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THE FAILURE OF ACCULTURATION:
THE SIOUX INDIANS AND WOUNDED KNEE, 1890-91

MICHAEL T. ISENBERG

A thesis presented to the Department of History of
Old Dominion College
in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the
Degree of Master of Arts in History

OLD DOMINION COLLEGE
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Without the cooperation of various groups of people, this method would have been impossible. Foremost in this department is the staff of the Old Dominion College Library, who have put up with all sorts of requests, along with extra orders of books through their inter-library loan system. The staff in the Indian Department of the new National Archives have also been most helpful, extending their services so far as to mail the author portions of his manuscript left inadvertently in Washington. Mrs. Edith George and Mr. Dick Krupp of the South Dakota State Museum were most helpful and interested in the early stages of the project. Finally, Mr. Bob Lee, of Sturgis, South Dakota, has been kind enough to share a few of his opinions on the subject.

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LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS USED IN FOOTNOTING

BIC	Board of Indian Commissioners, *Annual Reports*
CIA	Commissioner of Indian Affairs, *Annual Reports*
KBR	The Kent-Baldwin Report, part of Record Group 94, National Archives
NA	National Archives, followed by RG (Record Group)
Ricker Collection	The Judge Eli S. Ricker Collection, property of the Nebraska State Historical Society
SDSHS	South Dakota State Historical Society
SW, *Annual Reports*	U. S. Department of War, *Annual Reports*

INTRODUCTION

The writing of history pertaining to the American Indian has long been dominated by two faults. The person seeking to recreate and explain the interaction of white man and red man during the settlement of the continent may doctor his presentation with a polemic intended to expiate the helpless Indian, casting all the blame on the relentless, land-hungry pioneers and the Army. Or the writer may emerge as an apologist for the superior civilization of the white race, claiming that the Indian could only be uplifted by the contact between two contrasting cultures. Either inclination, of course, clouds any picture presented to today's western scholar.

This polarity of viewpoints in Indian Studies was apparent while actual conflict between Indians and whites engaged the attentions of the entire country; it still exists, to some extent, today. A prime example of this tendency is the controversy surrounding an incident which occurred between units of the United States Army and a portion of the Sioux Nation in December, 1890, near Wounded Knee Creek, in southwestern South Dakota. This incident at different times has been called a "massacre," a "slaughter," a "battle," or an "engagement," depending upon the inclination of the critic. It has been blown out of all proportion to its actual significance; it was a symptom of acute hardship on the Sioux reservations, yet seldom has it entered popular history in this form. Because the Wounded Knee affair happened to occur in 1890, the year the United States Bureau of Census announced the frontier had officially ceased to exist, students are fond of citing the fight as the last Indian battle, the great watershed between the wild, uncivilized savage and the Reservation Indian.

This paper reconstructs the background of the Wounded Knee incident in an effort to present the evolution of a failure - the failure of the government-inspired acculturation of the Sioux. It is the contention of the author that the government failed in its obligations to this tribe, not because of any inherent dishonesty in treaty negotiations (although skullduggery often was afoot at the council table), but because of the ineptitude of government officials, and of Congress, in dealing with the Sioux problem. Even when the blunders of certain bureaucrats are analyzed, the road to the tragic delusion of the Ghost Dance and the final confrontation of arms during the winter of 1890-91 will be found to be strewn with circumstance. It is the confident man who registers a belief in the inevitability of history, and a brash historian who subscribes motive and intent where there be none.

The conflict between the Army and the Sioux reflects the dichotomy in historical judgement mentioned above. Few subjects have been glorified above the United States Cavalry, or, equally, the fierce Plains warrior. The literature on the Sioux problem thus becomes difficult to utilize by the fact of its abundance. Practically all of the contemporary writings reflect either a pro-Indian or a pro-Army bias, a bias which is evident to a certain extent in later works on the subject. The problem becomes one of evaluating each source to a degree which would be unnecessary in a subject not surrounded by such diversified opinions. For this reason, the author has decided to use an annotated bibliography.

The overall technique of the paper is to present the Sioux conflict of 1890-91 in terms of the attempt of the white man to impose his culture on the Indian. The reader will find in these pages very few heroes and certainly no villains - simply human beings caught up in a conflict imposed by different pasts. Every effort has been made to let the central figures speak for themselves. The danger here is the difficulty in translation - Sioux history was long recorded graphically, in the famous Winter Counts, while the language itself admits of dialectical variations - so practically all of the Indian testimony surrounding the subject has passed through the mouth and mind of another person. It thus becomes necessary, whenever possible, to weigh all Indian evidence on scales furnished by our knowledge of the interpreter or translator.

In the text, the word Sioux is used interchangeably with the words "Teton" and "Dakota" as well as the various tribes of the Teton Dakota. Ethnical purists will doubtless take offense at the deliberate misrendering of these terms, the difference among which is explained in the opening pages. Nevertheless, the repetition of one title for the tribe, albeit correct such usage may be, would delegate a monotony to the paper which the author hopes will be lessened by this device.

A note on the various abbreviations used in the footnotes has been thought necessary; it will be found following the bibliography. The subject would be almost incomprehensible without some knowledge of the terrain covered by the action. Certain maps prepared by Walter T. Vitous of Olympia, Washington, copied from Army maps in the National Archives, and contained in Robert M. Utley's *The Last Days of the Sioux Nation*, preface appropriate chapters.

CHAPTER I

TO THE GREAT RESERVATION

When white men first came in contact with the Sioux, they found a people dominating the land from the western bank of the Upper Mississippi to the Big Stone Lake at the headwaters of the Minnesota.[1] The venturesome French, pushing down from Canada in quest of furs, traded with the tribe but did not settle, having neither the strength nor the inclination to test the power of a formidable warrior nation.

The word "Sioux" is a white appellation, an abbreviation of Nadouessioux, a name applied to the tribe by the Chippewa and modified by the French. It signifies "adders" and, by derivation, "enemies."[2] The Sioux called themselves "Dakotas," meaning "friends" or "allies."[3] In earlier times, these people had also called themselves the _oceti sakowin_, or Seven Council Fires, one Fire for each division of the tribe. The Mdewakantonwan, Wahpetonwan, Wahpekute,

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[1] Scudder Mekeel, "A Short History of the Teton-Dakota," _North Dakota Historical Quarterly_, X, No. 3 (July, 1943), p. 140.

[2] John R. Swanton, _The Indian Tribes of North America_ ("Smithsonian Institution, Bureau of American Ethnology," Bulletin 145; Washington: Government Printing Office, 1952), p. 280.

[3] Clark Wissler, _Indians of the United States_ (New York: Doubleday, Doran and Company, Inc., 1940), p. 158.

Sistonwan, and Ihanktonwan divisions comprised the easternmost part of the tribe, the Santees. The Ihanktonwanna dwelt further to the west, and became known as the Yankton Sioux, while the westernmost division, the Titowan, entered white history as the Tetons.[4] The Siouan language was common to all these people. Over the years, however, dialectical differences arose between the divisions; the Santees became marked as the Dakotas; the Yanktonai joined with the Yanktons to form the Nakotas; and the Tetons became the Lakotas.[5]

The westernmost division, the Tetons, were the last to meet the white man and the last to be subjugated. Seven subtribes comprised this powerful division of plains nomads. The Oglalas, meaning "To scatter one's own," were the strongest in numbers and the most powerful. Next in size were the Sichangu, whom the French called "Brules" or "Burnt Thighs," from their habit of riding horseback bare-legged. The Miniconjou name meant "Those who plant by the stream;" while the Hunkpapa translated as "Those who camp at the entrance." The Sihaspa became known as the Blackfeet Sioux, the Itazipichas, meaning "Without bows," the French naturally called Sans Arcs; and the Oohenonpa, whose name meant "Two boilings," suffered the change to Two Kettle Sioux.[6]

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[4] Mekeel, pp. 141-142.

[5] Royal B. Hassrick, The Sioux: Life and Customs of a Warrior Society (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1964), pp. 3-6. See pp. 3-31 for a thorough discussion of the cultural divisions of the Sioux.

[6] *Ibid.*, p. 3.

As an example of the Teton social behavior, the Oglala society was simple and functional. The Indians were almost democratic in the way they chose their leaders - only men of proven ability were allowed top positions in the tribe. The influence of an obviously incapable man who had gained his office through heredity or false representation was small and of short duration. There is reason to believe that the office of chief is a modern innovation and that previously the original tribal government of the Oglala was invested in the Wakicun, which consisted of four men of the tribe elected by the other leaders for the purpose of organizing and controlling the camp.[7] Only men were eligible to hold the reins of power; the women were charged with the mission of maintaining the home and serving the providers.

The Tetons enjoyed two great pleasures: hunting and war. In fact, "...there were so many seemingly obvious values for war," in the words of one authority, "that the idea of peace was confined to that of mere truce."[8] Nomads that they were, the Sioux eventually found the horse indispensable; the hardy plains pony was utilized by them as early as 1800, and soon became a new reason for war. Raiding parties formed one leg on which the tribal economy stood, dealing as they did with the predatory capturing of enemy property, particularly the horse.[9]

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[7] Clark Wissler, Societies and Ceremonial Organizations in the Oglala Division of the Teton-Dakota ("Anthropological Papers in the American Museum of Natural History," Vol. XI, Pt. 1, 1916), p. 11; Wissler, North American Indians of the Plains (New York: American Museum of Natural History, 1934), p. 97.

[8] Hassrick, p. 74.

The other leg was provided by the buffalo. The great, shaggy beasts provided food, clothing, and shelter; the Indians planned their migrations to coincide with the wanderings of the giant buffalo herds. Life was simple, and values were well-defined by custom and experience. Hunting and war gave the Sioux an inordinate pride in themselves and their way of life; it was natural for them to consider the whites they met as their inferiors in every way.[10]

Tribal societies were the basis for almost all tribal activity. Individual leadership in these societies was rare, just as it was in the tribe itself; instead, two or four leaders of equal rank were supported by a definite number of officers or councilors.[11] About the only time individual effort was emphasized or applauded was when a member went to war. The purpose of the warrior was to gain honor, capture horses, and win the commendation of his tribe and society. Honor could come to him either from loyalty to his comrades or from overcoming the enemy.[12] Only a successful performance could engender acclaim; no demonstrations were made when a war party left home, all accolades being reserved for a triumphant return.[13] Although the men's societies were paramount, the women had theirs also; however, most of both types passed out of existence during the first few years of reservation life.[14]

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[9] Ibid., p. 72.

[10] Stanley Vestal, Warpath and Council Fire (New York: Random House, 1948), p. 291.

[11] Wissler, Societies and Ceremonial Organizations..., p. 62.

[12] Frances Densmore, Teton Sioux Music ("Smithsonian Institution, Bureau of American Ethnology," Bulletin 61; Washington: Government Printing Office, 1916), p. 359.

All the male societies are assumed to have originated in the mystic experiences of shamans, by virtue of which certain individual attributes were associated with the various rituals. Mysticism thus mingled in the Sioux social structure to form the backbone of tribal religion. Like other peoples, the Tetons tended to worship that which they could not comprehend. If they had one omnipotent God, it was Nature in all its myriad forms. It is doubtful if the tribe, before the coming of the white man, believed in one great spirit.[15] The term Taku Wakan is a general one, meaning all that is wonderful, incomprehensible, and supernatural, and was usually used to describe objects of worship. Before the advent of Christianity, the phrase was probably not applied to any individual object of worship, but was equivalent to "the gods." It could not have conveyed to the Dakota mind the idea of a personal God, using the term person as the white civilization employs it.[16]

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[13] Ibid., p. 333.

[14] Wissler, Societies and Ceremonial Organizations..., p. 62.

[15] James O. Dorsey, A Study of Siouan Cults ("Eleventh Annual Report of the Bureau of Ethnology;" Washington: Government Printing Office, 1894), p. 431.

The religious schema of the Sioux has been called a "New World Pythagoreanism in formation."[17] Certainly the tribe stressed virtue gained by faithful religious practice. The men were honored for the possession of four cardinal virtues: courage, fortitude, generosity, and fidelity. The women also had four: industry, hospitality, faithfulness, and fruitfulness.[18] Religion smoothed the way for buffalo hunts, ceremonial dances, and war. A typical war song illustrates the close link between religion, nature, and battle in the Dakota mind:

> Clear the way!
> In a sacred manner I come!
> The Earth is mine!
> I come![19]

Supernaturalism thus affected the Dakotas long before the Messiah craze made headlines throughout the country. Living as they did in the very arms of Nature, wholly dependent on her whims, it was natural for the Indians to worship that which so obviously dictated their very existence. The intensity of faith, more often provoked than alleviated by conscientious medicine men, often produced visions which were passed on to the rest of the tribe in the form of miracles.[20] These visions were usually produced at periodic religious festivals, the most conspicuous being the Sun Dance.[21] Sun worship was fundamental to the Sioux; inasmuch as many elements of the dance later filtered into the Ghost Dance ritual, a closer look at the phenomenon is mandatory.

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[16] *Ibid.*, p. 433. This term is also known as *Wakan Tanka*-literally the "Sacred Ones." Wissler, *North American Indians*..., p. 110.

[17] Hartley B. Alexander, *The World's Rim* (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1953), p. 168. For a lucid explanation of the Dakota pantheon of gods, see pp. 166-168.

[18] *Ibid.*, p. 165.

[19] *Ibid.*, p. 190.

The dance was usually attended by great numbers of people from every branch of the tribe.[22] The ritual began with the selection of a tall tree, generally by the oldest woman in camp, as the "sun-pole." The tree was then stripped by young maidens, and the brush cleared from around it. The able warriors gathered about five hundred yards from the pole on horseback; when the first sunlight was announced by the medicine man, they all charged toward the pole, throwing lances and shooting arrows and bullets into it. When they reached the pole, they drew up shouting.

The Indians then drove stakes circularly around the pole, attached lines, and covered the pole with elk skins and buffalo robes, canvas, blankets, and a wattling of willows and brush. The assemblage then rested for two or three days. Early on the morning of the third or fourth day, the sun worship began. Sometimes as many as fifty warriors, aged 20-25, took part, usually after a rigorous preparation that included fasting. Each of the men presented himself to a medicine man, who took between his thumb and forefinger a fold of the loose skin of the breast, about half way between the nipple and the collarbone, lifted it as high as possible, and then ran a very narrow-bladed but sharp knife through the skin underneath the hand. In the aperture thus formed, and before the knife was withdrawn, a strong skewer of bone, about the size of a carpenter's pencil, was inserted. Then the knife blade was taken out, and over the projections of this skewer, backwards and forwards, alternately right and left, was thrown a figure-of-eight noose with a strong thong of dressed skin. This was tied to a long skin rope fastened, at its other extremity, to the top of the sun-pole in the center of the arena. Both breasts were similarly punctured, the thongs from each converging and joining the rope which hung from the pole.

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[20] Robert H. Lowie, Indians of the Plains (New York: McGraw-Hill Book Company, Inc., 1954), pp. 154-161.

[21] *Ibid.*, p. 178.

[22] Frederick Schwatka, "The Sun-Dance of the Sioux," Century Magazine, XXXIX, No. 5 (March, 1890), p. 754. Schwatka estimated 15,000 people present at a dance he witnessed in 1875; half-breeds and squaw men estimated at least 20,000 at the same dance. The above account is taken from Schwatka and Densmore, pp. 98-151.

The goal of the devotee was to break loose from his cruel bonds. Some dancers went for hours before mustering the courage to tear loose from the painful thongs. The Sun Dance experience was treasured by onlookers as well as participants; many watchers would experience visions as the dancers struggled. To complete the Sun Dance successfully was a signal honor; to the end of his days the brave who succeeded in the dance wore the twin scars upon his breast with pride and distinction.

The Plains tribes were among the last of the American

Indians to feel the relentless pressure of the white man. Space is lacking to detail fully the conflict between the Tetons and the whites, yet two important pre-reservation treaties must be mentioned.

The first, in 1851, marked an important concession on the part of the Sioux. Along with the Assiniboines, Arikaras, Gros Ventres, Crows, Cheyennes, and Arapahoes, they met with Federal representatives at Fort Laramie. After much cajolery, the Indians agreed to let the government establish roads and military posts throughout their lands.[23] The United States needed this protection for the Oregon emigres, and acted in good faith. But the protection of the military invited unwanted elements onto the Dakota lands; the tribe grew so restless that the United States Army was forced to campaign sporadically for thirteen years before securing another treaty on April 29, 1868. This second treaty, which was not ratified by Congress until February 16, 1869, outlined the limits of a Great Sioux Reservation. Hidden way down in the document, within the Twelfth Article, was a section which was to prove troublesome in the years ahead:

> No treaty for the cession of any portion or part of the reservation herein described which may be held in common shall be of any validity or force against the said Indians, unless executed and signed by at least three-fourths of all the adult male Indians, occupying or interested in the same; and no cession by the tribe shall be understood or construed in such a manner as to deprive, without his consent,

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[23] Esther S. Goldfrank, "Historic Change and Social Character: A Study of the Teton Dakota," American Anthropologist, XLV, No. 1 (January-March, 1943), p. 74.

> any individual member of the tribe of his rights to any tract of land selected by him, as provided in Article 6 of this treaty.[24]

In return, the government agreed to keep all whites from hunting or settling within the reservation, which included all of the present state of South Dakota west of the Missouri River, plus a small finger of land on the eastern bank. In addition, the whites agreed to abandon the proposed trail from Fort Laramie to Bozeman, Montana, and the military posts along it, the trail having been the main cause of the short but bitter Red Cloud War which had produced the treaty council. As soon as the Indians settled on their reservation land, the government promised to provide annuities for the tribe's more western lands, which had been appropriated under the terms of the treaty.[25]

The change from a nomadic to a sedentary existence was probably inevitable, but the Sioux were hastened into confinement by economic hardship as much as the threat of military defeat.[26] The buffalo herds, even in the late sixties, were beginning to thin out. In addition, the tribe was now bound by a treaty which they little understood and whose geographic points of reference had no meaning to them whatsoever. The concept of a border consisting of an imaginary line which they must not cross had no relevance; Sioux hunting parties continued to follow the game and prowl the prairie. Yet life was not the same. White pressure intensified, and the tribe became more closely knit under the anvil. Political necessity overcame petty inter-tribal squabbles as the Tetons prepared for the last, long struggle to decide the supremacy of the Upper Plains.

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[24] Charles J. Kappler (Comp. and ed.), Indian Affairs, Laws, and Treaties (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1903), p. 774.

[25] Gordon MacGregor, Warriors Without Weapons: A Study of the Society and Personality Development of the Pine Ridge Sioux (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1946), p. 31.

[26] Herbert S. Schell, History of South Dakota (Lincoln: University of Nebraska, 1961), pp. 315-316.

It took less than a quarter of a century following the Treaty of 1868 for the Tetons to lose their social cohesiveness and dissolve into fragmented groups. The chief reason for this was the firm establishment of the reservation system and all its attendant institutions.

Five years before the 1868 agreement, Crow Creek Agency had been established on the east bank of the Upper Missouri; it became the small finger of land included in the Great Sioux Reservation. The ink on the treaty was scarcely dry before two Cheyenne River Agencies, numbers one and two, were established, in 1868. With these agencies as a nucleus, the government sought to contain the wandering Tetons.

During the period between the 1868 treaty and the wars of the mid-seventies, the Blackfeet, Sans Arc, and Two Kettle tribes faded in power and became partially absorbed in the other four groups. The Blackfeet and Sans Arcs, in particular, followed the Hunkpapa branch. This combined group was settled on the Standing Rock Reservation, founded in 1873, which straddled the future North Dakota - South Dakota border just west of the Missouri River.

Significantly, only among the Plains Sioux did the government encounter open resistance to its program.[27] It is doubtful if most of the Teton leaders realized the geographic strait jacket into which they had fitted themselves by signing the 1868 treaty; at any rate, these warriors were soon allied with tribes in similar circumstances, namely the Northern Cheyennes and the Northern Arapahoes. The gulf between Teton and white man widened as historic enemies of the Dakotas, such as the Crows, Shoshones, and Rees, took the field as scouts in the service of the government.[28]

The ostensible reason for governmental intervention on the reservation was to quell the marauding bands of hunters who continually strayed outside its borders.[29] The bands were a nuisance to white settlement, to be sure, but there was another factor involved: the discovery of gold in the Black Hills. Governmental policy concerning the Black Hills gold seems to have reversed itself in November, 1875, at a White House conference called by President Grant and attended by Generals Sherman, Sheridan, and Crook. Article Twelve of the 1868 treaty, the provision providing for the signature of three-quarters of the adult male Tetons on any agreement affecting the reservation, was thrown aside in order to secure the legal right for prospectors to be in the Black Hills.[30] White men immediately swarmed into the area, joining those who were already there illegally. Discontent among the Indians grew as the whites continued to violate land they considered sacred; they fled the reservation into Montana Territory, where Custer found them and their allies in the greatest single concentration of warriors in the history of Indian warfare.

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[27] Ray H. Mattison, "The Indian Reservation System on the Upper Missouri, 1865-1890," Nebraska History, XXXVI, No. 3 (September, 1955), p. 171.

[28] Philip F. Wells, "Ninety-Six Years Among the Indians of the Northwest," North Dakota History, XV, No. 3 (July, 1948), p. 211.

[29] This thesis is advanced by Mark H. Brown, "A New Focus on the Sioux War," Montana: The Magazine of Western History, XI, No. 4 (Autumn, 1961), pp. 76-85.

The Custer victory, looked upon by many historians as the apogee of the Teton fortunes, was actually the candle flaring brightest before the darkness. Within a year after the Custer fight, June 25, 1876, the Sioux had suffered a disastrous loss at Slim Buttes, in present day northwestern South Dakota; Sitting Bull, the famous Hunkpapa medicine man, had fled with a considerable band of followers across the border into Canada; and Crazy Horse, probably the greatest war chief the Oglala Dakota ever produced, had been slain at Fort Robinson, Nebraska. The winter of 1876-77 drove most of the remaining Tetons back onto their reservation, where various representatives of white society stood ready to civilize them. As a final blow, a portion of the Agreement of 1876, which closed the hostilities, required the Indians to cede their beloved Black Hills to the United States, in return for which they received a small sliver of land to the north of the reservation.

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[30] Harry H. Anderson, "A Challenge to Brown's Sioux Indian Wars Thesis," Montana: The Magazine of Western History, XII, No. 1 (Winter, 1962), pp. 45-47.

In 1878, the wanderings of the Brules and Oglalas ended. The Upper Brules, under their great chief Spotted Tail, settled at Rosebud Agency in southern Dakota, just west of the Missouri, following much tedious bargaining. Some of the Brule tribe gravitated to Crow Creek Agency. Red Cloud's Oglalas had selected the spot for their agency themselves - they took the land to the west of Rosebud, which they called Wazi Ahanhan, or Pine Ridge.[31] In 1879, the Pine Ridge Agency was established on White Clay Creek, and a civilian agency appointed, without church sponsorship.[32]

By 1880, then, the four major divisions of the Teton Dakota were established at agencies within the Great Sioux Reservation. The Hunkpapas, minus the Sitting Bull band, which was still in Canada, were at Standing Rock. Cheyenne River, to the south, was comprised mostly of Miniconjous, with a sprinkling of Blackfeet Sioux, Sans Arcs, and Two Kettles; Crow Creek held mostly Lower Brules; while Rosebud was the home of the remaining Brules and Pine Ridge that of the Oglalas. At this time, the number of Indians on the reservation totalled about 16,000.[33]

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[31] George E. Hyde, Spotted Tail's Folk: A History of the Brule Sioux (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1961), p. 261.

[32] MacGregor, p. 32, n. 11.

[33] Robert M. Utley, The Last Days of the Sioux Nation (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1963), p. 20. It must be remembered that a considerable portion of the Sioux Nation, namely the Santee and Yankton divisions, were residing outside the Great Sioux Reservation in eastern Dakota and Nebraska, and had already, in 1880, made great strides toward civilization, as measured by the yardstick of the white man.

Such a large heathen population afforded a prime target for the missionary impulse of the East. From the beginning of the reservation, Christian influence made itself felt in the Dakota lodges. The first civilian agents to the Sioux were selected by the Episcopal Church; they served from 1870 until 1876, when the Army took over the reservation in the aftermath of the Custer War. The Episcopalians established their first school in 1871 at the old Whetstone Agency, a forerunner of Pine Ridge; the following year they moved into the Crow Creek and Cheyenne agencies. The Congregational Church established itself at Cheyenne River in 1871; both Congregationalists and Episcopalians waited until 1885 to enter Standing Rock.[34] The Roman Catholic Church, of course, was a veteran when it came to Christianizing the Indian. Led by the redoubtable Bishop Marty, head of the Dakota Diocese, the Catholics soon became well-entrenched at the various agencies.

The Catholic Church entered Standing Rock in 1883, predating the Congregationalists and the Episcopalians by two years, but it was at Pine Ridge that Catholic and Protestant most openly vied for the honor of converting the most Sioux. The Episcopalians arrived in 1884, followed by the Presbyterians and the Catholics two years later.[35] These reformers wielded a two-edged sword: religion and education. Religious teaching predictably followed sectarian inclinations; most of the difficulty between Indian and white was engendered by secular educational methods. Government-backed education had been available at Pine Ridge since 1881, when a boarding school staffed by a hardy little band of volunteer Protestants had been opened.[36] On September 7, 1886, a Catholic Training School was established on Wounded Knee Creek, about twelve miles north of the agency. The mission was called Holy Rosary, and was placed under the Jesuit Fathers of the German Province, with Father John Jutz, S. J., in charge.[37] Holy Rosary School, at Pine Ridge proper, opened in September, 1888, staffed by Franciscan sisters from Buffalo, New York.[38]

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[34] G. E. E. Lindquist, The Red Man in the United States (New York: George H. Doran Company, 1923), pp. 240-242.

[35] Ibid., p. 234.

In earlier years, missions had had little or no success with the Tetons. As late as 1858, Dakotas attending the religious meetings of missionaries were warned that they would be stripped, whipped, and have their name struck from the tribal lists. Soon, however, even the sons of chiefs entered the ministry.[39] In fact, Christianity made its greatest inroads in cases where the preacher was a native Sioux. The Roman Catholics were the leaders in this type of conversion, but the Episcopalians were not far behind.[40] All Sioux who took to the white teachings, both religious and secular, formed the Progressive branch of the tribe.

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[36] _Ibid._; MacGregor, p. 35.

[37] Sister Mary Antonio Fitzgerald, "Bishop Marty and His Sioux Missions, 1876-1896," _South Dakota Historical Collections_, XX (1940), p. 541.

[38] _Ibid._, p. 542; MacGregor, p. 35.

[39] Goldfrank, p. 82.

[40] William T. Hagan, _American Indians_ (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1961), pp. 128-129.

Some of the Dakota were won to the white man's ways with misgivings. One idea that gained ascendancy among the reformers was the plan of splitting up Indian families and sending the children east to school. In this way these self-styled "Friends of the Indian" hoped to inculcate the civilized practices of the white man into the younger generation of the tribe while weakening the family ties which lay at the roots of Sioux power. To educate the young Indian, the famous Carlisle Institute, in Pennsylvania, was established, and it was there, in 1879, that the first group of eighty Dakota boys and girls, culled from the various agencies, were sent to learn the white man's ways. Carlisle was the brainchild and the fief of the ramrod stiff Captain Richard H. Pratt; one critic has described him as "a domineering man who knew only one method for dealing with anyone who opposed his will. He bullied them into submission."[41]

The Dakotas had already been horrified when the schoolteachers at the government school at Pine Ridge had attempted to cut the long hair of the Oglala boys; long hair was the mark of Sioux manhood. Only suspicion and distrust marked the enforced emigration of the young Sioux to Carlisle, and shortly after the abortive barbering attempt, in 1881, Spotted Tail journeyed east to see the school for himself. He saw a strict regimen and discipline that were deliberately calculated to strip the Sioux of their past and usher them into the white world. Naturally enough, Spotted Tail and

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[41] Hyde, p. 289.

Captain Pratt held polar views on how the young Tetons should be educated; in a head to head confrontation with Pratt, the Brule chief took his four sons, a grandson, a granddaughter, and another small boy he claimed as a close relative from Carlisle by force.[42] Pratt later claimed that the youngsters would never have left the school under their own free will,[43] but one doubts whether they were truly happy in their strange new environment.

Despite such setbacks, the missionary work continued, and with such success that a visitor to Pine Ridge in 1883 remarked:

> The most perfect order, as I had frequent opportunity to observe, existed everywhere, and the agency itself, as seen from the burying ground which crowns the summit of a neighboring hill, looked more like a peaceful white village than a camp of wild Indians, who but a few months ago were supposed to be upon the eve of a serious revolt.[44]

In overall charge of the various agencies was a government agent, appointed (in the 1880s) for four year terms at an annual salary of roughly $1,500.[45] Until 1849, the Indian Bureau had been part of the War Department, but the agents and the Commissioner of Indian Affairs had not been appointed by the Secretary of War; the agency appointments were staples in the infamous Spoils System.[46] Although the Interior Department now had charge of Indian affairs, the system was still very much in evidence. Considering the fact that relatively little thought was given to the professional capability of a prospective agent, one almost wonders if the government was consciously attempting to foment rebellion on the Sioux reservation.

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[42] This epic encounter was one of the last victories for Spotted Tail. He was murdered by a fellow Brule, Crow Dog, in August, 1881. ibid., pp. 290-293.

[43] Richard Henry Pratt, Battlefield and Classroom: Four Decades with the American Indian, ed. Robert M. Utley (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1964), p. 239.

[44] Herbert Welsh, Report of a Visit to the Great Sioux Reserve (Philadelphia: Indian Rights Association, 1883), p. 32. Welsh was the Secretary and one of the founders of the Association, and an ardent reformer.

[45] Hagan, p. 125.

At Standing Rock, Agent James McLaughlin was firmly in the saddle and, until Sitting Bull arrived in 1883 from his imprisonment at Fort Buford, Montana, where he had given himself up upon returning from Canada two years before, this rugged little Scot was the sole voice of authority at the agency. Cheyenne River, Crow Creek, and Rosebud suffered with lesser men throughout the decade of the eighties. At Pine Ridge, during the tenure of Dr. V. T. McGillycuddy, the conflict between the two civilizations, white and red, was most effectively dramatized.

McGillycuddy came to Pine Ridge in 1879, when all was new; immediately he was confronted with the formidable opposition of Red Cloud and his Oglalas, only three years distant from the Little Big Horn. "I am Red Cloud, the great war chief of the Oglalas," was the greeting the new agent received. "When Red Cloud speaks, everybody listens. I have not asked you white men to come here."[47]

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[46] General John Gibbon, "The Transfer of the Indian Bureau to the War Department," American Catholic Quarterly Review, XIX, No. 74 (April, 1894), p. 248.

While faced with such intransigent opposition, McGillycuddy had to provide law and order at the agency; the odds were good that Red Cloud, left to himself, would wander off the reservation and take his considerable following with him. Thus the agent chose as his main weapon Indian police, which had been authorized by Congress in 1878. These police were picked from the Progressives, and were accepted in good faith by that group,[48] while dedicated reformers like Herbert Welsh found them to be trustworthy;[49] but with Red Cloud's band it was a different story. The Oglala chief became sullen and resentful when McGillycuddy chose George Sword, an able and intelligent Indian, to head up a force of fifty Indian police. Red Cloud regarded this as a deliberate insult, and in July, 1881, he addressed himself to President Garfield: "If my Great Father does not remove my Agent McGillycuddy, I, Red Cloud, will myself remove him."[50]

To effect this removal, Red Cloud gathered about two hundred young braves and plotted to take over Pine Ridge. He set up a camp over a hill behind the agency and organized a "soldier's lodge," in which Sioux warriors received instructions and prepared themselves for battle. McGillycuddy soon found out the chief's plans; in a dramatic confrontation he broke Red Cloud of his chieftainship and divided the Oglala leadership. Young-Man-Afraid-of-His-Horses became chief of the Smoke Band and American Horse chief of the Bear Band. McGillycuddy continued to control Red Cloud and other Sioux conservatives throughout the early eighties without once being forced to call for troops. He achieved this by constantly backing the Progressive Sioux in the settlement of intertribal questions and by seeking to divide the strength of the Conservatives.[51]

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[47] Quoted in Doane Robinson, "The Education of Red Cloud," South Dakota Historical Collections, XII (1924), p. 176. The seven years of conflict between the Oglala chief and Dr. McGillycuddy is more fully detailed in George E. Hyde, A Sioux Chronicle (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1956), pp. 67-106. See also Welsh, pp. 35-37.

[48] Mattison, p. 161.

[49] Welsh, p. 23.

[50] Quoted in Robinson, p. 176.

Over at Rosebud, Spotted Tail had tried to get control over the native police before his death, but he, too, had failed. The police were also established at Cheyenne Agency, and at Standing Rock they were Agent McLaughlin's right arm.

As the old chiefs died, the chieftaincy began to lose its power. The office of chief became appointive, and the appointment power lay with the agent. White encroachment on reservation life took place in other ways as well. In 1885, courts of Indian offenses were instituted on various reservations, presided over by three judges selected by the tribe to which they belonged. These judges were subject to approval by the agents, as were their verdicts.[52] In the same year, after prolonged litigation in the murder of Spotted Tail by Crow Dog (Crow Dog had been tried and acquitted), Congress extended the jurisdiction of United States Courts to cover major crimes committed on the reservation.[53] The government thus assumed certain legal rights over the Sioux without any specific guarantee that the Indian, who was not a citizen, would have any legal rights of his own not implied by his condition of wardship.

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[51] Vestal, p. 297.

[52] Mekeel, p. 191. At least one agent, Hugh D. Gallagher, who served at Pine Ridge in the late eighties, dispensed with the Indian judges entirely, preferring to settle disputes within the tribe himself. Commissioner of Indian Affairs, Fifty-Ninth Annual Report, 1890 (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1890), p. 52. Hereafter cited as CIA, with date.

The agent was also in charge of rationing. McGillycuddy later complained that when he first took charge at Pine Ridge the entire idea of the agent was to act as a "national poor-master dealing out rations."[54] In fact, however, control of the ration supply gave the agent inordinate power. The Tetons were confined as they had never been confined before; the slaughter of the two great buffalo herds, northern and southern, which had begun with the building of the Union Pacific Railroad in 1867, was virtually complete by 1883, and the tribe literally had nowhere else to go for food but to the federal government.[55] At Standing Rock and Cheyenne River agencies in 1882, agents McLaughlin and Leonard Love permitted their charges to organize a buffalo hunt, the last great Indian hunt on the Great Plains. The Dakotas enjoyed their outing to the fullest,[56] but by the mid-eighties the buffalo were almost all gone and the Indians were dependent on government support.

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[53] Schell, p. 319.

[54] Quoted in Flora W. Seymour, Indian Agents of the Old Frontier (New York: D. Appleton-Century Company, Inc., 1941), p. 318.

[55] Ray Allen Billington, Westward Expansion: A History of the American Frontier (New York: The MacMillan Company, 1949), p. 667.

Some of the Sioux frankly enjoyed loafing around their lodges until ration day, and then merely travel to the agency to collect their stipend. To counteract this tendency to sponge off federal funds, the reform groups clamored for further action: each homeowner was to be provided with livestock and farm tools with which to make a living. In the 1870s, the military had begun to provide the Indians with cattle. Beginning in 1871, one animal on the hoof was included in each man's monthly ration.[57] However, animal husbandry was not a Sioux strongpoint; they ran the meat off their herds and were wont to butcher their beef cattle after riding them down with bow and arrow rather than dispatching them in the conventional manner. Nevertheless, the idea persisted that the Sioux could be made to farm, with profit, on the prairies of western Dakota. The following extract from the Annual Message of Dakota Territorial Governor N. G. Ordway, on November 8, 1880, is indicative of this line of thought:

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[56] Utley, p. 22. The Sitting Bull Band from Standing Rock found about 1,000 buffalo midway between Bismarck and the Black Hills, and in two days killed them all. Ralph K. Andrist, The Long Death: The Last Days of the Plains Indian (New York: The MacMillan Company, 1964), p. 334.

[57] MacGregor, p. 38.

> I see no reason why a large proportion of the whole Sioux Reservation could not be utilized for stock raising and agricultural purposes, at least to a sufficient extent to feed the Indians now there. If a change in the policy now pursued by the government could justly be made, so that the Indians could be employed by the Indian agents at a moderate price per week, and thus utilize their labor to raise the stock and agricultural products now purchased and conveyed to them at great expense, it seems to me that this plan would greatly benefit the Indians and prepare them for independent action, and at the same time save large sums which the government could hold in reserve for those unfit to be made self-supporting...
>
> ...There are about 50,000 square miles of Indian reservation in Dakota. Would not that land support an average of an Indian to the square mile under the agricultural system I have indicated, at less than one quarter of the present cost to the government, and leave every Indian in ten years with his land in severalty and ready to become self-supporting?...[58]

Some of the Progressives tried. They began to work for wages, both around the agencies and, in the case of the Pine Ridge and Rosebud Sioux, in hauling freight from the nearest steamboat landing on the Missouri. Around 1885 these Sioux began to break up their old-fashioned village life and separate into family camps, just like the white man. The majority began to wear white man's dress; they had their hair cut.

All this had little effect on the Conservatives; a leading dissenter was Chief Hump, the leader of a band of Minneconjous on Cherry Creek, a tributary of the Cheyenne River. Hump's group, numbering about 550, had been among the most hostile of the Sioux in the Red Cloud and Custer wars, had accompanied Sitting Bull on his flight into

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[58] U. S., National Archives, Record Group 48: Records of the Office of the Secretary of the Interior. Hereafter cited as NA, RG 48.

Canada, and had been among the last to surrender to authorities.[59] Sitting Bull and Red Cloud also remained centers of dissatisfaction at their respective agencies.

The Conservatives aside, the transplanting of white culture onto that of the Dakotas was evidently making giant strides; an anonymous agent in 1886 waxed absolutely lyrical over the Elysium that awaited all those who chose the white man's path:

We'll have a little farm,
A horse, a pig, and cow,
And she will mind the dairy
And I will guide the plow.[60]

The verdict was not yet in on the degree of success the reservation system had achieved as the eighties drew to a close. Some of the agencies on the Great Sioux Reservation such as Cheyenne River and Crow Creek, were buffeted by the switch to the Democrats under Cleveland and then back again to the Republicans under Harrison, yet passed through a succession of agents without adverse effect. At Standing Rock, James McLaughlin was proving to be a fixture; he continued to nurture his Progressives and constantly opposed Sitting Bull and his renegade band of Hunkpapas. Admittedly, McLaughlin's way was smoothed slightly by his Indian wife. At Pine Ridge, McGillycuddy was gone; he had resigned a step ahead of political removal in 1886, tired of the "buncombe and red tape" of government,[61] and had been replaced by an interim appointee, a Captain Bell. Bell soon gave way to a

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[59] Mekeel, pp. 192-193.

[60] Quoted in Hagan, p. 140.

[61] Quoted in Seymour, p. 322.

Cleveland appointee, Hugh Gallagher.

Although the agent's tenure could be, and often was, short-lived due to the vagaries of politics, while in office he was expected to be omnem potens at his agency. He had to be; there were strong Indian leaders at all the agencies, men like Red Cloud at Pine Ridge, Hump at Cheyenne River, and Sitting Bull at Standing Rock, who were eager to assume their old roles of leadership. Even weak agents, though, could keep some semblance of order by either resorting to the Army and the Indian police or controlling the rationing.

Army posts speckled the western Dakotas in the eighties. Of particular importance were Ft. Yates, just north of the center of the present North Dakota - South Dakota border; Ft. Bennett, about ten miles south of the juncture between the Cheyenne and the Missouri rivers; and Ft. Robinson, on the White River in Nebraska, nearly fifty miles southeast of Pine Ridge. The troops on these posts, in some places only a token force, were responsible for prohibiting further violence on the frontier.

McGillycuddy at Pine Ridge had made Sword as chief of the Indian police directly responsible to him; such a direct chain of authority also existed under McLaughlin at Standing Rock, but the other agencies did not have a comparable relationship between their lawgiver and their enforcers. This was due either to the weakness of the police or the lack of a strong agent; wherever the agent kept firm control over his affairs, the Indian police were inevitably the implementing agency of his power.

