time of the crisis in Rwanda is largely unavailable. However, there were two relevant questions regarding Rwanda in a Gallup poll taken between 7 and 25 October 1994.[102] Responding to the first question, only 3 percent of those polled thought the U.S. response to the Rwanda situation was excellent, while 17 percent thought the U.S. response was good, 28 percent thought it was fair, 29 percent dismissed it as poor, and 23 percent were unsure. Even though 29 percent of the respondents found the U.S. response to the Rwanda situation poor, among the majority of

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98. Douglas Jehl, "Officials Told to Avoid Calling Rwanda Killings 'Genocide,'" *New York Times*, 10 June 1994, 8A.

99. Ibid.

100. See for example, Gordon, "United States to Supply 60 Vehicles."

101. Melvern, *A People Betrayed*, 219.

102. "Government Ratings Africa Diplomacy," *Gallup Organization*, 15 October 1995. The author received questions USGALLUP.94CFRP.R15E and USGALLUP.94CFRP.R16BX upon request on 19 February 2002.

respondents who held an opinion, 62 percent were not opposed.[103] This suggests that public opinion was more likely to agree with Clinton's response to the Rwanda crisis, even after a media event had taken place.

Based on the responses to this question, a larger portion of the American public believed that the United States should not have intervened militarily in Rwanda to halt the civil war, the ethnic hostilities, or the genocide. It also indicates that the majority of Americans felt that Clinton did the right thing to help provide humanitarian assistance to the refugee camps. In light of the media attention to the refugees in Goma in July, August and later, it is telling that 29 percent of the respondents were unsure of how they felt about the way the United States responded to the situation in Rwanda. This is not unusual in polls, especially when there is a low level of knowledge in the United States about the area in question.

The second question in the poll asked whether the respondent believed that the United States does or does not have a vital political, economic, or security interest in Rwanda. Among the respondents, 35 percent said that the United States does have interest in Rwanda, 46 percent said that it does not have interest in Rwanda, and 19 percent were not sure. Of those respondents with an opinion, a majority of 57 percent thought the United States did not have any interests in Rwanda.[104] While this is not an overwhelming majority, it does confirm that more Americans believed there was no reason to go to Rwanda. As we have already seen in the previous section, this position was reflected in the U.S. Congress as well.

Public opinion held a good deal of sway on policy makers, and television images

103. This figure is a percentage of only those with an opinion. It excludes those without an opinion.
104. This number excludes those without an opinion.

played a large role in increasing public awareness and subsequently prompting the United States to take action. While the media remained largely critical of U.S. inaction during the genocide, television coverage in Rwanda did not develop until reporters were able to safely enter the area and to document refugee flows and increased suffering in surrounding camps.

Although polling evidence indicates that American public opinion mildly supported the policy set by the Clinton administration in not becoming involved in what was thought to be a long-term civil and ethnic conflict, the media coverage of human suffering brought about a reevaluation of U.S. policy. Therefore, early media coverage of the situation in Rwanda, including civil war and genocide, was a key missing element for prompting the United States to intervene and stop bloodshed in Rwanda. In conjunction, the television coverage, particularly of the Goma refugee situation beginning in late June 1994, brought attention to the crisis in July and August and led the American public to support relief efforts. Indeed, the change of heart in public opinion increased the likelihood that policy makers would follow suit.

U.S. INTERESTS

This section explains the actions and the rhetoric of the Clinton administration during the crisis in Rwanda. As already explained, the United States initially perceived the violence as renewed civil war. After witnessing Belgian peacekeepers suffer a similar fate as had the American Rangers in Somalia, and the United States was more convinced than ever not to intervene with force. Barry Blechman shows that a lack of public interest in paying the price of foreign intervention is an important part of what he calls

the "intervention dilemma," in which "intervening governments can only rarely use peaceful instruments of conflict resolution knowing that they could credibly threaten military intervention should peaceful means fail."[105] Blechman points to the key reason for Clinton's decision not to intervene with force in Rwanda: the UN went along with the United States, until France decided in late June to unilaterally intervene to save their Hutu allies.

This was an important time in this crisis, because during June and July Clinton changed policy on Rwanda. This shift was a direct result of the increasing numbers of displaced persons and refugees in and around Rwanda, who were fleeing violence. Once conditions in refugee camps became known in the United States, the public and the Congress shifted to favoring humanitarian assistance. Clinton responded to this domestic pressure and sent troops, but only to distribute humanitarian relief.

In January 1994, the CIA reported that renewed hostilities in Rwanda could kill as many as 500,000 people. Their estimate was low. A month later, the United States issued a travel advisory for Rwanda and opposed Belgian requests to enlarge the UNAMIR mandate, force levels, or rules of engagement. The United States resisted action in Rwanda, because of high costs associated with operations in Africa. Besides, the United States did not want to become embroiled in another Somalia situation, in which peacemaking operations failed.

Initial Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) reports of the 7 April violence in Rwanda were largely interpreted as renewed civil war. The stated White House policy regarding intervening in civil war stipulated that the United States had nothing to do in

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105. Barry M. Blechman, "The Intervention Dilemma," *The Washington Quarterly* 18, no. 3 (1995): 65.

Rwanda. Moreover, Jones asserts that the United States "had exactly one foreign direct investment in Rwanda, a minimal presence, and in general no special interest in the country."[106] After U.S. nationals were evacuated to Burundi, the U.S. embassy in Kigali closed on 10 April. The interpretation of early massacres as genocide reduced to civil war delayed reports from reaching President Clinton until around April 20, when the CIA published a report of genocide. The DIA made estimates of the initial killings based on satellite photographic intelligence taken on 7 April. These estimates were low, because the figures were extrapolations of counted observable bodies in the outdoor areas that were visible to the satellite. Possibly due to the low figures, this intelligence was dismissed as renewed civil war by other agencies such as the Pentagon, Department of State, the Central Intelligence Agency, and the National Security Council. As a result, Kuperman asserts that "key agencies in Washington . . . either failed to absorb this information or explicitly rejected it as unreliable and thus did not become aware of the genocide until further evidence emerged on or after April 20."[107]

When Belgium formally withdrew from UNAMIR on 14 April 1994, one State Department official said, "you can't overstate the impact on our policy process of the Belgians leaving. People were saying, 'How can we get in, if it is so bad the Belgians have to leave?'"[108] Immediately, the United States said that without a cease-fire in Rwanda, there was no role for a peacekeeping mission,[109] and after some debate in the UN Security Council, the United States on April 15 considered withdrawing completely from UNAMIR, but reduced UNAMIR instead.

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106. Jones, *Peacemaking in Rwanda*, 75.
107. Kuperman, *Limits of Humanitarian Intervention*, 36–37.
108. Quoted in Burkhalter, "Question of Genocide,"46. Burkhalter outlines the bureaucratic politics behind the U.S. decision to stay out of Rwanda.

The United States first used the term "genocide" in a CIA report on April 19, which translated and published a 17 April RPF radio announcement that the "world cannot and should not forget the genocide which is being perpetrated in Rwanda today."[110] Human Rights Watch immediately wrote to the UN Security Council about concerns regarding genocide, and on 21 April 1994, the UN Security Council Resolution 912 withdrew most of the UNAMIR troops.

After Oxfam's press release on 28 April and lengthy debate in the Security Council on the official use of the word genocide, the United States and the U.K. decided to refrain from using the word. On 30 April, Clinton made a one-minute radio address to Rwanda, saying that he "hoped that all Rwandans would recognize their common bonds of humanity." Rather than a reproach for the massacres, the speech reassured the Rwandan extremists that the United States would take no action.

In a 29 April letter, UN Secretary General Boutros Boutros-Ghali petitioned the Security Council to increase UNAMIR troops and mandate, but by 30 April, the U.S. position on Rwanda had become key to UN Security Council decisions. U.S. representative to the UN, Ambassador Madeleine Albright worked to block the dispatch of troops by delaying negotiations in the UN Security Council in two ways. First, it applied PDD 25 closely, limiting U.S. involvement in peacekeeping missions by insisting that a ceasefire be reached in Rwanda's civil war prior to deployment of UNAMIR II, and that clear pre-planning should be solidified before deployment, and only a few hundred troops should be dispatched to secure the area. Second, there was considerable

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109. For a thorough discussion of the debate in the UN Security Council, see Des Forges, *Leave None*, 629.

110. (Clandestine) Radio Muhabura, 1900 GMT, 17 April 1994, in FBIS–AFR–94–075, 19 April 1994, quoted in Kuperman, *Limits of Humanitarian Intervention,* 31.

debate about whether it was appropriate to use the term genocide in the situation in Rwanda. If the international community were to employ the word, then it would automatically invoke the *1948 Geneva Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide*. This would require that the international community take action to halt the genocide immediately, regardless of where it was taking place. Thus, military intervention into a conflict would require high costs, both monetarily and in terms of human life. In early May, UN Secretary General Boutros Boutros-Ghali began to solicit African states to contribute forces. A few days later, on 5 May, Clinton's PDD 25 officially responded to Somalia, specifying that U.S. ground troops should not be deployed to humanitarian interventions in the midst of ongoing civil wars.

Increased pressure from the UN, Congress, the media, and public opinion led the Clinton administration to gradually give way, change its rhetoric, and take steps to provide some assistance. On 27 May, the United States imposed an arms embargo against Rwanda. Commander Dallaire asked on 1 June that the United States supply APCs, but the vehicles were delayed for several weeks, due to negotiations between the United States and UN on cost sharing.[111] After the UN used the term "genocide" on 8 June, international pressure increased to at least stop the killings and to provide humanitarian assistance. Congress for its part opposed military intervention, but agreed to humanitarian relief operations if they were ended by 1 October. Clinton complied and ended Operation Support Hope on 27 August 1994. Congressional criticism of Clinton for allowing delays in assistance and deployments to Rwanda pressured Clinton move more quickly to get UN forces to Rwanda.[112]

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111. See Gordon, "United States to Supply 60 Vehicles."
112. See discussion in the above Congress section.

A shift occurred in White House rhetoric amidst public pressure for not calling the genocide by its proper name. The widely read Jehl article appeared against Clinton not using the word genocide.[113] On the same day, 10 June, Secretary of State Warren Christopher admitted that genocide had occurred and that "if there is any particular magic in calling it genocide, I have ho hesitancy in saying that."[114] However, on 17 June, the *Washington Post* reported that administration officials claimed that the 1948 Genocide Convention "enables," but does not require states to detect genocide and intervene against it.[115]

France's Operation Turquoise began on 23 June, the same day that the U.S. APCs arrived in Uganda for training and the $10 million bill was sent to the UN.[116] On the surface, Operation Turquoise relieved the international community of the responsibility for helping Rwanda, and it "did more to slow the U.N. force's recruitment and deployment than to hasten it."[117] Regional security began to emerge as a more pressing issue with never-before-seen numbers of refugees overwhelmed the entire region.

Media attention to the plight of the refugees brought pressure on Clinton from the public. By 15 July 1994, the Clinton administration announced that the United States no longer recognized the interim government of Rwanda. The White House issued a statement that the United States would no longer "allow representatives of a regime that supports genocidal massacres to remain on our soil."[118] The United States stated that it

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113. Jehl, "Officials Told."
114. Quoted by Gordon, "United States to Supply 60 Vehicles."
115. Thomas W. Lippman, "United States Aides Fear New Violence in Burundi," *Washington Post*, 17 June 1994, A19.
116. "France Helps in Rwanda—so far," *New York Times*, 14 July 1994, A16N, A22L.
117. Burkhalter, "Question of Genocide," 53.
118. *The White House*, Statement by the Press Secretary, 15 July 1994, quoted in Des Forges, *Leave None*, 690.

would move to remove the Rwandan representative from the Security Council. On the same day, the administration ordered the Rwandan embassy closed and froze its assets. More importantly, on 16 July, Clinton announced "an increase in aid of $35 million to handle this problem" in the Goma refugee camps.[119] On 19 July, the Cholera epidemic was rapidly taking lives and the United States announced an additional $41 million to respond. After pictures of the horrible conditions in the refugee camps began to hit the international media, the Clinton administration dispatched 4000 troops to reinforce hundreds of civilian relief workers to the Goma refugee camp in Zaire. On 22 July, Clinton announced that it was preparing to send troops to help refugees, and he described the camps conditions as the worst humanitarian crisis in a generation.

The U.S. mandate in Rwanda "was to provide humanitarian assistance as opposed to nation-building or peacekeeping," despite continuing violence and lack of infrastructure.[120] The *After Action Review* for Operation Support Hope hails the Joint Task Force mission a complete success from beginning to end, using 3600 troops without casualties. Davis Thomas defends Clinton, writing that the president "made the right choice" according to U.S. strategic interests, because Central Africa poses little security threat to the United States, little threat of economic loss, and little threat of diminished U.S. sphere of influence.[121] Clearly, Clinton could and did remain highly cautious after Somalia, as exemplified by PDD 25. Moreover, Clinton kept a close eye on public

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119. These figures are taken from United States House, "Testimony of Honorable Brian Atwood," in United States Senate, *Hearing before the Subcommittee on African Affairs*, 26 July 1994, 5.

120. See United States European Command Headquarters, *Operation Support Hope*, 1.

121. Davis M. Thomas, "Commentary; Bill Clinton May be Sorry, but the President Made the Right Choice; Rwanda: After Somalia, with Haiti and Bosnia Looming, Sending Troops would have been a Strategic and Political Mistake," *Los Angeles Times*, 1 April 1998, B7.

opinion and followed a course that generated least public disapproval. Indeed, it was not until images of refugee suffering reached the American public and brought them to demand action that the Clinton administration sent relief troops. By then, however, the civil war was mostly resolved and the troops were sent into a relatively safe situation. In sum, there were vital and peripheral interests: vital for France, which intervened; and peripheral for the United States, which did not intervene.

CONCLUDING REMARKS

This chapter set out to examine the extent of influence exerted by the five variables of foreign policy decisions regarding intervention, and how they shaped the foreign policy of President Clinton. The overarching consideration in this case study is that the United States blocked international timely action to stop the progress of genocide. As a result, the United States contributed to inaction, and obstructing a multilateral effort to halt the genocide.[122] The Clinton administration has been thoroughly criticized for refusing to become involved in Rwanda.

Four years after the crisis in Rwanda, Clinton gave a speech at the Airport in Kigali on 26 March 1998. Clinton apologized to Rwanda and the world for not responding in a more timely fashion to those needing help in Rwanda. He said that at the time, he "did not fully appreciate the depth and speed, with which you were being engulfed by this unimaginable terror," and admitted that "we did not immediately call

122. One of the most critical essays about the Clinton Rwanda policy is found in Samantha Power, "Bystanders to Genocide: Why the United States Let the Rwandan Tragedy Happen," *The Atlantic Monthly*, September 2001: 84–108.

these crimes by their rightful name: genocide."[123] He said that there had been three main errors made by the international community, including: "not acting quickly to halt the killing; permitting refugee camps in neighboring Zaire to become havens for Hutu killers, and not immediately labeling the slaughter 'genocide.'"[124]

Many sources point at the United States' inconsistent and apathetic behavior as the main reason that little action was seen from the West, and base their analysis on the morality of foreign policy, rather than questions of national interest.[125] The United States began to provide humanitarian aid on 22 July 1994 in the aftermath of the genocide.

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123. Quoted in James Bennet, "Clinton Declares United States, with World, Failed Rwandans," *New York Times*, 26 March 1998, A1, A12L; and Tim Weiner, "Critics Say United States Ignored C.I.A. Warnings of Genocide in Rwanda," *New York Times*, 26 March 1998, A12.

124. Ibid.

125. For an excellent example, see African Rights, *Rwanda*.

CHAPTER V

CASE STUDY ON DEMOCRATIC GOVERNANCE IN HAITI

This chapter focuses on the 1991 democratic crisis in Haiti, and the subsequent U.S. intervention to restore Haiti's democratically elected President Bertrand Aristide in 1994. In assessing why, how, and when the Clinton administration decided to intervene, this study begins with a brief historical section and then looks specifically at the five international political variables outlined in Chapter III.

HISTORICAL OVERVIEW

The 1991–94 crisis is yet another chapter in Haiti's tumultuous history that sparked the interest of the largest hemispheric power, the United States.[1] There are at least six important themes found in the history of Haiti. These include: 1) colonization, 2) tension between the elites and the masses, 3) U.S. occupation that brought the military to the political fore, 4) a tradition of authoritarian leadership that lacks respect for human rights, 5) long-term demographic shifts in regional refugee movement, and 6) U.S. responses to refugee issues within the context of larger security interests in the region. Historian Anthony Maingot identifies three basic layers throughout Haitian history, including the importance of hard won independence, a fierce sense of autonomy among Haitian elites above the masses, and the pervasive poverty stricken post-plantation

1. For good overviews of Haitian history, language and culture, see Joan Dayan, *Haiti, History, and the Gods* (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 1995); Alex Dupuy, *Haiti in the New World Order: Limits of the Democratic Revolution* (Oxford: Westview Press, 1997); and Charles R. Foster and Albert Valdman, ed., *Haiti—Today and Tomorrow: An Interdisciplinary Study* (Lanham, MD: University Press of America, 1984).

economy.[2] U.S. responses to regional instability varied throughout Haiti's history, covering the range from occupation, to monetary aid, to refugee repatriation, to embargo, and back to military intervention.

Early colonization of Haiti by the Spanish and French created lasting ties between Europe and Haiti. During its colonial period, Haiti developed a plantation economy based on slavery and designed primarily for exporting luxury consumables, such as sugar, molasses, rum, coffee, and tobacco to Europe. Trade in the region improved consistently until 1790, at which time the "Caribbean was the epicenter of the New World due to novel food items."[3]

Over time, a three-tiered society developed and social tension between groups led to long-lasting political instability. The upper layer of the social hierarchy was dominated by wealthy plantation owning Europeans. Racial boundaries within Saint Dominique, as Haiti was known then, grew complicated because children stemming from the union of French colonial planters and female slaves were "frequently recognized by their fathers, sent to France to be educated and empowered to inherit."[4] Thus, a powerful middle class sprang up from these land-owning children that maintained deep ties to the French.

The introduction of this middle class into the colonial arrangement made for resentment between groups, destabilizing the internal balance of power in Haiti. The lowest strata in the social hierarchy consisted of the majority of people, who were of

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2. Anthony P. Maingot, *The United States and the Caribbean: Challenges of an Asymmetrical Relationship* (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1994), 205.
3. Sidney W. Mintz, "Can Haiti Change?" *Foreign Affairs* 74, no. 1 (1995): 74.
4. Ibid., 75.

African descent, owned no land and were mainly slaves. By 1791 social tensions erupted in a slave revolution lasting until 1804. It ended colonial rule and destroyed much of the existing plantation economy. Saint Dominique ceased to exist and Haiti was born. Even though Haiti had won independence, it remained haunted by its colonial past, as the masses replaced earlier resentment of colonial rulers with the new resentment of lighter skinned leadership that would lead to renewed revolution.

Long before the end of the cold war, the United States came to view the Caribbean as part of a vital sphere of influence—its backyard. In 1832, the Monroe Doctrine placed Latin America within the U.S. sphere of influence and warned Europe's colonial powers to stay clear. Viewed by some as coercive, the Monroe Doctrine set the course of U.S. foreign policy toward Latin America.[5] The United States dominated the Western Hemisphere, and increasingly justified intervention as efforts to maintain regional stability.

German investment in Haiti on the eve of the First World War increased U.S. security concerns in the region. Anthony Maingot explains that in 1910, about 200 Germans "controlled 80 percent of the island's international trade, all the major utilities, and the one railroad and tramcar line."[6] To stem the tide of German influence, the United States occupied Haiti from 1915 until 1934. Joseph Tulchin and Ralph Espach state that during the early twentieth century, "the islands of the Caribbean were perceived as strategic points of control over the primary crossroads of global commerce and a

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5. See Martha L. Cottam, *Images and Interventions: U.S. Policies in Latin America* (Pittsburgh, PA: University of Pittsburgh Press, 1994), 4, 141.

6. Anthony P. Maingot, "Haiti: The Political Rot Within," *Current History* 94, no. 589 (1995): 59. For more information on German interests in Haiti, see Gaddis Smith, "From Intervention to Intervasion," *Current History* 94, no. 589 (1995): 54–55.

permanent U.S. presence in the region became a key element of the nation's security agenda."[7] Haiti, situated just 90 miles off the coast of Florida, was too close to the United States to allow either a German presence, or the pirate vessels that threatened budding trade.

U.S. occupation marked a shift in Haitian culture and politics, by creating a military in Haiti, which provided a new path, aside from the priesthood, for peasants to rise to power.[8] Military loyalties bred and institutionalized corruption in Haiti over the years, and enabled the rise of General Duvalier, who used social division to lead the Duvalier Revolution. The majority black population revolted against the elite light skinned upper class and made Jean Claude Duvalier president in 1958. He ruled Haiti with an iron fist and in 1971, made himself president-for-life by law. Duvalier reinforced a long tradition of authoritarian repression that eliminated many of the wealthy elites in Haiti, but failed to improve living conditions for the people at large, and resistance mounted.

Increased population contributed to severe environmental and economic degradation, and depleted land resources including agriculture and forestation. By 1980, the arable land was cut by more than half and worsening humanitarian and economic conditions left many without hope of escaping extreme poverty. In 1982, President Ronald Reagan's Caribbean Basin Initiative was a stopgap measure to improve the regional economy and, more importantly, to stem increasing numbers of refugees moving to America.

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7. Joseph S. Tulchin, and Ralph H. Espach, ed., *Security in the Caribbean Basin: The Challenge of Regional Cooperation* (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2000), 2.
8. See Mintz, "Can Haiti Change?" 85.

A new era dawned over Haiti, as emerging signs of democratic institution building brought the first municipal elections in 1983. Jorge Dominguez asserts that Haitians are deeply attached to liberal democratic institutions and respect human rights as a result of experiences of subjugation.[9] Haiti was the poorest country in the Western Hemisphere, and by 1990, poverty was unavoidable for most people. Migration increasingly functioned as a population pressure-valve, as people moved to towns, cities, and other countries. The Dominican Republic just next door was unable to absorb the large numbers of Haitian refugees and they spilled into the region.

The Crisis

In a free election on 16 December 1990, Catholic Priest, Jean-Bertrand Aristide, was elected President of a "bankrupt" Haiti.[10] Victory for democracy in Haiti lasted less than a year, because Aristide's policies advocated sweeping reform, and threatened elites, the military and the small middle class. As a result, the crisis in Haiti began on 30 September 1991, when General Raoul Cedras overthrew Aristide and installed a military government. Brutality under the Cedras regime increased the numbers of migrants and presented a security challenge to the larger region.

The U.S. response to increased numbers of Haitian refugees was mostly to return them to Haiti. White House figures show that of the 34,000 refugees picked up in the Caribbean between September 1991 and May 1992, around 9,000 were allowed to claim

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9. Jorge I. Dominguez, "The Caribbean Question: Why Has Liberal Democracy (Surprisingly) Flourished?" in *Democracy in the Caribbean*, ed. Jorge I. Dominguez, Robert A. Pastor, and R. Delisle Worrel (Baltimore, MD: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1993), 1–25.

10. Maingot, *The United States and the Caribbean*, 217.

political asylum with 6,000 of those in the United States,[11] which accepted more than 10,000 refugees in the month of May alone. The refugee holding site at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba quickly filled to capacity at 12,000. Despite international criticism, former President Bush thought that most refugees had fled for economic, rather than political reasons, and were therefore not eligible for asylum in the United States.

After Cedras took power, the OAS imposed sanctions on Haiti in October 1991, but the Bush administration's policies largely circumvented the embargo for U.S.-based firms in Haiti. Dupuy argues that this "supported the interests of the Haitian military and bourgeoisie and was more responsive to the Right within the U.S. Congress, the CIA, and the State Department, all of which opposed Aristide's return."[12] Bush's strategy weakened the embargo, downplayed human rights abuses, accused Aristide of intransigence, and always wanted more concessions from Aristide. This approach possibly conveyed a lack of credible threat to Cedras, because he refused to step down.

To force Cedras out of power, the OAS amended its charter with the Protocol of Washington on 23 February 1992, condemning the overthrow of democracy in Haiti and granting general amnesty for Cedras and his supporters if they would step down.[13] For some, "Washington was reluctant to commit itself to a formula based on substituting

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11. See Michael Wines, "Switching Policy, U.S. Will Return Refugees to Haiti," *New York Times*, 25 May 1992: 4L.

12. Dupuy, *Haiti in the New World Order*, 139.

13. Organization of American States (hereafter cited as OAS), "Protocol of Amendments to the Charter of the Organization of the American States: The Protocol of Washington," 14 December 1992 (www.oas.org/juridico/english/Treaties/a-56.htm, accessed on 20 September 2001).

Aristide for the Duvalierist armed forces."[14] The lack of U.S. resolve to hold the embargo rewarded Cedras, the Haitian Parliament declared the Protocol of Washington illegal on 6 March 1992. A few days later, the Haitian Parliament rejected the international plan to restore Aristide. By late May, the refugee situation threatened to increase further and Bush reinstated the policy to intercept refugee boats and return all undocumented passengers. In the United States, the refugee issue grew more politically charged, particularly in Florida.

In his campaign, Clinton promised to end Bush's repatriation policy. He fulfilled this promise as president, however, the reversal lasted only a matter of days. Clinton was compelled to reinstate Bush's repatriation policy, when numbers of migrants became unmanageable despite temporary facilities in the Dominican Republic and Florida. As numbers of migrants outpaced capacity, the immigration process was put into place onboard naval vessels. In the case of the Haitian crisis, outward migration drew international attention, and heightened regional security concerns. The United States was compelled to intervene due to a growing regional culture of migration.

U.S. ALLIES

U.S. allies demonstrated considerable support for the establishment and maintenance of democracy in Haiti. Early on, the international community heavily funded the elections that brought Aristide to the presidency in 1990. The bankrupt Haitian economy received an estimated $40 million of foreign funding with foreign

14. Morris Morley, and Chris McGillion, "'Disobedient' Generals and the Politics of Redemocratization: The Clinton Administration and Haiti," *Political Science Quarterly* 112, no. 3 (Fall 1997): 366.

civilian and military election supervision assistance for managing and conducting the election.[15] The most important U.S. ally in this case study was the Organization of American States (OAS), however the Caribbean Community [16]also strongly supported the intervention efforts. The OAS was "the first international organization to act in defense of democracy in Haiti."[17] Furthermore, the OAS was instrumental in crystallizing international consensus regarding action in Haiti, and then the United States stepped in to provide further leadership. The United States responded to a call from the OAS to protect regional stability. The actions of the OAS and the United States were received well in the UN and it authorized military intervention.

The Organization of American States (OAS)

The OAS response became the launching board for international action to reinstate democracy in Haiti and as a result, shaped international policy regarding Haiti throughout the crisis. The OAS in particular demonstrated significant interest in seeing democracy upheld in Haiti, and especially when exiled President Aristide asked the OAS for help, it was ready to comply.[18] The same day of the coup, the OAS Permanent Council condemned it, calling for an immediate meeting of the Ministers of Foreign

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15. See Anthony P. Maingot, "Haiti and Aristide: The Legacy of History," *Current History* 91, no. 562 (1992): 68.

16. The Caribbean Community (CARICOM) is a collection of 12 independent English-speaking states and one U.K. dependency in the Caribbean. CARICOM strongly supported UN Resolution 940 in a 12 August 1994 statement. See Statement by Strobe Talbott and John Deutch, "U.S.-CARICOM Efforts to Support UN Security Council Resolution 940," *U.S. Department of State Dispatch* 5, no. 36, 5 September 1994, 589–93. (http://netserv.lib.odu.edu:2263/itw/infomark/972/49/16121572w4/purl=rcl_EAIM_0_A 158..., accessed on 3 October 2001)

17. John C. Pierce, "The Haitian Crisis and the Future of Collective Enforcement of Democratic Governance," *Law and Policy in International Business* 27, no. 2 (1996): 482.

18. For analysis regarding the impact of diaspora on the struggle of overseas communities to unseat authoritarian regimes, including a case study on how Haitians in the United States impacted U.S. foreign

Affairs. On 3 October 1991 the Foreign Ministers passed OAS Resolution 1/91 supporting democratic governance in Haiti. A few days later, Aristide sent a letter to the OAS Secretary General to request assistance in restoring democratic leadership in Haiti.[19]

In resolution 2/91 on 8 October, the OAS again condemned the coup, rebuffed the illegal Haitian government, and urged "all member states to proceed immediately to freeze the assets of the Haitian State and to impose a trade embargo on Haiti."[20] The OAS wanted to force the military leaders to negotiate. In addition, the resolution requested UN members "to adopt the same measures" as those adopted by the OAS.[21] By doing so, the OAS Ministers made two significant decisions that influenced the unfolding of events after the coup and before the reinstatement of Aristide. Although, the ministers agreed to impose sanctions against Haiti, they preferred to forgo military intervention as stipulated in the OAS charter.

