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AMBASSADOR HARRY FRANK GUGGENHEIM

IN CUBA: 1929-1933

Donald Ross Brimmer

A thesis presented to the Department of History of
Old Dominion College
in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the
Degree of Master of Arts in History

OLD DOMINION COLLEGE

August, 1969

This thesis was prepared by Donald Ross Brimmer under the direction of the chairman of the candidate's supervisory committee, and has been approved by all members of that committee. It was submitted to the Dean of the School of Arts and Letters and to the Graduate Council, and has been approved as partial fulfillment of the requirement for the degree of Master of Arts.

August, 1969

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Dean, School of Arts and Letters

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Chairman, Graduate Council

Supervisory Committee

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INTRODUCTION

This short study of Ambassador Harry Frank Guggenheim in Cuba is not an isolated or inconsequential fragment of United States diplomatic history. Instead, it is an integral part of United States foreign policy during the four years Herbert Clark Hoover served as President and Henry Lewis Stimson as his Secretary of State. President Hoover was almost totally engrossed with the impact of the Great Depression, and Secretary Stimson was mainly preoccupied with limiting Japanese hegemony in the Far East. Ambassador Guggenheim was the neophyte diplomat in Havana who lived with the policy successes and failures.

The history of United States-Cuban relations will be briefly traced prior to Guggenheim's arrival in Cuba. An attempt will then be made to describe the actions of the American Ambassador by an almost day-by-day narrative account. It is hoped that this thesis was written in a style whereby the reader can place himself in Ambassador Guggenheim's position and thereby recapture what actually transpired.

The primary purpose of this academic endeavor was to

probe, examine, and evaluate Guggenheim's performance. At times it was almost impossible to avoid the pitfall of sympathy toward the Ambassador, especially during the latter portion of his assignment.

Sometimes an ambassador who lives with everyday major and minor diplomatic problems is relegated to a position where his influence is reduced. He is keenly aware of what should be done, at least in his own opinion, but lacks the support or latitude to accomplish his task.

CHAPTER I

BACKGROUND RELATIONS, 1898-1928

When the United States declared war on Spain in 1898, the Teller Amendment proclaimed to a dubious world that the United States did not have territorial designs on Cuba, and that, after a short period of pacification, the Cubans would determine their own destiny. By July, 1900, Major General Leonard Wood, United States Military Governor of Cuba, had achieved the initial aims of the announced policy, and he issued Military Occupation Order Number 301. This order called for the election of Cuban constitutional delegates. The thirty-one members of the Constitutional Convention met in the Teatro Martí on November 5, 1900, and within three months, they had completed a draft constitution.

Diego Tamayo, chairman of the Convention's Committee on Relations with the United States, expressed the Cuban view that a simple declaration of eternal ties of friendship was adequate. The United States government, led by Secretary of War Elihu Root, disagreed with the Cuban Constitutional Convention. Four days after the Cubans

completed their draft, the United States Senate Committee on Cuba reported an amendment to the Army Appropriations Act for the fiscal year 1902 to the Senate. Like many ot "riders," the amendment overshadowed the parent bill. Th action by Senator Orville H. Platt of New York and his co mittee resulted in what has been commonly referred to as "Platt Amendment."

In effect, the United States was ready to permit th budding Cuban Republic to start moving on the bumpy road independence, but "big brother" remained in the immediate background to ensure that Cuba followed the "correct" rou This Amendment formed the very basic foundation of intern tional relations between Cuba and the United States from 1902 to 1934. Certain pertinent articles of the Platt Am ment are quoted below:

> I. That the government of Cuba shall never enter i any treaty or other compact with any foreign power or powers which will impair or tend to impair the indepen ence of Cuba. . . .
>
> II. That said government of Cuba shall not assume contract any public debt, to pay the interest upon whi and to make reasonable sinking fund provision for the ultimate discharge of which, the ordinary revenues of island, after defraying the current expenses of gover shall be inadequate.
>
> III. That the government of Cuba consents that th United States may exercise the right to intervene for preservation of Cuban independence, the maintenance o government adequate for the protection of life, prope and individual liberty. . . .

VIII. That by way of further assurance the government of Cuba will embody the foregoing provisions in a permanent treaty with the United States.[1]

There is no doubt that this action by the United States was a definite affront to Cuban sovereignty. The Cuban Constitutional Convention decided to make a plea to the United States to reconsider, and on April 24, 1901, a committee led by Dr. Domingo Méndez Capote, President of the Cuban Constitutional Convention, arrived in Washington, D. C. to discuss the vital issue. Conferences and interviews were held with President McKinley and Secretary Root. Root, who was the actual author of the Platt Amendment, became the key official in the controversy. Root told the Cuban delegation that in his opinion, the United States would only intervene in Cuba if there were anarchy, and acceptance of the Platt Amendment was the prerequisite for United States withdrawal from Cuba. Obviously, the frustrated Cubans were forced to accept the Platt Amendment.

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[1] U.S., Congress, Senate, Treaties, Conventions, International Acts, Protocols and Agreements between the United States of America and Other Powers, 1776-1909, comp. by William M. Malloy, Sen. Doc. 357, 61st Cong., 2d sess., Vol. I (2 vols.; Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1910), pp. 362-363. Hereinafter referred to as Treaties.

After futile delaying tactics, the provisions were begrudgingly written into the Cuban Constitution of 1901.[2]

At noon on May 20, 1902, the United States flag over the governor's palace in Havana was lowered and replaced by the revolutionary flag of the Republic of Cuba. One of the many immediate problems that confronted President Tomás Estrada Palma was the negotiation of a favorable trade agreement with the United States. President Theodore Roosevelt proved to be a valuable ally in this battle. Roosevelt, faced with a protectionist Congress aided by a strong sugar lobby, forced the issue in November 1903 when he called for a special session of Congress. He said:

> I have convened the Congress that it may consider the legislation necessary to put into operation the commercial treaty with Cuba. . . . When the acceptance of the Platt Amendment was required from Cuba by the action of the Congress of the United States, this Government thereby definitely committed itself to the policy of treating Cuba as occupying a unique position as regards this country. It was provided that when the island became a free and independent republic she should stand in such close relation with us as in certain respects to come within our system of international policy; and it necessarily followed that

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[2]Russell Humke Fitzgibbon, Cuba and the United States, 1900-1935 (Menasha, Wisconsin: George Banta Publishing Company, 1935), p. 83, footnote 76. Hereinafter referred to as Cuba-U.S. Fitzgibbon stated there was no record of these informal conversations and cited informal Cuban sources.

> she must also to a certain degree become included within the lines of our economic policy.[3]

With Roosevelt's prodding, the bill passed both houses and was signed into law on December 17, 1903. Generally, this treaty of reciprocity provided that articles on the free list in either country would continue to be free, and the United States made a twenty per cent concession on other dutiable articles excluding tobacco. The Cuban trade concession was higher and ranged from twenty to forty per cent.[4]

By the summer of 1906, Cuba was faltering and had deep internal problems. Estrada Palma had been re-elected as President during the 1905 election. The opposition charged fraud when the number of votes exceeded the actual registered voters. This resulted in open revolution which soon engulfed most of the island. President Estrada Palma requested United States intervention through Consul-General Frank M. Steinhart on three separate occasions during September 1906. President Roosevelt was extremely reluctant to intervene

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[3]James Daniel Richardson, ed., A Compilation of the Messages and Papers of the Presidents, Vol. XV (20 vols.; New York: Bureau of National Literature, Inc., 1897-1911), pp. 6741-6742.

[4]Malloy, Treaties, pp. 353-357.

until Cuba had exhausted all means of ameliorating the situation. Finally, the decision was almost forced on Roosevelt when the Cuban President, Vice President, and Cabinet resigned en masse. On September 29, 1906, the United States proclaimed intervention and Secretary of War, William H. Taft, was assigned as the Provisional Governor of Cuba.[5]

Charles Edward Magoon relieved Taft two weeks later, and eventually the United States military forces in Cuba totaled over 5,000 troops. This occupation, or re-pacification, of Cuba lasted until January 28, 1909, when Magoon passed control of Cuba to President José Miguel Gómez.

Early in the Cuban election year of 1912, Secretary of State Philander Chase Knox followed a "preventive policy" and warned the Cuban government that intervention might be

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[5]U.S., Department of State, Foreign Relations of the United States, 1906, Vol. I (2 vols.; Washington: Government Printing Office, 1909), 473-91. Hereinafter referred to as F.R.. For the most exhaustive account of the 1906 intervention see Allan Reed Millett, The Politics of Intervention: The Military Occupation of Cuba, 1906-1909 (Columbus, Ohio: Ohio State University Press, 1968). Thorough reading on the 1906 United States intervention in Cuba indicated that most Cuban historians agree it was forced on the United States.

required if there were disorders.[6] In May 1912, there was a serious black race revolt in Cuba, and 700 marines landed at Guantánamo as a precautionary measure and two United States warships were dispatched to Havana. Evaristo Estenoz, the black leader was killed on June 27th ending the uprising. The following month, United States forces withdrew from Cuba. The actual election of 1912 was relatively honest and peaceful, at least by Cuban political standards, with Cornell-educated General Mario García Menocal being elected as the third President of Cuba.

Cuba was stable for the next three years except for notable political graft and corruption. President Menocal reversed his one-term pledge and in 1916 announced his candidacy for a second term. This election was marked by violence and dishonesty. In the disputed election, Menocal was re-elected by a slim majority and by early February 1917, Cuba was in open revolt. The rebels were led by former President Gómez, former Vice President Alfredo Zayas, and General Gerardo Machado y Morales. Secretary of State Robert Lansing appealed to the Cubans not to plunge the country into

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[6]Knox to Beaupré, January 16, 1912, F.R., 1912, pp. 240-241.

a civil war. In a second note delivered on February 13, 1917, Lansing set forth President Wilson's policy that "the Government of the United States has given its confidence and support only to Governments established through legal and constitutional methods."[7] President Wilson and Secretary Lansing took a strong stand on this situation in Cuba and authorized a substantial sale of arms and munitions to Menocal's government. This action was prompted primarily by Wilson's policy of de jure recognition, the impending war with Germany, and the possible threat of Germany establishing a submarine base in Cuba.[8] In March 1917, the United States made it very clear that the situation in Cuba would not get out of control, and a large United States marine force was landed at Guantánamo and Santiago. By June of 1917, the revolt in Cuba had officially come to an end. With the hesitant consent of President Menocal, approximately 3,000 more United States army troops were later landed in Cuba for "ostensible training purposes."[9]

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[7]Lansing to Gonzales, February 13, 1917, F.R., 1917, p. 356.

[8]Lansing to Wilson, February 5, 1917, F.R., The Lansing Papers, 1914-1920, I, 593 and Wilson to Lansing, February 6, 1917, Ibid., 594.

[9]Lansing to Morgan, August 18, 1917, F.R., 1918, p. 276

World War I had a significant impact on the Cuban sugar industry and the island virtually became the "Allied sugar bowl." Cuba received a $15,000,000 loan from the United States in March 1918 and even mobilized her armed forces for possible expeditionary services.[10] Probably the most notable event for Cuba during World War I, except for United States armed intervention, was the fact that she agreed to United States demands for the price stabilization of sugar.[11]

After World War I, Cuba was faced with the perennial problem of a presidential election, and in addition, the sugar economy was suffering from a serious inflation. Sugar price controls ended in 1919, and Cuba immediately tried to increase production to gain additional profits. By May of 1920, the price of Cuban sugar had climbed to over twenty-two cents a pound, which was an increase of seventeen cents

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[10] The New York Times, March 12, 1918, p. 2. For the Cuban viewpoint on her participation in World War I see an article written by President Mario García Menocal, "Cuba's Part in the World War," Current History, IX (November, 1918), 315-18.

[11] Sugar Production in Cuba, F.R., 1918, pp. 339-358. See Robert Freeman Smith, The United States and Cuba: Business and Diplomacy, 1917-1960 (New York: Bookman Associates, 1960), pp. 20-21. Hereinafter referred to as Business and Diplomacy.

in less than one year. The Cubans called this the danza de los millones (dance of the millions) and it ended as abruptly as it started. Within six months, the price of sugar was down to the norm of about five cents a pound. As a result of the sugar price oscillation, Cuba was well on the way to almost complete economic chaos by the end of 1920.[12]

The presidential election of 1919 was the first subject of United States attention. On January 17, 1919, American Chargé Rutherford Bingham delivered a note to Cuban Secretary of State Pablo Desvernine. This note stated that the United States government was very concerned about an honest election in Cuba, and that the United States "would be greatly pleased to receive from President Menocal a request to have the United States send a commission to Cuba to aid in the supervision of the elections. . . ."[13] To add further discomfort to the Cuban government, the note stated that President Menocal should promise to make a public statement to that effect. This was certainly an insult to Cuban

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[12]Smith, Business and Diplomacy, pp. 30-32 and Raymond Leslie Buell, et al., Problems of the New Cuba: Report of the Commission on Cuban Affairs (New York: Foreign Policy Association, Inc., 1935), pp. 2, 3, and 221. Hereinafter referred to as New Cuba.

[13]Bingham to Desvernine, January 17, 1919, F.R., 1919, II, 3.

sovereignty, but within one month, and after considerable diplomatic pressure, President Menocal invited Major General Enoch Crowder, United States Army, to Cuba to supervise the electoral laws Crowder had written between 1906 and 1909.[14] By August of 1919, Crowder had completed his task and with the official thanks of the Cuban Congress, and an additional honorary degree from the University of Habana, he departed the island on board the cruiser Cuba.

Even with the reforms instituted by Crowder and United States observers at the polls, many still considered it a dishonest and contested election. By late 1920, it appeared that with the election results before the Cuban Supreme Court, Cuba might not have a legally elected president to replace Menocal. President Wilson, without officially notifying the Cuban government, on January 1, 1921, sent General Crowder to Cuba as his special representative.[15] President Menocal informed American Minister Boaz W. Long that he could not receive Crowder because of the manner in which he was being sent.[16] The United States reply to Menocal was curt and to

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[14]Gonzales to Polk, February 13, 1919, F.R., 1919, II, 9.

[15]The New York Times, January 4, 1921, p. 1.

[16]Long to Davis, January 3, 1921, F.R., 1921, I, 670-71.

the point. It stated:

> . . . that on account of the special relations existing between Cuba and the United States it has not been customary, nor is it considered necessary, for the President of the United States to obtain the prior consent of the President of Cuba to send a special representative to confer with him regarding conditions seriously affecting the interests of both Cuba and the United States.[17]

On January 6, 1921, General Crowder reported to the Department of State that he had called on President Menocal. The Cuban president expressed his "pleasure" with Crowder's mission and said he wished Crowder would cooperate in solving Cuba's problems.[18] After this, Crowder quickly overshadowed Minister Long in the official relations between Cuba and the United States, and Secretary of State Charles Evans Hughes notified Crowder on March 5, 1921 that President Harding wanted him to continue as his personal representative. With pressure from Crowder, by mid-April 1921, Alfredo Zayas was officially recognized as the Cuban president-elect. In the months that followed, Crowder commenced his "moralization program," and he had an entree to the Cuban presidential palace which no previous representative of the United States

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[17] Davis to Long, January 4, 1921, Ibid., 671.

