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EAST, WEST, OR CENTER? TURKEY'S STANCE STRADDLING CONTINENTS,
PIPELINES, AND INTERDEPENDENCES

by

Mustafa Kemal Dagdelen
B.A. June 2009, Gazi University, Turkey

A Thesis Submitted to the Faculty of Old Dominion University
in Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for the Degree of

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Approved by:

~~Regina Karp~~ (Chair)

~~Jar J. Andersson~~ (Member)

~~Steve Yetiv~~ (Member)

ABSTRACT

EAST, WEST, OR CENTER? TURKEY'S STANCE STRADDLING CONTINENTS, PIPELINES, AND INTERDEPENDENCES

Mustafa Kemal Dagdelen
Old Dominion University, 2012
Chair: Dr. Regina Karp

This thesis concentrates on the international relations of Turkey by studying one of the significant parameters of the world affairs, the Energy Security issue, and Robert O. Keohane and Joseph S. Nye's Complex Interdependence concept. The research is conducted through two case studies between Turkey and two different neighboring actors, Iran and the European Union. This thesis is a qualitative study with descriptive analyses on the literature of the interdependence and the energy security concepts. By revealing mutual dependences between Turkey, Iran, and the European Union, with different vulnerabilities, the results of this scholarly quest suggest that the interdependent nature of the Energy Security issue leads Turkey to be a multi-directional actor both in the regional and global arena. Finally, contrary to such perspectives, which are stating that Turkey shifts toward the East or turns away from the West, this thesis finds that Turkey has begun to reconsider its position in order to both meet its needs and maximize the benefits from its possessions.

This thesis is dedicated to the noble and brave Turkish nation.

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As an opportunity to express my gratitude, this page is the most important part of this thesis. I would like to gratefully thank my family, my teachers and professors, my friends, and my dearest for their precious help and support during my journey to achieve my aims. I would like to mention my special thanks to the architects of the Fulbright Scholarship Program. My scholarly curiosity and passion have always been inspired by the people, who I always consider as the pioneers of science and philosophy. In order to appreciate those people and their presence in my journey, words would not be pleasing enough. Hereby, it is my honor to mention the names of Dr. Regina Karp, Dr. Steve Yetiv, and Dr. Jan Joel Andersson, who have generously supported my scholarly quest. In addition, I would like to sincerely thank every member of the GPIS and my fellows. My undergraduate years' dream to pursue an academic degree in a foreign country has been realized by the invaluable help of Dr. Burcu Bostanoglu and the encouragement of the faculty members of Gazi University, Department of International Relations; I would like to express my deepest gratitude to my dear professors. I am also very grateful to the generous people of the United States, who demonstrate their hospitality during my time in this beautiful country. As the last words, I would like to emphasize my gratefulness to my family and my dearest again; they have always been my inspiration and my motivation.

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CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

With its transforming structure and paradigms, contemporary international relations significantly change the decisions and behaviors of the actors. This dynamism, which is derived from the transformation of the international relations associated with states' decisions, enables various types of analyses with regards to the actions of states. In the contemporary era, there are internal and external forces that have impact upon the foreign policy orientations of states.¹ Assessments that neglect these parameters risk turning into manipulations that cause regional and/or global disorder.

This thesis studies one of the significant parameters of international relations, the *Energy Security* issue, stemming from Robert O. Keohane and Joseph S. Nye's *Complex Interdependence* concept. Following from the approach on *Complex Interdependence*, this thesis concentrates particularly on the international relations of Turkey. With this regard, the main research questions are:

- *How to explain Turkey's foreign policy orientations in the last decade?*
- *How does the energy security issue impact Turkey's international relations?*

The above mentioned research questions are interlinked. With regards to the first question, this thesis uses the *Energy Security* issue to explain the complex calculus of contemporary Turkish foreign policy. Regarding energy, this thesis takes into account oil and natural gas exclusively because the institutions that focus on energy anticipate oil and natural gas to be the major energy resources for several decades. This thesis refers to the

¹ Fareed Zakaria, *The Post-American World* (New York: W.W. Norton, 2008), 3.

contemporary multifaceted foreign policy orientation of Turkey in the last decade; specifically, to *The Policy of Zero Problems with The Neighbors* that is introduced by the current Minister of Foreign Affairs, Ahmet Davutoglu. Thus, within the first research question, this thesis makes reference to the contemporary debate on whether Turkey shifts to the East from the West by implicitly stating that Turkey does not have a shift from one axis to another. By stressing that the *Energy Security* issue is a prominent variable in Turkey's foreign policy, the second research question argues that in terms of *Energy Security*, Turkey's international relations could be characterized as *Complex Interdependence*. These research questions are examined through two case studies between Turkey and two different neighboring actors, Iran and the European Union. Currently, Turkey follows a pragmatic approach with idealistic aspirations, and the *Energy Security* issue explains Turkey's *Complex Interdependence* relationship between Turkey and Iran and Turkey and the European Union.

In the literature, scholars have focused on the interdependence concept, Turkey's relations with Iran, and Turkey's relations with the European Union separately. Up to now, the literature lacks a comprehensive approach to explain Turkey's *Complex Interdependence* through *Energy Security* to explain Turkey's multifaceted foreign policy. This thesis contributes to Turkey's foreign policy with a different approach, *Complex Interdependence*, other than the traditional concepts in international relations. Presently, Turkey's foreign policy discourse and actions follow the multidimensional policies with the realization of the necessities of its neighborhood.

The methodology of this thesis is based on a qualitative study with descriptive analysis on the literature of the interdependence concept. Additionally, this thesis relies

on case study method to analyze Turkey's *Complex Interdependence* with concrete grounds. To explain the argument, this thesis uses primary documentation on the energy strategy of Turkey, Iran, and the European Union accessed from the official institutions, such as the Republic of Turkey Ministry of Energy and Natural Resources, the European Commission Directorate-General for Energy. Additionally, it utilizes statistical data from the institutions that research *Energy Security* such as British Petroleum and the United States Energy Information Administration.

Chapter II evaluates the descriptive approaches to the interdependence concept by mainly benefiting from Robert O. Keohane and Joseph S. Nye's descriptions. It first asks questions regarding the definition of interdependence concept. Although this term has been used widely in the literature, it lacks a common definition. Additionally, this chapter explains the contemporary alternative definitions of the interdependence concept. After these descriptions, this chapter digs into the debate on whether interdependence causes conflict or cooperation. Within the debate, Realism often articulates that interdependence causes conflict; whereas, Liberalism mostly expresses interdependence through cooperative settings. This debate is touched upon in Chapter V and VI, while analyzing the case studies. This chapter concludes by comprehensively explaining the *Complex Interdependence* concept by demonstrating its three characteristics, *multiple channels of contact among societies, lack of clear hierarchies of issues, irrelevance of military force*. After these three characteristics, this chapter emphasizes the role of *sensitivity* and *vulnerability* in the nature of *Complex Interdependence*.

Chapter III examines the nature of *Energy Security* by stating how the energy paradigm becomes a significant issue in international relations. This chapter notes

different definitions ranging from scholarly to institutional. Yet, similar to the concept of interdependence, the *Energy Security* concept also suffers from definitional ambiguity. This part explores concepts such as *oil weapon*, *oil diplomacy*, and *oil power*, as the *Energy Security* issue has become a security phenomenon. Due to the supply-demand imbalance, the energy paradigm begins to be perceived as a power component. This chapter also explores the *Energy Security* issue through a geopolitical stance in terms of the traditional and emerging actors' roles. This chapter considerably analyzes the emerging actors' positions and impact because those actors create a competitive environment for the European Union and new market options for Iran. This chapter works on the debate between *Energy Security* and *Energy Independence* and how the International Relations discipline's literature criticizes the latter concept. This debate develops the argument of this thesis that *Energy Security* cannot be obtained relying on the concept of independence. Chapter III concludes by stating the solid base for *Energy Security* after discussing the literature.

Chapter IV examines the energy strategy of Turkey. In this regard, this chapter argues that Turkey's main priority is to ensure its supply stability as a developing economy, and as a secondary objective, Turkey wants to be a key actor of regional and global energy politics by utilizing its geographical location. There are different approaches that explain Turkey's energy politics examined in this chapter. The legal regulations of Turkey on the energy developments are also defined in this chapter as well as Turkey's energy consumption trend. To reach the goal of being a key-actor in the region, Turkey's completed and projected pipelines are also covered. This chapter

concludes that Turkey has followed a coordinated and comprehensive strategy in the last decade.

Chapter V and Chapter VI explain on the evolution of Turkey-Iran relations and Turkey-European Union relations. The selection of Iran and the European Union on the relations with Turkey with regards to *Energy Security* is derived from the consideration of Iran as the representative of the East and the European Union as the representative of the West. Actually, these representation phenomena could be seen as the reflection of the debate on Turkey's so-called paradigm shift and its analytical cases. Within these relationships, these chapters reveal the political disputes that both sides encounter. In Chapter V, the political clashes between Iran and Turkey are summarized as the sectarian identity differences, Turkey's alliance with the West, Turkey and Iran's competition to be a dominant power over Central Asia, the Arab Spring and Turkey as an emerging regional power, and Iran's perception of Turkey as a potential competitor, and finally Iran's nuclearization. In Chapter VI, the political problems with the European Union and Turkey are summarized as the skepticism of the European countries towards Turkey's civil and political identity, the Cyprus issue, and the democratization process of Turkey. Later, in both chapters, the energy strategies of Iran and the European Union are explored.

In Chapter V, the Iranian energy strategy is investigated through the country's resource-rich position. Yet, because of the external isolations and, internally, the technology and infrastructure problems, Iran cannot completely utilize its natural resources. In this regard, this chapter argues that the energy resources' position as the

major input of the Iranian economy could be considered as the main vulnerability of Iran. Therefore, Iran needs market diversification and demand stability.

In Chapter VI; the European energy politics is explained by its significant demand for energy resources. Since the European Union's dependence on energy resources is fixed upon particular countries, the European Union needs to find different energy routes and resource options. This situation is evaluated as the main vulnerability of the European Union.

Chapter V and Chapter VI implement the three characteristics of *Complex Interdependence* that are formerly defined in Chapter II. These two chapters conclude that the relations among the three actors based on the vulnerabilities are characterized as *Complex Interdependence*.

Chapter VII is the concluding part that stresses *Complex Interdependence* as a cause for cooperation among the three actors. Therefore, although the realist literature heavily emphasizes the conflict prone nature of dependences, since three actors benefit from the direct international relations among each other, they are expected to stick within the *Complex Interdependence* setting.

This thesis states that the interdependent nature of the *Energy Security* issue leads Turkey to be a multi-directional actor both in the regional and global arena. Additionally, this view sheds light on the debate about whether Turkey shifts² axis or not³.

Accordingly, this thesis states that Turkey is not shifting axis but is setting its foreign

² Alexander Murinson, "The Strategic Depth Doctrine of Turkish Foreign Policy," *Middle Eastern Studies* 42, no. 6 (2006): 946.

³ Yunus Yılmaz, "Turkey's Challenge to the Realist World Order," *Turkish Policy Quarterly* 10, no. 2 (2011): 90.

policy agenda in terms of the necessities which are derived from the *Energy Security* issue.

CHAPTER II

DESCRIPTIVE APPROACHES TO INTERDEPENDENCE CONCEPT AND R. O.
KEOHANE AND J. S. NYE'S COMPLEX INTERDEPENDENCE

INTRODUCTION

Contemporary scholarly writings within the International Relations discipline's literature often begin their journey by referring to the complexity of modern world politics. In accordance with the literature, this chapter begins with the distinguished scholars Robert O. Keohane and Joseph S. Nye's words:

The traditional agenda of international affairs – the balance among major powers, the security of nations - no longer define our perils or our possibilities ... Now we are entering a new era. Old international patterns are crumbling, old slogans are uninformative; old solutions are unavailing. The world has become interdependent in economics, in communications in human aspirations.⁴

In this phase of international relations, which is usually mentioned with the terms of modernity and/or post-modernity, relying only on the traditional components in order to explain complex systems would not be a very accurate preference. Within this web of intertwined systems, where various paradigms could be influential simultaneously, a necessity of using both traditional and reformist approaches together has emerged.⁵ As Keohane and Nye discuss, the realist school of thought and its conflict and power-oriented perspective usually lack the explanatory power to understand and explain the contemporary parameters.⁶ These developments are a result of the transformation of the international relations' structure from a classical power conceptualization that focuses on

⁴ Robert Owen Keohane and Joseph S. Nye, *Power and Interdependence* (New York: Longman, 2001), 3.

⁵ *Ibid.*, 211.

⁶ *Ibid.*, 20.

the deterministic role of military components to a wider power conceptualization that focuses on a profound world order.⁷

According to this new power conceptualization, the contemporary and/or alternative approaches to power gain significance in the International Relations discipline. In line, Nye states that:

The great powers of today are less able to use their traditional power resources to achieve their purposes than in the past. On many issues, private actors and small states have become more powerful. At least five trends have contributed to this diffusion of power: economic interdependence, transnational actors, nationalism in weak states, the spread of technology, and changing political issues.⁸

...

Power in a global information age is distributed among countries in a pattern that resembles a complex three-dimensional chess game. On the top chessboard, military power is largely uni-polar. ... But on the middle chessboard, economic power is multi-polar. ... The bottom chessboard is the realm of transnational relations that cross borders outside government control.⁹

As Nye emphasizes strongly, the power concept in modern international relations experiences a significant transformation. The scholars of social sciences, particularly the International Relations discipline, have begun to acknowledge new dimensions of power, determinants of world affairs, and equations of social, economic and political effectiveness. Likewise Ikenberry refers to the liberal international order not to be constructed upon inflexible and previously determined principles.¹⁰ Dynamism has always existed in the nature of international relations and this dynamism makes nations more integrated. Thus, the countries, which were not influential over each other before¹¹,

⁷ Ibid., 9-10.

