Stratified Security Communities: Transatlantic Distrust and Identity Divergence

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STRATIFIED SECURITY COMMUNITIES:
TRANSATLANTIC DISTRUST AND IDENTITY DIVERGENCE

by

Afra Maike Herr
B.A. August 2017, University of Hamburg, Germany

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ABSTRACT

STRATIFIED SECURITY COMMUNITIES:
TRANSATLANTIC DISTRUST AND IDENTITY DIVERGENCE

Afra Maike Herr
Old Dominion University, 2020
Director: Dr. Regina Karp

With mounting pressure by the United States directly and through their strategic shift and slow abdication of leadership towards Asia and away from the transatlantic community, European states have growing incentive to cooperate more strongly and integrate their defense and security efforts. The absence of such a trend of integration points to internal barriers to growing cooperation countering the external dynamic. Utilizing the theory of security communities, this thesis explores German, French, and British understanding of leadership, defense, and their respective public opinions. Focusing on the security identities of all three nations and their visions for the community as well as defense interests, it is clear that these are too divergent to allow any of the three nations to take-over the position of core state within the security community, despite their economic, military, and political size and power. This leads to the conclusion that security communities function without mutual shared trust and congruent identity through a system of stratification.
Copyright, 2020, by Afra Maike Herr, All Rights Reserved.
Hana no iro wa
Utsurinikeri na
Itazurani
Wa ga mi yo ni furu
Nagameseshi ma ni
--Ono no Komachi

This is for my daughter, to show her that anything can be done no matter the circumstances.
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

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CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION

European defense since the Postwar years has been inescapably linked to the United States, their military capabilities, and their commitment to Europe through various bilateral agreements and, first and foremost, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization. Over time, the alliance enlarged, encompassing the greater part of the European continent as well as the whole of North America. Despite new members trickling in with various enlargements eastwards, and two member states being nuclear powers, too, the preponderant position of power and influence has been held by the United States. Capability parity between the U.S. and any other member state has never been achieved in NATO’s 70-year history, in fact it has never been a declared goal of the transatlantic alliance even though there have been repeated calls for European allies to strengthen or intensify their defense efforts and defense cooperation. With the loss of Europe as a strategic battlefield and area of strategic interest after the end of the Soviet Union and the Warsaw Pact, criticism of NATO and its perceived inequalities has continuously grown louder. European defense integration within or outside of the transatlantic alliance, however, has not followed suit. The culmination of decades of European members of a European or transatlantic security community resisting external urges to cooperate and integrate more can be seen in the 45th U.S. president openly calling NATO obsolete. The number of European defense initiatives\(^1\) as well as a recent uptick in defense spending that coincide with the growing American critique of NATO\(^2\) and the

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1 Like the European Defence Fund (EDF), the Permanent Structured Cooperation (PeSCo) or the Coordinated Annual Review on Defence (CARD).

overall lack of member states military funding and development in recent years obscure the fact that the situation concerning individual member states defense efforts as well as international cooperation within the security community are not significantly changing. Alleged “unfairness” in defense spending differences is one of the reasons Trump targets the alliance and member states, but he is not the first American president to call for higher expenditure. What is new with the current administration, however, is the vehemence of the criticism and the unconcealed threats to leave the alliance. As a great change towards more European commitment has yet to emerge, it must be assumed that the continuously growing American discontent with European partners and the likewise growing political pressure by the U.S. to do more has not had a significant influence on European defense integration, despite the American preponderant position in European security. While it can be said that President Trump is among the most vocal presidents, he exemplifies the fact that as a security guarantor the USA does no longer want to ignore European inefficiency and inaction in defense efforts and has begun a shift in strategic focus away from the transatlantic area towards the Pacific and Asia. Any call for stronger NATO capabilities and interoperability, as well as for new technology and policy to react to new and emerging threats necessitates not only national-level expenditure boosts, but active steps towards cooperation and integration of different European security apparatuses. With the loss of strategic importance of the European continent for American foreign policy since the end of the Cold War, the American willingness for continued extended deterrence, NATO cooperation and security promise is likely to diminish to a

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5 The European Intervention Initiative that has been ratified last year and that had been emerging after Emmanuel Macron’s declaration of NATO as braindead following Trump’s unilateral actions and threats has yet to move away from the paper stage. Therefore, it is difficult to assess whether this initiative will become a relevant player in European defense cooperation.
transatlantic break point, especially with an administration as transactional as the current one. In order to salvage the transatlantic security umbrella, it is necessary to understand the obstacles to further European defense cooperation and highlight the conditions under which European security commitments can be strengthened. The research question this thesis pursues and answers, therefore, is: what are the internal barriers to deeper European defense integration and security cooperation.

The goal of this study is to highlight and understand the inner dimensions of security communities and understand their character vis-à-vis external or top-down pressures by the international community, geopolitical changes or the will of the United States. This thesis assumes that leadership of a single state does not have a civilizing influence, meaning that despite American will for more European integration or defense responsibility, it has not been able to adjust the other state’s understanding of defense to a similar outlook of itself in over seven decades of cooperation. Instead vast differences in leadership and defense understanding and domestic outlook on security and threats, ergo the security identities of the group of states most relevant for continued NATO and transatlantic cooperation, trump external pressures.

Docking into the theory of security communities, this thesis shows that diverging security identities, national interests and visions and levels of trust are relevant barriers between European nations. These passively prohibit them from extending their cooperation and integration in accordance with the speed of American growing pressure and abdication of leadership. This thesis also shows that trust and identity are not as uniform as taken for granted by the theory, instead through continued internal competition obscured by the emergence of a leading core state, trust and identity appear in different layers within the transatlantic security community. This sheds a new light at the assumptions of the theory and evaluates the applicability of it to its main exemplary community, the transatlantic one.
I argue that leading European nations’ security identities, manifested in their leadership behavior, constitutional and practical understanding of defense and domestic outlook are incompatible with each other as well as with the foreign, American pressure, which effectively hinders further noteworthy cooperative defense policies and defense integration on the European continent or in the North Atlantic region.

This thesis consists of two distinct parts, one on the conceptualization and the other on the operationalization of this work and the research question. The conceptual part will ground this thesis in the theory of security communities, as proposed by Deutsch et al. and established by Adler and Barnett following the constructivist turn. For this, first, the dynamic between the U.S. and its allies needs to be highlighted, showing the relevance of the element of trust for this specific example of cooperation. Following the concept of trust into the study of international relations, trust-based cooperation in the form of security communities are explored theoretically. Here a highlight on the seminal texts will ground the thesis in this theory and open up the later implications for discussion. Identifying the pillars of security communities, namely identity and its interaction with trust and leadership, the variables for the case studies are investigated. Lastly this conceptual chapter illuminates further theoretical branches concerning themselves with the decay or disintegration of security communities. While these are not uniformly accepted or spread within the research agenda, they are particularly relevant for the research question at hand.

The second part of the thesis, the operationalization, brings the research question to life, utilizing the framework set out in the concept chapter. To begin the choice of cases needs to be explained. For this, parameters for operationalization of the research question and an understanding of the dimensions of the transatlantic security community are necessary. Additionally, understand the variables needed for leadership, the outgoing core state, the U.S., and
its interaction with the security community are investigated. With these parameters in mind, and through a comparative look at the existent member states of the community, Germany, France and the United Kingdom are chosen as focus nations. Their size, wealth, population and military expenditure as well as the fact that they are targets for the Trump administration’s criticism make them prime candidates for change actors in defense cooperation. Smaller nations, even if interested in active integration and further security cooperation, like Estonia or Poland, are not in a political position to vastly influence pan-European policy and are disregarded.

The main part of the operationalization chapter is taken up by the case studies. With the focus nations as objects of interests, the case study chapters individually focus on the three issues identified as relevant to investigate security identities and trust in between these three nations: Defense, leadership, and public opinion. As any cooperation needs a common understanding of the main issue, the topic of defense needs to be highlighted from all three countries’ perspectives. This case study explores the constitutional and practical manifestation of defense in all three nations, through an in-depth look at official governmental regulations and policy. This serves as a foundational study of the respective security identities and their incongruence. Considering that the U.S. is hailed as the leader of NATO and the free world, any concerted issue for stronger integration with the United States or away from the transatlantic bond needs a shared understanding of leadership or new leadership to emerge. Leadership and unifying vision for the security community therefore need to be another focal point of this thesis. This case study examines and contrasts each nation’s attempts at defense and security integration and their extent of leadership behavior. Especially in democracies, domestic consensus building for foreign or security policy is mandatory, therefore public opinion and public understanding of defense and their own nation’s role in it constrains the governmental capabilities for action. As the final case
study, this chapter through its look at public opinion polls featuring all three nations to ensure comparability expands on the images of security identity explored before. Cementing the differences between all three focus nations and closing with an investigation on the existence and possibility of trust between these three nations, the case study chapter leads over to a final analysis. Here, the order of the case studies, looking at issue areas instead of nations will be reversed. Piecing together first the security identities and their incompatibility and then building on this with individual looks at community vision and the will to take over responsibility, it is clear that the differences between each of the focus nations is too great to translate into mutual trust enabling new security community leadership.

As these findings cast doubt on central assumptions of the theory of security communities, the analytical chapter offers a new way of reading mature security communities. The element of stratification reintroduces relevant differences of interests, trust and identities into the study of security communities and helps understanding mature pluralistic security communities not in idealized terms, but in light of their complex construction.
CHAPTER 2
CONCEPTUALIZATION AND APPROACH

2.1. Introduction

“The word of the President of the United States is good enough for me.”
– President of France Charles de Gaulle, October 22, 1962⁶

“Looking at the latest decisions of President Trump, someone could even think: With friends like that, who needs enemies?”
– European Council President Donald Tusk, May 16, 2018⁷

When discussing transatlantic relations today, the shadow of the Trump administration looms large. The ‘America First’ President is often depicted as having wreaked havoc on the long-established ties of trust between the U.S. and its allies in Europe. As an integral part of the complex that has developed around transatlantic security and cooperation trust needs to be seen in light of its entanglement with identity and community.

This chapter highlights the current tensions between the Trump administration and European allies to anchor this thesis in time and illuminate the urgency of approaching the research question at hand. Extrapolating from narratives spun by the U.S. President and European counterparts, the loss of trust between both sides of the Atlantic is discussed. This serves to move away from the anecdotal nature of twitter feeds to a more robust understanding of the intercontinental state of affairs. This leads over to a general conceptualization of the role of trust in international relations. Trust has despite its intangible and elusive nature a place in international relations theory,

especially in constructivism and literature on cooperation. How and why trust emerges and what its influence is thought to be is investigated before turning to a form of international relation and cooperation highly dependent on great and growing levels of trust: security communities. This concept, first elaborated in 1957 by Karl Deutsch et al. and rediscovered by Emanuel Adler and Michael Barnett in the 1990’s after the emergence of constructivism, serves as the theoretical backbone of this thesis. In a concise subchapter, the two seminal texts are reviewed. A special focus lies on the pillars of security communities, namely identity, leadership, and community, all three of which receive due attention. Here, too, the debates and developments of the larger theory find their place and discussion.

Having established the broader literature, theory and background, it becomes obvious that any established, mature security community faces major hurdles or even the threat of disintegration if trust is lost between the member states and especially towards the leading state. The final subchapter of this part focuses on existent theories of security community disintegration and contrasts them with the relevance of trust and identity as established in prior parts. With a potential loss of the leading state, this thesis investigates the potential of other member states to innovate and alter their security identities to make up for the prerequisite loss in order to maintain the security community or at least save it from complete disintegration. Finally, this part will tie the conceptualization this chapter has undertaken back to the research question and explain the operationalization of the next part and its case studies as influenced by the theoretical background laid out.

Overall, this first part of the thesis highlights concepts, frameworks and theoretical claims surrounding security communities, trust, and security identities in order to create a thorough basis for the latter case studies as well as the research and argument of this thesis.
2.2. Tensions and trust between U.S. and European allies

In October of 1962, the United States of America faced an unprecedented and until now unparalleled crisis. President Kennedy sent former Secretary of State Dean Acheson to President Charles de Gaulle of France to brief the ally on nuclear missiles discovered to be stationed on Cuba by the Soviet Union. Accounts of that meeting report de Gaulle refusing\(^8\) the need of the American envoy to produce evidence of these grave allegations with the words: “The word of the President of the United States is good enough for me”\(^9\). A French account of the same event records de Gaulle’s assurance of French concerted action in case of greater conflict and repercussions even if France is not consulted on the path the U.S. would like to take.\(^10\) Widely held to be indicative of allied trust in the United States\(^11\), much has changed since. Trust in the United States from its European partners to “not exploit its superior power at their expense”\(^12\) and include the transatlantic realm into its self-conception has been an integral part of the community developed and shared between both shores of the Atlantic. Today, however, the White House’s remarks tell a different tale. Already on the campaign trail Donald Trump unmistakably questioned the existence of the institutionalized arm of the transatlantic security community: NATO. One of the


earliest opinions on the alliance by Trump is: “I said here’s the problem with NATO: it’s obsolete.”

And that the U.S. “support[s] NATO far more than we [the U.S.] should, frankly, because you have a lot of countries that aren’t doing what they’re supposed to be doing.” In tweets on the social media platform twitter, which has evolved to an official medium for presidential communication, the President has called NATO “very unfair to the United States!”

and depicted allied nations as “delinquent” and intentionally “rip[ping] us off on Trade [sic!]”.

Next to invoking enemy images of the world wars to pressure France and accepting follow-up tensions with another ally, the President has actively threatened the European allies with release of captured IS fighters and has questioned the mutual defense principle at several points of his presidency both directly linking defense and American commitment in case of war to allies’

16 Donald Trump (@realdonaldtrump), “Many countries in NATO, which we are expected to defend, are not only short of their commitment of 2% (which is low), but are also delinquent for many years in payments that have not been made. Will they reimburse the U.S.?” Twitter, July 10, 2018, 13:01, https://twitter.com/realDonaldTrump/status/1016729137409486853.
17 All capitalizations as well as hyphenated words stem from the original poster. Donald Trump (@realdonaldtrump), “…..And add to that the fact that the U.S. pays close to the entire cost of NATO-protecting many of these same countries that rip us off on Trade (they pay only a fraction of the cost-and laugh!). The European Union had a $151 Billion Surplus- should pay much more for Military!” Twitter, June 10, 2018, 21:29, https://twitter.com/realDonaldTrump/status/1005985339121504256.
18 Donald Trump (@realdonaldtrump), “Emmanuel Macron suggests building its own army to protect Europe against the U.S., China and Russia. But it was Germany in World Wars One & Two – How did that work out for France? They were starting to learn German in Paris before the U.S. came along. Pay for NATO or not!” Twitter, November 13, 2018, 06:50, https://twitter.com/realDonaldTrump/status/1062311785787744256.
19 Donald Trump (@realdonaldtrump), “The United States is asking Britain, France, Germany and other European allies to take back over 800 ISIS fighters that we captured in Syria and put them on trial. The Caliphate is ready to fall. The alternative is not a good one in that we will be forced to release them………” Twitter, February 16, 2019, 22:51, https://twitter.com/realDonaldTrump/status/1096980408401625088.
20 “‘Very aggressive’: Trump suggests Montenegro could cause world war three,” Guardian, July 19, 2018, https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2018/jul/19/very-aggressive-trump-suggests-montenegro-could-cause-world-war-three. Rosie Gray, “Trump Declines to Affirm NATO’s Article 5: Speaking in front of the leaders of its member-nations, the president fails to make clear the United States still has the alliance’s back,” Atlantic, May 25,
reaching of the two percent guideline in defense spending as well as to the trade relations between the U.S. and nations in question. Defense and transatlantic security under President Trump appear to become transactional and tied to tangible allied monetary commitment or in Trump’s words “obligation,” rather than being based on a relationship of cooperation and trust. Though these expressions have yet to culminate in an American retreat from NATO they have arguably already begun to wreak havoc on transatlantic trust created in over 70 years of cooperation since the end of World War II. French President Emmanuel Macron has reacted to these American developments with the assertion of “brain death” of NATO and a loss of American leadership and questioning the U.S. reliability and commitment. German Chancellor Angela Merkel has voiced concern over U.S. American reliability, too, albeit in her typical calm and reserved style. After a breakdown of diplomatic debates at the 2017 G7 meeting in Taormina, Italy, she stated that the times in which Germany could absolutely rely on others, and these others undoubtedly

22 Donald Trump (@realdonaldtrump), “Europe has to pay their fair share for Military Protection. The European Union, for many years, has taken advantage of us on Trade, and then they don’t live up to their Military commitment through NATO. Things must change fast!” Twitter, November 25, 2018, 15:27, https://twitter.com/realdonaldtrump/status/1066790517944606721.
refer to the United States, are over. And while more direct quotes like these from both sides of the Atlantic can be found with ease, these anecdotes alone should show a significant public discord between members of the oldest alliance on this planet. These anecdotes, however, leave room to question whether this situation is in entirely Trumpian, or whether the current President is not the cause, but a symptom and amplifier of a longer history of eroding trust. And indeed, when diving deeper into transatlantic relations it becomes clear that discord is nothing new, even if it has intensified greatly. A Pew Research Center study of 2018 shows a plunge in European confidence in the Trump administration to do the right thing regarding world affairs following a high level of confidence during the Obama administration. But, the study also shows that a similar yet not as extreme lack of confidence persisted and deepened under the 43rd President, George Bush. Additionally, the majority of surveyed European populations report a significantly lower level of U.S. concern for non-U.S. interests. German, French and U.K. respondents show a decline between 13 and 31 percentage points of confidence since 2013. This trajectory has been fueled by several events. Andrew Kydd, for example, highlights the Iraq war and the way the U.S. reasoned for and pushed the invasion through as one accelerator of trust erosion between the U.S. and European allies. The preference for multilateral and cooperative politics harbored by European domestic

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27 At an election event in Munich following the G7 summit in Italy, in which different states tried and failed to bring President Trump back to the nuclear deal with Iran, she said: “Die Zeiten, in denen wir uns auf andere [sic!] völlig verlassen konnten, die sind ein Stück vorbei. Das habe ich in den letzten Tagen erlebt”. The above translation in the text is my own. “Merkel sieht in den USA keinen verlässlichen Partner mehr,” Welt, May 28, 2017, https://www.welt.de/politik/deutschland/article165008816/Merkel-sieht-in-den-USA-keinen-verlaesslichen-Partner-mehr.html.


29 Wike et al., 2018: 9.

policy making elites was brought into light and sharp contrast with the prevailing American foreign policy outlook and identity. This fueled a crisis of trust in 2003, as Risse shows.\textsuperscript{31} Another element furthering an erosion of trust certainly has been the National Security Agency spying scandal of 2013 and the revelations published by Edward Snowden.\textsuperscript{32} The end of the Cold War, too, had adverse effects on trust and the perception of reliability. The question towards increase in burden-sharing by European partners had long affected the transatlantic relationship, with the removal of the main antagonist of the alliance and coupled with a diversification of NATO deployments and issue areas risk-sharing inequalities between the U.S. and allies added to the dynamic of mistrust, as Pesu and Sinkkonen point out.\textsuperscript{33} Therefore, it is safe to say that the anecdotal loss of trust between the U.S. under Trump and European allied nations such as Germany and France, is both nothing new in transatlantic relations and very real. And the Trump presidency is not the root of the problem, but rather another symptom of a growing transatlantic rift. Of course, it must be said that the 45th President has added another level of intensity to the process, with various instances that could intensify the loss of trust. Sudden departures from treaties and institutions, like the Iran nuclear deal, the Paris climate accords, the UNESCO, the WTO, the INF treaty, to name just a few. The latest sign, as of summer 2020, of American dismissal of cooperation and communication with allies is the sudden declaration of reduction of armed forces personnel


stationed in Germany, an action widely seen as intended on punishing the Federal Republic for noncompliance with American demands or even the perceived slight of Merkel’s refusal to attend a short notice G7 conference in Washington DC in person due to the ongoing pandemic situation.34

Whether the trust lost during the Trump administration is something of a hiccup in relations which will return to normal with the next president or not should not be speculated about here, but it is obvious that transatlantic trust has been chipped at over the past decades long before the election of Donald Trump. With the successive worsening of trusting relationships between both sides of the Atlantic, one must ask what role trust can play in international and especially in transatlantic relations. The following chapter introduces the scientific approach to trust in international relations studies and its effect on and importance for cooperation.

2.3. The role of trust in international relations

Relatively novel on the IR research agenda, trust had been dismissed as a factor worth studying for the greater part of this fields research history. Governed by the conception of the anarchy of the international system, it was assumed that mistrust was a necessary, systemic precondition of interstate relationship. Every state vying for its own survival simply could not allow itself to trust. Yet, as Ruzicka and Keating note, even Mearsheimer’s realist thinking could not completely rule out the existence of trust, but just assert rarity.35 Prevalence or acceptance of models such as the security dilemma or game-theoretical approaches like the prisoner’s dilemma further solidify the assumption of systemic restrictions for the existence of trust. With the advent

of constructivism following Wendt’s *Anarchy is what States Make of it* the potential role of trust in international relations was able to emerge in research. Where prolonged cooperation was thought to be based on a common threat, such as the Soviet Union posed for the Western world, now newer approaches gained traction placing trust as the necessary ingredient in successful and continued peaceful cooperation. Since it has gained more prominence in research, trust has eluded definition to a certain degree. An intangible and evasive concept that is certainly difficult to measure that is widely considered as a basis to continued international cooperation entails a variety of different understandings and approaches. As evasive as trust is, the following consensus of its concept exists:

First, scholars agree that trust refers to an attitude involving a willingness to place the fate of one’s interest under the control of others. This willingness is based on a belief, for which there is some uncertainty, that potential trustees will avoid using their discretion to harm the interests of the first. […] Second, scholars agree that trusting relationships are behavioral manifestations of trust [that] develop when actors grant others discretion over their interests based on the belief that those interests will not be harmed. […] Third, the intensity and scope of trust and trusting relationships are capable of variation. […] Fourth, trusting others involves making predictions about their future actions […] which introduces calculations of risk into the decision-making process. […] Finally, actors assess the risks of entrusting their interests to others using subjective estimates of the probability their trust will be honored.

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38 Hoffmann does connect trust research to writings of Karl Deutsch in 1958, but later clarifies that the major developments in this area follow after Wendt’s piece is released. Aaron Hoffmann, “A Conceptualization of Trust in International Relations,” *European Journal of International Relations* 8, no. 3 (2002): 375.
Broadly speaking, three approaches with varying degrees of overlap classify trust either as part of a rational choice calculation also referred to as strategic trust, or as a phenomenon hailed from psychology and often associated with generalized trust or, thirdly, as a social construction of particularized trust between ego and other.\textsuperscript{42} As will become clearer in the following, rationalist approaches or strategic trust is often discredited due to the calculating and hedging background to placing strategic trust in each other.