In a meeting on 10 October, the OAS Foreign Ministers considered a 7 October letter from Aristide and pledged further support. On the same day, the UN General Assembly drafted a resolution to uphold OAS sanctions. The OAS called upon its members to respect sanctions by placing an embargo on Haiti yet, to uphold sanctions in reality presented difficult challenges.[22] Some critics identified OAS actions as a "porous

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policy and intervention, see Yossi Shain, "Ethnic Diasporas and U.S. Foreign Policy," *Political Science Quarterly* 109, no. 5 (1994–5): 811–41.

19. See OAS, "The Ministers of Foreign Affairs Resolution 1/91: Support for Democrativ Government of Haiti," 3 October 1991.

20. OAS, "MRE/RES. 2/91: Support for Democracy in Haiti," 8 October 1991 (www.upd.oas.org/documents/basic/mreres%202%209leng.htm, accessed on 21 September 2001).

21. Claudette Antoine Werleigh, "Haiti and the Halfhearted," *The Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists* 49, no. 9 (1993): 21.

22. See UN, "General Assembly Resolution 7," 7 October 1992 (hereafter cited as: UN GA RES) (www.un.org/documents/ga/res/46/a46r007.htm, accessed on 6 October 2001).

embargo," which made high profits for a few well-positioned people in Haiti,[23] and countries, such as Panama, Venezuela and Colombia openly violated the embargo, while the United States partially lifted the embargo as early as November 1992 for U.S. companies. Moreover, the Dominican Republic remained a pipeline for goods flowing into Haiti. Monroe Leigh outlines some problems with imposing economic embargoes in general. He explains that

> they seldom achieve their declared objectives; that they deny trading opportunities to enterprises in the embargo-imposing country; that they bestow windfall profits on third-country traders; that economic embargoes are inherently illegal; that they despoil the poor and enrich the wealthy; that they fail to unseat the dictatorial regimes; that they are inherently immoral; that in American practice they almost always include extreme assertions of extraterritorial jurisdiction; and that most of our allies . . . consider American claims of extraterritorial jurisdiction violative of international law . . . and they usually entail serious domestic political embarrassment.[24]

Regardless of policy shortcomings, the OAS embargo made a strong enough statement that the United States considered complying.

An important breakthrough for the OAS came on 23 February 1992, when President-in-exile Aristide signed the Protocol of Washington. This document consists of amendments to the OAS Charter, condemning and suspending any member "whose democratically constituted government has been overthrown by force."[25] Unfortunately, the agreement failed to provide a deadline for the reinstatement of democracy. It also called for an interim prime minister in Haiti, as well as offered general amnesty for Cedras and his supporters, if they would to step down. On 6 March 1992, Cedras defied

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23. For a critical internal economic analysis of the effects of the Haitian embargo on Haiti and how it profited the few, see Werleigh, "Haiti and the Halfhearted," 22–23.

24. Monroe Leigh, "The Political Consequences of Economic Embargoes," *The American Journal of International Law* 89, no. 1 (1995): 74.

25. OAS, "Protocol of Washington."

the agreement by appointing Joseph Nerette as president and declared the Protocol of Washington illegal.[26]

In the 17 May 1992 meeting of the Ministers of Foreign Affairs, the OAS condemned "the disruption of the democratic system in Haiti and recommended the isolation of the *de facto* regime."[27] Cedras probably learned that there was little international resolve, and as Naom Chomsky stated, "the criminals are informed that they can do their work with impunity."[28] Cedras repeatedly rebuffed outside attempts to negotiate or restore President Aristide to power. OAS Resolution 3/92 on 17 May expressed hardened resolve to restore democratic rule in Haiti, as it intensified sanctions (excluding humanitarian assistance), and increased isolation of the military regime.[29] Member states were urged to deny port access to Haitian vessels, deny visas to Haitians, and freeze Haitian assets.

By the summer of 1992, the inability of the OAS to bring about a political solution became evident, and a major shift in policy was set into action. For example, the 9 June OAS Ministers of Foreign Affairs meeting passed resolution 6/94 to strengthen the mandate of the UN Mission In Haiti (UNMIH), passed by the UN on 16 June for a global oil and arms embargo.[30] Sanctions were credited with pressuring Cedras to negotiate the Governor's Island July 1993 agreement, which brought hope that the crisis could be resolved without force. The agreement consisted of eight main points. First, the UN

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26. "Haiti's President Won't Step Down," *Miami Herald*, 7 March 1992, A6.
27. OAS, "MRE/RES. 3/92: Restoration of Democracy in Haiti," 17 May 1992 (www.upd.oas.org, accessed on 20 September 2001).
28. Naom Chomsky, "Democracy Restored? Intervention in Haiti, its Meaning and Prospects," *Z Magazine* 7, no. 11 (1994): 51.
29. OAS, "MRE/RES, 3/92."
30. See UN, "Security Council Resolution 841," 16 June 1993 (hereafter cited as "SC/RES") (www.un.org/documents/scres.htm, accessed on 6 October 2001).

embargo would continue in force until ratification by the Haitian Assembly. Second, the Haitian Assembly would legislate reforms for the police and armed forces. Third, the preparations for Aristide's return would be made. Fourth, plans would be made for Haiti's economic recovery. Fifth, Cedras and his supporters would receive amnesty and go into retirement. Sixth, Aristide would name a new Prime Minister. Seventh, UN peacekeeping forces would assist in rebuilding the infrastructure of Haiti. Eighth, October 30 was set for Aristide's return and Haiti was given until 15 January 1994 to fulfill the agreement. An encouraging sign that Cedras would uphold the agreement was when he made a televised address urging Haitians to accept the agreement. The Haiti Assembly approved Aristide's appointment of Robert Malval as Prime Minister, and sanctions were quickly lifted.

Kate Doyle argues that the Governor's Island agreement was "profoundly flawed," mainly because of the assumption that Cedras was reliable to act as an "honest broker."[31] Generous measures of lifting sanctions unfortunately encouraged the Cedras regime, which immediately increased human rights violations, as the "army and police unleashed their thuggish paramilitary 'attaches,' who threatened Malval and a number of his cabinet ministers, and assassinated or attempted to murder prominent Aristide civilian and political supporters."[32] These practices indicated Cedras' intention to hold on to power as long as possible.

Despite these setbacks, the UN continued to implement the Governor's Island agreement in good faith, and dispatched peacekeepers to Haiti to address infrastructure

31. Kate Doyle, "Hollow Diplomacy in Haiti," *World Policy Journal* 11, no. 1 (1994): 53–4.
32. Morris Moreley and Chris McGillion, "'Disobedient' Generals," 369.

weaknesses.[33] On 11 October, the *USS Harlan County* set sail for Haiti carrying 200 lightly armed U.S. soldiers and 25 Canadian military trainers, but when it arrived, found the port blocked by vessels and a Cuban tanker was moored at the dock. The trip turned into a disaster for international negotiations, and the Haitian crisis took on a new urgency. Cedras' supporters blocked the docks, shouting Somalia, Somalia, and in the wake of the Somalia debacle only days before, the ship's captain U.S. Navy Commander Marvin E. Butcher ordered it to return to the United States.[34] The *Harlan County* incident was a clear victory for Cedras and served to embolden his home-front activities and intimidation tactics continued to increase. Yet, the incident also bolstered international resolve to reinstate democracy, partly because it embarrassed Clinton, who reinstated sanctions against Haiti, but also began planning a military alternative. Thus, the *Harlan County* incident was a turning point in the Haitian crisis, as hopes of restored democracy were dashed. Some argued that this event generated "an unintended but unmistakable sign of international disengagement from the Haitian crisis."[35] The incident brought pause to the international community, but deepened international understanding.

After the *Harlan County* incident, the UN Security Council took action without prompting by the OAS. UN Security Council Resolution 873 on 13 October 1993 confirmed UN readiness for additional measures if Cedras continued to violate the Governor's Island agreement. The spiral of violence in Haiti hit a high point with the 14

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33. See UN, "SC/RES 867," 23 September 1993 (www.un.org/documents/scres.htm, accessed on 6 October 2001).

34. For details, see Walter E. Kratchick, Robert F. Bauman, and John T. Fishel, *A Concise History of the U.S. Army in Operation Uphold Democracy* (Fort Leavenworth, KA: United States Army Command and General Staff College Press, 1997).

35. Pamela Constable, "Haiti: A Nation in Despair, A Policy Adrift," *Current History* 93, no. 581 (1994): 108.

October assassination of Justice Minister Guy Malary, since it marked the breakdown of the Governor's Island agreement, and this time, the UN Security Council responded quickly by increasing UN sanctions within two days. In addition, the failure of the Governor's Island agreement allowed the OAS to step aside so that others, especially the UN and United States, could engage. Restrained by its charter, the OAS profile diminished. By the 15 January 1994 deadline, none of the conditions set out in the Governor's Island agreement had been met by the Cedras regime.

After the *Harlan County* incident, the OAS prompted the UN to up its profile and spearhead international policy, and the OAS fell from the lead, even though it continued to support and pressure the UN to restore democracy to Haiti. The OAS by its charter could support sanctions, but not military force, and asked the UN and the United States to find alternatives other than the use of force. As the time for intervention approached a new OAS General Secretary took office. The United States favored former Colombian President Cesar Gaviria as the candidate of choice for the office, and "lobbied hard on Gaviria's behalf."[36] The new OAS Secretary General, Gaviria refused "to take a stand on plans for a U.S.-led invasion."[37] In his inaugural address, he said, "no one doubts that Cuba must undertake reforms leading to the restoration of democracy," indicating his support for the promotion of democracy in the region, if not specifically in Haiti.[38]

In summary, while the OAS initialized the international response to the coup in Haiti, the United States and the UN eventually took over leading the effort. Nonetheless,

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36. George Gedda, "New OAS Chief predicts Democracy will return to Haiti," *The Associated Press Political Service*, 15 September 1994 (http://ptg.djnr.com/ccroot/asp/publib/story.asp, accessed on 2 April 2002).

37. Ibid.

38. "Colombian Sworn as New OAS Chief," *The Boston Globe*, 16 September 1994.

regional allies were a very necessary component for bringing about a military solution to the Haitian crisis, if only by catalyzing initial international response.

THE UNITED NATIONS

This section discusses the UN response to the September 1991 coup in Haiti. The argument made here is that UN success in Haiti was a result of cooperation between international organizations at the request of member states. More specifically, the UN supported the effort to restore democracy to Haiti only after the OAS requested action. In fact, the OAS set the tone for international action against the Haitian military leaders until momentum in the UN led it to spearhead the effort. Moreover, once the UN began to lead, the United States stepped up its involvement, and leadership rotated between them.

After the coup, the OAS immediately convened and formulated a plan for international action against the illegal military government in Haiti. Despite the fact the Aristide addressed the UN General Assembly at the end of September, the first resolution passed in the UN on 8 October. The resolution sought member action "consistent with the steps already taken by the OAS,"[39] and on 10 October 1991, the UN Security Council passed a further resolution to uphold OAS sanctions.[40] The next day, the UN General Assembly requested that the Secretary-General consider implementing OAS requests.[41]

As already explained, increased flows of refugees in 1991 heightened regional

39. John C. Pierce, "The Haitian Crisis and the Future," 481.
40. See UN, "SC/RES 45/2," *United Nations*, 10 October 1991.
41. UN, "General Assembly Resolution 46/7," 11 October 1991 (hereafter cited as UN "GA/RES/") (un.org/documents/ga/res/46/a46r007.htm, accessed on 16 October 2001).

tension and brought the problem into the international limelight. International concerns increased because of the threat to regional stability generated by Haitian refugees in neighboring countries, and merited UN General Assembly Resolution 46/138, requesting assistance and calling international attention to the "fate of the Haitian nationals who are fleeing the country."[42] UN Resolution 47/20 reiterated concerns put forth earlier regarding refugees and human rights violations in Haiti, and urged increased humanitarian assistance from the international community.[43] It further called on member states to abide by international law within the UN framework and to cease providing Haitian illegal leaders with military assistance, petroleum, munitions, or arms. The resolution also authorized the deployment of the International Civilian Mission to Haiti, a joint project with the OAS, to verify human rights compliance.

The UN played an increasingly significant role in pressuring Cedras beginning in December 1992, and UN General Assembly Resolution 47/143 reported that Cedras' regime was practicing "flagrant human rights violations," including "summary executions, arbitrary arrests and detentions, torture, searches without warrant, rape, restrictions on freedom of movement, expression, assembly and association and the repression of popular demonstrations calling for the return of President Jean-Bertrand Aristide."[44] Further, it expressed concern regarding refugees and urged humanitarian assistance.

On 16 June 1993, the UN Security Council passed Resolution 841, imposing a

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42. UN, "GA/RES/46/138," 17 December 1991 (un.org/documents/ga/res/46/a46r138, accessed on 16 October 2001).

43. UN, "GA/RES/47/20," 24 November 1992 (un.org/documents/ga/res/47/a47r20, accessed on 16 October 2001).

44. UN, "GA/RES/47/143," 18 December 1992 (un.org/documents/ga/res/47/a47r143, accessed on 16 October 2001).

global oil and arms embargo on Haiti. It was widely thought that UN sanctions against Haiti were "responsible for the major breakthrough of the Governor's Island agreement" on 3 July 1993.[45] The agreement brought hope that the crisis could be resolved without military force, and on 27 and 31 August 1993, UN Security Council resolutions 861and 862 lifted sanctions against Haiti in good faith. Thus, the international community rewarded the Haitian junta by suspending all regional and global sanctions. In keeping with the Governor's Island agreement, the UN Security Council Resolution 867 on 23 September 1993 approved the dispatch of United States and Canadian peacekeepers to go to Haiti to help with infrastructure issues. Unfortunately, these measures of generosity encouraged the Cedras regime to break the agreement, and negotiations stalled in the next months. As discussed above, the early October *USS Harlan County* diplomatic disaster forced the UN to take action, and Resolution 873 on 13 October 1993, prepared for additional measures as necessary. After the 14 October assassination of Justice Minister Guy Malary, the UN responded quickly with UN Security Council Resolution 875. The resolution increased UN sanctions, and included an oil and arms embargo. The 30 October date for Aristide's reinstatement came and went without fulfillment, and by the 15 January 1994 deadline, Cedras had clearly not complied with any of the Governor's Island agreement conditions.

During the first half of 1994, the UN rhetoric sharpened considerably leading up to the momentous July resolution that authorized the use of military force. Following the Clinton administration's late April appeal, the UN shift took place in the form of UN Security Council Resolution 917 on 6 May. It marked a strong departure from previous

45. Pierce, "The Haitian Crisis and the Future," 106.

resolutions, as is noticeable in the extended length of the document (just over six pages), as compared to previous resolutions (usually two to three pages). Moreover, the document employed rhetoric that was more severe than previous documents, for example, using stronger phrases, such as "commending" efforts to bring compliance, "strongly condemning" the extra-judicial killings, arbitrary arrests, illegal detentions, abductions, rape and enforced disappearances, and "strongly urges." The urgency of the document is evident in the use of words such as "without delay" (used three times), expeditiously (used once), and "in the shortest time possible." Not only is this document more severe than earlier resolutions, but it repeats an earlier warning of "additional measures." It lists sanctions imposed that are in line with those requested by Clinton, including limitations on flights, visas, assets, imports/exports/trade, and traffic by sea. It also reiterates demands and other conditions found in the Governor's Island agreement and promises to end sanctions with compliance. When the content of UN Security Council Resolution 917 is compared to Clinton's April appeal, it is surprisingly similar. Two shifts had occurred: 1) the United States began to take on a more assertive role in determining the direction of international policy on the Haitian Crisis, and 2) the UN had shifted its rhetoric.

On 9 June, the OAS Ministers of Foreign Affairs made Resolution 6/94, which calls on the UN to further strengthen the mandate of UNMIH. The following day, Clinton broadened UN sanctions on Haiti, but it took the UN until the end of the month to draft a reply. The next UN resolution occurred on 30 June with UN Security Council Resolution 933, extending UNMIH and authorizing preparation for rapid deployment of UNMIH, and inviting members to supply troops. Resolution 933 emphasized that the

UN Security Council "strongly deplores the refusal of the military authorities to implement the Governor's Island agreement."[46] Despite the sanctions, strong language and repeated warnings from the UN, the Cedras regime disregarded the gravity of the situation and surprised the world with the expulsion of the International Civilian Mission (MICIVIH) from Haiti on 12 July 1994. At the end of the month, Aristide made a further appeal to the UN for support.

Two days later, the UN Security Council passed Resolution 940, at the high point of UN legitimacy in Haiti. Resolution 940 authorized intervention with military force to restore democracy to Haiti. Resolution 940 paragraph four authorized

> member states to form a multinational force under unified command and control and, in this framework, to use all necessary means to facilitate the departure from Haiti of the military leadership, consistent with the Governor's Island agreement, the prompt return of the legitimately elected President and the restoration of the legitimate authorities of the Government of Haiti, and to establish and maintain a secure and stable environment that will permit implementation of the Governor's Island agreement.[47]

In paragraph five, the resolution approves an advance team to enter Haiti to coordinate and monitor multinational force operations.

On 26 August 1994, Clinton authorized the final invasion plan for Operation Restore Democracy, and the United States took the lead in the intervention, on 18 September. Thomas Weiss, David Forsythe and Roger Coate argue that the UN "resorted to the 'sheriff's posse' approach" to the Haitian crisis, meaning that the UN contracted one of its member states to actually run the intervention it had authorized.[48] The United

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46. UN, "SC/RES 933," 30 June 1994 (www.un.org/documents/scres.htm, accessed on 21 September 2001).

47. UN, "SC/RES 940," 31 July 1994, 2 (www.un.org/documents/scres.htm, accessed on 6 October 2001).

48. Thomas G. Weiss, David P. Forsythe, and Roger A. Coate, ed., *The United Nations and Changing World Politics*, 3rd ed. (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 2001), 37; see also Richard Haass, *The*

States fulfilled this function for the UN by taking the lead on military action when the time came.

The next UN action took place with Resolution 944 on 29 September, laying the plans to end sanctions after Aristide's return. On 4 October the UNMIH Advance Planning Team arrived in Port-au-Prince to plan the transition from Cedras to Aristide. Eleven days later, Aristide returned to Haiti, and was welcomed home by UN Security Council Resolution 948.

There were three phases of UN involvement during the crisis in Haiti. The first occurred between the coup on 30 September 1991 and lasted until December 1992. During this time, the OAS led the campaign against the military junta in Haiti and favored reinstating democracy. The second phase began in December 1992, when the flow of refugees in the Caribbean region became destabilizing. At this point, the United Nations sought an understanding with the Cedras regime, however failed. The third phase began with Clinton's April 1994 appeal to the UN to increase its mandate, after which active U.S involvement grew. After UN Security Council Resolution 944 authorized intervention, the United States stepped into the lead role. The UN gained legitimacy as a useful world organization, and came away from the Haitian crisis more empowered to exercise authority at the international level, as UN efforts to resolve the crisis set precedents for intervention to restore democracy.

THE U.S. CONGRESS

Divisions in Congress regarding U.S. policy in Haiti largely led to inaction. Some

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Reluctant Sheriff: The United States after the Cold War (New York, NY: Council on Foreign Relations

of the issues behind this division included the recent humiliation in Somalia, bureaucratic power struggles, strategic interests, immigration and refugee movement, and partisan politics. Congressional apathy about supporting democracy in Haiti stemmed partly from nervousness after the recent U.S. humiliation in Somalia on 3 October 1993 that made the killing of 18 U.S. soldiers a world media event, and no one wanted to see this happen again. Moreover, after Somalia, there was concern that "there was and now remains the danger that the entire democratic trend could unravel as quickly and decisively as it was assembled."[49] Indeed, on 21 October 1993, the Senate rejected (81to 19) an attempt to prohibit defense appropriations from being spent on a Haiti invasion, except if U.S. citizens were at risk.[50] On the same day, the Senate approved (98 to 2) an amendment requiring the president to have prior approval from Congress for all military activities in Haiti, unless U.S. citizens there were in imminent risk.

For the most part the bureaucratic struggle between the Clinton administration, the Pentagon and the CIA over which Haitian leader was preferable generated conflicting information in congressional hearings, especially those regarding Aristide's mental stability. Bureaucratic analysis of the Haitian crisis has already been done by others, however, and is not repeated here.[51] Misinformation given to Congress about Aristide brought out sharp criticism of Clinton's policy to support him, and complicated the

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Press, Brookings Institution Press, 1997).

49. Introductory comments by Robert G. Torricelli, *Hearing before the Subcommittee on Western Hemisphere Affairs of the Committee on Foreign Affairs House of Representatives*, 102nd Congress, 1st session (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 31 October 1991), 1.

50. See "Senate Vote: Foreign Policy 1993-S Haiti," *Project Vote Smart*, 21 October 1993 (http://www.vote-smart.org/index.phtml, accessed on 24 May 2002).

51. For an excellent explanation of this behind-the-scenes struggle, see MacKinnon, *The Evolution of U.S. Peacekeeping*; Brune, *The United States and Post-Cold War Interventions*, 50–62; and Morely and McGillion, "'Disobedient' Generals," 363–84.

debate regarding his reinstatement. Many in Congress believed that Haiti had no strategic value and produced no valuable exports, but they failed to acknowledge the impact of refugees or the rising drug trade through this impoverished country. Pamela Constable claims that the central issue in Congress over Haiti involved immigration and illegal refugees that generated constituency undercurrents and complicated the lives of representatives in Congress.[52] Florida was the main state to be affected by refugee influx, due to costs of caring for them and local resentments that can influence politicians.

Large numbers refugees contributed to regional instability in the Caribbean and therefore affected foreign policy. Deputy Secretary of State, Strobe Talbot explained it this way:

> in many cases around the world, including this one, the disintegration of a political situation in one country can produce an outflow of refugees who, in various ways, impinge on the interests and capacities and resources of neighboring countries. And we saw that in spectacular and alarming fashion this summer in the case of Haiti.[53]

Despite the fact that Clinton had criticized Bush for refugee repatriation, it would continue, like it or not. According to William Berman, even though "Clinton earlier had been critical of Bush's handling of the Haitian refugee problem, claiming that it had not been humane in practice, he now felt the need to stem the tide coming from Haiti to Florida, or face intense risk of losing Democratic seats in Congress in 1994 and the state to a Republican challenger in 1996."[54] Rightly so, Clinton feared a resurgent Republican Congress in the midterm election of 1994.

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52. Constable, "Haiti: A Nation in Despair, A Policy Adrift."

53. Statement by Strobe Talbot, in United States House, *Hearings and Markup before the Committee on Foreign Affairs House of Representatives*, 103rd Congress, 2nd session (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 27 September 1994), 17.

54. Berman, *From the Center to the Edge*, 36.

During the Haitian crisis, the Black Caucus rose up within Congress as a powerful proponent for military intervention, but was unable to sway congressional consensus overall. The Black Caucus criticized the refugee policy as racist and supported Aristide. They opposed Clinton's demands on Aristide to accept measures that would appease the military regime. In March, the Black Caucus introduced a bill to tighten the economic embargo against Haiti, sever flight links, and stop refugee repatriation. Moreover, the Black Caucus introduced legislation calling for the resignation of Clinton's special envoy to Haiti since March 1993, Lawrence Pezzullo, who had tried to set up a "mini-plan" in hopes that Aristide would accept a deal that would neutralize him and protect Cedras.[55] Pezzullo was fired in April 1994, and Clinton announced on 18 May that the new Envoy to Haiti was the head of the Black Caucus, William H. Gray, a well-known proponent for intervention in Haiti.[56] Gray's appointment marked a shift in Clinton's refugee policy. Henceforth, Haitian refugees would be granted asylum hearings on board U.S. ships or in other countries. The Black Caucus wanted tougher measures against Haiti, particularly harsher sanctions, and by April that meant considering a military alternative.[57]

The influence of the Black Caucus on the Clinton administration was further demonstrated, when Clinton had implemented most of the Black Caucus' earlier legislative policies, despite the fact that it had not passed by July. The *New York Times* reported that "one lawmaker who follows Haiti grumbled that administration officials consult more with key members of the black caucus than they do with the chairmen and

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55. See Dupuy, *Haiti in the New World Order*, 155.
56. See Elaine Scioliono, "Clinton's New Policy on Haiti Yields little Progress, so far," *New York Times*, 18 May 1994, A1, A10.
57. See Christopher Marquis, "Legislators prod U.S. on Haiti," *Miami Herald*, 16 January 1994.

ranking members of the House and Senate committees with jurisdiction over policy on Caribbean affairs."[58]

Congress debated intervention in Haiti via a reexamination of presidential war powers and concluded that, at least in the case of Haiti, it would not block Clinton's use of military force. Congressional inactivity is a long-term issue for foreign policy, and House Foreign Affairs Committee Chair Lee Hamilton, D-Indiana, critiques the way Congress shirks its responsibility to shape solid foreign policy by remaining inactive and apathetic, because "in almost every case over the past 15 years, save for the Gulf War, Congress has failed to grant prior authority for intervention."[59] Congress was divided though, because some thought that Clinton overstepped his war powers authority by ordering military intervention in Haiti. Lori Fisler Damrosch argues that without prior congressional approval, Clinton's military actions would have been illegal if the military had actually landed in Haiti in 1994, regardless of UN authorization.[60] There were those who argued that it would have been illegal, because Congress had not yet approved the invasion and the War Powers Act was intended to allow for military defense, but not attack.[61] In a vote on 29 June 1994, the Senate rejected by 65 to 34 the requirement that the president must "seek congressional authorization before ordering military action against Haiti."[62] The Senate also rejected (57–42) a proposal to establish a congressional

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58. Steven A. Holmes, "With Persuasion and Muscle, Black Caucus Reshapes Haiti Policy," *New York Times*, 14 July 1994, A10.

59. The Honorable Lee H. Hamilton, "The Role of the Congress in U.S. Foreign Policy," Washington D.C.: Center for Strategic and International Studies, 19 November 1998, 4 (www.csis.org/htmlsp98hamilton.html, accessed on 21 June 2001).

60. Lori Fisler Damrosch, "AGORA: The 1994 Action in Haiti: The Constitutional Responsibility of Congress for Military Engagements," *American Journal of International Law* 89, no. 1 (1995): 58–70.

61. The War Powers Act allows the president 60 days of freedom to use military force. There is a debate however whether this includes attack without provocation.

62. "Senate Vote: Foreign Policy 1994-S Congressional Approval for Action in Haiti," *Project Vote Smart*, 29 June 1994 (http://www.vote-smart.org/index.phtml, accessed on 24 May 2002).

commission on Haiti in the middle of July, and in early August tabled (63–31) an amendment requiring the Clinton administration to have congressional approval before using military force.[63]

In a hearing on U.S. policy toward Haiti only a few days before the intervention, Republicans again called for further hearings about the appropriateness of using military force against Haiti to restore democracy and redress human rights violations. For example, Representative Benjamin Gilman argued that "If the grounds for using military force are undergoing redefinition, then Congress, I say, has an obligation to hear those grounds and to make their views known before the ships and planes are launched."[64] The Chair of the House of Foreign Affairs Committee, Lee Hamilton, defended Clinton's war powers authority on 13 September 1994 just before the intervention took place, saying:

> let me observe that whether you have prior authorization of military action is a constant question in American political history. And I think history will show that the Congress has on occasion granted prior authorization for military action, on occasion we have not. On occasion we have done nothing at all. I don't know that there is anything in the Constitution or in the War Powers Resolution that requires prior authorization.[65]

As a result of the debate over war powers, Congress was deadlocked, which resulted in inaction. This deadlock allowed the president to use his authority to order military intervention. In an interview on 19 September 1994, Clinton explained his position on the war powers issue. He said, "I think that every President and all my predecessors in both parties have clearly maintained that they did not require, by constitution, did not

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63. See "Senate Vote: Foreign Policy 1994-S Congressional Commission on Haiti," *Project Vote Smart*, 14 July 1994 (http://www.vote-smart.org/indexphtml, accessed on 24 May 2002).

64. Statement of Benjamin A. Gilman, in United States House, "U.S. Policy toward, and Presence in, Haiti," in *Hearings and Markup before the Committee on Foreign Affairs House of Representatives*, 103rd Congress, 2nd sess. (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 13 September 1994), 5.

