Latin American-United States Security Relations and the Power Asymmetry Divide

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LATIN AMERICAN-UNITED STATES SECURITY RELATIONS AND
THE POWER ASYMMETRY DIVIDE

by

Matthew R. Slater

B.S. May 1988, Radford University
M.A. December 1993, Old Dominion University

A Dissertation Submitted to the Faculty of Old Dominion University
in Partial Fulfillment of the Requirement for the Degree of

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Approved by:

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Security relations between Latin American and the United States are generally well explained by hegemonic stability theory. Succinctly stated, hegemonic stability theory explains that in systems with a hegemonic power there is a greater likelihood of security cooperation. This is because a hegemon provides public goods, such as a stable currency or security from outside interference, and in turn, the less powerful states acknowledge the leadership of the dominant state. When compared to other regions it is readily apparent that the U.S. and Latin America do not have major security issues on the level of East Asia, the Middle East, Africa, or even Europe.

However, a review of the literature indicates a persistent gap between U.S. and Latin American responses to security related issues such as state sovereignty, arms trade, humanitarian intervention, the illegal narcotics trade, and technology transfer. Hegemonic stability explains the relatively peaceful relations between the U.S. and Latin America; however, it fails to explain the undercurrent of distrust.

This study focuses on the degree of power asymmetry between the hegemon and weaker states in the system to explain why the same hegemonic system may create greater levels of cooperation during different periods. A hegemonic system by definition contains a certain level of power asymmetry, however this study asks the question: When
power asymmetry becomes more extreme does it erode security cooperation between the U.S. and Latin America?

To explore this issue empirical evidence is gathered from the last century of Latin American-U.S. security relations. The ebb and flow of security cooperation is analyzed and reveals that broad patterns in the system emerge over time demonstrating that as the power of the U.S. increases, the likelihood of U.S. leaders to commit to unilateral actions in Latin America increases. During the same time, the likelihood of Latin American leaders to be more sensitive to U.S. policies and search for alternatives to U.S. dominance also increases. Although U.S. hegemony contributes to greater security cooperation as hegemonic stability theory predicts, when U.S. power reaches higher levels compared to Latin American, the gains of hegemonic stability deteriorate and security cooperation becomes more difficult.

The dissertation contributes to international relations scholarship in two important ways. First, it demands that when hegemonic stability theory is applied it cannot be assumed that all levels of power asymmetry create security cooperation equally. Second, it applies formal international relations theory to Latin American-U.S. relations, a geographical area in which comparative political theory is more commonly utilized.
This work is dedicated to my wife, Denise U. Slater, my daughter, Monica R. Slater and my parents, Juanita R. Slater and Robert W. Slater. I thank them all for helping me keep faith, and my wife and daughter for allowing me the time away from them to complete the project.
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

I thank all of my committee members, Dr. Regina Karp and Dr. Donald Zeigler. particularly Dr. Francis Adams who continually provided constructive and timely feedback throughout the dissertation process. I also thank everyone in the Graduate Program in International Studies department who aided my efforts to complete my dissertation. To Ms. Elizabeth Thornton and Dr. Pat Rollins: although I can not share a handshake or a smile with you on graduation day, and thank-you personally for your efforts. I know you will both be there to witness the moment in some fashion.
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CHAPTER I

THE BURDEN OF POWER ASYMMETRY

The end of the Cold War ushered in an era of improved inter-American security cooperation. The Cold War had seemed to inhibit the ability of regional states to work together for the benefit of regional stability and prosperity. Many analysts noted the importance of the Cold War on regional relations: “In response to Soviet challenges the United States (U.S.) sought to extend and consolidate its political supremacy throughout the hemisphere,” resulting in a U.S. “anti-communist crusade.”¹ Regional experts noted that due to its anti-communist perceptions the U.S. proceeded to intervene in Brazil, Chile, Cuba, Dominican Republic, Grenada, Guatemala, and Nicaragua during the Cold War, and indirectly to influence the internal affairs of regional states in other cases. These actions had the effect of polarizing regional relations and undermining efforts at regional security cooperation.

Even with the end of the Cold War an invisible force still seemed to be curbing cooperative efforts. Alongside the successes of the post-Cold War era, such as the negotiations and implementation of the peace plan to end the Peru-Ecuador border conflict in 1997, there were also surprising failures. The Organization of American States (OAS) did not fulfill its collective responsibilities to defend democracy in Haiti to


This dissertation uses the following document for its formatting standard: Kate L. Turabian, A Manual for Writers of Term Papers, Theses, and Dissertations, 6th ed. (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1996).
the United Nations (UN). As David Forsythe noted, there is an abstract commitment to human rights and democracy in Latin America, but an unwillingness to politically support them. Despite the fact that the drug trade severely damages the social and economic institutions in Latin America, cooperation with the U.S. on the drug war has not been especially forthcoming by Latin American states. The problem of instability in Colombia, which is at least partially due to the narcotic trafficking, is almost ignored by neighboring states. Leaders of these countries fear U.S. involvement may lead to an escalation and a U.S. occupation, despite assurances from U.S. officials that this is not the intent. Although the benefits of the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) continue to fuel Mexican economic growth, some Latin American states are reluctant to enter into a broader hemispheric accord. In an almost reflexive response, regional states doubled their efforts to create and support a regional trade agreement that purposely excludes the U.S. Latin American disagreement over the government of Cuba has declined in the post-Cold War era but still remains a thorny issue between the U.S. and Latin America.

Although some reviews of Latin American-U.S. security cooperation focus on the detrimental impact of the Cold War, patterns that persist today began well before the forty-year confrontation between the U.S. and Soviet Union. Mexico and Argentina were both suspicious of U.S. intentions during the first Pan American meeting in 1889. U.S.


interventions were not unique to the Cold War, and occurred with frequency during the first twenty years of the twentieth century. The effect of U.S. interventions was similar to what was experienced during the Cold War: Latin American states actively sought to balance U.S. military and economic power because it was viewed as a threat to state sovereignty.

There were also eras of greater stability in regional security relations. After the Civil War in the U.S., and its subsequent rise to world power, Latin America reaction to U.S. power was more subdued. The U.S. assumed the role as the primary enforcer of the Monroe Doctrine, a position that was traditionally filled by Great Britain. Through U.S. military action and diplomacy several European forays into the region were reversed, and U.S. power was considered beneficial by many states in the Americas. The era before the Great Depression also resulted in better inter-American security relations. President Franklin D. Roosevelt extended his Good Neighbor Policy to Latin America with positive results. Relations improved in time to enable a unified effort against the Axis powers during World War II. This period of goodwill culminated in the signing of the Rio Treaty in 1947 and the creation of the OAS the following year. After the Cold War security cooperation once again seemed to improve to some degree.

Several theories exist to explain the lack of security cooperation in the region. As mentioned above, the overlay of the Cold War has been debated as a major impediment to regional security cooperation. However, problems began before the Cold War, and persisted to some degree in the post-Cold War era, although it is clear the Cold War played a role in amplifying security problems.
Many theses concentrate on the deleterious impact of U.S. intervention on regional states. David Dent’s meticulously records U.S. interventions in Latin America in his volume: The Legacy of the Monroe Doctrine. Dent blames the Monroe Doctrine for U.S. interventionist policy, and this policy for helping to destabilize Latin America. Although this approach to understanding regional security dynamics is logical, it does not comprehensively explain the security dynamics of regional security relations. For example, holding U.S. interventionist policy accountable for regional security dynamics does not sufficiently explain the rise and fall of security cooperation over time since U.S. policy is assumed to be consistently interventionist beginning with the introduction of the Monroe Doctrine in 1823. If intervention were the primary problem one would expect a consistent Latin American reaction, building in intensity for the last hundred years, and culminating in a Latin American collective security agreement directed against the U.S.

An alternative explanation for problems in regional security relations holds the lack of institutionalization accountable. Richard J. Bloomfield offers collective security as an alternative to intervention. However, collective security has been an ongoing effort in the Americas since the creation of Pan Americanism in 1889, reiterated by the creation of the OAS in 1948. Despite the best of intentions and efforts by many Latin American and U.S. leaders these institutions failed to create a reliable alternative for regional security relations.

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Some scholars focus on one constant dynamic through the history of U.S.-Latin American security relations, the persistence of U.S. hegemony. Bloomfield summarized the asymmetry of power in the region as follows:

"Their [Latin Americans] enduring problem has been how to cope with the greater power of the United States: how to benefit from it and avoid being dominated by it. For North Americans, the problem has been how to prevent their enemies from using the weakness of Latin American politics from threatening U.S. national interests."6

Cole Blaiser writes that U.S. behavior "reflects the huge power gap between the United States and the smaller powers in its sphere of influence in the Americas." He continues the observation, "The reason is not primarily one of leaders or policies per se. It is the result of power disparities."7 Blaiser acknowledges that all the good policies in the world cannot change the structural reality of the U.S.-Latin American relationship. Peter H. Smith finds that this disparity in power, at least in terms of GDP, is growing. In 1950 per capita gross domestic product (GDP) of the U.S. was seven times that of all Latin American states combined, and by 1990 this increased to ten times larger.8

The relationship between the U.S. and Latin America is one of hegemony. Blaiser writes of hegemony in terms of dominance. Hegemonic stability theory views hegemony in a more complex manner. Hegemonic stability is "the view that stability in

6Ibid.


international relations stems from the presence of hegemony. This stability is the product of a symbiotic relationship in which the hegemon provides public goods in exchange for acknowledgement of its leadership and the benefits that go with it. Two examples of public goods are security from outside intervention, or providing a market for the goods of weaker states in the hegemonic relationship. Unipolarity is a relationship stemming from dominance; meaning that there is an understanding among states that the relationship is solely based on power. One is more likely to find institutions in hegemonic stability than in a situation of strict unipolarity.

A fundamental characteristic of the U.S. hegemonic system in the Americas is that it seems to fluctuate between strong and weaker hegemony. The fluctuation seems to play a role in the kinds of public goods the hegemon is willing to provide. As James R. Kurth points out, “The inter-American collective security system has never been based upon an identity of interests between the United States and Latin America.” The reality is that regional cooperation has been based on a bargain in which neither side clearly understood the expectations of the other. Latin America expected economic aid in the form of debt relief, U.S. investments, opening of the U.S. market, and direct aid for infrastructure projects. The U.S. expected acknowledgement of its leadership in turn for protection from potential interlocutors. Latin America sought stability from internal social and economic threats, whereas the U.S. focused on providing stability against

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European monarchy, Soviet communism, and now, against terrorism. In short, there is a discrepancy in the kinds of public goods offered by the hegemon and the kinds of public goods sought by the weaker states.

RESEARCH QUESTION AND ASSUMPTIONS

To study power asymmetry in the context of U.S.-Latin American security relations, the following research question is proposed: How does power asymmetry impact security cooperation between the U.S. and Latin America? This dissertation examines a relationship exists between power asymmetry under U.S. hegemony, and the degree of security cooperation that takes place in the region. The U.S. and Latin America compose the region under study. When the term Latin America is used it is intended to encompass all states in Central America, South America, and the Caribbean. The next section will discuss the study's basic assumptions. The last section of chapter one outlines the overall organization and methodology of the project.

The concept of power asymmetry is tied to hegemonic stability theory. The presence of a hegemon raises the potential for system stability. However, this stability is not perfect. Just as hegemony provides a basic stability, it also represents a large degree of power asymmetry in the system. This dissertation contends that excessive power asymmetry in the relationship can provoke a reaction in the system that undermines security cooperation. For example, when one state becomes exceedingly powerful it is frequently tempted to use the unilateral option without deliberations with weaker states in the system. The lack of consultation gives the appearance of undermining the sovereignty of the weaker states. In such a system any action by the hegemon has the
potential to affect the sovereignty of the weaker state. Therefore, power asymmetry can be thought of as a condition among given states in which one state's dominance is so overwhelming that it undermines the gains from hegemonic stability.

The history of security cooperation between the U.S. and Latin America supports the idea that power structure is a determining factor in regional affairs, but also challenges hegemonic stability theory. Hegemonic stability predicts that institutions should exist in the Americas to address regional security concerns. Inter-American institutions exist, but play a limited role in security affairs. Strong power asymmetry may explain the duality of persistent security institutions that endure despite their diminished capacity to influence U.S.-Latin American security relations.

Hegemonic stability asserts that the presence of the hegemon improves the chances of security cooperation because the hegemon makes concessions to weaker states to encourage them to acknowledge the hegemonic state's leadership. The power asymmetry argument adds that in cases where the accepted hegemon is excessively powerful the stability endowed by the hegemon can be eroded.

A condition of strong power asymmetry in a given system suppresses security cooperation by making bilateral or multilateral initiatives appear to be coercive from the perspective of the weaker states. Weaker states find the difference between cooperation and coercion hard to distinguish. Whether a dominant state imparts public goods to weaker states or not, the public goods will be perceived as another indicator of the restraints of the weaker state. Military assistance becomes a scheme to sink less powerful

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states into further debt, and if offered for free, it is an attempt to create a dependent relationship. Free trade agreements may be perceived as a tool of the dominant state to keep weaker states in a subservient position. Under the condition of strong power asymmetry all intervention, for humanitarian reasons or otherwise, can be interpreted as an egregious breach of state sovereignty rather than as an attempt to restore stability and alleviate human suffering. Even non-intervention has the potential to be viewed in a negative light, as a sign of neglect and arrogance by the hegemon. As Donald Marquand Dozer states in his critique of U.S.-Latin American relations, "Gift-giving is intolerable except among equals." At a certain point power asymmetry becomes too strong in a given system, after that line is crossed security cooperation is less likely to occur.

Two basic assumptions deemed important to the study are reviewed below. The first argues that a region should be considered an important and useful level of analysis. The second supports the notion that security cooperation entails more than military related issues.

To justify the regional focus of this study there is an assumption that the regional level of analysis, specifically the America’s region, can be thought of as a cohesive unit. The regional level of analysis is not a well-developed concept, despite its frequent use in international relations literature. Many scholars have definition problems with the term ‘region’, which is no surprise since very few authors have written on the topic, and many that do focus on region structures do not recognize the analytical division within their

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own work. Some authors claim to be studying a region, yet are really only referring to it in a geographical sense, with their true discussion directed towards a systemic or comparative analysis.

Barry Buzan and William R. Thompson composed similar definitions of the term region. Buzan posits the need for a regional level of analysis because of the inherent complexity in trying to explain all state actions from a purely systemic level: “If the security of each is related to the security of all, then nothing can be fully understood without understanding everything. Such a tall order threatens to make the study of security unrealistic.” This study agrees, asserting that a greater degree of detail is obtained from observing state behavior from the perspective of the region.

Other scholars have provided a body of literature that fleshes out the regional level of analysis. Thompson has provided a four-point definition for a region, or subsystem, that roughly correlates with Buzan. First, the actors’ pattern of relations or interactions must exhibit a particular degree of regularity and intensity to the extent that a change at one point in the subsystem affects other points. Second, the actors must be generally proximate. Third, internal and external observers and actors recognize the

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13For more on this point see the introductory section of David A. Lake and Patrick M. Morgan, Regional Orders: Building Security in a New World (University Park, PA: Pennsylvania State University Press, 1997).


15The U.S. is a unique exception to this case as it is a major actor in every region in the world. The same may be said of the former Soviet Union.
subsystem as a distinctive area or "theater of operation". And the last point is that the subsystem must logically consist of at least two and quite probably more actors.\(^{16}\)

The literature supports the concept of a regional level of analysis and validates the idea that the Americas form a region. Some analysts argue that the U.S. and Latin America form distinct regions, based in Northern European roots of the U.S. and Canada, and the Iberian heritage of the states south of the Rio Grande. Robert Keohane disagrees: "Empirical evidence does not support this hypothesis." Based on "...communication routes, airline routes, and trade relationships across the globe, without sticking on national or regional labels, you would not be able to pick out a coherent geographical entity to be called Latin America. In fact, judging airline connections alone, the entire region would appear tied to North America."\(^{17}\)

The final assumption addresses the question: What issues are viable security topics? During much of the Cold War security issues were considered high politics, and economic and social phenomena were thought of as low politics. This is because the threat of military force was considered the most effective means of expressing power; therefore it deserved the majority of attention.\(^{18}\) Arnold Wolfers describes high politics in terms of the goals of self-extension, or self-preservation.\(^{19}\) Edward Morse contradicted


traditional thought, stating, "The classical goals of power and security have been expanded to, or superseded by, goals of wealth and welfare."20 After the end of the Cold War the clear delineation between high and low politics began to dissolve. Other variables, such as culture and economy rose to the forefront of security analysis.21

For this study high and low politics are considered relevant to security issues of the Americas region. Security issues will encompass border disputes, national insurrection, state sovereignty, but also include the drug trade, and economic issues. Many of the security topics in the Americas are instigated by state instability, in turn fomented by economic and social problems. To focus on "high" politics as the only legitimate topics for research would severely weaken this study.

ORGANIZATION AND METHODOLOGY

This study is structured around a research question that provides a framework to explore the effect asymmetric power structures on interstate security cooperation. The research question is: How does power asymmetry impact security cooperation between the U.S. and Latin America? Historical review is utilized to explore the causal relationship proposed in the hypothesis, supported by empirical evidence. Different eras of U.S.-Latin American relations are broken down into five case study chapters to better

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understand how U.S. regional dominance contributes to regional security cooperation. This method was selected since it could demonstrate whether security cooperation improved during times when U.S. dominance marginally decreased, such as during the Great Depression, and the recessions of the 1970s, or decreased during periods of U.S. power growth, such as the later years of the nineteenth century after the civil war, after World War I, after World War II and the end of the Cold War.

There are several potential ways regional security relations could be examined. One method is to explore bilateral relations between the U.S. and individual Latin American states in consecutive chapters. The second method is to organize the case study chapters by chronological order, dividing the chapters by time periods. This work utilizes the latter format. Studying time periods preserves the regional integrity of the study since it considers the impact of historical events on all states at once. This format will make the task of describing system-wide trends far easier. For example, the policy of the U.S. to evaluate states regarding their level of democracy in the late 1970s drew criticism from many Latin American leaders. If these reactions were noted in chapters that consider individual states, the ability to note the reaction as a regional trend becomes more difficult.

This study places an emphasis on security cooperation between the U.S. and key states in the Americas. Certain states are emphasized because of their importance to regional politics and history of interaction with the U.S. These characteristics make their policies, and reactions to U.S. policies, pertinent to understanding Latin America as a whole. Some of the states regularly referred to in this dissertation are reviewed below.
Argentina, like Brazil, maintained its independence and a strong military, making its role as a regional player more important. Further, it has developed into a very important security player in the region. One example of Argentina’s growing regional prestige can be found in its request for North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) membership. Although Argentina was not granted its request for NATO membership, the U.S. accorded Argentina with a security partner status that it previously only reserved for Israel.

Brazil is considered the primary power in South America, as Mexico is the primary power in Central America. Brazil has the largest economy and population in Latin America, its population of 160 million being greater than the rest of South America combined. It maintains a border with every state in South America except for Chile and Ecuador.

Mexico is the second most populous state in Latin America, with just over 100 million inhabitants. Until the end of the 1980s Mexico was prominent in leading Latin American efforts to lessen the impact of U.S. dominance. Mexico is particularly important to U.S. policy makers for several reasons. Because of its lengthy border with the U.S., migration and the illegal drug-trade are important issues in bilateral relations. Interdependence between Mexico and the U.S. increased dramatically with the advent of the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA). For example, in 1993 Mexico exported nearly $52 million of goods and services. This figure increased to $117 million by 1998.22

Venezuela's regional importance is due to its large petroleum production, its proximity to the fighting in Colombia, and its notable policies aimed at asserting its independence from the U.S. It is the world's fourth largest oil producing state, and the third largest supplier to the U.S. Because of the policies of its current leader, President Hugo Chavez, it has become the manifestation of problems in the U.S.-Latin American dialog. Colombia also is a major oil producer, although not to the same degree as Venezuela. Its instability due to a continuing civil war that has recently intensified makes Colombia the focus of much of the regional security dialog. Chapter seven will discuss the Venezuelan and Colombian cases in more detail.

This paper contends that the defining factor that shapes security cooperation in the region is the hegemonic power structure. However, it argues that hegemonic stability does not alone adequately describe regional security dynamics. The power fluctuation of the hegemon may have an impact on the level of security cooperation in the system. Chapter two will explore this notion further, laying the theoretical foundation for the rest of the project. Chapter two reviews the relevance of international relations theory literature associated with this study and explores alternative explanations for variation in the dependent variable, security cooperation. By reviewing international relations literature on security cooperation and power asymmetry a clearer definition of how the terms will be used in this study will emerge.

Chapter three reviews the general themes of U.S.-Latin America relations and how these themes relate to security issues. This is accomplished by providing a broad overview of regional relations dating from the early nineteenth century, when the first proposals for inter-hemispheric security cooperation were instituted, to the beginning of
World War II. Patterns in security relations emerged during this time period that held sway throughout the remainder of the twentieth century, making this time period important to understanding the broader regional security dynamics.

Chapter three explores bilateral relations between states on both sides of the regional asymmetric power division. In the nascent stage of the America’s regional development the power structure that would eventually emerge was far from certain. States in South America, such as Argentina and Mexico, seemed destined to surpass, if not compete, with the dominant position of the U.S. However, the regional power structure emerged as distinctly asymmetric, a point that will be elaborated. The period before strong power asymmetry became a characteristic of U.S.-Latin American relations provides a baseline for comparison to examine state behavior.

Chapters four, five, six and seven continue in the format of chapter three. Each case study chapter reviews a time period after World War II in the Americas region, and how security relations were shaped by the fluctuation of power asymmetry. Important events such as overt expressions of U.S. military dominance and economic upturns and crisis are closely examined to show any evidence of change in cooperative behavior. Because the U.S. has consistently been the dominant power in the region by any measure, regional security relations have been regularly dictated by a pattern of U.S. action and Latin American reaction. Therefore much of the research focuses on U.S. policy initiatives and the impact they have on regional security relations.

Chapter four examines the period from World War II until the 1960s. This era is primarily marked by an increase in Latin American goodwill towards U.S. leadership and U.S. distraction with the onset of the Cold War. Many Latin Americans were expecting a
version of Marshall Plan for their region, being disappointed with the U.S. response to rebuild former Axis member states and ignoring the needs of regional allies. Although the U.S. committed itself to binding security treaties with the region during this period, security relations suffered in part because of the U.S. policy imperative to concentrate on Europe. Hope was renewed because of initiatives implemented by the Kennedy Administration in the early 1960s, only to lead to disillusionment when the U.S. commitment waned in the later part of the decade.

Chapter five concentrates on interregional relations during the 1970 to 1980 decade. Some analysts characterized this era as one of U.S. neglect towards Latin America since the U.S. was focused on what it perceived as Cold War priorities. This sentiment is well represented by former Secretary of State Henry Kissinger's well-known comment that the only important politics are those that occur between Washington, London and Moscow. This chapter will show that what was perceived as neglect by the U.S. is in part explained by the broader issue of a global economic crisis. The perception that U.S. power was in decline grew, and events of the decade such as its retreat from Vietnam, and economic problems prompted its leaders to reduce national commitments and search for alternatives to unilateralism. The analysis will show the regional disengagement of the U.S. during the bulk of the 1970s only reinforced the Latin American perception of U.S. dominance.

Chapter six addresses the decade from 1980-1989. Security relations during this period became increasingly polarized, as Cold War competition increased. The government of Cuba supported revolutionary movements in the region and beyond, and U.S. policy became more aggressive at combating what it perceived as communist
activity. Latin American leaders generally discounted the U.S. perception that domestic revolutions were motivated by outside forces and believed Washington’s interventions were motivated by a desire to dominate the region. The 1980s also marked the beginning of the Latin American shift away from state-planned economic policy and authoritarianism.

Chapter seven, the last case study chapter, deals with the end of the 1990s to the present. The era is marked by a significant change throughout the Americas. The political and economic landscape was thoroughly altered, along with most of the contentious security issues of the past. This chapter explores whether cooperation improved with the easing of Cold War tensions and relative political stability in the region. Chapter eight summarizes the major study findings, and then it offers the major conclusions of the study.

Assuming this study supports the power asymmetry theory, it should provoke a reassessment of hegemonic stability theory. Perhaps more importantly, it might show the limits of regional security cooperation that will curb high expectations shared by both Latin American and U.S. leaders during the last hundred years. During times of increased power asymmetry leaders from both sides may learn to better understand the constraints on the regional partnership. The study results may also draw lessons from regional security successes and shed light on new strategies to circumvent the power realities that limit the U.S.-Latin American security relationship.
CHAPTER II
INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS THEORY, POWER ASYMMETRY AND SECURITY COOPERATION

The purpose of this chapter is to review the scholarly literature related to hegemonic stability, power asymmetry and security cooperation, and explain how they relate to the main topic of this study, U.S.-Latin American security relations. The first section describes the central points of hegemonic stability theory and references key criticisms of the theory. The second section reviews the theoretical debate on the dependent variable, security cooperation. The hegemonic stability literature addresses how security cooperation may occur due to the presence of a hegemon. The third section discusses power asymmetry and the debate surrounding alternative power distribution models. Hegemonic stability assumes that a system dominated by one power is more likely to create stability. Not all scholars agree with this assumption. By nature, a hegemonic system contains a large power differential between the hegemon and other states. The third section will outline how power asymmetry is used in this study and how it may lead to less security cooperation under the beneficial structure of hegemonic stability.

The fourth section briefly addresses other theories that also focus on the regional security cooperation problem, mostly from the perspective of state level theory. These theories are important to note because they are representative of the majority of the theoretical debate in the region. However, this study demonstrates that the systemic effects of power asymmetry have more influence over hemispheric relations. The last section explains power asymmetry and security cooperation in light of the literature, and
based on these explanations identifies indicators of power asymmetry and security cooperation.

This study assumes that the structural level of analysis is preferable to the state level of analysis or cultural studies. As Kenneth Waltz states,

"It is not possible to understand world politics simply by looking inside of states. If the aims, policies, and actions of states become matters of exclusive attention or even of central concern, then we are forced back to the descriptive level: and from simple descriptions no valid generalizations can be logically drawn."\(^1\)

For example, one can claim Latin American or U.S. culture is to blame for a lack of regional security cooperation, culture being a characteristic of states, or of a system. The next step in such an analysis is to list the attributes describing U.S. culture and Latin American culture. Left with two lists of disparate characteristics the author must assume that the system is a sum of its parts, and make value judgments in order to reach such a conclusion. Such a process removes the scholar further from the ideal goal of total objectivity and invites criticism of the use of such inductive methodology.

Another argument against state-level theory is that state-level variables are the most important to examine system level outcomes, one must believe that units will not influence each other's actions. Waltz points out that if this is not a likely assumption since "in the history of international relations...results achieved seldom correspond to the intentions of actors."\(^2\) Because the dealings of an actor do not always achieve their intended outcome, a description of an actor's motivations is not likely to be helpful in explaining systemic behavior.


\(^2\)Ibid.
To make a connection between state-level phenomena and its influence on the system, the internal characteristics of states must be relatively consistent over time to explain systemic trends. In this study that assumption could be made about the U.S. since it has maintained the same government for over two hundred years. However, Latin American states have not experienced this level of stability, making any explanation of systemic trends from state-level causes more difficult to prove. To account for regular state behavior that is produced by internal processes it must be assumed that these internal processes remain relatively consistent over time. This assumption would be difficult to prove since a multitude of variables contribute to state decisions, including other states, and the interests affecting policy decisions frequently change as well.³

This study uses the systemic level of analysis as described by Kenneth Waltz. In relation to systemic theory Waltz explains, "...How the organization of a realm acts as a constraining and disposing force on the interacting units within it."¹ In this study the presence of a dominant power is the organizational aspect of the system under scrutiny.⁵ Waltz also explains that systemic theory should explain the consistent behavior of units despite their differences. This study focuses on the continuity of U.S.-Latin American relations under U.S. dominance since the end of the U.S. Civil War, and seeks to explain security relations by noting the variation of U.S. dominance as an explanatory element.

³Waltz asks the question, "If changes in international outcomes are linked directly to changes in actors, how can one account for similarities of outcome that persist or recur even as actors vary?" Ibid., 53.

⁴Ibid., 60.

⁵Waltz supports the emphasis of study on the major powers in a system, stating, "The units of greatest capability set the scene of action for others as well as for themselves." Ibid., 61.
Systems theories maintain that outcomes are produced by a system's structure. The structure is key to understanding a system because they designate constraints on the actors. These constraints shape actor behavior by rewarding and punishing particular behaviors. These rewards and punishments create consistent actor behavior, as seemingly disparate individuals become far more predictable when acting in a group. The process of the structure creating consistent behavior is referred to as socialization. Put bluntly, "Socialization reduces variety." The socializing effect of a structure creates predictability and enables the analysis of state behavior. By comparison, the examination of the differences of state behavior to explain the system creates incoherencies that undermine analytical efforts.

Although this dissertation contends that the systemic level of analysis will explain the greater percentage of state behavior, it also acknowledges the value of state-level theories. The utility of the systemic level is that it can bring coherency to state interaction of a large period of time, but it does not seek to explain the ramification of these policies on the domestic politics of particular states. The direct cause of domestic politics is best explained by state-level theory.

HEGEMONIC STABILITY

The example provided by the last 130 years of U.S.-Latin American security relations directly supports hegemonic stability theory. The dominance of the U.S. has been the central issue in regional security dynamics since the 1870s. Frequently studies that focus on regional dynamics must focus more closely on U.S. policy choices since

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6Ibid., 65.
they are the most important determining factor in security relations. However, the 
description of ‘dominance’ does not adequately describe regional relations. Dominance 
can give the impression of a unipolar power occupying and ruling a system by force 
alone. Although the U.S. has demonstrated it is willing to use military power to enforce 
its will on other regional states, it has not acted as a conquering power, and at times led 
security cooperation efforts that show a remarkable level of support for weaker states in the 
region.

Even though this study utilizes hegemonic stability theory, which emphasizes the 
cooperative relationship between the dominant state and weaker states in the system, it 
focuses on the undercurrent of non-cooperation caused by the presence of hegemony. 
The study argues that in the case of U.S.-Latin American relations. U.S. hegemony has 
had a notable deleterious impact on state relations as well as a beneficial one. The 
possibility remains open that the conclusion may yet contradict hegemonic stability. 
perhaps finding the negative impact of a hegemonic system on other states in the system 
make other power alignments preferable to one with a single, dominant state. It is more 
likely that an alternative conclusion may emerge, such as a hegemonic system may 
provide disincentives for states to cooperate. However, these problems illustrate issues of 
a smaller scale compared to the greater stability caused by the presence of a hegemon. 
The remainder of this section reviews hegemonic stability theory, drawing out important 
theoretical questions and issues of this work.

A concise definition of hegemonic stability theory was given in chapter one:

“...stability in international relations stems from the presence of hegemony or
dominance."⁷ A major debate surrounding hegemonic stability theory emerged during the 1970s. Several authors noted that the unwillingness of the U.S. and Great Britain to assume a leadership role and Great Britain's loss of capability, created a power vacuum during the period between World War I and World War II.⁸ This power vacuum was indirectly blamed for interwar economic and security disequilibria that led to World War II. In their separate works the authors warned that the U.S. was once again retreating from world leadership and similar results could occur. Their fundamental hypothesis was that as U.S. power declined, international stability and openness declined, which was a thesis resurrected in the 1970s and 1980s.⁹

In the literature authors disagree on whether the weaker states, or the dominant state, has greater incentive to maintain the hegemonic system. Charles Kindleberger argues that the hegemon provides stability to a given system, and that stability is a benefit enjoyed by less powerful states without their contribution. Stability is therefore considered a public good, since all states benefit although only one contributes. In a system without a dominant state, free riders, or states that do not contribute to stability, will still seek to consume the same amount of public good, yet no state exists to produce

⁷Viotti and Kaupi, 592.


the public good. Stephen Krasner argues that when a state obtains hegemony it has the ability to provide stability without threatening its core security objectives. The hegemon is not concerned with its essential security objectives because it realizes gains from its dominance, just as less powerful states may realize the gains from stability. Krasner's interpretation of hegemonic stability shows that the hegemon has just as much incentive to maintain dominance as weaker states that enjoy the 'free' public goods. The hegemon realizes benefits from the relationship such as an increase in income and growth of political power without a commensurate effect on domestic stability. Because the hegemon has an incentive to maintain the dominant relationship Kindleberger points out that some commentaries describe a hegemonic arrangement as exploitation. These analyses contend that the U.S. sought world dominance as early as 1898, a notion that Kindleberger finds doubtful since most U.S. political leaders of the early twentieth century were isolationists.

Mancur Olson views the gains debate in hegemonic stability from an economic perspective. He explains there are two ways that an actor in a given system can increase their gains: either by procuring a larger slice of the pie, or instituting changes that enable the pie to grow larger. Rather than debating who gains the most in a hegemonic

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11 Webb and Krasner, 184.


relationship, Olson contends that an actor’s willingness to legitimize hegemony is directly proportional to how much benefit they gain. If the hegemon wishes to keep weaker states satisfied with its leadership, it must continue to provide an increasing amount of public goods to other states in the system, or provide the necessary support to ensure other states are experiencing satisfactory economic growth.

Putting aside the debate concerning whether the hegemon or weaker states in the system gain the most, hegemonic stability theory differentiates dominance from a symbiotic relationship. However, this study contends that over time this relationship may fluctuate and either side may view their contribution as being greater than what they receive. When this happens the incentives to support the hegemonic system decline. In the case of the U.S. and Latin America, the willingness of Latin American states to cooperate on security matters with the U.S. seem to deteriorate when U.S. dominance grows. The perception of dominant state exploitation increased as the power gap grew.

There is a debate on how other states come to recognize hegemonic leaders. Krasner comments that others recognize the hegemonic state as the primary power because it has economic and military capabilities that can be used as a carrot or stick to compel other states in the region to accept an open trading structure.¹⁴ Webb and Krasner argue that to be considered a hegemon a state must take on core responsibilities. These responsibilities include: organizing trade liberalization, keeping its market open in times of economic crisis, manage the monetary system, supply the international currency, provide liquidity, manage the exchange rate structure, supply investment capital and


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encourage development in the peripheral areas of the system. Kindleberger believes that primacy entails a broader list, including other things such as number of innovations produced, productivity growth, and the level of investment in key economic sectors. Kindleberger maintains that economic primacy performs a different function than hegemony. Primacy "involves less dominance or hegemony than the public good of leadership of the world economy, not ordering others to behave as the leader directs, but pointing the way and convincing others of the desirability of following."

Although theorists may disagree to some degree on what constitutes a hegemonic power, it is clear the U.S. fulfills the description of a hegemonic state vis-à-vis Latin America. The U.S. acts through institutions like the UN and the International Monetary Fund (IMF), to influence Latin American states to make certain domestic reforms or negotiate debt payments. The U.S. does not compel Latin American states to perform these functions as the Soviet Union ordered Warsaw Pact member states how to allocate its funding, meaning the systemic relationship is based on more than just power. It encourages development, promotes trade liberalization by maintaining trade policies more open than Latin American states, and provides for general stability.

Hegemonic stability theory is argued to have either an economic or security focus. Webb and Krasner dispute Kindleberger's focus on economic primacy. They point out that not all states gain equally from the public goods provided by the hegemon, thus their

\[15\] Webb and Krasner, 185.


\[17\] Ibid.
interests in supporting such a system are not constant.\textsuperscript{18} The economic and social problems of developing states, combined with the introduction of a relative gains dynamic, creates a security problem in hegemonic structures. Therefore security issues become the focus of hegemonic stability, and the ability of the hegemon to provide stability comes under pressure from state competition. Because states gain unequally the relative gain problem may occur. To this point Robert Gilpin states, "It may very well be that in a particular situation absolute gains will not affect relative positions. But the efforts of groups to cause or prevent such shifts in the relative distribution of power constitute the critical issue of politics."\textsuperscript{19} Since not all states seek hegemonic public goods at any given time, and some may openly eschew them, the reign of the hegemon may tend to be perceived as forceful domination and less benign.

Jonanne Gowa criticizes hegemonic stability theory because it focuses on economic cooperation among states as opposed to security cooperation. The focus of the discussion on economic issues was consciously motivated by scholars to demonstrate that states can move beyond the zero-sum paradigm that characterized nuclear deterrence of the era.\textsuperscript{20} As Gowa writes to the economic focus of the theory, "...hegemonic stability theory must include security as an argument in the utility functions it assigns to states opening their borders to trade."\textsuperscript{21}

\begin{flushright}
\textsuperscript{18}Webb and Krasner, 184.
\textsuperscript{19}Gilpin, 36.
\end{flushright}
This dissertation recognizes the primary importance of the security aspect of hegemonic stability theory, although identifying that the hegemon’s economic leadership is also vital to maintaining system stability. In other words, economic and military policies are both contributors to regional stability and therefore important in examining hegemonic stability, but both economic and military concerns are subsets of security. This study measures power by both military and economic indicators, reflecting the view that both matter to overall security of the region.

Some scholars question more basic assumptions than the military or economic emphasis of hegemonic stability theory. Isabelle Grunberg questions the very notion of hegemonic states and how one can differentiate between them and non-hegemonic states. She makes the point that other authors based their definitions of a hegemon on power indicators an not the control of outcomes. The insight fundamentally asks and important question: What is a useful metric to measure hegemony? Grunberg suggests that capability alone does not make one state a hegemon. For example, Japan’s GDP may be higher than China’s, but few would consider Japan the hegemon of East Asia. A hegemon must maintain dominance in terms of economic and military indicators. Further, a historical review must reveal that other states in the region accepted the leadership of the state in question on economic and security issues.

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23 Grunberg credits Russett with this observation. See Bruce Russett, “The Mysterious Case of Vanishing Hegemony; or, Is Mark Twain Really Dead?” *International Organization* 39, no. 2 (Spring 1985): 209, 211.
Grunberg's concerns are refuted by Kindleberger's analysis. She demands proof of dominance, yet Kindleberger explicitly states that hegemonic states do not lead by dominance, but by providing incentives and punishment for specified behavior. Punishment may include the use of military force, but less invasive actions are more likely to be applied. The relationship between the hegemon and weaker states is characterized by a quid-pro-quo interaction in which public goods are traded for the benefits of leadership. Direct domination of other states is not a regular feature of a hegemonic system since it demonstrates there is little mutual benefit. Historical review can ameliorate Grunberg's concerns at demonstrating the presence of a hegemon.\textsuperscript{24} Certain indicators, such as the ability of the system to generate institutions, maintain relative stability despite the presence of dominant state, may help define the presence of a true hegemon. If a dominant state can exist in a system for many years without instigating a durable alliance against it, then its leadership extends beyond simple dominance. In one hundred and thirty years Latin American states existed with U.S. leadership without being broadly opposed. This is an important indicator of the presence of a hegemonic system.

Measuring a system for the presence of a dominant state is not as difficult as measuring for a hegemonic system. A method for measuring a hegemon's presence is to test for stable regimes that should indicate the presence of a dominant state. Regimes can be defined as "principles, norms, rules, and decision-making procedures around

\textsuperscript{24}Strange supports this conclusion. See Susan Strange, "The Persistent Myth of Lost Hegemony," \textit{International Organization} 41, no. 4 (Autumn 1987): 554.
which actor expectations converge on a given issue-area."\textsuperscript{25} Robert Keohane adds that regimes are "...those arrangements for issue areas that embody implicit rules and norms insofar as they actually guide behavior of important actors in a particular issue area."\textsuperscript{26} The level to which regimes may guide actors is a controversial topic, however the fact that hegemonic leadership can give rise to regimes is less so.