The less drastic source of the agent's power, control of the ration system, afforded the biggest single excuse for profiteering in the Bureau of Indian Affairs; the iniquities of the system will be discussed in a later chapter. The agent, as "Father" to the Indians in his care, was open at once to bribery from profiteers and charges from reform groups that he was short-changing the Indians on issue day. Agent McGillycuddy ran counter to both groups; he found that rations at Pine Ridge were being over-issued and reduced them accordingly - the act was a contributing factor in his departure from office.[62] A reduction in rations, as well as the usage of Indian police as a private army, grated on the delicate nerves of the eastern reformers. They favored a program of distributing power on the reservation more equally, so that the Dakota could more effectively rule themselves, guided, of course, by the benevolent white hand. Herbert Welsh noted in 1883 that

> The power of the agent is at present too great and should be limited by the introduction of law upon reservations. The Indian is at present almost completely at the mercy of his caprice or tyranny should he be an unjust or hot-tempered man.[63]

The problem of Indian education remained unsolved. Captain Pratt still fought, with some success, for his Carlisle School, but other reformers like Welsh favored educating the majority of Indian children on or near the reservation.[64] Only the Progressives took part in the program; the Conservative Dakotas continued in the old pattern, camping as far from the agency as they could, coming in only on issue day. They continued to dress as before, wore their hair long, and would have nothing to do with the schools which were beginning to dot their lands.

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[62] Welsh, p. 33.

[63] Ibid., p. 42.

[64] Ibid., p. 4.

Among the Progressives, Christianity continued its progress. The churches had followed the Dakota onto the Plains; they had been with them when the land was fenced and the buffalo gone; now they offered comfort and the promise of a Higher Judgement in the afterlife. The Dakotas had to pay the price of renunciation of their old gods; the Sioux Christian leaders saw no values in the old ceremonies. The social ceremonies were retained in the dancing,but the early Dakota Christians - by which is meant the Progressive wing only, and even then only a portion - not because of the discipline of the churches but by their own reasoning, rejected the old ways and adopted the new with all the zeal of the newly converted.[65]

The impact of the whites was also felt among the Conservatives, try as they might to avoid the blandishments of an alien civilization. The Dakota no longer had what they cherished most: freedom of movement. They were bound within the reservation, henceforth to have their future decided for them by representatives of another culture, another way of life. Even as early as 1878, when the Oglalas and the Brules had stubbornly insisted on selecting the locations of their agencies themselves, the old tribal bonds were loosening, the power of the chiefs had been undermined, and the family unit was being subjected to unprecedented stresses.

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[65] Oliver La Farge (ed.), The Changing Indian (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1942), p. 163.

On the one hand, the reservation system was a remarkable success, considering the goals to which it had been dedicated by its white founders. A leading student of the system has concluded:

> The injustices to which the Indians were subjected tend to be relegated to the background. /The reservation system's_7 efficacy may be measured by the fact that in the short period of thirty-eight years from 1851 to 1889, a large number of the Indians had achieved citizenship, were economically independent, and were well fitted to take their place in the path of progress set for them by the government.[66]

The wardship of the government, from this viewpoint, had protected the Indian from potentially harmful outside influences. Mr. Justice Miller of the United States Supreme Court had noted this in his decision in U.S. vs. Kagama, when he wrote:

> ...Because of the local ill feeling, the people of the States where they /the Indians_7 are found are often their deadliest enemies. From their weakness and helplessness, so largely due to the course of dealing of the Federal Government with them and the treaties in which it has been promised, there arises the duty of protection, and with it the power...[67]

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[66] Charles L. Green, "The Indian Reservation System of the Dakotas," South Dakota Historical Collections, XIV (1928), p. 411. It must be remembered that here Green is including, and in fact speaking mainly of, the more advanced Santee and Yankton Sioux, who were far ahead of the Tetons in rate of achievement of citizenship.

[67] United States vs. Kagama, 118 U. S. 384 (1886), quoted in Laurence F. Schmeckebier, the Office of Indian Affairs: Its History, Activities, and Organization (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins Press, 1927), p. 10.

The other side of the coin showed a different picture. Critics of the reservation system pointed out that although the goals to which it was dedicated were adequate, mismanagement of the system was doing the Sioux more harm than good. A young schoolteacher at Pine Ridge, Miss Elaine Goodale, wrote in 1885 that her students consisted of "confused, depressed and humiliated dark folk, clad in a bizarre mixture of coarse jeans, gay calico and shoddy blankets, subsisting literally from hand to mouth upon a monthly or fortnightly dole of beef, pork, flour, and coffee."[68]

Miss Goodale was a lady of iron will and peppery tongue; she condemned the Indian agent in general as a "despotic ruler" and an obstacle to progress; scored Captain Pratt's idea of separating Indian families semipermanently for purposes of education; and censured the system itself, noting that "...this race of involuntary prisoners and paupers has become as demoralized as we should expect from the conditions, and has lost to a great degree its pristine courage, patriotism, independence, and honor. This is the saddest result of the Reservation System."[69]

The people surrounding the reservation, the white settlers of Dakota, generally opposed constructive recommendations for the betterment of the Sioux. The Sioux culture produced only contempt among those who did not understand the Indians, while those whites who could remember battles gone by felt only hatred for the red race.[70] But tragically enough, the situation of the Dakotas was too little understood by those responsible for the implementation of all reservation development, namely the members of the United States Congress. The Indians constituted a drain on government funds, both in supplies and in the cost necessary to maintain the western army posts. Washington had methodically made the Indian a ward of the government; in doing so, the United States had obligated itself to the task of civilizing the Sioux, a task onerous to some, exasperating to others, and a waste of time to many.

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[68] Elaine Goodale Eastman, "The Ghost Dance War and Wounded Knee Massacre of 1890-91," Nebraska History, XXVI, No. 1 (January-March, 1945), p. 76.

[69] Elaine Goodale, "Plain Words on the Indian Question," New England Magazine, II, No. 2 (April, 1890), pp. 146-148.

By treaty, the only possession of value left the Dakotas was their land; now even this came into dispute. One author even concludes that

> An irresistable power of land greed, which had been at work during the seventies and eighties, had already destroyed the reservation system by 1887.[71]

Dakota land seemed prime for settlement; pressure from east of the Missouri River increased throughout the eighties.

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[70] Henry E. Fritz, The Movement for Indian Assimilation, 1860-1890 (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1963), p. 168.

[71] Sister Mary Antonio Johnston, Federal Relations with the Great Sioux Indians of South Dakota, 1887-1933, with Particular Reference to Land Policy Under the Dawes Act (Washington: Catholic University of America Press, 1948), p. 123. This judgement is too severe; the reservation system remained viable, although considerably strained by economic difficulties, until the cataclysm of the nineteen-thirties.

The Great Sioux Reservation comprised about 43,000 miles of prairie and Bad Lands, much of which many whites believed could be used for ranching or even crops. More important, the reservation stood athwart the most direct route to the Black Hills and their rich veins of gold. During the decade, the Sioux were obliged to cope at once with physical hardship and the persistent attempts of the government to hew away reservation land guaranteed to the tribe by the 1868 treaty.

REDUCTION OF THE GREAT SIOUX RESERVATION 1868 to 1890


STANDING ROCK AGENCY
CHEYENNE RIVER AGENCY
SPOTTED TAIL AGENCY
RED CLOUD AGENCY

TREATY OF 1868


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CHEYENNE RIVER AGENCY
PINE RIDGE AGENCY
ROSEBUD AGENCY

AGREEMENT OF 1876


STANDING ROCK AGENCY
CHEYENNE RIVER AGENCY
PINE RIDGE AGENCY
ROSEBUD AGENCY

ACT OF 1889

CHAPTER II

THE ROOTS OF DESPAIR

The first attempt to divide the Great Sioux Reservation occurred in 1882. Territorial Delegate Richard F. Pettigrew, an ardent champion of white interests in the West River country, sponsored a bill providing for a commission to go to Dakota and sound out the Sioux about the proposal that they should cede about half their land in return for clear title to five separate reservations, each to have its own agency. The bill passed Congress as a rider to the Civil Appropriations Bill of 1882.[1]

Newton Edmunds was named by Secretary of the Interior Henry M. Teller to head the commission. Edmunds was from Yankton and had served as a former governor of Dakota Territory; he had a good background in Indian negotiations, but was as fully convinced as Pettigrew that the western lands should be occupied by whites. The second member of the commission, Judge Peter C. Shannon, had served as chief justice of the Territorial Supreme Court until 1881. His chief claim to fame had been presiding at the trial of Jack McCall, the murderer of Wild Bill Hickok. The third member, James H. Teller of Ohio, was the brother of the Secretary of the Interior.[2]

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[1] Utley, p. 42.

To go with this trio, the Reverend Samuel D. Hinman was assigned as interpreter. Hinman had been a missionary among the Dakota from his youth; he spoke better Sioux than did most of his flock. However, he was not too popular among the members of the tribe. According to Dr. Charles Eastman, later agency physician at Pine Ridge, Hinman was a "bad man" and had several times been found in flagrante delicto with Sioux women.[3]

The Edmunds Commission proceeded to outdo themselves in their efforts to open western Dakota to settlement.[4] The commissioners went far beyond the intent of the original bill; as they made the circuit of the various agencies, they tried to secure the assent of the Indians to the land cession, rather than merely asking the tribe if they desired to cede. With the 1868 treaty in mind, the commission used all the traditional methods to secure the required number of signatures to the bill. They talked the Sioux dizzy. All the advantages of the partition were extolled; the fact that the Dakotas were being asked to part with nearly half their remaining lands was scarcely mentioned. Key men at each agency were continually pressured, while the nimble-tongued Hinman confused the Sioux rather than enlightened them on the various aspects of the cession. At each agency some signatures were obtained, but many remained suspicious and would have nothing to do with either the commission or the idea of a land cession.

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[2] Hyde, A Sioux Chronicle, pp. 110-111.

[3] Ibid., p. 111.

[4] The adventures of this little group are fully detailed in ibid., pp. 107-144.

Edmunds returned to Washington early in 1883 and triumphantly announced that the Sioux had accepted the agreement. Soon, however, rumors began to drift eastward to the effect that the tribe had been victimized. A quick check of the cession document showed only 384 signatures, far short of the required three-quarters of all adult Teton males. Armed with this evidence, the eastern Friends of the Indian immediately leaped into action.

The Women's National Indian Association, founded in 1880 in Philadelphia, was dominated, as its title indicates, by females sympathetic to the plight of the red man. The Association assumed its formidable title in 1883; by the following year eight Protestant denominations were represented on the board, and by 1886 eighty-three branches had been organized in twenty-eight states and territories.[5] Herbert Welsh, whose uncle William had also been a leading reformer, was the force behind the Indian Rights Association, which began in Philadelphia in 1882. Others active in Indian reform later initiated their own groups; chief among these was the National Indian Defense Association, established in 1885 by Alfred Meacham and Theodore A. Bland, and the Indian Citizenship Committee of Boston.[6]

These reformers wielded power proportionate to the weighty titles of their organizations. They had an active press and an influential lobby in Washington; thus, when the story of the Edmunds Commission was made public, the hue and cry raised by the Friends was sufficient to force Congress to send the agreement back to the reservation for the necessary signatures. By now the Sioux were completely alienated; only a trickle of names were forthcoming, and the land cession failed to gain Congressional approval.[7]

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[5] Fritz, p. 199.

[6] *Ibid.*, p. 200; Hagan, pp.123-124.

The Edmunds Commission had done grave damage to relations between the government and the Sioux, and pressure began to build in Congress for remedial legislation. The reformers banded together in an effort to make their appeals even more effective. They held their first meeting in 1883 at Lake Mohonk, New York. The affair was sparsely attended, but by 1885 the Lake Mohonk Conferences were an annual affair. These get-togethers gave the Friends a chance to form their platforms and publish their views in annual reports. The Lake Mohonk delegates were by no means agreed on the best course to follow in civilizing the Indian. Those who held, like Bland, that the Indians must be allowed to make up their own minds whether or not they wanted all the privileges and obligations which the Mohonk reformers meant to procure, received very little hearing.[8] The majority favored a break-up of the Great Sioux Reservation, hoping in that way to further isolate the Indian from his past and make himmore susceptible to white civilization. The reformers were concerned, however, that the Sioux should receive greater compensation for their land and adequate preparation for assimilation before the breakup should occur.[9]

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[7] The full text of this agreement is in Kappler, pp. 804-807.

[8] Fritz, p. 203; Hyde, A Sioux Chronicle, pp. 145-163.

The Lake Mohonk meetings received a powerful boost with the first appearance of Henry L. Dawes in 1885. Dawes was a Senator from Massachusetts, with a long record of interest in Indian affairs.

Senator Dawes was chairman of the Senate Indian Committee; through him, the viewpoint of the Lake Mohonk reformers passed directly into the United States Congress. Dawes was one of the prime movers behind President Cleveland's proclamation of April 17, 1885, which reemphasized the integrity of the Indian lands at the Crow Creek Agency, lands onto which white settlers had begun to encroach.[10] The upheaval at the agencies caused by the Democratic victory in the 1886 elections intensified the efforts of the reformers for legislation; out of fifty-eight Indian agents, fifty were removed.[11]

A Dawes-sponsored bill, called the General Allotment Act, or more familiarly the Dawes Act, was signed by President Cleveland on February 8, 1887, and was immediately greeted by the reformers as a "panacea for all ills ever inflicted upon the red race."[12] The bill authorized the President to divide the lands of any tribe, giving each head of a family 160 acres, with lesser amounts of land going to bachelors, women, and children. Prior to this, Indian lands had been held in common, as the principal of individual ownership of land was unknown to the red man.[13]

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[9] Fritz, pp. 209-210.

[10] James D. Richardson (ed.), A Compilation of the Messages and Papers of the Presidents (20 vols; New York: Bureau of National Literature, Inc., 1911), pp. 4890-4892.

[11] James Mooney, The Ghost Dance Religion and the Sioux Outbreak of 1890, (Fourteenth Annual Report of the Bureau of American Ethnology, Pt. 2; Washington: Government Printing Office, 1896), p. 845.

The actual authority lay with the Bureau of Indian Affairs. If, in the judgement of the Bureau, an Indian was fully qualified, he would receive a "trust patent" to his allotment of land and immediately become a citizen of the United States. The title to the Indian's land would then be held in trust for the Indian by the government for a period of twenty-five years, at the end of which time the title would revert to the Indian by fee simple patent. The Indian could only vote, however, by meeting the voting qualifications in the state in which he lived. When all the Indians on a particular reservation had accepted allotments, or sooner if the President so decided, the government might negotiate with the Sioux for their surplus land, which would then be thrown open for settlement under the Homestead Laws.[14]

Dawes himself was not overly enthusiastic about his bill. He was concerned over the possibility of whites scavenging the Sioux land.[15] There was evidence that railroad companies and land greedy white settlers were exerting influence on the passage of the Sioux legislation. Dawes and his friends in Congress were forced to proceed; a diminished reservation, they felt, was better than no reservation at all, and if the pressure groups were resisted too strongly, the whole act stood a good chance of going up in smoke. Accordingly Dawes and his friends, all men deeply concerned with the welfare of the Indian, worked for the enactment which would strip the Sioux from his environment and, ipso facto, make him a white man.[16]

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[12] Johnston, p. 123.

[13] Schmeckebier, p. 78.

[14] Federal Indian Law (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1958), pp. 116-117. For criticism of this landmark in Indian legislation, see William C. MacLeod, The American Indian Frontier (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1928), p. 539; Utley, pp. 42-45; Hyde, A Sioux Chronicle, pp. 184-201; Billington, pp. 669-670; Green, pp. 352-355; Schmeckebier, pp. 78-81; and Fritz, pp. 212-217.

In later years, Dawes gave the reasons which led him to press on with his legislation:

> /The nation's Indian policy_7...was born of sheer necessity. Inasmuch as the Indian refused to fade out, but multiplied under the sheltering care of reservation life, and the reservation itself was slipping away from him, there was but one alternative: either he must be endured as a lawless savage, a constant menace to civilized life, or he must be fitted to become a part of that life and be absorbed into it. To permit him to be a roving savage was unendurable, and therefore the task of fitting him for civilized life was undertaken.[17]

Dawes expected aid for his program from churches, philanthropic societies, and advanced Indians, none of which materialized. The failure of the Dawes Act was ensured, not by the scope of the legislation itself, but by administrative blunders. What one recent critic has called a mixture of

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[15] Hagan, pp. 141-142. [16] Johnston, pp. 125-126.

[17] Henry L. Dawes, "Have We Failed With the Indian?", Atlantic Monthly, LXXXIV, No. 502 (August, 1899), p. 281.

"selfishness and idealism" did not solve the Indian problem.[18] Legislation was soon passed enabling whites to get control of the land patents. Within thirty-three years after the Dawes Act had been greeted with loud huzzahs by the reformers, more than 50% of the original area of allotted land had passed from Indian to white ownership.[19]

In the specific case of the Sioux, Senator Dawes and his group could not long withstand the pressure from the Dakota land promotors. Within a year this faction brought about the Sioux Act of 1888, which reversed the procedure of the Dawes Act as applied to the tribe. By the provisions of the Sioux Act, negotiations for surplus land were to take place before surveys had been made and allotments assigned to the Indians.[20]

The plan was to set aside six reservations as allotment land. These would be centered on the existing agencies of Standing Rock, Cheyenne River, Crow Creek, Lower Brule (across the Missouri from Crow Creek), Rosebud, and Pine Ridge. The remaining part of the Great Sioux Reservation, almost 9,000,000 acres, would be purchased from the Dakotas at 50¢ an acre, restored to the public domain, and opened to settlement under the Homestead Laws. In return, the Indians would receive clear title to their lands and up to 25,000 cows and 1,000 bulls. Each family head and single adult who took land in severalty would receive two milk cows, a yoke of oxen, farming tools, a two-year supply of seeds for five acres, and twenty dollars in cash. In addition, the government promised to continue the educational benefits of the Treaty of 1868 for another twenty years. The proceeds from the sale of surplus land, after federal expenses were met, would go into a permanent fund set up by the United States for the Sioux at five per cent interest, which would be spent on educational programs.[21]

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[18] Loring Benson Priest, Uncle Sam's Stepchildren: The Reformation of United States Indian Policy, 1865-1887 (New Brunswick: Rutgers University Press, 1942), pp. 250-252.

[19] La Farge, p. 90.

[20] Utley, p. 44.

Again, three-fourths of the adult Indian males living on the reservation had to agree to the Sioux Act. To secure this agreement, a second commission was appointed to treat with the Dakotas.

To head the Land Commission of 1888, the government made one of the worst choices possible: Captain Richard H. Pratt, the head of the Carlisle Indian School. In the East, Pratt was regarded as ideal for the job of selling the Sioux the benefits of the Sioux Act, but to Sioux themselves he was the man who had taken their children from them and taught them alien ways. In addition, Pratt's blunt, forthright manner was not calculated to please Indians in whom the bitter memory of the Edmunds Commission still lingered.

Nepotism was again served by the choice of the Reverend William J. Cleveland, a relative of the President, as official interpreter. The third member of the commission was Judge John V. Wright, of Tennessee. Cleveland and Wright were sincere, dedicated men, but the choice of Pratt as head of the commission negated any possibility of obtaining the required number of signatures before the trio ever left the

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[21] *Ibid.*, pp. 44-45.

East.

The Sioux had already decided on a united stand before the arrival of the commission. They resolved to say no to all blandishments of Pratt and the others. And so it was. At Standing Rock, Crow Creek, and Lower Brule, although some Indians signed, the Sioux majority remained firmly opposed to the agreement. Even if the Indians at Cheyenne River, Rosebud, and Pine Ridge were overwhelmingly in favor of the Sioux Act, Pratt would still lack the necessary three-fourths needed to make the agreement binding. Accordingly, the Captain adjourned to meet with Secretary of the Interior William F. Vilas, who was vacationing at Madison, Wisconsin. The two men arranged for a conference of commissioners and Indian agents at Lower Brule, on September 22, 1888. Two days later, a conference was held with Indian delegations from all the agencies on the reservation, 150 men in all. The Sioux remained firm, although they hinted that they would like to go to Washington to talk the situation over with the Great Father - the Indians were fond of government-sponsored junkets. Their only concrete proposal to the agents and the commissioners was to raise the amount of money to be paid per acre - a proposal which was summarily rejected in Washington.[22]

The Pratt Commission was a total failure. In their report, the commissioners compared the excellence of white farmers to the ineptitude of Indian farmers, generally painting a picture of the vast waste that would develop were the western Dakotas not opened to white settlement. Nevertheless, they could not produce the signatures, and much to the chagrin of the Dakota promotors, the Sioux Act never got off the ground. Pratt, as usual, had the last word: "In brief," said he in his report to the Senate, "the defeat of this act was a victory for indolence, barbarism, and degradation as against the influences of the farm, the work-shop, the schools, and the Gospel."[23]

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[22] Wells, pp. 278-280. For the entertaining story of the journey of this commission down the Missouri, see Hyde, A Sioux Chronicle, pp. 184-201; Utley, pp. 45-48.

In October, 1888, sixty-one Sioux chiefs were summoned to Washington. Secretary Vilas offered to recommend to Congress the price of $1.00 per acre for the Dakota land. Forty-seven of the chiefs held out for $1.25 and even more generous concessions. This conference was a failure as well.[24]

Dakota settlers were firmly in the Republican camp, as were most of the Friends of the Indian; both elements regarded Harrison's victory in the 1888 elections as *carte blanche* for their respective policies. The reformers had every reason for hope; Harrison's appointee as Secretary of the Interior was a man sympathetic to Indian problems, John W. Noble of Missouri. Even more promising was the appointment of Thomas J. Morgan as Commissioner of Indian Affairs. Morgan was a former professor of church history at the Baptist Union

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[23] U. S. Congress. Senate, 50th Cong., 2d sess., *Ex. Doc. 17*, pp. 16-18, 23.

[24] Utley, pp. 47-48.

Theological Seminary in Chicago, and had long favored compulsory education for the Indian.[25]

The renewed effort to break up the Great Sioux Reservation was given impetus by the passage of the Omnibus Bill in February, 1889, which provided for the admission to the Union of North and South Dakota, Washington and Montana in November of the same year. The people living in the future South Dakota had no desire to live in only half a state, the rest being the home of a race who appeared disinclined to improve their lot. Working under this new pressure, Congress enacted two further measures. The first, part of the Indian Appropriation Act of March 2, 1889, provided for another land commission. The second, the Second Sioux Act of the same day, outlined a new agreement offering $1.25 an acre for all Sioux land to be homesteaded by whites during the first three years of statehood, 75¢ an acre for land sold in the following two years, and 50¢ an acre for all the remaining land. The United States now offered to bear the entire cost of the Act, and specified that the allotment program could not be started on a reservation until favored by a majority of the adult males. Family heads would receive 320 instead of 160 acres and fifty instead of twenty dollars would be provided for each allottee. All other benefits promised by the First Sioux Act of 1888 would be retained. In addition, the Act sought to alleviate an old grievance by providing $28,500 to compensate the Red Cloud and Red Leaf great pressure. Unless the Indians agreed to some kind of land redistribution, and soon, friction was almost sure to develop, for white encroachment into the lands west of the Missouri was increasing slowly and with almost inexorable force.

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[25] Fritz, p. 220.

In spite of the dancing and feasting, the legacy of the Edmunds and Pratt commissions was strong at all the agencies, and Crook and the others had to step carefully. At Pine Ridge, they negotiated with about fifteen chiefs, five hundred other Sioux being present. Old Red Cloud, grumbling that he was sick, nevertheless sat down and listened attentively to the proceedings. The Pine Ridge Oglalas, like most of their fellow Teton-Dakotas, were concerned and confused about the boundary line of the Great Sioux Reservation, which had been determined by the Ft. Laramie treaty in 1868. Another point of confusion was the system of pricing the lands; many Indians could not grasp the arithmetic involved, and what they could not understand they felt to be mere trickery on the part of the white man. The idea of compensating the Red Cloud and Red Leaf bands for lost ponies rankled other bands who had also been stripped of their horseflesh. Above all, there was the question of rations. To the Sioux, the fact that the commission was authorized to treat only with the land question was immaterial; they tied up much of the proceedings with haggling over food.

The commissioners, however sympathetic they might be to the plight of the Indians, could do nothing but reiterate their arguments concerning the land agreement. Slowly the dances, the feasts, and the persistency of the commissioners began to take effect. One by one leading men stepped forward to sign the document. On June 9, 1889, Crook confided in his diary:

> Lovely day. Tuned different Indians up. Got a good many signatures by different younger Indians who were made to see that they must think for themselves, and in this way it is breaking down the opposition of the old, unreconstructed chiefs.[28]

At Rosebud, opposition was also strong. One of the most powerful of the old Brule chiefs, the venerable Hollow Horned Bear, walked out of the council in disgust, although he later admitted that while his personal sympathies were with the commission, his people had been against it.[29] Chief Standing Bear took the lead in signing the agreement.

At Cheyenne River on July 18, the conservative Hump, in his role as chief of the Indian police, almost generated a riot when the commission pressed for signatures.[30] Major George M. Randall, in uniform, was summoned from Ft. Bennett by Crook to sit in on the proceedings; this implied show of force eventually led even Hump to sign. The commission left Cheyenne River with 642 signatures from a total of 749 eligible men; it was their most successful showing.[31]

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[28] Martin F. Schmitt (ed.), General George Crook: His Autobiography (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1946), p. 286.

[29] Luther Standing Bear, My People the Sioux (Cambridge: The Riverside Press, 1928), p. 215. For an Indian description of the Crook Commission's activities at Rosebud, see pp. 210-216.

[30] Utley, pp. 53-54.

[31] Harry H. Anderson, "A History of the Cheyenne River Agency and Its Military Post, Ft. Bennett," South Dakota Historical Collections, XXVIII (1956), pp. 390-551.

Sitting Bull and his staunch following provided the opposition at Standing Rock. The Hunkpapa chief, perhaps still under Buffalo Bill's influence after a tour with that impresario's Wild West Show in the mid-eighties, rode around the council camp each evening, chanting, "The Nation named me, so I shall live courageously."[32]

In the hands of a less competent agent than McLaughlin, the situation at Standing Rock could have deteriorated into conflict. As it was, Sitting Bull's theatrics went for naught, and the commission enjoyed the same success as at the other agencies.

The final balance showed that the Dakotas eligible to vote had favored the cession, 4,463 to 1,215,[33] figures which met the three-fourths requirement. The incompatibility between these figures and the resolution of the Sioux not to surrender any more land can be attributed to the milder yet more tenacious methods of the Crook Commission; the active machinations of Three Stars himself; and the inability of the Sioux leaders to resist persistent blandishments.

The Crook negotiations underscore a major problem which faced the Indians in all their dealings with the whites. The white men inevitably determined the scope and nature of all treaty talks; the blurred patina which white negotiators often painted for the Indians usually presented, intentionally or not, a confusing picture which the natural distrust of the

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[32] Stanley Vestal (ed.), New Sources of Indian History, 1850-1891 (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1934), p. 309.

[33] Utley, p. 53.

Indians did little to allay. Most red men, the Teton-Dakota among them, had little or no concept of white definitions, white phraseology, white ideas. The abstractions of another civilization were impossible for them to understand, and when they did not understand, they grew confused; their minds would wander from the central issues to the gifts usually displayed with elaborate pomp by the whites. The Crook Commission succeeded by scrupulously avoiding the stirring of the glowing coals of discontent left by Edmunds and Pratt, and by relentlessly repeating the government's offer. The commission's success was typical of the success of other groups like it. To the whites, the land agreement was a bargain well-struck; the Sioux, once they truly realized the extent of the agreement, regarded the whole affair as yet another white swindle.

The "Crook Treaty" opened to white settlement the land bounded by the White and Cheyenne Rivers and the 102nd and 103rd meridians north of the Cheyenne.[34] The gold-seekers now had their arrow aimed at the heart of the Black Hills, and the settlers rejoiced over the opening of approximately 9,000,000 acres of new land.

In his first Annual Message, on December 3, 1889, President Harrison noted that "The work of the commission was long and arduous, but the assent of the requisite number was, it was understood, finally obtained..."[35] Three months later, on February 10, 1890, the President addressed a joint session of Congress:

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[34] Wells, pp. 280-282.

[35] Richardson, pp. 5496-5497.

> At the outset of the negotiations the Commission was confronted by certain questions as to the interpretation and effect of the act of Congress which they were presenting for the acceptance of the Indians. Upon two or three points of some importance the Commission gave in response to these inquiries an interpretation of the law, and it was the law thus explained to them that was accepted by the Indians. The commissioners had no power to bind Congress or the Executive by their construction of a statute, but they were agents of the United States, first, to submit a definite proposition for the acceptance of the Indians, and that failing, to agree upon modified terms to be submitted to Congress for ratification. They were dealing with an ignorant and suspicious people, and an explanation of the terms and effect of the offer submitted could not be avoided. Good faith demands that if the United States accepts the lands ceded the beneficial construction of the act given by our agents should also be admitted and observed...
>
> It will be found that the Commission has submitted many recommendations, some of them involving legislation and others appealing to powers already possessed by the executive department. The consent of the Indians to the act was not made dependent upon the adoption of any of these recommendations, but many of them are _obviously just and promotive of the true interests of the Indians_. So far as these require legislation, they are earnestly commended to the attention of Congress.[36]

Harrison closed by announcing that the ceded territory was open to settlement. This action took the Sioux by surprise, for none of the land surveys on Indian allotments had begun. No land rush materialized; a small group tried to claim some Lower Brule land, but was driven away by troops dispatched from Ft. Randall.[37] The settlement of the western land awaited only good crop years and some enterprising real estate promotion.

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[36] _Ibid._, pp. 5496-5497; emphasis supplied.

[37] Utley, p. 57.

By the time of Crook's death, March 22, 1890, the Dakota had come to realize the implications of the 1889 Treaty. They had bargained away a sixty mile wide corridor of their most precious possession, land, and suffered a division of their great reservation into six lesser reservations in return for benefits which ponderous Congressional machinery was fantastically slow in distributing. Although the nation's lawmakers granted a small sop by passing a bill permitting Indians to lease lands they could not use,[38] it was evident to the Sioux and all close to them that their fortunes were at the nadir.

Red Cloud probably said it best, when he spoke to Father Craft, a young Catholic priest at Pine Ridge. "General Crook came," said the old chief. "He, at least, had never lied to us. His words gave the people hope. He died. Then hope died again. Despair came again."[39]

By 1890, the Dakota catalogue of misfortunes was a long one. To begin with, the tribe was not increasing on the reservation. A study of the agents' reports between 1880 and 1890 indicates that the birth and death rates were about equal.[40] McLaughlin reported from Standing Rock that grippe and whooping cough had accounted for 213 deaths against only 208 births during fiscal year 1890.[41] Agent Charles E.

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[38] Johnston, pp. 123-124.

[39] Quoted in Bourke, p. 486.

[40] Mattison, p. 161.

[41] CIA (1890), p. 39.

McChesney, the latest political appointee at Cheyenne River, reported 87 births and 79 deaths over the same period, compared with 73 deaths in the preceding fiscal year. The agency doctor, Z. T. Daniel, estimated that 25 to 30 children died of whooping cough in the spring of 1890. The main killers at Cheyenne River, as at the other agencies, were consumption, scrofula, whooping cough, meningitis, and pneumonia.[42]

Any Dakota could see that his life was changing, and changing beyond his control. The buffalo were gone; the government had promised much and given little; and the Great Sioux Reservation was now but a vestige of its former size. For three straight years the tribal economy had been racked by economic misfortune. In 1888 the Indian cattle had contracted black-leg; in 1889 the crops had failed (due to the neglect of the Sioux, according to Commissioner Morgan); and in 1890 drought killed the crops again.

Rations had been reduced. The Sioux had been assured they would continue to receive the same rations they had been issued before the land cession. However, the appropriation made for the total subsistence of the Sioux in 1890 was $950,000, $50,000 less than in the two preceding years. One estimate of the effect of this cut, since beef prices were increasing at the time, is that the beef ration was cut by as much as 2,000,000 pounds at Rosebud, 1,000,000 pounds at Pine Ridge, and lesser amounts on the other reservations.[43] The 1890 appropriation was not passed by Congress until August 19 of that year; temporarily, rations had to be purchased and issued in limited quantities pending arrival of new supplies, a procedure that resulted in great hardships for the Sioux. On July 1, 1890, Pine Ridge Agent Gallagher, in reporting a census in which he found 5014 Oglalas and 517 Northern Cheyennes living on the reservation, appended the following table of shortages:[44]

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[42] Ibid., pp. 44-45.

[43] Andrist, p. 340.

Rations due the Sioux Under the 1877 Treaty			Rations allowed by Congress for FY 1891
Beef, Gross	16,593		14,800
Flour, net	2,765.5	All figures	1,917
Corn, net	2,765.5	pound weight	548
Coffee, net	221		178
Sugar, net	442		329
Beans, net	168		137
Bacon	5,531		411

When Gallagher had complained about the shortages in April, 1890, the helpless Morgan, whose office had no control over the ration issue except for the pressure it could exert on Congress, was forced to reply that it was better to give half rations for a whole year than to give three-quarters or full rations for a few months and none for the rest of the year.[45] In the summer of 1890, when part of the deficient beef was finally forthcoming, the Pine Ridge Sioux refused it (although they later accepted after Gallagher's resignation), and made threats against the life of the agent.[46] Not until January, 1891, after the Sioux troubles had rocked the nation, was an appropriation of $100,000 made by Congress for additional beef for the tribe. A bill containing this

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[44] NA, RG 98, *Records of United States Army Commands*.

[45] Andrist, p. 340.

[46] Mooney, p. 845.

$100,000 item had passed the Senate on April 26, 1890, and a House Committee had reported it favorably with the statement that the appropriation was in pursuance of promises made by the Crook Commission, which were "reasonable and should be faithfully kept;" the House, however, had failed to pass it.[47] Dr. Charles A. Eastman, the agency physician at Pine Ridge, had some cause for mourning that "Never was more ruthless fraud and graft practiced upon a defenseless people than upon the poor natives by the politicians."[48]

In addition, the following promises made by the Crook Commission to the Sioux had not been fulfilled: (1) The commissioners had asked Congress for $150,000 for educational purposes - the Sioux had received nothing; (2) the promised compensation of $200,000 for the ponies taken during the 1876-77 war had not been paid; and (3) the Crow Creek Indians had not been reimbursed for the reduction made in their per capita allowance of land as compared to that allotted the other Sioux, an amount of $187,039.[49]

The wording of the commission's agreement had changed the boundary line between Rosebud and Pine Ridge, diminished the reservations, and necessitated the removal of a portion of the Rosebud Indians from lands which, under the agreement, were included in the Pine Ridge Reservation. This removal, to lands on the diminished Rosebud Reservation, had unforeseen consequences which will be discussed in a later chapter.

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[47] CIA (1891), p. 134.

[48] Charles A. Eastman, From Deep Woods to Civilization: Chapters in the Autobiography of an Indian (Boston: Little, Brown, and Company, 1931), p. 99.

[49] Promises (1) and (2) were finally fulfilled by Congress on January 19, 1891, after the Wounded Knee incident.

Some of the Indians objected greatly to the census which Congress had ordered taken. An accurate head count was the only way the government could economically distribute supplies, and to falsify their census was the only way the Sioux could make up the difference in their diminished ration issue. The census at Rosebud, taken by Special Agent A. T. Lea and confirmed by a special census taken by Agent J. George Wright, who had been appointed on February 28, 1890, revealed that rations had been issued to the Indians "very largely in excess of the number actually present."[50] This census necessitated a diminution of the ration issue, and caused further discontent.

A number of minor difficulties also existed on the reservation as a whole, all detailed after the Sioux trouble by an astute infantry captain. First, the 1877 treaty boundaries were incorrect regarding the Black Hills area. Second, there was no provision for the employment of the Sioux children who had been uprooted and sent east to school, once they had returned to the agencies, to the benefit of themselves and their people. Third, the agents were not always of good character. Finally, the Sioux thought they should be issued cattle for breeding purposes, not simply for farm labor.[51]

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[50] Agent Wright's report in CIA (1891), p. 135.

[51] Captain Joseph H. Hurst, 12th Infantry, Ft. Bennett (Cheyenne Agency) to Assistant Adjutant General, Department of Dakota (St. Paul), January 9, 1891, in NA, RG 75, Records of the Bureau of Indian Affairs.

The Standing Rock Indians had grievances particularly their own. The southern boundary of the reservation had never been adequately surveyed; as a result, the Sioux were in constanttrouble for wandering off their assigned land. The ration problem was a particularly thorny one in Agent McLaughlin's bailiwick; although census fraud was not as blatant as it was at Pine Ridge and Rosebud, the Standing Rock Indians were still being issued less than the amount called for in Article 5 of the 1877 treaty. The commanding officer at Ft. Yates catalogued the following shortages as of July 1, 1890: 485,257 pounds of beef (gross); 761,212 pounds of corn; 11,937 pounds of coffee; 281,712 pounds of flour; 26,234 pounds of sugar; and 39,852 pounds of beans. In addition, the Sioux were not receiving the full amount of the annuity supplies they had been promised under Article 10 of the Treaty of 1868.[52]

In addition, the government had failed to expend a just proportion of the money received from the Chicago, Milwaukee, and St. Paul Railroad for right-of-way privileges across the reservation for the benefit of the Sioux. In 1881, the railroad had paid the government $13,911 for these privileges. In 1883 and again in 1885, both times at the insistence of the Indians, McLaughlin had written the Commissioner of Indian Affairs inquiring about payment; he was informed that until Congress took action, nothing could be done. In December, 1890, the Standing Rock Sioux had still not received one penny of this right-of-way money.[53]

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[52] Lt. Col. William F. Drum, Commanding Officer, Ft. Yates, to the Secretary of the Interior, December 7, 1891, in U. S. Congress, House, Liquidating the Liability of the United States for the Massacre of Sioux Indian Men, Women, and Children at Wounded Knee, 76th Cong., 3d Sess., May 28, 1940, H. R. 2317, pp. 11-12.

All of these onslaughts tended to dispirit the Dakotas. Agent Gallagher noted early in 1890 that "Since [the visit to Washington of the Sioux delegation in December, 1889] there has gradually been growing among [the Indians] a feeling of indifference as to the future, which I attribute to an entire loss of faith in the promises of the Government."[54] Despair, indifference, loss of dignity, of land, of the right to move about freely - all these combined to nurse a growing discontent among the Sioux as the year 1890 began. The Great Sioux Nation which had practically dictated the terms of the 1868 treaty was no more; there now seemed to be no hope, no hope at all.

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[53] *Ibid.*

[54] Agent Gallagher's report in *CIA* (1890), p. 49.

CHAPTER III

THE GHOST DANCE

While the Dakota reeled under the onslaught of hunger and the loss of their land, a remarkable development was occurring in far off Nevada. There, in Mason Valley, about fifty miles southeast of Reno, a young Paiute Indian named Wovoka was gaining converts for a religion he hoped would elevate the American Indian to his former glory.

Wovoka's father, Tavibo, had been a holy man of sorts. Just before his death, in 1870, Tavibo had gone into a series of trances, preaching that deceased Indians were about to return to their loved ones. Even more important, the ancient life was to be restored; game would be plentiful, and the white man would be gone. When his father died[1] Wovoka, or "Cutter," as his name meant in the Paiute language, was twelve years old; he was never, except for a few short trips, to leave Mason Valley and the Walker River of his birth.[2]

A farmer, Dave Wilson, hired the young Paiute as a farmhand, giving him the name Jack Wilson, by which he was known to most of the whites in the valley.[3] Working for Wilson, Wovoka was given a first-hand view of the white man's world. The mysticism of his father and the tremendous power of the white civilization battled within him for control. He seems to have acknowledged the superiority of the whites over the docile Paiutes, but the thin veneer of white culture which covered him in his boyhood years could not obliterate his heritage. Although he worked for Wilson by day, he slept at night in his own Tule wickiup. As he learned more about the white man's God, he continued to regard Mount Grant, the holy mountain of the Paiutes, with superstitious awe and reverence. Wovoka was first of all a Paiute, but his father's example had given him a strong sense of being an Indian - an Indian in a white man's world.[4]

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[1] MacLeod, p. 525, doubts that Tavibo was the father of Wovoka. The two were certainly closely related, and Wovoka's biographer gives the paternal relationship his unqualified endorsement. Paul Bailey, Wovoka, the Indian Messiah (Los Angeles: Westernlore Press, 1957), p. 21.

[2] Bailey, p. 21.

