Armageddon Revisited: The 1973 Gubernatorial Election in Virginia

James R. Sweeney
Old Dominion University, jsweeney@odu.edu

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.odu.edu/history_fac_pubs

Part of the American Politics Commons, Political History Commons, and the United States History Commons

Original Publication Citation

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the History at ODU Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in History Faculty Publications by an authorized administrator of ODU Digital Commons. For more information, please contact digitalcommons@odu.edu.
When choosing a title for his first post-election analysis, Larry Sabato, a young political scientist at the University of Virginia, used the biblical term “Armageddon” to describe the Virginia gubernatorial election of 1973. Defined by *Merriam-Webster’s Dictionary* as “the place where the final battle will be fought between the forces of good and evil,” Armageddon seemed to be an appropriate term to describe the ideological contest between conservative former governor Mills E. Godwin, Jr., and liberal-populist Lieutenant Governor Henry E. Howell, Jr. Viewing the election from the perspective of almost fifty years, the contest does not seem to have been apocalyptic. Nonetheless, the campaign has important legacies that help shape contemporary Virginia politics.¹

Some characteristics of the 1973 contest for governor are unique in Virginia’s history. Both candidates had been life-long Democrats; however, neither ran as a Democrat. In fact, for the first time since its post–Civil War rebirth in the 1880s, the Democratic Party fielded no gubernatorial candidate. Professor Sabato described the election as “a confusing one for political scientists and laymen alike.” Such indeed was the confused and confusing state of Virginia politics in the early 1970s.²

The late 1960s and the early 1970s was a period of transition politically in the Old Dominion. The long dominant conservative Democratic machine led by Senator Harry F. Byrd, Sr., had collapsed. The seeds of political change were already germinating before Byrd’s death in 1966. Population growth in urban and suburban areas persuaded federal courts to order legislative reapportionment and congressional redistricting. Political
activism among Black Americans formerly excluded by the poll tax and cumbersome registration procedures surged as these barriers were removed by federal legislation and judicial action. Even the state’s long dormant Republican Party was experiencing growth, while the Democratic Party was torn by factional divisions.3

As the power of the Byrd Organization waned, two very different leaders, Mills Godwin and Henry Howell, emerged in the Virginia Democratic Party. Both served in the Virginia House of Delegates and the Virginia Senate, although they were colleagues only briefly. Godwin would be elected lieutenant governor in 1961 and governor four years later. Godwin and Howell were polar opposites in philosophy, temperament, style, and family background. Howell’s father was a lumber salesman, while Godwin’s owned a 500-acre farm on the Nansemond River in southeastern Virginia. The Godwins, who could trace their roots in the area to the 1630s, counted members of the colonial House of Burgesses on their family tree. Writing in 1973, syndicated columnist James Jackson Kilpatrick captured the differences in style and temperament of the two men: “Godwin is a conservative in the classic Virginia image, sound-dollar man, an excellent administrator, a figure of dignity, sobriety, and reserve; he has as much color as a cool glass of water. Howell is in diametrical opposite, an ebullient extrovert who cheerfully confuses millions and billions and campaigns with the noisy zeal of a midway barker.”4

During the 1950s the principal issues between Godwin and Howell were the Byrd Organization and matters relating to race. Elected to the House of Delegates in 1947, Godwin was an orthodox Byrd conservative, who advocated fiscal restraint, “pay-as-you-go” financing, states’ rights, and racial segregation. Howell’s first political activity was in 1949 when he distributed guide ballots for Francis Pickens Miller, the anti-Byrd candidate for governor in the Democratic primary. In 1953, Howell ran unsuccessfully for the House of Delegates. Criticizing Byrd Organization rule as undemocratic, he proposed abolition of the poll tax and more oversight of the political activities of state employees, as well as increased funding for education and mental health facilities. The principal issue of the 1950s, however, was desegregation of the public schools as mandated by the Supreme Court’s Brown v. Board of Education decisions. The response of the Byrd Organization was outright
In the summer of 1956, the General Assembly enacted a package of laws that embodied a policy of massive resistance, requiring closure of any public school under court order to be integrated. State Senator Godwin was the most outspoken advocate of massive resistance. In the fall of 1958, Governor J. Lindsay Almond, Jr., ordered the closure of public schools in three localities, one of which was Howell’s home city of Norfolk. Strongly opposed to massive resistance, Howell decided to run again for a seat in the House of Delegates. This time he was successful.5

Both Godwin and Howell achieved political successes in the 1960s. Although Howell lost his reelection bid in 1961, he regained his seat in 1963 and was elected to the Virginia Senate in 1965. Godwin was elected lieutenant governor in 1961, having survived a surprisingly close primary challenge by state Senator Armistead L. Boothe of Alexandria, who denounced Godwin as “the architect of massive resistance.” Godwin realized that, if he were to have a political future statewide, he must become an advocate for change. As lieutenant governor, he embraced industrial development and improved state services. To appeal to national Democrats, especially numerous in Northern Virginia, Godwin rode the Lady Bird Special campaign train in support of President Lyndon Johnson’s reelection in 1964. A year later he won the governorship, espousing a Program of Progress platform that emphasized improvements in public education from kindergarten to graduate school. His administration was the most forward-looking Virginia had experienced in the twentieth century.6

Howell and Godwin clashed on several occasions during Godwin’s first term as governor. Godwin’s program required additional revenue. The governor’s answer was a sales tax that included food and nonprescription drugs. Howell denounced the sales tax as “a cruel, regressive tax which takes more and more out of a consumer’s pocket every year with inflation at its current runaway rate. . . . I have always been opposed to it because it taxes people who are least in a position to pay.” He also continued his long campaign against the poll tax. In 1967 he drew Godwin’s ire when he sued the governor to prevent him from deducting federal impact aid funds from the basic school aid formula (Shepheard v. Godwin). A federal court ordered Godwin to restore the $11 million.7
Becoming the General Assembly’s chief advocate for consumers, Howell successfully challenged before the State Corporation Commission rate increases and other practices of automobile insurance companies, the Virginia Electric and Power Company, and the Chesapeake and Potomac Telephone Company. By the mid-1960s Howell had become the leader of the progressive forces in his party as he supported creation of an office of consumer protection, poll tax repeal, local option liquor-by-the-drink legislation, registration of firearms, a lower voting age, and the creation of a biracial state human relations commission.8

One of Godwin’s principal goals as governor was to replace Virginia’s antiquated state constitution. He appointed a commission to suggest major revisions. When the draft constitution reached the state Senate, Henry Howell’s comments generated controversy. His was the only vote against amending Section 13 of George Mason’s Declaration of Rights regarding “a well-regulated militia” to include the phrase “therefore, the right of the people to keep and bear arms shall not be infringed.” He also moved to “strike out” the word “Christian” from Section 16, which guaranteed “the free exercise of religion,” and stated, “It is the mutual duty of all to practise [sic] Christian forbearance, love, and charity toward each other.” Howell’s amendment went down to defeat by a vote of 33 to 3; however, both amendments became fodder for his political opponents in future elections.9

Because Godwin was constitutionally ineligible to succeed himself, Howell decided to run for governor in 1969. The coalition that elected Godwin was broad but unstable. African Americans, disappointed that Godwin had not appointed Black Virginians to major positions, such as judgeships, were the first to depart, followed by organized labor. By 1969, Virginia’s Democratic Party was split into three factions: conservative, moderate, and liberal. Each faction offered a candidate for governor: Lt. Gov. Fred Pollard, William Battle, son of former governor John Battle, and Howell. Believing Battle and Howell would face each other in a runoff, Godwin at first refrained from endorsing a candidate. When his prediction proved accurate, he campaigned vigorously for Battle in the runoff. Although he probably helped Battle prevail narrowly, his bitter attacks on Howell angered the Norfolk populist’s supporters. As Battle recalled, Godwin “just hated Howell so badly that when he got on the stump what
came out was castigation of Howell. . . . [It] didn’t help when I then had to run against [Republican] Linwood Holton” in the fall. During the campaign, Godwin further alienated Howell’s voters when he refused to make a commitment to support Howell if he won the runoff.10

Howell displayed his own displeasure with Godwin when he announced that, although he would vote for Battle, his supporters were “free spirits” who should vote as they pleased in the fall election. Any possibility of a reconciliation disappeared in October when Godwin and state chairman Watkins Abbitt refused to seat Howell at the head table at a party unity event and did not even recognize him when introducing dignitaries. The snub was the last straw for Howell’s supporters. Leaders of organized labor as well as the Black Crusade for Voters endorsed Linwood Holton, a moderate who became Virginia’s first Republican governor of the twentieth century.11

Why did Mills Godwin have such a deep antipathy for Henry Howell? Interviewed by historian James L. Bugg, Jr., in 1984, the former governor offered an explanation:
I saw Howell as a militant that I felt was one who would not be able, given his personality, his personal attributes, . . . his philosophy of being able to continue the forward thrust that we were making in our industrial effort in Virginia. Here was a man who wanted to amend the right-to-work act, who was very liberal in his political leanings. He would have been almost persona non grata in the corporate board rooms of the country and among the chief executives of businesses.12

It is likely that there was a deeper explanation of Godwin’s disdain for Howell than differences in personality and philosophy. Howell burst on the statewide political scene in 1969, waging a “people’s campaign,” appealing to the “little man” with the slogan, “Keep the Big Boys Honest.” The “Big Boys” were the large banks, public utilities, and insurance companies. He communicated his message effectively through billboards and loud television commercials. Political scientist Ralph Eisenberg described “The Howell campaign” as “a populist one that sought to win the nomination on a base of blacks, labor, white small farmers, and blue-collar workers.” In a 2019

Mills Godwin and Henry Howell at the Shad Planking, a political rite of spring sponsored by the Wakefield Virginia chapter of the Ruritans. (Courtesy Richmond Times-Dispatch)
interview, Henry McLaughlin, who served as Howell’s press secretary and aide, reflected on the disdain for the Norfolk populist among some segments of the population. “[T]here was an argument,” McLaughlin recalled, “that he was unacceptable somehow, that he was too much connected to the unions, that there was something wrong with him, and it was really a class argument. The idea was that because he spoke to the people with less means, that there was something that just went against the Virginia elitist tradition, patrician tradition.” It is likely that Mills Godwin shared that point of view. If not for a contingent event, however, the major Godwin-Howell confrontation would likely never have occurred.13