[18] Crowder to Davis, January 6, 1921, Ibid., 673.

had ever enjoyed.

While General Crowder was solving the electoral issue, he was also working on the financial problems of Cuba. He was informed by Secretary Hughes that J. P. Morgan and Company was disposed to make a loan to the Cuban government up to $50,000,000. Under President Menocal, Cuba had greatly overextended its financial programs, and along with this waste, there was widespread corruption and graft. Crowder made a detailed examination of the Cuban financial situation and recommended reforms and a severe cutback in governmental spending. To put his program into effect, Crowder persuaded Zayas to appoint a cabinet composed of members selected by Crowder.[19] This cabinet was known as the "Honest Cabinet" or "Crowder's Cabinet."

Under General Crowder's close supervision, the financial situation in Cuba rapidly improved, and by the end of the fiscal year 1923, Cuba had a budget surplus of $12,000,000. At this time, the provisions of Article II of the Platt Amendment, which required sufficient revenues to meet the loan amortization, were met and the $50,000,000 loan was authorized. During the same month, February 1923,

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[19]Crowder to Hughes, April 27, 1921, Ibid., 691.

General Crowder was appointed as Ambassador to Cuba and the United States Legation was upgraded to Embassy status.[20]

After President Zayas received his loan, and when Crowder's assignment was changed, the relationship between Zayas and Crowder was immediately altered. Zayas dismissed Crowder's appointees from his cabinet and replaced them with members of his family. From April 1923 until President Zayas left office in May 1925, Cuba was plagued with a corrupt and graft-ridden administration. In August 1923, opposition to Zayas crystallized and General Carlos García Vélez formed the Veterans' and Patriots' Association in an attempt to topple the caudillo (political boss). A Cuban junta was organized in New York, and in April 1924, there was an abortive revolution. On May 2, 1924, President Coolidge issued a proclamation forbidding the sale of arms and munitions to the rebels. With this action by the United States, coupled with the lack of organization, the revolution was a miserable failure.[21]

By this time, Cuba was preparing for another presidential election and Zayas declined to run again. Surprisingly,

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[20]Fitzgibbon, Cuba-U.S., pp. 171-179.

[21]The New York Times, May 3, 1924, p. 1.

the contest which was between two members of the Liberal Party resulted in peaceful election. General Gerardo Machado y Morales easily defeated Colonel Carlos Mendieta who made the mistake of advocating a policy of close cooperation with the United States. Machado was a wealthy businessman and was also prominently associated with American utility companies in Cuba.

During the presidential campaign, President Machado had promised the Cuban Republic that he would reform the corruption which characterized the latter portion of the Zayas regime. To the surprise of many Cubans and Americans, Machado immediately commenced his programa de reforma (reform program). He also made a serious attempt to diversify the Cuban monoculture economy. However, while Machado was attempting to improve and overhaul the Cuban economy, there were ominous indications that he was gathering excessive political power by using the national lottery to gain control of various political leaders.[22]

In April 1926, Ambassador Crowder informed the Department of State that during recent interviews with President

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[22]Carleton Beals, The Crime of Cuba (Philadelphia & London: J. B. Lippincott Company, 1933), pp. 244-245. Hereinafter referred to as Crime.

Machado and his Secretary of State, Carlos Manuel de Cespedes, they had indicated that the Reciprocity Treaty of 1902 should be revised. Crowder stated, "While I have not committed myself in regard to the question of revision, I am of the opinion that such a request from the President of Cuba (for negotiation) ought to be complied with."[23] Crowder was informed by the Department of State that the matter was being given consideration by the Department of Commerce and the Tariff Commission. He was then instructed not to discuss the matter with the Cuban government until he received specific authorization.[24] During 1926, the price of sugar declined and Cuba entered the Great Depression three years ahead of the United States.

President Machado continued to broaden his political powers, and in 1927, he proposed a significant amendment to

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[23]Crowder to Kellogg, April 8, 1926, F.R., 1926, II, 11.

[24]Grew to Crowder, April 30, 1926, Ibid., 12. A lengthy discussion of Cuba's case for revision of the Reciprocity Treaty is contained in Ferrara to Kellogg, January 10, 1929, F.R., 1929, II, 887-93. See also Orestes Ferrara, "The Economic Loss from the High Tariff of Sugar," Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science, CXLIV (July, 1929), 63-9. The United States view is printed in U.S., Department of Commerce, Tariff Commission, The Effect of the Cuban Reciprocity Treaty of 1902 (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1929).

the Cuban constitution. This included the lengthening of the presidential term of office by two years, the abolition of the office of the vice president, and the extension of congressional terms. With the Platt Amendment hanging over his head, President Machado met with President Coolidge in Washington, D. C. on April 23, 1927. Machado discussed the problems of the Cuban economy and of communist agitation in Cuba during his preliminary conversation. After that he got to the crux of his visit. He explained to Coolidge that there was a proposed constitutional amendment before the Cuban Congress and he outlined the "reforms" in detail. President Coolidge told President Machado, ". . . that the United States felt that this was a question for the Cuban people and their government to decide; that the United States only desired that the people of Cuba should have whatever government and constitution they themselves genuinely wanted."[25]

This statement by President Coolidge was a rather wide departure from the former policy of the United States toward

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[25]Memorandum by the Chief of the Division of Latin American Affairs (Morgan) of the Conversation between President Coolidge and President Machado, Mr. Morgan interpreting, the Cuban Ambassador present but not participating, April 23, 1927, F.R., 1927, II, 527.

Cuba. In fact, it was the exact endorsement which President Machado had undoubtedly hoped for. United States influence in Cuba was also reduced during the summer of 1927, when Ambassador Crowder announced that he would retire on September 1, 1927. The long experience of General Crowder was lost at a crucial time. Crowder did warn the Department of State of the possible ramifications of Machado's amendment, and he was informed by Secretary of State Frank B. Kellogg to observe and report the "progress of this matter."[26]

In the Cuban presidential election of 1928, President Machado "forgot" his one-term pledge and became the candidate for all three major Cuban political parties. Machado was then easily elected for his second term, this time for six years.

On June 20, 1928, Secretary Kellogg notified Ambassador Noble Brandon Judah, Crowder's successor, that the Department of State had informed the Chase National Bank it would

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[26]Crowder to Kellogg, May 5, 1927, Ibid., 519-22; Kellogg to Crowder, May 13, 1927, Ibid., 522-23. For a definitive study on Enoch Herbert Crowder see David A. Lockmiller, Enoch H. Crowder: Soldier, Lawyer, Statesman, University of Missouri Studies Number 27 (Columbia, Missouri: University of Missouri Press, 1955).

not object to a $50,000,000 loan to the Machado government.[27] President Machado had requested this loan for completion of extensive public works projects which included a 700 mile highway across the length of the island. This comprehensive public works program had been started by the Machado government in 1925, and over the next three-year period, it had seriously over extended the faltering Cuban economy.

Machado was faced with growing hostility and resistance against his regime. On February 27, 1929, several prominent Cubans were arrested in Havana and charged with plotting to assassinate him.[28] Immediate repressive measures were taken against his known political enemies and the University of Havana was closed for an indefinite period.

Briefly, this was the background of United States-Cuban relations when Herbert Hoover was inaugurated as President of the United States and Henry L. Stimson was sworn in as his Secretary of State. President Hoover and Secretary Stimson both had an acquaintance with Latin America. Shortly after his election, President-elect Hoover had demonstrated his

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[27] Kellogg to Judah, June 20, 1928, F.R., 1928, II, 653.

[28] The New York Times, February 28, 1929, p. 1.

interest in Inter-American affairs by making an unprecedented six week good-will tour of ten Latin American countries. However, this tour did not include the Republic of Cuba.[29] Colonel Stimson had gained practical experience in Latin American diplomacy in 1927 when President Coolidg sent him to Nicaragua as his personal representative to mediate between warring political factions.[30]

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[29]N. Andrew N. Cleven, "President-elect Hoover's Vis in South America," Current History, XXIX (January, 1929), 683-85.

[30]Henry Lewis Stimson and McGeorge Bundy, On Active Service in Peace and War (New York: Harper & Brothers, 19 pp. 111-116. Hereinafter referred to as Active Service.

CHAPTER II

AMBASSADOR GUGGENHEIM'S INITIATION

On September 14, 1929 the Associated Press Office in Havana received a semi-official report from the Cuban Foreign Office that Harry Frank Guggenheim had been declared persona grata as Ambassador from the United States.[1] The White House announced two days later that Guggenheim had been selected by President Hoover as Ambassador Judah's successor in Cuba. A contemporary analysis of the nomination stated:

> In the selection of Mr. Guggenheim the President is believed to have taken cognizance of the great part commercial aeronautics is to take in fostering of closer relations between the United States and the countries of Central and South America. Mr. Guggenheim has been an outstanding figure in the development of this industry on both continents.[2]

The same article observed that Colonel Charles A. Lindbergh, Guggenheim's close friend, was one of the persons influential in recommending Guggenheim to President Hoover for the Cuban post.

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[1] The New York Times, September 15, 1929, p. 3.

[2] Ibid., September 17, 1929, p. 11.

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Harry F. Guggenheim was the scion of the wealthy Guggenheim family of New York City which had made a fortune in copper and other mining interests in Latin America and the United States. He was born in West End, New Jersey on August 23, 1890, and was educated at Yale and Pembroke College in Cambridge, England. Guggenheim said he made his first visit to Cuba in 1907 while he was enroute "to a three-year mining apprenticeship in Mexico." The future ambassador spent several years in Latin America and spoke fluent Spanish. Guggenheim enlisted in the United States Navy at the beginning of World War I, and six months later, he completed naval aviation training. After arriving in Europe in October 1917 with the American Expeditionary Forces, he served as a Navy flyer in France and Italy. The end of World War I found him as a lieutenant commander who had been cited for exceptional service in combat. Upon release from active service, Guggenheim returned to Pembroke College and completed one year of graduate school. He then returned to the United States and entered the family mining business. Four years later, Guggenheim retired from active business, and in 1923, he became the President of the Daniel Guggenheim Fund for the Promotion of Aeronautics. According to Guggenheim

he "never had any business interest, directly or indirectly, in Cuba."[3]

Guggenheim displayed an avid interest in the development of commercial aviation during the time he was President of the Daniel Guggenheim Fund for Aeronautics. In 1926, he conducted a comprehensive survey of commercial aviation activities in Europe, and after he returned to the United States, he advocated that the United States government should supervise flying regulations. When Herbert Hoover was Secretary of Commerce, he and Guggenheim had frequent contact with each other on aviation matters. During this period, the Bureau of Aviation was formed within the Department of Commerce. Guggenheim also was the chairman of the subcommittee on location of the Hoover-New York Airport Committee which recommended future airport sites.[4]

In 1928, Guggenheim attended the sixth Pan American Conference in Havana as a United States representative on aviation matters. During that same year, he was awarded the

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[3]Harry Frank Guggenheim, The United States and Cuba: A Study in International Relations (New York: The Macmillan Company, 1934), p. ix. Hereinafter referred to as Cuba.

[4]The New York Times, September 15, 1929, p. 3.

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American Arbitration Association's gold medal for distinguished service in the promotion of peace.

A perceptive editorial appeared in The New York Times regarding President Hoover's selection of Guggenheim as the United States Ambassador to Cuba. This examination of Guggenheim's nomination stated that even though he did not have previous diplomatic service, he did have extensive business experience in Latin America which would be especially useful since the United States had a large volume of commercial trade with Cuba. The editorial indicated that if Congress approved the proposed sugar tariff increase, the future ambassador would encounter difficulties and Cuba would suffer a serious trade reduction.[5]

When Guggenheim's nomination as Ambassador was before the Senate for confirmation, there was also a resolution on Cuba under consideration by the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations. This resolution called for an investigation of the economic and political conditions in the Republic of Cuba. It contained a rather far-fetched implication that if the grave charges against Cuba were true, then the United

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[5] Ibid., September 17, 1929, p. 11.

States should intervene under the provisions of Article III of the Platt Amendment. The resolution was very lengthy and steeped in legalistic terms like a complicated charge sheet for an involved army court-martial. Accusations against the Machado government included that: (1) the Crowder Electoral Code had been stripped by the emergency electoral law of July 10, 1928; (2) the Congress of Cuba was under the complete domination of President Machado; (3) the Cuban presidential election of 1929 was unconstitutional; (4) the Cuban judicial system had become a farce; and (5) Cuban and American life, liberty, and property were in dire jeopardy. The Senate Committee on Foreign Relations was directed to investigate the multitude of charges and report to the Senate on whether the provisions of the Platt Amendment had been violated by the government of President Machado.[6]

These accusations against the Cuban government originated long before President Machado assumed office in May 1925. Senator Henrik Shipstead of Minnesota and Senator William E. Borah, Chairman of the Senate Committee on Foreign

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[6]Richard V. Oulahan, "Cuban Terror Cited in Senate Charges; Inquiry Demanded," The New York Times, September 20, 1929, pp. 1 and 23.

Relations, had evidenced a sympathetic attitude toward three separate claims by United States private citizens in Cuba against the Cuban government. Captain Walter Fletcher Smith charged that he had been forcibly deprived of ocean-front property in Havana during the latter part of President Menocal's administration. This claim was settled through official United States arbitration in 1928. Charles J. Harrah pressed damages on the basis of the loss of a small railroad owned by him in Cuba. Harrah's claim amounted to $700,000 and had been in litigation since April 14, 1917.[7] The third claim, made by Joseph E. Barlow, demanded $9,000,000 from the Cuban government for alleged dispossession of thirty-two city blocks in the center of Havana.[8] Barlow's claim was the real basis for the Senate investigation of conditions in Cuba.[9]

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[7]Agreement Between the United States and Cuba to Submit the Claim of Charles J. Harrah to Arbitration, F.R., 1929, II, 897-923.

[8]The Joseph E. Barlow Claim to Certain Property in Cuba. Extract from a press release issued by the Department of State on May 9, 1930, F.R., 1930, II, 697-8.

[9]Guggenheim, Cuba, pp. 180-181. Guggenheim called this the "claims racket" and stated that it was used by juntas for propaganda purposes and by racketeers to have the United States collect unjust or doubtful claims.

