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Eisenhower and Khrushchev at the Paris Summit: Anatomy of a Failure

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EISENHOWER AND KHRUSHCHEV AT THE PARIS PEACE SUMMIT:

ANATOMY OF A FAILURE

by

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B.A. May 1989, The American University of Washington, D.C.

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ABSTRACT

EISENHOWER AND KHRUSHCHEV AT THE PARIS PEACE SUMMIT: ANATOMY OF A FAILURE.

Vincent Michael Kapral
Old Dominion University 1997
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Although it seemed at the time that the destruction of a U-2 reconnaissance aircraft over Soviet territory, slightly over two weeks prior to the Four-Power May 1960 Paris Conference had ended the summit, more deeply rooted historical differences ensured the meeting's failure. While President Dwight Eisenhower sought to ensure a national policy of defense sufficiency via his New Look strategy, he faced many internal and external critics who over-stepped or underutilized their positions. These included Allen Dulles, Christian Herter, Richard Bissell and Charles De Gaulle. Nikita Khrushchev faced internal division over his desires to achieve a new peaceful coexistence as well, and his own external challenges from Mao Tse-Tung. In the end, both leaders' inability to manage the pressures they faced and ensure their domestic advisors' adherence to their national strategy ended their attempts to cool the Cold War.

Co-Directors of Advisory Committee: Dr. Willard Frank
Dr. Austin Jersild

This thesis is written in honor of my father, the man who has taught me not only the value of family and perseverance, but also that education is worth any cost.

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CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

With the Soviet Union's explosion of an atomic bomb on August 29, 1949, the United States and its allies began to question their national security's reliance on a now-lost atomic monopoly. The United States looked to its atomic and nuclear technology to solve its foreign policy problems, and developed a hydrogen-based nuclear bomb that promised to redress the balance of power.¹ The Soviet Union quickly matched this fusion technology with the explosion of their nuclear device. When the Soviet Union launched the SPUTNIK rocket in October 1957, the Russians appeared to have surpassed the United States and its allies both in technology and its military applications.

SPUTNIK shocked the American public. This Soviet military surprise rivaled only Pearl Harbor and the Korean invasion in most Americans' minds.² President Dwight D. Eisenhower felt disappointed at this national reaction, but the president knew the true balance of military forces. Unwilling to devote large sums of money toward an unneeded military build-up, the president instead sought a defense sufficiency. Eisenhower knew that a proper balance between the

The journal consulted for this thesis was A Manual for Writers by Kate Turabian.

¹Gar Alperovitz, The Decision to Use the Atomic Bomb: And the Architecture of an American Myth (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1995), 638.

²John Lewis Gaddis, Strategies of Containment: A Critical Appraisal of Postwar American National Security Policy (New York: Oxford University Press, 1982), 183.

four pillars of his "New Look" strategy was required. These pillars, articulated in National Security Council (NSC) document 162/2 were, nuclear weapons, alliances, psychological and covert operations, and negotiations.³ Eisenhower, aware that the Soviets had not outdistanced the United States militarily, desired to use his nuclear weapons, alliances and a covert intelligence-gathering program to negotiate a formalized détente with the Soviet Union.⁴

The former General did not suffer from the complacency his critics charged, but instead had a well-founded but secret source providing him with the true balance of military power between the superpowers. Eisenhower had previously directed his administration to develop the U-2 ultra-high flying reconnaissance aircraft. The U-2 aircraft, having overflown the Soviet Union with impunity for years, revealed to the president that the Soviets' apparent atomic advances were actually well staged political demonstrations meant for the world stage instead of an actually deployed superior military force.⁵

With the advent of the atomic age, Western Europe's pre-World War II ideological fears of fascism were quickly replaced by the fear of the strength of Stalin-led absolutism in the Soviet Union, and its apparent ability to control

³Gaddis, Strategies of Containment, 148.

⁴Dwight D. Eisenhower, The White House Years: Waging Peace: 1956-1961 (New York: Doubleday & Co., 1965), 467.

⁵Robert A. Strong, "Eisenhower and Arms Control," in Reevaluating Eisenhower: American Foreign Policy in the Fifties, eds. Richard A. Melanson and David Mayers, (Chicago: University of Illinois Press, 1989), 249; Chester J. Pach Jr. and Elmo Richardson, eds., Presidency of Dwight D. Eisenhower (Lawrence, KS: University Press of Kansas, 1991), xii.

Europe either by force as in Eastern Europe, or through political subversion through Western Europe's growing communist movements. Only the superiority of American atomic and military technology seemed to keep the Soviets from walking across the divided German border and gaining hegemonic control of Europe. While the United States and Soviet Union stood as the only true global superpowers, both the British and French begrudgingly abdicated their previous global great power status. Two armed camps faced each other across a divided European continent. Tensions increased when the Soviets demonstrated the capability to deliver a nuclear device with their rocket forces.⁶ In the wake of SPUTNIK the United States placed its strategic forces on their highest state of alert, and NATO deployed its military aircraft to their wartime dispersal fields.⁷

Throughout his time in office, and especially after the Soviet launch of SPUTNIK, Eisenhower was forced to balance his desires to achieve détente with domestic and international demands that sought to more substantially increase the United States nuclear arsenal. Instead of seeking to increase international tensions, the president sought to reach a formalized and verifiable international accommodation with the Soviets. Instituting his New Look defense strategy, the president sought to tie American defense efforts temporarily to an all-nuclear response policy while he initiated several

⁶Walter Laqueur, Europe In Our Time: A History 1945-1992 (New York: Penguin Books, 1992), 295.

⁷Walter A. McDougall, The Heavens and the Earth: A Political History of the Space Age (New York: Basic Books, 1985), 219.

foreign policy initiatives to begin building the trust required to achieve détente. Combining his New Look defensive approach with such proposals as the United Nations initiative of Atoms for Peace or the Geneva Conference's Open Skies, the president balanced his fears of an uncontrolled growth of a domestic military-industrial complex with the nation's new fear of annihilation. Eisenhower's approach to détente attempted to incorporate and ease both domestic and his European allies' concerns about the apparently expanding Soviet threat.

Two of the president's European allies with the greatest concerns about United States foreign policy were the British and the French. Both nations, facing the relative decline in their international power in the post-war era, desired to utilize their respective position within the NATO alliance to manipulate Eisenhower's foreign policy. British Prime Minister Harold Macmillan sought to reassert Great Britain's foreign policy strategy of achieving diplomatic dialog with the Soviet Union. Macmillan pursued this strategy through manipulation of his role as a trusted, personal advisor to Eisenhower. French President Charles De Gaulle, although professing his personal support for the president, feared that Eisenhower was in too much of a hurry and was entering into special bilateral negotiations with Premier Nikita Khrushchev that would have

long term negative effects on the European nations.⁸ While Macmillan attempted to subvert the administration's initiatives from within, De Gaulle initiated a public debate on Eisenhower's plan. The president feared that the contrast in approaches toward the Soviet Union between London and Paris could shatter his strategy's NATO alliance pillar, and sought to harmonize these differences to ensure alliance cohesion.

After numerous discussions with Macmillan and De Gaulle, Eisenhower finally built enough alliance consensus with his NATO partners to add to his nuclear superiority and covert intelligence-gathering program. As Eisenhower prepared to leave office, he attempted to utilize his final strategy pillar of negotiations by inviting Khrushchev to a Four-Power Summit in Paris. Although delayed for almost a full year to further strengthen the British and French political positions, the May 16, 1960 summit was to be Eisenhower's last attempt to achieve détente with Khrushchev. Ostensibly seeking to discuss a final solution to the partition of Germany, and to achieve a limited nuclear test ban treaty with the Soviets, the president more deeply sought the formalization of an American-Soviet détente. Based on the success of his personal diplomacy with the Soviet premier in preparations for the summit,

⁸Simon Serfaty, France, De Gaulle, and Europe: The Policy of the Fourth and Fifth Republics Toward the Continent (Baltimore: John Hopkins Press, 1968), 35; Jean Lacouture, DeGaulle: The Ruler 1945-1970, trans. Alan Sheridan (New York: W. W. Norton & Co., 1991), 369; Charles Williams, The Last Great Frenchman: A Life of General De Gaulle (New York: John Wiley & Sons, 1993), 398.

Eisenhower hoped to conclude this codified détente in Paris, and demonstrate the validity of his New Look strategy.

Unfortunately, Khrushchev, who also desired the achievement of a "Peaceful Coexistence" in Paris, faced numerous problems of his own.⁹ The Soviet premier also sought to decrease military allocations through a new reliance on nuclear technology. Struggling to maintain the Soviets' leadership of the Communist world, however, Khrushchev confronted an increasingly belligerent Mao Tse-Tung of China and his demands for a radicalization in the revolutionary struggle with the United States.¹⁰ Mao's radical calls also appealed to a great number of Khrushchev's internal detractors who felt the premier had become too personally involved with the West.¹¹ Faced with a domestic opposition in the Politburo to his national objectives the premier needed a major international disarmament agreement with the United States before he could proceed with his plans to radically restructure the Soviet Union's society. The premier's plans to further decrease the size of the Soviet conventional forces, however, also provided his internal detractors with another source of political power: the Soviet military.¹² With Eisenhower's continued U-2 overflight program exposing

⁹R. Craig Nation, Black Earth, Red Star: A History of Soviet Security Policy, 1917-1991 (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1992), 203.

¹⁰Roy A. Medvedev and Zhores A. Medvedev, Khrushchev: The Years in Power, trans. Andrew R. Durkin (New York: W.W. Norton & Co., 1978), 133.

¹¹Wolfgang Leonhard, The Kremlin Since Stalin, trans. by Elizabeth Wiskemann and Marian Jackson (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1962), 243; Harrison E. Salisbury, The New Emperors: China in the Era of Mao and Deng (New York: Avon Books, 1992), 135-36.

¹²William J. Thompson, Khrushchev: A Political Life (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1995), 211, 217.

the premier's conventional military weakness, and Mao's appeal to his Politburo detractors, Khrushchev was compelled to shift his desires for détente into a more confrontational attitude toward Eisenhower to maintain both his internal and external political position.¹³

Historians, such as Michael R. Beschloss in Mayday, have argued that the downing of a U-2 intelligence-gathering aircraft deep inside Soviet territory was the sole cause of the breakdown of Eisenhower's last attempt at détente. Beschloss, the only author to devote an entire work to this complex issue, fails to understand the U-2 incident revealed a structural flaw in Eisenhower's New Look strategy rather than an individual failure. Eisenhower's strategy failed because the institutional pressure on the president to continue his intelligence-gathering program created a backlash that ended any hopes for a negotiated détente. The failure of clear communication between Eisenhower and Khrushchev, institutional pressure of the United States intelligence-gathering institutions, and to a small extent the personal idiosyncrasies among European national leaders allowed a tragedy of errors to set the two superpowers on a collision course that ended with the breakdown of the Paris Summit. Although the U-2 shoot down ended any early attempts at reaching détente, the issues surrounding this failure are more complex than this single incident.¹⁴

¹³John Lewis Gaddis, Russia, the Soviet Union, and the United States: An Interpretive History (New York: McGraw Hill, 1990), 230.

¹⁴Michael R. Beschloss, Mayday: Eisenhower, Khrushchev and the U-2 Affair (New York: Harper & Row, 1986), preface passim.

Mr. Beschloss argues that the U-2 incident marked a linear progression of events that culminated in the deterioration of the superpowers' relationship after the Paris Summit. Correctly asserting that Eisenhower sought to decrease the military nature of the United States and Soviet power struggle, May Day's author fails to understand the degree of the administration's internal and external pressures to continue overflights. Specifically Beschloss does not comprehend the military's ulterior motivations behind the reconnaissance program, and the intelligence community's requirement to maintain credibility and popularity with Congress and the American public.

Another area of weakness in May Day centers on its treatment of alliance relations. Beschloss agrees that Macmillan was most eager for the summit, but fails to see the degree to which London played into the Kremlin's hand, through Macmillan's public pronouncements declaring the need for great power negotiations. Macmillan failed to understand the adverse affect this role had on Eisenhower's goals of presenting Khrushchev with a united alliance prior to agreeing to negotiations to reach his national strategy. Beschloss presents De Gaulle simply as blinded by his resolve to restore French grandeur and prevent an Anglo-American appeasement of Khrushchev. To Beschloss, Eisenhower's alliance problems caused minor, but important problems in his attempts to reach a negotiated détente.

In addition, May Day's treatment of Khrushchev is lacking in depth. While claiming the premier was no longer,

"purely the Butcher of Budapest, and a careless rattler of missiles...", Beschloss claims Eisenhower came to view him as "as a man committed-however ambivalently-to reducing the harshness of the Cold War."¹⁵ Beschloss can not decide to respect or scorn Khrushchev. The author's use of emotion-laden language to describe Khrushchev further indicates a failure to utilize a rational, factual-based approach in dealing with the issues surrounding the failure of the Paris Peace Summit.

Beschloss fails to see that Khrushchev wanted peace, but a peace on his terms. When the cost became too high to the premier, Khrushchev simply sought an ulterior means in achieving his goals. Khrushchev, like Eisenhower, did not operate in a political linear vacuum, but faced multiple different stresses when making a decision. Once that decision was made a new series of stresses acted upon the leaders.¹⁶ To Beschloss the U-2 incident was the cause of the breakdown of détente at the Paris Summit rather than just a symptom of a larger impediment to peace. Few could argue with Beschloss' general remarks:

Then on May Day, like a clap of thunder, a CIA U-2 spy plane fell from the skies at Sverdlovsk, followed by some of the most perilous years of the Cold War.¹⁷

¹⁵Ibid., xi.

¹⁶Carl A. Linden, Khrushchev and the Soviet Leadership: With an Epilogue on Gorbachev, Updated Edition, (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1990), 43-45; Seweryn Bialer, Stalin's Successors: Leadership, Stability and Change in the Soviet Union (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1980), 238-39.

¹⁷As quoted in Beschloss, xi.

However, Beschloss failed to capture the subtlety of the specifics behind the spectacular events.

Neither Eisenhower nor Khrushchev fully understood what stresses affected their policies, or from where these stresses came. While the president and premier acted, their decisions often influenced other situations, and caused new challenges. No decision made by either leader was undertaken in a void. Each decision had a result on the other, and often in ways that neither understood. Both Eisenhower and Khrushchev had hoped to achieve a new détente to allow them the ability to achieve their desired political goals. In attempting to achieve their political goals both leaders, however, chose means that forced the other to act in such a way as to ensure the failure of the Paris Summit. For Eisenhower, this relaxation in tension would mean that his presidency could end with a decrease in the dangers of an uncontrollable arms race. Khrushchev hoped détente would allow him to transform the Soviet economy from one of heavy centralized military production to one that allowed an improvement in the Soviets' standard of living. Both Khrushchev and Eisenhower discussed such personal desires while Khrushchev visited Camp David in September 1959, however

each leader fundamentally misunderstood the other's position.¹⁸

Essential to this miscommunication was a difference in experience between the Soviet Union and the United States. Summarized thoroughly in David Fromkin's book In the Times of the Americans, while the Soviet Union felt compelled to seek compensation for its losses during World War II, the United States sought instead to create a world system that would prevent the future occurrence of such hostilities.¹⁹ While the Soviet Union sought to create a buffer area in Eastern Europe and desired to subdue the remaining European nations, the Soviets' almost paranoid fear of being attacked coupled with the United States engagement on the European continent represented a potential threat that seemed to ensure future conflict.²⁰

The failure of the Paris Summit of May 1960 can be traced to a multitude of factors. This summit, intended to formalize the direct dialog between the great powers, was to have allowed Eisenhower and Khrushchev to sit down as equals to discuss the future of the reduction of tensions on the European continent. Unfortunately for early advocates of détente, the summit failed. Eisenhower's desire for a negotiated settlement providing for détente with the Soviet

¹⁸Richard Crockatt, The Fifty Years War: The United States and the Soviet Union in World Politics, 1941-1991 (New York: Routledge, 1995), 130-31.

