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East European Security Revisited: Institutions, Power, and Security

Blagovest Tashev

Old Dominion University

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EAST EUROPEAN SECURITY REVISITED:
INSTITUTIONS, POWER, AND SECURITY

by

Blagovest Tashev
B.A. December 1989, St. Kliment Ohridski University
M.A. December 1991, St. Kliment Ohridski University
M.A. December 1997, Old Dominion University

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Approved by:

Donald J. Zeigler (Director)

Daniel N. Nelson (Member)

Regina C. Karp (Member)

Austin Jersild (Member)
ABSTRACT

EAST EUROPEAN SECURITY REVISITED: INSTITUTIONS, POWER, AND SECURITY

Blagovest Tashev
Old Dominion University, 2001
Director: Dr. Donald J. Zeigler

Drawing on the literatures on democratization, security studies, and small states, this dissertation explores the relationship of small states’ domestic and international institutionalization and their security. Small states have limited power not only to affect their environment but also to guarantee national security. Small states, it is hypothesized, enhance their security through the consolidation of domestic institutions and the accumulation of capacities provided by their participation in capacity-reach international institutions.

The dissertation tests the hypothesis by applying the comparative method to the post-communist states of Bulgaria, the Czech Republic, and Lithuania. The three case studies analyze the effects of domestic institution-building and integration in international institutions on the security of each state. The study analyzes the policies that the three states applied in the last ten years after the collapse of communism, which led to a profound transformation of their national security.

The most important finding of this dissertation is that the security of each of the states was determined not only by external factors, traditionally identified by realist approaches, but also by domestic factors. States that were able to quickly consolidate their political institutions were able to achieve not only a greater degree of integration in international institutions but also a greater level of security. Hence, states’ attempts to enhance their security should not only seek formal alliances and integration in powerful...
international institutions but also a domestic institutional strength that would enable the
state to achieve a further international integration and a greater capacity to address what
the population perceives as security threats, both domestic and external. Thus, the
security of small states is best achieved not only by attaining traditional security
guarantees, i.e. alliances, but also by strengthening domestic institutions.
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CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION

In a threat-rich environment, the security of a small state is a function of the capacities of the state. The capacities of the state, in turn, depend on the strength of the domestic institutions and the capacities the state can derive and utilize from capacity-rich international institutions. The stronger the small state in terms of the level of institutionalization of domestic institutions, and the higher the level of integration of the state in a stable, highly integrated, and capacity-rich core of states, the more secure the small state.

After regaining freedom to participate actively in international relations, the states of Eastern Europe embarked on a difficult process of a profound political, economic, and social transformation. This process is taking place within a security void. Having lost the security guarantees provided by the Soviet Union, the small states of the region found themselves dangerously exposed to both external and internal security challenges and risks. The requirements of political and socio-economic transition challenged the ability of the states to respond to the growing demands of a newly mobilized domestic public and individuals. Externally, restive diaspora, past unsettled scores among neighbors, regional conflicts, and an unpredictable, yet always threatening-looking Russia, heightened the perception of security threats in the states of the region. Most of them were quick to seek deep integration in West European and Atlantic institutions, some of which possess supranational functions. This process indicates that rather than seek complete autonomy of action, East European states opted to face challenges and threats.
by partially surrendering their sovereignty and autonomy in a larger institutional context. Of course, security is not the only national concern prompting this process. It is also motivated by the states’ attempts to define their identities in a new polity. This foreign policy seems to be defined as much by societal preferences as by the structure of the European international system.

The struggle for power as a means of achieving security is still an enduring characteristic of international politics. According to realism, the dominant school of international relations, states, regardless of their size, address security challenges through the accumulation of power. What is different about power at the end of the 20th century, however, is its nature and sources. Yet, realism fails to provide a comprehensive framework for the study of how small states address the new type of challenges to their security. While big states still can face security threats through enhancing their military power, small states are forced to look for other sources of power and security.

Thus there emerge questions pertaining to the security of East European countries under post-Cold War conditions. How does one account for the ability of Eastern European states to face challenges, indeed, to ensure their security? Is security a function of the state’s ability to withstand external threats through military force? Or does it depend on the capacity to keep its citizens content and its society cohesive? What are the sources of security in Eastern European countries after the Cold War?

Historically, security threats to East European states have derived from the region’s geostrategic position between powerful and expansionist empires: Russia and later the Soviet Union in the east, the Ottoman Empire and later Turkey in the south, and Germany and Austria in the west. The region’s geostrategic vulnerability was
exacerbated by its states' political, economic, and social backwardness. Furthermore, situated at the junction of major foreign empires, Eastern Europe had an explosive mix of nations exposing militant nationalism which often threatened both neighbors and its own ethnic groups. In this environment, international relations in the region were characterized by great-power rivalry for domination over the states, realpolitik, and balance of power. Eastern Europe has traditionally been what Martin Wight called a "buffer zone:" a group of weak states between stronger powers which try to deny domination over the states to their rivals. In these conditions, East European states had little room for maneuvering and their security options were extremely limited.

After the disintegration of the Soviet empire, the states of Eastern Europe regained their independence and became active participants in international politics. Most of them, however, were quick to seek deep integration in West European and Atlantic institutions. This seems to suggest that rather than seek complete autonomy of action after freeing themselves from hegemonic domination, East European states prefer to face external challenges by partially surrendering their autonomy within a larger institutional context. This foreign policy orientation seems to be as much a national choice based on a traditional quest for security as it is a result of the structure of the international system. The main point here is that changes in the international system increased the freedom of choice of the small states; their behavior is not tied to the realist notions of balancing and bandwagoning to the same extent as was evident during the Cold War.

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With the decline of direct military threats, alliances and other tools became less appropriate responses to security problems, which are mainly related to internal capacities and international vulnerabilities and instabilities. National coherence and international stability are increasingly important requirements for national security. Although security still remains a function of power one needs to look at the non-traditional ingredients that define its nature rather than merely its military, economic and other more readily quantifiable, and already extensively analyzed, elements.

Allan C. Lamborn writes that "much of what is traditionally meant by power does involve the government's capability to mobilize resources." The state has an interest in increasing its revenues, which enables it to address both domestic demands for resources, and international challenges and requirements. In the early European experience the search for security prompted states to build administrations and institutions capable of extracting resources needed to enhance the states' power. Power then meant military power capable of resisting foreign and domestic challenges and enlarging the state's territorial possessions. On the eve of the 21st century, however, only a small fraction of the resources extracted by the state goes to sustaining its military power. Yet, in the international context, the states need resources to alleviate international pressures stemming from balance of payment deficits, external debt and adjustments to structural changes in the global economy.

Of course, one might point out that the globalization of politics and economics places severe constraints on the autonomy of state choices and actions and thus

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circumscribes state power. International trade and finances, the argument goes, have grown explosively. Economic booms and recessions spread more rapidly from country to country. Interest rates in one country affect rates in others. Those chances have crippled the ability of national governments to decide their interest rates, exchange rates, and trade policies. Economic integration and competition have rendered governments impotent in their traditional tasks of guaranteeing economic and social benefits to citizens.

However appealing this reasoning might be, it fails to appreciate the still considerable, if not growing, power of the state. Regardless of growing integration, national governments have increased the extent to which they control resources. In fact since 1980 the public spending ratio has increased from 36 percent of the GDP to 40 percent. It is true, however, that integration and globalization have increased the intensity and severity of long existing constraints on government policies. Global markets have shortened the distance between an event and its consequences, and denied governments room for maneuvering and vital time to adopt policies to respond. States must often react in a crisis-like environment wherein time for response is short, the threat to national economy and well-being is apparent, and instruments for dealing with these crises are limited.

It is hard to account for these conflicting portraits of the power and autonomy of the state in the post-Cold War conditions of globalization as states operate in two intersecting arenas. In the first arena governments interact with foreign leaders, international organizations, international corporations, and transnational actors. The second arena encompasses the domestic sphere: states exert authority over society and interact with its institutions, leaders, and the public in general.

In such an environment, small and fragile post-communist democracies face especially grave risks. Transition to a free market requires embracing the rules and principles of the world economy, including exposure to highly competitive economic pressures. The restructuring of economies often involves borrowing from international institutions or financial markets which, in turn, comes with the commitment to meet financial obligations. A lag in economic modernization, lack of competitive practices, and, very often, outright inept leadership turns the conditions of globalization into challenges to the stability of transition countries. According to the stated objective of joining European and Atlantic institutions, most post-communist countries adopted reforms that required the complete alteration of the way the states participate in the global economy.

The external challenges to the ability of post-communist countries to integrate into the European and Atlantic institutions are not, however, the only tests that confront them. The goal of building market-based democracies requires domestic reforms that alter the ways the states extract and redistribute scarce resources. Concurrently, states come under pressure from multiple demands for democratization, resources, and values. Different, often opposing, interests challenge the state's capacity to satisfy expanding demands and test the state's ability to resolve conflicts peacefully. The politicization of social forces, or what Samuel Huntington calls praetorian politics, exposes the weaknesses of political institutions to mediate and moderate political action. Trade unions, ethnic groups, political parties and social groups confront each other in the absence of an established institutional framework capable of channeling high levels of

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political participation and demands. Thus the stability, indeed, sometimes the survival of the state hinges on its capacity to create institutions and procedures which channel domestic political action and respond to demands from within and without. In other words, the security of the state depends to a large extent on the political capacity of the state.

The Security of Small States in Eastern Europe

After the Cold War, critical perspectives shifted security analysis toward a more inclusive framework by questioning the dichotomous, zero-sum thinking of realism. The changing nature of the state, particularly its conspicuously diminishing ability to address traditional and non-traditional threats, prompts a redefinition of security concepts and fundamental assumptions about the nature of international conflict. This dissertation, while recognizing the *problematique* of various security conceptions, utilizes the state as the major unit of analysis, though not the single unit of analysis. The variables included in the study pertain to the state as well as to societal structures. This approach is based on the assumption that some of the threats to national security emanate not only from outside but also from within states. Kalevi Holsti goes even further by questioning the assumption that the problem of war is primarily a problem of relations between states. "Security between states," he argues, "... has become increasingly dependent upon security within states... The problem of contemporary and future politics, it turns out, is essentially a problem of domestic politics."7 A comprehensive analysis of international

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security must, therefore, include international, national and societal dimensions that to various degrees affect security on both the national and international levels.

The validity of many critiques of a state-centric vision and traditional definitions of security does not, however, eliminate the need for analyzing the state sources of security and threats. Evidence of the state’s inability to respond to challenges and threats is not proof of the existence of an alternative political entity better suited to address them. Weakened, inadequate, and sometimes impotent, the state still remains a strong player, and therefore a legitimate unit of analysis. In addition, in contrast to the industrialized world where under the conditions of globalization the traditional state may have given way to the “virtual state,” societies, which have yet to fully embrace liberal democratic practices and market economy, lack the essential social, economic, and political capacities and therefore rely on state-driven transitions. Such states still seem unchallenged by other political organizations in their ability to mobilize and redistribute resources and manage social and political conflicts. Similarly, the state in Eastern Europe is widely expected to provide security to individuals, groups, nation, and borders.

States in post-communist transition are not immune to the larger processes affecting the rest of the world. Deep political and economic crises in Russia in the summer of 1998 led to the downgrading of Central Europe’s GDP forecasts, despite the low trade turnout between the two regions. The economic crisis led to generally negative sentiments of portfolio investors toward emerging markets, irrespective of the discrepancy of the economic performance between Russia and Central Europe.8 This is

indicative of Eastern Europe's newly found exposure to international challenges which is in marked contrast to its Cold War insulation.

In addition to their recently gained international autonomy, the states of Eastern Europe embarked on a transition to democracy and a market economy in a security environment profoundly altered by the end of the Cold War. However, the manner in which the new environment affects the security of the post-communist countries has not been systematically investigated.

One of the explanations for the lack of comprehensive insights into the security of the Eastern European countries is that realism—the dominant school of political thought—has been fixated with the study of great powers. The problem of war and security in the theoretical literature on international relations has been characterized as essentially a great power phenomenon. In addition, realism's preoccupation with state's survival fails to provide an agenda for the study of small states. Ever since Annette Baker Fox's *The Power of Small States*, seen as the main inspiration for the security-oriented small state approach, realist studies have attempted to explain the resilience of small states despite the lack of military capabilities. Thus, following the realist logic for all Eastern European states, preservation of the country is supposedly their main foreign policy

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objective. Yet currently most of these states’ sovereignty is not contested by any power in the European system.

Lack of realists’ interest in the small state security problem has an even more fundamental explanation. Realists, and especially neorealists, while explicit that domestic variables are outside their subject foci, recognize that there exists a particular relationship between the systemic and domestic. Kenneth Waltz argues that the international environment “can tell us what pressures are exerted and what possibilities are posed by the system of different structure, but it cannot tell us just how, and how effectively, the units of the system will respond to these pressures and possibilities.”

The international structure constrains and conditions behavior but ultimately it is domestic actors who must assess domestic and international conditions and requirements and implement policies necessary for their survival. “Each state,” Waltz asserts, “arrives at policies and decides on action according to its own internal processes, but its decisions are shaped by the very presence of other states as well as by interactions with them.” Indeed, the constraints explain the similarities of behavior by states with comparable positions of power within the system, but fail to account for their behavioral differences. States vary in their domestic structure and policies and therefore address the challenges of the international environment in different ways. “To explain the expected differences in national responses, a theory would have to show how the different internal structures of states affect their external policies and actions.”

11Kenneth Waltz, Theory of International Politics (Reading, PA: Addison-Wesley, 1979), 71.

12Ibid., 65.

13Ibid., 122-23.
the study of environment as a primary determinant of state behavior, since the structure of the international system cannot be reduced to variables in its component units.

Systemic liberalism, on the other hand, is commonly seen as more hospitable to domestic level variables. Jenifer Sterling-Folker summarizes the difference between liberalism and realism in their treatment of state behavior as the "disagreement over whether process or environment is a primary determinant for actor interest and behavior." Bureaucracies, elections, political parties, and interest groups are essentially multiple processes and commonly thought to fit the process-based theory of liberalism. Sterling-Faulkner, however, faults liberalism in failing to treat these as independent variables and instead renders them as dependent variables in order to claim that systemic processes have an impact on domestic actors. Alternatively, she asserts that "the combination of environment and process means that the systemic and domestic can act as simultaneous independent variables in the realist argument."

For structural realists, the process serves the function of ensuring state survival. Ultimately, it is domestic actors, however, who recognize threats, assess their extent and formulate policies to achieve security. While the environment stimulates the drive for survival and security, it is the domestic process that accounts for the particular state behavior. In order to explain varied state responses of similarly situated actors, realism needs to incorporate process-based theorizing. In fact, systematic approaches to bridge the gap between international politics and comparative politics are already emerging. The first is based on the logic of two-level games as originally advanced by Robert Putnam.15

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15 Robert D. Putnam. "Diplomacy and Domestic Politics: The Logic of Two-Level Games." *International Organization* 42, no. 3 (Summer 1988): 427-60. See also Peter B.
National leaders, while seeking deals with their international partners, must ensure the acceptance of such agreements by relevant domestic actors. Another approach bridging the gap between domestic politics and international relations is provided by the concept of domestication of the international system: the process by which the international system becomes less anarchic and more rule-governed. This process is not simply integration among states based on interdependence, but more on "structural merger of the constituting principles, that is, their constitutions."¹⁶ No doubt, the large literature on European integration best represents such an approach.

Theoretical problems with the study of small state security were compounded by the lack of agreement on the analytical usefulness of the small state concept.¹⁷ Due to its dominant position in the field of international relations theory, the American scholarly community declared small state approaches irrelevant to the understanding of world politics. By the mid 1970's small state studies became rare. Realist and neorealist approaches have made only cursory references to the security of the small states in the framework of the great power politics. Hans Morgenthau, for example, stresses that "the protection of the right of a weak nation that is threatened by a strong one is then determined by a balance of power as it operates in that particular situation ... the small

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¹⁷See Baehr.
nation must look for the protection of its rights to the assistance of powerful friends.18

Realism generally treats the security and survival of small states as achievable only through system wide measures, i.e., balance of power, rather than enhancing national power. Even then small states can preserve independence only if great powers consider this in their own interest. The end of the Cold War, however, once again revived the interests in small states as they became free to pursue independent foreign policies.

The goal of this dissertation is to analyze the security of small states. The analysis is grounded in the realist perspective and joins the debate on the changing nature of security in the post-Cold War era. The end of rigid bipolarity enabled small states to gain more freedom of action in their quest to guarantee national security. The changed environment gives even more credibility to voluntarism as a mode of thought in realism--the belief that decision makers have effective choice and ability to affect outcomes.19

Thus, the post-communist countries of Eastern Europe represent an excellent test ground to analyze the security of small states. All countries shared common experience in terms of political and constitutional system, were subordinated to the Soviet Union, and enjoyed the same security arrangements. Following the end of communism, facing new structural constraints and conditions domestic actors initiated assessments of internal and international conditions in order to formulate and implement new policies and strategies for national security. The post-communist period presented conditions for the empirical study of the internal processes which account for behavioral similarities and differences

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19 For a recent example of the voluntarist conception grounded in the realist tradition see Henry Kissinger, Does America Need a Foreign Policy? Toward a Diplomacy for the 21st Century (New York: Simon and Schuster, 2001).

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among countries with comparable position in the international system. In the post-communist decade Eastern European countries achieved different levels of security and experienced different security dynamics for which external factors account only partially. Obviously, internal factors and processes, too, affected external policies and actions. Having lost long-existing security arrangements, the states made deliberate choices based on assessment of internal and external factors that resulted in different security outcomes.

This dissertation utilizes the insights provided by major bodies of literature on small states, security, realism, and democratization to explore the security of small states. For this purpose, the study uses the cases of three post-communist states including Bulgaria, the Czech Republic, and Lithuania. The three countries started to formulate new security policies at the same time and achieved different levels of security. The dissertation chooses three transition countries as the dynamic political, social, and economic transformation enables the analysts to identify empirically the variations in domestic and international processes and factors that determine differences in security outcomes. The study attempts to join the recent efforts in bridging the gap between the systemic approach of realism and domestic level variables and providing a systemic approach for the study of small state security.

This study contends that the security of the small state is a function of its power. The power of a small state, on its part, can be analyzed by investigating the state's capabilities and the distribution of capabilities in the subsystem of which the state is a member. In order to better understand the security and power of small states, the study will explore two sources of state power--the capabilities of national institutions and the capabilities the state can derive from its membership in core international institutions. The stronger the state in terms of the level of institutionalization of domestic institutions.
and the higher the level of integration of the state in a stable and highly integrated core of states, the more secure the state. In other words, the security of small East European states is to a great extent a function of the degree of institutionalization of domestic institutions and the levels of political, social, and economic integration in Western institutions. Domestic and international institutions are two major sources of a small state's power in the modern international system.

Content of the Study

The dissertation explores the relationship between a small state's domestic institutionalization and integration in international institutions and the ability of the state to ensure its national security. The study investigates the ability of small states in the process of profound political, economic, and social reforms to guarantee their security. More specifically, the study focuses on states in Eastern Europe which faced a fundamentally transformed security environment and which sought to attain security while transforming their regimes' type.

Chapter II explores the current theoretical debate over the changing nature of security. The discussion sets the stage for understanding the process of reevaluation and the reconceptualization of security in the three states during the post-communist transition. The first section surveys the theoretical state of the field in the context of the recent attempts to redefine the concept. The next section describes the theoretical context in which the debate on the security concept takes place including the debate over the changing role of the state and the transformation of state sovereignty. The next section surveys the state of literature on East European security after the Cold War. It identifies
the major approach used in the literature to the study of security in the region and the lack of systemic and theoretical approaches to the study of the subject.

Chapter III describes the dissertation's theoretical model, which draws on existing theory. This chapter builds a theoretical argument that can be summed up as follows. The security of a small state is a function of its power. In contrast to the past, however, the power of the small state is not determined exclusively by its military power and participation in a military alliance but rather by the strength of its domestic institutions and the capacities the state can utilize from international institutions, which possess ample military, political and economic capacities. In other words, the security of a small state depends on the strength of its domestic institutions and the capacities derived from international institutions.

The following section identifies the two independent variables including domestic institutionalization and international integration. It also identifies the dependent variable security. The next section operationalizes the independent variables and the dependent variable. Drawing on the large body of democratization literature, the first independent variable, domestic institutionalization, will be measured by the analysis of five factors, or variables, which account for the degree of institutional strength.

The next section describes the second independent variable, international integration. The operationalization of this variable is based on the organizing concept of core-periphery interaction. The concept places states on a core-periphery continuum, from belonging to the core to having no relationship with the core. The core represents a stable group of states organized in an institutional framework possessing great military, political and economic powers which provides, among other things, a high level of security to its members against internal and external threats. This section provides an
empirical method of identifying the state's place on the core-periphery continuum, which provides a corresponding set of power capabilities to the state. According to the adopted theoretical model and consistent with the realist approach, the state's relative power capabilities depend not only on the state's absolute capabilities derived from the state's specific place on the core-periphery continuum but also on the distribution of capabilities derived from the core in the state's regional environment. Just as neorealism distinguishes between capabilities as actor's attributes and the distribution of capabilities as a structural component, this dissertation defines a set of core-periphery interactions as an attribute and the distribution of core-periphery interaction in the subsystem as its structural component. For this purpose the theoretical model distinguishes between the interaction of the state with the core—designated as flow in this study—and the distribution of the interactions of the state's neighbors with the core—called stock. In other words, the state's capabilities derived from the core is the flow, and the distribution of capabilities derived from the states in the regional environment is the state's stock. The state's flow is measured by the level of integration in international institutions representing the core states and the amount of economic interaction, including trade and investments, between the state and the core. The state's stock is measured by gauging the neighboring states' integration in the core, including their membership in the core's institutions.

The next section of the chapter defines and operationalizes the dependent variable, national security. The discussion builds on the contemporary debate over the changing nature of security. Accordingly, the theoretical model adopts a more inclusive definition of security, which goes beyond the traditional conceptualization of security as freedom from military threats and instead incorporates additional elements, including
internal security and societal security. Security is seen as both an objective state and as a matter of official and popular perceptions. The last section of the chapter describes the methodology including the three case studies and the criteria for their selections.

The following three chapters are case studies of domestic institutionalization and international integration and their effects on security. Chapter IV, drawing on the rich body of empirical studies on the post-communist transition in Eastern Europe, evaluates the degree of domestic institutionalization in Bulgaria, the Czech Republic and Lithuania as measured by the five factors associated with institutional strength. A separate section is devoted to each country. Based on the discussion in previous sections, the final section provides a comparison of domestic institutionalization by ranking the three countries on an ordinal scale.

Chapter V evaluates the degree of international integration with the European Union (EU) and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) of each of the three states. The first section describes the decision of the European Union to integrate East European countries and the process to achieve this goal. The next section provides an overview of the emergence of NATO as the only robust security institution in post-Cold War Europe and its expansion to the East.

The next section of Chapter V sheds light on the three countries’ attempts to join the EU. It evaluates the states’ degree of integration in the Union by identifying the phases each country has gone through in the process of joining the institution. For this purpose, Chapter V draws on documents produced by the Union, which evaluate the countries’ progress in meeting membership criteria. In addition, the chapter identifies important Union decisions to begin new phases in the negotiations with each country as evidence of the country’s degree of integration in the institution. The next section traces
the three countries' degree of integration with NATO. It traces the phases of each
country's process of increasing interaction with the Alliance and the transformation of its
military structure to meet the membership criteria.

The next section evaluates the economic transactions between each country and
the core countries. For this purpose, the section analyzes the trade flow between each
state and the EU using trade statistics. Another section gauges the level of integration by
estimating each state's foreign direct investment originating in the EU.

Another section in Chapter V evaluates each state's stock. For this purpose the
section provides estimates of the neighboring states' integration in the core based on their
relationships with the EU and NATO. The relationships range from membership to
adversarial relations. The section also includes evaluation of public and official support
for integration in the EU and NATO.

Based on the discussion in the previous sections, the last section of the chapter
provides a comparison of international integration in the core among the three countries.
Separate figures compare the three states' flows and stock by placing them on ordinal
scales. The higher the values of the country's flow and stock, the higher the country's
degree of integration in the core.

Chapter VI investigates the dependent variable, national security. Separate
sections are devoted to each of the three states. Each section surveys the objective
security of each of the three countries in the post-communist period, the evolution of the
official conceptualization of national security and the evolution of popular perceptions of
security. The last section of Chapter VI provides a comparison of the degrees of national
security placing the countries on ordinal scale from most secure to least secure. The three
cases are ranked by summing up the three values assigned for objective security, official perception of security and popular perception of security.

Chapter VII summarizes the main findings of the dissertation. It also joins two major debates—the sources of security in Eastern Europe and the security of small states. The first debate is rather limited both in its theoretical scope and depth, and empirical range. The current literature on East European security is devoted mainly to the discussion of policy issues including the proposed NATO enlargement, interstate relations and their effects on international politics, and ethnic conflicts. Accordingly, security is conceptualized in traditional terms and participation in military alliances is assumed to provide the answer to security threats and risks. When the contributions to this literature, firmly grounded in the neorealism tradition of international relations, provide analyses of the domestic politics in the countries of Eastern Europe the authors see various factors not as variables in the theoretical model to explain the security of the countries but rather as factors which either facilitate or inhibit the countries' ability to join Euro-Atlantic institutions which would enhance national security. Invariably, the studies either propose policies that would accelerate the process of NATO expansion, or more rarely, warn about the policy implications of incorporating rather diverse societies—with deep political and ethnic divisions and economic problems—into already strained Euro-Atlantic institutions.

The other body of literature, which focuses on the security of the small state, is written mostly from a realist perspective and defines security as a function of power relations among the great powers—or less frequently, among the dominate regional players. Thus the security of small states is determined by exogenous factors and very little is attributed to the independent action of national decision makers. While providing
empirical evidence of varying outcomes resulting from specific choices, the studies investigating the decision-making process within the state almost always point to the limitations imposed by the states' small size and little power. This neorealist approach to the study of small states, however, is limited in its explanatory power when applied to security in the post-Cold War period. The final chapter of this dissertation attempts to contribute to the literature on small state security by focusing on the significant effect of preferences and choices on the security of the state. The end of the rigid bipolarity of the Cold War provided decision makers with greater room to maneuver and thus there emerged a need to investigate what within the state determines its foreign policy choices and what are the internal sources of security.

The last chapter also deals with another weakness of the traditional neorealist approach as applied to small states—the little attention paid to internal factors as determinants of security. Thus the role of domestic institutions as an element of power is an often ignored variable in the existing literature. The last chapter addresses this shortcoming by identifying ways to include national institutions in a modified realist approach to the study of small states' security. One of the most important findings of this study is that security policies are influenced not only by the international environment and context but also by domestic politics and more specifically by institutional processes. Thus, international actors interested in enhancing the security of small states should focus their efforts not only at providing external guarantees to national security but also at strengthening national institutions. In fact, powerful national institutions will provide security in the long run as international security institutions are structurally limited in their ability to address the new security threats and risks. Furthermore, the expectations and security perceptions of populations relate to the functions of national institutions as

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the public increasingly sees challenges to emanate not only from without but also from
within the state.
CHAPTER II
PREVIOUS RESEARCH ON STATE SECURITY

The goal of this chapter is twofold. First, it describes the current theoretical debate over the changing nature of security and the role of the state and state sovereignty in the post-Cold War environment. The first section surveys the state of the field in the context of recent attempts to redefine the concept. It sheds light on the theoretical attempts that reflect empirically identifiable processes of reconceptualization of security underway in the international system. The second section places the debate in the context of recent attempts to redefine the functions and place of the nation-state in the international system. Second, the chapter surveys the literature on East European security after the Cold War and identifies the dominant theoretical approach used in the study of the subject.

The Literature on Security

Since the end of the Cold War scholars have advocated the need for a broader concept of security. In the post-World War II period, security was seen as the absence of military threat. Now, however, a broader definition must incorporate political, economic, environmental, societal, and military security. The broader concept takes into account the multidimensional character of security threats and enables the analysts to turn to the most threatening problem in each area. Even those who find the state as an adequate unit

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of analysis argue for a position that views security as a holistic concept that breaks the confines of the realist framework with its military and power orientations.2

To be sure, basic differences about the security paradigm have long existed. Thucydides, John Hobbes, Nicolo Machiavelli, Emmanuel Kant and Hugo Grotius, in specific historical settings, outlined the main tenets of future concepts of security.

According to realists, the nation-state system, not unlike the pre-state chaos described by Hobbes, lacks common rules and institutions of law enforcement.3 War and the pursuit of power are the primary means to ensure national security and survival.

Hugo Grotius, the precursor of modern liberalism in international politics, challenged the Hobbesian view of the world by contending that states are limited in their struggle with each other by common rules and institutions. To Grotius, values and norms, particularly ones that are codified in international law, are important in maintaining order and security among states. Grotians, like Hobbesians, accept the state-centric vision of the international system, but contend that rules, norms, and laws and institutions significantly modify state behavior.4

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Against the Hobbesian realist image. Emmanuel Kant proposes a vision of perpetual peace—an enlightened political order forged by a community of humankind. The modern liberal tradition—inspired by the Kantian belief in republicanism, federalism, and global citizenship—not unlike Hobbes, accepts the state-centric vision of the international system, but contends that reason and moral commitments of individuals can subsume narrow national interests.

The debate about security after the Cold War has led to different interpretations of the meaning and nature of the concept. Some authors have attempted to broaden the neorealist conception of security to incorporate a wider range of threats, including economic, environmental, migration, and human rights issues. Richard Ullman suggests a definition of security that includes threats to quality of life and the range of policy choices available to both governmental and non-governmental entities. Jessica Mathews argues that the definition should include demographic, environmental and sustainable development issues. Others have attempted to shift the debate from its state-centric focus to the level of international, global, regional, societal, and individual security as well as state security.

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Of course, challenges to the traditional approaches to security studies are not new; a large body of literature on European integration has generated propositions that hard-core security problems can be partially resolved or mitigated by non-military approaches. Integration theories first developed by David Mitrany, Ernst Haas and Karl Deutsch emphasize the effect of interdependence, political choice, and supranational institutions on national and international security. While the realists view international interaction as basically a zero-sum game, integrationists claim that interaction can be turned into a positive-sum game in which there are mutual benefits to be gained. In fact, the early proponents of integration theory recognize the difficulty which security dilemmas and threats pose to cooperation. What distinguishes them from realists, however, is their effort not toward understanding conflict among states but toward defining the conditions and processes which lead to cooperation. In fact, making a realistic assessment of international politics, integrationists, particularly Haas, emphasize that political elites must perceive cooperative behavior to be in their rational self-interest.

What non-realist attempts have in common is their criticism of the state-centric orientation of neorealist perspectives. They question whether the state can be an adequate provider of security when security is defined in terms of economic, cultural, and ecological as well as politico-military terms. Most critics of neorealism agree that

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policies intended to ensure security at all levels require a fundamental revisiting of
traditional concepts and theories associated with thinking about security.8

One common criticism leveled at attempts to expand the security agenda or the
levels on which security is analyzed points to their failure to explain how the newly
emerging issues or levels of analysis are to be brought together. Keith Krause notes that
the “new thinking on security” fails to confront the ontological underpinnings of the
traditional concept of security and does not provide a new analytical core to the concept.9
In fact, lack of a clearly defined concept of security, he argues, prevents many authors
from distinguishing between “threats” and “problems” and thus overloading analytical
frameworks. More often, however, authors implicitly accept the traditional concept of
security by conceding that an issue becomes a threat when “it feeds into process that can
lead to violent conflict.”

David Baldwin argues that the problem of defining security after the Cold War is
even more significant than the perceived lack of a widely accepted concept. Reviewing
the state of security studies as an academic field, Baldwin finds that most efforts to define
security are, in fact, more concerned with defining policy agendas of nation-states while
little attention is devoted to clarifying the meaning of security.10 Consequently, security
appears to be “a confused or inadequately explicated concept.” To be sure, this
shortcoming is endemic not only to recent attempts at conceptualization but also to

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8See R. B. J. Walker, One World, Many Worlds: Struggles for a Just World Peace
(Boulder: Lynne Rienner, 1988). See also Booth: Booth and Smith.

9Keith Krause, “Theorizing Security, State Formation and the “Third World” in
125-36.

neorealism, the theory of international politics which posits security as one of the primary motivations of nation-states. Neorealism limits the object of study by constricting the range of relevant theories applied to understand security, and normatively, limits itself to national security.\textsuperscript{11} Instead, Baldwin proposes that students of security need to address the concept by specifying its problematic. Basic questions such as "what is security?"; "security for whom?"; "security for which values?"; "from what threats?"; etc., need to be addressed in order to conceptualize security. Others, too, point out that the field suffers not only from the absence of a common understanding of what security is, but also what its most relevant research questions are.\textsuperscript{12}

Attempts of critical perspectives to broaden the agenda of security studies are viewed from the neorealist perspective as making the field theoretically ineffectual. Alternative approaches are seen as providing no clear explanatory framework, which is most clearly reflected in the lack of concomitant empirical research. In the neorealist account, the field is about "the study of the threat, use, and control of military force...."\textsuperscript{13}

The state-centered orientation of the field is reflected in the conceptualization of security as state security, threat as the military force applied by the state, and the state as the unchallenged political authority in world politics. Accordingly, recent security studies in


the neorealist field have remained in the more traditional state-centric framework to advance historically tested approaches to addressing security issues. 14

Most of the students of security came to embrace the neorealist perspective as the only approach to offer a systematic way to investigate the subject. The dominance of the neorealist perspective rests on the confidence that the field has evolved into a scientific discipline which involves few foundational assumptions and generates empirically testable hypotheses. Of these, the existence of foundational assumptions in the neorealist perspective is central to the claim to scientific knowledge. Indeed, realists and neorealists might disagree on whether the sources of insecurity are exogenous or indigenous to the state but both agree that, under the conditions of anarchy—which is another foundational claim—it is the interaction of states that gives rise to it. Thus, the assumption that the state is the subject of security conditions dominates the discipline and precludes the introduction of more inclusive conceptions of security. Grounded in a number of assumptions about the reality of international politics, the neorealist security perspective can reject alternative approaches, which attempt to bring new issues into the security agenda as not meeting the expectations about what observable facts represent threats and insecurities.

An important reevaluation of the concept of security from a neorealist perspective, which attempts to go beyond this state-centric focus, is Barry Buzan’s People, States and Fear. Buzan broadens the definition of security to include freedom


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from military, political, societal, economic and environmental threats. Security is examined from the perspectives of the state and the international system as well as of the individuals. Yet, according to Buzan, the state remains the most important provider of security. The evolution toward "strong states," he argues, will result in a greater degree of security to the individuals as well as the society. International security, on its part, can be attained through the conjunction of the strong-state evolution and the move toward what he calls "mature anarchy."

The Broader Debate

These and other attempts revisiting the concept of security reflect a broader debate on the nature of the state after the Cold War. New approaches challenge the traditional realist-neorealist-neoliberal debate in international relations. The proliferation of international institutions and regimes, the growing inability of nation-states to respond to increasing public demands from within, and inability of states to unilaterally face the challenges of globalization and interdependence have challenged the accepted concepts of sovereignty and state. Views range from the spirited defense of the tenacious principle of sovereignty and the power of the states to the insistence that

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markets have overtaken the states. In between, there is a growing body of literature which investigates the broad transformation of sovereignty and power of the nation-states. Rather than see the state as withering away, this approach claims that, as a political organization, the nation-state is adjusting to the changing conditions in the global system. The spiraling growth of financial transactions and the free flow of capital and labor have created what Richard Rosecrance calls the "virtual state," a political unit with a transformed concept of sovereignty.

The large body of literature on European integration, too, points to the divergent processes of integration and disintegration, which transfer authority from nation-states to sub-national and supranational political units. In a related process, relations between industrial democracies have come to rest on consensus rather than force. Undoubtedly, the major powers are today less inclined to resort to force to resolve their differences.

It seems only natural that the dominant tradition in security studies, neorealism, has a difficult time addressing the question of how the transformed international security environment would affect the various aspects of state structure and its nature in general. There is no realist theory of the state and domestic institutions, merely simplified assumptions about them. The state is seen as a constant; the post-Cold War context might have altered the behavior of states, but its core structures, functions and goals remain unchanged.

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There are two groups of literatures on the state that speculate about the effect of
the changing international security environment on the nature of the state. Authors such
as Michael Mann insist that despite the dramatic changes brought about by the Cold War's end, states will remain essentially unchanged in scope and cohesion. States need to
facilitate domestic political, economic, and social functions such as redistribution tasks or
mobilization for collective action, regardless of the international context.

The other group of theories, on the other hand, maintains that the changed
security environment challenges the cohesion, and in some cases the viability, of certain
states. According to this reasoning, threats are crucial in the creation, consolidation and
continued cohesion of political entities. This argument is based on the assumptions that
threats and wars expand the scope of states and that without threats some states would
collapse under the strains of fractured and polarized societies. For scholars such as
Charles Tilly, it is the competition for power between states that provide impetus for
state-building. As Tilly puts it, "war makes states." The process of state formation in
Europe was protracted and violent; it resulted in vastly strengthened state structures.
Thus, the end of the Cold War would have a dramatic effect on the scope and cohesion of
states, especially weak ones.

This group of theories brings about an important point with relevance to security.
In contrast to neorealism's external security orientations, this approach defines security in

19 For a discussion see Michael C. Desch, "War and Strong States, Peace and
Weak States?" International Organization 50, no. 2 (Spring 1996): 237-68.

20 Michael Mann, "Nation-States in Europe and Other Continents: Diversifying,
Developing, not Dying," Daedalus 122, no. 3 (Summer 1993): 115-40.

21 See Tilly; See also Charles Tilly, "War-Making as Organized Crime" in Peter
Evans, Dietrich Rueschemeyer and Theda Skocpol, eds., Bringing the State Back In

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relation to both internal and external threats. Mohammed Ayoob observes that the explanatory power of the neorealist concept has been vastly reduced when applied to Third World states. While the long consolidation of states in the West created strong institutions and loyal citizenry and eliminated the domestic security dimension, most of the non-Western states still face significant internal threats. In fact, in some parts of the world, threats to security are almost exclusively domestic in their origin. Third World countries emerged in a state system in which the principle of territorial inviolability ensured their survival as international subjects, yet their fractured societies and politics challenge the survival of the state as a political unit. Paradoxically, it is the lack of challenging external environment during state-formation that accounts for the fragile state structure in most of the non-Western world. Authors such as Buzan and Holsti advance even further the connection between national security and state strength by arguing that in the post-Cold War environment it is the strong-weak state variable that accounts for international security. To Buzan, the evolution to “strong states” in conjunction with a move toward “mature anarchy” would result in greater international security. Holsti sees the problem of international security as determined by domestic politics.

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23 See Krause.


25 See Holsti.
The Literature on East European Security

This study will attempt to make a contribution to a small body of literature on the post-Cold War Eastern European security. The size of the literature notwithstanding, ten years of a fundamentally altered security environment has yet to translate into a rich body of empirical and theoretical accumulation. The very few works on the region's security have not produced a deep understanding of the subject as they confined their analytical focus on a variety of real and potential threats and risks, political and military variables associated with traditional security considerations, and recommendations and options related to practical foreign policy objectives. This state of the field comes as no surprise given that during the Cold War, at least on the part of American foreign policy, there was no autonomous policy toward the countries of Eastern Europe; they represented but an element in the more significant policy toward the Soviet Union. Not surprisingly, much of the literature dealing with security is devoted to “rediscovering” much of the countries' cultural, social, political, and economic backgrounds, an exercise which in itself discerns the unstable, fluid, and dynamic character of the security environment in the region.

As far as Eastern European security, the literature may be divided into two main groups, the first of which deals with traditional hard-core security issues. The second, vastly richer one, while not directly discussing security, focuses on problems, including political change, institution building, market reform, and political culture, which have a direct effect on it. In other words, previous studies have concentrated on either traditional politico-military factors of security or the nonmilitary factors of transition in Eastern Europe. This study will attempt to bring together some of the findings and concepts of the
two bodies of literature; it will combine some of their themes and subjects, and integrate them against the backdrop of the current debate over the changing nature of security and threat in world politics.

Only a handful of works systematically analyze the changing security environment in Eastern Europe. Most of the investigations provide policy studies of the states' foreign policy objectives and behavior, and abound in practical recommendations to both the West and the East concerning the states' proclaimed objective of "joining the West." Policy oriented works focus on the challenges to the region by identifying the main risks and threats, both within and outside the countries. Frequently, past historical experience and patterns of politics are used as a significant indicator of potential future security problems and conflicts.

Very few studies have ventured to theorize and empirically explore the security in the region, within the context of the wider debate on the transformation of the security environment. Usually, the problematique of security in the region is seen as determined by the collapse of the regional hegemon rather than as conditioned by the global processes, which alter the nature of sovereignty, nation-state, and national and international security. In one rare attempt, John Lampe and Daniel Nelson provide a framework for the study of East European security, taking into consideration the

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changing nature of threats and security.\textsuperscript{27} The complexity and dynamic of the concept of security in the region stems as much from global, political, social and geopolitical processes as from the history and recent experience of Eastern Europe. In the book, the problem of security is related to democratization, market and political change.

In another attempt, Richard Smoke edited a volume on public and expert perceptions of security in Eastern Europe. This work, written from a Eastern European perspective, lays out some very interesting—although given the unexplored status of the subject, still tentative—observations. These observations include the convergence of security perceptions held by the public and security experts, and the presence of relatively intense perceptions of insecurity despite the lack of clearly identifiable threats. Perhaps the most significant observations reached by some of the authors is that despite the existence of a real security vacuum in the region and the intensity of perceptions of insecurity, the situation is not perceived to be critical, as the emergence and enlargement of European and Atlantic structures (NATO, EU, Partnership for Peace, Council of Europe) are minimizing the negative effects of a security void.\textsuperscript{28}

The literature on political and social transformation in Eastern Europe, while not directly discussing international security in the region, contains insights about the countries' perspective on stable and peaceful development. A rich edited piece by Beverly Crawford, though not directly discussing security and institutionalization in Eastern Europe, contains a few chapters in which the authors are quite skeptical about the


future of the region's security and stability. With the development of capitalism and liberal institutions in Western Europe, Eastern Europe became a peripheral region, a status which created institutional, economic and social obstacles to reform. In another thorough and ambitious study of the most troubled region of Eastern Europe, the Balkans, Karen Dawisha and Bruce Parrott provided a systemic and cross-country comparison of political change in post-communist states. While not directly addressing the problem of security, the various essays provide a rich catalog of security threats and risks and their effect on institution building and politics under the conditions of social and political transformation. This study is so far unrivaled in its systematic approach to the problem of transition in this part of Eastern Europe. In another edited volume, both authors, applying the same approach, focus on similar processes in East-Central Europe.

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CHAPTER III
RESEARCH DESIGN

Chapter III describes the theoretical model that will be used in the dissertation. The first section discusses the dissertation's hypothesis. The next two sections describe the two independent variables--domestic institutionalization and international integration. The following section discusses the dependent variable--national security. The final section describes the methodology--the three case studies used and the criteria for their selection.

Hypothesis

This dissertation explores the relationship of the small state's power and its security. The hypothesis can be summed up as follows. The security of a small state is determined by its power. In contrast to the past, however, the power of a small state is not determined exclusively by its military power and participation in a military alliance, but rather by the strength of its domestic institutions and the capacities the state can utilize from international institutions, which possess ample military, political and economic capacities. In other words, the security of a small state depends on the strength of its domestic institutions and the capacities derived from international institutions.
Independent Variable I: National Capacity as Measured by Domestic Institutionalization

Robert Jackman proposes a definition and measurement of national political capacity conceived in terms of institutional capacity and legitimacy.¹ Jackman and Kenneth Bollen² argue for separating questions of stability from questions of democracy on the grounds that each concept represents a distinctive phenomenon. Stability can be seen as reflecting the political capacity in a sense that is independent of regime type. Their emphasis on political capacity built upon already existing studies examining the social and political conditions associated with the stability of democratic societies. The problem of political capacity was most thoroughly treated by Samuel Huntington, who argued that institutionalization is the key ingredient to political capacity.³

After making the distinction between force and power, Jackman defined political capacity in terms of institutions that are sustained by legitimacy. Institutions reflect the structures necessary for the exercise of power, which assumes a degree of continuity and regularity in the relationship between the participants. But these structures must also be seen as legitimate; that is, consent must be attained. Given that legitimization is an ongoing process, political capacity is never an all-or-nothing phenomenon, but rather a matter of degree.

A central feature of these forms is that they take considerable time to develop, which immediately draws attention to the age of institutions. Jackman’s analysis of


³Huntington, Political Order.
national political institutions accordingly focuses on their age, conceived in both chronological and generational terms. With age comes the formalization of routines, and the goal becomes organizational survival. By increasing the adaptability of institutions, age increases the probability of survival. While age increases the odds of survival, it is hardly a sufficient factor for the success of institutions. Thus it is reasonable to assume that those with a relatively strong pre-communist democratic tradition would have an advantage over states establishing democratic institutions for the first time.

Traditions always seem to be present in any assessment of democratic transitions' chances of success. Yet some authors question the invariable effect of the past on contemporary transitions. For example, Beverly Crawford and Arend Lijphart focus on the possibility of overcoming the Leninist legacy through what they call “the imperatives of liberalism.” They argue that “new institutions can be crafted and new international pressures can be brought to bear that shut out the negative influences of the past.” Indeed a substantial part of the democratization literature focuses on the elites' strategic interactions and choices in crafting institutions and procedures. Newly created institutions are often the result of the domestic balance of political forces, expectations about the future, and compromise rather than long held liberal principles and memories of a democratic past. Crawford and Lipjhart, trying to reconcile the historical determinism approach and recent democratization literature, argue that the immediate context of norms, institutions, and international pressures shapes the particular way that legacies influence outcomes. Therefore, it can be contended that while age increases the odds of

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institutional survival, it hardly precludes extinction; issues of legitimacy therefore need to be addressed explicitly. Drawing on a distinction between power and force, a regime is legitimate when it can resolve problems by exercising power without resorting to force or provoking a forceful challenge.

Rigid historical determinism is also challenged by sociology’s institutionalism. Formal bureaucratic structures did not spread as a result of their functional virtues as efficient coordinators of complex relationships but because the wider environment supports and legitimizes rational bureaucracy as a social good. Organizations exist, proliferate, and have the form they do not necessarily because they are efficient, but because they are externally legitimated.5

Gabriel Almond and G. Bingham Powell have a slightly different take on the capacities of political systems. Instead of capacities they speak of capabilities of political systems.6 The capability approach attempts to understand the performance of the political system in its domestic and international environments by introducing the notions of extractive, regulative, symbolic, responsive, and international capabilities.

Robert Dahl and Edward Tufte, while analyzing the correlation between the size of the state and democracy, implicitly investigate the relationship of small states’ national capacities and threat abatement.7 The authors ask the question: Can a small country


maintain its independence as well as a large country? First it must be observed that Dahl and Tuft do not identify a single dimension of size. Instead, population, area, and density as well as socio-economic variables are adopted as indicators of size. Furthermore, when dealing with the capacities of political systems the socio-economic variables are gauged, for the authors argue, a nation’s capacity for survival and autonomy depends on the size of its wealth, skilled workers, etc., rather than on the size of its population and territory.

Neorealists, too, include political capacity among the factors, which determine the state’s power. According to Kenneth Waltz, the place of the state in the international system depends on how it ranks in terms of size of population and territory, resource endowment, economic capability, military strength, political stability and competence.\footnote{Waltz, Theory, 131.} He goes on further to argue that states are highly ranked not because they excel in one way or another. Of course, we have to acknowledge that neorealist assumptions and prescriptions pertain to great powers rather than small states.

