Summer 2000

Community Building in Ethically Restructured States: The Baltics

Dovile Budryte

Old Dominion University

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.odu.edu/gpis_etds

Part of the International Law Commons, International Relations Commons, and the Sociology Commons

Recommended Citation


https://digitalcommons.odu.edu/gpis_etds/37

This Dissertation is brought to you for free and open access by the Graduate Program in International Studies at ODU Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Graduate Program in International Studies Theses & Dissertations by an authorized administrator of ODU Digital Commons. For more information, please contact digitalcommons@odu.edu.
COMMUNITY BUILDING IN ETHNICALLY RESTRUCTURED STATES:
THE BALTICS

by

Dovile Budryte
B.A. May 1994, Walsh University
M.A. May 1998, Old Dominion University

A Dissertation Submitted to the Faculty of Old Dominion University in Partial Fulfillment of the Requirement for the Degree of

DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY
INTERNATIONAL STUDIES
OLD DOMINION UNIVERSITY
August 2000

Approved by:

Regina C. Karn (Director)

Simon Serfati (Member)

Chandra Silva (Member)
ABSTRACT

COMMUNITY BUILDING IN ETHNICALLY RESTRUCTURED STATES:
THE BALTICS

Dovile Budryte
Old Dominion University, 2000
Director: Dr. Regina C. Karp

Drawing on democratic theory, this dissertation explores a thesis that the experience of ethnic restructuring significantly effects the ability of a democratizing state to successfully consolidate its emerging democracy. Ethnically restructured states, it is hypothesized, have an especially hard time creating inclusive democratic political communities, which is a necessary prerequisite for a consolidated democracy.

To test the thesis, the comparative case study method is applied to the ethnically restructured states of Latvia, Lithuania, and Estonia. The goal of the case studies is to examine the approaches that the Baltic states used to reduce polarization. The historical background to the case studies includes an analysis of recently released archival documents and historical studies conducted in the Baltic states that deal with the demographic history of the Baltic states.

One of the most important findings of the three case studies is that the shape of political communities and the political arrangements devised to accommodate ethnic differences in the Baltic states were conditioned by the historical memory of deportations and planned migration. Consequently, successful approaches to community building should be responsive to both the historical sensitivities of autochthonous ethnic groups and the need of the immigrants to have a say in community building and everyday affairs. Such approaches are likely to be implemented at the local (sub-state) level. They are
likely to be process-oriented and capable of incorporating flexible forms of political organization.

International actors interested in helping states to reduce ethnic polarization should focus their efforts at the local level. Using political conditionality from "above" for this purpose is likely to have some negative consequences, such as intensifying the activities of nationalist groups and prompting searches for new ways to preserve what is perceived as an endangered ethnic identity.
This dissertation is dedicated to my parents and my aunt Genovaite.
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

This dissertation was supported by generous fellowships from the European University Viadrina, Aalborg University, and the Open Society Archives in Budapest. My field research was funded by a grant from the Open Society (Soros) Foundation. I have also benefitted from the Summer Research Award given to me by the Russian and East European Center (University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign).

There are numerous people who gave me invaluable help in different ways. I would like to thank Dr. Regina C. Karp. Without her support and encouragement, I might never have undertaken this ambitious project. Dr. Chandra de Silva and Dr. Simon Serfaty also provided much-appreciated comments and guidance. Thanks to Dr. Daniel N. Nelson for introducing me to democratic theory and for all that he has done for me. I extend special thanks to Dr. Karl Schloegel (the European University Viadrina) and Dr. Ulf Hedetoft (Aalborg University) for their inspiration, guidance, and encouragement. My special thanks to Jekaterina Dorodnova whose grasp of developments in Latvia was a source of inspiration to me. I wish to thank Anna Minna Pavulans and Dr. Staffan Zetterholm for their comments and criticism. I am also grateful to my parents, my aunt, and my sister Alge who provided invaluable assistance. I express my deepest gratitude to my husband Charles who tirelessly edited the manuscript.
# TABLE OF CONTENTS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Chapter</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>I. INTRODUCTION</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>II. RESEARCH DESIGN</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>THE MAIN HYPOTHESIS AND ITS VARIABLES</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TESTING THE HYPOTHESIS: METHOD AND CASE SELECTION</td>
<td>19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ALTERNATIVE PROPOSITIONS</td>
<td>25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>III. PREVIOUS RESEARCH ON MULTIETHNICITY AND DEMOCRACY</td>
<td>42</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>THE FIRST QUADRANT: HISTORICAL APPROACHES</td>
<td>44</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>THE SECOND QUADRANT: THEORIES ON ETHNIC MOBILIZATION</td>
<td>50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>THE THIRD QUADRANT: MODERNIZATION THEORIES</td>
<td>54</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>THE FOURTH QUADRANT: THEORIES OF ETHNOPOLITICS AND DEMOCRACY</td>
<td>58</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CONCLUSION: ACKNOWLEDGING THE “GREY” AREAS, IDENTIFYING THE RELEVANT DEBATES</td>
<td>69</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IV. CRAFTING POLITICAL COMMUNITIES IN MULTIETHNIC STATES: WHICH ACTORS, WHAT INSTITUTIONS?</td>
<td>74</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>POLITICAL COMMUNITY AND MULTIETHNICITY: TWO THEORETICAL PERSPECTIVES</td>
<td>75</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>INSTITUTIONS WHICH HELP TO CREATE AND MAINTAIN POLITICAL COMMUNITY IN A MULTIETHNIC STATE</td>
<td>81</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>THE ROLE OF INTERNATIONAL ACTORS IN POLITICAL COMMUNITY BUILDING.</td>
<td>97</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CONCLUSION</td>
<td>101</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>V. ETHNIC RESTRUCTURING IN THE BALTIC STATES: HISTORICAL BACKGROUND FOR THE CASE STUDIES</td>
<td>104</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>THE ETHNIC RESTRUCTURING CARRIED OUT BY THE SOVIET UNION: WHY AND HOW</td>
<td>105</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SOVIET CONSTRUCTIVISM IN ACTION: THE BALTIC STATES</td>
<td>114</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>REACTION TO ETHNIC RESTRUCTURING: THE EMERGENCE OF POLITICALLY ACTIVE GROUPS</td>
<td>137</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CONCLUSION</td>
<td>153</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Table</td>
<td>Page</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-------</td>
<td>------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1. Number of People Deported from the Baltic States by the Soviet Union, 1940 to 1953 (partly estimates)</td>
<td>117</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Change in Ethnic Composition of the Populations of Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania</td>
<td>129</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. Estonian Legislation: Citizenship Laws, the Law on Aliens, the Language Law, and the Local Election Law</td>
<td>170</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. Russians by Estonian or Russian Citizenship (estimates)</td>
<td>174</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6. Ethnic Identification of the Deputies Elected to the Local Government in Narva</td>
<td>196</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8. Latvian Legislation on Citizenship and Minorities</td>
<td>214</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9. Ethnic Relations in Latvia</td>
<td>230</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10. Population of Latvia by Citizenship</td>
<td>232</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12. The Lithuanian Legislation on Minorities</td>
<td>261</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13. Differences Between Orthodox Liberal and Process-Oriented Approaches</td>
<td>319</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Figure</td>
<td>Description</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>--------</td>
<td>------------------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1.</td>
<td>The Variables</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.</td>
<td>Theories Categorized According to Their Understanding of Ethnicity and Nation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.</td>
<td>Institutions to Maintain a Political Community in Multiethnic States</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION

It is widely recognized in the literature on democratization and democratic consolidation that the existence of different ethnic groups within the same polity may become a challenge to successful democratization and democratic consolidation. A respectable body of scholarship subscribes to the view of John Stuart Mill who argued that democracy and multiethnicity are, in fact, incompatible, and that democracy is quite often a luxury to be enjoyed by ethnically homogenous (or ethnically cleansed) states.1 Stephen Van Evera has summarized this perspective in one of his hypotheses on the relationship between nationalism and stability. He hypothesizes that “the more closely the boundaries of emerging nationstates follow ethnic boundaries, the smaller the risk of war.”2 A logical extension of this hypothesis is that multiethnic states have fewer chances than ethnically homogenous states to establish sustainable democracies because they are more prone to ethnic wars.

The ideas expressed by this school of thought are generally embraced by orthodox liberals who believe in individual rights, a free market economy and modernization. The representatives of this school of thought, such as Juan J. Linz and Alfred Stepan, argue


that the creation and sustainability of democracy in multiethnic entities may be facilitated by inclusive democratic institutions and extending rights to minorities. Many representatives of this school are engaged in a search for the model that could insure stability and democracy in multiethnic areas. The emerging consensus within this school of thought has been that multiethnic or multireligious societies can become stable democracies if they adopt the right kind of inclusive political institutions, such as representation of minorities in decision-making processes and power sharing mechanisms. Since this group of scholars believes that the right kind of inclusive institutions exist, they are often in favor of political conditionality. This means that they are in favor of linking economic and political aid to emerging democracies to prescribed policies regarding ethnic minorities, such as rights and representation in decision making processes.

Their critics, led by Charles Taylor, argue that instead of trying to come up with a model that is universally applicable, scholars should recognize that there are different ways of sharing what Taylor calls the "identity space." The political arrangements in multiethnic states should be context-related and sensitive to historical factors. Other critics of the orthodox liberal perspective suggest that the existence of different ethnic groups may help to initiate and sustain democratization by providing alternative foci of

---


power to the authoritarian regime. Instead of being an obstacle to democratic consolidation, multiethnicity may, in fact, be a sustaining factor.⁶

The goal of this dissertation is to contribute to this debate by tracing democratic community building processes in multiethnic states burdened by historical memories. This dissertation is interested in two themes. First, it explores the long term effects of ethnic restructuring on the ability of a state to create a cohesive democratic community. Second, it examines whether the approaches to community building advocated by the two schools of thought help to reduce ethnic polarization within such states.

Chapter II describes the methodological framework that will be used in the dissertation. The first section discusses the thesis of the dissertation, which is that the experience of ethnic restructuring critically affects the ability of a state to consolidate its emerging democracy. The second section describes the methodology—case studies—used in the dissertation. The final section discusses rival propositions, drawn from other theoretical schools.

Chapter III reviews the research that has already been done on the impact that ethnic restructuring has on democratic processes. It divides the literature into four conceptually and thematically distinguishable areas. The first part reviews historical approaches that pay attention to the specific historical experiences of national and ethnic groups. These approaches suggest that the experience of ethnic restructuring can become a source of ethnic nationalism, which can threaten stability and democracy. The second part reviews theories on ethnic mobilization, which argue that ethnic groups can be mobilized within a nationstate in order to oppose or retaliate against various national political

⁶E.g., see Lord Acton's argument in Connor, 33.
projects, such as forced assimilation, genocide, or national self-determination. Mobilization along ethnic lines can lead to ethnic conflict, which threatens stability and democracy. The third part discusses modernization theories, pioneered by Karl Deutch. Ethnic segmentation, which can be a product of previous ethnic restructuring, is conceived as an obstacle to the creation of a "communications community" or nation. A nation is a requirement for democracy. Therefore, ethnic restructuring can be an obstacle to successful democratization. The fourth part reviews theories of ethnopolitics that try to establish a link between the presence of different ethnic groups within a nationstate and the transition to democracy.

Chapter IV joins a major debate within this body of literature on whether the presence of different ethnic groups (a product of previous ethnic restructuring) within one nationstate hinders or helps democratic processes. This chapter puts forward a theoretical argument which can be summarized as follows. Multiethnicity in and of itself does not constitute a danger, and in fact may be helpful toward the creation of a sustainable democratic community, especially in the beginning stages of democratization. By voicing demands for cultural rights, ethnic communities can form an opposition to nondemocratic polities or strengthen nascent civil societies in emerging democracies.

However, ethnic polarization does present a challenge. The legacy of ethnic restructuring can lead to polarization. Polarization is the presence of ethnopolitical groups actively opposed to the state and to the dominant ethnic group (and/or the presence of ethnopolitical groups actively opposed to the inclusion of minorities within an emerging nationstate.) Such condition may prompt ethnic groups to take revenge for wrongs inflicted in the past or in the present. This chapter concludes by arguing that in order to
understand how to bring about the consolidation of democracy in multiethnic states further empirical research will be needed. (Namely, it is needed in order to identify ways of reducing polarization.)

The goal of Chapter V is twofold. First, it documents the extent and impact of the ethnic restructuring that was carried out by the Soviet Union in the Baltic states. Second, it explores whether the experience of ethnic restructuring has induced ethnic polarization in the Baltic states. Ethnic restructuring is defined as the sudden alteration of the ethnic make-up of a geographically specific population involving (1) the physical removal of a large number of the members of an ethnic group or groups by the members of another ethnic group (or groups) and/or (2) the introduction of a large number of settlers belonging to one or more ethnic groups.

To achieve the first goal, Chapter V draws on recently released documents. The USSR never released official statistics on population movements. Therefore, recently released archival documents and historical studies conducted in the Baltic states help to fill in a grey area in the demographic history of the Baltic states. In addition, Chapter V sheds light on some of the lesser known aspects of ethnic restructuring, such as postwar population exchanges and the attitude of the Soviet state towards non-territorial nationalities residing in the Baltic states.

To achieve the second goal, Chapter V traces the response of the local population to the deportations and to the subsequent influx of settlers. Since there were no reliable public opinion polls in the USSR prior to 1988, the analysis of memoirs and letters helps to evaluate this response. This chapter concludes by tracing the emergence of ethnopolitical groups with concrete political demands, some of whom were opposed to the
emergence of the Baltic republics as independent nationstates. This development is characterized as "polarization."

The following three chapters are case studies of community building in the Baltic states. The goal of Chapter VI is to trace the approaches that the Estonian state used to reduce polarization and thus to legitimatize its power toward minorities that were opposed to the state. This case study consists of four parts. First, it traces the attitudes of Estonia’s minorities towards the state during the initial stage of political community building. Many Russians living in Estonia were opposed to the emergence of Estonia as an independent nationstate. There was even a movement in the Narva region that called for secession from the state.

Second, this chapter traces political community building “from above.” This means that the chapter discusses the policies that were adopted by the Estonian state toward its minorities. The state adopted a citizenship law which disenfranchised Estonia’s Russians. One of the main factors present during the debate about the citizenship law was the historical memory of the deportations carried out by the Soviet Union.

Third, the chapter traces political community building “from below.” It examines ethnic relations at the level of local governments, exploring whether Estonia’s Russians were allowed to use the state as a “service station” (i.e., whether they received full economic and social rights as permanent residents of Estonia), and looks at the ways that the two communities handled their different historical memories. This chapter concludes by exploring the level of polarization in Estonia in the late nineties. It argues that giving Russians the right to vote at the local level and extending to them full social and economic rights were the most successful approaches employed by the Estonian state to reduce
The goal of Chapter VII is to trace the approaches that the Latvian state used to reduce polarization and thus to legitimize its power towards minorities who were opposed to the state. The structure of this case study is the same as the one used for Estonia in Chapter VI. First, it traces the attitudes of Latvia’s minorities toward the state during the initial stage of political community building. Although fewer Russians were opposed to the emerging nationstate in Latvia than in Estonia, there was still widespread distrust. In addition, there were several active ethnopolitical movements opposed to the state.

Second, Chapter VII traces political community building “from above.” This means that the chapter discusses the policies that were adopted by the Latvian state toward its minorities. Similarly to Estonia, the state adopted a citizenship law which disenfranchised Latvia’s Russians. One of the main factors present during the discussions about the citizenship law was the historical memory of the deportations that were carried out by the Soviet Union.

Third, Chapter VII traces political community building “from below.” It examines ethnic relations at the level of local governments, exploring whether Latvia’s Russians were allowed to use the state as a “service station” and looks at the ways that the two communities handled their different historical memories. Unlike Estonia, Latvia did not extend rights of participation at the local level. It did, however, give full social and economic rights to all people residing in its territory. This chapter concludes by exploring the level of polarization in Latvia in the late nineties. It argues that the most successful approach used by the Latvian state to reduce polarization was the extension of full social
and economic rights to Latvia’s Russians.

Similarly to the previous two chapters, the goal of Chapter VIII is to analyze the approaches employed by the Lithuanian state to legitimize its power vis-a-vis ethnic minority groups who initially opposed the existence of an independent Lithuanian state. To analyze the approaches used by the Lithuanian state, the chapter takes three steps. First, it evidences the existence of polarization between the state and ethnopoltical groups opposed to the existence of Lithuania as an independent state and who claimed to represent Lithuania’s Slavic ethnic groups (Russians, Byelorussians, Ukrainians, and ethnic Poles) during the initial stage of political community building. To do that, the first part of the case study analyzes the results of public opinion surveys taken during that period. In addition, this part outlines the platforms of these ethnopoltical movements.

The second and the third parts of Chapter VIII trace the process of political community building “from above” and “from below” under the circumstances (i.e., polarization) described in the first part. The second part explores the circumstances surrounding the adoption of the law on citizenship and other laws affecting the status of minorities. It also documents the response of Lithuania’s ethnic minorities and their “mother states” (i.e., Russia and Poland) to these policies.

The third part of Chapter VIII focuses on developments within civil society (i.e., “below”)—the creation of local governments, the ability of Lithuania’s minorities to use the state as a “service station” and the impact of different historical experiences on inter-ethnic relations. The chapter concludes by arguing that the more than 180 liberal laws defining the status of Lithuania’s minorities were not enough to reduce ethnic polarization. A lack of funds at the local level, as well as the interference of the central government in
local politics caused dissent among Lithuania's ethnic minorities.

The dissertation concludes by relating the findings of the case studies to the ongoing debate on democracy building in multiethnic areas (which was outlined earlier in the introduction). The first part puts forward a theory of political community, which conceptualizes the "demos" as an entity with two dimensions. The vertical dimension refers to the basis of legitimacy for state power. The legitimacy of this power is based on an on-going association of people loyal to the state who possess the citizenship of the state. This on-going association implies a common history, shared historical memory and a common identity. In most nationstates, these three aspects are the basis of a common identity that keeps the nationstate together. Consequently, the question of the relationship between the vertical and the horizontal axes is the question of nation building and the attitude of the nationstate toward its immigrants and ethnic minorities. Drawing on the material covered in the three case studies, the concluding chapter applies this theory to ethnically restructured states.

One of the most important findings of the three case studies is that the shape of political communities and the political arrangements devised to accommodate ethnic differences in the Baltic states were conditioned by the historical memory of deportations, displacement and forced population transfers. Consequently, successful approaches to community building should be responsive to both the historical sensitivities of autochthonous ethnic groups and the need of the immigrants to have a say in community building and everyday affairs. Such approaches are likely to be implemented at the local level, or "below." They are likely to be process-oriented and capable of incorporating flexible forms of political organization. Thus, the case studies show support for the beliefs
of the second school of thought that argues for flexible arrangements. In states inhabited by ethnic groups with different historical memories, there is no one model to reduce polarization. However, states are capable of implementing such approaches if (1) they have a stable economy and (2) if they have a strongly established "vertical" axis.

International actors interested in helping states to reduce ethnic polarization should focus their efforts at the local level. Using political conditionality from "above" for this purpose is likely to have some negative consequences, such as intensifying the activities of nationalist groups and prompting searches for new ways to preserve what is perceived as an endangered ethnic identity. Such by-products of political conditionality hinder the creation of tolerant political culture that is necessary for democratic consolidation in multiethnic areas torn by different historical memories.
CHAPTER II
RESEARCH DESIGN

The goal of this chapter is to describe the methodological framework that will be used in the dissertation. The first section discusses the thesis of the dissertation, which is that the experience of ethnic restructuring critically affects the ability of a state to consolidate its emerging democracy. It points out the independent, dependent, and intervening variables in it. Furthermore, it puts forward definitions of the main concepts—ethnic restructuring and democratic consolidation—on which the hypothesis is built.

The second section describes the methodology—case studies—that is used in the dissertation. It outlines the structure of the case studies and identifies the major sources used. The final section discusses rival propositions, drawn from other theoretical schools. These hypotheses offer alternative explanations for changes in the dependent variable—the consolidation of democracy in an ethnically restructured state—when compared to the main hypothesis.

THE MAIN HYPOTHESIS AND ITS VARIABLES

Hypothesis

This dissertation explores the relationship between a state’s experience of ethnic restructuring and the ability of that state to consolidate democracy. This hypothesis is
drawn from democratic studies that are interested in exploring ways in which to support emerging democracies.

This proposition is limited to the analysis of ethnically restructured states which have retained ethnic heterogeneity after having experienced deportations, expulsions, and other forms of forceful population transfers. The further discussion of "multiethnic states" or ethnically segmented states refers to ethnically restructured multiethnic states.

The Variables

Ethnic Restructuring. Ethnic restructuring is conceptualized as an independent variable. The forcibly changed domestic ethnic structure of a country—which is likely to give rise to political and societal ethnic groups that are opposed to inclusive minority policies and that reject the state outright—is an intervening variable. International actors exercising political conditionality is another intervening variable. (See Figure 1.)

The term "ethnic restructuring" refers to the sudden alteration of the ethnic make-up of a geographically-specific population involving (1) the physical removal of a large number of the members of an ethnic group (or groups) by the members of another ethnic group (or groups) and/or (2) the introduction of a large number of settlers belonging to one or more ethnic groups. Ethnicity is defined as a historically-specific construct which may become the basis for the activity of political groups.¹

¹For a more elaborate definition of ethnicity and its relation with the concept of a "nation," see Chapter III.
In practice, ethnic restructuring involves the forcible removal of large groups of people through deportation, expulsion, or resettlement. Ethnic restructuring is not just a state-supported policy vis-a-vis a national group: it is something that is experienced collectively by the members of the affected group. It often leads to the emergence of political groups among the members of the affected party who are resisting the policy. Examples of ethnic restructuring include forced migration, genocide, politicide, ethnic conflict, expulsion, and deportation.

It is believed that states which have undergone ethnic restructuring (and have remained ethnically heterogenous) are more likely than other multiethnic or monoethnic states to be sensitive to issues of ethnicity. Historical experiences, such as discrimination, deportations, or expulsions, create distance between ethnic groups. Thus, often differences between the groups are perceived as irreconcilable.2 In societies that are

---

extremely polarized, ethnic identity becomes the only politically relevant identity.

This is especially true of states in which ethnic restructuring has occurred within one generation. Most importantly, such states are likely to contain politically influential groups who define their interests, first and foremost, in terms of identity. This condition, known as ethnic polarization, makes democratic political negotiation, which is necessary for every democratic polity, more difficult. Consequently, the presence of ethnic polarization may endanger the process of democratic consolidation.

Democratic Consolidation. Democratic consolidation is the dependent variable in the hypothesis. This dissertation builds on the concept of democratic consolidation devised by Alfred Stepan and Juan J. Linz who argue that it is "a political situation in which, in a phrase, democracy has become 'the only game in town.'" Pivotal to this theoretical notion is acceptance of the fact that not all states that engage in the process of democratization will complete the transition.

The definition of democratic consolidation put forward by Linz and Stepan implies that there are no significant political groups attempting to secede from the state or to

---


4 Karen Dawisha, "Democratization and Political Participation: Research Concepts and Methodologies," in The Consolidation of Democracy in East Central Europe, ed. Karen Dawisha and Bruce Parrot (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997), 43. This concept has been criticized for failing to identify the point at which democratic consolidation is completed. See Guillermo O'Donnell, "Illusions about Consolidation," in Consolidating the Third Wave Democracies, ed. Larry Diamond, Marc F. Plattner, Yun-han Chu, and Hung-mao Tien (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1997), 40–57, or Giuseppe Di Palma, An Essay on Democratic Transitions (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1990), 138–53. One answer to this critique is that one indicator for democratic consolidation in multiethnic states is the absence of strong movements opposed to the state.
overthrow the democratic regime; the majority of the public accepts the institutions of the state as the most appropriate way to govern collective life; and throughout the territory of the state governmental and non-governmental forces agree to solve conflict within the laws of the state. In other words, the majority of a state’s citizens accept the legitimacy of state power. The degree to which the residents of a territory accept the political unit in which they live as the appropriate entity to make legitimate decisions, or the legitimacy of a state’s power in the eyes of the governed, is a key variable for democratic theory.

Thus, following this definition, in order to become a consolidated democracy, a state must create a sense of "we-ness," a sense of cohesiveness that makes collective decision-making possible. On the other hand, the residents must accept the legitimacy of the state’s power by embracing state institutions as the most appropriate way to solve conflict. A political situation when the two conditions, outlined above, are met, is a criterion indicating that the democratic regime has become consolidated.

Creating cohesiveness within a state is a two-way process. In the case of multiethnic states, the policies of the state toward its minorities must be endorsed by the minorities themselves. The minorities must recognize that the rules and institutions created by the state provide enough political space to safeguard their interests. The degree

---

5Linz and Stepan, 5–6.
6Ibid., 27.
7This is an important criterion for determining the success of democratic institutions within multiethnic entities. Sir George Otto Trevelyan captured the essence of the problem: "The truth is that even the most genuine and established democratic way of life is exceedingly difficult to apply when you are dealing with a minority that does not want to live under your rule. We know very well that we ourselves were never able to apply democracy to our own attempt to govern the Irish." Cited in Charles Ingrao, "Understanding Ethnic Conflict in Central Europe: A Historical Perspective," Nationalities Papers (June 1999); PROQUEST.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
to which a minority accepts the power of the state which they inhabit is reflected by the activities of ethnically based political groups and the attitude of that minority. For example, a minority can exhibit extreme disloyalty to the state by attempting to secede from the state. Such a state, its minority policies and successful development in other areas notwithstanding, cannot be considered a consolidated democracy.\(^8\)

In sum, the absence of one or both of these characteristics (cohesiveness and legitimacy of state power) implies that a democratizing multiethnic state has not yet become a consolidated democracy. If a state has failed to develop a sense of cohesiveness among its residents (i.e., if the majority of people living within the state do not feel that it is "their" state) it means that the state is prone to disintegration. In the absence of a cohesive identity uniting the residents within a multiethnic state, there is the possibility of ethnic conflict emanating from within the state or of separatism among disloyal minorities. Such developments present a threat to the survival of the state. and, needless to say, to the consolidation of democracy within a state. The sense of "we-ness" (cohesive identity) is, therefore, a constitutive aspect of a consolidated democracy. In this dissertation, this aspect is referred to as democratic community.

*Democratic Community.* The cohesiveness within a state that makes democratic decision making possible is often referred to as *demos* or "political community" in the literature on the subject.\(^9\) It is a constitutive aspect of democratic consolidation. The

\(^8\)One exception to this statement are so-called "velvet divorces," when two groups within a state decide to split peacefully. However, such divorces are rather rare, and usually they are a result of democratic arrangements, such as referendums. More often, secessionism and ethnic tensions are followed by widespread violence.

\(^9\)E.g., see Robert A. Dahl, *Democracy and Its Critics* (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1989), 116–31; Christopher J. Berry, *The Idea of a Democratic Community* (New York: St. Martin’s, 1989), 100–4; or Alfonso J. Damico, *Individuality*
terms *demos* and "political community," meaning the entity underneath the state that makes democratic decision-making possible, are used interchangeably. Theoretically, political community is defined as an arena in which society "constitutes itself politically to select and monitor democratic government," or, in other words, in which society participates in political process: elections, political parties, and electoral alliances. The civility which makes such participation possible is learned in free associational networks, such as economic interest groups, corporations, or religious associations. Therefore, democratic political community is impossible without a functioning civil society—the entity in which self-organizing groups and individuals, relatively independent from the state and often outside of the political process, advance their interests. The relationship between political community and civil society should not be understood in terms of the opposition of civil society to political community. It can be seen as a dialectic between these two axes.

The main hypothesis implies that the development of an inclusive political community, which is a necessary condition for a functioning consolidated democratic regime, is most likely to be thwarted by the legacy of ethnic restructuring. Consequently, creating successful institutional arrangements and adopting policies that promote

---


cohesiveness among the residents of a state are a crucial aspect of democratic consolidation. In multiethnic states that have rebellious ethnic minorities such arrangements could help to reduce alienation and polarization. These arrangements are necessary for the peaceful coexistence of different ethnic groups.\footnote{This process of interaction does not imply that different ethnic groups can meet halfway for a compromise, and thus consolidate a democratic regime. A regime is consolidated when the two conditions, outlined above, are met.}

The success of the arrangements and policies a state uses to reduce polarization and to promote cohesiveness can be assessed using several criteria. The first criterion of success is the behavior of ethnopoli
tical groups opposed to the state and the amount of public support that they enjoy. If the activities of such ethnopoli
tical groups diminish after the adoption of strategies to reduce polarization, and if public support for such ethnopoli
tical groups declines, then ethnic polarization has decreased. If a causal link between polarization-reducing policies and a decline in anti-state activities and feelings can be established, it means that the policies have achieved their goal.

The second criterion of success for policies designed to reduce polarization is a change in public opinion. Public opinion surveys, especially when supported by mass media content analysis, reflect changes in the attitudes of different groups within the society toward the state and toward other ethnic groups. Once again, if a causal link between polarization-reducing policies and a change in public opinion (showing a decrease in polarization) can be established, then the policies can be regarded as successful. The section that follows describes the methodology that is used to analyze and assess the polarization-reducing policies of a state.
TESTING THE HYPOTHESIS: METHOD AND CASE SELECTION

The proposition that the legacy of ethnic restructuring significantly affects a state's ability to consolidate democracy suggests a two-step empirical testing method. First, nations that have experienced a high degree of ethnic restructuring must be selected. Second, the ethnic polarization within those states and the methods that have been used to reduce this polarization must be documented. In addition, a causal relationship between the legacy of ethnic restructuring and ethnic polarization must be demonstrated.

Structured case studies is the most appropriate methodology to achieve the above goals. Case studies yield research that is both historically interpretive and causally analytic. Such research gathers evidence "in a manner sensitive to historical chronology" and offers limited historical generalizations that are sensitive to context. These characteristics of the method are especially relevant to the major goals of the dissertation—to understand the long term effects of ethnic restructuring and to learn whether ethnic restructuring affects the ability of a state to create a cohesive community.

Case-oriented research allows a small number of cases to be examined intensively, but its inherent problem is that it contributes less to building theory than studies which include multiple cases or studies which search for associations between and among variables. One way to overcome this problem is to use case-oriented research

---


15 This particular merit of case-oriented research and its inherent problem were identified by Arend Lijphart in his scheme "Situating the Comparative Method," reproduced by David Collier, "The Comparative Method" in Theory, Case, and Method in Comparative Politics, ed. Nikolaos Zahariadis (Fort Worth, Tex.: Harcourt, 1997), 36.
deductively by building on an existing theory (which is based on previously conducted empirical investigations). An existing theory provides guidance as to what variables should be examined more closely and what variables do not deserve sustained attention. Relying on previous theories puts the chosen empirical studies into broader perspective and allows one to identify generalizable trends (e.g., under what conditions the previously made theoretical arguments hold true).

In order to be able to make generalizations and thus contribute to theory building, this dissertation uses a deductive case study method. Prior to applying the case study method to empirical data, it draws on previous theorizing about the impact of ethnic restructuring on the processes of community building to construct its own theoretical argument. Consequently, Chapter III is devoted to the examination of previous theory about the impact of ethnic restructuring and multiethnicity on the processes of community building. Having identified the variables that need further examination, the dissertation proceeds to construct its own theoretical argument about the impact of ethnic restructuring on community building and the ways to deal with the legacy of ethnic restructuring. The theoretical argument is tested against empirical evidence from several ethically restructured states.

Case Selection

One criterion for case selection is variance in the key variable: forced changes in

---

the ethnic structure of a country. Domestic ethnopolitical groups, whose emergence is prompted by drastic changes in the ethnic make-up of a country, are a potential source of resistance to the state. The central proposition of this dissertation implies that the higher the level of ethnic restructuring experienced in the past, the stronger the resistance to inclusive policies regarding minorities will be. In such a context, an agreement about minority policies and their status is difficult, if not impossible, to achieve. In addition to the first criterion, other criteria for case selection are: 1) forced resettlements pursued by a non-democratic regime in the past and an influx of residents belonging to different national groups from other territories (the experience of ethnic restructuring), and 2) attempts to democratize within an ethnically restructured state.

Using these criteria, the three Baltic states are selected. They share one major characteristic: ethnic restructuring in these three states was pursued according to the same plan and at the same time. All three states experienced an influx of residents from other parts of the USSR after the Second World War. Major repressions, including mass deportations, ended at the same time in all three states.

The three cases have variance in the key variable: the changed domestic ethnic structure. The demographic legacy of ethnic restructuring within the three states is different: by 1997, Latvia and Estonia had sizable (32.5% and 28.7%) Russian minorities. (This compares with 8.8% and 8.2% before World War II.) The most homogenous of the three, Lithuania, has fewer Russians (9%) and an active Polish-speaking minority (8%).

---

In addition to ethnically-based political groups, there have been a number of international actors (e.g., the OSCE (the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe) in Latvia and Estonia, and the EU (the European Union) in all three states) involved in community building processes within the three states. Russia and Poland, the minority “mother” states, have also attempted to propagate minority policies and thus influence the process of community crafting in the Baltic states.

**Historical Background to the Case Studies**

To document the degree of ethnic restructuring experienced by the Baltic states, a historical account of the population movements carried out by the Soviet state will be made. The sources used for this account are archival materials, private records of former deportees, and previously written historical studies. Specifically, the chapter draws on the instructions issued by the Soviet Secret Police on how to conduct deportations and resettlements (available in Lithuania’s Special Archive), similar materials from the Occupation Museum in Riga, and various Russian archives.

In addition, the historical account will be enriched by the personal narratives of former deportees. The publications of the Genocide and Resistance Research Center of Lithuania (LGGRTC, or Lietuvos Gyventojų Genocido ir Rezistencijos Tyrimo Centras) include memoirs of former deportees and resistance fighters. Analyzing memoirs and other documents (e.g., letters written during the time when ethnic restructuring took place,

---

The partisans' press, etc.) that record the actions of resistance groups within the Baltic states will help to assess the populations' response to ethnic restructuring.

The goal of this dissertation is not simply to document the extent of the demographic changes, but also to establish a link between this policy and the beginning stages of democratization. To do that, the dissertation will examine periodicals from the Baltic states that were published during the beginning stage of democratization, the narratives of Baltic resistance leaders, and sociological studies of public opinion. The news reports and press releases of *Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty* will be used to trace the actions of ethnopolitical groups. Using these sources will help to establish whether there was ethnic polarization in the Baltic states prior to the first stage of community building.

*The Structure of the Case Studies*

The goal of the case studies is to trace the approaches that the Baltic states used to reduce polarization. Each case study is structured around three themes. The first part of each case study explores the attitudes of ethnic minorities toward the state during the initial stage of community building. By drawing on public opinion surveys, mass media reports and the accounts of political leaders, this part documents the ethnic polarization that was present during the first stage of community building.

The position of ethnic minorities toward the state can be established by making a content analysis of mass media publications geared towards a minority audience (*Molodezh’ Estonii* and *Narvskaya gazeta* in Estonia, *Druzhba* in Lithuania, *SM-Segodnya*...
and the Russian edition of *Diena* in Latvia) and sociological surveys conducted by the *Baltic Data House*. The actions of ethnopolitical groups will be traced from the news reports and press releases of *Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty* and local newspapers such as *Lietuvos Rytas, Lietuvos Aidas, Eesti Päevaleht*, and *Postimees*.

The second theme of each case study is tracing the process of community building from “above” and from “below.” Tracing community building from “above” identifies the approaches of each of the Baltic state to the issues of citizenship and minorities’ rights, such as the right of the members of a minority community to be educated in their own language. The main sources for this analysis are official legal documents defining the status of minorities and mass media reports describing the circumstances under which the laws were adopted. Describing the circumstances will make it possible to discern the role of international actors (such as minority mother states and international institutions). These actors exercised political conditionality to push for what they saw as the relevant laws affecting the status of minorities.

Each case study will identify the response of ethnic minorities to the newly adopted or discussed laws and regulations. A minority’s reaction to a state’s policies reflects the degree to which a minority accepts the power of the state in which it lives. Tracing a minority’s reaction will help us to make an assessment of the effectiveness of policies defined by the laws.

At the sub-state level, the decisions taken by the elites may be challenged (or approved) by local political groups, including ethnically-based parties. These groups have a vested interest in the minority policies pursued by the state. In democratizing states with weak enforcement mechanisms, some laws and regulations may never be fully
implemented. Therefore, tracing developments and policies within the sub-state sphere (or civil society)—the actions of local governments in areas with a significant number of ethnic minorities, the functioning of the state as a "service station," and the ways that ethnic groups have addressed their different collective memories—represents an equally important source of ways that can be used to reduce polarization.

The final part of the case studies will reflect on the results of the policies that the Baltic states adopted to reduce polarization. Using public opinion polls and mass media reports, this part will help to establish whether the policies described in the previous sections helped to reduce ethnic polarization. Comparing the findings from the case studies will help to identify whether the Baltic states adopted and implemented the liberal universalist policies advised by international actors, and whether these policies or other policies helped to reduce polarization. In other words, the case studies will help to establish whether there is one "right" way to create a cohesive society and thus consolidate an emerging democratic regime.

ALTERNATIVE PROPOSITIONS

The main proposition of this dissertation explores the impact of historical experiences on democratic community building. This thesis fits into the domestic level of analysis within international relations theory. Other theories exploring the relationship between the variables analyzed by this dissertation are reviewed in Chapter III. The main

19Kenneth N. Waltz was the author of the idea of the systemic, domestic, and individual levels. See Kenneth N. Waltz, Man, the State, and War: A Theoretical Analysis (New York: Columbia University Press, 1954).

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
alternative propositions to the main thesis are situated within the systemic, or structural level of analysis of International Relations theory. 20

Structure can be defined as a set of relatively stable constraints on the behavior of a nationstate. Structuralist theories focus on the impact of structural factors, such as power distribution within a region, globalization and related global trends, on the behavior of a nationstate and processes within a nationstate. They assume that the system (or structure) of world politics provides the architecture and the incentives that affect the actions of its component units—i.e., the nationstates.

The Geostrategic Hypothesis

The first alternative proposition, drawn from the Neorealist scholarship which focuses on power distribution, is that previous ethnic restructuring and consequent ethnic segmentation have little if anything to do with the consolidation of democracy. This hypothesis suggests that in order to consolidate democracies within multiethnic states, a secure environment (a “security umbrella”) should be established to insure democratic development. In other words, a security umbrella is a necessary condition for a democracy to be consolidated. 21

---

20 Another big group of theories fits into the individual level. However, while tracing the process whereby a feeling of “we-ness” is created, this dissertation takes individuals (the leaders of ethnopolitical groups) and their beliefs into account.

This hypothesis emphasizes geostrategic factors, or the external dimension of
democratic transitions. It is popular among those who study East Central Europe. It
suggests that a favorable or supportive geostrategic environment is essential, even crucial,
to the success of democratic transitions in a given region. The proponents of this
hypothesis point out the fact that the international dimension has been a decisive factor for
the emerging democracies in East Central Europe. Those states that were not part of the
"zone" of Western influence (e.g., Moldova, the Caucasus or the former Yugoslavia)
exploded into ethnic conflict. Those that were under the patronage of Western powers
(e.g., Central European states) have been stable. Therefore, states that are under the
patronage of the West are likely to consolidate their emerging democracies.

This explanation is based on the assumption that a security vacuum in a region is
capable of "unleashing long-suppressed national animosities" in multiethnic states.
Following this school of thought, one scenario could be as follows. In the absence of
stabilizing outside powers, ethnic minorities living within a multiethnic state mobilize.
Their leaders press for secession. If one region secedes, then an ethnic minority left in that
region is going to feel threatened and may ask for protection from its mother state. This
may lead to endless intrastate and interstate wars. The presence of outside powers can

Richard J. Krickus, "The Case for Including the Baltics in NATO," *Problems of Post-

22Geoffrey Pridham, "The International Dimension of Democratization: Theory,
Practice, and Inter-regional Comparisons," in *Building Democracy? The International
Dimension of Democratization in Eastern Europe*, ed. Geoffrey Pridham, Eric Herring,
and George Sanford (New York: St. Martin's, 1994), 7–9.

23Adrian G. V. Hyde-Price, *The International Politics of East Central Europe*

24Barry Posen refers to a "window of opportunity" seen by ethnic leaders in
unstable multiethnic regions. These leaders press for full sovereignty for their ethnic
group. The basis of his argument is that the perceived "window of opportunity" triggers
prevent such scenarios. This presence can be established through the presence of NATO and the EU. These two international organizations can do the job of stabilizing the region because they are supported by important powers—the United States and Germany. Therefore, such institutions can become the pillars of the security architecture that is necessary to preserve the stability and security of emerging democracies.

The intellectual roots of such arguments can be traced to the Realist and Neorealist schools of thought in International Relations. These schools of thought emphasize the importance and autonomous existence of material structure. The Neorealist school of thought emphasizes the distribution of material capabilities (that is, the military and economic power of the nationstates). "Power vacuum" refers to the absence of a strong military and economic power. This condition is the main reason for the outbreak of wars and, subsequently, for the fall of democratic regimes.

Pioneered by Hans Morgenthau, the Realist and Neorealist perspectives rely heavily on the concepts of power, rationality, and balance of power. World politics is seen as a constant struggle for power because the international realm is seen as a competitive, ethnic mobilization. Barry Posen, "The Security Dilemma and Ethnic Conflict," *Survival* 35, no. 1 (Spring 1993): 27-47.


For a similar argument for integration of East Central Europe into transatlantic structures, see Stephen F. Larrabee, *East European Security After the Cold War* (Santa Monica, Calif.: RAND, 1993): 170-72.
anarchical field and also because human nature is seen as constantly lusting for power.\textsuperscript{27}

Neorealism, more so than Realism, is preoccupied with balance of power\textsuperscript{28} and international structures as a way of preserving stability. Consequently, as many critics of Neorealism have already pointed out, it is likely to overlook both history and human subjectivity.\textsuperscript{29} Neorealism cannot theorize about the emergence or evolution of the state nor can it theorize about when and how “ethnic hatreds” will be released. The argument that a security vacuum leads to the “unleashing of ancient hatreds” embraces a simplified idea of ethnicity. There are cases when ethnic tensions and ethnic conflict persist even in stable states that are within a security community. The existence of security guarantees is not sufficient to predict the future of ethnic relations and thus to hypothesize about the future fate of domestic political systems. Arguments based on the Neorealist school of thought do not identify possible sources of change within the system.

These shortcomings notwithstanding, the perspectives that focus on geostrategic factors identify one necessary condition for democratic consolidation. This condition is regional stability and the absence of interstate wars. It is true that many democratic regimes were strangled by outside intervention. Furthermore, the proponents of this hypothesis draw attention to the considerable influence of international actors on democratic processes. Consequently, the research design embraced by this dissertation has


\textsuperscript{28}Balance of power can be understood as an equilibrium of relative strength of the nation-states through which stability can be achieved.

incorporated the influence of international actors as an intervening variable.

*The Constructivist Hypothesis*

A second alternative proposition can be drawn from Constructivist (also known as Structuralist) scholarship in international relations, which argues that states can change their identities and acquire new interests while interacting at the international level. Identities of the states, in other words, are shaped by international structures (i.e., from “outside”). Therefore, past policies of ethnic restructuring have little to do with present difficulties in creating an inclusive democratic regime. The real problem is that there is not enough international involvement, which, according to this proposition, would help to reconstruct the identity of the state and even make it more open to inclusive minority policies.

The Constructivist hypothesis emerged as a critique of Realist and Neorealist approaches to International Relations. Alexander Wendt, who has pioneered a new Constructivist paradigm, has identified a major assumption shared by Realist and Neorealist theorists. These two perspectives take self-interested actors as constant and exogenously given. Wendt argued that states can develop new collective identities through interaction in the international system, and this relationship should be theorized as “structuration.” This theory implies that agents (e.g., nationstates) and structures are mutually constitutive yet distinct entities. Thus, the investigation of change in worlds

---

politics should focus on how the international structure affects the identities of
nationstates, and how nationstates transform the international structure.31

The hallmark of the Constructivist hypothesis is its focus on the role of ideational
factors, such as norms, identities, idealogies, and aspirations in international relations.
The representatives of this school of thought argue that given the prevalence of the Realist
and Neorealist schools of thought, ideational factors have been ignored in world politics.32
According to the Constructivist argument meaningful behavior between states is possible
only within an intersubjective social context. States, just like any other actors studied in
the social sciences, develop their relations with others through norms and practices. In the
absence of norms and mutually understood and endorsed rules, the exercise of power
would be meaningless.33 Structure is meaningless without intersubjective norms and
practices; or, in Alexander Wendt's words, "anarchy (the major assumption of the Realist
and Neorealist schools of thought) is what states make of it."34

Consequently, if the behavior of states is affected by intersubjective international
structures, then democratic states must have a way of understanding each other and
establishing certain socio-international practices that are different from dictatorships.35
This is an emerging Constructivist take on the democratic peace theory. Socio-

31 Alexander Wendt, "The Agent-Structure Problem in International Relations
Theory," International Organization 41, no. 3 (Fall 1987): 335–70.
and the Social Constructivist Challenge," International Organization 52, no. 4 (Autumn
33 Ted Hopf, "The Promise of Constructivism in International Relations Theory,"
34 Alexander Wendt, "Anarchy Is What States Make of It: The Social Construction
35 Hopf, 192.
international practices include conforming to rules founded upon similar expectations and coordinated sanctions against defectors.

Furthermore, Constructivists believe that well-established democratic states can socialize weak or young states. This can happen though the process of learning when norms and democratic rules are transmitted from one party to another. Material or political encouragement is one way to transfer these norms.³⁶

When referring to the attractiveness of Western international institutions (such as the European Union and NATO) to nationstates in East Central Europe, Institutional Constructivists conclude that they have had an “overspill” effect. International institutions work as magnets, constantly attracting new non-members, and in the process change their identities. Non-member states are hypothesized to be ready to change some aspects of their domestic politics and accept new policy choices in order to be accepted into these institutions.

Financial aid and/or membership in international institutions can indeed affect the identity of a state. However, the line between material or political encouragement of “correct” behavior during the process of socialization (which, according to the Constructivist hypothesis creates new interests) and the agreement by aspiring members to adopt norms and other requirements to fulfill their existing interests, such as the need for security, is not clear.

This observation points to one of the major drawbacks of the Constructivist proposition. This theory has not yet established criteria that can be used to identify which interests and which aspects of the identities of nationstates are established during international interactions, and which aspects and interests are constructed from "within" (domestically). Without this distinction, it is difficult to determine whether international interaction indeed is such an influential variable.

Nevertheless, the Constructivist hypothesis points to a very influential variable affecting the identities of states and their political systems—international institutions. Furthermore, by hypothesizing that international institutions are capable of transforming the identity of a state, this proposition reminds us about political and economic conditionality—the strategy that has been increasingly used by international actors to promote and consolidate democratic regimes. Empirical data shows that at the level of the international system, many types of interaction between established democracies and newly independent democratizing states include conditionality. Examples of such interaction include criteria for membership in international organizations (e.g., respect for democratic norms, a market economy, respect for the rights of minorities) and international financial aid. The latter includes liberalization of prices and economic activity, privatization, structural reform, debt management, and other similar requirements.


38This is especially true when it comes to receiving IMF credits and financial support for development from the World Bank. See Dawisha and Turner, 407.
The questions of whether and how to use political conditionality are closely related to the debate outlined in the Introduction on whether there is one “right” way, one “correct” model to consolidate democracies and to monitor political community building. Consequently, tracing the processes of political community building in ethnically restructured states must take the influence of international actors and their use of political and material encouragement and conditionality into account. In this way, this dissertation will take into account the Constructivist question about the ability of international actors to reconstruct the identities of nationstates.

The Globalist Hypothesis

The third alternative proposition is that globalization (usually understood as an “inter-connectedness” caused by the expansion of the global capitalist system) critically affects the ability of a nationstate to establish and to consolidate a democratic regime. The proponents of this thesis point out that since the mid-1970s the percentage of authoritarian states has fallen dramatically. They argue that worldwide democratization is a characteristic of globalization. Increased trade, new technologies, foreign investment, ..

39The concept of “globalization” emphasizes the level of interdependence between nationstates. It is a term that describes the rapid acceleration of the world economy in the last fifty years. Most scholars and practitioners would agree that globalization is “about much more than trade or capital flows. It is about a world linked together by information, knowledge, and ideas as well.” Renato Ruggiero (World Trade Organization Director-General), “A New Partnership for a New Century: Sustainable Global Development in a Global Age,” speech at the Bellerive/Globe International Conference “Policing the Global Economy,” 23 March 1998. Available from http://www.wto.org/wto/speeches/, INTERNET.

and expanding media have fueled economic growth. This makes the eradication of poverty a real possibility. One of the main requirements for democratic consolidation is a well-functioning economy. Therefore, globalization offers great potential for the creation of capitalist democracies.41

This group of scholars and practitioners embraces a rather optimistic view of the effects of globalization, hoping that global technological breakthroughs and the trend toward democratization offer great potential for human advancement and the establishment of democratic regimes worldwide. Some point to the possibility of the emergence of a global civil society due to the rapidity and ease of communication.42

Globalization implies a "pattern of society where social relationships are conducted across great distances."43

Not every one within the "globalist" camp agrees with this optimistic assessment of globalization. Many fear that emerging democracies are increasingly challenged by regional and global problems, such as the increasing gap between rich and poor countries, the spread of AIDS, and the unpredictability of the flow of financial resources. Some fear that the social institutions of the state, a hallmark of consolidated democratic regimes, are

41 For an optimistic argument emphasizing the role of a country’s economy in the consolidation of a democratic regime, see Adam Przeworski, Michael Alvarez, José Antonio Cheibub, and Fernando Limongi, “What Makes Democracies Endure?” in *Consolidating the Third Wave Democracies*, ed. Larry Diamond, Marc F. Plattner, Yun-han Chu, and Hung-mao Tien (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1997), 295–311. Przeworski et al.’s main finding is that economic factors are crucial for the endurance of democracy.


likely to be threatened by global market forces. Others wonder what kind of control citizens can have over multinational corporations, and how democratic institutions can control the new international market forces.\textsuperscript{44}

Furthermore, others point to the growing gap between rich and poor countries. According to the 1999 UN Human Development Report, in 1997, the richest countries of the world (20\% of the world population) had 86\% of world GDP, while the bottom fifth had just 1\%. Similar distribution of wealth is present in other sectors, such as trade and communications.\textsuperscript{45} Poor countries are plagued by ethnic and civil wars, unstable or non-existent state institutions and widespread corruption at the highest levels of government.\textsuperscript{46}

The intensification of ethnic hostilities after 1989—a development that coincides with globalization—is also presented as a serious challenge to the consolidation of democratic regimes. Even though contemporary debates on the impact of globalization have identified contradictory implications for ethnonational conflicts, some case studies try to establish a link between globalization and ethnonationalism. For example, it is

\textsuperscript{44}E.g., during his 2000 New Year speech on Czech television, Vaclav Havel hypothesized that globalization is leading to the "reckless destruction of the planet" and to the spread of a "civilization based on pseudo-values, the swelling of organized crime and terrorism, and a short-sighted form of market economy that abuses poorer countries." He went on to say that "it cannot be right when the total value of assets in the hands of the three richest persons in the world exceeds the GDP of developing countries with a total population of 600 million." \textit{Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty Newsline} (4 January, 2000).

\textsuperscript{45}Thus, the richest fifth had 82\% of world export markets, and the bottom fifth just 1\%. The richest fifth had 74\% of world telephone lines; the bottom fifth—only 1.5\%. UN, \textit{Human Development Report 1999: Globalization With a Human Face}. Available from \texttt{http://www.undp.org}; INTERNET.

\textsuperscript{46}In April 2000, the United Nations issued a report putting a lot of blame for poverty on bad government. "Good governance" has been made the top priority in poverty-fighting by the UN Development program. Barbara Crosette, "UN Says Bad Government Is Often the Cause of Poverty," \textit{New York Times} (5 April, 2000).
argued that globalization enables ethnic minorities that were relatively isolated in the past to mobilize their resources and challenge the state with its political order.\textsuperscript{47} This line of reasoning suggests a hypothesis that globalization may become an obstacle to the processes of democratization and democratic consolidation, especially in the poorest countries of the world.

This proposition is emphatically embraced by the second group of "globalists" (the pessimists) who focus on the power struggles and conflicts that are believed to be caused by globalization. Some envision worldwide clashes between different cultural groups, fierce fights over resources, or the spread of politico-economic crises rooted in bad political leadership and triggered by the sudden withdrawal of capital by foreign investors.\textsuperscript{48} The shift from national to another allegiance, which some analysts believe is happening, may become "a cultural and political earthquake," a worldwide conflict, triggered by what is seen as the diffusion of power away from nationstates.\textsuperscript{49} Immanuel Wallerstein, one of the most prominent representatives of world system theory and a leading "globalist," warns of a high level war-proneness around 2050, as the long period of global economic growth is likely to come to an end.\textsuperscript{50} Such pessimistic scenarios spell

\textsuperscript{47}James Anderson and Liam O'Dowd, "Contested Borders: Globalization and Ethno-national Conflict in Ireland," \textit{Regional Studies} 33, no. 1 (October 1999). INFOTRAC.
\textsuperscript{48}For a theory about the clash of civilizations, see Samuel P. Huntington, "The Clash of Civilizations?" \textit{Foreign Affairs} 72, no. 3 (Summer 1993): 22–49. For a proposition that environmental disasters may become the causes of conflict, see Robert D. Kaplan, "The Coming Anarchy," \textit{Atlantic Monthly} (February 1994): 44–76.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
gloomy prospects for the establishment and sustainability of democratic regimes.

Given the richness and diversity of the literature on globalization and its effects, little agreement exists about even a specific definition of "globalization." Consequently, it is difficult to identify an underlying theoretical concept unifying these works. The optimistic group of "globalists" (the ones who believe that cosmopolitan worldwide democracy is possible), trace their intellectual roots to Immanuel Kant and liberal economic theory pioneered by Adam Smith and David Ricardo.

Those critics of globalization who focus on the growing gap between rich and poor trace their intellectual roots to Karl Marx and his dependency theory, according to which the world system is seen as divided between industrialized "core" countries (rich established democracies) and underdeveloped "periphery" countries (poor conflict ridden states). A branch of this school of thought, world system analysis, focuses on the interaction of the units within the world system and not the constitution and/or functioning of the units (such as nationstates) themselves. During this interaction, different social, political and economic forms emerge within different regions of the world. These phenomena become the basis of the "developmental pulse" of these regions. Nationstates and even regions are incapable of controlling these phenomena. Consequently, the future of the political and economic system within each country is affected (or even determined) by this "developmental pulse" and not by the actions of individual states.\footnote{For a review of this literature, see Robert A. Denemark, "World System History: From Traditional International Politics to the Study of Global Relations," \textit{International Studies Review} 1, no. 2 (Summer 1999): 51–53.}

Such globalist perspectives suffer from a high degree of determinism. Furthermore, Marxist and many post-Marxist perspectives that are based on historical
materialism have been widely criticized for their failure to consider various forms of domination in world politics that are not reducible to "haves" and "have-nots." Ethnic and gender domination are often cited as domains that are ignored by Marxists. These critics have included postmodernists, critical theorists, and feminists who do not see the emerging global order and transnational society as a single homogenous entity. They think of global society as a complex and diverse social system, and have continued to argue for a major restructuring of International Relations theory, which, many of them believe, cannot adequately explain the changes associated with globalization. Their view of global society and of nationstates is one of a field in which differences and power struggles are constantly played out.

A major challenge faced by globalist perspectives, given their focus on the complex and often chaotic nature of global issues, is their inability to link "micro" conditions within individual nationstates with macro-outcomes at the global level. As a result, many globalist accounts of world politics suffer from incompleteness and over-generalization. This makes it difficult to come up with credible hypotheses at the systemic level about the prospects of democracy and democratic consolidation within specific nationstates.

In spite of this shortcoming, globalist perspectives draw our attention to the


importance of economic factors, such as a market economy, free trade, and growing economic interdependence between nation-states. This dissertation relates these insights to the concept of the “state as a service station.” A state that can function effectively as a service station has established functioning economic institutions and is capable of adapting to growing economic interdependence. Such a state is also capable of providing basic goods to its citizens and residents. Its political power has a strong economic foundation. Furthermore, such a state can create the conditions that are necessary for the growth of civil society, which, in turn, is a necessary condition for a sustainable democratic regime.

In sum, this dissertation does not dismiss alternative hypotheses as being irrelevant to its line of inquiry. Alternative hypotheses point to important variables that must be included in order to produce a credible account of community building in the post-Cold War world. In the words of Andrew Linklater:

“No sociology of community will proceed very far if it neglects state-building, geopolitics and war. [These are the variables examined by geostrategists.] No account will succeed if it overlooks the effects of commerce or production at the domestic and international levels. [These are the variables examined by globalists.] No account will reach far enough if it neglects the cultural dimensions of international relations which shape domestic and international order and structure images of the self and the other. [This dimension is the focus of Constructivist analyses.]”

This dissertation has incorporated the main insights of other leading schools of thought into its research design. To be more specific, it will assess the role of international actors and their use of conditionality during the process of community building as “intervening variables.” Furthermore, it will address the ability of democratizing multiethnic states to become effective “service stations.”