The conceptual consensus presented by Hoffmann already points to the necessity of partners in trust needing to be aware of each other’s interests and sharing them to a certain degree. For trust to emerge, understanding and transforming the identities of trustor and trustee through a “process of positive and mutual identification”\textsuperscript{43} is vital. Applied to the example in the previous subchapter above, the apparent loss of trust between the United States and select European allies necessitates a prior existence of both trust and mutual identification. The process of identification Wheeler refers to, is also found in Adler and Barnett’s writings and referred to as positive social learning experience. Their understanding of dependable expectations of peaceful change is “unarguably the deepest expression of trust possible in the international arena”\textsuperscript{44}. Trust is grasped not only as a result of positive social learning experiences between individual or groups of states, but also as a precursor to the development of shared identities. Trans- and interactions between states in various degrees of trusting relationships as well as in common institutions as elements of long processes of social learning directly influence the emergence of mutual trust and collective

\textsuperscript{44} Barnett and Adler, “Studying security communities,” 414.
And while the authors point to “leaps of faith that are braced by the verification offered by organizations”46, others criticize their lack of exploration of primary emergence of trust. Most notably and recently, Nicholas Wheeler critiques the constructivist assumptions of trust and its development. Pointing to the divergent understanding of the trust-identity relation in constructivism, where Wendt constitutes shared identity as a precursor to trust47 and Adler and Barnett in their work on security communities propagate a vice-versa approach48, Wheeler intends to fill the gap between these authors as well as other approaches in International Relations utilizing trust as a variable by introducing the interpersonal bonding between state leaders or their representatives in international bargaining situations as incentive for trust to form. This trust on an elite-level then can be dispersed to the domestic public and be built upon to develop shared identities as necessitated by Adler and Barnett. In the regard that trust always includes the risk of defection of the trustee49 that is exacerbated by the fact that trust also entails a lack of anticipation or rather hedging towards this potential defection50, loss of interstate trust makes trustors suddenly and unexpectedly vulnerable. Rationalist, strategic trust approaches cannot account for this vulnerability. Contrasted with the outlook of states in a trusting relationship onto states outside of this community of states, which per definition still includes the usual expectations of anarchy and potential military conflict, and which members states have anticipated and prepared for, a breaking

47 Wendt argues that mutual restraint may lead to shared interests, which inform identities needed for trust to grow. See: Nicholas Wheeler, Trusting Enemies: Interpersonal Relationships in International Conflict (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2018), 36.
away of a trusted state through loss of trust must be considered as more important and potentially
dangerous than continuously existing external challenges.

Collectively, a shared identity mutually constituted with trust, among other elements,
between a group of states, is conceptualized as a security community. This concept, part of the
constructivist approach to International Relations studies, not only serves as one if not the prime
example of an interstate relationship of trust but is also provides a basis for understanding the
historic and current transatlantic relationship. Below, this particular form of cooperation and
interstate relationship is further explored. The application of security communities to the research
question not only raises questions about how an abrogation of leadership, as hinted in the example
of the U.S. in transatlantic relations, affects the remainder of the security community’s members,
but it also allows a look at mechanisms or elements of maintenance of a security community or
incentives for erosion.

2.4. Trusting international relations: security communities

The concept of security community is inherently constructivist and developed alongside
the emergence of constructivism, albeit some roots to an earlier work. The following subchapter
explores the basic assumptions surrounding security communities based on the two seminal texts
that defined them.

Security communities have first been theoretically explored in the 1950’s, most notably
by Karl Deutsch in his study Political Community and the North Atlantic Area51, published in 1957.

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The concept was largely forgotten, before it was revitalized by Emanuel Adler and Michael Barnett and incorporated into the constructivist research agenda around the turn of the millennium. Adler and Barnett’s *Security Communities* is the second seminal work in this field. It includes a framework for analysis and an array of articles by others critiquing and operationalizing the titular security communities. Deutsch et al. define their view of security communities as such:

> A SECURITY COMMUNITY is a group of people which has become “integrated.”
> By INTEGRATION we mean the attainment, within a territory, of a “sense of community” and of institutions and practices strong enough and widespread enough to assure, for a “long” time, dependable expectations of “peaceful change” among its population.
> By SENSE OF COMMUNITY we mean a belief on the part of individuals in a group that they have come to agreement on at least this one point: that common social problems must and can be resolved by processes of “peaceful change.”
> By PEACEFUL CHANGE we mean the resolution of social problems, normally by institutionalized procedures, without resort to large-scale physical force.

Deutsch et al.’s study not only tries to explain the absence of war in certain geographically linked areas through the above understanding of security communities, it further differentiates between amalgamated and pluralistic security communities. The former describes a full integration of formerly independent states, including the dissolution of sovereignty of each member nation and the emergence of a new state. The latter is defined as a group of states, all remaining formally independently governed states, which, however, have attained a degree of integration in terms of security, through shared identity, institutions and the expectation of peaceful change between each other. While the study at hand is often criticized for the lack of a reproducible framework, Deutsch et al. lay out the groundwork for later studies. They point to the necessity of a core of states, that serve as drivers and active shapers of integration and can serve as magnets for other

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53 All capitalization and quotation marks are taken from the source. Deutsch et al., *Political Community*, 5.
54 Deutsch et al., *Political Community*, 6-7.
Their highlighting of the procedural character of the emergence of security communities, is mirrored in Adler and Barnett’s later classification of three distinct phases of security communities. Especially for pluralistic security communities, which are still understood to be more easily attainable than amalgamated ones, Deutsch et al. identify shared values, adequate responsiveness and communication between each member state, as well as the predictability of behavior as necessary elements for integration. All three of these terms remain somewhat underdefined in the study, nonetheless, a following short recapitulation will serve to highlight the evolution of the theory in later texts. Values to Deutsch et al. are “common propositions” shared by the politically relevant part of a state’s population. These can be habitualized and enshrined in institutions, and Deutsch et al. point to the size of the intersection of values between states as a main enabler of integration. It should be noted that the values deemed relevant for integrative processes by Deutsch et al. are only those that manifest themselves in political influence, like the value of democracy. Responsiveness, to Deutsch and his co-authors, is “the capacity of the participating […] governments to respond to each other’s needs, messages, and actions quickly, adequately, and without resort to violence.” Ergo, a well-established method of communication between the security community-to-be’s member states and a shared understanding and acceptance of what is deemed an adequate response. The final condition deemed necessary for the formation of pluralistic security communities is tied to the second one. Behavioral predictability, as a function of responsiveness, is necessary to be able to reach consensus concerning areas of integration or problems regarding the sphere of community, in this case security. These three

55 Deutsch et al., Political Community, 28.
56 Deutsch et al., Political Community, 66.
57 Deutsch et al., Political Community, 36.
58 Deutsch et al., Political Community, 46-47.
59 Deutsch et al., Political Community, 66.
60 Deutsch et al., Political Community, 67.
elements are integrated by Deutsch et al. into their model of “way of life”\textsuperscript{61}, which with its inclusion of values and habits, can be understood as a different term for what is known as state identity.\textsuperscript{62} The relevance of identity in the discourse of security communities is discussed further down. While Deutsch et al. do not identify a scalable framework or set forth measurable thresholds for the variables they identified, the historic case studies they evaluate in their book point toward a number of elements relevant to the development of security communities. One such element is leadership, which they were able to observe as a crucial element in the early stages of new waves of integration\textsuperscript{63} Reliant on coalitions and their ability to strike compromises, leaders appear historically relevant in moves attempting a change in the status quo either towards integration into a security community or in disintegration.\textsuperscript{64}

The research implications opened by the now seminal, yet through its descriptive character not readily applicable work by Deutsch et al. are large. The field of international relations, however, moved into a different direction and focused on different variants of realism, and then the grand debate between newly emerging liberalism and realism. When the concept of security community was revisited by Adler and Barnett during the formative decade of constructivism as a new school of thought in IR, beginning with the publication of Wendt’s \textit{Anarchy is what States

\begin{footnotesize}
\begin{enumerate}
\item Deutsch et al., \textit{Political Community}, 47.
\item Deutsch et al., \textit{Political Community}, 88-90.
\item \textit{Ibid.}
\end{enumerate}
\end{footnotesize}
In 1992, security communities received a revival, theoretical framework and vocabulary. In the following, the framework by Adler and Barnett will be highlighted, directly followed with newer developments in the field as well as differences, critique and spin-offs relevant for modern use of the framework.

Their first addition to the complex Deutsch et al. introduced in the 50’s is an operationalization of the process of security community building the earlier text had identified. They divide this process into three distinct phases: nascent, ascendant, and mature, and further distinguish mature security communities into loosely and tightly coupled ones. The nascent phase exhibits an increase in coordination of the relationship of two or more states. Primary motivation is not the creation of a security community, but rather the maneuvering of smaller milestones, like increasing mutual security or reaction to a mutual security threat, encouraging exchange (economic or otherwise). This initial phase can then set the states on a path-dependent way towards steadily growing mutual trust and the construction of a mature security community. Cooperation and interaction are aided by the existence or simultaneous development of institutions that encompass norms and foster accountability, reciprocity, the identification of shared interests or identities and that manifest or realize the growing cooperation. Adler and Barnett, like Deutsch et al. argue that there are core states functioning as leaders or magnets that unify and guide towards a shared vision of the future.

The ascendant phase then showcases a tighter network of institutions, increased cooperation and trust, especially in the field of military cooperation or a through a decreased level

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of fear vis-à-vis each other and most importantly “the emergence of collective identities that begin to encourage dependable expectations of peaceful change”.

Trust in terms of security is operationalized through the observance of interdependent military decision making, sharing of intelligence information and other areas. The degree of common identities shared by member states at this phase can be observed in narratives led within and in-between the states in question. National security of ascendant security communities’ member states will have observably changed in its form once states enter this phase, as does the definition of threat, which is at this point not thought to be emanating from the other member states anymore, as well as the expectations of use of violence to settle disputes. Between member states, violence and forms of military action are no longer seen as the ideal problem solver, instead other means are increasingly sought.

When the final phase, the mature phase, is reached, member states “share an identity and, therefore, entertain dependable expectations of peaceful change and a security community now comes into existence”.

The loosely coupled variant Adler and Barnett distinguish is characterized by positive identification with other member states and a shared way of life, collective identity and shared meanings, the expectation of self-restraint, trust manifested in multilateralism, unfortified borders between member states, changes in military planning, common understanding of the threat and lastly identifiable discourse and language of community. In contrast, tightly coupled security communities “mutual-aid becomes a matter of habit and, thus, national identity is expressed through the merging of efforts.”

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coupled mature security communities feature cooperative and collective security and a high level of military integration, policy coordination against internal threats, free movement of populations, internationalization of authority and a multi-perspectival polity, meaning shared rule at national, trans- and supranational level.72

With the exclusion of amalgamated security communities from their framework, Adler and Barnett refocus the debate to the constructivist research agenda and away from what has in the few historic instances where it has happened amounted to state-building.73 Constructivism, in contrast to previous schools of thought in international relations, works with the understanding of interstate relations and reality as socially constructed and acquired through mutual constitution. The seminal assumption enabling the school of thought of constructivism is that anarchy of the international system is what states make of it. This outlook explains and enables the possibility of community and lasting change and peace in the international system. Where realism and liberalism approach international relations from a material and rationalist angle74, the English School and, later, constructivism follow an ideational approach, and with the theoretical complex of security

73 Deutsch et al. consistently give the United States as the best example of an amalgamated security community. But, given the fact that amalgamation has erased the individual American states as state actors on the international relations stage, successful amalgamation must be seen as the process of unification towards a single, new state.
communities the possibility of change in the international system and a new paradigm in international relations theory is created.75

Security communities are conceptually arranged around three pillars, which have been alluded to in the previous subchapters. They are trust, (shared) identity and leadership, all of which lead to community. A deeper focus on the debates surrounding these pillars, as well as their interplay features in the next section.

2.5. Pillars of security community: identity and its interplay with trust and leadership

Through the process of evolution towards the third phase of security communities, the mature phase, preconditions and elements identified in the previous chapter can be boiled down to distinct complexes. These complexes or pillars make up the fabric of the security community and without them and their interplay a security community could not have matured. They are the previously discussed trust between different states, compatible state identities and a collective, shared identity derived from both, and finally leadership of a core state or states that actively pursue integration and serve as magnets attracting other nations to the community. In the surrounding literature on security communities, these elements are discussed, redefined, and critiqued. Visiting these critiques helps illuminate the pillars.

As shown above, both Deutsch et al.’s and Adler and Barnett’s thought on security communities feature collective identity as a necessary element in the development of said communities. Collective identity, as derived from research in psychology and social science, is

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defined in constructivist works as the “positive identification with the welfare of another, such that the other is seen as a cognitive extension of the self, rather than independent”. This positive identification does not preclude the possibility of conflict or discord between the concerned states, as collective identity formation is not to be equated with the simultaneous loss of interests of nation states. Of course, as interests are understood to be dependent on endogenous factors as opposed to the realist assumption on exogenous, system-dependent sources for interests and, therefore, state identity, changes in state identity following the emergence of a collective identity must be thought of as affecting the interests of the state. Identity is a social construct created and maintained through intersubjective interactions, both within the actor itself and between endogenous and exogenous influences. This refers not only to single individuals and their self-identification, but also to any form of collective identity. A state identity as constituted by the population of said state is a form of collective identity, even if from an International Relations point of view, the state is often considered as the smallest and only relevant unit of relevance. Additionally, it is relevant for the study of security communities to investigate the scope of the shared identity. This is tied to the degree of integration of a mature security community, with more loosely coupled ones having overlap in their security identities, which refers to the dominant understanding within either a state or a group of states of security and the narratives and acts surrounding and following from that understanding, and tightly coupled security identities sharing broader understandings, possibly surpassing their respective security identities. Rieker for example posits that NATO is exemplary

of a loosely coupled security community, bound by a degree of shared security identity, the EU however is a tightly coupled security community, with significantly more shared identities, though others like Adler and Barnett do place NATO further down on the spectrum towards a tightly coupled security community. Following her causal chain, security identities of different states inform security interests, which inform security policies or other tangible acts perceivable by other states, these in turn directly influence the environmental structure of the security community. This causal chain is of course applicable to the development of shared policies in a security community, stemming from shared collective security identities, as well.

When thinking of collective identities spanning all member states, the literature implies sameness of this identity across all member states of the community. Through sharing a self-identification as a group member contingent on sharing collective values and understandings, this implication is strengthened, yet Adler and Barnett also point to dependence on “actor’s interaction with and relationship to others […] and place within an institutional context.” Coupled with the expectation of core states to perform more actively, it must be assumed that despite member states understanding themselves as members there still exists a hierarchy or at least diversified identities of different states within the security community. A core state not only functions as a core but is also understood and identified by the others and itself as a core state. This is a complex the literature leaves yet unexplored. Now, if there can be assumed to be different variants of identity derived from the collective one, this means that in case of change of membership or values or identity of a member and especially a core state other states have to ameliorate the internal shock produced by this change. Applied to the research question at hand, it has been shown in the thesis

introduction that the United States as the historic core state of the transatlantic security community has voiced an interest in other member states taking over stronger leadership and commitment and therefore assimilating their identity more closely to the one currently held by the US as core state. This thesis illuminates the individual variations of the member states in their understanding of themselves and each other as members of the transatlantic security community and investigates potential inhibitors to the emergence of a new and accepted core state of the security community.

To several researchers, including the authors of the pieces disseminated above, part of the values forming state identities must be a liberal or democratic understanding of self. This is criticized by Amitav Acharya, Alexander Bellamy and others who argue that the necessary similarity in identity of states can also exist in non-democratic states and outside of the classical example of the European or transatlantic realm. To them, community is not dependent on the existence of democracy, but on the general likeness of domestic values. Similarly, because the most prominent and widely known security communities are regional and geographically connected, a good example is the security community located in Western and Central Europe or that of the USA and Canada, this geographical closeness is often assumed to be constitutive of security communities. However, following the argument of Benedict Anderson and Ernst Haas

among others, national identity, which was above defined as a main enabling factor in community development, is socially constructed and community can be imagined even between individual actors unknown to each other and not direct neighbors, security communities, too, can be cross-regional and geographically non-contingent. Examples could be not only be the transatlantic security community, which is divided by the Atlantic Ocean, but also the case of Australia and New Zealand being thought of as part of the Western security community of democratic states. A different example could be the case of Israel and the United States.

Pointing back to trust, if trust is thought as a process of social learning as Adler and Barnett formulate it, the cumulative experience of a core state as a leader, norm entrepreneur or, to more concretely link the theory to the thesis at hand, as the main supplier of deterrence, defense and therefore security, it can be assumed that this position of leadership informs the identity and image of the leader state as well as the expectations and trust into said leadership of the other member states. Referring back to the scientific consensus on trust promoted by Hoffmann illuminated above, to the degree that trust is related to both the interests of trustor and trustee and the fact that despite a certain amount of common interests each security community member state continues to harbor individual interests related to differing national capabilities and identities, trust and expectations following from this trust cannot be equal towards all member states of the same security community. Therefore, loss of trust also has different effects on the security community depending on the position of the related member state.

To recapitulate the above and form a more concise mental image it can be said that security communities are socially constructed and develop over three phases in which states

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develop mutual trust without hedging, share security identities, which are mutually constitutive with trust and malleable to endogenous as well as exogenous influence and have distinct core states, which lead, maintain and draw in other states as part of the security community. Identities inform interests, norms and values, which in turn lead to policy decisions. Collectively, these communities are integrated to a certain degree in terms of security and defense planning as well as policy coordination. The identities of member states do neither necessarily overlap completely with the other members, nor are they restricted to liberal or democratic identities. Identities and therefore state interests, too, do not get completely absorbed by the growing shared identity, but cannot only coexist with the collective identity as a related but distinct formation, but even within the collective identity there can be hierarchical and accepted different variants of the shared identity. This is best exemplified by core states and their security identity vis-à-vis other member states without a leading role. Deutsch et al. and Adler and Barnett and the following researchers concerned with security communities developed a comprehensive framework that helps understand prolonged cooperation, especially without exogenous threat. What has been missing from their view and the research conducted by them, quite curiously, is the opposite of emergence: disintegration. The next subchapter illuminates first theoretical approaches to disintegration and contrasts them with the perceived problem at hand and how that relates to the research question of this thesis.

2.6. Maintenance or disintegration: whither without trust or leadership?

Scholars such as Dytrich noticed the insufficiency of the prevalent research agenda in security communities concerning the potential demise of them. Others such as Müller and Koschut have ventured into theorizing and proposed two different models of disintegration or decay. Both were written before the Trump presidency was even thought possible and therefore

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do not investigate internal shocks to a security community or the possibility of maintenance through other members. With the current President being historically exceptional in his “open hostil[ity] to its [the transatlantic security community’s] core institutions”\(^{88}\), however, a look at the potential for maintenance of security communities once a core state loses the trust of its fellow member states or loses the interest in the leadership position is necessary. This chapter, first, highlights the existent approaches to disintegration. As a second focus, this chapter contrasts these assumptions with the situation at hand and then illuminates how the rest of the thesis attempts to approach the investigation of the potential of emergence of new core states.

With the renewed interest in security communities and the relative scarcity of security communities in existence as compared to the number of nation states, it should be no surprise that scholars focus more closely on the emergence of security communities than on the maintenance or disintegration of them. Deutsch et al. point to some historic examples of disintegrative reasons, without drawing theoretical implications from them.\(^{89}\) Adler and Barnett, too, mention the possibility of disintegration, and link it to the mutable nature of values and identity, stressing their point that identities are the glue that hold a security community together. The further mention that “The same forces that ‘build up’ security communities can ‘tear them down.’”\(^{90}\) This rather vague description appears to apply to both endogenous as well as exogenous influences on the security community in question. Yet, here as in Deutsch et al., the processes of disintegration are not explored on a theory-building level. Since identity is adaptable or better yet constantly in need for reconstitution, collective identity has the option to devolve, therefore neglecting the possibilities

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\(^{89}\) Deutsch et al., *Political Community*, 59.

for disintegration in the larger part of the literature appears puzzling. This lack of research has driven new scholarship by Harald Müller and Simon Koschut, who are investigating how external shocks to security communities as well as internal normative change impact the coherence of security communities. Müller proposes a three stage model of decay flowing from system and state-level challenges to common values or perceptions, over diminished responsiveness to the tipping point of a disappearing collective identity. Koschut’s approach is similarly procedural, writing that “the path of security community disintegration is similar to its foundation but under opposing signs: external change sets off social and internal change that leads to the degeneration of community norms”. Focusing on normative change of the common norms of the member states, and differentiating roles for norm leaders upholding the status quo and norm challengers, this piece as well as Müller’s propose a useful entry into the understanding of disintegrative processes. Both test their models on historic cases before applying it to NATO, which they use interchangeably with the transatlantic security community, as well as the European security community. While both ultimately argue that the transatlantic alliance, despite norm challenges and external shocks like the fall of the Soviet Union or the Iraq war, is still a functioning security community at the points of publication of the pieces, recent developments cast a shadow over that assumption. The drastic changes in intracommunity trust towards the core state alone warrant another look at the potential disintegration of the transatlantic security community. As has been pointed to in the introduction of this thesis, the United States as the security guarantor or in the language of security communities the core of strength of the community has increasing doubts and calls for changed

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93 Koschut, Normative Change and Security Community Disintegration, 57.
behavior of European partners. The above models do point to the increased power of norm leaders in form of core states concerning norm promotion and sanctioning of norm breakers\textsuperscript{94} but they do not explicitly handle the case of the internal shock of the core state abrogating from its position of leadership and trust and the need for the emergence of new core states. Müller in fact assumes the core states would attempt to maintain or strengthen the community. He does not account for a loss of leadership. Furthermore, the utilization of norms as the main variable changing obscures the fact that the individual states do not necessarily share the exact norm and interest set, as well as have individual identities that are overlapping but not fully amalgamated with the collective identity. This is especially true in the case of the transatlantic security community, where the United States have played a role larger than life and other member states have not been on equal footing, neither in terms of material dimensions, nor in the ideational realm. One example could be that of burden-sharing. As a norm in NATO, all members adhere to it, but not in equal ways. Germany is a nuclear host, as are other non-nuclear member states of the alliance, with the US as the donor of nuclear weapons and therefore extended deterrence. The assumption that all member states adhere to all norms in equal or common ways is misleading. When a core state and its magnetic effect disappear or retreat to an extent, upholding of the status quo by other members might not salvage the community. Instead, these states would have to themselves become a new core of strength. Another element these two models do not explore deeply is that of identity despite its centrality to the theory of security communities. Koschut criticizes the wideness of Müller’s working paper and intentionally narrows his approach down to nothing but norms.\textsuperscript{95} He, however, leaves room for other additional and interactive explanations for disintegration. Müller’s macro approach identifies values, identity, responsiveness, and trust as the main pillars of security

\textsuperscript{94} See core states subchapter in: Koschut, \textit{Normative Change and Security Community Disintegration}, 52-54.
\textsuperscript{95} Koschut, \textit{Normative Change and Security Community Disintegration}, 9-10.
communities. This thesis however argues that values are a part and derivative of identity. Responsiveness, as a way of interacting with other states could be seen as a function of identity and interest, therefore, this work does not elevate responsiveness as its own distinct pillar. Security communities as proposed by Deutsch et al. and Adler and Barnett and others are deeply dependent on the existence of mutual trust, core states in leadership positions and shared identity. Change in these three pillars, therefore, should hold a place in models of disintegration or decay of security communities. Both models do focus in their analyses on the actions of the relevant core states and assert an automatic, cascading disintegration process, without regard for the actions and potentials of non-core states, or the potential variants in security identity due to different roles in the community.

As the narrative of brain death in NATO and American loss of reliability and trust advances the need for changed identities and interests of European member states, utilizing a security communities approach to the thesis at hand allows to capture not only the element of identity but also that of trust in the analysis of the transatlantic community of states. Coupled with disintegrative tendencies identified in the two models above, the possibility of quick and coordinated identity change and the potential of emergence of new core states in security communities can be investigated. This emergence is dependent on state identities available or evolving to a point where the collective identity threatened by the loss of trust into the leading state of the security community can be upheld. While Deutsch et al. as well as Adler and Barnett have written about likeness of values and norms, I argue that for a security community specifically the identity concerning security is of importance. While security communities are expecting

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internal peaceful change, they do not expect peaceful cooperation with states outside their community. In case of the transatlantic security community, the United States have served as security guarantor for the entire community and as such have fulfilled the leadership role and adopted a self- and outside image of the leader in this particular community. The vulnerability of non-leader states such as Germany, France and the U.K. to external threats is directly dependent on the continuation of the status quo. Undesirable as this status quo is to the leading state under President Trump, identity and interest change of these three states is necessary to uphold the status quo. The breakdown of trust to this specific member state as well as its apparent defection from the position of leadership, but not yet the overall community, means one pillar of the security community is shaky. Now, as identities are able to change and adapt, it must be possible for other states to take over the position of leadership. If, however, it is assumed that security communities are more diversified, in their identities as part of a security community or in their trust towards other members of the community, the emergence of a new leader state could be severely inhibited.

