United States Diplomacy in the Age of the Internet

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US DIPLOMACY IN THE AGE OF THE INTERNET

by

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ABSTRACT

US DIPLOMACY IN THE AGE OF THE INTERNET

Allison S. Greene
Old Dominion University, 2003
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The dynamics of international relations are constantly changing, and the origin of an extraordinary amount of that change can be traced to what has been coined the ‘Information Revolution.’ It is a revolution as profound and as significant as Gutenberg’s invention of moveable metal type, and may result in social and political consequences of comparable magnitude. One of the most significant and far-reaching implications of this phenomenon is the emergence of the Internet. Since its inception, there have been many claims and assertions about existing and potential repercussions of the Internet within the diplomatic realm.

The purpose of this work is to study the role of the Internet in American diplomatic conduct. One is left with many questions. For example, has the Internet had any substantial effect on US diplomacy? More specifically, in what ways has it affected and/or modified traditional procedures? Has this technological marvel simplified or complicated existing diplomatic initiatives? What are the ramifications for public diplomacy? With diplomats typically playing a crucial role in decision-making efforts for international affairs practitioners and policymakers, how has the Internet transformed their role in the process?

As the literature on the subject is in its nascent form, finding the answers to the aforementioned queries relies upon first-hand knowledge of those in the field of
diplomacy. Hence, I combined a diachronic application of the comparative method with qualitative interviewing methods. From Ambassadors to academics to a vast array of individuals within the diplomatic hierarchy, extensive interviews were conducted in the attempt to address the inquiries.

This study finds that the Internet has indeed impacted US diplomacy to a considerable degree. It has modified and reconstructed the protocol of diplomatic communications, enhanced the reach and effectiveness of public diplomacy initiatives, sharpened diplomatic accountability, and optimized the influence and role of non-state actors in diplomatic and foreign policy endeavors. The transformations that have taken place as a result of the Internet have forever changed American diplomatic conduct.
This dissertation is dedicated to my extraordinary and beloved mother, as well as to the three other angels who came into my life in 1999: Miriam Galan deJesus, Jim Wood, and Lisa Cascio. My debt to you all is too deep for words...
Numerous people have contributed to the successful completion of this dissertation. I offer many, many thanks to my dissertation committee members for their guidance, suggestions, and encouragement. More specifically, I thank Dr. Regina Karp for her exquisite combination of elegance and brilliance that has been an inspiration to me for a decade. Next, I thank Dr. Mona Danner for her remarkable genius, tireless reassurance, and contagious spirit that has undoubtedly awakened the intellectual in me. Moreover, special thanks to my chair, Dr. Steve Yetiv, for his exceptional wisdom and indefatigable patience in completing this work. Additional thanks go both to my cherished father and to my dear friend, Lisa, who read and reread the many drafts of this manuscript. Of course, much love and appreciation go to my Golden Retriever, Lacey, whose unconditional loyalty kept me company under the desk at my feet for two straight years while I typed away. Finally, I am eternally grateful to family, friends, and other loved ones for believing in my dreams and challenging me to stay focused. This dissertation has a piece of each and every one of you within it, as well as within my heart.
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CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION

When the Rogers Act of 1924 created the modern Foreign Service, the United States had only one hundred diplomatic service officers and six hundred consular officers. Except for a handful of military attaches at major posts, diplomacy was run by the State Department and its seven hundred Foreign Service Officers (FSOs). At that time, officials in Washington traveled sparingly. In addition, communications with the capital were limited by both a slothful mail system that typically arrived by boat, and the lofty expense of sending telegrams.

This environment afforded diplomats overseas a sizeable amount of autonomy. Infrequent communications with Washington were concomitant with a great deal of independence at posts. Critical decisions were often made with little or no consultation with the capital without a second thought.

It was not until the end of World War II that the flexibility of FSOs was truly rivaled. Archetypal diplomatic procedures, formalities and rules of protocol were still maintained, but the methods by which they were achieved began to diverge. The world

This dissertation follows the format style of The Chicago Manual of Style, 14th Edition, University of Chicago Press.

2 Hereafter referred to as FSO(s).
was changing rapidly and America had to respond. For example, with the consummation of European colonialism came the formulation of a number of new countries, which in turn required additional diplomatic personnel. Soon, America’s overseas representation grew to more than 160 diplomatic missions and 250 consulates.³

To further accommodate incipient responsibilities, the State Department created an assortment of agencies: The United States Information Agency (USIA) was responsible for public diplomacy initiatives in the advancement of American values and ideals; the US⁴ Agency for International Development (USAID) provided resources to developing countries and promoted free markets; and Congress created the National Security Agency (NSA), the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), and the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) to attend to issues of national security. By the end of the 1950s, American embassies were filled with other agencies’ representatives, well outnumbering Foreign Service Officers.

Even before the end of the Cold War, the already-complex international environment became even more diverse. This is attributable in large part to the burgeoning of transnational issues. Disaffected states, terrorism, organized crime, the environment, population control, narco-trafficking, the proliferation of nuclear, biological and chemical weapons, and many other topics made their way onto the American foreign policy agenda. It became clear that traditional diplomatic training in political science, history, and economics was not sufficiently preparing Foreign Service personnel for this new state of world affairs.

³ Quainton, “Diplomacy in the 21st Century.”
⁴ US will hereafter be used to refer to United States.
This does not portend that the Realist model of international politics involving inter-state relations between sovereign states has been replaced. Rather, new issues and objectives that go beyond the traditional political-military concerns have been added to the existing framework. Many of these are not within governmental control and thus have become transnational, global endeavors. Consequently, diplomacy now "requires interaction with civil societies, not just foreign regimes. It is a much more dynamic world in which traditional statecraft is matched by an increasingly interdisciplinary agenda."5

A NEW ERA: DIPLOMACY IN THE INFORMATION AGE

Traditionally, the United States has conducted its foreign affairs using what has been called classic diplomacy.6 In this context, government-to-government relations are the principal activity, and ambassadors and embassies are often a nation’s only venues for expressing national interests. While nation-states act as sovereign, independent actors in the global arena, diplomats are the means by which state interests are communicated.7

Within that framework, the United States was able to build institutions and power structures to address its concerns and achieve its goals. Victories in two world wars and


the Cold War reaffirm this claim. However, the rise of what has been called the Information Revolution has shaken the ground under the traditional state system. The bearing on the formulation of foreign policy, on the methods of diplomacy, and on the advent of global political awareness is profound.  

The information age's numerous advances and innovations in information and communications technology (ICT) have revolutionized US foreign policy and diplomatic conduct. There was a time when diplomats were the sole interlocutors between countries. Now, unmediated dialogue and information exchanges between citizens and groups from around the world occur twenty-four hours a day.

As a result, nation-states are facing new rivals for power and influence. The world stage is crowded with an ever-growing cast of actors who have the ability to interfere with each other's interests. Non-governmental organizations (NGOs), special interest groups, and other non-state actors continue to grow in importance, in number, and in their international role. Groups and individuals never before involved have begun to play a part in shaping the conduct of diplomacy.

The Information Revolution actually began long ago and is a continuous phenomenon. It is not, however, the only marvel influencing US diplomacy. Additionally, one must consider concurrent revolutions in politics and economics, as they are indeed interconnected. Jeffrey Cooper summarizes the last twenty-five years of

9 Hereafter referred to as ICT or ICTs.
10 Walter Wriston, "Bits, Bytes and Diplomacy," Foreign Affairs 76, no. 5 (September/October 1997): 175.
11 Hereafter referred to as NGO(s).
international affairs as a combination of three broad, interrelated, and continuing revolutions. First there was a Political Revolution, brought about primarily by the collapse of the Soviet Union. With both a rise in democratization and the diffusion of state power, the new political arena has produced a challenge to nation-states used to being the principal actors in world politics.

Cooper’s second revolution is rooted in economics. He lists five forces behind its emergence - liberalization, marketization, privatization, securitization, and globalization. Like the Political Revolution, the Economic Revolution has led to an increase in the number of non-state actors influencing the international stage. Inter alia, an insatiable demand for information and transparency, including greater openness in politics, is what Cooper believes to be the key impact of this phenomenon.

Lastly, the Information Revolution has produced significant advances in information and communications technologies that have forever changed the world as we know it. These ICTs have provided new communications tools, demanded new organizational processes, and “altered existing hierarchies and power relationships among both domestic and global actors, thereby playing a major role in facilitating and spurring revolutions in both the political and economic domains.”

Consequently, the nature and conduct of US diplomacy have had to adjust. Traditional approaches are being challenged as technological developments have

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13 Cooper, “Diplomacy in the Information Age,” 1.
dramatically reduced the effects of time and distance. Real-time communication has linked the globe in ways previously inconceivable. Accordingly, American diplomats need to be conversant with an increasingly wider range of affairs.

This has put tremendous pressure on diplomats as they are operating in a more accessible, transparent environment. They are constantly deluged by more and more information, yet have less time to process and interpret it. In addition, global awareness has raised the bar on accountability issues, as people’s expectations include quick, prudent, and appropriate solutions.

ENTER THE INTERNET

One of the most significant means by which actors outside of the diplomatic arena are communicating is via the Internet. Originating in the late 1960s as a US government-sponsored research project called ARPANET, the Internet has evolved into a global meta-network of interconnected but separately-owned networks. In 1995, fewer than ten million people were using the Internet. Today, there are over 665 million users worldwide.

The “Net” is an information infrastructure which is not centrally managed by dominant private companies or government monopolies, nor is it inflexible from the standpoint of users, as were the telecommunications systems of old. Instead, it is a

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15 NUA Internet Surveys (NIS) has been publishing since 1997 and is renowned for its ability to monitor, discuss, and analyze key events on the Internet. NIS has been quoted extensively. See the website at www.nua.com (last accessed 10 January 2003).
16 Ibid.
decentralized medium that has been built to route around attempts to shut it down. As a result, it can tap the technological ingenuity of a multiplicity of service providers and users.

Without a doubt, it has fundamentally changed the ways in which people communicate, and will continue to do so. Consider the two most popular Internet applications – electronic mail, also known as ‘E-mail,’ and the World Wide Web, or ‘the Web.’ In the past few years, within the United States, E-mail has come to account for more messages between people per year than the conventional postal service.\(^{17}\) Additionally, a recent UCLA study revealed Americans who go on-line rank the Internet as the most important information source, outpacing television, newspapers, and radio.\(^{18}\)

The popularity stems from the ability to exchange messages without regard to distance or time. The usual costs of moving information a long distance have also been eliminated. Additionally, a user can send a message from one location to an unlimited number of other users' computer addresses. This facilitates the formulation of on-line virtual communities linking people with an infinite number of shared interests.

 Similarly, the Web provides users around the world with the ability to create their own multimedia information. One can incorporate text, images, audio, and even video into customized electronic web pages that can be accessed and downloaded to personal

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computers by millions of other people. Building upon TCP/IP\textsuperscript{19} and the Internet's nearly universal E-mail infrastructure, the Web operates on a powerful software platform called HTTP.\textsuperscript{20} With these capabilities, users can explore a self-selected, multidimensional web of connections within connections throughout the entire Internet.

The magnitude of this indiscriminate provider of information is growing exponentially and there is no turning back. Internet technology is changing the global economy, transforming political and business institutions and altering national foreign policy objectives and the methods of achieving them.\textsuperscript{21} As a result, information, typically categorized as what Nye and Owen refer to as 'soft power,'\textsuperscript{22} has become a much more critical measure of national power and influence than in the past. The use of soft power, otherwise known as information power, can range from a government making valuable information resources publicly accessible on the Internet to putting a particular slant on a policy or activity. In an information society, information "replaces weaponry and monetary wealth as the principal source of power."\textsuperscript{23}

In some ways, the Information Revolution was anticipated. In the early 1970s,

\textsuperscript{19} TCP/IP stands for Transmission Control Protocol/Internet Protocol. It is the standard procedure for regulating transmission on the Internet.

\textsuperscript{20} HTTP, or hypertext transfer protocol, refers to the software's ability to link other documents or video and audio programs stored elsewhere on the Internet into a single Web document consisting of one computer screen of material.


\textsuperscript{22} The term 'soft power' was first introduced by Joseph S. Nye, Dean of the John F. Kennedy School of Government at Harvard University. Its counterpart, 'hard power,' refers to a state's 'hard' or coercive power represented by its military force and involves military might.

computer mainframe systems were utilized for numerous complex assessments and
calculations, and smaller ‘dumb’ terminals were used in government communications.
Nevertheless, even experts were unable to presage the world’s reliance on computers, the
emergence of the Internet, or how these developments would define the end of the
twentieth century.

The ripple effects of nearly unlimited global access and interactive capabilities on
US diplomacy are many. Not all of them are clear as of yet, and some counter each other.
For example, the Internet has, in the same breath, been dubbed both a promoter of
democracy\textsuperscript{24} and a threat to national sovereignty.\textsuperscript{25} Moreover, while promoting US
interests and values, it connects individuals opposed to those very ideas.

The research for this dissertation is centered on how the Internet has impacted US
diplomacy. What are the conditions under which it is being used by diplomats in the field
and in Washington on a daily basis? How has it altered existing diplomatic conduct and
protocol? What advantages and/or limitations does it present for American diplomacy?

This topic has not been the subject of mainstream policy attention in the

\textsuperscript{24} See Barry N. Hague and Brian D. Loader, ed., \textit{Digital Democracy: Discourse
and Decision-Making in the Information Age} (London: Routledge, 1999); The
Democracy Network at www.democracynet.org; W.H. Dutton, \textit{Society on the Line:
Information Politics in the Digital Age} (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1998); K.
Oaks, Calif.: SAGE Publications, 2002); K. Schalken, “Internet as a New Public Sphere
for Politics and Democracy,” paper presented at the Images of Politics Conference,
Amsterdam, 23-25 October 1997; R.E. Sclove, \textit{Democracy and Technology} (New York:

\textsuperscript{25} James Rosenau, “States, Sovereignty, and Diplomacy in the Information Age,”
1999; Jerry Everard, \textit{Virtual States: The Internet and the Boundaries of the Nation-State}
(London: Routledge, 2000); David J. Rothkopf, “Cyberpolitik: The Changing Nature of
diplomatic community. It has not received appropriate attention in books or scholarly journals either. Indeed, within the academic world of political science and international relations, it is barely on the map. Nonetheless, there are literatures that encompass the research topic. The next section is a review of the existing literatures related to the focus of this dissertation.

LITERATURE REVIEW

This dissertation examines the impact of the Internet on US diplomacy. Because written works on this topic are few and far between, it is useful to place this study in the context of broader literatures in which it gains meaning. The first literature is US foreign policy, the second is global interdependence, and the third is Information Age Diplomacy.

US FOREIGN POLICY

US foreign policy can be viewed as consisting of three elements - process, choice, and outcome. All are considered within the broader context of national security and national interests. Process includes, but is not limited to, the setting of goals and objectives, the development of options to contemplate, and the evaluation of potential

26 William Drake, speech at the Information Age Diplomacy Symposium, Washington, D.C., 5 April 2001. He continues on this point and acknowledges that the Carnegie Endowment's Information Revolution and World Politics project was an effort to fill this gap. Available at www.ndu.edu/ndu/nwc/Public/SymposiumWebsite/william_drake.htm (last accessed 18 October 2001).

consequences. This has been referred to as thinking within the "black box." The next component, choice, involves the rational selection of a value-maximizing option or non-rational decision-making approaches. Lastly, outcome is what happens when the particular foreign policy choice is implemented. For the purpose of this dissertation, I shall focus only on process.

In the aftermath of the Cold War, American foreign policy encompasses both continuity and change. Consequently, the policy-making stage involving process has had to adjust. On the one hand, the European state-centric system that began over 350 years ago with the signing of the Treaty of Westphalia still exists and influences how process is executed. States remain, to a large degree, sovereign entities within the traditional hierarchies, and raw power can still be measured in terms of economic, political, and military might. James Rosenau argues that this underlying nature of world affairs cannot be taken for granted.

On the other hand, process is affected by an evolving new era that encompasses a multi-centric world of diverse collectivities. Such entities include, but are not limited to, multi-national corporations (MNCs), non-governmental organizations (NGOs), ethnic

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29 Ibid, 5; Yetiv, Explaining Foreign Policy Behavior.
32 Keohane and Nye, Power and Interdependence, 4.
33 Rosenau, "States, Sovereignty, and Diplomacy," 3.
minorities, professional associations, social movements, and incipient communities.\textsuperscript{34} Rosenau identifies this as "an emergent epoch comprised of contradictions and lingering tendencies."\textsuperscript{35} This combination of tradition and transformation is at the heart of his theory that world politics is in a state of \textit{fragmegration} - both fragmented and integrated at the same time.\textsuperscript{36}

One of the most significant undercurrents prevailing upon this new age in US foreign policy is the development of advanced information and communications technologies. At the present time, approximately thirty-five percent of global communication traffic originates or terminates in the United States, a country with less than six percent of the world's population.\textsuperscript{37} New political and economic forces brought about by these advancements redefine American geopolitical interests, most visibly trade,\textsuperscript{38} where information technology has become the leading American export sector.\textsuperscript{39} Other policy areas - from human rights to the environment to security issues - have also been affected by the new technologies.

David Rothkopf describes the transition as an evolution from \textit{realpolitik} - where

\textsuperscript{34} Ibid, 10.
\textsuperscript{35} Ibid, 5.
\textsuperscript{37} Wilson Dizard, Jr., \textit{Digital Diplomacy: US Foreign Policy in the Information Age} (Westport, Conn.: Praeger, 2001), 4-5.
\textsuperscript{38} Ibid, 4.
relations among states are determined by raw power and the mighty prevail\textsuperscript{40} - to what he calls \textit{cyberpolitik} - where actors are no longer just states, and raw power can be countered or fortified by information power.\textsuperscript{41} He feels the US government is ill-equipped to deal with a world in which non-state actors are of vital importance. The role of non-state actors in US diplomacy and foreign policy-making will be expanded upon in Chapter V.

Many believe historical change has been caused principally by changes in the dominant medium of communication.\textsuperscript{42} Certainly, inventions such as the telephone, the computer, the television, and satellites all have their own repercussions on the formulation of US foreign policy, as Chapter II will address. In order to narrow the scope of this dissertation, however, I am focusing solely on the Internet.

The Internet has created new virtual social formations which allow for greater political participation from citizens. It is, simply, public space [outside the confines of the state] that is shared by millions of citizens, but lacks a government.\textsuperscript{43} According to David Holmes, the Net “breaks down hierarchies...by allowing the construction of oppositional subjectivities hitherto excluded from the public sphere.”\textsuperscript{44} This affects both US foreign policy and diplomatic conduct.

Despite the lack of an overseeing government, Rosenau’s ‘diverse collectivities’

\textsuperscript{40} Kissinger, \textit{Diplomacy}, 104.
\textsuperscript{41} Rothkopf, “\textit{Cyberpolitik},” 325.
\textsuperscript{42} Gifford Malone, \textit{American Diplomacy in the Information Age}, Herbert Wilson Griffin Seminar in International Affairs, / DACOR Bacon House Foundation (New York: University Press of America, 1991), 35.
\textsuperscript{43} Wade Rowland, \textit{The Spirit of the Web: The Age of Information from the Telegraph to the Internet} (Toronto: Somerville House, 1997), 187.
increasingly exert their influence over US foreign policy and diplomacy, making the Web an advocacy channel for the average citizen. This was first confirmed in the late 1990s during a global debate regarding a UN-sponsored treaty to ban the use of land mines. In this instance, a non-profit organization primarily utilized the Web to contact advocacy groups in the US and overseas in order to gain support for the initiative. The ban was implemented in December of 1997, and the chief organizer, Jody Williams, was awarded the Nobel Peace Prize the following year.45

The most significant difference between traditional diplomacy and today's version is the accelerating pace, volume, and breadth of information which diplomats must consider in order to make informed decisions.46 Foreign policy-makers face the same dilemma. While diplomacy is an entity that is technically independent of foreign policy, it is often an integral part of the foreign policy-making process. Thus, the distinction between the two easily can be blurred. What is apparent is that US diplomats play a key role in advising American policy-makers on issues, as well as promoting the policies already in place or soon to be implemented.

The challenge facing the US is to develop a comprehensive approach to dealing with American foreign policy interests in the new information-intensive global environment. It is not necessary to completely imagine and construct a whole new foreign policy, but to update and improve the existing one so as to incorporate new world realities. American diplomats then will be better able to reinforce such policies.

46 Dizard, Digital Diplomacy, 100.
GLOBAL INTERDEPENDENCE

The second literature deals with global interdependence and its importance. When I refer to interdependence, I shall be using the definition created by Robert Keohane and Joseph Nye. They begin by defining dependence as "a state of being determined or highly affected by external forces."\(^{47}\) It follows, then, that "mutual dependence is the essence of interdependence."\(^{48}\)

It is notable to point out that an underlying theme in almost every publication addressing the information age is that the world is becoming increasingly interdependent at a quickening rate.\(^{49}\) Diverse technologies are fostering changes in global life, and these changes are creating common grounds, which in turn contribute to the rise in interdependence.\(^{50}\) This has significant global repercussions. Rosenau summarizes the process as a "shift from an industrial to a post-industrial order [that] focuses on the dynamics of technology, particularly on those technologies associated with the microelectronic revolution that have made social, economic and political distances much

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\(^{48}\) Ibid, 8.


shorter, the movement of ideas, pictures, currencies, and information so much faster, and thus the interdependence of people and events so much greater.\textsuperscript{51}

Interdependence in world politics involves scenarios that embody reciprocal effects among countries or among the actors in those countries.\textsuperscript{52} Patterns of interdependence within the contemporary international system have a great deal of variation and are often asymmetrical or imbalanced.\textsuperscript{53} As the world has become increasingly interdependent, states have turned to international organizations (IOs) and regimes - as well as regional alliances or subsystems - that are economic, political or military in nature in order to achieve their goals and maintain their interests.\textsuperscript{54} Moreover, states are working with non-state entities such as NGOs for the very same reasons. The emerging global system, according to Harvey Starr, "can best be understood as the consequence of states adapting to changing interdependencies."\textsuperscript{55}

New opportunities, risks, and potential costs & benefits are not only constraining decision-makers, but they are also raising questions as to the viability of the state and of the state-centric system itself. Starr claims interdependence threatens the three major components of state sovereignty: independent action, control over internal affairs, and consent in international interaction.\textsuperscript{56} Rosenau acknowledges the vulnerability of states’

\textsuperscript{52} Keohane and Nye, Power and Interdependence, 8.
\textsuperscript{53} Jones, Globalisation and Interdependence, 15.
\textsuperscript{54} Harvey Starr, Anarchy, Order, and Integration: How to Manage Interdependence (Ann Arbor, Mich.: University of Michigan Press, 1997), 27.
\textsuperscript{55} Ibid, 4.
\textsuperscript{56} Starr, Anarchy, Order, and Integration, 18.
sovereignty, yet maintains that the interstate system is indeed intact.\footnote{Rosenau, “States, Sovereignty, and Diplomacy,” 13.} Both recognize the relation between interdependence and sovereignty as a critical element for states.

The Internet can be viewed as one element of global interdependence. This is partly because it produces connections among states that may contribute to making them more mutually dependent. In addition, it has provided a haven for non-state actors to become more involved and exert influences. As a result, states are no longer just increasingly interdependent with each other, but with the growing realm of non-state, sovereignty-free, transnational actors as well.

INFORMATION AGE DIPLOMACY

While a vast academic literature explores the broader subjects of US foreign policy and global interdependence, the literature regarding the impact of the Internet on diplomacy is not vast. Most of the works written discuss the Information Revolution’s many potential implications, as opposed to focusing solely on the Internet. For example, initiatives such as the Virtual Diplomacy Conference held by the United States Institute of Peace in 1997 and the NetDiplomacy Conferences sponsored by the State Department in both 2000 and 2001 indicate that advances in information and communications technologies have influenced the nature and conduct of diplomacy, and it is important to contemplate the ramifications.

Books specifically written on the subject have been published predominantly within the last three years. Most do not focus on only one aspect of the information
revolution. Wilson Dizard, Jr. has written the most comprehensive work, entitled *Digital Diplomacy: US Foreign Policy in the Information Age*. In this 2001 publication, he identifies three trends.

The first trend is the advent of a new set of foreign policy issues brought about by the technological imperative of responding to advances in information and communications technologies. Dizard believes ‘digital diplomacy’ has great potential for strengthening the content and conduct of US foreign policy. Joseph Nye and William Owens agree, emphasizing the importance of America maintaining an edge in the information age. They go on to say that

knowledge, more than ever, is power. The one country that can best lead the information revolution will be more powerful than any other. For the foreseeable future, that country is the United States. America has apparent strength in military power and economic production. Yet its more subtle comparative advantage is its ability to collect, process, act upon and disseminate information, an edge that will almost certainly grow in the next decade.58

Dizard’s second trend points out that the State Department and other foreign affairs agencies are in need of extensive upgrades in their ICT facilities and capabilities. He is not alone in his thinking. Between 1997 and 2001, thirteen major reports on State Department reform have been composed.59 The most recent, “State Department Reform: Report of an Independent Task Force” - also known as The Carlucci Report - cosponsored by the Council on Foreign Relations and the Center for Strategic and International

59 For a list of the twelve reports on State Department reform, see Appendix A of “State Department Reform: Report of an Independent Task Force,” chaired by Frank C. Carlucci and coordinated by Ian J. Brzezinski.
Studies, is an overview and compilation of the first twelve studies. Almost every one of the reports recommends greater usage of the Internet for the purpose of reaching both the general public and private groups that have specialized interests in US foreign policy. All are focused on how to bring US diplomacy out of irrelevance and into the next century.

This is not just a recent phenomenon. As early as 1991, concern was being expressed as to the need for State Department reform. Day O. Mount, former Deputy Assistant Secretary for Information Systems in the State Department, made remarks regarding the limitations of traditional State Department culture. He believed that the State Department could neither understand nor become a part of the information age “until its members, senior as well as junior,” implemented information technologies to the point where their power and influence could be experienced.60 For him, technology in the service of diplomacy is a strategic factor.

Playing off the Pentagon’s recent “revolution in military affairs” (RMA),61 the State Department has begun to respond to these reports in an effort to explore what needs to be done in order to foster a much-needed “revolution in diplomatic affairs (RDA).”62 In May of 2000, Madeleine Albright initiated a multi-year, multi-administration, bipartisan mission to address the fact that the State Department’s Office of Scientific and Technological Affairs is lagging behind advancing technologies.63 She stated, “There can

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be no question about the integral role science and technology must play in our diplomacy."\textsuperscript{64} The issue of State Department reform is elaborated upon extensively in Chapter II of this dissertation.

The third trend involves the use of digital technologies to enhance public diplomacy. Once reforms are in place, new technologies can be used to advance US diplomatic concerns and initiatives. The State Department's 'NetDiplomacy' Conferences presented how ICTs could be utilized in the area of public diplomacy. Conference topics included promoting American values and ideals through the development of web pages for US governmental agencies and US embassies abroad.

On the topic of public diplomacy, Jamie Frederic Metzl questions whether US public diplomacy can "rise from the ashes."\textsuperscript{65} He discusses the difficulty that the State Department has had interacting with non-diplomatic populations over the years. Non-state actors (NSAs),\textsuperscript{66} such as non-governmental organizations and corporations, are benefitting from globalization and the proliferation of ICTs by gaining a stronger voice in the conduct of foreign affairs. The 1999 merger of USIA into the State Department occurred in part to contend with this emerging reality.\textsuperscript{67} However, Metzl is critical of State's overall slow progress in the area of technology, and calls for a more open and

\textsuperscript{64} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{65} Jamie Frederic Metzl, "Can Public Diplomacy Rise from the Ashes?" \textit{Foreign Service Journal} (July/August 2001).
\textsuperscript{66} Hereafter referred to as NSAs.
accessible organization that can respond to the challenges brought about by the information age.

An important element to consider with regard to public diplomacy is the concept of transparency. Diplomacy used to be conducted between governmental elites, behind closed doors. Today, in large part due to the spread of information via ICTs, diplomats can no longer practice completely quiet diplomacy.

The work edited by Bernard Finel and Kristin Lord contains essays which speculate on how new information technologies - such as the Internet - might change patterns of global conflict and cooperation. Faster and cheaper communications networks may be both hastening the pace of diplomacy and inviting new global actors into the mix. The authors acknowledge that more information is not necessarily a blessing. Concerns revolve around how transparency can in fact complicate matters by exposing sensitive knowledge to a global audience who will make judgments despite lacking appropriate expertise.

Gordon S. Smith raises the issue that with an increase of influence by non-diplomatic actors on the global stage comes a potential challenge to the sovereignty of the nation-state. For Smith, the distribution of power in the world is becoming more and more diffuse, at a rapidly growing pace. Jean-Marie Guehenno agrees with Smith, stating that while the dominance of the state has not and will not disappear, the balance of power

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69 Smith, “Reinventing Diplomacy,” 16.
between the state and other elements of society has been shifting for the past quarter century.\textsuperscript{70}

In a recent publication, Howard Cincotta analyzes this very notion of a collapse in traditional state-to-state diplomacy, which for so long has been the basic model for the conduct of global affairs. He lists numerous indicators he feels are contributing to a transformation of what used to be called traditional, classic or modern diplomacy. For him, the new emerging post-modern diplomacy is a by-product of four "overlapping, reinforcing, yet distinct quantum shifts, or discontinuities in the conduct of foreign affairs."\textsuperscript{71}

Cincotta’s first shift is the consummation of the Cold War. He proposes that as the Berlin Wall crumbled, so did the existing international political-military infrastructure. The result was the beginning of a new era of international politics. This transformation opened the door for the next three revolutions.