---

54 Linklater, “The Question of the Next Stage,” 94.
The following chapter reviews related bodies of literature that focus on the domestic and individual levels of analysis. It identifies the major bodies of literature on which the main thesis of this dissertation is based and points to areas in need of theoretical refinement and further empirical research.
CHAPTER III
PREVIOUS RESEARCH ON MULTIETHNICITY AND DEMOCRACY

This review consists of four parts which divide the previous literature into conceptually and thematically distinguishable areas. One goal of this chapter is to identify the main bodies of literature from which the main hypothesis about the impact of ethnic restructuring on democratic consolidation is drawn. Another goal of the chapter is to identify which of the debated areas of the existing theoretical approaches are in need of conceptual refinement and further empirical research.

To demonstrate the conceptual differences between previous works, the chapter employs a chart with two intersecting lines, representing two concepts—the nation and ethnicity (see Figure 2). The vertical line is the “nation” line. The area to the right is marked as “nation as a construct,” and the area to the left is marked “nation as an actor.” The term “nation as a construct” implies that the theories on the right side of the chart conceptualize the nation as a historically specific construct, capable of change with each generation. Such a nation may permit the entry of new members through membership in civil society and the state. The opposing theoretical view embraces a more static and, in some cases, even primordial view of the nation. The nation in this view is a community with a distinct language and history.1

Figure 2. Theories Categorized According to Their Understanding of Ethnicity and Nation

The horizontal line is the "ethnic groups" line. The area on top is marked "ethnic groups as a construct." The area on the bottom "ethnic groups as actors." Similarly to the previously described definition of the "nation," the theories which fall into the area on top conceptualize ethnicity as a historically specific concept, emphasizing the different historical experiences of each ethnic group. Some of these theories maintain that ethnic identities are primarily activated by group elites with particular purposes in mind. The
opposing theories embrace a more static, primordial view of ethnicity, treating ethnic
groups as given in domestic and international politics. They maintain that ethnic
identities are deeply rooted in historical origins, which define the nature of an ethnic
group. The chart divides the theoretical approaches to the subject into four quadrants,
reflecting the differing definitions of "nation" and "ethnicity" that each embraces.

THE FIRST QUADRANT: HISTORICAL APPROACHES

The Experience of Ethnic Restructuring as a Source of Minority-unfriendly Nationalism

The theories which fall into the first quadrant conceptualize ethnicity and nation as
historically specific constructs. They encourage us to pay attention to the specific
historical experiences of national and ethnic groups. The differences in historic
experiences are the basis for perceiving oneself as a member of an ethnic or national
community. No theoretical distinction between ethnic and national collectivities is made,
incorporating them instead into the term "identity."³

The best known representative of this quadrant is Rogers Brubaker's study
Nationalism Reframed: Nations and Nationhood in the New Europe.⁴ Arguing that nation

²MacIver, 6.
³"I am deliberately avoiding the term 'ethnicity'," writes Peter Burke, "which
raises more problems than it solves, and replacing it with the term 'identity' ..." Peter
Burke, "French Historians and Their Cultural Identities," in History and Ethnicity, ed.
Elizabeth Tonkin, Malcolm Chapman, and Maryon McDonald (London: Routledge,
1989), 159. For a discussion of the term "ethnicity" and its limitations, see Malcolm
Chapman, Maryon McDonald, and Elizabeth Tonkin, "Introduction," ibid., 11-17.
⁴Rogers Brubaker, Nationalism Reframed: Nations and Nationhood in the New
must be conceptualized as a historically specific construct, Brubaker’s ground-breaking study constructs an elegant “Minority-Nationalizing State-Minority Mother State” triangle for the study of European nationalities. An example of this triangle is the situation of the Russian minority in post-Soviet states. The Russians are subjected to the “nationalizing” policies of post-Soviet states, but at the same time they are “protected” by their ethnic patron—Russia. Such triangles are usually the products of the disintegration of empires, when their multiethnic populations “unmix” into separate nationstates. In the case of the former Soviet Union, the triangles are the legacy of Soviet nationalities policy, which involved ethnic restructuring (i.e., planned migration and deportations whereby large numbers of Russian speakers were moved into the Soviet republics, and some of the local inhabitants of the republics were deported).\(^5\)

A thesis put forward by the study is that the legacy of Soviet nationalities policy has become a source of minority-unfriendly nationalism in the Soviet successor states. Brubaker argues that in almost all new post-Soviet states the ethno-culturally defined, “state-owning” core nation is sharply distinct from other residents of the state. The core nation has been represented by its elites as weakened and underdeveloped as the result of previous discrimination and repression (i.e., ethnic restructuring). To compensate for previous injustices, the new state is seen as having the responsibility to protect and promote the interests of the core nation by adopting strict language laws or even expelling the minorities. Due to this reason post-Soviet states are unlikely to adopt the democratic

models, such as binational, multinational or civic, that are advocated by the proponents of
democratic policies in multiethnic states. Brubaker hypothesizes that the prospects of the
minority rights model, according to which minorities are endowed with special cultural
rights and autonomy, seem better because international institutions, such as the Council of
Europe (CoE), the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), and the
European Union (EU) push these new states to adopt this model.

Gerhard Simon puts forward a similar thesis about the impact of Soviet
nationalities policy: that it resulted in a surge of nationalism in the Soviet republics. Simon argues that even during Soviet times deportations and russification resulted in the emergence of small and, in some cases, large resistance groups that rejected nationalities policy either in part or completely. These groups, such as civil rights, re-emigration movements (e.g., the deported Crimean Tatars demanding a right to go back to their homeland), or national opposition movements, made concrete demands. Having researched the responses to this policy within the Soviet republics, Simon concludes that the processes of decolonization, which meant the development of the new (or re-newed) nationstates, began to take place even before the collapse of the Soviet Union (although they were less obvious than in other empires).

Vieda Skultans' study *The Testimony of Lives: Narrative and Memory in Post-
Soviet Latvia*, which is based on anthropological and historical research conducted in post-
Communist Latvia, underlines one of the most important aspects of Soviet nationalities policy—the deportations. Skultans argues that in Latvia "they (i.e., postwar events,

---

7Vieda Skultans, *The Testimony of Lives: Narrative and Memory in Post-Soviet*
including deportations and resistance) have come to play a central role in defining national identity because they are vividly remembered by the former victims and assert themselves in public commemorative practices.

Svetlana Aliyeva’s thesis is similar to that of Skultans’. She also argues that the experience of deportations has played a central role in the construction of post-Soviet identities. Furthermore, Aliyeva suggests that past deportations and repressions have become a source of conflict in several former republics, thus becoming an obstacle to democratization. Aliyeva’s book covers the first post-Soviet discussions about deportations in the Soviet Union and relates them to the conflict in North Ossetia and Checheno-Ingushetia.

Valery Tishkov, a former Russian nationalities minister, makes a similar argument. Tishkov attempts to trace the influence that Soviet deportations have had on the construction of post-Soviet identities by the Ingush and the Chechens and the eruption of conflict in that area of the former USSR. In the same vein, recent studies by Nikolai F. Bougai, a Russian historian, also maintain that the deportations carried out by the Soviets have, in the long run, engendered ethnic conflicts in the territory of Russia. This is especially true about the conflicts in the Caucasus.

---


*8* Ibid., xi. Skultans argues that public commemorative practices to remember the deportations carried out in the postwar period did not contrast with the personal memories of the respondents.


*11* See the introduction to Nikolai F. Bougai and Askarbi M. Gonov, *Kavkaz: narody v eshelonakh* (1920–1960-ye gody) [The Caucasus: The Nations in Railway Cars]
The most pessimistic thesis regarding the prospects for democratization in states with a troubled history can be drawn from a survey of East Central European political history by Joseph Rotschild. In Return to Diversity: A Political History of East Central Europe Since World War II Rotschild argues that the region has suffered from "fundamental weaknesses." These weaknesses, which include multiethnicity, the instability of institutions, and irresponsible governments, explain why countries in this region lost their independence in the past and why they have remained underdeveloped and non-democratized when compared to countries in Western Europe. Like most historical perspectives on ethnic issues, this survey is successful in identifying broader trends and the persistence of crises in the history of post-Communist Europe. However, it does little to theorize the link between multiethnicity and democratic processes.

In general, despite the visibility of nationalism in post-Communist politics in the early nineties, less new theoretical ground has been broken than might be expected from the multitude of case studies researched. What is probably one of the most important conceptual breakthroughs was achieved by Rogers Brubaker who distinguishes between civic and ethnic forms of nationalism. In the case of civic nationalism, the members of a
particular group identify first and foremost with the nation and the state in which they live (territorial identification), and not with a particular ethnic group within the state ("blood" identification). Ethnic nationalism is minority-unfriendly nationalism. In his article "Citizenship Struggles in Soviet Successor States," Brubaker argues that the politics of citizenship in Soviet successor states are shaped by the claims of politicized ethnicity, or by ethnic nationalism, which is more exclusive and more irreconcilable with democracy than civic nationalism. This argument suggests that in ethnically restructured states the logic of democracy and the logic of nation building may be incompatible.

With the exception of Brubaker's works, the approaches within the first quadrant do not go beyond the description of identity construction. They fail to identify the conditions when the legacy of ethnic restructuring interferes with democratization and democratic consolidation within states. Besides, these approaches do not explore why some multiethnic states get involved in the creation of democratic institutions to accommodate the needs of minorities. Nor do they explain why some agree on power sharing arrangements, decentralization, or the extension of minority rights (instead of succumbing to non-democratic ways, such as expulsion or ethnic cleansing). A recurrent theme among the approaches located in the first quadrant is that a previous experience of ethnic restructuring does matter. It may become a source of minority-unfriendly nationalism and, consequently, an impediment to successful democratization and democratic consolidation in multiethnic states.

---

THE SECOND QUADRANT: THEORIES ON ETHNIC MOBILIZATION

Previous Ethnic Restructuring as a Potential for Mobilization

The second quadrant ("nations as actors; ethnic groups as constructs") contains those theories that define nations as "actors" in domestic and world politics. Ethnic groups are normally invisible, but ethnicity can be mobilized in order to oppose or to take revenge for various national political projects, forced assimilation, genocide, and self-determination. This approach is popular in the political science literature on ethnic relations, which has tried to identify the circumstances (e.g., a sense of deprivation vis-à-vis another ethnic group) that accompany conflicts between ethnic groups and thus make ethnic groups "visible" within nations. These theories have, for the most part, examined competition between different ethnic groups.

The main thesis drawn from this quadrant about the impact of past ethnic restructuring is that it often becomes a potential for ethnic mobilization by the group which was previously oppressed or is currently oppressed by another ethnic group. Ted Robert Gurr, author of *Minorities at Risk: A Global View of Ethnopolitical Conflict* and Donald L. Horowitz, the editor of *Ethnic Groups in Conflict*, are the pioneers of this

---

approach.\textsuperscript{17}

Drawing on psychology, Vamik D. Volkan pursues a similar line of inquiry. He is primarily interested in why ethnic groups mobilize themselves to get revenge for past wrongs, or, in his words, “what happens to a group’s ‘we-ness’, its distinction from others, to become so deadly?”\textsuperscript{18} Drawing on evidence from the former Yugoslavia, Cyprus, the Baltic states, and Palestine, the author defines and analyzes identities as “emotionally bonded large groups.”\textsuperscript{19} He uses the analogy of a tent to explore large-group psychology and ethnic mobilization. Personal identity is the first layer, and it fits well. Ethnic identity is the second layer. It is a “loose” layer, and it embraces many other members under an ethnic “tent.” The ethnic tent is held up by a tent pole (a leader), and it provides a sense of security to those who are under the canvas. People may rally around the pole of the tent when they feel threatened. Efforts to secure the tent and to straighten out the canvas may lead to violent mass behavior. Mourning over past losses may induce feelings of anger and prompt mobilization.

Ernest Gellner and Charles C. Ragin have developed a theoretical “reactive ethnicity” perspective.\textsuperscript{20} According to this perspective, the infiltration of a sub-national area (e.g., a Soviet republic) by the members of a dominant cultural group (e.g., Russians) causes an “ethnic backlash” against the dominant cultural group by the inhabitants of the effected sub-national area. According Charles Ragin, in such situations, the dominant

\textsuperscript{18}Vamik D. Volkan, \textit{Bloodlines: From Ethnic Pride to Ethnic Terrorism} (Boulder, Colo.: Westview, 1997), 17.
\textsuperscript{19}Ibid., 18.
strata (e.g., Russians) come to be seen as alien by the lower strata (e.g., the inhabitants of a Soviet republic). On the other hand, the people from the lower strata are stereotyped as inferior by those in the dominant strata. An "ethnic backlash" on the part of the lower strata may involve mobilization along ethnic lines for forceful political action.

Raymond Taras has applied this perspective to post-Soviet nationalities. He argues that this perspective explains the Baltic peoples' sense of insecurity about having been infiltrated by large numbers of Russians.21 Graham Smith and Andrew Wilson applied the theory of ethnic mobilization to the Russian diaspora in Western Ukraine and Northeastern Estonia.22 They found that Estonia's citizenship policy imposed limits on the political activities of the Russian diaspora, thus limiting the possibility of "an ethnic backlash" occurring, but Ukraine has left the "political opportunity" for its Russians open. The authors hypothesized that, given the relative passivity of Russia—the ethnic patron of these minorities—and the lack of an influential leadership to lead a movement, the likelihood of an "ethnic backlash" on the part of the Russians was unlikely in the two states.

The approaches in this quadrant hypothesize that an "ethnic backlash" may lead to separatist movements, which, in turn, would threaten the existence of a multiethnic state. Such situations can present an obstacle to democratic consolidation. This hypothesis is similar to the one put forward by the theoretical approaches in the first quadrant. The theories in both quadrants agree that the experience of ethnic restructuring may become a

21Taras, 689.
stimulus for identity-based movements.

However, the theories in the second quadrant go one step beyond those in the first quadrant. Rather than assuming that grievance by itself leads to collective action (ethnic movements), these approaches explore the ways in which states can reduce the likelihood of an “ethnic backlash” occurring. States can control access to political participation by introducing restrictive laws; they can make deals with influential allies of the ethnic groups; or they can control the material resources available for mobilization. They may, on the other hand, choose to extend economic, minority rights and other civic rights to the minorities in order to ensure their loyalty.\(^2\)\(^3\) The theories in this quadrant excel in exploring those “ethnic backlashes” that are provoked by material factors (e.g., the economic deprivation of one ethnic group as compared to another), but they are less productive in exploring the influence of nonmaterial factors, such as previous ethnic restructuring, on the coexistence of several ethnic groups within a nation.

\(^{2}\)E.g., see Douglas McAdam, John McCarthy, and Mayer Zald, *Comparative Perspectives on Social Movements. Political Opportunities, Mobilizing Structures and Cultural Framings* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996). Donald L. Horowitz has argued that the disposition to secede, or an “ethnic backlash,” varies by regional position (i.e., whether the region inhabited by a minority group is economically backward or not) and the relative position of the group (i.e., whether the group is well-off when compared to other national groups). Therefore, multiethnic states should pay a lot of attention to the economic situation of their ethnic minorities. See Donald L. Horowitz, “Patterns of Ethnic Separation,” *Comparative Studies in Society and History* 23, no. 2 (April 1981): 165–95.
THE THIRD QUADRANT: MODERNIZATION THEORIES

Ethnic Restructuring As an Obstacle to the Creation of a “Communications Community”

The third quadrant (“nations as constructs, and ethnic groups as actors”) represents the theory of nations pioneered by Karl Deutsch who argued that nations are constructs of historical, industrial, and communicative (the invention of mass media, print, the spread of ideas) developments.24 In this theoretical perspective, ethnic groups are conceptualized as intervening variables. They are actors that can hinder the creation of “communications communities” in the territory of a state. An integrated community is the “end-state” of the integrationist project. It is “a unified homogenous political and social unit which authority securely and democratically centralized.”25 One of the significant contributions of this theoretical approach, despite its Marxist linear view of the nation, is the finding that most democratic states contain a functioning sub-state community, which is the product of multiple transactions and interactions among the people living in those states.26

24 "The community which permits a common history to be experienced as common, is a community of complementary habits and facilities of communication. . . . A larger group of persons linked by such complementary habits and facilities of communication we may call a people," wrote Karl W. Deutsch in Nationalism and Social Communication: An Inquiry Into the Foundations of Nationality (London: Chapman and Hall, Ltd., 1953), 70. A similar definition of a nation was put forward by E. J. Hobsbawm, Nations and Nationalism Since 1780: Programme, Myth, Reality Since 1780 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990).

25 This definition was put forward by Stephanie G. Neuman, Small States and Segmented Societies: National Political Integration in a Global Environment (New York: Praeger, 1976), 14.

26 Benedict Anderson defines the nation as an “imagined political community.” He writes: “The members of even the smallest nation will never know most of their fellow members. . . . It is imagined as a community, because, regardless of the actual inequality and exploitation that prevail in each. the nation is always conceived as a deep, horizontal
Drawing on the tenets of this perspective, one could hypothesize that previous ethnic restructuring can impede the creation of a communications community, which is necessary for a functioning democratic state. This can happen if ethnic restructuring produces a situation when large ethnic groups, who have not shared the same transactions and interactions in the past and who do not want to get engaged in the communications community's functions in the future, are placed into it.

After the end of the Cold War, the modernist theory was criticized for being flawed. This critique was based on evidence from the former Soviet Union. Some argued that not only did this theory "link the process of modernization to the emergence of nations," but that it suggested that nations were going to be transcended by supranational social and political integration. Many critics argued that the emergence of multiple non-Russian ethnic identities after the demise of the USSR has proved these theoretical approaches wrong.

Recently, however, the theories in the third quadrant have made a comeback. Drawing on the assumptions of these theories, some students of post-Soviet nationalities began to focus on the importance of the socioeconomic factors and common state functions that unite the residents of ethnically restructured states. According to this perspective, ethnically restructured states are engaged in the process of nation building. The arguments usually consist of the following elements: First, socioeconomic factors are considered to be pivotal to the current national integration processes in post-Soviet states. It is argued that these states are undergoing the processes of nation building and


27 Simon, 7.
socioeconomic transformation simultaneously. Second, if there is a difference between the level of prosperity in a state in which a minority lives and its "mother" state, then this is an incentive for the minority to stay. Hence, the continuing presence of Russian minorities in post-Soviet states is often characterized as one of "passive perseverance" and not one of "active integration."\textsuperscript{28} This suggests that those theoretical approaches which emphasize the importance of economics and functional integration still embrace a linear, materialist view of nations as integrated "communications communities."

The "competitive assimilation" theoretical game model developed by David Laitin includes elements of the theories located in the third quadrant. Using data on Russians in the Baltic states, Laitin hypothesized that the ability of a nation to assimilate different ethnic actors depends on its economic performance.\textsuperscript{29} Therefore, according to Laitin's model, given the relatively good economic performance of the Baltic states, and despite the restrictive language laws and citizenship policies of Latvia and Estonia, Baltic Russians should assimilate linguistically into the Baltic nations. In other words, he suggested that in order to do well economically, this ethnic group would have to learn the state language and thus eventually become a part of the "titular" nation. The scarce data that exists, however, on the linguistic assimilation of Latvia's and Estonia's Russians since


independence suggests just the opposite.30

In *Identity in Formation: The Russian-Speaking Populations in the Near Abroad*, Laitin concludes that economic factors do not fully account for the behavior of Russian-speaking populations in the Baltic states.31 He attempts to save the model by calling for the addition of other variables that reflect the social and political status of Russian speakers. Treating "cultural identity shift" as the main dependent variable, Laitin conducted a series of surveys and interviews to determine whether there is a potential for ethnic violence in Kazakhstan, Estonia, Latvia, and Ukraine. According to Laitin, the Russian-speaking populations in Latvia and Estonia could easily be transformed into Russian-speaking nationalist movements because the Russians share one culture and past grievances about alleged discrimination during the initial stage of nation building. The only thing missing to speed up mobilization is an economic incentive to rebel.32

---

30Russian is the most popular language of communication in both Latvia and Estonia (96% and 83%, respectively, 1996 data). In Lithuania, however, the most popular language is Lithuanian (used by 97% of respondents). The questions asked were the following: "Which Languages Can You Speak Well Enough to Take Part in a Conversation, Including Your Mother Tongue?" *Central and Eastern Eurobarometer* (March 1996), Annex Figure 44. Approximately 50% of Estonia's ethnically Russian physicians do not know Estonian, even though they are required to know the state language to practice medicine. In Narva, the Russian ethnic enclave, Estonian is rarely ever spoken. "Polovina russkikh vrachei v Estonii ne vladeyut gosudarstvennym yazykom" [Half of the Russian Medical Doctors Do Not Know Estonian] and "V Narvu—inTEGRirovat'sya" [Integration in Narva], *Narvskaya Gazeta* (7 January, 1999), 15.


THE FOURTH QUADRANT: THEORIES OF ETHNOPOLITICS AND DEMOCRACY

_The Fourth Quadrant: Ethnic Restructuring and Polarized Ethnicity as Obstacles to Political Community_

The fourth quadrant ("nations and ethnic groups as actors") contains theories of ethnopolitics, which conceptualize ethnic and national groups as political groups engaged in a search for power.\(^{33}\) No conceptual difference between nationhood and ethnicity is made. The term "ethnicity" is often used to refer to "a highly inclusive (and relatively large-scale) group identity based on some notion of common origin, recruited primarily by kinship, and typically manifesting some measure of cultural distinctiveness."\(^{34}\)

Conceptualized in this manner, "ethnicity" may embrace groups differentiated by language, religion, or race.

Building on the insights of the theories from the previously reviewed three quadrants, the ethnopolitical approach focuses on the translation of ethnicity into political arenas and encourages the identification of the power constellations behind each ethnic group. Joseph Rotschild, the author of _Ethnopolitics: A Conceptual Framework_, is considered to be the pioneer of this approach. There are two groups of theories within this quadrant. The theories in the first group take an essentialist, stable view of ethnicity and nation. The theories in the second group consider ethnic and national identities as historical constructs, yet they argue that such identities can become "petrified" and thus

---


become "relatively constant elements to be reckoned with."\textsuperscript{35}

The essentialists tend to see identity as "a fundamental empirical fact of social reality" and emphasize the stability of ethnic and national communities.\textsuperscript{36} Conceptually, they draw the definition of ethnicity and nationhood from Anthony D. Smith who defines the "ethnie" (a feeling of kinship) as the core around which nations are built. According to Smith, "national sentiment is no construct. It has a real, tangible mass base. At its root is a feeling of kinship, of the extended family, that distinguishes the nation from every other kind of sentiment."\textsuperscript{37} Smith, like many other primordialists, embraces a view of the nation as an enduring community of "history and culture, possessing a unified territory, economy, mass education system and common legal rights."\textsuperscript{38} He encourages the identification of those conditions under which the ethnie is transformed into a nation. The study of the impact of ethnic restructuring, following these theoretical perspectives, is a study of the interaction between two or more ethnic groups with different historical experiences and different interests.

Rasma Karklins, the author of \textit{Ethnopolitics and Transition to Democracy}, has applied the theory of ethnopolitics to the study of relations between ethnic Latvians and Russians in democratizing Latvia. Similarly to the theorists in the first and the second quadrants, she argues that Soviet nationalities policy, which included ethnic restructuring and was geared to promote internationalism, had the opposite effect from the one intended.


\textsuperscript{36} Karklins, 5.


\textsuperscript{38} Ibid.
Collective identities were activated by the presence of strangers and competitors within the state, and ethnic tensions emerged. However, unlike the majority of the theorists within the first quadrant, Karklins does not see the activity of ethnic groups as a threat to democratization, especially its initial stages. She argues that the existence of a cohesive Latvian collectivity actually helped to foster change in the regime.

A similar argument is put forward by Ghia Nodia, who argues that "clinging to nationhood" in fact favors the development of democracy and the protection of individual rights. Nationalism, according to Nodia, is the only effective unifying force for a community trying to restore itself from the atomized societies left behind by a totalitarian state. Nodia's argument is supported by Francis Fukuyama, who views nationalism as a "transitional strategy" for getting to liberal democracy in the postcommunist world. These perspectives suggest that ethnic restructuring may impede the initial stages of democratization if it weakens the nation, which is conceptualized as community underneath the state, necessary for a transition to democracy.

The concept of ethnopolitics encourages the exploration of a whole spectrum of political arrangements involving different ethnic groups. Democracy in Plural Societies: a Comparative Exploration, a classical study by Arend Lijphart, explores consociational democracy, a particular form of democracy. The study outlines the possibilities of power sharing arrangements in multiethnic states. The main thesis of the book is that it may be

---

40 See the collection of essays in Nationalism, Ethnic Conflict, and Democracy, ed. Larry Diamond and Marc F. Plattner (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1994).
difficult, but not impossible, to achieve and maintain democratic government in a “plural society.” A plural society, as defined by Lijphart, is a society with “segmental cleavages,” which may be linguistic, regional, cultural, racial, ethnic, or religious.\textsuperscript{42}

The most important element of consociational democracy is government by a grand coalition of political leaders representing all significant segments of a plural society. Lijphart criticizes modernization theories by arguing that the replacement of segmented loyalties by a “national allegiance,” which is implied by the linear concept of the nation, may have grave consequences in practice. Such a replacement seems to be envisioned by the third quadrant theories as a goal for political development. Lijphart argues that identities are first and foremost primordial, and any effort to eradicate “segmental loyalties” may in fact foster ethnic tensions. That is why power arrangements allowing ethnic groups to cling to their “primordial loyalties” are better solutions in practice.

The central aspect of Lijphart’s argument was that leaders should not wait for reconciliation within societies and instead try to achieve peace from above. A similar argument was put forward by Eric A. Nordlinger, Milton J. Esman and other “consociationalists” who focused on deriving models of “balanced pluralism,” which were supposed to alleviate the consolidation of democracy in ethnically divided states.\textsuperscript{43} These approaches, like most of the approaches in the first group, assume that each ethnic and/or national group has a cohesive identity and a unitary leadership capable of negotiating inter-ethnic agreements. The “consociationalists” consider ethnic parties to be the building

\textsuperscript{42}Ibid., 3.

\textsuperscript{43}For a summary and a critique of the arguments put forward by Eric A. Nordlinger and Milton Esman about the power arrangements which are supposed to help democracy building in ethnically segmented states, see Ethnic Groups in Conflict, ed. Horowitz. 570–72.
blocks of democratic coalitions. However, as multiple case studies show, even if the leaders of ethnic groups may be inclined to cooperate, their actions are likely to be questioned by the rest of the group. Therefore, the intention to cooperate shown from "above" may, in fact, lead to more ethnic conflict emanating from "below."  

With several exceptions, such as Arend Lijphart, democratic theory has been, by and large, silent on the issues of ethnicity and its role in democratizing states. The theorists working within this paradigm have operated with the models of a homogenous demos, which resembled and were built on the empirical evidence from states in Western Europe and, to a lesser extent, Latin America. Only after the disintegration of the Soviet Union did issues of ethnicity again become salient to democratic theory. Concepts such as "minority rights" were revisited. Will Kymlicka’s Multicultural Citizenship: A Liberal Theory of Minority Rights has become a widely discussed book by scholars studying democratic processes in multiethnic entities. Kymlicka touches upon democracy in multiethnic states, which is still a grey area in democratic theory. He attempts to construct what he calls a “liberal approach to minority rights.” Kymlicka’s argument is different from that embraced by many democratic theorists who oppose the concept of collective rights arguing that in the states where individual rights are protected there is no need for collective rights. Kymlicka suggests that minority rights can be helpful and need not contradict individual freedom. He argues that multiethnic states may extend “external protection” to the minorities living in the state in order to limit the economic or political power exercised by the larger national group. Extending national rights to minorities may

---

Ibid., 574.

be a first step toward reconciliation in multiethnic states.

Kymlicka's view of minority rights assumes the existence of a functioning state. Tamara J. Resler has applied this perspective to the study of Lithuania, Russia, and Ukraine—all of which are democratizing multiethnic states. Based on the evidence from these case studies, she argues that extending minority rights has helped to redress the wrongs of Soviet nationalities policy. In other words, she argues for the use of collective rights as a form of restitution related to the wrongs committed by the previous regime.

Unlike Kymlicka and Resler, Barnett R. Rubin and Jack Snyder (Post-Soviet Political Order: Conflict and State Building) do not assume the existence of functioning states in the post-Soviet area. Their collection of essays traces the process of institution building in that area by interpreting the conflicts in the post-Soviet space as the "unmixing" of the Soviet Union into separate nationstates. This process has transformed the post-Soviet state into "normal instability," which means that the likelihood of conflict has been greatly reduced. The main thesis of the book is that the key problem in the region is state and nation building. The authors argue that the processes of democratization are dependent on successful state and nation. They hypothesize that in those places where effective state institutions are lacking, increased popular participation in politics is likely to trigger civil and even international conflict.

Works with a democratic perspective that embrace a static view of ethnicity

---

sometimes read like cookbooks, offering an array of recipes on what democratizing states should do with their ethnic groups. Theorists who embrace a static view of ethnicity do not believe that minority ethnic groups can adapt to a state ruled by another ethnic group. Instead, the state should adapt to minority ethnic groups by developing different institutional frameworks. States are advised to extend special rights to their minorities, to arrange power sharing arrangements with them, or to offer them autonomy. Some theorists even develop taxonomies of different modes to "regulate ethnic communities," which, they argue, may help to avoid ethnic conflict.\textsuperscript{49} However, one significant aspect has been missing from these analyses. It is an analysis of the responses of the ethnic groups to the initiatives undertaken by the states.

The second group of approaches attempted to address this question. This group focuses on the actions of ethnic and national groups.\textsuperscript{50} Juan J. Linz and Alfred Stepan's study \textit{Problems of Democratic Transition and Consolidation. Southern Europe, South America, and Post-Communist Europe} puts forward the concept of a consolidated democracy, which requires an understanding not only the actions of the state, but also of the acceptance of the power of the state by the people who live in that state. For Linz and


\textsuperscript{50}Defining identities as flexible means that identities are constructed and sustained through social practices. This does not mean that identities are malleable or somehow more peaceful. On the contrary, this means that the changes in identities may, in fact, be a cause of a conflict. For an argument that changes in identities may cause ethnic conflict, see Badredine Arfi, "Ethnic Fear: The Social Construction of Insecurity." \textit{Security Studies} 8, no. 1 (Autumn 1998): 151–203. The fact that identities are increasingly defined as flexible suggests that the borders between the fourth and the first quadrant are becoming more permeable. In other words, theorists of ethnopolitics and democracy are becoming more open to the insights of historical perspectives.
Stepan, democracy is a two-way process: the state is ready to be responsive to the needs of its citizens, and the latter "accept the political unit in which they live as an appropriate entity to make legitimate decisions."\(^{51}\)

In this model, democratic consolidation is a political situation when democracy has become the "only game in town." It requires five supporting arenas. They are: a lively civil society (i.e., an entity with interest groups that are relatively independent from the state), a political community (a *demos*), the rule of law, a set of institutions to insure the functioning of the state, and an economic society (a state-mediated market economy).

Linz and Stepan argue that non-democratic experiences in the past critically affects the path that a democratizing state takes and the challenges that it faces on its way to democratic consolidation.

The last statement suggests that similarly to the authors within the first three quadrants, Linz and Stepan's theory suggests that the legacy of ethnic restructuring matters if it impedes the development of the supporting arenas of a consolidated democracy. By pointing out the importance of a political community and civil society that transcends the lines of ethnic division (the first two supporting arenas), Linz and Stepan's model provides a space for the insights of the theories in the second quadrant, which warn of the dangers that ethnic mobilization poses to democratization. By arguing that the capability of a state to perform economic, bureaucratic, and "rule of law" institutional functions is necessary for the emergence of a consolidated democracy, their model allows the insights of the modernization theories in the third quadrant, which underline the importance of creating "communications communities," to be incorporated. In addition, this work makes an

\(^{51}\)Linz and Stepan. 27.
attempt to theorize the relationship between state, nation and democratization.\footnote{Ibid., 36.}

In this model, the main variable explaining the ability of a multiethnic state to successfully democratize is the prevalence of other nations beside the titular nation within a state. Thus, if there is no other nation in the territory of a state and there is little cultural and ethnic differentiation, then that state can be both a nationstate and a democratic state. If there is another nation present in a state and if it is “awakened” or militant, then conflict is a very real possibility and democratization becomes very difficult. However, if there is no group which has sufficient cohesion and identity to be a nation builder, then no state is possible, so democracy is impossible. The model, therefore, yields two propositions about the impact of ethnic restructuring on democratizing states. First, the experience of ethnic restructuring can affect the ability of a state to successfully democratize because it can produce a bi-national polity, in which one national group is mobilized. Second, this experience can have an analogous effect because it could “kill a nation”—i.e., prevent a group from having sufficient cohesion and identity to become a \textit{demos}.

However, this model suffers from several flaws. By putting emphasis on the numerical ethnic variation in a state (i.e., the larger a minority’s ethnic or national presence, the greater the danger to democracy), this model cannot register the sharpness of the cleavages within societies.\footnote{The term “the depth of sharpness of sub-cultural cleavages” was used by Robert A. Dahl in \textit{Polyarchy: Participation and Opposition} (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1971), 109.} Besides, by ignoring the activities of a potentially active and aggressive minorities’ “mother state,” which may become involved in the mobilization of minorities or exploit the issue in its relationship with the host state, it does not explain...
when or why a national group might become "awakened." Previously developed models which ignore these factors suffer from similar flaws.54

Robert A. Dahl, the author of *Polyarchy: Participation and Opposition*, views the existence of polarized (or "awakened") antagonistic groups within a state as an obstacle to successful democratization. He argues that polarization between ethnic groups (which may be a legacy of previous ethnic restructuring) is a crucial variable. In fact, some case studies have shown that multiethnicity or ethnic pluralism per se, without polarization, may in fact be beneficial to "polyarchy" (or democracy) because it prevents any single unified group from having a monopoly of political resources.55

In his article "Some Thoughts on the Victory and Future of Democracy," Juan J. Linz returns to the typology of state, nation, and democracy-building strategies in multiethnic polities.56 He argues that if *demos* and nation are different, then states have two options on how to combine nation and democratic state building. The first option is for a state to alienate its minorities by adopting exclusionary citizenship and minorities' laws and become an ethnic democracy. The second option is to make a "major effort to accommodate minorities by crafting a series of political and civil arrangements which recognize minority rights," thus creating an inclusive democratic regime. The second

55In *Polyarchy*, Dahl refers to a debate about the impact of multiethnicity on democratic processes. The debate took place in the late sixties. The supporters of John Stuart Mill put forward the thesis that multiethnicity per se is a danger to democracy. Their opponents argued that multiethnic pluralism is a counteragent to despotism and is not a danger to democracy. Dahl, *Polyarchy*. 108.
option holds more promise for democratic consolidation in the long run.

A collection of essays by Graham Smith et al. entitled *Nation-building in the Post-Soviet Borderlands* has begun to focus on the sources of polarization between different ethnic groups in post-Soviet states, referring to them as “the construction of group boundaries.” Arguing that “a politics defined in relation to a particular national community may not in itself be incompatible with processes of democratization,” the authors suggest that many post-Soviet entities are, in fact, embracing the broader and more inclusive view of a multiethnic political community. By exploring the role of myths, historical memory, political discourses and language policies, the authors begin to break the boundaries between the fourth quadrant, which focuses on the actions of ethnic groups, and the first quadrant, which dwells on the role of history. With the exception of the chapter on the Baltic states, this volume, however, focuses on the nationalizing policies of states and the creation of national identities instead of the processes of democratization.

A serious drawback of many of the approaches within democratic theory, including the one devised by Linz and Stepan, is that they do not explain why some states, especially those that have experienced ethnic restructuring and other injustices in the past, decide to adopt inclusive and minority-friendly strategies, especially if those strategies are unpopular domestically. Questions about the influence that a minorities’ mother state and other international actors might have and whether they impede or help democratic consolidation in such troubled areas are left unanswered. The problem of outside influence, together

---

58 Ibid., 1.
59 Ibid., 93–119.
with questions about a states' choice of policies to accommodate polarized ethnic
differences. has become the topic of an ongoing debate within democratic theory.

CONCLUSION: ACKNOWLEDGING THE "GREY" AREAS, IDENTIFYING THE
RELEVANT DEBATES

This review suggests the following conclusions. Most works reviewed agree that
minority issues can become an obstacle to successful democratization and democratic
consolidation in states that have experienced ethnic restructuring in the past. This
observation is supported by extensive empirical tests which suggest that there is a
correlation between ethnic pluralism and failed democratic regimes. Two reasons are
specified: the rise of minority-unfriendly political groups which contribute to ethnic
tensions (quadrants one, two, and four) and the possibility that ethnic restructuring resulted
in the absence of a group with sufficient cohesion and identity to become a demos in the
democratizing state (quadrants three and four). Some works reviewed, however, suggest
that multiethnicity per se is an impediment to democratic processes (e.g., Rotschild within
quadrant one and some democratic theorists within quadrant four).

Three important questions remain unanswered. First, the theorists do not clarify
what aspect of the legacy of ethnic restructuring—multiethnicity per se, or only polarized
ethnicity—may become an obstacle to successful democratic processes. This

---

For multi-country empirical studies that examine the correlation between a
successful, peaceful democratic regime and multiethnicity see Arthur S. Banks and
"Why Minorities Rebel: A Global Analysis of Communal Mobilization and Conflict

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
disagreement is part of a larger debate within democratic theory on whether multiethnicity is a danger to the viability of representative democratic institutions in democratizing states.\textsuperscript{61}

The theorists in the first quadrant (who define ethnic and national identity as a historically specific construct) and the democratic theorists in the fourth quadrant (who embrace a flexible view of ethnic identity) are inclined to believe that polarization, and not multiethnicity per se, is the crucial variable. Polarization is likely to be the product of historical experiences, such as expulsion, deportation, and planned migration.

On the other hand, the theorists (e.g., the first group within quadrant four and quadrant two) who take a primordial view of ethnicity are inclined to believe that multiethnicity per se, especially in the absence of a cohesive national group, is an obstacle to the creation of a functioning democratic regime. Ethnic differences (which is defined as division along linguistic, religious, or other similar lines) are often regarded as a major danger to the creation of a functioning democratic regime.

Second, the differences in the conceptualization of ethnicity (outlined in Figure 2) are central to the debate over which arrangements democratizing states should use to solve ethnic tensions.\textsuperscript{62} Those who embrace a flexible view of ethnicity tend to believe that

\textsuperscript{61}For a summary of this debate see Dahl, \textit{Polyarchy}, 108–21. Many case studies and multiple-variable schemes suggest that ethnic cleavages and a failure in democratization are often related. For a review of this research see Larry Diamond and Marc F. Plattner, “Introduction: Divided Societies,” in \textit{Nationalism, Ethnic Conflict, and Democracy}, ed. Larry Diamond and Marc F. Plattner (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1994), xvii–xxii.

\textsuperscript{62}For a review of this debate see \textit{Multiculturalism: Examining the Politics of Recognition}, ed. Amy Gutmann (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1994). Charles Taylor is probably one of the best known proponents of a communitarian perspective. His opponents (e.g., Jürgen Habermas, K. Anthony Appiah) base their arguments on a Kantian perspective, arguing for a democratic state with equal rights for all citizens.
including all residents of a state into collective decision-making is the key to establishing a functioning political community within a multiethnic state. This inclusion takes place at the individual level, as a state extends the right to vote to the majority of its residents and includes ethnic minorities into its power structures. This, in turn, is a step towards a consolidated democracy. Another group of scholars that embraces a rather flexible view of identity argues that multiethnic democratizing states should try to alleviate ethnic tensions by decentralizing their power, by involving antagonistic ethnic groups in local institutions, and by making flexible power sharing arrangements. This will make co-existence among different ethnic groups easier.

On the other hand, those who embrace a more primordial view of ethnicity are likely to argue that "primordial loyalties" need special accommodation. They put more emphasis on special collective minority rights, including territorial autonomy and even secession.

These disagreements point to a debated area within democratic theory: the crafting of a political community in multiethnic states. Central to this issue is the question: How do ethnically heterogenous states legitimatize their power vis-a-vis their minorities? Do they extend special group rights and create power sharing arrangements? Questions about the legitimacy of the state have been neglected in democratic theory. As Linz and Stepan point out, this is unfortunate because it is of fundamental importance to democracy.

The third question is the involvement of international actors in the process of
political community building in multiethnic polities. As Brubaker’s triangle theory suggests, a minority “mother” state may in fact become an active actor in this process, coercing the democratizing state to extend rights and privileges to its minorities. It even may use other international bodies, such as international institutions, to pursue its goals. In addition, given their interest in conflict prevention and spreading democratic norms, international institutions may get involved in the process of community building in multiethnic states.

This last observation points to the third debated area in democratic theory: the role of international actors in multiethnic community building.65 The proponents of international involvement in _demos_ building argue that international actors can help in the crafting of political communities in ethnically restructured states by pushing states to accept inclusive policies and/or extending minority rights. Without this international encouragement, it is argued, states themselves are unlikely to accept such policies—which are necessary for the well-being of minorities and successful democratic consolidation.66

The opponents of this opinion respond that by pushing norms and recommendations, instead of promoting civic concord in multiethnic states, international actors are in fact polarizing ethnic differences even further. This makes the process of

65 For an attempt to synthesize the possible effects of international actors on domestic actors see Dawisha and Turner, 398–424.
66 E.g., see Hyde-Price, “Democratization in Eastern Europe,” 220–52. Hyde-Price argues that the postcommunist states in Eastern Europe can be affected by the example of liberal Western democratic states. Larry Diamond lists different ways in which foreign actors can assist in the crafting of civil societies and political communities in democratizing states. Larry Diamond, “Promoting Democracy in the 1990s: Actors, Instruments, and Issues,” in _Democracy’s Victory and Crisis_, ed. Axel Hadenius (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997), 311–70.
political community building more difficult.\textsuperscript{67}

These three debated questions suggest that political community building within multiethnic entities—a requirement for a consolidated democratic regime—is an area in need of theoretical and empirical refinement. The factors which may obstruct or facilitate this process need to be identified. The goal of the research that follows is to fill in this gap.

\textsuperscript{67}E.g., Joseph V. Montville writes, "the ultimate irony is that internal conflicts such as ethnic disputes are more difficult to mediate than international disputes, because any would-be conciliator from outside has little standing. In domestic disputes, mediation is meddling." Joseph V. Montville, "Negotiations and Prenegotiations in Ethnic Conflict: The Beginning, the Middle, and the Ends," in \textit{Conflict and Peacemaking in Multiethnic Societies}, ed. Joseph V. Montville (Lexington, KY: Lexington Books, 1990), 530–31. He suggests fostering domestic private agencies, who can act without challenging state sovereignty, to work as "dispute resolution-marriage counselors." Also see Ronald R. Krebs, "Perverse Institutionalism: NATO and the Greco-Turkish Conflict," \textit{International Organization} 53, no. 2 (Spring 1999): 343–77. Krebs argues that international institutions are sometimes capable of fostering conflict between states.
CHAPTER IV
CRAFTING POLITICAL COMMUNITIES IN MULTIETHNIC STATES:
WHICH ACTORS, WHAT INSTITUTIONS?

The aim of this chapter is to identify the factors which may help or hinder political community building in multiethnic states. To do that, it will build on the three themes identified by the previous chapter. First, it will address theoretical relationships between multiethnicity and political community by exploring the question of whether multiethnicity presents a challenge to sustainable democratic political community. This question requires a re-investigation of the assumptions underlying the concept of "political community." Consequently, in the first two segments, this chapter outlines the individualist and the pluralist perspectives on community building and the institutions that are suggested by these perspectives to create and maintain a democratic political community in multiethnic states and societies. Second, it puts forward a critique of the dominant approaches by identifying conditions in multiethnic entities that are often ignored by the dominant approaches. This chapter concludes by introducing a corrective to the dominant approaches and by identifying a set of factors which are particularly salient to political community building.

The answers to the questions considered in this chapter will be drawn from three major strands of democratic theory on political community building: individualism, pluralism, and perspectives on civil society.¹ The first two theories, individualism and

¹Usually, three prevailing theoretical models are identified: Individualist, Pluralist Political, and Holistic Socialism, or Economic Democracy. See Carol C. Gould.
pluralism, represent a continuum. At one end is the democratic individual version of community (the first perspective), while the pluralist version of political community can be found at the other end (the second perspective).² According to the first perspective, an individual in pursuit of his or her individual interest is the major agency in politics. The second perspective views political groups as the most important actors. The identity of an individual is inseparable from that of a social or political group. The third perspective focuses on sub-state societal processes necessary for a functioning political community.

The three perspectives outline both supportive and unfavorable conditions for sustainable democratic communities. In its conclusions, this chapter relates the insights provided by these theories to the relevant debates within the field of democracy studies outlined in the previous chapter.

POLITICAL COMMUNITY AND MULTIETHNICITY: TWO THEORETICAL PERSPECTIVES

The Individualist Perspective

The individualist perspective on political community building is based on the writings of Aristotle. Its central thesis is that the main function of a political community is

---

Rethinking Democracy (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1988), 92-113. This dissertation focuses on the first two, arguing that they suggest similar conclusions about the relationship between multiethnicity and democracy. The hypothesis drawn from the economic democratic model is presented in Chapter II as an alternative thesis.

²A similar continuum was represented by Christopher J. Berry in his discussion of Sandel's conception of political communities. See Berry, 102.
to provide a good life for its citizens—i.e., the individual members of a polity. However, even if the goal of the *demos* is to cater to individual interests, the community itself cannot be just a sum of separate individuals.\(^3\) According to this view, political community is a partnership of citizens in a constitution: the members of the community create the laws of the state. Participation in political life (i.e., the creation of laws) is, therefore, the most important aspect of membership in a political community. In short, the essence of a political community is that the members of *demos* are subject to the laws in which they have a part in making.\(^4\) This perspective later became the basis for arguments that a purely political solution (e.g., the inclusion of minorities in the political life of a democratic state by extending equal rights of citizenship) can be found to the problem of cohesion within multiethnic entities.\(^5\)

Political community, as conceived by the individualist model, is well equipped to handle the differences and disagreements of its members within its borders.\(^6\) The

\[^{3}\text{The intimacy of the ties connecting the individuals is a debated issue. In Aristotle’s writings, it is a tightly knit community. Later Jean Jacques Rousseau and John Stuart Mill equated the community with the nation, romanticizing the links between individuals. In the twentieth century, the community was replaced by the “public.” Yet most theorists still would agree that the “public,” or the political community in modern democracies, is more than just a simple aggregation of individuals. For a discussion of this issue in the context of John Dewey’s thought, see Damico, 104-18.}\]


\[^{5}\text{E.g., Bhikhu Parekh argues that “the modern liberal state itself” can be a source of cohesion for different ethnic groups within a state. The state can provide a variety of different services, and it can serve as a “service station” to citizens belonging to different ethnic groups. Margaret Canovan, *Nationhood and Political Theory* (Cheltenham, UK: Edward Elgar, 1996), 84-86.}\]

\[^{6}\text{Aristotle writes, “Again, the state, as composed of the unlikes, may be compared to the living being: as the first elements into which a living being is resolved are soul and body, as soul is made as a rational principle and appetite, the family of husband and wife, property of master and slave, so all these, as well as other dissimilar elements, the state is composed: and therefore the excellence of all citizens cannot possibly be the same, any}\]
members handle their disagreements through dialogue and persuasion in the political sphere of the *demos*. In fact, the differences and disagreements between the members of the community are among the factors which help to keep political life within the public sphere of democratic community alive.

However, an individualist democratic community is much worse equipped to handle differences and disagreements emanating from outside its borders. When the community is overrun by another antagonistic polity, it is likely to cease to exist. As a matter of fact, if ethnic restructuring is understood as the organized motion of actors other than community members, pursued by one side (see Chapter II), then, according to Aristotle's model, such an incident is likely to mark the end of the independent political community. In such a case, the members of Aristotle's community can expect to be enslaved if they want to remain alive. Alternatively, if Aristotle's community overran another state, the captured members of the other community would be likely to end up in the "private realm" of Aristotle's community together with other slaves and women.\(^7\) If the level of community restructuring is significant (i.e., if the community acquires a significant number of slaves after its interaction with another polity), then mobilization and a consequent revolt of the enslaved newcomers may also eventually spell the end of democratic community.\(^8\)

The gist of Aristotle's theoretical perspective is that a democratic regime can be best sustained within the borders of one community, and that the members of this

---

\(^7\)Ibid., 73-82.

\(^8\)Ibid., 122.
community are united by their participation in the political process. If multiethnicity is understood as differences along linguistic or other similar lines, then it does not present a danger to a functioning political community as long as it is exhibited by the members of the *demos*. However, violent interaction between several communities and the continued coexistence of these communities within the same territory may be dangerous to the democratic polity. This is the case unless the members of the other community are absorbed into the *demos* or placed “underneath” it (i.e., banished to the private sphere of the *demos*).

*The Pluralist Perspective*

The pluralist theoretical perspective focuses upon the aggregation of individual interests as group interests. The goal of a political community is to provide an arena for

---

9 The idea that the members of a community should be connected by close national links was introduced by Jean Jacques Rousseau and John Stuart Mill. In their writings, the idea of a political community became equated with that of a nation. Drawing on the logic of Aristotle’s theoretical perspective, John Stuart Mill argued that democracy is next to impossible in states containing multiple nationalities. See John Stuart Mill, *Utilitarianism, Liberty, and Representative Government* (New York: E. P. Dutton, 1951). This view was challenged by Lord Acton, who thought that multiethnicity is beneficial for democratic regimes. Acton argued that democratic states should not identify with a single idea of the polity (whether nation or class). If the state absolutizes the will of the *demos* (or the “popular” will), then the values of other particular communities within the state are marginalized. The existence of multiple communities, he argued, may provide a shield against authoritarian tendencies within the state. See John Emerich Edward Dahlberg-Acton, *Essays on Freedom and Power*, selected by Gertrude Himmelfarb (Boston: Beacon, 1949). Acton’s view is consistent with the main postulates of the second (pluralist) perspective.

10 Philosophically, this perspective owes to the writings of John Dewey, who introduced the pluralistic conception of the state. He wrote: “Most states, after they have been brought into being, react upon the primary groupings. . . . Our doctrine of plural norms is a statement of a fact: that there exists a plurality of social groupings, good, bad,
interaction between different groups, which express the interests of individuals. Group interests, which are often conflicting, are represented in the political process by parties, voting groups, or social organizations. These interests influence political decisions made by the government and thus legitimate the power of the state. Ethnicity becomes relevant to this perspective when ethnic divisions begin to build solidarities affecting political thinking and action.\textsuperscript{11}

The essence of this perspective is captured by Dahl's term "polyarchy," which means competitive politics, public contestation, and public opposition.\textsuperscript{12} Political community is consolidated when polyarchy becomes the "only game in town;" in other words, when the state and its residents agree on institutionalized management of their conflicting interests through the political process.

The existence of an opposition to the strongest actor is a necessary condition for the "democratic game" to take place because the concentration of power in the hands of one actor indicates the end of a democratic game. This game must always be played by more than one player. Therefore, following this logic, the existence of diverse ethnic or national groups may be a positive factor, challenging the authority of the authoritarian power.\textsuperscript{13} Consolidated ethnic groups may become centers of opposition to nondemocratic and indifferent." John Dewey, \textit{The Public and Its Problems} (1927; reprint, Denver: Alan Swallow, 1954), 71.


\textsuperscript{12}Dahl, \textit{Polyarchy}, 4.


Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
rulers. Thus, multiethnicity may in fact help to initiate the democratic game instead of impeding its start.

After the democratic game is initiated, politically active ethnic groups can join the government or remain in the opposition, i.e., be a political minority. Being a minority in the political community means having less power than the group that is currently associated with the government. By accepting the position of a minority, a politically active group has certain expectations. First and foremost, it expects to have a chance to be in the majority position. If a politically active minority defines itself solely in identity terms (i.e., language, race, or nationality) instead of interests, it may be impossible to be in the majority position in a multiethnic community without a certain level of assimilation or coercion.\footnote{Reiterer, 54-55.} It is quite likely that multiethnic polities containing such politically active and influential minorities will have a hard time achieving consensus on official language policy and other, similar matters.\footnote{Don MacIver argues that such polities are likely to disagree not only over language policies, but also over the basic laws of the state, the composition of the government, recruitment to public service, and prioritization of groups and regions in the allocation of resources. MacIver, 14.}

A smoothly functioning pluralist community requires that its members have multiple, flexible identities. In political arenas, the ethnic identities of the members should be intertwined with their identities as citizens, entrepreneurs, etc. In other words, ethnic differences should alternate and compete with class, religious, or regional differences.\footnote{Horowitz, “Ethnic Policy,” 572.} If this is the case, then multiethnicity \textit{per se} does not present a danger to a democratic regime.
The logic of the pluralist perspective is similar to the individualist: both approaches argue that the inclusion of ethnic or national minorities (either as separate members or as politically active groups) into the political process is central to a functioning political community within multiethnic entities. They recommend institutions which could help to achieve this goal.

INSTITUTIONS WHICH HELP TO CREATE AND MAINTAIN POLITICAL COMMUNITY IN A MULTIETHNIC STATE

Top-Down Approaches

The two main theoretical perspectives, outlined above, are referred to as “top-down” approaches because they underline the importance of the state and its institutions to democratic community building. These approaches range from assimilationist strategies to arrangements endorsing relative ethnic separation, which allow minorities to have special territorial or cultural arrangements within the state (see Figure 3).17

17In addition to the political arrangements outlined by the diagram, nation-states have used expulsions or population exchanges to “manage” ethnic enmities. In the past, such practices were even considered legitimate internationally. For example, the massive population exchanges that occurred between European nation-states after World War II were endorsed by international bodies. The underlying assumption of population transfers was that ethnic nationality should serve as the basis not only for cultural life, but also for political organization. Forced resettlements of members of a certain ethnic group or groups have been a compulsory operation. Ethnic groups were moved without any regard for individual wishes. For a critique of population exchanges, see Eugene M. Kulischer, “Population Transfer,” South Atlantic Quarterly 65, no. 4 (October 1946): 403-14. For an argument that ethnic separation may help democratization, see Raymond M. Basch, “The Effects of Ethnic Separation on Democratization: A Comparative Study.” East European Quarterly 32, no. 2 (June 1998): 221-42. In Ethnic Cleansing (New...
The individualist perspective, built on the insights of Aristotle, suggests that creating a strong centralized inclusive state is the optimal solution in order to achieve the necessary cohesion within the *demos*. This also holds true for a multiethnic setting. Such a state adopts ethnically neutral executive, legislative, and administrative decision making mechanisms and pursues ethnicity-blind public policies. It thus embodies the individualist values of Aristotle's *demos*: the goal of the neutral liberal state is to cater to individual citizens, regardless of their ethnic attachments. According to this perspective, special cultural rights or any other arrangements favoring the identity of a certain group will result in the creation of divisions among the citizens (in other words, they will result in the construction of "cultural ghettos"). Assimilationist language policies (i.e., promoting the major language of the state) are deemed as normal and even necessary in such state: they enable the interaction among the members of the political community.

The individualist perspective puts a lot of faith in the political process. It is believed that by extending equal rights of participation to the majority of its residents, the state opens political spaces in which the citizens can actualize their problems or voice their grievances through social or political movements.\(^{18}\) This is the way in which citizens belonging to different ethnic groups can express their needs, and that is why special political arrangements to satisfy the needs of minorities are deemed unnecessary.

However, in states that contain ethnic communities with group-based demands (e.g., the calls of ethnic minorities for quotas in political elections or even political

---

autonomy), the individualist suggestions to create an integrative state are likely to engender resistance from politically active ethnic and national groups. Under such conditions, recognition of group rights and power sharing arrangements between ethnic and national groups may be necessary to avoid conflict or even the breakup of the polity. The pluralist perspective outlines such arrangements, which range from extending group rights to minorities within the polity to the territorial autonomy of ethnically distinct regions or even their peaceful secession from the state. The first pluralist policy (see Figure 3) dwells on minority rights—i.e., the rights of minorities to “receive equal treatment, to practice their culture, religion and language, and to participate fully in the political and economic life of the state.”

This policy is often viewed as the one which avoids the extremes of a centralized state and ethnic separation. The first pluralist policy is a “middle of the road” strategy, combining the insights of individualists and pluralists. Individual members of ethnic groups are encouraged to be involved in the political activities of the state in addition to being active in their own ethnic communities.

The second policy—multiethnic coalitions within a political party system—refers to cooperation among political parties based on ethnic foundations. Driven by similar interests (e.g., to form a government), several ethnically-based parties can form a “coalition of convenience.”

---


Individualist perspective: An inclusive, centralized, unitary state

Pluralist perspective:
1: Special minority (group) rights
2: Multiethnic coalitions, consociationalism
3: Territorial or communal autonomy
4: Secession

Such coalitions are often formed after election and they disintegrate if the benefits of cooperation begin to decline. On the other hand, ethnic parties can form a more permanent alliance prior to the elections. The parties agree on their positions regarding ethnic issues prior to forming the government. Such coalitions, therefore, usually last longer than coalitions of convenience.21

The working principles of multiethnic coalitions, which can be described as "joint consensual rule" of several ethnic communities, include proportional representation in the government, the cooperation of elites, and mutual veto.22 The durability and success of

22These working principles are definitely different from the majoritarian
similar arrangements depends upon numerous factors, such as the ability of political leaders to convince the electorate of the necessity of such institutions, the internal cohesion of the parties, and the attitudes of the broader public regarding interethnic cooperation.