As this pertains directly to security, the security identity and the security interests and their compatibility need to be compared and contrasted. For this thesis and pointing back to research question, the nations of France, Germany and Great Britain, through their material, geographical as well as ideational position within the transatlantic as well as Western European security community could be contenders for a successful new core of strength. Looking back at the growing pressure from the U.S. side, the question what has hindered these states so far to become leaders and more integrated becomes pressing.

For the understanding of security identities and in relation to the above, the narratives and discourse concerning security in any nations need to be understood. In order to operationalize the security identities for this thesis, three different investigations will take place. First, the prevalent
domestic understanding of defense, their security narratives, must be illuminated. White books and defense doctrines of the three focus nations show the similarities and differences in the security identities of the decision-making strata. Second, the willingness to lead, as well as the potential for acceptance of other’s leadership of all three nations is examined. Thirdly, as is implied in the understanding of collective identities, a concerted effort of member actors produces it. As national identities are, too, a collective identity of the population of the state, for an understanding of the security identities of France, Germany, and the United Kingdom their domestic and public understanding of security must be highlighted. These three complexes security identity, leadership and domestic (non-elite) identity together can highlight what has barred France, Germany, and the U.K. from further integration so far, and whether the leadership pillar can be salvaged or propped up.

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CHAPTER 3
OPERATIONALIZATION: CASE STUDIES AND ANALYSIS

3.1. Introduction

Following the conceptualization part, this part of the thesis approaches the operationalization of the research question through the setting of parameters and their exploration in three case studies. This part is split into three distinct elements.

First, the conceptual thinking of the previous part is condensed into necessary variables for continued security community cooperation, and then the state of the object of interest, the transatlantic security community, is illuminated. For this, this first chapter of part II looks at the extent of the community and the necessary variables for community cooperation in the example of the first leader of the community, the U.S. In light of the potential dynamic of decay, this chapter will close with an investigation into and a choice of focus nations for the following case studies, explaining why Germany, France and the U.K. were chosen and how the parameters explained before will be applied to the individual case study nations.

Second, the focus nations are studies in three case studies, each one illuminating either the understanding of defense, leadership behavior or public opinion. Grouping the focus nations together for each of these topics simplifies their contrasting for the later analysis.

Third, this operationalization part comprises the analytical chapter, which compares and contrasts the findings of the case studies. This points to the centrality of trust in intercommunal cooperation and the lack of it currently existing between the focus nations being a major impediment to cooperation and integration in European defense initiatives.
With the analysis concluding the inquiry related to the research question central to this thesis, a short conclusion chapter summarizing the conduct and results of the research presented here will follow the end of part II on operationalization and the thesis.

3.2. Case choice and operationalization

3.2.1. Parameters for operationalization

Before the choice for focus nations is explained further down, the theoretical dimensions of security communities need to be translated into a view of a practical example. The ideal mature, pluralistic security community as theorized by Deutsch et al. and Adler and Barnett and later researchers is a construct from upon which the transatlantic security community needs to be superimposed to understand its imperfections and be able to analyze its dynamics in light of the theories of decay proposed above. For both the superimposition as well as the later focused analysis of three nations able to step up to a leadership position, the parameters and variables to be highlighted are in need of explaining.

Recapitulating the ideal or stereotypical security community in the mature phase, the basic tenets are the loss of war as a reasonable means of conflict management between community members and a common identity and sense of community materialized in a degree of integration. Additionally, there is a leader state or group of states around which the community manifests and the member states harbor trust in each other and rely on the others to not act in detriment to their interests, especially pertaining to issues of security. Regarding said leading state, as an agenda setter the leading state introduces a vision to the shared community. Following the premise of not acting in the disinterest of member states, a leading state necessarily has to consider foreign security interests and make them its own. A leader within a security community can therefore be

98 Deutsch et al., *Political Community*, 5.
said to have to give up some of its foreign and security policy decision- and agenda-making power and instead be cognizant of foreign interests. Protecting these, when a member state cannot, means leading states need to provide a public good, that of security, for the whole community and shoulder a larger part of the burden. Vulnerability of the leading and more powerful state for the sake of the community is a central tenet of security communities. In an ideal mature security community, trust exists between each and every single member state to a high degree and the shared security identity, too, is all encompassing. This would mean that a leading state is also somewhat interchangeable, given that the follow-up states have been integrated into the community. As the magnetic nature of the leading state that has been described in the literature implies that over time more states could join, it can be assumed that newer states procedurally take-over the collective identity and therefore are not necessarily sharing the same scope of the identity as older members.99 The security identity shared between all states would ensure that not only would the norms and interests in regard to the scope of the security community be the same, the understanding of the different states of what the community is as opposed to any outside other as well as the goals and needs of the community as implied in the shared identity would be known and inherent to all member states. As manifestations of shared identity, norms and interests, mature security communities also share institutions. These materialize and enshrine the norms and agreements of the community. Member states equally participate in them, sharing responsibilities and burdens connected to these institutions as well as equally profiting from their existence. A mature security community does not function transactionally. The trust existent between member

states means nations are not in a zero-sum game or quid pro quo cooperative situation, but rather in a form of limited\(^{100}\) partnership without expected immediate or action-based returns.

Concluding from the above, the variables to be looked at are the individual security identities of the member states in question and their overlap, signifying commonality and shared identity, mutual trust, displayed in the willingness or readiness of states to be influenced by foreign interests in security potentially making them vulnerable, and the existence or emergence of a group of leading states, setting a vision and agenda for the community, taking over responsibility and willing to provide the public good of security without an expectation of transactional returns of the same or similar value. Conversely, one could assume that a lack in any of these elements could severely hinder the further development or even the status quo of a security community.

3.2.2. The transatlantic security community - dimensions

In order to be able to make educated decisions on the choice of focus nations and display the urgency of the research question, the transatlantic security community, its dynamics and its imperfections when compared to the ideal type of a mature, pluralistic security community need to be illuminated. Beginning with Deutsch et al. the emergence of a pluralistic security community was equated with the geographic area of the North Atlantic,\(^{101}\) an area largely congruent with the extent of NATO at the time. Other institutions and organizations sharing a similar space as well as the foundational goal\(^{102}\) of diminished intracommunal international conflict were the Council of

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\(^{100}\) Limited in terms pertaining to the scope of the security community. As total amalgamation is not present in even tightly coupled mature security communities the member states retain sovereign governments and are coupled solely in terms of security expectations between each other and as a group vis-à-vis the outside world.

\(^{101}\) They define the community in question as consisting of: Austria, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Finland, France, West Germany, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, the United Kingdom and the United States. They purposefully do not equate the community with NATO membership alone to be able to include nations like Sweden and others, which are geographically linked and would therefore likely be included in identity building and sharing. Deutsch et al., Political Community, 9-10. \(^{102}\) “The Schuman Declaration – 9 May 1950,” European Union, accessed on July 9, 2020, https://europa.eu/european-union/about-eu/symbols/europe-day/schuman-declaration_en.
Europe, the European Economic Community of 1957 or the European Coal and Steel Community. Now, with subsequent enlargements of both NATO and the European Union, the spatial dimensions of the transatlantic security community span from North America to Eastern Europe, and if one includes the OSCE reach as an instrument of identity building well into Asia\(^{103}\). As the formal security organization of the area, the extent of NATO provides a good first understanding of the current dimensions of the transatlantic security community. As entry into the European Union can be seen as “tantamount to backdoor access to NATO’s Article 5 security guarantee”\(^{104}\), the EU too must be seen as a central part of the transatlantic security community. Additionally to the slow growth towards the East, there have been attempts to integrate Ukraine, Georgia and even Russia into the security community.\(^{105}\) While it can be tempting to equate the transatlantic security community with the broad term the West, states like Australia or New Zealand who are both part of the global Anglosphere and the West cannot be defined as part of the transatlantic security community. War between these two and any Atlantic riparian state can be seen as unlikely, the sense of community that is expressed in institutional membership like NATO, however, is considered missing still\(^ {106}\).

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\(^{103}\) Member states like Russia, Kazakhstan or Kyrgyzstan are firmly situated in Central Asia or even the Far East.


For the purpose of this thesis, it is not imperative to clearly delineate the borders of the transatlantic security community. It is imperative, however, to identify the core of the community and its security identity in order to make judgements about the state of the community in general. It should be safe to assume that members of NATO, bound by a security guarantee, are part of the security community. Additionally, EU membership, through large congruence with NATO and the EU security cooperation and backdoor to NATO security, must also be considered as a signifier for the extent of the transatlantic security community. For the thesis at hand the major actors within the transatlantic security community are of relevance, and due to the nature of identity and its evolution, longer-term community membership as well as prominence within the community are to be expected with states that fall into the category of NATO and/or EU member state.

3.2.2.1. Leadership, responsibility, and imperfections – the U.S. case and community conflict

President Truman signed the North Atlantic Treaty in 1949 and, turning towards the U.S. Senate for ratification, declared his conviction “that the North Atlantic treaty is a great advance toward fulfillment of the unconquerable will of the people of the United States to achieve a just and enduring peace”\textsuperscript{107} and that the power of the United States has imbued it with a responsibility for the freedom of people around the world. The following year, the American vision of extending peace and freedom to partner nations in NATO was further enshrined in the definition of a democratic, free Europe as a vital U.S. interest in National Security Council policy paper 68\textsuperscript{108}. Of course, the urgency of the agenda setting was tied to the American understanding of the Soviet


Union and its threat to the West.\textsuperscript{109} The U.S. continued to project this vision for Europe and the transatlantic security community, as a free, liberal-democratic and peaceful sphere throughout the Cold War and in the early Post-Cold War period, both in Republican and Democratic administrations.\textsuperscript{110}

This vision or agenda extended over the entirety of Europe and, importantly, was not tied to direct transactional reciprocal action on the side of the European partners. Another element necessary for leadership within a mature security community is the acceptance of responsibility for the public good of security, and in connection to that a degree of vulnerability through sharing risks of members and accepting infringement upon one’s own sovereign decision-making through valuing foreign interests. In this area, too, the U.S. has fulfilled the criteria set out above. The most prominent example for risk-sharing on behalf of member states and producing a common good is certainly the extended nuclear deterrence, coupled with American troop presence on European soil. Not only is the U.S. basing nuclear weapons as deterrents on European soil, in bases in Central and Southern Europe, but also giving European states limited access to them in an arrangement known as nuclear sharing. Nuclear sharing evolved out of the concern of European partners over American nuclear strategy and their vulnerability to it without potential influence. The U.S. ameliorated this concern through the establishment of the Nuclear Planning Group in NATO, and models of risk and burden sharing with host nation militaries.\textsuperscript{111} The Nuclear Posture Reviews of the U.S. are heavily influenced by allied sensibilities\textsuperscript{112}, which shows the U.S. concern for the

\textsuperscript{110} Mike Winnerstig, \textit{A World Reformed? The United States and European Security from Reagan to Clinton}, Stockholm Studies in Politics 75 (Stockholm: Stockholm University, 2000), 252.
\textsuperscript{112} The latest one with a known influence by NATO perceptions and interests is the Obama administration one. Steven Pifer, Richard Bush, Vanda Felbab-Brown, Martin Indyk, Michael O’Hanlon and Kenneth Pollack, “U.S.
wider interests for the security community underneath its nuclear umbrella. At the same time, through the nuclear security guarantee and attached policy and doctrine, Washington was communicating that it was willing to risk its own security in a nuclear war. Trading New York for Berlin, an allied but foreign city and strategic target of the Cold War adversary, shows U.S. accepted vulnerability as a leading state within the transatlantic security community. For the sake of the partners and without said partners being able to reciprocate through a similar capability, only two other nations in Europe have nuclear weapons, the U.S. has exhibited the leadership properties expected within the theoretical framework.

This previous level of leadership, and the trust it has built over time, has been waning. American troops on European soil are continuously being reduced, lately as a direct response to perceived allied misbehaviour\textsuperscript{113}. The U.S. has shifted its strategic view to Asia with a so-called pivot, moving away from the previous U.S. foreign policy agenda of bringing and guaranteeing freedom and democracy to Europe. In other areas like trade, energy and climate change, the U.S. and European partners are seeing eye to eye less and less, further eroding the trust between both shores of the Atlantic Ocean.

Following the assumptions of the ideal security community, within mature pluralistic ones all members equally share common values, interests and identity. This ideal would mean, any member could ascend to the leadership position, as the nations share enough similarities. American retrenchment should therefore not play the fracturing or deteriorating role for the community as it appears to do. It can therefore be assumed that the transatlantic security community, which in academic debate is seen as one of if not the only mature pluralistic security community in existence,

internally veers away from the ideal set out in the theoretical chapter above. Exploring this degree of imperfection is necessary to better frame the case choice selection criteria later on. As proposed above, an ideal security community asserts equal participation and equal sharing of the collective identity, the transatlantic reality, however, is far from ideal. Some member states are flirting with open authoritarianism, like Turkey under Erdogan or Orban’s Hungary. Populism in Poland, the United Kingdom and the United States has appeared on mainstream politics and a number of nations openly struggle with surging populist movements linked to nationalist or far-right extremist parties and views. Populism by way of its narrative nature pits an imagined homogenous community against an outsider group like certain elites, foreigners or others. This has a negative effect on institutional and international trust and cohesion. Not only does a shift towards populist or even authoritarian domestic politics strain international cooperation, such a shift also raises questions about the compatibility or sharedness of collective identity. While the literature debates whether security communities need to be democratic and liberal states in nature or not, a community between democratic and non-democratic or illiberal authoritarian states is questionable. While no state has yet left NATO, even if the current

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administration has heavily criticized it as obsolete, populist movements in the United Kingdom have prompted the nation to leave the European Union. Other member states’ publics are also flirting with EU secession. This underscores an assumption that member states’ collective identity adherence is not as equal and pervasive as is presupposed in an ideal security community.

Another example concerning diverging collective identity concerns nuclear deterrence. Mentioned above as the prime example for American leadership, within European member states, nuclear weapons are approached in a variety of ways despite their centrality to their security guarantee. Three transatlantic nations have developed and possess nuclear weapons, another five participate in direct nuclear sharing despite popular antinuclear sentiments. Nuclear member states are: The U.S., France and the U.K. States in a nuclear sharing arrangement are: Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, Belgium and Turkey. It needs to be mentioned that the status of Turkey is debated. While Incirlik airbase is still officially counted as a base used for the stationing of nuclear weapons, there are reports of a covert removal of nuclear weapons from Turkey due to security concerns. Hans Kristensen and Matt Korda, “United States nuclear forces, 2019,” Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists 75, no. 3 (April 2019): 131, https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/pdf/10.1080/00963402.2019.1606503?needAccess=true.

Mentioned above as the prime example for American leadership, within European member states, nuclear weapons are approached in a variety of ways despite their centrality to their security guarantee. Three transatlantic nations have developed and possess nuclear weapons, another five participate in direct nuclear sharing despite popular antinuclear sentiments.117 Only France does not participate in the Nuclear Planning Group. The majority of member states is not nuclear armed and there is a significant difference in popular and elite attitudes, ranging from aversion over pragmatic acceptance to “true believers”,118 throughout Europe. Nonetheless, they benefit from the extended deterrence structure provided by these weapons. This example alone points to problems with the presumption of mutually shared collective identity. Also, this is only one element of the wider burden-sharing as well as risk-sharing point of contention in transatlantic as well as intracontinental European debate. Probably the most prominent and widely known element

117 Nuclear member states are: The U.S., France and the U.K. States in a nuclear sharing arrangement are: Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, Belgium and Turkey. It needs to be mentioned that the status of Turkey is debated. While Incirlik airbase is still officially counted as a base used for the stationing of nuclear weapons, there are reports of a covert removal of nuclear weapons from Turkey due to security concerns. Hans Kristensen and Matt Korda, “United States nuclear forces, 2019,” Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists 75, no. 3 (April 2019): 131, https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/pdf/10.1080/00963402.2019.1606503?needAccess=true.

is the strongly debated\textsuperscript{119} and often titled as “arbitrary”\textsuperscript{120} two percent of GDP spending guideline for member states of NATO. This was unanimously agreed upon as a formal goal at the 2014 Wales summit by NATO members following decades\textsuperscript{121} of debate. Framed as an effort to reengage equitably in defense spending, make states more accountable within the community and illustrate their continued commitment to intra-community burden sharing\textsuperscript{122}, the two percent were seen as a remedy for conflicts of interest. With only a minority of states meeting the pledge since its inception, and with otherwise equally unequal military spending or direct NATO funding levels\textsuperscript{123}, it is quite clear that there is a discrepancy between the members states in terms of material commitment to collective defense. The question here is not whether there can be an equitable sharing of responsibilities within the security community and how that would look like, the question is whether this currently exists. Since it is a vital part of a contentious narrative, the debate on and the realities of burden sharing illuminate that there indeed is a level of inequality between the members of the transatlantic security community. Different defense initiatives and cooperations within the community, be it through NATO, EU or other frames, reveal a mosaic of


\textsuperscript{122} Contrasted with the “conceptual shortcomings” inherent in its design, the 2% pledge is seen as a political tool as opposed to a practical tool for increased burden sharing within the alliance. Jan Techau, “The Politics of 2 Percent: NATO and the Security Vacuum in Europe,” Carnegie Endowment for International Peace (September 2015): 10, https://carnegieendowment.org/files/CP_252_Techau_NATO_Final.pdf.

security institutions. The Permanent and Structured Cooperation (PeSCo) is short two EU members (Denmark and Malta) and there is mixed project adherence within. The European Intervention Initiative, a recent foray by French President Emanuel Macron into a different form of coordinated security cooperation, has eleven member states,\textsuperscript{124} most notably the United Kingdom despite its exit from the European Union. Bilateral agreements like the treaty of Aachen add another layer of stratified, unequal distribution of security cooperation in the transatlantic realm. While these on the one hand can be understood as a large interwoven construct that through its cross connections strengthens the security community, another reading is that of collective identity not deeply interconnected and thorough enough to satisfy the member states’ needs. While the theoretical assumptions laid out by Deutsch et al. and Adler and Barnett allow for a leader state and a group of non-leaders, the fracturing of defense cooperation into smaller piecemeal elements point to imperfect distribution of roles and responsibilities between the members of the transatlantic security community.

These more material representations of the collective identity can be rounded off with a look at the distribution of shared norms within the security community. An ideal security community would equally share collective norms that are informed by the collective identity. Central norms relevant to the working of mature security communities in general have been known to be eroding or have been on shaky grounds since the inception of the transatlantic security community. The consultation norm necessary for any coordinated and understanding communal action has been followed as well as ignored throughout transatlantic history. The United Kingdom has been its foremost user, with nations like France and Germany abstaining from communication and in effect influence on the security community leader depending on the issue area by choice.

\textsuperscript{124} These are: Belgium, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, the Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, Spain, the United Kingdom. Sweden, Italy and Romania.
rather than community design\textsuperscript{125}. The United States, too, has knowingly strayed from the norm, as early as the Suez crisis\textsuperscript{126} and as late as the 2020 decision to halve the size of troops stationed in Germany without consulting the host nation or the greater community dependent on the security provided by the forward deployment of American troops. Another norm visibly under duress is the norm of multilateralism. Tied closely to the need for consultation, in post-Cold War times the United States has increasingly turned to unilateral decision making with regard to security policy. Prominent examples are the Iraq War in 2003 or the 2018 withdrawal from the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action followed by unilateral pressure and threats against Iran among other unilateral foreign policy decisions with direct impact on community members security and interests.

Taken together, it is undeniable that the transatlantic security community is an imperfect mature pluralistic security community at best, or an eroding one at worst. The ideal of collectively shared identity, values and norms, needs to be called into question, however. With the United States as the leading state and preeminent guarantor of security pivoting away from Europe and from the position of leadership within the community one has no choice but to wonder about the future of the transatlantic community as well as European security. European nations through their membership in the security community have become reliant on the American security guarantee and a possible U.S. withdrawal from the continent and its defense could have grave consequences. This growing leadership vacuum has not been addressed so far, and European integration and cooperation is struggling to take off.


\textsuperscript{126} The Cuban missile crisis is also considered a prime example of missing consultation between the allies, but Risse-Kappen argues that the Kennedy administration knew the European positions and acted upon them during the initial phase of the crisis, ergo despite a lack consultation, the allies perspectives were not ignored and the U.S. stayed within the normative frame. Risse-Kappen, \textit{Cooperation Among Democracies}, 207.
3.2.2.2. Focus nation choice

In order to narrow down the list and make an educated guess of member states’ relevance vis-à-vis continued existence of the security community and with regard to European security cooperation, the following subchapter highlights measurable criteria for selection and selects three states as most relevant for new leadership structures. These are the focus nations which will be investigated in the thematic case studies later.

A first group of nations to be excluded from consideration must be the newest members of the community. As was argued above, identity develops over time. Leaders, who need to represent and anchor the collective identity, need to have thoroughly accepted the collective identity and it can be argued that newly joined member states, especially those of previous Soviet Union membership, have had less time for assimilation and have started from a very different set of values and identity. Therefore, newly joint NATO members like North Macedonia, or the newest additions to the European Union are excluded from consideration. Furthermore, as the security structure on the European continent is still dependent on NATO, membership of this institution is considered vital for any leading state. The community itself certainly has spilled outside of strict NATO boundaries, but current policy and defense shaping power is in the hands of NATO members. All non-NATO have to be disregarded for that reason.

Leadership under the United States has had a strong material component. Therefore, it can be assumed that this material element needs to be taken into account for new leadership candidates. In terms of population the largest members of the community are in descending order: the U.S., Turkey, Germany, France, the U.K., Italy, Spain, Poland and Canada, with major jumps

127 The latest formal additions to both organizations are: North Macedonia, Croatia and Albania.
in population between these nations as well as to the remainder of member states. In terms of wealth, measured in Gross National Product, the U.S. and Canada lead, followed by Germany, France, the U.K., Italy, Spain and the Netherlands. As defense spending has been narratively tied to responsible stakeholdership within the community a look at a country’s wealth and defense budget, which can be indicative of its capability for security leadership through potential investments, is necessary, too. As the famed guidepost of the two percent defense spending pledge was only reached by four nations in 2018, namely the U.S., the U.K., Estonia and Greece, and is a problematic tool to measure readiness, leadership or commitment, a different approach is taken. The following graphic serves to illustrate the direct monetary involvement in the administration of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, through a look at the latest direct budget proportion shouldered by individual members. It includes the adjusted percentage rates following the March 2020 ascension of North Macedonia to NATO. It must be noted that for the coming time period of 2021 to 2024, the U.S: commitment will shrink to roughly 16% following a decision by the Trump administration to match the second highest contributor. Germany and the United Kingdom will be taking over a greater share of the overall direct budget. While this budget is used for the general administration, rather than for financing NATO field missions, partaking in it could be seen as a measure first and foremost related to the consolidation and upkeep of the premier institution of the security community. Therefore, it can be assumed as a valid metric to gauge

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information on security community member commitment and integration into the community.

Figure 1 represents the percentage each NATO member state contributes to the NATO budget.

