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The Tale of Two Narratives: NATO as a Collective Defense and a Collective Security Institution

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THE TALE OF TWO NARRATIVES: NATO AS A COLLECTIVE DEFENSE
AND A COLLECTIVE SECURITY INSTITUTION

by

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ABSTRACT

THE TALE OF TWO NARRATIVES: NATO AS A COLLECTIVE DEFENSE AND A COLLECTIVE SECURITY INSTITUTION

Anna M. Rulska
Old Dominion University, 2010
Director: Dr. Regina Karp

The goal of this project is to determine NATO's present and future roles as a collective security organization and as a security alliance. In the past, NATO has dealt with both objectives under different and changing conditions. This paper argues that throughout the entirety of its history, NATO worked as both collective security and collective defense organization. The theoretical assumptions made within the paper are supported by the analysis of the past behavior of the Alliance in respect to the relationship between the narrative of collective security and that of collective defense, and changes within that relationship. Four specific periods will be taken into account: the creation of NATO, the Cold War, post-Cold War to September 11th, 2001, and post-9/11 in an effort to draw applicable lessons for the future of the North Atlantic Alliance.

NATO traditionally and historically has been described as and considered to be an alliance. This project shows, however, that contrary to the common perception, the story of NATO is that of two narratives: of an alliance and a collective security arrangement. While conceptually and theoretically separate, in the case of the North Atlantic Alliance those two narratives are linked together. Through most of NATO's history, those two narratives reinforced each other to such an extent that neither would have been possible and durable without the other.
The combination of those two narratives has been dependent on the structure of the international environment. In the past twenty years, with the change of the international structure following the end of the Cold War, the relationship between the two narratives changed as well. For the past two decades, the narrative of collective security has been dominating the collective defense nature of NATO.

Ultimately, the future of NATO is based on both features, intertwined: collective security and collective defense. As the organization has managed to carry out both characteristics in the past, it now must find political will and commitment among its members to continue effectively and successfully its role as a collective security arrangement and a collective defense organization.
Mamo, dziękuję, że otworzyłaś mi drzwi na świat
To Jamie, for her unconditional love and friendship
   To Daniel, the love and joy of my life
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On my journey to academic maturity, paving the way to this project, I learned to be endlessly curious, value and support my own arguments, be accepting of and benefit from constructive criticism, and have fun while learning. I thank Dr. Regina Karp, Dr. Simon Serfaty (who always kept me on my toes), Dr. Kurt Taylor Gaubatz, Dr. Steve Yetiv, Dr. Peter Schulman, and Dr. David Earnest for giving me such a wide scope of tools and teaching me how to use them.

No learning process would be complete and successful without friends to provide support, company for much needed coffee or ice cream breaks, topics for heated debates, and opportunities for silliness and adventure. I thank Cindy Miller, Bill Eliason, Vessela Chakarova, Curt Corey, Britta Rinehard, Matt Hall, Vlad Galushko, Jack Covarrubias, Matus Dobsovic, Molly McKnight, and Leslie Harlson for their colorful presence.

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CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION

INTERNATIONAL SECURITY AND NATO

Security is one of the basic human needs. From the beginning, people sought to create groups to maximize three factors necessary for survival: sustenance, shelter, and security. Security, therefore, serves as one of the three basic variables pushing all levels of actors—individuals, groups, states, institutions—to cooperate in some fashion or another. In response to this trend, the body of literature focusing on security organizations, be it alliances, coalitions, treaties, or loose institutions, is plentiful.

Scholars have looked at the reasons why states create security organizations; how they are managed; what sort of behavior they display during war and peace times; why those institutions fall apart; or under what circumstances and how they operate; what sort of norms they set or how the concept of security culture is established. However, in the vast body of literature on security organizations, the relationship between the alliances nature of such institutions and their role as collective security arrangements have not been directly addressed and analyzed. This project looks at the relationship between the internal and external security within a group of states, and between the functional and normative role of security organizations.

The argument of the paper centers on NATO and its continuing, and highly controversial, transformation in an effort to adapt to the post-Cold War security environment. The goal of this project is to determine NATO’s present and future role as a collective security organization and effectiveness as an alliance. In the past, NATO has
dealt with both objectives under different and changing conditions. The theoretical assumptions made within the paper will be supported by the analysis of the past behavior of the alliance in respect to the relationship between the narrative of collective security and that of collective defense, and changes within that relationship. Four specific periods will be taken into account: the creation of NATO, the Cold War, post-Cold War to September 11th, 2001, and post-9/11 in an effort to draw applicable lessons for the future of the North Atlantic Alliance.

NATO: DUAL NARRATIVE OF ALLIANCE AND COLLECTIVE SECURITY

NATO traditionally and historically has been described as and considered to be an alliance. This project posits, however, that the story of NATO is that of two narratives: of an alliance and a collective security arrangement. While conceptually separate, in the case of the North Atlantic Alliance those two narratives are linked together. Through most of NATO’s history, those two narratives reinforced each other to such an extent that neither would have been possible and durable without the other. The combination of those two narratives has been dependent on the structure of the international environment. In the past twenty years, with the change of the international structure following the end of the Cold War, the relationship between the two narratives changed as well. For the past two decades, the narrative of collective security has been dominating the collective defense nature of NATO.

The conclusion of this project posits that given the current international environment, with its challenges and opportunities, NATO cannot function as a pure alliance or solely as a collective security arrangement. Ultimately, the future of NATO is
based on both features, intertwined: collective security and collective defense. As the organization has managed to carry out both characteristics in the past, it now must find political will and commitment among its members to continue effectively and successfully in its role as a collective security arrangement and an alliance.

The concept of an alliance makes the basic structure and the goal of NATO clear to define. Alliances are created to protect their members against an outside threat. In this case, the threat was the Soviet Union. In contrast, collective security theoretically defines an all-inclusive arrangement designed to promote certain values and patterns of behavior within its community. Those values and standards, in turn, serve to provide peace and stability on the international scale, preventing and discouraging potential defectors from violating the rules. The goal of collective security arrangement is similar to any other institution, defined by Stephen Krasner as “rules and norms around which actors’ expectations converge.”¹ In other words, collective security institutions provide security benefits to its members, while in the same time punishing those that violate the rules and norms of behavior through built-in mechanisms.

From its birth, NATO’s nature was based on the linkage between the collective security values and alliance goals. The look into the post-WWII discussions of the organization’s founding fathers clearly shows the undertones of both narratives. On one hand, in the face of the tangible threat from the Soviet Union, the United States and Western European democracies created an alliance to provide an effective defense against a potential attack. On the other hand, NATO was born as a collective security arrangement.
extension of the United Nations, based on Roosevelt’s belief that powerful states carry
the responsibility to preserve world’s peace and stability.

If NATO is considered only as an alliance, it gives a rather unique example of an
alliance. Many of the organization’s decisions and developments over time do not fit the
behavior of an alliance. For example, the expansion of the North Atlantic Alliance to the
east in the 1990s, where the functioning of the alliance was jeopardized with increasing
number of members, cannot be explained by pure alliance theory. In a similar fashion,
the Alliance’s engagement in Afghanistan does not conform to the goals of an alliance, as
Afghanistan does not present a direct, tangible threat to the European members.

The same can be said if NATO were to be framed only as a collective security
arrangement. Collective security is designed to promote a standard of behavior within a
group of state that ensures peace and stability. How would one explain British and
French acquisition of nuclear weapons with collective security theory? Likewise, the
invocation of Article V after the attacks on the United States on September 11th, 2001
does not correspond with collective security arrangements characteristics.

Therefore, this exceptional and distinctive nature of the North Atlantic Alliance
provides a fertile ground for joined application of traditionally divergent approaches.
More specifically, in the case of NATO, there is an interaction of realist understanding of
threat (alliance) combined with neoliberal, institutionalist, and constructivist
understanding of norms (collective security). Some decisions from NATO’s past,
consequently, show exactly this equal interaction of alliance and collective security
characteristics. For example, the case of West Germany’s accession into the Alliance can
be explained by both narratives, and shows how the NATO’s nature as an alliance and
collective security reinforced each other to such an extent that Germany would not be able to join NATO if the elements of both collective security and collective defense were not satisfied.

Given the change in the current international environment after the fall of the Soviet Union and the end of the Cold War, the interaction of these two narratives has also changed. In the past twenty years, NATO’s role as a collective security arrangement has been taking precedence over its character as a collective defense institution. However, as shown through its history, NATO has never nor can it now function as a pure alliance or solely as a collective security arrangement. Ultimately, the future of NATO is based on both features, intertwined: collective security and an alliance.

What is the pattern of the interaction between the two narratives of collective security and defense? What are the drivers that dictate the behavior of those narratives? To answer these questions, this project looks at four different time periods in the history of NATO. In each of those time periods, the development of each of the two narratives is analyzed. The alliance narrative is closely linked with the perception of threat. As the perception of threat rises, NATO behaves as an alliance designed to prepare and counter that threat. In the same time, with the high degree of commonality of values among the member states, NATO acts as a collective security arrangement. Starting with the origins of NATO through most of its history, the two narratives of the Transatlantic Alliance have been reinforcing each other.
OPERATIONALIZATION OF THE CONCEPTS

The alliance narrative is operationalized through characteristics of alliance behavior, generally based on the neorealist assumptions and corresponding actions, namely, maximization of power in the face of potential danger and agreement of members on policies and actions to stop that potential threat. Generally, those policies and decisions address short to medium term goals.

The collective security narrative, on the other hand, is operationalized through decisions and actions of NATO that have little or nothing to do with protection of the members from an outside threat. Rather, they are focused on creating a framework of norms and rules of behavior within the Alliance and extending that structure to other neighbors in an attempt to bind them by the same standard of behavior. The goal, then, is to set a collective security environment that would provide peace and stability in the long term by awarding benefits of security, based on transparency and trust, which would be very costly to lose.

PERIODS OF ANALYSIS

The tale of NATO is divided into four periods, determined by the watershed events. The first period starts with the end of World War II and ends on June 25th, 1950. Shortly after the conclusion of WWII, the American, Canadian and European statesmen began discussing the creation of an organization for the defense of Europe. That first period, then, looks at the forces and ideas that led to the creation of NATO and its first year of existence. By examining those fundamental years of NATO's existence, one is able to see the basic principles of both alliance behavior and collective security goals.
guiding the birth of NATO, proving that from its conception, the organization was driven
by and balanced effectively the dual nature of an alliance and collective security
arrangement.

On June 25th, 1950, the Korean War began and drastically increased the
perception of the Soviet threat, while also changing the scope and character of that threat
in the eyes of the members. Given this new perception, the environment in which NATO
saw itself operate, and its factors, changed. This essential transformation, therefore,
provides a viable watershed mark. This period ends in December 1991.

On December 12th, 1991, the Belavezha Accords² were ratified by the Congress
of Peoples’ Deputies of the Russian Federation, effectively denouncing the 1922 treaty
which created the Soviet Union. This event marked the end of the tangible threat which
served as one of the main causes for the birth of NATO. As Richard Holbrooke writes:
“The end of the Cold War, which can best be dated to that symbolic moment at midnight
on December 25th, 1991, when the Soviet flag came down over the Kremlin for the last
time, began an era of change of historic proportions.”³

The third period, therefore, begins on December 26th, 1991, initiating the new
international environment without the Soviet Union, the original external threat against
which NATO was created. The end of that period is marked by yet another event that
redefines the shape and nature of the international environment in which NATO would
operate in the future, namely the attacks of September 11th, 2001.

The attacks in the US on that day did not begin a period of struggle against
intangible, transnational threats. Rather, they highlighted those threats and forced the

² Belavezha Accords were signed by the leaders of Russian, Ukrainian, and Belorussian Republics
on December 8th, 1991, dissolving the Soviet Union and creating the Commonwealth of Independent States.
Americans and Europeans to put them as a priority in their security agenda. From then on, NATO would be forced to address the non-state threats and plan for appropriate capabilities and strategies to protect against the dangers of non-state-centric security risks.

STRUCTURE AND PURPOSE

The theoretical discussions conducted in this project relate to NATO specifically, not to all alliances or collective security organizations in history. Therefore, the purpose of this project is not to create a new theory; rather, the goal here is to look at the history and development of NATO over time and apply the lessons learned to its future. This approach goes a bit against the traditional scholarly works regarding NATO’s future in that it uses the past to speculate what is possible in the future, whereas normally the discussions are focused on what NATO should be and not on what the Alliance has been and is.

This project is broken into two large sections: the first one addresses the theory, while the second one focuses on the empirical evidence to support the theoretical speculation. Therefore, chapter two provides the literature review regarding the scholarship on collective security and alliances, and concludes with the most recent theoretical approach of security communities. Furthermore, chapter two exposes the gaps in literature to date and positions NATO in the context of the theoretical concepts discussed.

The theoretical discussion, then, provides an opening for the empirical substantiation of the theoretical arguments. Chapter three, therefore, presents the story of
NATO's birth, accounting for the narratives of collective security and the collective defense, their roles in the creation of the Alliance, and impact on and interaction with each other in the immediate post-WWII environment. The discussion here is framed in the context of collective security structure and alliances, with the factual history of NATO's origins guided by the narratives mentioned above. The first part of this chapter focuses on dialogues and discourses prior to April 4th, 1949, the date the when the North Atlantic Treaty was signed. The second section addresses the North Atlantic Treaty itself and the organizational arrangement of the Alliance. Both sections are structured around and centered on the concepts of collective security and collective defense, and the relation of those two narratives to each other.

The factual story of North Atlantic Treaty Organization begins not in April 1949 but rather with the end of the World War II and the need to create a stable and secure world order. If one were to examine the beginnings of NATO from the perspective of power, the account appears to be simple. On one hand, there is the Soviet Union and its conquered European satellites, balanced on the other side of the Iron Curtain by the United States and Western Europe. Each side tries to maintain and maximize its security in the face of threat from the enemy. However, the narrative of the North Atlantic Alliance is incomplete without accounting for the more complicated and intangible normative nature of the organization focused on collective security.

NATO's birth was preceded by a long line of sometimes successful and at times futile attempts at collective security institutions, such as the Concert of Europe, the League of Nations, and the United Nations. One of the goals of those institutions was to establish and promote collective security environment, setting certain standards of
acceptable behavior among nations, conducive to resolving disagreements and disputes through peaceful means, rather than resorting to conflict. Therefore, it would be foolish and rather superficial to say that NATO was created only to counteract the power of the Soviets and protect Europe against their aggression. It would be equally imprudent to assume that NATO’s role today is only to show other organizations, regions, and the world, how the international security environment should operate. Rather, the story of NATO combines both, the collective security and alliances narratives, as it has been proven through its past and present, and which certainly applies to its future.

Chapter three, therefore, presents the story of NATO’s birth, accounting for the narratives of collective security and the collective defense, their roles in the creation of the Alliance, and impact on and interaction with each other in the immediate post-WWII environment. Furthermore, this chapter shows that at the point of NATO’s creation, collective security and defense characteristics were reinforcing each other to such an extent that neither would have been possible and durable without the other. The unique circumstances based on the combination of commonality of goals and values inside the Alliance, and the common perception of threat from the outside, allowed and encouraged the collective security and defense to harmonize. In other words, this specific combination of collective security and collective defense showed a direct structural dependency on the international environment.

The fourth chapter follows NATO’s history in regards to its nature as an alliance and as a collective security organization in the next period of its existence, namely the Cold War. This chapter begins with the day considered by some to be the effective beginning of the Cold War; namely, June 25th, 1950 which is remembered in history as
the day when the North Korean troops crossed the 38th parallel and invaded South Korea. As previously indicated, the beginning of the Korean War was a watershed moment in the history of NATO as well. Given the change in the external environment, in June 1950, the Alliance was faced with a more immediate sense of threat from the side of communism, threat that carried potentially more wide-spread and heavy consequence than thought before. Accordingly, NATO would have to prepare to respond to this new scope of potential threat. At this point, the story of the East-West conflict extended from Europe to Asia. The Soviet Union and China appeared much stronger to the West, and the potential of communist expansion in the Asian continent presented a vital threat to the US and European security.

The interaction between the collective security and defense narratives in this period support the patterns shown in the previous period, centered on NATO’s creation. The case of Germany’s accession into the Alliance demonstrates that those two narratives are still running parallel and reinforcing each other. Furthermore, they are as imperative for each other’s existence as was the case with the origins of NATO. In addition, both of the narratives still show high degree of dependency on the structural environment. The increased perception of threat coming out of the Soviet Union in the wake of the Korean War pushed the alliance narrative. The symptom or sign of that push was Germany’s joining.

In the same time, despite concerns from Great Britain and France about German propensity for conflict, Germany was incorporated into the Alliance as a democratic state. From the position of other allies, Germany would be from now on kept in check as well
and socialized to behave according to the internal security standards of the Alliance—here the narrative of collective security is clearly displayed.

The second case discussed in this chapter, NATO’s policy regarding nuclear capabilities, and the long-stretched process of disagreements and negotiations, was guided not by the incompatibility of goals and values, but rather by the divergent perceptions of what is the best policy for the European members given the Soviet threat. Therefore, this case shows that despite protracted periods of discord, the alliance and collective security natures of NATO remained untouched. Even the French withdrawal from the command structure of the organization did not leave any long term negative effects. France remained in the political structures of NATO, was still covered under NATO’s umbrella in terms of external security, and in 2009 returned into the command structure.

The two cases chosen for this time period represent the pattern of cohesion and agreement among the NATO allies, interrupted by the dissonance and disagreements over means but not goals—the goals still remained those of internal and external security. The example of West German accession into the Alliance and the MLF story show the organization in its time of cooperation, albeit characterized by heated discussion and negotiations. In both cases, it is important to mention the structural environment. In 1955, the perception of threat coming from the Soviet Union was heightened, pushing for a more cohesive combination of collective security and defense.

On the other hand, during the MLF negotiations, the Cold War was going through the period of détente and changed nature of cooperation between the West and the East. For the Europeans, this meant a perception of decreased threat. Within the Transatlantic
Alliance at that time, there was a divergence of opinions as to the means that the internal and external security can be accomplished, but not the divergence of opinions as to the need for those types of security. Therefore, despite heated discussions and disagreements on means, alliance and collective security progressed, albeit at a slower pace.

In chapter five, the narratives of collective security and collective defense exit the Cold War environment and enter the decade of uncertainty regarding the past enemies and future allies. In this decade, the rationality and utility of NATO’s existence will be questioned, and the Alliance emerges from this barrage with an expanded number of members and undefined set of goals. The second part of NATO’s nature, however, the collective security component, will become clearer and will overshadow the alliance character, redefining the organization’s role in Europe. In regards to the international environment, another set of unknowns emerges. The political fate of Central and Eastern Europe remains to be determined; Russia will slowly embark on the path towards illiberal democracy, and a set of intangible transnational threats will come to the forefront of decision making regarding NATO’s strategy for the future.

Again here, the structural changes are important to emphasize. The perception of threat changes in the post-Cold War environment. Not only is the threat intangible, in contrast to the Cold War period when the Soviet Russia was the clear and predictable enemy, but that threat is also hard to understand and define. After 1991, the threat acquires a hybrid nature, combining many immeasurable elements of transnational nature. Subsequently, the scope of internal and external security goals changes as well into the area of basic human security.
With this changing structure, we also begin to see a different pattern of behavior between the narratives of collective security and collective defense. In that sense, we see the reinforcement of the structure of the international environment as the driver in that relationship. In this period, collective security narrative starts to play a more integral role over the collective alliance element. This change is a direct result of the inability to pin down, define, and measure the new concept of threat. Rather, the threat becomes a multifaceted set of threats which needs to be address by multifaceted capabilities and structures.

Despite all the knowns and unknowns, to use the words or Robert McNamara, one thing became clear in this first post-Cold War decade of NATO’s existence; namely, that the role of NATO as a collective security arrangement not only overshadowed its function as an alliance, but effectively left it in the dust. One of the major and most detrimental developments of NATO in that period, enlargement of the organization to Central and Eastern Europe, had very little to do with its nature as an alliance and everything to do with its character as a collective security. While the political shape and stability of Russia remained uncertain, the push for inclusion of Central and Eastern European region in the Alliance, a process which continues still today, had as its fundament the spread of norms of peaceful behavior based on the principles of democracy at its heart.

The last empirical section, chapter six, looks at NATO in the post-2001 environment. As discussed earlier, the international environment in this most recent decade is characterized by more intangible, transnational threats and issues, quite different than the nature of threats during the Cold War and the immediate post-Cold War
decade. In that respect, NATO must readjust its scope, goals and means to meet those new threats. The year 2001, marked by the 9/11 attacks on the United States, serves as the watershed moment. For the first time in the history of NATO, the Article V was evoked in defense of the United States.

Given the trends of the collective security and collective defense narratives prevalent in the 1990s, the natural assumption would have been that NATO continues to absorb more and more collective security characteristics at the expense of the alliance narrative. While that is the case in reference to the Alliance’s engagement in Afghanistan, the out-of-area NATO operation under the auspices of the UN, the Allies themselves have an increasingly difficult time agreeing on the Alliance’s goals and means in Afghanistan. Furthermore, there is an increasing discord regarding the role of NATO in European and international security. Therefore, while the members seem to appreciate the idea of NATO as a collective security organization, spreading its collective security principles outside of Europe, they are not willing to provide practical and financial commitment to realize that noble idea.

In chapter six, NATO’s involvement in Afghanistan serves as the framework for analysis of its dual nature as an alliance and a collective security organization. Going back to the elements used in the previous chapters, we look at the international environment, internally and externally first. Internally, the expansion of NATO in Europe in continuing, encompassing more and more democratic states who see NATO as an effective vehicle for security. Externally, however, the international system is still operating in the structure of unipolarity, with the US at the helm, albeit the power of the
US is slowly declining. Furthermore, the external threats in this environment remain intangible and hard to define, and encompass both state as well as transnational threats.

In this environment, what is happening with the narratives of collective security and collective defense in the framework of NATO? The pattern of development from the last decade of the twentieth century, discussed in the previous chapter, continues. NATO’s role as a collective security arrangement, or more as a security community for Europe, grows, whereas its role as an alliance remains in decline. NATO members have an increasingly difficult time agreeing on what constitutes an external threat, how to deal with it, and who is going to pay for the capabilities to deal with that threat.

The involvement of the organization in Afghanistan shows a few possible directions for the Alliance in the future: Afghanistan’s issues with political instability, terrorism, and opium trade present threats to Europe and, as such, belong in the realm of NATO’s responsibilities, despite the fact that Afghanistan is outside of the European area. If that is the case, then it is clear that the nature and scope of threats are changing and NATO is responding to that change. The second direction is that of NATO as a collective security organization—in this case, NATO is broadening its scope and area of operations to Afghanistan. In this scenario, Afghanistan poses a threat to the broader international community and needs to be addressed as a practical and moral obligation. As a prolonged effort which is in its eight year now, Afghanistan serves as a test case for NATO members’ ability to come to agreements on policies and carry those policies effectively. The jury is still out on the success of NATO’s mission in Afghanistan, and in a similar fashion, on the role of NATO in European and international security.
Having said that, the fact that despite all the disagreements and problems NATO remains a key security institution in Europe, still bringing together the Transatlantic partners, shows that the utility of NATO has not diminished. However, the picture is not quite that rosy. On the other hand, NATO has sustained a significant loss of authority in the eyes of the members’ domestic audiences and external partners, significantly undermining the practical effectiveness of the Alliance in the international environment and its ability to spread its norms of democratic peace and stability. All allies seemed to agree that the future of the alliance rested, in large part, on the success of the mission in Afghanistan.

However, NATO has moved slowly to deal with the problems in Afghanistan, contrary to its public statements on the importance of the mission in Afghanistan. Furthermore, rather than emphasize the connective nature of collective security and alliance, which would be beneficial to both NATO and Afghanistan, NATO members continue to disagree on the means and goals of the organization, to the detriment of both, the Alliance’s relevance and purpose, as well as its effectiveness.

Chapter seven, finally, provides the summary of the main arguments made throughout this project and concludes with speculation on the future shape and role of NATO, given its most recent development regarding transformation and extension of partnership encompassing many states, other external international organizations, and issues. Furthermore, the main thesis of this project, namely that NATO throughout its history has displayed characteristics of an alliance and a collective security institutions; and secondly, that if NATO wants to remain relevant and effective for the external and internal security of the Transatlantic area, it must continue its development and
integration in the direction of collective security organization, while maintaining the functional structure of the alliance, will be reinforced again.
CHAPTER II
THEORY OF COLLECTIVE SECURITY AND COLLECTIVE DEFENSE
RECONSIDERED

As the meaning and purpose of power begins to shift, so, too, does the meaning and purpose of security.¹

Emanuel Adler and Michael Barnett, 1998

INTRODUCTION

This chapter provides the theoretical framework of alliance and collective security concepts, outlining the interaction of those two ideas, and leading into the discussion of security communities. The first section presents a general introduction into and review of literature on alliances and collective security theories. Section two discusses NATO’s dual nature as an alliance and a collective security arrangement as presented in the literature to date. The third part of this chapter, in turn, introduces in detail the concept of security communities, which, in the context of this paper, is used as the beginning and final point for collective security institutions, and, consequently as a basis for explaining NATO as a combination of a collective security institution and an alliance.

Subsequently, this chapter exposes the gaps in the literature to date addressing NATO in this dual light and the ways in which this research fills in some of those gaps.

The focal approach of this chapter, namely the security communities, begs an explanation. The concept of security communities, as explored by Van Wagenen, Deutsch, Adler, and Barnett mainly, indirectly brings together the elements of alliances

¹ Adler and Barnett, Security Communities, 3.
and collective security, and with that, serves as the theoretical framework that best addresses and explains this dual nature of NATO. Especially the most recent approach to security communities developed by Adler and Barnett account for the fundamentals of NATO’s creation and the direction in which the Alliance is going today. However, the literature on security communities does not talk about the interaction of those two elements of alliances and collective security, and most importantly their exclusive nature as represented by the literature to date. Furthermore, Alder and Barnett do not focus on tracing this particular type of NATO’s development through the history of the Alliance. This project, therefore, fills in those two particular gaps.

Also, one must ask: if NATO through its history displayed the characteristics of both a collective security arrangement and an alliance, why has its dual character not been recognized in the theoretical and practical literature on the Alliance? The answer that comes to mind is simple: the two theoretical concepts, collective security and alliances, traditionally have been treated as distinctly separate, and oftentimes as mutually exclusive. This chapter directly addresses the distinct groups of scholars who treated those two concepts as mutually exclusive and inclusive of each other.

The structure of this chapter follows the logical path of theoretical development in terms of chronology, as well as causality. The discussion of alliances begins and focuses on neorealism, followed by the neoliberal institutionalism. Chronologically, neoliberalism developed in the footsteps of neorealism and was based on the need to explain cooperative trends in the international community which neorealism was not addressing. The section on security communities, in turn, comes directly after the discussion on NATO in the context of neorealism and neoliberalism, again following the
chronological path of theory development. The concept of security communities combines institutionalism and constructivism. Constructivism, a post-positivist theory, emerged to fill in the gaps in the understanding of the international system, its structures and actors left open by the positivist theories.

ALLIANCES AND COLLECTIVE SECURITY

Before we delve too far into the theories of alliances and collective security, we need to understand the application and practical value of such an approach to NATO and its future. Traditionally and generally, since its conception, NATO has been seen and analyzed as an alliance, and, consequently, approached through the lens of the realist school of thought. However, ‘traditionally’ and ‘generally’ do not always mean right or complete. In the minds of the founding fathers of NATO, and as noted in the chapter three addressing the first years of the Alliance, the organization was created as an alliance against the threat of the Soviet Union and as a collective security arrangement designed to uphold and promote the Western values of democracy and capitalism. Similarly, in the past decade, there has been a noticeable return among scholars and practitioners to discussing NATO’s future, if there is to be one, in the framework of collective security, rather than a pure alliance.

Although rather infrequently, over the timeline of NATO’s existence, the politicians involved in the issues of security and defense, and theoreticians alike, perceived NATO as both: an alliance and a creator of an international security environment. To mention just a few: in 1954, the first Secretary General of NATO, Lord Hastings Lionel Ismay referred to the birth of the Alliance in those words: “In signing
the Treaty, twelve independent sovereign states—later to be joined by others—undertook pledges which called for immediate and continuous collective action, not only in the military, but also in the political, economic and social fields.”

After the end of the Cold War and the disappearance of the external threat against which NATO as an alliance was created, Warren Christopher, the US Secretary of State under President Clinton, saw the central goal of NATO and the US security policy as a “help to extend to all of Europe the benefits and obligations of the same liberal trading and collective security order that have been pillars of strength for the West.” In 1995, Richard Holbrooke, the former US Ambassador to the UN, wrote that “NATO’s core purpose of collective defense remains, but new goals and programs have been added. Collective crisis management, out-of-area force projection, and the encouragement of stability to the east… have been undertaken. Static forces… have been turned into… flexible multinational corps designed to respond to a different, less stable world.” In 1998, Secretary of State Madeleine Albright positioned NATO as “the broader concept of the defense of our common interests.”

Holbrooke, along with many other politicians and theorists, puts NATO in the context of historical developments designed to build security architecture for Europe: 1815 Congress of Vienna; 1919 Versailles Treaty; and the United Nations. However, as he aptly points out, in 1947 “the most successful peacetime collective security system in history, centered around the Truman Doctrine, the Marshall Plan, NATO, Atlantic

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3 Holbrooke, 40.
4 Ibid., 42-43.
partnership—and American leadership." Therefore, it is clear that even if theorists generally had a hard time classifying NATO as a collective security arrangement, politicians already saw those traits in the organization from its beginning in 1949.

On the side of the theoretical discussion on NATO, Andrew Bennett and Joseph Lepgold provide a comprehensive summary of realist, liberal and institutional approaches to collective security and alliances, using the examples of the Concert of Europe, the League of Nations and the United Nations as collective security arrangements. However, they effectively exclude NATO from that club, mentioning briefly that NATO follows in the tradition of those organizations but it is, effectively and practically, an alliance.

To follow with wide and comprehensive works on the subject, Emanuel Adler and Michael Barnett wrote in 1998: "Whereas once security meant military security, now states are identifying 'new' security issues that revolve around economic, environmental, and social welfare concerns and have ceased to concern themselves with military threats from others within the community." Their premise is that given the change in threat, the security arrangements that were created originally against a state-centered, tangible threat have a necessity to shift their nature to accommodate the intangible, transnational threats for which pure military scope is not sufficient.

This first section of chapter two, therefore, frames the ideas presented in this project in a larger body of literature on alliances and collective security specifically, in an attempt to position this paper in the existing research and show how it complements the

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6 Holbrooke, 39.
field and fills in the potential gaps. While there is somewhat of a disagreement among scholars whether alliances and collective security belong together, this project treats alliances and collective security as complementary fields, based on identification of common goals, assumption, and means between those two concepts.

From the first look it becomes clear that the most dominant approach to both collective security and alliances are the positivist theories, narrowed down by the neoliberal institutionalism in case of collective security and neorealist school of thought in reference to alliances. However, while the approaches to alliances remained relatively unchanged, the scholarship on collective security has been recently undergoing significant developments in the direction of post-positivist theories, namely culturalism, constructivism and normative theories. Furthermore, in addition to international relations theories, the academics have been incorporating elements of comparative theories such as theories of regionalism and integration to effectively explain the creation of security organizations and communities.

The fields within the literature on alliances that have been addressed to date include: alliance formation, alliance configuration/polarization, effects of alliances on military conflict, connections between alliances and trade, and the economics of alliances.9 Most notably, however, the potential current or future merger between alliances and collective security is not addressed at all. Similarly, the post-positivist approach to the concept of alliances is touched upon very peripherally, mostly in the literature on institutions and the norms built by those institutions. However, security

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institutions are very different in nature, function, and role from the larger body of institutions and deserve separate consideration.

As is outlined in this chapter, the basic difference in the traditional understanding of collective security and alliances concerns the reason for their creation—in other words, their goal. Collective security arrangements are created to establish the internal norm of behavior within that arrangement that would create and maintain peace and stability. Alliances, on the other hand, are arrangements with a goal of protecting their members from an external threat.

As are the cases with both fields of research, in reference to the relationship between collective security and alliances, more recent works have been showing a complementary relationship between the two, rather than separate concepts as has been the case in the traditional approaches. An alternative explanation of the relationship between collective security and alliances maintains that collective defense arrangements can progress into collective security institutions. This is especially true in some recent literature regarding North Atlantic Treaty Organization, although such approaches are very rare and limited.

This section begins with the general scope of alliances and collective security places in the scholarly field, followed by the review of specific concepts related to both. The section outlining the current research focusing on the relationship of those two concepts follows. This comprehensive overview of research to date, including definitions and operationalization of the terms and concepts used here, then, serves as basis for the theoretical approach based on security communities in respect to NATO.
THE FRAMEWORK OF ALLIANCES

The scholarship on alliances focuses on formation, types, performance, and alliance dynamics. In its most generic, this literature is about cooperation between states in the security field. More specifically, it tackles the issue of states responses to the imbalances of power they encounter in pursuit of their interests. Alliances are largely seen as more or less effective answers to states' inherent inability to balance on their own a superior opposing power. The authors active in the field of alliance theories talk about patterns of motivations, goals, strategies, resources, and structures which determine and reinforce the cooperative behavior of the alliance members. The existing literature on alliances shows that the discussion of the alliance management, cohesion, or functioning does not incorporate much of the interaction between the concepts of alliances and collective security, and the debate of normative factors of security alliances is peripheral at best.10

As this work deals mainly with alliances, looking inside and outside of the black box of this particular security organization, it is only fitting to explain in details what the concept of alliances means. Going back 2300 years, Indian philosopher Kautilya talked about alliances as one of six types of behavior of a state in relation to other states, later reiterated by Machiavelli. Although the recognition of importance of alliances goes far back, the academic literature on alliances can be more characterized by the lack of agreement, rather than consensus and coherence.

First, the definition of an alliance proves to be a tricky concept. In *Nations in Alliance*, the first modern comprehensive study of alliances, George Liska says “[a]lliances merely formalize alignments based on interests or coercion, but such formalizations have been more important for the “free world” and its leader than for the adversary.” This is as far as he goes in providing a definition of an alliance. George Modelski criticized this omission in a review of Liska’s book: “We learn here a great deal about how to make alliances work—for instance there is a most stimulating discussion of intra-alliance consultations and restraints. But paradoxically, we learn very little about what alliances in fact are; there is in this book surprisingly little general information about these arrangements.” In contrast, Modelski described alliances as “common defense,” with a premise that “defense is use of military power.”

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11 Holsti, Hopmann, and Sullivan, 1.


14 Modelski, 771.
Holsti, Hopmann, and Sullivan, the authors of the second attempt at a methodological study of alliances, point out that in many cases the terms alliance, alignment, coalition, pact, bloc, “defensive pact,” and “neutrality and nonaggression pact” are used interchangeably.\(^{15}\) They settle on defining an alliance as “a formal agreement between two or more nations to collaborate on national security issues.”\(^{16}\) The third and last major comprehensive work on alliances, Stephen Walt’s *The Origins of Alliances*, identifies an alliance as “a formal or informal relationship of security cooperation between two or more sovereign states.”\(^{17}\)

In the more recent years, Glenn Snyder combined the concept of alignments with alliances. He described alignments as “expectations of states about whether they will be supported or opposed by other states in future interactions.”\(^{18}\) Snyder, then, categorizes alliances as “simply one of the behavioral means to create or strengthen alignments. Thus alliances are a subset of alignments—those that arise from or are formalized by an explicit agreement, usually in the form of a treaty. The formalization adds elements of specificity, legal and moral obligation, and reciprocity that are usually lacking in informal alignments.”\(^{19}\) In 2004, Patricia Weitsman, in *Dangerous Alliances*, another attempt to comprehensively look at alliances and address gaps in the literature to date, defines alliances as “bilateral or multilateral agreements to provide some element of security to the signatories.”\(^{20}\)

\(^{15}\) Holsti, Hopmann, and Sullivan, 3.

\(^{16}\) Ibid., 4.


\(^{19}\) Ibid., 8.

\(^{20}\) Weitsman, *Dangerous Alliances*, 27.
In his review of literature on alliances, Michael Ward provides a very useful combination of characteristics that define alliances. Namely, he centers the definition of alliances on four features:

1. a collaborative relationship between at least two nation-states;
2. (potential) aggregation of military forces;
3. commonality of national security interests, typically viewed via a mutually perceived threat;
4. belief in the value of collective over individual action.  

The definition of alliances, then, includes both formal and less explicit security arrangements, including, as outlined by Singer and Small in their composition of the Correlates of War Project:

1. non-national security arrangements;
2. neutrality pacts entailing non-intervention against signatories;
3. entente which requires mutual consultation should inter-state hostilities involving co-signatories arise;
4. mutual defense pacts which obligate nations to militarily assist an ally if it is attacked by others.  

Given this broad scope of formal and informal definitions of alliances, it is clear that the academic community is yet to agree on one uniform definition of an alliance.

However, the discussion of the concept itself provided above forms a solid basis for

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understanding alliances for the purpose of this project, as well as conceptualizing the interactions among the members of this type of security organization, as well as the institutions and the outside environment. The next concept addressed here, therefore, is the alliance formation presented in the next section.

It is important to address the literature on alliance formation in the context of NATO, as the first case study in this project attempts to determine what elements impacted the creation of the North Atlantic Alliance. For this purpose, it is pertinent to understand the theoretical reasons for alliance creation. The explanations of alliances formation fall into two groups: external environment reasons and domestic, internal factors. The first group focuses on the structure of the international system and the type and level of threat—or its perception. The second group emphasizes the types of domestic systems more and less favorable to creating alliances and the power of national interests. While there is an ample body of literature regarding alliance formation, no single analytical framework exists.23 However, one would be hard pressed to find an explanation for alliance formation that does not fit within the neorealist school of thought. Furthermore, the fundamental reasons for alliance formation, in turn, provide the rationale for the internal functioning of alliances.