In 1969, Virginians elected a new lieutenant governor, Democratic state Senator J. Sargeant Reynolds of Richmond. Young, handsome, wealthy, and articulate, Reynolds reminded many of the late President John F. Kennedy. Because Linwood Holton was constitutionally limited to one term, many expected that Reynolds, an attractive moderate, would be the next governor. In August 1970, however, Reynolds learned that he had an inoperable malignant brain tumor. He died in June of the following year. Reynolds’s death necessitated a special election to choose a successor. Believing a convention dominated by Democratic Party regulars would not nominate him, Howell chose to run as an Independent. Winning a plurality of 40 percent, he defeated his Democratic and Republican opponents. Howell’s success even caught the attention of historian C. Vann Woodward, who included him among a group of rising “New Populists” in a New York Times essay. Howell was inaugurated in December. The following months saw political changes in Virginia that would have major impacts on both Godwin and Howell.14

In 1972, party realignment came to Virginia. Ideological conservatives, led by Richmond attorney Richard Obenshain, seized control from party moderates loyal to Governor Linwood Holton at the Republican state convention. The Democratic state convention also witnessed a changing of the guard. The national party had mandated new rules for delegate selection that required convention delegations at both the national and state levels to reflect a state’s population regarding race, gender, and age. For Democrats this meant a drastic change because Black Virginians, women, and young people would play an unprecedented role at the state convention. They were
instrumental in the election of Howell’s ally Joseph T. Fitzpatrick of Norfolk as state chairman and George Rawlings of Fredericksburg as national committeeman. They also chose a delegation to the national convention that was solidly behind the presidential candidacy of liberal Senator George McGovern of South Dakota. The liberal takeover was complete. Where did that leave Mills Godwin?215

Godwin’s reaction to the developments in the Democratic Party was disgust. When he arrived at his county’s mass meeting on 8 April 1972 to choose delegates to the state convention, he found that a large majority of those attending were Black Virginians. When his name was included as part of an uncontested slate from Chuckatuck Magisterial District, the mass meeting rejected the slate. Speakers made clear that their only objection was
the inclusion of Godwin, whom they described as “an independent,” because he had supported the Independent candidacy of U.S. Senator Harry F. Byrd, Jr., for reelection in 1970. Godwin’s humiliation at the mass meeting ended his activity in the Democratic Party, although he remained a member of the Nansemond County Democratic Committee until his resignation in December.

Godwin’s course of action in the 1972 presidential election was a matter of interest in President Richard Nixon’s White House. Although they denied it, Nixon and Harry Dent, special counsel to the president, had been pursuing a southern strategy of deemphasizing civil rights in order to attract the votes of southern whites who had supported George Wallace of Alabama for president in 1968. In mid-April 1972, Godwin went to Washington at the invitation of former Attorney General John Mitchell, who was heading the Committee for the Reelection of the President. The next day Godwin informed reporters that he and Mitchell had “discussed the political situation in the country in general, and the situation in the South and in Virginia in particular.” He added that he had made no commitment “to support the Republican Party, but I would be less than candid if I did not say I’m not enthusiastic about the main candidates for the Democratic nomination.”

After the Democratic state convention, Godwin indicated that he might support President Nixon’s reelection. At a press conference in Norfolk in June, he offered “guidance” to alienated Democrats. Suggesting that “those Virginians with conservative-moderate views might join together to support candidates who reflect their political philosophy,” he declared, “The important thing for us to remember is not so much the label we bear but rather the views we share, so let all who believe as we do join hands to find compatible company.” After the press conference the Godwins headed to the White House where they were among the guests that evening at a state dinner honoring the president of Mexico. Meanwhile Harry Dent wrote the president: “Today he [Godwin] bolted the Democrat party and we believe it is the first move toward becoming a Republican. He should be told that we are ready for the final transition whenever he, Senator Byrd, and their friends are ready. With the election of Dick Obenshain as the new Virginia GOP chairman and the radical actions of the Democrat Party last weekend, the way is being cleared for the big Byrd-Godwin transition in Virginia.”
Just six days later, John Mitchell and Fitzgerald Bemiss of Richmond, chairman of the Virginia Committee for the Reelection of the President, jointly announced that Godwin would head Virginians for Nixon, “a statewide general advisory committee” of prominent Virginians, Democrats, Republicans, and Independents. Chairman Obenshain had played a key role in persuading Godwin to take this step. Declaring that Nixon would provide “strong and effective leadership at home and abroad,” Godwin remarked that the “very liberal and radical policies of the national Democratic Party and the views and convictions of its likely nominee for President [McGovern] are not in accord with my own beliefs of what is best for our country.”

Godwin’s efforts to recruit conservatives and moderates to support President Nixon’s reelection were quite successful. On 7 August his advisory committee released a list of more than 1,200 persons prominent in business, politics, and other professions who were supporting Nixon. The release was timed to occur as Godwin and nineteen members of the General Assembly (eighteen Democrats and one Independent) arrived at the White House for a luncheon and a greeting from the president in the Oval Office. Harry Dent had arranged both events. Godwin told a press conference that the broad support Nixon was receiving was “the kind he would like if he were running for office in Virginia again.” In response to questions about a second candidacy for governor, however, he said such queries would be answered in 1973.

During the summer and fall of 1972, Godwin privately and Howell publicly addressed the next year’s gubernatorial election. Responding to letters urging him to seek a second term, Godwin affirmed that he had “no plans at present for 1973” but would “give serious consideration to the matter.” On 30 August, Howell made his long-expected announcement that he would run, but he deferred a decision whether he would run as a Democrat or an Independent. Howell’s announcement added a sense of urgency to requests that Godwin run. In an October letter, Godwin acknowledged that he could not win the Democratic nomination, but stated he did not want it “with its present leadership in control. This leaves me in the position of running for Governor as an Independent or as a Republican.” That decision, however, could wait until the new year. For the moment, however, both
Godwin and Howell were focused on the national election. After hesitating briefly, Howell endorsed Senator McGovern in August.21

Virginia Republicans had every reason to exult on Election Night, 7 November 1972. Not only did President Nixon win a remarkable 67.8 percent in the Old Dominion, but also Representative William Lloyd Scott upset incumbent Senator William B. Spong, Jr., a moderate Democrat. A bonus was the victory of Robert W. Daniel, Jr., by a plurality in the Southside Fourth Congressional District. State Chairman Richard Obenshain was the architect of Scott’s victory, aided by a $200,000 loan from financier J. D. Stetson Coleman, which funded a television advertisement blitz on Scott’s behalf. These victories encouraged Obenshain to pursue a goal that J. Kenneth Klinge, who became executive director of the Virginia Republican Party in 1973, has said was “number one on his [Obenshain’s] hit parade,” namely, wooing Mills Godwin into the Republican Party. Indeed, Obenshain was already at work on his mission.22

Members of the Nixon White House were also keenly interested in Godwin’s possible gubernatorial candidacy. On 21 November, Harry Dent wrote a memorandum for the president about his recent conversation with Godwin. Dent related that he had let Godwin “know that we were very hopeful he would do this [run] as a Republican, particularly since the Virginia Republican Party through its recent election of a new State Chairman [Obenshain] has sent him an engraved invitation to do so.” He also remarked that, after Scott’s election to the Senate, the Virginia Republicans were “more likely now to soon consider nominating one of their own for the governorship,” and that in a three-way race with Godwin running as an Independent, “Lt. Gov. Henry Howell, the liberal, would win.”23

No one, however, was going to rush Mills Godwin into making decisions about a possible gubernatorial candidacy. When the Godwins left the Governor’s Mansion in January 1970, neither anticipated a return to the house where their adopted daughter Becky had brightened their lives before her tragic death in August 1968 while vacationing at Virginia Beach. Returning to the mansion would be emotionally difficult. Desiring to become more comfortable financially, the former governor had accepted lucrative positions on numerous corporate boards, such as the Norfolk and
Western Railway and Virginia National Bank. He would have to resign these directorships if he became governor. By late November, Dent had heard that Godwin would wait “2 or 3 months and see a poll and have a physical examination first” before deciding to run.24

Godwin, however, was deeply troubled by the possibility of Henry Howell becoming governor. After Howell’s election as lieutenant governor, Godwin wrote, “I can think of few things that would be so harmful to Virginia’s best interest as would his election as Governor of Virginia.” If Godwin were to run, however, there would have to be “a strong appeal from across Virginia” that included “indications of support . . . from the proper people from which respected deductions could be made that success could follow.” In January 1972, 225 of what Godwin considered the proper people of both parties gathered for a dinner hosted by Jay W. Johns, a retired Charlottesville industrialist, at the exclusive Commonwealth Club in Richmond to honor ten retiring state senators. After giving Godwin a standing ovation, they heard him declare, “The transcendent need . . . in Virginia now is a consolidation of our thoughtful citizens into a solid front of political strength to confront anyone who would use our electorate for their own selfish purposes or political gain,” a thinly veiled reference to Howell. Alex R. Preston of The Washington Star wrote that “many interpreted” Godwin’s remarks “as an appeal for a new conservative coalition” to stop Howell.25

As 1973 began, Godwin faced two decisions. Would he run for governor? If he did run, would it be as an Independent or as a Republican? It seems that only a major health issue would have prevented his candidacy. His physical examination had revealed the existence of intestinal polyps. On 12 January he entered Johnston-Willis Hospital in Richmond to have the polyps surgically removed. The operation was successful but required a two-week stay in the hospital, delaying further any announcement. In his memoir, Godwin recalled that the prospect of returning to the Governor’s Mansion “did not carry the anticipation and excitement” it had in 1965, but, he believed, the sacrifice had to be made. As he told an interviewer in early 1973, “If Henry Howell was to be elected governor of Virginia, and one reason for that was my decision not to run this year, I would have to live with that for the rest of my life.” The best evidence of Godwin’s intentions is that he had commissioned a poll in December to learn how he might fare
in a two-candidate contest with Howell. The results had been gratifying. Only 30 percent of those surveyed were strongly in favor of Howell while 40 percent were strongly opposed. It also indicated that the number of voters who called themselves Democrats was decreasing while the number calling themselves Independent and Republicans was increasing.26