For the purpose of this study, states will be placed on a continuum of strength. As Kalevi Holsti defines it, “... state strength ... is not measured in military strength. It is, rather, in the capacity of the state to command loyalty—the right to rule—to extract resources necessary to rule and provide services, to maintain that essential element of sovereignty, a monopoly over the legitimate use of force within defined territorial limits, and to operate within the context of a consensus-based political community.”\footnote{Holsti, 82-83.} This conception of state strength goes beyond the traditional focus on institutionalization, capabilities for extraction of resources, and autonomy. These are important but
insufficient variables in determining the strength of states. What Holsti suggests is that "It is in the realm of ideas and sentiments that the fate of the state is primarily determined." He proposes that in addition to the instrumental capacities of the state one needs to analyze legitimacy, both horizontal and vertical, as another measurement of state's strength. Vertical legitimacy deals with authority, consent, and loyalty to the ideas of state; horizontal legitimacy deals with the definition and political role of community.

In order to operationalize the variable "domestic institutionalization" the study will investigate five factors that are commonly seen by most students of political systems as the variables determining the degree of institutionalization. According to the field of study or personal preferences, these variables are seen as determining the strength, power, capability, or capacity of the institutional system. For the purpose of this dissertation, these five factors are seen as determining the level of domestic institutionalization which partially accounts for the state's power.

Two-turnover test. One criterion for measuring institutionalization in transition states is the two-turnover test. A political system can be viewed as consolidated if the party takes power in the initial election at the time of transition, loses a subsequent election and peacefully turns power to those election winners, and if these election winners then peacefully turn over power to the winners of a later election. Of course, one might argue that the two-turnover test is an unclear indicator of political institutionalization as elections in transition democracies are marked by a high

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10Ibid., 84.

11Ibid. 108

level of electoral volatility. If a great percentage of voters change their voter preferences, political leaders might come to believe that they can achieve either total or overwhelming electoral victory over their opponents. Thus electoral volatility may not be conducive to moderation and political compromise. On the other hand, low volatility should encourage less confrontational politics among the elite. A study by Gabor Toka, however, persuasively argues that a high electoral volatility in Central Europe in the mid-1990s has not prevented the consolidation of democratic regimes.

Initial agreement among all sectors of society on the fundamental rules of the political game. In his discussion of democratic consolidation, Giuseppe Di Palma warns that “time alone—a number of elections or parliaments, or other supposedly significant institutional occurrences—is insufficient to advance consolidation: for example, elections and parliaments themselves come under attack.” Instead, his main argument emphasizes the significance of “outlying in advance of the rules of the game—the norms, procedures, institutions whose operation should affect a fair balance of winning and losing.” In this initial phase of a transition to a pluralistic political system, diverse political players agree upon clear, workable rules to which contending political players can commit themselves and ensure restraint, mutual security, and a nonviolent exit from authoritarian rule. As Di Palma cautions, however, the negotiations of these rules must involve all relevant sectors of society.

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13Electoral volatility (or net volatility) is defined as half the sum of the absolute value of the differences between the vote of each party in two consecutive elections.


15Giuseppe Di Palma, To Craft Democracies (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1990), 143.

16Ibid., 44.
political players, or at least must be drawn with an eye on them, lest in the future the
effectiveness and legitimacy of newly formed institutions and the rules of their crafting
are challenged. Therefore, agreement on the rules of the game requires more than a
majority. Instead it necessitates a broad, early consensus involving almost all relevant
political players. It must be noted that this initial agreement is not about formal
institutions, constitutions, separation of power, or the nature of the emerging regime.
Rather, it is about basic rules guiding players' behavior and ensuring their security in a
fluid political environment where processes have uncertain outcomes.

It seems to follow from these considerations that the consolidation of institutions
in the transition countries of Eastern Europe depended on the speedy adoption of basic
rules according to which political conflicts are carried out. Indeed, the new democracies
became involved in the turbulent process of rule making in areas such as division of
powers between president and parliament, minority rights, multiparty systems, civil-
military relations, and market economies. The process of rule making was carried out
under the conditions of specific cost-benefit calculations, which made them vulnerable to
challenges when, subsequently, payoffs did not satisfy various groups. This phase of the
transition, also known as extrication, is seen by many authors as a crucial explanatory
variable for the institutional outcomes and future political development.\textsuperscript{17} Initial
institutional choices are not easily altered and have clear implications for the fate of the
new polity. In any event, it is expected that after the initial phase of institution setting--
building consensus on the ends--the polity would move to political struggle over the

\textsuperscript{17} Some authors offer typologies of modes of extrication. See Samuel S.
Huntington. "How Countries Democratize," \textit{Political Science Quarterly} 106, no. 4 (Fall
Latin America, Southern and Eastern Europe," \textit{Journal of International Affairs} 45, no. 1
(Winter 1991): 269-84.
means. In other words, groups move from the uncertain and volatile fundamental politics to the certain (as far as the security of groups and players) instrumental politics.

The dominance of instrumental rather than fundamental politics--consensus on the ends, but political struggle over the means. A well-institutionalized society is one in which the constitutional order according to which political conflicts are carried out are not themselves the object of political struggle. Once the rules of the game have been established in the initial transition period, politics lose their confrontational character and become merely competitive. Jon Elster, Claus Offe, and Ulrich Preuss distinguish between distributional and constitutional conflicts. Distributional conflicts relate to divisible goods, thus easily accessible to bargaining within an established framework of bargaining procedures and rules. Constitutional conflicts are about the basic norms and fundamental institutions of the political order, including the rules about competing for and exercising of political power. In other words, constitutional conflicts pertain to ideological conflicts in which, although actors do not fear for their survival, political interactions are seen as a zero-sum game. Conflicts between political actors espousing competing ideologies are not easily reconciled as they see each other as mutually threatening. Each of them questions the legitimacy of its opponent and sees itself as better off if the opponent were defeated.

The completion of transition from fundamental politics to instrumental politics, in other words, from constitutional to distributional conflicts, marks the routinization and

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18 Elster and his associates also define another category, categorical conflicts, which involves conflicts about social belonging and identity. Examples of this category are ethnic and religious conflicts. Jon Elster, Claus Offe, and Ulrich K. Preuss with Frank Boenker, Ulrike Goetting, and Friedbert W. Rueb. Institutional Design in Post-Communist Societies: Rebuilding the Ship at Sea (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998), 147.
consolidation of political institutions. Politics becomes the process of competitive selection of sets of policies rather than about the struggle between various ideologies espousing different ideas about political and social order.

Writing about post-communist political elites, John Higley and Gyorgy Lengyel make a similar argument by identifying a normative and interactive dimension in elite cohesiveness. The normative dimension is the extent of shared beliefs and values among the elite, as well as informal norms pertaining to political access, competition, and restrained partisanship. The interactive dimension is the extent of inclusive channels and networks through which elite members, political parties and groups obtain access to the political decision-making processes.

Inclusiveness of political society—the degree of participation of diverse social and ethnic groups. Political institutionalization is based, among other things, on the fundamental rule that no group in a society is excluded from seeking political power and participation. In the countries of Eastern Europe the end of communism led to an explosion of participation and political mobilization. The emerging institutions had a difficult time channeling multiple demands and expectations from a suddenly empowered public. In this initial phase of transition, the main challenge to the emerging institutions was posed by the lack of clearly defined and constantly shifting functions, authority, resources, and even legitimacy. Once established, however, one of the main challenges comes from particular groups and interests. In the post-communist societies the initial phase of transition witnessed the differentiations and aggregation of diverse interests and groups ending the preceding dominance of the conflict between the extricating elite and

reform elite. The outcome is contingent on the capacity of the institutions to absorb new groups, and the receptivity of the groups to the institutions. If the institutions fail by design or default to incorporate newly mobilized groups, there emerges a serious challenge to the stability of the institutions and the functioning of the institutional arrangement. It might be hypothesized that what worked in the institutions' favor, in terms of fending off challenges arising from newly emerging groups, is the relative weakness of those groups in terms of organizational depth, ideological clarity, and functional skills. Although the disintegration of communist regimes brought about an explosion of political mobilization, it also exposed the weakness of diverse groups to formulate and channel interests and demands into a political program and action. In other words, groups needed time to build their identity in order to assert themselves politically.

Among the newly mobilized segments in the transition societies, ethnic groups already possessed distinct and identifiable interests and demands. Having distinct identities and interests, often predating the establishment of communist regimes, placed them into the fore of political conflicts and issues to be addressed in the transition. Negotiating elites had to reconcile the often conflicting concerns of building functioning institutions which ensure the interests and security of diverse groups, on the one hand, and the traditional—and often supported by the society at large—exclusion of ethnic minorities policies, on the other. Ethnically exclusive arrangements in crafting the new institutions led to the most disruptive consequences in transition societies. The price of ethnic exclusion was not simply the failure of various institutions but, in its extreme, the compromised territorial integrity of the state.

*High public commitment to the fundamental values and procedural norms of the state's constitutional system.* In the post-communist societies of Eastern Europe one of
the most important problems of institutionalization is the extent and degree of public acceptance of, and commitment to, the newly emerging and transforming institutions. The institutional framework of new regimes can consolidate only if a large majority of the public supports it.\textsuperscript{20} At bottom, consolidation of the existing regime can be construed as the process of achieving broad and sustainable legitimization: the belief among relevant political actors and the mass populace that the current regime is the best one among various alternatives.\textsuperscript{21} On the mass level, there must be a broad consensus on the legitimacy of the constitutional regime, regardless of its immediate political, economic, and social performance. Therefore, disengagement of legitimacy from the short-term performance of the regime requires nothing short from a transformation of political culture. In this process, the commitment to the constitutional regime, the rules of the game, and the procedural norms of the political process become routine and political players and the masses do not question and challenge the established order.\textsuperscript{22} In other words, citizens develop loyalty to the regime by deepening their normative and behavioral commitments to the specific rules and norms of the constitutional system.

Legitimacy is shaped by a wide range of historical, cultural, and performance variables, which affect the normative and behavioral commitments to the constitutional order. In the nascent democracies of Eastern Europe the political, social, and especially

\textsuperscript{20}Larry Diamond argues that consolidation is indicated when at least two-thirds of citizens believe that democracy is the best form of government for their country at their time. Larry Diamond, \textit{Developing Democracy: Toward Consolidation} (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1999). 68

\textsuperscript{21}Ibid., 65.

\textsuperscript{22}Writing about democracy as a form of political organization, Dankwart Rustow calls this process of transformation, "habituation." Dankwart Rustow, "Transition to Democracy: Toward a Dynamic Model," \textit{Comparative Politics} 2, no. 3 (1970): 337-63.
economic performance of the regime took on special significance as one of the immediate problems the emerging institutions encountered was the entrenched cynicism and distrust of state and political institutions, a consequence of decades of communist rule.

Historically, regimes which fail to deliver on citizens' expectations are unable to gain legitimacy in the long run. Indeed there is a reciprocal relationship between legitimacy and regime performance. The regime performance is a crucial intervening variable affecting the internalization of beliefs, commitments that sustain legitimacy. At the same time, if the regime enjoys a high degree of legitimacy, its institutions and political actors can negotiate, design, and implement efficacious policies. Effective policies enhance the individual political, social, and material benefits provided to the citizenry and thus strengthen the regime legitimacy.

One, however, should not exaggerate the effect of regime performance on legitimacy. As noted above, legitimacy is shaped by a wide variety of factors, and the more these factors produce legitimacy, the less significant the impact of regime performance on the consolidation of the emerging institutional framework. Thus, populations with a political culture, history, and prior experience which generate commitments to democracy might be willing to accept a short-term political and economic "under-performance" of the regime without seriously questioning the political and constitutional order.

It follows from these considerations that one would expect to find in Eastern Europe a co-variation of public perceptions of the regime's political and economic performance, while the legitimacy of democracy as a political form varies somewhat independently. In other words, satisfaction and dissatisfaction with the performance of
the political system reflect partisanship and attitudes towards governments, while the legitimacy of democracy is autonomous.\textsuperscript{23}

\textit{Independent variable II: Level of International Institutionalization}

In the last decades the growing proliferation of transnational interactions and increasing dominance of economic as opposed to military concerns, along with the growth of highly integrated international institutions, have made synergistic strategies more prevalent and essential to national and international governance. Certainly, the significance of international variables that affect national institutions and national developments, and the linkage between national and international systems, has long been recognized.\textsuperscript{24} Later, ample literature explored the interaction between domestic, foreign policy, and international negotiations. Putnam, for example, argues that the politics of many international negotiations can be treated as two level games.\textsuperscript{25}

In his overview of the crisis of authoritarianism, Lucian Pye saw the sovereignty of the regime as being critically undermined by the increasing flow of international finance, trade, communications and technologies.\textsuperscript{26} Similarly, it is now widely accepted among students of democratization that external factors played a decisive role in the


\textsuperscript{25}See Putnam.

\textsuperscript{26}Lucian W. Pye, "Political Science and the Crisis of Authoritarianism." \textit{American Political Science Review} 84, no. 1 (March 1990): 3-19.
regime change in Eastern Europe. While Western Europe had a substantial contribution to democratization in Southern Europe, particularly in the consolidation phase, in no other part of the world as in Eastern Europe did one witness the almost complete withdrawal of one superpower and the radical reorientation of states in terms of ideological principles, institutional objectives and social and economic transactions with the rest of the world. External factors seem to be one of the decisive sets of reasons for the East European change, causing the initial impetus for regime transformation and conditioning the subsequent democratic consolidation. The reason for the initial "opening" of the regimes was external, due to the reluctance of the Soviet Union to keep its empire intact at any cost. The ideas underpinning the emerging regimes were derived from the Western tradition. Additionally, the massive support in creating the democratic institutional framework and alleviating the shock of economic transition came from the West. Not unlike the South European experience, along with the process of democratization Eastern Europe embarked on the process of joining various European and Atlantic institutions, which provided West Europe with even further influence in the region. In fact, even before the outset of democratization, East European countries were what James Rosenau refers to as "a penetrated system ... in which non-members of a


national society participate directly and authoritatively, through actions taken jointly with
the society's members, in either the allocation of its values or the mobilization of support
on behalf of its goals," involving a certain "fusion of national and international systems
in certain kinds of issues-areas."^{29}

The international environment, along with providing the incentive for regime
transformation, posed numerous novel challenges to the security of post-communist
states. Therefore, East European states were faced with the task of accessing threats and
designing policies to guarantee their ability to ensure their basic security needs. This
requirement also represents a major challenge to security studies to provide understating
of the region's security in a systematic way. Neorealism would point us in the direction
of measuring the state's capacity to influence and control the shaping of events within a
specific international context. However, the application of this statement to the analysis
of East European states' security is obviously problematic. As stated above, neorealism
applies to great powers and its assumptions and prescriptions for small states give little as
a basis for investigation. In addition, most of the realist research on the behavior of small
states, which the East European countries certainly are, was done in the context of the
Cold War and thus provides insights into their behavior under conditions of bipolarity.
During the Cold War, small states tended to confirm neorealist notions that systemic
constraints accounted for small states' compliance with the will of the respective bloc's
leader.

In multipolarity, however, the validity of this hypothesis must be called into
question. Small states find themselves free to choose among multiple policy options.

^{29}James N. Rosenau, "Pre-theories and Theories of Foreign Policy" in R. Barry
Farell, ed., *Approaches to Comparative and International Politics* (Evanston, IL:

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being restrained by much more benign structural limitations. Newly acquired autonomy in the multipolar international system raises the question of what determines the security of small states. Since most of the East European states are by definition small states, it is tempting to analyze the regional setting in search of the subsystem distribution of power. That, in turn, would provide insights into the extent of security enjoyed by various states. Indeed, the end of bipolarity enhanced the ability of regional powers to claim leadership and superior status in various subsystems. The lack of great power confrontation that led to the extension of their rivalry far beyond their boundaries provides regional great powers the opportunity to advance their interests into previously off-limit states. Yet regional subsystems are not insulated from the larger international structure. Regional states stand in empirically identifiable relations not only to one another but to great powers as well. This leads to the reasonable assertion that the behavior of small states is influenced by the combined effect of the international system and the regional subsystem.

Of course, there emerge questions about the relative impact of the international system on the regional system, the extent of regional politics on state behavior as opposed to the effect of great power interactions, etc. In order to preserve the neorealist notion of structure one must account for the capabilities of regional actors and the distribution of capabilities among them, while incorporating the real impact of the larger international system on both subsystem and regional states. In short one ought to account for both actors' attributes and distribution of capabilities.

To this end, this dissertation introduces the organizing concept of core-periphery interaction, that is the pattern of interactions between small peripheral states and the industrialized, democratic system of states in the context of the regional subsystem. Just
as neorealism distinguishes between capabilities as actor's attributes and the distribution of capabilities as a structural component, this project defines a set of core-periphery interactions as an attribute and the distribution of core-periphery interaction in the subsystem as its structural component.

East European states, in addition to being small states, are located in the periphery of the industrialized world. The core-periphery dichotomy pertains not so much to geographical location as to the extent of modernization, democratization, and political stability. Similarly, external and internal constraints on foreign policy are stronger in the periphery than in the core. Peripheral states are more exposed to external pressures and are frequently internally weak and fragile. This results in frequent instability and disorder in the periphery. Peripheral states are frequently dissatisfied with the territorial and demographic status quo and had often sought radical revisions. It was notably so in Central and Eastern Europe for the better part of the last two centuries. However, Vital also notes that these states tend to claim membership in regional system, organization, alliance, association, or league—a distinct phenomenon of our times. In any event, what need to be emphasized is that crucial to the difference between core and peripheral states in their respective patterns of international behavior are factors that are internal to the societies in question.

In a contribution to the study of European security, Ole Waever argues that the continent has witnessed the transformation of the pattern of politics from the traditional

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model of competing nations to a core-periphery model. While traditionally the basic pattern in Europe had been a number of centers competing with each other, in the last decade this has been replaced by a pattern of concentric circles around the EU/NATO center. Indeed, since the end of communism a large number of European issues have translated into issues of "center-periphery, distance, questions of getting in to achieve influence versus keeping distance for the sake of independence." Similarly, the international and domestic politics of the states of Eastern Europe are no exception to this pattern; political controversies range from the East European states’ quest to join Euro-Atlantic organizations, to policies intended to increase the inflow of Western investments to the transforming market economies, to policies seeking to engage Euro-Atlantic institutions in maintaining the stability and territorial integrity of weak East European states, to domestic debates about the diminishing national independence in the process of joining institutions with supranational functions. In this model some of the states are closer to the center--not necessarily geographically--while others are more distant.

It is important to stress that in the so delineated model of European politics, the European Union, although not a formal security institution, has a crucial security role. According to Waever, the EU keeps the core intact, provides stability to the near periphery, and, if needed, directly intervenes in conflicts in the distant periphery.

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33 Ibid, 99-100. Waever argues that the EU/NATO represents an instance of the historically-tried method of peace-empire. Empires constitute political centers whose powers and influence extend radially with fading force, as a number of quasi-independent political units operate around the center with increasing independence as the distance from the center increases.

34 Ibid, 99.
other words, the EU is an institution, which not only performs integrative functions in the core but also attracts states from the more distant centric circles through the diffusion of institutions, principles, norms and practices as well as direct intervention.

Another crucial element in the core-periphery model of European politics, as delineated by Waever, is the issue of security. Waever observes that in 1970 West European states moved toward a state of "asecurity," where the very question of security amongst the states lost its traditional meaning. Western Europe went through a process of "desecuritization" after which the possibility of change without the consent of the major states became very unlikely; it produced a "non-expectation of war." In other words, West European states ceased to define their relationships in security terms. After the end of the rigid division of the Cold War, however, there is a new sense of insecurity as new elements were added to the security discourse including ethnic conflict, environmental issues, migration, and organized crime, among others. Although the emerging insecurity is more complex and hard to define as a pattern, it replaced the state of "asecurity" as new concentric circles were added to the core of Europe: a new process of "securitization" ensued as new risks and threats proliferated.

Security problems and controversies appeared in a variety of forms after 1989. Significantly, the traditional one--a state or group of states posing a credible threat to the territorial integrity and sovereignty of other states--was the least likely security threat. But not all security threats are posed by states that have the capability and intentions to

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35. Ibid. 88.
36. Ibid. 84-7.
37. It must be stressed that the state of "asecurity" emerged only in the context of interstate politics among West European states, while the communist states still constituted the overwhelming, and external to West Europe, security threat.
circumscribe the security of others. Security may be threatened by a state, which is politically unstable and therefore unable to keep its territorial integrity as it comes under pressure by discontent ethnic groups. A state may be the source of mass migration, therefore threatening the social and political peace in neighboring countries. A state may be the source of organized crime with international operations in human trafficking, drugs, and weapons of mass destruction. The proliferation of security threats requires the creation of novel security strategies to address them. Therefore, it comes as no surprise that a variety of institutions, in terms of their forms and functions, are necessary to cope with these security threats. Thus, while NATO provides the protection against military threats, the European Union addresses the multitude of risks and threats arising from the expanding interaction between the core and periphery. Accordingly, this study includes in its analysis not only East European states' relationship with organizations which address security threats through traditional means—including deterrence and defense—but also institutions that address threats through nontraditional means, such as values, norms and principles that suppress threats and risks.

Operationalization of Core-Periphery Variables

There have been several attempts to investigate and conceptualize the relationship of core-periphery and post-communist transitions.38 Analyzing East European

transformations, several authors point out that the farther away a country is from the West, the less likely it is to be democratic. In other words, geographic proximity to the West exercises a positive influence on the transformation of post-communist states, while isolation in the East arrests this transformation. In a compelling study, Jeffrey Kopstein and David Reilly go beyond the analysis of spatial context as mere distance from the West--pointing out that distance simply tells one that factors moving over space have discernable effects on East European transformations--and instead propose a model in which successful transformations are determined by spatial diffusion of resources, values, and institutions. Furthermore, Kopstein and Reilly go as far as to insist that although long neglected as a variable in the models of post-communist transformations, geography itself influences factors determining the pace and direction of transformations including communist legacies, historical context, culture, and other factors constituting the core of the so-called path-dependent explanations. Indeed, the authors conclude that the geographic pattern of success and failure of post-communist transformations is significant even when controlling for cultural legacies and institutional choices.

Spatial diffusion is a "complex process that involves information flows, networks of communications, hierarchies of influences, and receptivity of change." At the core of the spatial diffusion model is a relationship of stocks and flows, on the one hand, and transformation outcomes, on the other. The stock of the country represents the external environment while flows represent the movement of information and resources between the countries. Stocks may be the physical, political, economic, cultural and other structural and environmental conditions. Flows, on the other hand, may be represented by analyzing both the actual flow of resources and information and the country's potential

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39 Kopstein and Reilly. 12.
for these flows. The diffusion process is in large part a function of how open and interactive states are. It is important to stress that, as the authors point out, while the stock of the state represent the structural conditions and environmental context within which the state operates, flows indicate the willingness and capacity of the state and its society to behave in certain way. Indeed, as Andrew Cortell and James Davis argue, a state’s formal subscription to an international norm or principle is not a sufficient predictor of the nation’s commitment to this international norm. Instead, the norm’s “salience” requires a durable set of elite and public attitudes toward its legitimacy in the national arena.

In a similar vein, Emanuuel Adler and Michael Barnett posit that security communities rely for their governance structure not only on a common understanding of their members’ international behavior but also on a common reading of their domestic behavior and institutions. In other words, the assurance that states participating in a security community will not settle their differences through war is based on the members’ shared international and domestic practices and commitments. Therefore, for the purpose of this study, the extent of state integration into an international institution will be measured not only by the state’s formal membership in it but also by the extent of public and elite commitment to the institution’s norms and principles. The objective is to create

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40 For a description of the formal model see, Kopstein and Reilly, 7-24.


42 Ibid, 68.

a measure that reflects the receptivity to the new norms and principles of both the elites and the public.

For the purpose of this study, states will be placed on a continuum of integration with the European core. The more integrated the country in the main European institutions, the closer the country to the core. Conversely, the less integrated the country is in European institutions, the more distant the country from the core. The degree of integration is determined by both the country's stock and flows. In order to operationalize a country's flow the study will investigate the following factors:

Membership in core institutions including NATO, EU, OECD. As already discussed above, international organizations have important security functions. NATO is the institution that provides traditional security through deterrence and defense to its members. The Alliance also moderates the behavior of the allies.\textsuperscript{44} Even when military threats disappear other security problems may remain. Therefore, alliances may transform their functions to cope with more diffuse risks and challenges. As Celeste Wallander and Robert Keohane point out, after the Cold War, NATO was being transformed into a security management institution.\textsuperscript{45} Indeed, although many of the East European countries do not face a clear threat to their territorial integrity and sovereignty, they still seek NATO membership as a means of, among other goals, addressing more diffuse security risks and challenges. Similarly, EU membership is seen as another way to increase the


\textsuperscript{45} Institutions whose functions, along with the defense and deterrence, include the management of security risks have rules, norms, and procedures to enable members to exchange information and avoid generating security dilemmas. For more on alliances' management of security risks see, Celeste A. Wallander and Robert O. Keohane, "Risks, Treats, and Security Institutions." in Helga Haftendorn, Robert O. Keohane, and Celeste Wallander, eds., \textit{Imperfect Unions} (New York: Oxford University Press, 1999): 21-47.
security of post-communist states. The European Union is an institution holding the core states together, an area where the likelihood of political change through war is non-excitant so long as the organization performs its integrative functions.

*Percentage of international trade with the EU.* Trade is also seen as diffusing institutions and ideas. One of the most significant economic changes in Eastern Europe after the end of communism was the dramatic increase of trade with the European Union. Usually, the more advanced post-communist economies were more successful in reorienting their trade patterns from the East to the West without experiencing dramatic economic difficulties.

*The level of direct foreign investments in the national economy.* The inflow of direct foreign investments has been identified as an important agent of diffusion of institutions, norms and rules. Foreign direct investments also increase the state’s economic capacities and power. Of course it must be stressed that foreign direct investments are a result of, not a cause of, successful economic reform. Countries striving to attract investments must first significantly marketize their economies and fulfill the requirements of international financial institutions. Only then can states expect to attract foreign investments. In any event, what is significant for this study is the degree to which foreign investments incorporate the national economy into the core market and further how foreign investments increase economic, political, and social capacities. The study

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47 Foreign direct investments have been identified as an important agent of ideas. See. Ray Barrell and Nigel Pain, “Foreign Direct Investment, Technological Change, and Economic Growth within Europe,” *Economic Journal* 107, no. 445 (November 1997): 1770-86.
includes the foreign direct investments in both absolute terms and per capita. The per capita levels address discrepancies in the sizes of case studies’ economies, but does not measure the stakes the core has in the economies of the three countries. The total amount of foreign direct investments, therefore, provides a good measure not only of the levels of the core’s penetration of the country but also the extent of stake the core has in the country’s well-being and security.

Public acceptance of integration in the core. Integration in the core is a function of both the elite’s commitment and the public’s mobilization. A country’s flow can best be measured by devising a measure that reflects the receptivity to the integration of both the elite and the public. Whereas the stock represents the structural conditions within which the state operates, the flow’s component represents the society’s willingness to integrate in the core. Indeed, although a state may enjoy good stock—short distance to the core and neighbors bent on integration in the West—the elite and society, for various reasons may choose to erect barriers to integration.

For the purpose of this study I posit a country’s stock to be who its immediate neighbors are. The stock of a country represented by the structural and environmental conditions within which the state operates shape the options available to the state. In order to analyze a country’s stock this study looks at its neighbors’ position on the core-periphery continuum. The more integrated the country’s neighbors are in the core, the better the stock of the country. A post-communist country has a better chance of integrating itself in the core if its neighbors are already part of the core or are also striving to achieve integration in it. This measurement takes into consideration not only the geographic position of the state in relation to the core but also the decision taken by
its neighbors in relation to integration in the core and their place in the core-periphery continuum.\footnote{Although not investigating the international integration of post-communist states, Kopstein and Reilly make some conclusions relevant to this study. Using regression analysis, the authors conclude that neighbors are strong determinants of political and economic behavior. See Kopstein and Reilly, 18. One can hypothesize, then, that neighbors are strong determinant of international behavior, including a willingness to integrate.}

A state with a high level of interaction with the core enjoys membership in various organizations and institutions associated with being a part of the core state system—the EU, NATO, and the Council of Europe, among others; a high level of economic interaction including trade, financial penetration by core states’ businesses, and synchronization of economic practices; and human and elite exchange. The core develops a stake in the stability and security of a peripheral state with which it enjoys a high degree of interaction. The peripheral state, on its part, in addition to its own capacities can “borrow” capabilities from the core in confronting the challenges in its security environment and meeting the demands of transition to a market economy and democracy.

Of course, one can easily identify the correlation between the attributes derived from internal capacities and attributes gained from the pattern of interaction with the core. Transition states that have achieved a high level of institutionalization of the market economy and democratic institutions have also achieved a relatively high degree of interaction with the core. Politically and economically stable and prosperous East European states have attained associate agreements with the European Union and are on their way to negotiating membership in the institution. Stable national politics have also qualified them for membership in NATO and increased the penetration of foreign capital.
from the core states, thus increasing their chances of sustaining the political and economic stability so vital to strengthening of national institutions.

Dependent Variable: National Security

It is this dissertation’s contention that the security of a transition state depends on its power. The power of the state, on its part, can be analyzed by investigating the state’s capabilities and the distribution of capabilities in the subsystem of which the state is a member. There are two sources of state capabilities—the strength of national institutions and the capabilities the state can derive from the core state system. The system-wide component in the model is the distribution of patterns of core-periphery interactions in the subsystem in which the state is located.

One of the major problems with the dependent variable “security” is its definition as a concept. As David Baldwin observes, security has not been an important analytical concept for most security studies scholars. During the Cold War, if the military was relevant to an issue, it was considered a security issue, reflecting the dominance of the field by scholars of military statecraft. Conversely, if the military was not relevant, the issue was consigned to the area of low politics. Accordingly, security was defined as the absence of threat to the territorial integrity and sovereignty of the nation-state. Specifically, the West defined security as the absence of military threat from the Soviet bloc and Moscow defined security as the absence of military threat from NATO.

The last decade has witnessed the proliferation of attempts to redefine security by giving high priority to previously ignored issues such as human rights, the environment.

49See Baldwin, “The Concept of Security.”
drug trafficking, organized crime, human smuggling, and social issues. According to David Baldwin, however, surprisingly little attention has been devoted to defining the meaning of security. In other words, there have been only limited attempts to explicate the conceptual issues of security. Instead, most of the exploration of security intertwines conceptual analysis with empirical observations. Authors construct propositions, theories, and analytical frameworks as a substitute for the concept of security. Concepts, however, are not theories or propositions; they are constructs, ideas of general or abstract nature, which are used in the construction of theories. Therefore, Baldwin argues that "understanding the concept of security is a fundamentally different kind of intellectual exercise from specifying the conditions under which security may be attained."  

In defining the working definition of security in this study, the point of departure is Baldwin's characterization of security as "the low probability of damage to acquired values."  

As the author points out, traditional definitions of security usually emphasize the absence of threats. This formulation, however, does not include threats, which are beyond any human control such as natural disasters. There is, however, another reason to choose Baldwin's definition. Small states such as the ones in Eastern Europe have little independent control over their international environment. In response to external threats, including a powerful antagonistic neighbor or civil war on their borders, states develop deterrence policies. These policies are intended to provide security by lowering the likelihood that an attack or military spillover will occur. Yet by virtue of their relatively small power, these states cannot determine the presence or absence of the threats. The best the states can hope for is to preserve acquired values ranging from preserving

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50 Ibid., 8.
51 Ibid., 13.
territorial integrity to maintaining the well-being of their society in the face of existing threats beyond the control of any individual state. In other words, East European states' security policies do not eliminate threats but lower the probability of losing independence, reversing the democratic process, economic collapse or anything else that is defined as the states' values.

Furthermore, the concept of security must also include two specifications: Security for whom? And security for which values? For the purpose of this study the referent object will be the state and the society. As for the values, the security of the states has traditionally included territorial integrity and political independence, and more recently other values such as open seas, uninterrupted flow of resources, etc. Therefore, this study will include in national security the values as defined by the individual states. Those values are usually included in the national security concepts and other governmental papers created after the states found themselves free to pursue autonomous policies in a rapidly changing and increasingly complex international environment. In keeping up with the changing approach to security, these states, along with the traditional value of state security, included in their security conceptions abundant references to societal well-being and defined it as a referent object of security. The study identifies the values of state and societal security as defined by the national security concepts and other official papers prepared by the security experts in each country.

The working definition of security includes the subjective and objective dimensions of the concept. The purpose is to allow for the possibility that states and societies may either overestimate or underestimate the actual probability of damage to

52Following the logic of distinguishing between conceptual analysis and empirical observations, state security and societal security are different forms of security, not fundamentally different concepts.
acquired values. Therefore, "absence of fear" is designated as one of the values.

Operationally, the study investigates the public and experts' perceptions of the existing threats to the state and society's values which are defined as part of national security. On the other hand, the immediate regional environment is investigated to determine the objective state of threats to the state's acquired values. Attention is devoted to the presence of states, conflicts and developments that present threats to security. They may include neighboring states that challenge the territorial integrity and sovereignty of the case-study state, the presence of local conflicts, which hold the likelihood of spillover into the state, or adverse economic developments likely to affect the well-being of the society, among others.

In order to operationalize the dependent variable the study identifies what the individual states identified as the referent of security or, in other words, what values must be protected. Then the study measures the level of objective security the transition states enjoyed in the decade of post-communist transition. It proceeds with identifying the official perceptions of the level of security enjoyed by the state. Finally, it gauges the sense of security or threats exhibited by the populations of the states. The study also provides a comparison of the level of security each state enjoyed.

Case Selection

The selection of the three case studies is based on three criteria. The first criterion for the selection of the three countries is a variance in the dependent variable, national security. The three countries achieved different levels of security. While the Czech Republic enjoyed a relatively high level of security, Bulgaria and Lithuania faced
security challenges of high intensity. Similarly, the populations exhibited varying security perceptions. The second criterion pertains to similarities among the states in terms of power positions in the international system and types of political regimes at the beginning of the transition process.

Third, the countries have similar size and by all definitions qualify as small states. There is no widely accepted definition of small states. The problem boils down to determining the dimension of size. Some definitions use area as the criteria of size, others use population, GNP per capita, or military expenditures. Some authors prefer to speak of small powers rather than small states by mixing physical with psychological factors.\(^5\) In any event, by all definitions, the three countries are small states.

\(^5\)Robert Rothstein defines small power as one which cannot obtain security primarily by use of its own capabilities. Rothstein, 296.
CHAPTER IV
INDEPENDENT VARIABLE DOMESTIC INSTITUTIONALIZATION

Chapter IV evaluates the level of domestic institutionalization in the three case studies. Separate sections are devoted to the measurement of each country's strength of domestic institutions using the five factors constituting the first independent variable. The final section compares the countries' levels of institutionalization.

Bulgaria

Two-turnover test. Formally, Bulgaria meets the two-turnover test. The former communist party, now named the Bulgarian Socialist Party (BSP), won the first multiparty elections in 1990 and formed the first post-1989 government backed by a 53 percent majority in the Parliament. In the next elections in 1991, the opposition coalition, the Union of Democratic Forces (UDF) won 34 percent of the vote and formed the first non-communist government headed by Filip Dimitrov. The minority government was backed by the votes of the only other non-communist party in the parliament, the Movement for Rights and Freedoms (MRF), a predominately ethnic Turkish party. In the next parliamentary elections in 1994, after gathering 43 percent of the votes, the BSP again formed a government led by Zhan Videnov, backed by a 52 percent socialist majority in the Parliament. In fact, no party or group has so far succeeded in winning two consecutive elections, as confirmed by the convincing win of UDF in the 1997 parliamentary election.
It seems only logical to conclude that Bulgaria went even beyond the two-turnover test as the opposition parties or groups have formed governments after winning elections four times in the last ten years. Bulgaria's experience, however, must be qualified in one important way. Following Huntington's prescription, it is expected that the two-turnover test demonstrates that the losers of parliamentary elections, operating within the democratic system, are willing to peacefully turn over power to the winners. A peaceful transition is a reflection of the willingness of at least two groups in the political elite to commit to the rules and principles of democracy. In Bulgaria, however, no winner in a parliamentary election has been able to complete a full mandate in power. Each government was forced to resign under public pressure, organized opposition, or both. The first Socialist government of Andrei Lukanov, after the economy and standard of living went into a free fall, came under attack from a rapidly accelerating strike wave and had to resign. Bulgaria's president, Zheliu Zhelev, asked the politically unaffiliated Dimiter Popov to form a coalition government which governed until the 1991 election. Similarly, the minority government of Filip Dimitrov, formed after the UDF won the second multiparty election, lost the support of the MRF in the Parliament and had to resign after less than a year in power. The resignation came amid growing criticism of the government's policies by the president, unions, and the press. Once again, President Zhelev had to appoint a non-party government led by Liuben Berov, and supported in the Parliament by the BSP, the MRF, and a group of UDF dissident deputies. After nineteen months in power, the Berov government in turn fell out of favor with the odd coalition and had to be replaced by another nonparty government, led by Reneta Indzhova, until the December 1994 parliamentary election. The Socialists, winners in the election.
formed a government led by Zhan Videnov, and relied on a disciplined 52 percent majority in the National Assembly.

The last transition of power, from the Videnov government to the UDF in 1997, is perhaps the clearest example of why a formal application of the two-turnover test alone may fail to account for the degree of institutionalization. Amid dismal economic performance, growing international isolation, and uncompromising political self-righteousness, the Socialist government came under severe criticism from the public, the president, nearly all political parties, and the press. After forty days of strikes, mass demonstrations, student boycotts, and even barricades blocking streets and roads, bringing the country to a standstill, the society came to the brink of mass political and social violence. The Socialist Party, seeing the leaders of the opposition gradually mastering the wave of social discontent, finally agreed in early 1997 to relinquish power and hold early parliamentary elections.

In Huntington's treatment of the two-turnover test there is an explicit reference to the choice of the voters in determining the rulers. Indeed, in Bulgaria, as in what would be an institutionalized electoral system, the "voters regularly ousted the ins and the ins always yielded office to the new choices of the voters." It is important to note, however, that in 1990 and again in 1997, the voters had their say only after the "street" had its say and effectively forced both the Lukanov and Videnov governments to relinquish power. It is only expected in well institutionalized political systems that governments, under pressure of unfulfilled public expectations, would resign after exhausting certain legally prescribed venues for change, e.g., seeking a coalition government, changes in the executive team, or a new government agenda. In Bulgaria, however, the decision to step

\[1\] Huntington, *The Third Wave*, 268.
aside was taken as a response to the escalation of political and social violence. In other words, the mode of turnover did not occur in the framework of formally prescribed rules. In 1991 and 1997 the ballot boxes simply ratified what had been decided on the streets by the naked power clash between ruling party and opposition.

*Initial agreement among all sectors of society on the fundamental rules of the political game.* One of the most significant evidence of failed institutionalization is violence, ranging from civil war to ordinary crime. Civil strife, social unrest, and mass protests, as a form of violence in the initial phase of institutionalization in Bulgaria, signified the absence of legitimizing rules to which actors can refer.

Beginning in January 1990, the ruling Communist Party, its satellite, the Bulgarian Agrarian National Union (BANU), and UDF initiated a series of roundtable talks intended to set up the initial rules of the game.\(^2\) In the next two months the roundtable functioned as a parliament as the communist-held National Assembly could pass no law without its formal approval. The negotiations produced a series of agreements on political and institutional reforms including electoral law, basic depolitization of state institutions, granting citizens basic political and civil rights, and support to newly emerging political parties. One very significant stipulation called for the election of a Grand National Assembly to sit for eighteen months to prepare the new constitution and function as a regular parliament by passing new basic legislation. During

the negotiations, the UDF found itself outmaneuvered and yielded on most points of contention. For example, the UDF agreed to an early timing of the elections, thus giving the ruling party—already having a disproportionately large base and resources—an additional advantage. The BSP also retained Petar Mladenov as the head of state, and the ruling party successfully resisted attempts to bring to the talks any additional, potentially significant political players. In fact, Andrei Lukanov, a member of the Communist Party and later to become the prime minister of the first post-1989 government, held firm control over the negotiations and set their agenda.

This early phase of transition from totalitarian rule was initiated and heavily dominated by the old regime. The ruling elite was able to constitute a roundtable forum to set up the basic rules of the game to ensure the security of the participants and their interests. Yet, the rules of the game and institutions crafted in the initial phase quickly came under attack from newly emerging political actors. It must be noted that at the time of its formation, the UDF was dominated by center-left intellectuals, most of whom were former members of the Communist Party. In contrast to other Central European communist countries, Bulgaria did not develop an organized opposition to the regime until just before the beginning of transition.3 At the macro level, the initial changes found the political system in what Linz and Stepan call “early-post totalitarian stage,”4 which goes a long way in explaining why the still unreformed communists were able to control the transition. What is significant, as far as the initial phase of institutionalization, however, is the failure of the roundtable talks to include all significant players in the process of crafting rules of the game, security, and new institutions. There simply lacked

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3For comparative analysis of post-communist transitions see Linz and Stepan.

4Ibid., 293-343.
the process of defining multiple opposition interests, players, and groups—a process which in other post-communist countries took years, even decades. The process of opposition formation and its differentiation into diverse political groups representing various interests in the society began only after the regime initiated the transition. Even then, the Communist Party faced a weak opponent, internally divided, leftist in outlook, and lacking in leadership and confidence.

The initial deal between the Communist Party and the opposition, which obviously favored the old elite, proved unable to provide a stable transition to building new institutions. After the elections of 1990, the Communist Party, renamed the Bulgarian Socialist Party (BSP) in March of the same year, found itself the controlling majority in the Grand National Assembly, holding the presidency and controlling all other still unreformed institutions. After achieving legitimization through roundtable talks, free elections, and careful distancing from the personality of the last dictator Todor Zhivkov, the Socialist Party quickly lost interest in further substantial or symbolic reforms. Unwillingness to reform and dwindling standards of living gave impetus to the explosion of strong opposition in the civil society. This time the opposition was led by the emerging right-of-center elements in the UDF. These leaders, who came to be known as the “dark blues,” were in fundamental opposition not only to the BSP but also to the whole nature of the transition, including the agreements of the roundtable negotiations, the results of the first free elections and the right of the BSP to be a legitimate player in the political system. The “dark blues” challenged leftist elements, known as the “light blues,” in the UDF and accused them of collaboration with the communists throughout the transition process. In fact, their allegations of collaboration only seemed real after a number of key leaders in the UDF were revealed to have been “police informers” before
1989. In the Grand National Assembly, as the debate on the new constitution progressed, the "dark blues" refused to participate in designing the basic law in a parliament dominated by the Socialist Party. They were joined by the MRF, which argued that the draft failed to protect the right of ethnic minorities in calling for the elections of a new parliament that would be more representative of the rapidly increasing political demands in society. In fact, the most intense opposition in the civil society emerged after the first multiparty elections in 1990; this time they were led by the "dark blues." The "light blues," on the other hand, were becoming increasingly marginalized both in the Parliament and in the UDF.

When the draft constitution was presented in the Parliament, the "dark blues" walked out and began a hunger strike. The position of the strikers was supported by most MFR deputies and the increasingly radicalized UDF led by Filip Dimitrov. The majority of the UDF deputies, however, supported by the new president and former UDF leader Zheliu Zhelev, fulfilled their commitment to the roundtable agreements and in July 1991 joined the BSP in endorsing the new constitutions.

After the Grand National Assembly fulfilled its task of crafting the new constitution, the Parliament set the new elections for October 1991 and dissolved itself. Prior to the elections, the UDF completed the purge of "light blues" and proclaimed itself as the true anticommunist force in the country. Ekaterina Nikova observes that this initial period of transition was marked by revolutionary rhetoric, preoccupation with the past and what she calls "prepolitics and antipolitics." Indeed, the victory of the UDF at the 1991 elections did not subdue their uncompromisingly anticommunist stance despite their

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lack of majority in the parliament and the need to seek support for reform legislation. The Dimitrov government’s most important policy imperative was the complete "decommunization of the country." While the majority of the proposed legislation was in line with the attempts to create a modern political, economic, and social system, many of the laws were clearly aimed at denying the BSP a role in the society. The Assembly voted to deny pensions to former members of the Communist Party above a certain post or the security services. The so-called "Panev Law" barred former communists from administrative positions in academic institutions for five years. The UDF also introduced legislation that would have led to a broad purge of the civil administration. In one of its most controversial moves, the Prosecutor-General indicted Andrei Lukanov, former prime minister and a sitting member of the parliament, for diverting resources to friendly Third World regimes. Most significantly, in February 1992 a number of "dark blues" accused the BSP of planning a coup and threatened to ban the party. In a comparative study of transitions from totalitarian regimes, Linz and Stepan argue that the "dark blues were only semiloyal democrats in opposition in 1990-91."6 In interviews with UDF leaders, Stepan finds them to be more concerned with moral imperatives of justice rather than formal constitutional procedures.7

Questions about the democratic credentials of the political players aside, from an institutional point of view, the events of the 1989-91 demonstrated a lack of consensus among the major political players on the essential rules of the game and the nature of the emerging institutions and political system. While in early 1990, during the roundtable negotiations, there seemed to be a tentative agreement between the ruling regime and the

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6Linz and Stepan, 341.

7Ibid.
soft-liners in the opposition, the failure of the "dark blues" (either because their interests were not transformed into political representation or because of their outright exclusion by the Communist Party) to endorse the emerging rules of the game very soon put into question the viability of the consensus. Indeed, the failure of the roundtable talks to formulate workable rules of the game was signified by the fact that, only nine months after the series of agreements was signed and six months after the first post-1989 general elections, the accelerating political and economic crisis forced the main political players to sign a new agreement in January 1991. Even this agreement, however, did not establish stable rules of the game.

This initial failure, of course, should not have spelled doom for the prospects of political institutionalization. De Palma argues that "a democracy is not entirely doomed by a difficult birth."\(^8\) Players can adjust agreements and institutions or even learn to live with imperfect ones. Yet in Bulgaria the Socialist Party, gaining legitimacy after the roundtable negotiations and victory in the first free elections, lost incentives to implement further political, economic, and social reforms and isolated the opposition from further institutional crafting. Although the decision by the Communist Party in late 1989 to democratize was expeditious and relatively uncontroversial within its elite, the almost complete regime dominance over the initial transition precluded consensual institution building. The roundtable talks, although providing an orderly venue for transition, excluded, for various reasons, relevant players from the process. The constitution was drafted and adopted by a coalition of hard-liners in the regime and moderates (light blues) in the opposition to the resistance of the more radical opposition (dark blues).

Furthermore, the refusal of the Socialist Party, once it assumed power, to reform both

\(^{8}\)Di Palma, 108.
itself and the political system did not provide the radical opposition with stakes in the current process and emerging system. Riding on the wave of popular discontent, the dark blues defined radical “decommunization” as the overriding imperative of its present political activity and future governance, thus automatically excluding compromise with the Socialist Party, seen as the bearer of the past communist tradition.

The dominance of instrumental rather than fundamental politics—consensus on the ends, but political struggle over the means. The UDF’s refusal to regard the BSP as a legitimate political player is but one example of an important characteristic of Bulgarian politics. A well-institutionalized social order is one in which the rules according to which political conflicts are carried out do not become themselves the object of such conflict. In other words, there is a dominance of instrumental rather than fundamental politics. Political players can disagree over what particular policies governments should pursue, and yet broadly agree over the center of authority and the means by which decisions are made. Political parties and groups in the society struggle over distribution of scarce resources, economic and social legislation, foreign policies, and extent of governmental regulations. On the other hand, in well-institutionalized societies the players do not contest such core areas as the separation of powers; the fundamental principles of justice that underlie the state; guarantees of civil rights and liberties, including ethnic minorities; legitimation of government through periodic elections; limits of government authority and coercion; and, the right of diverse interests to representation and power. Even when such areas are contested, the groups must be committed to seeking decisions that satisfy more than a simple majority of political interests. For example, amendments to the constitution, contain those “higher order” rules requiring in most well-
institutionalized societies two-thirds of the votes in the legislative bodies and even the positive vote of other institutions.

