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The Effect of Illicit Drugs Securitization in Indonesia

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THE EFFECT OF ILLICIT DRUGS SECURITIZATION IN INDONESIA

by

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B.A. August 2007, Universitas Gadjah Mada

A Thesis Submitted to the Faculty of
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Barry Buzan and the Copenhagen School scholars introduce the concept of Securitization in International Relations. This concept argues that threat is formed and based on the interpretation of the actors\(^1\). Threat does not naturally arise from the situation of state. Rather, it arises because of how prominent actors politicize the issues.

This study mainly focuses on analyzing the effects of Illicit Drugs Securitization in Indonesia. Previous literature has analyzed the issue of Illicit Drugs Abuse and trafficking problems in Southeast Asia in general, but few focus on Indonesia in particular. As the biggest state in South East Asia and its prominent role as an Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) pioneer, the Illicit Drugs Securitization in Indonesia is important issue to research. Moreover, this state has faced many other challenges, such as the severe impact of 1997 Asian Financial Crisis, tsunamis and other natural disasters, separatism, and significant power transitions from an authoritarian regime to a democracy. This ‘transition of power’ has also brought Indonesia deeper into the Global realm.

The growing problems of Illicit Drugs Abuse and Trafficking, in line with the Globalization process have pushed the Indonesian Government to make securitizing the country a national priority. The Indonesian domestic socio-political situation today is impacted by both strong global influences and securitization. The securitization of Indonesia is, by nature, a complex

process. Yet, through this thesis, I seek to identify the vital elements of the securitization process and analyze its effects. I argue that the securitization process is unavoidable. Yet, despite this inevitability, I argue that there are many possible forms that the securitization of Indonesia could take, each dependent on the policy ultimately chosen by the state. At the end of this thesis, I will describe the possibilities that I believe may arise due to the Illicit Drugs Securitization process in Indonesia.
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This thesis is dedicated to my wife Sari Widi Kusumawati and my two Children, Nadia Celia Nusa Widiyono & Muhammad Al Farizi Nusa Widiyono, that have supported me through the difficult time in my life.

I love you all.
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CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION

OVERVIEW

During many occasions, the Indonesian President Joko Widodo has stated that Indonesia is currently experiencing an illicit drugs emergency. One particularly important moment was during the National Coordination Meeting on illicit drugs on February 4, 2015.\(^1\) Here, the President quoted narcotics abuse prevalence data to illustrate the serious situation of drugs abuse in Indonesia. Prior to this meeting on June 6\(^{th}\), 2011, former Indonesian President, Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono gave six instructions with the hope of intensifying and increasing the activities of Illicit Drugs prevention and eradication.\(^2\) The six instructions were intended to be guidelines for the establishment of a national project addressing illicit drug abuse and trafficking prevention and eradication (Pencegahan dan Pemberantasan Penyalahgunaan dan Peredaran Gelap Narkoba/P4GN.)

At the regional level, ASEAN (Association of South-East Asian Nations) declared a Drug-Free ASEAN 2020 campaign at the 31\(^{st}\) ASEAN Ministerial Meeting in July 1998. This joint declaration was later ratified at the 33\(^{rd}\) ASEAN Ministerial Meeting in July 2000. It changed the campaign target to be a Drug-Free ASEAN 2015, five years earlier than the previous target. This campaign was also the continuation of ASEAN Senior Officials on Drug Matters (ASOD) that


formed in 1984 and ASEAN Ministerial Meeting on Transnational Crime (AMMTC) that held periodically since 1997.³

At the world level, Indonesia and other ASEAN countries have joined the treaty of “United Nations Convention against Illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances” that established in 1988. Prior to 1988 Convention, the United Nations (UN) had already established another Convention on Illicit Drugs. At this previous 1961 convention, members of UN met to sign the UN Single Convention on Illicit Drugs. Although many International Relation scholars questioned the effectiveness of International Institutions in binding its member to follow a treaty, ASEAN countries, including Indonesia, have made many significant movements in line with the United Nations Convention against Illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances of 1988.

All of the commitments described above have triggered critical questions regarding the existence of a drugs securitization in Indonesia and the possibilities of this difficult securitization process. Democratic states enable critical thinkers to question the purpose of state policy and even to protest policy. Some important questions include: Is the illicit drug problem in Indonesia just the government’s way of politicizing the problem for a separate political agenda? Is it a merely government reaction to deal with serious problem that already exist in the society? Is it a good way to solve the problem? Finally, what possibilities await at the end of the securitization process? I will address these interesting critical questions further throughout this research.

PURPOSE OF THE STUDY

This thesis mainly focuses on examining the effects of Illicit Drugs Securitization in Indonesia. Previous literature has discussed the Illicit Drugs Securitization in Indonesia from different perspectives and with different findings. However, resources discussing the effect of the Illicit Drugs Securitization in Indonesia are still very limited. Most of the existing literature discusses it as part of a wider ASEAN Drugs Securitization process. There is also a limited literature discussing the effects of the process. Nevertheless, studying the effects or the impacts of the securitization process is important for several reasons. Firstly, it allows us to gain a comprehensive understanding of the Illicit Drugs problem in Indonesia. Secondly, we can better identify and analyze the securitization process of Illicit Drugs in Indonesia. Beyond this, we are able to identify not only the problems that arise along with the securitization process, but also to have a general vision on the future of this process. All of those purposes are closely related. Illicit Drugs problems trigger the securitization process due to the change in the perception of threat. The securitization process itself will affect the state, and these effects will later influence future outcomes.

Indonesia, like other countries in the world, is currently facing a growing problem of Illicit Drugs Abuse and Drugs Trafficking. Globalization processes have reshaped the world into new stage where the borderline between each states and individuals are blurred. Communication technology and transportation make people all over the world easily and quickly connected. However, this luxury has come at a high price that must be paid. Illicit drug abuse and smuggling is one of these terrible prices. This problem was not even considered as a major problem 20 years

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ago by third world country like Indonesia, but like snowball this problem slowly rising in third world countries. In part due to globalization, Indonesia today faces a major illicit drugs problem alongside other key threats of terrorism and corruption.\(^5\)

The United States International Narcotics Control Strategy Report (INCSR) 2017 considered Indonesia to be both a transshipment point as well as a key destination for illegal drugs.\(^6\) Indonesia has a long history of Illicit Drug exposure, but in the past, drug abusers were very limited to particular areas. The quantity of Illicit Drugs Abuse has risen significantly in the last two decades. The Drug Abuser and Trafficker it is no longer limited to only certain areas or societies. In fact, current survey data shows that Illicit Drugs have been widely abused by Indonesian people from all parts of society. The seizure data also shows that Drug Trafficking involves people from a variety of backgrounds. The diversity of abusers and traffickers is due to several factors. Current actions of investigations, arrests, seizures, and prosecutions related to Illicit Drugs Abuse and Trafficking must also deal with Indonesian geographic and demographic challenges. The total area of Indonesia is 1,904,569 sq. km. while total of the population is estimated to be 260,580,739 (July 2017 estimation).\(^7\) These situations are just some of the major factors that make Indonesia a promising Market for Illicit Drugs Trafficking.

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ORGANIZATION OF THE STUDY

This study consists of four chapters. This first chapter is the general introduction of the study. Chapter II that follows, contains important literature used as a framework for analyzing the Illicit Drugs Securitization in a general manner. Starting with a theoretical approach on the issue, this chapter includes the definitions of security, securitization, security actors, illicit drugs abuse, and illicit drugs trafficking. Furthermore, this chapter also explains the perceptions of the threat of Illicit Drugs Securitization.

Chapter three mainly provides background information on Illicit Drugs Problems in Indonesia. I describe key components of the Indonesian history of Illicit Drugs Abuse and Drugs Trafficking. In addition, I also consider the current Illicit Drugs problems in Indonesia and its correlation with globalization. Finally, I discuss Illicit Drugs Securitization.

In chapter four I specially discuss the effect of the Drugs Securitization in Indonesia, broken down into subchapters to present the effect it has at different levels. I start with the changing on the perception of threat regarding the securitization, and then discuss the effect of the securitization in individual, state, and international levels. In this chapter, I also discuss the challenges and possibilities of the securitization process. I also present the possibilities of the securitization process. Unlike Realism Theory, which states one definite prediction on the future of International dispute, this thesis gives several possibilities that can arise from the implementation of the securitization process. I also offer the conclusion of my thesis and suggest possible studies or research that can be taken in the future. In short, I argue that the Illicit Drugs Problem in Indonesia has become serious problem for the Indonesian Government and that the process of future securitization is a long and winding road for Indonesia.
CHAPTER II
LITERATURE REVIEW

THE DEFINITION OF ILLICIT DRUG SECURITIZATION

In their book *Security: A New Framework for Analysis*, Barry Buzan, Ole Waever, and Jaap de Wilde present a new way to analyze security as a response to the ongoing debate in security studies. Together, they identify the debate between two perspectives in security studies known as the “wide” versus the “narrow.” The “wide” arises during the cold war period due to the dissatisfaction on the “narrow” perspective that limits the security studies only in military and nuclear obsession. The “wide” perspective prefers security studies to put more dimension in the study.

The focus of securitization literature is the description of securitization processes, the causes of the securitization, the reason of the securitization process, and examines whether it’s legitimate or not.¹ This theory is well accepted among the security and military communities, but it still debated in International Relations community. Realists question the theory in several aspects. First, according to the Realist perspective, the state is the most important actor in International Relations. As such, IR should focus on international level, or the third level described in Kenneth Waltz’s Levels of Analysis.² Thus, any analysis below the state level is considered irrelevant. Secondly, non-state actors are considered unimportant. This is difficult for illicit drugs trafficking analyses as the actors behind it are mostly non-state actors. However, as Paul Rexton

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Kan finds, in some cases states, or Narco-States are the main actors behind the illicit drug trafficking.³

Liberalists, especially from the Neoliberal school, believe in the importance of non-state actors. Keohane and Nye introduce the concept of power and interdependence and show the important role of non-state actors, particularly international institutions and Non-Governmental Organizations (NGOs.) Yet, neoliberalist theory is more concerned about interdependence between nations and less concerned about respective state security.⁴

A third group of thinkers, constructivists, offer an alternative way to both Realist and Neoliberal thought to the analysis of Drugs Securitization. Constructivism is based on the idea that identities is very important to form the perception of threat towards state. Based on this idea, it is possible to analyze International Relations from both the individual and state level. Among constructivists, the Copenhagen School of Security Studies scholars Barry Buzan and Ole Waever are especially concerned about the securitization process.

Securitization, the concept introduced by Copenhagen School of Security Studies and coined by Ole Waever, rejects the narrow security idea that limit the idea of security only in military area. Waever and Buzan try to understand security from wider perspective than simply the military. They describe the five key sectors of security: military, political, economic, social, and environmental. According to Buzan, security is the move that takes politics beyond the established rules of the game and frames the issue either as a special kind of politics or above politics.⁵ Thus, securitization can be perceived as extreme version of politicization. The security

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problem is purposely constructed. A certain public issue can be considered as security problem or in other words, be ‘securitized’ due to the discourse content in the issue. Securitizing actors have influential power to “promote” the issue to be perceived as a threat or danger. The actors narrate the issue and the audiences either rejects or approves it. This is the process called securitization.

However, defining the threat or danger itself can be complicated. Different states have different idea on things that they considered as threat. Different actors can also have different ideas of what constitutes a legitimate threat. Objective perception of threat is hard to achieve, but alternative subjective perception makes the securitizing process even more difficult. Thus, Buzan states that the exact definition and criteria of securitization is constituted by the intersubjective establishment of an existential threat with a saliency sufficient to have substantial political effects.\(^6\)

In other words, securitization is intersubjective and it is socially constructed.

Regarding the securitization process described above, Buzan et comp. have introduced important additional concepts. *Securitizing actors* are the individual or institution that securitize issues by declaring something, a referent object, is existentially threatened. All kind of actions taken by securitizing actors to securitize the issue are called *speech acts*. *Referent objects* are things that seen to be existentially threatened and that have legitimate claim to survival. Existential threat here can only be understood in relation to the particular character of the referent object/s. In the military sector, the referent object is usually the state. In politics, however, existential threats are traditionally defined in terms of a constituting principle, the sovereignty or ideology of the state. In the societal sector, the referent object is the large-scale collective identity which can function independent to the state, such as nations and religions. In the environmental sector, the referent

\(^6\) Ibid. p.25.
object that is existentially threatened can be widely different things: from species to habitat, the climate, biosphere, etc.

In addition to securitizing actors, Buzan et comp. introduce concept of functional actors. Unlike securitizing actors that securitize the issue, functional actors are actors who affect the dynamics of securitization. These actors significantly influence decisions in security without being the referent object or the securitizing actors.

Securitization operates in four steps. The first step is the presentation of a certain issue by the securitizing actors as existential threat towards the referent objects. The second step is the acceptance of this threat by a credible audience. The third step is the deployment of extraordinary measures to address and combat this threat. The last step is the de-securitization process, which reverses the securitized issue and returns it to be an ordinary political issue.

KEY TERMS AND DEFINITIONS

According to the Merriam-Webster dictionary, there are multiple definitions of drug. Most generally, it is simply a substance used as a medication or in the preparation of medication. However, drug can also refer to an illegal substance that causes addiction, habituation, or marked change in consciousness, a commodity that is not salable or for which there is no demand (e.g. drug on the market), and a substance used in dyeing or chemical operations.\(^7\) Except for the last definition, the three definitions of drugs are still widely use in literature.

The term “illicit drugs” is used in this thesis to differentiate it from illegal drugs. In fact, the term drugs, illegal drugs, and illicit drugs are often used interchangeable in many literatures.

Illegal drugs refer to all substances that are supposedly used for medication or preparation of medication but prohibited by the state law due to many reasons. In other words, the perspective used to define a substance as legal or illegal is the law. Due to the different law systems in the world, the list of illegal substance is not the same for each country. Illicit Drugs refer to addictive substances that affecting someone’s mood or psychological state. Unlike illegal drugs, not all illicit drugs are considered illegal. According to the effect, illicit drugs are classified into Hallucinogens, Stimulants, Depressants, and Anti-psychotics.

Hallucinogens are drugs that alter perception (awareness of surrounding objects and conditions), thoughts, and feeling. The substances in these drugs can cause hallucinations, strange perceptions, and other subjective changes in human minds. Most common natural hallucinogens are subtracted from plants and mushrooms. Interestingly, the most common hallucinogen is synthetic type of drug called *D-lysergic acid diethylamide* (LSD).

In contrast, a stimulant is a drug that accelerates the activity of central nervous system in the brain. Many substances are included into this category, ranging from weak substances, like caffeine to stronger ones, like cocaine. The stimulant drug user will become excited and over active after consuming these substances.

A depressant is a drug that works oppositely to a stimulant. The substances in this drug slows down the central nervous system. The substances of depressants range from alcohol up to the strong ones like opium or heroin. Anti-psychotic drug also works in the central nervous system and have sedating effect, making the user sleepy.

The term drugs abuse and misuse is also interchangeable in daily usage. By referring to UNODC and the United States Food and Drugs Administration (FDA), the term drug abuse is

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more often used in this area. The term drug misuse is not only limited for illegal nor illicit drugs. It is also widely used for legal drugs when its usage does not follow the prescription.

THE SECURITIZATION OF DRUGS IN WORLD HISTORY

Illicit drugs have been known for centuries across the world. Peruvian Indians chew coca to fight altitude sickness and hunger, but the most important usage was for religious ceremonies. Native American also had used tobacco for a long time before Christopher Columbus introduced it to Europe in 1493. Ancient Sumerians used hul gill, their term for opium, for sleeping aid and painkiller. Old medical manuscripts by Ebers Panyrus, Dioscorides, Galen and Avicenna mention opium as an important painkiller for surgery. Old Egyptian papyrus records the production of alcohol and breweries, while Chinese manuscripts mention marijuana or hemp usage as an important medicine for rheumatic and abdominal pain, even though it was more widely used for clothes or as a mat material.

In 1805, Friedrich Sertuner succeeded to create morphine by extracting the active substance in opium and neutralized it using ammonia. Morphine is a very strong analgesic alkaloid (painkiller) that works directly on central nervous system. However, it has several side effects such as loss of consciousness, euphoria, drowsiness, laziness, and blurry visions. Compared with other substances, morphine also highly addictive. Historically, patients treated with morphine were reported to have insomnia and nightmares. Due to the invention by Sertuner, the opium trade flourished. It was regarded as highly valued commodity. By 1827, morphine began to be mass-

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produced by the *E.Merck & Company of Darmstadt* Germany. The name morphine itself derived from Greek God of Dream Morpheus.¹¹

In 1895, Heinrich Dreser from Bayer Laboratory formulated morphine with acetyl to create a new substance. This substance (*diacetylmorphine*) was mass-produced starting in 1898 as cough medicine by Bayer with brand name Heroin. The name was derived from German word *heroisch*.¹²

Another illicit drug cocaine was developed in the same century. As has been stated above, Peruvian Indians has known coca leaves for centuries for medical and religious purposes. When Spanish conquistadors invaded Peru in 1532, they broke the old Indian taboo and used the leaves to better control their laborers. Albert Niemann, a German chemist, succeeded extracting cocaine substance from coca leaves in 1859. However, this substance was not widely produced or used up until 1880. In his 1884 article *Über Coca* (About Coca), famous psychoanalyst Sigmund Freud promoted the substance as cure for depression and sexual impotence. By 1886, coca leaves were used in John Pemberton’s Coca-Cola. Coca-Cola finally remove coca in 1903 after public pressure due to the danger of the drug, and by 1922, the U.S. government officially banned cocaine in.