Fig. 1: Direct NATO funding budget, divided by percentage of contribution by member states. ¹³²

Following the U.S., the states contributing most are Germany, France, the U.K. and then with gradually falling percentage points the other member states. If this figure is read as an

¹³² The percentage values depicted in the figure have been rounded mathematically by graphics program in use. The graphic has been produced by the author. The data has been collected from: “Cost share arrangements for Civil Budget, Military Budget, and NATO Security Investment Programme [sic!] applicable as from Accession of North Macedonia on 27 March until 31 December 2020,” North Atlantic Treaty Organization, accessed July 22, 2020, https://www.nato.int/nato_static_fl2014/assets/pictures/images_mfu/2020/5/stock/200405-cost-shared-cb-mb.jpg. Unrounded data entry points can be found in Appendix I.
indicator for interest, integration and commitment, one could assume that the top donors are contenders for the burden of leadership.

Leading states are ultimately in need of policy shaping potentials and in a security community it is safe to assume that they must be able to take over portions of the security guarantor position. Therefore, a look at the members’ defense expenditure as an indicator of existing defense capabilities helps further consolidate the selection. Figure 2 serves as a visualization of this.

![Defense expenditure (2018) in billion US$ by NATO definition acc. to IISS The Military Balance 2019](image)

Fig. 2: Defense expenditures totaling over 1 billion U.S. $ in the year 2018 by non-U.S. NATO members as reported by the International Institute for Strategic Studies in *The Military Balance 2019*.133

As depicted above, and somewhat corresponding to the expectations built from looking at GNP and figure 1, the security community member states with the highest defense expenditures again aggregate around Western Europe. While the defense budget gives no indication on intended

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133 Graphic has been created by thesis author. Data has been aggregated from IISS *Military Balance* 2019. See Appendix I.
or actual use of the funds, the existing budget of the United Kingdom, France and Germany stands in stark contrast to the next in line, Italy, and could mean greater wriggle room for these three nations vis-à-vis realization of defense and security policy.

Following from the above and reviewing the indicator metrics set out, France, Germany and the United Kingdom have been singled out as contenders for closing a leadership vacuum the U.S. has been creating. These three nations serve as the case study focus nations for the remainder of the thesis at hand.

3.2.2.3. Operationalization of parameters

As was set out above, the transatlantic security community is suffering from an increasingly reluctant leader. Simultaneously there has not been a successful transfer of leadership or growing cooperation and integration on the European continent, despite the necessity to go further than the status quo to ameliorate the American retrenchment. Investigating what internal barriers hinder closer cooperation and with it the halting of further erosion of the transatlantic security community is necessary.

Extrapolating from both the theoretical chapter above, the variables necessary for successful leadership and security cooperation are shared security identity and the degree of commonality between the cooperating parties. Following from the identities in existence, there needs to be an agenda or vision for the community, which the other members can identify with and follow after. Since this alone does not mandate leadership, the willingness to shoulder additional responsibility in order to create the public good needs to be present. Lastly, the element of mutual trust, as the glue that holds communities together, warrants investigation. In order to tackle this element, three case studies are conducted. The first one sets out to highlight each focus nations' understanding of defense, both in terms of policy practice as well as in constitutional
realities. As identity manifests in action as well as in codified form, like in constitutions or law, this chapter investigates the constitutions and white books and governmental practice related to defense and security policy and decision-making. The second case study is concerned with instances of defense leadership, portrayed by each focus nation in recent years. This will shed light on leadership behavior, responsibility as well as the necessary element of a security vision for the community. Lastly, public opinion in all three nations is approached. As Tusicisny shows in his work on security communities and mass values\textsuperscript{134}, the domestic mindsets present within security communities, especially democratic ones, is another element playing into security identity, therefore it cannot be disregarded. Additionally, public attitudes also reflect the element of mutual trust that is vital for the functioning of a security community.

3.3. Case study

“And we also got the White House memo that Europe shouldn’t take the US [sic!] for granted […]. We know that our allies must do more to carry the burden of collective defence[sic].”

– \textit{Defence Secretary of the United Kingdom Ben Wallace}, March 5, 2020\textsuperscript{135}

“We can’t sleepwalk to a diminished Europe. We can’t remain in the routine of business as usual and wishful thinking.”

– \textit{President of France Emmanuel Macron}, March 4, 2019.\textsuperscript{136}

“I understand your desire for disruptive politics. […] But I’m tired of picking up the pieces. Over and over, I have to glue together the cups you have broken so that we can then sit down and have a cup of tea together.”

– \textit{Chancellor of Germany Angela Merkel}, November 23, 2019.\textsuperscript{137}

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Having chosen the three focus nations as laid out above, the following part of the thesis proceeds in three individual steps. The focus nations are not highlighted individually but are looked at through three individual lenses. Each case study subchapter focuses on one lens or aspect and illuminates all three focus nations under this chosen aspect. This serves to bring the individual nation’s characteristics into view and to contrast these subthemes of the respective security identities early on. An early contrasting enables this thesis to home in on the barriers between the focus nations without the need for reiterating and re-contrasting the earlier findings. The analytical chapter that follows focuses on and explores the meaning of these different identities for European defense cooperation and integration and for the transatlantic security community.

The thematic differentiation of the latter case studies is as follows. First, the understanding of defense of all three focus nations is scrutinized. This chapter focuses on the structural basis for defense, as portrayed in national constitutions, and the national understanding of the realm of security and the boundaries and goals each country sets for itself in official governmental communication. Coupled with an overview of strategic culture differences, this subchapter highlights the political and structural boundaries each nation has developed regarding security. As direct representations of the norms and values their respective security identities hold, this is a relevant entry point into the understanding of the security identities of France, Germany, and the United Kingdom.

Second, domestic values and public opinion pertaining to national security and security cooperation is highlighted. Drawing from the structural set-up of security institutions and decision-making as elaborated in the preceding chapter, not only is it necessary to highlight the public outlook on security and defense and military interaction each country has been engaged in, but it is also important to follow the public debate on threats to national, European and transatlantic
security. As democratic states, the public will as well as the public image of security are constitutive parts of security identities and potential options of political and military action of the three nations in question.

Third, the topic of leadership is addressed. As the United States of America are in a process of shifting towards Asia and the Pacific regions, and their continued leadership of the transatlantic security community is questioned both by the U.S. itself as well as a number of European partners, the leadership vacuum needs a country or a group of countries in bilateral or trilateral cooperation to exhibit interest in leadership, as well as a vision for the goals and direction a community under their guide could follow. Illuminating ongoing trends and actions, as well as their respective visions for security, this chapter highlights the French, German and British potential regarding cooperation and the leadership vacuum in the transatlantic security community.

Taken together, the three lenses of leadership, public opinion and understanding of defense enables this thesis to elaborate on the extant individual security identities and contrast the three contenders. Following these three explanatory investigations, the analytical chapter will summarize the findings, narrow down the security identities of all three nations and show their synergies as well as barriers to further cooperation and integration based on ideational differences that have yet to be overcome.

3.3.1. Speaking defense

As the initial foray into representations of French, German and British security identities and as the structural basis underlying manifestations and options for the respective identities mirrored in the following two lenses, leadership and public opinion, the way defense and security are spoken, understood, framed and politically manifested in all three nations needs the first spotlight. Beginning with the very basics, constitutional constraints, this chapter follows the
security and defense realm manifested in governmental publications as well as public speeches by relevant security shaping individuals representing the states, such as Ministers of Defense or heads of state. As documents, like white books, national security strategies and others, represent the official norms and values the policy making elite of a nation wishes to express, they can be seen as representations of the elite understanding and public portrayal of the inherent security identity.

3.3.1.1. Constitutional constraints: does accountability matter?

Beginning with the primary source for a nation’s self-understanding, constitutions portray the very basic and foundational values and norms any society has agreed upon. The way these kind of documents speak about defense or security, as well as related elements like military force or decision making informs the reader about the initial and enduring understanding of the division of power within a state, as well as the way and means a state deems legitimate in international action and national security.

Turning towards the most elusive case of the three, the British constitutional stance on security is somewhat intangible precisely because there is no British constitution in the sense of a single, legally binding foundational document. Instead, the United Kingdom draws on a number of laws, acts and similar legal texts as well as on unwritten norms and practices. Especially in the field of security, the non-codified elements are of major importance. Through a practice termed the royal prerogative a vast number of executive powers are still vested in the reigning monarch, but practically executed by the Prime Minister and the Cabinet and its Ministers. These include powers in the executive, legislative and judiciary branch. In relation to security matters these

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powers envelop: creation, ratification as well as leaving of international treaties, diplomacy, acquisition of territory, war-making powers, command over the armed forces and others. There is no legally binding decision-making process enshrined in documented or even practical form when it comes to decisions related to conflict, the use of force or the deployment of armed forces, whether in a peacekeeping, policing, training or armed combatant missions. The British government can choose to engage in conflicts or military missions worldwide, without the need to inform or consult with the democratically elected parliament or the public at large. That decisions made to commit to active engagement or interventions are seen as potentially lacking not only accountability, but also a degree of legitimacy is shown in the fact that constitutional reform and certainly the issue of parliamentary influence on governmental war-making capabilities are recurring themes in post-Cold War U.K. policy debates. In recent years, it has become more common for a cabinet to inform and sometimes debate security actions in parliament. The epitome of parliamentary influence was reached when military action in Syria was voted against in a non-binding vote in 2013. The only other time in modern British history a government has both put a war-related decision to a vote and lost was in 1782 on the U.S. war of independence. As Mills

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143 Mills, Parliamentary approval, 30.
points out, this instance is now often seen as the breakthrough of a new constitutional paradigm, normalizing parliamentary inclusion and setting up a precedent for a new constitutional practice. She cautions the enthusiasm with a nod to the continued non-legal status and vast and ill-defined powers of the prerogative executive. It appears that formal codification of the executive prerogative and the legal involvement of parliament has been struck down by the Cabinet as recently as 2016 to protect governmental decisions from legal recourse and therefore, effectively, accountability. And even within the Cabinet, a decision-making process concerning security policy, including military deployment, is not formalized. The Blair government has been known to work on such an informal level concerning the Iraq war that even Cabinet ministers reported concern over legitimacy of decisions.

A significant step in the development of security policy decision-making can be seen in the 2010 establishment of the National Security Council. This new Cabinet committee is the latest iteration of a century of development in defense decision-making committees in the U.K. In

144 "While many commentators concur that it would be politically difficult for any future government to move away from what is becoming adopted practice, as the recent limited action in Syria demonstrates the Government retains considerable freedom of action in determining the threshold for parliamentary involvement. It remains the case that Parliament has no legally [sic!] established role in approving military action." Mills, Parliamentary approval, 40. Also see her chapter 3 for further elaboration on the emergence and boundaries of this novel convention.

145 In questions of national security British courts are thought to have no jurisdiction over prerogative power usage. Bartlett and Everett, The Royal Prerogative, 7.

146 The explicit intent to have prerogative powers with regard to military deployment or conflict stay outside of the formal and legal influence of both parliament and the judiciary of the United Kingdom was shown in the remarks of Michael Fallon, 2016 Secretary of State for Defence. “[H]e said that the Government would not be bringing forward legislation to codify the convention into law, in order to ‘avoid such decisions becoming subject to legal action’”. Bartlett and Everett, The Royal prerogative, 20.

147 A report by the House of Lords states: “We are concerned, however, that the Government’s internal mechanisms in this area are not well understood. In particular, we note that the Cabinet Manual does not contain a detailed description of the processes we have set out. [...] it would be clearer and more transparent if the Cabinet Manual covered the whole advisory and decision-making apparatus [...] it [should] include[...] a detailed description of their internal arrangements for advising and deciding on the use of armed force.” [bold type by source] House of Lords Constitution Committee, Constitutional arrangements for the use of armed force, 2d Report of Session 2013-2014. The Stationary Office Limited, July 24, 2013, 13, https://publications.parliament.uk/pa/ld201314/ldselect/lconst/46/46.pdf.

148 House of Lords, Constitutional arrangements for the use of armed force, 10.
contrast to previous meeting and consultation formats, this includes a greater bandwidth of Cabinet ministers and resorts, portraying a new outlook on security. The National Security Council is concerned with “matters relating to national security, foreign policy, defence [sic!], international relations and development, resilience, energy and resource security”\textsuperscript{149} and includes as of 2020 the Prime Minister and Deputy, the Chancellors of the Duchy of Lancaster and of the Exchequer, the Attorney General and the Secretaries of State for Defence, Business, Energy and Industrial Strategy, International Trade, International Development, Home Department and for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs.\textsuperscript{150} Through the inclusion of these different areas of policy, the realm of security is widened. This council is now responsible for creating and publishing the National Security Strategy as well as the Defense White Book or Strategic Review, but has received continued criticism due to shortsighted or reactionary behavior and lack of strategic vision and action.\textsuperscript{151} Sub-committees fluctuate in existence and could be considered of a transitory nature. The ability of ad hoc establishment of new sub-committees points to a character of reaction and crisis management inherent in the structure of the National Security Council.\textsuperscript{152} Currently, there is only a dedicated subcommittee on nuclear deterrence and security.\textsuperscript{153}

The ease by which such ad hoc arrangements can be made is rooted in the constitution but gains traction through additional British voting and governmental practice. The first past the

\textsuperscript{150} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{152} Devanny and Harris, \textit{The National Security Council}, 25.
\textsuperscript{153} “List of Cabinet Committees and their membership as at 29 June 2020”, 2.
post voting system in the United Kingdom leads to a relative power imbalance between the winning party and smaller ones in comparison to the portion of votes they receive.\textsuperscript{154} This leads to single party governments without the need to form a coalition and a majority of the public’s vote not seeing a political representation relative to share in votes. While simple and straightforward, this system does not faithfully represent the votes cast and new developments in domestic public opinion does not easily come to political relevance in terms of governmental participation.

The winning party of national elections is artificially inflated in power, can expect less restraint politically and does not need to exercise political cooperation and compromise. The leader of the winning party will become Prime Minister by convention and has a free hand to create his cabinet. Additionally, the U.K. has a regular reshuffle of chosen ministers, between different Prime Ministers even of the same party, and within the term of any Prime Minister. For the post-Cold War period, this practice has led to an average duration of office-holding for the ministers relevant to security policy of 2.8 years for Secretaries of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs and 1.6 years for Secretaries of State for Defense\textsuperscript{155}. Compared to the maximum term length of five years for a British Prime Minister, Ministers relevant for the security realm and especially Ministers for Defense, usually do not stay in office very long, certainly not as long as the Prime Ministers who put them into the office. While this might partially be due to the practice of governmental reshuffle, it does not portray too much confidence into the office holder on the part of the Prime Minister and it must be questioned how powerful and relevant a ministerial post with a turnover time of under two years is, especially with regard to long-term planning and strategic


\textsuperscript{155} This has been calculated by the author on the basis of official dates of inauguration into office and final day in office of all secretaries in office starting with the office holder at the time of the final dissolution of the Soviet Union in December of 1991 until the time of writing of this thesis.
outlook. Instead, with one of the only constants in security related executive offices, the Prime Ministers gain relatively more importance as decision makers. Yet, this office, too, is somewhat volatile and practically removed from public influence. Four out of the six Prime Ministers\textsuperscript{156} of the post-Cold War period came into office without a public election but as the result of resignation by their respective predecessors. While they tend to stay in office in follow-up general elections as leaders of the winning party, the dynamic of ascension to power does not leave much room for democratic participation.

With the Commander-in-Chief being the British monarch and the loyalty of troops being solely to the monarch and their interest, as well as matters of defining security and acting upon it without public right to influence it, the constitutional understanding of defense shows a low regard for democratic values or influence as well as formality. The security realm appears to be removed from the wide public debate, influence and consensus and even governmental debate, making it highly dependent on the individual world views of the Prime Ministers and Cabinets in power. With the frequency of personnel changes in certain expertise areas, the practical influence of office holders is questionable. Ongoing attempts at constitutional formalization and furthering of security policy accountability and legitimacy point to a degree of unease or mistrust within parliament towards the vast prerogative powers of the government and especially the Prime Minister. Recent developments define security as a broad field, but the notable organ of political advice to the security policy makers is reportedly lacking a grand vision and has a more tactical rather than strategic outlook.

\textsuperscript{156} Major followed Thatcher's resignation, Brown Blair's, May followed Cameron and Johnson followed May's resignation after a snap-election kept her in office but with a diminished parliamentary representation. Only Blair and Cameron became Prime Ministers initially following a general election. While Major got into office before the fall of the Soviet Union, he continued on as Prime Minister until 1997. All office holders with a continued position that started before and led into the post-Cold War period have been considered for the argument towards governmental practice with the whole duration of their time served in said office.
French constitutional restraints are similarly loose, and the French president enjoys vast executive power in the security realm, albeit in a more documented and codified way. Article 15 states: “The President of the Republic shall be Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces. He shall preside over the higher national defence [sic!] councils and committees.”\textsuperscript{157} The French Parliament can influence defense through “statutes [which] shall also lay down the basic principles of: the general organization of national defence [sic!]”\textsuperscript{158} Parliament, too, has the sole authorization discretion over declarations of war. The same article granting the power over such declarations to Parliament furthermore states that:

\begin{quote}
[The] Government shall inform Parliament of its decision to have the armed forces intervene abroad, at the latest three days after the beginning of said intervention. It shall detail the objectives of the said intervention. This information may give rise to a debate, which shall not be followed by a vote. Where the said intervention shall exceed four months, the Government shall submit the extension to Parliament for authorization. It may ask the National Assembly to make the final decision. If Parliament is not sitting at the end of the four-month period, it shall express its decision at the opening of the following session.\textsuperscript{159}
\end{quote}

This addition was part of a 2008 amendment of the constitution. With regard to the changed strategic landscape and the growing number of military interventions or deployments as part of military assistance to allies, which seldom include formal declarations of war, this article still gives the French President vast leeway in utilizing the armed forces and applying them to their view of security policy interests nearly unrestrained, even with the recent additional conditions. While these changes portray an understanding of the power differential between the President and other political institutions in France, the President is understood and defined not only as the Head of State, but also as the bedrock of national defense and, therefore, the only adequate political

\textsuperscript{158} National Assembly, Constitution of October 4, 1958, October 1958, Title V art. 34.
\textsuperscript{159} National Assembly, Constitution of October 4, 1958, October 1958, Title V art. 35.
office to be in charge of security related affairs. Another constitutional opportunity for the President is that while a number of international agreements need authorization or ratification by Parliament, international interventions as part of defense agreements do not. One might go so far as to argue that the French National Assembly has lost its power in practice through the global change of military conflicts.

Additionally, the French President can harness emergency powers when “the institutions of the Republic, the independence of the Nation, the integrity of its territory or the fulfilment of its international commitments are under serious and immediate threat, and where the proper functioning of the constitutional public authorities is interrupted.” Noteworthy in this article is the allusion to an international dimension of the French executive. Even during times of cohabitation, when the National Assembly majority is not of the same party political background as the directly elected President and, in effect, the President has to choose a Prime Minister from this opposing majority and jointly create a government, the area of foreign policy remains practically in the sole executive power of the President.

Being legally unconnected to the French National Assembly and with nearly unlimited control over the course of foreign and security policy and international relations, including the use of force short of declarations of war, the French President enjoys a constitutional executive power.
in the realm of security that is vast and outside of democratic control or oversight. Security and international actions are, therefore, highly dependent on the person inhabiting the office.

Through its system of direct suffrage and two-round run off voting, it is ensured that the French President indeed is voted into office by a majority of votes cast. And, in the time period of choice for this thesis, all Presidents stay in office for the duration of their term, which has been reduced to five from formerly seven years in 2000. National assembly elections are held directly after the presidential elections and forming of government, in order to reproduce the public political opinion of the time of the presidential vote and reduce the likelihood of cohabitation. This way a rough alignment of Parliament with the President’s political background through party affiliation is ensured, strengthening the President’s already strong position, and also diminishing the need to form coalition and find policy consensus. This relative presidential stability is not directly mirrored in ministerial stability. The average tenure of both the Minister of Armed Forces as well as the Minister of Europe and Foreign Affairs is just shy of two and a half years, with a median tenure of 2.1 years in office. The mean tenure shorter than the presidential term tenure is popularly linked to presidential needs to strengthen their domestic position, especially before upcoming presidential elections or following defeats in municipal ones.165 As such, one can assume, like in the British case, that the constant foreign and security policy actor within a term is

more likely the President than the individual ministers. The ministers partially function to project a domestic image and to follow the foreign and security goals and strategy outlined by the President.

In direct contrast to the above two nations, in terms of constitutional defense and security structures, Germany is following a *Sonderweg*. With a paused but not abolished conscription,\(^\text{166}\) it is the latest of the three nations to move towards fully voluntary, professional armed forces. The position of Commander-in-Chief is not tied to the Head of State but the Minister of Defense. Only in case of self-defense or the threat of an imminent attack does the commanding position switch to the Chancellor.\(^\text{167}\) The German constitution, passed in 1949, defines the German armed forces as purely for defensive functions in article 87a\(^\text{168}\), with very specific restrictions for domestic deployment and no legal provisions for aggressive capabilities. This same article of the basic law also provides fiscal control, and therefore ability to oversee procurement and employment of the armed forces, to the German Parliament.\(^\text{169}\) Furthermore, the basic law provides for the establishment of both a Parliamentary Commissioner of the Armed Forces, the *Wehrbeauftragter*, and a defense committee, which is to be distinct from a committee for foreign relations.\(^\text{170}\) This committee of defense additionally acts as an investigative commission or inquiry committee,

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\(^{166}\) Conscription of males over the age of 18 is still existent, but the effect of conscription, namely becoming a member of the armed forces and being taught war fighting for a period of time, has been paused in 2011. In case of war, this pause is nullified. “Aussetzung der allgemeinen Wehrpflicht beschlossen,” change of conscription law 2011, Deutscher Bundestag, accessed August 1, 2020, https://www.bundestag.de/dokumente/textarchiv/2011/33831649_kw12_de_wehrdienst-204958. France and Great Britain have dissolved peacetime conscription practices in 1996 and 1960 respectively.\(^\text{167}\) Bundesrepublik Deutschland, Grundgesetz für die Bundesrepublik Deutschland, May 23, 1949, art. 115b, https://www.gesetze-im-internet.de/gg/BJNR000010949.html. In the following text, the German citation style for the basic law will be utilized. The basic law is abbreviated as GG. The article in this footnote would be cited as §115b GG.\(^\text{168}\) §87a GG.

\(^{169}\) “Der Bund stellt Streitkräfte zur Verteidigung auf. Ihre zahlenmäßige Stärke und die Grundzüge ihrer Organisation müssen sich aus dem Haushaltsplan ergeben [the federal level creates armed forces for defense. Their strength in numbers and their basic organizational structure have to be derived from the federal budget],” §87a GG. The German federal budget is planned and passed annually by the German Parliament.\(^\text{170}\) §45a GG.
which has to publicly open a case of parliamentary investigation if a quarter of its members call for it.\textsuperscript{171} Its main function is the oversight and control of the Ministry of Defense. The Commissioner of the Armed Forces is both the “lawyer of the soldiers”\textsuperscript{172}, advocating for their rights, as well as a via media of parliamentary control and oversight into the inner workings of the armed forces, bringing annual reports of the state of the forces into parliament.

A final article of importance in the German constitution is article 24.

