

Summer 1984

I.G. Farben's Petro-Chemical Plant and Concentration Camp at Auschwitz

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Yavner, Robert S.. "I.G. Farben's Petro-Chemical Plant and Concentration Camp at Auschwitz" (1984).
Master of Arts (MA), Thesis, History, Old Dominion University, DOI: 10.25777/7cqx-5d23
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I.G. FARBEN'S PETRO-CHEMICAL PLANT
AND CONCENTRATION CAMP AT AUSCHWITZ

by

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A Thesis Submitted to the Faculty of
Old Dominion University in Partial Fulfillment of the
Requirements for the Degree of

MASTER OF ARTS
HISTORY

OLD DOMINION UNIVERSITY
August 1984

Approved by:

Darwin Bostick (Director)

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ABSTRACT

I.G. FARBEN'S PETRO-CHEMICAL PLANT
AND CONCENTRATION CAMP AT AUSCHWITZ

Robert Simon Yavner

Old Dominion University, 1984
Director: Dr. Darwin Bostick

This study examines the history of the petro-chemical plant and concentration camp run by I.G. Farben-industrie (the dominant German chemical company during World War II) at Auschwitz to decide upon the degree of Farben's involvement with Hitler and the Holocaust. The study traces the construction of the plant to determine Farben's participation at Auschwitz. The main sources consulted were the transcripts of the postwar Farben trial at Nuremberg along with eyewitness accounts of members of the prosecution staff. Based on the court's verdict, one might conclude that I.G. Farben operated in a state of coercion during the war and could not be held accountable for most of its actions. The history of the Auschwitz plant indicates, however, that I.G. Farben had some involvement in the extermination process.

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PREFACE

On December 9, 1925, eight of the largest chemical companies in Germany merged to form the I.G. Farbenindustrie Aktiengesellschaft (better known as I.G. Farben).¹ This merger led to the creation of one of the largest industrial corporations in the world. I.G. Farben monopolized the chemical industry in Germany. Prior to World War I, those companies controlled 85 percent of the world's chemical production.² Two of the new company's prominent leaders, Carl Duisberg and Carl Bosch, were ardent Pan-Germans who believed passionately in Germany's mission in world affairs.

During the two world wars, the German chemical industry played a prominent role in supplying important war materials. In World War I, its factories produced gunpowder and poison gases. Major Victor Lefebure, a British chemical liaison officer, stated that Germany would have been compelled to abandon the struggle after the summer of

¹Farben: to dye or stain; Aktiengesellschaft (A.G.): joint stock corporation.

²Joseph Borkin and Charles A. Welsh, Germany's Master Plan (New York: Duell, Sloan and Pearce, 1943), p. 97.

1915 without the help of the chemical industry.³ Between the wars both Hitler and the leaders of I.G. Farben concluded that the British blockade was an important reason Germany was forced to surrender. Both parties decided that Germany needed to become an autarky to win another war. In the mid-1930s Farben contracted to manufacture oil, rubber, gunpowder, and other chemical products for the Wehrmacht. The expansion of synthetic rubber production led to the construction of a plant (known as I.G. Auschwitz) outside the Auschwitz concentration camp. Farben became the first company to sign a contract with the SS for the use of inmate labor on a large scale. Thousands of inmates died while working at this plant. After World War II Farben's managing board of directors was brought to trial at Nuremberg. I.G. Farben became the first industrial concern to be charged with war crimes. The prosecution charged the Farben directors with the planning and waging of aggressive war, the plundering of the European chemical industry, and participating in slave labor and mass murder. The slave labor and mass murder charge included participation in the forced labor program, the production of the Zyclon-B gas used in the gas chambers, the use of experimental drugs on concentration camp inmates, and maltreatment of workers which resulted in thousands of deaths at I.G. Auschwitz. The bulk of the prosecution's evidence dealt with the

³Victor Lefebure, The Riddle of the Rhine (New York: The Chemical Foundation, Inc., 1923), p. 205.

aggressive war charges. It seems inconceivable that the prosecution did not put more emphasis on Farben's role at Auschwitz.

Four books have been written in English directly about I.G. Farben: The Riddle of the Rhine (1923) by Victor Lefebure, I.G. Farben (1947) by Richard Sasuly, The Devil's Chemists (1952) by Josiah Dubois, and The Crime and Punishment of I.G. Farben (1978) by Joseph Borkin. Borkin also co-authored a book entitled Germany's Master Plan (1943). The book is not entirely about I.G. Farben, but the company is dealt with in great detail. One school of thought is consistent throughout these books: the record of I.G. Farben was a recital of Germany's attempts to use scientific methods to control the world.⁴

Not one of the authors shows a lack of restraint when writing about I.G. Farben. L. M. Hacker, when he reviewed Germany's Master Plan, compared the book to an Alfred Hitchcock movie.⁵ Lefebure described the German chemical companies as a "trump card for the future" because they had the power to use their laboratories either as a sword for war or a plough for peace.⁶ Dubois, as a member

⁴Borkin and Welsh, Germany's Master Plan, p. 19.

⁵L. M. Hacker, review of Germany's Master Plan, by Joseph Borkin and Charles A. Welsh, in New York Herald Tribune, 7 February 1943, Book section, p. 3.

⁶Lefebure, Riddle of the Rhine, p. 206.

of the Farben trial team at Nuremburg, tried to prove that I.G. Farben was guilty of making Mein Kampf a reality.⁷ The theme of Sasuly's book was that Germany was still a war-maker and that I.G. Farben was one of the forces that kept her active.⁸

It is important to note that the judgment of the Farben trial does not reflect the view of those authors. Most found it hard to visualize industrialists as men of war because they did not pull any triggers. The heaviest sentences handed out were to those men who were involved with I.G. Auschwitz, but none of the sentences exceeded eight years, an extremely soft penalty for anyone involved in the greatest murder machine in history.

This paper traces the history of I.G. Auschwitz. Its components are Farben's decision to build a plant at Auschwitz, the nature of Farben's activities at Auschwitz, the U.S. prosecutors' decision to emphasize the aggressive war charges rather than crimes against humanity, and the tribunal's verdict.

⁷"United States of America v. Carl Krauch et al.," 14 August 1947 - 30 July 1948, Records of the United States Nuernberg War Crimes Trials, Record Group 238, National Archives, Washington, D.C., Microfilm Publication M-892, roll 2, frame 59.

⁸Richard Sasuly, I.G. Farben (New York: Boni and Gaer, Inc., 1947), p. 231.

CHAPTER I

I.G. FARBEN BEFORE HITLER

By 1900 six German companies rose to prominence in the field of chemical production and distribution: Badische Anilin und Soda-Fabrik of Ludwigshafen (BASF), Farbwerke vorm. Meister Lucius & Bruening of Hoechst (Hoechst), Farbenfabriken vorm. Friedrich Bayer & Co. of Leverkusen (Bayer), Aktiengesellschaft fuer Anilinfabrikation of Berlin (Agfa), Leopold Cassella & Co. of Frankfurt (Cassella), and Kalle & Co. A.G. of Biebrich (Kalle).¹ Their success led to bitter and costly competition for a larger share of the foreign and domestic markets. This created price cutting, protracted patent litigation, kickbacks to customers, and bribery to gain technical secrets, all of which reduced profits and growth.²

In 1903 Carl Duisberg, the head of Bayer, tried to persuade the other companies to combine and form a trust in order to end the costly competition. As a scientist

¹Hermann Gross, Further Facts and Figures Relating to the Deconcentration of the I.G. Farbenindustrie Aktiengesellschaft (Kiel: n.p., 1950), p. 8.

²Joseph Borkin, The Crime and Punishment of I.G. Farben (New York: The Free Press, 1978), p. 5.

he was aware that research could be advanced so much better if all facilities were pooled. As an administrator he saw that duplication of effort wasted money, especially on the purchasing side of materials.³ The six companies were receptive, but they had reservations about surrendering too much control over their own corporate affairs. The result was that two loose-knit joint organizations, each known as an Interessengemeinschaft (meaning community of interests) developed. One was made up of Bayer, BASF, and Agfa; the other of Hoechst, Cassella, and Kalle. That helped to reduce the competition between the parties by setting up a formula for sharing profits, while each company retained its identity and control over policies and activities.⁴

Since Germany had no antitrust laws, cartelization was a common practice among the German industries. German courts had condoned this practice. In 1888 the courts had ruled that if individual companies could not restore the proper balance between supply and demand, it was best for them to combine and agree on limitations.⁵ Prior to World

³Louis P. Lochner, Tycoons and Tyrants: German Industry from Hitler to Adenauer (Chicago: Henry Regnery Co., 1954), pp. 40-41.

⁴"United States of America v. Carl Krauch et al.," 14 August 1947 - 30 July 1948, Records of the United States Nuernberg War Crimes Trials, Record Group 238, National Archives, Washington, D.C., Microfilm Publication M-892, roll 2, frame 63 (hereafter cited as U.S. v. Krauch, M-892/2/63).

⁵Richard Sasuly, I.G. Farben (New York: Boni and Gaer, Inc., 1947), p. 241.

War I, the German chemical industry had attained an almost absolute monopoly in the organic dyestuffs, pharmaceutical, and synthetic chemical industries of the world. The leaders of this industry represented the height of pan-Germanism in the economic sphere. This chemical industry was at all times the servant of the German government.

In 1909 Fritz Haber developed a synthetic nitrate that could be used to make fertilizers or gunpowder. By 1913 Carl Bosch, the head of BASF, had taken Haber's discovery out of the laboratory and started mass production of synthetic nitrates to make fertilizers. This process came to be known as the "Haber-Bosch process." Prior to this, most of the world was dependent on Chile's supply of natural nitrates in the form of saltpeter.⁶

After Germany did not achieve the quick victory it had hoped for in World War I, Walther von Rathenau realized that Germany's supply of gunpowder was insufficient. He persuaded the War Ministry to call upon Bosch to mass produce gunpowder for the war effort. Bosch said he would do so but only with substantial government subsidy. By May 1915 Bosch was supplying the Wehrmacht with sufficient amounts of gunpowder to carry on the war. Bosch's success helped to free Germany from dependence on Chile and proved

⁶See U.S. v. Krauch, M-892/2/66; Morris Goran, The Story of Fritz Haber (Norman, Okla.: University of Oklahoma Press, 1967), p. 42.

to be a financial bonanza for BASF. With the help of Hermann Schmitz, a young lieutenant in the War Raw Materials Office, Bosch persuaded the government to build a huge Haber-Bosch high-pressure plant in Leuna, in central Germany.

Also during the war, the chemical companies developed poison gases for use in warfare. German chemists developed chlorine, perite, and mustard gases, which the chemical factories produced. The chemical industry worked closely with Haber when he prepared the chlorine gas used at the Battle of Ypres in April 1915. After the war, Victor Lefebure wrote that the chemical industry functioned, in a sense, as the supply line of German offensive warfare.⁷

After the Battle of the Somme in July 1916, the members of the chemical industry realized that a German victory was no longer certain. They realized that the world's chemical industry had grown during the war and that they needed to strengthen their position for the postwar struggle against new competitors.⁸ In mid-August 1916 eight companies formed one large Interessengemeinschaft: BASF, Bayer, Hoescht, Kalle, Cassella, Agfa, Griesheim

⁷Victor Lefebure, The Riddle of the Rhine (New York: The Chemical Foundation, Inc., 1923), p. 206.

⁸Robert A. Brady, The Rationalization Movement in German Industry (New York: Howard Fertig, 1974), p. 59.

(Chemisch Fabrik Griesheim-Elektron of Frankfurt), and Ter Meer (Chemische Fabriken vorm. Weiler-ter Meer of Uerdingen). This chemical cartel came to be known as Interessen Gemeinschaft der Deutschen Teerfarbenindustrie (the community of interest of the German dyestuff industry).⁹ In subsequent years the cartel came to be known simply as the I.G., and the individual members as I.G. companies. Each company still retained its identity.

In 1923 the French invaded the Ruhr because the German government was delinquent in reparation payments. The closure of most I.G. plants during the French occupation had increased the strength of foreign competitors. By the fall of 1923 Duisberg and Bosch were convinced that a reorganization of the I.G. was needed to form a broader and more substantial corporate base. Bosch proposed that all of the I.G. companies merge into a single corporation. By 1924 a firm agreement was reached. On December 9, 1925, the eight companies merged, and the new company took the name of I.G. Farbenindustrie Aktiengesellschaft (I.G. Farben). Carl Duisberg was elected head of the Aufsichtsrat (supervisory board of directors) and Carl Bosch was elected head of the Vorstand (managing board of directors).¹⁰

⁹U.S. v. Krauch, M-892/2/64.

¹⁰Borkin, Crime and Punishment of I.G. Farben, pp. 42-43.

Under German corporate law the stockholders of a conventional company elected an Aufsichtsrat and a Vorstand. These elected offices were the focal points of power.¹¹ When I.G. Farben was created, the Aufsichtsrat members and most of the Vorstand members of all the parent companies became members of the Aufsichtsrat and Vorstand of Farben. The functions of the Aufsichtsrat were not well defined, and membership was mostly honorary. It met only three or four times a year and generally followed the views of the Vorstand. The Vorstand met once a month to formulate corporate policy.¹² The chairmen of the Aufsichtsrat were:

Carl Duisberg	1926-1935
Carl Bosch	1935-1940
Carl Krauch	1940-1945

The chairmen of the Vorstand were:

Carl Bosch	1926-1935
Hermann Schmitz	1935-1945

The I.G. Farben directorates, however, were mere showpieces; membership in those bodies without a position in an operating committee, a plant combination, or the central administration meant nothing.¹³ The head of the

¹¹U.S. v. Krauch, M-892/2/69-70. In general, the duty of the Aufsichtsrat was to supervise the overall management of the company. The Vorstand was to run the day-to-day operations.

¹²Raul Hilberg, The Destruction of the European Jews (Chicago: Quadrangle Books, 1961), p. 590.

¹³Ibid., p. 592.

Vorstand, nominally the head of the company, appeared to be no more than a figurehead. That is why historian Raul Hilberg described Farben as a "bureaucratic empire" and a "headless colossus," running like an autonomous machine that someone had set in motion.¹⁴ Telford Taylor, in his book Sword and Swastika, stated:

Largely because Farben was a widely owned stock corporation rather than a family enterprise like the Krupp concern, it presented an 'impersonal' appearance to the public, and no individual Farben director achieved the world-wide notoriety of the Krupps.¹⁵

The company's power structure was divided into three components: the top echelon or policy-making structure of the organization, the central services, and the plants.¹⁶ The policy-making structure had three separate centers of direction. The Technical Committee (TEA), headed by Dr. Fritz ter Meer, concerned itself with scientific questions, raw materials, production methods, plant expansion, and related matters. The Sales Committee (KA), headed by Dr. Georg von Schnitzler, dealt with marketing, sales, and taxes. The Krauch office, headed by Dr. Carl Krauch, dealt with the expansion of the entire chemical industry. This latter office was established in September

¹⁴Ibid., pp. 590, 592.

¹⁵Telford Taylor, Sword and Swastika (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1952), p. 98.

¹⁶U.S. v. Krauch, M-892/2/69-74.