The second seismic shift is the proliferation of non-state actors on the global scene. From non-governmental organizations to multinational corporations to an array of determined individuals, an impressive agglomeration of non-state entities have looked to flex their muscles on the world stage. No longer on the periphery, these groups have

\textsuperscript{70} Jean-Marie Guehenno, \textit{The End of the Nation-State} (Minneapolis: Minnesota University Press, 1995). For more on the information age and sovereignty, see Nye and Keohane, \textit{Power and Interdependence}; Wriston, "Bits, Bytes, and Diplomacy."

gained a legitimate voice in addressing international concerns and redefining foreign affairs priorities.

The transnationalization of foreign policy agendas is the third diplomatic shift. Globalization and the rise of interdependence have brought many more transnational issues to the table. Topics such as the movement of refugees, world health dilemmas, climate change, and international villainy are now discussed as primary policy focal points. In the past, agendas were typically geared more toward issues of national security and individual state interests.

The final shift is the revolution in information technology. Cincotta feels this factor may indeed be the most compulsory of all. Innovations have provided access to an unparalleled wealth of information. Furthermore, world news is available instantaneously, and communication can occur both quickly and inexpensively with essentially any locality on the globe via the technology of the Internet. With this in mind, diplomatic historians and scholars of international relations are left to ponder "whether the appropriate demarcation line between the ‘modern’ and ‘post-modern’ eras [in diplomacy] is the fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989, or the advent of a 1994 software application called Mosaic, which morphed into the Netscape browser that transformed the World Wide Web." 

Some scholars and diplomatic personnel proclaim that we ought to computerize foreign policy operations. Proposals for telediplomacy involving ‘virtual embassies’ incite strong opposition, such as in a Georgetown University study of the future of

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72 Ibid, 4.
73 Ibid, 3.
diplomacy. The report claims, "There is no such thing as remote control diplomacy. We will continue to need diplomats pounding the pavements, talking to all sorts of people in foreign countries and analyzing the significance of what they have learned."74

In the end, the most insightful printed sources on diplomacy and ICTs are the papers from recent conferences addressing US foreign policy and diplomacy in the information age. Beyond that, I have found that interviews with those within the diplomatic hierarchy, who are directly affected by the whole process, are the most conducive to my research needs. Individuals within the diplomatic hierarchy who must personally respond to the changes at hand have offered invaluable insight yet to be seen in print. With this in mind, the next section will explain the methodology used to explore the research for this dissertation.

METHODOLOGY

One way to gain some insight into the impact of the Internet (independent variable) on US diplomacy (dependent variable) is to use the comparative method. I first set up the independent variable by defining the Internet and its components extensively. Then, I defined what I refer to as diplomacy, and what elements thereof were examined.

I have chosen to research only US diplomacy in order to narrow the scope of the project. I concede that the findings may not be relevant to other states. Moreover, when I speak of US diplomacy and diplomatic conduct, I am referring to the workings

specifically within the State Department. While many other American entities are involved in US diplomacy, the State Department is the key organization through which all diplomacy is conducted. It follows, then, that this study is best served by focusing primarily on this agency.

It is important to distinguish precisely which aspects of American diplomatic conduct even involve the Internet and then explain the existing and proposed usages of the Internet within the diplomatic realm. The analysis chapters will address this aspect. Furthermore, in order to understand the impact solely of the Internet on US diplomacy, it is necessary to distinguish, to the extent possible, its effects from the effect of other technologies, and from the broader historical process. Chapter II will cover this point more elaborately.

For the purpose of this dissertation, I shall refer to the time period of “before” the Internet as the early 1990s, as 1991 marked the first stage of web development. This will provide the context in which to consider the variance of US diplomatic conduct before and after the Internet. Indeed, by exploring diplomacy before and after the rise of the Internet in the United States, using a diachronic application of the comparative method, we can control for variables better than cross-national studies can. This is because a diachronic approach involves more constants and fewer variables. That is,

75 Dr. Steve Yetiv, phone interview with author, 17 October, 2001.
fewer variables change over time alone than they do indeed change over both time and area.\(^7\)\(^8\)

For this endeavor, I developed a list of questions that involved propositions which make suppositions about the impact of the Internet on US diplomacy. To test these propositions, I relied primarily on interviews with those individuals who have been directly involved in the US diplomatic arena and who have specifically served pre-Internet and after its inception. With limited literature available on the research topic, the most accurate and reliable source of information lies within the knowledge and experience of this group of people. Thus, ambassadors, career Foreign Service officers, and other State Department officials within the diplomatic realm were consulted. To supplement my knowledge base of US diplomacy as well as the technological aspects of the Internet, I conducted additional interviews with both prominent academics, media personnel, technology experts, and retired diplomats.

Due to the nature of information gathering via interviews, my research incorporates qualitative research methods, which can nonetheless be based on quantitative logic in the sense that we seek to understand what, in fact, is impacting the dependent variable when several different causal factors may be at play.\(^7\)\(^9\) The validity of the study is assessed based on the determination of whether the findings are grounded in

\(^{78}\) John Stuart Mill, who contributed to the development of comparative methods, did not believe that they could be applied in the social sciences because few cases differ in just one respect. However, social scientists regularly apply the method, while relaxing the strict requirements that Mill put forth.

empirical material and whether the methods have been appropriately selected and applied to the procedure - in this case, interviewing.

In order to maintain legitimacy, I used the 'standardized open-ended interview' model as a guide.\(^8^0\) By open-ended, it means the interviewer does not supply or predetermine answers. Subjects are free to use their own words to express their educated opinions. It would not be conducive to simply administer a questionnaire, as in a "closed interview,"\(^8^1\) where participants are forced to fit their responses into the interviewer’s categories.

This interviewing method requires the researcher to prepare a set of questions ahead of time that are carefully worded and arranged.\(^8^2\) The questions are asked in the same order to minimize variation and reduce bias. However, one must account for the diverse and complex experiences of the individuals being interviewed. With regard to subjectivity, qualitative methods take the researcher’s communication with the subjects as an explicit part of knowledge production rather than excluding it as an intervening variable.

With an open-ended interview, one can control the questioning and obtain systematic and thorough data while allowing for elaboration based on individual knowledge, experience and expertise. It is important to remain open to new, and perhaps surprising, results when soliciting responses to the prepared research questions. It is the interviewees’ perspectives on the topic at hand that are being elicited.

\(^8^1\) Ibid, 98.
\(^8^2\) See Appendix C.
A major strength of this method involves the fact that subjects answer the same questions, thus increasing the comparability of responses. This reduces the interviewer's bias and facilitates organization and analysis of the data. Moreover, it is more amenable to the categorization of results.

Weaknesses include the issue that data collected is a compilation of beliefs. The knowledge accumulated is that which the subjects consider to be factual, based on their experience. Moreover, most of the information sought is not yet in published form, as it is a new and ever-moving topic.

One of the greatest challenges was choosing whom to interview. A specific strategy was necessary for selecting the right individuals to represent the knowledge being solicited. In an interview study, the issue of sampling is connected to the decisions regarding which persons to interview and from which groups these should come. I utilized the method of purposive sampling rather than random sampling in order to target specific individuals who are considered experts in the subject matter, or who are directly involved in or particularly important for the functioning of US diplomacy. Additionally, I limited my interviewees to those individuals who have diplomatic experience both before and after the emergence of the Internet. This was done to ensure an appropriate application of the diachronic approach while using the comparative method of analysis.

Gaining access to those who are appropriate for data collection required extensive planning. How does one overcome the problem of willingness and/or availability of

those who are the central figures and not merely the marginal ones? I first contacted individuals via E-mail, whenever possible. Letters and phone calls followed when E-mail addresses were either not available or no reply was received. Once certain subjects were contacted and interviewed, I used the strategy of reference and asked for suggestions of others to interview.

The number of interviews I conducted with those directly working within (or recently retired from) the diplomatic realm was twenty-six. In addition, eight interviews were conducted with academics and/or experts who are affiliated with diplomatic studies or have some expertise of information and communications technologies. Thus, the total number of interviews conducted was thirty-four.

I utilized Documentation Sheets to record my interview data. Notes were taken live and a tape recorder was used to ensure nothing was missed. At the end of each interview, I stated an overview or recap of the main points to the individual so as to confirm my interpretation of his/her responses.

Once an interview was complete, an analysis and interpretation of collected data occurred immediately. Responses were then organized according to an issue-area system of categorization based on my propositions. Information not involving the propositions was categorized and documented for potential formulation of additional propositions and/or implications. In the end, the data was broken down, conceptualized, and put back together in new ways to formulate concrete findings. The next section includes the list of propositions that were assembled to explore this research topic. The propositions were placed in the form of questions for the interviewing process.
PROPOSITIONS

The following propositions were tested so as to identify what impact the Internet has had on US diplomacy, as well as how state action involving diplomatic conduct has had to and will need to adjust. Each proposition is referring to American diplomacy explicitly. I will explain briefly the pith of the propositions after stating each one.

PROPOSITION I

P1: The Internet has increased the frequency of diplomatic communication.

Where has the Internet influenced the flow of communication within the diplomatic milieu? Is it the case that diplomats have come to rely more on communicating with each other electronically, at a greater rate of occurrence? The United States Institute of Peace (USIP) has invented a phrase for this phenomenon - ‘Virtual Diplomacy.’ This concept is defined as “decision-making, coordination, communication and the implementation of activities to prevent, manage and resolve international conflict relying on information and communications technologies adopted by citizens, non-governmental organizations, international bodies, and nation-states.”84 Richard Solomon, the President of USIP, further notes that Virtual Diplomacy is indeed still real, authentic diplomacy in that it involves authoritative interactions between officials of different governments. It is deemed ‘virtual’ based on the fact that these

84 This definition of ‘Virtual Diplomacy’ is located on the United States Institute of Peace’s web site, listed under Virtual Diplomacy. The address is www.usip.org/vdi (last accessed on 30 September 2002).
official exchanges are electronic rather than face-to-face. Nonetheless, it is "real" diplomacy.

This proposition seeks to identify any change in the frequency of diplomatic communications as a direct result of Internet technology. It also hopes to discover specifically which Internet applications diplomats are utilizing for communicative purposes. If diplomatic communications have increased in frequency, there may be significant repercussions for US diplomacy and its communications protocol.

PROPOSITION II

P2: The existence of the Internet has decreased the actual number of live diplomatic meetings held, yet it has not reduced the importance of in-person, face-to-face diplomacy.

Due to increases in the speed of and access to information exchange via the Internet, it is possible that diplomats have scheduled fewer in-person meetings with each other. However, despite significant advances in technology, more specifically the Internet, I propose that the importance of face-to-face diplomacy has not diminished. Indeed, I presume it remains a crucial and necessary part of the process. The adeptness of the individual statesperson or diplomat is still indispensable. In a profession in which credibility and integrity are paramount, there is no substitute for the face-to-face human relationship.

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PROPOSITION III

P3: The Internet is playing a major role in advancing the efforts of public diplomacy.

In the age of the Internet, public diplomacy has taken on a new essence. Strategies have included placing greater emphasis on public opinion when making policy, using communications tools to build coalitions and public support for policies, and developing web pages which promote American-oriented values and ideals for US governmental agencies and embassies. I hypothesize that the role of the Internet and its applications in this endeavor is significant.

PROPOSITION IV

P4: The Internet has enhanced accountability in American diplomacy.

Diplomats' words and actions are increasingly in the public domain. The quality of their decisions, as well as the capacity to execute them effectively, is on display. Each move is vulnerable to judgment from many angles.

This proposition explores how the capability of the Internet to exploit this reality may lead to a greater level of accountability in US diplomacy. I recognize that a distinguished, respectable level of accountability existed before the advent of the Internet. However, it is possible that the Internet's contribution to greater transparency and openness has resulted in more cautious and truthful diplomatic conduct.

\[86\] Public Diplomacy, sometimes viewed as propaganda, seeks to promote the ideas of a state through strategic communication techniques.
PROPOSITION V

P5: The Internet has augmented the influence of non-state actors in US diplomacy.

As the interconnectedness of the global civil society grows rapidly via transnational networks, so does the influence of non-state actors. This new openness has diplomats encountering additional domestic and international pressure. Thus, has 'citizen diplomacy' - the involvement and influence of non-diplomatic actors in diplomatic conduct and decision-making\(^{87}\) - grown in influence.

The Internet's outreach capabilities may be providing non-state actors with a crucial means to exert their influences on American diplomats and policy-makers alike. The more influence, the less autonomy for diplomats, causing a diffusion of diplomacy. With this potentiality, it is important to discover the Internet's role in the enabling of non-diplomatic actors in the diplomatic arena.

SET-UP

This dissertation begins with an introduction which familiarizes the reader with the subject matter and the terms involved in the research. A brief overview of how US diplomacy has transformed over time is presented. For clarification purposes, the concepts of the Information Revolution, the Internet, and Diplomacy are discussed in detail.

A literature review follows, with key authors and texts discussed in order to

\(^{87}\) Some use the term 'netizens' for citizen diplomats who use the Internet in their exploits.
present a picture of the current knowledge of the research topic. How this topic fits into
the existing literatures of US Foreign Policy, Global Interdependence, and Information
Age Diplomacy are addressed. The goal of the literature review is to show that there are
gaps in the literature to be filled in by the results of this dissertation.

Once the research topic is clear, I present the methodology section. This section
discusses how I investigated the topic via interviews with experts, using a list of specific
questions based on my propositions. The procedures, structure, and selection of subjects
are articulated in detail. The methodology not only provides a justification of method but
also notes the method’s strengths and weaknesses, as well as how to overcome those
weaknesses. In addition, the propositions tested in the interviews are stated and
explained in this chapter.

The second chapter includes an overview of the information revolution, focusing
on information and communications technologies in recent history, beginning with the
telegraph and ending with the Internet. How information and communications
technologies have impacted US diplomacy in its evolution to modern day status will be
discussed. This chapter also addresses the overall notion of State Department reform,
focusing particularly on reform involving ICTs. The current state of ICTs at the State
Department, including its use of the Internet, is explained.

Three analysis chapters that review the responses to the interview questions in
relation to the propositions follow Chapter II. Chapter III considers the transformation of
US diplomacy from the ‘traditional diplomacy’ of old to the new and emerging ‘post-
modern diplomacy.’ Propositions regarding the impact of the Internet on traditional
diplomatic communication and the occurrence of diplomatic meetings are examined, as is
the importance of face-to-face diplomacy. Additionally, security concerns regarding web-based technologies at the State Department and its posts are discussed.

Chapter IV explores a proposition revolving around the Internet's role in public diplomacy, with special focus on the mass media and the former USIA. Chapter V addresses two propositions within the context of greater transparency. The Internet's effect on diplomatic accountability is one topic. The other main topic of this chapter is how the Internet is being used for the benefit of non-state actors with regard to their influence on US diplomacy, both traditional and public. Lastly, a conclusion chapter provides a synopsis of the study, the implications of the findings, and suggestions for further research.

The United States is in a position where it must realize both the benefits and the challenges the Internet poses to US diplomacy in the information age. It is essential for America to assess the current state of affairs and make any and all necessary adjustments in policy or institutional structure. It is the hope of this study to provide insight into the resultant and ongoing changes occurring in American diplomatic conduct that are linked to the existence of the Internet.
CHAPTER II
INFORMATION/COMMUNICATIONS TECHNOLOGIES & THE STATE DEPARTMENT

Having defined the Internet and what is meant by the Information Revolution in the introduction, it is important to place these concepts in a time frame. The first section of this chapter includes an overview of information and communications technologies in recent American diplomatic history, beginning with the telegraph and ending with the emergence of the Internet. How these innovations have impacted US diplomacy in its evolution to modern day status will be discussed.

The chapter’s second section addresses the overall notion of State Department reform, focusing in particular on reform involving ICTs. Often criticized for its slow adaptation to the latest technologies, State has had to refurbish its Information Technology (IT)\(^1\) department so as not to jeopardize its relevancy in the 21st century. To provide the reader with an understanding of how such a prestigious institution could face such a dilemma, I will describe the primary obstacles the Department has faced in this endeavor. Moreover, State’s agenda for modernization will be explicated, along with an overview of its IT programs.

The final section offers the most recent update on the status of State’s IT programs. For example, I discuss what systems are being upgraded, changed, or

\(^1\) Hereafter referred to as IT.
eliminated. The current status of the implementation and utilization of Internet applications at the State Department will be addressed in the final section.

BRIEF HISTORY UP TO THE INTERNET

US diplomacy exists on a continuum, but the Internet has only recently emerged on the scene. Thus, to understand the impact of the Internet on US diplomacy independent of other variables, it is necessary to chronicle the significant technological advances (preceding the Internet) and their principal contributions to the State Department and US diplomacy.

Not long ago, global communication was limited to personal and diplomatic contacts between national elites. In the pre-telegraphic era, news traveled by word of mouth, by letter, or by transported newspaper, all of which traveled slowly. The diffusion of information was thus subject to many encumbrances, including but not limited to time, distance, validity, and accessibility.

During the early days of classical diplomacy, when ICTs were still developing, diplomats had tremendous freedom in how they represented their country in negotiations with host officials. With little or no contact for sometimes years at a time, it was the Ambassador's responsibility to make many key decisions on behalf of his homeland. Consequently, limited communication between the Ambassadors and their countries resulted in 'gate-keeping,' a scenario where diplomats abroad acted as filters between the

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domestic and international environments. At the same time, foreign affairs officials at home controlled information and foreign policy issues regarding other nations.³

The essence of diplomatic process was forced to adapt as technological innovations allowed for more frequent and timely communication with regard to negotiating instructions and policy guidelines from the home capitals. The circumstances increasingly constrained the autonomy of ambassadors. It is not surprising then that diplomats have traditionally been wary of new technologies, as is evidenced by Lord Palmerston’s reaction to the first telegram he received: “My God, this is the end of diplomacy.”⁴

Preceding the Internet, five major ICT inventions, including the telegraph, telephone, radio, television, and computer, have had dramatic effects on US diplomacy. As time progressed, and each of these advances became available, diplomatic conduct was modified accordingly. Every contrivance had unique implications and forever changed the nature of political dealings.

Electric telegraphy was the first quantum leap in the transmission of information. The telegram offered, for the first time, a written record of diplomatic correspondence which, in effect, fundamentally changed diplomacy. Before the telegram, it was not uncommon to wait years for word from diplomats abroad. This is apparent in the famous letter to then Secretary of State James Madison from former President Thomas Jefferson

⁴ Stewart Elder, From Quill Pen to Satellite (London: European Program, Royal Institute of International Affairs, 1994), quoted in Dizard, Digital Diplomacy, 5.
in which he wrote: “We have not heard from our ambassador in Paris for two years. If we do not hear from him by the end of the year, let us write him a letter.”

Despite notable progress in telecommunications from Jefferson’s time in history, the State Department has been slow to adapt. The implementation of the telegraph into its system of communications was dilatory. In fact, twelve years passed after the first operating Morse telegraph network began before State employed a communications clerk. Moreover, telegraph connections with State’s overseas posts were not established for yet another ten years.

The late 1800s marked the advent of the telephone. Although diplomatic messages were carried by public telegraphing networks well into the twentieth century, the telephone soon became an essential nexus for diplomatic confabulation. Its ability to provide direct verbal contact between leaders further reduced the confines of geography. However, while the telephone and its capabilities both augmented and benefitted diplomatic intercommunication, they also encroached considerably more on the Ambassador’s role as a go-between.

In contrast, radio was not initially used for diplomatic efforts. Although it was being used heavily by the military, the radio was seen more as an outlet of communication for the benefit of the general public. It was not until the Axis powers started spreading anti-US propaganda that the State Department got more involved.

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In response to the occurrence of disinformation, America incorporated radio broadcasting, along with other tactics, to influence international public opinion. The (now former) United States Information Agency applied US strategic information policy in the coordination of Voice of America (VOA), a radio operation meant to reach foreign audiences. The ultimate goal was to create a climate of opinion in which American policies could be successfully formulated, executed, and accepted. Particularly during the Cold War, additional broadcasts such as Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty sought to achieve similar objectives. Using media channels to advance diplomatic ends is known today as 'public diplomacy,' a concept to be discussed in much greater detail later in this dissertation.

Like radio, television was initially considered to be primarily a novelty for non-diplomatic audiences. During the Vietnam war, however, it took on new meaning as pre-recorded video images brought the carnage and destruction of the crisis into American living rooms. Posthaste, foreign policy was no longer just a distant thought for those outside of 'The Beltway.' Instead, it quickly became a serious domestic concern.

Television continued to develop an even more sophisticated version of real-time events with satellite imagery. People could watch world affairs as they unfolded. One extraordinary by-product of satellite broadcasting is known as the ‘CNN Effect.’

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8 See Chapter IV for an expanded explanation of public diplomacy.
9 ‘The Beltway,’ in this instance, refers to the highway surrounding Washington, D.C.
10 CNN refers to the Cable News Network which is known for its instantaneous reporting of world crises. For more on the CNN Effect see: Warren P. Stroebel, *Late-breaking Foreign Policy: The News Media’s Influence on Peace Operations*.
whereas "attitudes of both diplomats and the public at large are thought to be heavily influenced by fast-breaking (and often misleading) coverage of international crises." This phenomenon originated first and foremost with regard to the Cable News Network, but can be applied to other satellite news stations.

The CNN Effect is demonstrated in the case of Moscow's Black Monday in 1993. CNN was observed by top officials as the events materialized:

[Deputy Secretary of State] Strobe Talbot was watching the Russian White House burn in the tumultuous events of September 1993, talking to a counterpart at the Russian Foreign Ministry, both of them watching CNN. For several minutes, these two top diplomats, who were charged with working out the crisis, instead watched television while they sat on a secure line saying absolutely nothing. This freeze-frame picture of their conversation makes starkly clear the intrusion of instant, global TV pictures into diplomacy.

Even today, CNN is consistently monitored around the world at various political and foreign affairs offices, including the State Department.


Dizard, Digital Diplomacy, 172.


Dizard, Digital Diplomacy, 106.

intelligence were just a few of the topics discussed in the eighty-eight page pamphlet. His efforts were marginalized, though, as the general consensus in the State Department at that time was that computers had insignificant worth in such a sophisticated domain as diplomacy.

Computerization remained on the periphery at State into the 1970s. Meanwhile, other foreign policy agencies began to take advantage of the new technologies. Government intelligence agencies and the Department of Defense (DOD) proceeded to restructure their systems around computers. Additionally, the private sector computerized its practices, leading to significant repercussions for international trade.

Once the decision was finally made to seriously utilize computers, the State Department purchased a whole fleet of Wang computers with the intention of standardizing operations. It ended up being a costly mistake, however, as Wang technology was soon obsolete and overtaken by new, more complex IBM and Apple products. This became a substantial problem when the State Department decided to further improve its communication facilities in the 1980s. Its goal of providing personal computers for personnel in Washington and at overseas postings was poignant and necessary, but one that was slowed by antiquated technology and budgetary restrictions. In the end, the Department did not have the means to replace the existing outmoded computers and hence fell considerably behind in technological adeptness and competence.

Well into the nineties, the State Department struggled with technological relevance and compatibility issues. Concerns about security safeguards and the ingrained culture of secrecy further complicated efforts for modernization. By the end of the
decade, however, plans were in effect to "complete a high-tech integrated global system, incorporating Internet facilities and other advanced technologies." ¹⁵

STATE DEPARTMENT REFORM

The United States Department of State is an information-intensive organization that collects, analyzes, communicates, and presents information in forms useful to its customers and stakeholders. ¹⁶ These information products are the basis for decisions concerning US foreign policy, not to mention America’s comportment in the international arena. Nowhere is this more apparent than in the conduct of diplomacy.

It follows then that diplomatic endeavors rely heavily on timely, accurate information. Furthermore, it is imperative that diplomats have the tools needed to analyze and communicate the information via both secure and open lines of communication. As discussed in the previous section, the Department has not kept up with current technologies and innovations that would allow for maximum effectiveness in achieving its diplomatic objectives. As a result, a number of documents and studies have emerged that target the deficiencies at State in this regard, as well as in other areas.

In a recent report, "Developing Diplomats for 2010: If Not Now, When?", Stephanie Smith Kinney interviewed scores of US Foreign Service officers of virtually all ranks. She asked them to assess the readiness of their establishment to meet the

¹⁶ Ibid, 1.
challenges of the near future. The consensus was that both the Department of State and the Foreign Service are "hollowed-out institutions" badly in need of renewal. Neither was believed to be prepared for the demands on American diplomacy foreseen between now and 2010.17

The concerns expressed by the officers Kinney interviewed echoed many of the issues addressed in recent studies on State Department reform conducted by the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), the Stimpson Center, the National Research Council, and the Department of State's Overseas Presence Advisory Panel (OPAP), to name a few. In sum, the reports suggest the Department needs to:

- reorganize its structure to deal with the rapidly changing agenda of global politics, i.e., to focus on the functional rather than the geographic issues confronting American diplomacy,
- revolutionize its use of technology both in terms of hardware and software to bring diplomacy fully into the information age,
- reform its decision-making processes so as to devolve authority and encourage creativity and openness; and
- revise its personnel policies in ways that reward creativity and encourage innovation.18

In addition to the above reports and their findings, in 2000, over fifteen hundred Foreign Service officers signed a letter addressed to the incoming Secretary of State

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(General Colin Powell, although it was unknown at the time who it would be) that was somewhat of a plea for restructuring. Its title is telling in itself - “SOS for DOS.” As concerned professionals of the Department of State, they felt their institution was ill-equipped and ill-prepared to be considered an adequately staffed and modernized organization. Here is an excerpt from the letter:

Today’s demands and tomorrow’s dilemmas require that we act now to fix the problem. We must craft a clear plan of action to modernize and renew our organization, procedures and infrastructure. We must transform our outdated culture and demonstrate a clear commitment to change. We must embrace new technology and managerial techniques quickly. We must acquire the modern systems and expertise required to integrate policy and resource management in ways that advance national interests and promote operational efficiency. We must train and develop a new generation of diplomats schooled in the use of twenty-first century tools. Above all, we must make a clear and compelling case for how we will use any new resources needed to underwrite and sustain a modernized and reinvigorated Department of State.19

Thus, in short, the overall situation at State is predominantly the result of three major problems - first, outdated equipment and procedures; next, chronic resource shortages in all areas; and lastly, the confining traditions of a covert culture. All three of these hindrances are quite evident in all of the Department’s Information Technology programs. As the focus of this dissertation involves the use of the Internet in US diplomatic conduct, it is important to examine the limitations of State’s IT programs in a historical context.

The ability to manage and master information technology will be vital if we are to successfully create and lead a diplomacy for the 21st century.

Marc Grossman, Under Secretary for Political Affairs

The United States Department of State is the nation’s oldest agency, of which it is very proud. It is also the last organization to have used obsolete Wang computers, removing the last ones as late as 1999. It is incomprehensible that such a prestigious establishment would be operating with some of the most antediluvian technology in the federal government. However, this was indeed the reality.

The Department’s Information Technology programs typically have been characterized by:

- **Decentralization**: Reflecting the Department’s geographically-dispersed operations, IT investments and activities have been decentralized.

- **Proprietary and Customized Solutions**: Until recently, the IT environment was supported by closed and custom technologies. While this addressed requirements of the 1980s and provided a relatively simple infrastructure, end-users were unable to capitalize on emerging technologies.

- **Dependence on an Outmoded Cable Process and Culture**: The formal messaging system still in use today is mired in obsolete technology and rigid formats, inhibits true information management, needlessly restricts critical information flows, and reduces the value of vital information assets.

- **Focus on Administrative Applications**: This focus reflects technology

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availability and the relative ease of supporting administrative and consular functions.

- **Cold War Networking and Security:** The Department’s IT infrastructure, like its international affairs operations, still reflects the rigid security and closed networking paradigms that were appropriate in the Cold War era. Network security must be strengthened while allowing diplomats ready access to the world’s information sources (i.e., the Internet).22

The hampering of State becoming a modernized, well-equipped foreign policy institution began, as mentioned previously, with the purchase of Wang technology around 1980, despite the fact that it was close to being outmoded. The limitations regarding its upgrading capabilities hindered State in its mission of placing a computer on the desk of every employee, stateside and overseas. In response, the department pursued the implementation of a digitally-integrated network called DOSTN - Department of State Telecommunications Network.23

Without DOSTN, the existing system featured six separate and incompatible circuits. DOSTN was intended to be accessible by foreign policy agencies in Washington, and was also to be independent of private networks and those of other governments.24 It was “designed as a high-speed secure network linking 273 locations at home and abroad.”25 This would have addressed serious communications problems, both intra-agency and interagency. Unfortunately, Congress was wary of approving funding

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25 Ibid.
for the unproven and untested technology, which consequently impeded the implementation of DOSTN.

Yet another attempt to update State's information capabilities took place in 1989. Ivan Selin was appointed as Undersecretary for Management and proceeded to develop the first integrated plan for upgrading all of State's information and communications facilities. The project was called the Foreign Affairs Information System or FAIS.26 However, Selin's progress was slowed as Congress again expressed grave concerns with regard to providing funding for untried technology. Additionally, the issue of network security safeguards for classified data caused unease. As a result of delayed development, eighty percent of state's classified networks, and an even higher percentage of the department's unclassified networks, were already passé by 1992.27

Also affecting decisions to provide the means for the application of advanced ICTs at State is the stark difference between the dynamics of the private sector versus the public sector. In the private sector, there is competition. Competition breeds progress in order to outdo and/or outlast the competitors. The private sector utilizes this competition, as well as the need to increase efficiency in business practices, to foster innovation and ingenuity. This, in effect, creates the need to continually incorporate IT advancements.28

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In contrast, the public sector, wherein lies the Department of State, does not experience the same pressures or feelings of urgency. The relative lack of competition in the public sector contributes to the phlegmatic approach with regard to technological adaptation. This is reflected in the State Department’s impassive implementation of IT, which is even further exacerbated by budgetary restrictions and internal cultural opposition.