¹⁹David Fromkin, In the Time of the Americans: The Generation that Changed America's Role in the World (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1995), 546.

²⁰Vojtech Mastny, The Cold War and Soviet Insecurity (New York: Oxford University Press, 1996), 194.

Union failed because the president's strategy conflicted with itself. A negotiated agreement could not be reached when both leaders personally began to distrust the other's motives. The destruction of the U-2 was not just a clap of thunder, but a single clap of thunder in a larger political storm we named the Cold War.

CHAPTER II

EISENHOWER AND DÉTENTE

Eisenhower entered office determined to alter the containment strategy inherited from his predecessor. Seeking to achieve the best defense with the least cost, the new president instilled a new national security strategy or "New Look" in Washington. This new approach sought to achieve a defense sufficiency based on a minimal nuclear deterrent capability that would provide an asymmetrical response capability to the United States.¹ Eisenhower hoped to find some way to negotiate a relaxation of tensions and eventual arms control, confidence-building agreements with the Soviets through the use of his alliances, intelligence-gathering capabilities and New Look strategy. At the center of both ideas was the ability to correctly gauge and quantify the Soviets' military capability and intentions. Central to this knowledge was the creation of a robust intelligence-gathering organization under the control of Allen Dulles, John Foster Dulles, and Richard Bissell. Using his informal advisory system through the Office of the Staff Secretary under General Andrew Goodpaster, the president maintained overall control of this intelligence-gathering apparatus. This control centralized intelligence-gathering operations directly under Eisenhower's supervision, but also

¹Gaddis, Strategies of Containment, 187, 197.

allowed relatively few people access to the president's decision making process, and inadvertently created a chain of events that undermined détente.

Eisenhower promised that his New Look policy allowed the United States to prevent the Soviet Union from continuing its policy of global communist expansion through a threat of nuclear response. Eisenhower feared that without such a reliance on relatively inexpensive nuclear weapons, the United States would embark upon an unlimited and costly conventional arms build up that would drain the American economy. Partisan political calls, however, claimed Eisenhower's reliance on nuclear retaliation placed the United States in an increasingly weak position. The Soviet premier furthered these sentiments by boldly declaring that the Soviet Union could rain nuclear-tipped rockets down on any nation.² Eisenhower's intelligence-gathering activities allowed the president to understand that Khrushchev's threats were exaggerated, but the former general refused to publicly explain how he had obtained this knowledge.³

According to Christopher Andrew, Eisenhower was the first president since George Washington to have a well-developed knowledge of intelligence prior to entering the White House. In this particular instance, Eisenhower applied this knowledge to the use of a program of military and

²Paul Y. Hammond, The Cold War Years: American Foreign Policy Since 1945 (New York: Harcourt, Brace & World, 1969), 128-29.

³John Lewis Gaddis, The United States and the End of the Cold War: Implications, Reconsiderations, Provocations (New York: Oxford University Press, 1992), 82.

Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) aircraft overflights of the Soviet Union which provided Eisenhower with timely factual information. Eisenhower realized the potential benefits a robust intelligence-gathering program had on his New Look efforts; therefore the president ensured his direct control of all covert actions. The former general felt that covert action was a central part of his national security strategy, and an efficient means of countering the communist threat to the United States.⁴ Looking to maintain a non-provocative posture in his search for détente, the president was willing to accept certain risks, depending on the value of the information received.

Eisenhower inherited a military overflight program from the Truman Administration, but in line with his New Look, sought to curtail the military's ability to collect information so that they could not then exaggerate its importance to seek increased appropriations. The president also demanded greater personal control over the military reconnaissance program due to its political sensitivities, and its potential effects on his desires to reach political accommodations with the Soviets. The president transferred control of reconnaissance overflights of the Soviet Union to the CIA in hopes of achieving greater control of these provocative missions. With the CIA flights, Eisenhower instituted a two-step approach to mission approval. The president himself first measured the military significance

⁴Christopher Andrew, For the President's Eyes Only: Secret Intelligence and the American Presidency from Washington to Bush (New York: Harper Collins, 1995), 202-03.

versus the potential political damage to superpower relations if the aircraft were lost. Once this decision was made, if positive, he then compared the military gains to the political costs.⁵ If the intelligence gathered outweighed the potential political costs, the mission received approval.

Early military overflights were conducted in a different manner. General Curtis LeMay, head of the Strategic Air Command (SAC), used RB-57D high altitude reconnaissance aircraft assigned to the "Black Knight" squadrons, to conduct military reconnaissance overflights and RB-47 aircraft for both overflights and to conduct "ferret missions." These flights measured Soviet electronic radar and missile control developments by sending a specially modified aircraft toward the Soviet Union on an attack profile and electronically monitoring the Soviet reaction from 1950 until Eisenhower suspended all overflights in 1960. Acting under the guidelines of the May 5, 1950 Special Electronic Airborne Search Project, LeMay personally authorized such incursions. LeMay felt these military flights were critical to gain intelligence for SAC's nuclear targeting information.⁶ Eisenhower, however, believed the United States had the nuclear capability to destroy the Soviet Union completely and therefore ended LeMay's personal

⁵Robert S. Hopkins, "An Expanded Understanding of Eisenhower, American Policy and Overflights." Intelligence and National Security, 11 (April 1996): 336-37; Richard M. Bissell, Reflections of a Cold Warrior: From Yalta to the Bay of Pigs with the collaboration of Jonathan E. Lewis and Frances T. Pudlo (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1996), 115. Hereafter cited as Bissell, Reflections, and page.

⁶Richard Rhodes, Dark Sun: The Making of the Hydrogen Bomb (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1995), 564-65; Hopkins, 334.

control of these flights. With the president's former military advisors such as former Army Chief of Staff Maxwell Taylor becoming spokesmen for political opposition to Eisenhower's New Look, the president further claimed political as well as military reasons for his disapproval.⁷

To silence his military critics, whom Eisenhower felt failed to see the larger political advantages to détente, the president allowed the military to continue its own tactical intelligence-gathering missions close to and in denied areas along the periphery of the Soviet Union while shifting direct overflight approval to the administration. Understanding the foreign policy implication of these missions, Eisenhower directed the Joint Chiefs of Staff to codify the process of military reconnaissance flights and to ensure greater control of such activities. Approval for overflights remained with the president himself. The president understood the political sensitivities these flights caused, and desired to ensure that he maintained complete control of them.⁸

At an NSC meeting on March 31, 1953, Allen Dulles informed Eisenhower that the current military reconnaissance program did not provide sufficient information on the status of the Soviet Union's military forces.⁹ Without such specific information, the president realized he could not achieve any disarmament agreement with the Soviets, as he would be unsure

⁷Hopkins, 88, 91; Gaddis, Strategies of Containment, 183.

⁸Paul Lashmar, Spy Flights of the Cold War (Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 1996), 45.

⁹Andrew, 212.

as to the truth behind the Soviet claims of military superiority. The president, seeking to address this intelligence shortfall, established the Doolittle Committee. According to John Ranelagh in his authoritative history of the Central Intelligence Agency, the Doolittle Committee reported on September 30, 1954, that,

Every possible scientific and technical approach to the intelligence problem should be explored, since the closed society of the Eastern bloc made espionage prohibitive in terms of dollars and human lives.¹⁰

The 1954 Air Force intelligence estimates publicly claimed that the Soviet Union out-produced the United States in nuclear capable bomber aircraft.¹¹ With the national intelligence community unable to determine the truth behind the so called "Bomber Gap" and Allen Dulles's request for greater CIA intelligence-gathering capabilities, Eisenhower followed two courses of action to achieve his over-riding national security goal, which was to protect United States from Soviet strategic missiles.¹² Eisenhower committed American resources to national security for a super-secret reconnaissance program, and expanded the role of the CIA to prevent a repeat of the lessons of Pearl Harbor.¹³

¹⁰As quoted by John Ranelagh, The Agency: The Rise and Decline of the CIA (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1986), 277.

¹¹Stephen E. Ambrose, Ike's Spies: Eisenhower and the Espionage Establishment (Garden City, NJ: Doubleday & Co., 1981), 252-53.

¹²Peter J. Roman, Eisenhower and the Missile Gap Cornell Studies in Security Affairs, eds Robert J. Art, Robert Jervis, and Stephen M. Walt (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1995), 26.

¹³Douglas Kinnard, President Eisenhower and Strategy Management: A Study in Defense Politics (Lexington, KY: University Press of Kentucky, 1977), 7; James R. Killian Jr., Sputnik, Scientists, and Eisenhower: A Memoir of the First Special Assistant to the President for Science and Technology (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1977), xvi, 68.

Eisenhower contacted James R. Killian, the president of Massachusetts Institute of Technology, to form a Committee on Surprise Attack.¹⁴ In his confidential letter to Killian, Eisenhower stated that he had chartered Killian to give his "primary attention to the use of science and technology in relation to national security."¹⁵ One day prior to Thanksgiving 1954, the president's Science Advisor, the Director Central Intelligence (DCI), the Secretary of State, the Air Force Chief of Staff, the Secretary of Defense, and the Assistant Chief of Staff for Research and Development, orally reported the committee's secret Intelligence Panel recommendation to develop the revolutionary U-2 reconnaissance aircraft.¹⁶ The U-2 promised to provide the president with the means of gathering factual intelligence on the Soviet Union. This U-2 ultra-high flying reconnaissance aircraft immediately captivated the president.¹⁷

Peter J. Roman in his book Eisenhower and the Missile Gap most succinctly stated a rationale for the change in the president's national security requirements. As nuclear technology shifted from bomber aircraft to the intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM), time became the critical factor.

¹⁴Andrew, 221.

¹⁵Killian, 35.

¹⁶Bissell, Reflections, 94-95.

¹⁷Richard M. Bissell Jr., oral history by Richard D. Challener, 7 September 1966. transcript. The John Foster Dulles Oral History Project, The Princeton University, Princeton, New Jersey, 15-6. Hereafter cited as Bissell, oral history, Princeton, and page.

When the real attack comes, every minute of indecision costs us about 40 bombing aircraft; five minutes of indecision costs us 200 bombing aircraft; every SAC base covered with snow costs us about one aircraft per minute.¹⁸

On December 9, 1954, Allen Dulles, with the president's authorization, directed Richard Bissell's Development Project Staff to sign a contract for the U-2. Demonstrating Allen Dulles' unique role within the administration, the president, committed to balancing the federal budget, allowed the DCI to bypass normal administration policies and Congress for program budgeting and informally obligate funds for his intelligence-gathering project.¹⁹ According to Eisenhower's wishes, Bissell's staff prevented any involvement of the Department of Defense in the U-2.²⁰ The U-2 was developed without any leaks.²¹

According to the CIA's own history, the agency expected the U-2 program to be of only short-duration. The agency based the service life of the program not on the aircraft's survivability, but the time required for the Soviets to develop a radar system capable of reliably tracking the aircraft.²² The Soviets however, detected and tracked the

¹⁸As quoted by Roman, 55.

¹⁹Maurice H. Stans, One of the President's Men: Twenty Years with Eisenhower and Nixon (Washington: Brassey's, 1995), 90, 98; Ranelagh, 311.

²⁰Bissell, Reflections, 95.

²¹Richard M. Bissell, oral history by Ed Edwin, 5 June 1967. oral history 20 Part IV, transcript. Oral History Collection on Microfiche: Eisenhower Administration Project, Columbia University, New York, 40. Hereafter cited as Bissell, oral history, Columbia, and page; Andrew, 222; Ben R. Rich and Leo Janos, Skunk Works: A Personal Memoir of My Years at Lockheed (Boston: Little, Brown & Co., 1994), 135.

²²Central Intelligence Agency. History Staff Center for the Study of Intelligence, Cold War Record. CORONA: America's First Satellite Program ed., Kevin C. Ruffner (Washington: Central Intelligence Agency, 1995), 3.

first overflight. With the Soviets' private diplomatic protest of the first flight, complete with a radar track of the aircraft, the U-2's service life seemed to be at an end.²³ Only the enormous success of the intelligence gleaned by the U-2 overflights allowed continued missions. Neither the administration nor the CIA undertook a systematic reevaluation of the continued viability of the U-2 overflights of the Soviet Union, or the effect the missions had on the Kremlin's politics.²⁴ Yet those closely associated with the U-2 program now realized it was only a matter of time before an aircraft was shot down.²⁵

The enormous success of the U-2's information in allowing the president to maintain his New Look policy prompted Eisenhower to expand Allen Dulles's role in making foreign policy.²⁶ Under Allen Dulles's leadership and with the guarantee of close cooperation from his brother, the secretary of state, John Foster Dulles, the CIA shifted from a supporting agency for the State and Defense Departments to an agency that undertook some initiative in achieving

²³Bissell, oral history, Princeton, 22; An example of Official documentation of the Soviets' protest can be found in Memorandum, April 22, 1958, Dwight D. Eisenhower Papers, White House Office, Office of the Staff Secretary, Subject: Series, State Department Sub-series, box 2, File: {Feb-April 58 (1)}, Dwight D. Eisenhower Library, Abilene, Kansas. Hereafter cited as Eisenhower Library.

²⁴Dean A. Brugioni, Central Intelligence Agency. Interview by author, 13 October 1995, Virginia Beach. telephone. Original notes maintained by author.

²⁵Eisenhower, Waging Peace, 546; Memorandum of Conference with President Eisenhower, July 8, 1959, U S Department of State. Foreign Relations of the United States, (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1993), 10 (1):306-307. Hereafter cited as FRUS, and page number; Brugioni, interview.

²⁶Allen Dulles, oral history by Philip A. Crowl, 17 May 1965 and 3 June 1965. transcript. The John Foster Dulles Oral History Project, The Princeton University, Princeton, New Jersey, 63, 69. Hereafter cited as Dulles, oral history, Princeton, and page.

Eisenhower's foreign policy objectives. With the president's absolute faith in Allen Dulles, and the relative economic savings of covert intelligence activities in general, the DCI ensured he fulfilled the goals placed upon his organization. According to CIA historians, the CIA reached its "Golden Age" under Eisenhower.²⁷

Originally, the CIA's involvement in covert operations began with no set procedures in place. In November 1955, with the signing of NSC 5412/1 and 5412/2, the administration established the Intelligence Advisory Committee (IAC) to formalize the covert operations approval process. The IAC was shortly modified into the United States Intelligence Board (USIB), "ad hoc," or "5412 Committee," named after the national security order (NSC 5412/2) that approved and oversaw all covert affairs, including U-2 overflights.²⁸ The president created the 5412 committee to provide broad intelligence collection strategy to the National Security Council.²⁹ This committee was made up of the president, the national security advisor, the DCI, and the deputy secretaries of State and Defense.³⁰ Although this group

²⁷U S Senate, Final Report of the Select Committee to Study Governmental Operations with Respect to Intelligence Activities (Church Committee Report), Senate Report 94-755. 94th Congress, 2d. Session, Washington: Government Printing Office, 1976, book VI, 42-44. Hereafter cited as Church Committee Report and page number; Rhodri Jeffreys-Jones, The CIA & American Democracy (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1989), 82.

²⁸Memorandum, 4 February 1960, White House Office, Office of the Staff Secretary, 1952-1961, Subject: Series Alphabetic Sub-series, CIA, Vol. III (1), File: {Feb-April 1960}, Eisenhower Library.

²⁹Goodpaster, oral history, by Dr. Maclyn P. Burg, 20 August 1976, interview OH-378. transcript, Eisenhower Library, 38.