Another potential means of measuring hegemony lies in the degree of system socialization. G. John Ikenberry and Charles A. Kupchan write. "There is a more subtle component of hegemonic power, one that works at the level of substantive beliefs rather than material payoffs. Acquiescence is the result of the socialization of leaders in secondary nations."\textsuperscript{27} They found that when domestic instability occurred in a weaker state the socialization process was promoted through military and economic reconstruction. The hegemon was able to better articulate a new set of norms through a more direct approach than trying to passively articulate norms.\textsuperscript{28} The transfer of the dominant state's norms was more successful when they were inculcated to the weaker states elites, then spread to the masses than visa versa. This is an interesting observation that may demonstrate moments of greater power asymmetry that may immediately act as a detriment to interstate relations, but has the potential to increase stability in the long-term.


\textsuperscript{28}Ibid., 314.
Other scholars challenge the basic assumptions of hegemonic stability theory. Duncan Snidal suggests that hegemony may not ensure the level of stability that many assume. Snidal points out that hegemonic leadership can be either beneficial or exploitative, whereas collective action avoids this dichotomy since it is by nature inclusive of all players. Snidal supports his contention by providing the post-war examples of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization and the European Community (EC). He admits EC collective action was not flawless, but nonetheless was successful at times. He admits it took U.S. hegemony to create North Atlantic Security Organization (NATO), but argues its continued existence is based more on collective action than hegemonic leadership. His study concludes that hegemony is not necessary to create cooperation, since cooperation can occur through collective action. Snidal’s observation concerning the EC does not sufficiently acknowledge the fact that EC success can be attributed to the hegemonic presence of the U.S. In the post World War II period the U.S. was the guarantor of West European stability. Even in the context of the post-Cold War era, many European states oppose U.S. troop reduction plans in the European theater. Further, NATO is still clearly dependent on U.S. leadership and military capabilities.

Despite the arguments of some critics this study accepts the main premise of hegemonic stability, that the presence of a hegemonic power will create greater stability in a system. As Keohane states on the relationship between hegemonic power and stability: "as the distribution of tangible resources becomes more equal, international


\[30\] Ibid., 612.
regimes should weaken," and "as the hegemonial state's margin of resource superiority over its partners declines, the costs of leadership will become more burdensome."\textsuperscript{31} However, it also questions the issue of how the hegemonic relationship may deteriorate and inhibit the gains generated by hegemony. Figure 1 shows the relationship between security cooperation and hegemony in this dissertation. As the power of hegemony (x-axis) increases, the level of security cooperation (y-axis) increases, as predicted by hegemonic stability theory. However, when the power of the hegemon becomes excessive, security cooperation gains diminish.

\begin{figure}[h]
\centering
\includegraphics[width=0.7\textwidth]{figure1.png}
\caption{Relationship Between Hegemonic Power and Security Cooperation}
\end{figure}

The U.S. meets the criteria as a hegemon in its relationship with Latin America as described by Kindleberger, Krasner and Webb. It provides stability or regional security

\textsuperscript{31}Keohane, "International Institutions and State Power," 78-79.
by maintaining open markets, a strong currency, humanitarian intervention, and leadership on a variety of security issues. These are core responsibilities that may burden the hegemonic state, and which a dominant state that relies purely on coercion may not choose to accept. A hegemonic state leads predominately by setting an example rather than forcing weaker states to do its bidding. This suggests that hegemonic stability is differentiated from strict unipolarity by the degree of volunteerism inherent in the relationship between the dominant and weaker states. In both cases the relationship is defined by the presence of the dominant state, however in a hegemonic system the dominant state leads mostly by incentive as opposed to military force.

Different theorists focus on different elements of power when describing the role of the hegemon. Kindleberger applies the theory to the economic relationship between the hegemon and weaker states. Gowa, Webb and Krasner uphold that the stability the hegemonic system maintains is a security-centric variable. This study sides with the latter, although the analysis does not exclude economic considerations.

The literature contends that the presence of regimes and socialization are results of the hegemonic system. The economic or military infirmities of weaker states may fuel the socialization process. Socialization may be the engine that spreads the values of the hegemon to the rest of the system, but before these values are accepted by weaker states they are alien and may be considered a constant reminder of the dominance of the stronger state leading to the undercurrent of cooperation suggested in this study. Hegemonic stability theory focuses on the presence of regimes as by-products of the system. Since the cooperative aspects endowed by the presence of a hegemon produce them, the rise and fall of their prominence may be an indicator of security cooperation.

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For this reason the dissertation concentrates on regional organizations such as the Pan American Union and the OAS.

Krasner and Webb's contention that states in a given system do not gain equally from the public good provided by the hegemon, thus their interests in supporting such a system are not constant over time, is a key point in this dissertation. This study hypothesizes that weaker states are affected by the degree of power asymmetry when determining their gains from public goods provided by the hegemon.

SECURITY COOPERATION

This work examines the proposition that security cooperation in a hegemonic system may be directly related to the change of the hegemon's power in relation to other states in the system. It proposes that the power asymmetry inherent in a hegemonic system may reach a point at which the power is excessive and creates a higher level of distrust among the weaker states in the system directed towards the hegemon. This distrust is related to the way the hegemon exercises its power in the system. According to Ikenberry and Kupchan hegemonic states may exercise their power either through the manipulation of material incentives by the hegemon to prompt weaker states to cooperate or by a subtler process in which the hegemon is able to alter the substantive beliefs of weaker states.

The manipulation of material incentives occurs "through threats of punishment or promises of reward, the hegemon alters the political or economic incentives facing other
The hegemon induces policy change by using the stick and carrot approach to change the behavior of other states pursuing their individual interests.

The other way a hegemon exercises power is by socializing the elites of weaker states, or altering their substantive beliefs. The socialization of the hegemon's norms and values takes place

"...when foreign elites buy into the hegemon's vision of international order and accept it as their own—that is, when they internalize the norms and value orientations espoused by the hegemon and accept its normative claims about the nature of the international system."33

The successful transmission of norms from the hegemon guarantees some degree of acquiescence from other states in the system. Both expressions of power work together, but Ikenberry and Kupchan draw the distinction that altering substantive beliefs successfully is tantamount to the consolidation of hegemonic control.

This study seeks to identify the level of power asymmetry that indicates an erosion of security cooperation. Through the review of regional security relations it is likely that certain indicators, or stress points, may emerge that can be used to indicate eras of cooperation and non-cooperation. For example, when a high level of power asymmetry is present it is likely that it will be reflected through regional security institutions. In other words, institutional effectiveness should decline as the level of power asymmetry increases. Other indicators of high levels of power asymmetry should emerge as the historical review in the case study chapters unfolds.

Under excessive power asymmetry the sensitivity level of weaker states is increased to all hegemonic expressions of power, but particularly to the manipulation of

32Ikenberry and Kupchan, 285.

33Ibid.
material incentives. Because the manipulation of material incentives is a more visible expression of power, weaker states are particularly sensitive when it is utilized. Because of the greater than usual level of dominance by the hegemon, the level of awareness among other states is raised as well. The effect of excessive power asymmetry extends to hegemonic states as well. As the hegemon gains more power it becomes less interested in the quid-pro-quo of the hegemonic relationship. As a super hegemon it begins to redefine its unstated agreement with partner states, less willing to cooperate through multilateral forums, and more willing to take unilateral action. The combination of more sensitive weaker states, and a more confident hegemon, undermines security cooperation in the system. Although the system still benefits from a surplus of stability due to the presence of a hegemon, it suffers from the counter-current created by power asymmetry.

Whereas manipulation of material incentives under conditions of power asymmetry helps explain a decrease in security cooperation under hegemony, the growth and proliferation of regimes and institutions are thought of by some as indicators of increasing cooperation. Some of the regime theory and institution literature maintains that regimes and institutions have a greater likelihood of spreading and being successful at facilitating cooperation in a hegemonic system. Although the literature defines institutionalization as a more formal codification of norms rules and behavior between states, many scholars agree that both regimes and institutions are signs of cooperative behavior. Institutionalization is defined as "behavior recognized by participants as reflecting established rules, norms, and conventions, and its meaning is interpreted in light of these understandings." Regimes are defined as "...principles, norms, rules, and

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decision-making procedures around which actor expectations converge in a given issue area. Some theorists argue it is possible to circumvent anarchy through institutions or regimes. Arthur Stein comments that cooperation through regimes is possible when states recognize areas of mutual benefit. "Sovereign nations have a rational incentive to develop processes for making joint decisions when confronting dilemmas of common interests or common aversions. In these contexts, self-interested actors rationally forgo independent decision making and construct regimes." Stein's reasoning explains how the rational actor and anarchy assumptions can coexist with the potential for state cooperation.

Some regime theory scholars believe that in order for institutions to foster cooperation, the threat level must be reduced to a point that states assess the likely actions of other states based on their intentions as opposed to their capabilities. This explanation of state behavior elucidates the nature of security cooperation under power asymmetry. Under asymmetric conditions weaker states tend to alter their threat calculus to a capability based assessment since they are more threatened by the hegemon's overwhelming dominance. During times when the hegemon's power differential returns

\[35\] Stephen Krasner, "Regimes and the Limits of Realism: Regimes as Autonomous Variables," *International Organization* 36, no. 2 (Spring 1982): 498. The key difference between, according to scholars, is that regimes are narrower in subject matter and time since they converge on a single issue area. Institutions have a broader scope, usually designed to codify cooperation occurring now and assumed cooperation between states in the future. They are designed to cover several issue areas at once.


\[37\] Ibid.
to normal parameters weaker states are less likely to judge the threat posed by the 
hegemon in terms of capability, making security cooperation more probable.

Critics of regime theory maintain that they have a marginal impact on interstate 
cooperation if any. Some claim "...institutions are basically a reflection of the 
distribution of power in the world." They are based on self-interested calculations, 
have no independent effect on state behavior, and therefore have no power to motivate 
cooperative behavior. Some theorists have searched for a compromise position. Charles 
Glaser asserts that cooperative behavior can be understood within the structuralist 
framework if it is viewed as self help. Institutions can be tools used by states to realize 
mutual self-help situations, but are fundamentally still prisoners of state interests. Most 
institutionalists do not believe that cooperation can appear without serving state interests. 
When state interests happen to be congruent with institutions, institutions may function as 
facilitators. They maintain that institutions can make a difference, but only in 
conjunction with power realities. None of these views challenge the idea that regimes are 
a result of the presence of a hegemonic power, and their effectiveness reflects stability in 
the system.

Other scholars use the example of interdependence as an alternative to hegemonic 
stability theory and regimes to explain inter-state security cooperation. Richard

\[\text{\cite{38} John Mearshiener. "False Promise of International Institutions." } \text{International Security} \text{ 19, no. 3 (Winter 1994/95): 7.}\]


\[\text{\cite{40} Robert Keohane and Lisa Martin, "The Promise of Institutionalist Theory," } \text{International Security} \text{ 20, no. 1 (Summer 1995): 43.}\]
Rosecrance and Stein comment "The horizontal interaction of transnational processes is higher than at any point since World War I." Growing interdependence tasks governments to cooperate. "If they (governments) are to cope with the great transnational phenomena of the current age...they must cooperate with one another." Rosecrance and Stein admit that although they view interdependence as a potential way for state to work around anarchy, "Whether interdependence will emerge as positive or negative will depend on old-fashioned cooperation among governments." Keohane and Joseph Nye agree, in their volume in which they coin the term complex interdependence. "In analyzing the politics of interdependence, we emphasized that interdependence would not necessarily lead to cooperation, nor did we assume that its consequences would automatically be benign in other respects." Interdependence is a helpful tool to understand the level of hegemony in a given system, but not useful when discussing the likelihood of security cooperation. Institutions remain the better indicator in judging the level of systemic cooperative behavior.

Many authors who concentrate their research on Latin America are also strong institutionalists. David Mares critiques Latin American security issues and believes that more thought should be applied to finding workable solutions. He upholds the Peru-Ecuador border conflict as a model, and trumpets the role of international financial aid

\[\text{\footnotesize 41} \text{Richard Rosecrance and Arthur Stein, "Interdependence: Myth or Reality."} \]
\[\text{\footnotesize World Politics, 26, no. 1 (October 1973): 21.} \]

\[\text{\footnotesize 42} \text{Ibid.} \]

\[\text{\footnotesize 43} \text{Ibid., 22.} \]

\[\text{\footnotesize 44} \text{Keohane and Nye, 249.} \]
and outside arbiters.\textsuperscript{45} Joseph S. Tulchin and Ralph H. Espach think that the spread of democracy and free-markets via an organization like the proposed Free Trade Area of the Americas (FTAA) are the best way to approach Latin American problems.\textsuperscript{46} Hernán Patiño Mayer is more direct in his institutional belief, stating

"A genuine and effective inter-American hemispheric security system must be constructed upon a community of states that has as it is premise the acknowledgement of shared responsibilities, interests, and values and expresses the decision to assume, preserve, and protect them from situations of risk or threat."\textsuperscript{47}

Farer wrote that institutions such as the UN, OAS, international financial institutions and non-governmental organizations, are contributing to the stability of Latin America.\textsuperscript{48} Olga Pellicer's work is based solely on regional institutions contributing to security, explicitly showing the high regard the author has for them.\textsuperscript{49}

One of the divisions between academics on the subject of cooperation pertains to the examples they are likely to use to illustrate their viewpoint. Realists frequently use security issues to demonstrate why cooperation is unlikely to occur. Charles Lipson


explains the difference by noting that, “Economic issues are characterized far more often by elaborate networks of rules, norms, and institutions, grounded in reasonably stable, convergent expectations. There are few equivalents in the security field to the comprehensive, rule-guided arrangements in trade and money.”

Lipson points out that two factors work against the ability of security cooperative endeavors to succeed. First, the magnitude of potential loses for a player if cooperation is not reciprocated and second, the risks associated with a lack of sufficient intelligence on the others decisions and actions. Robert Jervis adds “…cooperation is more probable when mutual cooperation is only slightly less attractive than exploiting the other, when being exploited is only slightly worse than mutual competition.” Keohane and Axelrod came to similar conclusions using the prisoner’s dilemma model. Although they maintain that security and economic issues can be analyzed using the same model, they contend that actors are more likely to cooperate when it comes to commerce as opposed

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51 Ibid., 22.


53 Prisoner’s Dilemma is a tool to explain state behavior in the presence of anarchy. It explains that states are in competition with other states, and how this competition thwarts their attempts to strive for the most optimal outcome for their individual benefit. For a detailed explanation see Stein. 34-36.
to military related issues: "Economic issues usually seem to exhibit less conflictual payoff structures than do those of military security."\(^{54}\)

Many academics disagree that the presence of cooperation in a system can be supported by the example of regimes. At the outset this dissertation remains ambivalent on the question of institutions creating security cooperation, although a view on this issue may emerge as a product of this research. Instead, it focuses on institutional success as a product of hegemonic stability, and power asymmetry. In this context institutions become an instrument to explain the difference between hegemony and the onset of power asymmetry. As power asymmetry takes hold, the importance of institutions decrease as the hegemon increasingly acts unilaterally and weaker states view the institutions as tools of dominance by the hegemon. During times of hegemony the threat posed by the hegemon is reduced and institution creation and maintenance garner more attention.

POWER ASYMMETRY

This dissertation focuses on high levels of power asymmetry as a factor on reducing the level of security cooperation potential among states in a hegemonic system. The first assumption leading to this observation is that a concentration of power in one state in a given system is more conducive to creating stability, and thus security cooperation. The second assumption is that when the hegemon experiences sudden

power surges compared to other states in the region a condition of power asymmetry results. How this power surge will be accounted for in the study will be discussed.

As previously stated, the analysis of this study is performed at the systemic level. The distribution of power of the system is the primary determinant of system characteristics. This study focuses specifically on unipolarity as delineated by hegemonic stability theory and why unipolarity is the most likely systemic structure to create interstate cooperation that will provide a basis for the power asymmetry argument.

Three basic power alignments are noted in the literature, unipolarity, bipolarity and multipolarity. Highly centralized systems are those with one state at the center of power, bipolarity refers to those systems with two centers, and multipolarity is the most distributed power structure referring to systems with more than two poles. Each of these will be briefly reviewed below along with arguments concerning their qualities in relation to stability creation. During the critique of each theory, they will be individually placed in the context of U.S.-Latin American relations. The region has experienced both multipolarity and bipolarity through the lens of the global system. Multipolarity prevailed until the rise of U.S. power during the final quarter of the nineteenth century. Pure hegemony existed from the end of the nineteenth century until the 1930s, a brief period after World War II, and from 1990 to the present. Global bipolarity overlapped with U.S. regional hegemony from the 1950s to 1990.

The argument for the presence of one dominant state in a system was presented at the beginning of this chapter. Hegemonic stability theory posits that the presence of a hegemonic power in a given system creates more stability among states in the system that has a greater likelihood to lead to security cooperation than bipolar or multi-polar
systems. Hegemonic stability theory also makes the argument that because a hegemonic system is more likely to give rise to institutions of all varieties, these institutions in turn may perpetuate the stability above the singular ability of the hegemon. For example, U.S. hegemony produced many institutions, the more prominent being the Pan American Union, the Inter-American Defense Board (IADB), the Organization of American States (OAS), the Inter American Development Bank, the Treaty of Tlateloico, and NAFTA.

Not all academics agree with the hegemonic stability assessment. Some view the influence of bipolarity as having been a very stabilizing influence on the Americas. Some scholars suggest that during the U.S.-Soviet Union bipolar rivalry, U.S. power was effectively deterred, leading to greater system stability. Edgardo Mercado Jarrin noted that Latin American countries sought a greater degree of autonomy from the U.S. that made them more conscious of powers like the Soviet Union outside of the hemisphere.55 The Alliance for Progress can be considered as one example of this theory. The organization sought to bring greater development aid to Latin American to alleviate poverty and keep communist revolutions at bay. Through the prism of bipolar stability one could argue that Latin American states were able to play the Soviet card against the U.S. and receive more aid than they otherwise would. In theory, they were able to limit the depth of U.S. penetration by balancing one antagonist against the other.

Richard N. Rosecrance contends that weaker states may benefit from bipolarity. "One of the major characteristics of the contemporary international scene resides in the

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difference in attitude and position of the allies of the great powers and neutral states."  
He explains that nonaligned nations received benefits of alliance protection and without pledging political allegiance to either major power. Augusto Varas specifically cites occurrences of Latin American states exercising their relative political freedom: "The early relations between the Soviet Union and Argentina, Uruguay, and Mexico serve as counterpoints to the difficult relations between these same countries and the United States."  
Cole Blaiser adds that although many Latin American leaders were not admirers of the Soviet system, even so they reserved the right as an autonomous state to do so and "such ties give them room for maneuver and bargaining leverage in disputes with the United States."  

Despite the few perceived advantages of bipolarity in maintaining regional stability, many disadvantages resulted as well. Jarrin also noted that the superpower rivalry caused domestic strife in Latin America through "...exacerbating the ideological differences in Latin America, polarizing positions, and results in domestic confrontations on major issues."  
The polarization of Latin American politics throughout the twentieth century has been well regarded as a primary impediment to pluralistic political and economic development. Bipolarity also contributed to regional arms races. Some critics

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59 Jarrin, 75.
point out that the distribution of arms surpluses was the primary culprit of Latin American interstate arms races during the first half of the Cold War. However, both the European and the Soviet Union contributed to Latin American arms expenditures as well. For example, during the Falkland/Malvinas Island conflict the most lethal weapon used by Argentina was the French built Exocet missile. After President Carter's efforts to curb U.S. arms exports to the region the Soviet Union became the top arms exporter from 1979-1983.\textsuperscript{60} The bipolar competition guaranteed that regional states would always have access to military hardware. This situation contributed to arms races in the region that in turn, contributed to huge budget deficits that plague many Latin American states until today.

The frequency of U.S. intervention in the region during the Cold War, because of the perceived threat of communist revolution, is another symptom of instability caused by bipolarity. Because U.S. leaders viewed the actions of many Latin American states through the prism of the Cold War, the U.S. was more likely to intervene when there was a perception of Soviet involvement. During the Cold War Latin American sensitivities increased with each U.S. political or military effort to curb revolution, beginning first in Central America and Caribbean, but also in less traditional areas such as Brazil and Chile. This issue contributed to tension, which plagued U.S.-Latin American relations, affecting regional stability in the process.

Even though bipolarity may cause more instability than unipolarity, Joanne Gowa shows that multipolarity fares even worse. When Gowa performed an analysis on the effects of bipolarity and multipolarity on trade she found a greater likelihood that

\textsuperscript{60} Ibid., 78.
bipolarity will contribute to an open market system than multipolarity, bringing more stability to the system as a whole. The finding led to her comment, "It effectively assigns a large role in the opening of post-war Western markets to the transition from a multipolar to a bipolar international security system that occurred simultaneously." 61 Gowa contends that the refusal of the U.S. to assume a leadership role led to multipolarity during the interwar period, destabilizing the global system. Her analysis can be interpreted as an indication that the more concentrated the leadership function in a given system, the more likely cooperation may occur.

Many scholars agree that a greater concentration of power brings greater stability to a system. John Lewis Gaddis comments, "It is a curious consequence of bipolarity that although alliances are more durable than in a multipolar system, defections are at the same time more tolerable." 62 Waltz proposes that bipolarity is more stable than multipolarity because it is easier for states to track the capabilities of two states as opposed to more. 63 When capabilities are easier to track, the increased transparency makes states less concerned with marginal increases and decreases of power. Under multipolarity Waltz points out that in Europe every state was continually worried about the gains of several other states, refusing cooperative efforts even when mutual gain was possible. By comparison bipolarity during the Cold War "created a situation that


permitted wider ranging and more effective cooperation among the states of Western Europe."\textsuperscript{64}

Snidal hypothesized that multipolarity has the potential to be a more stabilizing influence on a system because its presence increases the predictability of state behavior. He points out that, "Because rational state behavior is less affected by relative gains, cooperation is easier under multipolarity."\textsuperscript{65} Therefore there is less need for states to track each other's behavior, nullifying the argument multipolarity may decrease stability because states feel compelled to monitor each other's capabilities; a more difficult proposition in instances of dispersed power arrangements. However, Snidal admits that his study does not take into account the argument that identifying and therefore punishing non-cooperators in a multipolar setting is more difficult. Because states cannot perfectly discriminate behavior in respect to other states, the possibility for decentralized enforcement decreases. Without proper enforcement cooperative agreements are more difficult. Snidal concludes that, "In brief, there is insufficient evidence to support the claim that multipolarity has increased cooperation."\textsuperscript{66}

From the discussion above the conclusion reached is that unipolarity, and thus hegemony, is the most likely structure to generate stability and security cooperation. The assumption of hegemonic stability that a singular center of power in a given system results in a greater chance for cooperation than more distributed systems is supported by

\textsuperscript{64}Waltz, "Reductionist and Systemic Theories." 58.


\textsuperscript{66}Ibid., 201.
a review of the effects of the three different power alignments on the chances of security cooperation. This analysis supports the contention that power asymmetry should be treated as a corollary to hegemonic stability.

There is ample evidence that a hegemonic system may increase the prospects of security cooperation. However, there is little discussion in the literature that power asymmetry may work to erode security cooperation which is the primary focus of this study. Therefore, the next step is to determine the likely indicators of power asymmetry. The ability to measure state power over time is key to understanding when asymmetry occurs. Power measurement in this study is based on economic and security indicators. Not only will the study seek to measure power across time to broadly demonstrate the hegemonic relationship, but also to show how power fluctuates over time. Data will be offered on military spending and GDP of key states for comparison purposes. The statistics will show that the regional dominance of the U.S. has existed since the end of the nineteenth century and most of the twentieth century. The measurement of the relative dominance of the U.S. to the rest of the region over time will chart any sharp increases or decreases and will be compared with increases or decreases in security cooperation.

Indicators of interdependence are also important to measure security cooperation, in both the military and economic spheres. This is because during times of power asymmetry it is likely that the weaker states in the system are increasingly sensitive to their dependence on the hegemon. Conversely, when the hegemon's power differential with weaker states grows at a reduced rate, weaker states are likely to be more amenable to the policies of the dominant states, and less sensitive to interdependence. Therefore,
the study will note increases and decreases of Latin American dependence on the U.S., and its general effect on regional relations.

This study will demonstrate many of the assertions made in this section. The case study chapters will show that hegemony creates more stability than other security structures. The U.S.-Latin American system offers many examples. For the last hundred years the region has not witnessed a large multi-state conflict, a claim no other regional area can make. On the contrary, the activity of the hegemon guided many regional rivalries to a state of peaceful coexistence. Argentina and Brazil maintained tense relations since the time of their independence until the 1980s, spending millions of dollars during a Cold War arms race. By the 1990s this relationship was so improved that the two states signed a historic trade agreement forming the core of Mercosur. Argentina and Chile avoided conflict over the possession of territory on their Southern border. More recently, a long-standing dispute between Peru and Ecuador was successfully concluded by U.S. sponsored negotiations. The record of major conflict, and deaths due to conflict, compares favorably to all other regions in the world during the same time frame.

Using these power indicators two points of time emerge as moments where power asymmetry began. The first one was the culmination of the rise of U.S. power at the end of the nineteenth Century. The second one took place after World War II. Two examples of a reduction of U.S. power will also be presented, one more dramatic than the other. The first one was due to the Great Depression; the second one was due to economic crises that occurred during the 1970s.
OTHER REGIONAL THEORIES

There are many theories besides hegemonic stability that address the change in security cooperation among states. These theories include state-level phenomena, such as form of government, economic structures, and culture. Although they are worthy of review because of their prominence in the regional debate, and because they address the security cooperation issue, they do not fit the structural theme of this dissertation.

Culture has become a frequently cited concept since the end of the Cold War. Huntington’s volume, *Clash of Civilizations*, is symbolic of the popularity and influence of culture as a causal variable to explain systemic instability. Huntington points out that culture is important to states because, “States define threats in terms of the intentions of other states, and those intentions and how they are perceived are powerfully shaped by cultural considerations.” However, he turns the realist versus liberal dialogue on its side, and shows he may share philosophical qualities with both sides, but also frames their debates under the cultural rubric. “States with similar cultures and institutions will see common interests.” In other words, the primary determinant of whether states will cooperate, or not cooperate, is based on the similarity of their cultures.

Huntington believes that the cultural trend of the post Cold War order means that globalization is both a negative and positive force. He sees the state losing power to international organization as well as cultural sub-groups from within. In the immortal words of Benjamin Barber, “The planet is falling precipitately apart and coming

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67 Huntington, 34.

68 Ibid.
reluctantly together at the very same moment.\textsuperscript{69} The only place where this may not cause chaos is within civilizations, although it may affect civilizations as well. A recent example of Huntington's thesis is the growing security ties between English speaking countries. Australia, Canada, New Zealand, United Kingdom (U.K.), and the U.S. As these ties grow stronger, the connections of the U.S. with NATO are growing weaker, as a clear example of the strength of culture over institutions.

The culture debate in the Americas predates Huntington. The culture-based thesis is typically divided into one of two camps in the regional literature, those that hold the U.S. accountable for detrimental regional relations, and those that blame Iberian culture. Lars Schoultz's volume, \textit{Beneath the United States: A History of U.S. Policy Toward Latin America}, is an example of the literature that takes the U.S. to task. A common assertion against the U.S. is that its Latin American foreign policy is usually not well managed.\textsuperscript{70} For example, Abraham Lowenthal suggests three changes to improve U.S.-Latin America relations, each one directed at the U.S., as though Latin America had no ability to affect change.\textsuperscript{71} However, Schoultz seems to think the blame is far deeper than a benign neglect and inept policies. Schoultz maintains that a feeling of cultural superiority, based in part on racial stereotypes, generates a capricious U.S. outlook towards Latin America. This policy is also driven by private economic interests. \textquotedblleft...the


need to protect U.S. security, the desire to accommodate the demands of U.S. domestic politics, and the drive to promote U.S. economic development.”72

Schoultz states that all problems between the U.S. and Latin America lie at the door of the U.S.: “While security concerns ebb and flow, domestic U.S. politics have been central to the explanation of nearly every important issue of U.S.-Latin American relations, beginning in the early 1820s....”73 In Schoultz’s essay most U.S. historical interventions south of the border were due to the internal machinations of U.S. politics with little or no regard for benefit or detriment of other hemispheric states. Schoultz maintains that the Reagan Administration’s refocus on the perceived communist threat in Central America was due to a misinformed U.S. populace. He argues that President Bush invaded Panama strictly for his own political aggrandizement and President Clinton’s signing of the Cuban Liberty and Democratic Solidarity Act was purely a cynical measure to gain the state of Florida’s support in the next election. Blame spans the century, since it is explained that the 1898 Teller Amendment was responsible for the rise of Cuba’s leader, Fidel Castro, and the resulting acrimony between U.S. and Cuba.74 Schoultz ends his work characterizing the contemptuous nature of U.S. cultural attitudes towards Latin America, explaining that U.S. Presidents have malignantly treated Latin American leaders as an: “…unwelcome dog at a garden party, giving us a glimpse of how


73Ibid., 370.

74Ibid., 372.
little has changed in the two centuries since John Quincy Adams and his generation fashioned the mold that still constrains our thinking."

It is apparent that Schoultz believes the fundamental problem in Latin American-U.S. relations lies with U.S. culture. Lawrence Harrison believes the opposite, as argued in his book, *Underdevelopment Is a State of Mind*. Harrison writes that most of Latin America's troubles derive not from the U.S., but from internal dynamics fed by undesirable cultural traits. He dismisses dependency theory, already called into question by mainstream critics in the U.S. and abroad, pointing out that many former colonies, such as Hong Kong, Singapore, South Korea and Taiwan left the ranks of underdeveloped states. They would not have been able to do so if the malevolent effects associated with dependency theory had truly burdened developing states. In the volume Mariano Grodona, a contributing author, lists cultural characteristics differentiating developing states from the rest. The author maintains that the values of developing states are virtually the same throughout the world, not an isolated Latin American phenomenon. Harrison points out that a particularly noteworthy area of culture study focuses on problems associated with corruption in developing societies.

Francis Fukuyama agrees with the cultural argument, noting that "virtually all serious observers understand that liberal political and economic institutions depend on a

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75 Ibid., 386.


healthy and dynamic civil society for their vitality.\footnote{Francis Fukuyama, \textit{Trust: The Social Virtues and the Creation of Prosperity} (New York: The Free Press, 1995), 4.} Fukuyama believes that the social capital in a society, resulting in a particular kind of culture found in all successful states, is just as relevant as the financial capital. Family-centric business and politics are a characteristic of developing cultures. Fukuyama points out that the lack of trust in developing states can lead a tight network of family and friends who depend solely on that network rather than on state institutions. These family networks are a shield against the problems in developing societies, but can also be a hindrance to modernization. Other researchers found that modernization does not automatically lend itself to the disintegration of large family groups. \footnote{Manuel L. Carlos and Lois Sellers, "Family, Kinship Structure, and Modernization in Latin America," \textit{Latin American Research Review} 7, no. 2 (Summer 1972): 113.} Instead, the modernization process is being molded into the existing family and kinship institutions and areas of traditional family function.\footnote{Manuel L. Carlos and Lois Sellers, "Family, Kinship Structure, and Modernization in Latin America," \textit{Latin American Research Review} 7, no. 2 (Summer 1972): 113.} Although these traditional social structures spring-up and are renewed as a result of poorly performing national government, their continuation hinders the potential improvement of government performance.

Another body of literature concentrates on Latin American reform at the state level to address the internal problems of Latin American states. Many analysts contend that if the right economic and political reforms were instituted most if not all Latin American states would reach new heights of economic and social prosperity. The logic continues that if such progress could be made, most security problems that are currently on the agenda will be ameliorated. For example, in one of Jorge Domínguez's recent
publications he begins by stating, “Today there are few matters more crucial to the
construction of democracy in the Americas than how governments deal with an array of
new security challenges.” Notice that construction of democracy is the primary focus
of the introductory sentence. The assumption is that by instituting internal reforms Latin
American states will be able to change their condition of underdevelopment. Other
studies delve deeper into Latin America democracies searching for tendencies in the
region that may undermine democratic reforms. Scott Mainwarring and Timothy R.
Scully contend that the successful consolidation of democracy is contingent on the
institutionalization of a party system.

The democratic peace theory is one of the more controversial theories of
democratic development literature. Its proponents and detractors remain divided over its
utility. David Mares researched the notion that democracies do not go to war with each
other in relation to the Americas. He found that democratic peace theory did not hold
ture for the region. Mares found that the assumption that voters in a democratic society
want peace was not something that should be assumed. He also found that, “Variations
among democratic institutions affect the immediacy and directness of voters’ ability to
punish or even observe decision-makers.”

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A body of literature that addressed the need for democratic reform in Latin American states dominated by military rule can also be included in the state-level school of thought. Latin American militaries were at one time viewed as the largest impediment to democracy in the region. Some works viewed the problem as connected to any state with a weak civilian government since the military by nature was organized and motivated.\textsuperscript{83} Richard L. Millet and Michael Gold-Biss has determined that military threat to democratic governments has subsided, and the main problem is now the disintegration of regional militaries since many lack a clear mission.\textsuperscript{84} Some of the state-level literature focuses on economic reform in Latin America, believing that democracy is dependent on a flourishing market economy. Regional agreements such as the NAFTA, the Southern Common Market (Mercosur) and the proposed Free Trade Area of the Americas (FTAA) are all topics of economic development category.

State-level explanations do not have the ability to fully explain the lack of U.S.-Latin American security cooperation. They focus on variables that describe characteristics of states, but cannot explain how these characteristics directly impact the system. By contrast the systemic level perspective allows the scholar to observe and address the reoccurring patterns in regional security relations without having to explain the internal dynamics of each state. The structural approach allows this study to explore the stress points that emerged over time as indicators of the level of security cooperation between the U.S. and Latin America.

\textsuperscript{83}For a good example of work on this topic see, Alfred Stepan, \textit{Rethinking Militant Politics: Brazil and the Southern Cone} (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1988).

CONCLUSION

A foundational point of hegemonic stability theory is that a concentration of power into one dominant state breeds stability. At the heart of hegemonic stability theory is the assumption that the presence of a strong hegemon is equivalent to a system more conducive to cooperation, a secondary effect being stronger international organizations.

This study challenges the notion that the presence of hegemon only creates cooperation, and the logic that increases in hegemonic strength only leads to more cooperation. Although it may seem intuitive that increasing the power of the hegemon leads to more security cooperation, since domination increases and with it the power to dictate terms and support more institutions, this study maintains that there is a point at which higher levels of power concentrated in the hegemon creates mistrust between the hegemon and weaker states. In turn, this distrust creates an undercurrent of non-cooperation that may erode the benefits of stability imparted by the hegemon.

There are two ways the hegemon spreads its influence, through manipulation of material incentives and altering the substantive beliefs of weaker states. Their differences help explain the mechanics of how distrust is manifested under power asymmetry. Altering substantive beliefs occurs over long periods of time, socializing weaker states so their views are in basic compliance with the hegemon. By comparison the manipulation of material incentives are more direct in serving the hegemon’s immediate goals, such as ending a conflict or stemming a monetary crisis. Weaker states are much more sensitive to the use of material incentives since this expression of hegemonic power is far more visible. During times when strong power asymmetry
exists, the sensitivity of weaker states increases, just as the likelihood of hegemonic states to rely on material incentives as a means to spread its influence increase.

Applying hegemon stability theory to the current power alignment in the Americas region demonstrates that the region has a hegemonic structure. Although the Cold War affected U.S. hegemony in the region during the last century, the U.S. was still considered as the primary regional power. Power indicators demonstrate the point, as well as the number of U.S. interventions in Latin America compared to Latin American regional interventions. Much of the literature on U.S.-Latin American relations reinforces this point.\(^5\)

Many hegemon stability scholars concentrate on the economic power of the hegemon in creating stability in the hegemonic system, however this study focuses on the security aspects of hegemonic stability. As Gilpin and others agree, security is an under-emphasized element of hegemonic stability because the distribution of public goods will give rise to a relative gains problem. The relative gains dilemma introduces security issues and assures that weaker states in a hegemonic system will compete by finding alternatives to the hegemon or aligning with the hegemon. The alternatives to the hegemon can be found outside of the system or by forming an internal alliance against the hegemon, as the case study chapters will demonstrate.

The power asymmetry argument supports the assumption that one dominant state in a system creates stability, but allows the scholar to make inferences in regard to the ebb and flow of the power of the dominant state, and its affect on the system. In other words a hegemonic system does not create the same amount of stability in the system over time. Power asymmetry assumes that if a particular hegemonic power has a comparatively high level of power asymmetry then a reduction of the hegemon's power may result in greater security cooperation. The goal of an analysis utilizing power asymmetry is that it seeks to explain the lack of cooperation and the instability it causes in a hegemonic system.

The history of the OAS is an important example of this dynamic. The U.S., as the hegemonic power, was fundamental to the creation of the organization, but within ten years of its inception, the inability of the U.S. to pass motions favorable to its regional foreign policy became apparent. The cause can be attributed to power asymmetry. The hegemonimic relationship allowed enough regional cooperation to create the OAS. It also helped that when the OAS was created, U.S. strong hegemony did not yet affect regional relations. By 1965 the strength of U.S. hegemony reestablished itself and regional security relations suffered accordingly. After this time the OAS ceased to operate as a consensus building institution for regional security crises. Hegemonic stability and power asymmetry maintain a symbiotic relationship. Hegemonic stability is the framework and power asymmetry may provide insight when hegemonic stability is most likely to create security cooperation.

The questions raised by power asymmetry are important. The current and foreseeable future tells us that the U.S. will remain the primary regional power.
Nevertheless, it is far more beneficial to elucidate how to derive and sustain cooperative behavior under these conditions. Furthermore, the process provides insights for other regions.

The review of state level theories of regional cooperation demonstrated that they lack utility in trying to explain the broader dynamics of hemispheric cooperation. Theories that focus on forms of government, types of economic systems or culture point to differences between states. However, these differences do not point to a causative reason for problems in U.S.-Latin American security relations simply by implicating the actions of a state. An explanation of how states interact should not be based on lists of characteristics that make them distinct, but of the consistent behavior of units despite their individuality. Theories that pertain to culture, to form of government, or to structure of economy are not particularly useful at explaining broad patterns in international relations. A synthesis of state-level theory usually involves a normative judgment, such as Harrison and Schoultz's essays on culture. Harrison makes the final judgment that Latin American culture is responsible for its own lack of development and subsequent problems with the U.S. By comparison, Schoultz comes to the opposite conclusion: the U.S. is the reason for ongoing problems in inter-American relations. The prescription recommended in each case is that the culture of either Latin America or the U.S. must change. Not only is such a recommendation highly unlikely, but also has polarizing effects bound to increase any divide the authors hope to ameliorate. The consideration of power asymmetry might explain the fluctuation of security cooperation among regional states and recommend courses of action to improve regional security cooperation.
The next four chapters will review particular time periods in U.S.-Latin American relations to note when systemic power asymmetry occurs, and how it relates to security relations. Chapter three will specifically focus on the roots of hemispheric relations, covering the time period from the 1820s until after World War II. During this period the U.S. grew into the role of a strong hegemon by the early twentieth century, became a weaker hegemon with the onset of the Depression, and at the end of World War II rose to strong hegemony once again. The chapter will address the question, as all the case study chapters: Did the periods in which the U.S. had a high level of power compared to Latin American states result in lesser or greater security cooperation?
CHAPTER III
THE FORGING OF U.S. HEGEMONY (1823-1944)

This chapter offers a brief review of the history of Latin American-U.S. security cooperation, from its beginnings in the early 1800s to the end of World War II. The level of U.S. power, relative to Latin America, fluctuated from one extreme to the other during this time period. The U.S. ascended to regional hegemon after the end of its Civil War. By the end of the 1800s it was widely acknowledged as the dominant state in the region. The hegemonic status of the U.S. was signified by its initial attempt at building a regional security institution, the Pan American Union. As the power of the U.S. grew in comparison to Latin American states, so did its penchant to intervene in the Caribbean and Central America. By the 1920s regional relations deteriorated to the point that the Pan American meetings generated little cooperation and many Latin American leaders were suspicious of U.S. motives.

