American Diplomacy Toward China, 1945-1948

Margo E. Horner
Old Dominion University, margohorner@yahoo.com

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.odu.edu/history_etds

Part of the History Commons

Recommended Citation

This Thesis is brought to you for free and open access by the History at ODU Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in History Theses & Dissertations by an authorized administrator of ODU Digital Commons. For more information, please contact digitalcommons@odu.edu.
AMERICAN DIPLOMACY TOWARD CHINA, 1945-1948

Margo E. Horner

A thesis presented in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of
MASTER OF ARTS

DEPARTMENT OF HISTORY
OLD DOMINION UNIVERSITY
July, 1973

SUPERVISORY COMMITTEE

Thesis Director
PREFACE

In November, 1945, American Ambassador to China Patrick J. Hurley's sudden and dramatic resignation "brought the China question into focus" and produced congressional hearings into a reexamination of American policy toward China.¹ The short-lived investigation of four days by the Senate Foreign Relations Committee did not thoroughly explore Hurley's charges or render a "full and complete study and investigation with respect to the policies, operations, administration and personnel of the Department of State."²

As President Harry S. Truman announced the resignation of Ambassador Hurley, he also announced the appointment of General of the Army and former Chief of Staff George C. Marshall as his Special Representative to China. To counteract Hurley's charges of America's lack of


²U.S., Congress, Senate, Committee on Foreign Relations, United States-China Relations, Hearings on the Evolution of U.S. Policy Toward Mainland China, before the Committee on Foreign Relations, Senate, 92d Cong., 1st sess., 1971, and in the Appendix, Investigation of Far Eastern Policy, Hearings on the Situation in the Far East, Particularly China, before the Committee on Foreign Relations, Senate, 79th Cong., 1st sess., 1945. This writer has decided to refer to these two hearings separately so as not to confuse the reader. This footnote is quoted in Investigation of Far Eastern Policy from S. Res. 197 of Senator Kenneth Wherry of Nebraska, p. 145.
a foreign policy in China, the President assured Americans that "the basic principles of United States policy in China would be laid down in black and white for the entire country to read." An American correspondent and adviser to Chiang Kai-shek, John Robinson Beal, asserted that this Truman statement, the first of three significant China policy statements, "was playing into the hands of the Communists," while noted Sinologist Herbert Feis felt that "each side found in the President's statement ... justification for its attitude." Senate Republican leader Arthur Vandenberg emphasized that the fate of the Marshall Mission could be traced to the President's first policy statement, particularly to American attempts to force the National Government "to bring Communists into the government."

Beginning his mission on a note of hope and ending on a note of despair, the Presidential mediator became enmeshed in negotiations, proposals and counterproposals.

---


which were advocated by the two irreconcilable forces. The Marshall Mission convinced Administration leaders that corruption, incompetence and inefficiency of Chiang's National Government necessitated a "hands-off" approach to Chiang's National Government. One correspondent summarized the situation in China in 1946: "China has collapsed and all of Chiang's horses and all of Chiang's men cannot put it together again."  

When Marshall returned to the United States in January, 1947, as the newly nominated Secretary of State, the Truman Administration attempted to disentangle itself from the Chinese civil conflict. The Administration's "hands-off" policy toward China was sharply challenged by Republican leaders, who criticized the European Recovery Program of economic and military assistance to Greece and Turkey as one-sided. Republican criticism brought about the President's designation of Lieutenant General Albert C. Wedemeyer as his Special Representative to conduct a fact-finding mission to China. Political fire raged on the floors of Congress as Republican opponents of the Administration's China policy seized upon the suppression of Wedemeyer's Report "as a new issue in their campaign for

---

6 From John Hersey's article in The New Yorker as quoted in Beal, Marshall in China, p. 60.
larger aid to China." Under pressure from Republican
criticism, Marshall placated the opponents of the Adminis-
tration's "Europe first" policy by promising assistance to
China in November, 1947, and fulfilled this promise in
February, 1948.

America's relationship toward China during the post-
war years was aptly described by President Truman's summary
of his China policy: "The role of this government in its
relations with China has been subjected to considerable
misrepresentation, distortion, and misunderstanding. Some
of these attitudes arose because this government was
reluctant to reveal certain facts..." Admiral William
Leahy, Chief of Staff to presidents Roosevelt and Truman,
acknowledged that America's "postwar attitude toward the
Government of China is completely beyond understanding." 9

7 Tang Tsou, America's Failure in China, 1941-50

8 Quoted in Lyman P. Van Slyke's Introduction to U.S.,
Department of State, The China White Paper, 2 vols.,
Originally Issued as United States Relations with China,
with Special Reference to the Period 1944-1949, Department
of State Publication 3573, Far Eastern Series 30, Reissued
with the original Letter of Transmittal to President Truman
from Secretary of State Dean Acheson (Stanford, California:
Stanford University Press, 1967), page not numbered but
numbered by this writer as p. I(ntroduction)-v.

9 Admiral William D. Leahy's letter of Dec. 1, 1947,
to Colonel Hogan as quoted in U.S., Congress, House,
"Letter from Admiral Leahy," Extension of Remarks of
Representative Walter Judd, 86th Cong., 1st sess., July 27,
1959, Congressional Record, CV, A6482.
This writer shares these beliefs and deems it necessary to reexamine the context of the historical developments within which American policy was formulated from the postwar years of 1945 through 1948 in order to prove that this misrepresentation, distortion and misunderstanding existed. Emphasis is placed on the role of the Department of State, including the reports of foreign service officers, the President, the Congress, American and Chinese correspondents, Chinese Nationalist and Communist representatives, all of whom surveyed the situation in China and helped to form and shape our China policy.

The first chapter of this paper will consist of an examination of America's China policy and the alternatives to that policy. The second chapter will analyze Ambassador Hurley's resignation and the ensuing congressional hearings. The third chapter will focus on the appointment of General George C. Marshall as the President's Special Representative to China and will examine the directives which Marshall carried with him to China, as well as the possibility of coalition government in China. The fourth chapter will scrutinize the thirteen-month Marshall Mission and the release of Marshall's farewell statement at the time of his departure from China. The fifth chapter will analyze the beginning of the end to bipartisan support for the Administration's China policy, the termination of the ten-month embargo, Wedemeyer's trip to China and his report.
The sixth chapter will reveal the height of Republican criticism and the resulting China Aid Act.
# TABLE OF CONTENTS

**PREFACE** ............................................................... ii

**Chapter**

I. THE COMPLICATED WEB OF CHINA POLICY AND ITS ALTERNATIVES ........................................ 1

II. HURLEY'S RESIGNATION .................................................. 35

III. THE APPOINTMENT OF GENERAL GEORGE C. MARSHALL ......................................................... 64

IV. THE MARSHALL MISSION ................................................ 90

V. THE REPUBLICANS ATTACK THE ADMINISTRATION'S CHINA POLICY ......................................... 135

VI. THE CHINA AID ACT .................................................... 160

VII. CONCLUSION .......................................................... 178

**BIBLIOGRAPHY** .......................................................... 187
CHAPTER I

THE COMPLICATED WEB OF CHINA POLICY
AND ITS ALTERNATIVES

China-born expert John Stewart Service, who was Second Secretary of the Embassy in Chungking until April, 1945, commented on the Chinese situation in 1945 as "a time bomb ticking steadily toward detonation."1 In May, 1945, Edward E. Rice, a foreign service officer stationed in China, informed Secretary of State Edward Stettinius that "full scale" civil war would "break out after the Japanese menace is removed."2 Everett F. Drumright of the State Department's Division of Chinese Affairs concurred with Rice's and Service's impressions that civil war was imminent and stated that "large scale internal strife" would occur as a result of "the formal establishment of two distinct political and military entities" in China.3


3Ibid., p. 381.
While "a China disorganized and divided either by foreign aggression . . . or by violent internal strife is an undermining influence to world stability and peace," United States policy toward China from 1945 through 1948 was primarily concerned with the establishment of a strong, independent, stable, peaceful and democratic China and deemed it of utmost importance to world peace. The defeat of Japan produced a most difficult task for China. Acting Secretary of State Dean Acheson felt that "the task which had to be solved by the Chinese Government was . . . how to create a nation, and how to have the authority of the Chinese Government exercised throughout that nation."

Following the sudden Japanese surrender, American planes and warships transported National troops to north China and east China to accept the surrender, and to demobilize and repatriate the Japanese armed forces even though the United States did not wish to intervene in China's internal affairs. Defeated Japanese garrisons were informed that they must lay down their arms only to

---


5 U.S., Congress, Senate, Joint Committee of Armed Services and Foreign Relations, Military Situation in the Far East, Hearings, before the Joint Committee of Armed Services and Foreign Relations, Senate, 82d Cong., 1st sess., 1951, Part 3, Testimony of Dean Acheson, p. 1838.
representatives of the legal and recognized government, the National Government of Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek.\footnote{Chung-Gi Kwei, The Kuomintang-Communist Struggle in China, 1922-1949 (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1970), p. 99.} In a letter to General Marshall, written on August 19, 1945, General Albert C. Wedemeyer, the Commanding General of the American Forces in China, revealed America's position: "It must be recognized that the movement of Central Government troops to key areas may be construed as a deceptive maneuver designed primarily to cope with the Communists."\footnote{U.S., Department of State, Foreign Relations, 1945, The Far East, p. 532.}

The Secretaries of State, War and Navy, who met on November 20, 1945, discussed the role of American troops in China. Secretary of the Navy James Forrestal emphasized that Americans were "on sound ground if we say that our Marines are in North China to complete the task of the defeat of Japan."\footnote{Ibid., p. 646. See also James Forrestal, The Forrestal Diaries, ed. by Walter Millis (New York: The Viking Press, 1951), p. 123.} Forrestal noted that there would be considerable criticism "if we say they are there for the purpose of backing Chiang Kai-shek." Secretary of War Robert Patterson thought that if the Marine's presence in effecting the repatriation of the Japanese aided in supporting Chiang Kai-shek's Government "so much the better."\footnote{Ibid., p. 647.}
Correspondents Theodore White and Annalee Jacoby supported the presence of Marines in China "to preserve, protect and defend Chiang Kai-shek's government in the northern areas where under attack."\textsuperscript{10}

Chinese Communist leaders Mao Tse-tung, Chou En-lai and Chu Teh protested the presence of the Marines who held cities and lines of communication prior to the Nationalist Army's arrival. The movement of Chiang's troops northward was viewed by Communist leaders as a threat to their expansion and existence.\textsuperscript{11} Historian Barbara Tuchman believed that American intervention "fed their [Communist] hostility and eroded American influence as mediator since America appeared committed to one side in the intervention."\textsuperscript{12}


\textsuperscript{11}Kwei, The Kuomintang-Communist Struggle, p. 99.

Americans appeared to be serving a dual purpose, with Marine actors taking part in a Chinese play and deciding what government China should have. Had American troops been withdrawn then, as most of them were in early 1947 after the termination of Marshall's Mission, the United States could have silenced widespread criticism that America was interfering in the internal affairs of China by supporting Chiang Kai-shek against the Communists.

At the end of the War, the Soviets held a strong foothold in Manchuria, partly as a result of the Yalta agreements of February, 1945, which granted them certain concessions for their entrance into the Japanese War within ninety days after the surrender of Germany, and the Sino-Soviet Treaty of Friendship and Alliance of August 14, 1945. At Yalta, Stalin requested and President Roosevelt agreed to the internationalization of the port of Dairen, the return of the southern part of Sakhalin and islands adjacent to it, the restoration of Russia's lease of Port Arthur as a naval base, and the joint Soviet-Chinese operation of the Chinese-Eastern and South Manchurian

———

Railroads. Harry Hopkins, who returned to the United States in June, 1945, from his Moscow conference with Stalin, told President Truman that Stalin considered Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek to be "the only Chinese leader capable of bringing about the unification of China." Stalin thought that "none of the Communist leaders was capable of unifying China." As a result of the Sino-Soviet Treaty, the Soviet Government pledged its support to the National Government rather than to the Yenan Government, while it abstained from the internal affairs of the Chinese people. Stalin pledged himself to render Chiang economic assistance and moral support in the postwar

---


period as China agreed to the Far Eastern terms of the Yalta Conference. 17

Realizing the tangled Chinese situation immediately after the Second World War, Dean Acheson, who was Acting Secretary of State in 1946 and Secretary of State in 1949, recalled in 1949 in his famous "Letter of Transmittal" to the State Department's China White Paper that there were three alternatives from which America could choose in order to achieve a strong, united, democratic and peaceful China. These three alternatives were:

(1) it could have pulled out lock, stock and barrel; (2) it could have intervened militarily on a major scale to assist the Nationalists to destroy the Communists; (3) it could, while assisting the Nationalists to assert their authority over as much of China as possible, endeavor to avoid civil war by working for a compromise between the two sides. 18

Dean Acheson believed that the first choice of pulling out of China would have meant that Americans thought the Chinese "must paddle their own canoe, and we have to wash our hands of it." 19 General Joseph Stilwell, a former Commanding General of United States Forces in China, advocated pulling out of China immediately after the


18 Ibid., I, p. x.

Japanese surrender. John Service and John K. Fairbank thought that this alternative as opposed to the second or third alternatives would have been a "wiser choice." Americans were eager to bring their men home and not become involved in China's affairs and had to be prepared to accept the consequences of this withdrawal policy if it resulted in "the complete domination of China by a Russian-supported Communist regime." "With China within the Russian orbit," historian No-Yong Park believed that "the United States might feel unsafe in the Pacific." Park agreed with Acheson's first alternative and thought that the Soviet Union should join the United States in remaining neutral "in word and in action" because through neutrality "China might have been united in one way or the other." While Acheson's first policy alternative advocated "our best role was no role at all" and that we should allow China to stew in her own juice, the second Acheson choice suggested that the United States Government "put into China unlimited resources and all the necessary military power to try and defeat the Communists, remove the Japanese and

20 U.S., Congress, Senate, United States-China Relations, Testimony of John Stewart Service, p. 32. See also Tuchman, Stilwell, p. 527.


remove the Russians from Manchuria." In Acheson's opinion, "the Communists probably could have been dislodged only by American arms," but Americans "would not have sanctioned such a colossal commitment of our armies in 1945 or later." Acheson labeled this policy of backing China to the hilt as "wholly impracticable." Foreign service specialists suggested that American postwar aid "if given carte blanche to the Nationalist Government, would encourage persistent reaction rather than reform and make the Nationalists more increasingly less able and less willing to compete with the Communists for popular support and therefore increasingly more dependent on our aid."

In John Carter Vincent's memorandum of November 28, 1945, entitled "Outline of Suggested Course in China," the Director of Far Eastern Affairs of the State Department emphasized that the United States "cannot support that [National] Government by military intervention in an

---


24 U.S., Department of State, China White Paper, I, Dean Acheson's "Letter of Transmittal" of July 30, 1949, p. x.

25 Ibid.

internecine struggle." An editorial in early December in The New Republic summed up the feelings of many Americans: "The American people will not stand for pouring out American blood and treasure in a war to perpetuate Chiang Kai-shek's regime." Chiang's problems could not be solved by large sums of money and quantities of goods. The tremendous unpopularity of using American troops in China was reflected in a large quantity of State Department mail which Acting Secretary of State Dean Acheson described as "so varied and the geographical spread is so great as to suggest that the protests represent a strong feeling among the people." If America intervened, her presence in China might provoke the intervention of the Soviet Union. Nearly one year later, in September, 1946, an editorial in The New Republic reported that "all-out aid to Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek" would encourage him "to wage open war against the Communists," while Henry Luce's magazine,


Life, urged the United States to give "continuous, wholehearted and plentiful aid to the Chungking Government." 30

The last Acheson alternative, which was chosen and implemented by the Truman Administration, was the policy of "friendly persuasion" backed by limited assistance to the Nationalists, to assist in preserving the peace in China, and to work out a modus vivendi preserving, reestablishing and increasing the influence of the National Government. 31

This piecemeal aid was dependent upon indications by the Chungking Government that hostilities had ceased and political differences had been resolved. This was the China policy which George Marshall attempted to follow in China during his thirteen months of untiring efforts to broaden the base of the Chungking Government, to eliminate one-party tutelage with the inclusion of the rival groups in the government, and to reorganize the armies of the Nationalists and the Communists. If there appeared to be risks in supporting Chiang, there seemed to be greater

---


risks in not supporting him. One American observer, Harold J. Noble, wrote in the Saturday Evening Post that "the Nationalists were the lesser of the two evils." American support was to be given to a "regime with acknowledged shortcomings but to which there seemed to be no adequate alternative."34

China hand John Service believed that Secretary Acheson's formulation was incomplete. Service felt that there was a fourth alternative which called for the United States "to work with both sides and to keep ourselves in a flexible position so that we could adapt to developments in China and work with whichever side proved dominant."35 This choice offered "the greatest likelihood of fostering a united, and democratic friendly China" while America observed the Chinese situation and did not become involved in it.36 This flexible policy would permit ultimate


36Service, Amerasia Papers, p. 104.
cooperation with any leadership in China, uncommitted to the Nationalist or any other power in China, "and ready to adjust itself to the further evolution of that country." 37

This policy was advocated by foreign service officers as early as March 2, 1945, when John Carter Vincent, Chief of the Division of Chinese Affairs, Everett F. Drumright, also of the Division, and Edwin F. Stanton, Deputy Director of the Office of Far Eastern Affairs, recommended:

it would be in the American interest to maintain a flexible policy . . . vis-à-vis Chiang for two reasons: the United States may wish to be in a position to withdraw support from Chiang in the event that his government and administration deteriorate to a point reaching impotence; and second, the United States appears to possess, in its discretion to grant or to withhold support and assistance, a weapon which may be used to induce Chiang to cooperate, reform the administration of his government, and put China's maximum effort into the prosecution of the war. 38

Two months later, Everett Drumright reiterated the importance of the American Government "to maintain a degree of flexibility of policy to permit cooperation with any other leadership in China which may give greater promise of achieving our policy with respect to China." 39 "With as uncertain a situation as that which exists in China,"

37 Ibid., p. 133.
observed John Paton Davies, another China hand, "it may be prudent not to commit all of our policy eggs to one basket." In John Service’s testimony before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee in 1971, he recalled that the foreign service officers and the State Department itself were helpless in making known these views on the situation.

In late 1945 when the State Department became concerned over developments in China, John Carter Vincent submitted a memorandum suggesting that normal diplomatic relations with the National Government be maintained while the United States refrain from involvement in China’s internal affairs. Vincent reviewed this memorandum in another memorandum to the Secretary of State on November 12, 1945, at which time he pointed out that "interference in the internal affairs of China would not pay dividends and involvement in civil strife in China would occasion serious difficulties for us without compensatory

---

40 Ibid., p. 337. Memorandum of April 15, 1945, by Second Secretary of the Embassy in the Soviet Union, John Paton Davies.

41 U.S., Congress, Senate, United States-China Relations, p. 33.

advantages.\textsuperscript{43} This policy of noninvolvement in China's internal affairs was the topic of many of the speeches on the floors of Congress. Representative Mike Mansfield, on the floor of the House in December, 1945, emphasized that "the internal situation in China or in any other country...is none of our business. It is purely a Chinese situation which the Chinese must themselves clean up."\textsuperscript{44} Delegate from Hawaii, Joseph R. Farrington, concurred with Mansfield's view of the Chinese situation by stating: "The Chinese must resolve this question of national unity among themselves, preferably without further violence."\textsuperscript{45}

President Truman's three statements of December 15, 1945, December 18, 1946, and February 18, 1948, to the American people on his China policy also advocated America's noninvolvement in China's internal affairs. In President Truman's first statement, he recalled that "the United States Government has long subscribed to the


principle that the management of internal affairs is the responsibility of the peoples of sovereign nations. In his subsequent statement of December 18, 1946, prior to Marshall's return to the United States, Truman forcefully emphasized:

We are pledged not to interfere in the internal affairs of China. Our position is clear. While avoiding involvement in civil strife, we will persevere with our policy of helping the Chinese people to bring about peace and economic recovery in their country.

America had pledged itself not to interfere in China's internal affairs even though Special Representative George C. Marshall was sent to China to act as mediator between the two irreconcilable and unresolvable forces in effecting a cease-fire, broadening the government and amalgamating the armies of the Nationalists and the Communists.

A fifth alternative, which concerned the territorial separation of China between Chiang and the Communists, received presidential attention as early as July 3, 1945.

---

46 U.S., President, Public Papers, Truman, 1945, p. 543.
47 Ibid., 1946, p. 504.
Professor Paul Linebarger suggested the creation of a Chinese buffer zone between Nationalist China and the Soviet Union or "the establishment of Communist self-governing enclaves within China." In November, 1945, General Albert C. Wedemeyer recommended to Chief of Staff Dwight Eisenhower the establishment of a "trusteeship under United States, Russia, Great Britain and China over Manchuria..." Wedemeyer believed that Chiang could not "stabilize the situation in North China for several months perhaps years unless a satisfactory settlement with the Communists is accomplished." Wedemeyer advised the Generalissimo that he attempt to hold China south of the Yangtze Valley with the assistance of foreign administrators and technicians to undertake political, economic and social reforms under the direction of competent and honest officials. Wedemeyer thought that Chiang should consolidate his position in a part of China which he knew he could definitely hold.

In August, 1946, Wedemeyer's trusteeship proposal was supported by Canadian Ambassador Victor Odlum, who advocated United States or United Nations trusteeship over the

---


51 Ibid., p. 652.
"disputed areas." One year later in his report, which was submitted to the President as a result of his fact-finding mission to China, Wedemeyer reiterated his proposal for a trusteeship in Manchuria. "Should France, Great Britain, the United States or Russia refuse to participate in the Manchurian Guardianship," he firmly believed that "China might then request the General Assembly of the United Nations to establish a trusteeship, under the provisions of the Charter." Joseph Alsop endorsed this proposal by declaring that "Two-thirds of a loaf is better than none."

As early as February 16, 1945, Dr. Sun Fo, son of the renowned Sun Yat-sen, suggested the possibility of another alternative [sixth] which was reported in a Chinese newspaper, Hsin Hua Jih Pao. Sun Fo noted that "China was beset with grave internal political problems" and he suggested "the possibility that these problems be brought up in an international meeting." In August, 1945, Edwin

52 Beal, Marshall in China, p. 171.
53 U.S., Department of State, China White Paper, II, p. 767.
Locke, Personal Representative of the President, informed President Truman of a proposal, similar to Sun Fo's proposal, for averting civil war in China.

I think real results could be obtained through a suggestion from you to the Generalissimo that he request the United Kingdom, and the Soviet Union to name representatives to an Advisory Commission that would appoint to make recommendations to him for the settlement of the existing disputes between the Central Government and the Communists. 56

The Advisory Commission was to be composed of two representatives of the Chungking Government, two representatives of the Yenan Government, one representative of the United States, Great Britain and Russia, all of whom would make recommendations to the Generalissimo. Locke believed that "Chiang need not necessarily be bound by the findings of the Commission, but if arrangements were made that its proceedings and report be published by him, the moral effect would be exceedingly powerful." 57

In late 1945, John Carter Vincent also suggested "an international conference of interested powers to seek

56 Ibid., p. 452. Memorandum of August 20, 1945, by Edwin A. Locke, Jr., Personal Representative of President Truman in charge of American Production Mission in China, to President Harry Truman. This letter was forwarded to Secretary of State Byrnes by Matthew J. Connelly, Secretary to President Truman, with Connelly's unprinted memorandum of September 4 requesting "any comments you may care to make." No reply to this memorandum was found in the State Department. Edmund Locke was Assistant to the Chairman of the War Production Board.