The third policy—territorial or communal autonomy—requires delegating considerable authority to local elites. The goal of this policy is to cater to the needs of regionally concentrated ethnic groups. It is quite possible that even nondemocratic regimes, such as multiethnic empires, were able to obtain obedience and gain some legitimacy in the eyes of the peoples living under their rule by allowing a high level of local self-governance.\textsuperscript{23}

The main difference between federalist institutions (e.g., decentralized, regional government) and consociational power sharing agreements, such as multiethnic coalitions, is that the former exhibits a territorial power sharing dimension (i.e., each ethnic or national group has power of governance over the territorial unit in which it lives), while consociational institutions refer to non-territorial power sharing. Yet all pluralist institutions are united by their goal: they aspire to accommodate the demands of ethnic groups within the existing political borders of the state. It is widely believed that territorial border changes can engender ethnic violence. It is not surprising, therefore, that the fourth policy—secession—is regarded by pluralists as the least desirable approach.

A Critique of Top-down Approaches

By suggesting that there are purely political solutions to the problem of cohesion within multiethnic states, top-down perspectives are assuming two conditions. First, they presume the existence of a well functioning state. In polities with serious ethnic problems, state institutions usually are weak and underdeveloped, unable to secure minority rights, even if they proclaim them legally.24

Second, the individualist and the pluralist perspectives assume that the members of the demos have agreed to initiate a political process in which the representatives of different ethnic groups are included. These perspectives do not take into consideration the possibility that the actors—either individual members of the demos or political and social groups—might not be willing to start the political game—a game that is crucial for the sustainability of the political community. Such a situation can be referred to as polarization. In a multiethnic setting, polarization may crystallize along ethnic lines. In its extreme form, ethnic polarization implies that ethnic groups are preoccupied by mutual mistrust and perceive themselves, first and foremost, in antagonistic identity terms. In such a context, polarized ethnicity becomes the only politically relevant identity.25

A potential cause for polarization is relative economic or political deprivation

24 Or, in some cases, the states dominated by one ethnic group may initiate a violent action against their own minorities. See Kumar Rupesinghe, “Theories of Ethnic Conflict and Their Applicability to Protracted Ethnic Conflicts,” in Ethnic Conflict and Human Rights, ed. Kumar Rupesinghe (Tokyo: United Nations University Press, 1994), 44.

experienced by one ethnic group vis-a-vis other ethnic groups. Even though it is relatively
difficult to bridge such ethnic differences in the short term, economic development
policies, coupled with power sharing arrangements could provide a long term solution to
such polarization. However, the issue of polarization becomes much more complicated if
the dividing line is drawn between the ethnic groups, one of which associates itself with
the former victims and sees the other ethnic group(s) as former perpetrators. This may
generate a phenomenon known as “ethnic fear”: once an ethnic group has been terrorized
by a neighboring ethnic group in the past, it becomes fearful of the possibility that the
same thing might happen again in the future.26

Given similar conditions, an ethnic group that sees itself as having been victimized
in the past is more likely to opt for an authoritarian regime with the members of its own
kin than to be open to the norms of democratic inclusiveness, especially if “inclusiveness”
means embracing an ethnic group that is associated with the perpetrators of past evils.
Ethnic affiliations provide a sense of security for the members of both ethnic groups, and
they offer protection of one’s interests vis-a-vis the members of the other ethnic group.27

Under conditions of ethnic fear, the existence of a minority’s “mother state” ready
to defend its minority against the majority ethnic group is a significant obstacle towards

---

26 The concept “ethnic fear” is discussed by Montville, 538, and Arfi, 151-203. Wendy Bracewell portrays how ethnic fear emerged in Serbian-Croatian relations in 1990s. The Serbs publicly remembered the crimes committed by the Ustaša during World War II and claimed that they were again threatened with genocide as the newly recreated Croatian state adopted the same national symbols that had been used by the Ustaša. Wendy Bracewell, “National Identities among Serbs and Croats,” in National Histories and European History, ed. Mary Fulbrook (London: University College London Press, 1993), 157.

the establishment of an interethnic dialogue. According to the logic of a pluralist
democratic community, the political game within a demos must be played only by its
members, and it must be relatively free from outside influence. Therefore, an outside
actor—especially if seen as a former perpetrator—who is anxious to get involved in a
community's political game may negatively affect the dynamics of interaction between
ethnic groups.

Ethnic fear, coupled with an active "mother state," is likely to be a legacy of
previous ethnic restructuring. The combination of these two factors—the inability of the
members of a community to play an independent political game and the lack of trust
between the members of such a community—makes demos building under such conditions
very difficult. The suggestions of the individualist and pluralist perspectives to include the
"others" in the political process in order to create a functioning political community are
therefore likely to be politically unthinkable. If different ethnic groups are not able to
overcome the mistrust underlying their relations, then interethnic coalitions and alliances,
propagated by the pluralist perspective, are likely to be short-term and torn by internal
conflicts over basic ethnic issues (e.g., language). Extensive empirical research confirms
the fragility of such political arrangements in different multiethnic settings, even though
ethnic groups might have shared a variety of interests.28 Within such a climate, past
experiences of ethnic restructuring or other injustices are likely to become politicized in
order to legitimatize the power of an ethnopolitical party.29

29 For a discussion on how ethnic or national identity can be used as a mode of
power legitimation, see Leslie Holmes, Post-Communism: An Introduction (Cambridge,
One outcome from a situation in which ethnicity has become a source of polarization is ethnic democracy.\textsuperscript{30} It is a political system within which full participation in the political process is limited to the members of a particular ethnic group, yet some civil and political rights are enjoyed by others as well. The members of other ethnic groups are prevented from taking part in this process by state-created barriers, such as limited access to organizational resources or deprivation of rights of political participation, yet at the same time, they can enjoy some other rights, such as cultural rights or the right to enjoy the economic goods produced by the state.\textsuperscript{31}

Such a situation is similar to that described by Aristotle in his \textit{Politics}: members from the "other" community are banished to the private sphere of the \textit{demos}, thus excluding them from the political process. However, the greater the number of the unsatisfied "others" within the private sphere, the greater the latent danger facing the \textit{demos} from a potential revolt. Thus, theoretically, even though ethnic democracy tries to achieve ethnopolitical stability by taking the contradictions and tensions inherent in such a system into account, endowing the "others" with a status different from that of the members of the \textit{demos} does not constitute a long term solution for a sustainable political community within a multiethnic state.

Yet what can be done, if anything, to relieve ethnic polarization in order to start


and to sustain a political process within multiethnic entities? The two leading democratic theories on political community do not provide a satisfactory answer to this question. The strategies on how to reduce ethnic polarization fall into the realm of theories on civil society, or “bottom-up” approaches. These approaches focus on the cultivation of associations within the sub-state sphere. They suggest a proposition that such sub-state associations, bridging individuals belonging to different ethnic groups or establishing links between different ethnic groups may help to overcome polarization, the most dangerous condition for a sustainable political community.32

Bottom-Up Approaches

One of the main premises of “bottom-up” approaches researching the development of civil society is that social and political cohesion within the state is not guaranteed by the interaction of its “units”—either individuals, sub-state communities, or political parties.33 For a democratic political process to take place, a certain level of societal unity must be present. This societal unity is sustained by integrative processes which are reflected by trust-generating social relationships, such as business groups, environmental groups,

32 This is a conclusion reached by Leo Kuper. He also argues that the development of civil society may preclude future instances of genocide. See Leo Kuper, Genocide: Its Political Use in the 20th Century (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1981).

33 For an account of the debates within several disciplines over the meaning of civil society, see Chris Hann, “Introduction: Political Society and Civil Anthropology,” in Civil Society: Challenging Western Models, ed. Chris Hann and Elizabeth Dunn (New York: Routledge, 1996), 1-7. This section does not intend to suggest that different and often conflicting approaches have reached some kind of agreement on the meaning and the roles of civil society. It still remains a debated concept. However, most approaches underline the existence of free associations among the residents of the state as one of the defining aspects of civil society.
church groups, etc. The sub-state actors joined by such relationships are capable of challenging state power, especially when this power is perceived as threatening to their associations.

A functioning civil society within a democratic state entails more than a collection of strong and autonomous groups capable of balancing the state. Individual membership in these autonomous groups must be both voluntary and overlapping. Societal unity, a characteristic of civil society, describes a situation in which individuals belong to different political and social groups, but at the same time they retain their individual choice to escape from these groups. The identities of the members of these groups are multi-layered because the individuals conceive of themselves not only as members of ethnic groups, but also as members of the political community and other organizations within civil society. Under such conditions, violence among them becomes unthinkable.

However, how is it possible to create a sustainable civil society within a polarized multiethnic state? Based on previous case studies, "bottom-up" approaches suggest the following strategies: first, fostering civil concord could begin with catering to basic individual human needs, such as food, shelter, money, etc. Even during times of severe ethnic polarization, it has been possible to sustain a certain level of order and cooperation within multiethnic entities in this way. This strategy—building civil society on the

---

34 John A. Hall, "In Search of Civil Society," in *Civil Society: Theory, History, Comparison*, ed. John A. Hall (Cambridge, UK: Polity, 1995), 15. In his words, the creation of a functioning civil society entails the ability of individual members to “escape any particular cage” (i.e., any social or political group).

egoistic interests of individuals and households expressed through private
business—eventually translates into voluntary collective organizations. As "economic"
civil society becomes stronger, individuals become engaged in well-established trust-based
relationships which transgress ethnic boundaries.36

The latter observation points to the importance of a functioning local government,
a second strategy often dwelt on by civil society approaches.37 Creating an autonomous
local public body, such as a town council, is one of the ways in which individual citizens
achieve their immediate interests and at the same time maintain independence from the
state.38 Not only basic human interests, but also potentially explosive ethnic issues, such
as language, the distribution of resources, and education, also often fall within the sphere
of local government influence. This suggests that more attention should be paid to the
ways in which multiethnic states allocate power to local governments and the ways in
which the latter handle ethnically sensitive issues, such as language laws, and conduct
community building on the local level.

The third approach focuses on the least explored area of civil society: social and

36A similar view, according to which private business horizontally integrates civil
society, and the latter then becomes a balancing force vis-a-vis the state, has been referred
to as an "East European view of civil society." See David L. Wank, "Civil Society in

37These approaches overlap with the third strategy proposed by the top-down
approaches. In addition to paying attention to local governments as a form of political
governance, civil society approaches also study the formation of social associations
among people of a community prompted by the existence of such governments. Scott A.
Bollens, "Urban Policy in Ethnically Polarized Societies," International Political Science

38Christopher G. A. Bryant, "Civic Nation, Civil Society, Civil Religion," in Civil
143.
psychological aspects of trust building among different ethnic groups. In a well
functioning civil society, different ethnic and national groups are free to write their
histories without fear: to publicly remember and mourn their dead, etc.39

Under nondemocratic rule, similar social relationships which so clearly manifest
themselves in the public sphere, are usually suppressed because they are seen as a source
of opposition to the state. Histories challenging the official narrative of the state are also
silenced. It is not surprising, therefore, that in democratizing multiethnic societies, after
decades of imposed historical amnesia, ethnic groups are likely to produce conflicting
interpretations about what has happened in the past. One ethnic group can easily become
the "demonized other": i.e., it can be blamed for the misfortunes experienced by another
ethnic group during the previous regime. Numerous case studies on collective identity
have recognized that those who control the images of the past shape the present. Political
and social groups self-consciously engage in the process of shaping their national pasts to
legitimate their current political views and policies.40 In such cases, mass media channels
which enable open discussion of what has happened in the past, mediation by outsiders,
international or national truth finding commissions, involving representatives from
different ethnic groups, are among the ways to reduce polarization.41

40Daniel Levy, "The Future of the Past: Historiographical Disputes and Competing
Memories in Germany and Israel," History and Memory 38, no. 1 (February 1999), 51.
41Klinke and Reur, 253-54. In addition, there is a body of literature on democratic
transitions. It puts forward several hypotheses on how to face the crimes of the past
regime: by creating truth commissions, by conducting trials or granting amnesty to the
collaborators with the past regime, by compensating the victims, etc. Some have argued
that these practices may help to provide social support for political democracy. See
Guillermo O'Donnell and Philippe C. Schmitter, "Transitions from Authoritarian Rule:
Tentative Conclusions About Uncertain Democracies," in Transitional Justice: How
Emerging Democracies Reckon with the Former Regimes, ed. Neil J. Kritz (Washington,
The goal of these practices is to build a network of associations transgressing ethnic divisions. However, these associations are not self-sustaining and not sufficient, in and of themselves, to create a democratic political community. To illustrate, after the basic interests of the ethnic groups are satisfied, the individuals belonging to the groups may choose to go back into their social ethnic “cages” if interethnic cooperation is not institutionalized in the ways outlined by the individualist or pluralist approaches. Furthermore, self-sustaining local governments do not provide a guarantee that democratic political community will be established within a multiethnic state. Local governments can be dominated by one ethnic group and therefore become abusive toward the members of other ethnic groups. In such cases, the existence of a countervailing power (i.e., the democratic state) to stop coerciveness is highly desirable.

Finally, there must be an actor capable of providing secure spaces for different ethnic groups to carry out their “coping with history” practices (e.g., writing their histories, burying their dead, debating their past, and so on). In the absence of such an actor, while trying to negotiate its relationship with a troubled past, one national or ethnic group can initiate the policies which attempt to take out revenge upon or even exterminate other “guilty” ethnic groups. Instead of embracing and enforcing only one account of the past, a democratic state opens channels for different ethnic groups to disclose their past embitterments. This characteristic distinguishes a nationalist autocratic state from a civic

D.C.: United States Institute of Peace, 1995), 57-64. It is not entirely clear, however, how these practices work in multiethnic settings.

For example, in 1986, the Serbian Academy of Science prepared a Memorandum which listed all injustices experienced by the Serbs in the past. This Memorandum became a basis for Milosevic’s rhetoric. Ivo Banaco, “Historiography of the Countries of Eastern Europe: Yugoslavia,” *American Historical Review* 97, no. 2 (October 1992), 1085-104.
democracy. These observations imply that civil concord in multiethnic entities is highly unlikely without a democratic state, which, in the words of Michael Walzer, both "frames civil society and occupies space within it."\textsuperscript{43}

Toward a Synthesis of the Top-Down and Bottom-Up Approaches

Synthesizing "top-down" and "bottom-up" approaches means conceptualizing political community not just as an arena for a series of government decisions, but primarily as a multilevel process of interaction between the state and sub-state actors. Amitai Etzioni's concept of community illustrates the intimate relationship between the state and the entity beneath it within democratic regimes: "[The community] has sufficient power to countervail the coercive member of any member unit or coalition of them; it has a decision making center that is able to affect significantly the allocation of assets throughout the community; and it is the dominant focus of political loyalty."\textsuperscript{44} This concept also outlines the relationship between political community and civil society. Political community is the sphere in which the political process described in the first two theoretical approaches (e.g., voting, power negotiations, or elections) takes place. Civil society is the sphere within which other sub-state societal links are forged. Thus societal unity is created, which is a necessary condition for the democratic political process to be carried out. The main difference between political community and civil society is that the former is capable of managing political power. In a democratic regime, the institutions of political community.

\textsuperscript{43} Walzer, "The Concept of Civil Society," 23.
therefore, are capable of preventing unfair “insider deals” within civil society.

In addition, creating lasting, businesslike, interest-based relationships among individuals must be backed up by the construction of a democratic state as a “service station.” The term “state as a service station” refers to a well functioning market economy, capable of fulfilling the basic needs of its citizens and non-citizen residents. To be more specific, modern liberal democratic states are capable of providing a wide variety of services for individuals, ranging from health care to food subsidies for the poor. Thus, they secure a web of trust-based business relationships among their citizens.45

Taking this interdependent relationship between political community and civil society into account means recognizing that merely including members of ethnic communities into the political process will not solve the problem of polarization in multiethnic states. The process of inclusion must be sustained by other developments conducive to a functioning civil society, such as the establishment of local governments and the development of relationships of trust among the members of different ethnic groups. The three theoretical perspectives outlined in this chapter suggest four factors which are particularly salient to political community building in a polarized multiethnic entity:

(a) the state (or groups with political power within a state-in-the-making) makes a decision on whether to include opposing ethnic groups into the political process on an individual or a collective level,

(b) the process of community building “from above” must be sustained by the following

---

45Bhikhu Parekh, quoted in Canovan, 84-85.
developments within civil society ("below"): 

1) the creation of business relationships based on individual interests which involve members of different ethnic groups. Such relationships entail construction of a democratic state as a "service station."

2) the creation of functioning local governments,

3) the establishment of dialogic ethnic relations; i.e., making sure that no ethnic group becomes the "demonized other."  

Considered together, these four factors indicate the ability of a multiethnic polity to create a sustainable democratic political community. They help to hypothesize whether a state will be capable of overcoming ethnic polarization. A potential fifth factor is the actions of an ethnic patron—an ethnic minority's mother state and other international actors.

THE ROLE OF INTERNATIONAL ACTORS IN POLITICAL COMMUNITY BUILDING

International actors are capable of affecting the creation of political community within a multiethnic polity both from "above" (i.e., by affecting the actions of the international community) as well as from "below" (i.e., through local initiatives and civil society organizations). This dual approach recognizes the importance of both external support and internal development in facilitating the creation of a democratic political community.

46 As defined by Harold H. Saunders, "sustained dialogue," or dialogic relations between different ethnic groups, does not need to be as structured as negotiation or formal mediation, yet this concept implies that trust and transparency must be established among the ethnic groups. "Dialogic relations" mean that previously polarized interethnic relationships are changed in fundamental ways. Thus, the foundations for an interethnic body politic are laid. Harold H. Saunders, *A Public Peace Process: Sustained Dialogue to Transform Racial and Ethnic Conflicts* (New York: St. Martin's, 1999), 12-13.
governments), and from “below” (i.e., by influencing the developments within civil society). In international relations (on the state level), there are three reasons explaining why a government obeys policies promoted by international actors: 1) because it fears punishment, 2) because it sees the rule to be in its own self-interest, and 3) because it feels that the rule is legitimate and should be obeyed. Consequently, actions of international actors aimed at changing an institutionalized state’s attitude toward its minorities are likely to undertake one of these three forms: coercion, persuasion, or contagion.

Theoretically, if threatened by a minority’s mother state or other international actors, a host state can change its institutionalized attitude toward its ethnic minorities and change the laws defining their status. However, if there are politically strong domestic groups opposing the inclusion of minorities into the demos or if the minorities residing within the state oppose the existence of the state, then even coercion exerted by international actors may not be capable of changing the institutionalized attitude of the state toward its minorities. On the other hand, threatening the host state in order to make it change its attitude toward the minority is unlikely to reduce polarization within the sub-state sphere.

Alternatively, both states can agree to solve the minority issue using international mechanisms. This may involve negotiations through regional organizations (e.g., the CoE, the OSCE, the Council of the Baltic States, etc.) or bilateral state-to-state agreements. Using these approaches to address the minority issue symbolizes the second rule: both

---

48 The term “contagion” refers to the third action. For further discussion see Dawisha and Turner, 404-5.
states should regard the agreement about the status of minorities as falling into their sphere of interest. Using regional organizations to help to build political community within multiethnic states can assume a variety of forms: elaborating the rights and entitlements of a minority, overseeing how these rights are implemented, etc. Bilateral and regional mechanisms need not be mutually exclusive; yet the most important difference between the two is that “regionalism” implies that dealing with the issue of minorities is not confined to the minority’s mother state and the host state.49 One aspect of bilateral agreements is that they are likely to enhance the self-confidence of ethnic minorities if they feel that their mother state, with whom they identify linguistically, and, in many cases, even politically, is championing their case.50

Third, states may choose to change the way that they treat their minorities because they believe that an international rule is legitimate or because they believe in the legitimacy of the international body that generated that rule.51 If a host state participates in a multilateral organization which promotes equal access of minorities and individuals to the political process, then it may choose to introduce changes in its own domestic legislation regarding the rights of minorities. However, given the vagueness of the status of minority rights in international law and international organizations, this course of action is highly unlikely.52

50 Ibid., 110-11.
51 Hurd, 387.
52 To be more specific, international law affirms the “value of cultural diversity, of individual choice, and cultures as contexts of choice.” See Patrick Thornberry, “Introduction: In the Strongroom of Vocabulary,” in Minority Rights in the “New”
International actors can considerably affect political community building from “below,” but this influence is not always stabilizing. If an active minority’s mother state lends its political, cultural, and economic support to its ethnic kin, such actions, even if they are well-intended, may complicate dialogic relations between different ethnic groups living within a state. On the positive side, international actors could help to strengthen civil society institutions by strengthening local governments, supporting free market reforms, and giving financial support to active civil society groups, the members of which include representatives from different ethnic groups.53

The importance of such activities should not be underestimated because, when acting from “below,” international actors are likely to be sensitive to domestic interethnic situations, which is especially important within ethnically polarized states.54 The sub-state interactions, outlined above, are likely to involve multiple actors, and most of them are

---

53 For a detailed overview of what international actors can do to help the development of civil society within a democratizing state, see Diamond, “Promoting Democracy in the 1990s,” 311-70.

54 In fact, some analysts have argued that the sub-state level of interaction may be “the most important determining factor in the ability of external actors to influence the transformations” within democratizing states. See Dawisha and Turner, 398-424.
likely to occur on a voluntary basis.

In sum, when the fifth factor—the role of international actors—is introduced into the set of factors which reflect the ability of a multiethnic state to create a sustainable democratic political community, the combination of external and internal factors affecting the creation of a political community within a multiethnic state is the following:

(a) Influenced by international and domestic actors, the state (or groups with political power within a state-in-the-making) makes a decision on whether to include the opposing ethnic groups into the political process on an individual or a collective level,

(b) this process of community building “from above” must be sustained by the previously outlined developments within civil society (“below”).

CONCLUSION

The theoretical argument put forward in this chapter can be summarized as follows. Examination of the dominant approaches to political community building suggests that multiethnicity in and of itself does not constitute a danger, and in fact can be helpful toward the creation of a sustainable democratic community, especially in the beginning stages of democratization. By voicing their demands for cultural rights and spaces to carry out their cultural practices, ethnic communities can form opposition to the nondemocratic polities or help to strengthen nascent civil societies in emerging democracies. However, ethnic polarization does present a challenge. Polarization along ethnic lines means that ethnic identity becomes the only politically relevant identity. The
members of ethnic groups are also divided by their threat perception.

Memories of traumatic events that happened in the past, such as ethnic restructuring, are likely to engender polarization along ethnic lines and to become an impetus for the creation of active ethnopolitical groups which oppose the inclusion of “others” in the political process, and, subsequently, into the political community; or, alternatively, to become an impetus for the creation of active ethnopolitical groups which reject the state and oppose the dominant ethnic group.

This line of argumentation lends support to the thesis that the experience of ethnic restructuring significantly effects the ability of a democratizing state to successfully consolidate its emerging democracy. Ethnically restructured states, it is hypothesized, have an especially hard time creating inclusive democratic political communities, which is a necessary prerequisite for a consolidated democracy.

This line of argumentation suggests that analyses of democratic community building within multiethnic states should be sensitive to the historical experiences of ethnic groups instead of relying solely on numerical ethnic variation within the state. In other words, in order to hypothesize about the influence of the factors which may alleviate ethnic polarization, one needs to identify the sources of polarization. Examining the historical background underlying the relations between different ethnic groups enables us to make an analysis of the ways in which states try to overcome ethnic tensions—a necessary condition for the creation of a successful democratic regime.

If previous interactions between ethnic groups have resulted in polarization, then merely including the members from other ethnic communities in the political process—either on an individual or group basis—is not likely to help to dissolve ethnic
tensions. Assimilationist strategies of a centralized state, proposed by the individualist model, are likely to engender resistance from ethnic groups which expect group-based rights. Consociationalist power sharing agreements, suggested by pluralist models, are also likely to disintegrate if underlying ethnic tensions are not addressed. In such cases, the process of inclusion must be sustained by the developments conducive to a functioning civil society, such as the establishment of functioning democratic local governments, the development of the democratic state as a "service station," and the building of relationships of trust between the members of different ethnic groups.

The three strands of democratic theory on which this argument has been built assume that the state—its basic research unit—is relatively free from outside influences. Consequently, it is difficult to predict the dynamics of political community building in a triadic "host state-minority-mother state" setting. However, it is reasonable to suggest that the existence of a minority's mother state is likely to render the process of community building more complicated. This chapter hypothesizes that the most visible influence exerted by international actors will probably be "from above," i.e., affecting the institutionalized attitude of a state vis-a-vis its minority. Related questions about the international aspects of democratic community building, e.g., which mechanisms—bilateral (between the host state and the minority's mother state) or multilateral (involving other international actors, such as regional organizations)—are more effective when it comes to addressing minority issues in ethnically polarized states, will be answered in the empirical case studies that follow.
CHAPTER V

ETHNIC RESTRUCTURING IN THE BALTIC STATES:
HISTORICAL BACKGROUND FOR THE CASE STUDIES

The overall aim of this chapter is to undertake the first step in the case studies: to assess the degree of the ethnic restructuring that was carried out by the Soviet Union and to outline the response of the Baltic populations to this policy. Drawing on recently released historical studies and declassified documents, the first part of the chapter identifies the official goals of the ethnic restructuring that was carried out by the USSR. The second part of the chapter traces the process whereby this policy was implemented in the Baltic states. The account is supplemented by material from the memoirs of former deportees, which helps to describe what the immediate response on behalf of the local populations was. Since there were no reliable public opinion polls in the former Soviet Union prior to 1988, the analysis of memoirs and letters should help to evaluate this response and to hypothesize whether the policy induced long-lasting ethnic tension.

By drawing on recently released documents, the second part also assesses the degree of ethnic restructuring that took place in the three states and constructs two tables which capture the changes. One table presents the data—an approximate number of people deported from the Baltic states—which became available only recently. (The Soviet Union did not release the data on internal and external migration of its citizens.) In addition, it sheds light on some of the lesser known aspects of ethnic restructuring, such as postwar population exchanges and the attitude of the Soviet state toward non-territorial nationalities residing in the Baltic states. The last part of the chapter traces the activity of
groups with concrete political demands, the emergence of which was prompted by ethnic restructuring.¹

THE ETHNIC RESTRUCTURING CARRIED OUT BY THE SOVIET UNION: WHY AND HOW

Irving L. Horowitz wrote that states pursue drastic population policies, such as genocide, when the ruling elites decide that their survival in power is a higher goal than all other economic and social interests of the polity. Therefore, he argued, such population policies are a feature of totalitarian or authoritarian states.² His insight about the nature of drastic population policies sheds some light on the ways in which ethnic restructuring was carried out in the Soviet Union. Most drastic population resettlements were carried out during the totalitarian dictatorship of Stalin. The first Soviet actions against "enemies of the state" (which included rebellious ethnic groups in the Caucasus) were planned and carried out in twenties under the rule of Lenin. Later, during the era of Khrushchev and Brezhnev, less violent population policies were used as a tool of political control over non-Russian republics and autonomous regions. They consisted of state-sponsored russification and planned migration.

Despite differences in tactics, the policies of ethnic restructuring carried out by Soviet leaders all shared one trait: the existence of politically active national (and

¹The emergence of these groups is an indication of a political society, which should not be confused with civil society. Political society, however, usually plays a significant role during the initial stages of state building. For a discussion of political society, see Hann, 23.
²Kuper, 49.
especially nationalist) groups was considered to be an unwelcome legacy of the past and an obstacle to the survival of the Soviet state. Therefore, the Soviet state began to move around huge numbers of people within its ethnically heterogenous body, hoping to merge societies into socialist nations, which would never come into conflict with one another, would pursue identical political interests, and would smoothly integrate themselves into the central state. Hannah Arendt aptly described this process as trying to achieve a "heterogeneous uniformity" within the Soviet state.

Even though Soviet nationalities policy did not have "nation-killing" as its goal, it did try to reconstruct them. This Soviet-style constructivism consisted of two distinguishable, but interrelated components: compulsory resettlement (deportation) and planned migration. The primary goal of compulsory resettlement in the USSR was to disperse members of disobedient social groups. It involved a two-way population movement: when resettling a group from one area, the Communist leaders simultaneously repopulated that territory with an equal or even greater number of people from the other

---

3 Hélène Carrère d'Encausse, *Decline of an Empire: The Soviet Socialist Republics in Revolt* (New York: Newsweek Books, 1979), 46. She goes on to argue that the Soviets thought that the solution to the "national problem" was the eradication of national differences. The latter statement was effectively challenged by other scholars who argued that the suppression of nationalism, and not "nation-killing," was the ultimate goal of Soviet nationalities policy. See Yuri Slezkine, "The USSR as a Communal Apartment, or How a Socialist State Promoted Ethnic Particularism," in *Becoming National: A Reader*, ed. Geoff Eley and Ronald G. Suny (New York: Oxford University Press, 1996), 203-38.

4 This description of the socialist nations is from Simon, 6.


6 In addition, Soviet constructivism included what can be called nation-building, especially during the twenties and the thirties. The Soviet Union created administrative units along ethnic lines and even attempted to modernize "primitive" societies. Slezkine, 210.
areas of the multinational state. Thus, the policy of ethnic restructuring usually resulted in the movements of people in two directions. On the one hand, thousands of people were put into railway cars and deported to the underdeveloped parts of the USSR, such as Siberia or Tajikistan. On the other hand, depopulated villages and cities were repopulated with newcomers from other parts of the USSR. Eugene Kulischer documented this aspect of the policy after World War II: "a flood of migrants [was] moving westward into all marches between the Arctic and the Black Sea." This flow of people coincided with intense collectivization and industrialization which demanded cheap labor. Consequently, the need for a mobile work force in a command economy was another reason for the mass resettlements carried out by the Soviet Union.

Forced resettlement policies were first used by the USSR to deport hundreds of thousands of kulaks (farmers and peasants) during the period of collectivization. Some have traced the origins of this policy to the fifteenth century, when Russian knights in Moscow and Novgorod practiced the principles of Razwod, "separation," and Wywod, "taking away," to control their disobedient populations. In the Soviet Union, the "extermination" of the kulaks was over by 1933. After that deportations were pursued mostly for political reasons (e.g., to punish people for collaborating with the Germans...

---

8Kulischer, 300. 
during World War II or to suppress nationalism), even though the label “kulak” was still used. This also applies to the Baltic states, occupied by the USSR in 1940 and once again in 1944: not only farmers and peasants, but, first and foremost, those who opposed the regime were likely to be deported.

Following the scheme devised by Pavel Polian, compulsory resettlements in the Soviet Union were carried out according to social criteria (e.g., former members of the nobility and kulaks), ethnicity (e.g., the “guilty nations” of Germans, Chechens, Ingush, etc., but also Georgians, who were moved into areas formerly occupied by the Ingush, and Ukrainians, who were moved into areas formerly occupied by the Tatars), religious and political orientation (e.g., former members of non-Communist religious and political organizations), and other criteria (e.g., the family members of persons who fell into any of the other categories, foreigners, and prisoners of war). Non-repressive migrations were planned migrations for industrialization, which aimed to replace those who had been deported. In addition, since migration within the Soviet Union was strictly controlled by a special residence permit (“propiska”) system, the state could create artificial migration into disobedient national and ethnic areas and thus pursue a policy of gradual denationalization.

Although ethnic restructuring did include several cases of ethnic cleansing (i.e.,

---


population restructuring that is directed against an entire ethnic group), the major goal of this policy was really social homogenization. This is because, in most cases, the Soviets gauged the success of their policy based on whether or not it was capable of suppressing those groups that were opposed to the Soviet state, especially those that opposed its plans to create *kolkhozes* (collective farms). To illustrate, on 10 February 1948, Khrushchev, who was the leader of the Ukrainian Communist party at that time, complained to the Central Committee of the Communist Party in Moscow that the peasants in Western Ukraine were not willing to join *kolkhozes*. He suggested that more “kulaks” ought to be deported in order to “fix the problem.” As a result, 11,456 people were deported from the area, and the “problem” was solved.13 Similarly, Rezev, the Minister of Internal Affairs for the Estonian SSR, wrote in a letter to Kruglov, the Minister of Internal Affairs for the Soviet Union, that “approximately one half of all farmsteads in Estonia were transformed into collective farms as a result of successful deportations carried out in 1949.”14

In 1954, after Stalin’s death, the Soviets began to relax the policy of compulsory resettlement. Limited mobility was granted to some who were in the places of deportation, and children under the age of ten were removed from the lists of deported people.15 At that time, at least 1,820,140 people, most of whom were German, were still living in camps in the places of deportation.16 Two years later, in 1956, during the 20th Congress of the Communist Party, the policy of ethnic restructuring was reevaluated for the first time.

---

13 Zhukov, quoted by Grunskis, 126.
14 This letter was written in April 1949. It is reproduced in *Võimatu Vaiikida* [It Is Impossible to Be Silent], ed. Hilda Sabbo (Tallinn: Ühiselu, 1996), 871-79.
15 Simon, 241.
16 There were at least 75,024 Lithuanians, 33,102 Latvians, and 16,070 Estonians in deportation then. Grunskis, 140.
Khrushchev delivered a speech on Stalin’s crimes, condemning the mass repressions carried out by his predecessor. He criticized the application of collective guilt whereby whole families of kulaks and whole nations were punished using deportation. Yet, as Nikolai F. Bougai, a Russian historian, observes, “a close examination of formerly unavailable documents revealed that Khrushchev supported and actively participated in the compulsory resettlement of more than 550,000 residents of the Ukraine . . . Therefore, any assertion that Khrushchev was sincere in his denunciation of these policies [i.e., ethnic restructuring] in the speech condemning his predecessor should be taken with a grain of salt.” The memoirs of the former deportees and other documents support his opinion: even during the time of the “thaw” those who streamed back to their homes were forcibly returned to the places of deportation.

After Khruschev was removed from power, almost no critical articles dealing with deportations, planned migration and other nationality-related issues appeared in the Soviet press. In 1962-67, the “debates” in the journal Voprosy Istorii [The Questions about History] and Izvestiya [the national newspaper] on whether to speed up the “fusion” of the

17 “Khruschev’s Secret Speech on Stalin’s Crimes.” in Frank Chalk and Kurt Jonassohn, The History and Sociology of Genocide (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1990), 300-22. Khruschev implied that only “military considerations” (i.e., the beginning of World War II) could have justified mass deportations.
18 Bougai and Gonov, 9.
19 E.g., see the narratives in the collection Lietuvos naikinimas ir tautos kova 1940-1998 [The Destruction of Lithuania and National Resistance 1940-1998], comp. Izidorius Ignatavičius (Vilnius: Vaga, 1999), 186, 214, 246. On 12 October 1957, the Estonian SSR adopted a law prohibiting “persons guilty of especially serious state crimes and former members of bourgeois government of Estonia, leaders of nationalist political parties and organizations . . .” to return to Estonia. Following the rulings from Moscow, similar laws were adopted by the Latvian and Lithuanian SSRs.
Soviet nations into the Soviet state never questioned the main tenet of the Soviet nationalities policy—the inviolability of the Moscow-centered Soviet “community” of nations, created with the help of planned migration and russification.\(^{21}\)

The use of ethnic restructuring was revisited in 1982. In a speech written for the 60th anniversary of Soviet nationalities policy, Yuri Andropov mentioned “millions of Germans, Poles, Koreans, Kurds, and representatives of other nationalities . . . who should be viewed as full citizens of the USSR.”\(^{22}\) Andropov, however, soon died and no real effort was made to address the legacy of ethnic restructuring or to rehabilitate its victims.

Five years later, on 14 November 1989, following a stormy session of the Congress of People’s Deputies, an announcement was made that the “forced resettlements carried out by the Soviet Union were illegal.”\(^{23}\) This was the first official statement to that effect. A similar statement is present in the “Concept of the Nationalities Policy” of the Russian Federation, the successor to the USSR, which was adopted on 15 June 1996.

The Russian Federation continues to exploit the issue of the resettled Russian speakers to assert its influence in the region. Cashing in on the legacy of ethnic restructuring, the Russian policy of diaspora instrumentalization (the “Karaganov doctrine”) includes three components. First, it encourages the Russian diaspora to stay in the post-Soviet states so that the Russian speakers could be used as a leverage in fulfilling

\(^{21}\)One group of scholars (“internationalists”) advocated an accelerated russification to achieve rapprochement of different national cultures in the USSR. Their opponents (“nationalists”) argued that retaining individual nations could only enrich the “Soviet community.” Ian Pennar, “A New Turn in the Soviet Nationalities Policy,” *Radio Liberty Research Note*, a Russian edition (20 June, 1967).

\(^{22}\)Bougai, “Postsovetskaya Rossiya” [Post Soviet Russia].

Russia's foreign policy objectives. According to the doctrine, Russia can defend its diaspora against "discrimination" by using diplomacy and economic pressure. The doctrine calls for closer economic links between Russia and Russian-owned enterprises in the former Soviet republics, so that a base for Russian political influence is formed. Third, it calls to strengthen cultural ties between Russia and minorities living in post Soviet entities.24

Following the doctrine, in February 1994, the Russian foreign minister Kozyrev declared the Baltic states a source of a threat and underlined the possibility of using force to protect the Russian speaking population in Estonia and Latvia. Furthermore, in a report issued on 24 September 1999, the Russian Foreign Policy and Defense Policy Working Group stressed that "the Baltic states will always be included in the zone of Russia's vital interest." The report also denounced the "anti-Russian policy" of the Balts, which supposedly is directed against Russia and its ethnic minorities.25

The Baltic leaders have continued to press Russia to acknowledge and apologize for the abuses related to ethnic restructuring.26 The parliaments of the three states have

26Such demands are voiced by some Russians as well. E.g., Yuri Afanasyev, the rector of the Moscow Humanitarian University, argued that Russia should apologize to the Baltic states. This would be a step toward a democratic federation. "Let Yeltsin Repent Stalin's Sins," interview conducted by Kadri Liik. Postimees (23 August, 1999). 2. Even though in August 1994 Yeltsin said that he "condemned the Stalinist crimes perpetrated against the Republic of Latvia," so far, there has been no official recognition and apology for the occupation. See "Yeltsin Condemns Stalinist Crimes Against Latvia," Radio Free Europe A-WIRE (1994). Open Society Archives, Budapest, collection 300, file 80/6/15.
adopted resolutions urging Russia to take responsibility for the Soviet past. During his August 1998 meeting with Valentina Matviyenko, then-Deputy Prime Minister of Russia and Co-chairman of the Estonian-Russian Intergovernmental Committee, Estonia's president Lennart Meri said that it was important for the development of the relations between two countries that Russia accepts the judgement given by the democratic world to the events of 1940 in Estonia.

The Baltic states have used various international institutions as a forum to voice their demands for apology. Thus, during a summer 1998 meeting of the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe, Tunne Kelam, a member of the Estonian delegation, joined by the members of the Lithuanian delegation, argued that the individuals deported from the Baltic states (who are still in Russia) should be allowed to return to their homelands and receive compensation (from Russia). Furthermore, it was argued that the "normalization" of Balto-Russian relations was impossible without an official recognition by Russia of the crimes related to ethnic restructuring.

Writing in the *International Herald Tribune* on 14 May 1999, Latvian Foreign Minister Valdis Birkavs asked Russia to "look at itself in the mirror" and "to accept the facts of their own history." "An acknowledgment of Russia's role in Latvian history in this

---


century will defuse many of the sensitive problems related to naturalization of [Russian] non-citizens,” wrote Birkavs.\textsuperscript{30} Tracing the process whereby ethnic restructuring was conducted in the Baltic states helps to understand why its legacy is still a raw nerve in Russo-Baltic relations—both on the international and domestic levels.

SOVIET CONSTRUCTIVISM IN ACTION: THE BALTIC STATES

*Compulsory Resettlement, or Deportations*

According to the official documents, deportations in the Baltic states were not pursued according to ethnic criteria. In 1940 and 1941, the most often cited reasons for deportations and repressions were "activities against the revolution" and "punishment for property owners."\textsuperscript{31} Those who were deported from the Baltic states were referred to as "anti-Soviet, criminal, and socially dangerous elements."\textsuperscript{32} Officially, the length of exile

\textsuperscript{31}According to Gabor T. Rittersporn, "Gegenrevolutionäre Aktivität" [Crimes Against the Revolution] were the official reasoning for 33.1% of deportations to the camps in 1940 and 28.7% in 1941. "Straftaten gegen Eigentum" [Punishment for Property Owners] were the reasoning for 12.1% of deportations to the camps in 1940 and 13.5% in 1941. He based his calculations on the documents from the Russian State Archive. Gabor T. Rittersporn, “Gab Es Etnische Säuberung in der Sowjetunion?” [Was There an Ethnic Cleansing in the Soviet Union?], paper presented on 7 January 1999 at Europa-Universität-Viadrina in Frankfurt (Oder), Germany.
was limited from ten to twenty years, but beginning with 1949, the duration of deportation was supposed to be lifelong.\textsuperscript{33} It is not surprising, therefore, that many from the Baltic diaspora in the places of deportation, who did not return to Lithuania, Latvia, or Estonia in the fifties after Khrushchev’s amnesty, became Russian speakers or simply perished. Only in the mid-nineties, the Baltic governments began to reach out to the former deportees, still living in the far regions of the former USSR, encouraging them to come back.\textsuperscript{34}

In all three states, deportations were carried out according to the same plan. As explained by the order “On the Expulsion of Anti-Soviet Elements from Lithuania, Latvia, and Estonia,” signed by Commissar Serov, the official primary goal of the Soviet deportations in the Baltic states in 1941 was to clean out all “alien elements”—members of non-Communist organizations, policemen, owners of plants, officers, government employees and the members of their families.\textsuperscript{35} The other goal of planned resettlements was to speed up transition to collective farms. To illustrate, in a letter addressed to Zhdanov, the Secretary of the Central Committee of the Soviet Communist Party, Botschkarev, a Soviet representative to Estonia, suggested that the problem of unequal distribution of land in Estonia and surrounding regions could be solved by resettling poor

\textsuperscript{33}Grunskis, 11.
\textsuperscript{34}E.g., preparing for his visit to Moscow in May 1998, the Latvian President Guntis Ulmanis, a former deportee himself, said that he would like to visit Latvians residing in Siberia after his visit to Moscow, and called for legal and financial measures by the parliament and the government to help them to return to Latvia. FBIS-SOV-98-145 (25 May, 1998). In his speech at the Conference “The Destruction and Defense of Lithuania,” the Lithuanian President Valdas Adamkus called for the “social rehabilitation” of the Lithuanians deported to Siberia who want to come back to their homeland. Valstybės žinios, The Destruction and Defence of Lithuania (Vilnius: Valstybės žinios, 1998), 34.
\textsuperscript{35}Lietuvos Istorijos Institutas. 14-20. The document was written not earlier than 19 May 1941.
Russian villagers from the region of Petschory to the lands inhabited by Estonian farmers.\textsuperscript{36}

The official goal of Soviet deportations during the period 1945-48 was to crush Baltic resistance fighters and their supporters. This time, deportations were carried out according to ten categories, which included German nationals, families who had arrived from Germany during the years of occupation, and "traitors" (almost anyone could classify as a traitor).\textsuperscript{37} The most massive deportations were carried out on 25-29 March 1949 in Latvia (at least 41,708 people) and Estonia (at least 20,480) and on 22-27 May 1948 in Lithuania (approximately 41,000 people, see Table 1). In 1948-49, about 200,000 people were deported from the Baltic states.\textsuperscript{38} The last deportation took place in 1953 in Lithuania, when families suspected of supporting the anti-Soviet resistance movement were deported.

Despite the claims in official documents, national identity, however, did play a role in the deportations under Stalin. In the late thirties, when Stalin became uneasy about the possibility of another major war breaking out in Europe and thought that all neighboring countries (including Finland and the Baltic states) represented a threat to the security of the Soviet Union, he began to draft plans of repression along "national lines." Thus, Poles, Balts or Finns who were in the USSR became viewed as potential enemies of the state.

\textsuperscript{36} A letter dated 21 October 1940. Sabbo, 688-89.

\textsuperscript{37} Directive No. 0165, entitled “Registration of the anti-Soviet and Contra-revolutionary elements,” written by J. Bartasius and A. Guzevicius, the directors of the secret police in Lithuania. Reproduced in Grunskis, 59.

Table 1. Number of People Deported from the Baltic States by the Soviet Union, 1940 to 1953 (partly estimates)*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>1940-1941</th>
<th>1945-49</th>
<th>Mass deportations, 1948-49</th>
<th>Total, 1940-53</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Estonia</strong></td>
<td>At least 10,605 (Salo)**</td>
<td>1949: 20,702 (Terekhov's report)</td>
<td>25-30 March 1949: 20,480 (Spasenko's report)</td>
<td>At least 40,455 (Memento cards)***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Population in 1934: 1,126,000</td>
<td>1941: 5,978 (Terekhov's report)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>At least 10,605 (Salo)**</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1949: 20,702 (Terekhov's report)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>25-30 March 1949: 20,480 (Spasenko's report)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>20,702 (Terekhov's report)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Latvia</td>
<td>16,563 (Vĕvers' report)</td>
<td>43,904 (Vĕvers' report)</td>
<td>25-30 March 1949: 41,708 (Spasenko's report)</td>
<td>At least 60,469 (Vĕvers' report)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Population in 1935: 1,905,000</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lithuania</td>
<td>18,093 (Grunskis) 19,285 (Kerulis)**</td>
<td>86,654 (Grunskis)</td>
<td>22-27 May 1948: 41,000 (LGGRTC)</td>
<td>Appr. 132,000 (LGGRTC)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Population in 1923: 2,620,000</td>
<td>1939-41: appr. 26,000 (LGGRTC)***</td>
<td></td>
<td>25-30 March 1949: 28,656 (Spasenko's report)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Notes:

* "Repatriation" of Germans is not considered.

** Salo and Kerulis used the lists of deportees compiled during the German occupation, and the Nazi authorities had forbidden mention of the deportees of Jewish descent.

*** includes the Eastern territories, formerly Poland, occupied by USSR in 1939.

**** Memento, the organization of Illegally Repressed in Estonia, has compiled 40,455 cards of deportees, but this number is estimated to be much higher.

Sources:


Grunskis.

Kerulis, Leonas, quoted by Anušauskas, 12.
In the late thirties and in 1940, many Balts who at the time resided in the territory of the Soviet Union were deported or otherwise repressed purely on the basis of their ethnicity.\textsuperscript{39} Feelings of insecurity vis-a-vis Germany were the most likely cause of these mass resettlements as well as the ones that occurred in the Baltic states in June of 1941. The "Memorial" historians in Russia argue that the reasoning behind this policy was the belief that Russia was "surrounded by enemies," and that it had to remove the "enemies" from its own territory.\textsuperscript{40}

\textsuperscript{39}E.g., on the certificate of rehabilitation, issued to Erna Melgal, there is a line which indicates that the reason for repression [on 23 June 1940] was "the person is Latvian." In 1940 Melgal resided in Kirovsk, Russia. The certificate is kept in the Museum of Occupation in Riga. Museum of Occupation, Riga, Latvia (July 1999).

\textsuperscript{40}N. V. Petrov, A. B. Roginsky. "'Pol'skaya operatsiya' NKVD 1937-1938 gg." [NKVD's "Polish Operation" in 1937-1938], in Memorial, Istoričeskiye sborniki "Memoiral': Repressii protiv polyakov i pol'skich grazhdan [The "Memorial's" Historical Collections: Repressions against the Poles and Citizens of Poland] (Moscow: Zvenya, 1997), 32-33.
Nationality as a criterion for deportations within the territory of the Baltic states was openly used only after the Second World War, in 1945, in order to "cleanse out" Germans and everybody related to them from the Baltic states. Residents of the Baltic states with German names found themselves being dragged out of their homes to be deported.\textsuperscript{41} Resistance fighters, also known as "forest brothers," were referred to as "Lithuanian- (or Latvian- or Estonian-) German nationalists" who in the eyes of the Soviet state deserved the same fate as the Germans.\textsuperscript{42}

Not only the Germans, but also other minorities who lived in the Baltic states were not spared from mass deportations. As early as September 1940, the Soviet state began to "denationalize" the Baltic states by searching not only for Lithuanian, Latvian, Estonian, but also for Byelorussian, Polish, Jewish, Russian, and German members of ethnic (or, in the Soviet jargon, nationalist) organizations.\textsuperscript{43}

In general, since there were so many categories for deportation (e.g., in 1941, there were as many as fourteen categories according to which people from the Baltic states had been deported), people had no idea why their relatives were being taken away and loaded

---

\textsuperscript{41}This is especially true in the case of the Germans from Lithuania, many of whom returned to their country of residence in 1942-1943 after the 1941 transfer to Germany. They were deported (by the Soviets) strictly on the basis of their nationality, which was often determined by their last names. Nastazija Kairiukštytė, "Lietuvos vokiečiai—pirmieji pokario metų tremtiniai" [The Lithuanian Germans—the First Deportees of the Post-war Years], \textit{Lietuvos Istorijos Metraštis} (1993): 92-105, and Patrik von zur Muehlen, "Die Umsiedlung und Vertreibung der Deutsch-Balten 1939-1945" [Resettlement and Expulsion of the Baltic Germans], in \textit{Flucht und Vertreibung} [Flight and Expulsion], ed. Robert Streibel (Vienna: Picus Verlag, 1994), 188-200.

\textsuperscript{42}The directive to deport Germans from Lithuania was signed on 16 December 1944. This directive ordered that everybody who is related in any way to Germans must be deported. The directive is reproduced in Lietuvos Istorijos Institutas, 95-97. For a document reflecting the results the partisans' and their families' deportation, see ibid., 120-21.

\textsuperscript{43}Anušauskas, 44.
onto cattle-cars. Furthermore, there is evidence that the repressive institutions of the state
sometimes fabricated evidence about "guilt" by creating bogus resistance organizations
and accusing people of taking part in them. Thus, often people who had nothing to do
with the resistance and those who were even friendly to the regime were deported.

This happened as early as 1940-41, when the Soviet regime was still trying
ardently to find collaborators among the local population. This fact emerges from the
memoirs of the deportees:

"Being put onto the truck, we saw the family of Vytautas Duoba, whom we knew
very well, approaching," writes Valentinas Gustainis, the former Director of Elta,
the Lithuanian news agency, deported in 1940. "The parents of Duoba were poor
peasants from an old peasant commune in Žemaičių Panemunė. The Duobos had a
couple of hectares of land. They lived together with their old mother, who had
never taken a bus, train, or car before in her life. Duoba had two little girls and a
pregnant wife. The women were walking barefoot, trying to save the soles on their
shoes... We considered the Duobas to be pro-Soviet not only because of their
[proletariat] origin, but also because of their beliefs. Vytautas Duoba had
congratulated the Soviet regime in Lithuania. He became the first leader of the
Kriukai district, and was an enthusiastic servant of the Soviet regime. And there
he was, with us! Why? We did not know, and neither did they. Realizing that not
only the intelligentsia from the Baltic states was being deported, we began to calm
down a little bit: maybe we won't be shot."

The wide scope of the deportations (see Table 1), which meant that almost anyone,
including children, could be deported, created panic and fear among the Baltic
populations, especially in June 1941. The survivors write that villagers rushed to church
to pray, believing that this was the end of the world. NKVD (Secret police) accounts

---

44During the process of rehabilitation of some victims in 1952, the NKVD
admitted that such organizations were created. Lietuvos Ypatingasis Archyvas [The
Special Archive of Lithuania], Vilnius, collection K-1, file 2-3.
45Valentinas Gustainis, Be Kaltes: 15 metų Sibiro tremtyje ir lageriuose [Without
46Lius Truska, Lietuva 1938-1953 metais [Lithuania in 1938-1953] (Kaunas:
Šviesa, 1995), 91.
suggest that during the days of mass deportations, such as 14 June 1941 or 25-29 March 1949, there was a widespread belief in the Baltic states that "all Estonians" (or Latvians and Lithuanians) were going to be deported. To illustrate, in his letter to Kruglov, the USSR Minister of Internal Affairs, Rezev wrote, "After the operation (i.e., deportation) was finished, some residents of Estonia were spreading a rumor that forced resettlement is not over yet and that all Estonians must be deported."47

Similar thoughts were expressed by the survivors who remembered mass deportations: "In 1949 there were the deportations which affected my close relatives and neighbors. There was nervousness, that the same might happen to us. There were even explicit threats: If you don’t join the kolkhoz, you’ll find yourself traveling towards the white bears."48 Explicit threats are mentioned in numerous other accounts: "There [i.e., in the place where people were being forced to sign up for kolkhoz] were files from the Secret police containing information about everyone. Jurevičius, the Soviet collaborator, reads [the material from the files] and then [verbally] assaults his victims. Sebecki is the first to be [verbally] attacked. . . . Jurevičius says, ‘see, we have some data about you.’ After that, Sebecki signs up for the kolkhoz."49

During the postwar years and long after, the fear of deportations permeated the interaction among those who were left behind.50 This fear was aggravated by public acts of violence. Repressions used against the resistance fighters were especially cruel. The dead bodies of partisans were sometimes left in the middle of the city for "recognition."

47Sabbo, 878.
48Skultans, 37.
49Ignatavičius, 163.
50Skultans, 59.
However, even mothers of the killed could not "recognize" their sons because this meant deportation along with the rest of their families.51

Bitterness toward those co-ethnics who collaborated with the ruling regime is a recurring theme in the narratives of those deported from Lithuania: "My sister and I nearly went mad from fear [during the scene of deportation]. . . . B. Lečaitė-Požėrienė, a member of the central Committee of the Lithuanian Communist Party, a 28-year old woman, was calmly sitting at the table. Her son was as old as mine, and she was married to my godfather Jurgis Požéra, but she had no pity for us. . . . From time to time she gave orders to her co-workers who were looting our house."52

"I remember so well that Lithuanian executioners (of the deportations) were much more cruel than the Russians. The Russians told us that we will not be shot, but driven to Siberia instead, and we will have to stay there. Therefore, we should take warm clothes with us."53 "Two soldiers and one Lithuanian participated in the operation of the deportation. The Lithuanian was especially cruel: he gave us (only) half an hour to get ready. We were told not to take anything with us because we would have everything."54

These Lithuanian narratives were probably influenced by the fact that the level of cooperation with the Soviet regime, especially in the post-Stalinist years, was somewhat higher than that in Latvia or Estonia. This was particularly true at the level of nomenklatura (elites). The Communist Party in Lithuania had the greatest percentage of indigenous population members. To illustrate, in 1970, the Latvian Communist Party

51Gaškaitė, 49.
52Ignatavičius, 44.
54Matulkaitė, 19.
included 40.2%, the Estonian—52.3%, and the Lithuanian—even 67.1% locals.\textsuperscript{55} In 1990, there were 70.3% “indigenous” (Lithuanian) and 21.9% Russian party members in Lithuania. The corresponding number for Latvia was 34.5% and 43.5%; 49.9% and 38.6% for Estonia.\textsuperscript{56} During his 33-year rule, Antanas Sniečkus, a Lithuanian-bom Soviet leader, who was well liked by Stalin and who was able to establish friendly relations with other Soviet leaders, surrounded himself with Lithuanian-born nomenklatura instead of importing helpers from Moscow. Little help was needed because Sniečkus and his Lithuanian followers were ardent supporters of deportations.\textsuperscript{57}

In contrast to this, national Communists in the other two Baltic republics attempted to resist ethnic restructuring. For example, Simson, the Chief Justice of the Estonian SSR, and other members of the Estonian nomenklatura, wrote a letter to Moscow asking to let the formerly deported to settle in Estonia instead of hiding in neighboring Latvia or Pskov region. (Even though many of the formerly deported were formally "rehabilitated" at that time, they were not allowed to go back to their homeland.\textsuperscript{58}) Moscow suppressed any resistance to ethnic restructuring by substituting the rebellious Communists with those who were more obedient. The latter were usually implanted from other parts of the USSR.\textsuperscript{59}

---

\textsuperscript{56}Fowkes, 212-13.
\textsuperscript{57}Tininis.
\textsuperscript{58}\textit{Obyasnitel'naya zapiska} [An Explanatory Note], dated 5 May 1965, asked the central government to reverse the 12 October 1957 order which forbade some of the formerly deported to live in their homeland. Sabbo, 1082-83.
\textsuperscript{59}In 1959, the Latvian Communists, led by Eduards Berklavs, attempted to reverse the demographic trend by resisting ethnic restructuring. A purge of 2,000 Latvian “national Communists” was undertaken in July 1959. Berklavs was deported to Siberia. Dreifelds, 45-46. Estonia experienced a similar purge in 1950-51. Also see Taagepera.
Resistance to ethnic restructuring came not only from "above," but also from "below." During the forties and fifties, many Baltic deportees wrote to numerous institutions asking to revise their cases and to let them return to their homeland. Out of thousands of pleas only 278 were satisfied in 1951-52. However, there is evidence suggesting that family reunions were allowed.

The letters seized by the secret police suggest that many tried to escape, especially after the end of World War II: "Do not just wait there, wrote one deportee to those still in Siberia, sell everything and go back to Lithuania. While traveling speak Russian all the time, dress like Russians do, and nobody will ask you for documents."

On 27 March 1953, the USSR Supreme Soviet declared amnesty for some deportees. Between 1954 and 1958, approximately 22,200 people (mostly ethnic Lithuanians) came back to Lithuania from the places of deportation. Approximately 71,522 survivors were allowed to settle in Lithuania. In 1957, commissions for rehabilitation were set up in the three Baltic republics, but the number of people rehabilitated was not substantial. In Latvia’s case, approximately 8.5% (13,480) of all people deported in 1949 were allowed to return. Homecoming continued until 1961.

---

_Estonia: Return to Independence_, 85.
60 Bougai, _The Deportation of Peoples in the Soviet Union_, 170.
61 Lietuvos Ypatingasis Archyvas [The Special Archive of Lithuania], Vilnius, collection K-1, file 10-39.
63 Sabbo, 1087.
Approximately 31,000 survivors resettled to Soviet Latvia. Ani, the Minister of Social Order in Estonian SSR, reported that 2,280 people were rehabilitated in the postwar years. From 1940 to 1989, 42,420 Estonians were repatriated from the East.