1935 to act as a military liaison office in Berlin. The central service department was headed by Dr. Max Ilgner (the nephew of Hermann Schmitz). It took care of matters dealing with personnel, protocol, legal problems, press, export, and political economy. The plants were divided into three divisions called Sparten. Sparte I (headed first by Carl Krauch, then by Dr. Christian Schneider) produced synthetic nitrates, synthetic gasoline, methanol, and other synthetic fuels. Sparte II (headed by Fritz ter Meer) produced dyestuffs, organic chemicals, pharmaceuticals, light metals, synthetic rubber (buna), and a variety of other products. Sparte III (headed by Dr. Fritz Gajewski) produced photographic materials, synthetic fibres, and cellophane. The I.G. laboratories developed many well-known important products: aspirin, salvarsan (a cure for syphilis), atebirin (a cure for malaria), novocain, heroin (originally developed as a cure for morphine addiction), methadone (a synthetic substitute for morphine), prestone, etc.¹⁷

In the inter-war period I.G. Farben focused most of its attention on the development of synthetic gasoline. In 1909 Friedrich Bergius developed synthetic gasoline by combining coal and hydrogen, under high pressure, in a process

¹⁷See Gross, Further Facts and Figures, p. 11; Borkin, Crime and Punishment of I.G. Farben, pp. 6-7; Josiah Dubois, The Devil's Chemists (Boston: The Beacon Press, 1952), p. 86.

known as hydrogenation. In 1916 he tried to adapt his hydrogenation process to large-scale production. By the end of World War I, he was still unsuccessful in producing this fuel which was so badly needed by the Wehrmacht. In 1925 Carl Bosch bought the patent rights to the Bergius process. By 1926 I.G. Farben had the technical ability to produce synthetic gasoline on a large scale, but the largest obstacle to the project was the staggering cost. It took the combined resources of the merged I.G. companies to support such a project. Experiments also took place with synthetic rubber which required the hydrogenation process. In essence, Farben staked its future on the production of these expensive products.¹⁸

Joseph Borkin wrote that Bosch dreamed of liberating Germany from dependence on foreign oil wells. This was the lesson taught to many Germans by the British blockade in World War I.¹⁹ Long before Hitler achieved notoriety, I.G. Farben worked toward German self-sufficiency by developing synthetic oil and synthetic rubber.²⁰ Richard Sasuly compared the leaders of I.G. Farben to men like General Erich Ludendorff, who looked at the armistice which ended World

¹⁸U.S. v. Krauch, M-892/2/79-80.

¹⁹Joseph Borkin and Charles A. Welsh, Germany's Master Plan (New York: Duell, Sloan and Pearce, 1943), p. 43.

²⁰Taylor, Sword and Swastika, p. 96.

War I as no more than a suspension of hostilities.²¹ He wrote that the military and industrial leaders of Germany came out of one war entirely prepared to start thinking about another. They knew they had made a good showing on the first try. They worked to correct their mistake.²²

Despite the cost, Bosch equipped the Leuna plant to produce synthetic fuels. By July 1930 I.G. Farben had poured Rm 300 million (approximately \$120 million) into the project with few results. The strain of the depression prompted many of the directors to call for a halt to the project. But Bosch, who was the dominant figure in Farben, proved too powerful to be forced to close down the project. He did realize, however, that he needed some kind of subsidy to save this expensive project.²³

During the depression Adolf Hitler's power grew tremendously. In the Reichstag election of July 1932, the Nazis became Germany's largest party capturing 230 of the 608 seats. The Farben executives took note of this growth and decided to establish lines of communication with him. They wanted to know his feelings about the synthetic oil project in case he did become the German Chancellor. Not

²¹Mitchell Franklin, "Sources of International Law Relating to Sanctions Against War Criminals," Journal of Criminal Law and Criminology 36 (1945): 153.

²²Sasuly, I.G. Farben, p. 39.

²³Borkin, Crime and Punishment of I.G. Farben, pp. 53-54.

yet willing to have top I.G. Farben executives seen associating with Hitler, Bosch instructed Heinrich Gattineau (a second echelon Farben official who was also an officer in the SA) to set up a meeting between Hitler and Heinrich Buete-fisch, an authority on synthetic oil production. Before the meeting, which took place in Munich, Gattineau and Buete-fisch worried that the hydrogenation process was too complicated for Hitler to understand. Hitler surprised them when he said:

Today an economy without oil is inconceivable in a Germany which wishes to remain politically independent. Therefore German motor fuel must become a reality, even if this entails sacrifices. Therefore it is urgently necessary that the hydrogenation of coal be continued.²⁴

Hitler then described a program under which he planned to make Germany self-sufficient in oil with the help of I.G. Farben. World War I had taught him, he said, that Germany's shortage of raw materials made the British blockade decisive in Germany's defeat. By a program of self-sufficiency he was determined to change Germany from a country which lacked raw materials into a self-sufficient power. Hitler assured Gattineau and Buete-fisch that their company could depend on his support, both financial and political. Now I.G. Farben acquired an economic interest

²⁴United States Military Tribunal, Trials of War Criminals Before the Nuernberg Military Tribunals: October 1946-April 1949, 15 vols. (Washington, D.C.: United States Government Printing Office, 1952), vol. VII: The I.G. Farben Case, p. 539 (hereafter cited as TWC).

in the installation of a Hitler government.²⁵

Hindenberg appointed Hitler Chancellor on January 30, 1933. Hitler realized he did not have a firm grip on this office. With another Reichstag election scheduled for March 5, Hermann Goering called a secret meeting of the leading industrialists and financiers to be held at his estate of Karinhall on February 20. Hjalmar Schacht, who was among the most active members of the financial community supporting Hitler, acted as host for the meeting. He hoped to raise three million Reichmarks for Hitler's campaign. Georg von Schnitzler, a member of the board of directors and chairman of the Sales Committee, represented I.G. Farben.²⁶ Bosch had instructed von Schnitzler to pledge Rm 400,000. That was by far the largest single donation pledged.²⁷ By that action Farben began to show clear support for Hitler. To solidify Farben's position in the new regime, Hermann Schmitz (now a Vorstand member) was appointed an honorary Nazi deputy in the Reichstag in November 1933.²⁸ Buetevisch joined the SS and became a

²⁵ Arthur Schweitzer, Big Business in the Third Reich (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1964), p. 102.

²⁶ Great Britain, Office of the Attorney-General, The Trial of German Major War Criminals, Proceedings of the International Military Tribunal Sitting at Nuremberg, 1:130-31.

²⁷ TWC, VII, pp. 565-68.

²⁸ U.S. v. Krauch, M-892/2/94.

member of Heinrich Himmler's "Circle of Friends."²⁹

Shortly after the March 5 election, Hitler and Bosch met for the first time. Hitler assured him that his government would fully back the synthetic oil project. Bosch then moved to a subject that his associates had begged him to avoid when talking to Hitler. He warned Hitler that the expulsion of Jewish scientists would set German chemistry back 100 years. Although Hitler became visibly upset, Bosch pursued the subject. Even though Hitler did not allow Bosch's outburst to interfere with Farben's synthetic oil project, he never again would appear in the same room with Bosch.³⁰ Bosch continued to fight against the dismissal of Jewish scientists, but by 1937 all Jewish officials including a third of the supervisory board had been removed from I.G. Farben.³¹ The year 1937 also marked a drastic change in the character of the Vorstand. Almost all of its members joined the Nazi party.

²⁹Dubois, Devil's Chemists, p. 163.

³⁰Lochner, Tycoons and Tyrants, p. 44.

³¹Hilberg, Destruction of the European Jews, p. 58.

CHAPTER II

COOPERATION WITH HITLER

I.G. Farben was an active, indispensable, and often enthusiastic ally of Hitler. Out of ambition, dislike, and a fear of communism, the Farben directors saw the Nazis as both their opportunity and their protection.¹ After World War II, Georg von Schnitzler admitted that Nazi foreign policy and I.G. Farben's foreign policy were largely inseparable.²

In the summer of 1933 General Erhard Milch, state secretary of the Aviation Ministry and Goering's right-hand man, was interested in learning whether Farben's synthetic oil was suitable for aviation gasoline. Milch was referred to Carl Krauch because he could be relied upon to give the most accurate report on the suitability of the gasoline and the level of production that could be obtained. Krauch promised to investigate Milch's question. On September 15, 1933, he submitted a four-year plan for the expansion of

¹John Kenneth Galbraith, review of The Crime and Punishment of I.G. Farben, by Joseph Borkin, in New Republic 26, August 1978, p. 35.

²Josiah Dubois, The Devil's Chemists (Boston: The Beacon Press, 1952), p. 54.

Germany's production of domestic motor fuel centralized around Farben's hydrogenation process for synthetic oil. The Air Ministry approved Krauch's plan.³ On December 14, 1933, a formal contract was signed between I.G. Farben and the government. By the terms of the contract Farben was to expand the synthetic oil installation at Leuna so that in four years it could produce 300,000 to 350,000 tons annually. The Reich, in return, promised to guarantee a price corresponding to the cost of production, including 5 percent interest on invested capital and a generous depreciation allowance. It also promised to assure the sale of all the synthetic oil that Farben could not sell through its own outlets.⁴ Borkin described the agreement as a monumental technical achievement in modern power politics. It was only a matter of time, he said, before Farben freed Hitler from dependence on foreign oil.⁵

Once Hitler had a firm agreement on the production

³United States Military Tribunal, Trials of War Criminals Before the Nuernberg Military Tribunals: October 1946-April 1949, 15 vols. (Washington, D.C.: United States Government Printing Office, 1952), vol. VII: The I.G. Farben Case, pp. 571-73 (hereafter cited as TWC).

⁴"United States of America v. Carl Krauch et al.," 14 August 1947 - 30 July 1948, Records of the United States Nuernberg War Crimes Trials, Record Group 238, National Archives, Washington, D.C., Microfilm Publication M-892, roll 2, frame 97 (hereafter cited as U.S. v. Krauch, M-892/2/97).

⁵Joseph Borkin, The Crime and Punishment of I.G. Farben (New York: The Free Press, 1978), p. 60.

of synthetic oil, he shifted to the next most important strategic raw material import, rubber. Farben had developed the synthetic rubber (buna) process in the late 1920s, but when Hitler focused his attention on synthetic rubber, Farben's buna operation was minimal.⁶ In late 1933 representatives of the Army Ordnance and the Ministry of Economics (headed by Hjalmar Schacht) asked Farben to resume its work in synthetic rubber. Without the guarantee of a sufficient government subsidy, however, Bosch feared a repeat of the financial difficulties that beset the synthetic oil project and decided not to step up the production. The Ministry of Economics, the Army Ordnance, and the tire industry thought the cost of buna to be too high and would not make those guarantees.

By the fall of 1934 Hitler was troubled by the lagging synthetic rubber production. He appointed his own economic adviser, Wilhelm Keppler, as the plenipotentiary for raw materials and synthetics. Keppler called a meeting of the representatives of I.G. Farben, the Ministry of Economics, the Army Ordnance, and the tire industry to tell them of Hitler's dissatisfaction. Fritz ter Meer, Farben's representative at the meeting, explained the need for financial guarantees. Keppler said the production of

⁶Charles F. Phillips, Competition in the Synthetic Rubber Industry (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1963), p. 30.

synthetic rubber was a pet project of the Fuehrer and must not be delayed. The reluctant parties realized they had no choice but to market the buna rubber. On September 11, 1935, at the Nazi party rally in Nuremberg, Hitler announced that Germany had solved the problem of producing synthetic rubber, and that the erection of the first German factory for this purpose would start at once.⁷

I.G. Farben already had a small pilot plant at Leverkusen but due to Hitler's assurances, Bosch decided to build a large-scale buna plant at Schkopau. That plant would be close enough to Leuna to use the high pressure equipment of the synthetic oil site. Later, Farben built a third plant at Huels. To make this expansion profitable, the government subsidized the construction of the plant and placed a high tariff on rubber.⁸

In September 1935 Carl Krauch moved his office from Frankfurt to Berlin in order to enhance Farben's cooperation with the Wehrmacht. His new office took the title of Vermittlungstelle Wehrmacht (army liaison). In a letter to all plant managers, he explained that the Vorstand created the army liaison office

in order to provide systematic cooperation within the I.G. in the current development of military

⁷Borkin, Crime and Punishment of I.G. Farben, p. 62.

⁸Burton H. Klein, Germany's Economic Preparations for War (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1959), p. 45.

economy, and particularly to assure central treatment of all questions of military economy, military policy, and military technique.⁹

On April 27, 1936, Hitler appointed Goering the commissar of raw materials and foreign exchange. Goering chose Lieutenant Colonel Fritz Loeb of the Air Ministry to head his staff. He then asked Bosch to recommend a man from I.G. Farben to head up research and development. Bosch recommended Krauch because he was an expert in synthetic products and he had his office in Berlin.¹⁰ Even though Krauch began to work for the government, he maintained his contacts with Farben and his seat on the board of directors.

At the Nazi party rally in Nuremberg on September 8, 1936, Hitler announced his "Four-Year Plan." His goal was to make Germany completely self-sufficient in strategic war materials such as rubber, gasoline, steel, explosives, and chemicals in four years. He entrusted the responsibility for the execution of this program to Goering.¹¹ Goering transferred Krauch's research and development staff to the office of the Four-Year Plan.

Hitler and Goering assigned a large portion of the

⁹U.S. v. Krauch, M-892/2/107.

¹⁰Dubois, Devil's Chemists, p. 54.

¹¹Great Britain, Office of the Attorney-General, The Trial of German Major War Criminals, Proceedings of the International Military Tribunal Sitting at Nuremberg, 1:129.

Four-Year Plan to I.G. Farben. In the first six months of the plan, the government invested nearly one billion Reichmarks, chiefly in power, oil, iron and other metals, textiles, chemicals, rubber, and explosives. Nearly two-thirds of this investment went into Farben products.¹² Arthur Schweitzer, in Big Business in the Third Reich, described the Four-Year Plan as a joint project of the Nazis, the leading generals in the Ministry of War, and I.G. Farben, who together formed a new relationship in economic matters.¹³

In December 1937 Paul Koerner, Goering's deputy, noticed certain disparities in the Four-Year Plan figures prepared by Loeb's office. He asked Krauch about Loeb's estimates. Krauch concluded that Loeb's figures were too conservative and could not possibly fulfill the projections of the Four-Year Plan. Krauch warned Koerner that the use of Loeb's figures could be disastrous.¹⁴ Koerner took Krauch's warnings to Goering, who invited both Loeb and Krauch to Karinhall to discuss Loeb's figures. Krauch impressed Goering by explaining his views in greatest detail. He proved to Goering that Loeb's figures were

¹²Telford Taylor, Sword and Swastika (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1952), pp. 123-24.

¹³Arthur Schweitzer, Big Business in the Third Reich (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1964), p. 547.

¹⁴TWC, VII, p. 1001.

wrong. Goering decided to ask Krauch to prepare a better plan. Krauch worked on a revision at Karinhall; and on June 30, 1938, he handed Goering an accelerated plan for the production of explosives, gunpowder, and chemical-warfare agents. Less than two weeks later he added a supplement which covered synthetic oil, buna rubber, and light metals. This plan came to be known as the "Karinhall-Plan" or "Krauch-Plan." On August 22, Goering sealed his approval of the Karinhall Plan by putting Krauch in charge of the entire chemical production of the Four-Year Plan with the title of Plenipotentiary General for Special Questions of Chemical Production.¹⁵

I.G. Farben factories worked overtime to make the Four-Year Plan a reality. By 1943 Farben's factories were producing large percentages of German production of the following products:¹⁶

	<u>Pct.</u>
Magnesium	88
Nickel	95
Plastics	90
Dyestuffs	98
Pharmaceuticals	55
Gunpowder	70
Buna	100
Gasoline	23
Synthetic lubricating oil	100
Methanol	100

¹⁵See Berenice A. Carroll, Design for Total War: Arms and Economics in the Third Reich (The Hague, Netherlands: Mouton and Co., 1968), pp. 135-37; TWC, VII, pp. 890-93.

¹⁶Richard Sasuly, I.G. Farben (New York: Boni and Gaer, Inc., 1947), pp. 296-97, figures compiled by the Bernstein investigation of I.G. Farben.