Bulgaria’s party system is characterized by bipolarity with the UDF at one pole and the BSP at the other. Of course, a bipolar model itself is not conducive to political confrontation. In the case of Bulgaria, however, the two blocks embody two significantly divergent ideological programs, socio-economic policies, and ideas about the country and its future. The great ideological distance between the two poles translated into differences on the ends of politics: the two parties differ to various degrees on almost all fundamental issues, including division of powers, minority rights, property rights, market economy, and matters of social justice. Not surprisingly, changes of ruling parties amount to changes of ideological directions rather than pragmatic alterations of policies.

What is significant in the case of Bulgaria is that the party system remains structured on the base of the roundtable division between ruling elite and opposition. While in the rest of Eastern Europe, the end of the roundtable negotiations and the first free elections marked the end of the rigid separation of the party system into opposition and communists, in Bulgaria there failed to emerge a significant political center capable of bridging the gap between the two ideological poles. In the elections of 1991 and 1994 respectively 25 and 16 percent of the active voters were not represented in the parliament and thus failed to create a centrist formation. Instead the BSP and the UDF dominated the political scene and seldom allowed smaller, centrist parties to emerge as consequential.

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players and affect their policies. Not unlike in the rest of Eastern Europe, the end of the initial phase of transition led to fragmentation in the opposition coalition, but unlike their counterparts in the region the UDF purged the dissenting groups and individuals from the organization rather than splitting into numerous weaker parties. The process of organizational restructuring in the UDF was completed in 1997-98 when it turned into a single party rather than a coalition of numerous and still rather diverse parties and groups. The BSP, too, despite the existence of numerous fractions within the party, maintained relatively high coherence and until late 1996 witnessed little threat of splitting apart. In addition, the presidential elections in 1992 and 1996 candidates with no affiliation with the two parties did not come even close to gaining any substantial vote, thus maximizing the political dominance of the bipolar model.

The dominance of the two ideologically polarized blocs ensured the lurking existence of fundamental politics along with instrumental politics in the polity. The separation of powers, parliamentarism, civil-military relations, market economy, and human rights often became contentious issues and the object of polarized and bitter political confrontation. From the point of view of institutionalization, what made these confrontations significant is their persistence after the initial phase of transition. In spite of the relatively uncontroversial acceptance of the separation of powers in the constitution of 1991, its practice has been rather dismal. There has been a protracted struggle over the independence of the judiciary. While in power, the BSP, perceiving the Constitutional Court as anticommunist, repeatedly tried to curtail its powers and autonomy. Along with frequently accusing the Court of being the political tool of the

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UDF, the BSP has tried to adopt laws and policies that undermine judiciary independence including openly defying the Court's decisions. The other institutions of the judiciary also came under attack: after winning the elections of 1994, the BSP tried to limit the powers of the Supreme Judiciary Council (the self-government of the judiciary) and enacted a law, later struck down by the Constitutional Court, requiring current judges, prosecutors, and law professors to have had five years of previous experience, thus ensuring that only individuals who had served under the communist regime would have their current positions. The judiciary system came under extreme political pressure and arbitrariness when the Socialist majority in the Parliament abolished the Parliamentary Legislative Committee and entrusted the drafting of legislation to a Council of Experts--law professors affiliated with the Socialists.

The UDF, too, has tried to influence, although not as zealously as the BSP, the judiciary. After assuming power in 1997 the Kostov government pushed through amendments to the Law on Judiciary Power, which in the view of President Stoyanov,...

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elected on the UDF's ticket and sympathetic to its program, gave the government too much power over the judiciary.\(^{15}\) Even more controversial, a provision of the law mandated the replacement of the current Supreme Judiciary Council, a body instrumental in the appointment of magistrates, with a newly elected one before the end of its term. In fact, as Sergio Bartole observes in this case, the Constitution invites political meddling into the judicial system by giving priority to political appointments rather than to professional qualifications.\(^{16}\) Furthermore, the government did not abandon the Socialists' habit of blaming the judiciary for runaway crime rates. Under these conditions, it is remarkable that the Constitutional Court in spite of its still unclear and limited role has maintained its independence, often going against the ruling majority in highly controversial cases. The independent track record of the rest of the judiciary institutions, however, is highly dubious.

The notion of parliamentarism, as the notion of separation of powers, is often misunderstood. During the crucial time of constitution crafting the dark blues boycotted the work of the parliament, a tactic later embraced by consecutive oppositions in the parliament, including the BSP. Even after ten years of transition, parliamentarian groups still resort to threats of boycotts, a measure with greater impact and consequences for the work of democratic systems than the mainly symbolic walkouts.

Economic policy is perhaps the rule of the game over which the two contending blocs had the most significant ideological split. Despite the UDF's opposition to the BSP


dominated process of institution building and constitution crafting, while in power in 1991-92 and again from 1997 on. The dark blues did not make concerted efforts to alter the constitution and the form of government. In the economic sphere, on the other hand, upon assuming power the UDF embarked, with qualified success, upon marketization and privatization in stark contrast to the policies implemented by preceding socialist governments. It must be noted that one would not find the great ideological differences on economic issues in the election programs of the two parties, as the socialists formally adopted the fundamentals of the free market, although at a slower pace and with a social orientation.

The BSP did not make any attempts to reform the economy before the elections of 1990, fearing backlash against marketization policies which would have inevitably deteriorated the living standards. Indeed, the government of Prime Minister Lukanov spent the last of Bulgaria's foreign currency reserves to pay salaries and pensions. After the elections, the government found itself unable to continue this policy and the economy went into free fall. It was the non-party government of Dimiter Popov appointed after Lukanov's resignation which implemented, however modestly, the first reform policies. Although the BSP avoided association with the painful consequences of policies intended to bring the creation of a free market, it also displayed lack of intra-party consensus on the free market as a mode of economic development.

After the 1991 election the minority government of Filip Dimitrov initiated the most radical economic reforms to date, including further price and trade liberalization, privatization, restitution, return of farmland to the previous owners, and repairing relations with international financial institutions (severely damaged after the government

\[17\text{See Bell, 370-72.}\]
of Lukanov suspended the repayment on the foreign debt). The success of the economic
reforms, however, was severely handicapped by systemic and political problems.
Politically, the government was restrained by its lack of majority in the Parliament, often
sore relations with its informal partner in the Parliament, the MRF, and inability to forge
informal alliances with various groups in the society, particularly the trade-unions. More
importantly, the government prioritized the privatization of small enterprise and the
restitution of properties confiscated by the communist regime, thus neglecting far more
important (from a macroeconomic point of view) decisions on the future of large scale
enterprise, the creation of a functional banking sector, and creating the institutional
structure of market economy.

After the resignation of the Dimitrov government, the government led by Lyuben
Berov relied on the support of an odd coalition of the BSP, MRF, and UDF dissidents in
the Parliament. Lacking the popular and political mandate to lead the country, this weak
government stalled the reforms and instead turned a blind eye to the hidden privatization
of much of the economy by former communist nomenclature. With the ascendance of the
socialist government led by Zhan Videnov to power in 1994, the reverse of the process of
economic reforms took an even more open character. Plans to implement cash
privatization were rescinded and instead mass privatization was chosen as the option that
would keep “national wealth” out of foreign reach. Resources were poured into heavily
indebted state enterprises and deals and credits from state banks were offered to those
close to government “shady” businesses. The restitution of farmland was halted and an
attempt was made to reinstate collective farming. The Parliament reversed many of the
laws intended to create a market economy and involved itself in the endless passing of
legal amendments. Relations with the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank

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were frozen. By the end of 1996 the economy collapsed: inflation reached 300 percent, the GNP shrank by 9 percent, the corrupt banking system witnessed the bankruptcy of several banks, and the average monthly salary shrank tenfold. Facing growing public protest and political violence the government resigned.

After the April 1997 elections, the UDF government led by Ivan Kostov enacted radical policies to stabilize the economy, build some of the foundations of a free market, and repair relations with international financial institutions. The Parliament approved the institution of a currency board, an IMF-supported mechanism which virtually strips authority from national institutions in monetary matters. The government also initiated a broad process of privatization, which this time included large enterprises and industries considered by the Socialists as having national security importance (e.g. National Telecommunication Company, the largest state banks, and petrochemical and metallurgical industries). In addition the decision was taken to gradually close heavily indebted and losing enterprises should there be no buyers.

On civil-military relations, too, the two blocs have significant differences of political programs which led to frequent clashes and tensions. The Socialists opposed almost all reforms in defense matters beginning with their opposition to ending the presence of the Communist Party cells in the armed forces during the roundtable negotiations. The old elite also objected to any restructuring of the military to adjust to the altered conditions in the post-Cold War world. In many cases the BSP’s resistance to any military reform took the form of public confrontation between civil and military authorities. In 1994, the joint-chief of staff General Lyuben Petrov openly defied a decision by the Ministry of Defense to retire a group of high-ranking officers as part of a government program to streamline the army.
The reasons for the significant differences between the UDF and the BSP on civil-military relations are not only ideological but also influenced by their respective visions of Bulgaria's place in Europe. For the first ten years of post-communist transition, the Socialists' foreign policy objectives included the country's membership in the European Union but opposed membership in NATO, unless the organization included Russia and became an all-European security institution.\textsuperscript{18} In May 2000 at its congress the BSP finally endorsed Bulgaria's bid to join NATO.\textsuperscript{19} The UDF, on the other hand, from early on declared NATO membership to be among the highest foreign policy priorities and sought military reforms that would lead to meeting the membership criteria.\textsuperscript{20} It is significant that Bulgaria--although one may argue Slovakia as well--is the only country among the EU's associated members that in the ten years of post-communist transition has failed to achieve consensus among the main political actors on the main foreign policy orientation of the country. Although the BSP seemed recently to have joined the other political parties in their support of NATO membership, there still remain substantial divisions about its priorities, preceding military and political reforms, and the policies and foreign policy behavior membership would entail.\textsuperscript{21}


\textsuperscript{19}"Socialists Break With Past, Back NATO,"\textit{ Reuters} (7 May. 2000).

\textsuperscript{20}After winning majority in the parliament, the UDF proposed and passed in the National Assembly the Declaration of National Consent which expressed, among others, the consensual parliamentary support of Bulgaria's membership in NATO. See\textit{ Bulgarian Telegraph Agency} (8 May, 1997).

\textsuperscript{21}"Socialist Party Insists on Referendum for NATO Membership,"\textit{ Bulgarian Telegraph Agency} (21 June, 2000).
Inclusiveness of political society—degree of participation of diverse social and ethnic groups. Given the history of ethnic relations in Bulgaria, and specifically the decade preceding the beginning of transition, the potential for excluding the ethnic Turks—the largest, 9 percent strong ethnic minority—from adequate political participation and power represented one of the most significant challenges to institution building.22 With the forced mass migration of approximately 300,000 ethnic Turks to Turkey—in response to a repressive campaign of ethnic assimilation and waged by the communist regime in the 80's—being a fresh memory, the interests of the Turkish minority at the onset of transition had more to do with acquiring fundamental assurances for identity survival and preservation than with conscientious demands for liberalization and democratization. A remarkable expression of the differences of perceptions and experience between the two titular nation and the Turkish minority was the fact that while ethnic Bulgarians during the regular December 1989 picketing of the National Assembly demanded political changes and democratization, the Turkish participants in separate demonstrations before the building demanded the return of their ethnic names, the right to worship, and the use of Turkish language in public.

Ethnic relations and tensions were among the most delicate issues discussed at the roundtable negotiations. The MRF was publicly invited to participate as a representative


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of the Turkish minority, but for yet unknown reasons it declined to join the discussions.\textsuperscript{23}

Years of ethnic oppression under communist regime and gradual liberalization at the end of 1989 led to exploding political mobilization among Turks and the formulation of a set of demands for improvement of the human and civil rights of ethnic minorities. Ethnic Turks began picketing the National Assembly, soon to be countered by Bulgarian nationalists in a mass protest. Both the UDF and the communists felt apprehensive and uncertain about the simmering ethnic tensions in the country and the political role to be played by the Turkish minority. Although the roundtable negotiations took place with full public openness, discussions on ethnic issues were held behind closed doors. An agreement was reached to ban parties based on ethnic or religious base, a provision which later made its way into the Constitution (Article 11, Section 4). Indeed, the Constitution, crafted in a Parliament dominated by the Socialists, included no liberal provisions on the way minorities organize politically and on basic human and civil rights. Elster, Ofse, and Preuss, in a comparative study of post-communist institutions, observe that the Bulgarian constitution contains no guarantees of group rights for minorities.\textsuperscript{24} There is a constitutional tendency toward ethnic homogeneity as reflected in the ban on ethnic and religious parties, the declaration of the Bulgarian language as the official language of the Republic, and the duty to use and study Bulgarian language—which is slightly mitigated by the right of citizens whose mother tongue is not Bulgarian to study and use their own language under the terms of the law.

Although it appears that the ban on ethnic parties was aimed at the MRF there emerged a tacit agreement, at least among some institutions, to tolerate its existence.

\textsuperscript{23}Kolarova and Dimitrov, 191.

\textsuperscript{24}Elster, Ofse, and Preuss, 80-93.
Early in the 1990 election campaign, the Central Electoral Commission, a committee charged with the overall implementation and administration of the elections, registered candidates nominated by the MRF although a court had refused to register it as a party. The UDF, although not always on good terms with the leadership of the party, also never questioned its legitimacy. The BSP, on the other hand, although it often found itself cooperating with the MRF, repeatedly challenged the constitutionality of the party, both in its political rhetoric and, most importantly, through judicial means. It was only due to international pressure that the Constitutional Court, against the letter of the basic law, allowed the MRF to participate in the elections of 1990, and subsequently reaffirmed the constitutionality of the party in 1992.

Apart from their precarious and uncertain constitutional status, the MRF was politically isolated in the first years of post-communist transition. Although it controlled the swing vote in the parliament from 1991 to 1994, neither the UDF nor the BSP ventured to create formalized alliances with the party. The leadership of the ethnic Turks could not jeopardize its credentials by forming an alliance with the Socialists who were


26 "Bulgaria Update," East European Constitutional Review 1, no. 3 (Summer 1992): 11-12: It must be noted that in the eve of the 1991 elections first the Regional Court and subsequently the Supreme Court refused the register the party under the name of Party for Rights and Freedoms. The Central Election Commission then re-registered the organization under its previous name, the MRF. Therefore, the registration of the MRF was based on precedent and remains an exception as no other ethnically based party has registered. See "Bulgaria Update," East European Constitutional Review 3, no. 3 (Summer 1994): 52-53.
associated with the anti-Turkish policies of the old regime. The UDF, on the other hand, could not bring the MRF into a coalition government lest it alienate a large portion of its voters.

The 1994 electoral victory of the Socialists and two subsequent years of almost total BSP political dominance which rendered the opposition impotent, naturally brought the MFR and the UDF together thus ending the political isolation of the Turkish community. In early 1996 UDF, MRF, and the People’s Union (a center-right coalition) signed an agreement which agreed upon the selection of a joint candidate for the presidential elections to be held in November. The newly created coalition, called United Democratic Forces (UdDF), did not have much effect on the workings of the Parliament. However, its candidate, Petar Stojanov, went on to win the presidential elections in the run-off, gathering 60 percent of the vote as opposed to 40 percent for the Socialist candidate. Once the BSP’s power and cohesion was destroyed, the incentives for cooperation between the UdDF and the MFR were lost and they parted ways before the 1997 parliamentary elections. The MFR was once again able to avoid political isolation by forging another coalition with several smaller centrist parties.

High public commitment to the fundamental values and procedural norms of the states constitutional system. Compared to most East European countries, the Bulgarian population has exhibited a persistent criticism of the implementation of reforms along with a deep distrust of democratic institutions and officials. Political parties, parliament, courts, and presidency, the core institutions of every democratic society, score low on the scale of public trust (See Table 1). In fact, a majority of the public finds that the behavior
of politicians and officials is even worse than in the communist era. These attitudes existed along with a dissatisfaction with the way democracy is developing in the country.

In Eastern Europe, satisfaction with democracy is strongly influenced by personal political and economic assessments; the greater the political and economic optimism, the greater the satisfaction with the way democracy is working. The impact of satisfaction with the way democracy performs is significant, for studies indicate that it is a substantive factor that mediates the effect of other variables on regime legitimacy. In Bulgaria dissatisfaction with the way democracy performs (See Table 2) does not appear to negatively affect support for democratic regime and even the legitimacy of the current regime, however inefficient its performance has been (See Tables 3, 4 and 5). Indeed, support for building a market economy and acceptance of the present and future democratic system of rule simply confirms earlier studies asserting that legitimacy of democracy is a relatively autonomous variable. However, in Bulgaria public attitudes indicating the legitimacy of democracy have not existed along with a strong rejection of authoritarian alternatives (See Tables 6, 7, and 8), an essential component in every set of public attitudes and norms that support democracy.

The Bulgarian public exhibited a relatively high degree of approval of the past communist regime, and a significant minority has always supported the establishment of a strong rule including a military one. Therefore, it may be speculated that despite the

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28Diamond, 77-93.

29Performance is construed to broadly include the political outputs and character of the regime, as well as the material conditions it generates. Diamond, 77.
high public support for democracy and its practice, until the late 1990s the Bulgarian public remained ambiguous in its acceptance of the existing political system and institutions. Frequent political crises and a general lack of economic prosperity as a result of long-delayed market reforms have maintained a relatively high degree of dissatisfaction with the way the political system performs, including belief that human rights are not respected, disapproval of the direction of the country, dissatisfaction with the development of democracy, and a low trust in institutions. Dissatisfaction with the development of democracy in the country and disapproval of the direction of country were especially high during the majority rule of the former communists between 1994 and 1996 (See Table 2). The ascent of the UDF in 1997 brought about a greater public approval of the direction of the country (from negative 63 to positive 21), while satisfaction with the development of democracy improved only slightly from negative 81 to negative 54.

It was noted in the theoretical discussion of this study that legitimacy is shaped by a wide array of variables. It appears that in the case of Bulgaria until the late 1990s, performance variables, and one might argue historical variables, have not positively affected the development and internalization of mass beliefs and commitments that sustain the regime's legitimacy.

**Czech Republic**

**Two-turnover test.** Formally, the Czech Republic meets the two-turnover test. At the first post-communist elections on June 8-9, 1990, the Civic Forum, a broad and amorphous coalition of anti-communist parties and groups, won over 53 percent of the
Czech votes for the House of the People. 50 percent of the votes for the House of the Nations, and almost 50 percent for the National Council. At the federal level, the Civic Forum formed a coalition government with its Slovak counterpart, Public Against Violence, and the Slovak Christian Democratic Movement. As in most of the other countries in the region the initial elections in the Czech lands of Czechoslovakia were dominated by broad-based movements and groups. The 1992 elections, however, were dominated by political parties. In the National Council the right-of-center political parties had a majority of seats and formed a coalition government of the Civic Democratic Party (CDP), the Civic Democratic Alliance (CDA), and the Czech People's Party-Christian Democratic Union (CPP-CDU), which was led by Prime Minister Vaclav Klaus. After serving its entire four-year term, the governing coalition returned to power in the 1996 elections (which were also the first elections in the newly independent Czech Republic), although it fell one seat short of an absolute majority. Remarkably, it was the first post-communist coalition in Eastern Europe to win re-election. However, amid economic stagnation and political crisis, the coalition government disintegrated and an early election in 1998 brought to power the previously in opposition Social Democrats (CSD).

What distinguishes the Czech governmental turnover from the case of Bulgaria is the lack of political and social violence accompanying the change of ruling elites. Indeed following the collapse of the totalitarian regime, marked by the inability of the communist elite to mobilize a violent response to rising opposition demands for change.

30The CDP entered into an electoral alliance with the Christian Democratic Party (ChDP).

31Linz and Stepan observe that the members of coercive institutions in Czechoslovakia such as the police and army simply did not believe in the legitimacy of the orders to use violence against the opposition in November 1989. See Linz and Stepan, 323-5.
the parliaments, both on the federal and Czech level, became the principle framework in which political interests clashed, bargained, and sought political ends. Once the communist elite was removed as the sole holder of power and voters in 1990 elected relatively heterogenous groups and parties to the parliament, the potential for violence significantly decreased. The weakness of the Communist party after the first elections had two important consequences for the likelihood of political violence. First, the very low percent of votes the communists gathered in the elections (13.5 percent of the Czech votes for the House of People in the 1990 election) and the way the party simply collapsed under society's pressure deprived the still unreformed party of the capacity to stir a radical confrontation and reverse the process of democratization. On the other hand, the relatively low presence of communist deputies, along with the presence of a wide range of anti-communist groups, legitimized the parliament as truly representative of diverse political interests and thus decreased the incentives for radical and extreme political actions. Thus, while the radical anticommunist opposition in Bulgaria found itself institutionally marginalized and therefore willing to exploit its growing political power on the street, the Czech opposition to the old elite quickly came to dominate the process of institution crafting and clearly established the parliament and elections as the ultimate arbiter in political conflict. Furthermore, the parliament in the Czech Republic became the only institutional forum within which new political actors could interact as the party system developed through splits of parliamentary-based parties and coalitions.

Of course, the conspicuous lack of direct public action and political violence does not imply an absence of public impact on the political process, but simply the significance of institutionalized forms of political action. Furthermore, Czech governments did not base their legitimacy only on the outcomes of electoral votes but
also on the support of public opinion between elections. Indeed, while direct action such as protests, demonstrations and strikes have been few and confined to the non-political, mainly economic sphere, changes in public preferences and attitudes have had significant impact on government and party fortunes. Writing on the Czech elections of 1998, Radin Marada observes that the political crisis in the governing coalition which, ultimately leading to the fall of the Klaus government and the holding of early elections, was preceded by a significant swing of public opinion, President and trade unions against the government and its policies.\textsuperscript{2} Conversely, a public approval of the Bulgarian government reaching single digits, and universal hostility of trade unions and the President against the policies of the socialists failed to force the resignation of the government of Zhan Videnov. Only when the prospects of widespread political and social violence threatened the very foundations of the political system did the government agreed to resign and hold early elections.

Initial agreement among all sectors of society on the fundamental rules of the political game. Not unlike Bulgaria, the opposition in Czechoslovakia was surprised at the sudden appearance of a window of opportunity for democratization. No negotiating team was ready to begin talks with the regime. It was two days after the November 19 brutal suppression of the student demonstration that the opposition in the Czech part of the state set up formal structure, the Civic Forum.\textsuperscript{3} Unlike Bulgaria, however, the lack of


previous formal organization and experience did not prevent the opposition from dominating the talks and imposing the new rules of the game. Indeed, the talks cannot be characterized as bargaining over outcomes but rather as managing the peaceful transition of power from the collapsing regime to the opposition. Vaclav Havel, the leader of the anticommunist Civic Forum, and his close advisers simply presented the regime with the terms of abdication and transition. By the time the first round of talks was held on November 26, 1989, it was clear to almost all participants that the power had slipped from the hands of the communists. In the span of two months, the roundtable decided on the election of Havel as president, the formation of a coalition government with members both from the communist party and the opposition, and the recall of deputies from the Federal Assembly and their replacement with members from the Civic Forum and its Slovak counterpart, Public Against Violence. On the Czech level, the Czech National Council was reconstructed like the Federal Assembly. The reconstructed parliament, on its part, encouraged the formation of a roundtable on regional, district, and local levels.

Unlike in Bulgaria, the first Czechoslovakia elections in 1990 and 1992 produced stable governments that lasted their full terms. Indeed, until 1997 the Czech Republic seemed to be the most politically stable country in Eastern Europe. The political system went through the complex process of creating new political institutions without the emergence of significant players that challenged the nature and direction of institution building. The main norms, procedures, and institutions were accepted by all significant contending parties and players. The political formation and conflicts outside of parliaments that marked the institution-crafting in the rest of Eastern Europe was lacking in the Czech Republic; the parliament (first the federal and later the national) became the
venue for addressing political conflicts and defining the institutional content of the political system.

The lack of a single party with a parliamentary majority to rule alone contributed to the emergence of a condition wherein plurality parties had to seek the support of both ideologically close and opposition parties in order to establish stable governments. This practice of sharing power and negotiating agreements of support provided diverse political players with stakes in the emerging system and ensured their security. After the 1992 elections, the strongest political party, the Civic Democratic Party (CDP) led by Vaclav Klaus, formed a coalition government with the Christian Democratic Union—made of the Czechoslovakia’s People’s Party and the Civic Democratic Alliance. After the 1996 elections, the governing coalition lost its majority in the parliament. Klaus, however, negotiated an agreement with the largest single opposition party in the parliament, the Social Democratic Party (CSDP), to support the continuation of the old government as a minority government. In exchange, the Social Democrats, led by Milos Zeman, were awarded seats in the parliament’s leadership including the Speakership and several committee chair positions.

The year 1997 marked the end of relative political stability in the Czech Republic. A deteriorating economic situation, rising unemployment, reports about corruption and nepotism, and general Western unhappiness with the pace and direction of reforms, led to the disintegration of the governing coalition and early parliamentary elections in 1998. After the elections, the Social Democrats emerged as the largest party in the parliament but did not have enough seats to form a majority government. After numerous negotiations failed to produce either center-left or center-right governing coalitions, Klaus agreed to allow a minority Social Democratic government by not supporting any
future non-confidence votes. In return, the Social Democrats agreed to give the CDP major parliamentary posts and to consult with them on important decisions.\textsuperscript{34}

However, growing discontent in 1999 over political and economic stagnation marked the limitations of informal agreements between the two largest parties in parliament. After nine years of peaceful transition in which the very few mass public protests were mostly confined to economic and social demands, the public once again felt compelled to mobilize mass demonstrations demanding political change. By the end of 1999, tens of thousands of Czechs demanded a new government and early elections in the largest movement since the end of communism.\textsuperscript{35} Disillusioned with the political elite, protests called not only for the resignation of Milos Zeman but also for the ouster of CDP’s leader Vaclav Klaus. Klaus and Zeman dismissed the movement as irrelevant, but nevertheless, responding to growing public and political demands for change, the CDP felt compelled to rescind the informal agreement with Zeman and to consider ways to replace the minority Social Democrat government—an unlikely option given the fractured political makeup of the Czech parliament.\textsuperscript{36} Indeed, by early 2000 the two parties once again reached agreement on a plan, which would keep the minority Social Democratic government in power.\textsuperscript{37}


\textsuperscript{35}“Thousands of Czechs Rally to Demand New Leadership,” \textit{Reuters} (3 December, 1999).

\textsuperscript{36}\textit{Reuters} (17 December, 1999).

\textsuperscript{37}“Czech Opposition Party Backs Deal to Save Government.” \textit{Reuters} (25 January, 2000).
Coalition governments and informal agreements provided a framework of political arrangements that ensured the stability of the transition process in the years following the Velvet Revolution. These political arrangements, however, worked as long as the reform was delivering and the institutions were performing. Although the Social Democrats and Civic Democrats were willing to maintain informal agreements to support each other's minority governments, the inability of Klaus' and Zeman's governments to press with reform and deliver on promises and expectations ultimately delegitimized the deals between the two largest political parties. In the final account, the inter-party informal agreements have been a mixed blessing for the institutionalization of the Czech political system. On the one hand, informal deals mark parties' acceptance of the need to provide other players with stakes in the system and indicate their ability to work in an environment of diffused power. Nevertheless, the informal deals in Czech politics after 1996 proved no substitute for effective politics. Although the agreement between Zeman and Klaus provided workable conditions for minority governments, the success of each government was ultimately contingent on the substance and success of its policies. In other words, in the context of a pluralistic political system not dominated at any time by single political party agreements proved a necessary but not sufficient factor for a stable transition.

The willingness of Czech political parties to negotiate, compromise, and conclude functional agreements was facilitated by institutional conditions, which did not exist in Bulgaria. From the very beginning of the transition in Czechoslovakia, dominant groups and individuals held strong "anti-politics" views. Conflicts were seen as "politics" and

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38 The provisional government set after the collapse of the communist regime and the government formed after the first post-communist elections in 1990 were broadly based as well and relied on the support of diverse groups and parties.
thus to be avoided. Milos Calda observes that as early in the transition as the roundtable talks, the anti-communist opposition was concerned more with the issue of parity in transitional institutions—between Czechs and Slovaks, communists and anticommunists, those with party affiliation and those without—rather than with eliminating the communists as a political force. Indeed, in a stage of the roundtable talks when the opposition had to choose an electoral system, Havel rejected a majoritarian model fearing that the dominant position of his Civic Forum would enable it to win almost all the seats in parliament. Before the collapse of communism, Czech dissidents never voiced interests in control of government. Instead Charter 77 and the Czech dissident movement developed into an alternative framework of social life, a "second polis" which existed separate but parallel to the state. Following the end of the communist rule, the former dissidents did not initially seek to institute a new political power structure, which would establish control over state, economy, and society. Therefore, leaders and groups in Czechoslovakia tended to easily accept and accommodate newly emerging groups and leaders.

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39 See Calda.


42 Linz and Stepan observe that Havel and his closest associates' style was not only anti-political but also anti-institutional as little attention was paid to formal institutional matters in the transition period. See Linz and Stepan, 331.
In addition, the constitutional context in Czechoslovakia in the transition period further enabled the emerging Czech political parties to adopt non-confrontational behavior and rules of the game. At the federal level following the first free elections, Civic Forum, Public Against Violence, and the Slovak Christian Democratic Movement formed a coalition government. To enact constitutional amendments and other major legislation required a three-fifths majority both in the Chamber of the People and in the Chamber of the Nations. Under Slovak political pressure, one of the first tasks of the Federal parliament was to define the divisions of powers between the federation and the two constituent republics. Accordingly, talks between the federal government and the governments of the two republics took place from August to December 1990, culminating in the adoption by the Federal Assembly of a constitutional amendment on power sharing. Although Czech parties failed to redefine the federation, which ultimately determined its demise, the experience of dealing with Slovak counterparts socialized them in the politics of accommodating multiple interests.

The dominance of instrumental rather than fundamental politics--consensus on the ends, but political struggle over the means. Czech politics emerged as much more pragmatic than Bulgaria's. Despite the presence of ideological rhetoric, parties tend to be pragmatic in a polity in which even anti-system parties are gradually socialized in the rules of the game. Like in Bulgaria, the Czech party system was formed along a left-

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44Of course, this relatively non-confrontational mode of political behavior did not prevent the federation from splitting apart at the end of 1992.

right axis. Yet, public and elite preferences never gravitated toward the extreme ends of the axis. Data presented by Michal Klima indicates that the early transformation of the Czech political system was dominated by a centrist orientation. Later, with the advent of market and political reforms, and the disintegration of the Civic Forum, both the public and the political elite moved in a markedly right direction, a development manifested in the election to the Parliament of right-of-center political parties in 1992. Klima observes that even after the consolidation of the Czech political system and the return of centrist tendencies, overwhelming public preferences for the right-of-center orientations remained a stable phenomenon. Recent public opinion polls seem to suggest that these preferences remain stable.

Most contemporary political parties in the Czech Republic seem to gravitate to the center of the right-left axis. Most are to the right on economics and liberal on liberty-authority issues. Of course, one should not overstate the similarities between political parties. The two major Christian parties, while committed to a free market, defend the role of the Church and religious values in social and political life and favor property restitution questions. The Social Democrats, in contrast to the center-right parties, while tending toward the market, favor more state involvement. The differences among the majority of mainstream parties, however, do not lead to intense political confrontations of

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47Only approximately 20 percent of deputies identified themselves with the left while the rest placed themselves in the center and on the right along the left-right axis. See Klima, 498.

48"Right and Center Orientation Prevailing Among Czechs." *Czech News Agency* (12 April, 2000).

49Olson, 183.
the type that stalled the formation of a stable institution in Bulgaria and postponed economic reform.

There are several factors that may go a long way in explaining the relative lack of confrontation between political parties in the Czech Republic and their gravitation toward the center of the right-left axis. Geoffrey Evans and Stephen Whitefield hypothesize that in countries as the Czech Republic, characterized by relatively advanced economic development, high ethnic homogeneity, and stable borders, attitudes toward the market are likely to be the most significant dimension in the structure of political cleavages.\textsuperscript{50} Where socio-economic issues dominate the basis of partisanship, the potential for consensus at mass and elite levels is more likely than in societies where ethnic divisions and questions of borders and national identity are central to the structuring of political cleavages. Indeed, political parties in the Czech Republic, from early on in the transition, focused their discourse and partisanship mainly on economic issues.\textsuperscript{51} The main issues of contention were related to economic reform, privatization and the associated corruption, and the general role of the state in the market.

Even over economic issues Czech political parties adopted a much more pragmatic approach than their political discourse might suggest. In the first eight years of economic reforms, despite Vaclav Klaus' neoliberal rhetoric, the government implemented policies that seemed to satisfy all politically significant interests and ensured that none of them would undermine reforms and newly established institutions.


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In contrast to Bulgaria, the political elite who designed the transformation policies in the Czech Republic was newly formed and liberal, and was not connected with the old communist elite and the associated managerial class that presided over the economy. In fact, the communist party failed to transform into a significant political player with any real impact on the political and economic transformation. Indeed, in this respect the Czech Republic is unique in Eastern Europe, as it produced the only genuine social-democratic party, the CSSD, which has no roots in the old communist party.

The new political elite embarked on quick privatization aimed at precipitating the formation of powerful interests that might have prevented it. The lack of presentation of the old political and economic class in the new leadership, however, made a conflict between reformers and managerial class inevitable. Recognition of the significance of the hurdle the old economic elite might pose to the reform convinced the reformers to provide the managerial class with stakes in the market. Indeed, the old economic elite acquired control over almost half of the enterprises and maintained their managerial jobs. The privatization of big businesses was accompanied by the restitution of old assets confiscated after the communist takeover in 1948 and the auctioning of small enterprises.

Despite Vaclav Klaus' neoliberal rhetoric, the first Czech governments attempted to satisfy various interests in their pursuit of comprehensive reforms. From the beginning of the transition, the government embarked on policies designed to build a market economy while implementing social democratic policies to maintain basic living standards and alleviate the negative consequences of transition. Indeed, as Maark Tomass observes, although the neoliberal ideology takes credit for the success of the Czech


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transition. much of the economy was controlled by the government.\textsuperscript{53} It must be noted, of course, that state control is not in itself instrumental for a successful economic and social transformation as the Bulgarian case only too conspicuously illustrates. The Czech reformers, however, used the power of the state to stir the reform and ensure that all concerns of diverse social and political interests in the society are addressed by governmental policies. Hence, the transition to a market economy was not challenged by old elites—however weak the political elite might have been—and the society as a whole. In the economic sphere the trade unions did not have reason to protest, and in the political sphere until 1998, the society did not see reasons to demand dramatic changes in the mode of transition.

Foreign and defense policies are even less contentious areas of political discourse. Daniel Nelson and Thomas Szayna observe that security and defense issues have a low priority and marked indifference among the electorate. Similarly, the political elite, missing the incentive for political gains, rarely engages in debates on security and the military.\textsuperscript{54} The uninterrupted rule of the Civic Democrats, their allies, and President Havel ensured a high degree of continuity in foreign and defense policy. As early as April 1993, the Parliament received and noted principle guidelines for foreign policy including progressive engagement and membership in the European Union, NATO, and the WEU.\textsuperscript{55} On security policies in particular, the Czech political elite sees NATO as the

\textsuperscript{53}Ibid., 322.


only institution capable of ensuring the state’s security. Had and Handl identify some differences among the elite on the timing and methods of achieving NATO membership. These differences, however, did not dilute the existing unanimity that NATO remained the Czech Republic’s main security goal. When the state was invited to join the Alliance in 1997, no political controversies and divisions were generated by either the public or the political elite. Consequently, the ascent to power of the Social Democrats did not in any substantial way change the state’s foreign and security policies.

Inclusiveness of political society—degree of participation of diverse social and ethnic groups. The disintegration of the communist regime in Czechoslovakia brought about an explosion of political and social mobilization and participation. The emerging institutions, however, were able to channel a growing number of diverse interests and demands. Newly evolving groups were gradually socialized in the rules of the game and accommodated institutionally. After peacefully solving its political, institutional, and national conflict with the Slovak part of the federation by way of peaceful separation, it seemed that unlike most other East European countries, the Czech political system would avoid the potentially divisive problem of accommodating ethnic and national minority interests. Most authors point to the high ethnic homogeneity of the Czech Republic as a positive factor in the country’s transition and institutional consolidation. The absence of restive minorities in the country or Czech diaspora in neighboring states is seen as

56Ibid, 139-40.

57During the Kosovo crises in 1999, the Czech Republic irritated the Alliance by publicly proposing to mediate in the conflict and it appeared that the national foreign policy elite did not speak with one voice on the conflict. This lack of consistency toward the crisis, however, did not in any way signify departure from the state’s foreign and security priorities and policies.
eliminating the potential for intense political confrontation fed by interests defined by distinct ethnic or national identities. The stable institutionalization of the political system was assured by the ability of institutions to absorb new groups and by the receptivity of the groups to these institutions. Minority ethnic groups are seen by most authors as hard to accommodate by political and social systems traditionally unresponsive to their distinct demands and interests.

The capacity of Czech institutions to absorb new groups has been challenged by late 1990s in the emergence of the Roma problem. After the collapse of the communist regime, the Romanies—a minority traditionally discriminated against and just over 2 percent of the population—did not manage to achieve any politically meaningful organization that would have enabled them to seek political power and participation. Although 32 Roma political parties existed none of them gathered enough votes to send deputies to the Parliament. The lack of political representation only compounded the social, economic, and legal problems the Romanies encounter in the Czech Republic. The disintegration of the communist regime and the subsequent transition toward democracy and a market economy destroyed previously the existing pattern of relationship between the society and the Roma minority. Romanies have been the hardest hit by the ensuing political, social, and economic transformations. Although the unemployment rate has been remarkably low for a country in profound economic transition, almost two-thirds of the Roma are unemployed due to a lack of essential skills, minimal education, and professional motivation. Socially, Romanies suffer from overt public discrimination and

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are often victims of racially motivated attacks. Even more significantly, from an institutional point of view, the new Czech citizenship law is intentionally designed to exclude the Roma who were previously citizens of the federation until 1993.

One of the most dramatic consequences of democratization in Eastern Europe was the emergence of ethnic identities as an instrumental factor in political mobilization. Ethnic groups, already holding distinct identities and interests, organized for political action and placed demands for inclusion in the newly emerging institutional framework. Often the failure of bargaining elites to include and accommodate these groups resulted in the most disruptive consequences in transition processes. The Romany minority, however, did not organize along a distinct group identity because, as Siklova and Miklusakova point out, "they lack a common, consciously shared identity." The overwhelming majority in the group does not claim Roma nationality and identity although that option has been available since 1991. The lack of a common language and the dominance of family ties in the framework of social and economic interactions have further prevented Romanies from achieving any form of organized political and social action. Not surprisingly, the minority had no unified concept of its identity and proper cultural, social, and political roles under the conditions of democracy. Neither the government nor various Roma organizations have clear visions about the policies needed to address the problem of accommodation. What is important from the institutionalization point of view, however, is that at least until 1997, the Roma minority did not present a

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significant predicament in the process of incorporating newly mobilized groups into the institutional framework.

It was only in 1997 that the Czech Republic witnessed the emergence of the Roma minority as a separate dimension in the transition. As thousands of Romanies tried to immigrate to the West and there appeared more frequent reports of racist practices, the government came under intense international scrutiny. The Canadian government, responding to an influx of Czech Romanies, imposed visa requirements for all Czech citizens; some Western European governments threatened to follow suit, and the European Union criticized the state for failing to address the legal, social, and economic status of the minority. The debate reached embarrassing proportions when the city council of Usti nad Labem erected a wall to separate Roma council apartments from private apartments. Only after the government and international community intervened did the local council agree to demolish the wall. The incident marked the evolution of the status of Romanies into a more prominent dimension of institution building in the state. President Havel called for a wider social debate on the issue and the European Union defined the treatment of Romanies as a key problem in the Czech quest for membership in the Union.61 It appears that after seven years of relatively unproblematic institutional accommodation of newly mobilized groups, the problem of the Romany Czechs gained the potential of creating disruptive new cleavages in the pattern of party competition at the elite level. Furthermore, a future division at the elite level will be mirrored in a similar base of partisanship among the public. Indeed, as the analysis of Evans and Whitefiled indicates, along with the issue of social values, attitudes toward Romanies “constitute the main aspect of a still weaker but still significant second dimension” of

It remains to be seen whether the Roma issue will emerge as a significant problem in the process of institutionalization. It can be hypothesized that the failure of the Romany community to mobilize for political and social action can only be offset by sustained and robust intervention by international actors, the European Union in particular.

**High public commitment to the fundamental values and procedural norms of the state's constitutional system.** Compared to public attitudes in Bulgaria, people in the Czech Republic were much more positive about politicians and officials in the transition period. An overwhelming majority declared that politicians and officials' behavior has improved since the communist era. Support for the principles of democracy and its practice, a market economy, privatization, and multi-party system was near universal. The public exhibited a high approval of the current and future regime (Tables 4 and 5), a common trend in most East European countries.

The performance of the regime seemed to have no significant impact on the legitimacy of democracy in the country. Indeed, when the political system and society began to experience economic downturn, political stalemate, and lack of political accountability on the part of the political elite, the public grew dissatisfied with the performance of the regime and the direction of the country (See Tables 2 and 9). On the other hand, these negative attitudes did not undermine the stability of democracy's legitimacy.

What accounts for the relatively high level of legitimacy is the high level of public trust in democratic institutions, despite the presence of dissatisfaction with their

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62 Evans and Whitefield. 126.

63 Grodeland.

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performance. Indeed, in the Czech Republic democratic institutions enjoyed significantly higher levels of public trust compared to Bulgaria (See Table 1). Richard Rose and his associates observe that trust in democratic institutions is associated with support for the new regimes in Eastern Europe.\textsuperscript{64} Trust is also associated with the rejection of authoritarian forms of political organization. In the Czech Republic relatively high levels of public trust in political and civil institutions seems to boost the regime's legitimacy. Another factor that accounts for the legitimacy of the regime is the Czech Republic's historical experience, unique among East European countries. In the inter-war period, the country was a constituent part of Czechoslovakia, a country with a lively democratic system and participatory political tradition.

It must be noted, however, that the Czech Republic experienced a significantly lower level of political, social, and economic instability compared to Bulgaria and Lithuania, and thus public attitudes have not been tested by unsatisfactory regime performance. It remains to be seen what would be the effect of the late 1990s political and economic crisis on democracy's legitimacy. For the most part of the transition, the country achieved a high level of accommodation of diverse interests seeking participation and satisfaction. The Czech Republic was the East European country with the lowest level of political and social confrontation. The economic and political crisis of the late 1990s, however, exposed the fragility of the achieved consensus and challenged the regime capacity to easily address the interests of all social and political groups.

\textsuperscript{64}Rose, et al., *Democracy and its Alternatives*. 155.
Two-turnover test. Formally, Lithuania meets the two-turnover test. Since its independence in 1991, Lithuania has held three parliamentary elections in 1992, 1996 and 2000 in which different political parties gained majority in the parliament and formed governments. However, it can be argued that even before seceding from the Soviet Union, the republic achieved a relatively high degree of political pluralism. The 1989 elections to the USSR Congress of People’s Deputies and the 1990 elections to the Lithuanian Supreme Soviet witnessed competition between various political formations, including the Lithuanian Communist Party, the nationalist Sajudis movement, and other nascent political parties. In fact, Sajudis, a mass nationalist movement seeking Lithuania’s independence, emerged as the dominant group in 1989 by winning 36 of the 42 seats to the Congress. A year later, in the first pluralistic national elections to the Lithuanian Supreme Soviet in February 1990, Sajudis-backed candidates won 80 percent of the seats. The former communist party (renamed Lithuanian Democratic Labor Party [LDLP] in December 1990) gained only 25 seats against 99 for Sajudis.65

These initial competitive elections were dominated by the question of Lithuania’s independence from the Soviet Union. The communist party, led by Algirdas Brazauskas, favored a slow approach to achieving independence as the most realistic policy to ensure peaceful secession. Conversely, Sajudis, led by Vytautas Landsbergis, centered its campaign on the promise of speedy and unconditional independence. Accordingly, on the

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eve of the overwhelming Sajudis electoral victory, the new Parliament voted on March 11, 1990 to restore the sovereignty of Lithuania.\textsuperscript{66}

After the abortive August 1991 coup in the Soviet Union, both Moscow and the international community recognized Lithuanian independence. Once the issue of political sovereignty and secession was finally settled the electorate turned their attention to the pressing issues of economic and institutional reform and at the same time increased their expectations about the ability of state and political institutions to deliver the economic and social dividends of the newly acquired independence. Not surprisingly, the inability of the ruling Sajudis to stabilize the disintegrating economy, continued political stalemate in parliament, and the inability of governmental institutions to implement even basic reforms brought about changes in public perceptions and voters brought the former communists back to power. In the 1992 elections the LDLP won a landslide victory in the new 141-seat Sejma by capturing 77 seats compared to only 13 for Sajudis.\textsuperscript{67}

Notwithstanding, this remarkable, in the context of East European transition politics, return of ex-communists to power, the 1992 parliamentary elections marked the advent of fully competitive electoral politics.


The LDLP went on to govern alone but faced formidable challenges in trying to build a market economy and meet citizens' economic and social expectations. Although the LDLP succeeded in bringing a measure of economic stability, the nationalist forces (now reorganized as the Homeland Union-Lithuanian conservatives, or the HU-LC) led by Landsbergis won the 1996 parliamentary elections by capturing 51.1 percent of the seats and forming a government in coalition with the Christian Democratic Party (CDP) who won 14 seats, the second largest number. The LDLP came forth winning only 11, or 8.8 percent of the seats.

Lithuania's parliamentary elections in October 2000 marked the ascent to power of a new political coalition including the center-right Liberal Union which won 34 seats, the center-left Liberal Union of Social Liberals with 29 parliamentary seats and several smaller parties. The left-leaning Social Democratic Coalition led by Algirdas Brazauskas and including the LDDP, Social Democratic Party, New Democratic Party and Russian Union of Lithuania won 51 seats. The Home Union of Landsbergis suffered the biggest slip in support and gained only 9 seats.\(^{68}\)

In addition to the three post-independence parliamentary elections, Lithuania held regular and free presidential and local elections which further institutionalized the electoral process as an essential component of the political process. These elections were seen by all political players as legitimate and their results were not challenged. Consequently, in the initial phase of transition, the parliament became the crucial instrument of system transformation. Indeed, political parties played marginal role until

\(^{68}\) For complete results see Terry D. Clark and Nerijus Prekevicus, “First We Take Vilnius. Then We Take Palm Beach,” *Central Europe Review* 2, no. 41 (27 November, 2000). Available from http://www.ce-review.org: INTERNET.
after the 1992 parliamentary elections, which fostered the creation of a more consolidated party system.

Initial agreement among all sectors of society on the fundamental rules of the political game. Lithuania's model of institutional transformation is similar to the process of democratization in the rest of Eastern Europe. The institutional structure was built through negotiations between the extricating communist elite and the newly emerging opposition. The initial phase of transition to independence and democracy was short and consensual. The emerging organized opposition, led by the mass movement Sajudis, and the reform communists, led by Brazauskas, quickly reached an agreement on the need to achieve Lithuania's independence and build a new political system. Indeed, when Sajudis emerged in 1988 it represented a coalition between reform communists and non-communists formed as support for Soviet leader Michael Gorbachev's policies of glasnost and perestroika. Sajudis was formed in the Lithuanian Academy of Science by intellectuals pressing for changes in the Lithuanian Soviet Socialist Republic constitution needed to accommodate Gorbachev's reforms. Consequently, Sajudis grew and became a mass organization, holding public meetings and establishing relations with all informal organizations in the republic.