The aforementioned internal culture is one of secrecy and is largely a result of Cold War politics. In the Cold War era, and beforehand, extreme measures were taken to protect sensitive information from getting into the wrong hands and compromising national security. Lines of communication were restricted and messages were encrypted and transmitted only via the most secure means. These precautions are still needfully practiced today, although the circumstances have shifted considerably.

At the root of the culture of secrecy quagmire is the resistance of senior Foreign Service and government officials pertaining to new technologies. They are apprehensive in part due to their Cold War background, as well as their general lack of understanding of and thus capability to utilize the innovations. People with this mind set are both more comfortable with and more trusting of existing modes of communication, despite the inefficiencies with regard to time and the limitations involving accessability and outreach. Moreover, changing the status quo could deem their knowledge and expertise extrinsic and their years of experience borderline irrelevant.

This covert and hierarchical control model for the conduct of diplomacy is an outdated paradigm and does not allow for transparency and openness, characteristics of
the new agenda for global politics in an increasingly interdependent world. In the words of Richard P. O'Neill, "The State Department needs to consider a cultural shift, one in which the technology-savvy, networking professional is regarded equally with those bearing the more traditional credentials of statecraft." Networking is overtaking hierarchy advancement and bureaucracy as a primary accelerate. Nonetheless, the State Department still has significant internal opposition to ICTs.

Furthermore, there are grave, legitimate security concerns regarding digital communications that involve classified information. It is not only Congress who does not trust untested technologies. To this day, the notion of a 'culture of sharing' is limited by the need for security, especially in terms of intelligence sharing.

Being guarded and cautious for security purposes is not a negative characteristic. In fact, for reasons of national security, it is imperative that information is protected appropriately. The problem arises when this approach hampers the technological capabilities of the State Department whereas the competence and efficiency of its operations suffer.

Despite these and other concerns, the State Department started to get its act

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29 Keith, telephone conversation.
31 "Reinventing Diplomacy in the Information Age," CSIS, 9 October 1998, 15-16. Project was directed by Barry Fulton and co-chaired by Richard Burt and Olin Robison. It is available online at www.csis.org/ics/dia/ (last accessed 14 July 2002).
32 Information Security issues will be addressed in Chapter III, in the section entitled Internet Security & Diplomacy.
together in the late 1990s. The most significant move was the 1998 consolidation of
management regarding its information resources into only one office - the Bureau of
Information Resources Management, which has its own Under Secretary of State. This
was particularly important because it finally accorded information management equal
status with politics and economics in State’s policy structure.

Additionally, Secretary of State Colin Powell was instrumental in upgrading the
department’s information facilities. Coming from the Department of Defense, he was
accustomed to having top-notch technology at his fingertips. When he arrived at State, he
realized a revamping was in order. He proceeded to pursue broad-based Internet access
for all State employees. In a speech to lawmakers in early 2001, he made this goal clear.
His words were as follows: “I want every employee in the Department of State, no matter
where they are located throughout the world, to have access to the Internet - access to the
power of the information revolution - so that they can get their jobs done in a more
efficient way.”

To achieve these goals, Secretary Powell, along with the Bush administration,
pushed for a dramatic increase in IT funding in the administration’s Fiscal Year 2002
budget. A total of $216 million was requested and approved for addressing ICT
concerns, a sum close to twice the FY 2001 amount. The money was to be part of a
two-year program aiming to provide all Department employees with Internet access from
their desks in addition to access to a network for classified computer communications.

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35 Ibid.
Furthermore, links to other government and foreign policy agencies, as well as private organizations with relevant databases, were planned.

STATE DEPARTMENT AND THE INTERNET - CURRENT STATUS

Our goal is to put the Internet in the service of diplomacy.

Secretary of State Colin Powell

The new cliche at State is ‘knowledge management,’ prompting the probationary opening of the Office of E-Diplomacy (M-eDIP) in August of 2002. The genesis for the office was based on the need to develop a digital collaboration zone with other Washington agencies involved in foreign affairs decisions. The “purpose, in government speak, is to implement the infrastructure needed to enable all agencies, regardless of their locations, to communicate and provide an interoperable platform for knowledge sharing.”

Gerald Gallucci, one of the officers assigned to M-eDIP, said in an interview that the office will be considered a task force for a period of a year to eighteen months. After that trial period, a decision will be made as to whether it shall be granted permanent status. In the meantime, M-eDIP will operate essentially as a ‘user office,’ aiming to

36 Secretary of State General Colin Powell, statement before the Senate Budget Committee, Washington, D.C., 12 February 2002.
37 Gerald Gallucci, phone conversation with author, 22 August, 2002. The Office of E-Diplomacy officially opened on 8 August, 2002. M-eDIP is the acronym used to refer to the Office of E-Diplomacy within the jurisdiction of the Undersecretary of State for Management.
provide user input for the IT branch at State with regard to the Department’s business requirements and overall interagency connectivity.

The office will focus first on how State does its internal business, examining digital communications and the likely need to legitimize E-mail and/or the Internet for diplomatic initiatives. M-eDIP will look to rationalize and facilitate a secure use of the Internet for interagency connectivity beyond the existing systems for the foreign affairs, homeland defense, and defense intelligence communities. Gallucci added that E-mail eventually could be used in the same way the phone is used now when officials want messages to be intercepted. When asked how the office will be used to address public diplomacy matters, Gallucci acknowledged the use of E-mail and the Internet for such initiatives, but noted it is not a primary focus for M-eDIP at this time. Those issues are being addressed by the Bureau of Cultural and Educational Affairs and the Office of the Under Secretary for Public Diplomacy.

At the present time, the State Department is transitioning toward having only two networks, down from its three-enclave system that necessitates the presence of three computers on any given desk for complete access and full connectivity. The two networks are to be unconnected and thus require either the use of two computers, or one with a switch box that can alternate back and forth. Ambassador Barbara Bodine likens this set-up to “playing an organ.”


40 Ambassador Barbara Bodine, phone conversation with author, 21 May 2002.
The classified system already in existence is C-LAN, meaning Classified Local Area Network. It is an internal State Department system, and operates as an Intranet or Ethernet.\footnote{An Intranet and Ethernet are essentially the same thing. Each is a local area networking protocol for connection, interaction, or communication between computers. A local area network, or LAN, is a limited access network linking two or more computers within an office, building, or organization.} C-LAN is encrypted, and connects State with its embassies and consulates.

An ongoing project called the Classified Connectivity Program (CCP) has State on track to install top-secret LANs at 250 overseas locations by December of 2003.\footnote{Wilson P. Dizard, III, “State Rolls on Secret LANs,” \textit{Government Computer News}, 22 July 2002.} The CCP LANs will replace the secure LANs, and their usage will be restricted to those with Top Secret clearances. Users will be able to send spreadsheets, PowerPoint presentations and documents to other secure LANs around the world. Additionally, CCP LANs will be connected to the Department of Defense’s classified network, the Secret IP Router Network (SIPRnet). SIPRnet allows “access to top-secret sites of the defense, intelligence and law enforcement communities.”\footnote{Ibid.}

The current unclassified network is like any other Internet server - state.gov - and encompasses both the State Department’s web page and its E-mail system. However, State is in the process of implementing a system for sensitive, but unclassified information called OpenNet Plus. The goal of the Department is to consolidate independent Internet access with State’s sensitive, but unclassified system. For embassies and consulates to maintain both independent as well as OpenNet Plus Internet

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\textsuperscript{41} An Intranet and Ethernet are essentially the same thing. Each is a local area networking protocol for connection, interaction, or communication between computers. A local area network, or LAN, is a limited access network linking two or more computers within an office, building, or organization.


\textsuperscript{43} Ibid.
connections is not economical, as separate connections could cost the department $1 million annually.\textsuperscript{44}

With OpenNet Plus, Internet access is still possible, but it is linked through Washington. This helps to counter threats of exposure to hackers, viruses and other security risks.\textsuperscript{45} By passing all data through a Washington-based data center, OpenNet Plus needs only one firewall. Otherwise, State would have to monitor as many as three hundred individual firewalls, a task that is neither necessary nor desirable.

State will always need more than one network. The reason for this is that it has to maintain an ‘airgap’ - complete lack of connectivity - between its secret network and its unclassified network. However, this minor inconvenience is a grand improvement when one considers State’s history of IT.

In addition to these networks, the State Department has deployed twelve different IT systems since the early 1990s. Barry Fulton’s report, “Leveraging Technology in the Service of Diplomacy,” is the only comprehensive publication regarding this information.

In the report, Fulton summarizes each of the twelve systems to illustrate how IT has been used to enhance diplomatic practices. Not one of these systems is utilized universally at State. In fact, most are familiar only to those user communities responsible for developing them. Of the twelve, ten involve web-based Internet technology. I shall briefly summarize these ten to show how Internet/Intranet applications are being used in this capacity.


The first project, Digital Video-Conferencing (DVC) was initiated in 1993, and has continued to expand since then. This technology uses the Internet to provide virtual face-to-face access to experts in the field of American diplomacy in support of public diplomacy objectives. While the majority of the time DVC is used for exchanges between an American diplomat and an international audience, the medium is being used for other diplomatic initiatives as well.

Since 1997, the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) Electronic Reading Room has been available on the State Department’s website. The Electronic Reading Room provides the public with Department records that are now declassified and thus available under the aforementioned FOIA. It receives over seventy thousand hits a day, indicating a legitimate public interest in State’s diplomatic endeavors.

After Kosovo was liberated, Internet connections were set up in Kosovo Refugee Centers in both the United States and Europe. This program, initiated in 1999 and running through 2001, was entitled the Kosovo Information Assistance Initiative (KIAI). Its purpose was to provide a means for families who had been separated by the war to communicate with and/or find each other, as well as to provide these individuals access to unrestricted world news and information.

1999 marked the year ChinaNet was implemented. This program involves web-based diplomatic and administrative applications designed to improve efficiency at the American Consulate General in Hong Kong. "Since the introduction of word processors

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47 Digital Video-Conferencing is addressed further in Chapter III.
49 Ibid, 19.
more than two decades ago, there are few documented examples of new information
technologies improving staff efficiency. The Hong Kong consulate is one of the
exceptions. The result has been the elimination of needless steps, a reduction in paper
use, and a much greater sharing of information.  

Two programs were implemented in 2000. The first was the Treaty Information
Portal (TIP). TIP provides a web-based classified portal that includes a number of
databases regarding all current arms control treaty records. This system allows
negotiators and analysts to access multiple databases at their convenience. The other
program, Worldwide Remote E-mail Network (WREN), provides secure, mobile, high-
speed Internet access for the Secretary of State during international travel.

The year 2001 marked the initiation of three more programs - two data bases, and
one knowledge management (KM) system. The Consular Consolidated Database (CCD)
"is a worldwide database of databases, consolidating data from every US consular office
in the world." It runs through State's sensitive but unclassified Intranet - OpenNet Plus.
The other database is entitled Worldwide Refugee Admissions Processing System
(WRAPS), and its purpose is to aid in the process of moving refugees to the United
States. The knowledge management system is called the Foreign Affairs Systems
Integration (FASI). It attempted to provide KM tools to all governmental agencies within
American embassies and consulates. However, in November of 2002, the Department

50 Ibid, 30.
52 Ibid, 28.
53 Ibid, 11.
54 Ibid, 15.
ended this program, and subsequently merged it with another messaging project called the
State Message Archive and Retrieval Toolset.56

The most recent project, Liquid State (Content Management System), was
initiated in 2002. Its purpose is to improve the availability of numerous existing
information services to the public, and to enrich the content of public diplomacy websites
and other related electronic products and print publications, including the Washington
File.57 Liquid State “is a concept, a procedure, and a process wherein producers focus on
the content rather than the product per se. Writers enter text into a web-based content
management system form which a variety of products - from print to electronic - can be
produced, depending on the public diplomacy requirements in different regions or
countries.”58

CONCLUSION

For many years, it was a losing battle for those who wanted to bring the latest
technologies into diplomacy and the State Department. “Now, we can link databases,
pinpoint locations, and share digital images. The marginal costs of transmitting


57 The Washington File is a daily multi-language product directed at foreign
publics to explain American foreign policy and American society. It consists of speeches,
texts, interviews, and summaries of US issues produced in regional editions in print and
web formats.

58 Fulton, “Leveraging Technology,”
information have dropped to near zero. Ten years ago, no one knew about the Internet. Today, it is a driving technology.\textsuperscript{59}

Developing the Office of E-Diplomacy, C-LANs, CCP LANs, OpenNet Plus, and web-based data bases are promising steps in a larger process of overall State Department reform as it continues to adapt to the realities of the Information Age. There are still tremendous challenges in the attempt to overhaul State’s information system. It is not something that will happen overnight and will likely take a considerable amount of time to come to fruition.

The important fact is that State is trying diligently to discard its reputation as the weak link in the national security chain as a result of structural shortcomings, cumbersome procedures, a culture of secrecy, and an antiquated ICT infrastructure. Changes being made will undoubtedly affect the Department’s organizational patterns. In the end, what is needed is a revitalized and modernized foreign affairs institution equipped with the latest and greatest technologies, along with the best-trained and well-prepared staff to carry out foreign policy in today’s world.

\textsuperscript{59} Ambassador J. Stapleton Roy, speech at the National War College/Northwestern University Symposium on Information Age Diplomacy, Washington, D.C., 5 April 2001.
CHAPTER III

DIPLOMATIC COMMUNICATION & THE INTERNET

Now there’s a level of proliferation of data, of information unlike anything that the human race has ever known. And in that context, to suggest that we’re going to have traditional Ambassadors in traditional embassies reporting to a traditional desk at the State Department, funneling information up through a traditional Assistant Secretary who will meet with a traditional Secretary strikes me as unimaginable. And of course, in the real world, it no longer works that way.¹

Newt Gingrich made the above comment more than five years ago when this state of affairs was an emerging reality. Today, it is an actuality. Advances in information and communications technology, particularly the Internet, have pushed diplomacy into an accelerated mode. E-mails and web sites have shrunk the world and transformed traditional diplomacy irrevocably.

In the first two chapters, we pored over this transformation of diplomacy from traditional to post-modern, and also surveyed the history of information and communications technologies in the State Department. The next three chapters constitute the analysis section of my dissertation. Propositions appertaining to how the Internet itself, independent of other ICTs, has impacted US diplomacy are organized according to issue-area, and the response results of the interviewees are introduced and examined. I shall present the first two propositions, and the accompanying findings, in this chapter.

The first proposition postulates that the Internet has contributed to an increase in the occurrence of diplomatic communication. When asked about this topic, the diplomats

¹ Speaker of the House, Newt Gingrich, during a speech at Georgetown University, 7 October 1997.
responded with a unanimous affirmative. Moreover, they stressed how the Internet (and E-mail) has not only magnified the incidence of exchange, but also has substantially altered diplomatic communications protocol.

Beyond the increase in the frequency of exchange, diplomats expounded upon additional effects of the Internet on diplomatic discourse. Some raised minor concerns regarding potential negative repercussions. Issues of security were highlighted as preventing a more rapid implementation of advanced digital communications systems.

The second proposition asserts that the number of in-person meetings among diplomats has decreased as a result of the Internet, yet has not devalued the importance of face-to-face diplomacy. Again, interviewees agreed with these averments. Special emphasis was placed on the belief that the need for in-person diplomatic contact may be intensifying, particularly in the wake of the September 11th attacks.

ANALYSIS OF PROPOSITION I

P1: The Internet has increased the frequency of diplomatic communication.

Historically, communication between Washington and the field has always faced certain obstacles of geography, time-zones, and the availability of reliable means. On this note, Ambassador Barbara Bodine shared her recollection of her posting while in the Iraqi capital: “When I was in Baghdad in the early 1980s, we were lucky if we could make phone contact with Washington once a week, and the calls were never secure. Saddam [Hussein]’s men listened to all calls. It was very hard to keep up to date, to discuss policy
or programs or anything else. There was a distinct feeling of being six feet beyond the edge of the earth.\textsuperscript{2}

Foreign Service Officer David Fredrick expounded upon his frustrations while in Yemen in the mid-80s. At that point in time, communication was extremely difficult as pouch mail was the only means of sending or receiving information. Often, the mail would be three to six weeks late, and was usually held up on purpose. With weekly and monthly phone calls from post to headquarters in Washington, they also had communication limitations based on unwelcome host-country listeners.\textsuperscript{3}

At present, the most widely used method of official communication is still the cable. The cable clearance process involves an infinite number of people. Sometimes it takes days by the time one achieves clearance. The more vital the policy, the longer it takes. Even unclassified cables have to be formatted exactly, cleared, referenced, numbered, and approved by the Deputy Chief of Mission. With the sets of layers involved, the physical transmission takes a significant amount of time.

FSO Bruce K. Byers recalls: "I remember the days when we used to have to type out cable telegrams on old IBM Selectric typewriters, using six-ply forms. One mistake, and six forms had to be corrected. The cable had to be cleared (they still do) through several levels of bureaucracy before an Ambassador would sign off and it could be transmitted."\textsuperscript{4}

While official cables, and their accompanying clearance procedure, still exist and

\textsuperscript{2} Ambassador Barbara Bodine, phone conversation with author, 21 May 2002.
\textsuperscript{3} FSO David Fredrick, phone conversation with author, 16 July 2002.
\textsuperscript{4} FSO Bruce K. Byers, phone conversation with author, 29 July 2002.
are very essential to the conduct of formal statecraft, diplomacy relies increasingly on faster mediums provided by the latest technologies. The most significant innovation to affect how diplomats are communicating is the Internet. It has interrupted long-standing communications protocol and procedures.

Diplomatic communication has always been very hierarchical. Specific rules exist for sending out any form of communication or document. For example, if you are a section-head, a subordinate officer’s send-out has to be approved. This is time consuming and often an unnecessary bureaucratic procedure.

Essentially, what the Internet has done is take the middle out of hierarchy. Networking has become pervasive. There is less hierarchy and more horizontal relationships. Routine unclassified information is now exchanged via E-mail. Diplomats simply e-mail whom they need to contact, when they need to contact them, and skip the formalities.

As a result, a lot of functions are no longer necessary. This has caused a great deal of reorganizing in foreign affairs bureaus. This compressing of the hierarchy has had a mostly positive impact, diplomats claim. For example, more people are involved at the grass roots level and time is not wasted on red tape, which allows FSOs to focus their energy on truly critical matters.

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5 Dr. James Rosenau, phone conversation with author, 3 August 2001.
6 FSO Mike Canning, phone conversation with author, 2 August 2002.
7 Byers, phone conversation.
Electronic communications, unclassified and classified, have had a profound impact on the way we do diplomacy.

Ambassador Barbara Bodine

As noted earlier, all interviewees were in agreement that the Internet has contributed to a dramatic increase in diplomatic communication. The question is, how exactly has this occurred? The answer is, predominantly via E-mail.

‘E-mail’ is short for Electronic mail. It is defined as “correspondence or data transmitted either over computer telephone lines, or digitally.” To send digital data is to send information recorded according to a system of numbers, as binary for the computer.

Interviewees noted that they start each day going through queues of E-mails and electronically-distributed telegrams, rather than stacks of paper. FSO Rosie Hansen commented on E-mail and her job as follows: “E-mail has affected my job the most. It has changed my entire way of working. I spend much of my time each day engaged in writing and answering E-mails. That is, in fact, how a large percentage of my work gets done.”

Describing how it has simplified the often insipid tasks of daily business practices, FSO Sheldon Austin commented, “Instant communication has made diplomacy

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8 Bodine, phone conversation.
10 ‘Digital’ means to be represented by a distinct value, as the 0 or 1 of a binary computer system.
easier. In the business of conducting high-level issues, I think we take advantage of the ease of E-mail to organize, propose and ultimately resolve issues and high-level meetings for the principle policy makers. Internally, it is often easier to do business this way."\textsuperscript{12}

While both E-mail and the electronic distribution of telegrams/cables are relatively new, many interviewees acknowledged the reality that it is hard to imagine how they survived before. For example, before E-mail, one would have to call up twenty-five or more people in key positions and talk to them personally. Or, one would need to at least send faxes to each individual. Turnaround time was slow, even with faxes.

With its ability to send information to an unlimited number of recipients at the touch of a button, E-mail has greatly accelerated this process. Moreover, with electronic mail, one can bypass the approval chain and save valuable time. This has eased communications drawbacks substantially.

Ambassador Bodine noted the dual effect of the Internet on this capacity. On one hand, she said it simplifies procedures because of its efficiency and reach. One can send information to an unlimited number of addressees, which in turn maximizes the number of people who can receive the same information at the same time, unfiltered or garbled. This makes coordination much easier.

On the other hand, it complicates for the very same reason. Far more people than before believe they should be in on an issue and, with E-mail, it is hard to keep them out. E-mails can be forwarded well beyond the intent of the original sender. With this latitude

\begin{footnote}{12} FSO Sheldon Austin, phone conversation with author, 5 June 2002.\end{footnote}
and lack of restriction, the Ambassador carped, “You also end up with far too many people trying to tell you what to do!”\textsuperscript{13}

Diplomats stressed it is critical to understand that E-mails are not action messages. No formal clearance process exists to send one. They are only for information exchange and are never considered official documents. The same parameters exist with the telephone, as phone conversations do not represent official communiques. However, due to the massive outreach capabilities of E-mail, the identical complications typically associated with the telephone are extended “to the nth degree.”\textsuperscript{14}

Furthermore, there is the potentiality that the tone and content of an E-mail can be misinterpreted.\textsuperscript{15} It certainly looks more formal than it actually is. In the words of FSO David Fredrick, “The truth of the matter is that the Internet and E-mail are not exactly kosher.”\textsuperscript{16}

Ambassador Laurilee Peters commented that E-mail is “one-person, informal, and individual,” whereas a cable is “official and collective.”\textsuperscript{17} She continued, “You can e-mail all you like. Reality is still a cable!”\textsuperscript{18} E-mail messages move information faster and leap time zones around the globe, but, as the Ambassador said, they are informal. The bottom line in any official decision has to be communicated by official cable channels through the State Department.\textsuperscript{19}

\begin{itemize}
  \item\textsuperscript{13} Bodine, phone conversation.
  \item\textsuperscript{14} Ambassador Laurilee Peters, phone conversation with author, 6 July 2001.
  \item\textsuperscript{15} Fredrick, phone conversation.
  \item\textsuperscript{16} Ibid.
  \item\textsuperscript{17} Peters, phone conversation.
  \item\textsuperscript{18} Ibid.
  \item\textsuperscript{19} FSO Dudley Sims, phone conversation with author, 22 May 2002.
\end{itemize}
COMMUNICATION BETWEEN WASHINGTON AND POSTS

When the use of the Internet became increasingly widespread at US diplomatic posts abroad, the primary use of this technology was as a means for unclassified E-mail between the many overseas posts and Washington. This has greatly facilitated and accelerated communications, but it has also created new lines of communication that have become 'squiggly.'\(^{20}\) That is, in the pre-E-mail days, there tended to be two-way communications between field posts and Washington and seldom among overseas posts, except for administrative issues. E-mail changed that and also made the long-standing official cable almost a relic, even though the official cable remains the communication of record to this day.\(^{21}\)

E-mail, as an adjunct of the Internet, has changed the speed and nature of how officers in the field and in Washington communicate with each other.\(^{22}\) Telegrams take a long time to type and slow the transmission of information to a significant degree. The Internet's digital abilities allow for faster, better, and more frequent and consistent communication between posts and the capital. With the nagging difficulties involving time differences and 'phone tag,' diplomats exclaimed that it would be extremely difficult to be as efficient in their daily routines without it.

Eventually, the State Department developed a classified Ethernet.\(^{23}\) It is still

\(^{20}\) Byers, phone conversation.

\(^{21}\) Ibid.

\(^{22}\) Canning, phone conversation.

\(^{23}\) An Ethernet (also known as an Intranet) is a local area networking protocol for connection and interaction or communication between computers. This is similar to Local Area Network (LAN), which consists of two or more computers that are linked within an office or a building to share programs, data, output devices, etc.

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somewhat cumbersome, as it is using Wang software and running on outdated computers. However, it has afforded diplomats the opportunity to communicate virtually instantaneously with Washington, either classified or unclassified, with the understanding that there may be up to twelve hours in time differences and different work weeks.

FSOs can pass information informally and quickly and work out problems before they get serious. If one is at a post with a very different time zone, E-mails are sent to Washington with questions and comments during that day. Washington would receive them at their opening of business, work the answers/responses during their work day, and then have them back to posts by the opening of business the next day.24

This was an extremely significant development. It allowed for more consistent and regular communication between Washington and posts, which in the world of diplomacy is critical. Sending a cable can take up to a day or two. Additionally, “when you send cables, you are often not sure who reads them. E-mail, unclassified and classified, has changed this.”25

With advancements come expectations. Electronic mail is immediate. Thus, the consequent obligation of posts is to keep Washington abreast instantaneously.

One example of how E-mail is being used for consistent updating is currently occurring at posts in India. The FSOs are preparing a weekly newsletter via E-mail that is sent to over three hundred readers in the United States. It is broken down into focus

24 Bodine, phone conversation.
points, and includes reporting from the local press. This is being done in addition to the reports and communiques those posts must send to non-US readers.

This is not unique to posts in India. Other American posts around the world are preparing similar reports, newsletters, and updates for Washington on a constant basis. Depending on the post - particularly in areas of conflict or potential conflict - updates may be expected and/or required every few hours.

What this also means is that diplomats spend an enormous amount of their time keeping Washington up to speed. In the past, according to FSO Steve Browning, diplomats were "slower, more measured, calculated, and conservative when sending information to Washington. That luxury is gone. Now, analysis is sent, and is expected to be sent, immediately. Because of the rush and the expectation of immediacy, the information may indeed be less thoroughly analyzed in the end."

This increase in dialogue has also made possible more direct out-of-channel communication, which can bypass elements in the chain of command. This undercurrent of E-mail exchange is called 'back-channeling.' It is a method of informal diplomatic communication and is easier, somewhat more secure, and therefore far more frequent now than before. FSO J. Michael Houlanan believes "this is a good thing and is useful."

In the early days of the Internet, back-channeling was being used to communicate

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26 Ibid.
27 FSO Milan Sturgis, phone conversation with author, 7 May 2002.
with foreign ministries without clearing anything through State Department channels.\textsuperscript{30} It was, and still is, a popular form of whistle-blowing in the attempt to influence a decision while circumventing the desk that does not agree. Because of E-mail, it is much easier to do.

It is important to note that the extent of increase in diplomatic communication depends on geographic region and infrastructure.\textsuperscript{31} Some posts do not have the facilities, the technology, or the personnel to operate in real-time or near real-time.\textsuperscript{32} While the ultimate goal of the State Department is to ensure Internet capabilities at all embassies and consulates, achieving this objective is circumscribed by local and regional limitations. Nonetheless, it has been established that where Internet access is attainable, the frequency of diplomatic communication have unquestionably increased.

PROS AND CONS

This new technology is a mixed blessing, but still a blessing.  

Ambassador Barbara Bodine\textsuperscript{33}

As with any new innovative technology, there is an adjustment period. During that time, the advantages and disadvantages become clear. It is a necessary process of acclimatization and cannot be avoided.

\textsuperscript{30} Dr. Wilson Dizard, Jr., phone conversation with author, 1 August 2002.
\textsuperscript{31} Sturgis, phone conversation.
\textsuperscript{32} "Real-time" is a term signifying instantaneousness. There is no 'lag time' involved. For example, when one sends an E-mail, it immediately is received by the recipient(s). Little or no time delay is involved. Therefore, E-mail is a form of real-time communication.
\textsuperscript{33} Bodine, phone conversation.
One of the ways the Internet has simplified the job of diplomats is its capabilities for data searching. Internet communication, by E-mail, and the ability to search for information from countless web sites, expands the ability of diplomats to gather and compare information on a country's given policies or actions. With the expectations of keeping Washington informed, FSOs at embassies read the daily press and submit media reaction reports that are edited in Washington for dissemination among key State Department, White House and other United States Government (USG) offices.34

These reports present brief headlines and descriptions of the way the media in different countries are reacting to US policy decisions. With the overflow of information available now, especially on the Internet, as well as the transnationalization of the foreign policy agenda, it has become more and more important to keep Washington informed of host-country domestic opinion.35 Reports provide the official Washington reader with a quick overview of media opinion on a 'watch list' of issues which every embassy covers.