The second decision was more complex. In the fall of 1972, a group of twenty Democratic state senators had asked for a meeting. “They were friends of mine,” Godwin wrote in his memoir. “They did not want Henry Howell to become Governor.” They urged him to run as an Independent as Harry F. Byrd, Jr., had done two years earlier, but Godwin reminded them that “there was only one . . . Harry F. Byrd, Jr.” A year later he told former governor Hulett C. Smith of West Virginia that running as an Independent would have been his preference. Many of his friends in the General Assembly and the courthouses could support him as an Independent. He also felt a sense of obligation to the Democratic Party that had honored him many times, including nominating him for governor. If he changed parties, would lifelong Republicans accept him? Could he expect continuing support from his Democratic friends? As Frank Atkinson, historian of the Virginia Republican Party, has written, “The best resolution . . . it seemed to Godwin, was for him to run as an Independent and for Republicans to forgo fielding a candidate.”27

The ideal solution for Godwin, however, was not acceptable to the leadership of the Virginia Republican Party. In the summer of 1972, State Chairman Obenshain and other conservatives had gathered at the Virginia Inn in Henrico County to discuss Godwin and the gubernatorial election. Dortch Warriner, an outspoken Republican attorney from Emporia, asserted that Godwin must seek the Republican nomination and “run as a Republican.” Otherwise, the Republicans should nominate their own candidate. Though Obenshain and others objected to such a confrontational approach to Godwin, they agreed that he had to formalize his ties with Republicans if he expected the party’s nomination.28

In October, the Republican courtship of Godwin began in earnest. Obenshain and Warriner visited Godwin’s new home at Cedar Point on the Nansemond River. Warriner later described Godwin as “cordial but condescending.” Godwin told them that their primary emphasis should be the
welfare of the commonwealth rather than building the Republican Party. That remark exasperated Warriner, who declared “the welfare of Virginia depended upon a strong Republican Party, and that we were thinking of Virginia when we were thinking of building the party.” After that exchange, Warriner wisely decided to let Obenshain handle future discussions. Over the next several months, Obenshain conferred with the former governor numerous times at Cedar Point and the Virginia Inn. Attempting to persuade Godwin to switch parties while keeping Warriner at bay, Obenshain later remarked that he “felt like a ping pong ball between the two men.”

Uncertainty about Godwin’s intentions continued throughout January. Apparently, the uncertainty was worrying Obenshain. His resolve that Godwin must become a Republican temporarily faltered as he issued a statement declaring Godwin could secure the Republican nomination simply by working to bring about a political realignment in Virginia. Political reporter George M. Kelley of The Virginian-Pilot interpreted Obenshain’s statement as “the first public indication that the door apparently has opened for Godwin to get the Republican nomination without formally joining the party.” Obenshain’s statement upset many longtime Republicans, such as Warriner, who had worked to defeat Godwin in the past. At the end of the month, Obenshain traveled to Washington to confer with Virginia’s Republican members of Congress. Southwest Virginia’s Caldwell Butler and William Wampler told Obenshain, “If Godwin wanted the Republican nomination, he ought to seek it and not expect the Republicans to give it to him without any effort on his part.” Disagreeing, Northern Virginia’s Joel Broyhill mentioned Godwin’s difficulty abandoning the party that elected him governor and his many close friendships with Democrats in the General Assembly and in the courthouses.

While Godwin remained hospitalized, his allies in the General Assembly endeavored to reduce the level of uncertainty about his candidacy. They invited approximately thirty conservative Democratic legislators to a dinner meeting at the Commonwealth Club and assured them that Godwin would indeed seek the governorship. Ten days later, citing “sources close to the . . . former governor,” Helen Dewar reported in The Washington Post that Godwin would soon be announcing his candidacy, but he would not reveal whether he would run as an Independent or a Republican. He would accept
the Republican nomination if offered, but would remain an Independent, welcoming the support of Democrats, Independents, and Republicans.\(^{31}\)

On 10 February, Godwin issued a statement announcing his candidacy. Apparently desiring to avoid questions from reporters, he remained at home while an aide distributed copies of the statement in Richmond. Although he was almost a month past his surgery, his continuing recovery could be cited as a reason for his absence. He appealed for “the support of all Virginians, regardless of party or faction who share my views and aspirations for Virginia’s future.” Former congressman Watkins Abbitt announced the creation of a Democrats for Godwin steering committee containing many names associated with the old Byrd Organization.\(^{32}\)

Many lifelong Republicans, especially in the Shenandoah Valley and southwest Virginia, were angry when Republican leaders in the General
Assembly held a news conference and indicated that all Godwin would have to do to get the Republican nomination would be to send a messenger to the state convention and indicate his acceptance without becoming a Republican. Constituents from those areas contacted their legislators to express their dismay. Even Governor Holton, who had lost control of the party to the conservatives, “was understood to be perturbed” by a prepared statement the leaders issued to the press lauding Godwin as “the necessary catalyst for the political realignment in Virginia” previously “stymied by ancient animosities and mutual distrust.” It was Warriner, however, who assumed the role of unofficial spokesperson for the angry Republicans. Godwin “wanted our endorsement,” Warriner later remarked, “but he didn’t want to call himself a Republican. It was as though we were good enough for him to go to bed with but not good enough to marry.” For Warriner and others, Godwin’s formal embrace of the Republican Party became in Atkinson’s words, “an intense matter of principle and pride.”

Republican Party leadership in Washington continued to pay attention to developments in Virginia. On 22 February, Ed DeBolt and Jim Galbreath of the Republican National Committee (RNC) staff informed National Chairman George H. W. Bush that Obenshain had told them Godwin would announce the following week that he wanted the Republican nomination, had agreed not to campaign for any Democrats, and would run on a slate with the Republican candidates for lieutenant governor and attorney general.

On the following Sunday, investment banker Peter Flanigan, formerly a White House aide, “joined” what he termed “a small Virginia caucus set up by a conservative Democratic friend of mine.” In addition to Flanigan, breakfast guests included Godwin, Senator Harry F. Byrd, Jr., and five Democratic members of the General Assembly. In a memo addressed to the president, Flanigan wrote, “The subject of the meeting was how Godwin timed his acceptance of the Republican nomination and how the maximum number of Democratic Assembly and Senate members run so as to move to the Republican column after the election.” Godwin stated that he could not “switch parties before receiving the nomination”; however, he understood that “a party with the strength of the Republicans in Virginia is obliged to run a candidate for the highest office in the State.” Godwin told the group
that sometime in the next two weeks he would say, “If I am offered the Republican nomination at their convention, I will consider it an honor and will accept the nomination with pleasure.” Regarding his party affiliation, he would declare, “If I run on the Republican ticket that question is moot, as obviously I would then be acting as a Republican.” There were only two conditions. First, he would not “campaign against his conservative Democratic friends . . . running for the House and Senate,” and second that he “have a voice in choosing the Republican candidates for Lt. Governor and Attorney General, who would be running with him.”

Delegate D. French Slaughter, Jr., the senior Democratic General Assembly member at the breakfast, estimated that after Godwin’s statement as many as thirty Democratic Assembly members would pursue the same course. All the Democrats present, however, were concerned about “the insistence . . . of many members of the Republican Party that these individuals express their allegiance to the Republican Party now.” They agreed that “this was impossible” and could cost them their seats in the legislature. Godwin strongly urged “patience and flexibility on the part of the Republican Party” and “had nothing but praise for Obenshain.” Flanigan stressed, “We were anxious that these people lead the right-thinking Virginians into the Republican Party and that Virginia, in turn, lead the South into the Republican Party.” According to a penciled note on the memo, President Nixon did not see the document. Instead Flanigan shared the contents with Chairman Bush, who wrote a brief memo to the president stating, “The Mills Godwin scenario appears on track.” He noted that he had met with Senator Byrd, Fitzgerald Bemiss, Stets Coleman, and Obenshain, all of whom agreed with the scenario. He added that Governor Holton “is not expected to cause difficulty on this.” Staff Secretary Bruce A. Kehrli informed Bush that, after reading his memorandum, the president’s “only comment was ‘Good!’”

The resistance of rank-and-file Republicans to nominating Godwin without a commitment to join their party alarmed some of Godwin’s most influential supporters in business and banking. If the Republicans nominated their own candidate, they feared, Howell would surely win in a three-way race. They also believed that Godwin needed a vigorous and enthusiastic Republican organization, especially in western Virginia, to defeat Howell. As
Godwin’s friend, businessman J. Smith Ferebee later remarked, “[We had] to be united, and you couldn’t get united with the Republicans if you didn’t embrace them.” Banker J. Harvie Wilkinson, Jr., was blunt: “[Godwin] cannot win except as a Republican.”