As in the case of Czechoslovakia, but unlike in Bulgaria, the newly organized opposition in Lithuania built upon a long tradition of widespread dissident movement. Military resistance against Soviet occupation in the 1940s, a mass nationalist movement including not only the elite but also lower social echelons, religious dissident activities, lively underground literature, and sometimes massive demonstrations and protests

69 See Vardys and Sedaitis, 100-5.

70 On the dissident movement see Vardis and Sedaitis. 80-100.
defined Lithuania as one the most anti-Soviet and anti-communist nations in Eastern Europe. Not surprisingly Gorbachev's policies of enlightened socialism presented Lithuania with a window of opportunity for political change: both Sajudis and the LCP began to push for constitutional and institutional changes that would accommodate glasnost and perestroika. Very soon, however, these demands were swept away by much more radical demands for political independence and democratization. In 1988 and 1989 Sajudis sponsored mass demonstrations and began to mobilize millions of Lithuanians into a national resistance movement. The Lithuanian communists had to choose between trying to moderate the emerging nationalist agenda and risk becoming politically irrelevant in the process, or joining the growing movement. By choosing to stay politically relevant and reformist, Brazauskas' party maintained the ability to negotiate and reach consensus with Sajudis. By joining the nationalist movement, the LCP also ensured that no significant national political force would resist the process of institutional transformation and significantly limited the likelihood of violent challenges to reforms emanating from local political forces.

The LCP and Sajudis' control over the nationalist and reformist movement in the initial phase of transition was by no means certain at the beginning. In late 1989 and early 1990 numerous political parties and movements appeared, some of which claimed to be a continuation of inter-war political formations, including the Democratic, the Christian Democratic, and the Social Democratic parties. One of these parties, the Lithuanian League, represented a formidable challenge to Sajudis in the process of capturing the loyalties of a newly mobilized population and formulating the agenda of the opposition.

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71 On Lithuania's party system see Algis Krupavicius, "The Post-communist Transition and Institutionalization of Lithuania’s Parties," Political Studies 46, no. 3 (Special issue, 1998): 465-491.
The League—consisting of long-time political dissidents, anti-Soviet partisans, deportees, and political prisoners—emerged in 1987 and adopted a radical program of Lithuanian independence and anti-communism. While Sajudis was careful to present its program as part of Gorbachev’s policies of glasnost and perestroika, and refused (at the insistence of Brazauskas) to include in the official resolution of its October 1988 founding congress any reference to secession from the Soviet Union, the League demanded immediate independence claiming that Moscow was illegally occupying the country. In addition the League rejected Sajudis’ cooperation with the LCP and called for a boycott of Soviet elections and politics. Although by 1990 the League of Lithuania had lost its popularity, its short-term impact was to radicalize Sajudis and shift the political debate and agenda to achieving national independence.

The radicalization of Sajudis marked the beginning of a process of polarization between the movement and the LCP. Initially the communist party kept up with the rapidly mobilizing populace by promoting reform within the party and in the society. Algirdas Brazauskas, a communist reformer, was elected the leader of the LCP in the fall of 1988 to replace Rigaidas Songaila, who represented the wing of the party which opposed reforms in the Soviet Union. Consequently, the party embraced many of Sajudis’ goals and demands. Following the shock of the 1989 elections, the LCP and Sajudis reached a consensus to make major changes to the national constitution, including making Lithuanian the official language, increasing national authority over the economy, allowing the Catholic Church to operate openly, and abrogating the communist party’s monopoly of power. However, these popular acts by the communist-controlled Supreme Soviet did not significantly increase the party’s popularity among the public as it also had

\[72\]Vardys and Sedaitis, 111-13.
to accommodate Moscow's demands for restraint on the rapidly radicalizing Lithuanian politics. Brazauskas' party was in the uncomfortable position of balancing Moscow's threats to intervene and the need to establish itself as a legitimate party representing the aspirations of the nation. For example, under Moscow's pressure Brazauskas agreed not to declare the national law supreme, while assuring the public that radical constitutional changes might take place in the future. Sajudis saw the LCP's policy as going against the tide of public aspiration; consequently, the relations between the movement and the communists became strained.

The LCP defeat at the elections to the All-Union Congress of People's Deputies in 1989 and the prospects of losing the elections to the national Supreme Soviet exerted additional pressure on its leadership to embrace an even more radical reform agenda. To co-opt the masses Brazauskas began to press Moscow for greater autonomy of the republic and the LCP. By then, however, Gorbachev and the reformers, openly challenged by hardline communists' backlash against the policies of perestroika, were in no position to accommodate the Soviet republics' calls for further liberalization. In December 1989 Brazauskas and 80 percent of the party's membership broke with the Communist Party of the Soviet Union and established an independent Lithuanian Communist Party. The remaining pro-Moscow communists formed a separate communist party, the so-called "night party." Although Brazauskas successfully eliminated the pro-Soviet hard-liners from the party and decisively defined the LCP as pro-independence, in the 1990 elections to the Supreme Soviet Sajudis won 80 percent of the seats, sending 99 deputies to the Parliament compared to 25 for the reform communists.

73 Krickus, "Democratization in Lithuania," 297.
One of the most significant outcomes of the 1990 elections was that Sajudis and the LCP emerged as the two dominant political players able to determine the process of institutional transition, eliminating radical forces on the right as well as pro-Moscow formations on the left in the struggle to define the national agenda. The elections did not signify the end of cooperation between the two blocs. Sajudis and the LCP supported the declaration restoring Lithuania's independence and both advocated basic laws laying the foundations of a pluralistic political system. In addition, Sajudis shared the executive power by appointing reform communists to governmental positions, including Kazimiera Prunskiene as Prime Minister, while Landsbergis was elected Chair of the Supreme Soviet. What accounts for this relatively high degree of consensual politics was the question of independence, for even after the declaration of independence was accepted by the new parliament, neither Moscow nor the international community recognized Lithuanian sovereignty.

The Parliament came under enormous pressure to rescind the declaration of independence lest the Soviet Union impose sanctions. After Lithuania's refusal to reconsider, in April Moscow imposed economic sanctions. Dramatic deterioration of economic conditions due to the sanctions, intense international pressure, and the communists' support for a compromise with the Soviet Union convinced the parliament to freeze the declaration and to begin negotiations with Moscow. From the very beginning, however, Landsbergis aimed to stall the process and the talks did not go anywhere as both sides could not agree even upon the ground rules. Although Sajudis and the LCP continued to agree on independence as the ultimate goal, the ensuing confrontation with Moscow created the first significant split between the two parties. Dealing with Moscow and addressing the growing socio-economic problems caused by
the sanctions and the early transition to market relations, strained the ability of the political elite to maintain the consensual character of Lithuanian politics. Indeed, there emerged great differences not only between Sajudis and the LCP but also significant divisions within Sajudis. As early as the second half of 1990 the movement split into right-wing and left-wing. Sajudis Common Union and Sajudis Center, respectively. Many of the Sajudis deputies resented what was seen as the authoritarian leadership of Landsbergis, and began to form separate factions which threatened the movement’s majority in parliament. While at its inception Sajudis included individuals who supported the general goals of perestroika as well as radical nationalists and anti-communists demanding independence, the confrontation with Moscow in 1990 radicalized the public opinion and helped radicals, especially forces associated with deputies from the city of Kaunas, to gain the upper hand in Sajudis. At the same time the LCP, while still unconditionally pro-independence, advocated a step-by-step approach to dealing with Moscow. This support was supported by Prime Minister Prunskiene who saw talks with Moscow as the only way out of the blockade and settling the question of independence.

In January 1991 the pro-Moscow organization Edinstvo and the “night party,” organized demonstration in support of Gorbachev’s declaration of his direct presidential role of the republic. Soviet paratroopers with the support of the KGB and the military tried to seize power but their attempt, met with the unified resistance of the public and political parties, failed. On February 9, 1991, Lithuanians voted in a referendum in support of Lithuania’s independence. After the August coup in Moscow failed, Yeltsin recognized the republic’s independence.  

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74 Norgaard, Hindsgaul, et al, 93.
75 For an excellent eyewitness account of the events see Krickus, Showdown.
The 1990-91 confrontation with Moscow exposed the fragility and inefficiency of Lithuania's institutional framework. While Sajudis and the reform communists agreed not to reintroduce the pre-war constitution there emerged no accord on the nature of the future basic law. Negotiations on the new constitution took place in the context of confrontation with Moscow and stalemate in parliament and government. The provisional constitution adopted after the March declaration of independence developed into paralyzing stalemates between government and parliament as both the chairman of the legislature and the prime minister had wide and untested authorities and powers and competed for supremacy in the conduct of relations with Moscow and in defining social and economic policies. However, the attempts of the right and Landsbergis to exert control over government and institution building were extremely weakened by the continuing fractioning of the Sajudis and its declining number of deputies. As a result, in 1991 the nationalist right gained control of the movement.

Attempts by the left and the right to develop functioning and effective policies inevitably led to political actions that tried to get around the inherent deficiencies of the interim constitution. As a result both sides accused each other of breaking the rule of law. The polarization of Lithuanian politics undermined any chances of finding a solution to the political impasse. Parliamentary walkouts became a common occurrence favored even by the nominally ruling Sajudis as its dwindling numbers in the Supreme Soviet hampered its ability to formulate policies and govern. At the same time the polarization was not offset by the appearance of any moderate center. There appeared to

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76 For examples of both sides' cavalier treatment of the constitution see Vardys and Sedaitis. 192-93.
be no political formation capable of creating a political base for any of the governing political institutions.

The only factor that moderated the confrontation between the left and right was the Soviet pressure on the republic. For all its volatile divisions, the two sides were briefly united during the January 1991 Soviet attempt to seize power in Lithuania and during the August coup of the same year. Once the question of independence was settled, however, the polarization and confrontation reached crisis proportions. In November 1991 Brazauskas’ party declared its formal opposition to the government.

Sajudis and the reform communists developed conflicting visions of how to overcome the political and institutional impasse. While Landsbergis and the right came to see early parliamentary elections and the creation of a strong, executive presidency independent from legislature as a way out of the stalemate, the left, both among the former communists and the opponents of Landsbergis, advocated the establishment of a strong parliament to balance what they came to see as Landsbergis’ authoritarian tendencies. The attempt to reach a compromise in the fractured parliament was greatly complicated as Sajudis continued in the spring of 1992 to split into new factions and the movement was reduced to a minority. Instead of trying to forge an alliance among the multiplying political groups in the parliament and negotiate the basic rules of the game, Sajudis took its chances with the voters by calling for a referendum on the future constitution. The referendum, conducted in the spring of 1992, calling for a constitution with a strong presidency dealt a serious blow to Landsbergis and his supporters as less than 51 percent of all eligible voters supported the right’s proposal. The defeat at the referendum motivated Sajudis to compromise on the constitutional design, and just in time for the early elections called by Landsbergis, the parliament produced a document.
assigning significantly less constitutional powers and authority to the future presidency than Sajudis hoped for. The draft document produced rather hurriedly—it was laden with references of statutes yet to be adopted, and provisions to be amended after approved by the electorate—represented a compromise between the pro-Landsbergis and anti-Landsbergis forces rather than a true social contract. The draft constitution was approved by the voters at a referendum on the day of the parliamentary elections in October 1992. The elections dealt another serious blow to Sajudis as the electorate soundly rejected the movement's policies sending only 14 of its deputies to the 141-seat Seimas compared to 77 for the Democratic Labor Party. The electoral swing from support for the nationalist right to support for the former communists was further represented by Brazauskas' election as the first post-Soviet era president in February 1993.

The adoption of a new constitution and the renewed mandate of the parliament after the 1992 elections did not change the pattern of political confrontation and abuse of the basic rules of the game. The left majority in the parliament frequently disregarded constitutional provisions and altered laws for short-term political gains. Sajudis, extremely weakened by the 1992 election results, once again resorted to walkouts and dilatory tactics. The strong rift between the LDLP and the right was reflected in the refusal of the left to include opposition deputies in the Seimas' elected offices.

Similar to the Czech Republic, but unlike developments in Bulgaria, the Lithuanian parliament emerged as the foci of institutional and political change in the transition period. Political parties played only a marginal role in the process as the society


78 "Lithuania Update," *East European Constitutional Review* 2, no. 3 (Summer 1993): 12.
lacked many of the requisites for a functioning party system. Another important feature of the party system in the transition phase is the emergence of a bipolar model, with the LDLP at one pole and Sajudis--later HU-LC--at the other. In fact, until the late 1990s the party system remained structured on the base of the initial divisions between the reform communists and the nationalist opposition. The 1992 and 1996 parliamentary elections failed to produce an effective centrist party. Instead, the LDLP and the conservatives dominated the political process and hardly allowed any political formation to moderate the existing political confrontation in the parliament. The lack of significant center parties in parliament precluded the emergence of cross-party alliances and cooperation that would have tempered the polarized stance and policies of the two dominant blocks. Although Sajudis after the 1990 elections and the LDLP after the 1992 elections went through a process of factionalization, the emerging new political formations failed to create a political alternative to the disappearing right and left governing majorities. Instead, the fractioning of the ruling parties became a recipe for parliamentary stalemate and political confrontation. The parliament elected in the 1996 elections did not seem to escape this pattern either. The fragmentation of the ruling conservatives has led to frequent government changes and confrontation between the Presidency, Seimas, and its Chairman.

The 1992 parliamentary elections also marked a starting point in the transformation and consolidation of the party system in Lithuania. It signaled the end of Sajudis as a mass national movement and its transformation into a political party. The refusal of Sajudis to participate in the elections as a political party signified the low degree of institutionalization of the party system in Lithuania. While in the Czech Republic the first free elections marked the end of the Civic Forum as a means of
political participation, the Lithuanian nationalist movement continued to rely on a mass, amorphous movement as an institution for aggregating interests and for political participation. Despite the constant process of fragmentation and factionalization of Sajudis in the 1990 parliament, the movement refused to consider its transformation into a political party built around a specific political program and a national structure. Not surprisingly, the movement had very little to show in terms of a comprehensive social, economic, and political agenda, and instead had to once again rely on anti-communist rhetoric to mobilize electoral support. In contrast to the 1990 elections, however, the voters were more interested in policies that would reverse the dramatic economic slump, and in any event doubted the ability of Sajudis to govern more effectively than during its previous term as a governing party.79

Meanwhile the LDLP, after losing the 1990 election, was able to transform itself into a modern and legitimate social-democratic party utilizing its existing Soviet experience and infrastructure. What accounts for the success of the reform communists in Lithuania is the communist party's high degree of legitimacy. In 1989-1990 the LCP was able to transform itself into a reform party and even support the emerging opposition in its demands for Lithuania's independence and democratization. In fact, the opposition contained many communists, including those in its elite. In addition, the communist party was able early on to eliminate hard-liners from its ranks by denying them material capacities and organizational support. A crucial advantage of the Lithuanian communist party compared with other republics' parties was the high percentage of Lithuanians in its ranks. Thus while in other Soviet republics the local communist party structures were

seen as imposed by the occupying Russians, in Lithuania it was seen as a national organization.80

During the rule of the LDLP, Lithuanian politics witnessed the gradual subsiding of polarized confrontation between the left and right in the parliament. Contrary to the fears of many in the West that the former communists would reverse the country's drive towards a market economy and democracy, the LDLP implemented, albeit at a slower pace, further policies that consolidated institutions and instituted fiscal and monetary stability and austerity. The inability of the central bank to hold the inflation at bay—caused to a great degree by constant political meddling and a split governing party—was addressed by the introduction of a currency board in March 1994. The currency board, an institution separate from the Central Bank, was committed to converting the national currency offered to the reserve currency, the US dollar, at a fixed rate. The currency board gradually brought about a great measure of stability to the market, significantly improved Lithuania's relations with the International Monetary Board and the World Bank, and most importantly, greatly limited the ability of political forces to meddle in fiscal and monetary polities. Thus the new institution not only brought some economic benefits but also eliminated an area of great political confrontation between left and right.

Another reason for the abating confrontation between the left and right in Lithuanian politics was the wide social and political consensus on the country's quest for European Union membership. The seven main political parties drafted and voted a statement emphasizing that integration into the EU was a top priority for the country and pledged to work toward achieving a membership. On June 12, 1995, Lithuania and the European Union signed an Associated Agreement, a first step in a process by which the

80See Krupavicius, 472.
country would eventually become a member of the Union. The agreement envisaged the gradual harmonization until 1999 of the national legislation with EU law. The negotiations and ensuing commitments brought a new urgency to the governing LDLP's pursuit of compromise with the opposition in parliament. In light of the Associated Agreement and the overwhelming public support for an EU membership, the opposition declared its readiness to participate in the negotiations and preparation of laws that would facilitate Lithuania's accession, including a constitutional amendment to allow foreigners to purchase land in the country. Only two small parties, the rightist Nationalist Union and the left-wing Peasant Party, refused to embrace such an amendment.

The process of subsiding political confrontation was further accelerated by the emergence in the late 1990s of a significant political center which further moderated the bipolar model. In the 1997 presidential elections the long-run hold on power by the LDLP and the HU(LC) was broken by the election of Valdas Adamkus, a U.S. emigree and former American environmental official. While LDLP and the HU(LC) supported former Prosecutor General Arturas Paulauskas and Speaker of Parliament Landsbergis respectively, Adamkus, backed by several smaller parties, refused to be a candidate of one party and sought wider support. Adamkus was elected as Lithuanian president defeating Paulauskas by less then one percent margin. The new President, while generally supportive of the HU(LC) policies, proved to be a moderating force

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83 After Landsbergis was eliminated at the first round, the HU(LC) made sure the LDLP candidate would not be elected president by throwing its support behind Adamkus at the second round.
constraining the excesses of the governing majority, not even hesitating to ask for the prime minister and ministers' resignations when he saw it fit.

Party realignment at the end of the 1990s further eroded the bipolar model of party politics and thus the level of confrontation. From the emergence of the party system in 1990 to 1999, politics were dominated by the struggle between the LDLP and Sajudis (later the HU(LC)). Three smaller parties, the Christian Democratic Party, the Center Union and the Social Democratic Party, were able to gain a significant share of parliamentary seats in the three post-independence elections, but were never able to challenge the two dominant parties. Continuing economic stagnation attributed to the Russian crisis of 1998 and major splits and realignments among well established parties created the conditions for the emergence of significant party alternatives to the previously dominant HU(LC) and the LDLP. The big winners of the Spring 1999 local elections were the relatively new Social Liberals and the revived coalition of the Peasants' Party and the Christian Democratic Union, while the HU(LC) came with the third largest number of deputies. The electoral success of the two parties indicated the voters' disillusionment with traditional parties and politics and the final coming of age of alternative the party system.

The dominance of instrumental rather then fundamental politics—consensus on the ends, but political struggle over the means. At least until 1999. Lithuania's party system was characterized by bipolarity with the LDLP on the left and Sajudis, later the HU(LC), on the right. Like in Bulgaria, the party system is rooted in the division between ruling elite and opposition at the initial phase of transition to independence and

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democracy. Accordingly, the resulting political left-right cleavages do not neatly correspond to concrete ideological platforms, but derive from the parties’ post-communist and anti-communist images. The left-right dichotomy has little meaning in national politics as the lines of divisions are not along the classical difference between collectivist and liberal policies. Indeed, ideological rhetoric aside, the left and right in Lithuanian politics share similarities in agenda and policies that assured a relatively high degree of continuity in the transition to a market economy and democracy.

As it was argued above, the question of secession from the Soviet Union brought Sajudis and the reformed communist party, the two dominant political players, close together as it was the most crucial aspect of Lithuanian’s transition. Both parties’ immediate agendas included independence, political, social and economic reform as common goals and objectives. The differences in programs pertained to the pace of change rather than to its desirability. For example, the former communists cautioned against Sajudis’ uncompromising manner of dealing with Moscow and demanded slower implementation of market reforms and more social protection of the affected masses.

Once the question of independence was settled in 1991, the electorate turned its attention to the immediate problems of the political, economic, and social transition, thus giving political parties a chance to distinguish each other by identifying and delineating political cleavages. Despite the increase in ideological rhetoric, the political left and right maintained a relatively high degree of program and policy similarities. Most parties, including the two dominant ones, displayed a cautious approach to market reforms, extensive provisions for welfare protection and social security, and very often they
formulated populist policies that ran against economic prudence and austerity.\textsuperscript{85}

Consecutive changes in ruling parties did not lead to a rupture in the pace and direction of institutional reforms and the implementation of marketization. Even more importantly, there emerged a wide-ranging consensus on the main rules according to which political conflicts are carried out. In other words, political players may disagree over particular policies governments should pursue, yet most parties agreed on the broad institutional structure and the ways authoritative decisions are formulated and implemented. Yet it must be noted that although the main political parties recognized the legitimacy of their opponents, the ruling majorities did not resist the temptation to exclude opposition parties from decision-making processes or to frequently change laws for the benefit of narrow party interests.\textsuperscript{86}

The primary cleavages in Lithuanian politics have not significantly threatened the consolidation of the institutional structures. Instead, they have been centered on differences in the pace and extent of market reforms; anti-communist and post-communists images; views of the past and relations with the Soviet Union and later Russia; church-state relations; and internationalism versus nationalism.\textsuperscript{87} While these cleavages sometimes bred virulent rhetoric and political gridlock, they did not question the legitimacy of the constitutional order and rules of the game. Even more, weakly

\textsuperscript{85}For an example of economic populism both in the right and left see Krickus, “Democratization in Lithuania,” 309; Peter Rutland, “A Year of Progress,” in Peter Rutland, ed., \textit{The Challenge of Integration} (Armonk, NY: M. E. Sharpe, 1998), 123.

\textsuperscript{86}Before the October 2000 parliamentary elections the conservatives changed the electoral law expecting to pick up more seats in the Seimas. See Mel Huang, “Changing the Rules at the Half,” \textit{Central Europe Review} 2, No 27 (10 July, 2000). Available from http://www.ce-review.org: INTERNET.

\textsuperscript{87}See Pettai and Kreuzer, 166; Krickus, “Democratization in Lithuania,” 309; Norgaard, Hindsgal, et al, 103; Rutland, 120.
institutionalized parties did not align political and social interests into cohesive cleavage structures and did not formulate consistent party programs or public policies. Therefore, political parties have sometimes been deeply split on many of the cleavage issues. The conservatives, for example, have long been divided on Lithuania's future and place in Europe with one faction insisting on the country's speedy modernization and incorporation in Euro-Atlantic structures. The other, more nationalist, faction demanded that Lithuanian should adopt the pre-war pastoral society and oppose Eastern as well as Western influences and entanglements.

Inclusiveness of political society--degree of participation of diverse social and ethnic groups. From very early on in its transition, Lithuania has demonstrated a liberal attitude toward political participation on the part of all ethnic groups. The status of the country's minorities, including 350,000 ethnic Russians and 300,000 ethnic Poles (out of the republic's 3.7 million residents), proved to be a non-confrontational issue as the Lithuanian parliament as early as November 1989 adopted a resolution granting all minorities, including post-World War II immigrants and their descendants, Lithuanian citizenship based on a simple application procedure. In addition, the Supreme Soviet passed a law on minorities guaranteeing the right to develop their culture, the use of minority languages in public areas and its use alongside Lithuanian, and the right of association. Later, in 1991, in an attempt to assure ethnic minorities, the parliament

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88 Although the process of party system institutionalization and stabilization of party elite accelerated discernibly in the period after the 1993 presidential elections the party system remained weak.


90 Vardys and Sedaitis, 212.
amended the law and guaranteed the right to schooling in one’s native language and its use in dealing with the government in areas with concentration of minorities. What accounts for the liberal attitude of the emerging elite and the masses to the integration of ethnic minorities is the relatively homogeneous ethnic character of the country. While in the Soviet Union, Lithuanians maintained their share of the republic’s population at around 80 percent, thus avoiding the fate of most other Soviet republics which witnessed massive influxes of Russian immigrants. Furthermore, after independence, Lithuanians accounted for almost 80 percent of the natural growth of population, securing the preservation of the existing ethnic balance.91

Ironically, it was the Poles, not the Russians, who had the more tense relationship with ethnic Lithuanians. A long history of uneasy and sometimes violent co-existence, which included both alliance and animosity between the two ethnic groups, created suspicion and apprehensions on the part of the Polish minority at the time of transition to independence. In the late 1980s, Sajudis failed to attract representatives of ethnic minorities as the presence of radical nationalists among its ranks assured the absence of appeal to Poles and Russians. The advent of Sajudis and its agenda was seen as encroaching on the rights and security of minority groups. Both minorities were generally opposed to the early reform attempts, including the establishment of Lithuanian as the official language and more economic independence from the Soviet Union. The Polish minority in particular came with demands of its own including administrative and cultural autonomy within Soviet Lithuania, more Polish education, and closer relations with Poland. To mobilize the minority, its leaders created in May 1989 a separate association of Lithuania’s Poles. The peak of the confrontation between the minority and the

independent movement came when the local Polish elite, joined by ethnic Russian bureaucrats in minority dominated districts, supported the January and August coups of 1991 and demanded the creation of an autonomous Polish republic in Lithuania. Authorities in Vilnus immediately suspended local government soviets during the August coup and established direct rule, further antagonizing minorities. Indeed, during the struggle for independence the only allies the Soviet leadership found in the republic were the leaders of the Polish minority, the Russian Yedinstvo, and a minority of hardline communists.

Since the emergence of a pluralist party system, the Polish minority has generally remained more active politically while the Russians chose to assert their rights and interests through social and cultural associations. A Russian party emerged in 1996 targeting the nine-percent strong minority but it gained only 1.63 percent of the vote. The Polish political parties, on the other hand, successfully mobilized their constituents and consistently won parliamentary seats in all elections. Krickus suggests that what accounts for the relatively lower political mobilization of the Russian minority compared with ethnic Poles is economic status. Employment and incomes figures comparing Russians and Lithuanians have indicated no difference in social status. Accordingly, ethnic Russians participate in the political process through established parties. Ethnic Poles, on the other hand, are disproportionately employed in industries hard hit by the

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93 Union of Poles won 2 percent in the 1992 elections and 2.9 percent in 1996 entitling it to 2.8 percent and .7 percent of parliamentary seats, respectively. See Pettai and Kreuzer, 157-58.

transition to a market economy and thus greatly vulnerable to social and economic
change. This, along with the interest to preserve ethnic identity, provides a powerful base
for political mobilization and autonomous participation.

With ethnic Poles’ political participation and further attempts by the state to
guarantee ethnic rights and freedoms addressed, a greater number Poles began to accept
Lithuania’s independence. A similar trend took place among ethnic Russians, although in
the mid-1990s still only a minority of them accepted independence.

There were also other political developments which went a long way towards
assuring the ethnic minorities in Lithuania and increasing their support for the
independent state. As noted above, during the transition to independence, Sajudis failed
to attract ethnic minorities among its ranks and files. Although Sajudis advocated
guaranteeing the rights and freedoms of ethnic minorities, and once in power continued to
promote legislation to that effect, its emotional nationalism and uncompromising attitude,
especially on the part of Landsbergis, during the negotiations with Moscow and Warsaw,
contributed to the feeling of insecurity among ethnic Russians and Poles. The elections of
the LDLP as a governing party and especially of Brazauskas as the President
contributed to the relaxation of inter-ethnic relations. Brazauskas and his party were able
to successfully negotiate the withdrawal of Russian troops from the country and
important treaties with Moscow and Warsaw which further addressed the uncertain
feelings of minorities which were still coping with their new status in a new state.

95 97 percent of the delegates to Sajudis’ founding congress were ethnic
Lithuanians.

96 Ever since Lithuania sought independence, Brazauskas has advocated a
conciliatory approach toward Moscow, seen as too powerful and important economically
to afford a tense relationship.
High public commitment to the fundamental values and procedural norms of the state’s constitutional system. Lithuanian public attitudes displayed many similarities with the ones in the rest of Eastern Europe. Dissatisfaction with the way democracy performs (See Table 2) does not appear to negatively affect support for the democratic regime and even the legitimacy of the current regime, however unsatisfactory its performance has been (See Tables 3, 4 and 5). Accordingly, there seemed to be an approval of the future democratic regime (See Table 5) which is associated with a better performing system, while the public felt unsatisfied with the development of democracy (See Table 2).

It must be noted that while the Lithuanian public seemed less satisfied with the development of democracy than the Czech’s, it expressed a significantly lesser dissatisfaction then the public in Bulgaria. On the other hand, the Lithuanian public displayed the least satisfaction with the direction of the country and with the respect of human rights (See Tables 9 and 10). This dissatisfaction, however, did not translate into a disapproval of democracy. As in the other two cases, the legitimacy of democracy is an autonomous variable: the public supported a market economy and accepted the present and future democratic system regardless of the performance of the current regime. Furthermore, strong support for democracy--like in the Czech Republic, but unlike in Bulgaria--existed along a low approval of either a military rule or restoration of the communist regime (See Tables 7 and 8). Yet, like Bulgaria, the Lithuanian public also displayed a high approval of the former communist regime and an acceptance of a strong leader ruling without parliament, thus exhibiting the instability of the public’s commitment to democracy (See Tables 6 and 11). The public also displayed the familiar almost everywhere in Eastern Europe low degree of confidence in the political
institutions, while political leaders and symbolic institutions, including the church and the presidency, enjoyed greater confidence.

Conclusion

In spite of having similar communist experiences and going through comparable phases of post-communist institution building, Bulgaria, the Czech Republic and Lithuania attained political systems of varying institutionalization (See Appendix 1). Measured by the two-turnover test, Bulgaria and Lithuania witnessed regular and free and fear elections in which no political party or coalition won consecutive elections. The Czech republic, on the other hand, did not meet the test, as only two parties, the CDP and Social Democrats in coalitions that included various smaller parties, formed governments after the 1992 parliamentary elections. Yet, this did not translate into authoritarian policies and the governments were almost always checked by effective opposition in the parliament as no governing coalition had comfortable majorities. Since 1996 all governing coalitions had no parliamentary majorities and had to conclude power-sharing agreements with opposition parties in order to form stable governments. Conversely, Bulgaria, although meeting the two-turnover test, witnessed successive weak governments; only the last UDF government, elected in 1997, stayed in office for the full term. In fact, a study of democracy in 17 East European states found that in the ten years since the first free elections, the average term of office of post-communist governments...
in Bulgaria is 9 months, while reaching 23 months for the Czech Republic and 15 months for Lithuania.\textsuperscript{97}

The differences between the three states are more significant in terms of the agreement among all sectors of society on the fundamental rules of the political game and the dominance of instrumental rather than fundamental politics. While the Czech Republic and Lithuania scored high on both scales, Bulgaria scored the lowest. The Czech political elite had the advantage of creating the fundamental rules of the political game, facing virtually no opposition from the communist elite as the communist party collapsed in late 1989 and had no meaningful political participation in the roundtable which created the new political regime. No organized political party dominated the process of early transition and only after the first elections did political interests begin to form political organizations. Thus political actors from early on reached a consensus on the rule of the political game and consequently no significant political interests questioned the established political order. Furthermore, in the latter part of the transition process and throughout the 1990s the dominant political actors did not differ significantly even on questions of instrumental politics. Therefore, the country did not experience dramatic changes in both in its domestic and international policies.

Similarly, the early transition phase in Lithuania witnessed a high degree of collaboration between the local communist party and the already powerful Sajudis opposition movement. Both parties were not only well organized and thus capable of negotiating as equals but they were forced to reach a quick consensus on the fundamentals of the new political regime as both of them saw Moscow as the significant

political challenge rather each other. As in the Czech Republic, both the LDLP and Sajudis emerged as legitimate political players seeking consensus on the fundamental political rules. In the latter part of the transition process and through the 1990s, however, the dominant political actors often sharply differed on the instrumental politics and the country witnessed both economic and political instability as reflected by the frequent change of government.

Bulgaria, in contrast, witnessed the most serious challenges to the emerging political order. The former communist party dominated the transition period and established rules of the political game that were later frequently challenged by political actors who had little say in their creation. Thus Bulgarian politics in the 1990s went through periods of political, social and economic instability as the major political actors often struggled over not only instrumental but also fundamental rules of the political game.

Instability in Bulgaria was also fed by the public which exhibited low approval of the developments in the country and was, more significantly, highly distrustful of the institutions of democracy. Similar sentiments were observed in Lithuania, although, it must be noted that negative public perceptions did not translate into open defiance on the streets as happened in early 1997 in Bulgaria. In both countries, the legitimacy of democratic institutions was relatively low and the approval of authoritarian alternatives relatively high. Conversely, the Czech Republic enjoyed relatively high public approval of democratic institutions, regardless of their performance. Even when in the rare cases the public was dissatisfied with political actors, the resulting protests were challenged into civic actions consistent with the established political rules.
Appendix I

Figure 1 represents an attempt to provide a rough comparison of domestic institutionalization on an ordinal scale from total domestic institutionalization to total lack of it. The figure measures the position of each country on the already discussed domestic variables. The three countries are ranked by summing the five variables by assigning values of 3 to the highest ranking on each variable, 2 to the next and 1 to the lowest ranking. In case two or more states share the same ranking, the states receive the same value on the 1-3 scale. The assigned values represent the countries' ranking for the period 1990-2000.

Institutionalization is estimated by using a 1-3 scale and assigning the value of three to the country which meets the two turnover test, has the highest degree of agreement on the rules of the game, has a political system in which instrumental rather fundamental politics are the norm, has a highest degree of inclusiveness of the political society, and its public has the greatest commitment to the constitutional system. The value of one is assigned to the country which scores lowest on each of the same variables.

Figure 1. Domestic Institutionalization

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variable</th>
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<th>(4)</th>
<th>(5)</th>
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<th>Average</th>
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<td>1</td>
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<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>2.2</td>
</tr>
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</table>

Note: Column headings are as follows: (1) Two turnover test; (2) Agreement on the rules of the game; (3) Instrumental rather than fundamental politics; (4) Inclusiveness of political society; (5) Public commitment to constitutional system.
Table 1.
Trust in Civil and Political Institutions
(seven point scale where 7 equals maximum trust and 1 equals maximum distrust)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
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<th>Czech R.</th>
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</thead>
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<tr>
<td>Parliament</td>
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<td>4.0</td>
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</tr>
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<td>Courts</td>
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<td>4.0</td>
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<td>Parties</td>
<td>2.5</td>
<td>3.7</td>
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<tr>
<td>Army</td>
<td>4.6</td>
<td>4.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Media</td>
<td>3.7</td>
<td>4.2</td>
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<td>Unions</td>
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<td>Private enterprise</td>
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<td>4.2</td>
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Table 2.
Satisfaction with Development of Democracy
(positive minus negative responses)

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Table 3.
Approval of the Creation of Market Economy
(approval minus disapproval responses)

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Source: Ibid.
Table 4.
Approval of Current Regime
(percentage of public)

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</table>

Note: Data for Lithuania in 2000. ethnic Lithuanians only.

Table 5.
Approval of Future Regime
(percentage of public)

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Note: Data for Lithuania in 2000. ethnic Lithuanians only.
Source: Rose and Haerpfer, 31: Rose, New Baltic Barometer II, 24; Rose, New Baltic Barometer IV, 52; Vitosha Research.

Table 6.
Approval of Former Communist Regime
(percentage of public)

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Note: Data for Lithuania in 2000. ethnic Lithuanians only.
Source: Rose and Haerpfer, 27: Rose, New Baltic Barometer II, 23; Rose, New Baltic Barometer IV, 50; Vitosha Research.
Table 7.
Approval of Restoring Communist Regime
(percentage of public)

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Note: Data for Lithuania in 2000. ethnic Lithuanians only.
Source: Rose and Haerpfer. 33; Rose. New Baltic Barometer II. 32; Rose. New Baltic Barometer IV. 52; Vitosha Research.

Table 8.
Approval of Military Rule
(percentage of public)

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Note: Data for Lithuania in 2000. ethnic Lithuanians only.
Source: Rose and Haerpfer. 35; Rose. New Baltic Barometer II. 32; Rose. New Baltic Barometer IV. 56; Alfa Research.

Table 9.
Approval of the Direction of Country
(approval minus disapproval responses)

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<td>28</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>-34</td>
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</table>

Source: European Union. Central and Eastern Eurobarometer.

Table 10.
Respect for Human Rights in the Country
(respect minus disrespect responses)

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</table>

Source: Ibid.
Table 11.
Approval of a Strong Leader. Ruling Without Parliament
(percentage of public)

<table>
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<tr>
<td>Lithuania</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>62</td>
<td>58</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: Data for Lithuania in 2000, ethnic Lithuanians only.
Source: Rose and Haerpfer, 37; Rose, *New Baltic Barometer II*, 32-33; Rose, *New Baltic Barometer IV*, 56; Vitosha Research.
CHAPTER V

INDEPENDENT VARIABLE INTERNATIONAL INTEGRATION

Chapter V evaluates the degree of international integration with the core for each of the three case studies. The first two sections describe the decision of the EU and NATO to integrate East European countries and the process to achieve these goals. The chapter evaluates each country's relations to the core in terms of integration in the EU, NATO, and economic interaction with core states, including trade and investments. Another section evaluates the stock of each country in terms of its neighbors' integration in the core.

The European Union

The changes in Eastern Europe in the late 1980s coincided with a very crucial phase in the European Community's history as the member states were striving to complete the single European market and finalizing plans for a monetary and political union. These processes marked the growing confidence of the member states in the EC's ability to be the cornerstone of a new European architecture. The Community with its history of addressing problems of security and stability through integration, economic and social development, and democracy, certainly possessed the right institution to include Eastern Europe in the process. Even before the collapse of communism, the Community agreed on a common approach to East European states; the approach was based on the belief that the promotion of democracy and reform would increase security
on the continent.\(^1\) On 9 June 1988 in Moscow the EC and the Council of Mutual Economic Assistance (CMEA)—an organization integrating the communist economies—initiated a declaration committing both sides to cooperation. Consequently, bilateral agreements were signed, encouraging economic cooperation in areas such as industry, agriculture, energy, transportation and environmental protection.\(^2\) Until 1988, the opening of relations between the Community and CMEA countries was not conditional on political reform in the communist countries. The beginning of change in some of the countries, however, led the Community to apply, for the first time, conditionality as a way to encourage reform in individual countries. In February 1990, the European Commission proposed to the European Council that potential aid to post-communist countries must fulfill several conditions, including commitment to the rule of law, respect for human rights, the establishment of a multiparty system, holding of free elections, and economic liberalization. In order to assist transformation in the states of Eastern Europe, the Community established the PHARE program and began to coordinate multilateral aid flowing to the countries.

Already by late 1989, it became apparent the East European countries demanded more intensive relations with the EC and most importantly, a membership in the Community. Accordingly, the established policies for dealing with the post-communist states—PHARE, aid programs and trade cooperation agreements—appeared insufficient to either address the new foreign policy objectives of the states in Eastern Europe or promote the Community’s vision of a new Europe. The new demands from the East.


\(^2\)Ibid. 54.
however, caused a short but dramatic debate on the Community's policy priorities. The dilemma was between an enlargement of the Community to include the countries of Eastern Europe or a process of further integration among the current members. This debate was resolved by proceeding with a deepening of the Community by creating a monetary union, further political integration, and designs for institutional reform to address the challenges facing the organization. To accommodate states of Eastern Europe, the Community proposed concluding associated agreements with individual countries without the promise of a membership. The associate agreements were called Europe Agreements and required that prospective associates meet basic economic and political conditions including democratization and transition to market economy. The Agreements provided the associated countries with trade concessions and other benefits that are normally associated with EU membership. Between 1991 and 1995, the European Union signed Europe Agreements with all ten East European countries.

Each Europe Agreement, adjusted for each country, established an institutional framework for political dialogue. It also provided for the establishment of a free trade area between the Community and the associated states as well as for financial support, and economic and cultural relations. The Europe Agreements, however, did not end the post-communist states' demands for Community membership. Finally, in June 1993, the European Council in Copenhagen agreed that the associates could join, provided they met some strict political, economic, and social conditions. The accession criteria, also known as the Copenhagen criteria, required that before gaining membership Europe Agreement countries had to achieve stability of institutions guaranteeing democracy, the rule of law, human rights and respect for and protection of minorities; the existence of a functioning

\[3\text{Ibid., 91.}\]
market economy as well as the capacity to cope with competitive pressures and market forces within the Union; and the ability to take on the obligation of membership including adherence to the aims of the political, economic and monetary union and the adoption of some 80,000 pages of laws, norms and standards that are in force throughout the EU, the so-called *acquis communautaire*.\(^4\) No timetable for accession was set up; that would depend on the progress in meeting the criteria. The European Council also established a structural relationship between the Community and the associated members, thus formalizing the burgeoning relationships with East European countries.

The setting of broad membership criteria by the Copenhagen European Council marked a departure from the previous Union's enlargements. Major integration treaties of the European Union, including Article O of the Treaty of Rome in 1957 (now Article 49 of the Amsterdam Treaty) did not determine specific criteria for membership in the organization. With the exception of the EC's southern expansion to Greece, Spain, and Portugal when the European Council insisted that prospective members need to respect human rights and maintain representative democracy, the expansion in 1973 and the most recent one in 1995 included countries with established democracies and market economies, so the organization had no reason to define membership conditions. An eventual eastward expansion of the EU to include the post-communist countries of Eastern Europe, however, caused the Union to face the prospect of incorporating rather diverse states exhibiting political, economic, and social levels of development significantly lower than the ones enjoyed in the Western societies. According to the European Union statistic agency Eurostat there is a huge variance in wealth between the

candidate countries, including the increasing poverty in 1997 in Bulgaria and Romania. GDP per capita, when measured according to the Purchasing Power Standard (PPS) method, varied from 23 percent of the EU average in Bulgaria (4,400 PPS) to 68 percent in Slovenia (13,000 PPS). In fact, the imminent enlargement facing the EU poses a unique challenge as it is without precedent in terms of its scope and diversity. As the East European countries are trying to join the Union, the organization itself is becoming more complex as it moves toward monetary and political union. In order to address this challenge and at the same time maintain the cohesiveness of the Union, the member states established strict criteria for membership while carefully avoiding commitment to a timetable for accession.

After recognizing East European countries as eventual future members, the Essen European Council in December 1994 embarked on a pre-accession strategy which provided the route plan for the integration of the associated states. The key element of the pre-accession strategy was the creation of a "structured dialogue" between the associated states and the EU institutions which would prepare the East European states for accession. It provided a framework in which associated states would become more involved in the EU activities--including the discussion of issues of common interests within the policy field of the organization, increasing familiarity with the process of decision making, and synchronizing policies ranging from home affairs to foreign and


6. The new members will increase the Union's territory by 34 percent and its population by 105 million.

security policies. The goal was to create a close working relationship between associated states and member states prior to the accession negotiations. It should be noted that the common foreign and security policy became an area where after 1994 the structural dialogue increasingly played an important role in integrating associated states’ international policies with member states by aligning themselves with statements, initiatives and joint actions in the framework of the EU’s Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP). The growing political and economic power of the EU boosted the feeling among member-states that the Union should create a more robust foreign and security identity. It was only natural that one of the first CFSP joint actions would involve Eastern Europe and more specifically the prevention and settlement of conflicts. In 1993, for instance, France’s proposal for a treaty to guarantee stability and peace in Europe was developed for that aim. The role of the treaty, called the Pact of Stability and signed in May 1994, encouraged parties to conclude good neighbor agreements covering the problems of borders and minorities, and set up regional cooperation agreements. In addition, the member-states invited in 1994 the associated countries and the Baltic states to join the Western European Union, the military arm of the EU, as associated partners. It is, however, difficult to evaluate the independent effect of these steps on the security status of the candidate countries as the WEU was virtually defunct and the Pact of Stability included recommendations and requirements already posed by the pre-accession process.

Following the Essen European Council, the interaction between the member states and associated states reached high levels and the Europe Agreements, the structured dialogue, and PHARE became the main tools at the EU’s disposal for helping associated

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8 See Karen Smith, 135-48.

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states achieve full membership in the Union. Indeed, the Madrid European Council in December 1995 clearly indicated that membership for the associated states was simply a matter of time and instructed the European Commission to produce opinions, also called *avis*, on the applicants in terms of how they satisfy the criteria for opening of negotiations. The Commission’s opinions were to be completed six months after the conclusion of the Intergovernmental Conference, a process to reform the Union’s institutions. The *avis* not only judge the applicants’ readiness for membership but also evaluate their ability to meet the membership criteria within the duration of negotiations. In other words, the *avis* provide a snapshot of a country’s preparedness for membership and the ability of the country to be ready for membership in the future.

The Commission published the opinions as part of a document, Agenda 2000, which looked at the future of the Union’s policies, its financial perspectives for the period 2000-2006, and the EU’s enlargement. It recommended that, on the basis of the Copenhagen criteria and membership applications from ten East European countries, negotiations be launched with the Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Poland and Slovenia. Agenda 2000 also established a financial framework for supporting the pre-accession process in the associated states, including EUR 21 billion for the period 2000-2006. The Luxemburg European Council in December 1997 approved the Commission’s Agenda 2000 and decided to start negotiations with the five recommended

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9 The opinions, also known as *avis*, are based on information and analyses provided by the applicants themselves. Commission’s experts, international institutions, academics and various parts of the policy-making community. See, Heather Grabbe and Kristy Hughes, *Enlarging the EU Eastward* (London: Royal Institute of International Affairs, 1998), 42.

countries. It also allocated financial assistance to the remaining five associated states in the amount of EUR 100 million to help them catch up with the first wave countries. In March 1998, the negotiations with the first countries officially began. The Commission also began a process of detailed evaluation or screening of the situation in all ten countries in relation to Union legislation and the second and third pillars of the Treaty of the European Union. The aim of screening was to help applicant countries increase their understanding of the Union’s institutional framework and assist them in identifying the issues they need to address as they adopt the *acquis*.\(^\text{11}\)

In November 1998 the Commission presented the initial evaluation reports of progress made by each of the applicants toward membership. The reports set out to analyze the progress made by each candidate in implementing the *acquis* and the adoption of reforms in light of the Copenhagen criteria. Assuming the obligation of membership, the ability to take on the *acquis* and adherence to the aims of the union became the fundamental requirements evaluated by the Commission. The evaluation reports were to become an important indicator of the countries’ progress toward membership and more specifically of the extent to which national institutions and processes were approximating those of the Union’s. Following the publication of the first Commission’s opinions on the progress of applicants in 1997, the EC submits annual Regular Reports to the European Council on further progress of each country.

The Helsinki European Council in December 1999 decided to open accession negotiations in 2000 with a second group of applicants including Bulgaria, Lithuania, Latvia, Slovakia and Romania. It must be noted that while the Commission’s reports on

the progress made by the first group of applicants found that they were able to take on the obligations of the *acquis* in the medium term if they pursued their preparatory efforts vigorously. Some of the countries in the second group were unable to meet all the Copenhagen criteria in the medium term. The Council also announced plans to convene another Intergovernmental Conference in 2000 to reform the Union's institutions to meet the requirements of enlargement.

The actual accession negotiations take the form of bilateral intergovernmental conferences between the member states and each of the applicants. Following the screening process conducted by the European Commission, negotiations are opened with each candidate on the *acquis communautaire*, which is divided into 31 chapters (for instance, company law, energy, external relations, and others). The Commission proposes and the member states approve unanimously a common negotiating position on each chapter. Negotiating sessions are held at the level of chief negotiators for the applicant countries and permanent representatives for the member states.

The European Union has also explicitly addressed the problem of security in Eastern Europe. Although international relations theory still debates whether democracy promotes stability and peace, the Union seemed convinced, very shortly after the collapse of communism, that the promotion of democracy in the East would engender security. The EU does not see itself as a traditional type of security institution as the organization's unsuccessful intervention in the civil wars in Yugoslavia attested. Only after the Cold War has the European Union tried to create a stronger common defense and security

\[\text{12For the full list of chapters see, European Commission, *European Union Enlargement*, 35.}\]

\[\text{13On the EU's view on the relationship of democracy and security see Karen Smith, 135-38.}\]
identity by institutionalizing its pattern of foreign and security cooperation, CFSP, or the second pillar of the Union as set out in Article 11 of the Treaty of Amsterdam—and agreeing on the creation of a Rapid Reaction Force by 2003. However, because the CFSP remains so limited, most of the discussions of traditional security matters still take place within the context of NATO.

Nevertheless, the Union has proved to be successful in preventing conflicts from erupting in the first place. Political, economic, and social integration and the promotion of development and democracy—the main strengths of the EU project—have promoted significant change in Europe and eliminated centuries-old patterns of conflict and warfare. The extension of EU institutions and values to include the countries of Eastern Europe, the leaders believe, holds the promise of spreading peace and stability to the entire continent.