As has been illustrated in the brief timeline of event in the history of illicit drugs, illicit drugs securitization in the world can be traced back quite far. Intoxication and addiction changes human behavior and this naturally invites the attention of those seeking to control human society. Consequently, authorities therefore use many tactics to manage or control the access and usage of illicit drugs.¹³ Sue Pryce uses the 20th century as a marking point for the world illicit drugs securitization. Prior to the 20th century, illicit drugs problems were regarded as a local issue for

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many states. Post 20th century illicit drugs problems entered a new chapter by being “Internationalized.” Several transnational rules and regulation issued to stop or to control illicit drugs trade across countries and regions.14 The US instigated the Shanghai Opium Commission in 1909 and the Hague Convention on opium in 1912.15 These conventions inspired illicit drugs prohibition around the world. Interestingly, alcohol and tobacco somehow escape from control prohibition. Pryce view this as reflections of US and Western Europe assumptions, prejudices, customs, and economic interests.16

Pryce’s argument of using 20th century as marking point is debatable if illicit drugs securitization is viewed not only from the existence of international rules or regulations. The two opium wars in China (1839-1842 & 1856-1860) are the best examples of how transnational or international problems arises due to the Internationalization of illicit drug problems. It shows that transnational or international drug existed before 20th century. The Qing Chinese kingdom “securitized” opium as symbol of disruption against Chinese sovereignty, while the United Kingdom, through its British East India Company (EIC), pressed for opening the opium market in China. Both side’s “securitization” was mainly used for the benefit of their respective state purpose, but the impacts were felt worldwide.

Regardless of the debate, the 20th century shows that illicit drug problems and securitization increase at different levels. After the free trade of heroin for two decades, international medical communities realized the danger of unlimited heroin use. The League of Nations then began to enforce strict limitations on the production and exportation of heroin through the Geneva

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14 Transnational here refers to the concept by Joseph Nye; interstate interactions/movements across border of state not only between governments, but also between non-state actors and intergovernmental organization. For details, refers to Joseph S. Nye and Robert O. Keohane, "Transnational Relations and World Politics: An Introduction," International Organization 25, no. 3 (1971).


Convention in 1925. Similarly, the Limitation Convention of 1931 limited heroin production merely on medical and scientific needs.\(^{17}\)

However, cutting the supply did not simply mean cutting the demand. In 1924, U.S. federal narcotics officials estimated that there were 200,000 addicts in U.S.\(^{18}\) Criminal Syndicates shifted their heroin production from pharmaceutical laboratories and factories to clandestine laboratories in Shanghai and Tientsin, China.\(^{19}\) These clandestine laboratories supplied the world heroin black market until the break of World War II. The twenty-first amendment (Amendment XXI) to the U.S. Constitution, ratified on December 5\(^{th}\), 1933 repealed the Eighteenth Amendment (Amendment XVII) prohibition of alcohol manufacturing and distribution.\(^{20}\) American Mafia like Salvatore “Lucky” Luciano and Meyer Lansky who used to smuggle alcohol before the Amendment started to smuggle heroin into U.S. as source of income. \(^{21}\) The prohibitions above ended the era of “drug trade” and started the era of “drug trafficking”。\(^{22}\)

World War II (1939-1945) brought major disturbances to the world illicit drugs supply and demand. Wartime border security measures and limited commercial shipping made smuggling nearly impossible. In the U.S., many addicts were forced to undergo involuntary withdrawal.\(^{23}\) However, illicit drug problems began to rise again in the post-WWII era. World politics of the post-WWII era was marked with the rise of the Cold War. Decolonization and the rise of nationalism made drug trafficking involve different kinds of people. The old colonial powers were


\(^{18}\) Ibid. p. 5.


no longer able to have direct control, while the newly independent countries lacked the power to control everything from the capital cities. Organized criminal groups, insurgents, local feudal lords, bureaucrats, warlords, and even the new independent government could not escape completely from drug trafficking due to the promising profits. The new independent governments were not only unable to control their territories, but they were also using drugs production and trafficking as economic tools against foreign invasion.

Due to all factors above, drug trafficking was almost unstoppable in Cold War era. The “Golden Crescent” area emerged in 1950s across Afghanistan, Iran, and Pakistan, as the highest production area for opium and heroin. Beyond political instability, the mountainous terrains of the area made it even more difficult for authorities to regulate drug farming. A decade after the Golden Crescent arose, a “Golden Triangle” area emerged in Southeast Asia. The Golden triangle encompasses an area across the border of Myanmar, Laos, and Cambodia. This area has been producing opium and marijuana since before WWII. Thailand government already initiated countermeasures in 1955, but political instabilities in the golden triangle made it difficult. The Vietnam War made everything worse. During this war, the insurgents in golden triangle started to transit opiates to Hong Kong and process them to be heroin.24

Prior to 1971, in a special message to Congress on July 14, 1969, Nixon identified drug abuse as “a serious national threat” by citing high rate of crime rate and juvenile delinquency from 1960-1967. To answer all the problems, U.S. President Richard Nixon proclaimed a “War on Drugs” in 1971. This was in response to the reports of two-congressional representatives, Robert Steele and Morgan Murphy, who described the growth of epidemic narcotic addiction among U.S. troops in Vietnam. The objective of this policy was to conduct interdiction and eradication of illicit

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24 Please refer to chapter 7 of the book The Politics of Heroin in Southeast Asia for detail information on Golden Triangle.
drugs problems from the main sources.\textsuperscript{25} The motive was to cut the supply of illicit drugs (mostly narcotics at that time) before it reached the US.

This policy can be accepted as the starting point of Illicit Drugs Securitization in the modern world. The U.S. government has allocated billions of dollars in this campaign since then. In 1973, the Drug Enforcement Agency (DEA) was created to coordinate the efforts of all other related agencies. This policy soon grew into a giant war against drug cartels from around the world. The Golden Crescent, Golden Triangle, and Andes mountainous area became the most prominent battlegrounds. Interestingly, the U.S. President successors after Richard Nixon keep continuing this policy until now, despite different implementations of the policy. Jimmy Carter, during his presidential campaign, promised the decriminalization of marijuana and an end to federal criminal penalties for marijuana possession up to one ounce. George H. Bush had to deal with Panamanian leader Manuel Antonio Noriega Moreno’s complicated plot along with the “War on Drugs” campaign.\textsuperscript{26} Reagan signed Anti-Drug Abuse Act 1986 and spent approx. $1.7 billion for supporting the drugs war. Similarly, Clinton signed Plan Colombia and gave aid approx. $1.3 billion for reducing cocaine production in that country. However, he also signed the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) deal to improve U.S.-Mexican trade as well as made border supervision difficult.\textsuperscript{27}

In short, illicit drugs have been an issue for ages. Interestingly, the long history of illicit drugs could not escape from political nuances. Alcohol is prohibited in most Muslim countries,

\textsuperscript{25} Interdiction refers to destroy, damage, or cut off (something, such as an enemy line of supply) by firepower to stop or hamper an enemy. Eradication refers to do away with as completely as if by pulling up by the roots. Both commonly used by UNODC and other illicit drug counter-measures agencies. (Merriam-Webster Dictionary, “Interdiction,” & “Eradicate,” Last update March 30, 2018. Accessed on April 3, 2018. https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/drug.

\textsuperscript{26} This matter is discussed further in Chapter IV of this thesis.

and tobacco smoking was a capital offence in 17th century Russia and some parts of Germany. China in the 19th century fought and lost two Opium Wars (1839-1842 and 1856-1860). The distinction between licit and illicit substances is based on custom, convention and prejudice, reinforced in the political arena and underpinned by law. A drug, in this way, is viewed as the “other” or an existential threat.

THE IMPORTANCE OF THE PERCEPTION OF EXISTENTIAL THREAT IN ILLICIT DRUGS SECURITIZATION

Buzan mentions a speech act as any actions taken by securitizing actors to bring the existential threat into a bigger arena. However, defining an existential threat is not simple. David Campbell in his book Writing Security, states that danger is not an objective condition. It is not a thing that exist independently of those to whom it may become threat. “Danger is an effect of interpretation. Danger bears no essential, necessary, or unproblematic relation to the action or event from which it is said to derives.”

While there is no implicit threat to Indonesia, based on this idea, anything can become threat to Indonesia. It all depends on how the state analyzes the danger. Barry Buzan, one of the scholars from Copenhagen School has ideas similar to Campbell. Buzan uses the term ‘speech act’ that labels issue as an existential threat with securitization referring to that spatial move of a certain development from the real of normal politics into emergency, hyper-politics.

Identity is another important point in David Campbell’s book. An escapable dimension of being, identity is not fixed by nature, given by God, or by intentional behavior. Identity is more

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likely constituted in relation to difference. The constitution of identity is achieved through building boundaries that separate the “inside” from “outside.” A certain issue can be regarded as national threat to state when anything regarded as or related to “the outside” is attacking “the inside” or anything that related with it.

The Illicit Drugs Securitization in Indonesia cannot escape from the securitization of the world. Globalization has a big role in this issue. There are a lot of definition for Globalization from different field of sciences. However, most of the definitions emphasize the concept of interconnectedness. People around the world today have connected each other across many different spheres. Borrowing from Appadurai, people are connected through five spheres; (1) ethnoscapess, the global sphere of mobile people through refugees, working opportunities, tourism, etc., (2) technoscapes, the global sphere of technologies that support people movements, (3) financescapess, the global sphere of capital and economy, (4) mediascapess, the global sphere of mass media and cyber network that enable people to connect virtually around the globe, and (5) ideoscapes, the global sphere of political ideologies that spread around the world through mediascapess. The Illicit Drugs Securitization in Indonesia connects the Illicit Drugs Securitization in the world through those five spheres.

Security studies scholars do not fully accept the new framework for security analysis by Buzan et. comp. Some scholars are skeptical on this new approach. There are two basic critical questions on securitization theory. The first question is on “new wide perspective of security studies” as opposed to the “narrow traditional realist perspective” as has been mentioned at the beginning of this chapter. The narrow traditional realist perspective refers to the concept that security is limited to military purpose. Realists, especially traditional ones, believe that the state is

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the most important entity in International Relations. Consequently, the concept of security followed by this school is focuses on the state level. The definition of existential threat according to this perspective is the real threat of military invasion from other states. Securitization theory, on the other hand, broadens the concept of security not only in the military area, but also in other areas such as economy, politics, society, and even environmental.

The second question is on the level objectivity of securitization theory. Some writers are questioning the concept of security and existential threat in this theory. The referent object in securitization theory is not just the state, but also the socially shared identity. The existential threat is not only military invasion from other states, but also everything that is considered outside of “we” or “us”. McSweeney points out that in traditional security perspective, the state would intervene and speak objective security for the society. This concept of threat is based on the state values. Securitization theory, as mentioned at the beginning of this chapter, is determined by the intersubjectivity of the existential threat. It is a subjective perspective on the threat from certain people or group that shared to the larger group of the society. McSweeney argument of objectivity itself is questionable because the development of “objective” reality in security was originally developed from a certain personal or collective opinion that enforced the citizen within the state.

Emily Crick mentions three speech acts that used in International Drug Securitization in her article “Drugs as an existential threat.” The first speech act was based on the 1961 UN Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs, the second was based on the 1988 UN Convention against Illicit

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Trafficking of Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances, and the third was based on the 2010 Russian Rainbow-2 Plan. Unlike U.S. “war on drugs” speech act that mainly aimed to securitize U.S. citizen, these three speech acts aimed to securitize the world politics.

The clear things about these three acts is the different referent objects and existential threats. The 1961 UN Single Convention portrayed drug addiction as an existential threat while the 1988 UN Convention emphasized drug trafficking and organized crime as existential threats. These two UN Conventions are also marked by the “wide vs narrow” perspectives present in security studies. The 1961 UN Single Convention refers to drug addiction as an existential threat towards human security, while the 1988 UN Convention refers the drugs trafficking and organized crime as existential threat towards national security.

DIFFERENT PATHS OF ILLICIT DRUGS SECURITIZATION IN DRUG FREE ASEAN 2015

There is much literature discussing the Drug Free ASEAN 2015. Some literatures mention that illicit drugs securitization in Indonesia is closely related to the Drug Free ASEAN 2015 campaign. Based on the securitization concept offered by Buzan, I identify the actors in Drug Free ASEAN 2015 as follow:

a) Securitizing actors: ASOD (ASEAN Senior on Drugs Matter) and the government of each ASEAN members.

b) Existential threats: Illicit Drugs Abuse and Trafficking. The issue of illicit drugs abuse and trafficking occurring in Southeast Asia is a threat to all elements of society in it. The existential threat not only threatens at the individual level, but also the state and international system.
c) Speech act: Drug Free ASEAN 2015. ASEAN must free members from illicit drug abuse and trafficking. Illicit drugs abuse and trafficking is powerful threat that need to be overcome.

d) Referent object: ASEAN members state that sovereignty is disrupted due to production and distribution activities of those drugs. Illicit drugs abuse and trafficking directly threaten ASEAN countries.

e) Functional actors: UNODC (United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime), UNDCP (United Nations Drug Control Program), and functional actors at national/domestic level units.

f) Audience: Represents all the people in Southeast Asia

Although the actors, speech act, audience, and referent object in the securitization of Drug Free ASEAN 2015 are the same, the development of this program in each member state of ASEAN is different. This is due to the unique situation of each state member of ASEAN. As we know, members of ASEAN have varying social, economic, and political situations. Although the narrative of each state is relatively similar, the counter narrative and alternative narrative of the audience in each state are different. I use the term counter narrative to identify opposite narrative that can reverse the main narrative of the government while alternative narrative is a different narrative that is not necessarily an opposite or reversal to the main narrative of the government but is able to change the direction of the main narrative or change it into new narrative. Each narrative is competing to be the main narrative of the government. As a result, the effect of the securitization of drug free ASEAN 2015 in Thailand will be different from that in Brunei Darussalam or the Philippines.
At this point, I will describe the securitization process and its effect so far in each country below:

**BRUNEI DARUSSALAM**

As one of the ASEAN member states, Brunei Darussalam has not considered the misuse of narcotics and dangerous drugs to be a serious problem. This is because Brunei does not have any territory or producing ingredients in any significant amount. This country is nowhere near the definition of Paul Rexton Kan Source or Transshipment countries. The various problems related to drugs in Brunei are relatively small. Likewise, there is an indication that Brunei is used as an illegal dispatch of illegal drugs or money laundering efforts. However, the Brunei Darussalam government has an extremely violent and proactive anti-drug program headed by the Narcotics Control Bureau (NCB). Both the number and quality of illegal drugs entering or transiting in Brunei are relatively small, but they exist. The UNODC report on Brunei in 2015 shows that the illicit drugs problem in Brunei is slowly increasing. Yet, the Bruneian people have reported no evidence of a syndicate operating within the country. Narcotics and dangerous drugs entering Brunei are usually smuggled through the air at international airports or by crossing several border checkpoints. Drug smuggling to Brunei can also be done by sea route by using boats coming from Malaysia such as Sabah and Sarawak or through illegal jungle entry points. Islam, which is widely applied by the government and the people, colors the narrative of Drug Free ASEAN 2015 in this country.

**SINGAPORE**

Singapore is the smallest country in ASEAN with a total area of only 641 square kilometers and a population of about 3.5 million. The Singapore Central Narcotics Bureau (CNB)

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is one of the pioneers in ASOD. Using the term from Paul Rexton Kan, Singapore has become transshipment country, or a drug market for various types of narcotics. No interesting data of drugs production is available here. However, Singapore does deal with the pre-cursors (narcotic ingredients) due to its strategic position as the main hub of Southeast Asia. Despite strong law enforcement by the state, and its reputation as one of the most democratic countries in Asia, Singapore still has the death penalty for serious crimes including drug trafficking.

MALAYSIA

Along with the increasing progress in the economic and social levels of Malaysian society, the problem of narcotics and dangerous drugs in Malaysia has also become a serious problem for the country's future. However, Malaysia is not an ASEAN member country that produces drugs. It cannot be denied that although it is not a producing country, Malaysia is a target of drug dealers. The distribution and trafficking of drugs in Malaysia varies, but includes drugs like heroin, morphine, marijuana, crystal meth, psychotropic pills, ecstasy, amphetamine, opium, and so on. Out of these many variations of narcotics, heroin, morphine and marijuana are the most common type found in Malaysia.

Although Islam is strong in this country, the number of illicit drugs crime in this country are quite high. Like Singapore, Malaysia still has death penalty for serious criminals and this is often applied to many drugs traffickers. However, there is few counter or alternative narratives can block the securitization of Drug Free ASEAN 2015 in this country.

THAILAND

Thailand is one of the few countries of the world that has a lifelong cycle of production, distribution, and drug markets in Southeast Asia. The existence of the Golden Triangle or the Golden Triangle in northern Thailand border near Myanmar and Laos make this country one of
the leading producers of narcotics. This is closely related to the existence of Golden Triangle which became a producer and supplier of 60% of the opium and heroin production of the world. Most types of drugs that currently circulating in Thailand consists of heroin, opium, methamphetamine, marijuana, and so forth. Cocaine and ecstasy are very popular for groups with have higher social status, like celebrities, foreign tourists, students who study abroad, and others.