The U.S. economy collapsed because of the Depression and ushered in a new era in regional relations. Relations steadily improved, paving the way for close security cooperation during World War II. After the war U.S. power swung again in the opposite direction, increasing the dominance of the U.S. once again. The power fluctuations during this time period provide an important test of this work’s main research question. If there was a notable decrease in security relations between the U.S. and Latin American when the U.S. power was at its peak during the early 1900s, and relations improved during the time period from 1930-1944, then the conclusion lends support to this dissertation’s central assertion. Chapter 3 is by no means a comprehensive historical review of all
security related events during this time frame. The chapter specifically concentrates on issues especially pertinent to regional security.

GROWTH OF POWER ASYMMETRY

Simón Bolívar and James Monroe were the authors of the two initial efforts to create institutionalized inter-American security. Simón Bolívar attempted to integrate Spanish American states by proposing a security pact. Bolívar and José de San Martín led their forces to victory over Spanish troops during a war that lasted fifteen years, ending in 1825. The victory resulted in the independence of Argentina, Bolivia, Chile, Ecuador, Peru, and Venezuela.¹ Bolívar was motivated to bring the former Spanish American colonies together in a security pact involving Argentina, Central America, Chile, Colombia, Mexico, and Peru.² Bolívar's ultimate goal was "to form a truly American League, a society of brotherly nations, a society whose federated strength could oppose [European powers]."³ To this end he proposed a meeting, the Congress of Panama, inviting the representatives of former Spanish American colonies in 1826.


²Although Argentina signed a formal treaty with Colombia, it was only a demonstration of friendship rather than a deeper expression of security cooperation. J. Lloyd Mecham, *The United States and Inter-American Security, 1889-1960* (Austin: University of Texas Press, 1961), 30-31.

The U.S. was supportive of the arrangement as a security measure against intrusive European powers, and was invited by Bolívar to participate to the extent the U.S. was interested. Despite the invitation, Bolívar was not seeking U.S. membership. As he once stated, "The North Americans and Haitians would be a foreign substance in our body." He actually viewed the U.S. as an equal rather than a guarantor of Latin American independence, thinking that a united Spanish America would compete with the U.S. for power and authority. Bolívar viewed Great Britain as the guarantor of the security for his new state, a plan Britain opposed because its over-extended security commitments during the period.

President James Monroe was supportive of Bolívar’s initiative to keep European states from seeking to re-colonize Latin America. He stated to a British minister on the topic of Latin American independence that the system of modern colonization was in his mind an abuse of government and should immediately come to an end. The British were already showing their antipathy to the diffusion of U.S. influence in the Caribbean. British concerns caused the U.S. to be cautious in its support of Bolívar’s security commitment to the Pan-American initiative. As a consequence Monroe instructed the

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4Mecham. The United States and Inter-American Security. 31-33.

5Masur. 411.

6Ibid. 417.


U.S. attending the meeting to show support for the growing republican movement, but not to commit to any arrangements during the Congress of Panama.9

Monroe had set the tone for future U.S. policy when he issued what came to be known as the Monroe Doctrine in late 1923. Bolívar’s document and the Monroe Doctrine differed although both aimed at creating regional solidarity against European intervention. Bolívar’s pact was issued through a multilateral process in the Congress of Panama, the original Monroe Doctrine was a unilateral declaration. Both documents were opposed to European intervention in the Americas. Monroe was ambivalent about supporting the emerging republican sentiment in Latin America, and avoiding the provocation of European powers, particularly Great Britain. As former President Thomas Jefferson advised Monroe, “Great Britain is the nation that can do us the most harm of any one. ... and with her on our side we need not fear the whole world.”10 The hope was that the Spanish-American republics could consolidate themselves into a single state, an ambition that seemed tenuous at best. Therefore, the U.S. had to avoid a situation in which it was forced to face a hostile European power alone. U.S. leaders were also concerned that political turmoil in the newly independent Latin American Republics would make an enticing opportunity for ambitious European states. As Monroe’s Secretary of State, John Quincy Adams said, “It was one thing to tell Europe to keep its hands off the Western Hemisphere, but it was another to join hands with those weak

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Latin American governments in the spirit of equality and fraternal affection.\textsuperscript{11} The Monroe Doctrine was an internal compromise created to defend U.S. ideals abroad, and protect U.S. domestic interests. It boldly warned the more powerful monarchies of the world, chiefly Spain and France, to not meddle in American affairs. However, it moderated its audacious warnings by stating the U.S. did not seek to interfere in the internal matters of Europe.\textsuperscript{12} The Monroe Doctrine amounted to a foreign policy statement with no enforcement mechanism.

In 1847 a second Latin American conference convened in Lima, Peru. This meeting was focused on repelling the efforts of Spain to reestablish its control over Ecuador, a former colonial possession. The former President of Ecuador, General Juan José Flores, headed the effort. He created an army composed of Spanish and British forces and garnered the support of Britain and Spain. The states of Bolivia, Chile, Ecuador, New Granada (present day Colombia), and Peru attended the Lima meeting. A U.S. delegation was invited in an observer capacity. The U.S. Charge d'Affaires, J. Randolph Clay, led the contingent.\textsuperscript{13} Attending states were able to agree on at least one important point: Reaffirmation of the nonintervention principle originally proposed at the Pan American meeting. Clay wholly supported the conclusion, assuming it was directed at Europe and therefore coincided with U.S. policy goals. However, some analysts point out that the principle of territorial integrity was directed against the U.S., as the U.S. was


\textsuperscript{12}Dent, 3. The original message was not intended to be controversial, but Dent points out that the Library of Congress lists over 425 analytical works focus on this piece that make it the most studied presidential doctrine in the history of U.S. policy.

\textsuperscript{13}Mecham, \textit{The United States and Inter-American Security}, 41.
involved in a war against Mexico at the time. The U.S. sought security measures to guarantee regional state sovereignty from any threat outside of the region, Latin American states also wanted the same guarantee, but also to include protection from U.S. interference. This important difference would be a key issue in how both sides viewed regional security through the twentieth century.

Latin American states were wary of U.S. expansionism, but they were even more alarmed at the more imminent threat of European intervention. From their viewpoint a powerful U.S. could be not only a potential competitor in security and trade issues, but also an advocate in keeping European interventionism at bay. Despite its doubts about the U.S., “the victory of the Union in the U.S. ‘s Civil War drew the U.S. and the sister republics of the Western world into closer bonds of friendship.”

The growing power differential between the U.S. and Latin America created a short-term impression that the U.S. could play the role of a benevolent security guarantor for the region. In the later part of the nineteenth century it was the only state in the Americas that had the power to deter colonial ambitions. However, at the first sign of U.S. interventionist activity, the security arrangement’s unilateral origins would eventually lead to problems in the regional security dialog. During the U.S. Civil War, France and Spain attempted to regain former possessions in the new world. Spain tried to

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15Samuel Flagg Bemis, *The Latin American Policy of the United States* (New York: Harcourt, Brace and Company, 1943), 115. The Union victory provided an obstacle for European regional ambitions not only in Latin American, but in the U.S. as well. British support of the Confederacy also promised a return of British influence in the U.S. if the Confederacy had been victorious. A Confederate victory also would have allowed a new wave of European conflict and colonization in Latin America.
bolster its presence in the Caribbean by reoccupying the city of Santo Domingo. Spain also took the Chincha guano islands off of Peru, rich in valuable nitrate deposits. After the Union’s victory in 1864 the U.S. pressured Spain to vacate both territories. Spain relented, cognizant of the military capability of the U.S. Under U.S. insistence Spain left Santo Domingo, and the Peruvian islands by 1865.\textsuperscript{16}

France invaded Mexico with the support of Britain and Spain. At the cessation of Civil War hostilities Secretary of State William Seward demanded France remove its troops from Mexico. Seward invoked the Monroe Doctrine and placed 25,000 soldiers under the command of General Sheridan on the U.S.-Mexican border.\textsuperscript{17} The threat forced France to capitulate, fully withdrawing from Mexico by 1867. These examples of the U.S. defending Latin America from aggression outside the hemisphere gave legitimacy to the Monroe Doctrine as a regional security institution, despite the fact it was unilaterally mandated and enforced.

The U.S. also played a positive role in regional security relations, playing a leading role in trying to bring the Paraguayan War to an end, which lasted from 1865-1870. The war began by a series of events that escalated the conflict to a major war by 1865. Paraguay began the conflict by seizing Brazilian territory in what it believed to be a preemptive strike. The attack pitted Paraguay against Argentina, Brazil and Uruguay. The war was enormously destructive, killing an estimated 200,000 Paraguayans alone.

\textsuperscript{16} Ibid., p. 112.

\textsuperscript{17} Ibid.
and reducing its prewar national population of 75 percent.\textsuperscript{18} The Triple Alliance lost over 100,000. The conflict was the bloodiest in Latin American history.

In 1867 the U.S. began to make notable efforts to broker a peace treaty between the combatants.\textsuperscript{19} Although the combat continued until the Brazilian led forces crushed the Paraguayan opposition, the role of the U.S. was notable in that it assumed a prominent regional struggle that did not directly involve U.S. interests. The actions of the U.S. helped secure its maturing position of regional hegemon, demonstrating leadership in most security issues, even when the U.S. was not directly affected.

In the immediate aftermath of the Civil War the status of the U.S. changed from a major regional power to a world power. U.S. foreign policy became more assertive in defending its foreign interests. In the mid-1800s U.S. presidents had been constrained from aggressively asserting U.S. interests because of the Monroe Doctrine. By comparison, after the Civil War, the growing power of the U.S. allowed President Ulysses S. Grant to pursue a regional security policy using the Monroe Doctrine as a validating tool. Grant harbored ambitions of expanding U.S. influence in the Caribbean in order to secure naval bases. Permanent basing could strategically position the U.S. to protect the Atlantic sea-lanes from European encroachment. Grant wished to annex the Dominican Republic to this end.\textsuperscript{20}

\textsuperscript{18} Thomas E. Skidmore, \textit{Brazil: Five Centuries of Change} (New York: Oxford University Press, 1999), 62.

\textsuperscript{19} Ibid.

\textsuperscript{20} Bemis, 114.
The U.S. Congress actively blocked Grant’s plans for expansion, doing so in the name of anti-imperialism. However, the preponderance of U.S. power continued to have an influence on the realignment its interests and foreign policy. As U.S. military and economic capability began to dwarf Latin America’s, its ability to affect change, through military and economic means increased. From the perspective of weaker states, outside involvement in domestic affairs, whether the cause altruistic or not, still amounted to unwanted intrusion into their internal affairs and smacked of the European imperialism many American states had fought so hard against in gaining their independence.

At first the growing asymmetry benefited regional relations. Its newfound stature was used to arbitrate disputes between Europe and Latin American states. In one such case Venezuela asked the U.S. to invoke the Monroe Doctrine in 1881 to defend it from the British. The U.S. agreed, and through diplomacy brought the British to arbitration.\(^{21}\) By the end of the nineteenth century favorable opinion of the Monroe Doctrine was not universal in Latin America, but it was still viewed positively in many quarters. In 1894 a monument was erected in Rio de Janeiro in honor of Monroe. The official U.S. dispatch to Washington read:

“Their [the Brazilians] aim is to erect a monument in honor of the great American statesman and the doctrine that bears his name. It is also their desire to bring about the solidarity of the American Republics, carrying them from without European influence or interference.”\(^{22}\)

The year after the monument was dedicated in Brazil the Dominican Republic’s Chargé de Affaires, Mr. A. Wos y Gil. requested U.S. assistance against a potential French


intervention. Republican political movements throughout Latin America viewed the U.S. as the model for the hemisphere. As early as 1878 Brazilian liberals openly contemplated U.S. institutions as a "splendid illustration of the principles of free government... who constructed a great free government in defiance of the traditions of the monarchies of Europe."  

It is notable that Latin American states did not seek a separate security arrangement to balance against the U.S. at this time. The natural distaste of the U.S. for conquest, due to its anti-colonial history, contributed to a Latin American sense of security. The U.S. was certainly in a position to press its economic and military advantage farther. Former U.S. Secretary of State Seward wrote to this point:

"I can confidently say that the United States is not seeking nor desiring any conquest here or abroad, and that, contrary, they seek and desire nothing more in regard to any part of America than that it may safely remain, under the care of its own people, in the enjoyment of republican institutions."  

The Latin American perception of the U.S. was benign since there was no collective response to the growing power differential between regional states and the U.S. This fact is demonstrated by the lack of an active security dialogue among Latin American states. However, the more the U.S. intervened during the close of the century, the more Latin American faith in the U.S. as a guarantor of regional security eroded.

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23 The statement reads, "In case of such an event transpiring (French intervention), I beg to say to your excellency that my Government, in defense of its rights and the principles of justice upon which its cause is based, is disposed to resist all coercive acts and to solicit the assistance of the Government of the United States." Ibid., 240.


When U.S. power grew, and Latin American states remained weak, the U.S. was able to intervene nearly unhindered. As some Latin American states politically faltered, the U.S. continued to intervene to prop up or replace regional governments. The repetition of these events began to force a Latin American realization that the U.S. perceived other regional states as a second-class citizen in regional security affairs. H.S. Ferns noted the growing Latin American resentment:

"They [the U.S.] had robbed the Mexicans of their frontier lands: Texas, New Mexico, and upper California. They had bought the Russians of Alaska. By the 1890s they were looking for fresh fields of influence to control. The purely defensive doctrine of President Monroe was subtly transformed into a claim to primacy in the two American continents." 26

Whereas the Monroe Doctrine worked to the advantage of Latin American states when they sought to marginalize European ambitions, the opposite effect was that the U.S. was able to invoke the document without being concerned that regional states may disagree with their reactions.

Most of the goodwill shared among the states of the new world began to dissipate as the century drew to a close. The Baltimore Affair, a regional incident that occurred between the U.S. and Chile, demonstrated the level of growing anti-U.S. sentiment during this time-period. The Baltimore Affair was precipitated by U.S. involvement in the internal political affairs of Chile. The U.S. was supporting the government of President J.M. Balmaceda against the forces of the Constitutionalist. Balmaceda claimed the presence of a U.S. Naval warship, the San Francisco, was present to directly support him. These claims were denied by the ships captain, but to no avail: the Constitutionalists considered the U.S. as a threat. Supporters of Balmaceda filled the

U.S. embassy for protection, and the new Chilean government demanded they be turned over to them for trial.27 The U.S. embassy refused, and popular sentiment in Santiago rose against the U.S., prompting large demonstrations outside the U.S. compound.

During these events sailors from the U.S.S. Baltimore were permitted to visit the city on shore leave. There was an altercation in a saloon between two U.S. sailors and a Chilean sailor. When the U.S. sailors attempted to leave they were assaulted by a mob, one being killed, the other being seriously injured. Thirty-six other crewmen from the Baltimore were detained over night then released.28 Tensions dissipated by January of 1892 due to three separate acts by the Chilean Government. To avoid war Chile withdrew a request for the recall of the foreign representative of the U.S..29 “disavowed an offensive statement by its own Washington envoy, and suggested that the Supreme Court of the U.S. adjudge the question of damages suffered in the Baltimore matter.”30 The U.S. responded favorably to these measures ending the crisis and averting open conflict.

The Baltimore Affair had a lasting impression on Chileans. Joyce Goldberg explains. “The Chilean abhorred the arrogance and impatience of the U.S. in the

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27Henry Clay Evans, Jr., Chile and Its Relations With the United States (Durham: Duke University Publications, 1927), 144-145.

28Ibid, 146.

29Oscar Espinosa Moraga, La Postguerra del Pacifico y la Puna de Atacacm (1884-1899), (Santiago de Chile: Editorial Andrés Bello, 1958), 66.

30Robert N. Burr, By Reason or Force: Chile and the Balancing of Power in South America, 1830-1905 (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1974), 197.
Baltimore affair—the insulting way in which they were forced to capitulate."\(^{31}\) What the U.S. considered a minor incident had a strong affect on the Chilean national outlook towards the hegemonic power of the U.S. Chile realized that the U.S. could have a large impact on its internal affairs, but Chile had little impact on the foreign policies of Washington. Resentment towards the U.S. led Chile to refuse participation in the Chicago Exposition of 1893, and to support Spain against the U.S. in the War of 1898.\(^{32}\)

As the power of the U.S. grew and European influence waned, U.S. interventions in the Americas tended to look less altruistic and more in U.S. self-interest. By this time the U.S. government was fully recovered from the economic and political consequences of the Civil War. National industrial development was flourishing, the Western frontier was mostly settled, and the growth of U.S. capital had to be invested outside of the country. Some analysts believed growing U.S. prosperity influenced the tendency to intervene during this period. The U.S. had to look abroad for other markets in order to compete with European rivals. In support of these ambitions the U.S. began to increase its sphere of influence to protect growing U.S. foreign interests and trade routes in the Caribbean.\(^{33}\)

The U.S. became a world power during this period, and most of Latin America could not maintain the same level of growth. The pattern of colonization in Latin American, compared to the U.S., is one potential explanation for the divergence in


\(^{32}\)Ibid.

\(^{33}\)Bemis, 123.
development. The Spanish and Portuguese colonists were more interested in exploiting the wealth of the new world with hopes that this would increase their social status in their home countries of Spain and Portugal. The driving force behind Iberian colonization was to ... "seek their fortune in the shape of gold and silver and to return home with it as soon as possible."\textsuperscript{34} Since their time in Latin America was to be as brief as possible families were almost always left in Europe, only occasionally visiting the Americas if at all. Not only did the families of colonizers remain in Europe, but frequently their capital was sent home as well, depriving Latin American states the ability to foster the development of financial institutions. This experience contrasted markedly to that of the U.S. and Canada that were primarily settled by families looking for new life rather than supporting the old.

Another contrast between U.S. and Latin American colonization concerned the settlement of border issues. As the U.S. embarked on its era of manifest destiny—spreading from the Atlantic seaboard to the Pacific—Latin America remained mostly in political turmoil. The U.S. filled in its continental borders by 1868; today many parts of South America are still plagued by border disputes.\textsuperscript{35}

Latin America's political turmoil contributed to a weaker position, making their ability to expel European domination difficult. The Argentine and Brazilian elite supported British economic investment. This situation eventually led to a natural distrust

\textsuperscript{34}\textit{ibid.}, 12.

\textsuperscript{35}It must be noted that the expansionism of the U.S. during this era was primarily accomplished at the expense of Mexico (acquisition of the territories of Texas, California and Oregon). Bemis' analysis blames Mexico's political anarchy and poor decision-making as much as manifest destiny policy of the U.S. for the Mexican American War (1846). Bemis, 54.
of Britain by both states. The degree of entanglement led to calls for British intervention in Argentina by English businessmen when Argentine political instability occurred.36

By contrast, because the U.S. was born upon the military defeat of the strongest European power, colonizing powers avoided direct confrontation with the U.S. The same could not be said for most of Latin America. In Mexico there was little resistance to French occupation during the mid to late nineteenth century due to monarchist sympathizers among Mexican elite. Brazil existed as a monarchy with strong ties to Portugal from 1823-1889, and if not directly under the control of a European power, severely constrained by them because of debt or political pressure. Schnieder believes that in the case of Brazil its late political development is mostly responsible for its overall development problems: “Although it contributed to a prolonged period of internal peace and stability, this system [monarchy] had negative implications for political development because parties lost any capacity to serve as vehicles for modernization and change—a situation prevailing to the present.” 37 The fractured societies of Latin American, lacking a significant middle class, did not seem to be cohesive enough to form strong institutions that could withstand outside influences or create internal political stability.

THE PROMISE OF PAN AMERICANISM AND THE REALITY OF WILSONIANISM

Under the rubric of the changing power dynamic between the U.S. and Latin America, the first Pan-American Conference was held in 1889. Since the time of Bolívar and Monroe the power of the U.S. had grown considerably. The U.S. had traditionally

36Fern, 118.

sought to keep European interests from interfering in its domestic affairs. Secretary of State James G. Blaine particularly viewed Great Britain's extensive commercial involvement in Latin America as a threat to the U.S. Blaine's purpose for convening the meeting was to establish the U.S. as the leading economic and military power in the region, and by this action, countermanding British influence.38

Blaine's personal experiences led him to regard all European powers with suspicion. France's and Spain's attempts to take advantage of the U.S. preoccupation with the Civil War angered him, but British partiality for the Confederate side during the Civil War instigated a extreme Anglophobia within him.39 Many Latin American leaders shared Blaine's opinions. Based on these mutual interests, the U.S. and Latin American delegates agreed to oppose any territorial acquisitions by aggression or conquest.40 Blaine thought that a security agreement might support Latin American stability, and this stability would increase trade between the U.S. and the rest of region. To this point he said "First, to bring about peace and prevent future wars in North and South America; second, to cultivate such friendly, commercial relations with all American countries as would lead to a large increase in the export trade of the United States..."41 The U.S. began to assume duties as the regional hegemon as it continued to arbitrate regional


40Crapol, 120.

41Lockey, 53.
conflicts, such as the War of the Triple Alliance between Argentina, Brazil, Paraguay, and Uruguay, and the Pacific War involving, Chile Bolivia, and Peru, among others.\textsuperscript{42} 

Blaine’s opening comments to the thirty-seven delegates emphasized his ambitious goals.\textsuperscript{43} During the opening moments Blaine noted to participants, “…no conference had ever assembled to consider the welfare of territorial possessions so vast, or to contemplate the possibilities of a future so great and so inspiring.”\textsuperscript{44} Blaine followed his introduction with a statement that he regarded as the Pan-American Creed:

\begin{quote}
We believe that we should be drawn together more closely by the highways of the sea, and that at no distant day the railway systems of the north and south will meet upon the isthmus and connect by land routes the political and commercial capitals of all America.

We believe that hearty cooperation, based on hearty confidence, will save all American States from the burdens and evils which have long and cruelly afflicted the older nations of the world.

We believe that a spirit of justice, of common and equal interests between the American States, will leave no room for an artificial balance of power like unto that which has led to wars abroad and drenched Europe in blood.\textsuperscript{45}
\end{quote}

Despite Blaine’s visionary words, and extensive efforts, the conference did not accomplish all that he had hoped for. Some progress was made. He was able to gain consensus on the adoption of four declarations, and more importantly the establishment of a bureau of information in Washington. This bureau was titled the International Union

\textsuperscript{42}The War of the Triple Alliance (1865-1870) pitted Argentina, Brazil, and Uruguay against Paraguay. The War of the Pacific (1879-1883) resulted in the defeat of Bolivia and Peru by Chile. Blaine personally involved himself in the mediation of the War of the Pacific by attempting to arbitrate an end to the conflict. Crapol. 72.

\textsuperscript{43}Ibid., 26.

\textsuperscript{44}Ibid. 74.

\textsuperscript{45}Ibid.
of American Republics. This institution still exists, evolving into the Pan-American Union, and in 1948 becoming the Organization of American States.

The efforts of Blaine continued as the U.S. and its Latin American counterparts committed to meet in Mexico City. Despite growing resentment of the U.S. during the period, the meetings continued in Rio de Janeiro, and then in Buenos Aires. None of the Pan American conferences before the Great Depression made notable progress on security issues. U.S. regional assertiveness was an impediment. The eviction of the Spanish from Cuba in 1898, and subsequent occupation of the island angered some hemispheric leaders. Howard J. Wiarda explains, The Spanish-American War of 1898 led to "considerable sympathy in Latin America toward Spain and to a common suspicion of and even hostility toward the United States, which had humiliatingly defeated Spain."

Latin American states interpreted President Theodore Roosevelt's "big-stick" diplomacy as evidence of a growing policy of interventionism by the U.S. Roosevelt's regional policies resulted in Cuba and Panama being claimed as protectorates. The U.S. assumed customs control over the Dominican Republic. Its unilateral activities created considerable mistrust by Latin American states. J. Lloyd Mecham points out that this era gave rise to an embedded anti-U.S. element in Latin American society: "Yankee phobe intellectuals were becoming popular in Latin America." These events influenced the agendas of Pan American meetings (see Table 3.1 below), and ensured that they avoided important security topics. The most lasting

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decision taken during the series of five meetings, after the initial conference, was during the fourth meeting in Buenos Aires that created the Pan American Union. Security cooperation was not fully absent in the Americas since states committed to meet under the auspices of the Pan-American conferences. However, their inability to address the most important issues of the day impeded their ability to make any meaningful progress.

When Woodrow Wilson was elected President, he was determined to reawaken a moribund relationship between the U.S. and Latin America, and push

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<td>First Int’l Conf. of American States</td>
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for greater regional integration. The means by which he pursued this goal struck a blow to his own cause. President Wilson understood that the U.S. needed to regain the trust of Latin American states in order to pursue the broader strategic goal of minimizing the European presence in the hemisphere. Wilson’s ambitions ran counter to that of most

\footnote{William Spence Robertson, \textit{Hispanic-American Relations with the United States} (New York: Oxford University Press, 1923), 398. Also, the Pan-American Union was housed in a million dollar building funded by Andrew Carnegie.}
Latin American states. They were increasingly relying on their European ties as a counterbalance to U.S. hegemonic regional power, circumventing U.S. security interests that sought to deflect European influence from hemisphere. This pattern would repeat itself during the 1970s and 80s. It was becoming increasingly clear little progress was being made in the regional security dialog. The U.S. continually sought regional support to keep other powerful states away from the Americas. By comparison Latin America sought support from outside powers to uphold their state sovereignty due to concern of U.S. dominance.

Wilson's methods increased Latin American skepticism concerning U.S. intentions. His regional policy reconciled his democratic ideals with the core interests of the U.S. As many past U.S. Presidents: Wilson believed that Latin American political instability created a security problem for the U.S. It formed an environment that allowed powers from outside the hemisphere to manipulate the internal affairs of these states. Wilson also believed that it was the responsibility of the U.S. to push Latin American political development by guiding fellow American states towards constitutional democracy. Therefore Wilson had a moral and \textit{realpolitik} solution: intervene when Latin American governments became untenable. Wilson's policies were considered extremist in Latin America. For example, Wilson refused to recognize any regional government that came to power that was not democratic. In essence, every Latin American government had to be certified by Washington as democratic. This was an unacceptable


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encroachment on the sovereignty of Latin American states, a paternalism that brought regional relations to an all-time low. The U.S. traditionally recognized any Latin American government that came to power, its legitimacy judged by the stability it created. Wilson's policies towards the region was a reflection of what Kaman refers to as a uniquely U.S. brand of "utopian pragmatism".\textsuperscript{51} Latin Americans considered Wilson's policies towards the region as an indirect form of intervention.\textsuperscript{52}

Under Wilson the U.S. militarily intervened in Haiti, Dominican Republic, Mexico, and Nicaragua.\textsuperscript{53} The U.S. also pursued a policy of electoral intervention in states it occupied. Repeated intervention stirred Latin American animosity. Latin America's displeasure manifested itself in many ways. Mexico supported the Nicaraguan rebel, Augusto Sandino, who fought against U.S. occupation. Argentina was at the forefront of regional efforts to push the ideal of hemispheric nonintervention that was directed specifically against the U.S. Argentina became a regular antagonist of all U.S. led security initiatives during Pan American meetings.\textsuperscript{54}

Two dynamics may have soothed Latin American antipathy towards the U.S. First, Latin American economic growth surged for sixteen years without pause in the


\textsuperscript{52}Atkins. 223.

\textsuperscript{53}For example, Wilson's occupation of Veracruz, Mexico, in 1914 lasted a half-year and provoked an unexpected backlash against the U.S., surprising the Wilson administration. Jan Bazant, \textit{A Concise History of Mexico: From Hidalgo to Cardenas, 1805-1940} (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1977), 143.

\textsuperscript{54}Argentina viewed itself as a rival to the U.S. as its economy significantly grew before World War I and Argentine leaders frequently played Britain against the U.S. Ferns. 119.
early twentieth century before the Great Depression, averaging thirteen percent a year.\textsuperscript{55}

Second, most U.S. interventions took place in Central America and the Caribbean, far away from Bogotá, Buenos Aires, Caracas, and Rio de Janeiro. However, by the 1920s Latin American leaders viewed Pan-American cooperation in a negative light due to continued U.S. unilateral interventions. Rather than seeing it as a forum for inter-regional cooperation, many Latin Americans viewed Pan-Americanism as a moniker to justify the U.S. imperialistic ambitions.\textsuperscript{56}

RENAISSANCE OF SECURITY RELATIONS

From 1929-1945 there was significant improvement in inter-regional security cooperation.\textsuperscript{57} This was primarily due to the secondary effects of the Great Depression on U.S. foreign policy. These secondary effects included President Franklin D. Roosevelt’s “Good Neighbor Policy”, resulting in less U.S. regional intervention, and the corresponding growth of Latin American trust. The U.S. became more conciliatory on regional security issues, ameliorating concerns of U.S. regional ambitions. The goodwill generated by this era aided the U.S. as it recruited regional allies during World War II.

A key component of the Good Neighbor policy was the Roosevelt Administration’s affirmation about the principle of nonintervention. Roosevelt understood the benefits of a ‘hands-off’ approach. Domestically, this strategy paid


\textsuperscript{56}Mecham, \textit{A Survey of United States-Latin American Relations}, 101.

\textsuperscript{57}Ibid., 86.
dividends by giving Roosevelt’s Democratic Party strong support in the U.S. South.

Roosevelt had decided that federal directives on U.S. racial relations should be curbed, and to that end let southern state and local governments decide how race relations should be managed. Roosevelt hoped to transfer his domestic ‘nonintervention policy’ to the hemisphere and reap similar rewards.  

Roosevelt’s strategy sought to avoid regional intervention, but also the advent and continuation of the depression played an important role in dampening U.S. enthusiasm towards incursion to the south. Because of the depression the pragmatism of the U.S. outweighed its idealist impulses. The U.S. could not afford to maintain its past interventionist policy as it also dealt with the burden of the depression. Frederick Pike remarks “Just as they [U.S. leaders] had found high principles with which to justify intervention that sometimes sprang mainly from hopes of economic gain, so now they found rationales to justify discarding interventionist policies that cost too much.”

Although the depression of 1929 affected both Latin America and the U.S., it comparatively affected the U.S. to a greater degree. The U.S. lost the market for its manufactured goods, severely impacting its substantial middle and upper classes. By comparison, the Latin American elite suffered losses in South and Central America, but since the middle class was modest in size there was less disruption in Latin American societies. A large part of the population was involved in subsistence agriculture. an

58Roosevelt let the South determine how to run its race relations without federal interference, giving the Democrats a great deal of popular support in the region. Frederick B. Pike, *FDR’s Good Neighbor Policy: Sixty Years of Generally Gentle Chaos* (Austin: University of Texas, 1995), 164-165.

59Ibid., 165.
endeavor that continued despite the downturn in U.S. and European demand for Latin American raw materials.

Both academics and politicians broadly supported Roosevelt's Good Neighbor Policy. Part of the motivation behind U.S. interventions into Cuba, the Dominican Republic, Mexico, Nicaragua and the Philippines was tied to the Wilsonian idea that the U.S. could recreate its domestic success abroad through direct political, cultural and economic change in a given state, brought about through military intervention. By the 1920s it was becoming clear to policy-makers in the U.S. that "uplift or cultural change could not be imposed on others, and therefore...change should not be imposed on others." After the depression the lesson was underscored by the failure of the economy of the U.S. The U.S. had lost faith in its superior economic, political and cultural structures, and therefore lost the impetus to wish it on other states.

What seemed to be a setback to U.S. power and self-esteem seemed to benefit regional relations. The Good Neighbor Policy was well received in Latin America. Even Latin American populists admitted that, "It was a step forward as far as the aggressive behavior of the United States was concerned..." Argentine leaders traditionally viewed all U.S. policies of the era with suspicion. However, several commentaries in Argentina were effusive about Roosevelt: "Mr. Roosevelt governs a democracy and personifies its ideals of welfare and tranquility, which are the ideals of the whole of

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60 Ibid.

The New Deal and Good Neighbor Policies made Roosevelt "a symbol of high achievement and of roseate hope for the future" in Latin America.\textsuperscript{62}

At the Seventh International Conference of American States, in 1933, all states repudiated the practice of unilateral armed intervention. This time, the noninterventionist statement was championed by the U.S. delegation. During the Buenos Aires (1936) and Lima Conference (1938) the U.S. augmented its popular noninterventionist policy with an economic policy designed to increase U.S. imports from the region. The outcomes were beneficial for the cause of interregional cooperation. Between 1929-32 the U.S. accounted for 35 percent of total Latin American trade, and by 1938 this increased to 45 percent. During this period trade increased by a total of 236 percent between the U.S. and Latin America, comparing favorably to Latin America's trade with Europe, that increased at a substantially lower percent.\textsuperscript{64} The increase in U.S. trade and decrease in intervention improved relations and reduced Latin American concerns of U.S. domination.

The amelioration of tensions between the U.S. and Latin America came at a fortuitous time for the U.S. Because of the improved climate the U.S. was able to lobby Latin American states to support its war efforts against axis powers after the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor. Brazil allowed the U.S. to construct air and naval bases in the northeast to defend the Atlantic and against a potential German invasion from Africa. Further a Brazilian expeditionary force of 25,000 men fought in Italy, sustaining 451

\textsuperscript{62} Dozer, 28.

\textsuperscript{63} Ibid., 27.

\textsuperscript{64} Department of Commerce,\textit{ Foreign Commerce and Navigation of the United States for the Calender Year 1937} (Washington, D.C.: 1939), 785-786.
casualties and 2,000 wounded. Other countries contributed. Guatemala allowed the construction of a bomber base in its sovereign territory, and Nicaragua a naval patrol station near Corinto. Other facilities were erected in Colombia, Ecuador, Panama, and Peru. Brazil and other regional states gave the U.S. preferential pricing on important raw materials. Concerns about U.S. intervention gave way to a high degree of security cooperation never previously experienced. The only two states that did not immediately cooperate were Argentina and Chile. Chile later relented and chose the Allied side. It had been concerned with the problem of defending its long coast from Axis attack. However, Argentina remained friendly to the Axis cause during the war due to the pro-German disposition of its military and monetary payments it received from Germany.

The creation of the Inter American Defense Board (IADB) in 1942 at Rio de Janeiro, was a notable milestone for regional security relations. The IADB was directed to be a consulting agency designed to deal with communications security, aviation, naval protection of shipping and transportation. It was created to allow closer coordination between the U.S. and its allies during the war, but due to its success has endured until today. The security cooperation by Latin American states would not have occurred without the sharp decrease in U.S. power that essentially abrogated the interventionist policy of the Wilson era. When U.S. power decreased, regional security cooperation improved.

67 Ibid., 224.
Today the IABD mission’s include: providing technical military advice and consultant services to the OAS, overseeing an academic program through the Inter-American Defense College, and convening a meeting with member states representatives. The meeting is composed of an organization, the Council of Delegates, are from twenty member countries, and meets bimonthly to review approaches on common security issues.

CONCLUSION

As U.S. hegemony grew during the 1800s two discernable trends emerged in order. The first was that the U.S. was increasingly recognized as the regional leader. The second was that as U.S. power asymmetry increased, Latin American attitudes towards U.S. leadership became less receptive, and U.S. policies became more assertive, forming another obstacle to productive security relations. These difficulties can be attributed to the growth of extreme power asymmetry in U.S.-Latin American relations.

As the power gap between the U.S. and Latin America increased under U.S. hegemony, security cooperation became more tenuous, and as the power gap decreased, security cooperation became less difficult. During the formative stages of U.S.-Latin American security relations, from the early 1800s to the period after the Civil War of the U.S., neither of the two sides were clearly dominant. Although the U.S. won its independence from Great Britain, and won Britain’s support of the non-interference clause of the Monroe Doctrine, Latin American states were still unshielded from European intrigue. The relative equality of regional states was underscored by Bolívar’s view of the U.S. as a regional competitor rather than a guarantor of Spanish American
security. Despite hegemonic overtones, the Monroe Doctrine was not threatening to Latin America states, gaining acceptance in Latin America since all regional leaders were concerned about European encroachment on their sovereignty, but few were apprehensive that intervention might occur from the U.S. One might be tempted to conclude that this time period shows multipolarity may generate security cooperation, however states must regularly meet through an established institution to demonstrate some level of cooperation. Regional states were mostly in a formative stage and this stage of regional maturity would not be reached until the end of the century.

The U.S. Civil War had several outcomes that deeply affected the regional security dynamic. An immediate impact was an increase in regional interventions by European powers as they sensed a power vacuum, since the U.S. was preoccupied by internal conflict. Another outcome was the ascendency of the U.S. to the position of regional hegemon, a position it has not yet relinquished. The U.S. ended the Civil War as an emerging world power, championing regional security cooperation by ending the French occupation of Mexico, the Spanish occupation of Santa Domingo and the attempt to broker a peace agreement in the Paraguayan War. After this point the Monroe Doctrine became the focus of regional security, enjoying a degree of support in Latin America despite its unilateral nature. This period lasted until the 1890s, when Latin American opposition to U.S. hegemony began to more openly assert itself during the first Pan American conference, and the Spanish American War.

As U.S. power grew, so did its foreign interests. When the century drew to a close, U.S. power was increasing in the region. With the growth of U.S. power, the Monroe Doctrine increasingly resembled a tool for U.S. dominance from the Latin
American perspective rather than a regional security institution. The growth in U.S. power coincided with an increasing Latin American mistrust of the U.S., producing an environment ill suited to create security cooperation. The *Baltimore* affair is a manifestation of this dynamic. The U.S. was able to dictate a favorable outcome in this situation due to its dominance. Chile grew to resent the influence of the U.S. in its internal affairs, and its inability to commensurately affect U.S. policy.

Blaine inaugurated the first Pan American conference in 1889 to address mutual security interests in the region, the first indicator of hegemonic institution building. The conference produced some positive results, but a single demonstration of U.S. goodwill was not enough to overcome growing Latin American pessimism about U.S. intentions. Blaine hoped to draw Latin American states closer to the U.S. by showing the strength of its economic and political structures. Some Latin American dignitaries were impressed, but not convinced that they must adopt U.S. practices to achieve the same results at home. Further, a few delegates interpreted U.S. vitality as a threat.

The Pan American conferences continued despite the growing schism between the U.S. and Latin America. U.S. military activities in Cuba, Haiti, Nicaragua, and Panama raised alarms throughout the region. Wilson's unabashed policy of intervening in Latin American states was a sign of strong hegemony of the U.S. To many in the U.S., Wilson's policy that sought to generate more regional democracies was morally correct. The Latin American perception of these policies was that they perpetuated U.S. domination. Any positive impact of the Pan American meetings was nullified by the U.S. rise to strong hegemony, reflected in its active regional interventionism. The irony of the Monroe Doctrine began to emerge: through the document the U.S. guaranteed the safety
of the America’s from outside intervention; however, Latin American states increasingly viewed the primary threat as the U.S., emanating from within the region.

The trend of higher levels of power asymmetry and Latin America discontent continued until the advent of the depression in 1929, affecting regional security by discouraging states from socializing the political and economic values that the hegemon openly encouraged. Although the U.S. was able to establish a regional institution to address security issues, the growing power asymmetry in the system abrogated the full effectiveness of the institutions. Although the Good Neighbor Policy ameliorated regional tensions to some degree, the U.S. still did not win support from Argentina and Chile during World War II, and had to grant concession to Brazil and Mexico to secure their backing.