⁸ Joseph S. Nye, *Power in the Global Information Age : From Realism to Globalization* (London; New York: Routledge, 2005), 73.

⁹ Ibid., 98.

¹⁰ Alan S. Alexandroff and others, "Rising States, Rising Institutions : Challenges for Global Governance," (Waterloo, Ont.; Washington, D.C.: Centre for International Governance Innovation ; Brookings Institution Press), 17.

¹¹ Andrew MacKay Scott, *The Dynamics of Interdependence* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1982), 3.

have begun to be affected by the social, economic, and political processes which arise in different territories.¹²

CONTEMPORARY PERSPECTIVES ON INTERDEPENDENCE

After this broad description of international relations and its dynamic structure, this study begins to explore the *Interdependence* concept which could be considered as one of the essential pillars of this study. It is difficult to argue that the fundamental actors of international relations and their perspectives, affiliations, orientations, decisions, and behaviors have followed completely independent processes. In fact, according to a number of scholars, the actors of modern international arena and their policy-making processes are tied closely to the interdependence between them.¹³ However, in order to establish a stable basis for this study, an exploration of the nature of the term, which is frequently used in the literature, is needed.

Interdependence is not a new term within the International Relations discipline's literature. It has a long history. Although it is considered as a popular concept of the liberal school of thought by some scholars¹⁴, some other members of the discipline point out that the evolution of *Interdependence* has been advanced by the realist school, too.¹⁵ However another pole of the literature claims that *Interdependence* has arisen as an opposite concept to Realism.¹⁶ The criticality of *Interdependence* is interpreted by Starr

¹² Ibid., 5.

¹³ R. J. Barry Jones, Peter Willetts, and Group International Relations Theory Research, *Interdependence on Trial : Studies in the Theory and Reality of Contemporary Interdependence* (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1984), 67-68.

¹⁴ John R. Oneal and others, "The Liberal Peace: Interdependence, Democracy, and International Conflict, 1950-85," *Journal of Peace Research* 33, no. 1 (1996): 11.

¹⁵ Jones, Willetts, and International Relations Theory Research, 127.

¹⁶ F. Labarre, "Self-Interest and Cooperation: The Emergence of Multilateral Interdependence in Post-Conflict Eras," *International Organization* 41, no. 4 (1987): 83.

with this remark, “Interdependence challenges key elements of sovereignty – independence of action, control over internal affairs, consent in international interaction.”¹⁷ Furthermore, he explains the structure of *Interdependence* as a synthesis of an historical process and a new identity:

Some analysts focus on the extensive new webs of interdependence that are creating a truly global system for the first time. Through technology and the dismantling of colonial empires, there is much that is new; however much of what is being seen as interdependence is not new but is just being recognized for the first time.¹⁸

The *Interdependence* concept, which has already been very influential over states and their orientations,¹⁹ and currently is improving its effective mission in international relations by being synchronized with such concepts as democracy and/or international institutionalism²⁰, benefits from information technologies’ development, communication, and transportation according to Starr.²¹

At this point, this study intends to demonstrate different illustrative approaches of the literature for *Interdependence* term, which is also mentioned in Kant’s international peace description²²:

- In common parlance, dependence means a state of being determined or significantly affected by external forces. Interdependence, most simply defined, means mutual dependence. Interdependence in world politics refers to situations characterized by reciprocal effects among countries or among actors in different countries.²³

¹⁷ Harvey Starr, *Anarchy, Order, and Integration : How to Manage Interdependence* (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1997), 18.

¹⁸ *Ibid.*, 21.

¹⁹ *Ibid.*

²⁰ J.R. Oneal, B. Russett, and M.L. Berbaum, "Causes of Peace: Democracy, Interdependence, and International Organizations, 1885–1992," *International Studies Quarterly* 47, no. 3 (2003): 389.

²¹ Starr, 21.

²² Oneal, Russett, and Berbaum, "Causes of Peace: Democracy, Interdependence, and International Organizations, 1885–1992," 371-372.

²³ Phil Williams, Donald M. Goldstein, and Jay M. Shafritz, *Classic Readings and Contemporary Debates in International Relations* (Belmont, CA: Thomson Wadsworth, 2006), 122.

- Interdependence describes a situation of mutual dependency; it rests on the notion that national political actors (most often governments) are structurally affected by the behavior of others (most often societies in other countries) while at the same time remain essentially autonomous.²⁴
- Interdependence is a quality of systems. Systems are composed of units of some kind and the interaction among them.²⁵
- Interdependence is a complex system of relations that has the merit of being observable in everyday international life.²⁶

The aforementioned examples demonstrate the diversity of the *Interdependence* concept within the literature. However, it ought to be mentioned that a considerable number of descriptions include negative senses²⁷ on the *Interdependence* concept in contrast to the supporters of the *Interdependence* concept's explanatory mission in world affairs. Moreover, the literature presents the fact that the nature of *Interdependence* requires further exploration, since this concept/term has been used by various actors for various purposes. In fact, as Keohane and Nye say, some politicians benefited from the *Interdependence* term for their political rhetoric.²⁸

Nye and Keohane make the point that although the *Interdependence* concept influences the decision-making mechanisms of states, it is usually affected by the decisions of states.²⁹ Parenthetically, some scholars indicate a confusion of perceptions of the *Interdependence* concept, and argue that the *Interdependence* concept ought not to be perceived as description/identification of "mutual benefit"³⁰ oriented and/or symmetrical relations.³¹

²⁴ Michael Zürn and Gregor Walter, *Globalizing Interests : Pressure Groups and Denationalization* (Albany, N.Y.: State University of New York Press, 2005), 7-8.

²⁵ Starr, 11.

²⁶ Labarre: 82.

²⁷ David A. Baldwin, "Interdependence and Power: A Conceptual Analysis," *International Organization* 34, no. 4 (1980): 506.

²⁸ Keohane and Nye, 6.

²⁹ *Ibid.*, 5.

³⁰ Williams, Goldstein, and Shafritz, 122.

³¹ *Ibid.*, 124.

As Nye refers, the growing importance of economic factors and significant progress of information technologies, communication, and transportation in the world assure the rise of *Interdependence* concept's empirical value.³² Therefore, consideration of the *Interdependence* concept as a result of international developments and/or interstate "transactions"³³ would not be inaccurate. However, in contrast to its naive appearance as a natural result of the transformation in international relations, according to some scholars the *Interdependence* concept has a capability to challenge states' domestic and foreign policies³⁴; because, as indicated earlier, the *Interdependence* concept does not only include symmetrical relations. A frequently emphasized "asymmetrical interdependence" concept often arises from the nature of world politics³⁵ and this situation has begun to be considered as one of the new power components of international relations.³⁶

After the entire effort to illustrate *Interdependence*, Kroll argues that there is not a definition consensus within the literature³⁷, although there is a significant number of scholars who study on the subject. However, this situation could be observable for several concepts/terms in social sciences. In addition to the definition complexity, although respective scholars, who use the *Interdependence* rhetoric and/or implement

³² Nye, 73.

³³ P.J. Katzenstein, "International Interdependence: Some Long-Term Trends and Recent Changes," *International Organization* 29, no. 4 (1975): 1022.

³⁴ Mark J. Gasiorowski, "Economic Interdependence and International Conflict: Some Cross-National Evidence," *International Studies Quarterly* 30, no. 1 (1986): 23.

³⁵ *Ibid.*, 26.

³⁶ Abraham L. Newman and Elliot Posner, "International Interdependence and Regulatory Power: Authority, Mobility, and Markets," *European Journal of International Relations* 17, no. 4 (2011): 589; R. Harrison Wagner, "Economic Interdependence, Bargaining Power, and Political Influence," *International Organization* 42, no. 3 (1988): 461.

³⁷ J.A. Kroll, "The Complexity of Interdependence," *International Studies Quarterly*, (1993): 321.

“theoretical or empirical”³⁸ view on it, avoid considering the *Interdependence* concept/term as a representative of a certain scholarly pole, Ikenberry’s efforts to incorporate the concept/term into the liberal school of thought could not be ignored.³⁹

Apart from all descriptive and theoretical debates, the *Interdependence* concept is valuable in assessing the evolution of the international relations discipline. The concept/term is still being enriched by various approaches, thus it is beneficial to demonstrate some of alternative descriptions:

- Although the theoretical message of most interdependence research is that interdependence is multinational or systemic, empirical operationalization has tended to concentrate on looking for interdependence (or integration, or community) as a relationship between a pair of nation states, rather than as an international pattern of behavior among an entire set of countries.⁴⁰
- Finally, we have seen that the concept of interdependence, by itself, is not necessarily new to international politics. Historical examples of cooperative interdependence and conflictive interdependence are easy to generate. Interdependence – as the term is used in the literature, referring to all strategic interactions – is not limited to economics.⁴¹
- Interdependence among societies is not new. What is new is the virtual erasing of costs of communicating over distance as a result of the information revolution.⁴²
- I propose three modes of regulatory interdependence: competitive, coordinative, and informational. The key assumption in the *competitive mode of regulatory interdependence* is that states are caught in a prisoner’s dilemma – either because states use social regulation as a protectionist tool or because states undercut each other’s regulations in a race to the bottom. In the *coordinative mode of interdependence* it is assumed that there are certain benefits to having regulations that are compatible with those of other states – sometimes resulting in a race together, or a race to the top. Finally, in the *informational mode of interdependence*, it is assumed that states are coping with massive uncertainty as to their best policy options.⁴³

³⁸ Jones, Willetts, and International Relations Theory Research, 67-68.

³⁹ G. John Ikenberry, "Liberalism in a Realist World: International Relations as an American Scholarly Tradition," *International Studies* 46, no. 1/2 (2009): 217.

⁴⁰ Mary Ann Tetreault, "Measuring Interdependence," *International Organization* 34, no. 3 (1980): 429.

⁴¹ Kroll: 343.

⁴² Robert O. Keohane and Joseph S. Nye Jr, "Power and Interdependence in the Information Age," *Foreign Affairs* 77, no. 5 (1998): 83.

⁴³ David Lazer, "Regulatory Interdependence and International Governance," *Journal of European Public Policy* 8, no. 3 (2001): 474.

INTERDEPENDENCE: CONFLICT OR COOPERATION

The exploration of the *Interdependence* concept/term within the literature leads this study to identify some scholarly debates. One of the most controversial debates on the concept/term is whether *Interdependence* causes conflict or cooperation in international relations. Therefore, in order to enrich this study, the scholars' perspectives are addressed. Alongside the debates about *Interdependence*'s theoretical pole and definition confusion, one of the most emphasized debates focuses on whether *Interdependence* is a habitat for conflict or cooperation.⁴⁴ However, there are also particular alternative approaches which propose that this sort of examination lacks a solid basis and that it is not easy to reach a clear judgment.⁴⁵

Within this debate, one of the most deterministic factors is gains and costs of *Interdependence* between states and their behavior in terms of gains and costs.⁴⁶ In this regard, some scholars claim that *Interdependence* makes states more aggressive. On the other hand, some others defend the fact that *Interdependence* encourages states to be more cooperative. Additionally, alternative approaches analyze the debate in terms of concepts and keep their neutrality by bringing different definitions to the concepts, conflict and cooperation.⁴⁷ However, as McMillan proposes, this debate sometimes reflects the polarization of the literature:

Interdependence, conflict, and the relationship between them are more complex than has generally been assumed. Liberalism has emphasized the benefits of interdependence and realism has emphasized the costs, but neither theoretical framework has developed an argument that explains how both the costs and the

⁴⁴ Starr, 18.

⁴⁵ S.M. McMillan, "Interdependence and Conflict," *Mershon International Studies Review* 41, no. 1 (1997): 34.

⁴⁶ Jon C. Pevehouse, "Interdependence Theory and the Measurement of International Conflict," *Journal of Politics* 66, no. 1 (2004): 247.

⁴⁷ Gasiorowski: 25.

benefits of interdependence are related to international conflict. Until we are willing to create and test more complex models, we are not likely to make theoretical progress in sorting out this question.⁴⁸

At this point, Nye's words are presented as a finalized statement:

Overreliance on the rhetoric of interdependence not only may blind us to the legitimate concerns of other nations, but it can obscure our own choices at home. Rhetoric often makes interdependence sound like a good thing or an inexorable force toward cooperation. In fact, interdependence is neither good nor bad, and is just as easily a source of conflict as of cooperation.⁴⁹

COMPLEX INTERDEPENDENCE

Nye and Keohane have always refused the labels, including *Liberal*, for their fundamental work *Power and Interdependence* which was developed in the 1970s.⁵⁰ Rather, they emphasize that their work is attributed to different schools of the International Relations discipline and they intend to develop a theoretical framework for the *Interdependence* concept by benefiting from both traditional and modern approaches' legacies.⁵¹

One of the most significant contributions of Keohane and Nye to the International Relations discipline, *Complex Interdependence*, is described with three characteristics:

- Multiple channels of contact among societies
- Lack of clear hierarchies of issues
- Irrelevance of military force⁵²

Another considerable contribution of Keohane and Nye is their effort to distinguish the sensitivity and vulnerability differentiation. They identify this differentiation with following statements, "Sensitivity involves degrees of responsiveness within a policy

⁴⁸ McMillan: 56.

⁴⁹ Nye, 154.

⁵⁰ Keohane and Nye, *Power and Interdependence*, xiii.

⁵¹ *Ibid.*, 4.