Godwin called a press conference for 5 March to clarify his situation. When the volatile Warriner learned of the plan, he dispatched a threat to Godwin relayed by Ferebee. Either Godwin would say, “I will run as a Republican,” or Warriner would declare that he was a candidate for the Republican nomination. Ferebee advised Godwin that only a change of parties would defuse the situation. At the press conference in the ballroom of a Richmond hotel, Godwin stated that he would accept the Republican nomination. Looking straight at Ferebee and Warriner, who were standing...
together at the back of the room, he departed from his text, declaring somewhat deliberately: “And, of course, having accepted that nomination, if it is forthcoming, I intend to run as a Republican in the campaign next fall for governor.” That satisfied Warriner. During this period, Henry Howell also made an important decision.38

Howell drew some important conclusions from his victory in 1971 and George McGovern’s landslide defeat in Virginia twelve months later. In 1968, segregationist presidential candidate George Wallace of Alabama received 23.6 percent of the vote in the Old Dominion. Three years later Howell received surprising support in rural areas, including the counties Wallace carried. In 1973, Howell wanted to retain that support, but, if he rejoined the state Democratic Party with its liberal leadership, he could easily lose it. In short, he was walking a tightrope. Continuing as an Independent seemed his best course. In a 1974 interview he offered an explanation. Citing McGovern’s performance, the new party rules, and conservatives’ defections, he declared, “The independent voter would shut their ears and shut their eyes just at the label Democrat. You just couldn’t get your ideas across.”39

In areas of the state where Democratic loyalties ran deep, Howell’s decision was not popular. Congressional district and city committees in Northern Virginia and Tidewater passed resolutions urging him to run as a Democrat. State Chairman Joseph T. Fitzpatrick worked diligently to persuade Howell to rejoin the party. Party loyalty was strongest in southwest Virginia’s Ninth Congressional District. Fitzpatrick cited a poll of the district that indicated Howell would gain 22 percent if he ran as a Democrat. Howell, however, was not persuaded. Citing voting data from his previous statewide races, he concluded that as an Independent he would be “able to appeal to a broader base of voters than running as a Democrat.” Choosing not to nominate a candidate, the Democratic State Central Committee adopted a resolution “commend[ing] the record of Henry Howell to the people of Virginia for their favorable consideration.”40

Adding to Godwin’s worries about changing parties was the unfolding Watergate scandal. On 30 April, President Nixon announced the resignations of his principal aides, H. R. Haldeman and John Ehrlichman, Attorney General Richard Kleindienst, and the firing of White House counsel John
W. Dean III. In the aftermath, Godwin reassured a Northern Virginia audience that he would accept the Republican nomination, but stated he was not ready to switch parties at that time. In fact, he commented that he might “still change his mind about doing so if the Watergate scandal deepens and threatens to affect the Virginia governorship race.”

The Republican Party state convention nominated Godwin in early June. Stating that “the eyes of the nation are on Virginia,” keynote speaker George H. W. Bush predicted Godwin’s nomination would be “a very significant step” in the party’s expansion, especially in the southern border states. Charles McDowell of the Richmond Times-Dispatch described the mood of the Republican delegates. They understood the necessity of nominating Godwin, but emotionally there was “no mistaking that nominating an old Democratic foe is still a joyless business.” The final tally gave Godwin 1,253 votes. Some 208 delegates either abstained, cast “no” votes, or voted for someone else. When Godwin reached the podium, he began his remarks with the words, “As one of you,” prompting a standing ovation, although it lasted just forty seconds.

The battle was joined between conservative Godwin and populist Howell, whom political scientist Earl Black described in 1976 as “by far the most racially and economically liberal politician in recent Virginia history.” The lieutenant governor had been running hard since April, while Godwin’s pace was slower during the summer. As in 1969, Howell’s main issue was repeal of the sales tax on food and nonprescription drugs. Rising food prices made this a more potent issue in 1973. Reflecting on the election in an interview in January 1974, Godwin said the “rapidly accelerating food price situation from spring right into the fall played into [Howell’s] hands.” Godwin constantly demanded that Howell disclose how he would replace the revenue under his tax plan.

Throughout the campaign, Godwin stressed inconsistencies between positions Howell took on various issues in 1973 and what he had said in the past. He noted that Howell had never criticized the food tax when it was part of Norfolk’s local sales tax before enactment of the statewide sales tax. On gun control, Howell, who had opposed putting the right to keep and bear arms in the state constitution, now stated that he did not favor gun registration. Godwin quoted from a Norfolk newspaper article in 1965 in
which Howell said he was “for a union shop and that means I am against the right-to-work law.” In 1973 the lieutenant governor was assuring audiences he had no intention of asking for repeal or modification of the right-to-work law. Godwin also cited Howell’s endorsement of his candidacy for governor in 1965 and his comment in April that Godwin had an outstanding record as governor.\(^{44}\)

Godwin accused Howell of trying to project a more moderate image to voters than in previous campaigns. That was certainly the case. George Kelley of The Virginian-Pilot wrote that Howell “had been carefully remolding his image since the 1971 election from that of the give ’em hell populist into one of quiet dignity many voters associate with the governorship.” The change was obvious in his demeanor while presiding over the state senate. His polling revealed that a liberal image would be fatal to his campaign. He even admitted to a group of business executives that he had to take a more centrist approach and move Godwin further to the right if he were to win. On the stump, however, this new image was sometimes difficult to maintain. At his campaign launch at Norfolk’s Old Dominion University in April, Helen Dewar wrote, “He was as evangelical as ever, and the crowd responded like true believers.”\(^ {45}\)

Although Howell preferred to focus on economic issues that would build a Black-White coalition of support, he could not escape the age-old issue of race. In Mills Godwin’s first campaign for governor, race had not played a major part. The new Conservative Party had appealed to hardcore segregationists, thereby making it essential that Godwin attract Black support. Eight years later the Conservative Party had disappeared, and most Black Virginians had a strong commitment to Howell. According to Earl Black, “The 1973 campaign featured the most explicit cleavage on racial issues in Virginia since the 1957 ‘Massive Resistance’ debate between Lindsay Almond and Ted Dalton.” Although Godwin “avoided outright segregationist rhetoric,” he emphasized the racially charged issue of school busing, especially across jurisdictional lines, as part of his strategy to discredit Howell as a dangerous liberal. Howell denied he was an advocate of busing, but to Godwin that seemed yet another Howell inconsistency.\(^ {46}\)

In January 1972, Federal District Judge Robert R. Merhige had ordered consolidation of the majority-Black public schools of Richmond with the
majority-white schools of suburban Henrico and Chesterfield counties. While the case was on appeal, Howell appeared on a Washington television station for an extended interview. The first questioner asked his position on busing across jurisdictional lines. Replying that school integration was a necessity, Howell declared, “Consolidation, when you have an all-black city, can be the only tool for integrating a school system. . . . And if it’s going to be some distribution of the young people of the District of Columbia into Maryland and into Virginia, to save our nation from being a divided black-white nation, then we’ve got to try this.” Howell, however, cautioned that whites constituted “close to 80 percent of the people, and we’ve got to get the consent of the governed to move this nation forward. We can’t invite revolution.” During the campaign, Howell saw no contradiction between his commitment to integrated schools as stated in the interview and his opposition to consolidation of school districts. On appeal, the Fourth
Circuit Court of Appeals overturned Judge Merhige’s ruling. In May 1973, the U.S. Supreme Court split 4 to 4, thereby upholding the Fourth Circuit’s decision. This should have rendered the issue of cross-jurisdictional busing moot, but it did not. The Godwin campaign had acquired both a tape and a transcript of Howell’s 1972 interview and used it in negative advertising against him.\(^{47}\)

Republicans hoped that Howell’s remarks about busing would alienate voters who had supported George Wallace in 1968. Despite a fundamental difference on racial equality, both Wallace and Howell espoused a strong economic populism, a factor that had attracted Wallace voters to Howell in earlier elections. In their study of Southern politics during the civil rights era, historians Numan V. Bartley and Hugh D. Graham wrote, “In both the primary and runoff campaigns [in 1969] Howell effectively sought to forge an urban coalition of blacks and low status whites and by populistic appeals to attract George Wallace’s rural constituency.” In the runoff, however, William Battle “won . . . by sweeping 60 percent of the ballots cast in rural-small town counties.” Four years later it was critical that Howell make inroads into the Wallace vote in rural areas.\(^{48}\)

Some of Howell’s staffers were eager to get an endorsement from Wallace and even involve him directly in the campaign. Chairman Fitzpatrick told an interviewer in 1974, “A contingent in the Howell campaign . . . felt that getting George Wallace would have been the margin that Henry needed to win.” Fitzpatrick, however, deemed any outreach to Wallace as “filled with danger” because it would alienate Black Virginians, who were such an important part of Howell’s coalition. Undeterred, the Howell aides were “extremely concerned” when T. Coleman Andrews, Jr., who managed Wallace’s Virginia campaign in 1968, mailed a letter in September to 300 Wallace supporters urging them to vote for Godwin. Andrews was perplexed by reports that some Wallace voters were supporting Howell, considering the latter’s views on busing and compulsory unionism as well as his denunciation of Wallace during the 1968 campaign. Andrews declared that Wallace had expressed “surprise and concern” to him at this development. Elyce Fishman, a key Howell aide, wondered if Andrews had “misrepresented” Wallace’s views. Paul Askew, a prominent local labor leader and Howell supporter, had told her his “contacts in Alabama had
reported that Wallace would assist our campaign.” Askew suggested to Fishman that he could call his principal contact in Alabama to learn if Andrews’s assertions were true; however, he wanted Fishman to check with Howell before he proceeded. 

Apparently securing Howell’s approval, Askew contacted William T. Thrash, president of the Birmingham Building Trades Council and a strong supporter of Wallace, to assess the governor’s position on the Virginia gubernatorial election. After meeting with “our mutual friend, Bill Thrash,” Wallace stated his position in a letter to Askew. He wrote that his “attitude about the Virginia political situation” was that “the people of Virginia are well able to decide this question for themselves.” He added: “I realize some people who supported me in the presidential campaign efforts are supporting one candidate and some another, which is of course their right. As far as I am concerned, the people who supported me in the [1968] campaign have a right to exercise their support for the candidate of their choice. I did want you to know that I am not involved in the political situation in Virginia.”

It is likely that Thrash may have mentioned specific actions Wallace might take to assist Howell. Several months after the election, Fitzpatrick told interviewer Jack Bass, “Somebody went down to Montgomery, Alabama . . . around the first of October . . . and there was a conference either with Wallace or one of his top aides about Wallace coming to Virginia or making five-minute tapes that could be used to put on television.” Although the date is incorrect by a couple of weeks, he was probably referring to Thrash’s visit. In an interview ten years later, Mills Godwin declared that during the campaign T. Coleman Andrews, Jr., and subsequently Wallace himself, had alerted him to the Howell campaign’s activities. “They even had the audacity,” Godwin recalled, “to send someone to Montgomery, Alabama, and try to get George Wallace to come to Virginia and campaign for Henry Howell.” In a telephone conversation Wallace reaffirmed to Godwin his intention to stay out of Virginia politics and added that he did not “particularly care for Howell.”