57 Ibid.
solution" as an approach to our China policy. 58 A proposal for an international conference to terminate the civil war was endorsed in December, 1946, by Senators Ralph E. Flanders of Vermont and James E. Murray of Montana in addition to Owen Lattimore of the Johns Hopkins University, Harley F. MacNair of the University of Chicago, H. H. Fisher of the Hoover Library at Stanford University and Foster Rhea Dulles of Ohio State University. 59 An international conference, composed of the United States, Great Britain, the Soviet Union and China, was to be held and attended by all political parties in China. President Truman refused to reply when he was asked to comment on Senators Murray and Flanders' suggestion of a three-nation board in an international conference. 60 In a speech on the floor of the House on February 3, 1947, a member of the House Foreign Affairs Committee, Mike Mansfield, who had recently returned from a thirty-one day trip to the Far East, suggested that an international conference, similar


60 U.S., President, Public Papers, Truman, 1946, p. 508. This statement was issued by President Truman at his press conference at the White House on December 18, 1946.
to the 1922 Washington Conference, of interested powers "be
called by President Truman to consider some workable
arrangement in China's behalf." Mansfield's speech
"elicited no positive response from the State Department." By 1947, Secretary of State Marshall had ruled out inter-
national mediation as America's policy toward China.

A seventh possible China policy alternative, which
was espoused in early 1945 and increasingly after the Sino-
Soviet Treaty, was for the joint cooperation of Soviet
Russia, the United States and Great Britain to intervene
"if they really desire not only to preserve world peace but
also to remedy the causes of this menacing conflict." This proposed common policy was quite evident in General
Wedemeyer's telegram to General Marshall on July 9, 1945,
when Wedemeyer commented:

If Uncle Sugar, Russia, and Britain united
strongly in their endeavor to bring about coalit-
tion of these two political parties in China by
coercing both sides to make realistic conces-
sions, serious post-war disturbance may be
averted and timely effective military employment
of all Chinese may be obtained against the
Japanese. I use the term coerce advisedly
because it is my conviction that continued

---

61 U.S., Congress, House, "Report on Conditions in the
Far East," Extension of Remarks of Representative Mike
Mansfield, 80th Cong., 1st sess., Feb. 2, 1947, Congress-
sional Record, XCIII, Part 1, 767.


63 "Explosion in China and the Powers," The New
Republic, November 12, 1945, p. 619.
appeals to both sides couched in polite diplomatic terms will not accomplish unification. There must be teeth in the Big Three approach. 64

Five months later, Wedemeyer suggested that China accept the assistance of foreign administrators and technicians to aid in political, economic and social reforms.

Believing that Soviet-American cooperation was of the utmost importance in uniting China, No-Yong Park felt that teeth could be put in this approach only by "telling the Chinese factions in plain and honest language that neither power will give them support, moral or material until they stop fighting each other." 65 President Truman was questioned by one reporter during a press conference on August 23, 1945: "Are the Big Three . . . planning joint action to avert civil war in China?" 66 Truman responded that he had not heard anything in regard to a Big Three approach of common policy toward China and declared that it was a matter which should be discussed with the Secretary of State.


An article in the *New York Herald Tribune* of October 30, 1945, analyzed the approach which the United States and the Soviet Union should take if their efforts toward cooperation in China were unsuccessful in preventing civil war. The Tribune announced that there should be a firm agreement between the United States and Russia "not to use their tremendous military power to support either faction," realizing that "any military interference from the outside world might create larger disputes in which all current efforts for world peace would be endangered." Like the Tribune, Representative Mike Mansfield emphasized the importance of a unified China. Mansfield observed that "it would be the best policy for us to go along with Russia and Britain, to use our collective ability to get those groups together because all of us, especially this country, want to see a united China, a strong China. We want to see China become a bastion of peace in the Far East."

---


An eighth alternative for the United States "would have been to attempt a rapprochement with the [Chinese] Communists in the hope of preventing their complete committal to Russia and to establish semi-friendly relations with the United States." The State Department's China White Paper, which focused on American-Chinese foreign relations between the years 1944 and 1949, suppressed and distorted pertinent material relating to the Mao Tse-tung-Chou En-lai overtures to the United States. Dean Acheson's noted "Letter of Transmittal" pointed out that the Chinese Communists were subservient "to a foreign power, Russia," when in reality the Communist leaders of Yenan attempted to establish relations with the United States and endeavored to remain as "free agents totally independent from the Soviet Union." Reporting from Yenan on August 23, 1944, John Service spoke of his first long conversation with Mao Tse-tung in which Mao emphasized:


China must industrialize. This can be done—in China—only by free enterprise and with the aid of foreign capital. Chinese and American interests are correlated and similar. They fit together economically and politically. We can and must work together. 72

Mao convinced Service of his "desire for American understanding." 73 One month later, Service reported again from Yenan that the United States was the only country which would be in a position to render economic assistance and to finance large-scale industrialization. 74 Mao Tse-tung and Chou En-lai repeated this desire for American assistance to General Albert C. Wedemeyer in late 1944. 75

In January, 1945, Ambassador Patrick Hurley informed President Franklin Roosevelt that he had discovered a plan of the Chinese Communists in which they had applied to General Wedemeyer "to secure secret passage for Mao Tse-tung

---

72 John Stewart Service's report of August 23, 1944, as printed in Service, Amerasia Papers, p. 173. In E. J. Kahn, Jr., "Profiles [John Service]," The New Yorker, April 8, 1972, p. 60, Professor Lyman P. Van Slyke, head of the Center for East Asian Studies at Stanford University, said that the intelligence material furnished by John Stewart Service while he was in Yenan "was . . . the most accurate and most revealing the United States had access to up to that time."

73 U.S., Congress, Senate, United States-China Relations, p. 11.

74 Service's report of September 28, 1944, as printed in U.S., Congress, Senate, State Department Employee Loyalty Investigation, Part 1, Testimony of John Service, pp. 1367-58.

and Chou En-lai to Washington for a conference with you."

The second mention of the Mao-Chou overtures to the United States occurred in a telegram from Hurley to Secretary of State Stettinius in February, 1945. Hurley's telegram mentioned the contents of "an eyes alone" telegram from Chairman Mao and General Chou to General Wedemeyer. Mao and Chou offered two proposals:

(1) that the Yenan Government dispatch an unofficial group to the United States to 'interpret and explain' the problems of China to interested American civilians and officials, and

(2) that Mao and Chou were available to proceed to Washington immediately for an explanatory conference in event that the President should express a desire to receive them at the White House as leaders of a primary Chinese political party.

Some experts on China contended that the prime purpose of Mao and Chou's projected trip to Washington was that China's Communist leaders were more interested in "outmaneuvering and outflanking Chiang Kai-shek and his

---


77 U.S., Department of State, Foreign Relations, 1945, The Far East, p. 209. This memorandum was dated February 7, 1945, and paraphrased a message, dated January 9, 1945, from Mao Tse-tung and Chou En-lai to General Wedemeyer. The January 9 memorandum was not printed in U.S., Department of State, Foreign Relations, 1945, The Far East.
Government.  

This leadership struggle was of the highest priority as opposed to warming relations with the United States. China hand John Service did not "know of any solid evidence" to support the Mao-Chou overtures for a conference with President Roosevelt. He questioned why the Chinese Communist leaders worked through Wedemeyer and not through Hurley "because at this time the actual breach with Hurley had not yet come about." Service stated that the only source of this incident was Ambassador Hurley, who "was not the most reliable source." He believed that Hurley "got this information through someone else who was not a disinterested party." Service, who had been in close contact with the Chinese Communists in Yenan, never heard any mention in Yenan of the Mao-Chou bid and General Wedemeyer's memoirs, Wedemeyer Reports!, failed to mention any substantiating information, while Admiral William Leahy's memoirs, I Was There, noted the Mao-Chou proposal to come to Washington to meet with President Roosevelt. Another foreign service officer with experience in China, John

79 U.S., Congress, Senate, United States-China Relations, p. 47.
80 Ibid., p. 3.
Paton Davies, recalled that possibly "the Mao-Chou request was genuine." 82

In speaking before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee in June, 1971, Professor Allen S. Whiting, former State Department Research Director for the Far East, said that Mao Tse-tung hoped the United States would use its economic and military support during the War to bring about a coalition government between the Communists and the Nationalists. 83 As a result of two lengthy conversations with Chairman Mao, Foreign Service Officer John Service felt that the Chinese Communists "were intensely interested in developing relations with the United States, in winning American support during the war, and I believe quite clearly in the postwar period." 84 Chairman Mao "wanted to determine Washington's willingness to work with a Communist China should coalition fail and they prevail in civil war." 85 Mao "was thinking of the future," said Service,

82 U.S., Congress, Senate, United States-China Relations, p. 48.


84 U.S., Congress, Senate, United States-China Relations, p. 3.

85 U.S., Congress, Senate, United States Relations with the People's Republic, p. 194.
"and he was thinking of a China which was not going to be a Russian satellite." Service surmised that Mao realized China's relationship with Russia would be quite different from the conventional idea of a Soviet satellite. Mao believed that a Communist China would have substantial independence and freedom of action and choice in the conduct of foreign relations.

In March, 1945, John Service reiterated in a lengthy Yenan memorandum Chairman Mao's views which had been expressed to him in August and September of 1944. Service emphasized that "American policy is a decisive factor in influencing the actions of the Chinese Communist Party." In recalling his conversation with Mao, Service said that the Chairman believed that "America would eventually realize that support of the Central Government was not the best way to ... ensure post-war stability in the Far East." "America and China," declared Mao, "complement each other economically: they will not compete."

---

86 U.S., Congress, Senate, United States-China Relations, p. 8.
87 Service, Amerasia Papers, p. 176.
89 U.S., Department of State, Foreign Relations, 1945, The Far East, p. 273. Service's Yenan memorandum was written on March 13, 1945, and was entitled "The Views of Mao Tse-tung: America and China."
Mao outlined "his grand design for Sino-America relations": 90

China's greatest post-war need is economic development. She lacks the capitalistic foundations necessary to carry this out alone. Her own living standards are so low that they cannot be further depressed to provide the needed capital.

America is not only the most suitable country to assist this economic development of China. She is also the only country fully able to participate. 91

Mao concluded by stating that "there must not and cannot be any conflict, estrangement or misunderstanding between the Chinese people and America." Mao had clearly and unequivocally stated to Service his desire to receive economic assistance from the United States and he had excluded any mention of Russian assistance from his conversation.

In John Service's final report from Yenan of his conversations with Communist leaders prior to his departure from China for the United States, he recalled his March memorandum. "The Communists will continue to seek American friendship and understanding," Service announced, "because it will be needed by China in the post-war period of recon-..." 92 Communist leaders had again indicated their

---

90 U.S., Congress, Senate, United States Relations with the People's Republic, Statement by Allen S. Whiting, p. 194.
92 Ibid., p. 314. Memorandum of Conversation in Yenan on April 1, 1945, by Second Secretary of the Embassy in China, John Service, with Mao Tse-tung, Chu Teh and Chou En-lai.
determination to avoid dependence on the Soviet Union. John Service left Yenan for the United States in April, 1945. He repeated his conversations of August and September, 1944, March, 1945, and April, 1945, with Chairman Mao in a memorandum to John Carter Vincent, Chief of the Division of Chinese Affairs. Service emphasized that Yenan's Communist leaders looked to America for large-scale postwar foreign aid.

Three other incidents substantiated John Service's reports of Yenan's request for American assistance. At the founding conference of the United Nations in San Francisco, Chen Chia Kan, member of the Chinese Communist Party, adviser at the United Nations and Chou En-lai's private secretary, informed his old Yenan acquaintance, Foreign Service Officer John K. Emmerson, that "all Communists accept the same philosophy, the same doctrines, and the same ultimate goal" while differing in their policies and programs.

The next incident occurred in December, following the Hurley resignation and the appointment of George C. Marshall as Special Representative of President Truman to China. A member of the Chinese Communists, Wang Ping-nan, talked to the counselor of the American Embassy in Chungking

---

and made a statement similar to that of Chen Chia Kan.

Wang emphasized that "Soviet policy is one thing but that
Chinese Communist policy is their own and independent of
Soviet policy." Wang said that "Chinese Communists are
particularly desirous of maintaining cordial relations
with the United States, recognizing that China must have
American assistance in postwar period." The last inci-
dent occurred in 1946 when General Chou En-lai told General
George Marshall: "Of course we will lean to one side. But
how far we lean depends upon you."

When Chairman J. William Fulbright of the Senate
Foreign Relations Committee learned in June, 1971, of Mao's
leaning to the United States' position, he felt that "by
not having the full record and only being given the offi-
cial version then you create a psychological atmosphere in
the country that creates obstacles to any change." One
possible reason for the United States' inability to accept
Mao's offer may be found in the little-noted and recently

---

95 Ibid., p. 465. Memorandum of December 3, 1945, by
the Counselor of the Embassy in China, Robert L. Smyth,
to the Secretary of State.

96 Ibid.

97 Quoted by Foreign Service Officer John F. Melby to
Allen S. Whiting in U.S., Congress, Senate, United States
Relations with the People's Republic, Statement by Allen S.
Whiting, p. 195.

98 U.S., Congress, Senate, United States-China
Relations, p. 32.
published letter from a commercial attaché in China, Alonzo B. Calder, to Walter Robertson, the Chargé in China. Calder spoke of a captured Soviet document which was addressed to the Shanghai Soviet Consulate and which indicated "that both the Soviets and Chinese Communists will 'lie low' for a period of about two years, disarming suspicion of ultimate aims." This letter noted that once the United States had been "sucked in" by spending billions of dollars and had been drained of its resources, "then the Soviets will launch their active campaign to rob us of our gains and will use China as a base for sovietizing all Asia." 99

Whatever the reason may have been, Washington did not respond to the Yenan leaders' overtures for assistance and, instead, suppressed and distorted documentation and altered American understanding of these developments, which led to "Mao's exclusive reliance on Stalin" and an extension of the Chinese civil war. 100 John Service, to whom Mao expressed his early rejection of Russia, believed that the evidence of this rejection was contained in Mao and his lieutenants' conversations with foreign service officers as well as the


100 U.S., Congress, Senate, United States Relations with the People's Republic, Statement by Allen S. Whiting, p. 196.
fact that Mao had just concluded a long "rectification campaign," which eliminated the influence of Russian-trained leaders and established the party doctrine of Chairman Mao Tse-tung.  

Service recalled that Mao had "always hated the Russians and the Russians always disliked him." Stalin would have preferred a weak and disunited China under Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek rather than a strong, united, effective China under Mao's Communist Party. Most assuredly, the United States had many China policy alternatives from which to choose and consider prior to and immediately following the termination of the Second World War, even though Americans usually remember only the three well-known alternatives mentioned by Dean Acheson in his "Letter of Transmittal."

---

101 U.S., Congress, Senate, United States-China Relations, p. 29.


103 U.S., Congress, Senate, United States-China Relations, p. 29.
CHAPTER II

HURLEY'S RESIGNATION

On November 26, 1945, Major General and American Ambassador to China Patrick J. Hurley dramatically resigned his post, attributing the "failure of American foreign policy in Asia to the weakness and opposition of the United States Foreign Service."¹ "The astonishing feature of our foreign policy," declared Hurley, "is the wide discrepancy between our announced policies and our conduct of international relations." General Hurley attacked American foreign service officers as the cause of his unsuccessful mission. His assault pinpointed foreign service officers who had been stationed in China during the Second World War and were in the Far Eastern and Chinese Divisions of the State Department. Hurley's explosive resignation informed the American people that the United States' position in China was "misunderstood" and he suggested that the American Government needed a complete

reorganization of its "policy-making machinery beginning at the lower official levels."²

Although this letter of resignation was dated November 26 and was addressed to President Truman, Hurley handed it to Secretary of State James Byrnes, who refused to deliver it to the President.³ Hurley asked for the Secretary’s views on China and Byrnes informed Hurley that American policy toward China had not changed since his arrival in the United States in September.⁴ Secretary Byrnes agreed to prepare for Hurley a memorandum on America’s foreign policy toward China to be given to Hurley on November 27. Satisfied that his long sought-after China policy memorandum was forthcoming, Hurley left the Secretary’s office and agreed not to resign but to return to China immediately after a speech before the National Press Club.⁵

²Ibid., p. 725. There is some question as to when Hurley’s letter of resignation reached President Truman. In U.S., President, Public Papers, Truman, 1945, p. 512, Harry Truman said that he received this letter on November 29 while Don Lohbeck’s Patrick J. Hurley (Chicago: Henry Regnery Company, 1956), p. 428, contradicted this information. Lohbeck included a letter from President Truman, dated November 27, accepting Hurley’s resignation.

³Feis, China Tangle, p. 408.


Noted for his Choctaw war whoop, Hurley evoked the same response of shock in the announcement of his resignation before the National Press Club in Washington, D.C., on the 27th of November. To a stunned audience of newspapermen, Hurley emphasized that Soviet Russia had said that "the Chinese Communists are not in fact Communists at all." Hurley felt that foreign service career men "continuously told the Communist party and the world that they were betting on the wrong horse." He attacked these career men by declaring they "either did not know the American policy in China or they were deliberately opposing the policy." When Patrick Hurley delivered his dramatic speech, President Truman, who was attending a Cabinet luncheon, informed the Cabinet of the contents of Hurley's speech. Secretary of the Navy James Forrestal said that Hurley's action "was a complete surprise to both the President and the Secretary of State," both of whom believed that Hurley was going to return to China. Harry Truman recalled in his Memoirs that he had persuaded Hurley on November 27, the day of his announcement of resignation, to go back to

---

7 Ibid., p. 69.
8 Forrestal, Forrestal Diaries, p. 163.
China, even though Patrick Hurley denied that he had spoken with the President on that day.\(^9\) Truman described Hurley's "impetuous" actions as "an utterly inexplicable about-face."\(^10\)

Secretary of State Byrnes informed the President that the Hurley resignation "was a mistake."\(^11\) President Truman discussed with his Cabinet the choice of a successor to General Hurley. Secretary of Agriculture Clinton Anderson suggested the former Chief of Staff, General George C. Marshall. Anderson judged that Marshall's appointment "would take the headlines away from Hurley's resignation."\(^12\) Anderson's suggestion was agreed upon unanimously by Truman and his Cabinet. Following the Cabinet meeting, the President announced and accepted the resignation of Ambassador Hurley and then he announced the appointment of George Marshall as presidential representative to China.


\(^10\)Truman, Memoirs, II, Years of Trial and Hope, p. 66. President Truman said that Hurley's letter of resignation had been given to the press.


Why Hurley had taken so long to resign from his post since his arrival from Chungking in late September must be investigated in order to discover the reason or reasons Hurley decided not to return to China and proceeded to attack the Truman Administration's China policy in his National Press Club Speech. Ambassador Hurley returned to the United States in late September and promptly informed Secretary Byrnes that he wished to resign from his post for reasons of health.13 Hurley's subsequent checkup at Walter Reed Hospital indicated that his health had improved, and he told President Truman and Secretary Byrnes that he had decided to return to China following a rest in the United States.14 Hurley requested that a public statement of policy toward China be issued by the Administration but no statement was issued.15

Ambassador Hurley met with President Truman and Secretary Byrnes on October 13 and informed them that he intended to resign because he was not receiving support for American foreign policy from American foreign service

officers. Hurley agreed to remain at his post if the career officers, who were sabotaging his efforts in China, were reassigned to other positions. The Ambassador again asked "for either a public statement or a written statement of American policy in China, but no such definitive statement was issued." Hurley returned to his home in Santa Fe and remained there for four weeks. He was kept informed by the State Department of China's "almost hopeless" conflict between the Communists and the Nationalists. In hopes of obtaining a response from Washington on American policy toward China, Hurley delivered his Santa Fe speech on November 15. Hurley reviewed America's role in China by strongly emphasizing that "a free, united, independent China has been for many years a strong and consistent tenet of U.S. foreign policy." "The people of China and their leaders," reflected Hurley, "are free to choose their own form of Government, furnish their own leadership, make their own decisions, and be responsible for their own policies." Unknown to Hurley, the Administration was

16 Lohbeck, Patrick J. Hurley, p. 421.
17 Ibid., p. 422.
18 Feis, China Tangle, p. 407.
20 Ibid., p. 63.
reexamining its China policy which would be released to
the American people in the President's statement of
December 15.\textsuperscript{21}

Hurley traveled to Washington and on November 25 he
discussed his resignation twice with Secretary Byrnes.\textsuperscript{22}
Byrnes asked him to reconsider his resignation in view of
the serious situation in China. Hurley agreed to return
to his post immediately after his speech before the
National Press Club on November 27. He recalled that he
had unsuccessfully requested a conference with President
Truman on November 25 and again, two days later.\textsuperscript{23}

Hurley's decision not to resign was reversed by a
series of events. First, Everett Drumright, head of the
Chinese Division of the State Department, showed Hurley a
letter addressed to President Truman which attacked
Hurley's policy as "not the policy of the United States."\textsuperscript{24}
According to Hurley, John Carter Vincent, head of the Far
Eastern desk in the State Department, declined to send out

\begin{footnotes}
\item[21] Tsou, America's Failure, p. 341.
\item[22] U.S., Congress, Senate, Investigation of Far
\item[23] Lohbeck, Patrick J. Hurley, p. 503. There is no
mention of this request in Truman's Memoirs, II, Years of
Trial and Hope.
\item[24] U.S., Congress, Senate, Investigation of Far
Eastern Policy, Testimony of Patrick J. Hurley, pp. 90, 96;
Lohbeck, Patrick J. Hurley, p. 443.
\end{footnotes}
Drumright's proposed reply and ordered a short two-sentence acknowledgment of the letter. This incident augmented Hurley's mistrust of foreign service officers, who he suspected were attempting to undermine his work. Second, Hurley was attacked on the floor of the House by Representative Hugh DeLacy, who noted that "step by step Ambassador Hurley's reversals of the Roosevelt-Gauss policy in China have made the present war unavoidable. He and General Wedemeyer have now committed us to armed intervention." Hurley thought that DeLacy's speech contained unpublished information which had been passed from the State Department to DeLacy.

Although Hurley labeled the DeLacy speech as his prime reason for resignation, he recalled at the 1951 MacArthur Hearings that the Chinese Minister of Foreign Relations, Wang Shih-chieh, had told him that Secretary Byrnes was "going to give my place to a deserving Democrat." Hurley also noted that the publication of his statements in the Daily Worker and several newspapers


26U.S., Congress, Senate, Military Situation, Part 4, Testimony of Patrick J. Hurley, p. 2937. Patrick Hurley was warned by Dr. Quo, who was working at the United Nations, that "if I would go to China, the idea was to get me over there and find some pretext of public disgrace."
proved to him those statements had originated in the State Department. 27 Noted Far Eastern expert Herbert Feis surmised that Hurley's insecurity about the completion of his mission may have contributed to his resignation. 28 Hurley might have perceived his inability to unite the two irreconcilable groups into a united and democratic China.

Hurley thought that the urgency of the Far Eastern situation and the inability on the part of Washington officials to take a definite stand on American policy in China demanded that he bring this matter before the American people. He believed that the State Department was "covering itself with a veil of secrecy that prevents the public from getting at the facts." 29 He felt that he was left "naked to my enemies" and decided to "commence firing" because "it was futile for me to try to uphold the American policy while I had such great odds against me in the State Department." 30

Although Hurley's resignation and the ensuing accusations brought him to the attention of the American people, President Truman refused to comment on Hurley's charges.