The U.S. had neither the ability nor the desire to continue Wilson’s interventionist policies as a result of the depression. The depression dampened U.S. hegemony and laid the groundwork for a rapprochement between regional states. The U.S. clearly maintained the status of the dominant state in the region, but lacked the will or capacity to actively intervene as in the past thirty years. The Roosevelt Administration’s Good Neighbor Policy, that eschewed regional interventions, was a symbol of the reduced regional hegemony of the U.S. The cooperative behavior among regional states slowly resuscitated the concept of a regional security partnership. World War II was the catalyst to introduce a new era in regional security cooperation by prompting the creation of the IADB that was specifically tasked with
researching security issues and recommending actions based on the studies it produces.\(^6\)\(^8\)

The strength of U.S. hegemony after World War II foretold that the OAS would have limited effectiveness as a security cooperation institution. The actual level of power asymmetry was at its apex after World War II, when the U.S. comprised half of the world's GDP. Despite the high ambitions for regional security after the war, cooperation minted during the early 1940s seemed to completely dissipate by the late 1950s. Chapter four demonstrates a pattern repeated in the study: the growth of U.S. power compared to Latin American states leading to difficulties in regional security cooperation.

From 1945 to 1969 U.S.-Latin American security relations began from a solid foundation, freshly minted by four years of economic and security cooperation against the axis powers during World War II. Rather than sustaining this solid foundation the following fifteen-year period had a corrosive effect on inter-American security relations. By 1969 security cooperation levels had deteriorated to their lowest point since before the depression.

The 1945-1969 time-period supports the argument of this dissertation that extreme power asymmetry may erode the security cooperation gains realized by hegemony. The more state leaders are made aware of the over-bearing presence of a dominant hegemon the less likely they are to participate in security cooperation schemes. Multiple interventions reminded Latin American states that the U.S. had the capability to interfere without consultation in their domestic affairs. Each successive intervention during this time period provoked even stronger reactions from regional states against U.S. policy. Interventions during this period included Guatemala (1954), Cuba (1959), and the Dominican Republic (1965). Instead of bolstering regional unity against the perceived threat of communism, each intervention served to unify Latin America against the U.S. as it reminded them the overwhelming dominance of the U.S. gave it the capability to manipulate regional politics with ease.

Unilateral actions by the U.S. eroded the effectiveness of the OAS. The OAS was the only multilateral tool of consultation, and when it began to fail Latin American states
began to reconsider their economic and military dependencies on the U.S., realizing the extent to which U.S. dominance had grown. Suddenly, Latin American leaders scrutinized every aspect of U.S. Latin-American relations.

The Kennedy Administration noted the ground swell of anti-American sentiment and initiated the Alliance for Progress to shore-up regional support for the U.S. Although appreciated, the Alliance for Progress did not mark an effort on the scale of the Marshall Plan, as many Latin American nations hoped, and in reality only demonstrated a modest increase in total U.S. aid to the region. It is likely, the effort had a positive impact of some kind in suppressing radical anti-U.S. sentiment, but the beneficial impact of the Alliance for Progress was offset by what Latin American leaders perceived as the U.S. preoccupation with Soviet expansion that was one cause of U.S interventionist activity.

REGIONAL HEGEMONY

Table 2 demonstrates the significance of the power differential between Latin America and the U.S. Latin America's total GNP was only fourteen percent of the GNP of the U.S. in 1963, and by 1969 remained at fourteen percent. Brazil has the largest economy in Latin American, and it grew by 27 percent during the six-year period. Mexico's GNP had a higher rate of growth at 36 percent. By comparison, the growth of the GNP of the U.S. was only 24 percent. Although Latin American growth rates were higher than the growth rate of the U.S., it was not enough to substantially alter the fourteen percent gap in total GNP.

The amount of total U.S. military expenditure displayed in Table 3 also demonstrates the dominance of the U.S. in the region. In 1964, the lowest year of U.S.
Table 2. Regional Dominance in Terms of GNP, 1963-1969

![Bar chart showing regional dominance in terms of GNP, 1963-1969.]


defense expenditure, the total equaled nearly $52 billion. The combination of Argentina's, Brazil's, Mexico's and Venezuela's defense spending equals roughly $1.3 billion. The U.S. far exceeded Latin American spending as a percent of total GNP well. In 1967 the U.S. spent 9.5 percent of its GNP on defense. The highest rate of defense spending in the same year was Brazil at 2.7 percent of total GNP.

These statistics show that despite the fact that Latin American states did not have comparable resources, Latin American states did not feel threatened enough to dramatically increase defense spending to match U.S. annual levels. This reinforces the notion that the system was hegemonic and not purely based on dominance or rule of force. Defense spending remained relatively consistent during the eight-year time frame.
Table 3. Annual Military Expenditure, 1963-1970

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Argentina</th>
<th>Brazil</th>
<th>Mexico</th>
<th>U.S.</th>
<th>Venezuela</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1963</td>
<td>308</td>
<td>333</td>
<td>112</td>
<td>52,295</td>
<td>181</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1964</td>
<td>393</td>
<td>678</td>
<td>128</td>
<td>51,213</td>
<td>144</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1965</td>
<td>414</td>
<td>487</td>
<td>136</td>
<td>51,827</td>
<td>166</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1966</td>
<td>473</td>
<td>625</td>
<td>168</td>
<td>63,572</td>
<td>172</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1967</td>
<td>342</td>
<td>740</td>
<td>168</td>
<td>75,448</td>
<td>198</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1968</td>
<td>380</td>
<td>746</td>
<td>188</td>
<td>80,732</td>
<td>194</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1969</td>
<td>435</td>
<td>803</td>
<td>205</td>
<td>81,443</td>
<td>193</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1970</td>
<td>486</td>
<td>1054</td>
<td>220</td>
<td>77,854</td>
<td>204</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


for all states. Since Latin American states did not directly respond to U.S. economic and military strength by increasing their own defense expenditures, it seems U.S. dominance was relatively accepted, meaning that although the U.S. might not enjoy total support for its leadership, the resentment was not strong enough to overcome the benefit of public goods produced by the U.S. It is also interesting to note that Mexico’s total military expenditure was the lowest among the Latin American states listed on Table 3, despite its geographical proximity to the U.S. Although Mexico was one of the greatest detractors of the U.S. in the region during this period, it apparently did not view the U.S. as an imminent threat.

FORMATION AND DEGENERATION OF GOODWILL: 1945-1959

At the beginning of the post World War II era there were few outward symptoms of the problems that later came to characterize hemispheric security relations. Significant cooperation between the U.S. and most regional states during World War II, along with
almost twenty years of a lack of U.S. military and political involvement in the region, contributed to a constructive era of regional relations. However, the dramatic economic and military growth of the U.S. in the World War II era led to new global responsibilities that made the U.S. redefine its regional role to the detriment of regional security cooperation. The U.S. began to view the region less as a partner in security cooperation, and more of a detriment as its rivalry with the Soviet Union ensued. The threat of communism became a regular focus of U.S. policy.

The growth of U.S. power during the war was impressive: during World War II fifty percent of the global GNP was concentrated in the U.S. Yet by the end of the war the U.S. had ninety-eight divisions stationed overseas.¹ The military posture of the U.S. resumed less exaggerated proportions as the post World War II era emerged, however, they demonstrated the preponderance of U.S. regional strength compared to Latin America. The vast asymmetry in regional power that resulted in the strong hegemony of the U.S. did not immediately translate into a deterioration of relations. Just as after the Civil War, when the U.S. quickly ascended to the top tier of states in the global community, the sudden rise of the U.S. seemed to bring a flurry of security cooperation that deteriorated in the following years.

Immediately following World War II security cooperation coalesced around Pan-Americanism. Several Latin American states directly aided the U.S. cause by ensuring the supply of critical war materials; in return the U.S. cooperated with Latin American governments to solve internal economic problems associated with Latin American efforts

Table 4. U.S. Lend Lease Aid to Latin America

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Amount in $ Millions</th>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Amount in $ Millions</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Argentina</td>
<td>NA</td>
<td>Guatemala</td>
<td>3.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bolivia</td>
<td>5.5</td>
<td>Haiti</td>
<td>1.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Brazil</td>
<td>361.4</td>
<td>Honduras</td>
<td>.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chile</td>
<td>23.2</td>
<td>Mexico</td>
<td>39.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Colombia</td>
<td>8.3</td>
<td>Nicaragua</td>
<td>.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Costa Rica</td>
<td>.2</td>
<td>Panama</td>
<td>NA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cuba</td>
<td>6.6</td>
<td>Peru</td>
<td>18.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dominican Rep.</td>
<td>1.6</td>
<td>Uruguay</td>
<td>7.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ecuador</td>
<td>7.8</td>
<td>Venezuela</td>
<td>4.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>El Salvador</td>
<td>.9</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>493.0</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


to support the allied cause.² The U.S. demonstrated part of its economic support for Latin American states that cooperated during and after the war through a program called Lend-Lease aid.³ Child states "Lend-Lease was the major component of the U.S.-Latin American military bilateral relationship and was, in effect, the precursor of the Military

²For example the Commodities Credit Corporation, credits supplied by the Export-Import Bank, contracted to purchase most the crops of Latin American states (e.g.: wool of Uruguay, cotton of Nicaragua, etc.) since Latin America lacked adequate markets during the war. Edgar B. Brossard, “The Effect of the War on Trade in the Americas,” *Pan American Union Bulletin*, LXXVI (December 1942), 661-667.

³The lend-lease program was an arrangement for the transfer of war supplies, including food, machinery, and services, to over thirty nations whose defense was considered vital to the defense of the United States in World War II. The Lend-Lease Act, gave the President power to sell, transfer, lend, or lease such war materials. Leon Martel, *Lend-Lease, Loans, and the Coming of the Cold War: A Study of the Implementation of Foreign Policy* (Boulder: Westview Press, 1979).
Table 4 shows that Brazil received seventy-three percent of the aid. Brazil was the primary benefactor because of the costs associated with the construction of airbases in the North of Brazil, and financial costs associated with its direct military involvement in the European theater. Many Latin American states joined the allied cause during World War II. One exception was Argentina that remained neutral—in reality leaning towards the Axis side—until March 1945, on the eve of Germany’s surrender. During the 1942 Rio de Janeiro Pan-American Conference, Argentina actively sought to dissuade other Latin American states from siding with the U.S. The U.S. retaliated by halting arms sales and loan credits. Argentina maintained its stance due to concerns of U.S. overt aggression and due to the strong U.S. alliance with Brazil.  

Although most countries did not have the military capability to directly aid U.S. operations in the Pacific or European theaters, they instead gave the U.S. raw materials at well below market prices. For example, Chile honored an arbitrary price placed on copper during the war. Chile’s acceptance below market prices incurred economic losses estimated in value from $107 to $500 million. Brazil not only gave raw materials such as rubber and coffee to the US at devalued prices, but also directly took part in the war effort. In August of 1942 Brazil declared war on Italy and Germany. President Vargas

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sent a 25,000 man expeditionary force, one division, to fight in the Italian campaign in late 1944. The division saw significant action in Italy, sustaining loses of 451 soldiers with 2,000 wounded.\textsuperscript{7}

With the norm of security cooperation pervading hemispheric relations, the IADB was created to aid with the war effort. The IADB was the first dedicated security institution of the Americas, created in 1942 after the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor. The organization's primary focus was to plan the defense of the Western Hemisphere against the Axis threat. U.S. strategists thought that German successes in North Africa would provide them with further motivation to invade South America from East Africa. After the war there was much debate about the mission of the IADB. The U.S. wanted to maintain the Board, other states, such as Brazil, wished to create a permanent organization since the IADB was designed as a temporary measure.\textsuperscript{8} The role of the IADB is defined by the OAS "to strengthen the ties of military cooperation between the American nations with a view to their common defense."\textsuperscript{9} Many Latin American States that had contributed to the allied cause were expecting greater rewards for their loyalty than the U.S. offered. What they did not expect was to witness the U.S. channel billions of dollars into Asia and Europe, primarily benefitting former axis enemies, while scant attention was given to Latin American economic conditions.

\textsuperscript{7} Burns, 359.

\textsuperscript{8} M. Margaret Ball, \textit{The OAS in Transition} (Durham NC: Duke University Press, 1969), 381.

The divide between U.S. goals and Latin American goals were reflected in how each sought to take advantage of inter-American relations. To solidify its position as regional hegemon, the U.S. sought to standardize military equipment in the region by exporting its arms surplus to regional states.\textsuperscript{10} The effort had two advantages: standardization of equipment would guarantee some degree of interoperability among armed forces in case they had to face a common threat, and it guaranteed the U.S. as the primary supplier of arms to the region, also keeping foreign powers out the hemisphere.

The 1948 inter-American conference at Bogotá, established the Organization of American States. In some ways this occasion symbolized the gulf in Latin American and U.S. perceptions about inter-American relations. Regional security cooperation that led to the Bogotá conference began during the opening stages of World War II. During the inter-American conference that took place in Havana, July 1940, the delegates approved a statement "...an attack on one American state is considered as an attack on all American states."\textsuperscript{11} At the Bogotá Conference the U.S. understood the creation of the OAS as a symbol of hemispheric solidarity based on common democratic principles, overlooking the fact that most of its regional allies were at best partial democracies. The U.S. also viewed the OAS as a tool to manage Latin America: "Americans could run their own affairs far away from the UN Security Council where Soviet veto power might be decisive."\textsuperscript{12}


\textsuperscript{12}Ibid., 93.
By comparison Latin American states viewed the OAS as means to address economic and social problems. David Green points out that Latin America thought the special relationship endowed them with the right to expect more economic aid to alleviate its underdevelopment: “Seeing a growing U.S. economic commitment to European construction, some Latin Americans feared that all the prewar and war time plans for postwar development projects in Latin America would once again be relegated to oblivion.” The divergence of views contributed to the deterioration of relations that seemed destined to become more polarized. As one analyst explained, “Pan-Americanism moved into the 1950s with its Northern component growing increasingly conservative, its Southern component increasingly restive, and much of the glue being supplied by alleged Soviet threats to hemispheric security, the Panama Canal, and ‘our way of life.’” With two divergent sets of expectations, security cooperation soon began to erode.

The cooperation generated by convergence of American states against the axis powers became institutionalized with the creation of the Rio Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance in 1947. The Rio Treaty is part of the triad of institutions that constitute the Inter-American system, the other two being the Charter of the OAS and the Pact of Bogotá. The Rio treaty was originally proposed in 1945, before there was a specific threat from the Soviet Union. The treaty directs that members must come to the aid of any regional state endangered by an outside power. Any armed attack by a power outside


of the region is considered an attack against all. Signatories to the Pan-American Union Treaty are obliged to recall chiefs of diplomatic missions, break diplomatic relations, engage in economic sanctions and armed force against any outside aggressor.\textsuperscript{15} No state is bound to use armed force until all members approve the measure. In order for a measure to pass, two-thirds of the signatory members must agree to the action. Perhaps the greatest achievement of the Rio Treaty was that it turned an informal regional association into a formal regional security association. The success of the founding of regional security institutions symbolized growing trust between regional states, and a general acceptance of U.S. hegemony.

The Rio Treaty was followed by the creation of the OAS in 1948 at the Bogotá conference. The document became known as the Bogotá Charter and served as the constitution for the members of the nascent organization. The Charter established three primary organs. An assembly was established to deal with broad policy guidelines. The most important organ was the Meeting of Ministers of Foreign Affairs to act as the Organ of Consultation for hemispheric security threats, settling inter-regional disputes and collective security measures against outside aggression. The Meeting of Ministers of Foreign Affairs consults with the Advisory Defense Committee that is composed of high ranking military officers from each country.\textsuperscript{16} The Council of the Organization of American States (COAS) is composed of one ambassadorial representative from every member state. The most important role for COAS turned out to be the prominence of one

\textsuperscript{15}Mecham, \textit{The United States and Inter-American Security}, 282.

\textsuperscript{16}Atkins, 317.
of its subordinate organs, the Inter-American Economic and Social Council that coordinates OAS economic and social programs.  

The Pact of Bogotá, or Inter-American Treaty on Pacific Settlement, was created during the 1948 Bogotá conference to mediate regional disputes and consolidate the obligations undertaken in connection with previous treaties. The Pact of Bogotá entered into effect with thirteen states ratifying it at the initial conference in 1948.

Regional security cooperation during this period continued outside the realm of hemispheric structures. Latin America was a key ally to the U.S. in the UN assembly during the pre-World War II years. For example, during the pre-World War II years they wholly supported an U.S. sponsored resolution concerning the Korean conflict, enabling the legislation's passage, even if they did not volunteer to send troops directly supporting for U.S. in the Korean War.  

DECREASING COOPERATION UNDER HEGEMONIC BEHAVIOR

Signs of impending problems between the U.S. and Latin American security relations began to surface a few years after World War II. Argentine leaders were traditionally the greatest impediment to U.S. leadership since the first Pan American conference in 1889, and despite the degree of regional security cooperation after the war, remained antagonistic. President Juan Perón led a populist ‘third way’ movement that

\[17\text{Ibid.}, p. 318.\]

\[18\text{John A. Houston, } \textit{Latin America in the United Nations} \text{ (Westport CT: Greenwood Press, 1978)} \text{ 105, 290.}\]
sought a path between capitalism and communism. The goal of Perón was to obtain a position of neutrality for Argentina and encourage other regional states to do the same. The reality was that these efforts were aimed squarely at constraining the regional hegemony of the U.S.

Argentina had never been a strong regional ally to the U.S., so although Perón's actions were evocative, they did not generate much concern in Washington. However, other problems began to appear. As previously stated, Latin American states were generally disappointed at the amount of resources the U.S. made available for Latin American development. Regional states that allied themselves with the U.S. expected a greater reward for their loyalty during the war, and the lack of U.S. attention drew a negative response. Latin American disappointment over the lack of U.S. economic support gave impetus to the creation of the Organization of Central American States in 1951. Dozer states that, "this movement of closer Latin American cooperation was inspired, in part, by the desire of some Latin Americans to free themselves from domination by the United States." The Latin American movement towards regional trade agreements gained momentum into the 1960s, resulting in the creation of the Andean Common Market and the Latin American Free Trade Area (LAFTA). Gavin Boyd and Yale Ferguson trace the inception of these organizations directly to insufficient support of the OAS, leading some countries to bypass the OAS.

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19 Dozer, 316.
20 Ibid., 321.
After years of the institution of Roosevelt’s Good Neighbor Policy the U.S. began a pattern of intervention in Latin America once again. The most controversial of these was in Guatemala (1954), Cuba (1959), and the Dominican Republic (1965). Although the U.S. did not directly intervene by the use of U.S. troops in the first two cases, it played an important role that concerned the U.S. Latin American security partners. The strength of U.S. regional hegemony began to express itself through the increase in interventions, just as the Good Neighbor Policy had represented U.S. weakness, resulting in a decline of intervention.

The willingness of states to participate in U.S. sponsored regional security cooperation was diminished by U.S. involvement in the overthrow of the Guatemalan Government in 1954. Guatemalan instability began after a coup by General Ponce in 1944. As a result, Juan José Arévalo was elected President of Guatemala. His platform of social, political and economic reform polarized the national political debate because of the general perception of his communist leanings. Ponce wanted to overthrow Arévalo and sought help from the U.S. In 1951 President Arbenz was elected, and he intensified Arévalo’s controversial policies.

Under the direction of Secretary of State John Foster Dulles the U.S. prompted other OAS states to support a resolution that called for appropriate action against the domination of the political institutions of an American state.\(^\text{22}\) Although the U.S. sought OAS approval to take action in Guatemala, Secretary of State Dulles warned that the U.S.

was prepared to take unilateral action with or without regional support.\textsuperscript{23} On June 18, 1954, Lieutenant Colonel Carlos Castillo Armas and two hundred men that had been trained by the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) entered Guatemala to take control of the government. The plan depended on the psychological impact, utilizing the radio to convince Arbenz a massive invasion was taking place, when actually a far smaller action occurred.\textsuperscript{24} The Guatemalan Army refused to defend Arbenz, leading to his resignation on June 27.

Although the U.S. was able to procure the support of the OAS, it resorted to strong-arm tactics that raised issues about the ability of Latin American states to make independent decisions. Latin American diplomats at the tenth inter-American Conference in Caracas were pressured by the U.S. to support a measure that allowed the Guatemalan intervention to occur.\textsuperscript{25} Latin American delegates were disillusioned by U.S. tactics, and by the fact that the U.S. did not announce any new aid programs as a favor for their loyalty. Richard Immerman reports that general Latin America disillusionment resulted from the response of the U.S. to events in Guatemala and performance during the Caracas Conference.\textsuperscript{26} Piero Gleijeses writes that Latin American governments were frustrated over the outcome of the Guatemalan Conference. They supported what they

\textsuperscript{23} Gaddis Smith, \textit{The Last Years of the Monroe Doctrine} (New York: Hill and Wang, 1994), 81.


\textsuperscript{25} Stephen Schlesinger and Stephen Kinzer, \textit{Bitter Fruit: The Untold Story of the American Coup in Guatemala} (Garden City, NY: Doubleday and Co, 1982).

\textsuperscript{26} Richard H. Immerman, \textit{The CIA in Guatemala: The Foreign Policy of Intervention} (Austin: University of Texas Press, 1982).
viewed as a weakening of the Pan American ideal yet received no pledges of economic aid in return. The actions of the U.S. worked to de-legitimize the OAS as a multilateral tool, in the process sensitizing Latin American states to the U.S. hegemony.

Latin American states objected more strongly to U.S. actions against the Cuban revolution. In 1960 Fidel Castro began to expropriate all U.S. owned properties in Cuba. In response, the U.S. withdrew its ambassador from Havana. The Eisenhower and Kennedy Administrations approved the military training of Cuban exiles to be used in an operation to overthrow Cuban leadership. The Bay of Pigs invasion took place in April of 1960 and failed primarily due to poor operational and strategic planning. Castro’s increasingly pro-communist stand reduced his popularity within his own army and with the general population. However, the inability of the exile forces to coordinate operations with anti-Castro elements on the mainland doomed any chance of success.

President John F. Kennedy sensed failure and ordered no further support for the U.S. trained force as it invaded Cuba. Without U.S. naval and aircraft support to provide cover for the invasion force, the operation was doomed to fail. After Cuba’s success at repelling the invasion, internal security forces smashed the domestic resistance through the mass arrest of any real or suspected collaborators. The Bay of Pigs failure abrogated

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29 Ibid., 164.

30 Suchlicki reports that anti-Castro forces were only told about the invasion the day it happened since the exile community believed their ranks may have been penetrated by Castro informers. Ibid.
any further direct attempt to unseat the Cuban government by Cuban exiles or U.S. leadership.

Latin American reaction to the U.S. intervention was far from the total support that U.S. leaders had sought. Latin American states understood the Cuban-U.S. dispute as a dominant power exerting influence over a weaker one, not as part of a larger communism vs. democracy ideological struggle. Latin American leaders became more inclined to side with Cuba because they could identify with Cuba's vulnerable position in regard to the U.S. The Latin American view of the U.S. deteriorated after the Bay of Pigs incident, and support of Castro increased throughout the region.\(^3\) Even before the Bay of Pigs, Paterson found that as the U.S. explored OAS mediation to the Cuban Revolution, Latin American diplomats had already began to express sympathy for Castro.\(^3\) The Cuban dilemma provides a looking glass into the deeper problem of U.S.-Latin American security cooperation during the Cold War. The U.S. viewed the security threat as emanating from outside the region whereas Latin American states increasingly viewed the U.S. as the security threat. The difference in perception is intimately tied to the overwhelming power of the U.S. in the region. Because of strong hegemony, the U.S. was free to act unilaterally. Regional approval was usually sought by the U.S., but was not perceived as a determining factor by policy makers in Washington. Because Latin American leaders understood the U.S. only used the OAS as a pretext for its policies and

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demonstrated an unwillingness to accept decisions against it as binding, they began to lose faith in the institution.

Once Fidel Castro gained power and became a self-proclaimed communist the U.S. continued to encounter difficulty garnering regional support against Cuba. The U.S. contended that all forms of communism were instigated by a foreign source the Soviet Union. Latin American policy makers disagreed. As Ball states: "Latin Americans were disposed to feel that an indigenous communist movement represented a legitimate exercise of self-determination against which the American republics were precluded from taking action...". The U.S. requested that the OAS condemn Cuba for inviting Soviet and other communist intervention into the region. Cuba responded by counter-condemning the U.S. for its aggression and intervention. Latin American states at the meeting accepted neither statement, another blow to the U.S.

In the autumn of 1961 a resolution was introduced in the OAS to call a meeting about the issue of Cuban human rights abuses and conducting subversive activities against its neighbors. Six Latin American states did not support the position of the U.S. on the matter: Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile Ecuador, and Mexico. Although the conference was finally held, the best result the U.S. procured from the proceedings was an agreement from other states that Marxist-Leninist principles were antithetical to the values of the inter-American system. A tepid anticommunist proclamation was quite

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33 Ball, 459.
34 Ibid., 460.
different than the U.S. goal to have unanimous support in its quest to have Cuba expelled from the OAS. Fourteen states eventually voted with the U.S., while six abstained. Brazil and Mexico abstained from approving the measure, important regional players the U.S. needed to demonstrate unanimity.36

If U.S. support of interventions in Cuba and Guatemala disillusioned regional states and polarized them against the U.S., the direct intervention against the Dominican Republic in 1965 increased Latin American determination to bring U.S. dominance under control. Lowenthall points out that when the U.S. Marines landed in the Dominican Republic, the last time the U.S. had committed to such an action was over forty years earlier. “Despite repeated involvements in Latin American politics—in Argentina, in Guatemala, and particularly Cuba—the United States had, since 1928, always kept its actions short of overt military intervention.”37 The U.S. not only broke the norm of direct intervention, a norm established by Hoover and Roosevelt that dramatically improved relations over the years, but it did so without consulting the OAS, knowing the OAS would disapprove. This act significantly damaged inter-American relations and solidified the impression of the U.S. as a malignant hegemon throughout much of the region.

The Dominican Republic was continually in turmoil under the increasing unpopular Rafael Trujillo regime. Out of twenty security incidents in the Caribbean

36Ibid., 178.

between 1948 and 1959 the Dominican Republic was the focus of nine of them.\(^{38}\)

During this time, the U.S. utilized the inter-American forum to address the situation in a regional setting. Secretary of State Christian A. Herter emphasized the inter-American commitment to nonintervention over other principles. He believed that overthrowing regimes, even when regarded as anti-democratic, produced disorder and gave a political opportunity for the manifestation of communism.\(^{39}\)

Actions by the Dominican Republic gave the OAS reasons for consternation. In 1959 an aircraft, flying with the complicity of the Dominican Government, accidentally dropped leaflets over Curazao that were intended for Venezuela. The leaflets implored the Venezuelan Army to overthrow the current regime. In later incidents Trujillo was found to have ordered the assassination of the Venezuelan leader and further supported a military uprising in Venezuela. Despite the Dominican Republic's acts against the inter-American norm of non-intervention, and the distaste of Trujillo throughout the region, the OAS agreed to sanctions but would not support direct intervention.\(^{40}\) This was the first time the OAS agreed to sanctions but was motivated by other reasons than U.S. pressure. Latin American states strongly disapproved of Trujillo's attempted assassination of another regional leader; they cared little for the anticommunist agenda of the U.S.\(^{41}\)


\(^{39}\)Herter's position was stated as the Fifth Meeting of Consultation of Ministers of Foreign Affairs in Santiago Chile, 1959. Ibid., 97.

\(^{40}\)Ibid., p. 100.

\(^{41}\)Ibid., p. 102.
In 1961 Trujillo was assassinated and the U.S. dispatched eight ships with a Marine contingent of 1,800 men as a deterrent against any movement by the Trujillo family to retake power. Although the U.S. did this without consulting the OAS, there was no open Latin American criticism of the action. The U.S. committed forty-five military advisors to retrain Dominican forces under the U.S. Military Assistance Advisory Group. Aid was increased by the Kennedy administration to validate the Alliance for Progress program, the aid disbursed after democratic elections resulted in the nomination of President Juan Bosch. However, U.S. efforts were to no avail. Bosch was overthrown by the military in 1963. In April 1965 pro-Bosch forces, or constitutionalists, clashed with military supporters, or loyalists, throwing the Dominican Republic into civil war. The loyalists requested U.S. intervention, and by the end of April, five hundred U.S. Marines landed when it appeared the constitutionalists would win. Eventually, the U.S. reached a total of 20,000 troops at the apex of the intervention.

The Dominican intervention was a turning point in U.S.-Latin American relations. The U.S. helped prevent the constitutionalists from gaining power but the action had a deleterious impact on relations since the U.S. had not consulted with the OAS before it intervened. The U.S. worked to receive OAS approval after the intervention by

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42 Connell-Smith, 176.

43 The U.S. viewed Bosch and his supporters as being too far to the left and therefore the U.S. believed his leadership was inviting another Cuban-style revolution. As a consequence the U.S. did not want to suffer the same fate twice in its own backyard. Dent, 146.

44 Bruce Palmer Jr., Intervention in the Caribbean: The Dominican Crisis of 1965 (Lexington: University Press of Kentucky, 1989), 139-143.
supporting the creation of an OAS force to assume peacekeeping duties.\textsuperscript{45} The OAS voted to pass the measure with the minimum number of votes allowable, fourteen. The force was composed of soldiers from Brazil, Costa Rica, El Salvador, Honduras, Nicaragua and Paraguay. The regional nature of the force symbolically demonstrated unity, however. Chile, Mexico, Uruguay, and Venezuela strongly objected to U.S. actions.\textsuperscript{46} Further, the cosmopolitan nature of the OAS force seemed to be a maneuver to give the appearance of OAS support, when in reality the U.S. unilateral action took the organization by surprise. President Johnson wanted to bring the operation under the OAS umbrella, undoubtedly to use the organization as a legitimizing tool.\textsuperscript{47} As in the case of Guatemala and Cuba, the U.S. Latin American states believed the U.S. was using the OAS as a tool of dominance rather than as a tool of security cooperation where it consulted with states as equals.

Although the U.S. demonstrated that it would rather have regional approval in the Cuban, Dominican, and Guatemalan, interventions it also showed that its dominance allowed it to act unilaterally when it chose. The U.S. urge to act unilaterally was compounded by other differences with Latin American states. Latin America thought economic and social issues were the most relevant to their security and the U.S. thought the Soviet threat was of primary significance. As the schism between the U.S. and Latin America became increasingly apparent to Latin Americans, their support of U.S. interventions declined. They felt they had little to gain by approving of this behavior

\textsuperscript{45}Ibid., 138.

\textsuperscript{46}Connell-Smith, 176.

\textsuperscript{47}Palmer, 46.
when the U.S could similarly identify their states as security threats. In short, the region’s power asymmetry eroded security cooperation.

The U.S. also played a role in the Brazilian military coup that took place in March and April, 1964. President Juan Goulart, a controversial figure in Brazilian politics, polarized the Brazilian electorate and alienated the military by handpicking military leaders sympathetic to his political cause. Goulart increased tension by signing decrees that enforced expropriation of private land and industries without compensation and declared the Constitution unjust and obsolete. Brazilian military leaders assumed from these remarks that Goulart was closely allied with communist revolutionaries and sought to usurp the Brazilian constitution. Mass demonstration occurred both for and against Goulart, convincing the military that a coup would be widely popular. At the height of the crisis the governors of all the major states aligned themselves against Goulart. Goulart had some support by the military, but only in the senior enlisted ranks. The lower ranking enlisted and officer corps were largely against the Brazilian President. By April Goulart was on his way to exile in Uruguay.

The U.S. was indirectly involved in the coup, being responsible for providing training and support for the Brazilian military. One-third of the Brazilian active duty generals in the Brazilian Army received some form of education and training from their


U.S. contemporaries.\textsuperscript{50} U.S. training focused on the perceived communist threat, teaching counterinsurgency tactics to Latin American students.\textsuperscript{51} The Central Intelligence Agency was also indirectly involved by infiltrating Brazilian labor unions, and waged a campaign to alter Brazilian public opinion.\textsuperscript{52} The U.S. embassy played a role by letting potential military conspirators know that the U.S. would not disapprove of a coup if it occurred.\textsuperscript{53} The role of the U.S. is perhaps best summed up by Lincoln Gordon, the U.S. ambassador to Brazil during the crisis: "Brazil is a very large country with a very active political life of its own, and the American voice, although a significant one, is in no sense a controlling one."\textsuperscript{54}

Although the U.S. was not directly involved, the U.S. was partly responsible for the military coup. Its power was so great in the region that any Latin American political leader must have the implicit backing of the U.S. as the regional hegemon or they would find their ability to rule much more difficult. In Goulart's case, he firmly embraced many policies that placed him in the pro-communist camp. This prompted the U.S. to be less active in helping the Goulart government with its debt renegotiation and to lessen


\textsuperscript{51} Wesson, 40.


\textsuperscript{53} Wesson, 40-41.

economic aid. The degree of U.S. control resulted in a backlash by 1968. Brazil's military leadership took an authoritarian turn at this time, leading the U.S. to further its distance from the regime. When the Brazilian military consolidated its control, the move contributed to the nationalist sentiment of the Orlando Geisel government. Growing nationalism combined with growing condemnation from Washington caused the Geisel regime to end close relations with the U.S. Attacks occurred against U.S. interests, protesting the U.S. role in Brazil. In 1966 the home of the U.S. consul was bombed in Porto Allegre, the U.S. Information Service building was bombed in Brasilia. Radical students and Catholic activists blamed U.S. 'imperialism' for all of Brazil's problems. In protest, nationalist kidnapped the U.S. Ambassador on the date of Che Guevara's death as a symbolic gesture.

Most U.S. presidents shared Eisenhower's outlook towards inter-American relations. He believed that regional peace and prosperity would benefit Latin American states, but more importantly keep communism at bay, and therefore serve general U.S. interests. This was the primary impetus behind President Kennedy's ambitious Alliance for Progress initiative (AFP). Policy makers in the Kennedy Administration thought "the

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57 Ibid., 101.

U.S. must seek to bring about stability at a tolerable level of social organization without leaving the transformation to be organized by communists. To this end twenty-two billion dollars were disbursed to the region from 1961-1970. The Kennedy Administration devoted eighteen percent of the foreign aid monies of the U.S. to Latin American, whereas the Truman Administration spent three percent and Eisenhower nine

Table 5. Latin American Aid Sources, 1961-1970

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percent.\textsuperscript{60} Table 5 shows that bilateral aid from the U.S. formed a significant amount of total aid to Latin American during the 1960s. During 1961 U.S. bilateral aid made up 55.7 percent of total aid, and in 1968 it comprised 41.2 percent.

The AFP sought to stabilize the economies, societies, and government institutions of all Latin American states. The Kennedy administration frequently made comparisons between it and the Marshall Plan, eventually regretting the comparison. As the Marshall plan had to instigate the recovery of shattered economies, the AFP was weighted with changing the entire foundation of a society. As pointed out by one observer

"The new program called for new industries, new ways of farming, new systems of education and health care, new attitudes toward government and community responsibility, new relationships between city and country, landlord and peasant, manager and worker."\textsuperscript{61} The indicators of success for the AFP were to improve the life and welfare of Latin Americans, and to this end stimulating economic growth in Latin America at the rate of at least 2.5 percent per year. Although it is difficult to measure the program's impact since many of the infrastructure projects give indirect benefits, the stated goal of 2.5 percent annual growth was not met. In a broad sense neither did it engender regional democracy in the short-run as Latin America experienced a wave of dictatorships during the late 1960s and 1970s.


Despite the ostensibly constructive intentions of the AFP, in some way the aid further reinforced Latin American perceptions of U.S. regional dominance. Many Latin American observers perceived the AFP to be a method of further subjugating Latin America to the U.S. These critics point to the fact that money was given in the form of a loan rather than grants, grants being the preferred method and was the primary form of monetary disbursement under the Marshall Plan. Arthur Schlesinger, Jr. counters this by pointing out,

"If the Alianza’s secret purpose was to lock Latin America more firmly than ever into U.S. capitalist hegemony, presidential speeches stimulating and legitimizing Latin American ambitions for economic independence and structural change seemed an odd way of going about it."

What was stated fifteen years prior to the beginning of the AFP was ironically reinforced during the program’s ten year period. "The more favors we (Latin Americans) receive from the Yankees, the less we like them." Henry Kissinger noted that the AFP’s "programs for social and economic improvement were both welcomed and resented." The ubiquitous presence of the U.S. in Latin American minds was reinforced by the Cuban, Dominican, and Guatemalan interventions, although the AFP was aimed at ameliorating these tensions it reminded Latin Americans that the U.S. had more influence over their lives than their own governments. It is no surprise that the AFP bought the U.S. positive, but limited goodwill from Latin America.

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63 Enrique Santos. El Tiempo. (Bogotá) 1 March 1945.

64 Henry Kissinger, Years of Renewal (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1999), 704.
CONCLUSION

The power asymmetry of the U.S. substantially grew after World War II, as measured by basic power indicators. Because the hegemony of the U.S. went through a period in which it avoided entanglement in regional politics from the late 1920s to the early 1950s, Latin American security cooperation with the U.S. did not immediately suffer from the extreme power asymmetry. Before the end of World War II, when the power asymmetry had been diminished by the Depression, there was great improvement in the willingness of Latin American states to work with the U.S. on security issues. The period immediately after World War II witnessed the fruits of hegemony, represented by the establishment of the IADB, the signing of the Rio Treaty and the creation of the OAS. All three institutions remain important in the inter-American security relationship.

Maingot makes an interesting distinction concerning the U.S. and the Latin American view of sovereignty that began to emerge as security relations deteriorated during the 1950s and 1960s. Latin Americans began to increasingly define sovereignty in a state-centric way that allowed them to resist U.S. leadership, and the U.S. defined sovereignty as democratic governance, that gave them a virtual mandate to intervene in the region.65 As extreme hegemony began to emerge between the U.S. and Latin America, Latin American leaders increasingly sought to use the non-intervention principle of the OAS as a tool to contain U.S. dominance.

Based on this interpretation of sovereignty Latin American states became less willing to commit to security cooperation endeavors with each incident of U.S. involvement in the internal affairs of regional states. Regional states disliked U.S.

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65Maingot, 190-191.
activities in Guatemala, but still supported U.S. declarations in the OAS that recognized the new government. There were stronger reservations against U.S. involvement during the failed Cuban invasion that coalesced against U.S. anti-Cuban activities in the OAS. The U.S. role in the 1964 military coup awoke a Brazilian nationalist sentiment that opposed the U.S., manifested by attacks against its interests and the nationalist policy of the Geisel administration. The direct U.S. intervention in the Dominican Republic drew alarm throughout the region that an era of strong U.S. dominance had returned and had to be resisted.

Divergent Latin American and U.S. views on the goals of security cooperation and the execution of it nullified some of the goodwill generated by the AFP. The goal of the AFP was to reduce regional instability by ameliorating Latin American poverty; institutionalizing democracy and spreading free markets, all typical of many U.S. regional foreign policy initiatives since the time of President Grant. However, the U.S. sought to help Latin America deter what it perceived as communist activity. The U.S. considered all revolution as indicators of Soviet intervention into the region. Many Latin American leaders viewed the revolutions as originating from domestic causes. They considered them indigenous and therefore protected by the right of state sovereignty.

Since the Nixon Administration considered the AFP unsuccessful, it was inclined to look elsewhere to deter what it perceived as a communist threat. The logic was that if normalization of relations with China could deter the Soviet Union, then Soviet efforts to foment revolution in Latin America could be abrogated, and U.S.-Latin American security relations would improve. The improper assumption in this policy is that tensions between the U.S. and Latin America had global roots, when the nature of the quandary
was primarily regional. What the U.S. viewed as a problem of communism supported by Soviet activity, Latin America leaders perceived as aggressive and unilateral U.S. foreign policy.