Josiah Dubois stressed the importance of Farben goods in the invasion of Poland on September 1, 1939:

As the planes took off in the drizzle . . .
 Farben wipers cleared their windshields. . . .
 The pilots peeked out of Farben aluminum fuselages and flipped their magnesium wings--85 percent of which had been made by Farben. They flew on Farben gasoline, their engines made of Farben nickel and lubricated by Farben. . . .
 Four out of every ten foot soldiers were warmed by Farben textiles, wore Farben plastic helmets, were outfitted with a dozen other Farben articles from mess kits to puttees. . . . All the tanks, the half-tracks, the squad cars rolled on buna rubber.¹⁷

I.G. Farben followed the Wehrmacht throughout most of Europe and established control over the European chemical industry. The company used its expert technical knowledge and resources to plunder and exploit the chemical industries of Europe and to enrich itself from unlawful acquisitions.¹⁸ After the Anschluss in March 1938, Farben took over the firm of Skodawerke-Wetzler, the largest chemical company in Austria. The owners asked an extremely low price because Farben promised to protect their lives. Farben then took over two other large firms, Austrian Dynamit Nobel A.G. and Carbidwerke Deutschmatriei A.G.¹⁹ Shortly after the signing of the Munich Pact, Hermann Schmitz (who became chairman of the Vorstand in 1935) sent

¹⁷Dubois, Devil's Chemists, pp. 318-19.

¹⁸TWC, VII, p. 41.

¹⁹Dubois, Devil's Chemists, pp. 90-92.

the following telegram to Hitler in order to lay the groundwork for the takeover of the Czechoslovakian chemical industry:

Profoundly impressed by the return of the Sudetenland to the Reich, which you, my Fuehrer, have achieved, the I.G. Farbenindustrie A.G. puts an amount of half a million reichmarks at your disposal for use in the Sudetenland territory.²⁰

After the occupation of the Sudetenland, Farben began negotiations with Prager Verein, Czechoslovakia's largest chemical company. When the company directors asked the Czech government for help, they were told to manage on their own as best they could. Due to the heavy pressure from the Farben representatives, the Prager Verein directors decided to sell.²¹

In Poland there were four large chemical companies: Boruta, Wola, Winnica, and Pabjanice. After the invasion Farben had little trouble taking over Boruta, Wola, and Winnica because they were locally owned. The fourth, Pabjanice, was owned by a Swiss company. The Swiss directors wired Farben that they had informed the Swiss government of Farben's attempts to take over Pabjanice. The Farben directors decided not to pursue Pabjanice because they did not want to harm relations between Germany and Switzerland. Switzerland was too valuable as a

²⁰TWC, VII, p. 591, Nuremberg Industrialists (NI) 2795.

²¹Ibid., p. 43.

clearing house of foreign exchange for Germany.²²

The largest chemical company in Norway was Norsk-Hydro. Prior to the German invasion in 1940, French interests controlled 60 percent of the company, Farben about 25 percent. With the help of representatives of the German government, Farben forced the French to give up their control of Norsk-Hydro. As a result Farben and the German government controlled the Norwegian chemical industry.²³

After Germany conquered France, I.G. Farben turned its attention towards controlling the French chemical industry. In Farben's view France was the key to domination of the European chemical industry. Farben representatives threatened French chemical leaders that if they did not cooperate, their companies would be classified as Jewish concerns and their plants would be confiscated. The leading chemical company in France was the Etablissements Kuhlmann. Its dominant figure, Joseph Frossard, firmly believed that the organization of the European economy must come under German leadership because it seemed inevitable that Germany would win the war. Under his direction Kuhlmann absorbed many of the other French chemical companies. Those not taken over by Kuhlmann could only

²²Dubois, Devil's Chemists, pp. 112-13.

²³TWC, VII, p. 45.

survive by following Frossard. On March 12, 1941, Kuhlmann and I.G. Farben agreed on the formation of a new company officially named Société Anonyme de Matières Colorants et Produits Chimiques (Francolor for short). The agreement gave Farben a 51 percent interest in the company, Kuhlmann the remaining 49 percent. Frossard became president while three members of the Vorstand sat on Francolor's board of directors: von Schnitzler, ter Meer, and Dr. Otto Ambros. In making this agreement, the French companies surrendered their dyestuffs and intermediate plants as well as their patents, licenses, manufacturing processes and stocks.²⁴

On November 8, 1940, the Reich Ministry of Economics asked I.G. Farben to expand its buna production from 100,000 to 150,000 tons per year. The ministry proposed that half of the expansion take place within Germany and the other half in a new plant in Silesia. The expansion was to take place under the direction of Carl Krauch in his capacity as the Plenipotentiary General for Chemistry.²⁵ The expansion of the synthetic rubber facilities was necessary to fulfill the enormous requirements projected for the invasion of the Soviet Union. After the war, Carl Krauch stated that Goering suggested the Silesian territory because he expected retaliation

²⁴See Dubois, Devil's Chemists, pp. 290-94; Borkin, Crime and Punishment of I.G. Farben, pp. 101-6.

²⁵U.S. v. Krauch, M-892/44/593-94, NI-11781.

after the failure of the Battle of Britain in the autumn of 1940. He wanted to decentralize the buna factories and build one out of bombing range of the British.²⁶

I.G. Farben already had two large buna plants at Schopau and Huels. Krauch decided to build a third plant at Ludwigshafen in order to utilize the hydrogenation equipment of that synthetic oil plant. For the fourth plant he considered two sites, one in Norway and one in Polish Silesia. He had to be careful to choose the best possible site because Farben had to build a brand new plant which could not utilize the hydrogenation facilities of an adjoining synthetic oil plant. In January 1941 Krauch assigned Otto Ambros, one of I.G. Farben's top buna chemists, to survey the Silesian territory. Ambros studied the maps of the area and decided on a site between the towns of Auschwitz and Monowitz. At the juncture of three rivers, the Weichsel, the Przemsza, and the Sola, the site offered an adequate water supply. The area also had three coal mines, large deposits of lime, and the Reich railroad, which afforded excellent transportation. The site was favorably located from the point of view of possible air pollution. He reported to Krauch that the building site would satisfy, in every respect, the requirements for the building of the new buna plant.²⁷

²⁶TWC, VIII, p. 652, testimony of Carl Krauch.

²⁷U.S. v. Krauch, M-892/44/602-4, NI-11783.

Although the Silesian site fulfilled the technical requirements of the new plant, Krauch and the Farben buna experts had to consider other advantages and risks involved before making a final decision. On January 18, 1941, Ambros met with Dr. Kurt Eisfeld and chief engineer Camill Santo to consider the lack of skilled labor. The Auschwitz area was completely agricultural. That meant the people of the area knew little of industrial work, and trained workers would have to be brought in to work on the plant. The town of Auschwitz was made up of 4,000 Jews, 7,000 Poles, and 2,000 German peasants. The SS was to expel the Jews and Poles from the area and put them into concentration camps. Their homes would serve as suitable quarters to accommodate construction workers and later on factory staff. Ambros, Eisfeld, and Santo thought the site was large enough to build an adjoining synthetic oil plant.²⁸

On January 31, Santo and another engineer, Max Faust, met with Reich representatives from the Silesian area. The officials told Santo and Faust that the concentration camp, which already had 7,000 prisoners, was to be expanded to hold the Jews and Poles of Auschwitz. They discussed the possibility of using inmates from the camp for the plant construction. The Farben representatives were told they would have to wait for approval from

²⁸Ibid., M-892/44/605-9, NI-11784.

Himmler.²⁹

On February 6, 1941, ter Meer and Ambros attended two meetings to discuss the Auschwitz site. At the first meeting with representatives of the Reich Ministry of Economics, Ambros explained that the Auschwitz site would involve very large financial risks on the part of I.G. Farben because the area was not near any other industrial installations. Farben, however, did not want the government to finance the construction because the firm assumed that the plant would prove to be a profitable venture after the war. Ambros did propose, however, that the government keep the price of rubber high until the cost of the plant construction could be paid. He expected the Auschwitz plant to start rubber production in the second half of 1943. The government representatives expressed their agreement with his suggestions.³⁰ Ter Meer and Ambros' second meeting was with Krauch. At that meeting Ambros emphasized the suitability of the Auschwitz site. The only problem, he said, was the procurement of suitable labor. His only solution, at the time, was to bring in German workers through an extensive settlement program. Krauch decided, he said, to drop the Norway site from consideration and to build the new buna plant at Auschwitz.

²⁹Ibid., M-892/44/610-14, NI-11785.

³⁰See Ibid., M-892/44/615-18, NI-11112; Ibid., M-892/44/633, NI-7604, testimony of Christian Schneider.

The plant would be known as I.G. Auschwitz. He also announced that plans were being made to erect a synthetic oil plant at the same site. Since Himmler controlled the Silesian territory, they made plans to contact him in connection with the settlement of German laborers in Auschwitz.³¹

After a visit to the Auschwitz area, Eisfeld informed Ambros that most of the buildings belonging to Jews and Poles were not suitable for housing Germans. A new large-scale settlement would have to be built along with the plant. Noting that the eviction of the Jews and Poles would create a great shortage of laborers, he suggested that they contact the Reich Leader SS of the area to procure the needed laborers.³²

In mid-February 1941 Krauch asked Goering to supply the new Auschwitz plant with the needed labor. He described Goering's cooperation in a letter he wrote:

At my request, the Reichmarshall issued special decrees a few days ago to the supreme Reich authorities concerned, in which he again particularly emphasized the urgency of the project, and is constantly devoting his particular attention to the progress of those tasks of military economic production which have been entrusted to your care. In these decrees, the Reichmarshall obligated the offices concerned to meet your requirement in skilled workers and laborers at once, even at the expense of other important building projects or

³¹Ibid., M-892/44/619-21, NI-11113.

³²Ibid., M-892/44/626, NI-11782.

plans which are essential to the war economy.³³

On February 18, Goering asked Himmler to expel all the Jews from the town of Auschwitz, but to allow the Poles to remain, temporarily, to work on the plant. He also asked Himmler to supply Farben with the largest possible number of workers from the Auschwitz concentration camp.³⁴

On March 1, Himmler ordered that the Jews in the town of Auschwitz be expelled as quickly as possible so that their apartments could be made available to accommodate the workers building the buna plant. The Polish residents suitable for employment were not to be expelled. He ordered Oswald Pohl, the Inspector of Concentration Camps and the Chief of the Main Economic and Administrative Office (WVHA), to supply the buna project with inmate laborers. He appointed SS Lieutenant General Karl Wolff, the chief of his personal staff, to act as liaison between the SS and the buna plant management.³⁵ I.G. Farben became a very important customer of the SS.³⁶

³³TWC, VIII, p. 359, NI-11938.

³⁴Ibid., pp. 354-55, NI-1240.

³⁵U.S. v. Krauch, M-892/44/663, NI-11086.

³⁶Raul Hilberg, The Destruction of the European Jews (Chicago: Quadrangle Books, 1961), p. 590.

CHAPTER III

I.G. AUSCHWITZ AND MONOWITZ

In his autobiography, Rudolph Hoess, the commandant of Auschwitz, wrote, "Before the war, the concentration camps had served the purpose of self-protection, but during the war, according to the will of the Reichsfuehrer SS, they became a means to an end."¹ The camps were to serve the war effort in munitions production, and as many inmates as possible were to become armament workers. In March 1941, when Himmler issued Goering's orders to accommodate I.G. Farben's labor needs, he visited Auschwitz. He gave orders to Hoess to enlarge the camp to hold 100,000 prisoners, with 10,000 to be allocated to the synthetic rubber factory. "At that time a camp containing 10,000 prisoners was considered exceptionally large."² After the war, Hoess stated that I.G. Farben was given preference in procuring concentration camp inmates. He testified that the concentration camps did not offer labor to industry. Instead, inmates were sent after industry

¹Rudolph Hoess, Commandant of Auschwitz, trans. Constantine FitzGibbon (London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1959), p. 125.

²Ibid.

made requests for prisoner labor.³

In the summer of 1941 Himmler told Hoess that Auschwitz had been selected as a site for the extermination of the Jews. He told him that Auschwitz was selected because of its easy rail access, its isolation from populated areas, and the physical possibilities that its location afforded for concealment and camouflage. The Nazis also favored the site because the corpses of millions of Jews could be deposited there without contaminating primary German soil. Himmler preferred Auschwitz to the other Polish death camps because of the fraudulent status it had acquired through the plans to build the buna plant. The Jews could be sent east thinking they were going to work on the plant without suspecting the real purpose of their trip. Therefore, Auschwitz had the double task of providing forced labor for I.G. Farben while serving as a center for the mass extermination of the Jews.⁴

³See Ibid., p. 235; "United States of America v. Carl Krauch et al.," 14 August 1947 - 30 July 1948, Records of the United States Nuernberg War Crimes Trials, Record Group 238, National Archives, Washington, D.C., Microfilm Publication M-892, roll 43, frame 1078 (hereafter cited as U.S. v. Krauch, M-892/43/1078), Nuremberg Industrialists (NI) 4434, affidavit of Rudolph Hoess.

⁴See Lucy S. Dawidowicz, The War Against the Jews, 1933-1945, 7th ed. (New York: Bantam Books, 1981), p. 175; Nora Levin, The Holocaust: The Destruction of European Jewry (New York: T. Y. Crowell Co., 1968), p. 292; Gerald Reitlinger, The Final Solution (New York: A. S. Barnes, 1961), pp. 104-5; Roger Manvell and Heinrich Fraenkel, Himmler (New York: G. P. Putnam's Sons, 1965), p. 122.

In the month that followed the issuance of Himmler's orders, Farben made the final plant preparations. First of all, the management was organized. Dr. Otto Ambros was to direct the buna plant and Dr. Heinrich Buete-fisch was to head the synthetic oil plant. Neither one of those men was to have an office on the Auschwitz site; nevertheless, Ambros communicated with I.G. Auschwitz from his office in Ludwigshafen and Buete-fisch from his office in Leuna. Each man visited the plant site only two or three times a year. Both had representatives in Auschwitz to deal with technical problems associated with construction. Ambros was represented by Dr. Kurt Eisfeld, and Buete-fisch by Dr. Karl Braus. Buete-fisch was also named chairman of the Fuerstengrube mining company which Farben had acquired. That mine was to be worked by inmate labor in order to supply inexpensive coal. At first, chief engineer Santo was in charge of all plant construction. Max Faust directed the building of the synthetic oil plant and Walter Duerrfeld was in charge of building the buna plant. By 1944 Duerrfeld had become managing director of all the Auschwitz plants.

At the first building conference, held on March 24, 1941, the plant management of I.G. Auschwitz addressed the problem of working with the Reich authorities in the area. They decided to hold a Founders' Meeting on April 7 in the neighboring town of Kattowitz. At the Founders' Meeting, all the competent Reich authorities in the area would

become familiar with the Auschwitz building project. At the conference Duerrfeld reported on some preliminary discussions he had had with SS Lieutenant General Karl Wolff. Wolff promised him that at least 700 inmates would be assigned to the building site, that all free labor in Auschwitz would be utilized, and that Hoess would be responsible for guarding the building site.⁵

On March 27, Bueteifisch and Duerrfeld met with Wolff, in the presence of SS Brigadier General Richard Gluecks (Inspector of Concentration Camps), to contract the services of the concentration camp. Bueteifisch was chosen to negotiate with the SS because he was a member of Himmler's "Circle of Friends." The two parties agreed that I.G. Auschwitz would be supplied with 1,000 inmates in 1941 and 3,000 in 1942. Bueteifisch was told there were not too many skilled workers in the camp and not to count on many in the future. The working time was to be ten to eleven hours a day in the summer and at least nine in the winter. Farben would pay the SS three Reichmarks per day for unskilled workers and four Reichmarks per day for skilled workers. The payment included transportation to and from the plant site, food, and shelter.⁶

⁵U.S. v. Krauch, M-892/44/695-99, NI-11115.

⁶United States Military Tribunal, Trials of War Criminals Before the Nuernberg Military Tribunals: October 1946-April 1949, 15 vols. (Washington, D.C.: United States Government Printing Office, 1952), vol. VIII: The I.G. Farben Case, pp. 374-75 (hereafter cited as TWC), NI-15148.