Despite the Golden Triangle’s existence, Thailand King Bhumibol Adulyadej Royal Project was able to change the life of hill-tribe in Chiang Mai Province and later some other northern province such as Chiang Rai Province, Mae Hong Son Province, Lamphun Province, and Phayao Province. This is an example of a successful securitization process in ASEAN. The king of Thailand started the project in 1969 and got attention from UN a decade later. This alternative development project or alternative empowered project inspires other Southeast Asian countries to adopt the same project for narcotics producer area. At present, the Thai Royal Project has supported more than 39,277 households, 288 villages, and 168,445 people in 5 Northern provinces and each household earned income around 140,000 Baht on average, which is 10 times better than an income reliant on growing opium.35

The Thailand alternative development project is interesting because it shows how the government’s main narrative has shifted towards an alternative narrative. The counter narrative existed in the Golden Triangle area when the King tried to stop the opium cultivation. The narrative of narcotics producer areas around the world (South America, Golden Crescent, and Golden Triangle) is usually based on poverty and planting the narcotics plant is the only way to get basic needs such as foods and education. Separatism grows particularly well in these areas (FARC in

Colombia, GAM in Aceh, and Taliban in Afghanistan).\textsuperscript{36} In Thailand, the authority and the legitimacy of Thai King is undisputed. Even though the government could have stood strongly with its securitization agenda, its King interestingly chose an alternative way instead.

Regardless of the successful royal project and its activity as the leader of ASOD, Thailand is still dealing with serious drug problems. Thailand has been slow to implement harm reduction practices. I believe that it should be the role of Non-Governmental Organizations and societal narrative to redirect the strong old main narrative from the government towards drug abusers. Those that have been implemented have focused solely upon injecting heroin users. There are few harm reduction services directed specifically at consumers of ATS: a situation common to many countries (Windle 2015).\textsuperscript{37}

\textbf{MYANMAR AND LAOS (LAO PDR)}

I put Myanmar and Laos together because of the close position of both countries and the Golden Triangle’s existence. Myanmar is a country that produces one of the largest types of opium in Southeast Asia and the second largest in the world after Afghanistan. Together with Laos, the number of opium crops in this area is approximately 25 % and 10% of the world opium crops.\textsuperscript{38}

Illegal opium cultivation in Myanmar is commonly found around Shan province and Kachin provinces, especially in Wa and Kokang area, in northern Myanmar. Geographically, Myanmar has a very favorable climate for poppy cultivation. Opium grows in places with a suitable climate and temperature. It is usually located in a plateau about 800 meters above sea level or above. Indeed, opium cultivation is very easy to do because it does not require irrigation, fertilization, or

\textsuperscript{36} Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (\textit{Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia, Ejército Del Pueblo (FARC-EP or FARC)}. Source: Higgins, "Counternarcotics to Counterinsurgency: Assessing the Transformation of Us Economic Assistance to Colombia, 1998–2002.".


\textsuperscript{38} McCoy, Read, and Adams, \textit{The Politics of Heroin in Southeast Asia}. 
the spraying of insecticides. The area of land used for cultivation of illegal opium in Myanmar fell from 108,700 hectares to 21,500 hectares in 2006. Laos similarly reported that its area of 19,000 hectares devoted to illegal opium cultivation had decreased to 2,500 hectares by 2006.39

McCoy in his book The Politics of Heroin in Southeast Asia explores the political disputes in golden triangle vividly. Until today, the golden triangle has remained a big challenge for Drug Free ASEAN 2015. Myanmar and Laos governments have put a lot of effort into securitizing opium and stopping its cultivation. However, the main narrative of the government confronts the counter narrative of the locals suffering from poverty. A documentary film the golden triangle forbidden land of opium portrays both narratives from the government and the local people.40 The long history of Burmese insurgencies supported by US to fight Chinese Communism in this border area and the inexistence of strong leadership as in Thailand case has made the securitization of Drug Free ASEAN 2015 in this area difficult.

**CAMBODIA**

Like other ASEAN countries, crystal meth growing is the biggest problem in Cambodia and has been increasing since 2003. In 1995, the Cambodian government founded the National Authority for Combating Drugs (NACD). This institution started to grow and make decisions on Drug control policy that includes drugs securitization in the country. Cambodia is not a significant source of narcotics or drugs, but its position near the golden triangle has made it difficult for this country to escape from the increasing drug problem in Southeast Asia.

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VIETNAM

Vietnam’s position is similar to Cambodia, due to its proximity to the Golden Triangle. Vietnam runs needle exchange programs in most of its provinces. This illicit drug started creeping in after the Vietnam War. In 1990’s, Vietnam was famous for its hard drug policy because the government securitized the danger of drugs which it perceived as social evil. Vietnam is one of a small number of states to have suppressed illicit opium production, an intervention that centered upon coercive negotiations with limited alternative development.

Vietnam government has a similarly strong authority and legitimacy as the Thai King, but Vietnam has instead chosen to stand on its illicit drugs securitization agenda and disregard any alternatives. Vietnam has successfully reduced 98% of the opium production in its northern region. No strong counter narrative can be developed against Vietnam “quasi-authoritarian” regime. Today, this country is slowly transform its drug policy from the hard way to harm reduction. The heavy HIV epidemic in the 90’s forced Vietnam to do it. The securitization of opium and other illicit drugs listed the substances as “social evil” which then forced the drug abusers and addicts to keep using it secretly. This secretive behavior brought difficulties for the government in dealing with HIV/AIDS problems. Functional actors in this country (non-governmental organizations, ASEAN, local communities, etc.) are able to voice counter narratives against the government’s hard policy narrative.

PHILIPPINES

In the Philippines, the most interesting topic on illicit drugs issue is not only the problem itself but also the way the government securitizes the issue. In the Philippines, takes an even harder step than other ASEAN states. Rodrigo Duterte, the President of the Philippines gives command

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for law enforcer to be able to shoot drug mule suspects at the crime scene. This policy is probably just the tip of Philippines attitude towards drug mule crimes. This capital punishment policy has resulted in the mass killing of citizens across many cities in the Philippines.

In fact, more than 35,600 people have been arrested in antidrug operations as a result of the government’s Project Tokhang. Government forces have gone door-to-door to more than 3.57 million residences, according to police. More than 727,600 drug users and 56,500 pushers have surrendered so far, leading to an overcrowding of prisons. In affluent neighborhoods like gated communities and estates, there are sometimes polite knocks on the door, an officer handing a pamphlet detailing the repercussions of drug use to the housekeeper who answers. In poorer districts, the police grab teenage boys and men off the street, run background checks, make arrests and sometimes shoot to kill if they deem it necessary. Human Rights Watch said in the World Report 2018 that Duterte’s murderous policy on drug abusers and traffickers has resulted in the killing of more than 12,000 drug suspects since the beginning of the policy on June 30, 2016.

Drug Free ASEAN 2015 is interesting as reference in discussing illicit drugs securitization in Indonesia. The same securitization process can result in different ways. Beside the securitizing actors, authority, and legitimacy as stated by Buzan, the existence of counter and alternative narratives to confront the main narrative from the securitizing actors is also important in determining the path of securitization.

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CONCLUSION

Barry Buzan and the Copenhagen School introduced Securitization Theory as a new perspective in analyzing International Relations (IR) issue. According to Buzan, securitization is the move that takes politics beyond the established rules of the game and frames the issue either as a special kind of politics or above politics.44 This theory rejects the narrow security idea that limits the idea of security only to the military area. Some IR scholars debate this theory, but it has been widely used in many security publications. Buzan introduces the concepts of securitizing actors, audiences, functional actors, and referent object that very important in securitization process.

In the securitization process, the securitizing actors starts by presenting a certain issue as an existential threat towards the referent objects. After this threat is accepted by a credible audience, the securitizing actors then deploy extraordinary measure to address and combat this threat. In the end, the actors de-securitize or reverse the securitized issue and return it to being an ordinary political issue. Illicit drugs that can affect human nerve system has been known for centuries and its long history has always involved politics. Illicit drugs securitization transforms illicit drugs abuse and trafficking into existential threat that must be eliminated.

A securitizing actor must have both authority and legitimacy over the audience in order to push the securitizing process forward. Otherwise, the audience will not accept the main narrative from the securitizing actor, as we can be seen in many narcotics producer areas. Buzan and other securitization theorist present securitization as a “one way” approach from authorized securitizing actor towards the audience. Securitizing actor is the subject while the audience is the object. I argue in support of this approach because the audience and functional actors often have their own

narratives that sometimes confronting the main narrative of the securitizing actor. I simplified these narratives into counter narratives and alternative narratives. Both narratives are important in determining the path of the securitization process.
A BRIEF HISTORY OF INDONESIA

The history of Indonesian civilization can be traced up to pre-historic era, but the oldest Sanskrit literary sources note Indian influences in the archipelago. Hindu-Buddhist civilization flourished during the early years of Indonesian civilization until the rise of the Muslim states around 13 AD. European Colonization reached this archipelago in 14 AD and brought with it a trade war between the Portuguese, Dutch, and British merchants. During this era, illicit drug abuse started to emerge in Indonesia. There was no record of illicit drug usage prior to the Colonization era. The Dutch East Indies Company (VOC) monopolized the drug trade in most of the Indonesian islands until it dissolved in 1800 following bankruptcy. The Dutch state then took control over Indonesia until the Japanese Empire occupied this territory in 1942.

The Indonesian Republic was born on August 17, 1945 during the vacuum of power after the Japanese Empire surrendered to the aligned forced two days earlier on August 15, 1945. The former Dutch Colonists did not easily accept the proclamation of Indonesian independence. The Dutch colonists tried to retake their former Dutch Indies colony through two military aggressions (politionale acties) in 1947 and 1949. The Dutch finally recognized Indonesian sovereignty at the Dutch-Indonesia Round Table Conference in The Hague, Netherland in August 23-November 2, 1949. The track of illicit drugs problems in Indonesia can be traced back to the Dutch Indies era, but for the purposes of this research, I will focus on the securitization under Indonesian administrations.
As has been told by Alfred McCoy, post-World War II Southeast Asian illicit drug history was marked by the rise of golden triangle area as one of the biggest opium supplier in the world.\(^1\) After successfully defending against two military aggressions (the Dutch refer it as police actions), the new Republic still had to deal with several rebellions and separatists movements. These rebellions happened from the revolution era (era of Independence movement) up to authoritarian rule (1945-1957).\(^2\) Indonesia was under two quasi-dictators for the next 30 years, Sukarno (to 1967) and Suharto (1967-1998). Both used strong and centralized rules type to manage the country.\(^3\) They also did not tolerate open opposition against their regimes. However, they had different styles in earning legitimation. Sukarno securitized Neo-colonialism while Suharto securitized Indonesian Communist Party (PKI).

As stated above, Sukarno became the first President of the Indonesian Republic through the revolution era against the Dutch and then through eliminating political opposition through his “Guided Democracy” idea. From the self-proclaimed era until 1960’s, Indonesia faced many political struggles that ensured that the supply of illicit drugs was almost nothing. War and rebellion also brought many casualties, reducing Indonesian population significantly, although the exact number of casualties is unknown.\(^4\) From a political perspective, the end of Sukarno is marked with the rising conflict between the communists and the military. Suharto used the military to gain power and violently put pressure on his political opponents. Large-scale killings targeting

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\(^1\) Refer to chapter II for details.
\(^3\) Ibid. p. 185.
communist sympathizers by the military and its supporters occurred during the time known as the Indonesian mass killings of 1965-1966.

Suharto began to rule as President in 1967. Unlike his predecessor Sukarno, who tended to build good relations with the Soviet Union, Suharto got strong support from the US. This was interesting because according to Indonesian foreign policy and the constitution, Indonesia should be active promoting peace yet stay neutral in world politics. The beginning of Suharto’s regime was marked with great economic improvement, but the end of his regime was marked with massive economic downturns due to the Asian Financial Crisis of 1998. Suharto used the term “New Order” to refer to his regime as opposed to Sukarno’s regime, which he referred as the “Old Order.” Suharto allowed foreign investment and foreign cultural product to enter the country during his regime. This became a critical supporting factor as to how illicit drugs abuse and trafficking started to rise in Indonesia.

In 1998, college students from all over Indonesia marched to the Indonesian parliament building demanding that Suharto be dethroned. This Indonesian style of “people power” finally succeeded in bringing Suharto down from his leadership role. The fall of Suharto was followed by riots over Jakarta and Surakarta, horizontal conflicts that victimized those with Chinese ethnicity, the Independence of East Timor, as well as the rise of the separatist movements in some border area of Indonesia such as Papua and Aceh. Some Indonesian observers even predicted a high probability of Indonesian disintegration into smaller states, like the former Yugoslavia.

Despite all the political and economic problems, Indonesia entered a new political era that enabled regime change without casualties. Five presidents entered office after Suharto. B.J Habibie, former Suharto vice president took leadership during the transition. His leadership is

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5 Maurizio Geri, "The Treatment of Ethnic Minorities in Democratizing Muslim Countries: The Securitization of Kurds in Turkey Versus the Autonomization of Acehnese in Indonesia," (ODU Digital Commons, 2017).
mostly remembered by the East Timor separation from Indonesia and release of thousands of political prisoners. Abdurrahman Wahid superseded him in 1999 through indirect elections. He only became president for two years until his impeachment in 2001. Megawati Sukarnoputri replaced him after the impeachment. During his time in office, the Bali bombing in 2002 started to bring terrorism and radicalism to the forefront as a major threat to the state. Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono (SBY) became the next president through direct elections in 2004. He securitized terrorism to the next level. SBY also started to securitize illicit drugs abuse and trafficking after the prevalence level of illicit drugs abuse keep rising since the era of Suharto. Joko Widodo, the current President of Indonesia, took leadership in 2014 and is continuing illicit drugs securitization today.

Since the reformation movement in 1998, Indonesia experienced many fundamental changes in politics and economy. Indonesia amended their Constitution four times because many articles in the constitution were considered multi-interpretable. Local provinces demanded a decentralization policy, something that would have been impossible to get during two quasi-dictators Sukarno’s and Suharto’s eras. Freedom of press and media openness were finally achieved, along with its complex implications. In 1999, the Indonesian parliament passed the Decentralization Law No. 22 Year 1999 (UU No. 22 Tahun 1999) that enabled the decentralization process of citizens in provinces other than the central government. This law revised by new Decentralization Law No. 32 Year 2004 (UU. No.32 Tahun 2004), not only rules the citizenship in autonomous provinces, but also expresses a clear relationship between the provinces and the central government.\textsuperscript{6} New government institutions, such as the Corruption Eradication

Commission (KPK), the Constitutional Court of Indonesia (MK), the Judicial Commission (KY),
and the National Narcotics Board (BNN) were founded to ensure good governance. These policies
were proven useful in maintaining Indonesian sovereignty against separatist demands, especially
during periods of political turmoil.

Reformation movements tried to change Indonesian leadership peacefully, yet they have also resulted in many negative consequences. In his dissertation, Mauricio Geri compares the Aceh case with the Kurds case in Turkey. The autonomization of Acehnese has allowed them to be able to stop the separatist demands while the securitization of Kurds in Turkey has aggravated current problems. A peaceful reformation movement has enabled Indonesia to bring its militaries back to the barracks after thirty years of controlling the state. It has also been able to avoid huge casualties like in Suharto’s beginning years or in the Indonesian Revolution era 1945-1950.

Despite the positive examples listed above, peaceful Indonesian reformation has created different problems. In a normal coup, the new leadership is usually ready to change the old leadership. The old leadership, especially dictatorship, can end in exile, prison, or elimination. This is not the case with a “pure” movement. Figures from the old leadership still exist and compete with the new figures in democratic elections. The new and weak democratic system can, at any moment, turn the competition into horizontal conflicts we have seen in the Arab spring. The popular uprising movements in Tunisia, Egypt, Syria, and Libya have brought the whole Middle East, a region that generally defined as troubled, conflict-ridden, into new unpredictable and even more complicated developments.7

The peaceful changes also affect the eradication of corruption. The presumed corrupt figures of the old regime still exist with significant power and influence. The KPK faces many

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7 Mustafa Yetim, "State-Led Change in Qatar in the Wake of Arab Spring: Monarchical Country, Democratic Stance?," Contemporary Review of the Middle East 1, no. 4 (2014).
difficulties in investigating and to prosecuting corrupted suspects.\(^8\) New media openness that supposedly supports corruption eradication, often turns out to be a new political battlefield instead. Transparency International in 2017 ranked Indonesia 96\(^{th}\) among 180 countries in the world and 17\(^{th}\) among Asia-Pacific countries.\(^9\) Indonesia’s score has improved when compared to previous years, but its improvement is very slow.

HISTORY OF ILLICIT DRUGS ABUSE IN INDONESIA

Illicit Drugs, including Narcotics, psychotropic, and other addictive substances, have been known into Indonesia since long ago. In the Dutch Colony or the *Vereenigde Oost-Indische Compagnie* (VOC) era, people in the archipelago were already aware of opium or *candu*, as it is referred to in the local language, at that time. The VOC tried to monopolize this commodity due to its high profit, yet opium was also very useful in conquering the lands in Java by making the landlords addicted. In 1677, VOC signed a treaty with King Amangkurat II of Mataram to monopolize opium trade in Java. After the treaty, opium trade in Java significantly increased. It is estimated that from 1619 to 1799, the average opium distributed in Java was approximately 56,000 kg per year. Paku Buwono IV (ruler of Surakarta 1788-1820) noted the addiction phenomenon of his people and described that the habit of using opium had truly paralyzed the health and the social life of its users. Gradually, the Dutch later realized that in the end opium brought more problems than profit. Unproductive drugs addict laborers would not make the production rate better. The social problems that arose due to addiction were also bad for business.