⁵² *Ibid.*, xv.

framework. ... The vulnerability dimension of interdependence rests on the relative availability and costliness of the alternatives that various actors face.”⁵³

This differentiation of the sensitivity and vulnerability dimensions has contributed prominently to the power of the *Interdependence* concept. In this regard, it has become easier to understand the nature of *Interdependence* and fronts of *Interdependence*; the explanatory mission of the concept and its implications have become more apparent. Additionally, Keohane and Nye have established a more solid basis for *Interdependence* by proposing the fact that it is shaped on the axis of “networks of rules, norms and procedures”.⁵⁴ Their noteworthy contributions have been derived from the quest which was started by firstly examining the political usage of *Interdependence* rhetoric and its results.⁵⁵ One of the initial purposes of their quest was presenting a different and unique approach to the International Relations discipline.⁵⁶

Although Keohane and Nye refuses *Liberal* label for their book, *Power and Interdependence*, they make the following statement for their *Complex Interdependence* concept:

The concept of complex interdependence is clearly liberal rather than realist. We made no attempt to integrate complex interdependence with realist conceptions of power and structure – on the contrary, our view of complex interdependence was in opposition to a realist ideal-typical view of world politics.⁵⁷

One of Keohane and Nye’s most significant contributions to the discipline, *Complex Interdependence*, has encountered both positive and negative reactions of other members of the discipline. On one hand some scholars evaluate *Complex*

⁵³ *Ibid.*, 10-11.

⁵⁴ *Ibid.*, 17.

⁵⁵ *Ibid.*, 193.

⁵⁶ *Ibid.*, 211.

⁵⁷ *Ibid.*, 275.

Interdependence as a very beneficial and creative contribution⁵⁸; on the other hand, it is criticized in terms of its depth and explanatory structure.⁵⁹

Exploring the depth of the *Complex Interdependence* concept and understanding its essence are crucially important for being able to use it within this thesis. Actually, Keohane and Nye mentioned a point very openly; *Complex Interdependence* is not a framework to describe mutually absolute or equal gains. Rather, it sometimes indicates that certain sides could be more effective over their counterparts.⁶⁰ It is worthwhile to note that the 1970s' popular term, *Interdependence*, especially referring to the developments in communication and transportation channels, has acquired a more important and complex meaning.⁶¹ The developments in communication⁶² and transportation have made inter-state transactions more multifaceted. This process could also reflect the international relations' equation which includes many parameters. Moreover, in this equation, *Interdependence* has reached a point at which it is not only a description of foreign policy orientations or a political rhetoric. In this regard, Keohane and Nye's *Complex Interdependence* has provided a new phase and/or stage for social, political, and economic affairs.⁶³ Keohane and Nye describe political processes according to this new phase/stage:

- *Goals of Actors*: Goals of states will vary by issue area.
Transgovernmental politics will make goals difficult to define.
Transnational actors will pursue their own goals.

⁵⁸ Helen V. Milner and Andrew Moravcsik, *Power, Interdependence, and Nonstate Actors in World Politics* (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 2009), 3.

⁵⁹ Robert O. Keohane and Joseph S. Nye Jr, "Power and Interdependence Revisited," *International Organization* 41, no. 4 (1987): 734.

⁶⁰ Milner and Moravcsik, 68.

⁶¹ Robert O. Keohane, *Power and Governance in a Partially Globalized World* (London; New York: Routledge, 2002), 2.

⁶² Keohane and Nye Jr, "Power and Interdependence in the Information Age," 85.

⁶³ Keohane, *Power and Governance in a Partially Globalized World*, 14.

- *Instruments of State Policy*: Power resources specific to issue areas will be most relevant. Manipulation of interdependence, international organizations, and transnational actors will be major instruments.
- *Agenda Formation*: Agenda will be affected by changes in the distribution of power resources within issue areas; the status of international regimes; changes in the importance of transnational actors; linkages from other issues and politicization as a result of rising sensitivity interdependence.
- *Linkages of Issues*: Linkages by strong states will be more difficult to make since force will be ineffective. Linkages by weak state through international organizations will erode rather than reinforce hierarchy.
- *Roles of International Organizations*: Organizations will set agendas, induce coalition-formation, and act as arenas for political action by weak states. Ability to choose the organizational forum for an issue and to mobilize votes will be an important political resource.⁶⁴

In addition to Keohane and Nye's essential contributions to the *Interdependence* concept/term, it is necessary to point out that Starr inserts the role of non-state actors to his *Interdependence* description.⁶⁵ This insertion could be evaluated positively in terms of international relations' current structure.

This thesis does not utilize *Complex Interdependence* as a theory to explain state relations. In this regard, this chapter has stressed the definitional and theoretical problems of the concept. Therefore, this thesis uses *Complex Interdependence* in line with Keohane and Nye's statement, "We did not pursue complex interdependence as a theory, but as a thought experiment about what politics might look like if the basic assumptions of realism were reversed."⁶⁶

⁶⁴ Keohane and Nye, *Power and Interdependence*, 32.

⁶⁵ Starr, 24.

⁶⁶ Keohane and Nye Jr, "Power and Interdependence Revisited," 737.

CHAPTER III

UNDERSTANDING THE ENERGY SECURITY ISSUE

INTRODUCTION

In the post-9/11 era, international politics has been mostly shaped around the war on terror; however the *Energy Security* issue still keeps its criticality.¹ The criticality rises from several influential factors; for instance, more effective actors are involving themselves in the energy politics and the fundamental transformations, which could remarkably affect *Energy Security*'s dynamics, are being witnessed in the resource provider states. Oil and natural gas prices, due to the aggressive countries' behavior, continue to harm many countries' financial structures and economic policies. In addition, while the energy resource demand is increasing, there has always been instability in supply because of the provider countries' political developments. In this regard, it is possible to refer George W. Bush's *securitization of energy* rhetoric; this rhetoric paves the way to consider the energy issue, which has already been very significant parameter of international relations, as a security paradigm.

In this sense, this chapter explores the approaches on *Energy Security* within the International Relations literature and portrays the study's perspectives under four subheadings, *Illustrative Approaches, Securitization of Energy, Geopolitics and Major Actors of Energy Security, and Energy Security and Energy Independence*.

¹ Richard Youngs, *Energy Security : Europe's New Foreign Policy Challenge* (London; New York: Routledge, 2009), 1.

ILLUSTRATIVE APPROACHES

The establishments of modern states are rationalized by various philosophical streams. However, the major tendency of states has always been assuring consistent development and providing prosperity to their people; at this point, as a basic proposition from economics, it is arguable that generating employment along with stability of production-consumption cycle underlies modern development and prosperity mechanism. In this regard, as several scholars propose, this study endeavors to reach the fact that energy is positioned at the center of production-consumption systems.² From industrial countries to developing members of international community, all actors confront the need for energy resources.³ However, the energy paradigm of contemporary international relations has gained deeper mission than as a basic component of economic systems.⁴

Selivanova explains the modern energy paradigm with the following statement:

Energy is different from any other commodity for a number of reasons. First, energy is more vital to the economic and social development of the modern world than any other good. Second, hydrocarbon resources are distributed very unevenly throughout the world. Third, energy trade is often linked to the fixed infrastructure necessary for the transportation of hydrocarbons and electricity.⁵

Energy, as one of the most deterministic factors of policy-making processes of international actors, has become more influential over social, political and economic orientations of world affairs. Nevertheless, the literature points out that the energy

² Gokhan Ozkan, "The Nabucco Project within the Context of Energy Supply Security and International Politics," *China-USA Business Review* 10, no. 8 (2011): 689; Carlos Pascual and Jonathan Elkind, *Energy Security: Economics, Politics, Strategies, and Implications* (Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution Press, 2010), 1.

³ Joy Dunkerley and Future Resources for the, *Energy Strategies for Developing Nations* (Baltimore: Published for Resources for the Future by the Johns Hopkins University Press, 1981), 15; Gregory F. Treverton and Studies International Institute for Strategic, *Energy and Security* (Farnborough, Hampshire, England; Montclair, N.J.: Published for the International Institute for Strategic Studies by Gower and Allanheld, Osmun, 1980), 40.

⁴ Ivan Scrase and G. MacKerron, *Energy for the Future: A New Agenda* (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2009), 20.

⁵ Andreas Goldthau and others, *Global Energy Governance: The New Rules of the Game* (Berlin, [Germany]; Washington, D.C.: Global Public Policy Institute; Brookings Institution Press, 2010), 49.

paradigm has also experienced structural changes while gaining its deeper mission. Today's energy paradigm is more integrated with the *environment* phenomena.⁶ Its meaning does not indicate only fossil fuels.⁷ In addition to this transformation, academia has also begun to bring different approaches for the energy subject according to different theoretical stances.⁸ In this regard, understanding the ties between security phenomenon, a summary of entire burden of socio-political arena's actors, and the energy paradigm⁹ has become easier.¹⁰

There are several definitions¹¹ for one of the most popular concepts, *Energy Security*, within the literature, from different members of international community. Some of those definitions are mentioned below:

- European Commission: Uninterrupted physical availability of energy products on the market at an affordable price for all consumers.
- International Energy Agency: Adequate, affordable, and reliable access to energy fuels and services, it includes availability of resources, decreasing dependence on imports, decreasing pressures on the environment, competition and market efficiency, reliance on indigenous resources that are environmentally clean, and energy services that are affordable equitably shared.
- United Nations: Protection against shortages of affordable fuel and energy resources.
- World Bank: Access to secure supplies of fuel, a competitive market that distributes those fuels, stability of resource flows and transit points, and efficiency of end use.¹²

Although several scholars and institutions have brought certain definitions, it is very difficult to recognize an agreement on a common definition. The reason, behind this

⁶ Scrase and MacKerron, xii; Brenda Shaffer, *Energy Politics* (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2009), 105.

⁷ Mathew Burrows and Gregory F. Treverton, "A Strategic View of Energy Futures," *Survival* 49, no. 3 (2007): 79; Dieter Helm, *The New Energy Paradigm* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007), 123.

⁸ Goldthau and others, 13.

⁹ Helm, 34.

¹⁰ Benjamin K. Sovacool, *The Routledge Handbook of Energy Security* (London; New York: Routledge, 2011), 214.

¹¹ *Ibid.*, 307.

¹² *Ibid.*, 5-6.

confusion, is interpreted as different actors' behaviors in terms of their interests and concerns by some scholars.¹³ This situation is analyzed by Faas, Graceva, Fulli and Masera, "In spite of its critical role, energy security lacks a universally agreed definition, which given its complexity may well just be unrealistic. The concept is still used in a wide range of reports and documents, often without discussion of its dimensions and their significance."¹⁴

In spite of this complex situation, this study benefits from the entire literature in order to locate the quest on a solid basis and essentially has been contributed from Elkind's four elements of *Energy Security*, "Availability, Reliability, Affordability, and Sustainability."¹⁵

SECURITIZATION OF ENERGY

Energy has gained more critical importance for states in terms of both economy and politics¹⁶; the reasons behind this remark are inequality between demand and supply trends, and more importantly instability and insecurity in the resource provider countries and their peripheries. In accordance with this critical importance, energy has begun to be considered as one of the power components in international relations, because demand-supply relations in energy have been one of the most important substances of states' national security agenda.¹⁷ Moreover, a significant number of scholars and decision-makers have begun to interpret international developments in terms of *Energy Security*¹⁸

¹³ Adrian V. Gheorghe and Liviu Muresan, *Energy Security International and Local Issues, Theoretical Perspectives, and Critical Energy Infrastructures* (Dordrecht: Springer, 2011), 10; Pascual and Elkind, 130.

¹⁴ Gheorghe and Muresan, 9.

¹⁵ Pascual and Elkind, 121-130.

¹⁶ Ozkan: 690; Youngs, 1.

¹⁷ Pascual and Elkind, 151; Scrase and MacKerron, 7.

¹⁸ Burrows and Treverton: 79; Scrase and MacKerron, 223.

and they have begun to propose new threat conceptions that are derived from the nature of energy.¹⁹ Sovacool's remark could be considered as an instance, "Global energy security threats can be roughly divided into three areas: geopolitics and war, global investment barriers, and transboundary externalities."²⁰ Nevertheless, some other scholars reveal the point that *Energy Security's* complexity is not only a demand-supply relationship. Yergin says:

Since the start of the twenty-first century, a periodically tight oil market and volatile prices have fueled new concern about energy security. Other factors also add to the concern: the instability in some oil-exporting nations, jihadist terrorism, the rebirth of resource nationalism, fears of a scramble for supplies, the costs of imported energy, and geopolitical rivalries.²¹

In line with Yergin, the securitization of energy paradigm has reached beyond the difficulty of demand-supply equation, the usage of this paradigm and the concepts from its periphery within the literature could demonstrate the contemporary content. Such terms as *oil weapon*, *oil power*, and *oil diplomacy* are being witnessed more in the literature. Maull's statement could be considered as an example:

... Like other weapons, the oil weapon has offensive and defensive capabilities. The threat and the application of the oil weapon for defensive purposes would aim at securing vital interests of an oil-producer country (or, more precisely, its incumbent regime). The offensive use would aim to increase power and influence and would involve a change in the status quo.²²

Although, as Krapels emphasizes that "states are aware of their energy vulnerability with their past experiences/traumas"²³, their dependence continue to grow and this trend has

¹⁹ Daniel Moran and James A. Russell, *Energy Security and Global Politics : The Militarization of Resource Management* (London; New York: Routledge, 2009), 95.

²⁰ Sovacool, 11.

²¹ Daniel Yergin, *The Quest : Energy, Security and the Remaking of the Modern World* (New York: Penguin Press, 2011), 265.

²² Treverton and International Institute for Strategic, 33.