“(1) The Federation may by a law transfer sovereign powers to international organizations. (1a) Insofar as the Länder [federal states] are competent to exercise state powers and to perform state functions, they may, with the consent of the Federal Government, transfer sovereign powers to transfrontier institutions in neighboring regions. (2) With a view to maintaining peace, the Federation may enter into a system of mutual collective security; in doing so it shall consent to such limitations upon its sovereign powers as will bring about and secure a lasting peace in Europe and among the nations of the world. (3) For the settlement of disputes between states, the Federation shall accede to agreements providing for general, comprehensive, and compulsory international arbitration.”\textsuperscript{173}

Not only does this article of the Basic Law provide for the cessation of partial sovereignty if ever the need may arise, this article also explicitly mentions collective security systems. At the time of passage of this law, NATO had just been founded, but Germany was not yet a member state. With Germany joining into the premier institution of what is now the transatlantic security community in 1955, the area of operation of the German armed forces, namely the geographical extent of Germany, had to be amended to follow NATO article 5 responsibilities. Known as the so-called “out-of-area”-debate, the German Federal Constitutional Court declared in 1994 that German armed forces were allowed to participate in missions and deployments within NATO, UN

\textsuperscript{171} ibid.
\textsuperscript{172} “Wehrbeauftragte,” Commissioner of the Armed Forces, German Parliament, last accessed August 15, 2020, https://www.bundestag.de/parlament/wehrbeauftragter#url=L3BhcmxhbwVudC93ZWhyYmVhdyW0cmFndGVyL3dlahHJ2WF12ZnRyYVdd0ZXttdNk3Nzly&mod=mod697708.
or (at the time) Western European Union as needed by these collective security systems to ensure security and peace. At the same time, the court tied any deployment of German forces under arms to a prior authorization by German parliament. In the Parliament Participation Act of 2005, the conditions surrounding the parliamentary influence were fleshed out and formalized, including the need for the government to clearly delineate the missions, manpower, area of deployment, capabilities, duration and cost prior to parliamentary consent and the right of parliament to recall authorization of already ongoing missions, effectively ending them.

These regulations make the German constitution not only the most explicit, but also the most restrictive one. The constitution displays a deep mistrust of armed forces, centralized authority and leadership, and the use of force. As the only one of the three focus nations Germany has created a system of oversight firmly in the hands of parliament, not the government or the Chancellor, and of democratic control, making German armed forces, their spending and deployment wholly accountable to a wider public. Additionally, the constitution differentiates defense from foreign affairs, through the establishment of separate commissions, indicating a value set trying to remove the use of force from international relations and the German foreign conduct. This should not come as a surprise, given the historic background of this state, yet in regard to decision making abilities in multinational systems of collective security, like NATO, further


175 Later amendments to the law include easier processes for missions of low intensity, for example scouting. In case of crucial reaction time, deployments can be ordered without prior parliamentary consent, but consent needs to be petitioned for immediately. Parliament can still stop deployments if consent is denied. Bundesministerium der Justiz und für Verbraucherschutz, “Gesetz über die parlamentarische Beteiligung bei der Entscheidung über den Einsatz bewaffneter Streitkräfte im Ausland (Parlamentsbeteiligungsgesetz),” Parliament Participation Act, March 18, 2005, https://www.gesetze-im-internet.de/parlbgu/BJR200500181010000005..
restriction of executive power is unusual\textsuperscript{176} and is considered a hindrance to alliance capabilities\textsuperscript{177}. New members of NATO’s eastern expansion tended to relax parliamentary control in order to gain membership, as multilateral decision-making with a restricted executive is not favored by the alliance in question.\textsuperscript{178} Defense and security in the normal political realm, outside of direct war on German soil, points to a very different understanding of defense and norms and values surrounding this political realm. Decentralization, accountability, public consent and mistrust of military and power-political tools are guiding values underwriting the German constitution in the realm of security.

Looking at political practice, the Federal Republic is characterized by considerable political stability and continuity. The only focus nation of the three to have a representational voting system, German governments are almost exclusively formed through political coalitions. Habit has it, that the senior party, meaning the one with a larger portion of votes, picks both the Chancellor and Minister for Defense, the junior partner usually appoints the Vice Chancellor and the Minister for Foreign Affairs\textsuperscript{179}. This means that for only seven of the past 30 years, the Defense Minister was not a Christian Democrat Party (CDU/CSU) member. Despite the shortest term limit within the three case study nations, Germany has only seen three different Chancellors in the past three decades, with two of them being in office for four terms, meaning 16 consecutive years.\textsuperscript{180}

\textsuperscript{176} Wagner, Peters and Glahn,\textit{ Parliamentary War Powers}, 25.
\textsuperscript{179} Other ministries are similarly prepicked, or, if they fall into the specific policy realm of certain parties, are expected to end up in that party’s hold. Examples could be: the Social Democrats (SPD) always hold the Federal Ministry for Labour and Social Affairs, whether they are the senior or junior partner.
\textsuperscript{180} Angela Merkel is in her fourth and last term. She has been in office for close to 15 years and as she is not expected to leave office before the 2021 General Election, she will have a combined tenure of 16 years. The only other Chancellor to be in office this long was Helmut Kohl, also a Conservative and preceding Merkel’s predecessor.
At the onset of each term, the coalition partners agree to a coalition treaty, in which certain reform plans or vetoes to certain policies are pre-determined, restricting some executive freedom of all ministers. The Chancellor, as with the President and Prime Minister discussed before, does have a policy guideline competence, meaning they can set the policy frame in which the Ministers can act, but they usually retain the management right of their policy resort. Over the course of the post-Cold War period, the Ministers of Foreign Affairs fulfilled the duration of their one term tenure, the Ministers for Defense, however, saw both fluctuations due to a resignation as well as tenure for over the usual term duration. Overall, the latest three ministers of the defense resort have been regarded as very close to Merkel, with potential to become the next party leader as well as Chancellor candidate. This political closeness gives credence to the assumption of policy action favored by the current Chancellor, ergo the past one and a half decades of security policy. With the comparatively long tenure of each German Chancellor, it should come as no surprise, however, that the interests and role of the Chancellor in international relations with neighbors as well as general security policy are considered to be greater than that of the Minister for Foreign Affairs. Sometimes titled leader of the free world in international public media, the question of her successor in the Chancellery is discussed more seriously as the next person in the Foreign Ministry. This perception of power and importance of the Chancellor within political practice larger than the constitutional boundaries would suggest still have to be seen in relation to the parliamentary approval necessity, when it comes to the use of military force even in non-war settings, like training or peace-keeping missions or even within the realm of allied territory, as seen in the AWACS discourse. German security political practice is characterized through continuity, the constant

Schröder. Germany had only been without a Conservative member of the government for seven years under Schröder from 1998 to 2005.
presence of the Chancellor if they wish to invest themselves in the foreign and security realm, coalition-building necessity and a conservative, non-adventurous habit.

When comparing these three nations side-by-side, several things concerning security identity, cooperation potential and the ability to trust and be trusted should become obvious. Through constitution and practice, all leaders, be it President, Prime Minister or Chancellor play an important role. The French President, however, constitutionally must be the lead on foreign and security policy. The office has little legal oversight and can normally only be held accountable by the citizens at the next presidential election. The French security identity developed in such a way as that the state and populace envision a strong leadership position of the President as the right course for security. This means that not only does the President not need to consider domestic coalitions to bring about his foreign and security policy, but has the chance to direct the military apparatus and relevant governmental policy in any way he or she sees fit personally. The lack of coalition-making practice and singled-out role within French politics could be a problem for cooperation and integration, as that hinges on considering other interests and the ability to make concessions to partners. This is in stark contrast with the Presidential self-understanding within French politics. Also, as the security policy acted out by the President is highly dependent on the personal character of the office holder, effective cooperation might be hampered. Additionally, after a five-year term, if another candidate is elected, the security priorities and projects could easily change due to personal preference. Germany, a state whose security identity revolves around the deep mistrust of leadership authority and military power and about accountability and control measures in the hand of the people through Parliament, must be rather cautious and mistrustful of such in their view uncontrolled leadership. While France provides political stability in practice, the United Kingdom, with similarly empowered Prime Minister, coupled with a volatile and
quickly changing governmental reality as well as the element of character-dependent policy, stands in even starker contrast to the stable, unmoving security practice of the Germans and their system of parliamentary control. In fact, when approaching this from a French or British side, not only can they not solely rely on the personal opinions of the Chancellor, they also have to expect the coalition partner to dampen any security adventures incompatible to their party outlook, but they also have to expect whatever agreement they might have reached in a bi- or trilateral setting including Germany to be struck down by a critical German Parliament, including the political opposition of the German government. Trust, defined as lack of necessity to plan and anticipate potentially negative outcomes in cooperation with another, certainly needs to exist in abundance for cooperation to overcome this constitutional German hurdle. On the other hand, the stability of German political habit in the past 30 years, especially in the figure of the Chancellor, makes it easier to approach the German government as its interest and acceptable frame of action have been staked out before. The inherent need to calculate German domestic reaction must be considered a serious impediment to cooperation and trust towards the Central European state. The British combine the outstanding role of the executive with a very opaque decision-making process. Practically, the Prime Minister could however not be able to really steer a national policy, as the continuous flux of the senior governmental positions mean that the Prime Minister can be flooded with decisions from all policy areas, putting him in a reactionary position. While the recent changes might be mainly attributable to Brexit, the propensity and ease with which posts and office holders change can seriously impede cooperation attempts and long-term planning ability not only of the U.K. but also of its partners.
3.3.1.2. Realms of influence and strategic vision

The previous section illuminated the constitutional framework all three nations base their security policy on. Guiding norms and values have manifested in the existence and form or absence thereof of the constitutions of the three focus nations. The norms and values of a security identity also express themselves in the states’ security goals of each nation. Strategic vision, as publicized in white books and security strategies, not only expresses how a nation portrays itself in terms of areas of interest and means, understanding of threat and other elements inherent in the aforementioned types of document, but also shows what a nations expects its own place in the international system as well as security communities to be. This chapter analyzes the latest strategic documents of France, Germany, and the United Kingdom, illuminating the interests and goals inherent in the three security identities.

The literature as well as policy commentators largely agree that Europe as a whole does not share a common strategic culture, but this is arguably also the case for the United States and its European allies and yet NATO has persisted for over seven decades under American leadership. However, a shared identity and trust linking the U.S. to the rest has kept the community together. Part of the shared identity, next to norms and ideas, established and propagated by the U.S. was a clear strategic vision. The NSC 68 set forth an American approach to Western Europe that served as an umbrella under which the community could come together. With the Soviet Union dissolved and the Cold War rationale, too, reduced in relevance, any new leader, too, needs a strategic vision not only for itself, but for the wider European or transatlantic realm.

A look at the most recent publicly available strategic document highlights the approaches and umbrellas each focus nation has developed. Since its reunification Germany has published
three\textsuperscript{181} white papers as the chief governmental work on the orientation and capabilities of its armed forces. Jointly devised and published by the German government and the Ministry of Defense, and in its latest iteration the Ministry of Foreign Affairs as well, the irregularly published white paper focuses on military planning and a security policy framework as a roadmap for future decision-making and as a mirror of the security situation Germany imagines itself in. The latest version was published in 2016, a decade after its predecessor, and in direct reaction to the changed security environment and the “Zeitenwende”\textsuperscript{182} since 2014. Arab Spring and mass migration, the annexation of Crimea, Brexit and the prospect of a Trump presidency following Obama era pivoting away from Europe, all these influenced the creation of this newest of white papers, leading to a qualitative caesura in security policy. Where the 2006 white paper was mostly concerned with terrorism, WMD proliferation and other threats and followed a more global, external security approach, promising preemptive and preventative strategic engagement, the new iteration appears almost introspective. The introductory works by both then Minister of Defense von der Leyen and Chancellor Merkel acknowledge the perception of insecurity and instability and its direct influence on the European continent. Pointing to external pressure, rather than domestic political will, the white paper acknowledges the need for Germany to grow more active in the security field. It says: “Deutschland wird zunehmend als zentraler Akteur in Europa wahrgenommen. Diese Verantwortung schafft ihre eigene Realität – im Sinne wachsender Handlungsmöglichkeiten, aber auch auf die daraus resultierende Verantwortung.”\textsuperscript{183} But with regard to ways of further leadership

\textsuperscript{181} The years of publication are: 1994, 2006 and 2016.
and action by the German state the white paper portrays a continued role of a mediator within EU and NATO communities. It points to the high necessity of coordinated cooperation in multilateral settings to be able to take over responsibility\textsuperscript{184} and the intention to balance and reconcile between diverging intra-community policy goals\textsuperscript{185} While the intention to lead is addressed, this white paper does not clarify how and in what areas. PeSCo and the FNC are highlighted as examples for German leadership, but the white paper does not illuminate how both the NATO and the European Union community can be bridged. Intent on peddling to both groups, this publication remains vague on concrete prioritization of either. Willingness to increase defense spending is signaled and later relativized.\textsuperscript{186} The strategic concept of crisis stabilization and helping others help themselves is pervasive, both with regard to areas of conflict outside of the transatlantic realm and within\textsuperscript{187}, shedding a light on continued unwillingness of conducting long-term, high-stakes military engagements and taking over broad responsibilities for other nations.

A main concern of the government releasing this white paper has been the economic stability of Germany. Security of resources, trade routes, communication, and knowledge, as a “strategic resource”\textsuperscript{188}, are addressed right at the beginning of the work, pointing directly to what is encompassed in German interests. Cooperative security arrangements appear as a means to the end of national economic stability. Of course, as this white paper makes abundantly clear with its very first sentence in chapter one, “[u]nser sicherheitspolitisches Selbstverständnis ist geprägt durch die Lehren aus unserer Geschichte. Diese sind Teil unser nationalen Identität und in unserer

\textsuperscript{184}Damals wie heute ist die Bundeswehr ausgerichtet auf ein Handeln im multilateralen Rahmen. Bei der Wahrnehmung von Verantwortung für die internationale Sicherheit sind wir in hohem Maße auf das abgestimmte Zusammenwirken mit unseren Partnern angewiesen.” \textit{Weissbuch 2016}, 23.
\textsuperscript{185} \textit{Weissbuch 2016}, 70.
\textsuperscript{186} \textit{Weissbuch 2016}, 69, 57.
\textsuperscript{187} \textit{Weissbuch 2016}, 71.
\textsuperscript{188} \textit{Weissbuch 2016}, 22.
Verfassung verankert.”\textsuperscript{189} Referring to the constitution with its strong character of mistrust towards German leadership and military engagement and power at the onset of the white paper frames the later proclamations of willingness to lead in a dimmer light.

Despite situating Germany in a web of international, multilateral institutions like the OSCE, NATO, the UN and EU, this publication misses a truly European or transatlantic angle. National security naturally takes center stage, but a vision for Germany as a leading part of any one of these institutions is missing. Ad-hoc coalitions of the willing are explicitly bound to national interest\textsuperscript{190} and not to the defense of common goods of any of the overlapping communities the German state defines itself as a member of. While there is a willingness present to infringe upon German national sovereignty\textsuperscript{191} in order to strengthen the bigger whole, the government is not willing to let go of overall technological sovereignty.\textsuperscript{192} This points to an inherent level of distrust in the capabilities and willingness of partners and allies.

Speaking of a new degree of whole-of-government approach, linking defense and foreign affairs budgets for the first time, this white paper portrays a wider understanding of the term security. Particularly the new focus on the cyber and information realm is subject to this. Spread between the Ministries of Defense, the Interior and Foreign Affairs, the control over policy is moved into the hands the junior coalition partner, who habitually heads the Foreign Affairs and has been critical\textsuperscript{193} of this white paper and its professed goals. A government in part critical of its

\textsuperscript{189} “Our identity and the way we see security is influenced by the lessons we have learned from our history. They form part of our national identity and are enshrined in our constitution.” Weissbuch 2016, 22.
\textsuperscript{190} Weissbuch 2016, 81.
\textsuperscript{191} Weissbuch 2016, 130.
\textsuperscript{192} Ibid.
own publication does not shed a positive light on the reliability of German aims professed in the white paper.

Overall, the latest iteration of Germany’s most relevant strategic paper shows an understanding for the dynamic of American retrenchment and the external pressure on the German state to do more in terms of community responsibility and burden sharing. Yet it also portrays a continued unease with concrete security leadership from a governmental perspective. Rather, the German government narrates itself as a mediator and staunch multilateralist. As the main concerns and therefore strategic interests revolve around German prosperity in economic terms, it is questionable in how far this identity lends itself for leadership positions putting the interests of other states first. With the underlying distrust of hard power and power politics, the white paper 2016 shows a Germany more attuned with stabilization and cooperative prevention of crises rather than an ambitious security trailblazer. As a status-quo interest is furthermore explicit in the juggling of both NATO and EU responsibilities, while conflict between these two communities had been apparent by then, the existence of a willingness to lead, as well as a vision for the community remains questionable. Additionally, the stress on keeping all possible technologies at hand, even if that means spreading the available defense resources very thin, displays a distrust in the direct and most intimate security partners of the time. These are identified as the United States of America, France, the United Kingdom, the Netherlands, Poland and Israel, in that order.\(^\text{194}\)

The United Kingdom has had a variety of differently named governmental strategy papers concerning security and defense.\(^\text{195}\) The latest iteration of a comprehensive national review or

\(^\text{194}\) Weissbuch 2016, 80.
strategy paper for security and defense is the *National Security Strategy and Strategic Defence and Security Review* published in November 2015. Planned to be published every five years, the next iteration of this white paper was due to arrive in early 2020 but has been postponed by the Johnson administration due to the ongoing global pandemic. As the 2015 national security strategy was published before the vote on Brexit and before the election of President Trump, and the uncertainty in transatlantic relations furthered more strongly in the ensuing presidency as has been discussed in earlier chapters, these elements do not yet play into the paper. A later addendum in the form of the 2018 National Security Capabilities Review, which briefly evaluates the progress made since the previous review and adds a narrow outlook on U.K.-EU security relations, is taken into account in the following analysis of British strategic vision and realm of influence.

The 2015 review presents a willful Britain with a strong global vision. Like in Germany’s white paper, national security is tied to the economic stability of the country. The entry statement by Prime Minster Cameron begins with: “Our national security depends on our economic security, and vice versa. So, the first step in our National Security Strategy is to ensure our economy is, and remains, strong”\(^{(196)}\) and thus clearly establishes a main security interest of the United Kingdom. As an island nation reliant on trade for its economic safety and sitting at the center of a vast global trade network based on their Commonwealth, the security strategy places great emphasis on a global reach and global interest and relevance of the British nation. The need for global power projection\(^{(197)}\) is stressed from the beginning of the paper and puts special emphasis on the relationship towards the Middle East, notably the Gulf Region\(^{(198)}\), Asia Pacific and North as well

\(^{(196)}\) British Government, *National Security Strategy and Strategic Defence and Security Review: A Secure and Prosperous United Kingdom*, Cm 9161, November 2015, 5. This will henceforth be shortened to NSSSDSR.

\(^{(197)}\) NSSSDSR 2015, 9.

\(^{(198)}\) NSSSDSR 2015, 55.
as Sub-Saharan Africa, remarkably a vision for Europe or the European Union is quite absent somehow foreshadowing the Brexit campaign of the following year.

While the SDSR stresses cooperative engagement, especially through diplomatic or soft power tools, cooperative arrangements are portrayed as one-way streets working solely in favor of the United Kingdom. The strategic review visibly points to the perceived outsize importance of the United Kingdom, proclaiming it “sit[s] at the heart of the rules-based international order”\(^{199}\) and also inhabits a strategic geographic positioning through a “time zone [that] allows us to connect with the Americas and Asia in the same working day”\(^{200}\). The evocation of the image of an empire on which the sun never sets must come to mind. And in further allusion to a continued position of hegemonic dominance, this paper makes it abundantly clear that cooperation works not towards common goals, but goals of the United Kingdom:

> Our influence, across foreign, defence and security policy, development, business and academia, and through our cultural and people-to-people links enables us to attract and persuade other countries to work for the same outcomes as we do, and to deter and enforce in support of our goals.\(^{201}\)

With regard to the role of alliance members or any form of cooperative partner, the U.K. government quite clearly defines that it “need[s] allies and partners who support us, and an international system which reflects our values and helps us to protect our interests.”\(^{202}\) Certainly, the United Kingdom expresses their willingness to lead, or rather their already existent high level of leadership or control within communities,\(^{203}\) yet, this leadership is not based on or reliant on a relationship of mutual trust. Instead, the strategic review stresses the importance of predictability

\(^{199}\) *NSSSDSR 2015*, 14.
\(^{200}\) *NSSSDSR 2015*, 13.
\(^{201}\) *NSSSDSR 2015*, 47.
\(^{202}\) *NSSSDSR 2015*, 10.
\(^{203}\) See for example the way the EU is portrayed as being steered towards U.K.’s interests. *NSSSDSR 2015*, 53.
in cooperation.\footnote{NSSDSR 2015, 20.} As was stressed in the conceptualization chapters, trust cannot be based on calculated predictability. The necessity to calculate a partner’s reaction portrays inherent distrust in their actions and the lack of great commonality of their respective security identities. This characterization of the British national interests as superior and all cooperation in favor of only the British interest questions the willingness to take foreign interests into account, which is a prerequisite of trust-based leadership in security cooperation.

The \textit{National Security Strategy and Strategic Defence and Security Review} of 2015 does identify major partner and allies of the United Kingdom. First of all, there is the United States, bound to the U.K. in a special relationship. The U.S.-based NATO defense guarantee makes up the major part of a reliable and continued U.K. defense. Another partner identified throughout the paper as a central ally is France. Both France and the U.K. are “the two European nations with the full range of military capabilities and the political will to protect our interests globally”\footnote{NSSDSR 2015, 52.} and have agreed to an “exceptionally close”\footnote{Ibid.} relationship. Germany, however, is portrayed in a different light. In most instances when the U.S. and France are named, Germany does not appear, and when it is addressed as a subchapter it is characterized as an essential but rising partner\footnote{Ibid.}, implying Germany has not yet reached the felt importance and global level the United Kingdom has.

As a further development of the image of preponderance of British interests and global vision, the 2015 security review stresses the importance of British sovereignty, for example when addressing the control over migration through abstention from the Schengen agreements.\footnote{NSSDSR 2015, 26.} Furthermore, the continued importance of unilateral military action, if no coalition of the willing
or cooperation of partners for the good of British will can be created, is made very clear. The relevance of strategic autonomy and maneuverability of British forces becomes furthermore apparent through the continued specification of concrete investment plans into armaments and technology throughout the course of the paper. While the 2018 addendum repeatedly expresses the will to preserve positive relations with the European Union, the repeated mentions appear formulaic, repetitive and without concrete substance. British sovereignty is the recurrent theme to dampen potential European influence on United Kingdom security decision making.

The British government identifies the entire globe as its realm of interest and influence. More concretely, in 2015 the British government focusses its intentions on the world outside of the European continent, portraying the EU and to an extent NATO, too, as acting on British behalf and therefore in no need of a distinct British vision for these communities. Great Britain portrays itself as in a position of global preeminence only outshines by the United States but in close cooperation with them. Their leadership is seen to enable them to draw in other states to follow their British designs, without a need to lend an ear to foreign concerns or interests and values. Through military and soft power and the British membership in the UNSC, NATO and (formerly) the EU, as well as their extended Commonwealth, the United Kingdom envisions itself as a steerer of global destiny and does not shy away from theoretical unilateralism. This strategic vision certainly contrasts with the German one highlighted previously.

Turning now to the remaining focus nation for this subchapter: France. Shortly after the last presidential election, newly elect President Macron whipped out the 2017 Defence and National Security Strategic Review. It had been four years since the release of its predecessor, another two had been published in 1994 and 2008. This strategic review chronologically is the

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209 NSSDSR 2015, 29.
latest one of all three focus nation papers and reflects both on the changed security surrounding, Brexit as well as on the first year of the Trump presidency and the accelerated dynamic of American isolation from transatlantic partners.

From the onset, this paper highlights the ambitions of France’s security understanding and policy despite the alarmist undertone concerning the growing global uncertainty and crises. President Macron begins his introduction to the review with the words: “France’s military power lies at the core of our national ambition. Living up to this ambition requires financial and human resources, as well as strategic vision.”211 This strategic vision with regard to the transatlantic sphere and cooperation or leadership, combined with highlighting the French realm of interest is the basis of the remainder of this subchapter.