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After opium, marijuana or *cannabis sativa* entered Indonesia. Aceh is known as the most suitable habitat and the oldest area interacting with this plant. The soils, humidity, rainfall, and geographical condition of the area supports the rapid growth of this plant. There are two different opinions regarding the history of cannabis, known as *ganja* in Southeast Asia. The first version is that this plant was not originally from Indonesia, that European traders brought it to Aceh in the 19th century. This version is widely accepted by the media and often used in literature. The second version refers to old Acehnese manuscript *Tajj-al-Mulk* from around 18th century that mentions the use of marijuana as a spice. Although today this manuscript is a past relic with doubtful objectivity due to the Islamization movement, *ganja* or marijuana has long been used as a spice in Acehnese culinary. It was not widely used for smoking until the late 19th century.

In 1931, the Dutch ratified Illicit Drugs Law (*verdovende middelen ordonannte stbl no.278 jo 536*) year 1927 to limit the existence of opium houses. The Dutch were still reluctant to ban opium completely due to their profit gain. However, the Dutch Illicit Drugs Law was erased when the Japanese imperial invade Indonesia during WW II, when the Japanese imperialists established a new rule, the *Brisbane Ordinance*, that completely prohibit the use of opium in his colonies. The aim of this ordinance was to ensure quality potential human resources for military or other war supportive purposes.

In the post-World War II era, Indonesia was unable to escape completely from illicit drug problems. The invention of heroin from opium by Heinrich Dreser in 1895 marks the beginning of a new era of narcotics. This supply of heroin was mostly taken from opium plantations in the

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golden crescent area (Afghanistan, Iran, and Pakistan) and in the golden triangle area (Thailand, Laos, and Myanmar). The cold-war policy of the preponderant powers had an influence in the existence of these areas. Alfred McCoy in his book *The Politics of Heroin in Southeast Asia* explained that the United States Intelligence agency was involved in heroin transnational crimes at that time. US Intelligence supported the nationalist guerillas in Burma (now Myanmar) as part of its containment strategy during the Cold War. In the 1950’s Burmese guerilla’s held 1/3 of the world opium.\textsuperscript{12}

John Lewis Gaddis in his book “Strategies of Containment: A Critical Appraisal of American National Security Policy during the Cold War” describes it as a series of attempts to deal with the consequences of that wartime Faustian bargain.\textsuperscript{13} The idea was to prevent the Soviet Union from using the postwar international order, a prospect that seemed, in the West, no less dangerous than what Germany of Japan might have done should they have had the chance.\textsuperscript{14}

It is interesting to see Gaddis use of the idiomatic expression Faustian bargain in viewing containment. Symbolizing the United States’ containment policy as a “deal with devil,” it is implied that the writer had a negative perception toward the end of this policy. Containment was not the ideal American foreign policy, although it was a reasonable choice for that era. Containment has been proven to successfully block communism. It also changed the world order from Bipolarity (United States vs. Soviet Union) to Multipolarity (USA, China, Soviet Union) to finally be Unipolar, making the USA the last super power in the world. However, the US made many Faustian deals or “deals with the devil” during the containment period. The golden crescent and the golden triangle were able to exist for a long time because the USA worked with the

\textsuperscript{12} McCoy, Read, and Adams, *The Politics of Heroin in Southeast Asia*.p.84.


\textsuperscript{14} Ibid.p.4.
paramilitaries in those areas. These paramilitaries depended on the opium to support their logistic
during the Cold War. Narco-Terrorism, the practice of producing illicit drugs to be traded for
weapons for terroristic activities, is one of the big problems many countries in the world face.

In the late 1960’s and 1970’s the number of clandestine laboratories that produced heroin
was rising in the golden triangle and most of the heroin was smuggled to USA, making the number
of drug addicts in USA increase rapidly. Thus, the US government faced the consequences of the
Faustian Deal and started its war on drugs in the 1970’s.

Indonesia was also impacted by this problem. After opium disappeared rapidly from
Indonesia during WWII, narcotic abuse started to reemerge in the 1970’s. The illicit drug that was
most abused was cannabis because heroin was very expensive at that time. This plant was widely
found in Aceh for a long time, but throughout history, the local Acehnese used it for food. There
are many varieties of cannabis, but the one from Aceh (cannabis sativa hybrid) was assumed to be
the best because it contains Tetrahydrocannabinol (THC) higher than the Cannabidiol (CBD). As
such, the smuggling of cannabis from Aceh started to increase once again.

The rise of illicit drug abuse in the 1970’s changed the way the Indonesian government
dealt with this problem. Prior to the 1970’s, the Indonesian government did not regard illicit drug
abuse as major threat. The President Instruction No. 6 Year 1971 was what started to make the
illicit drug problem into a national one, alongside money counterfeiting, smuggling, subversive
action, juvenile delinquency, and immigration alien supervision. Although it started getting
attention from the authorities, illicit drug problems had not perceived as serious threat in Indonesia.
It was more likely to be classified as a social problem rather than as a national threat. The President
Instruction also marks the birth of an integrated coordination board to supervise all of social
problems.
Law No. 9 year 1976 criminalized the illicit drug problem and took it to the next level. No longer classified as a social problem, illicit drug abuse was considered a crime. Throughout the 1980’s heroin and cannabis were the substances mostly likely to be abused in Indonesia, but in the 1990’s the trends changed. This era is marked by the abuse of medical substances that are legal such as Methadone, Lexotan (Bromazepam), Ephedrine, etc. A new substance variant Amphetamine Type Stimulant (ATC) also started to be abused widely. Ecstasy and Methamphetamine are the most often used drugs of this type. Unlike heroin and cocaine that are difficult to produce, ATS is easier to produce because the material or the pre-cursor is abundant and can be made anywhere. Based on the 2016 report of United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC), ATS and cannabis were the most abused substances in Indonesia.

Due to an increasing number of illicit drug abuse in Indonesia, the government changed its perception of narcotics and other addictive substances in 1997 by establishing the Law No. 5 year 1997 on Psychotropic drugs and Law No. 22 year 1997 on Narcotics. The new Law No.35 year 2009 on Narcotics opened a new chapter in dealing with the problem. This law made illicit drug abuse into a major threat for Indonesia and marked the beginning of the securitization of illicit drugs problem in Indonesia. This law also strengthened the authority of National Narcotics Board of Indonesia (BNN-RI).

Prior to 2009, Indonesia had an institution that specially dealt with illicit drug problems, but this institution did not have any jurisdiction to intervene in drug crimes. The main function of the board was to coordinate all government health and law enforcement agencies that deal with the issue. As I have stated above, in 1970’s illicit Drugs Problem emerged as a national issue, although it was not regarded as major threat. Indonesian President Suharto instructed the National Intelligence Coordination Board (BAKIN) in 1971 to tackle six national issues at that time. They
were money counterfeiting, illicit drugs abuse, illegal smuggling, juvenile delinquency, subversive countermeasures, and alien (foreigners) supervision. Indonesian government considered illicit drugs problem as a relatively small problem and believed that formal law and norms in Indonesia able to contain and minimize the problem. This view was in contrast with other Southeast Asian countries that consistently fought the illicit drugs problem. For countries in the golden triangle area such as Thailand, Laos, and Myanmar, it had been major challenge since 1970’s. Interestingly, other Southeast Asian countries such as Singapore and Malaysia also fought the problem since that time because they have borders with the countries in the golden triangle area.

The Law No. 5 year 1997 on Psychotropic and Law No. 22 year 1997 on Narcotics enabled President Abdurrahman Wahid to develop new institutions that were specially tasked in illicit drugs countermeasures. The National Narcotics Coordination Board (BKNN) formed in 1999 following the promulgation of the two Laws. This new government institution coordinates 25 other government institutions, including the Ministry of Health and Indonesian National Police (POLRI) in dealing with illicit drugs problem. Due to the serious development of illicit drugs problem, the President and the Parliament issued Decision Number VI/MPR/2002 in the year 2001 to amend Narcotics Law No. 22 year 1997 for efficient action to tackle the illicit drugs problem. This became the base upon which the National Narcotics Board of Indonesia (BNN-RI) was formed.

The demands of regional autonomy or “autonomization” following the regime changes in 1998 brought another obstacle for National Narcotics Board of Indonesia (BNN-RI). BNN-RI was directly under the President while Province Narcotics Board (BNP) and Municipal Narcotics Board (BNK) were each head of Regional Administration. They did not have any direct relation due to structural differences. The latest Narcotics Law No.35 year 2009 put all of Narcotics Board
into one structural organization under the President. The new law also enables BNN-RI to intervene illicit drugs abuse and trafficking.

INDONESIA IN WORLD NARCOTICS MAP

Since the beginning of 21st century, there were more than thousands case of illicit drugs took place in Indonesia. From those cases, approximately 90% of the drugs were smuggled from outside countries. Heroin or opiates mostly smuggled from Golden Crescent or Golden Triangle area. Heroin or opiates became the second ranks of most used illicit drugs after marijuana up to 1990’s. Cocaine were smuggled from South America. Compared with other types of illicit drugs, cocaine considered rarely used and trafficked in Indonesia. Methamphetamines, which known as shabu in Southeast Asia were mostly produced and smuggled from China (Guangzhou area). Based on the statement by Director of Illicit Drugs Crime Detective Indonesian National Police (Direktur Tindak Pidana Narkoba Bareskrim POLRI) most of shabu came from Malaysia which at the beginning functioning as the transit point of the smuggling from China15. In recent cases, Malaysia and Indonesia also evolve to start producing methamphetamine. Those smuggling operations usually involving International syndicate. Iran and West African Syndicate were often become headline in the early 2000, but today Chinese syndicate who often become newspaper headline.

The type of illicit drugs that being abused in Indonesia is changing through time. Since 2011, Crystalline Methamphetamine (crystal meth) became the most widely abused drugs in Indonesia. This type of drug can be made easily compared to heroin or cocaine.

Up to 60% of all crystalline methamphetamine seized in Indonesia is supplied by domestic manufacture. Significant quantities are also trafficked into the country from the Islamic Republic of Iran, China, Malaysia and the Philippines. Criminal groups from Africa also continue to smuggle ATS and other illicit drugs into Indonesia. The vast majority of demand for ecstasy-type pills in Indonesia is similarly supplied by domestic manufacture (about 90%). The remainder originates from Malaysia and China.


Only marijuana or cannabis that originally produce inside Indonesia. Due to the climate and soil texture, Aceh become suitable place for the plant. Up to 1990’s, this type of narcotics was the most widely used in Indonesia. Prior to giant tsunami in 2004, Aceh separatist movement smuggled the plant outside to be trade for arms. After the tsunami, the separatist agreed to sign treaty with Indonesian Government and returned as part of Indonesian Republic. Some people in Aceh even said the giant tsunami as “blessing in disguise” because peace finally came back to Aceh\(^{18}\).

As the problems of illicit drugs getting more serious each day, Indonesian Government applied death sentence as the highest punishment applied on illicit drug mules. Based on Indonesian Penal Law (KUHP) there are some crimes that can be punished with maximum death penalty such as killing or severely attacking President of Indonesia (Article 104), rebellion or separatism (Articles 111,124,140), killing or severely attacking friendly state leaders (Article 140), Murder (Articles 340, 365, 368), and Vessel Hijacking (444). These articles exist since Indonesia adopted the Dutch-Indies Penal Law (Wetboek van Strafrecht voor Nederlandsch-Indie). Overtime, some articles has been added or removed from the Penal Law to cope with new problems in the society. Despite changes on the Penal Law, Indonesia also created many special Law outside the original Penal Law to regulate specific matters. The examples for these are Law No. 25 Year 2003 on Money Laundering or Law No. 35 Year 2009 on Narcotics. The Narcotics Law contains various threat of punishments towards the offenders according to the seriousness of the crimes. The minimum punishment would be rehabilitation and the maximum would be death penalty.

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There were many protests towards capital as human rights violation. Some other people tries to push government to legalize some substances to solve this problem. Up to this day, legalization of narcotic and psychotropic has not meet it succeed in Indonesia. This is interesting because according to Indonesian Narcotics Law, narcotic substance allowed to be consumed for medical purpose. However, the medical community does not recommend those substances due to the addictive side effects.
The US policy change in dealing with drugs problem also influenced the law enforcement approaches. Starting in 2009, Indonesian Law Enforcement has tried to fight the crime by suppressing both demand and supply of the illicit drugs. However, it is hard thing to do since globalization has made people and substances easily produced and transported. In 2010, Indonesian legislative has ratified new narcotics law that put this issue to be prioritized along with Terrorism and Corruption.

Paul Rexton Kan analyzes the role of state in illicit drugs trafficking and makes some classification based on each characteristic. Rexton Kan terms has similar concept with terms that used by UNODC. The first one is source countries that in UNODC formal document were called as production countries. Source countries are states where major illicit drug production occurs\textsuperscript{19}. The second type is Transshipment countries. This refers to countries that used as indirect or circuitous routes of illicit drug trafficking or smuggling\textsuperscript{20}. The fourth type is demand countries, or in other words the consumer countries. Most consumers of illicit drugs are in developed countries with the United State being the largest consumer, but this trend is going to change due to the rapid urbanization in the developing world. This phenomenon can be seen in Brazil, Russia, India, China, South Africa, Mexico, Thailand, and South Korea\textsuperscript{21}. Although Kan does not mention Indonesia, the phenomenon also happens in Indonesia.

\textsuperscript{19}Kan, *Drug Trafficking and International Security*.
\textsuperscript{20} Ibid. p.41.
\textsuperscript{21} Ibid. p.42.
The last type is hybrid countries. As from the name, this country is a mix of source, transshipment, and demand countries. Although not widely recognized by the policy makers in the world, these hybrid countries are important to understand the geo-narcotics world. Examples of this hybrid type is Mexico, Cambodia, Jamaica, Laos, Lebanon, and Mali. Hybrid countries are complex in nature. Not only mix in characteristic, a country like Mexico or Cambodia has mixture type of drugs that being trafficked in those areas. Illicit drug traffickers in those countries often

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Drugs</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Bahamas</td>
<td>Cocaine, Marijuana</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Belize</td>
<td>Cocaine, Heroin</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cambodia</td>
<td>Meth, Heroin</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ecuador</td>
<td>Cocaine</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>El Salvador</td>
<td>Cocaine, Heroin</td>
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<tr>
<td>Guatemala</td>
<td>Cocaine, Heroin</td>
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<tr>
<td>Guinea</td>
<td>Cocaine</td>
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<tr>
<td>Guinea-Bissau</td>
<td>Cocaine</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Haiti</td>
<td>Cocaine, Heroin</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Honduras</td>
<td>Cocaine, Heroin</td>
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<tr>
<td>Iran</td>
<td>Heroin, Hashish</td>
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<tr>
<td>Jamaica</td>
<td>Cocaine</td>
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<tr>
<td>Laos</td>
<td>Heroin, Meth</td>
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<tr>
<td>Lebanon</td>
<td>Cocaine, Heroin, ATS</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mali</td>
<td>Heroin, Cocaine, Marijuana</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mexico</td>
<td>Cocaine, Heroin</td>
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<tr>
<td>Nigeria</td>
<td>Cocaine, Heroin</td>
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<tr>
<td>Pakistan</td>
<td>Opium, Heroin</td>
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<tr>
<td>Panama</td>
<td>Cocaine, Heroin</td>
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<tr>
<td>Senegal</td>
<td>Cocaine, Heroin</td>
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<tr>
<td>Thailand</td>
<td>Heroin, ATS</td>
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<tr>
<td>Tajikistan</td>
<td>Heroin</td>
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<tr>
<td>Uzbekistan</td>
<td>Opium, Heroin, Marijuana, Hashish</td>
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<tr>
<td>Vietnam</td>
<td>Heroin, ATS</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
demands another type of drugs as payment tools. This practice will turn transshipment countries to be demand countries for certain type of illicit drugs.

Regarding those types above, Indonesia is classified as hybrid country. As has been described in above, illicit drugs traffickers used Indonesia as transit countries in 1970’s. The real target was Australia. This was the main reason Indonesian Government under Suharto did not seriously deal with the problem. With the economic bloom and urbanization in 1990’s, Indonesia grew to be demand country. This trend continues until now. In Acehnese marijuana case, Indonesia can be regarded as Source country. Although there is no significant data of marijuana smuggling from Aceh to other countries, the ownership of firearm supplies by Free Aceh Movement (Gerakan Aceh Merdeka/GAM) during its separatist movement can be secondary evidence. Free Papuan Movement (Organisasi Papua Merdeka/OPM), another separatist movement in eastern part of Indonesia, mostly got their arms by killing Indonesian Police/Military Personnel and taking their arms. As the result, most of arms owns by OPM is similar to Indonesian Police/Military standard firearms. There are some other smuggled firearms from Papua New Guinea, but in general, firearm supplies of OPM is very limited.
On the other hand, Free Aceh Movement (GAM) has better arms supply compared to OPM. This separatist organization were able to smuggle marijuana to neighbor countries and bought firearms from black market in golden triangle area\textsuperscript{22}. After Helsinki Agreement brought peace to this western side of Indonesia, former GAM para-military personnel handover their firearms gradually\textsuperscript{23}.

Although peaceful agreement achieved, the existence of marijuana fields in Aceh keeps emerged through news headline. National Narcotics Board of Indonesia (BNN) with other law enforcement institutions keep raiding these fields, but the fields keep coming back. The reason


behind this phenomenon is not only due to Aceh suitable environment for the plants and simple profit motives, but Aceh culture is also highly intertwined with marijuana existence.