65. Statement of Dana Rohrbacher, in ibid., 5.

have to have congressional approval for every kind of military action."[66] It was not until some days past the actual peak of the crisis, and after military intervention, that Congress came to a resolution on the matter. House Joint Resolution 416, introduced on 24 September, heavily stressed congressional prohibition of continued use of U.S. armed forces in Haiti, and requested detailed reports from the administration.[67] President Clinton signed Senate Joint Resolution 229 on 25 October 1994, which criticized the president for not seeking congressional approval prior to deploying forces to Haiti.[68] The resolution again called for a "prompt and orderly withdrawal of all United States Armed Forces from Haiti."[69] The fact that Congress did not come to resolution on intervention until after it was over gave Clinton "a free hand" to carry out foreign policy as he deemed appropriate.[70]

Congressional debate served as an ever-present reminder to President Clinton that a military alternative could be difficult to get past a reluctant Congress. John Sweeny described congressional opposition to intervention in Haiti as a "collision course" between the executive and the legislature.[71] This is an overstatement; however, it does portray the potential for Congress to counter foreign policy decisions taken by the

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66. William J. Clinton, "The President's News Conference with President Carter, General Powell, and Senator Nunn on Haiti," *Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents* 30, no. 38, 19 September 1994 (http://frwebgate5.access.gpo.gov/cgi-bin...ID=56249622997+4+0+0&WAISaction=retrieve, accessed on 19 March 2002).

67. United States House, "House Joint Resolution 416: Limited Authorization for the United States-led Force in Haiti," 103rd Cong., 2nd sess., 28 September 1994 (http://thomas.loc.gov/cgi-bin/query/D?c103:1:./temp/~c103tj9e85::, accessed on 24 May 2002).

68. See William J. Clinton, "Statement on Signing Legislation on United States Policy on Haiti," *Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents* 30, no. 43, 31 October 1994, 2182–4.

69. United States Senate, "Senate Joint Resolution 229: Regarding United States Policy toward Haiti," 103rd Cong., 2nd sess., 25 October 1994 (http://thomas.loc.gov/cgi-bin/query/D?c103:5:./temp/~c103tj9e85::, accessed on 24 May 2002).

70. Carroll J. Doherty, "Congress, after a Sharp Debate, gives Clinton a Free Hand," *Congressional Quarterly Weekly Report* 52, no. 39 (1994): 2895–6.

71. John Sweeney, "Stuck in Haiti," *Foreign Policy* no. 102 (1996): 144.

president. Debate in Congress fueled a reexamination of presidential war powers in general, mainly over who has the power to do what. Opposition in Congress lacked the backing to impede the intervention effort, because Congress "had ample time and opportunity to act" but did not.[72]

Overall, the Haitian crisis did not move Congress to overwhelmingly support or oppose Clinton's plans for intervention, because Congress was divided on many issues. This analysis finds that division over issues basically incapacitated Congress to fully support or reject Clinton's plans for intervention beyond sanctions. As a result, Congress neither hindered, nor helped, Clinton's foreign policy in Haiti. Moreover, regardless of complaints, the inability of Congress to form a mandate on the course of U.S. policy in Haiti ultimately left the president to decide the best course of action.

AMERICAN PUBLIC OPINION AND THE MEDIA

American public opinion regarding the crisis in Haiti neither favored, nor opposed intervention. A Gallup Poll published in July 1993 showed that 65 percent of the American public believed that the presence of Haitian immigrants "generally created problems for the country."[73] This likely stems from the fact that Haitian refugees were often illiterate and unskilled. In the same poll, only 19 percent of the American public believed that "their presence has benefited the country."[74] Such measurements indicated that bias against Haitian immigration was nearly 3 and one-half times greater than that favoring it. Clearly, this would seem to be an indication that a stringent repatriation

72. Trimble, "The President's Constitutional Authority to Use Limited Military Force," 84.
73. "Immigration Prejudices: Selected Nations," *The Gallup Poll Monthly,* no. 334 (1993): 14.

policy regarding Haitian boat people would be more welcomed than opposed. Only half of Americans believed that Clinton was doing a good job with foreign affairs and many Americans held no opinion at all regarding foreign policy in general. There was a slight rise in public approval of the way Clinton was handling foreign affairs after 16 June 1994, when the UN placed an oil and arms embargo on Haiti.

The results of a poll taken on 15–17 July 1994 indicated that 54 percent of the public thought that the United States should send troops to Haiti to restore democracy.[75] Of these, 43 percent felt that the United States should send troops to Haiti only in a multilateral action, and a further 11 percent believed that the United States should send troops whether or not other countries participated. While 54 percent is over half, it is only slightly more than half and is therefore less convincing, as it could quickly turn either way. Clinton addressed the nation on 15 September 1994 to present his case in favor of sending troops to remove the military regime in Haiti. The speech inspired a frequently seen "rally around the president" effect, which was measured in a two part Gallup poll taken before and after the speech.[76] For example, prior to the speech 35 percent of those surveyed approved of the way Clinton was handling the situation in Haiti, whereas after the speech, this percentage jumped to 53 percent. Those disapproving fell from 49 percent to 43 percent and those with no opinion fell from 16 to 4 percent. When asked if the United States should send troops in a multilateral effort after all other diplomatic efforts failed, those who agreed in sending troops rose after the

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74. The same figures were published in a similar poll in January 1994, see "United States Immigration Prejudices," *World Opinion Update* 18, no. 1 (1994): 2.

75. David W. Moore, "America Hesitant about War in Haiti," *The Gallup Poll Monthly,* no. 346 (1994): 18.

76. David W. Moore and Lydia Saad, "After Clinton Speech: Public Shifts in Favor of Haiti Invasion," *The Gallup Poll Monthly,* no. 348 (1994): 16–17.

speech from 40 percent to 56 percent, while those who said not to fell from 48 percent to 41 percent. While these figures are more amenable toward intervention than earlier figures, they show a divided public.

In his September 15 address to the nation, Clinton outlined several reasons for justifying military action. According to a poll done at the time of the speech, the most persuasive reason (supported by viewers at 67 percent) was to stop human rights violations by the Cedras regime in Haiti.[77] Clearly, this is a very close tie-in to the Clinton Doctrine, since protecting human rights contains stopping ethnic genocide, albeit in Haiti the political killings were not ethnic genocide, but would, however, support the argument that Clinton did wish to promote human rights abroad. In the same poll, more than half (56 percent) of the viewers supported a military alternative to reduce the flow of Haitian refugees, and 55 percent were convinced that the United States should intervene to promote democracy. The mixed message from the public for intervention increase Clinton's available alternatives. Moreover, a majority of 58 percent did not believe that intervention was merited to maintain U.S. credibility abroad. Overall, 66 percent were convinced by Clinton's reasons for the United States to intervene, while 33 percent were not.

Despite increased public support for Clinton's upcoming intervention, 63 percent believed that the president should seek approval from Congress prior to sending troops to Haiti. Clearly, "going public" had a favorable impact on public opinion for intervention, but the approval rate of 53 percent in favor of intervention was a fragile majority. This is

77. Ibid., 16.

especially true given the possible sampling error set at plus or minus 6 percent for this poll.

Polls showed that popular opinion regarding U.S. activity in Haiti received mixed reviews, and a majority of Americans were "skeptical that many of the basic goals of the intervention will ever be achieved."[78] Table 3 shows public approval regarding how Clinton handled the Haiti crisis.

Table 3

Ratings on Clinton's Handling the Situation in Haiti[79]

	Approve	Disapprove
1994 Jul 15–17	28	56
1994 Sep 6–7	27	58
1994 Sep 16–18	35	55
1994 Sep 19	Intervention	
1994 Sep 23–25	48	48

Source: Frank Newport and Leslie McAneny, "Haiti Yields Clinton Small 'Rally Effect,'" *The Gallup Poll Monthly*, no. 348 (1994): 31.

The approval ratings improved from 27 percent in early September to 48 percent after the speech in late September. In the week following the arrival of troops in Haiti, American support for troops in Haiti increased from 46 percent on 19 September to 54 percent on 23–25 September. The pattern of public opinion regarding Operation Restore Democracy clearly reveals that approval for the intervention increased as intervention showed success. It is likely that this increase in public opinion regarding intervention reflected

78. Frank Newport and Leslie McAneny, "Haiti Yields Clinton Small 'Rally Effect,'" *The Gallup Poll Monthly,* no. 348 (1994): 30–2.

79. It is important to note that different polls do not always reflect the exact same results in data percentages; however, it is valid to consider similar trends.

the phenomenon in which the public typically rallies around the president during times of crisis.

While the President's address to the nation improved levels of public support for intervention, critical media reports may have reduced popular support for Clinton around the same time. Despite the majority approval in the polls, reports accused Clinton of exhibiting insecurity about public opinion, and criticized him for couching the intervention in terms of humanitarian concern rather than boldly explaining the true interests involved,[80] or of being "ashamed of tough-mindedness,"[81] or of using the successful intervention to boost his political credibility while claiming it was an issue of U.S. credibility.[82] Additionally, reports of U.S. troops standing by while the Haitian Police used "brutal crowd control tactics" against demonstrators tainted White House declarations regarding a "much stronger and safer position" in Haiti.[83] Such negative media attention regarding intervention and the president did not improve the public view of U.S. policy.[84] One report, however, explained that the press unjustly criticized Clinton's diplomatic and military decisions regarding Haiti, because he was successful in accomplishing what he set out to do.[85]

Michael Mandelbaum claimed that Clinton's "distinctive vision of post-cold war American foreign policy failed because it did not command public support."[86] Public

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80. See Michael Kramer, "The Case for Intervention," *Time* 144, no. 13 (1994): 28.
81. William Safire, "Jimmy Clinton, II," *New York Times*, 22 September 1994, A 27L.
82. Gloria Borger, "Whose Credibility is it anyway?" *U.S. News & World Report* 117, no. 12 (1994): 54.
83. John H. Cushman, Jr., "Haitian Police Crush Rally as American Troops Watch," *New York Times*, 21 September 1994, A1.
84. For a discussion of humanitarian measures exercised by the U.S. troops regarding detainees in Haiti after the intervention, see Theodor Meron, "Extraterritoriality of Human Rights Treaties," *The American Journal of International Law* 89, no. 1 (1995): 78–82.
85. Hendrik Hertzberg, "Haiti so Far," *The New Yorker* 70, no. 33 (1994): 7.
86. Michael Mandelbaum, "Foreign Policy as Social Work," *Foreign Affairs* 74, no. 1 (1996): 16.

opinion early in the Haitian crisis was generally against intervention, however, as intervention came closer public opinion grew mixed to favorable. This phenomenon also happened prior to the Persian Gulf War for George Bush, but like Clinton, this did not severely hamper his ability to achieve his goals.

The Haiti crisis is an example of how the media intervenes between the president and the public to convey a message of its own. Here, the message was more against intervention. Thus, the president went directly to the public with his message, and improved public support for action in Haiti. According to this analysis, the variable public opinion was not a decisive factor in influencing the decision to intervene in Haiti.

U.S. INTERESTS

At first glimpse, the role the Clinton administration played in resolving the Haitian crisis appears varied and occasionally ad hoc. While this has much to do with the president's personality and personal style, upon deeper examination, the Haitian crisis, was about protecting U.S. interests. For this reason, official rhetoric during the crisis favored supporting democracy in the Caribbean, as a strategy to induce potential refugees to stay home. In addition, Clinton pressured Aristide to remain flexible,[87] and to implore Haitian masses to remain in Haiti. As explained in an earlier chapter, situations of refugee movement often pose difficult challenges to countries, which then take steps to ensure the safety of citizens and refugees. This was also true during the Haitian crisis.

Democratic enlargement, as vital strategic interest, has highlighted a newer more abstract peripheral interest for human rights, which emerged during the Carter

administration. When faced with human rights violations, Bill Clinton, could not ignore the disruption of democracy in Haiti, just next door, when such an approach goes against the fundamental nature of America, which protects democracy and human rights and yet allows the freedom to refuse to do the same. This dilemma brings vigorous debate to the floor of the U.S. Congress, to clarify what the American public wants from policy makers.

In a sense, the president found himself in a "catch 22" during the crisis in Haiti. Some argued that Clinton's lack of attention to U.S. interests led him to deepen the commitment to Aristide, which left him "with no obvious way out other than prolonged sanctions or the intervention of foreign peacekeepers."[88] It is questionable however, how deep Clinton's commitment to Aristide was in actuality, because the United States pressured Aristide to negotiate and concede until Aristide was forced to comply or give up. Clearly Aristide needed the United States far more than the other way around, but we must not overlook a very real reason for U.S. action in Haiti, to stabilize demographic shifts. As such, Clinton did in fact operate to protect U.S. interests by supporting democracy.

Without congressional or public support of using military force, Clinton consistently considered all viable alternatives. For example, he said,

> Just because the cold war is over does not mean the United States can withdraw from the world. Just because it is almost always not necessary to resort to force, and we must always do everything we can to avoid it, does not mean there are never circumstances in which it might be necessary ... And that is why we have sought for 3 years to restore democracy to Haiti, to end violence and terrorism and human rights

87. Alex Doyle argues that this was a hold over from the Bush administration, which lacked support for Aristide reinstatement.

88. Paul D. Wolfowitz, "Clinton's First Year," *Foreign Affairs* 73, no. 1 (1994): 41.

> violations, to see that all parties lived up to their commitments, to keep democracy on the move in our hemisphere and to encourage those fledgling democracies to be brave and to go forward, to stabilize the borders and the territorial integrity of all countries, including ours.[89]

Here, Clinton used rhetoric akin to the Clinton Doctrine to explain U.S. action in Haiti. As one U.S. official said: "We are using every means at our disposal to get rid of this regime in the hopes of avoiding the necessity of an invasion. . . . Every means."[90] U.S. progress toward eventual military alternatives was therefore slow and cautious.

The key strategy for regional stabilization was to return democratic rule to Haiti in hopes that such steps would ease human suffering and restore demographic stability. Initially, Clinton had some difficulty to overcome momentum set in place by Bush, but Clinton's policy suffered because of a cleavage between conservative and liberal forces in the U.S. bureaucracy. The Washington bureaucracy complicated matters for the Clinton administration, because it lacked consensus on which Haitian leader was preferable. In a biting critique, Naom Chomsky explains that not only did the CIA give Congress misinformation about the Aristide's psychological soundness, but it maintained connections to Cedras' military establishment that were contrary to removing him from power.[91] For example, the CIA worked against Clinton's policy by inciting the junta to block the docks that led to the *USS Harlan County* incident. Moreover, thirty-year CIA national intelligence officer, Brian Latell, gave Congress counterfactual information in a

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89. William J. Clinton, "Remarks at the Congressional Black Caucus Foundation Dinner," *Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents* 30, no. 38, 26 September 1994 (http://frwebgate5.access.gpo.gov/cgi-bin...D=5624962297+47+0+0&WAISaction=retrieve, accessed on 19 March 2001).

90. Quoted in Doyle McManus and Robin Wright, "U.S. Tried Covert Action to Rid Haiti of Rulers," *Los Angeles Times*, 16 September 1994.

91. Naom Chomsky, "Democracy Restored," 50.

secret briefing about Aristide's mental health.[92] This report increased deadlock in Congress over backing Aristide. Second, this bureaucratic split was compounded by Clinton's initial decision to retain Bush's key personnel in the State Department as they undermined Clinton's efforts to negotiate the removal of Cedras in a legitimate fashion.

Under Clinton's strategy, Aristide needed to be reinstated as legitimate ruler of Haiti, and it was hoped that these steps would better the humanitarian situation, restore political and regional stability, and lessen refugee migration. As one commentator noted, "Clinton and most people in Haiti are pinning their hopes on a political settlement that will make Haitians want to stay home."[93] Clinton argued in his presidential campaign that when elected his policy on Haitian refugees would look much different than that of the Bush administration, but as explained earlier, this policy did not last long. The presidential campaign therefore complicated domestic pressures regarding the influx of Haitian refugees, because Clinton campaigned against forced repatriation. Once in office, however, he quickly learned the unfeasibility of fulfilling his campaign rhetoric, because "Haitians took his election victory as a guarantee of Uncle Sam's embrace and began to build more boats."[94] Accepting one wave of immigrants seemed innocuous, but in light of potential waves to follow, Clinton found himself constrained by a reducing number of foreign policy choices, and he quickly returned to the Bush policy of returning Haitian refugees.

When the UN imposed a global oil and arms embargo in mid-June 1993, Clinton

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92. See details of the report in Mark Danner, "The Fall of a Prophet," *New York Review of Books* 40, no. 20 (1993): 44–53.
93. J. F. O. McAllister, "Lives on Hold," *Time* 141, no. 5 (1993): 51.
94. Ibid., 50.

followed suit and announced tougher sanctions at the end of June. Less than a month later, the military junta in Haiti signed the Governor's Island agreement, and the approval of Robert Malval as Prime Minister of Haiti was an encouraging development in late August, as it fulfilled one of the Governor's Island conditions. Taking this appointment as an act of good faith, the international community suspended sanctions, but the Cedras regime immediately increased violence and international concern elevated.[95] In September, Clinton sought "support for imposing a global trade embargo on the country, together with financial sanctions (the freezing of overseas assets) and travel bans against 600 military officers who supported the autocratic regime or participated in the September 1991 coup."[96]

The *USS Harlan County* incident on 11 October 1993 posed problems for the Clinton administration for several reasons. First, reports surfaced that the Department of Internal Affairs (DIA) and Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) were behind Haitian militant activities to block the ports, and anti-Aristide DIA and CIA agents reportedly encouraged resistance by advising Cedras that the UN could be easily run off. Indeed, the United States, having recently experienced humiliation in Somalia was hesitant to take further injuries and was reluctant to enter into combat type exchanges. Second, Haitian intimidation tactics were successful for Cedras, because the *Harlan County* withdrew, causing the loss of credibility, not only for Clinton, but also for the United States. As misinformation about Aristide circulated, Clinton was forced to regroup, as Congress debated the soundness of intervention in Haiti.[97]

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95. See Morely and McGillion, "'Disobedient' Generals," 369.
96. Ibid., 374.
97. See ibid., 370.

Third, Cedras continued to ignore hard won agreements to restore democracy. Pamela Constable argues that the Clinton administration had "to an astonishing degree . . . underestimated the cynicism, greed, ruthlessness, and deep hostility to Aristide among military leaders and their civilian confederates, who also include conservative businessmen and criminal gangs."[98] Newly appointed Justice Minister, Guy Malary, was assassinated in broad daylight as he drove from his Port-au-Prince office on 14 October 1993. Malary, an aggressive reformist trained in the United States, was preparing legislation to bring the Haitian police under civilian control.[99] Even though Malary's attackers were never identified, the murder was widely interpreted as a direct military right-wing civilian challenge to international authority. The assassination was immediately met with reimposed U.S. and UN sanctions, which were enforced by six U.S. Navy warships. On 18 October 1993, Clinton imposed additional sanctions on Haiti to block properties held by certain Haitians.

The Governor's Island agreement did what the Protocol of Washington had failed to do: set a deadline of 30 October 1993 for Aristide's return. Clinton had worked hard to get Aristide to bend to political negotiations, and the administration was more likely frustrated than surprised when the 30 October Governor's Island agreement deadline to restore Aristide came and went, and persecution of Haitian citizens heightened. International concerns arose that a new wave of refugees could move out of Haiti.[100]

Fourth, the failure of economic sanctions often embarrasses the administration,

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98. Constable, "Haiti," 110.

99. See Congressional Research Service, Issue Brief, "Haiti: The Struggle for Democracy and Congressional Concerns in 1994," *Congressional Research Service*, 22 September 1994: 9.

100. "Thousands in Haiti ask Asylum in the U.S.," *New York Times*, 9 December 1993, A7L.

which imposes them, because they hurt the poor more than the wealthy who find loopholes to exploit the embargo. Once made public, this situation showed the world the hollowness of diplomatic efforts, and given the futility of his approach, Clinton moved to a stronger and more direct policy, even though Congress and the American public remained uncommitted to the use of force. In a move to toughen the U.S. stance on 21 April 1994, and after being pressured by Senate legislation for stiffer sanctions against Haiti, Clinton announced strict enforcement of the economic embargo and sent a naval blockade to enforce it.[101] Thus, in late April 1994 there was a mild shift between the United States and United Nations, as the United States began to take the lead and requested a global trade embargo from the UN Security Council.

Shortly thereafter, further policy reversals were apparent, as Clinton displayed a new understanding of *real-politik* in the context of the Haitian crisis. On 5 May Clinton issued PDD 25, limiting U.S. involvement in UN peacekeeping operations, as explained in Chapter I. PDD 25 revised U.S. strategic rationale behind peacekeeping within the broader context of foreign policy, and proposed reform for UN peace operations. On 6 May 1994, the UN called for increased sanctions against Haiti in Security Council Resolution 814, and a day later, the United States also increased import restrictions.[102] In his remarks on 10 June, President Clinton expressed concern regarding refugee flows into the United States, saying "I want to be clear about this issue, I continue to urge all

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101. See Mary E. Kortanek, "Democrats push Clinton to Toughen Embargo," *Congressional Quarterly Weekly Report* 52, no. 16 (1994): 1015.

102. For more details, see William J. Clinton, "Message to the Congress on Haiti," *Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents* 30, no. 21, 30 May 1994 (http://frwebgate5.accessgpo.gov/cgi-bin...D=56249622997+12++0+0&WAISaction=retrieve, accessed on 19 March 2001).

Haitians to avoid risking lives in treacherous boat voyages."[103] Strobe Talbot went before the OAS in mid-June and delivered four points on policy: the United States would 1) strictly enforce tight, comprehensive sanctions "as a primary element of pressure"; 2) provide "massive aid for economic and social reconstruction once democracy is restored"; 3) encourage "nations in the hemisphere to provide asylum for Haitian political refugees"; and 4) work to reform and strengthen UN efforts in UNMIH.[104]

By 30 June, the UN authorized rapid deployment of UNMIH and invited member states to commit troops to the mission. Clinton announced on 6 July, that the United States would only allow into the United States those refugees who applied for asylum from offices in Haiti. Otherwise, boat people would be returned to Haiti or to other "safe havens."[105] By 25 June, the Clinton administration cut U.S. commercial flights to Haiti and tightened other sanctions. When the Haitian military regime expulsed the International Civilian Mission (MICIVIH) on 12 July, Clinton began seeking a UN resolution authorizing member countries to use "all necessary means" to restore President Aristide to power. The same day, Clinton went before the UN to request approval for an invasion of Haiti. At the end of July, Aristide appealed to the UN for support and the next day, on 31 July 1994, the UN Security Council authorized a "multinational force under unified command and control . . . to use all necessary means to facilitate the

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103. William J. Clinton, "Remarks Announcing Additional Sanctions against Haiti," *Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents* 30, no. 23, 13 June 1994 (http://frwebgate5.access.gpo.gov/cgi-bin...D=56249622997+30+0+0&WAISaction=retrieve, accessed on 19 March 2002).

104. Statement by Strobe Talbott, see Organization of American States, *U.S. Department of State Dispatch* 5, no. 24 (June 1994): 384–5.

105. Quoted in Elizabeth A. Palmer, "A Haitian Chronology," *Congressional Quarterly Weekly Report* 52, no. 36 (1994): 2579.

departure from Haiti of the military leadership."[106] Thus, the UN approved military intervention in Haiti and cleared the way for Clinton's leadership in the military mission.

At the beginning of August, Clinton countered opposition saying that he did not believe he was mandated to receive approval from Congress prior to intervention.[107] On 26 August, Clinton authorized the final version of the invasion plan that the military had been drafting for months.[108] Thus, the momentum toward intervention had already begun some time before intervention was mentioned publicly.

As explained earlier, in his 14 September address to the nation, Clinton outlined several reasons for justifying military action. He said, the United States "must protect our interests, to stop the brutal atrocities that threaten tens of thousands of Haitians, to secure our hemisphere and to uphold the reliability of the commitments we make and the commitments others make to us."[109] Clinton explained in strong language that Cedras was responsible for atrocities and must step down, and he had already ordered military intervention.

Three days later he made another address in which he reiterated the U.S. reasons for going to Haiti: to restore democracy, reduce suffering, uphold commitments, "avert the flow of thousands of more refugees and to secure our borders."[110] While on the air, Clinton warned that "the Cedras regime's time is up. Their time is up. The remaining

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106. UN, "SC RES/940," 31 July 1994.

107. See "140 Congressional Record," at S10, *Congressional Record*, daily ed., 5 August 1994, 663.

108. See John C. Cushman, Jr., Steven Greenhouse, Douglas Jehl, and Elaine Sciolino, "On the Brink of War, A Tense Battle of Wills," *New York Times*, 20 September 1994, A1, A13.

109. Clinton, "Address to the Nation on Haiti."

110. William J. Clinton, "The President's Radio Address," *Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents.* 30, no. 38, 17 September 1994 (http://frwebgate5.access.gpo.gov/cgi-bin...D=56249622997+20+0+0&WAISaction=retrieve, accessed on 19 March 2002).

question is not whether they will leave but how they will leave. They can go peacefully . . . or they will be removed by force."[111] President Clinton sent a letter to congressional leaders regarding the crisis in Haiti dated 18 September 1994, the necessity, objectives and risks, the U.S. interests in the region, entry and exit-strategies, and projected costs (at levels of $500–600 million) of military intervention.[112] Both Congress and the American public remained ambivalent that a military intervention was necessary, but plans went forward.

As part of the plan, Clinton sent former-President Carter to Haiti to negotiate with the Cedras regime on the eve of the invasion. Richard Betts points out that compromise is most probable, when "both sides believe that they have more to lose than to gain from fighting" and that peace agreements more often occur prior to the breakout of violence.[113] Clinton's intervention worked well as the U.S. military backed Carter, and the U.S.-led multinational force launched Operation Restore Democracy from Pope Air Force Base in North Carolina, at 6:47 p.m. During negotiations, Cedras learned that 61 American planes were already in the air on the way to Haiti with more behind them. He reached agreement within hours of their arrival in Haiti.

Carter's agreement with Cedras was vague, but allowed U.S. entry into Haiti, and forced Cedras to step down by mid-October.[114] In addition, it stipulated conditions for Aristide's subsequent reinstatement, and granted general amnesty to Cedras. The

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111. Ibid.

112. The text of the letter can be viewed in William J. Clinton, "Letter to Congressional Leaders on Haiti," *Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents* 30, no. 38 (1994): 1801–3 (http://frwebgate5.access.gpo.gov/cgi-bin...ID=56249622997+0+0+0&WAISaction=retreive, accessed on 19 March 2002).

113. Richard K. Betts, "The Delusion of Impartial Intervention," *Foreign Affairs* 73, no. 6 (1994): 21.

114. A text of the one page document can be viewed in "Text of Agreement Averting U.S. Invasion of Haiti," *New York Times*, 20 September 1994, A 12.

agreement seemed to have "caught the Clinton administration by surprise and forced a rethink of the invasion plans literally in mid-flight,"[115] but military use of force was averted and, even though the military junta would remain for a month, Aristide successfully returned on 15 October 1994. Haiti scholar and staunch intervention supporter, Robert Rotberg, argues that despite continued economic turmoil and political instability after the intervention, Haiti had become "much better and much more livable" than before.[116]

On 14 October 1994 Clinton signed an executive order to lift all economic sanctions against Haiti as soon as Aristide was returned to power and the crisis ended.[117] A demonstrable shift in policy from "assertive multilateralism" to a more moderate stance could be seen, as Clinton learned from experiences, such as the *Harlan County* incident and Somalia. PDD 25 demonstrated this shift in early August 1994, after the Somalia debacle, when there was a distancing from a policy of assertive multilateralism. Clinton used economic sanctions against Haiti throughout the crisis,[118] arguing that these steps "demonstrated my determination and that of the international community to see that Haiti and the Haitian people resume their rightful place in our hemispheric community of democracies."[119] Despite many frustrations and setbacks, Clinton pursued restoring democracy in Haiti as a way to stabilize the region. Clinton intervened on 18 September

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115. Morely and McGillion, "'Disobedient' Generals," 381.

116. Robert Rotberg, "Clinton was Right," *Foreign Policy* 102 (1996): 140.

117. William J. Clinton, "Executive Order 12932: Termination of Emergency with Respect to Haiti," *Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents* 30, no. 41, 14 October 1994 (http://Frwebgate5.access.gpo.gov/cgi-bin...D=56249622997+32+0+0&WAISsction=retrieve, accessed on 19 March 2002).

118. For a detailed account of U.S. sanctions against Haiti from December 1990 through October 1994, see William J. Clinton, "Letter to Congressional Leaders on Haiti," *Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents* 30, no. 41, 13 October 1994 (http://frwebgate5.access.gpo.gov/cgi-bin...ID-56249622997+0+0+0&WAISaction=retrieve, accessed on 19 March 2002).

119. William J. Clinton, "Message to the Congress on Haiti," *Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents* 30, no. 17, 25 April 1994 (http://frwebgate5.access.gpo.gov/cgi-bin...ID=56249622997+

1994 to restore democratically elected Aristide as president of Haiti. Despite initial inclinations to soften the U.S. stance on Haiti, Clinton followed a cautious and reserved strategy that ultimately exhausted alternatives to military intervention.

CONCLUDING REMARKS

This chapter set out to examine the extent of influence exerted by the five variables on decisions regarding intervention, and how they shaped the foreign policy of President Clinton. There are three overarching considerations in this case study. First, the United States was concerned about the numbers of refugees leaving Haiti. Second, the Clinton administration wanted to restore democracy in Haiti. Third, responsibility and leadership for the intervention ultimately fell to the United States.