Sometime late in 1888, when he was thirty years of age, Wovoka was stricken by a fever. While he lay sick there occurred an eclipse of the sun, which was probably the eclipse of January 1, 1889.[5] This was Wovoka's vision: he claimed God directed him to preach against war and for the peaceful coexistence of Indians and whites. In his vision, Wovoka was given a special ceremonial dance; the execution of the dance was to be the pathway to the salvation of the Indian. Somehow, although the Indians were to live side by side in peace with the whites, the red men were to receive the regenerated land which once had been theirs; all the dead would return, handsome and strong as they had been in their youth.[6]

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[3] Andrist, pp. 336-337. [4] Bailey, p. 24.

[5] Mooney, pp. 773-774.

Wovoka's delirium produced a spiritual dynamism that was to ignite the West. In his new religion, his half-learned Christianity and Tavibo's ancient mysticism blended into a form of worship which seemed childish to outsiders but completely comprehensible to an Indian. The new prophet was well-known to both whites and Indians in Mason Valley; he may have travelled around several of the Nevada reservations with an itinerant magician, and so gained ears outside his own small world.[7] At any rate, his own beliefs, carried by his Paiute friends, soon began to spread outside the valley.

Mormon missionaries had been working among the Nevada Indians; their ceremonial robes became transmuted into "holy undergarments," which guaranteed their wearer everlasting life after death. While this shirt was worn, no physical harm or devilish influences could befall the believer.[8] This tenuous connection between the Chosen People and Wovoka's new religion later prompted undiscerning critics to assert that Mormon influence was active in stirring up dissatisfaction.[9]

Wovoka quickly and smoothly accomplished the rare transition from farmhand to Messiah. Messiahs were not uncommon to the American Indian; Tecumseh's brother The Prophet has probably achieved the most fame, but the Delawares had had one in the 1760s and the Senecas had followed a holy figure in the early nineteenth century. Without exception, these messiahs taught and preached a new way of life because of the good which they hoped to bring their people.[10] Usually, however, the messianic cults were of local influence and short duration only.[11] The Paiute Messiah, however, had allies unavailable to the earlier prophets; the swift dissemination of his religion was ironically aided by the white man, in the form of post offices, telegraph lines, railroads, and schools.[12]

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[6] Andrist, p. 337.

[7] Robert Lee, "Messiah Craze: Wounded Knee," The Wi-Iyohi, IX, No. 2 (May 1, 1955), p. 2.

[8] Bailey, p. 122.

[9] Major G. W. Baird, "General Miles's Indian Campaigns," Century Magazine, XLII, No. 3 (July, 1891), p. 370.

Wovoka also contrived miracles. In his rapidly growing band of converts he found an audience eager to believe. Not the least of his expositions was one before about three hundred Indians (including some Sioux), during which he was "shot" by a shotgun and lived, his unmarked survival undoubtedly due to the holy shirt which he wore.[13]

As word filtered out of Mason Valley to the western tribes, Wovoka's fame increased; he became, in the minds of other Indians as well as his, the Messiah, the only man who could restore the red man to his former days of glory. The Christian influence in Wovoka's religion is readily apparent.

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[10] Fred W. Voget, "The American Indian in Transition," American Anthropologist, LVIII, No. 2 (April, 1956), p. 254.

[11] Hagan, p. 130.

[12] Vestal, Warpath and Council Fire, p. 293.

[13] Bailey, pp. 126-127.

What is not so readily seen is the conflict thus engendered in the western Indian. Three contrasting methods of worship now vied for his attention. The gulf between nature worship and monotheism was large and well-defined, but the subtle differences between white Christianity and Wovoka's new religion were all but incomprehensible to the average Indian. The Trinity of the whites somehow blended into one in Wovoka's version; purposely or not, the Paiute became the sole hope of his believers. Hadn't the white men preached that the Messiah would return? It was only natural that the Indian would choose as a Messiah the man who would benefit him the most - a red Messiah. That the whites laughed at their religion was a matter of supreme indifference to the followers of Wovoka; they were in deadly earnest.

It has been suggested that a sense of helplessness led the Indian to rely on a personal God, a commanding father figure.[14] This is undoubtedly true, but the worship of the new Messiah had its foundations among Indians placed under severe economic and emotional strain; many instinctively reverted to a doctrine that appealed so strongly to their pride and sense of justice. Soon emmissaries began to penetrate Mason Valley to see the Messiah for themselves. Among the tribes sending delegations were the Arapahoes, Northern and Southern Cheyenne, Bannocks, Shoshones, Utes - and the Sioux.[15]

Letters had come in to Pine Ridge Agency from all over the West - from tribes in Utah, Wyoming, Dakota, Montana, Oklahoma - letters telling the Sioux of the marvels taking place in Mason Valley. These letters were read to an interested Oglala audience by William Selwyn, an educated Sioux who was the postmaster at the agency.[16] In the fall of 1889, without the knowledge of Agent Gallagher, the leading Sioux from Pine Ridge, Rosebud, and Cheyenne River met in council at Pine Ridge to discuss the rumors of a new Messiah. Among their number were such leaders as Red Cloud, still the titular head of the Oglalas; Conservatives like Little Wound; and Sioux usually regarded as Progressives, such as Young-Man-Afraid-of-His-Horses and American Horse. This council decided to send delegates to Nevada to weigh the teachings of the Prophet for themselves. Chosen for the journey were Good Thunder, Flat Iron, Yellow Breast, and Broken Arm from Pine Ridge; Short Bull and an unidentified man from Rosebud; and Kicking Bear from Cheyenne River. The little band traveled into Utah, where, ironically enough, the Sioux boarded a train for the remainder of their journey. Somewhere along the way, they joined forces with two other pilgrims, a Cheyenne named Porcupine and an Arapaho named Sitting Bull. Of the Sioux delegates, Kicking Bear and Short Bull emerged as the most ardent apostles. Kicking Bear was described as a "tall, stalwart savage, a fierce fighting man, a natural leader and ideal warrior."[17] Short

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[14] Voget, p. 251.

[15] Andrist, p. 337.

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[16] Mooney, pp. 819-820.

[17] Gen. Nelson A. Miles, "The War with the 'Messiah'," Cosmopolitan, XXII, No. 9 (September, 1911), p. 523. Miles knew all three Indians well.

Bull was a "small, sharp-featured dreamer, who, if he had been a white man, would have been an agitator and exhorter, rather than a leader."[18] Porcupine, who became the most zealous worshipper of the non-Sioux in the group, was characterized as a "keen, wiry, active savage, hostile to the white race and devoted to the welfare of the Indians."[19]

What the delegates saw and heard in Nevada remains shrouded in the fantasies of their later testimony. Their minds, by dint of the hardships to which they had been exposed on the reservation, were only too receptive to the message of the Messiah. Good Thunder, who was an elderly Oglala of Red Cloud's band, later described his meeting with Wovoka:

> We travelled three years [months] to find the Christ. On a broad prairie covered with Indians I saw him at last - a man of surpassing beauty, with long yellow hair, clad in a blue robe. He did not look at us nor speak, but read our thoughts and answered them without words. I saw the prints of the nails in his hands and feet. He said that the crying of the Indians had sounded loud in his ears. He would come to them tomorrow [meaning next summer]. Then they would be with him in Elysium, living in skin tents and hunting the buffalo. Three birds, an Eagle, a Hawk, and a Dove, attended him.[20]

Porcupine was astonished when he saw the Messiah. "I had always believed," he said later, "that Christ was a white man."[21] His statement and that of Good Thunder show clearly the impact of Christian thought. It seems obvious that the Sioux delegates, Porcupine, and Sitting Bull the Arapaho saw only what they wanted to see, equally obvious that they believed wholeheartedly what they saw. Dr. Eastman thought that these first prophets "were innocent enough," although he added that some zealots participated later out of a desire for self-advertisement.[22] The Indians seem to have accepted Wovoka as a being with divine power. They reasoned that he would be more willing to exercise this power in their behalf because of his rejection and crucifixion by the white race.[23]

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[18] Ibid.

[19] Ibid.

[20] Elaine Goodale Eastman, p. 31.

[21] Marion P. Maus, "The New Indian Messiah," Harper's Weekly, XXXIV, No. 1772 (December 6, 1890), p. 947; see also Porcupine's account of meeting the Christ, in testimony taken by 1st Lt. S. C. Robertson, 1st Infantry, at Camp Crook, Montana, on June 15, 1890, in NA, RG 75.

The Sioux delegates, all save Kicking Bear, returned to Pine Ridge sometime in the spring of 1890.[24] A council was called at once, but Selwyn, scenting trouble, informed Gallagher, who immediately had Good Thunder and two others arrested and imprisoned for two days. The intended council was not held; but soon Kicking Bear returned to Pine Ridge, having tarried with the Northern Arapaho on their reservation in Wyoming. Kicking Bear brought news of dancing and miracles on the Arapaho lands.[25]

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[22] Charles Eastman, p. 92.

[23] Brig. Gen. L. W. Colby, "Wanagi Olowan Kin (The Ghost Songs of the Dakotas)," Proceedings and Collections of the Nebraska State Historical Society, I, No. 3, 2d Ser. (January 1, 1895), p. 150.

[24] Andrist (p. 340) has the Sioux returning in March; Mooney (p. 820) in April. The fact that the council was held in April, following a fairly harsh winter, indicates the later date.

[25] The influence of Sitting Bull the Arapaho on Kicking Bear during this period is not known. It must have been great, perhaps decisive.

The arrival of Kicking Bear proved to be the catalyst. Soon, wherever Dakota gathered at Pine Ridge, talk was of the Messiah. He had come to earth in a cloud of smoke to talk to them; he had shown them the scars of his crucifixion. Kicking Bear reported that the Arapahoes had been able to communicate with their dead families and friends.[26] He also appended a thought that had not been a part of Wovoka's original teaching. Wovoka had visualized Indians and whites living together in harmony and prosperity; the mind of Kicking Bear had no room for this train of thought. When the time came for the Pine Ridge Indians to receive the message, they were informed that the Messiah was coming to earth the following spring (1891) to avenge himself for what the whites had done to him the first time he walked among them.[27]

The actual place of the Messiah in the Ghost Dance religion thus becomes unclear. He was seen in Nevada, yet he was to come to earth in the future. This discrepancy, in addition to illuminating the theological confusion of the Sioux, illustrates an important point: the preaching of a heavenly Messiah, one whose good works lay in the immediate future, would carry far more weight than the pronouncements of a Paiute Indian, no matter what his credentials might be in miracle-working. There can be no doubt that Kicking Bear and his fellow delegates subscribed wholeheartedly to the heavenly approach; whether they did so as charlatans and rabble rousers is difficult to say - especially in the cases of Kicking Bear and Short Bull, both notorious Conservatives.

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[26] Andrist, p. 341.

[27] *Ibid.*

The tales of the emissaries immediately produced wild excitement, not only at Pine Ridge, but wherever they were told. Red Cloud announced he was accepting the new religion. The Sioux were transformed; suddenly there was a future. The buffalo were coming back; hadn't the delegates said that on their way home they had killed a buffalo, feasted, and left its head, hooves, and tail on the ground? And hadn't the buffalo reformed itself from these parts as the Indians walked away?[28]

Of course, many Sioux at Pine Ridge were skeptical. Some of the tribe's leaders told Philip Wells later that they did not believe in the new religion, but "We have to arouse the white people or they will pay no attention to our petitions asking for better treatment. The white people have lied to us."[29] The staunchest Progressives could not be budged from their chosen Christian faith.

The ready acceptance of the new religion by some, though not a majority, of the Pine Ridge Sioux, made paramount the faithful practice of the new dogma. The prime ingredient in the worship, as defined by Wovoka and shaped by the delegates, was the Ghost Dance. The faithful took to the new dance as they had to the old war dances and the great ceremonial Sun Dance. Feet which had not danced in years showed they had not forgotten; at Pine Ridge the discontented and despairing Dakotas began the Ghost Dance.

The Conservative Chief Little Wound is said to have spoken thus of the Ghost Dance: "If this is something good, we ought to have it; if not, it will fall to the ground of itself."[30] The Sioux were sustained by the hope embodied in the dance; the ritual itself was at once a fond remembrance of the past life and a call to a brighter future.

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[28] Ibid., pp. 340-341.

[29] Wells, p. 296.

The dance was not an old institution. It was a compound of old ritualistic practices, to be sure, but what emerged was not an amalgam of old creeds but a new religion, the manifestation of which was the dance itself.[31] Among the Cheyennes, the dance was a "Dance to Christ," but there is no evidence that the Sioux ever called it by this name.[32]

In its basic form, the Ghost Dance was not a war dance; women participated, and were accorded the privilege of wearing a feather in their hair, like the men - an unprecedented act.[33] No weapon of any kind was carried, while all metal was banned.[34] No sound of drum or rattle permeated the ceremony; cadence was provided by the rhythmic shuffling of the dancers' feet and by singing.[35] The "Father Image" of the Messiah dominated the ghost songs.[36] The singing chants were always of the golden past or the life to come. As they linked hands and shuffled, always to the left, the dancers might chant:

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[30] Quoted in Elaine Goodale Eastman, p. 30.

[31] James Mooney, "The Indian Ghost Dance," Collections of the Nebraska State Historical Society, XVI (1911), p. 173.

[32] George Bird Grinnell, "Account of the Northern Cheyennes Concerning the Messiah Superstition," Journal of American Folk-Lore, IV (1891), p. 62.

[33] Dorothy M. Johnson, "Ghost Dance: Last Hope of the Sioux," Montana: The Magazine of Western History, VI, No. 3 (Summer, 1956), p. 45.

[34] Elaine Goodale Eastman, p. 33. [35] Johnson, p. 47.

[36] Colby, pp. 145-147.

> Father, I come!
> Mother, I come!
> Brother, I come!
> Father, give us back our arrows![37]

Another variation was

> Here we shall hunt the buffalo -
> So says the Father![38]

The long duration of the dance, the self-hypnotic pace, and the pre-acceptance of the new religious tenets in the minds of the dancers all combined to produce fainting spells, visions, and delirium. Warren K. Moorehead, a trained anthropologist, described the prelude to several dances he witnessed at Pine Ridge in 1890:

> There do not appear to have been any special preparations on the part of the candidates. The sweat lodge was in frequent use, and many Indians purified themselves. The sweat-bath was common among the Sioux in 1889-1890. But during the Messiah Craze, its use became widespread, and the dancers thought it prepared them, or purified them, for the dance. The pipe is also smoked during the sweat. When the young men issue from the bath, the perspiration is fairly streaming from every pore. If it is not cold weather, they plunge into a pool in the creek nearby, but if it is not chilly they wrap blankets about their bodies. None of the Whites and half-breeds who have witnessed these things ever saw a Sioux rub himself after issuing from the bath.[39]

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[37] Mrs. Z. A. Parker, "Ghost Dance at Pine Ridge," Journal of American Folk-Lore, IV (1891), p. 162.

[38] Elaine Goodale Eastman, p. 32.

[39] Warren K. Moorehead, The American Indian in the United States (Andover, Massachusetts: The Andover Press, 1914), p. 109.

Properly prepared, the Indians began the dance. One of the best accounts of the dance itself can be found in the report of Special Agent E. B. Reynolds, written shortly after Reynolds and Agent Gallagher witnessed a dance at Pine Ridge:

> There were at least one hundred and fifty tepees forming almost a complete circle within which the Indians had gathered to the number of six hundred - a part to engage in the exercises and a part to look on. At a given spot a young tree was planted on which was placed the American flag;[40] around it gathered the priests who sat down on the ground and remained silent for some time. Around this tree about equally distant therefrom men and women, to the number of near four hundred, formed a circle and assumed at first a sitting position. The men were arrayed in their war paint, consisting of red, black, and yellow feathers in their hair, leggins on their lower limbs, blankets wrapped round their bodies and moccasins on their feet. The women were clad in dresses of variegated colors; some were beaded in the most artistic style and their faces painted profusely.
>
> The Indians forming the outer circle sat down on their feet and remained quiet for some time, when they broke out in a sort of plaintive cry, which is pretty well calculated to affect the ear of the sympathetic. Then some one passes around with a vessel in his hand containing some kind of roots reminding one somewhat of a Methodist love feast where the meeting is opened by the passing of bread and water. After this is partaken of, at a given command the Indians rise to their feet, joining hands, thus forming a complete circle. Having occupied this position for a moment they begin to chant their opening hymn, which upon this occasion was as follows: "Man take hold of my hand; the great spirit tells me this" and commence a slow measured movement from right to left, increasing the pace as they go. It is not long until all - old and young - are singing and becoming exhalted.
>
> This is kept up for a half hour, when many being overcome with the exercises and excitement connected herewith, fall where they were standing in the ranks or leap wildly from the circle into the open space, fall flat on their faces upon the ground, strike the ground furiously with their hands as though they were endeavoring to dig a hole therein, leap up wildly again, rush from one side of the circle to the other

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[40] The flag was doubtless for the benefit of the white audience; it was not a traditional part of the ritual.

> throwing out their arms and finally fall exhausted themselves. The dancing stopped and all sat down again. As the exhausted ones revived they gathered in into a group at the center of the space and the proclaimers received an account of their experiences while in this state and then proclaimed it to the Indians...[41]

The visions of some of the dancers are indicative of the extent of the white failure in cultural assimilation, at least among the Conservative Sioux. Little Wound said:

> When I fell in a trance, a great and grand eagle came and carried me over a great hill, where there was a village where the tipis were all of buffalo hides, and we made use of the bow and arrow, there being nothing of white man's manufacture in the beautiful land. Nor were there any white permitted to live there. The broad and fertile lands stretched in every direction, and were most pleasing to my eyes.[42]

Little Horse, of Little Wound's band, had an explicit view of the Messiah:

> Two holy eagles transported me to the Happy Hunting Grounds. They showed me the Great Messiah there, and as I looked upon his fair countenance I wept, for there were nailprints in his hands and feet where the cruel Whites had once fastened him

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[41] Reynolds to Indian Commissioner Morgan, September 25, 1890, in NA, RG 75. This account is by no means a standard one. Procedures for the dance varied from reservation to reservation and even within a tribe. Three factors seem common to all the dances, all of which hark back to the Sun Dance: careful preparation, intense concentration, and self-revelation. For other interesting accounts of the Ghost Dance, see Warren K. Moorehead, "Indian Messiah and Ghost Dance," The American Antiquarian and Oriental Journal, XII, No. 3 (May, 1891), pp. 163-165; Moorehead, The American Indian..., pp. 111-117; Mooney, "The Indian Ghost Dance...;" James P. Boyd, Recent Indian Wars (Philadelphia: Publisher's Union, 1892), pp. 183-188; and Parker, pp. 160-162. The most exhaustive study is in Mooney, The Ghost Dance Religion..., pp. 822-824 and pp. 915-921.

[42] Little Wound was also ushed around Paradise by the Great Spirit, who informed him of the infallibility of the Ghost Shirt. Moorehead, The American Indian..., p. 113.

> to a large cross. There was a small wound in his side, also, but as he kept himself covered with a beautiful mantle of feathers this wound could only be seen when he shifted his blanket. He insisted that we continue the dance, and promised me that no Whites should enter his city nor partake of the good things he had prepared for the Indians. The earth, he said, was worn out and it should be repeopled. He had a long beard and long hair, and was the most handsome man I ever looked upon.[43]

Almost all who went into a trance had stories to tell when they regained consciousness. One man sat at the right hand of God; a young woman said she shook hands with Christ three times; a third said Christ would not see him because he /the Indian/ spoke the English language.[44] The visionaries were usually conveyed to Heaven by an eagle, sacred to the Sioux for its majesty, freedom, and hunting prowess. The visions were almost always of a personal confrontation with the Messiah, accompanied by views of the coming glory: vast herds of buffalo blanketing the prairies, limitless food, and, most important, the absence of the white man. The Sioux took the dance of Wovoka and reshaped it in their own tribal image.

The aftermath of the dancing was usually exhaustion, for onlookers as well as participants. Mrs. James A. Finley, who claimed to have witnessed a dance of about 500 Indians, said seven or eight of them died as a result of one dance near Wounded Knee. She thought that if the government let the Sioux alone, "they will kill themselves dancing."[45] Special

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[43] _Ibid._, p. 116. Note the strong influence of Christian teaching in the vision of Little Horse.

[44] Reynolds to Morgan, September 25, 1890, in NA, _RG 75_.

[45] Mrs. James A. Finley, "The Messiah Superstition," _Journal of American Folk-Lore_, IV (1891), p. 68. The author was unable to find any evidence of Indian deaths attributable to the Ghost Dance, other than this account.

Agent Reynolds reported seeing twenty-five men and women unconscious around a dance sight, while three or four passed out far away on the prairie, where they had run in the excesses of their delirium.[46] Mrs. Z. A. Parker said she saw over one hundred people unconscious at once at a dance which took place near White Clay Creek on June 20, 1890.[47] Although the dancers halted from time to time for refreshments, the dances usually lasted throughout the day, and sometimes far into the night. This, combined with the ritual fasting and the intense emotional strain, made the dance a fatiguing ordeal for even the most ardent worshipper.[48]

Not the least important aspect of the Ghost Dance was the wearing of the Ghost Shirt. An Indian named The Weasel, Warren Moorehead's interpreter during the latter's stay at Pine Ridge, said he had seen the shirt worn in a dance at the camp of Big Road, an Oglala chief, on Wounded Knee Creek. The Weasel danced himself; he related that "The priests had said prayers over these garments, and they were bulletproof. One girl tried to gash herself with a butcher-knife on the arm, but the blade was bent and the edge turned, so powerful was the medicine in the shirt."[49]

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[46] Reynolds to Morgan, September 25, 1890, in NA, RG 75. It is interesting to note that Reynolds advocated stopping the dancing not only to prevent an uprising, but also out of consideration for the health of the Sioux.

[47] Parker, p. 162.

[48] Moorehead, The American Indian..., p. 117.

[49] Ibid.

The "proof" of invulnerability which the Sioux found in the Ghost Dance was the capstone of the mutation of Wovoka's pacifist doctrine. What could now curb minds fastened on the most sacred of goals, and bodies rendered all-powerful by merely donning a magic piece of cloth? Only the omnipresent white strength kept the Sioux from an open reassertion of their old power. The new Religion continued to win adherents, and its fame began to spread.

The Ghost Dance grew in popularity under increasing pressure from the settlers. President Harrison had already noted this land-hunger; on the official division of the Great Sioux Reservation, February 10, 1890, he struck a stern note:

> Warning is hereby expressly given to all persons not to enter or make settlement upon any of the tracts of land especially reserved by the terms of [the act of partition] or by this proclamation...[and] to no wise interfere with the occupancy of any of said tracts by any of said Indians, or in any manner to disturb, molest, or prevent the peaceful possession of said tracts by [the Indians].[50]

Harrison, Commissioner Morgan, and the Eastern Friends of the Indian were almost 2000 miles from the Dakotas, however; even with the telegraph and the railroad, the agencies most interested in the welfare of the Indian could not keep a close rein on developments. Scattered sparks were already in evidence. Any actual danger that may have existed for the settlers in the early stages of the dancing was greatly exaggerated, both by the press and by word of mouth. There is evidence that local cattle interests were encouraging the scare as a means of frightening settlers off the newly opened range between the White and the Cheyenne Rivers.[51] Even back in 1888, before Wovoka's revelation, Dakota Territorial Governor L. K. Church had received the following telegram from Oelrichs, located in Fall River County, to the west of Pine Ridge:

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[50] Richardson, p. 5532.

> Rumor is here that the Indians are going to break out in a very few days. Indians have notified settlers all around here to get out at once. Send us at least two companies of soldiers to protect us, but do this without delay.
>
> H. A. Carland
> President, Town Board[52]

Upon investigation, Church found out that a rancher had arrived in Oelrichs, said he had been threatened by an Indian, and thus triggered news of an uprising.[53] Such rumors, repeated in increasing numbers during the next two years, grew steadily in proportion to the increase in dancing.

A sickly young Sioux, Eagle Horse, gave further credence to the rumors. On April 4, 1890, he shot and killed Frank E. Lewis, a schoolteacher who had formerly served in a day school at Pass Creek (Rosebud) and was presently teaching in the Number Two day school at Pine Ridge. The murder, apparently without provocation, took place as Lewis was riding from the school to the agency. Eagle Horse, described as a man who had "gradually been wasting away with consumption," dashed home and told his aunt he had killed a white man, that he might have company on his journey to the Spirit Land. Despondent, he then shot himself.[54]

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[51] Schell, p. 323.

[52] Telegram in NA, RG 75.

[53] Church to Militia General James E. Jenkins, May 31, 1888, in ibid.

The Lewis murder was inescapably linked with the Ghost Dance, although the religion was still in the formative stages among the Sioux. There is no evidence that Eagle Horse subscribed to the new faith in any degree. Yet the growing restlessness of the Indians remained a matter of concern only to Dakotans until a realtor in the South Dakota capital, Pierre, took it upon himself to inform Secretary Noble of the situation. This businessman, Charles L. Hyde, claimed that "the Sioux Indians or a portion of them are secretly arranging for an outbreak in the near future, probably tho' several weeks or months off."[55] This note triggered a circular letter to the Sioux agencies, inquiring about the threatened outbreak. One by one, the agents took stock of their charges and dutifully reported back. Agent McChesney, whose Sioux at Cheyenne River included the notorious Conservative Hump and the respected Miniconjou chief Big Foot, replied:

> There is now some little excitement among my Indians regarding the coming of an Indian Messiah, which will doubtless increase as the time draws near for his expected appearance - which I am informed will be some time next month - but I do not anticipate any serious trouble over the matter.[56]

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[54] CIA (1890), p. 54.

[55] Hyde to Noble, May 29, 1890, in NA, RG 75. As a realtor, Hyde was bound to keep a finger on the pulse of any activity that might depreciate western land values.

[56] McChesney to Morgan, June 16, 1890, in ibid.

Gallagher, whose Pine Ridge Indians consisted largely of the hardy Oglalas, was more confident:

> I have the assurance of the police from all parts of the Pine Ridge reserve that the Indians are peaceably disposed and have made no threats whatever. The excitement caused by the reported appearance of the "Great Medicine Man" in the North will I am sure die out without causing trouble.[57]

At Rosebud, Agent Wright exuded the same confidence. He wrote Commissioner Morgan that "the idea of an outbreak is scoffed at by the large majority of well disposed Indians of this Agency."[58] It remained for McLaughlin, the veteran agent at Standing Rock (who had again landed on his feet after a change in administrations and been reappointed on April 20, 1890), to cap the postal discussion by stating that

> ...in so far as the Indians of this Agency are concerned, there is nothing in either their words or actions that would justify the rumor, and I do not believe that such an imprudent step is seriously meditated by any of the Sioux... They will not be the aggressors in any overt act against white settlers, and if justice is only done them no uneasiness need be entertained.[59]

McLaughlin, it must be remembered, was the man under whose jurisdiction lay the leading malcontent of all the Sioux - Sitting Bull. McLaughlin's placid tone, matched as it was by the reports of the majority of the other west river agents, mollified Washington somewhat, even though Agent W. K. Morris at the Sisseton Agency in northeastern South Dakota reported that the Indian dances were increasing in his area.[60]

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[57] Gallagher to Morgan, June 14, 1890, in ibid.

[58] Wright to Morgan, June 16, 1890, in ibid.

[59] McLaughlin to Morgan, June 18, 1890, in ibid. The emphasis is McLaughlin's. McLaughlin added, however, that Sitting Bull and three other troublemakers, namely Circling Bear, Black Bird, and Circling Hawk, be removed from the rest of the Sioux.

In June, 1890, it appears that, despite Agent Morris's report, the actual Ghost Dance was still confined to the Pine Ridge area.[61] Throughout the summer, while the Sioux chafed under old spectres like the inadequacy of the ration issue, the poorly defined boundaries of the reservations, and disease, the new religion took a firm hold on the other reservations. Short Bull brought it to Rosebud; after he left, two Brules named High Pipe and Black Horn led the dancing.[62] The indefatigible Kicking Bear visited the camps of Big Foot and Hump in September, bringing the dance with him; he then moved on to Standing Rock.[63]

The first direct incident concerning the Ghost Dance which involved both whites and Indians occurred at Pine Ridge. On August 22, Agent Gallagher undertook to stop the dancing at the camp of a chief named Torn Belly on White Clay

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[60] Morris to Morgan, June 21, 1890, in ibid.

[61] Utley (p. 76, n. 22) believes that no Ghost Dances were held among the Sioux until August. The evidence of Mrs. Parker, quoted above (p. 50), and Dr. Daniel Dorchester, Superintendent of Indian Schools, in CIA (1891), p. 591, plus the probability that some early dances took place in far corners of the reservation, without white knowledge, indicates June as a more probable month. Indian evidence, as is usual on chronology, is very vague.

[62] Standing Bear, p. 219.

[63] Anderson, "A History of the Cheyenne River Agency...," p. 501.

Creek. The agent sent a squad of Indian police to quell the worshippers, whom he felt were getting out of hand. The police returned, saying they had been ignored; they claimed Torn Belly's camp held 2,000 dancing Indians. Two days later Gallagher and Special Agent Reynolds, along with Interpreter Philip Wells and the police, returned to the camp, about eighteen miles north of the agency. The day was Sunday; a dance was in progress, but the Indians ceased their activity and hid in a grove of trees on the bank of the creek upon the approach of the white men and the police, the latter always being suspect. Several braves remained in the open. Gallagher later reported that

> These men were stripped for fight, having removed their leggins and other such superfluous apparel as is usually worn by them, and stood with Winchesters in their hands and a good storing of cartridges belted about their waists, prepared to do or die in the defense of their new faith.[64]

At this juncture Torn Belly emerged from the trees and parlayed with Gallagher through Wells. The situation cooled, and the two whites (Wells was a half-breed) became the first government officials to witness the new faith in action. Gallagher was sufficiently impressed to strike a warning note in his report to Washington; "While nothing serious may come from this new religion, as it is called by the Indians," he wrote, "I would greatly fear the consequences should there be no restriction placed upon it."[65]

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[64] CIA (1890), p. 49.

[65] Ibid. Gallagher and Wells certainly should have known whose camp they were visiting, yet an old Indian named Keeps-the-Battle told Warren Moorehead that the camp was that of White Bird. Moorehead, The American Indian..., p. 107; see also Boyd, p. 179.

As autumn drew near, the government seemed content to let the Ghost Dance question remain in its pigeon-hole. By September, the Rosebud and Cheyenne Agency Indians were dancing openly. At this juncture, two significant episodes involving the Sioux agents took place. First, a special inspector from the Department of the Interior (the Department was forever sending out special agents to check on the Indian agents) concluded, while investigating a discrepancy between government rations issued and the census figures as reported by Special Agent Lea at Rosebud, that Agent Wright had pocketed the value of the difference. Wright was forced to return East, where he eventually proved his innocence, and was thus away from his post until early December. The three months he was away comprised the critical period of the Ghost Dance.[66]

The second episode involved changes in agents at Cheyenne River and Pine Ridge. Harrison's new broom swept the experienced agent McChesney out of office at Cheyenne River. In his place, on August 2, 1890, the President appointed Perain P. Palmer, of Estelline, South Dakota.[67] Palmer relieved McChesney on September 1, just before Kicking Bear arrived on the reservation from Pine Ridge. McChesney was only the latest in a long chain of good agents ousted to make room for a man who had backed the right horse in an election year; the inexperienced Palmer was now face-to-face with three of the most conservative Sioux to be found anywhere: Hump, Big Foot, and, temporarily, Kicking Bear.

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[66] Utley, p. 95.

[67] U. S. Board of Indian Commissioners. Twenty-second Annual Report, 1890. (Washington, Government Printing Office, 1891), p. 189. Hereafter cited as BIC, with date of report.

The second political appointment, following Gallagher's resignation over the ration issue, was Dr. Daniel F. Royer, a Republican from Alpena, South Dakota. Senator Pettigrew, who had effortlessly made the transition from Territorial Senator, was Royer's patron; the new appointee had served two terms in the Dakota Territorial Legislature and had dabbled in banking, pharmaceutics, and journalism, none of which had even remotely prepared him for the task he was about to undertake. He was so inexperienced that he began by treating the Sioux timidly - the Indians quickly gave him a name, as they did all their agents. Royer was called Lakota-Kokipa-Koshkala, which signified "Young-Man-Afraid-of-Indians."[68] Mrs. Eastman, who had been promoted to the post of Supervisor of Indian Education at the agency, called him inexperienced and timid, qualities that were all wrong if Royer was to convince the Dakotas of his effectiveness as an agent.

Contemporary authorities are almost unanimous in citing Royer as a milquetoast. Actually, he behaved much as any man would have who was inexperienced in dealing with Indians, especially those in the grip of religious hysteria. Robert V. Belt had assumed the duties of Acting Commissioner of Indian Affairs during a leave of absence which Morgan had requested; upon taking over at Pine Ridge, Royer found a message from Belt instructing him to warn the Sioux that the Ghost Dance had finally brought on the censure of the United States; the new religion was not to be practiced on the reservation.[69]

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[68] Mooney, The Ghost Dance Religion..., p. 848; Utley, p. 103; Lee, p. 5.

Accordingly, Royer went out to a Ghost Dance camp to order the dancing stopped. He was met by a lone Sioux who calmly explained that white people danced when they wished to, and so did the Sioux.[70] Nonplussed when he was ignored, Royer settled down at the agency to attempt to assert some shred of the authority vested in him by the government. In the meantime, the United States Army was beginning to feel the force of the new religion. The Sioux reservations fell under the dominion of the Department of the Missouri, which was under the command of Major General Nelson A. Miles.

In 1890, General Miles was regarded as America's premier fighting man. He was a veteran Indian fighter; the Sioux knew him well from the 1876-77 campaigns. The death of Crook in March, 1890 had removed a contentious rival from the scene; for years each officer had led informal factions within the Army. Now Miles stood alone in the Nation's mind as America's Indian-fighting general.[71]

As the most immediate result of Crook's death, Miles was upped a notch to major general and given command of the Division of the Missouri, which encompassed the Departments of the Dakota and the Platte.[72] The Department of the Dakota was under Brigadier General Thomas H. Ruger, while portly John R. Brooke, also a Brigadier, commanded the Platte. These three, Miles, Ruger, and Brooke, were responsible for the actions of the Army in the sprawling area of the Upper Plains.

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[69] Utley, p. 95.

[70] James H. Cook, Fifty Years on the Old Frontier (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1923), p. 232.

[71] Virginia W. Johnson, The Unregimented General: A Biography of Nelson A. Miles (Boston: Houghton Miflin Company, 1962), p. 264.

The new major general wasted no time in taking over his new command. On September 15, 1890, Miles arrived at his headquarters in Chicago; little more than a month later, on October 18, Agent Royer was advised that he could expect a visit shortly from the Division Commander.[73] Ostensibly, Miles would be chairman of a commission to investigate certain complaints of the Northern Cheyennes; Acting Commissioner Belt feared that this visit would foreshadow an attempt of the Army to gain control of the reservations, a condition which the Eastern Friends of the Indian, as well as many government officials, regarded as insufferable. It was imperative, then, that Royer demonstrate proper control over his charges during the commission's visit.

Unfortunately, the Oglalas at Pine Ridge did not cooperate. Even before Miles arrived on October 27, Royer himself had worsened the situation. Before he had been in charge a week, he had allowed six Indians to break into the agency jail and release a prisoner named Little; no punishment was inflicted, although the culprits were known.[74] Within two weeks, he had reported that more than one-half of his Indians were dancing, and that the situation was entirely beyond the capabilities of the Indian police at his disposal.[75] By the time Miles arrived, the Sioux were dancing almost constantly. The general was unable to persuade Little Wound, the leader, to cease the dance; although the general spoke sternly, the Dakotas would not listen; their imperviousness to the entreaties of Miles was an indication of the widening gulf that had developed between red man and white since the visit of Three Stars in 1889. Undaunted, Miles still thought that the craze would die of its own accord, as did the intelligent Progressive Oglala chief American Horse, whose early interest in the Messiah had cooled. The general probably could not have known, and if he did, would not have fathomed, the depth of the indifference which Congress, the hub on which the Indian wheel of fortune turned, displayed toward the new religion. As a result, Miles continued his tour, no military precautions were taken, and Royer settled back to bombard Washington with telegrams.

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[72] U. S., Department of War, Adjutant General's Office, General Orders and Circulars, 1890 (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1891), p. 9.

[73] CIA (1891), p. 127.

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[74] Mooney, The Ghost Dance Religion..., p. 848.

[75] Andrist, p. 342. This author reckons 6,000 Indians at Pine Ridge at this time, but these are the padded census figures. More accurate is Hyde's estimate of 4,452 Oglalas. To this may be added 600-700 other Sioux and Cheyennes. See George E. Hyde, Red Cloud's Folk: A History of the Oglala Sioux Indians (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1937), p. 307, Appendix A.

On October 30, the young agent notified Belt that

> ...the only remedy for this matter is the use of the military, and until this is done you need not expect any progress from these people. On the other hand, you will be made to realize that they are tearing down more in a day than the Government can build up in a month.[76]

Royer added that about six or seven hundred troops would be necessary to quell the dancing. Special Agent Reynolds, who was filling in for Wright at Rosebud, sent an ominous wire to Belt on November 2, which seemed to support Royer:

> The indications are unmistakable; these Indians have within the past three weeks traded horses and everything else they could trade, for arms and ammunition, and all the cash they became possessed of (sic) is spent in the same way. One of the traders here reports that Indians, within the past two days, have come into his store and offered to sell receipts for wood delivered at the Agency and for which no funds are on hand to pay them, for one third of their value, in cash. When asked, what urgent necessity there was for such sacrifice of receipts for less than their face value, they answered that they wanted the cash, to buy ammunition.[77]

By November 6, fully one-third of the Cheyenne River Indians were taking part in the Ghost Dance. Kicking Bear, ever the agitator, had journeyed on from Cheyenne River to Standing Rock where, early in October, he had initiated Sitting Bull's Hunkpapas into the rites of the new religion.[78] His success was such that Belt, on October 24, recommended that the War Department confine Sitting Bull, Circling Hawk, Black Bird, and Circling Bear in some military prison.[79]

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[76] Royer to Belt, October 30, 1890, in NA, RG 75.

[77] Reynolds to Belt, November 2, 1890, in ibid. Emphasis is Wright's.

[78] Anderson, "A History of the Cheyenne River Agency...," pp. 501-502.

[79] CIA (1891), p. 128.

Once the Sioux decided to arm, thus placing themselves in an activist role in white eyes, the die was cast. Short Bull had preached a defensive posture to his fellow Brules at Red Leaf's camp near the Pine Ridge - Rosebud boundary; earthly weapons would not be necessary in case of white interference. Instead, the holy shirts and the ghost songs would put an end to white domination.[80] Some believers, however, still desired more protection than cloth. If the Ghost Dance had remained passive, the Paradise promised in the spring may have come and gone, and the religion may have gone with it. By November, however, the onus of an offensive posture had been laid upon the Sioux, and the causes of Indian discontent were forgotten, if indeed they were ever known, by the majority of the white settlers.

On November 11, it became evident that Royer had lost all control over the Pine Ridge Sioux. Little came in to the agency, flouting his freedom, and the agent and his police were unable to make an arrest.[81] As soon as the law-breaker and his friends had left, the embattled Royer fired off another telegram to Belt, claiming that "The situation at the agency is such that I deem it for the best interests of the service that I be permitted to come to Washington and explain to you personally. Please grant authority for me to come at once, as the circumstances justify it."[82]

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[80] Utley, pp. 105-106.

[81] *Ibid.*, pp. 108-109. Utley confuses this episode with the first escape of Little. The author has lent more credence to Mooney on this question than to the hazy recollections of Utley's authority, Dr. Charles Eastman.

This plea was refused, and Royer was left to cope with what he thought to be four separate Ghost Dance organizations. Actually, he had a good idea of the course of events, for by now the Pine Ridge Indians were completely above board in their worship. On White Clay Creek, Torn Belly's camp still danced; among the archconservatives here, in addition to the chief, were His Fight, Bear Bone, and Jack Red Cloud, the son of the Oglala chief. Royer estimated 600 dancers at this camp. Approximately 250 were dancing on Wounded Knee Creek under the direction of Big Road, Shell Boy, and Good Thunder (one of the pilgrims to Mason Valley). On Porcupine Creek, Knife Chief, Iron Bird, and Whetstone led a group of 150 dancers, while Little Wound and 500 followers worshipped near Medicine Root Creek.[83] Inside of a month, Royer had lowered his estimate of the dancers on his reservation from about 3,000 to 1,500. Although he was gradually approaching a more rational view as regards the number of Sioux dancing, the agent still insisted on exaggerating both their intent and their actions.