²³ *Ibid.*, 62.

constructed an intense security perception and culture on energy resources supply-demand relationship.²⁴

GEOPOLITICS AND MAJOR ACTORS OF ENERGY SECURITY

In this subsection, this study aims to demonstrate how the literature evaluates *Energy Security* in terms of geopolitics and the traditional and emerging actors' roles. *Energy Security* is a considerable component of realpolitik; therefore, the emphasis of the literature on international relations' lebensraum and the actors is very understandable. In this sense, the literature sophisticatedly analyzes demanding, provider, and transit countries and their influential positions. Before the analytical review of the literature, it is necessary to mention that this study intends to focus on the contemporary literature's rising agenda rather than traditional subjects. In this regard, this study considers the emerging actors' influence and the transformation of status quo as the rising agenda of the literature.

The geopolitical aspect of *Energy Security* has always been analyzed with attribution to the resource rich regions such as the Middle East, Central Asia, the Caspian Basin, the most demanding geographies such as Europe and North America and the bridging routes. However, the literature has begun to adapt new terms and names; *MENA (the Middle East and North Africa)*²⁵, *The Wider Black Sea Basin*²⁶, and *Eurasia* have become the present-day popular terms. Despite the fact that the new names also indicate

²⁴ Goldthau and others, 97.; *ibid.*, 271.

²⁵ Anthony H. Cordesman, Strategic Center for, and Studies International, *Energy Developments in the Middle East* (Westport, Conn.: Praeger, 2004), 1.

²⁶ Gheorghe and Muresan, 123.

same geographies, their usage could be reflection of particular political and/or academic motivations.

The actors aspect of *Energy Security* basically points the states of the regions, mentioned above. Although it is difficult to find answers for each question, the question set of Hughes, Rycroft, Sylvan, Trout, and Harf could contribute the scholarly quest and depth of this study as well as the vision for the actors aspect of *Energy Security* could be widened:

Who are the global actors involved in the issue and what are the linkages among them? II. What prevailing values are operating and how have the relevant actors responded to these values? III. What policies are applied by these actors at the global level and how are these policies determined? IV. What futures are presented in the values and policies of these global actors?²⁷

Nonetheless, within this aspect of *Energy Security* one of the most important changes could be global arena's new influential actors such as China²⁸ and India²⁹ with their growing economies and energy resources demand. The growth in these countries' demands has forced the balances and policies of *Energy Security* to be revised and added a new parameter to the equations of traditional actors.³⁰

In his popular book, *The Quest*, Yergin considerably analyzes China and its emerging position and he describes this country's *Energy Security* strategy:

China has become a growing presence in the global oil and natural gas industry. This new role goes by the name of the "go out" strategy.

...

²⁷ Barry Hughes, *Energy in the Global Arena : Actors, Values, Policies, and Futures* (Durham, N.C.: Duke University Press, 1985), ix.

²⁸ Carrie Liu Currier and Manochehr Dorraj, *China's Energy Relations with the Developing World* (New York: Continuum, 2011), 17; A.M. Jaffe and S.W. Lewis, "Beijing's Oil Diplomacy," *Survival* 44, no. 1 (2002): 115; Andrew B. Kennedy, "China's New Energy-Security Debate," *Survival* 52, no. 3 (2010): 137; Steven A. Yetiv, *Crude Awakenings : Global Oil Security and American Foreign Policy* (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 2004), 121.

²⁹ Moran and Russell, 135.; Goldthau and others, 195.

³⁰ Goldthau and others, 25.; Sascha Müller-Kraenner, *Energy Security : Re-Measuring the World* (London; Sterling, VA: Earthscan, 2008), 57.

In general, the “go out” phase meant the internationalization of Chinese firms – that they should become competitive international companies with access both to the raw materials required by the rapidly growing economy and to the markets into which to sell their manufactures. For energy companies more specifically, it meant that the partly state-owned, partly privatized oil companies should own, develop, control, or invest in foreign sources of oil and natural gas. For the oil industry, this was complemented by another slogan – “using two legs to walk” – one, to further development of the domestic industry; the other, for international expansion.³¹

In addition to the description of Yergin, Kang Wu identifies the objectives of China’s

Energy Security policy:

- To enhance domestic oil and gas exploration and production activities and maximize oil and gas production
- To diversify the sources of oil and gas imports, increasing the share of oil and gas imports from Russia and Central Asia
- To strengthen the overseas investment by state oil companies, particularly in the Middle East, Asia Pacific, Russia and Central Asia
- To undertake different ways of trade to avoid transactions risk
- To increase the investment in oil and gas infrastructure and open more channels to imports
- To establish strategic petroleum stockpiling³²

Currently, the analysis of *Energy Security* in terms of geopolitics and major actors clarifies the fact that a strategic competition is arising between traditional and emerging actors of *Energy Security* arena over critically important resource-rich geographies.

Furthermore, it needs to be emphasized that this strategic competition is not only geopolitical challenge of *Energy Security* arena; the resource rich geographies’ inhabitants have begun to act according to their strategic calculations and projections and this situation has begun to establish a new problematic ground.³³

This subsection could be finalized with the words of Shaffer, “In turn, energy interests, especially under tight international market conditions, affect the mapping of

³¹ Yergin, 202-203.

³² Elizabeth Van Wie Davis and Rouben Azizian, *Islam, Oil, and Geopolitics : Central Asia after September 11* (Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, 2007), 139.

³³ Moran and Russell, 123.

geostrategic interests.”³⁴ ... “The study of energy in international relations represents a return to the study of the ‘geo’ of geopolitics.”³⁵

ENERGY SECURITY AND ENERGY INDEPENDENCE

Energy Security and *Energy Independence* terms have always been a puzzle for both scholars and policy-makers; some of them argue that *Energy Security* can be assured only by complete energy independence³⁶ and some others do not perceive the pursuit of energy independence as a rational and pragmatic effort. Although many conservative politicians defend their stance towards the necessity of energy independence very firmly, De Pascal and Zambetakis demonstrate this subject’s evolved structure, which ought not to be perceived only at national level according to them, “Inevitably, some politicians will call for energy independence, an unrealistic and unattainable goal. That is simply not possible in an interconnected world that requires access to global markets, capital, and technology, whether a nation is a net importer or exporter of energy.”³⁷ States’ engagements in different regions³⁸, establishments of international and supranational institutions, and international corporations’ effectiveness frankly indicate the transition of *Energy Security* to be a complexity that cannot be resolved at national levels. Furthermore, some scholars, as a response to energy independence seeking policy-makers, question how self-sufficiency could encounter the security challenge of integrated economic and political conceptions³⁹ and in parallel with this examination

³⁴ Shaffer, 30.

³⁵ Ibid., 163.

³⁶ Yergin, 268.

³⁷ Pascual and Elkind, 31.

³⁸ Ibid., 39.; Stephen M. Walt, “Beyond Bin Laden: Reshaping U.S. Foreign Policy,” *International Security* 26, no. 3 (2001): 56.

³⁹ Pascual and Elkind, 111.

some other scholars argue that self-sufficiency cannot be an efficient and reliable resolution in terms of basic principles of modern economy.⁴⁰ As another supportive argument, with its increasing momentum globalization affects countries' infrastructure projections in energy security, too; they have begun to carry their plans from national level to regional and international stages.⁴¹

To conclude, although there is a significant stream in both academia and political arena that perceives *Energy Security* as energy independence, the majority supports the counter-argument and the subject's multidimensional structure⁴² could be considered as their rationale.

CONCLUSION

Usage of the *Energy Security* term in an academic study carries a considerable responsibility, because the term is very dynamic and relatively subjective. Therefore, this study endeavored to explore the term, as one of the essential pillars of this study, within the literature comprehensively. Actually, this situation and its challenging nature are explained by Cherp and Jewell in terms of choosing indicators of *Energy Security* and they mention three challenges:

- Complexity. The complexity of energy systems hides multiple dynamic vulnerabilities, which are difficult to capture with simple understandable indicators.
- Uncertain future. Energy security is about how vulnerabilities will develop in the future, not the present or the past. How can potentially multiple and uncertain futures be presented in indicators?
- Conflicting perspectives. Various actors have different perspectives on energy systems and assign different priorities to their various elements and threats. How can energy security indicators credibly reflect these often

⁴⁰ Ibid., 152.

⁴¹ Sovacool, 44.

⁴² Scrase and MacKerron, 22.; Shaffer, 28.

conflicting priorities? How can simple, understandable indicators capture these complex dynamics?⁴³

In spite of these both empirical and theoretical challenges, this study is required to demonstrate its *Energy Security* perspective in order to set up its foundation. In this sense, the demanding countries/regions' *Energy Security* pursuit, which is evaluated in the following chapters, is analyzed in the light of following substances of Shaffer:

- Diversity of energy sources
- Diversity of suppliers
- Storage of energy and strategic petroleum reserves
- Redundant energy infrastructure
- Flexibility to shift fuels⁴⁴

This study is aware of the comprehensive content of *Energy Security* concept that also includes supplier and transit countries' positions and concerns. Although the literature is mostly shaped around the demanding countries/regions' perceptions on *Energy Security*, in the following chapters this study examines *Energy Security* in terms of the supplier and transit countries/regions' stances as well. As a prologue, a remark from the literature could be mentioned in this chapter:

In conclusion, and counter to popular perceptions, the energy world of the future is unlikely be a world of producers versus consumers, or of old consumers versus new ones. The main reason for this is that all actors in the energy domain have shared interests. Most fundamentally, consumers' quest for supply security is matched by producers' quest for demand security.⁴⁵

⁴³ Sovacool, 330.

⁴⁴ Shaffer, 91.

⁴⁵ Goldthau and others, 355-356.

CHAPTER IV

TURKEY'S ENERGY STRATEGY

Energy security is a critically important issue for Turkey; a country which is 74% dependent on external resources¹ although it is located very close to the most resource-rich geographies of the world. The critical importance of energy security has arisen from Turkey's development targets, its growing economy and population.² The country's resource demand is increasing continually. With awareness of the situation, policy-makers, scholars and specialists analyze the issue very comprehensively. In this chapter, those analyses are studied profoundly in order to portray Turkey's principal energy strategy. Revealing the major orientations of Turkey's energy strategy is going to settle down the fundamental purpose of this study.

Turkey's energy strategy basically has two major orientations; assuring supply stability and maximizing the benefits of its geostrategic location. However, the Ministry of Energy and Natural Resources lists the country's principal aims more extensively:

- Making energy available for the consumers in terms of cost, time and amount,
- Exploiting public and private facilities within the framework of free market practices,
- Discouraging import dependency,
- Securing a strong position for our country in regional and global trade of energy,
- Ensuring the availability of diversified resources, routes and technologies
- Ensuring maximum use of renewable resources,
- Increasing energy efficiency,

¹ "Turkey's Energy Strategy", Republic of Turkey Ministry of Foreign Affairs http://www.mfa.gov.tr/turkiye_nin-enerji-stratejisi.tr.mfa (accessed 13th of April 2012).

² Barry M. Rubin and Kemal Kirisci, *Turkey in World Politics : An Emerging Multiregional Power* (Boulder, Co.: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2001), 217.

- Minimizing negative environmental impact while producing and using energy and natural resources.³

The framework of Turkey's energy strategy is also supported by the legislative regulations, which have begun to be implemented, especially in the last decade. The Ministry of Energy and Natural Resources lists the essential regulations:

- Electricity Market Law (2001)
- Natural Gas Market Law (2001)
- Petroleum Market Law (2003)
- LPG Market Law (2005)
- Law on Utilization of Renewable Energy Resources for the Purpose of Generating Electrical Energy (2005)
- Energy Efficiency Law (2007)
- Law on Geothermal Resources and Mineral Waters (2007)
- Law on Construction and Operation of Nuclear Power Plants and Energy Sale (2007).
- Law (2008) on the Amendment of Electricity Market Law No. 5784 on Supply Security and Certain Other Laws.⁴

Turkey's regulations are evaluated by Akil in the following manner:

It should also be emphasized that the liberalization of the Turkish energy market will have a positive impact in Turkey's transit role. The Natural Gas Market and Electricity Market Laws enacted in 2001 have not only been important milestones in harmonizing Turkish energy legislation with that of the EU but also served to establish a transparent, efficient, competitive, sustainable and secure energy market. The ongoing deregulation process of the Turkish energy market will give Turkey a pivotal role in the energy field, particularly in the gas sector, and make her a major consumer and transit country in the region.⁵

As mentioned above, assuring supply stability is vitally important for Turkey, since the country's demand is increasing constantly. Table 1 and Table 2, below, demonstrate Turkey's consumption trend in oil and natural gas:

³ "Energy", Republic of Turkey Ministry of Energy and Natural Resources http://www.enerji.gov.tr/index.php?dil=en&sf=webpages&b=enerji_EN&bn=215&hn=&nm=40717&id=40717 (accessed 13th of April 2012).

⁴ "Energy".

⁵ Hakkı Akil, "Turkey's Role in European Security as the Epicenter of Regional Energy Routes," *Turkish Policy Quarterly* 3, no. 2 (2003): 4.