Chargé d'Affaires José Barón, of the Cuban Embassy in Washington, branded the charges against Cuba as "banal, vulgar, and calumnious."[10] Chargé Barón then issued a long statement pointing out that the claims existed before Machado took office, and that they were being used as a smear campaign against the present government of Cuba. A joint declaration countering the charges against the Machado government was made by the Associated Press on behalf of four Associated Press papers in Havana. This declaration stressed that there was freedom of press in Cuba and that the implications against the Machado government were not based on true facts.[11] The Cuban Embassy in Washington received supporting telegrams from three American firms operating in Cuba; the Bethlehem Steel Export Corporation, the Pan American Life Insurance Company, and the Luther Quinlan Auto Company. These messages denied there was a reign of terror in Cuba and stated foreign investors in Cuba were receiving fair and just treatment.[12]

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[10] The New York Times, September 20, 1929, p. 23.

[11] Ibid.

[12] Ibid., September 22, 1929, p. 2.

Secretary of State Stimson made an official statement on the Cuban situation the day after the charges against President Machado were aired in The New York Times. In his comment, Stimson said that the basis for the Senate resolution on Cuba did not come from the Department of State.[13]

The action by the United States Senate on the charges against the Cuban government reached a climax on September 26, 1929, when Secretary Stimson appeared before Senator Borah's committee. Later that day, Senator Borah and Secretary Stimson had a news interview. Stimson declined to make any comment and referred the reporters to Borah. Senator Borah gave an unusual reply when he said, "If you ask me about conditions in Cuba, disassociated from this meeting today, I will say that I consider some of the claims of these claimants are just."[14] Senator Borah also told the press that Harry F. Guggenheim's confirmation as Ambassador to Cuba had not been discussed during the meeting. This closed the Senate investigation on the conditions in Cuba, and within two weeks, Guggenheim's nomination was unanimously

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[13] Ibid., September 21, 1929, p. 3.

[14] Ibid., September 26, 1929, p. 3.

confirmed by the Senate.

After having dinner with President Herbert Hoover at the White House on November 4th, and dining with Senator Harry F. Byrd in Richmond on November 16th, Ambassador Guggenheim arrived at his post in Havana on November 18, 1929. Three days later he was formally received by President Machado and on the next day, November 22nd, Ambassador Guggenheim and President Machado had their first personal conference. After exchanging the normal formalities, President Machado and Ambassador Guggenheim discussed the American private claims against the Cuban government, especially the "Barlow case." Guggenheim stated that he wanted to be open and frank on the matter. He suggested to the Cuban president that Barlow and Mr. Gómez Mena settle the matter by private arbitration, out of court, and without intervention by the government of Cuba or the United States. Guggenheim added that if Barlow and Mena did not agree to this procedure, he would then recommend to the Department of State that the United States should take no further action to settle the claim. President Machado stated that he favored the plan, and that he would discuss the matter with Mena. Machado also told Guggenheim that if this method of private arbitration

failed, he would present Guggenheim with a list of eight to ten Cuban lawyers. Guggenheim could then select the lawyer of his choice as the umpire, and that person could then settle the matter.[15]

After the lengthy discussion of claims against the Cuban government, President Machado briefed Ambassador Guggenheim on the general situation in Cuba. The Cuban President told Guggenheim that undoubtedly he had heard disparaging comments about the present Cuban government. Machado informed Guggenheim that "Cuba could not be governed by a cotton thread but that strength and decision were required. President Machado said that Cuba had never before achieved the present state of internal peace and stability--there wa freedom of press, basic individual rights were guaranteed, and law and order prevailed throughout the island. In addition, there were comprehensive public works projects underway that would have long-term economic benefits. He tol Guggenheim that Cuba was suffering during the present economic depression, but this was due to the financial mismanagement and corruption of former Cuban governments.

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[15]Memoranda AC 11260, Draft Note of Ambassador Guggenheim's Interview with President Machado on November 21, 192 Dr. Ortiz, Secretary of State also Present, File Box 5, Harry Frank Guggenheim MSS, Library of Congress.

Machado said, "He was making good and paying today for the past, during which period such payments could so easily have been made."[16]

Guggenheim said he interjected a comment to determine how Machado would react. He told the Cuban President that Cuba's underlying and basic problem was economic in nature. Machado was not pleased with Guggenheim's analysis of Cuba's problem and he retorted that "there were no economic problems in the Government." In view of Machado's reaction, Guggenheim noted, "It seemed best for me at this particular time not to pursue this question further."[17] The memorandum of the meeting indicated that the conference ended without further "misunderstandings."

On January 3, 1930, Ambassador Guggenheim had a meeting with Orestes Ferrara, the Cuban Ambassador to the United States. The initial conversation concerned the Barlow case. Guggenheim told Ferrara that he was attempting to assist Cuba in the matter, and that he had not received data from President Machado which would permit solving the problem by

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[16] Ibid.

[17] Ibid. Guggenheim stated that his comment on the Cuban economic problem was "ill received" by President Machado.

private arbitration. The Cuban Ambassador said he would see President Machado on the matter in the immediate future.

Ambassador Ferrara then moved the conversation to a discussion of the Cuban economy. During his time in Washington, Ferrara had unsuccessfully attempted to revise the Treat of Reciprocity between Cuba and the United States. Ferrara proposed there should be more free trade between the two countries and the result would be jointly beneficial. Ferrara thought that Cuba's attempt to diversify the economy was a mistake, and realistically, Cuba would probably always have to depend on the two crops--sugar and tobacco. The topic was then turned to a discussion of the tariff legislation before the United States Congress. Both Ambassadors agreed that until Congress acted, there was not much that could be done on the tariff issue.[18]

Since the subject centered on United States economic policy, Guggenheim took the opportunity to complain to Ferrara about the tendency of the Cuban press to refer to the

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[18]Memoranda AC 11260, Memorandum of Conversation with Ambassador Ferrara on Friday, January 3, 1930, File Box 5, Harry Frank Guggenheim MSS, Library of Congress. When Ambassador Ferrara had conferences with Guggenheim he did not hesitate to criticize President Machado. This was evident in this particular conversation by his comments on the diversification of the Cuban economy. President Machado had attempted to broaden the Cuban economy beginning in 1925.

United States as the "Colossus of the North." The United States Ambassador also pointed out that many Cubans blamed the United States for all of Cuba's economic difficulties which was another manifestation of anti-American propaganda. Furthermore, Guggenheim added, the present commercial treaty did favor the export of Cuban sugar to the United States. Ferrara analyzed the anti-American publicity and concluded that it came from three main sources; (1) the Cuban press which was in the hands of the Spanish, (2) the basic religious conflict between a Catholic and a predominately Protestant country, and (3) from Cuban writers who identified themselves with other Latin American writers who had a definite tendency always to castigate the United States.

Ambassador Guggenheim's sincere interest in Cuba was demonstrated in January 1930 when he employed, at his own expense, two economic advisers to counsel him on Cuban economic matters. These two experts were Grosvenor M. Jones, the former chief of the division of finance of the Department of Commerce, and Philip Caryl Jessup, who had been assigned to the solicitor's office in the Department of State.[19]

[19] The New York Times, January 11, 1930, p. 9. This article compared Guggenheim's action with Dwight W. Morrow, United States Ambassador to Mexico, when Morrow had employed economic experts to assist Mexico.

President Machado told Guggenheim at a conference that he appreciated the American Ambassador's concern, and then thanked him for retaining these two economists.[20] Later, in September 1930, Jones was appointed as chairman of a special Cuban economic commission Machado created to make an overall study of Cuba's economic problems.[21]

On January 23, 1930, Ambassador Guggenheim had a long meeting with President Machado in which they discussed the Platt Amendment in relation to obtaining a loan for the Cuban government. Under the provisions of Article II of the Platt Amendment, the United States had a definite interest in the Cuban government's economic decisions which related to loans and the public debt. After Machado told Guggenheim how much he had done for Cuba, the President discussed the essence of the problem. The Cuban government had requested a loan from the Chase National Bank of New York for additional financing of the intra-island central highway.[22]

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[20]Memoranda AC 11260, Memorandum of Interview with President Machado, Thursday, January 23, 1930, File Box 5, Harry Frank Guggenheim MSS, Library of Congress.

[21]The New York Times, October 13, 1930, p. 17.

[22]Approval by the Government of the United States of New Financing Arrangements by the Government of Cuba, F.R., 1930, II, 684-96. This was a very complicated financial

Ambassador Guggenheim informed President Machado that he had discussed the status of the Cuban economy with various businessmen, bankers, and members of the Department of State before he left the United States. He said that these conversations indicated a basic "pessimism" in the present Cuban economic situation. Guggenheim added that in his opinion, the same unfortunate attitude was also prevalent in Cuba. Machado and Guggenheim both agreed on this point and thought there was a need to restore "confidence" and "optimism" in the Cuban economy.[23]

Guggenheim suggested that to meet the Department of State requirements for the Chase National Bank loan, he should have Grosvenor Jones contact the Cuban Treasury Department and obtain the required financial information. Guggenheim said that based on this data, he could forward an appropriate recommendation to the Department of State

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arrangement; basically, the Bank proposed a fresh credit of $20,000,000, and Cuba wanted to increase the additional commitment to $40,000,000. The Chase National Bank was reluctant to meet Machado's request because of economic conditions in Cuba, and undoubtedly, the condition of the bond market in 1930 affected the Bank's opinion.

[23]Memoranda AC 11260, Memorandum of Interview with President Machado, Thursday, January 23, 1930, File Box 5, Harry Frank Guggenheim MSS, Library of Congress.

on the proposed loan. President Machado told Guggenheim that this would not be necessary, and that he could provid him with the essential financial data. Machado stated tha in his opinion this should be considered an interior loan, but he would certainly give Ambassador Guggenheim any information he sought.

The procedure President Machado wished to follow to obtain the loan from the Chase National Bank deviated from the normal Department of State requirements. The Cuban President outlined to Ambassador Guggenheim, that the Cuba government could negotiate directly with the bank, then th bank, not Cuba, would request approval of the loan from th United States Department of State. Guggenheim said he did not have any objections to this plan and would inform his superiors of Machado's intentions. Ambassador Guggenheim added that the important factor was to "preserve the spiri of the Platt Amendment." The American Ambassador then remarked that the primary reason Cuba enjoyed the best credi of any Latin American country was due to the provisions of the Platt Amendment. President Machado agreed with Gugger heim and volunteered the suggestion that "the way the Plat Amendment would lose its force would be through lack of ne

for its use."[24]

Five days prior to this meeting with Ambassador Guggenheim, President Machado's actions indicated he was attempting to limit the opposition against him. His Secretary of the Interior, General Manuel Delgado, had announced that all labor, political, and public gatherings would be strictly prohibited throughout Cuba during the coming sugar cane cutting season. The proclamation explained that this restriction on the right to assemble was required to ensure that internal order was maintained and to prevent any possible disruption of the Cuban economy by political campaigning for the scheduled November congressional election.[25]

Machado was grasping for straws when he suspended these constitutional guarantees on the basis of the forthcoming election which was almost a year away. The Cuban Supreme Court on March 18, 1930, acting upon an appeal by the Nationalist Party, declared President Machado's ban on public meetings unconstitutional. General Machado very "graciously" stated that he accepted the Court's dictate

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[24] Ibid.

[25] The New York Times, January 19, 1930, p. 3.

and he intended to abide by the judicial ruling.[26]

Orestes Ferrara, the Cuban Ambassador to the United States, made a speech in New York City on March 28, 1930. In his address before the annual Cuban dinner at the Hotel Biltmore, Ferrara said, "Cuba pays about one-fourth of the total import duties levied by the United States on goods coming from abroad and more than all of Latin America combined." After pursuing the Cuban position on the trade barriers between Cuba and the United States, he made an attack on the Platt Amendment.[27] The Cuban Ambassador also stated that it was difficult to conceive how the United States could be so closely tied to Cuba politically, and at the same time, be so far separated economically.[28]

The Monthly General Conditions Reports on Cuba from the United States Embassy in Havana also recorded the Cuban discontent with the protectionist policy of the United States. The report for the month of March 1930 stated:

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[26] Ibid., March 19, 1930, p. 8.

[27] Guggenheim, Cuba, p. 230. When the Pan American Federation of Labor protested against Cuban labor conditions in 1927, Ferrara had also made a bitter attack on the Platt Amendment.

[28] The New York Times, March 29, 1930, p. 3.

> The actions of the Senate in reversing its former decision to maintain the existing tariff rates on sugar was received here with unconcealed disappointment. . . .
>
> The economic situation of the country is distinctly bad. Certain American businessmen long resident in the Island say that conditions have never been so bad in the history of the Republic and the matters are getting steadily worse.[29]

Along with the unsatisfactory economic conditions, political disturbances became more frequent.[30]

President Machado and Ambassador Guggenheim had a long discussion on Cuban political and economic problems during the morning of April 14, 1930. The American Ambassador suggested that Machado should inform the Cuban public of the measures he had taken to stimulate confidence in the Cuban economy. Briefly summarized, Machado intended to restore confidence by the following actions: (1) a drastic reduction

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[29]Ambassador Harry Frank Guggenheim, Apr. 11, 1930, to Secretary of State, No. 170-G, 837.00 General Conditions/29, Period Mar. 1-31, 1930, pp. 1 and 20, Department of State, National Archives.

[30]Raymond Leslie Buell, "Caribbean Republics Face Political Tests," The New York Times, May 11, 1930, III, p. 10. This article was a good review of the Cuban political situation. For an analysis of Cuban foreign trade during this period refer to U.S., Department of Commerce, Foreign Countries, Vol. II of Commerce Yearbook, 1931 (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1931), pp. 399-409, and especially the table on page 404. Hereinafter referred to as Commerce Yearbook.

in the Cuban budget, (2) a contraction of expenditures on public works programs, (3) the tax system would be reformed and taxes would remain at about the same level, and (4) resources in public special funds would be conserved.[31]

In March 1930, the Unión Nacionalista party filed an application to hold a mass political meeting on April 19, 1930. This political party was the main faction opposed to President Machado, and was led by Colonel Carlos Mendieta and Cosme de la Torriente, the foremost Cuban jurist. Machado delayed approval of the application until the evening the meeting was actually held. The Havana newspaper El Paí estimated that approximately 25,000 Cubans attended the assembly and analyzed the event as the "first organized publi demonstration against Machado."[32] During the meeting, the opposition leaders stressed that Machado's second term whic began in May 1929 was unconstitutional. They told the crow that Machado would be driven from power if he did not have

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[31]Memoranda AC 11260, Personal Memorandum for Presid Machado, April 14, 1930, File Box 5, Harry Frank Guggenhei MSS, Library of Congress. There was a note at the top of document that stated it was to be placed in the personal f and it was also marked "strictly confidential."

[32]Raymond Leslie Buell, "Caribbean Republics Face Po tical Tests," The New York Times, May 11, 1930, III, p. 10

support of the Platt Amendment and American business interests.