Indonesian government campaign of illicit drug abuse and trafficking prevention and eradication (Pencegahan dan Pemberantasan Penyalahgunaan dan Peredaran Gelap Narkoba/P4GN) in Aceh has more dimension compared to other area in Indonesia. Indonesian National Police (POLRI) has used law enforcement approach for decades, but the result is insufficient due to the separatist demand in Aceh. BNN tries different approach by alternative empowerment (pemberdayaan alternatif) of the society in the area. Inspired by Thailand King Bhumibol Adulyadej Royal Project that able to change the life of hill-tribe in Chiang Mai, BNN wants the marijuana farmers in Aceh to grow alternative crops that can substitute the benefit of growing marijuana in Aceh. This project will result in long time as seen in Thailand project. King of Thailand started the project in 1969 and got attention from UN a decade later. At present, the Thai Royal Project has supported more than 39,277 households, 288 villages, and 168,445 people in 5 Northern provinces and each households earned income around 140,000 Baht on average, which 10 times better than growing opium.

Regarding the number of drug users in Indonesia, there is no complete data available. In new book by Tim Lindsey and PIP Nicholson, *Drugs Law and Legal Practice in Southeast Asia*, the accurate estimation of the number of drug users in Indonesia are considered limited. The writers cited National Survey conducted by Indonesia’s National Narcotics Board (BNN) in 2011 that estimated the number of drug-users in Indonesia between 3.7 and 4.7 million. Furthermore, BNN predicted a sharp rise in the number of users and in a recent report projected users to reach 5.1

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to 5.6 million by 2015, equivalent to about 2.1% of the total population. Lindsey and Nicholson question the methodology and sampling of the survey and criticize the accuracy of the survey in their book. After tracing back to the source, the intended survey in 2011 done by BNN in collaboration with University of Indonesia (UI) was limited on high schools and University Students, not the total citizen of Indonesia. Unfortunately, Lindsey and Nicholson did not explain that information in their book.

BNN in collaboration with University of Indonesia (UI) do the same survey again in 2016. The report of the survey issued in February 18, 2017. The object group in the survey is still the same, high school and university students. The methodology used is systematic random sampling based on student attendance list from 1.284 schools. The total number of the sample is 35.340 samples from 18 provinces in Indonesia.

![Illicit Drugs Abuse Prevalence among High School/University Students in Indonesia](image)

*Figure 5. Illicit Drugs Abuse among High School and University Students in Indonesia 2016.*

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The result of the survey shows the prevalence number of drug-users in two categories. The first category is “ever-used” that has used illicit drug at least once in their lifetime while the second category is “current users” that used illicit drugs in at least one year before the survey. It shows that the prevalence of ever-used drug-users in 2016 is 3.8 percent while the current users is 1.9 percent\(^\text{27}\).

Prior to this survey, Center of Research Data and Information BNN (Puslitdatin BNN) made different survey on illicit drugs usage in Indonesian households in 2015. There are two categories of households here, general household (family ties household) and specific households (flats, dormitories, boarding houses, and prisons). The location of general households covered 20 provinces while the location of specific households covered 6 provinces. The prevalence of ever-used drug abuser in general households in 2015 is 1.7 % and in specific households is 6 %. The prevalence of current users in general households in 2015 is 0.6 % and in specific households is 4 %. The sampling in general households was done through multi-stage. First stage was through Probability Proportional to Size methodology by using 10 villages from each locations. Second stage was random sampling by utilizing two neighborhoods (RT) from each villages. The third stage was random sampling on 10 households from each neighborhood. As for specific households sampling, the first step in each location was mapping the boarding houses/dormitories to get sampling draft. The methodology used was proportional and systematic random sampling\(^\text{28}\).

\(^\text{27}\) Badan Narkotika Nasional (BNN) & Pusat Penelitian Kesehatan Universitas Indonesia (Center of Medical Research University of Indonesia), Ringkasan Eksekutif Hasil Survei Penyalahgunaan dan Peredaran Gelap Narkoba pada Kelompok Pelajar dan Mahasiswa Di 18 Provinsi Tahun 2016 (Executive Summary of Survey Result on Illicit Drug Abuse and Trafficking in High School and University Student Groups in 18 Provinces 2016) (Badan Narkotika Nasional. 2016).

Aside from the questions on data cited by Lindsey and Nicholson or the surveys done by BNN & UI, there are many obstacles to get the accurate data of drug-users in Indonesia. First, Indonesia is a large country with widely spread islands and sea. To conduct a complete research or survey, it will cost a lot of resources. Second, the culture in Indonesia societies that still regarding drug-abuse and trafficking as “taboo”. Third, the fear of entrapment due to the old hard approach by the law enforcers in the past. Narcotics Law Enforcement Institution in Indonesia based on the previous Narcotics Law regards illicit drugs abuse as crime.

BNN and other Indonesian Law institution use their “loose” data and classification to boost Illicit Drugs Abuse and Trafficking Securitization in Indonesia. In many occasions, BNN officials often use combining numbers of ever-used and current user prevalence data to estimate the total number of illicit drugs abuser. The motives is to securitize illicit drugs problems in Indonesia.

Regarding illicit drugs trafficking, the data of drug seizure in Indonesia from both domestic source (BNN) and global source (UNODC) are available. Data from BNN is more up to date than UNODC. In formal press release by The Head of Public Relation Division, BNN has been processing 46,537 illicit drug cases with 58,365 suspects in 2017. The law enforcers are seizing 4.71 ton methamphetamine, 151.22 ton marijuana, and 2,940,748 ecstasy pills weighted approx. 627.84 kg\textsuperscript{29}. This all shows that without further securitization, illicit drug trafficking is already become serious problem for Indonesia.

CONCLUSION

Indonesia is relatively young country that got its independence in post-World War II era. Despite the young age, this country has experienced many economic and political turmoil. The last one happened in 1998. Triggered by Asian Financial Crisis, the Indonesian monetary crisis lead to the fall of “quasi-authoritarian regime” under Suharto. This is the beginning of Reformation era that is marked with peaceful democratization process, something rare in Indonesian politics. Prior to this, regime changes in Indonesia always ended with civil war and great number of casualties. This peaceful change has advantage and disadvantage for Indonesia. The big advantage is open the gate of real democracy and avoid conflicts and casualties. The disadvantage of peaceful change is that the old corrupt bureaucracy is still survived.

Regarding illicit drugs, Indonesian knew some of them since pre-independence era. The Dutch Colonial regime and the Japanese Imperial regime issued some laws to control the distribution of illicit drugs because the realized the bad effects of the substances. Indonesian Republic adapted many Dutch East Indies law to regulate drugs. Since 1970’s, Indonesian government recognized illicit drug abuse and trafficking and started to deal with it.

UNODC classifies Countries related to illicit drugs trafficking into two categories, production and transit countries. Paul Rexton Kan classifies them into three categories, source, transshipment, and hybrid. Based on Kan classification, Indonesia can be regarded as hybrid country. There are some cases of illicit drugs production in Indonesia. The biggest case is Acehnese marijuana cultivation. This cultivation peaked during Aceh Free Movement (GAM) separatist era. Marijuana was sold in exchange with arms and ammunition. In Kan term, this is called Narco-Terrorism. As for transshipment country, Indonesia has been transit country targeting
Australia for decades. However, Indonesia today has become target country because of the large number of abusers.
CHAPTER IV

THE EFFECT OF DRUGS SECURITIZATION IN INDONESIA

THE CHANGING PERCEPTION OF EXISTENTIAL THREAT IN ILLICIT DRUGS SECURITIZATION IN INDONESIA

Identity is crucial to form the perception of existential threat. State perception of identity creates clear separation of what we perceive as “us” versus “others”. Clear separation enables states to define their enemy and their allies. However, different identities are not always lead states to be adversaries. Beside perception of identity, states need another important element to make a certain entities to be considered as their enemy. By referring to David Campbell ideas, the element needed here is danger\(^1\). Buzan uses the term existential threat in substitute for danger. States do not need any kind of action or event to declare danger because it depends on interpretation.

In two World Wars era and followed by cold war era, it was relatively easy to define state identity in the world politics. International Relation scholars tend Realism approach in viewing the world. State is the most important entity in international relations. Domestic politics inside the state is not important. International institutions are also unimportant because it only functioning as other arena for power states to have competition and to be the strongest influential state. In post-cold war era, identity is not as simple as before. Globalization changes the constellation in the world. Richard Haas in his book A World in Disarray shows the uncertainty of power in the world politics. In post-cold war era, many scholars believes that the world will move from bipolarity to one hegemonic power. Some other scholars believes that it would turn into multipolar world. It is

\(^1\) Campbell, Writing Security : United States Foreign Policy and the Politics of Identity. p. 2.
unclear to see the future since each regions in the world are in different socio-political state\textsuperscript{2}. Globalization enables entities both inside and outside state to create complex connection with other entities outside the state in extreme level. Not only limited in states and international institutions, non-state actors emerge as a new influential entity that can change the world politics.

Indonesian identity is a complex matter. By nature, Indonesia is a wide country in terms of geography and demography. It covered area more than 1, 9 million squares kilometers and consist of approximately 300 tribes with extremely varied backgrounds. Indonesia is very dynamic in ideology, politic, economy, social, and cultural aspects. Globalization, as I mentioned at the beginning of this paper has a great role in forming the Indonesian Identity. Even without any external involvement, it is difficult to create one unified identity for Indonesia due to its diversity.

Adding the complexity to the existing matters, external influences also involved in creating the identity of Indonesia. Indonesia is active members of International institutions such as United Nations (UN), APEC, G20, OIC, and Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN). As one of the pioneer, the role of Indonesia in ASEAN is significant. Reversely, ASEAN influence towards Indonesia is growing stronger over time. Regarding the UN membership, Indonesian role fluctuates according to domestic circumstances. With all of the entangled interconnectedness above, it is impossible to analyze Indonesian policy only based on a single analysis on domestic politics or international politics.

In dealing with illicit drugs problem, both UN and ASEAN view it as danger for both state and individual level. Both of the institution instigate securitization of illicit drugs abuse and trafficking through their system. UN ratified UN Single Convention in 1961 and UN Convention against Illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances in 1988 as basis for the

\begin{footnote}
\textsuperscript{2} R. Haass, \textit{A World in Disarray: American Foreign Policy and the Crisis of the Old Order} (Penguin Publishing Group, 2017).
\end{footnote}
International illicit drugs securitization. ASEAN ratified ASEAN Ministerial Meeting and ASEAN Senior Officials on Drug Matters (ASOD) to deliver the Drug Free Asian 2015 program.

Indonesia, like other democratic countries in the world, has to set priority in dealing with all problems ahead. Corruption, terrorism, and illicit drugs abuse and trafficking are three main problems that are being securitized in Indonesia among all serious problems in Indonesia. The motives for corruption problems are mostly from internal Indonesia. The trigger for securitizing corruption was the Asian Financial Crisis and Reformation movement which followed by the fall of Suharto. The motives of Terrorism and Illicit Drugs Securitization were mostly from global influence. The securitization of Terrorism cannot escape from 9/11 event in the United States. As for Illicit drugs securitization in Indonesia, the International drugs securitization process has big influence on it.

As has been stated above, danger or threat is a matter of interpretation. Securitization process forms the threat and sets the narratives to be state priority. This paper is not the first paper that focus on the securitization of illicit drug problem in Indonesia. Arifianto Rifki wrote a thesis on the securitization of Drug Free ASEAN program in 2015. He based his thesis on Barry Buzan securitization theory and put National Narcotic Board of Indonesia (BNN) as the speech act of the securitization process. The threat that defined in the thesis is the Drugs Trafficking in the South-East Asia. In the Indonesian national level, the concept of Barry Buzan applied by the writer as follows:

a. Securitizing actors: Indonesian government representing the Indonesian Republic as the securitizing actor that securitize drugs trafficking
b. Speech act: National Narcotic Board of Indonesia (BNN-RI) is the result of policies and actions taken by the securitizing actors in securitizing drugs trafficking.
c. Existential threats: Drugs trafficking issue in South East Asia is a threat towards all elements of society in this region. The threat was not only exist on individual level, but also on the state level and international level.
d. Referent object: Indonesia is the threatened entity in drugs trafficking issue.

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e. Functional actors: The functional actors on national level are Indonesian National Police (POLRI), and Non-Government Organizations that active in narcotics eradication such as Anti-Addiction National Movement or Gerakan Nasional Anti Madat (GRANAT) and Badan Kerjasama Sosial Usaha Pembinaan Warga Tama (BERSAMA)\(^4\).

I accept the basic idea that illicit drugs problems in Indonesia is being securitized. However, I argue some of his description above. The securitization of illicit drugs in Indonesia is not simple. It takes a long time and there is big possibility of failure. The securitized issue is not only limited in drugs trafficking, but also the drugs addiction and society empowerment to reduce both supply and demand of the illicit drugs. The aim of illicit drugs problem securitization in Indonesia is not the founding of BNN. The position of BNN is unique in the securitization process in Indonesia. BNN is part of the government narrative, or speech act in Buzan term, in the securitization process. In further process, BNN also become securitizing actors that can influence the process itself. I want to focus this paper to discuss the challenges of this ongoing securitization process and the possible outcome in the future.

I apply Buzan framework towards illicit drugs securitization in Indonesia as follows:

a. Securitizing actors: Indonesian government representing the Indonesian Republic as the securitizing actor that securitize drugs trafficking. I defined BNN as part of Indonesian government body and acts as securitizing actor.

b. Speech act: Indonesia is in Illicit Drugs Emergency situation. Illicit Drugs Abuse and Trafficking is one of the top threat in Indonesia. BNN program of Illicit Drug Abuse and Trafficking Prevention and Eradication (Pencegahan dan Pemberantasan Penyalahgunaan dan Peredaran Gelap Narkoba/P4GN) is part of the speech act.

\(^4\) Ibid. p. 17.
c. Existential threats: Illicit Drugs Abuse and Trafficking is perceived as threat from outside Indonesia because the sources of the illicit drugs and the pre-cursors are from outside and threatening the identity of Indonesia. Marijuana existence from Aceh is also perceived as threat because not only it is being abused and bad for health, but it is also used to support separatist violence in the past (GAM). The threat was not only exist on individual level, but also on the state level and international level.

d. Referent object: Indonesia is the threatened entity in illicit drugs abuse and trafficking issue. Indonesia here refers not only the state, but also the people. Threat towards the people means threat towards the state.

e. Functional actors: The functional actors on national level are no longer limited on law enforcement agencies (Indonesian National Police/POLRI, Indonesian Customs, Indonesian Prosecutors, and Court Judges) and active narcotics eradication non-governmental organizations (NGO) such as Anti-Addiction National Movement (GRANAT) and Badan Kerjasama Sosial Usaha Pembinaan Warga Tama (BERSAMA). Indonesian Military (TNI), religious leaders and organizations, society leaders and organization, and mass media are proven has significant role that can change the direction of Illicit Drugs Securitization in Indonesia. Regarding NGO, non-governmental organizations with different narrative such as Lingkar Ganja Nusantara (LGN) with pro-marijuana legalization agenda and human right NGO such as Amnesty Indonesia (Amnesty International affiliate), Commission for Missing Persons and Victims of Violence (Kontras) with
anti-death penalty agenda has strong influence in Indonesian illicit drugs securitization process.

The securitization process does not run smoothly. Some people assume that Indonesian government still halfheartedly put efforts in illicit drugs abuse and trafficking prevention and eradication. They have strong arguments on this idea. To put an issue to be prioritized security issues, Thierry Balzacq mentions three important basic assumptions for successful securitization. The first assumption is that effective securitization is audience centered. The second assumption is that securitization is context-dependent. The third assumption is that securitization is power laden. In other words, effective securitization needs Political Agency, Audience, and Context.

The three faces of effective securitization by Balzacq is important to see the real face of illicit drugs securitization in Indonesia. Balzacq theory also strengthening my argument on the existence of BNN as securitizing actors. Arifianto Rifki stated that the founding of National Narcotic Board of Indonesia (BNN-RI) is the result of policies and actions taken by the securitizing actors in securitizing drugs trafficking. It is the speech act of the securitizing actor. I argue this idea. Referring to Balzacq idea, BNN is the political agency that made by the securitizing actor (Indonesian government) to deliver the speech act of “Indonesia is under Illicit Drugs Emergency Situation”. BNN creates the Illicit Drug Abuse and Trafficking Prevention and Eradication program to amplify the context of the emergency.

Sabine Hirschauer citing four steps of securitization by Buzan et. comp. In general, securitization operates by follow the four steps. The first step is the presentation of a certain issue

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by the securitizing actors as existential threat towards the referent objects. In Indonesian illicit drugs securitization, the Indonesian government deliver the danger of illicit drugs abuse and trafficking and state the illicit drugs emergency faced by Indonesia. The second step is the acceptance of this threat by a credible audience. Audience is very important in securitization process because securitization is inter-subjective. Legitimate audience can recognize the existential threat and echoing the threat into bigger realm. The third step is the deployment of extraordinary measure to address and combat this threat. Regarding the founding of BNN in Indonesia, many writers assume it as extra ordinary measure to address and combat illicit drugs abuse and trafficking in Indonesia comprehensively. However, I assume BNN is not functioning only as tools for combating illicit drugs abuse and trafficking, but it is also functioning as part of Indonesian government body under the direct order of the president to take the extra ordinary measure for combatting illicit drugs abuse and trafficking. BNN creates the illicit drugs prevention and eradication (P4GN) program to implement the war on drugs. In most acts, BNN is the one that actively frames illicit drugs as danger towards Indonesia. The last step is the de-securitization process. De-securitization reverses and return of the securitized issue to be ordinary political issue.