At the same time, diplomats are preparing statements on US policy, recent comments by State Department officials, and other USG concerns. These reports are then made available to host-country media and officials, as well as a select list of non-governmental organizations and other non-state actors the US desires to keep informed.36 The Internet's digital commodities extend, in terms of functional bureaus, to those who have to work with other government agencies as well. FSO Bruce K. Byers remarked on the recent improvement in the availability of information for FSOs: "There was a sheer

34 Austin, phone conversation.
35 The importance of host-country domestic opinion will be explored more completely in Chapter IV, which addresses Public Diplomacy, among other topics.
36 Dr. Barry Fulton, phone conversation with author, 12 September 2002.
communication problem prior to the Internet. Before, you couldn’t access or share what a particular State Department spokesperson had said. Transcripts were not available until at least twenty-four hours after the fact. Now, the Department’s web site has it right away.\textsuperscript{37}

Another advantage of using the Internet and E-mail in diplomatic communications is cost containment. Communications have been at the speed of light for a while, but they are only now very affordable. While there were expenses incurred in buying the computers, software, and other technology needed for digital communications capabilities, the end result is beneficial for State’s perpetually-tight budget. For example, the use of E-mail has resulted in significantly fewer telephone calls, which has saved a significant amount of money. E-mail is approximately the equivalent of a phone call, except it is less costly and more informal in the formal hybrid.\textsuperscript{38}

FSO Dudley Sims has worked at a number of African posts. He saw first-hand the benefits of E-mail:

\begin{quote}
We save a fortune by using E-mail as much as we do. At some embassies, you are not charged local telephone fees. However, at most, that is not the case. For example, from Tanzania, it cost $7.01 a minute (in 2001), plus American charges, to speak on the phone. It is exorbitant! Then you consider the fact that E-mail is free. This is where digital saves money. You can communicate with DC without having to pay.\textsuperscript{39}
\end{quote}

On the down side, concerns have arisen with regard to the authenticity of messages sent and the recording of official communications. All cables are archived. However, E-mail does not create the sort of permanent, retrievable storage system that

\textsuperscript{37} Byers, phone conversation.
\textsuperscript{38} FSO John Salazar, phone conversation with author, 30 May 2002.
\textsuperscript{39} Sims, phone conversation.
traditional telegraphic communication does. For that reason, policy decisions cannot be made or transmitted through E-mail, but must still be done in normal telegraphic channels, such as the cable system. Recipients of E-mails should never consider their content to be the official line.

Technically, all E-mail is supposed to be filed and archived for documentation and security purposes. However, this is not what is transpiring. The lack of priority and sheer oversight with regard to filing Electronic mail could result in key information becoming lost in cyberspace, unless individuals are keeping personal files themselves.40 Ambassador J. Stapleton Roy commented that the filing of every E-mail “is impossible to enforce, even though it is supposedly a regulation. They have become a substitute for the telephone, which has similar drawbacks, but to a lesser degree.”41

Historically, diplomatic communications data and documents have been recorded and archived. With the expanded use of the Internet and E-mail, many of those documents aren’t kept on record. People are not cognizant or are simply disregarding the fact that everything is subject to the Freedom of Information Act.42

This lack of documentation is not a positive outcome of the utilization of digital communications. Before, there was an assurance that one could access State’s archives to find a former treaty or such. Today, there is no guarantee that information has been

40 Canning, phone conversation.
41 Interview with Ambassador J. Stapleton Roy, phone conversation with author, 19 August 2002.
42 Dando, phone conversation.
recorded. "Historians will struggle with this. They can't look at letters or pictures for a lot of the communication occurring these days."43

To address these and other concerns, interviewees strongly urged the development of a more formal and authoritative E-mail protocol for the Department of State. Stricter guidelines are needed to structure the propriety for Electronic mail, much like the rules that have emerged for cell phone etiquette in movie theaters, restaurants, and cars. There is always a social adaptation to new technology.

The government is diligently working toward a common system for recording digital communications.44 In the meantime, despite the advantages of back-channeling and instant access outside of the hierarchical chain, the use of E-mail, in the words of Ambassador Bodine, "has gotten a little out of control. Although it is a good way of communicating, sometimes it's too easy to press the SEND button. People can and should be reprimanded for noncompliance. There is too much at stake. In a way, the old system was cumbersome, but it was recorded."45

Lastly, a number of FSOs, particularly former USIA officers who continue to work in public diplomacy, made the comment that the Internet has allowed for a lack of personal communication for those who prefer minimum human interaction. Because it is both possible and acceptable to send an E-mail vice a phone call, in effect, one can literally avoid people. Phone calls can be reserved for the instances where it is essential

43 Ibid.
44 Fulton, phone conversation.
45 Bodine, phone conversation.
to hear the nuances in the person’s voice, or when it is desirable not to leave a paper trail.46

Public diplomacy officers have typically done their jobs under the pretense that the more human interaction, the better. While the major benefits of the Internet and public diplomacy will be discussed in Chapter IV, I will mention here that public diplomacy officers found the intentional substitution of digital exchanges versus personal exchanges to be a flaw in the conduct of diplomatic communications. Although this is not seen as a significantly detrimental repercussion, it is viewed by many as an unfortunate by-product.

In this section, it has been established that there has been a steady rise in diplomatic communications via the Web, along with fewer phone calls. Telephone communication has basically been replaced by E-mail. What are the repercussions, however, for in-person diplomatic encounters? The next section will review the responses to this concept.

ANALYSIS OF PROPOSITION II

P2: The existence of the Internet has decreased the actual number of live diplomatic meetings held, yet it has not reduced the importance of in-person, face-to-face diplomacy.

When presented with this proposition, the consensus of the interviewees was that the Internet and E-mail have, in point of fact, contributed to a decrease in the number of face-to-face contacts for diplomats. The ability to reach an enormous number of people

46 Houlanan, phone conversation.
with one E-mail has both simplified and expedited the typically tedious process of sharing pertinent information. Diplomats are able to reach a conclusion that was previously decided in a meeting by simply communicating digitally about the issue. This has fostered much more efficient organization. Consequently, sundry routine meetings, such as lunch meetings, have become unnecessary and often eliminated.  

Furthermore, other advancements in Internet communications technology, such as video-conferencing, are beginning to play a larger role in reducing the need for a physical presence. Video-conferencing is "Jetson-like" in that it allows live interaction with other individuals via a screen. While not physically in the same room, a certain amount of human interaction is involved that is above and beyond just an audio exchange, such as a phone call. One is not only hearing a voice or voices, but peoples' reactions, facial expressions, and demeanor are apparent.

Video-conferencing integrates multipoint video, voice and gateway conferencing with web collaboration on a single platform. By simply using a personal computer to access the Internet (or Intranet or Ethernet), along with a sound card, microphone, and speakers, one can collaborate in real-time and hold face-to-face conversations. With

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47 Sturgis, phone conversation.
48 "Jetson-like" refers to the popular cartoon, The Jetsons. On the show, individuals could speak directly to each other while viewing one another on a screen. Video-conferencing offers the same type of interaction.
49 The video tool needed for video-conferencing is a real-time, multi-media application based on the Draft Internet Standard called Real-time Transport Protocol (RTP). It is designed with a flexible and extensive architecture to support heterogeneous environments and configurations. For example, in high bandwidth settings, multi-megabit full-motion JPEG streams can be sourced using hardware assisted compression, while in low bandwidth environments like the Internet, aggressive low bit-rate coding can be carried out in software. Separate applications are needed for audio, whiteboard, and session control tools.
multipoint data conferencing, it is also possible to share information from one or more applications on the computer, exchange graphics, draw diagrams, and record meeting notes. Likewise, during a meeting, one can send files or documents to other meeting participants using the binary file transfer capability.

In essence, this technology categorically simulates in-person communication. The Department of Defense, government intelligence agencies, and corporations have been capitalizing on the benefits of video-conferencing since its inception. American diplomacy perpetually lags behind the rest of US society in adopting new electronic practices for reasons stated earlier.\(^\text{50}\) In this case, the State Department is slowly easing into this form of communication as a primary method. Nonetheless, a rising number of diplomatic meetings have been conducted in this manner in lieu of in person. Thus, this technology is indeed gradually abating the incidence of live diplomatic assembly.

A few FSOs felt that cost containment has also reduced the incidence of out-of-town meetings. Budget constraints have placed certain limitations on diplomatic travel. For example, when dealing with matters of lesser importance, fewer people may be sent to attend a meeting or conference. Moreover, fewer meetings are being held in person in circumstances where decisions can be made by a more affordable means of non-live communication. However, this factor was believed to be minimal in comparison to web-based and digital technologies.

In the end, it has been shown that a corollary of new Internet capabilities is a decrease in the number of diplomatic meetings. The Internet has become an important

\(^{50}\) See Chapter II regarding the State Department and ICTs. Also, see Dizard, *Digital Diplomacy*, 2.
tool for constituency-building, and has thus played a part in this adjustment of diplomatic conduct. As technologies continue to improve, and State's implementation of new innovations progresses, it is likely that the decline in the frequency of face-to-face diplomatic meetings will abide.

IMPORTANCE OF FACE-TO-FACE DIPLOMACY

What really counts is the 'last three feet' of diplomacy.

FSO Bruce Gregory

Fewer in-person diplomatic meetings are occurring. Does this mean that the importance of face-to-face contact is also declining? Each and every one of the interviewees responded with an adamant, "No!" FSO Dave Fredrick contends that human presence is a permanent element. For him, it is still the heart of diplomacy. There is a buffering that can only occur in face-to-face relationships.

Ambassador J. Stapleton Roy spoke to this matter at a conference on Information Age Diplomacy. He believes that "personal trust is best developed through personal contact - not through the telephone or television. Governments will still need on-the-ground assessment. Although some assessment can be achieved remotely, one thing we are learning is that video images can give you a highly distorted view of what is going on."

Retired FSO and author Wilson Dizard continues on this note when he writes that "machines cannot replicate the essential personal skills of diplomacy, particularly what

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51 Interview with Bruce Gregory, phone conversation with author, 9 August 2002.
52 Fredrick, phone conversation.
53 Roy, speech at the Symposium on Information Age Diplomacy.
British diplomat Harold Nicolson has defined as moral precision, the willingness to confront foreign policy realities directly and with conviction.  

When considering digital communications, in comparison to such entities as the telephone, all agreed that the need for personal contact will not be eliminated by the new virtual relationships. The Internet can be utilized by government officials, local academics, businesses, the media, NGOs, or whomever, to pass on information and resolve simple issues. However, diplomacy still requires “face time.” The Internet is strictly an extra-added-value to this irreplaceable face time. The point was made clear by the interviewees that it does not, and cannot, replace the need for human contact.

This chapter has thus far shown that the Internet and its capabilities has enhanced diplomatic communications, as well as increased their occurrence. Literally countless institutions in countries around the world maintain web sites and post information. This makes it possible for diplomats to access a wealth of information in order to learn about any given issue or problem. It is important to note, however, that the use of the Internet for this purpose is but one tool of many that diplomats employ in dealing with issues. “The most significant tool has always been the personal contact in the language of the host country. Nothing beats this. Not the Internet or E-mail or any other impersonal contact.”

Two main causes were cited when FSO J. Michael Houlahan acceded to the reduced instance of face-to-face diplomacy - the ease and speed of electronic communications.

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54 Dizard, Digital Diplomacy, p. 2.
55 Austin, phone conversation.
56 Byers, phone conversation.
communications, and the shift of decision-making to Washington.\textsuperscript{57} Nonetheless, "there will be no such thing as remote-control diplomacy. We will continue to need diplomats on the pavements, talking to all sorts of people in foreign countries and analyzing the significance of what they have learned."\textsuperscript{58}

One cannot dispute the distinct advantages of face-to-face diplomacy. There is the occasion to read body language and voice inflection. This is critical in order to assess more accurately the competency and sincerity of the interlocutor, which is particularly useful if he or she is a real player in policy formulation or implementation.\textsuperscript{59} Additionally, it offers an opportunity to develop a more personal relationship with your interlocutor, which may result in eliciting more information and/or better cooperation.\textsuperscript{60}

In diplomacy, you are by definition dealing with matters of discussion-dispute-disagreement or the like, and they will always be done better in person.\textsuperscript{61} Person to person diplomacy is what people remember more and are more affected by. "You can never replace the last three feet."\textsuperscript{62}

There is a fear that virtual connectivity is less effective than face-to-face interactions. But, it doesn't have to be either/or. The virtual supplements the personal. You can "have a drink together, and then follow-up with an E-mail. We need both in-person and digital exchanges. They don't trump each other."\textsuperscript{63}

\textsuperscript{57} Houlahan, phone conversation. The first component was addressed in the previous section. The second will be covered in Chapter VI.
\textsuperscript{58} The Foreign Service in 2008, 6.
\textsuperscript{59} Houlahan, phone conversation.
\textsuperscript{60} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{61} Bodine, phone conversation.
\textsuperscript{62} FSO Anne Grimes, phone conversation with author, 16 July 2002.
\textsuperscript{63} Gregory, phone conversation.
E-mail is sometimes used when face-to-face confrontation can be unpleasant and ugly among colleagues, added FSO Jacqueline Briggs. What may sometimes happen, though, is that folks rely on Internet communications to their detriment when they should be having in-person, firsthand communications. The Internet helps you find people and keep in touch with them more regularly. Notwithstanding, face-to-face diplomacy will never be replaced. Diplomacy still comes down to people to people.

INTERNET SECURITY AND DIPLOMACY

We have let the security cart get ahead of the technology horse.

Ambassador J. Stapleton Roy

Security of information has always been a top priority in diplomatic communications. Extreme measures have been taken to protect vital issues of national security, as well as other sensitive documents. Encryption and/or coding systems have been used since the first days of the telegraph.

Modern devices disregard human borders. With digital communications, such as the Internet, it is practically impossible to contain or control the flow of information anywhere in the world. China has tried, as has Saudi Arabia, among others. In a non-democratic context, the attempts to control this flow have mostly failed. Soon it will

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65 Hansen, phone conversation.
66 Ibid.
67 Roy, speech at the Information Age Diplomacy Symposium.
68 Mr. Jean Gazarian, phone conversation with author, 29 May 2002.
69 Dr. Michael Schneider, phone conversation with author, 21 August 2002.
become more apparent that openness is the only way to be a part of global economics and global trading.\(^7\)

This point aside, what is unmistakable is that information transmitted via the Internet is very vulnerable. In addition, the protection of provisions for confidentiality, secrecy, and intellectual property rights is an onerous endeavor.\(^7\) Hence, considering the State Department's infamous culture of secrecy, it is not surprising that State has resisted using digitally-based technologies to transmit classified or sensitive items.

Under the circumstances, how can diplomats send secure communications over a not-so-secure channel? Communication on the Internet requires both network security and information security, with information security taking priority. M.A. Rahimi lists three basic issues in Internet security:

- maintaining the confidentiality of information and control of its distribution;
- guaranteeing the integrity of the information; and
- authenticating and accurately identifying the source of the information.\(^7\)

To achieve these goals requires both an understanding of security needs and technological knowledge. Proverbially, this has been a problem. This is what Ambassador J. Stapleton Roy is referring to when he talks of allowing the security cart [to] get ahead of the technology horse. He maintains that "it is rare that the security

\(^7\) Houlahan, phone conversation.
\(^7\) Byers, phone conversation.
people understand the technology [itself]. There is a gap between those who use and those who develop technologies. Experts in technology are not responsive to the needs of users, and users do not know how to ask for what they need. Consequently, rules are made that often make no sense in terms of real security."73 Furthermore, the older generation of senior FSOs has the power, but lacks the willingness to use new technologies.

A unique complication engendered by this technology is electronic espionage. It is conducted against the United States by both friend and foe, so new concerns are raised about electronic intercepts and hacking into computer systems. There are more and more hackers and worms flexing their muscles. Moreover, moles exist in all the governmental agencies - the CIA, the FBI, the State Department, and beyond.

Fears are likewise compounded by communications carelessness on the part of many Foreign Service personnel. One example of this is the drafting of classified correspondence on insecure computer terminals at work or at home.74 Also, there have been several instances of laptops used for classified work disappearing.75

Feeling constrained by security concerns, the government has been unable to develop gradations of security. For them, it's all or nothing. Thus, the Internet has been used primarily for non-secure, unclassified documents and information. Internet computers are completely separate from classified hardware.76

For classified items, State has developed its own Ethernet and Intranets. These

73 Roy, speech at the Information Age Diplomacy Symposium.
74 Houlahan, phone conversation.
75 Ibid.
76 FSO Gerald Gallucci, phone conversation with author, 22 August 2002.
systems provide a means for classified information to be communicated within each system. However, none of them are interconnected. Thus, it is not uncommon for high-level State Department officials to have up to three computers on their desks in order to access each individual system.

According to Dr. Barry Fulton, the Australians and Canadians - not to mention private industry, especially large corporations - are ahead of the United States in some ways, particularly in digital communications.77 Ambassador Roy finds the state of affairs antiquated and somewhat embarrassing: "We should be using encrypted E-mail by now, with codes that are valid for one week, for example, before changing. It is practical for information exchange that is not at the top level of sensitivity. For routine information exchange, we need sufficient means. At this level of sensitivity, it wouldn't even justify tampering or hacking!"78

While secure communication is a legitimate concern, it need not restrict or eliminate the use of the Internet. Universities, corporations, the US military, and government intelligence agencies also have strong interests in protecting proprietary information. All have embraced new information technologies without compromising their missions.79

One of the ways they are accomplishing this is by using end-to-end secure virtual private networks (VPNs) on the Internet. The accompanying software identifies the users and permits appropriate web-access to secure information. VPN is less expensive, more

77 Fulton, phone conversation.
78 Roy, speech at the Information Age Diplomacy Symposium.
79 Rahimi, paper presentation at the Information Age Diplomacy Symposium.
secure, and more efficient than using special modem pools, or specialized networks for extending the Intranet to widely-distributed user communities.  

M. A. Rahimi claims that absolute security could exist in the sense that “the probability of finding a key to a security algorithm is one in many trillions. Time is on the side of secure systems given the length of time it takes to do the mathematical calculations necessary to find a key. The military, banks, and the FBI do not seem [worried about] using commercial technologies. Why should the Department of State?”

What is critical for the Department to realize is that not having information can be riskier than losing control of the information. Implementing sophisticated security systems to encrypt and protect all communication over the Internet must be a priority. It is important for interagency coordination. And, it is crucial that State’s missions abroad are in total contact with Washington in a secure mode, as not every post has secure connections. Dr. Fulton felt confident that State is on the right track. He predicts that around mid-year of 2004, the Internet will be routinely used for classified communiques.

CONCLUSION

Both propositions explored in this chapter have been substantiated. Interviewees acknowledged the tremendous increase of diplomatic communications via the Internet,

80 Ibid.
81 Ibid.
82 John Schall, speech at the National War College/Northwestern University Symposium on Information Age Diplomacy, Washington D.C., 6 April 2001.
83 Sturgis, phone conversation.
84 Fulton, phone conversation.
State's Ethernet, and E-mail. With the exceptional efficiency of information transmission in all its forms has come an overload of data, the involvement of nonessential individuals, greater expectations of updating Washington, a lack of recording and filing, and some loss of personal outreach. At the same time, diplomats enjoy the speed and low cost of communications, unlimited access to information for data searching and the compiling of reports, the ability to sidestep hierarchical approval procedures, and the advantages of back-channeling.

The Foreign Service officers also stated fervently that face-to-face diplomacy remains critically important. Its importance is no less than before, despite the decrease in the number of meetings. With the flood of data available, and much of it inaccurate or at least misleading, the Foreign Service officers interviewed contend that the need to work issues face-to-face is not only still important, but also has increased tremendously. Moreover, the events of September 11\textsuperscript{th} have intensified the need for personal interaction with other cultures, societies, and countries. Never before has our public diplomacy effort been so crucial.

To successfully achieve diplomatic objectives in the 21\textsuperscript{st} century, it is imperative that the State Department meets the requirements of Internet security. Designing and implementing a system that ensures the secure transmission of digital communications will significantly improve the efficiency of diplomatic endeavors. To continue to rely on slower, hierarchical methods is to cripple the efforts of the Department and its Foreign Service personnel.

Overall, the change in diplomatic communication with the advent of the Internet has been profound. Diplomats can move information much faster, post it on web sites for
general access, and share information on key international issues among our embassies
and consulates in real-time or near real-time. If we remember that pre-anything,
diplomats were out on their own going weeks, months, or sometimes longer with no
instructions and no communication with their capitals, the transformation is clear.
CHAPTER IV

PUBLIC DIPLOMACY AND THE INTERNET

Nowhere in diplomacy has the impact of Internet-based technology been greater than in public diplomacy and public affairs - arenas that in traditional diplomatic practice were regarded as peripheral.

Howard Cincotta, “Post-Modern Diplomacy and the New Media”

It has been established earlier in this work that globalization and the rise both in interdependence and transnationalism have redefined the foreign policy agendas of governments. Traditional bilateral relations remain, yet they are complemented by a growing number of transnational and multilateral relationships. These trends are augmented by the exponential growth of the Internet and its subsidiaries, such as E-mail and Ethernets.

With new foreign policy objectives comes a new approach to diplomacy. The impact of the Internet on US diplomacy, the front line of US foreign policy, is the focus of this dissertation. There are, however, different branches of diplomacy, and the Internet has affected each distinctly. This chapter will examine the category of diplomacy known as 'Public Diplomacy.'

To set the stage for today’s version of public diplomacy, a background of the former United States Information Agency will be recapped, including its eventual merger with the State Department in October of 1999. Next, an analysis of the proposition

1 Cincotta, “Post-Modern Diplomacy,” 33.
2 This was established in Chapter I of this dissertation. (See Chapter I, footnote 49).
claiming the Internet has enhanced public diplomacy efforts will follow. Input from interviewees on this topic will be divided into individual, separate sections for extensive elaboration.

WHAT IS PUBLIC DIPLOMACY?

In the old model, public diplomacy was simply an international version of public relations — a final brushing of clothes and combing of hair before sending the latest policy initiative toddling off to the school of hard knocks. But such a perspective hardly proved adequate in the networked world of a decade later, when the expectation was that foreign policy information would be accurate, authoritative and immediate.

Howard Cincotta, “Post-Modern Diplomacy and the New Media”

A variety of definitions are available for Public Diplomacy. In the US Department of State’s *Dictionary of International Relations Terms*, ‘Public Diplomacy’ refers to “government-sponsored programs intended to inform or influence public opinion in other countries.” The means by which to achieve these goals include, but are not limited to, publications, motion pictures, cultural exchanges, radio, television, and web-based technologies.

Hans N. Tuch expands the definition when he defines public diplomacy as “official government efforts to shape the communications environment overseas in which American foreign policy is played out, in order to reduce the degree to which

\[3\] Cincotta, “Post-Modern Diplomacy,” 33.
misperceptions and misunderstandings complicate relations between the US and other nations."

The term first originated in 1965 with the establishment of the Edward R. Murrow Center for Public Diplomacy at the Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy at Tufts University. The Dean at the time, Edmund Gullion, is credited with its first use. Edward R. Murrow, after whom the center was named, was a former Director of the United States Information Agency.

Public diplomacy is different than traditional diplomacy. The latter primarily involves conducting official United States government business with the officials of host governments. Public diplomacy, on the other hand, deals not only with governments, but engages a plethora of non-state actors, non-governmental organizations, and individuals. The same constraints are not in place when conducting public diplomacy, which allows for the inclusion of a diverse gathering of views as represented by private American individuals and organizations to supplement official USG views.

What is now known as public diplomacy used to be, and in some circles still is, described as ‘propaganda.’ As early as 1955, books were written describing America’s overseas information programs as propaganda. Wilson Dizard, publishing the first book on the USIA, wrote in 1961, “The United States has been in the international propaganda

6 Rosenau, phone conversation.
7 Ibid.
business, off and on, for a long time. Propaganda played a crucial role in the war of independence."9

Today, many USG officials contend that US public diplomacy programs are not propaganda. Others believe that since propaganda can be based on truth, public diplomacy “can be equated with propaganda. If based on falsehoods and untruths, while still propaganda, it is best described as ‘disinformation.’”10

Those who work in public diplomacy feel strongly, however, that if the information they are supplying is not trustworthy, their credibility will be in jeopardy. As the intent is to present a positive image of the United States and its values, ideas, and policies, half-truths and unreliable information would be counterproductive. Murrow’s statement before a Congressional Committee in 1963 drives this point home: “Truth is the best propaganda and lies are the worst. To be persuasive we must be believable; to be believable we must be credible; to be credible we must be truthful. It is as simple as that.”11

USIA AND THE 1999 MERGER

The US Information Agency has been sliced, diced, and scattered around the State Department, with its resources eviscerated and authority diminished.12

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9 The background of the ‘public diplomacy vs. propaganda’ debate is explained on the www.publicdiplomacy.org web site, which is sponsored by the USIA Alumni Association and the Public Diplomacy Council (last accessed 15 July 2002).
11 Edward R. Murrow, Director of USIA at the time, gave this quote during a speech at a May 1963 testimony before a Congressional Committee.
The organization that oversaw public diplomacy efforts for over forty years was the United States Information Agency. Established in 1953 by President Dwight Eisenhower, it was created as an independent foreign affairs agency within the executive branch of the United States government. From 1978 until 1982, the agency was renamed the International Communication Agency under President Jimmy Carter, but was changed back to USIA when Ronald Reagan assumed the Presidency.

USIA’s mission statement was to understand, inform, and influence foreign publics in promotion of US interests, as well as to broaden the dialogue between Americans, their institutions, and their counterparts abroad. They succeeded in doing so, despite continuous budget reductions. In the last years of USIA, there was a serious decline in resources, particularly since 1996.

Aside from the financial difficulties at USIA, State’s practice of protecting information constantly clashed with the agency’s practices. The Department prefers to be very cautious with information. Its professional culture is predisposed to information policing, causing it to stonewall information, not volunteer it. Furthermore, State’s focus has characteristically been on facilitating official interactions between governments, not on being proactive with the media or engaging civil societies.

In contrast, USIA operated with tremendous openness and transparency. It prospered by frequently sharing and offering information to a variety of sources, from the media to NGOs to issue-specific communities. It became apparent that State Department

13 Information found on the ‘What was USIA?’ link on the web site www.publicdiplomacy.com (last accessed 15 July 2002).
culture would either have to make a psychic adjustment, or USIA would go out of business. Talks of a merger began.

In a sense, there had been a long slide into the merger. For the past forty years, the United States has doubled the number of countries in which it has public diplomacy operations in its embassies while halving the number of people performing these roles. Moreover, the Clinton Administration had bought into the idea that USIA was a Cold War agency and didn’t see the value of the broader reach of public diplomacy in the post-Cold War era.

The notion of a shrinking government and the fact that the State Department wanted more control were also critical components of discussions regarding a consolidation. Senate Foreign Relations Committee Chairman Jesse Helms eventually spearheaded the merger. He proclaimed that the workings of diplomacy should be “streamlined and consolidated to foster a more coherent policy.”

USIA became part of the Public Diplomacy cone at the State Department on 1 October, 1999, and was implemented into the Bureau of Educational and Cultural Affairs. It now operates under the jurisdiction of the Undersecretary for Public Diplomacy and Public Affairs, and in conjunction with the Office of International Information Programs. The transition, however, has been anything but welcome.

Not one of the interviewees who were former USIA officers spoke highly of the

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15 Dr. Barry Fulton, phone conversation with author, 12 September 2002.
16 Ibid.
18 Equipped for the Future.
merger. The general feeling was one of taking backward steps. Ambassador Kenton Keith strongly believes the new structure is fundamentally flawed. He maintains that, as a result of the merger of USIA with the State Department, "the primary purveyors of public diplomacy resources have no formal bureaucratic connection with the public diplomacy sections in Embassies. [Moreover], the senior official responsible for the conduct of public diplomacy [the Under Secretary] has no authority over the field operations that perform that mission."20

FSO Mike Canning elaborated on the limitations of the Undersecretary position, currently held by Charlotte Beers. He said that "beyond having no direct authority over public diplomacy at posts," Undersecretary Beers "has a very small staff and lacks a direct field link. In the past, the old USIA boss had jurisdiction over film, television, press activities, and field operations."21

The merger also effectively eliminated USIA Area Offices. Formerly headed by USIA's most senior officers, these Area Offices had budgetary control and two bosses - the Ambassador and the Washington-based Area Directorate at the State Department.22 Now, it is the same operation at field posts in an Embassy context, but with only one

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19 According to FSO Patricia Kushlis, with whom I interviewed on 16 July 2002, there was about a 20% attrition rate of USIA officers as a result of the merger. The majority of officers left before the consolidation, as they did not want to work under the constraints of the State Department. Some retired, but a large number of them went to work for NGOs with outreach objectives similar to the USIA.


21 FSO Mike Canning, phone conversation with author, 2 August 2002.

22 Dr. Michael Schneider, phone conversation with author, 21 August 2002.
boss. However, this boss is the Deputy Chief of Mission, a position that does not have a Washington connection and is thus deferred to a regional bureau.\textsuperscript{23}

For Canning, the biggest change is that where previous Area Directorates had authority, that dominion is now in the hands of the heads of regional bureaus (i.e., Latin America, etc.). The loss of Area Offices has been detrimental to the linkages between Washington and field operations.\textsuperscript{24} There is considerable debate on this resulting “disconnect.”\textsuperscript{25}

The question remains that if senior officials overseeing public diplomacy do not have control of field resources, then who does? The answer is mid-ranking office directors who do not have the authority to make cardinal decisions. Ambassador Keith claims this structural defect has not only diminished the effectiveness of public diplomacy, but it threatens to marginalize public diplomacy within State.\textsuperscript{26}

As previously stated, the way USIA functioned was openness. Nothing was classified, and they operated OUT to people. State’s culture is one of secrecy and covertness. Essentially, the same clash of cultures that occurred before the merger still comes into play afterward. Public diplomacy officers continue to hit a wall when trying to work around confidential diplomatic restraints.

In sum, the merger caused former USIA functions to lose:

- Coordination - In the past, access to the Bureau of Educational and Cultural Affairs, the Information Bureau, the Voice of America (VOA), and television producers helped ensure a well-managed public diplomacy operation at field posts

\textsuperscript{23} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{24} Canning, phone conversation.
\textsuperscript{25} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{26} Ibid.

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and within the region. This access is now constrained within State’s bureaucratic procedures.