Ambassador Guggenheim provided valuable insight into this particular meeting and also on tactics used by some Americans in Cuba to interfere in Cuban internal politics. He stated that during the time the Nationalist Party was organizing its political rally, he received notification from the Department of State that two United States warships were scheduled to make a port visit to Havana. The usual phrase attached to this type of a communication was included - "if you perceive no objection to this visit." Evidently, during a casual conversation, an American businessman mentioned to Guggenheim that he was aware of the proposed ships' call. This American, who was not named by Guggenheim, said that the senior commanding officer was going to exchange official calls with President Machado. He added that the calls would enhance United States-Cuban relations, and that the calls included dinner. Ambassador Guggenheim informed the American businessman that the proposed visit would be cancelled. The next day, Ambassador Guggenheim saw the President and "as anticipated, President Machado knew all about the proposed visit of the ships." Guggenheim concluded that

apparently some American businessman in Cuba had contacted an obscure official in Washington. This official then recommended to someone in the Navy Department that a ship should make a port call in Havana, and the Cuban President would be receptive to official calls, which would include dinner. The unsuspecting Navy officer then scheduled the two warships for an official visit to Havana. If the warships had had appeared in Havana during the time of the opposition's political rally, it could have been interpreted as American military support for President Machado. In addition, there was a distinct possibility that while American sailors were on shore leave, an incident could have been provoked, and Machado would have placed the blame on his political opponents.[33]

The New York Times informed its readers on May 9, 19 that there was a degree of progress on the lingering Barlow claim. This article stated that the Department of State ha concurred with Ambassador Guggenheim's recommendation on pr vate arbitration and that the United States would not inter vene in the action. The next day there was a short editor on the subject. It stated that the Barlow claim had hinde

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[33]Guggenheim, Cuba, pp. 182-184.

relations between Cuba and the United States, and that the charges against Cuba had been the subject of action by the Senate too many times. Ambassador Guggenheim was praised as "our energetic man on the scene" who came up with a fair and impartial solution.[34]

Ambassador Guggenheim had a more vexing problem than the alleged Barlow claim. Commencing in mid-May 1930, he tried to persuade President Machado and his opposition to cooperate and arrange some type of a political truce. He reported to the Secretary of State on June 23rd that he had numerous talks and meetings with President Machado, and members of his government, and also with Colonel Carlos Mendieta, and other opposition leaders. He stated that the party led by Mendieta, the Unión Nacionalista, had refused to cooperate with Machado in any matter until the Cuban President agreed to hold a new presidential election. The opposition further stipulated that the election should be held within three years which was at least two years before Machado's term expired. Guggenheim reported that he refused to discuss Machado's resignation with Mendieta. However,

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[34]The New York Times, May 9, 1930, p. 20 and May 10, 1930, p. 18.

Guggenheim did feel that the general political situation had improved.[35]

During July 1930, the problems in Cuba did not substantially change. President Machado informed Ambassador Guggenheim that he was going to ask the Cuban Congress to reform the 1928 electoral code. On July 15, 1930, three days before he left Cuba on a two-month leave, Guggenheim reported to the Department of State that he had used his good offices to bring the opposing factions together. However, in his opinion, the Nacionalistas, especially Colone Mendieta, "showed themselves to be most stubborn and uncom promising."[36] The American Ambassador concluded that Mach was ready to make reasonable reforms, and if those reforms were honestly carried out, the Nacionalistas would have to either start a revolution or cooperate with President Mach Ambassador Guggenheim, at least in the early Summer of 193 had little sympathy for the Cubans opposed to President Machado.

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[35]Guggenheim to Stimson, June 23, 1930, F.R., 1930, II, 649.

[36]Guggenheim to Stimson, July 15, 1930, Ibid., 650-51.

Ambassador Guggenheim's report to the Department of State dated July 15, 1930, was the first reference to the possibility of a revolutionary attempt by the opposition to President Machado. Two months before, on May 18, Guggenheim had reported a serious clash between the Cuban army and the Nationalistas at Artemisa. This riot resulted in the death of two Cuban army officers, one member of the opposition, and the wounding of eighteen other Cubans. It was described as a fracas between members of the Cuban army who were ordered to end the political meeting at "all costs" and members of the Unión Nationalista who were determined "to uphold their constitutional rights."[37] The day after the riot at Artemisa, President Machado's secret police closed the Havana newspaper, El Día, which was the organ of Colonel Mendieta's party. El Día had printed an account of the struggle at Artemisa and termed it the "first bloodshed."[38] This was the only serious outbreak in Cuba before Ambassador Guggenheim took leave to the United States.

On July 19, 1930, Ambassador Guggenheim and his

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[37] The New York Times, May 19, 1930, p. 7.

[38] Ibid., May 20, 1930, p. 60.

copilot, First Lieutenant Phillip Melville, the Air Attaché in Havana, arrived at Mitchell Field, Long Island, in a Wasp powered Vought Corsair biplane. The "Flying Ambassador" made the trip in two days and the actual flying time was 12½ hours. Guggenheim was quoted as saying "that he was here to spend his two-month leave from active service in Cuba."[39]

Shortly after Ambassador Guggenheim's departure, Charg d'Affaires Edward L. Reed notified the Secretary of State that President Machado had transmitted his reform bill to the Cuban Congress. It recommended that the Unión Nationalista be authorized to participate in the November election as a legal political party and that the Cuban Congress revise the 1928 electoral law. Three weeks later, on August 8, 1930, Chargé Reed informed the Secretary of State that the Cuban House had rejected Machado's proposal by a vote of 86 to 1. The Nationalistas had flatly rejected President Machado's compromise, the Liberals (Machado's party) voted against it because the Nationalistas had spurned the President's offer, the Conservatives opposed it because they thought it was unconstitutional, and the Populars did not

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[39] Ibid., July 19, 1930, p. 13.

want the Nationalistas to emerge as a fourth legal political party. Reed recommended that the United States avoid any official position on a compromise plan, which had been advanced by Antonio Mendoza and accepted in principle by the Nationalistas. This plan called for a postponement of the November elections until March 1931 and an agreement by Machado that he would resign on May 20, 1931, if Colonel Mendieta's party won a majority. At the same time, the Nationalistas continued their attack on the constitutionality of Machado's administration.[40]

While Ambassador Guggenheim was in the United States during August and September 1930, the situation in Cuba steadily worsened and the opposition against President Machado increased. President Machado in an interview with the Associated Press on August 16, stated that reports of political unrest in Cuba were false, and he also rejected the rumors that the United States would intervene in the November Cuban elections.[41] Two weeks later, headline news

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[40]Reed to Stimson, July 18, 1930, August 8, 1930, September 16, 1930, and September 23, 1930, F.R., 1930, II, 651-59.

[41]The New York Times, August 17, 1930, p. 23.

in The New York Times proclaimed that twenty members of the Unión Nationalista had attempted to seize the Cuban army post located at Cruces.[42] On September 13, the Cuban Embassy in Washington, D.C. released a statement that the rumors of political discontent in Cuba were without foundatic On the same day, President Machado declared in a speech before a group of Cuban military officers, at the Colonel Ravena Military Post in Pinar del Río Province, that "foreign senators (indicating United States) have nothing to investigate here because Cuba has a government of its own."

Senator David Ignatius Walsh, of Massachusetts, made a public statement concerning the Cuban situation on September 21, 1930. The Senator, who had just returned from a visit to Cuba, recommended that the United States government take immediate steps to end the deplorable conditions in Cuba. Senator Walsh did not specifically state that the United States should intervene in Cuba, but he did imply that action.[44]

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[42] Ibid., August 30, 1930, pp. 1-2.

[43] Ibid., September 13, 1930, p. 3.

[44] Ibid., September 22, 1930, p. 1. Refer also to F.R., 1930, II, 659-60 for articles that were printed in Havana newspapers on Senator Walsh's statement.

Ambassador Guggenheim flew to Washington, D.C. for a conference with State Department officials on Cuba. After conferring with Secretary Stimson and Undersecretary Cotton, it became evident that Guggenheim's opinion of the situation in Cuba differed from the attitude held by Senator Walsh. The Department of State released a news bulletin which indicated "conditions in Cuba in no way warrant any action on the part of the United States."[45]

By the end of September 1930, regardless of the denials by the Machado regime, or the United States Department of State, the Republic of Cuba was in deep economic and political trouble. The question was not, would Cuba have some type of a revolution, but, when would Cuba have a revolution. The price of sugar was at an almost all time low and the United States tariff was at its peak. Cuba's economic plight was not unique in 1930, but it did add to the political instability. The Unión Nationalistas were fighting for one objective and that was to oust Machado. Machado could possibly leave his office in a hail of bullets or via dissatisfied Cuban voters in the balloting booth.

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[45] Ibid.

CHAPTER III

A LONG BURNING FUSE AND A SHORT EXPLOSION: THE 1931 CUBAN REVOLUTION

Latin America was a boiling caldron of political a economic unrest, upheaval, and turmoil during the entire Hoover administration. A military revolt in Mexico had greeted Hoover the day before he was inaugurated. In 19 there were revolts in the Dominican Republic, Bolivia, P Argentina, Brazil, and Guatemala.[1] Cuba's disturbances were not entirely unique; however Cuba was the only Lati American country which had an umbilical cord attached to the United States--the Platt Amendment.

Ambassador Guggenheim was still on leave in Port W ington, Long Island, because of his father's serious ill ness, when on October 2, 1930, Edward L. Reed, the Charg d'Affaires in Havana, notified the Department of State t President Machado was sending a message to the Cuban Con

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[1]Alexander DeConde, Herbert Hoover's Latin-America Policy, Stanford Books in Word Politics (Stanford, Calif nia: Stanford University Press, 1951), pp. 90-94. Here after referred to as Hoover's Policy.

requesting authority to suspend all constitutional rights in the Havana area.[2]

On that same day, Secretary Stimson held a long news conference on the Cuban situation. A news correspondent stated that press releases from Cuba indicated that the Cuban President was contemplating action to suspend constitutional guarantees until after the scheduled November Cuban congressional and municipal elections. The reporter then asked Stimson to please state the official position of the United States on this matter. Stimson replied:

> The correspondents could state authoritatively that the Department is carefully watching the situation in Cuba. The Secretary has gained the impression that some of the correspondents had the idea that perhaps we were not watching. We have no idea of minimizing any situation which may exist but are carefully watching it.[3]

After this preliminary statement, Stimson then discussed background information on Cuba. He said that for the last three decades the policy of the United States toward Cuba was based on the Platt Amendment. According to Stimson, many American citizens erroneously assumed that the Platt

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[2]Reed to Stimson, October 2, 1930, F.R., 1930, II, 662.

[3]Memorandum of Conference by the Secretary of State With the Press on October 2, 1930, Ibid.

Amendment meant that Cuba was an American protectorate, we could tell the Cubans how to run their internal affai Secretary Stimson stated that United States policy towar Cuba would be guided by the 1901 Root Interpretation of Platt Amendment which states:

> . . . the intervention in the third clause of the Platt Amendment is not synonymous with intermeddling or interference with the affairs of the Cuban Government, but the formal action of the Government of the United States, based upon just and substantial ground for the preservation of Cuban independence, and the maintenance of a government adequate for the protection of life, property, and individual liberty. . . .[4]

Stimson explained to the reporters that the United States had only intervened in Cuba one time. This inter vention was in 1906 when President Tómas Estrada Palma a his government resigned and Cuba was left without a gove ment. At the end of the press conference, Stimson decli to make any official statement on possible United States action. He did tell the reporters they could say "there was never an intervention in Cuba to support a Government[5]

On Saturday, October 4th, the headline news in some American newspapers centered on the action of the Cuban

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[4] Ibid., p. 663.

[5] Ibid., p. 665.

Congress granting President Machado authority to declare martial law in Cuba. The New York Times analyzed it as a political move by President Machado to tighten his hold on Cuba and to thwart his opposition during the forthcoming election. Under the provisions of this "political club," Machado could proclaim an estado de sitio (state of siege) in the Havana area and suspend the basic constitutional rights of 600,000 Cubans.[6]

Machado used a student riot in Havana on September 30th as a pretext to gain this authority. During the clash there was shooting on both sides and two students, one labor agitator, and a policeman were seriously wounded. Chargé Reed reported the riot to the State Department in two separate telegrams. He indicated that he thought the Machado government was very concerned and had used an excessive amount of force in quelling the rioters. Reed stated that he had talked to a prominent Cuban government official, opposed to Machado, concerning the significance and possible ramifications of the disturbance. The unnamed Cuban blamed the government for the incident and he predicted more riots would follow. He told Reed that the opposition to Machado

[6]The New York Times, October 4, 1930, p. 1.

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was reaching a crisis stage and the President might be forced from his office. Reed's opinion contained in the second report indicated that the Chargé thought there was cause for concern, but Machado would probably remain in office as long as the Cuban army supported him.[7]

The Cuban Congress, like the Cuban Supreme Court, was not completely acquiescent to Machado's political pressure The proposal to suspend constitutional guarantees in Havan was the subject of hot debate in the Senate and House. Opposition to Machado in the Senate was led by Dr. José Manu Cortina, a noted Cuban jurist and the leader of the so-called Popular party. The final vote on the measure was fifteen for and five against in the upper house. The Hous of Representatives indicated a higher degree of Machado's influence by a lopsided vote for the bill.[8]

Ambassador Guggenheim, after his father's death, immediately proceeded back to his post in Havana. On Octobe 13, he sent his own analysis of the situation to Stimson. Guggenheim stated that "the growing realization that your

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[7]Reed to Stimson, September 30, 1930 and October 1, 1930, F.R., 1930, II, 660-61.

[8]The New York Times, October 4, 1930, p. 1.

that your policy is not to intermeddle or interfere with the affairs of the Cuban Government (has) created a distinctly better atmosphere here."[9] According to Guggenheim, the hope inspired by the Cuban sugar stabilization plan was also an important factor regarding stability in the Republic of Cuba. Charge Reed had emphasized in September that Machado thought the problems in Cuba were not political, but were a "logical concomitant of Cuba's economic depression."[10] Reed also included his own views on Cuba's problems when he told the Department:

> I may say, however, that in every conversation I have had with Cubans and Americans who are opposed to the Machado administration I have asked the following question: "If sugar were selling at 3 cents a pound, would the present political agitation continue?"; and the answer has invariably been: "No."[11]

President Machado and Ambassador Guggenheim had a conference during the evening of October 14, 1930. According to the memorandum of the meeting, it was characterized by an

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[9] Guggenheim to Stimson, October 13, 1930, F.R., 1930, II, 667.

[10] Reed to Stimson, September 23, 1930, Ibid., 657. Reed stated that Machado had personally expressed this opinion to him on two different occasions.

[11] Ibid., p. 658.

intimate and frank conversation. Guggenheim told Machado that a recent statement made by Dr. Cosme de la Torriente (the former President of the League of Nations Council and the foremost Cuban international jurist) had received wide attention in the United States. Torriente had said that Machado's promise for internal reforms in Cuba was merely "political deception." The American Ambassador added that the Cuban President had received wide and unfavorable publicity in the United States, and the recent visits of United States senators to Cuba had given further impetus to the anti-Machado propaganda.