However, permission to return home did not imply housing nor any civil rights. The passports of the previously deported were stamped, and access to universities, trips abroad, or certain jobs was strictly limited. Their family members also faced similar restrictions. *Lietuvos Bažnyčios Kronika*, a publication of the Lithuanian resistance produced in Chicago, often published the letters of deportees. In 1975, Kęstutis Jokūbynas wrote: "[After deportation], I got a passport with a stamp which is used to mark the passports of prisoners jailed for the worst crimes. It meant numerous restrictions."

Even though Jokūbynas was innocent, he wrote that after deportation "a chasm was opened in my life, and it is impossible to bridge it. . . . I became invisible, unknown, silent."

This chasm—the experience of deportations—separated the deportees from the acquiescent members of the Baltic Soviet societies. Coupled with nationality registration in the internal USSR passport, the experience of deportation also opened a chasm that was

---

65Sabbo, 1076.
67*Lietuvos Bažnyčios Kronika* was a unique Lithuanian phenomenon. In Latvia, the Lutheran Church had very few possibilities to publish, and the publications were mostly limited to the church calendars. See Talonen, 293.
separating the Russian speaking newcomers and noncompliant Latvians, Estonians and Lithuanians. Those who returned to their native towns had to compete with the Russian speaking newcomers for a place to live and other resources. From its inception, the Soviet regime regarded the Russian speakers as its core supporters, and extended a privileged access to scarce goods and services to many of them. The indigenous population clustered in the countryside, while the capital cities became a home to numerous Russian-speakers. Thus, in 1979, the "titular" (territorial) nationals constituted 88.2% of rural population in Estonia, 73% in Latvia and 87.1% in Lithuania. They constituted only 32.2% of Tallinn residents, 40.9% of Riga, and 42.8% of Vilnius.

*Migration into the Baltic Republics*

Differences in migrant flows into the Baltic republics became apparent only in post-Stalinist years. As a matter of fact, mass migration into the Baltic republics did not start until the spring of 1941. In 1940, entry into the Baltic republics from other parts of the Soviet Union was highly selective. Only members of the Communist party and other important organs of the state were allowed to come to the Baltic republics.

---

69 The Soviets started the "cleansing of the cities from the unwanted" as early as 1940 by introducing passport regime. They openly identified the Russian speakers living in Petschory region as the core basis of their new regime. Sabbo, 681-85.

70 E.g., in 1989, ethnic Russians constituted 20.2% in Vilnius, 36.5% in Riga, and 41.2% in Tallinn. Georgiy I. Mirsky, *On Ruins of Empire: Ethnicity and Nationalism in the Former Soviet Union* (Westport, Conn.: Greenwood, 1997), 146.


72 Liudas Truska, "Lietuvos valdžios įstaigų rusifikavimas 1940-1941" [The
Since most of the members of the Baltic intelligentsia and most civil servants had been deported or repressed in 1940-41, the new regime lacked people. Soviet collaborators in Estonia sent a note to A. A. Andrejev, Secretary of the Central Committee of the Soviet Communist Party, in which they wrote that "despite the fact that many young Communists were incorporated into the Central Committee of the Estonian Communist Party, there is a dire necessity to strengthen many aspects of the party’s activities. We ask the Central Committee of the Communist Party to send experienced Communists of Estonian nationality to Estonia." Moscow responded readily to such invitations. In addition to the Communists of Baltic nationality, it sent numerous Russians. The most populous inflow of Russian speakers started in mid-1941, after the first mass deportation of the Baltic peoples. At that time, the greatest number of new Russian-speaking migrants worked for those state institutions responsible for carrying out acts of repression, such as the militia, the Communist party, or the secret police.

After World War II, the percentage of Russian speakers increased from 8.2% (1934) to 30.3% (1989) in Estonia, 8.8% (1935) to 34% (1989) in Latvia and 2.5% (1923) to 8.6% (1989) in Lithuania. At the same time, the percentage comprised by indigenous ethnic groups declined from 88.2% (1934) to 61.5% (1989) in Estonia, 77% (1935) to 52% (1989) in Latvia, but increased from 69.2% (1923) to 80.1% (1989) in Lithuania (Table 2). The exact number of Russian speakers who came to the Baltic states is still unknown, but the peak of the influx probably occurred during the postwar years. About 400,000

---

73A note dated 14 January 1941, in Sabbo, 730-32.
Russians and 100,000 people of other nationalities immigrated into Latvia from 1945 to 1959, which was equivalent to 25% of the prewar population.\textsuperscript{75} In comparison, at least 60,469 were deported during that time (Table 1). In 1951-90, 2,171,033 immigrants came to Latvia, some of whom settled for a longer period of time.\textsuperscript{76} More than 213,000 non-Estonians came to Estonia in 1945-53 (19% of prewar population),\textsuperscript{77} while at least 40,455 were deported. During 1945-89, 1.4 million (mostly) Russian speakers traversed the country (not including the military personnel). From 1944 to 1959, at least 150,000 Russian speakers immigrated to Lithuania,\textsuperscript{78} and approximately 132,000 people were deported. These numbers suggest that Latvia has experienced the highest level of ethnic restructuring, and Lithuania—the lowest.

The influx of Russian speakers bothered the indigenous populations. Reports of the former Secret police and the intercepted letters to be sent abroad attest to the existence of severe ethnic polarization in the Baltic states, especially until 1953, when deportations were still being conducted.

\textsuperscript{75}Romuald J. Misiunas and Rein Taagepera, \textit{The Baltic States: Years of Dependence, 1940-1990} (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1993), 112.
\textsuperscript{78}Nastazija Kairiūkštytė, “Lietuvos gyventojų dinamika ir jos įtaka gyventojų skaičiuo, tautiniam pasiskirstymui 5-6-ajame dešimtmetyje” [The Dynamics of the Lithuanian Residents and Its Influence for the Number of Residents, and Their Ethnic Division in the Fifties and Sixties], 109.
Table 2. Change in Ethnic Composition of the Populations of Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1934</td>
<td>1934</td>
<td>1934</td>
<td>1934</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>ESTONIA</strong></td>
<td>1935</td>
<td>1935</td>
<td>1935</td>
<td>1935</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Estonian</td>
<td>88.2%</td>
<td>74.6%</td>
<td>61.5%</td>
<td>65.20%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Russian</td>
<td>8.2%</td>
<td>20.1%</td>
<td>30.3%</td>
<td>28.09%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>German</td>
<td>1.5%</td>
<td>0.1%</td>
<td>0.2%</td>
<td>0.09%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jewish</td>
<td>0.4%</td>
<td>0.5%</td>
<td>0.3%</td>
<td>0.16%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other</td>
<td>1.7%</td>
<td>4.7%</td>
<td>7.7%</td>
<td>6.46%*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total Population</td>
<td>1.1264</td>
<td>1.1968</td>
<td>1.5657</td>
<td>1.44558</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(million)</td>
<td>(million)</td>
<td>(million)</td>
<td>(million)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>LATVIA</strong></td>
<td>1935</td>
<td>1935</td>
<td>1935</td>
<td>1935</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Latvian</td>
<td>77.0%</td>
<td>62.0%</td>
<td>52.0%</td>
<td>55.7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Russian</td>
<td>8.8%</td>
<td>26.6%</td>
<td>34.0%</td>
<td>32.3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jewish</td>
<td>4.9%</td>
<td>1.7%</td>
<td>0.9%</td>
<td>0.4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>German</td>
<td>3.3%</td>
<td>0.1%</td>
<td>0.1%</td>
<td>0.1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other</td>
<td>6.0%</td>
<td>9.6%</td>
<td>9.3%</td>
<td>11.5%**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total Population</td>
<td>1.905</td>
<td>2.094</td>
<td>2.667</td>
<td>2.439445</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(million)</td>
<td>(million)</td>
<td>(million)</td>
<td>(million)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>LITHUANIA</strong></td>
<td>1923</td>
<td>1923</td>
<td>1923</td>
<td>1923</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lithuanian</td>
<td>83.88%</td>
<td>80.1%</td>
<td>79.6%</td>
<td>82.26%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Russian</td>
<td>2.49%</td>
<td>8.6%</td>
<td>9.4%</td>
<td>8.21%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jewish</td>
<td>7.58%</td>
<td>0.8%</td>
<td>0.3%</td>
<td>0.16%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Polish</td>
<td>3.23%</td>
<td>7.7%</td>
<td>7.0%</td>
<td>6.84%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other</td>
<td>2.82%</td>
<td>2.8%</td>
<td>3.7%</td>
<td>2.53%***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total Population</td>
<td>2.62</td>
<td>2.756</td>
<td>3.675</td>
<td>3.653</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(million)</td>
<td>(1960)</td>
<td>(million)</td>
<td>(million)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Notes:

* Ukrainians (2.54%) constitute the second largest minority (after the Russians).

** Byelorussians (3.9%) constitute the second largest minority (after the Russians).

***Byelorussians (1.23%) constitute the third largest minority (after the Russians and the Polish).
Table 2 (Continued)

Sources:


Dreifelds.


E.g., one such letter reads, "Many Lithuanians are banished to Siberia. At the same time, bearded young Soviet specialists are coming by cars and by foot from the East. These are our new masters, who are coming here to teach us. It is a pity, however, that they do not do much, only talk, and nothing is coming out of this."\(^{79}\) Or another one: "The Russians are deporting our people. But the time will come soon, when we will retaliate. But we will not deport them. Instead, we will hang them."\(^{80}\) Competing for scarce resources often aroused muted feelings of deprivation: "They (i.e., the state) would not give us a flat. They didn’t give us one, the queues are long. And some of the more

---


powerful queues—I'm referring to the Russians—those move more quickly, but [for] ordinary people, the indigenous people, they do not only don't move forward but the queue gets longer all the time. . . . [I went to] to the executive committee and realiz[ed] I had no rights where I stood."\(^{81}\)

A survey of emigres from the USSR conducted in Germany in the late seventies suggests that the influx of Russians to the Baltic states has resulted in the perceptions on behalf of the local residents that the "native power (i.e., the power of the local residents) is decreasing." To cite a statement from the survey: "The power of Latvian decreases. Fewer are born there, more die, and if one Latvian gets into governing there are two Russians [there] for him. The Latvian has to dance as the Russians call the tune. Voss (the Latvian Communist leader) now does everything that Brezhnev wants."\(^{82}\) Similar opinions were voiced in 1981 in Riga during interviews conducted by a Western journalist: "The factories (built in seventies and eighties in Latvia) could be anywhere in the Soviet Union, but they put them here to dilute our population. I tell my children to have nothing to do with the incoming Russians. They don't belong here." "I've been fighting Russians all my life. In school we don't mix."\(^{83}\)

Those who experienced antipathy toward the Russian speakers sometimes found themselves distanced from other minorities residing in the Baltic states because the latter were, by and large, absorbed by linguistic and cultural russification. Ethnic tensions were

\(^{81}\)Skultans, 115-16.
\(^{82}\)National Council for Soviet and East European Research, *Executive Summary of a Research Project on Soviet Ethnic Relations* (an unpublished draft, 1979), 14. The study is currently kept in the Open Society Archives, Budapest, collection 300, file 80/1/547.
present in eastern Lithuania between the local Poles who often preferred Russian-language schools to Lithuanian ones.

On the other hand, the attitude of most incoming Russian speakers was that they were not minority groups outside Russia. As Nikolai Rudensky has argued, "[the Russians outside Russia] considered themselves to be representatives of the dominant nation in the multinational state. . . . Because of this basic attitude, most Russians felt no need to master local languages and traditions. Many of them, in fact, showed contempt for the cultural patterns of their ethnic environment, which could hardly improve their relations with native ethnic group."^84

During the postwar years, communication (other than interaction in the public domain) between the newcomers and the indigenous population must have been rare because after twenty years of independent statehood (1918-39) the majority of the Balts were not able to speak Russian, and vice versa.^85 It took ten to twenty years for a change to occur. In the seventies, at least one half of Baltic populations claimed to know Russian.86

In addition to the influx of Russian speakers to the Baltic states, there were several other, less visible waves of migration during the postwar years, such as forced repatriation from the Western territories, the return of emigrants who had gone to South America and

---

^84 Mirsky, 148.


other non-European territories in 1955-61, and population exchanges. Another wave of migrants came to Lithuania following the treaty between the Lithuanian SSR and Poland, signed in September 1944. In 1944-46, a population exchange between Lithuania and Poland took place. 171,158 people—former citizens of Poland who identified themselves as Poles and Jews—left Lithuania, but many Poles and Byelorussians came to Lithuania from the neighboring territories.\(^8\) The newcomers usually settled in the area around Vilnius, which had been previously inhabited by Poles.

The second population exchange between Poland and Lithuania was, until recently, virtually unknown. In 1956-59 about 48,600 people were repatriated from Lithuania to Poland. Repatriation to Poland was viewed as a step toward a freer world. Having found out about this population exchange, many deportees who were still in Siberia tried to identify themselves as Poles in order to get away from their places of deportation. At the same time, similarly to 1944-46, there was immigration of Poles and Byelorussians to Lithuania. That is why, even after this population exchange, the number of Poles residing in Lithuania did not change dramatically.\(^8\)

Despite these waves of migration, Lithuania retained its ethnic homogeneity due to two factors: the policies of Antanas Sniečkus, who insisted that Lithuania remains an agricultural republic, and fierce armed resistance. In those places where the partisan war was very intense, the influx of Russian-speaking immigrants was lower than in


acquiescent areas. On the other hand, Sniečkus' vision of Lithuania as mostly agricultural republic reduced the need for industrial workers. In 1953, Sniečkus even pushed out some Russian speakers who resisted Sniečkus' policies. In November 1953, approximately 3,000 Russian speakers left the country. In 1959, the state, party, and economic sectors of the Lithuanian SSR were 70% Lithuanian, compared to 40-50% in 1953. These facts do not imply, however, that Sniečkus was tolerant of any display of Lithuanian nationalism. He ruthlessly suppressed any opposition.

When it came to the implementation of the regulations of Soviet nationalities policy other than deportation or migration, such as teaching history or language policies, the Baltic Soviet elites also complied with most of the rules, although sometimes unwillingly. Eastern Lithuania and language politics in this region is a case in point. Eastern Lithuania is an area around Vilnius, the Lithuanian capital, and its population was heavily restructured during the interwar period and during Soviet times. In 1950, Mečislovas Gedvilas and Justas Paleckis, Lithuanian party functionaries, suggested teaching Lithuanian instead of Polish in addition to Russian in Eastern Lithuania, arguing that Poles in that area were in fact "polonized Lithuanians and Byelorussians," and that teaching in Polish in those areas was the continuation of polonization pursued by

---

80 Tininis, 69.
91 According to 1989 census, Lithuanians constituted 50.6%, Poles 18.8%, Russians 20.2%, and other nationalities 10.4% in this region. During the interwar period, Poland resettled 150,000 ethnic Poles to this region. Halina Turska, *O proiskhozhdenii pol’skoyazychnykh arealov v Vil’nyuskom kraye* [On the Origin of Polish Speaking Regions in the Area of Vilnius] (Vilnius: Mintis, 1995). 85.
"bourgeois" Poland. Moscow disapproved, and the proposal was denounced as nationalist. In mid-fifties, the Soviet Lithuanian intelligentsia became involved in another campaign of promoting the Lithuanian language, arguing that after the population exchanges with Poland the "real" Poles left and that there was no need to continue teaching Polish in that area. This time, local Polish leaders complained directly to Moscow, thus putting the campaign of lithuanization to an end. After the influx of Russian speakers in the sixties and seventies, the Russian language began to slowly push out Polish and Byelorussian languages. Thus, similarly to the northeastern Estonia (the Narva region) and southeastern Latvia (Latgale), eastern Lithuania became an ethnic enclave, heavily populated with Russian and Polish speakers.

The heavy concentration of Russian speakers in northeastern Estonia is a result of forced industrialization and related mass migration in the 1960s and 1970s, which, at its height, amounted to 20,000-30,000 people per year. Three quarters of newcomers settled in Ida-Virumaa and Narva regions, thus creating an ethnic enclave. Even though Latgale, a former Polish territory, was multiethnic prior to Soviet times, its ethnic composition was radically changed by migration during the 1960s and 1970s. In early nineties, only 15% of the population was Latvian. 55% was Russian, 9% Byelorussian.

---

93 Antanaitis, 50.
and the rest were mostly Russian speakers.\footnote{Ilga Apine, “Tolerantnost’ v Multikul’turnom obshchestve” [Tolerance in a Multicultural Society], in \textit{Multiculturalism Latvija: teorija un prakse} [Multiculturalism in Latvia: Theory and Practice], ed. R. Bramane (Daugavpils. Latvia: Multinational Culture Center, 1996), 55. The data is for 1994.}

Even though mass deportations ended in 1953, relations between newcomers and autochthonous residents were marred by memories about deportations. To make the matters worse, during the Soviet times, open criticism of deportations in Lithuania was not welcome and even silenced. In Latvia and Estonia, the atmosphere was somewhat more relaxed. In 1956, Estonian Rudolf Sirge (1904-70) wrote a novel \textit{Maa ja rahvas} [The Land and the People], which although otherwise pro-Soviet, included a realistic deportation scene and caused a sensation in Estonia. In Catholic Lithuania, embitterments were embodied by the crosses in \textit{Kryžų kalnas} [The Hill of Crosses]. Also known as the mound of Meškuičiai, or the Hill of Prayers, this site became a "sacred" place to which people came to pray and to put up crosses, leave rosaries, holy pictures and statuettes mourning those who were deported or killed. The Soviet authorities tried to destroy the hill numerous times: The hill was bulldozed; the crosses were burnt, taken away or buried. Despite a close watch by the authorities, new crosses kept reappearing during the night. There were plans to flood the place, block the roads and make the Hill an inaccessible island. It was only in 1985 that the Hill was finally left in peace by the government. In addition to these symbolic and nonviolent acts of resistance, ethnic restructuring triggered the emergence of politically active groups.
REACTION TO ETHNIC RESTRUCTURING: THE EMERGENCE OF POLITICALLY ACTIVE GROUPS

Based on their relationship with the Soviet state and its ethnic restructuring policies, the groups who responded to ethnic restructuring in the Baltic states can be classified into three broad categories. The first group, or restorationists, defined themselves in direct opposition to the Soviet state and aimed to recreate independent Baltic states. This was the goal of armed resistance movements in the forties and fifties, and later this goal was embraced by dissidents. The second group, or internationalists, expressed their full support for the Soviet state, but opposed the restorationists. Sponsored by Moscow, this group consisted mostly of Russian speaking immigrants. It became visible in the late eighties, after the emergence of national independence movements in the Baltic states. Both restorationists and internationalists lived in a polarized world of “us” versus “them,” and continuously asserted their identity in opposition to that of the other group.97

The third group, or compromisers, tried to oppose ethnic restructuring within the political limits established by the Soviet state. In fact, some of them even did not completely reject the Soviet state. This group included activists of cultural ethnic organizations who resisted russification, also folklore ensembles, and some church members.

Emigration movements from the USSR were another form of resistance. After the

---

anti-Jewish campaign in the USSR in 1948 and 1953, and especially in 1970s, many Baltic Jews emigrated to Israel.98 After World War II, members of Zionist organizations fled the USSR via Poland.99 So did numerous other Balts. Many refused to return to their occupied homelands from displaced persons’ camps in Germany, Sweden, and other western countries, resisting the attempts of the Soviets to bring them back. The Baltic western diaspora formed several groups with political demands resisting ethnic restructuring in exile. Their demands were often congruent with those of the first group, the restorationists, described in the segment that follows.

The Restorationists

Mass deportations, conducted in June 1941 and after World War II triggered armed resistance among the Baltic populations. One immediate goal of the resistance fighters was to prevent deportations and to revenge for those deported. “We warn you: do not let yourselves to be deported: find a place to hide and stay there until freedom comes. It will come soon,” wrote resistance fighters in their leaflets. “We warn all those who are organizing the deportations. There will be no pity for you!”100

---

99The attempts of the Zionist organizations to flee the Baltic states and to help other Jews to migrate were known to the Soviet Secret police. This police killed many of those who tried to escape. “Perepiska po planu meropriyatiya ‘Kapkan’” [Correspondence about the Undertaking “Kapkan,” 5 June 1948—29 July 1952], Lietuvos Ypatingasis Archyvas [The Special Archive of Lithuania], Vilnius, collection K-1, file 2-9.
100Document 40 in Partizanai apie pasaulį, politiką ir save: 1944-1956 partizanų
The strongest resistance movement was in Lithuania. It started as early as October 1940, when the Lithuanian National Front of Activists (LAF) was formed. One year later, numerous underground organizations—the Front of Lithuanians, the Union of Fighters for Lithuanian Freedom, the Lithuanian Army of Freedom, the Lithuanian Nationalist Party, and the Reform Movement of Lithuanian movement sprang, hoping to reestablish an independent Lithuanian state.

Having found out about the return of the Soviets, the restorationists did not lose hope. A more radical wing of restorationists in Lithuania, Lietuvos laisvės armija, LLA (The Lithuanian Army of Freedom) urged everyone to continue resistance. The LLA announced that it did not expect other states to help Lithuania and encouraged the Lithuanians to “control their own fate.” In 1944-45, the LLA became the leader of resistance. At that time (until summer 1945), there were approximately 30,000 partisans in Lithuania, and they were able to act throughout the whole territory of Lithuania, even though their forces were not consolidated. On 23 April 1946, during the first conference of the leaders of the Lithuanian resistance, a declaration was adopted which spelled out the main goal of the movement—to recreate a democratic Lithuanian state.

---


101 Its activities were coordinated from Berlin. The Soviet Secret police knew about its existence, and wrote in its reports: “There is a big organization in Lithuania which spies for Germany. There are approximately 700 people in this organization.” A note dated 4 May 1941, signed by Gladkov, Lietuvos Ypatingasis Archyvas [The Special Archive of Lithuania], Vilnius, collection K-1, file 10-5.

102 Valstynės žinios. 43.


104 Ignatavičius, 261.

105 Gaškaitė-Žemaitienė. “Lietuvos laisvės kovos sąjūdžio strategija” [The Strategy
goal—to recreate a free Republic of Lithuania and to fight against colonization—was reiterated by Lietuvos Laisvės kovos sąjūdis (the Movement for Lithuania’s Freedom), created in 1949. Hoping to prevent the decline of armed resistance, the leaders of the partisans established this organization, uniting several branches of partisan movement. However, even these attempts did not help: after deportations and collectivization, the partisan movement to restore Lithuania lost its momentum in the early fifties.

The Estonian metsavendlus [forest brothers] also harbored a hope to restore their independent state. This drive became particularly strong in mid-June 1941, following a mass deportation. After the return of the Soviets, the special forces ("destruction battalions") brutally suppressed armed resistance. All the men in some Estonian villages were killed. Local partisan groups were weakened and therefore were unable to provide protection for the population which was driven to deportation camps. According to the Soviet sources, 15,000 Estonian “forest brothers” were neutralized by 1947. Several years later, armed resistance in Estonia was subdued.

The Latvian meža braši [forest brothers] lasted until mid-fifties. The most intense fighting went on in 1945. After cruel repressions and collectivization, the activities of the partisans abated. Most Baltic partisans were either killed or deported.

---

After the decline of the partisan movement, restorationist ideas were, by and large, exiled from the Baltic soil—either to the Soviet deportation camps or to the West. Based on their own experiences and partisans' reports, the Baltic diaspora in the West produced numerous political memorandums and historical works depicting the illegitimacy of the Soviet actions in the Baltics. The Baltic Information Centers in the Scandinavian countries and diasporas in the United States and Germany were the outlets for these works. Each year the Baltic American Freedom League and other emigre organizations arranged demonstrations to commemorate Soviet deportations, which they called the "Baltic Holocaust." Poetry and prose written by the displaced to the deportation camps, coupled with the memories of the authors themselves became a part of the diaspora's attempts to remind the United States and its Cold War allies about the "other" Europe. It became the backbone of the diaspora's political arguments for non-recognition of the Baltic states as a part of the Soviet Union.

Those restorationists who were exiled to deportation camps had fewer channels to assert their ideas. However, surviving reports of the Secret police suggest that those opposing the Soviet state rebelled even in the places of deportation. Mobilization was especially strong during World War II. More often, however, the deportees expressed

---

110 Until 1948, some partisans were able to escape to the West and record their experiences. Gaškaitė-Žemaitienė, "Lietuvos laisvės kovos sąjūdžio strategija" [The Strategy of the Lithuanian Movement for Independence], 30.


113 There are reports suggesting that in 1942 "the representatives of the nations fighting against the USSR were especially active." Sabbo, 1135. Memoirs of the former
their disappointment in their letters, memoirs, and poems. Thus, memoirs and poems, written on pieces of sack material or on birch bark in the deportation camps and then tucked away, became another form of resistance. For each poem, if caught, the deportees were facing five more years of deportation. After Khrushchev's amnesty, when many former deportees became leading dissidents, their memoirs and poems, written in the deportation camps, found their way into samizdat (underground) publications and became an accusation of the Soviet system.

The analysis of the Baltic samizdat contents and recovered Secret police reports suggests that the Baltic dissident movements continuously asserted their right to restore the Baltic states.\textsuperscript{114} To illustrate, in the Program of the Democratic Movement of the Soviet Union, the anonymous Baltic authors asserted this right, arguing that "the road to national liberation lies through democratization of the entire Soviet society."\textsuperscript{115} National independence was deemed as the only cure for demographic changes inflicted on the Baltic states by the Soviet Union.\textsuperscript{116}


\textsuperscript{114}The major goals and actions of the Latvian dissident movement were aptly summarized in a conversation between Calyts, a Latvian dissident, and a Secret police agent. Calyts argued that the dissidents should try to gain trust of the intelligentsia and use its discontent with the current situation. Furthermore, he wanted to establish links with international organizations, such as the United Nations, and Baltic diaspora groups. Indulis Zalīte, "Pagrindinės neprievartinio pasipriešinimo formos ir slaptasis nacionalizmas" [The Main Forms of Nonviolent Resistance and Secret Nationalism], \textit{Genocidas ir Rezistencija} 2 (1997): 118.


\textsuperscript{116}This was the position of the Association of Concerned Estonians. Latvia's
Predictably, embitterments about ethnic restructuring and russification were often invoked in the letters written by dissidents to international organizations. For example, in their letter addressed to the UN Secretary General which protested against a campaign of russification, a group of Lithuanian dissidents wrote: “We, Lithuanians, feel somewhat disenchanted: why has the United Nations ignored . . . numerous injustices inflicted by the USSR?”

Naturally, the Final Act of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe, signed on 1 August 1975, was an impulse for intensified dissident activities. Numerous societal groups went public to record how Helsinki accords were implemented. The more radical restorationists, such as *Lietuvos Laisvės Lyga* (the Lithuanian Freedom League), published appeals to the Russian nation, accusing the latter of genocide vis-a-vis the Baltics. Radical restorationists also reprimanded the Russian dissidents who were, in their eyes, unwilling to admit the guilt of the Russian nation vis-a-vis the Baltics. However, these groups were promptly stifled by the Soviet state.

The second thaw, which started in 1986, instantly awakened the restorationist movement. In 1986, a chapter of the human rights group Helsinki '86 was formed by blue collar workers in the city of Liepaja in Latvia. Helsinki '86 organized a series of demonstrations to commemorate the events of 14 June 1941 (the date of mass

---

*Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.*
deportations). In addition to stirring up rebellious feelings against the Soviet state. Helsinki '86 pushed the Latvian Communist Party to reconsider the official interpretation of Latvian history. On 14 June 1987 (the day of mass deportations in 1941), despite the arrest of its leaders, Helsinki '86 organized several thousand demonstrators to march to the Freedom monument in Riga and lay flowers. 14 June 1987 was the largest demonstration which sparked the following waves of demonstrations in the Baltic states.120

On 25 March 1988, rallies were held to commemorate the mass deportations of 1949. On 22 May 1988, memorial services were held simultaneously in Vilnius, Kaunas, and Riga to commemorate the 132,000 Lithuanians who were deported to Siberia. One year later, on 14 June 1989, thousands of demonstrators gathered outside the Cathedral in Riga to once again commemorate the 1941 deportation. Thus, the calendars of the three Baltic nations were marked with a new date—14 June 1941. Since then, this day became known as the Day of Sorrow and Remembrance.

By invoking memories about displacement and illegal occupation of the Soviet Union, the restorationists became powerful political groups in all three Baltic states. Mass rallies often coincided with moving public acts of commemoration, such as reburial of the bones of compatriots. Beginning in 1988, thousands of Lithuanians, Latvians and Estonians went to look for the graves of relatives who had been deported to Siberia. Some of the remains were brought back by plane. According to the Lithuanian Union of Political Prisoners and Deportees, since 1989 the remains of approximately 10,000 deportees have been brought back to Lithuania from Siberia. Vytautas Landsbergis, the former leader of Sąjūdis, the Lithuanian restorationist movement, captured the mood in his

\[120\] Karklins, 70.
memoirs: "In the wilderness of Siberia, from the Arctic Ocean to Altay and Kazakhstan, there are graveyards containing the remains of nothing but Lithuanians. Some of them have survived. People went there, and, having found the graves of their relatives, took care of them. Some of the remains were brought back, and re-buried in the homeland. Many graves are unknown."121

During the revival period, collecting the bones of the compatriots and re-burying them in the Baltic states became a symbolic act of remembrance and a powerful source of legitimacy for the restorationist cause. Establishing a link between the armed resistance movements and the restorationist movements was another source of legitimacy. Thus, the name of Sajūdis [Movement], the Lithuanian restorationist movement, stems from the unified resistance organization active in 1949.

In addition, the restorationists began to reveal past injustices. The Estonian Heritage Society, one of the first civic restorationist organizations in Estonia, began by filling in the blanks in Estonia’s history. In 1988, the Estonian historian Mart Laar, the leader of this organization, published a series of articles entitled Vremia Koshmarov [The Time of Nightmares] about the fate of three villages in Estonia, the inhabitants of which perished from the activity of the “destruction battalions” during the summer of 1941. The articles, based on research conducted by the Estonian Heritage Society, caused a sensation. The next year, the historian found himself in court: both Laar and the editors of the journal in which his articles appeared were accused of lacking evidence and of “a possible attempt to undermine the Soviet state.” Half a year later, the case was dropped because

prosecutors were unable to show any "proof of misconduct." Several years later, Laar became the Prime Minister of Estonia. Mart Laar's transformation is an excellent example of the entanglement between history and politics during this period.

A controversy that shook the Soviet Estonian establishment began when the cultural weekly *Sirp ja Vasar* [Hammer and Sickle] published Evald Laasi's survey of Estonians deported under Stalin. Under pressure from the Estonian people, the Supreme Council of the Estonian SSR passed a resolution condemning the repressions that were carried out by the Soviet regime during 1940-53.

In Latvia, the human rights group Helsinki '86 activated the discussion of the deportations and other repressions in media. On 25 March 1989, a special issue of the journal *Literatūra un Māksla* [Literature and Art] focused on the mass deportations of 14 June 1941, and 25 March 1949, and outlined a project for gathering and publishing materials and the personal testimony of the victims. Societies and clubs founded by the victims of Stalinist repression, the Latvian Writers Union and committees formed to investigate the crimes committed under Stalin were proliferating. The demonstration on 14 June 1987, which was organized by Helsinki '86, helped to lift the taboo from the topic of deportations in Latvian society.

---


125 Only after the 14 June 1987 demonstration the Latvian press began to discuss the topic freely. The ground-breaking article was written by Arturs Skuburs in the teachers' weekly *Skolotaju Avize* who refuted standard interpretation of deportations by...
Another aspect of the restorationist movements was to record the names of the deported and otherwise repressed. This work—recording the names of the deported—was later undertaken by the Commission for Research into Stalinist Crimes Committed in Lithuania, a research center in Latvia and Memento, the Association of the Illegally Repressed, in Estonia. These lists are a site of memory. Enumerating thousands of names with similar stories, they represent the fate of family members, neighbors, or acquaintances—those who underwent forced resettlement or who knew someone who did.

In January 1989, however, different lists began to be compiled. The Estonian Heritage Society, which had begun by filling in the blanks in Estonia’s history, called for the creation of a congress elected exclusively by pre-1940 citizens and their descendants. Citizens Committees, which were widely supported by former political prisoners and deportees, began to register the names of all citizens of the interwar republic and their descendants. The idea of a relationship between nation and state began to crystallize. In 1988-90, the Supreme Soviets of the Baltic republics adopted laws declaring the restoration of independence and constitutional amendments declaring Estonian, Latvian, and Lithuanian the state languages.

The “Internationalists”

The activities of the restorationists and especially their goal to recreate independent nation states aggravated the supporters of the Soviet state. Together with public

commemorations of the formerly deported, embitterments spilled out onto the streets. Thus a former deportee observed that he found it very vexing to hear some Russian speakers on the streets of Riga employing the particular insult aimed at Latvians that was a feature of the language of labor camp guards.126 On the other hand, many Russian speakers felt threatened by the visible actions of the restorationists. In 1988, Internovements (social movements supported by the conservatives from Moscow) were proclaimed in opposition to popular restorationist movements in Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania. The newspapers put out by the Internovements lamented about commemorations of the Soviet deportations initiated by the restorationists, referring to the latter as “national-socialists,” and called to build more monuments for those killed by the “forest brothers”—i.e., mostly supporters of the Soviet regime.127

The internationalists drew their support mostly from Russian speakers. A poll taken in late 1988 in Latvia indicates that 48% of Russians in Latvia supported the Internovement, while only 6% of the Latvians did.128 A similar poll taken in 1989 in Estonia suggests that the Internovement was supported only by non-Estonians (10.9% of non-Estonian inhabitants).129 Public opinion data of 1989 from Lithuania implies that Yedinstvo (Lithuania’s Internovement) was supported only by non-Lithuanians (13% of non-Lithuanian inhabitants).130

The internationalists, represented by the Internovement and the Joint Council of

---

126Ibid.
128Dreifelds, 60.
129Taagepera, Estonia: Return to Independence, 150.
Labor Collectives (labor unions) in Estonia, Yedinstvo ("Unity") in Lithuania, and the Intermovement in Latvia, found most of their supporters in ethnic enclaves of the three states. In April 1989, the Latvian Russian speakers who embraced orthodox Communist views were demanding for a territorial autonomy in Daugavpils.  

In 1990, pro-Moscow deputies of the Estonian Supreme Council and other pro-Soviet organizations met in Kohtla-Jarve (northeastern Estonia) to establish the Interregional Soviet, which conducted an unofficial referendum asking whether the population approved of Estonia remaining within the USSR. In Tallinn, Narva and Kohtla-Jarve 92-96% of those voting approved of Estonia staying within the USSR. In 1989, the local government of Vilnius region declared a territorial autonomy and demanded to be within the Soviet Union. In 1990, only 9% of Russians and 10% of Poles in eastern Lithuania supported the independent Lithuanian state.

---


134 Arūnas Eigirdas, "Pietryčių Lietuvos gyventojai" [The Inhabitants of Southeastern Lithuania], in Lietuvos Mokslo akademia, Pietryčų Lietuva: Socialiniai teisiniai aspektai [Southeastern Lithuania: Social and Legal Aspects] (Vilnius: Lietuvos Mokslo akademia, 1990), 42.
In addition to the two types of polarized political movements, there were other
groups and individuals—cultural organizations, religious groups, or folklore
ensembles—whose responses to ethnic restructuring were less noticeable, but more people
could associate themselves with such groups even during the Soviet times. Commitment to
Catholic and Lutheran religious beliefs provided the Balts with strong ties to Western
Europe and the United States, which helped to sustain underground publications and,
especially in the case of Lithuania, voice protest against ethnic restructuring and other
aspects of the Soviet nationalities policy.135

The rise of the folklore movement started in the sixties: students and intelligentsia
gathered in small groups to learn folk songs, study history, and pagan religion.136 This
movement continued until mid-eighties. Folklore groups were proliferating. To illustrate,
in Lithuania, the number of such groups increased from 5,000 in 1964 to 64,000 in
1977.137

135 V. Stanley Vardys, “The Role of the Churches in the Maintenance of Regional
and National Identity in the Baltic Republics,” in Regional Identity Under the Soviet
Rule: The Case of the Baltic States, ed. Andre D. Loeber, V. Stanley Vardys, and
Laurence P. A. Kitching (Hackettstown, N.J.: Institute for the Study of Law, Politics, and
Society of Socialist States, 1990), 152.
136 Romualdas Apanavičius, “Sovietizmas ir lietuvų etnine kultūra” [The Soviet
Times and Lithuanian Ethnic Culture], in Pasaulio Lituanistų bendrija, Priklausomybės
metų (1940-1990) lietuvų visuomenė: pasipriešinimas ir/ar prisitaikymas [The
Lithuanian Society During the Years of Dependence (1940-1990): Resistance and/or
137 Jonas Trinkūnas, “Autentiškos liaudies kultūros paieškos 7-8 dešimtmetyje”
[Looking for Authentic Folk Culture in 7-8th Decades], in Pasaulio Lituanistų bendrija,
Priklausomybės metų (1940-1990) lietuvų visuomenė: pasipriešinimas ir/ar
prisitaikymas [The Lithuanian Society During the Years of Dependence (1940-1990):
Resistance and/or Adaptation] (Vilnius: Pasaulio Lituanistų bendrija, 1996), 64.
Cultural activities were especially important for the non-territorial minorities living in the Baltic states. Their communities were severely affected by deportations. Those who survived had even fewer cultural rights than Lithuanians, Latvians or Estonians. Only a large Polish minority in Lithuania managed to acquire some rights: in mid-fifties, as many as 263 Polish schools were opened plus 82 schools in which Polish was taught.\(^{138}\) However, the Poles in the other Baltic republics and other minorities did not have the same rights. For example, only in the late fifties were the Baltic Jewish communities allowed to engage in a very limited number of cultural activities, such as drama groups and choirs.\(^{139}\) The Polish minority in Latvia, unlike the one in Lithuania, did not have newspapers nor schools. Only in seventies was it allowed to renew one cultural association.\(^{140}\)

When the power of the Soviet state began to decline, non-territorial ethnic communities were the first actors to establish active organizations.\(^{141}\) Even prior to the consolidation of popular national movements within the Baltic states, multiple cultural minority associations were created. In 1988, the Lithuanian Jewish community renewed its activity. By then, out of a vibrant community of 200,000 Litvaks, only several thousand Jews were left in Lithuania, and they were contemplating moving to Israel. Many did so. Several organizations—Tkuma, a Sionist association, and a chapter of Sochnut, the


\(^{139}\)Segal, 226.


World Jewish organization—were created in Lithuania to coordinate the Jewish emigration to Israel. Prompted by the activists of the tiny Lithuanian Jewish community of fewer than 4,000 members, Lithuania became the first post-communist state (or, at that time, the first post-communist entity) to adopt a law to ensure that the graves and cemeteries of Jews would be taken care of.

At the same time, the Latvian Jews and Poles recreated their cultural associations. Similar phenomena were taking place in Estonia. The Ukrainians, Jews, Armenians, and other non-territorial ethnic groups began to organize their communities and even created a unified Forum of National Minorities which included more than twenty ethnic groups. The Program of the Forum asked for Cultural Autonomy for non-territorial nationalities living in Estonia. In Lithuania, the Jewish community lobbied other minority groups to support the adoption of a law on national minorities, which allocated some state support for a Jewish cultural association. The Estonian and Latvian republics also adopted the laws supporting the rights of minorities. Welcoming these laws on minority rights, the non-territorial minorities supported the re-establishment of independence and were willing to get engaged in the political processes within the democratizing Baltic polities.

---

CONCLUSION

Tracing the process whereby ethnic restructuring was conducted in the Baltic states points to two mechanisms at work. First, forced resettlements spurred armed resistance movements and incurred long lasting polarization within societies. By and large (with a partial exception of Lithuania), this polarization occurred along ethnic lines: i.e., the Russian speaking newcomers versus the autochthonous residents. It is not surprising, therefore, that resistance movements in the three states had a nationalist flavor: they embraced the goal of eventually restoring the nation state.

By producing underground publications and transmitting information to the West, the restorationist movements strived not only to invoke, but also to preserve historical memory about deportations and other repressions conducted by the Soviet state. Adhering to historical memory about ethnic restructuring helped the restorationists to legitimate their activities and to gain overwhelming public support during the initial stage of democratization. Supported by autochthonous ethnic groups, the restorationists constituted the backbone of future political communities in the three polities. Yet their reliance on historical memory also suggested a possibility that some groups may be excluded from emerging political communities. Especially those social and political groups who were associated with the former perpetrators became likely to be excluded.

Second, not only did ethnic restructuring prompt polarization between the older residents and the newcomers, it also sharpened ethnic consciousness of smaller (non-territorial) minorities. Even though the latter did not form strong movements during the Soviet times, they became very active—by asking for cultural rights and recounting past
injustices—during the initial stage of democratization. Yet instead of joining Moscow-supported *Internovements*, most non-territorial minorities supported the emerging nation states. Thus, the existence of numerous ethnic groups did not impede the process of democratization. On the contrary, by voicing their demands to protect what was left from their communities after deportations and russification, the non-territorial ethnic communities helped to strengthen nascent civil societies within the Baltic polities.

In sum, having experienced five decades of ethnic restructuring, the democratizing entities were faced with a serious obstacle to successful political community building. There were political groups, supported by Moscow and numerous local Russian speakers and, in the case of Lithuania, the Poles, who contested the existence of independent nation states. On the other hand, the radical wing of restorationist movements resisted inclusion of the “others”—i.e., political and social groups, associated with the former perpetrators from the Soviet regime—into the emerging polities.
CHAPTER VI

POLITICAL COMMUNITY BUILDING IN ESTONIA

The goal of this chapter is to trace the approaches that the Estonian state used to reduce polarization and thus to legitimatize its power toward minorities opposed to the state. This case study consists of four parts. First, it traces the attitudes of Estonia’s minorities towards the state during the initial stage of political community building and documents the presence of polarized ethnopolitical groups. Second, this chapter traces political community building “from above.” This means that the chapter discusses the policies that were adopted by the Estonian state toward its minorities. Third, the chapter traces political community building “from below.” It examines ethnic relations at the level of local governments, exploring whether Estonia’s Russians were allowed to use the state as a “service station” (i.e., whether they received full economic and social rights as permanent residents of Estonia), and looks at the ways that the two communities handled their different historical memories. This chapter concludes by exploring the level of polarization in Estonia in the late nineties and analyzing which of the approaches used by the Estonian state were most successful at reducing polarization.

ETHNOPOLITICAL ACTORS AND POLARIZATION DURING THE INITIAL STAGE OF COMMUNITY BUILDING (1989–95)

In the context of regaining the past and commemorating it (as described in the previous chapter), Estonia declared itself independent in 1991. The newly restored polity
found itself filled with people for whom the years 1940–41 and 1945–53 had different meanings. As sociological studies conducted during the early stages of community building suggested, the attitudes of Estonians and Russians toward history and the influence of the Soviet Union were, by and large, diametrically opposed. Estonians held negative opinions about the increasing percentage of non-Estonians living in their state and were concerned about the geographical proximity of Russia. Estonia’s Russians thought that the fact that their "mother" state was nearby was a positive factor.

As Table 3 shows, in 1988, approximately half of ethnic Russians held a negative attitude toward the Estonian state and citizenship. In 1990, the majority of the Russians living in Estonia preferred only partial independence for Estonia. Approximately one half of the respondents thought that Estonia should stay within the reformed Soviet Union. On the other hand, an absolute majority (96%) of Estonians supported independence.

Similarly to divisions along ethnic lines within society, Russian and Estonian political forces held radically different opinions about the existence of an independent Estonian state.

There were three major clusters. The first one, the restorationists (the right), focused on bringing about the "decolonization" of Estonia. This goal was especially pronounced during the first stage (1991–95) of community building.

---

1Of the 602,380 non-Estonians living in Estonia in 1989, only 38,174 were either born in Estonia before 1940 or descended from someone born in Estonia before 1940. Statistical Office of Estonia. 33.


3Ibid., 44–45.
Table 3. Attitudes of Estonia's Russians Towards the Estonian Nation and the Estonian State. 1989–99*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>positive</td>
<td>positive</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>55</td>
<td>55 (positive)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>neutral</td>
<td>positive</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>42</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>21 (ready to engage into politics)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>neutral</td>
<td>neutral</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>–</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>neutral</td>
<td>negative</td>
<td>37</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>–</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>negative</td>
<td>negative or neutral</td>
<td>47</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>3 (for emigration)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Notes:

* Data for 1989-96 is from Aksel Kirch’s studies. In 1989, the questionnaire for Russian speakers included four answers to the question on their preferences concerning the future political status of Estonia. The first was "the maintenance of the present status,” the second, “Estonia must stay in reformed Soviet Union (confederation),” the third, “Estonia as an absolutely independent state.” and the fourth was "cannot answer.” The first answer is put into the fifth row of this table (neutral/negative attitude). The second is put into the sixth row (negative/negative or neutral). The third is deemed to correspond with the second row (positive/positive), and the fourth is equated with the fourth row (neutral/neutral).

** Data for 1999 summarizes the findings of the Institute of the Open Estonian Society, published in the Postimees (5 November, 1999): 7. Approximately one fifth of non-Estonians held a highly positive attitude towards developments in the country. 55% opposed emigration from Estonia. (In this graph, the attitude is marked as "positive."). The institute study included a rating of five potential strategies. The options were: to leave Estonia for the ethnic country of origin, to fight with the Estonians for political power, to learn the state language, to attempt to influence developments and to help the Estonians to build a better country. The "emigration" option was the least desirable. The option of participation in the political process had 21% support. The remaining three strategies had roughly 42% support.

Sources:

Geistlinger and Kirch.


Their political discourse was based on the state-bearing nation's claim to its historical homeland. The second cluster included extreme left wing parties, the most radical of which (e.g., the Coordinating Committee for the Autonomy of Northeastern Estonia) had their origins in the Intermovement. They were directly opposed to the restorationists' case. The third cluster consisted of compromisers, most notably the Center party (a product of the national revival movement), which tried to live up to the demands of both Estonians and non-Estonians.

At first, the restorationist cause was most intensively championed by the Estonian Congress, which was established in 1989 by Estonian nationalists and the Estonian National Independence Party. After the restoration of statehood in 1991 and the emergence of a multiparty system, this cause was most strongly supported by the Pro Patria party. This party opposed liberalization of the citizenship law and the easing of

---

4 Graham Smith et al., Nation Building in the Post-Soviet Borderlands, 96.
5 For a comprehensive description of the evolution of the Estonian party system, see Pettai and Kreuzer, 148–89.
6 During 3 January–24 February 1990 the Estonian Congress set up an alternative (to Soviet Estonia) election procedure, which excluded all post-1940 immigrants. The Estonian National Front decided to support this movement and to participate in these elections. The electoral districts corresponded to the administrative boundaries of counties and municipalities in Estonia in 1940. The Estonian Congress wanted to become a legislative institution, and, as time went on, it demanded more power. In August 1991, after the restoration of independence, both the Supreme Council of the Estonian SSR and the Estonian Congress agreed to work on a Constitution.
7 This Party was extremely successful in the first elections to the Estonian parliament, winning 22% of the vote in 1992. It won 7.9% of the vote during the second election (1995) and 15.98% of the vote (the second largest share after the Centrists) in March 1999. After the local and parliamentary elections of 1999, Pro Patria Union held a leading position in the Estonian parliament and in the Tallinn city government. "The Chickens of Pro Patria Union Are the Fattest," Eesti Päevaleht (29 November, 1999), 2. Its supporters are mostly Estonian (11.6% of the electorate), although non-Estonians (0.7% of the electorate) support this party as well. In 1998 it received 9.7% of the vote.
language requirements for non-citizens. In the words of Mart Laar, Estonia’s Prime 
Minister, the position of Pro Patria could be summarized as follows: "Pro Patria Union 
does not oppose the idea of integrating non-Estonians [into the political community], but 
they must learn the language first. The government should improve its language teaching 
policies instead of making concessions to Russia." This party’s position regarding the 
citizenship law and language policies remained consistent throughout the later stages of 
political community building, despite occasional criticism of these policies by some party 
members (e.g., Minister Juris Mõis).

Other political parties, such as the Right-wingers or the People’s Party, have 
embraced positions similar to those of Pro Patria Union, but Pro Patria has exercised the 
most political influence. Furthermore, Memento (the Union of the Formerly Repressed) 
also supports the cause of the restorationists. It is a social movement that has significant 
moral authority.

At the other end of the spectrum, in the late eighties and the early nineties the 
restorationist cause was opposed by the Interregional Soviet, a Moscow-supported 
organization, and the Coordinating Committee for the Autonomy of Northeastern Estonia 

---


9 Writing in Eesti Päevaleht in April 1999, Juri Mõis argued that Estonian 
citizenship policy has been too inflexible and that the state “should be braver in making 

10 Since 7 March 1999, the Pro Patria Union has been in alliance with the Reform 
Party and the Moderates. These parties have formed a government.

11 Memento claims that their goal is to preserve the memory of those who have 
suffered. According to their statement of purpose the “[c]ompilation of the register [of 
those were deported or otherwise repressed]” and the “perpetuation of the collected 
information on [Soviet] genocide policy and its results will help to direct Estonia’s 
(CCANE), which called for political and territorial autonomy for regions of Estonia with a Russian-speaking majority.\(^12\) The political rhetoric of the CCANE, which was especially active in 1992–93, described the independent Estonian state as a threat to Russians living in Estonia.

With the exception of the CCANE, Estonia’s Russians were relatively unorganized during the first stage of community building. The first political parties began to emerge only in the mid-nineties (see the following section of this chapter). The first large-scale protest took place on 21 March 1992, when approximately 8–10,000 Russians demonstrated in Tallinn. They demanded that the government freeze prices and guarantee food for the poor. Organized by the former hard-line Communist faction of the Estonian parliament, this group also demanded that Gorbachev be put on trial for dismantling the Soviet Union.\(^13\)

In addition to these diametrically opposed ethnopolitical movements, there was a weak movement that allegedly tried to look for compromises between the two communities. This movement considered itself to be the successor of the Estonian National Front which tried to build bridges between the two communities. This movement, the "compromisers," was led by the Center party and Edgar Savisaar, former leader of the Estonian National Front. Savisaar has frequently argued that the existence of many people without citizenship "may cause the creation of closed communities which could be dangerous to the Estonian state."\(^14\) Often the goal of such discourse, however.


161

This analysis of the domestic actors and their platforms suggests that during the
first stage of community building in Estonia, there were no domestic actors genuinely
interested in building an inclusive political community in Estonia. The actors that were
interested in achieving this goal were, by and large, international institutions and Western
governments, especially those of the Nordic states. These actors were fearful that any
dispute between Russians and Estonians in Estonia could escalate into violence
threatening European security. Tracing the strategies used by the Estonian state from
above illustrates the influence of these actors.

TRACING THE PROCESS OF COMMUNITY BUILDING FROM "ABOVE"

1989–95: Defining the Borders of Political Community

In an interview with the Russian newspaper Izvestiya, Estonian president Lennart
Meri thus explained the rationale behind the 1992 citizenship law, which granted
citizenship only to those who held Estonian citizenship before 16 June 1940 and their
descendants: "We [i.e., the policymakers] were faced with a problem: How could the
rights and interests of the citizens of prewar Estonia and their descendants, who had no say
in becoming Soviet citizens, be maintained? . . . After independence was restored, we
chose the option of the continuity of Estonian citizenship. There was no other way for

15It won 14.2% of the vote in 1995 parliament elections and 23.6% in 1999. The
support for the Centrists grew mainly due to the backing of the non-Estonian voters.
us."¹⁶ Men acknowledged that when state creation was in its early stages, memory of past wrongs and especially a yearning for restitution became a constitutive element of political community building in Estonia.¹⁷ A closer analysis of the arguments put forward by the political actors identified above should help to explain why many Estonians, especially the restorationists, believed that "there was no other way for us" other than to accept such a citizenship law.

Remembering the deportations and other forms of repression that were carried out during Soviet times became a part of the debate on citizenship. Those who argued for restrictive citizenship laws (first and foremost, the restorationists, some of whom were the victims of Soviet repression) noted that the Baltic states fall under provisions of the Fourth Geneva Convention of 1949, which prohibits the deportation or transfer of members of an occupying power’s population into territory it occupies during war. Thus, they argued, Estonia should be permitted to "decolonize" its territory.¹⁸ For some, "decolonization" implied disenfranchisement and for some even resettlement of Estonia’s Russians. Such opinions, emphasizing the link between memories of past wrongs and deciding who will be "one of us," were captured in the writings of Rein Taagepera:

If you were to subtract deportees’ children and their relatives few Estonians would

---

¹⁶ "Not the Right of the Strong but the Right of the Equal," Izvestiya (2 April, 1999). Available from http://www.president.ee; INTERNET.

¹⁷ During his interview with the Ljubljana Delo in Slovenia, Men acknowledged that “it is no secret that we wanted to continue our political path where it had been stopped by the agreement between Germany and the Soviet Union in 1939, that is, in 1940. That was not very realistic.” “Estonian President Interviewed on NATO, EU Membership,” FBIS-SOV-97-142 (22 May, 1997).

¹⁸ CSCE, Human Rights and Democratization in Estonia (Washington, D.C.: CSCE, 1993), 8. In 1993, Jüri Estam, a member of the Congress of Estonia, established a Decolonization Foundation. The goal of this foundation was to pursue the process of "decolonization," which for some radical restitutionists meant the expulsion of Estonia’s Russians.
be left. And this [the deportations] was done to Estonians by Russians, not by some faceless "Soviets"—unless, of course, one is also willing to claim that the Jewish Holocaust was Nazi and therefore not German. Russian colonists took the place of Estonians who either fled or were deported. Forgive? Yes. Forget? No. Accept colonial settlers who refuse to learn Estonian as substitutes for those Estonians who were killed and those who, as a result, were never born? Take a guess at the answer.19

During the intensive discussions that took place in the Estonian parliament on the laws of citizenship (September and October of 1991), the following opinion was voiced by Johannes Kass, one of the more radical members of parliament: "In an indirect way, you [i.e., ethnic Russians living in Estonia], as citizens of the Soviet Union, are guilty for what that state did to the Republic of Estonia in 1939."20 Others feared that the existence of the Estonian state and nation would be threatened if the Russians (the "latecomers") were granted citizenship.

The opponents (the "compromisers," most of whom were members of the Estonian Popular Front and former Communists) based their arguments on the fact that the application of any requirements for citizenship in a retroactive order was "illegitimate, illegal, and undemocratic" (Pavel Panfilov, Enn Leisson), that the alienation of Estonia's Russians was "not in our national interest" (Rein Veidemann), and that the restoration of the citizenship law of 1938 would be criticized by the West (Peet Kask).21 International conventions on the reduction of statelessness were cited.

These arguments, however, were undermined by the results of a poll taken by the Interregional Soviet (an organization closely related to the Intermovement), which asked

---

19 Taagepera, Estonia: Return to Independence, 218. I would like to thank the author for his permission to use this quote.
21 Kask, 382–83.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
the people of Estonia if they would like to remain within the Soviet Union. In Tallinn, Narva, and Kohtla-Jarve (areas with large numbers of Russians), 92–96% of the approximately 330,000 people who participated in the vote said "yes" to staying in the USSR. This enabled the restorationists, such as Andres Tarand, to argue that many Russians "have been loudly bellicose against the Estonian state. And now those people only remember their rights." 

In addition to reviving memories of the deportations and the subsequent influx of Russian settlers, the arguments of the restorationists were strengthened by the fact that until August 1991, the Interregional Soviet (which was supported by Moscow and some Russians, especially in Northeastern Estonia) possessed all the attributes of state power: a government, armed forces, control of the economy, and its own radio station. This state-like entity became a source of anxiety among Estonians. Thus, eventually, the Interregional Soviet added political capital to the restorationist cause. The restorationist version of the citizenship law, which granted Estonian citizenship only to those who held Estonian citizenship before 16 June 1940 and to their descendants, was accepted in February 1992. Furthermore, the Estonian Citizen Party, Pro Patria, the Moderates, and the Estonian National Independence Party—parties that supported the restorationist cause—were elected to parliament in September 1992.

The initial version of the Estonian law on aliens (adopted on 21 June 1993) and the introduction of temporary travel documents were also partly intended to make the Russians leave. In accordance with the law on aliens, most residents who had settled in

---

23 Kask, 383.
Estonia prior to 1 July 1990 were initially given only temporary residence permits valid for two years. 25 8,238 Russians left Estonia in 1991. Then their number increased to 25,892 in 1992. 10,983 left Estonia the following year. 6,421 Russians left Estonia in 1994, and 6,525 in 1995. The out-migration of Russians began to decline in 1996, when 4,844 Russians left the country. In 1998, only 1,401 Russians decided to leave. 26

The law on aliens, adopted in 1993, caused the most upheaval, both nationally and internationally. Years 1992 and 1993 marked the beginning of the "internationalization" of community building in Estonia. Among the numerous governmental and non-governmental actors that got involved in political community building in Estonia, the CSCE (OSCE since February 1993), its High Commissioner for Minorities, and, to a lesser extent, the Council of Europe were the most visible and vociferous. 27 In July 1992, at the summit of the CSCE, a High Commissioner on National Minorities—a post "on" minorities rather than "for" minorities—was created. 28 This post was created with Russia’s

25 Bungs, The Baltic States, 79. The CSCE High Commissioner began to push for residence and work permits. He argued that "the best course of action would be to allow those who were permanent residents during Soviet times, and those who continue to reside in Estonia, to become Estonian residents without a three year waiting period." Estonian Review (16–22 May, 1994). It was not until 1997 that a significant number of Russians were finally granted permanent residence permits.