³⁰Evan Thomas, The Very Best Men: Four Who Dared: The Early Years of the CIA (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1995), 184.

formalized the approval process, it had no codified approval criteria, and met irregularly until 1959.³¹ According to Bissell, "The affair was conducted with the utmost informality... The project simply grew in this fashion."³²

The Office of the Staff Secretary led by General Goodpaster came to represent Eisenhower's informal advisory system. Installed to ensure the president was properly aware of all security issues, and utilized to keep formal records of security meetings and decisions, the office was also used to build inter-administration consensus on security matters. A second function of the Office of the Staff Secretary was to provide the president with his daily intelligence briefing. This reliance on verbal briefings by Goodpaster and Eisenhower's son, Army Major John Eisenhower, lasted until near the end of his second term, and allowed the president not to become overwhelmed with intelligence-gathering details.³³ Under this informal advisory system Goodpaster and the younger Eisenhower were the only people besides the president with access to and any insight into sensitive reconnaissance operations such as the U-2. These operations however, received additional presidential attention.

Each overflight mission followed a set procedure. Allen Dulles briefed a general proposal to the 5412 Committee

³¹Church Committee Report, 50-1; Jeffreys-Jones, 93.

³²Bissell, oral history, Columbia, 41.

³³John Helgerson, "The New President as Intelligence Consumer: Truman and Eisenhower: Launching the Process of Intelligence Support." Studies in Intelligence, Vol. 38, No. 5, [<http://www.odci.gov/csi/studies/95unclas>] 1995.

highlighting the information to be gained. This brief contained a single intelligence collection target, and the 5412 committee recommended the proposal to the president. Eisenhower, after receiving the 5412 Committee's recommendation during the meeting, then balanced the committee's recommendation against the overall tension between the United States and the Soviet Union in a follow-on meeting with the secretary of state. If John Foster Dulles and the president felt the mission was acceptable, during their private meeting, Eisenhower then passed this approval to fly the mission to the CIA via Goodpaster. Until his death, on May 24, 1959, John Foster Dulles' special relationship with the president allowed the secretary of state to explain the potential negative diplomatic ramifications in all U-2 overflights.³⁴ Bissell however, attacked the secretary's decision making process. He felt that John Foster Dulles had become hesitant in approving continued U-2 overflights due to the Soviets' ability to track the overflights, and he did not feel the secretary of state properly balanced the costs and benefits of the program in his advice to Eisenhower.³⁵ With the death of John Foster Dulles, less than two years after the launch of SPUTNIK, Eisenhower's foreign policy underwent a subtle but apparent change. Under Dulles's leadership, the State Department advised the president to gain détente through the application of pressure against the

³⁴Bissell, oral history, Princeton, 19-21.

³⁵Thomas, 168-69; Bissell, oral history, Princeton, 18-21.

Soviet Union.³⁶ While Dulles advocated this pressure, he influenced Eisenhower to a great degree in the formulation of the president's foreign policy strategy towards the Soviet Union.³⁷ This strategy referred to as "brinkmanship" heavily influenced the administration's New Look policy. Dulles and Eisenhower saw the decrease in the United States conventional forces and the nation's reliance on its nuclear capabilities as central to the prevention of the outbreak of general warfare. The key to the success of this policy was not only the application of pressure, but also the correct timing of that application.³⁸ According to Dulles, Washington must always retain the initiative, should never respond to intimidation, and should avoid direct negotiations with Moscow. Such discussions only would provide the appearance of equality between the superpowers. Instead the United States should direct any foreign policy initiative toward the United Nations or some other international multi-party forum.³⁹

Secretary of State Christian Herter provided different counsel to the president. Although Herter agreed with John Foster Dulles's assessment that the United States must never negotiate from a publicly perceived position of inferiority versus the Soviet Union, Herter felt that Eisenhower should directly negotiate with Khrushchev to improve the superpower

³⁶Richard Immerman, ed. John Foster Dulles and the Diplomacy of the Cold War (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1990), 67.

³⁷Immerman, 3, 9.

³⁸Immerman, 64-67.

³⁹Memorandum of Conversation with the President, July 29, 1958, Papers of John Foster Dulles, White House Memorandum Series, box 7, File: White House Meetings with the President (9) {July 1, 1958 - December 31, 1958}, Eisenhower Library.

relationship. Herter believed that "a conversation between the President and Khrushchev would do no harm and might do some good."⁴⁰ Herter failed to agree with the currency in the logic behind his predecessor's application of force, and instead sought to give the Soviet premier an informal meeting with the president.

Eisenhower sought to balance the advice provided by his secretaries of state in the execution of his U-2 inspection overflight policy. The president refused to approve multiple border violations in close succession until the Soviets had been given sufficient time to lessen the diplomatic tension that followed each provocation. The Office of the Staff Secretary's records indicate the president seemed to waver between his desires of continuing to ease diplomatic tension with the Soviets and his fears of verifying the Soviet premier's intentions through fact. The compressed timelines for an ICBM attack and John Foster Dulles's replacement by a less cautious Christian Herter seemed to convince the president as to the need for future overflights.⁴¹

Once Eisenhower agreed to a mission, the president passed his approval informally via Goodpaster to Bissell.⁴² Although not clearly stated in any currently available

⁴⁰Memorandum of Conversation with the President, July 13, 1959, White House Office, Office of the Staff Secretary, Subject: Series, State Department Sub-series, box 3, File: Meetings with the President (15) {July 1959}, Eisenhower Library.

⁴¹Memorandum for the Record, February 8, 1960, White House Office, Office of the Staff Secretary, Subject: Series, Alphabetic Sub-series, box 15, File: Intelligence Matters (13) {August 59-Feb 60}, Eisenhower Library.

⁴²Bissell, Reflections, 111.

source, there then appeared to be a second meeting. This second meeting consisted of the president, Goodpaster, John Eisenhower, Bissell, and the U-2 mission planners. This second meeting provided the president with the specific route Bissell's planners intended the U-2 to fly with additional potential intelligence collection opportunities.⁴³ The president then modified or accepted the plan and passed his final authorization once again through Goodpaster.

If the brief had the initials "DDE" on the original, the CIA understood it had ten days to fly the mission. Once granted presidential approval, Bissell then made the final decision of which specific day to overfly the Soviet Union based on the amount of cloud cover. If weather did not allow for a flight, the mission was re-submitted from the beginning of the approval process.⁴⁴ Once the target was accepted the 5412 committee was never informed as to the specific dates or routes taken by the U-2 aircraft. Only Bissell knew the specifics of the mission.

Herter demonstrated his misunderstanding of the role Eisenhower thought he was playing throughout his tenure as secretary of state. Never fully understanding the specifics in the president's word selection, Herter was, "More ready to approve U-2 missions."⁴⁵ While discussing the U-2 incident

⁴³Dino A. Brugioni, "The Unidentifieds," in Inside CIA's Private World: Declassified Articles from the Agency's Internal Journal 1955-1992 ed. H. Bradford Westerfield (New London: Yale University Press, 1995), passim; Brugioni, Interview.

⁴⁴Brugioni, interview; Bissell, oral history, Columbia, 46.

⁴⁵Bissell, oral history, Princeton, 40-41.

with the NSC twenty-three days after the Soviet destruction of the U-2, he stated that the timing of the fateful U-2 flight "was dictated by technical factors." Stating that the sun's angles and cloud cover were keys to successful U-2 flights, the secretary of state articulated that these technical reasons made the decision for a May 1, flight.⁴⁶ Eisenhower held U-2 information so closely, that his new secretary of state did not even comprehend the president's views toward covert activity and his national security policy. Herter in a sense abdicated his role as a foreign policy advisor to the president. Herter felt his role was to agree to the technical merits of each flight not to provide the president with a diplomatic advice as to the effect of the overflight on overall United States-Soviet relations.

Though Eisenhower now thought he controlled the U-2 intelligence-gathering activities, Bissell really held specific control of the intelligence-gathering program. When the first U-2 overflew the Soviet Union on July 4, 1956, covering Moscow and Leningrad, for example, Eisenhower did not realize Bissell had not back-briefed the specific flight path of this mission to Allen Dulles.⁴⁷ The DCI, for his part was surprised by such bravado on the U-2's maiden overflight of the Soviet Union.

Richard Bissell not only guided the CIA into a new age of technology with the U-2, but also realized that factual information was required to understand Soviet actions during

⁴⁶Memorandum of Discussion at the 445th Meeting of the National Security Council, May 24, 1960, FRUS, 1:525.

⁴⁷Bissell, oral history, Columbia, 44.

the Cold War.⁴⁸ Bissell saw the development of the U-2 aircraft as a "chance to leap over the waiting and uncertainties of human intelligence with a technological solution."⁴⁹ Together with Allen Dulles, Bissell understood the revolutionary technical means of collecting intelligence, and the personal power he gained by having the U-2 program under his control,⁵⁰

I wanted this project very much--it was a glamorous and high priority endeavor endorsed not only by the president but by a lot of very important scientific people on the outside. It would confer a great deal of prestige on the organization that could carry it off successfully.⁵¹

Bissell personally distrusted most of his supervisors. He declared John Foster Dulles to be "treasonous and timid,"⁵² because of his caution concerning the U-2 and even expressed disdain for Eisenhower's apparent hesitancy to approve multiple overflights:

Originally I had some doubts as to whether he was fully knowledgeable about what his administration was doing and whether he was in control of it; I realized my initial judgment was wrong, however, once I began to have direct contact with him.⁵³

Bent on ensuring that the president would see the power of the information that the U-2 brought, Bissell contrived ways to ensure the U-2 was flown with or without the president's permission.⁵⁴

⁴⁸Ranelagh, 310, 317-18.

⁴⁹Thomas, 165.

⁵⁰Ranelagh, 311-12.

⁵¹As quoted by Bissell, Reflections, 108-9.

⁵²Thomas, 189.

⁵³As quoted by Bissell, Reflections, 114.

⁵⁴Thomas, 166.

Bissell developed and implemented his own project office organization for the entire U-2 program within two weeks. Given his own special code word to identify the U-2, and establishment of special means to control the "TALENT" program's information, Bissell alone could authorize forwarding of U-2 information via its own unique communication security channels to the DCI. Ensuring Bissell's complete control of all U-2 information, he ensured the 5412 Committee reported only to him to prioritize intelligence requirements and priorities.⁵⁵ Bissell created an organization whose success ensured its continuity. For the head of the U-2 program there was an insatiable need for more photographic intelligence. Politics never factored in to Bissell's equation. Because the program was so classified, and the president had created his informal intelligence advisory system to keep him from becoming involved in the specifics, Bissell was able to create just the sort of independently acting, uncontrolled organization that affected foreign policy which Eisenhower had hoped to avoid when he shot down Le May.

On October 4, 1957, the Soviets appeared to take the technological military lead with the launch of SPUTNIK. For the first time, the Soviets demonstrated the capability to deliver a nuclear device to the United States with their rocket forces. The United States placed strategic forces on their highest state of alert; NATO deployed military aircraft

⁵⁵Ranelagh, 313; Bissell, Reflections, 101, 104-05.

to their wartime dispersal fields, and partisan political calls demanded Eisenhower address this military and technology gap.⁵⁶

According to John Eisenhower, the president was amazed at the dramatic effect SPUTNIK had on the American people. While underestimating the shock to the public, and to some extent the Soviets' ability to launch SPUTNIK, the president was confronted with an enormous public relations nightmare.⁵⁷ The president faced a Soviet propaganda machine that caused the press of Western Allies to report the great magnitude of the Soviets' accomplishments. With America's failure to launch its own Vanguard satellite in December, the press further noted that the American failure, after numerous Soviet accomplishments, had, "dealt a blow to American prestige from which the US will not quickly recover."⁵⁸

All of this complicated the president's resolve to reduce tensions as Eisenhower sought to achieve détente through direct and personal meetings with Khrushchev. Eisenhower felt that with his U-2 program in place providing him the ability to verify Soviet actions, such personal diplomacy could further build trust amongst the superpowers. These personal meetings could more clearly indicate the Soviet premier's intentions, and permit constructive discussions

⁵⁶Walter LaFeber, America, Russia, and the Cold War 1945-1984 (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1985), 195.

⁵⁷John S. D. Eisenhower, oral history by Dr. Maclyn Burg, 10 March 1972. oral history OH#15, transcript, Eisenhower Library, 47. Hereafter cited as John Eisenhower, oral history, Eisenhower Library and page.

⁵⁸National Security Council Staff: Papers, 1953-1961, White House Office, Special Staff File Series Box 4, Intelligence Items File: (4) and (5), Eisenhower Library.

aimed at reducing tensions.⁵⁹ With such a reduction in friction, and the president's reliance on the New Look strategy, both nations could look to reduce the disproportionate amount of assets they both spent on defense and transition the nature of the superpower competition to other areas.⁶⁰ As Eisenhower noted in his memoirs:

Men have begun to realize that the best interest of all, no matter how mutually hostile their ideologies, might be served by agreeing upon *controlled* reductions in armaments.⁶¹

Hoping to decrease the effect of military forces on the conduct of foreign relations, the president sought to strengthen the superpowers' abilities to discuss their needs via mutually acceptable diplomatic means, then continue to improve their relationship through limited and verifiable disarmament proposals. The president summing up his desires stated that,

From the very beginning of my administration, we sought creative proposals that might, if accepted by others, lead to progress. For eight years this effort was unrelenting. No matter how deeply preoccupied my associates and I became with other urgent situations, never for a day was there absent from our minds...the search for some kind of agreement...⁶²

Criticism intensified after Khrushchev's SPUTNIK launch. One of the more telling examples of this criticism

⁵⁹Memorandum of Conference with the President, October 16, 1959, White House Office, Office of the Staff Secretary, Subject Series, State Department Sub-series, box 3, file: State Department {Oct 59-Feb 60}, Eisenhower Library, 1-3.

⁶⁰Memorandum of Conference with the President, October 16, 1959, White House Office, Office of the Staff Secretary, International Trips and Meetings, box 9, File: Khrushchev's Visit (4) {September 1959}, Eisenhower Library, 2.

⁶¹As quoted in Eisenhower, Waging Peace, 467.

⁶²As quoted in Eisenhower, Waging Peace, 467-68.

came from Senator Stuart Symington, the former Secretary of the Air Force and his quasi-assistant Thomas Lanphier of the Convair ICBM producing corporation. Citing intelligence divulged to Lanphier, the senator charged that the president sacrificed defense preparedness for balanced budgets. Symington succeeded in making his concern over this missile imbalance public through Senate hearings and then continued to bait both the president and the DCI over the administration's intelligence estimates. Without being allowed access to U-2 information, the senator publicly accused the president and the CIA of manipulating intelligence estimates downward to decrease ICBM production.⁶³

Symington's political calls were further strengthened during 1958, as Senator John F. Kennedy adopted the SPUTNIK issue into his presidential race against Eisenhower's vice president, Richard Nixon. He charged that Eisenhower had allowed American defense efforts to lapse into a so-called missile gap.⁶⁴ Reminiscing about Eisenhower's decision not to reveal any U-2 information, General Goodpaster stated that the president,

⁶³Letter to the President, August 29, 1958, White House Office, Office of the Staff Secretary, Subject: Series, Alphabetic Sub-series, box 24, File: Symington Letter {Aug-Dec 58}, Eisenhower Library; Memorandum of Conversation, 16 December 1958, White House Office, Office of the Staff Secretary, Subject: Series, Alphabetic Sub-series, box 24, File: Symington Letter {Aug-Dec 58}, Eisenhower Library.

⁶⁴McDougall, 219.

Would not harm the national security in behalf of anybody's political candidacy. He regarded those as being two different orders of magnitude.⁶⁵

Neither the president's own popularity, nor the success of the 1960 Republican bid for the White House compelled Eisenhower to compromise the U-2 overflights. By 1959 these political calls forced Allen Dulles, however, to bow to political pressure. On August 25, 1959, the DCI shifted his position in order to maintain his public and official credibility, and recommended further U-2 overflights of potential Soviet operational missile sites in Western Russia.⁶⁶ Although the U-2 information was classified, Dulles needed further proof from his "source" to confirm Democratic political calls were incorrect. Although in the past his brother had swayed Dulles's counsel, his publicity and the credibility of the CIA had to be maintained. More importantly the resumption of these overflights had serious political ramifications for all parties seeking détente.