Guggenheim, after asking Machado when he was going to make these promised reforms, gave his opinion that it might be helpful to take appropriate action prior to the December session of the United States Congress. Machado told Guggenheim that after he made the reforms, he would request a new presidential election. Predicated on previous statements and a personal knowledge of Machado, Guggenheim evidently did not believe Machado. Guggenheim then proceeded to question the Cuban President on the subject of a re-election or resignation. At this point, the recorded conversation permitted a degree of inner knowledge to the diplomatic tactics

of an American Ambassador in a foreign country, especially in dealing with a Latin American caudillo. The following conversation was recorded by Guggenheim:

> I responded that I thought it would be a mistake at this time to resign, that he had important work still to do. He had an opportunity to go down in history as the greatest President that Cuba or any other Latin American country had ever had. . . . I thought that he could accomplish this, not by calling for a new presidencial (sic) election next December, but that he would resign at the end of a definite period - - say, two years when the next big elections would be held. If he did this, he would immediately cease to be a target for the politicians; he would leave office praised and beloved by everybody, instead of hated by all, like everyone of his predecessors. I said that the works of Machado had been very great and fifty years from now they would under any circumstances be appreciated; but I wanted him to have that appreciation now in his own life. Menocal (President of Cuba 1913 to 1921) was a living example of this, for in spite of the misdeeds of his administration and the hate under which he left office, he was now being proclaimed as "el hombre a caballo."[12]

Ambassador Harry Frank Guggenheim was being very "frank" when he soothed the ego of the Cuban caudillo, General Gerardo Machado y Morales, in this diplomatic manner.

Guggenheim then brought the conversation down from the previous lifty heights and reviewed the economic problems of Machado's monoculture country. He told President Machado

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[12]Memoranda AC 11260, Conference with President, Oct. 14, 1930, 6:30 p.m., File Box 5, Harry Frank Guggenheim MSS, Library of Congress.

that he would have Grosvenor Jones, his economic adviser (whom he had hired at his own expense), assist him in the analysis of the Cuban budget. Guggenheim stated that he thought the $15,000,000 appropriation for the Cuban army was "entirely out of line." On political reforms, Guggenheim said that he already had his personal legal adviser, Edgar Turlington, review the Crowder electoral code and th changes that had been made to that code by Vázquez Bello, the President of the Cuban Senate. If the Cuban President desired, Guggenheim continued, he could attempt to get Pro fessor Dodds from Princeton University to come to Cuba to assist in the study of the electoral law. Machado express his gratitude to Guggenheim, and said that he would send t Ambassador the necessary data. At the end of the meeting, Machado said, "All he desired was to serve his country anc that he was merely working for glory." The American Amba sador replied "that he wanted to see him get it." Accord· ing to Guggenheim's memorandum of the conference, Machado terminated the meeting with a warm embrace.[13]

Surprisingly the outward political situation in Cub seemed to improve. The Ambassador reported to the Secret

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[13] Ibid.

of State on October 23rd that "conditions continued to remain quiet and orderly in Habana and, for the most part, throughout the Island."[14]

Ambassador Guggenheim also stated in the aforementioned report that the numerous and exaggerated internal Cuban rumors had largely receded. To a certain extent, these rumors affected the difficulty of Guggenheim's diplomatic task in the Island Republic. Rumors in Cuba are described, or called, by the Spanish word bola, which means literally anything from "ball" to "shoe polish." In Latin American Spanish, it can be translated as "brawl" and even "revolution." The Cubans used the word bola to signify a rumor that passes through the streets of Havana like a rolling ball. These bolas are usually without basis and are discounted by the native Cubans. However, people who do not live in Cuba sometimes accept these far-fetched stories as being completely factual. Guggenheim said that the American press had a tendency to print these bolas and unfortunately, these exaggerated accounts shocked the American public.[15]

[14]Guggenheim to Stimson, October 23, 1930, F.R., 1930, I, 667.

[15]Guggenheim, Cuba, pp. 185-186.

Guggenheim observed a significant factor relating to possible increased opposition against President Machado in his October 23rd report to the Department of State. He stated that former Cuban President Mario García Menocal ha re-emerged as a political figure and had been designated a the head of the Conservative Party. Guggenheim also inclu in his report, "I have been reliably informed that Carlos Mendieta, leader of the Unión Nacionalista, offered to Men cal the leadership of all the elements in opposition to th Government."[16]

This move by General Menocal and Colonel Mendieta de onstrated the very nature of Cuban "checkerboard" internal politics. General Machado, General Menocal, and Colonel Mendieta had all served with distinction in the revolution against Spain. When President Menocal broke his one-year pledge in 1917 to be re-elected as the Conservative candidate, the Liberal Party charged fraud at the voting booth. This resulted in the Cuban Revolution of 1917 in which Machado led the unsuccessful revolt against Menocal in the western provinces. In the 1924 Cuban election, Mendieta h

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[16]Guggenheim to Stimson, October 23, 1930, F.R., 193 II, 668.

opposed Machado on the Liberal ticket. After 1925, and as the resistance to Machado's administration grew, the Liberal Party split and Mendieta formed the Nationalist Party (Unión Nacionalista). To further complicate the political scene, Menocal and Mendieta were considered traditional rivals. The political leaders in Cuba also had the unfortunate tendency, like so many other Latin American leaders, to resist any form of compromise. This was then combined with another trait which can be termed a "gambling instinct." They showed a willingness to make an attempt to win all, although there was a good chance they could lose everything.[17]

Ambassador Guggenheim reported to the Department of State that he had conferred with Mendieta and Menocal. Mendieta called at the American Embassy on October 7, 1930, and during his conversation with Guggenheim requested that "the United States invoke the Platt Amendment to prevent the November elections and restore a Constitutional government." Guggenheim told Mendieta that the United States policy was

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[17]Guggenheim, Cuba, pp. 158-159 and 170-171. For further information on Cuban politics during this period read Alberto Lamar Schweyer, Cómo cayó el Presidente Machado: una página oscura de la diplomacia Norteamericana. (2d ed. Habana: La Casa Montalvo Cárdenas, 1938), pp. 17-25 and Buell, New Cuba, pp. 1-23.

set forth by Secretary Stimson on October 2, 1930. Simply stated, there would be no intervention in Cuba unless there was a virtual state of anarchy. The following day, October 8, Menocal had lunch with Guggenheim during which the former President denounced the Machado government and the United States. He castigated Machado for his political excesses and criticized the United States for its policy of nonintervention. Guggenheim then reminded Menocal of the many complaints which he had directed against the United States concerning intervention in Cuba during the eight years he was el presidente.[18]

The Cuban attitude toward United States intervention in the Island Republic under the provisions of the Platt Amendment was discussed in the monthly General Conditions Report submitted to the Department of State on October 4, 1930. It stated:

> All shades of opinion profess to be opposed to American intervention, but signs are not wanting that the Nacionalistas would welcome any action by the United States Government short of military occupation which would induce President Machado to postpone the coming

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[18]Guggenheim to Stimson, October 23, 1930, F.R., 1930 II, 668.

election until certain electoral reforms have been put into effect.[19]

President Machado not wanting the United States to intervene had advocated the repeal of the Platt Amendment for a long time.[20]

The Cuban election of November 1930 was marked by severe political agitation and serious disturbances. On November the 11th and 13th, Ambassador Guggenheim submitted two separate telegram reports to the Secretary of State. These reports cited student violence in Havana, riots in the Province of Pinar del Río, and altercations in Santiago. The most alarming incident occurred in Santiago where Machado had to reinforce the police with the Cuban army and several people were wounded and one person was killed. Machado had closed the University of Havana in 1929, and during this outbreak of violence, he closed all secondary public schools in the Republic of Cuba. He also suspended two of Havana's

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[19]Ambassador Harry Frank Guggenheim, Oct. 4, 1930, to Secretary of State, 827.00 General Conditions/35, Period 1-30, Sept. 1930, p. 1, Department of State, National Archives.

[20]Rafael Rodríguez Altunaga, "Cuba's Case for the Repeal of the Platt Amendment," Current History, XXVI (September, 1927), 925-27. The author stated that he expressed the views of President Machado, and when it was written he was the Counselor of the Cuban Embassy in Washington, D.C.

leading newspapers, the Diario de la Marina and El País. T
combat the disturbances, Machado used the authority given t
him by the Cuban Congress in October and, by presidential
decree, suspended all constitutional guarantees in Havana
Province. Army troops then moved into the capitol city to
assist the Cuban riot squads in regaining control.[21]

By this time Ambassador Guggenheim was concerned abo
the political chaos in Cuba, and he thought positive actio
should be taken by the United States Embassy in Havana to
ameliorate the situation. He stated his intentions to Sec
retary Stimson on November 14 as follows:

> In an endeavor to terminate the present disorder and agitation I am extending my unofficial good offices to bring about a modus vivendi between Machado and General Menocal and Mendieta heading Opposition, in the hope th these difficulties can be peacefully settled by politic reform. . . . As yet it is too early to judge whether these efforts can succeed.[22]

Stimson's reply was not only immediate, but it was also al
most a personal censure. He informed Ambassador Guggenhei

> While I fully appreciate your desire to be helpful i the present difficult political situation in Cuba, yet am somewhat troubled at the implications involved in yc

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[21]Guggenheim to Stimson, November 11, 1930 and Noven
ber 13, 1930, F.R., 1930, II, 669-70.

[22]Guggenheim to Stimson, November 14, 1930, Ibid., (

> taking any initiative in extending good offices between President Machado and the Opposition leaders, particularly in your saying anything to the Opposition which they might take as encouragement at this critical time. If President Machado asks your informal cooperation and help, the matter would have a somewhat different aspect. I think you should be very careful not to originate any move which might be interpreted as interfering either by the Government of the United States or by you personally in Cuban internal political affairs.[23]

The next day Guggenheim sent a message to Stimson clarifying the action he had taken to arbitrate the crisis in Cuba. Guggenheim stated that he had been approached by the Director of Diario de la Marina, José Rivero, who was a mutual friend of Menocal and himself. President Machado had then asked Guggenheim to continue the negotiations with the newspaper executive based on a "six months' armistice" between Machado and the opposition. This would permit a grace period which could be devoted to the faltering Cuban economy. Guggenheim expressed his regret for creating an erroneous impression, and he informed Stimson that he had avoided the risks indicated in Stimson's message. The Ambassador ended his report with a further appraisal of the situation in Cuba. He stated that Machado's government had published reports of a suspected plan to damage United States property in Cuba.

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[23]Stimson to Guggenheim, November 15, 1930, Ibid., 671.

This was a distinct possibility, and conceivably some Cubar especially the Opposition, thought this might be a way to provoke United States intervention in Cuba. Guggenheim als reported the fact that numerous shots had been fired in the vicinity of the American Embassy residence on November 14, 1930.[24]

As long as the Platt Amendment, with the provisions o Article III and the implied threat of possible interventior existed it hung over the internal political scene in Cuba like a farmer's promising rainstorm during a long dry seaso The farmer wants the rain to save his crops, but there is also a distinct lingering fear that it might be a torrentia rain which would destroy the crops. This rain analogy applied to both Machado and the Opposition. The possibility existed that if the United States intervened, Machado's administration could be buttressed by American support. Yet at the same time, there was a chance that American interver tion could topple Machado. If the United States insisted o electoral reforms and a supervised "honest" presidential election, it was obvious that he might lose at the voting booth. Both sides had to publicly state, for Cuban public

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[24]Guggenheim to Stimson, November 16, 1930, Ibid., 6

consumption, that they were against any form of United States intervention. To state any other position would be certain political suicide in Cuba.

By November 19, 1930, Guggenheim could report to the Department of State that Cuban army cavalry troops were no longer patrolling the streets of Havana and that a certain degree of calm had been restored. Yet there were definite signs that General Machado was tightening his political grip on Cuba.[25] The next day, the Cuban Senate passed a bill which permitted Machado to suspend, by presidential decree, all constitutional guarantees for sixty days. This time the chief executive's authority was not limited to the Havana area but included all of the Republic of Cuba. Another very significant aspect of this law was that it authorized Machado to expend Cuban public funds to quell disturbances without accounting for the expenditures.

Machado in early December, 1930, attempted to relax his political grip on Cuba. He signed a decree that restored constitutional guarantees and also made provisions to reopen the University of Havana which had been closed for all intents over a year. This plan to make concessions to the

[25]Guggenheim to Stimson, November 19, 1930, Ibid., 672-3.

Opposition backfired on President Machado. The Cuban students thought this compromise by Machado was a sign of weakness. Instead of returning to the classroom, they intensified their agitations and incited further riots in Havana. The disturbances and opposition to President Machado then spread to the countryside. Machado reacted very rapidly to meet the renewed political turbulence, and on December 11, he decreed an estado de sitio throughout Cuba.[26]

The day after President Machado proclaimed his state of siege, Ambassador Guggenheim sent a telegram to the Secretary of State which analyzed the plight of Cuba. In this report Guggenheim said, "The basic cause of the revolutionary sentiment is poverty, especially in the cities."[27] According to Guggenheim there were five possible situations that could develop from this perennial unrest in Cuba. First President Machado could resign and this would create a furthe chaos. Secondly, there could be a coup d'etat led by Menoca and Mendieta and this would also probably result in more disorder. The third possibility was an unsuccessful revolution

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[26]Guggenheim to Stimson, December 11, 1930, Ibid., 678

[27]Guggenheim to Stimson, December 12, 1930, Ibid.

which would result in more repressive measures by Machado. Fourthly, Guggenheim stated that if the price of sugar increased, and if order were maintained, Machado could possibly regain his lost prestige. The Ambassador added that he did not think this was in the realm of probability. The last likelihood would be for Machado to resign at a specified future date, and then a provisional president could be appointed by the Cuban Congress. After this provisional president was appointed, he could call for another constitutional convention to delete the Machado Amendment of 1928. After listing his five possible developments, Guggenheim concluded, "The impoverished state of the Treasury and the constant diminution of revenues makes any form of government extremely difficult."[28]

Another indication that Secretary Stimson was concerned about Ambassador Guggenheim interfering in internal Cuban affairs was shown on December 12, 1930. Stimson sent a telegram to Guggenheim and stated that an Associated Press dispatch had contained information that Ambassador Guggenheim was present at a secret meeting of Machado's Cabinet, when the Cuban President proclaimed his estado de sitio.

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[28]Guggenheim to Stimson, December 12, 1930, Ibid., 679.

Guggenheim was instructed to provide full details on this and was also told to inform the State Department of recent additional changes in Machado's Cabinet. Within a few hour Secretary Stimson received the reply to his inquiry. Ambas sador Guggenheim stated in positive terms that he had not attended the Cabinet meeting. He then included one minor additional task that had been assigned to a Cabinet member by President Machado.[29]

The last few days of 1930 in Cuba were punctuated by political agitation, several hundred arrests, nightly bomb explosions, and the closing of several Havana newspapers. Between Christmas and the beginning of 1931, many prominen leaders of the Unión Nacionalista party and associates of General Menocal were arrested for conspiracy against Presi dent Machado. One of the Cuban leaders arrested was Colon Carlos Hevia. At a later date, Secretary of State Stimson discussed Hevia's arrest with Cuban Ambassador to the Unit States, Orestes Ferrara.