In Washington, Belt was moved to action; on November 13, he recommended to Secretary Noble that the jurisdiction over the entire affair be transferred to the War Department. The same day the Acting Commissioner received another telegram in which Royer again asked to be allowed to come to Washington.[84] On the fifteenth, Royer capped the whole chain of messages with the following:

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[82] Royer to Belt, November 11, 1890, in NA, RG 75.

[83] Royer to Belt, November 8, 1890, in ibid. In spite of Royer's earlier claims, the above numbers are probably as nearly correct as any estimate.

> Indians are dancing in the snow and are wild and crazy. I have fully informed you that employees and government property at this agency have no protection and are at the mercy of the dancers. Why delay by further investigation? We need protection, and we need it now. The leaders should be arrested and confined in some military post until the matter is quieted, and this should be done at once.[85]

Troops were already on the move. On November 17, Miles told Brooke to fence in Pine Ridge and Rosebud to the south and west and send units into the agencies. The same day advance elements arrived in Rushville, Nebraska, the nearest railhead to Pine Ridge, an act which sent some of the Sioux fleeing north into the barren and desolate Bad Lands.[86] Royer went to Rushville to meet Brooke, a move which proved to be impolitic at best. The charge later developed that Royer had left his post, although Special Agent James A. Cooper, who had just arrived at the agency for a closer look at the situation, assured Belt that this was not the case.[87]

On November 20, Brooke reached Pine Ridge, in command of five companies of infantry, three troops of cavalry, one Hotchkiss gun, and one Gatling gun. At the same time Lt. Col. A. T. Smith arrived at Rushville with three companies of the 8th Infantry and two of the Ninth Cavalry, plus another

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[84] Royer to Belt, November 13, 1890, in ibid.

[85] Royer to Belt, November 15, 1890, in ibid.

[86] Elaine Goodale Eastman, p. 33.

[87] Cooper to Belt, November 21, 1890, in NA, RG 75.

Hotchkiss. These forces were the vanguard of a concentration that would see about 3,000 men - nearly half the infantry and cavalry of the United States Army, concentrated on the Sioux Reservations.[88] Smith's arrival at Rosebud triggered another stampede of Sioux men, women, and children, some of whom fled to Pine Ridge, others to the Bad Lands to join the earlier fugitives. To contain the Indians in the Bad Lands, soldiers were deployed along the Burlington Railroad, the main line and one branch of which formed an angle wherein the camp of the fugitives was located.[89]

One of the Sioux malcontents had grievances stemming directly from the Crook Commission. The 1889 treaty, it will be remembered, had changed the boundary line between the Rosebud and Pine Ridge Reservation from Pass Creek to Blackpipe Creek, shifting it fifteen miles to the east. Chief Lip, a leader of the Rosebud Sioux, had previously moved his band to the east side of Pass Creek, where he had settled. The new boundary had excluded him from the jurisdiction of the Rosebud Agency. Lip objected to the government's request that he leave his home and move onto the Rosebud lands. He demanded that he be placed under the jurisdiction of the Pine Ridge agent (this was before the advent of Royer), as he had been promised in the Crook Treaty.

Lip intended to go to Pine Ridge and appeal to General Miles when the latter passed through on his inspection tour, but he never made it. When Smith's arrival propelled many

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[88] Andrist, p. 342; Boyd, pp. 199-200.

[89] Miles, p. 524; CIA (1891), p. 128.

Sioux from Rosebud into the Bad Lands, Lip and his people went to Pine Ridge. There, much to his chagrin, the Brule leader found, not General Miles, but General Brooke. Brooke was busy trying to persuade the Bad Lands fugitives to come in to a peace conference, a fruitless venture, and Lip remained a potential source of trouble that, fortunately, never developed.[90]

The response of the Sioux Conservatives to the arrival of the troops was an intensification of the dancing. Cooper reported on November 22 that "trouble seems inevitable."[91] Census Agent Lea was equally certain; he wired Cooper that "They [the Indians] are prepared for a fight, and will fight."[92] The mild report of Agent A. P. Dixon, whose domain included both Crow Creek and Lower Brule, that his Indians were "under good control,"[93] was hardly noted in the excitement. On the twenty-sixth Royer, backed by Cooper, responded to a question from Belt asking the names of troublemakers by naming sixty-four Sioux whom he felt should be arrested. The other four Sioux agents produced among them a total of only fifteen.[94] Although most of the Ghost Dance activity in

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[90] Lip's difficulties are most fully detailed in Wells, pp. 281-284, and passim.

[91] Cooper to Belt, November 22, 1890, in NA, RG 75.

[92] Lea to Cooper, no date (believed to be late in November), in ibid.

[93] Dixon to Belt, November 21, 1890, in ibid.

[94] Royer to Belt, November 26, 1890, in ibid.; Andrist, p. 343. A letter from Royer to Belt dated November 25 lists 66 names. NA, RG 75.

November was located around Pine Ridge, it is evident that Royer betrayed a trace of panic in his dispatches. The number of his communications with Washington during the entire period of the Messiah furor outnumbered those of the next one, McLaughlin, by four to one, a ratio that is not justified by the relative intensity of the worship of the Messiah at the respective agencies.

Royer had given an undeniable air of urgency to his telegrams to Belt; now this aura of crisis was seriously affecting the area surrounding Pine Ridge. Valentine, Nebraska, about 100 miles to the east of Pine Ridge and 35 miles to the southeast of Rosebud Agency, was said to be full of fugitives from north of the grandiosely named Fremont, Elkhorn, and Missouri Valley Railroad, which ran westward from Valentine through Rushville and Chadron, Nebraska.[95] A citizen of Valentine wrote Belt that "... unless some action is taken to make the Indians give up their arms and fine people who sell them, this country is ruined."[96] By the end of November, the whites who had come into the agency at Pine Ridge believed they were surrounded by about 1300 ghost dancing warriors.[97] Actually, there were about that many dancers; the whites made the traditional mistake of confusing the number of Indians with Indian fighting men, the latter of which, in the Pine Ridge area - once women, instruct the Sioux agents that

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[95] Boyd, p. 220.

[96] J. Fitzgerald to Belt, November 25, 1890, in NA, RG 75.

[97] Boyd, p. 227.

> During the present Indian trouble you are instructed that while you shall continue all the business, and carry into effect the educational and other purposes of the agency, you will, as to all operations intended to suppress any outbreak by force, cooperate with and obey the orders of the military officer commanding on the reservation in your charge.[102]

The Secretary emphasized this point shortly thereafter, advising Belt that the agents were to make no arrests whatsoever, except under the orders of the military.[103]

During the early part of December, the Progressives at Rosebud attempted to inform President Harrison of the seriousness of the situation. Their letter had no martial tone whatsoever; it was written directly from the stomach:

> Great Father: This day I will write you a letter with a good heart. When we gave up the Black Hills you told us in that treaty that a man would get three pounds of beef a day. The meaning was three pounds for one man. Besides, you said we could get food just like the soldiers. You did not, however, give it to us at this rate.
>
> Great Father, we are starving, and beg you, therefore, to give us just so, as you have promised. Thirty men of us get for ten days /̲only one cow̲/ to eat; that is the reason I mention it. And if you do not understand you send me /̲Hollow Horn Bear̲/ travelling money and I will come with five men.
>
> Great Father, if you do not want to do so, then please, let us have a soldier for our father when our father's term is out. Great father, please do us this favor.
>
> Signed by 102 Sioux Indians.[104]

The Sioux dearly loved trips to Washington, but this letter was more than a plea for a train ticket. It was an attempt by the Progressive wing of the Rosebud Sioux to place the fundamental causes of the trouble squarely before the Great Father. Nevertheless, the Rosebud Indians had cheated on their census. In what may be a related fact, Census Agent Lea had reported, only a week before the Brules wrote their letter, that he had yet to see the first family at Pine Ridge that showed the least sign of suffering from want of food.[105] In general, however, the Dakota were probably undergoing as much hardship in early December as they had suffered throughout the summer and autumn. Ironically enough, as the Sioux were posting their letter to the Great Father, Harrison was informing Belt that "We ought not to feed those who refuse to submit themselves to agency control."[106] Washington was as far from South Dakota as ever.

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[102] Noble to Belt, December 1, 1890, in NA, RG 75.

[103] Noble to Belt, December 5, 1890, in *ibid*.

[104] Quoted in Boyd, pp. 232-233.

While the pot was bubbling in the Dakotas, Congress displayed a magnificent indifference to the complaints of the Sioux. Only once before the actual fighting began did the Senate bestir itself to discuss the Indian situation. This discussion, which took place on December 8, was conducted amidst a continuous babble from the floor of the chamber; the solons were simply too busy to waste time on the Dakotas. Senator Dawes, who had read Lea's census report and was of the opinion that the Indians were being fed enough, led the exchange. His only interested listeners, who must be recorded, were Voorhees of Indiana (who thought the Sioux were underfed), Pierce of North Dakota, Paddock of Nebraska, and Morgan from Alabama.[107]

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[105] Lea to Belt, November 28, 1890, in NA, RG 75.

[106] Harrison to Belt, December 4, 1890, in *ibid*.

As Congress procrastinated and the Progressives at Rosebud chose to take their case to the President, the fugitives in the Bad Lands were working themselves into a frenzy under the direction of the militant Short Bull. With winter impending, Little Wound and Big Road had broken their camps and come in to Pine Ridge. General Brooke's problem was to coax Short Bull to do the same, all the while keeping a firm rein on abouc 4,000 Sioux and Cheyenne who had nervously clustered around the agency.

Brooke was clever enough to realize that blue coats would only enrage the Ghost Dancers, who were encamped in a portion of the Bad Lands which was a natural fortress, and which thus was called the Stronghold. Friendly Indians sent to the Bad Lands as emissaries were fired upon when they approached the worshippers; in desperation Brooke turned to Father John Jutz, S. J., the priest who had established the Holy Rosary Mission, about four miles north of Pine Ridge, in 1888.[108] In the intervening two years, the seventy year old Jutz had won the confidence of white and Indian alike. Father Jutz volunteered for the mission; with him went Jack

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[107] U. S. Congress, Congressional Record, 51st Cong., 2d Sess., 1890, Vol. XXII (Washington, Government Printing Office, 1890), pp. 197-201.

[108] Utley, p. 137. This author has written the best account of the Stronghold episode; see pp. 134-145.

Red Cloud, a recent apostate from the Ghost Dance.

Jutz and Red Cloud conferred with the leaders of the dancers, namely Short Bull, Kicking Bear (who had returned from his trip to Standing Rock), High Hawk, Crow Dog (the murderer of Spotted Tail, back in 1881), Turning Bear, Eagle Pipe, and Two Strike. The last named was old and nearly senile, but his word still carried great weight among the Sioux. Two Strike consented to lead a delegation in to the agency to confer with Brooke. This confrontation was a rehash of old grievances; nothing was settled, and the Indians headed back to the Bad Lands.[109]

The delegation was accompanied upon its return to the Stronghold by several friendly Indians and Louis Shangraux, a half-breed scout. Shangraux estimated about 260 lodges in the hostile camp, which indicates around 1,000 people. While there, the scout witnessed a Ghost Dance, and later recalled:

> Of all the wild dancing I saw on Wounded Knee, this beat the record. People went into trances by the dozen, and the priests were kept busy relating the experiences of the fainters. Several remained in trances as long as twelve hours, and gave evidences of utter exhaustion when the directors aroused them.[110]

For two days, the hostiles did not speak with Shangraux or the friendlies. On Friday and Saturday, December 12 and

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[109] There is evidence that Brooke mismanaged this affair, believing he had only to command for old Two Strike and his following to obey. ibid., pp. 138-139. For glowing prose on "Father Jules" mission, see Pierre Daily Capital, December 9, 1890 (1:1).

[110] Quoted in Moorehead, The American Indian..., p. 119. Shangraux's role in the Stronghold Affair is detailed in Boyd, pp. 205-210.

13, two councils were held, after the last of which Two Strike and Crow Dog decided to come in to the agency. Short Bull and his followers then threatened the lives of the two Brules and called Shangraux a traitor. Tempers were running high, and Short Bull actually ordered all the friendlies and the apostates killed. At the height of the furor, Crow Dog sat down on the ground and drew his blanket over his head, saying that he could not bear to see his brothers at each others' throats.[111] His act was as cool water on a blazing fire. The trouble subsided and 145 lodges were broken; about 60% of the Sioux in the Stronghold accompanied Shangraux and the friendlies toward Pine Ridge. About 117 lodges remained in the Bad Lands.[112] Short Bull, Kicking Bear, and Two Strike, all champions of the Messiah, were in the group leaving for the agency. Within an hour, however, before the procession had travelled four miles, Short Bull and Kicking Bear took their band, numbering about 200, left the rear of the column, and returned to the Bad Lands. Two Strike and his Brules continued on to the agency, arriving just before noon on Monday, December 15.[113]

By mid-December, almost all the leading men of the Brules and Oglalas had come in to Pine Ridge. In the meantime, though, die-hards from Cheyenne Agency, as well as the braves still left in the Stronghold, were on the prowl in the west-river country, stealing cattle and engaging in short, bitter fire-fights with local militia. Even though the winning over of Two Strike had been a big step in the direction of peace, the situation was far from eased. The South Dakota press had picked up the story of the Ghost Dance, and with very few exceptions, the papers of the west river region were indulging in jingoistic sentiments. As an example of this, Two Strike's journey in to Pine Ridge, which passed without event, was described as a march of 3,000 belligerent red men heading for the agency.[114] Short Bull and Two Strike's differences were reported to have resulted in bloodshed, with about fifty Indians killed.[115] The mission of Shangraux and the friendly Indians to the Stronghold was described with almost 100% inaccuracy; the Pierre Daily Capital reported that the emissaries had been "roughly treated," which was true enough, and "their peace pipe shot to pieces," which was not.[116]

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[111] Utley, p. 142.

[112] Moorehead, The American Indian..., pp. 120-121.

[113] Utley, p. 142; Johnson, p. 277.

Slowly, America's journalists were picking up the scent; reporters began to arrive at Pine Ridge, only to be greeted by a stern military censorship instituted by Brooke and a total absence of any of the gory happenings which had prompted their journeys in the first place. Undaunted, members of the Fifth Estate settled down and proceeded to festoon themselves with weapons and fabricate stories for their readers.[117]

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[114] Pierre Daily Capital, December 14, 1890 (1:3), under headline of "SIOUX ON THE MARCH!"

[115] Ibid., December 16, 1890 (1:1).

[116] Ibid., December 17, 1890 (2:3), under headline of "WAR BEACONS BLAZING."

Up to mid-December, Sioux names familiar to almost all Americans had been connected with the Ghost Dance. There was Red Cloud, who at first had been incredulous, then hopeful, and finally disillusioned. There was Hump, who had seized the new religion with the fervor of a drowning man clutching a straw. There were Progressives like American Horse at Pine Ridge and John Grass at Standing Rock, both of whom had wholeheartedly rejected the new religion. But the name most familiar to white America, that of Sitting Bull, belonged to a man who had not yet been convinced that the Ghost Dance was without value. The Hunkpapa medicine man was the pivot point of the entire craze, as far as the whites could see; therefore, he had to be muzzled.

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[117] Elmo Scott Watson, "The Last Indian War, 1890-91 - A Study of Newspaper Jingoism," Journalism Quarterly, XX (1943), pp. 205-219, passim.


THE SIOUX RESERVATIONS, 1890
SCALE OF MILES
0 10 20 30 40 50
AUGUST, 1961
WALTER VITOUS
N
Bismarck
Heart River
MISSOURI
Cannonball River
Cedar Creek
STANDING ROCK AGENCY
STANDING ROCK RES.
NORTH DAKOTA
SOUTH DAKOTA
South Fork Grand Riv.
Grand River
Thunder Butte Creek
CHEYENNE RIVER RES.
RIVER
Moreau River
CHEYENNE RIVER AGENCY
Belle Fourche River
Deadwood
BLACK HILLS
Elk Creek
Rapid City
Spring Creek
Custer
Cheyenne River
Pierre
Bad River
CROW CREEK RES.
LOWER BRULE RES.
Medicine Cr.
White River
PINE RIDGE RES.
South Fork
PINE RIDGE AGENCY
White River
ROSEBUD RES.
ROSEBUD AGENCY
SOUTH DAKOTA
NEBRASKA

CHAPTER IV

THE DEATH OF SITTING BULL

The news of the Ghost Dance had been carried north to the Standing Rock Sioux by Kicking Bear. On October 9, 1890, having concluded his visit to the Cheyenne Agency Reservation, he had arrived at Sitting Bull's camp along the Grand River. James McLaughlin had been thoroughly briefed on the Oglala missionary, who had found his teaching smoothed at Cheyenne River by his marriage to the niece of the Minniconjou chief, Big Foot.[1] The veteran agent immediately dispatched thirteen Indian policemen, including a captain and a second lieutenant, to Sitting Bull's camp with instructions to arrest the apostle and escort him from the reservation. The squad returned empty-handed, with the two officers in a "dazed" condition; the police had been overawed by the Ghost Dance ritual.[2] McLaughlin immediately sent the lieutenant and one man back. The pair succeeded in ousting Kicking Bear from the reservation, but not before the new religion had taken a firm hold at the Hunkpapa camp. Sitting Bull informed the Indian officer that he was determined to continue the dance, as the Great Spirit had sent a direct message via Kicking Bear to do so.[3]

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[1] Utley, p. 62.

[2] McLaughlin to Belt, undated, in NA, RG 75.

[3] *Ibid.* McLaughlin added that the dance itself was "demoralizing," indecent, and disgusting."

It is not entirely clear whether Sitting Bull took part in the dancing himself.[4] He apparently subscribed wholeheartedly to the religion. As a medicine man, he was prepared by his background of mysticism for the role of seer. As soon as the public at large became aware of his involvement in the Ghost Dance, he was identified as the leader of the dissident element of the entire Sioux Nation. McLaughlin himself had no qualms about accusing the chief. In a lengthy letter to Morgan on October 17, 1890, he had vented his spleen in full:

> "Sitting Bull" is high priest and leading Apostle of this latest Indian absurdity; in a word he is the Chief Mischief Maker at this Agency, and if he were not here this craze so general among the Sioux would never have gotten a foothold at this Agency. "Sitting Bull" is a man of low cunning, devoid of a single manly principle in his nature, or an honorable trait of character, but on the contrary is capable of instigating and exciting others (those who believe in his powers) to do any amount of mischief. He is a coward, and lacks moral courage; he will never lead where there is danger, but is an adept at influencing his ignorant henchmen and followers and there is no knowing what he may direct them to attempt. He ("Sitting Bull") is bitterly opposed to having any surveys made on the reservation and is continually fostering opposition to such surveys among his followers, who are the most worthless, ignorant, obstinate and non-progressive of the Sioux...He is an Indian unworthy of notice except as a disaffected intriguer, who grasps every opportunity to maintain his power and popularity. He is opposed to everything of an elevating nature and is the most vain, pompous,

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[4] Johnson (p. 277) says he did not; McLaughlin, on the other hand, constantly assigned Sitting Bull a leading role. The agent claimed that the medicine man "fasted and prayed with such vigor, and danced with such enthusiasm, that he reduced himself to mere skin and bone, and kept his people worked up to a high state of enthusiasm by inducing them to emulate his example." James McLaughlin, *My Friend the Indian* (Boston: Houghton Miflin Company, 1926), p. 190. Utley, (p. 150) states unequivocally that Sitting Bull took an active part in the worship.

and untruthful Indian that I ever knew.[5]

McLaughlin had a considerable stake in the dancing on Grand River. He was at odds with Commissioner Morgan, who did not approve of the agent's friendliness with the military. In addition, the press was holding him directly responsible for containing Sitting Bull.[6] McLaughlin was forced to walk a thin rope; he could not afford to offend the Eastern Friends of the Indian (and Morgan) by rough and precipitate treatment of the Grand River dancers, nor could he remain inactive in the face of a growing public demand that something be done. He constantly complained to Morgan that he wanted no interference from the military, even though he was on good terms with the soldiers at Ft. Yates.[7] McLaughlin intended to make the downfall of Sitting Bull his personal responsibility.

Sitting Bull's hatred of the white race had in no way abated since the Little Big Horn. He was wise enough to realize that any armed uprising could only lead to disaster for the Sioux; yet he chose to adopt the Ghost Dance in the hopes that through it he could restore himself to the pinnacle of Dakota leadership where he had once stood.[8] The wily Hunkpapa was forced to play a waiting game. He had quarreled with McLaughlin for almost a decade, and in the major had found a stout opponent. The presence of permanent Army posts at Ft. Yates to the north and Ft. Bennett to the south also acted as a check on his ambition. The combined opposition of the military and the intractable McLaughlin forced Sitting Bull to attempt an escalation of his authority within the Sioux Nation with caution.[9] There is no evidence which indicates that he ever broke the peace pipe which he had kept near him since his surrender upon his return from Canada in July of 1881.[10]

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[5] McLaughlin to Morgan, October 17, 1890, in NA, RG 75; see also Joe DeBarthe, The Life and Adventures of Frank Grouard (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1958), p. 218, for a further exposition of McLaughlin's feeling toward Sitting Bull.

[6] Stanley Vestal, Sitting Bull: Champion of the Sioux (Boston: Houghton Miflin Company, 1932), p. 288.

[7] See NA, RG 75, for McLaughlin's letters to Morgan during this period.

McLaughlin himself witnessed a dance at the Grand River camp on November 16. The sight so impressed him that he sought to isolate the Conservatives by inviting the friendly Indians in to the agency. Some took advantage of the offer.[11] The problem now was how to deal with Sitting Bull; McLaughlin was pondering this when events at Standing Rock took a bizarre turn.

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[8] Doane Robinson, "Some Sidelights on the Character of Sitting Bull," Collections of the Nebraska State Historical Society, XVI, (1911), pp. 190-191. A more florid statement of the same idea can be found in Bailey, p. 152.

[9] Usher L. Burdick (ed.), My Friend the Indian, or Three Heretofore Unpublished Chapters of the Book Published Under the Title of My Friend the Indian, by Major James McLaughlin (Baltimore: The Proof Press, 1936), p. 10.

[10] Vestal, New Sources of Indian History..., p. 309.

[11] McLaughlin to Belt, November 19, 1890, in NA, RG 75; DeBarthe, p. 218.

To the agency on November 27 came William F. Cody, the famous and flamboyant "Buffalo Bill." Cody immediately presented McLaughlin with a calling card belonging to Miles, on the back of which the general, who had given the card to the showman at a banquet in Chicago three days before, had scribbled an order to the effect that the military was to cooperate with Buffalo Bill in every possible way.[12] Miles had been prompted to enlist Cody in the peacemaking efforts because the latter had struck up a friendly relationship with Sitting Bull when the chief had toured the United States with Buffalo Bill's Wild West Show in 1884 and 1885. Cody had made Sitting Bull a present of a trick horse, which the Hunkpapa cherished.[13]

Cody's biographer is certain that the showman had no other intention than to have a talk with Sitting Bull and try to persuade him to stay off the warpath.[14] Undoubtedly, the arrival of Cody was a real attempt on Miles's part to calm the trouble. McLaughlin thought differently; he regarded Standing Rock as his personal preserve and he notified Belt accordingly, after Cody's arrival. "Such a step at present is unnecessary and unwise," wrote the agent, "as it will precipitate a fight which can be avoided...I have matters well in hand. When proper time arrives can arrest Sitting Bull by Indian police without bloodshed."[15]

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[12] E. A. Brininstool, "Buffaloing Buffalo Bill," Hunter-Trader-Trapper, LXXVI, No. 4 (April, 1938), p. 17; Don Russell, The Lives and Legends of Buffalo Bill (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1960), p. 35; Johnson, p. 278. Johnson, who feels Cody's mission to represent the best possible method of cooling the crisis, calls McLaughlin's attempts to foil Buffalo Bill "ambitious, vain, and petty;" ibid. For an entertaining account of the entire Cody episode, see Vestal, Sitting Bull..., pp. 287-289.

[13] Marvin and Dorothy Rosenberg, "'There Are No Indians Left Now But Me'," American Heritage, XV, No. 4 (June, 1964), p. 21.

[14] Russell, p. 359.

Buffalo Bill was determined to journey to the Grand River camp. On the night before his departure, McLaughlin and the officers at Ft Yates, who also thought that Cody's arrival usurped their authority, planned to get the showman drunk. Cody was invited to the Officer's Club, where relays of officers were assigned to drink him under the table. A mean man with a mug, Cody was still going strong by morning.[16] At 11:00 A.M., accompanied by eight newsmen and a wagonload of presents (including candy, for which Sitting Bull had an inordinate fondness), Cody started for Grand River. No one was armed and there was no escort. There were two roads from Ft. Yates to Sitting Bull's camp, running about four miles apart. Lt. Col. Drum, the post commandant, stationed messengers on each road, with instructions to tell Cody that Sitting Bull had already gone in to Standing Rock via the other road. Taken in by this ruse, Buffalo Bill returned to Ft. Yates, where he found McLaughlin armed with a Presidential telegram ordering him to cease his efforts.[17] McLaughlin himself had notified Harrison of the potential danger (or so he thought) of Cody's mission, and the President had responded with a restraining order.

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[15] McLaughlin to Belt, November 28, 1890, in NA, RG 75. McLaughlin's confident tone could not bely the fact that thirteen of his Indian police had previously been cowed by the Ghost Dance.

[16] Johnson, p. 278; Utley, pp. 124-125; Capt. Peter E. Traub, "The First Act of the Last Sioux Campaign," Journal of the United States Cavalry Association, XV (1905), p. 874.

Thus shackled, Cody departed the reservation. McLaughlin now resolved to arrest Sitting Bull on December 6, when most of the Hunkpapas would come in to the agency to collect their rations. Noble's order to Belt of December 5, ordering no arrests whatever unless by order of the military, crippled this enterprise, and the intended day of the arrest passed with no action.[18]

Evidence mounted that the Grand River camp was slowly giving itself up entirely to the dance; the Hunkpapas did not abandon their defensive posture in favor of an offensive one, but they kept the agency under constant surveillance. On December 8, Miss Mary C. Collins, a missionary of the Congregational Church at Little Eagle, located about ten miles from Sitting Bull's camp, arrived at Grand River to conduct services as usual. Normally her congregation numbered about 100; on this day only three worshippers appeared, and their hymns were drowned by the sounds of a nearby Ghost Dance. Miss Collins later said that she persuaded the Hunkpapas to stop dancing; if so, it could only be out of respect for her as a woman and a preacher, and not because they were won away from their new religion, that the Hunkpapas halted.[19]

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[17] Russell, p. 363; Brininstool, p. 18; Johnson, p. 278. Miles apparently remained unaware of the trick pulled on Cody. See U. S., Department of War, Annual Report, 1891, p. 146. Hereafter cited as SW, Annual Report, with date.

[18] DeBarthe, p. 219.

By now the military had subscribed to McLaughlin's way of thinking. Miles notified General Ruger that Sitting Bull was to be arrested and Ruger in turn, on December 12, telegraphed Drum that "The Division Commander has directed that you make it your especial duty to secure the person of Sitting Bull. Call on the Indian Agent to cooperate and render such assistance as will best promote the purpose in view."[20] The word "secure" in an Army telegram could only mean the separation of Sitting Bull from his followers.

The situation at Standing Rock became critical on December 13, when a letter, addressed to the "Major at the Indian Office," arrived at the Grand River camp. It had been dictated by Sitting Bull to Andrew Fox, his son-in-law, and read in part as follows:

> I had a meeting with all my Indians today and am writing this order to you...God made the red race and the white, but the white higher...I wish no one to come to me in my prayers with gun or knife...and you, my friend, today you think I am foll (fool) and you tell some of the wise men among my people...so you don't like me...I don't like myself, my friend, when someone is foll...You think if I am not here the Indians is civilization...I will let you know something. I got to go to Pine Ridge Agency, and to know this pray. So I let you know that and the policeman (sent out by McLaughlin the preceding evening in an ineffectual attempt to get the Indians to disperse to their homes) told me that you are going to take all our ponies, guns too. So I want

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[19] Robinson, pp. 191-192.

[20] Ruger to Drum, December 12, 1890, in NA, RG 75.

to let you know this. I want answer back soon.
Sitting Bull[21]

Sitting Bull at Pine Ridge, in McLaughlin's view, would be catastrophe, uniting him as it would with some of the most hostile elements involved in the Ghost Dance. The agent had planned to take the chief in custody on December 20, the next ration day;[22] now the date had to be advanced. McLaughlin still hoped to arrest Sitting Bull without the interference of the Army; he feared that a military demonstration would precipitate a collision and bloodshed.[23] Accordingly, he attempted to lull Sitting Bull by replying to the chief: "I have always been your friend...Do not feel that I dislike you..."[24] The Hunkpapa was not fooled. Early on the morning of December 14 McLaughlin received a letter from John M. Carignan, the teacher at the Grand River Day School, who had been keeping an eye on the activity in the Sioux camp. Carignan had received his information from one of McLaughlin's most trusted Indian police, Lt. Bull Head, who had visited the camp. The schoolmaster's note outlined the situation in bold relief:

> "Bull Head" wishes to report what occurred at Sitting Bull's camp at a council held yesterday. It seems that Sitting Bull has received a letter from the Pine Ridge outfit, asking him to come over there as God has appeared to them. Sitting Bull's people want him to go, but he has sent a letter to you asking your permission, and if you do not give it, he is going to go anyway; he has been fitting up his horses to stand a long ride and will go a horseback in case he is pursued. Bull Head would like to arrest him at

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[21] Quoted in McLaughlin, pp. 215-216.

[22] Utley, p. 152.

[23] McLaughlin, p. 201.

[24] Quoted in Usher L. Burdick, The Last Days of Sitting Bull (Baltimore: Wirth Brothers, 1941), pp. 38-39.

> once before he has the chance of giving them the Slip, as he thinks that if he gets the start, it will be impossible to catch him; if you shouldn't want to arrest him, he says to send word by courier immediately, also to let him know what your plans are; if soldiers are to come, he says to send them by Sitting Bull's road...one thing I understood thoroughly, and that is that the poor man is eat out of house and home; he says that what with Councils and Couriers coming to his place that even the hay he had is very nearly all gone. I sympathize with him as I am nearly in the same boat. If you send a dispatch to Bull Head through me please send some envelopes as I am entirely out. Can't even find one to enclose this letter.[25]

McLaughlin replied immediately with letters to Carignan and Bull Head, stating that his only intention was to arrest Sitting Bull and separate him from his band.[26] Couriers then gave Bull Head orders to concentrate his men near Sitting Bull's house, arrest him at daybreak, and move him in a wagon to Oak Creek, where he was to be turned over to Major E. G. Fechet, whom Drum had relieved as post commandant at Ft. Yates on November 25.[27]

The Indian police arrived at Sitting Bull's camp at

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[25] Carignan to McLaughlin, 12:30 A.M., December 14, 1890, in NA, RG 75.

[26] Burdick, The Last Days of Sitting Bull, pp. 51-52. McLaughlin assigned 42 Indian policemen to Bull Head, specifically stating that "you must not let him escape under any circumstances." Quoted in Utley, p. 155.

[27] Major E. G. Fechet, "The True Story of the Death of Sitting Bull," South Dakota Historical Collections, IV (1908), p. 187. The outstanding source on Sitting Bull is Vestal's biography. Utley (pp. 146-166) minutely details Sitting Bull's last hours, but fails to fully assess the consequences of his death. The brief account above is drawn mainly from official reports and Major Fechet's article. The Major's account of the affair, dictated to the adjutant,at Ft. Yates on December 17, is also quoted in DeBarthe, pp. 223-226.

5:30 A.M. on December 15 and immediately surrounded the chief's cabin. Bull Head, flanked by Sergeants Shave Head and Red Tomahawk, knocked on the door and then entered. Sitting Bull, awakened by the noise, consented to go with the police. In the meantime, the rest of the camp was rising, having been alerted by barking dogs. By the time the prisoner had dressed and was being ushered through the door of his cabin by theppolice, a crowd had gathered. Crow Foot, Sitting Bull's seventeen-year-old son, began to ridicule his father for giving up so easily. Catch-the-Bear, the chief's second-in-command, and a long-time personal enemy of Bull Head, began to harangue the assembled Sioux, urging them to defend their leader. As the police tried to urge the suddenly vacillating Sitting Bull toward his pony, Catch-the-Bear produced a concealed Winchester Rifle and shot Bull Head in the right side.[28]

Immediately the camp erupted into a scene of turmoil. As Bull Head slumped to the ground, he shot Sitting Bull in the chest. At the same time, Red Tomahawk shot the medicine man in the back of the head; the Hunkpapa was dead before he hit the ground. A pitched battle followed, in which Catch-the-Bear and Crow Foot, among others, were killed. In the midst of the melee, the trick horse that Cody had given

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[28] See testimony from one of the Indian police, Lone Man, reproduced in Vestal, New Sources of Indian History, p. 52. George Metcalf, "Tragedy at Wounded Knee," Great Western Fights (New York: Doubleday and Company, 1960), p. 308, says Sitting Bull was struck with a tomahawk. The Indian police werenot so armed.

Sitting Bull began to go through its paces, having received its cue from the sound of guns firing.[29]

A courier was dispatched, riding the trick horse, to summon Major Fechet and his detachment. The major had left Ft. Yates at midnight with two troops of the Eighth Cavalry, a detachment of artillery, a Gatling gun and a Hotchkiss breech-loading rifle. Prepared for the worst, he also brought along Surgeon Captain A. R. Chapin, one four-horse spring wagon, and a Red Cross Ambulance.[30] After forty miles of rapid riding, the detachment was within two or three miles of Sitting Bull's house. Here the courier met them, erroneously reporting that all the Indian police had been killed. As Fechet formed his men into two columns, with the artillery between them, a second messenger arrived with the report that some of the police were penned inside Sitting Bull's house and running low on ammunition.

The Hotchkiss rifle was placed on a low ridge overlooking the camp. With the first shot, the police in the house showed a white flag. Shortly thereafter the two forces rendezvoused in the camp itself and drove the remaining Sioux up the Grand River Valley. As Fechet rode by Sitting Bull's house, he noted the dead body of the Hunkpapa leader lying on the ground, its face smashed in by a neck yoke. The major recalled that the sight "assured me that the object of the expedition had been more than accomplished."[31]

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[29] Fechet, p. 190; Utley, p. 160. The horse had been taught to sit upon hearing gunfire and raise one hoof in the air; it is possible that the Sioux believed the spirit of Sitting Bull had entered the animal. Russell, p. 363.

[30] Fechet, p. 188.

The small skirmish resulted in fourteen Indian dead - six police and eight Hunkpapas.[32] The number included Lt. Bull Head, who died on December 18. Three hostiles were wounded, and two were taken under arrest.[33] In the chase up the valley, no injuries were reported on either side. One Ghost Dancer, wearing a ghost shirt, penetrated the Army line along the river, but rode away unarmed.[34]

The dead and wounded Indian police were returned to the post, along with the remains of Sitting Bull. Fechet and his command returned also, the major considering his mission accomplished with the death of the chief. The Indian police and their friends objected so strongly to Sitting Bull being buried in the agency cemetery that he was interred in the post cemetery.[35] The body was sewed in canvas and put into a simple wooden coffin; the Hunkpapa who once held sway over thousands of Teton-Dakota was attended by four Army officers at his graveside.[36]

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[31] Ibid., p. 189.

[32] Mooney, The Ghost Dance Religion..., p. 891; Andrist, p. 345.

[33] Ruger to Assistant Adjutant General, Division of the Missouri, March 26, 1891, in NA, RG 75.

[34] Fechet, pp. 191-192. The major says this particular brave fell at Wounded Knee two weeks later, still wearing his protective shirt.

[35] Ibid., pp. 192-193.

[36] Report of H. M. Deeble, Post Surgeon at Ft. Yates, to Lt. Col. Drum, January 23, 1891, in NA, RG 75.

The news of the death of Sitting Bull echoed across the nation. His demise was generally regarded as the best thing possible under the circumstances. Certainly McLaughlin thought so; he informed Belt that

> ...my Indian police...were instructed to arrest Sitting Bull when the troops were sufficiently near to afford them protection in case of resistance to arrest.

After asking for a monetary reward for the Indian police survivors, McLaughlin concluded smugly:

> ...the ending of Sitting Bull's career, whose influence has been of such a retarding nature, and the determination the police manifested in maintaining the will of the government, is most gratifying.[37]

In all his communications with Washington concerning Sitting Bull's death, the agent could hardly conceal his jubilation. Noble was moved to write Morgan that "Agent McLaughlin is so proud of his exploit that he rather suppresses the source of his action. But it is necessary that it be shown and understood that this was an act of the Military, without qualification."[38]

General Miles thought that a grave danger had been averted when Sitting Bull had been prevented from joining the Conservatives at Pine Ridge.[39] He recalled that "None of the other Indians possessed such power to draw and mold the hearts of his people to one purpose, and his fall appeared to be the death-knell of the Indian supremacy in that western country."[40]

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[37] McLaughlin to Belt, December 16, 1890, in ibid. For Fechet's praises of the Indian police, see the Rapid City Daily Journal, December 27, 1890 (1:2).

[38] Noble to Morgan, December 31, 1890, in NA, RG 75. Emphasis is Noble's.

[39] Johnson, p. 281.

The press, almost without exception, rejoiced at the news. The New York Times believed the end of the rebellion was near, now that the "accomplished liar" was dead.[41] The Black Hills Daily Times pompously informed its readers that "Bull was considered during the last years of his life a little better than the average coffee cooler, a term synonymous with vagabond."[42] The Pierre Daily Capital, never at a loss for purple prose, exuberantly declared that "He is sitting with his Bully Brothers in the Happy Hunting Grounds - the Rumor of the Demise of the Old Sinner is Confirmed."[43] The general feeling was that the Hunkpapa had been a "bad Indian;" even Red Cloud was critical. "He was nothing but what the white man made him," said the aging Oglala chief. "He was a conceited man who never did anything great but wanted to get into notice, and the white men who had something to make by it encouraged and used him."[44] Practically no one considered Sitting Bull's actions in the terms of

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[40] Lt. Gen. Nelson A. Miles, Serving the Republic (New York: Harper Brothers, 1911), p. 240.

[41] New York Times, December 17, 1890 (2:5).

[42] Black Hills Daily Times, December 19, 1890 (1:3).

[43] Pierre Daily Capital, December 17, 1890 (4:3).

[44] Quoted in DeBarthe, p. 250.

Indian patriotism; he was measured only by the yardstick of the white civilization. One editor called him "...a designing rebel whose life was spent in shedding the blood of innocent and unsuspecting victims and in plotting treason against the government that nourished him and his people."[45]

Some Americans, although excoriating the way in which Sitting Bull died, still temporized that his death would benefit his own people even more than the whites.[46] Others, a definite minority, castigated the Grand River incident as an example of total mismanagement on the part of Indian authorities. Among these was Mrs. Catherine Weldon, a member of the National Indian Defense Association, who had first come to Standing Rock in 1889 to oppose the Crook Commission. She had returned in 1890 to lavish gifts on Sitting Bull, much to McLaughlin's annoyance. She was not present at Sitting Bull's camp in December, having returned to Boston. Even at a distance of 2,000 miles, however, Mrs. Weldon was sure that "the whole affair was a deliberately planned and cruelly executed assassination."[47]

With the end of Sitting Bull, almost all effective opposition to McLaughlin collapsed. With the center of disaffection removed, the agent had little trouble in keeping his charges in line throughout the ensuing weeks. The death of the Hunkpapa chief was the first in a chain of circumstances that would end two weeks later at Wounded Knee. The behavior of McLaughlin in the Grand River affair, although clouded by his personal animosity toward Sitting Bull, is above reproach. Although he was happy to see the chief dead, it was not his intention, nor that of Major Fechet and the Indian police, to kill him. Sitting Bull died as Crazy Horse had died thirteen years before: uselessly, as a by-product of the almost complete inability of the United States to nourish an alien civilization in its midst, on the latter's own terms.

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[45] Pierre Daily Capital, December 24, 1890 (2:2).

[46] For an example of this view, see Baird, p. 370.