Chapter five concentrates on the 1970-1979 time frame. The problems created by the U.S. interventions in the 1960s had a lasting impact on regional security relations in the next decade, acrimony reaching even higher levels. The U.S.-Brazilian special relationship that lasted throughout most of the century came to an end in the mid-1970s. Several Latin American states signaled their uneasiness with U.S. hegemony by making attempts to lessen their dependency. They sought out other trade partners to counter U.S. dominance in trade, arms supplies, technology, and financial support. The regional security relation's difficulties were made worse by the two global economic crises that occurred during the 1970s. These downturns weakened the U.S. economy, but also severely afflicted the growth of Latin American states, further hampering efforts at security cooperation.
Security cooperation continued to deteriorate during the 1970s. This dynamic was complicated by the surge in Latin American economic growth followed by the impact of the world oil crisis in the early 1970s and U.S. recession in the late 1970s. Although U.S. political activities were less prominent than during the 1960s, any benefit accrued was nullified by other factors. The U.S. reiterated its policies maintaining that Latin American economic growth was not a regional priority. Instead it continued to focus on Soviet expansionism brought to the forefront by the Guatemalan and Cuban situations from the 1950s. Even the military government of Brazil that the U.S. helped bring to power in 1964 began to distance itself from the U.S. because of diverging interests. Latin Americans leaders reinforced their position that what the U.S. perceived as communist activities in the region, were largely of domestic origin, not a threat posed from the Soviet Union that would legally call for the enforcement of the Rio Treaty. The U.S. quietly disagreed, realizing it would not win regional support in the OAS for its view, and continued to have the perception that any communist movement symbolized foreign intervention through the Soviet Union until the election of President Carter. U.S. interventions declined during this period, but it did not ameliorate Latin American suspicions of U.S. dominance.

Regional relations in the 1970s took place against a backdrop of economic turmoil. The oil crisis and U.S. recession both affected Latin America worse than the U.S. The U.S self-perception was that of a state in decline, and its foreign policies
toward the region became less engaged as a result. Although the U.S. was experiencing economic problems, the collateral effect was worse in other states of the region. Latin American economic decline after several years of growth furthered reinforced insecurities about U.S. hegemony.

Latin American economies substantially grew in the early 1970s along with domestic spending. Its spending spree in the early 1970s caused most of the region to mirror U.S. gloom when the global economic crisis ensued. Although basic indicators show that asymmetry between the U.S. and Latin America remained constant, Latin America was suffering from hyperinflation and indebtedness, giving its leaders the perception the power asymmetry gap was growing. The further deterioration of regional relations prompted many Latin America leaders to actively search for an alternative to U.S. hegemony.

Chapter five begins by reviewing the basic power indicators of the U.S. and compares them to those of the two largest Latin American economies, Brazil and Mexico. In order to emphasize U.S. hegemony, the GNP of the U.S. is compared to an aggregate of all Latin American states. The second section addresses the popularity of dependency theory in the region as a means to describe the negative aspects of the hegemonic relationship. Dependency theory was derived as an explanation for the lack of the development in particular areas of the world. It focused on external factors such as their colonial history and the capitalist world system, rather than internal factors such as the presence of traditional societies. For example, Francis Fukuyama notes that traditional societies that are dependent on familial ties rather than the state for their well-being. In turn Fukuyama believes this dependency on the family perpetuates “low-trust” societies.
undermining state legitimacy. The rise of dependency theory seemed to be a reflection of the deteriorating relations between the U.S. and Latin America. The role of the Soviet Union was also an important factor in regional security relations during the 1970s. How Soviet political and economic actions shaped the U.S.-Latin American security relationship are discussed.

This chapter describes how U.S. policy under President Jimmy Carter sought to reengage Latin America in a security dialog. However, his initiatives had mixed results, and security cooperation continued to decline. The inability of regional states to effectively cope with the Sandinista revolution in Nicaragua was symbolic of the enduring impediments to regional security cooperation. Despite attempts by U.S. leaders to address the crisis in a multilateral fashion, the failure of this effort was another setback for the hegemonic relationship between the U.S. and Latin America.

REGIONAL HEGEMONY

Table 6 shows that the hegemonic status of the U.S. remained intact despite the economic problems of the U.S. in the mid 1970s, and a recession in the later part of the decade. In 1970, the GNP of the U.S. was slightly more than $1.5 trillion, increasing to over $2 trillion by 1979, representing a 25 percent increase. By comparison Latin America’s cumulative GNP stood at $311 billion, increasing to $511 billion by 1979, a forty percent increase. Brazil has the largest Latin American economy. Its GNP was $95 billion in 1970, increasing to nearly $200 billion by 1979, a 50 percent increase. Latin

\footnote{Fukuyama, 62-63.}
Mexico's GNP increased by 34 percent during the same time frame. Despite gains by American economies as an aggregate, they still only amounted to a quarter of the GNP of the U.S.

In terms of total GNP the U.S. gained more than Latin America as an aggregate. However, Latin American exports and imports from and to the U.S. decreased during the 1970s, also decreasing Latin American dependence on the U.S. The Inter-American Development Bank reported that in 1950 Latin America exported 48.3 percent of its goods to the U.S., this decreased to 32.1 by 1975.

Table 6. Regional Dominance in Terms of GNP, 1970-1979

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Brazil</th>
<th>Latin America</th>
<th>Mexico</th>
<th>U.S.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1970</td>
<td>500,000</td>
<td>1,000,000</td>
<td>1,500,000</td>
<td>2,500,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1971</td>
<td>500,000</td>
<td>1,000,000</td>
<td>1,500,000</td>
<td>2,500,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1972</td>
<td>500,000</td>
<td>1,000,000</td>
<td>1,500,000</td>
<td>2,500,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1973</td>
<td>500,000</td>
<td>1,000,000</td>
<td>1,500,000</td>
<td>2,500,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1974</td>
<td>500,000</td>
<td>1,000,000</td>
<td>1,500,000</td>
<td>2,500,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1975</td>
<td>500,000</td>
<td>1,000,000</td>
<td>1,500,000</td>
<td>2,500,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1976</td>
<td>500,000</td>
<td>1,000,000</td>
<td>1,500,000</td>
<td>2,500,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1977</td>
<td>500,000</td>
<td>1,000,000</td>
<td>1,500,000</td>
<td>2,500,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1978</td>
<td>500,000</td>
<td>1,000,000</td>
<td>1,500,000</td>
<td>2,500,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1979</td>
<td>500,000</td>
<td>1,000,000</td>
<td>1,500,000</td>
<td>2,500,000</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


Imports decreased just as sharply, from 50.1 percent from the U.S. in 1950, to 35.9 percent by 1975. The same trend occurred in trade with Europe. Inter-Latin American
trade picked up some of the surplus, with Latin America exporting 9.6 percent of its goods to other Latin American states from 1960-64, but increasing this total to 14.3 by 1975. The import numbers are similar, Latin American importing 12.6 percent of its goods internally in 1960-64, and increasing to 19.4 percent by 1975.²

The annual military expenditure of the U.S. and Latin America also demonstrates the continuation of U.S. hegemony. Table 7 shows that the military expenditure of the U.S. was $122 billion in 1979. By comparison the four states combined equaled not quite $5 billion, or less than five percent of the U.S. total. Brazil’s expenditure as a percent of GNP remained relatively steady, hovering at an average of 1.2 percent; Mexico’s was

Table 7. Annual Military Expenditure, 1970-1979

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Argentina</th>
<th>Brazil</th>
<th>Mexico</th>
<th>U.S.</th>
<th>Venezuela</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1970</td>
<td>594</td>
<td>882</td>
<td>249</td>
<td>77,854</td>
<td>279</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1971</td>
<td>489</td>
<td>988</td>
<td>333</td>
<td>74,862</td>
<td>369</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1972</td>
<td>483</td>
<td>1,096</td>
<td>364</td>
<td>77,639</td>
<td>356</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1973</td>
<td>600</td>
<td>1,288</td>
<td>414</td>
<td>78,358</td>
<td>388</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1974</td>
<td>804</td>
<td>1,392</td>
<td>514</td>
<td>85,906</td>
<td>463</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1975</td>
<td>1,206</td>
<td>1,480</td>
<td>582</td>
<td>90,948</td>
<td>551</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1976</td>
<td>1,290</td>
<td>1,859</td>
<td>567</td>
<td>91,013</td>
<td>560</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1977</td>
<td>1,535</td>
<td>1,719</td>
<td>466</td>
<td>100,925</td>
<td>632</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1978</td>
<td>1,793</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>108,357</td>
<td>643</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1979</td>
<td>1,640</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>122,279</td>
<td>569</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


²Economic and Social Progress in Latin America (Inter-American Development Bank, 1976).
roughly half of that. Argentina had the highest expenditure as a percent of GNP, reaching its zenith in 1978, at 2.8 percent. The lowest year of U.S. expenditure was 1978, at 5.1 percent of GNP, still much higher in comparison to Latin American states. The general trend in the hemisphere was a decline in defense expenditure, probably due to global economic problems in the 1970s. The only state to defy this trend is Argentina that actually increased defense spending from 1.6 percent to 2.8 percent of GNP in 1978.

These statistics broadly demonstrate that the hegemony of the U.S. continued during the 1970s. Despite the continuation of U.S. dominance there are also indications of a lessening in comparative power to Latin American states. Latin American imports and exports to the U.S. decreased, and Latin American economies as a region increased proportionately more than U.S. economy, a trend accentuated by Brazilian and Mexican increases that had a greater average than the region. These statistics suggest a decrease in power asymmetry. However, this time period demonstrates why power indicators may not always tell the complete story. Both the U.S. and Latin America experienced economic difficulties that in turn affected their willingness to cooperate. The U.S. also suffered from unprecedented domestic unrest due in part to the Vietnam War. The remainder of this chapter will detail the effects of these events on regional security cooperation to determine if the change in power asymmetry increased or decreased the level of security cooperation.

THE FAILURE OF DISENGAGED HEGEMONY

The disengagement of the U.S. in the region was instigated by the combination of Latin American recalcitrance and the continued U.S. preoccupation with the Soviet
Union. The Viña del Mar Consensus was presented through the Special Commission for Coordination of Latin America (CECLA), by Latin American leaders, to President Nixon in 1969. It stated that the inter-American system was in a state of crisis.³ It explained that the interests of Latin America were not those of Washington and that Latin America gave more than it received from the United States.⁴ The declaration demonstrated the cumulative impact of the continuation of strong hegemony.

During the Nixon Administration domestic economic crisis and external security issues preoccupied the U.S. leadership. The U.S. had lost the Vietnam War, and suffered through an oil embargo and inflation. One U.S. mainstream weekly magazine declared that the U.S. was "clearly facing a crisis of the decay of power".⁵ Although these events did not signal the permanent decline of U.S. power, they certainly helped give context to the foreign policies of both President Richard Nixon and Jimmy Carter, that consciously sought to limit the expression of U.S. power.

Nixon and Secretary of State Kissinger realized that the U.S. needed to extricate itself from the Vietnam conflict due to its growing unpopularity at home and due to concerns that the U.S. had globally over-committed itself. The U.S. gradual withdrawal from Vietnam represented the limits to U.S. power and a change in U.S. strategic thinking. The ensuing U.S. policy became known as the Nixon Doctrine. The Nixon

Doctrine began as an innocuous press briefing and boiled-down to three constituent elements: the U.S. will keep all of its treaty commitments, the U.S. will provide a shield if a nuclear power threatens the freedom of an ally, and in cases involving other types of aggression, the U.S. will furnish military and economic assistance when requested in accordance with our treaty commitments. However, the U.S. would look to the nation directly threatened to assume the primary responsibility of providing the manpower for its own defense.\textsuperscript{6} Kissinger's concise summary of the Nixon Doctrine was, "our interests must shape our commitments, rather than the other way around."\textsuperscript{7}

Neither Nixon nor Secretary Kissinger considered the Nixon Doctrine a retreat from the international arena, but the oil crisis of 1973 made U.S. leaders realize limits and the concurrent need to reduce U.S. commitments. On October 19, 1973, Arab oil producing countries decided to begin an oil embargo in order to express their collective displeasure concerning U.S. support of Israel during the fourth Arab-Israeli War of the same year.\textsuperscript{8} The Arab embargo was lifted in less than a year, March of 1974, but the impact on the U.S. economy coalesced to the national perception of decline and vulnerability that began with the Vietnamese conflict.

Even before the oil shock of 1973, the U.S. was recovering from inflation induced by the combined effects of soaring food prices and currency devaluation. Table 8

\textsuperscript{6}Gaddis, Strategies of Containment, 298.


Table 8. Increasing Oil Prices, 1970-1980

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Official Price of Saudi Light</th>
<th>Refiner Acquisition Cost of Imported Crude Oil</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1970</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1971</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1972</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1973</td>
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<tr>
<td>1974</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
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<tr>
<td>1975</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1976</td>
<td>0</td>
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<td>1977</td>
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<td>1978</td>
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<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1979</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1980</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


shows that the price of oil dramatically increased in a short time causing global economic destabilization, from the end of 1973 to the beginning of the 1974. The oil crisis negatively affected the U.S. as inflation increased and supply dwindled. The shock of the oil crisis was a turning point in how the U.S. viewed the world. It affected not only the average U.S. consumer, but also changed the worldview of the average citizen. The U.S. was forced to surrender the comfort of energy self-sufficiency and accepted the reality of oil dependence. The U.S. regularly preached to trading partners the benefits of interdependence but never thought that it might impact the U.S. as well. The panic over the oil crisis was magnified by the nationalization of U.S. oil concerns during the last decade in Iraq, Iran, Libya, and Venezuela.

The realization of U.S. limits led the Nixon Administration to view Latin America as a distant foreign policy priority. The U.S. neither paid attention to Latin American interests in social and economic development, nor tried to push its anti-Soviet Union
agenda in the OAS. Blaiser points out that the U.S. was more secure about the non-threat of Soviet imperialism during the early 1970s than it had been during the 1950s and 1960s. This led to the continued deterioration of the OAS as a center of security cooperation. The U.S. ignored Latin American complaints that led to a continued erosion of the ability of the U.S. to lead the region. Changes supported by Latin American states occurred during the proceedings of the 1975 OAS San José meeting. The first change resulted in the introduction of an amendment to expand the definition of security to include development issues. Another important change led to the modification of the Rio Treaty so that only a simple majority vote was needed to lift sanctions as opposed to two-thirds majority rule.

While the U.S. seemed to abdicate its regional leadership under the Nixon and Ford Administrations, Latin American states began to fill the vacuum by charting independent foreign policies. Argentina, Brazil, and Mexico had a common economic experience during the 1970s. They each celebrated strong growth based largely on dependency-inspired economic planning, only to see their progress deteriorate due to a combination of over-borrowing, the oil crisis, and the downturn in the U.S. economy. All these factors combined to cause hyperinflation.

Towards the end of the 1970s Argentina suffered through the storm of economic extremes. Through direct government control of business, subsidization of domestic industries, and import substitution policies, the Argentine economy began to show signs of improvement in the early 1970s. However, constant hyperinflation and the inability of

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domestic industries to mature beyond government sponsorship eroded the Argentine economy, reducing domestic support for the federal government. By the mid-1970s inflation was consistently in the triple digit range. In 1976, the Argentine government attempted to resuscitate the economy with a stabilization plan that temporarily slowed inflation, but it did not restore growth. Despite inflation Argentina was able to guide its economy away from raw product exports to manufactured goods, increasing manufactured goods exports from 15.6 percent of total exports to 21.5 percent by 1975. However, these gains did not last. Government subsidies were rescinded in 1976 and exports dramatically decreased without direct public sector support.\textsuperscript{11}

By the mid-1970s the Mexican economy surged due to the discovery of petroleum reserves. In 1974 Mexico produced 2.75 million barrels of oil per day, only consuming half of that amount.\textsuperscript{12} Mexico found a ready customer in its neighbor to the North; the U.S. was already suffering from shortages and high prices. Mexico began to mortgage its future on its newly discovered wealth, borrowing and spending millions on infrastructure projects. When the price of oil sharply declined, Mexico's debt soared from $14.5 billion in 1975 to $85 billion by the mid-1980s, leading to inflation and monetary crisis.\textsuperscript{13} Although Mexico was partially inoculated against the oil crisis because of its domestic reserves, these reserves did not last due to the improper management of fiscal policy.

\textsuperscript{11} Rock, 327.
\textsuperscript{13} Ibid., 199.
Brazil fared no better than Argentina and Mexico. From 1967 to 1974 the military leadership remained popular due to soaring domestic and export production, leading to growth frequently exceeding ten percent a year.\textsuperscript{14} The oil crisis reduced Brazilian economic expansion that fueled projects such as the design, construction and inauguration of an entire capital city, to extreme debt and a trade imbalance. After 1975 inflation reached triple digits and the foreign debt rose from \$5.5 billion in 1970 to \$60.8 billion in 1980.\textsuperscript{15}

The oil crisis reduced Latin American self-confidence, hindering attempts at regional security cooperation. Because of its economic vitality in the late 1960s and early 1970s, Brazil considered itself 'the country of the future'. Since the economic crisis that began in the mid 1970s Brazilians amended the expression, 'Brazil is the perpetual country of the future'. Before the economic chaos of the oil crisis Latin American leaders began to increasingly consider their states as more independent of U.S. hegemony, despite the consistent U.S. advantage in GNP and military expenditure. Perceptions of growing equality were demonstrated by increasingly independent foreign policies. Leaders in Latin American states began to act less restrained in criticizing the U.S. in forums such as the OAS and the UN. Whereas before Latin American states felt compelled to consider the desires of the U.S., they were now actively seeking independence on all fronts.

During the 1970s many Latin American leaders increasingly believed the hegemonic relationship was decreasing in value. This view was likely promoted by the

\textsuperscript{14} Burns, \textit{A History of Brazil}, 467.

\textsuperscript{15} Ibid.
economic crisis, in effect reminding Latin American states of their dependence on U.S. power in terms of financial backing and as an importer of Latin American goods. Latin American leaders were reminded yet again of the inability to modify or escape strong U.S. hegemony.

DEPENDENCY THEORY AS A REACTION TO ASYMMETRY

The effect of power asymmetry under strong U.S. hegemony eroded hemispheric relations, with the trend becoming worse during the 1970s. Latin American disapproval of the status quo found an expression in dependency theory. Fernando Henrique Cardoso, who later became President of Brazil, was one of the early proponents of dependency theory. He and other academics developed the construct while trying to explain underdevelopment in the Latin American region. Dependency theory is closely related to the Marxist theory of imperialism. Both schools of thought maintain that European colonization and capitalism are the root causes of the Latin American plight rather than domestic structures, such as economic policy or the lack of political stability. Dependency places the responsibility of Latin American poverty on shoulders of the U.S. and Europe: Europe for its historical exploitation of the region and the U.S. for perpetuating imperialistic policies. Bradford Burns defines dependency in the following way:

“Dependency describes a situation in which the economic well-being, or lack of it, or one nation, colony, or area results from the consequences of decisions made elsewhere. Latin America was first dependent on the Iberian motherlands, then in the nineteenth century on England, and in the twentieth on the United States.

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whose decisions and policies directly influenced, or influence, its economic prosperity or poverty. Obviously to the degree a nation is dependent, it will lack "independence" of action."17

Osvaldo Sunkel and Pedro Paz make a direct connection between under-development and development, claiming, for example, that the development of the U.S. came at the expense of Latin America's underdevelopment.18

In contrast to dependency theory, the modernization school of thought proposed that with a higher level of education and economic investment any state could increase its standard of living. The Alliance for Progress was planned around these ideas. The designers of the Alliance for Progress hoped to jump-start economic development in Latin America by giving regional states access to knowledge and financing. In theory, institutions rapidly develop, creating political stability as they evolve. Modernization theory implicitly blames underdevelopment on indigenous factors. Dependency refutes this assumption by claiming exogenous variables are primarily responsible.

Modernization calls on Latin American states to assume responsibility for their problems since it directs them to change political and economic policy to engender domestic changes. Dependency calls on the outside world to change in order to upgrade domestic problems, or support policies that limit external control in the domestic economy.19 The economic policy of dependency theory is likely to promote import substitution, strict government control of important economic sectors and strict limits on foreign

17Burns, Latin America: A Concise Interpretive History, 355-356.


The implementation of these policies led to widespread nationalization of many U.S. industries in the 1970s, and growing Latin American antipathy towards the U.S. that prompted Latin American leaders to search for alternatives to U.S. hegemony. The ascendency of dependency theory demonstrates the growing adverse Latin American reaction to U.S. hegemony. The theory is similar to hegemonic stability in that both assume the important role of a central power in the system. Hegemonic stability focuses on the positive aspects of hegemony, dependency theory focuses on the deleterious impact of the core state on the system. Hegemonic stability focuses on the benefits of U.S. leadership, dependency on its problems. The spread of dependency theory during the 1970s highlighted the growing resentment towards U.S. leadership.

SEEKING ALTERNATIVES TO U.S. HEGEMONY

Latin American states began to actively seek non-U.S. regional cooperation and other world powers as alternatives to U.S. hegemony. Gavin Boyd and Yale Ferguson observe that, "Most of the states in this region have strong economic links with the United States, but because there is a general desire to overcome traditional U.S. dominance, opportunities for U.S. initiatives to encourage and assist Latin American ventures in regional cooperation are limited." During this time period several regional organizations were initiated, including the Andean Common Market (ANCOM). Latin

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American Free Trade Association (LAFTA), and the Latin American Economic System (SELA).

LAFTA was established in 1960 when participating states signed the Montevideo Treaty. The free-market established by LAFTA came into effect in 1973. Its members included Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Ecuador, Mexico, Paraguay, Peru, Uruguay and Venezuela. LAFTA’s goal to create inter-regional trade had only modest success, increasing from seven percent in the pre-free market era of 1960 to fourteen percent by 1980. The states that most benefited were the larger regional powers, Argentina, Brazil and Mexico. However, trade with states outside of Latin America was growing at a much higher rate. Due to this disparity leaders began to realize that pursuing regional trade agreements accrued small gains in GNP and so they focused their efforts elsewhere.

Smith points out that although LAFTA did not accomplish much in terms of encouraging trade between Latin American states, “it came to represent Latin America’s persisting desire for regional unification.”

In 1968 the Andean Pact was formed between Bolivia, Chile, Colombia, Ecuador and Peru with the goal of accelerating economic development by isolating large power influences. The pact limited the amount of foreign investment in member countries, a move at least in part aimed at the region’s largest investor, the U.S. Latin American

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22Ibid., 125.


states watched their once promising economies deteriorate during the mid-1970s, the growing asymmetry with the U.S. prompting them to redress the mounting imbalance. During the 1976 Santiago meeting of the OAS, Liévano and Facio memorandums were circulated that called for preferential trade agreements to stimulate Latin American economies. Inspired by the Group of 77, an organization that was unified by the theme of third world development, Latin American states pushed for a treaty of collective economic security directed against the U.S. The treaty would have penalized states that were judged to act against the economic welfare of others.

During the 1970s the Soviets made a determined, but subtle, economic and political push in Latin America. This was part of a broader Soviet strategy. Porter explains: "The Union of the Soviet Socialist Republic (USSR) had been involved militarily in local conflicts before, of course, but the magnitude, scope, and apparent success of its efforts in the 1970s were perhaps without precedent." Soviet global ambitions were muted in the Americas because of U.S. dominance and recent history. The Cuban missile crisis forced Soviet regional strategy to alter course. The Soviets discovered that aggressive action in the Americas was met by fierce U.S. resistance and caused greater problems than the effort was worth. Geographical separation made strong Soviet support in Latin America economically difficult. Therefore regional Soviet

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26Ibid.

political ambitions were largely funneled through their lone regional ally, Cuba, in order to make their actions less conspicuous.

Although the Soviet Union policy was self-limited in the political arena, it was more ambitious in trying to form economic partnerships. Latin American insecurities about the asymmetric power structure, and their precarious economic situation, led many regional states to actively and passively pursue economic relations with the Soviet Union. Some Latin American states viewed a partnership with the USSR as a means to circumvent the imposing influence of the U.S. in their domestic affairs, Cuba being the most obvious example. Open relations with the Soviet Union demonstrated their independence from the U.S., and gave Latin American states a potential alternative to the U.S. as a trading partner. Blaiser states to this point

"They [Latin American leaders] welcome ties with the Soviet Union, first and foremost as the right of an independent state. Second, such ties give them room to maneuver and bargaining leverage in disputes with the U.S. Finally, relations with the USSR can bring material benefits."

Even the states that stayed firmly opposed to the USSR benefited gained from the presence of the Soviet Union in the Americas.

Argentina, Brazil and Mexico were the most important states for Soviet strategists. Argentina began diplomatic ties after World War II, and Brazil renewed relations with the Soviet Union in 1960. The USSR made a push in the 1970s to strengthen their Latin American ties. The USSR had maintained diplomatic relations with Mexico since the Bolshevik revolution. However, this one example was not the

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29 Ibid., 159.
norm: ten of nineteen Latin American states began diplomatic relations with the USSR during the 1970s.

Argentina began a push to broaden relations with the USSR in the early 1970s by offering their grain for export; an agreement that increased Argentine exports to the USSR until they comprised nearly ten percent of their national output. It was an agreement convenient to both sides: the Soviet Union badly needed grain to reconcile the difference in their domestic harvest, the Argentines needed hard currency to reconcile their debts and trade imbalance. Both sides had the common strategy of using their relationship as leverage against the U.S.: the USSR increased its visibility that worked to challenge the U.S., and Argentina used trade as a tool to increase its national sovereignty.30

The Soviet Union had broader ambitions for the incipient relationship with Argentina, especially when they lost Chile as a key ally after the overthrow of Allende in 1973. However, the relationship between the Soviet Union and Argentina never obtained a political dimension. President Juan Domingo Perón had similar anti-capitalist economic policies that the Soviets identified with but Perón was considered a nationalist, rather than a communist. Perón used the domestic Marxist political party as a tool to maintain power, but dissolved them once his purposes were served.31 After the military


coup led by General Jorge Videla in 1976, it became clear that the relationship would only be economic in nature thereafter.\footnote{Nicola Miller, \textit{Soviet Relations with Latin America, 1959-87} (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1989), 156.}

The Brazilian relationship with the USSR was similar to Argentina’s in that it primarily focused on economic issues, but also as a way to balance its dependency on the U.S. Because the U.S. had begun to limit arms sales and foreign credit, and ruled against nuclear technology transfer in the late 1960s and early 1970s, Brazilian military rulers felt the need to broaden their relationship with the Soviet Union. Dependency based import substitution policies were beginning to show their limits in generating economic growth, in turn making the increase of exports an imperative to Brazilian leaders.\footnote{Ibid., 172.}

In 1973 President Echeverría of Mexico went on a State visit to the USSR with the goal of diversifying the country’s financial and economic ties.\footnote{Ibid., 182.} Mexico’s trade balance with the U.S. was tilted heavily in Washington’s favor. The U.S. was also in the midst of an isolationist mood due to problems associated with the Vietnam conflict and its economic troubles, so talks on the topic were unlikely to yield any progress. Although President José López Portillo also visited the USSR in 1978, and reported substantial progress trade between the two states, actual trade between the two states was erratic at best. Venezuela also sought out Soviet trade ties in the early 70s, hoping to find alternative markets for its oil in the Eastern bloc.\footnote{A. I. Sizonenko. \textit{La URSS y Latino-America Ayer y Hoy}, translated by Venancio Uribe (Moscow: Progress Publishers, 1972), 149.} Venezuela previously demonstrated

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its will to break free of U.S. influence when it signed the Declaration of Bogotá in 1966, calling for the exploration of trade agreements with Eastern Europe. Despite its efforts little trade actually materialized.

Actions taken by the U.S. to remove President Salvador Allende of Chile from office served to remind Latin Americans of U.S. dominance. Allende was elected in 1970. He immediately began to institute foreign and domestic policies unfriendly towards the U.S., including the expropriation of U.S. privately owned industries and a pro-Cuban foreign policy.

The U.S. did not militarily intervene in Chile, but nonetheless was deeply involved in events that led to the overthrow of Allende. The U.S. tried to avert the election of Salvador Allende in 1970 through subsidizing his opposition and the use of propaganda. The U.S. also acted against Allende, once elected, by limiting credit from financial institutions, terminating new Export-Import Bank guarantees, and using its influence to limit credits from international financial institutions. The U.S. also financed strikes that preceded the Chilean coup.

The actions taken by the U.S. to oust Allende added to the problems of regional security relations. The incident reminded Latin Americans that there were no shields against the pressure the U.S. might exert to serve its policy goals. Even when democratically elected, their political systems were not immune from U.S. dominance.

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Ibid., 57.

Atkins, 234.
Whether Chileans supported Allende or not, Chilean citizens learned that the U.S. had the ability to control their domestic political and economic outcomes, and Chilean citizens were unable to influence the policies of the U.S. The indirect influence of U.S. hegemony by the means of socialization, such as through culture, raised an awareness of U.S. dominance. This form of hegemonic influence was usually considered benign. However, the hegemon’s diffusion of power through more direct actions, manipulating material incentives leading to an impact on Latin American economies and politics, led to a direct awareness of the control of the U.S., and therefore more resistance to the hegemon.

Attempts by Latin American leaders to find alternatives to U.S. hegemony demonstrated their unease with the status quo. Their efforts to initiate regional trade blocs and sponsor Soviet relations were an expression of dissatisfaction with U.S. policies.

REGIONAL RELATIONS UNDER MODERATED WILSONIANISM

President Jimmy Carter was elected because voters were disillusioned with the status quo. Carter took the opportunity to reformulate U.S. foreign policy. Carter’s foreign policies were motivated by the effort to steer the opposite direction of realpolitik that characterized the Nixon years. The Carter Administration seemed determined to soothe the U.S. public’s concerns about dependence by building a foreign policy that embraced interdependence. As Jerel A. Rosati observed, “Carter administration officials

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39 Critics pointed out that Carter was seemingly unable to think in large strategic terms, that directly led to many of his foreign policy failings. See, Robert W. Tucker, “Reagan Without Tears,” The New Republic 182 (May 17, 1980): 23.
believed that new issues and actors had to be addressed in a world of greater interdependence and decentralization.\textsuperscript{40} Carter believed the traditional conduct of U.S. foreign policy was responsible for creating enemies where cooperation had been possible, particularly in the case of Latin America. The administration believed that policy devoted to self-interest, like Kissinger's practice of \textit{realpolitik}, became a detriment as other states might become suspicious of all U.S. actions. Carter and his advisors listened to Latin American complaints of what they viewed as the U.S. preoccupation with the perceived Soviet threat, and tried to craft a policy that was more tolerant of indigenous political movements. The Carter Administration thought the U.S. needed to accentuate the positive by pursuing a multilateral approach, believing that other states would reciprocate the positive gestures. Therefore Carter purposely cultivated an image that Gaddis Smith describes "As the prophet assailing American wickedness."\textsuperscript{41}

Many of Carter's critics, foreign allies and enemies, viewed his concessions as signs of diminishing U.S. power, rather than as an honest effort to improve regional relations. To some, the Russian invasion of Afghanistan, the intransigence in finalizing SALT II, the temerity of Middle East states in their policies with the U.S., were all indicators that global actors perceived and formulated policy based on declining U.S. power.

\textsuperscript{40}Rosati came to his conclusion after exhaustive research that indicated the Carter Administration's primary foreign policy issues by polling the number of times that an issue was discussed by key administration officials. Jerel A. Rosati, "The Impact of Beliefs on Behavior: The Foreign Policy of the Carter Administration," in \textit{Foreign Policy Decision Making}, eds. Donald A. Sylvan and Steve Chan (New York: Praeger, 1984), 166.

power. U.S. fortunes in Latin America were no different. Despite Carter's efforts to demonstrate U.S. good will by showing more tolerance for Latin American revolutions, such as in Cuba and Nicaragua, and the regular denouncement of past interventionist policy, Latin America responded with indifference.

Carter Administration policies that had ramifications on hemispheric security relations included his initiatives toward Cuba and Nicaragua, arms control, and the human rights. During the 1976 presidential campaign, Carter made an issue of the large arms exporting industry of the U.S. One of his first orders of business was to issue Presidential Directive 13 that introduced six new categories of controls on arms sales and declared arms sales as an 'exceptional' tool for foreign policy. The sudden reduction of arms exports had far-reaching ramifications for inter-regional security relations, further weakening inter-American security relations and the growth of Latin American arms industries.

The Carter Administration chose to link U.S. aid with a state's human rights record in order to bring greater morality and consistency to U.S. foreign policy. The State Department was told to assign personnel to monitor human rights in every other nation, including traditional democratic allies such as Canada, Great Britain, Japan and West Germany so as not to show discrimination. These critiques were issued to states receiving U.S. aid, having an immediate impact on U.S.-Latin American relations. Each

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42 For a more in-depth analysis on this point see Robert W. Tucker, “American in Decline: The Foreign Policy of Maturity”. *Foreign Affairs* 58, no. 3 (May/June 1980): 451-484. Smith also discusses the perception that the U.S. lost the SALT II negotiations in *Morality, Reason and Power*.

nation offered aid with the human rights report rejected the offer, citing the U.S. was interfering with their internal affairs. The move alienated Brazil, a regional ally of the U.S. Brasilia made its displeasure with Washington known when it abrogated its mutual defense treaty with Washington in 1975 that existed since the end of World War II.

Latin American antagonism towards U.S. human rights and arms control policies grew, as the lack of progress on security issues important to Latin Americans stalemated. Indigenous arms industries began to flourish and Latin American states found alternative arms suppliers. South and Central American leaders thought that Carter's foreign policy measures were an unconcealed attempt by Washington to gain even further control of their internal politics. For example, "President Carter, by making Argentina a prime target of his human rights campaign, had minimized his leverage over the highly nationalistic Argentine generals, who bitterly resented what they regarded as outbursts of American hypocrisy."

U.S. actions further weakened their decaying regional influence in security affairs. The U.S. allowed its growing isolation from Latin America to be replaced with interests that did not always share Washington's political and economic agenda. For

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45 Specifically by France, Israel, Great Britain and the Soviet Union, and other European states.

46 Miller, 162.

47 Child predicted this outcome, stating: "...local drives to become self-sufficient in arms, show a strong potential for further weakening the IAMS (Inter American Military System) and replacing the old system with a new one which might exclude, or even be antagonistic to, the United States." Child, *Unequal Alliance: The Inter-American Military System, 1938-1978*, 189.
example, the military regimes in Brazil and Peru both adopted policies that marginalized U.S. influence in their national affairs, meaning that the U.S. was less able to encourage political and economic reforms. In both instances there were opportunities to influence their internal policies as they adjusted to meet the economic problems affecting the lower and middle classes. U.S. human rights and arms control policies fed the nationalistic tendencies of these regimes and reduced the effectiveness of U.S. policies designed to reintroduce democracy. U.S. arms embargoes led to the creation of Latin American arms industries. As the political tides in the U.S. turned against the funding of Latin American militaries, indigenous industries began to flourish. These industries became important centers of nationalism, allowing regional states to express their independence vis-à-vis the U.S.

President Carter improved regional relations with Latin America by negotiating an agreement with Panamanian officials that gradually transferred the canal to Panama by 1999. Before assuming office he had been warned by other Latin American leaders that if he did not mediate the Panama Canal issue to a successful closure, the tarnished reputation of the U.S. would become worse. Heeding the advice of regional leaders, his

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49 For example, Brazil made an agreement to obtain nuclear technology from West Germany. The U.S. criticized Brasilia and insisted that the agreement be modified with a promise of enriched uranium. Brazil rejected the offer confirming a long-held Brazilian suspicion that the U.S. was striving to keep underdeveloped states technologically dependent. See, Roger W. Fontaine, “Brazil: The End of Beautiful Relationship,” in Foreign Policy on Latin America 1970-1980, eds. Staff of Foreign Policy Journal (Boulder: Westview Press, 1983), 104-105.

50 Peter H. Smith, Talons of the Eagle, 271.
own advisors, and acting on his personal views, he was able to push a settlement through Congress by a narrow margin.51 Despite his good faith efforts, Carter did not witness significant improvement in regional security relations.

The multilateral front was equally unsuccessful during the 1970s. The Rio Treaty and Bogotá Pact were proving to be ineffective tools to manage security exigencies in the region. As one author observed, "The Pact of Rio de Janeiro was drawn up in 1947 when inter-American relations were at the highest level in history."52 These institutions were becoming increasingly dysfunctional as inter-American relations deteriorated. Their ability to address the changes in regional security dynamics made them mostly ineffective. Latin American suspicions about U.S. interventionist activity remained high, emphasized by the role the U.S. played in supporting General Pinochet's ouster of President Allende in Chile, and U.S. policies towards Nicaragua. President Carter had a strong conviction that the U.S. pursued shortsighted policies in the region, leading to its unpopular standing in the hemisphere. This conviction led him to be patient with events in Nicaragua, first attempting to convert President Anastasio Somoza into an overnight democrat. When this initiative failed Secretary of State Cyrus Vance submitted a proposal to the OAS that formed an interim government acceptable to all parties, a cease-fire, an OAS peacekeeping force and a major international relief and reconstruction

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51 Had President Carter lost votes in the Senate the treaties would have lost, the final vote being 68-32 for both. Gaddis Smith, Morality, Reason and Power, 114.

effort. Not a single Central or South American state supported the plan.\textsuperscript{53} Worse, President Portillo of Mexico actively lobbied other Latin American leaders to reject the peace plan, and “although other Latin Americans pursued a similar objective, Mexico efforts at the OAS were interpreted as particularly hostile and anti-American by U.S. officials.”\textsuperscript{54} The experience demonstrated to the Carter Administration that the multilateral approach to hemispheric problems was not beneficial in some security issues, a lesson the Reagan Administration would utilize. Despite the best effort of the U.S. to act in good faith in the Nicaraguan case, the negative impact of power asymmetry on regional security relations was too great to overcome.

CONCLUSION

Power indicators reveal the gap in relative power levels between the U.S. and Latin America remained firmly intact during the 1970s. Despite the continuation of U.S. dominance, Latin American GNP grew at a faster rate than the U.S., and its interdependence with the U.S. was partly diverted by a concerted effort to increase interregional trade. A curtailment of arms sales by the Carter Administration in the later part of the decade further reduced Latin American dependency on the U.S., making Brazil and Argentina seek out European partners to bridge the gap.

An analysis of the power indicators shows the potential for a reduction in power asymmetry, however the influence of economic crisis in the U.S. and Latin America

\textsuperscript{53}Gaddis Smith,\textit{ Morality, Reason, and Power: American Diplomacy in the Carter Years}, p. 159.

makes such it difficult to draw such a conclusion. Several events, such as the two economic crises, and the loss of the Vietnam War, decreased U.S. power during the decade. Scholars and policy-makers of the era believed that the U.S. had to reduce its foreign commitment due to shrinking influence. These events are similar to conditions after the Depression that led to Roosevelt's Good Neighbor Policy. However, Latin America also experienced severe economic crisis, resulting in the accumulation of extreme debts. Latin America suffered equally from the oil crisis of 1973 and from after-shock of the U.S. economic downturn. These conditions caused hyperinflation throughout South and Central America. During the Depression Latin America had comparatively less manufacturing capacity, and was less affected by the economic crisis. However, by the late 1970s many Latin American states had become more dependent on industry, and therefore were more affected by the economic crisis than forty years before. Despite a reduction of U.S. activity in the region, especially during the last half of the decade, it seemed that extreme power asymmetry continued.

The continuation of extreme power asymmetry in the U.S.-Latin American hegemonic system continued to erode the regional stability. The 1970s began with the Viña del Mar Consensus that demanded more public goods from U.S. hegemony, alienating the Nixon Administration, and setting the tone for the rest of the decade. The U.S. began to disregard multilateral tools to solve regional security problems sensing the uncooperative atmosphere of the period. Its problems in the region were approached in a bilateral manner. The unilateral behavior of the U.S. hardened the Latin American position against the overwhelming regional power of the U.S., resulting in their active search for alternatives to U.S. hegemony. The Carter Administration attempted to
remedy the U.S. position by relying on the OAS to bring a peaceful transition of power to Nicaragua, but was rebuffed by Latin American states.