Wolff told Bueteifisch that more inmates could be made available for the plant if enough Kapos could be obtained from the other concentration camps. A Kapo (derived from the French caporal) was the name given throughout the Nazi concentration camp system for a minor supervisor or "straw boss" who was chosen from among the inmates. He was not chosen because of his race, religion, or political beliefs, but because of his long criminal record. Many of the SS elite reportedly tried to remain as aloof as possible from the hell that they had created and that it was their duty to maintain. Bodily control of the inmates passed increasingly into the hands of the Kapos, whose conduct was far more savage than that of the SS.⁷ That was an important development, because no SS guards were allowed inside the plant area after June 14, 1942, when I.G. Farben built a fence around the perimeter. SS guards patrolled the area around the plant to ensure that no inmate escaped, but I.G. foremen controlled the inner area and dictated the work pace to the Kapos.⁸

At the second construction conference held on April 3, 1941, Duerrfeld reported on a discussion he had with Hoess. Hoess had said that he would support the

⁷Manvell and Fraenkel, Himmler, p. 122.

⁸See U.S. v. Krauch, M-892/44/647, NI-9542, testimony of Otto Ambros; Josiah Dubois, The Devil's Chemists (Boston: The Beacon Press, 1952), pp. 166-67.

construction management to the best of his ability. He was sorry that he could not provide more inmates in 1941, but he could promise them 4,000 in 1942. Duerrfeld also reported that each Kapo would supervise twenty inmates.⁹

At the Founders' Meeting on April 7, the leading I.G. Farben representatives were Otto Ambros and Dr. Johannes Eckell. Dr. Eckell served the dual role as a Farben representative specializing in buna production and as a representative of Krauch's office of Special Questions of Chemical Production. Ambros announced that Farben had received an additional order to build a synthetic oil plant with a capacity of 75,000 tons per year. Eckell emphasized the high priority of the Auschwitz plants to the government representatives. Ambros then declared that the plant construction would require up to 15,000 laborers, both skilled and unskilled. He announced Hoess' plans to provide concentration camp inmates as unskilled labor, but he could only speculate on the sources of skilled labor. Eckell stated that this problem could be solved by conscripting labor if necessary. Ambros concluded by asserting that I.G. Farben was determined to do everything in its power to build up a strong enterprise whose influence would become no less important than that of its numerous plants in Germany. In that way

⁹U.S. v. Krauch, M-892/44/705, NI-11116.

I.G. Farben was performing its moral duty of doing its very best to make this new enterprise "a strong corner-stone for a virile, healthy Germandom in the East."¹⁰

On April 12, 1941, Ambros wrote to ter Meer about the success of the Founders' Meeting. He reported that Dr. Eckell had proved his worth in getting the cooperation of the local government officials. Ambros also observed that "our new friendship with the SS is proving very profitable."¹¹

Construction began on I.G. Auschwitz after the Founders' Meeting. The laborers consisted mostly of Germans and Poles from the town of Auschwitz and the concentration camp inmates. I.G. Farben brought in most of its skilled workers from Germany. Despite the cooperation of the Nazi hierarchy, numerous shortages in materials and labor plagued the project. The biggest problem was the low productivity of the unskilled laborers, especially the concentration camp inmates. The SS believed that the only way to get the inmates to work was for the Kapos to beat them, but Farben representatives noticed the deleterious effect that brutality had on the free laborers in the immediate vicinity. In August 1941 they informed the board of directors that those "exceedingly unpleasant

¹⁰Ibid., M-892/44/725-26, NI-11117.

¹¹Ibid., M-892/44/731, NI-11118.

scenes" were

beginning to have a demoralizing effect on the free workers (Poles), as well as on the Germans. We have therefore asked that they should refrain from carrying out this flogging on the construction site and transfer it to the inside of the concentration camp.¹²

Faust reported that, by December, free Poles had attained 50 percent of the efficiency of the German workers and the inmates 30 percent.¹³ The plant management changed its attitude toward the use of force to raise the laborers' work performances:

The work, particularly of the Poles and inmates, continues to leave much room for improvement. . . . Every type of pressure, even sending them (Poles) to the concentration camp, remains without result. In this respect, it is only to be regretted that the construction management itself has no disciplinary powers. Our experience so far has shown that only brute force has any effect on these people.¹⁴

Despite the shortages in materials and the low productivity of the unskilled laborers, relations between the Farben management and the SS remained cordial. Representatives of I.G. Farben took part in an SS Christmas party "which was very festive and which ended up alcoholically gay."¹⁵ In return representatives of the concentration camp were invited to the Farben staff Christmas

¹²TWC, VIII, p. 393, NI-14543.

¹³U.S. v. Krauch, M-892/44/839, NI-11130.

¹⁴TWC, VIII, p. 405, NI-14556.

¹⁵Ibid., p. 410, NI-15253.

party.¹⁶

At the beginning of 1942 Ambros, Pohl, Gluecks, and Hans Frank, the Governor-General of Poland, met at I.G. Auschwitz. At the meeting Pohl expressed his appreciation for the work that I.G. Farben had done, and he repeated his willingness to support I.G. Auschwitz in every respect, especially in the labor commitments the SS had made in 1941. Pohl assured Ambros and Duerrfeld that Himmler had given I.G. Farben priority in the employment of inmate labor.¹⁷

Due to a shortage of inmates in late 1941, the Farben plant management decided to utilize foreign workers who were being recruited in constantly increasing numbers in the occupied territories. These workers became available after Fritz Sauckel, the Plenipotentiary General for the Allocation of Labor, started the forced importation of foreign laborers on April 6, 1942. At first, I.G. Auschwitz used Poles, Slovaks, and Frenchmen; and later, Italians, Ukrainians, Belgians, Croatsians, and British POWs. Farben was responsible for the housing, clothing, and feeding of foreign workers. They were quartered separately according to nationality. Farben's chief problem with foreign workers was that they frequently ran

¹⁶Ibid.

¹⁷See Ibid., p. 540, NI-15253; U.S. v. Krauch, M-892/43/1070, NI-382, affidavit of Oswald Pohl.

away because the SS did not guard them as carefully as they guarded the inmates.¹⁸

The winter of 1941-42 was an extremely harsh one for the inmates who worked at I.G. Auschwitz. Even though the inmates were poorly clothed and fed, Farben still expected them to do heavy construction work. Those who became too ill or weak to work were transferred to Birkenau, where they were gassed. In the words of Joseph Borkin, Farben reduced an inmate to a human raw material.¹⁹ Between working hours the inmates had to march a total of fourteen kilometers to and from the plant site. In October 1941 the Farben plant management complained that the inmates were arriving too late and leaving too early.²⁰ Farben could do little about that because the inmates had to be marched to and from the camp under SS guard during the daylight hours. They could not leave until after the morning roll call and had to return for the evening roll call. To add to I.G. Farben's problems, in the summer of 1942 a typhus epidemic broke out in the Auschwitz main camp and denied the plant that very important source of

¹⁸See Ibid., M-892/44/552-53, NI-9542, testimony of Otto Ambros; Benjamin B. Ferencz, Less Than Slaves: Jewish Forced Labor and the Quest for Compensation (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1979), p. 19.

¹⁹Joseph Borkin, The Crime and Punishment of I.G. Farben (New York: The Free Press, 1978), p. 126.

²⁰U.S. v. Krauch, M-892/44/750, NI-11127.

labor.²¹

By the summer of 1942 I.G. Auschwitz was approaching a financial crisis. Plant construction was far behind schedule, and I.G. Farben's investment was in jeopardy. In June the Vorstand voted to appropriate five million Reichmarks to construct a concentration camp next to the plant site.²² Farben gave the concentration camp the name of Monowitz. In this facility Farben assumed responsibility for the housing, feeding, and health of the inmates; the SS remained in charge of the security, punishment, and supply of inmates. Even though I.G. Farben owned the camp, Monowitz had all the equipment of the typical Nazi concentration camp. It had electrically charged barbed wire, four to six watchtowers, armed guards, and the standard inscription spanning the entrance gates: Arbeit Macht Frei (Work Will Make You Free).²³ I.G. Farben profited from a concentration camp close to the plant site. The inmates were no longer drained of their already limited energy by the long marches to and from the Auschwitz main camp, and Farben could get the full day of

²¹See TWC, VIII, p. 795, testimony of Walter Duerrfeld; John Mendelsohn, ed., The Holocaust, 18 vols. (New York: Garland Publishing, Inc., 1982), 11:272.

²²TWC, VIII, pp. 437-38, NI-14524.

²³See U.S. v. Krauch, M-892/44/648, NI-9542, testimony of Otto Ambros; Ferencz, Less Than Slaves, p. 25.

work it originally contracted for. Security improved, discipline was more effective, and Farben had greater and more immediate control of the inmates. Most important of all, Farben reduced its costs. By October 1942, 4,500 inmates moved into Monowitz. At the camp's last roll call in January 1945 there were 10,244 inmates.²⁴

While I.G. Farben was building Monowitz, Himmler decided that Auschwitz would be the main clearing house for the extermination of the Jews. Himmler was impressed by the deception of the huge buna project and the success that Hoess had had with Zyclon-B gas. Zyclon-B was a more effective killer than the carbon monoxide used at Belsec, Sobibor, and Treblinka. The German firm Degesch (short for Deutsche Gesellschaft fuer Schaedlingsbekaempfung) developed Zyclon-B to exterminate rodents and insects in enclosed spaces. Only six to seven kilograms were needed to kill 1,500 people. Degesch had a monopoly on the production of the gas. Its only drawback was that it deteriorated within three months and therefore could not be stockpiled by the SS.²⁵

Three corporations owned Degesch: 15 percent by

²⁴Ota Krans and Erich Kulka, The Death Factory: Documents on Auschwitz, trans. Stephen Jolly (Oxford: Pergamon Press, 1966), p. 280.

²⁵See Raul Hilberg, The Destruction of the European Jews (Chicago: Quadrangle Books, 1961), p. 567; Kazimierz Smolen, Auschwitz, 1940-1945, trans. Krystyna Michalik (Państwowe: Auschwitz Museum, 1961), p. 49.

the Goldschmidt concern, 42.5 percent by Degussa (short for Deutsche Gold und Silberscheidenanstalt), and 42.5 percent by I.G. Farben. The managing director was Dr. Gerhard Peters, and the chairman of the administrative council was Wilhelm Mann, one of four members of the Farben Vorstand. The other three were Carl Wurster, Dr. Heinrich Hoerlein, and Max Brueggemann. A Farben plant in Uerdingen produced the stabilizer used in the Zyclon-B. Although Degesch was a small company employing less than fifty people, the increased demands for the gas gave it a profitable monopoly. In 1942 Degesch supplied Auschwitz with 7,478 kilograms of Zyclon-B. Deliveries increased to 12,174 kilograms in 1943. From 1941 to 1944 I.G. Farben earned almost Rm 300,000 as its share from the sale of the gas. After the war, Dr. Peters stood trial on eight different occasions before West German courts. He was tried because he had been informed about the use of the gas. He was acquitted due to his defense that the Zyclon-B gave those people who were doomed to die an easy death.²⁶

Even with the construction of Monowitz, plant construction still suffered from a labor shortage, a problem

²⁶See Ibid.; Hilberg, Destruction of the European Jews, pp. 568-69; The Working Group of Former Prisoners of the Auschwitz Concentration Camp of the Committee of Anti-Fascist Resistance Fighters in the German Democratic Republic, IG-Farben, Auschwitz, Mass Murder; on the Guilt of IG-Farben From the Documents on the Auschwitz Trial (Berlin: n.p., 1964), pp. 26-27.

prevalent throughout the Reich. One of the ironies of the extermination process was the labor gap that the Jews could have filled in Germany's war effort. The SS authorities in charge of the camp labor allocation were infuriated by the large number of Jews sent directly to gas chambers. SS Lieutenant Colonel Gerhardt Maurer and his assistant SS Captain Karl Sommer, who were the labor allocation officers of the WVHA, were responsible for the labor supplied to I.G. Auschwitz.

Two incidents in early 1943 illustrate the importance that "The Final Solution of the Jewish Problem" had over the labor crisis. On January 27, 1943, Sommer informed Hoess that 5,000 Theresienstadt Jews were being sent to Auschwitz. He asked that the selection of prospective workers be made carefully because of their importance to I.G. Farben. After some delay, SS Lieutenant, later Captain, Albrecht Schwarz, the labor-commitment officer for the Auschwitz outer camps, replied that only 120 of the Theresienstadt Jews were fit for work. He explained that the men were too frail and the females were mostly children. On March 3, Maurer announced that skilled Jewish workers were beginning to leave Berlin. He reminded Hoess that I.G. Farben's needs were to be filled from these transports and asked that the trains be unloaded as near the factory as possible instead of the "usual place." Five transports brought a total of 5,837 Jews from Berlin, 3,316 of whom were sent directly to the

gas chambers. Schwarz told Maurer that the transports had too many old men and too many women and children. The buna works he said needed young, healthy bodies to do the heavy construction work.²⁷ In his book Infiltration, Albert Speer remarked that "the treatment of the Jewish question is a spectacle of German disunity."²⁸

Despite the labor shortage, Krauch appeared to be pleased by the progress of I.G. Auschwitz. By the summer of 1942 the synthetic oil plant was beginning to produce gasoline. On July 27, 1943, he urged Himmler to build another large synthetic factory similar to I.G. Auschwitz:

I was particularly pleased to hear . . . that you may possibly aid the expansion of another synthetic factory . . . in a similar way as was done at Auschwitz, by making available inmates of your camps if necessary. I have also written to Minister Speer to this effect and would be grateful if you would continue sponsoring and aiding us in this matter.²⁹

By 1943 I.G. Farben was no longer the only industrial concern with a plant at Auschwitz. On March 5, the Krupp fuse plant in Essen was bombed out. By March 17, plans had been made to move the remaining machinery to Auschwitz, out of range of the Allied bombers. Krupp also

²⁷See Reitlinger, Final Solution, p. 162; Hilberg, Destruction of the European Jews, p. 587. The number of Jewish deportees was calculated from these two sources.

²⁸Albert Speer, Infiltration, trans. Joachim Neugroschel (New York: MacMillian, 1981), p. 259.

²⁹TWC, VIII, p. 532, NI-10040.

chose to draw upon the supply of inexpensive inmate labor. Krupp was later followed by Siemens-Schuskert (part of the Siemens electrical concern) and other German firms. For the rest of the war, the average number of inmates in the Auschwitz outer camps was about 40,000.³⁰

Auschwitz thus acquired a number of industrial tenants who required inmates for their plants. But because of the gassings, the SS still could not supply all the inmates requested by the industrial concerns. As early as December 28, 1942, Himmler had ordered the death-rate reduced. He demanded monthly reports of progress, yet the number of gassings increased. In July 1943 he sent an SS judge advocate, Conrad Morgen, to institute prosecutions at the main camps. Morgen's investigations revealed that gold smuggling was a cause of the increased gassings at Auschwitz. As a result of that investigation, Auschwitz experienced a shake-up in the camp administration. Himmler suspended Ernst Graebner, the Political Officer in the Auschwitz main camp, and transferred Hoess. On November 1, Hoess became the Head of the Central Office in the Inspectorate of Concentration Camps in Oswald Pohl's office at Oranienburg (although he was sent back to Auschwitz in July 1944 to direct the gassings of

³⁰ See Hilberg, Destruction of the European Jews, p. 598; Martin Gilbert, Auschwitz and the Allies (New York: Holt, Rinehart, and Winston, 1981), p. 143.