The general debate on intervention in Haiti points out many sides of the issues. Critics argued that intervention was too costly and only marginally held to U.S. security interests.[120] For example, the 1994 mission cost the United States over $1.5 billion and triggered a $1.2 billion multinational reconstruction commitment. Fareed Zakaria cautioned that by getting distracted in small hot spots in peripheral areas, conflicts, and crises, the United States could risk long-term strategic interests and that "America, like Britain before it, will lose the core."[121] Moreover, critics decried intervention in this small and overpopulated country, claiming that the goal of institutionalizing democracy in Haiti was unachievable. This was especially disconcerting for the short-run, but there

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1+0+0&WAISaction=retreive, accessed on 19 March 2002).

120. See Georges A. Fauriol, "Before the House Government Reform Committee Subcommittee on Criminal Justice, Drug Policy and Human Resources: The New Haitian End-Game," Washington, D.C.: *Center for Strategic and International Studies*, 12 April 2000, 2 (www.csis.org/hill/ts000816fauriol.html, accessed on 21 June 2001).

121. Fareed Zakaria, "The Core vs. the Periphery," *Commentary* 96, no. 6 (1993): 26.

were also concerns over potential costs of long-term involvement and unintended consequences, such as a backlash against the United States, due to resentment similar to what is found in post-colonial states.[122] On this note, Richard Betts charged that the Clinton short-term strategy was problematic partly because of the initial limited character of the intervention that prolonged suffering brought on by embargoes.[123] He also argued that the long-term strategy of intervention failed, because it was not impartial, leaving the internal political balance-of-power off-kilter in Haiti. This points to the question of what will become of Haiti in the future after the UN Mission in Haiti (UNMIH) peacekeeping forces withdraw, and whether this expensive undertaking is in vain. Along this line, Eirin Mobekk writes that the intervention in Haiti did not succeed in reinstating the type of democracy envisioned by many Haitians.[124] When speaking of long-term commitments, Peter Rodman argues that the liberal "new age" internationalism was overdone by the Clinton administration, producing an isolationist backlash in the United States, which discredits intervention per se, and which will be difficult to overcome in the future.[125] Michael Mandelbaum picks up where Rodman leaves off, warning that intervention for purely humanitarian purposes is too costly considering the return on investment in terms of promoting U.S. interests, or in terms of resolving more pressing issues that merit a higher priority, such as strengthening relations with important allies around the world. Moreover, he points out that "restoration" of democracy in Haiti is a misnomer and is more accurately called creation of democracy in Haiti.[126] Critics charged that

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122. Zachary Karabell, "Don't Do It," *Tikkun* 9, no. 5 (1994): 12.
123. Betts, "The Delusion of Impartial Intervention," 25.
124. Eirin Mobekk, "Enforcement of Democracy in Haiti," *Democratization* 8, no. 3 (2001): 173–88.
125. Peter Rodman, "Points of Order: Flaws in the New Paradigm," *National Review* 47, no. 8 (1995): 36.
126. Michael Mandelbaum, "Foreign Policy as Social Work," 20.

intervention in Haiti to restore democracy was unrealistic, because the political history there was not democratic until the election of Jean-Bertrand Aristide, and that government held out less than a year. In addition, they argued that intervention constituted a diversion of U.S. assets and attention from more important issues.

Those favoring intervention in Haiti pointed to destabilization of U.S. security interests in the region due to drug trafficking, irritations due to disruption of trade, and especially an infusion of poverty stricken refugees. The United States had waged war against drugs for at least two decades and by 1996, the Caribbean Basin had become a "key trafficking route and location for money laundering."[127] Allowing instability to continue unhampered would serve the lawless interests of those in the lucrative drug trade. Thus, stopping the drug trade was a long established U.S. interest.

The potential for new waves of refugees setting sail for the United States proved enough to pressure Clinton to reverse campaign promises (although, according to some, the refugee quagmire was largely a side effect of the economic embargo).[128] In addition, intervention proponents wanted to promote and export traditional American principles of democracy and human rights. W. Michael Reisman points out that those, who criticize intervention on the grounds of humanitarian service, have "already dismissed human rights as a valid foreign policy concern."[129] Accordingly, this precedent should put to rest the question of whether human rights violations generate security concerns meriting intervention. Moreover, if action against Haiti was not warranted, then one could

127. Elliott Abrams, "The Shiprider Solution," *The National Interest,* no. 43 (1996): 87.
128. There are many articles on this topic, see for example, J. F. O. McAllister, "Lives on Hold."
129. W. Michael Reisman, "Haiti and the Validity of International Action," *American Journal of Law* 89, no. 1 (1995): 83.

question why did the United States impose sanctions against Haiti in the first place. Besides, proponents argued that an ignored crisis ultimately costs more to fix than an early intervention.[130]

130. For an economic analysis of the reconstruction of Haiti after the 1994 intervention, see Anthony Bryan, "Haiti: Kick Starting the Economy," *Current History* 94, no. 589 (1995): 65–71; and on institution building after intervention, see Colin Granderson, Sofia Clark D'Escoto, and Christelle Loupforest, "The Haiti Challenge: Following the Restoration of Constitutional Order in October 1994," *OAS Newsletter* (www.upd.oas.org/newsletter/thc.htm, accessed on 21 September 2001).

CHAPTER VI

CASE STUDY ON DEMOCRATIC GOVERNANCE IN EAST TIMOR

This chapter focuses on the 1999 crisis in East Timor. It entails an examination of U.S. foreign policy during the crisis to reveal, why, how and when the Clinton administration chose not to intervene in this crisis. This chapter begins with a brief historical overview and then examines the five political variables that are outlined in Chapter III, and concludes with a summary of findings.

HISTORICAL OVERVIEW

Historically, both Europe and the United States shaped developments in Southeast Asia. Until April 1974, Portugal colonized East Timor, when preparations were made for a transitional government away from colonial rule until democratic elections could be held in 1976. Decolonization deteriorated into civil war in the latter half of 1975. President Ford and Secretary of State Henry Kissinger visited Jakarta on 6 December 1975, and established that "Indonesia was of strategic U.S. economic and military interest because of its location near vital sea lanes used by U.S. military and commercial fleets."[1] The following day, Indonesia invaded East Timor, and despite reservations voiced in the UN, Indonesia began in mid-1976 to integrate East Timor into Indonesia.[2] From 1976 until 1981, the UN General Assembly passed annual resolutions reaffirming East Timor's

1. Comments made by Cynthia McKinney, see United States House, *Hearing before the Subcommittee on International Operations and Human Rights of the Committee on International Relations*, 106 Cong., 1st sess., 30 September 1999 (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 2000), 4.

2. For more on Indonesia's occupation of East Timor, see John Taylor, *East Timor: The Price of Freedom* (London: Zed Books, 1999); and James Dunn, *Timor: A People Betrayed* (Sydney, Australia: ABC Books, 1996).

right to self-determination. Despite these resolutions, U.S. policy on East Timor was couched in anti-Communist rhetoric, highlighting broader policy goals and sublimating human rights.

Throughout the next fifteen years, Indonesia's suppression of the opposition generated hundreds of thousands of internally displaced persons. Until 1999, the United States supported and trained Indonesian military officers and special forces, despite its occupation of East Timor.[3] Over time, only Portugal maintained interest in developments in East Timor and kept the issue alive.

The Crisis

Despite human rights violations, the crisis in East Timor received little international attention until Indonesian forces open-fired on a pro-independence demonstration in Dili in November 1991. This date marks the beginning of the crisis in East Timor. Journalists at the demonstration brought international attention to the situation, and UN redoubled its efforts to resolve the persistent issue of self-determination for East Timor. After learning of the Indonesian military's continued human rights violations in East Timor, the U.S. Congress cut military aid to Indonesia in 1992, but the Department of Defense rerouted aid through a different program.

Indonesia resisted the involvement of East Timorese political leaders in international politics. East Timor resistance leader José Alexandre Xanana Gusmão

3. For an overview of U.S. policy from Nixon to Carter, see Robert J. McMahon, *The Limits of Empire: The U.S. and Southeast Asia since World War II* (1999); and Daniel Southerland, "U.S. Role in Plight of Timor: An Issue That Won't Go Away," *The Christian Science Monitor*, 6 March 1980, 7.

remained imprisoned for seven years after his capture in 1992.[4] Gusmão, who would become president of East Timor after independence, had a significant following. He advocated a transitional period for East Timor, followed by referendum to decide how the East Timorese wished to be governed. He also influenced pro-independence resistance in East Timor to absorb tremendous amounts of violence before retaliation, bringing favor from international community on the resistance.

Michael Gordon Jackson argues that the international community's response to the crisis in East Timor was a "new phenomenon," because "many states, backed by military muscle, are increasingly not willing to allow genocide to occur without challenge."[5] The Security Council wanted to maintain stability in Indonesia, yet was forced to face events in East Timor, as had not been the case previously.

By the mid-1990s, the resistance movement in East Timor had grown due to increasing disillusionment with Indonesian rule. The formation of the National Council of Timorese Resistance (CNRT) in April 1998 strengthened and unified the resistance movement, and clashes with Indonesian security forces grew in frequency and intensity during 1998.

The fall of President Suharto[6] in May 1998 left Indonesia at the doorstep of democracy and offered a window opportunity for East Timor's independence, as Portugal again raised the issue in the UN. The new president of Indonesia, B. J. Habibie, proposed

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4. For a personal account of East Timor's history, see Sarah Niner, ed., *To Resist is to Win: The Autobiography of Xanana Gusmão* (Victoria, Australia: Aurora Books, 2000).

5. Michael Gordon Jackson, "Something must be done? Genocidal Chaos and World Responses to Mass Murder in East Timor between 1975 and 1999," *International Journal of Politics and Ethics* 1, no. 1 (2001): 58 (web4.infotrac.galegroup.com/itw/i..._A82651431&dyn=60!ar_fmt?sw_aep=viva.odu, accessed on 15 March 2002), 45.

6. This name is spelled in three different ways: Suharto, Sueharto, and S'Harto. President Suharto, like many Indonesians, only had one name. For more, see O. G. Roeder, *The Smiling General: President Soeharto of Indonesia*, 2nd ed. (Djakarta, Indonesia: Gunnung Agung Ltd., 1970).

autonomy for East Timor, in which Indonesia would retain power over foreign affairs, external defense and some aspects of monetary and fiscal policy.[7] In the UN, Portugal and Indonesia agreed in August 1998 to discuss preparations for autonomy of East Timor. Indonesia agreed in August 1998 to involve East Timor's resistance leaders in political negotiations. In November 1998, however, after the East Timor resistance killed Indonesian soldiers and captured arms in Alas, Indonesian forces retaliated. As a result, there were increased numbers of displaced persons in East Timor, as Indonesians and East Timorese fled, and by the end of 1998, a weary Indonesia was ready to "let Timor go."[8]

Australia supported Indonesian rule in East Timor since the 1970s, but in December 1998 surprised Habibie by pressuring him to seek more active negotiations with East Timorese leaders. This shift in Australian policy possibly "tipped the balance" in convincing Habibie to negotiate over East Timor.[9] Thus, Indonesia's goal for special autonomy for East Timor shifted during late 1998 and early 1999, when Habibie announced that if East Timor rejected its offer of autonomy, then the 1976 law integrating East Timor into Indonesia might be revoked.

Regardless of this shift in policy, Indonesia quickly began a paramilitary campaign against East Timor's pro-independence leaders and supporters. Gross violations of human rights increased as independence activists and supporters were taken captive, tortured, and sometimes killed. It was not uncommon in pro-independence

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7. See Ian Martin, *Self-Determination in East Timor: The United Nations, the Ballot, and International Intervention* (Boulder, CO: Lynne Reinner Publishers, 2001), 19.

8. David Lamb, "Indonesia Tries to Pull 'Thorn' of Timor Asia: The Annexed Ex-Portuguese Colony is Offered Autonomy—or Independence," *Los Angeles Times*, 11 February 1999, A12.

9. Paul Daley, "Protecting Timor Riches a Priority," *The Age*, 29 January 1999 (http://ptg.djnr.com/ccroot/asp/publib/story/asp, accessed on 25 February 2002).

communities to find rape and mistreatment of women, "who in some cases were subjected to continuing sexual slavery."[10] As a result, many homes were destroyed and many citizens displaced. The worst of the killings occurred on 6 April 1999 at a church in Lequiça, where around 2000 people had taken refuge. The Besi Merah Putih (BMP) militia along with the Indonesian military attacked a church, and killing at least 30 people. On 17 April, the BMP and the Aitarak militia began attacking pro-independence leaders.

The international community largely placed responsibility for calming the violence and restoring peace on Indonesia, because Indonesian military indicated that if the UN were to intervene with force, then it would be considered in Jakarta as an act of war. Thus, before sending any kind of force into East Timor, an agreement had to be reached regarding Indonesian sovereignty. Such an agreement was reached in New York on 5 May 1999 between Indonesia, Portugal and the UN, giving special autonomy to East Timor, and allowing an August referendum on independence.

In preparation for the referendum, the Security Council approved the UN Mission in East Timor (UNAMET) on 11 June 1999. This date marks the beginning of the second phase of the crisis in East Timor. To a large extent, violence eased once a UN presence was established, however, there were areas where militia violence impeded UN operations, as evidenced by militia found with stolen UN humanitarian delivery and transport vehicles. The referendum was postponed due to violence, but independence voters won the majority in the August 30 referendum. The Indonesian supported militia immediately began a punitive campaign. Mass mayhem ended the lives of many in East

10. Martin, *Self-Determination*, 45.

Timor, uprooted many others and threatened the presence of UN representatives. As the situation escalated, UNAMET was besieged and fired upon, and several UNAMET personnel were killed, leading to partial withdrawal of UNAMET from East Timor. The international community remained largely inactive however, and called on Indonesia to fulfill its agreement to quell the violence.

The violence targeted pro-independence East Timorese, but reached into the religious division, since Indonesia is mainly Muslim and East Timor Christian. Churches were defaced and some clergy murdered. Church artifacts dating to the 1600s were destroyed or defaced.[11] Paramilitary attacks on the church increasingly fell into disfavor at the UN. Nobel laureate Bishop Belo, whose parish and home were completely destroyed and many parishioners killed, went to Rome, after which the Pope denounced the violence in East Timor. The papal support of the independence option helped increase international pressure on Habibie, and the UN to find closure to the crisis. Of a pre-referendum population of roughly 850,000, about 300,000 East Timorese were displaced and an additional 200,000 or more people were forcibly moved across the to other parts of Indonesia.[12]

The violence caused dislocation and refugees, which resulted in a humanitarian crisis. Indonesian forces intimidated refugees and kept them from reaching UN officials and relief agencies. The crisis came to a head on 12 September and Indonesian leaders gave in to international diplomatic and economic pressure and invited a UN military force into East Timor. The UN quickly authorized the Australian-led the International

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11. For more details, see Arnold Kohen, "Going Home with Bishop Belo: Eyewitness," *The Tablet*, 23 October 1999.

12. Human Rights Watch, *Indonesia/East Timor: Forced Expulsions to West Timor and The Refugee Crisis*, vol. 11, no. 7 (New York: Human Rights Watch, December 1999), 2.

Force for East Timor (INTERFET) with a Chapter VII mandate to restore order in East Timor on 15 September, which marks the beginning of the third phase of the crisis in East Timor. Even though order was swiftly restored, there were nearly 230,000 refugees moving to West Timor by the end of September.

On 28 September 1999 a new tripartite agreement was reached between the UN, Portugal and Indonesia. The agreement acknowledged that Indonesia remained responsible for maintaining order until East Timor could become independent, however, the UN filled the vacuum of power in East Timor during the transition. On 19 October, among claims that the referendum had been rigged, Indonesia invalidated the integration of East Timor and cleared the way for its independence.

With order restored, the UN Transitional Administration in East Timor (UNTAET) began on 25 October 1999 peacekeeping and humanitarian mission to institutionalize democracy, and marks the fourth phase of the crisis. To a large extent, the violence had destroyed the infrastructure in East Timor, and around 70 percent of the homes were destroyed. As a result of the widespread destruction in East Timor, recovery and democratic transition was challenging. As time passed, the UN increased the numbers of civil police due to intense poverty and increased crime. Claims arose that at the expense of member nations the UN was institutionalizing itself to rule East Timor.[13] In addition, the UN bureaucracy in East Timor failed to embrace East Timorese in the

13. See for example, Jarat Chopra, "The UN's Kingdom of East Timor," *Survival* 42, no. 3 (autumn 2000): 27–40; and Astri Suhrke, "Peacekeepers as Nation-builders: Dilemmas of the UN in East Timor," *International Peacekeeping* 8, no. 4 (2001): 3.

transitional governing process. Because of prolonged UN governance without East Timorese participation, leaders in East Timor had virtually disappeared.[14]

U.S. ALLIES

The countries that played a main role in the crisis in East Timor were Indonesia, Portugal, and Australia. Indonesia was a critical component of the crisis as is addressed throughout this chapter. Portugal was a very important player in the developing crisis, because it initially supported the move toward autonomy in the UN, keeping international pressure on Indonesia. Australia however, proved to be the key element that influenced Indonesia's decision to hold the referendum. Moreover, it remained a pivotal player throughout the crisis and afterwards, as it led the UN mission to establish order in the newly independent East Timor.

Portugal

As discussed above, Portugal colonized East Timor until 1975, when the UN pressured for decolonization, which intended to lead to democratic self-rule in East Timor. Portugal remained the legal administrator of the tiny half-island, and was not pleased when Indonesia took possession of East Timor. As a result, relations between Portugal and Indonesia were troubled and a dispute transpired in the UN over many years. Even though the UN condemned Indonesia's occupation of East Timor, it did nothing. It seemed unfair that Indonesia remained, but Portugal could not. Consequently, Portugal pursued the issue through UN legal channels.

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14. For assessments of the challenges facing East Timor, see Hal Hill and Joãno M Saldanha, ed., *East Timor: Development Challenges for the World's Newest Nation* (Singapore: Asia Pacific Press, 2001).

Once Habibie succeeded Suharto as president of Indonesia, Portugal redoubled the pressure on the UN for talks on self-determination for East Timor. Finally Habibie agreed to discuss preparations for the autonomy of East Timor and entered into talks with Portugal under UN auspices in 1983. By 1986, Indonesia promised to allow East Timor to participate in the 1987 elections, and extended the right to vote to the East Timorese. With this compromise, Portugal eased pressure.

After the 1991 Indonesian killing of demonstrators in Dili, however, it became clear that Indonesia had not institutionalized reforms. The violence brought human rights to the fore of international concerns over East Timor. Portugal again defended the tiny fledgling state, especially since "many Portuguese regret dumping East Timor and feel some guilt for the deaths of many thousands of Timorese during the campaign that Indonesia has carried out against opponents of its occupation."[15] Once again, Portugal went to the UN with complaints against Indonesia.

Indonesia offered a type of autonomy to East Timor, in which Indonesia would retain control of East Timor in a similar manner as before. This time, however, Portugal insisted that autonomy could only be acceptable as a transitional state of affairs until a form of self-governance could be reached. By renewing discussion in the UN, Portugal initiated and shaped international involvement to resolve the democratic crisis in East Timor. The UN continued to support self-determination for East Timor, as it had since the 1970s, however this time mandated a mission to hold a referendum on the matter. The referendum determined that East Timor overwhelmingly voted for independence from Indonesia, but was followed by days of heavy punitive violence against East

15. "Lost Leader: East Timor," *The Economist* 325, no. 7787, 28 November 1992, 38.

Timorese. In mid-September, Portugal turned to the international media to remind the United States of its own participation in peacekeeping efforts in Kosovo and in return, expected U.S. participation in East Timor.

Indonesia

Once violence broke out in East Timor in 1991, the UN became increasingly concerned with human rights and security in the region. The Indonesian position on a UN peacekeeping force in East Timor however, was tentative at best, and insisted on the need for an agreement that would ensure its sovereignty. On 5 May 1999, Indonesia signed an agreement, and appended the Indonesian Constitution, giving special autonomy to East Timor. The same day, however, the Indonesian Deputy Chief of Staff of the Indonesian Army sent orders for preparations to "prevent the outbreak of civil war," including "repressive/coercive actions as well as plans for moving back evacuation of [East Timorese]."[16] A referendum date was set for Sunday, 8 August 1999 and the UN was invited to establish a mission in East Timor.

Despite the invitation, Indonesia did not want the referendum to take place. As a result, the Indonesian military in East Timor used violence to delay the referendum, which was rescheduled for 30 August. The UNTAET began to register East Timorese for the upcoming referendum despite unsafe conditions, and intimidation from local militia bands did not stop the referendum, which had a remarkable turnout of 98.5 percent. Theresults tilted heavily in favor of independence (78.5 percent) at 344,580 votes and

16. Document reproduced in Human Rights Watch, Appendix to *Indonesia/East Timor*, 18.

94,388 against.[17] Indonesia accused the UN of bias and fraud and rejected the referendum results. In addition, the Governor of East Timor attempted to partition East Timor into a western, pro-integration state and an eastern pro-independence state. These tactics only irritated the international community.[18] As a result, elements of the Indonesian militia unleashed a furor of violence immediately after the referendum that called international attention to severe human rights abuses and atrocities.[19]

By 9 September 1999, it was clear that Indonesia was either unable or unwilling to live up to its 5 May agreement to provide security in East Timor or to invite the UN to do so.[20] Moreover, it had become increasingly clear that Indonesia had role in the violence against citizens in East Timor. In an attempt to disguise Indonesia's involvement in the militia violence, Habibie declared martial law in East Timor on 7 September.[21] Resistance leader, Gusmão was released on the same day, projecting the appearance that Jakarta had come to its senses. Under the pretense of restoring order, Habibie temporarily relieved external pressure to stop the violence, but in fact the militia continued to slash and burn.

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17. United States House, "Resolution 292," *Markup before the Subcommittee on Asia and the Pacific of the Committee on International Relations House of Representatives*, 106th Cong., 1st sess., 15 September 1999 (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1999), 2.

18. See the Statement of Thomas R. Pickering, Under Secretary for Political Affairs, U.S. Department of State, in United States Congress, "The Political Futures of Indonesia and East Timor," *Joint Hearing before the Subcommittee on Asia and the Pacific of the committee on International Relations House of Representatives, and the Subcommittee on East Asian and Pacific Affairs of the Committee on Foreign Relations United States Senate*, 106th Cong., 1st sess., 9 September 1999 (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 2000), 9.

19. For a report on the involvement of the Indonesian military in the atrocities, expulsions and refugee crisis, see Human Rights Watch, *Indonesia/East Timor*; and Allan Nairn, "U.S. Support for the Indonesian Military: Congressional Testimony," in *Bitter Flowers, Sweet Flowers: East Timor, Indonesia, and the World Community*, ed. Richard Tanter, Mark Selden, and Stephen R. Shalom (Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, 2001), 163–73.

20. See the Statement of Thomas R. Pickering, Under Secretary for Political Affairs, U.S. Department of State, in United States Congress, *Joint Hearing*, 9 September 1999, 9.

21. See Keith B. Richburg, "Mayhem Continues in East Timor: Martial Law, New Indonesian Troops Fail to Halt Militia Rampage," *The Washington Post*, 8 September 1999, A1.

Indonesia claimed that it was doing everything it could to stem the violence, despite evidence to the contrary. Indonesia's deception did not last however, and two days later, the United States suspended military relations with Indonesia. Amidst mounting pressure from the international community, Indonesian president Habibie announced on 12 September that he would allow a UN multinational presence in East Timor. In the following days, there was concern that Indonesia was stalling, while it forcibly relocated East Timorese to other parts of Indonesia. Thus, despite supportive rhetoric from Indonesia, evidence in September indicated that Indonesian militia remained in East Timor and continued looting, burning, intimidating and killing.

Benedict Anderson explains the crisis in East Timor as a function of a culture, in which military prominence absolves leaders from all moral or ethical responsibility. He writes that a "culture has developed in the military according to which, in 'security' matters, every element of human decency can be set aside, with complete impunity—provided 'the boss' gives them the orders."[22] This culture grew over time until Indonesians have little sense of shame, a necessary ingredient for a responsible nation to function. Moreover, he argues, that compared to some leaders in Indonesia's past, Habibie was not so bad, considering that he allowed a referendum to take place, set free resistance political prisoners, and ultimately invited the UN into East Timor to end the violence. The lack of security in East Timor made outside efforts to reduce suffering difficult in many isolated areas. This was especially true in the western region of East Timor, as militia from West Timor engaged in cross border violence.

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22. Benedict Anderson, "Indonesian Nationalism Today and in the Future," *The New Left Review*, no. 235 (1999): 3.

Australia

Australia valued relations with Indonesia, its largest neighbor,[23] but Australia's position on Indonesia's suppression in East Timor shifted in August 1998 for four reasons.[24] First, the Australian government ran a survey and found that nearly all East Tiomorese wanted a voice in negotiations on autonomy and independence. Australian Prime Minister John Howard sent a letter dated 19 December 1998 to President Habibie, suggesting that Indonesia implement a "built-in review mechanism" into the autonomy process to delay actual autonomy or independence.[25] He recommended that Indonesia enter into negotiations with East Timorese leaders to distract the international community into thinking it was making reasonable progress on the East Timor issue. Despite continued Australian insistence on Indonesian sovereignty over East Timor, this shift generated tension, even bitterness between the neighbors. Even so, Australian Prime Minister John Howard remained "reluctant to commit Australia to a peacekeeping role in East Timor."[26]

Second, Australia and New Zealand presented the only European presence in the region. As a result, Indonesia insisted that the Asian component be increased in negotiations and participation in UN missions. This instance threatened Australia's influence in the region. Third, in its struggle to retain East Timor, Indonesia was losing a key long-term symbolic ally within the European camp. This loss occurred, because of

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23. For a thorough examination of Australia's foreign policy concerns regarding Indonesia and East Timor, see Henry S. Albinski, "Issues in Australian Foreign Policy: July to December 1999," *Australian Journal of Politics and History* 46, no. 2 (2000): 194–214.

24. The Australians were themselves very divided on the Indonesia-East Timor debate. See for example, Paul Monk, "East Timor: Truth and Consequences," *Quadrant* (January/February 2000): 33–40.

25. Laurie Brereton, "Media Release: Howard's Letter to Habibie," 22 September 1999 (http://search.aph.gov.au/search/parlInf...Item=0&ResultsID=29NP9&action-view&WCU, accessed on 15 March 2002).

26. Paul Daley, "Howard Unwilling on Peace Force for Timor," *The Age*, 30 January 1999 (http://ptg.djnr.com/ccroot/asp/publib/story.asp, accessed on 25 February 2002).

the West's turn to policy fostering the protection of human rights, rather than turning a blind eye, as had been the case for so many years. As part of the West, Australia found that human rights abuses in East Timor could no longer be easily ignored. Delicate relations between Australia and Indonesia had the potential to derail progress toward resolving the violence in East Timor. To keep this from happening, the United States and Australia asked Jaheed Marker, the UN Representative to East Timor, not to endanger the April 1999 agreements by pressing Jakarta about security concerns.[27] These efforts to reach an agreement on holding a referendum came to fruition in early May 1999. Once UNAMET was established on 11 June, Australia committed funds, vehicles and troops for the mission, and became increasingly intertwined in resolving the crisis as the referendum approached in late August.

Fourth, Australian public opinion increasingly pressed its government to stop the violence. Australia experienced internal pressure to intervene, because it had a large number of East Timorese citizens and refugees, and the Australian people were highly sensitized to their neighbor's plight. Popular approval of intervention by Australia reached well over 70 percent.[28] Consequently, many Australians took to the streets in demonstrations that pressured the government of Australia to work harder to resolve the crisis. As a result, Australia lobbied the UN, the United States, and other countries to intervene to restore order, and when violence erupted after the referendum, Australia was ready to use force.

Australia's Prime Minister, John Howard, phoned Clinton in early September to

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27. UN Secretary General Kofi Annan appointed Ambassador Jamsheed Marker of Pakistan in 1997 as his Personal Representative for East Timor.

28. See Albinski, "Issues in Australian Foreign Policy," 196.

appeal personally for U.S. support. Australia also had a strong lobby in Congress, and applied pressure to step up U.S. participation. Moreover, Australian Foreign Minister, Alexander Downer used the media pressure Clinton in a television interview to remind the United States of its support during the Gulf War.

Australia insisted on leading INTERFET even though it was concerned over strained relations with Indonesia, which voiced reservations. Australia demanded a robust mandate to fulfill the mission, and on 15 September 1999, the UN Security Council approved Resolution 1264, mandating Australia to lead a Chapter VII peace-enforcing mission into East Timor.[29] Australia committed half of the 8,000 initial troops for the UN mission and quickly brought calm. Thus, INTERFET stopped civil war, cross border fighting, and widespread militia violence in East Timor. INTERFET transitioned to UNTAET to begin institutionalizing democracy in East Timor.