The first most prominent causal basis for states' alignments fitting in the first group outlines in earlier is the balance of power theory.24 Within this approach, the reasons for alliance formation are determined by the external environment, namely the

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23 Weitsman, Dangerous Alliances, 11.

number and power of state actors in the international system. In *Nations in Alliance*, George Liska says: “In theory, the relation of alliances to the balance of power is simple enough. Put affirmatively, states enter into alliances with one another in order to supplement each other’s capability. Put negatively, an alliance is a means of reducing the impact of antagonistic power, perceived as pressure, which threatens one’s independence.” Edvard V. Gulick argues that the perceived imbalance of power within the international system gives rise to creation of alliances.

To show a slightly different approach to the issue, Organski writes: “Alliances are formed when the balance of power is threatened.” In other words, merely the potential of a power imbalance, rather than the perception or existence of one, may push states to ally.

Hans Morgenthau sees alliances as a symptom of the balance of power in the international system: “The historically most important manifestation of the balance of power... is to be found not in the equilibrium of two isolated nations but in the relations between one nation or alliance of nations and another alliance.” In his understanding, therefore, alliances are a vehicle through which the balance of power in the international system is carried out. He further argues that alliances and coalitions are a function of the

balance of power guiding a multi-state international system. To sum up in the words of Kenneth Waltz: “If balance of power politics are pursued earnestly, the eventual result will be two nations or two alliances.” Alliances, therefore, in the neorealist theory, are an essential element of balance of power.

The second group of authors specializing in alliance literature generally maintains that alliances are born in response to a threat or a state’s perception of threat. Walt pointed out that alliances are not created in response to power, but rather to prevent and protect against a threat to that state. He defined this causal link in more specific terms two years later in his seminal work *The Origins of Alliances*. There, he writes:

States form alliances primarily to balance against threats…. In anarchy, states form alliances to protect themselves. Their conduct is determined by the threats they perceive, and the power of others is merely one element in their calculations (albeit an important one). The power of other states can be either a liability or an asset, depending on where it is located, what it can do, and how it is used. By incorporating the other factors that create threats to national sovereignty, balance of threat theory provides a better explanation of alliance formation than does balance of power theory.

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30 Ibid.
With his theory, Walt set up the predominant framework for future analysis of alliance formation.

Glenn Snyder and Randall Schweller represent the rationalist approach to alliance formation. Schweller, in “Bandwagoning for Profit,” shows that bandwagoning and balancing are not only motivated by the need of states to achieve greater security, but also “balancing is driven by the desire to avoid losses; bandwagoning by the opportunity for gain.”Accounting for gains and losses, the author uses the basic cost-benefit analysis of the rationalist approach, building onto the realist theories of alliance formation.

Glenn Snyder, on the other hand, talks about capability aggregation where the central value of alliances lies in the “enhanced deterrent from external attack as well as the greater capability to defend oneself.” He goes on to outline other costs and benefits the allies might pay and receive from one another, not necessarily related to security, again expanding on the realist approach. “[A]llies may give each other “side payments” on matter unrelated to their mutual defense commitments, such as free hand in some colonial venture or a promise to support the partner diplomatically in realizing interests in conflict with a third party.” In addition, Snyder lists perception costs of alliances: “ideologically similar states gain satisfaction by creating alliances; for adversaries, alliances of their opponents mean psychological costs. Furthermore, in terms of domestic factors, external alliances can strengthen or weaken the domestic regimes in power.”

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35 Schweller, 74.
36 Snyder, *Alliance Politics*, 44.
37 Ibid.
38 Ibid., 45.
Slightly different take on alliance formation is introduced by Patricia Weitsman in what she calls an “alliance paradox.”39 While the main goal of alliances is to increase the security of its members, sometimes states will enter into alliances with their enemies in order to either face an external threat or to contain each other—the old fashioned wisdom of “keeping your friends close and enemies closer.” A fitting example of such an alliance was the Concert of Europe designed by Great Britain at the end of Napoleonic Wars and after the fall of France. One of the goals of the Congress System, if not the most important one, was to contain France, Austro-Hungarian Empire, Russia and Prussia—a group of natural enemies who warred each other for most of their existence as sovereign states—and establish an institution where they would keep one another in check.

Following the reasons for why states may choose to form alliances, the questions of the size of alliances comes to mind. This question especially brings up to light the recent expansions of NATO and their effect on the effectiveness and overall functioning of the Alliance. William Riker, in *Theory of Political Coalition*, talks about the “size principle.”40 In the frame of “n-person, zero-sum games in which side payments are permitted and for which players are assumed to be rational and possess complete information,”41 states will form minimal winning coalitions only. Minimal winning coalitions are those which “will no longer win were any member to withdraw from or fail to join the coalition.”42 Using the rationalist explanation, “the primary motivating reason for this is that member will seek to maximize the size of the individual payoffs; the fewer the number of members among which the payoffs must be shared, the larger they will

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41 Ward, 24.
42 Ibid.
be.\textsuperscript{43} It is also important to account for the costs of implementing an alliance. Siverson and McCarty posit that states will form alliances larger than minimum required in order to spread the costs of alliance formation.\textsuperscript{44} However, they do not address the later stages of alliances in terms of number of members.

This section outlined the major theoretical approaches which explain the reasons for alliance formation, including balance of power, balance of threat, and extending the realist theories to rationalism. The inquiry of why states enter into alliance, then, begs to question with whom one should ally and how those particular security institutions operate. The next section explores the way in which states choose their partners, be it major, medium or small powers.

One of the fundamental concepts introduced in this project is the role of the alliances. Hence, the questions of how a state chooses its security partners and what sorts of partners are chosen must be addressed. While so far the major discourse on the concept of alliances and alliance formation was dominated by the realist and neorealist approaches, the choice of partners in alliances is explained mainly by cultural factors and commonalities. And here again, the theoretical discussion sets the stage for later accounts of NATO’s choices of members at the moment of its creation, as well as in the later years.

The choice of partners depends, first and foremost, on the degree of commonality of security interests, and the type and strengths of dangers which the potential member-states face. Weaker states will align with stronger once they find themselves in face of perceived threats; states that do not posses significant military capability will enter into

\textsuperscript{43} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{44} Ibid.
collaborative arrangements with those that do. New states, underdeveloped, and developing nations tend to avoid entering into alliances. On the other hand, "politically and economically stable nations are more likely to join alliances than are unstable ones." More in tune with neorealism, Rothstein addressed the behavior of small powers in alliances, as opposed to major powers. In his book, Rothstein posits that generally small powers are less likely to enter into alliances, because of unprofitable distribution of costs and benefits. On the other hand, great powers were likely to court small powers in an effort to ally with them only in cases where the outbreak of war was imminent.

Hans Morgenthau talks about ideological solidarity that binds states together. In other words, states will enter into alliances with other states who share similar political and cultural traits. Walt defines ideological solidarity as "a tendency for states with similar internal traits to prefer alignment with one another to alignment with states whose domestic characteristics are different." Russett proposes that social, political and cultural similarities among nations lead to comparable policies and positions in the international system, and, therefore, will entice actors to align. Gullick extends the commonalities of goals and interests to territorial proximity, arguing that effective

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48 See Morgenthau, Politics Among Nations.
security arrangements, including alliances, happen within the same region. But then again, as Fedder states, “ideology is at best inadequate in explaining why or how an alliance comes into existence.”

Here again, it is clear that in a similar fashion to the lack of agreement on the definition of alliances, the reasons for why states enter into such arrangements spread over a wide range. However, the reasoning of states can be boiled down to one simple equation: as Liska aptly points out “[a]lliances are formed primarily for security rather than out of sense of community.” And as Morgenthau qualified it: “Community of interests is a necessary but not sufficient condition for alliance.”

From the wide range of perspectives presented here, it becomes apparent that the authors in the field of security do not provide any one unified approach to the question of alliance formation. While this particular field of research on alliances is dominated by neorealism, other theories, including culturalism, and factors, such as geographical proximity, provide complementary explanations and analytical approaches.

Alliance commitments present yet another aspect of alliances which needs to be addressed. The extent to which allies fulfill their commitments represents the strength and effectiveness of an alliance, one of the concepts utilized in this project. Furthermore, fulfillment of commitments implies not only the physical cohesion of an alliance, but also the ability to set the acceptable rules of behavior and carry enough built-in punishment and reward mechanism for states to follow those rules within the alliance. The normative

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51 See Gulick.
53 Liska, 12-13.
factor discussed below, therefore, provides the connecting piece for later discussion of the factors and concepts associated with the collective security arrangements.

One of the commitments allies pledge to uphold is security; specifically, allies will not attack each other and provide assistance when another member faces threat. Singer and Small showed that “allies are more likely to come to the aid of and less likely to fight against one another than are nonallies.”55 Oddly enough, their systematic study of alliances demonstrated that “allies are more likely to remain neutral in international conflicts involving alliance members. That is, allies are most likely to avoid situations in which alliance members are involved directly in conflict.”56 However, on a more positive note, the authors also showed that “if a state does become involved in a conflict that also involves an ally, the level of commitment is a relatively good predictor to whether military aid will be rendered.57 Similarly, Holsti, Hopmann, and Sullivan posit that when a member of an alliance is attacked, the commitments of individual states in the alliance are more likely to be honored.58

The impact of alliances on international system is a disputed territory in the alliance literature. One school of thought maintains that alliances create stability and eliminate factors which may potentially lead to military conflict. Singer, Bremer, and Stucky explain this relationship in the following terms: “The argument rests on the assertion that peace will be a consequence of an international system having a clear structure of power relationships. Alliances... tend to increase the certainty of the structure of the international system by clarifying the positions of each of the potential

56 Ibid.
57 Ibid.
58 See Holsti, Hopmann, and Sullivan.
friends and foes to one another.  In other words, alliances contribute to finding balance of power in the international system, and they provide transparency of behavior, increasing predictability and with that decreasing the chances of war.

Among proponents of this view is Henry Kissinger who applied this logic to the counterbalance between the United States and the Soviet Union during the Cold War. The sets of alliances created around each of the poles, NATO in reference to Washington and Warsaw Pact in case of Moscow, provided foundation for the Cold War stability, unparallel in any other distribution of power in the international system—unipolarity or bipolarity. Osgood expanded on this logic proposing that “alliances reduce the potential for international conflict by minimizing the possibilities for major shifts to occur in the distribution of power in the international system.” In other words, as institutions, alliances would change slowly and rarely.

On the other hand, Kaplan, Liska and Waltz, among others, maintain that alliances tend to hamper the development of crosspressures which are thought to be beneficial in reducing both conflict and its escalation. Thus, because alliances create bondings which tend to serve as defining referents through which ingroup and outgroup distinctions are developed by national decision markers, they also lead to generation of conflicts which are not mediated by the influence of crosspressures.

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61 See Liska and Waltz, “International Structure.”
Alliances, therefore, lock states in arrangements which stop the natural shifts of power in the international system, which in turn, can lead to a different set of conflicts. Morgenthau expands on this view arguing that “alliances reduce the possible range of coalitions, thereby leading to a reduction of the ways in which conflicts may be peacefully resolved, and increasing the probability that they will be resolved through violent means. Thus, the process through which conflicts are escalated into wars is enhanced.” 62

As can be ascertained from the discussion above, the field of research on alliances is largely dominated by realism and neorealism. Furthermore, alliance literature is plagued by a vast array of definitions and approaches. As the neorealist and neoliberal schools of thought developed somewhat parallel with each other historically, complementing each other in the areas where they were lacking insights, this project also expands into the neoliberal assertions on institutions to explain the concepts of collective security and its role maintaining international peace and stability.

THE FRAMEWORK OF COLLECTIVE SECURITY

The regional security arrangements, such as alliances and concerts, have worked in the past to stabilize and protect the areas in question. They also have served as stepping-stones for or a structural arm of a more comprehensive global security arrangement, as was the case with NATO and the UN. Europe is often used as a model for a regional security, with a hope that a similar system can be established in other regions, leading eventually to a global security arrangement.

The current security arrangement in Europe was established with the help of the United States, offering the European nations its own power and legitimacy as a loan. Inherently, therefore, Europe and United States tied their security goals, even if the means for achievement are not the same. Divided by the Atlantic, in the post-Cold War environment, the US and Europe have supplemented each other’s capabilities in an attempt to install and maintain international stability. The question remains, however, if this collective security arrangement carries the potential to be extended beyond the borders of Europe.

The goal of upholding peace through collective security arrangements resurfaces after each war, with the focus on preventing yet another devastating conflict. The notion of collective security is a generally contested one, with as many as 12 different definitions, as Barry Buzan aptly points out. In order to define security, one must first ask: who is threatened, who is threatening, what is the threat, and what can stop that threat? Kupchan and Kupchan maintain that “collective security rests on the notion of all against one.” In other words, collective security is a regulated and institutionalized group of states that provide security for each other. Downs calls it an arrangement of a group of states to reduce security threats by first, agreeing on the norms and rules, and second, punishing a state that violates those norms and rules. He defines collective security as “collective commitment of a group to hold members accountable for the

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maintenance of an internal security norm." The major conditions for security regime, in his opinion, include the willingness of the hegemon to uphold the system, other states' compliance and cooperation, as well as mutuality of goals.

As one can see, there is a broad scope of understanding what constitutes collective security. The broadest definition applies to international institutions such as the League of Nations or the United Nations. In this respect, collective security is understood as a comprehensive organization, incorporating all states and regions, and designed to maintain stability and peace in the world system. In the case of collective security organizations, no one state is considered a threat; rather, threats are perceived on a systemic level. In a more narrow scope, some scholars argue that collective security may include coalitions, concerts and alliances, where the main goal of the organization is still to maintain stability and peace in the system, but they are created, and oftentimes sustained, because of a tangible threat, possibly presented by a state or a group of states.

Collective security encompasses different types of arrangements, based on structure, region, or issue. Betts writes that the term of collective security over time has been applied in reference to "1) the Wilsonian or ideal concept associated with... the League of Nations; 2) the Rio Pact, the United Nations, and anti-communist alliances including the UN Command in Korea, NATO, the US-Japan Mutual Security Treaty, SEATO, the Baghdad Pact, and CENTO; and 3) current proposals for organizations to codify peace in Europe." Therefore, collective security arrangements can be loose or rigid international institutions with a specific focus on internal security.

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68 Ibid.
Within the literature on collective security, irrespective of the approach, there is an assumption that collective security must encompass a broad scope of states. The examples oftentimes brought up in reference to collective security arrangements are the League of Nations, or its successor, the United Nations. However, the Concert of Europe, despite its regional limitations, already displayed very strong characteristics of the collective security arrangement in its design to create an international triangulation in Europe that would prevent conflict among its powers. In essence, the Concert of Europe had the same principle as collective security organizations at its heart: to provide a mechanism within an organization of states to maintain peace and security internally—in Europe. The assumption that collective security must encompass the whole or majority of the international system, therefore, should not be taken as a given. A collective security arrangement can be applied to a regional setting, such as is the case with NATO in regards to Europe. It might be that with time the arrangement might find itself in a position where the spread of its scope beyond North America and Europe might be welcomed or needed.

Moreover, when the question of global versus regional scope of security organization arises, Andrew Hurrell writes:

The notion of a global community of states is unreal and... regionally-based collective security systems are most likely to prove effective: because such groupings have a greater understanding of the causes and nature of security problems affecting the region; because the incentives for

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managing conflict are likely to be higher; and because there will be a
greater degree of consensus over basic values.\footnote{Andrew Hurrell, "Collective Security and International Order Revisited," \textit{International Relations} 11, no. 37 (1992): 40.}

While this was the case in the past, globalization is impacting that assumption. Many of
the crises that face various regions of the world are the same. That does not, however,
mean that there are no regional differences. It is possible to create an umbrella collective
security organization which sets a certain standard of behavior regarding peaceful
settlements of disputes, with smaller regional subgroups designed to target the security
problems endemic to that particular area.

Secondly, one of the largest obstacles to conquer in terms of any international
institution, and even more when security issues are concerned, is sovereignty. Alliances
imply less forfeiting of sovereignty and less external control of the organization over the
domestic politics. On the other hand, collective security arrangement carries with it more
external control over domestic politics of a state. The main question that arises here is
this: Is security against the threats dominant in the international system externally and
internally worth enough as a benefit to give up sovereignty to the degree required to
establish a legitimate and reliable collective defense and security organization?

The basic idea of institutions comes from the neoliberal school of thought,
somewhat counterintuitive to the general approach to international security dominated by
neorealism. Institutions are defined as "rules and norms around which actors

As mentioned earlier, Stephen Walt pointed out that ideology binds states together.\footnote{See Walt, \textit{Origins of Alliances}.} This importance of common ideology is nowhere more clearly visible than in Europe and the creation of the European Union and North Atlantic Treaty Organization. As pointed out by Gulick and explained earlier, aside from geography and commonality of interests, the similarities in historical, cultural, and political ideologies made the creation of the EU and NATO as institutions, effective and functioning over long period of time, possible.

In terms of security, the more similar ideologically states are, the more they are likely to ally to balance what they perceive as a threat. Stephen Walt finds that balancing behavior explains best pattern of alliances in post-WWII Middle East.\footnote{Ibid.} Although the Middle East can hardly serve as an exemplary region for peace, similar idea was used in
the post-Napoleonic Concert of Europe. However, while common ideology and legitimacy are easier to find regionally, globally they are much more difficult to maintain. Here, the example of the League of Nations comes to mind. Based on Wilsonian idealism, the two major European powers, Germany and Russia, were not members. While Germany later joined and withdrew, Russia never was a member of the League of Nations. And, as E.H. Carr aptly pointed out in *The Twenty Year's Crisis*, legitimacy cannot exist without the support of the power.\(^7\) The off-spring of the League of Nations, the United Nations, has been internationally recognized for setting the norms and rules in an attempt to create a universal ideology, even if the enforcement mechanism is still rather weak.

However, despite commonality of values and goal, the question that remains to be answered regards the issue of one of the members of the collective security arrangement potentially becoming an aggressor. At this point, the two fundamentals of collective security, the concert and enforcement are compromised and at odds with each other. Here, Inis Claude provides an answer. Claude points out that a collective security arrangement should never run into a problem of states going against the regime because collective security assumes a concert that occasionally becomes a concert-minus-one-or-a-few; it relies upon the expectation that, in any given situation, most states—enough to constitute a preponderant force—will remain loyal to the system and will act upon the belief that their interests require them to join in suppressing a challenge to the order of the system.... Every system of law and order prescribed obedience to rules and provides for the contingency of disobedience.... No system for the maintenance of order needs to work unless some violators of rules are

likely to appear, or can work unless most of its members obey and support the effectuation of its rules.80

The next question brings up the ideas of justice and the relationship between legitimacy, power, and responsibility. If we have an international collective security arrangement where a few major powers monitor the behavior of states, is this system based on fairness and justice or is it based on the dominance of power? “The questions of availability and desirability of collective security are linked, operationally, in the conditions for its establishment and functioning, and in our willingness, and that of other nations, to make the necessary investment.”81 The answer to this can be found in the levels of commitment and the longevity of both the institutions and stability of the internal system. “If the goal of an international regime of collective security will never command the investment, then it cannot really be a policy, no matter how unarguable it may be as a need, or how attractive it may be as a remedy.”82

Furthermore, the responsibility for upholding stability and peace in the international system, and in this case in the regional context, has traditionally been assigned to major powers, again by scholars such as E.H. Carr, Earl Ravenal or John Ikenberry, and political leaders such as Presidents Woodrow Wilson, Franklin Delano Roosevelt or Harry Truman. Inis Claude holds the responsibility of major powers for the international system as a whole as self-evident. “Singly and jointly, the great powers are responsible for managing the international system. Like it or not, they constitute its

82 Ibid.
board of directors, as has been clear at least since the 1815 Congress of Vienna." In more specific and practical terms, the major powers "bear the burden of restraining the unruly—a category that might include themselves or each other but is not limited to their own ranks. It is their task to protect the weak and to feed the poor." Inis Claude goes even further in assigning the responsibility for international peace and stability to the powerful by accounting for both realist and liberal values: "The prospects of political freedom, human rights, and social justice... depend largely upon what they do and refrain from doing. The... international system, the rules of its operation, and the way it is organized are determined in considerable measure by their policies. Credit or blame for the state of the world devolves largely upon the great powers."85

In practical terms, there is a need for leadership within institutions of any kind, especially when they are created and before they reach full maturity—in the case of collective security, before they become fully integrated and institutionalized.

There have... been repeated arguments that an effective collective security system requires leadership and that collectivity that matters will consist of a smaller group of like-minded states with the effective (as opposed to theoretical) power to enforce their decisions. On this more limited view collective security is no more than the willingness of one bloc of states to uphold international law on the basis of motives that will inevitably be mixed.86

84 Ibid.
85 Ibid.
This position can be expanded to a group of states with varied degrees of power but of the same or similar mindset and willing to enter into an organized institution providing collective security.

However, not all international systems would allow for such a collective security community to work. Is it possible that globalization equalizes the power among states to the extent that while there might be a major power or two, no state would be able to gain preponderant power? Stephen Ambrose and Douglas Brinkley argue that while the United States is still a major power, the economic decline of the 1990s, combined with a fundamental change which effectively decreased the gap between the United States and other major powers had introduced the international environment where the US will not be able to become again a preponderant power in any short or distant foreseeable future.\textsuperscript{87} The same argument can be extended to other major states. Therefore, when we think of the longevity of any collective security organization and we take into account what we consider to be foreseeable future, it is plausible to argue that no state will be strong enough to stand up to the collective.\textsuperscript{88}

Who should be encompassed by collective security? Again, in the past the focus has been on states that sought to ensure their sovereignty and non-intervention, the concepts that have defined majority of international relations history but that are rapidly changing today. Going back to the goal of collective security discussed earlier, the current international environment sets a stage for conflict between the principle of sovereignty and the potential threats that have a tendency to disregard boundaries.


\textsuperscript{88} Here, the distance of foreseeable future is applied to the environment in which, given the current level of theoretical understanding and factual knowledge, we can account for the variables determining the conditions.
Hurrell writes in 1992: “Rousseau... could see all too clearly that, whilst leagues of states might create peace between their members, they might also serve to reinforce and exacerbate broader patterns of conflict.” If you have an organized group of states, the countries that are not included might see the organized group as a potential threat, increasing the level of conflict. And here again, involuntarily, the international actors would fall into the realist security dilemma. However, in such a case, the collective security arrangement would be providing the internal stability and peace, while the alliance component would target the external threat.

Once we have already established some sort of loose or rigid collective security arrangements among a group of states, what form of collective action would be appropriate and acceptable? “Collective security involves a shared understanding of what kinds of force have been proscribed and also a shared acceptance that a breach of the peace threatens the interests of all states. It also involves a shared willingness to act effectively to enforce the law and to protect those interests.... Rationality would ensure compliance.” For the same reason why most states follow the guidelines of international law, enforcement might not be necessary in all instances. Simple shadow of the future element, characteristic of international institutions, would provide build in benefits to cooperate and punishments in cases of defection. It might also be that in case of security, traditionally considered to be high politics, the degree of benefit and punishment would be higher in instances of collective security arrangements. The benefit of cooperation is security of the group, internal and external, while the punishment is the lack of that same security, internally and externally.

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90 Ibid., 41.
While the goal of alliances is easy to define, as it is focused on the tangible, external threat, the goals of collective security arrangements are more difficult to identify, especially in the current international environment. The changing nature of sovereignty is one of the dominant trends in the scholarship in and practice of international politics. With that, the field of international security is not impervious to the changing, and challenged, concept of sovereignty. Kenneth Thompson very aptly points out the application of this change to the concept of collective security:

The soul of collective security has been formed by the growth of practical morality. The chief characteristic of social behavior in the late nineteenth and early twentieth century has been the increasing attention paid to all forms of humanitarian projects. In medieval society the thoughts of eliminating war or poverty was rarely given serious attention. War and poverty were conceived of as abiding moral problems and defects and flaws in a universal moral order…. This philosophy, as well as the theological concepts undergirding it, was swept away by the Age of the Enlightenment. In its place the West seemed to accept the creed of democratic liberalism with its aim of abolishing all ills and diseases disturbing the body social.91

This trend has been embodied even more clearly and seen more prominently in the recent talk about the concept of responsible sovereignty.92 Responsible sovereignty or the responsibility to protect, in Ban Ki Moon’s definition, is a concept build on understanding sovereignty as a responsibility, rather than a right of a state to be taken for granted. Adopted in 2005 by the World Summit, the concept of responsible sovereignty

indicated that states recognize their moral and legal obligation to "protect their populations—whether citizens or not—from genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity, and from their incitement. They declared... that [they] accept that responsibility and will act in accordance with it."93

The concept of responsible sovereignty rests on three pillars. The first pillar is outlined above. The second pillar refers to the collective strength of the United Nations as an institution and its comparative advantage. In other words, the UN as an international community commits itself to “assists states in meeting these obligation” proactively, rather than “just to react one they have fail to meet their prevention and protection obligations.”94 The third pillar takes into consideration the need for a response in a “timely and decisive manner, in accordance with the United Nations Charter, to help protect populations from the four listed crimes and violations.”95 The response could involve any of the whole range of UN tools such as “pacific measures under Chapter VI of the Charter, coercive ones under Chapter VII, and/or collaboration with regional and subregional arrangements under Chapter VIII. They key lies in an early and flexible response, tailored to the specific needs of each situation.”96

While this understanding and application of responsible sovereignty was adopted by the UN, in academic field the concept of responsible sovereignty provided the new foundations for international security, taking into account the new triangulation of threats and capabilities. In this context, responsible sovereignty means that “sovereignty entails

93 Ibid.
94 Ibid.
95 Ibid.
96 Ibid.
obligations and duties to one’s own citizens and to other sovereign states.\textsuperscript{97} There is an associated with this concept need of states to cooperate across borders to safeguard common resources and prevent common threats.

The idea of responsible sovereignty was initially introduces by Francis Deng in 1996. He wrote: “national governments are duty bound to ensure minimum standards of security and social welfare for their citizens and be accountable both to the national body public and the international community.”\textsuperscript{98} This concept vastly differs from the traditional understanding of sovereignty as determined by the Treaty of Westphalia, or what is commonly referred to as Westphalian sovereignty. In that respect, sovereignty meant equality of states as international actors and non-interference in each other’s territories, based on the principle of state’s right to independent decision-making.

The goal of sovereignty was to provide a framework or a principle for the stability and the security of the international system. Today, given the inseparable link between national and international security, “the sovereign state’s responsibility and accountability to both domestic and external constituencies must be affirmed as interconnected principles of the national and international order. Such a normative code is anchored in the assumption that in order to be legitimate, sovereignty must demonstrate responsibility. At the very least that means providing for the basic needs of its people.”\textsuperscript{99}

While there is a need for the normative principle for behavior for a collective security arrangement, there is also the basic practical need. In his 2007 book \textit{Security}


\textsuperscript{99} Ibid., xvii.
First, Amitai Etzioni makes a very strong case for basic human security as a necessary prerequisite of domestic and international stability. By basic security, he means “the conditions under which most people, most of the time, are able to go about their lives, venture onto the street, work, study, and participate in public life (politics included), without acute fear of being killed or injured—without being terrorized.”

The concept of basic human security, in turn, brings to focus the problems of changing nature of threat, which goes hand in hand with the concept of sovereignty undergoing such a strong transformation and being under such an attack by the practically of the international system and the scholarly community alike. As Bruce Jones et al point out: “This is the world of transnational threats, where the actions—or inaction—of people and governments anywhere in the world can harm others thousands of miles away. It is a world where sovereign states acting alone are incapable of protecting their citizens.

When talking about the question of changing nature and perception of threat and potential institutions to protect against that threat, the simple question of “protection against what” comes to mind of academics and political leaders, especially those responsible for getting the funding and selling the concepts to their audiences. The mechanism against the state threats is already built in the fundamental concept of collective security—namely, both its mindset and institutional organization. However, the issue of non-state threats opens a new can of worms, so to say. Robert Keohane says:

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101 Ibid., 2.
102 Jones, Pascual, and Stedman, 3.
In discussing nonstate threats, I emphasize such human actions as the use of nuclear weapons by terrorists and the creation of diseases through biological processes. I distinguish between "threats"—which I limit to potentially very harmful conditions created deliberately by human beings—and two other categories of problems: (1) adverse changes in our social or natural environment created inadvertently by human beings (such as climate change, or violence possibly engendered by increasing acceptance of violence in the media); or (2) more fundamental social problems, such as world poverty and premature death due to preventable disease. The latter two categories of problems are very serious—quite possibly more so than nonstate threats—but I focus in these brief remarks on threats as defined above.103

Once the definition of threat has been established, we need to be able to determine when a threat becomes dangerous enough to warrant an action from the collective community or under what specific conditions is that action necessary. Here again, Keohane comes with an answer:

When it could directly affect all of us (such as biological terrorism); When the enormity of intentional harm is so great as to profoundly affect our view of the human race (such as the Holocaust during World War II, Rwanda in 1994, or a possible explosion of a nuclear weapon by terrorists); When clear abuses are preventable at moderate cost (such as Bosnia in 1993, or probably Sudan now). In such cases, a failure to act implicates us and affects our fundamental view of ourselves and our species.104

This list brings to light the necessity to establish clear definitions and rules of behavior for potential collective security organizations, which will be discussed below.

104 Ibid.
The effect of such an international environment and nature of current and future threats bring again the inseparability of international and national security. Because of that reality, the need for organized collective security arrangement has become not only a wish, but also a need. "Rebuilding international order will require focusing on specific institutions for addressing specific threats—and making them effective. But as a prerequisite it also requires a vision, a foundational principle that gives a moral value to order and brings coherence to expectations about how states should act across multiple issue areas. Such a principle must appeal to diverse populations in every region of the world [and] win the support of key states." In other words, while the alliance component of a security organization bring the tangible means to providing security, the collective nature of such an institution would bring with it the legitimacy and moral value.

Given this triangulation of threat and sovereignty, the problem with collective security is whether in the future it would act as a pro-active versus reactive element to stop aggression. "The critical points are whether one can predict action by an international agency to repress or punish any significant aggression, whether nations can rely on such action to the extent of delegating or pledging their essential security powers to such an agency, and whether each nation can expect all others to support exercises of collective enforcement even if they contradict those other nations' immediate interests." Therefore, the reactive versus proactive character of a collective is closely related with reliability and legitimacy of such an institution, and therefore, with the support and commitment it will be able to earn from its member states. Again, this is vastly different

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105 Jones, Pascual, and Stedman, 4.
106 Ibid., 8-9.
from the traditional approach to threat as exercised by alliances, where that threat was
determined ahead of time and tangible.

What should be the goal of collective security today? In the past, "collective
security was conceived as a response to the dangers of formal interstate violence and, in
particular, to the problem of the aggressive use of force by states. At its heart was the
idea that states should either proscribe the aggressive use of force by states or at least
severely curtail the right to use armed force and that they should take collective measures
to enforce that proscription."

Collective security in the past had as its goal protection against inter-state conflicts and domestic unrests. Is it still the case today? The inter-state
defensive war is not the problem these days. The main problems are non-tangible and hard to
contain to a territory or a government. Issues such as terrorism, energy security,
environmental damage, human security, and disease control dominate the security
discussion.

Similarly to the literature on alliances, the body of research on collective security
shows a wide array of definitions and approaches. However, what is the most important
to remember is that collective security arrangements are designed to provide security
internally to the members, while alliances protect the group from external threats.
Furthermore, whether it is alliances or collective security institutions, states join them
because they receive more benefits from such arrangements than costs they have to pay.
Both, neorealists and neoliberals in their respective approaches to security organizations
approach the members, states, as rational actors. The countries that created NATO were
no different. The Alliance originated and continued because the benefits of external and
internal security it provided outweigh by far the benefits of having the same level of

security unilaterally or bilaterally. Furthermore, the costs of creating this organization and binding one another together were much lower than the security benefits.

COLLECTIVE DEFENSE AND COLLECTIVE SECURITY: MUTUALLY EXCLUSIVE?

Recently, more scholars have attempted to categorize and define NATO in terms of security organizations, their nature and scope. Some still argue that NATO is an alliance and look at the organization purely as an alliance. Following on the earlier point, there is a danger of misconstruing alliances with collective security arrangements, for better or worse. “Indeed, the (mis)use of the term to describe alliance politics has been a recurring criticism of the attempts to implement collective security.”109 Political leaders, especially those who are responsible for NATO’s present function and shape, as well as those who must rally the domestic support for the Alliance, have a hard time selling NATO as a collective security arrangement to their domestic audiences, simply because the concept itself is hard to define, much less to show the tangible benefits of such an organization. NATO itself, therefore, struggles with management of both collective defense and collective security narratives for its future.110

Scholars engaged in the discussion on NATO tend to emphasize the role the organization has played in collective defense, obscuring the collective security component. The two concepts, as mentioned before, are as different from one another as the ideas of security promoted by the neorealist school of thought and the neoliberal institutionalism. So how was NATO able to reconcile this dual role as an alliance and a

109 Ibid., 39.
collective security arrangement if the literature treats those two concepts almost entirely mutually exclusive of each other? In the case of NATO, a slow moving transition in approaches was noticeable already prior to the end of the Cold War, with few scholars attempting to bridge a gap between collective defense and collective security. Below, the arguments for and against the mutual exclusivity of those two concepts are outlined.

Mutually Exclusive: YES

Here, we first start with Arnold Wolfers whose work provided often-used exclusive differentiation between collective defense and collective security. Secondly, we will utilize the ideas of Earl Ravenal who positioned collective security combined with defense in the realist framework. From there, we will transfer to Robert Jervis, who applied the neoliberal approach of security regimes to issues of international peace and stability and John Ikenberry who successfully combined both realism and institutionalism to develop a mechanism for security in the post-war environments. Tracing the above mentioned approaches, in turn, provides the next building block for establishing the connection between the collective security and collective defense in the case of NATO.

In the 1960s, Arnold Wolfers in *Discord and Collaboration* provided a very detailed discussion on the fundamental differences between collective security and collective defense.

Both in the case of alliances, now usually called collective defense arrangements, and in the case of collective security... countries commit themselves to assist others against attack.... And yet the two policies differ fundamentally in respect to both intent and modes of action, so that
the cases in which they are complementary and helpful to each other are largely a matter of happy coincidence.\(^{111}\)

Wolfers places the two concepts essentially in mutually exclusive positions because of different intents and modes of operation. However, this paper argues that their complementarities and reinforcements are not mere coincidences. Rather, the commonality of geopolitical, values that the members display will put them in the position where the internal cooperation will strengthen the external defenses.

According to Wolfers "nations enter into collective defense arrangements to ward off threats to their national security interests, as traditionally conceived, emanating from some specific country or group of countries regarded as the chief national enemy, actual or potential."\(^{112}\) As he explains in more detail, "the motive behind such arrangements is the conviction that the creation of military strength sufficient to ward off the specific threat would be beyond their national capacity or would prove excessively and unnecessarily costly in view of the opportunities for mutual support and common defense."\(^{113}\) Collective defense, therefore, belongs to the realist school of thought, where rational actors make a clear cost-benefit analysis to maximize their security in an anarchical environment.

Collective security, on the other hand, belongs to the normative world of "what should be," propagated by Wilsonian idealists. It is difficult to find a place for such an

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\(^{112}\) Ibid., 183.

\(^{113}\) Ibid.
approach in realism. Wolfers, again, would be the first to disagree that the two can coexist or even cooperate with each other. According to Wolfers:

> it is not the goal of collective security arrangements to provide their members with strength either against their national enemies or for the defense of their national interests, unless one redefines the terms ‘national enemy’ and ‘national interest’ in accordance with the philosophy upon which collective security rests. Collective security is directed against any and every country anywhere that commits an act of aggression, allies and friends included.¹¹⁴

Furthermore, Wolfers does not account for the possibility that collective security can be limited to a number of states or a region, which will be discussed in a later part of this chapter.

In their nature, therefore, collective security and collective defense are contradictory. From the 1960s assumptions regarding the relationship between collective security and collective defense to the 1990s mentality, not much has changed. Another support for the difference between collective security and collective defense is offered by Steven Hook and Richard Robyn:

> Collective defense and collective security are most often distinguished on the basis of alliance focus and scope. Collective defense is generally held to be based upon the presence of an explicitly identified outside nation-state or bloc that is widely perceived as threatening to actual or prospective alliance members. By contrast, the focus of collective security is on the members of the alliance themselves, with concerns including ways they can assure nonaggression within the alliance and promote

¹¹⁴ Ibid.
internal cooperation. In this respect the scope of collective-security arrangements is inherently broader and more ambitious.\textsuperscript{115}

As the authors point out, the mutual exclusivity lies in the threats targeted by the arrangement; in the case of alliance, the potential threat is external, whereas in the case of collective security, the goal of the institutions is to provide the internal security for its members by setting a certain standard of behavior.

\textit{Mutually Exclusive: NO}

A decade after Arnold Wolfers, Earl Ravenal attempted to merge the concepts of collective security and collective defense. He argued that an essential condition of collective security is a concert and essential function is enforcement. He looked at the collective security purely from the approach of realism: he assumed that the international environment was dominated by one or two powers, organized into stable blocks or semi-permanent alliances, or multipolarity. In such an international triangulation of power, he defined collective security as “a regime... based, at least, on a “concert” of powerful nations or, at most, on a global federation.”\textsuperscript{116} In that type of environment, “the undue aggregation of improper use of power is typically restrained by the assembling of a contrary and “benign” preponderance of power. Thus, “collective security” is both a shorthand description of a type of international system, and an identification of its essential adjustment mechanism.”\textsuperscript{117}


\textsuperscript{117} Ibid., 698.
Attempts were made in the past at collective security after major wars by preponderant powers: after Napoleonic wars, the Concert of Europe, after WWI—the League of Nations, after WWII—the UN. After each of the conflicts, there were conditions favorable to creating that sort of international order: “1. The victorious powers are momentarily in concert; this provides the basis for equating their provisional coalition to a disinterested concern for universal order; 2. The defeated powers are, by consensus of the victors, clearly labeled the “aggressors.” But of course this situation does not last.”