27 Ibid.
28 Feis, China Tangle, p. 409.
Senator Tom Connally, a leading Democrat, judged that the DeLacy speech "is the greatest achievement any member of the House of Representatives has attained in my time in Congress." Connally was amazed that "one little speech" had driven "a great Ambassador from his post in China." Washington Post correspondent Edward T. Folliard wondered whether Hurley was "launching a Hurley-for-President when he resigned and cut loose with his broadside." Whether Hurley was running for the Senate, the Presidency or possessed no political ambitions, Major General Claire Lee Chennault spoke for many Americans when he praised Hurley for "placing the issue of American foreign policy squarely before the American people." In an article in the Atlanta Journal of November 28, former Foreign Service Officer Hugh Grant praised the former Ambassador for "a

---


32 Ibid. See also editorial by Richard Lloyd Jones in the Tulsa Tribune on Nov. 30, 1945, as printed in U.S., Congress, House, "Pat Hurley for President," Extension of Remarks of Representative George W. Schwabe, 79th Cong., 1st sess., Dec. 4, 1945, Congressional Record, XCI, Part 13, A5277, and Drew Pearson, "The Washington Merry-Go-Round," Washington Post, Dec. 11, 1945, p. 8B. Mr. Pearson stated that "Friends say that Hurley will run for the Senate from New Mexico and two years hence would like to make a stab at the Presidency. Regarding the latter goal, seasoned Republican politicos say he won't have a chance."

distinct public service in revealing the destructionist tactics of American Foreign Service 'career' officers in the Far East and the State Department. This sort of business, said Grant, has been going on for a long time in our Foreign Service, but few men possessed Pat Hurley's courage to speak out."

Hurley's resignation set off a congressional debate, with Senators and Representatives lining up, in most cases, on a partisan basis. This debate opened "up full blast against President Truman and his foreign policy, or what many allege, his lack of foreign policy." Senator Kenneth S. Wherry, the Republican Whip from Nebraska, demanded on the floor of the Senate that an immediate investigation of Hurley's charges against the State Department personnel be initiated. Senator Wherry reported that the conduct of those State Department employees

---

34 Hugh Grant, "Few Men Have Courage," Atlanta Journal, Nov. 28, 1945, as printed in U.S., Congress, Senate, Investigation of Far Eastern Policy, p. 125. Hugh Grant, who was a member of the State Department from 1933 to 1942, was a former United States Minister to Albania and Thailand. Mr. Grant offered to testify before the Foreign Relations Committee on foreign service sabotage activities in Thailand during the Second World War.


"skirts the edge of treason." The Republican Whip concluded his address by introducing a resolution calling for a special committee of five Senators "to make a full and complete study and investigation with respect to the policies, operations, administration, and personnel of the Department of State." Another Republican, Senator Raymond E. Willis of Indiana, called for "some explaining and housecleaning" by the State Department. Senator Tom Connally, Chairman of the Foreign Relations Committee, recommended that Ambassador Hurley appear before his committee to explain "his extraordinary and dramatic resignation." Connally announced: "I'd like to have General Hurley come up here and look us in the eye and tell us what some of these terrible things are."

In the House of Representatives, Congresswoman Edith Nourse Rogers of Massachusetts and Congressman Carl T. Curtis of Nebraska, both Republicans, called for an investigation of the State Department. Mrs. Rogers wished


38 S. Res. 197 as printed in U.S., Congress, Senate, Investigation of Far Eastern Policy, p. 145.


that the Foreign Affairs Committee, of which she was a member, would summon Hurley "to give us the facts in the charges he made, since the country is entitled to know." Representative Hugh DeLacy, a Democrat, also urged that the Foreign Affairs Committee investigate the "rotten Hurley policy" in China. Members of the House, particularly Albert Gore, Democrat from Tennessee, Christian A. Herter, Republican from Massachusetts, and Chester E. Merrow, Republican from New Hampshire, introduced resolutions in the House for a complete investigation into Hurley's charges.

While congressmen advocated an investigation into Hurley's attacks, other congressmen, like Pat Hurley, felt that too little information on our China policy was given to the American people. In a speech on the floor of the House, Representative Frances P. Bolton, a Republican from Ohio and a member of the Foreign Affairs Committee, protested that "all too little information is given the people of the United States in the matter of what we are doing

---

41Quoted in Ibid. See also U.S., Congress, House, Representative Edith N. Rogers' H. Res. 443 requesting Secretary Byrnes to render information regarding Hurley's resignation "and the sabotage of our foreign policy in China" to the Foreign Affairs Committee, 79th Cong., 1st sess., Nov. 30, 1945, Congressional Record, XCI, Part 9, 11280.

and we are attempting to do in the foreign fields."\(^{43}\)

A Republican member of the House, Robert F. Jones of Ohio, demanded that the "entire field of American policy be investigated and that General Hurley be invited to address a joint session of Congress in recess."\(^{44}\)

As a result of the Senate resolution introduced by Senator Wherry, the Senate Foreign Relations Committee held hearings to investigate Ambassador Hurley's charges and to determine whether to reject or report the Wherry Resolution. As the star witness of the first two of the four days of hearings, General Patrick Hurley appeared before the Foreign Relations Committee on December 5 and 6. On December 5, Secretary of State James Byrnes' press release of that day was taken from the text of a letter, dated November 30, from the Secretary to Representative Jack Z. Anderson, a Republican from California, in answer to Anderson's inquiry on the clarification of America's China policy. Representative Anderson's letter to the Secretary of State noted that our relations toward China were "a subject of utmost importance to every citizen of the United States who is entitled to be kept fully informed of


our foreign relations policies throughout the entire world."45 "If the united support of our country's policies abroad is necessary and desirable," reflected Anderson, "and surely it is, then we must be kept fully informed of all future developments."46 The Secretary's reply to Anderson's letter reiterated American policy toward China:

We favor the creation of a strong, united, and democratic China which will contribute to peace and stability in the Far East and which will enable China effectively to support the United Nations.

In line with this policy, we deem it desirable and essential that China solve her internal problems. . . . [W]e seek by all appropriate and practicable means to pursue such policies and actions as will best facilitate China's achievement of internal unity and stability.47

This statement was expected to serve as the basis in the future for a more extensive statement from President Harry Truman.48

In a question posed to Hurley during the Foreign Relations hearings on the significance of Byrnes' letter to


46 Ibid., A5270.


Representative Anderson and the ensuing press release, Hurley stated that if the contents of Byrnes' letter "had been issued by the State Department before I returned from China, I would not have returned." If that public statement had been made by the State Department before I tendered my resignation," said Hurley, "I would not have resigned." Hurley repeatedly told committee members that he had been asking for a foreign policy pronouncement while he was in China and upon his return from China.

Responding to Hurley's accusations that he had requested but not received a public statement on China, Secretary Byrnes told the members of the Foreign Relations Committee that "I can state categorically that he has never made such a request in conversation with me." In a conversation with the President, Byrnes noted that President Truman had not been requested orally or in writing in regard to a public statement. Byrnes pointed out that he had responded to Representative Anderson's letter because "when a member of Congress requests an explanation of some aspect of our foreign policy, I take it as a matter


50 Ibid., pp. 84, 90, 101, 103.

51 Ibid., p. 148.
of course that the request should be answered." 52 Byrnes emphasized that if such inquiries were not made, he would issue a public statement "only as occasion may demand."

In testifying before the Foreign Relations Committee on December 7, Secretary Byrnes revealed to the committee members a preview of the upcoming presidential speech by informing them that China's Government must be broadened to include those groups which were not presently represented. 53 Byrnes then examined General Hurley's attacks on foreign service officers and defined their right to report what they had observed. Secretary Byrnes testified:

Whenever an official honestly believes that changed conditions require it, he should not hesitate to express his views to his superior officers. I should be profoundly unhappy to learn that an officer of the Department of State, within or without the Foreign Service, might feel bound to refrain from submitting through proper channels an honest report or recommendation for fear of offending me or anyone else in the Department. If that day should arrive, I will have lost the very essence of the assistance and guidance I require for the successful discharge of the heavy responsibilities of my office. 54

Even though the reports of foreign service officers weakened "faith in the power of the Generalissimo and his groups to govern China," Representative Mike Mansfield felt

52 Ibid.
53 Ibid., p. 146.
54 Ibid., p. 151.
that State Department career officers' "interests first and foremost must have been in our country's behalf." 55

Foreign service officers had maintained a flexible policy toward China by repeatedly advising in their in-depth reports against unqualified support of a corrupt regime. These men reported what they saw in Yenan and Nationalist China and "warned their superiors of the danger of tying the United States irrevocably to a regime that was rapidly discrediting itself and might well be unable to survive." 56

Washington Post correspondent Marquis Childs recalled in 1971 that these foreign service officers "reported the truth as they saw it." 57

While Secretary Byrnes and Representative Mansfield endorsed the honest and analytical fact-finding reports by foreign service officers, career officers not only criticized the Chungking Government of Chiang Kai-shek but also


criticized Ambassador Patrick Hurley's handling of America's foreign policy toward our ally. In April, 1945, the Deputy Director of the Office of Far Eastern Affairs, Edwin A. Stanton, noted that Ambassador Hurley's approach to China's complicated political problems was characterized by an intransigent and inflexible attitude.\textsuperscript{58} State Department officials encouraged Hurley to have a "completely flexible and realistic approach" to China's policy matters. Edwin Stanton's memorandum was an "attempt to put a high level curb on Hurley," who was giving "blank check" support to Chiang Kai-shek and his one-party government.\textsuperscript{59} Stanton also voiced deep concern over Hurley's restrictions upon political reporting by foreign service officers in China. "We have definite reason to believe," said Stanton, "that Hurley has ordered that only political events favorable to the Chinese National Government may be made to the Department." Stanton continued:

This means that the Department will receive restricted and incomplete information concerning developments in China and it is apparent that we can no longer count on receiving factual and objective reports in regard to all aspects of the situation which the Department must have if

\textsuperscript{58}U.S., Department of State, Foreign Relations, 1945, The Far East, p. 349. Memorandum of April 28, 1945, from Edwin A. Stanton to Under Secretary of State Joseph Grew and Assistant Secretary of State Holmes.

\textsuperscript{59}Ibid.; Service, Amerasia Papers, p. 120.
it is to conduct its foreign relations in an intelligent and successful manner.  

The State Department had bluntly and clearly stated that it was most concerned with Hurley's handling of China policy matters. John Service noted that the "unusual situation ... in which the government in Washington had one policy and its ambassador in China a different one persisted until Hurley's dramatic resignation."  

To support and substantiate the assertions he made in his National Press Club Speech, Pat Hurley often asked Chairman Connally to obtain from the State Department thirteen documents. Hurley believed that it was unfair for committee members to question him on unavailable documents which would support his assertions. Professor Anthony Kubek judged that Senator Connally would not release the documents because it would be detrimental to national security. In a closed meeting of the Foreign Relations

---


61 Service, Amerasia Papers, p. 121.


63 Kubek, How the Far East Was Lost, p. 291.
Committee on December 10, after the fourth and final session of hearings, Senator Styles Bridges of New Hampshire said that "what we saw in the secret documents 'substantiated in a general way' Hurley's complaints about his troubles in China." 64

At the three-hour closed meeting of the Foreign Relations Committee, Chairman Connally rejected the Hurley Resolution to investigate Hurley's charges. Connally stated that "there would be no more hearings on the Hurley charges, and no immediate action—maybe none at all—growing out of the committee's short-lived investigation." 65 The committee was in a state of "suspended recess" with the options of either forgetting the Hurley case or reopening the case. The top-to-bottom investigation of the State Department had terminated and the State Department had received "a virtual vote of confidence" by "dismissing the troublesome Hurley case of Patrick Hurley versus the State Department." 66

One pertinent document, which Hurley had requested during the hearings, was the secret Far Eastern agreements

---


65 Ibid.

of the Yalta Conference. He wanted the American people to learn of these agreements and he had originally included some information about the role of secrecy at the Yalta Conference in his letter of resignation. Senator Arthur H. Vandenberg, who was to be a representative of the United States at the Moscow Foreign Ministers' Meeting in mid-December, persuaded him not to mention it in his letter of resignation. Hurley agreed on the condition that after the Foreign Ministers' Meeting "the Yalta agreement [be] made public and ... changes in that document would be secured to preserve China's independence and territorial integrity." Hurley requested this document at the Foreign Relations Committee hearings, but Senator Vandenberg, a member of that committee, told him that possession of the Yalta document and a discussion of the Yalta Conference would hamper the efforts of Byrnes and himself at Moscow. Vandenberg asked Hurley: "Why don't you wait until it is over and you will be given an opportunity to say everything you wish to say." This idea of a temporary postponement was also evident in Senator Styles Bridges' suggestion on December 10 for a thorough investigation of Hurley's

---


charges "in a month or two." Hurley was not to testify again before a congressional committee until 1951.

Hurley wanted the American people to know the Far Eastern agreements within the Yalta document, but he trusted Senator Arthur Vandenberg and agreed that the exposure of Yalta's controversial provisions would harm the Foreign Ministers' Meeting in Moscow. President Roosevelt had believed that Soviet participation in the Far East was necessary to defeat Japan and agreed to the inclusion of the secret agreements. Stalin insisted that these agreements be put in writing and contain the following statement: "The Heads of the three Great Powers have agreed that these claims of the Soviet Union shall be unquestionably fulfilled after Japan has been defeated." If unrepresented China refused to agree to the Yalta agreement, the United States and Great Britain "would have been compelled to join in enforcing them." There is no record of conversation between Stalin and Roosevelt indicating the possibility that Chiang might not accept the Far Eastern provisions. Far Eastern expert Herbert Feis has said that "the whole record suggests that neither Roosevelt

---

70 U.S., Department of State, Foreign Relations, Conferences at Malta and Yalta, 1945, p. 984.
71 Sherwood, Roosevelt and Hopkins, p. 984.
nor Stalin thought it unlikely that Chiang Kai-shek would refuse his consent."72 Chiang was not informed of the contents of the Yalta document at the time of the conference or immediately following it "for fear knowledge of Stalin's intention to enter the Pacific War would reach the Japanese."73

The existence of these Far Eastern agreements was not disclosed in the joint communiqué which was published at the end of the conference or in President Roosevelt's address to a joint session of Congress on March 1, 1945. Secrecy was a military necessity and was maintained by the participants at the conference.74 Ambassador Hurley was not informed of the secret agreements until March and was not allowed to mention them to the Generalissimo until June. Hurley strongly opposed these agreements and emphasized that Chiang's Government was our ally. He objected to these agreements because they "gave away

72 Feis, Churchill, Roosevelt, Stalin, p. 515. See also Kubek, How the Far East Was Lost, p. 165.

73 Koen, "China Lobby," p. 51. At the Roosevelt-Stalin meeting of February 8, 1945, as recorded in U.S., Department of State, Foreign Relations, Conferences at Malta and Yalta, 1945, p. 768, President Roosevelt said that "one of the difficulties in speaking to the Chinese was that anything said to them was known to the whole world in twenty-four hours."

another's property." Hurley was infuriated that the contents of these agreements were kept secret from the Chinese people, Chiang Kai-shek and the American people. Even State Department Far Eastern specialists had no knowledge of the existence of any Yalta agreements pertaining to China. The head of the Far Eastern Division of the State Department did not learn of them until July, 1945.

During the month of May there was active consideration, particularly initiated by Assistant Secretary of State Joseph Grew, as to whether the Yalta decision should be reconsidered or carried into effect. In late April, President Truman had told Secretary of State Stettinius to inform Soviet Foreign Minister Molotov that if "one part" of the Yalta agreement "was breached he would consider the entire Yalta agreement was no longer binding on any of the parties interested." President Truman believed that

75Ibid., Part 4, Testimony of Patrick J. Hurley, p. 2840.

76Ibid., p. 2836.

77Service, Amerasia Papers, p. 130; Grew, Turbulent Era, II, p. 1444.

78Service, Amerasia Papers, p. 129. Memorandum of May 5, 1945, from Acting Secretary of State Joseph C. Grew to Secretary of the Navy James Forrestal.

79Forrestal, Forrestal Diaries, p. 50.
"our agreements with the Soviet Union so far had been a one-way street." This temporary reconsideration of American policy produced the decision not to revise the Yalta agreements but simply to have Stalin reclarify his position regarding Chinese sovereignty in Manchuria.

Even though General Hurley told Secretary Byrnes that he "did not ask for any hearing," he did want a hearing to air his views so that secrecy would not continue to prevail in our China policy. The American people did not learn much from the Foreign Relations Committee's investigation into the formulation and implementation of United States foreign policy. Prior to the termination of these hearings, Representative Hugh DeLacy, who had a most important part in Hurley's resignation, called on the floor of the House for Americans to learn the story of China not only from General Hurley but also from "those who know it well," particularly General Joseph Stilwell, former Ambassador Clarence Gauss, and American correspondents and businessmen who had returned from China. Only General Patrick

80 Ibid.
81 Tsou, America's Failure, p. 259.
Hurley, Secretary of State James Byrnes, Under Secretary of State Dean Acheson and war correspondent Theodore H. White testified before the Foreign Relations Committee. Not one foreign service career officer testified at these hearings, although their reports were criticized by General Hurley and praised by Secretary Byrnes.

Hurley's clashes with committee members during the hearings did not make for a pleasant atmosphere. Hurley was difficult to talk to and in many instances Chairman Tom Connally and his Senate colleagues found that Hurley chose not to answer their questions in a straightforward manner. John Service questioned Hurley's "balance" while Maxwell Stuart, a correspondent for Nation, attacked Hurley for "his attempt to shift the balance for his failure to his subordinates" as a reflection both of his vanity and of his incompetence. 83

The suppression of State Department documents deprived former Ambassador Hurley from presenting evidence to support his charges. A top-to-bottom investigation, as

November 30, 1945. This newspaper article did not give any information about this meeting.

83 U.S., Congress, Senate, United States-China Relations, p. 45; Margaret Truman described Hurley in her book, Harry S. Truman, p. 300, as an "excitable, unstable man, given to wild statements and accusations of disloyalty"; Maxwell S. Stuart, "Exit Pat Hurley," The Nation, December 3, 1945, p. 614.
originally envisioned by Senator Kenneth Wherry, might have thoroughly investigated America's Far Eastern foreign policy. The originators, reporters, proponents and opponents of this policy might have provided a constructive inquiry into that policy. Representative Mike Mansfield of Montana delivered a speech in the House one day after the Foreign Relations Committee had ended its investigation into Hurley's charges. Mansfield stated that he did not know what America's postwar Far Eastern policy was and emphasized that Americans had a right to know what it was. 84 "The American people must be kept more fully informed of our foreign policy," said Mansfield, "so that they may know in what direction we are heading." 85 He declared that the Senate Foreign Relations Committee and the House Foreign Affairs Committee should be kept informed on American foreign policy developments, with each committee meeting at regular intervals with the Secretary of State or the Under Secretary of State.

Had the American people learned at this time of Chiang's corrupt government and the inability of that government ever to govern China, our China policy might

---


85 Ibid., p. 11853.
have been quite different. If the Foreign Relations Committee's hearings had investigated the role of the career officers, who were stationed in China and were in the Far Eastern and Chinese Divisions of the State Department, those men could have been returned to their jobs instead of moving from one unsuitable job to another until their retirement. Hurley's attack was successful in one aspect: it destroyed the careers of many of America's foreign service officers stationed in China and deprived the State Department of valuable information on the Yenan and Chungking Governments.
CHAPTER III
THE APPOINTMENT OF GENERAL GEORGE C. MARSHALL

On November 27, 1945, in "a shrewd political counter stroke," President Harry Truman announced and accepted the resignation of Major General Patrick J. Hurley as Ambassador to China while he announced the appointment of former Chief of Staff and General of the Army George C. Marshall as Special Envoy of the President to China. 1 The selection of Marshall confirmed the importance President Truman assigned to the explosive situation and aided in "canceling the effect of Hurley's explosion." 2 Speaking of this appointment at a press conference, the President noted that "he is a Special Envoy to China for a Special job and it is temporary." 3 Whether or not the President remembered Personal Representative Edwin A. Locke's report of August, 1945, he did employ one of Locke's proposals to avert civil war by the appointment of a personal envoy to China, "preferably some experienced negotiator with a 'middle of

1 "Our Choice in China," p. 781.

2 Tuchman, Stilwell, p. 526.

the road1 reputation and who is well regarded in China, Russia and Great Britain."4

Public reaction to Truman's appointment of George Marshall was quite favorable. Commanding General of the American Forces in China Albert C. Wedemeyer felt that "few men in the United States are better equipped to evaluate the situation [in China] than General Marshall," who would determine how much American military aid was to be extended to the Chinese National Government.5 Senator Tom Connally believed that Marshall "would make an ideal emissary because he is such an outstanding military man."6 "If we don't send a peacemaker," said Connally, "we will either have to pull out of China entirely or fight a full-scale war on the side of Chiang Kai-shek's corrupt and reactionary government."7 In a speech on the floor of the House, Mike Mansfield announced that Marshall knew "far more about


7Ibid.
the Chinese situation than many Chinese experts."\(^8\) Mansfield reasoned that "his appointment shows how important we consider China and how difficult the Chinese problem is." "Perhaps the problem is not capable of solution," loudly voiced Mansfield, "but if we ever have any one man who can unlock the key to the Chinese puzzle that man is General Marshall." At the Foreign Ministers' Meeting in Moscow in mid-December, 1945, Stalin lauded Marshall: "If any man could settle the situation it would be General Marshall."\(^9\) Foreign Minister Molotov thought that the United States "could have found no better person for this difficult task" and "that he was there as a special representative of the President and not an Ambassador."\(^10\)

Although public reaction to General Marshall's appointment was generally favorable, two Americans opposed President Truman's choice. The Supreme Commander of American Forces in the Pacific, General Douglas MacArthur,


\(^9\) U.S., Department of State, Foreign Relations, 1945, The Far East, p. 849. Memorandum of Conversation on December 23, 1945, between Secretary of State Byrnes and Generalissimo Stalin. See also Byrnes, Speaking Frankly, p. 228.

believed that Marshall "will do more harm than good." Representative Ellis Patterson, a Democrat from California, thought that Truman's selection of Marshall was a "poor appointment" because he "doesn't know anything about China and he is a soldier."  

While Marshall did "possess unique qualifications and rare skill," the General neither anticipated his appointment nor "was he particularly keen about it." Marshall wanted to retire to his home in Leesburg, Virginia. In a conversation with Mrs. George Marshall, American correspondent and adviser to Chiang Kai-shek during 1946, John Robinson Beal, learned of Mrs. Marshall's bitterness that her husband "should be assigned, just at the moment of retirement, to be a messenger boy between the Generalissimo and the Communists, because that's all it is."  

It was rumored in late November that an important reason Marshall accepted his appointment "was to lay the ground

---

11 General Douglas MacArthur made this statement to General Wang Chih, Chinese liaison officer, who informed Chung-Gi Kwei, as reported in Kwei, *The Kuomintang Communist Struggle*, p. 115.


for his appointment as Secretary of State if and when Byrnes decides to step out." Chinese correspondent Hoh Chih-hsing recalled that Marshall accepted his appointment "mainly at the request of President Truman and out of a sincere desire to work for the common good of China and America." Hoh continued:

He had apparently no great personal ambitions and his sole reward, as perhaps he had foreseen, would be the goodwill of the peoples of the two countries. Actually the mission was thrust into his hands, but he was not aware of the difficulties and complications involved when he consented to take it.