*The EU and Bulgaria*

The relations between Bulgaria and the European Community were initiated as early as 1986. But while the Bulgarian government wanted to establish a comprehensive economic and trade relationship, the European Commission preferred to limit any agreement to trade with only general principles agreed upon for wider cooperation. However, intentions to establish relations were soon overtaken by concerns over Bulgaria's treatment of its Turkish minority, especially after the Bulgarian authorities increased their pressure and thousands of ethnic Turks left the country in 1988-89.14

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14On the early Bulgaria-EC relations see Karen Smith, 60.
Negotiations with the EC were resumed in March 1990 and the two sides signed a trade and cooperation agreement a month later. On 22 December 1990 the Grand National Assembly adopted a resolution officially declaring Bulgaria's desire to become a full member of the European Community.\(^{15}\)

On 30 September 1991, the European Council agreed to begin exploratory talks for Europe Agreement with Bulgaria. In April 1992 the European Commission asked the Council to approve the negotiating mandate. In contrast to Europe Agreements concluded previously with Poland, Hungary and Czechoslovakia, the Commission asked that the agreement contain, against the strenuous objection of Bulgaria, a reference to human rights and democracy. In May 1992, the Council approved the mandate and in December negotiations were concluded. The Europe Agreement with Bulgaria was unanimously ratified by the Bulgarian Parliament in April 1993, entered into force on 1 February 1995, and contained conditions with respect to human rights, democratic principles and the principles of a market economy. This conditionality, also present in Romania's Agreement, was the first time such a clause was included in a Union's treaty with third countries.

Backed by the unanimous decision of the Parliament, on 14 July 1995 Bulgaria formally applied for membership of the EU, and in the next year the government adopted a national strategy for the implementation of the European Commission's Single Market.

The White Paper preparing the countries of Eastern Europe for their integration into the Internal Market.\textsuperscript{16}

The beginning of the regular process of evaluating the candidate countries’ progress in meeting the membership criteria came in the wake of the most serious political, social, and economic crisis in Bulgaria after 1989. The events of 1996-97 which led to the near-collapse of the national economy and, more significantly, to the near breakdown of the still fledgling political and institutional order seriously questioned the country’s commitment to meeting the membership criteria. In the avis published as part of Agenda 2000 in July 1997, the Commission recommended that Bulgaria be excluded from the start of negotiations on economic grounds, while, despite the Commission concern for the stability of institutions, the country was judged to meet the democratic criteria.\textsuperscript{17} It must be noted that although the Commission divided the ten applicants into two groups the way the avis were written provided a degree of differentiation among the countries within the groups. Countries were evaluated to face problems and processes of different order of severity. Accordingly, although the Report recognized the efforts made by Bulgaria’s newly installed reformist government, the country was judged to be clearly at the bottom of the group of countries excluded from the negotiations. The avis found Bulgaria to meet the democratic criteria for membership but also pointed out that the democratic institutions lacked the stability to assure the consolidation of democratic

\textsuperscript{16}The White Paper, which includes over 1,4000 elements, sets out the body of essential market legislation the East European countries need to adopt in order to prepare their economies for the internal market. The candidates choose the order of adopting this legislation depending on the countries’ political, economic and social capacities to absorb new market legislation.

order. The Commission also found the economy represented the most significant problem the country faced in the process of joining the Union. The country clearly ranked at the bottom of the economic performance scale as measured by the scope and degree of economic transition. The Report did not expect Bulgaria to meet the condition of a functioning market economy until early in the next century. The country was also judged to be unable to cope with competitive pressure and market forces within the EU. Most significantly, the Commission judged Bulgaria to have made very little progress and to emerge worst off in terms of how near the country is to EU standards and policy norms.

As late as 1999, international and domestic developments gave the Bulgarian government no assurance that the country would be invited to begin formal negotiations with the EU. Prime Minister Kostov became increasingly frustrated with what he saw as a lack of the EU’s commitment to a firm early date for including Bulgaria in the second group candidates to begin negotiations. The Prime Minister even suggested that given the reluctance of the West to support the reforms in the country his government might reassess its international priorities and objectives.18 Meanwhile the continued crises in the Balkans and especially the ethnic conflict in Kosovo further circumscribed Bulgaria’s attempts to achieve stable political and economic development and integration with Western Europe. In 1999 in its annual report on Bulgaria’s progress towards accession the European commission deemed the country to have failed, along with Romania.

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establish a market economy. The Commission’s annual reports on progress only confirmed the already prevailing view that, among the applicant countries, Bulgaria and Romania were the laggards and both countries would require longer until deemed ready to join the Union. However, what worked in both countries’ favor and ultimately led to the Commission recommendation to the European Council to extend invitation for negotiations was the two states’ behavior during the Kosovo crisis. Despite public resistance to the way NATO and the EU were handling the crisis, the Bulgarian government sided with the West and supported officially and privately NATO’s actions against Serbia. Furthermore, although not a NATO member, Bulgaria agreed to allow the forces of the Alliance to use its air space during the air-strikes against Serbian targets. Thus, paradoxically, the crisis that initially seemed to distance Bulgaria from its goal of joining the European Union ultimately accelerated the country’s accession to the EU. In pursuit of stability in the Balkans and in recognition of progress, the Helsinki European Council in 1999 decided to include Bulgaria in the second group of candidate countries to begin negotiations in 2000. In its 1999 report the Commission summed up the prevailing view among the member states that “one of the key lessons of the Kosovo crisis is the need to achieve peace and security, democracy and the rule of law, growth and the foundations of prosperity throughout Europe. Enlargement is the best way to do this. There is now a greater awareness of the strategic dimensions of enlargement.”

Accordingly, despite the lack of full compliance with the economic requirements for the

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start of admission, the Commission recommended that Bulgaria be accepted as a
candidate at the Helsinki summit on 10 December 1999.

Despite Bulgaria’s inclusion in the Helsinki group of candidates, it was obvious
that the country lagged behind the others in its integration in the EU as measured by the
pace of implementing reforms and adopting the acquis. The European Commission’s
annual evaluation of the applicant countries in 2000 still listed Bulgaria, along with
Romania, as the only two candidates without functioning market economies.\(^{22}\) Although
the European Commission, following the Kosovo crisis, declared Bulgaria as meeting the
Copenhagen political criteria, the country was judged to have serious problems in all
transition areas. Only in its reports in 1999 and 2000 did the Commission evaluate the
country to have achieved a level of economic stability and a more satisfactory pace of
meeting the membership criteria. Yet, even in 2000, Bulgaria, according to the annual
report, had no functioning market economy. The two countries were deemed to be
prepared to open negotiations on the fewest chapters of the acquis and by March 2001
Bulgaria was able to close only eight of the thirty-one chapters.\(^{23}\) Not surprisingly,
Bulgaria is always paired with Romania as the two countries needing extra time to gain
EU membership.\(^{24}\)

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Toward Accession by Each of the Candidate Countries*, supplement 3/2000

Available from http://www.euractive.com; INTERNET.

\(^{24}\) The commissioner for EU enlargement Gunter Verheugen declared that all
candidates, excepting Bulgaria and Romania, would be able to finalize the negotiations
by the end of 2002 and gain membership by 2004. “Verheugen Sees EU Enlargement
http://www.rferl.org; INTERNET: “The Big EU Extension to Take Place by 2004.”
Bulgaria's rear position in the Helsinki group resulted not only in the EU's reluctance to integrate the country into the Union but also ensured a differentiated treatment of its citizens. While the citizens of all applicant countries could travel visa-free to the members of the Schengen Convention,\textsuperscript{25} Bulgarian nationals, along with Romanians, had to obtain visas, a process which caused much indignation among the public and increased the cost of traveling to the West.\textsuperscript{26} After many failed attempts to remove the country from the Schengen list of states whose nationals require visas to visit the members of the Convention, the EU finally on 1 December 2000 agreed to allow Bulgarians to travel to the Union visa-free.\textsuperscript{27}

\textit{The Czech Republic and the EU}

More extensive relations between Czechoslovakia and the European Union date back as far as the early 1980s. In November 1986, the European Council gave the Commission a mandate to negotiate an agreement on trade in industrial products with Prague. The agreement was signed in 1988 and went into effect on 1 April 1989. Within

\textsuperscript{25}The Schengen Convention (also known as Schengen \textit{acquis}), signed in 1990 by thirteen EU members plus Iceland and Norway, removed frontiers controls and introduced freedom of movement to all individuals who are nationals of the signatory states. See European Commission, \textit{Glossary}, 59.

\textsuperscript{26}"Survey Shows 95 Percent of Bulgarians Feel Affected by EU Visa Restrictions," \textit{Bulgarian Telegraph Agency} (21 November, 2000).

\textsuperscript{27}"Schengen Countries Drop Visa Requirements for Bulgarians as of Tuesday," \textit{Bulgarian Telegraph Agency} (10 April, 2001).
days of the new government after the Velvet Revolution in November 1989, Czechoslovakia asked the Commission to negotiate a new trade and cooperation agreement. In recognition of the speedy reforms taking place in the country, the European Commission and Prague concluded a new agreement which went into force on November 1990. As with the agreements with the other East European states, it included economic cooperation in a variety of areas. By then however, the reformers in Prague already defined a membership in the Community as priority of Czechoslovakia’s foreign policy: in March 1990 Foreign Minister Jiri Dienstbier declared that his country wanted to conclude an associated agreement and eventually become a EC member. In May Prime Minister Marian Calfa said he hoped Czechoslovakia would join the Community by 2000. In addition, in contrast to Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia was able as early as 1990 to reach agreements on visa-free travel with almost all members of the Community.

Czechoslovakia, along with Poland and Hungary, was the first country declared to meet the newly formulated conditionality—including the rule of law, human rights, free and fair elections, among others—for concluding a Europe Agreement. The agreement, however, was seen by the new governments in Eastern Europe, including in Prague, as little more than an improved version of the just concluded trade and cooperation agreements. Czechoslovakia’s government repeatedly demanded that the European Community commit to the country’s inclusion in the organization, but to no avail. The Europe Agreement between Prague and the EC was signed on 16 December 1991. After Czechoslovakia’s velvet divorce was completed on 1 January 1993 the Commission initiated negotiations of a new Europe Agreement with the Czech Republic. The agreement was signed on 4 October 1993 and entered into force in February 1995. By
then, of course, the European Union had already committed to enlargement. In January 1996, the Czech government submitted the application for EU membership.

Although the Commission does not formally rank the applicant countries, the annual *avis* provide comparison between the countries’ extent of meeting the membership criteria. In its first *avis* in 1997 the Czech Republic appeared as one of the star performers. Although none of the countries fully met the ability to take on the *acquis* and none was a fully functioning market economy, the Commission evaluated the Czech Republic, along with four other countries, to be ready to begin negotiations on joining the Union. The country along with Hungary were judged to have made the greatest progress in terms of their capacity to cope with competitive pressures and market forces within the Union and the Czech Republic was already ready to take on the main part of the *acquis* in the medium term. The Czech Republic became the first post-communist country to be admitted in 1995 to the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development, a recognition of the state’s transformation by the club of the most developed Western democracies. The Report also rated the country as a democracy with stable institutions and a market economy capable of coping with competitive pressures and market forces within the Union in the medium term. It was noted, however, that the Czech Republic needed substantial efforts to fully apply and enforce the *acquis*. Consequently, the Luxemburg European Council in December 1997 decided to begin negotiations with the Czech Republic in the spring of 1998.

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29 European Commission, *Enlargement Preparing for Accession*. 

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Paradoxically, the invitation to begin membership negotiations coincided with a serious economic and political crisis in the Czech Republic. The collapse of several banks and a general economic stagnation put an end to what was considered to be an exemplary political and socio-economic post-communist transition. Furthermore, the Klaus government was less than enthusiastic about what was perceived as a European Union bound on circumventing nation-states’ sovereignty; accordingly, the Czech Republic was reluctant to align its legislation with the Union’s and reform national institutions in preparation for membership. Not surprisingly, the second Commission report released in late 1998 noted the state’s lack of preparedness for joining the EU. The report observed no progress at all in several key areas since its last avis in 1997, including public administration, internal markets, anti-trust legislation, justice reform and the treatment of Roma. The report called for decisive reforms in the areas of finance and banking, corporate governance and corruption. The Commission also severely criticized the quality and adequacy of the country’s National Program for the Preparation of the Czech Republic for Membership of the European Union, prepared by Tosovsky’s interim government. In fact, the annual report defined the Czech Republic as one of the lagging members of the first group of negotiating countries, well behind the leaders Poland and Hungary.

The ascent of the Social Democrats to power marked the end of political instability in the Czech Republic and more favorable conditions for consistent efforts to meet the membership criteria. Still, the next Commission Report in 1999, although recognizing newly energized effort to implement reform, pointed to many of the same

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shortcomings included in the previous report. It labeled the pace of legislative approximation as inadequate and found that there had been only mixed progress to set up the institutions needed to implement the limited legislation passed by the Parliament. Only in its report in 2000 did the Commission establish that the country had significantly accelerated the rate of legislative alignment with the EU acquis and that the government had begun to implement major reforms in key areas.

The Social Democrats also ended a period of official Czech doubts about the nature and purpose of the European Union as a process. While in power, Prime Minister Vaclav Klaus, a self-proclaimed Tacherite, frequently criticized EU developments and stimulated a debate in the Czech Republic about issues such as monetary union and the social dimensions of the EU. Klaus resented what he saw as the federalization of the EU and the gradual centralization of authority and powers in Brussels at the expense of national governments. Instead, he favored admission into the Common Market but opposed key aspects of political unification, particularly the Social Charter. The Zeman government, in contrast, adopted a more positive attitude toward integration.

Despite the criticism in the European Commission's 1998 and 1999 reports, the Czech Republic's place in the first group of countries negotiating membership was never threatened. By March 2001 the Czech Republic had already closed fifteen of the

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33 Grable and Hughes. 73.
chapters. And although the pace of meeting the membership criteria made the country more suited to a second wave of enlargement, EU officials suggested that it may be politically impossible to exclude the Czech Republic from the first wave of enlargement.\textsuperscript{35}

\textit{Lithuania and the EU}

Relations between the European Union and Lithuania have developed rapidly since the country gained independence in August 1991. The two sides signed a Trade and Cooperation Agreement on 11 May 1992, which entered into force in 1993. Simultaneous with signing the Agreement, the two sides signed a Declaration on Political Dialogue creating conditions for political cooperation. Consequently, the Essen European Council reaffirmed the Copenhagen decision and extended the pre-accession strategy to the three Baltic states and Slovenia.

The EU and Lithuania signed in July 1994 an Agreement on Free Trade and Trade-Related Matters, which stipulated for the establishment of a free trade area during a transitional period lasting a maximum of six years beginning in January 1995. Even more significantly the two sides signed a Europe Agreement on 12 June 1995, which entered into force on 1 February 1998. As with the agreements with other East European countries, it provided a legal framework for political dialogue and gradual integration of the country in the Union, and promoted the expansion of economic and trade relations


\textsuperscript{35}ING Barings, 22.
between the two sides. The Europe Agreement recognized Lithuania's aspirations to become a member of the Union and created conditions for the country's participation in the pre-accession strategy.

Lithuania applied to join the EU on 8 December 1995. On 25 March 1998 the two sides adopted an Accession Partnership to help the country's reform efforts and preparations for accession. In its first report the European Commission did not recommend Lithuania as one of the countries to begin negotiations to join the Union. In terms of the political criteria the avis rated Lithuania among the best performers along with Hungary, the Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, and Slovenia. In terms of economic development, however, Lithuania, given its later start on economic reform, was judged to lag behind the most advanced countries, but to be ahead of Bulgaria and Romania. The country was evaluated as lacking a functioning market economy: the country's economy was deemed to be unable to withstand competitive pressures. The Commission urged the country to increase its effort in preparation to take on the acquis and adhere to the aims of political, economic, and monetary union. In accordance with the EU recommendations, the Lithuanian government accelerated its efforts especially in the area of meeting the acquis.37

Later reports by the European Commission observed accelerated reform efforts in Lithuania as the country gradually shortened the distance from the first wave countries.38

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Most significantly, in its 2000 report the Commission deemed the country to be a functioning market economy, thus eliminating the last factor, which informally defined the country as an economic laggard. Yet, while the country was judged to face no political obstacles to entry, economic, institutional and legislative issues continued to keep the country behind the first wave countries. The 2000 report presented Lithuania among the states which best met the Copenhagen political criteria but still lagged behind even the other Baltic states in terms of economic development and market, legislative and institutional reform—although it must be noted that the country was well ahead of Bulgaria and Romania. In any event, the country was making a smooth transition and by March 2001 it had closed thirteen chapters, only two less than the Czech Republic: a remarkable success given that Lithuania started the negotiations in 2000.

NATO

There was a short-lived hope in Eastern Europe following the Cold War that collective defense as a means of ensuring national security would give way to a collective security system which would address new instabilities and threats. Vaclav Havel’s

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40 On the state of the Lithuanian economy see European Commission, Commission Presents Forecasts for the Candidate Countries. file IP/01/595 (Brussels: European Commission, 2001); ING Barings, 64-65.

eagerness to see the Warsaw pact dismembered was as strong as his enthusiasm for a
Europe free of military alliances. In the spring of 1990, addressing the Council of Europe,
the Czech president called for the dismantling of both alliances. Just a few months prior
Havel was a dissident and now was responsible for formulating his country’s transition to
democracy. The dissident movement believed that communism and Soviet dominance
were to blame for the artificial division on the continent. The existence of NATO and the
Warsaw Pact was the military dimension of an ideological confrontation. Now that
communism was in retreat—at least in Eastern Europe if not in the Soviet Union, and
Moscow was gradually withdrawing its troops—it was only natural, the former dissidents
thought, that military blocs should become irrelevant.42

Paradoxically, it was Hungary, a country still ruled by communists, with its
decision to seek closer links with NATO and calls for the dissolution of the Warsaw Pact
that signified the Cold War was not only about ideology nor was NATO only about
security against the Soviets. In early 1991, following the dissolution of the Warsaw Pact,
Hungary was joined by Poland, Czechoslovakia, and Bulgaria in its calls for NATO to
provide security guarantees to the emerging democracies in Eastern Europe. Later that
year, the newly independent Baltic states sought closer ties with the Alliance as well.
Soon NATO membership came to be seen as a panacea for Eastern European countries’
inherent instability and insecurity as emerging elites in the region realized that NATO

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Ironically, President Havel insisted in early 1990 that the Warsaw Pact be
preserved only temporary as a means of bringing the Soviet Union into a new CSCE
security system in which both blocs would dissolve. For a discussion of the early
relationship between NATO and the post-communist countries see Christopher Jones,
“The Security Policies of the Former Warsaw Pact States: Deconstruction and
Reconstruction,” in Andrew A. Michta an Ilya Prizel, eds., *Postcommunist Eastern
would be the only institution capable of providing robust security guarantees in a still
dangerous world.

Only months after the revolutions in Eastern Europe, NATO invited the six
Warsaw Pact members to visit the North Atlantic Council, its highest body, and establish
regular diplomatic relations. NATO’s response to the emerging willingness of East
European states for membership committed the Alliance to a closer cooperation with the
post-communist countries but avoided any discussions of enlargement. The new
Strategic Concept adopted by the NATO Heads of States and Government in Rome in
November 1991 outlined a new approach to security based on dialogue, cooperation, and
collective defense capability, and including cooperation with East European countries as
an integral part of the Alliance’s strategy. More specifically, the summit established a
North Atlantic Cooperation Council (NACC) to oversee the emerging relationship and
involve the post-communist countries in a cooperative framework. The first meeting of
the NACC took place on 20 December 1991 and included six Eastern European countries
as well as the three Baltic states. The members adopted a “Statement of Dialogue,
Partnership, and Cooperation” that endorsed enhanced cooperation between NATO and
the former Warsaw Pact members. When the Soviet Union disintegrated in January 1992,
NATO decided to include the former Soviet republics in the NACC.

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43 On the early post-Cold War evolution of the Alliance see North Atlantic Treaty
Organization, NATO Handbook (Brussels: Office of Information and Press, 1998), 27-31:
North Atlantic Treaty Organization, NATO Handbook (Brussels: Office of Information
and Press, 1995), 21-40; Jeffrey Simon, “Partnership for Peace and Civil-Military
Relations,” in Jeffrey Simon, ed., NATO Enlargement: Opinions and Options

44 The new Strategic Concept replaced the 1967 strategy of “Flexible Response”
and moved away from mass mobilization and toward enhanced crisis management
capabilities and peacekeeping operations. See Simon, Partnership for Peace, 48.
Although the Alliance took significant steps to address East European states’ growing appeal for extensive cooperation it hesitated to address their pressing demands for immediate membership, made all the more urgent by the unsuccessful August 1991 Moscow coup and the continuing war in Yugoslavia. In January 1994 in Brussels, NAC launched a major new initiative, Partnership for Peace (PfP), aimed at enhancing stability and security in Europe. Although the PfP did not promise immediate membership it established a long-term commitment to expansion. The PfP marked a shift from a multilateral dialogue to a bilateral relationship between individual partners and the Alliance in the form of Individual Partnership Programs (IPP).

The Brussels Summit in December 1994 decided to initiate an extensive study to determine how NATO will enlarge, the principles to guide this process and the implications of membership. The NATO Enlargement Study, released in September 1995, emphasized that candidate countries should meet five criteria: democratic elections, individual liberty and the rule of law; demonstrated commitment to economic reform and a market economy; adherence to OSCE norms and principles involving ethnic minorities and social justice; resolution of territorial disputes with neighbors; and establishment of democratic control of the military. NATO also required new members to assume the financial obligations of joining and establish interoperability with NATO structures. In fact, there are striking similarities between many of the NATO and EU admission criteria including level of democratization, minority issues and economic progress. Based on the study’s findings, the Alliance conducted an intensive dialogue with interested partners, providing member states with valuable information about East European countries’ preparation and intention for membership. This in turn, provided potential candidates
with experience in dealing with the Alliance and knowledge of the responsibilities and obligations of membership.

At the Sintra Summit in May 1997 the NACC was replaced by the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council (EAPC), whose purpose was to launch a new stage of cooperation. The EAPC provided the overall framework for political and security-related cooperation under the PfP. Along with practical cooperation, the EAPC provided a mechanism for self differentiations so that partner countries would be able to decide individually the level and areas of cooperation with the Alliance. In other words, states were able to choose whether to pursue membership or enhanced cooperation in specific areas.

At the Madrid Summit in July 1997, the Alliance invited the Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland to start accession negotiations and reaffirmed its openness to new members. The Summit also strengthened the role of the partners in PfP decision-making and planning, and adopted an enhanced PfP. The enhanced PfP was intended to have a more operational character, as well as increased opportunities for the candidate-countries to participate in decision-making and planning relating to PfP activities. The accession talks with the three partners were followed by the signing and consequent ratification of accession protocols. The three countries gained formal membership on 12 March 1999.

NATO’s Washington Summit in April 1999, introduced the Membership Action Plan (MAP), a design which went further than the Study of NATO Enlargement in defining what the candidate countries needed to do in preparation for membership. The Madrid Summit, in an attempt to engage Russia, also created a NATO-Russia Permanent Joint Council. See North Atlantic Treaty Organization, NATO Handbook (Brussels: Office of Information and Press, 1998), 31.

On the MAP see Ambassador Klaus-Peter Klaiber, “The Membership Action Plan: Keeping NATO’s Door Open,” NATO Review 47 no. 2 (Summer 1999): 23-25; Stephen Blank, “MAP Reading: NATO’s and Russia’s Pathways to European Military
MAP gave the candidates a list of five issues—political and economic, defense and military, resources, security, and legal—from which each country will select the most valuable and work on them assisted by the Alliance to improve their ability to meet membership criteria. In fact, with the MAP initiative, NATO created its own *acquis* against which the Alliance could assess the progress made by each partner. The Alliance set to draw up an annual report for individual partners providing feedback on their progress in the areas covered in their individual national programs. The reports were to become the basis for an annual meeting of the NAC with each aspiring candidate.

*Bulgaria and NATO*

The beginning of Bulgaria-NATO relations was laid down by a decision of the Bulgarian government in 13 July 1990 to accept the invitation extended by the London Declaration of the NACC to establish diplomatic links with the Alliance. Compared to the other East European countries, however, Bulgaria remained ambivalent toward membership in NATO as there was no domestic consensus on the foreign policy priorities of the country. The Socialist Party, internally split on foreign policy priorities, either insisted that the Alliance should first transform and even agree to accept Russia as


\[\text{47}^{*}\] It must be noted that in contrast to the EU accession process, a NATO decision to accept new members remains overwhelmingly a political one. Simply fulfilling the MAP criteria is no guarantee for membership although a failure to meet the objectives will almost certainly disqualify a country from prospective membership. See Blank, 5-7.
a member before Bulgaria’s accession to the Alliance or outright resisted any moves to establish long-term relations with NATO. On the other hand, the pro-Western UDF remained internally divided and ineffective in making the case for membership. In fact, the only consistent and forceful voice of support to the idea of joining the Alliance was the first democratically elected president, Zhelju Zhelev.

Bulgaria’s ambivalence on relations with NATO between 1990 and early 1997 left the country unprepared for integration in the Alliance. The Parliament passed a declaration in December 1993 on the Euro-Atlantic orientation of the country and on 14 February 1994 the country signed the Partnership for Peace Framework Document. The Socialist Party, however, undermined any attempt to establish solid relationship with the Alliance and after its overwhelming electoral victory in 1994 put the relations on hold. In 1996, after rounds of discussions with NATO in accordance with the PfP guidelines concerning prospective desire to join the Alliance, Bulgaria concluded that it did not want to pursue membership.

The collapse of the Socialist government in early 1997 marked not only the ascendance of the UDF but also a dramatic change in the country’s foreign policy priorities. One of the first acts of the interim government of Stefan Sofiyanski was to

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declare Bulgaria’s aspiration to join the Alliance. After the UDF won the parliamentary elections and formed a stable majority government, the country became quite active in its quest to establish a strong relationship with the Alliance and ultimately gain membership. The government quickly established an infrastructure to catch up with the other candidates. On 17 March 1997 Bulgaria adopted the National Program for Preparation and Accession to NATO and set up an Intergovernmental Committee on NATO Integration. Yet, it was obvious that the country had lost valuable time and the final document of the Madrid Summit, which did not even mention Bulgaria as a potential future member, caused disappointment in the country but came as a no surprise.

Indeed, political will aside, Bulgaria was hardly prepared to join NATO. While the country met some of the criteria listed in the NATO Enlargement Study, including democratization, protection of individual liberties, among others, and governmental control over the military, Bulgaria failed to take any substantial steps to reform the military. Until 1997 consecutive governments had not started the restructuring of the military retained close to the pre-1989 level of over 100,000 troops and an extremely bloated, 3,000 strong defense ministry personnel. Since the country until 1997 did not seriously consider joining NATO no efforts were made to achieve interoperability and train personnel for work with NATO members. No efforts were made to coordinate its defense budget, planning, and resource management.

The government of the UDF a made considerable effort after 1997 to implement wide ranging military reforms, and more importantly, end Bulgaria’s self-imposed

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52 Simon, “Bulgaria and NATO.”

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isolation and convince the Alliance of the benefit of the country's membership. Bulgaria approved its National Security Concept in April 1998, a Military Doctrine in April 1999, a Defense Plan in October 1999, and Partnership Goals in April 2000. The government also established an inter-departmental structure, co-chaired by the foreign and defense ministers and an integration council in the Ministry of Defense, to coordinate NATO integration.

At the time of the UDF's ascendance to power in early 1997 the size of the military was still at pre-1989 force levels and structure. The new defense reform envisioned to cut its size from roughly 100,000 to 45,000 by 2004. It also called for restructuring of the forces in three corps and their gradual modernization to meet NATO standards. Although the reform plans were well conceived, attempts to trim the size of the military force encountered a lack of political support and the Parliament failed to support Plan 2004. Thus by early 1999 Bulgaria still retained a defense establishment of 112,000, only slightly lower than pre-1989 levels. The military is still characterized by

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55 Bulgaria's Joint Chiefs of Staff insisted that the country needed 65,000 strong military and clashed with the civilian authorities over the reform priorities. See Momchil Milev, "Bulgarskata Armija Prez Pogleda na Pentagona" [The Bulgarian Military Through the Pentagon’s Eyes], Kapital 15 (17 April, 1999). Available from http://www.capital.bg; INTERNET. Momchil Nedelchev, "Shefyt na Genshtaba Plashi s Ostavka" [Chair of Joint Chiefs of Staff Threatens to Resign], Kapital 1 (9 January, 1999). Available from http://www.capital.bg; INTERNET.

56 Simon, "Transforming."
poor training, low unit readiness levels, and poor morale throughout the officer corps and the enlisted ranks. As a late reformer, the country also suffered from the lack of institutional experience dealing with the member countries and PfP partners. Problems ranged from the absence from the numerous NATO and PfP programs designed to integrate partners’ militaries in the Alliance’s institutional framework to a lack of military participation in various peace-keeping operations providing real operational experience, to the lack of language skills essential in any coalition effort.57

The crisis in Kosovo in 1999 provided the biggest boost to Bulgaria’s attempts to join the Alliance. Even before the beginning of the air campaign, the government intensified its consultations with NATO officials in anticipation of armed conflict.58 President Stojanov and Prime Minister Kostov also met with their Balkan counterparts and issued appeals to Serbia’s leader Milosevic to accept NATO’s plan for solving the crisis in Kosovo.59 Later, during the air campaign, the government and the Parliament granted the Alliance the use of Bulgaria’s airspace for attacks against targets in Yugoslavia. The government recognized that the Kosovo crisis, although posing numerous security challenges to the country, presented a unique opportunity to prove the irreversibility of Bulgaria’s transformation, its choice to integrate in the Euro-Atlantic

57 Until 1997 Bulgaria was the only PfP partner with no participation in the IFOR and SFOR operations in Bosnia. Only after July 1997 did the government send a 25-man engineering platoon to join the Dutch troops in SFOR and later more troops joined. “Bulgaria-Bosnia-Blue Helmets.” Bulgarian Telegraph Agency (7 July, 1998).


area, and more immediately, the strategic value of an aspiring NATO member. Indeed, Bulgaria's support and cooperation with the Alliance significantly enhanced the country's standing, allowing to catch up with the rest of the partners in their quest to gain membership. In return for its wartime support, the NAC at the Washington summit in April 1999 extended a limited, in space and time, Article 5 guarantee to Bulgaria. Even before this explicit statement of commitment, the Alliance on numerous occasions conveyed its interest in the security and stability of the country. This was not lost on the Bulgarians and the government widely publicized any statement of support and commitment.

The end of allied air strikes over Yugoslavia did not diminish the growing cooperation between NATO and Bulgaria. The need to maintain multinational forces in Kosovo and the beginning of a new conflict, this time in neighboring Macedonia, gave Bulgaria another chance to enhance its status among the aspiring membership candidates. In March 2001 the government agreed to sign an agreement allowing NATO forces to use

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60 Anatoly Verbin, “Bulgarian Government Tested Over Kosovo,” Reuters (19 April, 1999); In a interview, Ivan Krastev, a Bulgarian political scientist, argued that the "crisis in Kosovo makes Bulgaria a real candidate for NATO membership." "Krizata v Kosovo Napravi Bylgarija Vidima" [Kosovo Crisis Made Bulgaria Visible], Kapital 13 (5 April, 1998).

61 In a “Statement on Kosovo,” the NAC committed the Alliance to the security and territorial integrity of the countries challenged during the crisis by Serbia’s regime. Quoted in Simon, “NATO’s Membership.” 19.

62 Steve Holland, “NATO Vows to Guard Border States from Serbs,” Reuters (25 April, 1999).

63 Interview of foreign minister Nadezhda Michailova. “NATO Razprostira Sistemata si za Sigurnost i nad Bylgarija” [NATO Extends its Security System Over Bulgaria], Kapital 41 (19 October, 1998); In an interview, Prime Minster Ivan Kostov said that NATO Secretary General Javier Solana had send a letter stating that “NATO is ready to guarantee the security of Bulgaria in a case of attack by Yugoslavia.” Bulgarian Telegraph Agency (13 October, 1998).
Bulgarian territory, including the establishment of military bases, in the event of a Balkan crisis. Remarkably, all political parties represented in the Parliament supported the agreement and it was approved without the usual resistance from the Socialist Party. In fact, the successful conclusion of the Alliance's air campaign against Serbia marked the transformation of the BSP’s position on the country's membership of NATO. After a relatively short and uncontroversial intra-party debate, the Socialists decided to embrace NATO membership as the only politically attainable means to guarantee national security. The change in the BSP's long-standing opposition to NATO was an attempt by the party leadership to transform the party into a modern social-democratic organization and position itself as a potential coalition partner ahead of the 2001 parliamentary elections. Even then, however, the Socialists remained the only party represented in the Parliament which insisted that the country should hold a referendum on NATO membership.

Ultimately, the policies of the government during the Kosovo crisis along with its efforts since 1997 significantly enhanced Bulgaria's prospects of joining NATO. Yet, the country's late start of reforms and systemic economic and political weaknesses continued to hinder its ability to convince the Alliance of the worth of its membership.

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The Kosovo crisis tested not only the political parties’ resolve to seek membership in NATO but also public consensus on Bulgaria-NATO relationship. As elsewhere in Eastern Europe, the Bulgarian public resisted the air campaign against Serbia: 77 percent were against NATO’s military intervention against Belgrade and 77 percent were against Alliance equipment or personnel crossing Bulgaria. Furthermore, although a majority of the public had supported the country’s membership in NATO, during the air campaign the majority of Bulgarians refused to recognize that failure to grant the Alliance access to the country’s territory and air space would most likely hurt Bulgaria’s membership hopes. Thus the Kosovo crisis indicated that public support for Bulgaria’s membership in the Alliance, although routinely over 50 percent in the latter part of the 1990s, has no deep commitment based on understanding of the costs and duties associated with participation in NATO. On the other hand, the same crisis provoked all political parties to finally go through an internal debate on eventual membership and ultimately led to the intra-party consensus on the priority of seeking to join the Alliance.

NATO and the Czech Republic

After the collapse of communism in Eastern Europe, it seemed as if Czechoslovakia was ready to accept some modified role for the Warsaw Pact, especially in the area of arms control and multilateral security consultations and as a counterbalance

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to unified Germany. Thus, although the government negotiated for the quick withdrawal of Soviet troops stationed in the country, it took a cautious approach to the Pact. The new national leadership accepted that both the Warsaw Pact and NATO would exist until the international community established a new Europe-wide security system based on the Conference for Security and Cooperation in Europe.

The reluctance of the Soviet leadership to contemplate reform of the Pact, the military crackdown in Lithuania in January 1991, and the refusal of NATO members to design any non-NATO based security arrangements convinced the Czechoslovakia leadership to define membership in the Alliance as a high security priority. As early as February 1991, President Havel urged closer cooperation between Czechoslovakia and NATO. Indeed, Vaclav Havel became the most ardent proponent of NATO enlargement as essential to the peace and stability in Eastern Europe.

Along with the clearly defined political will to join the Alliance, the Czech Republic, initially as part of Czechoslovakia and later as an independent state, was quick to implement drastic military and security reforms which were virtually complete by 1994. The government asserted total civilian control over the military and carried out a thorough restructuring of the force structure and command. While in 1993 the country had over 106,000 troops, the next year it downsized the forces down to 87,000 and

70 Andrew Cottee, 61-69.
further to approximately 60,000 in 1999. The reform, however, also included a substantial decline in military expenditures, which hampered any efforts to achieve modernization of the armed force interoperability with NATO standards. In 1997 the military budget accounted for 1.7 percent of the GDP—a decline from 2.6 percent of the GDP in 1993–94.

Although the Czech Republic was one of the first East European countries to seek NATO membership, the country seemed to have achieved no strong consensus on the issue. Vaclav Havel emerged as the driving force behind the drive toward membership but his efforts met no strong support by the rest of the political elite. Indeed, as early as 1993, Prime Minister Vaclav Klaus questioned the need of his country to seek membership at any price given the declining relevance of the Alliance and the high cost eventual membership might incur. The political elite, save Havel, did not initially campaign vigorously for membership until after the Alliance decided in late 1993 to enlarge eastward. As security and defense policy enjoyed very little priority and attention among the political leadership of all main political parties, the society as a

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75 Simon, “The New NATO Members.”


whole seemed to ignore the country's policies aimed at joining the Alliance.\textsuperscript{78} The lack of any substantial problems and confrontations accompanying the reform of the national military forces also made it impossible to turn Alliance membership into a hot political issue to be exploited by both ruling coalition and opposition. Even the Social Democrats, who initially opposed Czech membership, gradually came to accept it as inevitable and politically noncontroversial.

In accordance with its will to join NATO, the Czech Republic from early on became very active in international peacekeeping operations in order to demonstrate its military worthiness as a potential ally and to gather experience in the NATO operational environment. Very significantly, the country contributed to the coalition efforts during the 1991 Gulf War by dispatching a special chemical warfare-protection battalion to the Gulf region.\textsuperscript{79} From 1993 to 1998 Czech military observers were deployed in 15 United Nations or OSCE missions in the territory of 11 countries. The country has also been taken part in operations in the former Yugoslavia since 1992.\textsuperscript{80} The participation in these missions provided the Czech Republic with valuable operational and political experience in multinational NATO settings. The military expanded bilateral relations with Alliance members by signing defense cooperation agreements with all major members and conducting military exercise with France.\textsuperscript{81}

\textsuperscript{78} Nelson and Szayna, 19-24.


\textsuperscript{80} Nelson and Szayna observe that in 1993-94, the country had 1 percent of its armed forces committed to UN missions. Nelson and Szayna, 27.

\textsuperscript{81} Cottey, 82.
Despite concerns over the rational behind the creation of the PfP, the Czech Republic was among the first countries to embrace the initiative by signing it in March 1994. By then the first Czech strategic concept already identified integration in Euro-Atlantic institutions as the means to deal with any major threat to its security. However, in contrast to the other Central European countries, the Czech government was slow to develop the conceptual framework of the country's security and defense policies. The Parliament failed to approve any of the concepts advanced by the Ministry of Defense, once again confirming the low priority defense and security policies enjoyed among the elite. Only the impeding Madrid Summit in 1997, which was to decide on NATO expansion, made the country approve a hastily framed Defense Strategy. In fact, the invitation issued by the Alliance found the Czech Republic without basic documents outlining security and military strategies or the country's place and role in the Alliance. Only after the formal invitation to join did the Czech Republic accelerate its efforts to establish the conceptual foundations of its defense and security policies.

NATO's invitation to the Czech Republic issued by the Madrid Summit was followed by increased criticism of the country's preparedness to gain membership. Although Prague met the political and economic criteria for joining the political leadership was seen as unsupportive to further reforms in the field of defense and security. Member states, particularly the United States, repeatedly pointed to falling

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82 Szayna, 134.

83 Ben Lombardi observes that Prague followed incoherent policy; the government approved defense doctrine of the armed forces before the national security policy and the national defense strategy had been determined and implemented. The Security Policy was approved several months after the defense doctrine. Ben Lombardi, "An Overview of Civil-Military Relations in Central and Eastern Europe," *Journal of Slavic Military Studies* 12, no. 1 (March 1999), 25.
defense expenditures, lagging modernization and interoperability of forces, and the
general lack of political support to the reformers in the General Staff. Only after public
NATO pressure did the government agree to increase military expenditures by 0.1
percent to reach 2 percent of GDP by 2000. The resulting tensions between members
states and successive Czech governments did not end with the country’s formal accession
to the Alliance. It reached a high point during the Kosovo campaign when the
government, fresh from achieving the ratification of the country’s entry into NATO, broke ranks with the allies and offered to mediate in the conflict.

Lithuania and NATO

After gaining independence in 1991 Lithuania found it difficult to escape the
realities of geo-politics. As a small country and former part of a larger state, it confronted
an uncertain security environment with limited resources, including no standing military
force. Therefore Lithuania faced the dual challenge of building state institutions and a
defense establishment in close cooperation with the other Baltic states, Latvia and
Estonia. Cognizant of the country’s security vulnerability as a newly independent state

84 Glantz. 51.

85 Simon, “The New NATO Members.”

86 “NATO 2002 Need Not be Held in Prague, Threatens USA,” Czech News
Agency (29 March, 2001); Robert Anderson, “Washington Bars US Companies from
Czech Fighter Tender,” Financial Times (23 May, 2001). Available from
http://www.ft.com: INTERNET.

87 Czech Republic’s entry into NATO was ratified in April 1999 by the Lower
House of the Parliament 154 against 38 with only the Communists and the Republicans
voting against and 6 Social Democratic MPs abstaining. It was followed by its ratification
by the Upper House and the President in May.
which had just seceded from the Soviet Union, Lithuania's leadership quickly came to believe that national security could be guaranteed within a transatlantic defense system. This perception is shared by the public and as late as 1998, 72 percent of Lithuanians believed that their country could not effectively defend itself in the event of a military attack.88 Thus even before NATO developed a comprehensive framework to integrate East European countries in the Alliance, Lithuania sought to establish military and security cooperation with member states.89 Lithuania also participated in the creation of a Baltic Council along with Estonia and Latvia in the Baltic Sea Council in 1992, both designed to address the need for cooperation in the Baltic region and more ambitiously, the problem of "soft" security.

On 4 January 1994, Lithuania sent a formal letter applying for a membership to NATO. The same month, the country signed a Partnership for Peace Framework Document, thus formally joining the PfP. In cooperation with the other two Baltic states, Lithuania created in 1994 a peacekeeping battalion--BALTBAT--following a joint initiative to increase their individual and joint security. The Baltic states also heavily involved NATO members in the initiative as a way to address their lack of experience and resources, including basic military hardware.90 From Lithuania's perspective.


national security under the conditions of scarce capacities and uncertain environment could be assured only by cooperating with NATO. Indeed, as late as 1995 the country’s military numbered only 7,000 troops and its defense posture relied heavily on preparing citizens for self-defense on a massive scale.\footnote{Hans Binnendijk and Jeffrey Simon. “Baltic Security and NATO Enlargement.” Strategic Forum no. 57 (December 1995). Available from http://www.ndu.edu; INTERNET.} Accordingly, the 1996 Law on the Fundamentals of National Security--which lays out the country’s basic defense concept and command structure--explicitly required that Lithuania’s national security “be developed as part of the transatlantic defense system.”\footnote{Perry, Sweeney and Winner, 104.} Consequently, the country established coordination between 14 government institutions and five working groups to specifically work toward joining the Alliance.\footnote{Simon. “NATO’s Membership Plan”. 11-12: Lithuania went as far as to create a Vice-Minister of Foreign Affairs position responsible for overall coordination of national efforts in the framework of NATO integration. See. Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Lithuania, Fact Sheet--April 2001 (29 April 2001). Available from http://www.urm.lt; INTERNET.}

Because Lithuania’s defense capabilities were and still remain very limited, the political elite very early on recognized that traditional national self-defense was not achievable and pursued regional and institutional means to guarantee the state’s security. Even before its international recognition, Lithuania and the other two Baltic states established an institutionalized framework for cooperation first by signing a Baltic declaration for cooperation in 1990 and later the establishment of Baltic Council of Ministers in 1994. Increasing interaction with Baltic and Nordic ministers of foreign available from Columbia International Affairs Online. http://www.cc.columbia.edu; INTERNET.
affairs and defense led to cooperation on air space, borders, and Baltic Sea rescue operations. In addition, Lithuania enthusiastically joined any institution and initiative considered to enhanced the country's chances of joining the Alliance. In June 1994 Lithuania became an Associate member of the Western European Union—seen by the national leadership as a backdoor to the Alliance—just months after applying to join NATO and signing the PfP agreement.

Recognizing that the major challenges facing the Baltic states result from their small size and requires cooperation and coordination in building their armed forces and addressing security threats, Lithuania participated in the creation of a joint Baltic peacekeeping force—BALTBAT—and a joint Baltic naval squadron and airspace surveillance system—BALTRON and BALTNET. The three states went as far as to create in 1999 a joint military academy, Baltic Defense College or BALTDEFCOL, in Estonia. In order to prove its worth as a potential ally, the foreign policy and defense elite cultivated an extensive military relationship with Poland by establishing a combined peacekeeping unit and an airspace management regime. Lithuanian troops were committed to BALTBAT and international peace-keeping forces. In fact, since 1994

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95In a interview, Brigadier General Janas A. Kronkaitis hypothesized that regardless of whether the Baltic states are in NATO or not "if one of us is attacked, there's no doubt that the other two will also be attacked, maybe later." Mel Huang, "So Far So Smooth," Central Europe Review 2, no. 27 (10 July, 2000). Available from http://www.centraleurope.org; INTERNET.

over 600 Lithuanian peacekeeping troops have served with United Nations missions in Croatia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, and Kosovo.\textsuperscript{97}

NATO's decision at the 1997 Madrid Summit to invite only three countries was met with disappointment, yet not surprise, in Vilnius. The Summit communiqué, which left the door open to more candidates and specifically mentioned Lithuania as one, however, was considered significant progress. Furthermore, the signing of a Charter of Partnership, agreed upon between the U.S., Lithuania, Estonia and Latvia in January 1998, although not providing security guarantees, was seen by Vilnius as an important document reflecting America's political commitment to the future of the three countries. The agreement stipulated for consultations among the signatories and other countries in the event that "a Partner perceives that its territorial integrity, independence, or security is threatened or at risk." Seeing 2002 as the date of the next NATO expansion prompted Lithuania to concentrate its efforts on increasing the size and effectiveness of the national military. Accordingly, the military budget was consistently increased and was planned to reach almost 2 percent in 2001, up from 1.13 in 1999 and .85 percent in 1997.\textsuperscript{98} National armed forces were planned to grow from the January 1999 total of 12,200 to 23,000 by 2008.\textsuperscript{99}

Membership in NATO has consistently enjoyed strong support in Lithuania not only among the political elite but also among the public. The leadership has believed that EU and NATO integration are mutually reinforcing processes, thus integration in the


Alliance would provide not only hard core security benefits but also would significantly facilitate integration in the European Union. Accordingly, changes in governing political parties and coalitions led to no essential changes in foreign and security policy as governments, regardless of their ideological make up, maintain the priorities of their predecessors. Thus NATO membership has been consistently one of the top foreign policy objectives of the political elite. This consensus is sustained by a public, which routinely ranks the Alliance among the most trusted international institutions and sees NATO as the best guarantee of national security. According to a public survey conducted in 1998, 55 percent of Lithuanians approved of their country's quest for NATO membership.100 Another survey, conducted in August and December 2000, found the approval of a NATO membership at 49 percent as only 22.3 percent disapproved.101 Very significantly, more Lithuanians, 26 percent, in 1998 believed NATO membership alone would give their country the best chance for security, while fewer, 23 percent, backed neutrality and another 23 percent backed membership in both the EU and the Alliance as the best security option.102 The only slip in public approval of NATO occurred during the Alliance's air campaign against Serbia when for the first time the support for joining fell to 43.5 percent.103

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100Cited in Perry, Sweeney and Winner, 104.


103"Polls Show Balts Against NATO Airstrikes on Yugoslavia," Agence France-Presse (8 April, 1999).
Trade with the European Union

Trade relations between the European community and the Soviet bloc were limited as throughout the Cold War Moscow refused to recognize the Community and worked to undermine the integrative processes taking place in the Western part of the continent. The Soviet Union created its own organization, the Council of Mutual Economic Assistance (CMEA), in order to achieve similar integrative processes among the East European states. For its part, the Community was reluctant to contribute to Soviet domination over other communist states by extending trade relations to the East. Only after the beginning of the Helsinki process in 1975 did Western Europe open itself modestly to trade with the communist states. Accordingly, at the wake of communism’s fall the value of trade between individual East European countries and the countries of the EC was negligible.

The European Community quickly responded to the collapse of communism by liberalizing trade with the East and concluding bilateral trade agreements. What followed was the massive reorientation of East Europe’s trade from the East to the West. This process reflected not only the desire of newly independent states to limit Soviet, and later Russian, influence over them and the collapse of the Soviet economy, but also the explicit policy of the European Community to use trade as one of the means to promote a market economy and democratization in the former Soviet bloc, and ultimately its integration in

The combined effect of rapidly declining restrictions on goods from the East and new exchange rates increased trade flow in both directions.