The introductory texts by both the President and the Minister of Armed Forces situate France both in the heart of Europe and as a necessary driver of European defense development, as well as in a global position. “France and Europe are now directly at risk”212 is one of the themes woven through the publication. With this sentence, the strategic review points to the strong connection of France with Europe. Risks and challenges addressing France are simultaneously linked to the whole of Europe through a continuous placement of the European whole next to analyses affecting France.213 Pragmatically, the text understands potential bottlenecks in French capabilities in addressing the entirety of challenges it perceives, therefore prioritization of threats as well as cooperation with, firstly, European and, secondly, American partner nations is called

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212 DNSSR 2017, 5.
213 Examples like: “These events have emerged so suddenly and on such a scale that they have had a direct impact on France and on European Societies” are dispersed evenly throughout the whole paper. For this concrete one: DNSSR 2017, 13.
This prioritization then quickly introduces that France, despite the repeated linkage to Europe throughout the text, has a global outlook with roots in its colonial past. Committed to Africa, the Middle East and Asia and the Pacific area\textsuperscript{215} on top of the European continent, the second area of foremost interest and commitment at that point of time was the Sahel region,\textsuperscript{216} following defense of the nation and its people and overseas territories. Reasons for this are given as the fight against terrorism, protection of French expatriates or even climate change\textsuperscript{217}, but the colonial dimension to the French territorial expansion at the current time or through a historic link cannot be ignored. Presence of overseas territories both in the Pacific as well as the Indian Ocean are described as an asset as well as a reason for the global outlook and importance of the French Republic.\textsuperscript{218} Additionally, the French seat as a permanent member of the UNSC involve France in any world crisis by default, argues the security review.\textsuperscript{219} Therefore, France professes the globality of its realm of influence by virtue of both honest commitment to the provision of public goods and national interest as well as by virtue of its position in and relevance for global institutions like the UN.

Alluding to the growing problem of instability even within Europe, through the Brexit challenge to the European idea\textsuperscript{220} and rising doubts in the transatlantic alliance\textsuperscript{221}, this security strategy sets out to formulate ways for a French shaping of European defense, as “Europe is the natural framework for our security and the protection of our border.”\textsuperscript{222} The authors of this work place great emphasis on France as a facilitator of European strategic culture development or rather

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\textsuperscript{214} DNSSR 2017, 14.  \\
\textsuperscript{215} DNSSR 2017, 53.  \\
\textsuperscript{216} DNSSR 2017, 21.  \\
\textsuperscript{217} DNSSR 2017, 29.  \\
\textsuperscript{218} DNSSR 2017, 62.  \\
\textsuperscript{219} DNSSR 2017, 26.  \\
\textsuperscript{220} DNSSR 2017, 6.  \\
\textsuperscript{221} DNSSR 2017, 17.  \\
\textsuperscript{222} DNSSR 2017, 6.  
\end{flushleft}
emergence. And while this strategic review leaves the possibility for change of interests open, it states that any development of European shared strategy must follow after a clear articulation of French interests. Given that France is not only a member of the UNSC, NATO and the EU, but also the only remaining nuclear power within the latter organization, France intends to capitalize on this global preeminence and build and shape Europe, given the political will of the partners, into an autonomous, strong and relevant player. As these potential partners, France identifies Germany and the United Kingdom foremost, the order of appearance likely affected by Brexit. Towards the middle of the work, the paper states:

France must supplement these two major bilateral defence relationships by paying greater attention to its other European Partners and by giving proper consideration to both their expectations and their contributions to European security.

This passage illuminates a potential willingness to act in partner’s interests, rather than only in the domestic interest alone and shows a basic consideration by France for the fact that partners might have not only diverging but still relevant interests, but that partnerships are also mutual. Especially with the global agenda France has set for itself in terms of military involvement, contributions by partners are portrayed as an essential.

However, France explicitly intends to retain the option for unilateral action and interventions. For this, and the global presence it boasts, France intends to uphold all military capability areas. The paper argues that even a short term loss of control over a tactical or strategic military capability, could lead to long-term capability loss and, therefore, to a

223 DNSSR 2017, 53.
224 DNSSR 2017, 51.
225 DNSSR 2017, 14.
226 DNSSR 2017, 60.
227 DNSSR 2017, 76.
228 DNSSR 2017, 51.
229 DNSSR 2017, 75.
diminished role of France and even French autonomy. While an earlier passage has listed the international military cooperation, like the French-German Brigade, this necessity to not lose control over any capability ultimately points to the unwillingness of France to trust any ally with sharing capabilities or reliance to a capability France might want to outsource in an alliance setting. Even in cooperative settings, this paper envisions French autonomy, asserting that “only a strong France, in control of its own destiny, can provide answers for today’s major crises, promotes its values and assert its interests.”\textsuperscript{230} And for the projected European security autonomy France has put at the heart of its vision in this paper, French sovereignty shall not\textsuperscript{231} be infringed upon. Newly developed technologies are explicitly to be kept for France, to assess their potentials, before allies might access them.\textsuperscript{232} Precluding cooperation concerning emerging technologies because their potentials are yet unknown not only deprives France of the knowledge and expertise of potential partners in sharing, but also points to a level of distrust into France’s allies. Calculating that a technology in the hands of an ally might strategically disadvantage France, points to the level of calculation and prediction of behavior that need not exist in relationships of trust as needed between security community leaders and their followers. Another two elements in need of highlighting are French doubts about the utility of multilateral security arrangements, international institutions, and policy tools. As they are perceived to lose global legitimacy and are through bureaucratic-process slow and cumbersome, their ability to address global crises, too, is alluded to as diminishing.\textsuperscript{233} This points to the necessity for France to remain capable across all military sectors in order to react to any global, and therefore French, crisis. The second element that needs mention is the narrow outlook of this security review. As this \textit{Defence and National Security}

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{230} \textit{DNSSR 2017}, 6.
\item \textsuperscript{231} \textit{DNSSR 2017}, 65.
\item \textsuperscript{232} \textit{Ibid}.
\item \textsuperscript{233} \textit{DNSSR 2017}, 18.
\end{itemize}
Strategy Review aptly highlights diplomacy234 as a tool to prepare legal frameworks for military action, this whole review is very strictly focused on the military aspects of security. Other areas, like energy security, that the other focus nations discuss at greater length are glossed over at best, or simply nonexistent in the scope of this review.

Overall, this particular text portrays the French security identity as a global one. France perceives itself as a relevant global player that needs to assert itself in the coming uncertainty but has understood the need to coordinate to an extent with European partners. It intends to push a European security community, rather than a transatlantic one, into a direction France defines. Risks and challenges to France are automatically related to a wider European public, highlighting a French self-image as the heart of Europe. While there are notions of considerations for allied interests or concerns, this review illuminates a level of distrust in even the strongest partners necessitating a continued and absolute autonomy of French military capabilities across the whole armed forces spectrum.

Taken altogether, very distinct strategic self-images are present in the three focus nations. Both France and the United Kingdom see themselves, and to a degree each other, as global powers with interests spread across the planet and with values to be shared. Regarding Germany, only France identifies its neighbor as an equal when it comes to cooperation in Europe. Germany certainly does not propose a global realm of influence, instead the most recent strategic paper focuses more strongly on national defense. Global military interaction, even in the form of Peacekeeping operations or training missions, needs multilateral approval and engagement for German participation. And where France imagines itself as bound to any global crises through its seat at the UNSC table and military interaction as the most important asset in the foreign and

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234 DNSSR 2017, 55.
security policy toolbox, Germany favors the military the least, instead giving space in the white paper to diplomacy and aid frameworks. Great Britain, too, puts great emphasis on British soft power and the diplomatic apparatus.

A common theme in all three papers is the occurrence of autonomy and sovereignty. Yet, here too, there are stark differences between the focus nations. Germany explicitly favors a diminishing of its national sovereignty if the overall cooperation that ensues strengthens community sovereignty. France and the United Kingdom do not favor a diminished autonomy. Their respective needs for autonomy shroud an inherent distrust in the partner nations that could find themselves in a decision-making position. One could go so far as to say, these strategy texts betray an inherent mistrust in each of the other two focus nations, as all three nations identify each other as potential major players in the transatlantic or European security realm.

The only nation of all of them to continuously address some form of leadership vision for the community is France, but only through equating European with French interests and challenges. Germany points to a willingness to lead, but the propositions remain very modest and limited and do not reflect the importance for hard power engagement the other two nations seem to favor.

Overall, in terms of constitutional and publicly portrayed narratives and understanding of security and defense, three very different security identities emerge. Germany can be said to be deeply mistrustful of military means and individual leadership authority, yet it is proclaimed to be ready to address common interests or help supply public goods even at a disadvantage to itself. France enjoys the strongest executive of all three and values strategic autonomy above all. While it has very strong ideas about its relevance for Europe, its strategic interests lie around the globe. Interested in the legitimacy though not the efficiency of multilateral security solutions, France has pointed to its understanding of the importance of foreign interests in a security community. French
constitutional looseness, however, makes unilateral action easy and tempting. Great Britain, while employing and valuing a well-developed diplomacy as an asset for security, cooperation for the U.K. is a one-way street in which all consideration and help must move towards the U.K. and not vice versa. With opaque constitutional arrangements, it too, has and values vast unilateral possibilities.

These previous parts have illuminated constitutional arrangements in the security realm, shedding light on cooperative potentials or barriers. Combined with the latest strategic publications of the respective governments, a rounder picture of the institutionalized, official side of the security realm has been illuminated. However, these two elements, constitution and policy papers, must be considered as the theoretical framework each nation moves inside. As a next step, the practical dimension is focused on. Through a look at the actual instances of leadership, through research and development cooperation or bilateral security agreements, their previous proclamations about leadership, as well as their actual existent cooperation or integration can be evaluated.

3.3.2. Understanding leadership

Security communities thrive through the path their leaders prepare and through the trust members put into these leaders to not only take their interests into account but also to face a larger burden or risk for the sake of their community members. Membership of a security community means to impede on national sovereignty to a certain degree. Valuing others interests and becoming vulnerable for the sake of the common good and therefore having other members influence one’s own security behavior is a defining quality of leadership within a security community. This chapter highlights recent developments in terms of leadership behavior of the three focus nations.
With the background explored above, the three focus nations appear to have a varying degree of interest in allies or partners. Ranging from the security identity of the United Kingdom, whose security review does not see many equals on the European stage nor does it portray much value in security cooperation lest it be outside of declared British interest, to German alleged willingness of infringing on national sovereignty for the greater good, the study of the official public side of security identity has illuminated some barriers to further security cooperation. Yet, in practice these three nations could have exhibited a behavior different from what can be extrapolated from their public declarations. Therefore, the following chapter highlights and evaluates instances of intra-communal leadership in the realm of security and defense and contrasts them with the results from the previous discussion of formal manifestations of security identity.

The United Kingdom has a reputation as the most ardent Atlanticist among the three focus nations. Defined as a special relationship by Winston Churchill in his ‘sinews of peace’ speech of 1946, the United Kingdom is seen as the closest partner the United States have ever had. As such, it comes as no surprise that the United Kingdom has not only been the inroad for the U.S. into EU internal affairs and policy, but has also been backing the leadership of the United States in the transatlantic context and dampening attempts at developing security cooperation or integration within the European Union. The Lancaster House Treaties of 2010 between the United Kingdom and the Republic of France appeared to be a comprehensive step towards a European security dimension to the U.K. outside of NATO and U.S. engagement. Previous

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bilateral cooperation between these two states had been on an ad hoc basis, but were now to be put on a 50-year planned footing. Focused mostly on concrete capability planning, rather than strategy or common goals, the treaties define areas of cooperation, such as in the nuclear arms realm, and set out concrete objectives, like the establishment of a Combined Joint Expeditionary Force, pooled research and development on the Future Combat Air System for both nations and satellite systems among other things. This set of treaties has been unprecedented in Franco-British history, especially since it focuses on very precise capabilities. Conversely, it does not delve too much into ideational preferences and differences. In this regard it does not display a convergence of security identities or the attempt to unify the two nations or set a hierarchy, instead is functionally focused. Through elements like article eight it sets out to manifest access to each other’s defense markets and facilities, but not necessarily for shared, cooperative use, but rather for individual but parallel use or more competition and choice. Of course, a joint expeditionary force or the cooperative development of combat systems show a potential and willingness to cooperate. The question with these elements is how they fare over time and if they achieve to generate and solidify trust between the security community members. The CJEF and the other Joint Expeditionary Forces of the United Kingdom that were developed over the same period, namely the last decade, are purely voluntary, and each nation retains full sovereignty over their forces. The JEF system constructs a “force pool” through which other nations can add some of

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their forces if they want to join British military deployments. Touted as an addition to NATO, Joint Expeditionary Forces of the United Kingdom are formally and practically apart from NATO. Deployment and use of JEF is not even dependent on the participation of foreign militaries. Instead, it is a British expeditionary force with an opt-in ability for select partners. This means that the United Kingdom has preselected nations it trusts enough to allow them to cooperate with them, while at the same time this optionality of participation means that the goals of the individual deployments are fundamentally British and without an initial regard for the interests of partners. The pick-and-choose approach of any JEF mission manifests mini-coalitions of the willing. Whether they can translate into interested leadership for a shared interest and identity, rather than as a propping up of British interest and identity, remains doubtful.

The other front, that of research and development and economic defense cooperation, with France faces challenges, too. With the advent of Brexit and the struggle between the EU and the United Kingdom for any form of regulated future relationship, cross-border defense developments in the private and governmentally funded sector are in peril. The Future Combat Air System forged on until roughly 2018, when industry representatives declared a halt of the related projects from the British side. France has since moved on to develop a FCAS with Germany. The British, too, moved on to their own sovereign project, the Tempest, which is trying but struggling to attract committed partner nations. A similar dynamic can be observed in the

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241 Pierre Tran, “UK was the one to put the brakes on drone demo project, industry says,” Defense News, April 12, 2018, https://www.defensenews.com/global/europe/2018/04/12/uk-was-the-one-to-put-the-brakes-on-drone-demo-project-industry-says/.

242 Sweden and Italy appear to be the most reliable potential partners, given that Saab and Leonardo among other industry has joined the development. Other nations that had shown interest include Japan, Turkey, Saudi Arabia, but have also failed to commit as of the writing of this thesis. This FCAS project is painted by industry news as a
example of the Galileo satellite system. Previously a heavy investor in the European GPS alternative, the United Kingdom faces an ouster from the secret component of Galileo that will be available to all EU member militaries, polices and other governmental agencies. As security concerns by the EU keep third countries outside the British withdrawal from the Union tangibly diminished trust into the U.K. and handling or access to classified systems previously shared. The British continue to be able to access the American-led GPS structures, including certain non-free information, as has been the case before the installation of the first Galileo satellite in 2016. The U.K. has pledged to and already begun to invest in its own sovereign satellite system. This further fragmentation of the security infrastructure in the transatlantic realm not only exemplifies the British interest in being at the decision-making table but also its lack of trust in both the U.S. GPS and EU Galileo system, and an unwillingness to accept a diminished role in critical systems. While there are certainly some who might take this as an excellent example of leadership through technological innovation, a security community needs a leader willing to provide a common good and accept the influence of other members in exchange.


245 Norway and Switzerland have access to elements of Galileo’s secret infrastructure and signal, following treaty of access establishment. This road is technically open to the United Kingdom, too.

With a nod to the previously mentioned preference of NATO over EU cooperation, the U.K. has contributed only modestly to the EU defense budget.\textsuperscript{247} The active dynamic of establishing alternative systems of cooperation or defense infrastructure in recent years without inclusion of the other major players in the transatlantic security community speak to a relationship of “negative leadership”\textsuperscript{248}. The growing lack of European integration of the U.K. has prompted analysts to call for a new regulation of the Deputy Supreme Allied Commander Europe (DSACEUR) post, which is traditionally held by a Briton.\textsuperscript{249} Despite British professed willingness to be a global power, the past decade has shown that with the shadow of Brexit, the U.K. has retrenched further from transatlantic leadership through losing Europe. With the loss of training and exercise opportunities connected to EU CSDP and influence on EU internal defense mechanisms and dynamics, building a solo leadership position that would draw NATO members, most of whom are also members of the EU, to follow alternative British systems set out in direct competition to continental European and American initiatives in the case of GPS must be considered impossible. The existing cooperation in form of the JEF cannot be considered as a means of security community leadership, because the JEF is quite frankly a means to harvest foreign support without reciprocal British commitment to British global defense ends. If these missions and deployments do coincide with NATO or UN missions or an interest of a member, cooperation is certainly possible, but it cannot be considered as a functioning mechanism of a


security community. The identity of a global but singular power portrayed in the Defense Review of 2015 finds itself again in the narratives of going it alone in defense systems development.

Moving from negative leadership to the nation often portrayed as the reluctant partner in foreign policy, Germany. The current president of the United States is not the first national figurehead to call for more German ambition or to end the apparent free riding off of American security guarantees. And if defense and security engagement is only measured with the near-mythical two percent threshold in mind, even the comparatively large defense investments and budget increases of the previous years do not show a change in perceived German free-riding. A look at unique security initiatives started by the German state both within NATO and the EU, however, lightens the negative image.

Two major instances of German initiative in the defense and security realm stand out to illuminate the German take on leadership in security communities. The first one is the Framework Nations Concept (FNC) introduced into NATO and adopted from a framework established between Germany and the Netherlands and the European Permanent Structured Cooperation (PeSCo), an EU initiative to cooperate on research and development in the security realm backed by European Defense Fund contributions.

The FNC was first proposed by Germany in 2013 and officially adopted in NATO the following year. It is a platform that facilitates the cooperation between a framework nation, providing the bulk of the lead, coordination and military resources, and smaller nations that plug-in to clusters of their interest. Focusing on two pillars, capability development addressing NATO

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or framework nation defense capability gaps and multinational force creation under the lead of the framework nation,\textsuperscript{252} this concept has already attracted 20 member states\textsuperscript{253} that cooperate in different sized clusters with Germany. Not all parties participate in all clusters, but each nation can join coalitions of the willing on the development of certain core capabilities that are of interest to them. Through active participation in the development of capabilities, not only can interoperability be strengthened, but small nations can contribute and influence the development or purchasing decisions of the framework nation, in this case Germany, and reap direct capability benefits for their own national armed forces. So far, no enforcement mechanism binds smaller states to the clusters, and potential deployments of the multinational corps have an opt-out possibility. Out of the 21 nations active in Germany’s FNC only a third have agreed to join the second pillar of German-led and based multinational force creation.\textsuperscript{254} The potentially most notable nonparticipants in the German FNC are the U.S., France, the United Kingdom, Spain and Italy.

Decision-making as to the thematic development of each FNC cluster is formally reached through annual ministerial meetings of all cluster members, but since the German armed forces provide the framework, gaps and interest first and foremost is given by Germany itself. While FNC was adopted at NATO and Germany currently pledges to adjust its defense spending according to NATO needs, there is no formal link between the direction of FNC clusters and NATO. Most


\textsuperscript{253} These are: Norway, Sweden, Finland, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Denmark, Poland, the Netherlands, Belgium, Luxembourg, Switzerland, Czech Republic, Austria, Slovakia, Hungary, Slovenia, Croatia, Romania and Bulgaria. The Bundeswehr as a framework therefore reaches EU, NATO and third-country member states.

\textsuperscript{254} Glatz and Zapfe, Ambitious Framework Nation, 4.
impulses within the FNC system therefore are shaped by domestic German outlook on security and the ties that constitutionally bind it. Linking this initiative back to the capabilities conception of the German armed forces, the focus on territorial defense and collective territorial defense becomes obvious.\textsuperscript{255} Inclusive and interdependent in its idea, the German FNC is restricted by the foreign policy, constitutional and conceptual outlook on the position of the armed forces. But, as participation in research and development or procurement cooperation infringes less on national sovereignty and is less contingent on high levels of trust\textsuperscript{256}, the FNC could have a wider appeal in the long-run than similar incentives as is already mirrored in current participation.

The second noteworthy large-scale initiative of Germany is the Permanent Structured Cooperation. A PeSCo fact sheet describes the initiative as such:

PESCO is a Treaty-based framework and process to deepen defence cooperation amongst EU Member States who are capable and willing to do so. The aim is to jointly develop defence capabilities and make them available for EU military operations. This will enhance the EU’s capacity as an international security actor, contribute to the protection of EU citizens and maximise the effectiveness of defence spending\textsuperscript{257}

With 25\textsuperscript{258} member states, including France, this is a European project that has a sizable overlap with the transatlantic community membership and has received significant push by the German government. Tilting the scales to the inclusive, open and less strategically or rather less operationally ambitious PeSCo that came to pass in 2017 was Germany’s insistence and a France


\textsuperscript{256} Saxi, \textit{British and German Initiatives}, 176.


\textsuperscript{258} Namely: Austria, Belgium, Bulgaria, Croatia, Cyprus, Czechia, Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Ireland, Italy, Latvia, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain and Sweden.
Since the establishment of this inclusive process and framework for development cooperation 47 different projects have begun in three waves. Germany participates in 16 of them, leading seven, but France, Italy and Spain have higher numbers of participation and leadership within the framework. The projects led by Germany oscillate around facilitation or coordination projects, such as logistics hubs or training centers. With member-driven project initiatives, PeSCo is decoupled from a larger defense and security policy mechanisms within the EU, although nominally gaps identified in the CSDP should be addressed through PeSCo. Monetary incentive through EDF funding marries the lack of a defined and definable goal of PeSCo with the interest of national states eager to use these funds to relieve their defense budgets. With the number of nations attracted to PeSCo, one can certainly say that the adopted approach of inclusivity has worked in its favor, but other than cooperation for the sake of itself this framework led by Germany is lacking a vision for the European community.

Germany has been trying to reframe its own participation in NATO, for example through beginning to lobby for a new measurement other than the two percent threshold to better encapsulate German efforts. The two initiatives that have been proposed and greatly influenced by Germany in a way reflect the willingness to change the German narrative. Yet, while they offer smaller states to pursue defense and security cooperation with a larger magnet nation, they offer

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only a modest vision for the future. German leadership attempts to uphold or reinstate a status-quo level of capabilities, through pooling of resources and cooperation, that is ultimately bound to the unambitious German security identity and constitutional restraint that relegates defense and security to a territorial or collective defense area. If the British leadership can be termed a negative one, the German one could be named pro forma leadership.