- Accountability - USIA officers were accountable to both their Ambassadors and their area directors, which meant they not only responded to “brush fire” public diplomacy issues at individual missions, but they were also responsible for longer range goals such as building understanding via exchange programs, libraries, English-language teaching and cultural exchanges.

- Flexibility - There is a resultant loss of independent administrative infrastructure. More time is spent filling out forms and compiling reports than going out to engage target audiences. Additionally, USIA used to have flexible fund-raising procedures, including the freedom to solicit money from the private sector. With the merger, this has been lost, thus further hampering public diplomacy efforts.27

Beyond the difficulties listed above, yet another realization came about in the area of information and communications technologies. As the State Department absorbed the USIA into its framework, it became blatantly obvious just how antiquated State’s ICTs were. USIA was already worlds ahead of the Department in ICT capabilities, and did not have the internal opposition to using them. For example, the agency had routinely profited from the use of libraries that already had Internet capabilities by the late 80s.28 In contrast, State hardly accessed those valuable resources, and they were not utilized in routine procedures.

Moreover, USIA officers had PCs on theirs desks and were connected to the Internet for a good number of years before the merger. Internet access had been broadly available to agency personnel as of the mid-90s.29 Working under these conditions was customary at USIA. At the State Department, on the other hand, it was not until the late 90s that Embassies overseas even began to install Internet access at desktops.

27 Keith, testimony.
28 Kushlis, phone conversation.
29 Canning, phone conversation.
For USIA in the final years, the Internet was also instrumental in helping to counter some of the ramifications due to budget cuts and the loss of personnel resources.\(^{30}\) Substituting E-mail for phone calls, for example, helped cut corners under dwindling financial circumstances. In addition, it avoided the need to reduce the size of outreach by offering a less expensive alternative for communications.\(^{31}\)

Even after the merger, cost-effectiveness and reaching a widespread audience continue to be principal goals in public diplomacy. The Internet’s abilities in the advancement of public diplomacy initiatives have not only been discovered, but have been capitalized upon considerably. Exactly how the Internet is being used for the benefit of public diplomacy will be addressed in the next section.

**ANALYSIS OF PROPOSITION III**

P3: The Internet is playing a major role in advancing the efforts of public diplomacy.

When asked where the Internet has been utilized the most in diplomacy, ‘public diplomacy’ was the first response of every single interviewee. This branch of diplomacy, as defined earlier, operates within an environment of openness and thrives on the spread of information. It follows, then, that the Internet and its capabilities could significantly enhance its endeavors.

Indeed, public diplomacy officials have been taking advantage of this innovation since the early 90s.\(^{32}\) As Internet technology has progressed, the former USIA and now

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\(^{30}\) Keith, phone conversation.

\(^{31}\) Ibid.

\(^{32}\) Dizard, phone conversation.
the Office of International Information Programs (IIP) at State have added the Internet to its use of radio, film, and other sources for the purpose of contacting foreign audiences. Average citizens, leaders in government and industry, the media, and non-governmental organizations, among others, are all being communicated with using the Internet and/or its subsidiaries on a regular basis.

The use of the Internet in public diplomacy for over a decade appears to be an anomaly when one considers the obstacles State has faced regarding the implementation of advanced ICTs. The Department as a whole has only had widespread Internet access for a couple of years, and limitations still exist both in Washington and at various posts overseas. However, it makes sense when one considers the fact that the USIA was previously independent of State, and had been utilizing the Internet extensively in their work. Post-consolidation, Internet usage proceeded within the public diplomacy cone at the State Department, which is, not surprisingly, comprised of an abundance of former USIA personnel.

Likewise, public diplomacy is a concept, not an agency. Its objectives are pursued by those who possess a certain area of expertise. The notion of public diplomacy existed before the merger, when it was handled by USIA, and it continues to exist after the merger, within State’s Bureau of Educational and Cultural Affairs.

Today, the overseas environment in which public diplomacy officials work is formidable. As the foreign policy agenda has expanded to include more and more transnational issues, so has the audience that public diplomacy needs to reach grown in

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33 The State Department’s struggles with information and communications technologies are elaborated upon in Chapter II of this work.
size and scope. With this in mind, questions arise as to how public diplomacy officials have been able to take advantage of web-based technologies to advance their objectives. For instance, in what ways has the Internet added to existing methods of conducting public diplomacy? Likewise, what methods, if any, has it transformed or even replaced?

Before the Internet, public diplomacy methods ranged from cultural exchanges to publications to radio and television broadcasts, and beyond. The variety of approaches attempts to reach as many different factions as possible. Limiting the methods to just one or two would not reach all intended receivers as people use differing sources to gather information.

Internet capabilities have all at once simplified and expanded existing public diplomacy operations, and created new outlets of information proliferation. This exponential increase in the provision of information\(^\text{34}\) has revolutionized the capabilities and outreach of public diplomacy, interviewees asserted. According to Ira Magaziner, the former White House adviser who coordinated the government’s strategy on global electronic commerce, the Internet, with its “ability to move huge amounts of data and images around the globe via Web sites, direct E-mail, streaming video, and electronic publications - even into nations that traditionally place strict controls on the flow of information - provides the State Department with the most powerful medium ever for delivering its message.”\(^\text{35}\)

\(^{34}\) Schneider, phone conversation.

Delivering America's message is the mission first and foremost of public diplomacy. It has been growing in importance in an era of rising interdependence with an emerging global civil society. Fortunately, it is not only more important to deliver America's message, but it has become easier and easier to do so with new technological innovations.

"Never before have borders been as open to the flow of ideas and images. The opportunities for advancing the goals of American foreign policy are unprecedented."36 Thus, it has never been more vital that the US have an effective public diplomacy. Interviewees echo Magaziner's claim that the Internet is indeed the ultimate means for communicating about America. They offered a long list of Internet usage in public diplomacy efforts.

One of the first places it had an effect was in the area of print media such as books, magazines, and pamphlets.37 As new electronic media began to grow in appeal, there was a transformation from print to electronic publications. On-line magazines now closely match the hard-copy publication of magazines.

In terms of the press, information on press reports from anywhere in the world is available instantly at one's fingertips. Internet technology has allowed the electronic placement both of articles - usually written in Washington - and policy talking points from print and broadcast media. Speeches are immediately disseminated around the world and USG websites post statements of administration officials, scripts from Congressional hearings, and other documents immediately. Even the Washington File, 

36 "Reinventing Diplomacy in the Information Age," 13.
37 Ibid.
which was originally teletype, is available on-line at the home page of the Office of International Information Programs within the State Department’s website.\textsuperscript{38}

An extended period of shrinking budgets for public diplomacy caused a large number of US libraries overseas to shut down.\textsuperscript{39} Thanks to the Internet, however, they have largely have been converted to Information Centers. These centers provide access to materials electronically through the Internet rather than having to keep a sizeable holding of books and periodicals, a costly endeavor. Thus, the research/library function that is performed in public diplomacy shops has been literally transformed by the Internet.\textsuperscript{40} This has enabled public diplomacy to cut operational costs tremendously without sacrificing the provision of resources.\textsuperscript{41}

Not only public diplomacy officials are benefitting from this transition. Another advantage of these centers is that they offer host-country guests Internet access where they have none. Ergo, people are using the Internet to access all kinds of information at Information Resource Centers around the world.

Another area in which the Internet has been a boon for public diplomacy is the dissemination of information. Accessing the sources is only one part of the equation in public diplomacy. The next step is to send out select information to predetermined individuals and groups.

A recent example occurred in January and February of 2003 when the US government sent E-mails to Iraqi military and government officials urging them to protect

\textsuperscript{38} FSO Anne Grimes, phone conversation with author, 16 July 2002.
\textsuperscript{39} Houlanhan, phone conversation.
\textsuperscript{40} FSO Rosie Hansen, phone conversation with author, 18 July 2002.
\textsuperscript{41} Ibid.
their families by helping United Nations inspectors and turning away from Saddam Hussein.\textsuperscript{42} It was not as successful as was hoped for, however, because the Iraqi government was causing a service outage each time the US sent such E-mails. The outage would last only a brief time, but just long enough to clear the American messages from the in-boxes of the Iraqi recipients. In the past, public diplomacy of such sorts was accomplished by dropping leaflets or broadcasting from planes flying overhead.

The Internet has provided public diplomacy officials with the ability to continue making sources available to a growing audience, without increasing costs. For example, a great deal of money used to be spent annually mailing out or faxing press releases, government policy statements, and other pertinent information.\textsuperscript{43} Now, most everything can be sent electronically, costing virtually nothing.

The most common way public diplomats are sending information is via E-mail. As is the case with traditional diplomacy, E-mail has provided public diplomacy with an instantaneous, inexpensive form of communication. However, in public diplomacy, there are many more communication outlets that need to be informed. This component, in comparison to traditional diplomacy, amplifies the Internet’s effect and significance in the public diplomacy arena.\textsuperscript{44}

One key element of public diplomacy before and since the advent of the Internet is the careful selection of audiences and of people they want to reach and influence. Not only is there communication with those within the diplomatic realm, but with foreign

\textsuperscript{43} FSO John Salazar, phone conversation with author, 30 May 2002.
\textsuperscript{44} Kushlis, phone conversation.
publics, the media, and a surfeit of non-state actors. For example, public diplomacy officials reach out proactively to host country journalists, academics, business leaders and select government officials and actually supply them electronically with daily US government official texts. The use of targeted listservs, such as the one just mentioned, in outreach efforts is escalating rapidly. 45

With the Internet and E-mail, diplomats in public diplomacy are reaching out with much more regularity to contacts. It is a new vehicle of communication that is both expeditious and economical, and it keeps people in contact consistently. “This is very important for diplomacy, but even more so for public diplomacy,” noted Ambassador Bodine. 46 On the same note, FSO Sheldon Austin remarked that the Internet’s capacity to send messages in any way, shape, or form allows those in public diplomacy to reach out to contacts and keep their presence felt. It is requisite to keep in contact regularly so “they know we’re there.” 47 Web sites are arranged geographically, tailoring information to specific regions, and thematically, providing information on political and economic security, democracy, human rights, communications, and American society and values. At their best, the sites include plenty of links to other Web sites. 48


46 Ambassador Bodine, phone conversation with author.

47 FSO Sheldon Austin, phone conversation with author, 5 June 2002.

48 Jordan, “Net Diplomacy.”
WEB SITES AS INSTRUMENTS OF DIPLOMACY

It is becoming apparent that public diplomacy cannot function effectively without the use of the Internet. However, using the Internet for data searches and sending E-mails is only the beginning of the advantages offered by this phenomenal technology. The newest tool for advancing the mission of public diplomacy is the use of Web sites.\(^49\) They are like “cyber-leaflets”\(^50\) and have become one of the most critical aspects of public diplomacy.

Most countries nowadays have a national website “with links to more specific websites for the government, individual ministries, and governmental and sometimes non-governmental entities.”\(^51\) Websites offer diplomats an extraordinary tool for communicating with the public.\(^52\) Diplomats in public diplomacy are therefore utilizing websites as essential tools in the pursuit of their initiatives.

Sophia Lim, International Resource Center director and Web master in Kuala Lumpur, reported on her development of a Web site for the Embassy in Malaysia: “The focus of our home page is very much mission oriented. That mission is [three-fold] - to

\(^{49}\) FSO William Dietrich, phone conversation with author, 26 July 2002.

\(^{50}\) ‘Cyber-leaflet’ is a term I created. In the past, public diplomacy broadly used leaflets to explain US policy, ideals, values, and the like. Now, by accessing USG websites, individuals can find and see the same information on-line that used to be on paper in the form of leaflets or pamphlets.


support US foreign policy, to support US trade and international issues, and to promote understanding between the people of Malaysia and the United States."\textsuperscript{53}

One would be amazed at the number of hits per day on Embassy, State Department and other United States government web sites.\textsuperscript{54} Whitehouse.gov is one of the most popular government websites in the world with over three million daily hits.\textsuperscript{55}

"Anymore, it is the battle of the websites!" said Ambassador Keith in an interview. He added,

There will always be people checking our websites. Not just for spin, but for basic information. For example, when the United States was bombing in Bosnia, the Bosnian website was better and more up to date than the broadcasting of Voice of America. Thus, our websites need to be up-to-date, credible, and vast. They should offer access to policy, speeches, utterances of senior US officials, current events and more.\textsuperscript{56}

Timely, accurate content is certainly important for a web site. Yet excellent content means nothing if the number of people able to access it appropriately is limited.

What has thus become a primary task of web site management is the presentation of information in the most usable, user-friendly way.

For a web site to be user-friendly requires constant filtering and editing. For instance, instead of 1,000 pages, it would be more amenable to post 300 pages, and

\textsuperscript{54} Ambassador Laurielee Peters, phone conversation with author, 6 July 2001.
\textsuperscript{56} Keith, phone conversation.
include an assortment of links to other relevant sites. It is important to note that the
selection of which particular links to include on individual web sites is critical and should
adhere to the needs of those most likely to access the initial websites.\textsuperscript{57}

Furthermore, language content is extremely important. “If you add foreign
language materials,” said Minky Worden, Director of Electronic Media for Human Rights
Watch in New York, “you will get a radical jump in visitors. The US has invested in this
concept. Embassy web sites, for example, are now, at the very least, bi-lingual.\textsuperscript{58} Other
more general US governmental web sites have committed to posting information in a
variety languages, including Arabic, Chinese, Russian, French, Spanish and English.\textsuperscript{59}
Currently, the State Department is developing programs for their Web sites that will not
only translate information into the above six languages immediately, but into another
thirty very quickly as well.\textsuperscript{60}

Along with language issues, Embassy web sites should address cultural, religious,
and national interests of host countries. Such information should include the most recent
decisions of the US that will affect the particular host country’s policies - for example, a
recent trade negotiation that will have repercussions on the country’s economy. Even
though the information may be available elsewhere, the key is to know who the intended
audience is and thus place germane information where they are most likely to seek it or
find it inadvertently.

\textsuperscript{57} FSO Milan Sturgis, phone conversation with author, 7 May 2002.
\textsuperscript{58} Fulton, phone conversation.
\textsuperscript{59} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{60} Charlotte Beers, Under Secretary for Public Diplomacy and Public Affairs,
speech at the “WomenFuture Main Event 2002”, Washington, D.C., 11 April 2002, via
webcast.
WEB MANAGEMENT IN DIPLOMACY

Effective web sites are the product of effective web management. Web management goes beyond simply coordinating the content and nature of the information on a web site. It is a "multidisciplinary activity which brings together technology, graphic design and information management." Its success is oft a product of the interaction and cooperation between diplomats and IT specialists, coupled with basic marketing guidelines.

Unfortunately,

while the importance of the Internet for public diplomacy has greatly increased, knowledge of techniques for web-development, in many cases, has not. Many diplomatic services have entered this _terra nullius_ and developed websites without any previous knowledge or experience, using a trial-and-error approach. While this approach sufficed during the early phases of web-development, the increasing demand for information via the web, as well as the increasing quantity of information available, require a professional and consistent management approach.

Web management has therefore become very important in public diplomacy, because public diplomacy is a form of marketing. It is the art of promoting the product known as the United States of America. Advertising and marketing people call it 'branding.'

Traditional diplomats are not trained in marketing principles, but those in the public diplomacy realm are quite familiar with what 'sells' and what doesn’t. With the

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62 Quote available at www.diplomacy.edu/Web/conference2.htm (last accessed 30 August 2001).
Internet, they are now branding and selling the US and its ideals on the Web, as well as elsewhere.\textsuperscript{63} Even the Under Secretary for Public Diplomacy and Public Affairs, Charlotte Beers, is a former advertising executive, an admitted factor in her selection. At a recent event, she discussed a marketing approach to public diplomacy. She said, “The important thing about our products [US ideals, values, policies, etc.] is that they have to be marketed. We can’t assume that anyone is going to be assertive enough to pick up our website, reproduce it, pull it down, and move on. And so we’re learning to use the modern marketing tools of banner headlines, linking into other sites, [and more.]”\textsuperscript{64}

A recent example of how the US used the Internet to market its policies involved one of the interviewees, Ambassador Kenton Keith, a career FSO with the USIA and the State Department. After September 11\textsuperscript{th}, he came out of retirement to be Chief of the Public Diplomacy Center in Islamabad, Pakistan. In that position, he used both the Internet and satellite TV to address foreign audiences, as well as American, Afghani, and third-country journalists, on a daily basis about developments in the ‘War on Terrorism’ as the United States and its allies were engaging the Taliban and al Qaida forces in Afghanistan.

Yet another factor in the creation of USG websites is interactivity. Sites are designed to provide users interactive capabilities with the Webmaster, each other, and the Web page itself.\textsuperscript{65} This allows for feedback from users, as well as chat rooms and

\textsuperscript{63} Bodine, phone conversation.


\textsuperscript{65} FSO Gerald Gallucci, phone conversation with author, 22 August 2002.

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discussion boards. In public diplomacy, this has been highly beneficial for its cultural exchanges. Collaborative development tools such as E-mail discussion lists, message boards, and on-line conferencing are being used to support the work of traditional visitor exchanges. Not only does this present the opportunity for distance learning, but it helps to foster relationships between people who have not had the opportunity to meet in person.

Web management, it follows then, has become a substantial component of using the Internet in public diplomacy. Effectiveness in web management, according to Eduardo Gelbstein, the Director of the United Nations International Computing Centre, comes down to three basic success factors for websites - content, functionality, and usability. Webmasters and content producers must not only ensure the information is up-to-date and trust-worthy, but should provide links to other relevant sites. Functionality must meet the needs of the diplomatic community, such as secure access, encryption, discussion fora, and other interactive capabilities. Finally, a site’s usability is dependent on end-user satisfaction in the areas of organization, presentation, and navigation.

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68 Ibid.
MULTIMEDIA, PUBLIC DIPLOMACY, AND THE INTERNET

With USIA in the 60s, one of the biggest advantages was that countries DIDN'T have ICTs. That meant we could push information into the local media very easily and we could get US-biased stuff published. Now, with ICTs, it is not so easy. The more the Internet has grown, the less of a monopoly we've had on the media.

FSO William Dietrich

Multimedia is the business of presenting volumes of information in various modus operandi. Thus, its constituents have developed the skills of quickly gathering information and sorting out what is newsworthy. With countless outlets providing an unremitting amount of information, the media has come to play a larger role than ever in information age diplomacy, particularly in the public diplomacy realm.

The growth of the media has created an environment of transparency where governments feel pressure to deliver rapid responses to world events for domestic and international publics. This is complicated because radio and television have multiple audiences. Consequently, it is very difficult to create one message that addresses all interests and concerns. To be effectual within this context, public diplomacy must involve a combination of working with the media for the initial sharing of information, and using the Internet for expanding that information appropriately in the pursuit of its objectives.

69 Dietrich, phone conversation.
71 Houlanhan, phone conversation.
72 Salazar, phone conversation.
The Internet is similar to broadcasting. Like with radio and television, the audience selects itself. "Self-selecting audiences are what we want," claimed FSO William Dietrich.\(^{73}\)

One of the most capacious manners in which public diplomacy has traditionally used a media outlet is radio broadcasting. When the USIA was operable, the Voice of America, Radio Free Europe and other broadcasting services constituted the largest single program within its budget.\(^{74}\) Messages used to be sent via wireless radio, also known as short-wave.

International broadcasting is still a colossal part of public diplomacy, despite the amalgamation of the USIA into the State Department.\(^{75}\) On the same day as the merger, 1 October, 1999, the broadcast services came under the jurisdiction of the Broadcasting Board of Governors (BBG), an independent government organization. The BBG oversees seven US non-military international broadcast services, including the Voice of America (VOA), Radio Sawa (in Arabic), Radio Farda (which means Radio Tomorrow in Persian), the Office of Cuba Broadcasting (Radio and TV Marti), the WorldNet television and film service, Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty (RFE/RL), and Radio Free Asia (RFA).\(^{76}\) It not only oversees the content and production of all seven, but the BBG also serves as a firewall to protect the professional independence and integrity of broadcasters with the assistance of the International Broadcasting Bureau (IBB).\(^{77}\) Even though it is a

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\(^{73}\) Dietrich, phone conversation.

\(^{74}\) Canning, phone conversation.

\(^{75}\) FSO Dudley Sims, phone conversation with author, 22 May 2002.

\(^{76}\) Information available at www.bbg.gov (last accessed 10 January 2002).

\(^{77}\) Ibid.
separate entity from where the former USIA has been integrated, the BBG is considered an extension of US public diplomacy.

It has already been demonstrated that the USG has taken steps to employ the Internet and other media to achieve its ends in public diplomacy. This extends to the area of radio broadcasting. Today, broadcast services have Internet websites that offer real-time audio and video streaming of their radio broadcasts.78

One of the first to do so is the Voice of America, the largest international multimedia broadcasting service funded by the US government. Currently, the VOA broadcasts more than 1,000 hours of news, informational, educational, and cultural programs every week to an audience of some 94 million people worldwide.79 Programs are produced and broadcast in a multitude of languages through radio, satellite television and, since 1999, the Internet.80

The Voice of America News Internet site provides the latest news and information that is updated minute by minute, twenty-four hours a day with English text, graphics and Real Audio.81 As on other USG websites, news is increasingly available in other languages. Aside from English, one can access a complete version of all information in the languages of Chinese, Russian, Albanian, Farsi, and Spanish. However, the VOA

78 FSO Bruce Gregory, phone conversation with author, 9 August 2002.
80 Ibid.
News Internet site is equipped to provide the majority of its information in a total of fifty-three different languages.82

Beyond simply reading the text on the web site, one can listen to or view VOA programs via the Internet. To do so, it is necessary to download RealAudio and RealVideo on one's computer. Both are available on the website. It is also possible to download programs via FTP or MP3, allowing one to listen to or watch the programs at one's convenience. This is beneficial, for example, in the case where an individual is paying by the minute for connectivity.

Jamie Metzl, the former Coordinator for International Public Information at the State Department, has addressed the delicate balance of a partnership between public diplomacy and the media. He has called for a "broad-based information engagement" strategy, emphasizing the importance of outward orientation.83 His approach is threefold. First, he believes the US should form alliances with non-governmental organizations around the world to monitor the media environment.84 People tend to trust their local media more than international media, so fostering trust and cooperation with such entities is critical. Second, US information agencies must focus on international broadcasting, assessing strengths and weaknesses and ensuring credibility.85 Third, effective countering of disinformation, misinformation, and incendiary hate propaganda

84 Ibid.
85 Ibid.
against the United States is fundamental for a successful public diplomacy strategy. It is on this last point that I shall elaborate next.

COUNTERING DISINFORMATION AND MISINFORMATION

In the aftermath of the 11 September 2001 events, it has become clear that misinformation about the United States can spread like wildfire through information technologies such as the Web and E-mail.

Public Diplomacy Organization

Internet technology is a double-edged sword. On one hand, it has increased interpersonal collaboration. On the other hand, it has fostered a subterranean network of hate and violence. The result is a barrage of negative propaganda aimed at the United States.

False propaganda is also referred to as disinformation or misinformation, two terms that are used interchangeably. The appropriate distinction can be made by understanding that disinformation is actually intentional misinformation meant to be damaging. Definitions aside, diplomats are faced with the colossal task of countering derogatory and erroneous information about America. Their best hope of countering the rising flow of misinformation and disinformation is “through effective public affairs programs, using the skills of professionals in worldwide languages, cultures, the media, and education.”

86 Ibid.
87 www.publicdiplomacy.org (last accessed 2 October 2002).
89 FSO Bruce K. Byers, phone conversation with author, 15 July 2002.
90 “IT: A Double-edged Sword.”
In tackling this undertaking, two elements are central to success - response-time and the range and extension of influence. Interviewees praised the Internet’s instantaneousness and the scope of its potential outreach in responding to such matters. For example, if someone in France is saying something negative about US-African policy, one can read it and respond to it immediately and broadly. Dealing in real-time is essential both in seeing what is being said about the US and its policies, and in having the capacity to retort without unnecessary delay.

Another case of countering disinformation was recounted by FSO J. Michael Houlanhan:

There was a rumor the Soviets put out there that had Latin America believing the US was adopting Latin American children with birth defects not to help them, but to harvest their body parts and organs. This was NOT true. Countering this was very difficult via cable. The rumor still exists today, but has been mostly squelched thanks to the Internet. It wasn’t until the Internet that the rumor was overtaken.

Responding to accusations and anti-American slants has been further expedited due to the Internet’s capacity for quick and easy electronic exchange of information with Washington-based researchers and policy-makers. Decisions on how to answer or react to the propaganda are less time-consuming because the information is available to decision-makers at the click of a button. This was evident in the case of the diplomatic standoff with China over a US reconnaissance plane that was forced to make an emergency landing in southern China in 2001.

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91 FSO David Fredrick, phone conversation with author, 16 July 2002.
92 Sims, phone conversation.
93 Houlanhan, phone conversation.
94 Austin, phone conversation.
The Chinese were inaccurately reporting the incident to the media and beyond. Using Internet technology, State was able to gather all of the Chinese reports and promptly respond with factual information. In addition, the Internet enabled the Department’s Office of International Information Programs to place every text and transcript of remarks by both administration officials and prominent members of Congress on all electronic platforms. In the two-week period, the Chinese language site received over 135,000 hits, thus reaching many misinformed individuals.

With the Internet and E-mail you can also ‘deconflict’ information. The word ‘deconflict’ is a military term that refers to the correction or reparation of conflicting information. FSO Milan Sturgis recently had a situation where the Internet assisted him in deconflicting misinformation, although he noted that there have been several situations where he, and many others, have used this technology to counter invalid information. He shared his experience:

To give you one example, I usually surf sites such as OSCE, COE, EU and other IOs on a daily basis. One day I found a little-noticed status report on human rights in Kosovo on the OSCE site. I read it, disagreed with it, composed a think piece in reference to it and sent off the cable to Washington. Within a week, OSCE was caused to retract the report, which basically stated that Serbs and other non-Albanians were no longer in danger. OSCE Vienna had to commission a new study and convene a donor’s conference for improved security for minorities in Kosovo, which led to 30 million Euros being invested in the region. The point of this story is not to pat myself on the back, but rather to demonstrate the power of the Web in the way we do diplomacy. Prior to this, a report like that would have

96 Ibid.
97 Bodine, phone conversation.
been lost in the system with no chance of seeing the light of day and subsequently inflicting more harm than I’m sure the authors ever intended.98

CONCLUSION

Undersecretary Beers has proclaimed that the new mission statement of public diplomacy is not only to inform and influence foreign audiences regarding American values, policies, and the like, but to engage them. The Internet’s role in this endeavor has become increasingly significant. Its digital technology is widely-considered to be more innovative in public diplomacy than traditional diplomacy because of the kind of work involved, and the magnitude to which outreach is aspired.99

To accomplish the goal of disseminating the largest amount of information to the broadest audience, public diplomats have taken advantage of web-based communications. With a continually-shrinking budget, there was also a need to use resources that one person could produce versus a library of people. The Internet is excellent for this purpose, as it decouples information. From short-wave to interactive, analog to digital, it can produce not only text, but images, moving content to channels instantaneously and virtually cost-free.100

The 1999 merger of the USIA into the State Department was anything but smooth. USIA had a different culture, a tradition of openness, more advanced ICTs, and greater effectiveness with people skills.101 The clash of cultures and technology resulted in a

98 Sturgis, phone conversation.
99 Sturgis, phone conversation.
100 Schneider, phone conversation.
101 Canning, phone conversation.
disconnect that has generated both a loss of agility and a lack of means to act quickly at
the field level. There are no plans, however, to reinstate old USIA operations, so public
diplomacy officers have had to adjust.

Despite these obstacles, public diplomacy has marched on within the Bureau of
Educational and Cultural Affairs. Moreover, it has continued to use the Internet to
advance its objectives. The use of websites, the electronic distribution of information,
and E-mail communication are now commonplace in public diplomacy efforts.

The concept of web management has emerged as websites are now considered
instruments of diplomacy. Content, functionality, and usability are the three indicators of
a successful site. Once these factors are addressed, public diplomats incorporate basic
marketing principles to draw audiences to USG sites and other relevant links.

Public diplomacy is essentially a handful of people influencing a nation. For
maximum effectiveness, it is important to work in concert with the media, in all of its
forms, to foster cooperation and optimize credibility and trust-worthiness. Once this is
established, the Internet can be used as a multiplier to deliver one’s messages.

It is important to understand, however, that the Internet is not like newspaper
editors, who can screen what they want to print. The Internet is very difficult to
control. This is why it is very effective even in denied areas.

In addition to sending press items via distribution lists, the Internet allows
diplomats to electronically distribute audio and video of broadcasts, organize chat rooms,
and set up virtual libraries in developing countries. The Internet has made this possible

102 Sims, phone conversation.
even where host countries do not have widespread Internet access. At Information Centers, people can now send and receive E-mail, visit Embassy websites, listen to and watch programs, and learn about the values, ideals, and policies of the United States of America.103

A consensus exists that the Internet has created an environment with more facilities for public diplomacy.104 However, it has also presented more challenges.105 As much as it has created positive linkages of communities and individuals, it has fostered the growth of negative, hate-based organizations. Consequently, there is more misinformation and disinformation about America - on the Web and elsewhere.

Response-time is a precious commodity in diplomacy in general. For public diplomacy, it is even more vital, especially when responding to anti-American disparagement. The Internet permits a quicker turn-around time to deal with such matters. The quick availability of policy guidance and talking points via electronic communications is very useful for deconflicting false reporting as well.106

Public diplomats have long known that the richness of America is in its diversity of opinions. The Internet didn’t invent opinions, it just made it possible to reach factions easier, in a less-costly and vastly-accelerated manner. Ideas gain currency and legitimacy by repetition. Certainly, it is a challenge to keep up with the flow of information, to continually put out where the US stands, and to attempt to explain various points of view.