[47] Quoted in Thomas A. Bland (ed.), A Brief History of the Late Military Invasion of the Home of the Sioux (Washington: The Indian National Defense Association, 1891), p. 30. Utley (p. 99) calls Mrs. Weldon an "eccentric widow."

Had Sitting Bull reached Pine Ridge, it may be doubted if he could have elevated himself into a position of leadership, even though he had received an invitation to come. Yet in the light of the situation as they saw it, Miles, Ruger, Drum, Fechet, and McLaughlin were unanimous in their decision to arrest the chief. They could not have foreseen, although they were prepared for, the clash on Grand River, nor could they have predicted the exodus of the Hunkpapa camp. The most serious result of Sitting Bull's death was not that the Sioux had lost a leader who might have provided the catalyst for an uprising; it was the flight of nearly 400 of the chief's followers from the Grand River.[48] This group arrived, carrying their wounded, at a Miniconjou settlement on the Moreau River on December 16, thus putting themselves onto the Cheyenne River Reservation.[49] From there, about 160 returned to Standing Rock, coaxed by emissaries sent out by McLaughlin. Eighty-eight more lingered at the river; they too eventually returned to Standing Rock. The remaining 150-odd faced southward and headed toward the camp of the Miniconjou chief Big Foot on Cheyenne River.

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[48] Utley, p. 169.

[49] Report of Reverend Ashley in Pierre Daily Capital, December 18, 1890 (4:2).

At Cheyenne Agency, the inexperienced Agent Palmer had been having his hands full in dealing with Big Foot and Hump. He reported of Big Foot's band that "Nearly all of these Indians are in possession of Winchester Rifles and the police say they are afraid of them, being armed only with revolvers."[50]

Palmer had visited the Ghost Dance camp of Hump and Big Foot at the mouth of Cherry Creek, about sixty miles from agency headquarters. He was unable to stop the dancing, and indeed seemed an unequal match for the two chiefs. Big Foot (also called Spotted Elk) and Hump had both been regarded as unprogressive Indians by their former agent, McChesney, and Palmer had immediately endorsed this opinion, as both men had steadfastly refused to sign the 1889 treaty.[51] Palmer regarded Hump as "the most dangerous character on this agency."[52]

Actually, Palmer was probably dealing with more potentially dangerous adversaries than was Royer at Pine Ridge. Hump was a veteran of the Custer wars; he had been one of the three leading war chiefs of the Sioux Nation, along with Crazy Horse and Gall. Big Foot was widely respected throughout the Dakota lodges for his judgement and other qualities of leadership. He was particularly honored by a pretty legend, told while he still lived. It was said that at the age of nine young Spotted Elk, while in a Pawnee-hunting war party of twenty men, talked to a ghost. Although the ghost scared the other members of the band, the lad fed it and asked that he be allowed three things: to strike an enemy, be slightly wounded, and capture enemy horses. The ghost said it would help; as a result, Spotted Elk stole twenty-one Pawnee horses and was wounded in the foot by a Pawnee arrow. The wounded foot swelled until it was very large, thus giving the boy the name of Big Foot.[53] He became a chief, a great diplomat and a courteous friend to trusted outsiders. These two men, the warrior and the diplomat, were strong foes indeed.

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[50] Palmer to Belt, October 11, 1890, in NA, RG 75. Actually, as later events proved, Palmer grossly overestimated the fighting strength of the Miniconjous, just as Royer did with the Oglalas at Pine Ridge.

[51] "Messiah War on Cheyenne River," The Wi-Iyohi, XVII, No. 8 (November 1, 1963), p. 1.

[52] Palmer to Belt, October 29, 1890, in NA, RG 75.

The west river country was undergoing scattered raids, most of them from the Cheyenne Agency Indians, although some of the marauders came from the Stronghold. The Sioux were particularly fond of shooting cattle, from which they would remove the sinews, which they used as thread, and then take choice cuts of meat, or, if they were lucky, the greatest luxury - an unborn calf. The remainder of the carcass was left to decay or be consumed by wolves. Such activity plagued the west river ranchers throughout the fall of 1890.

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[53] J. R. Walker, "The Sun Dance and Other Ceremonies of the Oglala Division of the Teton-Dakota," Anthropological Papers of the American Museum of Natural History, XVI, Pt. 2 (1917), pp. 215-217.

James (Scotty) Philip was living with an Indian family at the mouth of Grindstone Butte Creek, eighty miles up Bad River, during this time. Twelve Indians visited him, "armed with Winchesters and laden with ammunition." One told Philip that "he had seen the time when he used to beat out the brains of children and drink women's blood, and that the time was coming when he would do it again."[54] Philip had twenty cattle killed during this period; he was sure there would be an uprising, and very soon. His neighbor, a man named Waldron, had seven cattle killed, while one Whitfield, a settler on Pass Creek, had his home broken open and his horses and goods stolen, on or about November 15.[55] Philip and Waldron were sure they had been visited by Short Bull's Ghost Dancers from the Stronghold. At this time, old Two Strike and his group had not yet been persuaded to come in to Pine Ridge; the two ranchers estimated about 1,000 lodges and 1,500 warriors in the Bad Lands fortress.[56]

Until the Army could position itself, the only organized force in the area was the state militia. Governor Mellette had commissioned Colonel M. H. Day to put volunteer troops in the field in an attempt to drive all the Indians back to their respective reservations. Day placed one company of fifty-one men, Captain George Cosgrove, at Frank Stanton's ranch on Spring Creek, and another at J. B. McCloud's ranch on Battle Creek, with forty-nine men under Captain Gene Akin. The ranch home of a man named Daly, located on the bank of the Cheyenne River, had been looted and its inhabitants driven to McCloud's place, three miles distant. Three militiamen at McCloud's made the return journey and found three braves lingering at Daly's. One of the Indians, whom McCloud later identified as a Carlisle graduate, had stolen one of Daly's horses; before crossing the river, he ineffectually fired on his pursuers, who returned the fire, also without effect. Eight men concealed themselves at the ranch throughout the night. In the morning, they were joined by Captain Akin and four others from Stanton's ranch. This gave the whites sixteen men. No sooner had the reinforcements arrived than they were attacked by a group twice their size. The attackers were driven off, and their leader, the "Carlisle graduate," was killed. This episode occurred on the morning of December 15, the same day on which Sitting Bull had died, 100 miles to the north.

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[54] South Dakota Governor Arthur C. Mellette to General Miles, November 26, 1890, quoted in George Philip, "James (Scotty) Philip," _South Dakota Historical Collections_, XX (1940), p. 383.

[55] Philip, _Ibid_.

[56] _Ibid_., pp. 383-384. This was yet another case of exaggeration, nearly quadrupling the actual number of fugitives in the Bad Lands.

The same day, Colonel Day and his remaining men were set upon by a large number of Sioux (McCloud estimated 300) between the Stanton and the McCloud ranches; in this skirmish, the portly colonel received a bullet through his coat. Day was forced to send for help to Colonel Eugene A. Carr, a regular army officer who was patrolling east and west with his Sixth Cavalry from a base at the mouth of Rapid Creek.

Carr sent a relief party up the river to Day's aid, and the Indians evaporated onto the prairie. Altogether, Day's command had half a dozen fire-fights with the Sioux during the week of December 14.[57]

The results of all this fighting were incredibly garbled when they reached the centers of population. The Pierre Daily Capital, much to its chagrin, was forced to discredit a rumor that fifty soldiers had been killed, but hastened to add that "Every means has been exhausted and /the Indians/ are still defiant and aggressive."[58] The capital city, seventy-five miles from any Indians and one hundred and fifty from any hostiles, seems to have been very impressionable during this period. The State Legislature was in session, but the lawmakers as well as everyone else hung on every word to come from the west river country. At 2:00 A.M. on Sunday morning, December 15, as Major Fechet and his command were moving rapidly toward the Grand River, word came for the Pierre militia to hold itself in readiness. The company promptly assembled, received instructions, and was drilled. At the evening church service, one of the pastors prayed, "O Lord, prepare us for what awaits us. We have just been listening to the sweet sounds of praise, but ere the morning sun we may hear the war whoop of the red man."[59] The legislature immediately made an appropriation for arms for the militia, at the expense of the state agricultural fair.

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[57] This account of the state militia and the Daly Ranch Affair is taken mainly from an undated letter (believed to have been written in 1906) from J. B. McCloud to Doane Robinson, South Dakota State Historian, entitled "Some Wounded Knee History," in the files of the South Dakota State Historical Society, Pierre, South Dakota (hereafter cited as SDSHS). McCloud's account is extremely colorful, perhaps too much so, but the author has favored his version, due to his familiarity with the terrain and the personalities involved. McCloud, like ranchers Philip and Waldron, thought he was fighting against "thousands of insanely desperate ghost dancers." For a slightly different viewpoint on the Daly Ranch Affair, see Utley, pp. 143-144.

[58] Pierre Daily Capital, December 19, 1890 (1:2).

Rumor was everywhere. A newspaper correspondent at Pine Ridge reported this conversation between himself and a friendly Indian:

> Question: What Indians are to fight?
> Answer: All who like.
> Q. Tonight?
> A. Soon.
> Q. How soon?
> A. In one sun.
> Q. Tomorrow, then?
> A. Yes, tomorrow.[60]

The topper, however, was the work of a civilian correspondent who had stationed himself at Army Headquarters on Bitter Creek. The anonymous scribe, who may or may not have seen any action, wrote:

> Wah! Wah!! Wah!!! All is wah! Indians in countless numbers swarm on every hand. Their disheartening and hair-lifting war cry drowns even the roar of musketry and canon (sic), which, in the hands of our own intrepid but rapidly decreasing band of soldiers, are steadily pouring grape and shell into the enemy. The circle described by the Indian cavalry is closer to us every moment. See them ride! Behold the dauntless Rain-in-the-Face cheer forward his followers. Gore-stained horses without riders rush madly among both cavalry and infantry, creating confusion and distracting attention from the front. There goes a horse dragging his former rider, whose foot caught in

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[59] Mooney, The Ghost Dance Religion...., p. 892.

[60] Black Hills Daily Times, December 17, 1890 (1:3).

> the stirrup when he fell, pierced by twenty-nine bullets. Will Miles never succor us? Our courier left here for his camp during the night. If he does not come soon we will surely be annihilated. The devils! How near they come! The infantry are piling up the dead soldiers - making breastworks. Carr's four companies are now protected by a three-feet (sic) wall, which does not shudder and start as the bullets strike them (sic). The dust and smoke are blinding.[61]

Such reports easily made Dakotans nervous. Miles was on his way to Rapid City, having first gone to Washington, where he had requested an increase in the Sioux beef allotment and the establishment of military control over the agencies.[62] While he was en route, the flock of correspondents at Pine Ridge had nothing better to do than write filler copy. A few bold ones, such as Will Cressey of the Omaha Bee, who witnessed the fighting at Daly's ranch, actually ventured into the field, but most of the reporters, like the man who talked to the Indian who predicted an attack "tomorrow," simply hung around the agency and filed stories on every rumor that came along.[63] To most of these men, as well as their readers who tingled in pleasant fear across the nation, the Ghost Dance was a sinister plot and the Army was embarked on a great campaign to eradicate the last Indian menace from the West. When a reporter took time to analyze the new religion, he usually approached his subject from the white Christian viewpoint, thus gaining the sympathy of his readers while further compounding the public misunderstanding of the outbreak. Thus the nation was informed of the Sioux and the Messiah.

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[61] Aberdeen American-News (no date), quoted in Pierre Daily Capital, December 19, 1890 (4:3). Even the fairly irresponsible Capital was forced to disclaim this hyperbole, if only from the knowledge that Rain-in-the-Face was one of the leading Progressives at Standing Rock.

[62] Johnson, p. 274.

[63] The number of correspondents on the scene eventually swelled to about twenty-five, including Frederick Remington, just beginning his career; Warren Moorehead, the anthropologist; and an educated Sioux woman named Bright Eyes. There was even one "honorary" correspondent, a Finnish tourist named K. V. Zilliacus, who had accompanied the St. Louis Post-Dispatch reporter. Most of the reporters carried the new snapshot cameras, making the activities around Pine Ridge among the best-photographed of Indian conflicts, although pictures of the Ghost Dance itself are extremely rare. Not all of these newspapermen, apparently, were reporters of integrity. Watson, pp. 205-219, passim; Cook, pp. 235-239; letter from Robert Lee to Will G. Robinson, South Dakota State Historian, January 6, 1952, in SDSHS.

The press was not centered at Cheyenne Agency, much to the relief of Agent Palmer. The Fifth Estate may well have proved unbearable to the recent appointee, added as it would have been to the trouble Big Foot was causing. The revered Miniconjou now stood alone; amazingly enough, Hump had been persuaded to renounce the Ghost Dance.

On December 3, 1890, an Army captain named Ezra P. Ewers had detrained in Pierre; Ewers had immediately set out for Ft. Bennett. He had been summoned all the way from Ft. Bliss, Texas. The captain had known Hump when the latter had scouted for the government years before. Ewers was able to persuade the chief to become a scout again. Hump even resumed his old job as head of the agency police, and began to oppose the Ghost Dance.[64]

Big Foot still held out. He had received a message from Pine Ridge inviting him to come there and see the trouble for himself; he chose to wait until the ration day at Cheyenne

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[64] "Messiah War on Cheyenne River," p. 2; Andrist, p. 346; Pierre Daily Capital, December 11, 1890 (3:3); Utley, pp. 131-132.

River Agency, December 22, and then go to Pine Ridge.[65] The Miniconjou chief had long been under troop surveillance; as early as April, 1890, even before Kicking Bear had visited Cheyenne River, three troops of the Eighth Cavalry and two companies of the Third Infantry under Captain A. G. Hennissee had camped on the north side of the Cheyenne River, within three miles of Big Foot's camp.[66] On November 23, the Sixth Cavalry had been summoned to South Dakota from Ft. Bayard, New Mexico. The Sixth unloaded in Rapid City on December 9; one squadron was in the field the next day, on its way to patrol the Cheyenne River country, while the rest of the men followed as soon as they could be equipped with winter clothing.[67] It was the Sixth which had aided Colonel Day and his hastily assembled militia in the skirmishing the week of December 14.

On December 3, Captain Hennissee had been relieved in his observatory post by Lt. Col. E. V. Sumner, a veteran Indian fighter who nevertheless displayed great respect and sympathy for the red man. Sumner brought with him an additional company of infantry, giving him about 200 men.

The focus of all this attention, of course, was Big Foot. Ironically enough, there is evidence that the chief himself had already given up the Ghost Dance,[68] but the religion was kept alive in his camp by a fanatical medicine man named Yellow Bird. When the Standing Rock fugitives arrived at the Miniconjou camp, Big Foot readily took them in; as he later told Sumner, "What else could I do? They came to me almost naked, were hungry, footsore, and weary, many of them my brothers and relatives!"[69]

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[65] The invitation to Big Foot was apparently extended by Red Cloud, Little Wound, Young-Man-Afraid-of-His-Horses, and No Water. See the statement of Frog, the brother of Big Foot, to Interpreter Philip Wells, in Wells, p. 290.

[66] "Messiah War on Cheyenne River," p. 2.

[67] Lt. Col. W. H. Carter, From Yorktown to Santiago with the Sixth U. S. Cavalry (Baltimore: The Friedenwald Company, 1900), pp. 257-258.

[68] Utley, p. 173.

In Agent Palmer's eyes, Big Foot was harboring Indians who rightfully belonged at Standing Rock. He was "satisfied that there is no longer any danger of trouble with any of the Indians on this reserve except those belonging to Big Foot's band."[70] When the Hunkpapa fugitives arrived on Cheyenne River, rancher Narcisse Narcelle became apprehensive. On the seventeenth, he advised all the white settlers in the area to go in to Ft. Bennett; all except a man named Henry Angell did so. Captain Joseph H. Hurst, the post commandant, sent out Lt. Harry E. Hale, Hump, a policeman named White Thunder, and Nolland, the post guide, to investigate the situation.[71] So effective had been the visit of Captain Ewers that Hump willingly agreed to act against the religion he had espoused so strongly only days before.

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[69] Quoted in DeBarthe, p. 228.

[70] Palmer to Belt, December 14, 1890, in NA, RG 75. This letter was misdated, as Palmer mentions the death of Sitting Bull, which occurred on the fifteenth.

[71] "Messiah War on Cheyenne River," p. 2; Utley, p. 176. The Bennett garrison was not large, yet it formed one-half of the pincers in which the Army hoped to squeeze Big Foot in case of any emergency. Sumner, to the west, had requested that two troops of the Eighth Cavalry under Captain A. B. Wells, stationed at Oelrichs, join him as soon as possible. Ruger vetoed the request, leaving Sumner with his original force of 200. "Messiah War on Cheyenne River," p. 4.

When Lt. Hale and his party arrived in Cheyenne City, about forty miles upriver from the agency, on December 18, only Angell was there. Hale pushed on and soon made contact with about forty Hunkpapa braves; after a tense moment, the officer extracted their promise to remain in the area until Captain Hurst could be summoned from Ft. Bennett. In this way, Hale hoped to prevent a juncture of the Hunkpapas with Big Foot's Miniconjous, an event that had already occurred.

The Hunkpapas had found Big Foot camped twenty miles above the mouth of Cherry Creek. With the news of Sitting Bull's death, the chief's dilemma became more pronounced; he could either move on to Pine Ridge or go in to Ft. Bennett to meet an uncertain fate. Big Foot vacillated; in the meantime, his men killed a calf belonging to James Cavanaugh, who ran a general store near the place where lay the Miniconjou camp.[72] Cavanaugh promptly reported this to a patrol of the Eighth Cavalry, under Lt. R. J. Duff. Duff in turn relayed Big Foot's whereabouts to Sumner, who instantly headed his command toward Cherry Creek.

While Lt. Hale was away at Ft. Bennett, summoning Hurst, a total of sixty-eight Standing Rock Indians and Miniconjous of Hump's band had joined Big Foot. A little over two hundred Hunkpapas and Miniconjous remained encamped at the mouth of Cherry Creek. Upon their return, Hurst and Hale persuaded this entire group to go in to Ft. Bennett. The Indians were escorted to the agency by rancher Narcello, arriving on December 23.[73] Later arrivals eventually swelled the total number of incarcerated Indians to 353. The Hunkpapas in the group, 166 in all, were sent downriver to Ft. Sully, to be confined as prisoners. Eventually, those belonging to the Cheyenne River Reservation were allowed to return to their homes.[74] In the meantime, Colonel Henry C. Merriam had reinforced Cheyenne City with four companies of the Seventh Infantry from Ft. Sully.

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[72] The Pierre Daily Capital, December 23, 1890 (4:2) reported that the Sioux had forced Cavanaugh off his land, plundered his store, and butchered one of his cattle. There is evidence that the merchant invited the Indians to kill his stock. He later claimed that otherwise they might have harmed him and his son, as they were armed and painted for war. Utley, p. 177.

By now Big Foot's band numbered 356, of which 106 were warriors capable of fighting.[75] Most of them were cold, hungry, and scared. They knew only that Sitting Bull had been killed and that the Army was closing in; the only course seemed to be to wait and see what the soldiers had to offer. What had begun on the Grand River was continuing on the banks of the Cheyenne.

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[73] Hurst to Assistant Adjutant General, Department of the Dakota, January 9, 1891, in SW, Annual Report (1891), pp. 201-202; Palmer to Morgan, December 22, 1890, in NA, RG 75. Palmer consistently misdated his letters throughout the trouble; he told Morgan that the Indians arrived at his agency on December 21.

[74] Anderson, "A History of the Cheyenne River Agency...," p. 505. An officer, seeing the prisoners, said, "Altogether, I don't think there was over 100 young bucks who looked as if they were capable of fighting. The Indians brought in were the worst scared lot of people I ever saw." Quoted in Pierre Daily Capital, December 25, 1890 (4:2), under the headline "WAR IS OVER."

[75] Vestal, Warpath and Council Fire, p. 302. Utley (p. 179) uses the count taken by the Eighth Cavalry, 333. The author feels that the Cavalry's count did not include certain outriders who chose for one reason or another to stay clear of the blue-coats, even though the soldiers offered food.



THE SIOUX CAMPAIGN OF 1890-91
AREA OF OPERATIONS

BATTLEFIELD
INDIAN CAMP
MILES
0
10
20
30
40
OCTOBER 1961
WALTER VITOUS
N
MONTANA
WYOMING
SOUTH DAKOTA
CHEYENNE RIVER
RESERVATION
MISSOURI
RIVER
CHEYENNE RIVER AGENCY
FORT BENNETT
FORT SULLY
Pierre
CHEYENNE
Cheyenne City
NARCELLE'S RANCH
TOUCH CL
BIG FOOT
Cherry
BELLE
FOURCHE
RIVER
Whitewood
FORT MEADE
Lead
Deadwood
DUNN'S RANCH
CAMP CHEYENNE
Deep Creek
Grindstone
Mexican Creek
Elk Creek
Boxelder Creek
Rapid Creek
Rapid City
Spring Creek
Battle Creek
Hill City
Hermosa
French Creek
Custer
Fairburn
BLACK HILLS
Bad River
LOWER BRULE RES.
CROW CREEK RES.
Sage Creek
BADLANDS
Sage Creek Pass
Big Foot Pass
BADLANDS WALL
Harney Springs
RIVER
WHITE RIVER
STRONGHOLD
CUNY TABLE
PINE RIDGE RES.
Medicine Root Creek
Red Water Creek
Porcupine Creek
Wounded Knee Creek
White Clay Creek
DREXEL MISSION
WOUNDED KNEE
PINE RIDGE AGENCY
RIVER
Bear
Pass Creek
Black Pipe Creek
South Fork
White River
ROSEBUD RESERVATION
ROSEBUD AGENCY
MISSOURI RIVER
Buffalo Gap
CHEYENNE
BURLINGTON & MISSOURI R.R.
Oelrichs
SOUTH DAKOTA
NEBRASKA
WYOMING
Chadron
FREMONT ELKHORN & MISSOURI VALLEY R.R.
WHITE
FORT ROBINSON
Hay Springs
Rushville
Valentine
FORT NIOBRARA
NIOBRARA RIVER
NIO
RIVER
Creek

CHAPTER V

THE FLIGHT OF BIG FOOT

On the morning of December 21, Lt. Col. Sumner made contact with Big Foot. When the officer pressed the Miniconjou for a decision, Big Foot agreed to turn his band back to their old camp within the reservation. All seemed settled, and the Indians enjoyed the feast which the Army prepared for them that evening.[1] After a rugged journey the next day, during which Big Foot's rebellious young braves were constantly on the verge of erupting, the Miniconjous and their Hunkpapa guests arrived at the old camp. Sumner then made what was probably the biggest mistake of the entire campaign. Erroneously believing that Big Foot could control his men, the colonel took the Eighth Cavalry back to Camp Cheyenne, their base post. Big Foot was ill; he promised Sumner that, regardless, he would come to Camp Cheyenne in the morning for a talk.[2] Sumner later justified his action by maintaining that the presence of troops would only have led to open revolt by the nervous, trigger-happy Sioux. Nevertheless, leaving the entire band unattended was inexcusable, if only from a military standpoint.

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[1] Utley, p. 179; James Garvey Interview, The Judge Eli S. Ricker Collection, Nebraska State Historical Society (hereafter cited as Ricker Collection). Garvey was a rancher on Bad River at this time.

[2] Wells, p. 282.

The next day, December 23, a rancher named John Dunn, well-known to the Miniconjous and called "Red Beard" by them, arrived at Sumner's camp to sell butter.[3] Sumner asked Dunn if he would ride to Big Foot's camp and try and persuade the chief to take his band into Cheyenne Agency. Dunn agreed.[4]

Sumner had written to Miles on the nineteenth, reporting the defiance of the Indians.[5] The general arrived by train in Rapid City on the same day, which also saw old Two Strike and his band finally reach Pine Ridge.[6] Miles immediately ordered the arrest of Big Foot and his entire following, an order which Sumner chose to carry out as indicated above.[7]

Relying on Dunn as he did, Sumner may be charged with poor military judgement, yet credited with an excellent sense of the situation in Big Foot's camp. The colonel later wrote that

> I was at that time impressed with the idea that Big Foot was making an extraordinary effort to keep his followers quiet and seemed much relieved at having succeeded in getting them to go to Bennett. With this impression on my mind, it appeared to me that he required at that time all the support I could give him, and I never failed, in the presence of his men

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[3] Joseph Horn Cloud Interview, Ricker Collection. Horn Cloud was a member of Big Foot's band.

[4] "Messiah War on Cheyenne River," p. 7, states that Sumner summoned Dunn by letter, but had already left for Big Foot's camp when Dunn arrived. If so, the letter has been lost. In Sumner's report, which Utley (p. 183) examines thoroughly, it is definitely established that Sumner and Dunn met at Camp Cheyenne.

[5] Ibid., p. 5.

[6] Pierre Daily Capital, December 20, 1890 (1:3).

[7] "Messiah War on Cheyenne River," p. 5.

and others, to show good feeling and the utmost confidence.[8]

Dunn was accompanied by Felix Benoit, an interpreter. At the Indian camp, the rancher overexceeded his authority; rather than peaceful persuasion, he chose to use threats. He informed the Sioux that unless they continued in to the agency, Sumner and his men would come and shoot to kill.[9] Dunn and Benoit then left, leaving Big Foot more undecided than before. The debate between those who favored jumping the reservation and those who wanted to go in to the agency raged throughout the evening of the twenty-third. Big Foot evidently intended to continue the journey to Cheyenne River, but argument was strong for Pine Ridge. For one thing, the Oglala invitation had included the inducement of 100 ponies if Big Foot could bring peace.[10] For another, the Indians believed for certain that Sumner intended to use force; this belief was bolstered by their knowledge that Colonel Merriam, with his detachment of Seventh Infantry, had arrived in Cheyenne City.[11] The Indians knew they would be refused a pass to leave the reservation; they naively reasoned that if they left peacefully and settled the trouble at Pine Ridge, all would be forgiven.[12] By midnight of the twenty-third, Big Foot had given in, and the trek to Pine Ridge was underway. The chief's brother said that Big Foot had left the reservation because he was tired of the treatment he had been receiving at the hands of both Indians and whites;[13] there is strong evidence that, sick as he was, Big Foot was no longer able to play a decisive role in the decision-making of the band, and that he was strongly influenced by a Hunkpapa named Crazy Thunder, who urged him to go to Pine Ridge.[14]

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[8] Sumner to Assistant Adjutant General, Department of Dakota, February 3, 1891, quoted in DeBarthe, p. 229. See pp. 228-237 for an excellent description of Sumner's relationship with Big Foot.

[9] Dewey Beard and Joseph Horn Cloud Interviews, Ricker Collection. Beard was a member of Big Foot's band. Horn Cloud said he heard Dunn say, "I heard the officers agree together to take all the men and bring them to Ft. Meade (near Sturgis, South Dakota) as prisoners." Carter (pp. 258-259) quotes an order to this effect, to Sumner from Miles.

[10] Joseph Horn Cloud Interview, Ricker Collection.

[11] "Messiah War on Cheyenne River," p. 7, says Merriam's arrival alone induced the Sioux to strike southward; this seems impossible in view of Dunn's actions.

Whatever the reason, Big Foot had broken his promise to Sumner. The colonel received the word of the Indians' flight the next morning via one of his scouts. Instead of chasing the band, which he had been charged to do by Miles's order, he delayed at Camp Cheyenne, in case further trouble should come from the north.[15]

Sumner was convinced that Big Foot, dazed by fear and apprehension, had been the motive force behind the exodus into the Bad Lands. Dunn he whitewashed:

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[12] Elks-Saw-Him Interview, Ricker Collection. Elks-Saw-Him was a member of Big Foot's band.

[13] Statement of Frog to Interpreter Philip Wells, in Wells, p. 290.

[14] William Garnett Interview, Ricker Collection. Garnett was an Indian Scout stationed with Sumner's command.

[15] Utley, p. 185; Carter, p. 259. The courier repeated to Sumner what Big Foot had told him. The chief had honestly said he intended to move south on the Deep Fork Trail and would probably pass the head of Bull Creek in the Bad Lands.

> What Mr. Dunn said or did is a question; I was at one time inclined to believe that Mr. Dunn had played me false, but he is a man of good reputation, and from his statement and statements to officers who have seen and interviewed him since, I am not sure that I did him an injustice, and I do not believe or claim that Mr. Dunn was in any way responsible for events which afterward occurred.[16]

It is true that Dunn cannot be held responsible for what later happened at Wounded Knee. His bullying of Big Foot was yet another link in the chain of circumstance which extended back through the death of Sitting Bull to the Crook Commission, and even earlier. As a result of the fear and mistrust which the Sioux felt for the white man, Big Foot and his band were now loose in the Bad Lands, the focus of every Army detachment in the area.

Miles, when he received the news of Big Foot's escape, immediately assumed that the Indians were heading for the Stronghold. As soon as word of Sitting Bull's death had reached Pine Ridge, some Oglalas fled to the Bad Lands to join the apostles Short Bull and Kicking Bear.[17] The Division Commander feared that Big Foot and the Oglalas would turn the Stronghold, already a natural fortress, into a redoubt capable of withstanding his troops for a considerable period. In reality, Big Foot led a weary, foot-sore group of Indians whose minds were focused on Pine Ridge; even the young braves had second thoughts about undergoing a winter in the Bad Lands. Big Foot himself, already ill, contracted pneumonia on the first day of the march, thus increasing the band's desire for an early arrival at Pine Ridge.[18]

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[16] Quoted in DeBarthe, p. 233. [17] Johnson, p. 281.

Colonel Carr had the best chance to head off the Sioux. From his base at the mouth of Rapid Creek, the veteran Indian fighter took four troops of the Sixth Cavalry and two Hotchkiss guns and forced a crossing of the Cheyenne River through floating ice. The detachment reached the head of Sage Creek before dark on December 24, where they were joined by two more troops of the Sixth. On Christmas morning Carr sent some men atop "The Pinnacle", a high point of weather-eroded sandstone which afforded a good view of much of the Bad Lands area. The troopers examined the valley of Bull Creek and reported that Big Foot had not passed there. The regiment then returnedto its camp on Sage Creek, arriving after dark, having covered nearly seventy miles with scarcely any food for the men or horses.[19]

Big Foot had passed to the east of Carr; he had found a pass in the Bad Lands Wall (still known as Big Foot Pass) and had passed through it on the morning of the twenty-fourth. Narrowly avoiding a scouting detachment of the Sixth, the Sioux moved on to Cedar Spring (now called Big Foot Spring) on Christmas Day, while Carr's detachment was scaling The Pinnacle. The Sixth had been eluded, and was henceforth assigned the uncomfortable duty of guarding the Bad Lands flank of the Pine Ridge Reservation.[20]

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[18] Joseph Horn Cloud Interview, Ricker Collection.

[19] Carter, pp. 259-261.

[20] Ibid., p. 262; Utley, pp. 190-191.

All the way from White River to Porcupine Creek, a distance of some thirty miles, the Indians saw no one except "a crazy Irishman" named Francis Mayock.[21] They passed by several ranch homes without incident. On the twenty-sixth, the illness of their chief and the strain of the long journey enabled the Sioux to travel only four miles, to Red Water Creek. By this time, soldiers at Pine Ridge had joined the search. Major Guy V. Henry and four troops of the Ninth Cavalry (a colored regiment) took up a position to the east of the Stronghold. On Christmas Day, some of the Cheyenne scouts used by the government collided with a party of Sioux led by Kicking Bear, on Battle Creek, just north of the Bad Lands. After a sharp exchange of fire, the Indians, who had not attacked the scouts, withdrew into the wasteland.[22] The next day Kicking Bear and Short Bull, with their entire following, succumbed to hunger and cold weather. The hostiles heeded the word of a delegation of some 500 friendly Indians under Little Wound, Big Road, and Fast Thunder, and began the journey in to Pine Ridge.[23]

Sometime during December 25 or 26, Big Foot sent word in to the agency, telling the Pine Ridge Indians of his whereabouts. General Brooke was informed by some of the Progressives; he immediately dispatched another frontier veteran, Major Samuel M. Whiteside, with Troops A, B, I, and K of the Seventh Cavalry and two Hotchkiss guns to the trading post on Wounded Knee Creek run by Louis Mosseau.[24] Mosseau had been hit hard by the Ghost Dancers; Short Bull's men had rifled his store, leaving him only two sacks of flour, four sides of bacon, and four pounds of baking powder.[25] Mosseau had just restocked his shelves. His trading post was the hub of a tiny community that included a post office and a few scattered Indian houses.

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[21] Joseph Horn Cloud Interview, Ricker Collection. The Crazy Irishman was guarding a house belonging to a man with the unlikely name of Condelario Benavidez.

[22] Vestal, Warpath and Council Fire, p. 302; Gus Craven Interview, Ricker Collection. Craven was one of Colonel Carr's scouts.

[23] William Denver McGaa Interview, Ricker Collection. McGaa was with Henry's command as a guide and interpreter. He investigated the Stronghold on December 27 and saw the last of the hostiles moving in to Pine Ridge. By the next day, they were all gone.

The Seventh, Custer's old command, now lay between Big Foot and the agency. On December 28, the Sioux resumed their southward march and immediately ran into advance elements of Whiteside's command.[26] The cold, hungry Indians continued on under the watchful eyes of the soldiers. That afternoon, the procession crossed Wounded Knee Creek; some of the Sioux stopped by Mosseau's store and purchased badly needed items like sugar, coffee, bacon, and candles.[27]

Big Foot himself was too ill to move. When the Indians went into camp on Wounded Knee he was taken off his wagon and transferred to a military ambulance for treatment. In the meantime, Whitside deployed his command. The two Hotchkiss guns were placed atop a low ridge (later named Cemetery Hill) overlooking the camp. Troops A and I were stationed as sentinels around the camp. The Miniconjou chief was given an Army tent, where he was attended by the Seventh's surgeon, Dr. John Van R. Hoff.[28]

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[24] Utley, p. 192.

[25] Louis Mosseau Interview, Ricker Collection.

[26] Philip Wells Interview, ibid.

[27] Joseph Horn Cloud Interview, ibid.

Upon receiving Whitside's message of capture, Brooke undertook to reinforce the 200 soldiers at Wounded Knee. On the evening of December 28, the remainder of the Seventh Cavalry arrived from the agency, together with a detachment of Indian scouts.[29] Commanding the Seventh, as he had since 1886, was Colonel James W. Forsythe.[30] Forsythe had been Phil Sheridan's chief of staff in 1864 and 1865; according to one authority, he had "much of a cavalryman's swaggering confidence."[31] The Colonel had only limited experience as an Indian fighter; his only engagement with the red man had been an inconclusive skirmish with some Bannocks in 1878. His command shared his relative inexperience. True, some of the Seventh's captains, such as George D. Wallace, Charles A. Varnum, Myles Moylan (all of the First Squadron, Whitside's command), Winfield S. Edgerly, and Edward S. Godfrey (the last two of the Second Squadron, under Captain Charles S. Isley) had served under Reno and Benteen at the Little Big Horn. Another, Henry J. Nowlan, had also been in the regiment since Custer's day.[32] However, the enlisted personnel were green; of the some 500 men Forsythe had at Wounded Knee, fully eighty-one were raw recruits, and thirty-eight of these had joined the Seventh only two weeks before, at Pine Ridge.[33] Many people regarded the Sioux and the Seventh as hereditary enemies;[34] the intensity of enmity could not have been as great on the Seventh's side as the Friends of the Indian later charged, given the composition of the regiment. The Indian scouts were seasoned, efficient men. They were led by one of the outstanding young officers in the Army, First Lieutenant Charles W. Taylor of the Ninth Cavalry. Also attached to the scouts was Philip Wells, who had lived at Pine Ridge for some years and was a seasoned interpreter.

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[28] Brig. Gen. E. D. Scott, "Wounded Knee - A Look at the Record," The Field Artillery Journal, XXIX, No. 1 (January-February, 1939), p. 10.

[29] Wells, pp. 282-284; Andrist, p. 348.

[30] Official Army Register, January, 1890 (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1890), p. 197.

[31] Johnson, p. 274.

The night of December 28 was a happy one for the Seventh's officers. They had captured Big Foot at last, and the winter campaign seemed at an end. Forsythe and the reinforcements arrived at 8:45 that evening.[35] The colonel immediately requested rations for 400 Indians - Whitside had had to have his men share some of their rations with the famished Indians.[36] To celebrate, the officers opened a keg of whiskey and gambled at cards.[37] These happenings later gave rise to charges of drunkenness from people who believed the events of the following morning to have been triggered by liquor. It must be remembered that only the officers partook, and then, according to available evidence, in moderation; at that, the cold of a December Dakota morning would have sobered even the most dedicated tosspot. Recreational drinking was a common outlet, indeed one of the few, for the frontier officer, and the Seventh's leaders cannot be accused of letting their previous night's activities cloud their judgement on the morning of the twenty-ninth.

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[32] Utley (pp. 201-202) has an excellent run-down on the chain of command at Wounded Knee. See also Andrist, p. 348.

[33] Lt. John C. Gresham, "The Story of Wounded Knee," Harper's Weekly, XXXV, No. 1781 (February 7, 1891), p. 106.

[34] Johnson, p. 274.

[35] U. S. House of Representatives, Liquidating the Liability..., p. 8.

Forsythe decided to disarm the Sioux the next morning. Indian and white man alike went to sleep unaware that dawn would bring only bloodshed and disaster.

Not so unusually, the men closest to the Sioux difficulties had the best ideas on why the tribe was restless. As soon as General Miles had arrived in Rapid City, on December 19, he had attempted to appraise the situation for the Commandant of the Army, Major General John M. Schofield, who had been appointed to his post in 1888. Schofield deplored the government's Indian policy, and believed firmly in civilian control of the military, although that belief did not extend to endorsing civilian authority on the reservations. According to a recent student, Schofield "did not enjoy the gift of a particularly original mind;"[38] Miles easily convinced him that the uprising was planned and general,[39] but tempered his observations with a plea for some action on Washington's part:

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[36] Forsythe to Acting Assistant Adjutant General, Department of the Platte (in the field), 8:30 P.M., December 28, 1890, in NA, RG 98.

[37] Louis Mosseau and Charles W. Allen Interviews, Ricker Collection. Allen, a reporter for the Chadron (Neb.) Democrat, had accompanied Forsythe out to Wounded Knee. Of the drinking, he noted that Whitside, Wallace, and the other officers were not intoxicated, but "felt well."

> The difficult Indian problem cannot be solved permanently at this end of the line. It requires the fulfillment by Congress of the treaty obligations which the Indians were entreated and coerced into signing. They signed away a valuable portion of their reservation, and it is now occupied by white people, for which they have received nothing. They understood that ample provision would be made for their support; instead, their supplies have been reduced, and much of the time they have been living on half and two-thirds rations. Their crops, as well as the crops of the white people, for two years have been almost total failures. The dissatisfaction was widespread...[40]

Although at times Miles could not resist using the entire affair to boost his reputation, giving the Messiah Craze the appearance of a gigantic cabal,[41] in private he felt an honest concern for the Indians. To his wife he wrote:

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[38] Russell F. Weigley, "The Military Thought of John M. Schofield," Military Affairs, XXIII, No. 2 (Summer, 1958-59), p. 77.

[39] SW, Annual Report (1891), p. 56.

[40] Miles to Schofield, December 19, 1890, quoted in Brig. Gen. L. W. Colby, "The Sioux Indian War of 1890-'91," Transactions and Reports of the Nebraska State Historical Society, III (1892), pp. 172-173.

[41] To this the General appended the idea of rendering the Sioux defenseless. On December 7 he had said, "No other civilized country on earth would tolerate many thousands of armed savages scattered throughout different States and Territories." Quoted in Boyd, pp. 234-235.

> The administration and the Republican Party are making a fatal mistake in not at once confirming the treaty their commissioners made with the Sioux.
>
> We have taken away their land and the white people now have it. The Indians have been half fed or half starved. Neither I nor any other official can insure the Indians that they will receive anything different in the future. They say, and very justly, that they are tired of broken promises.[42]

Miles's knowledge of the problem he confronted was perceptive; he blamed both whites and Indians for the present state of affairs, feeling that the whites had not provided the Sioux with food or clothing in sufficient quantity, nor helped the tribe during the years of crop failure. The Sioux, on their part, had only made a bad situation worse by subscribing to a "religious delusion," while a hostile element had persisted in keeping feelings inflamed.[43]

Commissioner Morgan, by now back at his desk from his leave of absence, also possessed an excellent grasp of the situation. While Big Foot and his band were painfully inching their way south through the Bad Lands, Morgan gave Secretary Noble his views on the Sioux problem:

> Prior to the agreement of 1876 (the Black Hills Cession) buffalo and deer were the main support of the Sioux. Food, tents, bedding, were the direct outcome of hunting, and with furs and pelts as articles of barter or exchange, it was easy for the Sioux to procure whatever constituted for them the necessities, the comforts, or even the luxuries of life. Within

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[42] Quoted in Johnson, p. 282.