Buzan, Waever, Balzacq, and the Copenhagen school views the securitization process as one-way speech from the securitizing actors to bring certain issue from the audience to be security priority. The audience is perceived as object or target. This, in my argument, is not always suit the real situation. I believe that audience and functional actors has significant role in determining the result of the securitization process, especially in democratic countries where leadership regime is chosen through general election. With functional actors and audience have significant role in the securitizing process; the result could be many possibilities.
In my opinion, the functional actors and the audience can influence the securitizing process through making different narrative from the securitizing actor. Drug Free ASEAN 2015 is a very good example of this. The same main narrative (illicit drugs abuse and trafficking) formed by the securitizing actors (ASOD) brings different result in each country member of ASEAN. I call the other narratives as counter narrative and alternative narrative to differentiate them. Counter narrative refers to narrative that confront the main narrative and able to bring failure to the securitization process or de-securitize the original issue. Alternative narrative does not necessary confront the main narrative or de-securitize the main issue. However, this narrative offers other issues or change the direction of the securitization process from the original intention. The audience and functional actors in each ASEAN countries have different narratives that result in different ending.

There are many challenges on those points that can bring the securitization process failed or redirect into different way from the original target. Buzan framework is useful to identify the actors that have significant role in securitization process. I categorized these challenges into three points below:

The first challenge of the securitization process lies inside the state. The complex socio-cultural backgrounds of Indonesian people make the securitization process more difficult compared to nation states, which has a certain shared socio-cultural background. Securitization needs one strong narratives that overcome other existing narratives. Many debates, voices, ideas can result in incomplete securitization that leads to the failure.

Since 2000’s, Indonesian government through National Narcotics Board (BNN), Department of Health, Department of Social Welfare, Indonesian National Police (POLRI), Supreme Prosecutor General (KEJAGUNG) together with anti-narcotics NGO’s and religious
organizations try to create one narrative on the danger of illicit drugs abuse. BNN leads the massive campaign on this. Learning from US experience on drugs war, BNN has used approach of reducing both supply and demand in eradicating illicit drugs. However, as a democratic country, other narratives also exist in Indonesia. I differentiate them into reverse narratives and alternative narratives.

The counter narratives are the oppose narrative against the government narrative. One existing reverse narrative that opposing the government narrative is to legalize cannabis or marijuana. In some area in Europe and in some states in USA cannabis or marijuana has been legalized for recreational or medical purpose. The security actors in Indonesia is still aiming cannabis or marijuana which widely produced in Aceh as threat to the health and to the law. Although this issue does not get big attention in Indonesia yet, this narrative can emerge in the future and bring the securitization of illicit drugs problem to de-securitize or to fail. Based on Law No. 35 year 2009 on Narcotics, cannabis for medical purpose is not strongly prohibited. It still possible to consume cannabis for medical purpose under strict supervision from doctor and permit from BNN. However, most of general practitioners are reluctant to use it medically because there is no convincing measurable dosage for safe usage and the possibility of causing addiction. The claim that cannabis can cure certain disease has not scientifically proved yet.

Another reverse narrative is the hard punishment towards drugs addict. Before Indonesian government apply Law No. 35 year 2009, the approach used against drugs addicts and drug dealers is the same. Both are simply regarded as law violation and prosecuted in the court. Due to this treatment, the prison in big cities in Indonesia majorly inhabited by convicts with narcotics related cases. This phenomenon also happens in Philippines that applies harder punishment on illicit drugs case. Indonesian Narcotic Law No. 35 year 2009 applies hard punishment towards drug dealers
and rehabilitation towards drug addicts. Unfortunately, some securitizing actors such as the investigators and prosecutors do not like to put the addicts to rehabilitation because of the longer and costly process. They like to send the addicts to the prosecutors for court rather than to send them to rehabilitation center. Many Indonesian organizations are also supporting Philippines hard punishment policy to be implemented in Indonesia. This would the opposite of government narratives that aimed to reduce both supply and demand of the illicit drugs.

The alternative narratives are not totally opposing the government narrative on illicit drugs. As I stated before, threats on states is influenced by the narratives. There are many important issue in Indonesia that need to be prioritized by the government to be solved. The government can prioritize other issues outside illicit drugs problem and creating different narratives. Corruption and Terrorism are examples of other threats to Indonesia which change the narratives.

There is another challenge that arise in dealing with illicit drug and its securitization process. There are many functional actors that involved in creating one narrative of illicit drug problems. Each of these actors has its own hierarchy and internal rules. This often creates problems in the implementation of policy. The different perspective on handling drug addicts above is one of the examples of internal disputes between securitizing actors. Despite of the same narrative, the implementation by the actors can be different. There is a big chance of dispute in Authorities of handling illicit drugs problem. This challenge grows bigger in transnational illicit drugs problems counter-measures.

IN HEALTH AND HUMAN SECURITY

BNN has made several surveys on the illicit drugs prevalence in Indonesia. As has been mentioned in Chapter III, the latest survey was done in 2016 aimed on high school and university
students group. Regarding survey on this group, BNN in collaboration with *Pusat Penelitian Kesehatan Universitas Indonesia* (Center of Medical Research-UI) has made similar survey prior to 2016. These surveys are important as tool to see the effect of illicit drugs securitization in Indonesia. The surveys were done in 2006, 2009, 2011, and 2016.

As seen in the chart below, the illicit drugs abuse in high school and university students in Indonesia decreasing in line with the development of the securitization process. The chart indicate the decreasing trend in each category. In “ever-used“ category, the number of the students keep decreasing from 8,1% in 2006, 7,8% in 2009, 4,3% in 2011, and to 3,8 % in 2016. BNN claimed that this is due to the massive prevention campaign in schools and universities.

![Decreasing Trends of Illicit Drugs Abuse](image)

*Figure 6. Decreasing Trends of Illicit Drugs Abuse in High School & University Students.*

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Center of Data and Information Research BNN (Puslitdatin BNN) and Center of Medical Research University of Indonesia (Puslitkes UI) also made another survey with different target group. Unlike surveys in 2006, 2009, 2011, and 2016 which targeting high school/university students, the surveys in 2005, 2010, and 2015 are targeting households. Because of the varied demographic characteristic of households in Indonesia, the households are categorized into two types. The first is general household that based on family ties relationship, the second is specific households that cannot be include into the first category. Similar with the surveys on high school/university students, the result of the surveys on households also divided into ever-used and current user categories. Because the surveys before 2015 took place only in 12 provinces, the comparison below is limited only in 12 provinces. The provinces are North Sumatra, Jambi, Special Capital Region Jakarta, West Java, Special Region of Yogyakarta, East Java, Bali, West Kalimantan, East Kalimantan, South Sulawesi, North Sulawesi, and Papua.

![Figure 7. The Prevalence Trend of Illicit Drugs Ever-Used and Current User Illicit Drugs upon Households in 12 Province in Indonesia.](source)

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As seen in the graphic above, the prevalence of illicit drugs abuse in households in Indonesia tends to increase in the current user category, while in ever-used category the prevalence of illicit drugs abuse is fluctuated. The ever-used category data is important to see the data of relapse abuser. However, the current user category data is more important to analyze than the ever-used data because it shows the active illicit drugs abuser in current year.

Some experts are questioning the accuracy and methodology of these surveys in describing the real condition of illicit drugs abuse in Indonesia. The surveys also do not target all segment of Indonesian citizens. They also do not target all of the provinces in Indonesia. Regardless of the critics, Indonesia has more data of illicit drugs abuse compared with other Southeast Asian countries. I believe that the two target groups of the surveys, high school/university students and the households can represent the real trends.

Discussing the health dimension of illicit drugs securitization cannot escape from human security point of view. Although indirectly threatening the state security, the real threat of health issue is towards the human security. The existence of human security concept in International Relation is controversial, especially from Realism perspective. Realism by nature is very state-centric approach.

Introduced in United Nations Development Program (UNDP) in 1994, Human Security concept is shifting the concept of state security towards security of human being from threat of disease, hunger, unemployment, crime, social conflict, political repression, and environmental hazards⁹. The UN report recognized four key points of “Human Security”:

1. Human Security is a universal concern.
2. Components of Human Security are interdependent; overlapping responsibilities – and objectives.
3. Emphasis on prevention rather than intervention

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4. Human Security is people-centric. (United Nations Development Program, 1994\textsuperscript{10})

These key points shows the deepening and the widening of security concept vertically and horizontally. Not only vertically covers the security of elements under the state level (individual level and society), but it also widening the area of security studies to cover issues outside military capabilities such as economic, environmental, and societal sectors. Stephen Walt criticized the deepening and widening of security studies as detrimentally unwarranted and consequentially damaging rather that productive or effective\textsuperscript{11}. It would destroy the intellectual coherence and make it more difficult to devise solutions to any of these important problems.\textsuperscript{12}

Regardless the critics and controversies, discussing illicit drugs securitization in Indonesia must include the health issues. In many media campaign, BNN always mentions the danger of illicit drugs towards human health. To give “quantitative” effect, the rising trend of drugs abuser in the last decades is always included beside the rising trend of drugs seizure. BNN also adds the number of the “ever-used” abusers together with the “current user” relapse argument. “Relapse” is the generic term in drugs abuse world that refers to drugs addicts that has entered rehabilitation process, but fall back to start using the illicit substance again. Many experts questioning the number of the drugs abusers and the methodology because of this.

To give the “qualitative” effect, BNN use the illicit drugs bad effect towards human health. The first example is the effect of illicit drugs towards human central nerve system. Illicit drugs are categorized into hallucinogen, stimulant, depressant, and anti-psychotic. Hallucinogen is drug that alter perception (awareness of surrounding objects and conditions), thoughts, and feeling. The substances in these drugs can cause hallucinations, strange perceptions, and other subjective

\textsuperscript{10} Hirschauer, The Securitization of Rape: Women, War and Sexual Violence, p. 49.
\textsuperscript{12} Ibid. p. 213.
changes in human minds. Most common natural hallucinogens are subtracted from plants and mushroom, but the most common hallucinogen is synthetic type of drug called *D-lysergic acid diethylamide* (LSD). The most common side effect of the natural hallucinogen is poisoning. There are many cases of poisoning related to this substance\(^{13}\). The hallucinogen effect of LSD made CIA used this substance to alter personalities in 1960’s. The common physical side effects of LSD are tremors, increased blood pressure, and insomnia while the common psychological side effects are anxiety, paranoid, aggressiveness, and suicidal tendency.

Stimulant is a type of drug that accelerate the activity of central nervous system in the brain. Many substances are included into this category from the weak substance caffeine to the strong one like cocaine. The drug user will become excited and over active after consuming these substances. The law does generally not prohibit weak substance. The strong stimulants such as amphetamines, usually prohibited by state law. Because stimulant tends to increase heart rate and blood pressure, this substance can bring cardiac arrest when overdose. These substances are the most abused in many countries due to the cheap price, including Indonesia.

Depressant is drug that works opposite to stimulant. The substances in this drug slow down the central nervous system. The substances of depressant ranged from alcohol up to the strong ones like opium or heroin. Heroin is well known as the most addictive illicit drugs. The worldwide death rate of heroin and other opioids substance reached 190,000 in 2017. Anti-psychotic drug also works in the central nervous system and have sedating effect. This type of drugs makes the user sleep. Most anti-psychotic drugs are not clearly prohibited in most countries, including Indonesia. Sleeping pills, the most common anti-psychotic, are widely used for suicide.

Aside from the side effect of the illicit drugs, BNN also narrates the diseases that often spread with the drug abuse. The most common narration on this is the spread of HIV/AIDS and Hepatitis type C & B through narcotics injection. This case was often found in Indonesia prisons in the 90’s. Injection is not the only way these diseases spread. Free unsafe sexual intercourse becomes the main way of spreading today. BNN changes the narration from injection drugs abuse to illicit drugs abuse behavior that motivates unsafe sexual intercourse boost the spread of dangerous diseases.

The most common issues used for developing counter narrative in illicit drugs securitization in Indonesia are health issues and human rights issues (law enforcement issues related closely with this). Regarding health issue, local NGO Lingkar Ganja Nusantara (LGN) has been advocating the legalization of marijuana for a long time. LGN create narration in Indonesia that Indonesian Narcotics Law has victimized marijuana. This NGO cited some medical journal to argue the main narration from government. Based on this narration, marijuana contains tetrahydrocannabinol (THC) that has analgesic effect. This substance is useful for physiotherapy. It also contains cannabidiol (CBD) substance that does not creates addiction and able to suppress the euphoric effect of THC. LGN narrates that marijuana can cure tumors and cancer. However, the idea that marijuana can cure tumors and cancer is too early because not enough research exist to support this argument. The narration of marijuana for physiotherapy or cure for cancer symptoms has stronger ground compare to cure tumors and cancers.

The narrative above is currently not strong enough to change the main narrative from Indonesian government and BNN because it limits itself only in the issue of marijuana. LGN narrative does not consider legalization of all illicit drugs substances. LGN narrative got strong

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momentum on a Fidelis Arie Sudewarto case\textsuperscript{15} that arrested by BNN on February 19, 2017. Fidelis planted 39 marijuana trees to nurse his wife that diagnosed having Syringomelia disorder. This rare disorder disturbs the spinal cord function from its center outward. BNN officers arrest him due to the marijuana ownership. The prosecutor and the judges in the court strengthening the argument from the officers because 39 trees is way exceeding the limit of marijuana ownership for personal usage\textsuperscript{16}. Fidelis wife passed away when his husband is under judicial process. The hospital refused to use marijuana for medical treatment.

DISPUTE ON THE SUBSTANCES

It is impossible to deal with Indonesian Illicit drugs problem apart from the International level. As I have stated in the overview section, globalization has made the border between states blurred. The interconnectedness of Appadurai five spheres (ethnoscapes, technoscapes, financescapes, mediascapes, and ideoscapes) put simple crimes into different level. People can move from one place to another place easily. States have new challenges in dealing with transnational crime such as drugs trafficking, human trafficking, money laundering, etc.

Indonesian Illicit drugs problem securitization is supposed to be only at national level. However, the transnational feature of the issue could not escape completely from International Dispute, especially when dealing with The Illicit Drugs Trafficking.

All states in the world has its own sovereignty in making their own rules and law. Indonesia as a member of UNODC created Law No. 35 year 2009 on Narcotics refers to The United Nations


\textsuperscript{16} Indonesian Narcotics Law No. 35 year 2009 article 111 stated that having Narcotics Group I (Marijuana includes in this group) more than 5 trees can be punish 4 years minimum to 12 years maximum imprisonment and fined eight hundred million rupiahs to eight billion rupiahs.
Convention against Illicit Traffic Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances of 1988. Most of UNODC states used the conventions as their references in making Narcotics Law, but the content of this Narcotic Law would be different due to each states situation and narratives.

Indonesian perspective on certain substances will be different with other states perspective on that substance. These different rules will bring difficulties in dealing with drugs trafficking crimes that have characteristic of transnational and across international border. Cannabis is the easiest example. Under Indonesian Narcotic Law No. 35 year 2009, cannabis or marijuana is strictly prohibited unless for medical or research purpose with expert’s supervision and permit from National Narcotic Board of Indonesia (BNN). Other states may have legalized cannabis or marijuana. In USA, for example, states have different rule of marijuana. Up to April 24, 2017, at least nine states in US legalized cannabis or marijuana consumption with different limitations. This number will probably increase because some of the state is still considering the legalization in their areas.

Referring to Indonesian Narcotics Law No. 35 year 2009, the illicit drugs that strictly controlled by the government is categorized into three groups. Group I is consider as the most dangerous narcotics. This group consists of 65 Substances.

*Group I* covers narcotics that have a very high potential to lead to addiction, are not used in therapy, and are only used in the development of scientific knowledge. Group I narcotics include, among others, any part of the opium poppy (*papaver somniferum L*) other than its seeds; heroin and opium; cocaine and any part of the coca plant; cannabis, THC and any part of the marijuana plant; and ecstasy (MDMA), MDA, LSD, mescaline, PCP, amphetamine, dexamphetamine (which is used to treat attention deficit hyperactive disorder (ADHD)), and methamphetamine.

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17 The excerpt of Appendix I Indonesian Narcotics Law No. 35 year 2009 can be find in the appendix of this thesis.
Some debates arise on this classification. The first debate is on marijuana. Some critics believe that marijuana should not be put into Group I because the effect of cannabis is not as strong as other substances in the group. Pro-legalization of marijuana activists narrates that marijuana does not bring addiction. The most common argument to support this is that marijuana is less harmful than cigarette. The second debate is putting psychotropic substances into this group. In the previous Narcotics Law No. 22 year 1997, psychotropic substances was not considered as narcotics and it was controlled with different regulation. The Law No. 5 year 1997 specially rules the psychotropic substances. Many Law practitioners are questioning the reason of putting psychotropic substances into Narcotics Group I.

The counter argument of the debate is based on the definition of Narcotics in the Law No. 35 year 2009 itself:

Narcotics shall mean any substance or medicine derived from plants or non-plants, either synthetic or semi-synthetic, which may cause degradation or change of consciousness, sensation loss, reduction through elimination of pain, and may cause dependence, which is differentiated into groups as referred to the Law (Article 1 paragraph 1)\(^\text{20}\).

By the definition above, psychotropic substance can be included as narcotics because it can cause degradation or change of consciousness, sensation loss, and reduction through elimination of pain.

*Group II* refers to medicines that may be used as last resort in therapy and in the development of scientific knowledge, and which have a high potential to lead to addiction. They include morphine and codeine. *Group III* refers to medicines that are frequently used in therapy, and in the development of scientific knowledge and have a low potential to lead to addiction\(^\text{21}\).