400,000 Hungarian Jews). SS Lieutenant Colonel Arthur Liebehenschel, who switched positions with Hoess, became the new commandant of Auschwitz. On November 22, at Pohl's suggestion, the SS divided Auschwitz into three parts: Auschwitz I (the Auschwitz main camp), commanded by Liebehenschel; Auschwitz II (Birkenau), commanded by SS Major Fritz Hartjenstein; and Auschwitz III (consisting of I.G. Auschwitz, Monowitz, and about thirty-nine sub-camps), commanded by SS Captain Schwarz. Liebehenschel remained commandant of the whole camp.³¹

Liebehenschel instituted some reforms at Auschwitz, including the punishment of some Kapos and Blockfuehrers, but this had little effect on the inmates who worked at I.G. Auschwitz. Their treatment followed Sauckel's guidelines concerning the treatment of laborers: "All the men must be fed, sheltered and treated in such a way as to exploit them to the highest possible extent at the lowest conceivable degree of expenditure."³²

When the inmates arrived at Monowitz, the SS

³¹ See Gerald Reitlinger, The SS: Alibi of a Nation, 1922-1945, 2nd ed. (London: Arms and Armour Press, 1981), p. 263; Reitlinger, Final Solution, p. 453; Jadwiga Bedwinska, ed., KL Auschwitz Seen by the SS: Höss, Broad, Kremer (W. Oswiecimin: Publications of Państwowe Muzeum, 1972), p. 74n.

³² Great Britain, Office of the Attorney-General, The Trial of German Major War Criminals, Proceedings of the International Military Tribunal Sitting at Nuremberg, 20:515 (hereafter cited as TMWC).

greeted them in the following manner: "You are all condemned to die, but the execution of your sentence will take a little while."³³ After entering the camp, the inmates moved into their sleeping quarters; three inmates had to share a bed. Usually 400 inmates slept in a block equipped with facilities for 162. The camp sewerage system was insufficient, the garbage pits overflowed, and the water was contaminated. Warnings against drinking the water were issued.³⁴

The diet was inadequate in view of the work required of the inmates. If the inmates were lucky, they could drink half a cup of coffee substitute for breakfast. Their evening meal consisted of a quarter of a loaf of bread made from wood dust along with either a slice of sausage, a spoonful of white cheese, or a spoonful of syrup. Farben at noontime also gave the inmates a liter of soup, a nutritional aid not available to inmates in other concentration camps. This "Buna Soup" was made from boiled nettles (a common wild plant with prickly leaves) or other greens, sometimes with a piece of potato.³⁵ Ambros said that Farben introduced the noontime soup to

³³U.S. v. Krauch, M-892/44/1178, NI-12373, affidavit of Robert Waitz.

³⁴TWC, VIII, pp. 575-77, affidavit of Arnost Tauber.

³⁵U.S. v. Krauch, M-892/44/981, NI-4830, affidavit of Rudolf Vitek.

improve the state of health of the inmates.³⁶

That diet gave many of the inmates diarrhea and abdominal typhus. Many of the prisoners died as the result of undernourishment. One prisoner doctor at Monowitz declared that "under normal conditions, ninety percent of the entire prisoner strength at Monowitz would have to be sent to the hospital."³⁷ An SS doctor in the Monowitz hospital testified that

the turnover of inmates in Monowitz was very extensive. The inmates were weak and undernourished. In this connection one has to emphasize that the work performances required from the inmates was not in harmony with the food and living conditions.³⁸

Dennis Greenham, a British POW, recalled that the inmates were obviously pushed far beyond their strength. "The work would have been too heavy even for a well-nourished man; it was impossible for the inmates."³⁹

Because Greenham was a British POW, he received periodic parcels from the Red Cross. Without those parcels, an inmate would die within three months. Two inmates who served as male nurses calculated that the

³⁶Ibid., M-892/44/650-51, NI-9542, testimony of Otto Ambros.

³⁷Ibid., M-892/44/1182, NI-12373, affidavit of Robert Waitz.

³⁸Ibid., M-892/44/1089, NI-6190, affidavit of Friedrich Entress.

³⁹Ibid., M-892/44/906, NI-11705, affidavit of Dennis Greenham.

inmate diet provided 1100-1200 calories a day. Due to the heavy work, the average inmate lost two to four kilograms a day in body weight. An inmate could only make up this deficiency for three months before he starved to death.⁴⁰ An official of the personnel department of I.G. Auschwitz described an incident depicting the inmates' poor physical condition:

I was sitting in my office barracks, eating an apple. I opened the window to throw the core of the apple out of the window, and concentration camp inmates were cleaning the street in front of the barracks, . . . and apparently because they were hungry, they pounced on this apple core and fought over it.⁴¹

If an inmate became too sick to work, he checked into the Monowitz hospital. Farben allowed no more than 5 percent of its Auschwitz inmates to be in the hospital at one time. If that number was surpassed, the SS transferred the excess inmates to Birkenau.⁴² The inmates had a maximum sick leave of fourteen days paid by I.G. Farben. If they still could not go back to work, they too were selected for Birkenau.⁴³ The management of I.G. Auschwitz did not intend to treat the inmates with consideration.

⁴⁰Ibid., M-892/44/982, NI-4830, affidavit of Rudolf Vitek.

⁴¹TWC, VIII, pp. 847-48, testimony of Helmut Schneider.

⁴²Ibid., p. 577, affidavit of Arnost Tauber.

⁴³U.S. v. Krauch, M-892/44/982, NI-4830, affidavit of Rudolf Vitek.

They were used up so quickly that any physician was confronted with an insoluble problem. The managers had no intention of enlarging the Monowitz hospital. The managers insisted on keeping it small because of the importance they attached to having as many inmates as possible who were capable of work.⁴⁴ A record book of the Monowitz hospital recovered after the war showed that 15,706 inmates entered the hospital in an eleven-month period; 766 died there and 2,599 transferred out, with the notation "Nach Birkenau" or "Nach Auschwitz."⁴⁵

When inmates went to work in I.G. Auschwitz, they usually worked at excavating, leveling, stacking cement, and storing sand. The work was very difficult for them in their weakened conditions, but that was only a part of their problem. One Monowitz survivor said that the work was difficult "because of the great working speed, for instance the unloading of cement at the double, and secondly, because the Kapos under the pressure of the (I.G.) foremen drove us to work."⁴⁶ The most dreaded work detail was the cement detail, known as "murder detail 4." In this duty the inmates had to carry sacks of cement,

⁴⁴Ibid., M-892/44/1088, 1091, NI-6190, affidavit of Friedrich Entress.

⁴⁵Ibid., M-892/45/1-2, NI-12116.

⁴⁶Ibid., M-892/44/902, NI-7967, affidavit of Ervin Schulof.

weighing fifty kilograms (about 110 pounds). The sacks were placed on the inmates' shoulders and carried 300 meters while running. If an inmate was unable to move, or if he fell, he was stomped and kicked until he either continued to work or died.⁴⁷

Another work detail was that of a spider-man who worked as high as 150 feet above the ground, without any scaffolding or safety belts. The inmates had to walk in their wooden shoes along girders which were only four inches wide. Many inmates fell to their death. Some inmates did not mind this detail because the guards would not follow them up. For that brief moment, they were safe from maltreatment.⁴⁸

The work system used at I.G. Auschwitz was called the "FFF system." Farben designed the system to squeeze out bigger work performances from the inmates. "FFF" stood for Freiheit (freedom)--freedom of movement on the building sites with intensive safeguarding of the fences through chains of guards and the pretended possibility of a release; Fressen (food)--scanty extra food for high work performances; Frauen (women)--brothel visits as a

⁴⁷Ibid., M-892/44/980, NI-4830, affidavit of Rudolf Vitek.

⁴⁸Krans and Kulka, Death Factory: Documents on Auschwitz, p. 21.

special reward to the Kapos.⁴⁹

Beatings designed to raise work performances were routine for the inmate laborers. Terrence Des Pres, in The Survivor, wrote that the beatings and killings were made easier because all visible signs of human beauty, bodily pride, and spiritual radiance were eliminated from the ranks of the inmates in the concentration camps. The inmates looked sub-human. Their appearance made mass murder seem less terrible to the SS.⁵⁰ At the Farben trial at Nuremberg, Duerrfeld testified that he did not consider the cruel treatment to be out of the ordinary--the SS convinced him the inmates were made up exclusively of criminal convicts.⁵¹ One inmate later claimed that he had seen Duerrfeld observing the inmates when they marched into Monowitz. He claimed that Duerrfeld could not help but notice their state of health and the dilapidated condition of their clothing.

On almost every occasion when we marched in, people who had fallen ill and those who had broken down during work, as well as people who had died, were carried into the camp on primitive stretchers, so he must have become aware

⁴⁹Working Group of Former Prisoners, IG-Farben, Auschwitz, Mass Murder, p. 19.

⁵⁰Terrence Des Pres, The Survivor: An Anatomy of Life in the Death Camps (New York: Oxford University Press, 1976), p. 61.

⁵¹TWC, VIII, p. 794, testimony of Walter Duerrfeld.

of the situation.⁵²

Dennis Greenham charged that the I.G. foremen had a fanatical hatred of the Jews and that they did not interfere when the Kapos beat them. Their attitude was not that of sympathy but rather that the Jews were untouchables on whom they would not soil their hands. He also noticed that all of the Farben foremen carried guns on the plant site.⁵³ Another inmate swore that he saw Max Faust beat prisoners:

I personally saw how Chief Engineer Faust beat several prisoners with a club because the moving of loaded wagons in road construction did not function as he desired. I know that it was Chief Engineer Faust, because I inquired for his name.⁵⁴

An inmate who worked at the Birkenau hospital reported meeting several women who said that Farben officials had cropped their hair short and broken their teeth for punishment. She asked whether those acts of brutality were committed by the SS or Kapos, and the women replied that they were done by civilians who worked for I.G. Farben.⁵⁵

I.G. foremen supervised every stage of the work to be sure a high standard of work was maintained. They made

⁵²Ibid., p. 592, affidavit of Norbert Wollheim.

⁵³U.S. v. Krauch, M-892/44/905-6, NI-11705, affidavit of Dennis Greenham.

⁵⁴TWC, VIII, p. 577, affidavit of Arnost Tauber.

⁵⁵U.S. v. Krauch, M-892/44/1132-33, NI-10932, affidavit of Olga Lengyel.

a note of any deficiencies in the work and brought them to the attention of the SS. The foremen reported any inmate, foreign worker, or prisoner of war who was too slow or did not fit "into our discipline."⁵⁶ The SS only recognized two categories of inmates--those who were capable of work and those who were dead.⁵⁷ When I.G. Farben complained that it was not getting the work contracted for, the SS selected the weaker-looking inmates and sent them to Birkenau. Once an SS labor officer was heard to say, "Don't send out prisoners like that. What would the I.G. say?"⁵⁸ The SS made its selections every fourteen days, in the morning as the inmates were leaving Monowitz for work at the plant. A commission made up of the camp commandant, the camp leader, the camp work leader, the camp physician, and always several civilians belonging to the I.G. Farben labor staff stood by the gate. Inmates knew that if they were selected, it meant certain death at Birkenau.⁵⁹ None of the Farben officials actually selected prisoners for the gas chambers, but their com-

⁵⁶See Krans and Kulka, Death Factory: Documents on Auschwitz, p. 19; TWC, VIII, p. 544, NI-14549.

⁵⁷Krans and Kulka, Death Factory: Documents on Auschwitz, p. 19.

⁵⁸U.S. v. Krauch, M-892/44/1189, NI-12373, affidavit of Robert Waitz.

⁵⁹Ibid., M-892/44/982, NI-4830, affidavit of Rudolf Vitek.

plaints of poor inmate work performances were indirectly responsible for the gassing of thousands of inmates.⁶⁰

At the Farben trial none of the defendants admitted that they knew of the gassings. Duerrfeld testified that he did not know what was going on at Auschwitz-Birkenau and never realized that an inmate who was unfit for work would be eliminated.⁶¹ Although the chimneys of the crematorium could be seen from I.G. Auschwitz, Krauch testified that Duerrfeld had told him that the crematorium was there only to burn typhus victims.⁶² Former inmates testified, however, that the odor of the burnt corpses could be noticed in I.G. Auschwitz when the wind was favorable; it was unavoidable for the management of I.G. Auschwitz not to know about the selections.⁶³ Hoess testified that the stench of burning bodies could be smelled in the entire Auschwitz area and that people living in the surrounding districts knew that people were being exterminated.⁶⁴

It was possible for the Farben plant management to save the lives of skilled workers who were headed for the

⁶⁰Interview with John Mendelsohn, National Archives Historian, Washington, D.C., 14 November 1983.

⁶¹See U.S. v. Krauch, M-892/99/1040, testimony of Walter Duerrfeld; TWC, VIII, p. 801, testimony of Walter Duerrfeld.

⁶²Ibid., p. 667, testimony of Carl Krauch.

⁶³U.S. v. Krauch, M-892/44/1094-95, NI-6190, affidavit of Friedrich Entress.

⁶⁴TMWC, XI, p. 360, testimony of Rudolph Hoess.

gas chambers. A telephone call to the SS could often take names off the roll.⁶⁵ John Mendelsohn, an expert on the Nuremberg trials, reasoned that Bueteftisch had to know about the gassings since he was a member of Himmler's "Circle of Friends."⁶⁶ In The Rise and Fall of the Third Reich, William Shirer concluded that the records leave no doubt that German businessmen like the I.G. Farben directors, who outwardly seemed to be the most decent of men and pillars of their communities, had some involvement in the extermination process.⁶⁷

In late February 1944 the Auschwitz area came within range of Allied aircraft. Since the I.G. Farben factories were in the area, the Allies assumed that Auschwitz-Birkenau served primarily as a labor camp for Farben. When Allied reconnaissance flew over the area, it was the factories and not the concentration camps that became targets in the campaign to destroy Germany's capacity to make war.

The first aerial reconnaissance plane flew over I.G. Auschwitz on April 4, 1944. Its photos showed that the area under development was 4,100 feet by 9,700 feet. The synthetic oil plant appeared to be in partial

⁶⁵U.S. v. Krauch, M-892/44/1184, NI-12373, affidavit of Robert Waitz.

⁶⁶Interview, John Mendelsohn, 14 November 1983.

⁶⁷William Shirer, The Rise and Fall of the Third Reich (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1960), p. 1266.

production, and Allied intelligence concluded that both the synthetic oil plant and the synthetic rubber plant would soon be capable of large-scale production.⁶⁸ Two more reconnaissance flights over the plants on May 31 and June 26 confirmed this information. The urgency to bomb the plants increased. On July 18, the Allies designated I.G. Auschwitz as a bombing target for the first time.⁶⁹

The first bombing raid took place on August 20, 1944. The summary of the intelligence reports showed that most of the damage was done to the buna plant. The plant did not appear to be producing any rubber before the attack. The damage to the synthetic oil plant was minimal.⁷⁰ The inmates enjoyed the attack; one described their feelings:

The bombing was really a happy day for us. . . . We thought, they know all about us, they are making preparations to free us, we might escape, some of us might get out, some of us might survive. . . . We really enjoyed the bombing. . . . We wanted once to see a killed German. Then we could sleep better, after the humiliation never to be able to answer back. To see a killed German: that was why we enjoyed the bombing.⁷¹

A second air raid which did considerable damage

⁶⁸Mendelsohn, ed., Holocaust, 14:95-96.

⁶⁹Gilbert, Auschwitz and the Allies, p. 282.

⁷⁰Mendelsohn, ed., Holocaust, 14:99-100.

⁷¹Gilbert, Auschwitz and the Allies, p. 308, interview with Arie Hassenberg.

took place on September 13. That raid temporarily halted production at the synthetic oil plant.⁷² Besides bombing I.G. Auschwitz, the Allies accidentally bombed the Auschwitz main camp and Birkenau. Two bombs fell on the main camp. One hit an SS barracks killing fifteen and wounding twenty-eight. The other killed forty inmates, wounded sixty-five, and buried thirteen under the ruins of a clothing workshop.⁷³ Two bombs also hit Birkenau. One damaged the railway track which led to the crematoria. The other destroyed an air-raid shelter and killed thirty civilians.⁷⁴ An inmate later wrote of this air raid:

We had nothing to lose, only expected to enjoy the destruction of the big factory which we were building for I.G. Farben Industrie. It was naturally so. This happy feeling didn't change also after the Americans indeed, began to bomb, and obviously we had casualties too--wounded and dead. How beautiful it was to see squadron after squadron burst from the sky, drop bombs, destroy the buildings, and kill also members of the Herrenvolk.⁷⁵

After the raids, I.G. Farben officials made no effort to recover the bodies of inmates trapped under the debris.