Table 1. Turkey's Oil Consumption

Thousand barrels daily	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010	Change 2010 Over 2009	2010 Share of Total
Total North America	25063	24955	25073	23841	22946	23418	2,1%	25,8%
Total S. & Cent. America	5144	5271	5622	5835	5827	6104	5,0%	7,0%
Turkey	648	629	651	657	615	624	1,7%	0,7%
Total Europe & Eurasia	20356	20498	20271	20358	19448	19510	0,1%	22,9%
Total Middle East	6225	6497	6736	7153	7433	7821	4,6%	8,9%
Total Africa	2835	2824	2974	3097	3195	3291	3,0%	3,9%
Total Asia Pacific	24503	24914	25753	25715	25866	27237	5,3%	31,5%

Source: BP Statistical Review of World Energy June 2011

Table 2. Turkey's Natural Gas Consumption

Billion cubic meters	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010	Change 2010 over 2009	2010 Share of Total
Total North America	774,9	771,9	812,1	820,8	807,7	846,1	4,7%	26,9%
Total S. & Cent. America	122,9	135,5	134,6	141,3	135,1	147,7	9,3%	4,7%
Turkey	26,9	30,5	36,1	37,5	35,7	39,0	9,2%	1,2%
Total Europe & Eurasia	1122,8	1129,5	1143,5	1148,2	1060,5	1137,2	7,2%	35,8%
Total Middle East	279,2	291,5	303,1	331,9	344,1	365,5	6,2%	11,5%
Total Africa	83,0	88,1	94,4	100,1	98,9	105,0	6,1%	3,3%

Table 2. Continued

Billion cubic meters	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010	Change 2010 over 2009	2010 Share of Total
Total Asia Pacific	398,9	426,0	459,6	484,0	503,9	567,6	12,6%	17,9%

Source: BP Statistical Review of World Energy June 2011

After assuring supply security, Turkey's other major purpose is acting as a *bridge*⁶ between the resource-rich geographies and the consumer countries/regions; The United States Energy Information Administration describes Turkey's geographical location and its importance:

Turkey is playing an increasingly important role in the transit of oil and gas supplies from Russia, the Caspian region, and the Middle East routed westward to Europe. Turkey has been a major transit point for seaborne traded oil and is becoming more important for pipeline-traded oil and natural gas, with significant volumes transported to westward to Europe. Growing volumes of Russian and Caspian oil are being sent by tanker via the Bosphorus Straits to Western markets while a terminal on Turkey's Mediterranean coast at Ceyhan allows the country to export oil from northern Iraq and Azerbaijan.⁷

Before analyzing Turkey's potential political gains from this aim, it is necessary to consider the financial/economic benefit potentiality. Freifeld indicates Turkey's situation, "It will collect transit fees, diversify its own energy mix, and perhaps in the future be able to re-export surpluses (such as when heavy rains allow for heavier reliance on hydroelectric power)."⁸ Considering the economic/financial motivations⁹ of states and other actors, which are engaged in energy politics, Turkey's stance, which is not only constructed upon political arguments, becomes more understandable. Nonetheless, there

⁶ Mirela Bogdani, *Turkey and the Dilemma of Eu Accession : When Religion Meets Politics* (London: I.B. Tauris, 2011), 19.

⁷ *Turkey, Country Analysis Briefs*, (U.S. Energy Information Administration, 2011).

⁸ Daniel Freifeld, "Nabucco: Pipeline Politics and the U.S.-Turkey Strategic Partnership," *Turkish Policy Quarterly* 7, no. 4 (2008): 77.

⁹ *Ibid.*, 79.

is another aspect of the subject; the infrastructure projects, which could realize Turkey's aims, constitute significant risks because of the potential costs in terms of the world's financial overview and the fluctuating economic developments.¹⁰

However, it is not satisfactory to explain Turkey's energy security projections only in economic/financial terms. In this regard, the literature on the political motivations of Turkey's energy strategy takes very diverse approaches. Some overlap and others are considerably differentiating. Considerable examples of the arguments of the literature are listed:

- Turkey's essential motivation is gaining influence over regional and global energy politics.¹¹
- Turkey seeks to establish consolidated transfer infrastructure with the partnership of global actors and make them more concerned about Turkey's peripheries' security and stability issues.¹²
- Turkey aims to be a key determinant of West-East and North-South energy trade.¹³
- Establishment of transit infrastructure with the partnership of both demanding and supplier countries could assure Turkey's own supply stability.

¹⁰ Barçın Yinanç, "Turkey in the Unfolding New Chapter of the Big Energy Game," *Turkish Policy Quarterly* 7, no. 3 (2008): 52.

¹¹ Bezen Balamir Coşkun and Richard Carlson, "New Energy Geopolitics: Why Does Turkey Matter?," *Insight Turkey* 12, no. 3 (2010): 214; Ali Tekin and Iva Walterova, "Turkey's Geopolitical Role: The Energy Angle," *Middle East Policy* 14, no. 1 (2007): 84.

¹² Emre İşeri, "The Eu's Energy Security and Turkey's Energy Strategy," *Turkish Review of Eurasian Studies* 7, (2007): 22.

¹³ Gokhan Ozkan, "The Nabucco Project within the Context of Energy Supply Security and International Politics," *China-USA Business Review* 10, no. 8 (2011): 692.

As an approving response to these theses, Turkey continues to work on the pipeline projects, on which Biresselioglu says, “The pipelines are the initial step in Turkey’s effort to become a major player in the region.”¹⁴ The list of pipeline projects, below, help to portray the previous statement:

Turkey’s Pipeline Projects:

- I. East-West Axis
 - The BTC Oil Pipeline/Completed
 - The Kirkuk-Ceyhan Oil Pipeline/Completed
 - The Trans-Caspian Oil Pipeline/Kazakh Oil Extension to BTC/Projected
 - The BTE Gas Pipeline/Completed
 - The Tabriz-Erzurum Gas Pipeline/Completed
 - The Iraqi Gas Pipeline/Projected
 - The Nabucco Gas Pipeline/Projected
 - The Trans Caspian Gas Pipeline/Projected
 - The South European Gas Ring Project/Completed

- II. North-South Axis
 - The Blue Stream Gas Pipeline/Completed
 - The Samsun-Ceyhan Bypass Oil Pipeline/ Under Construction
 - The Arab Gas Pipeline/Under Construction
 - The Turkey-Israel Oil/Gas Pipeline/Projected

Turkey’s objective to become an energy corridor could also be considered as a reflection of contemporary regional and global developments.¹⁵ The literature relates this objective to Turkey’s alliance with the west and its support to Turkish projections, the collapse of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and Turkey’s advantage, which is derived from ethnic roots¹⁶, Turkey’s historical legacy, and Turkey’s well-calculated, pro-active, and pragmatic foreign policy in the last decade. Additionally, Turkey’s

¹⁴ Mehmet Efe Biresselioglu, *European Energy Security : Turkey's Future Role and Impact* (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2011), 90.

¹⁵ Bill Park, *Modern Turkey : People, State, and Foreign Policy in a Globalised World* (London; New York: Routledge, 2012), 145.

¹⁶ G. Bahgat, "Central Asia and Energy Security," *Asian Affairs* 37, no. 1 (2006): 14-15.

proximity to Europe, which is the second biggest resource demanding region of the world, contributes the conjuncture positively in terms of Turkey's aims. Furthermore, Turkey's objectives are supported by the critical rise of China and India, especially the United States and the European Union have often assisted Turkey's transit position in order to prevent Central Asian, the Caspian, and the Middle Eastern resources' potential tendency to the East.¹⁷ On this point Yergin says:

For Washington, the thought that the main export pipeline could possibly go through Russia was unacceptable. The risk was too great. ... Madeleine Albright, Bill Clinton's secretary of state, privately summed up the matter at the time. One afternoon, sitting in a little room on the seventh floor of the State Department, she said, "We don't want to wake up ten years from now and have all of us ask ourselves why in the world we made a mistake and didn't build that pipeline[Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan pipeline]."¹⁸

As a conclusion Turkey presently is 74% dependent on external resources, firstly endeavors to ensure its supply stability, and then strives to be an energy hub between the demanding and supplier countries/regions with both political/strategic and economic/financial motivations. In this regard, Turkey has been preparing very comprehensive and coordinated energy strategy with its institutions and decision-maker mechanisms.

¹⁷ Ülke Ariboğan and Mert Bilgin, "New Energy Order Politics Neopolitics: From Geopolitics to Energieopolitics," *Yeni Enerji Düzeni Siyaseti (Neopolitik): "Jeopolitik"ten "Enerjeopolitik"e*, 5, no. 20 (2008): 128.

¹⁸ Daniel Yergin, *The Quest : Energy, Security and the Remaking of the Modern World* (New York: Penguin Press, 2011), 60.

CHAPTER V

TURKEY-IRAN RELATIONS

OVERVIEW OF POLITICAL RELATIONS

As Bernard Lewis implies that “division tendency of humankind exists in its nature,”¹ historical and contemporary analyses on Turkey-Iran relations could perceive the two countries’ positions as different poles under the influence of ideological, ethnic, and religious differences, although sometimes rapprochements emerge in accordance with the positive conjunctures. The scholars from generally Islamic societies claim that the language, ethnicity, and race based differentiation in the Islamic countries has arisen as a legacy of the Western values’ influences.² In this sense their argument proposes that Turkey’s and Iran’s stances and/or socio-political orientations’ differentiation became more potential especially after World War I, since both countries followed the Westernization processes.³ Nevertheless, some other scholars endeavor to associate Iran’s and Turkey’s political evolution especially in the period between 1920s and the Iranian Islamic Revolution in 1979.⁴ In fact, according to Tezcur, Iran and Turkey still share similarities in terms of the Islamic political actors of both countries and their references.⁵ Tezcur portrays the evolution of Islamic actors in Turkey and Iran with three phases:

Phase I – 1970s – Early 1990s: Islamist with dubious democratic credentials
Transition Period I: Ideological and Behavioral Transition
Phase II – Early 1990s – Late 1990s: Muslim reformers committed to competitive and pluralistic political order

¹ Bernard Lewis, *The Shaping of the Modern Middle East* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1994), 71.

² Mohammed Ayoob, *The Many Faces of Political Islam : Religion and Politics in the Muslim World* (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 2008), 32.

³ Lewis, 89.

⁴ Nilufer Karacasulu and İrem Aşkar Karakir, "Iran-Turkey Relations in the 2000s: Pragmatic Rapprochement," *Ege Academic Review* 11, no. 1 (2011): 112.

⁵ Ayoob, 59.

Transition Period II: Muslim Reformers in Power
*Phase III – Early - to – Mid 2000s: Implications of Moderation*⁶

As a contribution to Tezcur's arguments to reveal Iran and Turkey's shared concepts, some scholars diligently explain the common notions⁷ of the Shiite and Sunni schools of thought that are often expressed as competing identities of Iran and Turkey.

In contrast to the positive assertions, mentioned above, another pole of the literature emphasizes differences between the two countries with their inspirations from realpolitik. Table 3 portrays the historical evolution of Iran-Turkey differentiation:

Table 3. The Historical Evolution of Iran and Turkey

	Legacy	Regime Type	Recent Political History	Economic Structure	Foreign Relations
Iran	Safavid-Shia	Islamist	Autocratic Rule	Regulated, Oil-based Rentier	Antagonism with the US
Turkey	Ottoman-Sunni	Secularist	Competitive Elections since 1950 Interrupted by Coups	Open, Liberalized /Privatized	NATO Member, EU Aspirant

Source: Günes Murat Tezcür, *Muslim Reformers in Iran and Turkey : The Paradox of Moderation* (Austin: University of Texas Press, 2010), 5.

The problematic areas, which are mentioned within the literature, between Iran and Turkey are analyzed in the following subsections.

⁶ Günes Murat Tezcür, *Muslim Reformers in Iran and Turkey : The Paradox of Moderation* (Austin: University of Texas Press, 2010), 4.

⁷ Tareq Y. Ismael, Jacqueline S. Ismael, and Shereen T. Ismael, *Government and Politics of the Contemporary Middle East : Continuity and Change* (London; New York: Routledge, 2011), 53-54.

Shiite Iran

When Western scholars analyze Iran-Turkey relations, they often mention Iran's Shiite identity as an issue against Turkey. However, it is very difficult to state that Iran's Shiite identity is considered as a religious threat by Turkey. Namely, Turkey's concerns are not from the Shiite identity of Iran, as a Sunni-dominated state. Rather than the religious rivalry of Shiite-Sunni sects, which underlies most of the disputes in the Middle East, Turkey's basic threat perception is Iran's potential to damage the democratic state and society structures of Turkey. Iran's aggressive fundamentalist impact is considered as a destructive social force against Turkey's diverse and democratic structure. This threat perception kept its presence in Turkey's regional considerations until the mid-1990s when some Islamic-referenced political parties began to hold political power and soften relations with Iran. In fact, until that time, as Kibaroglu and Caglar says, "Turkey also held Iran responsible for a series of assassinations that claimed the lives of a number of prominent secular intellectuals who had pointed out the dangers of the Iranian mullahs' designs on Turkey."⁸

Turkey as the Ally of the West

Turkey, since the republican revolution in 1923, has considered the modernization as a national objective and has taken the West as a model of modernization. This socio-political ground also demonstrated its impact on Turkey's security arrangements; after World War II Turkey, which is in the accession process into the European Union and a member state of NATO, has always followed common regional and international policies

⁸ Mustafa Kibaroglu and Baris Caglar, "Implications of a Nuclear Iran for Turkey," *Middle East Policy* 15, no. 4 (2008): 60.

with the West. Until the Islamic revolution, Iran was also following the same path with Turkey, but after the revolution, Iran has begun to fanatically criticize its neighbor. In fact, sometimes politicians and/or decision-makers have begun to refer aggressively and threaten Turkey in their discourses.

Dominance over Central Asia

After the disintegration of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the independence declarations of the Central Asian countries, because of their strategic importance, the regional actors have begun to be interested in the region as well as the major powers of international relations paid attention to those countries. The literature, especially during 1990s, had confidence to assume that Turkey and Iran are going to struggle to be more influential over the Central Asian republics,⁹ because Iran and Turkey have very important advantages with their language, religion and other cultural components. On the other hand, some scholars argued that Turkey and Iran are not going to compete ideologically¹⁰; the followers of this argument currently propose that Iran and Turkey do not engage in an influence competition; contrarily, both countries, with the well-calculated and pragmatic strategies, are going to try to strengthen their relations with those countries. Moreover, another parameter of the equation are other countries' involvements in the region; the global actors, which have interests in the region, intend to engage in the regional politics with the partnership of Turkey or Iran and they often manipulate and/or motivate Iran and Turkey towards their aims.¹¹ As an additional point,

⁹ G. Bahgat, "Central Asia and Energy Security," *Asian Affairs* 37, no. 1 (2006): 15.