The classification of the three groups above is based on the harmful side effects and potential of addiction caused by the substances. This is still debatable in many forums today. Regardless on


\(^{21}\) Lindsey and Nicholson, *Drugs Law and Legal Practice in Southeast Asia: Indonesia, Singapore and Vietnam*. p. 52.
the narcotics classification, the Law enables some usage of illicit drugs for limited purposes. Article 7 allows narcotics (all groups) to be consumed only for the interest of health service and/or technology development. Minister of Health regulates the permit, control, and supervision. In reality, Indonesian medical practitioners hesitate using narcotics for medical treatment because they prefer to use safe substances with lower addictive probability.

IN LAW ENFORCEMENT AND INTERNATIONAL SECURITY

TRANSGNATIONAL ORGANIZED CRIME AND CORRUPTION

Indonesia is one of the Asian countries that mostly devastated by the Asian financial crisis in 1997. The impact of the crisis towards Indonesian Political Economy was huge. The rise of foreign currency drives into the rise of unemployment, the decreasing of Gross Domestic Products and the downfall of macro economy in general. The financial crisis turned into economic crisis, and finally became full-scale socio-political crisis. Indonesia still feels the impact of the crisis until now.

The significant point of the crisis was the downfall of Suharto that end his 32 years old regime. Unfortunately, this regime change took many casualties just like previous regime change in 1965. Learning from past events, the democratization of Indonesia post Asian financial crisis is done gradually to suppress political turmoil and avoid casualties. The positive side of this gradual changes is making democratization more sustainable and more stable. The negative side of this slow democratization process is that there are no possible major radical changes can be done in Indonesia. The corruption rate in Indonesia is still high because hard radical change of corruption eradication will be affecting the situation. The hard punishment policy towards drug dealers like

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22 Geri, "The Treatment of Ethnic Minorities in Democratizing Muslim Countries: The Securitization of Kurds in Turkey Versus the Autonomization of Acehnese in Indonesia."
in the Philippines is also hard to implement in Indonesia because it will affect the stable democratization process.

High corruption will also be affecting the supply reduction of illicit drugs. The eradication of illicit drugs will be harder if the government officials corrupted. On the other hand, radical steps to eliminate corruption are also impossible due to the reasons above. This is another dilemma in Illicit Drugs Securitization Problem in Indonesia.

The high corruption rate also affects the way illicit drugs syndicate operates in Indonesia. Unlike South American cartels or other transnational organized crimes in other countries that arm their group and often use violence against the law enforcers, the illicit drugs traffickers in Indonesia prefer to bribe corrupt government officers to smooth their operation\textsuperscript{23}. However, some gun shooting is unavoidable in many arrests when the drug traffickers desperate and choose to fight the law enforcers.

The case of Freddy Budiman is the most controversial issue related to illicit drugs and corruption. The judges has sentenced this drug kingpin with death penalty, but he keep running his drug business from the prison. An arrest of her girlfriend model opens up his drugs network in the prison. This network involves prison officers and even postal workers. The prison officers has been discharged from their jobs and facing the judicial process. Freddy was moved to Nusakambangan prison, the maximum secured prison, but he is still able to run his business there\textsuperscript{24}. Even before his execution on July 30, 2016, Freddy created controversy by telling a human rights activist that he has bribed BNN 450 billion rupiahs (approx. USD 32 million) and a Jakarta Police


General 90 billion rupiah (approx. USD 6 million). Indonesian police sue back this activist for no-evidence allegations.  

DEATH PENALTY AND INTERNATIONAL DIPLOMACY

![Figure 8. Total Number of Illicit Drugs Trafficking Cases in Indonesia 2011-2017.].(25)

Compared to the prevalence data, the data of illicit drugs trafficking seizures in Indonesia is more accurate. The data of illicit drugs seizures above was taken from BNN and National Police of Indonesia (POLRI). Based on the seizure data 2011-2017, the trend of illicit drug cases is rising with exception of 2012. In 2017, there are 46, 537 total illicit drugs cases in Indonesia. From that

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number of case, 58,365 suspects is under judicial process while 79 suspects has been dead because attacking the law enforcer during the arrest.

Human rights issues is currently the strongest narrative that can counter the main narrative from the Indonesian government. Human rights issues gains momentum due to two prominent cases, the death penalty towards drugs mule and rehabilitation verdict towards drugs abusers. Portugal decriminalization campaign inspires ASEAN countries, which dealing with growing illicit drugs problems, to follow the same step. Portugal decriminalization campaign started in 2001. This campaign shifted the previous perception on drugs abuser as law offender to be medical issue that need to get medical treatment.

Although the success of Portugal decriminalization is still debated, Indonesian government and other ASEAN countries consider this as promising way to reduce the overcapacity prisons problems. Almost all of Indonesian correctional facilities are dealing with overcrowding problem today. The available spaces in the correctional facilities are not enough to accommodate the number of convicts. In big cities, illicit drugs-related crime offenders dominate the number of convicts in prisons. Human right NGO Institute for Criminal Justice Reform (ICJR) also tries to push forward decriminalization policy for illicit drug abuser. This narratives can strongly change the main narrative in the future because BNN and other law enforcement institution seems supporting this idea.

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As I have mentioned in previous chapters, Indonesia still has the maximum death penalty in dealing with drugs trafficking. Unfortunately, due to the death penalty, Indonesia has several tensions with other countries like Australia, Malaysia, Brazil, China, and The Philippines. Indonesian court gave verdict of death penalty towards some drug mule from those countries. Indonesia is not the only country in Southeast Asia with problem. Neighbor country Philippines, which one of its citizens facing the death penalty in Indonesia, even take harder step than Indonesia. Rodrigo Duterte, President of the Philippines gives command for law enforcer to be able to shoot drug mule suspect in the crime scene. This policy probably the tip of Philippines patient towards drug mule crime. This capital punishment policy resulted in mass killing in the cities of Philippines.

Comparing Indonesian and the Philippines law enforcement on illicit drugs trafficking, there is a significant difference here. Indonesia implements maximum lawsuit, which is death penalty, towards illicit drugs traffickers according to the Indonesian narcotics law. The death penalty is judge verdicts on the defendant that proven guilty through the criminal court. The defendants can take some law actions such as appeal from district court up to high court, or even up to the Supreme Court. Even if the verdict in the Supreme Court is still unchangeable, the defendant can apply for President Clemency. Two latest Presidents, Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono (SBY) and Joko Widodo (Jokowi), have different opinions for giving clemency to illicit drugs traffickers.

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traffickers32. SBY is known giving some clemencies towards some drugs convicts such as Schapelle Leigh Corby, and Meirika Franola. The latter involved in another drug trafficking case in the prison and got another death penalty again in 2015. SBY was heavily criticized as the only Indonesian President who gave clemencies towards illicit drugs convicts. Jokowi has given clemencies only on three cases, Dwi Trisna Firmansyah (murder case), 5 political Papuan prisoners (separatist case), and the ex-head of Corruption Eradication Commission Antasari Azhar (murder case). He has hard opinion of illicit drug convicts and never gives clemencies related to illicit drugs cases.

Philippines policy towards illicit drugs traffickers, on the other hand, is capital punishment. I use the term capital punishment to differ it with Indonesian death penalty. Unlike Indonesian that gives death penalty decision through trial, Philippines President Rodrigo Duterte commands punishment of illicit drugs suspect on the crime scene. The law enforcers, and later mercenaries, are allowed to shoot the drug suspects on the crime scene if they fight back. Some Indonesian such as the Head of BNN and members of parliament prefer the government to follow the Philippines extra-judicial killings in dealing with illicit drug crimes33. Others disagree with the idea of extra-judicial killings, especially human rights activists34. Indonesia has extra-judicial killings experience in 1982-1985 that cost 514 lives and the investigation remains unclear until now.

One of the most famous case was the Bali Nine\textsuperscript{35}. Indonesian Police caught nine Australians on April 17\textsuperscript{th}, 2005 after got information from Australian Federal Police (AFP). They were convicted for smuggling 18 lb. of heroin valued around US$ 3, 1 million from Indonesia to Australia. Two of the ringleaders Andrew Chan and Myuran Sukumaran were sentenced to death and executed on April 29\textsuperscript{th}, 2015. The other were sent to prison. This death sentence raise the tension in Indonesia-Australia bilateral relation. Australian Prime Minister even recalled The Australian Ambassador.

Bali Nine is not the only death penalty on Illicit Drug Smuggler in Indonesia. There are some other cases in court and waiting for verdicts. The death penalty on Illicit Drugs dealer created a lot of protest that based on human rights issues. Many states pressed Indonesia to erase death penalty for drug trafficking criminals, especially states that have their citizen in the death row. Australia, the strongest protester, recalled its Ambassador from Indonesia. Brazilian President Dilma Rousseff delayed Indonesian Ambassador-Designate for Brazil until the execution done. Other states like Nigeria and The Philippines plea for judicial review\textsuperscript{36}. This could change the narratives of Illicit Drugs Problem Securitization in the future.


Institute for Criminal Justice reform, a local NGO that voicing the banishing of death penalty, noted that up to 2015, Indonesian courts has given death penalty verdict for 64 people. In latest update ICJR revised the data to be 115 people. Among all of the convicts, Narcotics-related cases dominate the list. 2017 is the peak year of death penalty execution in the history of Indonesia. Indonesia executes 30 convicts in this year.

Beside the death penalty, there is another important dimension of this case that could change the future narratives of the securitization process. As has been mentioned above,

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Indonesian Law Enforcer got the information of Bali Nine from AFP. Australian public was outraged by AFP decision, although AFP acted according to the bilateral Indonesia-Australia agreement in Law Enforcement⁴⁰. In his article *Law Enforcement, Justice and Democracy in the Transnational Arena: Reflections on the War on Drugs*⁴¹, J.W.E Sheptycki wrote further on this matter with different case study.

If we arrest a drug dealer here in the Netherlands he will be given a penalty of a maximum of six months in prison. If we arrest him in Germany he will get a maximum of six years. We arrest them in Germany. It is better I think. (Dutch Police Officer, from taped interview, 1995) (Sheptycki 1996:61).

Beside the illicit drug abuse and trafficking, public also questions the integrity of the law enforcers. Sheptycki encourage scholars to ask fundamental questions about the judicial system that arise due to the development of transnational practice of the law enforcement. This is a simple huge problem in dealing with transnational crime.

Transnational law enforcement is undisputedly important in current issues and it would be more in the future. The current transnational issues are impressive, including war crimes, terrorism, illicit drugs and arms trafficking, environmental crimes, frauds, art and historical stealing, racist and violent groups, kidnapping, etc. Aside from war crimes, other issues are traditionally regulated under state law. “Transnationalization”, term used by Sheptycki, has taken these crimes beyond the terrain of the nation-state level. Transnational law enforcement cooperation today involves multiple legal jurisdictions. This cooperation expands across agencies and Sheptycki describes it as “patchwork quilt of overlapping and competing agencies”⁴². The agencies well known often

⁴² Ibid, p. 65.
dealing with transnational drug crimes are United States Drug Enforcement Agency (DEA) in America and Drug Liaison Officers (DLO) network that work under TREVI agreement in Europe.

Some other transnational police agencies also exist and facilitate the illicit drug transnational law enforcement such as International Criminal Police Organization (ICPO/Interpol), International Association of Chiefs of Police (IACP), Schengen Police Cooperation, TREVI, Europol, etc. Among others, Interpol is the largest organization but it was not constituted through any international treaty, nor any convention or any other similar legal instruments. Many law enforcement agencies involved in illicit drugs issues often create competition and complex problems between them.

AFP-Bali nine case is not the only case in the world where the integrity of transnational law enforcement agency is being questioned. Sheptycki gives three examples from U.S. Supreme Court reports in Commonwealth Law Bulletin. In April 1990, DEA abducted Mexican citizen Dr. Humberto Alvarez-Machain and bring him to Texas for involvement in the murder of a DEA agent that operates in Mexico (Commonwealth Law Bulletin 1992:2). Other example is on “controlled delivery” tactics that widely used by law enforcement agency in the world. Controlled Delivery is the term used by law enforcer for illicit drugs transit or export by certain suspect under supervision of the law enforcer. The law enforcer uses this tactic to reveal and arrest the entire illicit drugs network. The last example is employing military hardware in a law enforcement capacity that blurs the traditional jurisdiction of police and military. Interestingly, all of these examples also happens in Indonesia.

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44 Ibid, p.69.
Machain case is arguably violation of Mexico national sovereignty. It is also an evident of law enforcement agent operation testing the limits of the law, and in Machain case, extend the limits\textsuperscript{45}. This problem often arises in controlled delivery tactics that create disputes between transnational law enforcement agencies, especially if both agencies does not have any treaty or memorandum of understandings (MoU).

The public interest demands not only that the guilty are brought to conviction, but also that they are brought to conviction in a civilized and publicly acceptable manner. In other words, the public has an interest not only in the conviction of the guilty, but also in the moral integrity, or to put it more simply, the quality, of criminal proceedings. (Commonwealth Law Bulletin 1992\textsuperscript{46}).

Regarding the third issue, there are two arguments arise here. The first argument is military capability that deployed on law enforcement cases often ends in exercising political pressure towards political opposition, especially in states under authoritarian regime. The second argument is that in developing countries like Indonesia, the capabilities of the law enforcement is limited. In many raid targeting sea vessels, BNN or Indonesian Police often request supports from Indonesian Navy. In this kind of issues, advance supervision from the both public and government organizations are needed.

WAYS FORWARD

THE CHALLENGES

The securitization of illicit drugs in Indonesia is advancing with some obstacles. The securitizing actors have tried to push the speech act of illicit drugs emergency state to be priority

\textsuperscript{45} Sheptycki, "Law Enforcement, Justice and Democracy in the Transnational Arena: Reflections on the War on Drugs." p. 71.

among other issues. This speech act has reach wide range of communities in Indonesia. However, there are other competing issues such as Terrorism and Corruption that being securitized to be the priority threat of the nation.

Aside from the competing issues, there are some other challenges arise that could change the future of the securitization process in Indonesia such as the legalization of marijuana, the death penalty, the law enforcement on drugs crimes, the alternative development policy, and the harm reduction policy. These are possible issues that can develop counter narrative against the main narrative (illicit drugs emergency in Indonesia).

All the challenges above related closely with the de-securitization process. Referring to the four steps of securitization by Barry Buzan, this is the last step of the process. De-securitization ends all the process by reversing the securitized issue back to be normal political issue.

THE POSSIBILITIES

Renee Scherlen wrote a good article on ending Drug War policy in USA in 2012. Scherlen stated that the drug war is expensive, damaging, and ineffective. This statement is debatable because it is based on the assumption that eliminating the possible profit of black market (by legalize marijuana) can reduce the use of the illicit drugs. Regardless the debate, Scherlen has given great insight in terminating drug war policy. Aside from Political characteristic and environment that need to be consider, Scherlen quotes De Leon five constraints that can block the policy termination. They are (1) the anti-termination coalition, (2) dynamic conservatism, (3) legal obstacles, (4) costs, and (5) fear. When public and politicians more acceptant to the risk of terminating the policy, the support of the status quo will evaporate.

In the current situation of Indonesian Illicit Drugs Securitization, the supports towards BNN and the government is still strong. In marijuana debates, anti-marijuana legalization sides always put on the fear of marijuana abuse due to insufficient supervision from the law enforcers. The cost of legalizing marijuana is still unacceptable compared to the benefit prospects. In death penalty cases, the fear of the drugs mules continuing their crimes inside the prison and bribes the government officers is greater than the fear of human rights violation. Freddy Budiman and Meirika Freola cases become the epitome of this argument. BNN and anti-illicit drugs abuse NGOs strongly supports the main narrative. Pro-marijuana legalization NGO still find difficulties in convincing public to support the alternative narrative against the securitization. Anti-death penalty NGO probably has stronger grounds because of the strong supports from their International affiliations.

The current government opposition coalition in Indonesia also shares the same perspective on illicit drugs. Some of the opposition parties, especially the “Islamic-colored” parties are strongly supports illicit drugs securitization. The possibilities of de-securitize illicit drugs are low in the near future considering those factors above.

CONCLUSION

Barry Buzan and the Copenhagen School give the concept of securitizing actors, referent object, speech act, functional actors. Furthermore, Buzan introduce four steps of securitization. According to these steps, Indonesian government presenting the issue of illicit drugs abuse and trafficking as existential threat towards Indonesia as the first step. As the second step, Indonesian people must recognize the existential threat, accept it, and spread the threat to the whole communities. The third step is deployment of extraordinary measure against illicit drugs problems. The illicit drugs
prevention and eradication (P4GN) program introduced by BNN is the extraordinary measure against the illicit drugs problems. The last step is de-securitizing the illicit drugs securitization process.

Some literatures that written at the beginning of illicit drugs securitization in Indonesia describes BNN as the speech act and the extraordinary measure against illicit drugs problems/existential threat. By examining the effects of the illicit drugs securitization in Indonesia, I argue the idea of BNN limitation as speech act because not only BNN actively creates massive program of illicit drugs prevention and eradication (P4GN), but also because the de-securitization process that should follow the extra-ordinary measure has not taken place. The extra-ordinary measure by BNN is growing bigger instead.