On 13 October both Godwin and Howell appeared separately before the State Central Committee of the American Party, Virginia’s successor to Wallace’s American Independent Party of 1968, to seek the party’s endorsement. Howell presented Wallace’s letter as evidence that the
Alabama governor did not oppose his candidacy. Nine days later the party leaders announced they would not support either candidate because “both will tell us anything if they think it is politically expedient to do so. . . . We feel both candidates will guide Virginia toward more centralized government at the price of destroying guaranteed freedoms and individual liberties.”

Virginians were unaccustomed to the harsh invective of the 1973 campaign. In September, Godwin accused Howell of advocating “socialistic” policies and even using a slogan, “Power to the People,” spoken with clenched fist, which was used by the Communists as they rose to power in Russia. On the other hand, Howell declared that Godwin’s campaign organization resembled the “isolated cocoon” which had resulted in the Watergate break-in. The Virginian-Pilot labeled both candidates’ accusations “ludicrous.” Howell stooped to a new low when he accused Godwin of anti-Semitism because he did not appoint a prominent Jewish lawyer in Norfolk to a judgeship in 1966. He neglected to say that Godwin appointed him two years later. Commenting on the tone of the campaign on the morning after
the election, *The Roanoke Times* declared, “Campaigns should be useful, even when vigorous; Election Day should not bring forth a compelling desire to take a bath to get rid of the mud.”

The 1973 gubernatorial election set a record for campaign spending in the Old Dominion. The totals far exceeded what the candidates had projected as their budgets early in the campaign. Howell’s estimate was $750,000 while Godwin’s was about $672,000. In fact, Godwin and Howell raised a total of $2,081,182. Godwin’s share, mostly raised from corporations and wealthy individuals, was $1,093,866 while Howell’s was $987,316. George Kelley commented that Godwin’s money came from “establishment and tradition-minded Virginians with the upper and middle economic classes probably the most involved.” Most of Howell’s money came from labor unions and a married couple, Sydney and Frances Lewis, the owners of Best Products, a national mail order and discount store chain based in Richmond. The Lewises donated $155,000 in stock in Best Products, and late in the campaign, as Howell’s funds ran short, loaned the candidate $50,000.

Godwin charged that the greater share of Howell’s union funds came from out of state. Howell denied the claim, but the financial records prove Godwin was correct. Nearly 52 percent of Howell’s union contributions came from outside Virginia. Howell, however, was keenly disappointed with the fundraising efforts of organized labor. He expected at least $300,000 from unions, but their total contributions amounted to only $277,000. He also wanted the unions to provide “smart, personable international [representatives] that knew the territory. We couldn’t get it out of them to save our lives.” Overall, Howell’s contributors outnumbered Godwin’s by 1,000, but large givers favored the former governor. Howell enjoyed a distinct financial advantage early in the campaign, but that changed drastically in October. The release of a poll by Howell’s campaign provides the key to understanding that development.

Polls played a major role in the outcome of the Godwin-Howell race. In February, Howell’s pollster, William R. Hamilton, conducted a poll that put Godwin in the lead by 9 percent with 23 percent undecided. In July, Hamilton recommended that another poll be taken in early September. The interview subjects would be the same as those in February. The new poll put
Howell at 47 percent and Godwin at 37.5 percent, with 15.5 percent undecided. Howell continued to be strong with his core constituency groups—Black Virginians, union members, and youth. New support came from lower class whites, including George Wallace supporters. Hamilton stressed that a high turnout would help Howell, but that his vote was “still soft.”

Although the September poll cheered the Howell campaign, their decision on whether to release the poll results may have cost them the election. Elyce Fishman “strongly” objected to disclosing the results and tried unsuccessfully to persuade others. After the election, Howell revealed that the principal reason he authorized release was, “Money was slow coming in, and we had television to pay for, and people like to contribute to a winner.” He thought releasing the poll would add to the campaign’s momentum. The
effect was the opposite. Revealed to the press on 3 October, the poll prompted the business community and conservatives of both parties to pour money into Godwin’s coffers. According to Mel Carico of The Roanoke Times, “When that poll came out. . . . That’s when the panic hit the [Godwin] organization and the money . . . started coming in. I mean it was just like your house was burning down. You’d get the hell off your butt and start trying to put some water on it.”

The infusion of money came at an opportune time for Godwin, whose campaign was flagging. Grassroots Republicans seemed lethargic. Chairman Obenshain recalled, “Watergate-related problems were a particular trauma. The campaign in some ways was almost like walking through a minefield because every two or three weeks another explosion at the national level would take place.” Under normal circumstances a Republican candidate would welcome a Republican president to campaign for him. Godwin, however, made it clear that he did not want President Nixon to be involved because of the Watergate scandal. In midsummer, Vice President Spiro

Elyce Fishman, campaign coordinator for the Howell campaign. (Courtesy Keith Brothers)
Agnew invited Godwin to have lunch with him in Washington. Godwin accepted. Agnew “expressed great interest in the campaign in Virginia.” He wished Godwin well but said he would only come into Virginia to campaign if invited. Godwin, interested, responded that he “was not ruling it out” and “would be back in touch with him.” Godwin later told James Latimer of the Richmond Times-Dispatch, “[I]f subsequent events had not transpired, I might have invited him into the campaign.” By mid-September, however, there were reports that Agnew was being investigated by the Justice Department for accepting bribes from contractors while governor of Maryland and vice president. On 10 October, Agnew pled guilty to one count of income tax evasion and resigned as vice president. Godwin was glad he did not invite him into Virginia.\(^\text{58}\)

Another serious problem for Godwin was the inferior quality of his campaign organization. Godwin had chosen Carter O. Lowance as campaign manager. A highly capable individual, Lowance had served as chief of staff to six Virginia governors, but he had no experience running a campaign. Lowance’s campaign staff included many veterans of the old Byrd Organization, such as former Congressman Watkins Abbitt.\(^\text{59}\)

Officials of the Republican National Committee (RNC), including political director Eddie Mahe, Jr., considered the Republican campaign in Virginia “a bumbling disaster.” About two weeks before release of Howell’s poll, Mahe dispatched Norman Bishop, a field coordinator based in Atlanta, and several other operatives to Virginia on a rescue mission. In a postelection memorandum Bishop enumerated seven problems with Godwin’s campaign: the absence of any voter identification program; poor public relations; lack of communication among the Republican candidates; “No real communication or coordination between Richmond and local units; No passion or enthusiasm among workers; Lack of local initiative . . . [and] Lack of campaign flexibility and quick response and decision making.” Bishop had work to do.\(^\text{60}\)

Bishop, Virginia party officials, and RNC staffers developed a multipart strategy. The most important items were the creation of telephone banks in seven geographical areas to identify strong Godwin supporters and improvements in field work. Using a computer program, the RNC had prioritized all precincts in Virginia. A mix of professional callers and trained volunteers
made more than 200,000 initial and follow-up calls by Election Day. Postelection analysis of voting data from Richmond and Roanoke indicated that increased turnout coincided with areas where calls were concentrated. Obenshain believed the data was “a powerful indication of how instrumental this program was in turning out the votes necessary to achieve . . . victory.” Bishop cited Godwin’s narrow margins in Northern Virginia where “according to polls he likely should have lost. Since there was little media help, telephone operations must be concluded as the margin of victory in these two districts [Eighth and Tenth congressional districts] and thereby quite likely the entire election.” The second critical part of the plan was the hiring of “field staff workers” to operate in the seven areas. Among their duties was recruiting volunteers for the telephone banks, distributing “issue material” and generating and designing local advertising, “putting out fires,” and gathering intelligence.

By late September, Bishop believed a “cutting, ruthless attack was obviously needed and needed quickly.” RNC staffer Bill Royal’s “constant hammering” prevented the issues of busing and gun control from being “sublimated in a mass of bland news releases.” Obenshain assumed the role of “hatchet man . . . hitting Howell with anything we could find. . . . We began putting together a series of throw-aways, pamphlets on busing and everything else. Openly, blatantly prejudicial material. We referred to them as voter information documents. I think they’re called smear sheets in some places.” Reprints of newspaper articles were targeted to certain localities. The one on gun control would go to southwest Virginia, but not Northern Virginia. The one on busing went to the Norfolk and Richmond areas, Alexandria, and Arlington.

Bishop and Klinge also planned to use surrogates to attack Howell on specific issues. Aside from Kenneth Robinson of the Seventh District, however, Bishop found the congressional delegation “virtually useless.” They endorsed Godwin, but they declined to attack Howell. Bishop believed the state senators, some of whom were Democrats, were more effective.

*Opposite page: Mills Godwin responds to questions from a radio station correspondent as reporters take notes across from the Loudoun County Courthouse in Leesburg. (Loudoun Times-Mirror Photograph Collection, Rust Archives, Courtesy Thomas Balch Library, Leesburg, Va.)*
According to Bishop, a separate budget was necessary to “finance the project outside the supervision of the campaign organization.” In that way the plan’s directors would be able to “get action quickly and where needed.” How would the money be raised? After a conversation with Obenshain on 22 September, former Lieutenant Governor Fred Pollard, a Democrat, volunteered to help finance the program. He raised $20,000 in the first week. Originally estimated to cost $140,000, the program’s total cost came to $58,200 because of the efforts of volunteers and in-kind contributions. Project operations were conducted from the second floor of state headquarters while the regular campaign was located on the first. Bishop believed that Godwin never knew who he was.64

Just nine days after the release of his September poll, Howell made another tactical error. He believed that to be “a credible candidate” he must
demonstrate how he would replace the approximately $231.7 million per biennium lost by the repeal of the sales tax on food and nonprescription drugs. On 12 October he offered what he called his ABC Tax Plan (for alcohol, banks, and corporations). The proposals included increased taxes on alcoholic beverages and an increase from 6 to 7 percent in the income tax for corporations having taxable incomes in excess of $25,000. Previously untaxed dividends from Virginia banks and corporations would be treated as regular income. The plan also included a 4 percent tax on most professional services, such as those provided by attorneys and accountants. Doctors would be exempt. Howell conceded that the new taxes would raise about $90 million less than was needed to replace the revenue generated by the tax on food and nonprescription drugs. To bridge the gap, he proposed a 1 percent cut in existing programs and a $500 million ceiling on new spending for the 1974–76 biennium. Godwin labeled the plan “a cruel hoax.”