¹⁰ Shireen Hunter, "Iran's Pragmatic Regional Policy," *Journal of International Affairs* 56, no. 2 (2003): 133.

¹¹ C. Christine Fair, "India and Iran: New Delhi's Balancing Act," *Washington Quarterly* 30, no. 3 (2007): 145.

the literature usually refers to the argument that both Iran and Turkey do not want to confront Russia, the country that is very influential actor of the region.

The Arab Spring and Turkey as an Emerging Regional Power

After the United States' Operation Iraqi Freedom in 2003, Iran and Turkey initiated some common policies to improve their relations with common security concerns, but the improving relations have begun to decline again with the Arab Spring; the term which is used for the revolutionary demonstrations, started in 2010, in the Arab countries such as Tunisia, Egypt, Libya and Yemen. Particularly, the Iranian authorities are concerned about Turkey's contemporary foreign policy orientations; they strongly criticize Turkey's decisions to give solid support to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization's initiatives and Turkey's secularism recommendation to Egypt, Tunisia, and Libya, and Turkey's current stance against the authoritarian regime of Syria. Alongside the Arab Spring, Iran has begun to consider Turkey as the most important obstacle against its regional strategies.¹² Iran, since 1979 and under the control of *Ayatollahs*, has been losing their attraction; however, Turkey, in recent years, with its domestic and external performance attracts the attention of the Middle Eastern countries, additionally *Turkey as a model for democratic transformation* rhetoric helps to understand Iran's concerns. In brief, one of the main reasons behind Iran's concerns is Turkey's increasing influence over the region.¹³ According to some policy-makers and scholars, Turkey's rapprochement with the countries in the region, which were formerly

¹² "Turkey-Iran," *Middle East Reporter (Weekly Edition)* 137, no. 1231 (2010): 9.

¹³ M. Ögütçü, "Turkey: A Major Regional Power to Engage or Confront Iran," *CEPMLP Internet Journal (Dundee)* 17, no. 2 (2007): 9.

perceived as potential threats by Turkey, means Iran's relative exclusion from the regional developments.

Iran's Nuclearization

Since 2005, Iran's nuclear program and international concerns have been one of the most important articles in Turkey's agenda. Turkey, firstly, has been the facilitator of diplomatic options and then the mediator between Iran and the Western countries for reaching a diplomatic resolution.¹⁴ Instead of being opposed to Iran's program, Turkey always keeps its official stance which encourages Iran to be transparent and handle international concerns. Turkey always considers Iran's right to have nuclear power for peaceful purposes. However, as it is often mentioned in the literature, Iran's nuclear weapon option always exists in Turkey's defense and security agenda; in fact, it could change Turkey's security strategies.¹⁵

Potential asymmetrical advantage of Iran could also force Turkey to consider different policy options, which could have a range from more improved strategic partnership with the West to having its own nuclearization program.¹⁶ Indeed, the latter is able to provoke other regional actors' reactions and a nuclear arms race. Iran's nuclear weapon possibility could damage rational, peaceful, and stable regional relations and policies.

¹⁴ Kadir Üstün, "Turkey's Iran Policy: Between Diplomacy and Sanctions," *Insight Turkey* 12, no. 3 (2010): 26.

¹⁵ Kibaroglu and Caglar: 60.

¹⁶ Tarik Oğuzlu, "Soft Power in Turkish Foreign Policy," *Australian Journal of International Affairs* 61, no. 1 (2007): 95.

IRAN AND ENERGY

In world politics, Iran has always been mentioned with its radical religious identity, state ideology and anti-Westernism; however Iran is a very influential energy actor with its proven energy resources reserve and its critically important location.¹⁷ While evaluating Iran's position, in addition to its territorial resources, most of the analyses indicate its geographical advantage in terms of the potentiality of the Caspian Basin.¹⁸ The analyses on Iran, in terms of energy politics, draw a very complex picture. In spite of the international actors' isolationist policies, Iran has been a deterministic component of the Asian and the European energy markets.¹⁹ Although Iran's radical policies could potentially destabilize the markets, both the Western countries and the most demanding Eastern countries, such as India and China²⁰, have always considered the Iranian resources as an essential option. However, the awareness of this situation enables Iran to benefit from the situation in global energy politics and its foreign affairs pragmatically. In fact, the Iranian policy-makers often mention their objectives to establish an alternative market system.²¹ Nevertheless, Iran's radical policy projections are often responded with the isolation decisions of international actors; therefore the country cannot completely benefit from its resources. Thus, Iran could only have certain partnerships and routes for marketing its resources. However, Iran and its particular partners sometimes confront disputes and/or their interests do not always overlap. For

¹⁷ Bezen Balamir Coşkun, "Global Energy Geopolitics and Iran," *Uluslararası İlişkiler* 5, no. 20 (2008): 192.

¹⁸ Anthony H. Cordesman, Strategic Center for, and Studies International, *Energy Developments in the Middle East* (Westport, Conn.: Praeger, 2004), 191.

¹⁹ Coşkun: 197.

²⁰ Carrie Liu Currier and Manochehr Dorraj, *China's Energy Relations with the Developing World* (New York: Continuum, 2011), 71.

²¹ Michael P. Croissant and Bülent Aras, *Oil and Geopolitics in the Caspian Sea Region* (Westport, Conn.: Praeger, 1999), 157.

instance, Russia and Iran sometimes act with coordinated strategies²² and other times face conflicts of interests.²³

According to the majority of the literature, the most perilous aspect of Iran's energy politics is the fact that the revenues of Iran's resources have become one of the biggest inputs of its national economy. The scholars' approaches for the situation could be demonstrated with two examples:

... In one view increase in oil incomes is a golden opportunity for our country and it makes progress performance of structural projects and lots of investment on Iran's economy, but management of these income sources is one of the most important challenges of the government. At the present, Iran's economy is based on oil incomes that called Mono-product economy, therefore each mutation - however it be little- will have significant effects on economic indexes of country.²⁴

Iran's economy and state budget are highly dependent on revenue from oil exports. Hydrocarbons account for over a fifth of Iran's GDP. Oil revenues make up approximately 80 percent of total export earnings and 40 to 50 percent of government revenue.²⁵

Namely, the energy concept is a multifaceted parameter for Iran. Although the energy consumer countries need the Iranian resources, the country is also very sensitive to its markets' existence. Since the increasing resource demand rates direct analysts to consider mostly the consumer countries' dependence, analysts and policy-makers often ignore the vulnerability of the provider countries. Nevertheless, in order to analyze Iran's potential influence over the world energy politics more strategically, Table 4, Table 5, Table 6, and Table 7, below, could help:

²² Coşkun: 187.

²³ Reza Simbar and Arsalan Ghorbani Sheikhneshin, "Iran and Russia: Strategic Energy Relationship," *Journal of US-China Public Administration* 8, no. 11 (2011): 1285-1286.

²⁴ Y. Mehnatfar, "Energy Security & the Economy of Iran," *Australian Journal of Basic and Applied Sciences* 4, no. 8 (2010): 197.

²⁵ Brenda Shaffer, *Energy Politics* (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2009), 149.

Table 4. Iran's Proved Oil Reserves

	At end 2000 Thousand million barrels	At end 2009 Thousand million barrels	At end 2010 Thousand million tones	Thousand million barrels	Share of total	R/P ratio
Total North America	68,9	74,6	10,3	74,3	5,4%	14,8
Total S. & Cent. America	97,9	237,6	34,3	239,4	17,3%	93,9
Total Europe & Eurasia	107,9	139,2	19,0	139,7	10,1%	21,7
Iran	99,5	137,0	18,8	137,0	9,9%	88,4
Total Middle East	696,7	752,6	101,8	752,5	54,4%	81,9
Total Africa	93,4	130,3	17,4	132,1	9,5%	35,8
Total Asia Pacific	40,1	42,2	6,0	45,2	3,3%	14,8

Source: BP Statistical Review of World Energy June 2011

Table 5. Iran's Oil Production

Thousand barrels daily	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010	Change 2010 over 2009	2010 share of total
Total North America	13696	13732	13616	13152	13474	13808	2,5%	16,6%
Total S. & Cent. America	6898	6865	6635	6676	6753	6989	3,5%	8,9%
Total Europe & Eurasia	17542	17599	17815	17590	17745	17661	-0,4%	21,8%
Iran	4234	4286	4322	4327	4199	4245	0,9%	5,2%
Total Middle East	25488	25675	25309	26338	24629	25188	1,7%	30,3%

Table 5. Continued

Thousand barrels daily	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010	Change	2010
							2009 over	share of total
Total Africa	9902	9918	10218	10204	9698	10098	4,2%	12,2%
Total Asia Pacific	7959	7940	7951	8054	7978	8350	4,9%	10,2%

Source: BP Statistical Review of World Energy June 2011

Table 6. Iran's Proved Natural Gas Reserves

	At end 1990	At end 2000	At end 2009	At end 2010		Share of total
	Trillion cubic meters	Trillion cubic meters	Trillion cubic meters	Trillion cubic feet	Trillion cubic meters	
Total North America	9,5	7,5	9,9	350,8	9,9	5,3%
Total S. & Cent. America	5,2	6,9	7,5	261,6	7,4	4,0%
Total Europe & Eurasia	54,5	55,9	63,0	2227,6	63,1	33,7%
Iran	17,0	26,0	29,6	1045,7	29,6	15,8%
Total Middle East	38,0	59,1	75,7	2677,0	75,8	40,5%
Total Africa	8,6	12,5	14,7	520,1	14,7	7,9%
Total Asia Pacific	9,9	12,3	15,8	571,8	16,2	8,7%

Source: BP Statistical Review of World Energy June 2011

Table 7. Iran's Natural Gas Production

Billion cubic meters	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010	Change	2010
							2009 over	share of total
Total North America	743,3	763,9	781,6	801,5	801,6	826,1	3,0%	26,0%

Table 7. Continued

Billion cubic meters	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010	Change 2010 over 2009	2010 share of total
Total S. & Cent. America	138,6	151,1	152,5	157,6	151,9	161,2	6,2%	5,0%
Total Europe & Eurasia	1038,0	1051,7	1053,2	1086,5	969,8	1043,1	7,6%	32,6%
Iran	103,5	108,6	111,9	116,3	131,2	138,5	5,6%	4,3%
Total Middle East	319,9	339,1	357,8	384,3	407,1	460,7	13,2%	14,4%
Total Africa	174,3	191,2	203,1	211,5	199,2	209,0	4,9%	6,5%
Total Asia Pacific	363,9	383,7	402,2	420,7	446,4	493,2	10,5%	15,4%

Source: BP Statistical Review of World Energy June 2011

After the demonstration of Iran's resource potential, as another obstacle of Iran's energy politics, the country's weak infrastructure ought to be emphasized. According to several reports from the institutions on energy, research indicates the country's infrastructure development needs. The country does not have enough refinery capacity for its oil reserves and pipelines for its natural gas reserves. This situation limits the country's profit from its resources and forces the country to establish regional and/or international partnerships in technology development. Table 8 demonstrates the country's oil refinery capacity:

Table 8. Iran's Oil Refinery Capacity

Thousand barrels daily *							2010	Share
	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010	2009 over	of total
Iran	1642	1727	1772	1805	1860	1860	-	2,0%
China	7165	7865	8399	8722	9479	10121	6,8%	11,0%
India	2558	2872	2983	2992	3574	3703	3,6%	4,0%
European Union	15811	15857	15784	15658	15553	15240	-2,0%	16,6%
Total World	86147	87427	88552	89446	91068	91791	0,8%	100,0%

Source: BP Statistical Review of World Energy June 2011

In addition to the refinery facilities necessity in oil, as mentioned, in terms of Iran's market security, Iran needs to enrich its route options. Iran, as the owner of the world's second largest natural gas reserves, has only two established pipelines and two proposed/planned pipeline projects:

- The Iran–Pakistan–India gas pipeline, also known as the IPI pipeline or the Peace pipeline, is a proposed 2,775-kilometre (1,724 mi) pipeline to deliver natural gas from Iran to Pakistan and India.
- The Iran–Armenia Gas Pipeline is a 140 km pipeline from Iran to Armenia.
- The Iran–Turkey pipeline is a 2,577 kilometers (1,601 mi) long natural gas pipeline, which runs from Tabriz in North-West Iran to Ankara in Turkey.
- The Nabucco pipeline is a planned natural gas pipeline that will transport natural gas from Turkey to Austria, via Bulgaria, Romania, and Hungary. It will run from Erzurum in Turkey to Baumgarten an der March, a major natural gas hub in Austria.²⁶

INTERDEPENDENCE

Iran and Turkey, since 17th century, have not engaged in a war and/or a direct conflict, but at the same time they have not shared cordial relations; it is reasonable to describe their relationship as cold peace. This relationship has always been adjusted under the effects of different determinants and could not reach stability. However, this

²⁶ "Oil Gas Directory, Gas Pipelines", OILGAS <http://www.oilgas.ir/> (accessed April 22 2012).

chapter intends to portray that from the relationship between both countries, an Interdependence concept is emerging in terms of Energy Security, although both countries still face certain problematic issues. As Turkey's energy strategy is analyzed comprehensively in Chapter IV, Turkey desires to assure its supply stability and keep its geopolitical location's importance and in order to reach its both aims it needs to find different resource options and be able to transfer energy resources. Therefore, Turkey needs cooperation with its resourceful neighbor regions and countries. In this sense, cooperation with Iran, which has a very significant resource potential, is crucially important for Turkey. The short statement, from the Republic of Turkey's Ministry of Foreign Affairs, on Iran-Turkey Economic relations is mentioned below; it demonstrates the significance of energy resources in the trade between Turkey and Iran:

... Substantial growth in bilateral relations particularly in the sectors of commerce and tourism has been recorded in recent years. The bilateral trade volume between the two countries increased tenfold from 1.2 billion Dollars in 2001 to 10.6 billion Dollars in 2010. 90% of Turkey's imports from Iran is composed of petroleum, natural gas and its derivatives. Turkey's main exports to Iran are industrial machines and equipments, textiles, iron-steel products, motor vehicles and furniture.²⁷

Additionally, when the Iranian side is focused, although the Asian markets, which are being led by especially China and India, could satisfy Iran's market concerns, in terms of the market reliability Iran needs to assure the existence and diversity of its customers. Otherwise, an economic and/or political dispute in the certain markets which Iran could face in the future, could risk one of the Iranian economy's biggest inputs, the energy resources revenues, and could negatively impact the country's domestic politics and destabilize the socio-economic structure.