26 Statistical Office of Estonia, 54. In 1993, the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe urged Russia to draft legislation for ethnic Russians wishing to return to Russia from the Baltic states, arguing that repatriation was not the result of national discrimination, but of a "loss of privileges." Radio Liberty Report (8 February, 1993).


28 "On minorities" means that the High Commissioner’s mandate prevents him from seeking to resolve conflicts that already have erupted. It is not a vehicle through which the violations of human rights can be addressed. Jane Wright, "The OSCE and the Protection of Minority Rights," Human Rights Quarterly 18, no. 1 (February 1996): 200. Also see "Max van der Stoel. Minority Man," Economist (11 September, 1999): 60.
support and with the Russians in Estonia in mind. Beginning in December 1992, the CSCE and its High Commissioner became heavily involved in community building in Estonia. They tried to help Estonia by offering their comments on the law on aliens.

When addressing the question of Estonia's Russians, the Nordic states often referred to the statements of CSCE/OSCE High Commissioner Max van der Stoel. The European Union and NATO also played significant roles in the process of political community building in Estonia.

After 1993, Russia began to link the issue of its "compatriots" with other issues in its negotiations with the Estonian government. These included a border accord and the issue of troop withdrawal. Numerous threats were made to the Estonian government, especially in 1992-95. These included Yeltsin's infamous warning to remember "certain geopolitical and demographic realities." Statements about the "plight" of Russians in Estonia by Russian leaders were often meant for domestic consumption, especially to please the Duma which was dominated by the Communists until the end of 1999. On the other hand, Russia's endless complaints to the international community about alleged human rights violations in the Baltic states were an attempt to assert its influence in the


30 "Estonia: Russia's Baburin Links Border Accord With Other Issues," FBIS-SOV-96-247 (21 December, 1996). Sergey Baburin, the Deputy Speaker of the Russian Duma, said that "any agreement concluded with Estonia" would be linked to the problems of Russians living in Estonia.

31 "Still on the Prowl," Economist (28 August, 1993). In addition, Russia has linked the issue of the border agreement with the "problems of Russian speaking residents." "Yeltsin Puts Condition on Estonia, Latvia Border Treaties," FBIS-SOV-97-336 (2 December, 1997).

32 An example of such a statement is: "A major objective of foreign policy is to protect the rights of the Russian-speaking population living abroad." Boris Yeltsin, Sixth Annual Report to the Federal Assembly and State Duma, 30 March 1999.
territory of the former USSR.\textsuperscript{33} 

Given this enormous international pressure, Estonia's laws and policies of community building had to be constantly revised. Initially, in the words of Andres Kollist (the author of the law on aliens), this notorious law was intended to "regulate the relations with those [aliens] who already live here: to document and somehow classify them."\textsuperscript{34} Reportedly, Kollist wanted to make those Russians who ignored the calls for registration apply for residency and job permits. However, this did not happen. Instead, many Russians, especially those in Northeastern Estonia and in Russia, characterized this attempt as "ethnic cleansing."\textsuperscript{35} The Russians in Northeastern Estonia held a referendum on regional autonomy. Russian Foreign Minister Andrei Kozyrev threatened to "halt all oil and gas deliveries to the county [Estonia] if it did not change course."\textsuperscript{36} These developments attracted international attention. International institutions and Western governments were worried that the goal of the law was not only to regulate the status of non-citizens, but also, in the words of Joanne Skolnick, to "make them feel unwelcome in the hope that they would leave."\textsuperscript{37}

The Council of Europe—the international institution that Estonia hoped to join at that time—announced that the law contained inconsistencies with the norms of public

\textsuperscript{33}Zevelev, 276. 
\textsuperscript{34}"Red Passports Out of Use for Good," an interview with Andres Kollist, \textit{ETA Insight} (16–22 May, 1997). 
\textsuperscript{35}Jeff Chinn and Robert Kaiser, \textit{Russians As the New Minority} (Boulder, Colo.: Westview, 1996), 102. 
\textsuperscript{36}Ott, Kirch, and Kirch, 22. 
international law, and with European law in particular. This was a change compared to the
previous position of the Council of Europe regarding Estonia’s minorities, which can be
summarized using the words of Catherine Lalumire, the Council of Europe’s Secretary-
General in 1992: "giving the right to vote to all Russian people living in Estonia could
jeopardize Estonia’s identity." 38

The CSCE High Commissioner expressed concern that the vague wording of the
law would, in effect, put a lot of power in the hands of Estonian government officials. 39
The CSCE criticized the requirement that "permanent residents" would have to repeat the
registration process every five years. 40 The Committee of Senior Officials of the CSCE
was so concerned with the Estonian case that it became the topic of discussion during their
17th, 18th, and 19th meetings between November 1992 and February 1993. 41 In response
to this enormous pressure, President Meri asked the parliament to amend the law. He
refused to sign it until it was endorsed by the CSCE and the Council of Europe.

Amended because of international pressure, the final version of the law on aliens
guaranteed residency and work permits to those who settled in the country prior to 1 July
1990. Those who were denied residency permits had the right to appeal this decision.
During the same year (1993), the President’s Roundtable was created to establish
institutional contact between Estonia’s Russians and the state. The Roundtable, supported
by a number of foreign embassies in Tallinn, became a forum in which the representatives
of Estonia’s minorities held monthly discussions with the representatives of the Estonian

39 Skolnick.
40 CSCE, Human Rights and Democratization in Estonia, 15–16.
3 (Fall 1994): 248.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
parliament on issues that concerned them and came up with recommendations for the
lawmakers. In addition, a law governing local elections was passed, which permitted
permanent residents and citizens of other countries who had lived in Estonia for five years
to participate in local elections (see Table 4). Under the pressure of the Council of
Europe, the organization which Estonia was hoping to join, the citizenship law was
amended to add those whose maternal ancestors were pre-1940 citizens (see Table 4).

Furthermore, the Estonian Constitution, adopted in 1992, guaranteed non-citizens
equal civil rights to those of citizens. The Constitution gave numerous rights, such as
freedom of expression, access to the courts and limited participation in the political
process to all residents of the state. The adoption of the Dwelling Privatization Act gave
everybody, regardless of citizenship, the right to acquire their present apartment in
exchange for vouchers given to them by the government.

Estonia’s willingness to guarantee these rights to non-citizens was duly noted by
the Council of Europe. Thus, in 1993, over the protests of the Russian delegation, Estonia
was admitted to the Council of Europe.

Office of the President of Estonia, “A New Cycle of the President’s
INTERNET. In 1995, the Roundtable included five members of the Estonian parliament,
five members of the Association of Estonia’s Nationalities, and five members from the
Russian Representative Assembly.

included only those whose paternal ancestors were pre-1940 citizens.

Skolnick.

Vouchers were given to all residents of Estonia for the years that that resident
worked in Estonia. Non-citizens got the right to own apartments and real estate virtually
at no cost to them. Ainso, 19. Others have argued, however, that Estonians received
proportionally greater compensation than Russians for illegally expropriated property.
Erik A. Andersen, “The Legal Status of Russians in Estonian Privatization Legislation
Table 4. Estonian Legislation: Citizenship Laws, the Law on Aliens, the Language Law, and the Local Election Law

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>DATE</th>
<th>LEGISLATION</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Feb. 1992</td>
<td>The citizenship law of 1938 (<em>ius sanguinis</em>) is re-established.*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Automatic citizenship granted to those who held Estonian citizenship before 16 June 1940 and their descendants (Art. 3)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>The naturalization process for other residents included:</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- residence in the territory of Estonia for at least the last two years and a one year waiting period (residence census &quot;2+1&quot;).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- proficiency in the Estonian language.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- an oath of loyalty to the state: &quot;In applying for Estonian citizenship, I swear to be loyal to the constitutional state system of Estonia.&quot;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Feb.-March 1993</td>
<td>The citizenship law is amended.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Citizenship is offered to those who have registered for citizenship prior to the elections to the Congress of Estonia (February–March 1990):**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Citizenship is offered to those whose maternal ancestors held Estonian citizenship before 1940.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>July 1993</td>
<td>A revised version of the law on aliens is adopted. (It was first adopted on 21 June 1993.) This version</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- classifies all non-citizens as aliens and requires them to apply for residency and work permits within two years (and not five, as in the previous version) if they wish to remain in the country;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- establishes that non-citizens must apply for Estonian, Russian, or other citizenship or an alien's passport if they want to travel abroad.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>May 1993</td>
<td>The local election law is passed. It permits the permanent residents and citizens of other countries who have lived in Estonia for five years to participate in local elections.***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jan. 1995</td>
<td>The citizenship law is amended. The amendments include:</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- residence in Estonia on the basis of a residence permit issued at least five years prior to the date of written application for Estonian citizenship and at least one year after the registration of the written application (residence census &quot;5+1&quot;).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- plus: knowledge of the Constitution and the citizenship law (20 questions on the Constitution and the law, 16 of which must be answered correctly.)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Feb. 1995</td>
<td>A new language law is passed. It includes the following:</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- the Estonian language is the only official state language.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- the use of minority languages is allowed in areas of minority concentration.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- unlike the 1989 law, this version does not oblige state officials to use Russian when interacting with Russian speakers.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dec. 1998</td>
<td>The citizenship law is amended. Children under the age of 15 who were born in Estonia after independence and who do not have the citizenship of any state become eligible for Estonian citizenship through naturalization.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Table 4 (Continued)

Notes:

* Article 2 of the law on citizenship states that Estonian citizenship:
  1) shall be acquired by birth;
  2) shall be received by naturalization;
  3) shall be restored to any person who has lost Estonian citizenship as a minor;
  4) shall be lost through release form or revocation of Estonian citizenship or upon acceptance of the citizenship of another state.

** In February 1993, approximately 20,000 non-Estonians were granted citizenship by the Estonian Citizens’ Committee for having supported Estonian independence in 1990.

*** According to the Estonian Constitution (adopted in 1992), Estonia’s non-citizens have the right to use the courts, to exercise freedom of expression, and to vote in municipal elections. The latter right was approved by the law on elections to local government councils in 1996.

Sources:


This event was one of Estonia’s greatest foreign policy successes. Intense international involvement in political community building did not go unnoticed by the domestic actors. At first the widespread international criticism of the laws which attempted to regulate the borders of the community (e.g., the law on Aliens and the Citizenship law) was interpreted by the restorationists as a result of the Russian “propaganda campaign.”

The Foreign Ministry was reprimanded by for low efficiency in mounting a

---

counter-campaign.\textsuperscript{47} Later, many complained about the "double standards" applied by the international institutions to the small versus big states and the pressure exerted on Estonia to "give a definite answer to the classic tension between group rights and individual rights."\textsuperscript{48}

Yet in spite of the worries by the international actors and Russia's threats about the restrictiveness of the citizenship law and the law on aliens,\textsuperscript{49} some Russians were applying for (and receiving) the Estonian citizenship. Thus, as illustrated by Table 5, the number of Russians who chose Estonian citizenship increased from 16% of those residing in Estonia in 1993 to 35% in 1994. It became approximately 30% in 1995.

When Russian citizenship became available in 1993 to the Russians living in Estonia, some of them opted for both Russian and Estonian citizenship. (The Russian citizenship law allows double citizenship.)

\textsuperscript{47} Kask, 385.
\textsuperscript{48} Peter Vares, "Estonia Returns to the International Community: History Repeats Itself." \textit{Journal of Baltic Studies} 25, no. 2 (Summer 1994): 122. In this article, the rights of the Estonians to recreate their nationstate are referred to as the "group rights," and the rights of the Russians to obtain citizenship are understood as individual rights. The comment about double standards relates to the fact that unlike Estonia and Latvia, Russia has not invited the international community to comment on its citizenship law. Erika B. Schlager. "The Right to Have Rights: Citizenship in Newly Independent OSCE countries," \textit{Helsinki Monitor} 8, no. 1 (1997). Available from http://www.fsk.ethz.ch/osce/h_moni/; INTERNET.

The Response of Estonia's Russians to the Laws and Policies

In 1993–94, the Russians living in Estonia were becoming a highly differentiated ethnic group. The ones with a higher social status (i.e., a higher educational and job status) were usually the ones who had lived in Estonia for a longer period of time and thus had a better knowledge of Estonian. The Russians from a lower social stratum were likely to have a negative or neutral attitude vis-a-vis the Estonian state.\(^5\) As shown by Table 3, in July 1993, approximately 30% of the Russians held a positive attitude toward the Estonians and the state, while all the rest were either neutral or negative.

The restorationists were concerned about the last category of the Russians (see Table 3) who tended to hold a negative attitude toward the Estonian state. They became especially alarmed when Vladimir Zhirinovsky, a Russian ultra-nationalist arguing for the reintegration of the Baltic states into Russia, began garnering considerable support among Narva's Russian citizens.\(^5\)

---


Table 5. Russians by Estonian or Russian Citizenship (estimates)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Citizens of Estonia</th>
<th>Citizens of the Russian Federation</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>April 1992</td>
<td>2% (Kirch)</td>
<td>–</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>February 1993</td>
<td>16% (Kirch)</td>
<td>10% (Kirch)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>December 1994</td>
<td>35% (Kirch)</td>
<td>8% (Kirch)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>May 1995</td>
<td>30% (Kirch)</td>
<td>12% (Kirch)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>June 1996</td>
<td>29% (Kirch)</td>
<td>18% (Kirch)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>February 1997</td>
<td>32.71% (ETA)*</td>
<td>26.65% (ETA)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>August 1999</td>
<td>March 1999: appr. 20%–30% (RFE/RL)**</td>
<td>appr. 20%*** (ETA)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Notes:

*According to 18 February 1997 ETA announcement, out of predominantly Russian-speaking aliens living in Estonia, 135,000 are Estonian citizens; 110,000 have taken Russian citizenship and 177,000 do not have citizenship. According to another source in January 1997, 119,752 people living in Estonia were the citizens of Russia. FBIS-SOV-97-007 (10 January, 1997). According to the Estonian Statistical office, in 1997, there were 412,628 Russians who were the permanent residents of Estonia.

**According to a Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty report, between 100,000 and 150,000 of Russian speakers in Estonia hold Estonian citizenship, which makes them one fifth of the electorate. There were approximately 500,000 Russian speakers in Estonia in 1999.

***The data for 1999 was received by ETA from the Russian Embassy. On 6 August 1999, nearly 100,000 Russian citizens were registered in Estonia. This represented a drop in approximately 24,000 cases since 1 August 1997. The percentage of the Russians holding the Russian citizenship has been calculated using 1998 data for the total number of Russian residents (409,111).

Sources:

ETA, Estonian News Agency.


Partially in response to these activities, but partially hoping to push out the "colonists," in February 1993, Jüri Estam, an Estonian-American politician, established the Decolonization Fund and the electoral bloc *Parem Estii* [Better Estonia], which openly sought an "Estonia for the Estonians." Such radical restorationist views were not widely supported by the Estonian public. However, in 1993, a substantial minority (27%) of Estonians continued to think that the danger of their ethnic extinction was growing. Responding to such fears, in February 1995, the restorationists passed a new language law which reiterated Estonian status as the state language (see Table 5). This law reflected a new ethnopolitical balance of power, since it no longer obliged state officials to use Russian when interacting with Russian speakers, as the language law adopted in 1989 did. One goal of this new language law was to strengthen the position of the Estonian language because Russian was claimed as the first language by 83% of the residents of Estonia, and Estonian—only by 77%.

In addition, in January 1995 the citizenship law was made even stricter (see Table 4). The residency requirement for those who entered Estonia after 1992 was changed from two to five years. For those applying for the citizenship the requirement to know the Constitution and citizenship law was spelled out, and the language requirement was tightened.

---


53Haas, 72.


55“Use of Language in Central European Countries.” *Central and Eastern Eurobarometer* (March 1996), Annex Figure 44.

56In February 1992, the language requirement for citizenship was defined at a fairly liberal level. It was equivalent to the active knowledge of about 1,500 words of
The European Union did not approve of these changes in legislation. A conservative politician Mart Nutt, one of the authors of the citizenship law and one of the founders of Pro Patria party, confronted this criticism by saying that "considering the present situation in Estonia, it is not possible to follow these suggestions [of the European Union]." Nutt went on to say that even though Estonia asked the EU experts to give their opinion about the law, this does not give them [the EU experts] the right to demand changes.

In 1995, the controversies about the citizenship and language laws abated and were not rekindled until several years later. However, during this period, several Russian political parties (most notably, the Russian Party and the United People's party) came into being. The Russian party, led by Nikolai Maspanov, has represented the Russians with an Eastern-orientation (i.e., those mostly supporting Moscow). Maspanov summarized his party's platform by saying that "the society of Estonia will be stable only when the Russian language is declared the second official language" (which is unacceptable to most Estonians and especially the restorationists). Even though in 1995 this party joined the

---

58 Ibid.
59 During 1995 elections to the Estonian parliament, these two Russian parties together with the Russian People's Party of Estonia formed an electoral coalition "Our Home is Estonia" and received 5.9% of the vote. The alliance disintegrated. In 1999 elections, the United People's Party won 6.13% of the vote. Its supporters included 7.4% non-Estonians and 0.3% Estonians, or 1.6% of the vote.
60 Interview with Nikolai Maspanov, *Postimees* (27 February, 1998), 2. The

---

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
electoral bloc "Our Home is Estonia!" with the United People's Party led by Viktor Andreyev, the alliance was short lived. Consequently, the two most influential Russian parties—the Russian party and the United People's Party—have remained two separate actors.

According to Viktor Andreyev, the chairman of the United People's Party (the second Russian party), the goal of his party is "to liquidate national segregation [because] the Estonian parties just do not notice that." Andreyev's organization does not support isolation of the Russians and promotes integration based on equal rights. The platform of the party states that equality (between different ethnic groups) can be achieved by liberalizing the existing law of citizenship. Automatic citizenship should be given to all those who were born in Estonia and live in the country at the time of such a new law. The party claims that it does not contest the Estonian language law per se, but it disagrees with "the law's discriminating nature." The party has opposed the principle of collective guilt [they see it in the application of exclusive citizenship law] and has argued that all sections of the population should be equal before the state. The party says that it does not have official relations with the Russian government, but representatives of the party often travel to Russia to establish trade links and even to soothe Estonian-Russian relations, when needed. One of the main interests of the party is to help to maintain

---

Russian party's supporters include 14.6% non-Estonians (2.6% of the vote).

61 Interview with Viktor Andreyev, Postimees (1 March, 1999), 2.
64 Ibid.
65 Sanita Upleia, "Levye Latvi i Estonii aktivno obrashchayutsya s Moskvoi" [The Leftists of Latvia and Estonia Actively Communicate with Moscow], Diena (12 April, 1999), 3.
stable relations between Russia and Estonia. Predictably, the party has opposed the prospect of Estonia's membership in NATO.⁶⁶

1995–Present: Defending the Borders of Political Community

After introduction of more restrictive language and citizenship laws, ethnic differentiation which was present during the first stage of political community building continued to take place.⁶⁷ Estonia was still a two-society state, in which the Russian and the Estonian communities had little in common other than using the state as a "service station." Social differentiation was taking place among the Russian Estonians as well. In 1995, by no means were they a united disenfranchised group as portrayed (and instrumentalized) by Russia. Within the Estonian Russian community, the length of their stay in Estonia remained the dividing line between those who supported the state and those who opposed it.⁶⁸

At the same time, Russia continued to complain about the rights of Russians living in Estonia. According to Vladimir Parshikov of the Russian Ministry's International and

⁶⁶During the Latvian-Russian crisis in March 1998, triggered by the protests of the Russian speaking pensioners, the United People's Party of Estonia, fearful of a potential spillover of the conflict to Estonia, called for the normalization of economic ties between the two countries. See the interview with Aleksandr Glukhov, the Russian Ambassador to Estonia, in Postimees (26 March, 1998), 2. After the US-Baltic Partnership Charter was signed, this party urged Estonia to sign a similar agreement with Russia. "Russian Party Calls for Partnership," Baltic Times (5 February, 1998), 4.


Human Rights Department, a member of a Russian "fact-finding mission" in Estonia. "The key problem [in Estonia] is that tens of thousands of people simply cannot get citizenship of the country in which they live." To solve the problem, Russia wanted to create a joint Russian-Estonian group to reconstruct the Estonian legislation. Such a group was unacceptable to the Estonians, who argued that would be an outright interference into the state's internal affairs.

Responding to Russia's pressure, the Estonian government did not prevent and even encouraged international observers to investigate the situation of human rights and Russians in particular in their state. In January 1997, the Council of Europe decided that Estonia no longer needed to be specially monitored by this human rights organization. Rudolf Binding, the chief Council of Europe rapporteur, told the Council of Europe's Parliamentary Assembly (CEPA) that "many accusations against Estonia, also in the Western press, are very much exaggerated and unfair to Estonia." Having experienced pressure from the Russian deputies, who managed to garner support from some Moldovan and Ukrainian deputies, the CEPA did pass a resolution requiring the Estonian government to ensure state support for Russian language schools. In addition, Estonia was asked to improve teaching Estonian to the Russians and to offer free or reduced rate courses to applicants of citizenship. Helped by the United Nations Development Program

71 Ibid. There are Russian schools supported by the Estonian state. Recently, during a public discussion, there was a suggestion to establish centers for developing Estonian culture and to give Estonian citizenship to Russian secondary school graduates. "Scientists Recommend that Russian School-Leavers Should Be Granted Citizenship." *Eesti Päevaleht* (14 June, 1999), 3.
(UNDP) and Nordic countries, the Estonian government tried to comply with these recommendations.\textsuperscript{72}

The Council of Europe decision was criticized by Moscow, who complained that Tallinn now can use the Council of Europe decision to counter Moscow's claims about the minority situation in Estonia.\textsuperscript{73} Furthermore, this Council of Europe's decision stirred a debate in the Russian Estonian daily \textit{Estoniya}, which, basing its report on the Russian Information Agency, wrote that van der Stoel, OSCE High Commissioner, found "systematic prosecution" of Russians in Estonia, and this finding supposedly contradicted with the Council of Europe's decision. Van der Stoel responded to \textit{Estoniya} by saying that since 1993 he "found no evidence of systematic persecution of national minorities or of systematic violation of human rights in Estonia."\textsuperscript{74} Furthermore, he praised Estonia for a larger number of Russian citizenship applicants. Indeed, in 1997, the rate of naturalization increased: in 1997, 32.7\% of all Russian speakers had Estonian citizenship compared to 29\% last year (Table 5). Helped by the OSCE, Estonia was issuing aliens' passports to those Russians who did not want or could not get Estonian citizenship.\textsuperscript{75}

\textsuperscript{72}Since May 1997, Estonia's attempts to speed up the process of integration included the creation of a new minister without portfolio with responsibility for integration issues, formation of the policy proposal for integration, and the formation of the Non-Estonians Integration Fund. The project together with the UNDP and the Nordic governments will continue into the year 2001 and will attract approximately $1.3 million to provide funds for teaching the Estonian language to Russian children, training of Estonian in Russian language schools, and regional development in ethnic enclaves. Denise Albrighton, "UNDP, Nordics Lend a Hand for Integration," \textit{Baltic Times} (17 September, 1998). 9.

\textsuperscript{73}OMRI \textit{Daily Digest} (5 February, 1997).

\textsuperscript{74}Kristopher Rikken, "OSCE Chief Denies Estoniya Report," \textit{Baltic Times} (6 February, 1997). 1.

\textsuperscript{75}"Mission to Estonia Notes Positive Developments in Citizenship Issues." \textit{OSCE Newsletter} (February 1997).
Estonia’s willingness to follow the recommendations of the international institutions were promoted by Goran Persson, then Swedish Prime Minister, who argued that Estonia’s Russian speakers, even those living in the ethnic enclave in Northeastern Estonia, no longer constitute a hurdle for Estonia to be admitted into the European Union.76

These developments probably helped Estonia (prior to Latvia and Lithuania) receive a recommendation by the EU Commission in July 1997 to be invited for starting accession negotiations. Estonia’s success in the transition to a market economy and its willingness to accommodate the non-citizens were among the reasons why Estonia was singled out of the three Baltic states.77 However, a visit by Jørn Donner, a rapporteur from the EU Parliament, in August of the same year, re-politicized the ethnic divisions within the Estonian state. In his interview with Eesti Ekspress, Donner suggested that Estonia declared itself bilingual, i.e., that Russian would be declared the second official language of the state and loosened the citizenship requirements. He drew parallels with the position of the Swedes in Finland.78

Donner’s comments prompted polarization in Estonian society. Donner was harshly criticized by the Estonian language press and Estonian politicians, while the Russian press applauded his comments. The Estonians saw Donner’s suggestions going “further than those in Moscow.” Kristiina Ojuland, one of the leading Estonian politicians, argued that Donner’s suggestions contradicted Estonia’s integration policy

77The other reasons probably were the willingness of the Commission to signal that the EU was ready for the members from the former area of the USSR, but, at the same time, the institution did not want to stress its institutional capacity for enlargement. Bungs, The Baltic States, 26.
which has been geared to integrate the Russians through learning the language. Donner was seen as hampering Estonia’s border agreement with Russia, since his statement, along with the criticism by the Baltic Sea States’ Council’s Human Rights Commissioner Ole Espersen, was later (in November 1997) instrumentalized by Russia’s Primakov during the border negotiations with Estonia. When the EU Parliament decided to include the wording of Kirsi Piha, the chairman of the Estonian group in the EU Parliament, praising the integration of non-Estonians instead of Donner’s opinion, into its statement, this move was hailed as “Estonia’s victory” by the Estonian press.

Eventually, however, the recommendation of the European Commission to start the negotiations temporarily helped to improve the Estonian-Russian relations. When Estonia received an invitation to start the talks, the Russian Council for Foreign and Defense policy suggested that Russia instrumentalized the Estonian Russians not as "a fifth column," but as a "weighty instrument of political and economic rapprochement of peoples [i.e., the Russians in Russia proper and Estonians]." Furthermore, in October 1997, Russia changed its “steel” ambassador, Alexander Trofimov with a "softer" Alexei Glukhov. It silenced its rhetoric about the "abuses of the human rights" in Estonia, and appointed Ludvig Chizhov (instead of Vassili Svirin) as the head of Estonian-Russian

---

82Paul Goble, “An Experts’ Report Defines a Novel Policy,” *Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty Research Report* (7 November, 1997). In this report, a group of senior Russian experts on foreign policy encouraged the Russian government and Russian businesses to spend more money on Estonian Russians to make relations between the two nations better. Also see “Russians Prefer Baltic EU Membership to NATO,” *FBIS-WEU-97-100* (6 May, 1997).
border negotiation team, which made the border negotiation process somewhat smoother.83

Hoping for further improvement in Russian-Estonian relations through EU membership, the Estonian government decided to submit legislation which grants citizenship to children born in Estonia to non-citizen parents to the Estonian parliament. This move was made strategically on 16 December 1997, just days ahead of a key EU summit in Luxembourg which identified the states for the first round of enlargement. This decision was welcomed by the United States, who said that "Estonia now has acted on all thirty recommendations made by Max van der Stoel in 1994," van der Stoel himself, and the EU.84

On the domestic front, the decision was assaulted by restorationist Mart Laar who argued that it contradicts with Estonia’s national interests. Laar argued that the simplified order of giving citizenship would slow down the integration of non-Estonians into the Estonian society because there "will be no incentive for non-Estonians to learn to speak Estonian." Laar went on to say that the government should aim to improve its language teaching policies instead of making concessions to Russia.85 Jüri Adams, a member of the committee supervising the draft law on the citizenship from Laar’s party (Pro Patria Union) was alarmed about the possibility that the government was trying to "gradually introduce the ‘zero option’ of citizenship" which was rejected by the Estonian voters in 1992. Pro Patria Union warned that this amendment could launch the disintegration of the


The ruling Coalition Party was reminded about its 1993 program which mentioned that "Estonia cannot afford an explosive and uncontrolled increase in the number of citizens." "Neither domestic political documents nor politicians have ever mentioned that the principle of *ius soli* should be introduced together with *ius sanguini*," argued the restorationists, fearful about the changes to the citizenship law which, they thought, should remain fixed to the 1992 version.

On 18 December 1997, two days after the draft law was submitted to the parliament, four Russian Estonian parliamentarians submitted an amendment of their own, suggesting liberalizing the law of citizenship even further. They offered to extend Estonian citizenship to all stateless children under 18. In a backlash, the Right wing parties of Estonia released a statement, addressed to the president, the parliament, and the government, which argued that "the Republic of Estonia, restored under the principle of legal continuity, should not retreat from nationstate politics of citizenship, language, and aliens. Language and citizenship policies and complicated demographic issues resulting from genocide carried out during the Soviet occupation (i.e., deportations and repressions) should not be solved at the expense of the interest of the nation." Similarly to the first stage of community building, historical memory about the past ethnic restructuring once again entered political discourse.

Trying to alleviate the fears of the restorationists and at the same time reiterating

---

88 Ibid.
its willingness to adjust to the democratic norms of inclusiveness. On 10 February 1998, the Estonian government, which in 1998 was dominated by the compromisers, adopted the Estonian national integration policy. The policy included, among other things, a statement underlining the importance of "the serious effort [by the non-Estonians] to study the Estonian language" and a goal to foster regional development in the ethnic enclave in Northeastern Estonia. The essence of this policy, however, was the continuation of the previous integration attempts, which was based on the idea that the integration of Russians into the Estonian state should proceed through language.

The restorationists supported this policy (adopted by the Estonian parliament in June 1998), but they continued to resist any changes in the citizenship policy, arguing that citizenship should not be changed without a public discussion. On the contrary, the President’s Roundtable of Ethnic Minorities, led by non-Estonians (with the exception of two members), supported the move to extend Estonian citizenship to all stateless children by arguing that it would not significantly alter the existing citizenship law but criticized the integration policy for lacking a focus. Finally, in March 1998, the bill offering Estonian citizenship to children under 15 passed the first reading in the parliament.

---

91 Andra Veidemann (a former Minister of Ethnic Affairs), "Perspectives of Estonia’s National Integration Policy," speech at the conference “Towards a Civil Society,” Riga, 11–12 June 1998. A copy of her presentation was given to me by the Naturalization Board of Latvia on 7 July 1998.
92 “We Should Start with a Discussion,” Postimees (11 March, 1998), 8.
93 Office of the President of Estonia, “Resolution of the President’s Roundtable of Ethnic Minorities on the Citizenship Act” (10 March 1998). Available from http://www.president.ee:INTERNET. Vladimir Vel’man, one of the members of the Roundtable, criticized the program by saying that it does not identify the main goal. “It is no clear,” he argued, “whether the Estonian state is trying to create a multicultural society, assimilate the Russians, or pursue integration on the individual level.” “Razrabatyvayets’a programma integratsii nekorennogo pokoleniya” [Creating a Program of Integration of non-Autochthonous Population], Molodezh’ Estonii Subbota (13 November, 1999), 5.
However, the parliament rejected a similar draft law submitted by the Russian deputies.

A similar amendment to the citizenship law passed by the parliament of the neighboring Latvia under pressure from international actors reactivated the debate about citizenship in Estonia. The amendment offering citizenship to the stateless children was passionately promoted by Foreign Minister Toomas Hendrik Ilves and the committee on the foreign affairs of the parliament who argued that Estonia had to change the law if it wants to join the EU. The restorationists continued to view the amendment as "letting in the Trojan horse" (i.e., allowing the "aliens" trespass the borders of the Estonian political community). They also argued that by giving in to the pressure of the OSCE, Estonia, in fact, is "giving in to Russia," since Russia is using the OSCE to pursue its own interests. Should Estonia accept the proposed amendments, the argument went, there will be new ones. Finally, by using the international institutions, Russia will get what it wants.

To keep the passions down, the parliament delayed the second reading of the bill until September. The same month, Robin Cook, the British Foreign Secretary, remarked that "the way Estonia tackles the issue of protecting the rights of minorities is the key to its accession to the EU." He continued by saying that he hopes that Estonia will soon implement Max van der Stoel's recommendations. Cook's "encouragement" was reiterated by Max van der Stoel, who expressed a wish that "Estonia will follow Latvia in adopting the amendments to its citizenship law." The Estonians heard the same "recommendation" for the third time during the negotiations with the EU which started on

---

95 Vahur Made, "Estonia's Foreign Policy is Changing," Postimees (26 June, 1998), 9.
96 Baltic Times (3 September, 1998). 3.
10 November 1998.\textsuperscript{98} Responding to this pressure, Tune Kelam, the chairman of the committee in charge of bringing the Estonian laws in compliance with EU standards, argued that even though the government of Estonia supports the amendment proposed by the international actors and Moscow, "we [Estonia and international institutions] must make it absolutely clear where the end [to these amendments] will be. This should be the last demand for Estonia or any Baltic state."\textsuperscript{99}

In order to persuade the lawmakers to adopt the bill, President Lennart Meri asked them to overcome the "political passions."\textsuperscript{100} Raul Malk, Estonia’s Foreign Minister, argued that the amendments are crucial for Estonia’s future in international arena, and that failure to pass the amendment would "baffle" the international community. The restorationists still tried to protest by arguing that citizenship should be used as a reward for those who have already integrated instead of being utilized as an impetus for integration.\textsuperscript{101} The Estonian Freedom Fighters Union (an organization tracing itself to the resistance fighters of the postwar years) gathered in front of the parliament building on the day of the vote to protest what they thought was "russification through the European Union."\textsuperscript{102}

In spite of these protests, the amendment offering citizenship to the children born in Estonia to stateless parents after 26 February 1992, was passed by a vote of 55 to 20 by

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{98}Rebecca Santana, “Estonia Moving Steadily Toward EU,” \textit{Baltic Times} (12 November, 1998), 8.
\item \textsuperscript{99}Ibid.
\item \textsuperscript{101}Rebecca Santana, “Citizenship Amendments Clear Another Hurdle,” \textit{Baltic Times} (26 November, 1998), 4.
\item \textsuperscript{102}“Protesters Gather Outside the Parliament,” \textit{Baltic Times} (10 December, 1999). 4.
\end{itemize}
the parliament. Yet many members of the parliament still held reservations about such intense outside intervention to promote inclusiveness, and admitted that their vote was crucially affected by Estonia's need to get into the EU.\textsuperscript{103}

Having amended its citizenship law under external pressure, the Estonian state has been very reluctant to make its language laws more liberal. In December 1998 (the same month when the citizenship law was amended), the Estonian parliament adopted a draft law which would require the members of the parliament and elected officials in local governments to be fluent in the Estonian language. The proponents of the law knew that it was naive to hope that these language requirements would increase the willingness of the aliens to study the language, yet, they professed, [the law] "had a symbolic meaning [to them] nevertheless."\textsuperscript{104}

This time, despite the criticism by Max van der Stoel, President Meri promulgated the amendment, even though he had declined to do so in 1996 and in 1997.\textsuperscript{105} In his interview to \textit{Eesti Päevaleht}, Max van der Stoel criticized the law by saying that he thought that it should be "up to the voters" to decide whether to elect someone who does not speak the official language.\textsuperscript{106} Predictably, van der Stoel was criticized by the Estonian restitutionists who argued that even though "many people indeed hoped that after the liberalization of the citizenship law, the High Commissioner and Russia would not


\textsuperscript{104}"Language Rung in the Career Ladder." \textit{Positimes} (16 December, 1998), 8.

\textsuperscript{105}Refusing to promulgate this amendment to the language law in 1996 and in 1997, Meri argued that this piece of legislation would "upset the constitutional balance of power because it would allow the government to evaluate and determine the level of proficiency of parliamentary deputies and local government officials." \textit{Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty Newsline} (6 February, 1998).

\textsuperscript{106}"Stoel Attacks Language Requirements." \textit{Eesti Päevaleht} (8 January, 1999), 3.
advance any new claims, it did not happen so.\textsuperscript{107}

Responding to Meri’s decision to promulgate the law, four Russian members of the President’s Roundtable on Ethnic Minorities resigned, arguing that the lawmakers have ignored their opinion on the language law and thus making this multiethnic institution useless.\textsuperscript{108} The United People’s Party, defending the interests of Russian Estonians, appealed to the EU “to force the Estonian authorities to cancel the amendments.”\textsuperscript{109} Several months later, in April and June 1999, Max van der Stoel once again criticized the amendment to the Estonian language law (the one requiring the members of the parliament and elected officials in local governments to be fluent in Estonian and also establishing requirements concerning the minimum level of Estonian for public servants, employees and individual entrepreneurs) as too intrusive.\textsuperscript{110} His visit to Estonia in June was protested by the Memento organization, uniting the victims of the previous regime.\textsuperscript{111}

This time, even the Estonian compromisers did not share van der Stoel’s views. Arnold Rüütel, a former leader of the Estonian Popular Front and a member of the Rural Union (in 1999), argued that "it is not correct [to amend the language law according to the recommendations of van der Stoel because] this means that we should rely on interpreters in the parliament and elsewhere. . . . I think that our Constitution and all other laws [already] correspond with the modern (i.e., the Western) requirements." Another moderate—Andra Veidemann, a former minister of ethnic relations—argued that even

\textsuperscript{108}“Language Made the Roundtable Split Up,” \textit{Potivees} (20 February, 1999), 10.
\textsuperscript{109}“Estonia Tightens Up Language Law,” \textit{Baltic Times} (18 February, 1999), 4.
\textsuperscript{111}“Van der Stoel Makes Concessions in Estonia.” \textit{Baltic Times} (17 June, 1999), 2.
though the Estonian citizens should not be differentiated by their ethnic origin (as the law may potentially do). Estonia is in a unique [demographic] situation and therefore should "find a solution when formal legal truths do not conflict with our interests."\(^{112}\)

When this amendment to the language law was once again criticized by the OSCE, disapproved by the EU Commission in its second annual report on Estonia's progress released in October 1999, and recommended being revoked ("harmonized with EU norms") by Martti Ahtisaari, the Finnish President, some prepared to defend them by saying that the EU criticism concerns just "one legal act," and this criticism can be addressed by merely changing the text, but not the essence of the law.\(^{113}\) The Commission on the European Affairs within the Estonian parliament has reacted to the EU Commission report by remarking that the "Russian problem" has been mostly "imposed [on Estonia] from above." Instead, the Estonian parliamentary commission suggested that the EU should focus its attention on other problems in Estonia, such as agricultural issues or economic difficulties instead of dwelling on the ethnic issues.\(^{114}\)

So far, there has been little domestic support for changing the amended language law, which went into effect in July 1999, as previously planned. This unwillingness to give in to the external pressure regarding the language law, as well as the previous

\(^{112}\) Answers to the question "Should the Language Law Be Amended According to the Recommendations of Max van der Stoel?," *Eesti Päevaleht* (27 April, 1999), 2.


\(^{114}\) For Finnish President Ahtisaari's "encouragement" (in the second half of 1999, Finland held the rotating presidency of the EU), see "Ahtisaari Discusses Estonian Language Law," *Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty Newsline* (8 November, 1999). For a response to these criticisms, see Harri Tiido, "Reading Between the Lines of the Euro-report," *Eesti Päevaleht* (15 October, 1999), 2.
resistance to changing the citizenship law suggests that in spite of intense international
involvement, the restorationist idea of political community as "a post factum kind of
affirmative action, commemorating past persecutions"¹¹₅ has not been abandoned yet.

Response of the Russians

The Russians within Estonia have tended to support Estonia's membership in the
EU much more passionately than Estonians.¹¹₆ Encouraged by a positive EU attitude
toward the Estonian state and hoping for the future Estonia's membership within the EU,
many of them decided to go through the process of naturalization in 1997. In 1996,
Estonia granted citizenship to only approximately 3,000 people. In 1997, this number was
8,132. The number of people who received Estonian citizenship in 1998 was even
larger—9,969.¹¹⁷

However, this "rush" for citizenship abated in 1998. The adoption of the
amendment further liberalizing the law in 1998 did not significantly alter the pace of
naturalization. Even though approximately 7,000 new citizens were expected, the non-

¹¹⁵ This phrase has been used by William Safran to describe Israel's political
community. William Safran, "Citizenship and Nationality in Democratic Systems:
Approaches to Defining and Acquiring Membership in the Political Community,"
International Political Science Review 18, no. 3 (July 1997): 327.
¹¹⁶ In November 1997, 35% of those questioned (Estonians and non-Estonians)
were in favor of EU membership. A year later, 25% of Estonians and 37% non-Estonians
were in favor. In October 1999, 36% of Estonians and 48% of non-Estonians held such
views. EU, Briefing 41: Public Opinion on Enlargement in the EU Member States and
¹¹⁷ Mati Heidmets, "Integration: What and How?" paper presented at the
conference "Multicultural Estonia" on 26 December 1998 in Helsinki, and Bungs. The
Baltic States, 66.
citizen did not hurry to apply for Estonian citizenship for their children. As of 5 March 1999, approximately 220,000 residents of Estonia (about 17%) reportedly were still "stateless." or undecided, which citizenship (Russian or Estonian) to apply for. The language requirement established by the Estonian state on one hand and poor knowledge of Estonian by the Russian speakers on the other were some of the reasons why many Russians could not opt for the Estonian citizenship.

At the same time, the attitude of the Russians toward the state has been gradually improving (Table 3). In fact, in 1995–96, the Russians began to actively discuss their role in the restored state. One group, led by the Estonian United People’s Party, argued that the Russian Estonians should seek integration into the Estonian state. Another group, led by the Russian Party of Estonia, supported consolidation of all movements and parties of Estonian Russians to be able to voice their own, yet specifically "Russian," demands to the Estonian state. These debates signal that many Russians began to foresee their political activities within the Estonian state. Tracing community building processes at the sub-

---

120 According to the September 1999 data, approximately 72% of non-citizens (356,000 people) are only now acquiring the skills of Estonian language. Iris Pettai, “Info-isolation of non-Estonians,” Postimees (3 September, 1999), 9.
121 Lembit Annus, “Tanets vokrug passportov” [A Dance Around the Passports], ME Russkiy Telegraf (16 January, 1996), 2. A widespread wish among the Russian speakers has been to “adapt to the local conditions, but preserve the culture.” See "Russkaya molodezh' istorii ne skovyvayet" [The Russian Youth Is Not Overwhelmed by History], Narvskaya Gazeta (8 March, 1997), 4.
123 This statement is supported by Saar Poll studies. conducted in April 1997 and in November 1996. The poll conducted in 1997 suggested that 53% of Estonia’s non-citizen population wanted to become Estonian citizens. The study conducted in 1996 revealed that 79% of non-citizens wanted their children to have Estonian citizenship.
COMMUNITY BUILDING FROM "BELOW"

Local Governments

Even though the Estonian language law pronounced Estonian as the only state language, it has permitted the use of minority languages in the areas of minority concentration. Furthermore, all residents of Estonia, regardless of their citizenship, have been allowed to vote in the local elections, even though non-citizen cannot be elected to an office. In practice, this meant that multiethnic localities with a large percentage of Russians (i.e., Tallinn and Narva) were endowed with a significant degree of self-governance and even cultural autonomy. Estonia’s non-citizen were eager to use these rights: their participation in local elections has been quite intense. To illustrate, in 1996, 85% of aliens and only 49.7% of Estonian citizens voted in local elections. Three years later, the majority of the non-citizen still considered it worthwhile to cast their vote.


125 The right to vote in the local elections is extended to "all residents over 18 years old, regardless of citizenship who reside permanently on the territory of the local government; for non-citizen: if s/he has resided legally in the territory of the corresponding local government for at least five years by 1 January of the election year." Estonian National Election Committee, Fact Sheet (October 1999). Available from http://www.vm.ee/eng/local.el.99; INTERNET.

126 Merike Lees, "Leftists Win in Ida-Virumaa," Luup (4 October, 1999). The turnout in local elections was 52.3% in 1993, 52.5% in 1996, and less than 50% in 1999.

The state decided to tolerate a high degree of self-governance after a strike at the two plants near Narva and simultaneous attempts by the Russian secessionist organizations to collect the signatures for a referendum on the future of Narva in 1992. (In Narva, at least 96% of the population is Russian, and out of 74,000 inhabitants approximately 55% hold the Russian citizenship, and approximately 80% of the residents do not speak any Estonian.) However, the right to vote in local elections extended to non-citizen by the Estonian state did not prevent secessionist groups from organizing a referendum on Narva's regional autonomy in July 1993, in which the majority of participants voted in favor of establishing an autonomous territory. The Supreme Court declared the referendum unconstitutional, but it did not revoke the right of the non-citizen to vote in local elections.

As the time went on, the popularity of the conservative Russian secessionist leaders among the Narvans declined. Three months later, in October 1993, the voters of Narva elected to power the leftist but not secessionist parties—the Trade Union Center, the Democratic Labor Party, and the Estonian Society—to the local government. During the next round of elections in 1996, three representatives of the Estonian "compromisers"—the

---

128 Sergei Gorokhov, "Integration in Practice: The Case of Narva," in The Integration of Non-Estonians into Estonian Society: History, Problems, and Trends, ed. Aksel Kirch (Tallinn: Estonian Academy Publishers, 1997), 131, 134. Gorokhov gives the following figures on citizenship (1996): 27% of the population are the citizens of Estonia, 55% of Russia, and 18% are without citizenship. Another estimate is that 27% of Narvans hold the Russian citizenship. Denise Albrighton, "Estonia's Little Russia," Baltic Times (17 June, 1999), 16.

129 Gorokhov, 128. In 1999, electoral district of Ida-Virumaa was home to 74,263 aliens and 66,113 citizens.

Estonian Center Party—was elected to the local government. In 1999, the Center party won the local election. During 1989–99, mostly Russians who hold Estonian citizenship were elected to the local government (see Table 6).

By and large, the voters in Narva take the local elections quite seriously. For example, while complaining that the parliamentarians are not responsible to the non-citizen, even when the policies which directly affect the life of the latter are adopted, the Narvskaya Gazeta (the local newspaper) wrote that "the matters are quite different on the local level [than on the national]. Everybody is electing [those who hold power]. In this case [local elections], not only can we expect and even demand that our problems are solved, but we can anticipate that our way of thinking will be taken into account as well. For the local population [i.e., in Narva], an increase in the prices of utilities is more important than European integration."

During October 1999 local elections, readiness to cater for these elementary interests of regional communities and to fight corruption in the local city administration which grew under the Center party (the compromisers) became a stimulus for power sharing of several diametrically opposed ethnic parties.

\[\text{\textsuperscript{131}}\text{Ibid. The electoral union “Narva” won 12 seats, the Democratic Labor Party won 8 seats, the United People’s Party won 6 seats, and “My Home Is Narva” won 2 seats.}\]

\[\text{\textsuperscript{132}}\text{The Center party won 14 seats, the Social Democratic Labor party won 3 seats, the electoral union “Unity and Trust” (includes the Russian party of Estonia) won 7 seats. “Narva-21” won 4 seats, “Narva’s People’s Trust” won 2 seats, and an electoral union “Arukus” won 1 seat. Narvskaya Gazeta (26 October, 1999), 1.}\]

\[\text{\textsuperscript{133}}\text{N. Dmitriyev, “Narod bezmolstvuyet, no mneniye imeyet” [People Are Quiet. But They Have Opinions]. Narvskaya Gazeta (3 June, 1997), 2.}\]
Table 6. Ethnic Identification of the Deputies Elected to the Local Government in Narva

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Russian</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>29 (non-Estonian)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(80%)</td>
<td>(77%)</td>
<td>(48.4%)</td>
<td>(51.6%)</td>
<td>(93.5%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Estonian</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(8%)</td>
<td>(11.5%)</td>
<td>(45.2%)</td>
<td>(29%)</td>
<td>(6%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>n/a</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(12%)</td>
<td>(11.5%)</td>
<td>(6.4%)</td>
<td>(19.4%)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source:


In Tallinn City Council, the ruling coalition of Pro Patria (the arch restorationist party), the Reform party and the Moderates, signed an agreement with the People’s Trust, an electoral union of ethnic Russian organizations. The October elections were different from the previous ones because only one electoral union—the Joint Russian List—based its election strategy on ethnic issues while campaigning in multiethnic areas. Yet this strategy failed. In order to form a city government that is capable of catering to all residents of the city, it became necessary for the restorationists to seek allies from the electoral list which included Yevgeni Kogan, one of the most ardent enemies of Estonia’s

independence and the former leader of the Intermovement. Welcoming the prospect of cooperation between the arch enemies on the local level and referring to Kogan, Prime Minister Mart Laar, the former leader of the restorationist movement, said that "we will not attach any mythological features to one or another person." Kogan asserted his willingness to cooperate by saying that "there is no more Popular Front and there is no more Intermovement. Popular Front or Intermovement is of no importance in the discussions on road repairs or water pipes." However, Kogan’s presence was unwanted by the other members of the right-wing coalition. To help the right-wingers and the coalition of Russian parties reach an agreement, Kogan gave up the seat he won on Tallinn’s City Council.

Everyday needs of local communities have been an important issue not only during the local elections. As a matter of fact, the Estonian central government has paid a lot of attention to regional economic development and the effectiveness of local governments. Attempting to curb unemployment in Northeastern Estonia, the state set up a free economic zone in the town of Sillamae. (The town, as well as the whole northeastern region, was strongly affected by the Russian financial crisis and the demise of massive Soviet-style energy industries.) Furthermore, helped by the EU, OSCE, Open Society Foundation, the Nordic governments and other international actors, the state has funded the so-called "integration projects," pursued on the community level, which have included

---

136 "Let Us Avoid Conflicts." Postimees (22 October, 1999), 6.
138 Eesti Päevaleht (19 October, 1999), 1.
language courses, seminars for teachers, and training centers.\textsuperscript{141} International gatherings have been organized in Narva to promote regional development and to sell the area to the potential investors as "a port of transit."\textsuperscript{142} These strategies of functional integration have been geared toward sustaining a good level of economic well-being within the region and toward enabling the non-citizen to "use the state as a service station."

\textit{Using the State as a Service Station: The Development of Civil Society}

Many Russians, especially those living in the ethnic enclaves of Northeastern Estonia were previously employed in large industries sponsored by Moscow. Sudden loss of employment has been one of the most serious issues that they have faced.\textsuperscript{143} Although ethnic affiliation does not present an insurmountable hurdle for economic success, the Russians were found to be somewhat more vulnerable to unemployment than Estonians,\textsuperscript{144} often due to their poor Estonian and the lack of Estonian citizenship. Consequently, the

\textsuperscript{141}Denise Albrighton, "Reformers Focus on Social Issues," \textit{Baltic Times} (8 April, 1999), 4.
\textsuperscript{142}In May 1997, an international conference "Narva-Transit '97" was held in Narva. The local newspaper evaluated this development by saying that "transit [to Russia] is key to self-governance of the region." "Vse dorogi vedut v Narvu" [All Routes go to Narva], \textit{Narvskaia Gazeta} (24 January, 1997), 1. The goal of the conferences and exhibitions held in Narva is to "mark Narva on the map of Europe." See "Oboznachit' Narvu na karte Evropy" [Marking Narva on the Map of Europe], \textit{Narvskaia Gazeta} (6 May, 1997), 1.
\textsuperscript{143}Mikk Titma, Nancy Brandon Tuma, and Brian D. Silver, "Winners and Losers in the Postcommunist Transition: New Evidence from Estonia." \textit{Post Soviet Affairs} 14, no. 2 (1998): 134. The authors argue that the Russians were especially hard hit by transitional changes.
\textsuperscript{144}Aadne Aasland, "Ethnicity and Unemployment in the Baltic States," \textit{International Politics} 35 (September 1998): 353–70. This article summarizes the results of the NORBALT living conditions survey, conducted in 1994.
purchasing power of non-Estonians has been growing slower than that of the Estonians.\textsuperscript{145}

It is not surprising, therefore, that civic activity of non-Estonians began in associations that deal with economic issues—i.e., economic interest groups, trade unions and, to a lesser degree, in professional associations.\textsuperscript{146} Recently, the share of people active in trade unions and professional associations has increased. To illustrate, in 1996, the share of Russians active in trade unions was almost twice as high (34\%) when compared to 1993 (18\%).\textsuperscript{147} The leaders of the trade unions, especially in Estonia’s northeast, have been quite vociferous in demanding to make the implementation of the law on language or on education more lenient.\textsuperscript{148}

Some concerns, such as crime control or care of residence facilities, prompted the development of the organizations involving both Russians, Estonians, and other residents of the Estonian state. An example of such organizations is the apartment-owners’ associations, which constitute approximately a half of 10,000 nonprofit organizations registered in Estonia.\textsuperscript{149}

Ethnic cleavages, however, are still discernible. As Aksel Kirch has argued, the

\textsuperscript{145} ETA Insight (12–18 November, 1999).
\textsuperscript{146} Ruutsoo, 119.
\textsuperscript{148} On 7 December 1999, a group of trade union leaders from Estonia’s northeast wrote an open letter “Zashchitim russkuyu shkolu” [We Will Defend the Russian School] to President Meri, in which they asked to refrain from making abrupt changes to the current Estonia’s language policy. They were worried about the implementation of the language law in the Russian schools. The teachers of those schools were asked to learn Estonian. Molodezh’ Estonii (7 December, 1999), 1.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
emerging structures of civil society among the Estonians are rooted in their historical memory (e.g., the prewar Republic, folklore activities during the occupation, organizations of formerly deported, etc.) Historical memory, however, separates these Estonians and some Russians from the Russian speaking "latecomers." Therefore, many sub-state associations only underline the bifurcation of the Estonian society.

Different Perceptions of the Past: An Insurmountable Obstacle?

In ethnically divided societies, commemorations often incite ethnic hatred or even prompt violence. This has not been the case in Estonia, even though Estonians and Russians commemorate different days. Most Russians (especially the older "latecomers") devotedly celebrate May 9—the Victory day, or the day when the Russian army captured Berlin after World War II. Gatherings to celebrate this day has become a tradition among Russian war veterans. Many Estonians, however, associate the end of World War II with the return of the Soviets and deportations. Instead, they tend to celebrate Estonia’s independence day and June 14, the Day of Mourning and the day of one of the greatest deportations.

The official rhetoric of commemoration during the Day of Mourning has often tried to downplay different historical experiences of Estonia’s current residents:

"The word ‘deportation,’ remarked Lennart Meri, the President of Estonia, in his mourning day address on 14 June 1998, turned overnight into a term of equal abhorrence as ‘genocide,’ ‘holocaust,’ marking the crimes against humanity that were committed on the Estonian territory by foreign invaders. . . . As we mourn

150 Kirch and Kirch, 590.  
our compatriots today, we also mourn all the victims of Stalinism and Nazism, regardless of their nationality, religion or land of residence."^{152}

Furthermore, to confront the legacy of the past, the government initiated an intense search for the individuals guilty of deportations. Thus, in January 1999, an Estonian court convicted Johannes Klaassepp, a former Soviet security official who was involved in the deportations that occurred in 1949. Mikhail Neverovski, another person in charge of deportations, was convicted in August 1999.\(^{153}\) The state's decision to initiate the search for the "guilty" did not prompt ethnic tensions.\(^{154}\)

Neither commemorations nor trials turned out to be the most challenging outgrowths of different historical experiences of the autochthonous residents of Estonia and the "latecomers." However, conflicting historical memories have translated into different perceptions of threat.

Since the reestablishment of the independent state, the Estonians and the Russians have had different attitudes on Russia as a source of threat. To illustrate, in 1994, 84% of the Estonians thought that Russia presented a threat to the Estonian state, but only 12% of the Russians shared their view.\(^{155}\) In 1996, 79% of the Estonians and 14% of the Russians thought that Russia still presented a threat to the independence of Estonia.\(^{156}\) In 1999,


\(^{154}\)Toivo Kamenik (Special Police Unit researching the war crimes), interview by author, 6 November 1998, Vilnius.

\(^{155}\)Richard Rose and William Maley, "Conflict or Compromise in the Baltic States? What Do the Peoples There Think?" Studies in Public Policy No. 231 (Glasgow: University of Strathclyde, 1994), 43. 38% of the Estonians thought that the Russian state definitely is a threat to "peace and security in this country," and 46% thought that this is possibly the case. 3% of the Russians thought that Russia definitely presents a threat to Estonia, and 9% thought that this is possibly the case.

\(^{156}\)Kirch and Kirch, 154. 43% of the Estonians thought that Russia "definitely" presents a danger to the independence of Estonia, and 36% thought that Russia
ethnic restructuring which took place in Kosovo and in Chechnya were interpreted differently by the Estonians and the Russians. In the words of Andrei Hvostov, these events underscored "the line between ‘us’ and ‘them.’”¹⁵⁷ Most Estonians sympathized with the Albanians and the Chechnyans, but most Russians living in Estonia sympathized with the Serbs and the Russians. Protesting against NATO’s intervention in the Kosovo conflict, in March 1999 a group of the Russian youths even staged a protest in front of the American embassy.¹⁵⁸ During the same month, more than 1,000 Russian citizens who live in Narva have signed a plea against NATO air strikes in Kosovo. Yuri Mishin, the leader of the association of Russian citizens in Estonia, threatened that Northeastern Estonia may follow the example of Kosovo,¹⁵⁹ but this threat remained hollow.