Ravenal was not alone in his assumption of international order after the wars. However, before we go into security institutions as described by other authors, the basic definition of institutions needs to be refreshed. The most often used definition of institutions is the one provided by Stephen Krasner, as mentioned earlier. He defines institutions as “sets of implicit or explicit principles, norms, rules, and decision-making procedures around which actors’ expectations converge in a given area of international relations.” Keohane and Nye define them as “sets of governing arrangements, networks of rules, norms, and procedures that regularize behavior and control its effects.” Hedley Bull expands this definition with describing institutions as “general imperative principles which require or authorize prescribed classes of persons or groups to behave in prescribed ways.” Furthermore, institutions “secure adherence to rules by formulating, communicating, administering, enforcing, interpreting, legitimizing, and

118 Ibid., 699.
119 Krasner, International Regimes, 2.
adapting them.”\textsuperscript{122} The authors on the liberal end of the theoretical scale agree that institutions reduce uncertainty in the anarchical world of mistrust and are important means of cooperation.\textsuperscript{123} States enter institutions for purely rational reasons—namely those of cost-benefit analysis. Simply put, institutions minimize costs of ‘doing business,’ while maximizing the benefits.

John Ikenberry and Charles Kupchan, among others, talked about similar institutional arrangements to those outlined by Ravenal. Ikenberry specifically provides an example of institution-building after major wars. He applies the domestic structure of institutions (hierarchy), a form of a constitutional political order, to international institutions (with the international system ruled by anarchy). Such a constitutional political order manifests itself through three characteristics:

1) shared agreement on the principles and rules of order;
2) rules and institutions bind and limit the exercise of power;
3) the rules and institutions are entrenched in the wider political system and they are not easily altered.\textsuperscript{124}

Oddly enough, he uses the same logic to international institutions (based on domestic patterns) as Karl Deutsch used for building international communities.

This so-called constitutional approach, applied to states, creates a system in which “power is restrained through binding institutions that tie states down and together and thereby reduce worries about domination and abandonment.”\textsuperscript{125} An international order with strong constitutional characteristics is one in which the power and capabilities of the

\textsuperscript{122} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{124} Ikenberry, After Victory, 5.
\textsuperscript{125} Ibid.
relevant states are highly constrained by interlocking institutions and binding agreements. This order is also based on consensus among states.\textsuperscript{126} Ikenberry explains the logic of his arguments in the following words, emphasizing willingness of all sides to enter into the arrangement, as well as a necessity for shared values:

The more extreme the power disparities..., the greater the capacity of the leading state to employ institutions to lock in a favorable order; it is in a more advantaged position to exchange restraints on its power for institutional agreements and to trade off short-term gains for long-term gains. Also, the greater the power disparities, the greater the incentives for weaker and secondary states to establish institutional agreements that reduce the risks of domination or abandonment. Likewise, democratic states have greater capacities to enter into binding institutions and thereby reassure the other states in the postwar settlement than non-democracies. That is, the ‘stickiness’ of interlocking institutions is greater between democracies than between non-democracies, and this makes them a more readily employable mechanism to dampen the implications of power asymmetries.\textsuperscript{127}

Kupchan furthers the argument for self-binding of preponderant power as an attributing element to peace and stability by providing a set of defining characteristics—or measurements—for self binding of hegemons. Self-binding is the mechanism through which states render their power benign. Quantitatively, it means states are willing to withhold power, to refrain from fully exercising their resources and influence.

Qualitatively, it means that states seek to manage rather than maximize power, to promote joint gains rather than to behave in an extractive and exploitative manner, and to build order based on the notion that the spread of shared norms and identities and the

\textsuperscript{126} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{127} Ibid.
formation of community at the international level can overcome competitive relations among states. "In terms of process, it means that that hegemons prefer multilateral over unilateral action, favor consensual initiatives, and resort to unilateral decision-making only when multilateralism fails to produce an acceptable outcome." 

With willingness, commitment, and shared values, benign exercise of power gives rise to trust, shared interests and identities, and international institutions "essential to escaping anarchy and fostering a community of states within which the rules of self-help competition no longer apply." Institutional hegemony, therefore, represents a means of combining the right structure with the right character—encompassing characteristics of both, realist and idealist, worlds. It provides a structure through which power of states is channeled and restrained, building a secure environment. In an anarchic world, institutional hegemony offers hierarchy within the system it builds. The structural hierarchy that accompanies power distribution carries a powerful peace-causing potential, since the incentive for conflict is minimized. But, as Kupchan warns, hierarchy alone is not enough—the stability of the system also depends on the core's willingness to create that order and the periphery's agreement to share the system and its values with the core.

Robert Jervis put the same idea in context of security regimes. In 1982, he provided a definition of a security regime: "By a security regime I mean... those principles, rules, and norms that permit nations to be re-strained in their behavior in the belief that others will reciprocate. This concept implies not only norms and expectations that facilitate cooperation, but a form of cooperation that is more than the following of

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129 Ibid.
short-run self-interest." His concept of security regimes connects the Deutsch's idea of community and the neoliberal idea of institutions as proposed by Ikenberry and Kupchan, and along with both approaches, provides a sound basis for establishing a security organization that would encompass both collective security and defense.

Jervis goes on to discuss the condition that best serve the formation and continuation of a security regime.

First, the great powers must want to establish it—that is, they must prefer a more regulated environment to one in which all states behave individualistically.... Second, the actors must also believe that others share the value they place on mutual security and cooperation. Third,... even if all major actors would settle for the status quo, security regimes cannot form when one or more actors believe that security is best provided for by expansion. The fourth condition for the formation of a regime is a truism today: war and the individualistic pursuit of security must be seen as costly.131

In other words, security institutions, as Robert Jervis rightly asserts, are most difficult to form because of greater competitiveness among states in the security arena; higher impact of prisoner's and security dilemma; difficulty in measuring achieved security; and a blur between offensive and defensive motives.132 The traditional neorealist concerns of states are the hardest to overcome in the most vital of subject—the area of security. The major conditions to establish a security regime include the willingness of great powers to do so, participants' willing compliance and cooperation, precipitated by mutuality of security goals. Finally, war and individual pursuit of security must be seen as costly, for only

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131 Ibid., 360-362.
132 Ibid.
then will institutions fulfill their role of minimizing the costs, while maximizing the benefits.

In essence, the preconditions that Jervis sees as necessary for creation of a security regime are already present in case of NATO. The first condition has been fulfilled with the mere creation of NATO as a balancing alliance against the threat of Soviet Union and a body for stabilizing the North Atlantic area. The second condition is self evident in the degree to which geopolitical, cultural, and economic values have been shared by NATO members. In the case of the third condition, expansion, Jervis meant territorial expansion in the context of imperialism. While NATO has expanded over the years, it has done so in an attempt to extend the normative value of security and stability, not to fulfill imperialist motivations of one or more of the members. And lastly, the fourth assumption goes back to the rational actor behavior of states, that is maximizing profit, in this case security and stability, while minimizing the costs—namely the conflict and war.

In 1999, Steven Hook and Richard Robyn introduced an argument that NATO is a hybrid between collective defense and a regional collective security arrangement.

NATO has effectively promoted solidarity among its member states, discouraged the renationalization of European politics, and enhanced the capacity of governments to cooperate in social, political, and economic areas. In so doing, the alliance has abetted the parallel process of 'co-operative security' that has produced a previously unseen degree of collaboration among European governments.¹³³

¹³³ Hook and Robyn, 82.
In its nature and role, therefore, NATO has served as an alliance as well as a collective security arrangement throughout its history. The collective security role is especially important to acknowledge in the post-Cold War environment, in terms of lack of the original Soviet threat that served as the basis for establishing NATO and the expansion of liberal values of freedom and democracy. Furthermore, the welcomed by the Eastern Europeans expansion of NATO and the push for keeping the Alliance alive and functional points to the fact that its normative role is already not only acknowledged and accepted, but also welcomed and wanted.

This argument was furthered by Richard Rupp in 2006, who argued that NATO suffers from the lack of agreement among its various leadership bodies as to what sort of security arrangement it is and what it should be in the future. "One of the principle factors undermining NATO in 2006 is the presence of competing perspectives among member-states, officials in Brussels, and NATO supporters, on the fundamental nature and purpose of the Alliance."134 In his analysis, the author goes back to the beginning of NATO, which was established as a military alliance and until the end of the Cold War the organization’s “security guarantee and identity remained unchanged and resolute. In the 1990s, NATO governments gradually altered the organization’s structure and mission, shifting the Alliance’s moorings toward collective security as NATO enlarged its membership."135

Perhaps the words of Earl Ravenal best show the complicated nature of collective defense and collective security, and the mixed feelings of scholars as to the relationship between the two.

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135 Ibid.
The animating idea of collective security is that each outbreak of aggression will be suppressed, not by a partial alliance directed specifically against certain parties, but by a universal compact, binding *all* to defend *any*. Although, conceptually, collective security can be regarded as a limiting case of collective defense (in the sense that it represents a universalization of a military alliance—an alliance of all members against, potentially, each), and though, historically, these two kinds of regimes have coincided for limited periods, the two modes of international organization are quite distinct and have widely differing consequences. Collective security is the essential function of a distinct structure of international system; collective defense, or the contracting of bilateral or multilateral security pacts, is an instrument available to states in systems of bipolar confrontation or multiple balance of power.\(^{136}\)

This project extends this connection that Ravenal, Jervis, Ikenberry and others discussed, in that collective security and collective defense work together to form a complementary arrangement to protect a group of states, small or large, from an external threat, while providing a set of norms and rules, commonly and willingly agreed upon, in order to ensure the internal stability and security.

And this complementary arrangement can be found in the form of security communities, as originally proposed by Van Wagenen and Deutsch, and most recently explored anew by Adler and Barnett. Security communities combine the elements of institutions and ideology, and in terms of causality, reinforced one another. Institutions are created by states that have common sets of interests. Over time and continues interactions with one another, members will share more and more interests and characteristics, creating communities. Those communities, on the other hand, will have built-in institutional mechanisms in them. NATO developed over time to display characteristics of an institution and a community. Hence, this concept of security

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communities is able to explain NATO better than any other because it accounts for all elements of NATO: structure, institutions, common goals, common identity, common values, democracy, and geography. The section below, therefore, positions NATO in the context of security communities to bring the concepts of alliances and collective security together.

SECURITY COMMUNITIES AND THEIR APPLICATION TO NATO

The recent changes in approaches to collective security and alliances have been driven by changing foci in the scholarly approaches; namely, the research and analysis have been moving away from neorealism and toward post-positivism and critical theories. This transition has been caused to a large extent by a shifting nature and perception of power and threat. As Adler and Barnett put it:

By marrying security and community… states are revising the conventional meaning of security and power…. Some states are revising the concept of power to include the ability of a community to defend its values and expectations of proper behavior against an external threat and to attract new states with ideas that convey a sense of national security and material progress.  

Not only is the relationship between the two concepts changing, but also the concepts themselves are evolving. In reference to power, the authors said, “some states are revising the concept of power to include the ability of a community to defend its values and expectations of proper behavior against an external threat and to attract new

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137 Adler and Barnett, Security Communities, 5.
states with ideas that convey a sense of national security and material progress.”¹³⁸ In essence, they married the concept of security against an external threat with the idea of internal security, embodied in the concept of security communities. This project adds to Adler and Barnett’s idea by tracing that marriage of internal and external security through the history of NATO in an attempt to assess the effectiveness of that relationship for the future of the Alliance.

With the shifting perception of threat and power, among other variables in the international system that have recently undergone significant transformation, the ideas of Karl Deutsch resurfaced again.

Constructivist scholars have been most prominent in resurrecting Deutsch’s concept of security community: urging that international relations scholarship recognize the social character of global politics; forwarding the need to consider the importance of state identities and the sources of state interests; suggesting that the purpose for which power is deployed and is regarded as socially legitimate may be changing; and positing that the cultural similarities among states might be shaped by institutional agents. Consequently, constructivist scholarship is well-suited to consider how social processes and an international community might transform security politics.¹³⁹

The concept of security communities was initially introduced by Richard Van Wagenen in the early 1950s.¹⁴⁰ But it was not noticed until the work of Karl Deutsch et al in 1957 in which Van Wagenen also participated. Richard Van Wagenen and Karl

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¹³⁸ Ibid.
Deutsch defined security community as "a group which has become integrated... [Integration] is the attainment, within a territory, of a sense of community."\textsuperscript{141} The authors argued that states can get integrated to such an extent that they have a sense of community; this sense of community, in turn, assures, that when they disagree, they will resolve their differences without using military means; rather, they will find a peaceful and institutionalized way to resolve their differences. Therefore, states that are members of that community have created a stable peace, and not just a stable order.\textsuperscript{142}

Deutsch and his team identified two types of security communities: amalgamated and pluralistic. "An amalgamated community is the formal merger of two or more independent units into some type of a unitary or federal government."\textsuperscript{143} They pointed to the United States as an example of an amalgamated security community. On the other hand, "a pluralistic security community, e.g., the combined territory of the United States and Canada, retains legal independence for the separate governments."\textsuperscript{144} In both instances, what holds the communities together is the high degree of communication among the members. "Communication alone enables a group to think together, to see together, and to act together,"\textsuperscript{145} claimed Deutsch.

In 1957, Deutsch and his colleagues applied to concept of security community to the North Atlantic area in an attempt to gage its degree of amalgamation and integration. They found that the North Atlantic area was not integrated. Although it was not a security community, it contained several security communities within. It was considered

\textsuperscript{142} Ibid., 4.
\textsuperscript{143} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{144} Ibid., 27.
\textsuperscript{145} Ibid., 36.
a political community, however, with NATO serving as one of the amalgamating factors. In their assessment, the authors took into account the compatibility of major values (defined as main values which are considered to be of importance in the domestic systems of the states in question), commonality of political ideology (constitutionalism and democracy), and economic values (capitalism or socialism with free enterprise). They remarked on a high degree of communication and mutual responsiveness among some nations but not the others, which indicated a movement toward a security community, even though one was not achieved yet at the moment the study was conducted.146

Adler and Barnett especially have been expanding on the ideas of Karl Deutsch and their application to the current triangulation of power, threat, and security. Going back to the concepts of communities, they define pluralistic communities as “transnational regions comprised of sovereign states whose people maintain dependable expectations of peaceful change. Pluralistic security communities can be categorized according to their depth of trust, the nature and degree of institutionalization of their governance system, and whether they reside in a formal anarchy or are on the verge of transforming it.”147 In case of NATO, it is the pluralistic communities that are of importance, as the Alliance’s make up is a grouping of sovereign states.

Following in the footsteps of Deutsch, the authors identify two types of pluralistic security communities: loosely coupled and tightly coupled.

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146 Ibid., 118-161.
147 Adler and Barnett, Security Communities, 30.
Loosely coupled security communities observe the minimal definitional properties and no more. Tightly coupled security communities, however, are more demanding in two respects: First, they have a “mutual aid” society in which they construct collective system arrangements. Secondly, they possess a system of rule that lies somewhere between a sovereign state and a regional, centralized, government; that is, it is something of a post-sovereign system, endowed with common supranational, transnational, and national institutions and some form of a collective security system.¹⁴⁸

NATO definitely is not just a loosely coupled pluralistic security community; however, categorizing the Alliance as a fully integrated tightly coupled security community should not be taken as a given, either. While NATO does meet some of the specifications of a tightly coupled community as set by Adler and Barnett, the degree of cultural integration and legitimacy of the supranational governing bodies have not reached their full potential. However, the main and distinctive feature of what identifies a group of states as a security community, namely “that a stable peace is tied to the existence of a transnational community,”¹⁴⁹ has been met in the case of NATO.

Three characteristics define a community: first, members share identities, values, and meanings.¹⁵⁰ Second, there are multi-faceted direct relations between the members in the community. Third, reciprocity based on long-term interest, knowledge of the partners, and a sense of responsibility for the wellbeing of the community.¹⁵¹ Members will act in their own interests and the interests of the group, which—because of the shared characteristics—will have a large degree of overlap. However, within

¹⁴⁹ Adler and Barnett, Security Communities, 31.
¹⁵¹ Adler and Barnett, Security Communities, 31.
communities, there will be a different degree of peaceful conflict resolution and that degree will depend on the degree of integration of the community and the legitimacy of the supranational governing institutions.

As shown above, Adler and Barnett, in their work, returned to and built on the idea of security communities introduced by Richard Van Wagenen and Karl Deutsch in the 1950s. Given the recent return to this concept, the analysis of NATO’s nature as a collective security and an alliance should begin at the commencement of the idea of security communities and its first application to the North Atlantic area. The main goal of this project is to show the dual narrative of NATO as a collective security organization and an alliance, rather than inventing the concepts of collective security and alliances anew. In that context, Deutsch’s concept of security community serves as a basis for understanding the idea itself and NATO’s role as a collective security institution.

However, how do we know that a security community has been effectively established? How do we measure the degree of integration that would warrant to be called a community? Deutsch et al applied the integration of domestic societies, including their causal mechanisms and processes, to the integration among states in the international environment. The authors measured the “sense of community” by quantifying transaction flows. By transaction flows, the authors meant trade, migration, tourism, cultural and educational exchanges, and use of physical communication facilities. Furthermore, they put a particular emphasis on the volume of those transaction flows within and among the nations in the community. Then, they compared the growth in transaction flows within the societies in the states to the growth of transaction flows among states. They used the level of integration within societies as a benchmark for the
degree of integration among states, which in turn indicated the growth of new communities.\textsuperscript{152}

The next step in the process of analyzing communities is establishing a sound connection between a sense of community and security. Here again, Karl Deutsch applied the dynamics of peaceful change domestically to the international environment. He assumed that at the international level the system is changing and the transformation is caused by the formation of communities and the sense of ‘we-ness’. In some instances, the process of integration has reached such a high degree that the nonviolent change is taken for granted. In his assumption, Deutsch challenged the realist school of thought dominant in the international relations at the time and advocating a state-centric analysis of the international system, introducing the concepts of identity, and cultural and ideological community among states that may lead to the unified behavior of those states based on norms and rules.

In a similar fashion to Karl Deutsch, Kenneth Thompson sees the application of the domestic order to international system as the means to create a collective security system.

If the individual is threatened or endangered in municipal society, he turns to the legitimate agents of law enforcement, the police. The comparatively successful operation of this system has meant relative peace and tolerable harmony for most local communities. Through the action of police or “fire brigades” on a world scale, collective security has as its goal two comparable objectives. It would prevent war by providing a deterrent to aggression. It would defend the interests of peace-loving states in war if it came, by concentrating a preponderance of power against the aggressor.\textsuperscript{153}

\textsuperscript{152} Ibid., 7.
\textsuperscript{153} Thompson, “Collective Security Reexamined,” 755.
Deutsch's ideas of creating collective communities did not catch on for various reasons. First, there were substantial problems with his conceptualization. As Arend Lijphart points out, Deutsch "looked to transactions as the source of new identifications, but his emphasis on quantitative measures overlooked the social relations that are bound up with and generated by those transactions. His commitment to behavioralism... overwhelmed the demand for a more interpretive approach at every turn." Furthermore, Deutsch did not account for the influence of domestic politics on the international behavior of states. In other words, Deutsch's model ignored "social groups or classes, decision-makers, business elites, and the mixture of self-interest and self image that motivates their behaviors." By discounting these factors, the author did not acknowledge "the complex and causal way in which state power and practices, international organizations, transactions, and social learning processes can generate new forms of mutual identification and security relations."

Also, at the time of Deutsch's project, "scholars began adopting new theories and concerning themselves with new research puzzles that shifted the ground away from it. Increasingly, scholars interested in ideas of regional integration and international cooperation used the vehicles of international interdependence, and later, international regimes." Deutsch's idea, therefore, collided with the beginnings of neoliberal institutionalism. In addition, as Adler and Barnett point out, "any talk of a community of

155 Arend Lijphart, "Karl Deutsch and the New Paradigm in International Relations," in Richard Merritt and Bruce Russett, 246.
156 Ibid.
157 Ibid.
158 Adler and Barnett, Security Communities, 9.
states, not to mention a security community, seemed hopelessly romantic and vividly discordant against the backdrop of the Cold War and the prospect of nuclear war." In other words, the field was not ready for neoliberal approaches or post-positivist theories. “Quickly distancing themselves from the sociological spirit of these studies, the discipline became enamored with structural realism, rational choice methods, and other approaches to political life that excluded identities and interests as phenomena requiring explanation. Deutsch’s study was often cited but rarely emulated.”

However, for the purpose of this study, the positive contributions of Deutsch’s study take the central role, not the shortcomings of his methods. In 1957, Deutsch et al applied the concept of security community to the North Atlantic area in attempt to gage its degree of amalgamation or integration. He found that the North Atlantic area was not integrated to the extent that the term security community could be applied. Although it was not a security community, it contained several security communities within its geopolitical area. The North Atlantic area at the time was considered a political community, with NATO serving as one of the amalgamating factors.

In their assessment, the authors took into account the compatibility of major values (defined as main values which are considered to be of importance in the domestic systems of the states in question), commonality of political ideology (constitutionalism and democracy), and economic values (capitalism or socialism with free enterprise). They remarked on a high degree of communication and mutual responsiveness among some nations but not the others, which indicated a movement toward a security

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159 Ibid.
160 Ibid.
161 Deutsch, Political Community and the North Atlantic Area, 118-161.
community, even though one was not achieved yet at the moment the study was conducted.\textsuperscript{162}

There is a fundamental difference between the neoliberal institutionalist approach toward collective security discussed later and Deutsch’s proposal of security communities. For the neoliberals, states build institutions and integrate “to encourage cooperation and to further their mutual interest in survival.”\textsuperscript{163} Adler and Barnett put it this way:

Although neoliberal institutionalists are focusing on many of the same variables discussed by Deutsch, their general commitment to how self-interested actors construct institutions to enhance cooperation prevents them from considering fully how: a community might be forged through shared identities rather than through pre-given interests and binding contracts alone; or, interstate and transnational interactions can alter state identities and interests. While neo-liberal institutionalism shares with neo-realism the assumption of anarchy, it is more interested in how self-interested states construct a thin version of society through the guise of institutions and regulative norms in order to promote their interests.\textsuperscript{164}

Given Deutsch’s finding, combined with more detailed account of the mindsets of political and military leaders at the time of the NATO conception as outlined in the following chapters, in its early stages already, the Alliance was displaying characteristics of a collective security organization, not merely an alliance. The degree of commonality of cultural, political, historical, and economic values enhanced the sense of community

\textsuperscript{162} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{163} See: Bull, \textit{The Anarchical Society} and Krasner, \textit{International Regimes}.
\textsuperscript{164} Adler and Barnett, \textit{Security Communities}, 11.
among the member states, while the military alliance agreements contributed to its external security.

CONCLUSIONS

This chapter outlined the developments of collective security and collective defense approaches over time, based on a wide range of theoretical schools of thought. Beginning with realism, through institutionalism, to post-positivism, collective security and alliances have been seen as separate ideas, oftentimes mutually exclusive. Some scholars thought of collective defense as a subset of collective security or collective security as a next step in the future of alliances. This paper posits that, contrary to traditional approaches, those two concepts are not only complementary to each other, but also mutually reinforcing, as is shown in the case of NATO.

In 1953, Kenneth Thompson put the nature and evolution of the relationship between the collective security and alliances in those words: "Approached in imaginary and figurative terms, collective security may be said to have found its soul in the revolution in beliefs, its body in the revolution in techniques, and its mind in the revolution in contemporary international institutions taken place in the last three quarters of a century."\(^{165}\)

Let us look at each of the aspects Thompson mentioned. "The soul of collective security has been formed by the growth of practical morality." Here, the author addresses the normative socialization of the members based on the necessities pressed on them by the international environment. In other words, he merges the practical necessities with moral values. Collective security found its "body" in "revolution in techniques and

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\(^{165}\) Thompson, "Collective Security Reexamined," 753.
economics" or industrialization. This development essentially refers to globalization or shrinking of time and space, increasing the economic, political and, most important to this study, security interdependence of states. And what Thompson categorizes as the "mind" of collective security is represented in the rapid growth and importance of international institutions. Although written in the early 1950s, Thompson’s passages carry a very strong predictive nature of current characteristics of relationship between different parts of a collective security organization.

However, today as it did throughout history, the concept of collective security carries with it inherent problems. Mearsheimer rightly points out that “it is difficult to find scholarly work that makes the case for collective security without simultaneously expressing major reservations about the theory, and without simultaneously expressing grave doubts that collective security could ever be realized in practice.” However, his criticism of collective security does not end there. The author paints the theory of collective security as an incomplete one because

it does not provide a satisfactory explanation for how states overcome their fears and learn to trust one another.... The very purpose of a collective security system... is to deal with states that have aggressive intentions. In effect, collective security admits that no state can ever be completely certain about another state’s intentions, which bring us back to a realist world where states have little choice but to fear each other.
Mearsheimer, however, is a realist in the most deep sense and meaning of that concept and he approaches the concept of security only from a realist point of view. He continues his criticism with outlining the difficulty in recognizing who the victim and aggressor are. Also, he questions whether all kinds of aggression are wrong. In addition, the rapid response to aggression is difficult to guarantee in a collective security system.170

From the perspective of realists and neorealists, therefore, NATO should have dissolved after the end of the Cold War, since the external threat of the Soviet Union disappeared. The continuing existence and transformation of NATO, in that sense, are generally explained by neoliberal institutionalist and post-positivist theories. NATO, shows how the trends, generally characteristic to separate specific theories come can work together—NATO bridges the gaps between the positivist and post-positivist theories. “From a social constructivist perspective, NATO did not fragment as neorealists had predicted because the shared democratic norms and identities of the members meant that they did not perceive each other as threats with the end of the Cold War.”171 From this viewpoint, “NATO’s continuation is seen as demonstrating the Alliance’s enduring and institutionalised patterns of co-operation, the existence of common ‘regulative’ and ‘constitutive’ norms and values within the organisation, and the continuing impact of the shared democratic identities upon which the Alliance is based.”172 Thomas Risse-Kappen adds to that by saying: “the Western Alliance

170 Ibid., 32.
172 Ibid.
represents an institutionalization of the transatlantic security community based on common values and a collective identity of liberal democracies.\textsuperscript{173}

However, those competing perspectives and approaches in the case of NATO also complicate its further development and decisions regarding its future. "One of the principle factors undermining NATO in 2006 is the presence of competing perspectives among member-states, officials in Brussels, and NATO supporters, on the fundamental nature and purpose of the Alliance."\textsuperscript{174} NATO was established in 1949 as a military alliance based on the tenets of collective defense, as is shown in the chapter referring to the creation of NATO. "For the next forty years, NATO's security guarantee and identity remained unchanged and resolute. In the 1990s, NATO governments gradually altered the organization's structure and mission, shifting the Alliance's moorings toward collective security as NATO enlarged its membership."\textsuperscript{175}

In reference to NATO, which since its conception has been showing the characteristics of both collective security and alliances, scholars, analysts and politicians have tended to ignore the fact that NATO has consistently performed both roles—collective security and collective defense.\textsuperscript{176} The academics and practitioners alike gravitate toward generalizations and extremes; in that sense, a collective security is only viable and effective if it encompasses everything and everyone, and never fails. As Hook and Robyn write: "This skewed analysis has discouraged consideration of a more comprehensive rationale for NATO, as for other regional organizations that may one day


\textsuperscript{174} Rupp, NATO after 9/11, 193.

\textsuperscript{175} Ibid.

\textsuperscript{176} Hook and Robyn, 87.
assume NATO's stature. Conventional analysis has neglected the possibility of evolutionary patterns by which alliances complement collective-defense functions with those pertaining to internal cohesion and the projection of shared interests, values, and resources.”

It is enough to look into 1991 and 1999 NATO's strategic concepts which already emphasized the collective defense as well as collective security roles of the Alliance. The emphasis on internal cohesion in Western Europe persisted as the communist bloc was weakening, with German reunification and the possible inclusion of Eastern European states emerging as primary concerns. This new approach was elaborated further in the Strategic Concept approved at the April 1999 Washington Summit, which noted that a “new Europe of greater integration is emerging and a Euro-Atlantic security structure is evolving in which NATO plays a central part.” The statement emphasized the importance of “solidarity within the Alliance through daily cooperation in both the political and military spheres' and called for NATO to 'prevent the renationalization of defense policies'. Both the 1991 and 1999 statements placed European security in a broader context than previous articulations, stressing the importance of political, economic, social and environmental factors as well as military defense.”

In summary, NATO from its birth has displayed characteristics of and acted as an alliance and collective security institutions, with variant degrees of both at various times. In the international environment where the nature and perception of threat are changing

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177 Ibid.
and where the concept of sovereignty and power are being challenged, a combination of collective security and collective defense in one organization provides an optimal security arrangement and NATO has all the tools at its disposal to become that optimal security organization in the future. The alliance nature, with its traditional focus on external threat, provides the means and material power, whereas the collective security part addresses the internal stability and supplies the legitimacy to the organization and the accepted norms of behavior. Therefore, the two security concepts are complementary and mutually reinforcing. To return to the words of Earl Ravenal:

In the bipolar environment, it was “characteristic of proponents of collective security to opt for, and also predict, an evolution of the international system through increasing specific cooperation among adversaries leading to general détente and, eventually, an underlying concert—whether formal or not—that might support a universal regime of authoritative management and restrain of power. It is the confluence of the objectives of all possible major rivals (who would be adversaries in several other types of system) that makes—and, historically, has made—collective security possible. Thus, such a concert is both the limiting case and the minimum condition of a collective security system.  

This review of literature framed the concepts of collective security and alliances as traditionally separate, yet recently complementary fields in the scholarly literature on international security and stability. Furthermore, the outline of the existing research on alliances exposed the gaps in the literature and showed where the triangulation and intersection of the concepts of collective security and alliances, introduced in this project, fit and how they complement the field. Most recent research on collective security and

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alliances addresses new theoretical, conceptual and empirical approaches to the NATO’s dual conceptual nature or alternatively, development of collective security from the original objectives of collective defense. However, even with these most recent developments in the field, the more comprehensive and systematic study of parallel or subsequent development of collective security and collective defense natures or one organization, especially in relations to NATO, is sparse and limited at best.

In 1997, Stephen Walt wrote:

During the Cold War, the clarity of the Soviet threat and the relatively static nature of the global balance of power kept the main coalitions more or less fixed for over four decades. The end of the Cold War has eliminated the original rationale behind many of these arrangements (most notably NATO), leading to a lively debate over their future prospects. For the most part, however, this debate has not been informed by a sophisticated theoretical understanding of alliance dynamics.\(^{180}\)

Although, over a decade has passed since he criticized the gaps in the literature and research on alliances and collective security, not much has improved. In 2006, the Journal of Peace Research published a special issue concerning alliances. The six articles included there addressed alliance formation, alliance polarization, alliances and democratization, trade among allies, alliance obligations and regional economic organizations, and defense policies of military alliances. While this wide range of approaches provided a considerable expansion of the existing research on alliances, again, nowhere in that issue was the relationship between the concepts of alliance and collective security, presented in this project, mentioned or analyzed.

CHAPTER III
NATO IN THE 1945 TO 1950 PERIOD

INTRODUCTION

The factual story of North Atlantic Treaty Organization begins not in April 1949 but rather with the end of the World War II and the need to create a stable and secure world order. If one were to examine the beginnings of NATO from the perspective of power, the account appears to be simple. On one hand, there is the Soviet Union and its conquered European satellites, balanced on the other side of the Iron Curtain by the United States and Western Europe. Each side tries to maintain and maximize its security in the face of threat from the enemy. However, the narrative of the North Atlantic Alliance is incomplete without accounting for the more complicated and intangible normative nature of the organization focused on collective security.

NATO’s birth was preceded by a long line of sometimes successful and at times futile attempts at collective security institutions, such as the Concert of Europe, the League of Nations, and the United Nations. One of the goals of those institutions was to establish and promote collective security environment, setting certain standards of acceptable behavior among nations, conducive to resolving disagreements and disputes through peaceful means, rather than resorting to conflict. Therefore, it would be foolish and rather superficial to say that NATO was created only to counteract the power of the Soviets and protect Europe against their aggression. It would be equally imprudent to assume that NATO’s role today is only to show other organizations, regions, and the world, how the international security environment should operate. Consequently, the
story of NATO combines both, the collective defense and security narratives, as it has been proven through its past and present, and which certainly applies to its future.

This chapter presents the story of NATO’s birth, accounting for the narratives of collective security and the collective defense, their roles in the creation of the Alliance, and impact on and interaction with each other in the immediate post-WWII environment. Furthermore, this chapter shows that at the point of NATO’s creation, collective security and defense characteristics were reinforcing each other to such an extent that neither would have been possible and durable without the other. The unique circumstances based on the combination of commonality of goals and values inside the Alliance, and the common perception of threat from the outside, allowed and encouraged the collective security and defense to harmonize. In other words, this specific combination of collective security and collective defense showed a direct structural dependency on the international environment.

The discussion here is framed in the context of collective security structure and alliances, with the factual history of NATO’s origins guided by the independent variables mentioned above. The first part of this chapter focuses on dialogues and discourses prior to April 4th, 1949, the date the when the North Atlantic Treaty was signed. The second section addresses the North Atlantic Treaty itself and the organizational arrangement of the Alliance. Both sections are structured around and centered on the concepts of alliances and collective security respectively, and the relation of those two narratives to each other.

Given the relatively short period of time discussed in this chapter, the narratives of alliance and collective security within NATO remained relatively constant. In the span
of five years, the military, economic, and political strength of the United States in relation to Western European countries continued unchanged. On the other hand, the perception of relative power between the West and the Soviet Union was quite different. The West perceived Moscow to be much stronger than it really was. As Lord Ismay wrote in 1954: “On the other side of the Iron Curtain, Russia had about 25 divisions stationed outside the Soviet Union, supported by about 6,000 aircraft available for immediate attack, the whole under a centralized command: and behind these ‘forward’ Russian units was the massive bulk of the Red Army and air forces.”

From the beginning of the discussion on the creation of the collective defense and collective security institutions for Europe, the normative undertone was very strong. In 2000, Peter Duignan described the Alliance in those words:

NATO was, above all, more than a military alliance. It developed an extensive system of committees dealing with subjects as varied as political collaboration; the settlement of intra-alliance disputes; consultation on foreign policy; economic, scientific, technical, social, and cultural cooperation.... The alliance united policymakers and executives of many different nationalities in a common task. No other alliance in history had comprised such a diversity of partners or cooperated on such a broad range of subjects, nor lasted as long.

While in the period of 1945-1948, there was a relative disparity of perceived threat between the Americans and Canadians on one side, and Europeans on the other, events of 1948 brought those three regions closer together, speeding up the process of negotiations and decision-making. In terms of impact of alliance and collective security

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1 Ismay, NATO: The First Five Years 1949—1954, 29.
natures on each other, those two variables complemented each other, while enhancing the cooperation between the states engaged in the creation of NATO.

As mentioned in the beginning of this study, the first period discussed here starts with the end of World War II and ends on June 25th, 1950—the start of the Korean War. The beginning date of this time period centers on spring of 1945, namely the end of World War II in May and singing of the Charter of the United Nations in June. Those two events, so close in time to each other, are very representative of the general spirit of this project, for they represent the two main foci: collective security and collective defense. Realist aspects of alliances are embodied in war and conflict, and their conclusion in May 1945, while the collective security elements shine through the creation of the United Nations, an international institution that set the stage for the future international environment.

The date recognized as the beginning of the Korean War was a fundamental watershed which changed the direction of NATO. June of 1950, therefore, provides a convenient point concluding the first period of analysis of the two narratives of collective security and defense. After that date, the relationship between those two narratives within NATO changes its course. This segment, therefore, with its introduction to and explanation of NATO’s raison d’être at its conception, provides a much needed background to understanding the Alliance in its Cold War and post-Cold War existence.
EUROPEANS AND THE TREATY OF BRUSSELS

On June 26th, 1945, the Charter of the United Nations was signed in San Francisco. The UN was created as the last deed of President Franklin Delano Roosevelt, who was committed to establishing an international institution based on “Wilsonian Idealism,” main task of which was to uphold peace and stability in the world. In FDR’s own words, “great power involves great responsibility.”3 In other words, as he stated in his State of the Union Address in 1945, the necessity and usefulness of power are undeniable; however, he equally emphasized the responsibility that came with that power, especially in a democratic world, for which the United States served as a beacon at the time.4 The Security Council, made of the major powers, carried the responsibility to preserve peace and stability in the world, as designed personally by Roosevelt. Those major powers, the former WWII Allies often referred to as “United Nations,” bore the duty of protecting states from potential aggressors. NATO, by extension, inherited that task from the moment of its creation under the UN Charter.

In addition to the practical component of security, UN and NATO were created to establish the norm for peaceful behavior. In 1954, the first Secretary General of NATO, Lord Hastings Lionel Ismay, wrote in his account of the conception and birth of the Alliance:

The signature of the North Atlantic Treaty in April, 1949, marked the beginning of a revolutionary and constructive experiment in international relations. In signing the Treaty twelve independent sovereign states—later to be joined by others—undertook pledges which called for immediate and

continuous collective action, not only in the military, but also in the political, economic and social fields.... Let it not be thought for a moment that the present arrangements are final: on the contrary they can, and will, be improved at times goes on and further experience is gained.\(^5\)

In Lord Ismay's understanding, NATO was to serve as protection against potential threats and as an institutional pioneer in the set-up of the international norms of behavior.

Lord Ismay was not alone in his vision for the Alliance. Louis St. Lauren, Canadian Minister of External Affairs and later Prime Minister, emphasized in April 1948 that the purpose of the North Atlantic alliance, in addition to providing security for the Western, democratic world, "would create the dynamic counter-attraction to Communism—the dynamic attraction of a free, prosperous and progressive society, as opposed to the totalitarian and reactionary society of the Communist world."\(^6\) In the words of both of those men, the future NATO would combine the role of a security provider in the power-oriented, realist-based world, as well as construct a pattern of behavior to follow: a blueprint founded on the principles of Western civilization, democracy, and liberalism, all of which would lead to a peaceful, conflict-free world.

But the idea of collective security, or collective security and defense in one organization, was not widely accepted by the political leaders in the beginning. In 1946, Winston Churchill rejected the idea of "a defensive alliance between like-minded nations, within the framework of the United Nations."\(^7\) It was not until September 1947 that the idea was brought back by St. Lauren in an address to the UN. In his speech, St. Lauren


was concerned about “the inability of the Security Council to ensure the protection” for peaceful Western democracies. He suggested that “these nations may seek greater safety in an association of democratic and peace-loving states willing to accept more specific international obligations in return for a greater measure of national security.”