On November 30, 1945, three days after his appointment, George Marshall commented on the China situation that the United States would find itself "on the horns of a dilemma." Marshall noted that the United States Government

---


17 Ibid.

18 U.S., Department of State, Foreign Relations, 1945, The Far East, p. 748. Memorandum of November 30, 1945, from General George C. Marshall to Fleet Admiral William D. Leahy, Chief of Staff to President Truman.
was reluctant "to make as plain or bold a statement" which must indicate "what we mean so that the people at home and the people in China, and the Russians also, will clearly understand our intentions."\(^{19}\)

As General Marshall appeared before the Pearl Harbor congressional investigating committee, the White House and the State Department prepared four directives for Marshall's Mission to China. One of these directives became the presidential statement on China which was delivered on December 15, the day on which Marshall departed for his new post. This statement "laid down in black and white" for America and the world the principles of United States policy toward China.\(^{20}\) John Carter Vincent, Secretary of State Byrnes, Under Secretary of State Acheson, Generals John E. Hull, Louis A. Craig and Thomas T. Hardy, Fleet Admiral William Leahy, Time correspondent James Shepley and George Marshall assisted in the preparation of Marshall's written instructions on China.\(^{21}\)

---

\(^{19}\)Ibid.

\(^{20}\)"Truman Promises Publicity on China," p. 3.

\(^{21}\)Readers may consult the following sources for further information on Marshall's China directives: Acheson, Present at the Creation, p. 142; U.S., Congress, Senate, Military Situation, Part 1, Testimony of George C. Marshall, pp. 459-60; Feis, China Tangle, p. 413; and U.S., Department of State, Foreign Relations, 1945, The Far East, pp. 745-73.
The State Department had been reanalyzing its China policy since October and foreign service officers had prepared numerous memorandums on our China policy.

On November 26, Secretaries Forrestal and Patterson presented a long memorandum on the military departments' proposals on the situation in China to Secretary of State Byrnes. The Patterson-Forrestal memorandum called for the State Department to "provide a definitive policy to cover the period of the next few years in China." The two Secretaries recognized that it was "impossible to support Chiang [in demobilization and repatriation] against the Japanese without also supporting him against the Chinese Communists" and "firmly elected to accept the risks of the latter course." To assist in repatriating the Japanese, the Secretaries recommended that the Marines remain in China in spite of their probable involvement in internecine warfare.

On the following day, the Secretaries of State, War and Navy met to study the situation in China. Secretary of War Robert Patterson was perplexed over General Wedemeyer's view that the General was unable to demobilize and repatriate the Japanese "without becoming involved in the Chinese

22 Forrestal, Forrestal Diaries, p. 111.
23 Ibid.
civil conflict." Secretary Byrnes believed that the wisest course for the United States "was to try to force the Chinese Government and the Chinese Communists to get together on a compromise basis, perhaps telling Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek that we will stop the aid to his government unless he goes along with this." Byrnes indicated the possibility that the United States could establish a common policy with Russia toward China. Secretary Patterson interjected that it was "clearly in our interests to see China united under Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek if that is possible." 24

On November 28, John Carter Vincent prepared a memorandum entitled "Outline of Suggested Course of Action in China." This memorandum was used in the preparation of the presidential statement of December 15. Vincent emphasized that the United States "is prepared to assist the National Government in effecting the rapid demobilization and repatriation of Japanese troops in north China." 25 Even though the United States recognized and supported the National Government of China as the only legal government, Vincent reasoned that "it cannot support that Government.


by military intervention in an internecine struggle. 26 Vincent said that "the United States is prepared to arrange ... for a truce between the opposing forces" if this country was requested by the National Government. 27 For this truce to be effective, it should be accompanied by the immediate convocation of a national conference to seek a peaceful solution to China's political strife. Vincent labeled the National Government a "one-party government" and thought that military, political and democratic reform could only be attained "if the basis of that Government is broadened to include other political elements in the country" with the existence of autonomous armies hampering this endeavor. 28 Vincent's last recommendation, which was definitely included in the December presidential statement, emphasized the if-then pattern by declaring that "if the Chinese Government is able to bring about peace and unity along the lines described, the United States is prepared

26 Ibid. In U.S., Department of State, Foreign Relations, 1945, The Far East, p. 755, this point was reiterated in a State Department memorandum dated December 8, 1945, with Secretary Byrnes noting that it contained his views of American policy toward China.


28 Ibid. See also U.S., Department of State, Foreign Relations, 1945, The Far East, p. 772, especially the memorandum by Deputy Director of the Office of Far Eastern Affairs, James K. Penfield.
to assist the Chinese Government in every reasonable way. . . ."29 China must accomplish reform or America would not provide assistance to her.

At a presidential news conference on December 7, 1945, the President was asked if General Marshall would try to get "the two factions together again."30 President Truman replied: "I hope so." One day later, Secretary Byrnes told General Marshall that before his departure for China "a firm and unequivocal policy [would] be published."31 "Otherwise," said Byrnes, "you, the JCS [the Joint Chiefs of Staff] and the War and Navy Departments may continue to be hamstrung by the vague, indecisive, delaying tactics which have characterized U.S. policy toward China since Japanese capitulation."

Vincent's late-November memorandum was echoed by Secretary Byrnes in his memorandum of December 9, 1945.32 Byrnes' memorandum was one of the four directives which


30 U.S., President, Public Papers, Truman, 1945, p. 528.


32 Ibid., pp. 760-61. Memorandum of December 9, 1945, from Secretary Byrnes to the War Department.
Marshall took with him to China. Byrnes strongly urged that "the Central Government of China as well as the various dissident elements approach the settlement of their differences with a genuine willingness to compromise." 33

Again, like Vincent, Byrnes called for the cessation of hostilities and the convocation of a national conference of representatives of divergent political elements.

Following General Marshall's departure for Chungking on December 15, President Harry Truman issued his statement on United States policy toward China. The President laid down the principle that "a strong, united and democratic China" was most important to the success of the United Nations as well as to the success of world peace. 34 Truman labeled the National Government of the Republic of China as the only legal government of China and called it a "one-party government" whose political, military, and democratic reform would "be furthered if the basis of the Government is broadened to include other political elements in the country." 35 "A China disorganized and divided by ... internal strife," said the Commander-in-Chief, was "an undermining influence to world stability and peace, now and

33 Ibid.
34 U.S., President, Public Papers, Truman, 1945, p. 543.
in the future."\(^{36}\) Truman felt that China's internal affairs were the responsibility of China alone and encouraged the Chinese to solve their internal differences by peaceful negotiation. The President deemed it essential that the fighting between the armies of the Communists and the Nationalists cease with the subsequent convocation of a national conference of representatives of China's diverse political parties. If China achieved peace and unity along Truman's prescribed lines, the United States would render financial assistance to the National Government in postwar reconstruction and rehabilitation.

President Truman announced that the National Government had the only alternative of bringing the Communists into the government or continuing civil war.\(^{37}\) Truman's statement clearly enunciated that there would be no United States military intervention to influence the outcome of the Chinese civil conflict while American Marines remained in north China for the surrender, demobilization and repatriation of Japanese troops. Secretary of State Byrnes recalled that Marshall was informed verbally by the President that "the Chinese Nationalists were not to

\(^{36}\)Ibid., p. 543.

be left entirely without help, regardless of the success or failure of his efforts to promote a peaceful settlement." 38 "All factions," said Byrnes, "were to be impressed . . . that if China was ravaged by civil war, the United States would not intervene." The Truman statement, an outgrowth of Vincent's draft of late November, was a continuation of the American Government's policy of conditional aid to Chiang Kai-shek with a new dimension or shift of emphasis that no aid would be rendered to the Chinese Government unless it settled its differences with the Communists.

The President's announcement noted that the existence of the armies of the National Government and the armies of the Chinese Communist Government made political unity impossible in China. 39 This issue would continue to be one of the main obstacles to agreement between the Nationalists and the Communists, with the Nationalists desiring full control over the Communist armies prior to any reorganization of the Government and the Communists insisting that the coalition should come first.


39 U.S., President, Public Papers, Truman, 1945, p. 545.
The Kuomintang and Communist reaction to the presidential statement was one of general approval as revealed by New York Times correspondent Tillman Durdin, who expressed the view that even though the announcement "buoyed hopes for a peaceful settlement, commentators were not inclined to assert that the declaration provided certain means of solution." "It is clear that much will depend on the forcefulness and astuteness," said Durdin, "with which General George C. Marshall works within the terms of his directive." Communists were pleased that President Truman had, for the first time, referred to the Chinese Government as a one-party government and they also applauded Mr. Truman's pledge of nonintervention in Chinese internal affairs.

In a series of six articles on Marshall's Mission to China, Chinese correspondent Hoh Chih-hsing recalled in 1947 that American journalists had referred to Truman's China statement as a "big stick statement." These journalists believed that General George Marshall "was

---


42Quoted in Hoh Chih-hsing, "Impressive Achievements," p. 2., in the Seeklock Collection.
going to China with a club in his hands, with which he was
to bring the rival parties there together." Correspond-
ent Hoh emphasized that the "big stick" was the promised
American loan to China.

American-educated Lo Lung-chi, a member of the
Democratic League, felt that the Chinese words "Hu Yin" or
"Call and Answer" described China's situation after the
announcement of the American statement of policy toward
China. Lo declared: "We have called, America has
answered." Historian Kenneth Scott Latourette stated that
Marshall's presence was a violation of our intention not
to intervene in Chinese internal affairs. Marshall's
China Mission was to be a most difficult task for the
General. Many Americans agreed with Barnet Nover's
analysis: "It is not too much to say ... that not only
the future of China but the peace of the world depend on
the success or failure of his mission." The American
people earnestly believed that General Marshall's
prestige could not fail to break down the interparty

\[43\text{Ibid.}\]
\[44\text{Tillman Durdin, "China Continues Debate on Policy,"}
\text{New York Times, Dec. 18, 1945, p. 2.}\]
\[45\text{Kenneth Scott Latourette, The American Record in}
\text{the Far East, 1945-1951 (New York: Macmillan Company,}
\text{1952), p. 106.}\]
\[46\text{Nover, "China Policy," p. 10.}\]
differences. If Marshall could not succeed, then no one would be able to accomplish this formidable task, even though the presence of Marshall and the Marines was a violation of our intention not to intervene in Chinese internal affairs. Even Marshall's old friend, General Joseph Stilwell, cautioned him on the success of his forthcoming mission: "Once Chiang Kai-shek sensed the situation he would become more intransigent. Don't you realize the Chinese respect only power?"

When General Marshall left for Chungking, he carried with him as one of the directives a highly important letter from President Truman in which he told him to speak to all Chinese leaders, including Chiang, "with the utmost frankness." Marshall was to inform them "that a China disunited and torn by civil strife could not be considered realistically as a proper place for American assistance. . . ." Truman admitted that Marshall's presence in China was "the clearest evidence" of his great concern for the


48 Tuchman, Stilwell, p. 527.

troubled and equally complicated situation. President Truman recalled in his *Memoirs* that he had sent the General to China "not to intervene in the affairs of that country but to render whatever aid we could to the cause of peace there." To Truman, the alternatives to a strong, united and democratic China, which Marshall was to assist in achieving, would be either "disunity or prolonged civil war, neither of which would be in our interests nor in the interests of international peace." The American Government was starting on its last determined effort to bring about peace and unity in China but was uncertain, according to Herbert Feis, "as to how firmly to support Chiang Kai-shek, and unwilling to risk the involvement of our fast waning forces in the threatening civil war."

President Truman, a great admirer of General George Marshall, called the General "the greatest living

---

50 Truman, *Memoirs*, II, *Years of Trial and Hope*, p. 92. In U.S., Congress, Senate, *Military Situation*, Part I, Testimony of General George C. Marshall, pp. 396-97, General Marshall recalled that he had been sent to China with the instructions that the "only hope of China, long-run view of it, was to bring about an integration of the Communists with the Nationalist force."

51 *U.S., Department of State, Foreign Relations, 1945*, The Far East, p. 773. Letter of December 15, 1945, from President Truman to General Marshall. This letter is not the same letter as recorded in footnote 49.

52 Feis, *China Tangle*, p. 428.
One of Truman's biographers, Jonathan Daniels, thought that "Truman had . . . more confidence in Marshall than in anybody in the government and probably anybody in the world. Truman completely trusted Marshall." Following Truman's statement on China, he notified all United States agencies which were transacting business with the Chinese to suspend their discussions immediately. Marshall would coordinate all negotiations with China and "have complete control of America's China policy." Marshall exercised a free hand and called the shots for President Truman while he was in China as the President's Special Representative but found his role difficult, thankless and troublesome. He acted as


intermediary, adviser, referee, errand boy, postman and peacemaker between the National Government and the Chinese Communists. 57

As General Marshall began his efforts toward political, military and democratic reform in China, the Council of Foreign Ministers of the United States, Great Britain and Russia concluded its meeting in Moscow. The final communiqué, which was issued, supported the Sino-Soviet Treaty and "reaffirmed their adherence to the policy of non-interference in the internal affairs of China." 58

Marshal Stalin felt that if the Chinese people knew Chiang was depending on foreign troops, he would lose his influence. 59 Foreign Minister Molotov and Secretary Byrnes agreed "to the desirability of withdrawal of Soviet and American forces from China at the earliest practicable


59 Byrnes, Speaking Frankly, p. 228.
moment..."  

George Kennan, who had predicted in April, 1945, the Soviet Union's "fluid, resilient" policy toward China, felt that Russia "sought predominant influence in China" through noninterference, intrigue and support of a coalition government in which the Communist Party would capture control of the government. Stalin's outward show of cooperation could be a tactical move on his part to serve the Soviet Union and assist the Chinese Communists to extend their influence. Marshall would face this predicament in his many exasperating attempts to seek a political and military solution to war-torn China.

The role which America was to play in this Chinese tangle was spelled out in Truman's December statement, which Marshall attempted to carry out in China. The United States desired Generalissimo Chiang to broaden the government to include other political elements. Foreign service officers had informed their superiors of the growing influence of the Kuomintang's rival since August, 1944. In a letter to President Franklin Roosevelt in January, 1945,


Secretary of State Edward Stettinius evaluated the Chinese situation.

China is in a dilemma. Coalition would mean an end of conservative Kuomintang domination and open the way for the more virile and popular Communists to extend their influence to the point perhaps of controlling the Government. Failure to settle with the Communists, who are daily growing stronger, would invite the danger of an eventual overthrow of the Kuomintang.62

Secretary Stettinius was not the first or the last official to inform President Roosevelt of the Communist influence in China. Sinologist Edgar Snow observed that President Roosevelt was quite concerned about the situation in China and informed Snow of his solution: "I've been working with two governments there. I intend to go on doing so until we can get them together."63

In late February, 1945, Foreign Service Officer John Service reported to his superiors his conversation with General Claire Lee Chennault's aide, Captain Joseph Alsop. Alsop put little faith in a coalition of the two rival groups, declaring that the Communists are not "really willing to accept any compromise or coalition short of


complete control of China." Congressman Walter Judd also rejected the idea of Communist participation in the formation of a coalition government. General Albert Wedemeyer never thought that a coalition of the Communist forces with Chinese forces could be obtained. John Paton Davies, in a report from his new post as Second Secretary of the Embassy in Moscow, said that the Communists desired coalition "because it would mean a relatively cheap acquisition of control over most if not all of China." Wedemeyer concurred with Davies' statement. "If coalition was not forthcoming," reported Davies, "they can afford to wait." Time was on the Communists' side.

At the end of the Second World War, Edwin A. Locke submitted to President Truman a proposal to avert impending

64 Quoted in Service, Amerasia Papers, p. 185. Service interviewed Captain Alsop on February 28, 1945.
civil war in China. "The only alternative to civil war," said Locke, "is some far-reaching adjustment and compromise between the two factions resulting in a genuine democratic government." Locke was not the only official following the War to propose coalition as a solution to China's internal civil war. In 1948 Stalin informed Eduard Kardelji, a chief aide and official biographer of Marshal Tito:

After the war we invited the Chinese comrades to come to Moscow and we discussed the situation in China. We told them bluntly that we considered the development of the uprising in China had no prospect, and that Chinese comrades should join the Chiang Kai-shek government and dissolve their army. The Chinese comrades agreed here with the views of the Soviet comrades, but went back to China and acted otherwise. They mustered their forces, organized their armies, and now, as we see, they are beating the Chiang Kai-shek army. Now, in the case of China, we admit we were wrong. It proved that the Chinese comrades and not the Soviet comrades were right.71

In testifying before the subcommittee of the Committee of the Judiciary in 1952, John Carter Vincent

70 Ibid., p. 449. Memorandum of August 20, 1945, from Edwin A. Locke, Jr., Personal Representative of President Truman in charge of the American Production Mission in China, to President Truman.

recalled that the proposal for coalition was an attempt to avoid "the worst possible disaster that could come to Chiang, which was the outbreak of general civil war."\textsuperscript{72} At the time of Truman's proposal for broadening the base of the Chinese Government, civil warfare had not broken out throughout China. Vincent believed that this proposal "was not the perfect solution" although "it was better than civil war."\textsuperscript{73} He thought that civil war "would have been a direct advantage to the Communists."\textsuperscript{74} Vincent observed that the President's proposal for a broadening of the base of the National Government would have brought the Communists into the government on a minority basis, and with American support of Chiang's Government the United States "could eventually strengthen the Chinese Government enough to eliminate the Communists."\textsuperscript{75} Chiang would retain control of this government, particularly since President Truman had classified Chiang's Government as the only legal government in China.

In the United States' efforts to broaden the base of the Chinese Government, many Americans feared that the

\begin{footnotesize}
\begin{enumerate}
\item \textsuperscript{72}U.S., Congress, Senate, Institute of Pacific Relations, Part 6, Testimony of John Carter Vincent, p. 1714.
\item \textsuperscript{73}Ibid., Part 7, p. 2217.
\item \textsuperscript{74}Ibid., Part 6, p. 1722.
\item \textsuperscript{75}Ibid., pp. 1714, 1716.
\end{enumerate}
\end{footnotesize}
United States faced a dilemma. Sinologist John K. Fairbank believed that America faced two intertwining objectives: to encourage the Chinese leaders to reform their government by decreasing their influence and power to bring internal peace to their country, and to strengthen the Kuomintang regime "as a step toward political stability in East Asia." Fairbank viewed these objectives as both building up the Kuomintang regime and tearing it down. Marshall was supposed to apply pressure solely upon the Kuomintang Government. Historian Anthony Kubek thought that pressure could have been exerted upon the Yenan Government by informing Mao Tse-tung and Chou En-lai that "unless they recognized the supremacy of Chiang's Government, the United States would assist Chiang without reservations." Sumner Welles, a former Under Secretary of State, felt that General Marshall tried "to browbeat Chiang Kai-shek" into admitting the Communist Party into the Chinese Government. General Claire Lee Chennault reported that the Generalissimo understood that a Communist minority in a coalition government "would actually result in complete

---


77 Kubek, How the Far East Was Lost, p. 342.

Communist domination of China." 79 At the 1951 Senate hearings into America's Far Eastern policy, General Douglas MacArthur recalled that the coalition proposal was "one of the greatest blunders in American diplomatic history." 80 MacArthur believed that it "at once weakened the government and materially strengthened the Communist minority."

---

79 Chennault, Way of a Fighter, p. xv. In the Foreign Relations' hearings on July 21, 1971, as recorded in U.S., Congress, Senate, United States-China Relations, p. 22, Senator Clifford P. Case of New Jersey spoke of the impossibility of reform by Chiang Kai-shek's Government. Senator Case said: "He [Chiang] had to reform himself out of existence which is too much to ask any man to do."

80 Quoted in U.S., Congress, Senate, Military Situation, Part 3, p. 2249.
CHAPTER IV

THE MARSHALL MISSION

When General George C. Marshall arrived in Chungking on December 20, 1945, General Albert Wedemeyer compared attempts to obtain a coalition government in China to mixing oil with water and informed Marshall that it would be impossible.¹ The Nationalists were determined not to relinquish any of their power to the Communists. Marshall reported to Wedemeyer that he would accomplish the goals of his mission with Wedemeyer's assistance.² Marshall immediately conferred with political leaders, correspondents and American embassy personnel. He learned from these conferences that everyone favored a united China but no one offered a solution as to how this might be accomplished.³ Generalissimo Chiang contended that


²Wedemeyer, Wedemeyer Reports!, p. 363.

Soviet Russia would play a significant role in the formation of a peaceful and united China.

Acting as an intermediary, General Marshall, in the words of historian Shen Yun-Kung, "made his experience and wisdom available to the Chinese leaders in their efforts to reach a solution of China's internal difficulties." Marshall succeeded in bringing the Communist and Nationalist representatives together for a meeting at which time the Communist representative, Chou En-lai, proposed a cessation of hostilities. Marshall firmly believed that the solution to China's difficulties rested with a cease-fire. This cease-fire would serve as "a psychological prelude" to the convocation of the Political Consultative Conference which would be represented by China's diverse political elements. Marshall's progress depended on the success of a compromise between both sides instead of allowing the civil war to continue until one side achieved victory.

The Nationalists and the Communists asked General Marshall to be the presiding member of a three-man

---

5 Acheson, Present at the Creation, p. 145. In U.S., Congress, Senate, Institute of Pacific Relations, Part 6, p. 1717, John Carter Vincent recalled that General Marshall "immediately set about organizing . . . truce teams to stop the fighting; that was his own idea."
committee, to be named the Committee of Three, and represented by General Chang Chun of the Kuomintang and General Chou En-lai of the Communist Party to create a useful truce plan. The Committee of Three met for the first time on January 7, 1946, and reached an agreement on January 10, ordering a cessation of hostilities and the freezing of military positions by January 13. Upon signing this agreement, Marshall, who "was a very powerful and moving speaker," made his first public statement in China. "I have been instructed by President Truman to come to China to help her achieve unity and democratization. The truce represents the first of our labors."  

To enforce this cease-fire agreement, an Executive Headquarters was established in Peiping to supervise the implementation of the cease-fire orders. The Executive Headquarters was to be headed by three commissioners, each

---


representing the two opposing sides with the mediating side, the United States, serving as chairman. The Executive Headquarters' responsibility for maintaining the cease-fire was directed by subsidiary three-member field truce teams which were dispatched to those areas where fighting continued. 8

Historian Tang Tsou admitted that the announcement of a cease-fire provided a favorable atmosphere for the convocation of the delegates to the Political Consultative Conference on January 10. 9 This conference had been established by an agreement between the Communist and Kuomintang representatives following Ambassador Patrick Hurley's departure and was composed of delegates from the Kuomintang, the Communist Party and the splinter parties. The delegates agreed on the immediate organization of a coalition government with an interim State Council of all political parties to govern

---


9 Tsou, America's Failure, pp. 406-07.
until a freely elected constitutional government was established. ¹⁰ The delegates adopted a resolution setting May 5 as the date for the convocation of a National Assembly, which would adopt the new constitution, and they also agreed to accept the leadership of Chiang Kai-shek and the necessity for the reduction and ultimate amalgamation of the Government and Communist armies. ¹¹

With the conclusion of the Political Consultative Conference on January 31, the China situation seemed to be improving and the Marshall Mission reached the height of

¹⁰ U.S., Congress, Senate, Military Situation, Part 3, Testimony of Dean Acheson, p. 1850. U.S., Department of State, China White Paper, II, pp. 610-11. The Resolution on Government Organization, adopted by the Political Consultative Conference, revealed that the State Council, which was composed of forty councillors, met every two weeks unless it was called into session by the President of the National Government for emergency meetings. One-half of the State Council was represented by Kuomintang members, while the remaining half was represented by members of other political parties. The State Council, an interim council, must not be confused with the People's Political Council, an advisory body which had been set up in 1938 to provide representation in the government to non-Kuomintang groups. For further information on the People's Political Council, see Tsou, America's Failure, p. 451.