Although the U-2 program allowed Eisenhower to remove the military from controlling overflight operations, and despite the vast amounts of intelligence the TALENT program provided, the president's informal advisory system complicated his ability to achieve détente at the Paris Summit through its failure to adhere to Eisenhower's larger strategy while

⁶⁵As quote in Goodpaster, Andrew J. Jr., oral history by Mr. Malcolm S. McDonald, 10 April 1982. oral history OH#477, transcript, Eisenhower Library, 47.

⁶⁶Memorandum for the Director of Central Intelligence, August 25, 1959, White House Office, Office of the Staff Secretary, Subject: Series, Alphabetic Sub-series, box 15, File: Intelligence Matters (13) {Aug59-Feb60}, Eisenhower Library, 1-2; Jeffreys-Jones, 110-12.

executing his intelligence-gathering policy. While the U-2 removed the military from effecting foreign policy through its overflight program, Bissell's special project created its own separate self-feeding institution. With John Foster Dulles's replacement by Herter, and Allen Dulles's desires to maintain his credibility, the president's informal advisory system began to slide out of bounds. While Eisenhower thought he had gained control over his military, he failed to see he had lost control of his intelligence-gathering agency. With no re-evaluation of the U-2 program, the president continued to seek a détente that would not be achievable.

CHAPTER III

KHRUSHCHEV AND DÉTENTE

While Eisenhower's strategy was undergoing continuous change, Khrushchev also was affected by both internal and external dynamics. Hoping to obtain a summit with his major competitor, Khrushchev was forced to placate domestic political rivals. Only recently secure in his control of the Soviet Union, Khrushchev also needed to convince his hard-line ally, Chairman Mao Tse-Tung of China of the validity of his courses of action and international stature. Khrushchev gambled that his personal diplomacy with Eisenhower would allow the two powers to achieve an international agreement with the United States that would allow the premier the ability to restructure the Soviet economy from its centralized military economy to one based on the needs of the communist consumer. Khrushchev desired to shift the superpower struggle from the Stalin led military struggle to a more Leninist economic struggle that eventually would defeat the West.

Khrushchev rose to power following the death of Stalin. Quickly he realized that he needed to disassociate himself from the former dictator's political system. Delivering his famous "Secret Speech" to the Twentieth Congress of the Communist Party to break Stalin's excesses based upon the

former leader's cult of personality, Khrushchev exposed the brutality of the previous regime to public political debate in order to consolidate his own power. Khrushchev realized that through the expulsion of Stalin's Old Guard, and disassociation with Stalin's extreme political tactics, he increased his political power base, and further strengthened his support along anti-Stalin lines. This power base initially centered in the Soviet military, as Khrushchev attempted to glorify the role of the Soviet Army versus Stalin as the true Great Victors of World War II.¹

Khrushchev required a base of political support as his rise to power uncharacteristically did not include the immediate and complete political destruction of his opponents. Instead, the Soviet premier slowly began to depose of his potential rivals with the assistance of Marshal Georgi Zhukov, who had led the victorious Soviet Army to Berlin. Khrushchev thus ensured that he would face potential retribution from the various political factions he had not destroyed.² This tenuous political position affected Khrushchev's ability to negotiate with the United States.³ Khrushchev's first leadership

¹Nina Tumarkin, The Living and the Dead: The Rise and Fall of the Cult of World War II in Russia (New York: Basic Books, 1994), 106-110; Martin Malia, The Soviet Tragedy: A History of Socialism in Russia, 1917-1991 (New York: Free Press, 1994), 319, 327.

²Linden, 43-45.

³Mastny, 184; Harold Macmillan, Pointing the Way: 1959-1961 (New York: Harper & Row, 1972), 105.

challenge occurred in June 1957 when his fellow Politburo members, upset at the premier's Secret Speech demonstrated the premier's weakness. These leaders did not want to replace Stalin's personality cult with a Khrushchev cult, and threatened to remove Khrushchev from power because of their growing concern with his foreign policy innovations. After defeating this "Anti-Party Group" Khrushchev realized he needed a great foreign policy coup quickly to ensure the Kremlin's support in achieving his national objectives.

To Khrushchev, this foreign policy coup could only occur through a bilateral agreement with the United States. Khrushchev realized that if Eisenhower treated him as an equal, and he was able to secure an international agreement codifying détente, he would be seen as the greatest communist diplomat since Stalin. Furthering Khrushchev's desires for fundamental shifts in the nature of the superpower struggle, such an effort would also be understood as a personal insult to the leaders of the June 1957 revolt.⁴

To achieve his goals, Khrushchev realized he had to make a bold statement to gain the Western world's attention. On November 27, 1958, the Soviet premier called together the

⁴Malia, 327; Vladislav Zubok and Constantine Pleshakov, Inside the Kremlin's Cold War: From Stalin to Khrushchev (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1996), 187, 201.

Kremlin's first public press conference. During this conference, Khrushchev announced that unless the United States and its European allies began serious negotiations about the thirteen-year informal separation of Germany, the Soviet Union was prepared to act unilaterally and sign a peace treaty with East Germany.⁵ Such a unilateral move by Khrushchev not only threatened the Four-Power decision-making process in Germany, but also threatened NATO access to West Berlin. A newly recognized East Germany would not be held bound to honor western access through East Germany to the now divided former German capital. Implicit in Khrushchev's calls for negotiations with the United States was a desire to conduct bilateral superpower discussions on an equal footing with the American president, and a subtle enunciation that Khrushchev no longer viewed London or Paris as key to the future decision making process on the European continent.

Though this declaration appeared to effect only West Berlin, Khrushchev in fact astutely opened the possibility of dividing the NATO alliance by subtly provoking doubts concerning the credibility of the United States commitment to Germany and the European continent. Eisenhower would find

⁵Beschloss, 162-63.

it difficult to garner public support for armed intervention over a Berlin question that in his own mind was a political anomaly.⁶ Furthermore, if the president failed to respond to Khrushchev's initiative, the president could be viewed as failing to seek détente while if he did directly engage the Soviet premier, he could lose the support of his NATO allies who rejected direct superpower negotiations over Europe without their inclusion.

With Eisenhower rejecting the idea of a unilateral settlement of the German question, superpower negotiations seemed to reach an impasse. This impasse lasted until June 28, 1959, when the premier's personal emissary to the Soviet National Exhibition of Science, Technology and Culture in New York, Frol Kozlov, visited the United States. According to Deputy Under-Secretary of State, Robert Murphy, "Kozlov is a trusted deputy of Khrushchev and appears to be regarded by the latter as the 'heir apparent.'"⁷ Beginning with Kozlov's initial call on Eisenhower on July 1, the superpowers discussed the subject of an Eisenhower-Khrushchev meeting. Official documentation of Kozlov's initial call on the president demonstrated Kozlov eagerness to organize such a

⁶Eisenhower, Waging Peace, 334-35.

⁷FRUS, 1:287-8, ed. note.

meeting.⁸ The president did not fully understand Kozlov and Khrushchev's anxiousness or their motivations. Eisenhower was unsure if the Soviets sought serious negotiations, or merely photographic propaganda opportunities.⁹ Although the official Memorandum of Conversation ended with the president expressing salutations to Khrushchev, Eisenhower also passed on that he hoped "ways could be found for fruitful negotiations..."¹⁰ During a press conference seven days later, the president expressed his failure to understand Soviet anxiousness for a summit by saying it was the first time he had heard of Khrushchev's desire to meet formally and did not understand the motivation behind such a summit.¹¹ Eisenhower understood direct meetings with the premier could lead to arms reductions, and allow personal negotiations that could reduce superpower tensions over Germany, however, the president was unsure that he had the required support from his allies to entertain such a meeting.

On July 8, Eisenhower called Herter, and discussed the idea of Khrushchev visiting the United States. Eisenhower believed the State Department would have to weigh seriously

⁸Memorandum of Conversation of Mr. Kozlov's Call on The President, July, 1, 1959, FRUS, 1:292-3.

⁹Eisenhower, Waging Peace, 404-5.

¹⁰Memorandum of Conversation of Mr. Kozlov's Call on The President, July, 1, 1959, FRUS, 1:295.

¹¹Eisenhower, Waging Peace, 405.

the idea's political benefits. Although there is not agreement in the official and oral sources, Eisenhower probably linked Khrushchev's visit to the United States to prior agreements between foreign policy officials in order to create substantial reasons for such meetings. As he wrote in his memoirs,

At least it now seemed that we should have a better atmosphere...and developing mutual trust through satisfactorily enforced disarmament treaties...But, as always, we would have to wait for deeds to determine the sincerity of Soviet words.¹²

Eisenhower did not desire a photographic opportunity that Khrushchev might exploit for its propaganda value, but a meaningful pre-arranged summit that could further the president's desire to achieve a lasting détente to end his presidency.¹³ Murphy however, had always sought any Eisenhower-Khrushchev meeting. Murphy felt a visit by Khrushchev followed by a reciprocal visit by Eisenhower would make a substantial impact on the Soviet people regardless of concrete results.¹⁴

On July 12, Murphy met with Kozlov in New York and the printed documents reported that Murphy passed Kozlov a sealed envelope from Eisenhower for personal delivery by Kozlov to Khrushchev, as well as an oral message from the president to

¹²As quoted in Eisenhower, Waging Peace, 449.

¹³Eisenhower, Waging Peace, 432; General Andrew Goodpaster, oral history by Ed Edwin, 25 April 1967. oral history 38 Part III, transcript. Columbia, 101, 127. Hereafter cited as Goodpaster, oral history, Columbia, and page; FRUS, 1:309-311, ed. note.

¹⁴Robert Murphy, Diplomat Among Warriors (Garden City, NJ: Doubleday & Co., 1964), 438.

Khrushchev. In a previously written State Department talking paper, Murphy stated that a personal meeting between president and premier on an informal basis could allow a relaxation in tensions.¹⁵ Murphy apparently did not attach any conditions to the meeting, prompting a stunned Khrushchev to note that in his memoirs:

I couldn't believe my eyes. We had no reason to expect such an invitation...What did it mean? A shift of some kind? It was hard to believe.¹⁶

On July 21, Khrushchev agreed to a personal meeting between the two leaders of the superpowers.¹⁷ President Eisenhower did not learn of Murphy's misunderstanding of his prerequisite of diplomatically substantial agreements prior to any meeting with Khrushchev, until he received Khrushchev's written acceptance.¹⁸ Goodpaster noted in his oral history that all future discussions conducted with Herter included a member of the Administration to prevent future misunderstandings.¹⁹

Khrushchev, accepting Eisenhower's invitation, also understood his own weak political position. The premier therefore paradoxically used the apparent power of his military to bluff the Soviet Union into a greater international political position while using his increased

¹⁵Memorandum of Conversation between Mr. Kozlov and Deputy Under Secretary Murphy, July 12, 1959, and Mr. Murphy's Talking Paper, FRUS, 1:316-319.

¹⁶As quoted by Nikita Khrushchev, Khrushchev Remembers: The Last Testament trans. Strobe Talbott, (Boston: Little, Brown & Co., 1974), 369.

¹⁷Letter From Chairman Khrushchev to President Eisenhower, July 21, 1959, FRUS, 1:324-5.

¹⁸Eisenhower, Waging Peace, 405-7; Memorandum of Conference with the President, July 22, 1959, White House Office, Office of the Staff Secretary, Subject: Series, State Department Sub-series, box 3, Eisenhower Library.

¹⁹Goodpaster, oral history, Columbia, 101-2; John Eisenhower, oral history, Eisenhower Library, 97.

stature as a diplomat to depose his political rivals. Without this ability to bluff, Khrushchev could not hope to consolidate his power. The Soviet premier walked a political fine line. As he proclaimed the strengths of the Soviet military, he continually sought to make major paradigm shifts in its force structure. In full view of his adversaries he could prevail only if his deception lasted until communism's economic superiority could take hold and the Soviet Union out-produced the United States.

After securing Zhukov's support against the Anti-Party Group, Khrushchev waited until the Marshal was on travel outside the Soviet Union to retire the former Soviet Army hero with full military honors. Removing any threat from his former ally, Khrushchev next began to implement his radical restructuring of the Soviet military force structure vis-a-vis the economy. With the military deprived of its most recent spokesman, it relied on its press to attack Khrushchev's shift of resources away from the military. The press cautioned the premier that the military would resist any alteration of its preference in the economy. Unwittingly Khrushchev now forced the military back into league with the more conservative opponents to his rule.²⁰

At the same time, Khrushchev used the military in his game of bluff. The Soviet leader threatened to use his nuclear tipped rockets on any nation that did not match Soviet policy objectives. According to Khrushchev himself:

²⁰Linden, 52.

Eventually, we began to launch our SPUTNIKS, which made our potential enemies cringe in fright but made many other people glow with joy...People all over the world recognized our success. Most admired us; the Americans were jealous.²¹

The Soviets claimed the political offensive in European affairs.²² Khrushchev unabashedly timed SPUTNIK launches before every foreign trip, and used these launches to seek political concessions and a psychological advantage for his propaganda efforts. Khrushchev understood it was not the true balance of power, but rather the world's perception of the balance of power that really mattered in foreign relations.²³

A secondary benefit of the SPUTNIK launches was Khrushchev's ability to now re-focus the Soviet military strategy away from costly manpower-intensive army troops toward less expensive rocket forces. These savings would also allow Khrushchev to transition the Soviet economy from heavy to light industry or toward what Carl Linden called "Consumer Communism."²⁴ However, continued Western postponement forced the Soviet-American summit beyond Khrushchev's internal political timetable. Khrushchev, in January 1960, announced reductions of over one million men in the Red Army. With no further Western moves toward détente, he began to question Eisenhower's commitment.²⁵

²¹As quoted by Khrushchev, 47, 54.

²²Hammond, 128-29; Katherine Verdery, "What Was Socialism, and Why Did It Fail?" ed. Daniel Orlovsky, Beyond Soviet Studies (Washington: Woodrow Wilson Center Press, 1995), 43.

²³Thompson, 187-88; Bialer, 238-239.

²⁴Linden, 90.

²⁵Khrushchev, 416; Macmillan, 62.

This desire to decrease political and military tensions specifically with the United States clearly demonstrates Khrushchev's ties to Lenin's teachings. Lenin's teachings, obsessed with the industrial might of the United States as the greatest threat to communism, ensured Khrushchev also sought to economically out-pace the leader of the capitalist world. Seweryn Bialer in his book Stalin's Successors, elevates the premier's focus on the United States to the same level of obsession as Lenin. This special attitude toward America became apparent in Khrushchev's writings, and highlights Khrushchev's fixation with receiving treatment equal to Eisenhower. Hypersensitive to any indication of difference, the Soviet premier demanded an equal footing with Eisenhower, and became deeply disturbed at even the perception of inequity.²⁶

Seeing the United States as the central nation for the true competition between the nature of capitalism and communism, Khrushchev felt his job was to use this new period of peaceful coexistence to accelerate Lenin's promised economic victory.²⁷ To the Soviet premier, the inevitable economic victory over capitalism and its revolutionary appeal remained the true state of the nature of the confrontation. According to Martin Malia in his book The Soviet Tragedy, Khrushchev wanted to be the modern day Lenin, the leader who would utilize the full potential of communism to demonstrate the power behind the revolution.²⁸ The premier merely had to

²⁶Bialer, 238-39.

²⁷Zubok, Inside the Kremlin's Cold War, 184-85.

²⁸Malia, 320.

use his innovative solutions to unleash this potential and lead the communist world down the path to this victory.

On January 27, 1959, at the Extraordinary Twenty-first Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, one year before Khrushchev unilaterally announced the reduction of 1.2 million men in the Soviet Army, the Soviet premier set his plan to convert the Soviet economy in motion.²⁹ Khrushchev understood that nuclear weapons had revolutionized the Cold War: "We now have a broad range of rockets, and in such quantity that can virtually shatter the world." Like Eisenhower, Khrushchev believed that a relatively inexpensive reliance on nuclear rockets allowed the Soviet Union to lower its defense budgets, and permitted the Soviets the ability to concentrate economic resources on improving the standard of living at home.