Again, from the beginning of the discussions on NATO’s creation, the underlying discourses were not only focused on providing security against the threat posed by the Soviet Union. Rather, there was a clear emphasis on uniting Western, democratic nations, who would accept certain international obligations, while receiving collective protection in return.

While the United States and Canada fell into the category of democratic states responsible for international peace and security, as Roosevelt maintained, it was the Western European nations who found themselves in the direct and immediate threat of the Soviet politics and military. Although it was in the best interest of the United States to rebuild Europe economically and ensure its security from the Soviets, in terms of the actual tangible threat or the perception of threat, the Western Europeans and Americans were in quite different positions. The US was separated by two oceans from the Soviet Union and its extensive conventional forces. It would have taken considerable time and effort for Moscow to launch an attack on the US. Furthermore, at this point Washington was in possession of the only nuclear capability in the world. Economically, the US was in a much better shape than the Soviet Union, and definitely better than war-damaged Europe.

On the other side of the Atlantic, the situation was vastly different. In terms of geography, the Soviets were right next door without much room to spare in case of a Russian attack, nor much time to prepare. The Europeans also grossly misunderstood

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and misperceived the strength of Russian conventional force, thinking it was much stronger than it was. Politically, Russia was establishing communist regimes in Eastern and Central Europe, creating its future satellites. And economically, although depleted and damaged by war, with the massive expanse of land, resources, and Stalin’s policy of rapid and forceful industrialization, Moscow was dominating over Europe.

Given this political, economic, and security triangulation between the United States and Canada on one side, Western Europe in the middle, and the Soviet Union on the other side, it is no surprise that originally the United States was not eager to tie itself up militarily in the security of Europe. US Secretary of State, General Marshall, in his 1947 Harvard speech said to the Western European governments: “Try and help yourselves and we will try to see what we can do. Try and do the thing collectively, and we will see what we can put into the pool.” In other words, while General Marshall recognized the need for security in Europe and its benefit to the United States, it was the responsibility of Europeans to collectively fend for themselves. Only in the case of the inability on the part of the Europeans to ensure their security against the Russians would the United States get involved.

However, to the European governments, the message from General Marshall provided a positive incentive. In the words of the British Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, Ernest Bevin, Washington’s position “meant the beginning of Europe’s salvation, and Europe will go on until it has restored itself and reestablished its culture, its influence, and in turn that gift will become an investment, because in the years to come we will return to the United States, for all of the gifts you have made, the blessings that

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Europe can still give.” European statesmen understood that it was their responsibility to collectively provide for security in Europe; however, given the economic and military shape of the continent relative to the United States, many of them were rather pessimistic as to their potential capabilities, if left alone without the American assistance.

That first step, European collective security, recognized by both Americans and Europeans as necessary, was introduced in January 1948 by Ernest Bevin in the House of Commons. He proposed to form a western union built on the network of bilateral agreements among the Western European governments. As a blueprint for his proposal, Bevin used the example of the Dunkirk Treaty of 1947, extending the cooperation between France and Great Britain to include Belgium, Luxemburg and the Netherlands.

In addition, he also put forward an example of the Rio Treaty, a collective defense arrangement “aimed against any aggression” between the US and the Latin American states. With those two treaties as basis, combining the framework of bilateral defense against a pre-existing threat and principles of “attack against one is an attack against all,” Bevin provided a solid collective defense structure for the Europeans.

Furthermore, he emphasized the historical, civilizational, and political unity of Western Europe. “We shall have to consider the question of associating other historic member of European civilization, including the new Italy, in this great concept.... We are thinking of Western Europe as a unit.”

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10 Cook, 88.
12 Ismay, 7.
13 Lawrence Kaplan, 28.
14 Ismay, 8.
15 Henderson, 77.
normative undertone of discourse complements pure security concerns in the narrative of what later would become the North Atlantic Alliance. The countries here were not considered as separate national entities; rather, there was a drive for establishing a common identity.

In March 1948, Belgium, France, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, and Great Britain met in Brussels to launch a structure for mutual assistance. While the leaders feared that this would not be possible without American assistance, General Marshall again stressed that while Washington shared the concerns of the Europeans, the European states must be able to "do for themselves and for each other before asking for further American assistance."\(^{16}\) Despite doubts and uncertainties, the Treaty of Brussels, which later served as basis for the North Atlantic Treaty, was signed by Belgium, France, Luxembourg, the Netherlands and the United Kingdom on March 17\(^{th}\), 1948. Article IV of this Treaty stated that if any of the members were attacked, the other members would support the attacked states with "all the military and other aid and assistance in their power."\(^{17}\)

The states pledged to "set up a joint defensive system as well as to strengthen their economic and cultural ties."\(^{18}\) In that statement, the cultural and constructivist attitudes accompany the neorealist security issues. Although the main focus of this treaty was to provide a joint defensive system for Western Europe, the goals of preserving democracy and Western cultural values was not unrecognized. The words of General

\(^{16}\) Ismay, 8.

\(^{17}\) Treaty of Economic, Social and Cultural Collaboration and Collective Self-Defence, Article IV, Brussels, 17 March 1948. This Treaty was signed by France, the United Kingdom, Belgium, the Netherlands and Luxembourg. Although it provided only for cooperation between the signatories and it did not provide for the establishment of an international organization, in practice it led to the creation of the Western Union.

\(^{18}\) Ismay, 8.
Marshall summarize well the importance of the Treaty of Brussels: “United Europe can stand on its feet as a powerful united states of Europe. Divided Europe can only repeat its own history.”

AMERICANS AND THE EUROPEAN DEFENSE

In February 1948, the communist party in Czechoslovakia, with the support of the Soviet troops, took control of Prague. This event exposed the intentions of Stalin in regards to Eastern European governments—namely, Stalin had no intentions of allowing free elections in the countries occupied by the Soviets, despite earlier promises made to President Harry Truman. Along with further solidification of the East-West division, the Czech coup d'état provided the first strong push for Washington to revisit the question of support for Western European defense system. The second push came four months later with the Berlin blockade, which begun in June 1948 and reinforced the US reexamination of joining the Europeans in their effort to collectively defend the Western culture and values. Starting in July 1948, Americans and Canadians started attending the meetings of the Brussels Powers.

Given the involvement and intentions of Moscow in Prague and Berlin, the Soviet threat shifted from potential to direct in the perceptions of both, the Europeans, the Canadians and the Americans. From that moment, the decisions and actions on the side of all three happened relatively quickly. In April 1948, Secretary of State George Marshall and Under-Secretary Robert Lovett started talking with Senators Arthur

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21 Cook, 171.
22 Lawrence Kaplan, 14.
Vandenberg and Tom Connally regarding security issues in the North Atlantic region.\(^2^3\)

At the end of April that year, St. Lauren introduced the idea of an organization including the US, Canada, and the Brussels Powers to the Canadian House of Commons. A week later, Bevin did the same at Westminster. At the same time, Vandenberg prepared a resolution involving the US in a collective security arrangement with Canada and Western Europe “contributing to the maintenance of peace by making clear its determination to exercise the right of individual or collective self-defence under Article 51 (of the United Nations Charter) should any armed attack occur affecting its national security.”\(^2^4\) Despite the subsequent negotiations, this resolution effectively marked the US entrance into the Atlantic Alliance.\(^2^5\)

The treaty proposed by Vandenberg would operate under the framework of the UN Charter. As Lord Ismay stated, the treaty would be designed to “promote peace and security; express determination of the parties to resist aggression; define the area in which it should be operative; be based on self-help and mutual aid; be more than military: that is, promote stability and well-being of the North Atlantic peoples; provide machinery for implementation.”\(^2^6\) Between the military and defense elements of the proposed treaty and its goals to promote peace and security, again here the conception of North Atlantic Treaty displays the elements of realist alliances and institutionalist collective security. While empirically it would be hard to determine which took precedence in those formative years, it is safe to assume that in terms of practicality security and defense


\(^2^4\) *The Vandenberg Resolution and the North Atlantic Treaty*. Hearing in Executive Session before Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, 80th Congress, 2nd Session; on Senate Resolution 239; May 19, 1948. Vandenberg Resolution, also known as Resolution 239, passed in the US Senate by 64 to 4 vote.

\(^2^5\) Ibid.

\(^2^6\) Ismay, 10.
against the apparent threat from the East provided the needed reason and catalyst to unite Americans, Canadians, and the Western Europeans.

In March 1949, the Brussels Powers, Canada and the US invited Denmark, Iceland, Italy,27 Norway and Portugal to partake in the Treaty. The following month, on April 4, 1949, the North Atlantic Treaty was signed by Belgium, Canada, Denmark, France, Iceland, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, the United Kingdom, and the United States. Within five months, the parliaments of the member states ratified the treaty. In 1952, Greece and Turkey joined the Alliance. The pace of the process of negotiation and ratification of the North Atlantic Treaty was representative of the perceived need to unite forces against the tangible threat from the Soviet Union.

THE NATURE OF COLLECTIVE SECURITY AND COLLECTIVE DEFENSE AT NATO’S CONCEPTION

The narrative of the NATO’s conception prior to the signing of the North Atlantic Treaty speaks loudly to the interaction of neoliberal and neorealist variables of collective defense and security. Lord Ismay talked about the degree of unity among NATO members, spanning from military individuals to politicians. He saw this as a great accomplishment five years after NATO’s conception, along with the creation of the governing bodies and the infrastructure of the organization. In 1954, he wrote:

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27 Issues with Italian communism provided the reason for the perceived necessity to quickly involve Rome in the North Atlantic Treaty and make it effectively dependent on the West. President Truman was worried about Italy falling into the Russian hands and was set on preventing that from happening. “The Position of the United States with Respect to Italy,” NSC 1/1, November 14, 1947, FRUS, 1948, III: 726.
There is another achievement which is perhaps even more valuable—namely the remarkable degree of unity which characterizes all the NATO agencies. A visitor to the NATO Defence College will see officers of eight or ten different nations working in the same study group and lunching together afterwards, learning each others’ view points and making friendships that will endure perhaps for a lifetime. There is the same atmosphere at all NATO military headquarters.... [M]en belonging to different nations, speaking different languages, wearing different uniforms, carry out together, with admirable precision, exercises of impressive magnitude. The forces of NATO are no longer a dream, they are a reality. On the civil side, no member of the International Staff regards himself as a national of his own country. They all feel themselves member of an international team dedicated to the service of the Alliance as a whole.  

Especially the last sentence strays away from purely security-oriented role of NATO. Lord Hastings talks about the culture of common identity, where nationalism does not find a place, where the military and civilians operate as an “international team” designed to protect and promote the same set of cultural and political values. Lawrence Kaplan in his book on the first years of NATO reinforces the same idea. While there indisputably was the perception of threat from the Soviet Union and a sense of encroaching danger, “there was also a mix of idealism and realism that transcended the sense of crisis in 1948. After World War II, the United States believed that they could help create the peaceful and prosperous world the United Nations failed to secure. A United States of Europe, no matter how distant its realization, was expected to become a political and economic partner of the United States.”

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28 Ismay, x.
29 Lawrence Kaplan, x.
This partnership would span from culture to security, from politics to economics. Nobody was disputing the dependence of Europe on the military, economic, and political power of the United States. However, there was a growing sense of interdependence of European and US economies, based on the basic principle of supply and demand: the US needed a market, and the Europeans needed the supplier. "The Alliance was, therefore, primarily an answer to the great disparity of strength and purpose between the Communist-dominated countries to the East and the weakness and fragmentation of Western Europe. It was also a response to the overall problem of recovery in Western Europe and the lack of any current prospect of working effectively with the Soviet Union to achieve a European-wide settlement."\(^{30}\)

The founding fathers of NATO had ambitious plans for the alliance.

In the past, alliances and leagues have always been formed to meet emergencies and have dissolved as the emergencies vanished. It must not be so this time. Our Atlantic union must have a deeper meaning and deeper roots. It must create the conditions for a kind of cooperation which goes beyond the immediate emergency. Threats to peace may bring our Atlantic pact into existence. Its contribution to welfare and progress may determine how long it is to survive.\(^{31}\)

With this approach, from the moment of its conception, NATO was more than an alliance, assuming the route of a comprehensive collective security institution, designed


\(^{31}\) Speech given by Lester Pearson, the Canadian Minister of External Affairs, on February 4\(^{th}\), 1949 to the Canadian Parliament to explain the Washington Treaty. In Lester Pearson, Words and Occasions: An Anthology of Speeches and Articles Selected from His Papers (Toronto: Toronto University Press, 1970), 86.
to not only defend from an external threat but also to promote the ideal of peace and security in the world.

Lester Pearson, the Canadian Minister of External Affairs, in a speech given at the ceremony of the signing of the North Atlantic Treaty, said: “The North Atlantic Treaty was born out of fear and frustration; fear of the aggressive and subversive policies of communism and the effect of those policies on our own peace, security, and well-being; frustration over the obstinate obstruction by communist state of our efforts to make the United Nations function effectively as a universal security system.” But the fear and frustration expressed by him did not tell the whole story of NATO. “This Treaty, though born of this fear and frustration, must, however, lead to positive social, economic, and political achievements if it is to live; achievements which will extend beyond the time of emergency which gave it birth, or the geographical area which it now includes.”

Furthermore, he emphasized the concept of community, bound together by values.

We, in this North Atlantic community, the structure of which we now consolidate, must jealously guard the defensive and progressive nature of our league. There can be no place in this group for power politics or imperialist ambitions on the part of any of its members. This is more than a treaty for defence. We must, of course, defend ourselves, and that is the first purpose of our pact; but, in doing so, we must never forget that we are now organizing force for peace so that peace can one day be preserved without force.  

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32 Ibid., 88
33 Ibid.
34 Ibid.
Here again, the normative elements of establishing international peace and security complement the practical security concerns. Bevin’s phrase “spiritual federation of the West”35 in reference to NATO serves as an apt conclusion to Pearson’s remarks and a suitable summary of NATO’s inherent nature.

THE NORTH ATLANTIC TREATY: CONVERSATIONS ON STRUCTURE AND DESIGN

The discussions and negotiations on the structure of North Atlantic organization also show the elements of collective security and collective defense. While the US was a hegemon in terms of political, military and economic power and could push for a design more favorable to Washington and representative of purely a collective defense organization, the neoliberal and normative components influenced the building of the Alliance structure in a visible way. The Preamble to the North Atlantic Treaty states:

The Parties to this Treaty reaffirm their faith in the purpose and principles of the Charter of the United Nations and their desire to live in peace with all peoples and all governments. They are determined to safeguard the freedom, common heritage and civilization of their peoples, founded on the principles of democracy, individual liberty and the rule of law. They seek to promote stability and well-being in the North Atlantic area. They are resolved to unite their efforts for collective defence and for the preservation of peace and security.36

From the first paragraph, the North Atlantic Treaty clearly combines the elements of collective security and collective defense. The cultural components of common

35 Lawrence Kaplan, 15.
heritage, civilizational and historical values, and Western principles of democracy, liberty and the rule of law take an equally important place in the design of NATO as do the tangible threats. Again, it would be hard to determine at this point which set, the collective security or the collective defense, takes the precedent over the other. The question here, therefore, is not really about which is more important than the other. Rather, the difference is in the immediate needs versus long-term goals, in the practical necessities and future potential effects. The alliance components satisfy the immediate needs, while the collective security undertones set the stage for common basis and future goals.

Furthermore, Article II of the North Atlantic Treaty provides four binding commitments that speak directly to the collective security nature: “1. to strengthen their free institutions; 2. to bring about a better understanding of the principles on which those institutions are founded; 3. to promote conditions of stability and well-being; 4. to seek to eliminate conflict in their international economic policies, and to encourage collaboration between any or all of them.” Therefore, it is safe to say that the neoliberal and normative elements of NATO are visible not only in the Preamble, but also throughout the rest of the text of the Treaty, reinforcing the importance of norms beyond the appeasement of obligatory and superficial wording characteristic of international documents.

The need for security in face of potential tangible and intangible dangers echoes throughout the Treaty as well. In Chapter VII Article 51, it is written:

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Nothing in the present Charter shall impair the inherent right of individual or collective self-defence if an armed attack occurs against a member of the United Nations, until the Security Council has taken the measures necessary to maintain international peace and security. Measures taken by members in the exercise of this right of self-defence shall be immediately reported to the Security Council and shall not in any way affect the authority and responsibility of the Security Council under the present Charter to take at any time such action as it deems necessary in order to maintain and restore international peace and security.38

The first part of Article 51 emphasizes the connection of North Atlantic Treaty Organization to the United Nations, and its goals of international peace and security. In its collective security structure, the principles of self-defense and membership in an organization for mutual assistance do not exclude one another. In its character, therefore, NATO was not designed purely as a military alliance. Using the words of Lord Ismay, NATO’s first appointed leader: “It is, of course, true that the Treaty was born of collective insecurity and that the energies of the Treaty Powers have hitherto been primarily directed to strengthening their collective defence against aggression.”39

However, he could not avoid adding the cultural unity and commonality of the universal values among the members. As he points out “the Preamble and the first two articles of the Treaty make it crystal clear that the member countries believe they belong to a community of nations within which cooperation should be developed not only for defence, but in all fields.”40 Along with other founding fathers of the North Atlantic Alliance, Lord Ismay had long-terms plans and hopes for the organization, extending

40 Ibid.
beyond simply providing security against the Soviets. Rather, Ismay wrote, "[p]eace is not merely the absence of war: its maintenance requires continuous cooperation by governments in economic, social, and cultural, as well as in the military field."41

CONCLUSIONS

Given the post-WWII geopolitical environment in Europe, there is no question that it was to the benefit of the West—the Americans, Canadians, and the Western Europeans—to cooperate and support each other in the creation of a security system designed to deter the Soviet from an attack on Europe. While the Europeans felt the more immediate need of defense system, this could not have been effectively accomplished without the power of the United States. However, from the perspective of Washington, the US could have provided the necessary military reinforcement for Europe to defend itself against the Russians.

Why did Washington choose to bind itself to the European governments through the North Atlantic Treaty? Why did Americans not simply loan their conventional and nuclear forces, combined with economic strength, to Europe? The answer lies in the other independent variable utilized in this study—namely the collective security narrative. From the beginning, NATO was not only about the security in Europe against the evil forces of the USSR; rather, as apparent in the Preamble and many Articles of the Treaty, and exemplified in the words of Bevin, Pearson, Marshall, and Vandenberg, among other founding fathers, the ambitions, hopes, goals of NATO reached out to setting the international standard of behavior that would promote peace and stability, along with Western values of liberty, freedom, and democracy. In other words, in those

41 Ibid.
early stages of NATO's development, the collective security and collective defense mechanisms were not only reinforcing each other; rather, they were dependent on each other.

This dependency was especially evident in the months following the 1948 communist coup in Czechoslovakia and the Berlin blockade. The speedy pace at which the United States and Canada decided to join the Brussels Powers under the umbrella of a comprehensive organization and structures of NATO was further increased by the amplified sense of threat from the Soviet Union, leading to a relatively smooth process of negotiating and making decisions regarding the future shape of the Atlantic Alliance. The effort of the founding fathers proved successful; the originally planned conclusion of the organization, set for 1969, is long gone; despite the disappearance of the major threat against which NATO was created as an alliance, the North Atlantic Alliance is still in existence, taking on increasingly wider scope of responsibilities, and functionally and practically extending its role and nature from a collective defense to collective security institution to an even great extent.
CHAPTER IV
NATO IN THE 1950 TO 1991 PERIOD

INTRODUCTION

This chapter begins with the day considered by some to be the effective beginning of the Cold War; namely, June 25th, 1950 which is remembered in history as the day when the North Korean troops crossed the 38th parallel and invaded South Korea. As the previous chapter indicated, the beginning of the Korean War was a watershed moment in the history of NATO as well. Given the change in the external environment, in June 1950 the Alliance was faced with a more immediate sense of threat from the side of communism, threat that carried potentially more wide-spread and heavy consequence than thought before. Accordingly, NATO would have to prepare to respond to this new scope of potential threat. At this point, the story of the East-West conflict extended from Europe to Asia. The Soviet Union and China appeared much stronger to the West, and the potential of communist expansion in the Asian continent presented a vital threat to the US and European security.

As pointed in the discussion of NATO’s beginnings, the narratives of collective defense and collective security, combined with and impacted by the perception of threat, all played a significant role in the direction that the Alliance took throughout its history. The decisions made before the signing of the North Atlantic Treaty were impacted in an equal measure by the high degree of commonality of interests among the future allies, based on the perception of threat coming from the Soviet Union, as well as the need to uphold Western values and norms within the Western block, characteristic of collective
security communities. At this point, the unequivocal superiority of the US power within an alliance was an added benefit, which provided the Alliance with a clear leader who could use power to nudge the decision-making process and speed it up.

The interaction between the collective security and defense narratives in this period support the patterns shown in the previous period, centered on NATO’s creation. The case of Germany’s accession into the Alliance demonstrates that those two narratives are still running parallel and reinforcing each other. Furthermore, they are as imperative for each other’s existence as was the case with the origins of NATO. In addition, both of the narratives still show high degree of dependency on the structural environment. The increased perception of threat coming out of the Soviet Union in the wake of the Korean War pushed the alliance narrative. The symptom or sign of that push was Germany’s joining.

In the same time, despite concerns from Great Britain and France about German propensity for conflict, Germany was incorporated into the Alliance as a democratic state. From the position of other allies, Germany would be from now on kept in check as well and socialized to behave according to the internal security standards of the Alliance—here the narrative of collective security is clearly displayed.

Would economically-needed Germany be allowed to enter the Alliance if it were not showing the same set of democratic values, aversion to military conflict and potential for building security community based on peaceful solution of disagreements with other countries? Probably not. Would democratic Berlin be incorporated into the NATO structures if its military and economic resources were not needed for the alliance?
Probably not. Germany at the point of its accession possessed a perfect combination of values and material components to be wanted by and allowed into the Alliance.

This chapter, therefore, uses the cases of German accession to the alliance and NATO's nuclear policy as examples of the interaction of the two historical narratives of collective security and collective defense in the second period of NATO's existence. The beginning date of this phase is June 25th, 1950, which as explained earlier, served as an important event in the life of the Alliance. To determine the end of this time period, the official dissolution of the Soviet Union is used. On December 12th, 1991, the Belavezha Accords1 were ratified by the Congress of Peoples' Deputies of the Russian Federation, effectively denouncing the 1922 treaty which created the Soviet Union. This event marked the end of the tangible threat which served as one of the main causes for the birth of NATO.

The second case discussed in this chapter, NATO's policy regarding nuclear capabilities, and the long-stretched process of disagreements and negotiations, was guided not by the incompatibility of goals and values, but rather by the divergent perceptions of what is the best policy for the European members given the Soviet threat. Therefore, this case shows that despite protracted periods of discord, the alliance and collective security natures of NATO remained untouched. Even the French withdrawal from the command structure of the organization did not leave any long term negative effects. France remained in the political structures of NATO, was still covered under NATO's umbrella in terms of external security, and in 2009 returned into the command structure.

1 Belavezha Accords were signed by the leaders of Russian, Ukrainian, and Belorussian Republics on December 8th, 1991, dissolving the Soviet Union and creating the Commonwealth of Independent States.
The two cases chosen for this time period represent the pattern of cohesion and agreement among the NATO allies, interrupted by the dissonance and disagreements over means but not goals—the goals still remained those of internal and external security. The example of West German accession into the Alliance and the MLF story show the organization in its time of cooperation, albeit characterized by heated discussion and negotiations. In both cases, it is important to mention the structural environment. In 1955, the perception of threat coming from the Soviet Union was heightened, pushing for a more cohesive combination of collective security and defense.

On the other hand, during the MLF negotiations, the Cold War was going through the period of détente and changed nature of cooperation between the West and the East. For the Europeans, this meant a perception of decreased threat. Within the Transatlantic Alliance at that time, there was a divergence of opinions as to the means that the internal and external security can be accomplished, but not the divergence of opinions as to the need for those types of security. Therefore, despite heated discussions and disagreements on means, alliance and collective security progressed, albeit at a slower pace.

Don Cook, in his book Forging the Alliance, points out to the cycles of cooperation and dissent in the Alliance.

The first ‘NATO cycle’ was set off by the Soviet test explosion of the atomic bomb in 1949 followed by the Korean War in 1950, ending on the downside in the Eisenhower presidency. The second cycle was set off by Sputnik, Soviet resumption of nuclear testing and the threat to Berlin at the start of the Kennedy presidency, and ended on the downside in détente in the 1970s. The third cycle began under President Carter, in response to the Soviet conventional buildup and its growing nuclear superiority with
massive deployment of the SS-20 under way against Europe—all of this culminating, then, in the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. 2

This cyclical pattern is best summarized in the words of Reimund Seidelman who wrote in 1985: “Atlantic cooperation has always been characterized by consensus and dissensus.” 3 Or maybe after all, aside from the external threats and internal disagreements, the North Atlantic Alliance has always had at its heart the caring cultivation of the transatlantic culture, values and unequivocal historic link between Europe and the United States. As Helga Haftendorn says: “[A]fter the demise of an acute military threat, NATO continues to have a raison d’être and a mission: to ensure a close link between America and Europe…. At the end of the East-West conflict, the Alliance could again, as in the 1966-7 NATO crisis, use its flexibility and adaptability to assume a new role as the guardian of an all-European stability.” 4 So again, despite the disagreements and heated disputes, the allies remain connected not only through mutual military reinforcement, but also through commonality of values, effectively extending NATO from an organization of collective defense to one of collective security.

INTERNATIONAL STAGE: THE KOREAN WAR

June 25th, 1950 had a “profound influence on the evolution of NATO.” 5 The North Korean army crossed the 38th parallel into South Korea, effectively invading its

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2 Cook, 271.
neighbor after a long period of political strife. In response, the United Nations Security Council ordered ceasefire which was ignored. Given the lack of reaction by either side of the conflict, on June 27th, President Truman instructed the US air and naval forces to support South Korean forces; furthermore, on the same day, the UNSC denounced North Korea as the aggressor, decided on military and economic sanctions against it, and called on all member states to send aid to South Korea.

For the first time in history, an international organization took a military action. As Lester Pearson said to Dean Acheson in July 1950: "The struggle ahead should not be one of the United States vs. the Communist world. The American people could be convinced of this if we all acted together on the Korean front as members of the United Nations, and if we worked together to strengthen our defenses generally." Subsequently, Acheson suggested that NATO should lead a collective, coordinated effort to bring stability and security to the conflict between the Koreas.

Besides historical significance, the beginning of the Korean War, and the subsequent UNSC decision, provided a push for NATO to start organizing quicker than it was doing up to that date. Before that, while the Treaty was signed and decisions regarding structure and policies were being made, especially the Americans were not ready to act. "It was the Europeans who were pushing and pleading for a reluctant America to move in, take over and dominate. But the United States was trying... to get Europe back on its own feet to look after its own economic and security problems." The two steeples of the economic and security support, as outlined by President Truman, were the Marshall Plan and military support for Western Europe.

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7 Cook, 225.
This was why General Marshall had urged Bevin to launch a security arrangement in Europe with the Brussels Treaty before turning to the United States. This was why George Kennan and Chip Bohlen had opposed the North Atlantic Treaty idea, and contended instead that the United States should confine itself to a unilateral guarantee of support for Europe if it were attacked but should not become more deeply involved.8

From the above evidence, it is clear that NATO was not designed to be a purely military security arrangement. If that was the case, then the US would have no reason to commit as deeply as it did. Washington could, after all, provide the unilateral support for Europe only and not bind itself by the structures of NATO. The reason that more was accomplished in the framework of an institution was because the mindset of the founding fathers of NATO had at its core the normative roots of the Alliance, going beyond neorealist power and security agenda and into the field of neoliberal and constructivist collective security arrangement. Robert Osgood writes: “On the eve of the Korean War, NATO already embodied a degree of military collaboration that was unprecedented among peacetime coalitions.... The United States, sharing an identical interest with the enfeebled countries of Western Europe in their economic recovery and security, extended them the assurance of an entangling alliance.”9

Given the immediate need presented by the outbreak of the Korean War, in July, 1950, the Council Deputies met under the leadership of the US Ambassador Charles Spofford and emphasized the need to increase effort and contributions from each member. In the same time, the Brussels Treaty Powers met to discuss rearmament. The

8 Ibid.
speed of response was remarkable: all members responded by the end of August, 1950 with their propositions for increase of armament despite economic and financial concerns. During the September meeting of the North Atlantic Council, the members repeatedly expressed a fear of aggression similar to North Korean attack on South Korea. They emphasized the need to prepare, especially given the inadequacy of existing forces and structures of the Alliance at the time. “The Council decided that members should take urgent measures to increase their military strength.... An ‘integrated force under a centralized command, adequate to deter aggression and to ensure the defence of Western Europe’, was to be created and placed under a Supreme Commander to be appointed by NATO.”

Here again, it is important to point out the speed of decisions made in the face of an outside threat, with the unanimity in action and the prospect of very real and tangible threat in near sight. As the Korean War continued and the fear of the domino theory taking effect in Asia prevailed, the Truman Doctrine was shaping and impacting the cooperation between the Allies in Europe. In the background of those events and mindsets, West Germany was invited to join the North Atlantic Alliance on May 5th, 1955.

WEST GERMANY’S ACCESSSION INTO NATO

In the case of West Germany’s joining the ranks of NATO, the perception of threat greatly influenced both of the narratives, the collective security and the alliance one, playing a critical role in the behavior of the Alliance. The US was pushing strongly for including Bonn in the Alliance, simply because NATO needed to reinforce its military

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10 Ismay, NATO: The First Five Years 1949—1954, 32.
capability in the face of danger coming from the communist bloc. In the same time, West Germany under Chancellor Adenauer was taking a political course oriented toward a western-style democracy. Given the ideological fundamentals of NATO, it was only logical that West Germany should be allowed to join the Alliance, since it shared the basic normative values of its members, namely the cultural and historical heritage, the geopolitical closeness, and the democratic political system. Although the negotiations among the existing members took five years, the process of West German accession was not as troublesome as the nuclear policies and related issues outlined later in the chapter. The case of Germany well represents the fundamental and general issue of the Alliance. Earl Ravenal describes it well, when he writes:

The alliance of Atlantic nations, in its history, has been beset by many kinds of problems. There have been the periodic recrudescence of commercial and agricultural disputes; the irreconcilable antagonisms of pairs of nations, such as Greece and Turkey; the threat of Eurocommunism; the acrimony revolving around burden-sharing; the complaints about the “one-way street” of American military production for the alliance; the assaults of neutralists and anti-American political groups; the failures of “consultation” and the recriminations about American “hegemony.” But whatever else is wrong with the Atlantic alliance, its essential problems are strategic…. In NATO the principal problem is that the United States and Europe have persistently failed to resolve their discordant strategic conceptions.11

In December, 1949, Bonn asked the Brits, the French, and the Americans what is being done to protect Germany against potential attack from the Soviet Union. At that time, however, “the Bonn government... did not indicate any desire to rearm in order to

defend its own territory.”12 Four months later, in March, 1950, Prime Minister Churchill told the British Parliament that “the effective defense of European frontiers could not be achieved if the German contribution were excluded from the thoughts of those who were responsible.”13 His concerns were supported by Dean Acheson, who introduced the position of the US as prepared to “participate in the immediate establishment of an integrated force in Europe, within the framework of the North Atlantic Treaty, adequate to ensure the successful defence of Western Europe, including Western Germany, against possible aggression.”14 Lord Ismay concurred with this opinion: the Allied forces should include “the participation of German units and the use of German productive resources for its supply.”15 In effect, NATO needed both German territory and human power to increase in military strength and capability, because “without German terrain, the strategic plans of the NATO command would lack sufficient depth for defensive maneuvers.”16 As the French General Billotte pointed out in March, 1950, in the event of attack from the Soviet Union, NATO should fight as far as possible to the east and this could not be accomplished without a degree of rearmament by Germany. However, he also was very specific in stating that the other NATO signatories would have to be provided for first.17

The initial framework of integrating Germany in the NATO structures called for each German unit’s incorporation into larger Allied forces; furthermore, the size of units

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13 Ibid., 17.


would be limited; German military would be dependent on other members for equipment; and Germany would not reopen any military-supporting industries. In addition, "the United States proposal entailed a reversal of the Allied policy of disarmament and demilitarization of Germany. German participation in Western defence had been mooted several times in the preceding months, and the anxiety caused by the Korean War had brought the question to a head."

In the same time, the Russians planned for East Germany to generate the people's militia amounting to around 50,000 heavily armed men. Again, in the face of more tangible and imminent danger, the decision was made quickly and without much opposition. To the Senate Committee on Appropriations, Secretary of State Acheson said in the summer 1950: "The strength of the free nations is potentially great—more than enough to deal with this threat. But we must translate that potential into defense in being, with the greatest speed." Therefore, despite heated debates, the pressure from the United States, the need associated with risk, overwhelmed the historical differences and potential veto from France, Great Britain, and other states who just recently concluded a large scale war with, combined with occupation by, Germany.

After a long discussion, all but the French were ready to accept Germany's rearmament. French Foreign Minister Robert Schuman believed that "the raising of German troops would at this stage do more harm than good." After some debates, the occupying powers in Germany issued a statement that they would increase and reinforce their own forces in Germany. Furthermore, they would consider "any attack against the

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18 Ismay, NATO: The First Five Years 1949—1954, 32.
19 Osgood, NATO: The Entangling Alliance, 69.
20 Ibid., 70.
Federal Republic or Berlin from any quarter as an attack upon themselves.” In support of the French dissent, the occupying powers agreed that building of German national force would not be beneficial to Europe at that time.

At the end of September, 1950 when the North Atlantic Council met again, it decided that Germany “should be enabled to contribute to the build-up of the defence of Western Europe,” intentionally using rather vague language as to not limit its options. In October, the French Prime Minister René Pleven introduced to the French Assembly a plan for “the creation of a European army linked to the political institutions of a united Europe... with a complete fusion of all the human and material elements.” A European Minister of Defense would be appointed by participating states and responsible to a European Assembly, with a financing from a common budget. “The European forces would be placed at the disposal of the unified Atlantic force and would operate in accordance with the contractual obligations of the Atlantic Pact.”

This idea of European army, including the German forces, was introduced to NATO’s Defense Committee in October, 1950 as an alternative to the American proposal of creating the German army. The French and the Americans could not come to a compromise at that particular Defense Committee meeting, led by Secretary of State Marshall, so they opened the issue for further study. In December, 1950, the North Atlantic Council met in Brussels and issued a communiqué that “German participation

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22 Ibid.
23 Ibid., 34.
24 Ibid., 35.
25 Ibid., 33.
26 Osgood, *NATO: The Entangling Alliance*, 73.
would strengthen the defence of Europe without altering in any way the purely defensive character of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization."

Although, the decision to invite West Germany into the Alliance was made in December, 1950, it would take another four years of negotiations regarding the specific form in which German forces would join the European defense structure. The process NATO's expansion into Germany was slowed down by the stagnant character of the Korean War and decreasing sense of threat which initially was spurred by that conflict. Finally, in October, 1954, the Paris Treaties were signed, providing a structural formula under which Germany would enter the Alliance.

Although the invitation of Germany to join the alliance was motivated by the increased sense of threat from the Soviets in the environment set by the outbreak of the Korean War, the two elements of NATO's nature, the collective security and the collective defense were mutually reinforcing. Despite the history of aggression and war which marred West Germany, the cultural and geopolitical commonalities made the accession of Germany into NATO's collective security component possible. Furthermore, the need for German army in the face of danger from the East made Bonn's membership in the Alliance necessary.

\[27\] Ismay, 34.
NATO'S ROUGH ROAD TO NUCLEAR POLICY

Gregory Traverton, in his book *Making the Alliance Work*, writes:

NATO's nuclear dilemma is nearly as old as the Alliance itself. It is rooted in the fundamental paradox of geography: most of NATO's ultimate deterrent, American strategic nuclear forces, resides an ocean away from the likely point of attack or political pressure. The dilemma is also an anomaly: it crystallized the exceptional situation of the 1950s and with it the military dependence of Europe on the United States.\(^{28}\)

One would be hard pressed to find a better review of the fundamental issues of the nuclear policy NATO faced in the 1950s and the 1960s.

The 1950s also brought about the economic and financial problems. The US was spending over 50% of its budget on military and the Europeans were still recovering from the devastating effects of World War II. With the expenses associated with the Korean War, the prices of imports to Europe increased, as the producers in the United States faced scarcity of raw materials. The increasing prices, combined with decreasing resources, caused deterioration of Western Europe's economic system. The apt critique of this trend came from the French Deputy Alphand, according to whom NATO had responsibility to "recommend and supervise the execution of future measures designed to ensure not only the security but also the economic equilibrium of the Atlantic Community."\(^{29}\)

In terms of raw numbers, in 1953, 176 million North Americans still accounted for a total economic output about three times that attained by the 208 million citizens of


the European NATO states. Furthermore, France and Great Britain were spending 10% of their GNP on defense, whereas the United States, under NSC-68 passed in April 1949, was putting well over 20% of its GNP, amounting to $50 billion, to rearm the US and NATO. In effect, “the gap between the productive capacity of the United States and the other NATO members encompassed every field of activity from nylon stockings to bomber aircraft.”

However, even more pressing than economic hardship, yet closely connected to the economic capacity of the Allies, was the credibility of American nuclear security shield extending to Europe.

There is another, structural reason for NATO’s debility... the danger and yet the incredibility of the American military guarantee of Europe, including ‘nuclear umbrella.’... For the commitment to Europe presents the United States with a choice between unsupportable costs, associated with the confident defense of Europe with conventional forces, and unassumable risks, attributable to reliance on the earlier use of nuclear weapons.