Even in this early phase of increased trade between the EC and the East, however, differences in the levels of economic development among the post-communist countries led to different levels of trade flows. While Czechoslovakia, and later the Czech Republic, could exploit not only its geographic proximity to the West but also its relatively advanced stage of economic development and dramatically increase trade with the West, the relatively backward Bulgarian economy witnessed a hard time taking advantage of the opening of Western markets. Lithuania, unlike the other two countries, was a formal part of the Soviet economy and encountered harder times reorienting its trade to the East. Well into the 1990s Lithuania’s international trade continued to be with the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS), mainly Russia. In fact, both Bulgaria and Lithuania throughout the 1990s remained greatly dependent on Russia as a source of energy and natural resources.

The early liberalization of trade between the EU and post-communist countries, of course, accounts only partially for the structure and volume of trade between the two sides. The consequent market reforms, and more specifically their success or failure, determined the general economic growth and the ability of the economy to compete in the


106 As late as 1999 Russia was still Lithuania’s largest trading partner and accounted for 19.5 percent of the country’s imports. See, Vilniaus Bankas AB, Lithuanian Macroeconomic Review 1 (April, 2000) 46, Table C 1.

107 In 1998, 21 percent of Bulgaria’s imports came from Russia. See, ING Barings, 53, Figure 51.
Western market. Accordingly, the success of market reforms in the Czech Republic not only boosted the country's economic development as reflected in the growth of GDP but also increased the ability of the national industry to diversify and increase its exports to the European Union, including the export of high value-added products. The growing economic prosperity through 1998 also boosted the demand for imports from the EU. Thus the Czech Republic witnessed a steady growth of trade with the core countries both in total value and as a percentage of its total international trade (See Table 12). Bulgaria, on the other hand, was reluctant to implement radical and quick market reforms until 1997 and the ensuing economic slowdown prevented the national economy from taking advantage of the opening of Western markets. In fact, unlike the Czech Republic and Lithuania, Bulgaria did not achieve stable economic development and growth and this inevitably reflected in both the total volume of trade with the West and the West's share of Bulgaria's total trade (See Table 12).

Lithuania is clearly placed between the Czech Republic and Bulgaria in terms of volume and share of its international trade with the European Union (See Table 12). Starting the reforms after the other countries and implementing relatively slower and less radical market policies than the Czech Republic's, Lithuania, nevertheless, was able to achieve economic stabilization and resume growth relatively quickly. Although, like Bulgaria, its exports to the West were dominated by low value-added, low-skill products, Lithuania was able to increase the total value of trade with the West. The country's total value of international trade is comparable with Bulgaria's but given that Lithuania's
population is not even half as large, it reflected the general stability and healthy growth of the national economy.\textsuperscript{108}

\textit{Foreign Investments in the National Economy}

Along with trade liberalization, foreign investments in the post-communist countries were seen by the West as another means of promoting the political, economic and social transformation. The European Commission, after the fall of communism, quickly became the body coordinating the flow of financial assistance provided by the industrialized countries, the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank as well as the institutions specifically designed to assist the transition in the East European countries, including PHARE and the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD).\textsuperscript{109} The official financial aid and investments, however generous, were not enough to satisfy the countries’ hunger for massive resources in the reform process. Indeed, the EU financial transfer was designed to increase the countries’ ability to attract private investments on their own by providing technical assistance, making visibility studies, co-financing infrastructure projects, and assisting in the development of capital markets, among others. The geographic proximity of those countries to the West.

\textsuperscript{108} Along with the general backwardness of Bulgaria and Lithuania’s economies relative to the Czech’s, another explanation of the inability of the two countries to increase their exports to the EU is the relatively large share of their agriculture as share of the GDP. The European Union, traditionally very protective of its farmers, failed to liberalize restrictions on imports of agricultural products, including from the associated members. On the share of the farming sector in the three countries see ING Barrings, Figures 49, 55, 67.

\textsuperscript{109} On the coordinating functions of the European Commission in providing aid to Eastern Europe see Smith, \textit{The Making of EU}, 66-82.
the liberalization of trade, the prospects of future inclusion in the EU, and the relatively low labor cost, made those countries a natural destination of foreign capital and investments. Here again, however, differences in political and economic development led to wide disparities among the countries' capacities to attract capital. While the Czech Republic, following the success of reforms, quickly became a prime destination of foreign direct investments, Bulgaria and Lithuania greatly lagged behind (See Tables 13 and 14). Lithuania and Bulgaria attracted comparable amounts of foreign investments, but once again, the larger size of the Bulgarian population translated into much smaller foreign direct investment stock per capita in the period 1989-2000 (See Table 14). Most of the direct investments in Bulgaria were made only after the beginning of the comprehensive economic reforms in 1997, several years after the start of transition to the market in the Czech Republic and Lithuania. While in the period 1989-2000, the Czech Republic attracted $1,884 of foreign direct investments per capita, and Lithuania, starting the reform a few years later, attracted $626 per capita, Bulgaria was able to achieve only $388 per capita in the same period.

Stock

The end of the Cold War not only uncovered the diversity of the Eastern European countries' legacies, experiences, capacities and goals but also removed the homogenizing Soviet and communist influences and exposed them to a variety of environments and external challenges facing each society and the political elite. Soon after the beginning of reforms, many authors began to identify differences in external factors as partially accounting for the variances in transformation outcomes. In fact.
students of post-communism, ever seeking more precision in identifying the diversity of 
what was communist Europe, branded new regions to substitute for the generic “Eastern 
Europe.” Following the collapse of Soviet dominance, diverse developments ranging 
from successful transitions to inability to establish a stable democracy, to open ethnic 
warfare validated the need to approach the study of post-communist countries through 
recognizing the unique characteristics of each country’s regional environment. That post-
communist countries were a former part of the Soviet sphere of dominance and now they 
are still at the periphery of the Western core does not fully ascertain their position on the 
core-periphery continuum or their capacity to become part of the core. Bulgaria, the 
Czech Republic and Lithuania’s ability to integrate in the Euro-Atlantic institutions 
depends not only on their political elite and societies’ political will and commitments but 
also on their neighboring countries’ degree of integration in the same institutions. In the 
best case, a country would be enveloped by states, which are members of NATO and the 
EU; in the worst case, a country would be surrounded by states that have adversarial 
relations with the core. When surrounded by core countries, a post-communist state 
willing to integrate in the core would be receptive to the flow of ideas and institutions 
across its border, while, if conflicts flare in neighboring states, the country would be 
interested in the resolution of those conflicts and would try to limit flows across borders.

Not surprisingly, those hard realities of geopolitics clashed with some of the 
fundamental requirements for regional behavior imposed on the associated states by the 
EU and to a lesser degree by NATO. The EU demanded that candidates actively pursue 
regional cooperation and good neighborhood relations. It made no sense, the member-
states argued, in the Union opening its doors to new members if the aspiring states did
not open their doors to each other.\textsuperscript{110} Both the Union and NATO demanded that candidate countries not simply improve relations and cooperation with neighboring states but solve all serious issues of contentions with them, including borders and minorities. Accordingly, the EU mobilized resources, mainly through PHARE, to assist cross-border projects and solutions to common problems designed to create a pattern of practical cooperation and integration. In other words, the European Union insisted that it would accept only states that in practice embraced the Union's ideas of openness to outside influences, flows and institutions. The post-Cold War environment, however, presented the East European states with risks and challenges that inhibited some of the fledging democracies' willingness to fully embrace cross-national interaction and openness.

\textit{Bulgaria’s Stock}

The three countries in the study are located in three distinct regions representing very different challenges to their security and transitions--Bulgaria in the Balkans, the Czech Republic in Central Europe, and Lithuania in the Baltic region. Among the three countries, Bulgaria's regional politics and developments represented most trying challenges to the country's policies of transition and integration in the Western core. Almost as soon as Bulgaria's transition had started in the early 1990s, the region witnessed the beginning of the most violent and destructive European conflict after the Second World War--the wars of Yugoslavia's disintegration. The wars brought about not only the institutional isolation of Serbia from the larger process of democratic transition

and integration with the West taking place in Eastern Europe, but also led to the state's physical segregation as core countries and neighboring states imposed political, military, and economic sanctions for a better part of the last decade. Thus Bulgaria had to limit its interaction with a country located between itself and the core countries. Furthermore, the wars caused frequent disruption of the road and river travel through Serbia and Bulgaria's trade flow with the West had to be diverted through longer and more expensive routes.111

Another Bulgarian neighbor, Macedonia, posed a challenge of a different kind. Gaining sovereignty for the first time in its history, Macedonia faced major difficulties in state-building and nation-building. Consequently, the country failed to develop an extensive relationship with both the EU and NATO, and only recently did Macedonia express a willingness to join both, although remaining far from being ready to start even initial negotiations. In addition to its relative isolation from the larger integrative processes in Europe, Macedonia also failed to reach a bilateral agreement with Bulgaria on the terms of their relationship. Although Bulgaria was the first state to recognize Macedonia's independence, Sofia refused to recognize Macedonians as a separate nationality and the Macedonian as a language rather than a mere Bulgarian dialect thus effectively dooming the prospects of an extensive relationship. Consequently, political, social, and economic relations between the two countries remained stagnant until finally

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111 During the NATO's air strikes against Serbia in 1999, the Bulgarian government estimated that Bulgaria foreign direct investments would be half of the envisioned for the year and the originally forecast for a 5 percent growth had to be scaled down to 3.7-4 percent. Mike Dolan, "Balkans Count Rising Cost of War at EBRD," Reuters (18 April, 1999).
an agreement in 1999 in which Bulgaria recognized the existence of a Macedonian language, opening the way to a more intensive bilateral cooperation.\textsuperscript{112}

To the north, Bulgaria borders Romania, an EU associated member and candidate for NATO membership. In its transition, Romania achieved similar to Bulgaria's degree of integration into the Euro-Atlantic institutions as both countries concluded their Europe Agreements and were invited to begin negotiations to join the Union at the same time. Both countries have also achieved a similar pace of adopting the \textit{acquis} and are almost always singled out as the only two states without chances of being accepted in the EU before 2005. In their quest to join NATO, Romania holds a slight advantage as Bucharest defined membership in the Alliance as a top foreign policy priority long before Bulgaria decided to seek it in 1997. In fact at the Madrid Summit, which extended invitation to the first three new members, the Alliance specifically pointed to Romania as a strong candidate for the next wave of expansion.

To the south, Bulgaria borders Greece and Turkey: both members of NATO. Greece has also been an EU member since 1982 but remains the poorest member-state, even after successive Union enlargements. Being a relatively underdeveloped EU member prevented Greece from becoming an agent of institutional and value flows into Bulgaria as Athens failed to establish significant political, social, and, most significantly, financial and trade presence to the north.\textsuperscript{113} Its weak position also precluded Greece from successfully promoting Bulgaria's interests before both NATO and EU. The other

\textsuperscript{112}"Bulgaria, Macedonia Sign Language Accord." \textit{Agence France-Presse} (22 February, 1999).

southern neighbor, Turkey, although more powerful economically and geopolitically, has
remained outside the EU dimension of the Western core as its attempts to join the Union
have been thwarted for not meeting the political and economic membership criteria.

The EU and NATO’s requirements that candidate countries solve bilateral
conflicts with neighboring states and actively seek regional cooperation and integration
presented Bulgaria with a difficult dilemma. Almost constant armed conflict to the West
and historically rooted regional problems challenged the country’s political will and
capacity to undertake practical steps toward cooperation and integration before political
solutions were found to existing conflicts and problems. Furthermore, the Balkan region
has historically witnessed a very low level of economic and political interaction and
flow. Persistent ethnic conflict, political instability, and underdevelopment made the
likelihood of increasing cooperation and integration among the countries in the Balkans
extremely low. Indeed, several post-Cold War attempts to forge closer cooperation
through the creation of regional organizations have met the resistance of some Balkan
countries, which failed to achieve their goal. In the case of Bulgaria these regional
initiatives were seen as institutions diverting the country from its foreign policy
priorities—the EU and NATO. Thus although Bulgaria participated in the early 1990s in
the creation of a Black Sea Economic Cooperation (BSEC)—an institution designed to
facilitate political and economic cooperation among the Black Sea countries—Sofia

114 Aurel Braun, Small-State Security in the Balkans (Totowa, NJ: Barnes & Noble

115 As late as 2000, Bulgaria’s trade with the Balkan states represented only 6
Available from http://www.dbresearch.com; INTERNET; This trend is consistent with
the historical record as Braun observes that in the early 1980s the intra-Balkan trade
represented merely 6 percent of the total international trade of the Balkan states.
resisted any proposals to forge integration among the members, including the creation of a free-trade zone and an inter-parliamentary body.\textsuperscript{116} Similarly when the European Union and the U.S. created the Southeast European Cooperation Initiative in the mid-1990s, and in 1999 the Stability Pact for South Eastern Europe to financially assist the reconstruction of South East Europe in the wake of the Kosovo crisis, Bulgaria perceived these initiatives simply as yet another resource to utilize in the process of joining the EU rather than as institution designed to forge cooperation and integration among the Balkan states.

The inability of the Stability Pact to live up to expectations as a latter day Marshal Plan notwithstanding, the Pact's leadership often complained about Bulgaria's attitudes toward the initiative.\textsuperscript{117} Similarly, when the head of the Stability Pact suggested that a framework was created to monitor and address corruption in the Balkan countries, President Stoyanov reminded him that Bulgaria already negotiates with the EU on a chapter of the \textit{aquis} dealing with this issue.\textsuperscript{118} All in all, while Western institutions see these initiatives as facilitating the implementation of the EU and NATO membership requirements for practical cooperation and partnership among neighboring countries, Bulgaria saw them

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\textsuperscript{117}“Bulgaria Wants Revisions of Stability Pact,” \textit{Reuters} (3 May, 2001). Bulgaria threatened to withdraw from the Pact unless the country was removed from the Schengen visa list.

\textsuperscript{118}\textit{Bulgarian National Radio} (31 July, 2001).

\textsuperscript{119}On the shortcomings of the West's attempts to create peace through cooperation and assistance see International Crisis Group, “After Milosevic: A Practical Agenda for Lasting Balkans Peace” (29 April, 2001). Available from http://www.crisisweb.org: INTERNET.
as attempts to postpone the country's integration in the Western core.\textsuperscript{120} Although the ascent to power of a reform government in 1997 ended Bulgaria's relative international isolation and ushered Sofia into a more active foreign policy, the country embraced regional cooperation strictly as a means of enhancing its chances of Euro-Atlantic integration. Indeed, most of Bulgaria's Balkan policy was in response to various crises in the region rather than a long-term policy of regional integration.\textsuperscript{121} Not surprisingly, even when the Balkan states were able to create institutions of the type the EU and NATO envisioned as creating the fundamentals of a more integrated region, it was often found that those organizations had no viable missions.\textsuperscript{122}

\textit{The Czech Republic's Stock}

The Czech Republic borders Poland, Germany, Austria and Slovakia. Two of the countries--Germany and Austria--are members of the EU, and Poland and Slovakia are associated members. In addition, Germany is a member of NATO and Poland was invited

\textsuperscript{120}On the Western perspective see the interview of Mediapool agency with the head of the Stability Pact, Bodo Hombach. "Investitorite Chakat Kraja na Konflikta v Makedonija" [Investors Await the End of Macedonia Conflict] Mediapool (6 July, 2001). Available from http://www.mediapool.bg; INTERNET.


\textsuperscript{122}Southeast European states--Albania, Bulgaria, Greece, Italy, Macedonia, Romania and Turkey--created in 1998 a joint peacekeeping force envisioned to have up to 4,000 troops and a headquarters to be rotated in each country. A year later, however, the NATO Secretary-General Robertson suggested that the newly-established peacekeeping force should not be deployed in a Kosovo operation. "Balkan Peacekeeping Force Should Not be Deployed in Kosovo: Robertson." Reuters (13 January, 1999).
to join the Alliance along with the Czech Republic in 1997. Slovakia is an active participant in the PfP program seeking membership in 2002, while Austria chose to remain outside of NATO. Among the three case studies, the Czech Republic possessed the best stock throughout the decade following the demise of communism. In fact, the country's regional environment improved when the separation between the Czech and Slovak parts of Czechoslovakia paradoxically increased the quality of the Czech Republic's stock as the independent state of Slovakia substituted for the potentially unstable, and institutionally isolated from the West, Ukraine. Thus the Czech Republic found itself surrounded by either core countries or states seeking integration in the core. Furthermore, the neighboring states seeking to join the core--Poland and Slovakia--were among the most advanced East European countries as reflected, more so Poland than Slovakia, by their advanced stage of integration in Western institutions. The Czech Republic's favorable geographic position and stock combined with success of political, social and economic reforms translated into a quick institutional and economic reorientation of the country toward the Western core.\textsuperscript{123} Geographic proximity to Western markets and a relatively advanced national economy enabled the Czech Republic to attract Western capital, which further boosted competitiveness of the economy and its integration in the world market. In the decade following the start of economic reforms.

\textsuperscript{123}Czech reorientation toward the West was both economic and political. Accordingly, Czech-Russian relations cooled significantly: the heads of states met very few times, regular consultations between deputy foreign ministers from both countries ceased in 1998 and the Russian Foreign Minister visited Prague in 2001 after seven years of no show in Prague. “Russian Foreign Minister Visits Prague After Seven Years,” Czech News Agency (31 January, 2001).
the country accumulated almost three times as much foreign direct investment per capita as did Lithuania and almost five times as much as did Bulgaria (See Table 14).\textsuperscript{124}

The direction of Czech trade, too, quickly shifted from East to West. Even in the early stage of reform, over 50 percent of international trade was with the European Union consequently, by the end of the decade it reached over 70 percent of the total. Of the EU members, Germany, from early on, emerged as the Czech Republic’s largest trade partner absorbing 35 percent of the exports and providing 35 percent of the total imports.\textsuperscript{125} Very significantly, the Czech Republic greatly decreased its dependence on Russian sources of energy and by 2000 Russia accounted for only 6 percent of the total imports.\textsuperscript{126} Conversely, Russia still remained a main source of imports, particularly energy and raw materials, to Bulgaria and Lithuania, accounting for 21 percent of total imports to each country.

The reorientation of the Czech economy towards the Western market was consistent with the overall national policy of seeking quick and complete integration in the Western core. This policy was based on a single-minded strategy, which saw demands by Western states and institutions for more cooperation and integration among the Eastern European countries as attempts to postpone or even reject integration in the West.

\textsuperscript{124}Josef Tosovsky cautioned in 1995 that the national economy cannot absorb the huge inflow of foreign capital and warned that short-term speculative capital is producing strong inflationary pressures. “Bank Governor Says Capital is Flooding Czech Economy.” \textit{RFE/RL Research Report} (7 June, 1995).

\textsuperscript{125}ING Barings, 57; Russia became a very minor Czech trade partner, accounting for only 2.5 percent of the total exports in 1998, down from 3.4 percent in 1994. Czech Statistical Office, \textit{External Trade Structure by Country Group, Updated Figures}, table no. 6 (August, 2001). Available from http://www.czso.cz; INTERNET.

\textsuperscript{126}Ibid., 57.
The spectacular success of Czech reforms convinced the political elite that the country was well positioned to enter all Western institutions and it did not need to wait for the other post-communist countries until they caught up with the Czech Republic.\textsuperscript{127} Therefore, when Czechoslovakia, Poland and Hungary initiated in February 1991 the so-called Visegrad Group--designed to facilitate cooperation in a variety of areas, ranging from scientific research and trade issues to security--Prague saw it only as a consultative organ.\textsuperscript{128} The Czech leadership consistently rejected calls by its Hungarian and Polish counterparts for a common and coordinated approach to their quest to join Western institutions and for more regional cooperation.\textsuperscript{129} Accordingly, only after great pressure from the West did Prague agree to create a Central European Free Trade Area (CEFTA) among the Visegrad states, which went into effect in March 1993.\textsuperscript{130}

\textsuperscript{127}The admission, in November 1995, of the Czech Republic to the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development, an institution of the most advanced democracies, as the first of the post-communist countries can be seen as a recognition of the country's transformation effort by Western democracies.

\textsuperscript{128}In an interview for the French newspaper \textit{Le Figaro}, Prime Minster Vaclav Klaus described the Visegrad Group as an artificial process created by the West. Xavier Gautier, “Prime Minister on Partion of Czechoslovakia” (text). Paris \textit{Le Figaro} in French (12 January 1993). Translated by the Foreign Broadcast Information Service. \textit{FBIS Daily Report-East Europe}, 13 January 1993 (PrEx 7.10: FBIS-EEU-008-93; p. 22-23); On the Czech ambivalence about the Visegrad Group see Cottey, 126-41.

\textsuperscript{129}The Czech Republic refused to submit a common application for membership of the EU with Poland and Hungary and applied individually only after the other two states did so.

The Czech political elite throughout the 1990s challenged the proliferation of Central European cooperative arrangements, claiming that the Czech Republic was a Western rather than Central European state. The government reluctantly agreed to participate in 1993 in the so-called Central European Initiative including most post-communist states in the region plus Austria and Italy. Later, when CEFTA began to include more East European countries, the Czech Republic saw this development as another attempt by the EU to slow down the enlargement process. Instead Prague consistently demanded a speedy Union expansion.

More recently, when Austria in early 2001 suggested the setting up of a “Strategic Partnership” among the countries of Central Europe along the lines of the defunct Austro-Hungarian Empire, the Czech leadership once again expressed skepticism of the idea of creating yet another institution in which an EU member state would play a leading role rather than work for EU expansion. Prague’s suspicion of any regional arrangement that might divert the country from its course toward the Western core, however, did not lead to isolation from the neighbors as two of them were already in the core and the other two were among the frontrunners to join it. Indeed, most of the Czech Republic’s

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132 While some East European and EU leaders saw CEFTA as a step toward integration into Western institutions, Czech officials insisted that the Area is nothing more than a free-trade agreement rather than a “preparatory school for the EU.” Nigel Stephenson, “CEFTA Premiers to Hold Prague Summit,” Reuters (10 September, 1998).

133 Initially the Czech Republic hoped for EU expansion in the year 2000 and as this date became increasingly unrealistic the leadership consistently pressed for speeding up the process. “Havel in France Seeking Support for EU Expansion,” Agence France-Presse (2 March, 1999).

interaction, especially economically, was with its neighbors. In that sense, by rejecting regional institutional arrangements and single-mindedly pursuing integration in the Western core. Prague did not seek to alter its relationship with its neighbors but rather to transfer this relationship to a different institutional environment—the Western institutions.

Lithuania's Stock

Lithuania shares borders with Latvia to the North, Belarus to the Southeast, Poland to South and the Russian enclave of Kaliningrad to the southwest. None of Lithuania's neighbors is a member of the EU and of them only Poland in 1997 was invited to join NATO. Poland and Latvia are also EU associated members negotiating to join the Union. Latvia along with Lithuania is a PfP member and actively seeks membership in the Alliance. Of all neighbors, Belarus is the most institutionally isolated state as it has not sought membership in either NATO or the EU. Belarus' lack of democratization and social and economic reform have relegated the country as the only authoritarian political system in Eastern Europe. Therefore, the country has been shunned by the European core and no significant relationships have been established between the Western institutions and the government of Belarus. In fact, bilateral relations have frequently been strained and confrontational.136

135 Belarus is PfP member but has stated no intention of joining the Alliance and therefore developed no MAP after the 1999 Washington Summit.

136 Following NATO's expansion in 1999, Belarus' president Alexander Lukashenko suggested that his country will strengthen its military forces in collaboration with Russia to counter-balance the admission of the three former communist states to the Alliance. "Belarus to Strengthen Forces to Balance NATO Enlargement," Agence France-Presse (12 March, 1999).
The period leading to independence demonstrated to Lithuania’s leadership the utility of joint action and coordination of policies with neighboring countries toward the Soviet Union.\(^{137}\) Being a republic in the USSR and having no standing army or stable democratic institutions forced the political leadership to seek the cooperation and assistance of the international community and, in particular, Poland and two other Soviet republics—Latvia and Estonia.\(^{138}\) Having successfully gained independence, the Baltic states were initially committed to a high level of mutual cooperation and assistance. This commitment represented a sharp break with the inter-war pattern of antagonism and mutual suspicion, which partially accounts for the changing fortunes of Lithuania, Estonia, and Latvia since gaining independence after the First World War.\(^{139}\) The West, for its part, intensively cultivated the idea of Baltic unity. After 1991 Western institutions and states preferred to negotiate and deal with the three states simultaneously and at the same encouraged integration and cooperation among them as a precondition for joining those same institutions. The EU’s policy, in particular, indicated that it perceived the three countries as a unified group whose closer links would make the accession to the Union easier. Accordingly, the Baltic states created a Baltic Assembly in late 1991, the

\(^{137}\)Clemens, 39-52; Norgaard, Hindsgaul, et al.; Krickus.


\(^{139}\)On the inter-war attempts to forge Baltic cooperation see Zaneta Ozolina, “The Impact of the European Union on Baltic Co-operation,” occasional paper (Copenhagen, Denmark: Copenhagen Peace Research Institute, January 1999). Available from Columbia International Affairs Online; INTERNET.
Baltic Council of Ministers in 1994, the Baltic Free Trade Agreement, biannual summits of the heads of states, and other regional institutions.\textsuperscript{140}

Paradoxically, however, the three states found it increasingly difficult to cooperate as the EU and NATO started to make specific decisions about their respective enlargements. Then, the progress of reforms, the implementations of \emph{acquis} and even geographic location, rather than their sub-regional integration, increasingly came to determine their chances of joining the institutions of the Western core.\textsuperscript{141} The EU decision in 1997 to begin accession negotiations with Estonia, but not Lithuania and Latvia, clearly split the Baltic states and further strained their resolve to cooperate with one another.

The Baltic states also were gradually included in a Nordic framework of cooperation. This framework must be seen in the context of two parallel tracks, including the so-called “5+3” cooperation between the Nordic states—Finland, Sweden, Norway, Denmark, and Iceland—and the Baltic states; and bilateral cooperation, which in the case of Lithuania included extensive interaction with Denmark.\textsuperscript{142} After 1991 the Nordic states focused on creating a pattern of regional institutions and cooperation and acted as model for the creation of the Baltic Council between Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania. A Danish

\textsuperscript{140}According to Ozolina, in 1990 alone, the Baltic states signed 36 agreements on mutual cooperation. Ozolina, 6.

\textsuperscript{141}It must be noted that although Lithuania is frequently singled out as a laggard, ahead of Bulgaria and Romania but behind the other associated members, what works in the country’s advantage is its geographic position. Thus, in scenarios envisioning a large EU enlargement of up to ten countries, Lithuania is always included among the countries to join the EU with this group. Drawing a line between Lithuania and Poland and Latvia—two countries deemed to be better prepared to join—only to remove in a couple of years later, makes no political sense. For this argument see “Knocking at the Clubhouse Door.” \textit{The Economist} 360, no. 8237 (1-7 September, 2001): 22-24

\textsuperscript{142}See Knudsen, ed., \textit{Stability and Security}. 

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initiative also led to the creation of the Council of the Baltic Sea States (CBSS) in 1992, which included all Baltic coastal states, as well as Norway and Iceland. The CBSS was designed to improve cooperation and coordination in the region and promote democracy, the rule of law and economic development in the post-communist countries. Consistent with the traditional political culture of the Nordic states was the emphasis this institutions and bilateral cooperation arrangements put on "soft security"--cultivating post-communist countries in the peaceful resolution of common problems and promotion of mutual trust.

While embracing various regional arrangements and institutions, Vilnius pursued multiple track policies in its major foreign policy goal--joining NATO the EU. Responding to calls in the West to accept at least one Baltic state in NATO Lithuania initiated a campaign to convince the member states of its worth as a future ally. Vilnius, giving relatively more weight to NATO membership than the other Baltic states, turned its attention to Poland and tried to cultivate strong political, economic, and military relations as the more practical way to obtain membership of the Alliance as well as the EU.\textsuperscript{143} Simultaneously, Lithuania began increasingly to see itself as a Central European rather than a Baltic country and Poland was seen as a natural intermediary in the process of interacting with Central Europe.\textsuperscript{144} Accordingly, trade between the two states

\begin{flushright}
\textsuperscript{143}Perry, 104-7: "Lithuania, Poland to Cooperate on European Integration Bids," \textit{RFE/RL Newsline} (18 December, 1998).

\end{flushright}
increased and while Poland accounted for 5 and 4 percent of Lithuania's total export and import in 1994, in 1999 it accounted for 4.5 and 7 percent respectively.145

Lithuania also maintained strong trade exchange with Latvia; in 1999 it accounted for 12.7 and 4.6 percent of Lithuania's total exports and imports, up from 5 percent of its total trade in 1992.146 In fact, Lithuania, to a much greater extent than either the Czech Republic or Bulgaria, maintained extensive trade relations with its neighbors, a pattern established during the Soviet years.147 Latvia, Belarus, Poland and Russia accounted for 29.9 percent of the country's exports and 33.4 percent of its imports in 1999.148 Of them, Russia remained the largest trade partner with 6.8 percent of total exports and 19.5 percent of imports, mostly energy and raw materials.149

The Russian enclave of Kaliningrad and Russia in general represents one of the most important elements of Lithuania's stock. Because of the small share of the Russian minority in Lithuania and its early decision to grant them all citizenship rights, relations between Vilnius and Moscow are, with the exception of the Kaliningrad enclave.

145Knudsen, 212; Vilniaus Bankas, 46.
146Vilniaus Bankas, 46; Ozolina, 7.
148Ibid.
reasonably good. In fact, Moscow, ever since independence, has had the least problematic relations with Lithuania compared with the other two Baltic states. Yet, having been a part of the Soviet Union puts Lithuania in a precarious position as its security and development are greatly affected by Russia’s behavior. While relations for most of the 1990s had been relatively calm, they have frequently become hostage to the unsettled nature of Russian politics and rapidly changing regional and European dynamics. The need to establish good neighborly relations as a precondition for joining the Western core and Russia’s need to assure rail and road passage to Kaliningrad through Lithuania forced both countries to cultivate a stable relationship. Yet moves by Vilnius to integrate the enclave in a sub-regional Central European pattern of cooperation has aroused Russia’s fears about its territorial integrity.\textsuperscript{150} Lithuania, too, sometimes becomes a victim of its newly found independence from its former hegemon and unnecessarily challenges Russia’s sensibilities.\textsuperscript{151} Thus, although the relationship between the two countries remains extensive, it still remains capable of greatly affecting, both positively and negatively, the stability of Lithuania and its chances of joining the Western core. The unpredictability of Russia’s future political and economic development and the power discrepancy between the two countries places Lithuania in a hard position as Vilnius has little ability to determine the success of bilateral relations. For instance, although the two


\textsuperscript{151}In late 2000, in compliance with a law passed in June, a commission appointed by the Lithuanian government announced that USD 20 billion is the equivalent of damage Lithuania incurred under Soviet occupation. The government, after receiving the figure, was expected to initiate negotiations with Russian about the compensation. Inga Pavlovaite and Mel Huang, “News From Lithuania,” \textit{Central Europe Review} 2, no. 35 (16 October, 2000).
states signed a border treaty, the Russian parliament still refuses to ratify it in the hopes of maintaining Moscow’s influence on Lithuania’s foreign policy.\textsuperscript{152}

\textit{Conclusion}

The three states have clearly achieved different levels of international institutionalization (See Figures 2, 3, 4 and 5). While all of them had relatively similar communist experiences and in the 1990s declared almost identical foreign policy priorities and goals, differences in socio-economic development, political developments and regional environments endowed them with varying capacities and opportunities to achieve their stated objectives. Among the three cases the Czech Republic clearly achieved the highest degree of integration in the Western core, being among the first post-communist states to conclude a Europe Agreement with the European Commission, being invited to join NATO in 1997 and beginning negotiations on EU accession in 1998. The country was also able to quickly reorient its economic relations toward the Western core without the economic hardship associated with market reforms. The ability of the Czech Republic to attain the highest degree of integration was created by its stable political and economic development as well as its geographic location as the post-communist state closest to the Western core. Indeed, geographic location seemed to have

a significant impact of a country’s ability to integrate. Paradoxically, all three countries were reluctant participants in regional integrative and cooperative arrangements, as these were perceived as diverting them from integration in the Western core. Here, however, geographic location made the Czech Republic’s cost of avoiding non-EU and NATO integration relatively low, as all of its neighbors are either already members of these institutions or actively seeking to join them. In other words, regional integration and cooperation was achieved in the context of the country’s Euro-Atlantic integration and cooperation.

In contrast, Bulgaria and Lithuania achieved relatively weaker integration in the same core (See Figure 2). Lithuania, having achieved independence from the Soviet Union after the other two countries, faced major challenges in its integration efforts as along with its efforts to join the West it had to build state and political institutions from scratch. Consequently, Lithuania initially lagged behind the other two states in concluding a Europe Agreement and membership in all-European institutions such as the Council of Europe and OSCE. Economic and political stabilization, however, enabled the country to speed up the process of joining the Western core: the country was quickly recognized as a potential NATO member, and although having started negotiations to join the EU two years after the Czech Republic, Vilnius speedily caught up with the first group of candidates in terms of adopting the acquis. And as for the impact on country

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153 Public opinion seemed to have little independent effect on the three countries’ integration in the West as all publics maintained consistent approval of integration in both the EU and NATO (See Tables 15 and 16).

stock, although Lithuania’s geographic location was not as advantageous as the Czech Republic’s, what played in Lithuania’s favor was the pre-existing integration, especially economic integration, among the countries in the region.

Of the three cases, Bulgaria attained the lowest level of integration in the Western core (See Figure 2). Although Sofia concluded an European Agreement the same year as the Czech Republic did, slow economic reform and political instability until 1997 relegated Bulgaria to the group of countries which are consistently seen as achieving EU membership only after the other ten candidates become members. In addition, until the ascent to power of the Kostov government in 1997, Sofia was not considered a serious NATO candidate. and even then its chances were seen as no better than most of the other candidates. The weakness of national capacities to integrate in the Western core were compounded by the handicaps of its international stock. The almost constant armed conflict to the west and the low level of integration of the neighboring countries in the Western core further weakened Bulgaria’s ability to integrate internationally. Historically low levels of cooperation and integration with neighboring states and constant regional threats and risks hampered Bulgaria’s willingness to stimulate interaction within the region.
Appendix II

Variable Flow

Figure 2 represents an attempt to provide a comparison of the three states’ flows on an ordinal scale. The figure measures the position of each country on the already discussed international variable flow. The three countries are ranked by summing the five variables by assigning values of 3 to the highest ranking on each variable, 2 to the next and 1 to the lowest ranking. In case two or more states share the same ranking, the states receive the same value on the 1-3 scale. The assigned values represent the countries’ ranking for the period 1990-2000.

The country’s flow is estimated by using a 1-3 scale and assigning the value of three to the country, which has the highest integration in NATO and the EU, the highest amount of foreign direct investments per capita, and consistently highest public approval of membership in the Euro-Atlantic institutions. The value of one is assigned to the country which scores lowest on each of the same variables.

<table>
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<th>NATO</th>
<th>EU</th>
<th>FDI</th>
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<th>Public Approval</th>
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<th>Average</th>
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<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
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<td>7</td>
<td>1.4</td>
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<td>3</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>3.0</td>
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<td>3</td>
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</table>

Variable Stock

Figures 3, 4 and 5 represent an attempt to provide a comparison of the three states’ stocks on an ordinal scale. The figure measures the position of each country on the already discussed international variable stock. The three countries are ranked by summing the values each of the three states’ neighbors has in terms of their integration in the EU and NATO. The country’s stock is estimated by using a 0-4 scale. The value of 4 is assigned to a country which has a membership in the institution, 3 to a country which is in the process of negotiating membership, 2 to a country interested in joining, 1 to a country which has maintained a very weak relationship with the institution, and 0 to a country which had a hostile relation with the institution. The assigned values represent the countries’ ranking for the period 1990-2000.

Figure 3.
Bulgaria’s Stock

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<th>EU</th>
<th>Total</th>
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</thead>
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<td>3</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Serbia</td>
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<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
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<tr>
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<td>2</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Greece</td>
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<td>4</td>
<td>8</td>
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<tr>
<td>Turkey</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Total Score: 22; Average Score: 4.4
The Czech Republic has the highest international stock of 7.25, Lithuania scores 4.75, and Bulgaria has the lowest stock of 4.4.
Table 12.
Trade with the European Union
(percentage of total)

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</thead>
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<td>20</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>34</td>
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<td>38</td>
<td>41</td>
<td>47</td>
<td>52</td>
<td>53</td>
<td>54</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Czech R.</td>
<td>53</td>
<td>57</td>
<td>61</td>
<td>60</td>
<td>61</td>
<td>64</td>
<td>67</td>
<td>71</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lithuania</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>37</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>42</td>
<td>44</td>
<td>48</td>
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</tbody>
</table>


Table 13.
Foreign Direct Investment
(net inflows recorded in the balance of payment, in millions of US dollars)

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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Bulgaria</td>
<td>98</td>
<td>138</td>
<td>507</td>
<td>537</td>
<td>806</td>
<td>820</td>
<td>3,152</td>
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<tr>
<td>Czech R.</td>
<td>2,526</td>
<td>1,276</td>
<td>1,275</td>
<td>2,641</td>
<td>4,912</td>
<td>4,500</td>
<td>19,424</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lithuania</td>
<td>72</td>
<td>152</td>
<td>328</td>
<td>921</td>
<td>-478</td>
<td>295</td>
<td>2,307</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


Table 14.
Cumulative Foreign Direct Investment Per Capita, 1989-2000
(in US dollars)

<p>| | |</p>
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
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<th></th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Bulgaria</td>
<td>388</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Czech R.</td>
<td>1,884</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lithuania</td>
<td>626</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Ibid.
Table 15
Public Approval of Membership in NATO
(in percentage) ____________________________________

<table>
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<tr>
<td>Lithuania</td>
<td>83</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>55</td>
<td>55</td>
<td>49</td>
<td>64</td>
<td></td>
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</tbody>
</table>


Table 16
Public Approval of Membership in the European Union
(in percentage) ____________________________________

<table>
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</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Bulgaria</td>
<td>75</td>
<td>49</td>
<td>57</td>
<td>55</td>
<td>46</td>
<td>86</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Czech R</td>
<td>72</td>
<td>43</td>
<td>49</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>55</td>
<td>45</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lithuania</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>42</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>39</td>
<td>47</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

CHAPTER VI

DEPENDENT VARIABLE SECURITY

Chapter VI investigates the dependent variable, national security. Separate sections are devoted to each of the three states' levels of security. Each section surveys the objective security of each of the three countries in the post-communist period, the evolution of the official conceptualization of national security and the evolution of popular perceptions of security. The last section compares the levels of security achieved by each country.

Bulgarian Security

The end of Soviet domination in Eastern Europe presented Bulgaria with fundamentally different security challenges. Bulgaria’s entire security arrangement was based on the assumption that the Warsaw Pact, and the Soviet Union in particular, would provide unconditional assistance in the event of military conflict. Thus Bulgaria lost not only its sources of cheap raw materials, energy, and reliable markets but also its traditional partners to provide security. This explains why initially the Bulgarian leadership was reluctant to let the Warsaw Pact go. The only notable exception was President Zhelev, who, from early on, argued that the Pact was already a political corpse and insisted on closer ties with the West.1 Zhelev made several visits to the West, including Western Europe, the United States and Japan in 1990-91 to demonstrate the

country's reorientation away from Moscow. While the governments in the first two years after 1989 were broadly supportive of this reorientation, they had a hard time contemplating an alternative to the existing security arrangements in a new security environment. Thus Bulgaria did not initially consider the unilateral dissolution of the Warsaw Pact as a valuable option.²

When the end of the Warsaw Pact became inevitable in 1991, Bulgaria was at a loss to produce an alternative security policy. While acquiescing to the loss of traditional security guarantees, Sofia attempted to ensure national security by enhancing national military power, improving relations with neighboring states and nurturing a new, more equal relationship with the Soviet Union.³ Although the government recognized that the new approach required good relations with NATO, it doubted Bulgaria would become a member of the Alliance.⁴


The loss of the traditional security framework which guaranteed Bulgaria’s security in the context of fundamental political, social and economic transformation in the country coincided with the emergence of acute regional security challenges. The beginning of Yugoslavia’s disintegration and the accompanying civil wars presented the country with unfamiliar threats and risks to which the leadership had no readily available responses. The Bulgarian leadership faced the necessity of formulating new policies and strategies to address the new challenges in a completely new international environment.

The conflicts of Yugoslavia’s disintegration involved, among others, Serbia, a state with which Bulgaria had a long history of rivalry, and Macedonia, a country which Balkan states have traditionally sought to possess or dominate. Sofia feared that the conflict might spill over and engulf the entire region. Feeling extremely vulnerable, Bulgaria’s policy, until at least 1996, of addressing the likelihood of a wider military conflict was to try to persuade its Balkan neighbors to avoid any involvement in the Yugoslav conflict. This policy explains why Sofia was the last state among the associated members of the EU to provide troops to various peacekeeping operations in the region. It considered such involvement risky and exacerbating conflicts among Balkan states.

Accordingly, Bulgaria was the first state to recognize Macedonia’s independence in

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1992, thus trying to prevent the repeat of past attempts by various Balkan states to dominate the area. The growing international isolation of rump Yugoslavia and Bulgaria's commitment to observe political, economic, and military sanctions against Belgrade denied Sofia opportunities to work with Serbia on any of the outstanding issues between the two countries and, in general, rendered impotent any Bulgarian attempts to affect developments in this part of the region.

The disintegration of the Warsaw Pact left Bulgaria alone to face Greece and Turkey, two states Bulgaria was supposed to confront militarily in the event of war during the Cold War. Without external security guarantees, Sofia became increasingly concerned about military imbalances in the region. These concerns became more resilient as, in accordance with the Conventional Forces in Europe Treaty, excess weapons from NATO members in Western Europe, including advanced systems, poured into Greece and Turkey. In addition Sofia complained that Yugoslavia never signed the Treaty and thus was under no international obligation to limit its military power or participate in a confidence-building framework.

Consecutive Bulgarian governments adopted different policies to address the perceived threat. The short-lived first non-communist government of Filip Dimitrov in 1991-92 reoriented Bulgarian foreign policy toward greater cooperation with the West and Turkey. In this period, however, Bulgarian leadership, with the notable exception of President Zhelev, did not actively seek NATO membership as a means of guaranteeing national security. Dimitrov's policy led to improved ties with Ankara, which was

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8 See statement by President Zhelev in the daily Balgarska Armia (18 November, 1991), 1.

9 In his election address before the 1991 parliamentary elections, UDF leader and future Prime Minister Filip Dimirtov listed Bulgaria's integration in the EC as a number
pleased to see changing treatment of the country’s Turkish minority. The two countries signed a Treaty of Friendship, Goodneighborliness, Cooperation and Security in May 6, 1992. Along with economic and social agreements, the two governments arranged to develop bilateral confidence-building measures. Accordingly, Sofia and Ankara signed in December 1991 the Sofia Document on Mutually Supplementing Measures to Strengthen Confidence and Security and Military Contacts Between Bulgaria and Turkey, in which they agreed to give each other advance notice of military exercises taking place within 60 kilometers of the borders, an exchange of military observers, etc. Military strength along the border was reduced on both sides. The Sofia Document was later strengthened by the Edirne Document on Some Additional Measures for the Strengthening of Security and Confidence and Military Contacts, signed in 1992. The Edirne Document reduced the threshold for military activity notices and expanded the cooperation in military training and contacts.

Similar attempts were made to establish security ties with Greece. The Bulgarian-Greek Treaty of Friendship, Good Neighborhood, Cooperation and Security was signed in October 1991 to last for period of 20 years. The two countries also signed in December 1992 a confidence building agreement committing to lowering the Vienna Document’s

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threshold on the number of troops, tanks and artillery pieces involved in military
exercises.

Despite Bulgaria's early attempts to address its security concerns by seeking more
extensive security ties with the West, in general, and regionally with Turkey and Greece,
the Bulgarian leadership continued to see the country as dangerously exposed in a
uncertain security environment. Political and military leaders continued to compare the
national force structure and armaments with those of Turkey and Greece. Discussions
of the deteriorating state of the Bulgarian military and the increasing scope of military
hostilities in Yugoslavia frequently evoked comparisons to the accelerated modernization
of the Greek and especially the Turkish military forces as a result of the cascading
transfer of weapons systems from Western Europe.

Although Bulgaria dramatically increased its ties with the West, the lack of
security guarantees forced the country to fall back on previously tested security ties. In
contrast to most other East European countries, Bulgaria did not see Russia as security
threat to its independence and territorial integrity. Accordingly, in August 1992, Bulgaria
and Russia signed a Treaty on Good Neighborliness and Friendly Relations, which went
beyond similar treaties between Russia and its former Warsaw Pact allies, as two of the
articles in this treaty were security related. Article 4 states that consultations will be held
if a particular situation endangers international peace and security, and Article 5 that
"none of the contracting parties shall allow its territory to be used for military aggression
or other violent activities against the other contracting party."

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12 Statements by President Zhelev and General Tsvetan Totomirov. *Bulgarian
Telegraph Agency* (2 October, 1994).

13 Kyril Haramiev-Drezov, "Bulgarian-Russian Relations on a New Footing,"
politicians interpreted the treaty as leaving the possibility of Russian military assistance to Bulgaria. Sofia was also highly encouraged by the fact that the treaty was signed during a visit of Russian President Boris Yeltsin to Sofia, his first visit to a East European country as a head of state. Yeltsin also promised his guests more oil deliveries and greater access to the Russian market.

The signing of the treaty coincided with an increased sense of insecurity among the public. While in 1991 and 1992 the world closely followed developments in Yugoslavia, the Bulgarian public seemed preoccupied with the domestic transition process and disinterested in the disintegration of the neighboring state. National media provided little coverage of the conflict and politicians found it only too convenient to avoid taking a stand on events over which the country seemed to have no control, influence, or interest.

In early 1993, however, Bulgaria was forced to take a more definite stand on the conflict in Yugoslavia, as the West demanded that the Bulgarian government meet its obligations under international law and enforce the embargo on the neighboring country. Yugoslavia was regularly defying international sanctions and using the Danube River to smuggle in badly needed supplies. Pressed to meet its obligations and fearful of provoking conflict with its neighbor, the government of Berov requested from the EU and the U.S. security guarantees and assistance but received none. In February 1993, Bulgaria ruled out the unilateral use of force to halt the convoys along Danube.

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14 Ibid., 37.


16 Ibid., 8
Only in 1993 did part of the Bulgarian political leadership, notably the UDF, begin to seek NATO membership as a guarantee for national security. After the BSP formed a majority government in 1994, however, the issue of joining the Alliance became extremely politicized as the Socialists concluded that NATO was not the answer to national security concerns. Although the new government maintained formal relations with the Alliance, it was clear that the formal membership was not a foreign policy priority.17 The Socialist government proved to be much more conservative in its foreign policy as it displayed a tendency to fall back on alliances and affinities that had been based in the course of history. During the Cold War Bulgaria and Greece developed close ties, an affiliation based on the shared mistrust of Ankara. Following the UDF government’s policy that led to strained relations with Russia and especially with Greece, after Bulgaria recognized Macedonia the Socialist government embarked on restoring ties with Moscow and fostering an even closer relationship with Athens. Thus Bulgaria tried to address its security needs by establishing closer relations with what it saw as historically tested allies while gradually isolating itself from the broader process of the East European countries’ forging of increasingly extensive relations with the West. In fact, Bulgaria’s shunning of NATO membership was accompanied by difficult relations with other institutions including the EU, the International Monetary Fund, and the World Bank.