103 Byers, phone conversation.
104 Interviewees not only unanimously agreed that the Internet has had the greatest impact on public diplomacy, but they also concur that it has had a predominantly positive effect.
105 Schneider, phone conversation.
106 Houlahan, phone conversation.
Nonetheless, the Internet has made this endless task easier, faster, and less expensive, which has avoided sacrificing the scope of outreach to worldwide audiences.

When linked with the Internet tools and applications available today, public diplomacy can be used to help set the international agenda, forge consensus on common approaches to global challenges, and help shape the preferences of international actors. Used strategically, it can “engage millions of people directly, with pin-point accuracy, in their own language” on the themes and issues that are vital to their own national interests, well-being, and stability.\(^{107}\) Her Excellency, Ambassador Barbara Bodine, summarized the repercussions of Internet technology for public diplomacy as follows: “If the Internet is the core of the information revolution, and public diplomacy is essentially information sharing, then the impact is clear.”\(^{108}\)


\(^{108}\) Bodine, phone conversation.
CHAPTER V
US DIPLOMACY IN A TRANSPARENT WORLD

It is the ethos of the Net - community action, transparency and accountability - that have enforced a kind of political parity among the members of the wired international community, or the emerging network society.

Manuel Castells, “Materials for an Exploratory Theory of the Network Society”

In the past, especially during the Cold War, secrecy was a given in foreign affairs. Secure communication lines and the protection of government positions, policies, and activities were top priorities. With advances in information and communications technologies, however, the notion of information-sharing has been transformed. While sensitive data is still protected with encryption and/or other secure means of communication, information age technology has facilitated greater access to once-closed diplomatic processes.

The advent of the Internet, in particular, has allowed for the creation of additional information and communication channels that jeopardize the boundaries of diplomatic space and confidentiality. National borders have become porous and penetrable as a diversity of information flows easily across geographical lines via the World Wide Web. The result is a level of transparency in international relations that is unprecedented.

Consequently, traditional diplomatic functions have been significantly challenged. For example, diplomats’ speeches, decisions, and actions are now available to the general

public. Thus, the effectiveness of their policies and other endeavors is increasingly vulnerable to criticism by a more educated and informed world.

In this chapter, I will first elaborate on the Internet’s contribution to greater transparency in international politics and US diplomacy. Next, I will evaluate the results with regard to two of my propositions, in the context of greater transparency. The first contends that the Internet has enhanced accountability in US diplomacy. The second proposition states that the Internet has played a part in the enabling of non-state actors in the American diplomatic arena.

The findings of both propositions are important to understanding the overall effect of the Internet on US diplomacy, which is the purpose of this dissertation. If it has contributed to greater accountability, this is a fundamental implication for US diplomacy. Likewise, if non-state actors have gained a legitimate voice in American diplomacy, the repercussions could potentially involve a diffusion of diplomacy or even, to some degree, a loss of state sovereignty. I shall explore the implications of these findings in greater detail in the conclusion.

Lastly, I shall elaborate on how the Internet has contributed to a diffusion of diplomacy. The concepts of networking and state sovereignty will be discussed, as will the contradicting forces of fragmentation and integration in world politics. How US diplomacy has had to adjust to meet the demands of a more transparent and shared platform is also examined.

A NEW WORLD OF TRANSPARENCY

Transparency, in the political realm, is a condition in which information about
governmental preferences, intentions, and capabilities is made available either to the public or other outsiders. It is a condition of openness that is enhanced by any mechanism that leads to public disclosure of information such as a free press, open government hearings, the Internet, and reporting requirements in international regimes.

Ann Florini lists six key factors that contribute to the increase in transparency:

- rising democratization that leads to increasing openness
- advances in information and communications technologies
- the growth of the global media
- the proliferation of international regimes and organizations
- economic globalization
- a growing normative commitment to transparency in international affairs

More specific examples of elements which add to or heighten transparency include increasing access to personal computers, the lower cost of telecommunications, global media coverage in a multitude of languages, unimpeded Internet data flows, commercial observation satellites, and global positioning satellites. Broadening transparency is a cumulative process that will keep moving forward and can never return to its beginnings. What is evident is that ICTs are playing the leading role in this international trend.

Some governments still attempt to limit or block the flow of information into their countries. However, it is getting "harder and harder to plug all of the holes." From newspapers to satellite television to the Internet, world publics have multiple outlets from which to access information. Moreover, the lack of governance over the Internet allows

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4 FSO Milan Sturgis, phone conversation with author, 7 May 2002.
information to infiltrate into societies or states where print media, radio, and television are still controlled.

When it comes to the US government, transparency has never been something for which it has been famous. With the inception of advanced ICTs, however, it has had to adapt to a new era of openness and lucidity. Innovations such as the Internet are providing the capability to collect, analyze, and disseminate information on just about any topic imaginable. For the USG, US diplomacy, and international politics in general, this has meant “bringing into the open previously classified information about, for example, a nation’s weapons system that was gathered by reconnaissance satellites and other electronic collection methods, or making available instantaneously and globally information about human rights abuses - from Timor to Tian An Men.”

Whereas traditional American diplomacy is uncomfortable with transparency, US public diplomacy practitioners in Washington and overseas have always focused on sharing information, even official policy statements insofar as they have been issued by the State Department or the White House. Therefore, there has been a ‘clash of cultures’ between those who practice public diplomacy and those who do not. In the current state of affairs, however, openness and transparency are essential for advancing the objectives of both traditional and public diplomacy, regardless of how the information is transmitted.

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6 Ambassador Barbara Bodine, phone conversation with author, 21 May 2002.

7 See Chapter IV for more on American public diplomacy.
This notion is reinforced in the CSIS report directed by Dr. Barry Fulton -
“Reinventing Diplomacy in the Information Age.” In one of its strategies for State
Department reform, the report “calls for an end to the culture of secrecy and exclusivity
that shrouds diplomatic practice by placing greater emphasis on public awareness and
opinion and on broader participation and networking, while balancing the requirements of
security and openness.”

Despite its initial hesitation and resistance to new technologies, traditional
diplomacy has made steady progress toward operating more effectively in a transparent
environment. Today, with all of the information available on the State Department’s web
page and its links, almost any USG information can be accessed, given that it is
unclassified and suitable to the public at large. This is a huge transformation in the
conduct of American diplomacy, especially when considering the State Department’s
information-sharing history (or rather the lack thereof) and the reality that it was still
using Wang technology as recently as 1999.

In sum, there is indeed a rise in transparency in world politics. The Internet, with
the astounding breadth, width and diversity of information it is capable of sharing, is a
major component of this trend toward openness. How Internet-inspired transparency has
impacted the conduct of US diplomacy with regard to accountability and the influence of
non-state actors will be discussed in the following sections.

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8 “Reinventing Diplomacy in the Information Age,” 53-55.
ANALYSIS OF PROPOSITION IV

P4: The Internet has enhanced accountability in American diplomacy.

To understand the impact of the Internet on the accountability of US diplomacy, it is necessary to explain what is meant by accountability. For the purpose of this dissertation, and in the context of this proposition, the term refers to the overall truthfulness, credibility, and trust-worthiness of US diplomatic information, actions, and policies. Furthermore, it encompasses an American diplomat’s responsibility to adhere to and respect job criteria, including compliance with regard to the set rules of the profession.

This proposition does not mean to suggest that diplomatic accountability did not exist within the United States diplomatic corps before the Internet and other ICTs provided a greater level of transparency. In fact, it presupposes a solid, existing level of accountability. Instead, its intent is to identify how, if at all, accountability has been ameliorated as a result of newly-developed conditions, especially the Internet.

In their work entitled, “Rethinking Foreign Policy Practice in the Information Age,” Sheryl Brown and Margarita Studemeister, Co-Directors of the USIP Virtual Diplomacy initiative, remind us that with greater transparency in international politics comes the expectation of more accountable governance.9

Transparency necessarily guides not only official relationships but also the relationships between public and private sectors and among individuals. Because each state’s public has expanded far beyond the state’s geographical borders and its collective values, each state, by way of accessing its citizens far and wide,

renders itself accountable to all publics, not least of which is the indefinite but potent international community.¹⁰

When asked about the Internet’s effect on accountability in diplomacy, interviewees responded in a few different ways. Most felt strongly that accountability had definitely increased. Once the terminology and the intent of the proposition were further explained in the context of the research, diplomats’ responses began to sound more similar and a consensus emerged.

INTERVIEWEES RESPONSES

An individual without information cannot take responsibility. An individual who is given information cannot help but take responsibility.

Jan Carlzon¹¹

I shall begin by reviewing the responses of those diplomats who did not feel the Internet has impacted accountability in US diplomacy. FSO Dudley Sims asserted that the Internet has had little or no effect.¹² He reasoned that accountability “has always been the basis for diplomatic performance evaluations. And, the public has always been a part of and involved in diplomatic decisions.”¹³ In his opinion, accountability has been maintained by the system and thus had no room to improve.

FSO Ann Grimes felt strongly that diplomacy is not any more scrutinized now

¹⁰ Ibid.
¹² FSO Dudley Sims, phone conversation with author, 22 May 2002.
¹³ Ibid.
than in the past.\textsuperscript{14} She believes that diplomats are held to the same standards they always were, despite greater transparency. While her statements may indeed be true, their thrust involves expectations. She is contending that there is an equal level of expectation for diplomatic accountability before and after the Internet. However, this does not dismiss the possibility that the actual degree of accountability has improved.

A somewhat sobering point was raised by FSO Steve Browning with regard to this proposition. He claimed that the Internet has not made people more accountable, just more careful. While visibility has increased in the information age and with the Internet, he disclosed that “it doesn’t necessarily keep people honest.”\textsuperscript{15}

On the other side of the coin, the majority of interviewees, when presented with the proposition, were in agreement that while accountability has always been present in diplomatic dealings, it has been further reinforced by the Internet’s components. The basic concord is that ICT innovations, such as satellites and the Internet, have made fabricating and/or providing misinformation and disinformation from capitals more difficult. Under the circumstances, it is much easier to ascertain and confirm facts, figures, and events. Because of the Internet’s expansive reach, there is an extended system of checks and balances that did not exist before.

One example of this verification system, FSO J. Michael Houlanahan observed, is the quick, easy access to a magnitude of information that fortifies the ability of print and broadcast media to delve more deeply into issues and pursue stories more aggressively.\textsuperscript{16}

\textsuperscript{14} FSO Ann Grimes, phone conversation with author, 16 July 2002.
\textsuperscript{15} FSO Steve Browning, phone conversation with author, 25 July 2002.
\textsuperscript{16} FSO J. Michael Houlanahan, phone conversation with author, 15 July 2002.
Additionally, non-state actors in the private sector and the international arena also have the ability to tap resources in order to verify the credibility of information.\textsuperscript{17} Ambassadors and other diplomats reporting information must thus ensure accuracy and validity, an obligation that apparently “frustrates controlling Ambassadors.”\textsuperscript{18}

“The Internet makes world affairs more public,” said Dr. Michael Schneider, a thirty-six year veteran of the Foreign Service and member of the Public Diplomacy Council.\textsuperscript{19} As a result, diplomats must be extremely attentive and heedful when disseminating information. FSO John Salazar buttresses this point:

We diplomats must put the correct information down or it will come back to haunt us. [Consequently], people are a lot more careful now. They should be, in theory, as there is more to lose than to gain and it is one’s basic duty to be honest. For example, in the case of warning the public of potential terrorist threats. However, there is a fine line between covering your [behind] and accountability. A very fine line.\textsuperscript{20}

Thus, diplomats are more attentive and accountable when reporting information. This is, however, only one aspect of how the Internet has increased diplomatic accountability. The responsibility of being informed and abreast of what is going on in the world has also been affected by web-based technologies.

Both Ambassador Keith and notable academic Dr. James Rosenau raised this point in their interviews. They maintain that the USG and its diplomats can no longer claim they are unaware of things or events. In the case of humanitarian situations, for

\textsuperscript{17} FSO Lori Dando, phone conversation with author, 31 July 2002.  
\textsuperscript{18} FSO Jacqueline Briggs, phone conversation with author, 24 May 2002.  
\textsuperscript{19} Dr. Michael Schneider, phone conversation with author, 21 August 2002.  
\textsuperscript{20} FSO John Salazar, phone conversation with author, 30 May 2002.
example, information on such atrocities is made readily available, particularly by non-governmental organizations.

When dealing with NGOs or other interest groups, the Ambassador articulated that such entities ensure the USG is cognizant of what is going on globally. Once this has been accomplished, “they hold us to our word and make us accountable.”21 On this note, Dr. Rosenau added, “The truth cannot be circumvented anymore.”22

Likewise, American diplomats cannot claim ignorance in the process of negotiating. In the past, they could blame Congress for limitations. Now, foreign elites know what is going on in Congress. They know because many communicate regularly via E-mail with members of Congress and/or interest groups who are following specific topics on policy agendas. Coalitions are being built to ensure issues are addressed appropriately.23 Thus, advances in ICTs, like the Internet, have made such ‘Good Cop, Bad Cop’24 games more complicated to play.

The notion of accountability is apparent as well in the use of E-mail. In a previous chapter, I described the tremendous increase in the use of E-mail for diplomatic communications. With an abundance of E-mail comes many more opportunities for information to be mishandled or misconstrued.

Informal as it may be, E-mail is a means to disseminate information - information

22 Rosenau, phone conversation.
23 Ibid.
24 ‘Good Cop, Bad Cop’ refers to the act of making someone else take the blame for some lacking or an unpopular decision, even though you are a part of it. For example, a diplomat could try to blame Congress for limitations in a negotiation process when, in reality, it is not Congress alone that is limiting the process. The diplomat just wants to ease his/her own personal delivery of information.
that can be forwarded to anyone, including those who should not receive it. “We must be more cautious and more honest when writing E-mail,” warns FSO David Fredrick.25 “It is an eternal element whether it is [filed appropriately] or not. If you don’t want it on the front page of the Washington Post, don’t put it in an E-mail!”26

The issue of filing and recording E-mails was also touched upon beforehand. As a reminder, diplomats had commented that E-mails were supposed to be archived so that any and all communication was recorded. FSO Jacqueline Briggs added her opinion of the accountability factor and E-mail: “Accountability has been slow in coming. However, employees are now responsible for keeping records of E-mail since all correspondence is considered official government business. Prior to that requirement, it was impossible to verify information and deem it reliable and correct. It is better, in some ways, but it remains a problem to this day.”27

As FSO Briggs mentioned, there are regulations in existence, but they are not always followed. This is an area where accountability has yet to improve. Whereas diplomats are more guarded with the actual content of E-mails for accountability purposes, several are still falling short in their basic responsibility of keeping E-mails on file.

What is clear after the interviews is that accountability in diplomacy has, at least to some degree, been enhanced by the intricacies of the Internet. Moreover, the vertical accountability and centralized processes of government institutions make it possible to

26 Ibid.
27 Briggs, phone conversation.
hold government officials responsible for their decisions and actions.\textsuperscript{28} The combination of both systemic and outside monitoring of American diplomatic information, actions, and policies reveals, in the end, a rise in diplomatic accountability. The contribution of the Internet in this trend may not be monumental, yet many feel it is significant enough to be both acknowledged and respected.

In this section, non-state actors and the private sector were cited as components of the system of checks and balances regarding diplomatic accountability. The following section will elaborate on who exactly is included in the term ‘non-state actor.’ Once this is established, the next proposition, which contends that the Internet has advanced the abilities of non-state actors to influence American diplomacy, will be examined.

WHO ARE NON-STATE ACTORS?

The most striking change in diplomacy’s theater of operation, the international landscape, is the rise of non-state actors in the public realm.

Jessica Mathews, “Power Shift”\textsuperscript{29}

In a previous chapter, I explained the proliferation of added players outside of the State Department at US embassies. Federal agencies, such as the Department of Defense, the Department of the Treasury, the Federal Bureau of Investigation, etc., now have a considerable presence and representation at embassies. As a result, the number of Foreign Service employees serving in US Embassies has dropped to a mere forty percent


\textsuperscript{29} Jessica Mathews, “Power Shift,” \textit{Foreign Affairs} 76, no. 1 (January/February 1997): 50-60.
of overall Embassy personnel, with nearly half of them performing administrative support functions for other agencies. Accordingly, American diplomacy has had to incorporate the input and influence of these entities.

In addition to other state actors, non-state actors, within the private sector and beyond, have emerged on the scene and are vying for their own voice in the conduct of American diplomacy. Non-state actors can be described as individuals or groups who are not acting within the confines of a state’s government. Examples of non-state actors may range from representatives of non-governmental organizations to corporate executives to international organizations (IOs) to academicians, “all of whom can offer professional expertise, information resources, and political influence to the foreign policy process.”

NGOs are just one of the examples of a non-state actor, as mentioned previously. However, they are distinct in that they are widely regarded as being among the most important and influential with regard to world politics. Moreover, their number has increased dramatically in recent years. For example, in the early 20th century, the number

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of NGOs was less than two hundred, but by the late 1990s, there were already more than forty thousand, with the most significant growth occurring since the 1980s.33

Non-state actors have always had some degree of political influence. However, they were not usually taken very seriously.34 Information age technology has changed this drastically, first with the growth of satellite television, and then even more so with the advent of advanced digital communications.35

The most compelling innovation to magnify the reach and amplify the voice of non-state actors is by far the Internet. Enabling citizens to have a voice gives them power - power to communicate, power to organize, and, ultimately, power to influence government. The digital technology of the Internet provides the opportunity for people with common interests to find each other, interact, discuss, organize, and even attempt to influence politics locally and internationally. “By increasing the ease with which people can establish and maintain relationships, share resources and information, and coordinate their activities, the Internet aids the process of building and maintaining the social bases of a global civil society.”36 How these non-state, non-diplomatic entities have utilized the Internet to leverage the conduct and policy-making of American diplomacy is the focus of the next section.

33 Hughes, Continuity and Change in World Politics, 186.
34 Dr. James Schwoch, phone conversation with author, 19 November 2001.
35 Schneider, phone conversation.
36 Craig Warkentin, Reshaping World Politics: NGOs, the Internet, and Global Civil Society (Lanham, Md.: Rowman and Littlefield Publishers, Inc., 2001), 33.
ANALYSIS OF PROPOSITION V

P5: The Internet has augmented the influence of non-state actors in US diplomacy.

The information age has produced an accelerated interaction of cultures and of social and political systems. It has done this largely by making information available and communication possible just about everywhere and in every way imaginable with the interactive and communicative abilities of new ICTs. These advances are now available to the general citizenry, not just to government officials. As a result, the government no longer has the same degree of control over or privilege to information. This has opened the door for many new actors to be involved in international affairs, as the last section began to explain.

In 1997, Joseph Nye wrote an article about how government will undergo a complex transformation in which it will share governing responsibilities with market and nonprofit institutions. The contributors to the CSIS study, “Reinventing Diplomacy in the Information Age,” echoed this sentiment when they predicted that non-governmental institutions, “increasingly enabled by technologies and empowered by new skills, will assume many roles traditionally reserved for government.” Both pieces proved to be prophetic, as the foreign policy arena has expanded to include a multitude of non-state actors.

Whether technology can be used by governments to control the information their people have, or whether individuals can use it themselves to gain an information

38 “Reinventing Diplomacy in the Information Age,” 25.
advantage, is not a question that has just come about in the last few years. Diana Lady Dougan, speaking at a seminar back in 1991, observed that when George Orwell’s book, 1984, first came out, there was a vision of ICTs being a centralizing force for governments. The notion of “Big Brother” meant centralized control. Dougan then pointed out that, in reality, information and communications technologies have had the opposite effect. ICTs have actually led to a decentralization of government in the sense that individuals have gained more control and more access than governments ever imagined.

The Internet’s role in this phenomenon is immeasurable. The Net is public space that is shared by millions of citizens, but lacks a government. In its short existence, it has created a multiplicity of public spheres outside the confines of the state. In effect, the Internet has become an “enormously important tool for democratic participation at all levels, for strengthening civil society, and for the formation of a whole new world of transnational political and civic projects.”

Furthermore, the Internet breaks down hierarchies by “allowing the construction of oppositional subjectivities hitherto excluded from the public sphere.” The development of these Internet societies has lead to an energized and more participatory

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40 Ibid.
civil society. This civil society is where non-state actors have always been, but their presence was not always known, felt, or acknowledged, with rare exception.

Ambassador Keith agreed that non-state actors were not a factor in earlier days of diplomacy:

When I entered the Foreign Service, we simply did not work with NGOs. Now they are very important. We are all on the same page. The Internet has played a big role [in this process] and in how everyone subsequently deals with information. Now there is a checks and balances phenomenon [between governments and the non-governmental realm]. For it to get to this point, the Internet was the spur.

Internet capabilities have magnified the involvement of such actors by giving them a ‘microphone,’ so to speak. In the past, they had to shout from the back of the crowded room of world politics, where their claims were often inaudible or ignored. FSO Steve Browning also believes the Internet has provided the opportunity for interest groups to gain a greater role in US diplomacy. Not just NGOs, but small states, businesses, educational institutions, and state governments are all players now. With the Internet to credit, their “seat at the table” has been assured.

Dr. James Schwoch recalled his experience of the transition in the importance of non-state actors. It occurred while he was serving as part of a research team at the Center for Strategic and International Studies: “Non-state actors, such as non-governmental organizations, played second fiddle for a very long time. Their views and interests were considered on some level, but not prioritized. It took the Land Mine Treaty to formulate

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44 Frank Webster, *Culture and Politics in the Information Age* (London: Routledge, 2001), 165.
45 Keith, phone conversation.
46 Browning, phone conversation.
consensus in the CSIS group that NGOs have become full, legitimate partners in policy-making.  

The land mine treaty that Dr. Schwoch speaks of has an interesting history. A woman named Jody Williams began a campaign to ban the use of land mines, co-founding the ICBL (International Campaign to Ban Land Mines). The ICBL was formally launched by six NGOs in October of 1992.

From her laptop computer in her Vermont cottage, Williams used the Internet and E-mail to contact other NGOs, government officials, and peace activists around the world with the mission of the ICBL. Within five years, it had attracted the support of more than one thousand organizations in sixty different countries. In December of 1997, 137 countries signed the treaty to eliminate the use, production, sale, and stockpiling of anti-personnel mines. Williams went on to win the Nobel Prize for Peace.

All of this was accomplished outside of the traditional ratification process for an international treaty. The United Nations system was failing in its efforts, so the Canadian Foreign Minister, Lloyd Axworthy, invited all interested states to Ottawa to negotiate a treaty. Despite the absence of major powers - Russia, China, and the United States - a large number of states participated, and the treaty was signed. It would not have been

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47 Schwoch, phone conversation.
signed, however, without the resources of both the Internet and an active network of NGOs.51

The US government was sideswiped by the Land Mine treaty, according to Virtual Diplomacy expert Margarita Studemeister. She said the whole process was not taken seriously at first. It was assumed it would not affect governments. “How wrong they were!”52

The Land Mine Treaty is just the first of many examples of how the Internet has propelled the influence of non-state actors. The virtual citizens movement has been using E-mail and websites to organize demonstrations and revolutions around the world.53 Activists exploit Internet capabilities to expose an offending issue, facilitate public education about the issue, and mobilize “netizens”54 in actions to address the particular issue.55

NGOs are an excellent example of this trend, as most Northern-based NGOs make use of the Internet to pursue their organizational goals.56 Disseminating informational


52 Margarita Studemeister, phone conversation with author, 10 October 2001.


54 A ‘netizen’ is a citizen of cyberspace. Grassroots activists use the Internet to gain support from global citizens who are reachable on the Web. This is also referred to as cyber-activism - using the Internet to advance a cause.


56 Warkentin, Reshaping World Politics, 35.
resources to “both governments and the public historically has been one of the most
important and visible functions of NGOs.”\textsuperscript{57} Thus, it is not surprising that NGOs utilize
the Internet extensively in this continued endeavor.\textsuperscript{58}

For instance, Greenpeace International has been using the Internet since 1985.\textsuperscript{59} Its first website was established in 1994, and has grown to include over forty official
Greenpeace sites.\textsuperscript{60} Moreover, the organization utilizes Internet-based tools - such as
Web cams, streaming video, and sound files - to broadcast its message while capitalizing
on the Internet’s interactive abilities.

Another well-known NGO, Amnesty International, also takes advantage of web-based technologies in many ways. One application is put to use with the organization’s
‘Urgent Action Network,’ where masses of E-mails are sent in response to urgent cases of
human rights violations.\textsuperscript{61} E-mail recipients include relevant authorities, media sources,
and the public. The intent of the network is to circulate critical information immediately
so that dire situations can be addressed as soon as possible.

\textsuperscript{57} Ibid, 37.
\textsuperscript{58} See Andrew L. Shapiro, \textit{The Control Revolution: How the Internet is Putting
Individuals in Charge and Changing the World We Know} (New York: Public Affairs,
1999); Stephen E. Frantzich, \textit{Cyberage Politics 101: Mobility, Technology, and
Democracy} (New York: Peter Lang Publishing, Inc., 2002); Bruce Bimber, \textit{Information
and American Democracy: Technology in the Evolution of Political Power} (Cambridge,
UK: Cambridge University Press, 2003); Elaine Ciulla Kamarck and Joseph S. Nye, Jr.,
Institution Press, 2002); Michael Margolis and David Resnick, \textit{Politics As Usual: The
\textsuperscript{59} Warkentin, \textit{Reshaping World Politics}, 77.
\textsuperscript{60} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{61} Joanne Lebert, “Information and Communications Technologies and Human
Rights Advocacy: The Case of Amnesty International,” in Hajnal, \textit{Civil Society in the
Information Age}, 23.
Further examples include the introduction of E-mail at the 1995 Beijing Women’s Conference so that women globally would be able to stay in touch and keep working collectively toward the conference’s agenda after the fact. Along the same lines, student activists in Indonesia have used anonymous E-mail addresses, via Internet cafes, to organize pro-democracy rallies. Likewise, residents and diaspora of East Timor opened the world’s eyes to the horrors occurring on the island largely by using E-mail and websites.

From protesting meetings of the World Trade Organization and the G-8, to promoting the International Criminal Court, to fighting for democracy in Burma, electronically-savvy grassroots activists have used the Internet “to sway international opinion, and pique the interest of more traditional news media.” The ‘microphone effect’ of the Internet has carried this influence into the foreign policy process. This is one of the contributing factors to what has been called the “diffusion of diplomacy.” The next section will discuss this concept.

THE INTERNET AND THE DIFFUSION OF DIPLOMACY

Diplomacy in the information age has had to integrate a broad range of economic, socio-cultural, environmental, scientific, and legal considerations, along with the traditional political and military factors. With the increasing frequency of large multinational negotiations that cover many non-traditional topics, it is to be expected that a

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63 Danitz and Stroebel, “Cyber-Activists,” 2.

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broad spectrum of non-governmental participants and interest groups will be key audiences.\(^{64}\) However, these constituencies have gone from being part of an audience to becoming key players in the development of foreign policy.

Globalization and the proliferation of information technology are the major components behind the empowerment of non-state actors in foreign affairs. Their involvement has increasingly encroached upon traditional government functions.\(^{65}\) When the US fashioned a policy before, it didn’t have so many influences. This is not the case today.\(^{66}\)

Jessica Mathews has identified this as a power shift that is transferring part of a role once uniquely attached to governments - namely, framing international policy and law - to outsiders represented by NGOs, etc. For example, NGOs can now yank an issue from third or fourth tier of official interest and push it to the top. Once there, backed by sufficient public pressure, issues can move with a speed foreign to usual diplomatic practice. Information and communications technology is crucial in this power shift.\(^{67}\)

Of all the latest ICTs, the Internet has had the most profound effect in this transition.\(^{68}\) By making advocacy groups more efficient and better able to participate in

\(^{64}\) Cooper, “Diplomacy in the Information Age,” 6.
\(^{66}\) Grimes, phone conversation.
\(^{67}\) Mathews, “Power Shift,” 50-60.
making their values and standards known, the Internet strengthens the institutional roles they play in foreign policy formation.\textsuperscript{69} This challenges the management of diplomatic affairs traditionally carried out by states and their diplomatic representatives.\textsuperscript{70}

The Internet has had what Richard Solomon calls a “decentralizing effect on the formulation of US foreign policy.”\textsuperscript{71} By introducing new constituencies to the policy-making process, it changes the institutional arrangements under which foreign policy is promulgated. This phenomenon has been coined the “diffusion of diplomacy,” whereby academics, corporations, non-governmental organizations, and others assume traditional diplomatic roles through the power of networking.\textsuperscript{72}

These networks are decentralized, which is why they are so challenging to state-centered hierarchies. They are made up of “sets of interconnected individuals who occupy analogous positions in institutional or social structures and create new community relationships that build upon, democratize, and magnify existing social frameworks.”\textsuperscript{73}

Although such networks have always existed, proliferating ICTs, particularly the Internet, are rapidly reducing the economic and physical barriers that once limited network expansion.

Jamie Metzl describes decentralized networks as “self-optimizing. The more appropriate people they connect, the more useful and attractive the network becomes to

\textsuperscript{69} “Program on Communication and Society,” \textit{The Annual Review of Communications and Society}, (Queenstown, Md.: The Aspen Institute, 1990), 61.

\textsuperscript{70} Ibid, 2.

\textsuperscript{71} Solomon, “Internet and Diffusion of Diplomacy,” 1.