The difference in economic, political, and military power between the US and the European members was so enormous that Western Europe was referred to as an “American protectorate in Europe.” Therefore, especially in the sphere of nuclear

30 Duignan, 10
31 Ibid., 17.
32 Ambrose and Brinkley, 1997.
capability and economic strength, the United States remained immeasurably superior to its European allies.\footnote{Duignan, 10.}

At NATO’s conception, Europeans thought that the US would develop more conventional forces to stop the Soviets in Europe. This assumption was based on the need to counter what was perceived as extremely strong Soviet conventional army. However, soon the arms race took precedence. Misperception of the Soviet Union’s conventional forces and their power as too large to counter with conventional means reinforced the need for nuclear capability. Furthermore, the aforementioned economic slump would not leave room for a development of conventional forces and their maintenance. In contrast, nuclear weapons were more affordable. Their projected tactical and strategic use would stop the Soviet progress into Europe. But on the other hand, nuclear capability did not give NATO much flexibility. What if the treat from the Soviet Union was relatively small? Even when the Dulles’ policy of massive retaliation, based on tactical nuclear weapons and nuclear deterrence, dominated the US foreign policy, the Europeans had a difficult time applying that policy to their own situation. Simply put, the lack of space between Western Europe and the Soviet bloc did not leave room for potential benefit; rather, it was clear that the costs for the Europeans would be unbearable.

NATO has relied on the US strategic nuclear weapons as a deterrent to the Warsaw Pact. Because of this dependence, “nuclear guarantee” was a central issue of alliance security. If that assurance were to be questioned, the principle of deterrence of NATO would be challenged. This potential weakness was one of the most notorious instances that threatened the cohesion of NATO as an effective alliance.
In terms of the cohesion as a collective security institution at that particular time, the discussion on the group’s unity is purely speculative. However, given the benefit of hindsight and the fact that NATO still exists and, what is more important, is assuming increasingly more role as a collective security arrangement, it is safe to say that the basic commonalities of the members were already at play in the time of the most aggressive discussions regarding the Alliance’s nuclear capabilities. In the words of David Schwartz: “Approaches that challenge the grounds for European fears, forcing the allies to elaborate and to justify those fears, work as well as, if not better than, those that accept such fears as a basis for interaction.” 37

Given the strategic triangulation of the US, Europe, and the Soviet Union at the time, the direction that Washington’s foreign policy took under President Eisenhower was hard to stomach by the Europeans, and provided an ample ground for the nuclear policy dissonance. “The reliability of the US strategic guarantee has been difficult to ensure…. [I]ts efforts in the past have raised the opposite fear within the alliance, namely, that the United State could commit its allies to a nuclear war they neither want nor, given their proximity and vulnerability to Soviet nuclear attack, could survive.” 38

The New Look, Eisenhower’s military policy, combined domestic, military, and foreign considerations and rejected the premise of NSC-68 in terms of spending 20% of its GNP on defense; furthermore, eliminating deficit spending, Eisenhower focused on the policy of containment toward the Soviet Union. Such a policy was passable at the time because of two reasons: first, the Korean War ended, and second, Stalin died in 1953. In addition,

38 Ibid., 3.
the US was in possession of nuclear capability and Washington had the capability to deliver it.

As NATO adopted the New Look policy in the early 1950s, the US pushed for rapid technical development of nuclear capabilities, infrastructure, technology, which Washington was more than willing to share with the Europeans. The Deputy Supreme Commander Field Marshall Bernard Montgomery said in 1954:

I want to make it absolutely clear that we at SHAPE are basing all our planning on using atomic and thermonuclear weapons in our own defense. With us it is no longer: ‘They may possibly be used.’ It is very definitely: ‘They will be used, if we are attacked.’ In fact, we have reached the point of no return in regards to the use of atomic and thermonuclear weapons in a hot war.\textsuperscript{40}

Even as they accepted the New Look policy, the Europeans remained concerned about the nuclear war happening on their ground, something that the Americans did not have to worry about to nearly the same extent.

In the eyes of the Europeans, the Korean War produced a firm commitment on the side of the US to the defense of Europe. However, due to Dulles’ plan of “massive retaliation” and then the events related to the Suez Canal crisis in 1956, “NATO stagnated as a military coalition for the defence of Europe and regressed as a political alliance.”\textsuperscript{41} When Sputnik was launched in 1957, “the years of stagnation were brought dramatically to a close, and a period of activity throughout the Alliance comparable to

\textsuperscript{39} Ibid., 31.
\textsuperscript{40} Osgood, NATO: The Entangling Alliance, 110.
\textsuperscript{41} Buchan, NATO in the 1960s, 35.
that of 1951-1953 has ensued.\textsuperscript{42} Again, similar to the outbreak of the Korean War, the launch of Sputnik provided the needed incentive, in a form of a potential threat, for the Allies to speed up their policy decisions. In regards to conventional and non-conventional capabilities,

by 1957, NATO had determined that its ground forces—not conventional, since they were armed with nuclear weapons to offset their supposedly small size relative to the Pact—would not seek to achieve the tactical military objective of defeating the enemy on the ground. Instead, those forces would buy the time required to implement strategic nuclear retaliation. NATO’s ‘shield’ was relegated to protecting the ‘sword’ of national nuclear arsenals.\textsuperscript{43}

In 1956, the Suez Crisis did not help to reassure Europeans that Americans were committed to the security of Europe nor that the interests of the NATO members on the two coasts of Atlantic diverged. Rather, the actions of Washington in response to British and French policies regarding Suez Canal emphasized the inherent conditionality of American support for Europe. The difference in interests between the allies was clear. The US would not always support the European efforts; moreover, Washington had the ability to not only block the interest of Europeans but also counteract them.

Concerned with the possibility of Nasser’s nationalization of Suez Canal, Great Britain and France approached Israel with a prospect of an attack on Egypt. In the same time, the Russians were extending their influence in the Middle East and the Czechs started negotiating with Egypt. Dulles, in response to the nationalization of Egyptian

\textsuperscript{42} Ibid., 37.
\textsuperscript{43} Schwartz, 34.
industries, offered Nasser aid for the construction of the Aswan Dam. When the Egyptians refused to give up the deals with the Czechs and the Russians, Dulles withdrew the aid. In 1956, Nasser seized the control of the Suez Canal.

The French and the Brits were furious—they wanted a complete control over the Suez Canal, whereas the US wanted to protect its oil interests. Dulles helped Nasser run the canal without the Brits and the French. In return, London and Paris started planning invasion of Egypt with Israel without informing Washington of their plans. When the Israelis attacked Egypt, Great Britain and France supported them with air bombings. To stop the invasion of Egypt, the US appealed to the UN to enforce a truce between the warring sides, and imposed oil embargo on Britain and France. The US efforts were supported by the Russians: Khrushchev threatened an attack on Great Britain and France. Under the pressure from the UN, lack of support from the Americans and the threat of an attack from the Russians, the Brits and the French pulled back.\(^\text{44}\)

This drastic divergence of policies between the French and the British on one side, and the Americans on the other, left a long lasting scar on the Euro-Atlantic relationship. In 1957, in response to the events of the Suez Crisis, London released the White Paper on Defense, emphasizing “the pursuit and maintenance of the independent British deterrent as a hedge against the unreliability of the US guarantee of British security interests.”\(^\text{45}\) The French followed suit, but their response was even more drastic than London’s. The French Ministry of National Defense and Commissariat à l’Énergie Atomique finalized a decision to develop nuclear weapons.\(^\text{46}\)

\(^\text{44}\) For the discussion on the Suez Crisis and the US policy, consult Ambrose and Brinkley, Rise to Globalism.

\(^\text{45}\) Schwartz, 60.

The debate caused the sense of insecurity in Europe, based on questionable reliability of the US. “This crisis taught different lessons: the British scurried for the cover of a ‘special relationship’ with Washington, while the French pursued independence from Atlantic restraints through their own nuclear force.”47 In effect, the Alliance welcomed 1957 with increasing dependence on strategic nuclear retaliation in response to any aggression from the Warsaw Pact without the conviction that the organization possessed an adequate deterrent. Europeans worried that the US would not carry through if Western Europe was attacked. Americans, on the other hand, worried that if the US did respond with nuclear retaliation in defense of Europe, it would provoke the Soviet to attack all of NATO members—including the US. Furthermore, the Europeans as a whole were divided in their fears.

The sense of insecurity in Europe was further enhanced by the developments in the Central and Eastern European states and the Soviet Russia. In 1956, in an address to the Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, Khrushchev renounced Stalin. The political and economic relaxation under Khrushchev gave way to the riots in Poland and Hungary. Especially in the case of the uprising in Budapest, the Warsaw Pact intervention ended in a bloody massacre, setting an example for Central and Eastern Europe of what the Soviet military is capable of and sending a signal to the West to watch out. The Soviet threat was also reinforced at the time with the 1957 launch of the sputnik. “If in general terms sputnik was a dramatic symbol of the technological superiority of the Soviet Union in a particularly threatening military area, it also

symbolized in specific terms the ever-growing vulnerability of the United States to Soviet strategic attack.\textsuperscript{48}

In the light of those developments, the policy of massive retaliation that the Americans practiced at the time, as well as NATO’s concept of countering the potential attack from the Warsaw Pact, had to be adjusted. The Alliance’s goal in fighting against the Warsaw Pact “would be to prevent the war from degenerating into an all-out nuclear conflict, which would be so destructive as to negate any political objective.”\textsuperscript{49} If the conflict was between conventional, not military, forces, the policy of massive retaliation did not present a believable threat. This pointed to the need of conventional force that would match the strength of the opponent—at least in the beginning—with a potential reinforcement with nuclear capabilities in the later stages.\textsuperscript{50} In other words, the need for conventional and nuclear capability combined was becoming more and more apparent.\textsuperscript{51}

1960 brought even more push from Europeans toward the conventional forces. However, along with the seeming need for conventional forces came a worry about the perception of weakness, limiting the strength of deterrence and potentially giving the Soviets an idea that US is not extending the nuclear umbrella to Europe. At this point, the US under Kennedy was slowly switching from the policy of massive retaliation to flexible response. Originally, however, the Europeans did not think that this policy was financially feasible for them, given the misperceived conventional strength of the Soviet Union. They argued that it is impossible given the post-war situation of the allies in Europe to be able to match the conventional forces of the communist bloc. Rather, the

\textsuperscript{48} Schwatz, 61.
\textsuperscript{49} Ibid., 53.
tactical nuclear power was necessary to balance the Soviet conventional forces.

Combined with that, however, was the need to signal willingness to spare civilian populations. Therefore, the potential nuclear capability would have to show reliability and accuracy of delivery into military targets, not urban populations.\(^{52}\)

The US solution to the nuclear security of Europe, however, was very different. To address the capabilities of the Warsaw Pact, in December, 1960 Washington proposed the creation of the Multilateral Force (MLF) in Europe. It was the US response to the European request to have a greater degree of control over the nuclear deterrence. NATO’s forces would control and man a fleet of warships and submarines, equipped with Polaris ballistic missiles.\(^{53}\) The submarines crews would be composed of multinational forces of at least three NATO members. While the US would maintain formal custody of the warheads to assure security, the Allies would have to agree on the process for the launch. The second goal of the Multilateral Force, aside from the European external security, would be to stop European members from proliferating and decreasing stability of the system internally.\(^{54}\)

For President Kennedy, the MLF was not a priority on the agenda, but he did see it as the solution to the NATO’s strategic problems with nuclear security.\(^{55}\) In 1961, Kennedy said:

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\(^{54}\) Ibid.

We must make certain that nuclear weapons will continue to be available for the defense of the entire Treaty area, and that these weapons are at all times under close and flexible political control that meets the needs of all the NATO countries. We are prepared to join our Allies in working out suitable arrangements for this purpose. To make clear our own intentions and commitments to the defense of Western Europe, the United States will commit to the NATO command five—and subsequently still more—Polaris atomic-missile submarines, which are defensive weapons, subject to any agreed NATO guidelines on their control and use, and responsive to the needs of all members but still credible in an emergency. Beyond this, we look to the possibility of establishing a NATO sea-borne force, which would be truly multi-lateral in ownership and control, if this should be desired and found feasible by our Allies, once NATO’s non-nuclear goals have been achieved.56

American support, according to Kennedy, would depend on European approval of necessity, usefulness, and feasibility of the MLF, and would be pursued after NATO achieves the non-nuclear goals.57 The Brits were skeptical of the American MLF idea, and the French continued pursuing their own nuclear capability. Furthermore, Paris suggested the creation of specifically and independently European nuclear force, rather than what the US was proposing.

To further their proposals and ensure their realization, the Americans started negotiations with the Brits, which resulted in the Nassau Agreement. The US would provide the Polaris missiles to the Brits in return for leasing the nuclear submarine base in the Holy Loch. Although originally the Polaris missiles were supposed to function under the MLF treaty, at the end the warheads in the missiles were British and could be deployed by the Brits without consultations with other NATO members. This gave

57 Schwartz, 89.
London security independence from the Americans, and political dominance over the French. At the end, the American attempts to implement the Multilateral Force project failed, increasing the divides among the NATO members.

The final stalemate, however, between the United States and France especially, came in the wake of the Cuban Missile Crisis in 1962 and subsequent efforts to limit vertical and horizontal proliferation of nuclear weapons. "The ensuing Limited Test Ban Treaty of 1963 marked the realization of a stalemate between the two superpowers at the strategic nuclear level, with debilitating effects on the American guarantee to defend Europe."58 However, the French were not alone in the European dissatisfaction with American nuclear guarantees in the aftermath of the Cuban Missile Crisis. London was not far behind Paris. "The unilateral American decision in 1962 to cancel the Skybolt air-to-ground missile, upon which the British relied for the perpetuation of their nuclear deterrent, indicated that the United States might put its own efficiency criteria before its alliance responsibilities."59

The Cuban Missile Crisis, therefore, effectively changed the relationship between Americans and the Western Europeans in regards to means and policies to accomplish security goals, which still remained cohesive and shared by both sides. The years prior to the fateful events of the late 1962, marked by the multilateral efforts during the Korean War, were the golden years of the Euro-Atlantic alliance. During that time, the Allies were consulted, and they trusted the American word. There was willingness to pay the price for security on both sides. This mindset allowed for the unquestioned support of the Western Europeans during the Cuban Missile Crisis, although the Americans were

59 Ibid.
informing the Europeans about their decisions and actions, rather than consulting with them. The decline of this trust begins right after 1962 peak; after that, the Allies would be more concerned with inequality of security—by definition based on geographic proximity to the Soviet Union, Europe would insist on protection, but the partnership would become increasingly troubled.

While during the 13 days of the crisis there was a strong Western cohesion, the years afterwards witnessed an increasing break in the Alliance. With the decrease in the external threat from the Soviets, emphasized through détente, the Allies did not have to pull the ranks together so much. The strategic decisions regarding military capabilities were increasingly harder to make. However, despite the increasing problems among members as military allies, the question of the US pulling out its support or the Europeans dissolving the Alliance never emerged. In the same time, the nature of NATO as a collective security organization for Western Europe was also never questioned. It is, therefore, important to remember that despite disagreement in NATO based on the collective defense nature of the organization and its means, collective security aspect never weakened.

In January 1963, de Gaulle, in a press conference, “vetoed British entry into the Community, rejected the American Polaris offer, and refused to participate in any NATO nuclear force.”60 A week later, he signed the Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation between France and the Federal Republic of Germany.61 He wanted to take Europe as far away as he could from the British-American domination. In the eyes of Americans, de Gaulle set back the European integration, discouraging European states from the MLF

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60 Schwartz, 107.
61 Ibid.
and encouraging them to proliferate instead. David Schwartz explained French logic in those words:

The French then launched an active diplomatic effort to woo West Germany, and other European nations, away from the MLF. Two themes were constantly stressed: any system that relied on a US veto would suffer from the lack of US credibility, and progress toward European unity could come only from abandoning the MLF as an instrument of US hegemony and domination.62

By 1965, the MLF was effectively dead.

Eventually, NATO, following the lead of Washington, took on the strategy of flexible response and applied it to its nuclear capability.63 The emphasis of security moved from pure nuclear weapons onto the spectrum of responses from tactical and strategic nuclear forces, and conventional capabilities. In contrast to the New Look of Eisenhower and Dulles' policy of massive retaliation, JFK proposed responses respective of the scope of attack. There were three stages to flexible response: 1) direct defense by NATO's European forces based on conventional weapons in case of the Soviet attack with similar conventional forces; 2) deliberate escalation in case of insufficiency of NATO's conventional forces whereby the tactical nuclear weapons would be used in a limited scope; and 3) general nuclear response which essentially corresponded to the mutually assured destruction through a full-scale nuclear exchange.64

62 Ibid., 117.
64 Ibid.
As this section showed, the disagreements within the Alliance regarded the policies not the goals. Those discussions resulted in a temporary lack of cohesion in the Alliance, but which never resulted in breaking of the alliance structures, ideas of complete withdrawal from the Alliance, or diminishing collective security component. The decreased perception of threat simply left more room for divergent policies and more time for decision-making.

DIVERGENCE OF AMERICAN, FRENCH, BRITISH AND GERMAN POLICIES

This section gives us a look into the fundamentals and reasons for the divergent stances of NATO’s members on what the most beneficial policy should entail. The basis for those differences stemmed mostly from economic and geopolitical disparities between the American and European members.

France started developing nuclear weapons in the 1930s. After WWII, the French were focused on rebuilding of their country, so it was not until 1954 that de Gaulle returned to the French nuclear planning. At that time, Great Britain joined the Russians and the Americans with their possessions of the nuclear weapons. Given the French character, Paris they did not want to be behind the British. In the same time, the French were having trouble in Indochina (Dien Bien Phu). Furthermore, the US was gradually backing away from the nuclear support for Europeans and there was a consideration of bringing Germany into the NATO pack. All those elements provided a fertile ground for French arguments for acquiring nuclear capabilities.65

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France felt threatened by West Germany and the Soviet Union after WWII, despite the US guarantees—or possibly because of them. During the developmental phases of NATO, France wanted to take Federal Republic of Germany into account as a potential threat as suggested by the Dunkirk Treaty of 1947, but Brussels Treaty did not include anti-German rhetoric.66 Given this insecurity, France had many arguments for armament:

1. Nuclear weapons were a symbol of national prestige in the international community;
2. They would provide France with greater leverage and input into the setting of Western strategy;
3. With respect to other issues, possession of nuclear weapons would provide France with political leverage;
4. Nuclear weapons would reverse the trend toward Anglo-American domination of NATO;
5. They would give France a greater voice in the increasingly prestigious arms-control discussions between East and West; and
6. They would boost the morale of a French office corps shattered by the experience of Dien Bien Phu.67

In the same time in Bonn, Adenauer was hoping to bring West Germany into the Alliance on equal terms. He wanted to unify Germany and reconstruct it as a peaceful power in Europe. France's objections forced Germany to pledge to not develop nuclear

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capability. Therefore, after 1955, there was not much notice in Germany given to the nuclear armament of Europe. This disinterest in, or even objection to, the nuclear weapons was further exaggerated by the Operation "Carte Blanche" carried out in Germany by the US forces. It was a simulated NATO operation using 355 nuclear weapons in defense of Western Europe. This simulated exercise had "resulted" in 1.7 million German deaths and 3.5 million Germans wounded, and forced the issue of NATO's nuclear strategy onto the German consciousness.68

Furthermore, Adenauer was not sure how the New Look policy applied to Germany and he believed that nuclear weapons could not compensate for the Warsaw Pact's conventional forces.69 Instead, he thought that becoming a member of NATO would shield Germany from a potential attack if the war between NATO and the Warsaw Pact were to happen, because, in his mind, such a war would quickly turn into a conflict between the US and the SU.70

London, on the other hand, practiced the policy of graduated deterrence, introduced by Sir Antony Buzzard. Graduated deterrence would

deliberately distinguish between tactical nuclear responses to aggression, in which low-yield atomic weapons would be used against military targets, and strategic nuclear responses, which would involve high-yield (thermonuclear) attacks on enemy cities. As a deterrent against less-than-all-out local aggression, NATO would threaten tactical nuclear retaliation; if enemy aggression continued unabated, then the alliance would threaten strategic nuclear responses. Since tactical nuclear responses would not necessarily compel enemy retaliation against Western cities—in fact, they

68 Schwartz, 42.
70 Hans Speier, German Rearmament and Atomic War (Evanston: Row, Peterson, and Co., 1957), 182-183.
might give the enemy incentives to avoid escalation to counter-city strikes—the tactical nuclear threat would appear to be more credible and hence better able to deter aggression in a wide range of contingencies. 71

The British policy seemed to be quite in tune with the American one. In October 1957, the US shifted its foreign policy away from massive retaliation in the direction of flexible response. In an article in Foreign Affairs, Dulles wrote:

[T]he resourcefulness of those who serve our nation in the field of science and weapons engineering now shows that it is possible to alter the character of nuclear weapons…. [T]heir use need not involve vast destruction and widespread harm to humanity. Recent tests point to the possibility of possessing nuclear weapons the destructiveness and effects of which can be confined substantially to predetermined targets. 72

In lieu of making his argument, Dulles implied that “the threat of massive retaliation had never presented much of a deterrent to aggressor intent or conventional success: by implication, he argued that only the recent development of small-yield battlefield nuclear weapons would deter such an aggressor.” 73 There is no clear understanding why Dulles made that shift at that time. Critics of massive retaliation at the time agreed that the policy itself was not believable, but there was no proposed alternative.

President de Gaulle did not wait long to implement his ideas of what the European security order should look like—without the Americans. In the beginning of 1963, he called a press conference, in which he positioned France very decisively against the

71 Schwartz, 50.
73 Schwartz, 51.
United States and Great Britain. During the press conference, de Gaulle "first... pronounced a one-man veto against Great Britain's joining the European Common Market.... Next he contemptuously rejected an offer by President Kennedy to give France the American Polaris nuclear missiles for their submarines if they would place them all under NATO control, and join a proposed NATO multilateral nuclear naval force."74 The statement made by de Gaulle came rather unexpected to the British and the Americans and set the tone of the eventual French withdrawal from the Alliance at the end of the 1960s.

In 1966, de Gaulle was reelected for another 7-year presidential term. The first visit he planned to make was to the Soviet Union.75 For years now, the French President was envisioning a pan-European détente with the Soviet Union. For his plan to materialize, he needed to break off with NATO and appear independent of the US. To that effect, he wrote letters to the heads of NATO members: the US, Great Britain, West Germany, Canada, and Italy, emphasizing that "France proposes to recover the entire exercise of her sovereignty over her territory, presently impaired by the permanent presence of Allied military elements, or in the use which is made of her airspace."76 He did not negotiate or discuss his decision with other NATO members. The Allies were given one year to get out of France.

De Gaulle was convinced that the increased distance between Paris and Washington was a precondition for the Soviet Union to get engaged with Europe. His alternative to the American idea of the Euro-Atlantic cooperation "envisioned a core Europe limited to Western Europe with France as its leading power (and not the growing

74 Cook, 265.
75 Ibid., 266.
76 Ibid.
economic power Germany) and none of its members having to give up their national identity." At the time, the US was getting increasingly bogged down in Vietnam. On the other hand, the Soviet Union was undergoing its own internal shift in the beginnings of the Brezhnev era. In 1964, Khrushchev, who introduced de-Stalinization and softer form of communism in the Soviet Russia, ended his Communist Party career. However, his legacy of relative non-aggressive Moscow remained, decreasing the Soviet threat in Europe and eventually opening the door to détente.

On the European side, the beginning of détente was initiated by Willy Brandt under the umbrella of Bonn's Ostpolitik—opening up of the German relations to the East. On the US side, President Lyndon Johnson started talking to the Soviet about the ending of the Vietnam War and limitations on nuclear weapons. Subsequently, the SALT started under LBJ, but was put on the back burner with the 1968 events taking place in Czechoslovakia, and not restarted until President Nixon came to office.

Given the lowered fear of the Soviets in Europe, NATO relaxed its cohesion as an alliance. As far as French participation in the Alliance was considered, on February 21, 1966, de Gaulle declared that "France intended to regain sovereignty over its national territory and armed forces, and would therefore review its relations with the Atlantic Alliance. Shortly thereafter, the Paris government announced that France would withdraw from the integrated structure of NATO with effect from 1 July 1966, and that the Allied staffs and military institutions should be removed from the country by 1 April 1967."78

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77 Haftendorn, *NATO and the Nuclear Revolution*, 3.
78 Ibid., 1-2.
In summary, there were three basic problems in the 1950s and 1960s, which the resulted in the final French withdrawal from NATO’s command structure:

1. the credibility of extended nuclear deterrence and the unequal risk faced by the different NATO allies;
2. the role of the United States and its Allies, particularly France and West Germany, as leading powers of the European order, and the place of the Atlantic Alliance in their policy; and
3. the assessment of the Soviet Union’s political and military intentions and the possibilities for East-West détente, as well as the German question.\(^79\)

It is important to note that none of those problems listed above pertain to the overall goals or values of the Alliance. Rather, they speak directly to the means to accomplish those goals and divergence of opinions on effective policies.

The joint nuclear defense proved to be impossible for NATO as an alliance. Although the security interest of the Allies remained the same, the regional political interests and the willingness to commit, in the face of perception of decreasing threat and unreliability of all the Allies, combined national and personal egos, put limits on the level to which the Allies were willing to solidify their policies. Earl Ravenal explained this discord in the following words: “De Gaulle’s withdrawal of France from NATO and his denial of French territory and facilities to the alliance, in 1966, rendered uncertain the terms of participation of Western Europe’s largest military force; it also required NATO

\(^{79}\) Ibid., 4.
to shift to new and vulnerable lines of communication." However, it did not render the Alliance ineffective, incapable, or finished.

As mentioned earlier, despite the discord among the Allies in reference to the MLF, the collective security nature of NATO never wavered. Harlan Cleveland, the former US Ambassador to NATO, summarized the importance of the MLF failure and the subsequent withdrawal of France from the Alliance in those words:

In retrospect, the significant thing about the withdrawal of France from the NATO defense system is that it was not very significant. It did not destroy the Alliance—if that was the idea. It did not set France up as the Western European partner best suited to make peace with the Russians—if that was the idea. It did not remove France from dependence on the US nuclear umbrella—if that was the idea. It did not even keep de Gaulle in office. The net effects were to accelerate the reduction of French influence in Europe, in favor of the Germans, and to prod the other Western Allies into changing their strategy and improving their cohesion. These can hardly have been the results consciously desired by a Gaullist France.  

In other words, the French withdrawal had no significant effect on the collective security or defense natures of NATO. Ultimately, it was the temporary change in the structural conditions, not the divergence of policies, which determined and drove the alliance and collective security narratives.

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81 Cook, Forging the Alliance, 267.
COLLABORATION AFTER DISCORD

At the end, the collaboration among the NATO members resumed after the protracted and heated period of disputes on appropriate and beneficial policies. Although the Multilateral Force policy turned out to be a failure, the idea opened the road to the policy of flexible response and then the subsequent Nuclear Planning Group. In 1965, McNamara tried to initiate the discussion on nuclear planning with the Europeans again.82 The MLF was dead but the European allies were still unsatisfied with their level of conventional and nuclear forces relative to the Soviet capabilities; furthermore, they wanted to have the ability to contribute to the NATO’s nuclear policy decisions. To satisfy the European allies, in June 1965, McNamara proposed the creation of a committee composed of NATO members that would oversee consultation on nuclear planning. From the beginning, France made it clear that Paris was out. A year later, France announced withdrawal from NATO. Great Britain was enthusiastic, Germany was mixed—Berlin wanted to participate but it did not want to give up on the idea of the MLF. Other members were waiting to see how this committee would be made up.83

In November 1965, the Special Committee of Defense Ministers was created, including ministers from Belgium, Great Britain, Canada, Denmark, Greece, Italy, the Netherlands, Turkey, West Germany, and the US.84 A year later, the Defense Planning Committee created a two-level nuclear planning working group. One level, the Nuclear Defense Affairs Committee, would include all the interested members of the alliance. The second level would become the Nuclear Planning Group made of the US, West Germany,

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83 Schwartz, 182.
Great Britain, Italy, and three other members of the Nuclear Defense Affairs Committee in rotation. All members except for France, Luxembourg, and Iceland joined the Committee. In the beginning, Portugal, Denmark, and Norway asked to be excluded from the rotation.85

In December 1967, NATO formally accepted the flexible response policy, for which the Nuclear Planning Group paved the path by opening the channels of communication on nuclear strategy, and providing a sense of equality and security. Although the members agreed on the policy and adopted the Nuclear Planning Group, the trust among the Allies was not restored to pre-Cuban Missile Crisis Level. As far as the Nuclear Planning Group was concerned, the US had the monopoly on planning and kept it secret from other Allies. Only the Brits had a bit of a view into the US strategy planning. In regards to the policy of flexible response, McNamara could not fully explain the logic behind the new policy to the Europeans. Without the empirical evidence and logical process of decision making visible, Europeans were skeptical of the flexible response policy. Second, it again proved the unequal distribution of security among the allies, and added to suspicion and resentment. “If the allies had no voice in determining the strategic nuclear policy of the alliance, how could they be expected to have confidence in it?”86 Especially in the view of the French, this was also exaggerated by the fact that the Brits were kept as the “special friend” having some view into this, whereas other allies did not. Furthermore, the policy of flexible response was not consulted with other allies—it was a unipolar decision made by the Americans.87

85 Ibid., 41.
86 Schwartz, 179.
CONCLUSIONS

As we see through the accounts of German accession into the Alliance and the discussions that accompanied Multilateral Force decisions, divergence of opinions on means to accomplish goals is not the same, nor carries the same effects, as disagreements on goals themselves. NATO came unscathed out of that period of discord bother as an alliance and as a collective security arrangement. Both narratives played an integral role especially in the case of Germany’s joining the Alliance. In the case of nuclear policy, the account here shows that the protracted period of disagreement does not mean the end of the collective security and defense story of NATO.

The pattern of NATO’s discords and collaboration periods is not random. Rather, it represents the tests of confidence among the Allies, neither accidental nor superficial. The periods of discord and collaboration derive from divergent conceptions of means and policies, security needs, and geopolitical situations. Furthermore, they stem from problems inherent in NATO’s nature as an alliance from the beginning.88 "Military alliance is an act that cuts two ways. In the obvious sense, alliance fosters political trust and social community. But there is a countervailing effect: the delegation of security responsibilities by one nation to another is also likely to excite suspicions of abandonment and betrayal."89 However, those periods of suspicion and mistrust never resulted in the Alliance’s dissolution or in abandoning the common goals of internal commonality and cohesion of values.

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89 Ibid., 12.
NATO was created as an alliance "which derived its security almost entirely from this one country." And as an alliance, separated by an Atlantic Ocean, NATO was bound to periodically go through phases of divergent security and political interests, as well as differences in opinions on the means to accomplish the common goals. Through all the periods of discord, however, those common goals remained the same: security of Western Europe and preservation of the Western civilization based on democracy and human rights. In the case of West German accession into NATO, the cost-benefit rationality made sense to the Allies on both sides of the Atlantic. The Europeans were benefiting by increase in security with the addition of the German human and economic capital, and the costs did not outweigh the benefits, in their perceptions. However, in the case of the nuclear issues, the perceptions of security benefits were not higher that the threat costs, again in the perceptions of the Europeans, so the members ran into more disagreements and longer discussions.

In terms of alliance dynamics in both cases of disagreement, the US was still the preponderant power with the overwhelming superiority of economics and military, including the nuclear power. However, Great Britain also possessed the nuclear capability, albeit much smaller, and France was on the way of obtaining it. Great Britain acquired nuclear weapons in 1952 and France in 1960—the date of its first independent test. However, the nuclear power of those states is negligible in the equation of power distribution in NATO—the US remained an undisputable hegemon. Nevertheless, the power of the American hegemon was diminished by the lack of credibility of the 'common good' that the US was supposed to provide to the Allies—the nuclear security for Europe. And at the end, the Americans did not get what they wanted—Great Britain

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90 Buchan, *NATO in the 1960s: The Implications of Interdependence*, 34.
and France both went nuclear independently, rather than under the umbrella of NATO and the US control.

Regarding the collective security nature of NATO, in terms of Germany, it played a significant role. West Germany was a democratic state, falling into the category of Western culture. Despite the events of WWII, West Germany during the Cold War was threatened by the Soviet Union to a greater degree than other Western European states because of its immediate proximity to the East and the understanding of both sides of the conflict that Berlin represented the demarcation line. The accepted norms of behavior, characteristic of collective security arrangements, here played an important role, especially also given the sense of threat. It was right after the beginning of the Korean War and NATO needed the military provided by Germany. It gave NATO more power in numbers. Therefore, in this case, the narratives of NATO as a collective defense and collective security organization were in cohesion: the US was pushing for German accession into NATO, and France and Great Britain, despite their fears and historic experiences, went along, and the increased sense of threat pushed the decision to extend NATO’s security umbrella to Germany forwards. Furthermore, those two narratives added leverage to each another: democratic nature of Adenauer’s Germany enabled the accession, and the economic and military numbers that Berlin was able to supply provided the rationale for Germany’s joining in terms of the pure cost-benefit analysis.

In the case of Multinational Force, the interactions between collective security and collective defense narratives of NATO were more complicated to discern. However, here it is important to separate the concepts of goals from the concepts of means or policies to accomplish those goals. While MLF discussions showed growing
disagreements on the means and policies, the members did not develop divergent sets of internal and external security goals. Therefore, while the extended and oftentimes heated debates slowed down the decision making process, they did not weaken the collective defense and security natures of NATO. Even the withdrawal of France from the command structures of NATO did not prove to cause much trouble for the Alliance in the long term. Rather, it proved the enduring commonality of goals that overpowered the disagreements as to the means to accomplish those common objectives, again reinforcing the collective security nature of the Alliance.

In terms of the external environment, detrimental to the cohesion of NATO as an alliance, the thawing of the relationship between the East and the West must be mentioned. Following the Cuban Missile Crisis, both sides directly faced the possibility of nuclear exchange and potential effects such an exchange would evoke. Furthermore, the increasing schism between China and Russia was pushing Moscow toward the West. In addition, Willy Brandt’s opening of German foreign policy to the East, the Ostpolitik, gave the Soviets hope for increased economic trade with Western Europe, very much needed at the time given the economic difficulties in the Soviet Union. Therefore, the beginning of Détente in the late 1960s decreased NATO’s perception of threat coming from the Soviet side.

Here again, the dependence of the common security and defense combination on the structural environment is noticeable. When the Allies perceived the threat of the Soviet to be decreasing, they involved in more protracted discussions and disagreements regarding the policies. They allowed themselves to be more relaxed in their alliance cohesion. However, as the threat never disappeared, neither did the alliance or collective
security natures of NATO. As the détente was winding down, NATO experiences a fairly rapid consolidation process, yet again proving the cyclical collaboration/discord nature of the organization.\textsuperscript{91}

\textsuperscript{91} Haftendorn, 386.
CHAPTER V
NATO IN THE 1991 TO 2001 PERIOD

INTRODUCTION

In this chapter, the narratives of collective security and collective defense exit the Cold War environment and enter the decade of uncertainty regarding the past enemies and future allies. In this decade, the rationality and utility of NATO's existence will be questioned, and the Alliance emerges from this barrage with an expanded number of members and undefined set of goals. The second part of NATO's nature, however, the collective security component, will become clearer and overshadow the alliance character, redefining the organizations role in Europe. In regards to the international environment, another set of unknowns emerges. The political fate of Central and Eastern Europe remains to be determined; Russia will slowly embark on the path towards illiberal democracy, and a set of intangible transnational threats will come to the forefront of decision making regarding NATO’s strategy for the future.

Again here, the structural changes are important to emphasize. The perception of threat changes in the post-Cold War environment. Not only is the threat intangible, in contrast to the Cold War period when the Soviet Russia was the clear and predictable enemy, but that threat is also hard to understand and define. After 1991, the treat acquires a hybrid nature, combining many immeasurable elements of transnational nature. Subsequently, the scope of internal and external security goals changes as well into the area of basic human security.
With this changing structure, we also begin to see a different pattern of behavior between the narratives of collective security and collective defense. In that sense, we see the reinforcement of the structure of the international environment as the driver in that relationship. In this period, collective security narrative starts to play a more integral role over the collective alliance element. This change is a direct result of the inability to pin down, define, and measure the new concept of threat. Rather, the threat becomes a multifaceted set of threats which needs to be address by multifaceted capabilities and structures.

The beginning date of this period was already clearly identified in the previous chapter. The effective dissolution of the Soviet Union served as the demarcation line for the end of the Cold War; with that, it provided a watershed in NATO’s mission, as it eliminated one of the primary reasons why the Alliance was born. For the post-Cold War period, the same date serves as the beginning point of a new security environment, one without the Soviet bloc, but with many other undefined threats and insecurities. The final date for this period, on the other end, September 11th, 2001, does not need much of an introduction. The terrorist attacks in the US forced not only Washington, but also the European capitals, to redefine the threats and refocus the means to combat those threats. In effect, the security goals of NATO, and subsequently the means to achieve those goals, had to be reevaluated and readjusted. This process continues today, as the questions regarding the future role of NATO as an alliance and as a collective security arrangement remain unanswered. In addition, the disagreements among the Allies regarding the necessity and the potential of NATO’s capabilities to address those intangible threats further complicate the decisions regarding the scope and the role of the Alliance.
Despite all the knowns and unknowns, to use the words or Robert McNamara, one thing became clear in this first post-Cold War decade of NATO's existence; namely, that the role of NATO as a collective security arrangement not only overshadowed its function as an alliance, but effectively left it in the dust. One of the major and most detrimental developments of NATO in that period, enlargement of the organization to Central and Eastern Europe, had very little to do with its nature as an alliance and everything to do with its character as a collective security. While the political shape and stability of Russia remained uncertain, the push for inclusion of Central and Eastern European region in the Alliance, a process which continues still today, had as its fundament the spread of norms of peaceful behavior based on the principles of democracy at its heart.

At that point, the region of CEE was geographically close to NATO's territory and its future political shape was hanging in the air. If NATO were to maintain its security, it was only natural to incorporate that region, in a similar fashion as was done in the case of West Germany in 1955, into its framework. This way, the newly independent states would fall under the umbrella of collective security, where they would be encouraged to built a security community based on a common standard of behavior—peaceful solution of disagreements. Furthermore, as those states were coming from the Soviet domination, and as Russia's future was still a question, the CEE and NATO members shared a common security interest.

The early discussions among international relations scholars regarding the eastern enlargement of NATO were dominated by the negative voices, represented by George Kennan and Charles Kupchan, to name just a few. The critics of NATO's expansion
were worried about the effective challenge to Russia, which might potentially lead to conflict with Moscow. Furthermore, they pointed out the difficulty of managing expanding number of members, which would effectively weaken the decision-making process in the alliance. At this point, it is safe to say that the alliance nature of NATO was put on the back burner at the expense of the collective security role. In addition, the pursuit of collective security goals weakened the alliance component of NATO.