⁷²Krans and Kulka, Death Factory: Documents on Auschwitz, p. 22.

⁷³Bedwińska, ed., KL Auschwitz Seen by the SS: Höss, Broad, Kremer, p. 257n.

⁷⁴Ibid.

⁷⁵Gilbert, Auschwitz and the Allies, p. 315, letter from Shalom Lindenbaum.

They would only clear debris to free trapped Germans.⁷⁶

Farben had the synthetic oil plant repaired by late October 1944, although it operated at only two-thirds of its earlier capacity of 3,000 tons a month. The amount produced was the third highest in the Reich.⁷⁷ Allied bombers continued to attack I.G. Auschwitz, but they were never again able to shut down oil production completely. The bombardments gradually reduced production, however. By December production fell to 1,200 tons a month; in the first two weeks of January 1945 the production was 500 tons.⁷⁸ A reconnaissance flight of January 14 showed forty-four damaged buildings and 940 bomb craters in Auschwitz III, although the synthetic oil plant was still operating.⁷⁹ The buna plant still did not produce any rubber, however.

By November 1944 the mass killings were almost over. As Soviet troops pushed westward, the SS transferred more and more inmates from Auschwitz to camps in Germany. On January 17, Soviet troops reached the town of Kattowitz. That same night, the rumble of artillery fire

⁷⁶U.S. v. Krauch, M-892/44/907, NI-11705, affidavit of Dennis Greenham.

⁷⁷Gilbert, Auschwitz and the Allies, p. 322.

⁷⁸*Ibid.*, p. 335.

⁷⁹*Ibid.*, p. 334.

could be heard in Auschwitz. On January 18, the SS ordered the camp evacuated. Of the camp's 64,000 inmates, 58,000 set out for Germany. The other 6,000, who were too weak to walk, remained in Auschwitz; 850 inmates remained in Monowitz. Eighty percent of the inmates who marched out of Auschwitz were either shot, or died of cold, hunger, and sickness.⁸⁰ One who survived the death march compared Monowitz to his new home in Buchenwald:

Conditions in Buchenwald . . . were considerably more favorable than those of Monowitz: the food was better. Moreover, the prisoners who had to work in the stone quarry performed with few exceptions, no heavy work, and finally they were better clothed.⁸¹

One last bombing raid took place on I.G. Auschwitz on January 19, 1945, leaving the 850 inmates in Monowitz without water or light.⁸² On the same day, Duerrfeld received a phone call from the Reich Defense Commissioner with orders to evacuate I.G. Auschwitz.⁸³ On January 20, the Farben plant managers burned their files and fled from Auschwitz. After the war, the U.S.S.R. dismantled the equipment of I.G. Auschwitz and sent it east to be used in

⁸⁰Ibid., p. 349n.

⁸¹U.S. v. Krauch, M-892/44/1186, NI-12373, affidavit of Robert Waitz.

⁸²Gilbert, Auschwitz and the Allies, pp. 335-37.

⁸³U.S. v. Krauch, M-892/44/668, NI-4184, testimony of Walter Duerrfeld.

Soviet industry.⁸⁴

The final balance sheet on I.G. Auschwitz reveals that I.G. Farben invested nearly Rm 600 million (\$240 million) in the operation.⁸⁵ Otto Ambros testified that I.G. Farben paid the SS Rm 20 million for the inmate laborers.⁸⁶ By the summer of 1944 the synthetic oil plant achieved a peak production of 3,000 tons a month--only half of Farben's original projections. Allied air raids gradually reduced this output. Not one single pound of synthetic rubber was ever produced.⁸⁷ Gustav Herzog, an inmate whose responsibility it was to draw up the death lists in Monowitz, estimated that 120,000 inmate deaths could be traced to I.G. Auschwitz and Monowitz.⁸⁸ I.G. Auschwitz had to be one of the most dismal failures in the history of modern industry.

⁸⁴Hermann Gross, Further Facts and Figures Relating to the Deconcentration of the I.G. Farbenindustrie Aktiengesellschaft (Kiel: n.p., 1950), pp. 41-42.

⁸⁵TWC, VIII, p. 1017, Prosecution's Final Brief.

⁸⁶U.S. v. Krauch, M-892/44/649, NI-9542, testimony of Otto Ambros.

⁸⁷See Dubois, Devil's Chemists, p. 341; Borkin, Crime and Punishment of I.G. Farben, p. 127.

⁸⁸Working Group of Former Prisoners, IG-Farben, Auschwitz, Mass Murder, pp. 22-23, NI-12069, affidavit of Gustav Herzog.

CHAPTER IV

I.G. FARBEN AT NUREMBERG

As World War II ended, investigators in the U.S. Treasury and the Department of Justice pointed out to General Eisenhower that I.G. Farben, the dominant chemical cartel in Germany, suffered only slight damage during the war. They thought that if I.G. Farben remained intact after the war, it would pose a threat to the Allies. Eisenhower ordered an investigation into Farben's part in Germany's war effort. He assigned his financial advisor, Colonel Bernard Bernstein, to head the investigation of Farben's main office in Frankfurt.¹

The Farben files were so immense that it was easier for the investigators to interrogate the top leaders of the company. One by one, the investigators arrested and interrogated all the corporate directors in order to assess Farben's role in supporting the Hitler government: Hermann Schmitz, Carl Krauch, Fritz ter Meer, Georg von Schnitzler, and others. While in custody, von Schnitzler, the man who pledged Rm 400,000 for Hitler's campaign in March 1933, testified at the International Military

¹Richard Sasuly, I.G. Farben (New York: Boni and Gaer, Inc., 1947), p. 11.

Tribunal which tried the major war criminals.

The Bernstein investigating team concluded that I.G. Farben was indispensable to the German war effort. Its report, especially on Farben's cartel practices and its role in the takeover of the European chemical industry, made a deep impression on Eisenhower. He concluded that Farben had to be completely dissolved as one means of assuring world peace. He recommended that: 1) all Farben plants and assets be made available for reparations; 2) all Farben plants used exclusively for war-making be destroyed; 3) Farben's chemical monopoly be dissolved; and 4) Farben's interest in international cartels be terminated. Immediately after this announcement, the Allies blew up three Farben plants and dismantled five others for distribution as reparations.²

At the trial of the major war criminals, the prosecutors planned to indict a prominent German industrialist as a symbol of those industrialists who cooperated with Hitler. They chose Gustav Krupp von Bohlen und Halbach to fill this role because he was the individual most associated by reputation with the war-making power of Germany. When the tribunal tried to serve the indictment upon Krupp, it discovered that he was mentally and physically unable to defend himself. On November 15, 1945, the

²New York Times, 21 October 1945, p. 1, col. 6.

tribunal decided that Krupp was too senile to be tried.³ When the chief prosecutors tried to substitute Krupp's son Alfred, the tribunal denied the motion. Thus the trial began without an industrialist as a defendant.

After the trial of the major war criminals, the chief prosecutors were determined to try leading German industrialists. They decided that a trial of industrial war criminals should be left to each of the Allies in its own zone of occupation. The United States proved to be the most energetic in that prosecution. American prosecutors brought charges against the leaders of three large companies: I.G. Farben and the steel concerns of Krupp and Flick.

Those trials were part of a series of twelve conducted by the United States to try "second-line" leaders of Hitler's Germany. On October 18, 1946, President Truman appointed Brigadier General Telford Taylor to succeed Justice Jackson as chief U.S. provost of the war crimes trials.⁴ Josiah Dubois, who served on the War Refugee Board during the war, became chief of the prosecution staff for the I.G. Farben case. Captain Drexel

³Great Britain, Office of the Attorney-General, The Trial of German Major War Criminals, Proceedings of the International Military Tribunal Sitting at Nuremberg, 22:411.

⁴Whitney R. Harris, Tyranny on Trial: The Evidence at Nuremberg, 2nd ed., with an Introduction by Robert G. Storey (Dallas: Southern Methodist University Press, 1970), p. 543.

Sprecher, Taylor's deputy, headed the I.G. Farben trial team.⁵ A large part of the evidence used by the prosecution came from the Bernstein investigation.

The three judges selected to conduct the trial were Curtis Shake of Indiana, James Morris of North Dakota, and Paul Hebert of Louisiana. Clarence Merrill, who was also from Indiana, was the alternate member of the tribunal. He would vote if one of the other members were forced to drop the case. Shake, who was chosen as the presiding judge, was a chief justice of the Indiana supreme court; Morris was a justice of the supreme court of North Dakota; Hebert was the dean of Louisiana State University's law school; and Merrill was an attorney recommended by Shake.⁶

The indictment against I.G. Farben, filed on May 3, 1947, consisted of five separate counts:

Count I: Planning, Preparation, Initiation,
and Waging of Wars of Aggression
and Invasions of Other Countries

Count II: Plunder and Spoilation

Count III: Slavery and Mass Murder

Count IV: Membership in the SS

⁵"United States of America v. Carl Krauch et al.," 14 August 1947 - 30 July 1948, Records of the United States Nuernberg War Crimes Trials, Record Group 238, National Archives, Washington, D.C., Microfilm Publication M-892, roll 1, frame 36 (hereafter cited as U.S. v. Krauch, M-892/1/36).

⁶See Ibid.; Josiah Dubois, The Devil's Chemists (Boston: The Beacon Press, 1952), pp. 66, 82, 93-94.

Count V: Common Plan or Conspiracy.⁷

Counts I and V, the aggressive war counts, accused Farben of an alliance with Hitler that started in 1932 when Carl Bosch first sought support for his synthetic oil project. The aggressive war counts also accused Farben of focusing all its activities on Germany's preparations for war. The plunder and spoilation charge accused Farben of following the Wehrmacht into a captured country in order to take over its chemical industry. Count III, slavery and mass murder, accused Farben of participating in the forced labor program and the enslavement of concentration camp inmates which led to torture and murder. The prosecution charged that the Farben directors knew of the atrocities, including the use of the Zyclon-B gas and experiments with Farben products on concentration camp inmates. Count IV, membership in the SS, charged certain Farben officials with membership in that organization which the International Military Tribunal had declared as a criminal group.⁸

The prosecution indicted a total of twenty-four of Farben's top executives on Counts I, II, III, and V: the

⁷United States Military Tribunal, Trials of War Criminals Before the Nuernberg Military Tribunals: October 1946-August 1949, 15 vols. (Washington, D.C.: United States Government Printing Office, 1952), vol. VII: The I.G. Farben Case, pp. 10-11 (hereafter cited as TWC).

⁸Ibid., pp. 10-80.

twenty members of the Vorstand and four other top officials.⁹ The prosecution charged Heinrich Buete-fisch, Christian Schneider, and Erich von der Heyde with membership in the SS.

The trial began on August 27, 1947. From the beginning, the prosecution encountered many problems. By the summer of 1947 the Cold War between the United States and the Soviet Union had started. Because of their growing fear of communism, many Americans were prepared to ignore past German crimes. Before he left Washington for Nuremburg, Dubois overheard three men discussing the growing tensions which had developed:

They agreed vociferously and bitterly that the last war had been unnecessary, whereas the next was inevitable. We had fought the wrong enemies, apparently by our own choice and without a single righteous reason. But the next war would have an honest moral basis.¹⁰

The Cold War led to the questioning of the legality of the Nuremberg trials. By the time the Farben trial started, Congressman John Rankin of Mississippi was calling the

⁹The twenty members of the Vorstand were: Carl Krauch, Hermann Schmitz, Baron Georg von Schnitzler, Fritz ter Meer, Otto Ambros, Heinrich Buete-fisch, Wilhelm Mann, Max Brueggemann, Heinrich Hoerlein, Carl Wurster, Christian Schneider, Fritz Gajewski, Max Ilgner, Paul Hae-fliger, Ernst Buergin, Friedrich Jaehne, Heinrich Oster, August von Knieriem, Hans Kuehne, and Carl Lautenschlaeger; the four other top officials were Walter Duerrfeld, Heinrich Gattineau, Hans Kugler, and Erich von der Heyde. See Appendix A for the position each defendant held in I.G. Farben.

¹⁰Dubois, Devil's Chemists, p. 18.

trials a disgrace to the United States.¹¹ Congressman George Dondero of Michigan accused Dubois of being a communist sympathizer.¹² August von Knieriem claimed that the prosecution held the advantage before any of the trials began. He pointed out the problems that many of the defense lawyers had in obtaining documents.¹³

In November 1947 Judge Francis Biddle, who served on the International Military Tribunal, defended the trial against the major war criminals as a fair trial. The tribunal, he wrote, had no desire to imitate Nazi methods because the burden of proof was on the prosecution. The defendants grew to realize that the rulings of the tribunal were objective. The Nuremberg trials, he alleged, were not regarded as an opportunity for propaganda by the four victorious powers.¹⁴

John Mendelsohn agreed that the defense had problems in procuring documents in some of the trials, but contended that in the I.G. Farben case the defense was quite effective in procuring the documents it wanted. He

¹¹Joseph Borkin, The Crime and Punishment of I.G. Farben (New York: The Free Press, 1978), p. 139.

¹²Dubois, Devil's Chemists, p. 69.

¹³August von Knieriem, The Nuremberg Trials (Chicago: Henry Regnery, 1959), p. 184.

¹⁴Francis Biddle, "The Nurnberg Trial," Virginia Law Review 33 (November 1947): 680-81.

maintained that Judge Shake interpreted the document handling procedures liberally enough to give the defense the advantage.¹⁵

At a luncheon on the first day of the trial, Judge Morris commented to Dubois, "We have to worry about the Russians now; it wouldn't surprise me if they overran the courtroom before we get through."¹⁶ During the course of the trial, he allowed his wife to dine with von Schnitzler's wife. She thought it was an honor to be befriended by a real baroness.¹⁷ Judge Shake went to Germany armed with the conviction that the trial of German industrialists on aggressive war charges was a mistake.¹⁸ He was very friendly towards the defense attorneys throughout the trial. Once he had the brilliant idea of inviting the Farben attorneys to dinner at the Grand Hotel where Germans were generally denied the right of admittance.¹⁹

The aggressive war charges constituted the heart of any case at Nuremberg. In the early postwar years the

¹⁵John Mendelsohn, "Trial by Document: The Problem of Due Process for War Criminals at Nuernberg," Journal of the National Archives 7 (Winter 1975): 232-34.

¹⁶Dubois, Devil's Chemists, p. 95.

¹⁷John Alan Appleman, Military Tribunals and International Crimes (Westport: Greenwood Press, 1971), p. 180n.

¹⁸Dubois, Devil's Chemists, p. 347.

¹⁹Appleman, Military Tribunals, p. 180n.

Allies had not fully realized the extent of the Holocaust. Most of the printed material on the extermination process was published after the completion of the Nuremburg trials. The prosecution in the Farben trial relied upon the judgment of the International Military Tribunal which had declared that the crime against peace was the supreme international crime, differing only from other war crimes because it contained within itself the accumulated evil of all the crimes. Anything else, however dramatic, however sordid, however shocking and revolting to the feelings of civilized peoples, was subordinate to the supreme crime against peace.²⁰ Besides contending with the effects of the Cold War, the Farben trial team tried to prove that the defendants contributed to the cause of war. They knew it was a difficult task to blame a war on men who did not pull any triggers. Years later they realized that they had made a mistake. It was under those circumstances that the prosecution set out to prove its case against I.G. Farben.