Carter’s policies towards the region in the last half of the 1970s provided excellent litmus to test the negative impact of power asymmetry on regional security cooperation. Carter sought to demonstrate that he represented a break from business as usual. His strategic motivation was that once Latin American leaders understood that the U.S. was not a threat, regional security tensions would dissipate. Despite a concerted effort by U.S. policy-makers to correct the ‘sins of the past’, Latin American leaders remained doubtful about all policy that emanated from Washington. Carter misinterpreted Latin American complaints about what they claimed was a pattern of U.S. actions to subjugate them. The Carter Administration thought using U.S. power for beneficial regional interests, and not purely U.S. self-interest might improve relations. Latin American states, highly sensitized to U.S. dominance, interpreted almost any expression of U.S. power as detrimental to their interests. Initiatives by the U.S. were viewed as coercive rather than cooperative, and therefore security cooperation reached new lows despite the progressive efforts of Washington in the last half of the decade.

Carter misunderstood the basic underlying problem in the Americas. He thought it was a general U.S. malaise towards the region, reflected in the foreign policy priorities of the U.S., which created security problems. The true culprit behind the anemic security relationship was the continuation of the large power differential between the U.S. and Latin American. Latin American leaders were less willing to accept U.S. hegemony as it had been in the past. Latin America perceived it was receiving less of the public goods offered by the U.S. than was sufficient. The U.S. offered security from revolution as a
public good and some economic support. By contrast Latin American governments continually sought more support for economic and social development, but its requests were largely unanswered. Latin America's willingness to work under power asymmetry was quickly deteriorating.

Under Carter, U.S. regional policy was not as one-dimensional as in the past, containing overtones of Franklin Roosevelt's Good Neighbor policy. It is no coincidence that the Good Neighbor policy was instituted during a period of economic weakness, just as Carter's policy was initiated under a perceived power decline as well. Since Roosevelt's policies engendered better relations, the Carter Administration was hoping for the same reaction. Under deteriorating Latin American economic conditions, creating the Latin American perception of growing asymmetry despite economic problems that affected the U.S. as well, these initiatives accrued very little goodwill in the region.

The popularity of dependency theory reached its apex during the 1970s. The anti-U.S. thrust of dependency theory, reflected in the economic policies of most Latin American states of the period, was an indicator of negative Latin American perceptions of U.S. hegemony. The core-periphery relationship described by most forms of dependency theory runs counter to hegemonic stability theory. It described the relationship as detrimental to the peripheral states that were subservient to the core state, with little hope of increasing their standard of living. By contrast, hegemonic stability views the relationship as beneficial to both sides. The growth of the dependency paradigm in Latin America was perhaps a manifestation of the detrimental impact of extreme power asymmetry.
Latin American states began to actively search for ways to alleviate U.S. hegemony during the 1970s. The two primary alternatives were regional organizations and the bipolar rival of the U.S. and the Soviet Union. Many analysts viewed the Soviet Union as the primary culprit in the deterioration of U.S.-Latin American security cooperation during the 1970s. The reality was that problems in U.S.-Latin American relations led to the deterioration in security cooperation. the Soviet Union was simply a convenient alternative for Latin American states. Latin American states became increasingly less cooperative towards the U.S. as it became apparent that after thirty years since World War II, there would be no Marshall Plan for the region. Faced with accumulating economic and social problems at home, Latin American states believed the U.S. all but turned their backs to the true needs of the region. Latin American leaders believed the U.S. was obsessed by their concerns over revolutionary activity, so much that many thought it to be a ruse to justify further interventions and increase U.S. dominance.

The early 1970s witnessed strong growth in Argentina, Brazil, and Mexico, bolstering national confidence in each country. However, deteriorating economic conditions associated with the oil crisis negatively impacted the national confidence of most Latin American states. Latin American debt began to accrue, as they could not finance their domestic fiscal commitments of the early 1970s. Feelings of insecurity were bolstered by Carter's foreign policies towards the region despite the administration's efforts to take regional concerns into account in case of the Panama Canal and Nicaraguan revolution. The Carter Administration's focus on grading the
human rights and democratic levels of regional states was viewed as another tool of U.S. domination.

The 1970s mark a low point in regional security relations and the 1980s would not be significantly better. Chapter six reviews the nature of U.S. hegemony during the 1980s as well as any attempts at regional security cooperation. The Reagan Administration controlled U.S. foreign policy from 1981-1989 and maintained a unilateral approach to security matter except when left with few other options. Whereas the Carter Administration seemed to mimic Wilson’s democratic activism, President Ronald Reagan mimicked another element of the Wilson legacy, the concern over U.S. interventionism.
CHAPTER VI


U.S. hegemony remained steady throughout the 1980s, as did the power asymmetry gap. Power asymmetry meant the U.S. would continue to give low priority to Latin America, also guaranteeing a minimum of regional security cooperation. The lack of regional security cooperation manifested itself in several major events including the Falklands/Malvinas conflict; U.S. interventions in Grenada, and Panama; Latin American aversion to the anti-Cuban policies of the U.S.; Latin American reaction to U.S. Central American policy; the U.S. policy of supporting democratic reform and principles; continued Latin American arms exports and arms proliferation; and Latin American anger over U.S. technology transfer policy. Each of these topics was contentious in U.S.-Latin American relations, and therefore provided a basis for an analysis on the broader implications of regional power asymmetry on inter-American relations.

The return of interventionist U.S. policies in the 1980s did not go unnoticed by Latin American states. The role of the U.S. in the Malvinas Islands crisis; renewal of anti-Cuban policies; and interventionist actions in Grenada, Panama and Nicaragua all drew strong criticism from Latin American states. Latin American states demonstrated solidarity with Argentina by supporting Buenos Aires in the Malvinas Island conflict. The opposition between the U.S. and the rest of the region signified a diminished ability to execute security cooperation. U.S. direct intervention in Grenada, and covert intervention against Nicaragua, was strongly opposed by regional states. The U.S. and Latin America continued to disagree over the issue of Soviet ambitions in the region.
Latin American leaders attempted to circumvent the subject as a means to derail what it viewed as U.S. preoccupation with the topic. During the Carter years, the U.S. signaled to Cuba that it sought a more constructive relationship with Havana. Reagan ceased these efforts and revived a hard-line posture. Cuba, symbolic of competing regional security agendas between the U.S. and Latin America, once again, ignited divisions between the two sides.

Other areas besides U.S. interventions and Cuba policy continued to irritate regional security relations. The Argentine and Brazilian arms-exporting industries, weapons proliferation, and technology transfer are interrelated issues separating Latin America from the U.S. during the 1980s. Although both Argentina and Brazil were experiencing hyperinflation during the 1980s they invested huge sums of money in their domestic arms industries. Policy-makers in the U.S. did not understand Latin American reticence in curbing their exports to Third World countries, primarily in the Middle East. In turn, many Latin American leaders did not comprehend why the U.S. was so concerned, and explained U.S. behavior by believing that it was part of a continuing effort to dominate Latin America.

During the 1980s the Reagan Administration continued the practice of using democracy and human rights as focal points for its relations with Latin American countries. policies originating with the Carter Administration, albeit in a more subdued manner. Despite general agreement in Latin American states that democracy and observance of human rights were desirable, and indeed there were strong movements in the 1980s away from authoritarianism, both South and Central American states were angered by Washington’s efforts to shape Latin American political reform. Regional
tension increased over the emergence of the drug trade as a theme in regional security, which increased U.S. diplomatic and military activity in the coca growing and exporting states. There was very little improvement in inter-American relations during the 1980s compared to the previous decade.

REGIONAL HEGEMONY

A direct GNP comparison in Table 9 shows that the U.S. maintained its dominating economic performance over the primary states of Latin America, including Brazil and Mexico. During the 1980s Latin America dependency on the U.S. became more pronounced in terms of imports and exports as demonstrated in Table 10. Four key states in the region, Argentina, Brazil, Mexico and Venezuela, all increased their exports to the U.S., and imports from the U.S. Brazil and Venezuela generally imported less than they exported to the U.S. while Argentina and Mexico mostly imported more from the U.S. than they exported. Judged in a vacuum, Table 6.2 does not demonstrate Latin American dependency as increased exports and imports to the U.S. conversely meant that the U.S. was able to maintain some degree of influence over their trade. This trend seems to denote growing mutual interdependence. However, when taken into consideration with Table 9, a case can be made for the lack of reciprocity in growing U.S.-Latin American trade. The U.S. total GNP is much larger than all of Latin America combined, therefore significant increases in Latin American trade to the U.S. does not translate into a similar dependency on the part of the U.S., since their overall GNP is much higher than Latin American states. In other words, $50 million worth of goods reciprocally
traded between the U.S. and Latin America does not carry the same influence in both economic sectors. It is less significant to the U.S., but might be very significant to a particular Latin American state. The continuation of GNP growth in Latin America during the 1980s without Latin American gains vis-à-vis the U.S., could eventually lead to a decrease in regional security cooperation, as the asymmetry gap might be perceived as widening. Table 11 shows that U.S. military dominance remained intact during the 1980s. The year of greatest U.S. defense expenditure was 1989, with a $304 billion total. The highest Latin American figure is from Brazil in 1988, close to $6 billion, but still
Table 10. Import/Exports To U.S. (As a Percentage of Total World Trade)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>1980</th>
<th>1985</th>
<th>1987</th>
<th>1989</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Argentina Export</td>
<td>8.9</td>
<td>12.2</td>
<td>14.6</td>
<td>12.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Import</td>
<td>22.6</td>
<td>18.2</td>
<td>16.5</td>
<td>21.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Brazil Export</td>
<td>17.4</td>
<td>27.1</td>
<td>27.9</td>
<td>24.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Import</td>
<td>18.6</td>
<td>19.7</td>
<td>20.7</td>
<td>20.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mexico Export</td>
<td>63.2</td>
<td>60.4</td>
<td>60.4</td>
<td>70.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Import</td>
<td>65.6</td>
<td>66.6</td>
<td>66.6</td>
<td>70.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Venezuela Export</td>
<td>27.8</td>
<td>46.0</td>
<td>57.2</td>
<td>51.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Import</td>
<td>48.2</td>
<td>47.5</td>
<td>44.6</td>
<td>44.6</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


Table 11. Annual Military Expenditure, 1980-1989

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Argentina</th>
<th>Brazil</th>
<th>Mexico</th>
<th>U.S.</th>
<th>Venezuela</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1980</td>
<td>1.559</td>
<td>1.899</td>
<td>456</td>
<td>144,000</td>
<td>317</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1981</td>
<td>1.647</td>
<td>1.955</td>
<td>671</td>
<td>169,900</td>
<td>310</td>
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<tr>
<td>1982</td>
<td>2.793</td>
<td>2.666</td>
<td>686</td>
<td>196,400</td>
<td>480</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1983</td>
<td>2.112</td>
<td>2.531</td>
<td>714</td>
<td>268,000</td>
<td>617</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1984</td>
<td>2.347</td>
<td>2.561</td>
<td>970</td>
<td>237,100</td>
<td>580</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1985</td>
<td>1.847</td>
<td>2.793</td>
<td>1,049</td>
<td>265,800</td>
<td>358</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1986</td>
<td>2.075</td>
<td>3.579</td>
<td>967</td>
<td>280,900</td>
<td>490</td>
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<td>1987</td>
<td>2.017</td>
<td>4.185</td>
<td>937</td>
<td>288,200</td>
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<tr>
<td>1988</td>
<td>1.989</td>
<td>5.731</td>
<td>962</td>
<td>293,100</td>
<td>647</td>
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<tr>
<td>1989</td>
<td>1.858</td>
<td>NA</td>
<td>875</td>
<td>304,100</td>
<td>407</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


just two percent of the U.S. total. The cumulative totals of the four South American states in 1988 equals $9.3 billion, which is still only three percent of U.S. expenditure.
U.S. NATIONAL RENEWAL AND LATIN AMERICAN RESPONSE

The 1980s was a decade of U.S. economic renewal. Conversely, Latin American economies remained unstable, prone to hyperinflation that contributed to a greater debt burden. The combination of the opposing trends did not bode well for the probability of regional security cooperation. In the 1970s, the U.S. public elected two presidents that introduced foreign policies designed to manage U.S. decline. The 1980 election of President Reagan signaled a shift in the national outlook. The era of deterrence during the 1970s gave way to a new era of activism in the 1980s. Whereas deterrence was pragmatic, it also seemed to implicitly acknowledge the limits U.S. power. The formation and institution of the Reagan doctrine reflected growing U.S. confidence. In turn, this confidence signaled a return to more traditional U.S. regional policies but did not seek to reinvigorate the moribund multilateral security organizations that might have increased security cooperation.

With a return to more active involvement in regional politics, the U.S. also became less tolerant of any Soviet economic or political initiative in the region. Latin America always maintained that what the U.S. viewed as Soviet activity in reality had domestic origins. The difference in opinion, and resulting U.S. policy, would have a strong impact on regional security relations during the 1980s. Soviet regional involvement reached its zenith during the 1980s and was the focus of U.S. consternation in regional security issues. The USSR had diplomatic representation in three Latin American states in 1960, maintained trade with four states, and had no serious political or military involvement. By the late 1980s Soviet activity had dramatically increased. The USSR had representation with eighteen Latin American states; traded with twenty; hosted
thousands of Latin American students: furnished military equipment to Cuba, Nicaragua, and Peru; and had close political relations to Cuba, Grenada and Nicaragua.¹ At the same time U.S. financial and military assistance to the region was dramatically reduced in most cases, due to U.S. concerns about instigating another Vietnam-type conflict, and due to controversy over U.S. support of regional military regimes. Receding U.S. power and encroaching Soviet influence during the late 1970s reawakened traditional U.S. policies that the Carter Administration had shunned, and became entrenched in the Reagan Doctrine.

The Reagan Doctrine had a significant influence on U.S.-Latin American relations during the 1980s. The Reagan Doctrine was never officially stated, as in the case of the Nixon Doctrine. It emerged from the Reagan Administration’s policies towards Soviet expansionism through proxies in the developing world. Charles Krauthammer succinctly defined the Reagan Doctrine as a demonstration of unabashed support for perceived anticommmunist uprisings and “...is intended to establish a new foundation for such support by declaring equally worthy all armed resistance to communism, whether foreign or indigenously imposed.”²

The Doctrine had its roots in Reagan’s strong anticommmunist beliefs and Jeanne Kirkpatrick’s expositions on authoritarianism. Kirkpatrick did not label all authoritarian dictatorships as antithetical to democracy. It was her perception that dictatorships, such as Cuba under Castro, were incapable of evolving into a democracy because of their

¹Lowenthal, Partners in Conflict: The United States and Latin American America in the 1990s. 37.

Marxist orientation. By contrast, other dictatorships had the potential to become democratic states.\(^3\) Therefore, the U.S. actively supported insurgencies that it perceived as anticommunist throughout the world, including Afghanistan, Angola and Nicaragua.

Since the Cuban revolution, the island nation became a symbol of anti-American sentiment throughout Latin America. Leaders of the U.S. viewed Cuba as a surrogate of the Soviet Union that had to be held in-check due to the perception that Soviet gains might result. The rest of Latin America was averse to any U.S. efforts to destabilize the Cuban government. Cuba had become a symbol of the growing Latin American sentiment wishing to be independent of U.S. hegemony. As President Portillo of Mexico once stated, "We will in no way allow anything to be done to Cuba because we would feel that it is being done to ourselves."\(^4\) Although there was a perception by some Latin American governments that Cuba activity supported revolution in Central and South America, regional states felt more threatened by the U.S. encroachment on Cuba's sovereignty. The U.S. viewed its efforts to isolate Cuba as part of a global strategy to contain communism: Latin American leaders understood U.S. actions as regional strategy to dominate them. Latin American suspicions of U.S. Cuban policy were exacerbated by domestic economic instability during the last half of the 1970s and the 1980s, in contrast to the recovery of the U.S. during the 1980s.

The foreign policy of the U.S., in order to actively engage what it perceived as communist activity, brought the Cuban issue to the forefront of regional politics in the

\(^{3}\) Thomas Carothers. *In the Name of Democracy: U.S. Policy Toward Latin America in the Reagan Years.* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1991), 77.

\(^{4}\) Pastor and Castañeda, 161.
1980s. The confrontation policy was a reversal of the Carter Administration that sought to downplay the differences of opinion between the U.S. and Latin American leaders over Cuba. Many regional states strongly believed the U.S. regularly over-reacted against Cuba. The more candid of these opinions expressed the idea that the U.S. engaged in a policy geared toward regional domination. Some critics of U.S. policy during the 1980s believed Washington purposely provoked Latin American revolutions to seek alliance with the USSR to provide a pretext for U.S. intervention. Critics noted that U.S. policies actually encouraged Latin American communist revolution, as Walter LaFeber claimed that "Nicaragua, faced such intensified CIA and U.S. military pressure that it moved closer to Cuba and the Soviet bloc—exactly the kind of dependency the Reagan policies supposedly sought to prevent."\(^5\)

The OAS played almost no role in the Nicaraguan conflict after its initial rejection of the attempt of the U.S. to broker a peaceful transition of power. The Reagan Administration clearly ignored the OAS, as "Haig addressed the problem of Nicaraguan subversion unilaterally and in an East-West framework rather than regionally and as a violation of the Rio Pact."\(^6\) Latin American states seemed to abandon the OAS as well. Brazil and Mexico issued a joint communique in 1983 opposing U.S. intervention in Central America and SELA unanimously approved a resolution condemning the U.S. economic boycott of Nicaragua in 1985.\(^7\) After difficult negotiations, known as

\(^5\)LaFeber, 303.


\(^7\)Muñoz, "The Inter-American System," 32.
Contadora, an agreement was reached in 1987 that introduced a timetable for democratic elections. Although Contadora was eventually successful, it was not accomplished through the region's primary multilateral agency, the OAS.

The U.S. invasion of Grenada in October 1983 was roundly criticized throughout Latin America. An editorial in *Folha de Sao Paulo*, a nationally distributed paper in Brazil, stated: "In sum, Reagan ordered the invasion because he considered unacceptable (sic) the constructions of an economic system which disregards the essence of U.S. politics...including economics and the "[U.S.] way of life"." Another Brazilian newspaper was equally critical of U.S. unilateral policy: "The intervention in Grenada is part of a long history, which has its shameful pages, such as the Bay of Pigs." It continued by rejecting the assertion that it was a Cold War maneuver, pointing out that Reagan's staunchest ally, Margaret Thatcher, did not approve of the action either. The Canadian and Mexican foreign secretaries emphasized their displeasure with U.S. unilateral behavior by issuing their denunciation jointly. Another editorial bitterly denounced the invasion as breaking the international law of non-intervention, which is frequently done by great powers against "...weak and poor nations and governments that


are docile." It also rejected the argument that the U.S. was pursuing an overly aggressive anti-communist policy. "Deep down, the arguments are intended to maintain zones of influence since the force to do so is available."11

The strong condemnation by Central and South American states demonstrated how U.S. unilateral actions further provoked Latin American concerns about U.S. dominance. Criticisms by Latin American leaders of the U.S. intervention did not seem to take into account that the U.S. had the approval of the Organization of Eastern Caribbean States (OECS).12 Also, their strong condemnation of the U.S. seemed to discount the growing violence in Grenada leading up to the invasion. Under the guidance of General Hudson Austin soldiers from the People’s Revolutionary Army shot into unarmed crowds of protesters resulting in many civilian casualties. Shortly after this event Austin ordered the execution of Grenada’s leader, Maurice Bishop, three cabinet members, and two union leaders that had been arrested.13 Latin American concerns were driven by a broader issue: If they allow any military intervention by the U.S. to occur without objection, justified or not, they perceived that they risked the U.S. doing the same


12Thorndike states that five of the seven OECS members (Antigua and Barbuda, Dominica, St. Kitts-Nevis, St. Lucia, and St. Vincent) invoked Article 8 of the OECS Treaty. This Article allowed members to take collective security measures against external aggression. Tony Thorndike, “Grenada,” in Intervention in the 1980s: U.S. Foreign Policy in the Third World, ed. Peter J. Schraeder (Boulder: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1989), 259.

to them. Tony Thorndike came to a similar conclusion: "The invasion confirmed the deeply held suspicions of Central and South American countries that the United States remained interventionist, thereby increasing long-term anti-U.S. feelings and further damaging an already suffering image."\(^{14}\) The regional power asymmetry problem contributed to the strong Latin American condemnation. Latin American over reaction and U.S. unilateralism combined to further divide U.S.-Latin American security relations.

Some regional observers interpreted the Grenada intervention as a precursor to a U.S. invasion in Nicaragua.\(^{15}\) A likely analysis by an observer of U.S. politics would conclude that the U.S. direct involvement in Nicaragua was very improbable, since the U.S. public was still leery of committing itself to such large-scale incursions after the Vietnam experience. However, U.S. funding of anti-Sandinista elements, and covert activities in Nicaragua, increased Latin American concerns that the U.S. was poised to directly intervene yet again in Nicaragua. In order to avoid direct U.S. intervention, many Latin American states vociferously supported negotiations between the Contras and Sandinistas. Latin American consensus emerged on the issue when the foreign ministers of the Contadora Group (Colombia, Mexico, Panama and Venezuela) met with Argentina, Brazil, Peru and Uruguay to expedite the Contadora negotiation process. Their joint proposal was aimed at establishing an immediate cease-fire and therefore ending U.S. support for irregular military forces. The goal was to provide a Latin

\(^{14}\)Ibid., 62.

American solution that would reaffirm the principle of nonintervention, a message aimed directly at the U.S.\footnote{Mark Falcoff and Robert Royal, \textit{The Continuing Crisis: U.S. Policy in Central America and the Caribbean} (Lanham, MD: University Press of America, Inc., 1987), 150.}

During the closing month of the 1980s the U.S. intervened in Panama, drawing criticism from most states of the region. The U.S. stated that its purpose was to overthrow the leader of Panama, Manuel Noriega, and ostensibly to restore democracy in the country. Latin American reaction to the intervention was no different than their negative reactions to other U.S. interventions in the region. The President of Brazil, José Sarney, condemned U.S. intervention in Panama and claimed the U.S. infringed on the ideal of state self-determination.\footnote{Benites, Giselle. “Communique Condemns U.S. Actions in Panama” (text). Brasilia Domestic Service in Portuguese (20 December 1989). Translated by Foreign Broadcast Information Service. \textit{FBIS Daily Report-Latin America}. 21 December 1989 (PrEx 7.10: FBIS-LAT-89-244; p. 35).} The two most prominent Chilean political parties denounced the U.S. invasion. The Christian Democratic Party, right of center in the Chilean political spectrum and a natural ally of the U.S., stated the action violated the UN and OAS Charters.\footnote{“PDC Issues Communique.” (text). Santiago \textit{Radio Cooperativa Network} in Spanish. (December 20, 1989). Translated by the Foreign Broadcast Information Service. \textit{FBIS Daily Report-Latin American}. 21 December 1989 (PrEx 7.10: FBIS-LAT-89-244; p. 36).} President Carlos A. Pérez of Venezuela rejected any justification for intervention. Although he admitted that Noriega’s dictatorship was offensive, he lamented the breaking of the nonintervention principle, demonstrating the traditional
hierarchy of Latin American security concerns as opposed those of the U.S. The Mexican representative to the UN announced Mexico’s official position, stating the intervention was a distortion of UN principles and called for the withdrawal of U.S. forces. An OAS vote on the matter demonstrated regional concern about the U.S. unilateral action. Twenty states voted for a measure expressing regret at the U.S. action, seven abstained, and the U.S. was the lone dissenter. The words of the resolution were muted, but firmly directed against the U.S., specifically mentioning that the military intervention was regrettable, and calling for the withdrawal of U.S. troops.

The Panama invasion in 1989 was the last U.S. intervention of the decade. President Bush was a stronger adherent to multilateral forums than Reagan, and attempted to empower the OAS by pushing it to resolve the Panama crisis. The OAS negotiators almost brokered a compromise that allowed a two-year timetable for Manuel Noreiga to retire. Eventually the OAS mission failed, but perhaps there was a small victory in that the Bush Administration made an attempt to reawaken its role as an active player in multilateral security cooperation efforts. Despite these efforts, regional reaction

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was predictably negative, as Smith states, “From Chile to Mexico, reaction to the invasion was swift and negative. Bush had not bothered to consult any Latin [American] leaders beforehand.”

FALKLAND/MALVINAS ISLANDS CRISIS

Some analysts believe the Falkland/Malvinas Islands War was a defining moment for inter-American security. On April 25, 1982, the Argentine government invoked the Rio Treaty, a security agreement within the framework of the OAS that calls for reciprocal assistance among American states to meet acts of aggression generated either within or outside of the Americas region. The Rio Treaty was a victory for regional security relations simply by being collectively approved by member states. Ball points out that “The Rio Treaty had turned the regional association into a regional security organization.” Yet the treaty has also served as a reminder of their divisions. Latin American states began to view the U.S. as a security threat from within, the primary issue being the importance of the preservation of their state sovereignty against U.S. encroachment. By comparison, the U.S. viewed the Soviet Union as the most immediate threat to regional security, with Latin American state sovereignty of secondary importance. The OAS voted in favor of supporting the Argentine position, with eighteen for the petition, none against it, and the U.S. abstaining. The appearance of a British

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23 Peter H. Smith, The Talons of the Eagle, 274.

24 Ball, 27. Further, the Rio Treaty designated security questions to be handled through the Meeting of Foreign Ministers (Article 11 of the Rio Treaty).

task force two days before the vote rallied several Latin American states to the Argentine cause despite any misgivings over the role of the Galtieri regime in instigating the conflict.

Despite the OAS vote, the US came to the aid of the United Kingdom (U.K.). albeit not through direct involvement in the conflict. The U.S. assisted the U.K. by allowing the use of Ascension Island as a support base. More specifically, this entailed supplying fuel; sidewinder and stinger air-to-air missiles for British aircraft; and phalanx gun systems for some British vessels. The U.S. also supplied up to ninety percent of the total intelligence of the U.K. during the conflict. The U.S. also supported the British sponsored Security Council Resolution 502, which called for the withdrawal of Argentine troops from the Falklands.

The inability of Latin American states to prevent U.S. support of the British was probably not unexpected by OAS members, however the event reinforced growing cynicism among Latin American leaders concerning the viability of regional security organization. It demonstrated that U.S. power was the real driver behind any regional agreement, not Pan American idealism or multilateral principles. More importantly, for Latin Americans it showed their own impotence vis-à-vis the U.S. Even when the large majority voted against the U.S. there was no enforcement mechanism strong enough to curb U.S. dominance. The conflict had the potential of demonstrating a unified regional

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26 Ibid., 320.

security vision, but had the opposite effect of highlighting the enduring and growing fissures between Latin American and U.S. security interests.

DEMOCRACY AND HUMAN RIGHTS

Under the Carter Administration the U.S. began to apply human rights and democracy as standards to transcend the traditional power politics approach. When the Reagan Administration assumed executive powers, it publicly disavowed the former administration's multilateral initiatives. Despite its public criticisms of Carter Administration policies, it did not fully scrap the role of human rights and democracy in policy creation towards developing countries. The approach was domestically successful, stressing democratic values and human rights, which added credibility to some policy decisions. It became the cornerstone of U.S. foreign policy from 1980-1988, and was a reflection of past U.S. policies. Mari-France Toinet explains that even before World War I, "...the United States also believed itself to have a civilizing 'mission' even if it did not use that term, and whenever they decided to intervene anywhere it was always in the name of democratic principles."^28

 Whereas the coalescence of U.S. interests and desires to uplift developing states was successful domestically, it was both perplexing and cynical to many Latin American observers. Policymakers in the U.S. believed this policy created a more coherent and predictable standard, leading to a more productive interaction with Latin American representatives. However, the policy was unable to distinguish between the security

needs of the U.S. and the need for support of Latin American democratic development. The presence of an anti-democratic competitor in the region, the Soviet Union, put U.S. interests and support of democracy at odds. In essence, whatever the U.S. did to truncate the spread of Soviet influence was perceived as a victory for democracy. Latin American states viewed the two faces of U.S. regional diplomacy as highly inconsistent. The policy was interpreted as at best, benign neglect of regional and domestic realities, at worst, the U.S. acting in its interests with no regard for its impact on regional states. The differences between the U.S. and Latin America created fertile ground for disagreement because many states south of the Rio Grande thought democracy and human rights were catchwords to provide new fuel to traditional U.S. interventionist policies.

As proof of their suspicions about U.S. intentions, skeptical Latin Americans pointed out that the record of the U.S. in supporting democracy was selective. The U.S. claimed it intervened in Grenada and Nicaragua to overthrow non-democratic leaders, but looked upon military dictatorships in Chile and Brazil as acceptable. As well as taking exception to the uneven record of the U.S. in supporting democratic reform in Latin America, critics also thought the criteria of the U.S. for deciding what was considered a democracy was more than suspect. At one point U.S. policy seemed to treat the holding of elections as the requirement for a democracy. Guy Poitras noted, “If simply holding elections were the sole requirement of democracy. Central America would be

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For example Pastor states “In justifying its confrontation with Nicaragua, the administration [Reagan] discovered and then elaborated a commitment to democracy.” It must also be said on this issue that Pastor gives the Reagan Administration credit for communicating to military leaders in Latin American America that U.S. support for them was contingent on their resolve to institute democratic government. Robert A. Pastor, *U.S. Foreign Policy Towards Latin America and the Caribbean* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1990), 80.
substantially more democratic than it actually is." Because the U.S. used democracy as the motivation in the interventions in Grenada and Nicaragua, and its military support of pro-U.S. elements in El Salvador and Honduras, the policy was judged as either arbitrary or unequally enforced. The strong support of the U.S. for democratic ideals seemed to be the cover for justifying politics driven by pure self-interest.

It is not difficult to understand the concern of Latin American leaders with U.S. regional security policy during the 1980s, since the Reagan Administration's policies varied so widely. Carothers found four distinct U.S. policies towards individual Latin American states during the 1980s: democracy by transition (Costa Rica, El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras); democracy by force (Grenada, Nicaragua); democracy by applause (Argentina); and democracy by pressure (Chile, Paraguay, Panama, Brazil). Democracy by transition was initiated when the U.S. believed a state was threatened by leftist aggression, and as a response promoted democratic change to provide a bulwark against potential communist incursion. Democracy by force consisted of direct intervention to overthrow a regime that was perceived as aligned with the Soviet Union, which was considered anti-democratic. Democracy by applause refers to a U.S. policy that demonstrated support for democracy in a particular state, but did so without direct involvement. The most important reason being the U.S. wanted to maintain a relationship with the military regimes in Argentina, but did not want to lose it as valuable ally in its Cold War confrontation with the Soviet Union. Democracy by pressure

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30 Poitras, 75.

31 Carothers, 192-195.

32 Ibid., 240.
policies were not directed against a perceived communist threat, but was similar to
democracy by transition in that U.S. policy was proactive in trying to influence
democratic reforms. An example of democracy by pressure is when the U.S. enforced
arms sales restrictions against the Brazilian military dictatorship. The pattern emerging
from Carothers' study is that the U.S. consistently supported democratic reform, but
weighted its most severe responses towards communist dictatorships.\textsuperscript{33}

The same criticisms have been made of U.S. actions to support human rights in
Latin America. Human rights began to assume a high level of importance in U.S.
regional policy under the Carter Administration, and were reinforced to a lesser extent
under the Reagan Administration: "When President Carter was defeated, this growing
human rights consciousness lost its chief spokesperson but not the public basis of its
support."\textsuperscript{34} However, U.S. human rights enforcement was inconsistent because under the
Reagan Administration contending political parties controlled the legislative and
executive branches. They were constantly at odds over human rights observance by
foreign states and the proper punishment mechanisms. Reagan Administration officials
wanted a less strict standard to allow them more latitude in policy implementation, the
legislature called for tougher enforcement.

Since the U.S. did not consistently support human rights, criticism from Latin
America grew. From their perspective, the U.S. supported human rights as long as it was

\textsuperscript{33}This was more or less the stated policy by Jeanne Kirkpatrick, the U.S.
ambassador to the UN in the Reagan Administration. She thought that there should be a
two-tiered policy applied to dictatorships. Communist dictatorships were less likely to
reform to democracies so stronger measures were needed. By contrast other dictatorships
were more likely to be led by less direct pressure.

\textsuperscript{34}Carothers, 242.
convenient to U.S. security concerns. There was also a great deal of Latin American resentment in that the U.S. behaved as though it was the custodian of human rights, judging other states and distributing rewards or punishment for a state’s performance.

AUTONOMY THROUGH ARMS PRODUCTION

The growth of Argentine and Brazilian arms producers was another point of contention between the U.S. and regional arms producing states during the 1980s. The disagreement typified many of the impediments to broader security cooperation and demonstrated the lack of trust many Latin American leaders had towards the U.S. Argentina, Brazil, and other regional states thought U.S. demands on export restrictions were solely based in self-interest, not due to strategies meant to truncate Soviet expansionism and control the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction as U.S. policy-makers frequently proclaimed. In contrast, the U.S. thought Latin American industries were leveraging U.S. technology transfer and financial support to sell Latin American arms indiscriminately to the highest bidder. Each side had a different but still credible perspective. The middle ground was elusive on the arms exporting issue and the Latin American arms industry issue remained a point of contention during the 1980s.

Argentina, Brazil, and to a lesser extent Chile, pursued additional capacity in arms production to obtain greater autonomy, and more specifically, a hedge against U.S.

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36 Ibid., 400.
The motivations behind indigenous arms production expressed the lack of trust many Latin American states held towards U.S. hegemony. Achieving greater autonomy for its own sake does not demonstrate a specific policy against the U.S. as much as a natural need for self-reliance and development. However, autonomy from the U.S. denotes a particular insecurity directed towards the U.S. During the 1970s and 1980s Latin American states diversified their sources for arms primarily from the U.S. to France, Italy, Israel, the Soviet Union, the U.K., and indigenous arms production.

Brazil had been, and remains today, the largest Latin American arms exporter. Table 12 illustrates the success of Brazilian efforts to gain autonomy in arms production, which can be gauged over a twenty-year period. In 1975 Brazil was able for the first time to export $51 million in arms; in 1987-88 the effort reached its apex with $650 and $700 million in sales respectively. Although the statistics show that Brazil never achieved complete autonomy in the arms sector, it was successful in reducing the U.S.'s influence. From 1981-1988 Brazil exported more than it imported, while also being able to reach this goal in 1992 and 1994. Armored vehicles, missiles and rocket systems generated the bulk of earnings from Brazil’s arms sales.

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37 Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Cuba and Mexico were the only arms exporting states during the period from 1985-1995. Mexican efforts to export were almost too small to be considered a directed policy, reaching its zenith in value in 1990 at $23 million. Cuban arms exports were for the most part not domestically manufactured, for example in 1988 Cuba imported just over $2 billion in arms and exported $287 million. These statistics demonstrate Cuba's search for autonomy vis-à-vis the U.S., but not exclusive autonomy in arms production. See James W. Wilkie, Eduardo Aleman and Jose Guadalupe Ortega, 302-303.

38 Lowenthal, 37.
Table 12. Brazilian Arms Exports and Imports, 1985-1993

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<td>330</td>
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<td>1990</td>
<td>172</td>
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</tbody>
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Source: James W. Wilkie, Eduardo Aleman and Jose Guadalupe Ortega, p. 302

The considerable effort by Argentina, Brazil and Chile to produce and export arms was two-fold: indigenous arms production would give the state greater autonomy and could earn badly needed export capital. In the Brazilian case, plans to achieve greater autonomy began in the 1960s, when the Brazilian army's Department of War Material and manufacturing interests in Sao Paulo formed an alliance known as Grupo Permanente de Mobilização Industrial. The alliance sought to convert underutilized civilian industries to defense production. The goal of greater self-reliance in the arms sector was also influenced by the advent of military rule in 1964, lasting until 1985. In the late 1970s, for the first time in the post World War II period, Brazilian purchases from European suppliers and domestic sources were larger than weapon imports from the U.S. The trend was exacerbated by the Carter Administration's policy to tie the distribution of military aid to human rights. Guidelines to the State and Defense

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41Schmidt, 5.
departments prohibited states judged to be human rights abusers from receiving any military aid.\textsuperscript{42}

Regional arms exporting states also had an economic imperative for their actions. From 1974-1994 Brazil accrued five billion dollars in export earnings. These export earnings were one of the few bright spots in Brazil's value-added exports. Despite their hard-credit earnings, critics in the U.S. noted that Brazil spent nearly half of its annual GDP supporting domestic industries.\textsuperscript{43} Further, research and development in the state supported armaments industries accounted for 20-25 percent of the country's science and technology budget.\textsuperscript{44} Therefore, whatever profit Brazil gained from arms exports was diminished by government investment in domestic industries. A point of contention that spread beyond the arms sector concerned issues related to economic development strategy. Whereas Brazil and other Latin American states actively pursued import substitution policies, the U.S. strongly believed that these policies should play a smaller role in economic development.\textsuperscript{45}


\textsuperscript{43}"Tomorrow's Italy," \textit{The Economist}, 17 June 1987: 20.

\textsuperscript{44}Conca. "Technology, The Military, And Democracy in Brazil." 146.


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The issue of U.S. technology transfer to Brazil and Argentina turned out to be another stumbling block in regional security affairs. Brazil had become competitive in the arms export industry by selling robust and easy to maintain equipment. Customers were not burdened with end-item utilization requirements that the U.S. frequently attaches to their weapons exports, and were frequently given licenses to produce Brazilian designed equipment amounting to a technology transfer. These qualities gave Brazil thirty-six customers willing to buy major weapons systems by the late 1980s.

During the early 1980s Brazil held at least nine licenses to produce major ground, sea, air and missile weapons systems: Argentina held eleven.

The U.S. objected to Brazilian technology transfer for three reasons, first due to opposition to the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, second it undercut U.S. regional influence, and third, it increased competition against U.S. arms producers. Brazilian nationalists contended that U.S. measures and objections to Brazilian technology transfer were primarily due to the impact it had on arms industries of the U.S. This explanation seemed unlikely since Brazilian sales, generally to developing states that could not afford U.S. technology, found Brazilian products far less expensive. It is more possible that U.S. policy-makers were concerned that Brazilian arms sales had the


47 Ibid., 94. These states are: Abu Dabi, Algeria, Argentina, Bolivia, Canada, Chile, Colombia, Cyprus, Ecuador, Egypt, El Salvador, France, Gabon, Guyana, Honduras, Iraq, Libya, Madagascar, Morocco, Nigeria, Panama, Paraguay, Portugal, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, South Korea, Sudan, Thailand, Togo, Tunisia, United Arab Emirates, United Kingdom, Uruguay, Venezuela and Zimbabwe.

48 Louscher and Salomone, 22.
potential to undercut U.S. regional influence in Latin America, in the Middle East, and in Africa. The U.S. frequently utilizes arms sales as instruments of foreign policy. Former Secretary of State Vance summarized U.S. arms sales objectives: support diplomatic efforts, influence political orientation of other states, maintain regional balances, limit Soviet influence, enhance U.S. access to regional governments, and provide leverage and influence with governments.\(^{50}\) Because Brazil sold arms to nearly every state in the region and many in Africa, it could potentially stunt U.S. efforts to exercise control via the arms trade.