After Clinton administration efficiently and swiftly pushed for the expansion of the Alliance, the scholars in the international relations field understood that the deed has been done and addressed the facts. Given the lack of conflict with Russia and the increasing stability of the Central and Eastern Europe, which in turn contributed to the overall peace and security of the Transatlantic region, the discussion regarding the NATO enlargement became positive. Enlargement was considered to be a positive development, leading to promotion of democratic norms in a post-Soviet space. Without an obvious collapse of the alliance component of NATO, the relationship between collective security and collective defense natures of the organization became mutually reinforcing. As the process of expansion continues and the set of threats facing Europe remains uncertain, it becomes clear that NATO's future will focus on its role as a collective security organization, with the alliance component serving as an effective, functional structure for the arrangement.

This chapter begins with a discussion on the components of collective security and collective defense in the context of NATO's enlargement. The segment evaluating the changing nature of security environment in Europe after 1991 follows. Then, the enlargement process is outlined, addressing the security issues and pointing to the
collective security elements along the way. The next section deals with the transition of NATO to an increasingly collective security dominated institution, leading to the concluding segment which attempts to answer the questions addressing the relationship between the collective security and collective defense narratives of NATO in the last decade of the twentieth century.

COLLECTIVE SECURITY AND COLLECTIVE DEFENSE IN THE CONTEXT OF NATO ENLARGEMENT

In a nutshell, the Post-Cold War enlargement reaffirmed NATO’s openness to new members under Article X of the North Atlantic Treaty and emphasized the continuing process of the enlargement.1 Having said that, let us look at the discussions that took place in the early and mid 1990s between the proponents and the opponents of the enlargement in order to understand the underlying reasons and logic for NATO’s expansion. Although the expansion of the organization was wanted and supported by the Western Allies, it was the Clinton administration’s determination that provided the critical push.

Generally, the proponents of the expansion argued that it was a historical opportunity to build democracy and extend the zone of stability and security to Central and Eastern Europe. The alliance was supposed to be the means of accomplishing that—the practical vehicle for carrying out the idea of collective security.2 Acceptance to NATO would serve as an incentive and institutionalization of democracy in the CEE

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region. Others argued that it was a political, economic, and moral obligation of NATO and its democratic members to include CEE in its sphere of security. Zbigniew Brzezinski and Stephen Larrabee especially were emphasizing the need to consolidate democracy in CEE and the contribution of such a consolidation to the overall security and stability of the whole European region. There was also the simple alliance-based cost benefit analysis—more members from the CEE would lower the degree of burden on the old members, especially the US. Also, on the alliance side of the rhetoric for enlargement, the expansion would provide more availability and coordination of forces; the new members would not be free riders or the net consumers—but rather, the net contributors.

On the other hand, the opponents of the eastern enlargement of NATO questioned the potential of the organization as a vehicle of democracy promotion and institutionalization in Central and Eastern Europe. Furthermore, they pointed to the high likelihood for damaging the relationship with Russia. They argued that the driving mechanism behind the push for expansion is the irrelevance of the alliance and diminishing of the US power in Europe. Why, they asked, would NATO expand if there

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6 Stephen Larrabee, East European Security after the Cold War (Santa Monica: RAND, 1993), 175.
was no external threat? They maintained that a higher number of members would weaken the alliance because the decision-process would be more complicated.  

At the Prague Summit in 2002, called by Lord Robertson the "NATO’s transformation summit," the leaders of the new NATO members expressed their appreciation for the return to the European civilization and mentality that accession to NATO epitomized. The Prime Minister of Hungary Medgyessy emphasized the enduring strength and relevance of the Alliance. Vaclav Havel, the Czech President saw "enlargement as a signal to the world of a new era where countries could no longer be forced into spheres of influence or where the strong could subjugate the weak." Polish President Aleksander Kwasniewski talked about the end of Yalta and Potsdam’s legacy that divided Europe.

Similar rhetoric came from the Westerners’ side: Chirac referred to the end of the division of Europe, while Blair talked about the opportunity to transform NATO. In other words, to the new CEE members, as well as the old NATO Allies, enlargement meant consolidation of democracy and, with that, consolidation of Europe. With this approach, the practical focus of NATO shifted from alliance to collective security. This

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emphasis on the collective nature of the Alliance was well summarized by Richard Lugar when he wrote that enlargement provided an opportunity to overcome the divisions of Europe and build consensus on security of democratic societies and the threats to them. In other words, while the alliance element was by no means eliminated, because the outside threat was not well defined but still present, the main goal of NATO at that point became the internal cohesion and security under the umbrella of a security community.

However, as we mentioned earlier, the enlargement was considered to be potentially damaging to the alliance component of NATO. Daniel Braun argued that “the process of enlargement... increased number of member with divergent views... and complicated the workings of the alliance and possibly inhibited or diminished its ability to address some of the extremely difficult issues that it confronts.” Sean Kay maintained that NATO “is already politically unmanageable, militarily dysfunctional and strategically irrelevant” for the alliance component of the organization. Most notably, George Kennan wrote in the New York Times that NATO enlargement is “the most fateful error of American policy in the entire post-Cold War era.” He based his claim on the potential of the enlargement to block the rapprochement with Russia. Charles Kupchan believed that NATO expansion was a mistake, but once it was on the way and could not be stopped, he advocated for Russia’s membership. His view was shared by the majority of scholarly community. However, it is important to point out that in this

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discussion, NATO was treated as a pure alliance, without taking into account its collective security component.

On the other side of this debate were voices maintaining that “enlargement is not an end in itself; rather, it is a means to an end.”22 That end is the security of Europe. This brings us back to the concept of security communities, introduced by Karl Deutsch and renewed more recently by Adler and Barnett. In his 2008 article, Adler used the enlargement of NATO as an example of expansion of security communities.23 NATO is a community of practice “like-minded groups of practitioners who are informally as well as contextually bound by a shared interest in learning and applying a common practice.”24 He further argued that without shedding its defense alliance identity, NATO steadily moved into cooperative security in the 1990s.”25

Adler was not alone in pointing out this steady trend of NATO in the 1990s to migrate towards the narrative of collective security at the expense of an alliance: “It is almost as if NATO, after having defeated attempts in 1990–91 to create an all-European collective security organization under CSCE auspices, is gradually transforming itself into an entity comparable to such a body — a mutual supervisory agency for the Euro-Atlantic region.”26 While NATO enlarged its membership to the East for both the alliance and collective security reasons, “every new crisis thrust its practitioners deeper

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into cooperative security practices, until, in 1999, partnerships became a main component of its new Strategic Concept. From then on, NATO aligned its practices with its role as the institutional arm of a security community.”  

An apt example of this trend was the Partnership for Peace initiative. The main goal of PfP was to build up the militaries of joining states to match the NATO standards and to enhance its political stability based on democratic values. PfP, therefore, was designed to bring together and reconcile the two narratives of NATO, collective security and collective defense or as Felix Ciuta called it “different visions and practices of an alliance against enemies, and a partnership for peace.”

SECURITY ENVIRONMENT IN THE POST-COLD WAR EUROPE

As mentioned in the beginning of this chapter, the first decade after the fall of the Soviet Union was plagued by a plethora of insecurities and unknowns in regards to European security environment. The peaceful reunification of Germany under the existing system of government in Bonn and the breakup of the Soviet Union can be considered landmark events that served to define the new security environment in Europe. In addition, it soon became clearer to NATO members that most of the CEE countries would seek values compatible with NATO and its states, as they viewed democracy synonymous with the restoration of national sovereignty in their countries.  

In the aftermath of the 1989 revolutions, the CEE governments did not know how to deal with the new security environment. In the beginning, NATO was not the

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28 Ibid.
preferred option, especially with the unstable situation in many of the CEE states and Moscow's strong opposition to NATO's expansion. At NATO's London Summit, in July 1990, NATO invited members of the Warsaw Pact, which still existed at the time, to send ambassadors to act as liaisons with the organization, but it did not go further than that.

In February 1989, the Warsaw Pact countries met in Budapest and announced the dissolution of the military structures of the Warsaw Treaty Organization, which effectively ended the organization. Subsequently, the Warsaw Pact was formally dissolved on July 1, 1991. Later that year, at the Rome Summit, NATO announced the creation of the North Atlantic Co-operation Council (NACC) to provide a framework for dialogue with central and eastern European countries. By mid-1992, the NACC had expanded from six to twenty-three members.

NATO enlargement gradually came to be seen as the preferred solution to the new security dilemma in Europe, as it offered Central and Eastern Europeans the opportunity to overcome the problems of both geostrategic vulnerability and the historical discontinuity of state institutions. To the US, NATO enlargement in Central Europe was fundamentally political and reactive, while for European members of NATO, and especially for Germany, it was seen as adding strategic depth for NATO in the east.

Bringing Poland into NATO marked the first step towards overcoming the regional insecurity dilemma: it reaffirmed that the stability and security of Poland had become a vital national interest of the united Federal Republic, while at the same time offering to Poland the transatlantic security framework critical to any future resolution of the two countries' tortuous historical legacies.

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30 Ibid., 365-366.
31 Ibid., 366.
Furthermore, a number of CEE governments have also pursued stronger bilateral ties with the US, beyond the scope of the NATO alliance itself, as reinsurance against the perceived progressive weakening of NATO.

The expansion of NATO in the 1990s, therefore, addressed the security issues present immediately after the break down of the Soviet bloc, but it also brought about a less homogenous group of members, creating a more complicated process for decision-making, effects of which are still visible today. In part due to these factors, NATO has faced greater challenges in mustering the necessary political will and resources for the capabilities it needs for its out of area missions in Bosnia, Kosovo and Afghanistan.32

In line with the evolution of the Euro-Atlantic security environment of the first post-Cold War decade, the 1999 NATO’s Strategic Concept acknowledged that the risks to the security of the Alliance “are multi-directional and often difficult to predict.”33 Besides nuclear proliferation and less likely large-scale conventional aggression or nuclear attack, they include “uncertainty and instability in and around the Euro-Atlantic area and [may stem from] ethnic and religious rivalries, territorial disputes, inadequate or failed efforts at reform, the abuse of human rights, and the dissolution of states.”34 In order to address these sources of insecurity, the Alliance committed itself to a multi-dimensional approach that included political, economic, social and environmental factors in addition to the indispensable defense dimension. Hence, the fundamental security tasks to be performed are:

34 Ibid.
a) security, based on the growth of democratic institutions;

b) consultation as provided by Article 4 of the Washington Treaty;

c) traditional deterrence and defense;

d) crisis management, and

e) partnership.\textsuperscript{35}

In the framework of the multifaceted, intangible threats that emerged in the 1990s, NATO carried on three types of enlargement in order to redefine its role, goals and means to accomplish those goals after the Cold War. The first form of enlargement was the acceptance of the new members to the East; the second form of enlargement refers to the new role and missions of the Alliance; and third, “NATO’s influence outside its territory, on non-members' ground, its power projection and presence on partners’ territory is a form of extension.”\textsuperscript{36}

**ENLARGEMENT PROCESS IN A NUTSHELL**

In the House Resolution 987, also called *NATO Freedom Consolidation Act of 2007*, the 110\textsuperscript{th} US Congress reemphasized the importance of enlarged NATO to the Transatlantic security:

(1) The sustained commitment of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) to mutual defense has made possible the democratic transformation of Central and Eastern Europe. Members of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization can and should play a critical role in addressing the security challenges of the post-Cold War era in creating the stable environment needed for those emerging democracies in Europe.

\textsuperscript{35} Ibid.

(2) Lasting stability and security in Europe requires the military, economic, and political integration of emerging democracies into existing European structures.  

But the expansion of NATO was not a given from the moment when the Cold War ended. Rather, it came about after a few years of deliberation among the members and their careful observation of the neighbors to the east. “Given the context of the German reunification as well as the political pressure to grant the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) a greater role in organizing the post-Cold War European security system, NATO ruled out enlargement as a political option at the beginning of the 1990s.” Rather, the Alliance’s first steps towards the CEE countries were very cautious and consisted in extending them “the hand of friendship” by inviting six Warsaw Pact countries (Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Poland, Romania, and the Soviet Union), at the 1990 London Summit, to establish regular diplomatic liaison with the Alliance.  

A year later at the Rome Summit in November 1991, NATO adopted a new Strategic Concept and established a more direct relationship with Central and Eastern Europe through the newly created North Atlantic Cooperation Council (NACC). The 1991 Strategic Concept specified that the “risks to Allied security are less likely to result

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from calculated aggression against the territory of the Allies, but rather from the adverse consequences of instabilities that may arise from the serious economic, social, and political difficulties, including ethnic rivalries and territorial disputes, which are faced by many countries in Central and Eastern Europe. Consequently, while highlighting traditional Article V tasks (defense against any territorial aggression and preservation of the strategic balance of power within Europe), the Strategic Concept laid out the grounds for introducing more consultation and conflict prevention measures as provided by Article 4 of the North Atlantic Treaty. Therefore, NACC was actually designed to provide exactly such a formal mechanism through which Central and Eastern European countries were able to consult with NATO members on various political and security issues.

In summary, NACC’s core mission was to assist the partner countries to defuse their mutual security suspicions through a set of confidence-building measures and consultation mechanisms and by promoting a long-term understanding of national and multilateral security concerns. Until its replacement in May 1997 with the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council (EAPC), NACC grew up to include 38 members from Central and Eastern Europe and former Soviet Union, and provided a multilateral forum for discussion, consultation and sharing of information with regard to a wide range of topics such as: political, economic, military and security related matters.

The intervention of Anthony Lake, the national security advisor to President Clinton, was critical to the US decision to implement the enlargement of NATO as part of the Clinton administration’s strategy of enlarging the community of democracies. In

41 Ibid.
doing so, Clinton, through his personal relationship with President Boris Yeltsin at the time, attempted to make Russia a part of the process. When in January 1994 Clinton framed the enlargement of NATO in terms of 'when', rather than 'whether', the political and scholarly discussions started shaping into reality very quickly. Richard Holbrooke points out that 1994 was the year in which "NATO decided it would eventually expand. This decision was reached during the January NATO summit in Brussels and reaffirmed by President Clinton during his return to Europe in June, when he stated that the question was no longer whether NATO would expand but how and when."44

Along with Clinton, the foreign ministers of NATO states embarked on a two-phase program. First, NATO would determine through an internal discussion the process for expanding its membership. Second, the decisions made would be presented individually to PfP members who have expressed an interest in such discussions and potential accession into the Alliance. "This critical step will mark the first time detailed discussions on this subject have taken place outside the alliance. Then the ministers will meet again in Brussels in December and review the results of the discussions with the partners before deciding how to proceed."45

NATO launched the Partnership for Peace (PfP) at the January 1994 Brussels Summit. In strategic terms, PfP served three main goals for the Alliance: it established a process with membership as the target for some partners; it allowed for self-differentiation among partner states without extending the full benefits of NATO membership to the partners; and it attended Alliance’s mission of exporting stability as

44 Holbrooke, "America, A European Power," 44.
45 Ibid.
envisioned in the 1991 Strategic Concept. At the same time, the partner countries interested in membership were given more access to NATO’s political and military bodies and were offered a flexible and practical set of mechanisms that went far beyond the soft dialogue and cooperation framework institutionalized by the NACC.\footnote{Ibid.}

As for their main concern, the PfP invitation made it clear that “active participation in the Partnership for Peace will play an important role in the evolutionary process of the expansion of NATO.”\footnote{“Partnership for Peace: Invitation,” Ministerial Meeting of the North Atlantic Council, NATO Press Communiqué, M-1(94)2, 10-11 January 1994, http://www.nato.int/docu/basictxt/b940110a.htm.} But the degree of involvement in PfP was purely voluntary, at a pace and scope decided by each partner. Moreover, PfP enjoyed the full support of Russia but for different reasons. Convinced that PfP would not lead to eventual NATO expansion, President Boris Yeltsin called the Partnership idea a “stroke of genius.”\footnote{Quoted by State Secretary Warren Christopher in James Goldgeier, Not Whether But When, 59.}

In practical terms, Partnership for Peace set out an important agenda animated by the goal “to intensify political and military cooperation throughout Europe, increase stability, diminish threats to peace, and build strengthened relationships by promoting the spirit of practical cooperation and commitment to democratic principles that underpin the Alliance.”\footnote{“North Atlantic Treaty Organization: Partnership for Peace: Invitation,” NATO, http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/topics_50349.htm.} First, it made participation to the program contingent upon adherence of the partner countries to “the preservation of democratic societies, their freedom from coercion and intimidation, and the maintenance of the principles of international law.”\footnote{“Partnership for Peace: Framework Document,” Ministerial Meeting of the North Atlantic Council, Annex to NATO Press Communiqué, M-1(94)2, 10-11 January 1994. http://www.nato.int/docu/basictxt/b940110b.htm.} In addition, the partner countries were asked to commit themselves “to refrain from the
threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any State, to respect existing borders and to settle disputes by peaceful means [and] to fulfill in good faith the obligations of the Charter of the United Nations and the principles of the Universal Declaration on Human Rights [as well as] the Helsinki Final Act and all subsequent CSCE documents."51 In order to reach these goals, the PfP required all interested partners to adjust their defense and foreign policies in conformity with the following provisions:

a) Facilitation of transparency in national defense planning and budgeting processes;
b) Ensuring democratic control of defense forces;
c) Maintenance of the capability and readiness to contribute, subject to constitutional considerations, to operations under the authority of the UN and/or the responsibility of the CSCE;
d) The development of cooperative military relations with NATO, for the purpose of joint planning, training, and exercises in order to strengthen their ability to undertake missions in the fields of peacekeeping, search and rescue, humanitarian operations, and others as may subsequently be agreed;
e) The development, over the longer term, of forces that are better able to operate with those of the members of the North Atlantic Alliance.52

The Partnership for Peace, therefore, served as an important conceptual and operational blueprint for most of the ensuing discussions concerning NATO enlargement. Thus, NATO’s 1995 Study on Enlargement reiterated the political objectives of the

51 Ibid.
52 Ibid.
Alliance as stated in the PfP Framework Document and called upon prospective members not only to "conform to basic principles embodied in the Washington Treaty: democracy, individual liberty and the rule of law [and] accept NATO as a community of like-minded nations joined together for collective defense and the preservation of peace" but also to "be firmly committed to principles, objectives and undertakings included in the Partnership for Peace Framework Document." Moreover, the study insisted that in the process of preparation for membership "premature development of measures outside PfP for possible new members should be avoided." Consequently, the PfP was confirmed as the key instrument to be used by the candidate countries to streamline their political and military preparation for NATO membership.

Given the predominant military dimension of the PfP and the determination to keep politically connected those partner countries that were not interested in NATO membership at the time, namely Austria, Finland, Sweden, and Switzerland, and those interested but not yet selectable, at the Madrid Summit NATO decided to establish the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council (EAPC). The EAPC was designed to increase the participation of the partner countries in the decision-making and consultation process and to expand the scope of political and security-related issues to be discussed within its framework. One of the political goals has been to transform EAPC into a NATO body

54 Ibid., paragraph 41.
capable of preventing the next "out of area" regional crisis by enhancing PfP's emphasis on crisis management, terrorism, and disaster response.\textsuperscript{56}

Probably the most comprehensive and important NATO document governing the relationships with the CEE aspiring countries was the Membership Action Plan (MAP) approved at the NATO's Washington Summit in April 1999. MAP, as NATO defines it, is a program of "advice, assistance and practical support tailored to the individual needs of countries wishing to join the Alliance. Participation in the MAP does not prejudge any decision by the Alliance on future membership."\textsuperscript{57} MAP, therefore, was designed to reinforce the Open Door policy of the Alliance and its firm commitment to further enlargement by putting into place a program of activities to assist the aspiring countries in their preparations for possible future membership.\textsuperscript{58} While stressing that the list of issues did not constitute criteria, neither guarantee the timeframe for membership, MAP required each aspiring country to draw up an annual national program containing specific information and implementation measures.\textsuperscript{59}

In making its selection for enlargement, NATO assesses the suitability of the Membership Action Plan countries regarding their potential to contribute to the Alliance, specifically, and the stability and security of Europe, generally. In his exhaustive


\textsuperscript{59} Ibid.
analysis on NATO enlargement, Thomas Szayna of RAND identifies seven areas for assessment:

1. GDP growth;
2. Per capita GDP;
3. Attainment of market economy;
4. Defense expenditure;
5. Defense expenditures per troop;
6. Attainment of democratic political institutions; and,
7. Strategic Rationale—strategic position and the armed forces.60

The MAP assists candidates in the quest for membership. The organization makes it clear that no uniform roadmap to NATO membership exists, and that attaining all the prerequisites is not a guarantee of membership. For NATO to even consider a country for accession, specific political and military prerequisites must be fulfilled:

1. Peaceful resolution of ethnic, external territorial, internal jurisdictional, and international disputes. Refrain from using threats of force in international relations that are inconsistent with the purposes of the U.N.
2. Institution of democratic and civilian control of the armed forces.
3. Commitment to the PfP Framework Document and active participation in PfP.
4. Establishment of free market economies and democratic political systems based on the rule of law.

5. Initiation of steps that allow the armed forces to operate seamlessly within the integrated military structure with the emphasis on collective defense and interoperability.\textsuperscript{61}

From the requirements and expectations outlined in both the PfP as well as MAP documents, it is clear that the goal of the expansion was targeting both external and internal NATO security. Externally, as mentioned earlier, the threats were not quite defined yet; however, the future shape and international position of Russia was not clear. Internally, the expansion aimed at creating an extensive collective security umbrella, based on commonality of democratic values, peaceful and stable security environment, and protection from external threats. In this sense, NATO was taking on a more extended role as a security community. And with a larger number of members, its functioning as an alliance was increasingly undermined.

NATO’s relationship with the Central and Eastern European region and the strength of the emerging combined security community was first put to test during the 1999 NATO intervention in Kosovo. Although preceded by a few low-scale NATO interventions in Bosnia in 1995, the Kosovo crisis caught both NATO and its CEE partners relatively unprepared for dealing with this sort of situations. Having been primarily engaged in peace-keeping and peace-building training and exercises within the PfP framework and driven by various political interests, the CEE countries and to a certain extent NATO itself signaled moderate willingness to engage themselves into peace enforcement missions. The Kosovo crisis represented a defining moment for evaluating the strength of the institutional and normative building stones shaping the triangle relationship between Romania, Hungary and NATO. To be sure, the military

\textsuperscript{61} Ibid.
contribution of both countries during the Kosovo operation was very limited, but the key input was political.\textsuperscript{62}

NORMATIVE EFFECTS OF NATO ENLARGEMENT

There is not much argument or debate today that the enlargement of NATO to the Central and Eastern Europe contributed to the political and economic stability of the region, especially combined with the simultaneous expansion of the European Union in the eastern direction. Zoltan Barany even makes a case that NATO may have been more influential than the EU in the democratization of Eastern Europe because it provided security critical to successful democratization and induced positive changes in some policy areas.\textsuperscript{63} The CEE took on a democratic shape, albeit to various degrees of success. In the aspect of creating a democratic, peaceful norm of behavior, NATO had succeeded as a collective security organization tasked at providing and extending the accepted norms of security. But again, this success came at a price of expanding the alliance component of NATO. And increasing number of players generally has a tendency to complicate the rules of the game and making the decision process difficult to complete.

Earlier, the arguments for and against the expansion of NATO were addressed. In the same way as was the case with the alliance component, the normative success of NATO’s enlargement to the East, regarding the promotion of democracy and enhancing European security, was not impervious to the political and scholarly debates. Jeane Kirkpatrick, the former US Ambassador to the UN during the Reagan presidency,

\textsuperscript{62} Spinant, 52.

maintained that the membership in NATO for CEE countries would help to achieve the
goals of promoting democracy in the region, stabilizing the region and deterring any
future Russian aggression, while at the same time strengthening the NATO alliance. As
Rachel Epstein stated:

NATO has in fact contributed to democratization as well as to other
positive trends among its member states. NATO has significantly
denationalized defense strategies and thereby stabilized relations among
states. Although NATO by no means triumphs in all its endeavors to
shape the policies of aspiring and member states, it does exercises
considerable influence if it so chooses where certain domestic conditions
prevail. Exploiting the political fluidity inherent in post-cold war
transitions, for example, NATO cultivated transnational coalitions that
supported the alliance’s democratizing, denationalizing agenda.

NATO’s organizational structures, the process of normative socialization, and the
prospect of NATO membership played a key role in CEE in promoting norms of civil-
military relations, civilian control of the military and military transparency.

For example, in the case of the Polish military, the officers initially resisted
changes in order to retain the autonomy of the armed forces. However, NATO demanded
that this rhetoric be removed from the public and private military discourses if Poland
plans on becoming the Alliance’s member. In addition, “NATO played a significant role
in helping to subordinate the military to civilian control, reinforcing the Polish politicians

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domestically and by spreading and reinforcing these norms through interaction with and education of Polish military officers.²⁶

It is clear that socialization in the context of collective security institutions plays a very important role; however, this role has been hardly addressed in cases of security and defense in the theoretical literature. According to Alexandra Gheciu NATO has conducted a socialization process in liberal-democratic norms of security behavior on Central and Eastern European states.

NATO was especially heavily involved in the eastern projection of liberal-democratic norms in the field of security. These include accountability and transparency in the formulation of defense policies and budgets, the division of powers within the state in the area of security, government oversight of the military through civilian defense ministries, and accountability for the armed forces. In addition, NATO has sought to project into Central and East European countries Western-defined liberal norms and rules of international behavior, in particular involving peaceful settlement of disputes, multilateralism, and democracy and human rights promotion in the international arena.²⁷

The prospect of NATO membership has created generally positive incentives for democratization in the CEE region. For example, a key attraction to Slovak voters of the coalition that unseated Meciar in the 1998 elections was its commitment to Euro-Atlantic integration. Prior to the 2002 elections, President Rudolf Schuster remarked, "everybody realizes that if we want to get into NATO and the EU, this must be granted by certain

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²⁶ Ibid.
personalities." In other words, people such as Meciar, the obstacle to Slovakia's integration into Europe, would have to be voted out of power. Another example is the signing of basic treaties between Central and East European governments aspiring to NATO membership and their neighbors. The main reason why the aspiring countries concluded these pacts with traditional adversaries (such as Slovakia with Hungary in 1995, Romania with Hungary in 1996, and Romania with Ukraine in 1997) was the signatories' realization that it would substantially improve their chances of being admitted to the Alliance.

The Alliance, in its first round of expansion in the post-Cold War environment, has promoted democratization in a number of specific policy areas, oftentimes overlapping and reinforcing those areas with the efforts of the EU. However, NATO largely focused on military effectiveness, civil-military relations, defense expenditures, and a host of other issues that the EU has not taken into account. "Foremost among these [was] civilian control over the armed forces. Such control is essential to the success of a democratic polity, and in this regard, it is beyond question that the demands of NATO membership have had a strongly pro-democratic effect in Eastern Europe." Transparence and other confidence-building and security-building measures within NATO provided assurance to the future member states and allowed them to focus on their domestic and economic issues, rather than feeling the need to focus as much on basic security. Transparency played an important role in maintaining and building confidence among allies after the candidates' accession as well. As Millen states:

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68 Barany, "NATO's Peaceful Advance," 74-75.
69 Ibid.
70 Ibid.
71 Millen, 10.
“Enlargement contributed to security and stability in two ways. First, potential candidates seek membership in order to enjoy the assured security of collective defense. Second, the allure of NATO and EU membership is so great, candidates have taken steps to reform their economies, governments, and armed forces. No other initiative has enhanced stability as quickly and assuredly as NATO enlargement.”

On the other hand of the discussion on normative effectiveness of NATO in the post-Soviet European space, Dan Reiter argues that

NATO membership has not and will not advance democratization in Europe. The empirical record during the Cold War is clear: Inclusion in NATO did not promote democracy among its members. Further, enlargement did not contribute much to democratization in the three East European states admitted in 1999, and the promise of NATO membership is unlikely to speed democracy within any of the nine countries awaiting a decision on their request for membership. The weakness of the democratization argument, coupled with the costs and risks of further enlargement, caution against pursuit of this policy in the near or medium term. Instead the West should rely on the European Union (EU) to spread democracy, an approach that is more likely to foster democratization yet less likely to alienate Russia.73

Reiter’s arguments find support from other scholars as well. Andrew Michta maintained that while “NATO enlargement after the Cold War contributed to the democratic transformation of post-communist states, it failed... to generate a larger consensus on the shared mission and to provide the requisite military capabilities.”74 In other words, while the democratization of the CEE did happen, the cohesion of the alliance and the

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72 Ibid., 5.
73 Reiter, 45.
74 Michta, 376.
collective security values were weakened. In addition, Michta says, "the more NATO has expanded to foster the military-political security of the new democratic states of eastern and south-eastern Europe, the less it seems capable of dealing with real security threats such as Afghanistan. Facing the possible strategic failure of its ISAF mission, NATO needs to re-evaluate the policy track chosen post-1989."75 The ability of the security alliance that is NATO, therefore, to meet the main goals of protection against potential tangible and intangible threats, is challenged.

While scholars and analysts continue to debate the actual scope and phases of the process, few seem to question its overall political utility, emphasizing the norm-setting aspect of the two cycles of NATO enlargement and their contribution to the democratic transformation of the post-communist space. However, while the institutional and normative aspects of what has transpired since 1989 may give some profound satisfaction, today, with NATO polarized by debates on current and future missions, the geopolitical dimension of NATO enlargement into post-communist Europe requires careful reassessment as a backdrop to the Eurasian security environment.76

Andrew Michta's comments bring to light another issue associated with the strengthening of the collective security in Europe and effectiveness of NATO as an alliance, namely the issue of post-Soviet Russia. James Baker, a former White House Chief of Staff and Secretary of State under President George H. W. Bush, said in 2002 that NATO made a mistake in the 1990s in not considering Russia for membership.77 While NATO and Russia came to a tentative agreement on the first wave of enlargement,

75 Ibid.
76 Ibid., 365.
the following expansion steps of the Alliance heavily threatened Russia and undermined Moscow’s security. “According to Russia’s expectations from the first half of the 1990s, NATO should disintegrate in the same way the Warsaw Pact did.” However, that did not happen.

The other acceptable scenario from the Russian perspective is the transformation of NATO from an exclusive, and mainly military, organization to a Europe-wide, open political structure. As long as the political transformation of NATO would end in its subordination to the …OSCE, Russia could even accept the accession of the central European countries, except for the Baltic republics.

However, NATO’s expansion has not stopped there, either. The bottom line in terms of security here is this: the more Russia feels threatened by its closest neighbors to the West, their growing unity and combined power, the more threat it presents to NATO. Here, the basic security dilemma is at play.

Michael Williams and Iver Neumann also bring up the idea of democratic peace theory in respect to NATO and Russia. They argue that

the claim that enlargement represents a consensual extension of the democratic peace runs into an even more intractable problem: the fact that the most democratic circles in Russia have opposed NATO enlargement exactly on the grounds that it threatens the development of democracy in Russia. Indeed, the Russian consensus against NATO enlargement is overwhelming.

79 Ibid.
80 Williams and Neumann, 359.
To give only a few examples: in February 1996, Russian Deputy Defense Minister Andrey Kokoshin attended an annual conference on security sponsored by the German Ministry of Defense where he argued that “we have pulled back to the East, while NATO is turning in this direction and is pushing us further and further eastward.”

Similarly, in their first meeting, Foreign Minister Yevgeny Primakov reportedly told Polish Foreign Minister Geremek that “you have to understand we are not glad about the enlargement of NATO. But we know it will happen. Just don’t ask us to be happy about it.”

At an Economic Forum in Davos, in February 1997, Anatoly Chubays declared that when it came to the question of NATO enlargement “for the first time in the last five years, I personally am adopting the same position as Messrs. Zhirinovsky and Zyuganov.”

As Williams and Neumann aptly point out:

Such statements hardly seem to vindicate a view of the enlargement process as the consensual extension of a democratic security community. And in light of such views, it seems unlikely that one can explain the enlargement process as a straightforward evolution of the consensual and progressive security community embodied by NATO. Nor can such a position explain adequately why despite this considerable opposition and continuing misgivings, Russia in the end largely acquiesced to NATO’s enlargement.

Charles Kupchan, who in the early 1990s criticized the expansion of NATO to the East along George Kennan, ten years later argued that the United States should guide the

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84 Williams and Neumann, 360.
enlargement of NATO and make sure that Russia’s inclusion in the alliance is a top priority. The US and its NATO allies must seize historic opportunity to bring Russia into the Atlantic community, as only in this way the goal of collective security for Europe could be accomplished.  

COLLECTIVE SECURITY AND COLLECTIVE DEFENSE: CONTRADICTION OR REINFORCEMENT?

The post-Cold War enlargement of NATO was the biggest and the most important geopolitical change in Europe, after the transitions of 1989 to 1991. The 1990s expansion of the Alliance, which started a process of subsequent enlargements, carried into the future significant implications for the Alliance. Enlargement was and still is a part of NATO’s transformation in the Post-Cold War era in which NATO has evolved from a traditional form of military-political alliance into a combination of an alliance and security community, with the component of a security community gaining an increasing dominance over the alliances characteristic.

The originator of that change was the shift in the international environment, with the fall of the Soviet Union, end of bipolarity and clear definition of threat, and expanded group of similar-minded states in Europe. Subsequently, this change led to the change in the relationship between collective security and collective defense in the framework of NATO. Whereas in the two previous periods discussed, the international environment stayed unchanging, and with that so did the relationship between the two narratives, in the 1990s, with the changing international environment, the dependency of this

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relationship on the international structure became evident. While before those two narratives reinforced each other to such an extent that at times one could not exist without the other, as was the case with the creation of NATO, here the collective security narrative took precedence over the alliance narrative. With the absence of clearly defined external threat, NATO focused on creating an expanded community of members whose goal is internal and external security, very much resembling what Deutsch defined a security community. However, this extension of collective security arrangement also meant that the functioning of NATO as an alliance, with more members, would be somewhat hampered.

While the new members generally have done a good job at fulfilling and increasing their NATO commitments since joining, the enlarged number of Allies within NATO slowed down the decision-making process within the Alliance and diffused greatly the agreement on the means and goals of NATO’s mission. Daalder and Goldgeier write:

> Besides raising questions of efficacy, changes in NATO’s composition and scope will also raise questions about the alliance’s core purpose. As was true when NATO expanded eastward, in the 1990s, the most controversial aspect of any effort to enlarge the alliance’s membership will be how such enlargement might affect the security guarantee in Article V of the North Atlantic Treaty.

However, on the other side of this discussion, no NATO member currently faces a military threat from another country, much less the type of threat that led to NATO’s

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86 Hillison, *New NATO Members: Security Consumers or Producers?*  
87 Ivo Daalder and James Goldgeier, “Global NATO,” *Foreign Affairs* 85 (September/October 2006): 105.
establishment in 1949. "In the unlikely event that such a threat did materialize, nothing about NATO’s enhanced reach would in any way weaken its collective defense commitments." But the current situation does not guarantee the similar future environment. "The core question remains whether the new NATO will endure long enough to sustain the structure of the Euro-Atlantic security, as the alliance transforms itself into a collective security organization with marginal military capabilities." In other words, will NATO be able to sustain the alliance element, while it manages its collective security arrangement? Is it possible that the alliance element will become an imbedded part of collective security?

The fundamental contradiction of NATO in the 1990s and today is that while enlargement was critical to the security of post-communist states, the process of setting the security norms and systematic transformation has become the primary focus of the Alliance. The irony of the post-1989 transformation of NATO, therefore, lies in the very success of the enlargement process. Alliances are first and foremost against something, and only peripherally serve to support and promote shared values. The post-1991 NATO chose to redefine itself through norm-setting, arguably at the expense of the alliance component. "On the balance, NATO has become hollowed out, raising the question of its long-term ability to provide security to those post-communist states that originally joined the alliance to ensure their newly regained independence." Stuart Croft, however, argues that the problem of enlargement is not in the jeopardized effectiveness of the alliance, but lack of strategy for the expansion itself.

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88 Ibid., 106.
89 Michta, 375.
90 Ibid.
91 Ibid., 376.
A different perspective holds that the flaw lies not with an ongoing process of enlargement, but rather in the lack of strategy surrounding the management of the issue [of enlargement]. NATO will be enlarged.... But it should do so with an eye to three sets of processes; the enlargement of the European Union; the development of NATO-EU interaction on security matters; and, of course, the development of a structured interface between Russia and both NATO and the EU. In an already overcrowded diplomatic agenda, this is a tall order.\(^\text{92}\)

But is it possible that the enlargement was a part of the process of searching for new purpose of NATO, which was transforming itself from a military-political alliance whose primary purpose is territorial defense of its members to a security community that would act on the stabilization of the area through new missions?\(^\text{93}\)

At the intersection of the collective security and collective defense elements of NATO are the emergence of divergent interests among the enlarged group of members that is not entirely homogenous any more and the increasing difficulty of reaching consensus within an Alliance with close to 30 members. Within the pre-1991 Alliance, different perceptions on policies generated already an identifiable cleavage. There was a disagreement on means between France and the United States, present within NATO ever since the creation of the Alliance in 1949. However, this divergence did not impact the goals and caused no harm to the collective security and defense character of NATO.

There is a second cleavage that became clear after the end of the Cold War, namely the different perception of most immediate threats between the members to the


West and the East. In other words, NATO enlargement is a challenge for the consensus rule and tradition inside the Atlantic Alliance. The more members' negotiations within the alliance increase the likelihood of collision among members' interests. Potential tensions inside the alliance in time of crisis may undermine the decision-making capability of NATO, its political credibility and, consequently, the effectiveness of its military action. Furthermore, they can potentially imbalance both of the narratives of NATO.