By mid-January 1931, Machado settled down for a long struggle with his opposition. He placed all members of th Cuban armed forces on continuous active duty and granted

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[29]Guggenheim to Stimson, December 12, 1930, Ibid., 6

them the authority vested in a Cuban policeman. Machado then appointed a special task force, the Committee of Public Order, to combat the rebels. This Committee was established under an obscure 1870 Spanish law for public order. Machado's government announced that male parents of minor children who were arrested for anti-government activities would be forced to move their place of residence up to 120 kilometers from their present location. The Cuban dictator also ordered the Commandant of his Palace police "to make free use of their firearms whenever occasion might appear to warrant it."[30]

On January 10, 1931, Ambassador Guggenheim had a conversation with Ambassador Ferrara after dinner at the American Embassy. The informal talk centered on the possibility of compromise with President Machado's opposition. Ferrara said that the President had told him that he wanted to meet with the opposition, but every time he indicated a compromise, they had started more demonstrations. The Cuban Ambassador informed Guggenheim that Machado had told him not to see Mendieta. Ferrara did see him as a personal friend, and

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[30]Guggenheim to Stimson, January 16, 1931, F.R. 1931, II, 43.

related the following conversation to Guggenheim:

> I then had a conference with Mendieta. They also like my plan, but they, on their side, do not trust the President and are afraid he will put in his own man if he retires. They are sure they will win if they have a revolution now.[31]

Guggenheim and Ferrara both agreed that if Machado resigned, there would be chaos in Cuba. Toward the end of the dialogue, Ferrara informed the American Ambassador that he had never believed in the 1928 Constitutional changes. Guggenheim closed the conversation by saying that he thought Ferrara could be very instrumental in bringing about a compromise.

Six days later, President Machado and Ambassador Guggenheim had a conference at the President's finca (country house). Machado reiterated his opinion that the problems in Cuba were economic and were further agitated by communists. The United States Ambassador disagreed with President Machado, and then told him that the basic problem was economic but there were serious political problems too. Machado complained about the unjust treatment he was receiving from the Cuban press. He

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[31]Memoranda AC 11260, Conversation Between Ambassador Ferrara and Ambassador Guggenheim, Jan. 10, 1931, File Box 5, Harry Frank Guggenheim MSS, Library of Congress. There was a note at the top of this document which was written in Guggenheim's handwriting that said "Not wholly accurate--hold for short period."

said that the press and the opposition were using the Cuban economic situation to personally discredit him. Guggenheim informed Machado that it would be impossible for the Cuban government to obtain financial assistance with the present chaotic conditions in Cuba. The necessity for political compromise was stressed by Guggenheim, and his opinion was there could be no political solution achieved as long as the Cuban government continued to use oppressive tactics.[32]

President Machado ignored Ambassador Guggenheim's advice and on February 5, 1931, approved a law which granted the President of Cuba authority "to suspend constitutional guarantees whenever and wherever he may consider it necessary and without limitation as to duration."[33] By this time the Cuban Congress was merely "rubber stamping" President Machado's requests and actions.

The isolation of the Department of State was indicated by a telegram sent to Ambassador Guggenheim by Acting Secretary of State Wilbur J. Carr on February 7, 1931. This

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[32]Memoranda AC 11260, Conversation with the President at his Finca, Jan. 16, 1931, File Box 5, Harry Frank Guggenheim MSS, Library of Congress.

[33]Guggenheim to Stimson, January 27, 1931, F.R., 1931, II, 46.

message instructed Guggenheim to investigate "thoroughly and discreetly whether prisoners have been arrested without formality of law."[34] The communiqué also specified several other categories of infringements on what could be termed as "basic individual rights in a democracy." Carr's instructions closed with the comment that the data should be forwarded as soon as possible. Guggenheim replied:

> Such limited investigation as nature of Department's inquiry permits seems to justify conclusion that as regards rights of individuals the Government has not exceeded powers derived from reasonable interpretation of constitutional provisions and law of public order of 1870 which is in effect during the suspension of constitutional guarantees.[35]

This answer was written when someone, probably Ambassador Guggenheim, was becoming exasperated with Departmental restrictions. It should have been obvious to the Department of State that Cuba was actually under a stage of siege, which by its very nature deprived most Cubans of their basic rights.

This interest in Cuban justice, or the lack of justice, was the primary topic of a meeting between Secretary Stimson

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[34]Carr to Guggenheim, February 7, 1931, Ibid., 47.

[35]Guggenheim to Stimson, February 13, 1931, Ibid., 47-48.

and Ambassador Ferrara on April 10, 1931 in Washington. Stimson cited the fact that Colonel Hevia had been denied a writ of habeas corpus on at least six different occasions. Ferrara explained that Hevia was being tried by a military court and not a civil court. Stimson replied that the accused should be tried by a civil court since he was not on active duty in the Cuban army and was only a former officer. Ambassador Ferrara then summed up the differences between traditional Spanish law and the United States judicial system. Secretary Stimson probably was not completely satisfied with the Cuban Ambassador's explanation, but he did not pursue the matter beyond that conversation.[36]

From March to May 1931, it appeared that President Machado might be ready to compromise with his political adversaries. The basis for mediation was known as the "Cortina plan" and was named after Senator Cortina, who was the leader of the Popular Party. Briefly summarized it provided for a stronger Supreme Court; a reduction in the length of terms

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[36]Memorandum by the Assistant Secretary of State (White), April 10, 1931, Ibid., 51-54. Stimson called the meeting and told Ferrara that he wanted to discuss the Cuban situation with him before he (Stimson) left for Japan. Ferrara stressed the fact that the Cuban elite were bitterly opposed to Machado.

for the President and Congress; a presidential election to be held in 1932 (Machado's term was to expire in May 1935); a coalition Presidential Cabinet; some restrictions on executive powers; and a return to Cuban electoral code that had been written by General Crowder. Guggenheim informed the State Department that Machado had discussed this plan with him, and with the concurrence of President Machado, Senator Cortina had regularly informed Guggenheim of the meetings.[37]

By April 3, 1931, some United States newspapers hinted a possible political settlement in strife-torn Cuba. It was reported:

> President Machado called on his foes for a truce today to end the bombings and other disorders that have kept Cuba in ferment since last autumn.
> . . . he offered complete restoration of constitutional rights, which have been suspended in most of Cuba for about six months, and liberal amnesty for all political prisoners arrested for delinquencies up to February 24.[38]

Another article in the same issue stated that Ambassador Guggenheim had denied that he was operating in the capacity

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[37]Guggenheim to Stimson, March 17, 1931, Ibid., 48-49. On March 30, Guggenheim had a meeting with Mendieta and urged him to accept the Cortina plan.

[38]The New York Times, April 3, 1931, p. 1.

as an arbitrator in the rapprochement between Machado and the opposition.[39]

Chargé Reed reported to the Department of State on May 6th that President Machado had restored constitutional guarantees throughout Cuba, except in the Havana area. On May 7th, Ambassador Guggenheim arrived at Bolling Field in Washington, D. C. Secretary of State Stimson said Guggenheim's visit was not of an emergency nature, and Guggenheim said that he had just flown into Washington on his way to New York and "dropped off to see his diplomatic superiors."[40] During his short two-week stay in the United States, Guggenheim spent most of his time on Long Island. One week after his arrival in the United States, a news story stated that "Harry F. Guggenheim, American Ambassador to Cuba, was a partisan of President Machado."[41] Apparently Guggenheim could not escape the Cuban bolas even while he was home. Secretary Stimson and Undersecretary William R. Castle, Jr. both denied

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[39] Ibid., p. 16. Within three weeks after this was printed, Secretary Stimson cautioned Guggenheim again not to participate in any way between the Opposition and the Government in the negotiations; Stimson to Guggenheim, April 24, 1931, F.R., 1931, II, p. 56.

[40] The New York Times, May 7, 1931, p. 2.

[41] Ibid., May 15, 1931, p. 19 and May 16, 1931, p. 11.

this allegation against Guggenheim with Stimson stating that the Ambassador had the full confidence of the Department of State.

During Guggenheim's absence from Cuba, the Commandant of the Naval Station at Guantánamo sent a message to Washington stating there was reliable information "that a well organized revolution is imminent, the informant believes not later than the 20th (May)."[42] This message was then transmitted to the American Embassy in Havana for appropriate comments. Reed replied:

> Similar rumors have been current here since the fall of 1930, but they have been more persistent recently. Although the elements comprising the Opposition have been gaining steadily in strength, I do not think they are prepared to start a revolution now. There are no signs of disaffection in the army.[43]

President Machado's greatest anti-revolution asset during this period of constant political agitation was the 12,000 man Cuban army. There were economic problems in Cuba but the army remained well-paid, well-fed, and well-trained.

After Guggenheim returned to Havana on May 23, 1931, his reports to the Department of State stated that he had

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[42]Stimson to Reed, May 13, 1931, F.R., 1931, II, 60.

[43]Reed to Stimson, May 13, 1931, Ibid.

numerous personal conferences with President Machado, and that Machado was probably delaying a compromise with his political opponents. Machado also encountered resistance from his own Liberal Party on the subject of shortening congressional terms. Guggenheim included in one report:

> I have had a few conversations with emissaries of the opposition in the course of which I explained to them that I could have nothing more to do with them unless they would put into writing what they will accept in the Cortina plan, and I sent word to this effect to General Menocal when it was intimated to me that he wished to continue conversations.[44]

The opposition to Machado based their refusal to co-operate with the President on the hope that the Cuban Supreme Court would render a decision making the 1928 Amendment to the Constitution invalid. Opposition to President Machado crystallized on June 30th when the Supreme Court dashed the hopes of the opposition to the ground. The Court's decision favored Machado and ruled that his 1928 Amendment was constitutional. Guggenheim said, ". . . the refusal of the Supreme Court to declare the Government unconstitutional deprives the opposition elements of their last hope that the Machado administration might be supplanted by peaceful and

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[44]Guggenheim to Stimson, May 29, 1931, Ibid., 61.

legal methods."[45]

Ambassador Guggenheim's appraisal of the Cuban situation proved to be correct. During July 1931, revolutionary clouds were gathering over the Republic of Cuba. Active and violent resistance to Machado accelerated throughout the entire length of Cuba and centered in Havana. To meet this increased violence, Machado moved five hundred of his most trusted police to the downtown headquarters in Havana. Another ominous sign of a revolution became apparent when the leading opposition leaders commenced sending their families to safe havens in Mexico and the United States.[46] On July 16 an assassination attempt was made on the life of Clemente Vázquez Bello, the President of the Cuban Senate and Machado's Liberal Party. The next night bombs exploded near the home of President Machado's married daughter. Cuban authorities were quoted as saying this was part of a "well-organized terroristic plan against the administration."[47]

Other indications of a threatening revolt appeared in

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[45]Guggenheim to the Acting Secretary of State, July 1, 1931, Ibid., 65.

[46]The New York Times, July 6, 1931, p. 18.

[47]Ibid., July 18, 1931, p. 6.

the United States. The United States Department of Justice on July 30, 1931, commenced an investigation of an alleged revolutionary plot against the Cuban Republic. Federal agents arrested Jorge de Zaldo, a Cuban, in New York City on the charge of possessing weapons and medical supplies. Within two weeks, the Department of Justice arrested sixty more Cubans and one American on conspiracy charges.[48]

At 10:40 a.m. on August 10, 1931, Ambassador Guggenheim notified Secretary Stimson by telephone that Cuba was in open revolt. He said that former President Menocal, Colonel Mendieta, and other opposition leaders had left the Havana area, and martial law was declared. Guggenheim reported open fighting in the streets of Havana and stated that most of the fighting was restricted to the western end of the Island. He informed Stimson he had conferred with President Machado and General Alberto Herrera, the Cuban Army Chief of Staff. Both Cuban leaders were confident of defeating the rebels in open battle.[49]

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[48] Ibid., July 30, 1931, p. 8; August 6, 1931, p. 21; and August 8, 1931, p. 5.

[49] Guggenheim to Stimson, August 10, 1931, F.R., 1931, II, 67-68.

Acting Secretary of State William R. Castle, Jr., announced the official policy of the United States toward the Cuban Revolution. He told the press that the United States did not intend to intervene and troops would not be sent to Cuba.[50] Castle informed his audience that the United States attitude was based strictly on the Root Interpretation of the Platt Amendment. This meant that the United States would not intervene in Cuba unless there was a virtual state of anarchy in the Island Republic. The Department of State did indicate a willingness to provide political refuge for former President Menocal and other prominent Cuban leaders if they should come to the United States.

On August 11th, Guggenheim conferred with Machado and Herrera about the progress of the revolution. After a briefing on the military situation, Machado attempted to sound out the American Ambassador on the subject of an arms embargo. Guggenheim informed him that "when the request was made the matter would be considered."[51] The Cuban government did not

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[50] The New York Times, August 11, 1931, p. 8.

[51] Guggenheim to Castle, August 11, 1931, F.R., 1931, II, 68. For an additional and more complete account of the arms embargo question see Guggenheim, Cuba, pp. 232-233.

formally make this request.

On August 14, 1931, Guggenheim informed Acting Secretary Castle of the capture of General Menocal and Colonel Carlos Mendieta by the Cuban army. Both General Herrera and President Machado, at different times, assured Ambassador Guggenheim that these prominent prisoners would not be put to death.[52] That same day, Assistant Secretary of State Harvey H. Bundy notified Secretary Stimson, who was in London, of Menocal's capture. Bundy said:

> This probably breaks the backbone of the movement although undue optimism should not be felt as the Island is tense and failure of reform program to materialize might result in another uprising in two or three months.[53]

This was an astute observation by Bundy because the revolution did not end for two years, it just went underground.

By the end of August, 1931, the open revolution against President Machado was a failure. General Peraza, one of the seven directors of the Unión Nacionalista, and approximately

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[52]Guggenheim to Castle, August 15, 1931, Ibid., 70. This telegram confirmed Guggenheim's telephone call on the previous night which notified Castle of Menocal's and Mendieta's capture.

[53]Assistant Secretary of State Bundy, Aug. 14, 1931, to Secretary of State (Telegram to American Embassy London), 837.00B/31 #317, Department of State, National Archives.