\textsuperscript{73} Metzl, “Network Diplomacy.”
others. Metcalf's law, named after Ethernet inventor Robert Metcalf, suggests that a network's value is the square of its members. Small network growth can therefore lead to exponential increases in effectiveness.74

The rise of a network society, together with the explosive growth of NGOs and other elements of transnational civil society, has complicated the understanding of "demarcating boundaries and state sovereignty, both key features of modern diplomacy."75 The new network society has spurred a political transition from territory-based power to information-based power. "Because networks are divested of territory, mastery transfers from territory to network."76

One of the most notable scholars on the topic of state sovereignty in the information age is Jean-Marie Guehenno. He contends that "territorial sovereignty is no longer sacrosanct."77 World politics has moved from the previously two-dimensional world of territorial power to a three-dimensional world of network power.78 "The integrity, power and security of the nation state are challenged by multinationals from above and by ever-shifting coalitions of networked interest groups from below."79 Both exert political pressure on nation states to "conform to the norms of the network society."80

James Rosenau has also written extensively on the notion of state sovereignty. He

74 Ibid.
75 Cooper, "Diplomacy in the Information Age," 2.
77 Guehenno, End of the Nation State.
79 Ibid.
80 Ibid.
claims that while it has eroded, it is still being strongly asserted. Nonetheless, there is a decentralized fusion of global and local interests, a dynamic he calls “fragmegration.” He defines this as “a concept that juxtaposes the processes of fragmentation and integration occurring within and among organizations, communities, countries, and transnational systems such that it is virtually impossible not to treat them as interactive and causally linked.”

What Rosenau’s fragmegration amounts to is the notion that authority is being dispersed away from states at the same time that non-state actors are gaining more leverage as primary international actors. These new constituencies contending for international power do not have the official power to recognize or withhold recognition from states. However, with ICT innovations like the Internet, “they often influence the states that do.”

Thus, the diffusion of diplomacy is being fueled by the Internet’s ability to involve non-state actors in international and domestic governance. Moreover, traditional diplomatic functions and practices are becoming more and more affected by the “easy and diverse routes wherein information flows and the acceleration of fragmegrative dynamics results.” Brown and Studemeister sum up this new reality as follows:

Diplomacy’s theater of operation, its tools and practitioners, have changed

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81 Rosenau, “States, Sovereignty, and Diplomacy,” 5.
82 This concept was first developed in Rosenau, “Fragmegrative Challenges to National Security.” For a more recent and elaborate formulation, see Rosenau, “New Dimensions of Security.”
85 Ibid.
fundamentally to meet the demands of flatter, more responsive, more information-equipped and demanding global publics. Diplomacy in this environment is shared by all who speak and act on a global level to arbitrate, negotiate, mediate, or in any way represent the multiple perspectives that make up these publics. Will the diffusion and expansion of diplomacy to non-state actors continue? Is the Internet here to stay? Without a doubt.87

CONCLUSION

This chapter first analyzes, in the context of greater transparency, the Internet’s role in US diplomatic accountability. It was found that a checks and balances system has emerged. Increased openness and public access to greater amounts of information have allowed non-diplomatic actors to observe and even verify information being communicated by American diplomats. This has resulted in a much more attentive approach to knowledge-sharing.

Moreover, actions taken and policies implemented by US diplomats are more often in the public eye for scrutiny. The expectation that diplomats will be able to justify their decisions is enhanced by the transparency of the decision-making process. In addition, it is hardly possible or acceptable to claim a lack of knowledge, or to transfer blame elsewhere, as constituencies have the ability to confirm information.

With regard to the impact of non-state actors on American diplomatic conduct, it was discovered that the Internet has played a crucial part. With its ability to extend and accelerate the dispersion of information to an unlimited global civil society, the Internet has greatly contributed to magnifying the influence of non-state actors on diplomatic conduct. Examples were given as to how the Internet has aided the cause of activists

dispersed by geography and culture in ways that would not have been possible in the era before the Internet's networking capabilities became cheaply and globally available. Without the Internet, it is doubtful that these groups would have the means to connect, organize, and project influence in world politics to such an extent.

Important to the understanding of the changing arena of global politics is the notion of the diffusion of diplomacy. This diffusion is a result of the increased access of non-state actors in large part due to ICT advances like the Internet. Many believe this has reduced the power of the state, even weakening its sovereignty. The validity of this claim, however, is difficult to assess, as the changes occurring are continuous and not static. More time is needed to reveal to what extent information power has replaced or taken precedence over territorial power.

What is apparent is that American diplomacy in the age of transparency is a multifaceted process with rapidly shifting trans-state alliances. The Internet has essentially shrunk the world and has "forever altered the power of netizens to influence the development of US foreign policy without ever setting foot inside the nation’s capital." Therefore, US diplomacy must create a permanent place for non-state actors as it adjusts its operations and its agenda to information age realities.

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89 See Rosenau, “States, Sovereignty, and Diplomacy”; Everard, Virtual States; Rothkopf, “Cyberpolitik”; Guehenno, End of the Nation-State; Nye and Keohane, Power and Interdependence; Wriston, “Bits, Bytes, and Diplomacy.”
90 Finel and Lord, Power & Conflict, 345.
91 Solomon, “Internet and Diffusion of Diplomacy,” 5.
CHAPTER VI
CONCLUSION

We are presently deeply immersed in a ubiquitous, networked, multimedia technological era where information has become a fundament of modern society.¹ The ascent of information has been a result of tremendous advances in information and communications technologies. Such innovations have created a whole new set of standards for the acquisition, processing, storage, and dissemination of information.²

The computer-based network facility known as the Internet has expanded this trend exponentially. Every day, millions of people throughout the globe communicate via E-mail and search for information by means of the World Wide Web, both Internet applications. With its ability to disperse information instantaneously and inexpensively, Internet technology has made information more malleable, movable, and transmissible than ever before.

A more transparent, information-intensive environment has had significant repercussions regarding the conduct of international relations. Consequently, the diplomatic realm has faced new challenges to its traditional practices. The academic work involving such entities has focused on what has been called 'information age diplomacy.'³ While the effects of the telephone, satellite television, and other forms of

¹ Mason, Mason, and Culnan, Ethics of Information Management, xv.
² Ibid.
³ See “Reinventing Diplomacy in the Information Age,” 25; Malone, American Diplomacy, 36; Webster, Culture and Politics in the Information Age, 165; Cooper, “Diplomacy in the Information Age,” 6; Rosenau, “States, Sovereignty, and Diplomacy,” 5; Brown and Studemeister, “Virtual Diplomacy,” 3; Spalter, “Digital Diplomacy”;
mass media have been studied in this context, academia has paid surprisingly little attention to the specific ramifications of the Internet and its applications.

Under these pretenses, I organized a research project that studies how the Internet has impacted diplomacy. For the purpose of this dissertation, I narrowed my scope to focus only on American diplomacy, and in particular on the US State Department, for reasons stated in the introduction. It is the aim of this dissertation to offer a new perspective on the changes occurring in the conduct of US diplomacy in the age of the Internet.

In the previous three analysis chapters, I identified and discussed five distinct propositions I devised regarding the impact of the Internet on US diplomacy. Each proposition was explained and analyzed accordingly. The findings of my propositions were based predominantly on the data collected from interviews with those within the diplomatic hierarchy. Interviewees were selected on the basis of having an active Foreign Service career that encompassed both the pre-Internet era and the period after its inception, for comparative purposes. This collection of individuals offered invaluable insight on the research topic where current literature is either unavailable or, at best, scant. Additional interviews with notable academics, technological experts, and retired Foreign Service personnel were conducted to fill in any gaps, as well as to complement the compiled data.

At this time, a review of the findings of each proposition will be presented. After summarizing the results, I shall expound upon the implications of my research. The
implications will be explained within the framework of my dependent variable (US diplomacy), and will be placed in the broader context of the existing literatures surrounding foreign policy, global interdependence, and information age diplomacy. Both theoretical and policy-making implications will be considered, as well as the overall impact on US diplomacy.

EMPIRICAL FINDINGS - A SUMMARY

Chapter III outlined the Internet's effects on the transformation of US diplomatic communications, with special emphasis on the pertinence of face-to-face diplomacy. Two propositions were addressed within this framework. The first one claims that the Internet has increased the frequency of diplomatic communication. The second proposition postulates that while the number of meetings between diplomats has decreased due to the communication advantages of the Internet, the importance of face-to-face diplomacy remains critical. One of the main undertones that emerged is that communication issues are no longer just technical issues for engineers and scientists, but rather a complicated blend of economic, political, and strategic interests.4

The results of the first proposition indicated that the Internet has indeed greatly increased the frequency of diplomatic communication. Interviewees described multiple ways in which the Internet and its adjuncts have transformed the way they communicate for their jobs. E-mail was cited as the main method being used. It was praised for being a form of communication that is instantaneous, inexpensive, and more efficient with

4 The genesis of this concept emerged in the early 90s. See Malone, American Diplomacy, 16.
regard to time zone differentials. It is important to note that although E-mail has been utilized extensively, the cable system is still the formal means of transmission for official diplomatic communiques.

Increased diplomatic communication has both negative and positive repercussions. On the down side, there is the problem of information overload, the expectation to keep Washington informed constantly, and the potential loss of diplomatic record if E-mails are not filed appropriately. In addition, some interviewees expressed concern that digital communications could result in a certain degree of sacrifice regarding the personal aspect of diplomatic interaction, whether on the phone or in person. For example, individuals can substitute an E-mail for a live exchange in circumstances where a more personal exchange is more appropriate.

In contrast, interviewees praised the speed, ease, and low cost of web-based, real-time communication that is essentially indifferent to geography. In addition, interviewees commented on the benefits and advantages of using E-mail for the purpose of ‘back-channeling.’ This maneuver allows diplomats to utilize E-mail to forward an idea or concept without experiencing the frequent delays or interruptions typical of the traditional, hierarchical approval chain.

With regard to the second proposition, it was discovered that the actual number of in-person, face-to-face diplomatic meetings has in fact declined. New technologies, such as web-based, digital video-conferencing, offer the advantages of interactive, real-time collaboration despite geographical barriers. While such virtual meetings are occurring more often, diplomats strongly emphasized the ongoing importance of face-to-face, personal interaction. The catch phrase that was continually repeated was “the last three
feet" of diplomacy. Interviewees believe there is no substitute for this, for instance, when developing personal connections, establishing trust, or interpreting the body language of other interlocutors.

Concerns of information security were also addressed in this chapter. Transmitting information via the Internet raises issues of confidentiality, the protection of sensitive documents, and the vulnerability to hackers, worms, viruses, and moles. The State Department has made progress in this area, but is still in the process of implementing a more advanced, secure web-based communication system, borrowing from lessons learned at the Department of Defense, government intelligence agencies, and private industry.

The next analysis chapter, Chapter IV, examined the utilization of the Internet by American public diplomacy practitioners. The proposition surrounding this topic proposed that the Internet is playing a major role in advancing public diplomacy efforts. A brief history of the United States Information Agency is covered, as is an extended explanation of what constitutes ‘public diplomacy.’

From 1953 to 1999, the USIA handled all public diplomacy initiatives for the US government. However, cost-containment and the goal of integrating foreign policy objectives led to the merger of USIA into the State Department. The consolidation has been difficult, due to a clash of cultures. The traditional culture of the State Department has its roots in the Cold War era. It is based on secrecy and protectionism. The antithesis to this is the USIA, which, operating independently of the State Department, pursued objectives that required a substantially high level of openness.

Further complicating the merger was the stark differential in the degree of comfort
and utilization of ICTs, with USIA officials much further along than those at the Department. Again, it was State's culture generating distrust and caution with regard to implementing technological advances. The cumulative result of this resistance has been a dangerously-antiquated IT system at State. Consequently, this has been one of the main focal points regarding State Department reform for the past five to seven years.

In spite of the difficulties, public diplomacy officials - both in the former USIA, and in the post-merger public diplomacy cone at the State Department - have used the Internet to enhance their initiatives. In fact, the consensus among interviewees was that the Internet has had more of an impact in public diplomacy than in any other area of US diplomacy, before and after the merger. Public diplomacy's mission is to inform, influence, and engage foreign audiences with regard to US values, ideals, and policies. It follows, then, that the Internet's unlimited degree of outreach, its instantaneousness, and its cost-effectiveness have greatly enhanced the initiatives of public diplomacy practitioners.

One of the latest benefits of the Internet for public diplomacy is the development of USG websites. Basic marketing principles underlie the management of governmental sites which have, in a sense, become instruments of diplomacy. Web-based technologies allow public diplomats to work with the media and other interest groups to disseminate information, as well as to provide access to additional linkages that address the individual needs and interests of end users.

Budgetary constraints have led to the closing of many overseas cultural centers that were considered key outreach tools for public diplomacy. These cultural centers are often the only means for foreign publics to learn about the United States - its history, its
ideals, its government, and beyond. To counter the loss of these critical assets, public diplomacy officials are taking advantage of Internet technology to create virtual libraries that place books, journals, and other publications on-line for continued access despite the loss of a physical presence.

Yet another utilization of the Internet for public diplomacy is the electronic placement of television and radio broadcasts. People can now listen to or watch live media programs on the Web, or, if they prefer, download the programs for more convenient, cost-effective access off-line. Extensive efforts have been made to offer such entities in a multitude of languages so as to provide the maximum amount of information to an increasingly-diverse audience.

It is important to note that as much as the Internet is being used to promote the United States, many are using it as a means for spreading negative propaganda about America. Fortunately, the same technology that disseminates misinformation and disinformation can be used to counter it. Interviewees stressed the importance of using the Internet as a primary tool to retort and respond quickly, easily, and broadly in such instances.

Chapter V, the final analysis chapter, included an overview of how greater transparency in the age of the Internet has impacted both accountability and the influence of non-state actors with regard to US diplomacy. Two propositions were examined in this chapter. The first declares that the Internet has enhanced accountability in American diplomacy. The second proposition asserts that the Internet has augmented the influence of non-state actors in US diplomacy.

On the first point, it was found that diplomatic accountability has been impacted
by the Internet's capacity to provide widespread, public access to a wealth of information. The resulting transparency has opened the door for outside sources to both oversee and confirm the information being offered by diplomatic sources. Once an action or policy intention is stated, the media and/or other interest groups can hold the USG accountable to its word. Interviewees referred to this as an emerging system of checks and balances.

Increased transparency also eliminates the ability of the government to claim ignorance on world issues, whether it be a humanitarian crisis or a political uprising. The expectation is that a well-informed statement or response to world events will be given promptly. Moreover, if an unpopular policy must be communicated, or a negotiation is lagging, it is difficult to transfer blame elsewhere if the responsibility is indeed within, or shared in part.

The Internet presents situations where accountability is paramount. E-mail is an "eternal element," so diplomats have had to be more cautious, truthful, and calculated in what they send electronically. Likewise, the responsibility of recording diplomatic exchanges sent via E-mail, along with concerns for security breaches such as missing laptops or the use of non-secure computers for classified work, have raised the bar on diplomatic accountability.

Overall, diplomatic accountability was believed to have been improved and reinforced due to the existence of the Internet. Diplomats are more careful about what they say, what they put in an E-mail, and how they comply with occupational regulations. Although I began with the presupposition of a respectable level of existing diplomatic

5 Fredrick, phone conversation.
accountability, interviewees acknowledged that, in their experience, the Internet has had a considerable impact on ameliorating this level.

On the second point, interviewees were in agreement that greater transparency due to the Internet has amplified the role of non-state actors in American diplomacy. As mentioned above, the Internet has provided access to an incredible amount of information that, in the past, had a limited audience. Now, non-governmental organizations, multinational corporations, interest groups, and even individuals can learn about and, if necessary, request (through the Freedom of Information Act) information once limited to state actors or elite USG officials.

This new openness has led to what has been called a decentralization of government. Foreign policy agendas have expanded to include a growing number of transnational issues, which in turn has called for more input from a multitude of interest groups. Likewise, as the interconnectedness of global civil society grows rapidly via transnational electronic networks, so has the influence of non-state actors on diplomacy.

Cyber-activism has blossomed in the age of the Internet as well. Virtual citizens movements are using web-based technologies to communicate, organize, and disseminate information on issues of concern, as well as to put pressure on governments to respond. E-mail and websites are now the primary tools for mobilizing ‘netizens’ to take action.

The diplomats interviewed also referred repeatedly to a diffusion of diplomacy that was occurring in a more transparent environment. They listed globalization, the proliferation of information via the Internet, and the Net’s provision of connectivity as

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6 Keck and Sikkink, *Activists Beyond Borders*. 

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being major factors in the diffusion process because these constituents enhance and enable the involvement and influence of non-state actors in US diplomacy. Additionally, interviewees raised the issue that traditional notions of state sovereignty are challenged as authority is dispersed away from states, and other entities gain more leverage in the American diplomatic process.

The consensus of interviewees with regard to the propositions can be explained as follows. First of all, each is a member of the Foreign Service, which is within the jurisdiction of the State Department. Thus, they have the same job responsibilities, expectations, and protocol. Secondly, being that they have all been active FSOs before and after the inception of the Internet, their experience with the Internet and US diplomacy is similar within the context of the Foreign Service. Even those interviewees who had served at posts lacking the infrastructure or capability for web-based technology also had had experience elsewhere, so that their responses to the interview questions were still parallel, resulting in overwhelming consensus on each issue.

In sum, it has been determined in this study that the Internet has had a significant impact on certain aspects of American diplomacy. It has transformed the methods, patterns, and protocol of diplomatic communication and interaction, increased the efficiency and outreach capabilities of public diplomacy, enhanced the level of diplomatic accountability, and strengthened the role of non-state actors in US diplomacy. At this time, it is necessary to determine what these results mean for US diplomacy, and why they are important. I shall begin with a discussion of the theoretical implications of my findings. First, I will apply the Organizational Process Model to the United States Department of State. Secondly, the findings will be considered in the context of the two
main camps of international relations theory - realism and liberalism. Specific focus is placed on the challenges of the diffusion of diplomacy in the age of the Internet, including the role of non-state actors and the notion of state sovereignty.

Next, implications for US foreign policy-making will be examined. The diffusion of diplomacy is revisited in this section. In addition, the influence of non-state actors on policy-making is analyzed. Moreover, I will address the difficulties surrounding information overload, the verification of data, and the expectation of rapid responses to world events.

Finally, a discussion of the broader implications for US diplomacy is explored. How changes and adjustments in diplomatic conduct due to the Internet and its applications have affected the role of diplomats is examined. Moreover, I shall contemplate what such changes mean and reveal for the conduct and content of US diplomacy overall.

THEORETICAL IMPLICATIONS

To reveal and understand the significance of the Internet's impact on US diplomacy, it is necessary to place it in a broader theoretical context. Thus, we must retract the zoom lens and examine the overall picture. American diplomats operate within the confines of the Foreign Service, which is under the jurisdiction of the United States Department of State, an organization within the United States government.

Secondly, to understand the changes in the behavior and conduct of US diplomacy on account of the Internet, we must first examine what determines the behavior and conduct of the Department of State. As the Department is an organization, it is possible
to explain its actions by applying a theory of organizational behavior. I shall therefore call upon international relations (IR) theory and apply the Organizational Process Model, also known as the Organizational Behavior Model, to the US State Department.

ORGANIZATIONAL PROCESS MODEL

The Organizational Process Model tells us that organizations function according to standard patterns of behavior. These patterns are based on an existing, preestablished set of rules and operating procedures. Thus, the behavior of organizations can be explained in terms of these "common organizational purposes and practices."

Organizations, according to the Organizational Process Model, have what is referred to as an 'organizational culture' that shapes the behavior of individuals within the organization itself. This culture is defined as "the set of beliefs the members of an organization hold about their organization, beliefs they have inherited and pass on to their successors." Moreover, operational activity of an organization further shapes organizational culture, as organizations define and redefine themselves through their actions.

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8 Allison and Zelikow, *Essence of Decision*, 143. Allison and Zelikow refer to this model as the Organizational Behavior Model, which is synonymous to the Organizational Process Model.
9 Ibid, 144.
11 Allison and Zelikow, 153.
12 Ibid, 154.
When applying the Organizational Process Model to a governmental organization, Siobhan McEvoy-Levy explains that “the view and policies proposed by government officials are limited because of a process of institutional conditioning and recruitment and training procedures which create ‘organizational parochialism’.”\textsuperscript{13} The author comments that organizational parochialism is particularly evident in the military and the Foreign Service (a division of the State Department), where “hierarchical structures promote conformity in thought and activity. Policies are affected by institutional self-interest, the need to justify ongoing practices and expenditures, the desire to increase the power of the institution, or to maintain its existence.”\textsuperscript{14}

A distinct set of beliefs emerges, and those beliefs create the organizational culture, which is “marked and accentuated by:

- the way the organization has defined success in operational terms
- selective information available to the organization;
- special systems or technologies operated by the organization in performing its task;
- professional norms for recruitment and tenure of personnel in the organization;
- the experience of making “street-level” decisions;
- the distribution of rewards by the organization.”\textsuperscript{15}

I shall now apply the Organizational Process Model to the State Department. State has a strict set of rules and procedures in the code of conduct for its personnel. Its culture has traditionally been one of secrecy, with caution and covertness surrounding their operational structure and practices in the interest of national security.

The Department is America’s oldest agency, and is not known for its innovation\textsuperscript{13} McEvoy-Levy, \textit{American Exceptionalism}, 15.\textsuperscript{14} Ibid.\textsuperscript{15} Allison and Zelikow, 167.
and adaptation to change. In fact, it prides itself on its continuity and consistency in a changing world environment.\textsuperscript{16} However, resistance to change is not always a positive choice. As Allison and Zelikow warn, cultural routines of organizations often clash with efficiency.\textsuperscript{17}

This became obvious as advances in information and communications technologies redefined the concepts of time and distance. The State Department’s internal culture strongly objected to the newer, more efficient technologies, preferring instead the existing slower, safer methods of communication. The snail-like response to faster, less expensive, and more effective ICTs is indicative of the components explained by the Organizational Process Model.

The structure of the Organizational Process Model also has relevance for the comportment of US diplomacy. Bruce Kuklick has identified what he calls an “operative tradition” within the diplomatic community.\textsuperscript{18} The Foreign Service operates within the State Department and, consistent with the Organizational Process Model, has applied its traditions and culture to its practices.

This helps to explain, for example, the secondary status assigned to public diplomacy. Public diplomacy requires and thrives upon openness and transparency. Because it operates in contrast to State’s core organizational culture, it was not only

\textsuperscript{16} Byers, phone conversation.
\textsuperscript{17} Allison and Zelikow, 155.
marginalized, but it was also placed within a separate agency (the USIA) until just recently.\textsuperscript{19}

CONTRASTING CAMPS

The other theoretical aspect that is relevant to my findings involves the division of international relations theory into two traditional camps - Realism and Liberalism. Where this debate comes into play the most is with the findings regarding the role of non-state actors in US diplomacy, as well as the diffusion of diplomacy and the potential consequences for state sovereignty. In order to understand the different theoretical approaches to these concepts, I shall first begin with a short overview of both Realism and Liberalism.

Classical realist assumptions are based on two basic tenets. The first is that states are key actors in international affairs. The second is that states act rationally, using cost-benefit analysis when choosing actions that maximize their benefit and minimize their risk.\textsuperscript{20}

The law of politics, for realism, have their roots in human nature.\textsuperscript{21} In this tradition, it is believed that humans are “motivated to seek domination over others,

\textsuperscript{19} Today, particularly in the wake of the September 11\textsuperscript{th} attacks, public diplomacy has taken on a new meaning.

\textsuperscript{20} For more on Realism, see George F. Kennan, American Diplomacy 1900-1950 (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1951); Hans J. Morgenthau, Politics Among Nations: The Struggle for Power and Peace, 5\textsuperscript{th} Edition (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1978); Michael Joseph Smith, Realist Thought from Weber to Kissinger (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1986); Kissinger, Diplomacy.

\textsuperscript{21} Morgenthau, Politics Among Nations, 4-15.
making politics among nations a struggle for power, and *realpolitik*\textsuperscript{22} policies the necessary prescription for survival.\textsuperscript{23} In short, Realism's 'state-as-actor' model is the criterion on which the expectations of state behavior are based.

Liberalism, on the other hand, assumes that a state's objectives, beliefs, and behaviors are shaped by its political regime - for example, whether they are democracies or dictatorships.\textsuperscript{24} This is predicated on the central theme of the liberalist tradition, which declares that "state structures matter."\textsuperscript{25} Therefore, for liberalism, the structure of a state's domestic government, along with the values and opinions of its citizens, impacts a state's approach to international affairs.

Liberalism is distinguishable from realism by the priority it bestows upon the institutions and processes of domestic governance.\textsuperscript{26} In contrast to the 'state-as-actor' premise of realism, theorists in the liberalist tradition identify state-society relations as one of the fundamental components impacting state behavior in world politics. Thus, in the words of Andrew Maravcsik, "societal ideas, interests, and institutions influence state behavior by shaping state preferences, that is, the fundamental social purposes underlying the strategic calculations of governments.\textsuperscript{27}"

\textsuperscript{22} *Realpolitik* is the state of affairs where "relations among states are determined by raw power and the mighty prevail." See Kissinger, *Diplomacy*, 104.


\textsuperscript{24} Allison and Zelikow, 36.

\textsuperscript{25} Ibid, 39.


Under the Realist approach, any state action that is taken is a function of state interests. With regard to my findings, then, it follows that realism would downplay the role non-state actors could play in foreign policy-making or the conduct of diplomacy. Furthermore, NSAs would receive little or no credit for influencing policy decisions because realism assumes that, ultimately, no state action is taken that states do not want to happen.

This is in direct contrast to my findings, which indicate that one of the repercussions of advanced ICTs like the Internet is a diffusion of diplomacy in international affairs. This diffusion has opened diplomatic procedures and conduct to include the input of non-diplomatic entities, such as non-state actors. My findings on this matter, therefore, are more consistent with the liberal school, as liberalism would emphasize that non-state actors do indeed matter in the tapestry of international relations.

Furthermore, many believe the diffusion of diplomacy has caused a shift in the notion of state sovereignty. The realist, Westphalian model links sovereignty with exclusive territorial jurisdiction. However, the innovations of the information age - and in large part, the Internet - have rendered state sovereignty "vulnerable to boundary-spanning flows" of information affecting the political, economic, and social aspects of a

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28 This point was elaborated upon in Chapter V. See Mathews, "Power Shift"; Solomon, "Internet and Diffusion of Diplomacy"; Brown and Studemeister, "Diffusion of Diplomacy," 24-29; "Program on Communication and Society," 61; Cooper, "Diplomacy in the Information Age," 6; Metzl, "Network Diplomacy"; Metzl, "Can Public Diplomacy Rise?" 2.

29 See Guehenno, End of the Nation State; Guehenno, "Topology of Sovereignty"; Rosenau, "States, Sovereignty, and Diplomacy"; Cooper, "Diplomacy in the Information Age"; Mathews, "Power Shift"; Sassen, "Internet and Sovereignty".

30 Guehenno, "Topology of Sovereignty."
state’s jurisdiction. As Ken Booth describes it, “the [metaphor for the] international system which is now developing...is of an egg-box containing the shells of sovereignty, but alongside it a global community omelet is cooking.”

While the Internet may challenge or even redefine traditional notions of state sovereignty, it is an overstatement to say that state sovereignty has eroded. For the purpose of this dissertation, it is important to consider how the Internet’s role in the diffusion of diplomacy and the changing nature of state sovereignty affect US diplomacy. The next section will address how these entities come into play for US diplomacy with regard to foreign policy-making.

IMPLICATIONS FOR US FOREIGN POLICY-MAKING

The Internet has created an environment of greater transparency and connectivity that has significantly altered the conduct of US diplomacy and its role in foreign policy-making. Moreover, with the rise in globalization and interdependence, a transnationalization of foreign policy agendas has occurred. Beyond the traditional political and military matters, additional global issues - such as the environment, human

33 See Rosenau, Study of Global Interdependence; Brown, New Forces, Old Forces; Ray, Global Politics; Russett and Oneal, Triangulating Peace; McMillan, “Interdependence and Conflict,” 33-58; Jones, Globalisation and Interdependence; Keohane and Nye, Power and Interdependence.
34 This was established in the Introduction of this dissertation. For more on the transnationalization of the foreign policy agenda, see Cincotta, “Post-Modern Diplomacy.”
rights, terrorism, and drug trafficking - have become a primary concern for policy-makers.

The combination of such trends has led to a diffusion of diplomacy, exposing the diplomatic realm to a plethora of influences. Non-state actors are increasingly utilizing the Internet to access information, advance their causes, and put pressure or exert influence on diplomats and others making policy decisions. Information is empowering private sector individuals and groups to such a degree that non-state actors are playing an increasingly prominent and autonomous role in the ways that governments interact with their citizens and with other governments. As a result, NSAs have moved from the periphery to playing a primary role in foreign affairs and diplomatic dealings, which has had a decentralizing effect on foreign policy-making.

The dispersion of influence has led to the emergence of a checks and balances system for American diplomacy. Sources outside of the policy-making arena can now easily verify information being communicated by USG officials, and hold them publicly accountable. With increased transparency, maintaining credibility and consistency has become more difficult. Policy-makers, and the diplomats presenting such policies, have had to adjust. A more heedful approach to information-sharing has been implemented so as to lend verisimilitude to their policies.