[43] Maj. Gen. Nelson A. Miles, "The Future of the Indian Question," North American Review, CLII, No. 410 (January, 1891), pp. 9-10; Rapid City Daily Journal, December 20, 1890 (1:1).

> eight years from the agreement of 1876, the buffalo had gone and the Sioux had left to them Alkali land and Government rations.
>
> It is hard to overestimate the magnitude of the calamity as they viewed it, which happened to these people by the sudden disappearance of the buffalo and the large diminuition in the number of deer and other wild animals...Their loss was so overwhelming and the change of life which it necessitated so great, that the wonder is that they endured it as well as they did. For not only did the vast herds of buffalo and exhaustless supplies of deer and other animals furnish them with food, clothing, shelter, furniture, and articles of commerce, but the pursuit of these animals and the preparation of their products furnished to the great body of them continuous employment and exciting diversion. Suddenly...the freedom of the chase was to be exchanged for the idleness of the camp...Under these circumstances, it is not in human nature not to be discontented and restless, even turbulent and violent.[44]

Unfortunately, many South Dakotans did not see the situation in the same light. The west river country, to all intents and purposes, had been evacuated, and the press responded to the war scare by adding fuel to the flames. People were convinced that they were involved in the Last Great Indian Campaign; Pine Ridge, in glibly worded press dispatches, became "the front."[45] One editor felt that "there is nothing like hunger to bring Indians to terms. Then they might be hurried up a little toward a surrender by an occasional mortar shell dropped among them. The best thing for the troops which the hostile Indians can do is to collect in the bad lands."[46] The same man took a dim view of the complaints of the Dakotas. "The Indians are always complaining of a shortage in rations," he wrote. "If the government boarded them at first class hotels, with the privilege on their part of ordering unlimitedly from the bill of fare, then they would find something to kick about. Some of them would be hungry. The probabilities are that no Sioux has ever starved to death."[47]

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[44] Morgan to Noble, December 26, 1890, quoted in Bland, pp. 6-7.

[45] Rapid City Daily Journal, December 30, 1890 (1:1).

[46] Black Hills Daily Times, December 24, 1890 (2:2).

The contrasting views of government officials and the public, even on the eve of Wounded Knee, served notice that the Indian problem was no nearer to solution than it had been before. In fact, the uprising triggered a rash of public sentiment that could only be classed as anti-Indian.

The refugees at Pine Ridge had been on pins and needles ever since the death of Sitting Bull. General Brooke's command, agency personnel, nervous Sioux, and fugitive settlers were all packed together in uncomfortable and annoying proximity. A missionary, John Y. Nelson, wrote his daughter a letter condemning the entire assemblage:

> I have been working for the benefit of the Indians since I came here. Of course I have no interests on the reservation, neither do I wish to have any. I hate the place and the people also. Daughter, it is no place for anyone who wishes to be virtuous, clean, or religious. I tell you daughter that I would rather follow you and Rosa to your graves than to see you on the Reservation or associate with the people here. Nine of every ten of the girls that came back here have gone to ruin...It is getting worse every day the soldiers are here and it has a demoralizing effect on them.[48]

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[47] Ibid., December 27, 1890 (2:2).

[48] Letter dated December 26, 1890, in NA, RG 75.

Nelson and the refugees were at Pine Ridge by force of duty or circumstance. Others, however, were moved to contribute in their own way to try and bring peace to the Plains. Some of these were racists, some pacificts, some lunatics - all were dead serious. Their interest in the Messiah affair is indicative of the misguided thought regarding the Ghost Dance. Although some of the people mentioned below doubtless existed on the fringes of society (and of sanity), the fact remains that they were not apathetic, but interested enough to step forward and let their views be known.

Sitting Bull had received many letters before his death, some violent, some pleading with him to exert his influence against the Ghost Dance. A Georgian's letter, dated one week before the chief died, may be quoted as an example of the race invective surrounding the outbreak:

> Sitting Bull, old boy, of course you are aware of the newspaper noteriety you have gained through your cussedness, and the uneasy feeling you have caused as an agitator - a worse "tater" could not be found.
>
> Now, I will proceed to express the object of this letter, which is to inform you that if the military authorities do not punish or cause the troops of the regular army to quench your bloodthirstiness, there are 20 or 30 of us Georgian "Corn-Crackers" who will go up there and do you up in a brown rag. We mean business, and don't you "fordoubt" it.
>
> I tell you this as a friend and hope you will accept it as advice, for I don't want to see you hurt, and "I would hate to have to go up there to hurt you myself."
>
> You have danced a long jig now. You had better let somebody else have a chance.
>
> I will close now by telling you that if we hear any more of this monkey business, we are coming and the first thing we do will be to cut off your right leg and beat your brains (or horse sense) out with the bloody end of it.
>
> Hoping these few lines will be a valuable

> warning to you, I await results of my effort to save you and your tribe from being wiped out from the face of the earth like hogs with the measles. If there is any more moon-light hops, you will be swept away like the chaff before a jimmykane.
>
> With due respect, I am, a preventor of cruelty to (you) animals.
>
> P. S. If you have time, "when you have time," I would be glad to hear from you by letter. Give my love to Misses Sitting Bull and all the other cows.[49]

Some people chose to bombard the Indian Office with sure-fire ideas for ending the outbreak, proudly proclaiming their credentials. One man notified "James G. Blane, Sec. Int.," that

> The Indian outbreaks are getting to be a nuisance. We will organize a party of fifty men, the Government to furnish us with two good horses each, a good Winchester Rifle, two good Colts Rev. and give us $300.00 Bounty and say a salary of Fifty Per Month each and our own Judgement and we will settle this Indian question For Ever, and Rations and Ammunition we should have in addition to this say five dollars a head. Should you think favorably of this, telegraph at once.[50]

Old soldiers everywhere were stirred to action. Several British Army officers, said to be friends of Buffalo Bill, left England heading for Pine Ridge to offer their services.[51] "Texas Ben," who boasted that he had "the written endorsement of Cole Younger," modestly offered his services to the government.[52] One man concluded his pitch by assuring the

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[49] Quoted in Vestal, New Sources of Indian History, pp. 76-77. In both this source and the National Archives, it is unusual to come across a dispassionate letter concerning the Messiah Craze.

[50] L. Hemrick (no address) to Secretary of the Interior, November 29, 1890, in NA, RG 75.

[51] Pierre Daily Capital, January 17, 1891 (1:1).

[52] "Texas Ben" to Morgan, November 21, 1890, in NA, RG 75.

President that he was a Republican.[53] And from the Old Soldiers' Home in Marshalltown, Iowa, came this stirring call to arms:

> Dear Sir:
>
> i Am Filen Wile Anf to Get into the Cadel A Getn And can do mor with the indians than eney man THAT LIVES OR EVER DID LIVE. i can toak the tun better than eney man leves if my cuves is wanted i wish you wood rite A leter rite may or teleraf me BFOR IT GOES TO FAR i CAN STOP IT. now befor it geoes to far i no mor beout them indians AS I WAS RAZED A mon them.
>
> P.S. i will do enethin for my cuniry that i can.[54]

The letters sent to Washington were split about evenly between the martial-minded and the pacifists. The Universal Peace Union reminded Secretary Noble that "*if thine enemy hunger, feed him.*"[55] Several suspicious souls wrote in to inform the Bureau that the Mormons were behind the whole thing. A lady of Utica, New York, calling herself the "Doctor Princess Viroqua" and claiming to be of Iroquois blood, offered (along with her sister "Wynima") to journey to the Dakotas and try moral suasion on the Sioux.[56] One eccentric actually got to Pine Ridge - Albert C. Hopkins, of Nashua, Iowa. Hopkins arrived at the agency shortly after the news of the death of Sitting Bull, and the newspaper correspondents, desperate for local color, gave him a big play. Hopkins claimed to be the Messiah; he announced he would go to the Sioux bearing the "Pansy Banner of Peace." The pansies would bloom on the prairie in the spring of 1891 and the millenium would be there, said he. To the poker-faced Sioux camped around the agency, he showed stigmata on his feet and side and also had them feel a soft spot on the top of his head, warning them not to press too hard or wings would sprout and he would fly away. The Indians treated him with courtesy and respect, as they did with all whom they regarded as demented, but they did not listen; most of the Messiah's audience were Progressives, the rest disillusioned. Hopkins was escorted to the border of the reservation and told not to return, but not before he had provided the bored newspapermen some hot copy.[57]

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[53] W. H. McNutt, of Philadelphia, to Harrison, November 25, 1890, in *ibid*.

[54] William J. Cannon to Commissioner of Indian Affairs, November 27, 1890, in *ibid*.

[55] Universal Peace Union to Noble, December 17, 1890, in *ibid*. Emphasis is the Peace Union's.

[56] Mooney, *The Ghost Dance Religion...*, p. 893. Mooney shows the sisters' ancestry to be froudulent.

From the diverse and unusual reactions to the Ghost Dance, it is evident that the new religion of the Sioux, in the eyes of a largely uninformed or misinformed public, was strictly an emotional issue.[58] The men nearest the center of the cloud surrounding and obscuring the entire affair in the American mind, namely Noble, Morgan, Miles, Schofield, and McLaughlin, not to mention other cognizant government personnel, understood the situation as well as it could have been understood in the light of contemporary evidence. Obviously, the Sioux would have to receive an increase in rations and clothing; by now, all the interested parties were agreed, even the most inflexible or disinterested Congressman must be made to see that point. First, though, the armed men of Big Foot's band had to be disarmed and brought in to Pine Ridge. This is the task which Colonel Forsythe and his men set for themselves on the morning of December 29, 1890.

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[57] *Ibid.*, pp. 893-894; Hagan, p. 133; Bailey, p. 172; *Black Hills Daily Times*, December 26, 1890 (1:3); *Sioux Falls Argus-Leader*, December 24, 1890 (1:3); William F. Kelley, "The Indian Troubles and the Battle of Wounded Knee," *Transactions and Reports of the Nebraska State Historical Society*, IV (1892), p. 37. Hopkins later wrote Secretary Noble in March, 1893, threatening to try again, signing himself "Albert C. Hopkins, Pres. Pro. Tem. The Pansy Society of America." Mooney, *The Ghost Dance Religion*..., p. 894.

[58] In the light of the above collection of letters, it must not be thought that serious offers of help were not forthcoming. See, for example, a letter from A. G. Shaw of Valentine, Nebraska, to Miles, January 8, 1890, in NA, *RG 98*.


THE BATTLE OF WOUNDED KNEE CREEK
DECEMBER 29, 1890
Cemetery Hill
WOUNDED KNEE
Cavalry Camp
Post Office and Store
E Tp.
Battery
1/2 A & I Troops
B Tp.
COUNCIL
K Troop
G Troop
Indian Village
ROAD
WIRE FENCE
WIRE FENCE
WIRE FENCE
2/3 A & I Troops Dismounted
AGENCY
Indian Scouts Mounted
C & D Troops Mounted
Wounded Knee Creek
3400'
3400'
3400'
3400'
N
0 0.1 MILE 0.2 0.3
0 100 YARDS 200 300
0 300 FEET 600 900
OCTOBER 1961

CHAPTER VI

WOUNDED KNEE

At daybreak, Colonel Forsythe deployed his troops with some care, keeping in mind his ordered objective of disarming the Sioux without any difficulty. The Seventh's camp lay just to the west of Wounded Knee Creek, while Big Foot's band was encamped about 250 yards to the southwest of the soldiers. To the north of the Indian camp lay the yet-to-be-named Cemetery Hill, on which Whitside had placed four Hotchkiss guns the night before. On a small knoll to the west of Cemetery Hill Forsythe placed E Troop. He divided Troops A and I - one third of these he sent north to protect the battery's left flank; the other two thirds dismounted and took position on the far side of a ravine running east into the creek about fifty yards south of the Indian encampment.

The spot for the council had already been picked; it lay mid-way between the two camps. Immediately to the west of the council ground, Forsythe placed B Troop; to the south, K Troop. Across the road leading to the agency, to the east, G Troop was positioned at a distance of about 300 yards. Behind the dismounted line of cavalrymen from Troops A and I, Lt. Taylor and his Indian scouts drew up in a mounted line abreast. Behind and to the left of Taylor, straddling the agency road, were C and D Troops, also mounted.[1]

The Sioux were completely surrounded. It was the purpose of the deployment to "overawe" the Indians and thus more easily bring them to terms.[2] Forsythe, satisfied that his placement of troops was correct, sent Scout John Shangrau to summon the Sioux males to the front of Big Foot's tent. The tent lay at the edge of the council space, and the ailing Miniconjou was propped up on a pallet in front of it so he could better view the proceedings. The women and children were separated from the men at a distance of about 100 yards, while between the warriors and their tepees Troops B and K were interposed. No one but small Indian children were allowed to take horses to water or in any way touch them.[3]

The time was 8:00 A. M., about sunrise. Slowly, the men gathered at the appointed spot, while the women and children remained apart. When the assemblage was complete, the Sioux were told to go to their tents, collect their weapons, and surrender them to the soldiers. Sullenly, about twenty Indians left the council and returned a few minutes later with two broken carbines. With this, Forsythe lost patience and ordered a general search of the camp.

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[1] Sources for the placement of troops are Army maps drawn shortly after the battle and contained in NA, RG 94, Records of the Adjutant General's Office.

[2] Testimony of Major Whitside in Kent-Baldwin Report, ibid. (Hereafter cited as KBR).

[3] Statement of Catching Spirit Elk, a member of Big Foot's band, in Burdick, The Last Days of Sitting Bull, p. 83.

The search itself was conducted by several of the scouts and about thirty men from Troops B and K. At the same time, the remainder of these two troops closed the council even more, until the soldiers and the Indians were only about ten yards from each other.[4] The young Sioux men seemingly paid no attention to the search,[5] but the nearness of the soldiers and the presence of the Hotchkiss guns on Cemetery Hill were slowly bringing the situation to a boil. Some critics have claimed that the Seventh manhandled the Sioux during the search, deliberately bullying the Indians into producing weapons.[6] There is some small evidence of this. One of Big Foot's men later claimed that the soldiers took axes, knives, pins, and awls;[7] Shangrau saw one soldier with a handful of knives and made him give them back to their owners.[8] The greater weight of evidence, however, indicates that the search itself was conducted in an orderly manner. Lt. Mann of K Troop recalled that "The squaws were sitting on bundles and other arms. We lifted them as tenderly and treated them as nicely as possible. Had they been the most refined ladies in the land, they could not have been treated with more consideration."[9] Even some of the Sioux later recalled that the soldiers had treated them kindly.[10] Nevertheless, the troopers at times had to lift the Indian women bodily off weapons they were concealing under their voluminous skirts;[11] Captain Varnum said that "Everything found was so hidden that I had to almost dig for it."[12] The keening of the squaws was heard at the council, and the Sioux there became increasingly restless. Some of the Indian women in the village began to saddle horses.[13] About 9:00 A.M., the search was completed, having produced thirty-eight weapons, of which only a few were modern Winchester repeaters.[14]

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[4] Major Whitside's testimony in KBR.

[5] Philip Wells Interview, Ricker Collection.

[6] Metcalf, p. 311; Andrist, p. 350.

[7] Statement of Pipe-on-Head in U. S., Congress, House, Sioux Indians: Wounded Knee Massacre, 75th Cong., 2d Sess., March 7 and May 12, 1938, H. R. 2535, p. 17.

[8] John Shangrau Interview, Ricker Collection.

[9] Quoted in Lt. Col. Frazer Arnold, "Ghost Dance and Wounded Knee," The Cavalry Journal, XLII, No. 183 (May-June, 1934), p. 20.

Throughout the search, Yellow Bird, the medicine man, had been haranguing the Indians gathered in the council space. Interpreter Wells had been relaying the substance of the holy man's speech, which was a harmless prayer, to Forsythe. As the guns were being assembled, though, the tone of Yellow Bird's remarks changed. He took a handful of dirt and, tossing it in the air, cried, "Haha! Haha! I have lived long enough!"[15] He then addressed the Sioux men in the following manner:

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[10] Statements of Help Them and Frog in Wells, p. 292.

[11] Charles W. Allen Interview, Ricker Collection.

[12] Captain Varnum's testimony in KBR.

[13] Lieutenant Taylor's testimony in ibid.

[14] Utley (p. 211) says the search ended at 9:30 A.M., which does not agree with Forsythe's official report to Brooke, contained in NA, RG 98, which states that the fighting lasted from about 9:15 A.M. until 9:45 A.M. See also Wells, p. 285, and Louis Mosseau Interview, Ricker Collection.

[15] Statement of Help Them in Burdick, The Last Days of Sitting Bull, pp. 80-81; testimony of Major Whitside in KBR. Elaine Goodale Eastman (p. 42) claims that in her talks with the survivors, no Sioux witness mentions Yellow Bird's tossing a handful of dust in the air as a signal for resistance.

> Do not be afraid and let your hearts be strong to meet what is before you; we are all well aware that there are lots of soldiers about us and that they have lots of bullets; but I have received assurance that their bullets cannot penetrate us. The prairie is large and the bullet will not go toward you but over the large prairies, and if they do go towards you they will not penetrate you. As you saw one throw up the dust and it floated away, so will the bullets float away harmlessly over the prairies.[16]

Some white witnesses later recalled that Yellow Bird's act of throwing the dust in the air was a prearranged signal for an outbreak. Overlooking the basic stupidity with which the medicine man could be charged if he had urged such a revolt after the weapons had been collected, it is evident from Philip Wells's interpretation of his speech that he was merely alluding to the immortality of the ghost shirt, should the soldiers open fire. While Yellow Bird was making his speech, the old men were being searched one by one - a search which revealed nothing. As the speech and the search both drew to a close, a shot rang out.

All witnesses agree the first shot was fired by an Indian. Who did it is another question. Shangrau said nobody knew; William Palmer, present as a spectator, said it was a brave name Blue Face; Joseph Horn Cloud said three soldiers struggled with an Indian for a gun, and it went off; and Dewey Beard recalled that the shot was fired when the soldiers attempted to take a gun away from a brave named Black Coyote.[17]

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[16] Philip Wells Interview, Ricker Collection.

[17] John Shangrau, William Palmer, Joseph Horn Cloud, and Dewey Beard Interviews, Ricker Collection. See also Metcalf, p. 311; Philip Wells Interview, Ricker Collection, and Wells, p. 207.

Immediately, some of the braves who had not yet been searched threw off their blankets and commenced an indiscriminant fire on the closest whites, the members of Troops B and K. The soldiers immediately began to fire back; within an instant the council area was a scene of smoke and confusion. Big Foot had been lying helpless in front of his tent while the search was in progress. When the shooting began, he tried to raise himself to see what was happening, and was shot in the back by a soldier.[18] Interpreter Wells had his face slashed by a man he thought was Yellow Bird; with his nose dangling by a single shred of flesh, he killed the medicine man as an "act of war."[19] Scout Baptiste Garnier, also known as Little Bat, was unarmed when the fighting began; he received several bullets through his clothing and saddle, but was uninjured.[20]

Others were not so lucky. The troopers began shooting spontaneously;[21] their first shots, accompanied by a volley from the Hotchkiss guns, decimated the Sioux men standing in the council area. Those who escaped this onslaught fled westward up the ravine, while the women and children fled in another direction, across an open field.[22] Unfortunately, some of the women, swathed as they were in heavy winter garments and wearing ghost shirts, were indistinguishable from the men.[23] Big Foot's daughter was slain as she ran to help her father. One woman later remembered that she took her little boy, two years old, and her thirteen year old daughter and hid in a gulley. Soon after, her husband and other son found them. The couple was separated in the fight, and both the man and the boy were killed.[24]

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[18] Charles W. Allen Interview, Ricker Collection.

[19] Wells, p. 287. The nose was later restored successfully by an army surgeon at Pine Ridge.

[20] Cook, pp. 197-198.

[21] Guy Vaughn Interview, Ricker Collection. Vaughn, a member of the Nebraska National Guard, served as a courier for Captain Wallace at Wounded Knee.

[22] Statement of Turning Hawk in Liquidating the Liability..., pp. 6-7.

The deadly Hotchkisses, with their explosive shells, took an enormous toll.[25] One Indian was later found with a six-inch hole in his stomach where a shell had burst.[26] As the Sioux fled in all directions and the soldiers turned into hunters, the carnage became general. Those of the Sioux that were armed fought bravely and well, but the outbreak had been as much of a surprise to the Indians as it had been to the troopers, and they lacked cohesive leadership. It was every man for himself. Within five minutes, the Indian camp was a burning shambles; several Sioux were roasted beyond recognition. Still the Indians fought with a deadly ferocity. Father Craft, a young Roman Catholic priest who had accompanied Forsythe the night before, was knifed in the back. Craft, who later had the pleasure of reading his own obituary, believed that the deed was an accident; "the poor fellow did not know he was stabbing a black robe."[27] Among the soldiers killed in the first exchange of fire was Captain Wallace of K Troop, he who had been in Reno's command at the Little Big Horn,[28] while another Custer veteran, Lt. Garlington, was wounded.

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[23] Wells, p. 304.

[24] Interview by Eb Jones of Whitewood, South Dakota, in SDSHS.

[25] Edward S. Farrow, Farrow's Military Encyclopedia, Vol. II (New York: Published by the Author, 1885), p. 62.

[26] James Garvey Interview, Ricker Collection.

During the fighting, John Shangrau remembered that an unidentified officer said to him, "Scout, we've got our revenge now."[29] This remark, apocryphal or not, shadowed what most critics of Wounded Knee have called a slaughter. Corporal Paul H. Weinert of Troop E, First U. S. Artillery, was manning one of the Hotchkiss guns. After the heaviest part of the fighting, some of the Sioux took cover in a ravine and commenced a deadly fire on the soldiers. Seeing that the cavalrymen were in difficulty, Weinert positioned his weapon at the entrance of the ravine and "blazed away."[30] In the ravine, in addition to the sharpshooters, were Indian men, women, and children, most of them unarmed. Among them was Dewey Beard (known among the Sioux as Iron Hail) and his family. Altogether, seven members of Beard's family fell under the rain of Hotchkiss shells - his father and mother, his wife, two brothers, a cousin, and his child.[31] Although accounts of the ravine incident are confused and contradictory, it appears that a flag of truce was offered by the soldiers. One woman was killed as she approached the banner. A number of boys and men were called upon to surrender. As they advanced up from the ravine, the troopers fired on them.[32]

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[27] Cook, pp. 235-236; New York Times, December 31, 1890 (1:5); Sioux Falls Argus-Leader, December 31, 1890 (1:4). Herbert Welsh characterized Father Craft as "young and indiscreet." Craft, who knew Big Foot and his band well, had frequently been at odds with the eastern Friends of the Indian over principles of Indian reform. BIC (1891), p. 180.

[28] DeBarthe, p. 240, n. 5; Rapid City Daily Journal, December 30, 1890 (1:2).

[29] John Shangrau Interview, Ricker Collection.

[30] W. F. Beyer and O. F. Keydel (eds.), Deeds of Valor, II (Detroit: The Perrier-Keydel Company, 1907), p. 325.

The catalogue of tragic incidents concerning both sides could go on indefinitely.[33] It is sufficient to say that both the Seventh and the Sioux had been taken off balance by the opening gunshot, and both had reacted immediately in the way their backgrounds had conditioned them. Every instinct directed the soldiers, especially the inexperienced ones, to fire upon the Sioux, while reflexes conditioned by long years of despair led the Indians to shoot at the bluecoats. The firing continued on both sides for about half an hour. Some of the Sioux were persuaded to give themselves up, while others were captured. Some Indians simply fled onto the prairie; scouts sent out as late as February 6, 1891, found two women who had built a shelter about ten miles from the scene of the battle and had remained there, afraid to move. One of the women had been wounded in the arm; the other was unhurt.[34] A line of bodies, most of them women and children, was found later to extend more than two miles from the Indian camp.[35]

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[31] Dewey Beard Interview, Ricker Collection.

[32] Statement of American Horse in Liquidating the Liability..., p. 7; Metcalf, p. 314. Philip Wells said he overheard Colonel Forsythe yelling "Quit shooting at them!" in an effort to save the women and children. Philip Wells Interview, Ricker Collection.

[33] The best account of the actual fighting is in Utley, pp. 200-230. Points on which the author differs from this source have been noted in the text.

The Indians encamped near Pine Ridge had been alerted by the sound of gunfire. That there had been trouble was confirmed by the arrival of some of the frightened Indian survivors, who chose in their panic to go to the agency.[36] The agency and its white inhabitants became the target of the unnerved Sioux. Royer telegraphed to Morgan the awful news of Wounded Knee, adding:

> Two Strike and his party, who were camped on White Clay Creek just below Red Cloud's house, opened fire on the agency from the hilltop opposite the Boarding School, wounding two soldiers. The police returned fire, killing two of Two Strike's Indians and wounding others. Two Strike and his band have retreated in a Northwestern direction from the agency and it is supposed he is trying to make his way back to the bad lands. Thus far the Pine Ridge Indians have taken no active part in the war but the big foot (sic). Now Kicking Bear and Two Strike bands have been and are active in the disturbance.[37]

The news of Wounded Knee burst upon a nation which had not experienced the titillation of an Indian outbreak for years. The Pierre Daily Capital was exuberant, headlining "At Last a Battle - Many Indians Killed and It is Hoped that the Whole Band Perished." The editor added that "The members of the Seventh Cavalry have once more shown themselves heroes in deeds of daring. Single conflicts of great bravery were seen all over the field."[38] The editor of the Black Hills Daily Times sounded the tocsin for all-out war: "We say give no quarter. The bloodthirsty devils give us no quarter, but kill all prisoners. Why then should we spare even the semblance of an Indian. Wipe them from the face of the earth."[39] Even the usually moderate New York Times headlined "Big Foot's Treachery Precipitates a Battle," followed by a story lavishing praise on the Seventh Cavalry.[40]

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[34] Colonel William R. Shafter to Assistant Adjutant General, Department of the Platte, February 6, 1891, in NA, RG 98.

[35] Andrist, p. 351.

[36] Philip Wells Interview, Ricker Collection.

[37] Royer to Morgan, December 29, 1890, in NA, RG 75.

Only a few voices were raised in defense of the Indians. The New York Times, in the same issue in which it castigated the unfortunate Big Foot, carried an editorial blaming the tragedy on starvation.[41] The London Times weighed in with the opinion that "The Americans must not be angry if we suspect that this alarming state of affairs is due greatly to their injudicious and inconsiderate management of the Indians...The American policy has made the Indians what they are."[42] Of course, the Eastern Friends viewed the Battle as a massacre, pure and simple.

The voices of this sympathetic minority were drowned, however, in a tidal wave of sentiment from an uninformed nation. To most Americans, the Seventh Cavalry was inescapably and forever wrapped in the glorious mantle of Custer, and now, at last, that gallant leader had his reward. Typical of this type of reaction to Wounded Knee was the following bit of doggerel by one R. M. Seeds, published in the Indianapolis Journal:

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[38] Pierre Daily Capital, December 31, 1890 (4:2). See also the Capital's story the next day, headlined "Treacherous Indians," (1:2).

[39] Black Hills Daily Times, December 31, 1890 (1:3).

[40] New York Times, December 31, 1890 (1:5).

[41] Ibid., (4:3,4).

[42] Quoted in ibid., January 1, 1891 (1:5).

Twas mid-winter summer on Wounded Knee
    And the Christmas sun his splendor bent
From the arch of heaven in like degree
    On the warrior's lodge and the soldier's tent.
The slayers of Custer, Big Foot's band,
    Had gathered on Wounded Knee and sworn
To grasp in friendship the white man's hand
    And lay down their arms that Monday morn;
The Christmas message of "Peace, good will!"
    Seemed even the savage heart to thrill!
And the soldiers there had with Custer bled -
    Twas the same old Seventh the dare-devil led -
And proudly each thought on his glorious deed;
    For Custer would be avenged![43]

General Miles had neither the time nor the inclination to think about avenging Custer; by now convinced that the threatened Indian uprising which he had predicted for so long had become a reality, he left Rapid City on December 30 for Pine Ridge. Forsythe was left to ponder the imponderable, while the whites huddled together at the agency sought to prepare themselves for war. The Sioux, feeling that their worst fears about the evil intentions of the white man had come true, responded by resorting to arms.

The immediate backlash of the Wounded Knee battle was the fight at Drexel Mission. The Mission was located about four miles northeast of the agency, across White Clay Creek.

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[43] Quoted in Bland, p. 19.

It had been founded by Father John Jutz, the Jesuit who had made the rigorous trip into the Bad Lands to talk with Kicking Bear, Short Bull, and Two Strike. On December 30, Father Jutz had about twenty persons, mostly mixed bloods, with him at the Mission, the official name of which was Holy Rosary Catholic Mission.[44] As the priest supervised the parcelling of food to the refugees, a band of young braves rode up and fired a small log cabin normally used as a schoolhouse and located near the Mission.

This group of Sioux had already tangled with elements of the Ninth Cavalry under Lt. Col. Guy V. Henry. Henry brought a brilliant record into the Pine Ridge campaign; he had been brevetted five times for conspicuous gallantry during the Civil War, winning the Medal of Honor at Cold Harbor. In the vicious fighting on the Rosebud eight days before the Custer battle, the Sioux had slashed away half his face, a fact which led one eastern paper to declare that Henry "had sworn eternal vengeance on the Sioux."[45]

Henry was not a vengeful man; like his fellow officers Miles and Whitside, he had a great respect for the Indian, born of years of campaigning. His Ninth Cavalry was a regiment of Negroes.[46] The Ninth had been in the field since

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[44] Father Craft Interview, Ricker Collection.

[45] New York Times, November 29, 1890 (1:4).

[46] From their heavy coats, the Sioux knew the colored boys as "Buffalo Soldiers;" among Henry's Army comrades, the Ninth was somewhat prosaically known as "Henry's Brunettes." Cyrus T. Brady, Indian Fights and Fighters (New York: Doubleday, Page and Company, 1913), p. 351.

Christmas Eve, patrolling the eastern border of the Black Hills, but the troopers had seen no Indians. At 9:00 P. M. on December 29, Henry received news of Wounded Knee in a letter brought by two friendly Indians.[47] In half an hour the regiment was on the march to the agency. The need for haste was great; the couriers had told the Ninth that 5,000 Oglalas were menacing Pine Ridge. Henry left his supply train under the escort of one company and rode on to Pine Ridge with the remainder of his command. The Buffalo Soldiers arrived at the agency at daybreak on December 30, having completed their grueling ride in less than twelve hours.

As the supply train lumbered toward Pine Ridge that morning, it was attacked on Cheyenne Creek, only two miles short of its goal. One of the troopers in the advance of the train was killed by an Indian dressed as a soldier.[48] Several more were wounded before Henry and his remaining men could ride out from the agency to save the train. The Sioux involved in this raid dispersed, to assemble later that day at the Mission. When Henry and his exhausted men returned to the agency, they learned that the Mission was under attack. Brooke immediately ordered the Ninth into the field again; Henry was forced to plead for rest, and Forsythe and the Seventh were dispatched instead.

Forsythe blundered into a draw and allowed his command to be surrounded on three sides. He had eight troops and a detachment of artillery, yet he was trapped by about fifty Sioux youths, many of whom had never been in battle before.[49] A courier, Lt. Guy Preston, rode back to the agency to alert Henry, who immediately set out for Holy Rosary with four troops of the Ninth. By this time, the Negroes had travelled one hundred miles in twenty-four hours, but their arrival was enough to chase away the Sioux.[50]

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[47] William Denver McGaa Interview, Ricker Collection.

[48] Ibid.

General Miles was now faced with three problems: Rounding up the terror-stricken Indians, many of whom were heading back to the Bad Lands; trying to explain away the actions of Forsythe's command without justifying the charges of the Friends of the Indian that Wounded Knee had been a massacre; and calming the settlers at the agency. The General's solution to the first problem was to form a three-sided screen of soldiers, with the open end to the south, and slowly move the screen toward Pine Ridge, trying in this way to gently funnel the nervous Sioux back into the fold. To do this he had part of the Second Infantry, four troops of the Ninth Cavalry, eight troops of the Seventh Cavalry, and the light artillery battery which had mangled the Sioux at Wounded Knee - all at Pine Ridge. In the immediate vicinity were three companies of the First Infantry, a remnant of Henry's Ninth, and part of the Second Infantry. To the north lay Col. Carr and the Sixth Cavalry, Sumner and part of the Eighth Cavalry, four troops who had been hustled northward from the School of Instruction at Ft. Leavenworth, the entire Seventh Infantry under Col. Merriam, and portions of the Third and First Infantries.[51] Altogether, about 3,000 soldiers, well-armed and warmly clothed, were in the field. Their orders were to avoid fighting at all costs, but to round up the hostiles and the fugitives and return them to the agency.

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[49] Miles, "The War with the 'Messiah'," p. 526; Testimony of Father Jutz and Louis Shangrau (who was with Forsythe as an interpreter) in NA, RG 94. The Indians had guaranteed Father Jutz his safety if he stayed within the Mission. Father Craft Interview, Ricker Collection.

[50] The Ninth had spent twenty-two out of the past thirty-four hours in the saddle; during that time they had fought two pitched battles and rested only two hours. Brady, p. 354; Philip Wells Interview, Ricker Collection. The Ninth's actions are most fully detailed in NA, RG 94, and Boyd, pp. 258-260.

The nation's press seized on the action in the Bad Lands and gave the story page one headlines. Brooke, even before Wounded Knee, had been forced to institute censorship by creating a correspondent's pool in which only one correspondent per day was allowed to file a story from Pine Ridge. After the rescue of the Seventh Cavalry by the Ninth, however, the Sious story was too big to be thus stifled, and the Wounded Knee and Drexel Mission fights were thus broadcast to America by newspapermen who rejoiced at their newly acquired freedom from the censor's pencil.

The situation at the agency could have been far worse than it actually was. The Seventh had done some looting at Wounded Knee, and those of the Sioux who fled to the agency were bereft of much of their ceremonial paraphernalia, blankets, saddles, and animals.[52] Dr. Charles Eastman, the agency physician, was kept busy treating the Indians, while the army surgeons worked on the soldiers. An appeal published in a Boston newspaper soon produced liberal supplies of much needed clothing and linen for dressings.[53] Elaine Goodale, the Supervisor of Education at Pine Ridge, stayed at the agency with her fiancee; she and Dr. Eastman had announced their engagement on Christmas Day. Another college-trained Sioux, the Episcopal Reverend Charles Smith Cook, remained at the agency, as did Father Jutz's assistants.[54] The sisters of the Holy Rosary "kept constant vigil before the Blessed Sacrament and to their great joy were not molested."[55] The Catholics were fond of boasting later that they had stood their ground, while the Protestants had fled the area at the first sign of danger.[56] This is not entirely true. Two teachers, Miss Dickson and Miss McCreight, remained, as did the Reverend Cook. In addition, the Presbyterians took great pride in the fact that of their 1,100 communicants on all the Sioux reservations combined, only one, a Pine Ridge man, was found among the hostiles, and only one joined the Ghost Dancers.[57]

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[51] Pierre Daily Capital, January 3, 1891 (1:2).

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[52] U. S., Congress, House, *Liquidating the Liability...*, p. 5.

[53] Charles Eastman, p. 114. For the difficulties in medicine at Pine Ridge, see the Surgeon-General's Report in SW, *Annual Report* (1891), pp. 599-603.

[54] Elaine Goodale Eastman, p. 34. [55] Fitzgerald, p. 545.

[56] Father Craft Interview, *Ricker Collection*.

[57] *BIC* (1891), pp. 40-42.

Anthropologist Warren Moorehead, who was at Pine Ridge throughout the disturbances, believed there was no danger at any time. He later remarked:

> There were a number of newspapermen in the little log hotel at Pine Ridge, and they send many sensational accounts to the eastern papers. Not one of them ever left the agency, until the battle of Wounded Knee had occurred, when a few went out to look over the field. Mr. Bartlett, who spoke Sioux quite well, and myself, were the only men to my knowledge who left the agency and visited the camps in the valley, one or two miles distant. The fact that we were able to do so, is sufficient refutation of the statement that the Indians desired to fight, or were savages. We never experienced the slightest trouble, but on the contrary were afforded every facility. We often felt guns and revolvers under the blankets on which we reclined in the tipis. Force caused Wounded Knee. Humanity would have prevented it.[58]

The population at Pine Ridge had a melancholy task to perform: the burial of the dead. The burial party consisted of one company of the Seventh Cavalry, about thirty laborers, one wagon of working tools, and two wagons of provisions. The men arrived on the battlefield on New Year's Day, after an intense blizzard had whipped the Dakota prairie, removing the smell of gunpowder and mercifully covering the debris of the battle - broken tipi poles, scattered cooking utensils, and overturned wagons.[59] The dead were frozen as they fell; grotesque shapes slept silently under mantles of snow. It was too late in the day for interment, and the members of the graves detail camped in Mosseau's store for the night.[60]

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[58] Moorehead, The American Indian..., p. 132. In actuality, three correspondents were present at Wounded Knee: Allen of the Chadron Democrat; William F. Kelley of the Nebraska State Journal (Lincoln); and Will Cressey of the Omaha Daily Bee, who hired trader Louis Mosseau as an interpreter at $5.00 a day. Watson, p. 213; Utley, pp. 203-204; Elaine Goodale Eastman, p. 36; Louis Mosseau Interview, Ricker Collection.

[59] William Garnett Interview, Ricker Collection; Standing Bear, p. 226.

The contract to bury the dead had been given to a man named Paddy Starr; when Starr and the rest reconnoitered the field on January 2, they found seven Indians still alive - five adults and two infants.[61] The men took all that day to dig a mass grave. Into the pit went 146 members of Big Foot's band, 62 of which were women and children.[62] The Miniconjou chief, once one of the leading diplomats of the Sioux Nation, was among the first to be buried; he was frozen in the half-sitting attitude he had achieved at the moment of his death.[63] The detail stripped the bodies of the ghost shirts, keeping the holy garments as souvenirs.[64] The grave-side service was read by Reverend Cook. It was reported that "Owing to the intensely critical condition of the surroundings, with hords (sic) of the enemy flocking about the agency, threatening an attack, the usual salute was omitted, while soft notes from the bugle and the wailing of the storm whispered the last loving good bye."[65]

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[60] William Peano Interview, Ricker Collection. Peano was a civilian member of the burial party.

[61] Paddy Starr Interview, ibid.

[62] William Peano and Ed Janis Interviews, ibid. Janis was another member of the burial party. The official army report also noted 146 dead; see KBR.

[63] Joseph Horn Cloud Interview, Ricker Collection.

[64] Andrist, p. 352.

[65] Sioux Falls Argus-Leader, January 2, 1891 (1:4).

The decimation of the Miniconjous and their Hunkpapa guests was almost total. Altogether, eighty-five warriors were killed outright or later died of their wounds, while a total of sixty-eight women and children died, all as a result of Wounded Knee. Forty-seven Sioux bodies were unable to be identified after three days on the frozen prairie. Eight male adults, eleven female adults, twelve male children, and five female children were received in the hospital at Pine Ridge and tended by Dr. Eastman. Of these, seven later died. The death toll, ironically enough, was within twenty of equalling that of Custer's command on the Little Big Horn. The Army was never able to account for the remaining seventy members of Big Foot's band; they either died on the prairie and their bodies were never found, or they joined up with other bands of fugitives and remained uncounted.[66]

The Seventh Cavalry suffered twenty-five deaths as a result of the Wounded Knee fight. Thirty-nine were wounded, including two civilians, Philip Wells and Father Craft.[67] It had been the last major engagement between Indians and white men.

Almost before the last shovelful of earth had fallen in the mass grave on Cemetery Hill, charges and countercharges began to fly. Everyone was concerned with placing the blame on somebody, reasoning that disaster of such magnitude must have been caused by human error that could be easily singled out and condemned.

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[66] The best source for enumerating the Sioux casualties is in a letter from Captain Frank D. Baldwin, 5th Infantry, to Assistant Adjutant General, Division of the Missouri, February 5, 1891, in KBR.