Taylor's opening statement set the tone of the prosecution's case:

The indictment accuses these men of major responsibility for visiting upon mankind the most searing and catastrophic war in human history. It accuses them of wholesale enslavement, plunder, and murder. These are terrible charges; no man should underwrite them frivolously or vengefully, or without

²⁰Franz B. Schick, "Crimes Against Peace," Journal of Criminal Law and Criminology 38 (January-February 1948): 446-47.

deep and humble awareness of the responsibility which he thereby shoulders.²¹

The prosecution approached the aggressive war charges as if it were trying antitrust violators instead of war criminals. It presented the tribunal with organizational charts, cartel agreements, patent licenses, correspondence, production schedules, and corporate reports.²²

After nearly three months of listening to the anti-trust strategy, Morris became irritated that the case had become bogged down by a lot of irrelevant evidence. The trial was slowed down by the presentation of a mass of contracts which appeared to have little bearing on the case. To Morris, I.G. Farben was simply a big chemical, commercial, and business concern, similar to many throughout the world.²³

Judges Hebert and Merrill accused Morris of prejudice against the prosecution. Hebert said the prosecution would not be doing its duty if it overlooked any evidence which it considered important. Merrill agreed that it was better to submit too much evidence rather than keep something out which might have some bearing on the case. Shake sided with Morris when he asserted that Hebert and Merrill were too sympathetic towards the prosecution.

²¹TWC, VII, p. 99.

²²Borkin, Crime and Punishment of I.G. Farben, p. 141.

²³Dubois, Devil's Chemists, p. 82.

He told the prosecution to organize the case better. Dubois observed that the court was split down the middle. The big problem the prosecution had was Merrill's opinion meant nothing to the final judgment.²⁴

Emanuel Minskoff, a member of the prosecution staff, took note of Shake's request for better organization. He told Dubois the prosecution should start discussing Farben's role at Auschwitz. He agreed that the evidence on the aggressive war charge was fine, but the court just could not believe that the Farben directors were guilty of starting a war. Dubois warned Minskoff that this statement was prejudgmental. Minskoff replied:

Of course it is. But I still say you should argue Auschwitz; then they will see what kind of men they are trying, and they'll understand all the rest of it. We should have started with Auschwitz on the first day.²⁵

He said they should introduce Duerrfeld, then show how he reported to Ambros, who then reported to ter Meer and the rest of the Vorstand. Dubois liked Minskoff's idea but claimed that it was too late to adopt his recommendation. The trial had to continue according to the sequence of the counts of the indictment. Drexel Sprecher later agreed that the prosecution had made the mistake of not arguing

²⁴Ibid., pp. 94-96.

²⁵Ibid., p. 99.

I.G. Auschwitz enough.²⁶

The prosecution continued to argue the aggressive war charge. It submitted into evidence Gattineau's and Bueteftisch's first meeting with Hitler to discuss his support for Farben's synthetic oil project in November 1932, Farben's support for Hitler in the meeting of the industrialists in February 1933, the synthetic oil and rubber contracts made between Farben and the Reich, Farben's army liaison office in Berlin, and Farben's part in the Four-Year Plan.

Georg von Schnitzler's pre-trial testimony was a very important part of the prosecution's case in the aggressive war charges. It used his testimony to show that the whole Vorstand, through these activities, knew that war must come. Dubois later wrote, "Yes, the directors of I.G. Farbenindustrie owned the power to make a war. . . . Only Farben could have done it, and without Farben war was, in von Schnitzler's word, 'unthinkable.'"²⁷ The tribunal damaged the prosecution's case when it ruled that von Schnitzler's statements proved nothing about the common intentions of the defendants.

During the trial, the events of Nuremberg took a

²⁶Interview with Drexel Sprecher, Former Head of Farben Trial Team at Nuremberg, Bethesda, Maryland, 24 August 1983.

²⁷Dubois, Devil's Chemists, p. 336.

back seat to the events of the Cold War. As East-West tension grew, Nuremberg became more untimely, and editors relegated it to the back pages of the newspapers. The trials against German industrialists seemed inappropriate when the differences among the Allies were increasing. As the crimes of the Nazis became more remote, a strong rearmed Germany became desirable.²⁸ On February 25, 1948, the communists secured President Eduard Beneš' agreement to a predominantly communist government in Czechoslovakia. Events like that led Dubois to conclude later that the fear of communism influenced the Farben trial just as it influenced American foreign policy.²⁹

At the time of the communist coup in Prague, the prosecution received another setback in a dispute over access to certain documents. The prosecution learned that Farben had transferred a large number of documents from the company library near Frankfurt to its Ludwigshafen plant in the French zone of occupation. The prosecution believed that those documents were part of the missing records of I.G. Auschwitz. The Ludwigshafen plant management claimed that the documents were important to the operation of the plant. The prosecution sent a team of investigators to Ludwigshafen. They searched the plant and

²⁸Mendelsohn, "Trial by Document," p. 230.

²⁹Dubois, Devil's Chemists, p. 357.

the home of Wolfgang Alt, who had served the dual role of technical advisor to the Ludwigshafen plant management and associate defense counsel for Otto Ambros. Although they obtained some records from the search of Alt's house, they entered without a warrant. That was a big mistake because Alt, as an associate defense counsel, was under the protection of the court. Shake reprimanded Alt for mixing the records of the defense with his personal papers, but he did not allow the prosecution access to these documents, and reprimanded the prosecution for taking matters into its own hands.³⁰

After the prosecution completed its case for aggressive war, it introduced evidence on the plunder and spoilation charge. It showed how Farben had used the fear of Nazi takeover to acquire chemical plants throughout Europe. It emphasized the role of the defendants in the Sales and Technical Committees: von Schnitzler, ter Meer, Max Ilgner, Friedrich Jaehne, Heinrich Oster, Paul Haeffliger, Ernst Buergin, and Hans Kugler.

The prosecution next proceeded to Count III, slavery and mass murder. That charge included Farben's use of forced labor throughout its plants in Germany, but the heart of the indictment was the activities of I.G. Auschwitz. The prosecution presented a history of I.G.

³⁰See Appleman, Military Tribunals, p. 179n; Mendelsohn, "Trial by Document," pp. 232-33.

Farben's involvement at Auschwitz: the choice of the site, negotiations with the SS for inmate labor, and treatment of the inmates at the plant site and at Monowitz. The prosecution introduced evidence which showed how the whole Vorstand approved the choice of the Auschwitz site and appropriated money to build Monowitz. Ambros testified that the management of I.G. Auschwitz had complete control over the allocation of inmates.³¹ The prosecutors showed how Farben had built a fence around the perimeter of the plant to keep out the SS so that the Farben managers could dictate the work pace of the inmates to the Kapos.³² The prosecution concluded that Farben's conduct at Auschwitz was best described by a remark once made by Hitler, "What does it matter to us? Look away if it makes you sick."³³

The basic strategy of the Farben defense was to show that: 1) Farben was a private enterprise which pursued a long-term policy of peaceful investment; 2) none of the defendants had knowledge of what was going on at Auschwitz-Birkenau; 3) Farben was in a state of coercion during the Nazi period; and 4) the directors feared the expansion of communism when they supported Hitler. Krauch

³¹TWC, VIII, p. 753, testimony of Otto Ambros.

³²See Dubois, Devil's Chemists, pp. 166-67; U.S. v. Krauch, M-892/44/646, Nuremberg Industrialists (NI) 9542, testimony of Otto Ambros.

³³TWC, VII, p. 58.

testified that all the executives of I G. Farben put the greatest emphasis on peacetime production. The company tried to keep its distance from the Nazis; it only capitulated on the order of the military high command. He said the military high command misunderstood his motives when he expanded buna production. Krauch maintained that Farben recognized buna rubber as a far superior product for shoe soles than leather. He wanted to expand production in order to provide German consumers with a superior type of footwear.³⁴

Part of Farben's strategy was to blame everything that happened at I.G. Auschwitz on the SS. All the defense attorneys in the trials of second-line Nazi leaders had great success with this type of strategy.³⁵ Ter Meer, who visited I.G. Auschwitz and Monowitz twice, testified that he was not aware that the camp which housed the inmates was called Monowitz. He said he heard this name for the first time at the trial. He did not recall seeing any guard towers at the camp and noticed nothing special in regard to the physical condition and attire of the inmates.³⁶ Duerrfeld testified that he did not have any jurisdiction at I.G. Auschwitz. The SS had total

³⁴New York Times, 13 January 1948, p. 10, col. 4.

³⁵Interview, Drexel Sprecher, 24 August 1983.

³⁶Dubois, Devil's Chemists, p. 157.

responsibility. He did not know what went on at Auschwitz-Birkenau, and he feigned surprise when he heard that inmates transferred to Birkenau went directly to the gas chambers.³⁷ Buete-fisch summed up the position of the Farben defendants when he said, "We are only technical men."³⁸ Friedrich Jaehne, a member of the Technical Committee, visited I.G. Auschwitz twice. He claimed that he had noticed no mistreatment of the inmates. His son Norbert, who served as an engineer at I.G. Auschwitz, called his father a liar. He asserted that there was a direct relationship between the requirements set by Farben and the ill-treatment of the inmates.³⁹

The first two defense tactics met with mixed success. The defense had more success when it claimed that regulations were so stringent under Hitler's dictatorship that private individuals, including leading industrialists, could not refuse their cooperation without fear of immediate penalty, including imprisonment and possibly even death. That claim was called "the defense of necessity."⁴⁰

³⁷U.S. v. Krauch, M-892/99/1039-41, testimony of Walter Duerrfeld.

³⁸TWC, VIII, p. 777, testimony of Heinrich Buete-fisch.

³⁹Dubois, Devil's Chemists, p. 219.

⁴⁰TWC, VII, pp. 414-15.

The Farben lawyers brought in Field Marshal Erhard Milch and Friedrich Flick, the head of the Flick concern, as defense witnesses. When asked what would happen to a German businessman if he refused to employ concentration camp prisoners and prisoners of war, Milch replied:

He would have been put under arrest immediately and he would have faced the Peoples' Court for undermining the fighting spirit. . . . It normally led to the death sentence.⁴¹

The defense asked Flick what would happen to a prominent industrialist who refused to attend the February 1933 meeting which Goering called to raise election funds for Hitler. Flick said, "He could do that, if he did not consider the consequences, but naturally he would have regretted it."⁴² The defendants used the defense of necessity when they contended that the government forced them to build the fourth buna plant at Auschwitz.⁴³

John Mendelsohn argued that the government did not force I.G. Farben to build the plant at Auschwitz. Farben had enough power to refuse the government's request.⁴⁴

The International Military Tribunal had rejected coercion as an excuse for war crimes. Authors of criminal

⁴¹Ibid., p. 416.

⁴²Ibid., p. 417.

⁴³See U.S. v. Krauch, M-892/98/197, testimony of Fritz ter Meer; Ibid., M-892/99/548-51, testimony of Otto Ambros; Ibid., M-892/99/1076, testimony of Walter Duerrfeld.

⁴⁴Interview, John Mendelsohn, 14 November 1983.

acts had not been allowed to shelter themselves behind their official positions.⁴⁵ But the tribunal in the I.G. Farben case allowed the defense of necessity. It ruled that the directors had no choice but to comply with the mandates of the Hitler government:

There can be little doubt that the defiant refusal of a Farben executive to carry out the Reich production schedule or to use slave labor to achieve that end would have been treated as treasonous sabotage and would have resulted in prompt and drastic retaliation.⁴⁶

The defense also had success when it worked on the prevailing atmosphere of the Cold War. Schmitz told the tribunal that Farben sympathized with Hitler's fear of communism; his continual warnings that Germany had to be prepared to defend itself against the Bolshevist danger.⁴⁷ When Krauch's defense counsel made his closing statements, he said that Hitler's speeches on foreign policy made a deep impression on his client:

Through them all, like a red thread, runs the profession of love of peace and preparedness for peace, and from 1936 on, the Bolshevist danger is represented as the thing against which a dam must be erected. How right Hitler was in this outline of his policy, by the way, might be

⁴⁵See Biddle, "The Nurnberg Trial," pp. 688-89; Sir Norman Birkett, "International Legal Theories Evolved at Nuremberg," International Affairs 23 (July 1947): 317-18.

⁴⁶TWC, VIII, pp. 1174-75, Opinion and Judgment.

⁴⁷Dubois, Devil's Chemists, p. 338.

confirmed by the political situation which had developed in recent months in Europe.⁴⁸

After 152 trial days, the proceedings ended on May 12, 1948. Two months elapsed before the tribunal reconvened to read its judgment. During that time, two events magnified the importance of the statements made by the defense on the expansion of communism. In mid-June Beneš^u resigned as president of Czechoslovakia; Klement Gottwald, a communist, succeeded him as president, thus completing the communist takeover of Czechoslovakia. In July the Berlin blockade began.

On July 29, the tribunal convened to read its opinion and render its verdict. The court acquitted all the defendants on Counts I and V, the planning and waging of aggressive war. It relied on the judgment of the International Military Tribunal when it said that the Farben defendants were not planners and leaders like Goering, Hess, Rosenberg, and Keitel, who were found guilty of waging aggressive war. The defendants were followers like Speer who aided the war effort in the same way that other productive enterprises aid in the waging of war:

The defendants now before us were neither high public officials in the civil government nor high military officers. Their participation was that of followers and not leaders. If we lower the standard of participation to include them, it is difficult to find a logical place to draw the line

⁴⁸TWC, VIII, p. 914, closing statement for Defendant Krauch.

between the guilty and the innocent among the great mass of German people.⁴⁹

The court then set the guidelines for the guilt or innocence of Count II, plunder and spoilation. A defendant was guilty when he deprived an owner of his property involuntarily and against his will; and when his consent was obtained by threats, intimidation, pressure, or by exploiting the position and power of the military occupant under circumstances indicating that the owner was being induced to part with his property against his will.⁵⁰ The tribunal found nine of the defendants guilty for their part in Farben's takeover of the European chemical industry: Hermann Schmitz, as head of the Vorstand; Georg von Schnitzler, as head of the Sales Committee; Fritz ter Meer, for his role in the acquisition of the Polish plants and Francolor; Hans Kugler, for his role in Francolor; Friedrich Jaehne, for his role in Alsace-Lorraine; and Ernst Buergin, Paul Haefliger, Max Ilgner, and Heinrich Oster, for their roles in Norway.⁵¹

In Count III, slave labor and mass murder, the tribunal addressed Farben's participation in the forced labor program, the production of the Zyclon-B gas, medical experiments made on inmates with Farben products, and Farben's participation at Auschwitz. The tribunal allowed

⁴⁹Ibid., p. 1126, Opinion and Judgment.

⁵⁰Ibid., pp. 1134-36.

⁵¹Ibid., pp. 1153-67.

the defense of necessity and acquitted the Farben defendants of participation in the forced labor program:

During the course of the war the main Farben plants, in common with German industry generally, suffered a serious labor depletion, on the account of demands of the military for men to serve in the armed forces. Charged with the responsibility of meeting fixed production quotas, Farben yielded to the pressure of the Reich Labor Office and utilized involuntary foreign workers in many of its plants.⁵²

The prosecution had charged Farben with participation in the production of the Zyclon-B gas because it owned 42.5 percent of Degesch and four of the defendants sat on its administrative council: Mann, Hoerlein, Wurster, and Brueggemann. The tribunal decided that the evidence failed to show that any of the defendants had any persuasive influence on the management policies of the company or any significant knowledge of the uses of the product. Dr. Gerhard Peters, the managing director of Degesch, was sworn to secrecy under the penalty of death as to the use of the Zyclon-B gas. Therefore, all the defendants were acquitted on this charge.⁵³ The prosecution had charged that Farben manufactured deadly pharmaceuticals and supplied them to the SS for experimentation on concentration camp inmates. The tribunal concluded that the evidence showed that while Farben did supply the SS with experimental drugs, it discontinued forwarding them as soon as they suspected improper conduct. All of the defendants were acquitted on

⁵²Ibid., pp. 1173-74.