Australia was concerned with oil mining rights in the Timor Gap, and surprised the international community in October 2000, saying it "was not giving up its claim to half of East Timor's oil and gas reserves," and would continue to honor a 1989 treaty with Indonesia.[30] Since international lines are drawn in the middle of the waterway and the field is mainly on the East Timor side, UN law of the sea indicated that the main oil field lies in East Timor's economic zone. The final agreement gave East Timor 85 percent of the oil and gas royalties, with Australia receiving the remaining 15 percent.[31]

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29. UN, "Security Council Resolution 1264," 15 September 1999 (hereafter cited as UN, "SC/RES") (www.un.org/Docs/sc/scres/1999/sc1264.htm, accessed on 15 March 2002).

30. "Petro Trouble," *Business Week* 3706, 6 November 2000, 68E2 (http://web4.infotrac.galegroup.com/itw/i..._A66532779&dyn=70!ar_fmt?sw_aep=viva_odu, accessed on 15 March 2002).

31. My appreciation goes to Don Greenlees for his comments on the economy of East Timor, communication with the author, 14 April 2002.

Ironically, the oil must be shipped to the northern Australian port of Darwin to be refined, stored and distributed. East Timor stands to begin receiving money in 2005.[32]

THE UNITED NATIONS

Since the end of the cold war, we have seen an increased number of small conflicts, and have consequently threatened regional security and become an international concern. As a result, the UN has experienced increased demands for peacekeeping and peace-enforcing missions. Moreen Dee proposes that there has been an "emergence of a possible new paradigm in the mechanisms of collective security which has seen the delegation of peacekeeping/peace-enforcement operations to regional organizations and defense alliances."[33] The UN Chapter VII mandate to restore order in East Timor fell to Australia, a dominant regional power.

The United Nations peacekeeping efforts during the crisis can be separated into four phases. The first phase begins with the November 1991 massacres in Dili and is mostly inactive, other than disapproving of the human rights violations. Phase Two starts with UNAMET in June 1999 and entails assistance in preparations for the referendum in East Timor. Phase three begins in September 1999 with INTERFET, the UN Chapter VII mandate for an Australian-led intervention. Phase four begins with UNTAET in late February 2000 for disarming, repatriation, rebuilding and transition to self-governance. UN responsibilities under UNTAET included all legislative and executive authority, as

32. Peter O'Connor, "East Timor and Australia negotiating Maritime Boundary, Oil Revenues," *Associated Press Newswires*, 17 June 2002 (http://ptg.djnr.com/ccroot/asp/publib/story.asp, accessed on 22 June 2002).

33. Moreen Dee, "'Coalitions of the Willing' and Humanitarian Intervention: Australia's Involvement with INTERFET," *International Peacekeeping* 8, no. 3 (2001): 2.

well as administration, electoral, repatriation and rehabilitation tasks for up to three years. East Timor's independence from Portugal might not have happened at all, had the UN not insisted in 1960 that Portuguese territories were self-governing according to Chapter VI provisions. The UN had pressured Portugal to make provisions for independence of East Timor, and this explains Portugal's later insistence on East Timor's independence from Indonesian rule. After Indonesia took possession of East Timor in 1975, the UN Security Council passed resolutions 384 on 22 December 1975, and 389 on 22 April 1976. The resolutions called on Indonesia "to withdraw without delay all its forces from the territory, and on all states to respect the territorial integrity of East Timor and the people's right to self-determination."[34]

Phase One

The UN approach to East Timor remained disapproving yet inactive for many years, until the killings of demonstrators in Dili in November 1991, after which the Committee on Human Rights became involved. It took several more years for an agreement to be reached with Indonesia in 1994, so that UN human rights and humanitarian organizations could gain access to East Timor. The UN brought together East Timorese leaders in 1995 to form the All-Inclusive Intra-East Timorese Dialogue (AIETD) to preserve and promote the cultural identity of East Timor. After Secretary-General Kofi Annan took office in January 1997, the UN began to increase efforts to resolve the East Timor question of self-determination.

When Indonesian militia unleashed attacks against the pro-independence resistance in East Timor in April 1999, the UN seriously considered alternatives for

34. Martin, *Self-Determination*, 17–18.

resolving the crisis. The UN sent an assessment team to East Timor in late April 1999, which found deficiencies in the delivery of basic services, health and education.[35] After the UN finished assessments, the Secretary-General made recommendations on 22 May to the Security Council for a new resolution, which was delayed to wait for U.S. Congressional approval until June.

In the meantime, Indonesia agreed to give special autonomy to East Timor, and invite the UN to oversee the referendum set for early August. In addition, Indonesia agreed to provide for the safety of unarmed UN representatives. Two days later, UN Security Resolution 1236 welcomed the 5 May agreement between the UN, Portugal and Indonesia, and announced the UN's intention to establish a UN presence in East Timor "as soon as practicable."[36] The resolution promised to assess the security situation in East Timor, and to decide on a mission in East Timor. The speed with which UNAMET was set up was unprecedented. The largest contributions were from Australia, Portugal, Japan and the United States, with substantial contributions from the European Union.[37]

Phase Two

UN Security Council Resolution 1246 passed on 11 June 1999, UNAMET. The resolution condemned the violence in East Timor and stressed "the responsibility of the Government of Indonesia to maintain peace and security in East Timor."[38] The

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35. For more, see Geoffrey C. Gunn, *The New World Hegemony in the Malay World* (Lawrenceville, NJ: The Red Sea Press, 2000), 275; and Martin, *Self-Determination*, 37–8.

36. UN, "SC/RES 1236," 7 May 1999 (www.un.org/Docs/scres/1999/99sc1236.htm, accessed on 15 March 2002).

37. Around $50 million of the $80 million cost of UNAMET was met through voluntary contributions.

38. See UN, "SC/RES 1246," 11 June 1999 (www.un.org/Docs/sc/scres/1999/99sc1246.htm, accessed on 15 March 2002).

resolution authorized 280 civilian police "to act as advisors to the Indonesian Police . . ., to supervise the escort of the ballot papers and boxes to and from the polling sites."[39] The resolution also authorized the deployment of 50 military liaison officers who maintained contact with the Indonesian Armed Forces. Despite these measures, security for UN officials in East Timor was a major obstacle in preparing for the August referendum. In addition, UNAMET faced hostile local media reports that "extended to deliberate fabrication."[40] As a result, UNAMET officials became targets of militia violence themselves. In at least one case on 29 June the stoning of the regional office in Maliana, Bobonaro resulted in injuries to locals and the UNAMET official. On 4 July, a humanitarian convoy was attacked. The led to the evacuation of the UNAMET staff from Liquiça. During the evacuation, militia attacked UNAMET's helicopter and vehicles. Both of these incidents were captured by international news for the world.

Although Indonesia officially supported UN presence, its militia targeted UNAMET officials with violence and threats. Moreover, Indonesia insisted that UNAMET remain unarmed, making it very vulnerable. Indonesia also insisted that the referendum should take place before the end of August, but used covert activities to make such progress difficult. This strategy paid off at least in the short term, because the Secretary General postponed voter registration until 16 July, to give Indonesia time to bring the security under control.[41] Four days later, the UN Secretary-General recommended that despite violence and threats, the registration for the referendum vote

39. Ibid.
40. Martin, *Self-Determination*, 47.
41. UN, "Letter dated 10 July 1999 from the Secretary-General Addressed to the President of the Security Council," S/1999/773, 10 July 1999 (www.un.org/Docs/sc/letters/1999/s1999773.htm, accessed on 15 March 2002).

should proceed, because Indonesian authorities had assured him that they were taking steps to improve security.[42] Besides, registration had to begin on 16 July for the referendum to take place by the August deadline. Registration lasted from 16 July to 4 August 1999 with 451,792 East Timorese registered. UNAMET was hailed as an overwhelming success. The campaign prior to the referendum began 14 August and lasted until 27 August, allowing for a two-day cooling off period before the referendum.

UN Security Council Resolution 1257 postponed the referendum until 30 August 1999 and extended the mandate for UNAMET.[43] In late August, Resolution 1262 extended UNAMET until 30 November 1999, but increased the number of civilian police in East Timor to 460, and upped the military liaison component to 300 personnel. The resolution aimed "to build confidence and support stability" during the post-referendum period.[44]

The day after the referendum, severe violence broke out, as militia units implemented a "scorched earth" policy across East Timor. Hundreds of militia attacked and burned houses of pro-independence supporters. Journalists were attacked, and locals fled. On 2 September, militia surrounded UNAMET's office in Maliana and killed two local staff members. As a result, UNAMET pulled international and local staff to Dili the following day. Immediately, BBC pulled out all of its news correspondents, and took other journalists with them. The departure of the international press was cause for militia celebration, but not for UNAMET representatives left Dili.

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42. UN, "Letter dated 14 July 1999 from the Secretary-General Addressed to the President of the Security Council," S/1999/788, 14 July 1999 (www.un.org/Docs/sc/letters/1999/s1999786.htm, accessed on 15 March 2002).

43. UN, "SC/RES 1257," 3 August 1999 (www.un.org/Docs/sc/scres/1999/99sc1257.htm, accessed on 15 March 2002).

44. UN, "SC/RES 1262," 27 August 1999 (www.un.org/Docs/sc/scres/1999/sc1262.htm, accessed on 15 March 2002).

The UN announced the referendum results on the morning of 4 September. Immediately after the announcement, the militia renewed a punitive campaign against pro-independence East Timorese. In light of the increased violence, UNAMET considered pulling out completely, but feared that a complete withdrawal might strengthen Indonesia's resolve to keep East Timor, rather than honor the referendum. As a result, on 10 September, all but 80 UN volunteers evacuated from Dili to Australia. When UN volunteers again came under militia fire, international and domestic pressures squeezed Habibie. With the UNAMET volunteers in ever more danger, UN headquarters threatened Habibie with economic consequences, such as holding IMF and the World Bank funds, which were critical to Indonesia's economic recovery.[45] This pressure from the international community had the potential to bring domestic consequences and the political and economic isolation of Indonesia began to take shape.

Domestically, Habibie was dependent on General Wiranto and the Indonesian military for power. Rumors of a potential coup swept through Jakarta, and Habibie, a lame duck leader, was increasingly vulnerable to forces in his government that could oust him.[46] In a conversation with UN Secretary-General, for example, Habibie agreed to allow in multinational forces, but when it came to negotiations that included the presence of his military general, Wiranto, he was uncommitted. Moreover, Habibie refused to invite a UN mission into East Timor to restore order until Wiranto had first visited Dili personally to assess the situation. Outsiders understood Habibie's indecision as weakness and vulnerability relative to Wiranto, whose power was increasing. Moreover, even

45. The World Bank set a precedent, because it entered into politics by warning Indonesia that further violations of human rights in East Timor would result in halted funding.

46. See Seth Mydans, "Indonesia says No to Timor Peacekeepers," *New York Times*, 9 September 1999, A8.

though the militia in East Timor was shown to have ties to Jakarta, it is unclear whether it was Habibie, or Wiranto, who was controlling the troops. Wiranto visited Dili on 11 September, where "members of the [UN] mission were convinced that he had been personally shocked by his visit."[47] Afterwards, Wiranto agreed to invite an international force into East Timor, which Habibie announced the very next day.

Remaining UNAMET volunteers in Dili were in precarious danger, despite Habibie's announcement, and two days later, all but twelve UN volunteers were evacuated to Australia because of continuing militia attacks.[48] The UNAMET headquarters was closed and those remaining were removed to the former Australian Consulate for safety. The UN remained reluctant to withdraw UNAMET completely from East Timor, because such action could signal the militia to continue violence with impunity.

Phase Three

The day after the evacuation, UN Security Council passed Resolution 1264 INTERFET to send a multinational force to restore peace and security, to protect and support UNAMET, to facilitate humanitarian assistance, and authorize the participating States in the multinational force "to take all necessary measures to fulfil this mandate."[49] Thus, Resolution 1264 authorized a Chapter VII mandate for the International Force in East Timor to restore order. Countries that participated in INTERFET included Australia, Brazil, Britain, Canada, France, Germany, Ireland, Italy, Malaysia, New

47. Martin, *Self-Determination*, 111.
48. Keith B. Richburg, "UN Staff flees East Timor: Local People sheltered in Compound taken along on Flights to Australia," *The Washington Post*, 15 September 1999, A18.

Zealand, Norway, the Philippines, the Republic of Korea, Thailand, and the United States. In addition, Brazil and China offered to send civilian police. The resolution also requested plans for a UN transitional administration in East Timor, and stressed the importance of encouraging and ensuring the safe return of refugees to their homes in East Timor, as well as "full, safe, and unimpeded access by humanitarian organizations."[50]

Australian Commander, Major General Peter Cosgrove flew to Dili on 19 September to meet with the Indonesian military and work out details of Indonesia's withdrawal from East Timor. On the same day, Jakarta renounced the integration of East Timor into Indonesia, and announced Indonesia would cooperate with INTERFET operations. Jakarta added claims that the referendum had been rigged and requested an investigation, but the UN quickly dismissed such accusations. The following day, INTERFET forces arrived in East Timor, and according to Cosgrove, "met absolutely no resistance."[51]

The success of the INTERFET mission in East Timor was largely due to the dual nature of mission implementation. First, initial success depended on depriving the adversary of chances gained from using force by creating the perception that the Indonesian military and militia were out-manned and out-equipped. INTERFET carefully downplayed the connection between the Indonesian military and the militia by working through the military leadership. Second, INTERFET success was due to consistent and co-operative communication with the Indonesian military, so that they

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49. UN, "SC/RES 1264," 15 September 1999 (www.un.org/Docs/sc/scres/1999/sc1264.htm, accessed on 15 March 2002).

50. Ibid.

51. Quoted in Doug Struck, "In East Timor, Smiles Greet Peacekeepers: Armed Patrols Meet no Resistance," *The Washington Post*, 21 September 1999, A13.

were "given the space to retire gracefully from East Timor."[52] This required careful communication between INTERFET and the Indonesian military to prevent misunderstandings.

Phase Four

Within a month of the Australian led intervention, the UN began the transition of East Timor to self-governance. On 4 October, the Secretary-General published a report with recommendations for the fourth phase of UN activity in East Timor, which began with Resolution 1272 on 25 October 1999. The resolution established the UNTAET.[53] With the last remaining Indonesian representatives departing East Timor on 30 October, the daunting task of UNTAET was to maintain order and institutionalize democracy in East Timor. It was estimated that the transition could take up to 3 years. In the meantime, UNTAET was "endowed with overall responsibility for the administration of East Timor" and "empowered to exercise all legislative and executive authority, including the administration of justice."[54] UNTAET could deploy 8,950 military personnel, 200 military observers, and 1640 civilian police in November, and formally replaced INTERFET on 23 February 2000.

The task before UNTAET was daunting because virtually all infrastructure and services had been interrupted or destroyed by the militia, and displacement and forced relocation had made conditions ripe for a humanitarian disaster. While East Timor was

52. David Dickens, "The United Nations in East Timor: Intervention at the Military Operational Level," *Contemporary Southeast Asia* 23, no. 2 (2001): 214.
53. UN, "SC/RES 1272," 25 October 1999 (www.un.org/Docs/scres/1999/99sc1272.htm, accessed on 15 March 2002).
54. Ibid.

poor before the referendum, afterwards it was poorer still. Crime in East Timor grew to be a large problem complicated by the lack of a legal system. In addition, refugee issues in West Timor constituted a threat to regional stability.

Even though many factors favored UNTAET operations, it was plagued with persistent lack of success. One key failure had to do with bureaucratic struggle between departments in the UN over who would administer UNTAET. The struggle was eventually settled by the Secretary-General, who decided to give leadership to the Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO), rather than the Department of Political Affairs (DPA), which had run the UNAMET preparations in country for the referendum. Thus, the "planning of UNTAET took place in the context of a fierce bureaucratic struggle between the DPA and the DPKO."[55] The DPA had extensive in country experience and networks, while the DPKO did not. Therefore, when the DPKO received the leadership, much of the in-country experience and contacts were not used. As a consequence, the key failure of UNTAET was that UN administrative, judicial and military operations failed to incorporate East Timorese in their operations, thereby prolonging East Timor's dependence on the UN, and diffusing existing political influence of East Timorese leaders. Under the auspices of remaining neutral, the UNTAET leadership refused to incorporate local leaders into its framework. A secondary consequence was that the already diminished numbers of skilled workers in East Timor received no critical training in institutions or governing. As a result, UNTAET ironically functioned as a pseudo-colonial government over East Timor, rather than as a transitional administrative body as planned.

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55. Astri Shurke, "Peacekeepers as Nation-builders," 6.

Another flaw in the implementation of UNTAET, was that "both legislative and executive powers are in the hands of a single individual, the Special Representative of the Secretary-General and Transitional Administrator, Sergio Vieira de Mello, who is also the head of the UN's Office for the coordination of Humanitarian Affairs."[56] Such consolidated power enabled a monarchy style rule, in which a double standard made locals, but not UN representatives, subject to UN laws.

A third concern with UNTAET was the growth of a dual economy by April 2000: one for the UN, and one to serve the UN. This was possible because the UN bureaucratic administration in East Timor resisted the incorporation of locals. For example, in April 2000, de Mello resisted replacing the 13 UN central department deputies with East Timorese. In May however, Annan and José Ramos Horta demanded that the district deputies be removed and replaced with local leaders and that a terminal date for UNTAET be fixed.

In early September, the UN presence in East Timor came under renewed attack. Militia killed three UN personnel in West Timor, who were assisting refugees, and two UNTAET peacekeepers were killed in East Timor. The Indonesian government expressed outrage over these attacks and killings in a letter to the UN Security Council dated 7 September. The following day, the UN Security Council passed Resolution 1319, condemned the attacks and killings. It stated that Indonesia must "disarm and disband

56. Chopra, "The UN's Kingdom," 29.

the militias immediately" and that "UNTAET should respond robustly to the militia threat in East Timor, consistent with its resolution 1272."[57]

THE U.S. CONGRESS

Congress had long disliked U.S. military assistance to Indonesia, due to its repressive policies in East Timor and other territories. Congress cut military aid to Indonesia in 1992 after learning that the Indonesian military committed human rights violations in East Timor. The U.S. Department of Defense continued military aid however, by using a different program under the code name "Iron Balance" to hide from Congress and the public its training of and equipment shipments to Indonesia's military. In particular, an elite and especially feared force called the Kopassus received U.S. training. The Kopassus had played a large role in the 1975 genocide of an estimated 200,000 people in East Timor. It received Joint Combined Education and Training, for "military expertise that could only be used internally against civilians, such as urban guerilla warfare, surveillance, counter-intelligence, sniper marksmanship and 'psychological operations.'"[58] Some of the U.S.-trained Kopassus were linked to the 1991 massacre in Dili. In a UN Inquiry, the Kopassus was later linked to spearheading militia and police violence against pro-independent East Timorese.[59]

When the crisis occurred in 1999, the U.S. Congress preferred pressuring Indonesia to halt the human rights violations in East Timor. Moreover, Congress favored

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57. UN, "SC/RES 1319," 8 September 2000 (www.un.org, accessed on 15 March 2002).

58. Id Vulliamy, and Antony Barnett, "U.S. aided Butchers of Timor: Exclusive: Washington trained Death Squads in Secret while Britain has continued to help Indonesian Army," *The Guardian*, 19 September 1999 (http://ptg.djnr.com/ccroot/asp/publib/st...AAAMjAwMjAzMTgoWTM2MDEAAAAK &refer=true, accessed on 18 March 2002).

59. Mark Riley, "UN Official Doubts Jakarta Probe," *The Age* 2 February 2000, 7 (http://ptg.djnr

sending a UN sanctioned multilateral force to provide humanitarian relief in East Timor, however, wanted to limit U.S. participation to supplemental assistance, rather than ground troops. Congress also debated a deeper commitment from Japan.

After the referendum on 30 August, the violence in East Timor generated a shift in Congress. Senator Russell D. Feingold (D Wis.) introduced a bill on 8 September, urging the World Bank, the International Monetary Fund and the U.S. government to cut off assistance to Indonesia.[60] In a joint hearing on 9 September, Doug Bereuter, Representative of Nebraska and Chairman of the Subcommittee on Asia and the Pacific, warned "Jakarta that Congressional support for pending and future IMF and World Bank Resources to Indonesia are at grave risk unless acceptable order is restored in East Timor."[61] Benjamin Gilman, Chairman of the Committee on International Relations, declared that "what is happening in East Timor today is nothing short of ethnic cleansing."[62] He argued that genocide loomed and the international community should be prepared to assist in restoring order. As seen above, the urgings of the IMF and the World Bank were instrumental in pressuring Habibie to invite the UN into East Timor.

In a testimony to Congress on 30 September, Allan Nairn testified about continuing U.S. military assistance programs with Indonesia, and described assistance ranging from training from a variety of branches of the U.S. bureaucracy, including, the Department of Defense, the Central Intelligence Agency, the Federal Bureau of Investigation, the Drug Enforcement Administration, Customs, and the U.S. Marshals.

.com/ccroot/asp/publib/story_clean_cpy.asp?articles=AGEE0003200036'TINEA..., accessed on 1 May 2002).

60. See Steven Mufson, "West's Credibility at Stake, Laureate Says," *The Washington Post*, 9 September 1999, A17.

61. United States Congress, *Joint Hearing*, 9 September 1999, 4.

62. Ibid., 7.

He described equipment such as U.S. C-130s, new U.S. machine guns, U.S. M-16s, high-tech electronics and surveillance, ammunition and spare parts. Facilities that were employed in this assistance included for example, Virginia and California police departments, the New York City Police Department Police Academy, the U.S. Joint Combined Education and Training, the Federal Bureau of Investigation Academy, and training at Quantico.[63]

During the last week of September 1999, the House passed Resolution 292, condemning Indonesian military efforts to overturn the referendum and called on Indonesia to help end the civil unrest and violence in East Timor.[64] The resolution supported a UN Security Council move for a multinational force. Congress also supported further economic sanctions against Indonesia. During the remarks on Resolution 292, it became clear that the United States might support a UN multilateral intervention in East Timor, because regional actors such as Australia, New Zealand, Japan, the Philippines and Malaysia were willing to bear the most costs. Australia wanted to lead the mission, allowing the United States to remain less active. California Congressman Dana Rohrbacher said; "I support this resolution because the United States is not the lead player in this intervention for democracy. As should be the case, local and regional powers are committing their troops, and the United States is there in a supportive role, rather than having to play the lead role and rather than be the one that has to put out all the money."[65] At the same hearing, the Representative from American Samoa, Eni Faleomavaega, pointed out that international interest in East Timor had much to do with

63. Allan Nairn, "U.S. Support for the Indonesian Military.
64. United States House, *Resolution*, 292.
65. United States House, *Hearing before the Subcommittee on International Operations and Human Rights of the Committee on International Relations*, 30 September 1999, 8.

the mostly unpublicized oil reserves. Consequently, the question of East is complicated "because of the vast amount of resources and corporate interests."[66]

Congress was reluctant to fund UN peacekeeping missions abroad and played a large role in pressuring Clinton to request the UN to reduce the U.S. role in the East Timor operations on 7 October.[67] Debate in Congress had already delayed paying back-dues and further reduced the UN assessments to 25 from 31 percent to reflect a more "fair" scale of assessments.[68] In the 10 February 2001 joint hearing, Assistant Secretary Stanley Roth credited both the administration and Congress for their part in pressuring Indonesia to end the violence and to allow a multilateral force to enter East Timor.

AMERICAN PUBLIC OPINION AND THE MEDIA

This section considers the role of the media in the developments in East Timor, particularly as it relates to public opinion. The position of the media closely reflected the position of the U.S. government and downplayed evidence that the United States was aware of Indonesia's involvement in violence against pro-independence East Timorese. Examination of the media is followed up with evaluation of U.S. public opinion regarding the crisis in East Timor a limited public survey. Overall, public opinion in the United States did not favor military intervention.

Michael Gordon Jackson examined press coverage of East Timor by counting the times "Timor" appeared in the title or first paragraph of articles. The newspapers included the *Washington Post* and the *New York Times* (*Times*). Jackson found that in

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66. Comments made by Eni F.H. Faleomavaega in ibid., 7–8.
67. Joe Lauria, "U.S. Asks UN for Trims in Force for East Timor," *Boston Globe* 256, no. 100 (1999): A1, A13.
68. Richard Holbrooke quoted in ibid., A13.

1991 the *Times* published 35 stories and the Post 7. From 1991 until 1998, the *Times* contained 201 and the *Post* had 106 articles. In 1999, the *Times* presented 334 and the *Post* 223 reports. The trend is similar for both papers with the total trend showing that of the total 906 stories between 1991 and 1999, 4.6 percent were in 1991, 34% were between 1992 and 1998, and 61.4 percent were in 1999. These figures indicate that media coverage in 1999 was over thirteen times greater in frequency than in 1991. Thus, the situation in East Timor clearly received increased media attention as the crisis in East Timor unfolded. There was a similar pattern for television coverage during the same periods, but though the coverage increased, "it would be wrong to assume that it clamored for U.S. military intervention," since the "coverage gives the sense of general approval of the limited nature of the U.S. commitment, full-hearted support for INTERFET, and great sympathy for the goals of the East Timorese resistance."[69]

The international media during the crisis in East Timor mostly remained uncritical of the West's inaction on the part of the West to prevent or stop the violence in East Timor. A "follow the flag" phenomenon on the part of the media, which ignored evidence that Western countries and organizations, such as Great Britain, the United States, Australia, the UN, and Human Rights Watch knew that Indonesia had planned post-referendum violence. Indonesia's plans for reprisal violence after a pro-independence referendum were varied. The amount of evidence "was considerable, including documents from the Indonesian army and militias, intercepted cables and

69. Jackson, "Something must be done?" 61.

satellite telephone conversations, satellite photographs of troop movements along the border of East and West Timor, and first-person testimonies."[70]

As early as March 1999, it was clear, according to intelligence reports that Indonesia was working closely with as many as 24 militia groups in East Timor, however the media failed to take note. In the U.S. print media, there were virtually no reports on the situation in East Timor between 20 July and 24 August 1999, despite increased turmoil and harassment experienced by UN teams inside East Timor. The media reported that Indonesia had splintered authority, for example, Indonesia was supposedly controlling the military, but was also responsible for stopping militia violence. Here, the depiction of a Habibie-Wiranto difference allowed the media to represent a moderate leadership as reasonable, while extremists ran out of control. Therefore, a central part of this interpretation was media complicity not to expose evidence proving that the Indonesian military supported the militia in East Timor. Thus, the West, particularly the United States, appeased Indonesia because of long-term military relations with an important geopolitical ally.

Herman and Peterson argue that the *New York Times* so closely reflected U.S. official policy on Indonesia, that beginning in the 1970s, the paper's reporting remained biased in favor of Indonesia, and against East Timor. They criticize *Times* reporters and editors for aligning too closely with U.S. official policy and rhetoric regarding Indonesia and East Timor, and as a result the public was misinformed or uninformed on actual events. They identify twelve different tactics used by the *Times* to misconstrue or

70. Edward S. Herman and David Peterson, "East Timor: From 'Humanitarian' Bombing to Inhumane Appeasement," *Covert Action Quarterly* 68 (Fall/Winter 1999): 4.

sidestep important information that could have changed public opinion about the crisis.[71] The public was led to believe that the crisis in East Timor was a civil war, rather than resistance to illegal, repressive occupation by Indonesia. *The New York Times* sidestepped important issues by not giving the events in East Timor "compelling attention and it continues to inject Indonesia-protective biases and misleading frames of reference that it has used since 1975."[72] For example, the crisis in East Timor received no front-page placement in the *Times* until 9 September 1999, when National Security Advisor Sandy Berger highlighted the importance of the U.S.-Indonesian relationship at the expense of East Timor. Moreover, the *Times* did not publish photos of victims in East Timor or "anywhere in the Indonesian Archipelago for 1998 and 1999."[73] In contrast, during this period the *Associated Press* reported on 1 April the discovery of a mass grave in Ermera, and *Reuters* reported bodies in the Bay of Dili on 25 April 1999. Photos of such atrocities commonly stir up a public reaction, so their omission is notable. In addition, *Times* reporters never used the terms "genocide," "ravaging," or "horrors" to describe events on the ground in East Timor. The use of such words generally conveys a sense of perverse injustice and therefore holds the potential to turn the tide of public opinion against the perpetrators of such actions. As a result, readers received less compelling versions of events, conveying a much lower sense of urgency about the crisis.

Times reporters approached the crisis as if Indonesia legally occupied East Timor territory and that the violence was the result of separatist activities. In fact, pro-

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71. Edward S. Herman and David Peterson, "Appendix: The Standard Forms of Apologetics on Indonesia and East Timor used by New York Times Reporters," *Z Magazine* 12, no. 7/8 (1999): 87–8.

72. Edward S. Herman and David Peterson, "How the New York Times Protects Indonesian Terror in East Timor," *Z Magazine* 12, no. 7/8 (1999): 84.