[67] Ibid.

Two figures, Agent Royer and Colonel Forsythe, were at the center of the controversy, and for vastly different reasons. Royer, in addition to his feeble attempts to control his charges, suffered by comparison with former Pine Ridge Agent McGillycuddy, who was at the agency during the trouble. McGillycuddy had strong views on the Ghost Dance; he considered it a "pitiable, disgraceful affair forced on Indians and whites alike by politics, graft, and bad management."[68] McGillycuddy, who had come to the agency at the request of Governor Mellette, had an equally low opinion of Royer. The embattled agent telegraphed Commissioner Morgan that "Dr. McGillycuddy is at this agency severely criticizing the Interior Department and yourself. He is doing me dirty in the hope of getting me removed..."[69]

McGillycuddy wasn't the only one doing Royer dirty. Miss Emma C. Sickels, who had established the Indian School at Pine Ridge, thought the luckless Alpena druggist was "weak" and "narrow-minded,"[70] while a local rancher considered the agent to be without any backbone whatsoever.[71] Royer had

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[68] Quoted in Vestal, New Sources of Indian History..., p. 81.

[69] Royer to Morgan, January 6, 1891, in NA, RG 75.

[70] Quoted in Colby, "The Sioux Indian War of 1890-'91," p. 184.

[71] Richard C. Stirk Interview, Ricker Collection. Stirk, who ranched north of White River, had come in to the agency for protection.

Philip Wells, who knew most of the Sioux agents, said most of them were "good riddances."[74] It is not correct to state, however, as a recent historian of South Dakota has done, that "Unquestionably...the outstanding single factor in the crisis precipitated by the messiah movement was the inability of the agent at Pine Ridge to cope with the situation."[75] Royer was more a victim of the system that created him and agents like him than he was a cause of the messiah troubles; to link him directly with the Wounded Knee and Drexel Mission affairs is absurd, since these incidents were only links in a chain of causality stretching back to the death of Sitting Bull, and beyond.

In all fairness to the Bureau of Indian Affairs, which honestly tried to place capable agents on the reservation, Secretary Noble's remarks must be included:

> I myself examined Royer, who came with the highest endorsements and recommendations. He appeared to justify the good opinions expressed of him and was duly appointed. It is said that he showed lack of nerve and executive ability at a critical moment. He became alarmed and fled the country to telegraph for troops. Well - courage is a quality which no personal examination can discover.[76]

With the iniquities of the spoils system thus exposed, even if only temporarily, it became apparent that Royer was through in the Indian service. On January 5, 1891, General Miles recommended that he be removed, and that Captain Daugherty of the First Infantry be placed in charge at Pine Ridge. It was done.[77]

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[74] Philip Wells Interview, Ricker Collection.

[75] Schell, p. 323.

[76] Quoted in Seymour, p. 329. As noted above, Royer's dash to Rushville on November 20 to welcome Brooke was, correctly or incorrectly, construed to be cowardice, and was one of the major charges brought against the agent.

Colonel Forsythe, who in the public eye had been either Custer's avenger or a wanton mass murderer, depending on the views to which one listened, came under fire from his comrades-in-arms. Leading the assault was Miles himself, and the issue was the placement of troops on Wounded Knee on the morning of December 29. The Division Commander acted immediately upon receipt of two telegrams from General Schofield, which directed an inquiry into the conduct of the battle. Miles established a Board of Inquiry with Major J. Ford Kent and Captain Frank D. Baldwin as the investigating officers. He also exceeded the authority given him by Schofield (although he was perfectly within his rights as a commander of troops in the field) when he removed Forsythe from command of the Seventh on January 4 and replaced him with Major Whitside.[78]

It was Miles's opinion, simply stated, that Forsythe had blundered badly both at Wounded Knee and Drexel Mission. The General felt that "...the disposition of the troops made by Colonel Forsythe was not judicious,...he allowed his command in the first action to be surprised, and on both occasions allowed them to be taken at a great disadvantage."[79]

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[77] Pierre Daily Capital, January 6, 1891 (1:1).

[78] Schofield to Miles, January 2, 1891, in NA, RG 98; Utley, p. 245; Pierre Daily Capital, January 7, 1891 (1:1).

[79] Miles to Adjutant General, February 4, 1891, in NA, RG 94.

Privately, Miles was even more accusative; to his wife on January 6 he wrote:

> To overcome the failures caused by others, either through blind stupidity or criminal indifference, I have had much additional work. I think Colonel Forsythe's actions about the worst I have ever known.
>
> I doubt if there is a Second Lieutenant who could not have made better disposition of 433 white soldiers and 40 Indian scouts, or who could not have disarmed 118 Indians encumbered with 250 women and children. There must have been nearly 100 women and children killed.[80]

Shortly thereafter he wrote again that "The Forsythe action was a useless slaughter of women and children. Every day we hear of poor women, little girls and boys and children found dead and frozen to the ground, or crawling over the prairie, for a distance of one hundred miles north and south."[81]

Forsythe had been under clear orders not "to be mixed up with the Indians, or taken at disadvantage."[82] It was for the alleged violation of these orders that Miles removed him from command. In Forsythe's defense, when Miles (then still in Rapid City) was informed that Major Whitside had cornered Big Foot's band, he had jubilantly wired Brooke, in response to the latter's query on disarming the Sioux: "All right, use force enough. Congratulations. Miles Commanding."[83]

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[80] Quoted in Johnson, p. 289.

[81] Quoted in ibid., p. 294.

[82] Miles to Brooke, in telegrams dated November 18, November 23, and December 7, 1890, all in KBR. General Brooke passed these orders on to his subordinates, Colonel Forsythe included.

[83] KBR.

The rumor that the Seventh was under the influence of alcohol on the morning of the twenty-ninth also buzzed around Forsythe's head. William Peano, who was at the agency during the fighting, judged that the voices of Forsythe's command, officers and men, as they moved out of the agency on the night of December 28, "suggested that they had been imbibing freely."[84] There was also the incident of the whiskey keg opened by the Seventh's officers in camp on Wounded Knee. The charge that the soldiers were drunk during the battle seized the popular mind, so much so that Judge Eli S. Ricker, fifteen years later, could say with imagined impunity that "The affair at Wounded Knee was a drunken slaughter - of white soldiers and innocent Indians - for which white soldiers were responsible - solely."[85]

A minor indictment, one advanced mainly by the Friends of the Indian, was the assumption of intent on the part of the Seventh Cavalry. The shadow of the Little Big Horn, said this group, had driven the soldiers to a ghastly slaughter, which they had then tried to hush up. A witness said that the officers of the regiment had at least one conference with civilians after the battle, asking them what they knew and warning them not to talk too much.[86] Another claimed he overheard an officer of the Seventh say he had orders to go and get Big Foot, and that if the Indians "made a break of any kind to fire on them."[87]

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[84] William Peano Interview, Ricker Collection.

[85] Comment of Judge Eli S. Ricker, in Ricker Collection.

[86] E. C. Swigert Interview, ibid.

[87] William Peano Interview, ibid.

All these rumors were circulating as the Court of Inquiry convened at Pine Ridge. Major Kent and Captain Baldwin were concerned only with Forsythe's tactics, yet it is difficult to see how they or any of the witnesses could have escaped the hearsay evidence that was buzzing about the agency. Many people maintained that the soldiers had been so placed that they were shooting at each other when the fighting began. Pursuing this idea, the investigators pieced together an indictment of the Colonel. Captain C. S. Ilsley, commander of the Second Squadron, testified that

> From my remembrance of the location, E Troop of the battalion was located out of danger of fire from others. G Troop's position was the safest... of all. D and C, I think, their position was such as to receive the fire from other troops. I don't think the disposition of the troops was judicious.[88]

Captain Allyn Capron, "a grim old fellow, with...nerve enough for a hundred-ton gun,"[89] the officer who had directed the deadly Hotchkiss fire from Cemetery Hill, thought it was "unavoidable that some of our own troops should be hurt from our own fire."[90] Charles B. Ewing, an army surgeon, gave the clearest opinion:

> I have reason to believe that some of our men were killed by the fire of other of our troops. The most injury was inflicted on Captain Wallace's Troop K, and there was another troop which suffered as severely, I think it was Captain Varnum's Troop B. One out of every eight was wounded or killed, taking

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[88] KBR.

[89] Frederic Remington, "The Sioux Outbreak in South Dakota," Harper's Weekly, XXXV, No. 1779 (January 24, 1891), p. 61.

[90] KBR.

> the number of troops to be fifty strong each. There were about 25 killed from all the troops and a large number wounded; located as the troops were and firing as they did it was impossible not to wound or kill each other.[91]

Kent and Baldwin carefully differentiated between Forsythe's positioning of his men and the thought that some of the troopers may have been felled by the bullets of their comrades. On January 17, 1891, Baldwin concluded that Brooke's order to Forsythe to "'Hold them all at a safe distance from your command, guard against surprise or treachery,'" was "entirely disregarded by Colonel Forsythe when in the exercise of his judgement under the firm belief that the Indians contemplated no outbreak he placed his troops in such close proximity to the hostile camp."[92] Both investigating officers concurred in finding that the evidence "fails to establish that a single man of Colonel Forsythe's command was killed or wounded by his fellows,"[93] in spite of the testimony of men like Illsley, Capron, and Ewing.

General Miles forwarded the Kent-Baldwin report with this endorsement:

> It is in fact difficult to conceive how a worse disposition of the troops could have been made...I can only partially account for the singular apathy and neglect of Colonel Forsythe upon the theory of his indifference to and contempt for the repeated and urgent warnings and orders received by him from the division commander, or by his incompetence, and entire inexperience in the responsibility of exercising command where judgement and discretion are required.[94]

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[91] Ibid.

[92] Ibid.

[93] Ibid.

[94] Miles's endorsement of the KBR, in NA, RG 94.

Strong words; but Washington did not agree with Miles's opinion on Forsythe's behavior. Major General Schofield furthered the Investigation Report, together with the endorsement of Miles, to the Secretary of War on February 4, 1891, with the comment that "The interests of the military service do not, in my judgement, demand any further proceedings in this case, nor any longer continuance of Colonel Forsythe's suspension from the command of his regiment."[95] Schofield, in fact, had bestowed a commendation on the Seventh Cavalry in his first telegram to Miles following the engagement.

Still further up the ladder, Secretary of War Redfield Proctor endorsed Schofield's view, saying "The conduct of both officers and men through the whole affair demonstrates an exceedingly satisfactory state of discipline in the Seventh Cavalry. Their behavior was characterized by skill, coolness, discretion, and forbearance, and reflects the highest possible credit upon the regiment..." Proctor concluded by announcing that, by direction of President Harrison, Forsythe would resume command of the Seventh.[96]

Forsythe and his command were thus officially cleared, but the Colonel was never vindicated by Miles. The old Crook faction in the Army was now buttressed by the "Forsythe faction." Both groups subsequently opposed Miles and his policies in palace intrigues from within the military establishments.[97] The final verdict on Forsythe's conduct is in dispute, even today. The fairest, if the crudest, evaluation of the Wounded Knee affair was probably that penned by Lt. James D. Mann, shortly before his death from wounds suffered in the battle:

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[95] Schofield's endorsement of the KBR, in ibid.

[96] Proctor's endorsement of the KBR, in ibid.

[97] Johnson, p. 295.

> I do not see how any disposition of the troops could have been made to have prevented the fight. I have thought over and over about this, and the only thing I can see would have been to place a man behind each buck, with his revolver against the buck's head, with instructions to shoot if he made the least move, and I doubt if even that would have done any good.[98]

Forsythe was certainly not as "brash" an officer as he has been described;[99] he dealt with the situation as he saw fit, but the orders he had received, to both disarm the Sioux and keep them at a safe distance, operated at cross-purposes to each other. It is difficult to see how, given the circumstances, the Sioux could have been disarmed without resulting friction. The killing of women and children, however, is a different story, and must be blamed on the relative inexperience of the soldiers, the excitement of the moment, and the unfortunate tendency of some Sioux women and children to resemble the men, clad as they were in bulky clothing, with a few wearing the ghost shirts.

Royer and Forsythe drew the most critical fire, but they were not the only ones to sustain a barrage. The peppery Miss Sickels noted that General Brooke "is unanimously, and justly, characterized as obstinate, shortsighted, and easily deceived."[100] Captain Augustus W. Corliss, of Company G, Eighth Infantry, recalled that he went to Brooke during the troubles on December 30, the morning of the attack on Lt. Col. Henry's supply train, and asked the General if he might not fire on the Indians who were shooting at his men from behind Red Cloud's house. He quoted Brooke as replying, "No! No! If we fire on them, what will the people in the East say?"[101] Whether this incident is true or not, Brooke did stand with one foot in the eastern papers and one at Pine Ridge, due to the close proximity of the press representatives. His stand on censorship was an unpopular one, and he did not emerge as a public hero.

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[98] Quoted in Arnold, p. 20.

[99] Schell, p. 322.

General Miles, unlike his subordinates Forsythe and Brooke, did manage to receive his share of public acclaim. His supporters considered that his influence actually kept the uprising from assuming more serious proportions, while at the same time suggesting that the Messiah Superstition was a planned rebellion, which is what the General had been saying all along. T. A. Bland, although not a follower of Miles, put it nicely. "It was clearly a very fortunate circumstance," said the reformer, "that the invading army was under the personal command of, perhaps, the wisest and most humane general in the United States Army."[102]

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[100] Quoted in Colby, "The Sioux Indian War of 1890-'91," p. 181.

[101] Augustus W. Corliss Interview, Ricker Collection.

[102] Bland, p. 30.

The Army had strong defenders. Some suggested that the military, far from being the cause of the entire affair, could in fact administer the reservations far better than civilians, saving the Indians from "the plunder to which they are exposed at the hands of broken down political hacks who man the Indian agencies."[103] As far as the actual conduct of the soldiers at Wounded Knee was concerned, some were inclined to clear the army completely. Father Craft was quoted as saying, "The Indians fired first and the troops were not to blame for the wholesale killing, as everything was done at close quarters."[104] Another critic thought that Big Foot's men were "well armed and supplied with ammunition,"[105] so the battle could in no way be construed as a senseless massacre. A third army defender claims, too loyally, that the charges of inhumanity by the troops "were refuted by every witness." He goes on to say:

> There is nothing to conceal or apologize for in the Wounded Knee battle - beyond the killing of a wounded buck by an hysterical recruit. The firing was begun by the Indians and continued until they stopped it - with the one exception noted above. That women and children were casualties was unfortunate but unavoidable, and most have been from Indian bullets....
>
> ...The Indians at Wounded Knee brought on their own destruction as surely as any people ever did. Their attack on the troops was as treacherous as any in the history of Indian warfare, and that they were under a strange religious

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[103] New York Times, January 3, 1891 (4:4).

[104] Rapid City Daily Journal, January 14, 1891 (2:1). The editor went on to say, "No one should say this priest would do the Indians injustice in his account of the battle. He was there as a friend of the Indian."

[105] Gresham, p. 106.

> hallucination is only an explanation, not an excuse. They do not come into court with clean hands, though they may believe their recollection...[106]

Practically everyone who regarded the Army innocent in the affair tended to credit the fighting at Wounded Knee to (1) religious hysteria, and (2) a plan to attack the soldiers. Secretary of War Proctor emphasized the first cause, but totally abjured the second:

> [The Indians] surrendered because of the necessities of their situation rather than from a submissive spirit. It was the sullen and unwilling yielding of a band of savage fanatics, who were overmatched and out of food, to superior forces. It was not in good faith on the part of the younger braves, at least, but yet not with any definite prearranged plan of treachery.[107]

On their side, the Indians claimed ignorance of any plans for a revolt. Old Two Strike said, "We did not mean to fight, unless the soldiers came to the Bad Lands to break up our dance and take our guns away from us. If the soldiers had not come to our country, there would have been no trouble between us and the government."[108] John Shangrau talked with several Indians present at Wounded Knee; all claimed that they had no intention of fighting - some even said the soldiers fired the first shot.[109] Miss Elaine Goodale, later Mrs. Elaine Eastman, defended the Indians for years. She quite correctly emphasized the fact that Big Foot's group was not a war party, an idea that had somehow entered the public mind, doubtless through the inflammatory press reports from Pine Ridge.[110]

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[106] Scott, pp. 20-23.

[107] U. S., House, Liquidating the Liability..., p. 8.

[108] Quoted in Bland, p. 3. Emphasis is Bland's.

[109] John Shangrau to Bland, March 11, 1891, quoted in ibid.

Thus the battle of words continued long after the bullets had ceased to fly. On one side stood the Friends of the Indian, the sentimentalists, and the Indians themselves, all loudly claiming that Forsythe's men had done nothing more than wantonly massacre the helpless Miniconjous and Hunkpapas. At the other extreme were those who believed that Big Foot and his men had posed a threat to the peace of the Great Plains, and had instigated the battle themselves. Rare was the critic who took his stand somewhere between those poles. The battle became so shrouded in emotionalism that it was blown up out of all proportion to its actual significance. Wounded Knee was the nadir of Sioux fortunes from the standpoint of armed conflict with the white man, but the battle marked no huge watershed in either Sioux or United States history. It was a tragic exclamation point on a long sentence of Indian misery, but more sentences were to follow.

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[110] See particularly a letter from Elaine Goodale to Commissioner Morgan, January 12, 1891, in NA, RG 75.

CHAPTER VII

"THE INDIAN PROBLEM INVITES YOUR ATTENTION"

Shunting all other problems to one side, General Miles set himself to convincing the frightened Sioux, many of whom had now in fact turned hostile, to come in peacefully to Pine Ridge. Altogether, about 700 warriors, at the most, were involved in the entire uprising, out of a total Sioux warrior population of 6,000. It is safe to guess that no more than 500 effective fighting men were facing Miles after the Wounded Knee and Drexel Mission fights.[1] To oppose them, the General had some 3,000 infantrymen, cavalrymen, and artillerymen. He moved with characteristic swiftness; by January 3, 1891, General Brooke was in position to the west of the hostile encampment in the Bad Lands, and Colonel Carr was drawn up along the White River to the north.[2] Altogether, Miles had about 2,500 men in the field, leaving 600 to guard the agency. North of Pine Ridge itself, the Army entrenched a three-inch gun, protected by breastworks. On the east, guarding the ravine along which the Sioux would have to travel to reach the agency, a Hotchkiss battery and a Gatling gun were positioned. To the west of the ravine, the defenders placed a second Hotchkiss.[3]

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[1] These figures are from Census enumerations contained in NA, *RG 75*, and estimations made by Mooney (who puts the population of the entire Sioux nation at 25,000) in *The Ghost Dance Religion*..., p. 852.

[2] *Rapid City Daily Journal*, January 4, 1891 (1:1).

According to one contemporary writer, the Sioux huddled together in the Bad Lands were "half-crazed barbarians."[4] If so, they had been forced into this posture by fear, not fanaticism. The ghost shirt had been proven fallible by the Seventh Cavalry; now the only concern of the fugitives was survival. To be sure, traces of the warrior spirit remained. Amazingly enough, though, only one white civilian was killed during the entire uprising. He was Isaac "Club Foot" Miller, a government herder, whose body was found on January 5 several miles west of Pine Ridge, "riddled with bullets."[5] He had been killed by a son of Chief No Water, who was among those in the Bad Lands.[6]

The weather was bitter cold; the fugitives faced the cruel alternative of freezing and starving or surrendering to white men who, in their eyes, had displayed nothing but hostility from the moment Sitting Bull had died. Only the most conservative were for holding out; by January 6, small bands of Indians were beginning to straggle in to the agency. By the ninth, almost 5,000 Indians were camped close by Pine

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[3] Johnson, p. 296.

[4] Boyd, p. 273.

[5] Pierre Daily Capital, January 6, 1891 (1:2); letter from Robert Lee to Will G. Robinson, South Dakota State Historian, January 6, 1952, in SDSHS.

[6] CIA (1891), p. 132.

Ridge, forced there by the slowly tightening vise of bluecoats.[7] Among those coming in was the aged Red Cloud. According to friends, the Oglala chief had not wanted to leave the agency, but his wife had thrown his belongings into the family wagon, stating that she was going on the warpath, even if her husband was not.[8] Under protest, Red Cloud, along with his son and daughter, joined the hostiles. His two children were responsible for bringing him back; Jack Red Cloud smuggled him out of the Indian camp, and the daughter led him eighteen miles through a severe blizzard, back to Pine Ridge.[9] Lt. Taylor, head of the Indian scouts, witnessed his return. He recalled, "Certainly, he was a wreck, all in a tremble, cold, wet, exhausted, hardly able to articulate...I gave him a drink of good whiskey. In a few minutes a wonderful change took place..."[10]

Next to Sitting Bull, Red Cloud had been the leader of the Sioux in the public mind, and the news of his peaceful return to the agency cheered those wishing for a bloodless ending to the uprising. In fact, Red Cloud had consistently opposed the new religion after his vacillation in the late summer and early fall of 1890. In the opinion of Warren Moorehead, the chief's high character helped him withstand the teachings of the Messiah.[11] James H. Cook, who was with him nearly every day during the troubles, claims he never discovered that Red Cloud had anything to do either with directing the hostiles or giving them aid and encouragement. Corroborating Cook's view were other scouts who knew Red Cloud well: Little Bat, Woman's Dress, Yankton Charlie, and Short Bull (not the religious leader).[12]

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[7] Johnson, p. 295. [8] Ibid.

[9] Moorehead, The American Indian..., p. 186.

[10] Taylor's memoirs, quoted in Rosenberg and Rosenberg, p. 111.

[11] Moorehead, The American Indian..., p. 186.

Even with the Sioux peacefully trudging in to Pine Ridge, tension remained at a high pitch. On January 7, 1891, Lt. E. W. Casey of the 22nd Infantry, while on a scouting mission, was shot and killed by a Brule Ghost Dancer named Plenty Horses.[13] The young Indian, a Carlisle graduate, was a very confused man. At his trial, the foreman of which jury was former Pine Ridge agent McGillycuddy, Plenty Horses unintentionally gave an eloquent recital of one instance of the failure of acculturation:

> I am an Indian. Five years ago I attended Carlisle and was educated in the ways of the white man. When I returned to my people I was an outcast among them. I was no longer an Indian. I was not a white man. I was lonely. I shot the lieutenant so I might make a place for myself among the people. Now I am one of them. I shall be hung and the Indians will bury me as a warrior. They will be proud of me. I am satisfied.[14]

But Plenty Horses was not hung. He was tried in a federal court, which decided that at the time of the slaying the United States and the Sioux Nation were at war! Thus the killing of Casey was an incident of war, not murder under the law.[15] Plenty Horses was acquitted, and returned to his people a hero.

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[12] Cook, p. 233.

[13] CIA (1891), p. 132; Philip Wells Interview, Ricker Collection.

[14] Quoted in Julia B. McGillycuddy, McGillycuddy: Agent (Palo Alto: Stanford University Press, 1941), p. 272.

The counterpart to the Casey killing occurred only four days later, on January 11. Two peaceful Oglalas, Few Tails and One Feather, were hunting near the Black Hills with their families. The Indians had a pass from Pine Ridge, allowing them off the reservation. Unaccountably, the Sioux were set upon by three brothers named Culbertson (one of whom had served time in the state penitentiary) and several other whites. Some U. S. Troops, at the insistence of the attackers, also joined in firing on the tiny group. Few Tails was killed, while both his and One Feather's wives were badly wounded. For the murder of Few Tails, five men were indicted in the state court at Sturgis. The slaying could not, in the farthest stretch of the imagination, be called an "act of war," as the Casey killing had been called; yet on July 2, 1891, the jury returned a verdict of "not guilty."[16]

The murders of Casey and Few Tails served only to inflame public opinion, already badly divided. There was no question where white South Dakotans stood. Governor Mellette took time out from preparing for his inaugural ball to present their point of view:

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[15] CIA (1891), p. 132.

[16] Capt. F. E. Pierce, First Infantry, to Commissioner Morgan, February 21, 1891, enclosing the testimony of Red Owl (One Feather's wife), Otter Skin (his elder daughter), and Clown (Few Tails' wife), in NA, RG 75.

> The Indian problem invites your attention. Since the opening of the vast tract of ceded lands west of the Missouri River in February last there has been a growing discontent among the Indians resulting from vexation at having to leave their lands. This discontent has been steadily nurtured by vicious leaders through the agency of the "ghost dance," adroitly substituted in the guise of a religious frenzy for the war dance which is ordinarily used to incite savages to warfare and which has been forbidden among the Indians by the government. Growing insubordination during the year resulted in the collection and organization of bodies of defiant Indians on the outskirts of the agencies west of the river, who were speedily brought to the frenzy which always precedes an uprising. From more than ordinary insolence and theft everywhere, in many places, notably on the Upper Cheyenne, White, and Bad Rivers, they became open and defiant in their depredations, pillaging and robbing the settlers and conveying their plunder to a general rendezvous in the Bad Lands between the forks of the Upper White River. The prompt action of United States troops in breaking up the lesser camps and the timely death of Sitting Bull, the prince of the disaffected, as he was starting with his band from Grand River to join the camp in the Bad Lands, has, it is believed, dampened their warlike ardor, although the main camp is yet to be captured. The affray at Wounded Knee Creek...shows the trouble is not yet settled...
>
> ...Stringent laws should be passed by the Nation and State prohibiting the selling and furnishing of arms and ammunition to Indians and strictly enforced. The arms are a constant menace to settlers and a great obstacle to the control and civilization of the Indians.
>
> It is to be hoped also that in the adjustment of the difficulties the customary governmental policy of rewarding the perpetrators of deeds of violence by extra rations and supplies will be reversed, and the doctrine of rewards and punishments applied among the Indians as it is everywhere else. This will encourage the large mass of them, who are well disposed in their fidelity, and discourage insubordination and settle the Indian problem for all time in the interest of humanity and justice.[17]

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[17] Excerpt from the Governor's Annual Message, quoted in Pierre Daily Capital, January 6, 1891 (2:4,5).

The state's legislators were also in favor of a quick peace at any cost. As late as February 3, the solons proposed that "the immediate and complete suppression of Armed Hostilities against the Government is of vastly greater importance at the present moment than a theoretical solution of the various causes that may have led to the present critical situation."[18] The bellicose editor of the Pierre Daily Capital, never at a loss when it came to suggestions, proposed to "...have the affair over with as soon as possible. The only way to accomplish this is to commence active operations at once. Fight the Indians. Subdue and annihilate them."[19]

At the same time, defendants of the Sioux were vocal as well. Their stand, almost without exception, was that government-induced privation had paved the way for the Ghost Dance and the outbreak. The widely respected Episcopal Bishop W. H. Hare emphasized the hunger factor; his view was shared by others.[20] The dance itself, according to a correspondent at Pine Ridge, "was undoubtedly religious, the ghost song a prayer." He piously added, "In all of that song, there was not an improper expression."[21] The people who knew the Sioux best, like Scout Frank Grouard, were almost unanimous in believing that the craze itself would have died in a natural death, once the Messiah did not arrive in the spring of 1891, as promised.[22]

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[18] Congressional Record, 51st Cong., 2d sess., Vol. XXII, p. 2172.

[19] Pierre Daily Capital, January 9, 1891 (2:1).

[20] Mooney, The Ghost Dance Religion..., pp. 840-842.

[21] Quoted in Bland, p. 23.

Commissioner Morgan was sympathetic to Indian problems in general, and was particularly aware of the Sioux situation.[23] Nevertheless, he and Secretary Noble had no desire to place the government, which posed as the guardian of the Indians, in a position where it would have to tacitly admit having systematically starved the red man. Accordingly, Morgan asked Noble and himself the question: "Are the Indians starving, and if so, who is to blame for it?" The Commissioner concluded:

> ...it will be seen that so far as the furnishing of subsistence to the Sioux is concerned the government has strictly fulfilled its obligations to them, as set forth in the agreement of 1877; that where there has been a reduction in the amount of rations it has been made by Congress in the exercise of that discretion which was clearly reserved to them by the terms of the agreement; that the reduction, whether wise or unwise, was not brought about by the Interior Department, but rather against its express wishes; that the reductions was not brought down to a starving point; and that if there has been suffering among the Indians for want of food it has been due partially to drought and other causes for which the government is not in any wise responsible.[24]

Noble himself consistently denied charges that the Indians had been starved.[25] The truth, as usual, was somewhere in between the two extremes. Special Agent S. A. Cooper, he who had been sent to Pine Ridge to assist Royer, made a backhand reference to this fact when he informed Morgan:

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[22] DeBarthe, p. 204.

[23] See a letter from Morgan to Secretary Noble, December 24, 1890, in CIA (1891), pp. 182-190, in which the Commissioner enumerates the causes of the Sioux distress.

[24] CIA (1891), pp. 191-194.

[25] Rapid City Daily Journal, January 8, 1891 (2:1), and January 10, 1891 (2:1).

> It is probable that the treatment of the Indians has not in every respect followed exactly the written laws of the statute book or the unwritten laws of morality, but to suppose that the department had always been wrong (as many would have the world believe) and that the Indian has always been right is to suppose that the savage is endowed with a stronger sense of moral obligation than the civilized man, a proposition that will hardly be accepted by those who understand the true inwardness of the wily Sioux.[26]

With the government putting the disclaimer on Sioux complaints of starvation, it became imperative that Miles treat his charges with kid gloves. One more incident like Wounded Knee could set the Indian policy of the reformers back a decade.

General Miles was not without outside help at Pine Ridge. In addition to McGillycuddy, Buffalo Bill had reappeared. This bizarre pair, so unlike in almost every respect, shared the opinion that he, and he alone, could bring the difficulties to a peaceful solution. McGillycuddy was at the agency in his capacity as Assistant Adjutant General of the state milita, having been ordered by Governor Mellette to use his undoubted influence with the Sioux to quell the disturbance. General Brooke, however, had refused to allow the former agent to visit the camp of Short Bull and Kicking Bear in the Stronghold. Chagrined, McGillycuddy had gone back to Rapid City to clear the air with Miles; he had returned to Pine Ridge on the eve of Wounded Knee.[27]

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[26] Cooper to Morgan, January 11, 1891, in NA, RG 75.

[27] McGillycuddy, p. 262.

McGillycuddy, never shy at speaking his mind, was quoted repeatedly as an authority on the uprising. He cast the spectre of racism over the affair when he said, "There is back of all this the natural race antagonism which our dealings with the aborigine in connection with the inevitable onward march of civilization has in no degree lessened."[28] As for the Ghost Dance: "Too much attention has been paid to it. It was only the symptom or surface indication of deep-rooted, long-existing difficulty...."[29] He took a dim view of the Army's presence at Pine Ridge. "When the Seventh Day Adventists get up on the roofs of their houses, arrayed in their ascension robes, to meet the Second Coming," he noted dryly, "the U. S. Army is not rushed into the field."[30] Thus, as long as the Army controlled Pine Ridge, McGillycuddy's usefulness in helping to end the difficulty was negligible.

Cody's was a different case; being a personal friend of Miles, he had an easier time moving into circles of power at the agency. After his attempt to parlay with Sitting Bull had been rebuffed, the showman had retired to his home in North Platte, Nebraska.[31] He was a brigadier in the Nebraska National Guard, and his commission was activated on January 6,

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[28] Quoted in Mooney, The Ghost Dance Religion..., p. 831.

[29] Quoted in Ibid., p. 833.

[30] Quoted in Vestal, Sitting Bull..., p. 287.

[31] Although Cody was on no official payroll during his abortive mission to Sitting Bull, a voucher dated February 28, 1891, shows he was paid $505.60 as a "reimbursement of expenses in complying with order by General Miles." Russell, p. 366.

He immediately travelled north to Pine Ridge, where the manager of his Wild West Show, Major John Burke, was already on hand with about fifty Indian members of the show. The Indians had been employed as Indian police and as part of a company of scouts which had been sent temporarily to Ft. Robinson under Lt. Taylor.[32] Despite his close connections with Miles, Buffalo Bill wielded nothing more than a pen in the cause of peace. He was no more able than McGillycuddy to penetrate the Army control of the situation, and so, assisted by Burke, he settled back to draft dispatches, mild in tone, to two New York newspapers, the Herald and the Sun.[33]

On January 8, control over Sioux Indian affairs was was officially transferred from the Interior Department to the War Department. Miles had his appointments ready: at Pine Ridge, Captain Francis E. Pierce, First Infantry, was placed in charge. Captain Jesse M. Lee of the Ninth Infantry, went to Rosebud, while Captain Hurst, who had persuaded a portion of the Standing Rock Sioux to come in to Ft. Bennett, took over at Cheyenne River. Agent McLaughlin remained in the saddle at Standing Rock. Captain Ezra P. Ewers, Hump's old friend, was assigned to the Tongue River Agency in Montana, where signs of restlessness had recently been observed.[34]

Some of the Brules among the remaining fugitives met with Miles on the tenth; they were disarmed and sent back to their band carrying Miles's ultimatum: surrender, and food and shelter would be provided.[35] The next day, Miles sent scouts Frank Grouard and Yankton Charlie to the fugitive camp, bearing a message asking the Sioux to come in peaceably and surrender. Eventually the two scouts and an escort of Indian police led a bedraggled lot of Indians back to the agency.[36] Grouard reported to Miles that Young-Man-Afraid-of-His-Horses, among the remaining chiefs who still held out, wished to come in, but the other chiefs were against him, the squaws silent, the old men half afraid, and the young men all in war paint and anxious for a fight.[37] Miles was so encouraged by the success of Grouard and Yankton Charlie that he notified Governor Mellette on January 12, that "As far as I can see, the danger to settlement is past."[38]

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[32] Ibid., p. 367.

[33] Johnson, pp. 297-298.

[34] General Order Number Two of Miles, dated January 12, 1891, in NA, RG 75; Pierre Daily Capital, January 9, 1891 (1:1).

And so it was. On January 16, 1891, the last Sioux hostiles straggled in to Pine Ridge. Miles had them pitch their tepees, 724 in all, just west of the agency, and immediately issued the tribe badly needed rations of coffee, beef, and sugar.[39]

The last act of the Sioux campaign was the Grand Review. Miles conducted it on the same day the last Indians arrived from the Bad Lands. Cody, in his last service for the government, sat beside the Division Commander as the troops passed in review before an audience of respectful settlers, sullen Sioux, and agency personnel with mixed feelings about the whole thing.[40] The Army intended the review to be an awesome show of strength, and it succeeded. In the parade were representatives of the many regiments - infantry, cavalry, artillery - which had been in the field for almost two months. Somehow, the First Regiment Band of Angel Island, California, had been rounded up to provide fitting martial music.[41] The long column was an hour passing Miles and Cody, both sitting on horses; there were nearly 4,000 soldiers and 3,700 horses and mules in the line.[42] Miles allowed himself a sigh of satisfaction as he surveyed his men:

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[35] Johnson, p. 296.

[36] DeBarthe, pp. 243-244.

[37] _Sioux Falls Argus Leader_, January 13, 1891 (1:7).

[38] Quoted in _Pierre Daily Capital_, January 13, 1891 (4:4).

[39] _Ibid._, January 17, 1891; Andrist, p. 352.

> The scene was weird and in some respects desolate, yet to me it was fascinating - possibly on account of the jubilant spirit occasioned by the reflection that one more Indian war had been closed, and closed in the most satisfactory way, without desolation and devastation in the settlements, as others had closed in former times. I did not then realize that we had reached, probably, the close of Indian wars in our country.[43]

The Sioux had been brought to heel as much by the elements as by the Army. Intense suffering was the lot of most of the fugitives in the Bad Lands; it was only a deep-rooted fear of the military that kept many of the Indians out in the open. Nevertheless, judging from the amount of weapons they eventually disgorged, the tribe could have fought for some time. At Standing Rock, Cherry Creek, Ft. Bennett, and Pine Ridge, upwards of 500 stand of arms were surrendered. These were mostly Winchesters, Springfields, and Sharps of good value, and did not include the hundred odd weapons taken from Big Foot and his band.[44]

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[40] Russell, p. 368.

[41] Boyd, p. 283. The best description of the Grand Review is on pp. 281-287.

[42] *Ibid.*, p. 286.

[43] Miles, "The War with the 'Messiah'," p. 528.

Secretary Noble felt that the Indians had no legitimate use for firearms, and should therefore be required to dispose of them. At the time of the final surrender, he reiterated the traditional reformist belief that the Indians should be broken to the plow, the sooner the better. "Latterly they have been treated with more kindness," the Secretary wrote, "and so they have come to believe that the white people are under never-ending obligations to them."[45] The Indian, he went on to say, must be yoked to the land to insure his own independence, just like the white man.

On this note, the Sioux rebellion ended. The Ghost Dance had made a big splash in the national conscience; the ripples, already rapidly spreading, would be a long time in dying out.

Movement among the different bands of Sioux on the reservations had been intense, and the resettlement problem presented itself. Some Rosebud Indians, mostly of Lip's band, were at Pine Ridge, as were various Hunkpapas and Blackfeet Sioux who had come all the way from Standing Rock. The Hunkpapas and Miniconjous who had turned themselves in to Captain Hurst at Ft. Bennett were still incarcerated at Ft. Sully. The Pine Ridge Hunkpapas wanted to stay there; they claimed that Sitting Bull, before his death, had told them to join their relatives among the Oglalas. They said they were afraid of their enemies at Standing Rock.[46] The resettlement problem dragged into the middle of 1891; eventually all the Sioux were either relocated or escorted peacefully back to their reservations.

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[44] Miles to Adjutant General of the Army, February 3, 1891, in NA, RG 75.

[45] Quoted in Boyd, p. 280.

A second problem, that of Army vs. civilian control of the agencies, was resolved, at least temporarily, in favor of the military. Commissioner Morgan let it be known that this measure was for expediency only, when he informed Miles, "*I yield to no man in my respect for the Army and in my recognition of its valuable services in the performance of its legitimate functions, but it is not, never has been, and never can be a civilizing force.*"[47] In at least one instance, the proponents of civilian control put up a valiant fight. At the close of the campaign, petitions were circulated promoting the appointment of Scout James H. Cook as agent at Pine Ridge. The petition was signed by "many of the prominent citizens of the Black Hills country and of the county (Fall

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[46] Second Lieutenant Guy H. Preston, Ninth Cavalry, to Colonel W. R. Shafter, First Infantry, undated, in NA, RG 75.

[47] CIA (1891), p. 144.

River) lying adjacent to the Pine Ridge Indian Reservation,"[48] and was duly placed with the Commissioner of Indian Affairs. Cook numbered among his backers such Indian leaders as Red Cloud, Jack Red Cloud, Young-Man-Afraid-of-His-Horses, Little Wound, No Water, and American Horse, but to no avail; the Army was already firmly in control at Pine Ridge.[49]

At Standing Rock, agent McLaughlin existed uneasily side by side with the military. On January 30, 1891, General Miles ordered Lt. Col. Drum to "exercise...such military supervision and control as may be necessary without interfering unnecessarily with the routine administration of the agents of the Indian Bureau under the prescribed regulations of the Interior Department."[50] This brought a loud blast of complaint from McLaughlin to Morgan, but the acid-tongued Scot could do little more than voice his discontent. After a visit to Washington by certain Sioux chiefs in February, Congress passed a bill enacting that all future vacancies in the office of Indian agent should be filled by military officers selected by the Indian office and detailed for that purpose from the Army. At the same time, a plan was originated to enlist the Indians as a component part of the regular Army, in addition to their irregular capacity as scouts.[51] Although civilian control over Indian affairs eventually resumed, for the time being the Army ran the

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[48] Cook, p. 200.

[49] See the letter from these chiefs to Commissioner Morgan, quoted in ibid., pp. 201-202.

[50] Miles's orders to Drum, January 30, 1891, in NA, RG 75.

[51] Mooney, The Ghost Dance Religion..., p. 891.

Sioux agencies.

The visit of the Sioux leaders to the nation's capital gave the chiefs a chance to air their grievances. The delegation included both Progressives and Conservatives, men like American Horse, George Sword, Big Road, and He Dog (Pine Ridge; White Bird and Turning Hawk (Rosebud); Little No Heart and Straight Head (Cheyenne River); and John Grass and Mad Bear (Standing Rock).[52] Somehow Old Two Strike, whom Rosebud's agent Wright regarded as one of the "fomentors of rebellion,"[53] got himself included in the group. This angered Miles, who believed the inclusion of such chiefs merely inflated their ego while irritating loyal Indians like Young-Man-Afraid-of-His-Horses and American Horse.[54]

The members of the Sioux delegation gave emotional but basically true accounts of the Wounded Knee action to Commissioner Morgan.[55] In his statement, American Horse accused the Crook Commission of broken promises, an indictment with which the other Sioux agreed.[56] The real center of attention, however, was Two Strike, who, "full of years and caution, complimented the daughters of the high officials, and skillfully avoided the weak points of his people's conduct."[57]

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[52] Ibid.