Predictably, the majority of Estonians and the Russians have disagreed on Estonia’s membership in NATO. The majority of the Russian Estonians have been either against or undecided about Estonia’s NATO membership, but all Russian parties have been strongly against.¹⁶⁰ Realizing that the majority of the Russians do not share their ideas about the membership in NATO, in mid-1999, two thirds of Estonians still felt that the Russians pose a threat to the survival of the Estonian nation and were opposed to

“probably” presents a danger to the independence of Estonia. 4% of the Russians fell into the first category and 10% into the second.
¹⁶⁰In 1998, 29% of non-Estonians were against Estonia’s NATO membership. In May 1999, 53% non-Estonians were against NATO membership. This number dropped to 43% in October 1999. The corresponding percentages for Estonians were 10%, 20%, and 15%. Postimees (26 November, 1999), 2. Also see “The Russians of Estonia: On the Other Side of the Front Line,” Eesti Päevaleht (3 April, 1999), 2.
automatic integration.\textsuperscript{161} These developments prompted some to argue that political community building in Estonia is far from complete because different perceptions of threat have been more difficult if not impossible to negotiate, even when compared to the citizenship or language policy.\textsuperscript{162} Consequently, there has been considerable support "from below" (i.e., on behalf of the Estonian electorate) for the restorationist idea of political community which deters the "latecomers" from making decisions about security arrangements for the state.

TOWARD A STABLE DEMOCRATIC COMMUNITY IN ESTONIA? ATTITUDES AND POLARIZATION IN LATE NINETIES

The examination of the actions of the actors involved in political community building together with the circumstances surrounding this process suggests a conclusion that one of the most influential explanatory factors regarding the state's attitude vis-a-vis non-Estonians has been the salience of historical memory, especially among the Estonians living in Estonia. This is the reason why the restorationist approach to political community building has prevailed and has been regarded as more legitimate compared to the one suggested by the compromisers. The restorationists have aimed to forge a "historic" state, or the "community of fate," the membership in which is limited to the residents of pre-1940 Estonia and their descendants.

Overall, Estonia's approach to political community has reflected a tension between

\textsuperscript{161} Iris Pettai, "Info-isolation of Non-Estonians," \textit{Postimees} (3 September, 1999), 9.

\textsuperscript{162} Aleksandr Shegedin. "What Keeps Estonians and Russians Apart?" \textit{Eesti Päevaleht} (18 November, 1999), 2.
the restorationist orientation and external pressures, pushing Estonia to introduce the elements of *ius soli* and thus create a more inclusive political community. The attempts of the international actors to expand the membership within the restorationist political community have been energetically opposed. As a matter of fact, a strong push for inclusive state policies vis-a-vis its minorities from “above” has even intensified the activity of extreme political parties, capable of invoking the yesterday’s embitterments of both Russians and Estonians.

Estonia’s dependence on the international actors for its security requires the government to maintain an image of a modern democratic state. Therefore, unwillingly, the state decided to liberalize its citizenship law. Nevertheless, it refused to liberalize its language law, which implies that the state is not ready to challenge the prevalent restorationist orientation.

Even though most international actors interested in fostering integration in Estonia, regarded the isolation of the groups with different sets of historical memory as a threat to a functioning democratic state, this separation has been a part of solution and a reason why Estonia managed to maintain a relatively stable political community. The consequences of forced “integration” of Russian speakers into the Estonian community, especially if “integration” had involved strict implementation of the language law and imposition of Estonian commemorative practices, would have been grave, especially in the ethnic enclave of Ida-Virumaa. Instead, the state has tolerated a virtual cultural autonomy in the ethnic enclave and has extended a high degree of self-governance for local communities.

The arrangements adopted by the Estonian state—a fairly liberal law on local elections and allowing minorities to speak their language in the areas of
concentration—even prompted cooperation of the former enemies on the local level (i.e., in Tallinn during 1999 October local elections). Together with the rights to use the state as a "service station" (i.e., social and economic benefits and the ability to be a full-fledged member of civil society), these arrangements have probably contributed to the growing acceptance of the Estonian state by the Russians.

Since 1993, the attitudes of the non-citizens vis-a-vis the state have been warming up. In 1999, the political preferences of the Russians (both citizens and non-citizens) were divided between different parties. During the local elections, some Russians supported even the right wing Estonian nationalist parties. The existence of these trends (see Table 3) was also identified by the findings of other opinion polls.

Unfortunately, different perceptions of threat embraced by the autochthonous residents of the state and the "latecomers" are an obstacle to replicate such pluralistic arrangements linking the communities with different historical memories on the national level. Theoretically, a bilateral agreement with the minorities' "mother state," involving reconciliation and transparent communication between the minority's host state and the minority's "mother" state, would

163 Prior to October 1999 local elections, a telephone poll was carried out by the Estonian Centre for Sociological Research. The greatest percentage of the non-citizens supported the Center party (the compromisers). A large number of the non-citizens supported the right wing Pro Patria (12%) and the right center Reform party (12%). Sirje Kiin, "Non-Estonians Turned to Estonian Parties," Eesti Päevaleht (28 October, 1999), 2.

164 This does not mean that the non-Estonians regard themselves as "Estonians" nor do they completely identify with the state. See Titma, Tuma, and Silver. Their article includes the results of a longitudinal survey of one generation in Estonia. Also see Rose and Maley. For a survey of different public opinion polls in the Baltic states, see Jekaterina Dorodnova, "Identity Formation of the Russian Speakers in Estonia and Latvia," in Diasporas and Migrants in 20th Century Europe, ed. Rainer Münz, Rainer Ohliger, and William Safran (Newbury Park, UK: Frank Cass Publishers, forthcoming).
be one way to alleviate such fears. However, given the domestic instability of Russia, such an agreement is unlikely.

Consequently, the Estonian state and especially the domestic actors embracing restorationist views are likely to remain quite cautious in extending membership within the Estonian political community. The influence of the restorationists is likely to be moderated by Estonia’s membership in the Western community of democratic states, which will help to sustain the Estonian state as an effective "service station" and thus encourage the multiplication of sub-state mechanisms linking the two communities on the grassroots level.
CHAPTER VII

POLITICAL COMMUNITY BUILDING IN LATVIA

This chapter presents a case study of political community building in Latvia. Its goal is to analyze the approaches employed by the Latvian state to legitimatize its power vis-a-vis ethnic minority groups who initially opposed the existence of an independent Latvian state. In addition, this chapter will assess the influence of international actors who affected Latvia’s decisions regarding its minorities.

To achieve this goal, the chapter will undertake three steps. First, it will evidence the existence of polarization between the state and the ethnopolitical groups who opposed the state and who claimed to represent Latvia’s Soviet-era immigrants (i.e., Russians, Byelorussians, Ukrainians, etc.) during the initial stage of political community building. To do that, the first part of the case study will outline the platforms of these ethnopolitical movements. As Chapter V has shown, the emergence of these diametrically opposed ethnopolitical movements (restorationists and internationalists) was prompted by the ethnic restructuring carried out by the Soviet Union. In addition, this part will examine the attitude of the minorities toward these ethnopolitical movements and their attitudes toward the independent Latvian state during that time.

Second, the chapter will trace the process of political community building “from above” and “from below” under the circumstances (i.e., polarization) described in the first part. The second part of the case study focuses on the approaches undertaken by the Latvian state “from above.” It examines the following: Why did the state make a decision to exclude a significant number of residents (mostly non-Latvians) from the political
process by disenfranchisement? To answer this question, the chapter will explore the circumstances surrounding the adoption of the law on citizenship and other laws affecting the status of minorities. The third part of the chapter focuses on developments within civil society (i.e., “below”)—the creation of local governments, the ability of the minorities to use the state as a service station and the impact of different historical experiences on ethnic relations.

The chapter will conclude by assessing the effectiveness of the approaches employed by the Latvian state. To do that, the concluding part of the chapter will trace the changes in the attitudes of minorities and ethnopolitical actors vis-a-vis the state.

ETHNOPOLITICAL ACTORS AND POLARIZATION DURING THE INITIAL STAGE OF COMMUNITY BUILDING (1990–94)

In 1990–91 many Russians had high hopes, thinking that their life in the newly restored Latvian state would be better than in the Soviet Union (see Table 7). Yet their support for the Latvian state during the initial stage of state building should not be overestimated. According to a survey conducted by SM-Segodnya (one of the most popular Russian language newspapers in Latvia) in April 1990, 71% of non-Latvians thought that if Latvia became an independent state there would be mass unemployment, and 62% thought that there would be discrimination against non-Latvians.¹

Table 7. Support among non-Latvians for an Independent Latvian State, 1989–97*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>9%</td>
<td>26%</td>
<td>26%</td>
<td>35%</td>
<td>53%</td>
<td>56%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Notes:

*The data for June 1989, June 1990, and October 1990 is from Latvian Social Research Center. This is a response to the question “Should Latvia become an independent state outside the USSR?” In Dorodnova, “Identity Formation Among Russian Speakers in Latvia and Estonia.”

**The data for 1991, 1994, and 1997 was compiled by the Baltic Data House. This is a response to the question “Do you support Latvia as an independent state?” Baltijas datu namu, Na puti k grazhdanskomu obschestvu: Otchet po rezul’tatam dvuh etapov [Toward a Civil Society: Results of Two Stages]. Riga: Baltijas datu namu. 1998. 22.

Sources:


Dorodnova. “Identity Formation Among Russian Speakers in Latvia and Estonia.”

Such opinions became even more pronounced after the Supreme Council decision about restrictive citizenship which was adopted on 15 October 1991. The Soviet-loyalist Internovement (Yedinstvo) was the first political actor in Latvia to disagree with Latvia’s nationalist leaders and voice its disapproval of an emerging independent Latvian state in ethnic terms. Prior to 1991, the leaders of Internovement were active participants in and organizers of conservative pro-Soviet rallies, such as the “Solidarity march” organized by the Supreme Council of the USSR and the weekly Literaturnaya Rossiya [Literary
Russia. The goal of this march was to show the support of the “Soviet nation” for Russians residing in the Baltic states.

In spring 1991, Intermovement publications began to promote the “Russian idea” instead of Communism as a new platform for their movement. By presenting itself as the guardian of Russian interests Intermovement was trying to increase its political capital. Consequently, it got a lot of support from those Russians who had a hard time dealing with the resurgence of Latvian nationalism. In addition, Intermovement tried to cash in on the differing interpretations of history held by Latvia’s Russian residents and by Latvia’s non-Russian residents.

Despite these attempts to cash in on ethnic ideas, Intermovement could not regain its supporters after its involvement in the events of January 1991, when the Soviet army attacked neighboring Vilnius and Riga. It was banned in August 1991 by the Latvian government for backing the coup attempt that month in Moscow. In 1992, a weakened Intermovement merged with other pro-Soviet/anti-Latvian organizations, such as the

---


4E.g., Galina Tkachenko, who decided to leave Latvia, thus described the atmosphere in Latvia during the beginning stages of community building: “The more Latvian I understood, the more difficult it was to live there. It was difficult to tolerate everyday nationalism. One type of ethnic relations was prevalent in the workplace, but another one (i.e., unfriendly) in the street.” “Pochemu ya pokinula Pribaltiku: Ispoved’ v puti” [Why I Left the Baltics: Confession On My Way Out], Sovetskaya Latviya (25 November, 1989), 3.

5E.g., a newsletter published by Yedinstvo argued that the Soviet-Nazi pact signed in 1939 was legitimate. I. Ivanov, “Litso istinnych okkupantov” [Who Are the Real Occupants], Yedinstvo (9 July, 1989).
organization of Soviet military veterans, the Council of War and Labor Veterans, the Latvian Communist Party Operative Center and the Association of Russian Citizens.\(^6\)

Reportedly, the latter had close contacts with representatives of the Northwestern Group of Forces still stationed in Latvia (they left in 1994) and extremist organizations in Russia, such as the National Salvation Front.\(^7\) On 23 May 1992, during a meeting in Liepaja (a town with a considerable Russian population) the Association of Russian Citizens distributed leaflets encouraging Russians to oppose the Latvian state and even to initiate a struggle against it.\(^8\) In December, several organizations representing Soviet war veterans, Russian citizens, and civilian employees of the Northwestern Group of Forces picketed in front of the Latvian Supreme Council in Riga, expressing support for the USSR and demanding equal rights for both citizens and non-citizens in Latvia.\(^9\)

The same year, the Latvian Foreign Ministry called the activities of these associations “unacceptable” and a threat to Latvia’s sovereignty. This declaration triggered a passionate response from several deputies of the Ravnopraviye (Equal Rights) faction within the Latvian Supreme Council who admitted to having contacts with these pro-Soviet organizations, arguing that they “had to maintain contacts with their voters.”\(^10\)

In October 1993, the Latvian government banned the activities of the Association of

---


\(^8\)Tatyana Kolgushkina, “Kak MVD Latvii zashchishchalo chest’ Yel’tsina ot kritiki russkoyazychnogo naseleniya respubliki” [How Latvian Ministry of Internal Affairs Defended the Honor of Yeltsin Against the Criticism of the Russians], *SM-Segodnya* (19 June, 1992), 1.


Russian Citizens, the Union for the Protection of Veterans’ Rights, and the Latvian Union of Communists, arguing that these groups supported the restoration of the Communist regime in Latvia. Predictably, this move provoked protests from the members of these organizations who argued that they were “the champions of the interests of Russian-speakers in Latvia.”

Within the emerging political system, the interests of the Russians were represented by several ethnopolitical parties: Ravnopraviye (the Equal Rights movement), Harmony for Latvia, and Rebirth for the Economy. The Equal Rights movement became active during the initial stage of political community building. It consisted mostly of Russians. Initially, this movement supported the idea that Latvia should remain a part of the Soviet Union. In 1991, it severely criticized the Latvian Supreme Council decision of October 15 which outlined the principles of granting citizenship. According to this decision citizenship would be granted only to those who had been citizens of the interwar Latvian republic and their descendants, arguing that this decision will “bring apartheid to Latvia.” In 1993, during the first postcommunist parliamentary election, this ex-communist ethnopolitical movement managed to garner 5.8% of the vote and won seven seats (7%) in the first parliament. According to Aleksandrs Bartashevitsch, an “ethnocratic Latvian state [was] absolutely unacceptable to us.”

---

11 Oleg Kapranov, the leader of the Association of Russian citizens, quoted by the Baltic News Service (11 October, 1993).
13 Pettai and Kreuzer, 155.
movement suggests, Ravnopraviye (the Equal Rights movement) opposes the Latvian state's laws regulating membership in the political community (see Table 8 for an outline of these laws). It has fought for a more inclusive approach to citizenship, which would include most Russians currently residing in Latvia.

Harmony for Latvia is another Russian-based ethnopolitical party which was active during the initial stage of political community building. In 1993, it formed an alliance with Rebirth for the Economy. Together they received 12% of the vote and 13 seats (13%) in the 1993 parliamentary election. That year also saw the birth of a new party devoted to the interests of Latvia’s Russians, aptly called the Russian party. Led by Andrei Vorontsov, it also intended to defend the interests of “all non-Latvians who consider Latvia to be their homeland.” The views of these Russian-based ethnopolitical movements and parties on the laws regulating membership in the demos were, by and large, similar to those of the Equal Rights movement. The enthusiastic support that Russians (both citizens and non-citizens) have given to the Equal Rights movement and to Harmony—clearly ethnopolitical parties—was probably caused by their disappointment with the Latvian National Front—the compromisers. The compromisers tried to forge multiethnic unions (see Chapter V).

thus trying to gain support from the Russian speaking businessmen in Latvia.


Table 8. Latvian Legislation on Citizenship and Minorities

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>DATE</th>
<th>LEGISLATION</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>March 1991</td>
<td>The Latvian parliament passed legislation on the free development and the right to cultural autonomy of nationalities and ethnic groups. This law included:</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- a guarantee that all permanent residents have equal rights with respect to employment;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- activities that promote national hatreds or discrimination are banned;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- a guarantee for national minorities to set up their own educational institutions, to create their own outlets of mass communication, and to use the mass media of the state;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- a guarantee that the Latvian government promotes these activities and supports them materially;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- calls for the creation of a Consultative Nationalities Council.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Oct. 1991</td>
<td>The Latvian parliament passed a resolution restoring Latvian citizenship for those who held Latvian citizenship before June 17, 1940 and their descendants.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Naturalization process for the other residents included:</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- residence in the Latvian territory for 16 years</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- proficiency in the Latvian language at the conversational level, confirmed by examination</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- an oath of loyalty to the state.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Approximately 600.000 out of approximately 906,780 (1989 data) Russian speakers are denied citizenship.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Apr. 1995</td>
<td>Latvia adopts a law on the Status of Former Soviet Citizens Who Are Not Citizens of Latvia or Any Other State (the “illegals”).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>The Citizenship and Immigration Department is entrusted with preparation of new travel documents verifying the rights of approximately 700.000 noncitizen residents to reside in, leave, and return to Latvia. Those who have a residency permit with no time restriction are considered as permanently resident.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Permanent residents are allowed to:</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- free choice of residence in Latvia;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- freedom to leave and return to Latvia;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- the right to a family reunion;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- protection against expulsion;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- preservation of native language and culture;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- assistance by an interpreter in court;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- the right to choose the language of communication with state authorities and administrative institutions.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>The amended law allows the “illegals” to register as non-citizens of Latvia.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1996</td>
<td>A Presidential Consultative Council on Nationality Issues is established. It is geared to strengthen government-minority dialogue and minority participation in public life, is established.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>June 1998</td>
<td>The Citizenship Law is amended. It is promulgated by the State President and afterwards confirmed in the Referendum.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Several amendments to the Citizenship law:</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- the “window” system is abolished.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- the language test simplified for most categories of applicants.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- stateless children born in Latvia after 21 August 1991 are entitled to the Latvian citizenship.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Table 8 (Continued)

| Dec. 1999 | The Parliament passes the new language law, which is later confirmed by the President. The law regulates language usage in the public sector as well as in private sector, first aid and public safety. |

Notes:

* 16 March 1995 and on 6 February 1997 the law was slightly amended, but these changes did not affect the majority of non-citizens.

** The “windows system” means that the older a person was, the longer s/he would have to wait to apply. This system was seen by many as an attempt to punish those who had been in the first wave of Stalin’s drive to russify Latvia.

Sources:


During the period of national revival, the leaders of the Latvian National Front promised that “free individual choice” would be the basis for deciding who would be granted citizenship in the Latvian state-in-the-making. This was an attempt to gain the

---

17In the March 1990 elections for the Supreme Soviet (when Latvia was still a part of the USSR), all adult residents, including Soviet soldiers stationed in the republic, were allowed to vote. However, on 5 and 6 June 1993 (during the first post-communist election), only citizens of the pre-1940 Latvian republic and their descendants, who were

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
support of the Russians. This promise, however, was not fulfilled: many non-Latvian "newcomers" were not allowed to vote in the 1993 parliamentary election.

Right-wing nationalist organizations and ethnopolitical parties—the National Independence Movement, the Homeland and Freedom Group, the Popular Front, the National Soldiers Association, the Immigration Council, the Politically Repressed Persons' Association, and the Livs' Association to name but a few—were among those who strongly opposed the inclusion of the "latecomers" into the emerging demos. As a matter of fact, inclusive citizenship policies have been vehemently resisted by the victims of the former regime. They voiced their protest through the Politically Repressed Persons' Association and the Congress of Latvian Citizens.18 The latter organization was set up in 1989 as "an alternative parliament of Latvian citizens"—alternative, that is, to the Supreme Council of Latvian SSR, which included many Russians. The raison d'etre of this organization, whose political influence is rather substantial, was to restore the pre-1940 Latvian political community by extending citizenship exclusively to pre-1940 Latvian citizens and their descendants.

In 1993, these ethnopolitical groups consolidated their power in the Association of Latvia's National Forces in order to promote the restrictive citizenship bills sponsored by the For Fatherland and Freedom and the National Independence Movement factions—the right-wing groups elected to the first postcommunist Latvian parliament.19 For Fatherland mostly Latvians, were eligible for vote. The inclusive version of the citizenship bill was championed by Juris Boyars, a leader of the National Front.


19 "Latvia's National Radicals to Promote Citizenship Bills." Baltic News Service
and Freedom received 5.4% of the vote (6 out of 100 seats), and the National Independence Movement received 13.4% of the vote (15 out of 100 seats).²⁰ Even though these two ethnopolitical parties were surpassed by a more moderate center-right force called Latvia's Way in the 1993 elections, their moral and political influence was quite substantial during the initial stage of political community building in Latvia.²¹

In sum, the analysis above suggests that during the beginning stage of political community building the Latvian political landscape was characterized by polarized ethnopolitical groups. The ethnopolitical parties of the Right, led by For Fatherland and Freedom, refused to include the “latecomers” in the political process. The Russian-based ethnopolitical parties and movements, on the other hand, were repelled by the nation-centered idea of political community that was promoted by parties of the Right. The following sections trace the steps undertaken by the Latvian state geared to forge a functioning political community and at the same time to legitimatize its power vis-a-vis the non-Latvian minorities under these initially unfavorable conditions.

POLITICAL COMMUNITY BUILDING FROM “ABOVE”

* Negotiating the Law on Citizenship, 1991–95

---

According to theorists of democratization and international analysts who have

(22 November, 1993).
²⁰Pettai and Kreuzer, 155.
²¹During the next parliamentary election in October 1995, For Fatherland and Freedom won 11.9% (14 seats) of the vote. It was assigned the task of forming a government.
written on political community building in the Baltic states, the optimal solution for sustainable community building in Latvia would have been the suspension of a 1991 parliamentary resolution restoring citizenship to prewar citizens and the adoption of a more inclusive approach to citizenship which would guarantee the right to vote to all residents of Latvia. The analysis that follows traces the process whereby Latvian policy makers decided upon the laws regulating the status of the “latecomers” (mostly ethnic Russians). It also assesses the effects that these decisions had on the polarization described in the previous section.

Unlike Estonia, which adopted its citizenship law in 1992, Latvia refused to adopt its law until 1994, waiting for the retreat of the Russian army (see Table 8). The essence of the Latvian citizenship problem during the first stage of community building can be summarized as follows: Russian residents, backed by Russia, demanded that their Soviet citizenship automatically translate into Latvian citizenship (zero option), but the Latvian government was unwilling to grant automatic citizenship. International organizations (the European Union, the Council of Europe, and the Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) ) tried to convince the Latvian government to liberalize its citizenship policies. Like in Estonia, the memory of the deportations carried out under Stalin became a part of the debates on citizenship.

In February 1993, Georg Andreyevs, Latvia’s Foreign Minister, attributed his country’s demographic situation (more than a third of its residents are Russians) to large

\[\text{\textsuperscript{22}}\text{E.g., see Skolnick. John T. Ishiyama and Marijke Breuning have argued that, given disenfranchisement in Latvia, one should expect mobilization of the Russians and possibly even their reliance on Moscow. Ishiyama and Breuning, 105.}\]

\[\text{\textsuperscript{23}}\text{This position was forcefully (and successfully) pushed forward by the representatives of For Fatherland and Freedom.}\]
scale population transfers and called for "affirmative action for Latvians to compensate them for the discrimination they have experienced in their own country." He went on to say that "we will not sacrifice our country for the democratic rules of the Western world which are currently simply not suitable for our situation."24 Juris Bojars, who drafted the citizenship law, argued that "unfortunately, the [citizenship] Law of 1994 gave no decisive priorities to applicants of indigenous ethnic groups—Latvians and Livs—who suffered the most from Stalinist reprisals in the Soviet Union." He suggested liberalizing the requirements for Latvian citizenship for applicants of Lithuanian, Estonian or Polish origin who were residents of Latvia and who decided to settle in Latvia because they were prevented by the Soviet government from returning to their homelands after their deportation time was over.25

Predictably, most Russian-speakers believed that anyone who is a resident of Latvia should receive automatic citizenship. The citizenship bill submitted by the Ravnopraviye (Equal Rights Movement) to the Latvian Saeima suggested that Latvian citizenship should be granted to all foreigners and stateless people who have resided in the Latvian state for five years.26 At the same time, many Russians wanted to have dual citizenship—Russian and Latvian, which would have made travel to Russia and back easier.27

24 CSCE, Implementation of the Helsinki Accords, 8.
This triggered a response from right-wing political activists who argued that the Russians were not loyal to the Latvian state, could vote for return to the USSR and therefore should not be given Latvian citizenship. For example, in an interview with SM-Segodnya, Juris Dobelis, a member of the right wing National Independence Movement, after having asserted that he had “fought against the Soviet regime during all of his life,” openly argued that “the Latvian nation should be the master in its land [because] very many of non-Latvians feel absolutely no moral responsibility (i.e., loyalty) toward the Latvian state.” He went on to say that even the Russians who are economically successful in Latvia (i.e., the “newly rich,” or businessmen) think, first and foremost, only about themselves and not about the Latvian state.”

The members of more radical Latvian nationalist groups made no secret of the fact that they would like to see Latvia’s Russians leave. Thus, in their letter to Max van der Stoel, High Commissioner of the CSCE, the members of the For Fatherland and Freedom party asked van der Stoel to “use his influence to get the CSCE’s backing for Latvia’s intention to repatriate Soviet-era immigrants.” Even more moderate politicians, such as Valdis Birkavs, who was Latvia’s Prime Minister in 1993, thought that the solution to the

---


29 E.g., see Ritvars Eglas “The Ethnic Situation in Riga and How It Must Be Solved” (translated from Latvian by Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty Research Institute), Latvijas Jaunatne (7 August, 1993), 2. Eglas writes that “[forced] migration could be one of the main means for achieving a Latvian majority in Riga. Unfortunately, the colonists [i.e., Latvia’s Soviet-era immigrants] are taking root in Riga: they are allowed to participate in privatization and receive certificates. This does not promote decolonization.”

"Russian problem" could be found not only through naturalization, but also by encouraging voluntary repatriation and emigration to third countries. Latvia’s President, Guntis Ulmanis, promised that the Latvian state would not engage in the forceful repatriation of Russians, and that repatriation would be "peaceful and voluntary." At one point (in February 1993), voluntary repatriation of Russians from Latvia was contemplated by the parliamentary assembly of the Council of Europe which urged Russia to draft legislation for ethnic Russians wishing to return to Russia from the Baltic states, arguing that repatriation (i.e., out-migration) is not the result of national discrimination, but of the process of a "loss of privileges" by Latvia’s Russians.


In 1992–93, Russia began to politicize this return migration by launching an active

---

34 Financial support was offered to Soviet-era settlers. Since the mid-nineties, official support for repatriation has declined. Repatriation is still a sensitive issue and politicians are reluctant to talk about it. See "Latvia’s Forgotten Few," Baltic Times (22–28 July, 1999), 7.
36 Central Statistical Bureau of Latvia, 73.
campaign in international institutions to allegedly "protect the rights of Russians" in Latvia.\(^{37}\) Furthermore, Russia kept referring to the "threats to ethnic Russians" in Latvia as an excuse to keep its troops in the country.\(^{38}\) Andrei Kozyrev, who was Russia's Foreign Minister at that time, referred to the out-migration of Russians from Latvia as "ethnic cleansing" and accused the Latvians of trying to "deport thousands of people to Russia."\(^{39}\) Russian representatives began raising the issue of the rights of Russians in Latvia during CSCE meetings. Meetings between delegations representing Latvia and Russia in international organizations, such as the CSCE or the Council of Europe, became forums in which the representatives of the two delegations exchanged insults.\(^{40}\)

Sometimes Russian laments about their compatriots were supported by the representatives of Western states. For example, during a CSCE meeting on April 10, 1992 in Helsinki, Russian demands for the Baltic states "to do something" about the rights of Russians were supported by the American and many other Western delegations.\(^{41}\) One year later, in September 1993, the CSCE issued appeals to Latvia to "adopt a fair law on citizenship" which, in their opinion, was necessary for the internal stability of Latvia as

\(^{37}\)For examples of such opinions, see Oleg Meshkov. "Desyataya kategoriya" [The Tenth Category], Trud (3 November, 1993), 5.
\(^{40}\)Another example: on 29 September 1992, Russia's delegation to the UN General Assembly warned Latvia against pursuing a policy of "ethnic cleansing." From that time on. Russia pledged to conduct its policy vis-a-vis the Baltic states "in light of their success in finding solutions to their 'human rights problems.'" Riina Kionka and Dzintra Bungs, "Russia Warns Balts Against 'Ethnic Cleansing.'" Radio Liberty Report (30 September, 1992).
well as for good relations with its neighbors (i.e., Russia).\textsuperscript{42} In a meeting with Latvian legislators, Max van der Stoel argued that while deciding on its citizenship law, Latvia should "take into consideration Russia's possible negative reaction to the law"—a "negative reaction" that could be prompted by Latvia's annual naturalization quotas.\textsuperscript{43}

These suggestions elicited an agitated response from Latvian policy makers—especially from those on the Right who interpreted these comments as a breach of Latvia's sovereignty. Thus, after a meeting with Max van der Stoel, Georg Andreyevs, who was Latvia's Foreign Minister at that time, argued that the CSCE's recommendations on the citizenship law were "unacceptable" to the sovereign Latvian state and that the aims of van der Stoel's visit to Latvia "remained unclear to him" (suggesting that the CSCE was merely Russia's instrument to assert its influence in the near-abroad).\textsuperscript{44} The right-wingers criticized both the Council of Europe and the CSCE for failing to press for the withdrawal of Russian troops from Latvia. They suggested that the only thing that one could expect from the two organizations was "advice on how to create a citizenship bill."\textsuperscript{45}

The stalemate surrounding Latvia's citizenship bill—Russia linking the withdrawal of their forces to a "fair" treatment of the Russians in Latvia and Latvia's influential right-wingers refusing to consider the citizenship bill until the Russian army left Latvian

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{42} "CSCE Urges Fair Law For Russian Minority in Latvia," \textit{Radio Liberty Report} (15 September, 1993).
\item \textsuperscript{43} "Van der Stoel Visiting Latvia," \textit{Interfax} (6 January, 1994). Also see "CSCE Commissioner, Latvian MPs Meet On Citizenship," \textit{Baltic News Service} (6 January, 1994).
\item \textsuperscript{44} "CSCE High Commissioner on Ethnic Minorities Discusses His Previous Recommendations On Citizenship with Latvian Foreign Minister," \textit{Interfax} (14 September, 1993).
\item \textsuperscript{45} Alexander Kirsteins, a representative of the National Independence Movement (LNNK) faction, quoted by the \textit{Baltic News Service} (27 November, 1993).
\end{itemize}
soil—was finally broken in March 1994, when Germany reiterated its desire to see the European Union expanded to include the Baltic states and insisted that Russia should meet its agreement to withdraw troops from Latvia by the end of August. At the same time, during the meeting between Klaus Kinkel, then Germany’s Foreign Minister, and his Baltic counterparts, Germany made it clear that there was “no alternative to the integration of Russians” into the Latvian political community. Kinkel urged the Latvians to listen to the CSCE’s suggestions.\textsuperscript{46} The CSCE has been calling for a more liberal version of the citizenship law, which would grant citizenship to those permanent residents who have a conversational knowledge of Latvian, are familiar with Latvia’s Constitution, and are ready to give an oath of loyalty to the Latvian state. Van der Stoel also suggested getting rid of the quota system, which would have allowed only a limited number of non-citizens to be naturalized every year.\textsuperscript{47}

In addition, hoping for membership in the Council of Europe, Latvia had to take the suggestions of this institution into account. These included criticism of the quota system and giving stateless people priority in the naturalization process.\textsuperscript{48} The Council of Europe told Latvia that it wanted to accept Latvia before Russia, which gave Latvian policy makers a strong incentive to push for a citizenship law which incorporated the Council of Europe’s recommendations.\textsuperscript{49} Under this pressure and after Clinton’s visit to

\textsuperscript{46}Kinkel, Klaus. “Eingangserklärung des Bundesministers des Auswärtigen Dr. Klaus Kinkel” [Klaus Kinkel’s Opening Remarks], Bonn (9 March 1994).

\textsuperscript{47}“Van der Stoel Advises Latvia to Adopt Liberal Citizenship Law,” \textit{Baltic News Service} (8 February, 1994).

\textsuperscript{48}Naturalization Board of the Republic of Latvia, \textit{On Naturalization in Latvia} (Riga: Naturalization Board of the Republic of Latvia, 1997), 64.

\textsuperscript{49}“The Council of Europe Advises Latvia to Temporize With Citizenship Law.” \textit{Baltic News Service} (16 June, 1994).
Riga, the President of Latvia urged the members of Latvia's parliament to adopt the suggested changes. According to his staff, however, this move "went against his 'Latvian instinct.'" Predictably, the citizenship bill (which had been modified to please foreign critics) triggered large protests from the right-wingers who accused the ruling coalition of center-right parties of an "inability to explain the real [demographic] situation in Latvia and the status of its residents [i.e., Russian residents] to international institutions." During the debate over the ruling coalition's citizenship bill protesters marched in front of the parliament, demanding that the "Soviet colonists" be repatriated.

Despite these protests, and after years of delay, a citizenship bill incorporating the suggestions of international institutions was passed by the Latvian parliament on 22 July 1994. The law still tried to restore the pre-1940 citizenship body, but it included a schedule for the naturalization of non-citizens and eased the requirements for naturalization (see Table 9). One year later, the Latvian state decided to adopt a law on the Status of Former Soviet Citizens Who Are Not Citizens of Latvia or Any Other State (i.e., "illegals"). Approximately 700,000 non-citizen residents were given permission to reside in, to leave, and to return to Latvia (see Table 9).

Ethnic Latvian voters, however, were upset by the continuing international scrutiny of their political community. Consequently, they voted for right-wing radical nationalist forces led by the Movement for Latvian National Independence. This ethnopolitical party

---

50 Quoted in Mark Frankland, "War of Russian Pride and Baltic Swank," *Observer* (7 August, 1994). During his visit, Clinton warned Latvians that the rights of Latvia's Russians had to be protected.
won an overwhelming victory in the local elections held on 26 May 1994 (i.e., during the
time that the citizenship bill was being discussed in parliament). Latvia’s Way—the
center-right party that had a controlling majority in parliament when the citizenship law
was adopted—did not do well in the local elections. Latvia’s non-citizens were not
happy with the outcome of this election. According to Boris Tsilevitch, the Chairman of
the League of Non-citizens in Latvia, many Russians began to fear that in Riga the newly
elected local government would try to push out the nonnative population from the city. One year later (in 1995), parties on the Right won the parliamentary election. Consequently, the immediate by-product of international intervention into political
community building was to increase the polarization between ethnopolitical parties and
movements in Latvia. The following section examines the response of Latvia’s minorities
to the adoption of the citizenship law and their participation in the debates about the
emerging political community in Latvia.

53 "Right-Wing Radicals Score Electoral Success in Latvia," Interfax (6 June, 1994). Unlike in Estonia, only citizens could vote in local elections. Approximately one third of citizens at that time were non-Latvians.
56 For Fatherland and Freedom won 11.9% of the vote (14 out of 100 seats). It formed a coalition with the National Conservative Party of Latvia. Other right-wing parties, such as For Latvia (the Siegerists) and the National Conservative Party of Latvia, also won a considerable portion of the vote. In addition, in 1995, the country’s major bank suddenly collapsed, which contributed to the failure of the leading coalition. Pettai and Kreuzer. 156.
Ethnic relations remained relatively calm on the individual level, even though in 1995 only 2% of Latvians and 4% of non-Latvians thought that they were completely without any problems (see Table 9). At the same time, Latvia's minorities were developing a feeling of being "second class residents" in Latvia. According to the Latvian sociologist Brigita Zepa, in 1994, Russians in Latvia began to develop "an imposed negative collective identity." This means that most Russians in Latvia began to see themselves as belonging to a separate social and political group (i.e., one that did not belong to the Latvian political community), but one that had nonetheless chosen to reside in the Latvian state.57

An analysis of the actions of the Russians and their debates in the mass media during that period suggest a similar conclusion. The leaders of Latvia's Russian community could not imagine cooperating with right-wing politicians who sometimes assigned guilt for past wrongs collectively on an entire ethnic group. Consequently, some of them concluded that the main problem facing Russians and Latvians was to find ways of dealing with conflicting historical memories. Thus, Vladlen Dozortsev, a former deputy of the Supreme Soviet of Latvia, argued that community building in Latvia must involve the suppression of historical memories about deportations.58 Until that happened, Latvia would remain a two-community state.

57 Dorodnova, "Identity Formation Among Russian Speakers in Latvia and Estonia," 9.
58 Vladlen Dozortsev, interviewed on "Sootechestvenniki" [Compatriots], a Russian TV program, broadcast 11 February 1993. A transcript of this program is kept in the Open Society Archives, Budapest. collection 205, file 14/0/257.
After the adoption of the 1991 and 1994 Citizenship laws, the members of the Russian elite who had initially supported the Latvian National Front began to feel alienated from the state. Vladimir Stashenko, a former Director of the Department on National Questions in Latvia, is a case in point: "I had to ask myself who I was first and foremost—the representative of a national minority or the representative of a state. I realized that I was first and foremost the representative of a national minority. Given the "nationalization" of the emerging state and its institutions, I could not defend the interests of Russians anymore. That is why I had to leave my position [as the Director of the Department on National Questions]." 59

Stashenko's resentment toward the emerging Latvian state was shared by many of Latvia's 800,000 ethnic Russians, who despised the idea of pending naturalization and their status as non-citizens. 60 Many thought that "the best that we [Russians] can expect is a round stamp in our passports and permanent residence in Latvia." 61

59 Vladimir Stashenko, interviewed on "Compatriots," a Russian TV program, broadcast 10 February 1993. A transcript of this program is kept in the Open Society Archives. Budapest, collection 205, file 14/0/257.
60 E.g., see Sergei Zaletayev's open letter to the President of Latvia "I s mneniyem otverzhyennych neobkhodimo schitatsya" [The Opinion of Those Rejected Must Be Taken Into Account], Panorama Latvii (23 November, 1993), 1). Zaletayev, a political analyst of Panorama Latvii, presented himself as the voice of Russian public opinion in Latvia. Similar opinions were voiced by Russians living in Latvia in interviews with Russian journalists. Oleg Meshkov, "Desyataya kategoriya" [The Tenth Category], Trud (3 November, 1993), 5, and Juri Lepski, "Apatridy" [The "Apartrids"], Trud (20 July, 1993), 2.
61 Vladimir Buzaev, the co-president of the Latvian Committee on Human Rights, referred to this situation as a "genocide." See "Welcome to the State of Apartheid." SM-Segodnya, reprinted in Human Rights in the Countries of the Former Soviet Union (2 August, 1994), 15–16. Predictably, such opinions were not shared by those Russians who were citizens of the interwar republic of Latvia (and their descendants) who formed their own organization, led by Vladimir Sorokin. The goal of this organization, according to Sorokin, was "to make sure that people distinguish between the Russians in this organization and those who belong to the Internovement and other organizations..."
Even though this resentment did not spill into ethnic relations, in 1993, only 1% of Latvians and 3% of non-Latvians described ethnic relations in Latvia as "without any problems" (see Table 9). Taking into account the results of the 1993 survey conducted by Rose and Maley, the essence of ethnic tension in Latvia can be described as follows: a majority of Latvians thought that Latvia's Russians were treated fairly, but a majority of Russians thought that they were treated unfairly, especially when it came to the right to vote. Furthermore, attitudes toward Russia were a dividing line between the two ethnic groups. Unlike Latvia's Russians, 73% of Latvians saw Russia as a threat to their security.62

In 1994, non-citizens (approximately 34% of Latvia's permanent residents at that time) began to unite into the League of Aliens. Led by Boris Tsilevitch, this organization claimed to represent the interests of non-citizens to Latvian authorities and international organizations and to provide legal assistance to non-citizens when dealing with the state.63 This was a change in the behavior of non-citizens, especially when compared to the early nineties. Until 1994, there was no coherent Russian organization to defend the interests of Russians in Latvia. Furthermore, in 1993-94, Latvia's Russians began to spell out their needs and fears to international actors, such as then-U.S. Secretary of State Warren Christopher, the Council of Europe, and the CSCE, more actively.64

___________________________

62 Rose and Maley, 10.
Table 9. Ethnic Relations in Latvia

How Would You Describe the Relations Between the National and Ethnic Groups in Latvia? (%)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>September-October 1993</th>
<th>April 1995</th>
<th>November 1996</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Latvians</td>
<td>Others</td>
<td>Latvians</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No problems</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>All right, we can handle whatever problems arise</td>
<td>61</td>
<td>59</td>
<td>62</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Not so good, difficulties</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bad</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source:

In sum, after the adoption of the laws approved by international organizations which defined the status of non-Latvians within the emerging political community, the polarization which was present within Latvian political community in 1990–93 did not abate. Non-Latvians began to develop social and political identities separate from the state. Furthermore, the pressure exerted by international actors to liberalize the law on citizenship triggered a backlash from ethnic Latvians who became increasingly supportive of right-wing ethnopolitical parties.

Revising the Law on Citizenship. Looking for Alternative Solutions (1996–99)

To relieve the polarization present in the Latvian state, Guntis Ulmanis, the
President of Latvia, decided to create a Minorities Advisory Council. The Council was expected to promote government-minority dialogue and to encourage the participation of minorities in political life. Despite its promising beginning in 1996 (the Council managed to pull in the political leaders of Latvia’s Russian community, such as Vladlen Dozortsev), this institution proved to be incapable of sustaining government-minority dialogue: radically different opinions regarding the citizenship law simply made dialogue impossible. The leaders of Latvia’s Russian community continued to argue for the elimination of quotas on the number of non-citizen residents who could be naturalized as established by the 1994 law on Citizenship, but the ruling political parties refused to do so. Meanwhile, the number of ethnic Russians who became Latvian citizens stayed almost the same as in 1994, when the Citizenship law was adopted (see Table 10).

Despite the impotence of the Council, President Ulmanis continued to push for equal social and economic rights for all segments of the population—citizens, foreigners, and non-citizens, as suggested by the Council of Europe. To implement equal rights between citizens and non-citizens, a parliamentary human rights committee was established.

---

65Prior to 1996, the Section on National Affairs within the Latvian government had performed this function. It focused on cooperating with minority cultural societies, especially the Latvian Association of National Cultural Societies, which united nineteen different organizations. Since downsizing in the mid-nineties, the function of the Section has been the distribution of state subsidies for minority cultural affairs. UN, Latvia Human Development Report 1997, 54.

66“Vladlen Dozortsev: Neobkhodimo razblokirovat’ zakon o grazhdanstve” [It Is Necessary to Lift the Blockade Off of the Law on Citizenship], SM-Segodnya (13 December, 1996). This article argues that the Council on National Minorities did not address any specific problems.

Table 10. Population of Latvia by Citizenship

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Citizens of Latvia</th>
<th>Citizens of the Russian Federation</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1996</td>
<td>71.85%</td>
<td>0.15%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1997</td>
<td>72.33%</td>
<td>0.33%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1998</td>
<td>72.72%</td>
<td>0.50%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1999</td>
<td>73.34%</td>
<td>0.71%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source:


The latter institution had the power to dismiss the employees of the citizenship and immigration department who had refused registration to several thousand Russians who had the right to permanent residence. In addition, a National Human Rights Office (funded by the state) became an outlet for minorities to voice their needs. De facto discrimination against non-citizens in the economic sphere ended in 1998, when non-citizens no longer had to demonstrate a knowledge of Latvian to get unemployment benefits.

---

68One of the functions of this office was to identify which rights of non-citizens were in contradiction to Latvia's international obligations. Prodded by Boris Tsilevich, a member of the Latvian parliament and an active minority leader, this office also pushed policy makers to broaden the rights of non-citizens. Natalya Lebedeva, “‘Spisok byuro’ kak razvitiye ‘spiska Tsilevicha’” [List of Office as the Extension of the List of Tsilevich], *SM-Segodnya* (18 December, 1996).
Furthermore, the President expressed support for a revision of the citizenship law to grant citizenship to all children born in Latvia after the country regained its independence. These actions won him trust and respect among the Russians. When experiencing problems that they believed to be ethnic discrimination, many Russians and other minorities went directly to the President for support. Since then, Latvia’s minorities have viewed the Presidency as an institution capable of defending their interests.

In spite of the stabilizing role of the President, polarization between ethnic Latvians and ethnic Russians re-emerged in August 1996 when the Latvian parliament adopted a declaration denouncing the occupation of Latvia by the USSR as illegal. This document, which was strongly supported by the right-wing parties in the parliament, argued that “the time has come to find out whether the Geneva convention of 1949 [forbidding forceful population transfers in occupied territories] applied to Latvia.” Some ardent proponents of the declaration believed that if the convention is applicable to Latvia, then “decolonization” (possibly including the resettlement of Latvia’s Russians) should be feasible as well. Latvia’s Russian community protested. The Russian Duma in Moscow echoed this protest, and in September 1996 the Russian Federation imposed tariffs on transit from Latvia.

---


70 Dmitri Nikolayev, “Jusu Ekselence, Podderzhite Natsional’niye Mens’shistva” [Dear President, Support the National Minorities], *Diena* (16 June, 1999), 2.


Russia imposed more economic sanctions on Latvia after a protest by some 1,000 elderly Russians in Riga in March 1998 against a recent increase in utility rates. This demonstration, which was broken up by the Latvian police, was an international scandal. Moscow accused Latvia of a "blatant violation of elementary human rights" and threatened to "demand that all discriminatory measures against Russians be removed." Furthermore, Russia linked its signing of a treaty delineating the border between Latvia and Russia with the status of Russians living in Latvia. (Latvia needs this treaty to get into the European Union.) According to Moscow, removal of those "discriminatory measures" meant accepting the revisions to the law on citizenship proposed by the OSCE. OSCE suggestions regarding the law on citizenship—to make it easier for stateless children born in Latvia after the country regained its independence in 1991 to obtain citizenship and to abolish the "windows" system allowing only a limited number of applicants per year—were forcefully advocated by Sweden and Finland and the rest of the EU.

Responding to international pressure and trying to prevent other expressions of protest from Latvia’s Russians, Latvia immediately extended the validity of Soviet-era passports for thousands of Russians. Furthermore, urged by Max van der Stoel of the OSCE and Ole Espersen of the Council of the Baltic Sea States, the Latvian government

---

73 This protest was instigated by an article in the newspaper Panorama Latvii, which called upon Russian pensioners to gather in front of Riga's city hall.
74 The first quote is from Paul Goble. "Playing the Ethnic Card," Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty Endnote (10 March, 1998). The second quote is from a speech given by Yevgeniy Primakov, then Russia's Foreign Minister, at a session of the Council of Europe in Strasbourg, as reported by Interfax (4 May, 1998).
75 Moskovskiye Rossiyskiye Vesti (18 February, 1998), 2.
decided to try to persuade the parliament to amend the citizenship law. Yet, according to Ulmanis, the greatest problem was that "it became clear [to us] that we had to amend our citizenship law under pressure from the East [i.e., Russia] and not on our own will."77 Many ethnic Latvians perceived this pressure as a violation of the sovereignty of their state. Consequently, Latvia’s parliamentarians were very unwilling to give in to the pressure “from above.”

In the midst of the debate on whether to amend the citizenship law, the EU issued a statement reminding Latvia that it “had earlier raised the issue in the context of Latvia’s bid to join the European Union,” and hoped that “the Latvian parliament will take early action to adopt the government’s decisions.”78 After prolonged inter-party debates and active lobbying by Foreign Minister Valdis Birkavs, Latvian lawmakers finally approved amendments to the citizenship law on June 22 whereby citizenship was granted to all children born to non-citizens residing in Latvia after August 1991.

However, similarly to the first stage of community building, there was a backlash from ethnic Latvians who had opposed any changes to the law of citizenship. The right-wing For Fatherland and Freedom party managed to collect the required number of signatures to hold a referendum on the law. According to Guntars Krasts, Latvia’s Prime Minister and a member of the For Fatherland and Freedom Party, “if we make one

77 Quoted in Sergei Zaletayev, “Zamenit’ by populizm” [How to Get Away from Populism], Panorama Latvii (17 April, 1998), 2.
concession [to the Russians], then they will demand more and more until we are once again controlled by them.”  

The President, the other major political parties, the leading national newspaper and numerous international actors opposed the right-wingers. The opponents of the right-wingers managed to convince 53% of the electorate to vote to liberalize the law. The right-wingers managed to get approximately 45% of the vote in support of their law on citizenship. Many ethnic Latvians who voted against the right-wingers were under the impression that their vote would put an end to OSCE intervention into political community building in Latvia and that a stricter language law (then under debate in the parliament) would ensure their survival as an ethnic group.

Even though the law on citizenship was liberalized, the referendum did little to reduce ethnic division in Latvia. This division became apparent in December 1999, when Latvia’s Russians protested against the law on Latvian language which had already been watered down under pressure from the OSCE and the EU. The major parties voted for the bill, but For Human Rights in a United Latvia, an ethnopolitical party which claims to protect the interests of Russians in Latvia, voted against it. This party, which enjoys the support of a substantial number of ethnic Russians, also opposed the new education law (which had received the “approval” of international organizations) that will require high


81 “The Legacy of Fifty Years of Russification is Still Here,” an open letter by the members of the Commission on the Latvian Language, Panorama Latvii (29 November, 1999), 2.

82 The Law on Language represents a compromise between OSCE experts and those interested in protecting the Latvian language. The OSCE pushed Latvia to prevent state intervention into the private sphere. “Saeima Passes State Language Law,” LETA (Latvian News Agency) (9 December, 1999).
schools to use Latvian as the language of instruction by 2004. These fundamental differences on language and education have prevented ethnopolitical parties from cooperating in the implementation of the National Programme on the Integration of Society in Latvia adopted in 1999.83

The Response of Latvia’s Minorities to Changes in the Law on Citizenship

Despite the liberalization of the law on citizenship, the number of Russians who have received Latvian citizenship has remained low (see Table 10). In 1999, 58.9% of the Russians living in Latvia were non-citizens, and only 39.7% were Latvian citizens, an increase of only 3.7% since 1994, when the first law on citizenship was adopted. The slow speed of naturalization (an increase of only 1.49% in the body of citizens since 1996) came as a surprise to all involved parties, including international organizations (see Table 10).84 One of the major reasons for slow naturalization is a lack of proficiency in the Latvian language, especially among older Russian residents of Latvia. In workplaces where the majority of workers are Russian there is no incentive to learn Latvian.85

83 The Programme defines integration as “achieving mutual understanding and cooperation among different social groups and individuals in one state.” The essence of the Programme is to foster “loyalty to the Latvian state” by teaching the Latvian language, by making changes in the education system, by encouraging dialogue between the Russian and Latvian mass media, etc. Preses Nams, Integratsiya obshchestva v Latvii: proyekt [Integration of Society in Latvia: A Draft] (Riga: Preses Nams, 1999). The Programme is opposed by sixteen non-governmental organizations of Russians in Latvia.


85 Ibid., 118. Antane and Tsilevich also compare the results from the 1989 census and a 1995 survey which showed an increase in proficiency in the Latvian language (55.8%, up from 22.3%) among Latvia’s Russians. However, the data from the survey

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
addition, an unwillingness to serve in the army, passivity, and dissociation from political life are often cited as other potential reasons. According to a survey conducted by the Naturalization Board, the main reason why young non-citizens are not willing to acquire Latvian citizenship is because they "do not see any reason for it." This may be because permanent residents in Latvia enjoy rights which are almost the same as those enjoyed by citizens. A survey done according to region of attitudes toward the state suggests that in regions with a predominantly Russian population, such as Daugavpils, people tended to be more interested in local issues than in citizenship.

Despite the slow speed of naturalization, the attitude of the majority of non-Latvians toward Latvia as an independent state has been improving (see Table 7). Furthermore, the percentage of non-Latvians who thought that both Latvians and non-Latvians were capable of "handling whatever problems might arise" was also on the rise (see Table 9). Consequently, even though the Russians living in Latvia have developed an identity separate from the state, the survey data suggests that they have not rejected the state (i.e., they have continued to use it as a "service station") and have even gotten used to their status as non-citizen residents within the Latvian political community. An investigation of sub-state developments sheds more light on the reasons why such attitudes became widespread among Russians living in Latvia.

and the census are not directly compatible, and the increased figure probably shows changes in the self-perception of those who were interviewed.

86 The Programme cites the following reasons: a lack of information, the inefficiency of state institutions responsible for naturalization, belonging to ethnopolitical groups opposed to the Latvian state, and poor knowledge of the Latvian language. Preses Nams, 9–10. Antane and Tsilevich argue that the main reason is that the tests for citizenship are too stringent. Antane and Tsilevich, 94.

87 Naturalization Board of the Republic of Latvia, 29.

88 Baltijas datu nams. 13.
Unlike Estonia, Latvia decided to bar non-citizens from voting in local elections. In 1994, the Latvian parliament did not even consider the possibility that non-citizens could participate in local elections, arguing that "the issue should be considered only after the adoption of the law on citizenship." The 1994 local elections were won by parties that were not willing to represent the interests of Latvia's Russians. In five of the seven cities in Latvia the majority of the city council seats were filled by members of right-of-center, pro-Latvian rights political parties and organizations. In the regions, for every four right-wing representatives elected, there was only one left-wing representative. The low level of minority representation in local governments did not help to build an inclusive political community. It probably contributed to alienation among Russians in 1994–95 who complained that the nationalist parties were interested solely in reducing the number of schools in which the Russian language was taught and were not doing much to alleviate the plight of the needy.

There was a slight change during the next local elections, which took place in

---

10. E.g., see Konstantin Kazakov, "Rizhskaya Duma—Mini Seim" [The Council of Riga Is a Mini Parliament] Bizness i Baltiya (14 February, 1997). In 1990–95, the number of students in Russian language schools dropped from approximately 150,000 to 125,000. Antane and Tsilevich. 122.
March 1997. Even though right-wing parties got most of the votes, the level of minority representation actually increased in some areas. These were areas with large concentrations of Russians. There was a threefold increase in the number of non-Latvian deputies in the Riga City Council. In Daugavpils, another city with a large Russian population, the extreme left Social Democratic Party, which championed the interests of Latvia’s Russians, won 13 out of 15 seats.

Latvia’s Russian parties—the National Harmony Party, the Socialist Party, and the Unity Party—have been trying to convince the Latvian government to give Russians the right to elect or be elected to local government, regardless of their citizenship. Such demands have sometimes translated into street protests. The Latvian parliamentarians who have refused to grant this right argue that only those who are fluent in Latvian should be able to participate in local elections and to be elected. Others have argued that extending such a right would be only a halfway measure in the process of integration. Instead, they argue, Latvia should focus on political community building “from above”—i.e., finding incentives for Russians to learn Latvian and apply for Latvian citizenship.

---

94 For example, this happened in Daugavpils in 1997. The Russian community wanted to keep Aleksey Vidavskiy, a popular city mayor, in power. However, the law governing local elections did not allow him to be a candidate for the city council because he had not resigned from the Communist party. Aleksandr Shinkin, “Second Class Citizens in Latvia Have Something in Common: They Are All Russian,” *FBIS-SOV-97-015* (18 January, 1997).
Using the State as a Service Station

Even though the majority of Russians living in Latvia could not or were not willing to become citizens, they became full-fledged members of Latvia's civil society. Both Latvians and non-Latvians were fully entitled to use the Latvian state as "a service station." First, both citizens and non-citizens were included in the process of privatization. All residents of Latvia received vouchers to privatize their apartments, land, and enterprises. When the city council of Riga tried to limit the rights of non-citizens to privatize their apartments by asking for supplemental documents from the Citizenship and Migration Board showing their (non-citizen) status, Anatol Gorbunov, the Minister of Regional Development, stepped in and vetoed this decision, thus defending the rights of non-citizens. Second, both citizens and non-citizens could participate in the conduct of business. Consequently, there have been no distinct differences between the income of citizens and non-citizens. Even though, as non-citizens (until 1998), many Russians had fewer rights to pensions and jobs in the public sector, many of them became active members of a vibrant business community in Latvia.

As a matter of fact, there is evidence to suggest that Latvia's Russians, especially those with contacts in the industry and the transport sectors, were better able to adapt to a

96 "Gorbunov Protiv Rizhskoy Dumy" [Gorbunovs Against the Council of Riga], Bizness i Baltija (20 September, 1996).
97 Baltijas datu nams, 22.
98 William E. Schmidt, "Latvia's Worry: What to Do With All Its Russians," Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty B-WIRE (1 March, 1994). Furthermore, a study of living conditions in the Baltic region (conducted by NORBALT in autumn 1994) found that, all other things being equal, Russian men are no more likely to be unemployed than men of Latvian ethnicity. Unemployment among Russian women, however, was found to be greater than unemployment among Latvian women. Aasland, 353–70.
market economy than those ethnic Latvians who had been engaged in agriculture. Some of the Russians who belong to this socioeconomic group joined an organization called Russkiye Zapada [The Western Russians] and tried to persuade the Latvian government to let them act as a liaison between Russia and Latvia in order to further the economic interests of Latvia. It is not surprising, therefore, that the civic activity of non-Latvians has been most intense in interest groups dealing with economic issues—business associations and trade unions.

Similarly to Estonia, the attitudes of Russians with a high level of income toward the state tended to be more positive than of those with a low level of income. On the other hand, older Russians (e.g., retired Soviet military officers and workers sent to Latvia in 1950s and 1960s) were more likely to be incapable of leading an active life in the business community and therefore to be opposed to the Latvian state.

Different Perceptions of the Past: An Insurmountable Obstacle?

In Latvia, similarly to Estonia, Russians and Latvians commemorate different days.

---

99 Nils Muiznieks, quoted in Antane and Tsilevich, 133. However, there is no data to substantiate the popular belief in Latvia that the majority of Latvian capital belongs to non-Latvians.

100 Dmitri Nikolayev (President of the “Western Russians”). “Vostrebovannost’ russkikh” [The Needs of the Russians], Diena (19 April, 1999), 2.