Vladislav Zubok, quoting Khrushchev's original memorandum to the Communist Central Party Presidium, in the Cold War International History Project states the Soviet premier proposed cutting the Red Army by one-third, to its lowest level since 1924 to increase the standard of living. This radical attempt to restructure the Soviet Union's centralized military machine and shift Soviet foreign policy toward a more peaceful coexistence with the west was the only way Khrushchev could hope to convert the Soviet economy and still maintain sufficient military and political power to challenge the western world. Realizing that such radical reform had to occur quickly while he maintained the political

²⁹Thompson, 200.

momentum both inside and outside the Soviet Union, Khrushchev continued to build up his four operational ICBMs into the force that could "Bury the West." Although not meant as a literal destruction of the west, Khrushchev astutely realized that if his plan worked, and Lenin's guidance was accurate, the Soviet Union could economically defeat the west. Contrary to previous Soviet political tactics, Khrushchev sought to implement a reduction in military allocation through the reliance on the Rocket Forces, rather than using this publicly proclaimed revolutionary transition as a smoke screen for a larger military construction program. Catching both his own military and the Warsaw Pact by surprise with such a radical restructuring, the Soviet premier's desire to convert the Soviet Union's military muscle into a nuclear-based deterrent force began Khrushchev's political isolation and fall from power.³⁰ Khrushchev's assumptions were immediately challenged by the Minister of Defense, Rodion Malinovsky, known as the "Rocket Minister" who served with Khrushchev in the Ukraine during World War II. Like Eisenhower, Khrushchev had his dissenters in the Politburo attacking his national security objectives.

Chairman Mao Tse-Tung of China also challenged Khrushchev's foreign policy leadership, specifically his plan for a more peaceful coexistence with the capitalist west. Khrushchev himself stated,

³⁰Vladislav M. Zubok, "Khrushchev, Memo to CC CPSU Presidium, 8 December 1959," Cold War International History Project, no. 8-9 (Winter 1996/1997): 416-418. Hereafter cited as Khrushchev, Memo, and page.

It was obvious what Mao was up to: he thought (he would)... be able to outdistance the Party of Lenin and surpass the strides the Soviet people had made since the October Revolution.³¹

Mao felt Khrushchev was a novice to world politics. Although he was more enlightened than Stalin, Mao felt the new Soviet leader's Secret Speech denouncing the absolutism of the previous regime did not allow Khrushchev to place the worldwide struggle of revolutionary communism in proper perspective. Mao believed he must now distance China's foreign policy from the Soviet Union while educating his young apprentice.³²

Mao wanted the "Eastern Wind" of Communist nations to lead the Soviets' growing military and political power to force the west into a more equal position. Mao believed in the power of Khrushchev's SPUTNIK and ICBM propaganda and felt Khrushchev should utilize this new power base to further the spread of world communism.³³ Mao correctly surmised that the premier's upcoming trip to the United States was the antithesis of the Chinese chairman's tutelage. Khrushchev furthered this alienation with the Soviet Union's failure to provide Peking with atomic information and further high-tech weaponry.³⁴

Mao's fear would be answered immediately after the Kozlov arranged Khrushchev-Eisenhower meetings of September 1959 when the Soviet premier arrived in Peking espousing the

³¹As quoted in Khrushchev, 273.

³²Salisbury, 135-36.

³³Salisbury, 152-3; Malia, 326.

³⁴Ibid.

benefits of the new détente between the superpowers. Rather than acting like the child to Mao's pedagogical admonishments, Khrushchev decided to end Mao's posturing and put an end to the Chinese leader's games. In a direct attack on Mao's direction, the Soviet premier criticized the Chinese for attacking the National Chinese islands of Quemoy and Matsu just prior to his Washington meetings and further warned his Asian partner that it was unwise to threaten the west with force. The ultimate victory between communism and capitalism, Khrushchev claimed, would come in the economic arena.³⁵

Although Khrushchev's exact motivations for the selection of this moment, immediately after his discussions with Eisenhower, to chastise Mao can not be definitively proven, his aggressive nature and direct confrontation with the Chinese elder statesman clearly indicate that Khrushchev decided to ensure he maintained the leadership of world communism.³⁶ Immediately following his direct attacks on Mao, Khrushchev further taunted the Chinese to free two captured American pilots, questioned the direction of Chinese Communism, and decried the Chinese armed movement into India. The Soviet premier hoped to place Mao in a clearly subordinate role after his visit to the United States, but achieved only further fissures in the alliance. As far back as Mao's "Two Winds" speech, given on the occasion of the fortieth anniversary of the Bolshevik revolution, November 7, 1957, the growing rift between the two parties was displayed. Mao

³⁵Salisbury, 189-194; Zubok, Inside the Kremlin's Cold War, 201.

³⁶Khrushchev, 283.

claimed the international communist movement must chose to follow either his leadership of revolutionary conflict with the west, or Khrushchev's policy of accommodation.³⁷

Khrushchev needed the Paris Summit and his personal diplomacy with Eisenhower to underscore the important leadership role the Soviet Union played in world events. Although not fully understood at the time, the Administration began to notice this growing tension between Khrushchev and Mao.³⁸

As early as November 1958, a year before his first summit with Khrushchev, Eisenhower understood there was a growing difference of opinion between Khrushchev and Mao. Speaking to his delegation to the superpower disarmament talks in Geneva, the president stated,

he would be most eager to have their (Soviet) views toward Communist China. He wondered if the Soviets were not really becoming concerned about Communist China as a possible threat...³⁹

Almost a year later the president received reports that Mao demanded Khrushchev visit China after his visit to the United States.⁴⁰ Within a month of Khrushchev's visit, the

³⁷LaFeber, 199; Macmillan, 201.

³⁸Goodpaster, oral history by Mr. Malcolm S. McDonald, Eisenhower Library, 48.

³⁹As quoted in Memorandum of Meeting with the President, November 6, 1958, White House Office, Office of the Staff Secretary, Subject: Series, Alphabetic Sub-series, box 24, File: Surprise Attack Group {July-Nov 58}, Eisenhower Library, 3.

⁴⁰Synopsis of Intelligence Items Reported to the President, September 24, 1959, White House Office, Office of the Staff Secretary, Subject: Series, Alphabetic Sub-series, box 14, File: Intelligence Briefing Notes {Sept-Nov 59}, Eisenhower Library; Report on Khrushchev Visit to the United States, Asian Communist Reaction to Khrushchev Visit to the US, u.d., White House Office, Office of the Staff Secretary, International Trips and Meetings, box 9, File: Khrushchev Visit {Sep59} (6), Eisenhower Library.

Intelligence community advised the president that the Khrushchev-Mao difference affected Sino-Soviet relations, but also reported that other members of the Eastern Alliance were concerned with Khrushchev's leadership strategies.⁴¹

While Khrushchev's leadership was beset by external woes, his internal opposition shortly would have reason to be concerned by the premier's leadership style. Challenged internally by Communist hard-liners that wished to continue in Stalin's tradition, Khrushchev sought to reorient the Soviet economy away from heavy industry and the military through his reliance on nuclear rocket forces, and political blustering. While disenfranchising senior members of the military who understood the true nature of the balance of power between the superpowers Khrushchev not only opened himself to internal opposition, but also to the more radical and revolutionary external opponents embodied in Mao. With the Chinese claiming the Soviet leader had lost Stalin's revolutionary fervor and the East Wind's call for alternate approaches toward the struggle with the west, Khrushchev's position weakened. Khrushchev, like Eisenhower, sincerely wanted an international lessening of tensions that could only be achieved through direct and personal negotiations. These negotiations, however, further damaged Khrushchev's credibility both internally and externally.

⁴¹Synopsis of Intelligence Items Reported to the President, October 31 and November 2, 1959, White House Office, Office of the Staff Secretary, Subject: Series, Alphabetic Sub-series, box 14, File: Intelligence Briefing Notes Vol. I (10) (Sept-Nov 59), Eisenhower Library.

CHAPTER IV

GREAT BRITAIN, FRANCE AND DÉTENTE

While Eisenhower was attempting to manipulate the military and civilian members of his administration into executing his foreign policy of seeking détente, the president also had to convince his NATO allies of the benefits of following his New Look strategy. More importantly, the president also had to ease the concerns of London and Paris that he would engage the Soviet premier in direct exclusive bilateral negotiations. In an interesting contrast, the president faced two divergent views when discussing détente with his allies. British Prime Minister Harold Macmillan sought détente at almost any cost. Remembering the devastation of World War II, Macmillan felt there were very few issues that required the use of nuclear weapons. In contrast with the prime minister's emotional cries for peace, the French President, Charles De Gaulle, felt Eisenhower was too interested in détente and feared that the United States and Soviet Union would seek a bilateral peace agreement that might actually subtly increase the Kremlin's power on the European continent. De Gaulle instead felt Khrushchev's growing threats indicated the weak domestic position the Soviet premier faced, and publicly responded to the Soviet premier's statements by

stating the key role France played in the international community.¹

Realizing Khrushchev was attempting to divide the Western Alliance, Eisenhower felt he must "hold the line of American authority in NATO...",² while attempting to erode the potential for conflict with the Soviet Union.³ Eisenhower personally desired to reach a unprecedented peace, "one great personal effort, before leaving office..."⁴ The United States and Soviet Union were close to reaching a limited Nuclear Test Ban Treaty, the first major accord of the Cold War, and Eisenhower was "determined to achieve it."⁵ Eisenhower hoped the summit would be the first step in worldwide acceptance of regular superpower discussions that eventually would formalize détente and disarmament.

One of the few people who could look closely at Eisenhower's foreign policy strategy was Macmillan. With London's post-war lessons in mind, Macmillan realized England could no longer claim global great power status. Only through successful manipulation of its "special relationship" with the United States on foreign policy matters could London still

¹Transcript of President De Gaulle's Press Conference, u.d., White House Office of the Special Assistant for the National Security Council 1952-1961, NSC Series, Briefing Notes Sub-series, box 19, file: US-NATO Relations and Problems (1), Eisenhower Library.

²Hammond, 127.

³Beschloss, xi.

⁴Eisenhower, Waging Peace, 432.

⁵Beschloss, 7, 192.

consider itself diplomatically powerful.⁶ Macmillan hoped to use that position to force Eisenhower toward détente at any cost.⁷

Obsessed with Khrushchev's public statements regarding peace and the future of the European continent Macmillan, in February 1959 and unbeknownst to Eisenhower, traveled to Moscow. His objectives were:

to promote the concept of a series of meetings moving steadily forward from point to point in which 'peaceful co-existence' (to use the jargon of the day)-if not peace-could reign unchallenged in the world.⁸

While this was a brave step for an advisor with an admittedly limited role, Macmillan overstepped his bounds. Eisenhower wanted détente but unlike London he felt the Soviets must first in good faith negotiate formalized agreements with the west. Without such good faith negotiations the president feared Khrushchev would feel rewarded for his military blustering. Macmillan was premature in his callings.

After Macmillan's trip, Eisenhower relayed to his son that he "resented the pressure from London."⁹ According to John Eisenhower, the president was "pretty unhappy" and said, "I'll never go to the Summit meeting under threat."¹⁰ In a conversation with Macmillan, Eisenhower became so unhappy with

⁶Macmillan, 61; Henry Kissinger, Diplomacy (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1994), 596.

⁷Frank Costigliola, "The Failed Design: Kennedy, De Gaulle, and the Struggle for Europe," Diplomatic History 8 (Summer 1984): 234.

⁸As quoted in Macmillan, 101.

⁹Hammond, 130.

¹⁰John Eisenhower, oral history, Eisenhower Library, 59.

the British Prime Minister that he openly questioned whether Macmillan's overstep should fundamentally alter British-American relations. The president, speaking in emotional terms, felt the British had lost their rational ability to advise the president on any Eisenhower-Khrushchev summit.¹¹ Still, with the State Department pushing for a summit, the president felt personally compelled to try to establish the requirements for a summit.

In the end, Macmillan's trip further softened Eisenhower into accepting direct personal negotiations with Khrushchev. Although he desired détente personally, Eisenhower feared the Soviet Union's propaganda machine might force individual Western nations to seek unilateral initiatives with the Soviet Union. Eisenhower feared he was losing his position as leader of the Western world and the cohesion of the NATO alliance. Yet, Macmillan's trip to the Soviet Union alienated Eisenhower by forcing his hand politically, while the Prime Minister's emotional post-trip pleas for peace forced both Eisenhower and Khrushchev to see him as nothing more than a powerless second rate ally.¹²

Despite his anger at Macmillan, it was the State Department's mishandling of Kozlov's visit that finally compelled the president to directly negotiate with the Soviet premier.¹³ Before Eisenhower undertook such an endeavor the president understood he needed to convince the troublesome

¹¹Memorandum of Conference with the President July 27, 1959, White House Office, Subject: Series, State Department Sub-series Box 3 File: 7, Eisenhower Library.

¹²Khrushchev, 459.

¹³Eisenhower White House, oral history, Eisenhower Library, 38-40.

French President Charles De Gaulle of the usefulness of such a summit.¹⁴ A personally divided Eisenhower, having fought off his own better judgement against seeking a summit, now needed to convince De Gaulle of the need for a summit he himself was unsure of. Before 1957 the French were a perplexing ally as they had a weak government; now they were a problem since they were strongly united behind a domineering De Gaulle.¹⁵

Eisenhower however felt the French deserved a new-found recognition for De Gaulle's efforts in returning France to the international scene, and promised continued unofficial support to this French role within certain limits.¹⁶ Although the United States desired a strong France, the Administration needed a consistent ally that would not waver from the United States position. De Gaulle however, overtly sought the leadership of the European nations of the Western Alliance.¹⁷

Khrushchev visited the United States from September 15-29, 1959 after much diplomatic preparation. Prior to Khrushchev's arrival, the president was supplied with a briefing book on the Soviet premier. In this book, the State Department revealed that it felt Khrushchev was "a gambler" who was an "expert in calculated bluffing." The Department of State further assessed that the premier, having chosen not to

¹⁴John Eisenhower, oral history, Eisenhower Library, 97.

¹⁵Briefing Notes for the Planning Board, June 22, 1959, White House Office, National Security Council Staff Papers 53-61, Special Staff Files Series, box 3, File: France, Eisenhower Library.

¹⁶U.d. Briefing Memorandum for the President's Talks with De Gaulle, Whitman File, International Series, box 14, File: De Gaulle-Visit to U.S. Apr. 22-25 1960, (5), Eisenhower Library.

¹⁷Operations Coordinating Board Report on U.S. Policy on France, November 9, 1960, White House Office, Office of the Special Assistant to the National Security Council Records, 1952-61. NSC Series, Policy Paper Sub-series, box 27, File: NSC 5910/1-U.S. Policy Toward France (1), Eisenhower Library, 3.

follow Stalin's previous path of reigning by terror, was limited in his courses of action to modernization of the Soviet economy through "inspirational campaigns" to make up for Soviet lack of resources. Without Khrushchev's inspiration, the Administration questioned whether the Soviet Union could surpass the United States in per capita production.