73. Ibid., 85.

independence leaders asked supporters not to resort to violence in response to militia harassment, and as a result drew increased support from the UN. Reports on resistance activities were tagged as separatist and by implication illegal. An example of this is that the *Times* failed to report that Indonesia supported the militia activities in East Timor, not only against East Timorese resistance and citizens, but also against the UN and humanitarian organizations. A deeper issue however, is that this approach sidestepped the issue of U.S. support for the Indonesian military and possibly even U.S. intelligence on Indonesia used by the military to derail the referendum. As a result, the *Times* explained U.S. policy as assisting Indonesia to provide for its defense, rather than providing equipment and training to be used against East Timor.

Times reporting failed to identify that the militia was connected to and supported by the Indonesian military, thereby sidestepping the need to identify Indonesia as the critical agent in the violence and killings in East Timor. By failing to connect the militia to the Indonesian military and leadership, the *Times* reporters showed Habibie as a benign reformist leader in the midst of difficult times. Such portrayal of Habibie increased the image that Indonesia "means well and is trying to amend its ways."[74] Habibie was however hand picked by Suharto and maintained many of his predecessor's policies. Moreover, the portrayal of Habibie in a weak leadership position led to the gullible interpretation that neither Habibie, nor Wiranto could control the militia in East Timor. The *Boston Globe* portrayed this as an official Washington belief, when it printed that an administration official said that "U.S. intelligence analysts increasingly believe that neither Indonesian President Habibie nor Wiranto can control the military in East Timor,"

74. Herman and Peterson "Appendix," 88.

because they are "loyal to a rogue faction in the military."[75] Jeffrey Winters complimented the *Boston Globe*, which "deserves credit for a level of completeness and accuracy that the *New York Times*, *Wall Street Journal*, *Los Angeles Times*, *Chicago Tribune*, and *Washington Post* failed miserably to provide" about the crisis in East Timor.[76] Thus, misconstruing, downplaying, or eliminating important information in American news did not lead to a sense of urgency in the American public that the violence should end, as is reflected in the poll taken in September 1999.

The amount of data from polls pertaining to the crisis in East Timor is limited. At the end of September 1999, the Gallup Organization asked four questions with content on East Timor. This section examines that survey.[77] In general, the poll indicated that the "American public is paying relatively little attention to the conflict in East Timor, and to date has little inclination to support the involvement of U.S. military troops there as a part of the international peacekeeping force."[78]

The survey revealed that only 5 percent of the respondents followed the news about the conflict in East Timor closely. Of the remaining respondents, 24 percent followed it somewhat closely, 29 percent followed it not too closely, and 41 percent did not follow it at all. Only 1 percent had no opinion. With 29 percent following the crisis relatively closely, the crisis rates in the lowest category of news events followed by the

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75. John Donnelley, "Pentagon Reluctant to Isolate Indonesia," *Boston Globe*, 11 September 1999, A1, A10.

76. Jeffrey A. Winters, "Why U.S. owes East Timor a Moral Debt," *The Korea Herald*, 30 May 2002 (http://ptg.djnr.com/ccroot/asp/publiclib/story.asp, accessed on 22 June 2002).

77. The poll was conducted by random telephone interview of a national sample of 1039 adults between 23 and 26 September 1999. There is a 95 percent confidence that the results of this survey fall within a plus or minus 3 percent margin of error due to sampling or other random effects.

78. "East Timor Has Yet to Register Strongly on Americans' Consciousness: but Majority Says a Peaceful Solution Is at least Somewhat Important to U.S.," *The Gallup Poll News Service*, 4 October 1999 (www.gallup.com/poll/releases/pr991004.asp, accessed on 30 January 2002).

Gallop Organization over the previous ten years. As such, it is above only one other news story tested by Gallup: the 1994 political reforms in Japan.

Many Americans knew little about what happened in East Timor. When asked, "with what country is East Timor currently having a dispute," only 20 percent answered correctly with Indonesia. More to the point, 70 percent of the respondents did not know, 1 percent thought it was with Australia, 1 percent with China, 2 percent thought it was a civil war, and another 6 percent thought it was with some other country. The level of disinterest in the crisis in East Timor likely led to a majority of uninformed respondents, since 80 percent either knew that they did not know, or guessed incorrectly.

Despite a relative lack of knowledge about the East Timor crisis, the majority of those surveyed considered a peaceful solution to the conflict important. Of the 56 percent who considered peaceful resolution important, 14 percent said it was very important and 42 percent said it was somewhat important. Of the 33 percent who said it was not important, 20 percent said it was not too important, while 13 percent indicated it was not important at all. When compared to responses on other conflicts, including the Palestinian/Israeli, Kosovo, Bosnia, and Northern Ireland, 33 percent ranked the lowest importance. A full 11 percent had no opinion. When asked if the United States should send military troops to participate in a multilateral peacekeeping force in East Timor, 34 percent favored, 59 percent opposed, and 7 percent had no opinion. These results suggest that public opinion was more against intervention than for it.

The role of the media in the crisis in East Timor mainly endorsed the U.S. official policy. It did serve an important part in the crisis however, by bringing atrocities to light. For example, the plight of East Timor went largely unnoticed until 1991, when the

Indonesian military massacred pro-independence demonstrators at a rally in Dili. The media highlighted this event and increased international pressure to stop such practices. As explained above, the coverage by the *New York Times* of the crisis in East Timor closely followed official U.S. policy and rhetoric supporting Indonesian occupation and downplaying the right to self-determination in East Timor. The role of the media during the crisis in East Timor therefore, reinforced a sense of low importance.

U.S. INTERESTS

During the 1990s, the momentum of cold war anti-Communist containment abated, despite continuing concerns over growing Chinese influence in the larger region. Other competing concerns began to take on greater importance to U.S. policy makers, including the status of Taiwan and potential North Korean nuclear armament. Thus, the United States shifted focus from Indonesia, to promoting regional stability through economic and democratic development. As a result, the United States was more interested in seeing stability in Indonesia, the largest and most populous country in the region, rather than worrying about tiny East Timor.

After the economic downturn in 1997–98, stability became increasingly worrisome in Indonesia as banks failed, the Rupiah fell, food prices shot up, students rioted, and the Indonesian Parliament initiated proceedings to impeach Suharto. Rolland Challis argues that the United States was the force behind the economic diplomacy packages from the IMF: President Clinton, giving a rare insight into whose voice really spoke when the IMF moved its lips, telephoned Suharto to make clear that the IMF

package must be implemented if the proposed help was to be forthcoming.[79] The IMF package forced economic reform on Suharto and ultimately led to his downfall, because it undermined what IMF managing director, Michel Camdessus, called "an economic system based on conglomerates, the collusion between the state, banks, business, and restrictive markets."[80] Indeed, on the eve of Suharto's resignation, Secretary of State Madeleine Albright phoned Suharto that it was time to go. Habibie replaced Suharto soon thereafter. The United States maintained strong relations with Indonesia however, to help sustain the fragile economy that threatened regional security. The United States was interested in seeing Indonesia recover from economic recession after the crash of the Thai Baht in 1998.

The Clinton administration supported Indonesian progress toward democracy, but was forced to consider the question of East Timor's self-determination. The administration's approach to the crisis in East Timor was to deal diplomatically with Indonesia, rather than engage East Timor. This strategy may not have produced independence for East Timor at great speed, but it maximized results at the lowest cost and risk to the United States. The following examines more closely Clinton's policies regarding East Timor and Indonesia.

In late February 1999, there was a meeting between senior United States and Australian officials. The United States was convinced that during transition in East Timor a full-scaled peacekeeping operation would be unavoidable, but the Australians wanted to avoid a military alternative. Washington was not however, yet willing to pressure Jakarta to accept a peacekeeping operation without some prior agreement on the

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79. Roland Challis, *Shadow of a Revolution: Indonesia and the Generals* (Glouchestershire: Sutton Publishing, 2001), 203.

autonomy of East Timor under Indonesian sovereignty. The United States and Australia asked the UN Representative to East Timor to be patient so as not to endanger such an agreement, and the United States approached the situation in East Timor with diplomatic pressure on Indonesia to control the militias in East Timor. Secretary of State Madeleine Albright visited Jakarta on 4 March 1999. While there, she officially met with imprisoned resistance leader Xanana Gusmão. Albrights's spokesman called on the Indonesian government to bring under control the paramilitary activities in East Timor.[81] This visit officially acknowledged the increased importance for U.S. foreign policy of the situation in Indonesia regarding East Timor.

On 6 April, militias killed by machete many people gathered in a church in Liquiça, East Timor. Two days later, U.S. Commander in Chief of the Pacific Admiral Dennis Blair went to Jakarta to tell Wiranto to shut down militia activities. Blair did just the opposite, however, and invited Wiranto to Hawaii to participate in the upcoming July/August bilateral defense discussions, and promised "expert exchange for doctrinal development" and that he would "send a small team to provide technical assistance . . . on crowd control measures."[82] Once the State Department got wind of the meeting contents, however, it wired Ambassador Stapleton Roy at the embassy in Jakarta to arrange "a corrective phone call" on April 18 from Blair to Wironto. According to an official report on the call, Blair "again failed to tell Wiranto to shut the militia down," and violence again increased.[83] Reinforcing Albright's earlier message, however, President

80. Quoted in ibid.
81. See Taylor, *East Timor*, 224–25.
82. Allan Nairn, "U.S. Complicity in East Timor," *The Nation* 269, no. 9 (1999): 5–6.
83. Ibid.

Clinton wrote to President Habibie of Indonesia on 23 April 1999, expressing concern about East Timor and asked Habibie to control the militias.[84]

Once the 5 May 1999 agreement was signed regarding the sovereignty of Indonesia, the UN began assessments for the upcoming UNAMET mission and on 22 May the Secretary-General made his recommendations to the Security Council. With Congressional approval, the UN Security Council Resolution 1246 passed on 11 June 1999, and cleared the way to prepare for the August referendum.

Militia activities were in full swing in East Timor by mid-July, when a meeting took place in Jakarta, involving Admiral Archie Clemens, Commander of the U.S. Pacific Fleet. According to those present, "he offered the officers an increase, a step-up in the U.S. military relationship with Indonesia. . . . He proposed that in Surabaya, at the Indonesian naval eastern fleet headquarters, training facilities be established for the U.S. military."[85] Clemens explained that "U.S. goals for the Asia-Pacific region depend on maintaining our strategic partnership with Indonesia."[86] This meeting happened concurrently with contradicting messages from the State Department, Congress, and Clinton.

On 23 July 1999, U.S. Assistant Secretary of State for Southeast Asia and Pacific Affairs visited Jakarta for three days and toured East Timor. While there, he warned Habibie that U.S.-Indonesian relations would be affected if the referendum had to be postponed until 30 August, due to impoverished security.[87] In the initial days following the referendum, the United States stepped up diplomatic efforts by repeatedly requesting

84. See Jackson, "Something must be done?"56.
85. Nairn, "U.S. Support for the Indonesian Military," 167.
86. Ibid.
87. Taylor, *East Timor*, 227.

Indonesia to stop the violence, but it is possible that low U.S. willingness to send troops to East Timor was misunderstood in Jakarta as an encouraging sign, because the violence did not abate. On 7 September, Habibie attempted to dupe the world by declaring martial law in East Timor under the pretense of bringing order. While this may have bought him a day to continue devastating East Timor, it very quickly became clear that this measure was a tactic to delay UN action.

While the Clinton administration worked diplomatically to end the violence, it did not wish to damage U.S. relations with Indonesia. On 8 September, administration officials said the administration had "made the calculation that the United States must put its relationship with Indonesia, a mineral rich nation of more than 200 million people, ahead of its concern over the political fate of East Timor, a tiny impoverished territory of 800,000."[88] Indeed, the Clinton administration viewed the crisis in East Timor as a greater Indonesian issue. For this reason, foreign policy favoring Indonesia took precedence in the administration over injustice in East Timor.

Despite the administration's wishes not to damage relations with Jakarta, it also had to consider pressures from important allies. The Clinton administration received pressure in early September, especially from Australia and Portugal to increase levels of participation in a UN multinational force. Australia's Prime Minister, John Howard, used several means to pressure Clinton. As explained earlier, he phoned personally, lobbied Congress, and went on television. Portugal used similar tactics. Clinton, ever mindful of the media and public opinion, knew that the violence had the potential to generate a public outcry, but Congress was not in the mood to send in U.S. ground troops.

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88. Quoted in Elizabeth Becker and Philip Shenon, "With Other Goals in Indonesia, U.S. moves gently on East Timor," *New York Times*, 9 September 1999, A1.

Whereas prior to the referendum, Clinton "refused to discuss" the alternative for an international force,[89] after the referendum, the violence convinced him that stronger resolution was necessary. In a speech on 9 September, Clinton warned that Habibie must invite the international community into East Timor to restore order. On the same day, the United States suspended all military relations and arms sales to Indonesia. Clinton bent to international and congressional pressures, by cutting military ties to Jakarta and by supporting the IMF decision to suspend a loan program.[90] Chief of U.S. military forces in the Pacific, Dennis Blair delivered the message personally to Indonesian Defense Minister Wironto of the U.S. suspension of military ties on 9 September.[91] In addition, the United States retracted Blair's April invitation to Wiranto to attend the Hawaii meeting of Asia-Pacific defense chiefs. All together, the message from Washington was clear that Indonesia was responsible for security in East Timor, and would pay a high price if it failed to do so.

Despite diplomatic and economic moves to isolate Indonesia, the United States supported Indonesian stability and pushed for reform in Indonesia to continue to institutionalize democracy. As a result, the United States continued to focus on Indonesia, rather than the much smaller East Timor. For example, on 10 September 1999, Clinton's National Security Advisor, Sandy Berger likened the crisis in East Timor to his daughter's "very messy room up in college."[92] He thereby intimated that involvement in East Timor was insignificant messy business of very low importance.

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89. John Roosa, "Fatal Trust in Timor," *New York Times*, 15 September 1999, 29A.

90. See Steven Mufson, and Bradley Graham, "US, IMF move to Isolate Jakarta; Clinton cuts Ties to Indonesian Military; Loan Program suspended," *The Washington Post*, 10 September 1999, A1.

91. U.S. military training of Indonesian officers resumed in February 2000, see Rajiv Chandrasekaran, "U.S. Resumes Training Indonesian Army Officers," *The Washington Post*, 19 February 2000, A21.

92. Quoted in "Another Messy Apartment," *The Washington Post*, 10 September 1999, A36.

According to some, Berger's explanation of the U.S. inaction in East Timor was a side effect of Euro-centric geopolitics after all East Timor is in Asia, not in Europe. Where U.S. interests in East Timor were low, interests in Indonesia were, according to Under Secretary Thomas Pickering, "profound."[93]

The following day, Clinton strongly criticized Indonesian military involvement in the violence in East Timor, and finally admitted[94] that it "is now clear that the Indonesian military is aiding and abetting the militia violence. This is simply unacceptable."[95] He warned that the "Indonesian Government and military must reverse this course to do everything possible to stop the violence and allow an international force to make possible the restoration of security."[96]

At the 12 September meeting of the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) summit in Auckland, New Zealand, President Clinton took advantage of an opportune moment to build consensus among important regional leaders regarding a united international response to Indonesian policy in East Timor. He urged other countries to join the United States to pressure Jakarta to control militia violence in East Timor, and indicated U.S. willingness to place economic diplomacy on the table as necessary and that the United States was ready to consider backing a UN multinational force in East Timor to restore order. He repeated his comments of 10 September and hammered home his remarks with a statement that invoked the Clinton Doctrine: "We must help both the

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93. See the Statement of Thomas R. Pickering, Under Secretary for Political Affairs, U.S. Department of State, in United States Congress, *Joint Hearing*, 9 September 1999, 12.

94. As early as 11 June 1999, Australia had publicized that it had evidence connecting the Indonesian military to militia activities in East Timor.

95. William J. Clinton, "Statement on the Situation in East Timor," *Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents* 35, no. 36, 10 September 1999 (http://frwebgate4.access.gpo.gov/cgi-bi...ID-5605249287+4+0+0&WAISaction-retrieve, accessed on 19 March 2002).

96. Ibid.

people of East Timor and the democratic process in Indonesia because the world community seeks to have the integrity of democracy protected everywhere."[97] As a result, regional leaders came together at the APEC meeting against the violence in East Timor, creating tremendous pressure on Jakarta.

On the same evening, Habibie succumbed to international pressure and invited a UN mandated force into East Timor. The next day Clinton, still in Auckland, spoke to reporters, welcoming Indonesia's invitation to a UN force. He kept on the pressure by saying that "its important to get the details worked out and get this force in a hurry, in a way that it can be effective." Once this could be done he said, "we can resume our work with the people of Indonesia ... to help their transition to democracy and the restoration of prosperity there."[98] On 14 September, Clinton explained that he was "strongly supportive" of Australia leading INTERFET, regardless of Indonesia's reservations. Again reinforcing the Clinton Doctrine, he said, "The work we've done in the past few days will help build a more secure, more prosperous, more integrated Asia-Pacific region. It will give our citizens, all our citizens, all the way from New Zealand back to Washington, better lives in the 21st century."[99] His comments reflect U.S. interests in the larger region, rather than in East Timor.

During the days following the Indonesian invitation for the UN to enter East Timor, concern was raised that Indonesia was again stalling, possibly to gain time to

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97. William J. Clinton, "Remarks to American and Asian Business Leaders in Auckland," *Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents* 35, no. 37, 12 September 1999 (http://frwebgate4.access.gpo.gov/cgi-bi...D-56117930978+7+0+0&WAISaction-retrieve, accessed on 19 March 2002).

98. William J. Clinton, "Remarks on the Situation in East Timor and an Exchange with Reporters in Auckland," 13 September 1999 (http://frwebgate4.access.gpo.gov/cgi-bi...ID-5605249287+5+0+0&WAISaction-retrieve, accessed on 19 March 2002), 1740.

99. William J. Clinton, "Remarks on Departure from Auckland and an Exchange with Reporters," 14 September 1999 (http://frwebgate4.access.gpo.gov/cgi-bi...D-5605249287+11+0+0&WAISaction-retrieve, accessed on 19 March 2002).

forcibly relocate East Timorese to other parts of Indonesia. An example was given in the *Washington Post* on 14 September, in which Indonesian Foreign Minister Ali Alatas said that he "needed time to discuss details of the United Nations' proposal for the deployment of as many as 7000 troops," and that he would be there "as long as it takes." U.S. Ambassador to the UN responded that "if he starts to stretch this out while the Indonesian forces continue to rampage, that would be a major deception. The Indonesians would be back in the depths of the mess they created and only just began to bail themselves out of." He further indicated that "Timing is of the essence."[100]

The UN Security Council passed Resolution 1264 on 15 September, establishing INTERFET with a Chapter VII mission to restore order in East Timor. President Clinton committed limited support to the multinational force, including "communications, intelligence, logistics, planning assistance, and transportation."[101] Clinton also deployed the amphibious ship *USS Belleau Wood*, carrying a special operations capable Marine Expeditionary Unit and helicopters to provide airlift, search and rescue. The president was unclear on how long the mission would last, however indicated that the objective was to support INTERFET until a transition to an upcoming UN peacekeeping mission could be achieved.

At the end of September, Harold H. Koh, of the State Department outlined the U.S. position on East Timor at a Congressional Hearing. He indicated that the United

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100. Colum Lynch, "Indonesia asks UN for Discussion Time: Annan, Clinton Press for Quick Deployment of Peacekeepers to East Timor," *The Washington Post*, 14 September 1999, A25 (http://ptg.djnr.com/ccroot/asp/publib/story.asp, accessed on 15 March 2002).

101. William J. Clinton, *Communication from the President of the United States: Transmitting a Report to Congress, Consistent with the War Powers Resolution, Regarding U.S. Military Forces in East Timor,* 8 October 1999 (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1999).

States had a four-tiered policy.[102] First, the human rights abuse had to end and refugees allowed to return home. Second, Indonesia should remove all militia from East Timor and refrain from hampering relief efforts in East and West Timor. Third, the United States promoted democracy in East Timor. Fourth, the United States supported the establishment of an international Commission of Inquiry to investigate and bring to justice the perpetrators of human rights violations.

By late September, the United States had provided $10 million to the humanitarian relief effort in East Timor. On 29 September, the Department of State added $5.1 million to this figure.[103] The United States agreed to provide 200 support personnel for non-combat work in communications, logistics, intelligence, and strategic airlift, and in late September the increased its commitment of personnel from 200 to 500.[104]

On October 7 Clinton asked the UN to reduce the U.S. role in the East Timor operations, as Congress was reluctant to fund UN peacekeeping missions abroad.[105] Debate in Congress had already delayed paying back dues owed by the United States Despite Clinton's desire to reduce the U.S. costs, Marine Corps Brigadier General John Castellaw made available on 10 October four C-53 Sea Stallion helicopters, based near Dili.[106] The helicopters provided much needed heavy lift for the INTERFET force of 6500 troops.

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102. See the Harold Hongju Koh, in United States House, *Hearing before the Subcommittee on International Operations and Human Rights*, 30 September 1999, 11–17.

103. See comments made by Assistant Secretary of the Bureau of Population, Refugees, and Migration, U.S. Department of State, Julia Taft, in ibid., 20.

104. See Jonah Blank, and Steven Butler, "A Plea for Peace from Someplace near Hell," *U.S. News & World Report* 127, no. 12 (1999): 42.

105. Lauria, "U.S. asks UN for Trims in Force," A1, A13.

106. See Slobodan Lekic, "U.S. adds Choppers, Specialists in E. Timor," *Boston Globe* 256, no. 102 (1999): A12.

By October, attention was drawn to the plight of the refugees across the border in West Timor. An estimated 260,000 of the 850,000 East Timorese population were living in these militia-controlled camps. The refugees were terrorized and starving. It was feared that the coming rains would worsen camp conditions. On 10 November, Clinton wrote to Congress and requested $40 million for the Timor and Caucus crises "to meet unexpected urgent refugee and migration needs, including those of refugees, displaced persons at risk."[107] Refugee issues threatened to unravel progress made in the crisis.

U.S. involvement in the international response during the crisis was limited to non-combat troops, specifically the United States supplied communications, logistics and airlift personnel. In addition, the United States sent civilian police and military observers in varying numbers, but with a maximum of 200. U.S. policy remained consistent throughout the crisis that it would not commit combat troops, but rather it focused support on humanitarian relief efforts. During the INTERFET phase of the international operations, the United States added a small force of rotational units to work in cooperation with, but not under the authority of the UN peacekeeping mission. The U.S. contribution to the UNTAET phase of the crisis was smaller yet. The U.S. contribution to UNTAET was small: three military observers and one judge advocate. These personnel served under UN operational control. Clinton said that the United States maintained "a credible and visible presence" in East Timor, but this credible presence

107. William J. Clinton, "Memorandum on Assistance for Refugees and Victims of the Timor and North Caucasus Crises," *Presidential Determination* 35, no. 45 (1999): 2353.

consisted of 30 military personnel under U.S. command, who coordinated U.S. military humanitarian and civic assistance.[108]

The United States pressured Indonesia to internally address its human rights violations. The United States supported the UN position that prior to an international tribunal alternative, Indonesia should investigate and prosecute the war crimes of beginning with "33 individuals, including 6 generals, the Governor of the province, the head of several of the militia groups."[109] The United States made clear to Indonesia that if the Indonesian domestic judicial process were inadequate or not credible, then the United States would "have to consider supporting an international process."[110]

Assistant Secretary Stanley Roth testified before a joint hearing in February 2000 that the administration's position was to pressure Indonesia to resolve the refugee situation in West Timor by allowing refugees to return to East Timor, or by integrating them into Indonesian society. This pressure was applied via withholding military aid and through economic assistance. Moreover, the United States would not resume normal relations with Indonesia until the refugee matters had been resolved and finalized.

CONCLUDING REMARKS

This chapter set out to examine the extent of influence exerted by the five variables on foreign policy decisions regarding intervention, and how they shaped the

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108. William J. Clinton, *Communication from the President of the United States: Transmitting a Report Consistent with the War Powers Resolution Regarding U.S. Military Forces in East Timor*, 1 March 2000 (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 2000).

109. United States Senate, "East Timor: A New Beginning?" *Joint Hearing before the Subcommittee on Asia and the Pacific of the Committee on International Relations House of Representatives and the Subcommittee on East Asian and Pacific Affairs of the Committee on Foreign Relations United States Senate*, 106th Cong., 2nd sess., 10 February 2000 (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 2000), 10.

110. Ibid., 11.

foreign policy of President Clinton. The overarching consideration in this case study is that the United States approached the crisis in terms of its long-term relationship with Indonesia, an important strategic, military, and economic ally in the region.

The crisis in East Timor, beginning in 1991 and ending in 1999, culminated decades of suppressed international action, a side effect of larger cold war concerns regarding containing communism. Indonesia was a long time ally of the United States and had received significant military and economic assistance in reward for remaining a "bulwark against the spread of communism in Southeast Asia."[111] As a result, the international community largely looked the other way as Indonesia committed crimes against humanity in tiny East Timor and elsewhere. The end of the cold war changed the international system and as a result, such crimes were no longer sustainable. Internal social turmoil toppled the leadership in Indonesia, which was replaced by more moderate leaders, who accepted reform as inevitable. This leadership too had to go, because it was too closely associated with the old regime and lacked popular support.

Scholar Naom Chomski argues that the atrocities in East Timor in 1998–99 "could have easily been mitigated or terminated merely by the withdrawal of direct and decisive participation."[112] The reasons no state advocated a forcible military intervention in East Timor had to do with the fact that "Indonesia possessed a strong military, that such an intervention was likely to be strongly opposed by nearby China, and that concerned states believed that Indonesia's consent to a multinational force would, in any

111. Ramesh Thakur, "Cambodia, East Timor and The Brahimi Report," *International Peacekeeping* 8, no. 3 (2001): 117.
112. Chomsky, *A New Generation*, 30.

case, soon be forthcoming."[113] Washington played a large role in resolving the crisis in East Timor, even though its focus remained firmly on Indonesia and regional stability. Clinton pressured Jakarta to invite the UN into East Timor at the point when Congress, the UN, and U.S. allies pressured him to do so. More importantly, the East Timor issue had grown into a regional issue that threatened U.S. interests in Indonesia. Thus, resolving the crisis in East Timor had become a subset of U.S. interests in Indonesia.

113. Sean D. Murphy, "Contemporary Practice of the United States Relating to International Law," *American Journal of International Law* 94, no. 1 (2000), quoted in ibid., 20.

CHAPTER VII

SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS

This dissertation examined the extent to which concerns about ethnic cleansing and democratic governance influenced President Clinton's decision to intervene with military force in three specific and distinct cases. The previous chapters explored domestic and international constraints that shaped these decisions. This chapter summarizes the findings in the chapters on Haiti, Rwanda, and East Timor based on the theoretical discussion laid out in Chapter III. The results are then compared across the case studies to assess patterns of foreign policy. Next, the hypotheses, set out at the beginning of this dissertation, are examined in the context of these findings. In the concluding section, a comparison is made between the Clinton Doctrine and the policies implemented during the three crises. This chapter concludes with a discussion of the importance of this study and remarks regarding developments since September 11.

CASE SUMMARY FINDINGS

An overview of case study findings is presented in Table 4, which emphasizes the important turning points for each case. Together, these turning points show that foreign policy decisions made by President Clinton were not improvised. In fact, his decisions fall into a framework that reveals the impact of specific variables on his decisions to intervene or not. For example, in the case of Rwanda, the allies involved included Belgium, the United Kingdom, France, and the Organization of American States. Belgium's position, for instance, favored the use of military force to end the civil

violence until 14 April 1994. After that date, Belgium opposed military intervention. France openly favored military intervention as of mid-June 1994, implemented that policy later in the month, and then turned its support to humanitarian assistance. The UN policy only approved military intervention on 22 June. The position of the U.S. Congress was that it never supported the use of force and only favored humanitarian assistance after mid-June. Public opinion and the media, was similar to that in the Congress. Finally, U.S. interests did not reflect the need for military intervention, and humanitarian assistance was not sent until September. The following section explains the impact of these variables with more depth.