The objections of the U.S. to Brazilian technology transfer were mostly centered on the possibility of the proliferation weapons of mass destruction. The U.S. strongly objected to Argentine and Brazilian attempts to sell missile technology to Libya and Iraq, and tried to block the West German sale of nuclear reactor technology to Brazil due to the concern the material could be weaponized and resold to other states. Analysts agreed that with the new reactor Brazil had the ability to produce weapons grade uranium.\(^{51}\) At the time, the sale of West German nuclear reactor technology to Brazil was the largest nuclear transfer to a developing country, and was instantly understood as a threat to nuclear weapons proliferation.\(^{52}\) Further, the U.S. expressed concern about the potential for the sale to ignite a nuclear arms race between Argentina and Brazil, at the time strong


rivals. Germany and Brazil couched U.S. objections in terms of economics: they thought the true objection of the U.S. was the entrance of German companies into a market niche that was formerly filled only by two U.S. corporations, General Electric and Westinghouse.53

Brazil and Argentina's missile programs caused consternation in Washington as well. Two Brazilian companies, Avibras and Orbita, separately worked on missile systems meant for export to Libya and Iraq.54 After the signing of the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR) Brazil was unable to procure the parts needed to complete its missile sales. Further, the U.S. was able to stop France from supplying rocket technology to Brazil although it was purportedly meant for launching satellites. Argentina was also working on a clandestine nuclear weapons program and missile program, the Condor II. The MTCR signatories expressed concern about the Condor II program, in part because of Argentina's partner states, Iraq and Egypt. Under U.S. pressure, the Condor II was cancelled in 1990.55

The inability of Latin American to compromise on these issues was a product of mutual distrust between them and the U.S. From the Latin American perspective it was essentially a question of autonomy. Latin American states wanted to insulate themselves from the seemingly capricious effect of U.S. foreign policy. Latin American states producing arms resented U.S. interference, at best believing U.S. policy goals only

53 Ibid., 63.
factored Cold War interests, at worst believing the U.S. wanted to keep the region subjugated to continue forms of exploitation. As one South American commented, reflecting broad opinion throughout the region. “Developing countries must develop the will to break out of the cycle of technological colonialism.” Many Latin American observers believed the policies of the U.S. were designed to subjugate them both economically and in security affairs. It seemed the U.S. had the intent to abrogate Brazilian success in arms exports, which was one of the few manufacturing sectors that any Latin American state had succeeded in during the late 1980s. Furthermore, by denying Latin American indigenous arms production, the U.S. increased Latin American dependency on U.S. and European suppliers.

The U.S. had a distinctly opposite view. Regional states that should be allied with U.S. initiatives against weapons proliferation and technology transfer to potential adversaries were instead turning against the U.S. for profit reasons only. Some U.S. analysts pointed to the fact that the only reason Brazil and Argentina’s defense firms realized any profits was due to huge amounts of state investment, and due to finances procured by loans from U.S. controlled financial institutions. Technology transfer, at times originally procured from the U.S., angered domestic critics. Many critics wanted to see U.S. loans directly benefit the Argentine and Brazilian populace rather than the elite, who reaped most of the financial rewards of the arms trade.


CONCLUSION

In terms of GNP and defense expenditure, U.S. hegemony was perpetuated through the 1980s. The presence of power asymmetry was demonstrated by the lack of improvement in security cooperation during the 1980s. Several factors contributed to the lack of security cooperation, including: the continuation of unilateral U.S. military intervention, large Latin American investments in indigenous arms production, the continued Latin American support for Cuba, and signs of Latin American balancing against the U.S. on certain security issues.

Direct unilateral military intervention in the cases of Grenada and Panama, and indirect involvement in Nicaragua and Cuba, helped contribute to difficulties in regional security relations. Because the U.S. by-passed established multilateral forums in most of these cases, Latin American leaders had no input into U.S. policies that in turn had a great deal of influence over them. An interesting duality to Latin American reactions against U.S. unilateral interventions should be noted. Despite the adoption of democratic principles in the later part of the 1980s, Latin American states were still strongly critical of U.S. policies to force regime change in Cuba, Grenada, Nicaragua and Panama. One might expect statements condemning the unilateral manner of U.S. actions from Latin American statesmen, but similarly it would be expected that the U.S. receive support for initiatives to democratize regional states. The strong Latin American reaction to these events demonstrates the high degree of Latin American distrust towards the U.S.

The exhibition of balancing behavior also demonstrated the regional hegemonic system was not functioning as effectively as it should be. Latin American states stood firmly behind Argentina during the Malvinas Islands dispute with the U.K., and they
formed a consensus outside of U.S. leadership to ameliorate the Nicaraguan conflict. Although U.S. leadership was far from abdicated, the system seemed to be under considerable strain from the use of U.S. power that created a power asymmetry condition.

The OAS and the Rio Treaty continued to be marginalized as tools to facilitate hegemonic stability. Despite votes in the OAS that condemned U.S. actions in Grenada and Panama, and that supported Argentina in the Malvinas crisis, the U.S. ignored these deliberations. The OAS became a forum where Latin American leaders could vent their frustrations towards U.S. policies but with little impact on Washington.

Latin American support of Cuba remained strong despite the growth of democracy in the region. Latin American states did not agree with U.S. policy aimed at undermining the government of Cuba, not because they were ardent supporters of Cuba’s brand of government, but because they viewed U.S. actions as a breach of Cuban sovereignty. Due to the power asymmetry of the U.S during the 1980s and a demonstrated willingness to use it, security cooperation showed little improvement. The hegemony of the U.S. began to resemble less of a consensual relationship, that is suggested by hegemonic stability theory, and inched closer to that of a purely unipolar system, in which power was the primary determinant of state interaction.

The broad base of support for Argentina during the Falkland/Malvinas Islands War was another indicator of the schism between U.S. and Latin American security interests. Despite the fact that Argentina used force to take and occupy a disputed territory, even as an aggressor since the residents preferred U.K. citizenship, OAS member states felt compelled to ally with the Galtieri regime. Latin American concerns about their own weakness compared to the U.S., and therefore incursions on their
sovereignty, were so great that became the over-riding determinant of their foreign policies.

Burgeoning nationalism and the quest to reduce dependency on U.S. suppliers drove the state funding of Argentine and Brazilian arms industry. Despite the considerable strain placed on the Brazilian economy, a high level of effort continued until the end of the 1980s. Argentina and Brazil demanded the relaxation of U.S. laws prohibiting the technology transfer of rocket technology while failing to address genuine U.S. concerns about weapons proliferation. The prevailing claim from some Latin American leaders was that the U.S. wanted to keep Latin American states as customers of U.S. arms, and as a consequence to maintain Latin American indebtedness, when in reality most U.S. military equipment in the past had been given to many Latin American states in terms of aid packages that did not produce debt upon purchase. The other common Latin American argument was that the U.S. only gave its outdated equipment to the militaries of regional states to keep these states at an inferior level of preparedness, and therefore dependent on the U.S. The development of domestic arms industries in several Latin American states during the 1980s was an attempt to circumvent such a strategy. However, Conca explains that in their search for autonomy from U.S. hegemony, Brazil conversely created domestic insecurity by increasing its economic burden through subsidizing defense related industries.

58 For example, the U.S. transferred many arms factories to Brazil under lend lease. Ken Conca, Manufacturing Insecurity: The Rise and Fall of Brazil’s Military-Industrial Complex (Boulder: Lynn Rienner, 1997), 31.

59 Ibid.
The overabundance of U.S. power during the 1980s, magnified by the increased level of U.S. unilateral policies, gave the impression that the U.S. was more of a security threat to Latin American states than outside powers such as the Soviet Union. The U.S. found that when it acted outside of the security agreements established through the hegemonic relationship, it achieved short-term goals at the expense of diminished trust. The diminished trust between the U.S. and Latin America created obstacles to achieving meaningful long-term security cooperation. These obstacles manifested themselves in policy disagreements related to the topics of Cuba, democracy, human rights, intervention, and arms control. The inability of Latin American and U.S. leaders to mitigate their differences worked to destabilize regional security, countermanding the benefits of the hegemonic system.

Although the 1980s was a step backwards in efforts to solidify regional security cooperation, the era still witnessed the diffusion of the values of the hegemon in the form of market economics and democratic political values. The trend laid the foundation for the solidification of democratic and market reforms in the 1990s, which will be described in the next chapter. The 1990s witnessed the aftermath of the end of the Cold War, leading hopeful observers to assume a golden age in inter-American affairs was just over the horizon. However, their assumption was that the Cold War had been the primary impediment to regional security cooperation as opposed to power asymmetry. The primary inhibitor of security cooperation, power asymmetry, was not significantly alleviated therefore little progress was made. New security issues include; the growing problem of the drug trade: protection of bio-diversity and the environment; Colombian instability and resulting migration of citizens to neighboring states, and issues associated...
with regional trade negotiations. Although these issues are not directly related to the Cold War, they still hinder regional security cooperation. Chapter seven explores the lack of significant progress in light of the power asymmetry dynamic.
CHAPTER VII
AN ERA OF NEW OPPORTUNITIES (1990-2001)

The decade of the 1990s potentially ushered in a new era for inter-American relations. The end of the Cold War alleviated the growing division between the U.S. and Latin America on the issue of state sovereignty, however other issues emerged to test regional security cooperation. These issues included border conflicts, the drug trade and environmental protection. Latin American leaders had good reason to hope that the U.S would systematically address the economic and social development that they believed should be the focus of the public goods that the hegemon should provide.

This chapter will review regional post-Cold War security issues, including: competition among trade regimes and their security implications, the drug trade, regional relations with Cuba, the border war between Peru and Ecuador, and regional reaction to any U.S. action involving military solutions. Gauging bilateral and multilateral interaction of regional states coalescing around these issues will help determine the level of security cooperation.

The analysis of chapter seven is based on the assumption that regional consensus has a greater chance of emerging since the U.S. spent less on defense during the 1990s and that affects the overall power asymmetry comparison. Therefore, security cooperation should have increased marginally with the slight decrease in the extreme power asymmetry that persisted since the 1960s.
REGIONAL HEGEMONY

The U.S. continued to outpace the GNP performance of leading Latin American states from 1990-1999, as demonstrated in Table 13, suggesting that there was no reduction in U.S. hegemony during this period. Latin America as an aggregate kept pace with U.S. growth. The U.S. economy grew twenty-four percent from 1990 to 1999: by comparison Latin America also grew by an equal amount during the 1990s. The two largest economies in the region also grew at similar rates. Brazilian GNP increasing seventeen percent and Mexican GNP more closely matching the U.S. with a twenty-five percent increase in total GNP. The import/export dependency of Argentina, Brazil and Venezuela on the U.S. remained relatively unchanged (Table 14). By contrast Mexican

Table 13. Regional Dominance in Terms of GNP, 1990-1999

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>U.S.</th>
<th>Brazil</th>
<th>Latin America</th>
<th>Mexico</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1990</td>
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<td>1991</td>
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<tr>
<td>1999</td>
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</table>

imports and exports to the U.S. substantially increased during the early 1990s, undoubtedly due to the effects of the culmination of the NAFTA treaty in 1994.

Table 14. Import/Exports to U.S. (As Percentage of Total World Trade)

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<tr>
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<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Argentina</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Export</td>
<td>8.9</td>
<td>12.2</td>
<td>14.6</td>
<td>12.4</td>
<td>13.8</td>
<td>10.4</td>
<td>11.0</td>
<td>9.1</td>
<td>11.1</td>
</tr>
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<td>18.2</td>
<td>16.5</td>
<td>21.2</td>
<td>21.5</td>
<td>18.0</td>
<td>21.2</td>
<td>22.6</td>
<td>23.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Brazil</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Export</td>
<td>17.4</td>
<td>27.1</td>
<td>27.9</td>
<td>24.6</td>
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<td>20.2</td>
<td>19.1</td>
<td>20.7</td>
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<tr>
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<td>20.7</td>
<td>20.9</td>
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<td>23.3</td>
<td>24.5</td>
<td>23.6</td>
<td>24.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<tr>
<td>Export</td>
<td>63.2</td>
<td>60.4</td>
<td>60.4</td>
<td>70</td>
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<td>66.6</td>
<td>66.6</td>
<td>70.4</td>
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<td>64.8</td>
<td>62.8</td>
<td>68.2</td>
<td>70.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Venezuela</td>
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<td></td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Export</td>
<td>27.8</td>
<td>46.0</td>
<td>57.2</td>
<td>51.6</td>
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<td>46.8</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
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<td>47.5</td>
<td>44.6</td>
<td>44.6</td>
<td>46.4</td>
<td>47.5</td>
<td>48.3</td>
<td>40.3</td>
<td>43.2</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: James W. Wilkie, Eduardo Aleman and Jose Guadalupe Ortega, 691.

The defense expenditure of the U.S. continued to be much higher than Latin America’s, as demonstrated in Table 15. Argentina and Venezuela’s defense expenditure declined during this period, while Brazil and Mexico’s rose. Despite the increase in two of four countries U.S. expenditure still dwarfed the region. In this time frame the U.S. spent the least amount of money in 1996, $271 billion. The total of all four countries reaches $21.5 billion, or only 12.6 percent of the U.S. total. Despite the anemic comparison, the Latin American total increased from the last decade, which was only three percent of the expenditure of the U.S. during a given year. The decrease in the comparison can be related to the U.S. post-Cold War draw-down that continued until the end of the decade, and the improvement in Mexico’s and Brazil’s economies allowing for
military upgrades. This may lead one to conclude that although power asymmetry remained, the gap shrunk in terms of overall military expenditure.

Table 15. Annual Military Expenditure, 1990-1997

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Argentina</th>
<th>Brazil</th>
<th>Mexico</th>
<th>U.S.</th>
<th>Venezuela</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1990</td>
<td>3,350</td>
<td>9,560</td>
<td>1,330</td>
<td>306,000</td>
<td>1,220</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1991</td>
<td>2,730</td>
<td>7,530</td>
<td>1,510</td>
<td>280,000</td>
<td>2,520</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1992</td>
<td>4,470</td>
<td>6,640</td>
<td>1,720</td>
<td>305,000</td>
<td>1,870</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1993</td>
<td>4,230</td>
<td>8,450</td>
<td>1,940</td>
<td>298,000</td>
<td>1,310</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1994</td>
<td>4,730</td>
<td>8,010</td>
<td>2,440</td>
<td>288,000</td>
<td>1,190</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1995</td>
<td>4,620</td>
<td>11,200</td>
<td>2,160</td>
<td>279,000</td>
<td>1,440</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1996</td>
<td>4,490</td>
<td>13,800</td>
<td>2,100</td>
<td>271,000</td>
<td>1,050</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1997</td>
<td>3,700</td>
<td>14,100</td>
<td>4,290</td>
<td>276,000</td>
<td>1,860</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


THE REALIGNMENT OF INTERESTS IN THE AMERICAS

The growing convergence of NAFTA members, and conversely, the growing division of interests between the U.S. and Mercosur, is a reflection of regional security cooperation. Both trends coincided with the end of the Cold War and marked a significant departure from the historical regional norm. Although other sub-regional groupings exist, including the Andean Group, the Caribbean Community and Common Market (CARICOM) and the Central American Common Market,¹ the primary goal of the states in these groups was to strengthen their economies and financial institutions for

¹ Peru, Chile and Mexico are also members.
the rigors of the global economy, and then they would be positioned to enter into larger trade schemes such as the proposed FTAA. Although Brazil stated that the creation of Mercosur was for similar reasons, Brazil’s actions during the 1990s seem to prove their ambitions were different. Many analysts familiar with regional politics believe Brazil was actively pursuing a sphere of influence in South America and viewed U.S. hemispheric dominance as an impediment to this goal. If such a strategy formed the nexus of Brazilian strategy for entering Mercosur, then this could prove to be a problematic issue for the traditional hegemonic structure of the region.

The 1994 implementation of the NAFTA drastically altered the tone of relations between Mexico and the U.S. The core of the treaty began in 1987 when Mexico and the U.S. signed a bilateral agreement concerning trade and investment. In the 1990s, Presidents Bush and Salinas announced their support for negotiations of a free trade agreement, and by 1991 Canada joined the talks. After a contentious debate in the Congress of the U.S., the treaty was signed on January 1, 1994.

The NAFTA Treaty had far-reaching consequences beyond bilateral trade. With the end of the Cold War the U.S. began to pay attention to the impact of Mexico’s economic and political instability, particularly to the issues of illegal migration and the drug trade. During the Reagan Administration Mexico was crippled by a severe economic crisis. Washington’s remarkable and costly bailout of Mexico awakened the

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Reagan-Bush Administrations to the threat that Mexican instability posed to the U.S.\(^3\) Despite an overwhelming victory against Iraq in the Gulf War, the experience imbued U.S. leaders with the sense that the Gulf region would be highly unstable in the foreseeable future. Gulf War instability reminded U.S. leaders of the importance of Mexican and Venezuelan oil to the vitality of the U.S. economy. The leadership of the U.S. was increasingly forced to realize the growing interdependence of Mexico and the U.S., and this realization kept U.S. leaders on course to negotiate and sign the NAFTA treaty. Further, U.S. leaders became more sensitive to the rise of trade blocs in Europe and Asia.\(^4\) Under pressure from global concerns and bilateral issues with Mexico, the U.S. was able to pass NAFTA despite its domestic opposition.

The Mexican crisis of 1982 also had a sobering impact on Mexican officials as well. President Miguel de la Madrid was able to stabilize the Mexican economy through huge cutbacks in the public sector and opened the Mexican economy to foreign investment and trade. President Carlos Salinas de Gortari continued Madrid’s policies. Salinas worked to improve relations with the U.S., understanding that the key to

\(^3\)Portillo borrowed heavily against Mexican oil reserves and spent lavishly. When the market collapsed in the early 80s, so did the Mexican economy. In August of 1982 the Mexican finance minister informed Washington that his country was close to defaulting on $80 billion in foreign debt, a scenario that would have repercussions on the global economy. The U.S. quickly intervened by: purchasing a large amount of Mexican oil in advance, establishing treasury and federal reserve lines of support, restructure commercial debt, negotiate emergency measures with the International Monetary Fund, and arranging for credits for the import of grains. See, Clint E. Smith, *Inevitable Partnership: Understanding Mexico-U.S. Relations* (Boulder: Lynne Rienner, 2000), 62-63.

improving Mexico's economy was to draw from the strength of the U.S. to the North. After signing several bilateral agreements with the U.S., Salinas proposed a free trade area with the U.S. in 1990 for two distinct reasons, to encourage foreign investor confidence, and because its overtures to Japan and Europe went largely unheeded.⁴

For the first half of the century Brazil had a policy of near autonomous alignment with U.S. interests. Growing Brazilian nationalism contributed to the deterioration of the relationship, culminating in U.S. support of the overthrow of President João Goulart. Under military rule bilateral relations eventually worsened. In the mid-1970s Brazil signaled the official end to the "special relationship" by breaking military ties to the U.S. and charting an independent course. During the Carter Administration the issues of human rights and non-nuclear proliferation became constant topics, driving Brazil farther way from Washington, and in the process, limiting Washington's influence over Brazil. Unencumbered by its ties to the U.S., Brasilia was free to concentrate on achieving the latent national ambition of Grandeza, or greatness, it traditionally sought since the 1800s.⁵ The Brazilian feeling of entitlement to control the continent of South America stems from its large size,⁶ its location on the continent of South America, with borders on all countries except for Chile and Ecuador, its population which is larger than the rest of

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⁴Clint E. Smith, 72.

⁵Philip Kelly, Checkerboards and Shatterbelts: The Geopolitics of South America (Austin, TX: University of Texas Press, 1997), 54, 178.

South America combined and its abundant natural resources. From the late 1970s, onward Brasilia seemed to define its interests against the U.S. with more frequency.

The explicit logic for the creation of Mercosur was the same as other regional trade groups in developing states. Member states wanted to create an internal market and economies of scale so indigenous industries could survive the rigors of opening to the global market. The official reason for the initiation of Mercosur was to develop the markets of member countries to pave the way for broader regional integration. Brazil’s Mercosur partner countries were originally attracted to the idea of membership in the FTAA as proposed by the first Bush Administration, a proposal based on the expansion of NAFTA. Argentina and Chile immediately responded they wished to negotiate, however, due to President Clinton’s loss of fast-track negotiation authority, their calls for inclusion had to be delayed. Argentina was pushed into Mercosur since its leaders were searching for a vehicle to liberalize its economic structure, and was unable to negotiate an economic agreement with Washington. The economies of Paraguay and Uruguay were

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8The typical Brazilian view on this issue can be explained by a poll taken in 1996 that asked the unusual question of respondents if they felt Brazil was making significant progress towards becoming a great power. Fifty-seven percent of those polled replied ‘yes’. “Glad to be Brazilian,” Latin American Weekly Report, 18 January 1996: 16. Further to the point, Hollerman quoted an official of Itamarti, Brazil’s foreign ministry, as stating: “Everybody in the Brazilian bureaucracy works in accordance with the assumption of ‘Manifest Destiny,’ although we don’t use that expression.” Leon Hollerman, Japan’s Economic Strategy in Brazil (Lexington, MA: Lexington Books, 1988), 20.


already deeply integrated to its two large neighbors, Argentina and Brazil, and therefore led them to join Mercosur as well.

One reason Brazil aggressively pursued Mercosur was to blunt growing American influence and create a more prominent regional position for itself. In the 1990s, "Brazil struck out on its own and reasserted that it was *primus inter pares* in South America."  

Slowly, but surely, Brazil began to seek its aspiration of South American leadership by a policy of annulling U.S. influence where it could, and cooperating when it must. Mercosur gave Brazil a means to counter U.S.-led regional integration and offered an alternative to other Latin American countries disenfranchised with U.S. hegemony.

Brazil began to actively seek economic diversification away from the U.S. hegemony as early as the 1980s. Roett points out that Japanese commercial banks provided substantial lending prior to the 1982 debt crisis."  

Many Brazilian leaders did not consider investments by the U.S. beneficial. For example, one observer noted that when Brazilians spoke derisively of multi-national corporations (MNC), they were speaking specifically about American MNCs. Japanese diplomats and commercial interests made a concerted effort to court Brazil. Their strategy was to utilize Brazil as a source of raw materials, a specialization that was viewed as complimentary to Japan's expertise in manufacturing. To this end, Japan supported projects in Brazil, such as the

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13 Hollerman, 73.
Cáritas dam project and research into growing crops in the dry cerrado in the Northeast of Brazil, that would in turn reap dividends by supplying Japan with natural resources.14

However, the nature of their complementary relationship had its limits. Brazil wanted the benefits of Japanese technology so it could begin to produce value-added manufactured goods and jump-start the creation of a technology sector. The fact that Japan was not interested in technology transfer to Brazil diminished Brazilian interest in pursuing the Japanese alternative to U.S. hegemony. One Brazilian official noted in regard to the Brazilian-Japanese relationship, the employment effects of selling natural resources was very small and the technology transfer expected by Brazil was not materializing.15 In essence, it seemed Japan was turning Brazil into a client state that would limit Brazil’s ability to transform its economy from supplying raw materials to developed states to producing assembled goods. Because Brazilians looked to Japan to escape a similar relationship with the U.S., Brazilian leaders diagnosed the pursuit of Japan as an alternative to U.S. hegemony as an unfruitful policy initiative.

During the late 1990s Argentina and Brazil actively pursued a trade agreement with the EU in another attempt to diversify Mercosur trading partners away from U.S.

14 Ibid., pp. 20-21. Hollerman points out that Japan’s investments are aimed at reducing its dependence on the U.S., and thus undermining the products where the U.S. has a comparative advantage with Japan: “By its assistance in the construction of infrastructure and heavy and chemical industries in Brazil, Japan is strengthening Brazil’s competitive power in the low-and middle-technology industries that will seek markets in the U.S. and in third areas where the U.S. is fighting to maintain its market share. The Brazilian case is thus a model of Japanese strategy in challenging the U.S. through the aspirations of others”, 17.

15 The official gave the example of Japanese efforts to develop the cerrado. He stated that whatever results Japan obtained were not being given to Brazil, only used by Japanese industries to export to Africa. Hollerman, 77-78.
influence. The goals of the EU were similar to those of Mercosur. The EU was alarmed as Mexican trade was diverted to the U.S. with the advent of NAFTA, increasing from 60.4 of Mexico's percent of total trade in 1987 to 80.4 by 1994. The EU realized that if the U.S. successfully completed a comprehensive trade agreement with Latin America it could reduce European competitiveness in Latin American and U.S. markets. Confirming their suspicions, during the same time period Mexico's trade with the EU decreased from 18.2 to .4 percent of its total trade. The EU was seeking export markets to strengthen its global position and was concerned about the enactment of a hemispheric free-trade agreement, and thought the FTAA proposal could result in trade diversion, threatening its economic growth.

The chances of Brazilian success in reducing the U.S. profile in South America were dependent on U.S. actions during the Bush Administration. The Clinton Administration hoped to negotiate the expansion of NAFTA but was unable to do so because of the loss of fast-track authority. The resulting lack of regional leadership left a

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16 Presidents Fernando de la Rúa of Argentina and Fernando Henrique Cardoso of Brazil urged a formal European Union-Mercosur pact before the year 2005, an agreement which would seek to augment commercial ties between the EU and Southern Cone countries. “EU-Mercosur Trade Critical.” Buenos Aires Herald. 28 October 2000.

17 James W. Wilkie, Eduardo Aleman and Jose Guadalupe Ortega, 691-693.

power vacuum that *Itamarati*, the Brazilian foreign ministry, was eager to fill.\(^9\) Despite Brazil’s efforts, its exports trade with Japan, the EU and the US had not significantly been altered. Total exports, which is frequently used internally as Brazil’s most important indicator of economic success, increased by only .6% from 1980 to 1994 to Japan, .1% with the EU and 1.6 to the U.S (see Table 16). With the fall of the Japanese economy, which the Euro currency, Brazil’s trade diversion strategy had little success. Brazilian ambitions took another blow when its primary Mercosur partner, Argentina, endured an economic collapse in 2001 and is now headed into its tenth year of economic stagnation.\(^{20}\) Despite regional attempts to circumvent U.S. hegemony, these efforts enjoyed little success.

The position of Argentina on the FTAA was less clearly defined than the Brazilian position. Although Argentina was a core state of Mercosur, it also expressed a desire to join NAFTA, or the FTAA as a NAFTA follow-on. When Chile began to lobby for NAFTA membership early in the Clinton Administration; the Argentine government expressed a similar interest.\(^{21}\) Argentina’s dual policy, being both pro-Mercosur and

\(^9\)Roett described Brazilian negotiating tactics during the FTAA conference of 1994 as designed to weaken the U.S. position and solidify Brazil’s bid to be the regional leader. See Roett, “U.S. Policy Towards Mercosur,” 112-115.


NAFTA, concerned Brasilia, since their policy counted on Mercosur to give them bargaining power vis-à-vis the U.S., EU and Asia.

Table 16. Brazilian Trade Trends (Exports as Percentage of Total World Trade)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
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<td>6.1</td>
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<td>8.1</td>
<td>6.2</td>
<td>6.0</td>
<td>6.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Imports</td>
<td>4.8</td>
<td>4.3</td>
<td>6.0</td>
<td>5.8</td>
<td>5.6</td>
<td>5.9</td>
<td>5.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>European Union</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td>Exports</td>
<td>27.2</td>
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<td>31.2</td>
<td>31.9</td>
<td>25.9</td>
<td>27.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Imports</td>
<td>15.4</td>
<td>14.6</td>
<td>21.3</td>
<td>22.6</td>
<td>22.2</td>
<td>22.7</td>
<td>24.9</td>
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<tr>
<td>Imports</td>
<td>18.6</td>
<td>19.7</td>
<td>19.8</td>
<td>23.3</td>
<td>24.5</td>
<td>23.6</td>
<td>24.3</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Source:* Brazil was chosen as the representative for Mercosur trade as a whole since the Brazilian economy dominates the organization and because the statistics can be directly attributed to Brazil. Statistics taken from, James W. Wilkie, Eduardo Aleman and Jose Guadalupe Ortega. 692.

Venezuela had emerged as an important economic power in Latin America due to its large oil reserves. Under President Hugo Chavez, Venezuela generally supported a united Latin American front to counter U.S. hegemony. Chavez had denounced current multi-lateral security approaches to hemispheric relations as antiquated, claiming they supported the unilateral approach of the U.S. Chavez had circulated a document to other Latin American states suggesting that they should cooperate on creating a new security agenda. The strongly worded document stated, "The United States' predominant military power has been clear since [the Monroe Doctrine], through the use of an imperialist foreign policy of territorial expansion, military conquest, and construction of an
American community based on its own [U.S.] concept.”22 Chavez’s vociferous opposition to the U.S. was noted by his conduct during the aftermath of a large mudslide killing thousands of Venezuelans. Regardless of Venezuela’s need of disaster relief assistance, he refused U.S. humanitarian aid that was already en-route. This action was to demonstrate that any dependency on the U.S. would not be tolerated. Chavez opposed the FTAA, since he had a well-documented resistance to U.S. leadership on most issues.

REGIONAL SECURITY AND THE DRUG TRADE

The current U.S. multi-billion dollar anti-narcotics policy began to take shape when President Nixon first declared drugs a national threat at the end of the 1960s.23 President Reagan re-emphasized the effort when he issued the National Security Decision Directive 221 in 1986 that declared drug trafficking a national threat. Aware of regional sensitivities, three criteria were established that would allow U.S. military participation in Latin American exigencies: host governments had to invite U.S. forces, the Department of State or Drug Enforcement Agency had to coordinate U.S. efforts, and U.S. Forces were only permitted to fill a logistics role.24 Under President Bush the war on drugs began to take shape when the Department of Defense was given the task of detecting

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24 Bruce M. Bagley, Myths of Militarization (Corale Gables: University of Miami North-South Center Press, 1991), 5.
illegal narcotics entering the U.S., and integrate command and control of the services for interdiction efforts. The Office of National Drug Control Policy was created under the executive branch in 1989 with the mission: "...to establish policies, priorities, and objectives for the Nation's drug control program, the goals of which are to reduce illicit drug use, manufacturing, and trafficking; drug-related crime and violence; and drug-related health consequences." The U.S. regional military command, Southern Command, inherited the bulk of the counter-drug mission performed by the military by virtue of its geographic area of responsibility that included Central and South America, as well as the Caribbean.

The drug certification process of the U.S. was central to its efforts to combat the drug trade, and garnered a hostile reaction from Latin American states. The U.S. used foreign aid to support Latin American efforts in various forms including: military, economic, and law enforcement assistance. In order to continue to receive aid a regional state had to pass through the annual drug certification process of the U.S. Latin American states were forced to endure a unilateral U.S. process that required recertification by a Senate majority vote on an annual basis. If the state failed to meet U.S. criteria, then it was exempt from particular forms of U.S. aid. The certification process was universally disliked in Latin America as it embodied unilateral measures the U.S. imposed on other states, and was therefore viewed as infringing on Latin American sovereignty.

There have been efforts to bridge the gap between U.S. policy and Latin American objections to drug certification. President Vincente Fox of Mexico proposed a plan that replaces the drug certification policy with greater bilateral cooperation with regular contact between representatives of regional governments.26 Fox's conciliatory attitude seems to be unique. Other Latin American states believe the U.S. policy to be hypocritical, frequently citing the fact that the U.S. is the largest consumer of narcotics in the region. The same argument led former Mexican President Zedillo to announce that the U.S. should have to undergo its own drug certification.27 Venezuela has also vociferously denounced U.S. drug certification as a breach of its national sovereignty.28

In 1997 the OAS General Assembly approved a resolution that was cosponsored by fifteen members directed against the U.S. policy of drug certification.29 In response the drug certification policy of the U.S., the OAS introduced its own multilateral certification process in 1998. The Multilateral Evaluation Mechanism is embraced by regional states and is being closely examined as an alternative by U.S. legislators. In an effort to ameliorate tensions over the issue there were efforts to introduce legislation to


the U.S. Senate that would suspend the U.S. certification process for a number of years, allowing time to review alternatives based on a multilateral process.30

Latin American leaders are also concerned about the implementation of Plan Colombia, a billion dollar aid package given to Colombia to help in the control of illegal narcotic trafficking. States that border Colombia are concerned about the lack of multilateral consultation in the proposal. To control the drug trade, the Colombian government will likely be forced to fight the guerilla insurgency that uses proceeds from the drug trade to fund its activities. A civil war in Colombia has already raised sovereignty issues due to forced migration from the state. Also, any U.S. involvement raises the concern of U.S. military intervention in the border areas. Many bordering states also believe that a dislocation of the drug industry in Colombia would force the Colombian rebels to simply move their operations into their own territory.

Brazil has reservations about Plan Colombia directly linked to the state’s insecurity regarding its own Northern frontier. As early as 1991 Brazil expressed dissatisfaction with U.S. involvement in the drug war. Some Brazilian government officials believing the U.S. had the ulterior motive of wanting to occupy the Amazon to protect it from environmental degradation or for its natural resources.31 The implementation of Plan Colombia rekindled Brazilian concerns that its authority over sovereign territory will come into question. To this point a political leader from the


Amazon region stated, "the real plan is to occupy the whole Amazon region, and not just the Colombian area." The specter of U.S. troops near the Brazilian border has contributed to rising apprehensions over the possibility of U.S. military intervention. In response Brazilian leaders created emergency plans to defend the area, one called the *Calha Norte* and other known as the Amazon Region Protection System. Luis Inacio de Silva, an influential labor leader in Brazil since the 1980s, and strong presidential candidate, has announced his opposition to Plan Colombia. If he were elected President, it is likely Brazil would stand firmly against U.S. military aid to Colombia.

The controversy surrounding the System for Vigilance over the Amazon (SIVAM) project provides an example of Brazilian suspicions of U.S. intentions in Brazil's northern frontier. The SIVAM system is intended as a surveillance system for use in curbing the trafficking of illegal narcotics and can also be used to monitor environmental degradation in the Amazon region. Many Brazilians, and in particular the military, felt that the system could be used to threaten Brazil's sovereignty because a U.S. company was awarded as the primary contractor to construct SIVAM. Although the controversy continued for some time because of charges of bid-rigging and other


33 Ibid.


corruption, the U.S. contractor was eventually awarded the contract and the controversy has subsided.

Due to the threat of Plan Colombia to Brazilian sovereignty, Brazilian leaders committed resources to autonomously defend its 1,650-kilometer long Amazon border in order to fight the narco-trafficking. General Alberto Cardoso, chief of the Institutional Security Cabinet, stated: “The Brazilian territory cannot be used as a base for standard US military actions, nor as a sanctuary for guerrilla elements to flee to, nor a shelter for drug traffickers and their laboratories.” There were rumors that Brazil was allowing the U.S. to construct military bases in the Amazon to fight drug trafficking, Cardoso denied that the Brazilian Government is going to authorize any U.S. use of its territory. Brazil prefers a multilateral approach to the drug problem in order to minimize the impact of U.S. hegemony. One example of Brasilia’s preferred multilateral approach is the South

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American Financial Action Group that will coordinate anti-money laundering laws of participating states to affect the profit of narco-traffickers.

Brazilian policies reflect a need to control U.S. hegemony, but do not promote a specific proposal to deal with the Colombian crisis. Brazil's reticence to address the issue prompted historian Kenneth Maxwell to comment, "Brazil is the main ostrich, which paradoxically searches for a leadership role in South America, but keeps its distance from the most dangerous conflagration, and the most potentially divisive conflict: Colombia." However, the unwillingness of Brazil to deal with the drug trade on its northern frontier is partly due to its reluctance to regularly patrol this area. Because it is a large territory covered by dense jungle the undersized Brazilian Army would be pressed to maintain a regular presence.

The U.S. has met with objections from other regional states in its efforts to combat the illegal narcotics trade, based on familiar concerns of U.S dominance. The U.S. had agreed to withdraw its military in Panama by the year 2000. The U.S. prepared to leave the Panama Canal to Panamanian authorities, as directed by the Torrijos-Carter Treaties signed in 1977. Even as the U.S. prepared to withdraw its military forces from Panama, the Panamanian Government tried to negotiate to allow U.S. forces to stay. The talks were controversial among Panamanians, ending when President Mireya Moscoso said that "never again would there be a US military presence in her country." Any

\footnote{Maxwell, 9.}

continuation of a U.S. military presence was understood by the U.S. as a deal among equals, whereas Panamanians only viewed a continued U.S. presence as denigrating the ability of Panama to safeguard the canal and effectively fight drug trafficking. Prior to Moscoso, President Ernesto Perez tried to broker an agreement that would place an international center to fight drug trafficking and money laundering in the former U.S. installations. The center was to be a joint Latin American effort called the Multilateral Coordination Center to Fight Drug Trafficking. It was considered during the proceedings of the OAS in 1996, but withdrawn due to domestic opposition in Panama.\footnote{"President Repeats Offer To Set Up Antidrug Center," (text). Paris. \textit{AFP} in Spanish (2 July 1996). Translated by the Foreign Broadcast Information Service. \textit{FBIS Daily Report-Americas}. 5 July 1996 (PrEx 7.10: FBIS-LAT-96-129). Available from World News Connection. July 8, 2001.}

Other proposed and active U.S. bases are generating similar nationalist opposition in Ecuador and Peru. A U.S. base was established in the Iquitos area of Peru, near the border with Ecuador. Its purpose is to provide support to the Peruvian National Counter-narcotics Directorate that works to eradicate coca crops and to combat drug trafficking activities. The residents are strongly opposed to the presence of U.S. Drug Enforcement Agents and military personnel who will settle at that location.\footnote{"Loreto Patriotic Front Gives Ultimatum to DEA, Southcom Members if Base Built in Peru." (text). Mexico City. \textit{NOTIMEX} in Spanish (01 March 2001). Translated by the Foreign Broadcast Information Service. \textit{FBIS Daily Report-Americas}. 2 March 2001 (PrEx 7.10: FBIS-LAT-2001-0301). Available from World News Connection. July 8, 2001.} They have threatened violent action against them. In Ecuador, a similar dynamics seem to be at work. A U.S. base was established in Manta to monitor the flows of heroin and cocaine from the Putumayo and Caquetá provinces of Colombia through the basing of advanced air-
warning aircraft and their tankers. Although the U.S. presence is supported by a large part of the populace, strong doubts remain among congressmen who state that Ecuador has “sold-out” and is becoming the “new Panama” of Latin America.\(^3\) Antagonists of the American presence disliked the expansion of U.S. influence in Ecuador noting that the state has already adopted the U.S. dollar as its currency.

### CHANGE AND CONTINUITY IN REGIONAL SECURITY RELATIONS

Latin American nationalism has had a propensity to be strongly associated with anti-U.S. sentiment since the end of World War II. Many Latin American observers believed Latin American resistance to U.S. hegemony would be reduced with the end of the Cold War. Certainly tensions have been reduced, but opposition to U.S. hegemony has not completely dissipated. Certain U.S. actions during the 1990s soothed regional concerns, such as the end of U.S. control of the Panama Canal, and the role of the U.S. military in the Peru-Ecuador border conflict. Despite the assurance provided by these examples, regional states still exhibited mistrust represented by the 1994 Haitian security crisis, and continued support for the Cuban government.

Two incidents during the 1990s engendered security cooperation between Latin American states and the U.S. by reducing traditional antagonisms concerning state sovereignty. The first was the way in which the Peru-Ecuador conflict was resolved, and the second dealt with the U.S. peacefully relinquishing control of the Panama Canal. The U.S. did not take a unilateral approach when it intervened in the two hundred-year-old

border dispute between Peru and Ecuador. Fifty years ago the dispute had been solved through the vehicle of the Rio Protocol, the agreement including Argentina, Brazil, Chile, and the U.S. as guarantors. Although the accord settled contentions on the large majority of the border between Peru and Ecuador, the Cóndor Mountain and Cenepa River areas had not been properly mapped before the treaty and therefore remained under dispute. In 1995 Peru and Ecuador clashed over their interpretations of which state controlled the Cóndor and Cenepa areas. The two sides endured hundreds and possibly thousands of casualties.