Better relations with Moscow and Athens did not, however, translate into perceptions of more security on the part of the ruling elite. Politicians and military elites continued to compare the structure and power of the national military forces with those of

17Videnov; See also Council of Ministers of the Republic of Bulgaria. Kontceptciia.
neighboring countries.¹⁸ Even Yugoslav troops, although deployed to fight Muslim and
Croat forces, remained one of the best-equipped armies in Europe and thus superior to the
deteriorating Bulgarian military. At the same time, NATO was perceived to have
couraged an arms race on the Balkans to Bulgaria's disadvantage by further cascading
weapons from Central Europe to Greece and Turkey.¹⁹ This perception was shared not
only by the Socialists but also by the opposition UDF.²⁰

The Socialist government defined national security in narrow, traditional terms
reflecting the government's preoccupation with external threats and risks. In the National
Security Concept approved by the Videnov government on 13 July 1995, national
security is defined as the lack of immediate threat of military aggression, political
control, or economic coercion to the state and the society.²¹

The Concept identifies international and domestic factors determining the state of
national security. While the document recognizes the growing multiplicity of

Modernization, Or We Will Be Hopelessly Behind in One or Two Years" (text). Sofia
Trud in Bulgarian (6 February 1995). Translated by the Foreign Broadcast Information
Service. FBIS Daily Report-East Europe. 10 February 1995 (PrEx 7.10: FBIS-EEU-95-
028; p. 4).

¹⁹"At One Stroke, NATO Pushes Us Into a New Arms Race" (text). Sofia 24
Chasa in Bulgarian (27 October 1994). Translated by the Foreign Broadcast Information
Service. FBIS-Daily Report-East Europe, 1 November 1994 (PrEx 7.10: FBIS-EEU-94-
211; p. 6).

²⁰Nikolay Slatinski, former Chairman of the National Assembly's National
Security Committee, worried in early 1995 that the Conventional Forces in Europe Treaty
exacerbated an already great regional imbalance to Bulgaria's detriment by allowing
modernization of weapons system and cascading of military hardware to Greece and
Turkey. Given the economic and social crisis in the country, Bulgaria was seen as unable
to compete and keep up with these countries. Slatinski and Caparini, 32.

²¹Council of Ministers of the Republic of Bulgaria, Konceptcija, 1.
international threats and risks, it firmly identifies the traditional, specifically regional, hard-core threats--regional civil wars and their spill-over potential, historical conflicts among some Balkan states, serious asymmetry of institutional security guarantees among states, demands for territorial changes, and the emergence of new states after Yugoslavia's disintegration--as the most significant security challenges to national security. The document warns that the growing asymmetry between the military power of Bulgaria and most of its members may lead in the future to aggression against the country. Very significantly, the Concept fails to state that Bulgaria does not see an immediate threat to its territorial integrity and sovereignty stemming from the conditions existing in the region.

Although the Videnov government did not identify any country as threatening national security, it implicitly regarded Bulgaria's traditional enemies, especially Turkey and Yugoslavia, as posing a threat to national sovereignty. Although no country in the Balkans had declared any territorial claims to Bulgaria, the government and part of the society seemed to assume them.22 Both failed to realize that Yugoslavia had no intentions of antagonizing Bulgaria and, in any event, Belgrade was in no position to mount any effective military challenges to the East. In addition, Sofia's preoccupation with the growing military disparity between Bulgaria, on the one hand, and Greece and Turkey on the other, indicated a misreading of the security dynamics between Athens and Ankara. In fact, the two countries came to blows in the mid-1990s over their deep divisions.

22 In an interview with the Kontinent daily, Turkey's president Suleyman Demirel was asked to assure the Bulgarian public that his country had no evil designs on Bulgaria or the Balkans. "Suleyman Demirel, Interview" (text). Sofia Bulgarian Telegraph Agency in English (10 December 1993). Translated by the Foreign Broadcast Information Service. FBIS Daily Report-East Europe, 13 December 1993 (PrEx 7.10: FBIS-EEU-93-237: p. 10).
involving Cyprus, air space, territorial waters and treatment of minorities, and both were only happy to maintain unproblematic relations with Bulgaria.

Discussing domestic factors, the Concept identifies the pace and direction of political and economic reform, the social effects of those reforms, and the strength of state institutions, especially judiciary, police and army as the major factors affecting national security. It also includes demographic factors, environmental problems, organized crime’s effects, and the “non-Bulgarian spiritual invasion of the society.”

The document contains implicit criticism of the previous governments’ policies, which led to severe economic and social problems, in turn severely exposing the country to threats and risks. It also points out that the country neglected traditional allies in its pursuit of integration in international institutions without regard for national autonomy and interests. According to the Concept, the state’s goal is to guarantee its territorial integrity and sovereignty, to ensure the conditions for economic development and to guarantee the democratic character of the society, among others. The decisive way of achieving this is through the sustained process of increasing national power, active cooperation and coordination with international partners and stimulating the nation’s patriotism and loyalty to the state through sustained economic and social prosperity. National interests can be protected by relying mainly on the national military forces. Moreover, military security is seen as determined by the strategic, political and military factors in the international environment, on the one hand, and national military capacities, on the other. Although the concept defines cooperation with international institutions and friendly states as an additional way to guarantee security, it makes no explicit

\[23\text{Ibid., 10.}\]

\[24\text{Ibid., 11-12.}\]
commitment to seeking integration in NATO as a major foreign policy goal. Instead, it suggests that Bulgaria may seek NATO membership only after the Alliance transformed itself into one of the elements of a pan-European security framework in which Russia will have a major role. Accordingly, while membership in the EU and the WEU is defined as a priority, the relationship with NATO is seen as a partnership.

The Videnov government's Concept reflected the emergence of a deep division among the political elite over the nature of national security and how best to achieve it. While the Socialists' conception perceived the issue in largely traditional ways, emphasizing the accumulation of mostly military power and the maintenance of alliance with friendly states, the UDF opposition insisted that integration in both the UN and NATO is both consistent with Bulgaria's quest to join a community of states sharing common values and the best way to guarantee the country's security and prosperity. The BSP government correctly concluded that membership in both organizations is only a distant possibility and was skeptical of the organizations' ability and willingness to address the country's security needs. Yet Bulgaria, in their view, was facing immediate

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and grave threats and challenges. The government saw neighboring states as competitors, some of which—Greece and Turkey—were already members of a security organization which Bulgaria had no chance of joining in the near future. Bulgaria fell back on already tested security arrangements by reviving its close relations with Russia and cultivating more extensive cooperation with Greece.

In addition to its reverse in foreign and security policies, the government also ended the gradual reduction in military budgets implemented by previous governments. At the wake of communism’s collapse, Bulgaria was spending $2.46 billion on its military, accounting for more than 4.5 percent of the GDP (See Table 17). After declining to 2.5 percent of the GDP in 1994, the Videnov government refused to implement further military reforms and maintained the armed forces’ structure and high budgets. In fact while in Eastern Europe military budgets were declining, Bulgaria continued to have high military expenditures, becoming a heavy burden on the stagnated economy.

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27 The public seemed to share the Socialists’ perception of the likelihood of NATO accession. In 1995 only 31 percent of the public believed that accession within five years was likely. United States Information Agency, *The New European Security*, 15: The public also seemed to have little confidence in international organizations. 35 percent trusted OSCE, 29 percent trusted WEU, and 33 percent expressed trust in NATO. Ibid., 33.

28 Russia was more than happy to reward Bulgaria’s lack of interest in NATO. In July 1995 Moscow sent to Bulgaria free of charge 100 T-72 tanks along with armored fighting vehicles. *Kontinent* (27 February, 1995), 7.


30 It must be noted that differences in accounting practices explain the discrepancies between figures provided by Bulgaria’s Ministry of Defense and Western sources such as *The Military Balance*. Thus according to the Ministry of Defense between 1990 and 1996 the budget for defense averaged slightly over 3 percent of the GDP and in 1997 and 1998 it declined to slightly over 2 percent. In any event, until 1996
The public seemed to share some of the government's assumptions about security. The relatively strong relationship with Russia established by the bilateral treaty in 1992 and enhanced by the Videnov government after 1994 was an unproblematic issue in domestic politics. In 1992 only 6 percent of the public perceived Russia to represent a threat to Bulgaria and by 1994 only 5 percent seemed to share this perception. In fact, the Bulgarian public did not see any of the great powers as posing any threat to its security. In 1992 and 1996, only 3 percent perceived Germany to be a threat, and 4 and 9 percent respectively saw the US as a threat. In other words, neither a single great power nor a conflict among great powers was seen to be a likely threat to national security. Conversely, in 1992, 61 percent of the public perceived neighboring countries as representing a threat to peace and security in Bulgaria, although by 1996 this feeling of threat was shared by only 31 percent. Threats emanating from the region and within countries were perceived to be the most likely challenges to national security. The beginning of the Yugoslav conflict generated a sense of grave insecurity; the negotiated end of the war in Bosnia and the consequent deployment of NATO peacekeeping forces in late 1995 only slightly abated the public's security apprehensions. Raging and dormant ethnic conflicts in the region heightened security fears about the possible threat posed by


31In most other East European states the perception of threat from Russia actually increased. Christian Haerpfer, Claire Wallace and Richard Rose, *Public Perceptions of Threats to Security in Post-Communist Europe* (Glasgow, Scotland: University of Strathclyde, Center for the Study of Public Policy, 1997). 6.

32Ibid., 6-11.

33Ibid., 12.
Bulgaria's own ethnic groups (See Table 18). Remarkably, in the decade following the collapse of communism the public never ceased to see ethnic minorities as a possible threat to territorial integrity and national security.

The public's perceptions of external threats to national security were compounded by a growing sense of personal and social insecurity. The Bulgarian economy witnessed one of the most dramatic declines in Eastern Europe. In the first six years the country experienced significant shrinking of its GDP, high inflation and constantly growing unemployment (See Tables 19 and 20). These developments inevitably led to social and economic dislocations whose consequences challenged the relative sense of social security the public was accustomed to during the years of communism. In the years following the end of communism, infant mortality rates reached numbers higher than the one in 1989 (See Table 21). In addition, life expectancy for males reversed its previous tendency of steady increase and slightly declined (See Table 22). In the years 1990-1996 Bulgaria experienced a dramatic drop in its Human Development Index (HDI), from .854 to .758, thus sliding from 40th to 63rd place among states (See Table 23). Serious crime, previously a rare occurrence, quickly became one of the most important social issues and was placed among the greatest threats to social peace and personal security (See Table 24). These developments increased the public's perceptions of domestic threats to the levels of social and economic security enjoyed during the last years of communism. The rule of the Socialists in 1994-96 coincided with the greatest public dissatisfaction with the development of democracy and the direction of the country in the period analyzed in this study. Accordingly, the populace also perceived little respect for human rights in this

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34 Developed by the United Nations, the HDI combines life expectancy, educational attainment and income indicators to give a composite measure of human development in various countries.
period of Bulgaria’s transition. Increasingly, as the economic and social crisis deepened, the public came to see the consequences of this crisis as the more significant threats to security even as external threats continued to be identified by the Socialists as the most significant among multiple threats.

The ascendance of UDF to power in early 1997 dramatically changed Bulgaria’s approach to cooperation with and integration in the international community. Bulgaria saw membership in NATO, the EU and the WEU not only as a reliable source of security guarantees but also as a natural expression of the country’s foreign policy orientations. Accordingly, the Kostov government not only reoriented the country’s foreign policy but also altered its approach to security.

The National Assembly approved in April 1998 a new National Security Concept which reflected the new government’s security policies and priorities.\(^\text{35}\) Like the Concept of the previous government, the new Concept identifies both external and internal factors affecting and determining national security. National security is defined as a condition “when the major rights and liberties of the Bulgarian citizens are protected as well as the state borders, the territorial integrity and independence of the country, when there is not any danger of armed attack, violent change in the constitutional order, political dictate or economic compulsion for the state and the democratic functioning of the state and civilian institutions is guaranteed.”\(^\text{36}\) Although the Concept sees a considerably decreased danger of direct military aggression against Bulgaria, it still emphasizes the importance


\(^{36}\text{Ibid., 3.}\)
of military and force factors in international relations. In contrast to the previous government's approach, however, the new Concept recognizes the inability of the country to ensure its security on its own or to seek security through neutrality, because of insufficient financial, economic and military potential. Instead it identifies integration in international organizations and participation in the globalization process as the means to address these shortcomings. Along with identifying the national scarcity of security resources, the document points out that national security is affected by world economic, political, scientific and environmental processes as well as regional developments. Thus it becomes very unlikely that unilateral decisions, including military ones, are imposed in regional and bilateral conflicts. The Concept points out that these developments--scarcity of national resources, the significance of world processes, and the institutional, rather than unilateral, solution of problems--prompts Bulgaria to seek security through transition to democracy and a market economy and integration in Euro-Atlantic institutions, including the EU and NATO. Significantly, the lack of security and stability until recently were caused by the failure of the previous government to pursue these same policies. In other words, it is not mainly the external threats that affected the state of national security but the failure to advance reforms and the refusal to integrate in the Euro-Atlantic institutions.

The new Concept, like the old one, devotes much attention to threats in the Balkans, especially the ones associated with the conflicts in Yugoslavia. The effects of the crisis in the neighboring country are seen not in the form of a direct military challenge but rather as the existence of conditions for the development of organized crime and

37 Ibid., 1.

38 Ibid., 2.
corruption and for the isolation of Bulgaria from the process of integration in the Western institutions. These conditions jeopardize the stability of the Bulgarian state institutions whose integrity is a precondition for national security. In other words, the regional threats to national security are not in the form of direct military challenges to the territorial integrity and sovereignty of Bulgaria but in their effects on the capacity of the country to reform and integrate in Western institutions. Bulgaria’s perception of regional and limited threats to its national security were also evident in its Military Doctrine, which did not envision any direct military threat but defined any armed conflict in the Balkans as potentially presenting the challenges already identified in the Security Concept. 39

Significantly, after the UDF’s ascendance to power, political leaders and officials ended their references to any military unbalances between Bulgaria and its neighbors as Greece and Turkey were already seen as soon-to-be allies. Even the Socialists, although fundamentally opposed at least until 2000 to a membership in NATO, were unable to generate public support for their security and foreign policies. In fact, while in opposition after disastrous electoral results in 1997, the BSP did not develop any cohesive foreign policy vision of its own.

The new security concept was adopted shortly before a new escalation of armed conflicts in the Balkans. In early 1999 NATO initiated air strikes against Yugoslavia, the second such action in less than four years. This time the military action was even closer to Bulgarian territory, in Kosovo and Serbia, and presented an even more dramatic challenge to national perceptions of security. Both the rhetorical and already institutional commitment to Euro-Atlantic integration, forced Bulgaria to take a firm stand on the

conflict. In contrast to the 1991-96 period, when Bulgarian governments saw neutrality and noninterference as the best guarantee of national security, the Kostov government firmly committed the country to the Alliance’s strikes, including providing overflight rights, imposing sanctions on Serbia in accordance with EU associate members’ obligations, and urging Belgrade to accept the international community’s conditions.\textsuperscript{40}

It must be noted, however, that the government’s decision to support the West in the conflict was taken over the public’s disapproval of NATO’s action and of the government’s involvement in the conflict.\textsuperscript{41} UDF was the only party which unequivocally supported the NATO air campaign, while the BSP strongly objected and frequently tried to end the agreement between the Alliance and the government. Public resistance reflected the perception of an acute threat to national security and exposed the public’s

\textsuperscript{40}In a sharp reversal of previous Bulgarian policy of neutrality toward Yugoslavia, President Stoyanov stated that Bulgaria’s long term interests did not coincide with the interests of today’s leadership of Yugoslavia and described the conflict as “a collision between the democratic community and the last communist regime in Europe.” “Bulgaria Sides with NATO Over Kosovo,” Agence France-Presse (16 April, 1999); In an interview for Le Mond, President Stoyanov noted that in the past seven years Bulgaria had been a hostage of Milosevic’s policies and that it is time to solve the Serbia problem. Bulgarian Telegraph Agency (5 May, 2001); In an interview for the daily Trud. Prime Minster Ivan Kostov stated that Bulgaria cannot have a neutral policy toward the Kosovo crisis for neutrality would bring about more threats to Bulgaria. Valeriya Velva. “You Stop Violence with Violence” (text). Sofia Trud in Bulgarian (3 May 1999). Translated by the Foreign Broadcast Information Service. FBIS Daily Report-East Europe. 3 May 1999 (PrEx 7.10: FBIS-EEU-1999-0503). Available from World News Connection: INTERNET.

\textsuperscript{41}In March 1999, 72 percent of the public was against NATO military intervention in Yugoslavia and 77 percent were against NATO equipment and personnel crossing Bulgaria. “Bulgaria--Survey--Kosovo,” Bulgarian Telegraph Agency (23 March, 1999).
belief that neutrality to conflicts in the Balkans is still the best guarantee for Bulgaria’s security.42

Although the perception of insecurity was widespread, the public did not exactly identify the nature of the threat posed by the Kosovo conflict. Yugoslavia did not issue any specific warnings about Bulgaria’s support to NATO’s action as Sofia’s behavior did not substantially differ from the policies of the other Balkan countries which provided political and practical assistance to the Alliance. Moreover, Bulgaria did not turn into a destination for refugees leaving Kosovo, and aside from several stray American missiles landing on Bulgarian territory43 the short war did not inflict any damages on the country.44 Yet the public was afraid the country would be dragged in the conflict.45 Despite government assurances that Bulgaria was ready to face any challenge with the assistance of Western Europe, and despite the widely publicized NATO commitments to national security, the public remained skeptical.46 Conversely, the ruling elite saw the

42 In the same survey, 58 percent of the public viewed the conflict in Kosovo as the worst threat to national security. While one-third considered NATO guarantees a reliable protection only 59 percent said Bulgaria would be better protected if it did not allow its territory to be used in a possible attack on Yugoslavia. Ibid.

43 “Fifth Stray NATO Missile Hits Bulgaria.” Agence France-Presse (7 May, 1999).

44 During the air campaign the Bulgarian military was not placed on higher alert although some special security measures were implemented, including additional security for the nuclear plant in Kozloduy. Galina Sabeva, “Bulgarian Leaders Work to Grant NATO Request,” Reuters (19 April, 1999).

45 Anatoly Verbin, “Bulgarian Government Tested Over Kosovo.” Reuters (19 April, 1999).

46 During the crisis Bulgaria and the Alliance held intensive consultations, and in late 1998, NATO Secretary General Javier Solana sent a letter, which, according to Prime Minister Kostov, provided security guarantees to the country. “Bulgaria--NATO Consultations,” Bulgarian Telegraph Agency (13 October, 1998).
crisis as enhancing Bulgaria's security as it prompted Euro-Atlantic institutions to further assist Bulgaria's quest to join the West.\textsuperscript{47}

What partly explains the heightened sense of insecurity among the public during the Kosovo crisis is to be found within the states. Even before the conflict, the public exhibited a high level of economic and social insecurity even as the government was able to implement reforms, stabilizing the country after the disastrous rule of the Socialists. Although the economy resumed growth and inflation was brought under control, rising unemployment, stagnating individual incomes and the inability of the government to bring crime under control increased social tensions. Very importantly, after a short period of high public support after the 1997 parliamentary elections, the public's approval of the government, political institutions and the direction of the country declined significantly.\textsuperscript{48}

The public tended to blame politicians and ineffective institutions for falling standards of living, corruption and crime. Indeed, life expectancy continued to fall, infant mortality remained high, and the HDI increased only slightly but remained way below the 1990 level (See Table 23). Thus, the Kosovo crisis simply compounded public fears that national political leadership and institutions would be unable to deal with yet another

\textsuperscript{47}As was discussed in the previous chapter, the Kosovo crisis prompted the EU to initiate accession negotiations with Bulgaria. For the political elite's view see President Stoyanov's interview with \textit{Le Mond. Bulgarian Telegraph Agency} (5 May, 2001).

\textsuperscript{48}A poll by the National Public Opinion Center in 1998 found that the Bulgarians' perception of the incidents of crime and the risks to which the person in the street is exposed has not changed in the last four years. Three out of 20 respondents said they or a member of their family was victimized during the last year. "Bulgaria--Crime--Poll," \textit{Bulgarian Telegraph Agency} (16 July, 1998). In another poll the same year found that 55 percent of the population believed corruption in the law enforcement authorities is the greatest obstacle to fighting crime. "Bulgaria--Corruption--Fight Against Crime," \textit{Bulgarian Telegraph Agency} (7 July, 1998).
crisis that threatened security.\textsuperscript{49} According to the public, national and social capacities were insufficient to address multiplying threats.

\textit{Czech Security}

The collapse of communism in Eastern Europe was seen by the leadership in Prague not only as the end of totalitarianism but also as the end of the Cold War which had been the major threat to peace and security on the continent. As discussed in the previous chapter, President Havel, who at this first phase of transition emerged as Prague’s foreign policy leader, called for the transformation of both the Warsaw Pact and NATO. Prague believed that after the Cold War, post-communist states needed to be gradually incorporated into a Europe-wide security system in which there would be no divisions.\textsuperscript{50} In the initial post-communist period, the security policy efforts of Prague were focused on transforming the CSCE into a pan-European security organization that would guarantee European security.\textsuperscript{51} The reluctance to call for a quick dissolution of

\textsuperscript{49}According to a poll by the National Public Opinion Center conducted before the Kosovo crisis, the government scored high marks for its foreign, defense and security policies, but only 28 percent approved of its efforts in public peace and fighting corruption, 66 percent disapproved the government’s income policy, 63 percent of its handling of unemployment and 62 percent disapproved health care policies and the corruption in the executive. Public support for the government’s foreign and security policies, however, ended with the beginning of the Kosovo crisis. “Government–Opinion Poll,” \textit{Bulgarian Telegraph Agency} (16 November, 1998).


\textsuperscript{51}Cotey, 149-53.
both alliances was provoked by latent fears about the role of a reunified Germany.52
Thus, while Czechoslovakia was striving for a more independent foreign policy and the
withdrawal of Soviet troops from its territories it was also seeking to modify the existing
security arrangements in a new security environment.53 Soon, however, Czechoslovakia
came to accept the enduring need for a robust security institution on the continent, a role
that only NATO could provide.

In this early phase, two issues dominated Czechoslovakia’s foreign and security
policies—the presence of Soviet troops and the policy known as the “return to Europe.”54
The national leadership identified the presence of Soviet troops in the country as the only
immediate threat to the country’s national security and sovereignty. Prague recognized
the USSR as the main threat due to the possibility that Moscow would try to reimpose its
dominance over Eastern Europe and reverse the reforms in post-communist states.

52During a visit to London, Havel suggested that Germany should rid its
neighbors of fears of new expansion. “Havel Calls for Dissolution of Military Pacts”

53Foreign Minister Jiri Dienstbier suggested Europe needed to transform its
security architecture. In the first phase the two blocs would continue to exist but lose their
military significance. In the next phase, there would emerge a United States of Europe.
Even in early 1991 when it was obvious that the disintegration of the Warsaw Pact was a
matter of time, Prague still did not call for Czechoslovakia’s NATO membership. “Havel
on Slovakia, Country’s Role in Europe” (text). Vienna ORF Television Network in
German (5 May 1991). Translated by the Foreign Broadcast Information Service. FBIS

54In an interview for Lidove Novini, Foreign Minister Jiri Dienstbier stated that
Czechoslovakia’s most important foreign policy tasks in 1990 were the renewal of the
sovereignty of the state and the normalization of relations with the West. “More Active
Translated by the Foreign Broadcast Information Service. FBIS Daily Report-East
Accordingly, national diplomacy attempted to curtail Moscow’s ability to use the Warsaw Pact as a means to deny Czechoslovakia full sovereignty and later advocated its dissolution altogether. Concurrently, the non-communist government was able to negotiate an agreement on a swift troop withdrawal from Czechoslovakia. The withdrawal of more than 73,000 troops was formally agreed upon in February 1991 during President Havel’s visit to Moscow, and formally completed in June 1991. Along with the withdrawal of foreign troops the country made swift progress on its return to Europe priority as it joined the Council of Europe in February in 1991 and signed a European Association Agreement in December. Even more importantly from a security perspective, in November 1991 Czechoslovakia and Germany signed border treaties, an issue of symbolic significance for Prague.

With the Soviet troops gone, Czechoslovakia found itself in a benign security environment. No neighboring country seemed to have territorial demands on Czechoslovakia and, in Prague’s view, no attempt by any country to make changes to the country’s borders was seen as even slightly probable. The disintegration of Czechoslovakia into two independent states rendered the security environment of the Czech Republic even more benign. This change had several important security consequences for the new state. It moved the country’s geographical gravity westward: the shift created more distance from the already increasing turmoil in the Balkans and the unpredictability of the former Soviet states. It also greatly decreased the size of

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55 Hyde-Price, 232.

56 In an interview with Hospodarske Noviny, Foreign Minister Josef Zieleniec argued that, after the split with Slovakia, not only did Czech Republic find itself removed from the turbulence of the former Soviet Union and the Balkans and it is now a more “clear-cut” Western state. Milos Sklenka, “Two States, Two Diplomatic Policies” (text). Prague Hospodarske Noviny in Czech (19 January 1993). Translated by the Foreign
minorities in the Czech Republic and freed its national politics of the burden of dealing with a relatively more backward Slovakia.\textsuperscript{57} 

The relatively favorable geopolitical position of the new state among the countries of Eastern Europe conditioned the relative absence in Czech foreign affairs of significant security issues. In fact, this early period in the foreign policy of the state set in the tendency of benign neglect of security policies by both the public and the political leadership.\textsuperscript{58} Accordingly, the national leadership did not lobby vigorously for membership in NATO.\textsuperscript{59} Only after the Alliance's decision in 1993 to expand did Prague openly campaign for inclusion in the first round. NATO membership was seen more as part of the overall policy of a return to Europe rather than as a security policy to guarantee national sovereignty against any conceivable military challenge. The newly independent state quickly identified itself as a Western society which had been denied its rightful place among democracies and with which it shared basic values and principles. Thus joining the institutions of these democracies was defined as part of the process of rejoining the West.

\textsuperscript{57} The division also greatly diminished the public's perception of threats posed by minorities (See Table 18).

\textsuperscript{58} Had and Handl.

The lack of interest in security and defense issues resulted in a delay in the formal, official conceptualization of national security. In early 1993, the Czech parliament received and noted principal guidelines for foreign policy, presented by the foreign minister. The guidelines, however, did not represent a formal national security concept. In the part relevant to national security, the guidelines observe that direct military threats to the Republic have diminished significantly. Instead the document identifies other, non-traditional and less-predictable threats such as the growth of militant nationalism, ethnic conflict, refugees, and the possible disruption of supplies of raw materials. The guidelines also define integration in NATO, the EU and the WEU as well as good relations with neighboring states as the means to guarantee the Republic’s security, a point over which there was already a wide political consensus. Indeed, in this period the Czech Republic was more concerned with the uninterrupted flow of vital raw materials including oil and gas rather than with any conceivable military threat as it went to great lengths to quickly diversify its sources of deliveries.

While the government still failed to produce an official security concept, the Institute of International Relations (IIR), an advisory board to the Czech Ministry of Foreign Affairs, produced two documents elaborating the nation’s security policies.

For a discussion see Had and Handl. 132-3.


According to these documents the goal of every Czech government is to sustain freedom and independence. The way to achieve this goal is through establishing and sustaining a democratic political system and a functioning market economy. Domestic policies to attain this security goal must be supported by a comprehensive policy of integration of the country into a larger, democratic, market-based European area. According to the 1994 document, if there was any external threat to the Republic, it was, above all, the developments in the former Soviet Union. Even the raging civil war in the Balkans was not seen as presenting similar threats as the political, ethnic, social and economic conflicts in the former USSR.

To the extent that there existed any threat from Russia, political leaders agreed that the Czech Republic’s integration in Western institutions, and especially in NATO would eliminate this danger as a direct and specific threat to the state. For all the comfort that distance from the former Soviet Union provided to the Republic, a realist assessment of Russia’s geopolitical place in Europe was displayed by Czech political leaders. Therefore, Russian membership in NATO was rejected as incompatible with the values underpinning the Euro-Atlantic community as well as unrealistic considering Russia’s size and power. The Russian assault in early 1995 in Chechnya only seemed to reinforce those attitudes.

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65 In an interview with French historian Jacques Rupnik, President Havel argued that Russia would be unwilling to become just another member of NATO, and in any
The documents also specifically identify NATO, the EU, and the WEU as the most significant elements of the European security architecture. At the same time, the documents caution that small countries such as the Czech Republic need external security guarantees together with membership in international security institutions as the best means to guarantee national security. It explicitly states that the state should never again become a subject of manipulation by big powers or international organizations—an implicit reference to the inability of Czechoslovakia to influence the great powers' readiness to sacrifice its sovereignty before the Second World War.67

At the same time, however, Czech security experts and most citizens were cognizant of the Republic's inability to influence its security environment and came to accept the West's responsibility for maintaining security, order and stability.68 Therefore, the Czech political leadership faced a dilemma: the awareness of the limited security capacities of the Republic which required integration in Euro-Atlantic institutions dominated by great European powers, especially Germany, on the one hand, and fear that event the Alliance was providing a balance to the overwhelming power of the Russian state on the continent. Jacques Rupnik, “We Constitute a Single Whole” (text). Krakow Tygodnik Powszechny in Polish (26 June 1994). Translated by the Foreign Broadcast Information Service. FBIS Daily Report-East Europe. 27 July 1994 (PrEx Translated by the Foreign Broadcast Information Service. FBIS Daily Report-East Europe, 7.10: FBIS-EEU-94-144; p. 7-10).


67For a discussion of security concepts and policies of the states in Central Europe see Glantz.

68Had and Handl. 138-39.
those great powers were capable of having a great impact on the security environment. Not surprisingly, while the public seemed to see no threat posed by neighboring countries, Germany and Russia scored high as perceived security threats by public opinion (See Tables 25 and 26). It must be noted that the public fears of potential threats from Germany and Russia were partially shared by the Czech leadership with one important qualification: the Czech leaders believed the threat from the two countries seemed unlikely to materialize. But if they were to endanger Czech sovereignty, the cost would be enormous. In other words Germany, and especially Russia presented, an unlikely but potentially costly threat. That explains why the Czech leadership very early on became an enthusiastic proponent of the United States' continued engagement in the continent, a Czech preference that endured throughout the 1990s.69

In the first years after the peaceful disintegration of Czechoslovakia the Czech Republic failed to formalize a security concept. Thus the Ministry of Defense undertook the unusual step of preparing the National Military Strategy in 1995 and the National Defense Strategy without the framework provided by a security concept.70 The official


70For a discussion of the Republic’s military doctrine and strategy see Nastoupil. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
Security Strategy was finally approved by the Czech government on 17 February 1999 as one of the requirements before joining NATO in March of the same year.71

The Strategy distinguishes between security threat and security risk. It uses "security threat" for dangerous phenomena and processes stemming from willful conduct" while security risk is defined as "phenomena and processes whose direct and indirect negative impact on society, the functions of the state, or citizens is not a manifestation of a willful conduct."72 The vital national interests to be defended include "sovereignty, territorial integrity, the principles of democracy and a legal state, and the creation of the fundamental conditions of the lives of its citizens."73 The Strategy points out that the end of the Cold War resulted in a substantial relaxation of general tensions and greatly diminished threat of worldwide confrontations. This development, however, does not eliminate threats as they are now posed by states, non-governmental groups, and organizations that do not respect international law, implicitly referring to actors which do not accept the existing status quo in international politics. The Strategy reinforces this point by declaring that the threat of use of nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction had not been totally eliminated.

What distinguishes the Republic's Strategy from similar security concepts is that while the security conceptualization of Eastern European states identifies the threats and challenges to individual states, the Czech Republic sees the threats and risks to an area, the West, in which the Republic is almost completely integrated. In others words, the

72Ibid., 2.
73Ibid, 3.
potential risks and threats challenge the international security of the Euro-Atlantic area rather than face individual states. Thus, according to the document, the Republic is bound to face these risks and threats as part of a politically, economically, and militarily integrated area rather than on its own. Accordingly, the threats and risks that the Czech Republic faces are by definition identical to those faced by the Euro-Atlantic community.

The most serious threats to this area are developments in Southeastern Europe where instability and conflict threaten to spill over. Other threats include the complex developments in the Commonwealth of Independent States, including Russia, and especially in the Trans-Caucasus region and Central Asia, as well as in the Middle East and Northern Africa. The Strategy points out, however, that in the medium term there is no direct military threat to the Czech Republic.

Among the risks, the Strategy identifies widespread political and economic migration, economic inequality among states, economic interdependence, and communication opportunities. Once again, the document sees these risks as challenging the Euro-Atlantic area rather than specifically the Czech Republic. Accordingly, the Czech Republic's only means to address these risks and threats is in the framework of security-providing institutions of this area, including NATO, WEU, and indirectly, the EU. Therefore, the Republic's complete integration in these institutions is the most important priority of the nation's foreign policy.

The Strategy also addresses the internal dimension of security. Significantly, while the document identifies some of the possible internal sources of threats and risks to security, it leaves no doubt in the strength of political and state institutions. Instead, it points out that some of the threats and risks may pose a challenge to the proper

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74 Ibid., 2.
functioning of these institutions. In addition, it details that the integration in Euro-
Atlantic institutions turns the Republic into an open state and society, both an opportunity
that must be preserved in order to prosper but also a challenge that makes the role of the
domestic security and law and order institutions more complex.

The Security Strategy of the Czech Republic expired on 21 January 2001, and an
amended Strategy was approved by the government.\textsuperscript{75} Although it once again makes a
distinction between threats and risks, the document, very much along the lines of
Baldwin's conceptualization, defines security threat as a situation that can inflict damage
to the Republic. Accordingly, the amended Strategy includes natural disasters as one of
the possible risks. Reflecting the benign security environment, the document lists only
security risks, while adding that some of them may develop into threats in the future.\textsuperscript{76}
Furthermore, it does not identify a specific region presenting either a risk or threat to
national security. Even a reference to the low probability of nuclear confrontation
mentioned in the previous version, was this time omitted. Thus, while the Czech Republic
identified specific security threats in its pre-NATO security strategy, once it became a
member of the Alliance, its amended strategy specifies only risks, reflecting the official
perception of enhanced security.

The change in the Czech Republic's military expenditures reflected the
transformation of security perceptions. During the Cold War Czechoslovakia was in the
center of war scenarios and witnessed a great concentration of both national armed forces
and Soviet troops. Accordingly, the state devoted great resources, both human and

\textsuperscript{75} Government of the Czech Republic, \textit{Security Strategy of the Czech Republic}, as
INTERNET.

\textsuperscript{76} Ibid., 3.
economic to national defense (See Table 17). After the Cold War, the government quickly reduced defense expenditures—both in absolute terms and as a percentage of GDP—and manpower, a move that met no public or even professional soldiers' resistance. Low regard for the armed forces and the need to divert resources to national reform led to levels of armed expenditures that were seen as unacceptably low for a future NATO member. Only after the Alliance's pressure did the Czech Republic agree to increase its military expenditures to at least 2 percent of its GDP. In 1993 the armed forces had over 106,000 troops and after steady annual decline it reached 55,000 troops by 2000.

The political elite's neglect of security and defense issues was reinforced by similar perceptions and attitudes held by the public. The public does not view political and national security risks as matters that can threaten the state in the near future and, in any event, doubts the ability of the national military forces to defend the country effectively. These attitudes are consistent with long-running pacifist tendencies determined by history and politics. In the Second World War Czechoslovakia's military

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77 On NATO's criticism of the Czech military's shortcomings see Michta. 137.
78 Simon, "The New NATO Members."
79 Ibid., 4.
81 In the 1992-97 period, the majority of the public believed that in case of a military conflict, the Republic was not able to defend itself. A majority also believed that it is futile to consider national defense because superpowers will decide the nation's fate. Sarvas, 60; See also Blasek.
82 An international Gallup poll conducted in 1995 found that only 12 percent of Czechs expressed any fear that global conflict would occur within the next ten years. the lowest percentage of all 50 countries in which the pool was conducted. Blasek, 90.
was unable to defend the nation's sovereignty and territorial integrity and in 1968 during the Prague Spring—a national movement seeking the reform of the communist regime—the military failed to resist Soviet intervention. Recently, the armed forces have been a constant target of defense-issues reporting by the Czech media. Not surprisingly, the national military does not enjoy high public approval and it has a difficult time attracting young men into the professional ranks.

Of course, historical ambiguity about the ability of the armed forces to defend the nation is only one of the factors explaining the relative lack of interest in security issues among the public. The society was also influenced by the calm security environment the Czech Republic found itself in after the Cold War and the split with Slovakia. Public perceptions of traditional security, perceived as the lack of threat to national sovereignty, rapidly assumed that there was no strong enemy that could threaten the country. The only exception was Russia, which was perceived by a great majority to constitute a potential threat to the stability of the country. Another great power, Germany, with which the Republic had an uneasy relationship regarding the fate of property rights of the Germans expelled from Czechoslovakia after the Second World War and the German dominance

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of the Czech economy, seemed to divide public opinion (See Table 26).\textsuperscript{86} Thus the public seemed to share with the political leadership the perception that the main external threat to national security was the potential great powers’ collusion, particularly between Russia and Germany, rather than a danger from a single country.\textsuperscript{87}

It must be noted that the perceived threat from Russia and Germany should not be exaggerated. The majority of the public which identified the two countries as threats at various times was asked to choose the most likely among several threats. However, when asked whether there was any military threat to the Republic 78 percent of the respondents in 1996 believed that there was no military threat to the country while a year later as many as 83 percent did not see any military threat.\textsuperscript{88} This public perception of relatively high traditional security is confirmed by the polls which indicated declining perceptions of threats coming from the Balkans—a region specifically identified by the Czech security experts as a potential source of threats and risks.\textsuperscript{89} All in all, the Czech public perceptions


\textsuperscript{87} On the public fear over possible Russo-German agreement to reject NATO enlargement see Dusan Trestik, “Germany and Russia” (text). Prague \textit{Lidove Noviny} in Czech (21 February 1996). Translated by the Foreign Broadcast Information Service. \textit{FBIS Daily Report-East Europe}, 1 April 1996 (PrEx 7.10: FBIS-EEU-96-063; p. 8-9).


\textsuperscript{89} While in 1994 10 percent, and in 1995 as many as 14 percent of the public believed that the Balkans represented a sources of threat to national security, in 1998 only 4 percent believed so. “Czechs See Russia as Biggest Threat to Country’s Security--Poll,” \textit{Czech News Agency} (20 March, 1998).
of threats to national security gradually abated and by the time Czech Republic was
invited to join NATO, the public ceased to see any likely external threat to country.

After Czechoslovakia's split in 1993, the Czech public also ceased to see ethnic
minorities as a threat to national security (See Table 18). Therefore, security perceptions
underwent transformation as the public began to rank traditional security well below
other forms of security. The society came to see internal sources of threats and
challenges as the top set of factors affecting security, and social and individual threats as
priority concerns in the security field.

As in most other East European countries, a majority of the Czech public
considers social and economic risks and threats as priority security concerns. This
tendency was reinforced by the economic crisis after 1996, which caused the depreciation
of the national currency, the failure of several banks and an increase in unemployment.

In the early transition period the Czech Republic was seen as the model of post-
communist transition as the Republic successfully implemented political and economic
reforms without the political turmoil and social tensions faced by the other East European
countries, either successful or not. The Klaus government was able to establish a market
economy and get rid of inefficient industries while keeping unemployment, inflation, and
social dislocations under control (See Tables 19 and 20). Therefore, although the
generalization about domestic insecurities having greater impact on citizens' security
perceptions than that of any other external threats and risks remained true, gradually by

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90 A public poll in 1995 fund that the public ranked military security to be seventh
among security priorities, well behind good family relations-ranked first--urban security,
social security, income security, ecological security and security of democratic rights.
Blasek, 91.

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1994 the public’s sense of internal insecurity diminished greatly. In other words, internal insecurities initially remained greater because external threats and risks were perceived to be low. The economic crisis of 1996-97, although tarnishing the Republic’s image of success, did not alter these attitudes. The crisis did not disturb the sound foundations of Czech transition and did not change public trust in and approval of the political system and its institutions.

Social indicators suggest that, indeed, the Czech population, in contrast to most other post-communist societies, experienced a relatively smooth transition. The life expectancy at birth and infant mortality rates, both good indicators of the quality of life and the health care system, by the end of the 1990s had better indicators than at the transition’s beginning (See Tables 24 and 22). The Czech HDI too, although in decline in the early 1990s, rebounded and the country improved its rank among all states. Even the 1996 economic crisis failed to cause the social tensions and dislocations common in similar developments elsewhere in Eastern Europe. Not surprisingly, economic hardship was not associated with labor protests.

Lithuania’s Security

Unlike the most other Eastern European states, Lithuania initially faced a severe challenge to its sovereignty and territorial integrity; the very existence of the newly independent state was contested by the Soviet Union and later Russia. To ensure its survival Lithuania adopted policies which simultaneously sought three objectives—

gaining international recognition of its independence, concluding an agreement with the Soviet Union on its sovereignty, and the withdrawal of Soviet troops from the Republic.

On May 12, 1990, a month after the parliament voted to restore Lithuania's independence, Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania established the Baltic States Council, which was designed, among other objectives, to help all three republics reach these goals. In fact, the geopolitical interests of the three republics have coincided since they decided to seek independence. Very early in this period, Lithuania emerged as the most ardent proponent of an uncompromising approach to dealing with the Soviet Union. The government in Vilnius, headed by the staunchly anti-communist Sajudis and its leader Vytautas Landsbergis, saw the presence of Soviet troops as the greatest threat to the survival of the state. The pressure Moscow exerted on Lithuania to rescind the declaration of independence, including the imposition of crippling economic sanctions and the use of Soviet troops in January 1991, convinced all Lithuanian political parties that the Soviet Union posed the greatest challenge to national survival. Not surprisingly, the Lithuanian political elite reached a consensus on the need to eliminate Soviet presence in the Republic as a precondition for national independence. Sajudis and the LDLP, the two dominant parties, however, differed on the speed of reaching an agreement and the approach to negotiating with Moscow. While Sajudis demanded an uncompromising stand even at the risk of provoking a conflict, the former communists insisted on a step-by-step approach. At this early phase of consolidating Lithuania's independence, however, it was Sajudis which dominated national politics.

The unsuccessful coup attempt in Moscow in August 1991 further motivated Vilnius to seek the immediate withdrawal of Russian troops. At the Baltic States Council in October 1991 in Vilnius, Landsbergis insisted that the withdrawal was not a question
of negotiations and that all Russian military forces should leave by the end of the year. Although Estonia and Latvia considered the deadline unrealistic, a document was adopted making the withdrawal of troops the major foreign policy goal of the Baltic states. At the time, there was over 34,000 strong Russian military presence in Lithuania at over 180 bases. Although the Sejma passed a law prohibiting the introduction of any new troops, the newly independent state had no means to enforce the law and Russia maintained its presence. Furthermore, in the ensuing institutional collapse and chaos following the disintegration of the Soviet Union, Vilnius found it problematic to find the appropriate authority in Moscow to negotiate.

Lithuania’s hopes of a withdrawal agreement with Russia increased in January 1992 when the Russian Supreme Soviet finally ratified the treaty signed in July 1991, formally recognizing Lithuania’s independence. On the day of the ratification, Landsbergis was able to convince Yeltsin to withdraw Russian troops. However, little progress was made in subsequent negotiations. By then it became clear to Vilnius that Moscow did not speak with a single voice, as Russian President Boris Yeltsin had a difficult time keeping his promises and exerting authority over security and military matters. In fact, some officials in Moscow suggested that the continued presence of Russian military forces in the Baltic states was a stabilizing security factor in this part of Europe.

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Moscow's refusal to consider an immediate troop withdrawal was caused by growing pressure in Russia for a revision of Yeltsin's relatively pro-Western policies. There were calls for Moscow to take a tougher line toward the so-called "near abroad," the area of the former Soviet Union.94 One of the reasons for the worsening of relations between the Baltic republics and Russia was that the Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs failed to exert its authority over the process of foreign policy decision making and instead left the military leadership to handle the "near abroad." Consequently, the military establishment began to negotiate with the government of Lithuania without any political oversight.95

As part of the policy of getting tough with the former Soviet republics, Moscow began to champion the rights of ethnic Russians left outside Russia after the disintegration of the USSR. The "Karaganov Doctrine," named for Sergei Karaganov, an early adviser to Yeltsin, justified Russian intervention in the domestic affairs of the countries in the "near abroad," if the human rights and the rights of ethnic Russian were violated.96 Even as the Russian approach to the "near abroad" hardened, Vilnius and Moscow continued to negotiate the withdrawal of military forces. In September 1992 in the Kremlin, Lithuanian Defense Minister Audrius Butkevicius and his Russian counterpart Pavel Grachev agreed on a schedule that provided for the withdrawal of troops from Lithuania to be completed by August 1993.97 Even as the troops were being...

95 Ibid., 24.
96 Clemens, 182-84.
withdrawn. Russia continued to insist that the rights of ethnic Russians were being
violated and threatened to halt the pullout. In October 1992 the Russian president issued
an order suspending the withdrawal of Russian troops from the Baltic states; however, the
pullout continued unabated.

Despite Russia's intransigence Lithuania reached an agreement on troop
withdrawal by skillfully negotiating with Moscow and rallying support at home and
abroad. Recognizing the limits of its power, Lithuania relied on cooperation and
coordination of policies with Estonia and Latvia and sought the assistance of international
organizations and individual states. Internally, the government quickly granted automatic
citizenship to all ethnic Russians, thus denying Moscow one of the most successful cards
it used against the other two Baltic states. In an effort to discredit a Russian claim that
Lithuanians did not want the Russian troops to leave the country, the government held a
referendum on the question in June 1992; over 90 percent voted for the unconditional
withdrawal and compensation for the years of Soviet occupation.

Lithuania's success of solving the problem of Soviet military presence on its soil
owed not only to the relentless efforts to reach an agreement but also to geopolitics and
Russia's weakness. Even the Russian military establishment, despite its refusal to accept
psychologically or legally Lithuania's independence, had to accept temporary retreat as
the price for the future restoration of Russia's military might. In addition, Lithuania did
not have military installations of any strategic value and Moscow found it easier to part

98“Lithuania Criticizes Russian Stance on Pullout.” RFE/RL Research Report 1,
no. 48 (4 December, 1992): 58.

99Norgaard, Johannsen, et al., 187.

Vilnius also successfully used the assistance of various states and international institutions in its pursuit of Russia’s military pullout. Along with the coordination of policies among the members of the Baltic States Council, Lithuania benefited from involvement by the CSCE, the European Community, and especially the U.S. Even after the withdrawal of the last Russian soldier from Lithuania in 1993 was completed, Vilnius continued to side with Estonia and Latvia in their attempts in 1994 to achieve the same. This stand stemmed not only from the commitment Vilnius undertook in the BSC but also from the belief that the security of the country would be enhanced if Moscow pulled out from all Baltic states.

Lithuania’s ability to establish working relations with Moscow was also greatly enhanced by the change in power in Vilnius in 1992. While Sajudis and its leader Landsbergis applied an uncompromising approach to negotiating with Moscow, Brazuskas and the former communists were willing to accommodate Russia’s concerns and establish a better relationship with the Kremlin.\footnote{Even after the Sajudis’ overwhelming loss at the 1992 elections, Landsbergis continued to insist that Russia exhibited “pro-empire” tendencies in its dealings with Lithuania even as Russian troops were pulling out, and called for a no-compromise policy toward Moscow. “Landsbergis on Russian Attitude Toward Vilnius” (text). Moscow Baltfax in English (18 January 1993). FBIS Daily Report-Central Eurasia, 22 January 1993 (PrEx 7.10: FBIS-SOV-93-013; p. 100).} The new approach was not an indication of an ideological affinity with Moscow, but rather based on the recognition that Lithuania was still very dependent on Russia’s goodwill for economic development.
and even security. Brazuskas insisted that Lithuania was still unprepared to achieve integration in the West and saw the process of seeking membership in Euro-Atlantic institutions as a long and difficult one. In the meanwhile, Lithuania had no choice but to establish good relations with Moscow. In this early phase of independence, the ruling former communists did not see integration in NATO and the EC as a politically realistic means to guarantee national security. Instead, the ruling elite considered the accumulation of national power and good relations with neighbors as the way to enhance national security. Meanwhile, the opposition leader Landsbergis continued to insist that Russia posed a great danger to Lithuania. Accordingly, while the Labor Democrats preferred to strike a balance between the country’s eastern and western orientation, Sajudis insisted on quick integration in NATO and the EC.