Table 4

Evaluation of the Five Variables

U.S. Ally	United Nations	U.S. Congress	Public Opinion	U.S. Interests
Case: RWANDA				
BELGIUM + mil Jan 94 - mil 14 Apr 94	- mil to 22 Jun 94 + mil 22 Jun 94	- mil throughout - hum mid-Jun 94	- mil throughout - hum mid-Jun 94	- mil throughout + hum Sep 94
UNITED KINGDOM - mil throughout				
FRANCE + mil 17 Jun 94 mil intervention 23 Jun 94 + hum				
OAU + mil throughout				

Table 4 (continued)

U.S. Ally	United Nations	U.S. Congress	Public Opinion	U.S. Interests
Case: HAITI				
OAS + san 8 Oct 91 - mil to Jul 92 ~ mil Jul 92	+ san 8 Oct 91 + mil 31 Jul 94	/ mil to 25 Oct 94 + mil 25 Oct 94	/ san throughout / mil to 15 Sep 94 /+ mil 15 Sep 94	+ san 4 Oct 91 + mil 11 Oct 93 - mil to Aug 94 + mil Feb 94 mil intervention 19 Sep 1994

U.S. Ally	United Nations	U.S. Congress	Public Opinion	U.S. Interests
Case: EAST TIMOR				
INDONESIA + ref 5 May 99 - mil to 12 Sep 99	+ san + mil 15 Sep 99	+ mil san 92 - mil throughout - hum 15 Sep 99	- mil throughout / mil san	- mil throughout + mil san 4 Mar 99 + e san 9 Sep 99 + hum 12 Sep 99
PORTUGAL + mil throughout				
AUSTRALIA + ref Aug 98 + mil Aug 99 mil intervention 19 Sep 1999				

Legend:

+ favored	san	sanctions	ref	referendum
- opposed	mil	military intervention	hum	humanitarian relief
/ mixed or undecided	e	economic		
~ unable to legally endorse military intervention				

FINDINGS: RWANDA

After the crisis in Rwanda, "blame game" occurred for allowing the genocide to take place or to continue after it had started. The main failure of the international community during the crisis in Rwanda was that it failed to distinguish between ongoing refugee hostilities, renewed civil war, and genocide. Misrepresentations of the initial

killings of both moderate Hutus and Tutsi generated the impression that killings were perpetrated on both sides. As a result, the genocide was mistaken for renewed civil war, which outside states were hesitant to enter. Thousands of Hutu refugees fled from advancing RPF forces as the government collapsed and the Tutsi regained control after several decades. Hutu gathered in the French protected safe zone, prompting Philip Gourevitch to say; "the humanitarian relief effort became a catering service for the largest genocidal movement on the planet at the time."[1]

Behind a charade of accusations and demands, Rwanda attempts to escape responsibility for the genocide that happened there. Clinton's 1998 apology did not ease tension but precipitated further claims and accusations. Rwandans are left to come to terms with, and accept responsibility for the genocide that was planned and implemented by the government against the people. Rwanda's claim that the UN owes apologies "is uncalled for."[2] In addition, the demand that the UN, the United States, France, and Belgium owe reparations to Rwanda for what it did to itself and then misrepresented to the world,[3] exemplifies an attempt to extract economic benefits based on the judgement that Clinton was right to apologize. Despite Michael O'Hanlon's argument that since all people are equal, then the decision to intervene becomes one of pure numbers of savable lives over and above the cost in number of lives required to stop the killing,[4] the payment

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1. Quoted in Gina Jae, "Interview with Philip Gourevitch: International Responses to Genocide in Rwanda," *The Journal of the American Medical Association* 285, no. 9 (2001): 1216.

2. See Africa News Service, "Rwanda Genocide: Why the Truth Must Be Told," *Africa News Service*, 10 Jan 2000 (web3.infotrac.galegroup.com/itw/i..._A58510962&dyn=77!ar_fmt?sw_aep=viva_odu, 17 January 2002).

3. See Africa News Service, "International Community to Blame for Rwanda Genocide," *Africa News Service*, 10 July 2000 (web3.infotrac.galegroup.com/itw/i..._A6320391&dyn=41!ar_fmt?sw_aep=viva_odu, 17 January 2002).

4. Michael O'Hanlon, "How to Stop Genocide: Saving Lives with Force," *The New Republic*, 12 July 1999, 21.

of reparations would reward Rwanda for having behaved so atrociously in the first place. Certainly, this is not to say that assistance should not be given to Rwanda per se, only that such assistance should be attributed to developments in Rwanda, rather than because it is associated with the genocide, guilt, or an erroneous apology.

U.S. Allies

U.S. allies have been highly criticized for their varying positions regarding the Rwanda crisis. France was accused of imperialist intentions aimed at maintaining a francophone sphere of influence in the region. France played a crucial role in the Rwanda crisis however, by intervening to provide a safe zone in Southwestern Rwanda on 23 June 1994. This action not only protected the extremist Hutu government, but also simultaneously contributed to massive refugee movement that led to deadly conditions in overcrowded camps. Criticism against the French was due to the fact that France supported the Hutu genocidal regime. Consequently Rwanda demanded reparations from France in July 2000.[5]

The nature of the French intervention generated moderate divisions between France and Belgium, which withdrew very early from the UNAMIR mission in mid-April 1994, because of domestic public pressure based on ethical and economic issues that were brought to the fore by the killings of Belgian forces. Belgium's withdrawal from the UNAMIR was a severe blow to the effort, as it removed a significant force from Rwanda, consequently damaging Dallaire's capacity to provide UN peacekeeping

5. See Barbara Crossette, "Report Says U.S. and Others Allowed Rwanda Genocide: Panel Urges Reparations for 1994 Killings," *New York Times*, 8 July 2000, A4.

services and lowering the morale of troops from participant countries that were left behind.

The OAU was most supportive of intervention, as was evident by high levels of willingness found in its members to send troops. However, given the organization's severe financial limitations, the OAU was unable to accomplish much more than provide consistent pressure on the warring sides to come to a cease-fire. The OAU was pivotal in facilitating negotiations for the Arusha Accord, and on other occasions, worked to bring about peace negotiations, albeit without significant success.

The United Nations

The United Nations was ambivalent at best. A Rwandan representative sowed confusion in the Security Council by giving false information, thereby misrepresenting the violence as renewed civil war. Regardless of this confusing situation in the Security Council at the time, the UN was at fault for sluggish and ineffective administration of assistance and in efforts to resolve the crisis. The UN failure grew out of communications issues starting in the field, increasing in the Secretariat, and culminating with the Security Council that "was not informed" of early communications from Dallaire regarding the Hutu plans for genocide against the Tutsi.[6] Moreover, the general UN membership was responsible to the extent that capable members were unwilling to commit troops, equipment and supplies to the mission. The main shift, which occurred with UN Resolution 929 on 22 June 1994, came at the insistence of France to intervene unilaterally with Operation Turquoise, on 23 June 1994. With this exception, the UN

6. See "From Rwanda Study: 'Serious Mistakes were Made,'" *New York Times*, 17 December 1999, A14.

remained overall unwilling and ineffective in peacekeeping efforts in Rwanda, as military intervention was not considered a viable alternative.

The U.S. Congress

The role played by the U.S. Congress during the crisis was two-fold. First, after the Somalia incident, Congress worked on legislation aimed at limiting the ability of the president to commit the United States to UN missions abroad, especially in Africa. Essentially, Congress tended toward disengagement after Somalia. Second, after the news of possible genocide spread, public opinion began to show signs of moving to a more sympathetic stance. As this happened, Congress began to shift accordingly in mid-June 1994, but only to the extent of supporting humanitarian aid. At that time, Congress began to petition the president to step up support for humanitarian relief in Rwanda.

American Public Opinion and the Media

During the crisis in Rwanda, the U.S. public did not favor injecting U.S. military troops into the civil violence in Rwanda. The media characterized the genocide incorrectly as tribal conflict, and therefore failed to convey accurate and timely information. The media was instrumental in changing policy, however, when it publicized the terrible conditions that prevailed in refugee camps, where many people were dying of cholera and other diseases. Once the tragic plight of the refugees came to light, public opinion shifted and favored humanitarian assistance. This shift in turn moved Congress as well, and as the president was urged to do the same, U.S. policy was

reevaluated. At no time, however, did the U.S. public, or the media demand the use of military force to end violence.

U.S. Interests

There were few vital or peripheral interests compelling the United States to intervene unilaterally in Rwanda. There were no direct military or economic interests and French strategic interests in the region were greater than U.S. interests. Peripheral U.S. interests at stake could be linked to international law, but the costs of military operations in such a geographically remote area outweighed any plausible benefits. France relieved the pressure on the United States to take action when it intervened in southwest Rwanda to provide a short-term safe haven for Hutu. Thus, neither U.S. vital nor peripheral interests compelled the United States to take remedial action in Rwanda before France acted as the regional hegemon to promote stability. The Clinton administration was unwilling to intervene in Rwanda and blocked UN Security Council efforts to halt the genocide. This stance only softened after the genocide was ending, France intervened, and international attention turned to refugee camps, at which time the administration turned to providing humanitarian relief. Such humanitarian efforts held low risk and relatively low cost for the United States, both in terms of life and assistance.

Summary

U.S. policy on Rwanda differed from the policy set by France, a major ally and contender for influence in the region. Belgium however, set the tone of international non-involvement, when it pulled out of the UN mission to Rwanda. The Clinton

administration's policy did not differ significantly from UN policy, which can be seen a function of U.S. influence in the Security Council. Moreover, U.S. policy in Rwanda remained in line with public opinion and Congress. For example, until the American public learned of the suffering in Goma, there was relatively little action taken by the Clinton administration. This inaction was largely due to U.S. hesitation to engage in UN peacekeeping missions abroad after Somalia. Once the American public became informed however, it supported humanitarian assistance. Then, the domestically oriented Clinton administration immediately sent relief assistance to the refugees in July 1994, albeit with strong limitations on the mandate for U.S. troops.

FINDINGS: HAITI

The crisis in Haiti demonstrated the importance of two main issues. First, despite Somalia, it revived international and especially U.S. willingness to establish democratic governance as the most stable and therefore preferable form of governance. Moreover, the U.S. willingness to lead in Haiti reinforced norms of state behavior in a given sphere of influence. Second, it confirmed that refugee migration is indeed high politics. It took only a matter of days to bring President Clinton to reverse his campaign promises to accept Haitian refugees into the United States. Moreover, Haitian refugees were flooding all countries in the region, including those that could not take care of them appropriately. Consequently, international pressure brought many countries together to root out the cause of the refugee issue: representative governance at home. Clinton negotiated with Aristide in an effort to resolve the crisis in Haiti. Once it became clear that this approach

was ineffective, he called an invasion to convince Cedras that the United States meant serious business.

U.S. Allies

In the case of Haiti, this "variable" consisted mainly of the OAS. The OAS initiated action because of its concern about the disruption of democracy in Haiti. The OAS, however, did not endorse military intervention largely because its Charter declares such action illegal, since it erodes the law of sovereign authority. Most OAS members favored economic sanctions, including an embargo against Haiti after the September 1990 coup. The 1993 *Harlan County* incident brought about a slight shift in the OAS, as it began to support, or rather not oppose, UN and U.S. measures for military intervention, despite its Charter limitations. In addition, the majority of OAS member states cooperated with the UN and U.S. military intervention. This cooperation was explained by the need to contain the security threat posed by refuge migration around the region.

The United Nations

Initial UN activity was informed by urgings from the OAS, and consisted of sanctions against Haiti on 10 October 1991. Due to the increased threat to regional security, the UN intensified international pressure on Haiti in late 1992, by declaring that Haiti was committing human rights violations. Again in mid-1993, the UN increased sanctions against Haiti. The failure of the 3 July 1993 Governor's Island agreement followed by the *Harlan County* incident clarified the depth of the military junta's commitment to remain in power, regardless of sanctions and an oil embargo. By May,

the UN began to take its lead from the United States, which expressed keen interest in resolving refugee issues as a result of the situation in Haiti. On 31 July 1994, the UN Security Council authorized military intervention in Haiti under United States.

The U.S. Congress

The role of the U.S. Congress during the crisis in Haiti was minimal. Divisions in Congress focused the debate on legal issues, such as the extent of the president's war powers. Throughout, Congress remained deeply divided on intervention, neither willing to endorse it nor prohibit it. Such a deadlock granted the president greater latitude and to a large extent allowed him to bypass Congressional approval.

American Public Opinion and the Media

Public opinion during the crisis in Haiti was mixed from beginning to end. The mixed nature of public opinion allowed the president greater freedom, even though he needed to proceed cautiously. As a result, Clinton exhausted all possible alternatives before a military solution emerged. Even then, Clinton made one last effort to negotiate with Cedras by sending Jimmy Carter as the warships were on their way. This course of action led to media accusations that "Clinton bungled his way into Haiti."[7] This conclusion is misleading however, because Clinton sought to resolve the crisis at the lowest cost possible. Thus, public opinion and the media neither hampered nor helped President Clinton in making his decision to intervene in Haiti.

7. Tony Smith, "In Defense of Intervention," *Foreign Affairs* 73, no. 6 (1994): 35.

U.S. Interests

President Clinton intervened in Haiti to restore democracy in an effort to protect U.S. vital and peripheral interests in the region. The United States sought to protect strategic interests by preserving regional stability through democratic enlargement against an authoritarian military government that violated human rights and caused a refugee problem. The United States promoted peripheral interests including the enforcement of international law against the overthrow of a government, and by enacting a policy of nation building to support democracy. Although the United States acted to impede the drug trade funneled through Haiti, the main U.S. interest involved halting the flow of Haitian refugees to the continental United States. Haiti's geographic proximity to the United States led Clinton to acknowledge that accepting refugees was not acceptable, because as more followed, there would eventually be a significant political risk at home. The best solution for dealing with the increasing flow of refugees was to stabilize the internal situation in Haiti, or in other words, to reinstate democracy.

Summary

Initially, Clinton responded to the democratic crisis in Haiti by supporting OAS-UN initiatives for sanctions thereby easing tension in relations with regional allies. The later embargo supported the international effort to oust the military regime, but it hurt many people in Haiti. Under embargo conditions, Haiti was unable to provide economic prosperity for its citizens, and the brunt of economic sanctions fell on the poorest among them. As a result, the urgency for humanitarian intervention increased because poverty prompted an ever-greater outward migration. In this sense, international economic

initiatives contributed to the already dire situation in Haiti and compounded threats to regional stability. Further destroying the fragile economy left many Haitians so desperate to survive that they risked life and limb to escape on the high seas. Returning refugees caught on the high seas is illegal according to international law, however, and caused some difficulty for the United States in intercepting refugees bound for Florida. As a result, Clinton eased sanctions, but that again raised tensions between the United States, the OAS and the UN. The OAS did not oppose intervention as early as the *USS Harlan County* incident on 11 October 1993, after which a major international shift was visible. The UN Security Council passed Resolution 940 authorizing multilateral joint forces intervention on 31 July 1994, and Clinton authorized plans for military intervention on 26 August. Despite the fact that neither the U.S. Congress, nor public opinion fully favored a military alternative, Clinton successfully launched Operation Restore Democracy and U.S.-led intervention took place on 19 September 1994.

FINDINGS: EAST TIMOR

Preferring diplomatic and economic efforts to curb undesirable activities in Indonesia, the Clinton administration maintained a low profile during the crisis in East Timor. At no time did Clinton engage East Timor as a primary objective, instead the U.S. relationship with Indonesia was primary. Indeed, the United States continued to supply military training and equipment to Indonesia until international pressure mounted against such actions after the 30 August referendum consumed the territory in severe violence. As a result, Clinton cut off military assistance to Indonesia in September 1999, delivering the decisive message to Indonesia that this violence would no longer be

tolerated. At the same time, Clinton added the needed boost to the efforts within the international community to take steps to stop the violence. Geographic proximity was an important element during the crisis in East Timor, because Clinton avoided U.S. involvement in the intervention, and it fell to Australia to maintain regional stability.

U.S. Allies

Portugal and Australia were most concerned with the situation in East Timor. Portugal shared a colonial past with East Timor, and did not want to lose its colony at the request of the UN, and to the benefit of another regional power that would opportunistically take over. Consequently Portugal was key to early international focus on East Timor. Whereas Portugal was leaving the region, Australia, in close proximity to East Timor, ran the risk of absorbing refugees, or spillover violence. Australia was also concerned with the shipping and mining rights in the waterway between East Timor and Australia, an issue, which resurfaced immediately, even before East Timor received official independence. The strategic importance of this waterway, the Timor Gap, brought international action, as Australia paid special attention to crisis resolution and regional stability.

The United Nations

The UN was initially involved in East Timor in an effort to settle the long-term dispute about colonial jurisdiction between Portugal, Indonesia, and East Timor. The UN became deeply involved in providing international pressure on Jakarta to relinquish its hold on East Timor. Consequently, UN actions in UNAMET, INTERFET, and UNTAET

were central to resolving the crisis in East Timor. Through negotiations in the UN, the United States began to reevaluate its protection of Indonesia as international pressure to stop the violence in East Timor mounted. Moreover, the UN mandate to use force largely halted the rising violence against East Timorese, saving many lives in the process. The UN was subsequently criticized however, for administrative flaws in the UNTAET mission, which gave the UN overt control of the tiny country without making it accountable to the East Timorese.

The U.S. Congress

Despite a strong Australian lobby, debate in the U.S. Congress was concerned mainly with rendering humanitarian assistance without committing troops other than for logistics, communications and airlift. Such debate was often characterized by ardent appeals on behalf of human rights, while tempered with apologetic limitations. Congressional debate bore out that U.S. interests in East Timor did not merit military intervention. Besides, if regional allies were interested and willing to send troops, then the U.S. Congress would rather support that move thereby circumventing its own responsibility. This position enabled the United States to remain aloof from the crisis in East Timor, while supporting efforts of other countries. Therefore, the U.S. Congress supported the UN humanitarian mission, but in light of poor security in East Timor, drew the line at behind the scenes peacekeeping.

American Public Opinion and the Media

The role of public opinion and the media was an important part of the U.S.

response to the crisis in East Timor, because it closely followed the official policy of non-intervention. The media increased the exposure of the crisis in East Timor, but it failed to convey a sense of urgency to the public that the United States should intervene. Public interest in the East Timor crisis remained low throughout, as the American public tired of less than vital interventions. As a result, neither the media nor public opinion pressured Clinton to a significant degree to send troops and end the violence.

U.S. Interests

The examination of U.S. interests in East Timor reveals that even though some peripheral interests were at stake, these were less critical than the vital interests involving U.S. relations with Indonesia. The Clinton administration was concerned with the overarching pattern of abusive Indonesian rule, not only in East Timor, but also in other territories such as Irian Jaya, or states like Aceh. Consequently, the United States was more interested in seeing institutionalized democracy in Indonesia as a viable method for reducing such suppression by increasing representation in troubled areas. Thus, the United States worked with Indonesia, which had only recently had its first parliamentary elections in June 1999 after the fall of Suharto in May. Clinton wanted to see democracy flourish in all of Indonesia, and the issue of East Timor was a stumbling block to democracy that needed to be addressed for Indonesia to move beyond repressive and military rule. In the aftermath of the crisis, the task remained to investigate the crimes against humanity and to bring the perpetrators to justice. Considerable criticism was levied against the UN and the United States for supporting Indonesia's insistence to

internally investigate and prosecute crimes committed in East Timor.[8] Under the direction of the new president, Abdurrahman Wahid, Indonesia produced a list of 33 names of those charged with responsibility for crimes against humanity.

Summary

The main findings of this case study include the following. Indonesia agreed in early 1999 to allow the UN to hold a referendum in East Timor offering the choice between independence and integration. East Timor chose independence on 30 August, after which punitive violence backed by elements in the Indonesian military was unleashed against the East Timorese. Indonesia agreed in September to invite the UN peace-enforcing mission INTERFET into East Timor to restore order. Portugal remained pro-independence for East Timor throughout the entire history of the crisis in East Timor. Australia shifted policy from supporting Indonesia's integration of East Timor to opposing it in August 1998. Consequently, Australia became a major proponent of military multilateral intervention in September 1999. The UN initially remained inactive except for annual condemnation of the illegal Indonesian occupation of East Timor and its violent policy there. The UN changed course favoring multilateral intervention with Resolution 1264, providing a Chapter VII mandate to restore order. Congress remained consistent throughout the crisis. It paid lip service to stopping the violence, however, remained slow to pay UN back dues and staunchly refused entertain thoughts on contributions of ground troops to resolve the crisis in East Timor. It did, however, authorize U.S. contributions of communications, logistics, and airlift capabilities. At no

8. See for example, Chomsky, *A New Generation*, 57.

time during the crisis in East Timor did the media or public opinion demand that the United States intervene in East Timor.

PATTERNS IN FOREIGN POLICY ACROSS THE CASES

This section considers patterns in foreign policy across the three case studies. It examines specific patterns that were observed within each variable in this study.

The major pattern that emerged in the examination of U.S. allies was that a dominant regional actor greatly impacted the unfolding events. Across all three cases, there was a distinct U.S. policy favoring intervention by the regional hegemon, which is a step away from the idea that the United States would become a type of globo-cop in post-cold war era. France intervened in Rwanda as the regional hegemon to create a safe haven for Hutu. In Haiti, the United States was the regional superpower that led the UN intervention to put down the military regime and reinstate democracy. Australia was the regional power that led the UN mission in East Timor to stop the punitive violence after the referendum. In Rwanda and East Timor, the United States objected to intervention, until the regional hegemon decided to intervene and subsequently petitioned the UN for support. For example, the United States adamantly opposed the use of military force to stop the civil violence in Rwanda up to the last hour, when France declared that it would unilaterally intervene and the UN half-heartedly agreed. Even in Haiti, where the United States functioned as the regional hegemon, the United States opposed military use of force for quite some time. In East Timor, the United States at no time wanted any part of military use of force, and opposed UN actions that might commit it to do so. It was not until Australia decided to intervene and petitioned for assistance in the UN and approval

from the United States, that the United States agreed as long as it was not involved except for minimal peacekeeping assignments. In Haiti, the United States also hesitated to use force, preferring to explore other alternatives before taking that step.

The major pattern found in the examination of the United Nations was the apparent unwillingness of member states to interfere in civil violence within a single member state. Moreover, the position of the Security Council depended on the policies of its members. This most clearly occurred in the case of Rwanda for two reasons. First, Rwanda had a temporary seat on the Council at the time of the crisis, and used this opportunity to misinform and mislead the Council regarding the violence at home. Second, the United States blocked UN action by delaying decisions and by refusing to participate in missions. Without U.S. participation, even humanitarian missions would suffer, because the United States had the most advanced technology and equipment available. As a result, missions without U.S. participation or support were more challenging. In addition, the UN waited to mandate the use of force until after one country was willing to intervene unilaterally. For example, France intervened in Rwanda, the United States went into Haiti, and Australia led the mission into East Timor.

The U.S. Congress reflected a mixed pattern across the case studies. At no time did Congress support U.S. involvement in military intervention in Rwanda. Moreover, Congress did not support humanitarian assistance to Rwanda until after public opinion began to shift in favor of it. In Haiti, Congress was deadlocked by debate regarding legal issues and therefore only came to support the military intervention after it had taken place. Congress responded to the crisis in East Timor in a similar way, as it had to the crisis in Rwanda. For example, Congress did not support military intervention in East

Timor at any time, and was slow to support sending humanitarian assistance until mid-September and then only limited to support activities. Thus, Congress responded to each crisis differently, but remained generally reluctant to commit U.S. forces to participate in military missions.

Similarly, U.S. public opinion and the media did not support the use of force in the cases of Rwanda and East Timor, but not in Haiti. This was because during the crisis in Haiti, the public was ambivalent until the presidential address to the nation on the eve of the intervention. Then, public support slightly increased as it "rallied around the flag." Geographic distance and knowledge of the region also influenced the pattern of public opinion and the media with Haiti closer to the United States compared to Rwanda and East Timor. In addition, the polls indicated that fewer people in the United States knew as much about Rwanda and East Timor as they knew about Haiti.

The predominant pattern for U.S. interests found in all three case studies is that the issue of refugees caused political and social instability that ultimately required outside international intervention. As shown in Chapter II, refugees place considerable strain on international stability because they essentially "invade" the neighboring country, which has no recourse but to care for them. The burden of providing for large numbers of refugees is particularly difficult when violence is involved. In such cases, refugee camps can become hotbeds for resistance movements and may function as headquarters for raids into the country of origin. Understandably, such activity strains relations between neighboring countries, even if they have a history of friendly relations. Two of the cases in this study exhibit examples of governmental collapse that degenerated into civil unrest, violence and brutal behavior, as was apparent in Rwanda and Haiti. The crisis in East

Timor was the result of outside oppression, which degenerated from brutal suppression of self-determination into punitive violence. All of these cases generated large numbers of refugees, which consequently merited some form of international action, regardless of whether the United States participated or not.

A related pattern was that each case became a crisis when regional stability was compromised. In Rwanda, the crisis began years before the double assassination of the President of Burundi and the President of Rwanda launched the genocide. This event placed neighboring countries into a highly precarious position, especially considering that neither country had institutionalized government to any great extent. Consequently, both countries were thrown into internal political turmoil. In the case of Haiti, regional security was paramount in the OAS and UN decisions to take action against the military regime. A precedent had to be set to oust Cedras to show that military takeovers would not be tolerated in the Western Hemisphere. Regional security in East Timor was at the root of the lack of the U.S. commitment to resolving the crisis. The United States viewed Indonesia as the bulwark of stability for the larger region, including the shipping lanes reaching into Southeast Asia. The United States worked to prevent the collapse of Indonesia after Suharto, damaging this relationship would have potentially meant the loss of the largest Muslim U.S. ally in that part of the world.

It appears that a shift has occurred in the level of emphasis placed on peripheral interests such as international laws pertaining to human rights. Historically state security matters pertained to military or strategic concerns. During the nineteenth and twentieth centuries however, vital economic interests grew in importance. Today peripheral interests such as international law, and especially human rights, have been thrust into the

realm of high politics. While this does not make international law a vital interest, it has grown in importance, as it increasingly becomes the mechanism for regulating state behavior to minimize anarchy at the international level. Moreover, the evolution of vital and peripheral interests over time continues to progress, as peripheral interests become more central.

The pattern that emerged in all cases was that the distance of the crisis had an impact on the United States decision to intervene. The United States refrained from involvement in Rwanda partly because of operations in far away Africa are costly, for example, for air lifting supplies, equipment, and troops. The geographic location of Haiti, just next door, also aided the ability of the United States to quickly send ships with equipment and troops. The geographic location of East Timor played a very large role in the decision for two main reasons. First, East Timor was located next to, and some would argue, within Indonesia, making military use of force against Indonesia a possibility that was less than desirable for the United States. Second, East Timor is distant from the United States and would therefore make operations even more costly than in Africa. This pattern is revisited below in the hypothesis section.

Third party political actors were another pattern that emerged in Haiti and East Timor to a larger extent than in Rwanda. For example, the Clinton administration worked extensively to include Aristide in its plans for Haiti. Part of the reason that Clinton did not use force earlier was that Aristide would not endorse such an alternative. As the democratically elected leader of Haiti, this resistance from Aristide complicated policy decisions. Only after Aristide appealed to the UN to restore democracy in Haiti did the use of force become a viable alternative, even though he had not explicitly

requested such action. Similarly, the administration worked extensively with Indonesia's political and military leaders throughout the crisis in East Timor. It was not until the United States cut military aid to Indonesia in September, that the Indonesian government invited the UN to restore order in East Timor. Third party actors also complicated the crisis in Rwanda, but that involved France more than the United States. For example, the RPF quickly swept through Rwanda and took power from Hutu extremists. France however, maintained that the Hutu were the proper government of Rwanda. This did not involve the United States directly, but did complicate the crisis for France a great deal.

THE HYPOTHESES REVISITED

H_1: The more vital interests are at stake, and the closer United States is to the crisis, the more the president will push for intervention. Conversely, the more peripheral interests are at stake, and the more distant the United States is from the crisis, the less the president will push for intervention.

The three case studies show that despite competing factors in making foreign policy decisions, President Clinton remained mindful of overarching goals, such as protecting vital and peripheral interests. When faced with a threat to vital U.S. interests, such as posed by refugee migration from Haiti, Clinton recognized that he needed support for intervention from international and domestic constituencies to maintain regional stability. For example, Clinton went to the UN to ask for a mandate to intervene with force. After receiving a nod of approval from Aristide and the OAS, the UN mandated the use of force under U.S. leadership. In addition, Clinton made an address to the public on the eve of the intervention to announce and explain to the American public the

intervention in Haiti. The public response was favorable, and even though the president did not ask for congressional approval ahead of time, the Congress was kept abreast of events and did not attempt to stop the intervention.

Geographic distance from the United States did impact the U.S. response to crisis. Our case studies demonstrate that the farther the crisis is from the United States the less the United States is to intervene. Rwanda and East Timor, for example, are very far from the United States and the United States did not use military force in either instance. Haiti however, is very close to the United States and the United States was compelled to intervene to end the refugee flow. In addition, geographic distance played a role in the U.S. policy of endorsing regional powers to settle the crisis. This was observed in both Rwanda and East Timor, most likely because the cost of intervention would be lower and the benefits higher for regional powers than for a distant country, such as the United States. Besides, the United States was spared participating in intervention, since France and Australia intervened in Rwanda and East Timor respectively.