150 other rebels were killed by Machado's forces. The only destruction of American private property that was reported through August 17, 1931, was "a powder magazine attached to a quarry owned by N. A. Allen at Arrieta in Santa Clara Province which was blown up by insurgents. . . . Allen estimated damages including stolen horses and equipment at about $5,000."[54] Probably the most colorful engagement of the revolt was a landing on August 17th by a Cuban rebel force at Jibara, a small seaport in Oriente Province. This was the consummation of a filibustering expedition from New Jersey. The revolutionary force was easily defeated by Machado's army at the "Battle of Jibara."[55] The "key" to victory in the Cuban Revolution of 1931 was the 12,000 man Cuban army. This time the army and General Herrera remained loyal to Machado.

The defeat of the Cuban rebels in open warfare was not the end of opposition to Machado; it was merely the end of a

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[54]Guggenheim to Castle, August 17, 1931, F.R., 1931, II, 71.

[55]Charles W. Hackett, "Cuban Revolution Fails," Current History, XXXV (October, 1931), 110-112. This article was written by an American professor of Latin American history and was the only account of the revolution encountered in American journals.

stage or phase. Hostilities reverted to a bitter campaign, mainly fought in Havana, which was characterized by extreme violence and brutality by both sides. It became a war of nerves and terror between President Machado and his political adversaries.

CHAPTER IV

A LIMITED AMBASSADOR

After the Cuban Revolution of August 1931, comments and recommendations from various sources were sent to Secretary of State Stimson concerning United States policy toward Cuba. Charles Edward Chapman, professor of Latin American history and author of a comprehensive study on Cuba, wrote a letter to Stimson which analyzed the situation in Cuba. Chapman described Machado's government as the type of "evil dictatorship" which is too often encountered in Latin America. He suggested that the United States should either directly interfere in Cuba to protect the Cubans, or strictly maintain a hands-off policy. Professor Chapman believed the latter was the best course to pursue. He then told Secretary Stimson:

> At all events I hope the United States cannot continue to be charged, and justly so, with being responsible for the evils inflicted by a government which is kept in power virtually because of the support of the United States.[1]

[1]Charles E. Chapman, 20 Aug. 1931, to Henry L. Stimson, Box 5923, 837.00, Department of State, National Archives. Chapman's book on Cuba was A History of the Cuban Republic: A Study in Hispanic American Politics (New York: The Macmillan Company, 1927).

A short reply from Secretary Stimson informed Chapman that his letter had been "received."

The official actions and policies maintained by Ambassador Guggenheim and the United States toward the revolution were extensively probed and examined by the Cuban press. Harold N. Denny, who was an Associated Press correspondent in Havana, reported on an editorial that was contained in El Mundo, an important anti-Machado newspaper, which stated:

> During the early days of this tragic month of August we have observed in the Ambassador the greatest desire for an immediate solution of the problems of Cuba. He has acted with the utmost delicacy in order not to wound our national pride, abstaining from the least tendency toward intervention.[2]

This comment by the opposition newspaper partially reversed the earlier position maintained by General Menocal and Colonel Mendieta that Ambassador Guggenheim and the United States were supporting Machado's regime.

Ambassador Guggenheim submitted editorials from two politically divergent Cuban newspapers to the Department of State regarding the Cuban attitude towards United States policy. El País, which was the newspaper that President

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[2]Harold N. Denny, "Foes of Machado Now Acknowledge Our Envoy's Neutrality," The New York Times, August 26, 1931, p. 6.

Machado had temporarily suspended during the Artemisa riots contrasted the present attitude of the United States with President Wilson's unfavorable policy in 1917. This newspaper then complimented Ambassador Guggenheim on respecting Cuban patriotism and permitting the Cubans to solve their own problems.[3]

The second editorial was from the Liberal party's news organ, the Diario de la Marina. It was a comprehensive and objective reading which explored the unique relationship between Cuba and the United States. This editorial stated tha under Article III of the Appendix to the Cuban Constitution of 1901 (Platt Amendment), the United States government acquired certain rights but did not contract the obligation tc intervene. The editorial continued, that during the present revolution "the State Department of our neighbor republic has maintained itself in the same attitude as the other foreign chanceries . . . the United States, represents, in evident terms, full neutrality."[4] Diario de la Marina pointed

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[3]Editorial Comment from El País, August 12, 1931, File Box 5, Harry Frank Guggenheim MSS, Library of Congress.

[4]Editorial Comment from Diario de la Marina, August 2(1931, File Box 5, Harry Frank Guggenheim MSS, Library of Cor gress.

out that even though the United States maintained a neutral position, both sides had severely criticized Ambassador Guggenheim. According to the editorial, Ambassador Guggenheim could have prevented the revolution by acting decisively on behalf of the government. On the other hand, if Guggenheim had made "a discreet statement to the effect that in the opinion of Washington the demand of the Opposition should be met (this) would have rapidly constructed the road to (the Opposition) victory."[5] The editorial then stated an opinion that Ambassador Guggenheim had undoubtedly avoided either position, probably because he was instructed by Washington to maintain a neutral position. The Cuban editor concluded that Guggenheim was acting as a "sincere friend" of the Cubans and that both sides should avail themselves of his conciliatory position.

On September 2, 1931, Ambassador Guggenheim submitted a report to the Department of State on his recent conferences with President Machado and prominent members of Machado's regime. Ambassador Guggenheim said he had informed Machado that in his opinion this was the opportune time to make comprehensive reforms, since the Cuban army proved its loyalty

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[5] Ibid.

to the president and the opposition leaders were discredit by their failure in open revolution. Guggenheim recommend a program of "moral peace" to Machado which contained the following provisions: (1) the constitutional reforms that had been proposed by Machado before the revolution should be enacted; (2) the Cuban Supreme Court should appoint a politically neutral vice president; (3) a Supreme Electora Board with appropriate powers should be appointed to supe vise the elections; and (4) the vice president could assu Machado's office on September 1, 1932.[6]

After Guggenheim had outlined the reform program to President Machado, he also told him that if the program w carried out it would be a personal triumph for the Cuban ident. In addition, Guggenheim said:

> Without the carrying out of this program in good faith there could be no moral peace in Cuba. Without moral peace, there could be no recovery from the present eco nomic, political and financial crisis. Without this recovery, the present officeholders, who will be held accountable for the nation's difficulties, would lose office with the inevitable collapse of the government.

Machado "professed agreement" with Guggenheim's recommen

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[6]Guggenheim to the Acting Secretary of State, Sept 2, 1931, F.R., 1931, II, 71-5.

[7]Ibid., p. 73.

and stated that he would carry out the program. They both agreed the program should be carried out in a forcible manner, and until it was formally announced, it must not be divulged. President Machado told Guggenheim he would have the Cuban Secretary of Justice, José Averhoff, confer with Guggenheim, so they could work out the full details of the reform plan.

On September 1, 1931, Guggenheim and Machado had another meeting, and Machado indicated he had changed his mind and would not resign in September 1932. Machado stated that if he announced his intention to resign, the Cuban army and his political followers would then desert him. Guggenheim informed Machado that in his opinion, he didn't think Machado had another alternative, and then Guggenheim suggested that Machado should discuss the matter with General Herrera, the Cuban army Chief of Staff.

Four days later, General Herrara requested an interview with Guggenheim. Herrera, who was Guggenheim's personal friend, did not specifically tell Guggenheim that President Machado had sent him to the American Embassy. The General stated he did not agree with the politicians in power and asked Guggenheim to help President Machado make necessary

reforms to restore peace in Cuba. Guggenheim informed Herrera he had had two recent conferences with President Machado, after which he described in detail to Herrera what had been discussed. Herrera then told Guggenheim that he concurred with the proposed reform program saying that "it represented the only salvation for Cuba."[8] Guggenheim emphasized that the plan called for Machado's resignation, ar Herrera acknowledged that stipulation. General Herrera als stated that in the present emergency if the politicians failed to enact the necessary reform legislation, it would be necessary to force the issue.

At the final conference before President Machado presented his reform program to the Cuban Congress, Machado informed Guggenheim he would not retire on September 1, 1932 The New York Times on September 18, 1931 contained an article indicating the reforms had passed the Cuban House of Representatives after a continuous twenty-two hour session. The article expressed the opinion that the reforms would b followed by a sweeping amnesty law which would be the "fin step toward restoring the country to normal. . . ."[9]

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[8] Ibid., p. 74.

[9] The New York Times, September 18, 1931, p. 8. This

On September 23, 1931, Dr. Cosme de la Torriente established a Cuban junta headquarters at Washington, D. C. to represent the resistance to President Machado. Torriente stated that the objectives of the opposition were to bring reforms to Cuba, provide for free elections, and restore individual political rights. He declared, "The revolt in Cuba will not end until President Machado is driven from power."[10]

After the 1931 revolution had been quelled, there was a change of leadership within Cuba in the opposition to President Machado. The most prominent anti-Machado leaders such as Menocal and Mendieta were in Cuban military prisons. Torriente and many other eminent statesmen had fled to political sanctuary in the United States. The gap in the opposition leadership was then filled by professors and students from the University of Havana who formed an effective anti-Machado organization which was called the ABC.

At the end of August 1931, President Machado revived

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news article was in error when it stated, "The action paves the way for elections next year and the retirement of General Machado from the Presidency two years before the end of his present term." As indicated, General Machado did not agree to Ambassador Guggenheim's recommendation on early retirement.

[10] Ibid., September 23, 1931, p. 9.

the old Spanish ley de fuga (fugitive law).[11] This law permitted the Cuban secret police, rural guards, and the military to shoot prisoners who were "attempting" to escape. In effect, it became a means whereby Machado's enemies were eliminated by quasi legal political assassinations. The ABC responded to Machado's actions by murdering leading members of his regime. Brutality was met with ever increasing terrorism on both sides, and hardly a day passed where there were not shootings and bomb explosions in Havana.[12]

President Machado addressed a delegation from the National Association of Merchants and Manufacturers in Havana on October 28, 1931. He stated that "80 per cent of Cuba's economic trouble is due directly to the high American tariff: Machado assessed the overall situation in the following words:

> Our economic problems far overshadow the political strife and while Cuba has done everything possible to solve the problems confronting her, the legislation of

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[11] The New York Times, August 31, 1931, p. 6. Ambassador Guggenheim later compared Machado's excesses with Carlyle's often quoted remark: "Most delicate is the mob queller's vocation; wherein too-much may be as bad as not-enough." Guggenheim, Cuba, p. 159.

[12] An objective firsthand account of the 1931 to 1933 period of terrorism in Cuba was presented by Russell Porter who was on the staff of The New York Times in Havana. Russel Porter, "Cuba Under President Machado," Current History, XXXVIII (April, 1933), 29-34.

other countries had virtually nullified such effects.[13] The Cuban President did not add in his accusation against his northern neighbor that the United States was also suffering from a serious depression. Cuba's monoculture economy was at a virtual standstill, but the same situation existed in the highly industrialized United States.

Cuba's foreign trade in 1931 dropped to about the 1906-1910 level. General imports from the United States to Cuba in 1929 were $127,051,000, and by 1931 this figure had dropped to $46,017,000. Exports from Cuba to the United States followed the same trend; in 1929 the amount was $208,754,000, and two years later the figure was $89,074,000.[14] To prove that the situation in Cuba was not exclusive, United States trade with Brazil was examined. Brazil's general imports from the United States in 1929 were valued at $125,552,000, and two years later slumped to $33,212,000. Exports to the United States from Brazil in 1929 were $192,480,000 and in

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[13] The New York Times, October 29, 1931, p. 15. A sympathetic view on Cuba's economic problems relating to the United States was presented by the former American Commercial Attaché in Buenos Aires, William L. Schurz in "Cuba's Economic Isolation," Current History, XXXVI (August, 1932), 545-49.

[14] Commerce Yearbook, 1932, II, 409.

1931 fell to $104,588,000.[15]

By January 1932, Ambassador Guggenheim was dissatisfied with United States policy toward Cuba.[16] He informed Secretary Stimson on January 25, 1932 that:

> For nearly a year and a half, Cuba has been in a stat of disorder. There has been agitation, demonstration, continuous bombing with some destruction of property, an last August the revolution which, though won by the Government, did not end in the reestablishment of moral peace. Intermittently, during this period, there has be a curtailment of freedom of speech or press; at the pres time constitutional guarantees are suspended and the cou try is under martial law. An organization called "El Partido de la Porra" (Bludgeon Party), consisting of str arm mercenary supporters of the Government, carries on sanguinary reprisals against violent or especially obnox ious acts of opposition groups. The only University of country and all the higher schools have been closed for more than a year, due to student opposition to the Gover ment. The jails have been intermittently full of politi prisoners. In addition to the worldwide depression (and that is the basic cause of Cuba's economic plight), the lack of confidence in the Cuban Government and the condi tions mentioned have helped to bring about a stagnation business that has added to misery of the Cuban people.[17]

After this review of the unsatisfactory conditions in Cuba, Guggenheim added, "The Machado government will gain complet mastery of Cuba in the 1932 elections if reforms are not

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[15] Ibid., p. 369.

[16] Guggenheim, Cuba, p. 233.

[17] Guggenheim to Stimson, January 25, 1932, F.R., 193 V, 535-36.

carried out."

Ambassador Guggenheim succinctly analyzed his own position and said, "Any influence that I have been able to exert . . . has been limited by policy to the often ineffectual appeal to enlightened self-interest where there has been more self-interest than enlightenment." Guggenheim told Secretary Stimson that the United States policy of complete non-interference in Cuba has been misconstrued by many to mean that we were actually supporting the Machado government. To counter this misconception, Guggenheim made two basic proposals to Stimson. His first recommendation was that the policy "which avoids any appearance of supporting Machado or sympathizing with his policies be continued by the Embassy and reinforced by the attitude of the Department in its relations with the Cuban Embassy in Washington." Guggenheim then suggested that Stimson inform Cuban Ambassador Orestes Ferrara of "our lack of sympathy with President Machado's present policies." According to Guggenheim's rationale, "this would at least tend to relieve our Government from responsibility for the inevitable consequences of Machado's persistence in his present course."[18]

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[18] Ibid., pp. 537-538.