¹¹ China and U.S. Far East Policy, 1945-1967 (Washington, D. C.: Congressional Quarterly Inc., 1967), p. 39; Shen, "American Official Attitudes," p. 161. In Ross Y. Koen's "China Lobby," p. 62, the author noted that the resolutions of the Political Consultative Conference were not approved "by the governing bodies of the various parties as required by the agreement establishing the council." It was the objective of all parties during the negotiations throughout the year to make those resolutions workable.
its short-lived success. Marshall now "seemed very close to pulling the marble cake out of the oven," and he turned his attention to the difficult problem of the consolidation of the Nationalist and Communist armies. He had informed the Generalissimo in late January that it was imperative "for him to find an agreement with the Communists for a unified government and army at an early date." Marshall concluded that China was "very vulnerable to . . . Russian infiltration methods to the strengthening of the Communist regime and the progressive weakening of the Nationalist Government's position that it is apparent that United States military and naval forces cannot be continued for long in China." Chiang told Marshall that his talks with the Communists could be compared to negotiating "with the tiger for its skin."

12 Gardner, Architects of Illusion, p. 156.
13 Ibid.
15 Ibid.
16 Chiang Kai-shek, Soviet Russia in China (New York: Farrar, Straus and Cudahy, 1957), p. 162. Historian Tang Tsou's America's Failure, p. 402, emphasized that the Communists believed that the integration of their forces into a national army would take place "only after the establishment of a democratic coalition government and a constitutional regime." See also Harold M. Vinacke, The United States and the Far East, 1945-1951 (Stanford,
Marshall's second triumph occurred on February 25 when a military agreement, which provided for the gradual unification of the Nationalist and Communist armies, was signed in Chungking. With a substantial reduction in both armies, the new force would consist of sixty divisions—fifty Central Government divisions and ten Communist divisions. The agreement requested both sides to submit a list of army strengths, positions and weapons. The National Government submitted a list while the transient Communists never submitted a list. This was a warning to General Marshall of further difficulty in his efforts to bring peace and unity to China. 17

On March 9, General Marshall reported to Chiang that it was "of paramount importance that the unification of China be speeded to a successful conclusion." 18 Marshall had been continually emphasizing to Chiang and his representatives throughout the months of January and February the importance of the unification of China. Marshall thought that unification would eliminate China's

---


"vulnerability to Soviet undercover attack, which exists so long as there remains a separate Communist Government and a separate Communist Army in China."\(^19\)

Following the signing of the military reorganization agreement, Marshall recommended to President Truman that he be recalled to the United States to report on the situation in China, especially the issue of assistance to China.\(^20\)

In a subsequent letter to the General, President Truman thought that Marshall's trip would keep "Congressional public opinion solidly in line" with the China policy.\(^21\)

Prior to Marshall's departure for the United States on March 11, he traveled to northern China with Chou En-lai and Nationalist General Chang Chi-chung. At the end of this tour, which included Marshall's first encounter with

---


Mao Tse-tung and Chu Teh, Marshall predicted at Hankow: 
"Last month and the next two months are the most critical months in the history of China." 22

General Marshall must not have realized the significance of his Hankow statement and it is indeed difficult to understand why he would leave at such a critical time in his discussions for a month's trip to the United States for consultation with Administration leaders and Congress. Since both interim government and army integration appeared to be "well on their way to acceptance" as well as Chiang's approval to allow tripartite truce teams into Manchuria, Marshall reasoned that he "could be spared in China." 23

Marshall's presence in China had produced a calming effect on the two irreconcilable forces. With his departure from China "the flood dikes broke open" and his absence proved a fatal mistake. 24

Appearing before the United States Congress on March 16, General Marshall proclaimed:

The United States is I think at the present time best able to render material assistance to China. We are asking no special preference of any kind

22 Quoted in Payne, Marshall Story, p. 266.
23 Acheson, Present at the Creation, p. 146; Truman, Memoirs, II, Years of Trial and Hope, p. 78.
whatever regarding economic or similar matters. We are placing no price on our friendship. I must say . . . that we have a vital interest in a stable government in China. . . . 25

Marshall concluded his speech by reiterating his Hankow statement: "The next few months are of tremendous importance to the Chinese people and . . . to future world peace." 26

General Marshall testified before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee and the House Foreign Affairs Committee in early April. Marshall reported on his mission and tried to convince the committee members to send loans and surplus property to China. Assistance to China through Lend-Lease would end on June 30, 1946, and Marshall thought that China should receive $500,000,000 to repair the railroads and revive the economy. 27 One of Marshall's biographers, Robert Payne, said that the General emphasized that he needed the support of the legislators who could "demonstrate that America had a stake in the peaceful recovery of


26 Quoted in U.S., Department of State, Foreign Relations, 1946, IX, p. 577.

China."\(^{28}\) As a result of his personal report to these two committees, Marshall had the impression that his mission "was being supported" by both Houses of Congress.\(^{29}\) His testimony before the committees was not disclosed to the American people for fear that "it might embarrass General Marshall."\(^{30}\) Secrecy once again prevailed until General Marshall authorized the release of information regarding his congressional testimonies, his talks with the President and his subsequent talks with officials of the Treasury Department, at which time President Truman said that "the whole thing will be turned loose for the benefit of everybody."\(^{31}\)

Marshall was successful in obtaining the transfer of surplus property to the National Government and in extending to Chiang's Government $66,000,000 for emergency rehabilitation.\(^{32}\) Marshall thought that these emergency measures were inadequate and he reached an agreement

---


\(^{31}\) Ibid.

\(^{32}\) Shen, "American Official Attitudes," p. 163. Shen revealed that the $66,000,000 was to be spent on "six specific projects, chiefly for the purchase of raw cotton, and for ships and railroad repair material."
with the Treasury Department for a loan of $500,000,000 to
the Central Government. The Generalissimo's speech on
April 1 to the People's Political Council, in which he
announced to the representatives of the Council "in effect
a call to arms" following the withdrawal of Russian troops
from Manchuria, dissuaded the Treasury Department from
extending the $500,000,000 loan.

On April 18, General Marshall returned to China to
find renewed outbreaks of civil strife, which impaired the
success of the truce agreement, as well as a continuing
crisis in Manchuria aggravated by the slow withdrawal of
Russian troops from Manchuria and compounded by the
Nationalist Army's difficulty in entering Manchuria.

Marshall had been kept informed by his staff concerning
the dangerous developments in China. On April 3, a member
of Marshall's staff, Brigadier General Henry A. Byroade, had urged Marshall's immediate return to China for only his "position and prestige can handle this situation." Three days later, American Commissioner Walter S. Robertson also urged the General to return to China at once to prevent his mission from being "dangerously jeopardized." Marshall remained in the United States for another week despite the ominous situation in China.

The Manchurian situation was climaxed by the Communist capture of the Manchurian capital, Changchun, on the day of Marshall's arrival in Chungking. With their victory at Changchun, the Communists not only were confident that they could defeat the Nationalists, but they were also "no longer as amenable to compromise as they had been during the previous months." This Communist victory encouraged the Generalissimo to order his troops to regain Changchun by launching "an all-out attack in Manchuria to defeat the Communists."

---

36 U.S., Department of State, Foreign Relations, 1946, IX, p. 727. Letter of April 3, 1946, from Brigadier General Henry A. Byroade to Lieutenant General Alvan C. Gillem, Jr. This letter was classified by American Commissioner Walter Robertson as an "eyes alone" message.


38 Davids, America, p. 399.

39 Tsou, America's Failure, p. 419.
Despite General Marshall's opposition, Chiang "decided to pursue a policy of force in dealing with the Communists."\(^{40}\) Marshall at first believed that Chiang would not advance into north China, but he soon discovered that the Generalissimo wanted to reoccupy Changchun and defeat the Communists in Manchuria.\(^{41}\) Marshall learned from Chiang that no settlement of the Manchurian crisis would be made on Chiang's part until the Communists evacuated Changchun and Nationalist troops had complete sovereignty in Manchuria.\(^{42}\) The General noted that there existed between the two rivals "a complete lack of faith and a feeling of distrust on both sides."\(^{43}\) According to Marshall, "each side saw behind all proposals from the other an evil motive."\(^{44}\) He doubted whether the civil war could be halted and the suggestion of a cooling-off period was unacceptable to either the Nationalists or the Communists, who attempted to hold what

\(^{40}\) Ibid.

\(^{41}\) U.S., Department of State, *China White Paper*, I, p. 150.

\(^{42}\) Ibid., p. 152.

\(^{43}\) Ibid., p. 150.

\(^{44}\) Ibid.
ground they held and to expand the territory within their possession.\(^{45}\) Chiang's troops pushed toward Harbin and recaptured Changchun without opposition on May 23.

Prior to the Nationalist troops' capture of Changchun, sixty American citizens affixed their names on May 15 to the "Manchurian Manifesto," in which they reported that Soviet actions in Manchuria were in violation of the Yalta Far Eastern agreements and the Sino-Soviet Treaty. These Americans emphasized in this extensive document that Manchuria was "the key to the future of China."\(^{46}\) This Manifesto reiterated what some State Department career officers, particularly Joseph Grew, had announced a year earlier. "We must request Russia to punctiliously live up to the terms of the Sino-Soviet Pact we helped to force on China by secret agreement at Yalta."\(^{47}\) The sixty signatories, including Representatives

---


Clare Boothe Luce and Walter Judd, called for, among other demands, complete revision of the Yalta Far Eastern agreements. While the "Manchurian Manifesto" reflected the views of sixty Americans, it was not successful in influencing the State Department or Congress to voice support for the revision of the Yalta Far Eastern agreements.

Negotiations in China were at a standstill, with Special Representative Marshall engaged daily in discussions with representatives of Chinese political parties about the possible restoration of peace in Manchuria. At the time of the Nationalist reoccupation of Changchun, Generalissimo Chiang's absence from Nanking made it difficult for Marshall to keep Chiang informed of the dangerous situation in Manchuria. Marshall unsuccessfully appealed by radio to both sides for a cessation of offensive operations. Six days after the Nationalist reoccupation of Changchun, on May 29, Marshall informed Chiang that the continued advance of his troops in Manchuria placed his mediating role in a difficult and "virtually impossible" position.

---

48 Other prominent signatories included Alfred Kohlberg, Norman Thomas, Mrs. Wendell Wilkie, Emily Hahn and William Henry Chamberlain.

49 U.S., Department of State, China White Paper, I pp. 154-55.

50 Ibid., p. 157.
The Manchurian crisis temporarily diminished when General Marshall persuaded Chiang and Communist leaders to issue a second truce for a period of fifteen days, beginning on June 7, 1946. During the truce, agreements were to be reached regarding the termination of hostilities in Manchuria, resumption of communications in China and the execution of the military reorganization agreement of February 25.\textsuperscript{51} Lieutenant Colonel Robert B. Rigg has called this truce "the turning point not only of the Manchurian campaign but of the entire civil war."\textsuperscript{52} Chiang contended that this cease-fire "turned out to be the beginning of the Government forces' debacle in Manchuria."\textsuperscript{53} Had the Nationalist troops pushed forward instead of being halted, the Generalissimo surmised that the Communists would have been driven out of Manchuria. Marshall disagreed.

\textsuperscript{51} Acheson, \textit{Present at the Creation}, p. 204.

\textsuperscript{52} Lieutenant Colonel Robert B. Rigg, \textit{U.S.A., Red China's Fighting Hordes} (Harrisburg, Pennsylvania: Military Service Publishing Company, 1951), p. 254. In John Robinson Beal's \textit{Marshall in China}, p. 350, the author noted that there were "two moments during the year 1946 when coalition with the Communists could have come off." Beal named the June truce negotiations "when Marshall believed that the two sides were within inches of getting together." Beal recalled that the second opportunity was "lost by the Communists themselves" at the time when "they boycotted the National Assembly."

\textsuperscript{53} Quoted in Tsou, \textit{America's Failure}, p. 421. See also Kubek, \textit{How the Far East Was Lost}, p. 330.
with Chiang because he knew that the Communists had a large political following which could not be ignored.\textsuperscript{54}

Realizing that the Nationalists had made territorial gains since the first truce, the Communists "proposed ... the restoration of the status quo in China proper as of January 13, in accordance with the order for the cessation of hostilities of January 10, and the restoration of original positions in Manchuria as of June 7."\textsuperscript{55} General Marshall agreed to this proposal, but Chiang disliked it and agreed to extend the truce until June 30.\textsuperscript{56}

Beginning in June and continuing thereafter, there was an often-expressed belief by National Government military officers and politicians that "only a policy of force would satisfy the situation and that the Chinese Communists could be quickly crushed."\textsuperscript{57} By pursuing a policy of force, Chiang would be able to force the Communists to accept the terms of a settlement.\textsuperscript{58} With the two divergent sides

\textsuperscript{54}Payne, Marshall Story, p. 283. See also U.S., Department of State, China White Paper, I, p. 161.

\textsuperscript{55}Tsou, America's Failure, p. 422.

\textsuperscript{56}Ibid., p. 423; U.S., Department of State, China White Paper, I, p. 161.

\textsuperscript{57}Ibid. See also U.S., Department of State, Foreign Relations, 1946, X, p. 54. Letter of August 12, 1946, from General Marshall to President Truman.

\textsuperscript{58}Tsou, America's Failure, p. 423. See also U.S., Department of State, Foreign Relations, 1946, X, p. 110,
unable to reach a decision and unable himself to produce a compromise, Marshall told Chiang that the National Government "was washing its hands of any democratic procedure and was pursuing a dictatorial policy of military force." 59

Throughout the second truce negotiations, the Communists demanded that the United States withdraw their troops and military aid from China. The Communists held that the United States could not be impartial if American aid and troops assisted the Kuomintang Government. The Communists contended that American economic and military assistance would be given to Chiang's Government "irrespective of whether the National Government offered the Communists a fair and reasonable basis for settlement of military and political differences." 60 In late June, Communist Party Chairman Mao Tse-tung requested that the United States withdraw troops and assistance from China. 61

Letter of August 10, 1946, from General Marshall to President Truman; and in the same reference source, p. 51, Memorandum of the Notes of a Meeting on August 16, 1946, of General Marshall with Generalissimo Chiang.

59 U.S., Department of State, China White Paper, I, p. 169.

60 Ibid., p. 170.

Replying to Chairman Mao's request, the State Department stressed America's neutrality in civil strife between the Communists and the Nationalists. United States policy "cannot rightfully be interpreted as current support of any factional military group in China." Economic assistance toward China would be rendered to "a government fully and fairly representative of all important Chinese political elements, including the Chinese Communists."

Chairman Mao Tse-tung and his followers would not stop their attacks, which persisted throughout the summer and were climaxed by Madame Sun Yat-sen's dramatic plea on July 22 to the American people. In speaking to the American people, Madame Sun said that they "must be told that the presence of United States armed forces on Chinese soil is not strengthening peace and order among the Chinese people." She thought that American loans should be given only to a recognized and representative government. Madame

---


63 Ibid. See also China and U.S. Far East Policy, p. 40.

64 "Mme. Sun Ban on Our Aid to China," New York Times, July 23, 1946, p. 5. See also U.S., Department of State, China White Paper, I, pp. 170-72; Tsou, America's Failure, p. 426. In John R. Beal's Marshall in China, p. 132, the author noted that "Madame Sun, as the widow of the Republic's founder, is bound to get widespread attention in the U.S."
Sun noted that the continuation of the civil war depended on the United States. If America ceased her military and economic assistance, the civil war would be halted.

For seven months, Marshall had been carrying on his mediation efforts by himself and was concerned that a long-range American program in China "be directed by a top flight man in the post of Ambassador." In July, he recommended to President Truman that John Leighton Stuart be appointed Ambassador to China, a post which had not been filled after Patrick Hurley's resignation. Dr. John Leighton Stuart, a seventy-year-old President of Yenching University in Peiping and fluent in Chinese, was confirmed by the Senate on July 11, 1946.

General Albert Wedemeyer, who was also well experienced in China's problems, was considered for the post and his possible appointment had been mentioned in Ambassador Patrick Hurley's conversation with President Truman in September, 1945. When General Marshall arrived in China in December, 1945, he suggested to the President


that Wedemeyer be appointed Ambassador. 67 As late as February 20, 1946, Wedemeyer had not been recommended to President Truman. 68 In a conversation with President Truman in March, James R. Shepley, a member of Marshall's staff, noted that the President placed considerable emphasis on recent press comments on the appointment of another military officer to a diplomatic post. 69 On May 29, General Wedemeyer asked Marshall to clarify his future status. 70 In July, Marshall finally informed Acting Secretary of State Dean Acheson that Wedemeyer's appointment had "greatly disturbed" the Communists and "should be indefinitely postponed." 71 Chinese Nationalist leaders,


71 Ibid., p. 1298. Letter of July 5, 1946, from General Marshall to Acting Secretary of State Dean Acheson. See also Beal, Marshall in China, p. 110; Acheson, Present at the Creation, p. 200; Wedemeyer Reports!, pp. 366, 369, 381; U.S., Congress, Senate, Military Situation, Part 3, Testimony of General Albert C. Wedemeyer, p. 2311; and
particularly Foreign Minister T. V. Soong, were disappointed with the appointment of Stuart, who they claimed was "not a big enough man."  

After Dr. John Leighton Stuart's appointment as Ambassador to China, historian Robert Payne contended that General Marshall no longer "found himself in a position where he could exert his influence." General Marshall reached "the point of no return" and switched from his role as an active participant to that of a spectator. At this point, Payne believed that Marshall should have returned to the United States.

During the month of July there also occurred "a gradual worsening of the military situation with the spread of hostilities to various points in China proper." In addition to this worsening situation, Chiang's new policy of force which started during the June truce negotiations, Communist statements against American assistance to the National Government and Madame Sun's appeal to the American

---


people, American officials were at that time considering a shutdown on arms and munitions shipments to Chiang's Government "in the hope that such a move might assist their efforts to unify China." This shutdown on combat items from the United States and its Pacific bases became effective in the United States on July 29, 1946, and in the Pacific one month later.

During the ten-month period that this embargo was in effect, the United States, according to Tang Tsou, entered into a period of partial withdrawal from China. Marshall suggested a period of withdrawal to be followed by a two- or three-month period of reappraisal and reevaluation of American policy toward China if the June negotiations broke down. He had been placed in a most difficult position of mediating between the two Chinese political groups while the American Government supplied one group,


76 U.S., Department of State, China White Paper, I, p. 356.

77 Tsou, America's Failure, p. 453.

78 Forrestal, Forrestal Diaries, p. 174.
the Chungking Government, with arms and ammunition. 79 At this time, the Russians supplied the Chinese Communists with Japanese war munitions. The General recalled in the 1951 MacArthur Hearings that the embargo was a "final effort to try to bring to a halt the military operations that were then going on and which were developing into a general war over all China." 80 This embargo was to become a subject of great controversy in the history of America's China policy. 81

While Chiang and his military leaders pursued their policy of force after the second truce, Marshall emphasized to a high National Government official that "the United States would not underwrite a Chinese civil war." 82 At a Cabinet meeting on August 2, 1946, Secretary of Labor Louis B. Schwellenbach argued that we should not continue to interfere in China's internal affairs. "If they wanted to have a civil war," said Schwellenbach, "they should have it, but ... we should not be in the position of trying to

79 U.S., Department of State, China White Paper, I, p. 181.


81 In How the Far East Was Lost, pp. 337, 339, 386 409, historian Anthony Kubek was most critical of the embargo.

82 U.S., Department of State, China White Paper, I, p. 173.
impose any form of government on any nation." Secretary of the Navy Forrestal interrupted Schwellenbach to inform the Cabinet members that the chaotic conditions of civil war would attract other powers, especially Russia, "to come in and dominate China." Under Secretary of State Dean Acheson thought that American policy should support Marshall "to the limit" until the General admitted there was no hope of obtaining the objectives outlined in President Truman's China policy speech of December, 1945. This Cabinet meeting reflected an attempt by some of its members to redefine America's China policy.

Another and more significant attempt to redefine American policy toward China was reflected on August 10 in both a joint statement and a personal letter. The joint statement of Marshall and Stuart, two tireless and persevering explorers for peace, was an attempt "to arouse public pressure for the termination of hostilities"

---

83 Forrestal, Forrestal Diaries, p. 190. Louis B. Schwellenbach served as Secretary of Labor from July, 1945, to August, 1948.

84 Ibid.

85 Ibid. Dean Acheson served as Under Secretary of State from August 27, 1945, to July 1, 1947. In Present at the Creation, p. 143, Dean Acheson recalled that General George Marshall chose him "as his rear echelon man who would have right of access at any time to the President and Marshall could communicate through him."
from the war-stricken Chinese people. Both writers noted that it seemed impossible for the two sides to reach a settlement for the cessation of hostilities. One Chinese correspondent for The Peiping Chronicle, Hoh Chin-hsing, recalled that this joint statement "was generally interpreted as a virtual admission on the part of General Marshall of the failure of his mission of mediation in China." Hoh also said that this statement was regarded in China as the General's "farewell statement" to China. Should Marshall's Mission fail, Colonel Marshall S. Carter, Marshall's aide in Washington, told the General that "the United States must resort to the status of an interested bystander rather than that of an active participant in Chinese affairs."

President Harry Truman's seething confidential letter of August 10 to Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek expressed a change in American foreign policy toward China. "There

---

86 U.S., Department of State, China White Paper, I, p. 175.


88 Quoted in Ibid.

exists in the United States," said the President, "an increasing body of opinion which holds that our entire policy toward China must be reexamined in the light of spreading strife."\(^9^0\) Truman pointed out that the American people had been shocked by the assassinations of prominent Chinese liberals and the Central Government's suppression of freedom of the press. "Unless convincing proof is shortly forthcoming that genuine progress is being made toward a peaceful settlement of China's internal problems," stressed President Truman, "it must be expected that American opinion will not continue in its generous attitude toward your nation."\(^9^1\) Truman continued: "It will, furthermore, be necessary for me to redefine and explain the position of the United States to the American people."

The threat of a reexamination and appraisal of American policy toward China had been sounded again in stronger terms, which pointed to Chiang's responsibility for the breakdown of the June truce negotiations.\(^9^2\) Three days later, on August 13, Chiang replied to the President's

---

\(^9^0\) Ibid., p. 21. Letter of August 10, 1946, from President Truman to Chinese Ambassador Wellington Koo, who transmitted it to Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek.

\(^9^1\) Ibid.

\(^9^2\) U.S., Congress, Senate, Institute of Pacific Relations, Part 7, Testimony of John Carter Vincent, p. 2253. See also Beal, Marshall in China, p. 163.
letter by issuing a public statement which placed the 
blame for the breakdown of negotiations on the Communists. 93

In this atmosphere of talk over the possibility of 
reappraisal of our foreign policy toward China, the United 
States signed an agreement on August 30 for the sale of 
American surplus property to the Central Government. The 
Chinese Communist Party violently protested this agreement 
by saying that the surplus property would be used in the 
civil war or sold with the proceeds used for military 
purposes. 94 Marshall stated that the surplus property con­
sisted of non-combat items, especially machinery, vehicles 
and communications equipment. 95 This agreement definitely 
"threw away the only effective weapon available to General 
Marshall in his effort to prevent China from being 
devastated by civil war." 96 America had no intention of 
withdrawing from involvement in China or of washing its 
hands of the China problem.