In tying the economic to the military, the assessment declared that Khrushchev had used the development of the ICBM as a means of convincing the world of Soviet power. The Soviet premier was considered to be in a hurry both in foreign and domestic matters. Time seemed to burden Khrushchev. With time acting as a source of pressure and the premier's inspiration making up for the Soviets' lack of resources, Khrushchev seemed beset by "conflicting objectives." The assessment concluded that Khrushchev's apparent military successes provided the principal means of the premier's legitimacy of power. Without further economic success, the premier would continue to rely solely on military achievements.¹⁸

The president and the State Department felt a personal advance to the Soviet premier was the best means of approach. Recommending that Eisenhower appeal to Khrushchev's vanity, the State Department advised that the president declare to Khrushchev that the premier could achieve the position of a leading statesman in history if he reduced the Cold War. Competition could then be refocused from the military front

¹⁸Background Paper, KHRUSHCHEV: The Man and His Outlook, September 11, 1959, Whitman File, International Series, box 52, File: Khrushchev's Visit Sept.'59 (2), Eisenhower Library, 1-3.

to the economic arena. This approach was guaranteed to try to appeal to Khrushchev's identification with Lenin's belief in the supremacy of the economic struggle. If Khrushchev continued to press his blustering about an inevitable Soviet victory, the president should remind the Soviet premier that the United States had not yet placed its economy on a war footing as it had done during World War II. If this was the premier's choice then only the individual people of the two nations would be left to suffer.¹⁹ In adopting this tactic, the administration demonstrated that it understood the false nature of Khrushchev's military threats and threatened to further pressure the premier's goals of increasing the average Soviets' access to consumer goods.

A second series of recommendations from the State Department urged the president to emphasize to the Soviet leader the urgent need to find serious means of decreasing the current military tension within the Cold War. Attempting to seek a basis for improved relations, the Administration sought to instill a sense of rational debate to the Cold War to build the basis for future agreement.²⁰ The paper clearly identified Khrushchev's apparent desire for serious negotiations, and also recognized the beginnings of Sino-Soviet antagonism in that it recommended the Soviet government dissociate itself from Chinese intransigence and assert its

¹⁹Paper on U.S. Objectives in Khrushchev Visit and Suggested Tactics for Conversation with Him u.d., Whitman File, International File, box 52, File: Khrushchev Visit Sep'59 (1), Eisenhower Library, 7-8.

²⁰Paper on U.S. Objectives in Khrushchev Visit and Suggested Tactics for Conversation with Him dated September 11, 1959, Whitman File, International Series, box 52, File: Khrushchev Visit Sep'59 (2), Eisenhower Library, 1.

leadership of the Communist bloc.²¹

However, Khrushchev belied this appearance of détente when he launched the Soviet Luna rocket mission to the moon the day before Khrushchev's visit.²² Eisenhower's fears of Khrushchev using his American visit as a propaganda circus seemed to be coming to fruition. In very personal terms, the president deplored Khrushchev's "poor behavior." Despite his personal irritation Eisenhower decided to make an enormous effort to seek cooperation.²³ Eisenhower's initial meetings with Khrushchev seemed to further the president's worst fears as discussions broke down into Eisenhower publicly mediating Vice President Richard Nixon and Khrushchev's argument over who had insulted the other more during their previous encounters.²⁴

After Khrushchev's initial visit to the nation's capital, his tour of the western portion of the United States, the Soviet premier and the American president met for the first time in direct personal negotiations. Utilizing the recommended tactic of appealing to Khrushchev's vanity, Eisenhower conveyed Khrushchev's potential great position in history to the premier.²⁵ Later conferring with his American

²¹Paper on U.S. Objectives in Khrushchev Visit and Suggested Tactics for Conversation with Him dated September 11, 1959, Whitman File, International Series, box 52, File: Khrushchev Visit Sep'59 (2), Eisenhower Library, 6, 13.

²²Eisenhower, Waging Peace, 434.

²³Memorandum of Conference with the President, September 14, 1959, White House Office, Office of the Staff Secretary, Subject: Series, State Department Sub-series, box 3, File: State Department 1959 (May-Sep) (6), Eisenhower Library, 2.

²⁴Memorandum of Conversation between President Eisenhower, and Premier Khrushchev dated September 15, 1959, FRUS, 1:398.

²⁵Memorandum of Conversation, September 15, 1959, Whitman File, International Series, box 52, File: Khrushchev's Visit 9/15-27/59 (2), Eisenhower Library, 1.

tour guide, American Ambassador to the United Nations Henry Cabot Lodge, Khrushchev agreed that something must be done to lessen tension, as war between the two nations would be suicidal.²⁶

Ambassador Lodge escorted the Soviet premier throughout his tour and reported on his conduct and the reactions to his presence throughout Khrushchev's visit. The Administration also created special means of reporting press coverage of the premier's visit, in order to monitor the effect of world opinion on the unfolding events.²⁷

In the resultant flurry of reporting to the president, various members of the Administration commented to Eisenhower concerning Khrushchev's remarks. On September 24, Secretary of State Herter reported that the Soviet premier had publicly offered to reduce his country's conventional armed forces by almost half from 2.9 million to 1.7 million men. Although not providing a means for the United States to verify these troop reductions, Herter's report confirmed Eisenhower's conversations with Khrushchev, numerous intelligence reports articulating Soviet transition from conventional to nuclear forces, and seemed to be the precursor to genuine reduction in the Cold War.²⁸

²⁶Memorandum of Conversation, September 17, 1959, Whitman File, International Series, box 52, File: Khrushchev's Visit 9/15-27/59 (1), 2.

²⁷Special Memorandum, Soviet Bloc Coverage of Khrushchev's Visit Since 22 September With a Summary of Free World Reaction, 25 September 1959, White House Office, Office of the Staff Secretary, International Trips and Meetings box 8, File: Khrushchev Exchange of Visits, Vol. II (3) {Sep 59}, Eisenhower library.

²⁸Memorandum of Conference with the President, Sept 24, 1959, Whitman File, DDE Diary Series, box 44, File: Staff Notes Sep 59 (1), Eisenhower Library, 3.

The following day the American Ambassador to Moscow, Llewellyn Thompson stated to the president that Khrushchev's visit indicated the Soviet premier was earnest in seeking peace, and that this search for peace was central to Khrushchev's ideas for the Soviets' future. Clearly linking this desire for peace with an increase in the Soviet standard of living, the ambassador further advised Eisenhower that Khrushchev's advisors were "poisoning" the premier's attitude toward détente by telling the premier that Eisenhower was disingenuous in his promises. Lodge also alerted the president that this negative advice was compelling Khrushchev to not consult his advisors prior to his speeches and pronouncements, and that the premier was not addressing questions concerning Sino-Soviet affairs.²⁹ On September 27, Khrushchev told Lodge that he would not speak on behalf of the Chinese government and that even if asked he would not be their spokesperson.³⁰ Had Khrushchev merely stated he was not a spokesperson for the Communist Chinese government the incident should have gone unnoticed, but his further announcement that he would not speak for them even if given the authority to do so was especially revealing. This report coupled with Eisenhower's previous awareness of strains in the Sino-Soviet relationship demonstrated the growing rift amongst the communist nations.

After Eisenhower and Khrushchev had their final private

²⁹Memorandum of Conference with the President, Sept 25, 1959, Whitman File, DDE Diary Series, box 44, File: Staff Notes Sep 59 (1), passim; Memorandum of Conference with the President, Sept 28, 1959, Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, DDE Diary Series, box 44, File: Staff Notes Sep 59 (1), Eisenhower Library, 1.

³⁰Memorandum of Conversation, Sept 27, 1959, White House Office, Office of the Staff Secretary, International Trips and Meetings, box 9 File: Khrushchev's Visit (Sep 59) (3), Eisenhower Library, 3.

sessions at Camp David, Ann Whitman, the president's private secretary noted in her diary that Khrushchev's position seemed to shift from one of bitter attack to a more mellow espousal of the benefits of the communist system.³¹ During these negotiations, both leaders agreed to a Big-Power summit meeting in the winter of 1959, or early spring of 1960.³² Both leaders ended these meetings on a high note. Eisenhower felt Khrushchev could become a "Great Statesman,"³³ while Khrushchev was now convinced Eisenhower was genuinely seeking to reduce tensions, and therefore could proceed with his own plans to further dramatically reduce the size of the Soviet military.³⁴ Apparently both Eisenhower and Khrushchev allowed their personal discussions to convince themselves that their former opponent was now sincere in their public pronouncements desiring détente. Newsweek labeled Khrushchev's visit a success and spoke cautiously of the "Hope From Camp David."³⁵

In mid-July 1959, America's two major allies reacted predictably to news of an impending summit. While both France and Britain desired negotiated settlements to world problems, France was concerned with the apparent haste in Eisenhower and Khrushchev's post visit calls for a summit. On October 9, De Gaulle never convinced of the need for an early meeting

³¹Diary entry September 26, PAP, Whitman File, Ann Whitman Diary Series, box 11, File: ACW Diary September 59, Eisenhower Library.

³²Eisenhower, Waging Peace, 447-48; Memorandum of Conversation, Sept 27, 1959, White House Office, Office of the Staff Secretary, International Trips and Meetings, box 9 File: Khrushchev's Visit (Sep 59) (3), Eisenhower Library, 3.

³³Eisenhower, Waging Peace, 432.

³⁴Thompson, 211, 217.

³⁵"Great Encounter: Part 3 - Special Section," Newsweek, 05 October 1959, 20.

notified the president that he felt the western alliance was moving too fast. The French wanted the western allies to first meet without the Soviet Union present, and discuss a NATO strategy prior to any great power meeting.³⁶ In contrast to this position, the British government recommended that Eisenhower meet Khrushchev at the soonest opportunity, before the end of 1959. Macmillan felt that without such an agreement, Khrushchev's position might harden.³⁷ Agreeing with Macmillan's assessment of Khrushchev's political position, the president directed Herter to inform the French that the United States desired to meet with Khrushchev at the earliest opportunity. Implicit in this correspondence was a warning that unless this time-line was followed, the United States might feel compelled to deal with the Soviet Union on a purely bilateral basis.³⁸

Although Eisenhower's initiative greatly satisfied Macmillan, De Gaulle protested the threat to resort to bilateral discussions.³⁹ For De Gaulle, France must first detonate its atomic device before it could bring its true national power to bear on any summit negotiations. Until France could speak with the other nuclear nations, De Gaulle

³⁶Memorandum of Conversation with the President, October 9, 1959, White House Office, Office of the Staff Secretary, Subject: Series, State Sub-series, box 3, File: State Department Oct 59-Feb 60, Eisenhower Library, 2-3.

³⁷Memorandum for the Staff Secretary, October 19, 1959, White House Office, Office of the Staff Secretary, Subject: Series, State Sub-series, box 3, File: State Department Oct 59-Feb 1960 (1), Eisenhower Library, 3.

³⁸Memorandum with the President, October 21, 1959, PAP, Whitman File, DDE Diary Series, box 45, File: Staff Notes October 1959 (1), Eisenhower Library, 1-2.

³⁹Lacouture, 421.

hesitated to enter any diplomatic discussions.⁴⁰ Fearing an exclusive American-Soviet solution toward Europe without the prior consent of the European nations themselves, De Gaulle's protests revived Eisenhower's fears that the Western Alliance was shattering under Soviet propaganda efforts. Further, De Gaulle asserted that by Eisenhower agreeing to meet with Khrushchev while the Soviet premier held the power of SPUTNIK, he played into Khrushchev's hands. While Soviet propaganda could be used to blackmail the United States, any American concessions allowed further release of any internal or international stress on Khrushchev.⁴¹

De Gaulle's biographer believed that there was always personal ease between the generals.⁴² The problem between De Gaulle and Eisenhower was that they misunderstood each other's position. De Gaulle felt compelled to give the French people a sense of national pride and security, while to Eisenhower, France's role was directly proportional to the contributions it made to the alliance.⁴³ Eisenhower felt the alliance had to reach a consensus. Once the alliance, under American leadership reached a consensus, Eisenhower felt he should speak for the alliance directly and singularly to the Soviet Union. De Gaulle hated the subjection of France to another power. More than this however, the General hated, "the direct, exclusive dialogue between superpowers..."⁴⁴

⁴⁰Serfaty, 117.

⁴¹Henry Kissinger, The Troubled Partnership: A Re-appraisal of the Atlantic Alliance (New York: McGraw-Hill Book Co., 1965), 59.

⁴²Lacouture, 366.

⁴³Kissinger, Diplomacy, 603.

⁴⁴Lacouture, 367.

Eisenhower's personal reservation about Khrushchev, and his commitment to politically strengthen De Gaulle, compelled the president to hold a preliminary American-British-French meeting prior to the Big Power summit. Between December 19-21, 1959, for the first time, the leaders of France, the United States, and England met in Paris to discuss the upcoming Paris Summit. Eisenhower's goal of an immediate post-Khrushchev meeting Big Power summit was put on hold until after the French could explode an atomic device. Further, the president allowed De Gaulle the prestigious role to host the summit to ensure the French president acquiesced on his opposition to a summit.⁴⁵ Eisenhower, torn over the need for direct negotiations, now attempted to balance Britain and France's needs to ensure their support for his summit. De Gaulle's posturing delayed the summit until May 1960, and delayed Eisenhower's plans.⁴⁶ The pressures of time continued to weigh on Khrushchev.

⁴⁵Lacouture, 369.

⁴⁶Kissinger, Diplomacy, 582.

CHAPTER V

THE PARIS SUMMIT

Publicly hopes for the summit ran high, however, so did the stakes for the Soviet and American leaders. Khrushchev's political position, became tenuous after his unilateral military cuts were not reciprocated by the west. Khrushchev now had to placate his internal detractors, or lose his political power. Eisenhower, for his part, increasingly faced public political concerns over the missile gap prior to the presidential election, and needed to balance the need for further overflights and the internal pressures he faced for such missions with his desire for further negotiations. with an apparently divided alliance continued to seek one last chance to gain a formalized peace through summitry. Although the agenda for the Paris Summit did not seem ambitious, to bring the leaders of the great powers together for personal discussions on means of achieving a more stable European security for the first time fulfilled Eisenhower's strategy of negotiating an end to the Cold War. Camp David had unleashed a worldwide hope for the end of direct superpower confrontation and saber rattling, however, both leaders had already committed themselves to actions that ended any hopes for détente.

This apparent thaw in superpower relations caused the Administration to issue multiple post-Khrushchev visit

assessments. On October 28, the State Department prepared a briefing memorandum for the president to provide to the Cabinet. Highlighting Eisenhower's personal influence over Khrushchev and the premier's seriousness regarding disarmament, the report concluded that the summit had been a success for the United States position in the world and should be presented as such.¹ The approved State Department assessment was dispatched by Herter as a formal paper to all overseas diplomatic missions, and provided to each member of the Cabinet. This paper transitioned Newsweek's "Hope From Camp David" to "The Spirit of Camp David."² While this assessment was being created the Administration also sought further guidance on whether a fundamental shift was to occur in superpower relations. The Executive Secretary of the State Department, John A. Calhoun in a memorandum for the president asked whether the trip should "require some new method of handling... certain of our programmed activities of particular political sensitivity?"³ Although not directly referring to the U-2 missions, the memorandum clearly sought to identify the operational implications of Khrushchev's visit, and its implications for politically sensitive operations. The president's initials on the file copy of the memorandum clearly indicate that Eisenhower understood the State

¹Briefing Memorandum for the Cabinet Meeting, October 28, 1959, Whitman File, Cabinet Series, box 14, File: Cabinet Mtg. of Oct 28, 1959, Eisenhower Library.

²Assessment of Chairman Khrushchev's Visit, November 3, 1959, Whitman File, Cabinet Series, box 14, File: Cabinet Mtg. of Nov 6, 1959 (1), Eisenhower Library, 5.

³Memorandum for the President, October 14, 1959, Whitman File, International Series, box 52, File: Khrushchev visit 9/15-27/59 (1), Eisenhower Library, 2.

Department was looking for further guidance.

At the same time, Khrushchev's opponents in the Kremlin and Peking remained unsure what agreements their leader had made in his private meetings with Eisenhower. The day after Khrushchev's return to the Soviet Union, he felt compelled to fly to China to placate Mao over his meetings with Eisenhower. At home Khrushchev continued to seek further economic reforms and felt a new Western perception of the Soviet Union. believing Eisenhower was equally committed to détente.⁴ Eisenhower similarly felt "quite possibly the man was completely sincere." Contrary to his earlier inhibitions, Eisenhower desired to have private conversations with Khrushchev, "Because in these man-to-man talks {it was possible} to learn more about his intentions, objectives, and personal characteristics."⁵ Khrushchev appeared to be on the road to achieving the foreign policy coup required to maintain his leadership of world communism and ensure his power domestically.