Despite the initial criticisms and current arguments that the alliance is weakened and ineffective, that it lacks defined purpose and the agreement among the members on the means is non-existent, the fact is that "the first post-Cold War round of NATO enlargement can be proclaimed a success. None of the fears and worst-case predictions that opponents of enlargement circulated in the pre-accession debates have materialized." The enlargement did not cause a serious problem for the relationship between Moscow and the West, and there was no widespread nationalist or anti-Western backlash; the political cohesiveness, decision-making ability, and military effectiveness were not seriously harmed; the costs of the expansion were manageable for both NATO and the new members; the membership has not led to a greater aggressiveness on the part of the new members; and the new borders of NATO have not proved to be divisive and the new structures established helped to ensure that excluded applicants were not left out.

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94 Spinant, 7.
95 Ibid., 8.
in the cold. In addition, NATO has played a key role in the transformation and stabilization of the post-communist area of the Central and Eastern Europe.97

Perhaps Williams and Neumann sum up NATO’s post-Cold War development and effectiveness best, when they write:

The evolution of NATO constitutes one of the most important developments in post-Cold War international security. Despite predictions of fragmentation from within or supercession from above, the Alliance has emerged as a—perhaps the—dominant institution in contemporary security relations. While debates in the late 1980s often revolved around whether NATO would, could, or should survive, they now centre around the implications of its centrality, and its current and (possible) future enlargement.98

Following the collapse of the Soviet Union and of its CEE communist satellites, NATO defied all realist assumptions about alliances dissolving in absence of a threat and made instead a series of steps that allowed it to move again, within just a decade, to the core of the European security system. In 2000, Kenneth Waltz wrote that NATO, as with all other international institutions, is dependent on the national interests of the states involved. The US and other NATO states see the organization as a useful tool in promoting their interests. This does not mean that the organization is unimportant or not useful, but simply that its existence and utility is up to the powerful states involved. NATO expansion is part of the expansion of American influence.99

97 Ibid., 20.
98 Williams and Neumann, 357.
In addition, "one of the most dominant fears associated with enlargement of the Atlantic Alliance to new members was the dilution of NATO and its de facto transformation into a talk shop." Instead, NATO has moved closer to becoming a security community that Karl Deutsch envisioned in the 1950 or a community of practice which Adler and Barnett brought back in the 1990s. Enlargement to the Central and Eastern Europe provided NATO with the opportunity and means to become a leading institutional agent of the cooperative security community of practice. European states want to be member of NATO and other regions look at it as a blueprint to emulate.

In 2008, Emanuel Adler applied the concept of community of practice to NATO, in lieu of previous idea of security communities. Community of practice, Alder wrote, "can incorporate so many concepts because it encompasses not only the conscious and discursive dimensions and the actual doing of social change, but also the social space where structure and agency overlap and where knowledge, power, and community intersect." He essentially combined the structural component of an alliance with the idea-based normative factor of collective security. "Communities of practice are intersubjective social structures that constitute the normative and epistemic ground for action, but they also are agents, made up of real people, who—working via network channels, across national or organizational lines, and in the halls of government—affect political, economic, and social events."

NATO in the 1990s, and subsequently now, clearly displays the characteristics outlined by Adler. The North Atlantic Alliance as the community of practice is a

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102 Ibid., 199.  
103 Ibid., 200.
“security community spread via the diffusion not only of democratic values but also of self-restraint subjectivities. Liberal democracy and self-restraint norms and practices are intimately related, and in some instances it might not be prudent to treat them as separate normative categories. Self-restraint norms might be necessary (but not sufficient) for liberal democracy, and liberal democratic norms are not necessary for self-restraint (as evidenced by non-liberal security communities).”

NATO has encouraged democratization in the post-communist CEE countries for three reasons: “First, securing national sovereignty and security establishes the fundamental basis that makes it possible for democratic transition and consolidation to proceed. East Europeans found themselves in a highly uncertain security environment following the end of their countries’ state-socialist regimes. They had no security alternative to the Alliance.”

The difference between NATO and all other security organizations is that NATO’s integrated command arrangements, its common procedures and doctrine, and the trust and bonds developed over decades of cooperation are an irreplaceable force. During the Cold War, the collective defense guarantee was the rationale of the Alliance, but in the post-Cold War era, greater security flexibility became apparent. Although the Alliance remains committed to the fundamental tasks of security, consultation, deterrence and defense, it has added partnership, conflict prevention, and crisis management as part of its responsibilities.

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104 Ibid., 198.
105 Millen, Pax NATO: The Opportunities of Enlargement.
106 Ibid.
CONCLUSIONS

The end of the Cold War and bipolarity makes it possible for European security to encompass a continental vision of security. Security is no longer exclusively a military challenge, but it is economic, political, social, and environmental as well. NATO must adapt to be able to simultaneously carry out three complementary enlargements: new members, new missions, and power-projection extension. These three enlargements and the effects that they collectively generate, form a spine for a pan-European security arrangement.\(^\text{107}\) In these combined issues and tasks, NATO’s structure as an alliance and its mission as a collective security arrangement complement each other, reinforce each other, and it is safe to say, could not function without each other.

Enlargement process is a continuation of the security community of the democratic states. Thomas Risse-Kappen maintains that NATO “extends that community of values, it extends that community into Eastern Europe and, potentially, into even the successor states of the Soviet Union, creating a ‘pacific federation’ from Vladivostok to Berlin, San Francisco, and Tokyo.”\(^\text{108}\) However, there are, however, two major difficulties with viewing enlargement as a straightforward extension of the Western democratic security community. “First, it ignores the fact that while official policy may appear to mirror a consensus, enlargement has been subject to severe and continuing criticism from within countries traditionally forming the Alliance. The policy of enlargement often met strong resistance within the policy-making community, and it continues to be subject to strong criticism.”\(^\text{109}\)

\(^{107}\) Spinant.
\(^{109}\) Williams and Neumann, 359.
Michael Mandelbaum, for example, considers it a sure means of losing the peace.\textsuperscript{110} John Lewis Gaddis has observed that among historians there is a near universal consensus that NATO enlargement is a mistake.\textsuperscript{111} Obviously, for the present moment, NATO has been able to not only stay afloat as a security institution, but also extend its territorial membership and operations. However, that does not guarantee its effectiveness and persistence in the future. One thing remains clear, however: NATO would not and will not survive as a collective defense organization alone; rather, it needs to hone its operability as an alliance and focus on its mission as a collective security organization in the future.

INTRODUCTION

The final empirical section looks at NATO in the post-2001 environment. As discussed earlier, the international environment in this most recent decade is characterized by more intangible, transnational threats and issues, quite different than the nature of threats during the Cold War and the immediate post-Cold War decade. In that respect, NATO must readjust its scope, goals and means to meet those new threats. The year 2001, marked by the 9/11 attacks on the United States, serves as the watershed moment. For the first time in the history of NATO, the Article V was evoked in defense of the United States.

Given the trends of the collective security and collective defense narratives prevalent in the 1990s, the natural assumption would have been that NATO continues to absorb more and more collective security characteristics at the expense of the alliance narrative. While that is the case in reference to the Alliance’s engagement in Afghanistan, the out-of-area NATO operation under the auspices of the UN, the Allies themselves have an increasingly difficult time agreeing on the Alliance’s goals and means in Afghanistan. Furthermore, there is an increasing discord regarding the role of NATO in European and international security. Therefore, while the members seem to appreciate the idea of NATO as a collective security organization, spreading its collective security principles outside of Europe, they are not willing to provide practical commitment to realize that noble idea.
In this chapter, NATO's involvement in Afghanistan serves as the framework for analysis of its dual nature as an alliance and a collective security organization. Going back to the elements used in the previous chapters, we need to look at the international environment, internally and externally first. Internally, the expansion of NATO in Europe in continuing, encompassing more and more democratic states who see NATO as an effective vehicle for security. Externally, however, the international system is still operating in the structure of unipolarity, with the US at the helm, albeit the power of the US is slowly declining. Furthermore, the external threats in this environment remain intangible and hard to define, and encompass both state as well as transnational threats.

In this environment, what is happening with the narratives of collective security and collective defense in the framework of NATO? The pattern of development from the last decade of the twentieth century, discussed in the previous chapter, continues. NATO's role as a collective security arrangement, or more as a security community for Europe, grows, whereas its role as an alliance remains in decline. NATO members have an increasingly difficult time agreeing on what constitutes an external threat, how to deal with that threat, and who is going to pay for the capabilities to deal with it.

The involvement of the organization in Afghanistan shows a few possible directions for the Alliance in the future: Afghanistan's issues with political instability, terrorism, and opium trade present threats to Europe and, as such, belong in the realm of NATO's responsibilities, despite the fact that Afghanistan is outside of the European area. If that is the case, then it is clear that the nature and scope of threats are changing and NATO is responding to that change. The second direction is that of NATO as a collective security organization—in this case, NATO is broadening its scope and area of
operations to Afghanistan. In this scenario, Afghanistan poses a threat to the broader international community and needs to be addressed as a practical and moral obligation. As a prolonged effort which is in its seventh year now, Afghanistan serves as a test case for NATO members' ability to come to agreements on policies and carry those policies effectively. The jury is still out on the success of NATO's mission in Afghanistan, and in a similar fashion, on the role of NATO in European and international security.

Having said that, the fact that in the post-2001 environment "NATO's members and partners continued to recognize it as a key Euro-Atlantic security institution—as the main transatlantic forum, in spite of all its problems, for articulating and implementing security policies in the Western security community"¹ shows that the utility of NATO has not diminished. Rather, it has enabled NATO to "identify common allied priorities, identify problems, define solutions to those problems, and help implements those solutions, including in the areas of preventing and combating terrorism."² However, the picture is not quite that rosy. On the other hand, NATO has sustained a certain loss of moral authority in the eyes of allied publics as well as in partner states, in part because of the alliance's (perceived) willingness to tolerate or actively support significant exceptions to liberal norms…. Should this situation persist in the future, it could easily lead to deeper questions and challenges to the moral authority of the alliance….That, in turn, could significantly undermine the ability of the alliance to act as a key player in the contemporary field of security.³

² Ibid., 115.
³ Ibid., 114.
All allies seemed to agree that the future of the alliance rested, in large part, on the success of the mission in Afghanistan. Committing NATO to out-of-area operations at meetings in Reykjavik and Prague in 2002, supporters of NATO saw the mission in Afghanistan to be a bridge linking the NATO of the Cold War with a new, post-Cold War NATO that would be involved in the war on terror. According to Amin Tarzi, reporting on Afghanistan for the Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty:

> It was Afghanistan, the last battlefield of the Cold War, that led to the tragic events of 11 September 2001. NATO’s first challenge in the war on terrorism began in Afghanistan as well ... As such, NATO’s shift of attention from the threat posed by the former Soviet Union to terrorism seems a natural and logical progression. A major question that remains unanswered, however, is whether or not NATO is facing the challenge with solid unity of purpose and action.”[^4]

This section will first outline the origins of NATO’s involvement in Afghanistan and the actual situation on the ground in the country. Next, the scope and nature of disagreements among the Allies regarding NATO’s involvement in Afghanistan will be addressed, concluding with the discussion on the relationship between collective security and collective defense narratives in respect to the post-2001 period in NATO’s most current history.

**NATO’S ROAD TO AFGHANISTAN**

The Article V of the North Atlantic Treaty was invoked for the first time in the history of the Alliance after 9/11: the “U.S. leaders welcomed the European pledges of

support, and the U.S.-led military campaign in Afghanistan soon had a key NATO component.  

On October 7th, 2001, the United States, in the aftermath of the attacks of September 11th, launched the Operation Enduring Freedom in Afghanistan. The OEF-Afghanistan later became one of five components of the OEF as the US effort in the War on Terrorism. The other subordinate components of the Operation Enduring Freedom have taken place in Kyrgyzstan (finished in 2004), the Philippines, in the Horn of Africa, and in Trans-Sahara region. In Afghanistan, the Operation Enduring Freedom ran by the US, and the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF), executed by NATO, operated parallel with each other, with a high degree of joint efforts, until they merged together in 2009. The goal of the OEF-Afghanistan, as stated by President Bush in 2001, shortly after 9/11, was to eliminate terrorist training camps in Afghanistan, damage the infrastructure in the country, capture the Al-Qaeda leaders, remove the Taliban from power, and dismantle terrorist groups operating out of Afghanistan.

In December 2001, the United Nations Security Council sanctioned the creation of the International Security Assistance Force tasked with providing security in Afghanistan in the wake of the US invasion in an effort to re-establish a legitimate Afghan government. “NATO member countries have responded to the call of the U.N. Security Council to assist the Afghan government in restoring security in Kabul and its surroundings. Their forces constitute the backbone of the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) in Afghanistan.” This decision was based on an earlier Bonn Agreement regarding Afghanistan.

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7 Rupp, NATO after 9/11, 157.
Officially called the Agreement on Provisional Arrangements in Afghanistan Pending the Re-Establishment of Permanent Governing Institutions, the Bonn Agreement, as its name shows, was designed to aid Afghans in building of their state and government after years of Soviet and later Taliban domination. The NATO-led ISAF was to be responsible for providing security in the period of transition from conflict and instability to legitimate and capable governance in Afghanistan.\(^8\) Despite this ambiguous statement by NATO regarding Afghanistan, pressure continued to mount throughout 2003 on the Alliance to commit to ISAF formally, and also to the nation-building mission in Afghanistan. This was in part due to the fact that most of the states contributing to ISAF were already NATO members or partner states. With the general mandate from the Prague Summit to support out-of-area operations, it only seemed natural that NATO would directly oversee the ISAF. In February 2003, with NATO under stress as a result of Iraq differences, Secretary General Robertson proposed a formal NATO mission in Afghanistan in part to counter the perception of the Alliance in trouble as a result of the deadlock on the issue of Iraq.\(^9\) In August 2003, NATO commenced the control of security and reconstruction efforts in Afghanistan.

Since NATO took command of ISAF in 2003, the Alliance has gradually expanded the reach of its mission, originally limited to Kabul, to cover Afghanistan's whole territory and, in a similar fashion, has broadened the issue scope of its operations.

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The number of ISAF troops has grown accordingly from the initial 5,000 to around 50,000 troops coming from 42 countries, including all 28 NATO members. In accordance with all the relevant Security Council Resolutions, ISAF's main role is to assist the Afghan government in the establishment of a secure and stable environment. To this end, ISAF forces are conducting security and stability operations throughout the country together with the Afghan National Security Forces and are directly involved in the development of the Afghan National Army through mentoring, training and equipping. Through its Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs), ISAF is supporting reconstruction and development (R&D) in Afghanistan, securing areas in which reconstruction work is conducted by other national and international actors. Where appropriate... ISAF is also providing practical support for R&D efforts, as well as support for humanitarian assistance efforts conducted by Afghan government organizations, international organizations, and NGOs.10

Upon NATO's arrival in Afghanistan, the political stability of the Afghan government was practically non-existent. Not only was there a possibility that the transitional government in Kabul could be easily destabilized and toppled, but also the legitimacy of President Hamid Karzai was heavily questioned.

On the ground, Karzai was variously portrayed as a pawn of the United States or in the pocket of southern anti-Taliban fighters of Pashtun ethnicity, or implicitly controlled by the Northern Alliance. The Northern Alliance exerted explicit control over Kabul and the associated political processes by dint of its 27,000-man military contingent based in the city and its environs.11

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10 Ibid.
Furthermore, the central government in Kabul held very little power; rather, the control came from the local leaders, anti-Taliban chieftains which the media pejoratively labeled “warlords.” In addition, “remnants of the Taliban, supported by the remnants of al Qaeda’s military forces were in the process of transitioning from a conventional guerilla war to a low-level terrorist campaign, and the possibility of a return to the destructive post-Soviet era infighting between the chieftains existed in numerous locations, including Kabul.”

Given the past 30 years of the Afghan history, the population outside of the Pashtun areas was not openly hostile toward the international forces, but it generally was not overtly supportive either.

In 2003, international forces in Afghanistan included 18,000 members of the Operation Enduring Freedom--Afghanistan and 4,500 military provided by the states participating in International Security Assistance Force. “The OEF at the time was evolving into a mature counterinsurgency force, operating mostly in the southeast and eastern parts of Afghanistan, while ISAF was confined to Kabul. ISAF had a muddled mandate and, without the resources to carry it out, functioned as a nearly symbolic European presence in Kabul, a green-uniformed island in a tan-uniformed sea.” On the Afghan side, the Afghan National Army was weak and untrained. In addition, the “infrastructure damage after 25 years of war was another impediment to extending federal government control over the provinces.”

Overall, the Afghan transitional government had questionable legitimacy among the people, it was subject to coercion and pressure by the warlords and Taliban groups, and it was dependent on international forces in every way. “Without security, there can

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12 Ibid., 22
13 Ibid., 30.
14 Ibid., 24.
be no reconstruction, and with no reconstruction there would be no nation-building, thus leaving Afghanistan susceptible to continued instability and penetration by international terrorism. On the plus side, the insurgency was forced by OEF operations to alter its methodology, which in turn made insurgent operations less effective."\(^{15}\) There were clear indicators that the Afghan population did not and would not support the continuation of Taliban and Al-Qaeda influence in the country.\(^ {16}\)

The acceptance by NATO of the ISAF command changed the perception of the Afghan transition government. Under the Canadian leadership, ISAF extended its support, and with that legitimacy, to the interim government in Kabul, and provided the most essential element for a government and society to function—security.

ISAF’s area of operations was expanded to encompass the entire province of Kabul, not just the city, and coordination between ISAF and OEF was improved, particularly in the special operations realm. ISAF was able to keep an eye on potential problem factions… and facilitate a wide variety of local projects which synergistically assisted the security efforts by building trust with the population.\(^ {17}\)

Furthermore, ISAF, in conjunction with OEF-Afghanistan, the Afghan Ministry of Defense and the National Directorate of Security embarked on the process of institution-building, through enhancing the leadership of military, police and government and providing training. However, the difficulty came in the reality that “all of this had to be done without generating the perception that the result was being imposed from the outside by foreign entities. OEF [took] on the organized insurgents, while ISAF [assisted]

\(^{15}\) Ibid.
\(^{16}\) Ibid., 25.
\(^{17}\) Ibid.
with security of the capital. PRT expansion [provided] bases for the extension of central
government power into the outlying areas."18 This mission was further emphasized by
former Secretary General of NATO, Jaap de Hoop Scheffer. In 2004, he outlined his four
priorities for the future of the Alliance: Afghanistan, Iraq, military transformation, and
cooperative relations among member states. The mission in Afghanistan was his top
priority, however.19

Early on during the initial phases of the ISAF mission, getting most NATO states,
other than the US, Canada and Germany, to deploy more than a few troops was
difficult.20 That lack of commitment became a persistent problem based on perception of
NATO’s members’ support of the US efforts in Afghanistan despite systematic pledges
of troop increases. At the Istanbul Summit, in June 2004, NATO pledged to increase its
troop presence form 6500 to 10,000 troops in the lead-up to the October 2004 election
(however 1000 of these would be held in reserve in Europe). The US publicly welcomed
this but was privately disappointed by the modest increases in troop levels. The US
Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld proposed deploying the newly established NATO
Response Force to Afghanistan, but several NATO members, led by France, successfully
opposed this.21

In the fall of 2004, the US pressed its NATO allies to consider merging the US
combat mission in Afghanistan with the ISAF force. This was publicly rejected by
France and Germany, partly because of the reluctance by Germany and others to engage
their troops in combat in Afghanistan. Initially, NATO only operated around Kabul and

18 Ibid.
19 Rupp, NATO after 9/11, 153.
20 Ibid., 163.
21 Ibid., 165-166.
in the northern provinces. In 2005 meeting of NATO defense ministers, the alliance eventually agreed to expand the mission to the western provinces, adding several hundred troops, and then eventually expanding the ISAF mission to the entire country. Throughout 2005, the US and its NATO allies became better at coordinating the two missions, the OEF and the ISAF, eventually leading to the merger of the two.  

At the NATO summit in April 2008, NATO countries pledged to continue to work to remove the other so-called “national caveats” on their troops’ operations that U.S. commanders say limit operational flexibility.” Subsequently, the NATO members improved in the coordination of their troops and adopted the flexible rules of engagement that allowed for more adequate response to problems in Afghanistan. All have also agreed that their forces would come to each others’ defense in times of emergency anywhere in Afghanistan. However, as of the end of 2008, some NATO members still did not relax their caveats. “Some nations refuse to conduct night-time combat. Others do not fight after snowfall. These caveats were troubling to those NATO countries with forces in heavy combat zones, such as Canada, which feel they are bearing the brunt of the fighting.”

In 2007, the problems plaguing the situation in Afghanistan increased in size and scope. “The drivers of instability include insurgency, chronic weakness of the Afghan government and state institutions, exploding drug production, and a weak economy. Uncoordinated military operations by international forces and shifting political dynamics

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22 Ibid., 167-168.
24 Ibid., 35.
in the region are additional contributing factors."25 The stabilization efforts and state-building endeavors became increasingly complicated. Furthermore, the problems with the troop's contributions and the commitment of NATO members aggravated the situation:

with the partial exception of British, Canadian, and Dutch units, most of the NATO troop contributions amount to little more than military symbolism. The NATO governments can argue that they are contributing to the U.S. led mission, but in reality most of the deployments are militarily irrelevant. That is true even as overall alliance troop levels in Afghanistan have gradually climbed. Most NATO members have placed a variety of caveats on the use of their military personnel. Some forbid them from engaging in night operations (which are inherently more dangerous). Others prohibit their forces from being deployed in certain areas of the country—specifically, those areas where significant combat is taking place and where additional troops might actually prove useful.26

The national caveats, overtime, became the problem most difficult to manage for the ISAF command. "In most instances national caveats actually reduced the number of troops. The problem became particularly acute with the Stage III enlargement into southern Afghanistan, where the Taliban posed a serious security threat. ISAF needed to implement a firm approach in order to counter the threat, but the approach is in danger of being undermined by [the caveats]."27

In defense of NATO members, one can list many reasons why the restrictions have been imposed on the use of troops in Afghanistan: lack of equipment and training; domestic political reasons, namely the lack of belief that the troops are sufficient to create

27 Peter Thruelsen, "NATO in Afghanistan—What Lessons Are We Learning, And Are We Willing to Adjust?" Danish Institute for International Studies Report 14 (2007).
stability in Afghanistan; lack of flexibility of troop in countering the new arising threats and their complexity.\textsuperscript{28}

The response has been decidedly underwhelming. Although the French parliament voted in September 2008 to keep the country’s 3,500 troops in Afghanistan, Paris has no current plans to increase that contingent. French Defense Minister Hervé Morin stated bluntly in February 2009 that France has “already made a considerable effort” toward stabilizing Afghanistan and that “there’s no question for the moment of sending additional troops.” The Netherlands, which despite its size has been one of the more substantial contributors, not only refuses to increase its military commitment, it has also announced that it will begin drawing down its 1,770 troops in 2010. Germany argues that its military is simply too stretched to commit more troops beyond the 4,500 already in the country. Typically, Berlin insists that a larger deployment of combat troops would be superfluous, since the primary focus of the Afghan mission should be on civilian reconstruction.\textsuperscript{29}

In February 2009, the ISAF increased its troops from approximately 43,000 in 2008 to 56,000. This meant more troops in more areas that previously had little or no regular security presence. The consequence was actually more fighting as militants were pushed away from some of the more densely populated areas.\textsuperscript{30}

\textsuperscript{28} Ibid.


\textsuperscript{30} “Afghanistan Report,” NATO, 2009. As of July, 2009, ISAF has approximately 64,500 troops. ISAF consists of 42 countries. The contributions are as follows: US: 29950; UK: 9000; Germany: 4050; France: 3160; Canada: 2800; Italy: 2795; Poland: 2000; Netherlands: 1770; Australia: 1090; Romania: 1025; Spain: 780; Turkey: 730; Denmark: 700; Belgium: 510; Norway: 485; Bulgaria: 470; Sweden: 430; Czech Republic: 340; Hungary: 310; Croatia: 295; Slovakia: 230; Lithuania: 200; Latvia: 165; Macedonia: 165; New Zealand: 160; Estonia: 150; Greece: 145; Albania: 140; Finland: 110; Azerbaijan: 90; Portugal: 90; Slovenia: 80; United Arab Emirates: 25; Ukraine: 25; Luxemburg: 9; Iceland: 8; Singapore: 8; Ireland: 7; Jordan: 7; Austria: 3; Bosnia and Herzegovina: 2; Georgia: 1. Source: “ISAF Placemat” as of 23 July 2009. Available at:  http://www.nato.int/isaf/docu/epub/pdf/placemat.pdf.
EUROPEAN AND AMERICAN DISAGREEMENTS: ALLIANCE IN JEOPARDY?

The discussions, agreements, and disagreements among NATO members touch on two main areas: does NATO's engagement in Afghanistan compromise NATO's role in security of Europe?; what are the goals of NATO in Afghanistan and what are the appropriate means to achieve those goals? It is important to note here, that the members are having issues with agreement on more specific goals, whereas before the discussions centered on the means. However, it is not the general goals of overall European internal and external security that are in question; rather the more specific objectives of that security. This question goes back to the concept of how the comprehensive security should be defined in the first place.

Specifically, the ISAF mission is seen as especially crucial for two reasons. Failure could potentially hurt the alliance and US commitment to it, which some countries, particularly the Baltic states, see as critical. However, an increase in out-of-area operations is not seen as preferable, as these countries would prefer to see NATO's focus more within the European region.31

In Estonia, for example, within the government and among the general public, NATO is seen as Tallinn’s principle security guarantee and as absolutely a critical alliance. There is a fear that the US commitment to NATO may be diminishing. Tallinn wants to make sure that the alliance stays central to European security and is not marginalized by the development of an EU defense policy. Lithuania and Latvia are both very similar among political elites and citizens. They see NATO as a guarantor of security, a check against Russian imperialist ambitions, and as offering potential to aid in

democratization for countries farther east in ways that other organizations cannot provide. In this framework, the Article V guarantee, with the US strongly involved in NATO, is highly important to all three Baltic republics.

Disagreements related to the goals and the methods to accomplish them regarding Afghanistan started arising between the US and the European members in the early stages of the engagement in Afghanistan. “Should Afghanistan be rebuilt as a model democracy once the war against the Taliban had been won, as the Americans argued? The Europeans doubted whether a working democracy could be established in a tribal country, and advocated as much regional governance as possible under the rule of law whether this was Western or Shia.” On the other hand, the training and creation of functional and capable Afghan police that could provide the security for state- and nation-building were questioned.\(^\text{32}\) The Washington’s position regarding those issues was clearly stated by the former Secretary of State under President George W. Bush, Condoleezza Rice:

This is a defining moment for Afghanistan, for NATO, and for our wider democratic community. Our nations and organizations have achieved our greatest success when we have married power and principle to achieve great purposes—not when we have dealt with the world as it is, but when we have sought to change the world for the better. This same spirit must guide our efforts today. We are transforming NATO into an alliance that its founders might not have recognized but would certainly have celebrated: an alliance of free nations, joined in common effort with other great democracies from across the globe, to support the growth of peace and freedom throughout the world. Now we must fulfill our commitment to success in Afghanistan—for in so doing, we will help a new democracy

take root in the heart of a troubled region, and we will make a lasting contribution to the security of the world.\textsuperscript{33}

The problems historically typical to the NATO alliance are some of the same ones that can be seen in the case of ISAF. These include troop levels, troop transport, and the problems of defense spending. In addition, the problems of national caveats have caused at times great difficulty in mission operation.\textsuperscript{34}

Aside from those practicalities, the two major challenges for NATO in Afghanistan include: 1) The reluctance of some allies to commit troops to counterinsurgency tasks. This includes national caveats on troop area of deployment, decision-making, use of troops for certain tasks, etc. Even though countries that are taking disproportionate casualties have been placated through various adjustments, this has been done very much on an ad hoc basic; 2) Defining realistically the goals of the military mission in Afghanistan and how these goals will be accomplished.\textsuperscript{35}

In the testimony before the House Armed Services Committee, NATO’s lack of commitment and cohesive strategy in Afghanistan was compared to the Alliance problems during the Cold War again. “At present NATO is manning the Afghan frontier, but doing nothing to address the threat emerging from its other side. This is akin to NATO’s guarding the Fulda Gap throughout the Cold War, but having no agreed policies

\textsuperscript{33} Condoleezza Rice, “Fulfilling the Commitment to Success in Afghanistan.” Prepared Remarks at the NATO Afghanistan Contributing Nations Meeting; Brussels, Belgium, January 26, 2007.


for dealing with the Soviet Union." Richard Cordesman supports this view and argues that overall "NATO lacks a 'long war' strategy, and economic levels to match its military efforts." The NATO military forces are inadequate, the efforts in training the Afghan National Police are largely insufficient and ineffective, and the drug eradication and counter-narcotics endeavors are unrealistic and are not bringing desired results.38

According to ISAF, its mission in Afghanistan represents universal values, which would seem that there was no legitimate opposition to the mission. The Alliance very much frames it in terms of norms and a universal struggle for civilization itself.39 Such framing of the situation as a confrontation between good and evil has made NATO less likely to pay enough attention to how its own actions are perceived by people within Afghanistan, especially in the use of force and causing collateral damage, including deaths of civilians, in its military operations. This has led some to be sympathetic to or ally themselves with those opposed to the ISAF presence in the country and the Afghan government that it supports. It has also led some more moderate factions within the Taliban to forge links with Al Qaeda. Also, the lines between the ISAF mission and the US-led counterterrorism operations have become blurred at times.40

NATO's mission in ISAF in Afghanistan is structured by the idea that only a mission that effectively combines both military and non-military dimensions in a comprehensive manner can effectively promote stability and prevent Afghanistan from

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38 Ibid.
40 Ibid., 110.
re-emerging as a safe haven for terrorism. However, state building is always a difficult exercise, but it is especially so in the case of Afghanistan. It has a long and devastating recent history of warfare, its national political institutions have been destroyed, has an ongoing and well-organized insurgency, weak rule of law, very low levels of development in pretty much every sense, opium as its primary export commodity, and high levels of corruption, to name just a few issues that NATO is dealing with in Afghanistan.

The new government in Afghanistan, backed by large numbers of coalition troops and high amounts of outside financial assistance has begun to bring some degree of democracy to Afghanistan, as well as new infrastructure and increased educational opportunity for the Afghan people. However, rule of law is still rather weak in much of the country. Although the country is still quite poor, it has shown real signs of economic growth, even if it is largely dependent on the flow of foreign aid. Corruption is a major threat to the legitimacy and moral authority of the Karzai government. In addition, Afghanistan has become less safe on a day-to-day basis for civilians. Security for Afghan civilians to work, travel, and sleep free of fear is essential to the construction of a viable state and success of the mission in Afghanistan.

The Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs) in Afghanistan, made up of small contingents of military and civilian personnel, are front and center in NATO’s ISAF mission in Afghanistan. These PRTs both help the government forces to fight Taliban and other armed groups. However, they also assist in various nation-building tasks, such

41 Ibid., 107.
43 Ibid.
as constructing water wells, building hospitals and schools. They are a key component in the three-part strategy for ISAF in Afghanistan, including elements of security, governance, and development.

The ultimate aim of NATO in Afghanistan, as mentioned earlier, is to spread stability throughout the country in the framework of those three dimensions. In addition to the PRTs, NATO is working in Afghanistan to train the Afghan National Army and provide advice and assistance in the areas of defense and institution-building. In the process, the Alliance seeks to promote the democratic norms of transparency and democratic accountability. "The Kantian idea has found expression in the contemporary NATO discourse, which insists that in the fight against international terrorism, it has become particularly important to differentiate between responsible actors and dangerous, illiberal individuals and groups."44 In other words, NATO seeks to create conditions where Afghans can enjoy security, representative government, and self-sustaining peace.45

However, although NATO’s goals in Afghanistan sound rational and organized, the members do not seem to be able to find a coherent and agreed upon strategy how to accomplish them.

The coalition does not have a coherent strategy for Afghanistan and some member states are not prepared to sustain a counter-insurgency operation. In the Taliban, NATO faces an opponent that aims to create disagreement within the Alliance and wants to influence national domestic publics. The consensus-based nature of NATO’s decision-making mechanisms provides insurgents with an obvious opportunity to influence NATO’s strategy-making process. In particular, they can selectively target

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individual member states in their attacks in order to affect public opinion and make it more risk-averse. Thus, the Afghanistan operation clearly demonstrates the limitations of NATO's consensus-based decision-making process. It places clear limits on NATO's ability to successfully develop and implement a coherent strategy.46

Furthermore, NATO lacks the adequate material capabilities to accomplish the goals outlined earlier. "The evolution of the Afghan operation shows that NATO is ill prepared to conduct a large-scale and complex stability and reconstruction operation that requires its forces to be capable of sustaining counter-insurgency campaigns. These difficulties are multiplied by the coalition's inability to agree on a joint perception of the conflict in Afghanistan, whether regarding adequate responses or in terms of operational objectives."47 Overall, the multi-faceted nature of the issues in Afghanistan and the appropriate measure to address those problems makes it difficult for the Alliance to generate the necessary political will to raise the essential resources to progress towards agreed operational objectives. Given this lack of political will, combined with disagreements on the definitions of security, the alliance component of NATO is going through a period of weakening, despite and, in part, because of the increased role of NATO as a collective security arrangement within the geographical boundaries of Europe.

47 Ibid., 8.
CONCLUSIONS: AFGHANISTAN AS A TEST CASE FOR NATO?

The September 11th attacks “marked the beginning of a new era”48 for NATO. From small amounts of special operation troops, NATO mission in Afghanistan gradually grew in both troop levels and in the scope of the mission. Over time, the mission shifted from defeating al-Qaeda in Afghanistan to creating a free, democratic and stable government in a war-torn country. While all NATO members agree on this general goal, the commitments and will of various NATO states vary widely, and over time have been increasingly harder to maintain.49

This chapter used the case of NATO’s engagement in Afghanistan to show the interaction of collective security and alliance narratives in the post-2001 period. It is clear to see that in the case of Afghanistan, the elements of collective security are hard at play; however, the alliance functionality and decision-are not supportive, and rather hindering, of the collective security values. While NATO is clear in setting its goals for the mission in Afghanistan around democratic values of peace and stability, the agreement on means to accomplish that, emphasized in the alliance characteristics of NATO in terms of rationality of members’ behavior relating to troops commitment, and other political and economic assurances, is missing. As Alexandra Gheciu writes:

From its creation in 1949, NATO defined itself as the security arm of a community of liberal-democratic norms and values, regarded as the core values of the Western world. Thus, in the eyes of its members, what made the North Atlantic Treaty Organization different from pervious military alliances was its explicit expression of, and support for, a security

49 Ibid.
community of liberal-democratic values-democracy, individual liberty, and the rule of law.  

The NATO mission in Afghanistan is seen as testing the alliance’s political will and military capabilities. “Since the Washington Summit in 1999, the allies have sought to create a “new” NATO, capable of operating beyond the European theater to combat emerging threats, such as terrorism and the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction.” In Afghanistan, NATO found a way to show that its relevance in the post-Cold War environment and its ability to counter the new set of threats. However, while the values are emphasized in the rhetoric coming out of the Alliance, that language is not supported by the physical and material commitment of the member states.

For the first forty years of NATO’s existence, its political dimension, built around Article 2, was often subordinated to—though never completely subsumed by—the military dimension. The end of the Cold War, however, led the allies to focus on Article 2 to an unprecedented degree, in a situation in which NATO embarked on a process of adaptation to the new environment. To a large degree, NATO’s efforts at reinventing itself involved a strengthening of its political dimension, as the allies insisted that their security organization had never been just a military alliance against the Soviet Union.

Many argue that Afghanistan will determine the future role of NATO, if not its existence. “The Alliance attempted in Afghanistan, as in Kosovo, to serve as a risk manager, but as

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50 Gheciu, Securing Civilization?, 80.
52 Gheciu, Securing Civilization?, 80.
“success” in Afghanistan becomes doubtful, the future of the Alliance has been called further into question.”\textsuperscript{53} If the situation in Afghanistan remains unchanged, then it could potentially result in a withdrawal of combat forces by some key alliance countries. While this would not kill the ISAF mission, it would hurt its credibility and, consequently, that of NATO.\textsuperscript{54} One important overriding question for NATO engagement in Afghanistan involves “NATO’s ability to honor its commitment to adapt to the new security environment while remaining true to the liberal-democratic norms around which it defines its identity.”\textsuperscript{55}

As the initial post-Cold War debates about the relevance of NATO were subsiding, the 9/11 attacks and the subsequent US-led war on terror forced the Alliance to attempt to redefine its role once more. This presented the Transatlantic Allies with the challenge of not only proving that they were not facing an existential crisis again, but also they were challenged to adapt their institutions to a new environment where they faced numerous, often ill-defined tasks. Broadly speaking, the Alliance found it necessary to aggressively and consciously pursue both collective security and collective defense goals. The collective security role included a renewed effort at promoting liberal-democratic norms that were shared among the members. The collective defense role included measures aimed at identifying and defeating if necessary, the state and transnational actors who were identified as the new existential threats to the security community of NATO, its member states and their partners.\textsuperscript{56}

\textsuperscript{53} Michael Williams, \textit{NATO, Security and Risk Management: From Kosovo to Kandahar} (New York: Routledge, 2009), 89.
\textsuperscript{54} Kulesa, 2.
\textsuperscript{55} Gheciu, \textit{Securing Civilization?}, 115.
\textsuperscript{56} Ibid., 79.
However, while the original reaction to the attack on the United States was unified in values and goals, from the beginning the NATO members were not acting in cohesion characteristic to an alliance. At the Prague Summit in November 2002, several NATO states expressed hope that the Alliance would more formally engage in the UN supported nation-building efforts in Afghanistan. A number of NATO members, however, voiced reservations. By this point, the US and the European members were at odds over the prosecution of the war on terror and the pending conflict with Iraq.

Worried that NATO was becoming a mere tool of U.S. foreign policy, some members expressed concern that if NATO entered the Afghan conflict, the Alliance would inevitably be drawn into Washington’s search for Osama bin Laden and the Bush’s administration larger campaign against Islamic extremists. A senior foreign policy specialist with US Senate Foreign Relations Committee observed that NATO’s willingness to enter Afghanistan was “directly linked to the organization’s determination to ‘steer clear’ of Iraq.”