Two months later, on March 26, 1932, Secretary Stimson answered Ambassador Guggenheim's recommendations concerning a modification of policy. Stimson in his reply reviewed Guggenheim's lengthy analysis of January 25, 1932 and stressed the important parts by direct quotations rath than by paraphrasing. Stimson was in complete disagreemen with Guggenheim. He told Guggenheim that the policy of th Hoover administration was based on the Root Interpretation of the Platt Amendment. Not wanting to leave any doubt in Guggenheim's mind, Stimson quoted the Root Interpretation verbatim. The Secretary of State then informed Guggenheim that:

> I feel that any indications, such as you suggest, of la of sympathy with President Machado, either by the Depar ment or by the Embassy, would constitute a marked depar ture from that policy. It would be tantamount to takin sides on a purely internal political question, a step t be avoided whether on behalf of the "Opposition" or on behalf of President Machado, and one which this Governm has hitherto so scrupulously endeavored to avoid.[19]

Secretary Stimson "reminded" Guggenheim that Cuba wa an independent and sovereign nation and should solve her c internal problems. He also told Guggenheim that Ambassadc Judah in 1928 had taken the position that the constitutior

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[19]Stimson to Guggenheim, March 26, 1932, F.R., 1932, V, 546.

of the 1928 amendment to the Cuban Constitution extending President Machado's term was a matter for the Cuban Supreme Court to decide, not the United States. Stimson stated that this was still the position of the Department of State. The Secretary then instructed his Ambassador:

> In view of the foregoing I trust that you will refrain from taking any attitude or position with respect to Cuban internal political questions which could fairly be interpreted as a departure from our policy of complete non-interference in Cuba's internal affairs. The Department will continue to be guided by this policy in its relations with the Cuban Ambassador in this city.[20]

Stimson not being content to end the matter with that pronouncement told Guggenheim:

> The Department cannot acquiesce in the view that the continuance of its policy of non-interference in Cuba's internal affairs involves our Government in any responsibility for any consequences of the policies of the Cuban Executive.[21]

After receiving this severe rebuff from Secretary Stimson, Ambassador Guggenheim in effect became the official United States "observer" and "reporter" in Cuba. A few days before Guggenheim received his additional instructions from Stimson, an Associated Press news release from Havana reported that Guggenheim had denied the periodic rumor that he

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[20] Ibid., 547.

[21] Ibid.

intended to resign. The source of the Cuban bola was the Havana commercial newspaper Mercurio, which was edited by José Emilio Obregón, President Machado's son-in-law.[22]

Resistance to Machado continued and violence became the way of life in Havana. To combat growing terrorism, the Cuban Congress in February 1932 enacted a law that stipulated all terror bombing cases would be subject to the jurisdiction of military courts.[23] The Cuban Supreme Court, which continued to oppose Machado's dictatorial rule, declared the bombing law unconstitutional. In addition, the month before the Court had also held that the closing of the University of Havana was in conflict with the Cuban Constitution. Cuban Independence Day in 1932 was celebrated by President Machado's proclamation of martial law throughout the Island.[24] Within three days, Machado ordered the arrest of ex-President Menocal, Colonel Mendieta, and other prominent opposition leaders who

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[22] The New York Times, March 20, 1932, p. 23.

[23] Ibid., February 17, 1932, p. 9.

[24] Ibid., May 21, 1932, p. 3.

had been released from prison in January.[25] General Menocal escaped from Machado's police and received asylum in the Brazilian Legation.

Chargé Reed informed the Department of State on June 22, 1932, that Machado's Congress had passed a measure which suspended constitutional guarantees for one year, and that the law also authorized Machado to extend this suspension for an additional two years by presidential decree.[26] It would have been apparent to the discerning reader of The New York Times in mid-1932 that the Republic of Cuba was engulfed in internal strife which bordered on open revolt.[27]

Ambassador Guggenheim reported to the Department of State on July 6, 1932, that Menocal had been permitted to leave the Brazilian Legation and was sailing for Europe on the steamship Karlsruhe. He included in his report that President Machado had assured the Government of Brazil that

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[25] Ibid., May 19, 1932, p. 5; May 20, 1932, p. 17; May 24, 1932, p. 9; and May 25, 1932, p. 1. Chargé Reed reported "once more the jails are filled with hundreds of political prisoners." Reed to Stimson, May 25, 1932, F.R., 1932, V, 548.

[26] Reed to Stimson, June 22, 1932, F.R., 1932, V, 550.

[27] The New York Times, July 10, 1932, p. 1 and July 16, 1932, p. 2.

Menocal would not be molested on Cuban soil, and elaborate security measures had been taken by the Cuban police to prevent possible demonstrations or disorders.[28]

When ex-President Menocal left Cuba he promised Machado he would remain in Europe for one year. However, in less than one month he was on the steamer Lafayette bound for New York City. José Barón, the Cuban Chargé d'Affaires in Washington, sent a note to Assistant Secretary of State Francis White requesting the United States to adopt "measures which it may deem adapted to prevent the direction and organization of movements and armed expeditions from the United States to Cuba." White replied that the Department of Justice had been requested to have an agent meet General Menocal when he docked at New York City and "warn him in confidence to abstain from any activities which may violate our so-called neutrality laws . . . under penalty of suffering legal consequences."[29] He then informed Barón the United States would immediately notify the Cuban government of any information it might receive if General Menocal shou

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[28]Guggenheim to Stimson, July 6, 1932, F.R., 1932, V, 551-2 and The New York Times, July 3, 1932, p. 5.

[29]Barón to White, August 1, 1932, and White to Barón, August 3, 1932, F.R., 1932, V, 554-6.

engage in illegal activities.

During the summer of 1932, the student-led ABC revolutionary group conducted a campaign of planned assassinations against the high officials in Machado's regime. On July 9, 1932, the hated and much-feared chief of Machado's secret police, Captain Manuel Calvo, was killed in downtown Havana.[30] This touched off a series of violent repressive measures which Ambassador Guggenheim reported to the Secretary of the State. Guggenheim stated that two or three hundred Cubans had been arrested and charged with conspiracy. He described in vivid detail the killing of Colonel Esteban Delgado Acosta. Guggenheim said the Cuban secret police had reported that Colonel Delgado was killed when his house was surrounded and he refused to surrender. However, the American Ambassador added, "Whoever shot Colonel Delgado must have been remarkably accurate . . . since he had no other wounds except two bullets in the forehead."[31] According to one newspaper account there were powder marks around one of the bullet wounds. The chauffeur of the prominent

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[30]The New York Times, July 10, 1932, p. 1.

[31]Guggenheim to Stimson, July 25, 1932, F.R., 1932, V, 553.

Cuban opposition leader was also mysteriously killed the next night in Havana.

On September 24, 1932, President Machado emphasized in a speech that he would maintain peace in Cuba.[32] Two days later, Dr. Vázquez Bello, the President of the Cuban Senate and also the President of Machado's Liberal Party, and three other prominent Cubans were assassinated in Havana. Chargé Reed reported to the Department of State, "Practically every prominent member of the opposition who is not in prison fears that he may be the next victim of Vázquez Bello's avengers."[33]

Ambassador Guggenheim notified Secretary Stimson on January 5, 1933, that Machado's police were murdering political prisoners. Guggenheim stated that the United States Embassy had received several requests asking that he intervene to protect the lives of prisoners held by Machado's government. He informed Stimson, "Without making official representations, in each case brought to my attention I informally conferred with Government officials expressing

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[32] The New York Times, September 25, 1932, p. 6.

[33] Reed to Stimson, September 29, 1932, F.R., 1932, V, 557.

hope that lives would be respected." Guggenheim added that the killing of prisoners had seriously affected the attitude of the Cubans toward Machado and "strengthened belief that no person under arrest is safe from official vengeance." The Ambassador told Secretary Stimson that he had asked for an appointment with Machado and that he would attempt to use "his personal influence to discourage further acts of this kind."[34]

On the morning of January 9th, Ambassador Guggenheim had a meeting with President Machado. The Cuban President admitted his government's responsibility in the murders of the political prisoners and described it as a "stupid mistake."[35] He informed Guggenheim that prisoners would be spared in the future.

Representative Hamilton Fish, Jr. of New York, a member of the House Foreign Affairs Committee, on January 12, 1933, introduced a resolution in Congress which "would

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[34]Guggenheim to Stimson, January 5, 1933, F.R., 1933, V, 270 and The New York Times, January 6, 1933, p. 11 and January 10, 1933, p. 1. Guggenheim explained his unofficial intervention to save political prisoners in his work Cuba, pp. 187-190. He stated, "A large number of Cubans were protected by this unofficial intercession, including most of the opposition leaders."

[35]Guggenheim to Stimson, January 9, 1933, F.R., 1933, V, 271.

authorize President Hoover to extend the good offices of this country in bringing about mutual understanding and amity between the Cuban political factions."[36] Fish stated that he was not recommending United States intervention at this point; however he did infer that it might be necessary if the Cuban situation became worse. The next day, Representative Fish implied that Ambassador Guggenheim should be relieved when he stated that the United States should send a "strong ambassador to Cuba to clean up the mess that prevails there."[37]

On February 28, 1933, Ambassador Guggenheim submitted his last long report on Cuba to the Secretary of State. He reported that "with the exception of eight bomb explosions on the night of the 23rd, the seizure of supplies of arms and ammunition . . . and numerous arrests of alleged conspirators"[38] Havana was quiet. According to his report, there were extensive incidents in the interior which included train derailments, the cutting of telephone and telegraph wires,

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[36]The New York Times, January 13, 1933, p. 6.

[37]Ibid., January 14, 1933, p. 1.

[38]Guggenheim to Stimson, February 28, 1933, F.R., 1933, V, 273.

an attack on a Cuban rural guard post in Oriente Province, and revolutionary activity by marauding bands in the provinces of Santa Clara and Camaguey.

One month later, March 27, 1933, the United States Embassy in Havana announced that Ambassador Guggenheim would resign effective April 1, 1933.[39] The day after he resigned, former Ambassador Guggenheim arrived at Miami, Florida, where a new junta was being formed against President Machado.[40]

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[39] The New York Times, March 28, 1933, p. 17.

[40] Ibid., March 23, 1933, p. 8. The Miami junta was led by Carlos Mendieta, the future President of Cuba, and included: former President Menocal; a future Provisional President, Colonel Carlos Hevia; numerous other prominent exiles; and provisions were also included to provide for representation from the student ABC revolutionary group.

CONCLUSION

For three decades the relationship between the Republic of Cuba and the United States was welded together by the Platt Amendment. Under the provisions of Article III of the Platt Amendment, the United States intervened in Cuba in 1906 when the Cuban government resigned. Six years later Secretary Knox firmly informed the Cubans that they must have a quiet and peaceful election or the United States might be forced to intervene. The United States government landed military forces in Cuba during World War I under the guise of training exercises to protect the valuable and temporarily scarce commodity of sugar. An event more significant than this armed intervention, or threat of intervention, occurred in January 1921. President Wilson, with little respect for Cuban sovereignty, sent General Crowder to Cuba to unravel the tangled and contested Cuban presidential election of 1920. President Harding and Secretary Hughes continued this policy and permitted Crowder to practically run the internal affairs of Cuba. This was considered the zenith of United States intervention, interference,

and intermeddling in the Republic of Cuba.

Herbert Hoover, before he assumed office, paved the road in Latin America for President Roosevelt's future "good-neighbor" policy. During the Hoover era, the United States almost completely liquidated intervention and interference in the internal affairs of all Latin American countries.[1]

Prior to Guggenheim's arrival in Cuba in 1929, United States diplomatic agents in that Republic enjoyed a preferred position. The United States ambassador was the political and economic focal point for almost all routine daily affairs. Generally, the Cuban President did not make a major decision without some type of consultation with the senior United States diplomatic representative.

In November 1929, Ambassador Guggenheim, the neophyte diplomat, arrived at his post in Cuba. In many respects he was extremely aware of Latin American affairs. Guggenheim was still a young man, he spoke the native language fluently, he had travelled extensively in Latin America, and had lived south of the border for a number of years. The Ambassador had been raised in a world of big business, but had divested

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[1]Stimson and Bundy, Active Service, pp. 174-187 and DeConde, Hoover's Policy, pp. 123-127.

his economic interests prior to his appointment. When he arrived in Cuba, the Island Republic was already deep in t Great Depression. His immediate economic advice to President Machado was to "tighten the belt" and reduce governme expenditures, especially on public works projects. The Am bassador did not pursue an active course to lower trade ba riers between Cuba and the United States. Even after late reflections, Guggenheim thought Cuba's major economic prob lem was the overproduction of sugar and not the United Stat tariff.[2]

Ambassador Guggenheim established an excellent initia rapport with President Machado. This cordial relationship continued until shortly after the revolt of 1931. Undoubtedly, President Machado knew that Secretary Stimson had tightened the diplomatic reins on Guggenheim. After Machad realized that Guggenheim's official actions were limited tc friendly advice and mere verbal pressure that lacked official Washington backing, Machado was free to increase his dictatorial hold on Cuba. In effect, Secretary Stimson was the first Secretary of State to actually recognize Cuba as

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[2]Guggenheim, Cuba, p. 139.

a sovereign nation. United States active participation in Cuban internal affairs was being withdrawn. However, it was some time before all parties realized that this had actually happened.

Menocal, Mendieta, Hevia, Torriente, and other prominent Cuban politicos wanted United States intervention against Machado. The desired degree of intervention varied, but the basic reason was to support their individual cause. Yet, these very same Cubans, if they were in power, would have quickly established an anti-Platt Amendment policy.

The most significant aspect of this study was Stimson's reversal of the policy of intervention in Cuban internal affairs. The Secretary announced to the gathered press in October 1930, when it appeared Cuba was in serious trouble, that the United States would be guided by the Root Interpretation of the Platt Amendment. Prior to this official pronouncement, the Root Interpretation was neatly folded in some dusty State Department file cabinet and had been totally neglected. The very next month, November 1930, Stimson informed Guggenheim that he should not extend his unofficial good offices to mediate between President Machado and the Opposition. This warning was repeated to Guggenheim at least

two more times.

The policy announced by Secretary Stimson was placed under a severe test during the open revolution in Cuba dur ing August 1931. Even though Cuba was wracked by a seriou revolt, the United States refused to intervene, intermeddl or interfere. The United States maintained a position of strict neutrality and did not declare an arms embargo. Th impartial action by the United States surprised many Cuban and Americans.

In January 1932, Ambassador Guggenheim recommended t Stimson that the United States policy toward Cuba should b modified. Secretary Stimson refused to entertain Guggenhe suggestions and then vehemently discarded them item by ite Stimson did not want the United States to become involved in internal Cuban affairs. Professor Chapman, after the l revolt, thought the United States was propping up a falter ing and corrupt regime. Guggenheim, himself, partially re peated this charge when he suggested to Stimson that the Secretary should inform Ambassador Ferrara the United Stat government was not in sympathy with Machado's present poli cies. The "clincher," and it must have affected Stimson's reply, was when Guggenheim stated that this action by Stim

would relieve the United States to a certain extent of the responsibility for the chaotic conditions in Cuba.

Cuba, until recently, has always been one of the leading commercial customers of the United States. The fact that this trade was greatly reduced and dropped to an almost unprecedented low during the Hoover administration is not significant, at least within the context of overall United States international trade during the Great Depression. Cuba was but one of many countries, including the United States, which suffered from this withering economic situation. It was unfortunate that the United States Congress decided to counter the problem with a towering tariff, but neither President Hoover, Secretary Stimson, nor Ambassador Guggenheim could control this economic nationalism.

Russell H. Fitzgibbon, a foremost scholar on Cuban-United States relations during this period, very succinctly evaluated Ambassador Guggenheim's performance. He said, "If criticism is to be directed it should be against State Department policy--Guggenheim was merely the agent of that policy."[3]

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[3]Fitzgibbon, Cuba-U.S., p. 195.

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