American policy toward China was aimed at not 
encouraging the Soviet Union to become involved in the

93 U.S., Department of State, China White Paper, I, 
p. 177. See also same reference source, II, pp. 649-51, 
for Chiang's statement of August 13, 1946.

94 Ibid., p. 180.

95 Kubek, How the Far East Was Lost, p. 338.

Chinese conflict. American leaders who did not advocate the policy alternative of washing our hands believed that it was of the utmost importance that the United States remain in China to achieve the creation of a unified China and discarded a policy of "all-out support" to Chiang. General George Marshall's efforts to bring the two sides together were pursued with unrelenting and tireless energy. The Director of the Office of Far Eastern Affairs, John Carter Vincent, aptly stated that "we had every intention of staying with the problem and at the same time staying out of China's civil war."  

Marshall found that his and Stuart's efforts were frustrated by the departure in mid-September of Chiang Kai-shek and Chou En-lai from Nanking. General Chou demanded that the United States freeze all supplies and shipments under the surplus property agreement and

---


99 U.S., Department of State, Foreign Relations, 1946, X, p. 115. This view was stated again in the same reference source, p. 163, by John Carter Vincent on September 9, 1946, to Dr. Tan Shao-hwa, Minister Counselor of the Chinese Embassy.
recommended to Marshall that the Committee of Three be
convened to discuss an order for the cessation of hostili-
ties.\footnote{U.S., Department of State, \textit{China White Paper}, I, p. 184.} Chou's recommendations went unheeded as Chiang's
troops attacked a Communist political and military center,
Kalgan. This attack infuriated Communist leaders, who
thought that the attack was an indication of "a total
national split" and an abandonment of a policy of peaceful
settlement.\footnote{\textit{Tbid.}, p. 188 and II, p. 622. Memorandum of
September 30, 1946, from the Head of the Chinese Communist
Delegation, Chou En-lai, to General Marshall.} In the Communists' eyes, the Nationalists
desired "to launch unrestricted war."\footnote{Truman, \textit{Memoirs}, II, \textit{Years of Trial and Hope}, p. 86.} Chiang had
allowed the Communists in June to retain control of Kalgan
and now, four months later, he reversed this agreement.\footnote{U.S., Department of State, \textit{Foreign Relations}, 1946, X, p. 269, Memorandum of October 2, 1946, of the
Minutes of the Meeting between General Marshall and
Ambassador Stuart; and same reference source, p. 273,
Letter of October 2, 1946, from General Marshall to Under
Secretary of State Dean Acheson.} With the Nationalist capture of Kalgan, the Communist
Party refused to announce the names of their delegates to
the opening of the National Assembly on November 12.

In light of these conditions, General Marshall felt
that his tightrope-walking role as mediating middleman in
the complicated series of negotiations had almost ended. On October 1, General Marshall informed the Generalissimo that "unless a basis for agreement is formed to terminate the fighting without further delays of proposals and counterproposals, I will recommend to the President that I be recalled and that the United States Government terminate its efforts of mediation." Marshall refused to negotiate while the Nationalists battled for Kalgan. Foreign Minister T. V. Soong, Madame Chiang Kai-shek's brother, admitted to Ambassador John Leighton Stuart that the Government wanted to capture Kalgan before terminating hostilities. Marshall was convinced that his continued participation in negotiations with the two proponents was merely "a cloak to the continued conduct of a military campaign." He repeated the contents of his October 1 letter to the Generalissimo and stated that he would request his recall unless hostilities were terminated.


107 Ibid.
Director John Carter Vincent believed that Marshall would be successful "in calling Chiang's hand."\textsuperscript{108}

Distressed over the possibility of the termination of Marshall's Mission, Chiang suggested a ten-day truce in the Kalgan military offensive with specific conditions while General Marshall pursued his negotiations on Chinese political and military problems.\textsuperscript{109} The Nationalist Government had finally offered this temporary solution only to have it rejected by the Communists on the grounds that the truce should not have a time limit on the number of subjects to be considered at the time of the cessation of hostilities.\textsuperscript{110}

Viewing the Communist refusal of the October truce and Chiang's continuation of his policy of force with the capture of Kalgan, Special Representative Marshall, the forceful mediator in the first three months of 1946, became only an interested observer of the Chinese situation. In

\textsuperscript{108}Ibid., pp. 276-77. Memorandum of October 3, 1946, by the Director of the Office of Far Eastern Affairs, John Carter Vincent, to the Under Secretary of State, Dean Acheson.

\textsuperscript{109}Ibid., p. 290. Letter of October 5, 1946, from General Marshall to President Truman.

\textsuperscript{110}U.S., Department of State, China White Paper, I, p. 194; Truman, Memoirs, II, Years of Trial and Hope, p. 87; U.S., Department of State, China White Paper, II, pp. 665-67. This statement was written by General Marshall and Ambassador Stuart on October 8, 1946.
late October in an interview with Chiang, the General emphasized to the Generalissimo that "the Communists had no intention of surrendering and that, while they had lost cities, they had not lost armies, nor was it likely that they would lose their armies at any place."  

Marshall exerted little influence on Chiang, who proposed another unacceptable truce for the cessation of hostilities in northeast China. Marshall learned from Chou En-lai that Chiang's troops posed a threat to the Communist base at Yenan. Whether Chou's suggestion "was just a Communist fear," Marshall never heard of any mention by a member of the Nationalist Government of a possible attack on Yenan. Marshall told General Chou that such an attack would terminate his mission and return him to the United States "for good." Marshall requested Chou, who was returning to Yenan "for orientation and new instruction," to ascertain whether his presence was desired as mediator.

---


interested in continuing mediation in view of their rejection of the October cease-fire. With General Chou's departure, the lack of participation by the Communists on the Committee of Three as well as the lack of Communist participation at the convocation of the National Assembly proved to Marshall the futility of the Chinese situation. 115

On November 12, John Carter Vincent, a high-level official in the State Department, launched an attack on American investment in China before the National Foreign Trade Council. The Director of the Office of Far Eastern Affairs spotlighted our role in China:

... I think it worthwhile to mention what has been in some quarters a misinterpretation of General Marshall's mission as solely political in its objective. Chinese economy is in a vicious circle. General Marshall is fully aware of this state of affairs and it has been his purpose to encourage the Chinese to break the vicious circle by reaching a political settlement that would result in a cessation of civil strife and make possible a revival of economic activity.

... [W]hat is unsound for private capital is unsound for Government capital, that is, for the taxpayers' money. I believe it is unsound to invest private or public capital in countries where there is widespread corruption in business and official circles, where a government is

wasting its substance on excessive armament, where the threat or fact of civil war exists.\textsuperscript{116} Vincent's noted address, which urged that private and public capital was an unsound investment in war-torn China, was made in the presence of the Chinese Ambassador to the United States.\textsuperscript{117} The influence which this address had on the Marshall Mission was reflected in John R. Beal's journal. Marshall thought that Vincent had spoken "out of turn, at least in his timing."\textsuperscript{118} Marshall informed Chinese Nationalist officials not to pay any attention to Vincent's speech.

Following the failure of an unacceptable fourth truce in November, Marshall remained in China in order to use his influence for the adoption of a democratic constitution by the National Assembly. The National Assembly adopted a constitution on December 25, 1946, and this action was immediately denounced by the Chinese Communists, who had chosen not to send delegates to the Assembly "unless there

\textsuperscript{116} U.S., Congress, Senate, Institute of Pacific Relations, Part 7, Testimony of John Carter Vincent, pp. 2256-60. Vincent's speech was entitled "American Business in the Far East" and was delivered to the Thirty-third Convention of the National Foreign Trade Council in New York City.

\textsuperscript{117} Ibid.; Bertram D. Wolfe, "What Next in China?," American Mercury, April, 1949, p. 495; Ross Y. Koen's "China Lobby," pp. 325-26, 362, revealed that John Carter Vincent's career was jeopardized by this address.

\textsuperscript{118} Beal, Marshall in China, p. 283.
was a prior military settlement.\textsuperscript{119} This Assembly had departed from the procedures of the Political Consultative Conference of January, when the delegates had advocated a reorganized multiparty government prior to the convocation of the National Assembly.\textsuperscript{120} With the adoption of this constitution, General Marshall requested his recall, which was announced on January 6, 1947.\textsuperscript{121}

George Marshall had asked Chou En-lai in November to consult with Yenan leaders as to whether he should continue his efforts as mediator. No reply was ever received to this request.\textsuperscript{122} In a conversation in December with Chiang Kai-shek, General Marshall told Chiang that he knew that "the Communists no longer had any intention of accepting American mediation along the former lines and . . . I was

\textsuperscript{119}U.S., Department of State, China White Paper, I, Dean Acheson's "Letter of Transmittal" of July 30, 1949, p. xiii.

\textsuperscript{120}Tsou, America's Failure, p. 427.


personally persona non grata." Marshall had been attempting to mediate between two opposing sides for almost a year when President Harry S. Truman reiterated his December 15, 1945, statement of American policy toward China on December 18, 1946, and emphasized Marshall's role as peacemaker between the two opposing forces. President Truman said that China's unification, which could be achieved by halting hostilities, broadening China's Government and effecting a united and democratic China, "were tasks for the Chinese themselves." "We are pledged," said Truman, "not to interfere in the internal affairs of China." Upon completion of these goals, economic assistance would be available to China's Government. The theme of noninvolvement in China's internal affairs permeated this statement repeatedly, even though the United States had completed one year of mediation. Chiang's adviser on foreign press and political relations, John R. Beal, labeled Truman's statement as interference.

---


124 U.S., President, Public Papers, Truman, 1946, p. 499. See also same reference source, p. 207, for President Truman's news conference of December 18, 1946.

125 Ibid., p. 504.
between the two forces.\footnote{Beal, Marshall in China, p. 327. See also an editorial entitled "Report on China," New York Times, Dec. 19, 1946, p. 28.} The President's speech had failed to outline any new United States policy and indicated uncertainty and confusion in America's China policy. Beal concluded that "the United States did not know what to do next," while historian Anthony Kubek believed that Truman had issued a "hands-off" statement.\footnote{Beal, Marshall in China, p. 327; Kubek, How the Far East Was Lost, p. 335. See also Beal, Marshall in China, p. 317.}

On January 7, 1947, President Truman announced the nomination of George C. Marshall as Secretary of State. Marshall departed for the United States on January 8, as the State Department released the Special Representative's frank personal statement of his year-long mission in China. "The greatest obstacle to peace," announced Marshall, "has been the complete, almost overwhelming suspicion with which the Communist Party and the Kuomintang regard each other."\footnote{U.S., Department of State, China White Paper, II, pp. 686-87.} Marshall criticized the "reactionaries" in the National Government as "a dominant group . . . who have opposed . . . almost every effort I have made to influence the formation of a genuine coalition government" while Communist cooperation in China's Government was
inconceivable.\textsuperscript{129} The General said that his efforts to arrive at a peaceful settlement were "frustrated time and again by extremist elements of both sides."\textsuperscript{130} Marshall noted the presence of a liberal group among the Communists who turned to the Communist Party as a result of the corruption in local governments.\textsuperscript{131} The solution to war-torn and party-ridden China, as viewed by the General, "would be the assumption of leadership by liberals in the Government and in the minority parties, a splendid group of men, ... who as yet lack political power to exercise a controlling influence."\textsuperscript{132}

Marshall's "plague on both your houses" speech placed his hopes and America's hopes on Chinese liberals "to destroy the power of reactionaries and bring a liberal element into control of the government."\textsuperscript{133} Liberals were


\textsuperscript{131}"China's Liberals Unable To End War," p. 19.

\textsuperscript{132}U.S., Department of State, China White Paper, II, p. 688.

\textsuperscript{133}U.S., Department of State, Foreign Relations, 1946, X, p. 664, Letter of December 28, 1946, from General Marshall to President Truman; "China's Liberals Unable To End War," p. 19. References to "plague on both your
incapable of providing China with political leadership because of disagreements within their own ranks over the make-up of a Communist or non-Communist government. Unlike the Communists and the Nationalists, the liberals did not possess an army or a large membership. Indeed, Marshall had overemphasized the role which he wanted them to play. 134 Historian Tang Tsou believed that the role of the liberals "might have had a better chance for success if it had been vigorously implemented at the beginning of the Marshall mission." 135

George Marshall thought that his departure would increase the role of Ambassador John Leighton Stuart, who he believed "will almost automatically continue to be sought by all sides and will increase in importance as time

---

134 U.S., Congress, Senate, Committee on Foreign Relations, U.S. Policy with Respect to Mainland China, Hearings before the Committee on Foreign Relations, Senate, 89th Cong., 2d sess., 1966, Testimony of Dr. Benjamin I. Schwartz, Professor of History and Government at Harvard University, p. 234.

135 Tsou, America's Failure, p. 376.
State Department officials pondered whether Ambassador Stuart should assume Marshall's role as mediator between the two factions. John Carter Vincent considered that "we should go out of the negotiation business and see if the Chinese can't get together better without a 'middle man.'" Vincent thought that both sides "may endeavor with more earnestness of purpose to get together themselves." Vincent erred in this premise, as Marshall had misjudged Ambassador Stuart's role, because the Chinese elements had no intention of getting together. The Marshall Mission failed, in the words of correspondent Benjamin Welles, "because the Orientals wanted no Occidental solution to their conflict." "The Chinese Nationalists and Communists wanted nothing from the United

---

136. U.S., Department of State, Foreign Relations, 1946, X, p. 664. Letter of December 28, 1946, from General Marshall to President Truman. In John Robinson Beal's journal, Marshall in China, p. 207, he revealed that on September 27, 1946, "Marshall has concluded that Stuart is too naive and is keeping a check on him; perhaps embassy underlings are watching Stuart; one cannot rule out the possibility that the sabotage that Hurley complained of--if it existed--is still going on, potentially."


States," reminisced Welles, "except help in defeating the
other."

While General George Marshall was in China, President
Truman left the many problems affecting American foreign
policy toward China in the hands of his eminent representa-
tive. Marshall's representative in Washington, Colonel
Marshall S. Carter, recalled a conversation with President
Truman in which the President spoke of his complete trust
in his Special Representative. Truman "relied entirely and
only on General Marshall's judgment in the China problem
and ... he would continue to do so 'At least as long as I
am President.'"139 One critic of Truman's reliance on
General Marshall, Theodore H. White, decried Marshall's
tremendous influence: "On those days when Marshall sends
no cables from Nanking, Washington has no opinion on China.
Never since the days of Roman proconsuls has a single man
held in the name of a great republic such personal responsi-
bility for security over its future and frontier."140 John

139U.S., Department of State, Foreign Relations,
1946, X, p. 482. Memorandum of November 7, 1946, by Colonel
Marshall S. Carter to Deputy Chief of Staff, General
Thomas T. Handy. See also same reference source, p. 446,
Letter of February 28, 1946, from James R. Shepley to
General Marshall; Acheson, Present at the Creation, p. 208;
U.S., President, Public Papers, Truman, 1946, p. 213;
President Truman's news conference of April 18, 1946, and p.
505, President Truman's news conference of December 18, 1946.

140Theodore H. White's article in The New Republic as
Carter Vincent recalled in 1952 in his testimony before the subcommittee of the Committee on the Judiciary that the State Department did not receive any telegrams from the General requesting "advice" on the situation in China. Marshall sent the State Department a telegram every ten days or two weeks. 141

The provisions enunciated by President Truman in his statement of December 15, 1945, emphasized that hostilities in China must cease, the government must be broadened and a unified army must be created prior to American assistance to China. The United States acted as a third party in attempting to mediate the conflict between the two bitter and distrustful enemies, the Nationalists and the Communists. Marshall patiently listened to accusations, counteraccusations, proposals and counterproposals in his role as mediator. Probably no one except General Marshall could have been successful in laying the basis for the completion of his three objectives. 142 Unfortunately, General Marshall chose to return to the United States during the crucial month of March and returned to China after one month to find violations of the truce agreement and civil


war in Manchuria. Marshall continued his mediating efforts and America later embargoed combat items but permitted non-combat items to be sent to China. The United States seemed to be pursuing a "double policy" or a "smoke-screen" policy by assisting Chiang Kai-shek's National Government with non-combat items while evoking the words of peace, unity and stability in China with noninvolvement in Chinese internal affairs. The Nationalists and the Communists were also employing a "smoke-screen" policy of negotiating and maneuvering for military position. In view of Generalissimo Chiang's policy of force during the summer of 1946, Marshall informed Chiang that the Communists could not be defeated militarily. In the midst of this policy of force, General Marshall's role changed to that of an interested bystander who remained in China only to see the National Assembly, unrepresented by Communists, adopt a constitution to go into effect on December 25, 1947. A disheartened George Marshall returned to the United States in January, 1947, with the knowledge that "the Kuomintang was beyond salvage."  


144 U.S., Congress, Senate, State Department Employee Loyalty Investigation, Part 1, Testimony of Owen Lattimore, p. 820. Owen Lattimore was appointed as an economic adviser to the United States Reparations Mission to Japan on October 15, 1945. He served with the Mission until February 12, 1946. Lattimore later became the Director of the Walter Hines Page School of International Relations at the Johns Hopkins University.
CHAPTER V

THE REPUBLICANS ATTACK THE ADMINISTRATION'S CHINA POLICY

General George C. Marshall, President Truman's Special Representative to China and recently nominated Secretary of State, was recalled from China in January, 1947, after thirteen months' effort to arrange a peaceful settlement. Marshall's blunt farewell statement, which was critical of both the Communists and the Nationalists, reflected "his sense of frustration and discouragement at his failure to bring the warring sides in China together."¹ His untiring attempts to resolve this Chinese dilemma, in addition to his immense prestige, were responsible for the reluctance of the American people to criticize American policy toward China.² Ross Y. Koen commented that during 1945 and 1946 "there was almost no criticism of American policy and virtually no support for increased aid to the Kuomintang Government."³ Throughout this two-year period

Representatives Judd and Luce and Senators Wherry and Bridges were disturbed about the China situation and reflected their concern in their speeches on the floors of the House and Senate. The mid-term elections of November, 1946, had produced a Republican-controlled Congress and the expectation that a Republican could capture the White House in 1948. With the beginning of the new session of Congress, in January, 1947, Republican leaders attacked the Truman Administration's foreign policy toward China.

As a result of General Marshall's year of experience in frustration and discouragement, the Truman Administration desired to disentangle itself from the Chinese civil war. Historian Ross Koen aptly summarized the President's position:

The President apparently felt that the United States should not encourage or sanction Chinese Communist actions, but that their enmity should not be deliberately courted by continuing to aid Chiang, thereby further identifying the United States with his cause.  

Marshall and State Department officials understood that only all-out military intervention could save Generalissimo Chiang and decided against any action which might culminate in armed intervention.  

---


5Tsou, America's Failure, pp. 356, 459; Van Slyke's Introduction to U.S., Department of State, China White Paper, p. I-iii. In John Leighton Stuart, Fifty Years in
"hands-off" policy during his term as Secretary of State despite the rapid deterioration of the Nationalist Government from a peak in military progress in early January, 1947, to the political, military and economic nadir in the summer of 1947 and early 1948. 6

On January 9, 1947, a Republican-controlled Senate had swiftly demonstrated its bipartisan support of General George C. Marshall by unanimously confirming Truman's nomination of him for Secretary of State. 7 Ironically,

---


7 Ferdinand Kuhn, Jr., "Gen. Marshall Unanimously Confirmed by Senate," Washington Post, Jan. 9, 1947, p. 1. In the Man of Independence, p. 309, Jonathan Daniels recalled that during General Marshall's visit to the United States in April, 1946, President Truman asked the General to become the next Secretary of State. See also De Conde, "George Catlett Marshall," pp. 245, 247. Alexander De Conde noted that Marshall brought to the office of Secretary of State "the attitude of the independent 'non-partisan,' one who relied on the confidence of legislators of both parties for support of his policies."
Senator Arthur Vandenberg, who as Chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee approved the nomination of George Marshall, announced a change in this bipartisan support of America's China policy in a speech before the Cleveland Council of World Affairs on January 11. The Senator demanded that the Truman Administration "shift its emphasis" from the policy of broadening the base of the Chinese Government with the inclusion of "a rival armed party, the Chinese Communists." While still recommending unity, it might well encourage those," announced Vandenberg, "who have so heroically set their feet upon this road, and discourage those who make the road precarious." The Senator dramatically concluded: "There will never be a minute when China's destiny is not of acute concern to the United States and to a healthy world." Vandenberg's speech was to be echoed and reechoed until criticism of the Administration's China policy culminated in the passage of the China Aid Act of April, 1948.

Joseph and Stewart Alsop, two columnists for the Washington Post, incorrectly believed that Secretary of State Marshall would "have no difficulty in harmonizing Vandenberg's view with his own, since Vandenberg will be

the first to acknowledge that there is no sense in aiding a regime which is inherently a bad investment." Vandenberg did not stray from his Cleveland position. He thought that the United States must "firmly sustain" and provide "the moral support it deserves" to the Chinese Nationalist Government to "put its own house in better order."10

In a speech which was delivered on January 25 to the National Publishers' Association, Republican foreign policy adviser John Foster Dulles warned the Administration that its foreign policy was going to be administered by a Republican-controlled Congress. Dulles' fiery speech reminded the Administration:

A Democratic President and his Secretary of State can propose, but a Republican Congress can dispose. Foreign diplomats know that, and they suspect what we know—that two years from now a Republican will be in the White House. So these foreign governments will not take very seriously American proposals which are backed only by the Democratic Party.11


Senator Claude Pepper, a Democrat from Florida, attacked Dulles' speech. Pepper angrily stated that John Foster Dulles has "served notice on the people of the United States and the world in unmistakable words that the only bi-partisan foreign policy his party will agree to must be their policy."\(^{12}\)

Unlike John Foster Dulles' speech, Senator Arthur Vandenberg's speech had attacked the Administration's China policy. Dulles' speech made no mention of any foreign country but emphasized the importance of the role of the Republican-controlled Congress. Senate Appropriations Committee Chairman Styles Bridges intensified Vandenberg's attack on the Administration's China policy by acknowledging that the United States "cannot afford to push China into the Soviet orbit."\(^{13}\) Senator Bridges emphasized one point which Democratic President Truman had urged in his two China statements: "A free, sovereign, independent China is vitally important to the future of freedom in any part of the world."

Although Bridges' address on January 31 had warned Americans of the power of the Soviet Union, John Foster Dulles' speech, Senator Arthur Vandenberg's speech had attacked the Administration's China policy. Dulles' speech made no mention of any foreign country but emphasized the importance of the role of the Republican-controlled Congress. Senate Appropriations Committee Chairman Styles Bridges intensified Vandenberg's attack on the Administration's China policy by acknowledging that the United States "cannot afford to push China into the Soviet orbit."\(^{13}\) Senator Bridges emphasized one point which Democratic President Truman had urged in his two China statements: "A free, sovereign, independent China is vitally important to the future of freedom in any part of the world."

Although Bridges' address on January 31 had warned Americans of the power of the Soviet Union, John Foster Dulles' speech.

---

\(^{12}\)Ibid.

Dulles, a member of the United States delegation to the United Nations General Assembly, proposed to the Inland Daily Press Association on February 10 a six-point program "to meet the challenge of the Soviet Union's 'dynamism' in world affairs." Dulles' fifth point applied to America's China policy. Dulles advised that the United States "continue to safeguard the integrity of China, which calls for continued support of the National Government as distinguished from the opposing Yenan regime."