101 Trade unions are the most popular civic organizations in Latvia. 12% of all citizens and 5% of non-citizens are members of such unions. Overall, however, non-citizens were found to be less active than citizens. Approximately 90% of non-citizens have not joined any organizations. Baltijas datu nams, 27.

102 Non-citizens with a low level of income were more interested in leaving Latvia than those with a higher level of income. Baltijas datu nams, 22.

Most Russians (especially the older generation) commemorate May 9, Victory Day (the day when the Russians captured Berlin in 1945), while the Latvians associate this day with the return of the Soviets and deportations. Instead, Latvians commemorate March 25 and June 14, the days when mass deportations were carried out in 1941 and 1949, as days of national mourning.

To confront the legacy of the past, the Latvian government initiated an intense search for those guilty of deportations. The first case was initiated in 1995 against Alfons Noviks, a former KGB general. He was convicted and sentenced to life in prison. In 1998, a case was initiated against Vasily Kononov, who, together with eighteen other pro-Soviet partisans (dressed up in German uniforms) had committed atrocities in a Latvian village in 1944. Yuri Luzhkov, the mayor of Moscow, criticized Latvia for “harassing war veterans.” and the Russian Duma passed a resolution in favor of Vasily Kononov. The trial was vehemently opposed by Latvia’s Russian community. On 27 September 1999 a Riga regional court found Mikhail Farbukh, an 83-year-old former KGB agent, guilty of signing the deportation orders.

Even though it is too early to hypothesize about the long term impact of these trials on the bifurcation of Latvian society, it is probably safe to say that they have become a forum in which former victims can voice their memories. “Taboo” topics are openly discussed. During this process, survivors and other members of society agree on what is “real history” and what is myth. This helps to reduce polarization.

---

Post-independence commemorations have played a similar function. For example, on 25 March 1999, the day on which Latvians remember the mass deportations of 1941, a special exhibition was opened in the Museum of Occupation in Riga. Henrihs Strods, the head of the Museum’s research program, reformulated the question of guilt by revealing that even though the deportations had been orchestrated by officers from other parts of the USSR, many Latvians had, in fact, been involved as well. Local score-settling and greed among neighbors were the partial reasons why many Latvian names appeared on the deportation lists. Although it is probably too early to speak about complete reconciliation between Latvians and Russians, the establishment of functioning state institutions (specifically, courts and museums) helped to place the experiences of the past into history books and to record them as crimes.

TOWARD A STABLE POLITICAL COMMUNITY IN LATVIA? ATTITUDES AND POLARIZATION IN THE LATE NINETIES

In the late nineties, the polarization that was present in Latvia during the initial stage of community building decreased. According to data for the years 1997–98, around 80% of Latvia’s non-citizens (mostly Russians) felt “close connected” to Latvia, and around 90% had made a decision to stay in Latvia.\textsuperscript{107} There was no revival of the

\textsuperscript{106}“Remembering a Legacy of Terror,” \textit{Baltic Times} (1–7 April, 1999), 17.
\textsuperscript{107}Baltijas datu nams. 22. Some of those who have decided to stay, however, may have done so because they lacked the funds to emigrate to Russia. According to the Riga office of the International Organization for Migration (IOM), approximately 10% of the 70,000 ethnic Russians living in Latvia would like to emigrate to Russia. The reliability of this data, however, is questionable, since the IOM did not conduct an official survey. \textit{Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty Newsline} (9 December, 1999).
Interruption. The political parties representing the interests of Latvia’s Russians—the Russian party, Harmony for Latvia, the Party of Latvia’s Russian Citizens, the Movement for Social Justice and Equal Rights in Latvia, the Latvian Socialist party, and For Human Rights in a United Latvia—were all willing to compete for power in parliamentary and local elections. Furthermore, the number of ethnic Russians elected to the Latvian parliament has been increasing. In 1993, only 6 of the 100 deputies were ethnic Russians. By 1998, this had increased to 10. These facts indicate that the two communities are willing to play the democratic game.

The decrease in polarization, however, does not imply that the Russians have been assimilated into the Latvian political community. A series of interviews with the leaders of Latvia’s Russian community revealed a strong resistance to “assimilation” (understood as forceful linguistic integration into the nation state). Many argued for even more autonomy within the Latvian state. This was understood to be a condition under which Latvia’s minorities felt “secure being Russians, Byelorussians, or Ukrainians.” Similar opinions were expressed during a series of debates in April and May 1999 involving the leaders of Latvia’s Russian community, the representatives of the Latvian Migration and Naturalization Board, and representatives from various international organizations.

Furthermore, conservative representatives of Russkaya obschina Latvii [the Russian

---

108 This information is from the list of political parties and organizations registered by the Latvian Ministry of Justice (as of 1 May 1999). In 1998, Russian ethnopolitical parties failed to win any seats in parliament.

109 There was also a parliamentary election in 1995. Candidates nominated for parliament, however, did not have to indicate their ethnic origin. Latvian Parliament, “History and Legislature of the Republic of Latvia.” Available from http://www.saeima.lanet.lv/LapasEnglish/History_sauts.htm; INTERNET.

110 Baltijas datu nams. 28.
Community of Latvia] rejected the possibility that Latvia could ever create an inclusive political community if it stuck to its current interpretation of the Soviet past. Mikhail Gavrilov, the leader of the Latvian Association of Russian Communities, argued that if Latvia really wanted to build an inclusive community, it should have suppressed "the whole issue of occupation" because "it is a source of passions" and interethnic tensions.111

Understandably, such approaches to community building are absolutely unacceptable to ethnic Latvians, many of whom see themselves as victims of the former regime and are interested in recording the crimes of the previous regime.112 So far, the Latvian state has been sympathetic to such requests.113 Taking the interests of the two ethnic groups into account, the cultural autonomy of Latvia's Russians (i.e., letting them speak their own language and have their own schools) was probably the optimal approach to community building in Latvia. This approach was condoned by influential groups in Latvia's Russian community.114 Consequently, the state has not tried to regulate the activities of political and social groups representing Latvia's Russians and has tolerated their links with Russia.115

112 Groups representing the former victims have opposed what they call "two-community" approach in Latvia, arguing for stronger policies of assimilation. Mara Grinberga, “Zakon yazyka razdelil Daugavpil’skoye obschestvo” [The Language Law Has Divided the Community in Daugavpils], Diena (24 April, 1999), 1.
113 The state has incorporated the stories of former victims into official history books: it has financed a Museum of Occupation in Riga, has offered compensation to victims or their descendants, and has conducted trials of those responsible for crimes committed during Soviet times.
114 Dmitri Nikolayev, “Natsional’nyi protektsionizm i konkurentosposobnost’ russkikh v Latvii” [National Protectionism and Competitiveness of the Russians in Latvia], Diena (29 April, 1999), 2.
115 The Equal Rights party, for example, has close links with Moscow and the Russian parliament. Sanita Upleia, “Leviye Latvii i Estonii aktivno obraschayutsa s

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
However, one repercussion of this approach is that the state is currently incapable of promoting the Latvian language among Latvia’s Russians (e.g., by teaching some subjects only in Latvian). Policies that encourage Latvia’s Russians to learn Latvian are supported by the European Union and other international organizations. Latvia’s Russians, however, have stubbornly resisted these policies. Members of the conservative Russian Community of Latvia and Russian ethnopolitical parties have actively resisted the law on education. They have also disapproved of the language law because it regulates the use of language, not only in the public sector (in areas such as first aid and public safety), but in the private sector as well. Thus, the Russian ethnopolitical party For Human Rights in a United Latvia voted against the State Language Law in December 1999. Furthermore, conservative groups of Russians have resisted the state language implementation policies pursued by Dzintra Hirsa, director of the State Language Inspection Center (the institution responsible for overseeing the implementation of the Language Law). These policies have included requiring medical doctors and lawyers to

Moskvoi” [Left-wing Parties in Latvia and Estonia Have Active Communication with Moscow], Diena (12 April, 1999), 3.

116 The National Programme for Language Training, which is designed to prepare teachers to teach Latvian as a second language to the 150,000 students in Latvia’s Russian language schools, is supported by Sweden, Norway, Finland, the Netherlands, and other states. It is also supported by the UN Development Program ($3.2 million for the first two years and $4.7 million for the next two) and the EU. Katya Cengel, “No More Emotional Gibberish,” Baltic Times (14 January, 1999), 9.

117 According to the law on education, most of the secondary schools in which instruction is currently conducted in Russian will be required to switch to Latvian by 2004. The Latvian language law passed on 9 December 1999. was praised by the EU, the OSCE, and the Council of Europe, but criticized by Russia and by the conservative Russians living in Latvia. Hoping for membership in the EU, Latvia listened to OSCE recommendations (e.g., less state intervention in the private sphere) and watered down its language law.


119 Andrey Vorontsov. “Oko za oko: nash otvet Dzintre Hirshe” [Eye for an Eye:
pass a language test in order to keep their licenses.

The most successful community building approach employed by the Latvian state has been to extend to Latvia’s Russians the full rights of membership in the civil society. That is, even though Latvia’s Russians could not vote, they were able to participate in the business community and to conduct business with Russia with very little state intervention. This helped to legitimatize the power of the state in the eyes of those Russians who were successful in Latvia’s emerging market economy. On the negative side, this may have reduced the need of Russians to apply for Latvian citizenship (or any other citizenship, for that matter). In 1998, approximately 26.5% of the people living in Latvia were still stateless. Since 1998, the number of applications for naturalization has been rising, but slowly. Naturalization is generally viewed by Latvia’s Russians as an unnecessary and humiliating process because it involves demonstrating knowledge of the Latvian language, Latvian history, and the Constitution, and because of the fee.

Finally, a closer look at the circumstances surrounding the adoption and revision of the law on citizenship suggests a conclusion about the role of international actors in political community building in Latvia. Intense international pressure affected the policies


121 In 1995, there 4,543 applications for citizenship were submitted to the Naturalization Board. In 1996, this number was 2,627; in 1997—3,075. In 1998, 5,608 applications were accepted. This number increased (6,507) in 1999. Republic of Latvia Naturalization Board, Fact Sheet: Naturalization Process in Latvia (Riga: Naturalization Board, 1999).

122 48% of non-citizens think that the language test is too difficult. 56% of non-citizens think that the test on Latvian history is too difficult. Baltijas datu nams, 24.
of the state towards its minorities: Latvia agreed to liberalize its law on citizenship. However, a by-product of this international action has been to induce more polarization within Latvian society. In addition, this pressure gave more legitimacy to more radical ethnopolitical parties. Consequently, the sustainability of a functioning political community in Latvia in the future depends not on further liberalization of laws on citizenship and minorities, but on the ability of the state to remain a functioning decentralized "service station," willing to preserve the de facto cultural autonomy of its Russian community. EU membership, which has been promised to Latvia, should help to achieve this goal.
CHAPTER VIII

POLITICAL COMMUNITY BUILDING IN LITHUANIA

This chapter is a case study of political community building in Lithuania. Similarly to the previous two chapters, the goal of this case study is to analyze the approaches that were employed by the Lithuanian state to legitimize its power vis-a-vis ethnic minority groups that were initially opposed to the existence of an independent Lithuanian state. There was much less international involvement in Lithuania than in Latvia and Estonia. However, consistently with the research design, this chapter considers this variable and assesses its impact on Lithuania’s decisions regarding its ethnic minorities.

To analyze the approaches used by the Lithuanian state, the chapter will undertake three steps. First, it will evidence the existence of polarization between the state and ethnopolitical groups that opposed the existence of an independent state and that claimed to represent Lithuania’s Slavic ethnic groups (Russians, Byelorussians, Ukrainians, and ethnic Poles) during the initial stage of political community building. To do that, the first part of the case study will analyze the results of public opinion surveys done during that period. The surveys reflect the attitude of minorities toward the independent Lithuanian state. In addition, this part will outline the platforms of these ethnopolitical movements. As Chapter IV has shown, the emergence of these diametrically opposed ethnopolitical movements (restorationists and internationalists) was prompted by the ethnic restructuring that was conducted by the Soviet Union.1

1Lithuanian-Polish relations, however, are a bit more complicated. In addition to
Second, the chapter will trace the process of political community building “from above” and “from below” under the circumstances (i.e., polarization) described in the first part. The second part of the case study focuses on the approaches used by the Lithuanian state “from above.” It examines the following: Why (unlike Latvia and Estonia) did the state make a decision to include all residents of Lithuania into the political process? How did this move affect the attitudes of ethnic minorities toward the state? To answer these questions, this chapter will explore the circumstances surrounding the adoption of the law on citizenship and other laws affecting the status of minorities. It will also document the response of Lithuania’s ethnic minorities and their “mother states” (i.e., Russia and Poland) to these policies.

The third part of the chapter focuses on developments within civil society (i.e., “below”)—the creation of local governments, the ability of Lithuania’s minorities to use the state as a service station and the impact of different historical experiences on inter-ethnic relations. The chapter will conclude by assessing the effectiveness of the approaches employed by the Lithuanian state. To do that, the concluding part of the chapter will trace the changes in the attitudes of Lithuania’s minorities and ethnopolitical actors vis-a-vis the state.

the policy of ethnic restructuring pursued by the USSR, the historical memory of the interwar period (1919–39) plays a significant role. In 1919, Poland seized eastern Lithuania militarily and kept it until 1939.
ETHNOPOLITICAL ACTORS AND POLARIZATION DURING THE INITIAL STAGE OF COMMUNITY BUILDING (1988–91)

As in the other two Baltic states, the attitude of the Poles and other Slavic ethnic groups living in Lithuania toward Lithuanian independence was reserved or even hostile. The prospect of an independent nation state provoked nervousness among the Russian and the Polish populations in Lithuania. A sizable number of Poles and other Slavs living in eastern Lithuania—one of the most ethnically restructured areas in the country—opposed the establishment of an independent state. As Table 11 shows, only the Lithuanians living in that area welcomed the prospect of independence.

Table 11. Support for an Independent Lithuanian State in Eastern Lithuania by Nationality, 1990 and 1994

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Lithuanian</td>
<td>86%</td>
<td>65%</td>
<td>9%</td>
<td>23%</td>
<td>3%</td>
<td>9%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Russian</td>
<td>38%</td>
<td>46%</td>
<td>35%</td>
<td>29%</td>
<td>13%</td>
<td>16%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Polish</td>
<td>35%</td>
<td>40%</td>
<td>35%</td>
<td>34%</td>
<td>19%</td>
<td>19%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other nationalities</td>
<td>41%</td>
<td>48%</td>
<td>38%</td>
<td>29%</td>
<td>12%</td>
<td>12%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source:
In contrast, in March 1990 (shortly before Lithuania declared itself independent from the USSR), approximately one third of all residents in Sniečkus (a town heavily populated with ethnic Russians) wanted to remain citizens of the USSR. Every fifth resident said that s/he would consider leaving Lithuania if it became de facto independent from the USSR. Percentages were similar in other parts of Lithuania. In April 1990 (after Lithuania had declared itself independent), only 18% of non-Lithuanians said that they supported the existence of an independent Lithuanian state. Several months later, in August 1990, only 8% of ethnic Russians and 17% of ethnic Poles said that they supported Lithuania’s independence.2

Yedinstvo (Unity or Intermovement), the movement that opposed Lithuania’s independence and tried to keep the USSR intact, received most of its support from non-Lithuanians. In October 1989, 13% of non-Lithuanians supported Yedinstvo and even 45% supported the Soviet Communist party.3 The Unity movement was especially influential in eastern Lithuania, where it was promoted by the local authorities. In eastern Lithuania, ethnic identity was the most important factor when it came to the affiliation of individuals with political parties and political movements.

Thus, in 1990, in the region of Vilnius, 47% of non-Lithuanians supported the pro-Soviet Communist party and 12% of the residents expressed their support for the Unity movement. In 1989, in the region of Švenčionys, 64% of non-Lithuanians supported the


pro-Soviet Communist party. In contrast, only 8% of Lithuanians living in the same regions supported the pro-Soviet Communist party and only 2% (Vilnius) and 1% (Švenčioniu) supported the Unity movement.4

Aware of the widespread support that the pro-Soviet Communist party enjoyed among non-Lithuanians living in eastern part of the country, A. Brodavski, one of the leaders of the anti-independence movement, decided to gain some political capital by finding allies in Moscow. Thus, in May 1990, Brodavski wrote a letter to Mikhail Gorbachev telling him that his region was loyal to the USSR and had declared territorial autonomy within the Lithuanian Soviet Socialist Republic.5 Knowing Gorbachev's desire to keep the Soviet Union intact, Brodavski was trying to push for a “Polish territorial unit” within the USSR in which he would continue to hold a position of power.

He was not alone. Jan Ciechanowicz, a deputy of the Soviet Supreme Council from Lithuania, also argued that creation of “real equality for ethnic Poles [when compared to other ethnic groups] in the USSR will be achieved when there are autonomies in Lithuania, Latvia, Byelorussia, and other parts of the former USSR.”6

To achieve this goal, Ciechanowicz proposed the establishment of an “Eastern Polish Republic” as a constituent part of the Soviet Union on the basis of the territories joined to the Soviet Union as a result of Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact. His proposal appeared in Nasza Gazeta, a newspaper published by the Union of Poles in Lithuania. According to

---


5Garšva and Grumadienė, 383.

this proposal, the first step in the process of creating an Eastern Polish Republic within the Soviet Union would be the formation of Polish autonomous regions within already existing republics, such as Lithuania.\(^7\) In October 1990, representatives from local governments in eastern Lithuania met in the town of Eišiškės and announced their plan to create a "Polish National Territorial Unit" in the territory of Lithuania. Predictably, this announcement prompted a wave of dissatisfaction among ethnic Lithuanians.\(^8\)

Brodavski and his followers were supported by approximately 28% of the residents in eastern Lithuania.\(^9\) This group actively supported the Soviet Union, which was strongly opposed to Lithuania’s independence. They tended to associate the prospect of an independent Lithuania with economic hardship, and were ready to continue to support the Lithuanian SSR as a part of the USSR if this preserved the economic status quo. It is not surprising, therefore, that in 1989, 76% of the residents of the Vilnius and Šalčininkai regions (located in eastern Lithuania) revealed that material well-being was more important to them than the type of political unit in which they would live.\(^10\) Furthermore, in 1990, Sąjūdis (Lithuania’s pro-independence movement) had the lowest support in eastern Lithuania. Its supporters were spread throughout all regions in Lithuania except eastern Lithuania.\(^11\)

\(^9\)Eigirdas, “Pietryčių Lietuvos gyventojai” [The Inhabitants of Southeastern Lithuania], 36.
\(^10\)Krukauskienė, “Nepriklausomybės samprata kitatauciu sąmonėje” [What Do non-Lithuanians Think About Lithuania’s Independence], 17.
Brodavski’s anti-independence movement was looking for allies in Moscow. Brodavski attended the IVth Conference of Soviet Deputies in Moscow, during which he argued that “the current Lithuanian government is not willing to take the interests of Polish speakers into account” and that only the USSR could help the non-Lithuanian residents of the Vilnius region to be granted territorial autonomy.\textsuperscript{12} Polish political activists in eastern Lithuania were also looking for allies in Warsaw. They managed to find some support in Poland, even though the majority of Polish political parties, numerous non-governmental organizations, and Poland’s Senate all expressed support for an independent Lithuanian state. To illustrate, in 1990, a group of Polish activists who supported their compatriots in Lithuania complained to the President of Poland about the alleged mistreatment of Poles living in Lithuania.\textsuperscript{13} These problems included the “lithuanization” of Polish names (i.e., having to choose Lithuanian substitutes for letters that occur only in Polish),\textsuperscript{14} historical accounts of the interwar period that condemned the actions of Poland in eastern Lithuania, the decreasing number of Polish-language schools in Lithuania, and the incorporation of areas with a large number of ethnic Poles into the city of Vilnius.

In 1991, the Warsaw-based Citizens Committee for the Defense of Poles in the Vilnius region was formed. This Committee, led by Bronisław Geremek, pushed for more autonomy in the Vilnius region, more cultural rights for ethnic Poles, and a revision of the laws governing restitution to allow people who were not Lithuanian citizens to participate in the restitution process (e.g., Polish citizens who owned, or whose ancestors owned, land

\textsuperscript{12}Garsva and Grumadienė, 395-7.
\textsuperscript{13}Lietuvos Mokslo akademija, 126-38.
\textsuperscript{14}Elvyra Baltutytė (Deputy Director of the Lithuanian Human Rights Center), interview by author, 22 June 1999, Vilnius.
in the area of Vilnius when that area was occupied by Poland during the interwar period would be eligible to get it back). The Committee managed to convince the Polish Foreign Ministry to support the first two demands at the international level. Consequently, these demands translated into cool Polish-Lithuanian relations in the early nineties.

Despite the support it gave to Lithuania's Poles and their demands for cultural autonomy, Poland warned them that their "mother state" would not support the pro-Soviet Unity movement. This warning coincided with a fall in Unity's popularity and a rise in the popularity of the Union of Poles among ethnic Poles in Lithuania. The Union proclaimed itself the major representative of Polish interests in Lithuania. These interests included minority rights, a variety of cultural concessions for all minority groups in Lithuania, and political representation. Cultural issues, such as the fact that Lithuania's Catholic bishop refused to allow a Polish-language mass once a week in Vilnius' reopened Cathedral, became a source of bitterness among Poles living in Lithuania.

Thus, in the early stages of political community building in Lithuania, there were two major organizations—the Unity movement and the Union of Poles—who claimed to represent the interests of non-Lithuanians. The Unity movement was pro-Soviet and fiercely anti-independence, while the Union of Poles claimed that its main goal was to fight for minority rights. According to Jan Sienkiewicz, leader of the Union of Poles, the primary goal of this organization was "to find a political voice for themselves" as Lithuania tried to get out of the Soviet Union. Ethnic Poles became the most active

minority group. Other minorities were less active.

The creation of the Unity movement and the Union of Poles became a source of concern for some Lithuanians. A non-governmental union—Vilnija (the area around Vilnius)—consisting of ethnic Lithuanians was founded in 1988 to counteract the perceived threat of growing Polish influence in eastern Lithuania. It still exists today. The main goal of Vilnija is to “lithuanize” the eastern part of Lithuania by “getting rid of alien (i.e., Polish or Russian) textbooks, school teachers, symbols and other aspects of foreign states.”

The union is supported by the victims of the Soviet regime and ethnic Lithuanians who suffered under the policies of Poland in occupied eastern Lithuania in 1919–39. Vilnija’s drive to make eastern Lithuania more “Lithuanian” was defended by Zigmas Zinkevičius, a leading expert on the Lithuanian language. Consequently, Vilnija has had a considerable influence on Lithuanian politics.

Predictably, there has been little dialogue between Vilnija and organizations uniting non-Lithuanians. Even though Vilnija is not a political party, it has attracted the support of right-wing political parties, such as Naujoji Lietuva [New Lithuania], and some radical members of Kriščionys Demokratai [the Christian Democrats] and Sąjūdis.

---

18 Voruta (2 January, 1992), 2.
Even prior to declaring independence in March 1990, Lithuania’s political leaders (at that time still members of the Lithuanian Soviet establishment) adopted the law on language, which made Lithuanian the official language of the state. The goal of the law was to address the consequences of russification. In 1989 (the year when the Law was adopted, see Table 12), most business in state-owned enterprises was conducted in Russian. Consequently, the requirement to switch to Lithuanian was met with outrage, especially in the Russian and Polish dominated parts of Lithuania. In eastern Lithuania, for instance, it was more common to hear Russian and a dialect of Polish (po prostu) than Lithuanian. Many ethnic Poles, Russians and ethnic Byelorussians did not know the state language.

Even though the law assured ethnic minorities residing in Lithuania that their constitutional rights would not be abridged and promised state support for the teaching of minority languages (see Table 12), it prompted some anxiety among Lithuania’s ethnic minorities. Brodavski, Ciechanowicz and other politicians from the region decided to

---

make political capital from this fear by promoting the idea of the "Polish National Territorial Unit" described in the first part of this chapter. Local Communist leaders in eastern Lithuania supported the idea because they argued that there was "a lack of teachers capable of teaching Lithuanian and communication [in eastern Lithuania] took place in Russian, not Lithuanian." Ethnic Poles showed little enthusiasm for learning Lithuanian. To illustrate, in 1990, in the whole region of Šalčininkai only 40 people (out of 40,000) took courses in the Lithuanian language. Several groups of ethnic Lithuanians (e.g., the representatives of right-wing parties such as Jaunoji Lietuva [Young Lithuania] and the Democratic Party) interpreted this willingness to create an autonomous pro-Soviet territorial unit in Lithuania as disloyalty toward the emerging state and argued that only pre-1940 residents of Lithuania and their descendants should be entitled to citizenship.

The arguments made by such groups were similar those made by the restorationists in Latvia and Estonia. It was argued that the Baltic states fell under the provisions of the Geneva Convention of 1949, which prohibited the transfer or settlement of members of an occupying power’s population into territories it occupied. Thus, "colonists" would not be eligible to become citizens in the restored state. Otherwise, Lithuania would be implicitly recognizing its own occupation by the Soviet Union. Such opinions were rejected by Vytautas Landsbergis, the leader of Sąjūdis, who argued that Lithuania should follow the inclusive traditions of the Lithuanian medieval kingdom and be magnanimous to its ethnic minorities.

---


22 Zinkevičius, 293.
Table 12. The Lithuanian Legislation on Minorities

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>DATE</th>
<th>LEGISLATION</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Jan. 1989</td>
<td>Law on language was adopted. &lt;br&gt; - The Lithuanian language was declared as the official state language; &lt;br&gt; - Enterprises, institutions, and organizations whose internal business was conducted in Russian were required to make the transition to Lithuanian in 2 years (Article 2; In 1991, the deadline was extended to 1995.); &lt;br&gt; - Non-Lithuanians were to be provided with appropriate facilities for organizing education and conducting cultural activities in their own language (Article 7).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nov. 1989</td>
<td>Law on Citizenship was adopted. The Lithuanian citizenship was extended to: &lt;br&gt; - all persons who were born in the territory of the Republic of Lithuania; &lt;br&gt; - who were citizens prior to 1940; as well as to their children and grandchildren (Article 1). All permanent residents were eligible for Lithuanian citizenship. &lt;br&gt; The deadline for their decision on citizenship was 3 November 1991. &lt;br&gt; In order to qualify for naturalization, an applicant had to: &lt;br&gt; - pass a Lithuanian language examination; &lt;br&gt; - have been a resident in Lithuania for the last 10 years; &lt;br&gt; - have a permanent job or source of income. &lt;br&gt; - renounce his current citizenship (Article 15).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nov. 1989</td>
<td>Law on ethnic minorities was adopted. It guarantees, extended to all ethnic minorities residing in Lithuania, include: &lt;br&gt; - the right to freely develop their culture; &lt;br&gt; - the right to obtain aid from the state to develop their culture and education; &lt;br&gt; - depending on demand and [economic] capacity, Lithuanian institutions of higher learning shall train specialists to respond to needs of ethnic cultures; &lt;br&gt; - signs used in public areas can be in the Lithuanian language and in the language used by that minority (Article 5).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jan. 1991</td>
<td>Law on ethnic minorities was amended. Extra rights guaranteed to ethnic minorities include: &lt;br&gt; - to have schooling in one’s native language (Article 2); &lt;br&gt; - to use the language spoken by ethnic minority in offices and organizations located in areas serving substantial numbers of a minority with different language (Article 3).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dec. 1991</td>
<td>The law on citizenship was amended. &lt;br&gt; Citizenship was granted to: &lt;br&gt; - those who became citizens under 1989 Law; &lt;br&gt; - those who have lived in the territory of Lithuania since 9 January 1919 until 15 June 1940 and their descendants if they were the residents of Lithuania on 1 December 1991 and did not have a citizenship of another state (Article 1) &lt;br&gt; The 1991 Lithuanian-Russian agreement offered citizenship to Russian residents who had taken up residence in Lithuania as of the date of the agreement.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dec. 1993 and Feb. 1996</td>
<td>The citizenship law was amended. &lt;br&gt; Citizenship restoration for citizens of the pre-World War II Lithuania and their descendants is simplified. &lt;br&gt; The right to citizenship was retained for an indefinite period for: &lt;br&gt; 1) persons who were citizens of the Republic of Lithuania prior to 15 June 1940 and their children . . . who are residing in other states and &lt;br&gt; 2) persons of Lithuanian origin residing in other states (amended on 6 February 1996). &lt;br&gt; (Article 17)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Table 12 (Continued)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>DATE</th>
<th>LEGISLATION</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Jan. 1995</td>
<td>The law on language was amended. Language requirements for local governments were added. They included:</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- a requirement for the representatives of local institutions to know the state language according to the language categories established</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>by the Lithuanian government (Article 6);</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- all secondary schools were required to teach the state language “in the manner prescribed by the state” (Article 12);</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- the State Lithuanian Language Commission was established to “protect the state language and approve linguistic norms” (Article 20).</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Sources:


—. *Law on the State Language*. Available from the Lithuanian parliament or from http://www.lrs.lt; INTERNET.

—. *Lithuania’s Law on Citizenship*. Available from the Lithuanian parliament or from http://www.lrs.lt; INTERNET.


Thus, in contrast to Latvia and Estonia, the demographic situation never became a part of the debates about citizenship. The law adopted on 3 November 1989 extended citizenship to all people born in Lithuania and to all permanent residents of Lithuania (see Table 12). Furthermore, the act restoring Lithuania’s independence on 11 March 1990, included a guarantee that ethnic minorities would have the same constitutional rights as those enjoyed by citizens.23

The day after Lithuania declared its independence, the Lithuanian government

23Jovita Litvaitienė (a lawyer from the Lithuanian parliament), interview by author. 10 June 1999, Vilnius.
addressed the ethnic communities of Lithuania, promising them cultural rights and a voice in the political and economic decisions of the state. The same rights—the right to freely develop their culture, state support for the cultural activities and organizations of ethnic minorities, a promise to provide money for schools to teach the official language of the state—had already been included in the law on ethnic minorities adopted in November 1989.

However, these laws did little to increase the popularity of and support for the Lithuanian state in eastern Lithuania. Local governments in eastern Lithuania denounced the laws issued by the politicians in Vilnius and continued to express their support for the Soviet Union. Thus, in May 1990 local government in the Vilnius region voiced their disapproval of the “restoration of the bourgeois system” and proclaimed their support for Moscow. At the same time, the Moscow-supported Unity movement increased its activities in eastern Lithuania. The Unity movement helped the USSR and local authorities to draft residents into the army of the USSR (while the rest of the state boycotted the draft) and refused to adopt the symbols of the recreated state.

Trying to reduce polarization, on 29 January 1991, the Lithuanian government amended the law on ethnic minorities and extended more rights to Lithuania’s ethnic minorities. This included schooling in their native language and the right to use non-state languages in offices and organizations (including in the official institutions of the state) that were located in areas serving substantial numbers of an ethnic minority (see Table 12). The goal of this amendment was to show the willingness of the state to listen to the

---

demands of its ethnic minorities. Praised by international institutions, this law, however, was fiercely criticized by some ethnic Lithuanians.

But even this legal measure did not work. In 1991, the Unity movement was as strong as ever. The Lithuanian government began to receive complaints from residents in eastern Lithuania that those with positions in local governments who supported Lithuania’s independence were losing their jobs. When, in August 1991, the representatives of the local governments backed an attempt by hardcore Communists to overthrow Gorbachev, the Lithuanian government changed its compromising stand and imposed “direct rule” upon the disobedient territory. This meant that the powers of the local governments were restricted. Two pro-Moscow regional councils in predominantly Polish parts of Lithuania were dissolved.

Thus, September 1991—the month when the Lithuanian parliament passed a resolution reaffirming its decision to remove the pro-Moscow chairmen from their seats on the regional councils in eastern Lithuania—marked a change in Lithuania’s policy towards the disobedient ethnic enclave. The government took a firmer stand. The parliament also suspended (on the same grounds) a council in Sniečkus (now Visaginas), a predominantly Russian region. In addition, the liberal law on citizenship was amended. It was decided to include a clause extending Lithuanian citizenship to those “who lived in eastern Lithuania from 9 January 1919 until 15 June 1940 [i.e., during the time when Poland occupied eastern Lithuania] and their descendants if they . . . did not hold the citizenship of another

---

state" (Table 12). By including this "if," the Lithuanian government was trying to make sure that people who were citizens of Poland during the interwar period would not be eligible for the privatization of land in eastern Lithuania. This amendment was adopted in order to assuage the fears of those who feared yet another "polonization" of eastern Lithuania.

This decision prompted protests from the ethnic Poles, Poland and from the disintegrating USSR. In Lithuania, these protests translated into demonstrations by ethnic Poles in front of the Lithuanian parliament followed by public statements by the leaders of the Polish community. Thus, Ryszard Maciejkianiec, the leader of the Polish faction in the Lithuanian parliament, remarked that some ethnic Poles "felt threatened by Lithuanian independence." Michail Trescinsky, a member of one of the dissolved councils, complained that the dissolution of the councils was "unjust because they [the councils] were fairly elected." The decision made by the Lithuanian government to disband the councils was criticized by the Polish government, the U.S. embassy, and the Helsinki Foundation for Human Rights. Lech Wałęsa wrote a letter to Vytautas Landsbergis arguing that if individual deputies of regional councils breached the law, then they should be individually punished. The decision to disband whole councils involves application of collective guilt toward the Polish community.

Other international actors—the Polish parliament, the Helsinki Foundation, and the

---

26 E.g., see Nikolai Lashkevich, "Zakon dlya pol'skoi avtonomii?" [A Law of Polish Autonomy?], Izvestiya (28 December, 1990), 2.
27 These leaders were quoted by Reuters (11 September, 1991).
US embassy in Lithuania—put forward similar arguments. They claimed that if elected
officials had taken part in illegal activities against the state, then local elections should
have been held to replace them. Poland’s Foreign Minister, Krzysztof Skubiszewski,
decided to postpone a planned visit to Lithuania until an “acceptable” agreement between
the Lithuanian government and Lithuania’s ethnic Poles were reached.29

The official response of the Lithuanian state was that “the councils were disbanded
because they supported the coup attempt” and that the question of eastern Lithuania was
“not a question of nationality but a question of loyalty [to the state].”30 Yet, responding to
international pressure, the Lithuanian government promised to hold local elections by

Despite this attempt to reach a compromise, interstate relations between Poland
and Lithuania began to deteriorate. During a press conference on 26 March 1992,
Krzysztof Skubiszewski expressed concern about the state of Lithuanian-Polish relations,
arguing that “mistreatment of ethnic Poles in eastern Lithuania has a negative effect on
interstate relations.”31 His opinion was echoed by the Warsaw-based Citizens Committee
for the Defense of Poles in the Vilnius region. Vilnija reacted to these announcements by
referring to the mistreatment of Lithuanians during the interwar period and calling for
power sharing arrangements in eastern Lithuania. According to Vilnija, which claimed to
speak for ethnic Lithuanians living in eastern Lithuania, the local governments in the
region should include representatives from all ethnic groups living in the region instead of

30Audrius Ažubalis, a spokesperson for the Lithuanian parliament, quoted by
31Arūnas Bubnys, article in Voruta (10 June, 1992), 7.
being dominated by representatives from the Polish Union and the Unity movement. There was no political opposition to Polish ethnopolitical parties in the ethnic enclaves of eastern Lithuania. Consequently, Vilnija argued that elections to the local government in this region should be postponed.32

After prolonged political battles at the national and international level, direct rule of the region was lifted and local elections finally took place in December 1992. However, only 34% of the residents in Vilnius region and 45% in Šalčininkai region participated in local elections.33 Voter turnout was too low, and new elections had to be held in early 1993. However, even after a third attempt to hold local elections in April 1993 not a single deputy was elected to the local councils. This was because of voting irregularities. To solve this problem, Sniečkus (Visaginas) was put under the authority of an ethnic Russian administrator appointed by the central government in Vilnius. This reduced the anxiety of ethnic Russians living in eastern Lithuania. Eventually, in eastern Lithuania, after several rounds of elections, local deputies (mostly from the Union of Poles) finally formed a government.

In addition, to reduce polarization, in 1992 the Lithuanian parliament adopted the Law on Election to the Parliament. This law gave special treatment to ethnopolitical parties. This treatment lowered the barrier for ethnopolitical parties, thus hoping to involve those parties in the political process. The Union of Poles, the strongest social movement in the ethnic enclave, consolidated into an ethnopolitical party in 1994 and won

33"Rinkimai Vilniaus ir Šalčininkų rajonuose" [Elections in Vilnius and Šalčininkai regions], Voruta (2 December, 1992), 1.
2% of the vote. Following the special treatment given to ethnopolitical parties by the Law on Election to the Parliament it received two seats (taken by Jan Minciewicz and Artur Ploksto) in the Lithuanian parliament.

These two concessions paid off. Gradually, the negative attitude which ethnic Poles had toward the Lithuanian state began to change. New leaders, such as Czeslaw Okinczyc and Zygmund Balcziewicz, emerged in the Polish community. They began building bridges between ethnic Lithuanians and ethnic Poles. This was done by publishing a state-friendly newspaper, Kurier Wilenski (edited by Balcierowicz) and by establishing a dialogue with the government (Czeslaw Okinczyc). The Union of Poles, whose position had been similar to that of the Unity movement during 1988–90, began to warm up to the Lithuanian state and to separate itself from pro-Soviet leaders.

Furthermore, Russia’s position regarding the Russian ethnic minority in Lithuania in the early nineties was much warmer than their position toward their co-ethnics in Latvia and Estonia. According to Nikolai Obertyshev, Russia’s ambassador to Lithuania, Russia “took into account” the fact that Lithuania’s law on citizenship was more liberal than in the other two states. Russia was satisfied with the agreement that it had signed with Lithuania in 1991 (see Table 12). This agreement allowed the naturalization of Russians who came to Lithuania after the 1989 citizenship law was adopted. However, one of the major disappointments expressed by Lithuania’s Russians regarding the law on citizenship was that this law, especially after its December 1993 amendments (see Table 12), did not allow dual citizenship for Soviet-era immigrants. Lithuania’s Russian community complained that it was still possible for ethnic Lithuanians living abroad to obtain dual

---

34ITAR-TASS (9 February, 1993).
citizenship, while they were prevented from doing that.\textsuperscript{35}

At the same time, despite the liberal citizenship law, by 1993, approximately 12,000 of the approximately 304,800 Russians living in Lithuania had acquired Russian citizenship. This meant that the voters had Russian citizenship. Furthermore, despite the liberal citizenship and language laws, Russians were leaving Lithuania. 10,409 ethnic Russians left in 1991. Their number increased to 16,380 the following year. It began to decline in 1993. 9,423 ethnic Russians left that year; 2,145 during the following year. This number declined to 827 in 1998.\textsuperscript{36} Unemployment and “returning to one’s roots” (i.e., to the ethnic motherland) were among the major reasons for these flows of out-migration. The presence of relatives abroad (i.e., in Russia), the difficulty of learning Lithuanian and an unsatisfactory financial status were other motives for leaving.\textsuperscript{37}

Unlike Lithuania’s ethnic Poles, the ethnic Russians who stayed in Lithuania did not mobilize themselves into a politically influential force. According to a survey conducted in 1994 among ethnic Russians and other non-Lithuanians in Klaipėda (a city whose population is 28.2% ethnic Russian), 83.4% said that they were not interested in and did not participate in the activities of national organizations and political parties.\textsuperscript{38}


\textsuperscript{36}Statistical Department, \textit{Demographic Yearbook of Lithuania} (Vilnius: Statistical Department, 1999), 112.

\textsuperscript{37}These reasons were indicated by the respondents to the survey in the city of Klaipeda. The survey was conducted by the Klaipėda University Sociological Service at the request of the State Nationalities Department. “Russians in Lithuania Feel OK. Survey Says,” \textit{Baltic News Service} (19 January, 1994).

Russian language publications from that time show a similar attitude: political leaders had a very difficult time organizing ethnic Russians—even into folklore groups or cultural organizations.\(^{39}\)

At the same time, the attitude of Lithuania's Russians toward the independent Lithuanian state improved. 78.9% of those polled in Klaipėda said that they did not experience any discrimination in public places and only 3.1% indicated that they "felt segregated." Only 2 out of 450 respondents said that they considered their relations with Lithuanians to be bad.\(^{40}\) Ethnic Russians living in eastern Lithuania expressed similar views (see Table 11). The number of those who expressed support for an independent Lithuanian state increased from 38% in 1990 to 46% in late 1994. The number of ethnic Poles who expressed support for an independent Lithuanian state also showed a slight improvement (from 35% in 1990 to 40% in 1994).

However, according to the same survey, the percentage of ethnic Lithuanians who supported an independent Lithuanian state in eastern Lithuania dropped from 86% in 1990 to 65% in 1994 (see Table 11). This group felt betrayed by the Lithuanian state which, they thought, was making too many concessions to ethnic Poles and to Poland. Furthermore, the number of Russians living in eastern Lithuania who did not support an independent Lithuanian state increased from 13% to 16%. They probably also felt that the Lithuanian state was giving too many special privileges to the ethnic Polish minority. These data suggest that polarization between different ethnic groups living in eastern


Lithuania remained even during the second stage of community building.

*Attempting to Solve the Remaining Issues, 1994–present*

*Polish-Lithuanian Treaty.* Even though Lithuania adopted a liberal citizenship law and extended numerous cultural rights to its ethnic minorities (a decision that was praised by the Council of Europe and other international actors),\(^4\) a number of issues, such as the demand for the establishment of a Polish university in Vilnius, the interpretation of the events of 1919–39 in eastern Lithuania and the proposed redrawing of regional boundaries to expand the region which includes Vilnius (which is perceived by some ethnic Poles as an attempt to upset the “ethnic balance” in eastern Lithuania), were causing tension at the domestic and international levels. These questions were addressed during negotiations between Poland and Lithuania, both of whom wanted to join NATO and were aware of the fact that NATO did not want to “import” ethnic tensions from its prospective members.

Yet evaluations of the past (the annexation of eastern Lithuania by Poland during the interwar period) and the rights of ethnic minorities (ethnic Poles in Lithuania and Lithuanians in Poland) became major stumbling blocks during the process of negotiating the friendship treaty required for entry into NATO.

The prospect of a Treaty prompted protests and the gathering of signatures against the treaty in Vilnius. *Vilniija* and other right wing organizations were especially opposed

\(^{4}\)E.g., in 1994, Miguel Martinez, the president of the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe, expressed his satisfaction with Lithuania’s policy toward ethnic minorities. “Martinez Praises Lithuania’s Care for Ethnic Minorities.” *Baltic News Service* (14 April, 1994).
to the legalization of the *Arnia Krajowa* Club (the Polish War Veterans' Club) in Vilnius and a treaty that did not condemn the interwar period in eastern Lithuania. Opponents of the treaty argued that the Union of Poles was uniting with the (at that time still illegal) Polish War Veteran Club and that this consolidated bloc could become another source of demands for territorial autonomy. The Lithuanian government tried to relieve these tensions by organizing a Commission of historians to evaluate the legacy of *Arnia Krajowa*. Initially, the Commission wanted to sell to the public a "historical rehabilitation" report to the public, but this report was received with outrage. Under pressure, five of the seven members on the Commission decided to change their conclusions.

Furthermore, many *Vilnija* activists thought that the signing of the Treaty with Poland would open the way to another polonization of eastern Lithuania. After the Treaty, it was argued, the Poles would be interested in teaching their language in eastern Lithuania, which would eventually lead to "re-polonization." Opponents of the treaty urged the Lithuanian government to demand that Lithuanians living in Poland be guaranteed the same minority rights as Poles living in Lithuania.

Passions were running equally high in Poland. In January 1994, 72 Polish lawmakers wrote an open letter to the Polish President in which they expressed concern about the status of ethnic Poles in Lithuania. In it they demanded that cultural autonomy

---

be granted to the predominantly Polish Vilnius and Šalčininkai regions (i.e., eastern Lithuania), that nationalized property be returned to Polish organizations, that the evaluation of the interwar period be excluded from the agreement with Lithuania, and that a Polish university be given the right to function in Vilnius.45

The letter appeared in the Lithuanian press, creating some tension between ethnic Poles and ethnic Lithuanians. This polarization did not disappear even after the Good Neighborhood Treaty was finally signed by Poland and Lithuania in April 1994, after successful lobbying by Jan Widacki, Poland’s Ambassador to Lithuania, and a series of articles by prominent public figures, such as Czeslaw Milosz, Zbigniew Brzezinski, Adam Michnik, and Tomas Venclova. Finally, both sides agreed to make concessions. The Treaty stated that ethnic Poles living in Lithuania and ethnic Lithuanians living in Poland had the right to “freely develop their own culture and preserve their traditions.” According to the Treaty, membership in an ethnic group is a matter of individual choice and should not be a source of discrimination.46

Yet this was not enough for ethnopolitical activists. Some Polish activists in Lithuania denounced the Treaty and claimed that Poland had “left them at the mercy of the Lithuanian government.”47 Ryszard Maciejkianec, one of the leaders of the Union of Poles in Lithuania, went as far as to compare the Treaty with the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact. (The Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact divided Eastern Europe into German and Russian spheres of influence in 1939.) Jan Minciewicz, chairman of the Union of Poles, argued that [...]

47 Ibid., 334.
the Treaty] “the situation of the local Poles worsened in all spheres.”48 Such positions were echoed in Poland by the Civic Committee for the Defense of Poles in the Vilnius region which reprimanded the Polish government for “betraying” its co-ethnics. This discontent was fueled by the decision of the Lithuanian state to continue its investigation, begun in November 1993, of so-called “Polish autonomists” (i.e., those who supported the idea of autonomy in 1989–91) who were charged with anti-state activities. However, most of the “autonomists” refused to adopt Lithuanian citizenship and thus managed to temporarily avoid punishment.

Attempts to Solve Problems in International Institutions. The unresolved issues raised by ethnic Poles—the expansion of the boundaries of the city of Vilnius, the creation of a Polish university in Vilnius, instruction in Polish, and the representation of ethnic minorities in national power structures—became topics of discussion during regular meetings between the two states. By 1997, Poland and Lithuania had created numerous intergovernmental institutions, such as the Parliamentary Assembly of Lithuania and Poland, the Government Cooperation Council of Lithuania and Poland, and the Advisory Committee of the Presidents of Lithuania and Poland.

Intergovernmental attempts to solve these problems, however, still did not satisfy some ethnic Poles residing in Lithuania. They argued that in eastern Lithuania the pace of privatization was slower than in the rest of Lithuania. Furthermore, they complained that the amount of land returned to previous owners in eastern Lithuania was two times less than in the other parts of Lithuania. According to Eugenijus Petrovas, a representative

from the Lithuanian Department for Regional Problems and National Minority Affairs, there is currently very little that the Lithuanian government can do to speed up the process. This is because of a lack of documents and because of the intricacies of land ownership dating back to the interwar period.\textsuperscript{49}

Although more than 180 legal acts and laws were adopted by the Lithuanian state\textsuperscript{50} to address the problems of Lithuania’s Poles they were still not satisfied. They decided to complain about their status to the European Council. The Council sent a delegation to Lithuania led by George Frunda. This delegation wrote the scandalous “Frunda report” in which Lithuania was charged with breaching international law, refusing to allow the creation of a Polish university in Vilnius, and discriminating against its Polish minority in education.

This report generated a wave of protests in Lithuania. The Lithuanian government expressed its objections to the report by complaining that the report was opinionated and “lacked credibility.”\textsuperscript{51} In Poland, on the other hand, the report was supported by some Polish senators (e.g., Senator Alicja Grzeskowiak). \textit{Nasza Gazeta}, the Polish newspaper in Lithuania, suggested that the organizations of ethnic Poles living in Lithuania should use this document as a guide for political action.

After complaints from the Lithuanian government, the Parliamentary Assembly of

\textsuperscript{49}Eugenijus Petrovas, interview by author, 23 June 1999, Vilnius.


\textsuperscript{51}Elvyra Baltutytė, interview by author, 22 June 1999, Vilnius.
the European Council decided to review the “Frunda report” and to send another
delegation to Lithuania. This time, the delegation came up with a report that was
favorable to Lithuania. The fact that a group of ethnic Poles had complained to the
European Council about their status, however, irritated some ethnic Lithuanians, especially
the members of right-wing organizations and Vilnija. The members of Vilnija intensified
their demands that ethnic Lithuanians living in Poland be granted the same minority rights
as ethnic Poles living in Lithuania.

Furthermore, Vilnija and its sister organizations were especially offended by the
decision of the Brazauskas government to officially recognize the Polish War Veterans
Club (Armia Krajowa) in February 1995. This decision did improve relations between
Lithuania and Poland. At the same time, however, it strengthened the anti-Polish stance of
some Lithuanian activists. Thus, the members of the Former Political Prisoners and
Deportees party decided to initiate a protest against President Brazauskas, accusing him of
bad policies toward eastern Lithuania. This protest was supported by Vilnija, the
Homeland Union, and other organizations who were worried about the emergence of a
secessionist movement in eastern Lithuania and thought that the government was not
doing enough to prevent this from happening.

Yet the voice of the protesters was heard. In 1996, in an attempt to prevent the
formation of politically influential ethnopolitical parties capable of leading a secessionist
movement in eastern Lithuania, the Lithuanian parliament amended the Law on Elections.

---

52“Strasbūro tribūnoje—parlamentarų iš Lenkijos ir Estijos politiniai akiброkštai”
[In Strasbour, the Polish and Estonian Parliamentarians Surprise the Lithuanians”]
53Valionis, Ignatavičius, and Bričkovskienė. 21.
Special provisions which made the entry of ethnopolitical parties into the parliament easier were eliminated. The parliamentarians (the majority of whom belonged to left-wing parties at that time) hoped that ethnic Poles would begin voting for other parties, such as the Democratic Labor Party led by Algirdas Brazauskas or other leftist parties. This decision, however, did not help to strengthen the trust of ethnic Poles in the parliament and other state institutions. The trust of Lithuania's Poles in state institutions remained very low.55

Numerous Polish-Lithuanian intergovernmental institutions, although quite successful in building trust between Poland and Lithuania at the interstate level, could do little to address the concerns of ethnic Poles living in Lithuania and ethnic Lithuanians living in Poland. The treatment of ethnic minorities is constantly raised by politicians on both sides, but so far no solution has been found for some contentious issues, such as the Polish university in Lithuania, the speed of privatization in eastern Lithuania, or demands for more cultural rights by ethnic Lithuanians living in Poland.56 In the words of Jerzy Buzek, Poland's Prime Minister, despite good interstate relations, “the problems [related to] ethnic minorities still remain a cause of tension and doubt.”57 According to Eugenijus Petrovas, a specialist on the issues of ethnic minorities in Lithuania, the solutions to ethnic

55Only 5% of ethnic Poles said that they were willing to entrust their problems to a member of parliament. Friedrich-Naumann Fund and International Relations and Political Science Institute at Vilnius University, “Political Culture as an Essential Prerequisite to Civil Society,” public opinion survey, Vilnius. 1994.
56Jakub Karpinski, “Poland and Lithuania Look Toward a Common Future.” Transition (4 April, 1997), 15. Also see “Lithuania, Poland Fail to Solve Minority Issues,” New Europe (12–20 July, 1999), 8.
issues in Lithuania must be found at the local level. Consequently, the following section examines community building from below.

COMMUNITY BUILDING FROM "BELOW"

Local Governments

During the first stage of community building (1988–94), the Lithuanian government decided to move toward the decentralization of state power. It planned to give more rights to local political bodies. However, the secessionist movement that started in eastern Lithuania in the late eighties made the government rethink its plan to decentralize its power in eastern Lithuania. In response to this movement, the state decided to temporarily limit the power of local governments. Consequently, Lithuania has been much slower to create functioning local governments than Estonia or Latvia.

Like the ethnic Russians in Estonia and Latvia, local issues were of extreme importance to Lithuania's minorities. In 1994, trying to quickly resolve the problem related to local elections, the Lithuanian parliament debated a law that would limit participation in local elections to political parties. Lithuania's ethnic minorities, represented by the Union of Poles, the Russian Society, the Byelorussian Language Society and the Foundation of Russian Culture (all of which were social organizations and therefore would not be able to participate in local elections if the bill passed) staged...

---

meetings in front of the Lithuanian parliament to protest against the proposed law.\(^5\)

Despite these protests, the law limiting participation in local elections to political parties was adopted. Responding to this decision, the Union of Poles quickly created a new political party, Election Action for Lithuanian Poles. Its platform was a list of all the issues causing tensions between Poles and Lithuanians. Election Action promised to fight for more rights for the "illegal" Polish university, for the restitution of prewar property to Poles, and for more language rights. Some ethnic Lithuanians were deeply worried by the promise made by Election Action to create "one political Polish unit" out of the Vilnius and Šalčininkai regions. To some, this promise was reminiscent of calls for a "Polish national-territorial unit" dating back to the late eighties.\(^6\) Consequently, Election Action became viewed as a potential secessionist movement.

The government's decision to limit participation in local elections to political parties was strongly criticized by pro-Lithuanian Polish activists, such as Czeslaw Okynczyc who argued that the emergence of Election Action was a direct result of the adoption of this law. Clearly, argued Okynczyc, this party was not capable of representing the interests of more moderate Poles. Moderate Poles, however, were not willing to support Lithuanian parties because the majority of those parties had made anti-Polish statements in the past.\(^6\) Consequently, the votes of moderates Poles would go to Election Action.

\(^5\)"Brazauskas Promises Careful Consideration of Local Elections Law," *Baltic News Service* (26 May, 1994).


\(^6\)Furthermore, some of the parties (e.g., Tautininkai) allowed only Lithuanians to join the party. Other parties (e.g., the Center party), included openly anti-Polish leaders such as Romualdas Ozolas. Ėslovas Okincicas, "Lietuvos lenkai didžiajame valstybės eksperimente" [Lithuanian Poles in the Great Experiment of the State], *Lietuvos Rytas* (8 March, 1995), 4.
Action, which would make this anti-Lithuanian party stronger. This party would be likely
to dominate local politics, which would lead to the politicization of numerous issues, such
as education and territorial reform. This would become a source of ethnic tensions in
eastern Lithuania. This scenario, however, could have been prevented if social
organizations and individuals had been allowed to participate in local elections.

Okynczyc’s prediction turned out to be true. In the 1995 elections, Election Action
scored significant victories in eastern Lithuania. Even the representatives of the party
were surprised by their success at the ballot box. As a consequence, since 1995, local
politics in eastern Lithuania has been a constant fight between the representatives of the
central government and local non-Lithuanian officials.

Since 1996, when the law on elections to the Lithuanian parliament was amended
(it introduced a 5% threshold, effectively preventing ethnopolitical parties from getting
into the parliament), non-Lithuanian officials have tried to gain more power at the local
level. Education, territorial reform, privatization, and even the expansion of the borders of
Vilnius all became hotly debated issues. To illustrate, politicians in eastern Lithuania
complained that their constituency was the least educated. The state, they argued, should
pay for a Polish university. The Lithuanian central government responded that the Poles

---

62Election Action won significant victories in Vilnius and Šalčininkai, the two
major regions in eastern Lithuania. It won 13 and 19 seats. It also won four seats (13%) in
Klaipėda, which has only 1,107 (0.5%) Polish residents. The electoral success of Election Action in Klaipėda can be explained by the fact that it received the support of other non-Lithuanians besides Poles. These “others” were protesting against the prevalence of Lithuanian parties in politics. Artasėsas Gazarianas, “1995 m. rinkimų į savivaldybes rezultatai ir demokratijos perspektyvos Lietuvoje” [1995 Local Election Results and the Prospects of Democracy in Lithuania], Politologija 1 (1995): 134–49.

63There is some truth to this claim. According to 1992 data, for every 1,000 Poles
only 50 have a university degree. This compares to 109 Lithuanians, 172 Russians and
385 Jews in Lithuania. Severinas Vaitiekus, Lietuvos lenkai [Lithuania’s Poles] (Vilnius:
and the representatives of other national minorities from eastern Lithuania already had the right to enter Lithuanian universities. Besides, ethnic Poles were eligible to study in Poland. Furthermore, the government argued that it lacked the money to establish a Polish university.6

As Okynczyc had predicted, Lithuanian language schools became another hotly contested issue between the central government and local authorities. Ethnic minorities in eastern Lithuania had the right to get an education in their native language as well as in the state language. However, the schools with the Lithuanian language of instruction complained that they did not get enough support from the local governments.65 Responding to these complaints, in June 1998, the central government in Vilnius adopted a law on education that transferred responsibilities related to education to the district (i.e., to the central government). Jan Minciewicz, the Polish parliamentarian in Lithuania, argued that this law limited the power of the local governments.66 This decision was met with protests from Polish political leaders who in December 1997 proposed the establishment of two state languages—Polish and Lithuanian—in eastern Lithuania.67

Two other sensitive issues were administrative territorial reform and privatization.

Valstybinis nacionalinių tyrimų centras, 1994), 33.

64 In addition, some parliamentarians argued that the university (which is currently known as the “illegal” university) should be banned. See Seimo Kronika (The Parliament Chronicle), No. 3 (9–22 October, 1995), 8, 15.

65 Thus, according to Evaldas Gečiauskas of Vilnija, local governments refused to support Lithuanian schools in 1996. Voruta (15–21 February 1997), 2.


67 This decision was related to Lithuania’s presidential elections. One candidate (Arturas Paulauskas) tried to gain political capital by promising to recognize two state languages in eastern Lithuania.
The complaint of ethnic Poles was that the Lithuanian government did not allow local governments to participate in privatization. In addition, there was a latent fear among ethnic minorities that the state would change the boundaries of territorial units, thus diluting ethnic proportions. To address these fears, in 1994, the state passed a law promising that the territories of local governments would not be altered. In addition, in January 1999, President Adamkus pledged his personal support to the needs of ethnic Poles. He promised to include the representatives of ethnic minorities whenever decisions about eastern Lithuania would be made. President Adamkus argued that the first priority of the state should be to create functioning local governments capable of addressing privatization issues. His statement was passionately supported by Election Action which wants more power at the local level.