At times Clinton hesitated to use force because he had to balance interests with demands and pressures from other constituencies and actors. During the crisis in East Timor, vital interests such as military, strategic, and economic interests in the U.S.-Indonesia relationship far outweighed vital and peripheral interests in the U.S.-East Timor relationship. The United States was not ready to risk its long-term and ongoing military partnership with Indonesia, at least until the international momentum against certain aspects of this relationship forced the United States to reevaluate the way Indonesia used its military and equipment. Once Clinton made this reevaluation, he announced that there would be no more forthcoming military assistance to Indonesia as

long as its military supported militia in East Timor. Even after this reevaluation, however, Clinton limited U.S. participation in the UN mission to East Timor to minimal humanitarian assistance, because relations with Jakarta still remained more important to the United States than relations with Dili. Thus, Clinton's hesitation to use force in East Timor was a function of U.S. interests in Indonesia that held far more importance to policy makers than interests in tiny East Timor.

Geographic proximity also played a part in East Timor, but here the importance fell on its proximity to Indonesia, a long-time and critical ally of the United States. As a result, the United States viewed the violence in East Timor as a side effect of the modernization and democratization in Indonesia. Clinton therefore recognized that resolution of the crisis in Indonesia was key to resolving threats to the larger region. In this respect, Clinton had to be very careful to walk a thin line between offending important allies such as Indonesia, China, Japan, Australia, and the Philippines on one hand, and offending a sense of injustice supported by East Timor, Portugal and the UN in general. Clinton worked with Indonesia through diplomatic and economic means to end the suffering not only in East Timor, but all throughout Indonesia.

Clinton not only hesitated, but also refused to use force to stop civil violence in Rwanda, because the United States had few if any interests in Rwanda. There were no military, or strategic, and few economic ties to the country. The only U.S. interests in Rwanda were peripheral, having to do with international law and norms regarding human rights. Unfortunately, the United States cannot build policy based on principles and norms alone. Without threats to vital interests, the cost of U.S. intervention in a hot civil conflict in Africa would have been too high to justify. As a result, Clinton hampered UN

aspirations for intervention in Rwanda, because the costs outweighed the benefits of intervention in a place that ranked low for the United States in terms of U.S. vital and peripheral interests, congressional approval, public opinion and the media. Even though the UN invited member countries to participate in missions around the world this did not automatically ensure intervention. This was an important part of the UN intervention in Rwanda, because after Belgium withdrew, the UN mission was unable to uphold order because many of the contributing countries had sent inexperienced and ill-equipped forces.

The U.S. Congress was not likely to support the use of military force abroad in either the case of Rwanda or East Timor. This response was more associated with the recent events in Somalia than geographic location of the crisis in question.

It was not until the media informed the public about the conditions in the refugee camps that Clinton sent humanitarian aid to Rwanda. Despite the financial expense of providing humanitarian assistance in a distant location, the risk to life and limb for American troops was low and the political benefit to the president at home was great.

As shown in the case studies, Clinton was not willing to risk the lives of American soldiers to intervene with force to stop ethnic violence either in Rwanda, or East Timor. While it is true that ethnic cleansing can and often does generate international instability, it is also true that such instability is generally regional-specific. Therefore, as the cases in this study demonstrate, the geographic proximity of the crises in question along with the long-standing historical and political ties to the United States have an important impact on the decision whether to intervene. The closer regional

instability is to the United States the more likely it is that U.S. leaders will be compelled to intervene.

H_2: The more a U.S. ally is likely to intervene, the less the president will intervene. Conversely, the less a U.S. ally is likely to intervene, the more the president will intervene.

This hypothesis is confirmed by the case studies examined in this dissertation. When France intervened in Southwest Rwanda to provide a safe haven for Hutu, it relieved any pressure on the United States to take action. As a result, the United States was not compelled to use force in Rwanda to end the violence. Moreover, once it became clear that humanitarian assistance was necessary, the United States sent assistance for a short period of time within a multilateral framework.

In the examination of the case of Haiti, no U.S. ally came to light that was willing to intervene with force in Haiti. On the contrary, the OAS objected to the use of military force to reinstate Aristide, preferring to use other means of persuasion, such as economic sanctions. The OAS position remained opposed to the use of force, but the appointment of a new Secretary General softened its position, and then the OAS neither openly supported nor opposed the use of force. Therefore, even though no U.S. ally wanted to intervene in Haiti, there was also little opposition to the U.S. use of force. This enabled the United States to intervene with force in Haiti without fear of condemnation from the OAS. Consequently, pressure on the United States was not relieved, and as a result the United States was compelled to intervene to restore democratic rule.

In the case of East Timor, Portugal initiated negotiations in the UN to end the Indonesian occupation of East Timor. It was not until Australia developed domestic pressures that it began to push for intervention. Even though Australia and Portugal approached the United States to send forces, the U.S. relations with Indonesia proved more important until September. In the meantime however, Australia intervened in East Timor to end the post-referendum violence. By doing so, Australia relieved pressures on the United States to contribute to the mission to any great extent. Thus, this hypothesis proves to be correct as shown in the case studies of Rwanda, Haiti, and East Timor.

H_3: The more the UN is likely to call for intervention, the more the United States is to support it.

This hypothesis is problematic because it has a circular element in it. This is because the United States is a member of the Security Council from which resolutions are declared. Moreover, with the United States as a member of the Security Council, the United States is as likely to influence other members of the Council as it is to be influenced by others. Thus, this hypothesis is problematic, because the United States cannot influence itself.

Now, looking at our three case studies, the United States did not want to intervene in Rwanda in any way. Thus, when it came to the UN mandating a mission to help end violence in this country, the United States actively blocked any such action. Thus, the United States exercised more influence over the UN Security Council decisions than the other way around. Indeed, it was not until France announced that it was willing to

intervene unilaterally, that the UN Security Council approved the mission that did not require the United States to participate.

In the case of Haiti, the United States wanted to restore democracy and needed UN support. Initially, the United States followed the OAS lead. At some point, however the OAS-sponsored sanctions clearly failed, and the United States began to assume a more forceful role in resolving the crisis. Consequently, the OAS, limited by its charter, acquiesced to the use of force by not objecting. The United States appealed to the UN without objection from either the OAS or Aristide. In this case, the United States again exerted a large amount of influence over the decisions made by the UN Security Council to involve the Chapter VII mandate to use force.

The case of East Timor reveals similar influence of the United States in the UN Security Council. For reasons explained above, the United States did not want to participate in any military action against Indonesia in East Timor. This had many consequences, but the U.S. position made it difficult for Australia to receive the Chapter VII mandate to use force. Australia had to apply pressure on the United States not to block such a mandate. U.S. approval ultimately came with the condition that the United States would not participate in the intervention to any great extent. In the case of East Timor, the United States was a key element of the UN Security Council decision regarding the authorization to use force to end the violence. Thus, the case studies suggest that this hypothesis is conflicted because the United States is a critical factor in the decisions regarding UN Security Council mandates.

H_4: The more the U.S. Congress is likely to call for intervention, the more the president will intervene. Conversely, the more the U.S. Congress is likely to oppose intervention, the less the president will intervene.

This hypothesis is confirmed by our case studies. In Rwanda, the U.S. Congress not only resisted committing troops and funds, but it also delayed paying already existing dues at the UN for previous peacekeeping activities. The crisis in Rwanda came at a time when Congress had turned to domestic affairs after Somalia. Thus, Congress was more concerned with containing costs and mission creep, than it was about ending the violence in a far away country in Africa. It was not until the images of suffering refugees hit the news that Congress became more pliable in sending humanitarian aid. Even then however, Congress stipulated that allocated funds should be strictly used for non-military humanitarian operations. In addition, Congress demanded a pull-out deadline, reinforcing its position.

Congress was ambivalent at the time of the crisis in Haiti, and it remained deadlocked in debate over such issues as the president's legal rights to use force. As a result, Clinton received relatively broad freedom to forge policy without congressional interference. Thus, the inability of Congress to make a commitment of support or opposition of the use of force in Haiti had little effect on Clinton's foreign policy in Haiti.

The crisis in East Timor invoked resistance to the president's policy toward Indonesia, thereby sending the message that Congress did not approve of U.S. implied involvement in militia activities in East Timor. Congress had already cut military aid to Indonesia in 1992. By the time of the referendum and ensuing violence, Congress favored using U.S. influence on Indonesia to end the human rights violations. It was

shortly after this that President Clinton shifted the U.S. policy to withhold military aid to Indonesia, due to its involvement in supporting the militia activities in East Timor. Thus, congressional pressure on the president did occur just prior to the announced shift in U.S. policy, as Congress took a position against supporting Indonesia and the President acquiesced. Congress did not, however, go so far as to demand that the United States participate in the UN mission to East Timor, but it was instrumental in pressuring Jakarta to invite the UN force in to restore order.

H_5: The more the media opposes the president's policy, the more public opinion will engage during crisis, and the more cautious the president will be regarding intervention. Conversely, the more the media endorses the president's policy, the less public opinion will engage during crisis, and the less cautious the president will be regarding intervention.

Public opinion is a highly influential variable in the policy-making process. As shown in the cases of East Timor and Rwanda, Clinton hesitated to use force to stop civil violence because public sentiment opposed such action. In each case, the crisis was far away and in a part of the world that is less well known to the American public. With less knowledge about the country and region in question, the public has more difficulty supporting costly policy, especially if the benefits of that policy are vague or unknown. Thus, selling intervention to the public in far away and less known places is more difficult. Moreover, if the president is not interested in intervening in that part of the world anyway, the disinterested public facilitates inaction, because it goes relatively unnoticed.

In Haiti, public opinion was mixed and hovered around the 50 percent mark throughout the crisis. In effect, a divided public opinion allows the president greater latitude to forge policy, because the president can directly appeal to the public to generate greater support in either direction. In this way, the president can pull the public along with him, as policy gains momentum. In a case such as Haiti, where the public is more interested in the region in question, the public more readily absorbs the information it is offered either by the president or by the media. Thus, when the president addressed the public prior to the intervention in Haiti, public approval jumped to above the half way mark.

Of the three cases in this study, the Haiti case presented the most evidence that the U.S. public came the close to engaging elite decision makers in Congress, as a consequence of issues surrounding Haitian refugees. The public had more at stake due to the crisis in Haiti than in the crises in Rwanda or East Timor. Consequently, there was potential for political implications—at least in Florida—if the Haitian refugee situation went on unfettered. The crisis in Rwanda produced a public reaction to the plight in the refugee camps. Here, the public engaged elite decision makers to the extent that it generated a shift in the congressional position regarding humanitarian assistance.

Initially in Rwanda, the media relayed information to the public that was in line with official policy, calling the violence renewed civil war, rather than genocide. Once the refugee camps were established however, the media played an important role, because it helped public opinion engage elite decision makers to send humanitarian assistance. Once this took place, Congress also began to shift its position, thereby dividing the elites. Thus, once Congress saw public opinion shift, it also shifted. The media was

instrumental in shifting both public opinion and for dividing elites. Therefore, as long as the media followed official rhetoric on Rwanda, there was no division in public opinion or Congress. However, once the media began to counter official rhetoric, by publicizing the suffering in refugee camps, the public engaged and division began to emerge in Congress as public engagement took effect.

Throughout the three cases, public opinion was mixed regarding intervention in Haiti, only reaching a slight majority after President Clinton made his address to the nation to plead his case for intervention. The role of the media was similarly mixed. While the president's address improved the likelihood that the public would favor intervention, critical news reports about the intervention itself possibly tempered public opinion. Thus, the mixed nature of media reports during the crisis in Haiti left public opinion mixed, and no shift formed in Congress, which remained deadlocked in debate.

The media closely reflected the official position of the U.S. government during the crisis in East Timor. This included minimizing evidence of U.S. involvement or implication in military affairs in Indonesia that fueled militia intimidation of East Timorese. For the most part, the American public neither followed the crisis in East Timor, nor supported the use of military intervention to resolve it. Thus, the hypothesis is true, because the media endorsed the message of the president, and the public did not form a lobby in Congress.

Therefore, this study suggests that in cases where public opinion becomes strong enough to engage elites in Congress, then a reassessment of policy becomes possible. It also suggests, that in cases where the public remains disinterested, the public will not engage elite decision makers and there is little chance for a reevaluation of policy.

THE CLINTON DOCTRINE AND FOREIGN POLICY UNDER CLINTON

In the second half of its first term, the Clinton administration moved "toward the political center."[9] International and domestic political forces prompted this moderate foreign policy. In many respects, Clinton was influenced by the extent of U.S. interests, the availability of international allies and world support, the amount of congressional support as well as domestic public approval. This dissertation began with a central question: to what extent did Clinton uphold the principle that the United States would intervene to stop ethnic cleansing. This dissertation concludes that Clinton did not consistently uphold this principle. However, whenever possible, Clinton attempted to follow through on what some described as the Clinton Doctrine.

The examination of U.S. interests in these three case studies reveals a great deal about the conditions for, and types of, intervention that Clinton was willing to risk. The key was to bring change at the right price, according to the risks involved. An evaluation of U.S. interests revealed layers of interests that are either vital or peripheral. As it turns out, ending ethnic violence is a peripheral interest, and is therefore much more difficult to uphold because it is an intangible end product that requires the payment of tangible costs. As a rule, foreign policy cannot be determined by intangible principles. Tangible costs include the likely loss of life or limb of troops that are inevitably placed in harms way to end violence, even though technological advancement since 1975 has made intervention less costly in terms of risks to inherent dangers of warfare. In addition, intervention abroad is financially costly. Under such conditions, the costs must not outweigh the benefits of intervention. Therefore, if ethnic violence occurs in a country in which the

9. Kurtz, *Spin Cycle*, xiv.

United States has few financial interests, such as Rwanda or East Timor, then the intervention could cost more than benefit—in economic terms. The political costs of intervention must also be matched with benefits. For example, in Rwanda, France perceived that its sphere of influence was coming under threat by expanding U.S. influence. Along this line, France had more interests at stake in Rwanda than did the United States. Consequently, France was compelled to intervene before the United States.

The claim that Clinton would defend human rights is a principled stand and is therefore difficult to substantiate. For example, despite rhetoric to end ethnic violence, Clinton did not order an intervention in Rwanda because the costs were greater than the benefits of doing so. The United States did intervene in Haiti, but it did so because the political and economic benefits of reasserting regional stability—and ending refugee migration—outweighed the costs. The United States did not intervene in East Timor, regardless of human rights violations, because the political, diplomatic, economic, and military costs of intervening were higher than were the benefits of coming to the aid of this tiny fledgling nation. Thus, Clinton's rhetoric supporting human rights was not in line with U.S. interests at all times. Clinton ultimately had to take U.S. vital, as well as peripheral interests into consideration as part of the decision whether to intervene. The Clinton Doctrine therefore places Clinton under pressure to trade peripheral interests for vital interests, which is unreasonable.

The case studies demonstrate that U.S. allies play an important role in the formulation of foreign policy. Obviously, you cannot have a "foreign" policy without other countries, but consider the implications of anarchy. International relations

essentially encapsulate the actions of states to independently or collectively overcome the effects of anarchy. The goal of each state is to maximize its position within the international system. Consequently there is tremendous competition, but also cooperation. The cases in this study show that U.S. allies do impact U.S. foreign policy and the way the United States behaves in the international system. In both Rwanda and East Timor, U.S. allies were extremely influential on United States foreign policy because as the superpower, the United States was effectively relieved of the "sheriff's" obligation to respond, if and when one of its allies did the job first. In Rwanda, France intervened to provide a safe haven for the Hutu. Australia filled this role in East Timor. This option was not available in the case of Haiti, because the regional hegemon is the United States, so there was no other country left to fill this role.

In addition, U.S.-French competition for expanding or maintaining a sphere of influence in Africa added an element of complication to the crisis. Here we can directly observe the competition to maximize position under anarchy, as mentioned above. Similarly, the fact that Australia is considered a "Western" power brought increased strain in relations around the larger region, because Indonesia demanded a higher level of Asian participation, yet Japan was reluctant to participate since it fell into trouble in Cambodia. This element of competition was lacking in the case of Haiti, because the United States dominates the region.

Clearly, U.S. relations with allies in each crisis are rooted in the concept of anarchy, because each one deals with actors out to maximize their position within the system. For the Hutu, it meant eliminating the Tutsi, but retaining a French alliance, while misleading the UN. For the Tutsi, it meant fighting for survival, and that also

meant regaining leadership in the state of Rwanda. Cedras took the government away from the democratically elected leader and held it for four years. East Timor was a case in which this tiny half-island was buffeted between occupying forces and stood for the first time to attain independence, but needed outside support and assistance. In each case, U.S. allies played a large role in defining the events and policy over time.

Clinton embarked upon the presidency, endorsing a policy to uphold humanitarian rights, as a catalyst for engineering change. According to Michael Jackson, Clinton did well, while in office, to support international stability in the much less stable post-cold war era.[10] He supported "assertive multilateralism" to achieve this lofty goal. Under such conditions, the UN becomes an important forum for building international consensus and authority for legitimizing and administering intervention. When evaluating the Clinton Doctrine, we cannot forget that ending ethnic violence is potentially a very costly undertaking for any nation. The costs must remain within the capabilities of the intervening nation. It is more cost effective to resolve ethnic crises within a multilateral framework. The UN provides a system for burden sharing, so that no single country must pay all costs. The UN ultimately mandated the intervention in each case study. Moreover, the costs of intervention were spread over the shoulders of several countries, even though one self-selected country chose to lead the mission and in fact, pushed for intervention.

That the international community in general, and the UN specifically, would institutionalize and uphold norms and laws against ethnic cleansing is unprecedented. It is clear that the UN fulfilled its function of creating consensus for international policy.

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10. Jackson, "Something Must Be Done?," 13.

More importantly, the UN informed members about the crises and thereby enabled the world body to negotiate peacefully. In this case, information is very important, because if countries remained uninformed of the goals and intent of the intervention exercise, then there would be an increased perceived threat to international and regional stability. For example, Alan Dowty and Gil Loescher explain that "there is a growing international awareness of the linkage between human rights abuses, forcible displacement of civilian populations, and local, regional and international security."[11] Stemming regional instability due to refugee migration is in the interest of any country. This plays out in all three of the case studies in this dissertation, in which refugees generated tension within the region. In all three cases, the UN authorized military intervention to restore order in the afflicted country. In each case, the public mood in the specific country with the most interests in regional stability influenced that country's decision to intervene. Because humanitarian intervention is based on principles, it can only be practiced when the benefits of such action outweigh the costs. Thus, the UN played a vital role in resolving each of these crises by making the intervention activities transparent and more cost effective and consequently less threatening to regional actors and other allies.

Once situations of ethnic violence hit the news media, they usually bring about a global outcry. Once this happens, world leaders come under pressure to do something to halt this type of injustice. This public response is a relatively new phenomenon in history, and suggests that norms and principles supporting human rights have increased at domestic and international levels in recent years. Ethnic cleansing violates the most essential human right—the right to life. This issue touches deep American ideological

11. Dowty and Loescher, "Refugee Flows," 43.

sentiment, and encounters part of the American identity. For this reason, presidential rhetoric favoring ending human rights violations, such as found in the Clinton Doctrine, invokes American beliefs in the right to life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness. Therefore, such rhetoric would naturally have powerful political appeal to the American public.

Despite this ideological appeal, the cases in this study did not show that the American public consistently supported or demanded that the U.S. government use force to end ethnic violence abroad. What they did show however, was that the American public more readily demands humanitarian assistance to be sent to refugees in need. This was substantiated in instances, when horrible images of the Goma refugee camps brought about a U.S. public response. This suggests that even though the American public enjoys rhetoric such as the Clinton Doctrine, promising to end ethnic violence, when it comes right down to doing it, there is a tremendous disconnect. Therefore, while the American public wants to hear benevolent rhetoric, it does not have the stomach to actually send American troops into harms way.

We cannot be so foolish as to forget, however, that if indeed the public mood were to become insistent, then it would not only serve the political interest of the president to stop such violence, but would place pressure on him to do so. This is seen in the case studies in this dissertation by the fact that Congress tends to remain extremely aware of public sentiment and acts accordingly. This was exemplified in all three cases.

The case of Rwanda shows that the American public had no real interest in intervening to end the violence and neither did Congress. Congress did not make great efforts to end the violence or to pay the UN dues for the peacekeeping effort. Indeed, it

was not until after the formation of the deadly conditions in the refugee camps that the public began to show some shift in the direction of sending assistance. Congress followed the same trajectory as the public and resisted the use of force to put down the violence, however, readily sent assistance once it became more politically charged. In Haiti, the public was divided right up until the president's address to the nation on the eve of the intervention, after which there was a small spike in public approval. Likewise, Congress was deadlocked in debate until just after the intervention, at which time it approved in a post mortem resolution.

The situation in East Timor revealed that the American public had little knowledge of, or interest in stopping the violence. Congress, for its part was less concerned with taking action to end the violence in East Timor, than it was over shutting off funding for military assistance that doggedly continued to flow to Indonesia and the militia in East Timor. This military aid implicated the United States in supporting the militia in its reign of terror throughout East Timor. This was important because once the media began to spread this message, it made the United States appear to be an accomplice, and the American public does not tolerate this sort of injustice for very long. Moreover, the risk of public disapproval or opposition increased. As explained in an earlier chapter, once the public catalyzes a response in opposition, then elites in Congress are more likely to take notice. Consequently, implications of U.S. involvement providing training and equipment to the militia via Indonesia could have led to a political scandal. Thus, continued military assistance to Indonesia inherently had deep political undercurrents and high risks. Thus, it was in the political self-interest of politicians to

avoid connection to scandals of this extreme nature, and Congress acted to reinforce earlier decisions to end military aid to Indonesia.

The Clinton Doctrine announced that eliminating ethnic cleansing was in the interest of the United States. It stood to reason that Clinton was committed and willing to intervene in the internal affairs of other nations to achieve this goal. However, as much as he would have liked, he was not free to intervene everywhere, because of constraints placed on him, either by U.S. interests, the UN, allies, the U.S. Congress, or the public and the media. These considerations served to remind Clinton of political and other risks involved in trying to fulfill unreasonable goals. Foreign policy is very complicated and can change over time because of conflicting pressures on the president. The variables examined in this dissertation helped shape foreign policy under Clinton, as he searched for the best foreign policy alternative.

We have seen in the cases of Rwanda, Haiti, and East Timor that alternative variables placed pressure on the president. They either pressured him to act, or constrained him. As a rational actor, the president must assess each alternative according to desired outcomes and weigh the costs and benefits of his decision. This process was evident in the case of Haiti, in which Clinton sought to resolve the crisis in democracy through progressively deepening commitment, beginning with sanctions, progressing to an embargo, reaching agreement, then military deterrence, to ultimate use of military force. In this instance, by the time Clinton ordered military use of force, he had exhausted his options in negotiations, sanctions, and incentives.

Policy outcomes did not necessarily include the use of U.S. military force to end ethnic violence abroad. Clinton learned quickly in Somalia, for example, that the United

States, despite its prowess, cannot successfully intervene everywhere without first assessing the costs and benefits involved. Either the United States must be willing to embrace the necessary costs, or the president must be willing to absorb the risked political price if intervention does not succeed. Clinton delivered rhetoric with mastery, but as shown in our case studies, he was unable to end ethnic violence. The conclusion of this study suggests, surprisingly, that Clinton did in fact fulfill the Clinton Doctrine, because it was a qualified statement—that the United States would stop ethnic cleansing whenever possible. This conclusion unfortunately places greater emphasis on the *qualification* than the *message*.

The qualification encompasses the impact of the five variables in this dissertation on the foreign policy process. While all of these variables—U.S. interests, allies, the UN, Congress, and public opinion and the media—do matter, U.S. interests are the primary contributing variable. Public opinion is expected to be the most influential variable, but it has relatively little influence on foreign policy, that is unless and until it catalyzes a lobby that reaches elite decision makers. Rather, the president has tools at his command to monitor public sentiment and to lead public opinion and the media. Congress is especially influential in areas where it can limit the budget, but also when it influences public opinion, informs the media, and demands reports from the president. In addition to these domestic factors, the president must consider international variables as well. U.S. allies proved to be highly influential on U.S. foreign policy during the three crises examined in this study. Moreover, U.S. membership in the UN was shown to motivate other countries to take or not to take specific actions, as well as to pressure the United States to alter the direction of foreign policy. Thus, this study demonstrates that Clinton

did fulfill the Clinton Doctrine, to the highest degree possible, according to the opposing winds of influence from each of the five variables examined. These opposing forces served to moderate, shape, and balance Clinton's foreign policy by limiting the number of acceptable alternatives.

The pitfalls of this holistic approach are that foreign policy is extremely complex and the variables can and often do interact with one another and therefore they have some feedback between them. This is seen most clearly in the case of U.S.-UN interaction, in which U.S. foreign policy is influenced by UN Security Council decisions that are themselves heavily dependent on U.S. policies. Moreover, the holistic nature of this framework intrinsically omits influences on foreign policy that could prove informative. For example, individual analysis could be included to address the impact of personality, belief systems, analogical and imaging cognition, as well as group dynamics, and rational choice of the president's decisions at the personal level. This framework could also benefit from the inclusion of analysis on interest groups and multinational corporations, as they continue to increase in importance.

This study is important to the field of international relations, because it examines foreign policy within a framework of variables that impact foreign policy on a holistic level. The applicability of this framework can be used evaluate other foreign policy decisions to help analysts predict and understand complex foreign policy outcomes. The framework in this dissertation is not time sensitive, and can be applied to other crises and events than those in this study. Additionally, this framework is not context dependent, because it can be applied across different administrations.

To demonstrate the applicability of the analysis in this dissertation, consider briefly the ongoing deliberations on a possible war against Iraq. Negotiations in the United Nations are delicate and there is contention that a U.S. intervention in Iraq could cause future regional complications. To find a way through difficult negotiations, the UN Security Council must focus on the necessity for inspections for weapons of mass destruction. Negotiations are confounded because Russian government is reluctant to sign onto the intervention against Iraq, because of the U.S. position against a possible Russian intervention in Georgia. France hesitates to endorse a single UN resolution, preferring a double resolution instead. The first resolution might call for adherence to international inspection for weapons of mass destruction, with the second mandating enforcement to automatically come into force with violation of the first. Interestingly, both France and Russia agree that inspectors should not enter Iraq without a resolution. China is hesitant, insisting that in the case a resolution can be passed, the U.S. must abide by it to the letter.

The U.S. allies are also sending mixed messages to the White House. France resists U.S. military use of force in Iraq because of larger unresolved regional issues. Considerable German opposition came to light in the summer 2002, when the Chancelor Schroeder built his campaign against any military intervention in Iraq. This opposition sparked significant diplomatic tensions between the two countries, as shown by President Bush's failure to make the customary congratulatory phone call to Chancelor Schroeder upon his reelection. Despite such reluctance from two key partners in Europe, the United Kingdom remained firmly supportive of the U.S. policy, and has helped build the case for quick military action. Finally, Israel's response to an Iraqi missile attack aimed at its

territory remains unclear, and the impact of such a response, should it occur, on regional stability continues to be a central U.S. concern.

After much deliberation, the U.S. Congress passed a bipartisan resolution approving the use of military force in Iraq. The vote in the Senate was 77 to 23 in favor of the resolution, and the House passed the Resolution with a margin of 296 to 133.[12] The final resolution, however, also highlighted the importance of diplomatic measures designed to achieve a multilateral approach to the issue. The majority in Congress reflects public opinion polls that showed a 62 to 67 percent majority of the American public in favor of a military intervention in Iraq, but the figures dropped significantly when unilateral. Clearly the American public supports this pending intervention.

Our framework shows, therefore, that despite the fact that Europe is disinclined to support U.S. action in Iraq, it is faced with few choices. Congress and the American public support the action and the media facilitates the transmission of information without opposition. This leaves President Bush with "extraordinary flexibility" to intervene in Iraq.[13] In addition, vital interests are at stake in the Middle East for Europe and the United States as well. Thus, the remaining piece in this framework is that it would be best for the UN Security Council would adopt a suitable resolution that would give a likely U.S. military action the multilateral legitimacy sought by the Bush administration.

In conclusion, this dissertation builds on the existing body of literature on foreign

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12. See "Senate, in 77–33 Vote, passes Iraq Resolution," *New York Times*, 11 October 2002, 1; and "Congress Passes Iraq Resolution: Overwhelming Approval gives Bush Authority to Attack Unilaterally," *New York Times*, 11 October 2002, 1.

13. Glenn Kessler, "A Muscular First Step: Bush Gains Freedom, Negotiating Power," *The Washington Post*, 11 October 2002, 1.

policy and intervention, and takes into account international relations theory, highlighting the importance of international and domestic forces that shape policy decisions to use military force abroad. This is an original study that approaches foreign policy and intervention in a holistic method, encompassing the United Nations, U.S. allies, the U.S. Congress, public opinion and the media, and U.S. interests. This study shows that these variables significantly shape the course of foreign policy decisions emanating from the White House by focusing on small scale, low intensity, and low risk crises, but the framework suggested in this study could also be useful for examining large scale, high intensity, and high risk crises.

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