Howell’s objective was to shift some of the tax burden from low- and moderate-income groups to the wealthy, especially the business community. The latter groups, of course, were supporting his opponent. Norfolk’s *Virginian-Pilot* found the plan to be the work of “a full-fledged populist.” The editorial described the spending limit as “the most difficult feat of all,” noting that in their budget proposals, state agencies had asked for $1.5 billion in new spending. Echoing Mills Godwin, the *Richmond Times-Dispatch* declared that, if enacted, the Howell plan would result in higher taxes for most Virginians, “assuming the state wishes to pursue its progressive course.” Republican headquarters circulated a flyer describing Howell’s proposal as “a tax on jobs.”

Without the benefit of tracking polls, it is impossible to measure the impact of the ABC tax plan on the election. One fact is indisputable. In the eleven days after Howell revealed the plan, Godwin’s campaign received an additional $219,000 in contributions. Howell’s populism posed a threat to those who benefited from the status quo. Rather than revealing his detailed tax plan, Obenshain later remarked, Howell “would have been better off to have stuck to the nebulous position and taken the flak. He might have come out better than he did in having to take the pounding for an ill-conceived program that couldn’t do the job.” Journalist Mel Carico commented that Godwin “is a tremendous campaigner when he can hang his hat
on something.” By revealing the ABC plan, [Howell] “just gave him a campaign coat rack.”

The final three weeks of the campaign saw a surge in support for Godwin. Writing to his principal campaign aides on 15 October, Howell made another serious miscalculation. “I want us to be very deliberate in our actions and moves during the last three weeks. I think we are ahead. Our campaign speeches and activities should attempt to stay on the high road.” This was at the very time when the Republican offensive was going into high gear. Norman Bishop believed Howell’s momentum was already beginning to “fade,” but, “Once he had a real plan, his tax attack was doomed.” Carico recalled the changing political climate in the Roanoke Valley. “It’s a funny thing—out there, day and night—you could feel Howell’s strength sapping away. You get it from cab drivers and waitresses. ‘What’s happening to Henry Howell? . . . I feel he’s slipping.’ It [the ABC tax plan] turned it around. No doubt about it.”
If Howell needed any concrete evidence he was slipping, it was soon available in statistical form. Though he might discount a new Godwin poll that placed the former governor “slightly in the lead,” he could not overlook his own pollster’s new survey in late October that revealed his lead over Godwin had “dwindled to a ‘razor-thin’ edge.” Unlike the earlier poll, Howell would not discuss the new one. He immediately changed the low-keyed tone of his campaigning. At a rally in Newport News, he attacked Godwin in what reporter Jim Henderson of The Virginian-Pilot described as the “give-em-hell style reminiscent of his unsuccessful 1969 drive for the governorship.” A Howell memo written two days after the press reported the poll indicates the rising level of anxiety in the campaign. The author is listed as Howell and the recipient Paul Askew. The subject is a “CONFERENCE WITH GOVERNOR GEORGE WALLACE.” The memo defines “The Target” as persuading “Governor Wallace to come out against Mills Godwin.” Askew’s mission was to gain Wallace’s approval of Howell’s “fight for the economic plight of the common man . . . and against the most powerful interests” rather than an explicit endorsement. It is likely that a Howell staffer wrote the memo. There is no evidence that Askew conferred with Wallace. Instead, Howell invited two Democratic governors, Jimmy Carter of Georgia and Wendell Ford of Kentucky, to campaign for him.69

The effectiveness of endorsements by out-of-state politicians in any election is debatable. According to Joe Fitzpatrick, Howell at first “didn’t want anybody to come in.” In early September, Carter had offered his assistance, writing, “I’m an admirer of yours & wish you well—especially against Godwin.” Three weeks later he reiterated his desire to help in a handwritten note. When Howell received the results of the poll in late October, he realized that outside assistance could be beneficial. Carter paid two visits to Virginia. Joining Howell for press conferences on 31 October, the Georgia governor stated that the principal issue at stake in the election was the clash between “the special interests who have long dominated Southern politics—the banks, corporations, insurance companies and power and telephone people—and the people who demand their own right to . . . control their own government.” Labeling Godwin’s charge that Howell supported “massive mandatory busing of students across state and county lines” as “completely false,” he characterized it as a common response when “an attack is made on
interests with a privileged status in society.” The purpose was “to confuse the issue.” On the final campaign weekend, Carter returned to Virginia for stops in southside and southwest Virginia. On 29 October, Governor Ford, who had secured repeal of the food tax in Kentucky, appeared with Howell at press conferences in Roanoke and Richmond.70

After months of intensive campaigning both candidates were facing a new enemy: apathy. Some observers believed the long and bitter gubernatorial campaign along with the continuing scandals in Washington had disillusioned voters, who by late October were “up to their neck” with politics. Obenshain recalled an “emotional pall” that hovered over the political scene.71

The Godwin campaign, however, finally seemed to be hitting its stride. His growing financial advantage over Howell enabled the campaign to air more hard-hitting ads on topics like busing. On the stump, Godwin adopted a more positive tone and even wore more colorful clothing instead of his

Mills Godwin at the annual Republican “Grand Old Pig Roast” at Southern Comfort Farms in Albemarle County, 15 September 1973. (Courtesy Special Collections Research Center, William and Mary Libraries)
usual dark suits. The campaign also organized supportive college students whose “highly visible” activities gave Godwin “a more forward-looking image.” Even as the campaign entered its final days, however, there was more drama to come.  

On Thursday, 1 November, a weekly newspaper in Appomattox County published an open letter from county resident Watkins M. Abbitt, chairman of the Democrats for Godwin. The letter contained the following sentences: “A person is known by the associations he has and the people who support him. Howell’s campaign is financed largely by big union bosses from outside the state who are contributing over $300,000 to his campaign and the liberal left-wing millionaire Jew from Richmond who has contributed along with his wife over $145,000.” The reference, of course, was to Sydney Lewis and his wife Frances.

Abbitt’s anti-Semitic comment provoked widespread denunciations. Leonard B. Sachs, chairman of the Virginia Regional Board of the Anti-Defamation League of B’nai B’rith, found it “inconceivable in this day and age that a person, who was an elected representative in Congress . . . could possibly make such an anti-Semitic statement. One would have expected this from George Lincoln Rockwell [founder of the American Nazi Party].” In Danville, Godwin, looking grim, stated, “I regret . . . extremely” Abbitt’s comments. Obenshain sent Lewis a telegram (later issued as a press release) condemning “the extreme personal attack which was made against you yesterday” and expressing his respect for Lewis “as a distinguished, honorable and exceedingly generous first citizen of Virginia.” Abbitt quickly issued a brief apology: “I intended no reflection on Mr. Lewis, nor any member of the Jewish faith and sincerely regret if any contrary impression was given. If I have unintentionally given offense in this instance, I offer my sincerest apology.”

Godwin’s and Howell’s reactions to Abbitt’s statement provide a study in contrasts. Moving quickly into damage control mode, Godwin arranged a meeting with leaders of Richmond’s Jewish community. Sensing that the Abbitt letter could give him a needed boost, Howell not only denounced it but also tried to associate Godwin with it. On a live television interview in Roanoke, Howell charged, “After Mills Godwin told him [Abbitt] ‘go ahead and do it,’ now he [Godwin] tonight is apologizing. Watkins Abbitt is
Godwin’s closest campaign aide.” Characterizing Howell’s statement as “a diabolical lie,” Godwin in his final press conference denied knowing anything about the letter before publication.75

What impact did Abbitt’s letter have on the election? A Richmond Times-Dispatch reporter speculated that the letter was “apparently designed to disabuse Southside supporters of Henry Howell.” Whatever the intent, the letter did not benefit Godwin. In an interview a few months after the election, Obenshain stated his conclusions about the impact of the letter:

I felt that it had a negative effect on Godwin’s showing. I felt that it was a politically harmful statement. The momentum of our campaign up until that time had been steadily increasing. The last two weeks had been very strong, emotional ones, and I think we were rolling to a high climax to the campaign. The [Abbitt] statement was a shock and rocked the campaign back on its heels. . . . It had a negative effect, particularly in the urban areas.76

Recalling the incident in 2019, Henry McLaughlin, Howell’s press secretary in 1973, agreed with Obenshain’s analysis. “I think the difference would have been more than 1 percent,” McLaughlin remarked, if Abbitt had not sent the letter. “Toward the end the momentum shifted back to Henry . . . not quite enough. . . . They [the Godwin campaign] were worried about that [Abbitt letter], and it very nearly elected Henry.”77

As if there were not enough twists and turns in this bizarre election, one more occurred on the morning of Election Day. At 8:00 a.m. during the Today program on NBC, host Frank McGee briefly mentioned the gubernatorial election in Virginia. He described Howell as “a populist who favors busing and who backed George McGovern a year ago.” Howell headquarters immediately contacted NBC and demanded a retraction. NBC broadcast the retraction just before 9:00 a.m. By that time thousands of those who had heard the earlier announcement had left for work. Howell believed that McGee’s remarks changed enough votes to cost him the election. Threatening a lawsuit, Howell prepared a memorandum to NBC citing evidence of voters changing their votes to Godwin, because as one put it, “A national network can’t be wrong.”78