France, on the other hand, appears to have a very clear idea of where it sees Europe or the transatlantic security community and is willing to steer it into that direction. President Macron has stirred the European Union and the United States since his ascension to the presidency with a number of speeches disruptive of the usual political sphere, two of whom are of special relevance and significance for the debate of this thesis. Early on in his presidency, in September 2017, Macron visited the Sorbonne university and held his *New Initiative for Europe*-speech\(^\text{264}\) in which he outlined his understanding of the challenges Europe faced and his proposals as French President on how to approach them. Macron highlights the necessity to build a political community, beginning in the field of security. He states that “Only Europe can, in a word, guarantee genuine sovereignty or our ability to exist in today’s world to defend our values and interests”\(^\text{265}\) stating that the double challenge common to all of Europe is the disengagement of the U.S and the threat from terrorism. European autonomy in defense is his remedy for both problems and his vision for Europe. A European Intervention Initiative, armed forces exchange with the French military, common defense budget and doctrine are Macron’s means to the end of development of shared strategic culture, which will in turn create the possibility to have lasting European autonomy. Accompanying his observation of American retrenchment from Europe, Macron identifies


\(^{265}\) Macron, *New Initiative*. 
Germany as the main partner to “inject decisive, practical momentum”\textsuperscript{266} into the European defense debate. Three years later, in 2020, Macron develops his vision for defense further in a speech at the Ecole de Guerre, the French War College. Pointing to a triple paradigm shift in the modern security realm, namely a strategic, legal-political and a technological shift, affecting Europe and France and necessitating autonomy from a diktat of foreign powers like the U.S., Macron sets this speech out to be a rough guideline towards further European and French engagement with each other and in global affairs. “France and Europe have a historic role to play”\textsuperscript{267}, he asserts and links French ambition to necessary European engagement. Following his four-pillared solution to the security challenges, namely efficient multilateralism, strategic partnerships, European autonomy and national sovereignty, the French President establishes that he “firmly believe[s] that Europeans must first and foremost define together what their security interests are and sovereignly decide what is good for Europe”\textsuperscript{268}. Macron while implying that France is different from the rest of Europe, he also acknowledges that “this ambition of France […] cannot be realized without an extensive network of friendships, strategic partnerships and alliances […] because our security interests and responsibilities are global”\textsuperscript{269} and this network of partners and friends must first be strengthened on the European continent. With the goals of engaging Russia, as one immediate threat to European stability, disarmament and working towards multilateralization of international treaties on arms control, whose abrogation does affect France but cannot be influenced by France or Europe at the moment, Macron pledges to follow the path

\textsuperscript{266} Macron, New Initiative.  
\textsuperscript{268} Macron, Defense and Deterrence Strategy.  
\textsuperscript{269} Ibid.
of European autonomy the “European union already set for itself”\textsuperscript{270}. Macron’s France finds itself following a Europeanist vision, as other presidents have set it out to before Macron. While he asserts that NATO and European defense do not necessarily compete with each other, but are two different elements of European collective defense, he directly speaks to European publics and leaders when wondering about why the capabilities on the continent have been in disrepair and vastly underfunded. Macron’s determination to lead a change in European security becomes especially obvious towards the end of the speech, where he declares:

“On that point, our independent decision-making is fully compatible with our unwavering solidarity with our European partners. Our commitment to their security and their defence [sic!] is the natural expression of our ever-closer solidarity. Let’s be clear: France’s vital interests now have a European dimension.”\textsuperscript{271}

Macron’s France continues to be “fiercely committed to remain master of its own destiny, within a refunded Europe for the common good”\textsuperscript{272} and in this regard mirrors the sentiment portrayed in British leadership, in that national sovereignty must be safeguarded at all costs. President Macron in his function as the political and strategic lead on French foreign and security policy, however, portrays an understanding for the need to cooperatively create and uphold a security community on the European continent. In cooperation with Germany he has pushed for the EDF and PeSCo, but rather than be content with a status-quo upholding framework that is tasked to ensure continued viability of European national armies, he also attempts to push the French ambition for global action onto the European partners. France currently leads the Security and Defence Committee (SEDE) of the European Parliament, despite a comparatively larger share of French seats held in that Committee as compared to the French participation of the related standing committee of foreign affairs (AFET) this committee ranks 20 out of 27 judged by the

\textsuperscript{270} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{271} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{272} Macron, \textit{Defense and Deterrence Strategy}. 
membership of French officials. So while there certainly is a comparatively stronger interest in SEDE in France than in Germany, keeping in mind the larger share of German MEPs overall, bringing defense to the forefront of European parliament has not yet happened.

Following the Sorbonne speech, Macron led two initiatives that are set to alter the European defense landscape. First, he introduced the European Intervention Initiative (EI2) in 2018, a project for select countries to increase intervention interoperability and develop shared strategic culture, and second, he and Merkel signed the bilateral Franco-German Aachen Treaty in 2019, which agreed on stronger cooperation and even integration of France and Germany in several issue areas and among them defense and security. The EI2 is penned as a direct reaction to the German-led inclusivity of PeSCo and is exclusive to a French invited selection. Started with a small group of nations EI2 sits parallel to other multinational initiatives or frameworks but is not restricted to only EU or only NATO nations. Entry into EI2 is subject to will, shared point of view, ability and “operational added value”. The ambition of the project is used as a pretext to

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273 France has six delegates at the Security and Defence Committee SEDE, the same amount as in the Committees on Budgets, Women’s rights, Foreign interference and disinformation and critical infrastructure and AI. Only the Beating Cancer and Human Rights Committees have a lower French attendance (five MEPs). For the SEDE French MEPs own ca 10% of the seats, German MEPs 11.9%. For AFET France has 7% and Germany 12.8% of seats. For Data on the distribution of MEPs and Committees were aggregated through the following tool to show all committees and membership: European Parliament, "Members of European Parliament Advanced search", search engine for composition of parliamentary committees of the European Parliament, last accessed September 15, 2020, https://www.europarl.europa.eu/meps/en/search/advanced?name=&groupCode=&countryCode=&bodyType=ALL.

274 In fact, SEDE is only a subcommittee, underneath AFET and was only established in 2014. In a way this shows development and a stronger look at defense and security, but not one on equal footing as other areas of EU interest like fisheries, development or legal affairs, all of which are standing committees with a lower membership number than SEDE.


277 The initial letter of intent was signed by Belgium, Denmark, Estonia, France, Germany, the Netherlands, Portugal, Spain and the United Kingdom.

278 Ministère des Armées, “European Intervention Initiative".
artificially create boundaries for states that are seen as unwilling or unable or not valuable to the strategic outlook of the French-led project. With the outlook on operational participation and the tying-in to French military establishments, the potential to focus mostly on French operational and strategic realms, a South-centric view not necessarily shared by partners, is high. Not only is this initiative focused on a minority of transatlantic security community members, excluding those not invited as unreliable, incapable to share an expected burden or incapable of sharing the same French vision, it also does not yet provide a common good to the community being built. The overall aim is to strengthen European autonomy through cultural, steered convergence, but the French lead suggests a bending towards French opinion. Through explicitly not inviting a larger part of the transatlantic and European spheres, Macron’s France attests all these nations are not trustworthy enough to become a member. Ambitious though it is, but at the same time cannibalizes on simultaneous European or NATO efforts, where nations that are member to two or all three have to spread their resources, political and economic, in yet another way. The inclusion of the U.K. in the initial invitee list on the one hand gives credit to French understanding of British capabilities and willingness to intervene, but also undermines potential EU cooperation on Brexit, or the convergence of EI2 with similar projects in PeSCo.

The Aachen treaty mentioned above is the second noteworthy international treaty of the past years. In it, France and Germany agree to an additional layer of mutual protection, which specifically includes military action, concerted foreign affairs decisions and a new outlook on Africa among other things.\textsuperscript{279} That the promise of military assistance\textsuperscript{280} in a defense case


\textsuperscript{280} For a German dissemination of the scope of the assistance paragraphs see: Deutscher Bundestag, “Die Beistandsklausel im Aachener Vertrag über die deutsch-französische Zusammenarbeit und
immediately raises the question of nuclear sharing is clear. Nuclear deterrence provided by the U.S. is one of the pillars of the transatlantic security sphere and Germany has participated in burden and risk sharing through its program of nuclear sharing with the U.S. While the Aachen treaty promises any means necessary, the French government has already declared it would not share its *force de frappe* capabilities with Germany.\(^{281}\) While this sentiment has its own long tradition, France is not member of the Nuclear Planning Group of NATO and does not share information on his nuclear program with allies, the current situation and the opportunity of the Aachen treaty-related dialogue could have been a great entry point for both nations to reassess their relationship vis-à-vis each other in nuclear terms, too. With the American will to uphold its deterrence commitments wavering, France missed a chance to provide this common good for both its self-identified closest partner as well as the greater transatlantic area.

Overall, France exhibits an ambitious, but impatient leadership. Impatience with its partners, most notably Germany, leads to French establishment of yet another layer of security projects with EI2. France has realized that its global ambition cannot be fulfilled through a solo-act, thus it now tries to draw in European partners, but with a similar argument as the British is ultimately interested sole in French autonomy and sovereignty and the ability to act. Macron links France to Europe, through asserting French interests as European interests in his two speeches. But as is obvious France has yet to develop a willingness to expand a defense and security common

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good to its partners. It is not yet able to trust the vast majority of transatlantic partners in terms of means or will or ideal with defense or security issues at its own heart.

When taken altogether, these three nations exist on a scale from Atlanticist to Europeanist, with Germany floating in between with regard to where they wish to lead their own country to. But this is not all there is to it. There is also a sliding scale of trust apparent in the leadership decisions they have taken so far. On the one hand there is the United Kingdom, whose decision to not trust any defense or security relationship where it itself does not pull the levers puts it into the corner of least trust in the European partners. Reasserting sovereignty and duplicating many EU efforts in order to reseize control portrays a fundamental distrust in the interests and goals of other partners and especially Germany and France, as the other major EU players. France, too, values its sovereignty in the security realm, but has realized that without cooperation on seemingly equal footing, France itself cannot attain all its global goals. France therefore attempts to bring its own vision and ambition to the European table. This vision, however, still clearly lacks the European point of view. France is not interested in an inclusive security community and would rather only select those members most useful for its own goals, than the entire EU, European continent or transatlantic area. Germany is the one country least interested in reasserting its own autonomy and is willing to lead projects for the public good and take over a larger part of burden sharing for the projects than less-able or less affluent, smaller countries can. However, Germany lacks any grand vision or ambition for the security community. Instead, Germany pursues a status-quo objective. While this is coupled with growing defense investment and more engagement, it does not exceed any capability level previously existent. The Federal Republic is set on mending the holes in the security carpet, rather than creating a new fabric.
To summarize, the leadership positions of all three nations naturally differ, but with respect to the level of trust portrayed to the other focus nations or other member states of the community, there is a differing amount of mistrust visible. Additionally, a community goal and the willingness to provide the bulk of a burden or a unifying, inclusive vision has not emerged between the three nations or any single nation.

A final case study to look at is the non-governmental outlook on defense and the security community. Since all three nations are democratic, the public and its shared strategic identity is highly relevant for the maneuvering room of the political elite that create or maintain international cooperation.

3.3.3. Visualizing the public

As the final case study, a step away from official governmental positions and practice is necessary to provide a rounded answer to the research question. As the first case study has shown, very different security identities are visible in the constitutional and practical arrangements of the three focus nations. The image of the three individual identities, however, must be further solidified through an investigation of the domestic publics of each nation. Taking a step back from the sole focus on governments, constitutions and leadership figures or actions, this case study adds another layer to the question about domestic barriers to integration and cooperation. Despite the potentially uninhibited powers of the executive in some of the focus nations, they remain democracies and need to work with or through the domestic will. Through a look at the understanding of the domestic view on security, threat and the ability or necessity to cooperate, the findings of the previous two case studies are solidified. First, similarities and differences in domestic security outlooks are highlighted. Following this, a more pointed look at confidence and
trust is cast. This also includes a look at the greater transatlantic or European public, to gauge general tendencies for later analysis.

A first look at the domestic understanding of the security realm necessarily asks about what the perception of threat and its potential differences are. Most recent polls concerning global threats have all three publics see similar threats but in different intensities. The biggest threat is seen to be climate change in France and Germany and spreading of disease in the United Kingdom,\textsuperscript{282} which is likely a mirror of the devastating effects of the ongoing global pandemic on the island nation. The second in line is either terror for France, cyberattacks for Germany or Climate Change for the U.K.\textsuperscript{283} When looking at the polled threats more closely relevant to security, namely terrorism, cyber-attacks or the effects and spread of nuclear weapons, while more than half of respondents see these as major threats, the French public (80\%, 71\%, 71\% of respondents name terrorism, cyberattacks and spread of nuclear weapons as major threats to their country is arguably more concerned than both the German (59\%, 64\%, 64\%) and British (65\%, 63\%, 50\%) one with regard to these specific issues.\textsuperscript{284} An earlier Pew Research Center study included the power and influence of the U.S., Russia and China as potential threats to respondent’s countries and here, too, relevant differences in perception are obvious. Both French and German publics find the U.S. influence greatly more threatening than the other two with 49\% of respondents answering this way. For the U.K. this perception is around 37\%. Concerning Russia and China, the three nations’ publics answered thus: France 40\% and 40\%, Germany 30\% and 33\% and the U.K. 45\% and 29\%.\textsuperscript{285} The raised mistrust over U.S. American influence correlates

\textsuperscript{282} Jacob Poushter and Christine Huang, “Despite Pandemic, Many European Still See Climate Change as Greatest Threat to Their Countries,” \textit{Pew Research Center} (September 2020), 4.
\textsuperscript{283} ibid.
\textsuperscript{284} Poushter and Huang \textit{Climate Change as Greatest Threat 2020}, 9.
\textsuperscript{285} Jacob Poushter and Christine Huang, “Climate Change Still Seen as the Top Global Threat, but Cyberattacks a Rising Concern,” \textit{Pew Research Center} (February 2019), 3.
to the Trump presidency. These different nuances in levels of threat and specific threats perceived in all three focus nations are relevant for the domestic win-sets of political elites making policy. A divergent perception of threat, however, does not mean cooperation or leadership in security communities is impossible. As has been stated previously, if states are willing to act on behalf of others’ concerns or expand their security umbrella over them these nuances do not factor in as much. Therefore, a look at focus nation public perception of the security realm and their nation’s position within it is necessary.

Paired with a general outlook on the necessity or utility of armed conflict showing Germany (3% strongly agree, 23% agree in total) distrustful of military means in general and the U.K. (10%, 53%) as most in favor with France (6%, 33%) in between and a greater level of distrust into the national military in Germany than the other two nations, the German domestic public is not only less concerned about military threats but also of a more pacifist outlook than the other two states. This correlates with the outlook of all three nations on their specific leadership place in global affairs, with the British public most strongly believing in a British responsibility for moral leadership (33% strongly believe, 86% believe overall), followed by France (26%, 79%) and Germany (21%, 72%). Contextualizing this public perception of a responsibility to lead with the willingness to employ arms, these three nations have a more nuanced outlook on their

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288 Bricker World Affairs, 41.
alliance-mandated responsibility to perform in military crises. In a 2019 YouGov poll, when asked whether the home country should or should not take up arms to assist an ally in case of Russian attack, there was a clear divide between each nation’s public willingness to step up. Additionally, the hypothetical country under attack mattered for the response, showing an overall disinclination of all three nations to assist Turkey foremost (31% of Britons, 14% of Germans and 18% of French supported use of military force), but also visibly less motivation to assist Latvia, Romania or Croatia with military means. The U.S. is another country that did not entice clear will to protect by Germany and France. When looking at will to protect each other the little over half of the respondents answered positively. Consistently, the U.K. public scored highest in using military force for allied protection and Germany and France are tied for a low public backing of military aid to allied nations and European neighbors. These scores are in contrast to the respective countries’ general acceptance of article five, the NATO mutual defense clause, obligations (66% U.K., 58% German, 53% French respondents think their country should maintain their article five commitment). All three nations have a higher response to the general idea of article five commitment, than ready commitment for specific nations. A Pew poll underlines these findings showing public perception in both Germany (60%) and France (53%) are against the use of military force related to article five. Out of the three, only British respondents committed to the mutual defense clause with a majority (55%). This public sentiment of a lack of need to adhere to the central allied norm of mutual defense must be contextualized with the overall waning of not only

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the leadership position of the U.S. within NATO, but NATO itself. Favor for the premier institution of the transatlantic security realm has decreased over the last decade markedly in both continental European countries, moving from 71% in 2009 to 49% in 2019 in France and from 73% to 57% in Germany in the same time frame.291

Given that two out of three focus nations’ publics have increasing doubts over NATO and there is a visible public reluctance to accept the responsibility in case of defense, a more direct question concerning trust in focus nations needs to be asked. When asked about the confidence in current leaders of Western nations to “do the right thing regarding world affairs”292, 76% of British respondents reported trust in Angela Merkel, 64% in Emmanuel Macron and just over half reported confidence in their own Prime Minister Boris Johnson. 78%, 52% and 35% of French respondents reported trust into the above-mentioned leaders in the same order. Germany’s public response turned out to 81%, 71% and 27% of responder’s trusting domestic and foreign leaders.293 The study points to long-term dynamics behind these numbers rather than the ongoing pandemic situation and has pointed to great continuity, especially considering the view of Chancellor Merkel. This public trust in German leadership stands in direct contrast of the above found German unwillingness to use arms both in general and in the NATO context. The constrained and pacifist German security identity pervasive within the German population does however mean that the likelihood of Germany instigating a conflict that would draw in unwilling and unrelated partners is smaller than in the United Kingdom with a public perceptive of a British moral responsibility and will to engage globally and through military means.

291 U.K. opinion rose by two percentage points from 53% to 55%. Fagan and Poushter, “NATO seen favorably”.
293 Ibid.
Moving away from solely public polls, and looking at international cooperation and coalition perception through polls with professionals and academics, it is revealed that Germany, followed by France and then the U.K. is perceived as either the most or one of the most important partners in security in Europe. When it comes to integrated foreign and security policy, Germany is seen by experts to favor an EU level, France a treaty-based approach excluding unwanted EU partners and the U.K. only informal cooperation, which would infringe the least upon their sovereignty. Defense cooperation specifically is perceived to be even more delegated away from grand, EU scale cooperation, despite PeSCo and other projects already being in their early phases. Germany is seen to prefer smaller, treaty-based cooperation, France is alleged to favor informal cooperation and the U.K. mainly favors the national, domestic level. In terms of wider European cooperation, Germany is seen as the most favored partner, followed by France, the U.K. only factors in on seventh place and neither German nor French respondents list Great Britain as one of their top three choices. Given that U.K. is seen as one of the most disappointing EU members, which certainly links to Brexit, this should come as no surprise. As most members of the transatlantic security community are also members of the EU, this disappointment in British cooperation is due to Brexit, trust towards the U.K. has been lastingly negatively impacted. Another layer of importance is that the U.K. has been viewing Germany and France as the most

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297 Janning et al., “EU Coalition Explorer”, 909.

298 Janning et al., “EU Coalition Explorer”, 316, 411.
influential nations within the EU, Brexit and taking back control can therefore be seen as emancipation from German or French rule. Brexit in itself therefore must be understood as a vote of no confidence in both of these nations.

Taken altogether, this case study reveals continuities between German, French and British constitutional and practical security and defense behavior and their public opinion. Germans and Germany are deeply distrustful of the security realm and are unlikely to have broad public backing for the use of arms, even in case of the solidarity of NATO nations manifested in article five. The public also comparatively feels less inclined to act and influence on a global scale than do the other two nations’ publics. With the apparent level of mistrust in the security realm and burden sharing in defense cooperation, a potential increase of responsibility for the German state appears rather difficult. Despite this, Germany is perceived to be a central, if not the central player in European continental cooperation both in general, as well as in defense affairs. With an unadventurous public, Germany can certainly be seen as a safe choice that will not conjure up wars, but its reliability must be questioned given the public reluctance to military support. The British public can be said to be diametrically opposed on the other end of the spectrum, with a mind of global responsibility and public backing for the use of force. With the greatest backing of article five burden sharing, its commitment to the alliance appears trustworthy. However, the British public is less inclined to cooperate in the defense field on a broader scale and the overall orientation of the public remains with the U.S. The brinkmanship of the recent Prime Ministers, additionally, have rendered the U.K. as well as the U.K. leadership in form of Boris Johnson as untrustworthy. France meanders in between both these nations, being a trusted partner under trusted leadership, but equally

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299 For example, U.K. respondents assert that Germany is the EU leader in fiscal and border and migration policy, and France the second most influential in fiscal as well as foreign, security and defense policy. Janning et al., “EU Coalition Explorer,” 544, 578, 612.
disillusioned by NATO and the U.S. as Germany and less inclined to cooperate in the common defense in a EU context than Germany. Similar tendencies have been described in the previous two case studies.

With all case studies explored, it remains to condense the findings and apply them to the central research question. The following chapter focuses on the integrative analysis of the above three case studies and the answering of the research question.

3.4. Analysis and limitations

The previous chapters have investigated the state of the transatlantic security community, detailing on the dynamic of American retrenchment and which states have the potential to contend for an increased responsibility or leadership position within the security community. In the past years and decades the U.S. has shifted its focus away from Europe and European defense, a dynamic that has been accelerated by the current administration, and for the security community to continue existing in a working fashion an increase in cooperation or integration of the other member states is paramount. So far, initiatives on the continent have not led to new leadership within the community or to a dynamic countering the American shift of focus and the European loss of trust in U.S. leadership and the security umbrella. Given what is at stake, namely the future existence of the transatlantic security community, the question arises what internal barriers exist within Europe that have and will likely continue to hinder security cooperation and integration. The chapter above have set out to explore this question. First a choice of essential nations for any further cooperation was made. The choice was based on NATO membership, as NATO is the oldest institutional manifestation of the security community. Other layers of security that have been built, like the European Union and its External Action Service, EU Battlegroups et cetera, are based on the base layer of security community that NATO represents, just in a more exclusive
format. Within the community, three nations were identified following their engagement with NATO itself, their geographic and population size, economic and political weight in security community institutions as subjects for further study. These are the Federal Republic of Germany, the Republic of France and the United Kingdom. Additionally, parameters for the inquiry were set. The functioning of security communities, but especially that of a mature pluralistic security community, is dependent on a convergence of security identities between members, a leading state formulating a community vision, goal or character that other states rally around and get drawn into and mutual trust, which enables cooperation and integration. The case studies conducted above investigated these elements, in three individual chapters, one focused on the institutionalized forms of security identities, one on leadership behavior exhibited by all three nations in the recent past and one investigating public opinion, which further rounded out the security identities in question and illuminated more deeply on mutual trust.

This chapter sets out to condense the findings above and apply them to the research question of this thesis. Following the three case study focus points on the portrayal and manifestation of defense and the security realm in constitutional and practical governmental realities and action, the understanding of leadership and the public approach to security, the following compiles and synthesizes the case studies to clearly identify the security identities of all three nations. Based on this the differences in security identity, the security goals or vision and their applicability to the wider security community are discussed. This ultimately leads to the foundational dynamic on which a security community is based, trust and responsibility, and a discussion of Germany, France, and the U.K. in this context. Following a look at uni-, bi- or multilateral non-U.S. leadership of NATO and the transatlantic security community, this chapter closes the thesis’ investigation of the lead question on what internal barriers within Europe hinder
further cooperation and integration with a discussion of the wider meaning of these results for the community at hand and the theory of security communities.

3.4.1. Identity

Through all three case studies, different aspects of German, French and British security identity have been illuminated. If a spectrum were to be drawn, Germany would find itself on the end opposite of both France and the United Kingdom. Institutionalized in the Grundgesetz, the German Basic Law or constitution, and pervasive through the German population is a weariness and mistrust of the military and its power or political use. The German security identity revolves around the image of a civil state and power that does not entangle itself in foreign conflicts but cooperates on consensus-based decision-making with a wide basis. This has led to a severely limited executive in the defense realm in comparison to the other two nations and with it limitations on cooperation potential. Germany has a decidedly nonglobal perspective of its security and shirks away from military use, even if to defend or assist allies, other than for example training missions of foreign military which could make further German interference obsolete. The German security identity can be described as unambitious and conservative, as in trying to conserve a state of being rather than conservative realist, but without a realistic look at the consequent necessities to not only reap the benefits but also shoulder the responsibilities. With its attempt at all-encompassing and low-entry barrier cooperation, Germany portrays an interest in cooperation on other states’ terms to a degree of nonaccountability of the others and follows a way of least resistance without setting clear ambitions and boundaries.