Identity is very important in forming the perception of existential threat. The changing perception of existential threat influence the changing narratives in the securitization process. These narratives changes will influence the effect of the securitization. Based on this idea, the effect of securitization can show the changes of narratives in the securitization process. In Indonesian illicit drugs securitization cases, some securitization effects show the changes of the narratives. Referring to four securitization steps by Buzan, securitization is viewed as one-way process by the securitizing actors towards the audience. Indonesian government and BNN, as authorized and legitimate securitizing actors, have one main narrative to put illicit drugs as major threat. However, there are some different narratives arise from the audience and the functional actors to confront the main narrative as counter narrative or alternative narrative. The first one is the rise of marijuana legalization and the grouping of narcotics and psychotropic. The second one is the protest on death penalty from the human rights activists. Both narratives come from functional actor (LGN and Kontras) and grows as counter narrative towards the main narrative.
Beside counter narratives, some alternative narratives grows to challenge the direction of the securitization process. Among alternatives, the securitization of Terrorism and Corruption are two most prominent narratives to redirect the securitization process.
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LIST OF NARCOTICS GROUP I

1. *Papaver Somniferum* L., i.e: plant and all its parts, including the poppy, straw, except its seeds.
2. Raw opium i.e. gum which selfcoagulates, obtained from the *Papaver Somniferum* L that is just simply processed for packaging and transportation without considering its morphine content.
3. Refined opium consists of:
   a. opium, i.e the product obtained from raw opium through a series of processes, particularly by dissolution, heating and fermentation, either with or without addition of other substances for the purpose of converting it into an extract for compact.
   b. Jicing, i.e. residue of smoked opium regardless whether the opium is mixed with leaves or other substances.
   c. Jicingko, the product obtained from processing Jicing.
4. Coca bush, i.e. all plant of *Erythroxylion* genus, of the *Erythroxylaceae* family.
5. Coca leaf, i.e fresh or dried leaf, in the form of pollen of all plants of *Erythroxylion* genus, of *Erythroxylaceae* family, which can produce cocaine directly or through a chemical process.
6. Raw cocaine is all products obtained from coca leaves, which can be processed directly to produce cocaine.
7. Cocaine is methyl ester ethyl benzoyl eegnine.
8. Cannabis plant, i.e. all plants of Cannabis genus and all parts thereof, including its seeds, fruit, straw, or. Products of hemp plant and its, or any other part of cannabis plant, including its resin and hashish.
9. *Tetrahydrocannabinol* and all isomers including all chemical stereo forms.
10. *Delta 9 tetrahydrocannabinol* and all chemical stereo forms.
11. Acetorphine: 3-0-acetyltetrahydro-7α- (1-hydroxy-1-methylbutyl) -6, 14-endotoeno-ropavina.
13. Alpha-methylfentanil: N- [1 (α-methylphenethyl) -4-piperidyl] propionanilide
15. Beta-hydroxypentanil: N- [1- (beta-hydroxyphenyl) -4-piperidyl] propionanilide
17. Desomorphine: dihydrodesoxymorphine
18. Etophine: tetrahydro-7α- (1-hydroxy-1-methylbutyl) -6, 14-endotoeno-ropavina
19. Heroin: Diacetylmorphine
20. Ketobemidone: 4-methyl-hydroxyphenyl-1-methyl-4propionylpiperidine
21. 3-methylfentanil: N- [3-methyl-1-phenethyl-4-piperidyl] propionanilide
22. 3-methylthiophiathphanyl: N- [3-methyl-1- [2- (2-tienil) ethyl] -4-piperidyl] propionanilide 22. 3-methylthiopentanil: N- [3-methyl-1- [2- (2-thienyl) ethyl] -4-propionanilide
23. MPPP: 1-methyl-4-phenyl-4-piperidinol propanate (ester)
24. Para-fluoropentanil: 4'-fluoro-N- (1-phenethyl-4-piperidyl) propionanilide
25. PEPAP: 1-phenethyl-4-phenyl-4-piperidinolasetheate (ester)
27. BROMAFETAMINE, other name: (±) -4-bromo-2,5-dimethoxy-α-methylphenethylamine DOB
28. DET: 3- [2- (Diethylamino) ethyl] indole
29. DMA: (+) - 2,5-dimethoxy-α-methylphenethylamine
30. DMHP: 3- (1,2-dimethylheptyl) -7,8,9,10-tetrahydro-6,6,9-trimethyl-6H-dibenzo [b, d] pyran-1-ol
31. DMT: 3- [2- (dimethylamino) ethyl] indole
32. DOET: (+) -4-ethyl-2,5-dimethoxy-α-methylphenethylamine
33. ETICYCLIDINE, other name PCE: N-ethyl-1-phenylsiklohexylamine
34. ETRIPTAMINE. : 3- (2-aminobutyl) indole
35. CATHINONE: (-) - (S) - 2-aminoopropiophenone
36. (+) - LYSERGIDE, Lamine nin: 9,10-didehydro-N, N-diethyl-6-methylergoline-LSD, LSD-25 carbosamide
37. MDMA: (+) -N, ? -dimethyl-3,4- (methylenedioxy) phenethylamine
38. Mescaline: 3,4,5-trimethoxyphenethylamine
39. METHCATHINONE: 2- (methylamino) -1-phenylpropan-1-one
40. 4-methylaminorenes: (+) -sis 2-amino-4-methyl-5-phenyl-2-
41. MMDA: 5-Methoxy-a-methyl-3,4- (methyleneoxy) phenethylamine
42. N-Ethyl MDA: (+) -N-ethyl-a-methyl-3,4- (methyleneoxy) phenethylamine
43. N-Hydroxy MDA: (+) -N- [a-methyl-3,4- (methyleneoxy) phenethyl] -hydroxylamine
44. Parahexyl: 3-hexyl-7,8,9,10-tetrahydro-6,6,9-trimethyl-6H-dibenzo[b, d] pyran-1-ol
45. PMA: p-methoxy-a-methylphenethylamine Psilosin, psilotsin: 3- [ (dimethy lamino) ethyl] indol-4-ol
46. PSILOCYBIN: 3- [ (dimethylamino) ethyl] indol-4-yl dihydrogen phosphate
47. ROLICYCLIDINE, other name: 1- (1-Phenylsiklohexyl) pyrrolidinePHP, PCPY
48. STP, DOM: 2,5-dimethoxy-, 4-dimethylphenethylamine
49. TENAMFETAMINE, n-Lamine: α-methyl-3,4- (methyleneoxy) phenethylamine MDA
50. TENOSYCLIDINE, other name: 1- [ (2-Thienyl) cyclohexyl] piperidine TCP
51. TMA: (±) -3,4,5-trimethoxy-a-methylphenethylamine
52. AMPHETAMINE: (±) -α-methylphenethylamine
53. DEXAMFETAMINE: (+) - α-methylphenethylamine
55. PHENMETRAZINE: 3-Methyl-2-phenylmorpholine
56. PHENCYCLIDINE, other name PCP: 1- (1-phenylcyclohexyl) piperidine
57. LEVAMFETAMINE, other name: (±) - (R) - α-methylphenethylamine levmefetamine
58. LEVOMETHAMPHETAMINE: (±) - N, α-dimethylphenethylamine
59. MEQUALONE: 3- (o-chloro phenyl) - 2-methyl-4 (3H) - quinolinone
60. METAMPHETAMINA: (+) - (S) - N, α-dimethylphenethylamine
61. METHAQUALONE: 2- methyl- 3-o-to lil-4 (3H) - kainazolinon
62. ZIPEPROL: α - (α metoksibenzil) -4- (β-methoxyphenyl) -1- piperazinetano
63. Opium Drugs
64. Mixture or opium preparations of drugs with other substances not narcotics

LIST OF NARCOTICS OF GROUP II
1. Alphacetylmethadol: Alpha-3-acetoxy-6-dimethyl amino-4,4-diphenylheptane
2. Alphameprodine: Alpha-3-ethyl-1-methyl-4-phenyl-4-propionoxypiperidine
3. Alphamethadol: alpha-6-dimethylamino-4,4-diphenyl-3-heptanol
4. Alphaprodine: alpha-1,3-dimethyl-4-phenyl-4-propionoxypiperidine
5. Alfentanil: N- [ (2- (4-ethyl-4,5-dihydro-5-oxo-1 H-tetrazol-1-il) ethyl] - 4- (methoxyamethyl) -4-pipe ridinil] -N-phenylpropanamide
6. Allylprodine: 3- allyl-1-methyl-4-phenyl-4-propionoxypiperidine
7. Anileridine: 1-para-aminophenethyl-4-phenylpiperidine acid) -4-carboxylic ethyl ester
8. Acetylmethadol: 3-acetoxy-6-dimethylamino-4, 4-diphenylheptane
9. Benzethidine: 1- (2-benzylxyethyl) -4-phenylpiperidine-4- carboxylic ethyl ester
10. Benzylmorphine: 3-benzylmorphine
11. Betametadene: beta-3-ethyl-1-methyl-4-phenyl-4-propionoxypiperidine ridINE
12. Betamethadol: beta-6-dimethylamino-4,4-diphenyl-3-heptanol
13. Betaprodina: beta-1,3-dimethyl-4-phenyl-4-propionoxypipe ride
14. Betacetylmethadol: beta-3-acetoxy-6-dimethylamino-4, 4-diphenylheptane
15. Bezitramide: 1- (3-cyano-3,3-diphenylpropyl) -4- (2-oxo-3-propionyl-1-benzimidazolinil) -piperidine
16. Dextromoramide: (±) - 4- [2-oxo-4-oxo-3,3-diphenyl-4- (1-pyrrolidinyl) butyl] - morpholine
17. Diampropide: N- [ (methylphenethylamin) ]- propyl] -propionanilide
18. Diethylthiine: 3-diethylamino-1,1-di (2'-tienil) -1-butene
19. Difenoxylate: 1- (3-cyano-3,3-diphenylpropyl) -4fenylpiperidine-4- carboxylic ethyl ester
20. Difenoxin: 1- (3-cyano-3,3-diphenylpropyl) -4-phenylthieiccinic acid
21. Dihydromorphine
22. Dimethheptanol: 6-dimethylamino-4,4-diphenyl-3-heptanol
23. Dimenoxadol: 2-dimethylnoethyl-1-ethoxy-1,1-diphenylacetate
24. Dimethyltrimbutene: 3-dimethylamino-1,1-di (2'-tienil) -1-butene
25. Diocapetil butyrate: ethyl-4-morpholino-2, 2-diphenylbutyrate
26. Dipipanona: 4, 4-diphenyl-6-piperidine-3-heptanone
27. Drotebanol: 3,4-dimethoxy-17-methylmorphan-6β, 14-diol
28. Ecgonine, including esters and derivatives equivalent to ecgonine and cocaine.
29. Ethylmetiliumbutenone: 3-ethylmethyloamino-1,1-di- (2'-tiethyl) -1-butene
30. Ethokseridine: acid. [2-, (2-hydroxyethoxy) -ethyl ] -4 phenylpiperidine-4- carbboxylic ethyl ester
31. Etonitazene: 1-diethylaminooethy-2-paro-ethoxybenzyl-5nitrobenzemedazole
32. Furetidine: 1- (2-tetrahydrofuranyl oxyethyl) 4 phenylpiperidine-4- carbboxylic ethyl ester)
33. Hydrocodone: dihidrokodeinona
34. Hydroxyacetidine: 4-methyl-hydroxyphenyl-1-methylpiperidine-4-carboxylic acid ethyl esters
35. Hydromorphone: 14-hydroxydihyromorphine
36. Hydromorfonna: dihidrimorforina
37. Isomethadone: 6-dimethyamino-5-methyl-4, 4-diphenyl-3-hexanona
38. Phenoxadone: 6-morpholino-4, 4-diphenyl-3-heptanona
39. Phenamormide: N - (1-methyl-2-piperidinoethyl) -propionanilide
40. Phenaazoxine: 2'-hydroxy-5,9-dimethyl-2-phenenyl-6,7-benzomorphan
41. Phenormophane: 3-hydroxy-N-phenethylmorphine
42. Phenoperidine: acid - (3-hydroxy-3-phenylpropyl) -4-phenylpiperidine-4-carboxylate
43. Ethyl esters
44. Fentanyl: 1-phenethyl-4-N-propionylanilineopiperidine
45. Clonitazene: 2-para-chlorenzyl-1-diethylaminoethyl-5-nitrobenzimidazole
46. Kodoxima: dihydroxyvinone-6-carboxymethoxime
47. Levophenasilmorphan: (1) -3-hydroxy-N-phenasilmorphine
48. Levomoramide: (.) - 4- [2-methyl-4-oxo-3,3-diphenyl-4- (1pyrrolidinyl) butyl] morpholine
49. Levometorfan: (.) - 3-methoxy-N-methylmorphine
50. Levorfanol: (.) - 3-hydroxy-N-methylmorphanen
51. Metadona: 6-dimethyamino-4, 4-diphenyl-3-heptanone
52. Metadona intermediate: 4-cyano-2-dimethyamino-4, 4-diphenylbutane
53. Metazozine: 2'-hydroxy-2, 5,9-trimethyl-6,7-benzomorphan
54. Metildesorpihine: 6-methyl-delta-6-deoxymorphine
55. Methyldihidromorphine: 6-methylhydrromorphine
56. Methon: 5-methylhydrromorphine
57. Myrophine: Miristybenzylmorphine
58. Intermediate mammide: acids (2-methyl-3-morpholino-1, 1dypenylpropane carboxylate
59. Morpherinone: 1- (2-morpholinoethyl) -4-phenylpiperidine-4-carboxylic acid ethyl ester
60. Morphome-N-oxide
61. Morphine metobromide and other pentafalent nitrogen morphone derivatives include derivative parts morphine
62. Morphine
63. Nikomorphine: 3,6-dinicotinylmorphine
64. Norasimetadol: (±) -alpha-3-asetksi-6methyamino-4,4-diphenylheptane
65. Norleorfanol: (.) - 3-hydroxymorphine
66. Normetadona: 6-dimethyamino-4,4-diphenyl-3-hexanone
67. Normorphine: dimetylmorphine or N-demetilatedmorphine
68. Norpipanona: 4,4-diphenyl-6-piperidino-3-hexanone
69. Oxsodone: 14-hydroxidihidrokodeinona
70. Oksimorona: 14-hydroxydihydromorphine
71. Petidine intermediate A: 4-cyano-1-methyl-4-phenylpiperidine
72. Petidine intermediate B: 4-phenylpiperidine-4-carboxylic acid ethyl ester
73. Petidine intermediate C: Acid 1-methyl-4-phenylpiperidine-4-carboxylate
74. Pimodine: 4-phenyl-1- (3-phenylaminopropyl) acid - pipe ridine-4-carboxylate ethyl esters
75. Pymyleramide: 3-cyano-3,3-diphenylpropyl -4 (1-piperidino) -ipiline-4- Carbosylate armida
76. Proheptasine: 1,3-dimethyl-4-phenyl-4-propionoxiasikloheptane
77. Properidine: 1-methyl-4-phenylpiperidine-4-carboxylic acid isopropyl ester
78. Rasemetorfan: (±) -3-methoxy-N-methylmornphinan
79. Rasemoramida: (±) -4- [2-methyl-4-oxo-3,3-diphenyl-4- (1pyrrolidinyl) -methyl] -morpholine
80. Rasemorphan: (±) -3-hydroxy-N-methylmornphinan
81. Sufentanil: N- [4- (methoxymethyl) -1- [2- (2-tienil) -ethyl-4-piperidyl] propionanilide
82. Thebaine
83. Thebacon: aetildihidrokodeinona
84. Tilidine: (±) -ethyl-trans-2- (dimethylamino) -1-phenyl-3-cyclohexene-1- carboxylates
85. Trimeperidine: 1,2,5-trimethyl-4-phenyl-4-propionoxypiperidine
86. The salts of Narcotics in the Group mentioned above

LIST OF NARCOTICS OF GROUP III
1. Acetylhydrocodine
2. Dekstropropoxifene: α - (+) - 4-dimethylamino-1,2-diphenyl-3-methyl-2-butanol propionate
3. Dihydrocodeine
4. Ethylmorphine: 3-ethyl morphine
5. Codeine: 3-methyl morphine
6. Nicodycodine: 6-nicotinldihydrocodeine
7. Nicocodine: 6-nicotinylecodeina
8. Norcodeine: N-demetilkodeina
9. Polkodine: Morpholiniloylmorphine
10. Propyram: N- (1-methyl-2-piperidinoethyl) -N-2-pyridylpropionamide
11. Buprenorfnia: 21-cyclopropyl-7-α - [(S) -1-hydroxy-1,2,2-trimethylpropyl] - 6,14-endo-entano-6,7,8,14-tetrahydrooripavina
12. The Drugs of Narcotics in the Group mentioned above
13. A mixture or preparation of diphenoxin with other non-narcotic substances
14. Mixture or dosage of diphenoxylate with other substances not narcotics

PRESIDENT OF THE REPUBLIC INDONESIA

Signed

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EDUCATION

Master of Arts student in International Studies 2016 – present, GPIS-Old Dominion University. Thesis title: The Effect of Illicit Drugs Securitization in Indonesia

Sarjana Sastra (B.A.) August 2007, in English Literature, Universitas Gadjah Mada. Undergraduate Thesis: Death and Suicide in Evelyn Waugh’s The Loved One.

PROFESSIONAL EXPERIENCE

May 2016-Present Anti-I illicit Drugs Instructor BNNP Kepri
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Dec 2009-Dec 2012 English (ESL) Teacher EF Batam-Indonesia
Dec 2010-Sep 2011 HR Admin Asst. PT. McDermott Indonesia
Jun 2008 -Dec 2010 English Lecturer Putera Batam University
Apr 2007-Jul 2010 English Language Teacher ILP Batam/YKB

PROFESSIONAL TRAINING

LKPP-RI Indonesian Government Procurement Course 2014
BNN-RI Narcotics Crime Investigation Course 2013
Safety Induction Training at PT. McDermott Indonesia-Batam Base
SVO Workshop on English Pedagogy with Singapore International Foundation 2008
ILP Teacher Training Program 2007

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