Yet, as the president felt he had learned more about Khrushchev the man, the CIA felt it needed to know more about the location of Khrushchev's missiles. Although the previous U-2 overflights had provided significant information, the president and the CIA realized that the U-2 had only photographed a limited portion of the Soviet Union. This limited information did not clearly disprove the notion of Soviet military superiority.⁶ On October 26, 1959, following

⁴Thompson, 211-212.

⁵Eisenhower, Waging Peace, 435, 444.

⁶Lashmar, 145.

Senator Symington's public attacks, Allen Dulles met with Goodpaster and the president to propose additional U-2 reconnaissance missions. This search over the Western part of Russia sought to find the first operational Soviet ICBM site. The Director of the CIA, expressing the urgency of the mission, implored Eisenhower to conduct a renewed overflight policy. The president, after conferring with Herter, informed Goodpaster that he was not happy with the plan, that the plan was inconsistent with the Administration's policy toward the Soviet Union, and directed Goodpaster to inform Bissell not to undertake this mission.⁷

The president however began to feel the pressure to approve further U-2 overflights with domestic political calls of a missile gap and upwardly revised intelligence analysis predicting Soviet fielding of an ICBM all serving as contributing factors. Eisenhower, with concurrence of the 5412 Committee, therefore, continued U-2 overflights. Allen Dulles' CIA clearly tied Soviet advances in ICBM's to the potential of a fundamental shift in the military balance of power and Khrushchev's ability to use this new "Spirit of Camp David" to build up Soviet rocket forces as propaganda tools.⁸ One week later in a memorandum for the DCI, the CIA reported,

Positive evidence relative to Soviet ICBM production facilities or operational deployment sites continues to be missing...the Panel (5412 Committee) giving

⁷Memorandum of Conference with the President, October 26, 1959, White House Office, Office of the Staff Secretary, Subject: Series, Alphabetic Sub-series, box 15, File: Intelligence Matters (13) {Aug59-Feb60}, Eisenhower Library, 1.

⁸Report on Soviet Military Position of 18 August 1959, White House Office, Office of the Staff Secretary 1952-1961, Subject: Series, Alphabetic Sub-series, box 8 CIA, Vol. II (7), File: {August 1959}, Eisenhower Library.

consideration to collection means available to the U.S. finds this situation alarming.⁹

The report strongly recommended further U-2 missions.¹⁰ Dulles forwarded the report to the White House.

On April 9, 1960, a U-2 overflew Soviet airspace with Eisenhower's authorization.¹¹ This incident had serious internal ramifications for Khrushchev. Not seen publicly for days, Khrushchev did not appear at Lenin Day celebrations. Khrushchev saw this incursion as a direct personal affront upon himself by Eisenhower.¹² With the overflight occurring just days before the Soviet premier's birthday, and within a month of the superpower summit, Khrushchev must have been further infuriated. The next U-2 flight on May 1, 1960, was shot down.

Although the ICBM issue was not officially on the agenda for the Paris summit, the requirement for the May 1, 1960, flight code-named Operation Grand Slam, came from the 5412 Committee fear of a growing missile gap. The committee required that a mission be flown from Peshawar, Pakistan to cover the Soviets' north-south rail network, the only means the Soviets had of transporting their ICBMs, and to photograph the Tyuratam Space Flight Center, which now boasted a much larger rocket launching apparatus. Finally the committee

⁹As quoted in a Report of DCI Ad Hoc Panel on Status of the Soviet ICBM Program, 25 August 1959, White House Office, Office of the Staff Secretary 1952-1961 Subject: Series, Alphabetic Sub-series, box 8, CIA, Vol. II (8), File: {Sept.-Dec 1959}, Eisenhower Library, 2.

¹⁰Report of DCI Ad Hoc Panel on Status of the Soviet ICBM Program, 25 August 1959, White House Office, Office of the Staff Secretary 1952-1961 Subject: Series, Alphabetic Sub-series, box 8, CIA, Vol. II (8), File: {Sept.-Dec 1959}, Eisenhower Library, 3.

¹¹Eisenhower, Waging Peace, 547.

¹²Khrushchev, 451.

required the overflight of the Plesetsk guided missile center to prevent Khrushchev from surprising the president with any new missile developments at the Paris Summit. Plesetsk or Northern Cosmodrome was the leading contender to host the first Soviet operational missile base after multiple communications intercepts and CIA operatives reported that Plesetsk had been built-up into a major military area by December 1959.¹³ To achieve good photographic results the U-2 aircraft had to overfly the Soviet Union between April and June. With the summit scheduled for May, the president could only order overflights of the Soviets during the later part of April if he wanted the information prior to the summit.¹⁴

Bissell knew the U-2 was becoming increasingly vulnerable, but decided that it had to continue to fly until the Corona satellite imagery gathering program succeeded it, as the Soviets were about to field their SS-6 ICBM. Bissell felt the United States could not afford to go blind, and assured Eisenhower that there was only "'one chance in a million'" that a U-2 pilot could be captured. Bissell failed to realize that by flying the U-2 on May 1, 1960, with the Soviet celebrations going on to commemorate May Day, there would be little or no air traffic and the flight would be easier to track on Soviet radar.¹⁵ Further, Bissell assumed since the overflight had been approved that adequate consideration had been given to the diplomatic significance

¹³Brugioni, Interview; Jeffreys-Jones, 112; Steven J. Zaloga, Target America: The Soviet Union and the Strategic Arms Race (Novato, CA: Presidio, 1993), 150-51.

¹⁴Bissell, Reflections, 124.

¹⁵Thomas, 217-18.

of a May Day mission. Bissell, ever desiring more overflights, did not raise the issue to the president.¹⁶ According to a review of the president's appointment book, apparently, neither had Herter.

No one assumed the U-2 could survive a crash intact, and if one did, no one believed its pilot could possibly survive. In fact, Kelly Johnson, the designer of the aircraft, said the plane was as "fragile as an egg." The U-2 was so fragile that when it began to fly out of Wiesbaden, Germany, it had just taken off when a Canadian jet fighter taking off behind it became so curious about the aircraft that it decided to fly closer and get a good look at the U-2. As the F-86 jet fighter flew past its jet wash was so great that it caused the U-2 to crash, killing the pilot.¹⁷

According to the president's son, Eisenhower was told hundreds of times that no pilot would be able to withstand a U-2 crash alive. In fact, the president had not been told that U-2 pilots had been equipped with parachutes.¹⁸ In an interesting side note, the aircraft chosen for the first complete overflight of the Soviets' Western area was the same aircraft, article 360, that had crashed a year earlier in Japan.¹⁹ The selection of this aircraft although tangential to the argument of the paper does seem to indicate complacency in the CIA's procedures for such a delicate flight. Just as Bissell had not felt it was important to point out the

¹⁶Bissell, oral history, Eisenhower Library, 12.

¹⁷Brugioni, Interview.

¹⁸John Eisenhower, oral history, Eisenhower Library, 119.

¹⁹Chris Pocock, Dragon Lady: The History of the U-2 Spyplane (Osceola, WI: Motorbooks, 1989), 48.

significance of May 1, neither had the ground crew felt uncomfortable about utilizing an aircraft known to have problems.

Francis Gary Powers took off from U-2 Detachment 10-10 based in Adana, Turkey, and flew his U-2 aircraft to Peshawar Pakistan. Powers' mission left Peshawar at 0626 local time just as previous overflights had. Goodpaster allegedly entered a memorandum for the record referring to the May 1 overflight.²⁰ The actual memorandum stated,

After checking with the President, I informed Mr. Bissell that one additional operation may be undertaken, provided it is carried out prior to May 1. No operation is to be carried out after May 1.²¹

Giving Bissell overflight permission is readily apparent. What remains unclear is whether or not Bissell had permission to conduct the mission on May 1, 1960. Hundreds of references to the Administration's recognition of the importance of the May 1 holiday in the Communist World are found throughout the archival material. Although this is the declassified memorandum directly authorizing a specific overflight time period there is no reason to doubt its authenticity. What is unique within this document is the lack of attention to detail concerning this sensitive reconnaissance operation. With no clear guidance, a provocative aerial mission was conducted

²⁰FRUS, 1:510, ed. note.

²¹As quoted in a Memorandum for the Record, April 25, 1960, White House Office, Office of the Staff Secretary, Subject: Series, Alphabetic Sub-series, box 15, Intelligence Matters (14) (Mar-May60), Eisenhower Library, 1.

based on loose wording and Bissell's belief that someone else must have considered the political timing of the mission.

Yet to Bissell, the intelligence requirement simply outweighed any diplomatic protest the Soviets might wage.²² The CIA had to know if the Soviets had an operational ICBM site capable of striking the United States.²³ This domestic political need for accurate intelligence had far-reaching implications. Having recovered the U-2's camera, after its destruction on this mission, Khrushchev quickly realized that previous overflights had exposed his propaganda of raining rockets down on the West.²⁴ With Khrushchev's bluff exposed, the Soviet military knew that the American president understood he could launch a first strike on the Soviets' four operational ICBMs with impunity.²⁵

Although there is no official record of the president's notification of the shoot down, Jack Anderson reported in the Washington Post on May 12, that the United States had immediately intercepted Soviet fighter radio exchanges announcing the shoot down on May 1.²⁶ A thorough review of the president's schedule and memorandum does not review any specific incidents related to the destruction of the U-2. That no official documentation was maintained is not unusual. The

²²Brugioni, Interview; Memorandum for the Director of Central Intelligence, August 25, 1959, White House Office, Office of the Staff Secretary, Subject: Series, Alphabetic Sub-series, box 15, File: Intelligence Matters (13) {Aug 59-Feb 60}, Eisenhower Library, 1-2.

²³Bissell, oral history, Columbia, 46.

²⁴Gaddis, Russia, the Soviet Union, and the United States, 230.

²⁵Zaloga, 154.

²⁶Washington Post article of May 12, 1960, White House Office, Office of the Staff Secretary, Subject: Series, Alphabetic Sub-series, box 15, File: Intelligence Matters (15) [Jun-Jul60], Eisenhower Library, 1.

first mention of the U-2 aircraft occurs on May 5 when Eisenhower in a previous scheduled meeting at the United States emergency nuclear command site code named High Point assigns the State Department as lead agency for handling all public statements. Upon the Staff's return to the White House, the Press Secretary James Hagerty recommended that the president make a statement to the press. The president agreed to a press release, under Goodpaster's objections.²⁷ The earliest official documentation of the Eisenhower having been notified is at this time in the unfolding crisis. The next day, Ann Whitman's diary declares Eisenhower blurted out a negative statement disparaging Khrushchev and wondering "if" he would be going to Russia as a courtesy return visit for the premier's 1959 visit to the United States.²⁸

With the destruction of the U-2 and Powers' apparent death, the president reverted to his previously prepared U-2 cover story which was the aircraft was a NASA weather research mission that had gone off course. Khrushchev, however, knew the U-2 was not a weather observation plane that had strayed off course. Again as fate would have it, the president had a chance to continue in his desires for détente. At a diplomatic reception the day that the Eisenhower Administration released its official version of the incident, the Soviet Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs, Yakov Malik, announced to Ambassador Thompson in a drunken conversation that the Soviets

²⁷Memorandum for the Record, Events of May 5, White House Office, Office of the Staff Secretary, Subject: Series, Alphabetic Sub-series, box 25, File: U-2 Incident {Vol. I} [May 1960] (5), Eisenhower Library.

²⁸Diary, Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, box 11, File: [ACW] Diary, May 1960, Eisenhower Library, 5, 6, 10.

had captured Gary Powers alive with his camera equipment intact. Unfortunately the Ambassador's telegram failed to reach the White House prior to the release of the U-2 cover story.²⁹

Even though the president realized that Khrushchev was not "confident of his position" and that he had "great opposition from some of his colleagues,"³⁰ Eisenhower could not remove Khrushchev from the political uproar the U-2 incident had put him. Khrushchev had to act. Therefore, he personally and publicly attacked Eisenhower by referring to him as his "Fishy Friend".³¹ Any chances for the great powers to reach a new détente ended. Khrushchev realized that personal talks between the leaders of the superpowers had led internally to a great deal of suspicion among the more extreme hard line elements in both political camps. Khrushchev felt,

America had been pursuing a two-faced policy. On the one hand, the United States had been approaching us with outstretched arms and all sorts of assurances about their peaceful and friendly intentions. On the other hand they were stabbing us in the back... It was as though Eisenhower were boasting arrogantly about what the United States could and would do... The Americans were showing that they didn't give a damn about anyone else, that they would pursue only their own selfish goals.³²

Khrushchev now blatantly exploited the U-2 overflights, as demonstrations of American use of intelligence, in order to

²⁹Anatoly Dobrynin, In Confidence: Moscow's Ambassador to America's Six Cold War Presidents (New York: Times Books, 1995), 39; Telegram from Thompson to Herter, May 5, 1960, White House Office, Office of the Staff Secretary, Subject: Series, Alphabetic Sub-series, box 25, File: U-2 Incident (Vol. I) [May 1960] (3), Eisenhower Library.

³⁰Memorandum of Conference with the President, October 21, 1959, PAP, Whitman File, DDE Diary Series, box 45, File: Staff Notes October 1959 (1), Eisenhower Library, 3.

³¹N. H. Mager and Jacques Katel, eds., Conquest Without War (New York: Pocket Books, 1961), 306.

³²As quoted in Khrushchev, 447-49.

justify destroying the summit.³³

Of all the advice given to Eisenhower between May 1 and May 15, the beginning of the summit, Llewellyn Thompson's advice seemed to be the most insightful. The United States Ambassador to the Soviet Union clearly indicated that the Soviets were genuinely angry about their borders being penetrated, and identified that the military was using this U-2 issue as a means of redressing Khrushchev's unconventional handling of military matters. He explained the public nature of the opposition to Khrushchev from within and exterior to the Kremlin and declared Khrushchev needed to "turn toward a harder line" to maintain his leadership position.³⁴ The next day the ambassador again warned that the premier "was really offended and angry" by the reconnaissance mission, and that it was difficult to appraise the president of Khrushchev's intentions for the summit.³⁵ On May 11, in the last available, currently declassified telegram, Thompson warned that Khrushchev would use the U-2 pretext as a means of dividing the western nations. The ambassador relayed that barring the success of that strategy, the premier would be forced to shift to a hard line to maintain his leadership of the communist

³³Telegram From the Embassy in the Soviet Union to the Department of State dated May 7, 1960, FRUS, 1:514-5.

³⁴Telegram from Moscow to Secretary of State, May 6, 1960, White House Office, Office of the Staff Secretary, Subject: Series, Alphabetic Sub-series, box 25, File: U-2 Incident (vol. I) [May 1960] (3), Eisenhower Library, 1-2.

³⁵Telegram from Moscow to Secretary of State, May 7, 1960, White House Office, Office of the Staff Secretary, Subject: Series, Alphabetic Sub-series, box 25, File: U-2 Incident (vol. I) [May 1960] (3), Eisenhower Library, 1.

bloc.³⁶

While Thompson passed on his thoughts concerning Khrushchev's state of mind, the CIA also provided its assessments to the president. On May 11, the CIA advised the president that Khrushchev's public pronouncements and personal attacks on the president raise "urgent questions" regarding the summit.³⁷ After the CIA briefing on Khrushchev's probable motivations during the upcoming summit, Eisenhower enraged that his plans for détente seemed to be slipping away, questioned whether he should not take a model of a ballistic missile carrying submarine to the summit to present to Khrushchev.³⁸ Both leaders' actions had taken their struggle to the level of personal effrontery.