Ecuador approved the plan to let the guarantors of the Rio protocol mediate the conflict. The complicity of Ecuadoran Government was likely due to the cost of war. The border war incurred an estimated $7-10 million a day, with one report calculating the total cost of the conflict at $250 million. Not only was the war blamed for a decrease in foreign investment, but also an increase in inflation that had the combined

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effect of increasing Ecuador's fiscal deficit. Whatever the reason, the U.S. seemed prepared to act as an equal partner in unison with the Rio Treaty's other guarantor states. Both Ecuador and Peru agreed to seek a resolution through the Rio Protocol. The resulting document signed by antagonists and guarantors was agreed upon in Brasilia in February of 1995. Subsequent procedural meetings took place in Argentina and Chile.

The peaceful transition of the Panama Canal also helped ease Latin American concerns about U.S. dominance. Panama had long been derisively considered the fifty-first state of the U.S. throughout the region. Therefore, many Latin American observers interpreted the transition of the Panama Canal to Latin American control as the conclusion of U.S. occupation. However, because the U.S. president did not attend the transition ceremony, the U.S. failed to capitalize on the event. President Clinton, concerned that the ceremony might project U.S. weakness as opposed to its willingness to compromise, declined to participate in changeover ceremonies. Panamanian Foreign Minister José Miguel Aleman stated that the absence of President Clinton and the U.S. Secretary of State was indicative of the "lack of diplomatic courtesy" by the U.S. Aleman bitterly pointed out that: "the Latin American countries and Panama are


disappointed by the fact that the people heading the current U.S. administration are going
to miss a celebration where they might have shined.” Latin American leaders might
have viewed U.S. participation in the ceremony as a demonstration of U.S. resolve to
amicably negotiate settlements with less powerful Latin American states. Instead, the
U.S. was perceived as begrudgingly accepting its eviction from Panama. If the power
disparity were less between the U.S. and Latin American states the U.S. might have been
more responsive to the degree of importance that many Latin American states placed on
the occasion.

Latin American leaders demonstrated their continued mistrust of the U.S. by
hesitating to approve any intervention during the Haiti crisis in 1994. Many regional
states declined to support the humanitarian mission despite the obvious human suffering
and absence of legitimate state authority. The U.S. first opted to consult with the OAS.
which refused to support the U.S. led initiative. The U.S. then sought approval by the
UN, where the strength of Latin American opposition was overcome by support for the
U.S. position. The sequence of events underlies how the U.S. asymmetric power so
troubles the rest of the OAS membership that they refused to come to the aid of a
regional state in acute humanitarian need.

The question must be raised, if not Haiti during the 1994 crisis, then when will the
OAS approve an intervention and under what circumstances? Maingot points out that
although Latin American states pledged to support and defend democracy in the region
by signing the Santiago Declaration, they still valued state sovereignty above this

50Ibid.
commitment. The explanation for this duality is that Latin American states are more concerned about U.S. dominance than they are about supporting democratic norms. Whether the U.S. offers a direct threat or not, Latin American distrusts the overwhelming nature of U.S. power that has the potential to ruin their economy or destabilize their government at the change of a single policy.

As discussed in earlier chapters the issue of Cuban sovereignty has undermined Latin America and U.S. relation during most of the Cold War. One might expect these differences to fade with the end of the Cold War, the theory being that the Soviet Union used Cuba as one of many issues to drive a wedge between the U.S. and Latin America. This has not been the case. Sanctions imposed by the U.S. are still a point of contention, although states demonstrated a tendency to look beyond their differences with the U.S. on the topic of Cuban sovereignty during the 1990s. Key regional states still defend the government of Cuba since they believe if the U.S. intervenes in the affairs of any regional state, such a precedent may allow the U.S. to do the same in any state in the region.

Most regional states support the idea of democratic change in Cuba, but also admire Cuba for circumventing U.S. dominance. For this reason most Latin American states disagree with Washington’s economic embargo and political stand against Cuba. Mexico’s Minister of Foreign Affairs, Jorge Castañeda, stated that the Fox Administration would try to improve its financial, cultural exchange and trade ties with Cuba and he added that U.S. policies were impediments to Cuban reform. President Fox

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51 Maingot, 190-191.

stated, "We do not agree with the blockade; we believe that Cuba's solution must make it move toward a market-oriented economy and democracy. It is a position different from that of Washington."

Similarly, Brazilian leaders announced their support of Cuban sovereignty, and therefore disagree with U.S. policy. However, a willingness to push the issue of democratic change in Cuba denotes a degree of movement towards the U.S. position. President Cardoso broke with Brazil's traditional neutrality on the Cuban government when he announced his support for human rights and the establishment of democracy. Cardoso's proclamation angered the Castro government and in retaliation Fidel Castro shunned the visit of Brazil's foreign minister in 1998, excusing himself because of illness. An observer in the foreign ministry carefully noted that despite Cardoso's comments, the President was in no way suggesting he approved of the violation of Cuba's sovereignty: "The president's speech was not against the principle of not interfering in the internal affairs of other countries. President Cardoso did not demand that Castro call elections now, he only recalled Brazil's commitment to a democratic Cuba."

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54 Freita.

However, Brazil and Cuba improved relations both economically and politically during President Cardoso's tenure. The state-owned Brazilian oil-company, Petrobras, is working with Cuba to begin drilling for oil off the Cuban coast, and Brazil is working with Cuba to overhaul its antiquated sugar harvesting techniques. The willingness of Brasilia to push democracy in Cuba is still limited, as Cardoso made a point to endorse the end of U.S. sanctions against Cuba during a visit to Havana.

Argentina and Venezuela stand at opposite ends of the Cuban issue. In 1997 President Menem regularly told domestic and international audiences he opposed the Cuban government. Menem backed his position, framing an important question concerning what he perceived as a double standard applied to regional efforts to democratize:

"Cuba is a dictatorship where for the past 36 years human rights have not been respected, there is political persecution, and prisons are full... If we have been so tough on Stroesner or Pinochet, who at least left their respective countries in working condition, why should we behave any differently toward Fidel? Or are there different standards for democracy?"

The speech was indicative of improving relations between Washington and Argentina. Although not all Latin American leaders fully agreed with the statement, the fact that a leader of a major Latin American state said this in a public forum demonstrates that some of the difficulties caused by U.S. hegemony in the previous forty years may have been receding.

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President Hugo Chavez had a different approach to relations with Cuba. Chavez strongly supports Cuba and condemned the U.S. economic embargo against it. Chavez promised to provide Castro with half of Cuba's petroleum needs, and in return Cuba agreed to send doctors, trainers and industrial engineers to Venezuela. Chavez claimed these actions were part of a broader policy to truncate U.S hegemonic aspirations.

CONCLUSION

The GNP totals demonstrate that extreme power asymmetry remained intact during the 1990s, except for defense spending indicators that reflected a reduction in U.S. spending during the Bush and Clinton Administrations. The end of the Cold War introduced a period of reduced U.S. spending, and conversely, an era of economic success in Latin America leading to an increase in defense spending. Although enough consistent data was presented to note these trends, total U.S. spending was still significantly higher. It initially seemed that extreme power asymmetry remained entrenched, but the slight deviation in military spending may have had a positive impact in regional relations by lessening the extreme dominance of the U.S. This chapter reviewed key security issues confronting the region in the post Cold-War order and concluded that regional security relations were improved when compared to the prior twenty years. It also concluded that the level of improvement could not be directly correlated with the small decrease in extreme power asymmetry levels, so other explanations for the improvement in security cooperation must be highlighted.

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Table 17 summarizes four Latin American states general attitudes towards issues pertinent to U.S. Latin American relations during the 1990s. Argentina's viewpoints were most similar to those of the U.S. than other Latin American states, a trend that was introduced with the end of dictatorship in 1983, but gathered momentum during the 1990s. Whereas Brazil may worry about U.S. domination, Argentina seemed to use its pro-U.S. policy as a fulcrum against Brazilian dominance. Argentina was supportive of the U.S. Gulf War and actually sent military forces to aid the coalition effort. This action brought a notably negative reaction from Brasilia. Brazilian leaders perceived

Table 17. Regional Issues Demonstrating Security Cooperation. 1990-2001

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>FTAA/NAFTA</th>
<th>U.S. Drug Certification</th>
<th>Plan Colombia</th>
<th>U.S. Policy Towards Cuba</th>
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</thead>
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<td>Argentina</td>
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<td>Unknown</td>
<td>Positive</td>
<td>Positive</td>
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<td>Negative</td>
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<tr>
<td>Mexico</td>
<td>Positive</td>
<td>Negative</td>
<td>Neutral</td>
<td>Negative</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Venezuela</td>
<td>Negative</td>
<td>Negative</td>
<td>Negative</td>
<td>Negative</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Argentina was currying favor with the U.S. at the expense of Brazilian-U.S. relations. President Fernando de la Rua announced his support for Plan Colombia and both de la Rua, and his predecessor Menem, made their dislike for Castro publicly known. Argentina supported the OAS sponsored multilateral drug effort and did not approve the highly unpopular U.S. drug certification policy. Argentina supports the expansion of NAFTA, or the creation of the FTAA. Buenos Aires is not as concerned as Brasilia that

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it could become a U.S. dominated institution. Argentine leadership supported both Mercosur and U.S. efforts to solicit support for the FTAA.

Brazilian leaders stated that they supported the FTAA, but they preferred an agreement negotiated on their terms. Judging by recent policies it seems that Brazil seeks to solidify itself as the regional leader through Mercosur, and diversify its domestic trade and investment away from U.S. dominance, towards the EU and Asia. Brazilian leaders believe these efforts will increase its bargaining position against the U.S., and allow it to enter an FTAA on more favorable terms.\textsuperscript{58}

If Brazil’s trade policies were the only signs of disagreement with the U.S. then securing Brazilian cooperation on security issues would not be problematic. However, Brazilian leaders voiced some disagreement over U.S. policy towards Cuba and stronger disagreement with Plan Colombia, both touchstone issues showing a general inclination against U.S. hegemony.\textsuperscript{59} Although Brazil’s stand on both issues was not nearly as clear as Chavez’s, Brazilian leaders expressed concern that Plan Colombia could lead to a long-term U.S. military presence in the Amazon, and therefore they do not want to support the U.S. interference with Cuban sovereignty, although it is not supportive of Cuba’s government.


Mexico and the U.S. continued to become closer on economic, political and social issues, but more friendly relations did not inhibit Mexican leaders from adopting positions opposite of Washington on some other areas. Recently, the Fox Administration made it clear Mexico will remain friendly with Cuba. Mexico has chosen the role of intermediary between Latin America and the U.S., denouncing the unilateral drug certification policy of the U.S. but constructively countering with the negotiation of a bilateral accord. In its new role Mexico has warned Washington about how states bordering Colombia are concerned about the secondary effects of Plan Colombia. Instead of maintaining the role of interpreter of U.S. actions to Latin America, it has become the interpreter of Latin America to the U.S. There are promising signs that the Bush and Fox Administrations are forging ahead on key issues that they were formerly unable to compromise on. The interdependence reinforced by NAFTA infused a new sense of urgency to Mexican-U.S. relations.

Venezuela was opposed to the U.S. in all key regional issues during the 1990s. Venezuela had stated their opposition to a regional trade agreement with the U.S. Venezuela, like most of the region, severely criticized the U.S. policy of unilateral drug certification. Despite FARC incursions on the Venezuelan border and the influx of Colombian migrants, Venezuelan leaders believe that the Colombian conflict is an

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internal matter and does not support Plan Colombia. Since the election of Chavez, Venezuela is Cuba’s strongest proponent, offering Cuba petroleum on favorable terms and frequently voicing support of the Cuban government.

The broader trends show that anti-American rhetoric has been substantially moderated during the 1990s in Latin America. This trend is in part reflected by the regional posture of Latin American leaders toward Cuba that has migrated from strong anti-U.S. opinion to one of general disinterest. Since the spread of democracy and the reduction of U.S. interventionist activity, democratic and pro-market administrations in Latin America find it difficult to support the Cuban form of government. Mexico is the most vivid example of the Latin American move away from Cuba. In the past, Mexico was Cuba’s most ardent supporter; but the Fox Administration has distanced itself from that role.62

Latin American states no longer consider democracy and human rights as first world issues being imposed on them, and the region has shunned ‘the third way’-type economic policies aimed at curbing U.S. hegemony. The regional discourse is no longer focused on the dogmatic debates of the free-market versus import-substitution government-led development, but only how far the free-market model is applied to developing economies. U.S. leadership in the creation of the FTAA is widely accepted, although the timetable for its implementation is still being debated between Brazil and the U.S.

During the 1990s, U.S. military power declined by comparison to Latin American

62Venezuela during the presidency of Hugo Chavez is the lone exception to this trend.
states. The reduction in the overwhelming nature of U.S. hegemony had a positive impact in regional security relations, although differences still remain between the region and the U.S. One mitigating factor in U.S. hegemony seems to be the creation and continued maintenance of the NAFTA accord. Its general effect is to circumvent the hegemonic relationship and place U.S.-Mexican relations on a different level than U.S. relations with the rest of the region. Recent U.S.-Mexican cooperation under the Bush and Fox Administrations is unprecedented, and seems likely to continue as both states are forced to confront interdependence in a constructive manner.
CHAPTER VII

FINAL ANALYSIS: COOPERATION UNDER POWER ASYMMETRY

The central purpose of this dissertation was to explore the obstacles to achieving greater security cooperation between Latin America and the U.S. Hegemonic stability theory was used as a tool to understand the historical interaction between regional states. The use of hegemonic stability theory necessitated analysis at the structural level, avoiding the more common state-level approaches normally applied to Latin American-U.S. relations. Hegemonic stability aptly described the relative peace between regional states, but did not account for the undercurrent of non-cooperation exemplified by varying degrees of Latin American distrust of U.S. hegemony. This weakness in hegemonic stability theory prompted the question: Could varying levels of power asymmetry in the hegemonic system explain some of the problems in security relations? More to the point: Do higher levels of U.S. power asymmetry negatively impact U.S.-Latin American security relations? The research question, how does power asymmetry impact security cooperation between the U.S. and Latin America?, provided a framework to test the contention that higher levels of power asymmetry may negatively impact the security cooperation generated by a hegemonic system.

The case study chapters demonstrate that the U.S.-Latin American security relationship is aptly described by hegemonic stability theory. The historical analysis suggests that the regional relationship is not a pure power relationship, nor is it likely that Latin American states would have banded together to balance against the U.S. and form a security-based alliance to deter U.S. unilateral actions. Instead, all functioning security
alliances in the region include the U.S. as the senior partner. Hegemonic stability explains why states have not formed a cohesive front against the U.S., because the hegemon provides public goods to the weaker states in the form of stability. However, as the brief review below will show, the strength of U.S. hegemony also created problems for regional security cooperation.

The deleterious impact of extreme power asymmetry began to show several decades after the U.S. Civil War. The U.S. status as the regional hegemon began to emerge with the end of the Civil War. Latin American states were for the most part receptive to the role of the U.S. because the U.S. showed a willingness to intervene when Latin American states were threatened by European incursions. Regional incursions by Spain and France during the Civil War were both turned back by the threat of U.S. force, and a British threat against Venezuela several years later. Latin American states lauded the exercise of U.S. power, as the U.S. seemed to become the regional broker of state sovereignty.

However, Latin America soon grew to recognize their inability to influence U.S. security policies, leading them to realize that the unilateral security guarantee by the U.S. could be a double-edged sword. The *Baltimore* incident was a lesson to Chileans that the U.S. was able to enforce its policies without what they deemed as proper attention to their state sovereignty. The purpose of the first Pan-American Conference was to rectify the tendency of the U.S. to set security policy for the hemisphere, a goal both sides of the Rio Grande concurred with for different reasons. The U.S. wanted to reduce their regional obligations as laid out in the Monroe Doctrine, Latin American states sought to curb U.S. power. Although the first Pan American Conference and three follow-on events forged
the Pan-American Union, little progress was made beyond the founding of the organization because of lingering Latin American suspicions of U.S. dominance. As regional historian Lloyd Meecham points out, "Yankee-phobe intellectuals in Latin America were becoming popular at the end of the nineteenth century and the beginning of the twentieth century." Latin American leaders began to realize the limitations of security arrangements under a hegemon that was comparatively too powerful. Security agreements among disproportionate powers are difficult to maintain. What may be cooperation can be interpreted as coercion, and the ability of the system to produce visible public goods becomes increasingly complicated.

The Wilson Administration's interventionist policies against the Caribbean, Central America and Mexico were negatively viewed in much of Latin America, and as a result, hemispheric security relations languished. Wilson had a policy that justified intervention against all non-democratic governments, a prescription viewed as moralistic by the U.S., but imperialistic by Latin Americans. With Argentina and Mexico at the forefront of anti-U.S. sentiment, many Latin American leaders equated security cooperation under Pan-Americanism as approval of U.S. expansionism. Latin American states began to commit to a strategy to displace U.S. regional influence by positively affecting trade flows with Europe, and thus reducing the hegemonic influence of the U.S. Many Latin American leaders throughout the Cold War mimicked this strategy.

Interventionist U.S. policy subsided with the onset of the Great Depression. Because the U.S. had neither the will nor the capacity to intervene, it seemed logical that President Roosevelt's 'Good-Neighbor Policy' was a natural outcome. Whether the

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1Meecham, *The United States and Inter-American Security*, 34.
origins of the policy were altruistic, or executed in self-interest, it resuscitated Latin American-U.S. friendship. Improving relations cleared the way for security cooperation in the form of an anti-intervention treaty signed at the seventh hemispheric summit in 1933. The depression reduced power asymmetry in the system, with the ultimate impact of increasing trust among the U.S. and Latin American states. The positive atmosphere fostered by a reduction of power asymmetry to more acceptable levels by weaker states in the system greatly benefited U.S. efforts to successfully lobby regional states to support the Allied cause during World War II.

After World War II the military and economic power of the U.S. reached an apex unparalleled in world history. Post-World War II security cooperation began on a positive note with the creation of institutions that had remained elusive under the prior fifty years of Pan American meetings. The creation of these institutions belied the strength of the post World War II hegemonic system. Several important treaties were signed, including; the IADB in 1942, the Rio Treaty in 1947, and the OAS Charter and Pact of Bogotá in 1948. The Rio Treaty, in particular symbolized the growth of trust in the hemisphere compared to regional relations twenty years earlier. It focused on codifying security cooperation among regional states, a goal that the Pan American Union could never achieve. During this period and into the early 1950s, Latin American states regularly supported U.S. proposed security measures in the UN and OAS.

With the growth of U.S. power relative to other regional states, security cooperation steadily deteriorated. The U.S. directed a series of overt and covert operations aimed at overthrowing Latin American regimes in Cuba and Guatemala, culminating in the widely condemned intervention of the Dominican Republic in 1965.
The U.S. miscalculated the degree of Latin American support in the Cuban-U.S. dispute. Latin American states began to identify with Cuba, although most regional states did not approve of Cuba's form of government. This duality can be explained by the ability of Cuba to attain independence from U.S. influence. Cuba became a symbolic focal point for U.S.-Latin American security relations. The more Latin American states thought the U.S. was imposing its will, the stronger they seemed to support Cuban efforts to circumvent U.S. hegemony. At an OAS meeting in the early 1960s, the U.S. was unable to garner support for its measure that condemned Cuban human rights abuses. Instead, the U.S. settled for a measure vaguely aimed at Cuba denouncing communist principles.

Latin American leaders were becoming increasingly frustrated with the public goods the U.S. provided to hemispheric states. Latin American states expected a great deal of economic support from the U.S. in the post World War II era. They were expecting something akin to the Marshall Plan rewarding regional states for their support of the Allied cause during the war. They were disappointed by the lack of corporate investment and monetary infusion, noticing the U.S. did far more to help its former enemies, Japan and Germany, than hemispheric allies. As U.S. power grew Latin American states expected to accrue some benefit. The U.S. raised regional expectations when the Kennedy Administration initiated the Alliance for Progress, but the program did not meet the level of economic support that Latin American states thought was necessary to alleviate regional poverty.

A division over the kind of public goods offered by the U.S. began to become pronounced during the 1960s. Both sides thought that the U.S. should provide stability, but how that stability would be achieved was the central question. Latin American states
thought the public goods required to achieve stability should be in the form of economic and social support to relieve their intractable problems with poverty and education. The U.S. thought it provided stability in terms of protection from Soviet intervention.

Regional arrangements began to emerge that excluded the U.S., such as the Andean Common Market, the Latin American Free Trade Area, and the Latin American Economic System, as the U.S. was increasingly perceived as the security threat rather than a security partner. The public goods equation was influenced by the more visible role the U.S. played in regional security as power asymmetry remained a key feature of the post World War II era. As the U.S. became more visible in the region because of its strong hegemonic position, expectations on what the U.S. should, and should not, provide increased.

Although the regional dominance of the U.S. did not subside during the 1970s, the oil crisis, combined with Latin American economic growth early in the decade, gave the short-term impression U.S. power was declining. Due to the defeat and social unrest attributed to the Vietnam War, the U.S. public was inclined towards the support of an isolationist foreign policy. Double-digit inflation and high unemployment rates brought on by an oil crisis added to national pessimism and forced the Carter Administration to become less interventionist in Latin America. The Carter Administration viewed U.S. economic problems as the signs of a permanent decrease in U.S. power and believed the U.S. must learn to act multilaterally to exist in such an environment.

In the same time frame Argentina, Brazil, and Mexico began the decade with growing economies, bolstered by strong export earnings and domestic consumption. However, hyperinflation from over-borrowing, and the impact of the global economic
crisis, sent Latin American states into debt. These states began the decade with the perception they were gaining vis-à-vis Washington, supported by statistics showing their imports and export dependence on the U.S. to be shrinking, only to be frustrated by a dramatic downturn leaving the national outlook cynical and embittered. Just as the U.S. self-perception of declining fortunes made it more compliant on security issues towards Latin America, Latin American self-perceptions of success, dashed by crushing hyperinflation, made it less amenable to U.S. overtures. Despite the Carter Administration’s attempts to improve relations by trying to negotiate with Nicaraguan revolutionaries, to increase contacts with Cuba, and to negotiate the end of the U.S. occupation of the Panama Canal, inter-American security cooperation was barely functioning.

Perhaps if Latin American economies had not experienced severe downturns that crushed growing Latin American confidence. Carter’s attempts to use multilateral forums rather than unilateral action might have been viewed as constructive engagement by regional states. However, the economic turmoil of the 1970s forced Latin American states to look inward, too absorbed by domestic concerns to notice overtures from the U.S. Washington’s motivations stemmed from its own self-perception of declining international status. Eras of economic or security crises seemed to have a different impact on hegemonic powers and weaker states: whereas crises seemed to force Latin American states to look inward, they made the U.S. search outward for regional allies to shore up an eroding hegemonic position. The radicalization of Latin American policies towards the U.S. was highlighted by the proliferation of dependency theory that cast U.S.
hegemony in a negative light and regional flirtation with the Soviet Union as a means to balance against the U.S.

During the 1980s the inability of Latin American states to balance U.S. military or economic power led to greater insecurities. Whereas South American states usually considered themselves ethnically and geographically separate from the Caribbean and Central America, they now took stronger interests when the U.S. intervened in any part of Latin America. Despite the hemispheric growth of democracy, regional states demonstrated outward sympathy to non-democratic regimes in Argentina, Cuba, Grenada, Nicaragua, and Panama. Latin American states viewed U.S. interventions against any regional state as a potential threat against themselves, and the U.S. democratic justification as a cynical pretext.

Argentina and Brazil both embarked on aggressive campaigns to build indigenous arms-manufacturing industries, aimed in part at their interstate rivalry, but also to gain autonomy from the U.S. dominance. These expensive efforts continued despite economic hardships, underlying the degree of concern these states viewed on U.S. dominance. Complaints from the U.S. concentrated on Argentine and Brazilian attempts to sell ballistic missile technology to Middle Eastern countries, and was vehemently rebuffed as yet another attempt by the U.S. to interfere with state autonomy.

The 1990s marked an important event: the end of the Cold War, the decrease of the perceived threat by the U.S., and its subsequent reduction in defense expenditure. Since the defense expenditure of the U.S. dropped, so did the level of power asymmetry in the region, and security cooperation increased. The decade after the Cold War resulted in many regional states conforming to the hegemon by moving towards liberal economic
and democratic reforms. Government representatives in Buenos Aires and Mexico City tended to side more frequently with the U.S. on regional security issues. Economic integration attributable to NAFTA generated good will between the Mexico and the U.S. Issues such as cooperation against the illegal narcotics trade, illegal migration, and commercial trade, were being positively addressed between national officials. The U.S. and Argentina vastly improved relations, although Argentina's ongoing economic crisis has placed a question mark on this trend continuing. The U.S. and Brazil still maintain differences over the drug war but reached a compromise in the OAS on cooperation in this arena, and recently the U.S. has pledged to fund a Brazilian sponsored plan to curb drug use in the region. Because of Chavez's strong stands against several U.S. regional policies, and Washington's unwillingness to engage Chavez, Venezuela and the U.S. have not maintained productive relations.

This research shows that the lack of security cooperation between Latin America and the U.S. described in the case study chapters reviewed above can be attributed to extreme power asymmetry. Power asymmetry explains why security cooperation was more difficult during certain periods, such as the early 1900s, and from roughly 1965 to 1994. Conversely, security cooperation increased during the post Civil War and post-Depression periods, when the U.S. had not yet obtained regional dominance (Civil War), and when the U.S. significantly reduced its regional presence (Depression). During periods of reduced U.S. power asymmetry the U.S. intervened in regional states to a lesser degree, and was more inclined to pursue multilateral as opposed to unilateral policies.
During times of extreme hegemony the U.S underutilized regional institutions since it was tempted by its capability to unilaterally enforce its policies. For this reason the OAS was disregarded as a vital instrument of regional security during most of Cold War. The IADB, Rio Treaty, and OAS are the focus of regional multinational security efforts. All were created before extreme power asymmetry negatively impacted the hegemonic system.

Distrust related to extreme power asymmetry also explains the Latin American tendency to search for alternatives to the U.S. during the 1960-1980s period. During times of extreme power asymmetry Latin American states tended to look to Europe, Japan and the Soviet Union as a means to circumvent what they perceived as dominance. The EU, Japan, and the Soviet Union all took their turns in courting individual Latin American states from the 1960s to the 1980s. Many Latin American states turned to regional alternatives also. Organizations such as the Andean Group and Mercosur were in part created to reduce Latin American dependency on the U.S. Despite the negative impact of power asymmetry, the research also shows that the majority of states acknowledged the benefits of the hegemonic system at any given time. Because Latin American states were not determined enough to undermine U.S. hegemony through balancing against it, some level of advantage must have been perceived.

In the 1990s the Latin American preoccupation with sovereignty cooled although power asymmetry remained relatively unchanged. Latin American defense of Cuba has subsided except for the unique case of the Chavez regime in Venezuela. Regional sensitivities still exist over the conduct of the drug war but the U.S. has established bases in Ecuador and Curaçao, and received cooperation from Peru, Bolivia and Colombia.
The Brazilian approach had been to ignore the problem and oppose U.S. initiatives, but even Brazilian sensitivity over the Amazon region in the North is giving way to cooperation sponsored in the OAS and forced to some degree by the heightened conflict in Colombia.

The increasing trust between the U.S. and Latin America during the 1990s is more difficult to explain since U.S. economic power grew substantially during the period. Several potential explanations exist for recent improvement in security relations. One is that despite continued power asymmetry, growing globalization has forced the U.S. to acknowledge Latin American interests. Competition from the EU encouraged the U.S. to implement NAFTA. Because U.S. interests are more tightly aligned with Mexican interests through NAFTA, the U.S. is consistently aware of Mexican domestic problems, and maintains an open dialog with the Mexican government to maintain bilateral stability. The growing U.S. energy dependency also makes regional stability more important than in the past. The petroleum production of Mexico and Venezuela has grown in importance, particularly due to the growing instabilities in the Persian Gulf region. Finally, the growing strength of the EU as a competitor to U.S. global leadership encourages the U.S. to increase its multilateral ties to Latin America and push for an FTAA.

Locating the precise moments when extreme power asymmetry impacted security cooperation is difficult because of the complex relationship between power asymmetry and security cooperation as well as a lag-time between power changes and system reaction. In this case study chapter 3 contains two examples of hegemony under acceptable power asymmetry: after the U.S. Civil War until the end of the century and
from the beginning of the depression until the end of World War II. Chapter 3 also has
one example of extreme power asymmetry, from the turn of the century until the
depression. Even with these obvious cases exact dates are difficult to identify because of
a lag-time between eras. For example, the true security benefits of beneficial levels of
power asymmetry produced after the depression did not appear until the early 1940s.
although the actions to create that cooperative behavior occurred fifteen to twenty years
earlier. Also, there was a notable change in Latin American opinion towards the U.S.
for the end of the nineteenth century, however the true lack of security cooperation was
demonstrated by the lack of security cooperation produced by the Pan American Union
and Latin American sensitivity towards U.S. interventionism during that era.

The connection between hegemony and security cooperation is complex, making
the task of isolating specific moments when extreme power asymmetry negatively
affected security relations difficult to identify in case study chapters 4 through 7. There
are points when extreme power asymmetry seems to be clearly defined. After World
War II Latin American states approved of U.S. interventions until 1965, when there was a
backlash against the U.S. action in the Dominican Republic. During this period the
negative impact of power asymmetry seemed to reach its height during the 1970s. In the
late 1970s U.S. power and unilateral policies declined: a similar pattern to U.S. policy
change due to the depression during the 1930s. However, strong Latin American distrust
remained, and generally rebuffed U.S. attempts to peacefully mediate the Nicaraguan
conflict.

Through the collection of empirical evidence the study identified several stress
points in regional security relations that were used to identify when weaker states became
uncomfortable with power asymmetry. These stress points included an increase of Latin American sensitivity towards sovereignty issues, an increase in Latin American efforts to find alternatives to U.S. dependency, and an increase in U.S. unilateral action. When U.S. power rose to unacceptable levels there was a notable increase in Latin American sensitivity to any sovereignty issue. Latin American states were extraordinarily defensive of U.S. policies against Cuba, not so much because they supported Cuban policies, but because they sensed if they were complacent on the issue it was tantamount to approving similar U.S. policies against other states in the region. As U.S. power rose to unacceptable levels Latin American leaders began to increase their efforts to ameliorate their security dependencies on the U.S. through internal or external economic and security arrangements. Power asymmetry also resulted in an increase in U.S. unilateral behavior. When U.S. power grew the temptation to act in its own interests without regional consultation would grow. When power asymmetry was extreme Latin American leaders demonstrated their mistrust of U.S. leadership by disapproving of any U.S. intervention for humanitarian reasons or security concerns. Latin American opposition increased the likelihood of U.S. unilateral action that resulted in the erosion of multilateral institutions.

INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS SCHOLARSHIP

This study opens debate into a dimension of hegemonic stability theory not yet explored and to this moment assumed. It suggests that hegemony can no longer be thought of in one dimension: the level of power asymmetry in a given system must be taken into consideration. The consequence of power asymmetry is to work against the
stability created by the presence of the hegemonic system by creating mistrust among the weaker states in the system against the hegemon. As the power of the hegemon grows, it tends to rely increasingly on material incentives to spread its power since it is already generating a surplus of this commodity. There were two important time periods in which extreme power asymmetry happened. The first occurred during the last years of the nineteenth century and the early years of the twentieth century, the second proceeding World War II. After the increase in U.S. military and economic power, relative to Latin America, interventions increased as well, one expression of the U.S.'s use of material incentives. The question of the legitimacy of interventions is not the primary issue, but the fact that they resulted in Latin American sensitivity to any expression of U.S. power helped create distrust among regional states directed against the U.S. This distrust eroded the positive impact of hegemony. This occurred by weakening the role of the hegemon in supporting regional institutions, security or economic initiatives. Opposition to the U.S. was symbolized by initial support for the Cuban revolution, sustained over the years despite the spread of democratic norms that Cuban leadership had rejected. Further, Latin American distrust led to the active search for an alternative to the hegemon, as Latin American states turned toward Europe, Japan, and finally regional agreements excluding the U.S.

The opposite is also verified by the study. When extreme power asymmetry is alleviated, relations between the hegemon and weaker states generally improved. This occurred because the exercise of material incentives of the hegemon was curtailed, eventually reducing the level of distrust between the U.S. and Latin American states over the course of several years. After years of active intervention, the Depression led to
Roosevelt's Good Neighbor Policy. The U.S. lacked the resources and therefore the will to intervene in Central America and the Caribbean as it had during the previous twenty years. As noted in chapter three, the Good Neighbor Policy was hailed in Latin America, improving regional relations and setting the stage for a high level of cooperation during World War II. The power of the U.S. was curtailed once again during the 1970s due to economic crises, over-extension in Vietnam, and other domestic concerns. Regional relations and security cooperation significantly dipped during this era, even as President Jimmy Carter actively worked to improve ties by curbing arms exports, support democracy, and reawaken a multilateral forum to solve regional security issues. This result can be explained by decreasing Latin American power during the 1970s, occurring in tandem with the decline of the U.S.

This study demonstrates that when hegemonic stability theory is applied, hegemonic power should not be considered static. The power level of the hegemon is likely to fluctuate over time, and this fluctuation affects the system. When a hegemon accrues excessive power relative to the weaker states in the system, dynamics occur that impede security cooperation despite the presence of public goods. The primary good of the hegemonic system, in that it promotes stability and fosters the best possible environment for the expansion of wealth that benefits all states in the system, can be eroded by extreme power asymmetry.

This study also provides a systemic base from which to examine U.S.-Latin American security relations, a perspective largely neglected in the literature dealing with hemispheric relations. Literature concerning regional relations typically focuses on state-level analysis, such as the enabling of democratic institutions or the spread of free-
market principles to enable domestic growth. Another popular approach is to compare the cultural differences of each side to determine which one requires renovation to improve regional relations. The systemic view tells us that the spread of political, economic and cultural structures is a result of the diffusion of the norms of the hegemon through a socialization process, or as Ikenberry and Kupchan label it, alteration of substantive beliefs. Since they are a result of the system, it may be more helpful to focus on these phenomena from the structural view as opposed to state or unit levels.

Although this study utilizes the systemic level and maintains that such an analysis has the potential to explain the majority of state behavior, it also recognizes that other theories at the state level are useful in identifying contributing causal variables. The systemic level is appropriate for examining international relations dynamics over large periods of time, however state-level theories allow a researcher to examine particular events in more depth than systems-level analysis allows.

Individual studies of Latin American or U.S. culture may shed light on problems in the inter-American dialog. Prominent works regarding state-level theory were reviewed in Chapter 2. Huntington explains how the prominence of U.S. culture in Latin America can create domestic resentment in Latin American states, and therefore harm regional relations. Schoultz focuses on the superiority that U.S. citizens feel towards Latin Americans, and how that attitude negatively impacts U.S. foreign policy. Wiarda and Fukuyama focus on different views of Latin American and U.S. social structure to explain the relative success of the U.S. compared to the challenges faced by most Latin American states. Wiarda argues that U.S. policy makers should consider these differences.
Other state-level factors such as changes in domestic political and economic institutions are frequently used to explain the improvement or decline in domestic circumstances. Domínguez focuses on the regional transformation towards republican democracy as a foundation for improving relations. Other authors focus on the efforts of Latin American states changes their economic structure as a means to promote greater stability and improve regional relations.

These state-level theories are capable of describing certain aspects of U.S.-Latin American relations in depth, but do not provide an analysis broad enough to explain the reoccurring patterns in U.S.-Latin American relations across time. The power asymmetry argument explains why security cooperation between the U.S. and Latin America has occurred despite cultural differences, changes in types of government and economic structure.

Detailed case studies of the time periods involving the sudden growth of U.S. power, and sudden reduction would be helpful in determining how the hegemonic system conformed to those circumstances. By studying these periods in isolation details may emerge to further explain why security cooperation decreases and ways to ameliorate this phenomena.

POLICY IMPLICATIONS

The U.S. must work to reduce the negative impact of power asymmetry, which may improve the perception of Latin American leaders towards the U.S. One method to accomplish this is by working harder to support a multilateral forum for Latin American states to provide input into regional issues. Unilateral U.S. action must be avoided as
much as possible, although leadership stipulates it must occur on occasions. Institutions exist to enable U.S. consultation; these multilateral organizations should be given greater importance in Washington's overall foreign policy. The pattern of reoccurring power asymmetry among regional states is not likely to dissipate in the foreseeable future. The U.S. can increase regional security cooperation and facilitate its ability to lead on key security issues by at a minimum consulting with Latin American states, and when possible including Latin American states in the solution as in the case of the Peru-Ecuador border conflict.

In order to reduce the negative impact of hegemonic leadership the U.S. must also show tolerance for the Latin American states that disagree with Washington's policies. The U.S. maintained a more moderate response to Venezuela and Cuba during the last ten years. Despite the efforts of the U.S., deep Latin American suspicions remain. For example, although there is little evidence to charges against the U.S. that it planned to overthrow Chavez with domestic opposition in 2002, many policy makers in Latin America believe this has been the case. The U.S. will always find its credibility in sovereignty issues to be very low, mostly due to power asymmetry. However, the U.S. must demonstrate a willingness to engage its critics rather than give the appearance of condescension, as it has done in some past cases.

If Latin American states truly want to influence the kind of public goods the U.S. is willing to offer, it must seek to engage the U.S. in a NAFTA type arrangement. The prognosis of the region-wide implementation of an FTAA is not promising. Argentina was in line to negotiate its entry into a trade agreement with the U.S. behind Chile, however Argentina became mired in financial crises during the last part of 2001 that
endangered the Mercosur agreement, and will likely curtail its partnership in any other similar agreement. The economic crisis of Argentina may affect the Brazilian position on the FTAA, encouraging Brazil to push for a region-wide integration plan during the next five to ten years. If the U.S. were to support a free-trade agenda, it is conceivable that this action might create enough momentum to bring a recovered Argentina, and even Brazil into an arrangement, with the rest of Latin America following suit. The continued growth of the Mexican economy also will act as encouragement to other Latin American states.

Cooperation seemed to marginally improve during the 1990s, but power asymmetry may increase in light of the growing U.S. defense expenditures. The power asymmetry argument dictates that a new undercurrent of distrust is likely to challenge whatever progress has been made during the 1990s. This means it is likely another era of strong hegemony may create security cooperation problems between the U.S. and Latin America. The Colombian issue is one potential issue that will test regional relations. Latin American hostility to extreme U.S. hegemony will continue to express itself around sovereignty issues and lead to periodic quests to find alternatives to U.S. power in the region. The best method for Latin American states to ameliorate the impact of extreme power asymmetry is to successfully bind the U.S. to an FTAA scheme that creates a mechanism that increases the likelihood the U.S. will pay attention to their agenda.

There are two positive indicators that show security cooperation, and therefore regional stability, improved over periods when power asymmetry was more extreme. First, U.S. leadership seems increasingly dedicated to engaging Latin American states on a regular basis. This is motivated primarily by trade concerns, but also because there is
an increasing recognition that unilateral policies tend to be counterproductive in the long-
term. Second, the U.S. as the hegemon has been successful at socializing the system
since its norms are now widely accepted in Latin America. Democracy and free market
economies proliferated and continue to endure in Latin America as in no other time in
history. With democratic reforms and liberalization creating some degree of stability in
most Latin American states, the political discourse has moderated. The combination of
growing interdependence, and wide acceptance of common political and economic values
may be enough to block the negative impact of extreme power asymmetry.
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Newspapers and Serials


O Estado de Sao Paulo (available from FBIS). December 2000.


Monographs


Articles


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