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103 Justas Paleckis, presidential aid for foreign policy, insisted that “Lithuania has no good relations with the East, and is not interesting to the West.” He insisted that the best way of guaranteeing national security is the unity of all national democratic forces and the stability of the country. “Presidential Aid Discusses Foreign Policy” (text). Moscow Baltfax in English (12 May 1993). FBIS Daily Report-Central Eurasia. 13 May 1993 (PrEx 7.10: FBIS-SOV-93-091; p. 72).

Although Vilnius embraced cooperation with Estonia and Latvia in its quest for membership in international institutions, differences among the Baltic states began to strain their commitment to cooperation. The constitutional crisis in Russia involving President Yeltsin and the Parliament, the ascent of nationalist forces in the 1993 Russian parliamentary elections, the establishment of a more assertive foreign policy toward the "near abroad," and the continued conflict in Chechnya forced the political leadership in Vilnius to seek speedy integration in Euro-Atlantic institutions without necessarily coordinating policies with its Baltic neighbors. Lithuania decided that domestic stability, neutrality in foreign affairs and good relations with neighbors would not suffice to guarantee national security. Yet, according to the ruling Labor Democrats, the process of integration should not come at the cost of antagonizing the bilateral relationship with Russia. Indeed, despite what was perceived to be worrisome domestic developments and attitudes in Russia, Vilnius was willing to downplay their potentially negative impact or recognize some of them as legitimate. In fact, the ruling elite perceived bilateral

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105 Lithuanian ambassador to the EC, NATO and the Group of 24 argued that Lithuania could have joined European organizations very quickly if the country were acting alone instead of waiting the Estonia and Latvia to sort out their relationship with their Russian minorities. "Inflexible" Baltic Laws Hinder European Membership" (text). Moscow Baltfax in English (12 November 1992). FBIS Daily Report-Central Eurasia. 13 November 1992 (PrEx 7.10: FBIS-SOV-92-220: p. 88).

106 National Defense Minister Audrius Butkevicius warned that there were forces in Russia that seek to either restore the Soviet Union or to split Russia. Both of these forces were represented danger to security in the region. Lithuania needed to address this danger through integration in Western security institutions. Valdas Sutkus, "Audrius Butkevicius: "I Am Against the Concept of Neutrality" (text). Vilnius Lietuvos Aidas in Lithuanian (27 March 1993). Translated by the Foreign Broadcast Information Service. FBIS Daily Report-Central Eurasia, 14 April 1993 (PrEx 7.10: FBIS-SOV-93-070; p. 87-88).

107 President Brazauskas attributed some of the belligerent rhetoric toward the "near abroad" as electoral campaigning and defended Russia's willingness to send troops in parts the former Soviet Union as based on legitimate security concerns to maintain
relations to be good and attributed any problems to be part of the normal process of establishing a relationship between two newly independent states.¹⁰⁸

While during the rule of the Labor Democrats Lithuania seemed to have reached a working relationship with Russia and to have attained the most basic conditions for national sovereignty including international recognition, basic treaties with Moscow, and the pullout of foreign troops, there remained questions about the significance of threats to national security. An analysis of Russia's security and military policies indicates that, in fact, Lithuania's independence and security were more threatened than the perceptions, especially those exhibited by the Labor Democrats, would have suggested.

In the chaos and uncertainty following the disintegration of the Soviet Union, the external environment seemed threatening to Russian foreign policy makers. Initially, however, Moscow failed to elaborate on a clear concept for the country's relations with the diverse states emerging on its borders. In the ensuing vacuum of foreign policy visions and properly distributed areas of authority the Defense Ministry assumed some of the responsibilities for dealing with the former Soviet republics, while the Foreign Ministry focused on relations with the rest of the world. Very early on the defense establishment not only negotiated the status of former Soviet troops on the territories of the newly independent countries but also became involved in the many local conflicts. The Ministry went as far as to include in its military doctrine the responsibility to defend peace and stability on its borders. "Brazauskas on Nordic, Russian Relations, NATO" (text). Vilnius Vilnius Radio Network in Lithuanian (3 December 1993). Translated by the Foreign Broadcast Information Service. FBIS Daily Report-Central Eurasia, 6 December 1993 (PrEx 7.10: FBIS-SOV-93-232; p. 86-87).

the rights and interests of ethnic Russians on the territory of the former USSR. Soon, however, the intensity of security threats forced the Russian political leadership to begin the elaboration of a cohesive foreign and security policy.

The continuing conflicts in the states along the Russian border, especially to the South, forced Moscow to think of its strategic interests in terms of sphere of influence. Russia saw the emergence of a security vacuum, which could potentially invite outside powers willing to fill it. Instead Moscow established the concept of “near abroad” and claimed to be responsible for maintaining peace and stability in the whole post-Soviet space. And while Russia came to accept the independence of the former Soviet states, it perceived itself to have a legitimate right to be engaged in the region as it was seen as home to millions of ethnic Russians as well as a potential source of threats to Russia. After the December 1993 parliamentary elections, which led to the rise of the nationalist right, some in Moscow did not rule out the use of force to achieve these foreign policy priorities.

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110 For an excellent study of Russia’s post-communist security thinking see Alexander A. Sergounin, *Post-Communist Security Thinking in Russia: Changing Paradigms*, occasional paper (Copenhagen, Denmark: Copenhagen Peace Research Institute, 2001). Available from Columbia International Affairs Online.


112 The policy came to be known as the Kozyrev Doctrine, proclaimed by the then Russian Foreign Minster Sergey Kozyrev. Sergounin, 15-19.
Russia paid increased attention to the "near abroad" after Foreign Minister Kozyrev was replaced in 1996 by Evgeniy Primakov. Moscow began to think of its place in the world and its foreign policy in increasingly power relations terms. In its part concerning the Baltic states, including Lithuania, the new Russian security conceptualization envisioned the region as adhering to strict neutrality. Accordingly, Moscow strongly objected to NATO expansion to include any of the Baltic states.\(^\text{113}\)

Responding to the Baltic states' quest to join the EU and NATO, Russia tried to stall the process by threatening not to sign or ratify any agreement delimiting their borders, a crucial requirement by both Euro-Atlantic institutions in order to gain membership.\(^\text{114}\) Very significantly, Russian officials at the highest level questioned the current borders and suggested that they should be revised.\(^\text{115}\)

In order to deny the Baltic states the choice of membership in NATO, Russia suggested that their insecurities could be addressed by bilateral security arrangements with Moscow. In 1997 Moscow proposed to the Baltic and Nordic states a security agreement offering individual states the option to conclude either a bilateral security guarantee or a security agreement involving Russia, the U.S., or NATO itself.\(^\text{116}\) Of course, no state accepted the offer, rejecting the idea of separating Northern Europe from

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\(^\text{113}\) Ibid., 24-6.

\(^\text{114}\) In 1997 the Russian Duma urged President Yeltsin not to hurry with signing the Russian-Lithuanian Treaty on the state border citing that the treaty would deprive Russia of legal rights to Klaipeda territory, and would deny Moscow from affecting Lithuania's policy of seeking NATO membership. See Paul Goble, "Putting Pressure on Baltics," *RFE/RL Research Note* (14 February, 1997). Available from http://www.rferl.org:INTERNET.

\(^\text{115}\) On the Russian approach to NATO enlargement see Blank.

the rest of Europe as a region with separate security guarantees.\footnote{In October 1997 President Yeltsin formally proposed to his Lithuanian counterpart, Algirdas Brazauskas, that Russia was ready to guarantee unilaterally the security of the three Baltic states. The presidents of the three Baltic states rejected the Russian offer of security guarantees in their summit meeting held in Lithuania a month later. See \textit{RFE/RL Newsline} (27 November, 1997).} In fact, any suggestions that the security of the Baltic states could be somehow considered separately from the process of unconditional membership in NATO, caused fears in Lithuania.\footnote{Responding to a report in the \textit{Washington Times} that the United States was prepared to hand over the Baltic states into the Russian sphere of influence, Lithuanian officials quickly requested official information from the U.S. State Department and later assured the public that Washington had not changed its policy of support for Lithuania’s membership in NATO. “Foreign Minister Rules Out New East-West Partition” (text). V\textit{ilnius Radio Vilnius Network} in Lithuanian (12 September 1994). Translated by the Foreign Broadcast Information Service. \textit{FBIS Daily Report-Central Eurasia}, 13 September 1994 (PrEx 7.10: FBIS-SOV-94-177: p. 74). See also “U.S. Response to Formal Inquiry Noted” (text). Tallinn \textit{BNS} in English (12 September 1994). \textit{FBIS Daily Report-Central Eurasia}, 13 September 1994 (PrEx 7.10: FBIS-SOV-94-177: p. 74).}

Lithuania approved its first national security concept on 19 December 1996, and the document was amended in 1998 and 2000. It must be noted that the differences between the amended versions of the Law are relatively minor and follow the themes and approaches set by the original concept. The approach to conceptualizing national security in all versions is very comprehensive and lengthy as it includes not only general provisions but also identifies the institutions responsible for ensuring security, discusses the development of the security system, and includes the legal regulations and the long-term program for strengthening national security.

The security concept does not identify specific threats but defines the nature of probable threats. Like the Czech security concept it includes risks and threats but, unlike it, does not formally define the differences between them, although it appears that the distinction is the degree of threat. It divides the risks and threats into external risks and dangers, and internal risks. Notably the internal challenges include risks but not dangers, implying a relative confidence that the stability of society and state institutions make internal sources of dangers less probable. Among the external threats the Law identifies is one of the most significant: the geopolitical environment, including the militarization of the region and the instability of democratizing states. The concept focuses only on regional political, military, economic, and criminal factors that could threaten national security.121

The Law does not identify any specific threat, including any state or contemporary development. However, the concept is explicit in its requirement that

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121 Ibid., 8.
Lithuania’s national security be developed as part of the trans-Atlantic defense system, specifically discussing NATO, the EU, and the WEU. The national security is to be guaranteed by the state not only through the strength of national defense forces but also through the country’s future participation in these institutions. In addition, citizens are expected to play an important role in national security by preparing for total civil resistance, developing civic associations, and fostering the resolve to defend Lithuania’s freedom.\textsuperscript{122}

Lithuania’s security concept attempts to strike a balance between traditional security conceptualization, including defense and alliance participation, and a focus on soft-security issues including confidence-building measures, strengthening of domestic institutions and people-to-people contacts with other societies. Yet, the priorities in the Law imply that hard-core security factors, especially in the regional environment, are the preconditions for national security. Although no country or region is specifically identified as posing a threat or risk, references to probable adverse developments that may cause acute dangers to the already achieved national sovereignty and internal institutional stability implying that Vilnius sees Russia and Belarus as the only potential security threats.

Although Russia was seen as the most significant threat to national security, Lithuanian leadership was well aware that good relations with the giant to the East was a precondition for successful integration in the West. Even after 1997, when Russia seemed to have finally established the fundamentals of its foreign policy toward the former Soviet republics including Lithuania, Vilnius did not significantly alter its approach to

\textsuperscript{122} Ibid., 3.
dealing with Moscow. While rejecting Russia's attempts to divert Lithuania's course toward the integration in the Euro-Atlantic institutions, Vilnius went out of its way to cultivate a working relationship with Moscow and address its security fears and concerns. Even when the growing integration of Russia and Belarus was seen as creating a new danger to national security as it was about to bring once again Russia to Lithuania's border, Vilnius continued to assure Russia of the benign nature of its quest to join NATO.

Russia, however, remained unconvinced and continued to aggressively reject Lithuania's quest for NATO membership. That caused Lithuania to speed up its efforts to join NATO by lobbying for its inclusion in the 2002 round of expansion, enlisting the

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support of individual states, even at the expense of coordinating policies with its Baltic neighbors.\textsuperscript{126}

Despite the prevailing perception of external threats, Lithuanian military expenditures did not seem to reflect a nation obsessed with the traditional defense of national territory and independence. Although Lithuania had to build military forces from scratch, and in that respect was in a disadvantaged position compared to Bulgaria and the Czech Republic, efforts to establish the basic structure of a national military were initially modest at best. In the first years of independence, the military budget did not reach 1 percent of the GDP (See Table 17). Only after NATO made it clear that one of the preconditions for membership is the ability of the candidate countries to contribute military power to the Alliance did Lithuania undertake a concerted effort to increase its defense budget. Even then, the military establishment found it difficult to receive sufficient resources to meet the basic requirements for building national defense.\textsuperscript{127} In fact, Lithuania's military budget remained one of the lowest in Eastern Europe.

Lithuania's public perceptions of security followed a tendency similar to those in the rest in Eastern Europe. The public seemed to be more concerned with internal sources


\textsuperscript{127}Brigadier General Janas A. Kronkaitis warned that the failure of the Parliament to allocate sufficient resources for national defense would endanger Lithuania’s chances of joining the Alliances. Huang, “So Far So Smooth.”
of threats and risks and more attention, at least in the second half of the 1990s, was paid to personal and societal security rather than to traditional military security. Indeed, the public’s understanding of security seemed to have departed from the traditional power relationship image and instead was increasingly linked with the concepts of freedom and liberties, free market economy, social security, and the maintenance of civil society.\(^{128}\)

Remarkably, already in the mid-1990s the majority of the public perceived the size of the national military force as adequate or too large, while only 21 percent supported an increase in the military.\(^{129}\) Accordingly, 45 percent of the public pointed to internal dangers as probable threats to national security. This is not to say that the public was oblivious to dangers posed by Russia. Instead the majority saw Russia emerging as the most likely threat in the case of Lithuania’s failure to accomplish political and economic reforms and the West’s failure to open up to the Baltic states’ membership in Euro-Atlantic institutions. Indeed, while the great majority of the public in the mid-1990s believed that Russia represented a threat to Lithuania’s stability, by the end of the decade, the number of people believing so decreased (See Table 25).

Economic and social developments reinforced public perceptions of the significance of internal threats and risks to national security. Lithuania experienced one of the most dramatic, in terms of economic and social dislocations and suffering, transition processes in Eastern Europe. In the early years following independence declining economic growth, high unemployment and hyper-inflation caused social pain and a rapidly declining standard of living (See Tables 19 and 20). Lithuania experienced


\(^{129}\)Ibid., 84.
one of the steepest declines in HDI, a development also reflected by declining life expectancy and increasing infant mortality rates. However, the political stability and the advance of economic and social reforms in the second half of the 1990s reversed this trend and Lithuania quickly began to improve personal and social conditions. In addition, the public perceptions of threats posed by minorities significantly declined, a remarkable turnabout considering the long history of nationalist and international confrontation.

Conclusion

Bulgaria, the Czech Republic and Lithuania experienced varying degrees of security through the first decade of post-communist transition. All three states perceived security to be the presence of conditions under which the state’s sovereignty, independence, and integration in the Western core was guaranteed. Domestically, security was perceived as the enhancement and preservation of the democratic nature of the society, and the increase in economic and social prosperity. In other words, security was seen as the low probability of damage to those values.

Of the three countries, the Czech Republic clearly enjoyed the highest level of security (See Appendix III). After the withdrawal of the Soviet troops and the split of Czechoslovakia, the Czech Republic found itself in a benign security environment, surrounded by states which were either part of the Western core, which Prague aspired to join, or were in the process of joining the Euro-Atlantic institutions. In addition, no neighboring state had any territorial claims on the Republic and all of them had an interest in seeing the state completing political, economic and social reforms and joining the Western core.
Czech leadership saw the level of security the Republic had as relatively high. The country’s sovereignty and independence was seen as unchallenged by any significant player or political development. In Czech security thinking, the potential threats and risks to security were directed at the Western core which the state strived to join, rather than specifically at the Republic. The threats more specific to the Czech Republic were associated with developments that challenged the country’s quest to join the Euro-Atlantic institutions. Even those threats, however, were not perceived to be intense and were categorized by experts as risks rather than traditional hard-core threats. Significantly, the economic and political instability in Russia in the mid-1990’s although perceived by Prague as a short-term risk, ultimately enhanced the Czech Republic’s security in the long term as the Euro-Atlantic institutions and the national leadership accelerated their efforts to integrate the state in the Western core.

The Czech public seemed to share official perceptions of security. The benign nature of the security environment and the success of post-communist reforms created a sense of security in the population not typical for East European societies. The public saw neither a neighboring state nor a development that could possibly emerge as a significant threat to national security. Of course, this conclusion requires a qualification as both Russia and Germany were seen as posing threats. This perception, however, was consistent with the official image of threats to peace and stability of the continent posed by general confrontation among great powers rather than a threat specific to the Republic. In addition, in the case of Germany, the risk was associated more with the powerful neighbor’s economic presence in the country rather than with any clear attempt to dominate politically.
Conversely, Lithuania faced a fundamentally different security environment. In the first years of newly acquired independence the very survival and sovereignty of the state was questioned by the Soviet Union and later Russia. Therefore, Lithuania was the only state in this study to face a challenge to the fundamental value of national survival. In the course of post-communist transition, however, the security threat subsided as Lithuania concluded treaties with Russia recognizing its independence and secured the relatively speedy withdrawal of Russian troops from its territory. In addition, the country gained international recognition and participation in major international organizations, which validated its sovereignty. Although the country secured its sovereignty, the security environment remained dangerous as the disintegration of the Soviet Union created a new set of neighbors with which Lithuania had yet to establish relations and sort out long suppressed grievances and issues. The continuing instability in the former Soviet area, however, spurred Vilnius’ efforts to reach an understanding with its neighbors and create an area with them wherein military conflict seemed unlikely. Lithuania also established a working relationship with Moscow and reached an agreement on basic issues including demarcation of borders, access rights to Kaliningrad, the status of ethnic Russians, and economic and social cooperation. Russia’s rejection of Lithuania’s policy of joining NATO, on the other hand, instead of increasing the potential for conflict between the two countries, forced Vilnius to maintain good relations with Moscow. In fact, in Lithuanian security thinking, the success of the country’s quest to join the Western core depended, among other factors, on maintaining a problem-free relationship with Russia, an official attitude which dominated governments’ policy toward the eastern neighbor after Sajudis’ loss of power in 1992.
Lithuania's public seemed to have a less intense sense of external security compared to either objective or official evaluation of the security environment. Lithuanians quickly shifted their focus from external to internal threats and risks to security. Indicative of this attitudinal change is that while Lithuania was still a Soviet republic the population overwhelmingly voted for Sajudis, which called for immediate independence and an uncompromising approach to dealing with the greatest threat to this goal, the Soviet Union. After independence was achieved, however, the population voted for the former communists who emphasized the collapse of the national economy and the accompanying social despondency. In addition, the labor democrats insisted on a more moderate approach to dealing with Russia. Indeed, the consequent improvement in economic and social conditions contributed to the further relaxations of perceptions of external and internal threats, as both the ethnic minorities and Russia were seen by only a small share of the population as threats to national security.

Among the three states, Bulgaria scored worst on the dependent variable security. Although at no point through the post-communist transition did Bulgaria confront a challenge to its sovereignty and independence, the country faced a dangerous security environment. The disintegration of Yugoslavia, civil wars, and the appearance of new neighbors presented the country with an uncertain and turbulent environment in which non-traditional security threats stemming from ethnic conflict, organized crime, and economic and social deprivation challenged Bulgaria's national security. One of the declared national values--joining the Western core--was threatened as continuing warfare and unstable neighbors threatened to isolate the country and prevent it from establishing a stable interaction with the Euro-Atlantic institutions. In fact, on occasion, including during the Kosovo conflict in 1999, Bulgaria found itself physically cut off from Western
markets. Thus, although the country did not experience the type of challenge Lithuania faced to its sovereignty and independence in the first years of post-communist transition, it confronted a similarly intense danger to its national security stemming from the regional environment.

The nature of the security perceptions of Bulgaria’s political leadership reflected for the most part the intensity of objectively existing security threats. Well into 1996, the political leadership felt extremely uncomfortable with the end of firm external security commitments and tended to exaggerate the intensity of traditional security threats such as the ones posed by a state to another state. Accordingly, Sofia searched for an immediate remedy to its security conditions and fell back on traditional means, including the maintenance of strong military power and falling back on tested security arrangements. After 1996, however, Bulgaria began to recognize the non-traditional nature of security threats and therefore embarked on a new approach to addressing challenges. Security threats and risks, however, remained intensive.

The public in Bulgaria, like in the rest in Eastern Europe, shifted its focus from external to internal threats and risks to security, and from state security to social and individual security. The slow pace of political, economic, and social reforms created social and economic deprivation that sustained the sense of insecurity. Indeed, although the number of people who saw ethnic minorities and neighboring states as threats decreased, the sense of insecurity remained high. It must be noted, however, that the public, like the leadership, began to see integration in the Western core as the means to address the dangers fading national security.
Appendix III

Figure 6 represents an attempt to provide a rough comparison of degree of national security on a ordinal scale from most secure to least secure. The figure measures the position of each country on the already discussed security variable. The three countries are ranked by summing the three variables by assigning values of 3 to the highest ranking on each variable, 2 to the next and 1 to the lowest ranking. In case two or more states share the same ranking, the states receive the same value on the 1-3 scale. The assigned values represent the countries' ranking for the period 1990-2000.

Security is estimated by using a 1-3 scale and assigning the value of three to the country, which has the highest degree of objective security, the highest of security as perceived by national political elite, and the highest degree of security as perceived by the population. The value of one is assigned to the country which scores lowest on each of the same variables.

Figure 6.
Variable Security

<table>
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<tr>
<th></th>
<th>(1)</th>
<th>(2)</th>
<th>(3)</th>
<th>Total</th>
<th>Average</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Bulgaria</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>1.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Czech R</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>3.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lithuania</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>1.67</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: Column headings are as follows: (1) Objective security; (2) Official perception of security; (3) Public perception of security.

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### Table 17.
Military Budgets as Percentage of GDP

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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Bulgaria</td>
<td>4.5</td>
<td>3.5</td>
<td>2.9</td>
<td>2.7</td>
<td>2.5</td>
<td>2.5</td>
<td>2.1</td>
<td>2.3</td>
<td>2.5</td>
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<tr>
<td>Czech R.</td>
<td>2.6</td>
<td>2.3</td>
<td>1.6</td>
<td>1.9</td>
<td>1.9</td>
<td>2.1</td>
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<tr>
<td>Lithuania</td>
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<td>0.5</td>
<td>0.5</td>
<td>0.5</td>
<td>0.8</td>
<td>1.3</td>
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### Table 18.
Perceived Threat from Ethnic Minorities in the Country
(percentage of public)

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<th></th>
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<tr>
<td>Czech R.</td>
<td>44</td>
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<tr>
<td>Lithuania</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>23</td>
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Note: Data for Lithuania includes ethnic Lithuanians only.

### Table 19.
Unemployment
(percentage)

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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Bulgaria</td>
<td>1.7</td>
<td>11.1</td>
<td>15.3</td>
<td>16.4</td>
<td>12.8</td>
<td>11.1</td>
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<td>13.7</td>
<td>12.2</td>
<td>16.0</td>
<td>17.9</td>
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<tr>
<td>Czech R.</td>
<td>0.8</td>
<td>4.1</td>
<td>2.6</td>
<td>3.5</td>
<td>3.2</td>
<td>2.9</td>
<td>3.5</td>
<td>5.2</td>
<td>7.5</td>
<td>9.4</td>
<td>8.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lithuania</td>
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<td>1.3</td>
<td>4.4</td>
<td>3.8</td>
<td>6.1</td>
<td>7.1</td>
<td>5.9</td>
<td>5.4</td>
<td>8.4</td>
<td>12.6</td>
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</table>


### Table 20.
Inflation
(percentage)

<table>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Bulgaria</td>
<td>23.8</td>
<td>338</td>
<td>91</td>
<td>72.8</td>
<td>96</td>
<td>62.1</td>
<td>123</td>
<td>1.082</td>
<td>22.3</td>
<td>0.3</td>
<td>9.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Czech R.</td>
<td>9.7</td>
<td>56</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>20.8</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>9.1</td>
<td>8.8</td>
<td>8.5</td>
<td>10.7</td>
<td>2.1</td>
<td>3.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lithuania</td>
<td>8.4</td>
<td>225</td>
<td>1.161</td>
<td>188</td>
<td>45</td>
<td>35.7</td>
<td>13.1</td>
<td>8.4</td>
<td>2.4</td>
<td>2.5</td>
<td></td>
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</tbody>
</table>

Source: Ibid.
Table 21.
Infant Mortality Rates
(deaths of infants under one year of age per 1,000 live births)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Bulgaria</td>
<td>14.4</td>
<td>14.4</td>
<td>16.9</td>
<td>15.9</td>
<td>15.5</td>
<td>16.3</td>
<td>15.6</td>
<td>14.8</td>
<td>17.5</td>
<td>14.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Czech R.</td>
<td>10.0</td>
<td>10.8</td>
<td>10.4</td>
<td>9.9</td>
<td>8.5</td>
<td>7.9</td>
<td>7.4</td>
<td>6.0</td>
<td>5.9</td>
<td>5.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lithuania</td>
<td>10.7</td>
<td>10.2</td>
<td>14.3</td>
<td>16.5</td>
<td>16.0</td>
<td>14.1</td>
<td>12.5</td>
<td>10.1</td>
<td>10.3</td>
<td>9.2</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


Table 22.
Life Expectancy at Birth

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
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</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Bulgaria</td>
<td>Male: 68.5</td>
<td>Male: 67.8</td>
<td>Male: 67.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Female: 74.3</td>
<td>Female: 74.9</td>
<td>Female: 74.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Czech R.</td>
<td>Male: 67.2</td>
<td>Male: 68.8</td>
<td>Male: 70.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Female: 74.3</td>
<td>Female: 75.2</td>
<td>Female: 77.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lithuania</td>
<td>Male: 66.1</td>
<td>Male: 64.9</td>
<td>Male: 64.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Female: 75.5</td>
<td>Female: 76.0</td>
<td>Female: 75.6</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


Table 23.
Human Development Index

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<tr>
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</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Bulgaria</td>
<td>0.854</td>
<td>0.796</td>
<td>0.773</td>
<td>0.780</td>
<td>0.789</td>
<td>0.758</td>
<td>0.758</td>
<td>0.772</td>
<td>0.772</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(40)</td>
<td>(65)</td>
<td>(62)</td>
<td>(69)</td>
<td>(67)</td>
<td>(63)</td>
<td>(63)</td>
<td>(60)</td>
<td>(57)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Czech R.</td>
<td>0.892</td>
<td>0.872</td>
<td>0.872</td>
<td>0.882</td>
<td>0.884</td>
<td>0.833</td>
<td>0.833</td>
<td>0.843</td>
<td>0.844</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(26)</td>
<td>(38)</td>
<td>(37)</td>
<td>(39)</td>
<td>(39)</td>
<td>(36)</td>
<td>(36)</td>
<td>(34)</td>
<td>(33)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lithuania</td>
<td>0.881</td>
<td>0.762</td>
<td>0.719</td>
<td>0.762</td>
<td>0.750</td>
<td>0.761</td>
<td>0.761</td>
<td>0.789</td>
<td>0.803</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(29)</td>
<td>(71)</td>
<td>(81)</td>
<td>(76)</td>
<td>(79)</td>
<td>(62)</td>
<td>(61)</td>
<td>(52)</td>
<td>(47)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: Figures in parentheses are country's rank among members of the United Nations.
Table 24.
Death Rate Caused by Homicide, Injury, Purposely Inflicted by Other Person and Other Violence (number of deaths per 100,000)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Bulgaria</td>
<td>3.6</td>
<td>4.0</td>
<td>5.2</td>
<td>6.7</td>
<td>6.3</td>
<td>7.7</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Czech R.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lithuania</td>
<td>11.2</td>
<td>12.7</td>
<td>13.0</td>
<td>15.3</td>
<td>17.0</td>
<td>19.5</td>
<td>18.2</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


Table 25
Perceived Russian Threat to Security (percentage of public)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
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<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Bulgaria</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>5</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Czech R.</td>
<td>39</td>
<td>55</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lithuania</td>
<td>68</td>
<td>50</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Note: Data for Lithuania includes ethnic Lithuanians only.*
Source: Haerpfer, Wallace and Rose, 6; Rose, *New Baltic Barometer II,* 34; Rose, *New Baltic Barometer IV,* 36.

Table 26
Perceived German Threat to Security (percentage of public)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
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<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Bulgaria</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Czech R.</td>
<td>38</td>
<td>44</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lithuania</td>
<td></td>
<td>5</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Note: Data for Lithuania includes ethnic Lithuanians only.*
Source: Haerpfer, Wallace and Rose, 9; Rose, *New Baltic Barometer II,* 32; Rose, *New Baltic Barometer IV,* 36.
Chapter VII summarizes the main findings of the dissertation. It joins two major debates—the sources of security in Eastern Europe and the security of small states.

The Three Case Studies

Bulgaria, like the other East European states, recognized early on the changing nature of threats and security. However, the political elite failed for most of the 1990s to reach a consensus on the specific threats and policies to guarantee the nation's security. While there was no disagreement on what values to protect— including sovereignty, independence, and democratic practices, among others—the elite disagreed on the policies to lower the probability of damage to these values. In fact, Bulgaria is a good example of the limited ability of the neorealist approaches to predict the country's behavior in its search for security as consecutive governing elites formulated different foreign policies in response to similar factors in a relatively stable international system. In other words, the country's foreign and security policies changed not in response to any significant changes in the international environment but rather in response to changes in internal politics.

The early period of post-communist transition witnessed the power domination of the former communist party and the inability of political elites to agree on the basic rules and principles of the political system. The lack of an encompassing political consensus and the dominance of old political elites forced Bulgaria to postpone a complete break from old security and foreign policy patterns. The country continued to perceive
historical foes including Greece, Yugoslavia, and especially Turkey as the most likely and immediate threats to national security. The disintegration of the Warsaw Pact and the end of firm external security commitments to Bulgaria’s security faced the country with a dilemma: the post-communist transition required that the state increase its distance from Russia and improve relations with the West including Turkey and Greece, while the imperative of national security, according to the former communists, required that Bulgaria maintain good relations with Moscow and rely on the former ally for security.

During this period even the opposition, while seeking to bring Bulgaria closer to the West, did not object to the efforts of the ruling elite to seek a Russian security commitment to national security. The ruling elite was preoccupied with regional threats and danger and not surprisingly did not see any of the great European powers, including Russia, as a threat to the country. These perceptions were shared by the public as history conditioned the population to see neighbors as threats, while the great powers—however meddlesome in the international politics of the Balkans—had never directly occupied the country for long. Indeed, while in most other East European countries it was Germany or Russia, or both, which were seen as the past and potential imperial power, in Bulgaria it was Turkey that was seen as the past imperial ruler and a possible future danger.

Accordingly, official Bulgarian security thinking continued to focus on a hard-core security threat—including to sovereignty and territorial integrity—emanating from traditional sources and at the same time relying on the traditional means to address these threats including maintaining, although in a less formalized form, tested alliances.

Similarly, along with seeking a traditional external means to enhance security, the old elite resorted to traditional internal policies to guarantee security by maintaining a large military, sustaining the ability of the Bulgarian economy to increase the national military
Several developments, however, convinced the Bulgarian opposition to commit itself to firm, pro-NATO policies. The decision of the Alliance to maintain only the robust security institutions in Europe and continuing instability in the East, including Russia’s inability to build democracy and implement reforms as well as Moscow’s return to more traditional realpolitik, exposed Bulgaria’s perilous security position in staying away from the process wherein post-communist states were already seeking a complete integration in the West, even at the expense of a complete break with the East. Concurrently, the UDF recognized that the already declared policy of integration in the European Community, a goal shared by all national political actors, was inconsistent with neutrality and staying out of NATO. Furthermore, the opposition decided that the country’s limited political, economic, and social capacities would inhibit any attempts to reform unless Bulgaria sought complete integration in all Euro-Atlantic institutions including NATO. In other words Bulgaria could achieve its main objectives including security, democracy, and free market only though full integration in the West.

Thus by the mid 1990s the dominant political players held different views on the country’s security and the policies to ensure it. The Socialists continued to conceptualize Bulgaria’s security conservatively, focusing on policies aimed at the internal mobilization of resources as a means to increase national power and relying on old alliance patterns to ensure external guarantees to security. The reliance on Russia forced Bulgaria’s Socialists to make sure that their policies of integration in the West were aimed at membership in the European Union but not in NATO. The ruling elite insisted that a membership in the Alliance would be considered only after its transformation into a European-wide security
organization in which Russia was a member. This policy was not lost on the West and soon Bulgaria’s lack of reform and stability and its ambiguous integration strategy relegated the country to international isolation.\textsuperscript{1} At the end neither Bulgaria’s objective security nor the perception of security increased as the ruling elite and the public continued to see various intense threats to security, both internal and external. The country found itself dangerously exposed as the failure to achieve a substantial level integration in Western institutions, similar to the one achieved by most other post-communist countries in Eastern Europe, exacerbated the sense of isolation while revealing the inability of the country to achieve internal political and economic stability without those same institutions.

The failure of the Socialists’ rule and the ascent to power of the UDF in 1997 marked a watershed in Bulgaria’s security policies. The former opposition implemented very different foreign and security policies. While still considering the region as the main source of external dangers to national security, the new government embarked on a process of unambiguous integration in Western institutions including NATO as the means to achieve security. Neighboring states ceased to be seen as potential threats to national security in the traditional sense and instead the new elite defined various developments in the region as the sources of danger. Furthermore, the government began the implementation of thorough economic and political reforms both as a policy to meet the requirements for membership in the Western institutions and as a means of building a stable political system and a market economy. In other words, the reforms were seen as both achieving integration in the West and consolidating domestic institutions. This policy adequately addressed the requirements of the security conceptualization defined by

\textsuperscript{1}Gareth Jones, “Close Russia Ties Push Bulgaria to Back of NATO Queue,” \textit{Reuters} (10 April, 1996)
the post-1997 rulers—international integration and domestic institutional consolidation were defined as the strategies to achieve security.

During the rule of the UDF the Socialists still remained skeptical of the government’s security policy and opposed, until at least early 2000, integration in NATO. This time, however, the Socialists’ opposition did not translate into an ambiguous national security policy as the BSP was relatively inconsequential as an opposition party and the other significant political parties supported the country’s integration in the Alliance. Therefore, Bulgaria was able to maintain the appearance of a security policy based on national consensus. In addition, the public became more committed to the process of integration in NATO.

The policy of integration and reform paid off when new challenges to the country’s security emerged in the late 1990s. The Kosovo crisis, seen as a significant source of threat to the state, prompted the Alliance to provide security guarantees, although short of formal commitments. The crisis also prompted the EU to invite Bulgaria to begin membership negotiations despite the country’s obvious shortcomings, and further committed the Union to its stability. Bulgaria received further financial assistance, and visa restrictions on its citizens were eliminated. The Kosovo crisis and its aftermath marked the end of the country’s isolation and made its security and stability a matter of greater NATO and EU interest. Thus in the course of the UDF’s rule the external security of the country was enhanced. Internally, however, the weaknesses of the economy and the instability and ineffectiveness of domestic institutions—all factors with deep and long systemic shortcomings—remained significant sources of societal and individual threats to security.
From a security point of view, the Czech Republic is the country with perhaps the best geopolitical position among the states in Eastern Europe. The only clear danger to its sovereignty, the presence of Soviet troops, was addressed quickly and without political struggle in the first year of transition. Surrounded by states seeking to completely integrate the region in the West, the Republic boasted the most stable political system and the most advanced economy, making it the best-suited candidate for membership in Western institutions.

The Czech reformers were able to steer the Republic into a quick transition to post-communist politics without having to contend with old elites. The new elites were able to reach a consensus on the nature and direction of all major reforms, including on foreign and security policies. The basic rules of the political game and the structure of the political system were swiftly established and did not at any point become a matter of political contention. The basic policies of democratization and marketization were widely accepted by political parties and the public. Similarly, the early government's security and foreign policies were even less contentious as the benign security environment and the lack of public interest made the formulation of policies non-political and pragmatic.

In the early phase of the transition the governing coalition led by Vaclav Klaus defined integration in the West as the main foreign policy priority. Accordingly, the Republic sought quick membership in EU, although it was less than insistent on NATO membership until the Alliance declared its policy of enlargement. The opposition parties found this objective and the policies to achieve it uncontroversial, and for most of the 1990s foreign policy was not a political issue in domestic politics.

The political elites also achieved a wide-ranging consensus on the structure of the political system and the nature of the political, economic, and social reforms. Having met
no opposition from the old communist elite, the reforms were able to build a political regime that satisfied the interests and preferences of the significant political actors. The government of Vaclav Klaus was not only able to implement the reforms but also to meet the economic and social expectations of the public. Although the public understanding of security was increasingly associated with internal threats and risks and focused on economic and social factors, the government, at least until 1996, was able to address these concerns. Even the economic crisis after 1996 did not challenge the process of institutional consolidation and integration in the West. Although the economy stagnated, the population did not experience the economic and social pain inflicted by similar developments in the rest of Eastern Europe. Thus neither the public nor any significant political force challenged the stability of the political regime and the country's foreign policy. The electorate simply booted Vaclav Klaus' government and elected the Social Democrats to power. By relying on Klaus' party to rule, the minority government of Milos Zeman in effect continued its predecessor's policies although at a different pace. The slow-down of reforms did not threaten the Republic's integration in the West.

The success of reforms and the stability of the Czech Republic made it a front-runner for membership in both the EU and NATO. Not surprisingly, the Republic was invited to begin negotiations to join the Union and became along with Poland and Hungary the first East European state to join NATO. The gradual integration in the West eased perception of risks and threats on official and public levels. Experts ceased to see any of the neighboring states as presenting any threat to national security. Most of the potential risks and threats were seen emanating from the former Soviet Union and the Balkans. Not surprisingly, instabilities in these regions only increased the determination of the political elite to seek quick integration in the Euro-Atlantic institutions. Gradually,
however, there emerged a recognition that the regions of instability were relatively
distant and did not present direct threats to the national security. Instead, as the Czech
Republic was becoming further integrated in the West, any potential threats emerging
from the regions of instability were seen as affecting the Euro-Atlantic area rather than
individual states. In other words, experts saw the Republic as joining an area in which
security is indivisible.

The public, too, gradually relaxed its perceptions of external threats. Although
Russia continued to be seen as the greatest probable threat to national security, when
asked whether there were any military threats to national security the overwhelming
majority of the public by late 1990s believed that there were none. Even the Balkans, a
region which experts tended to identify as a potential source of threats and risks,
gradually ceased to be seen by the public as a security danger, regardless of the
continuing violence in the area. While external security issues did not attract public
attention the population was much more concerned with the domestic dimension of
security. Yet even societal and individual security concerns were tempered by the
political and economic stability of the Czech transition. The extension of political and
civil liberties and freedoms accompanied by the continued growth of living standards
guaranteed that the majority of the public would gain a sense of security quite unique
among the societies in Eastern Europe.

Of the three countries in this study, Lithuania experienced the most intense threat
to its national security in the early phase of post-communist transition. Unlike in
Bulgaria, however, the political elite reached a consensus on how to address the threat to
national sovereignty even before the Republic formally seceded from the Soviet Union.
In fact the intensity of external threats played a positive role in the early years of
Lithuania’s independence as it forced all significant political players to work together and craft basic rules of the political game so they were accepted by all. The two main political parties saw the stability of domestic institutions as a guarantee against the Soviet encroachment.

Sajudis and the former communists reached an agreement on the basic political institutional structure and the means to sustain national independence, including the withdrawal of Soviet and later Russian troops. Even as the political elite reached a basic consensus on the most important issues in the post-communist transition, there emerged some disagreement that clearly marked the future divisions among political parties. While Sajudis insisted on an uncompromising approach to negotiating with Moscow, a clear break with the East and quick integration in the West, the former communists argued a more conciliatory approach towards Moscow and balanced relations with both the East and the West. Ironically it was the former communists who reached an agreement with Moscow and the speedy withdrawal of Russian troops from Lithuania and also restored economic stability after the chaotic and economically disastrous rule of Sajudis.

The Labor Democrats’ rule brought about not only some economic and political stability but also enhanced national security by achieving the withdrawal of Russian troops and setting the course for integration in the West, including the EU and NATO. Lithuania became an associated member of the EU and a PfP partner. The country also denied Russia the ability to interfere in its domestic affairs by granting all ethnic Russians on its territory automatic citizenship and ensuring their political participation. Lithuania also felt safe enough to develop a normal relationship with Moscow both as an attempt to cultivate acceptance of Lithuania’s independence Russia and as a response to the EU and NATO’s requirements to maintain good relations with its neighbors. In fact, Lithuania’s
policies of integration in the West by requirement included the cultivation of relationships with neighbors, which in the past presented—and some still do—security threats and risks. Thus the very process of seeking membership in the Euro-Atlantic institutions enhanced Lithuania’s security as the country had to sort out historically burdened relations and apply confidence-building policies. For example, Poland quickly turned from an old foe suspected of seeking to incorporate parts of Lithuania’s territory into a partner and ally in the process of joining NATO and the EU.²

Lithuania’s relatively tenuous security position and limited power forced the country to seek a cooperative approach to enhancing its security. Given the internal consensus on security and foreign policy, the country was able to sustain a cohesive strategy of seeking the formalized assistance of various states and organizations in order to increase not only its internal power but also its ability to utilize the power of various international institutions. The early political cooperation and coordination among the three Baltic states was institutionalized and, although differences in geopolitics and reform progress soon strained commitment to cooperation, enabled Lithuania to utilize capacities provided by international institutions to support this process in the Baltic region.

The Baltic states were able to attract the political and economic commitments of Western states and institutions. Even in the security realm, the three states were able to commit the U.S. to increase its interest in the maintenance of peace and stability of the region by signing the Baltic Chapter. Although short of a formal security commitment, the Chapter represented an elevated degree of Baltic integration in the Western arena.

²Parts of present-day Lithuania used to be part of Poland in the interwar period. After the Second World War the Soviet Union acquired Polish territory as part of the post-war settlement.
While maintaining its cooperation with Estonia and Latvia, Lithuania also pursued bilateral policies to increase its power and to achieve speedy integration in the West by seeking close relations with states with interests in the region including Poland and Denmark.

After the initial steep decline in economic activity, Lithuania was able to implement market reforms and achieve a stable and rapid economic growth. The creation of a currency board severely limited the ability of governments to apply economic policies that would potentially lead once again to inflation and unrestrained public spending. In fact, the currency board regime and the application of the EU requirements for membership inhibited any political tendency to select policies that would have destabilized the Lithuanian economy. The economic stability and growth soon helped reverse the trend of falling living standards, and the basic indicators of life quality began to improve.

The intense threat to Lithuania’s security in the early transition years also dampened public dissatisfaction inflicted by the break with the Soviet Union. Once there emerged a public belief in the country’s basic parameters of independence and sovereignty, the population became willing to accept a more moderate and gradual approach to strengthening the country’s power and security. The public increasingly became more confident in Lithuania’s ability to withstand external threats and instead focused on the domestic sources of threats and risks to security. Security came to be associated with personal and societal security. The heightened sense of insecurity prompted by the initial pain of reforms did not, however, translate into political instability as the institutional design proved efficient; the voters or the parliament were able to follow constitutionally prescribed paths for political changes and avoiding any
challenges to the established institutional order. In other words, economic and social
disenchantment did not translate into political instability as political and state institutions
proved capable of channeling political participation and mobilization.

The Study of Security of the Small States in Eastern Europe

The changing structure of the international security system after the end of the
Cold War has significantly increased the opportunity of small Eastern European states to
operate autonomously in pursuit of their preferences. Although great powers still define
the nature of the international system, post-communist states are able to select from
among diverse policies. Serious dangers are created, however, where these small states
face severe military and economic threats emanating from regional rivalries, hostile
ethnic groups, or declining economic development. The transition countries of Eastern
Europe face even more complex challenges as along with providing for their national
security after the disintegration of long-lasting security arrangements they embarked on a
difficult process of fundamental political, economic, and social reforms.

Most of the literature on East European security is based on the traditional
neorealist paradigm. Accordingly, the international security of the area is seen in the
context of the security vacuum left by the end of the Cold War, and the national security
of individual states as the search of new alliance arrangements to guarantee the national
sovereignty and independence. More specifically, NATO is seen as the means to address
the problem of the existing security vacuum and provide a security framework capable of
facing any outside threat and rendering conflicts among member states highly unlikely.
Realists differ among themselves as to how much explanatory power is to be attributed to the international system.3 For neorealists, the system is a material structure, which functions as a significant independent variable influencing the states that are part of this system. However, according to traditional realists, including Wolfers, Morgenthau and Kissinger, what is also very significant is the nature of the state; there is a difference between imperialist, revolutionary and revisionist states which seek to alter the nature of the international system on the one hand, and status-quo states, which seek to preserve the international system and their places in it on the other. Another group, the so-called modified structural realists, while accepting the insights of neorealism, attempts to incorporate international institutions and domestic factors as explanatory factors of state behavior.4

A modified realist approach, concentrating on the behavior of individual states and incorporating internal and external variables into the analysis, can provide insights on the international behavior of small states of Eastern Europe.5 Deborah Larson suggests that the dominant elite of a weak state seeking external allies may not necessarily act out

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3 For a short discussion see Paul R. Viotti and Mark V. Kauppi, *International Relations Theory: Realism, Pluralism, Globalism, and Beyond* (Boston: Allyn and Bacon, 1999), 82-84.


of concern for the territorial integrity of the state, but rather seek its own political survival. Alignment with an external hegemon may help a weak regime by eliminating external threats and providing political and economic assistance, thus enhancing the dominant elite's domestic legitimacy. Analyzing the international behavior of Third World countries, Steven David argues that the elites of weak regimes are willing to accommodate secondary external threats and concentrate on battling primary domestic threats. In other words, elites seek external resources to deal with internal threats. Of course, one may correctly argue that the experience of Third World countries in creating alliances provides no valuable insights into the foreign policy formation of East European states, especially the ones in which there are relatively stable and legitimate political and state institutions and a high consensus on the domestic and foreign policy objectives among the elites. However, this approach reveals that the formation of alliances is not a simple function of the presence of external threats, but is also linked to the domestic objectives of national elites. It is also linked to the political, social, and economic constraints on the elites' ability to mobilize internal resources needed to ensure the territorial integrity of the state and their own political survival. In an attempt to illuminate

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domestic factors in the states' international behavior, Randall Schweller goes even further by insisting that the most important determinant of alignment is the compatibilities of political goals, rather than the distributions of power or threats.⁹

Some authors go even further and call for a synthesis combining elements of realism and pluralism. Robert Keohane and John Ruggie, among others, propose that analysis must begin with the realist focus on power and the state which provide the context to understand the actions and behavior of actors and political structures.¹⁰

The scarce literature on security in Eastern Europe, applying mostly realist approaches, fails to incorporate insights provided by the modified approaches to the study of state behavior. Thus the traditional approaches provide limited understanding of East European security as it still conceptualizes security in the traditional terms as freedom from threats to the sovereignty and independence of the states. The post-communist states and societies, however, defined security in more complex, inclusive terms. In addition, policies designed to attain what the states consider to be national security were based not simply on the possibilities and limitations posed by the international environment but also by domestic processes. In other words, it is domestic actors involved in domestic processes who make the assessment of the international context and the choices necessary


for national security. Therefore, the traditional approach to the study of East European security does not systematically account for the differences in paths taken by the post-communist states in search of security. The actual paths were determined by what individual ruling elites and societies understood to be national security, what they saw as threats to this value, and the process of formulating of the proper policy responses. Thus although the three states analyzed in this dissertation operated in the same international environment and, from a realist perspective, had similar positions in the international system, domestic politics determined variations in preferences and choices and consequently variations in outcomes.
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VITA

Blagovest Tashev is a doctoral candidate in International Studies at the Graduate Programs in International Studies, Old Dominion University, BAL 621, Norfolk, VA. 23529. He is also Adjunct Professor in World Politics and Comparative Politics at Old Dominion University and Christopher Newport University, Newport News, VA. He is currently completing a dissertation on the effects of institutionalization on international and national security in Eastern Europe. His interests include international security, democratization, and U.S. foreign policy. He has also written scholarly and topical articles about Eastern Europe and international organizations.