²⁷ "Turkey-Iran Relations", Republic of Turkey Ministry of Foreign Affairs <http://www.mfa.gov.tr/turkey-iran-relations.en.mfa> (accessed 14th of April 2012).

At this point, as it is the scholarly quest of this study, the emerging Interdependence between Iran and Turkey needs to be analyzed. In Chapter I, several different approaches, from the literature, on Interdependence concept are examined comprehensively; as they are mentioned before, the literature mostly focuses on the nature of interdependence and its consequences. In this regard, this study clarifies its stance towards the description and the consequences of Interdependence. In terms of the relations between Iran and Turkey, this study argues that Interdependence concept is not established on equally mutual benefits. The benefits could be differentiated according to political and economic conjuncture; in addition, vulnerability and sensitivity notions, which are emphasized by Keohane and Nye, could also differ in terms of national, regional and global trends. Furthermore, one of the most controversial debates on Interdependence, which questions the results of Interdependence as conflict or cooperation, could be answered as *cooperation* in the light of the relations between Iran and Turkey, since both countries always avoid conflicts in their relations despite the potentially severe issues.

Furthermore, as the major intention of this study is using Keohane and Nye's *Complex Interdependence* concept as a characterization of Turkey's international relations in terms of Energy Security, at this point three characteristics of Complex Interdependence, "*Multiple channels of contact among societies, Lack of clear hierarchies of issues, Irrelevance of military force*" are used to describe the relations between Iran and Turkey in terms of Energy Security. In terms of the first characteristic, this study argues that the energy resources trade between Iran and Turkey establishes an alternative channel of contact, which is not engaged with the military power usage option

of international relations. In terms of the second characteristic, despite the political disputes Energy Security connects both countries and this situation demonstrates the absence of hierarchical structure in the relations. Finally, in terms of third characteristic, it is arguable that the relations between two countries in terms of Energy Security are not related to any sort of military force.

CHAPTER VI

TURKEY-EUROPEAN UNION RELATIONS

OVERVIEW OF POLITICAL RELATIONS

Since the collapse of Ottoman Empire, the independence war and the republican revolution, Turkey has been following a modernization path by modeling the West.¹ It stood for the Western values as a part of the Western bloc and a member state of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization in the Cold War era. Today, Turkey is the only secular democracy in the Muslim world and the only representative of the European Union's normative values in the Islamic sphere. In this sense, the history of Turkey-European Union relations, a fifty-year old process, could be considered very significant. As a summary of this process, the beginning point of Turkey-European Union relations was Turkey's accession application to the *European Economic Community* in 1959, and that application gained *de jure* status with the *Ankara Agreement* in 1964; however the relations have always drawn a chaotic tableau² because of Turkey's domestic politics and international political orientations. Turkey, which has achieved the *candidate* status, and the European Union still suffer from certain problematic issues and the integration progresses very gradually. In addition to the issues which are related to Turkey's domestic organs and mechanisms, the cold peace with *Greece* and *Armenia* and deficiency of solid recovery in the *Cyprus* issue since 1974 could be indicated as the context of problematic areas in Turkey-European Union relations. Moreover, different

¹ Esra LaGro and Knud Erik Jørgensen, *Turkey and the European Union : Prospects for a Difficult Encounter* (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2007), 185.

² Armagan Emre Çakir, *Fifty Years of Eu-Turkey Relations : A Sisyphian Story* (London; New York: Routledge, 2011), 67.

actors often bring different dimensions to the relations. Tocci draws a table on the stakeholders and their perspectives on Turkey-European Union relations:

Table 9. Stakeholders and Perceptions

Stakeholders	Debates	Positions
State Institutions	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - European foreign policy - Turkey's reforms 	Conditionally in favour
Political parties	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Identity and borders - Turkey's reform and democracy - Foreign Policy - National Security - [European Union] Institutions - Immigration 	Varied
Business	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - The [European Union] in the global economy 	Strongly in favour
Unions, Professional Associations and Civil Society	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Turkey's reform and labour rights - The [European Union]'s multicultural identity - Foreign policy, energy and the global economy 	Conditionally favourable to strongly in favour
Churches	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Turkey reforms and the rights of the Christian minorities - [European Union] identity and Christianity 	Resolutely against to conditionally in favour
Media	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Identity and culture - Immigration 	Skeptical or against
Diaspora communities	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Turkey's reforms - Armenia and the Armenian Genocide - Immigration - [European Union] Identity 	Resolutely against to conditionally in favour

Source: Nathalie Tocci, "Elite Opinion Dimension: Behind the Scenes of Turkey's Protracted Accession Process: European Elite Debates," in *Fifty Years of EU-Turkey Relations: A Sisyphean Story*, ed. Armağan Emre Çakır (London; New York: Routledge, 2011), 96.

In spite of this negative composition, the accession process still is one of the most essential determinants of Turkey's developing international relations. Turkish foreign policy has experienced very significant transformations in the last decade and the fundamental dynamics of those transformations have differentiated according to Turkey's geopolitical and conceptual relations. In this regard, there is a very significant debate in the literature on whether Turkey's transformation process is heading towards *Middle Easternization* and/or *Islamization*.³ However, this study argues that Turkey diligently keeps its *Europeanization*⁴ objective in its both domestic and external transitions. As contributing the argument, Terzi mentions, "[Current Turkish] government has been comparatively much more proactive than previous governments in pursuing ambitious foreign policy goals, ranging from the search for a solution in the Cyprus dispute to framing of a new relationship with Armenia."⁵ Furthermore, in the last decade, it could be claimed that Turkey acts with the highest momentum in the way of harmonization with the European Union's normative values and for the accession to the European Union. Today, in Turkey's political arena, *democratization, re-positioning the military mission, respect to the human rights, and rule of common law* have become the most emphasized concepts. However, it is not possible to ignore the fact that certain member states of the European Union are still skeptical towards Turkey's civil or political identity.⁶

³ Ronald Haly Linden, *Turkey and Its Neighbors : Foreign Relations in Transition* (Boulder, Colo.: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2012), 3.

⁴ Z. Öniş and Ş. Yılmaz, "Between Europeanization and Euroasianism: Foreign Policy Activism in Turkey During the Akp Era," *Turkish Studies* 10, no. 1 (2009): 20.

⁵ Özlem Terzi, *The Influence of the European Union on Turkish Foreign Policy* (Farnham, Surrey, England; Burlington, VT: Ashgate, 2010), 135.

⁶ Joseph S. Joseph, *Turkey and the European Union : Internal Dynamics and External Challenges* (Basingstoke [England]; New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2006), 8.

EUROPEAN UNION AND ENERGY

The European Union, the *sui generis* model of international relations with its *supra-national* structure, has always coped with different difficulties at every stage of the integration process, and always strived to construct joint policy prescriptions against problems. Presently, the European Union is focused on bringing structural solutions for the financial depression; yet the solution process could be sustained by, as a fundamental macro-economic assumption, production-consumption stability and reliable competition conditions. In this regard, the literature often argues that the energy resources, as the European Union's production sectors' generator, are critically important.

The European Union has always kept the energy security paradigm in its agenda as a strategic priority.⁷ Additionally, in its future projections the European Union always analyzes the issue comprehensively.⁸ However, presently the European Union has to confront a more complex energy tableau. The internal paradoxes of the European Union and the resource provider geographies' political developments force the organization to reevaluate its equations and parameters.

Decoding the energy equations of the European Union, with the remarkable statements from the advisory and official documents, will enrich the structure of this chapter;

- *Europe's energy infrastructure is the central nervous system of the economy.*⁹
- *Adequate, integrated and reliable energy networks are a crucial prerequisite not only for [the European Union] energy policy goals, but also for the [European Union]'s economic strategy.*¹⁰

⁷ Femke Hoogeveen and Wilbur Perlot, "The Eu's Policies of Security of Energy Supply Towards the Middle East and Caspian Region: Major Power Politics?," *Perspectives on Global Development & Technology* 6, no. 1-3 (2007): 486; Khazar Ibrahim, "Energy Security: A New Buzzword for Europe," *Turkish Policy Quarterly* 6, no. 3 (2007): 94.

⁸ Mehmet Efe Biresselioglu, *European Energy Security : Turkey's Future Role and Impact* (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2011), 31.

⁹ "Energy Infrastructure Priorities for 2020 and Beyond – a Blueprint for an Integrated European Energy Network," ed. European Commission (Brussels: 2010), 4.

Currently, the European Union is experiencing one of the most destructive financial crises of its history. The crisis has reached the point at which it could damage the integration process of the Europe. Therefore, the scholars and the policy-makers ought to focus on solution policies, which ought to surpass the short-term structural measures. This study argues that the long-term solution could be dynamizing the production sector's components and the components mostly rely on the energy resources' *availability, reliability, affordability and sustainability*. Furthermore, when the individual level energy consumption and demand becomes inserted to the current composition, the energy's deterministic role will be more understandable.

- *World energy demand is on the rise.*¹¹

Another fundamental dimension of the world energy politics is that, as it is mentioned in Chapter III, the new markets are emerging and their demand is rising steadily. Despite the fact that after North America, Europe is the second biggest energy market in the world, Asian countries, with their developing economies, especially China and India force the European Union to take action immediately and in terms of certain options they are creating very severe competition.

- *The [European Union] produces 48% of its energy needs.*¹²
- *[The European Union] dependency on imports is increasing for all fossil fuels.*¹³
- *Energy Dependency strongly differs among member states; Denmark is the only net energy exporter while Malta is entirely dependent on energy imports.*¹⁴

¹⁰ Ibid.

¹¹ "Market Observatory for Energy, Key Figures, June 2011," ed. European Commission Directorate-General for Energy (2011), 3.

¹² Ibid., 5.

¹³ Ibid., 6.

¹⁴ Ibid., 8.

These statements obviously indicate that the European Union is significantly dependent on the external resources and its dependence is increasing, although the dependence varies with the states' conditions. In this sense, the European Union has potentiality to face a strategic turmoil and the European Union could experience a deficiency in generating well-calculated and stable policies with this potentiality.

The statistical data on the European Union's current energy composition, Table 10, Table 11, and Table 12, demonstrates the situation's critical state;

Table 10. Oil Consumption of the European Union

Million tones	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010	Change 2010 over 2009	2010 share of total
Total North America	1131,0	1120,9	1124,7	1070,0	1018,8	1039,7	2,1%	25,8%
Total S. & Cent. America	239,9	246,0	261,5	271,4	268,6	282,0	5,0%	7,0%
Total Middle East	288,5	302,3	314,1	334,9	344,3	360,2	4,6%	8,9%
Total Africa	134,5	133,7	140,8	146,8	150,9	155,5	3,0%	3,9%
Total Asia Pacific	1144,5	1163,5	1201,9	1201,9	1203,8	1267,8	5,3%	31,5%
European Union	723,1	724,6	708,4	709,0	670,2	662,5	-1,1%	16,4%

Source: BP Statistical Review of World Energy June 2011

Table 11. Natural Gas Consumption of the European Union

Billion cubic feet per day	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010	Change 2010 over 2009	2010 share of total
Total North America	75,0	74,7	78,6	79,2	78,1	81,9	4,7%	26,9%

Table 11. Continued

Billion cubic feet per day	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010	Change	
							2010 over 2009	2010 share of total
Total S. & Cent. America	11,9	13,1	13,0	13,6	13,1	14,3	9,3%	4,7%
Total Middle East	27,0	28,2	29,3	32,0	33,3	35,4	6,2%	11,5%
Total Africa	8,0	8,5	9,1	9,7	9,6	10,2	6,1%	3,3%
Total Asia Pacific	38,6	41,2	44,5	46,7	48,8	54,9	12,6%	17,9%
European Union	47,8	47,1	46,6	47,3	44,4	47,7	7,4%	15,5%

Source: BP Statistical Review of World Energy June 2011

Table 12. Energy Dependency Rate of the European Union (% of Net Imports)

	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009
All products	52,5	53,7	53,0	54,7	53,9
Solid fuels	39,3	41,0	41,3	44,7	41,1
Crude oil	82,4	83,9	83,6	85,0	84,1
Natural gas	57,7	60,8	60,3	62,3	64,2

Source: Eurostat

After this entire data set, this study demonstrates the comprehensive and strategic planning of the European Union on energy in order to evaluate the European Union's strategic approach to the energy security issue; this planning contains a broad range from the domestic infrastructure to the international policies;

The New Energy Strategy Priorities

- I. Achieving an energy efficient Europe;
 - Tapping into the biggest energy-saving potential — buildings and transport
 - Reinforcing industrial competitiveness by making industry more efficient
 - Reinforcing efficiency in energy supply
 - Making the most of National Energy Efficiency Action Plans
- II. Building a truly pan-European integrated energy market;
 - Timely and accurate implementation of the internal market legislation
 - Establishing a blueprint of the European infrastructure for 2020-2030

- Streamlining permit procedures and market rules for infrastructure developments
- Providing the right financing framework
- III. Empowering consumers and achieving the highest level of safety and security;
 - Making energy policy more consumer-friendly
 - Continuous improvement in safety and security
- IV. Extending Europe's leadership in energy technology and innovation;
 - Implementing the SET [Strategic Energy Technology] Plan without delay
 - The Commission will be launching four new large-scale European projects
 - Ensuring long-term [European Union] technological competitiveness
- V. Strengthening the external dimension of the [European Union] energy market.
 - Integrating energy markets and regulatory frameworks with our neighbors
 - Establishing privileged partnerships with key partners
 - Promoting the global role of the [European Union] for a future of low-carbon energy
 - Promoting legally binding nuclear-safety, security and non-proliferation standards worldwide¹⁵

As a contribution to the broad-based strategy, above, one of the developing regulations should be mentioned. The European Union establishes a solid basis at the bureaucratic level to enhance its strategic vision on the energy security issue and the issue's external dimensions:

The External Energy Policy Priorities

- I. Building up the external dimension of the European Union external energy market
 - Coordination in the internal market: enhancing the influence of the European Union and Member States
 - Network integration: diversification of supply sources and routes
 - Market integration with neighbouring states: a comprehensive but differentiated approach
 - European Union-Russia energy dialogue: from partnership to integration
- II. Strengthening partnerships for secure, safe, sustainable and competitive energy
 - Partnerships with energy suppliers

¹⁵ "Energy 2020: A Strategy for Competitive, Sustainable and Secure Energy," ed. European Commission (Brussels: 2010).