Howell’s memorandum also mentioned an indirect tie of McGee to Godwin. McGee owned a farm in Rappahannock County. His local attorney had received an appointment from Godwin as chairman of the State
Board of Education. A member of a committee of conservative Democrats supporting Godwin, he had signed a letter which, according to Howell, “‘distorted [his] busing . . . position’ by quoting out of context from the televised interview.” The memorandum implied, “McGee spoke with actual knowledge that the statement he made was false and with the intent to damage Howell.” Any possibility of suing, however, ended when McGee succumbed to cancer on 17 April 1974. Unbeknownst to viewers of the *Today* show, McGee had been quietly battling the disease for four years. Given McGee’s reputation for what Walter Cronkite described as “character and integrity of iron” and his distinguished career in broadcasting, it is highly unlikely that he and his lawyer conspired against Howell.79

When the votes were tallied on 6 November, Mills Godwin scored a narrow victory over Henry Howell. Predictions of a light turnout based on voter indifference and apathy were not borne out because a record total of 1,035,495 votes for governor were cast. Godwin’s margin of victory was 14,972 votes. He won forty-nine of Virginia’s ninety-five counties and twenty of the thirty-nine independent cities. The Richmond area’s Third Congressional District, whose newspapers were stridently anti-Howell, and the Danville area’s Fifth Congressional District were Godwin’s strongest areas. Democratic Chairman Fitzpatrick later complained that Howell “spent about half his time . . . on the damn Ninth [District]” in southwest Virginia and did not do as well there as he should have. Perhaps some of that time and energy might have been more profitably expended in Northern Virginia where Godwin won by slim majorities.80

The Nixon White House was pleased that Godwin won, but there must have been frustration that the election did not advance party realignment in Virginia. On the day after the election, the president called Godwin at his home. The call lasted only four minutes. In consultation with RNC Chairman George H. W. Bush, counselor Anne Armstrong had prepared talking points for the call. She suggested that Nixon congratulate Godwin for “this great personal triumph” (italics added). Indeed, it was personal. Godwin’s running mate, Senator John Dalton, was elected lieutenant governor by a wide margin, but as expected, Democratic Attorney General Andrew Miller won a landslide victory over his little-known Republican opponent. The Republicans’ chief disappointment was in the contest for
seats in the House of Delegates. Their hopes rose after the liberals’ takeover of the Virginia Democratic Party when seven legislators declined to seek reelection, two defected to the Republican Party, and thirteen others said they would seek reelection as Independents. By mid-October, however, it was apparent that the likelihood of a Republican-Independent coalition was doomed. Democratic Speaker of the House John Warren Cooke had ensured that the Democrats-turned-Independents would caucus with the Democrats when the General Assembly convened. Instead of gaining about ten seats, as Republican caucus chairman Delegate Vincent F. Callahan had optimistically predicted, the GOP suffered a net loss of five seats. Chairman Obenshain attributed the losses to lack of enthusiasm among Republican workers and the spill-over effect of labor union activism in the gubernatorial race. In his postelection analysis, Professor Sabato cited the Watergate scandal and local issues as key factors in the Republicans’ disappointing performance.

Racial issues, especially busing students to achieve racial balance, also played a significant role in Howell’s defeat. In early October, Norman Bishop employed a clever stratagem to revive the busing issue. Knowing that the Republican candidate for attorney general, M. Patton Echols, had little chance of winning, Bishop decided to use Echols to attack Howell on busing. The connection between them was Howell’s opposition to an antibusing bill Echols had managed on the floor of the Virginia Senate in 1970. Bishop proposed to Echols’s campaign manager Steve Bell that he write some hard-hitting radio advertisements implying that Howell supported busing of Northern Virginia students from the District of Columbia and vice versa. When listeners called radio station WMAL in Washington to object to the advertisements as misrepresenting Howell’s position, the station canceled broadcasts of the thirty-second spot. Accusing the station of censorship, Echols made a formal complaint to the Federal Communications Commission. The Virginian-Pilot praised the station’s action, stating, “Race has no place in the campaign.” The Washington Post denounced the ads, stating, “This kind of demagoguery is an insult to the intelligence of voters in the Old Dominion.” Reviewing the campaign several months later, Bishop cited the telephone banks and ads attacking Howell on busing as “key” to Godwin’s victory. In his study of the election returns, Larry Sabato conclud-
ed, “Concern over busing in Northern Virginia, Danville, and Richmond seemed to erode Howell’s voting strength.” He also noted that Howell’s margin in predominantly blue-collar Newport News was “not as substantial as expected.”

Godwin himself made a racial appeal when he appeared before the central committee of the American Party of Virginia in mid-October. The former governor stated that the philosophical differences between the candidates were best illustrated by two endorsements they had received on the same day in September, namely conservative Senator Harry F. Byrd, Jr.’s backing of Godwin and the endorsement of Howell by Ruth Harvey Charity of Danville, a Black city councilwoman, prominent civil rights activist, and member of the Democratic National Committee. Speaking on the courthouse steps in Culpeper on 17 October, Godwin again introduced race when he warned that Howell would appoint “radical, militant liberals” in the Democratic command structure to major positions in his administration. His examples included Charity and Jessie Rattley, a Black woman who served on the Newport News City Council and as vice chairman of the state party.

Voter turnout may have been decisive in the outcome of the election. Sabato concluded, “Had Howell’s localities equaled the voting participation of Godwin’s, the electoral result would have been reversed.” The Third District, which had the highest turnout among registered voters, 57.1 percent, was also Godwin’s strongest district. On the other hand, the Ninth District, which was the focus of so much effort by Howell, yielded only a 44.8 percent turnout among registered voters. There is also a racial dimension to the size of the turnout.

The most intriguing turnout data applies to two divergent groups that Howell wanted as part of his coalition: Black Virginians and supporters of George Wallace in the 1968 presidential election. Despite Wallace’s refusal to become involved in the Virginia gubernatorial election, Sabato reported that Howell “received his largest margins ever in the Wallace precincts.” Howell’s populist views regarding taxes, big business, and public utilities resonated with these voters. Although Black Virginians gave 94 percent of their votes to Howell, their level of participation hurt him. In mid-October Shelley Rolfe of the *Times-Dispatch* reported that Black leaders feared many
registered African Americans might not vote. Two days after the election, The Virginian-Pilot commented that, if Black voters had turned out as they did in the 1972 presidential election, Howell would have won by 1 percent. The vote in some Black precincts in Richmond was only about 60 percent of what it had been in 1972.85

“If the black participation level had approached the overall participation in 1973,” Larry Sabato concluded, “Henry Howell would have been elected governor by a comfortable margin.” George Kelley wondered if Howell’s “more conservative . . . stance in an apparent effort to hold white blue-collar voters” during the campaign’s closing weeks had “dulled the interest of rank-and-file blacks.” Black Virginians had long regarded him as “an outspoken champion of their efforts to achieve total equality. [Had] Howell’s numerous denials of being pro-busing raised suspicions among blacks?” Black turnout in Richmond suggests this might have been the case. Noting their absence at a much-publicized Capitol Square lunch-hour rally addressed by Howell on 26 October, the Norfolk reporter queried “politicians in areas with heavy black populations” if African Americans “had been asked to maintain a low profile.” They responded that there were “no signs of blacks being ‘turned on.’” An official of the influential Black political organization, the Richmond Crusade for Voters, informed Shelley Rolfe that energizing Black voters was complicated. He spoke of “doing it subtly . . . walking on eggshells to do nothing to disturb Howell’s delicate coalition of blacks and Wallace whites.” Ray Boone, editor of the Richmond Afro-American, however, stated that Howell, taking Black voters’ support for granted, did not spend enough money in the Black community. Boone believed that there was a way turnout might have been improved, but Howell would not do it.86

Howell’s refusal to buy votes in the Black community speaks well for his character. Several months after the election, he acknowledged “the black turnout was kind of low.” He revealed he “was told early [in the campaign] to get $25,000 just for Richmond by a very distinguished black officeholder.” He rejected the proposal. “I don’t believe in paying a whole lot of money [for votes],” he declared. “I was fighting for fair causes, and had a record, and I told them that, if they didn’t motivate, I’d lose, and they said, ‘You lose.’” In 2019, Henry McLaughlin recalled the request and Howell’s refusal: “I always admired him for this. He didn’t like that whole idea. He didn’t
believe you ought to pay somebody money to buy votes. . . . The decision he made was the honorable one on that subject. He took the high road . . . and there was some anger towards him about it, but I thought he did the right thing.”

The legacy of the Armageddon-like battle between Mills Godwin and Henry Howell for the governorship in 1973 denoted five emerging trends in Virginia politics. The campaign saw an unprecedented level of spending by both candidates. The U.S. Senate campaign in 1972 had hinted at this development when retired industrialist J. D. Stetson Coleman made a loan of $200,000 near the end of the campaign to Republican candidate William Scott. In 1973, however, money flowed to the candidates from multiple sources and was not concentrated in one large contribution in the waning days of the campaign. Adjusted for inflation, Godwin’s total would be $6.3 million in 2020 while Howell’s would be $5.7 million. These figures pale beside the $47.1 million raised by Terry McAuliffe in 2013 and Ralph Northam’s $33.8 million four years later. The role of big money in Virginia elections can be traced to the elections of 1972 and 1973.

The 1973 campaign also set a precedent for negative advertising in gubernatorial elections. On the morning of the election, Norfolk’s Virginian-Pilot commented that the election had witnessed “this century’s bitterest campaign for Governor.” Though not all subsequent gubernatorial elections were as bitter as 1973, the outcome of the Godwin-Howell race proved that negative advertising worked. We only need review the television commercials of recent statewide elections in Virginia to see that this unfortunate legacy of 1973 is still with us. As former state Senator Charles Waddell of Loudoun County told historian James Hershman in late 2017, “The harsh attack politics that came to dominate politics [in Virginia] over the last few decades really had their start in the 1973 campaign.”