⁵³Ibid., pp. 1168-69.

this charge because the evidence fell short of establishing guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.⁵⁴

The tribunal then turned to Farben's participation at Auschwitz. Even though the whole Vorstand had approved the Auschwitz site for the plants, the tribunal ruled that the prosecution had not proved that the possible employment of concentration camp inmates was an important factor when the directors made their decision. The court acknowledged that the construction of Monowitz went beyond the necessity created by the pressure of government, but it was an improvement over Auschwitz. The court commended the defendants for supplying, at company expense, the noon-time "Buna Soup" to the inmates. The tribunal blamed the SS for the mistreatment of the workers: "It is clear that Farben did not deliberately pursue or encourage an inhumane policy with respect to the workers."⁵⁵ The court did hold Krauch, ter Meer, Ambros, Buetefisch, and Duerrfeld accountable for their initiative in procuring concentration camp and forced labor for I.G. Auschwitz. The tribunal concluded that their actions constituted a crime against humanity because those defendants procured labor

with knowledge of the abuse and inhumane treatment meted out to the inmates by the SS, and that the employment of these inmates on the Auschwitz site

⁵⁴Ibid., pp. 1169-72.

⁵⁵Ibid., p. 1185.

aggravated the misery of these unfortunates and contributed to their distress.⁵⁶

The tribunal dismissed the charges against Schneider, Bueteftisch, and von der Heyde for membership in the SS. It ruled that they were only honorary members who did not have knowledge of war crimes or crimes against humanity.⁵⁷

After the tribunal delivered its judgment, Hebert announced that he agreed with the acquittal of the defendants on Counts I and V, but dissented on the judgment in Count III. He would sign the judgment, he said, but reserved the right to file a dissenting opinion. In December 1948 he wrote that the whole Vorstand was guilty of using forced labor and should have been held accountable for the living and working conditions at I.G. Auschwitz and Monowitz.⁵⁸

After the members of the tribunal had signed the judgment, Shake imposed the sentences. The tribunal found thirteen of the twenty-four defendants guilty on at least one of the charges. The sentences ranged from one and one-half years to eight years. The tribunal imposed the heaviest sentences on the five defendants who dealt directly with I.G. Auschwitz. The tribunal gave the

⁵⁶Ibid., p. 1187.

⁵⁷Ibid., pp. 1196-97.

⁵⁸Ibid., pp. 1312-13, 1320, Dissenting Opinion of Judge Hebert.

defendants credit for the time they spent in custody. For that reason, it released Max Ilgner and Hans Kugler after it adjourned. The rest were to serve the balance of their sentences.⁵⁹

Not all of the Farben defendants served the balance of their sentences, however. In 1950 in an effort to start a new relationship between the United States and Germany, Washington called for the creation of a new German army of 500,000 men. A large number of former German officers responded with an all-out campaign for the immediate release of all war criminals, asserting that without it there would be no army. The movement enjoyed wide public support. American diplomats, in an effort to appease the movement, released a large number of convicted war criminals, including Krauch, ter Meer, Ambros, Bueteftisch, and Duerrfeld. Released by January 1951 none, therefore, served more than two and one-half years of his remaining sentences.⁶⁰

After the trial Dubois observed that "the sentences were light enough to please a chicken thief, or a

⁵⁹ See Appendix B for a complete list of the sentences imposed and the time left to serve.

⁶⁰ See Benjamin B. Ferencz, Less Than Slaves: Jewish Forced Labor and the Quest for Compensation (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1979), p. 32; T. H. Tetens, The New Germany and the Old Nazis (New York: Random House, 1961), pp. 99-100.

driver who had irresponsibly run down a pedestrian."⁶¹ John Appleman wrote in Military Tribunals and International Crimes that the prosecution proved that the Farben directors had worked closely with Hitler in Germany's preparations for war, but that the tribunal seemed less concerned with the leading business figures than with the persons actually carrying out orders.⁶² Quincy Wright, in his 1949 article "International Law and Guilt by Association," defended the tribunal's leniency by arguing that a defendant's guilt had to be personal, not by association. No matter how bad his character, the accused must be considered innocent unless his guilt is established by evidence that he committed, attempted, or intended the crime charged.⁶³ Louis Lochner wrote that many of the industrialists who supported Hitler were fervent nationalists and patriots. They were good Germans who believed in the creed: "My country right or wrong."⁶⁴ The tribunal's judgment reflected the tide of events. Though the sentences handed out seemed to be inappropriate, the Farben trial took place during a time when the western

⁶¹Dubois, Devil's Chemists, p. 339.

⁶²Appleman, Military Tribunals, pp. 179-80, 183.

⁶³Quincy Wright, "International Law and Guilt by Association," American Journal of International Law 43 (October 1949): 747.

⁶⁴Louis P. Lochner, Tycoons and Tyrants: German Industry from Hitler to Adenauer (Chicago: Henry Regnery Co., 1954), p. 33.

democracies engaged in a new confrontation with their former ally. Their strategic position would be strengthened when the political and economic restoration of western Germany was achieved.⁶⁵

The Nuremberg trials did not stress the rights of the former concentration camp inmates. It was natural that some of them began to wonder about their legal rights. One of the inmates who testified at the Farben trial, Norbert Wollheim, was as surprised as the prosecution at the mildness of the court's verdict. He decided to make I.G. Farben pay for what it did to him. He hired a lawyer and sued for Dm 10,000 (less than \$2,500). The Frankfurt court that heard the case ruled in favor of Wollheim. The newspaper stories of his success encouraged other survivors to seek compensation. The courts awarded 5,855 former inmates a total of Dm 27,841,500 in damages.⁶⁶

Because of the antimonopolistic ideals of the United States, the break-up of I.G. Farben became a prime objective of U.S. occupation policy after World War II. In late February 1947 the American Military Government passed an antitrust law designed to prevent monopoly practices in Germany. The military government said it

⁶⁵Carl Boyd, "Industrials and Total War: Records of the U.S. Nuremberg War Crimes Trials," Microfilm Review 7 (November-December 1978): 330.

⁶⁶Ferencz, Less Than Slaves, pp. 35-37, 210.

would investigate any firm which employed more than 10,000 people. If the firm was found to represent an excessive concentration of economic power, it would be reorganized and broken up into a number of units. This law served as the legal vehicle for the dissolution of Farben and led to the division of the cartel into forty-seven independent companies. German trustees ran each unit until I.G. Farben could be formally decentralized. The break-up stalled because of the Cold War. The western democracies considered the disintegration of I.G. Farben to be an impediment to the economic recovery of Germany. The American Military Government took no further action until the Farben trial ended.⁶⁷

The judgment which acquitted the Farben directors of crimes against peace meant that Farben would no longer be dealt with as a war criminal. I.G. Farben became subject only to decartelization laws intended to create competition in the German chemical industry.⁶⁸ The Farben stockholders, who realized that I.G. Farben must adapt to the antimonopolistic practices of the United States,

⁶⁷Borkin, Crime and Punishment of I.G. Farben, pp. 158-59.

⁶⁸See Hermann Gross, Facts and Figures Relating to the Disintegration of the I.G. Farbenindustrie Aktiengesellschaft (Kiel: n.p., 1949), p. 2; Hermann Gross, Further Facts and Figures Relating to the Deconcentration of the I.G. Farbenindustrie Aktiengesellschaft (Kiel: n.p., 1950), p. 45.

proposed that the plants in western Germany be restructured into three companies: Hoechst, Bayer, and BASF. There would be one company for each zone of occupation: Hoechst in the U.S. zone, Bayer in the British zone, and BASF in the French zone. The stockholders realized that assets in the hands of the Soviet Union were lost.⁶⁹ On March 18, 1953, the Allied High Commission officially divided I.G. Farben into the three new companies.⁷⁰

Today the three companies are among the largest in the world. In 1982 Hoechst ranked forty-second, Bayer forty-third, and BASF forty-eighth. The companies had a combined net sales of over \$40 billion, which ranked the I.G. Farben survivors among the ten largest industrial corporations in the world.⁷¹

⁶⁹New York Times, 20 December 1949, p. 19, col. 1.

⁷⁰Ibid., 19 March 1953, p. 5, col. 2.

⁷¹"The World's Largest Industrial Corporations," Fortune, August 22, 1983, pp. 170-71.

CONCLUSIONS

Prior to this study, I.G. Farben's place in historiography was that of a large company that helped Hitler make World War II possible. To the historians who previously wrote about Farben, the company's role in planning and waging aggressive war constituted its greatest crime, while the use of concentration camp labor seemed of lesser importance. From the perspective of nearly four decades of an international arms race, it is more difficult to condemn industrialists who contribute to national defense and prepare for possible war. Correspondingly, violations of human rights have come to seem more important. By focusing on I.G. Farben's role in constructing and operating I.G. Auschwitz, this study has reassessed the responsibility of the Farben directors for their part in Nazi crimes against humanity.

From the beginning, Farben leaders were deeply involved in decisions regarding the use of slave labor. A decisive factor in the Vorstand's approval of the plant location was the SS plan to expand the Auschwitz concentration camp, thus providing Farben an inexhaustible supply of cheap labor. When construction began, the plant management adopted SS labor practices and dictated the

inmates' working speed to the Kapos. Although the I.G. Auschwitz management did not directly select prisoners for gassing, their complaints of poor inmate work performance resulted in the transfer of thousands of inmates to Birkenau. By the end of World War II, 120,000 inmate deaths could be traced to I.G. Auschwitz.

In the Farben trial the attempt to assess the responsibility of the Farben leadership was flawed from the start. The prosecution considered the aggressive war charge to be the supreme international crime and the most important part of its case. It tried to prove that the defendants were guilty of helping Hitler start World War II, but it was not able to convince the tribunal that men who did not pull any triggers were guilty of starting a war. The prosecution did not understand the enormity of the crimes against humanity and looked upon the Holocaust as a result of the war. Years later one of the prosecutors, Drexel Sprecher, realized that the prosecution had been mistaken in not attaching sufficient significance to the crimes committed at I.G. Auschwitz.¹

The trial was also conducted by judges who were less than impartial. Even before the trial began, two of the judges, Shake and Morris, were convinced of the defendants' innocence. They saw I.G. Farben as part of a

¹Interview with Drexel Sprecher, Former Head of Farben Trial Team at Nuremberg, Bethesda, Maryland, 24 August 1983.

rebuilt Germany which would help prevent the spread of communism. Events like the Berlin blockade fortified their convictions. Dubois perfectly described the judges when he wrote, "No playwright could have conceived a more inspiring tragedy than the Farben judges. . . ." ² John Appleman wrote that the difference in the verdicts of the secondary war crimes trials arose from differences in the judges' philosophy rather than from the amount of evidence. ³

The Farben tribunal also found it difficult to condemn individuals for the collective decisions of this large bureaucratic empire. Collectively, however, the Farben leaders were active participants in the Holocaust. Dubois described them best when he wrote that they were "industrialists who deliberately washed their hands in blood." ⁴

²Josiah Dubois, The Devil's Chemists (Boston: The Beacon Press, 1952), p. 357.

³John Alan Appleman, Military Tribunals and International Crimes (Westport: Greenwood Press, 1971), p. 183.

⁴Dubois, Devil's Chemists, p. 360.

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APPENDIX A

POSITIONS OF THE DEFENDANTS

Carl Krauch: The Plenipotentiary General for Special Questions of Chemical Production; he represented the chemical industry at the highest planning level of government. In 1940, he succeeded the deceased Carl Bosch as chairman of I.G. Farben's supervisory board (Aufsichtsrat).

Hermann Schmitz: The chairman of the Vorstand since 1935; he was recognized as the head of Farben.

Georg von Schnitzler: Chief of the Sales Committee which planned and directed Farben's foreign and domestic sales.

Fritz ter Meer: Chief of the Technical Committee and Sparte II which made buna rubber, pharmaceuticals, and poison gases; he succeeded Krauch as head of the Vermittlungstelle Wehrmacht in 1936 (Farben's army liaison office in Berlin).

Otto Ambros: Director of the buna plant at I.G. Auschwitz; production chief for buna rubber and poison gases.

Heinrich Buetefisch: Director of the synthetic oil plant at I.G. Auschwitz; production chief for gasoline and methanol (the material used to burn the gassed victims' bodies); member of Himmler's "Circle of Friends"; participated in the first meeting with Hitler.

Wilhelm Mann: Chief of the Bayer sales combine and chairman of the board of directors of Degesch.

Max Brueggemann:	Secretary of the <u>Vorstand</u> and a director of Degesch (discharged before the trial began on grounds of poor health).
Heinrich Hoerlein:	Chief of Farben's chemical planning who was a Nobel Prizewinner in the field of medicine; a director of Degesch.
Carl Wurster:	Technical director of inorganic factories and a director of Degesch.
Christian Schneider:	Chief of <u>Sparte</u> I which made nitrogen, gasoline, lubricating oils, and methanol; member of the SS.
Fritz Gajewski:	Chief of <u>Sparte</u> III which made photographic materials, gunpowder, and explosives.
Max Ilgner:	Chief of the <u>Vermittlungsstelle Wehrmacht</u> office and head of the central service department which dealt with protocol, legal problems, press, and political economy.
Paul Haeffliger:	Chief negotiator of the Sales Committee.
Ernst Buergin:	Production chief for light metals, dyestuffs, plastics, and nitrogen; director of light-metals concerns throughout Europe.
Friedrich Jaehne:	Director in charge of construction and physical plant development.
Heinrich Oster:	Director in charge of the European nitrogen syndicate.
August von Knieriem:	Chairman of Farben's legal and patent committees.
Hans Kuehne:	Director who was an expert in explosives.
Carl Lautenschlaeger:	Chief of the Farben works in Hoechst and director of the Typhus Institute in Lemberg.
Walter Duerrfeld:	Managing director of I.G. Auschwitz.

Heinrich Gattineau: Chief of the political-economy department at the Vermittlungsstelle Wehrmacht; organized Farben's first meeting with Hitler.

Hans Kugler: Member of Farben's Sales Committee who organized the newly acquired plants throughout Europe.

Erich von der Heyde: Member of the political-economy department and member of the SS.

APPENDIX B

A COMPLETE LIST OF THE SENTENCES IMPOSED AND THE TIME LEFT TO SERVE

Carl Krauch, guilty of Count III, slavery and mass murder; sentenced to imprisonment for six years; reduced to four years and one month because of time spent in custody.

Otto Ambros, guilty of Count III, slavery and mass murder; sentenced to imprisonment for eight years; reduced to six years and one month.

Heinrich Buetefisch, guilty of Count III, slavery and mass murder; sentenced to imprisonment for six years; reduced to two years and eight months.

Walter Duerrfeld, guilty of Count III, slavery and mass murder; sentenced to imprisonment for eight years; reduced to five years and three months.

Fritz ter Meer, guilty of Count II, plunder and spoilation, and Count III, slavery and mass murder; sentenced to imprisonment for seven years; reduced to three years and eight months.

Hermann Schmitz, guilty of Count II, plunder and spoilation; sentenced to imprisonment for four years; reduced to eight months.

Georg von Schnitzler, guilty of Count II, plunder and spoilation; sentenced to imprisonment for five years; reduced to one year and nine months.

Max Ilgner, guilty of Count II, plunder and spoilation; sentenced to imprisonment for three years; released.

Friedrich Jaehne, guilty of Count II, plunder and spoilation; sentenced to imprisonment for one and one-half years; reduced to two and one-half months.

Paul Haeffliger, guilty of Count II, plunder and spoilation; sentenced to imprisonment for two years; reduced to six and one-half months.

Hans Kugler, guilty of Count II, plunder and spoilation; sentenced to imprisonment for one and one-half years; released.

Heinrich Oster, guilty of Count II, plunder and spoilation; sentenced to imprisonment for two years; reduced to six months.

Ernst Buergin, guilty of Count II, plunder and spoilation; sentenced to imprisonment for two years; reduced to six months.

The tribunal acquitted August von Knieriem, Heinrich Hoerlein, Christian Schneider, Fritz Gajewski, Hans Kuehne, Carl Lautenschlaeger, Carl Wurster, Wilhelm Mann, Erich von der Heyde, and Heinrich Gattineau.