On May 13, Goodpaster noted that the CIA stated that Khrushchev's earlier attacks on the president were "off-the-cuff", and noted Soviet press censorship was heavy. The CIA estimations also believed there was no indication Khrushchev had changed his position toward the summit. The Agency felt Eisenhower could mollify Khrushchev with a promise to discontinue any future penetrating reconnaissance overflights.³⁹ Eisenhower decided to follow through on this

³⁶Telegram from Paris to Secretary of State, May 12, 1960, White House Office, Office of the Staff Secretary, Subject: Series, Alphabetic Sub-series, box 25, File: U-2 Incident {vol. I} [May 1960] (5), Eisenhower Library, 1.

³⁷Current Intelligence Memorandum, May 11, 1960, White House Office, Office of the Staff Secretary, Subject: Series, Alphabetic Sub-series, box 25, File: U-2 Incident {Vol. I}[May 1960] (4), Eisenhower Library, 1-3.

³⁸NSC Meeting no. 444, 09 May 1960, Whitman File, NSC Series, box 12, File: 444th Mtg. of NSC May 9, 1960, Eisenhower Library, 12-13.

³⁹Current Intelligence Memorandum, May 13, 1960, White House Office, Office of the Staff Secretary, Subject: Series, Alphabetic Sub-series, box 25, File: U-2 Incident {Vol. I}[May 1960] (5), Eisenhower Library, 1-3.

recommendation and on May 15 advised his summit team, that "the U-2 is now a dead issue—it is obsolete." If Khrushchev brought up the issue at the summit the president would merely offer to discuss the issue privately and bilaterally.

These hopes were soon dashed in Paris. Khrushchev had to maintain leadership of world communism by directly attacking Eisenhower. Discrediting Eisenhower's recklessness could fracture a weakening Western alliance or force a détente with conditions favoring the Soviet Union. With these thoughts in mind, Khrushchev finished constructing the Soviet Summit position on the plane to Paris early on May 14.⁴⁰ According to Walter La Faber,

Khrushchev's major concern...was the embarrassing position in which the U-2 flights, which had been occurring over Russia for at least four years, placed him in his struggle with Mao.⁴¹

Khrushchev, meeting De Gaulle upon his arrival to France, showed his list of demands which included an apology from Eisenhower. De Gaulle responded that Khrushchev "could not seriously expect" that President Eisenhower would apologize to him. When briefing the other Western leaders the General told Macmillan and Eisenhower that the conference was over. Eisenhower's hopes were dashed. The president finally understood the CIA underestimated Khrushchev's personalization of the incident and realized the shootdown ended his hopes for détente.

⁴⁰Thompson, 225; Macmillan, 197.

⁴¹As quoted in LaFeber, 207.

Internal political reaction also forced Khrushchev to accept the comradeship of Defense Minister Malinovsky to ensure he was not fooled by Eisenhower's false sincerity again. Malinovsky like others in the Kremlin once again questioned whether Khrushchev had not given away too much through his personal relations with Eisenhower at the expense of the Soviet military and the Sino-Soviet alliance.

Eisenhower, De Gaulle, and Macmillan all felt that Khrushchev constantly followed by Malinovsky was, "acting more like a student reciting a difficult lesson than as a person whom was speaking his own convictions and beliefs."⁴²

Although Eisenhower's critics believed Moscow needed the summit merely for its propaganda value, Soviet sources indicated the Soviet delegation traveled to the Paris Summit with extensively reviewed and specifically approved summit positions. Unknown to the west, Khrushchev's personal leadership of foreign policy had ended. Khrushchev received permission from the Politburo to strongly denounce the American U-2 flight, however, because he felt that Eisenhower committed to achieve a codified détente at the summit, he went beyond his authority to demand a personal apology.⁴³ While the allies agreed Khrushchev previously displayed greater diplomatic flexibility when dealing personally with Western leaders, the continuous presence of a Soviet entourage, and the premier's personalization of the U-2 Incident limited his

⁴²Eisenhower, Waging Peace, 556.

⁴³Dobrynin, 42; Macmillan, 193; Khrushchev, 449-51.

freedom of action.⁴⁴

Khrushchev confirmed these thoughts by stating the rules for the summit had changed. He notified the other heads of state that he wanted the initial meeting of the summit to occur one hour later than scheduled, and that he would skip the initially scheduled one-on-one leaders' discussions.⁴⁵ Eisenhower felt duty bound to maintain his presence at the summit, and in fact was a bit hopeful at the possibility of "Uncover (ing) more Soviet hypocrisy."⁴⁶ When the meeting began at 11:01 A.M. Khrushchev demanded the floor first. Eisenhower also stated he desired to speak. De Gaulle presided over the meeting, stating Eisenhower should speak first. Khrushchev demanded that the Soviet delegation speak first; both Eisenhower and Khrushchev felt they had to maintain their positions.

Eisenhower acquiesced to Khrushchev's demands, and the Premier began a forty-five minute denunciation of the United States, and concluded by thanking the British and French for their efforts to make this summit, but told them the Americans had torpedoed any chance of success for the summit.⁴⁷ Once again the Soviet premier demonstrated his highly personalized and emotional attitudes toward foreign relations.⁴⁸ Lieutenant General Vernon A. Walters, attending the conference as a

⁴⁴Memorandum of Conversation with the President, 25 April 1960, Whitman File, International Series, box 14, File: De Gaulle-Visit to U.S. April 22-25 1960 (1), Eisenhower Library, 5.

⁴⁵Beschloss, 276-79, 284.

⁴⁶Eisenhower, Waging Peace, 552.

⁴⁷Statement by N. S. Khrushchev, Unofficial translation, May 16, 1960, White House Office, Office of the Staff Secretary, Subject: Series, Alphabetic Sub-series, box 25, File: U-2 Incident {Vol. I} [May 1960] (6), Eisenhower Library; Beschloss, 284-85.

⁴⁸Zubok, Inside the Kremlin's Cold War, 181; Macmillan, 215.

translator reported, that Khrushchev's hands were trembling as he read his prepared script in an ever more angry voice. Khrushchev, visibly upset and agitated, continued his denunciation of Eisenhower until De Gaulle interrupted the premier and ended the premier's frenzy with a patronizing set of comments.⁴⁹ Eisenhower then spoke and stated that he would not apologize for protecting American national security, but that he hoped that all parties could go beyond this incident to permanently erase the need for all types of espionage. Furthermore, Eisenhower promised to forgo any further U-2 flights. Unfortunately, the Soviet premier did not understand this presidential statement.⁵⁰ Eisenhower attempted to meet the premier's public demands to foreswear any further intelligence-gathering halfway. Khrushchev personifying the U-2 overflight however, refused to accept anything less than Eisenhower's public apology.

Eisenhower's gesture to publicly forego any future U-2 overflights was a foregone conclusion. If the Soviets destroyed Operation Grand Slam, they could destroy any future missions. Eisenhower on May 12 decided to end the U-2 penetrations of Soviet airspace. Interestingly, the president chose to pass this guidance onto the Secretaries of Defense and State. Review of the Cabinet minutes stated that Allen Dulles was in attendance at the Cabinet meeting, but was not

⁴⁹LTGEN Vernon A. Walters "1960 Summit Conference: General De Gaulle In Action" Studies in Intelligence, Vol. 38, No. 5, [http://www.odci.gov/csi/studies/95unclas], 1995.

⁵⁰Memorandum of Conference with the President, May 16, 1960, Whitman File, DDE Diary Series, box 50, File: Staff Notes May 1960 (1), Eisenhower Library, 1.

involved in the formal notification that all U-2 penetration and provocative ferret intelligence-gathering flights were terminated.⁵¹ Either the president had previously informed the Director of the CIA, felt there was no need to inform the DCI as he had final authorization on all overflights, or the president did not want to discuss the matter with the CIA. With the Departments of State, Defense, and the CIA requesting the president rethink his decision two weeks later, Eisenhower made it clear. There would be no further U-2 penetration flights during the remainder of his term in office.⁵²

Both the public and private gesture, meant to meet Khrushchev's demands halfway, could have been the solution to the U-2 crisis. Khrushchev could have had Eisenhower's public pledge to forego any further U-2 flights. Eisenhower, for his part, realized the U-2 could no longer be flown over the Soviet Union. He also realized that the United States would successfully launch the first of its new reconnaissance satellites. The opening was presented so that anyone could have proposed a compromise to Khrushchev's demands for a public apology. Both sides became inflexible by their dissenters' political pressure.

After Eisenhower's comments, Khrushchev proposed an indefinite delay in the proceedings. De Gaulle, who had previously known of the U-2 overflights, quickly and angrily

⁵¹Memorandum for the Record, June 1, 1960, White House Office, Office of the Staff Secretary, Subject: Series, Alphabetic Sub-series, box 25, File: U-2 Incident {Vol. III} [May-June 1960] (4), Eisenhower Library; Cabinet Meeting, May 12, 1960, Whitman File, DDE Diary Series, box 50, File: Staff Notes May 1960 (2), Eisenhower Library, 1.

⁵²Memorandum of Conversation with the President, May 23, 1960, Whitman File, DDE Diary Series, box 50, File: Staff Notes May 1960 (1), Eisenhower Library, 1.

reminded him that a Soviet satellite with reconnaissance capabilities was currently in orbit over France. The General felt such matters were not appropriate for public diplomatic discussions. In continuing to patronize Khrushchev, De Gaulle reminded him that he had personally invested large political equity in the conference, and further, Khrushchev promised to attend, and was now abruptly canceling.⁵³ Khrushchev would not continue without Eisenhower's personal apology,

Otherwise the Soviet people will think the United States has forced the Soviet Union to its knees by our coming to Paris and engaging in talks in the face of a threat...our internal politics require this.⁵⁴

This reference to internal politics was not in character for Khrushchev. As Eisenhower left the summit he was obviously flustered and stated to De Gaulle his disbelief that his efforts to promise to forgo future U-2 flights had failed to achieve results. De Gaulle took Eisenhower by the arm and paternally stated, "No matter what happens, France as your ally will stand with you all the way."⁵⁵

Eisenhower returned to the American embassy in Paris after the failed summit meeting and said to the American Ambassador to France, Amory Houghton Sr.,

⁵³Thompson, 227.

⁵⁴As quoted in Memorandum of Conference with the President, May 16, 1960, Whitman File, DDE Diary Series, box 50, File: Staff Notes May 1960 (1), Eisenhower Library, 1; Beschloss, 288.

⁵⁵Memorandum of Conference with the President, May 16, 1960, Whitman File, DDE Diary Series, box 50, File: Staff Notes May 1960 (1), Eisenhower Library, 2; Walters, 1995.

Amory, I'm going to do something that I haven't done twice in four years. That is I'm going to have a drink... He (Eisenhower) picked up his glass, and he said, That son-of-a-bitch! He went on and he never said anything else.⁵⁶

As Eisenhower sat at the American Embassy, in despair over his failure to achieve détente, and re-thought his decision to admit personal responsibility, Khrushchev publicly reveled in his newfound propaganda victory. Both, however, realized that their appeasement of internal conservative political elements doomed their ultimate goals of détente. Although Khrushchev could now use his propaganda victory in his external battle for control of the international communist movement, Eisenhower feared whether the Western Alliance would not withstand this challenge to his leadership. Further, the president realized his cautious efforts to soothe Soviet fears of hostile Western intentions were now being shattered.⁵⁷

There is no coincidence that post-event diplomatic reporting by the Soviets clearly indicated that the premier's hands had been pressed by the military. Soviet diplomats all claimed that the Soviet military leadership had told Khrushchev that they could not accept or live with continuing overflights. Khrushchev's diplomatic freedom of action had been reduced to reading from a pre-approved script.⁵⁸ American diplomats reported that the Soviet military had pressured

⁵⁶As quoted by Amory Houghton, Sr. oral history by John T. Mason, 27 August 1968 and 19 September 1968. oral history #1 Part IV, transcript. Columbia, 43-44.

⁵⁷Eisenhower White House, oral history, Eisenhower Library, 85.

⁵⁸Memorandum of Conference with the President, May 17, 1960, Whitman File, DDE Diary series, box 50, File: Staff Notes May 1960 (1), Eisenhower Library, 1-2; Macmillan, 211.

Khrushchev during the summit by threatening to remove their political support from the premier.⁵⁹

Upon Eisenhower's return to Washington, he told the NSC that "there was no good time for failure."⁶⁰ Noting that the Soviets had known about the flights for many years Eisenhower speculated that Khrushchev felt he was not able to achieve his goals at the summit and therefore chose to use the U-2 incident as a pretext to regain his political position within the Kremlin. The CIA furthered this analysis stating that the Soviet summit position was clearly a counter-reaction to the Soviet premier personally undertaking too many foreign policy initiatives and treating the military poorly. In essence the summit failed because the more conservative element of the Soviet government had attempted to re-balance the Kremlin away from Khrushchev's over-liberalizing policies. Again the presence of the military by the premier's side and his scripted position paper reading were evidence that Khrushchev's personal ability to dictate foreign policy had now been restricted.⁶¹ The failure by this analysis, was not the fault of the United States.

⁵⁹Telegram from Paris to Secretary of State, July 1, 1960, White House Office, Office of the Staff Secretary, Subject: Series, Alphabetic Sub-series, box 25, File: U-2 Incident {Vol. III} [July-August] (1), Eisenhower Library.

⁶⁰Memorandum of Discussion at the 445th Meeting of the National Security Council, FRUS, 1:523.

⁶¹Cabinet Meeting, May 26, 1960, Whitman File, DDE Diary Series, box 50, File: Staff Notes May 1960 (1), Eisenhower Library, 2-4.

CHAPTER VI

CONCLUSION

French President Charles De Gaulle bid Soviet Premier Nikita Khrushchev goodbye at the opening and final meeting of the May 1960 Paris Summit with the following quote, "There are many devils in the world who spoil international relations."¹ The General was correct: multiple events had led to the failure of the summit. Both Eisenhower and Khrushchev had undertaken strategies that although apparently meeting their national policy goals, in fact led to a series of counter actions that defeated their over-all national policy of détente. In an ironic twist of fate, the U-2 overflights that had provided both leaders a rationale to keep defense budgets low ended both leaders' long term aspirations for their respective nations.

Eisenhower sought to ensure his intelligence-gathering mission could no longer be flown by the military to justify a large conventional force build up, and to ensure these sensitive operations were centrally controlled and timed to meet national foreign policy objectives. While shifting control to the CIA, the president failed to realize that his informal advisory system had created its own self-serving organization under Richard Bissell. With the president unable to control every finite detail of his intelligence-gathering program, and Allen Dulles' counsel being rendered ineffective

¹Charles De Gaulle, Memoirs of Hope: Renewal and Endeavor (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1970), 252.

by his desires to maintain his public reputation, the U-2 program became the very program Eisenhower feared General Le May had developed. The U-2 covert intelligence-gathering program became a structural impediment to the New Look strategy.

The NATO alliance also developed into a problem for the president. While Macmillan obliged Eisenhower to soften his stance toward Khrushchev, De Gaulle feared this softening and contrived means of ensuring his former comrade in arms did not become too much in a hurry to achieve détente. The Soviet premier, similarly faced Chairman Mao's confrontation over the direction of his alliance's leadership in its handling of its opposition.

In addition, Eisenhower faced domestic political pressure for further overflights, while Khrushchev's opponents in the Politburo questioned his approaches toward the United States. Khrushchev's revolutionary approach to foreign policy caused his opponents to push him into a more confrontational position than he intended. While the Soviet premier sought to reach formal accommodation with Eisenhower via the summit process, his decision to cut the Soviet Army without a corresponding good will gesture limited his freedom of action.

Although both leaders sought to achieve their long-term national objectives via summitry, cracks within their power bases ensured their efforts would fail and their relationship would turn antagonistic. In the end, the U-2 incident provided the rationalization for the end of

Khrushchev's grand design for the Soviet Union, and Eisenhower's dreams for a legacy as a peacemaker. The U-2 incident was not as Michael Beschloss claimed a clap of thunder, but rather a single bolt of lightning in an already ensuing thunderstorm.

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