Another implication of the diffusion of diplomacy is the fact that foreign policy and diplomatic decisions are now made based on a compilation of both domestic and

36 Solomon, “Internet and Diffusion of Diplomacy,” 1.
international implications. Joseph Nye elaborates on how this has impacted foreign policy and diplomacy:

The inter-penetration of domestic and international policy arenas has had the effect of ‘ politicizing’ the diplomatic environment. The process of ratifying agreements often involves a continuing dialogue with interested domestic constituencies alongside international negotiation. This has meant that the demands for coordination have expanded from the horizontal plane represented by intra-bureaucratic linkages, to the vertical plane of intra-societal relations.37

In effect, there has been a blurring of the word ‘ foreign ’ in foreign policy. In the new environment of world affairs, foreign policy is no longer limited to just foreign elements. The meshing of domestic and foreign issues suggest the term ‘ foreign policy ’ may be more appropriately renamed as ‘ global policy ’.38

An additional challenge posed by the Internet to policy formation, implementation, and coordination is the overwhelming amount of information available. This has been referred to as ‘ information overload. ’ It is complicating not only decision-making processes among international affairs practitioners, but such fundamental activities as discerning valuable from useless, misleading or deliberately distorted information.

Furthermore, the age of real-time television and digital communications has led to the expectation of immediacy. The technologically-emboldened media has made a habit of thrusting microphones in the faces of statesmen, incessantly demanding fresh quotes for their 24-hour news deadlines.39 By permitting greater “ public and media interference

38 For an extended inquiry into the dynamics that have obscured the boundaries between domestic and foreign affairs, see Rosenau, Along the Domestic Foreign Frontier.
39 “ Ambassadors: Relics of the Sailing Ships? ”
in foreign policy agenda-setting and deliberations, the Internet’s real-time and open-source information access has effectively shortened the time frame in which decisions are expected to be made. Consequently, political figures are under more pressure to react to world events immediately with a response and/or policy intentions.

The problem of information overload, and the challenge of sorting what is valid and what is not, leaves policy-makers in a situation where they have more information than ever before, but less time to analyze it. Concerns were raised by interviewees that hasty analyses may be less thorough as a result. An old adage among diplomats is that time is on the side of diplomacy. Rushed decisions can potentially reduce the quality of output. The strategic importance of delay in diplomacy is explained by Warren P. Stroebel: “Speed is not an advantage in diplomacy as it is in journalism or war. Speed is the enemy - hastening decisions, locking in initial reactions, and minimizing room for negotiation. In journalism and war, there is no substitute for speed. In diplomacy, there is no cure for it.”

It has been determined that the Internet and its capabilities have contributed to greater transparency, increased connectivity, and rising global interdependence. Consequently, it has fueled a diffusion of diplomacy that has allowed for non-state actors to play a more significant role in influencing both diplomatic conduct and the policymaking process. The power of ideas, activism, and networks have become a force with which governments must reckon.

40 “Program on Communication and Society,” 73.
41 Stroebel, Late-Breaking Foreign Policy, 108-9.
42 Smith, “Reinventing Diplomacy,” 17.
The resultant new information-intensive environment presents diplomats and policy-makers with the challenges of information overload and an accelerated decision-making process. Moreover, the lines between domestic and international policy are disappearing. As a result, policy-makers have had to develop a more comprehensive approach in order to incorporate new world realities.

IMPLICATIONS FOR US DIPLOMACY

The acquisition, analysis, management, and dissemination of information are central to every aspect of diplomacy. Information and communications technologies can enhance these areas by increasing the quality and efficiency of such practices. This dissertation has isolated the Internet from other ICTs to examine the ways in which web-based technologies have been utilized to advance the conduct of US diplomacy. Specific focus was placed on the patterns of diplomatic communication, public diplomacy initiatives, and the emergence of a more transparent environment for US diplomacy. Thus, the implications for US diplomacy overall can be divided into these three major themes.

With regard to the first theme of diplomatic communication, the Internet has altered traditional methods. It has allowed for communications to be faster, less expensive, and more frequent. Moreover, it has provided alternatives to in-person meetings so that the number of face-to-face diplomatic exchanges has declined. However, what does this mean for American diplomacy?

In general terms, it has greatly increased the efficiency of diplomatic exchange. More can be accomplished in less time due to the immediacy of information-sharing and
access to real-time interchange. Time zones have become irrelevant, as digital transmissions eliminate former inconveniences.

While the efficiency of communications has increased in US diplomacy, the role of American diplomats has changed as a result. Previously in this dissertation, it was established that in the earlier days of diplomacy, limited communication with Washington allowed diplomats more freedom and autonomy with regard to making key decisions. As more and more advances in ICTs came about, however, communication between overseas posts and the capital increased accordingly.

The Internet has significantly added to this trend. Its capabilities provide a means for more regularity and consistency in consultations between Washington and the field, despite time zone differentials. This has critical implications with regard to the role of diplomats in decision-making.

For example, now there is far more frequent deferral to Washington for decisions than was practical when most correspondence went by diplomatic pouch. Washington is keeping its overseas personnel on a tighter leash. As a result, embassies, and their personnel, have become less powerful players in policy formulation.

Diplomats' first-hand, culturally-sensitive input regarding public opinion and media reactions in host countries remains important to policy-makers. Nonetheless, diplomats are making less decisions at post that do not involve consultation with the capital. Consequently, their role in foreign policy is not as significant or proactive as in the past.

At a recent colloquium, former US Ambassador to Yugoslavia, Warren Zimmerman, commented on the tighter leash put on diplomats in the information age:
[It] may annoy them, but it does not make them less necessary. On the contrary, envoys are still needed to deliver messages privately and confidentially, even under the watchful eye of the media... In some sense, they are more needed than ever before. An Ambassador in a country can speak now on a much more current basis because he or she has instant knowledge of the government’s position. Today you don’t have to make it up. You really know. You are in constant communication with your capital.43

One might think that with more frequent communications and the resulting deferral of decision-making, the policy-making process would be accelerated. Richard Solomon makes the strong claim that “one of the most profound ways the Internet affects US foreign policy is by accelerating the policy-making process.”44 In many ways, it has indeed quickened the process. Information is available immediately via instantaneous transmissions, thus allowing for faster access to the data needed for making decisions. This often results in a faster overall time period for the policy-making process.

At the same time, however, the ‘shorter leash syndrome’ occasionally delays the process. Whereas decisions made at post, before the increased interaction with Washington, were executed quickly, the Washington bureaucracy can actually slow down the overall time element due to the time-consuming series of consultations and clearances. On the up side, there may now be more consistency in decision-making, as more of it is centralized in Washington.

The Internet has also inspired new patterns of diplomatic communication, resulting in what has been called a flattening of hierarchy.45 Whereas older patterns are

44 Solomon, “Internet and Diffusion of Diplomacy,” 1.
45 Rosenau and Byers, phone conversations.
based on hierarchy, monopoly, and the upward flow of information, web-based technologies offer flexibility, decentralization, and networked specialization. Consequently, the middle component of the traditional diplomatic communications structure has been all but eliminated. Diplomats simply send an E-mail directly to whomever it is intended without the tiresome delay of the approval chain.

This method of communication is referred to as back-channeling. It is used primarily to send a message quickly and directly, or to communicate an idea without the interference of a middle-man who does not agree. The existence of E-mail has fostered a tremendous increase in back-channeling due to the ease of transmission. With classified or highly sensitive information, however, the traditional hierarchical communication process remains both necessary and intact.

The widespread access to information on the Web has also simplified typical job duties of diplomats at post. In the past, diplomats were responsible for collecting, analyzing, and disseminating data from local media sources, interest groups, and beyond for the benefit of those back in Washington. Now, anyone with Internet access can gather almost as much intelligence as the CIA and obtain almost as much data as resides in the Library of Congress. With most of this type of information available on-line, there has been a significant reduction in the amount of reporting done by diplomats.

Furthermore, other embassy duties have been made easier and less time-consuming by the on-line availability of information and/or forms. Many consular functions have been taken over by websites. Increasingly, functions that required in-

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person contact with embassies now can be completed over the Internet. For example, visa applications and other forms are now available on embassy websites.

Thus, instead of going to an embassy in person, one can download the forms, and process them using electronic filing via E-mail. This has reduced the number of trips to the embassy for those needing visas or other items. Lines are much shorter, and efficiency is enhanced. This allows embassy personnel to shift their attention to more important matters.

Another area where efficiency of diplomacy has been enhanced by Internet technology is that of in-person meetings. Although both active and retired diplomats, as well as diplomatic scholars, overwhelmingly stress the continued and even growing importance of face-to-face diplomacy, the Internet can provide an alternative approach when necessary or more convenient. Jovan Kurbalija and Stefano Baldi, in their project regarding negotiation via the Internet, cite certain diplomatic scenarios where the Internet may be the preferred method of communication. These include "problems with negotiating venues, negotiations which run the risk of becoming too emotional and need some physical distance prolonged or highly technical negotiations, or situations where focus on developing a text is of primary importance."47 Advances in video-conferencing technology allow for an experience as close to in-person as is possible.48

On the second theme, public diplomacy, the Internet has significantly increased its

47 Jovan Kurbalija and Stefano Baldi, "Internet and Diplomacy: Negotiating via the Internet," project for DiploEdu, Malta. Available at www.diplomacy.edu/Edu/prospectus/id.htm (last accessed 14 March 2003).
48 See Chapter II for information on the State Department’s digital video-conferencing project, DVC; see Chapter III for a technical explanation of video-conferencing.
efficiency of operations. Public diplomacy's success is measured by its ability to inform, influence, and engage international audiences. Thus, the more people who are reached, the higher the success rate. However, recent budget cuts hampered such efforts considerably. As a result, public diplomats began to utilize Internet technology to forward their initiatives, as it offers unlimited outreach capabilities and a means for distributing news, documents, and links at an affordable level.

The proliferation of Embassy web sites on the Internet is one example. These are designed to give foreign audiences public information about embassy functions, the list of current staff members from the Ambassador on down, and access to public statements made by ambassadors and by our senior government officials, including the President.49 Public diplomats also maintain E-mail distribution lists for the purpose of disseminating information to an exponential number of recipients. Web-based techniques help diplomats engage in the field more effectively, and with greater flexibility. Essentially, the Internet can accomplish what in the past would have taken many hours, days, or even weeks, in the time it takes to press SEND.

On the other hand, those who are anti-American can use the Internet just as easily to promote their views, making the Web a double-edged sword.50 Countering the resultant misinformation or disinformation successfully relies on two factors: response time and the degree of outreach.51 Fortunately, the Internet is strong in both of these areas, and is therefore also employed in such instances.

49 Byers, phone conversation.
50 "IT: A Double-edged Sword."
51 Fredrick, phone conversation.
Daniel Sreebny, the Director of the Office of Public Diplomacy’s Bureau of Near Eastern Affairs at the Department of State, recently addressed a conference by stating,

The Web is now the primary means of distributing information about US policy, culture, and society. Embassy web pages are often among the best sources of information. The Tel Aviv website, for example, has the texts of all Middle East peace proposals. Information Resource Centers also provide electronic databases and other information. And, we now have websites in French, Russian, Spanish, Arabic, and Chinese. Our overseas press attaches are e-mailing key journalists and, because of information technology, the news cycle has been compressed. Moreover, IT has broken down the wall between foreign and domestic journalists, if it ever existed. Our cultural officers are using IT for exchanges, as a programming tool, for video-conferencing, etc. In sum, IT has caused us to change fundamentally the way we work. This means that our Public Affairs officers must have IT skills as well as foreign language ones.\footnote{2}

As critical as the Internet appears to be in public diplomacy, particularly for information officers, public affairs officers, and cultural affairs officers, it is the case that traditional Foreign Service officers have very little training in information and communications technology. As of recently, however, ICT training has become mandatory for public diplomacy practitioners. There now are required technology training courses that “teach you everything you need to know about the Internet and its applications.”\footnote{3}

There are also sources available for diplomats around the world to better their IT knowledge and agility ranging from books, conferences, and even distance learning programs.\footnote{4} The same two innovators, Kurbalija and Baldi, have even published a book \footnote{5}

\footnote{2} Daniel Sreebny (Director, Office of Public Diplomacy, Bureau of Near Eastern Affairs, Department of State), speech at the “E-Diplomacy and International Organizations” conference, Rutgers University-Newark, Newark, N.J., 21 September 2001.

\footnote{3} Sims, phone conversation.

\footnote{4} See the website at www.diplomat.edu for more information on sources available for diplomats.
entitled, *Internet Guide for Diplomats*. Its intent is to “provide diplomats and others involved in international relations [information on how to use] the Internet in their work. The book covers basic technical information on the Internet, as well as examples, tips, and illustrations. It also discusses the concept of web management.”

Ironically, there was a poll taken in 2001 on whether or not to change the name of the Public Diplomacy Association, due to the negative connotation of that term. However, in the wake of the horrific events of September 11th, public diplomacy had a new revival. As the world’s population became more engaged in the aftermath of the crisis, the public dimension of American diplomacy increased in importance and is now considered a much more critical element.

On this point, Undersecretary of Public Diplomacy, Charlotte Beers stated that it is a dangerous time not to be engaged. Thus, public diplomacy officers have prioritized the development of new resources and new capacities to engage international audiences, with the Internet as a key component of the plan. Post 9-11, the number of hits on the State Department’s website “proved to any doubters just how critical this is.”

Speed, accuracy, and completeness are vital in making one’s case, as public diplomacy professionals will tell you. In short, the Internet has made public diplomacy endeavors much easier because it can reach a lot more people, faster and less expensively than other methods of communication. Websites even are being touted now as

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56 Byers, phone conversation.
57 Beers, National Press Club.
58 Keith, phone conversation.
Instruments of diplomacy. Consequently, the role of an Ambassador today is as much about public diplomacy as about private conversations with government officials. From websites for embassies and consulates, to E-mail distribution lists, to Internet access at cultural and information centers abroad, the Internet has dramatically impacted the efficiency and reach of American public diplomacy.

On the third theme, it has been established that the Internet has contributed to greater transparency in world politics. The rapid development and mass diffusion of ICT in general has changed the ways in which people in industrialized countries get news and information, define their personal and group identities, manage their time and resources, learn, work, shop, participate in civil society and government affairs, and so on. Furthermore, as the media has gained greater and speedier access to information, this access has empowered other governments and special interest groups wishing to influence policy. The Internet has amplified these trends significantly.

This new openness has American diplomats encountering additional domestic and international pressure. The capability of the Internet to exploit this reality has augmented the level of accountability in US diplomatic conduct. Moreover, as the interconnectedness of the global civil society has grown rapidly via transnational electronic networks, so has the influence of non-state actors on American diplomacy.

With regard to diplomatic accountability, the impact of the Internet has not been

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59 Kappeler, "Websites as Instruments of Diplomacy."
61 Houlanahan, phone conversation.
overwhelming. There is, and always was, a respectable degree of accountability in US diplomacy. What the Internet has changed is the depth of that degree.

Diplomats must be more honest and forthcoming with information than in the past. Nearly everything they say or do is available to the public for praise, commentary, or criticism. Evasive, empty comments on policy, for example, are not acceptable to either the domestic or international community. A system of checks and balances has emerged that can verify the validity of statements, and ensure policy-makers are aware of world events lest they claim ignorance.

This has altered the approach of diplomats when it comes to the sharing of information, whether it be the wording of speeches, the heedful handling of documents and E-mails, or the like. Diplomats are now much more cognizant of their actions. Thus, the most compelling difference as a result of the Internet with regard to diplomatic accountability is a more cautious and calculated approach to the public presentation of policies, the communication of intended actions, and the process of knowledge-sharing in general.

A much more significant repercussion of the Internet and its consequent rise in transparency is the involvement of non-state actors in US diplomacy. Beyond states and statesmen, there is now a far wider variety of actors exerting their influences. These include international organizations, non-governmental organizations, corporations, individuals and other private sector entities who interact directly and apart from foreign ministries and traditional channels of diplomatic communication.62

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62 Cooper, “Diplomacy in the Information Age,” 3.
Moreover, in the words of Cooper, there are an increasing number of
regional, supranational, as well as sub-national governmental entities such as
states and cities that have international interests and engage directly, not through
national governments, in international affairs. As a result, the new international
system that is evolving is marked not only by a loss of control and erosion of state
sovereignty, classically the defining element of statehood, but relations in this
system are also far more complex. These trends have made it nearly impossible
for foreign ministries to retain their previous role in controlling foreign relations
of the state.\textsuperscript{63}

The diffusion of diplomacy and challenge to state sovereignty are topics that
already have been elaborated upon in this dissertation. The growing role of non-state
actors outside of the diplomatic realm further perpetuates the diffusion of power and
decision-making in diplomacy, which, in effect, can be considered a threat to sovereignty.
Public opinion, consequently, has grown in importance in its effect on governments.\textsuperscript{64}

Along the same lines, the Internet has undoubtedly advanced the efficacy of cyber-
activism. Organizations and political movements use on-line technologies as an
information provision tool in campaigns against governments, pushing interests such as
humanitarian or environmental issues. Internet-empowered revolutions in China, Burma,
East Timor, and beyond speak to this trend, as do such phenomenons as the success of the
international campaign to ban land mines. This is a trend that is likely to increase
tremendously as world politics becomes more and more transnational.

Through networking, non-state actors are able to do the same work they always
did, with the Internet greatly expanding their reach, and reducing the time and cost to do
so. The effect of the Internet as a tool that collects, processes, and transmits data for

\textsuperscript{63} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{64} Malone, \textit{American Diplomacy}, 95.
decision-making and action is exponential. Its role in the creation of transnational networks, partnerships, and communities for the purpose of information exchange, resource sharing, policy pressure, and activism is unprecedented.

AFTERTHOUGHTS / SUGGESTIONS FOR FURTHER RESEARCH

One interesting element that has emerged from this research is the dual effect of the Internet on the power of the state. On the one hand, it has strengthened the state in ways beyond the capacity of other ICTs in history. On the other hand, it has potentially weakened the state, challenging traditional notions of sovereignty.

The Internet has essentially strengthened the state in many ways. First of all, it has improved the efficiency of typical business practices by allowing for faster, less expensive communications and data sharing. As a result, communication and interaction with other states, non-state entities, and those within the diplomatic realm are more frequent. A consequence of a heightened level of exchange is an increased degree of transparency, which can work in favor of the state in various ways. For example, the state can be perceived as more trust-worthy, persuasive, and accountable. Additionally, greater transparency can reduce the uncertainty regarding American diplomatic initiatives, viewpoints, and policies.

Secondly, the Internet can be seen to strengthen the state because its attributes provide a venue for the state to broaden both its outreach capabilities and its span of influence. For instance, it has been used extensively for the purpose of promoting democracy, capitalism, and other US values, ideals, and policies. This is particularly
effective in public diplomacy endeavors, an area believed to have grown significantly in importance after September 11th.

At the same time, the Internet has been contributing to what has been called the diffusion of diplomacy. The Internet is the first ICT to provide a medium where many can organize, coordinate, and assemble at very little cost, and to an exponential degree. Virtual communities have emerged and special interest groups have gained power and influence by taking advantage of web-based capabilities. Consequently, non-diplomatic entities have gained a stronger voice in foreign policy initiatives, thus resulting in the aforementioned diffusion of diplomacy.

The notion that outside influences are shaping and/or have bearing on US foreign policy and American diplomacy suggests a weakening of the traditional state. Earlier in this dissertation, I discussed the transnationalization of foreign policy agendas. This trend, also amplified by ICTs such as the Internet, further decentralizes policy-making because the state must consider a wider array of opinions, perceptions, and actors. Moreover, with a diffusion of diplomacy comes a significant challenge to the notion of state sovereignty. The dichotomy of the varying effects of the Internet on the power of the state would be an excellent topic to explore in further research with regard to the impact of the Internet on US diplomacy.

Another dichotomy became apparent when studying the development of the Internet and the history of ICTs within the State Department. The Department of Defense has long been utilizing and pursuing the further development of new technologies while the State Department has been resistant to new innovations. The two organizational cultures are extremely different, despite the fact that they are working toward the same
goal and for the same government. A historical comparison of the DOD and State with regard to ICTs (or just the Internet) - utilization of, attitude toward, implementation of - in the context of the Organizational Process Model would be an interesting complement to this dissertation.

Yet another suggestion for further research is to continue to follow the elevation of public diplomacy from the periphery to a main component of US diplomacy, with special focus on the role of the Internet in this transition. For example, it has been implemented already that American diplomats working in the public diplomacy realm at State must attend mandatory training in IT. Moreover, various case studies could be examined regarding the use of the Internet for the purpose of misinformation or disinformation by non-state actors, and the countering thereof by State’s public diplomacy cone.

Likewise, additional case studies could be examined that involve the more positive use of the Internet by non-state actors. For instance, non-governmental organizations, non-profit organizations, special interest groups, and the like have been taking advantage of web-based technologies at a rapid pace in order to advance their interests. Further attention is also necessary regarding the concepts of networking, virtual communities, and cyber-activism, as they are still developing. Along the same lines, the emergence of a global civil society is creating a new sense of identity outside of the confines of national borders, which is yet another topic worth exploring within the context of the Internet.
CONCLUSION

IT is not a panacea. On the other hand, it is not an option in today's competitive environment. If diplomats do not have real-time connectivity to stay informed, if they do not have powerful tools to assist in analysis, if they do not have the means to improve their productivity, then those who do will best them. That will include not only diplomats from other nations, but also colleagues from other areas of government and competitors from the NGOs.

Dr. Barry Fulton

This dissertation began with a research topic that attempted to comprehend the role the Internet is playing in American diplomacy. What was discovered is that US diplomacy in the age of the Internet is faster, more efficient, more transparent, more honest, more accountable, more diffused, less hierarchical, more decentralized, less exclusive, more interdependent, and more transnational. The Internet’s function in each of these transitions ranges from minimal to largely responsible.

More specifically, The Internet has dramatically transformed the methods and protocol of American diplomatic communications, as well as substantially increased the efficiency of such communications. In addition, Internet applications have greatly enhanced the reach and effectiveness of public diplomacy endeavors, perhaps having the most significant effect in this branch of US diplomacy. Lastly, the repercussions of greater transparency in American diplomacy as a result of Internet technology are paramount. In reference to diplomatic accountability, the Internet has had only a moderate impact on improving its level. However, it has played a considerable part in the diffusion of diplomacy by providing a means for non-state actors to organize and thus

become critical players in the formulation of US foreign policy and the conduct of American diplomacy overall.

History proves that advances in ICTs have continuously and steadily been transforming traditional US diplomacy to a more post-modern entity. The Internet has continued this pattern, but is unique in that it has amplified the trend to an exponential degree. Consider the fact that, in the United States, it took radio thirty-eight years to reach fifty million people, personal computers sixteen years, television thirteen years, and the Internet only four years.\(^6\)\(^6\)

Despite the fact that the information age has been upon us for some time, it is only recently that IT modernization has been broadly appreciated as a critical enabler of diplomacy.\(^6\)\(^7\) It has become apparent that the Internet should be utilized and taken advantage of to "substantially modify diplomatic representation, negotiations, facilities, reporting, and coordination."\(^6\)\(^8\) Despite a few down sides to the Internet in diplomacy, its impact has been predominantly a positive one. Thus, the United States must continue to develop and adapt its diplomatic strategies to incorporate 'digital diplomacy,' a diplomacy that embraces the Internet as a cornerstone of its operations.

\(^6\)\(^6\) Spalter, "Digital Diplomacy."
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APPENDIX A: ACRONYMS

FSO(s) - Foreign Service Officer(s)
USIA - United States Information Agency
US - United States
USAID - United States Agency for International Development
NSA - National Security Agency
CIA - Central Intelligence Agency
DIA - Defense Intelligence Agency
ICT(s) - Information and Communications Technology(-ies)
NGO(s) - Non-Governmental Organization(s)
TCP/IP - Transmission Control Protocol/Internet Protocol
HTTP - Hypertext Transfer Protocol
MNC(s) - Multi-National Corporation(s)
IO(s) - International Organization(s)
RMA - Revolution in Military Affairs
RDA - Revolution in Diplomatic Affairs
NSA(s) - Non-State Actor(s)
USIP - United States Institute of Peace
IT - Information Technology
VOA - Voice of America
CNN - Cable News Network
DOD - Department of Defense
CSIS - Center for Strategic and International Studies
OPAP - Overseas Presence Advisory Panel
DOS - Department of State
DOSTN - Department of State Telecommunications Network
FAIS - Foreign Affairs Information System
M-eDIP - Office of E-Diplomacy
C-LAN - Classified Local Area Network
CCP - Classified Connectivity Project
LAN - Local Area Network
DVC - Digital Video Conferencing
FOIA - Freedom of Information Act
KIAI - Kosovo Information Assistance Initiative
TIP - Treaty Information Portal
WREN - Worldwide Remote E-mail Network
KM - Knowledge Management
CCD - Consular Consolidated Database
WRAPS - Worldwide Refugee Admissions Processing System
FASI - Foreign Affairs Systems Integration
USG - United States Government
VPN(s) - Virtual Private Network(s)
IIP - Office of International Information Programs
BBG - Broadcasting Board of Governors
RFE/RL - Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty
RFA - Radio Free Asia
IBB - International Broadcasting Bureau
ICBL - International Campaign to Ban Land Mines
APPENDIX B: INTERVIEWEES

CAREER DIPLOMATS

* SHELDON AUSTIN - Career FSO; USIA; (6/5/02)
* AMBASSADOR BARBARA K. BODINE - (5/21/02)
* JACQUELYN BRIGGS - Career FSO; (5/24/02)
* STEVE BROWNING - Career FSO; Former Dean of the School of Professional and Area Studies - Foreign Service Institute; (7/25/02)
* BRUCE K. BYERS - Career FSO; USIA; (7/15/02)
* MIKE CANNING - Career FSO; President of USIA Alumni Association; (8/2/02)
* LORI DANDO - Career FSO; (7/31/02)
* PURNELL DELLY - Career FSO; (11/20/01)
* WILLIAM DIETRICH - Career FSO; USIA; (7/26/02)
* DR. WILSON P. DIZARD, JR. - Career FSO; USIA; Senior Associate, International Communications Program - Center for Strategic and International Studies; (8/1/02)
* DAVID FREDRICK - Career FSO; USAID; (7/16/02)
* DR. BARRY FULTON - Career FSO; USIA; Public Diplomacy Council; Professor, George Washington University; (9/12/02)
* JERRY GALLUCCI - Career FSO; Office of E-Diplomacy; (08/22/02)
* BRUCE GREGORY - Career FSO; USIA; Executive Director of Public Diplomacy Council; (8/9/02)
* ANNE GRIMES - Career FSO; USIA; (7/16/02)
* ROSIE HANSEN - Career FSO; (7/18/02)
* J. MICHAEL HOULAHAN - Career FSO; USIA; (7/24/02)
* AMBASSADOR KENTON KEITH - USIA; Senior Vice President, Meridian International Center; (10/18/02)
* PATRICIA KUSHLIS - Career FSO; USIA; (7/16/02)
* GIFFORD D. MALONE - Career FSO; USIA; Professor; (7/17/02)
* AMBASSADOR DONALD NORLAND - National Foreign Affairs Training Program; (7/16/02)
* AMBASSADOR LAURIE LEE PETERS - Career Ambassador; (7/6/01)
* AMBASSADOR J. STAPLETON ROY - Career Ambassador; (8/19/02)
* JOHN SALAZAR - Career FSO; (5/30/02)
* DR. MIKE SCHNEIDER - Career FSO; USIA; Public Diplomacy Council; (8/21/02)
* DUDLEY SIMS - Career FSO; (5/22/02)
* MILAN STURGIS - Career FSO; (5/7/02)
SUPPLEMENTAL INTERVIEWS

* JEAN GAZARIAN - United Nations Secretariat (1946-1987); Former Director - UN General Assembly; Senior Fellow of UNITAR (United Nations Institute for Training and Research); (5/29/02)

* DR. JAMES ROSENAU - Professor, International Affairs and Political Science - George Washington University; (8/3/01)

* DR. JAMES SCHWOCH - Professor, Department of Communications Studies - Northwestern University; (2/14/02)

* MARGARITA S. STUDEMEISTER - United States Institute of Peace, Co-director of Virtual Diplomacy Initiative; (10/10/01)

E-MAIL CONSULTATIONS

* SHERYL BROWN - United States Institute of Peace, Co-Director of Virtual Diplomacy Initiative; (more than once)

* WILSON P. DIZARD, III - Journalist, Government Computer News; (more than once)

* JOVAN KURBALIJA - Director, DiploEdu - Mediterranean Academy of Diplomacy; (more than once)
APPENDIX C: INTERVIEW QUESTIONS

1) We know from history that ICTs have impacted the conduct of US diplomacy. I am focusing solely on the Internet and its effects. With this in mind, what major changes/themes do you feel the Internet has brought to the practice of American diplomacy? How has the Internet simplified, complicated, modified, and/or transformed traditional diplomatic procedures and protocol?

2) How has the existence of the Internet modified your job? How has it done so with regard to the jobs of others in the US diplomatic hierarchy?

3) How has the Internet affected the lines of communication within the American diplomatic realm? For example, has it increased the frequency of communication? Between whom?

4) How has the Internet altered the frequency of face-to-face diplomacy for American diplomats? What does this mean with regard to the importance of face-to-face diplomacy?

5) Has the Internet impacted American public diplomacy? How? In what ways is the Internet being utilized in US public diplomacy?

6) Has the Internet contributed to the rise in transparency of US diplomatic endeavors? How has this affected American diplomatic accountability?

7) What is the role of the Internet with regard to non-state actors and their influence on US diplomatic initiatives? How are non-state actors using the Internet to augment their goals in this circumstance?
VITA

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Global Security
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French
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WORK EXPERIENCE

Assistant Executive Director
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