With the focus in Prague on the Alliance’s new members, the establishment of the NATO Response Force, and avoidance of a major public split over Iraq, Afghanistan received modest attention by NATO’s heads of state and government. According to Lord Robertson, NATO must “maintain the will and the capabilities… to root out and defeat [criminal terrorists and criminal states]…. NATO played the key role in defeating the threats and the instability that followed it. We must now transform our Alliance so it can play an equally pivotal part in the war against terrorism and the dangers of weapons of mass destruction.”

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57 Rupp, *NATO after 9/11*, 158.
The US decision to not accept the assistance of its NATO allies proved to be damaging in the long-run, because ousting the Taliban was simply the first battle in the much larger war on terror context in which it was set by the US and others. Afghanistan fell victim to a similar problem that had plagued previous Western interventions in the country—namely, that the military campaign far outpaced the political strategy. In other words, after the toppling of the Taliban, the US was left with the far more difficult task of managing the situation of a failed state and attempting to rebuild the country, both politically and otherwise.\(^5^9\) There was lingering resentment among some allies within NATO that Washington had not included its allies in the planning or conduct of Operation Enduring Freedom, which had been successful in toppling the Taliban in cooperation with the Northern Alliance forces. Had the NATO allies been involved at this point, it is possible that some of them would have been involved in the peacekeeping and reconstruction mission much earlier.\(^6^0\)

In other words, had NATO been officially involved in the OEF-Afghanistan, this could have provided the bridge between the invocation of the Article V on September 12\(^{th}\), 2001 and the peacekeeping and nation-building mission in Afghanistan. It would have given much greater political power to the mission and made the requisition of troops and supplies from member states potentially easier. Furthermore, it would have provided a mutually reinforced cooperation between the collective security nature of NATO with the functionality of an alliance to uphold and spread out the values of democratic peace and stability.

\(^{60}\) Rupp, *NATO after 9/11*, 162.
Instead, there is great strain and argument among NATO partners regarding the ISAF effort in Afghanistan. The British, Canadians, and Dutch have particularly complained about the amount of the fighting that their troops are required to do in the southern parts of Afghanistan, where the Taliban is much stronger. Canadian officials pointed out, for example, that Canadian casualty rates were higher than those of the United States. In January, 2009, the US announced that it would send an additional 3200 marines to the south to help in the fighting. This was important not only for the bolstering of the combat efforts tactically, but also politically to emphasize to the British, the Canadian and the Dutch allies in particular that the US was doing its part in the most dangerous parts of the country. The US has shifted away from publicly criticizing its NATO allies with regard to their contributions in Afghanistan, in part because of the realization of difficulty of maintaining such deployments for Canada, Germany and others in terms of their domestic audiences, but also because of understanding that sending more troops itself can help as a show of leadership or perhaps even shaming other countries into sending more troops.\footnote{\textcite{DeYoung:2008}}

The Taliban’s resurgence and the accompanying increase in violence further exposed the gaps in the resolve and goals of various NATO members with regard to the mission. Most NATO troops, except for British, Dutch, Canadian and US, were kept in areas that were considered to be relatively secure. Many also placed very restrictive conditions on the use of their forces in Afghanistan. In addition, the lack of agreement at times among national commands added to the difficulty of the mission.\footnote{\textcite{Chalmers:2008}} The decision to

\footnote{\textcite{DeYoung:2008}}

\footnote{\textcite{Chalmers:2008}}
hand over control of southern provinces to NATO has caused great concern among Afghan leaders regarding the US long-term commitment and NATO’s ability to fight.63

However, the differences on the role of NATO as a collective security and collective defense organization in relations to the case of Afghanistan remain. France, for example, argues that NATO should concentrate on collective defense, rather than dealing with development and democracy projects, which it feels are better left to the EU, the UN, the World Bank, or other civilian institutions, rather than NATO.64 The French government may have decided to support NATO command of the ISAF mission in Afghanistan, despite its bitter quarrel with the US regarding Iraq at the time, “out of a desire to avoid doing too much long-term damage to NATO.”65 As Noetzel and Scheipers explain:

ISAF’s geographical expansion also led to increasingly visible cracks within the coalition, especially when the Taliban launched an insurgency campaign in southern Afghanistan in 2006. The large operational spectrum ISAF finds itself confronted with today leads to increasingly divergent perceptions of operational objectives among coalition members. Most participation states define coalition operations in Afghanistan as being specifically about counter-insurgency and counterterrorism or about stabilization and reconstruction. The situation on the ground is that coalition forces are deployed to conduct operations across the whole operational spectrum, increasingly under both ISAF and OEF mandates.66

64 Morelli and Belkin.
66 Noetzel and Scheipers, 6.
In the first decade of the 21st century, under the Bush Administration, NATO as an alliance exhibited two trends which have long characterized its development: periodic exposure to crisis and division, and subordination to American leadership. Views of NATO in the last ten years were shaped by Afghanistan giving rise to a return to the alliance on America’s part, as opposed to the focus on the European expansion that dominated the 1990s. Today, NATO remains important to President Obama, but he returned to a more equal distribution of voices between the American and European members. “The safest assumption... is that Obama will continue to favor the trend towards a global NATO.... However, retreat (or defeat) in Afghanistan could hasten a contrary trend towards a consolidation NATO with a renewed concentration on the wider Europe.”

The current strategy of the United States and NATO in Afghanistan is based on the idea of establishing security, while maintaining a light footprint that would lead to providing adequate prerequisites for eventual self-sufficient political and economic stability in Afghanistan. The worsening security environment, however, has demonstrated that this strategy has not been successful.

Establishing security during stability operations is largely a function of several factors that foreign powers can influence: the number and performance of troops and police, amount of money, establishment of a peace treaty, and duration of the operation. The United States and NATO have failed to meet most of these benchmarks. In particular, the amount of troops, police and financial assistance has been among the lowest of any stability operation since the end of the Second World War, and there has been no peace settlement.

Therefore, with its engagement in Afghanistan, “NATO has placed its reputation and arguably its future on the line in Central Asia. Failure in Afghanistan would be devastating for NATO.” 69 NATO has moved slowly to deal with the problems in Afghanistan, contrary to its public statements on the importance of the mission in Afghanistan. Furthermore, rather than emphasize the connective nature of collective security and alliance, which would be beneficial to both NATO and Afghanistan, NATO members continue to disagree on the means and goals of the organization, to the detriment of both, the Alliance’s relevance and purpose, as well as its effectiveness.

69 Rupp, NATO after 9/11, 155.
CHAPTER VII

CONCLUSIONS: NATO'S YELLOW BRICK ROAD?

The new Strategic Concept must... serve as an invocation of political will or—to put it another way—a renewal of vows, on the part of each member. Threats to the interests of the Alliance come from the outside, but the organisation's vigour could as easily be sapped from within. The increasing complexity of the global political environment has the potential to gnaw away at Alliance cohesion; economic headaches can distract attention from security needs; old rivalries could resurface; and the possibility is real of a damaging imbalance between the military contributions of some members and that of others. NATO states cannot allow twenty-first century dangers to do what past perils could not: divide their leaders and weaken their collective resolve. Thus, the new Strategic Concept must clarify both what NATO should be doing for each Ally and what each Ally should be doing for NATO.¹

Report of the Group of Experts on NATO’s Strategic Concept, 2010

INTRODUCTION

The goal of this project was to utilize the analysis of collective security and collective defense throughout NATO's existence in an effort to make informed assumptions about the future route the Alliance should take if it wants to maintain and reinforce its relevance and effectiveness. This concluding chapter first provides the summary of the main points made in this paper. The second section embarks on a journey of speculation regarding NATO's strategic concept and its transformation and

assesses how symptomatic these most current developments are of the expected path NATO might take in regards to its role as a collective security and collective defense organization.

The following passage provides a very accurate review of the relevance of this project:

Creating a global NATO is not about saving the alliance from obsolescence. The issue is not whether NATO goes out of area or out of business. The issue is how the world’s premier international military organization should adapt to the demands of the times in a way that advances the interests not just of the Atlantic community but of a global community of democracies dependent on global stability. Global threats cannot be tackled by a regional organization. NATO has worked well in the past because its founding treaty demands that members be committed both to the political and economic principles underpinning democracy and to the common security challenges faced by the alliance. It would be foolish not to welcome into the alliance other countries that can make the same commitments and help confront new global challenges.²

NATO traditionally and historically has been described as and considered to be an alliance. However, as discussed in this paper, the story of NATO is that of two narratives: of collective security and collective defense. While conceptually separate, in the case of the North Atlantic Alliance those two narratives are linked together. Through most of the NATO’s history, those two narratives reinforced each other to such an extent that neither would have been possible or durable without the other. Furthermore, the combination of the collective security and defense has been heavily dependent on the structure of the international environment.

² Daalder and Goldgeier, 105.
Given the change in the current international environment after the fall of the Soviet Union and the end of the Cold War, the interaction of these two narratives has also changed. In the past twenty years, NATO’s role as a collective security arrangement has been taking precedence over its character as a collective defense institution. However, as shown through its history, NATO has never, nor can it now, function as a pure alliance or solely as a collective security arrangement. Ultimately, the future of NATO is based on both features, intertwined: collective security and an alliance.

As shown in the conceptual theory chapter, the history of NATO, with its dual narrative of collective security and collective defense, also serves as a bridge between the neorealist, neoliberal, and post-positivist traditions. As Michael Williams and Iver Neumann write:

While prominent neorealists have claimed that international institutions hold out only a ‘false promise’ as a foundation for new security structures, social constructivists have argued that the ‘persistence’ of NATO demonstrates the need for a fuller understanding of institutions, and that such an understanding provides a basis for concluding that international ‘security communities’ possess considerably more promise as a means of structuring security relations than neorealism has traditionally allowed. From a social constructivist perspective, NATO did not fragment as neorealists had predicted because the shared democratic norms and identities of the members meant that they did not perceive each other as threats with the end of the Cold War. From this viewpoint, NATO’s continuation is seen as demonstrating the Alliance’s enduring and institutionalised patterns of co-operation, the existence of common ‘regulative’ and ‘constitutive’ norms and values within the organisation, and the continuing impact of the shared democratic identities upon which the Alliance is based.  

This connection, then, leads us to the summary of main arguments made in the theoretical and empirical chapters.

SUMMARY OF MAIN POINTS

Let us review briefly the main points made in the theoretical section and the subsequent empirical chapters.

Chapter two explored and utilized the theoretical framework combining the elements of alliances and collective security arrangements to provide the basis for understanding NATO's transition from an alliance to collective security mentality in the theoretical scope. In that context, the discussion returned to Karl Deutsch and the concept of security communities, again, to provide the basis for the current position of NATO as a merger between an alliance and a collective security institution. Also, this section served as a segway to the projections of the relationship between alliance characteristics and the nature of collective security in the future, in the case of NATO. In Thomas Risse-Kappen's words, "the Western Alliance represents an institutionalization of the transatlantic security community based on common values and a collective identity of liberal democracies."\(^4\) NATO is not just an alliance; rather it is a security community set to spread its democratic values and collective security.

Despite the fact that the general literature in the field has shown collective security and collective defense as two separate concepts, if NATO were to be considered only as an alliance, it would give a rather unique example of an alliance. The same can be said if NATO were to be framed only as a collective security arrangement. Therefore, this exceptional and distinctive dual nature of the North Atlantic Alliance provides a

fertile ground for joined application of traditionally divergent approaches. More specifically, in the case of NATO, there is an interaction of realist understanding of threat (alliance) combined with neoliberal institutionalist and constructivist understanding of internal security (collective security).

What is the pattern of the interaction between the two narratives of collective security and defense? What are the drivers that dictate the behavior of those narratives? To answer these questions, this project looked at four different time periods in the history of NATO. In each of those time periods, the development of each of the two narratives was analyzed.

The alliance narrative is closely linked with the perception of threat. As the perception of threat rises, NATO behaves as an alliance designed to prepare and counter that threat. In the same time, with the high degree of commonality of values among the member states, NATO acts as a collective security arrangement. Starting with the origins of NATO through most of its history, the two narratives of the Transatlantic Alliance have been reinforcing each other. This pattern of behavior is shown in the discussions surrounding NATO’s birth and structure (Chapter III) and in the decision to allow Germany’s membership in 1955 (Chapter IV). Furthermore, the failure of Multilateral Force serves as an example showing that despite disagreements on policies and means to accomplish the goals of security, the narratives of collective defense and collective security remained intact (Chapter V).

However, the story of those two narratives and their mutual reinforcement changes with the end of the Cold War and the shifts in the structure of the international environment. In the post-Cold War environment, the narrative of collective security
begins to take precedence over the narrative of collective defense. Because those two concepts are subject to the international structure, with the changes in the nature and tangibility of threat that NATO has been facing since 1991, the interaction of those narratives has also transformed. In the past two decades, NATO has been increasingly struggling with finding and defining its role as an alliance, but the collective security component has been expanding in terms of geographical scope, cohesiveness, and policies. This internal battle of the Alliance is examined through the lens of NATO’s expansion to the East in the 1990s (Chapter V) and its engagement in Afghanistan in the first decade of the third millennium (Chapter VI).

In the last and the most current case discussed here, NATO’s engagement in Afghanistan, while there has been the potential for the collective security and alliance narrative to work together to the benefit of the Alliance and Afghanistan, the members so far have not able to effectively set a path for the organization that utilizes those two natures of NATO. The case of Afghanistan, itself, is originally based on the clear assumptions of NATO’s role and responsibility as a collective security organization. However, the disagreements on the alliance character of NATO and on its collective security role have dominated the discourse, and unfortunately, seem to have failed to set the path for the future of the Alliance.

Two factors must be present for a security organization to establish itself, effectively act, and maintain itself over time as a collective security and collective defense institution. In other words, there are two necessary elements: a high degree of commonality of political, cultural, economic, and historical characteristics found in regional integrated institutions. Second, there has to be an agreed upon external threat or
perception of threat, tangible or intangible. The first element serves as the basis for creation of the integrated collective body, whether regional or more expansive, with the main focus on providing internal collective security. The second element, the common perception of threat, provides the collective defense component against the environment external to the collective group. Chapter two provided a detailed discussion on the concepts of collective security, collective defense, and security communities.

Chapters three through six supplied empirical evidence to the theoretical arguments discussed in the second section. They traced the development of the two NATO narratives from the organization’s creation in 1949 to its most recent engagement in Afghanistan. Edward Mortimer’s words very well summarize NATO’s persistent role in the Transatlantic area: “Two basic assumptions, almost truisms, shape the basis of the security system, which is emerging in Europe. First of all, security is indivisible. The new security architecture must include all European states, if it is to ensure stability on a continent that was the scene for two devastating world wars.”

In discussion of the collective security and collective defense roles of NATO throughout its history, especially the perception and understanding of threat should be reemphasized, as it is the most defining variable that impacted the relationship of the two narratives, and with that the role and behavior of the Alliance. NATO was created to counteract the tangible threat coming from the East, namely the Soviet Union. Throughout the Cold War, the perception of increased threat from the Soviets reinforced the cohesion of the alliance nature of NATO, whereas the sense of declining danger from Moscow loosened the unity of the members, creating the cycles of discord and

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collaboration among NATO allies. However, during the Cold War, there was never any disagreement among the members on the general internal and external security goals. Despite a period of discord, both of the narrative remained strong and intact.

The story of threat and security in reference to NATO had to be vastly revised in the post-Cold War environment, characterized by the disappearance of the tangible threat in the form of the Soviet Union and the emergence of intangible, transatlantic security issues. Daniela Spinant writes:

The changing nature of international relations as a consequence of the globalization process and the diffuse character of threats ask for a continental vision of security in Europe. No state can separate its security from that of its neighbors, nor can it deal, on its own, with cross-border threats. On the other hand, security cannot be achieved only by military means, as it has economic, political, social, environmental and human rights aspects. A logic consequence is that conflict prevention, peacemaking, peacekeeping and peace-building can no longer be considered as separate activities.\(^6\)

In other words, NATO does not have a choice between choosing its role for the future between collective security and collective defense; rather, NATO must assume both of those responsibilities if it intends to remain relevant to and effective in providing external and internal security to the Transatlantic area.

This period of questioning NATO’s validity and effectiveness as a security organization is not the first and probably not the last. NATO has faced imminent collapse so often that it is difficult to take seriously the latest judgment that its days are numbered. As James Sperling and Mark Webber aptly point out:

\(^6\) Spinant.
NATO seems to possess an inexhaustible capacity for recovery, a characteristic NATO pessimists largely ignore. Of course, mere survival is not enough; what matters equally is how far and how well survival reflects a more thoroughgoing adaptation to new circumstances. NATO’s efforts to do just that, however imperfect or ill-judged, is the real story of the last two decades. From 1989 to 2009 the alliance has engaged in a ceaseless process of transformation—of structure and organization, of operations, partnerships and membership.\textsuperscript{7}

It is enough to look at both the vertical and horizontal transformation of NATO to see that the organization is indeed attempting to adjust to the challenges of the new international environment and the appropriate role in such environment. First of all, however, the transformation of NATO was a necessity after the end of the Cold War, for both NATO and Europe.

During the Cold War the alliance had come to function as more than simply a collective defence organization but the disappearance of the Warsaw Pact along with the Soviet Union undoubtedly robbed it of its major rationale. An alliance bound to traditional defense tasks, it was claimed, faced real ‘danger of dissolution’ if it could not reorient itself to the emerging and fluid circumstances of the post-Cold War world.\textsuperscript{8}

And that is exactly what NATO did—it embarked on a road of reorientation of its geographical and issue-related scope. Furthermore, on the side of Europe, there was no other security organization as effective and reliable as NATO, while the problems were mounting in the 1990s. “As the high hopes of 1989 have way by the early 1990s to the

\textsuperscript{7} James Sperling and Mark Webber, “NATO: from Kosovo to Kabul,” \textit{International Affairs} 83, no. 3 (2009): 491-492.
\textsuperscript{8} Ibid., 492.
problems of disintegrating communist federations, Balkan instability and uncertainties in Mitteleuropa, NATO came to occupy centre stage in the so-called ‘architectural’ debate on European security institutions.”

Throughout the scope of this project, the instances of horizontal (geographical) and vertical (issues) transformation of NATO have been addressed through the discussion on the Alliance’s enlargement in the 1990s in relation to the horizontal transformation and through the debate on NATO’s role in Afghanistan, the organization’s first out-of-area operation, in reference to the vertical transformation. “As NATO’s geographic range has expanded, so has the scope of its operations; the alliance now takes on jobs that are no longer strictly related to territorial integrity and security but pertain to international stability more broadly.” However, every change brings positive and negative results, as well as creating a whole new set of problems. The transformation of NATO is not impervious to this dynamic, either.

Besides raising questions of efficacy, changes in NATO’s composition and scope will also raise questions about the alliance’s core purpose. As was true when NATO expanded eastward, in the 1990s, the most controversial aspect of any effort to enlarge the alliance’s membership will be how such enlargement might affect the security guarantee in Article 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty. Some current NATO members, particularly some of the newer ones, might worry that geographic enlargement will weaken the existing collective defense commitments of the alliance. However, no NATO member currently faces a military threat from another country, much less the type of threat that led to NATO’s establishment in 1949. In the unlikely event that such a threat did materialize, nothing about NATO’s enhanced reach would in any way weaken its collective defense commitments.11

9 Ibid.
10 Daalder and Goldgeier, 105.
11 Ibid., 106.
The question that still remains to be answered is the relationship between NATO and Russia, in which case, both the horizontal and vertical transformations of the Alliance play a role. In 2009 and 2010, NATO increasingly engaged Russia in a dialogue regarding both the European and international security, the role of both actors in the security environment, and the potential for cooperation. This was a vastly changed attitude from the one of the past decade, which culminated in a suspension of any dialogue between NATO and the EU on one side, and Russia on the other, in August 2008, in the aftermath of the conflict in Georgia.

And the last development that should be addressed in the context of the conclusions to this project is NATO’s new strategic concept. It has been now ten years since the Alliance released its last strategic concept in 1999. Given the changes in the international environment and the transformation of the Alliance itself, the new strategic concept was well overdue.

In the 1999 Strategic Concept, NATO addressed the changing, multifaceted and transnational nature of the international security environment. Given this framework, the Alliance defined its role in meeting the challenges of this new setting. At the Washington Summit that year, it was decided that NATO

must safeguard common security interests in an environment of further, often unpredictable change. It must maintain collective defence and reinforce the transatlantic link and ensure a balance that allows the European Allies to assume greater responsibility. It must deepen its relations with its partners and prepare for the accession of new members. It must, above all, maintain the political will and the military means required by the entire range of its missions.\(^{12}\)

\(^{12}\) The Alliance Strategic Concept. Approved by the Heads of State and Government participating in the meeting of the North Atlantic Council in Washington D.C. on 23rd and 24th April 1999.
At the 1999 Washington Summit, the members were talking about the dual role of NATO as a collective security and collective defense organization—although not in that elaborate of terms. They referred to both basic security and to the values of democracy and human rights, among other things.

NATO's essential and enduring purpose, set out in the Washington Treaty, is to safeguard the freedom and security of all its members by political and military means. Based on common values of democracy, human rights and the rule of law, the Alliance has striven since its inception to secure a just and lasting peaceful order in Europe. It will continue to do so. The achievement of this aim can be put at risk by crisis and conflict affecting the security of the Euro-Atlantic area. The Alliance therefore not only ensures the defence of its members but contributes to peace and stability in this region.\(^\text{13}\)

However, that was the posture of the Alliance in 1999, two and a half years before the attacks of September 11\(^\text{th}\), before the fundamental recognition of changed nature of threat, before the first in history invocation of Article V, before the engagement of NATO in the first out-of-area operation in Afghanistan. The new Secretary General of NATO, Anders Fogh Rasmussen, appointed in April 2009, has been tasked with providing a proposal for the new NATO strategic concept by the end of 2010. The designated group of experts published the recommendations for the new strategic concept for NATO in May, 2010.\(^\text{14}\)

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\(^{13}\) Ibid.

The recommendations for the new strategic concept incorporate the elements of internal and external security of the NATO members. Furthermore, it is safe to say that the new strategic concept will emphasize the changing nature of international environment, and with that, the transforming political and military issues.\textsuperscript{15} Having said that, given the current level of disagreement among the members, best exemplified by the lack of coherent strategy in Afghanistan, there is a clear danger of the members’ not being able to cohesively frame the mission and strategy of NATO in the future. While some members, as mentioned earlier, strongly support the global collective security responsibility of the Alliance, others prefer NATO to limit itself to security in Europe. However, one of the main points made in the recommendations is the need for NATO’s increased cooperation with other international organizations in and outside of Europe.\textsuperscript{16}

Furthermore, the Allies will have to agree on the internal form of NATO to address its projected mission and the adequate means to accomplish that mission. Jens Ringsmose and Sten Rynning argue that “in the short run, the current disagreements about the Alliance’s key tasks and the primary threats to allied security are too profound to allow for a Strategic Concept that differs distinctly from the existing document. The default position will be the 1999 Strategic Concept. In the long run, however, we expect NATO to keep to the trajectory of globalization.”\textsuperscript{17}


\textsuperscript{16} NATO 2020: \textit{Assured Security; Dynamic Engagement. Analysis and Recommendations of the Group of Experts on a New Strategic Concept for NATO}.

\textsuperscript{17} Ibid.
Karl-Heinz Kamp argues the opposite. He poses that the new strategic concept will differ significantly from the one adopted in 1999.¹⁸ The author acknowledges that the consensus among the Allies regarding the role of NATO and its form is still an open question; however, the need for redefinition will force the new form of the strategic concept. Along with this project, as well as many other authors, Kamp agrees that the Allies will struggle with reaching a workable concurrence in reference to wide scope of topics: balancing between European and global security, to maintenance of NATO’s credibility and relevance, scope of global and European security issues, the application of Article V, the role of Russia, and the utility and control of nuclear weapons, just to name a few of the issues.

In summary, NATO from its birth has displayed characteristics of and acted as an alliance and collective security institutions, with variant degrees of both at various times. In the international environment where the nature and perception of threat are changing and where the concept of sovereignty and power are being challenged, a combination of collective security and collective defense in one organization provides an optimal security arrangement and NATO has all the tools at its disposal to become that optimal security organization in the future. The alliance nature, with its traditional focus on external threat, provides the means and material power, whereas the collective security part addresses the internal stability and supplies the legitimacy to the organization and the accepted norms of behavior. Therefore, the two security concepts are complementary and mutually reinforcing. The question that remains to be answered, however, is whether the political leadership of NATO, as well as the internal leadership of the member states,

is ready and willing to make and carry out decisions combining those two elements of NATO in the future.

NOW WHAT: NATO AS A ‘COLLECTIVE SECURITY ALLIANCE’?

Before we delve into the discussion on the results of the research undergone and presented in this project, and the speculation on the success of the Alliance in Afghanistan and the subsequent validation of the future of NATO as a collective security and collective defense organization, let us remind ourselves why this discussion is necessary.

In September 2009, Zbigniew Brzezinski published an article focusing specifically on the future of NATO. In this article, he referred to NATO as the “collective security alliance,” a term very fitting for the purpose of this project, as it precisely incorporates the two narratives discussed here: collective security and collective defense. Brzezinski writes: “NATO's potential is not primarily military. Although NATO is a collective-security alliance, its actual military power comes predominantly from the United States, and that reality is not likely to change anytime soon.”19 The author then goes on to combine those two natures of the Alliance in more tangible terms. “NATO's real power derives from the fact that it combines the United States' military capabilities and economic power with Europe's collective political and economic weight.... Together, that combination makes NATO globally significant.”20

Brzezinski’s article on the future of NATO provides yet another proof of the importance of the discussion on the current and future shape and role of NATO—and,

20 Ibid.
therefore, confirms the saliency of this project. Parallel to some of the arguments made here, Brzezinski outlines four main issues that NATO will have to face in its new strategic concept:

First, how to attain a politically acceptable outcome for NATO's deepening engagement in the overlapping Afghan and Pakistani conflicts; second, how to update the meaning and obligations of "collective security" as embodied in Article 5 of the alliance's treaty; third, how to engage Russia in a binding and mutually beneficial relationship with Europe and the wider North Atlantic community; and fourth, how to respond to novel global security dilemmas.21

The issues outlined by Brzezinski refer to many of the challenges mentioned in this project: NATO's relevance and credibility, the Alliance's mission in the European and global security, and the dual character of NATO as a collective security and collective defense. And here too, Brzezinski brings up the argument relating to the changing nature of threat confronting NATO and other players in the global security environment. "The basic challenge that NATO now confronts is that there are historically unprecedented risks to global security. Today's world is threatened neither by the militant fanaticism of a territorially rapacious nationalist state nor by the coercive aspiration of a globally pretentious ideology embraced by an expansive imperial power."22 He goes on to position those global threats in the context of increasingly globalization and interconnectedness of international actors and issues. "The paradox of our time is that the world, increasingly connected and economically interdependent for

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21 Ibid.
22 Ibid.
the first time in its entire history, is experiencing intensifying popular unrest made all the more menacing by the growing accessibility of weapons of mass destruction—not just to states but also, potentially, to extremist religious and political movements.\textsuperscript{23}

While Brzezinski aptly points to the current major internal and external dilemmas of NATO, the reality of the Alliance’s functioning especially in 2009 and 2010 timeframe in Afghanistan, however, contradicts his speculations to some extent. Although it is true that NATO draws on the US military power and the European collective character, those two features of the Alliance are at odds. The case of Afghanistan, in this respect, shows the inability of the Allies to come to a consensus regarding not only the means, but also the definition of effectiveness of collective actions. While the Americans and Europeans still maintain the need for cooperation in the name of defense and security for both sides of the Atlantic, the basic understanding of what that defense and security constitute seems to be challenged. Furthermore, the Europeans are increasingly dissatisfied with the American leadership and irritated with the distribution of power within the Alliance.

Especially in the case of Afghanistan, and more recently Pakistan, this question as to the definition of security goals is clearly visible. While Washington continuously perceives the stability of Afghanistan and Pakistan as absolutely necessary to American and European security, at quite a large cost, Europeans are not on the same page with Americans. When the US, despite decreasing popular approval, increased the number of troops in Afghanistan, the European capitals announced upcoming withdrawals, precisely spurred by the loud public opposition to the war in Afghanistan.

\textsuperscript{23} Ibid.
To satisfy the need expressed by the generals on the ground in Afghanistan and the growing public disapproval of the US engagement there, "on December 1, 2009, President Obama announced a new strategy for Afghanistan including the decision to commit an additional 30,000 U.S. military forces to address the conflict. The plan also considers the idea of reducing the number of U.S. forces in Afghanistan beginning in 2011 if conditions on the ground warrant." In the words of the Administration and the Congress in the US, "NATO's mission in Afghanistan... is seen as a test of the allies’ military capabilities and their political will to undertake a complex mission in a distant land and to sustain that commitment." Therefore, while the need to increase the troops is seen as necessary, the Administration also provided for the projected end state allowing for withdrawal of troops to appease the public opinion.

The US is not alone in this assumption. Supreme Allied Commander in Europe James Stavridis in January 2010 was estimating that the European Allies will contribute about 10,000 more troops, in addition to the 30,000 increase from the US. "Several key NATO members... view the Afghanistan mission as a test case for the allies’ ability to generate the political will to counter significant threats to their security. These countries believe Afghanistan provides a test of will against the concrete danger of

25 Morelli and Belkin, 1.
international terrorism." However, as mentioned earlier, in the same time as the statements about the commitment to collective security are made, “there appears to be growing opposition to the war among the public throughout Europe who question the threat to Europe from Afghanistan, and many experts suggest that significant progress in stabilizing Afghanistan must be made in 2010 or allied solidarity in support of the ISAF mission, including within the United States, could begin to unravel.”

While the forces from the US, Great Britain, Canada, and the Netherlands have been carrying the brunt of fighting, the lack of political will and increasing opposition have pushed the governments of Great Britain and the Netherlands to announce withdrawals. The British and Dutch decisions are symptomatic of a greater feeling sweeping through the European capitals. Since February 2010, NATO has been increasingly squabbling over the troop contributions, given the declining political will in member states and increasing financial problems in the EU. Subsequently, the war in Afghanistan has decreased in popularity in every country in Europe. In February, Defense Secretary Robert Gates said that “public and political opposition to the military had grown so great in Europe that it was directly affecting operations in Afghanistan and impeding the alliance’s broader security goals…. Right now, the alliance faces very serious, long-term, systemic problems.” As of 2009, only 5 out of 28 NATO members have met the target budget commitment of 2% of GDP spent on defense, while the US spends over 4% of its GDP on defense. Even though the European contributions made up 40% of the troops in Afghanistan in 2009, the growing economic crisis in Europe and

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27 Ibid., 2.
28 Ibid.
lack of public support are pushing the increase in discrepancy between the Europeans and the Americans.\(^{30}\)

In a sense, NATO and the US are caught in a catch 22 in Afghanistan. The policy decision makers, the military leaders active in the theater, and academics equally are emphasizing the fact that Afghanistan is a test case for NATO’s role and effectiveness in the future security environment and the need for cohesive cooperation between the American and European Allies. In the same time, neither the Europeans nor the Americans have sufficient resources or the political will to provide the resources necessary for success in Afghanistan. To demonstrate this shortage, in January 2010, NATO’s Secretary General Rasmussen asked Russia for help in supplying military helicopters to Afghanistan, because the European Allies did not have enough equipment or money to buy the necessary gear.\(^{31}\) In March, Rasmussen and then later Supreme Allied Commander Europe Admiral James Stavridis met with political leaders of NATO states (PM Jan Fischer, Defense Minister Martin Bartak, and Chief of Staff Vlastimil Picek) and emphasized the need for more troops and trainers in Afghanistan. Their requests were denied.\(^{32}\)

The refusal to support NATO’s efforts in Afghanistan comes in the wake of April 2008 Bucharest Summit where Bush Administration pushed for the strategic vision outlining the rationale for ISAF mission in Afghanistan. “The paper made four principal points: the allies promised a “long-term commitment” to Afghanistan; expressed support to improve the country’s governance; pledged a “comprehensive approach” to bring civil


\(^{31}\)Ibid.

and military efforts to affect stabilization; and promised increased engagement with Afghanistan’s neighbors, especially Pakistan.”  

At that point, while the Allies agreed that the “military commitment remained paramount,” they did not pledge more troops. Rather, they “believed that the United States, as a global power, needed to provide the leadership and resources to counter the destabilizing influences upon Afghanistan of the two neighboring states [Iran and Pakistan].”

In other words, the Allies expect NATO under the US leadership to be successful in Afghanistan and come up with tangible results in the near future, while in the same time not having enough resources or will to provide the necessary number of troops, trainers, and equipment. As NATO is less and less capable of accomplishing the end goals, the political will and support in Europe and the US are declining. So, the public on both sides of the Atlantic want to have it both ways: security and stability in Afghanistan without the cost of achieving those goals.

Ironically, the Europeans are increasingly dissatisfied with the distribution of power and control in the Alliance, again nothing new or unusual for NATO. However, this frustration with the US leadership follows the 2008 Bucharest Summit, mentioned earlier, where the European Allies expressed their expectations of the US leadership in terms of troop’s contributions and strategy. Therefore, the problems lie not only in the European lack of political will and economic means, but also in questioning the American leadership. In September 2008, “a highly respected opinion poll published by the German Marshall Fund found a sharp decline had developed in European public opinion towards U.S. leadership since 2002. In key European countries, the desirability of

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33 "ISAF’s Strategic Vision," NATO Summit, Bucharest, April 3, 2008, 1.
34 Morelli and Belkin, 4
35 Ibid., 5.
U.S. leadership in the world,... fell from 64% in 2002 to 36% in June 2008." Part of this decline in support and want of the US leadership comes from the public’s confusion of war in Afghanistan with the war in Iraq. Secretary of Defense Robert Gates expressed his concern with this particular political confusion in February 2008: “I worry that for many Europeans the missions in Iraq and Afghanistan are confused.... Many of them ... have a problem with our involvement in Iraq and project that to Afghanistan.”

The Obama Administration attempted to address this growing European dissatisfaction. In the process of complete review of the US and NATO strategy in Afghanistan, the President solicited the Allies’ input. “This outreach was evident in an early March 2009 meeting of the NATO Foreign Ministers by Secretary of State Clinton and a meeting a week later with the North Atlantic Council by Vice President Biden. In both cases, Europe’s ideas for new strategies to deal with Afghanistan were solicited.”

Given this dual set of problems with NATO’s actions in Afghanistan, namely the lack of political will and economic resources to continue the war and the increasing dissatisfaction with the US leadership, NATO is struggling to find a workable bargain between collective security and collective defense. And again, as in the past, those two narratives are susceptible to the changes in the structure of the international environment. The symptom of this inability of the Allies to adapt to the international environment can be found in the disagreements on what constitutes threat and security. While Washington perceives the lack of security and stability in Afghanistan as a vital threat to European and American security, the European capitals do not see the same danger in Kabul,

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38 Morelli and Belkin, 5.
spreading to Pakistan and Iran. Furthermore, the Allies disagree on what it means for the Alliance to be effective in handling those threats.

The distribution of power in the Alliance—the domination of the US in terms of military power and decision-making, has not changed. The US, in concert with its past history, is the hegemon who structurally wants to maintain its dominant power and is fearful of the competition. However, what has changed is the willingness of the Europeans to be satisfied with the role of a consultant, rather than an equal partner in the decision making, especially when the definition of threat remains so nebulous.39

Does this mean that NATO has run out of the yellow brick road of the dual narrative of collective security and collective defense? Not necessarily. The failure of NATO’s cohesion in terms of policy, and military and economic commitments, in Afghanistan does not carry a clean dichotomous effect: 1. if NATO fails in Afghanistan, it fails as a valid and effective Alliance in the future, or 2. if NATO wins in Afghanistan, its validity and effectiveness as an Alliance are confirmed.

In the past, NATO went through series of periods of discord, for example regarding the nuclear policy or conventional capabilities. If NATO does not accomplish all its goals in Afghanistan or the Allies are unable to generate cohesive policies.

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39 In 1988, Charles Kupchan proposed four hypotheses for intra-alliance behavior in regards to NATO’s engagement in the Persian Gulf. First, the External Threat hypothesis suggests that alliance cohesion rises and falls with external threats to collective security. This holds today: with the lack of tangible and defined threat, the Alliance’s cohesion is declining. Second, the Alliance Security Dilemma hypothesis proposes that cohesion is a function of the coercive potential of the alliance leader and its ability to exact cooperative behavior from its weaker partners. This hypothesis holds true today again. While the US is still dominant, its power relative to the European members is declining, and with that the US ability to dictate policy for the Alliance as whole weakens. Third, the Collective Action hypothesis suggests that alliance behavior is fundamentally a public goods problem. Today, this is very evident in the fact that both sides of the Atlantic want to accomplish goals without paying the costs. Fourth, the Domestic Politics hypothesis asserts that alliance behavior is determined primarily by political and economic factors at the domestic level. This is reflected in the fact that the decrease in the popular support for the war in Afghanistan is reflected in the inability to make commitments by the North Atlantic Council, regarding means and goals of the Alliance. See: Charles Kupchan, “NATO and the Persian Gulf: Examining Intra-Alliance Behavior,” *International Organization* 42, no. 2 (1988): 317-346.
regarding Afghanistan, this might force the Alliance to define more clearly the future role and scope of NATO.\textsuperscript{40} The Alliance might possibly limit its area of operations to Europe only, while continuing its comprehensive approach strategy in cooperation with other international organizations. This comprehensive approach was first used in Afghanistan out of necessity, but has recently been emphasized by the Group of Experts that proposed the recommendations for the new strategic concept for the Alliance, along with underscoring the need for partnership with intergovernmental and non-governmental organizations, as well as engaging Russia.\textsuperscript{41}

While the Atlantic is getting wider, not narrower, with the disagreements and unwillingness to carry the burden of unclear security growing, neither side can afford to dismantle the Alliance. The Transatlantic community is still a community of shared political and cultural values; it is still a community that faces a plethora of similar problems and challenges; it is a community that remains stronger together than separate. The Europeans still need the US military and economic power, while the US still needs the European political support in the international environment. The question, then, is: how much further is NATO able and willing to extend its collective security and collective defense, both politically and geographically? That question will be answered not only by the success of NATO in Afghanistan, but also by the economic wellbeing of both Europe and the US in the near future.


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