Using the State as a “Service Station”

Eastern Lithuania—the area troubled by ethnic tensions—is also one of the poorest regions of the country. After Lithuania regained its independence, the economic conditions in eastern Lithuania became worse. In late 1994, 30% of the Poles in eastern Lithuania perceived themselves as being worse off than others in that region (compared to 17% of the Lithuanians and 19% of the Russians). Furthermore, compared to Lithuanians and Russians living in that region, Poles were the most dissatisfied with their quality of life.

---

68 An interview with Vladas Adamkus conducted by Barbara Machnicka, reprinted from Kurier Poranny by Voruta (30 January, 1999), 5.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
life (the figures are 23% of Poles; 13% of Lithuanians and 18% of Russians).\textsuperscript{70} The economic situation in Poland, the "mother state" of Lithuania's Poles, has been better than that in eastern Lithuania. When comparing themselves to their co-ethnics living across the border, Lithuania's Poles probably feel economically deprived. It is not surprising, therefore, that 68% of the Poles in eastern Lithuania think that life during Soviet times was better than in independent Lithuania. 56% of the Russians and 32% of Lithuanians living in that region held similar views.\textsuperscript{71}

To lessen the economic woes of eastern Lithuania, the state decided to allow its ethnic minorities to receive help from their mother states. The Poles living in eastern Lithuania received some help from Wspolnota Polska (an organization sponsored by the Polish parliament to support Poles living outside of Poland). Recently, instead of simply giving aid to their co-ethnics, Polish activists have tried to encourage Lithuania's Poles to learn Lithuanian and to integrate themselves into the Lithuanian state.\textsuperscript{72}

In 1996, the Lithuanian state adopted a program designed to develop Eastern Lithuania. So far, however, this program has not produced any tangible results. The speed of privatization in the region remains slow: as of January 1999, only 18% of the land has been returned to its previous owners. In the words of President Adamkus, privatization has been a "bureaucratic disaster."\textsuperscript{73}

\textsuperscript{71}Ibid., 129.
\textsuperscript{72}E.g., this is the opinion of Andrzej Zaksewski, chairman of the Polish Department for Communication with Poles Living Abroad. Voruta (5 December, 1998), 11.
\textsuperscript{73}Voruta (30 January, 1999), 5.
These factors explain why support for Lithuania's independence among ethnic Poles has not increased significantly since 1990 (see Table 11). Data collected by Lithuanian sociologists shows that the anti-Lithuanian party Election Action gets most of its support from the poorest residents of Lithuania.\textsuperscript{74} As long as this party is supported by a large number of disgruntled Poles, its popularity is unlikely to decline in the near future. At the same time, ethnic tensions stemming from language issues and education are likely to remain there as well.

\textit{The Role of Different Perceptions of the Past}

Even though the Poles living in eastern Lithuania suffered considerably under the Soviet regime, surveys of public opinion show that they tend to have a more positive view of the Soviet past than Lithuanians living in the same region. At the same time, the Lithuanian state has not forgotten that in the early nineties this region was the main stronghold of Soviet power. Consequently, in 1999, in an attempt to discourage secessionist attempts in the future, the Lithuanian state began to try Soviet-era local council members who had opposed Lithuanian independence. In April 1999, after a two-year process, a Lithuanian court found five people, mostly ethnic Poles, guilty of setting up anti-state organizations during the initial stage of state building.\textsuperscript{75} The secessionists received penalties ranging from two years to six months in prison.

\textsuperscript{74}VILMORUS data, January 1999 (Vilnius: VILMORUS, 1999).
\textsuperscript{75}Ingrida Vēgelytē, “Paskelbtos bausmēs Šalčininkų rajono teritorinės autonomijos organizatoriams” [Penalties Announced for the Organizers of Autonomy in Šalčininkai Region]. \textit{Lietuvos Aidas} (3 April, 1999), 2.
This decision elicited protests from Jan Sienkiewicz, a member of the Lithuanian parliament, and numerous Polish senators who argued that trial and punishment would stifle the civic activities of ethnic Poles. Former Senate chairman Andrzej Stelmachowski, who now heads Wspolnota Polska, a society for relations with Poles abroad, said that the trial was “purely political” and therefore “we [i.e., Poles] should take political [protest] actions in Poland.” Some members of the Russian Duma, along with Russia’s representatives in Lithuania, also protested.

So far, the trials have not had a significant impact on Polish-Lithuanian or Russian-Lithuanian relations. The reaction to the trials in eastern Lithuania has been muted. This is a reflection of the low level of political involvement in the region. It is unlikely, however, that these trials will increase the support for the Lithuanian state among ethnic Poles living in that area.

ATTITUDES AND POLARIZATION IN THE LATE NINETIES

In the late nineties, the polarization that was present in Lithuania in the late eighties decreased. There is no serious threat of a secessionist movement emerging in eastern Lithuania because the Lithuanian state is currently strong enough to suppress such a movement. In addition, after the Good Neighbor Treaty signed by Poland and Lithuania, Poland is unlikely to support any attempts by Lithuania’s Poles to secede from Lithuania.


Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
However, there were a considerable number of people in eastern Lithuania whose approval of an independent Lithuanian state decreased during the second stage of political community building. The number of those who felt disappointed with the independent Lithuanian state in this region was 2.5 times higher than the rest of Lithuania. According to 1997 data, the loyalty of ethnic Poles toward Lithuania, their state of residence, has not increased since 1988.\(^7\)\(^8\) Content analysis of the newspapers that are published by the ethnic minorities living in this region suggests a similar conclusion.\(^7\)\(^9\)

Given the large number and the liberal nature of the minority laws that Lithuania has adopted, this would seem to be a surprising development. The lack of funds at the local government level and the intervention of the central government in local politics are probably the major causes for this discontent. Local governments are still heavily dependent on subsidies from the central government.\(^8\)\(^0\) Furthermore, in eastern Lithuania, the local governments are dominated by the anti-Lithuanian members of Election Action. This situation is a direct result of 1994 law on local elections. This law has prevented broad representation of both political and social movements at the local level. Consequently, the domination of local politics by this ethnopolitical party alienates the

---

\(^7\)\(^8\) Jurgis Krikoniškis, “Paribio Lietuva” [Border Lithuania], *Voruta* (1–10 January 1997), 15.

\(^7\)\(^9\) For example, *Druzba*, a newspaper published by a group of anti-Lithuanian Russians and Poles, complains that the state program to develop eastern Lithuania has been forgotten by Lithuania’s politicians, and that the expansion of Vilnius is a “political decision” designed to dilute this ethnic enclave. In addition, this newspaper has complained about the lack of attention that eastern Lithuania has received from the central government.

\(^8\)\(^0\) In February 2000, 27 of 46 Lithuania’s local governments still lacked approved budgets for 2000. They objected to cuts planned by the central government. On the other hand, given a difficult economic situation, the central government is not able to allocate subsidies to local governments. *Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty Newsline* (28 February, 2000).
ethnic minorities—Lithuanians, Byelorussians, and Russians—that live in that region. These minorities feel that the state gave into international pressure and has been favoring one ethnic group. As a consequence, the lack of “ethnic” balance at the local level is likely to foster further ethnic tensions over issues such as language, education, and privatization.

Lithuania’s central government, as well as the ethnic Poles, Lithuanians and other minorities living in eastern Lithuania, hope that the Nemunas Euroregion which will unite this part of Lithuania with part of Poland will help to reduce poverty in that area. This endeavor is expected to encourage the free movement of people and goods across the Polish-Lithuanian border, thus enhancing the well-being of this poverty-stricken Lithuanian region.

Furthermore, in 1999 the Lithuanian parliament ratified the European Local Governance Chapter. By signing this document, Lithuania has promised to speed up decentralization and local government reform. With the help of the European Union, Lithuania will probably be able to create functioning, self-sustaining local governments. This will help Lithuania to become a functioning “service station” in the future. This is exactly what the ethnic minorities in eastern Lithuania are waiting for.
CHAPTER IX

CONCLUSIONS: REFINING THE THEORY OF POLITICAL COMMUNITY

The goal of this concluding chapter is to relate the findings of the case studies to the on-going debate on democracy building in multiethnic areas (which was outlined in the introduction). The first part puts forward a theory of political community, which conceptualizes the *demos* as an entity with two dimensions.¹

The second part of this chapter applies the two dimensional model to ethnically restructured states. By doing that, the chapter exposes the importance of the horizontal dimension for successful political community building. This dimension is sometimes referred to as “the missing thread in democratic thought.”² Drawing on empirical evidence from the case studies, the second part identifies ways in which democratizing states can promote the peaceful co-habitation of several national groups with different historical memories, or, in the words of Charles Taylor, what can be done to learn to “share identity space.”³ In addition, it theorizes about the impact of historical memory on the dynamics of community building. This variable is often omitted in the analyses of political scientists dealing with ethnopolitics and state building in multiethnic areas.

¹A similar theory was put forward by Alan C. Cairns, who argued that citizenship has both a vertical and a horizontal dimension. See Alan C. Cairns, “Introduction,” in *Citizenship, Diversity, and Pluralism: Canadian and Comparative Perspectives*, ed. Alan C. Cairns, John C. Courtney, Peter MacKinnon, Hans J. Michelmann, and David E. Smith (Montreal: McGill-Queen’s University Press, 1999), 4. The major difference between Cairns’ theory and this dissertation is that the latter conceptualizes community as a space inhabited by actors with different historical memories. In addition, the theory is applied to ethnically restructured states inhabited by more than one major nation.

²Saunders, 55.

³Taylor, 281.
The third part of this chapter focuses on the international dimension of community building. Drawing on the case studies, it theorizes about the roles that are played by those international actors who are interested in encouraging democracy in ethnically polarized states. It identifies several "by-products," such as the intensification of activities by extremist political groups, that are prompted by international involvement in community building. By doing that, this part contributes to the ongoing debate about invoking political conditionality in democratizing states (e.g., exerting pressure for political reforms in return for financial aid and membership in the European Union).

The chapter concludes by summarizing lessons to be learned from the Baltic experience. Furthermore, it hypothesizes about the future re-application of the community building strategies that were employed by the Baltic states in states with similar conditions. The findings from the case studies are integrated into the wider debate on democracy building in multiethnic areas.

A THEORY OF POLITICAL COMMUNITY BUILDING

A democratic community can be understood as a political space inhabited by numerous actors. These actors—political parties, leaders, minority groups—create state institutions, write rules of engagement, get engaged in conflict or cooperate within that space. The interests of these actors are shaped by their previous experiences or, in other words, their historical memory. That is, the actors remember what has happened to them in the past and act accordingly. Historical memory affects their present actions. That is why history plays an important role in this political space. In fact, it is why political
community can also be referred to as a “historical construct.”

Such a conceptualization of political community is based on the belief that it is not a power-free social medium, as conceived by the liberal institutionalist accounts of political community. Social and political power play important roles within that space. Some groups of actors are more visible and more influential in the political space than others. For example, actors who can stir up the accumulated historical memories and remembered grievances of a larger group of people are more powerful than those who can’t. Former victims whose experiences were shared by a large number of people have enormous moral power. An ethnic minority group with a strong and vocal “mother state” is another example of a powerful actor. It is likely to be taken more seriously by other actors in the political community than a minority group that lacks a powerful foreign champion. To illustrate, the status of ethnic Russians in the Baltic states—a minority group with a mother state—is closely followed by international actors. In contrast, little is known about the status of Roma in the Baltic states.

This political space has a vertical and a horizontal dimension. The vertical dimension refers to the basis of legitimacy for state power. The legitimacy of this power is based on an on-going association of people loyal to the state who possess the citizenship of the state. This on-going association implies a common history, shared historical memory and a common identity. In most nation states, these three aspects are the basis of

\[\text{\textsuperscript{4}}\text{These experiences are also passed from one generation to another. Sometimes this may lead to the exaggeration of ethnic group identity. For further discussion, see Vamik D. Volkan, \textit{Cyprus—War and Adaptation} (Charlottesville: University of Virginia, 1979), 90.}\]

\[\text{\textsuperscript{5}}\text{The description that follows refers, first and foremost, to democracies. In dictatorships, decisions regarding ethnic minorities and citizenship are made by a small group of people.}\]
a common identity that keeps the nation state together. Consequently, the question of the relationship between the vertical and the horizontal axes is the question of nation building and the attitude of the nation state toward its immigrants and ethnic minorities.6

The citizens, or the members of this on-going association, are the decision makers in the political community. Decision making includes creating the rules, policies and regulations related to ethnic minorities, immigrants, or foreigners who may not have a voice in the decision making process within that community. In this dissertation, the vertical dimension is referred to as "political community building from above."

The horizontal dimension refers to political community building from below. It captures developments within civil society, such as building associations among people living in the same state.7 Within this layer of community, some residents do not have the citizenship of the state in which they live. The horizontal dimension refers to sub-state relationships (i.e., business, trade, or cultural associations) that citizens and non-citizens establish. The existence of the horizontal dimension is a necessary condition for democratic regimes because it is a source of an alternative foci of power to that of the state. Furthermore, this is the space within which the learning of democratic norms and

6Lately democratic and democratizing states have been increasingly wary about extending citizenship to the immigrants. Even cultural minority rights have become an object of heated debates. Behind this unwillingness to change the borders of political community is the fear of losing social cohesion, which, many believe, would weaken the vertical axis. Alternative approaches to integration of non-citizens include "democratic obligation" to protect the rights of disadvantaged groups and mutual recognition. Anthony H. Birch, "Reflections on Ethnic Politics," in Citizenship, Diversity, and Pluralism: Canadian and Comparative Perspectives, ed. Alan C. Cairns, John C. Courtney, Peter MacKinnon, Hans J. Michelmann, and David E. Smith (Montreal: McGill-Queen's University Press, 1999), 64.

7Some members of the civil society are engaged in relationships that transcend the borders of the state. This is especially the case for diasporas, who have a "host" state (i.e., the state of their residence) and a "mother" state (i.e., the state of their origin).
principles takes place, as it is being passed on from one generation to the next.

Democratic states that want to integrate large immigrant populations or minority groups into their body politic usually start from "below." They usually give social and economic rights to their immigrant populations, but are reluctant to extend the right of citizenship to them. For example, Turkish *Gastarbeiter* in Germany are entitled to a variety of social and economic rights (that is, they are entitled to use the state as a "service station"), even though many do not have citizenship. In most nation states, *Gastarbeiter*, immigrants, and ethnic minorities either by choice or by law are not a part of the vertical axis (the ongoing association of citizens). At the same time, they are excluded or they choose to exclude themselves from the official history and national memory embraced by the major national group or groups.8

Liberal theorists, including Juan J. Linz, Alfred Stepan and Will Kymlicka, have argued for more lenient approaches to citizenship and minority rights, whereby anyone willing to abide by the laws of the state and pay taxes would be awarded membership in the political community.9 Consistent with the orthodox liberal paradigm, OSCE and EU policy recommendations to the Baltic states (and to other states in East Central Europe) have focused on the vertical dimension, calling for the immediate incorporation of ethnic minorities into the political community.

The major problem with the liberal view of political community is that it conceptualizes political community as a power-free social medium, within which actors

9Linz and Stepan, Kymlicka.
exist regardless of historical circumstance. According to the orthodox liberal view, national integration can be achieved by extending the rights of citizenship and minority rights to the "have-nots" (i.e., immigrants and ethnic minorities). This would also help to address the legacy of ethnic restructuring. Such arguments do not take into account the crucial role played by historical memory during the process of community building.

Very few would disagree with the argument that has been put forward by liberal scholars and embraced by international institutions: that basic democratic rights such as the right to participation or basic human rights should be applicable to the members of all ethnicities. However, given the presence of actors with political power and different historical memories, there are different ways to implement democratic governance. In other words, there are different ways to build and balance the two axes, the backbone of democratic communities. This is especially true in ethnically polarized states. The application of the theory to the post-Soviet Baltic experience illustrates this point.

---

10 Peggy Watson refers to such political space as a "curved" space. Drawing on the Einsteinian understanding that "there is no absolute space" (i.e., power relations are present in all social media). Watson argues that social sciences should discard the idea of an absolute ("power-free") social space, often assumed by liberal theories. Understood as a "power-free" space, political community is viewed as "a level playing field set aside for the pursuit of individual or group interests," without taking prior history nor already existing power relations into account. See Peggy Watson, "Civil Society and the Politics of Difference in Eastern Europe," in Transitions, Environments, Translations: Feminisms in International Politics, ed. Joan W. Scott. Cora Kaplan, and Debra Keates (New York: Routledge. 1997). 24.
The Two Axes and Political Systems

In dictatorships, the power within both dimensions of the political space is monopolized by the state. Under such conditions, the state "bends" the space in any way that it considers necessary. Its main goal is to control the vertical dimension—the "ongoing association" of people sharing one history. The state puts a lot of emphasis on the vertical dimension. It allows very little or no activity in the horizontal layer.

In order to insure its monopoly on the vertical axis, the state can deport or eliminate those sub-state actors who pose a threat (whether real or imagined) to the major supporters of the state. Therefore, theoretically, it is in the best interests of a non-democratic state to pursue a policy of social homogenization. This means that the state tries to obliterate, or at least to control, the ethnic, political or social differences in its population. By pursuing a policy of social homogenization, the state ensures that there are no alternative centers of power and, therefore, that no group is capable of challenging its power. In other words, there is one vertical axis.

Under such conditions, the "horizontal" dimension of political community (civil society) is a sum of "atomized" households, in which people associate only with their family members and friends. These individuals are, by and large, incapable of mobilizing for political action.\footnote{In the former Communist bloc, there were small groups of dissidents. However, such "civil societies" were dependent on the existence of a hostile state. These groups defined themselves in opposition to that state. See Aleksander Smolar. "From Opposition} The goal of the deportations and resettlements carried out by Stalin
was to create such a space, thus preventing potential mobilization.

Furthermore, to reduce the power of on-going associations among the so-called “titular” nations (i.e., Latvians, Lithuanians, Ukrainians, etc.), the state decided to transform the vertical axes of titular nations with planned injections of other nationalities, mostly ethnic Russians, Ukrainians, and Byelorussians. The Soviet approach to nationalities after Stalin consisted of three stages. These were rastsvet (flourishing, or allowing the “equal” development of socialist nations within the USSR), sblizheniye (rapprochement, or a movement away from rastsvet towards an eventual unity), and sliyaniye (assimilation, amalgamation, or the final process after the stage of unity).12

Sliyaniye, or the third stage, envisioned the creation of a Soviet nation around the Russian nation and its language. In other words, the ultimate goal of the Soviet approach to community building after Stalin was to create one strong vertical “Soviet” axis and to eliminate the horizontal dimension.

In the late eighties, when it became impossible for the authorities in Moscow to continue “bending” the political space, new actors emerged in that space. These actors included nationalist movements—movements that have often been mistakenly viewed as representatives of the horizontal dimension (i.e., civil society).13 Many of these movements were in fact representatives of the previous “vertical” axes that the Soviet state wanted to subdue. That is especially true in the case of the restorationist movements in the

---

13“The myth of civil society as united, anti-political, and supportive of radical reform was one of the first casualties of the postcommunist era,” writes Smolar. 268.
Baltic states. These movements openly proclaimed themselves the heirs of the independent Baltic states that existed prior to 1940.

This "return of the repressed" was the first stage of democratic community building in post-Soviet era. Its major goal was to re-create the vertical axis of communities. During this stage, there were widespread demands that the experiences of ethnic restructuring, deportation, and forced migration (i.e., the amalgamation methods used by the Soviet Union) be officially recognized by the democratizing polities as genocide. Such demands became a powerful source for mobilization and the recreation of the vertical axis. However, one other legacy of the ethnic restructuring carried out by the Soviet Union was the presence of ethnic groups opposed to the emerging nationalist movements in the territory of the emerging political communities.

During the process of mobilization, the previous experiences of displacement played a major role. It is probably not a coincidence that many Baltic politicians had a personal experience of displacement.\textsuperscript{14} This experience helped them to become effective "entrepreneurs of memory" (in Maurice Halbwach's terminology),\textsuperscript{15} capable of stimulating personal memories in Baltic societies. This, in turn, created a sense of unity and became a basis for social cohesion among ethnic Balts, which was a necessary condition for nation building, and, at the same time, a sustainable vertical axis. Mobilization defined the

\textsuperscript{14}E.g., Vaira Vike-Freiberga and Valdas Adamkus, the presidents of Latvia and Lithuania, have experienced displacement to the West as their families were fleeing the Soviet onslaught. Vilis Kristopans, a former Prime-Minister of Latvia, was born in Siberia. Guntis Ulmanis, the former president of Latvia, was deported to Siberia in his youth. This fact softened the opposition of radical nationalists and the Independence movement to his candidacy as a president. Lennart Meri, the president of Estonia, and his family were exiled to Russia during World War II.

boundaries of the emerging political communities. The experiences of deportation became a dividing line between the autochthonous residents of the Baltic polities on the one hand and the "newcomers" on the other. Even in the case of Lithuania, which decided to adopt the most liberal laws on citizenship, the memory of ethnic restructuring played a major role. It became a dividing line between ethnic Lithuanians on the one hand and ethnic Russians, Poles, and other minorities on the other. It became a source of polarization, insecurity, and fear that the emerging state would lose territory to the "mother states."

During the second stage of political community building the vertical axes in all three Baltic states were restored. Since then, the major remaining problem facing these states has been to address another aspect of the Soviet legacy—the recreation of the horizontal axis. Developing a functioning civil society (i.e., restoring the horizontal axis) offers one way to integrate disappointed and alienated minorities who are incapable or unwilling to merge into the vertical axis. This would prevent the minorities from consolidation into their own vertical axis within the same state.

The following section examines the dominant features of different arrangements that helped to reduce polarization and to insure peaceful coexistence among different ethnic groups in the three states. In addition, it seeks to explain why and how these arrangements were accepted and experienced by ethnic minorities. The analysis is organized around two aspects of the regimes—political power and the economic dimension.
In previous works on ethnic relations, toleration (or coexistence) has been viewed as the product of an unequal relationship—a relationship in which the "tolerated" group (an ethnic minority) is in an inferior position when compared to the dominant ethnic group. The dominant ethnic group decides whether it will tolerate the minority and under what conditions. The minority decides whether to accept the diktat of the dominant ethnic group. Ideally, in consolidated democracies, all involved parties should be willing to go beyond such arrangements and try to base their strategies on mutual respect.16

Polarization along ethnic lines refers to the absence of toleration. If ethnically polarized states are unwilling to take action to deal with this condition, then, as was argued in Chapter III, the state is unlikely to develop a sustainable democratic regime.17 One of the most important findings of the three case studies is that the shape of political communities and the political arrangements devised to accommodate ethnic differences were conditioned by the historical memory of previous deportations, displacement and forced population transfers. A closer look at the power dimension of the institutions adopted by ethnically restructured states illustrates this point.

16For a further discussion of toleration as a relationship of inequality, see Michael Walzer, On Toleration (New Haven: Yale University, 1997), 52.

17For a detailed discussion of polarization along ethnic lines, see Pål Kolstø. "Bipolar Societies?" in Nation-Building and Ethnic Integration in Post-Soviet Societies: An Investigation of Latvia and Kazakhstan, ed. Pål Kolstø (Boulder, Colo.: Westview, 1999), 15-43. Kolstø and his co-authors applied Horowitz's thesis about the difficulties related to community building in multiethnic states to the cases of Latvia and Kazakhstan.
The three states chose to legitimatize their power by giving citizenship only to pre-1940 inhabitants and their descendants. By doing that, the authorities took into account the historical memories of the Soviet occupation that were rekindled by individual scholars and political groups during the period of national revival in the three states. Thus, many individuals, especially those belonging to the autochthonous ethnic groups, could relate their individual experiences with those legitimatized by the state. Consequently, in the three states, the atrocities committed by the previous regime, including deportations and forced resettlements, became the central component of legitimacy within the emerging communities. Especially during the initial stage of community building, historical legitimization of citizenship laws (referring to the pre-World War II states and the illegitimacy of the Soviet republics) was perceived as indispensable by the leaders of the national revival movements.18

In the cases of Latvia and Estonia, membership in the recreated communities favored ethnic Latvians and Estonians. In all three states, the members of diasporic communities were given preferential treatment when it came to citizenship.19 In this respect, membership in the Baltic communities is curiously similar to the Law of Return in Israel that grants citizenship to ethnic Jews and constitutes a post factum kind of

---


19In Lithuania, this treatment was institutionalized by 1996 Amendment to the Citizenship Law.
affirmative action by commemorating past persecutions.\textsuperscript{20}

The remembrance of the past during the debates on citizenship in Estonia and Latvia (Chapters VI and VII) explains why the more radical, exclusionist version of citizenship gained legitimacy vis-a-vis the more moderate approaches to political community building. Historical memory, and not the suggestions of outside actors, was the determining factor in the shaping of the political community in these two countries.

Legitimizing the citizenship laws by remembering the past resulted in powerful arguments for defining the borders of political communities to exclude Soviet-era immigrants. This action won the approval of the autochthonous residents of the state and, interestingly, silenced potential opposition among ethnic Russians. With the exception of the Russians living in the Northeast, the response of most Russians in Estonia to the exclusivist nature of the citizenship laws was muted. They decided either to leave the country or to retreat into the private sphere (or just focus on making money). Mobilization of ethnic Russians living in Estonia has remained low. The reaction to the development of ethnic democracy in Latvia was similar among Russians living in Latvia (see Chapter VII). Those who stayed in Latvia began to develop a sense of being second class citizens—but they did not rebel.

In Lithuania, despite its inclusive citizenship law and numerous laws promoting the rights of ethnic minorities, the level of mobilization by ethnic Poles living in southeastern Lithuania has been much higher than that of the Russians living in Latvia and Estonia. Ethnic Polish political entrepreneurs who emerged from the ranks of local Soviet leaders have been rather successful in exploiting the feelings of relative economic

\textsuperscript{20}Safran, 325-27.
deprivation (when compared to other regions in Lithuania) and resistance to the Lithuanian language among ethnic Poles and other ethnic Slavs living in Northeastern Lithuania (see Chapter VIII).

To legitimatize their power vis-a-vis minorities living in ethnic enclaves and to reduce polarization, the Lithuanian and the Estonian governments chose to grant a high level of autonomy to the inhabitants of those regions. In Lithuania, this decision was met with resistance from organizations that united former victims of the Polish and Russian occupations. These organizations continued to press the central government for more schools in the Lithuanian language in the region and for more attention to the rights of ethnic Lithuanians living in this ethnic enclave. Extending partial autonomy to ethnic Poles in Eastern Lithuania helped to relieve tensions during the first stage of community building. However, because of a dearth of state funds, the economic backwardness of the region, and only half-hearted attempts at reform by the local government, tensions have re-emerged. Ethnic Poles living in the region continue to view themselves as an underprivileged minority and continue to press for more funds from the central government. On the other hand, support for the restored state among ethnic Lithuanians living in the enclave has declined sharply. Many think that they are treated unfairly by the local government (see Chapter VIII). As the literature on autonomy in multiethnic areas suggests, this happens frequently in multiethnic areas in which the dominant ethnic group is granted self-governance.\textsuperscript{21}

was more successful than the attempts of the Lithuanian government to balance the demands of ethnic Poles for more autonomy against the demands of ethnic Lithuanians to "re-lithuanize" Southeastern Lithuania. As the analysis of the arrangement in Chapter VI shows, Estonia’s Russians were very active at the local level. Furthermore, they were interested in having a say in the issues discussed at the local government level. Including the Russians in decision making at the local level helped to prevent ethnic Russian political leaders from exploiting feelings of perceived humiliation and ethnic deprivation among Estonia’s Russian population. On the other hand, ethnic Estonians did not view this arrangement as a threat to their national identity. Consequently, even nationalist parties eventually decided to cooperate with Russian parties at the local government level.

The Estonian case clearly shows that the most successful strategies to reduce polarization were implemented at the local level, or "below." These strategies—extending full social and economic rights to all residents of the state and extending the right to vote in local elections—were sensitive to the historical sensitivities of ethnic Estonians on the one hand and to the need of the Russians to have a say in community building and everyday affairs on the other. The successful implementation of these strategies was the reason why the Estonian state managed to gain legitimacy in the eyes of Estonia’s Russian community.

The other two states also extended full social and economic rights—the right to use the state as a "service station" and a full membership in civil society—to their ethnic minorities. As the analysis conducted in Chapter VII shows, the approach used by Latvia to reduce polarization, in which full rights of membership in civil society were extended to

22Such a scenario was described by Laitin, Identity in Formation, 327.
Latvia's Russians, was the most successful approach. As a consequence, Latvia's Russians are perceived (both by themselves and by ethnic Latvians) as the richest ethnic group in Latvia.\textsuperscript{23}

Lithuania extended full political, social and economic rights to its minorities. However, as Chapter VIII shows, this nation state was not entirely successful in reducing ethnic tension in the Eastern part of the country. It failed to create representative local governments and to increase the level of economic development in that area. Unlike the Russians in Latvia and Estonia, ethnic Poles in Eastern Lithuania continue to view themselves as the worst educated, poorest and most politically underprivileged group in the country. The case of Lithuania's Poles points to the importance of the economic dimension in legitimatizing the state in the eyes of its ethnic minorities.

*Sustaining the Legitimacy of Power: The Economic Dimension*

As the three states strengthened their market economies, different non-state actors, such as labor unions or business associations, slowly began to assert themselves. Even though it is too early to assess the importance of these associations in building bridges between different ethnic groups, it is probably fair to suggest that the emergence of these organizations provides channels for voicing the grievances of ethnic minorities in the three

\textsuperscript{23}Given the scarcity of data on real wages, it is difficult to determine whether this stereotype correspond to the actual distribution of wealth in Latvian society. However, it is important that Latvia's Russians do not consider themselves to be an underprivileged ethnic group. For sociological data from the mid-nineties, see Irina Malkova, Pål Kolstø, and Hans Olav Melberg, "Attitudinal and Linguistic Integration in Kazakstan and Latvia." in *Nation-Building and Ethnic Integration in Post-Soviet Societies: An Investigation of Latvia and Kazakstan*, ed. Pål Kolstø (Boulder, Colo.: Westview, 1999), 235.
Of the three Baltic states, Estonia is usually considered to be the most successful in the economic sphere. It was the only state to receive an early invitation to start accession talks with the European Union (in 1997). In the words of EU Commissioner Erki Likanen, Estonia was singled out because "of its functioning market economy and free trade." In addition to its liberal trade policy and market economy, Estonia established a stable currency prior to the other two Baltic states. Furthermore, it received a lot of assistance from Finland and other Nordic states—both at the national and local levels. Good economic performance enabled the state to establish functioning local governments and thus make their state a functioning "service station" at the local level.

Good economic performance was another reason (in addition to the integration policy at the local level) why the Estonian state managed to win loyalty among its citizens and noncitizen residents. According to opinion polls conducted in 1997, the percentage of people who are disloyal to the state is far less in Estonia than in Lithuania and Latvia: only 10% of those polled in Estonia would like to see the old Soviet order restored. In Latvia, approximately 26% of citizens thought that "due to the help of the nations of the Soviet Union, Soviet Latvia reached a high level of economic and cultural development." 58% of

---


25 More than 65% of Estonia's trade is with the EU. Trade with Sweden and Finland alone accounts for 50% of all trade. Estonia managed to establish an export-oriented economy, supported by substantial investment by foreign companies, such as Nokia of Finland and Tolaram of Singapore. It also has developed a very successful banking sector. Bruce Barnard, "The Baltics: Seven Years After the Breakup of the Soviet Union, the Baltic Countries Are on the Economic Fast Track," *Europe* (October 1999): 23.

non-citizens embraced this opinion. In 1998, the number of those who thought positively about Soviet times increased compared to 1994.27 According to 1995 data, Lithuania’s residents have the most positive evaluation of the Soviet past, and Estonia’s residents the worst.28 According to the World Bank Lithuania has the worst overall economic situation of the Baltic states.

At the same time, a functioning market economy made it possible for Estonia to provide the necessary funds with which to investigate the crimes of the past. In the early nineties, Estonia created a special police department to conduct historical research and to search for the perpetrators of crimes committed during Soviet times. It played the role of a historical truth commission.29 Similar commissions were established in the other two states. Furthermore, the establishment of functioning state institutions in the Baltic area helped to put the experiences of displacement and deportation in the history books and to record them as crimes. Displacement and deportations were revisited by public debates, trials, and public commemorations. Consequently, even though only a few conscious efforts at reconciliation were made by the representatives of the different ethnic groups, historical memories were not transformed into a desire for revenge. Instead, these memories are becoming a learned history. As the second-generation permanent residents and citizens of the three states learn this history, they become part of the vertical axis.

27Baltijas datu nams, 84.
28Gaidys. 87. Gaidys refers to the study conducted by the centers for market and public opinion research in the Baltic states and the Centre for the Study of Public Policy, University of Strathclyde.
29Toivo Kamenik (Special Police Unit researching the war crimes), interview by author. 6 November 1998, Vilnius.
THE ROLE OF INTERNATIONAL ACTORS

As the case studies (Chapters VI–VIII) indicate, a large number of international actors were involved in community building in the Baltics. This is especially true in the cases of Latvia and Estonia. The dissertation focused on the most prominent organizations—the European Union, the OSCE, the Council of Europe, and, in the case of Lithuania, Polish-Lithuanian institutional arrangements—and the minority’s mother states, Russia and Poland. After the Baltic states joined the Council of Europe, the influence of this organization on the decision making processes within those countries was reduced. After that, the EU and Western governments directly affected decisions on citizenship and minority laws in the three states.

The actions of these international actors, and Western international institutions in particular, were representative of a larger trend in postcommunist politics during the post-Cold war era. Numerous international actors, such as governments, international organizations, and non-governmental bodies, did not hesitate when it came to intervening in the domestic politics of nation states in East Central Europe. The official goal of these interventions, especially those conducted by Western international organizations, was certainly noble: to promote human rights, minority rights, and democratic government.

Previous research on the impact of international institutions on community building in the Baltic states has tended to hail the political conditionality exercised by

--


international institutions as "successful preventive diplomacy" or as a necessary step to promote democracy in "an inclusive mode." Indeed, it would not be fair to ignore the positive influence that international institutions and international actors have had on the Baltic states. If it were not for American and EU pressure, then the withdrawal of the Russian military would have been much slower. Furthermore, foreign investment, military cooperation, and financial help received from the West played a positive role during the initial stages of democratization. These actions by international institutions helped to strengthen the institutions of the states, to increase the welfare of their citizens, and, consequently, to legitimatize the states in the eyes of their ethnic minorities.

Recently, however, some students of democratization have begun to question the effectiveness of political conditionality in promoting human rights and minority rights in states undergoing the transition to democracy. So far, however, little is known about the effect that political conditionality (as exercised by international organizations) has had on ethnic relations in the Baltic states. The case studies of this dissertation trace the process of community building in detail and help to fill in this gap in knowledge.

---

32 E.g., see Birckenbach.
34 Vamik D. Volkan has conducted focus group studies in Latvia and Estonia. One of his conclusions is that despite Latvia's willingness to join international organizations, by 1995, the "emotional fragmentation among Latvians remained, and the psychological border between Latvians and Russians living in Latvia seemed even more rigid." See Volkan, Bloodlines, 145.
The basic requirements adopted by the EU Councils at Copenhagen and Essen for those states interested in joining the EU stated that the "applicant must be a stable pluralist democracy." This meant that a prospective member must have, among other things, independent political parties, regular elections, be committed to the rule of law, respect human rights and protect its minorities. These basic requirements are very broad. Furthermore, the fact that there is widespread disagreement among international organizations and specialists in international law on what in fact constitutes a "minority" and whether non-citizen residents should be entitled to collective cultural rights, has complicated the process. To illustrate, during the 1993 summit of the Council of Europe in Vienna, its members pledged to protect the rights of their countries' minorities, but they failed to agree on what a minority is. In the cases of Latvia and Estonia, the initial versions of their citizenship laws were at first approved by the Council of Europe, the OSCE, and other international organizations as being in accordance with international law. However, as the case studies show, several years later the international actors changed their position and began exerting pressure on these states to change their citizenship laws, hoping that this would make the creation of political communities easier.

The concessions made by Estonia and Latvia—revising their citizenship laws several times, in the case of Latvia watering down its language law (see Chapters VI and VII)—were agreed upon for a very simple reason: the desire of the Baltic states to join the

---

35 For further discussion, see Marie Lavigne. "Conditions for accession to the EU," *Comparative Economic Studies* (Fall 1998); PROQUEST. 
European Union and NATO. These international organizations, which offered implicit and explicit security guarantees to their members, were the only ones capable of providing for the national security of the Baltic states. Latvia and Estonia made concessions related to the citizenship laws and the rights of minorities only when they became convinced that these concessions would directly affect their chances for membership in these organizations.

The greatest problem related to the political conditionality exerted by Western states is, as Chapters VI and VII show, the fact that Russia has used the “human rights” and the “rights of compatriots” rhetoric to assert its influence in Latvia and Estonia. Russia is perfectly aware of the fact that the European Union is “conditioning their [the Baltic states] further integration on improving their relations with Russia and . . . the rights of their Russian-speaking populations.” Consequently, “human rights” rhetoric has been a powerful tool in the hands of Russia. The March 1998 crisis in Russian-Latvian relations is a case in point. Russian officials and the Russian mass media drew international attention to the dispersion of a crowd of protesting Russian pensioners by the Latvian police by describing this action as a violation of human rights and implementing economic sanctions against Latvia. Shortly afterward, the OSCE High Commissioner, with the support of the European Union, began exerting pressure on the Latvian government to revise its citizenship law. The law was amended in April of 1998 (see Chapter VII).

Ethnic Latvians perceived this pressure to liberalize the law on citizenship to be the

\[38\] Igor Yurgens, member of the Russian Council for Foreign and Defense Policy, quoted by ITAR/TASS (24 September, 1999).
direct result of Russian influence. Thus, one unintended consequence of political conditionality in Latvia (and also in Estonia) was that the OSCE High Commissioner for minorities became perceived by both ethnic Russians and ethnic Balts as the “defender” of the ethnic Russians living in those countries. Van der Stoel’s visits to Latvia and Estonia were met with protests by the former victims of the Soviet regime and by former partisans, thus adding to ethnic polarization within those two states.

It is, therefore, not surprising that many ethnic Estonians and ethnic Latvians perceived EU and OSCE pressure to amend their citizenship laws to be something that would benefit only Russia and ethnic Russians. Very few viewed the liberalization of laws on language and citizenship as something that would help them to build bridges between the two communities. Having made all the required concessions on its law on citizenship, Estonia refused to water down its language law. Under international pressure, Latvia agreed to liberalize its language law by agreeing not to monitor the use of language in the private sphere. However, the Latvian government has not abandoned its willingness to make the position of the Latvian language stronger. Its new Law on Education envisions switching to Latvian in all state-run schools by 2004. The EU has not yet objected to this law, even though it is frowned upon by Russian ethnopolitical groups.

Another unintended consequence of international intervention into political

---

39Malkova, Kolstø, and Melberg found that in Latvia Max van der Stoel is widely seen as a champion of the interests of non-Latvians. Malkova, Kolstø, and Melberg, 231.

40The intention to switch to Latvian was also included in the document outlining Latvia’s strategy for integration into the EU. The plan to switch to Latvian as the sole language of instruction in public schools was attacked by Russian political groups an hour and a half prior to the visits by Romano Prodi, head of the European Commission in 2000, and Guenther Verheugen, EU Commissioner, to Riga’s parliament. “Latvia Approves Strategy of Integration into the EU,” ITAR/TASS (15 February, 2000).
community building in Latvia and Estonia was an increase in feelings of victimhood among ethnic Balts: a feeling that they were not the “masters of their own fate.” Such perceptions can easily be exploited by nationalist parties who often argue against international influence and call for ways to “strengthen the nation.” As the case study of political community building in Latvia (Chapter VII) shows, the swing to more radical ethnopolitical parties in Latvia’s local elections was the direct result of international pressure to amend the law on citizenship. Thus, during the initial stage of political community building in Latvia and Estonia (1990 to the mid-nineties) political conditionality exerted by international actors helped right wing political parties to make some gains and thus strengthened those groups.

As the case study on Lithuania (Chapter VIII) shows, this country received less international scrutiny than Latvia and Estonia. However, similarly to the previous two cases, attempts by Poland to monitor the status of ethnic Poles in eastern Lithuania prompted widespread resistance among right wing activists. Such groups argued that Lithuania and Poland should establish “ethnic minority parity”: that is, any rights that are granted to Lithuania’s Poles, should be also granted to Poland’s Lithuanians. Even though the two states have developed a variety of intergovernmental institutions, these bodies have failed to alter the attitudes of ethnic Poles and their perceptions of the Lithuanian state.

In sum, the case studies show that attempts by international actors to change political communities from above (that is, attempts to restructure the vertical axis) are likely to have some negative consequences, such as intensifying the activities of nationalist groups and prompting searches for new ways to preserve what is perceived as an
endangered ethnic identity. Such by-products of political conditionality hinder the creation of the tolerant political culture that is necessary for democratic consolidation in multiethnic areas torn by different historical memories.

This is not to say, however, that international institutions should not intervene into political community building in multiethnic states. The most successful programs launched by international actors interested in helping to reduce ethnic polarization were long term multilateral projects with little visibility in the political arena. For example, the EU has given financial support for the National Program for Training in the Latvian Language which aims to promote the Latvian language among Latvia’s Russians. A similar language training project—Individual and Constant Language Teaching of Russian Children in Estonian Families—that aimed to place Russian children in Estonian families was supported by the Open Society Foundation. The European Council supported Slenkstis [Threshold], a program for teaching Lithuanian to non-Lithuanians interested in learning the state language.

These programs helped to de-politicize the language issue in the Baltic states because they were conducted by “third parties” (i.e., neither by the nation states nor by minority mother states). They were consistent with international laws, such as the Council of Europe’s Framework Convention for the Protection of National Minorities, that prohibit national assimilation, but encourage minorities to learn the official language of the state in which they live.41 In contrast, the programs geared to help Lithuania’s Poles that were organized by Wspolnota Polska, a Polish organization interested in helping ethnic Poles

living abroad, usually aroused the suspicions of ethnopolitical groups interested in the “re-lithuanization” of Eastern Lithuania.

The international attention given to the economic condition in the ethnic enclave in Northeastern Estonia is another example of successful international intervention in community building. Ethnic Russians living in that area got used to on-going international attention. Visits by the representatives of Western governments or Western businesses became so commonplace that they barely even made it into the local news. To illustrate, in 1999, reporting on a visit by representatives of the Swedish government interested in helping Narvans to deal with unemployment and Estonian language education, the local newspaper wrote, “there was a visit from our regular guests, the Swedish government.”

EU help for the strengthening of local governments in the region coupled with the help of Scandinavian governments at the local level helped to relieve the grievances of Russians living in that area and to focus their attention on local projects. Thus, in 1999, Narvskaya Gazeta (Narva’s local newspaper) wrote, “We must try to gain respect from the West instead of looking to the East. . . . Our local government is working on the projects that may get attention and money from the West.” The Latgale region in Latvia and Southeastern Lithuania would probably benefit from similar endeavors.

These strategies by international actors were carried out within the “horizontal” area of communities. Their components were multilateralism (that is, numerous state and non-state actors were involved) and not top-down pressure and long term commitment. Such programs, directed at community building efforts at the horizontal level and

---

42Narvskaya Gazeta (22 January, 1999), 1.
43Narvskaya Gazeta (19 January, 1999), 1.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
consistent with the major policies of the states. are likely to help states to legitimatize their power in the long run.

REVISITING THE DEBATE ON MULTIETHNICITY AND DEMOCRACY: LESSONS LEARNED FROM THE BALTIC EXPERIENCE

The tension between the need for some form of state-wide community cohesion and recognition of the needs and histories embraced by different ethnic groups is going to remain a sensitive issue in world politics. Contemporary nation states, either established democracies or states undergoing transition, have become increasingly ethnically heterogenous. They have become home to ethnic groups with different historical memories, different mother states, and different political interests. Ethnic heterogeneity has become a normal characteristic of a nationstate.

At the same time, ethnic conflict has become more dangerous. In the post-Cold War era, civil wars and ethnic conflicts have become more prevalent than interstate wars. Consequently, understanding why a group of people gets mobilized to address past wrongs and knowing what can be done to reduce ethnic polarization are of tremendous importance to those interested in creating sustainable, consolidated democracies capable of tolerating difference.

The huge body of literature on identity construction and mobilization, reviewed in Chapter III, has produced rich case studies on the intersection of identity and democracy and a list of ways to promote democracies in multiethnic areas. A large number of scholars agree that in order to achieve democratic consolidation in multiethnic areas,
governments and international actors must create an inclusive political process that includes ethnic minorities. This belief translated into policies promoted by international institutions such as the EU or the OSCE and their use of political conditionality in the Baltic states. The orthodox liberal idea—integration and democratic consolidation through democratic citizenship rights and minority rights—has become the basis of the external aspects of democratization in the Baltic states and elsewhere. It is widely believed that *rights* in and of themselves constitute the basis of legitimacy for state power in democratizing states.

The research contained in this dissertation challenges this consensus. It shows that orthodox liberal approaches have ignored the crucial role that historical memory plays during the processes of community building. Historical memory and official history are probably one of the most powerful ways that emerging states legitimate the social order and their power. Alternatively, actors who are capable of stirring up historical memory have the power to demonstrate that the existing political order is illegitimate.  

This was the role played by the nationalist movements in the Baltic states during the initial stage of political community building.

Logically and historically, the existence of political actors with a sense of cohesiveness is prior to the rights and laws. The rights and laws must be written by someone. Furthermore, there must be ways to enforce the laws. In democratic communities, citizens must feel that they are the authors of the laws and that they have the power to change the laws if they want. Often, historical memory and official history

---

become the basis of cohesiveness uniting the members of one national group. However, by establishing functioning state institutions and inclusive local governments an ethnically heterogenous state may be able to achieve peaceful co-habitation between ethnic groups with different historical memories.

These observations suggest two questions crucial for the debate on the relationship between multiethnicity and democracy. First, how do we explain the movement from the multitude of diverse individual historical perspectives to the collective “we”? Second, what can be done to prevent the group’s “we-ness” from becoming exclusionary and even deadly? Stirring up memories of past wrongs may lead to calls for revenge. In such cases, the same variable that is necessary for the establishment of a functioning democratic regime may become deadly for the members of other ethnic groups. Ethnic conflicts and genocide are often at least partially provoked by competing mobilized memories about past abuses and past experiences of genocide and ethnic conflict.4 5

These two questions include clumsy variables such as historical memory and ethnic hatred that have been traditionally treated with scepticism by political scientists. This probably explains why the orthodox liberal perspective has been much better received in political science and international relations than historical approaches. Norms, laws, rights, or institutions are easier to explore than the role of history. Meanwhile, other disciplines, such as history, anthropology or even psychiatry, have been much more open to studies of historical memory. In order to successfully integrate such insights into the

debate on democracy and multiethnicity, political actors must be conceptualized, in the words of John Ruggie, "as not only strategically but also discursively competent." That is, one must acknowledge that actors have rational egoistic interests, but at the same time, one must take into account their discourse and their memories.

The concept of political community as a two-dimensional space with actors who bend this space is one of the first steps in this direction. Such conceptualization encourages us to take the previous experiences of the actors into account in order to understand how they have become powerful. Thus, the first question about the movement from the multitude perspectives to the collective "we" is addressed. In the Baltic case, the major forces behind this movement were public commemorations, some of which were preserved even during the times of dictatorship (see Chapter V). Furthermore, many of the former victims and former deportees became "entrepreneurs" capable of stirring up historical memories for political goals and thus constructing the "vertical" axis.

A close examination of the constitutive elements of the vertical axis reveals that historical memory became the basis of political community and cohesiveness in all three Baltic states. The fact that they ended up with similar citizenship laws and that the political activity of minorities became limited to the horizontal axis is a case in point. Exploring the relationship between the vertical and horizontal axes helps to answer the second question: What did the states do to reduce ethnic polarization? The case studies suggest that the most successful arrangements—inclusiveness at the local level in Estonia, the extension of social and economic rights in Latvia, and balancing between the demands of the minority and the majority's sensitivities in Lithuania—took historical sensitivities

\[40\text{Ruggie, 869.}\]
and ethnic fears into account (see table 13).

If this is the case, then it follows logically that there is no one universal way to reduce ethnic polarization and to consolidate democracies. Ethnic arrangements must be context-specific. Reducing ethnic polarization is a long, painstaking process that involves many actors at both the state and sub-state level. At the state level, economic strength may aid in the development of institutions to deal with different memories. It may also foster a generation of historians who are willing to discover and publicly discuss painful aspects of the past, thus distinguishing between memory and history.

The most successful approaches to reduce polarization, however, are likely to be exercised at the “horizontal level.” As the Estonian case suggests, a state that is doing well economically and is willing to foster strong local governments may eventually be rewarded with fledgling ethnic coalitions at the local level. The Latvian and Lithuanian cases suggest that economic grievances may be very easily transformed into ethnic tensions and complicate the reduction of ethnic polarization.

Consequently, international actors (that is, international actors other than a minority’s “mother state”) are extremely helpful in fostering the horizontal sphere—by extending economic help, smoothing relations between the multiethnic state and the “mother state” or, as in the case of Lithuanian-Polish relations, integrating the triadic state-minority-mother state relationship into larger and more attractive international structures. Political conditionality while attempting to transform the vertical axis should be exercised with a great caution.
Table 13. Differences Between Orthodox Liberal and Process-Oriented Approaches*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>ORTHODOX LIBERAL APPROACHES</th>
<th>PROCESS-ORIENTED APPROACHES</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>THEORY</td>
<td>Focus on the Vertical Axis</td>
<td>Focus on the Horizontal Axis</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Outcome-Oriented</td>
<td>Process-Oriented</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Means to Reduce Polarization:</td>
<td>Means to Reduce Polarization:</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- Focus on prescribed liberal democratic norms, rights, institutions</td>
<td>- Flexible forms of political institutions;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>and policies</td>
<td>- Decentralization;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>The Role of International Actors:</td>
<td>- Dialogic communities;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- Generally approve of political conditionality:</td>
<td>- Socioeconomic communities</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- The outsiders are seen as experts in democratization.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EVIDENCE FROM THE</td>
<td>Ways to Strengthen the Vertical Axis:</td>
<td>Ways to Strengthen the Horizontal Axis:</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CASE STUDIES</td>
<td>- Mobilize historical memory (all cases);</td>
<td>- Give full social and economic rights to non-members living in the</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- Establish historical continuity of the state (all cases);</td>
<td>state; let them use the state as a &quot;service station&quot; (all cases);</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- Political disenfranchisement of large segments ethnic minorities</td>
<td>- Give cultural autonomy to the interested ethnic groups (all cases);</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(Latvia and Estonia in particular).</td>
<td>- Establish functioning local governments (Estonia).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>The Role of International Organizations:</td>
<td>The Role of International Organizations:</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- Pivotal role in liberalization of the Citizenship laws (Estonia and</td>
<td>- Relieve ethnic anxiety of autochthonous groups by promoting</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Latvia);</td>
<td>national language among ethnic minorities (all cases);</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- Provoked ethnic polarization (Estonia and Latvia).</td>
<td>- Help in establishing functioning local governments (the Narva</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>The Role of International Organizations:</td>
<td>region in Estonia).</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note:

*Illana Shapiro refers to these two schools of thought as "Modernization" and "Conflict Resolution." She traces the philosophical roots of the first school to "positivist objective truth." The roots of the second school are described as "constructivist multiple truths."

Source:

In sum, the Baltic experiences suggest that in territories inhabited by ethnic groups with different and recently activated historical memories, process-oriented approaches to community building should be preferred to outcome-oriented, or orthodox liberal approaches. The goal of process-oriented approaches to political community building is to create interdependent relationships between different ethnic groups instead of trying to create one cohesive "integrated" democratic state. Process-oriented approaches admit that the integration of different ethnic groups into one cohesive unit in ethnically restructured and other history-sensitive regions is not possible. After the vertical axis has been re-established, one should aim for co-habitation. Flexible forms of political organization capable of addressing the historical sensitivities of different ethnic groups and capable of building a strong civil society are the means to achieve this goal.
ARCHIVAL MATERIALS

Lietuvos Ypatingasis Archyvas [The Special Archive of Lithuania], Vilnius, Lithuania. Collection K-1.

Open Society Archives, Budapest. Collections 205, 300.


DOCUMENTS AND OFFICIAL SOURCES


—. Law on the State Language. Available from the Lithuanian parliament or from http://www.lrs.lt: INTERNET.

—. Lithuania’s Law on Citizenship. Available from the Lithuanian parliament or from http://www.lrs.lt: INTERNET.


Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.


**MEMOIRS**


**NEWPAPERS AND SERIALS**


*Central and Eastern Eurobarometer*. March 1996.

Druzhba, July 1999.


Europe. October 1999.


Lietuvos Bažnyčios Kronika. 1975.


MONOGRAPHS


Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.


ARTICLES AND REPORTS


Anderson, James, and Liam O'Dowd. “Contested Borders: Globalization and Ethnonational Conflict in Ireland.” *Regional Studies* 33, no. 1 (October 1999), INFOTRAC.


Bougai, Nikolai F. “Postsovetskaya Rossiya: problema reabilitatsii narodov v
premlomlenii obschestvennogo soznaniya” [Post Soviet Russia: a Problem of
Rehabilitation of Nations during the Time of Transition]. Paper presented at the
Conference “Im Jahrhundert der Flüchtlinge: Umsiedlung and Vertreibung im
Gedächtnis der Europäischen Völker” [The Century of Displaced and
Expulsion in the Memory of the European Nations] on 28 May 1999 at Europa-
Universität Viadrina in Frankfurt (Oder), Germany.

Brubaker, Rogers. “Citizenship Struggles in Soviet Successor States.” International
Migration Review 26, no. 2 (Summer 1992): 269-89.


Carment, David B. “The Interstate Dimensions of Secession and Irredenta: A Crisis-Based
Approach.” Paper presented at the International Studies Association’s Annual
Meeting in San Diego, California (16-20 April 1996).

Connor, Walker. “Self Determination: The New Phase.” World Politics 20, no. 1
(October 1967): 30-53.

Denemark, Robert A. “World System History: From Traditional International Politics to
the Study of Global Relations.” International Studies Review 1, no. 2 (Summer
1999): 43-76.

http://www.einst.ee/society/ethnic_issues.htm; INTERNET.

Gagnon Jr., V. P. “Ethnic Nationalism and International Conflict: The Case of Serbia.”

Gaškaitė-Žemaitienė, Nijolė. “Lietuvos laisvės kovos sąjūdžio strategija” [The Strategy of
the Lithuanian Movement for Independence]. Genocidas ir Rezistencija 1, no. 5

Gazarianas, Artašesas. “1995 m. Rinkimų į savivaldybes rezultatai ir demokratijos
perspektyvos Lietuvoje” [1995 Local Election Results and the Prospects of

Gerner, Christian. “A Moveable Place with a Moveable Past: Perspectives on Central
Europe.” Australian Journal of Politics and History 45, no. 1 (March 1999);
INFOTRAC.

Mobilization and Conflict since 1945.” International Political Science Review 14


Huntington, Samuel P. “The Clash of Civilizations?” *Foreign Affairs* 72, no. 3 (Summer 1993): 22–49.


Lavigne, Marie. "Conditions for accession to the EU." Comparative Economic Studies (Fall 1998); PROQUEST.


Rittersporn, Gabor T. “Gab Es Etnische Säuberung in der Sowjetunion?” [Was There an Ethnic Cleansing in the Soviet Union?]. Paper presented on 7 January 1999 at Europa-Universität-Viadrina in Frankfurt (Oder), Germany.


INTERVIEWS AND OTHER UNPUBLISHED SOURCES

Baltutytė, Elvyra (Deputy Director of the Lithuanian Human Rights Center). Interview by author, Vilnius (22 June, 1999).

Dozortsev, Vladlen. Interviewed on “Compatriots,” a Russian TV program, broadcast 11 February 1993. A transcript of this program is kept in the Open Society Archives, Budapest, collection 205, file 14/0/257.

Friedrich-Naumann Fund and International Relations and Political Science Institute at Vilnius University. “Political Culture as an Essential Prerequisite to Civil Society.” Public opinion survey, Vilnius (1994).

Kamenik, Toivo (Special Police Unit researching the war crimes). Interview by author, Vilnius (6 November, 1998).

Litvaitienė, Jovita (a lawyer from the Lithuanian parliament). Interview by author, Vilnius (10 June, 1999).


Petrovas, Eugenijus (a representative from the Lithuanian Department for Regional Problems and National Minority Affairs). Interview by author, Vilnius (23 June, 1999).


Stashenko, Vladimir. Interviewed on “Compatriots,” a Russian TV program, broadcast 10 February 1993. A transcript is available in the Open Society Archives, Budapest, collection 205, file 14/0/257.


VITA

Dovile Budryte
Graduate Programs in International Studies
621 Batten Arts and Letters Building
Old Dominion University
Norfolk, VA 23529-0086

Education:

1995-2000 Old Dominion University, Graduate Programs in International Studies, Ph.D.
1994-1998 Old Dominion University, Graduate Programs in International Studies, M.A.

Fields of Interest:

Conflict and Cooperation; Democratization; Gender Perspectives on International Relations.