Announcing that "it must be the policy of the United States to support free peoples who are resisting attempted subjugation by armed minorities or by outside pressures," President Truman on March 12 requested before a joint session of Congress that it appropriate $400,000,000 in military and economic aid for Greece and Turkey in order to "assist free peoples to work out their own destinies in their own way." Truman also asked for congressional authority to send military and civilian personnel to Greece and Turkey to supervise the use of this aid.

Republican leaders immediately attacked the President's China policy. In a speech on the floor of the


15U.S., Congress, Senate, United States Relations with the People's Republic, p. 326.
House at the time of the hearings of the Foreign Affairs Committee on assistance to Greece and Turkey, Representative Walter Judd pointed to the National Government's refusal "to yield to such internal and external pressures as today threaten Greece and Turkey." Judd reminded his Democratic colleagues, particularly former Majority Leader John McCormack, that "in some degree we have been assisting a Communist minority in China in its efforts to overthrow the Chinese Government." Whatever our intentions were," expressed Judd, "has not our policy resulted in weakening our ally, the Government of China, and strengthening the Communist minority?" Representative McCormack replied that no assistance was being given to the Chinese Communists but Judd refused to accept his answer. Judd informed his colleagues:

I want to make quite clear I was not suggesting that the United States has been giving direct assistance to the Communists of China; but the inevitable, inescapable result of our policy of trying to bring the minority Communists into the Chinese Government and failing to support effectively that government while helping to correct its weaknesses has been to strengthen the Communist position.  


17 Ibid., 1985.
Representative Judd's position was strongly advocated by Senator Owen Brewster, who declared "it an anomaly for the United States to help King George fight the Communists while urging Chiang to embrace them."\(^{18}\)

Assistance to Greece and Turkey was the ammunition which provided Republican leaders with further proof that the Administration's "hands-off" China policy of wait and see was disastrous. In Dean Acheson's testimony before the House Foreign Affairs Committee on March 20, the Acting Secretary of State explained that China's situation could not be compared to that of Greece. Acheson described Greece and Turkey as one problem while China was another problem.

The Chinese Government is not in the position at the present time that the Greek Government is in. It is not approaching collapse. It is not threatened by defeat by the Communists. The war with the Communists is going on much as it has for the last twenty years.\(^{19}\)

Representative James G. Fulton, a Republican from Pennsylvania, asked Acheson "if China's Government were facing defeat . . . , what is your comment then?"\(^{20}\) Acheson

---

\(^{18}\)This speech was delivered on March 13 and is quoted in Tsou, America's Failure, p. 449.

\(^{19}\)U.S., Congress, House, Committee on Foreign Affairs, Assistance to Greece and Turkey, Hearings, before the Committee on Foreign Affairs, House of Representatives, on H.R. 2616, 80th Cong., 1st sess., 1947, p. 17.

\(^{20}\)Ibid., p. 18.
responded that his "comment would be that China would be much worse off than it is now." Acheson was severely criticized for these statements before the Foreign Affairs Committee.21

Representative Walter Judd spoke for many Republican congressmen when he said that assistance to Greece and Turkey as opposed to the lack of aid to China was a contradiction in America's foreign policy in regard to Communist-dominated governments.22 China belonged in the same category as Greece and should receive military and advisory assistance. To Foreign Affairs Committee members on March 22, Dean Acheson explained that Marshall's farewell statement urged the Kuomintang to become more efficient and representative. "That was not directed toward including Communists in the Government," assured Acheson, "but making the Government more effective in carrying out the purposes of the Government."23 Acheson cautioned Republican leaders who bitterly complained of the lack of an effective China policy and announced briefly to them America's role in the Chinese civil war.

Those people who lightly describe our attitude toward China as a hands-off policy do not

---

21Tsou, America's Failure, p. 449.
22U.S., Congress, House, Assistance to Greece and Turkey, p. 16.
23Ibid., p. 17.
accurately describe it. We have given great and vast aid to China in this effort to reoccupy its areas and to establish the authority of the Government in the country.24

Dean Acheson emphasized that American assistance to China through Lend-Lease and surplus property agreements was a clear indication that America was not pursuing a "hands-off" policy toward China.

During this congressional debate on the Greek-Turkish aid bill, the Chinese National Government requested on numerous occasions large-scale economic assistance and attributed this need to "the dangers of a Communist-dominated China."25 Two Republican Representatives, Howard H. Buffett of Nebraska and George H. Bender of Ohio, criticized the manner in which "the present Fascist Chinese government" was pressuring the State Department and was attempting "to blackmail America."26 Secretary James Forrestal noted in June in his diary that the Nationalists used "the danger of Communism" as their chief argument in support of their attempts to obtain massive American aid.27

During a June Cabinet meeting, Secretary Forrestal urged

24Ibid., p. 16.

25Tsou, America's Failure, p. 452.


27Forrestal, Forrestal Diaries, p. 285.
continued support of the National Government and warned that America "no matter how difficult the situation became ... should not withdraw entirely from China" even though our support might indicate intervention in Chinese internal affairs. 28

In the midst of the National Government's pleas for assistance, the State Department was analyzing, reviewing and reconsidering the insoluble situation in China. In June, Secretary of State George Marshall succinctly explained his exasperating search "for a positive and constructive formula to deal with the Chinese situation" to the Business Advisory Council of the Department of Commerce: "I have tortured my brain and I can't now see the answer." 29

Believing that Europe was, in the words of Ross Koen, "the decisive area of the world in the power struggle," the Truman Administration decided that "if concessions had to be made on China policy in order to carry through the European program, then the sacrifice had to be made." 30 A decrease in funds for Europe would hamper European recovery

---

28 Ibid., pp. 286-87.
efforts. Administration leaders learned from Republican leaders that their European programs, going beyond Greece and Turkey, would be approved only under the condition that assistance be forthcoming to China.31

Pressures from Republican leaders also brought about the termination of the ten-month embargo on combat items to China.32 Pressure from China advocate Walter Judd culminated in Secretary Marshall's request to President Truman for another survey of the situation in China. Another survey of China's difficulties would undoubtedly uncover facts already known by Administration leaders but pressure on the Administration had forced "a modification in the Administration's opposition to aiding Chiang."33

A survey of the situation in China was not the only proposal offered to the Truman Administration. Foreign Service Officer George Atcheson, Jr., an old China hand, informed General of the Army Douglas MacArthur in February, 1947, that in the State Department "there was a suggestion floating around . . . that you be asked to visit China to

31 Tsou, America's Failure, p. 463.

32 Westerfield, Foreign Policy, p. 259.

make a survey of the situation." In a meeting in February with President Truman, Vice Admiral Charles M. Cooke, Jr., proposed that the President send to China a commission "composed of eminent members of high prestige, in the political field, . . . and thoroughly explore the situation and make the recommendation to the U.S. Government of what should be done." Two months later, Maine's Republican Senator Owen Brewster proposed a "Unified American Program" in the Far East with General Douglas MacArthur, then Supreme Commander of American Forces in the Pacific, to serve as American Vice Regent of the entire Orient. Brewster's suggestion was partially adopted in William Bullitt's China Report of October, 1947, which informed Americans that General MacArthur was the only American who could save China. Whether or not President Truman was influenced by these proposals, he ultimately sent a personal envoy to China.


36 Incoming Unsigned Message from the State Department, April 20, 1947, to General Douglas MacArthur, in the Douglas MacArthur Papers, State Department File, Record Group No. 9, March-April, 1947.

Although these proposals mentioned the selection of General Douglas MacArthur as the personal envoy of the President, General Albert Wedemeyer, long experienced in China's difficult postwar problems, was chosen as Special Representative of President Truman to appraise "the political, economic, psychological and military situations—current and projected." In a conversation with Chinese Foreign Affairs Minister Wang Shih-chieh, Secretary of State Marshall recalled his reasons for selecting General Wedemeyer. "I had selected Wedemeyer," said the Secretary of State, "because of his known anti-Chinese Communist bias and his devotion to the Generalissimo, and also because of the Generalissimo's expressed confidence in Wedemeyer."

General Wedemeyer reluctantly accepted his new assignment, realizing that his views on America's China

---


policy "were diametrically opposite to those of the State Department which General Marshall tried so hard to implement for over a year."\textsuperscript{40} He believed that during Marshall's Mission "our government by economic and diplomatic pressures tried to coalesce Communist and Nationalist Forces, [and] the government of China was unable to strengthen itself politically, economically and militarily."

Wedemeyer hoped that his new assignment "would afford [him] an opportunity to help formulate a realistic U.S. policy in China and the Far East."\textsuperscript{41} His presidential directive focused his attention on the situation in China in estimating "the character, extent, and probable consequences of assistance which you may recommend, and the probable consequences in the event that assistance is not given."\textsuperscript{42}

Learning of Wedemeyer's Mission, Foreign Affairs Minister Wang Shih-chieh noted that his Government believed that the mission "would result in immediate and substantial military aid."\textsuperscript{43} Chinese Communists attacked Wedemeyer's

---

\textsuperscript{40}Letter from General Albert C. Wedemeyer to General Douglas MacArthur, in the Douglas MacArthur Papers, V.I.P. Correspondence File, Record Group No. 10, Box 8. This letter, which was not dated, was written on State Department stationery.

\textsuperscript{41}Wedemeyer, \textit{Wedemeyer Reports!}, p. 379.

\textsuperscript{42}U.S., Department of State, \textit{China White Paper}, I, p. 256.

\textsuperscript{43}Ibid.
appointment as the American means "to prop up Chiang Kai-shek's moribund rule." Chinese splinter parties, skeptical of the upcoming mission, feared that assistance to China "would only prolong the civil war." 

After surveying China's insurmountable difficulties for one month, General Wedemeyer addressed a joint meeting of the State Council and all Ministers of the National Government, Chiang, Madame Chiang and Ambassador Stuart on August 22, 1947. Wedemeyer told his audience that "the Central Government cannot defeat the Chinese Communists by the employment of force, but can only win the loyal, enthusiastic and realistic support of the masses of the people by improving the political and economic situation immediately." He emphasized Chinese Nationalist inefficiency and incompetence and "hoped to jolt the Nationalist leaders into taking action which would convince America that they were worth supporting." 

Wedemeyer's speech greatly offended Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek, who was convinced that the United States

44 Wedemeyer, Wedemeyer Reports!, p. 387.

45 U.S., Department of State, China White Paper, I, p. 256.


47 Wedemeyer, Wedemeyer Reports!, p. 391.
was trying to force him to retire.\textsuperscript{48} Chiang had originally asked Wedemeyer to discuss frankly with him his observations.\textsuperscript{49} Ambassador John Leighton Stuart, who later criticized General Wedemeyer's speech at Nanking, had also urged the General to give this address. Stuart informed Wedemeyer that his criticism "would be accepted in the spirit in which it was given as a friend."\textsuperscript{50} Had Wedemeyer known that his subsequent report would be suppressed by Secretary Marshall, he would have never made his first Nanking speech. General Wedemeyer delivered another equally explosive speech at the time of his departure from China. He announced that the Central Government must "effect immediately drastic, far-reaching political and economic reforms" for it "to regain and maintain the confidence of the people."\textsuperscript{51}

As the Central Government's position deteriorated further, General Wedemeyer's statements went unheeded and


\textsuperscript{50}Wedemeyer, \textit{Wedemeyer Reports!}, pp. 386-87. See also Stuart, \textit{Fifty Years}, p. 186.

were presented in a lengthy report on September 19 to President Harry Truman. The urgency of action in the Manchurian situation to prevent the area "from becoming a Soviet satellite" necessitated Wedemeyer's most significant recommendation in his report.52

That China be advised to request the United Nations to take immediate steps to bring about a cessation of hostilities in Manchuria and request that Manchuria be placed under Five-Power Guardianship or, failing that, under a Trusteeship in accordance with the United Nations Charter.53

Wedemeyer had originally proposed a trusteeship for Manchuria in November, 1945, knowing that the creation of a buffer zone denied the Soviet Union "the opportunity to penetrate effectively to the South" and "confined their influence."54

Wedemeyer's Report constantly reiterated the importance of assistance to China by declaring that a "removal


53 Ibid., p. 814. See also same reference source on p. 767. The five powers were China, the Soviet Union, the United States, Great Britain and France. This recommendation was considered as a policy alternative to halt the Chinese civil war by New York Times correspondent Henry R. Lieberman, who advocated an understanding with the Soviet Union either through the Foreign Ministers' Council or the United Nations. See Henry R. Lieberman, "U.S. Bases in China Held To Be Vital," New York Times, Sept. 1, 1947, p. 6.

of American assistance without the corresponding Soviet removal of assistance" would lay China "open to eventual Communist domination." Wedemeyer's controversial report also envisioned a program of military assistance over a period of at least five years "under the supervision of American advisers in specified areas.\textsuperscript{56} General Wedemeyer later admitted that these advisers would have entered Chinese areas of conflict.\textsuperscript{57}

If Congressman Walter Judd, the instigator of Wedemeyer's Mission, believed that Wedemeyer's Report would support his campaign for aid to China, his plans were thwarted by Secretary of State George Marshall, who personally suppressed the report.\textsuperscript{58} Marshall contended

\begin{footnotesize}
\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{57} Tsou, \textit{America's Failure}, p. 759.
\end{itemize}
\end{footnotesize}
that Wedemeyer had been sent to China to obtain information for the Secretary of State and "not for a public speech." Walton Butterworth, the new Director of the Office of Far Eastern Affairs and successor to John Carter Vincent, asked General Wedemeyer unsuccessfully to delete certain potentially embarrassing portions of his report. Secretary Marshall was particularly opposed to Wedemeyer's trusteeship proposal, which "would be a great embarrassment" to the United States in view of our relations with Greece. Marshall knew from his thirteen months of experience in China and from his discussions with Chiang Kai-shek that "he [Chiang] would resign before he would accept any

---

59 U.S., Congress, Senate, Nomination, p. 23.

60 Wedemeyer, Wedemeyer Reports!, pp. 397-98; Westerfield, Foreign Policy, p. 259; Tsou, America's Failure, p. 453; U.S., Congress, Senate, Military Situation, Part 3, Testimony of General Albert C. Wedemeyer, p. 2365. John Carter Vincent was succeeded by Walton Butterworth as Director of the Office of Far Eastern Affairs on September 15, 1947. In Tang Tsou, America's Failure, p. 453, the historian noted that "Vincent's transfer from that important office to serve as minister to Switzerland was a concession to the Republicans."

relationship in connection with China in which the Russians or the British had a part." 62 The Secretary also rejected Wedemeyer's proposal for an advisory group in China since America could not, at that time, commit 10,000 men to China. 63 If these men had been sent to China, this action would have been a step toward full-scale American involvement in the Chinese civil war.

The suppression of the Wedemeyer Report, as well as the silencing of the members of his mission, aroused widespread suspicion and condemnation by members of Congress, by members of the press, and by the American people. 64 Senator Arthur Vandenberg, Chairman of the Foreign Relations Committee, admitted that he never saw the report but listened to a paraphrase of it. 65 Representative Frank B. Keefe, a Republican from Wisconsin, declared on


63 Tsou, America's Failure, p. 459.

64 For further information on Wedemeyer and his staff's silencing, see Wedemeyer, Wedemeyer Reports!, p. 396; U.S., Congress, Senate, Military Situation, Part 1, Testimony of General George C. Marshall, p. 546.

the floor of the House that the Wedemeyer Report "was asked for and paid by the people of America."\textsuperscript{66}

American criticism of the Administration's suppression of the Wedemeyer Report was heightened by the publication in \textit{Life} of a "Report on China," written by the former Ambassador to France and the Soviet Union, William C. Bullitt. Bullitt had visited China and viewed the country's problems firsthand at the time Wedemeyer was also surveying the situation in China. Bullitt's Report was released one month after Wedemeyer addressed his recommendations to President Truman. Bullitt also found deteriorating conditions and announced that China could be "kept from the hands of Stalin . . . at a cost to ourselves which will be small compared to the magnitude of our interest in the independence of China."\textsuperscript{67} Bullitt's three-year proposed plan would cost $250,000,000 a year for both military and economic assistance.\textsuperscript{68} Bullitt, like Wedemeyer, emphasized the importance of Nationalist troops remaining in Manchuria. "If Manchuria should be abandoned to the Communists or should fall into their hands by


\textsuperscript{67}\textit{Bullitt, "Report,"} p. 135.

\textsuperscript{68}\textit{Ibid.}, p. 152.
conquest," said the former Ambassador, "a course of events fatal to China would follow."\(^{69}\) Unlike Bullitt's Report, Wedemeyer's undisclosed report did not recommend "all-out aid to Chiang." "It is my belief," said General Wedemeyer, "that aid given to any country should be subject to careful supervision to insure that it is used for the purposes for which it is intended."\(^{70}\) Wedemeyer's proposed assistance was to be carefully supervised by American advisers.

William Bullitt demanded that President Truman act at once on two points. First, the former Ambassador said that President Truman should send munitions to China "to keep Manchuria out of the hands of the Soviet Union."\(^{71}\) If this action was not taken, Bullitt believed that when Congress reconvened it should investigate American foreign policy toward China. Second, Bullitt requested that President Truman designate General Douglas MacArthur as Personal Representative of the President to China "to organize with the Generalissimo a joint plan to prevent subjugation of China by the Soviet Union."\(^{72}\)

---

\(^{69}\) Ibid., p. 142.

\(^{70}\) Letter from General Albert C. Wedemeyer, Commanding General, Ft. Meade, Maryland, Oct. 20, 1947, to General Douglas MacArthur, in the Douglas MacArthur Papers, V.I.P. Correspondence File, Record Group No. 10, Box 8. This letter was entitled "Personal--Eyes Alone."

\(^{71}\) Bullitt, "Report," p. 145.

\(^{72}\) Ibid., p. 154.
Bullitt's Report was "the opening in the long great assault on the administration's conduct of relations with China."\textsuperscript{73} Mounting pressure was exerted on the President and the Secretary of State to reveal the contents of the Wedemeyer Report. Had the Truman Administration not suppressed this report, it might not have been faced with its concession to the Republican Congress—the China Aid Act. Through the widespread discussion of these reports, which called for America's immediate attention toward assistance to China, the China issue was repeatedly placed before the American people and was the center of congressional attention when President Truman called a special session of Congress in November, 1947, "to provide emergency aid for Europe in anticipation of consideration of the full Marshall Plan program of the following year."\textsuperscript{74}

\textsuperscript{73}Westerfield, \textit{Foreign Policy}, p. 261

\textsuperscript{74}Koen, "China Lobby," p. 200.
CHAPTER VI

THE CHINA AID ACT

In calling for a special session of Congress in November, 1947, to provide interim aid for Europe, President Harry S. Truman faced a Republican-controlled House, which was basically interested in including a provision in the Administration's program for financial aid to the National Government of China.\footnote{Westerfield, \textit{Foreign Policy}, p. 262.} House Military Affairs Committee members, especially Walter Judd, had traveled to China during the congressional recess, at which time Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek appealed to them for greater American assistance. Chiang cautioned the congressmen that if the Chinese Government "were finally defeated it would not be because of Russia or the Chinese Communists, but because the United States failed to give promised assistance at a time of desperate need."\footnote{U.S., Department of State, \textit{China White Paper}, I, p. 264.} Two Republican members of this committee, Representatives Walter Judd of Minnesota and John Vorys of Ohio, returned to the United States
"determined to include China among the nations destined to receive American aid."³

In late October in response to Republican demands for aid to China, the State Department began to redefine American policy toward China by devising a program of economic assistance to China. This new policy became apparent in Secretary of State George C. Marshall's endeavors to overcome Judd and Vorys' pressure.⁴ In Marshall's testimony on November 10 before the joint session of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee and House Foreign Affairs Committee, the Secretary of State reaffirmed his deep concern for the situation in China. He reminded the legislators:

The United States Government and all other world powers recognize the National Government as the sole legal Government of China. Only the Government and the people of China can solve their fundamental problems and regain for China its rightful role as a major stabilizing influence in the Far East.⁵

Secretary Marshall next announced a point which he knew would be welcomed by Republican Foreign Affairs Committee

⁴U.S., Department of State, China White Paper, I, p. 269.
⁵U.S., Congress, Senate, Committee on Foreign Relations, Interim Aid for Europe, Hearings, before the Committee on Foreign Relations, Senate, 80th Cong., 1st sess., 1947, p. 7.
members: "We can be of help and, in the light of our long and uninterrupted record of friendship and international cooperation with China, we should extend to the government and its people certain economic aid and assistance." 

"A definite proposal," said Marshall, "is under preparation for early submission."

On the following day, the General appeared before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, which questioned him on his estimate of the cost of economic aid to China. Secretary Marshall estimated $300,000,000 for fifteen months. This figure was slightly higher than Ambassador William Bullitt's proposed amount of $250,000,000 for one year. Republican Senators welcomed Marshall's estimate and decided not to endorse China's inclusion in the interim aid bill.

In Marshall's subsequent testimony on November 12 before the House Foreign Affairs Committee, the Secretary informed Congressman Judd that there had been a "great deterioration" in the situation in China since Acting Secretary of State Dean Acheson's testimony on the Greek-Turkish aid bill before the same House Committee. Like

---

6 Ibid.
7 Ibid., p. 43.
8 Westerfield, Foreign Policy, p. 262.
Acheson, the Secretary of State emphasized that China's situation differed from that in Western Europe. Marshall contended that Europe was one problem and China was another problem. In speaking of assistance to Europe as opposed to assistance to China, Representative Judd reminded his colleagues that he would not vote "to put $20,000,000 into holding the line on one front and then ignore another front equally vital to our future." Judd tied the two areas of the world together and reminded his colleagues that our loss in Asia would mean our loss of Europe.

Secretary of State George Marshall told Congressman Judd, the leading Nationalist China supporter, that his detailed proposal for economic assistance to China would be submitted to Congress in January, 1948. He admitted later to Representative John Kee, a Democrat from West Virginia and a member of the Foreign Affairs Committee, that "we have been trying to find some practical basis which would justify the expenditure of American funds on the basis . . . of getting about a seventy percent return in effectiveness of use." Under the leadership of Representatives Judd

9U.S., Congress, House, Committee on Foreign Affairs, Emergency Foreign Aid, Hearings, before the Committee on Foreign Affairs, House of Representatives, 80th Cong., 1st sess., 1947, Testimony of Representative Walter Judd, p. 239.

and Vorys, the Foreign Affairs Committee proposed an interim aid bill which included China as one of the recipient countries to receive economic assistance.

While Walter Judd was the most active Republican supporter for economic and military assistance to Nationalist China, House Speaker Joseph W. Martin, Jr., felt that it was imperative "to fight Communism anywhere in the world, not just in Europe."\(^{11}\) Senator Robert A. Taft of Ohio believed that "the United States could not deal with Europe without considering China and Latin America."\(^{12}\) This view was reiterated by Representative Judd during the Foreign Affairs hearings. The climax of this Republican criticism occurred on November 24, 1947, when Governor Thomas Dewey of New York delivered an address to the alumni of Columbia University Law School. Governor Dewey demanded that "we change our national policy immediately" or face the possibility that China "will fall wholly into the Communist hands."\(^{13}\) He described the free world as a patient with gangrene in both legs, naming these two legs--


Western Europe and Asia. Dewey announced that "our government is telling the world we have a very good cure for gangrene but will apply it to one leg while the gangrene in the other leg destroys the patient."