- Partnerships with industrialised and fast growing economies
 - A stable and predictable framework for trade and investment
 - Promoting the highest safety, security and environmental standards globally
- III. Improving access to sustainable energy for developing countries
- IV. Better promoting European Union policies beyond its borders
- A strategic approach to energy partnerships
 - Improving coordination among Member States
 - Optimising the European Union's external assistance in the energy sector¹⁶

INTERDEPENDENCE

European Union's Position

As it is illustrated within this chapter, the European Union is significantly dependent on the external energy resources and the dependence is increasing. Although new innovations and improvements have been occurring in the renewable energy technologies, the fossil fuels continue to be the major energy resources in the 21st century. Therefore, the European Union has to act very cautiously and comprehensively towards assuring its energy security. Currently another issue facing the European Union is the contradiction of the energy provider countries' political structures and the European Union's normative mission. The undemocratic developments in the resource provider countries create a paradox for the European Union and its member states. This situation has arisen from the European Union's dependence on the particular sources¹⁷, and this dependence could make the European Union more vulnerable and prevents advocating

¹⁶ "On Security of Energy Supply and International Cooperation - "the Eu Energy Policy: Engaging with Partners Beyond Our Borders", in *COM(2011) 539 final*, ed. European Commission (Brussels: 2011).

¹⁷ Ali Tekin and Paul A. Williams, "Turkey and Eu Energy Security: The Pipeline Connection," *East European Quarterly* 42, no. 4 (2008): 421.

the European values. In this regard, diversifying the energy options is vitally important for the European Union.¹⁸

The Energy Security issue bears two dimensions according to the European Union's situation; as Youngs emphasizes that "the pursuit of energy security could either strengthen or weaken cooperation between European governments."¹⁹ The European Union, as an integrated construction, is the second biggest energy market of the world and it could be very influential in the world energy politics, if it acts as a united international actor. Otherwise, individual strategies could only strengthen the vulnerability. As it is witnessed in several crises, any sort of turmoil in the provider countries could lead the European Union to a harmful difficulty and/or any sort of price fluctuation due to a conflict in the resource-rich geography could damage the European economy, which is currently in chaos.

Turkey's Position

Turkey has been in a very impressive transition process in the last decade and has become a regionally and internationally influential actor. Turkey demonstrates that the geopolitics is still a very important aspect of international politics. Turkey, which is surrounded by the Caucasus, the Middle East, the Black Sea Basin, and the Balkans, endeavors to solve its domestic issues, while developing its relations with regional actors by implementing a proactive foreign policy.

¹⁸ Bezen Balamir Coşkun, "Global Energy Geopolitics and Iran," *Uluslararası İlişkiler* 5, no. 20 (2008): 189; Yonca Özer, "Eu Energy Security and the Role of Turkey," *Turkish Review of Eurasian Studies* 7, (2007): 115.

¹⁹ Richard Youngs, *Energy Security : Europe's New Foreign Policy Challenge* (London; New York: Routledge, 2009), 3.

After describing Turkey's position, as it is examined in Chapter IV, Turkey's energy strategy has two major aims, assuring its supply stability and maximizing the advantages of its geopolitical location. Today, Turkey, with the completed and projected pipelines, claims to be an energy terminal country. This situation could strengthen Turkey's regional and international impact as well as contributing to the Turkish economy. Therefore, Turkey desires to transfer the oil and natural gas, which is going to be acquired from the most resource-rich regions of the world, to the global markets, especially the European market.²⁰ The importance of Turkey's neighbor regions in the European energy composition is demonstrated below:

Table 13. The Supplier Regions of the Europe

Million tones	
From	To Europe
US	17,1
Canada	1,3
Mexico	6,8
S. & Cent. America	16,0
Former Soviet Union	295,2
Middle East	116,7
North Africa	83,0
West Africa	45,7
East & Southern Africa	0,1
Australasia	†
China	0,7
India	8,2
Japan	0,9
Singapore	1,7
Other Asia Pacific	3,3
Total imports	596,8

Source: BP Statistical Review of World Energy June 2011

²⁰ Nursin Atesoglu Güney, *Contentious Issues of Security and the Future of Turkey* (Aldershot, England; Burlington, VT: Ashgate, 2007), 147.

Succeeding in this objective is both an energy and foreign policy goal for Turkey.

Turkey's other argument, which is feeding its motivation, is that potential connection of the both sides through Turkey could make the country a critical actor.

Emergence of Interdependence

As the same scholarly quest is examined with Turkey-Iran relations in Chapter V, this chapter also endeavors to analyze the emerging interdependence between the European Union and Turkey. In parallel with the Turkey-Iran relations, the relationship between the European Union and Turkey helps this study to demonstrate its stance about the debates on interdependence concept within the literature. The analysis of the energy security quests of both the European Union and Turkey leads this study to recognize the nature and the consequences of interdependence. The existing interdependence between both actors substantiates *cooperation* despite the problematic subjects; however the geopolitical, economic and strategic variables prevent equally mutual and/or symmetrical benefits or costs of interdependence.

As the same implementation is examined in Chapter V, in the light of this study's main objective, which benefits from Keohane and Nye's *Complex Interdependence* concept as a characterization of Turkey's international relations in terms of energy security, this chapter's conclusion examines three characteristics of *Complex Interdependence*, "*Multiple channels of contact among societies, Lack of clear hierarchies of issues, Irrelevance of military force,*" in terms of the relationship between the European Union and Turkey. The characteristics of *Complex Interdependence* could be implemented with three descriptions of the relations:

- I. The European Union's major pursuit of diversification of energy resources supply options/routes, and Turkey's secondary aim of maximizing the importance of its geographical location, bring two actors closer and establish a channel of contact.
- II. The critically important political disputes in the relations, which are described in the previous subsections, are not able to prevent the coordinated and integrated projects between the European Union and Turkey, thus this situation could be evaluated as the absence of the hierarchy of issues.
- III. Although the Energy Security concept includes the security term, the relations in terms of the Energy Security is constructed without the components, which are directly related to military force and/or power.

CHAPTER VII

CONCLUSION

In a world of complex relationships, it is significantly important to understand the foreign policy settings of different actors and the subsequent reasons to follow such a policy. This thesis suggests that Turkey follows a multifaceted approach in its regional and global relations because of the particular geopolitical nature of Turkey in the modern world order. Many observers of Turkish foreign policy over the past decade assess a shift has occurred in Turkey's neighboring relationships. This thesis opposes such perspectives which are stating that Turkey shifts toward the East or turns away from the West and argues that Turkey follows a balanced approach in its international relations, which are characterized by the *Complex Interdependence* concept. On the basis of this interdependent relationship; it is unproductive and misleading to position Turkey in one axis or the other.

This thesis argues for the need to incorporate a sound understanding of *Energy Security* derived of *Interdependence* thinking in analysis of Turkish relations with Iran as well as the European Union in terms of energy politics. The main findings stress complex relationships explain these balanced/multifaceted cooperative engagements in Turkish foreign policy and have not resulted in conflictual conjunctures among its neighbors, as shown in the case studies.

To develop this argument, this thesis begins with a comprehensive analysis of the literature on the *Interdependence* concept, the *Energy Security* issue, and Turkey's, Iran's, and the European Union's positions in terms of the energy politics. In the first two

chapters the literature on the *Interdependence* concept and the *Energy Security* issue are reviewed. In this quest, the main research question is described as “*How does energy security impact Turkey’s international relations?*” The main conclusion from this question is that Turkey’s international relations with different actors arising from the *Energy Security* vulnerabilities establish multidimensional engagements, characterized as *Complex Interdependence*. In the bigger picture, this thesis implicitly reflects upon the debate on whether Turkey shifts axis or not. The main concluding contributions to this debate are as follows:

- Turkey has not made a paradigm shift in its international relations. Rather, Turkey follows a pragmatic and rational foreign policy, and *Energy Security* is a significant foreign policy determinant. Scholars that argue Turkey has shifted to the East disregard the multifaceted nature of its contemporary foreign policy.
- This thesis also reveals mutual dependences between Turkey, Iran, and the European Union, with different vulnerabilities. The vulnerabilities stressed for Iran are the necessity to diversify its market options and find international partners to develop its technological infrastructure. For the European Union, these vulnerabilities are to find different energy routes and energy resources as there is competition from the emerging actors and the dependence on particular options prevent the European Union from advocating its normative values. Finally, Turkey must ensure the energy resources supply stability and the benefits of its geography to become a key transit country on energy routes.

- In particular, Turkey needs supply stability because it is 74% dependent on external energy resources. Additionally, Turkey needs to maximize the strategic benefits of its geographical location since it aims to be a key actor in the region. In accordance with these geopolitical goals, Turkey initiates a number of pipeline projects.
- Due to the vulnerabilities and necessities of the three actors, these relationships should be characterized as *Complex Interdependence*. Endorsing this characterization are three characteristics of *Complex Interdependence*. Moreover, as these actors continuously encounter each other, it is expected that they will engage in cooperative engagements rather than conflict.

With regards to recommendations for future works, this thesis suggests to research:

- To what extent interdependence provides cooperative engagements in Turkey's international relations in terms of energy security? Since within this thesis the interdependence between actors is concluded as cooperative engagements, it needs to be extensively questioned how potential imbalance in vulnerabilities could influence the consequences of the interdependence.
- How could the risks and insecurity of Turkey's pipeline projects be assessed? This thesis's major arguments are basically realized by the pipeline projects which are from the Eastern and Southern neighbors of Turkey to the Western markets. However, certain security issues in Turkey

and its periphery such as terrorism, ethnic and religious disputes, and border issues could threaten the stability of infrastructure projects.

Therefore risk assessments of the completed and planned pipeline projects could enrich the literature.

- To what extent the normative mission that comes from the historical legacy of Turkey has an impact on Turkish foreign policy? This thesis essentially argues that Turkey follows a rational and pragmatic foreign policy according to its needs and opportunities, however a number of studies in the contemporary literature have begun to refer Turkey's motivations as arisen from its historical legacy. Thus, the comparison of Turkey's rational orientations and its sensitivity to its historical legacy could provide important insights for the literature on Turkish foreign policy.

Contemporary Turkish foreign policy is evaluated by a number of scholars and analysts by referring different testimonials, and some analyses often emphasize the concerns for Turkey's transformation. However, as this thesis comprehensively reviews the literature on the *Interdependence* concept, the *Energy Security* issue, the energy politics of three actors, Turkey, Iran, and the European Union, there are rationally deterministic factors in both regional and global affairs. In line with the deterministic factors in international relations, Turkey has begun to reconsider its position in order to both meet its needs and maximize the benefits from its possessions. As a conclusion, the current coordinator of the Republic of Turkey Prime Ministry Public Diplomacy Office says:

The rapid transformation of Turkey's internal and external dynamics manifests itself in a wide range of fields and presents new risks and opportunities. Reconnecting with its history and geography, Turkey ascribes strategic value to time and place in a globalized world, and is leaving behind the one-dimensional and reductionist perspectives of the Cold War era.¹

¹ Ibrahim Kalin, "Soft Power and Public Diplomacy in Turkey," *Perceptions: Journal of International Affairs* 16, no. 3 (2011).

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VITA

Mustafa Kemal Dagdelen
Graduate Program in International Studies, Old Dominion University
7045 Batten Arts and Letters, Norfolk, Virginia, 23529

2009, Gazi University, Turkey, Bachelor of Arts in International Relations

2010, The University of Kansas, Language Certificate in English

Mustafa Kemal Dagdelen is an M.A. candidate as a Fulbright Scholarship grantee from Turkey. He has been studying international/regional conflicts, energy politics and foreign policy orientations of developing countries. He knows Turkish as a native language, and also he is fluent in English.

He has many publications and TV, radio broadcast experiences on his study area. During his undergraduate education, he worked at several NGOs in Turkey. In those positions, he focused on the Developing Countries' political structures, domestic and foreign policies. He went to Iraq as an international elections observer in 2009. During his education in the United States, he has gained significant experiences at both governmental and nongovernmental institutions.