[53] See the letters from Wright to Morgan throughout this period, in NA, RG 75.

[54] Miles to Adjutant General, March 13, 1891, in ibid.

[55] See the testimony of Turning Hawk, Spotted Horse, and American Horse, February 11, 1891, in CIA (1891), pp. 180-181.

[56] Mooney, The Ghost Dance Religion..., pp. 839-840.

[57] David Graham Phillips, "The Sioux Chiefs Before the Secretary," Harper's Weekly, XXXV, No. 1783 (February 21, 1891), p. 142.

Secretary Noble faced the chiefs wearing an expression of "alternate amusement and concern,"[58] as well as he might. The chiefs cut quite a swath in official Washington, as Indian delegations always did, but they were unable to gain much by their visit. Steps were taken to reimburse those whose ponies had been confiscated in 1876, and additional appropriations were made for rations. Before the end of 1891, the Sioux were receiving half again as much food as they had before the outbreak.[59] Other problems, like the land question and reimbursement for damages suffered by the peaceful Indians (all the Sioux now claimed to be peaceful Indians) during the uprising, remained to be resolved.

A third difficulty was the press, which continued to magnify the aspects of Wounded Knee beyond all proportion to the real troubles of the Sioux, the direction of the magnification depending on the editorial persuasion of the various newspapers. As an example of this tendency, the Omaha _World-Herald_ and the Omaha _Bee_ may be cited. The reporter representing the _Bee_ had been excluded from the court of inquiry conducted by Major Kent and Captain Baldwin. As a result, this paper's reporting of events reflected a hostile attitude toward the Seventh Cavalry and its actions in the campaign, while the opposition sheet consistently praised Colonel Forsythe and his men.[60] Miles, for one, was sick and tired of the role the newspapers had played throughout. "For months I have endeavored to avoid being interviewed," he wrote to Morgan, "and have always regarded public comment concerning a branch of the public service that I am concerned in as improper."[61]

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[58] _Ibid._

[59] Mooney, _The Ghost Dance Religion..._, p. 891.

[60] Wells, p. 294.

There remained the problem of what to do with the former leaders of the Ghost Dance. The solution, although not unique as far as treatment of Indian captives went, is worthy of note. Some thirty of the principle warriors were sent to the headquarters of the Division of the Missouri in Chicago, conducted by Captain Jesse M. Lee.[62] Nineteen of these were rescued by the indefatigable Cody. Soon such former Ghost Dancers as Kicking Bear, Short Bull, Lone Bull, Mesh the Kettle, Scatter, and Revenge, along with peaceful Indians like Lone Wolf, No Neck, and Black Heart, and scouts like John Shangrau and Yankton Charlie, found themselves touring Europe as part of Buffalo Bill's Wild West Show.[63] This in spite of a protest by the Congregational Club of Boston that "unfortunate moral and physical results" would be the only product of such an excursion.[64]

Not every Sioux could go to Europe. Some of those who remained peaceful during the fighting had to be content with less spectacular rewards. Thus Chief Standing Bear and other leaders at Rosebud, at their own request and the behest of Miles, received a button about one inch in diameter. The buttons displayed a rising sun, on the clear sky above which were emblazoned the words "Peace, Good Will." Below were two clasped hands, on each side of which was a shock of corn; below this, at the extreme bottom, was a plow. The chiefs were greatly pleased to wear these buttons as a mark of honor and distinction; to them the tokens signified that the Great Father in Washington recognized them as Progressive Indians.[65]

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[61] Miles to Morgan, January 31, 1891, in NA, RG 75.

[62] Miles, "The War with the 'Messiah'," p. 528.

[63] Russell, p. 369; John Shangrau Interview, Ricker Collection.

[64] Congregational Club to Morgan, undated, in NA, RG 94.

The government also rewarded the Army. In fact, the Sioux campaign produced a veritable deluge of medals, some of which, under more careful investigation, were later revoked. Initially, fifteen men, including Corporal Weinert (who had taken his Hotchkiss gun into the ravine at Wounded Knee and "blazed away"), received the Medal of Honor.[66] For their actions in the vicious hand-to-hand combat in the ravine, four more received the same award. Five soldiers won the Medal for their role in the fighting around Drexel Mission. The relief of the Seventh Cavalry by Colonel Henry's Ninth on January 1, 1891, a completely insignificant affair as far as actual fighting went, earned six more soldiers the same prize. The Medals of Honor thus totalled thirty.[67] The awards had been made in the first flush of victory; as the Friends of the Indian began to castigate the Army in the wake of pro-Indian reportage, the number of awar recipients was precipitately trimmed to eighteen. Eventually, the government chose not to publicize the Medals any more than necessary, and on June 25, 1891, the fifteenth anniversary of the Little Big Horn, the eighteen Medals were mailed to their recipients.[68]

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[65] Standing Bear, pp. 229-230.

[66] The Congressional Medal of Honor, owing to the paucity of other military awards, was a far more popular decoration during the latter part of the nineteenth century than it is today. For a complete listing of the Medal of Honor winners in the Sioux campaign, see Beyer and Keydel, pp. 324-325.

Basically, the cost of the Messiah Craze can only be measured in blood and dollars. On the Army side, three officers and twenty-eight enlisted were killed outright or mortally wounded during the campaign. Four officers and thirty-eight enlisted were seriously wounded, some of these dying at a later date of complications to their wounds. In all, counting the killings of Lt. Casey and the herder Miller, the total white dead numbered forty-nine.[69]

At least 250 fatalities resulted on the Indian side as a result of the Wounded Knee battle. Later skirmishes were responsible for the deaths of twenty or thirty Indians - the exact number is impossible to ascertain.[70] In all, about 300 Indians lost their lives, a ratio to white fatalities of about 6:1. Army officials counted a total of 532 Indians surrendered or captured for the entire campaign.[71]

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[67] *Ibid.*, pp. 326-330. [68] Lee, p. 11.

[69] Mooney, *The Ghost Dance Religion...*, p. 891.

[70] *Ibid.*

The Sioux made a shrine of the mass grave on Cemetery Hill. In April, 1890, Captain Charles G. Penney, who had relieved Captain Pierce as acting agent at Pine Ridge on the latter's request, nervously informed Morgan:

> Numbers of individuals from Standing Rock, Cheyenne River, and other neighboring agencies are continually violating graves of people killed in the Wounded Knee fight. They cry and howl and work themselves and my people into a sad state of mind. I think it would be well if you would stop these people from leaving their reservations. You may expect trouble from this cause unless it is stopped.[72]

Lacking a catalyst like the Ghost Dance, the Sioux could only mourn. Their grief was strong, but so were the tentacles of the government's creditors. The expenses of the Army Ordnance Department and the Justice Department (for the Plenty Horses and Few Tails affairs) are unknown, but easily ran into thousands of dollars. The Nebraska National Guard was reimbursed $43,000, while the property of friendly Indians and other legal residents of the reservations which had been destroyed by the hostiles was evaluated at $97,646.85. The expenses of the Army's Commissary Department totalled $37,764.60; those of the Medical Department $1,164. The Quartermaster Department required $915,078.81, $120,634.17 of which was used for railroad transportation. James Mooney was probably close to the mark in his estimate that "the total expense, public or private, was probably but little short of $1,200,000, or nearly $40,000 per day..."[73]

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[71] General Ruger to Assistant Adjutant General, Division of the Missouri, March 26, 1891, in NA, RG 75.

[72] Penney to Morgan, April 8, 1891, in ibid.

The State of South Dakota was ineffectual in providing sums for damage, although the 1891 legislature did introduce a $2,000 appropriation bill to pay for the guns and ammunition which had been used by the west river settlers.[74] Dakotans disclaimed liability for any damage that took place off reservation land, reasoning that it had been wards of the federal government who were responsible. This damage included one church, two schoolhouses, a bridge, and fifty-three cabins, to say nothing of haystacks burned, farm machinery destroyed, and government and privately owned cattle slaughtered.[75] All in all, the Messiah War was an expensive proposition for all concerned.

The signs of unrest on the Sioux reservations were slow to die. However, the removal of the most fanatic worshippers, such as Kicking Bear and Short Bull, coupled with the complete disavowal of the Ghost Dance Religion among the larger part of its former adherents, brought a shaky peace to the Upper Plains. Herbert Welsh, upon his visit to Pine Ridge in 1893 (accompanied by the young Theodore Roosevelt, at that time an employee of the United States Civil Service Commission), wrote: "Among the wilder and more or less disaffected

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[73] Mooney, The Ghost Dance Religion..., p.892.

[74] Personal correspondence of Robert Lee to Will G. Robinson, South Dakota State Historian, January 6, 1952, in SDSHS.

[75] Vestal, Warpath and Council Fire, pp. 307-308.

Indians the ember of the Messiah craze and ghost-dance superstition still smoulder."[76] Other agencies also reported lingering traces of the superstition.[77]

Because the Sioux adoption of the Ghost Dance religion was accompanied by violence, the tribe's name has become inseparably linked in the public mind with the Messiah. Two important facts have been obscured. First, the entire Sioux Nation did not adopt the Ghost Dance. At its peak among the Teton Dakota, the religion could not have claimed more than 25% of the tribe's population.[78] At the first sign of military interference, many believers became apostates, such as Two Strike and his band. Only the horror of Wounded Knee precipitated further hostilities; but by this time the majority of the Sioux were motivated not by their new religion - the immortality conferred by it had been disproven by the guns of the Seventh Cavalry - but by fear and distrust of the white man. Some of the staunchest allies of the government, like Hump after the visit of Captain Ewers, had been among the mightiest of Dakota warriors; others, like American Horse and Standing Bear, who could have easily turned their followers to the Ghost Dance, steadfastly hewed to the Progressive line. Fortunate indeed were the whites who never had to face the full might of the Sioux, as the public believed the Dakota settlers were facing. The day when the Dakotas and their allies could band together in the face of white pressure was gone; it had passed at the Little Big Horn.

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[76] Herbert Welch, Civilization Among the Sioux Indians: Report of a Visit to Some of the Sioux Reservations of South Dakota and Nebraska (Philadelphia: Indian Rights Association, 1893), p. 41.

[77] See the various reports of the Sioux agents in NA, RG 75.

[78] This estimate is based on Census Agent Lea's reports, in ibid.; reports of Army officials in NA, RG 98; and various interviews with Indian Ghost Dancers contained in the Ricker Collection.

Second, the Sioux were not the only western tribe to adopt the new religion. The Ghost Dance was popular with the Northern Cheyennes, Shoshones, Northern and Southern Arapahoes, Kiowas, Comanches, Wichitas, Caddoes, and other smaller tribes.[79] The tribes which did not adhere to the new Messiah, if indeed they ever heard of him, included the Blackfeet (to be differentiated from the Blackfeet Sioux), Assiniboines, Gros Ventres, Rees, Mandans, Ojibwas, Omahas, Poncas, Sauk and Fox, Potawatomi, Kickapoos, and Iowas. In addition, the Sioux at Devil's Lake, North Dakota; the Sisseton Agency in northeastern South Dakota; and the Santee Agency, in Nebraska - although showing signs of restlessness - never developed the fervor that characterized some of the actions of their western brothers.[80] The Ghost Dance itself lived longest among the Arapahoes, Caddoes, and Wichitas;[81] it was still in evidence among these tribes when James Mooney visited them in 1893.

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[79] Grinnell, p. 64.

[80] *Ibid.*; Mooney, *The Ghost Dance Religion...*, p. 816.

[81] Mooney, "*The Indian Ghost Dance*," p. 180.

Why, then, did bloodshed occur only on the Sioux reservations? Certainly the tribe did not intend war; only the most uninformed citizens, and there were many of these, believed the myth of a planned, full-scale uprising. Even Miles, for all his public pronunciamentos that a vast rebellion was taking shape, knew precisely why the trouble occurred. This viewpoint, one which sympathized with the Sioux while realizing both the military and political necessity for quelling the disturbances, was shared by General Schofield, who later wrote: "Accidents rather than design on either side occasioned some serious collisions.../the Sioux/ had no general intention to go to war, if they could avoid it without starvation."[82]

The road to Wounded Knee was a chain of circumstances, any link of which could have been broken but for the enormous lack of understanding between red man and white. Commissioner Morgan, upon taking office on July 1, 1889, had confidently proclaimed, "The American Indian is to become the Indian American."[83] He did not need to add that this metamorphosis was to be on the white man's terms, and therein lay all the difficulty. Morgan was merely stating a basic tenet of the reform groups, one which had been implicit in the management of Indian affairs since the government first assumed wardship. The Sioux troubles served only to deepen the conviction of the Friends of the Indian that their way was the right way. Said Herbert Welsh: "Had we in the past been able to educate every Indian child who has now grown into savage manhood on the frontier in Christian truth and civilization, we should have prevented this outbreak."[84]

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[82] Lt. Gen. John M. Schofield, Forty-Six Years in the Army (New York: The Century Company, 1897), p. 488.

[83] CIA (1890), p. 6.

This enforced acculturation, among the Sioux, broke down in many places. It broke down in the failure of the treaties of 1868 and 1876; it broke down in the tactless methods used by educators like Captain Pratt; in the inept and careless way in which Congress dealt with the Indian problem; in the alienation of Sioux leaders, like Sitting Bull, who were hostile to begin with. Even the Christianization of the Sioux was, paradoxically, a failure as regards the Ghost Dance. It may be seriously doubted if the Messiah could have gained such a hold on the tribe had not the strong monotheism of the white man been overlaid on the centuries-old traditions of ritual dancing and mysticism. Given this set of circumstances, combined with the physical hardships the Sioux endured throughout the eighties, and one marvels not that fighting finally occurred, but that it came almost by accident.

In the years following Wounded Knee, the Sioux and their Friends did not allow the tragic event to leave the public mind. In 1920 the tribe, aided by Miles, appealed for redress from the government, but was rebuffed - mainly through the efforts of James McLaughlin, who had risen to the post of Indian Inspector.[85] Again in the late thirties, when the only Indian survivors of the Ghost Dance were aged men and women, the Sioux appealed again, and were again disappointed.[86]

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[84] BIC (1890), p. 181. See also Herbert Welsh, "The Meaning of the Dakota Outbreak," Scribner's Magazine, IX, No. 4 (April, 1891), pp. 439-452.

Some things did change as a result of the Sioux trouble. Previous to 1890, the spoils system had determined the appointment of Indian agents. Civilians with a civilian background had dominated the agencies, albeit aided by Army officers in the distribution of goods and annuities. By 1894, an authority on the subject could write, "The Indian Bureau is now conducted on essentially the same system as prevails in the Army."[87] By this was meant that the agents became directly accountable for rations issued. Although inequities in the system still existed, the Sioux benefitted somewhat by the increased attention on the part of the Indian Bureau.

In the case of the Pine Ridge Sioux, the allotment of lands did not commence until 1904. By 1916, the major portion of the reservation had been divided into tracts of 160 acres for each Indian, regardless of age.[88] The same thing was happening at the other agencies. Acculturation would not be stayed; today Commissioner Morgan's statement is truth – the Sioux have been culturally assimilated.

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[85] Utley, pp. 249-250. The twenties and thirties were the period of sensationalism, as far as the reporting of Wounded Knee was concerned. Pro-Indian sentiment ran rampant in the popular journals, and basic facts regarding the outbreak, readily found in James Mooney's works, were completely disregarded.

[86] For this second effort, which aroused much pro-Indian sentiment in the public press, see U. S., House, Sioux Indians: Wounded Knee Massacre, and U. S., House, Liquidating the Liability..., passim.

[87] Gibbon, p. 258.

The remaining story of the protagonists in the Sioux uprising is quickly told. Miles eventually succeeded to Schofield's post as Commandant of the Army. Colonels Forsythe and Henry both became generals, and Henry capped his remarkable career by serving as Governor of Puerto Rico. Dr. Royer died in obscurity in California in 1929, while McLaughlin continued his career in the Indian Office. William Cody had no qualms about taking part in the battle in a 1913 movie production of the Wounded Knee fight, along with Miles.[89]

On the Indian side, the Wounded Knee affair is held in sacred memory. Today, the grave on Cemetery Hill, enclosed by a small cement curb, is marked with a simple stone shaft, on three sides of which are engraved the names of some of the Hunkpapas and Miniconjous who lie beneath it. The fourth side carries the inscription: "Charging Cloud, the Peacemaker, died here innocent."[90]

Warrior chiefs like Red Cloud, Hump, and Two Strike died as reservation Indians. Short Bull survived to an old age, and was seen attending a rodeo at Pine Ridge in 1930.

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[88] MacGregor, p. 38.

[89] Wells, p. 304. See also an indictment of this cinematic capitalization on the battle by Chauncey Yellow Robe, a full-blooded Sioux, in an unidentified newspaper clipping in SDSHS.

[90] Metcalf, p. 317.

Wovoka lived the remainder of his life almost entirely forgotten; he died in 1932, and was buried in Walker Valley.

The Sioux became more dependent than ever on the government for their livelihood, and their wardship is not over yet. The heritage of the plains warrior has been all but stifled; yet in the bonds of an alien civilization these Indians have not found lasting peace.

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Record Group 75, Records of the Bureau of Indian Affairs, contains much valuable information on the subject. It includes letters and telegrams of the Sioux agents to the Secretary of the Interior and the Commissioner of Indian Affairs, and in some cases the correspondence of the latter two individuals. Certain military correspondence can also be found here, particularly that originated by General Miles, as well as a partial record of orders sent from the field at Pine Ridge. Letters both to and from private individuals concerning the outbreak are also included.

Record Group 48, Records of the Office of the Secretary of the Interior, consists of Dakota Territorial Records. An analysis of these papers gives some insight into local Indian policy, which was often at variance with that of the federal government.

Record Group 94, Records of the Adjutant General's Office, contains the valuable Kent-Baldwin Report, which includes interviews conducted early in January, 1891, with Army officers involved in the Wounded Knee fight.

Record Group 98, Records of United States Army Commands, includes field messages sent and received by Miles, Brooke, Ruger, Forsythe, and Whitside, among others, during the Pine Ridge campaign.

Nebraska State Historical Society

The Judge Eli S. Ricker Collection is, along with the Kent-Baldwin Report, one of the most important bodies of material available for the reconstruction of the events on Wounded Knee Creek. Judge Ricker interviewed white, mixed-blood, and Indian survivors of the battle during the years 1905-1907, setting down their comments on white lined note paper. The defects of this collection are obvious; Judge Ricker was an extremely partisan champion of the Indian cause, and looked upon Wounded Knee as nothing less than a massacre. The large time gap may have played tricks with the memories of many of the participants. The collection itself remains in Ricker's own handwriting and is badly organized. Nevertheless, these interviews are a tribute to the historical sense and time-consuming labor of Judge Ricker;

without them no study of Wounded Knee and the Sioux troubles can be called complete.

Personal Correspondence

Letter to the author from Robert Lee, October 25, 1965. Mr. Lee has amassed what is probably the largest private collection of data on the Sioux uprising of 1890-91. Here he gives some of his views on two key actors in the drama, Agent Royer and Sitting Bull.

South Dakota State Historical Society

Although material in the South Dakota archives is not as plentiful as one might expect, much valuable information may be obtained there. Rare photographs of the Ghost Dance and the field of Wounded Knee assisted the author immensely in forming a mental picture of many of the scenes. Old newspaper clippings contain ready reference material, including several interviews. There is also some useful correspondence pertaining to the Ghost Dance.

Newspapers

Black Hills Daily Times. Deadwood, S.D.

This paper had no correspondent at the scene; its wire-service accounts are fairly reliable, but its editorials are bellicose in nature.

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This paper was picked as a source to give an example of the viewpoint of a moderate eastern sheet. It also had no correspondent at Pine Ridge.

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Mekeel, Scudder. "A Short History of the Teton-Dakota," *North Dakota Historical Quarterly*, X, No. 3 (July, 1943), 137-205.
A fine survey of the Sioux from a cultural standpoint.

"Messiah War on Cheyenne River," *The Wi-Iyohi: Monthly Bulletin of the South Dakota Historical Society*, XVII, No. 8 (November 1, 1963), 1-8.
Outlines important facts about the lesser known events of the Sioux campaign in the Cheyenne River and Bad Lands areas.

Metcalf, George. "Tragedy at Wounded Knee," *Great Western Indian Fights* (New York: Doubleday and Company, 1960), 307-317.
A good survey of Wounded Knee by a member of the staff of the Smithsonian Institution.

Miles, Maj. Gen. Nelson A. "The Future of the Indian Question," *North American Review*, CLII, No. 410 (January, 1891), 1-10.
The commander of the Army Troops in the Pine Ridge campaign reiterates his arguments that a vast conspiracy existed among the western Indians, while stating that the red man was better prepared for war than ever.

________. "The War With the 'Messiah'," *Cosmopolitan*, XXII, No. 9 (September, 1911), 522-533.
A valuable personal account, in which Miles gave his opinions of the nature of the uprising and of some of his foes.

Mooney, James. "The Indian Ghost Dance," *Collections of the Nebraska State Historical Society*, XVI (1911), 168-186.
The leading contemporary authority on the Messiah superstition gave a more popular account than in his earlier study in an address before the Nebraska State Historical Society on January 18, 1910.

Moorehead, Warren K. "Indian Messiah and Ghost Dance," *The American Antiquarian and Oriental Journal*, XIII, No. 3 (May, 1891), 161-167.
Moorehead was at Pine Ridge during the Ghost Dancing, pursuing ethnological studies. Although some of his facts are inaccurate, his account of the dance itself is excellent.

Parker, Mrs. Z. A. "Ghost Dance at Pine Ridge," *Journal of American Folk-Lore*, IV (1891), 160-162. Reprinted from *New York Evening Post*, April 18, 1891.
Another eye-witness account of a Ghost Dance.

Philip, George. "James (Scotty) Philip," *South Dakota Historical Collections*, XX (1940), 409-430.
Philip was a rancher in the west river country in 1890; he was visited by some Ghost Dancers, probably of Short Bull's band.

Ralph, Julian. "The Dakotas," *Harper's New Monthly Magazine*, LXXXIV, No. 504 (May, 1892), 895-908.
A travelogue which aids in the geographic study of the events surrounding the uprising.

Remington, Frederic. "The Art of War and Newspaper Men," *Harper's Weekly*, XXXIV, No. 1772 (December 6, 1890), 947.

Remington, just beginning his rise to fame as a writer and an illustrator, was at Pine Ridge and in the Bad Lands with Miles and the Northern Cheyenne Commission. Here he points out that Indians could read of troop movements in the newspapers as well as white men.

________. "Chasing a Major-General," Harper's Weekly, XXXIV, No. 1772 (December 6, 1890), 946.
Description of a trip with Miles around the Little Big Horn area and Fort Custer.

________. "Indians as Irregular Cavalry," Harper's Weekly, XXXIV, No. 1775 (December 27, 1890), 1004-1006.
Favors Indians as scouts while excoriating mismanagement of Indian affairs by the Department of the Interior.

________. "Lieutenant Casey's Last Scout," Harper's Weekly, XXXV, No. 1780 (January 31, 1891), 85-87.
Remington was with Casey and his Cheyenne scouts, but left for the East three days before Casey was shot by Plenty Horses.

________. "The Sioux Outbreak in South Dakota," Harper's Weekly, XXXV, No. 1779 (January 24, 1891), 58, 61-62.

Robinson, Doane. "The Education of Red Cloud," South Dakota Historical Collections, XII (1924), 156-178.
A description of the clash of wills between the great Oglala chief and Dr. V. T. McGillycuddy, the Pine Ridge agent, over the establishment of an Indian police force at the agency.

________. "Some Sidelights on the Character of Sitting Bull," Collections of the Nebraska State Historical Society, XVI (1911), 187-192.
A short essay on the Hunkpapa chief, including a penetrating glimpse into Sitting Bull's attitude toward Christianity.

Rosenberg, Marvin, and Rosenberg, Dorothy. "'There Are No Indians Left Now But Me'," American Heritage, XV, No. 4 (June, 1964), 18-23, 106-111.
An article sympathetic to the Indians, this essay states that Sitting Bull consciously used the Ghost Dance to further his own design.

Schwatka, Lt. Frederick. "The Sun-Dance of the Sioux," Century Magazine, XXXIX, No. 5 (March, 1890), 753-759.
A vivid first-person account by an Army officer who witnessed the last great Sun Dance of the Sioux Nation. The dance, conducted by the Brules, was held at Spotted Tail Agency, Beaver Creek, Nebraska, in 1875.

Scott, Brig. Gen. E. D. "Wounded Knee - A Look at the Record," *The Field Artillery Journal*, XXIX, No. 1 (January-February, 1939), 5-24.

Scott presents the Army's side of the Wounded Knee argument with great conviction and very little substantiation.

Seymour, Charles G. "The Sioux Rebellion," *Harper's Weekly*, XXXV, No. 1781 (February 7, 1891), 106.

Contains an excellent description of the final review of troops at Pine Ridge.

Steel, Maj. M. F. "Buffalo Bill's Bluff," *South Dakota Historical Collections*, IX (1918), 475-485.

An account of Cody's mission to Standing Rock by a former Second Lieutenant in F Troop of the 8th Cavalry, Major Fechet's command.

Traub, Capt. Peter E. "The First Act of the Last Sioux Campaign," *Journal of the United States Cavalry Association*, XV (1905), 872-879.

Traub was also at Ft. Yates in 1890; here he writes of Buffalo Bill's mission to Sitting Bull.

Voget, Fred W. "The American Indian in Transition," *American* Anthropologist, LVIII, No. 2 (April, 1956), 249-263.

A An excellent examination of Indian religious movements, with emphasis on the messianic influences engendered by cultural conflict.

Walker, J. R. "The Sun Dance and Other Ceremonies of the Oglala Division of the Teton Dakota," *Anthropological Papers of the American Museum of Natural History*, XVI, Part 2 (1917).

One of the first and still one of the most competent studies of the religious practices of the Oglala Sioux.

Watson, Elmo Scott. "The Last Indian War, 1890-91 - A Study of Newspaper Jingoism," *Journalism Quarterly*, XX (1943), 205-219.

An excellent study which utilizes rare material pertaining to the correspondent corps at Pine Ridge.

Weigley, Russell F. "The Military Thought of John M. Schofield," *Military Affairs*, XXIII, No. 2 (Summer, 1958-59), 77-84.

An analysis of the theories of the Commandant of the Army at the time of the Sioux uprising.

Wells, Philip F. "Ninety-Six Years Among the Indians of the Northwest," *North Dakota History*, XV, No. 3 (July, 1948), 169-216, and No. 4 (October, 1948), 265-312.

Wells was an Indian scout and an interpreter for much of his life, serving in both capacities during the Messiah troubles. His recollections are hazy in spots, but his memoirs provide absorbing reading.

Welsh, Herbert. "The Meaning of the Dakota Outbreak," Scribner's Magazine, IX, No. 4 (April, 1891), 439-452.

An ardent reformer, Welsh here stresses the difference between the pagan and Christian Sioux, pointing out the dangers of including the latter when placing the blame for the outbreak.

Wissler, Clark. "Societies and Ceremonial Associations in the Oglala Division of the Teton-Dakota," Anthropological Papers of the American Museum of Natural History, XI, Part 1 (1916), 1-99.

Wissler was perhaps the most learned student of the customs of the Oglala Sioux. In this outstanding study, he describes and analyzes their society.

Book and Pamphlets

Alexander, Hartley B. The World's Rim. Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1953.

A general work which is quite successful in examining the great mysteries of the North American Indians from a philosophical viewpoint.

Andrist, Ralph K. The Long Death: The Last Days of the Plains Indian. New York: MacMillan and Co., 1964.

A fairly good general work which is marred by a pro-Indian treatment of the Ghost Dance and Wounded Knee.

Bailey, Paul. Wovoka, the Indian Messiah. Los Angeles: Westernlore Press, 1957.

Although inclined toward sensationalism, this work is standard and contains interesting information on the foundation of the Messiah belief and on Wovoka's personal life.

Beyer, W. F., and Keydel, O. F. (eds.) Deeds of Valor. Vol. II. Detroit: The Perrien-Keydel Company, 1907.

This eulogization of American Medal of Honors winners is shallow and poorly written on the Messiah and inaccurate on Sitting Bull; it contains Corporal Paul Weinert's account of his role in the Wounded Knee fighting.

Billington, Ray Allen. Westward Expansion: A History of the American Frontier. New York: The MacMillan Co., 1949.

A highly regarded textbook which places the Ghost Dance in its proper historical perspective; distinguished by an outstanding bibliography.

Bland, Thomas A. (ed) A Brief History of the Late Military Invasion of the Home of the Sioux. Washington: The National Indian Defense Association, 1891.

Bland, the President of the National Indian

Defense Association, was a leading reformer, although not as radical as men like Herbert Welsh. This work contains accounts of Bland's talks with the Sioux delegation to Washington in February, 1891. Although Bland's viewpoint is patently pro-Indian, the inclusion of many documents and letters renders extreme value to his writing.

Bourke, John G. *On the Border With Crook*. New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1891.

Bourke, a captain in the 3rd Cavalry, was a great admirer of General Crook, and a member of his "faction." This work contains a brief account of the General's activities in the Sioux land cession of 1889.

Boyd, James P. *Recent Indian Wars*. Philadelphia: Publisher's Union, 1892.

Although rather badly written and inaccurate in places, this is one of the first books written concerning Wounded Knee and the Sioux campaign. It contains many quotations, particularly from Miles.

Brady, Cyrus T. *Indian Fights and Fighters*. New York: Doubleday, Page and Co., 1913.

Contains a chapter detailing the activities of Lt. Col. Guy V. Henry and his all-Negro 9th Cavalry during the Pine Ridge campaign.

Burdick, Usher L. *The Last Days of Sitting Bull*. Baltimore: Wirth Brothers, 1941.

Quotes from Agent McLaughlin's copy book of letters in the author's possession. This work also includes the three chapters of *My Friend the Indian*, noted directly below.

________. (ed.) *My Friend the Indian, or Three Heretofore Unpublished Chapters of the Book Published Under the Title of My Friend the Indian, by Major James McLaughlin*. Baltimore: Proof Press, 1936.

For some reason, the final three chapters of McLaughlin's book, noted below, were not published in the original work. They contain valuable material on the Ghost Dance at Standing Rock and on the death of Sitting Bull.

Carter, Lt. Col. W. H. *From Yorktown to Santiago With the Sixth U. S. Cavalry*. Baltimore: The Friedenwald Co., 1900.

Carter was with the Sixth in the Pine Ridge campaign and was the regimental historian.

Cook, James H. *Fifty Years on the Old Frontier*. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1923.

Cook was present at Pine Ridge as an Indian scout; his story of the campaign is lucid and informative.

DeBarthe, Joe. *The Life and Adventures of Frank Grouard*. Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1958.

Grouard was a scout at Pine Ridge; DeBarthe, a newspaperman, interviewed him several years after Wounded Knee. The scout is sometimes inaccurate and his interviewer tends to exaggerate, but the book quotes much correspondence, especially regarding the attempt to arrest Sitting Bull.

Eastman, Charles A. *From the Deep Woods to Civilization: Chapters in the Autobiography of an Indian*. Boston: Little, Brown, and Co., 1931.

Dr. Eastman, a full-blood Santee Sioux, was the agency physician at Pine Ridge in 1890 and 1891. His recollections are disappointingly skimpy on the Sioux difficulties.

Eastman, Elaine Goodale. *Pratt, the Red Man's Moses*. Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1935.

A passable but biased biography of the founder of Carlisle.

Farrow, Edward S. *Farrow's Military Encyclopedia*. Vol. II. New York: Published by the Author, 1885.

A handy guide for contemporary weaponry.

Fritz, Henry E. *The Movement for Indian Assimilation, 1860-1890*. Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1963.

This work draws on much primary material; it is an excellent study of the attitudes of both government and private agencies toward the Indian problem, although it slights the cultural conflict between white man and red.

Gessner, Robert. Massacre: A survey of Today's American Indian. New York: Jonathan Cape and Harrison Smith, 1931.

An intensely emotional and grossly inaccurate account of Wounded Knee; this work is a typical example of the extremism surrounding the subject.

Hagan, William T. *American Indians*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1961.

A short, general work, which includes an excellent encapsulization of white-Indian relations during the period of the Ghost Dance.

Hassrick, Royal B. *The Sioux: Life and Customs of a Warrior Society*. Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1964.

This excellent survey takes a sociological approach to the study of the tribe's motivations.

Hodge, Frederick Webb (ed.) *Handbook of American Indians North of Mexico*. 2 Parts. New York: Pageant Books, Inc., 1959.

An indispensable reference work, written in dictionary style.

Hyde, George E. *Red Cloud's Folk: A History of the Oglala Sioux Indians*. Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1937.
Hyde's trilogy on the Sioux is unparalleled. He has comprehensively examined Indian evidence, a fact which may lend a slight but harmless bias to his writing. Here he examines the Oglala up to the death of Crazy Horse in 1877.

________. *A Sioux Chronicle*. Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1956.
A major source for any student of the Sioux. It covers the tribe from 1878 until 1891, and includes chapters on the eastern "Friends of the Indians" and on government Indian policy.

________. *Spotted Tail's Folk: A History of the Brule Sioux*. Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1961.

Johnson, Virginia W. *The Unregimented General: A Biography of Nelson A. Miles*. Boston: Houghton Miflin Co., 1962.
Although pro-Indian and pro-Miles, this work is valuable for its inclusion of some of Miles's letters to his wife, written during the Pine Ridge campaign.

Johnston, Sister Mary Antonio. *Federal Relations With the Great Sioux Indians of South Dakota, 1887-1933, With Particular Reference to Land Policy Under the Dawes Act*. Washington: Catholic University of America Press, 1948.
An excellent study, particularly helpful in the analysis of the effects of the Indian legislation of the late eighties.

La Farge, Oliver (ed.). *The Changing Indian*. Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1942.
Contains a discussion of Indian problems engendered by cultural conflict.

Lindquist, G. E. E. *The Red Man in the United States*. New York: George H. Doran Co., 1923.
A very general work, dealing mostly with twentieth century reservation life.

Lowie, Robert H. *Indians of the Plains*. New York: McGraw-Hill Book Co., Inc., 1954.
Another general work concerned with anthropological studies among the Plains tribes.

MacGregor, Gordon. *Warriors Without Weapons: A Study of the Society and Personality Development of the Pine Ridge Sioux*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1946.
A sociological and psychiatric study of the effects of white culture upon the Sioux.

MacLeod, William C. The American Indian Frontier. New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1928.

A survey which treats the Sioux uprising in perspective, but which is generally sympathetic to the Indians.

McGillycuddy, Julia B. McGillycuddy: Agent. Palo Alto: Stanford University Press, 1941.

Written by McGillycuddy's second wife. This work is, naturally enough, generally favorable to the actions of the controversial Pine Ridge agent.

McLaughlin, James. My Friend the Indian. Boston: Houghton Miflin Co., 1926.

Memoirs of the veteran agent at Standing Rock. Extremely valuable in understanding agency policy and in the study of the death of Sitting Bull.

Miles, Lt. Gen. Nelson A. Serving the Republic. New York: Harper Brothers, 1911.

Miles's memoirs shed little light on the Messiah activity and Wounded Knee.

Miller, David H. Ghost Dance. New York: Duell, Sloan, and Pierce, 1959.

An undocumented account which uses Indian evidence to a degree unmatched by any other work. Like so many other authors, however, Miller cannot resist an overdramatization of hisstory; he displays a definite bias toward the Indian side.

Moorehead, Warren K. The American Indian in the United States, 1850-1914. Andover, Mass.: Andover Press, 1914.

Moorehead was a practicing anthropologist, and was at Pine Ridge during 1890 and 1891. His comments on the Ghost Dance are erudite and perceptive.

Neihardt, John G. The Song of the Messiah. New York: The Macmillan Co., 1935.

A panoramic poem about the Ghost Dance and Wounded Knee, this work is almost valueless for factual research. It nicely demonstrates the emotionalism surrounding the subject.

Pratt, Richard Henry. Battlefield and Classroom: Four Decades With the American Indian. Edited by Robert M. Utley. New York: Yale University Press, 1964.

The founder of Carlisle Indian School tells much about himself and his philosophy concerning Indian affairs in these revealing excerpts from his memoirs. The work concentrates exclusively on Pratt's early career at Carlisle, and is of little value in the study of the Ghost Dance.

Priest, Loring Benson. *Uncle Sam's Stepchildren: The Reformation of United States Indian Policy, 1865-1887.* New Brunswick: Rutgers University Press, 1942.
This is the definitive work on federal paternalism and the Indian.

Russell, Don. *The Lives and Legends of Buffalo Bill*. Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1960.
Contains a good account of Cody's role in the Pine Ridge campaign.

Schell, Herbert S. *History of South Dakota*. Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1961.
A good textbook study which unfortunately does not choose to deal with the impact of the Ghost Dance upon the white Dakota natives.

Schmeckebier, Laurence F. *The Office of Indian Affairs: Its History, Activities, and Organization*. Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins Press, 1927.
The definitive work on the Indian Bureau; also contains an outstanding bibliography.

Schmitt, Martin F. (ed.). *General George Crook: His Autobiography*. Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1946.
These rough notes were intended to form the basis for Crook's autobiography; they include the General's own account of the Land Commission of 1889.

Schofield, Lt. Gen. John M. *Forty-Six Years in the Army*. New York: The Century Co., 1897.
These long and uneven memoirs contain little of interest on the Sioux campaign.

Seymour, Flora Warren. *Indian Agents of the Old Frontier*. New York: D. Appleton-Century Co., Inc., 1941.
Unreliable sketches of Indian agents, characterized by sensationalism and faulty research.

Standing Bear, Luther. *My People the Sioux*. Cambridge: The Riverside Press, 1928.
Emotional but entertaining reminiscences by a Brule chief. The work includes descriptions of the machinations of the Crook Commission of 1889.

Tebbel, John, and Jennison, Keith. *The American Indian Wars*. New York: Harper and Brothers, 1960.
A general work at the juvenile level.

Textor, Lucy E. *Official Relations Between the United States and the Sioux Indians*. Palo Alto: Standord University Press, 1896.
An excellent source for documentary evidence.

Utley, Robert M. *The Last Days of the Sioux Nation*. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1963.
Contains an outstanding bibliography. Along with Mooney, this work is a basic secondary source.

Vestal, Stanley (Walter Campbell) (ed.). *New Sources of Indian History, 1850-1891*. Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1934.
A very important reproduction of unofficial documents, many relating to the Ghost Dance and Wounded Knee.

________. *Sitting Bull: Champion of the Sioux*. Boston: Houghton Miflin Co., 1932.
Stanley Vestal was the pen name used by Walter Stanley Campbell. Although generally biased toward the Indian side, he has here produced the definitive biography of the Hunkpapa chief.

________. *Warpath and Council Fire*. New York: Random House, 1948.
A good study of the Plains tribes.

Welsh, Herbert. *Civilization Among the Sioux Indians: Report of a Visit to Some of the Sioux Reservations of South Dakota and Nebraska*. Philadelphia: Indian Rights Association, 1893.
Although Welsh was an ardent reformer and may be suspected of pro-Indian bias, he possessed keen powers of observation. Here he describes the Sioux in the wake of the Messiah religion.

________. *Four Weeks Among Some of the Sioux Troubles of Dakota and Nebraska, Together With a Brief Consideration of the Indian Problem*. Philadelphia: Horace F. McCann, 1892.
Description of reservation life.

________. *Report of a Visit to the Great Sioux Reserve*. Philadelphia: Indian Rights Association, 1883.
Another description of reservation life.

Wissler, Clark. *Indians of the United States*. New York: Doubleday, Doran and Co., Inc., 1940.
A standard general work by a critical observer.

________. *North American Indians of the Plains*. New York: American Museum of Natural History, 1934.
An anthropological view.

This thesis was prepared by Michael T. Isenberg under the direction of the chairman of the candidate's supervisory committee, and has been approved by all members of that committee. It was submitted to the Dean of the School of Arts and Sciences and to the Graduate Council, and has been approved as partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Master of Arts.

Date May 23, 1966

Dean, School of Arts and Sciences

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