Classified by historian Ross Koen "as the opening gun for the 1948 Republican presidential nomination," Governor Dewey's address emphasized that the American Government "has no discernible Chinese policy whatsoever. We are bankrupt so far as Chinese policy is concerned." Dewey criticized President Truman for not including China in the interim aid program and attacked his Administration for the lack of consultation and bipartisanship in American foreign policy toward China. This last issue had been espoused by Senator Arthur Vandenberg on the same day on the floor of the Senate, at which time the Senator observed that "I do not believe that the Senate Foreign Relations Committee has been consulted in any substantial degree regarding Asiatic policy during the past year or two." The Foreign Relations Committee, according to Vandenberg, had "not had the China problem before us in any detail whatsoever."


Republican Senators regretted that President Truman's interim aid program had not included China but were satisfied that China was to be the subject of a forthcoming economic assistance program instead of the Administration's continuance of its program of watchful waiting. Democratic Senator Tom Connally commented to his colleagues on the floor of the Senate on December 15 that the State Department desired "a concrete plan for China" to be completed in January, 1948. Connally supported Secretary Marshall's position by stating that the State Department "is already at work, and . . . has been for some time, on the details of the proposed plan for aid to China."

Republican Senator Styles Bridges of New Hampshire countered Connally's support for the Truman-Marshall policy by expressing his concern over the "continual bungling" of the China policy. Senator Arthur Vandenberg admitted to Bridges and Connally that he had "for some time been out of harmony with our official attitude toward China" and had "repeatedly urged a different attitude." 

16 Ibid., 10704.


18 Ibid.
In this Senate debate on December 15, Senate Republican leader Arthur Vandenberg, adhering to the pleadings of Representative John Vorys, added China to the list of recipient countries under the interim aid bill.\(^\text{19}\) Vandenberg noted that China had been included in the House bill and thought "it would be distinctly misunderstood and would be almost an act of negation in respect to China, if it were not also recognized by the Senate in the ultimate conference report." Representative Vorys had won one battle by succeeding in including China as an interim aid recipient, although he lost another fight when House Appropriations Committee Chairman John Taber of New York, who had not received a definite plan for China from the Administration, failed to include China as a recipient of assistance.\(^\text{20}\)

In his testimony on December 18, before the Senate Appropriations Committee under the chairmanship of Styles Bridges, Assistant Secretary of State Willard L. Thorp told a stunned audience that "the State Department has no

---


\(^{20}\)Westerfield, *Foreign Policy*, p. 263.
program of American aid to China today."^21 The Senate Appropriations Committee decided to earmark $20,000,000 for aid to China. At Senator Vandenberg's suggestion, this figure was changed to $18,000,000 to coincide with a previously authorized "post-UNRRA" relief bill, Public Law 84.^23

Realizing that congressional pressure was mounting for the Administration's proposal of economic assistance to China, the National Government in late December requested from the United States a long-range four-year program of economic assistance totaling $1,500,000,000 with $500,000,000 for the first year. This figure was higher than Marshall's estimate of $300,000,000 for fifteen months or Bullitt's estimate of $250,000,000 for twelve months. At the time of this Nationalist request, the Chinese Communists launched their largest offensive in Manchuria, with


^22 Westerfield, Foreign Policy, p. 263.


^24 U.S., Department of State, China White Paper, I, pp. 376-77. The cost for the second year would be $500,000,000, $300,000,000 for the third year and $200,000,000 for the fourth year.
their goal the isolation of the Central Government's forces at Changchun, Mukden and Chichow.25

Mounting Republican pressure for the long-awaited Administration China aid bill provoked Senator Styles Bridges' letter of January 20, 1948, to Secretary of State George Marshall. Bridges reminded the Secretary of his testimony before the joint session of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee and the House Foreign Affairs Committee on November 10 and demanded that the China aid program be submitted at once to Congress.26 On January 21, former President Herbert Hoover joined Republican congressmen in suggesting that aid be given to China in addition to Germany, Japan and Korea.

Senator Bridges and former President Hoover did not receive a response from the Truman Administration until February, 1948. At a meeting of the National Security Council on February 12, Secretary of State Marshall revealed the contents of two China documents which would soon be released. Secretary of Defense James Forrestal recalled the contents of these two documents: "The gist of both is that we regard the China problem under present conditions of disorder, corruption, inefficiency and impotence of the

25 Tsou, America's Failure, p. 477.
Central Government as being practically unsolvable; that we cannot afford to be drawn in on an unending drain upon our resources."\textsuperscript{27}

The Truman Administration's program of economic aid to China was submitted by President Harry Truman to Congress on February 18, 1948. This presidential address reaffirmed America's faith in the Chinese Government "to provide the framework within which efforts toward peace and ... economic recovery may be effective" and recommended that Congress appropriate $570,000,000 to provide assistance to China for fifteen months.\textsuperscript{28} President Truman told his Republican critics that the problem of assistance to China had been the subject of continuous study since General George Marshall's return from China in January, 1947. "The agreement," considered Truman, "should include assurances that the Chinese Government will take such economic, financial and other measures as are practicable, looking toward the ultimate goal of economic stability and recovery."\textsuperscript{29} President Truman understood that the

\textsuperscript{27}Forrestal, Forrestal Diaries, p. 371. James Forrestal served as Secretary of the Navy from May, 1944, to July, 1947, and then served as Secretary of Defense from September, 1947, to March, 1949.

\textsuperscript{28}U.S., Department of State, China White Paper, I, p. 379; U.S., President, Public Papers, Truman, 1948, p. 145.

\textsuperscript{29}U.S., President, Public Papers, Truman, 1948, p. 146.
assistance which the United States proposed to give China could not "be a substitute for the necessary action that can be taken only by the Chinese Government."

Following Truman's address to Congress, Secretary of State Marshall appeared again before a joint session of the Committees of Foreign Affairs and Foreign Relations. Secretary Marshall reiterated his and the Administration's opposition to American involvement in Chinese internal affairs. "It involves obligations and responsibilities on the part of this Government," said Marshall, "which I am convinced the American people would never knowingly accept."30 "It would involve this Government in a continuing commitment from which it would be practically impossible to withdraw, and it would very probably involve grave consequences to this nation by making China an arena of international conflict."31 Marshall reemphasized to congressional committee members that the Chinese Government had to maintain itself against the Communists.32 Historian Robert Payne noted that Secretary Marshall mentioned "for the first time the possibility of their [the Nationalists']

31 Ibid., p. 382.
32 Ibid.
defeat." Americans should be prepared "to face the possibility that the present Chinese Government may not be successful in maintaining itself against the Communist forces or other opposition that may arise in China."  

Secretary of State Marshall believed that the United States could not afford "economically or militarily, to take over the continued failures of the present Chinese Government" or to reduce our strength in more vital areas, especially in the industrial areas of Western Europe, "where we now have a reasonable opportunity of successfully meeting or thwarting the Communist threat."  

Marshall believed that Western Europe was number one on America's priority list. He resolved to avoid a long-term Chinese commitment which might involve the United States in a fratricidal civil war to the detriment of European recovery.  

While the Administration had yielded to the wishes of Republican critics, its China aid bill provided solely for economic assistance. Republican critics once again expressed their opposition to the lack of military

---

33 Payne, Marshall Story, p. 306.

34 U.S., Department of State, China White Paper, I, p. 382.


36 Rosinger, "China Policy," 236.
assistance in the Administration's proposed program even though it was inconsistent with our foreign policy of non-involvement in a civil war. Two exceptions in this list of Republican critics were John Foster Dulles and Senator Arthur Vandenberg, both of whom had, by now, "been privately won over to the State Department's view of the hopelessness of American intervention on behalf of Chiang Kai-shek in China." 37

Two loyal proponents of Chiang's Government, Senator Bridges and Representative Judd, urged that the Administration program include military aid as well as economic aid. Senator Robert Taft urged that the United States supply the Chinese Government with military assistance to repel the Communist forces in Manchuria, similar to what had been undertaken by the United States in Greece. 38 Senator Taft was convinced "very strongly that the Far East is ultimately even more important to our future peace than is Europe." 39

While the Administration had submitted its China aid bill of economic assistance to the Congress, the House and

37 Westerfield, Foreign Policy, p. 248; Vandenberg, Private Papers, p. 523.
38 Rosinger, "China Policy," 236.
39 Quoted in Ibid.
Senate reported their own China aid bills. The House Foreign Affairs Committee proposed that $150,000,000 over a fifteen-month period be designated for military assistance to China under the supervision of American military advisers, while $420,000,000 was to be earmarked for economic aid with a portion of that possibly to be diverted also to military aid. American military advisers, who were to be stationed in combat areas, were to provide the Chinese military officers with "strategic advice." This bill was not approved by the Senate, since it implied that the United States would be "underwriting the military of the National Government" at a time when our military strength could not have even spared General Wedemeyer's low estimate of 10,000 men for China.

The Senate Foreign Relations Committee recommended a bill which would provide $363,000,000 for Chinese relief and rehabilitation and $100,000,000 to be used as President Truman chose. In a speech on the floor of the Senate on March 30, Chairman Arthur Vandenberg, who now understood

---

40 For an analysis of the House and Senate China aid bills, see Westerfield, Foreign Policy, pp. 263-66; Koen, "China Lobby," pp. 67-70, 205-07.

41 Westerfield, Foreign Policy, p. 263.


43 Quoted in Ibid., p. 68.
the unsolvable Chinese situation, spoke for other Foreign
Relations Committee members in declaring that "in this, as
in all other relief bills, . . . there is no implication
that American aid involves any continuity of obligation
beyond specific current commitments which Congress may see
fit to make."44 Vandenberg further declared that "we do
not—we cannot underwrite the future. Events are unpre-
dictable in this tragically fluxing age." The man who had
launched the criticism within his party fourteen months
earlier was now supporting the Administration "in express-
ing doubts about the Chinese situation and fears of too
deep an involvement."45

The final bill, which was passed by the Congress on
April 2 and signed by President Harry Truman on April 3,
incorporated both House and Senate versions of the China
aid bill by agreeing on a twelve-month program of
$338,000,000 for economic aid and $125,000,000 for special
grants or military aid to be used at the discretion of the
Chinese Government.46 The passage of the China Aid Act of
1948 marked the return of the United States to the policy

44 U.S., Congress, Senate, Extension of Remarks of
Senator Arthur Vandenberg, 80th Cong., 2d sess., Mar. 30,
1948, Congressional Record, XCIV, Part 3, 3668.
46 U.S., Department of State, China White Paper, I,
p. 389.
of "limited commitment" to the National Government. In a letter to Secretary of State Marshall one month after the passage of the China Aid Act, Ambassador John Leighton Stuart analyzed the significance of the Act: "Any broad or powerful bargaining position vis-à-vis the Chinese Government disappeared on the date Congress passed the China Aid Act of 1948."\(^{48}\)

Whether or not the United States was in a bargaining position, Europe still held priority over China. The China Aid Act only delayed the inevitable— the doom of Chiang's Nationalist Government. The Generalissimo's corrupt and incompetent regime had been kept breathing with a golden pulmotor operated by the Republican-controlled Congress. \(^{49}\) Republican opponents of the Administration's China policy pressured Secretary Marshall until a shift in our foreign policy became imperative in order to assure the adoption of the European Recovery Program. The China Aid Act did not terminate Republican


\(^{49}\) *Incoming Message from the Chief of Staff of the Public Information Division, Nov. 3, 1948, to Major General David Barr of the United States Military Advisory Group, in the Douglas MacArthur Papers, Incoming Messages in the WCL File, November, 1948.*
criticism toward the Truman Administration. This Act was
to become the subject of great criticism in the United
States, particularly with regard to the delays in American
shipments of military goods to China.50

50 See U.S., Congress, Senate, "Aid to China," 
Extension of Remarks of Senator Styles Bridges, 80th Cong.,
2d sess., Aug. 7, 1948, Congressional Record, XCIV, Part
12, A5079-82.
CHAPTER VII
CONCLUSION

Secrecy loomed heavily over American diplomacy toward China in the postwar years of 1945 through 1948. In
General Patrick Hurley's testimony before the MacArthur
Hearings in 1951, he objected greatly to the prevalence of
secrecy in the government. "In a government by the
people," said Hurley, "the people cannot make correct con­
clusions if they are not given all the facts."1 American
foreign policy toward China might have taken a different
course if the American people had learned of such sup­
pressed documents as the Yalta Far Eastern agreements, the
Wedemeyer Report and the foreign service officers' memoran­
dums from 1944 through 1946 relating to the Yenan Govern­
ment's interest in establishing relations with the United
States to avoid their dependence on the Soviet Union. The
Senate Foreign Relations Committee's investigation into the
resignation and charges of Ambassador Hurley should have
been followed by further public debates and a top-to-bottom
congressional investigation, as envisioned by Senator
Kenneth Wherry, to analyze America's role in postwar China.

1U.S., Congress, Senate, Military Situation, Part 4,
p. 2828.
With the American people and their elected representatives uninformed of their commitments, Americans were misled by Dean Acheson's "Letter of Transmittal" into believing that only three alternatives toward China existed after the termination of the Second World War. Foreign service officers advocated that the United States pursue a flexible policy toward China by working with the Nationalists and the Communists while America adapted itself to developments in China. This approach would have produced the best results if it had been implemented immediately after the War. "The agonizing question" within the acceptance of this alternative, as viewed by historian Barbara Tuchman, was "why people who report the scene are not listened to by the policy makers in Washington."

Americans would have realized that Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek's National Government was run by incompetent and dishonest officials who would never be able to unify all Chinese political elements. The magnitude of this corruption and of the inability of the Central Government to succeed in unifying all factions would have encouraged Americans to look favorably at the Chinese Communists,

2 U.S., Congress, Senate, United States-China Relations, Testimony of John Stewart Service, p. 33.

who were not at this time subservient to the Soviet Union, as claimed by Dean Acheson in his "Letter of Transmittal."

An alternative to the leadership of the Generalissimo was rarely mentioned and never seriously considered. In the Department of State's discussion on American policy toward China on October 8, 1949, General George C. Marshall recalled that "no one ever suggested anyone could take his place; at least, they never made a suggestion to me, that made any impression on my mind of a man who could handle the situation." 4

The United States chose a policy of friendly persuasion in an attempt to assist the Nationalists to broaden the base of their government to include other political elements, cease the fighting in China and amalgamate the armies of the Communists and the Kuomintang. As Special Representative of President Harry S. Truman, the eminent General Marshall left for China in December, 1945, on a thirteen-month mission, with the American people and the President believing that only he could resolve the situation. 5 Marshall's first three months supported their

---


5U.S., Department of State, Foreign Relations, 1945, The Far East, p. 764. Draft of letter from President Truman to General Marshall. This letter was dated December 10, 1945, and was apparently written by John Carter Vincent. This draft stated: "The fact that I have
hopes, but his return to the United States at a critical time to obtain assistance for China coincided with the exploding crisis in Manchuria. Marshall’s role as mediator and peacemaker between the Communists and the Nationalists decreased upon his return and dwindled upon the failure of the June truce negotiations. American assistance to Chiang damaged Marshall’s role as an impartial mediator throughout the summer and fall of 1946.

America turned from a policy of involvement in December, 1945, by attempting to mediate the two dissident, divergent and irreconcilable forces to a "hands-off" policy of wait and see initiated upon the termination of the Marshall Mission in January, 1947. The bipartisan support of the Truman Administration’s China policy began to erode immediately after Marshall’s confirmation as Secretary of State as the Administration turned its attention to the problems of European postwar recovery. Containing Communism in Europe had higher priority than containing it in China. President Truman, who had no desire to support a

asked you to go to China is the clearest evidence of my real concern with regard to the situation there." See also the November 29, 1945, editorial in the Manchester Union entitled "Hurley’s Resignation" as reprinted in U.S., Congress, House, "Hurley's Resignation--The Muddle," Extension of Remarks of Representative Chester E. Merrow, 79th Cong., 1st sess., Nov. 30, 1945, Congressional Record, XCI, Part 13, A5223. This editorial spoke of General George C. Marshall as "the right man for the job. . . . If any man can bring order out of the present chaos, it is he."
moribund regime, did not want to apply a Truman Doctrine to China. Republican criticism of the Administration's China policy reached its zenith when the Administration suppressed General Albert Wedemeyer's Report and silenced the members of his mission.

Secretary of State Marshall faced a determined Republican opposition when he asked for their support in endorsing an Administration bill on interim aid for Europe. Marshall contended that China was "an entirely different problem and should be handled in a different way." His critics disagreed and he was forced in November, 1947, to promise Administration legislation on assistance for China to assure passage of the European recovery legislation. Three months later, President Truman submitted his China aid program to Congress.

Some historians have noted that during the year 1947 America's priority in foreign policy in the Far East

---


7U.S., Congress, House, Extension of Remarks of Representative James P. Richards, 80th Cong., 1st sess., Dec. 11, 1947, Congressional Record, XCIII, Part 9, 11287. Representative Richards, a Democrat from South Carolina, recalled this statement during the congressional debate on the probable proposal of Administration assistance to China.
shifted from China to Japan. The United States refused to allow the Soviet Union to have a part in controlling Japan, and Russia looked to China as an alternate. This theory explains America's reluctant policy toward China during that critical postwar year. In a speech to the National War College on May 6, 1947, George Kennan told his audience: "If at any time in the postwar period the Soviet leaders had been confronted with a choice between control over China and control over Japan, they would unhesitatingly have chosen the latter." Following General Wedemeyer's departure from China after his fact-finding survey, Ambassador John Leighton Stuart in a letter to Secretary of State George Marshall spoke of an "added element increasing Chinese fear that the United States is tending more and more to shift the center of gravity of its Far Eastern policy from China to Japan."

While this theory was not mentioned by many American leaders and historians, no one can underestimate the role of Special Representative and Secretary of State George C.

---

8 Gardner, Architects of Illusion, p. 164.
9 Tsou, America's Failure, p. 370.
Marshall in America's foreign policy toward China during the postwar years. Foreign Service Officer John Paton Davies recalled that "no other American of that period had the influence that Marshall did." President Truman relied entirely upon Marshall's advice while the General was serving in China. Historian Alexander De Conde thought that the General "had a voice, probably the decisive one, in every major foreign policy during the years of 1947 and 1948." Unlike Patrick Hurley and Secretary of State James Byrnes, President Truman relied on Marshall whose experience in China demonstrated that Chiang's policy of rule or ruin would bring about the Generalissimo's eventual downfall. John Paton Davies recalled in his testimony before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee in 1971 that Secretary of State George Marshall "made the . . . basic decision that we should disengage in China." American assistance to Chiang's National Government from 1945 through 1948 merely delayed the inevitable outcome—the deterioration and ultimate downfall of Chiang


14 U.S., Congress, Senate, United States-China Relations, p. 36.
and his tired and decayed Government. Many Americans repeatedly advocated increased military assistance to the Central Government. Historian Lyman P. Van Slyke observed: "To the Nationalists and their supporters, any amount of aid would have been insufficient if it failed to defeat the Communists." Colonel Ivan Yeaton, the head of the Military Observers Mission in Yenan, had wisely predicted in August, 1945, that Kuomintang troops "cannot hold out even with United States help" against the Communist Army.

While American assistance to Chiang's Government delayed the outcome of the Chinese civil war, President Harry Truman's three China statements emphasized the importance of a strong and unified China as well as America's attempts as intermediary to cease the fighting in the fratricidal Chinese war. From 1945 through 1948 unity and peace in China were not achieved. On March 11, 1948, President Truman announced his interpretation of his December 15, 1945, policy statement on the broadening of the base of the Chinese Government. Truman's analysis, which was similar to that of former Director of the Office of Far Eastern Affairs John Carter Vincent, stated that the broadening was not to include the Chinese Communists but


16 Tsou, America's Failure, p. 358.
Chinese liberals. The President announced that he did not "know that it was ever the policy of this Government" to include the Communists. "We don't want a Communist government in China," reported Truman, "or anywhere else, if we can help it." President Truman had cut "the last threads of Marshall's China policy." Historian Tsou viewed this announcement as "the internment of the policy of a coalition government."  

---


18 Gardner, Architects of Illusion, p. 166.

19 Tsou, America's Failure, p. 474.
BIBLIOGRAPHY

A. GENERAL WORKS


---


*The United States and the Far East, 1945-1951*. Stanford, California: Stanford University Press for
the American Institute of Pacific Relations, Inc., 1952.


B. MEMOIRS, AUTOBIOGRAPHIES AND PERSONAL PAPERS


C. UNPUBLISHED STUDIES


D. GOVERNMENT PUBLICATIONS


U.S. Congress. Senate. Committee on Armed Services. 
Nomination of General of the Army George C. Marshall 
To Be Secretary of Defense. Hearings before the 
Committee on Armed Services, Senate, 81st Cong., 2d 
 sess., 1950.

U.S. Congress. Senate. Committee on Foreign Relations. 
China and the United States: Today and Yesterday. 
Hearings before the Committee on Foreign Relations, 
Senate, 92d Cong., 2d sess., 1972.

U.S. Congress. Senate. Committee on Foreign Relations. 
Interim Aid for Europe. Hearings before the Committee 
on Foreign Relations, Senate, 80th Cong., 1st 
 sess., 1947.

U.S. Congress. Senate. Committee on Foreign Relations. 
State Department Employee Loyalty Investigation. 
Part 1. Hearings before a subcommittee of the 
Committee on Foreign Relations, Senate, on S.R. 231, 

U.S. Congress. Senate. Committee on Foreign Relations. 
United States-China Relations. Hearings on the 
Evolution of U.S. Policy toward Mainland China before 
the Committee on Foreign Relations, Senate, 92d 
Cong., 1st sess., 1971, and in the Appendix, Investigation of Far Eastern Policy, Hearings on the Situation in the Far East, Particularly China before the 
Committee on Foreign Relations, Senate, 79th Cong., 
1st sess., 1945.

U.S. Congress. Senate. Committee on Foreign Relations. 
U.S. Policy with Respect to Mainland China. Hearings 
before the Committee on Foreign Relations, Senate, 
89th Cong., 2d sess., 1966.

U.S. Congress. Senate. Committee on Foreign Relations. 
United States Relations with the People's Republic of 
China. Hearings before the Committee on Foreign 
Relations, Senate, on S.R. 18, 37, 48, 82 and 139, 

U.S. Congress. Senate. Committee on the Judiciary. The 
Amerasia Papers: A Clue to the Catastrophe of China. 
2 vols. Hearings before the subcommittee to investiga 
t the administration of the Internal Security Laws 
of the Committee on the Judiciary, Senate, 91st Cong., 
U.S. Congress. Senate. Committee on the Judiciary.
Institute of Pacific Relations. 15 parts. Hearings before the subcommittee to investigate the administration of the Internal Security Act and other Internal Security Laws of the Committee on the Judiciary, Senate, on S.R. 366, 82d Cong., 1st, 2d sess., 1951, 1952.

U.S. Congress, Senate. Committee on the Judiciary.


**E. ARCHIVAL MATERIAL AND MANUSCRIPT COLLECTIONS**


**F. "ARTICLES"**


--- "Who Will Win the Civil War in China?" Virginia Quarterly Review, XXXIII (Spring, 1947), 193-208.


"Pulling Out of China?" The Nation, February 8, 1947, pp. 143-44.


——. "Who Will Win the Civil War in China?" Virginia Quarterly Review, XXXIII (Spring, 1947), 193-208.


"Pulling Out of China?" The Nation, February 8, 1947, pp. 143-44.


Tuchman, Barbara W. "If Mao Had Come to Washington: An Essay in Alternatives." Foreign Affairs, LI (October, 1972), 44-64.


G. NEWSPAPERS