France and the United Kingdom appear towards the other end of the spectrum, sharing similarities in their security identities without being entirely congruent. With leaders institutionalized as nearly all-powerful executive decision-makers in the security and defense
realm without civil mechanisms of control, their identity encompasses a high level of trust in the military and its use as well as the power of leaders. Both nations understand themselves as global players and world powers with different points of focus, Africa for France and the Middle East for Great Britain. Defense and security are high on their national agenda, but the French population appears to have comparatively more and stronger feelings of threat then both their direct neighbor Germany or their insular ally across the channel. Both highly value autonomy and sovereignty, seen in French calls for European emancipation from the U.S. and their value of the force de frappe, but the question of sovereignty has brought the U.K. to leave the European Union, shirking cooperation and integration in the defense field, too. French identity incorporates a European idea, imagining Europe and European security as an extension of France and French ambitions. Where German identity shows a lack of ambition but a knack for cooperation, France and the U.K. are active and ambitious, but show a disregard for the interests of partners and allies, with the U.K. seeing itself as in the U.S. global power tradition and, of course, the legacy of the British Empire, and France impatiently focusing on formative influence on Europe.

While a mature security community does not require absolute congruence of the security identities of all member states, the identity of the leading state needs to be able to function as an umbrella under which the members can and want to fit. For states with the self-image of global influence and power and positive outlook on security and defense, fitting under a purely reactive, defense-critical security identity to secure the continuation of the transatlantic security community and its formerly global outlook must be regarded as unlikely. Similarly, if following a more active leader means being drawn into conflicts itself, a status-quo state without interests ranging widely outside its own state borders will encounter difficulties both with its own population and with partner states.
At the same time, larger similarity between security identities does not translate into better cooperation either. France and the U.K. arguably show quite similar outlooks on security, with their focus on sovereignty, their global interest etc. Yet, the character of their identities complicates cooperation. Two states valuing their autonomy cannot but face difficulties integrating their diverging priorities and interest in influence into single, cooperative policy. Instead, not the amount of similarity of security identities, but rather the compatibility within any given cooperative setting is important for functioning community. Even if a wide gap between both leaders’ and members’ identities exist a unifying vision or goal regarding the community could continue mutual attraction and cooperation if the fulfilment of the vision positively affects all sides. Of course, security itself is a unifying core of any security community, but the questions of means, ends, boundaries and dissemination of burden remain.

3.4.2. Community vision

With the most pressing perceived threats being essentially nonmilitary, as terrorism reverberates between the domestic police sphere and military defense through missions against nonmilitary adversaries abroad it is difficult to count it as a typical threat in military security, a threat such as the Soviet union at the beginning of NATO’s founding is not in existence at this point of time. So far dependent on the security guarantee of the U.S., Germany has optically begun an intensification of efforts in the defense field. These, however, do not aim to catapult Germany into the frontlines of security community agenda-setting. Despite the nominal proclamations of leadership interest, Germany’s efforts must be seen as attempts at preserving the status quo. Envisioning more cooperation within Europe has led to some success in gathering member states’ support, but not to the extent that they overwhelmingly entrust Germany with their defense. German efforts as a framework nation also do not consider what partners’ problems and interests
are but must be seen as an attempt to even out the holes in the German defense landscape that
caters to breadth before depth on too small a budget. Foreign engagement is not a national goal
and taking over responsibility in a European context professed by German political elites has to be
seen in light of the parliamentary influence potential and the civil negation of military use even in
an allied context.

In contrast to this, France has a more outward vision of security. Judging that the global
standing and agenda France sees itself in and would like to protect will be more and more difficult
without willing and trustworthy partners, France under Macron actively searches for such partners
in a European context. French ambition is especially pronounced regarding Africa and intervention
in African countries which ties into the French counterterrorism agenda and historic, colonial ties
to the region. France has displayed a will to push for and lead coalitions of the willing and trusted
as seen with EI2 but is less inclined to tackle wider communities that could potentially disagree
with or hamper French decision making. Following from this, one could say that France has a
vision for itself and searches for cooperation to achieve that, but does not have a vision for a
European dimension of security other than autonomy from the U.S. While it has sought stronger
partnership with the U.K. and more recently Germany, ultimately it is not willing to provide more
in terms of security as the partner can. This makes France transactional and a suitable alliance
partner mostly for states on equal capability footing but collides with the understanding of security
community leadership and the necessity of burden-sharing imbalance.

In a similar vein, the U.K. has a global vision of itself and its sphere of influence and
security interests. Contrary to France, however, this does not include a European component
anymore. With a strong focus on sovereignty, any potential influence on British decision-making
and foreign or security policy must be denied and fought. Cooperation is only attempted when the
United Kingdom has all decision-making power, leaving other states in the situation as stooges to British will without the possibility to shape or influence. The U.K. is willing to go it alone, even if that means infringing upon the potential security of NATO allies, through cannibalizing on limited defense budgets of partners through duplication of defense efforts.

This again shows a stratification of all three nations across a spectrum. There is a divergence of global versus local outlook, a divergence in European versus non-European self-image and an active/reactive difference. None of these three nations formulate a vision for either NATO or Europe (with or without NATO) that can easily be accepted by the other two, and potentially not a majority of the member states of the current transatlantic security community.

Lack of vision and a divergence in security identity certainly inhibit any form of cooperation or even integration over the amount already in place. These two elements, however, could be overcome by trust into each nation or the willingness to assume responsibility by each nation.

3.4.3. Responsibility and trust

Security communities function through states willing to curb their sovereignty to a degree and through placing themselves in a relationship of dependence to each other for the merit of a greater good, namely the creation of security for all. That entails the leading states to assume responsibility for the interests of the member states and their willingness to be in a way influenced by external interests that might go counter to domestic will or that might diminish a country’s own decision-making power. When assessing the three focus nations through a look at their security identities, their leadership behavior, security vision and popular opinion, it becomes obvious that trust into each other and the willingness to assume responsibility for one another is significantly lacking.
Germany has professed an understanding of the fact that sovereignty needs to be infringed upon to a certain degree to keep the transatlantic security community and European security alive. Its broad outreach for consensus shows an acceptance of the fact that the interests of others need to be taken into account. At the same time, Germany has not only lost confidence in the U.S. but the U.K. through Brexit as well, making any meaningful defense cooperation with the insular neighbor difficult. If a more benign project like the EU is thwarted by the U.K., how can any continental state trust in a British defense commitment. Also, German responsibility does not extend further than its own borders. Intensification of defense commitment with France notwithstanding, the German security identity portrays an unwillingness to take over military responsibility. Executive power over military use is commonly frowned upon and deeply mistrusted, which cannot do else but extent to nations with seemingly all-powerful leadership in security matters.

France, too, has begun to value closer cooperation with a caveat. Driven by economic necessity rather than trust in other states, France is searching for select and trusted partners for their agenda, rather than for the providing of a common good for the community. It partakes in large-scale formats like PeSCo in order to extend its influence but favors select coalitions of the willing. This points to a lack of trust in the community. Autonomy is a central value to the French security sphere, meaning that is does not intend to rely on and trust other states with their security, and it also is not willing to extend all their means for the security guarantee, shirking away from the responsibility of leadership in the sense of security communities.

When looking at the U.K. and the issue of trust and responsibility, one cannot move far without having to address Brexit. This historic milestone of British foreign policy is certainly very important evidence of a general lack of trust in continental partners, especially Germany and
France as the most prominent EU nations. The United Kingdom values strategic autonomy, sovereignty and global influence so strongly that it actively hinders cooperation. Rather than trust in decisions of NATO partners other than the U.S., the U.K. rather establishes their own parallel system. While public opinion values the defense commitment within NATO, the U.K. is unwilling to shoulder responsibility for allies, since that would mean an impingement on their sovereign decision-making and interest. Their relationship to the U.S. is too seen as on equal footing rather than in terms of dependence, meaning that the U.K. self-image disregards differences in capabilities and hierarchy for the sake of their image of sovereignty.

Taken altogether, a lack of trust into each other, exacerbated by and representative of diverging security identity that is manifested in leadership, constitution and public opinion hinders European defense cooperation and integration. Unilateral leadership through any of the three nations would require a degree of submission of the other two to the interests and values of the one that must be considered as highly unlikely, given the divergences laid out above and the lack of trust between all of them. Bi- or trilateral leadership cooperation of these three focus nations is complicated by the issues previously investigated as well. Out of all three, the United Kingdom is certainly the least trusted and the least interested in taking over responsibility and extending security to others at the expense of its own sovereignty. That leaves Germany and France, who have shown growing cooperation between each other. Germany certainly has a larger following in the security sphere within Europe than does France. Therefore, it could be an essential magnet for the security community. However, its stance on the use of military and executive power and therefore the credibility of its potential defense guarantee to any partner cannot be seen as trustworthy. This could be ameliorated by a partner with a more proactive, regional outlook onto security. France has such a more proactive outlook and has formulated a certain vision but shows
distrust in partner nations and is not willing to take responsibility to all corners of its abilities, as it explicitly refrains from extending the nuclear deterrent. Additionally, the security outlook France has placed into the center of the agenda, counterterrorism in Africa, is not shared by Germany and others as are their concerns not regarded by France. Trust is again an underlying feature that hinders the emergence of a reliable Franco-German bilateral co-lead of the transatlantic security community. This lack of trust has efficiently hindered the ascend of any of the three nations onto a stronger leadership position.

3.4.4. Entanglement and loss of trust

In the past decades Europe has been rocked by several crises that began to show the fault lines dividing the EU member states. A number of stumbling blocks between the nations have crystallized into a Europe of regions or coalitions, which are pitted against each other in various crises and political debates. One continuous stumbling block is fiscal policy in various forms. There is a divide between member states using the Euro and those states that purposefully did not choose to do so or did not meet the economic threshold to adopt the shared currency. The global financial become Euro crisis brought the more frugal states into conflict with the less wealthy south, austerity measures as championed by Germany have hurt Greece and other Southern states badly. Taxation is an additional layer, where tax havens like Ireland and Luxemburg band together against states interested in accessing the tech giants harboring there. Another obvious example of inner-European dissent is the migration crisis. Asylum seekers fleeing the Syrian civil war and other conflicts disproportionately affect the Southern states, like Italy and Greece, where they arrive on European soil and the states with small populations where they go to live, like Hungary and Sweden. If and how and where refugees should receive help, and in which form, is highly contested and leads to recurring stand-offs between groups of states in the EU context. The north-
south divide has recently seen a dramatic new element: COVID-19. Frugal nations, like the Netherlands or Sweden and Austria, block aid in form of grants, favoring loans. Nations like Italy, hard-hit by the virus, initial refusals of help by neighbors at the beginning of the pandemic and with a struggling economy, are faced with a united front of richer states unwilling to grant them much needed help, as loans might adversely affect their economy. Struggles over influencing domestic dynamics, like the growing authoritarianism and populism in Hungary or Poland, introduce additional angles. And in all these cases, the EU member states having to reach decisions and having direct interests in the topics at stake, trust is left behind piece by piece. Referring to the security sphere, one of the best examples of this interstate loss of trust is Brexit. Brexit is not a rebuke of only the contented German, French or EU defense cooperation, but rather a rebuke of overall foreign interference in any British affair, be it health care, migration, trade, or defense. General trends within European nations have shown a north-south regional divide, as well as a center-east one, affluent versus struggling, proactive vs reactive. The stratification within the EU is mirrored in the three nations chosen for the case studies above.

Europe, through its very tight net of interaction means the stakes of each single nation in each other’s decision making are higher than between partners or allies more distant and less interconnected. More contact in more areas of interest equates to more potential for conflicting interests. Consequently, more conflicts of interest mean trust is contested and eroded with every adverse decision. When other areas of clashing interest are removed and cooperation could be reduced to solely the security sphere, trusting a partner would be based on a less complex and varied common experience. This means a security guarantee from a state otherwise less interested in shaping one another’s domestic policy through European affairs, could have higher hopes for continued and wider followership than a state deeply entangled in all manners of contentious and
wide-ranging policy with direct effect on its partners. The United States of America have been such a state. While they were and are of course involved in European affairs, extending their influence through the United Kingdom, using sanctions to influence European decision-making, as happens in the case of Nordstream 2, or the multitude of other ways employed by a global power in international affairs, they have arguably been less entangled than any EU member state simply by nature of their membership. Trusting in the actions of a state with a lower stake and less interest in one’s own affairs can be considered easier than trusting another with whom one has been in continuous debate and conflict over all manner of policies. It is therefore safe to say that the United States have had a better position to have feelings of trusts developed towards them than any of the three focus nations in this study.

3.4.5. Barriers to cooperation

Given the loss of trust and the introduction of transactionality and conditionality into the transatlantic security community in between the U.S. and its partners, especially the three big European players, the question a rises what a further reduction of U.S. engagement, up to an overall exit from NATO, could mean for the transatlantic security community. The U.S. is already scaling back commitments, which has been met with some efforts to equal out said losses. Germany, for example has pledged to raise its expenditure for NATO to the reduced American level, France and the U.K. are increasing their defense budget and the development of new combat systems is intended to address capability shortfalls that would be exacerbated by further American retrenchment. But a growing disengagement of the U.S. from NATO necessitates more cooperation on the part of the remaining partners, especially from leaders, to even sustain the status quo. With a return of geopolitics and increasingly assertive Russia and China, conflicts close to Europe and potentially involving EU and NATO members, like unrest in Belarus inviting Russian
action to Polish dismay or Armenian conflict with Azerbaijan that could involve Turkey, and destabilizing effects of continued climate change leading to growing migration towards Europe as well as resource conflicts, NATO is faced with the need to make decisions that are increasingly outside the preservation of the status quo. The current dynamic shows the need for more coordination and more action, meaning there is a need for more unified security goals and foreign policy convergence within the security community. This necessitates even further cooperation and integration, and therefore trust, between the remaining interested and involved members of NATO.

If the current level of cooperation cannot be increased due to the inherent lack of trust and the divergence of security identity between the nations most important for the future of the security community over the amount that has been reached, NATO cannot function. The transatlantic security community, without an anchor grounding it in policy and a magnet to hold it together, would likely fracture further as disfunction begets mistrust. Without a concerned, trusted and responsible leader or group of leaders a security community is unable to halt its decay. Until at least the collapse of the Soviet Union, this position was filled by the United States. Less entangled in the intricacies of EU or European affairs, trusted, concerned about partner’s security and willing to bear an outsize burden, the U.S. was the essential ally in European security. The future of the transatlantic security community depends on a repetition of this kind of leadership, and the image of European security illuminated in this thesis shows that internal barriers bar Germany, France and the U.K. to take up that mantle. These barriers are their security identity differences, lack of leadership, responsibility and, ultimately, trust.

3.4.6. Stratified security community

The study results above must also be taken a step further. As identity manifests over a long period of time is only changes slowly, the stark ideational differences between all focus
nations are not a product of these past years. The problems arising from these different security identities have existed before and they only move into stronger focus now that the U.S. is heading down a different path and turning away from leadership in the transatlantic security community.

As was shown, the most prominent members of the community not only have different security identities and dependent interests, but also do not universally share mutual trust. As the premier example of a mature pluralistic security community the revelation of internal lack of trust coupled with a discernable hierarchy of these three states in the view of other members, diverging security identities and interests and no uniform understanding of threats or visions for the future one must wonder whether the expectations of collective identity, shared way of life, uniform trust are not too idealistic to be applicable to the transatlantic security community. If the collective identity steered by the U.S. but uniformly carried by all members were as universal as the theory expects, one could expect to see more trust between the members next in line and the problem at hand, namely why there is no furthering of cooperation or integration above the status quo, would not be as dire as it is. Instead it appears that within the community several different identities exist, attracting more or less other states. Trust, too, is not shared on an equal basis, but was higher towards the U.S. as a leader and differing degrees of lower towards other European partners. Similar security identities, like with France and the U.K., do not necessarily lead to growing cooperation, instead similar interests, like between France and Germany in the case of the Aachen treaty, support cooperation. Outside of these shared interests, competition persists within the transatlantic security community. This competition has so far not led to the disappearance of dependable expectations of peaceful change, which is one of the main signifiers of the existence of a security community. While member states do not necessarily trust each other with acting in one’s own interest, they also have not begun to fear each other again. U.S. underhanded threats of
potentially leaving NATO have diminished trust into its leadership, but not into its membership in the security community. As the community persists, but identity and trust are not as mutual and uniform as has to be expected following the theory, the central value of both for the continued existence needs to be adjusted.

Adler and Barnett’s security communities exist on a three-step ladder from nascent over ascendant to mature, and within the mature category on a sliding scale from tightly to loosely coupled. Once the mature stage is reached, which is defined as reaching dependable expectations of peaceful change and having attained a degree of collective identity, the degree of integration becomes their identifier. Some authors use this to classify the EU as more tightly coupled as NATO, despite the EU being entirely dependent on the NATO security guarantee. This classification seems to serve as a tool to highlight the nations pathway towards ultimate amalgamation, but glosses over the fact that, as was shown above, even tight couplings have diverging identities and disregarding the convergence of interests and the role of leadership and hierarchy of trusts within the workings of security communities.

While interests are dependent on identity, this thesis not only points to a greater role of interests in the degree and success of cooperation. European nations and the U.S. were able to form this community based on mutual interests, but the identities of the nations involved did not change substantially over time. This thesis, too, shows that a widely shared and very congruent collective identity cannot be taken for granted within security communities. In order to better focus on the prevalence of diverging identities, as well as on the relevance of interests, highlighting the degree of stratification of security communities must be relevant and illuminating. As in the case of the transatlantic security community, dividing it into tightly coupled and loosely coupled communities is not target-oriented, as one would not exist without the other. Understanding the transatlantic
security community as a widely stratified security community, one can both incorporate the different mosaic pieces of cooperation that have grown within the community, like the EU, different FNCs or bilateral treaties, and at the same time point to the dynamics of competition and differences in trust or collective identity. Understanding security communities in terms of stratification also makes room for the idea of hierarchy. The extant theory admits to the existence and importance of leadership within security communities but does not further define it and does not detail about hierarchy between non-leading members. Yet, the differing levels of trust vis-à-vis each other show that member states do understand each other in terms of a hierarchy. Stratification also serves to highlight clustering of nations within security communities around certain issue areas or identities, making identity not only a check point to be reached but an issue that needs to be understood and highlighted separately to better understand the dynamics of security communities.

Introducing stratification as a measurement of mature security communities does not mean trust, leadership, and identity as the pillars of security communities are irrelevant. They are still important thresholds to be reached to attain maturity in the sense set out by Adler and Barnett. However, once these thresholds are reached previous theory lost interest in them and only focused on the degree of cooperation and integration. As these are dependent on these pillars, understanding a security community as a stratified system of groups of states, trust, leadership, identity, and interests are reintroduced into the research agenda.
CHAPTER 4
CONCLUSION

This thesis has set out to answer the question what internal barriers exist hindering further European security cooperation and integration. Given the mounting external pressure and the apparent abdication of leadership by the U.S. answering this question helps understanding a major problem in the alliance dynamic of NATO and the general transatlantic security community.

Following an exploration of the theoretical background on security communities and their development and necessary conditions as well as dynamics of decay, variables important for the continued functioning of a mature, pluralistic security community were identified as the existence of leadership, responsibility, a vision, compatible security identities and first and foremost trust between the members and especially towards the states in a leadership position. Looking at contenders for such a position, Germany, France, and the U.K. were identified as focus nations and then subsequently illuminated in three case studies. These case studies on the standing of defense, both in constitution and in practice, understanding leadership of each nation as well as highlighting the public opinion have shown distinct differences in the security identities and follow-up behavior by all three states. When contrasting these results it became apparent that the factor of trust was missing, effectively disabling all three nations to ascend to a more relevant position within the security community and intensifying cooperation and integration in a way necessary to counter American retrenchment. Without American leadership reminiscent of earlier decades, the transatlantic security community is likely to continue fraying.

Whether it could be salvaged in smaller versions largely depends on the development of trust and the willingness to take up responsibility by any of the three focus nations. Franco-German cooperation is less disadvantaged than British leadership participation but still necessitates major changes in either or both nations.
While this study has only illuminated the identities of the three major players, cooperation of which is necessary for the continuation of NATO, other member states have had to be disregarded for the sake of the length of the study. However, even with a new leadership, the potential acceptance of this relies on the wider member audience. A look at transatlantic trust towards France, Germany and the United Kingdom could help shed another light on the potential effects of their leadership. For the sake of the European project and one of if not the only mature pluralistic security community in existence, that has enabled Europe to be free of violent interstate conflict for decades and brought about the post-modern sphere in which millions thrive, one must hope the die has not yet fallen.

For the wider literature on security communities, this thesis has shown that mutual trust and shared identity within mature security communities cannot be taken for granted. Integration and cooperation being dependent on these variables, a focus must be reapplied to these elements. Therefore, this thesis has proposed to introduce the study of stratification of mature security communities. Stratified security communities reilluminate internal dynamics and shift the focus back to the pillars of security community instead of seeing them as mere milestones in the evolution of community.
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# APPENDIX I

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<td>HDI</td>
<td>GDP per Capita (US$)</td>
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APPENDIX II

LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

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<tr>
<th>Abbreviation</th>
<th>Description</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>AFET</td>
<td>European Parliament Committee on Foreign Affairs</td>
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<tr>
<td>AWACS</td>
<td>Airborne Warning and Control System</td>
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<td>CARD</td>
<td>Coordinated Annual Review on Defence</td>
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<td>CDU/CSU</td>
<td>Christlich-Demokratische Union/Christlich-Soziale Union</td>
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<tr>
<td>CJEF</td>
<td>Combined Joint Expeditionary Force</td>
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<tr>
<td>CSDP</td>
<td>Common Security and Defence Policy</td>
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<td>DNSSR</td>
<td>Defence and National Security Strategic Review</td>
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<td>DSACEUR</td>
<td>Deputy Supreme Allied Commander Europe</td>
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<tr>
<td>EDF</td>
<td>European Defense Fund</td>
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<td>EI2</td>
<td>European Intervention Initiative</td>
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<td>FCAS</td>
<td>Future Combat Air System</td>
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<td>FNC</td>
<td>Framework Nations Concept</td>
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<td>G7</td>
<td>Group of Seven</td>
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<td>GG</td>
<td>Grundgesetz</td>
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<tr>
<td>GPS</td>
<td>Global Positioning System</td>
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<td>INF Treaty</td>
<td>Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty</td>
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<td>JEF</td>
<td>Joint Expeditionary Force</td>
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<td>NATO</td>
<td>North Atlantic Treaty Organization</td>
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<td>NSC 68</td>
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<td>NSSSSDSR</td>
<td>National Security Strategy and Strategic Defense and Security Review</td>
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<td>OSCE</td>
<td>Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe</td>
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<td>ParlBG</td>
<td>Parlamentarisches Beteiligungsgesetz</td>
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<tr>
<td>PeSCo</td>
<td>Permanent Structured Cooperation</td>
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<td>SEDE</td>
<td>European Parliament Subcommittee on Security and Defense</td>
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<tr>
<td>UNESCO</td>
<td>United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization</td>
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<td>UNSC</td>
<td>United Nations Security Council</td>
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<tr>
<td>WTO</td>
<td>World Trade Organization</td>
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</tbody>
</table>
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An international, young academic with a background in Asian politics and literature studying conflict and cooperation in Europe and the Transatlantic area. Engages in various leadership positions on and off campus. Main research focus lies on the interdependence of trust, identity and security in systems of cooperative security and on securitization in modern conflicts.

Conference Presentations

2020 Virginia Social Science Association
   “Kosovo – securitization and desecuritization of a region and of identity”

2020 Midwest Political Science Association
   “Kosovo – securitization and desecuritization of a region and of identity”

2020 Graduate Research Conference Old Dominion University
   “Kosovo – securitization and desecuritization of a region and of identity”

2019 Graduate Research Conference Old Dominion University
   “China – Stakeholder or Challenger to the International Community”

Education

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