The 1973 election also marked the end of the moderate mountain-valley faction’s control of the Republican Party. Mills Godwin’s victory did not signal the reemergence of the old Byrd political organization. Instead, it reaffirmed the political power of the industrial, financial, and legal elites known as the “Main Street boys” in Richmond, who saw in Henry Howell a genuine threat to their interests.
Of at least equal significance, Henry Howell’s defeat marked the failure of a unique attempt to construct a coalition of organized labor, Black Virginians, white liberals, and working-class whites to gain power in the Old Dominion. Howell would mount a third attempt to win the governorship in 1977, but the political environment had changed. After defeating Andrew Miller in the Democratic primary, he would suffer a landslide defeat at the hands of Lieutenant Governor John Dalton. Starved for victory, the Democrats would purge Howell’s influence from the party’s leadership and embrace a more pro-business course under Charles (Chuck) Robb, a candidate who was entirely acceptable to the “Main Street boys.”

Lastly, the outcome marked the end of the dominant role in state politics of conservative whites from the so-called Black Belt counties. The votes of Black citizens undoubtedly enabled Howell to carry the southside Fourth Congressional District, formerly a bastion of strength for Byrd Organization candidates, by almost 15,000 votes over Godwin. In his memoir, former Governor Linwood Holton recalled that on the morning after the election he made a congratulatory call to Godwin. During the conversation, Holton asked Godwin why he had done poorly in his own congressional district. Godwin somewhat resignedly responded, “It was all that black vote.” Holton wanted to offer an explanation, but held his tongue “because Mills was so sensitive and so easily offended.” He wrote that he would like to have said: “You fellows realize that they count that vote now?” Holton added, “Many like Godwin, who had spent a lifetime as part of the racist Byrd organization, simply could not grasp the reality that votes from the black community could now have a significant effect on the outcome of a statewide election.” Godwin would live to see just how fundamentally the impact of black voting would affect Virginia politics with the election of a Black man, L. Douglas Wilder, as governor of Virginia in 1989.
NOTES

The author would like to thank Carla Braswell, archivist at the Richard M. Nixon Library and Museum, for her indispensable assistance accessing relevant documents in the library’s collections for this essay.


“Quietly, he [Howell] coached emissaries from the Holton camp on how to obtain his backers’ support.”


17. Sweeney, “Southern Strategies,” 168–69; Holton, *Opportunity Time*, 82; George M. Kelley, “GOP Brass Approaches Va. Democrat,” *Washington Post*, 20 Apr. 1972, B1 (first and second quotations); George M. Kelley, “Nixon Aide Consults Godwin,” *Virginian-Pilot*, 20 Apr. 1972, 1; George M. Kelley, “About That Call Godwin Got from D.C.,” *Virginian-Pilot*, 23 Apr. 1972, C3. Although his primary employer was *The Virginian-Pilot*, Kelley also contributed articles on Virginia politics to *The Washington Post*. In his memoir, Godwin offered a different version of the meeting. He wrote that the president himself issued the invitation to meet in the Oval Office in mid-April of 1972 and asked Godwin to help him in the election, which Godwin said “might be possible,” but he would need more time before making a decision. In a week, according to Godwin, Mitchell called and asked if he would help in the campaign, and Godwin agreed (Godwin, *Some Recollections*, 53–54). The problem with this account is that nowhere in the president’s daily diary for April 1972, or on any other date that year before the announcement of Godwin’s involvement in the Nixon campaign, is there mention of a meeting with Godwin. He may have confused this visit to Washington with one late in 1971. The president had summoned him to the White House on that occasion to discuss the political situation in Virginia (Presidential Daily Diary, *Richard Nixon Presidential Library and Museum*, https://www.nixonlibrary.gov/president/presidential-daily-diary [accessed 9 Aug. 2022]).

15 June 1972, White House Central Files, Alphabetical Name Files, Godwin L–R, Richard Nixon Presidential Library and Museum, Yorba Linda, California (third quotation). The Nixon Library prefers not to list box numbers for items in the Alphabetical File because box numbers change "as the volume of reviewed folders increases." In an interview on Richmond’s WTVR-TV on the eve of the Democratic state convention, Godwin said that he might vote for President Nixon or not vote at all if Senator McGovern were the Democratic nominee ("Godwin Says He Might Support Nixon if McGovern Nominated," Washington Post, 10 June 1972, B4). Dent was overly optimistic about Senator Byrd. He was reelected again as an Independent in 1976 and retired after that term.


23. Memorandum for the President from Harry S. Dent, 21 Nov. 1972, box 16, Harry S. Dent Papers, Clemson Libraries Special Collections and Archives, Clemson University, Clemson, South Carolina.

24. Bugg, "Mills E. Godwin, Jr.,” 377; Godwin, Some Recollections, 57–58; Dent Memorandum,


34. Memorandum to George Bush from Ed DeBolt and Jim Galbraith, 22 Feb. 1973, White House Special Files, Staff Member and Office Files (Staff Secretary), box 81, Nixon Presidential Library.


36. Memorandum for the President from Peter Flanigan, 26 Feb. 1973 (first through fifth quotations); Memorandum for the President from George Bush, 26 Feb. 1973, White House Special Files, Staff Member and Office Files (Staff Secretary), box 81, Nixon Presidential Library (sixth and seventh quotations); Memorandum for Honorable George Bush from Bruce A. Kehrli, 2 Mar. 1973, ibid. (eighth quotation). Slaughter had already stated he would not run for reelection as a Democrat in the fall.


38. Atkinson, *Dynamic Dominion*, 300–302 (first quotation); Helen Dewar, “Godwin Agrees to Accept if GOP Nominates Him,” *Washington Post*, 6 Mar. 1973, A1. The next day, Staff Secretary Bruce Kehrli informed Chairman Bush that the White House News Summary reported, “Godwin will accept GOP Gov’s nomination and run as GOP if nominated, but he didn’t plan to campaign for it and said petitions were being circulated to qualify him as an independent if he failed to get GOP nod. . . . 5 GOP MCs (members of Congress from Virginia) fell into line behind Godwin’s candidacy. . . . Referring to the above, it was noted that the President is for Godwin all the way” (Memorandum for Honorable George Bush from Bruce A. Kehrli, 6 Mar. 1973, White House Special Files, Staff Member and Office Files [Staff Secretary], box 81, Nixon Presidential Library).


50. George C. Wallace to Paul Askew, 19 Sept. 1973, box 93, Howell Papers (quotations); Alan Draper, Conflict of Interests: Organized Labor and the Civil Rights Movement in the South (Ithaca, N.Y., 1994), 117. In the mid-1960s, William T. Thrash was the business manager of Operating Engineers Local 312 in Birmingham (Draper, Conflict of Interests, 110). Askew may have met Thrash while serving as a representative of the international union.


54. George M. Kelley, “They Are Beginning to Punch a Bit Harder,” Virginian-Pilot, 16 Sept.
The discrepancy was because of a proliferation of separate committees for both candidates, some of whom did not send their money to state headquarters and were, therefore, not included in the candidates’ totals.


59. Atkinson, New Dominion, 310; “Campaign Director Named,” Washington Post, 20 May 1973, B1; Interview with J. Kenneth Klinge, 23 May 2019. Lowance was granted a leave of absence from his position as executive vice president of the College of William & Mary to accept the position with the Godwin campaign.

60. Bass and DeVries, Transformation of Southern Politics, 364 (first quotation); Daniel J. Galvin, Presidential Party Building (Princeton, N.J., 2010), 95; Interview with J. Kenneth Klinge, 23 May 2019; Memorandum from Norman Bishop to Richard D. Obenshain, n.d. (internal evidence suggests the late winter or spring of 1974), Archives of the Republican Party of Virginia, Richard D. Obenshain Center, Richmond, Virginia (second quotation); Interview with Norman Bishop, conducted by Jack Bass and Walter DeVries, 2 May 1974 (A-0063), in the Southern Oral History Program Collection (#4007), SHC.

61. Memorandum from J. Kenneth Klinge to Richard D. Obenshain, 18 June 1974, Archives of the Republican Party of Virginia; Richard D. Obenshain to J. Kenneth Robinson, 2 July 1974, Archives of the Republican Party of Virginia (first quotation); Memorandum from Norman Bishop to Richard D. Obenshain (second through fifth quotations); Atkinson, New Dominion, 312–13. In his memorandum to Obenshain, Kenneth Klinge also pointed out, “In those Congressional districts where there was an effective telephone campaign, only the 1st and 2nd were lost by Godwin. This likely was due to the influence of the hometown effect.” Both districts were in southeastern Virginia. Howell resided in the Second District.
62. Memorandum from Norman Bishop to Richard D. Obenshain (first through third quotations); Interview with Norman Bishop, 2 May 1974 (fourth and fifth quotations).

63. Memorandum from Norman Bishop to Richard D. Obenshain (quotations); Richard D. Obenshain to J. Kenneth Robinson, 2 July 1974; Memorandum from J. Kenneth Klinge to Richard D. Obenshain, 18 June 1974; Interview with Norman Bishop, 2 May 1974.

64. Memorandum from Norman Bishop to Richard D. Obenshain (quotations); Interview with Norman Bishop, 2 May 1974. Representative Robinson provided Betty Burkeholder from his staff to organize and schedule the surrogates.


68. Memorandum: The Candidate (Howell) to Jerry, Elyce, and Chris, 15 Oct. 1973, box 89, Howell Papers (first quotation); Memorandum from Norman Bishop to Richard D. Obenshain (second and third quotations); Interview with Melville Carico, 11 Mar. 1974 (fourth quotation).


72. Atkinson, Dynamic Dominion, 313 (quotations); Carico, “’73 Campaign Floated.”


77. Interview with Henry W. McLaughlin III, 4 Feb. 2019 (quotations).


87. Interview with Henry E. Howell, Jr., 13 Mar. 1974 (first through fourth quotations); Interview with Henry W. McLaughlin III, 4 Feb. 2019 (fifth quotation).


90. I am indebted to Professor Emeritus James Hershman of Georgetown University for sharing the notes of his interview with Senator Waddell and for insights into issues of class as related to the 1973 gubernatorial election (James H. Hershman, email to author, 10 Dec. 2018). Hershman served on the Democratic State Central Committee from 1979 to 1983.